

THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM

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NIKO PYRHÖNEN

# THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM

Consolidation of Neo-Populist Advocacy as a Resonant Collective Identity through Mobilization of Exclusionary Narratives of Blue-and-White Solidarity



Department of Social Research  
University of Helsinki

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of Blue-and-White Solidarity

NIKO PYRHÖNEN

**ACADEMIC DISSERTATION**

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The True Colors  
of Finnish Welfare Nationalism:  
Consolidation of Neo-Populist Advocacy  
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of Blue-and-White Solidarity

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## Foreword and acknowledgements

Like most of the Finns I know of, I also have developed a strong emotional and symbolic attachment to the Finnish welfare state since my childhood. Working intensively with my PhD project over the past five years, I have begun to appreciate how important a role this attachment has played from the very beginning. In addition to directing my research aims and interests related to right-wing populist advocacy, I have been motivated by strong sense that I am exploring a pertinent and ubiquitous facet of a Finnish self-understanding on national solidarity and collective identity.

My own earliest distinct memory of taking pride in my home country dates back to January 1990, when I experienced this pride being humiliatingly challenged by the United States Border Protection in Miami Airport. Our family was coming home to Fort Lauderdale from Finland, where we had spent the Christmas holidays with our relatives. Two officers took our family into a small room, where they posed my parents a seemingly unending series of questions that I could not decipher with my six-year-old's command of English. The tones of voices and the setting made it obvious, though, that my parents were being questioned, that their answers were being challenged and that my parents were gradually growing nervous.

Once inside the comfortable cushioning of the airport taxi, I asked my parents what the men wanted to know. (Later on, I found out that the officials were puzzled as to why we went to Finland just before our six-month visa expired, stayed there for two weeks, and came back with another six-month visa.) My parents saved me from

the institutional minutia, and told that the men wanted to make sure that we would not try to stay in the United States for good. First I was flabbergasted, but then just angry and indignant. Why on earth would we – coming from Finland of all places – want to escape to the United States? I had been told by everyone, including my grandfather, a veteran of the Winter War, that being born in Finland is comparable to winning the jackpot in a lottery, “because we’ve got everything so good here.” Considering that, from my point of view, every sane and logical person would rather be born in Finland than anywhere else, the behavior of the border control officials appeared totally idiotic. I quickly came to the conclusion that the only plausible reason they would want to ask the question for is that they were envious of us for hailing from the best place of the world to live in. To mitigate their sense of inferiority, they would seek to cast a shadow of doubt against a crystal clear fact, suggesting that perhaps not everybody would prefer Finland to United States.

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I think this anecdote crystallizes how great many native Finns have grown, ever since childhood, to relate to their country of origin. This is – as I have come to believe during my five years of PhD research – to grow to relate to it essentially as a welfare nation, the exemplary individual among countries in terms of how well its population’s needs are met. This public perception of the Finns being united by the common purpose that can keep Finland a country where it is a privilege to live in has been gradually met with a growing sense of disillusionment in the wake of the economic crises of the early 1990s and the late 2000s. The narrative emphasizing the role of the Finnish welfare state as a source of national pride began to be undermined by a collective sense of its fragility in the face of range of abstract external and internal threats, such as globalization and the erosion of national solidarity.

One of the primary endeavors behind my PhD project has been to illustrate how this experienced fragility of the welfare state as the symbol of national pride has been harnessed by the neo-populist advocates in the 2000s. In the heart of the right-wing populist championing for the welfare nationalism, there was a narrative of

looming disentanglement to the Finnish birthright that presents the Finns with the threat of losing their “fair share” in a nation state that used to be able to sort all kinds of things out for its citizens.

In the most abstract sense, there is nothing new or surprising in the fear of an uncertain future. This is particularly true after decades of relative prosperity that has framed the conception of normalcy and generated expectations of continuity for a whole generation of Finns in their childhood and adolescence. Nevertheless, for me it has been striking to witness the certainty with which the scapegoats for this uncertainty have commonly been identified by neo-populist advocates in Finland during the 2000s. Sometimes the scapegoats are seen in concrete groups of people, such as immigrants, national minorities, homosexuals or post-modern artists. At other times the blame is placed on reified abstractions, such as “multiculturalism” or the distanced elites in politics and the media. Regardless of who the scapegoats are, they are considered to be responsible for undermining what the “good old Finland” used to be, either in terms of culture, in terms of material redistribution of welfare or a peculiar mixture of both, as is the case in welfare nationalist public narratives.

When I started this PhD project late in 2010, I focused on how the welfare state and immigration policy were debated on the high political arena. Already at that point I was intrigued by the saliency with which the neo-populist “immigration critical” political agenda was covered in the mainstream media. Writing this in September 2015, it appears evident that this was only beginning; this summer hardly a day has passed without neo-populists featuring in the headlines. Such a strong ongoing media presence – from tabloid scandals to serious political journalism – underlines chameleonic character through which neo-populist advocates are reaching a wide range of potential constituencies. Even with four years passed since the electoral breakthrough of Perussuomalaiset in 2011, new manifestations of neo-populist narratives continue to resonate among the online-based dot.net-generation, the precarious working class net-losers of globalization and the middle class taxpayers.

More recently, the neo-populist catch-all strategy has become more pronounced. While embracing realpolitik sensibilities in the government by abandoning their promise to oppose new bailout

loans for Greece, the Perussuomalaiset leadership has also shied away from renouncing the neo-Nazi sympathies and contacts among some of their MPs. By meeting public criticism from the subject positions of the underdog and the pariah both in the high political grassroots level arenas, neo-populists are advancing on the very same trajectory I illustrate in this study. As the Finnish neo-populists continue moving further away from any concrete endeavors for realizing welfare nationalist policies – instead focusing on nurturing a victimized collective identity among an increasingly heterogeneous constituency – I realize that the results and the analytical narrative presented in this study could hardly have been published at a more critical juncture.

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I could not have finished this PhD project without the enduring support – analytical, emotional and material – from which I feel a sense of immense gratitude towards my parents and a great number of friends and colleagues. Even before writing the first draft of my doctoral research proposal in 2010, I was taken by the certainty with which people at the Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations and Nationalism (CEREN) wanted me to establish and share an academic home at the Swedish School of Social Science.

Writing, collaborating and brainstorming on a daily basis in EU-ROSPHERE and Academy of Finland projects together with three CEREN junior researchers – Peter Holley, Karin Creutz and Marjukka Weide – each encouraged me in an intimately personal style. Peter shared his precious time in reading any and all of my papers, always keen on helping me to develop my fledgling ideas into valuable discoveries, while Marjukka's rigorous approach to doing science reined some of my wildest ideas into methodologically feasible pursuits. Karin – typically entering my office in the wee hours like a hurricane – turned several “wasted days” into hectic sessions where literally half an article was written in one go. Each of them facilitated several life-changing transitions; from student to researcher, from theory obsessed political scientist to empirical sociologist, from colleague to personal friend.

I am grateful of the four year period from 2011 to 2015, during

which I was able to freely pursue my research funded by the Kone foundation. Leading CEREN before taking up the directorship at the Institute of Migration, Tuomas Martikainen's door was always open for me to get advice and to be pushed forward in a gentle and determined way. I was also lucky to always have wonderful colleagues in neighboring offices for all imaginable purposes. Whether needed a respite from my chaotic research cave or advice in navigating through the vast bureaucratic expanses, Heidi Aaltonen and Anna Storgårds were the people I could turn to from the very beginning. For several years, Pasi Saukkonen from Cupore, sprinkled me with mature advice for advancing my research (some of which I actually followed) and Laszlo Vincze and Enikő Marton consistently cheered me up with their uniquely sunny disposition.

With the first half of my work completed in 2013, and eager to adopt new methods and approaches to the rest of my work, I was fortunate enough to be introduced to the people in the Helsinki Research Group for Political Sociology seminar, led by Risto Alapuro, Markku Lonkila, Eeva Luhtakallio and Tuomas Ylä-Anttila. Together with other PhD students, particularly Veikko Eranti and Tuukka Ylä-Anttila, my writing was peppered with new, creative, crazy and fun approaches to political sociology, quickly convincing me that no academic constraints should prevent the completing this work in the true spirit of exploration. Planning, developing and teaching the course "Challenges of Citizenship in Diversifying Societies" together with Marjukka Weide, I strived to instill the same spirit of having fun while researching into our students. I also wish to thank my students, especially Emma Kolu, for their critical and profound questions that led to several revisions in the way I address the theory and practice of multiculturalism.

During the dozens of international conferences and PhD seminars I participated in, I particularly enjoyed meeting new junior and senior researchers. Especially in the ones organized by the European Sociological Association, the Nordic Political Science Association and the Welfare and Migration Research Network, I met way too many people who made a lasting impression for them to be exhaustive listed. Even so, I feel I must mention at least Will Kymlicka, Veit Bader, Peter Kivisto, Suvi Keskinen, Ellen Annandale, Robert Fine, Karina Horsti, Saara Pellander, Cristian Norocel, Laura



Parkkinen, Mika Danetiu, Lucilla Salvia, Camilla Nordberg, Sanna Saksela-Bergholm and Mats Wickström as people whose encouraging comments and critical feedback profoundly shaped my work.

Joining the ranks of the Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration and eventually assuming the position of vice-chairperson in 2014 also provided me with contacts to several interesting people. Working together with Lotta Haikkola, Merja Pentikäinen, Katja Vilkkama and Miika Tervonen – all highly motivated to develop new ways of communicating and applying their research on ethnic relations and migrancy to those outside academia – helped me to negotiate between the roles of researcher and public discussant.

Collecting a diverse range of research material from various fora was another trying task in which I was fortunate enough to be able to rely on help from Legislative Councillor Jorma Kantola at the Ministry of the Interior, Kaisa Hakkarainen at Helsingin Sanomat and Matias Turkkila on Hommaforum.

Finally, as my supervisor, Sirpa Wrede was undoubtedly the most important person in my PhD project. Consistently surprised in our meetings by Sirpa's uncanny ability to somehow know what I was trying to express even before I did myself, I ended up rearranging all the pieces in this puzzle over and over again. Always encouraging, but rarely completely satisfied, she pushed me further and gave me room to develop my own voice so that my analysis of public narratives followed a red thread around which I could weave the text into a real story and an analytical narrative in its own right. Whatever tasks I end up taking in the future, this is the skill I treasure the most from my days as doctoral candidate.

Thank you everybody.

On a beautiful skydiving day in Utti on September 12th, 2015,

*Niko Pyrhönen*



# Table of Contents

<b>1 Introduction: Neo-Populist Welfare Nationalism and the Exclusionary Conceptualization of Solidarity in a Welfare State Context</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 The Emergence of Welfare Nationalist Narratives and Neo-Populist Advocacy in Public Debate	5
1.2 The Research Aim and the Structure of the Dissertation	10
<b>2: Sociological Approaches to Populist Advocacy of Exclusionary Welfare Nationalism</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1: Drawing the Boundaries of Citizenship and National Belonging	16
2.2: Nordic Welfare State as a Seedbed for Promoting Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Civic Solidarity	22
2.3: Promoting Neo-Populist Advocacy in Mediatized Arenas through Strategic Social Action	28
2.4: Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Consolidation of Welfare Nationalist Narratives	36
<b>3: Studying the Narratives Employed in the Consolidation of Blue-and-White Welfare Nationalism</b>	<b>43</b>
3.1: Collecting the Data in the Key Arenas of Public Debate	43
3.2: Coding the Data to Explore the Critical Turning Points in the Uses of Neo-Populist Mobilization Narratives	52
3.3: Developing the Analytical Narrative on Neo-Populist Consolidation of Welfare Nationalist Rhetoric	58
<b>4: Conceptualizations of Exclusionary Welfare Solidarity in the High Political Arena Prior to the Rise of Neo-Populism</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>5: The Neo-Populist Breakthrough and the Mainstreaming of the Blue-and-White Political Agenda of Welfare Nationalism</b>	<b>88</b>

<b>6: Scandalized Underdogs or Xenophobic Satirists? Consolidation of a Neo-Populist Collective Identity in Mediatized Contestations</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>7 Discussion: Consolidation of Neo-Populist Advocacy in Public Debate through Welfare Nationalist Narratives on the Politics of Immigration</b>	<b>151</b>
7.1: Narrating the importance of Immigration Politics through Welfare Nationalist Boundary-Work	153
7.2: The Idealized Legacy of the Welfare State as the Narrative Justification for Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Solidarity	157
7.3: Strategic Social Action in the Consolidation of Neo-Populism as a Resonant Collective Identity in the Public Sphere	160
<b>8 Conclusions: Rethinking the Role of Welfare Nationalist Narratives in the Mediatized Consolidation of the Neo-Populist Collectivity</b>	<b>164</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>Appendix A: The Exhaustive Listing of All the Data Analyzed</b>	<b>183</b>
<b>Appendix B: Original Quotations from the Parliamentary Debates on the Aliens Act of 2004</b>	<b>187</b>
<b>Appendix C: Operationalization of the Justification Types and Discourses Coded as Neo-Populist Mainstreaming of Welfare Nationalism in the Data Set 4</b>	<b>192</b>
<b>Appendix D: An Illustration of the Frequency of the Narratives Coded in the Data Set 5</b>	<b>194</b>
<b>Appendix E: The Original Posts Used for Compiling the Four OPS Pairs</b>	<b>195</b>



## 1 Introduction:

# Neo-Populist Welfare Nationalism and Exclusionary Conceptualization of Solidarity in a Welfare State Context

This dissertation explores the narratives that facilitated the emergence, mainstreaming and consolidation of right-wing populist advocacy from the political fringes into everyday public debates in Finland in this millennium. The main argument advanced in this study is that right-wing populist political activism developed from the early 2000s onwards into a resonant, neo-populist collective identity. Accordingly, the dissertation argues that neo-populist advocates were able to secure the support of a wide range of potential constituencies through a political agenda that reinterprets the Nordic tradition of universalistic welfare solidarity in exclusionary and nationalist terms. While narratives that build around concepts such as “the people” and “the nation” have been employed across a wide spectrum of contexts in nationalist mobilization during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, several interesting and even unique elements differentiate these public narratives of neo-populist advocacy in contemporary Finland from earlier manifestations of political nationalism. I have chosen to focus on what is termed here *blue-and-white welfare nationalism* as the central one of these flexible narratives employed by Finnish neo-populist advocates.

The identification of the central narrative as *blue-and-white welfare nationalism* is based on my interpretation of the early 2000s as a critical period in Finnish politics, during which political debates were commonly marked by fears linked explicitly to the expansion of the European Union to include countries with lower living standards, most notably the Baltic States. These rapid changes in Finland's institutional environment contributed to a growing sense of fear for the future of the welfare state in the globalized era across the Finnish party political spectrum (Nylund 2008). In the context of this heated political climate in which numerous societal actors, including trade unions, raised concerns about the massive influx of guest workers especially from Estonia, the populist "immigration critics" were able to downplay their earlier explicitly xenophobic ideological underpinnings, instead narrating their welfare nationalist political activism as a part of the mainstream public debate. This skillful narrative reorientation allowed the neo-populists to position themselves as a key player in mundane political contestation concerning the development of national social policy, while nevertheless emphasizing the arguably immigration-induced challenges the Finnish welfare state faces. The ubiquitous public support for the welfare state made it possible for the emergent neo-populism to face the public critique of racism with a wide range of justificatory narratives that commonly presented nationalist articulations in their political agenda as a benign sense of political responsibility and essential for saving "our" welfare state (Billig 1995, 6).

The analysis in this study proceeds from a close examination of the subject matter of the emergent neo-populist narratives as cultural constructs. In order to capture the wider societal implications of the proliferation of these narratives – particularly concerning their ability to contribute to an exclusionary public understanding of the welfare state – I also analyze *how* these narratives are harnessed as instruments of neo-populist political mobilization and collective identity formation that fuels political action. Following Fligstein's and McAdam's (2012) research on the "theory of fields", political mobilization is here conceptualized as meso-level strategic social action that requires social skill and collaborative meaning making. Accordingly, the study contextualizes the emergent field of political debate on immigration and the welfare state with regard to a his-

torical development that goes beyond contemporary manifestations of neo-populist politics. In the post-WWII Finland, for instance, there had been a long tradition of venerating an idealized, universalist conceptualization of civic solidarity through a public discourse that emphasized “the small nation’s success story” in transcending particularist interests and identities for the sake of creating “an exceptionally good country for anyone to live in” (Kettunen 2008, 34–35).

The argument developed in this study further holds that from the early 2000s onwards, the emphasis on the welfare state developed into a central component in the right-wing populists’ mobilization narratives. Studies from the other Nordic countries show that the recent narrations of Nordic welfare nationalism have often employed exclusionary and highly moralized conceptualizations of the nation, the people and national solidarity. Drawing from a common public understanding of the welfare state as national project, neo-populists have sought to legitimate their claim to restrict immigrants’ rights to welfare redistribution with the need to protect the welfare state and its autochthonous population from ‘outsiders’ in various ways. These neo-populist, welfare nationalist narratives typically seek to redraw the boundaries of national belonging in self-evidently nativist terms (see, for example, Suszycki 2011; Vad Jönsson et al. 2013). The literature on more long-standing right-wing populist movements in other Western European countries has produced similar observations concerning the role of immigration in the nationalist justification for exclusionary political agenda (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Crepaz 2008; Mudde 2007; Kivisto and Wahlbeck 2013).

Despite the low levels of immigration and the idealized tradition of consensual decision-making in Finland during the early 2000s, immigration was rarely discussed as a multiculturalist challenge for the universalist welfare state to transcend. Research on populist mobilization in Finland illustrates how populist advocates sought to portray the presence of minorities and societal heterogenization through immigration as threats to the sense of national solidarity on which the welfare state was built (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 14–15). There are also indications that right-wing politicians from established parties commonly painted the picture of the im-



migrant Other as representing the kind of diversity that threatens to erode the prided Finnish solidarity and the welfare state (Förbom 2010, 10–12).

From the point of view of this doctoral study, there are two particularly interesting, interlinked elements in the development of neo-populism in Finland. The first one is related to strategic social action that can be observed in how successfully neo-populist advocates mobilized in the online front of public debate from the early 2000s onwards (Hannula 2011, 50; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009b, 8). The second one pertains to the subject matter of the mobilization narratives, specifically how neo-populists have been able to gradually narrate the welfare state itself as the key symbol of national identity to be protected against the immigrants' alleged abuse of social welfare (Puuronen 2011, 224). The significant symbolic role attached to the welfare state – not only in the neo-populist narratives, but also in the Finnish political culture writ large – is often considered to originate from the idealization of the “People’s home” model of universalist welfare that Nordic institutions sought to implement in the post-war period. This “Scandocentric” conceptualization of the welfare state, embedded in the pride in the superiority of the “Nordic model” of organizing welfare (see, for example, Allardt 1981, 7; for critiques, see Alestalo 2010, 300; Kettunen and Petersen 2011, 16; Vad Jönsson et al. 2013), has been widespread among politicians and in the media (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 272). It is partly because of this role of the welfare state as a national symbol that the neo-populist nationalism has been able to capitalize on the general disillusionment concerning the universalist capabilities of the welfare state in the aftermath of the economic crises of the 1990s and the “euro crisis” of the late 2000s (Hannula 2011, 185–190; Förbom 2010, 12–13, 127–131).

Despite the ample literature on European right-wing populism, to the date there exists no in-depth study of how neo-populist actors, such as the Finnish Perussuomalaiset<sup>1</sup> party, operationalize the

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1 In this dissertation I refer to the parties with their original names, rather than translating them. The main reason for this is to avoid ambiguity related to the English translation of Perussuomalaiset. During the period covered in this chapter, Perussuomalaiset used the translation “True Finns,” but as of August 2011 started referring to themselves as “The Finns” in international contexts. Since “True Finns” is an outdated name,

legacy of idealized welfare state in their anti-immigration oriented political agenda – or how their advocates on a grassroots level and in the political arena have positioned themselves as legitimate political actors within the online arenas of political debate and in the mainstream publicity. This doctoral study remedies this lacuna by exploring in detail the emergence, mainstreaming and consolidation of neo-populist narratives in the Finnish public debates. This is achieved by analyzing public narratives within a wide range of arenas of public debate, focusing particularly on two kinds of intertwined narratives; the ones employed for *justifying welfare nationalist political agenda* and those for *consolidating neo-populist political advocacy*.

This introductory chapter is divided into two sections. First (1.1) I present the case of emerging neo-populist advocacy in public debates, as well as some general features in how welfare nationalist narratives present immigration as a threat to the welfare state. The second section (1.2) presents the research objective; elucidating the analytical narrative of the dissertation and underlining how the structure of the dissertation supports the exploration of the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy.


## **1.1 The Emergence of Welfare Nationalist Narratives and Neo-Populist Advocacy in Public Debate**

The volume and status of the Finnish neo-populist political activism of the 2000s differed from that of the earlier variants of political nationalism in post-war Finland in that previously nationalist activism had only occupied the political margins (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 33). Drawing from experiences from other countries, as examined in international research literature – discussed in the chapter 2 – it is possible to emphasize certain particularities in the way Finnish neo-populists have developed and employed political narratives that created a field of “immigration critical” politi-

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but referring to them as “The Finns” is an analytically problematic translation, running the risk of the party being conflated to Finns as the people, using the original names allows for conducting the analysis with as little ambiguity as possible.

cal debate used for successful political mobilization of large, new constituencies. This rapid growth in the political support for the right-wing populist Perussuomalaiset party, illustrated in the graph 1 (below), is so exceptional in the context of European political movements that its background should be explored in some detail.



**Graph 1. Support for the leading right-wing populist party in parliamentary elections in the Nordic EU countries.**

The point of departure of this doctoral study is that the successful political mobilization of the right-wing populism in Finland has benefitted from the neo-populist advocates' ability to construct and link two types of public narratives; one for communicating their political goals and the other for developing neo-populist advocacy into a resonant collective identity.

The first type of narratives emphasizes the saliency of the items in the welfare nationalist political agenda as possible remedies to widely shared political concerns. As I will discuss in more detail in 2.2., the neo-populists' ability to reach wider audiences with their narratives has been greatly facilitated by the overarching public internalization of the concern that globalization, immigration and increasing heterogeneity may present an impediment for endeavors to

uphold national unity and solidarity necessary for the maintenance of the welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 3). In Finland, combating these developments is presented as the primary tasks on the welfare nationalist political agenda.

This political agenda is heavily influenced by several European discourses that began to be domesticated in Finnish public debate already decades before the neo-populist political breakthrough (on domestication of global trends, see Alasuutari 2009, 69). A prime example of such a discourse would be the *fear for declining national solidarity*. International research literature discusses the “declining national solidarity argument” as pertaining to the sense of a diminishing consensus on social commitment and concern for the living conditions of compatriots, an understanding of solidarity developed in tandem with the welfare state itself (Crepaz 2008, 113). The previous scholarship has highlighted that this discourse started to proliferate somewhat simultaneously with the European discourse according to which nation-states under the conditions of economic globalization are no longer capable of funding their redistributive welfare regimes (Lavelle 2008, 2–3). Moreover, researchers on populism tend to agree that the neoliberal claim about the need to reorient state policies has helped to create a favorable political niche for the successful mobilization of populist welfare nationalism (Kettunen 2008, 227). As the subsequent analysis will indicate, in the 2000s the Finnish neo-populists began to occupy this niche by using narratives that argued that since the welfare state is under the threat of diminishing, there must be stricter access criteria for the inclusion into the sphere of solidarity among welfare recipients.

Another example of such a domesticated meta-narrative discussed in international scholarship, is the opposition to multiculturalism that drew from the emerging European discourse of “death of multiculturalism.” This discourse portrays the increasing presence of immigrant cultures as leading to segregation and as incompatible with the goals of “our” modern way of life (Favell 2001, 10; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Faist 2013, 22–23). In the welfare nationalist rhetoric of Finnish neo-populists, the supposedly immigration-induced increase in heterogeneity is presented as incompatible with the fostering of national solidarity that the maintenance of the welfare state is considered to require (Puuronen 2011, 244).

There exists a wide range of approaches towards solidarity-based welfare regimes among European right-wing populists. While the Nordic populist parties are regarded as the most keen on promoting an extensive system of welfare redistributions, Cas Mudde – having conducted extensive research on European populist parties – points out that this kind of solidarity is distinctly bounded in the sense that many of “the benefits of the welfare state should be limited to the ‘own people’” (2007, 131). Indeed, as the Perussuomalaiset party asserts in its electoral manifesto for the parliamentary elections of 2011: “the point of departure in social policy must be to unite the people [and] encourage people to behave in a responsible and socially sustainable way” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 11). The rhetoric that burdens the welfare policy with such high ambitions establishes the immigrants outsiders’ access to welfare benefits as a heavily loaded normative question of desert and morality (Kangas 2000).

The most deeply domesticated Finnish narratives of welfare nationalism differ from their nationalist counterparts in Europe, primarily in their statist conceptualization of exclusionary welfare solidarity. The international literature on multiculturalism suggests that in the welfare state context, immigration is commonly framed as concern from the point of view of welfare redistribution. Gary Freeman (1986, 62), having pioneered the modern study of politics of immigration crystallizes this approach: “When the welfare state is seen as something for ‘them’ paid by ‘us,’ its days as a consensual solution to societal problems are numbered.” This framing, highly prominent in Finland, emphasizes that a willingness to maintain high levels of tax revenue requires that the recipients of the welfare benefits can be regarded as “people like us” (Crepaz 2008, 40).

Any public discussion on the ideal and practical implications of national solidarity can easily develop into a heated political debate. This is especially so when the arena for conducting such a debate is the mainstream publicity within a modern welfare state. One of the reasons for this contestation within nation-state bounded public sphere is that the concept of solidarity is often presented as built on the notion of coinciding interests within an idealized, allegedly homogeneous national group (Lepola 2000, 22). Public debates growing from this nationalist conceptualization of solidarity often employ assertions of the nature of the interests that most accurately

define the national group in question. Indeed, since the early 2000s, the Finnish populism emphasized the necessity to exclude immigrants as outsiders for the sake of maintaining levels of solidarity that the continued existence of the welfare state requires. The main welfare nationalist narrative for justifying exclusion and rigid control of immigration and minority politics that the neo-populists advocate is that, since the presence and recognition of minority groups dilutes the sense of “our common interests” on which solidarity is built, immigration undermines or even destroys the welfare state and the national culture it embodies (Förbom 2010, 47).

The narratives that facilitated the development of neo-populist advocacy into a resonant collective identity advance from the position that the neo-populists, unlike other political actors, have the answers needed to counter the immigration-induced globalizing and heterogenizing developments that are threatening the Finnish welfare state. The fact that both the problems (“immigration-induced, solidarity-eroding heterogeneity”) and solutions (“promotion of national values and norms”) are presented as simple also requires that they both remain relatively unspecific in terms of what kinds of policies they entail. This means that, upon closer examination, the neo-populists narrate their political goals in a markedly open-ended manner which, in turn, furnishes their advocacy with a distinctly chameleonic character (Taggart 2000, 117).

This open-endedness also allows selling neo-populist advocacy for many kinds of potential constituencies by strategically employing different justificatory narratives in different arenas. For example, the narratives for reaching the middle classes can be tailored to the arenas of mainstream publicity by avoiding explicitly essentializing claims about immigrants and their qualities, and rather referring to “taxpayers’ monies.” The more radical narratives, on the other hand, tend to proliferate within the online arenas of public debate (Maasilta 2012, 14–15), where neo-populists actively reach for the younger dot.net generations. Indeed, the voter profile of the Perussuomalaiset party has been steadily moving from lower-class, blue-collared net-loser of globalization towards “middle class taxpayers” and emerging, young voter cohorts (Rahkonen 2011, 434).

While there are important differences in how neo-populist collective identity is narrated in various arenas – even to the extent

that its “ideological core” is often perceived to remain in a constant state of flux (Taggart 2000, 4) – the Finnish neo-populists are nevertheless united in the narrative that claims the sole ownership of the policy solutions for saving the welfare state. This is typical in the tradition populist rhetoric where the established political order and their political opponents are presented as subject to elitist affiliations which prevent them from identifying the most salient political challenges or developing policy solutions for them (see, for example, Mudde 2007, 65–66). In Finland, the contemporary neo-populist narratives have sought to justify the emphasis on immigration in political agenda with the idea of the fragility of the welfare state in the global era – a notion that permeated both academic and public debates on immigration in Europe already towards the end of the millennia (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 235–236). At the heart of this neo-populist welfare nationalism, there has been a sense of disenfranchisement to the “blue-and-white birthright,” a fearful narrative that presents Finns as a nation just about to lose their “fair share” of welfare state on which high national hopes were piled – their advocates often genuinely believing that the welfare state would be able to resolve the all kinds of social problems for its citizens in the foreseeable future.

In this dissertation, I explore the development of public narratives of exclusionary welfare solidarity from three aspects. Firstly, I illustrate how welfare nationalist narratives emerged in the high political arena. Secondly, I analyze how the neo-populists – justifying their nationalist political agenda with welfare state idealizing narratives – were able reach salient coverage in the mainstream publicity. Finally, I assess how neo-populist advocacy of blue-and-white welfare nationalism consolidated in the public debate as a resonant collective identity – channeling a wide range of societal discontent into narratives that present remedies to the, allegedly immigration-induced, challenges that welfare state is facing as something that only neo-populists can properly envision and implement.

## **1.2 The Research Aim and the Structure of the Dissertation**

Much of the existing research on Finnish right-wing populism

tends to emphasize the role of structural developments behind the recent politicization of “the immigration question” – focusing on the effects of globalization on its net-losers, disenfranchisement, unemployment and the protest-mentality (Puuronen 2011, 204–205; Wiberg 2011), the subsequent changes in the party political opportunity structures (Rahkonen 2011), and developments in the right-wing populist media exposure (Horsti and Nikunen 2013; Maasilta 2012).

Contemporary research on European populism, however, suggests that such macro-level developments can only account for the demand-side of the rise of populism, outlining the elements that create a fertile ground for populist electoral success (Mudde 2007, 256). Therefore, it is important to complement the structural explanations with an analysis on how right-wing populist agency has contributed to increased support for neo-populist advocacy and the strategic measures employed for harnessing the potential for growth. Indeed, several researchers have explored the changes in certain specific policy issues in the political agenda of the Perussuomalaiset party (Railo 2013; Ylä-Anttila 2014), but to so far very little research has been done to explore the emergence of welfare nationalist narratives in political debates and how these narratives are employed in the mainstreaming and consolidation of neo-populist advocacy. Considering this gap in the existing research, the key aim of this dissertation monograph is to illustrate narrative practices of and arenas for spreading and justifying neo-populist welfare nationalism.

The decision to study these relatively recent historical developments under the label of *neo-populism* and *neo-populist advocacy* (rather than radical right-wing populism, for instance) reflects fact that the research object of this study is very much a moving target. While many of the items on the political agenda of Finnish neo-populists advocates are common to European right-wing populist parties, this study is not only about the political subject matter of Finnish right-wing populist mobilization narratives. Instead, the primary focus is on what could be considered, following McAdam and Fligstein conceptualization, the *neo-populism as a strategic action field* (for more detailed discussion on strategic action fields, see Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 3–5) and the *neo-populist mode of*



*operation* in the Finnish context where “democratic institutions are strong, populists ideas [...] cohabit with other political visions, compete for electoral support, and are kept in check by opposing forces” (Mazzoleni 2003, 2). Studying this strategic aspect of neo-populism entails focusing on the meso-level between the Finnish right-wing populist agency and the political opportunity structures within which its advocates operate.

For instance, rather than seeking to appeal to constituencies within a distinctly “conservative-reactionary spectrum of political ideology” (Mazzoleni 2003, 4), neo-populists employ diverse range of narratives for collective identity-work serving to consolidate a collective self-understanding in several distinct arenas of public debate. Notwithstanding the commonly xenophobic underpinnings in right-wing populist “immigration critique”, neo-populists have sought to position themselves “as true democrats, voicing popular grievances and opinions [supposedly] ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the media” (Canovan 1999, 2). This calls for disciplined sociological examination on the proliferation of public narratives for favorably presenting welfare nationalism to mainstreamed audiences and eventually successfully mobilizing middle class constituencies towards the end of the 2000s.

The multi-faceted task of elucidating the advancement of neo-populist advocacy in contemporary Finland in this dissertation is divided respectively into the content-specific research aim, focusing on the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives and into the practice-specific research aim, focusing on the strategic narrative agency of the Finnish neo-populists. In terms of the former, I aim to assess how the subject matter in welfare nationalist political agenda has been narrated in the public so that social political challenges for the welfare state can be linked to the exclusionary conceptualizations of solidarity by neo-populist advocates. With regard to the strategic narrative agency, I aim to analyze how neo-populism consolidated as a resonant collective identity whose large and heterogeneous constituency actively seeks to position neo-populist advocacy favorably in public.

As a result of such approach to neo-populism – aimed at examining the narrative practices contributing to the proliferation, mobilization and public justification of neo-populism in various arenas

of public sphere – the research object in the analytical narrative put forward in this doctoral study extends beyond the agency of *Perussuomalaiset* as a political party. For instance, while the party apparatus, its political leadership and individual politicians first operationalized welfare nationalist narratives in the high political arena (chapter 4), the proliferation these narratives is studied in relation to the steadily growing saliency of issues of immigration politics and the increasing critical media exposure for “immigration critique” in the mainstream arenas of public debate towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s (chapter 5). Finally, for the purposes of analyzing the consolidation of a neo-populist collective identity, the focus shifts towards the neo-populist grassroots level advocacy, particularly within the social media “sphericules” (chapter 6).

In order to meet these aims, I first conduct a literature review (chapter 2) that allows developing analytical tools from a body of research that incorporates three distinct disciplinary traditions; political sociology, political science and media research. Triangulating between these research traditions, this chapter portrays three pertinent approaches to the emergence, mainstreaming and consolidation of Finnish neo-populist welfare nationalism.

The first one (2.1) pertains to the boundary-drawing use of the notion of a national “we” as a point of departure for the neo-populist to enter the political debate from a privileged position. The second approach (2.2) underlines the historical legacy of an encompassing and overarching welfare state, which has been considered necessary to protect against various erosive effects by emphasizing national unity and solidarity in similarity. The third pertinent research approach (2.3) to the success story of neo-populist advocacy focuses on the mediatized strategies for developing a collective resonant identity – particularly through a rapid organization in the emergent social media – that can be presented favorably in the mainstream arenas employing various subject positions, such as the silenced underdog, waging war against corrupted established parties and the elite media. Based on the literature review, section 2.4 then synthesizes an analytical framework and presents the empirical research questions to be operationalized in analyses of the data.

In chapter 3, I present the data sets to be analyzed, illustrating the practical considerations guiding the progression of the data col-

lection and coding of the data. I also emphasize how the research methodology was developed and operationalized to be employed in the analysis of the different data sets.

The empirical analysis is divided into three chapters, from 4 to 6, each pertaining to specific sets of data. The fourth chapter looks into legislative process for developing Aliens Act of 2004, analyzing the narratives of exclusionary welfare solidarity in the high political arena prior to the emergence of neo-populist welfare nationalism. The fifth one analyzes the political mobilization of welfare nationalism in mainstream publicity during the electoral breakthrough of the right-wing populist *Perussuomalaiset* party in 2011, focusing on the narratives employed in the electoral manifestos of the party and in the online debates by grassroots level advocates of neo-populism. The sixth and final chapter of analysis looks into consolidation of neo-populist advocacy in the mediatized narrative contestations. I focus on two online arenas where neo-populists developed narratives for legitimizing their role in political scandals revolving around two *Perussuomalaiset* MPs in 2012 and 2013. Based on narrative analysis of oppositional public stories, the sixth chapter assesses the implications of these narrative contestations for the consolidation of a neo-populist collective identity in the public debate.

The order of chapters of analysis follows the advancement of exclusionary narratives of welfare solidarity in the civil society – starting from the most formal arenas of public debate in early 2000s and moving into the next decade with analyses of welfare nationalist narratives as presented within the more informal and mediatized arenas of public debate.

In the discussion (chapter 7), I present a synthesis of how the results of the empirical analysis can be employed to meet the research aims and answer the research questions of this study. Finally, in the conclusion (chapter 8), I discuss the theoretical implications of this study for a compound body of literature that I refer to as critical nationalism studies. I also assess the extent to which my finding both corroborate and challenge the contemporary understanding of the mediatized consolidation of a neo-populist collective identity and the role of the welfare nationalist political agenda in this process.

## 2

# **Sociological Approaches to Populist Advocacy of Exclusionary Welfare Nationalism**

This chapter reviews how previous research has approached the topics of right-wing populist political mobilization and the politicization of immigration in public debate, discussing these phenomena with reference to the welfare state context, where appropriate. The body literature selected to be reviewed encompasses a variety of research traditions – focusing mostly on sociology, political science and media studies – in order to meet two research aims. This chapter aims to build an understanding of, firstly, how a neo-populist political advocacy can develop into a resonant collective identity and, secondly, how central elements on a nationalist political agenda can be successfully narrated to wider audiences in various deliberative arenas of the civil society. These aims will be met in this chapter by conducting the literature review in three sections, and by synthesizing the findings in the analytical framework for the dissertation in the fourth section.

The first section in the chapter (2.1) focuses on the literature on nationalist boundary construction through notions of “the nation” and “the people,” emphasizing the available narrative avenues for flexibly harnessing them in welfare nationalist political mobilization. The second section (2.2) discusses the contextual elements of

this boundary construction to the extent that they are pertinent to the context of Nordic welfare state. This includes an overview of the historical development of the idealized notions of “our” national past and the likewise idealized approach to institutions of an encompassing and potent welfare state as symbols of national solidarity and unity, that were eventually operationalized in mobilization narratives by the advocates of populist welfare nationalism. The third section (2.3) focuses on the communicative dimension of neo-populist mobilization in various mediatized arenas within civil society. This entails a discussion of the discursive strategies through which neo-populist advocacy can be developed into a resonant collective identity and how exclusionary conceptualizations of welfare solidarity at the core of the welfare nationalist agenda can be mainstreamed for the purpose of reaching salient media coverage in public debate.

The final section of this chapter (2.4) synthesizes an analytical framework from this literature review by illustrating how each of the first three sections contribute to a specific theoretical “lens” or an analytical toolkit that can be operationalized in empirical analyses that examine the role of welfare nationalism and neo-populist advocacy in the emergence, mainstreaming and consolidation of public narratives of exclusionary welfare solidarity.

## **2.1 Drawing the Boundaries of Citizenship and National Belonging**

Both in the academic literature and in more mundane arenas of day-to-day political debates, nationalism is a highly contested concept that has proved exceedingly elusive to tackle. Indeed, there exists no commonly agreed, scientific standard definition for nationalism (Seton-Watson 1977, 5; Favell 2001, 12; Pakkasvirta and Saukonen 2005, 9). However, for the purposes of studying nationalism as a means of building and maintaining a collectivity, as I endeavor to do, a useful point of departure can be derived from Benedict Anderson’s oft-quoted definition of nation as an “imagined political community” (2006, 5–7).

According to the social constructionist approach to nationalism

that Anderson spearheaded, nationalism should not be conceptualized as an ideology – like liberalism or socialism – that emphasizes the importance of the nation. Rather, in the study of national identity formation, nationalism is typically understood as a narrative process through which an abstract, territorially and/or ethnically bounded sense of pre-existing kinship is “invented” in the sense being imagined and articulated into an existing political community (Smith 1991, 71).

Manifestations of nationalism in this sense are not necessarily, or at least explicitly, “nationalistic,” but rather reproduced in a wide range of mundane or “banal” narratives that are reproduced in public discourses (Billig 1995, 8). Making use of such a definition of nationalism in this dissertation also has the benefit that it renders it meaningful to explore how seemingly “benign” and “harmless” nationalist narratives – such as those of blue-and-white welfare nationalism – are able to attribute a variety of rigorous and particularistic identity criteria as boundaries of belonging to a community in specific socio-historical contexts.

One of the predominant aims in critical research of nationalism – often conducted under disciplines such as political science and history, sociology, social psychology and anthropology – has been the illustration of boundary-work of symbolic resources that serve to create, institutionalize or contest various kinds of social differences. Lamont and Molnár (2002, 167–168), who have developed interdisciplinary research on boundary-work, also related to nationalist boundary constructions, emphasize that is necessary to differentiate between two categories of boundaries: symbolic and social boundaries. The former pertain to the constructionist dimension of boundary work, consisting of conceptual distinctions that are employed by social actors struggling to structure the social reality and establish particular interpretative strategies and cultural traditions as hegemonic in a specific context. To the extent that these endeavors are successful, their outcome is the formation of symbolic boundaries that separate people into groups and generate “dichotomous classifications in the organization of their thinking,” not only generating of feelings of similarity and group membership, but also interpreting societal inequalities so that they may become “regarded as normal, necessary and just” (Epstein 1992, 232–234). The cul-

tural repertoires reproduced in context-sensitive narratives may take the form of institutionalized definitions of cultural membership, effectively separating people into high-status in-groups – such as the autochthonous population – and low-status out-groups – such as immigrants (Swidler 2000, 201; Fiske 2000, 312–313). In addition to categorizing people in different ways, boundaries also incorporate a behavioral element, offering “scripts of action” for relating to individuals depending on how they get classified (Wimmer 2013, 9).

This is also a significant reason for the ubiquitous contestation for symbolic boundaries. Once they are widely agreed upon, they can translate into institutionalized social boundaries, “objectified forms of social differences” that “pattern social interaction in important ways.” In contemporary literature on political sociology, this is considered to commonly lead to inequalities in the ways different groups can meet various criteria of belonging, through which they may gain access to both material and immaterial social resources and opportunities (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168–169).

In the present transnational era, some of the most intense societal boundary-work – often marked by an “obsessive [...] concern to remain different from others” – pertains to membership in national community (Parekh 2008, 61). Scholars engaging in the critical study of nationalism agree that the increased mobility of people in general – and of workforce in particular – has resulted in increase in support for political movements that seek to present the sovereignty of the nation-state and the boundaries of “the people forming the nation” as endangered by both internal heterogenization of the civil society and external glocalizing dynamics (Delanty 2000, 95–96; Hervik 2006, 39). Economic and political theorists contributing to critical nationalism studies have therefore sought to highlight how the notions of “nation” and “people” have emerged as what could be referred to as flexible “moral resources” in narratives of nation-building in the modern era. They constitute readily applicable stocks of “trust, norms, and networks” that “tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative” and the supply and applicability of these resources “increases, rather than decreases, when used” (Hirschman 1984, 93; Putnam 1994, 10).

The shared point of departure in critical research on nationalism is that nationalist political actors are able to make wide use of these

resources not only because they are self-reinforcing once consistently articulated in the public, but also because “the nation” and “the people” can be made readily applicable in a variety of contexts and arenas due to their doubly flexible nature. First of all, the choice of the relevant markers for national identity and difference – around which the “the nation” and “the people” are constructed – is flexible in the sense that these markers are typically highly particular, varying significantly in between different contexts of nationalist mobilization (Gellner 1964, 168). These notions are also flexible in relation to their use; by being ambiguous and void of any definitive or fixed meanings, “the nation” and “the people” can be discursively operationalized for the purposes of publicly justifying a wide range of nationalist narratives, attitudes, identity constructions and political positions (Canovan 2005, 65).

Theorists of citizenship have pointed out that some of the most powerful nation-building narratives are produced by highly formal, state-controlled, top-down institutions, as is the case with the legislation that articulates the rights and obligations associated to citizenship (Marshall 1992, 8; Brubaker 1992, 21). Even so, the vast majority of the nationalist boundary-drawing narratives are considered to originate in the civil society, articulated within various mediatized arenas of public deliberation (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 186; Saukkonen 2007, 33). As such, boundary-drawing narratives typically seek to employ these symbolic resources in a manner that is rarely coherent and analytically sound – quite unlike the formal, legislative articulations of citizenship codified in legislation on citizenship. Constructionist approaches to narratives of formal and informal boundary-drawing regard both as more usefully analyzed as “producing, rather than reflecting” differences in status among people (Bridget Anderson 2013, 2).

According to Ernesto Laclau (2005, 129–133) – a pioneer of critical discourse analysis on nationalist and populist movements – these boundary-drawing narratives, seeking to construct a nationally bounded “people,” tend to make wide use of insinuating, imprecise and metaphoric language, reifying internally conflicting categories into existence through the use of so-called “floating signifiers.” The reference points of those signifiers – quite like those of flexible moral resources – are perpetually “suspended”; never



fixed, but constantly in the process of being reconstructed in their context-sensitive articulation (Chandler 2007, 78–80). Researchers of political thought agree that nationalist political mobilization through these flexible boundary-drawing narratives of national belonging have been present in most European countries since the 18<sup>th</sup> century (see, for example, Gellner 1964; Smith 1991).

While the contemporary literature on political sociology of the symbolic boundaries of national belonging often emphasizes how these boundaries are constantly in the process of being imagined in a wide range of practices – discursively constructed and narrated by very different kinds of actors and institutions (Paasi 2002, 158) – it is possible to identify certain common denominators in the narratives contributing to exclusionary boundary-work of national belonging. This boundary-work is typically considered to advance through narratives that 1) select a relatively narrow set of features and 2) link these features to a national denominator (e.g. “blue-and-white Finnishness”) in a manner that 3) emphasizes how these features constitute the community’s internal unity, difference from Others or temporal continuity (Saukkonen 1999, 144–145). Contemporary sociological research on negative attitudes towards immigrants in Europe (see, for example, Bail 2008) has indicated that exclusionary configurations of these symbolic national boundaries often employ discourses that juxtapose immigration with national solidarity, presenting the former as a particular challenge for developing a bonding sense of national collective identification (Putnam 2000, 20).

In the Nordic countries, anti-immigration narratives based on exclusionary conceptualization of national belonging began to proliferate rapidly in public debates from 1990s onwards (see, for example, Cole 1997, 11–13; Hervik 2006, 93–94; Mudde 2007, 74–78; Norocel 2013, 14–15). The emergent anti-immigration populism developed two important features. The public discussants successfully used new forms of media for promoting exclusionary conceptualizations of solidarity in various arenas of public debates. They also invoked the welfare state as a national symbol in narratives for justifying anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalist narratives (Maasilta 2012, 27–28; Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 180–182; Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 10–14).

The rigidity of symbolic boundaries in the exclusionary constructions of national identity and solidarity is sometimes argued to accentuate in a welfare state context, where state-coordinated policies seek to actively redistribute opportunity-creating resources (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 1–6). Some political theorists have argued that the willingness to make redistributive sacrifices for others depends on the maintenance of a high level of solidarity that must be recreated by symbolic boundary-work through nationalist narratives of common membership and common identity (see, for instance, Miller 1989; Barry 2001; Joppke 2004). The notion that a nation is defined by its ability to deploy and enforce encompassing symbolic boundaries has been particularly predominant in French republican political theory. For example, Dominique Schnapper (1998, 16) has argued that what renders the nation unique and distinguishable from other types of communities “is that it integrates populations in a community of citizens, whose existence legitimates the internal and external action of the state”. Such characterizations of the nation have been heavily criticized in the study of governance as post-hoc rationalizations that give undue emphasis to the elements of solidarity-based association while downplaying nation’s character as an instrument of governance “through vertical hierarchies, bureaucracy, centralism, cultural normalization and illegitimate domination” (Bader 1995, 218).

Recent empirical research on multiculturalist politics has challenged the argument that increasing heterogeneity actually corrodes national solidarity (Crepaz 2006, 116–117; Crepaz 2008, 132). Instead, there has been wide range of contemporary empirical research on the mechanisms of interaction between solidarity and trust, on the one hand, and the particularities of redistributive regimes, on the other. This literature suggests that by augmenting the existing democratic institutions with contextually tailored multicultural policies can function as means for overcoming the alleged heterogeneity-induced erosion of solidarity. Specifically, it is argued that dismantling some symbolic boundaries delineating the mythical “people” by institutionalizing the recognition of heterogeneities and the contextual configurations of difference within nation-state through multiculturalist policies can actually promote solidarity and trust among its members (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 17). In

this respect, the formal power-sharing and majority-restricting legislative institutions – regarded as particularly prominent within the Nordic welfare states – may offer a good starting point for multicultural policies, as these institutions are generally considered to have important capabilities for facilitating societal trust and solidarity between heterogeneous groups of people (Maskell 2000, 119–120).

However, critical research on welfare nationalism has pointed out that there are several historical and contextual caveats that limit the ease with which multicultural policies can be built on welfare institutions (Suszycki 2011; Vad Jønsson et al. 2013). In the next section, I will discuss this legacy of the welfare state as a national project, and its implications to the particularities of the present populist political mobilization.

## 2.2 Nordic Welfare State as a Seedbed for Promoting Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Civic Solidarity

Any attempt to account for the contemporary success of neo-populist, welfare nationalist mobilization in a Nordic welfare state context must address the post-Second World War cementing of the long-standing emphasis on *folkhemmet*. Most importantly, the notion of the welfare state as “people’s home” served as the guiding principle for the development of universalist social and welfare policy particularly in Sweden, but also in other Nordic countries during the post-war era (Esping-Andersen 1990, 48). One of the most important features of this welfare regime, labeled “social-democratic” in Esping-Andersen’s influential typology (1990, 28), is that it is commonly regarded as based on the notion of universal solidarity. The emphasis on universalism entails – in addition to redistributive policies’ indirect effect of stabilizing society, for instance by curbing extreme poverty – that most citizens can directly benefit from several state coordinated economic redistributions at some point in their lives. The ability for the great majority to enjoy these benefits is also considered to create and maintain reciprocal trust in and legitimacy for the relatively stringent system of progressive taxation among citizens (Rothstein 2002, 213).

It must be noted that the accuracy with which such regime mod-

el typologies (and Esping-Andersen's in particular) can capture the actual developments and contingencies in the Nordic countries, has been challenged by contemporary historical and political science research on welfare states. As Kettunen and Petersen point out, "[t] here seems to be a growing awareness that regime or model typologies cannot be more than analytic ideal types or crude generalizations" and, as such, "tools of the research project, not its results" (2011, 2–3).

It is nevertheless remarkable from a constructivist, sociological perspective that during the quarter of a century after WWII, sometimes referred to as the "golden era" of social democracy (Harvey 2005, 11), a *perception* of there being a "Nordic model" started to develop in both academic and political discussions (Christiansen et al. 2006, 338). Indeed, there exists a consensus in the literature on political sociology that the notion of "the Nordic model of welfare state" pertains not to any historically existing, empirically observable policy model, but rather to a common Nordic self-understanding based on a "wide political consensus" concerning the universalist principles of redistribution as "the fundamentals of the welfare state [which] may be said to have developed during the postwar period" (Allardt 1981, 411–413). Subsequent references to "the Nordic model" in this dissertation pertain to this common public self-understanding of the Nordic countries distinctly as *welfare* states (Anttonen and Sipilä 2000, 17).

Considering that political historians typically define Sweden as "the leading country" in the development of the Nordic welfare state during the postwar period (Christiansen et al. 2006, 338), a solidarity-promoting Nordic model of the "people's home" was gradually established as a common, albeit abstract, goal that Nordic countries sought to realize through somewhat heterogeneous paths of social policy development. The Nordic model of welfare further attributes a very strong role for the state, as it is regarded to be responsible for extensive, "from cradle to grave" -provision of welfare to its citizens through implementation and enforcement of a wide range of universally applicable social policies (Kiander and Lönnqvist 2002, 23–25). However, notwithstanding the universalist principles and solidary-based justification in the core of the Swedish model of welfare – aimed at "the provision of better [...] welfare for their citi-

zens” (Hay 1999, 57) – historians acknowledge that development of the welfare state soon manifested in the Nordic countries as a nationalistic and socially protectionist project. Critics point out, for example, that in Finland – where the welfare state was built by a series of coalition governments as opposed to the social democratic dominance in Sweden – the universalist regime of redistribution was from the beginning aimed at catering the needs of “sufficiently similar” groups of people that could be subsumed under the heading of the Finns (Wickström 2013, 55).

It is necessary to emphasize here that the origins for the successful contemporary neo-populist political mobilization through xenophobic and exclusionary rhetoric in the Nordic countries lie deeply rooted in the originally Swedish utopia of *folkhemmet*, “a trinity of democracy, the people and the nation that contributed to the establishment of the modern Swedish national community” (Hellström 2010, 62). The national community, in which any fully-fledged citizen was expected to take part in, entailed – from the very origins of the concept of the “people’s-home” in the 1920s onwards – a very particularistically defined membership in the national project. This project conceptualized belonging to the (welfare) state in terms of a family membership and used “the figure of the worker as synonymous with ‘the common folk’” (Hellström 2010, 97). Based on the people’s home model, the social-democratic welfare regimes in the Nordic countries “exhibited a restrictive and disciplining nature, drawing clear demarcation lines between those who were included in the community and their duties, and those who were deemed unworthy of it” (Andersson 2009, 114–115; Norocel 2012, 7).

The end of the golden era of social democracy was met with a gradual disillusionment with the panacea of “the Nordic model” of welfare (Lavelle 2008, 145). As the economic recession of 1990s undermined the ability of the social democratic welfare-model to generate the revenues necessary for covering what Esping-Andersen calls “the enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic, and de-commodifying welfare system” (1990, 28), there was a wave of the criticism to the extant welfare-regime, rooted partly in the global rise of neoliberal sentiment. Although much of the most vocal critique – based predominantly on economic considerations such as competitiveness, unsustainability and increasing dependen-

cy ratio – remains controversial in academic debates to the date (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 7–8), the political climate vis-à-vis the welfare state has fundamentally changed since 1990s. Political scientists were able to observe how the Nordic countries started to adopt increasingly diverging paths in terms of the development of their social policy (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 1).

Regardless of the increasingly diverging approaches to welfare policy towards 1990s, the Nordic countries continued to exhibit distinct commonalities on the level public discourse. These commonalities manifested in an increasingly critical approach towards the sustainability of the welfare state, also in the academic research, but more enduring in the practical political deliberations (Lavelle 2008, 154–156). Most importantly, “the discourse concerning social policy [...] moved from emphasizing the pitfalls of social security in securing the welfare of the citizens to underscoring the concern about the costs and incentive effects of social security and taxation,” also leading to sociological analyses claiming that the legitimacy and “support for the welfare state is declining in the long run” (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 235–236). This discursive shift created favorable conditions for the rise of right-wing populist parties, not least by undermining the political stability and the trust in traditional political parties that the previously relatively consensual, social-democracy dominated approach to the welfare state politics served to uphold (Rydgren 2006, 38–39).

Although there have been parties trying to link tax populism to various kinds of nationalism in the Nordic countries since the 1970s (Rydgren 2006, 1–2), the favorable conditions created by the discursive shift in the early 1990s did not initially result in much actual success in the political mobilization of the populist parties in the Nordic EU-countries, who only started to expand and consolidate electoral support more than a decade later in the mid-2000s (see graph 1 in 1.1). After the 2011 parliamentary elections in Finland, several media researchers have argued that the proliferation of the ongoing discourse depicting the Nordic model as being threatened by the EU, the Euro and the “economically irresponsible ‘PIGS countries’<sup>2</sup>”, contributed significantly to the victory of the right-

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2 Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.

wing populist Perussuomalaiset party (Tervonen-Gonçalves and Oinonen 2012, 9).

Political scientists account the initial lack of success in populist mobilization early concessions to neo-liberal and right-wing parties by the social democrats (Lavelle 2008, 144), but also to the underdevelopment of practical leadership and organization among the European populist parties, rendering them unprepared to make use of the changed political opportunity structures during the recession (Mudde 2007, 263–264). Even though researchers of populism agree that changes in political opportunity structures (and the demand-side of the political climate in general) can “potentially explain similar development [in party support] in very different settings” (Mudde 2007, 202), the macro-level sociocultural developments in the conditions for political mobilization cannot account why such political parties fail in their attempts make use of “a fertile ground” and effectively facilitate mobilization (Van der Brug 2005, 563). For instance, in the Swedish case, the breakdown of the *Ny Demokrati* in early 1990s and the meager electoral success of the *Sverigedemokraterna* in the early 2000s, is typically attributed to the failures in the parties’ media strategies, leading to difficulties in creating “a sufficiently respectable façade” – rather than the parties being regarded as xenophobic and potentially anti-democratic (Rydgren 2006, 120).

The construction of a respectable façade as the prerequisite for sustained support can render identifying a successful populist party as belonging into the radical right a perilous task (Mudde 2007, 32). This is partly because nationalism, anti-elitism and anti-establishment mentality – the traditional key markers of radical right populism (Mudde 2007, 66; Schedler 1996, 303) – easily become interpreted among the wider public as the kind of radicalism that undermines a populist party’s attempts to portray itself as socially acceptable. In contrast, focusing on the role of state and national solidarity in sustaining welfare economy is a relatively respectable endeavor that “has never failed to engage people’s minds” in the Nordic context (Rydgren 2006, 121).

This focus, although shared with the established parties, opens the avenues for the right-wing populist parties – such as the *Perussuomalaiset* – to criticize the perceived widening of the sociocultural

cleavage. One way to build a respectable façade for welfare nationalist populism is to raise the abstraction level from the more policy-oriented agenda towards emphasizing national solidarity, often by various reinterpretations of the so-called “primordial argument.” Originally, the concept of primordial argument was introduced by T.H. Marshall in his ground-breaking work on post-war citizenship theory, defined in quite general terms as the notion that citizenship “requires a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession” (1992 [1949], 24).

Nordic literature on immigration suggests that nationalist, typically anti-diversity interpretations of this primordial argument can be made to resonate strongly in the Nordic countries – not only in monolingual Denmark and Norway, but also in bilingual Finland – where the perception of a long tradition of national homogeneity has remained relatively uncontested up until 2000s (Lepola 2000, 21). The welfare nationalist narratives of primordialist juxtaposition of welfare redistribution and increasing heterogeneity have some parallels within the academic literature on welfare states, too. Especially before the extensive empirical studies on multiculturalist policies in the mid-2000s (see, for example, Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Crepaz 2008), many political philosophers argued that the logical outcome of increasing societal heterogeneity is the erosion of solidarity and growing tax resistance, since: “if the ties that bind you to increasingly diverse fellow citizens are loosened, you are likely to be less inclined to share your resources with them” (Wolfe 1997, 28).

Finnish studies of racism and xenophobia suggest that in the 2000s – an era marked by the growing scepticism towards the sustainability of the welfare state in the Nordic EU-countries – the reappropriation of the primordial argument benefitted the right-wing populists. Narratives grounded in the primordial argument opened an avenue for employing and justifying exclusionary nationalist and xenophobic arguments in neo-populist mobilization also in the mainstream publicity, for example by interpreting certain mediatized violent crime cases as evidence of how ethnic heterogenization is threatening the national security (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 12; Keskinen 2014).

Finnish research on electoral behaviour suggests that this suc-



cessful mainstreaming of anti-immigration narratives during the late 2000s can be seen in the ability of the *Perussuomalaiset* to increasingly attract middle class constituencies (Rahkonen 2011, 433–434). In Finland, the neo-populists’ success in mainstreaming their exclusionary narratives in public debate is regarded as facilitated in part by the failure of traditional parties’ overly careful strategy “to silence the criticism towards immigration politics to death”, even as late as during the campaigning for the parliamentary elections of 2008 (Puuronen 2011, 207; Hannula 2011). In the public debate on immigration politics, neo-populists were able to dub themselves supposedly benign, moderate and analytical “immigration critics” (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 10–11). By monopolizing the term, they could also present their political opponents as the small, irresponsible elite, often constructing derogatory and distinctly gendered figures such as “the lady with flowery hat” (Maasilta 2012, 75–78; Keskinen 2011, 118–119). It can be argued that by employing this rhetoric, the neo-populists were able to represent themselves as “blue-and-white” voices in a debate, whereas others are, by default, unpatriotic in their neglect of “the legacy of the Finnish welfare state.”

In the next section of this chapter – drawing from the contemporary literature on media studies and right-wing populism – I will further discuss the narrative agency of the right-wing populist advocates, particularly concerning their ability to position themselves favorably in mediatized arenas of public debate.

### **2.3 Promoting Neo-Populist Advocacy in Mediatized Arenas through Strategic Social Action**

In the previous sections of this chapter, I explored how the critical research on nationalism and the literature on historical trajectories in the development of the Nordic welfare state ideology form a useful starting point for explaining how the context-sensitive favorable conditions for proliferating narratives of anti-immigration advocacy came about in Finland. However, even though much of the contemporary literature on the electoral success of right-wing populism tends to focus on these demand-based, macro-level explanations

(Mudde 2007, 8), the political opportunity structures do not simply translate to the growing right-wing populist advocacy. Overemphasizing the demand-based explanatory avenues runs the risk of overlooking populist *agency*, and reduce its advocates to little more than a “hapless victims” of economic or demographic externalities (Berman 1997, 102). A sound theoretical approach must thus complement the demand-based approaches with a discussion on how right-wing populist advocates can organize internally and present themselves in public arenas in order to capitalize on the demand for welfare nationalist politics, or even further increase its demand. This entails a discussion of the literature in media studies, illustrating how nationalist and populist movements may facilitate a successful entry into the public debate and the political mainstream.

While conventional wisdom in political science regards “party positioning in the competitive space [as] an important determinant of political outcomes,” the study of political communication suggests that this significance of positioning is severely limited by the party’s capacity to reach the potential constituencies with their mobilizing narratives (Ellinas 2010, 3). In order to maximize this communicative capacity, the successful use of – and good contacts to – media are crucial. This is not only because it helps to communicate their message to wider audiences than they could otherwise reach with their own resources, but also because requisite mainstream visibility can “confer legitimacy and authority to political newcomers,” particularly when the social acceptability of their agenda is questioned to the degree that anti-immigration narratives are (ibid.).

Indeed, recent media research points to the conclusion that “the fortunes of the Far Right largely depend” on two interlinked factors: “how the mainstream parties compete over national identity issues and on how the media treat the Far Right” (Ellinas 2010, 21). The interlinkedness of these two considerations is important to note in this study because, as the history of immigration politics in the Nordic countries testifies, a successful and visible entry of anti-immigration advocates into the public debate exerts a strong pressure on the mainstream parties. The more conservative parties typically feel particularly compelled to respond to people’s immigration-related fears in order to mitigate the loss of votes to other parties (Roemer, Lee and Straeten 2007, 199, 320). In doing so, however,

the mainstream parties further facilitate the political saliency of an anti-immigration political agenda and bring them closer to the political mainstream (Ellinas 2010, 28). By forcing the mainstream parties to compete over issues of national identity in public fora, neo-populist advocates may actively generate favorable political opportunity structures and media saliency, rather than merely depend on them as external conditions for their success (Mudde 2007, 276).

The strategy of forcing the mainstream parties into competing over issues of immigration is only rendered feasible for the neo-populist advocates of exclusionary welfare nationalism through relatively high levels of media exposure, without which the mainstream parties are able to remain silent on issues that can potentially hurt them. Indeed, research on European populism suggests that media indifference towards anti-immigration advocates may be a much larger obstacle for their popular success than unsympathetic coverage (Mazzoleni 2003, 8–9; Mudde 2007, 251; Ellinas 2009, 219–220; Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 501). Mudde attributes this to the “logic of media populism” that – especially in a tabloid context – is based on “personalization, emotionalization and an antiestablishment attitude” (Mudde 2007, 249–251). As these features are regarded as shared with the logic of party populism, too, right-wing populists already have the tools at their disposal to formulate narratives that are lucrative for tabloid media to cover. Once anti-immigration advocacy reaches the position of a media phenomenon, the advocates are increasingly able to bring their political agenda to the fore (Hannula 2011, 180).

Political science has traditionally emphasized the importance of personalized, charismatic leadership that gives the face for a populist party, anchoring its position to be repeatedly discussed in the media (see, for example, Taggart 2000, 75; Weyland 2001, 5). However, more recent research on right-wing populism suggest that after the electoral breakthrough, the relative importance of this charismatic figurehead in the successful facilitation of media exposure seems to fade (Ignazi 2006; Mudde 2007, 261–262). A recent media study suggests that during the post-breakthrough period there are more interesting and juicy news to be found by focusing on the internal strife and cleavages within the populist camp, allowing new political characters to be presented in the popular, archetypical news frames

of the villain, the victim and the tragic hero (Van Gorp 2010, 86).

This interpretation is further supported by observing how the attempts to devise concrete policy solutions to meet abstract political goals – embedded in a national identity-based political agenda of right-wing populism – bring about internal fragmentation into the ranks of anti-immigration advocates, often leading to the kind of political drama that the mainstream media is keen to comment on. On the one hand, “[t]hemes related to national identity are ideal for politicization because of their great emotional potential and because they do not always create concrete policy commitments” and “because they do not confront similar pressures to moderate their appeals” (Ellinas 2010, 27–29). On the other hand, this “programmatic flexibility granted by its opposition status” also easily translates to dissension in the ranks, because it is rarely easy to agree what kind of policy-level implementation a certain, relatively abstract and radical formulation entails. In a sense, the media can provide “a venue for direct communication with voters but at the expense of organizational development” (Ellinas 2010, 74).

For the reasons considered earlier, such “bad publicity” might be considered good publicity, at least in the breakthrough period, because it facilitates persistent media visibility. Later on, after the exposure is established, this might be less beneficial, as the critical exposure undermines the ability of anti-immigration advocates to present themselves as a serious political force to be reckoned with (Ellinas 2010, 206–207). Regardless of whether the critical media exposure can advance the public acceptability of welfare nationalist politics and neo-populist advocacy, there is not always much the advocates are able to do to counter this development. The largest challenges are commonly considered to relate to their relative lack of organization and concrete political guidelines. Although many right-wing populist parties have resorted to relatively autocratic internal leadership in order to sustain electoral support against internal fragmentation, these attempts have met with only varying levels of success, and among the more successful instances of electoral persistence one finds “parties with several strong leadership figures” (Mudde 2007, 270–271), who may be taking the party to different directions.

While the programmatic flexibility and divided leadership may

give many opportunities for media to illustrate the ambiguity in neo-populist advocacy, skilled social actors within neo-populist movements can actually nurture this ambiguity so as to develop a loose political movement into a resonant collective identity with open-ended strategic action (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 51–52). For example, when expendable neo-populist discussants present radical arguments against immigration in public – and face critical media coverage that seeks to position neo-populists as racists – the neo-populists may publicly shun or expel these members. In so doing, they can illustrate strong leadership in being able to delineate how anti-immigration political agenda can be narrated in public, thereby positioning themselves favorably towards the more moderate advocates in the (potential) neo-populist constituency. At the same time, they may internally justify their actions to the radicals in strategic terms – sympathizing with the demands for heightened mechanisms for controlling immigration while also emphasizing instrumental importance in maintaining a respectable public façade for neo-populism.

Unsympathetic media coverage of neo-populist advocacy may also open avenues for strategic social action. Successful narratives for confronting delegitimizing subject positioning may construct “the elite media” as a common enemy and thereby promote a sense of internal unity among neo-populist advocates. Media researchers have pointed out that Finnish neo-populists have been able to present themselves as brave media martyrs (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 47–49), thereby adopting the common populist position of underdogs; fighting the unfair war against the elite media “with bows and arrows facing an adversary using heavy artillery, bombers, missiles” (Copsey 1996, 123). Claiming to be harassed, silenced and misrepresented in mainstream publicity can also be employed as a persuasive media strategy by neo-populist advocates who seek public sympathy of the moderates. Here the most commonly employed justificatory narratives make use of the concept freedom of speech, since it is “especially susceptible to being mobilized for political interests because of [its] unquestioned and mythological status that prevents the critical examination of [its] premises” (Garnham 2000, 165–166; Karppinen 2007, 25; Keskinen 2012).

The introduction of new forms of media can also facilitate the

capacity of neo-populist advocates to position themselves and their narratives advantageously in the public debate, and make the most use of their victimized subject position. Political historians agree that successful adaptation to a new media environment has been proven to change the fortunes of political movements rapidly, allowing (neo-)populists to employ novel strategies for developing a diverse range of contextually alternating narratives consolidating popular support among their heterogeneous potential constituencies. For example, contemporary literature in journalism research points to the conclusion that the increasing accessibility of, and exposure to, a chaotic flow of information is rapidly creating more demand for opinion-journalism (for a brief discussion on increasing demands “participative journalism,” see Cammaerts and Carpentier 2007, 88–89). Several media studies have pointed out that online communities have responded to this challenge by taking the form of more or less hermetic “sphericules” (Gitlin 1998; Papacharissi 2002; Galston 2003) or “information cocoons” (Sunstein 2009).

Within these sphericules a sense of communality can be constructed through debates that take largely place in discursive isolation from the public sphere at large; a process which may “contribute to the diminution of a shared public culture, as the communicative environment of politics for different groups separates from each other” (Dahlgren 2009, 49, 164). Quite like the introduction of televised political debates allowed small and emerging parties to successfully develop new performative vocabularies (Ellinas 2010, 31), neo-populists’ cyber-campaigning in the 2000s made increasing use of social media and various online fora as means for internal communication and as recruiting bases for more radical constituencies (Römmele 2003, 17–18). These online sites can facilitate a sense of an open horizontal and vertical communication among the advocates in the neo-populist collectivity. Jointly interpreting contemporary events within the sphericules amongst likeminded advocates with different formal and informal statuses can help neo-populist advocates to consolidate a common political agenda and a mutual understanding concerning the practices and policy tools at their disposal (Norris 2003, 42–43).

As the neo-populist sphericules do not welcome contesting interpretations within their boundaries but tend to be marked by a distinct

degree of closure, the online discussants are often able to brainstorm with little exposure to any critical interference from the highly contentious public sphere outside. Those who increasingly exchange ideas between the likeminded advocates within sphericule arenas may become more prone to interpret any critique against neo-populism in the public sphere at large as evidence that its advocates are discriminated against by the elite-controlled media. This may further facilitate the internalization of a “silenced pariah” subject position among the populist advocates (Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012, 130). At the same time, some – typically young – online discussants are keen on making their own sphericule’s interpretations of contemporary events acknowledged in the wider public sphere, thus devising mainstreamed narratives for proliferating neo-populist political agenda (Cammaerts and Carpentier 2007, 265–266).

Political discussions containing xenophobic or nationalist articulations that may not be considered acceptable in mainstream media do, however, reach new potential constituencies in social media. This applies particularly to the IT-adept “Dot.Net generation” of 15-28 year-olds which the literature on political science has traditionally considered difficult reach with traditional means of political mobilization (Zukin et al. 2006, viii). During the period of rapid social media expansion in the early 2000s in Finland, the populist online communities were among the first ones to organize (Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 14–16). As the support for right-wing populism has been steadily growing among the Dot.Net generation whose political activity increasingly takes place on online arenas (Vaalitutkimuskonsortio 2012), their exposure to issues that are salient in public debates is becoming increasingly framed by sphericule-specific neo-populist narratives.

Media researchers exploring the internal dynamics of these close-knit online communities point out that the debates in social media often do not entail actual analyses concerning issues of shared interest. Rather, they fortify a sense of communality, shared identity and purpose by adopting a common language, narrative tropes and interpretative frames (Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 19; Vänni 2009). Within right-wing populist online activism, these narratives typically sketch an idealized vision of “our society” where unwanted

phenomena (for example, “multiculturalism”) would be eradicated. This can radicalize advocates of the political movement to interpret contemporary events in binary terms; as simply either impediments or facilitators for the realization political goals on which there is very little critical exchange inside the movement (Witschge 2007, 146–147).

While the lack of critical public exchange on their welfare nationalist political agenda is often interpreted by Finnish neo-populists as evidence of them being silenced by the elite media, media researchers tend to agree that many of the challenges populist movements face in the mainstream publicity are common to most aspiring political movements (Dahlgren 2009, 50–53). Moreover, the Finnish neo-populists’ sense of alienation is exacerbated by the confrontational and provocative narratives through which they position themselves as victims. They also commonly position their political opposition into distinctly reified populist enemy categories – such as “the small, but vocal minority” or “the political elite, far distanced from the common man” (Canovan 2005, 74–76; Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012, 110). Such rhetoric is likely to further discourage the established parties from engaging in dialogue with Finnish neo-populists in their uncompromising terms (Maasilta 2012, 9–11). While this narrative practice may be successful in promoting a sense of collective identity within neo-populist sphericule arenas, it is also commonly believed to hamper their ability to promote exchange on issues in their political agenda in the wider public sphere and the mainstream arenas.

Indeed, by attaching the stigma of elitism to those seeking to publicly question the viability of exclusionary politics of immigration, neo-populists can effectively dodge the inconvenient, policy-oriented criticism and present individual targets – public discussants and members of the government – as the scapegoats for the arguably immigration-related challenges (Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 497–498). As such, the quick adoption of the subject positions of “the silenced whistleblower” and “the pariah in the media war” can be understood in terms of nurturing a collective identity in an environment perceived as hostile. Many neo-populist advocates may want to rely on hermetic in-group sphericules as more accessible source of information (Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann



2012, 107). Paradoxically, though, this closure largely follows from their own endeavors to insulate their political agenda from criticism in the public sphere.

## 2.4 Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Consolidation of Welfare Nationalist Narratives

The three critical perspectives to welfare nationalism discussed in the previous three sections relate to the general features of nationalist boundary-drawing narratives, to the historical development of political narratives on welfare solidarity in Finland and the mediated narratives for developing neo-populist advocacy into a resonant collective identity and its favorable positioning in the mainstream media. They each serve to elucidate a specific category of narrative resources available for neo-populists seeking to consolidate an exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity. The theoretical framework presented in this chapter is based on these three interlinked dynamics that will be used as analytical lenses to guide the analysis. Each of the empirical chapters (4–6) employs a particular set of lenses, based on an assessment of which of the dynamics are deemed most relevant for the purpose of illustrating the narratives for neo-populist consolidation of exclusionary welfare solidarity in a particular set of data. Next, I will present these lenses and the way in which they are triangulated in the subsequent chapters of analysis. I conclude this chapter by pointing to the research questions I seek to pursue by employing these analytical lenses.

The first analytical lens, *nationalist boundary-drawing*, focuses on illustrating the flexible use of narrative resources in welfare nationalist boundary-drawing and exclusion, discussed in 2.1. It underlines how the exclusionary categories of “the people” and “the nation” are constructed in narratives by selectively emphasizing certain markers of blue-and-white national identity. This lens is used in the analysis to illustrate how different markers of identity are employed in narratives that construct a bounded frame of reference, through which sentiments of national safety, belonging and solidarity can be portrayed as being threatened by externalized developments, such as immigration.

The boundary-drawing lens is the most abstract of the three lenses because it underlines the open-endedness in the use of cultural repertoires in narratives that seek of a sense of communality and unity in a modern nation state. Indeed, the nationalist logic at play in the use of such repertoires is not specific to the particular subject matter of this dissertation. Employing this lens makes it possible to emphasize how the flexible applicability of the nationalist narratives of “people building” can be operationalized in welfare nationalist political mobilization. It also supports the illustration of how the welfare nationalist narratives that belong in this long-standing tradition of nationalist boundary-work have been employed in Finnish public debate on immigration, consolidating a “public philosophy” (Favell 2001, 14–16) of exclusionary welfare solidarity.

With regard to boundary-drawing, abstractness and flexibility are two sides of the same coin. The fact that the reference point for categories such as “the nation” and “the people” is, in Laclau’s terms, perpetually suspended (2005, 131), means that the advocates of welfare nationalism can make contextually informed assessments concerning which markers of identity and difference should be emphasized in a particular narrative. Even when the narratives employed may be at odds with each other, together they can still contribute to a particularistic public understanding concerning how the boundaries of national belonging should be drawn.

For instance, by asserting that immigration challenges the economic sustainability of the welfare state, welfare nationalist narratives promote a kind of public understanding of “the people” whereby the capacity for economic self-sustainability is presented as a key marker of national belonging. Such a boundary-drawing narrative can then be employed for the purposes of justifying a political agenda that aims to exclude immigrant outsiders from welfare redistribution.

To continue with this example, the boundary-drawing lens can render the flexibility of blue-and-white narrative resources visible in the data by identifying how welfare nationalists seek to justify the public spending for non-self-sustainable people. These narratives underlining the importance of maternity leave or elderly care – items of welfare expenditure that also rank highly in the right-wing populist agenda – use a very different set of markers for nation-

al belonging while operating within the same logic of nationalist boundary-drawing.

In short, the boundary-drawing lens is used in this dissertation to draw attention to the common features in the welfare nationalist narratives of inclusion and exclusion, particularly to their flexible use of symbolic boundaries of belonging.

While the boundary-drawing lens focuses on revealing the ubiquitous aspects that are present in welfare nationalist narratives, the second analytical lens, *welfare state idealization*, is employed in this dissertation with the purpose of revealing what is particular to the Finnish narratives that promote an exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity. Through this lens, it becomes possible to illustrate how the strong legacy of the social democratic welfare state has created some highly specific, contextual narrative repertoires that can both reinterpret and resonate with a public understanding of what the nation as a “community of value” (Bridget Anderson 2013, 2–5) stands for in Finland.

In more concrete terms, focusing on welfare state idealizations makes it possible to understand why Finnish right-wing nationalism may appear quite leftist in its agenda on social policy – not only in a global perspective but also within the Finnish political climate as well. Indeed, through this lens, it is possible to illustrate how narratives reconstruct empowering capabilities of the welfare state – idealizing elements such as the strong statism, consensual decision-making, instrumental efficiency and the citizen as stakeholder in the welfare state – thereby narrating an exclusionary political agenda as built on the public support for these seemingly benign idealizations of the welfare state.

These notions enjoy such widespread public support in Finland that their use can furnish contested narratives in public debate with an important degree of social acceptability. By successfully grounding an exclusionary political agenda in idealized narratives of welfare state, arguments that might otherwise be considered in mainstream publicity to carry a stigma of populism, xenophobia or radicalism may transcend party political divisions and redefine some of the fundamental norms among a great variety of citizens and political actors across the political spectrum. Therefore, the application of the second analytic lens in the analyses reveals how

idealized, blue-and-white notions of the welfare state are juxtaposed with the “reality” in which the welfare solidarity that supposedly maintains these idealized institutions is being eroded by influences external to the welfare state, particularly by immigration.

The two first analytical lenses described above pertain to quite different types of narrative resources available to the promotion of exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity. Even so, both lenses can still be applied in the analysis of narratives produced by any kinds of political actors in Finland – from ministers in the government to grassroots political actors – regardless of how implicitly or explicitly their narratives draw symbolic boundaries or reinterpret the legacy of the Finnish welfare state. This is possible because the property that these lenses share is that they are employed to reveal features and properties in any Finnish welfare solidarity pertinent narratives.

The third analytical lens, *strategic neo-populist social action*, is, however, different in this respect. While the lenses of *nationalist boundary-drawing* and *welfare state idealization* can be used to analyze narratives developed by great variety of public discussants, this lens focuses on narratives authored by people who identify as neo-populist advocates, emphasizing the strategic social action in the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy into a resonant collective identity and for positioning neo-populist advocacy favorably in various arenas of public debate.

The main purpose for complementing the theoretical framework with this lens is that it allows for the analysis of neo-populist narrative agency in the rapid growth in public and electoral support of right-wing populism in Finland. As discussed in more detail in section 2.3, in order to compete against other political actors in public space, right-wing populists must be able to politicize issues of national identity and the related boundary-work of belonging in public debate. The ability of the neo-populist advocates to achieve this depends on how acceptably they are able to narrate their welfare nationalist political agenda in public and on their ability to bring these narratives into mediatised arenas of public debate. In addition to these considerations, the *strategic neo-populist social action* also allows analyzing how neo-populist narratives manifest the social skill required to develop the divided support for an open-ended welfare

nationalist political agenda into a resonant collective identity. As such, this lens focuses on the strategic social action employed when narrating neo-populist advocacy in a manner that “help[s] induce cooperation from people by appealing to their identity, belief and interests, while at the same time using those same stories to frame actions against various opponents” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 50–51).

The lens of populist subject positioning is therefore employed in this dissertation for the purpose of analyzing the narrative practices with which the political advocates of nationalist populism – both the party members and grassroots level public discussants – are seeking to establish and sustain media saliency and favorable public exposure for themselves and their political agenda, and present themselves as a political force representing “the Finnish people.” The narrative agency highlighted through the use of this analytical lens pertains to the contextual management of open-ended, even conflicting narratives across various arenas of public debate. The social skill this lens focuses on manifests in the coordination of collective action that produces a resonant collective identity while pursuing several lines of action simultaneously. It supports the analysis concerning the consolidation of the diverse range of neo-populist narratives with different functions. A good example of consolidation of conflicting narratives is the mobilization new, young constituencies through online arenas of public debate while editing the more radical and xenophobic nationalist narratives developed in hermetic sphericules of social media into subtler arguments concerning the implications of immigration to social policy when reaching for audiences in mainstream arenas of public debate. Another example would be responding to critics in media by positioning them as “elites” or “ladies with flowery hats” while adopting the subject position of the underdogs in the media war, bravely sacrificing themselves in the name of freedom of speech and the future of “our” Finnish welfare state.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this theoretical framework – built around the three analytical lenses – serves as a tool for conducting the empirical analyses. As such, this framework, and particularly the hierarchical ordering of the three lenses, should not be taken to suggest that the public narratives of exclusionary

welfare solidarity are always examined in this study by consistently using each of the three lenses. Rather, considering that the research object alternates in the three chapters of analysis between narratives produced by public officials, politicians, online activists and other grassroots level advocates, the empirical analysis triangulates between the three lenses in a non-hierarchical manner – largely depending on which actors, audiences and arenas a particular data set pertains to.

Indeed, this triangulation is an important element of the analysis as it makes possible to capture the flexible use of narrative resources through which advocates of welfare nationalism are able, for example, to downplay some of their central boundary-drawing narratives when seeking to secure favorable media coverage in a mainstream arena of public debate.

For the purposes of presenting a lucid analytical narrative and documentation of this doctoral research, there are, however, certain advantages in structuring this study on the proliferation of exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity in immigration-related public debates around the three lenses. Most importantly, this research design facilitates the operationalization of the research aims (presented in chapter 2) into clear-cut sets of research questions, each pertaining to a specific dimension. The research questions for this study are:

1. How do welfare nationalist narratives operationalize the nationalist, blue-and-white conceptualizations of “the nation” and “the people”? What kinds of narratives link these concepts to the politics of immigration and delineate an exclusionary set of criteria for belonging to the Finnish national community?
2. How are idealized reinterpretations concerning the legacy of the welfare state narrated as the foundation of the welfare nationalist political agenda? What kind of public understanding of welfare solidarity do these mediatized neo-populist narratives promote?
3. How do the neo-populist advocates facilitate salient media exposure for their political presence in various arenas of public debate? How do they seek to make use of this exposure and consolidate support from heterogeneous political constituencies into a resonant neo-populist collective identity?

While each of these sociological research questions relate to the contemporary academic debates within critical nationalism studies, they also contribute to different research traditions. The first question contributes to the literature on political sociology, reassessing how welfare nationalist narratives can be used in neo-populist delineation of national belonging. The second provides an opportunity to assess how the political history of the Finnish welfare state as a seedbed for exclusionary welfare nationalism may have contributed to the recent neo-populist electoral successes. The third research question seeks to bridge a gap between media studies, political science and political sociology, contributing to a coherent understanding of how neo-populist advocates can narrate their collective action so that it consolidates the support for an open-ended welfare nationalist political agenda between divergent constituencies into a resonant collective identity that consistently reaches salient exposure in mediatized public debates.

These contributions, only briefly summarized here, will be discussed in detail in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, also addressing the question of how triangulating focus between the narratives by different actors facilitates a better understanding of public opinion forming in civil society at large.

In the next chapter, I will present the collection and coding of the data sets to be analyzed in the chapters 4-6, also outlining the methodological operationalization of my theoretical framework and the research questions.

## 3

# Studying the Narratives Employed in the Consolidation of Blue-and-White Welfare Nationalism

This chapter describes the development of the research design of this study. I first illustrate the progression of the data collection process and then continue to present the priorities guiding the coding of the data sets for the empirical analysis. In the final subsection, I demonstrate the methodological operationalization of the research design for the purposes of producing a lucid analytical narrative of the neo-populist consolidation of welfare nationalism in the Finnish public debate.

### 3.1 Collecting the Data in the Key Arenas of Public Debate

The data for the empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation was collected in three phases during the period of seven years, from 2008 to 2014. This process of data collection was progressive in the sense that the earlier data collection phases informed the subsequent collection of data by introducing new sets of criteria according to which data was collected. In this section I present the developing



process of data collection in detail<sup>3</sup>.

The initial phase of data collection began in 2008, when I was leading the planning of a joint article with two other doctoral researchers (Pyrhönen, Creutz and Weide 2015). The parts in this article that were authored by me were eventually developed into the first chapter of empirical analysis of this dissertation (chapter 4). The key considerations in the collection of data for this article must be discussed in some detail, because they eventually developed the research agenda of the whole dissertation towards examining public debate on immigration, thereby informing the subsequent data collection process at large.

The core aim of the original article was to illustrate how the boundaries of national belonging are discursively reproduced in the Finnish high political debates during the 2000s. In order to collect data that can be operationalized for the purposes of conducting qualitative content analysis on discursive reproduction of national identity in the high political arena, the first task was to focus on a particular process of legislative development that would serve as a source for collecting a rich corpus of data on debates on national identity. The decision to focus on immigration-related legislation was justified by three important considerations.

Firstly, the academic literature concerning the recent politicization of immigration in various European countries during the late 1900s and early 2000s suggests that questions of national identity tend to become particularly accentuated in conjunction of political debates on immigration. Indeed, based on his extensive research on nation-specific “public philosophies” of integration in several European countries, Adrian Favel has identified national identity and fragmentation of the civil society – rather than actual immigration policy measures – as common sources of the heated contention in public debate on immigration. According to Favell, “[i]mmigration, and the citizenship questions it invites, is a political issue that can, if it unsettles any of the other social, class, or regional divisions that characterizes these societies, rapidly throw into doubt much broader assumptions about the bases of social and political integration in a nation: its moral and cultural identity, in short” (2001, 22).

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3 An exhaustive listing of all the data analyzed is presented in the Appendix A.

Secondly, by the 1990s Finland – having remained a country of emigration up until 1980s – had faced several challenges in harmonizing its immigration legislation with the several international treaties and, eventually, with European Union membership guidelines. This incited public debate on immigration that challenged the traditional understanding that regarded Finland's legal responsibilities to apply only to Finnish citizens (Lepola 2000, 44–48).

Thirdly, these two considerations set the context for the exceptionally encompassing legislative review during the period from 2000-2004 that led to enacting the Aliens Act of 2004 that incorporated a hearing process of 60 NGOs, something unprecedented in the Finnish legislative history. The debates taking place in the course of this legislative review – and in the preparatory process it entailed – were, therefore, deemed to provide an excellent source to collect the data from for the purposes of analyzing discursive reproduction of Finnish national identity and the drawing of boundaries of national belonging.

The first empirical chapter (chapter 4, “Conceptualizations of Exclusionary Welfare Solidarity in the High Political Arena Prior to the Rise of Neo-Populism”) uses two sets of data, both of which are collected from the documents and the background material pertaining to the revision of the Finnish Aliens Act of 2004. The first data set consists of background documents and memoranda produced in preparatory process of the Act, dating from 1999 to 2004, and an interview with the Legislative Councillor Jorma Kantola, the public official in charge for the preparation of the Aliens Act in the Ministry of Interior. This data set covers approximately 600 sheets of documents.

The second data set consists of the minutes of six Finnish parliamentary debates between 2002 and 2004. Five of these debates discuss the Aliens Act of 2004 and one debate discusses the Integration Act of 2002. The debate on Integration Act of 2002 was included in the second data set in order to evaluate whether the narratives of national identity are somehow exceptional in the debate on Aliens Act or whether another parliamentary debate on immigration-related topic contains similar national identity reproducing narratives. Together these debates in the second data set cover some two hun-

dred addresses to the parliamentary floor by seventy Finnish MPs.<sup>4</sup> The interview was conducted in December 2008 and the rest of the data in the first two data sets was collected in 2009 and 2010.

The decision to collect data on immigration policy debates, and the subsequent analysis of this data, informed the development of the research agenda of this doctoral study. Having produced results concerning the welfare nationalist narratives on immigration control in the high political arena, I soon realized the importance of comparing these findings with an analysis of welfare nationalist narratives in other contexts of political debate. Reviewing the academic literature on nationalism, and particularly on its banal and everyday variants, suggested that – notwithstanding the symbolic significance of the legislative process in the reproduction of national identity – the vast majority of articulations of national identity takes place in civil society outside the strictly political sphere (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 186; Saukkonen 2007, 33). The next phase of data collection would, therefore, have to focus on the less formal arenas of public debate.

This phase of data collection, conducted in 2011, produced two data sets to be analyzed in a peer-reviewed article (Pyrhönen 2013) which was eventually developed into the second empirical chapter (chapter 5, “The Neo-Populist Breakthrough and the Mainstreaming of the Blue-and-White Political Agenda of Welfare Nationalism”). The aim of this chapter was to assess the narratives for presenting welfare nationalist politics in the mainstream publicity. That year was an exceptionally fruitful time to start collecting such data because of the campaigning for the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011. In the elections, the right-wing populist *Perussuomalaiset* party (PS) managed to muster support for their anti-immigration oriented, welfare nationalist political agenda to the extent that their number of MPs increased from 4 (in 2007) to 39 (out of 200 seats). As a result of the neo-populist campaigning and the electoral result, there was extensive media coverage on the topic of immigration politics that PS raised as the key issue on the political agenda. This

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4 The exhaustive list of the addresses to the parliament floor in the Aliens Act debates in the second data set – quoted and translated in chapter 4 – is presented in the Appendix B: Original Quotations from the Parliamentary Debates on the Aliens Act of 2004.

provided an excellent opportunity to collect data for exploring the welfare nationalist mobilization narratives and its commentaries in the public debate right before and after this critical turning point in the Finnish political climate.

The data used in the fifth chapter is separated into two data sets. First of all, it was deemed important to collect data as data set that would allow the analysis of the mobilization narratives employed by the PS. This third data set consists of two electoral manifestos by PS, used in their most successful electoral campaigns. The first manifesto was prepared for the municipal elections of 2008 (*Perussuomalaiset* rp. 2008) and the second one for the parliamentary elections of 2011 (*Perussuomalaiset* rp. 2011). This data set also includes the only part of data collected from outside Finland, the electoral manifesto of the Swedish right-wing populist party *Sverigedemokraterna* for 2010 parliamentary elections (*Sverigedemokraterna* 2010). While the fifth chapter does not constitute a full-fledged comparative analysis, assessing the manifestos from both parties side by side underlines certain particularities in the mobilization rhetoric of Finnish neo-populists, especially concerning a distinctly welfare nationalist emphasis in comparison to its Swedish “sister-party”. Since this material is expressly presented to the public for the purpose of convincing as large a potential constituency as possible, the third data set pertains to a less formal, and in many respects “more public” arena of political debate on immigration, than the high political debates.

While the electoral manifestos provided a rich material for analyzing the neo-populist narrative agency in mobilizing new constituencies behind welfare nationalist political agenda, it was also important to somehow address the emergence of a novel mediatized phenomenon, the extensive coverage of the *Perussuomalaiset* in the mainstream media. Instead of focusing on the newspaper articles themselves, I wanted to analyze the grassroots level narratives for supporting neo-populist advocacy. As such, the fourth data set was collected from the largest online arena of public debate, the discussion boards of *Helsingin Sanomat* [HS] in the website of the Finland’s largest nationwide newspaper. This data set consists of a sample of three online discussion board threads, each consisting of a follow-up commentary of frontpage newspaper article, in which

a Finnish high-profile politician outlines ‘an immigration-related problem’. This data was collected from online debates that took place in 2009 (right after the smaller PS victory in municipal elections of 2008) and 2011 (one right before the electoral victory and one right after). The data was collected from this time period in order to have the fourth data set coincide with the time period from which the electoral manifestos included in the third data set originated (2008, 2010 and 2011). The threads selected for analysis were collected by adhering to three distinct selection criteria worth discussing in more detail.

Firstly, each of the three threads of online debate analyzed is based on a newspaper article in the Helsingin Sanomat (HS) that exhibits a critical evaluation of an immigration-related phenomenon, and is articulated by a high-ranking political actor. The articles are based, respectively, on statements by the Minister of Economy, Jyrki Katainen (Mölsä 2009), the PS leader Timo Soini (Helsingin Sanomat 2011a) and President Tarja Halonen (Silfverberg 2011).

Secondly, immigration had to be a central, reoccurring topic in each of the threads, defined as making an explicit reference to ‘immigration’ at least once per A4-sheet. With the discussion within each of the threads consisting of about 300 A4 sheets, this translates to at least 300 references to immigration per thread.

Thirdly, each of the threads included in the analysis belong among the ten most commented topics of the month the thread originates in, each thread consisting of more than 200 posts.<sup>5</sup> The minimum requirement 200 posts is a very high threshold that excluded the vast majority of debate threads. As a point of comparison, the average number of posts in the 17 most discussed threads of any topic in January 2011 was 173 posts per thread according to the HS. Any thread exceeding this threshold therefore signifies an exceptionally intense debate.

Posts from each of the three threads were coded using the Atlas.TI -program up until a saturation point is reached. Each of the

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5 It is important to note that the discussants participate in the debates anonymously using aliases, and sometimes submit posts that are not in accordance with the Finnish legislation against hate speech. Considering that the debates are being moderated by the HS staff, the number of posts submitted is likely to exceed the actual number of posts published online.

threads is considered saturated when, firstly, more than 50 posts are analyzed and, secondly, the number of posts **not** expressing support for anti-immigration oriented welfare nationalism (labelled as off-topic or anti-racism) exceeds the count of the anti-immigration narrative with the highest coded frequency in a given thread.

When I started planning the third and final chapter of empirical analysis in 2013 (chapter 6, “Scandalized Underdogs of Xenophobic Satirists? Consolidation of a Neo-Populist Collective Identity in Mediatized Contestations”), I wanted to focus on a new facet of collective advocacy of neo-populism and pursue the research aims with a different type of analysis. I had already previously analyzed how exclusionary conceptualizations of welfare solidarity in the high political arena contributed to a fertile ground for the emergence of Finnish neo-populism, and how their mobilization was facilitated by successfully mainstreamed welfare nationalist narratives. To complement these analyses, I focused on the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy as a resonant collective identity.

An important theoretical consideration that informed the data collection for chapter six was that academic literature on media studies and the neo-populist media use indicates that many of the collectivity-producing narratives originate from within relatively hermetic “sphericules” of social media outside the wider public sphere (Gitlin 1998; Papacharissi 2002; Galston 2003). I therefore decided to collect the data from two distinct arenas of online debate; a mainstream newspaper discussion board (*Helsingin Sanomat*) and a more intimate debating arena for the likeminded neo-populist advocates (*Hommaforum*).

Another theoretical consideration, corroborated by my initial empirical observations, informed this focus on data collection. During the electoral breakthrough period of the Perussuomalaiset party, the welfare nationalist justificatory narratives had often been used in the public debate to counter the critique according to which the anti-immigrant political agenda of the right-wing populists was built on racism and xenophobia (see, for example, Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a; Maasilta 2012). During the institutional persistence phase of the Finnish neo-populism, the public critique towards right-wing populism shifted away from their political agenda towards the actions of prominent neo-populist figures (for

more detailed assessment on the “breakthrough” and “persistence” phases in the lifecycle of populist political movements in Europe, see Mudde 2007, 232). Especially when news journalism started to increasingly focus on right-wing populist hate speech scandals after electoral breakthrough of the *Perussuomalaiset* in 2011, the public discussants found it increasingly difficult to position neo-populist advocacy favorably in the media without addressing the contested behavior of their figureheads. Instead, they often chose to employ various subject positioning narratives for reinterpreting the role of neo-populist advocacy behind events framed as scandals in the media. These narratives would commonly seek to either distance the discussants themselves, supposedly representing the great majority of sensible advocates of neo-populism, from the scandals, or alternatively seek to reinterpret the scandalized behavior as justifiable.

The sixth chapter presents a reconstruction of these mediatized narrative contestations of neo-populist advocacy as the catalysis of their identity-work after the electoral breakthrough of the *Perussuomalaiset* party. This is established by operationalizing and analyzing data collected from a mainstream arena and sphericule arena of online debates that pertain to two front page media scandals revolving around the allegations of racism and xenophobia against two *Perussuomalaiset* MPs.

The fifth data set analyzed in this chapter consists of a total 429 posts. With the single exception of the debate thread originating around the interpretative news article on “The Hirvisaari Case”, these posts are distributed evenly among six online debate threads, so that online discussion board threads are considered in both scandal cases (table 1).

	The Hirvisaari Case	The Halla-aho Case
<b>HS online debate: the descriptive news article</b>	(Helsingin Sanomat 2013a) 80/80 posts	(Helsingin Sanomat 2012a) 80/110 posts
<b>HS online debate: the interpretative news article</b>	(Helsingin Sanomat 2013b) 29/29 posts	(Helsingin Sanomat 2012b) 80/236 posts
<b>Homma online debate thread</b>	(Hommaforum 2013) 80/1158 posts	(Hommaforum 2012) 80/2718 posts

**Table 1. Online debate threads in the data set 5.**

For each scandal case, two mainstream threads and one sphericule thread are analyzed. In each of these threads, the discussants comment on newspaper articles published by *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS). For both scandal cases, two articles are considered. The first ones present the scandal story (Helsingin Sanomat 2012a; Helsingin Sanomat 2013a), while the second ones present how the subject of the scandal seeks to justify his actions (Helsingin Sanomat 2012b; Helsingin Sanomat 2013b).

For the mainstream arena, the data is collected from the HS online discussion boards<sup>6</sup>, one thread per each of the articles. The remaining two threads (Hommaforum 2013; Hommaforum 2012) are collected from a sphericule arena called *Hommaforum* (Homma), which I will briefly present in the following.

Founded in the beginning of 2009 by active discussants of the online blog by the *Perussuomalaiset* MP (since 2011) Jussi Halla-aho, Homma is a discussion forum with a strong “immigration critical” agenda (Hannula 2011, 145–146). According to the Homma moderators, the debate in Homma is conducted by some 9200 registered users (in February 2015), each whom can start a discussion by opening a discussion thread within dozens of “discussion rooms”. The volume of the debate in Homma totaled at some 1.7 million comments or posts, divided among all the threads since its founding in 2009 (“Hommaforum” 2015). Homma has been extensively covered in the mainstream media and is widely known among the

<sup>6</sup> Described in more detail as part of the presentation of the data set 4, earlier in this chapter.



Finnish population as a neo-populist arena of debate with close, but informal ties to the Perussuomalaiset party (Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 18–19).

The fifth data set is operationalized for narrative analysis by identifying and coding the right-wing populist subject positioning narratives in each of the six online threads by using Atlas.TI, up until a saturation point of 80 posts is reached. Setting the saturation point at 80 posts is based on the observation from the data collection process in the fourth data set, in where the discussion board debates started to rapidly generate more off-topic and self-referential posts after about 80 posts. Only one of the discussion board threads, HS Hirvisaari B, consists of less than 80 posts. For this thread, all 29 posts were included.

### **3.2 Coding the Data to Explore the Critical Turning Points in the Uses of Neo-Populist Mobilization Narratives**


Collecting the data progressively in several phases – each informed by the previous data collection phase – makes it possible to triangulate between different types of data. This allows reconstructing three critical turning points in the development of the arenas, the audiences and the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives. It must be emphasized here that identifying “critical turning points” in the data collected is primarily a rhetorical means for advancing the analytical narrative of this dissertation monograph – I do not suggest that these are *the* critical turning points through which (neo-) populist mobilization advances, even in the Finnish context. Using this term for the purposes of historical reconstruction underlines the importance in analyzing the introduction of certain interesting, previously less employed narratives and modes of strategic social action that occur before, during and after the political breakthrough of the Perussuomalaiset party (Taira 2008, 236–237). Another important caveat is that the empirical reality manifested in a “critical turning point” is fuzzy (Abbott 2001, 249–252). As such, I do not suggest that the turning points mark the emergence of particularly abrupt or pinpointable departures from longer historical trajectories or that they that render the previously employed ethno-cultural

and nativist logic inherent in (neo-)populist mobilization narratives somehow obsolete.

Being contextually sensitive in the analysis to the particularities in these critical turning points requires, however, that each of the three empirical chapters inductively approaches the data collected from separate arenas of public debate. This also means that the harmonized operationalization of the data between the chapters – beyond the common focus of collecting data on welfare nationalist narratives in immigration-related debates – is not a priority that informs the coding of the data. Instead, the guidelines for coding of the data are different with each of the data sets in order to explore the specificities in separate stages of the progressive consolidation of neo-populist advocacy of welfare nationalism.

The first step in operationalizing the data employed in each of the chapters exploring the critical turning points requires identifying the most appropriate arenas of public debate for the data collection. The first critical turning point in the exclusionary narration of welfare solidarity is the *politicization of role of the welfare state in the management of immigration*, analyzed in the first empirical chapter (chapter 4, “Conceptualizations of Exclusionary Welfare Solidarity in the High-Political Arena Prior to the Rise of Neo-Populism”). These politicizing narratives first manifested in the public debate within in the high political arena during the early 2000s, several years before the successful political mobilization of welfare nationalist political agenda by neo-populist advocates.

Contextual sensitivity to the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives was the key consideration in operationalizing the vast amount of data collected from the high political arena. This is established by coding the various narratives employed in the preparatory process and in the parliamentary debates with a particular regard to how immigration is conceptualized as a critical challenge for the future of the welfare state. This coding is both informed by the theoretical framework, specifically the analytical lenses of *nationalist boundary-drawing* and *welfare state idealization*, and an inductive content analysis of the first two data sets. In practice, this means searching the data for narratives that belong to one or more categories of welfare nationalist politicization of immigration, coded as *instrumentalism*, *civic solidarity*, *consensualism* and *statism* (figure 1, next page).



**Figure 1: Frames of high political narratives that link immigration control and the welfare state**

Each of the four codes pertains to a specific type of narrative through which political control of immigration is presented in the debates as having particularly significant implications to the welfare state. The model entails, firstly, that immigration is presented in the high political arena as a potential burden to the welfare state, necessitating an *instrumental* weighing of quantifiable pros against the cons. Immigration is further presented as a catalyst for the heterogenization of civil society, which in turn can erode the *solidarity*, to which the venerated Finnish tradition of *consensualist* decision-making is commonly linked in the Finnish public understanding (for critical commentaries on the Finnish solidarity-based consensualism, see Lepola 2000, 21; Förbom 2010, 10–12). Finally, with regard to this threat of eroding civic solidarity and consensualism, the statist frame refers to the use of narratives that emphasize the (welfare) state's overarching responsibility for universal distribution of welfare among its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990, 27–28; Kiander and Lönnqvist 2002, 23–25), thereby also justifying the expansion of policies controlling immigration.

Coding the first two sets of data (1 and 2) – employed in the fourth chapter of analysis – like this makes it possible to analyze the narratives of that constitute the first critical turning point in public narration of welfare nationalism, namely the *welfare state pertinent politicization of immigration*.

The second empirical chapter (chapter 5, “The Neo-Populist Breakthrough and the Mainstreaming of the Blue-and-White Political Agenda of Welfare Nationalism”) employs data from two data sets, both collected from arenas of mainstream publicity, thereby seeking to reconstruct the second critical turning point in the consolidation of welfare nationalism, the *neo-populist mainstreaming of the welfare nationalist political agenda*. In this chapter, the analytical focus shifts from the early narratives that formed the political subject matter of the emergent of welfare nationalism towards the neo-populist political mobilization through mainstreamed narratives of the welfare nationalist political agenda. “Mainstreaming” does not only denote the fact that these narratives proliferate in the mainstream arenas of publicity. Even more importantly, the concept of mainstreaming refers here to the narratives through which welfare nationalism is being “sold” for a potentially increasingly large and heterogeneous (electoral) constituency. This purpose of underlining how welfare nationalism is narrated to the wider public informs the operationalization of these two data sets (3 and 4).

The analysis of the third data set, collected from electoral manifestos, focuses on how the mainstreamed narratives seek to transcend the abstract political jargon within the high political narratives and present welfare nationalism as the political movement for promoting the wellbeing of “the people”. The narratives for advocating stricter measures of immigration control in this data set are coded into three distinct categories – formed around the themes related to labour markets, refugees and national identity. Each of these themes is constructed as a specific globalized challenge to the welfare state as an immigration-induced and to position the neo-populists as the advocates for the political agenda championing the cause of an ordinary, autochthonous Finn.

The analysis of the fourth data set, collected from particularly contentious online discussions revolving around three news articles on Finnish immigration politics, complements the analysis

of welfare nationalist mainstreaming narratives by focusing on the neo-populist grassroots level advocacy. These discussants within the informal online arena of public debate do not represent the *Perussuomalaiset* party, even though they identify as sympathizers of neo-populist “immigration critique.” While the third data set could be coded with focus on the proactive mainstreaming narratives for the promotion of welfare nationalism, the online discussants are not in a position to mobilize new constituencies behind the welfare nationalist political agenda. Rather, facing the stigmatizing accusations in the mainstream publicity of being racists and xenophobes, they are occupied with developing justificatory narratives for presenting their advocacy of neo-populist “immigration critique” as socially acceptable.

The coding of the fourth data set underlines the characteristics of these reactive narratives for insulating the “immigration critical” political agenda from the public critique of racism and xenophobia. Each of the posts that employs a narrative of justificatory mainstreaming of neo-populist advocacy is attributed a code that pertains to one of the eleven most common narratives justification, such as “scarcity of goods” or “reaffirming our ways.” Each of these codes are also distributed among one of the four meta-codes that signify the justification type – “Rights of the Majority,” “Immigrants as the Other,” “Economic redistribution” or “Norms of the public debate” – depending on which narrative justification they employ.<sup>7</sup> With this coding scheme, it is possible to analyze how the use of justificatory narratives in mainstream publicity has developed during the second critical turning point, particularly how the frequencies of various mainstreaming narratives change between online discussions on the articles published before, during and after the *Perussuomalaiset* electoral victory of 2011.

The sixth chapter (“Scandalized Underdogs or Xenophobic Satirists? Consolidation of a Neo-Populist Collective Identity in Mediatized Contestations”), the final one of the empirical analyses, assesses the most recent developments in the public debate on

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<sup>7</sup> For more detailed illustration of the justificatory discourses and their types are coded for the purposes of analysis, see Appendix C: Operationalization of the Justification Types and Discourses in Chapter 5.

neo-populist advocacy of welfare nationalism. Securing the institutional persistence of the party developed into a priority for the *Perussuomalaiset* after their electoral breakthrough, when the hate speech scandals in which several members of the party were involved started to feature in numerous frontpage news articles. This chapter seeks to reconstruct this critical turning point, *mediatized catalysis of neo-populist identity-work*, by focusing on the narratives – proliferating in the online arenas on public debate – with which neo-populist online discussants seek to position themselves favorably vis-à-vis the scandal publicity by reinterpreting their negative media exposure in order to legitimize neo-populist advocacy.

While the fourth data set was operationalized for analysis by coding the various narratives employed in support for more extensive political control of immigration, the fifth data set codes the narratives for legitimizing the neo-populist advocacy that is challenged in the scandal debates. The key difference here is that in the data collected from the debates during electoral breakthrough, the neo-populists could focus on narratives for justifying their political agenda and their emphasis on the questions of immigration. The mediatized scandals do not challenge the political agenda of the *Perussuomalaiset*, but rather question the neo-populists' willingness and ability to promote this political agenda without breaching the legal and social norms against hate speech.

This shift in the post-breakthrough political climate is emphasized in the operationalization of fifth data set. This data on two prominent online scandal debates is coded to illustrate the distribution of various subject positioning narratives in the narrative contestations on the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. Coding the posts with regard to how neo-populist advocacy is legitimized or delegitimized in narratives originating in the mainstream and sphericule arenas reveals a strong presence of neo-populist discussants in both arenas. To underline the role of the contested narratives as collectively produced public understanding on neo-populist subject position, it was feasible to operationalize the data collected in the fifth data set as public stories, whose oppositional nature could be assessed with narrative analysis (Feldman and Almqvist 2011). In chapter six, I discuss the practical operationalization of this methodology in more detail.

### 3.3 Developing the Analytical Narrative on Neo-Populist Consolidation of Welfare Nationalist Rhetoric

The empirical part of this study is developed into an analytical narrative on the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy of welfare nationalism in the Finnish public debate by operationalizing the theoretical framework with regard to two principle features that inform the research design. These features are *the methodological focus on the rhetorical discourse analysis of collective narratives* and *the illustration of critical turning points of political welfare nationalism by triangulating between the data collected from salient arenas of public debate*.

The common methodological approach that guides the empirical analysis is that the material in all of the five data sets is first operationalized as *collective narratives* that can be then studied with rhetorical discourse analysis (see, for instance, Billig 1987; Potter 1996; Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen 1999). Among contemporary narrative researchers, narratives are commonly regarded as a distinct form of discourse where the concerted ordering of the material is a crucial factor that shapes the process of meaning making (Chase 2011). The focus on collective narratives in the operationalization of the data emphasizes the fact that the material is produced by multiple authors or discussants. Regardless of their often divergent individual affiliations or personal motivations for employing certain kinds of rhetoric or conceptualizations, the discussants enter a collective process of meaning-making in public fora, thereby contributing to a wider public understanding concerning the social phenomena they discuss.

In order to first identify specific types of narratives from the material, the empirical chapters employ the analytical lenses of *nationalist boundary-drawing welfare state idealization* and *strategic neo-populist social action* (as discussed in 2.4). As such, while the subsequent rhetorical discourse analysis is empirically grounded, the operationalization of the material into collective narratives entails a theoretically informed approach to the processes of thematic sorting and coding of the material. This way of operationalizing the data does not seek to reconstruct the multiplicity of narratives produced by the discussants in a given data set, but instead focuses on “what is socially accomplished” in the contested, collective pro-

cess of narrative storytelling within specific arenas of public debate (Holstein and Gubrium 2011, 6–7).

The method of rhetorical discourse analysis makes it possible to examine in detail how the most successful and persuasive collective narratives employ various, often implicit justificatory strategies, through which discussants in public debate seek to alter and manage public perceptions concerning acceptability, justifiability and necessity of welfare nationalist politics of immigration control. Some of the narrative strategies that rhetorical discourse analysis of public narratives can make visible include fact construction through invitations for an imagined audience to complete suggestive narratives, favorable speaker positioning and enemy representations (Potter 1996, 114–128, 142–169), reductive quantification of complex qualitative questions, lists and repetition (Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen 1999, 146, 152–154) and metaphorical conceptualization of social action (Billig 1987, 40–41).

By employing rhetorical discourse analysis as tool in the narrative analysis of public stories, it is also possible to alternate between the three analytical lenses to assess how distinct narratives seek to bundle the questions of immigration, national belonging and the future of the welfare state. For example, by juxtaposing the perception of increasing demands from growing immigrant minorities with the state's idealized capabilities for providing encompassing redistribution of welfare (illustrated through the *welfare state idealization* lens), it is possible to employ exclusionary categorizations of national belonging (revealed by the *nationalist boundary-drawing* lens) for the purpose of presenting the neo-populist advocacy of heightened immigration control as benign welfare nationalist social policy (a subject positioning narrative examined through the lens of *strategic neo-populist social action*) (Billig 1987, 149–150).

The other key feature for advancing the analytical narrative entails selective triangulation between the data collected from salient public arenas order to illustrate the critical turning points of how welfare nationalism is debated in the civil society. First of all, the chronological ordering of the three chapters of analysis presents a historical reconstruction of the consolidation of welfare nationalist advocacy in three critical turning points. The data from the early 2000s focuses on the *politicization of role of the welfare state in the*



*management of immigration*, the data collected from the period of near the 2011 electoral victory of *Perussuomalaiset* illustrates the *neo-populist mainstreaming of the welfare nationalist political agenda* and, finally, the data from 2013 and 2014 emphasizes the narratives employed in the *mediatized catalysis of neo-populist identity-work*.

Obviously, these critical turning points could not be used as the guideline for data collection, because identifying these three as the critical turning points could only be established *post hoc*. The prerequisite for identifying the turning points was first identifying an emergent public arena for debating a salient facet of welfare nationalist politics, and then collecting data from the debates conducted within these arenas. The results from the analysis of the narrative data collected like this made it possible to emphasize the particularities in each data set and then use them to identify the critical turning points. This was established by illustrating what features of welfare nationalism were first debated in public in conjunction to which arena and what was particular in these debates, and naming these accordingly as the critical turning points.

This progressive process is documented in detail by the analytical narrative that is advanced in the three chapters of empirical analysis and in the synthesizing concluding discussion. Before proceeding to the empirical part of this study, two important features linking the data triangulation and the analytical narrative on neo-populist consolidation of welfare nationalism in three critical turning points should be emphasized here.

Firstly, the decision to advance the analytical narrative through the concept of *consolidation* of welfare nationalism and its neo-populist advocacy was made possible by the observation that, from the early 2000s to 2013, the most salient emergent arenas for debating welfare nationalism in public have become increasingly informal. In the early 2000s, welfare nationalism was only debate in public within the high political arena. During the electoral victory of *Perussuomalaiset*, the most heated debates were conducted in the mainstream publicity. Finally, the narratives for justifying welfare nationalism within the intimate, quasi-public sphericules of social media helped to develop neo-populist advocacy into a resonant collective identity.

Secondly, analyzing the narratives by triangulating between the data indicates that the subject matter of what is being debated vis-à-vis welfare nationalism is specific to the arenas and the critical turning points. In the high political arenas, the level of abstraction is high, and much of the debate pertained to the aims and ideals of welfare nationalism. In the analysis of these debates, the lenses nationalist *boundary-drawing* and *welfare state idealization* are particularly useful. When welfare nationalism is debated in mainstream publicity, the focus is on how the neo-populists are able to justify their anti-immigration oriented political agenda to the wider public as the proper interpretation of welfare nationalism that can save “our” welfare state. Analyzing these debates requires complementing the analytical tools with the *strategic neo-populist social action* lens. Finally, when neo-populist advocacy is heavily challenged in mainstream media, the political agenda of welfare nationalism is barely discussed in the data. Instead, the debates are mostly contestations between subject positioning narratives. While anti-populist discussants are keen to employ narratives that delegitimize the neo-populist advocacy by focusing on their inability to keep the rampant racism at bay, the neo-populists seek to construct the position of a “true” neo-populist advocate as impossible for racists to hold, thereby presenting the accusations against the true advocates as false by definition.

The subsequent empirical chapters employ the data and methods as described in this section, approaching the material as collectively produced narratives through rhetorical discourse analysis. In these three chapters, I aim to offer an analytical narrative that explores critical turning points in the consolidation of welfare nationalism and its neo-populist advocacy.

## 4

## Conceptualizations of Exclusionary Welfare Solidarity in the High Political Prior to the Rise of Neo-Populism<sup>8</sup>

This chapter examines the political narratives, proliferating in the Finnish political arena during the beginning 2000s, that emphasize the welfare state's duty to manage and control immigration into Finland. The analysis focuses on the high political arena where nationalist conceptualizations of immigration and welfare solidarity became a salient topic for political debate several years before immigration-related narratives were harnessed more widely in the public debate in neo-populist political mobilization. The role of this chapter is to present a reconstruction of the Finnish, pre-populist political climate where the narratives linking exclusionary boundary-work of welfare solidarity to the politics of immigration first emerged. The data analyzed is gathered from the debates revolving around the legislative development of the Aliens Act of 2004 – including material from the preparatory process in the Ministry of

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<sup>8</sup> This chapter builds on an article that included the first version of my analysis of the case of the legislative process of the Aliens Act 2004 (Pyrhönen, Creutz and Weide 2015). Here I develop that analysis further, conducting a secondary analysis that uses the theoretical framework of this dissertation as the new point of departure for the analysis. Where relevant, I acknowledge the work of the co-writers of the original article.

Interior as well the parliamentary debates concerning the Act.<sup>9</sup>

In order to illustrate a welfare nationalist rationale in the high political debates on Finnish immigration policy, the narrative analysis is based on two analytical lenses discussed in the theoretical framework in chapter 2.4 – *nationalist boundary-drawing* and *welfare state idealization*. By employing these analytical lenses, it is possible to analyze the nationalist boundary-work in the narratives produced by state officials and MPs, particularly focusing on how policies aimed at more rigorous control of immigration are justified in narratives that present several challenges to the welfare state as immigration-induced.

In the following, I will first present the case of Aliens Act of 2004, contextualizing the historical background against which the political debate is assessed. I will then move into the analysis, divided into four thematic sub-sections, before finally discussing the findings and their implications, relating both to the research agenda of this dissertation.

### **The Finnish Debate on Immigration and Welfare State within the High Political Arena: The Case of the Aliens Act of 2004**

The Finnish Aliens Act is a piece of legislation through which much of citizenship related immigration policy is implemented. This explicit purpose of the Act is

*to implement and promote good governance and legal protection in matters concerning aliens. In addition, the purpose of the Act is to promote managed immigration and provision of international protection with respect for human rights and basic rights and in consideration of international agreements binding on Finland. (“FINLEX” - Translations of Finnish Acts and Decrees: 301/2004 English” 2014).*

In the year 2000, the Ministry of the Interior organized an extensive legislative review of this legislation. The outcome of the leg-

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<sup>9</sup> For a more detailed discussion concerning how the data was collected and operationalized for the analysis, see chapter 3.

islative review was the Aliens Act of 2004, which was the third iteration of the Aliens Act in Finland. The earlier Acts were enacted in 1983 and 1991 – of which the latter was regarded as “an exceptionally thorough revision of the earlier Act” – necessitated largely by the ratification of international and EU-level regulations on human rights and the projected increase in the number of asylum seekers in Finland (Lepola 2000, 77–78).

Even though the previous Aliens Act had only been enacted nine years before, the Minister of the Interior Kari Rajamäki (SD)<sup>10</sup>, supported the need for another review as motivated by the need “to prepare the legislative means to confront the inflow of immigrants from the upcoming enlargement of the EU in May 2004 and to capitalize on the assets of international migration whilst eliminating any possible negative repercussions for Finland” (PTK 40/2003 vp)<sup>11</sup>. The extension of the preparatory process over the period of five years of work in the Ministry of Interior (2000–2004) is quite uncommon in the Finnish legislative practice, and the related hearing process, involving over 60 civic bodies and NGOs, was at the time the largest in Finland’s legislative history. Eventually, the process that was approaching to be finished in 2003 was further delayed by the parliamentary elections and change of the government that year.

This exceptionally lengthy process, and the fact that it was seen fit to make the next government responsible for the outcome of the Aliens Act, was nevertheless defended by Rajamäki on the grounds that there must be an “extensive, active hearing process of national and international NGOs” (Ibid.). The laborious development of the Aliens Act of 2004 serves to illustrate how difficult and politically divisive the forging of immigration related policy solutions were considered in Finland already in the beginning of the 2000s.

Hundreds of expert statements submitted by human rights and migration NGOs are documented in “The General Overview of the Statements Concerning the Aliens Act Memorandum”. Comparing this overview of statements to the memoranda of the parliamentary

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10 SD = The Finnish Social Democratic Party. The other party abbreviations used in this paper are: NC, The National Coalition Party; SPP, The Swedish People’s Party; C, The Centre Party of Finland; CD, The Christian Democrats; PS, Perussuomalaiset (The Finns Party); G, The Green League of Finland; LA, The Left Alliance.

11 The policy documents in the empirical material are listed in the Appendix A.

committees that are supposed to assess these expert statements in the preparatory process (especially “The Memorandum of the Parliamentary Administrative Committee”, (HaVM 4/2003)) reveals that the vast majority of the feedback – although formally “heard” in the process – has not been discussed and considered in the parliamentary committees.

This suggests that extensiveness of the hearing process does not seem to correlate with any measurable increase in the political power or influence of the expert organizations that were heard. Moreover, of the few NGO-mediated revisions acknowledged and initially supported by the committees (such as the removal of the anomalous right to appeal from the Finnish Immigration Service or the right for recently graduated students extend their stay while seeking employment), most failed to influence the letter of the law. This empirically meagre outcome can be used to question the official rhetoric lauding the role and the impact of this hearing process.


However, it is important to underline the sense of gravity with which immigration related challenges were perceived at the time by politicians and participants in public debates alike, and contrast these perceptions with the demographically minute migratory flows to Finland. Indeed, despite the fact that Finland has since the early 2000s experienced the second lowest levels of immigration of all the EU-15 countries in absolute terms (United Nations 2006, 1), the political debate on immigration has significantly intensified, both in terms of volume and rhetoric (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 7–8).

This discrepancy between the demographic hard data on immigration to Finland on the one hand, and the political climate towards immigration on the other, makes it particularly hard to grasp the essence of early politics of immigration in Finland through policy analysis or by developing quantitative indicators that pertain to outcomes of immigration policy. Rather, this discrepancy calls for a social constructionist mindset and a research agenda that focuses on how immigration is perceived and narrated in the public sphere. In the following, I will therefore analyze how the participants in the high political debate on Aliens Act consistently narrate the significance of immigration policy by relating to considerations national identity and welfare solidarity. This also supports the concluding

discussion, where I consider how these early narratives – developed years before the rise of the populist, welfare nationalist mobilization – have contributed to the public discourse that constructs immigration as difficult challenge for the welfare state.

**Narrating Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Welfare Solidarity in High Political Debates on Immigration Policy**

This analysis advances in four sections, each focusing on a particular narrative frame employed in the Finnish high political arena (figure 2, below). The four-fold scheme of narrative frames is grounded in the inductive content analysis of the empirical data, gathered and coded by the three independent researchers for an original article (Pyrhönen, Creutz and Weide 2015) and aligned to the theoretical framework in a manner discussed more closely in the chapter 3.



**Figure 2: Frames of high political narratives that link immigration control and the welfare state**

Each of the four frames pertains to a specific type of narrative through which immigration management is represented in the debates as having particularly significant implications to the welfare state. The model entails, firstly, that immigration is presented in the high political arena as a potential burden to the welfare state, necessitating an *instrumental* weighing of quantifiable pros against the cons. Immigration is further presented as a catalyst for the heterogenization of civil society, which in turn can erode the *solidarity*, to which the venerated Finnish tradition of *consensualist* decision-making is commonly linked in the Finnish public understanding (for critical commentaries on the Finnish solidarity-based consensualism, see Lepola 2000, 21; Förbom 2010, 10–12). Finally, with regard to this threat of eroding civic solidarity and consensualism, the statist frame refers to the use of narratives that emphasize the (welfare) state's overarching responsibility for universal distribution of welfare among its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990, 27–28; Kiander and Lönnqvist 2002, 23–25), thereby also justifying the expansion of policies controlling immigration.

The interconnectedness between the narrative frames is highlighted during the analysis where appropriate, and will be discussed in more detail in the concluding discussion. This discussion summarises the results of the analysis, focusing on how the official narratives belonging to each of the four frames rely on each other and effectively present immigration as a problem for the Finnish welfare state to resolve.

### ***Focusing on the costs and gains of immigration through the instrumentalist narrative***

The first narrative frame – “instrumentalism” – refers to the narrative whereby the immigration question is presented as one of instrumental management of pros and cons. This costs-versus-gains frame is frequently employed during the preparatory process of the Aliens Act of 2004, as well as in the parliamentary debates revolving around the Act. These quantitative approaches to migration and diversity appear in the material as references to both positive potential and negative expenses, although the latter appear to be emphasized



in the data. While it is possible to see the references to “resources” as opposed to articulations of the “costs,” the two approaches share the logic of measurability and rationality.

The instrumentalist narrative frame is commonly adopted when the debate touches on the subject of public expenditure. For example, some discussants point out that if municipal economies are burdened with the costs of immigration, it will severely deteriorate the public security (Soini, PS, PTK 40/2003). Another example on the use of this narrative frame, underlining the instrumentalist emphasis on minimizing the costs, can be found in the account of Minister of Interior Rajamäki. In presenting the governmental bill to the parliament, Rajamäki states that reaping the benefits of immigration must be subject to minimizing its ill effects to the greatest possible extent:

*[T]he positive aspects of the cross-border migration flows had to be capitalized on while keeping its ill effects as small as possible. [...] The government considers it important that the motion for Aliens Act will be given to the parliament [...] as soon as possible with the aforementioned justification.* (PTK 40/2003 vp) (a).

While it is only logical to try to minimize the ill effects of any societal phenomenon, the instrumentalist narratives tend to prioritize the prevention of the ill effects in the short term, rather than investing in resources for immigrant integration. In this sense, the instrumentalist narratives are strictly at odds with multiculturalist perspectives to immigration – favored by many minority NGOs statements commenting Aliens Act – that regard sustainable immigration as primarily a process of give-and-take (see, for instance, Kymlicka 1995).

As opposed to Rajamäki’s negative use of the instrumentalist narrative – suggesting that the most prudent immigration policy is based minimizing the “gives” rather than maximizing the “takes” – some discussants argue that it is possible to facilitate some quantifiable benefits to welfare economy by investing in immigrant integration. These MPs employ instrumentalist logic in order to emphasize the potential value of migrants as an untapped resource, typically referring to the potential economic gains related to non-labour mi-

gration. Such arguments deal with the future needs of Finland and seek to refer to the education of immigrants as an investment rather than as a cost. The notion that there are ample resources to be harnessed through proper implementation of immigration policy is captured neatly in a quote by a Centre party MP:

*Finland does have a comparably short immigration history. Maybe that's why we are not yet fully capable of recognizing and utilizing the social, linguistic and cultural know-how brought by immigrants. Taking into productive use of this existing but untapped resource would serve Finland on various fronts.* – Paula Lehtomäki, C, (PTK 195/2002) (i).

In terms of actual costs of immigration, some of them are presented in more critical light than others within the instrumentalist frame. The proponents of the strictest entry policy are quick to underline that those in “real distress” should be allowed to stay. Indeed, attempts to discern between worthy and scam asylum seekers are typical of European immigration debates (Bridget Anderson 2013, 7) and one of the core elements of the costs discourse pertaining to individual migrants. MPs disapproving of undeserving asylum seekers operate with clear-cut categories of “real” and “unfounded” distress, as illuminatingly expressed by a Social Democratic MP:

*If only someone would bring [to light] the figure in a quite straightforward way and tell the truth about who are real refugees and who have only come in the hope of better [life] [...] – Tero Rönni, SD, (39/2004 vp) (j).*

The discussants focusing on the false asylum cases employ the instrumentalist narrative in order to play with two sets of cards at the same time. On the one hand, the provision of welfare to ungrounded asylum seekers is claimed to translate directly into diminished public expenditure on deserving Finns. On the other hand, the resources of the reception system are viewed as relatively stable since the sluggishness of granting protection to those worthy of it is said to be caused by the burden of processing bogus applications:

*The more we have people groundlessly applying for asylum, who only have arrived in order to seek access to our social welfare, the less resources we are left with to receive those*

*individuals who would really be in the need of an asylum. – Pertti Hemmilä, NC, (39/2004 vp) (k).*

These instrumentalist calculations construct the asylum seeker as an ultimately immoral individual who whittles away the welfare of needy Finns and stands in the way of a deserved new life for the few truly persecuted applicants. In a similarly dual argument, the substandard wages paid to foreign workers are referred to both as a violation of the rights belonging to the foreigners themselves (cf. worthy asylum seekers) and a reason for economic suffering of Finns (Kuoppa, LA; Soini, PS, PTK 16/2004 vp).

The commonly used notion of “legitimate distress” – intended to separate the bogus applicants from the deserving asylum seekers – is not clearly defined by those who refer to it within the instrumentalist frame. Here the expression “life in danger” (Soini PTK 45/2004 vp) is employed in a particularly loose and purposeful sense. These expressions are commonly linked to the narrative that the right to asylum should not apply to people whose subsistence is endangered because of economic or social circumstances, and that grounds for asylum can only be justified with reference to political causes of distress (Paajanen, NC, PTK 39/2004 vp). Some discussants also juxtapose the refugees suffering from discriminatory minority policy with those suffering from “real” persecution:

*The goal is, after all, to prevent the misuse of our asylum regulations and social security. Of course, the aim is to give protection from persecution to those who are in need of such protection, but repatriate as soon as possible those who seek to misuse our system. [...] The actual problem with the latter people [Eastern European Roma] is, of course, the minority policy of their countries of origin [...]. – Ben Zyskowicz, NC, (PTK 40/2003 vp) (nn).*

Indeed, the boundary-drawing juxtapositions that present certain groups of asylum seekers as categorically undeserving welfare recipients appear most commonly in conjunction to a specific instrumentalist narrative. As exemplified in the quote above, this narrative emphasizes how the Aliens Act should be revised for the purpose of preventing immigrants, especially the most underserving

ones, from further burdening the welfare expenditure.

***Immigration politics at the centre  
of the negotiations on the boundaries of civic solidarity***

The civic solidarity frame pertains to narratives that present the immigration-induced heterogeneity of the civil society as a challenge to Finnish welfare solidarity that must be countered through immigration policy. The arguments that employ this narrative present civic solidarity as a kind of social capital that is based, first and foremost, on bonds among native Finns as a group of supposedly similar people (for critique against the idealized constructions of Finnish homogeneity, see Lepola 2000, 21). The discussants in the high political arena commonly claim that as a sovereign nation Finland should legitimately care more for wellbeing of Finns than for the wellbeing of immigrants, thereby juxtaposing “Finnish national interests” with the interests of the immigrant Other as an important guideline for developing immigration policy. By using this exclusionary narrative of civic solidarity, the discussants reinforce the boundary between ethnic Finns and immigrants, rather than vesting immigration policy with the multiculturalist task of bringing these boundaries (see Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 17, for arguments for the latter conceptualization of immigration policy).

The civic solidarity narratives typically advance through reification of a common, ostensibly civic (i.e. non-ethnically based) national unity, regarding this unity-based solidarity as both the goal for and legitimization of immigration policy against social and cultural stratification. Stratification, perceived as a central negative effect from societal heterogenization, is commonly narrated in the data as being due to increased immigration and lack of control mechanisms for immigration. For example, the juxtaposition of national security and the immigrants’ rights in the preparatory material is a clear manifestation of such an assimilationist way to employ the civic solidarity narrative:

*The most fundamental aim [in the revision of the Aliens Act] has been to find a balanced whole where Finnish internal security as well as the rights of the alien residents and immi-*

*grating aliens are taken into consideration.* – Kari Rajamäki, SD, (PTK 40/2003 vp) (b).

Although Rajamäki argues that it is possible to balance between national security and the rights of immigrants, it is telling that he presents – the ideally reconciliatory – immigration policy in terms of balancing act between these two opposite goals. The discussants do not typically explicate why and how exactly national security requires compromises pertaining to immigrants' rights and vice versa.

Instead, the discussants employing civic solidarity narratives tend to portray welfare solidarity as based on an idealized notion universalism, implying that both are threatened by the existence of an immigrant population, when their particular rights are being protected through context-sensitive policy solutions.

The analysis of the preparatory material support this interpretation, which appears in a particularly lucid form in report by the Finnish Institute of Migration – commissioned by the Ministry of Labour in 1999 and used as background material in the revision of the Aliens Act of 2004. In defining the term “ethnocentrism” as a “willingness to live without social disruptions from the outside,” this document bluntly states: “Finns are mostly ethnocentrists” (Institute of Migration 1999).

This underlying ethnocentrism in the Finnish polity has quite problematic implications for the high political debates on the Aliens Act, where the discussants face the challenge of presenting new policy solutions as promoting national solidarity but still compatible with an idealized, universalist conceptualization of welfare solidarity. Indeed, when the securing of immigrants' rights necessitates a revising of existing practices with immigrant-specific solutions in the Aliens Act, the discussants are keen to point out in explicit terms that the native Finns are nevertheless prioritized in the high political arena. This nativist way of employing the solidarity frame manifests particularly lucidly in the statements by right-wing MPs:

*The task of this parliament [...] is to take care of our own citizens. In certain situations, taking care of our own citizens requires that we receive [...] foreign workers [and] refugees [and] take care of them. It's a part of the whole. But [...] the primary task is that we in this hall decide first and foremost*

*on the problems of Finnish people.* – Ahti Vielma, NC (PTK 39/2004 vp) (f).

Some right-wing MPs further emphasize the importance of regulating immigration as a common, national effort that manifests the state's capabilities in the exercising popular sovereignty:

*Finland and the Finns have always the right to decide who and how many come here. It is our task and our right in this country, as the Turks in Turkey, Slovaks in Slovakia and Swedes in Sweden. This is a national question.* – Timo Soini, PS, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (g).

Many articulations justify the value of drawing national boundaries in an exclusionary manner as a solidaristic pursuit, regarding it “only natural” to define the possible outcome of immigration policy from the point of view of a native Finn (e.g. Zyskowitz, NC, PTK 39/2004 vp). Presenting their solidarity promoting role first and foremost as gatekeepers against the immigrant Other, the discussants rarely articulate how immigration policy could generate more encompassing ties of solidarity among the autochthonous population and the new Finns.

Parliamentarians also attach themselves to the frame of national solidarity in less explicit ways. The fact that Finnish citizens are consistently referred to in the parliamentary debates simply as Finns (*suomalainen*) – a word also bearing a connotation of Finnish ethnicity – employs the solidarity narrative in a manner that is typical to countries marked by a strong public understanding on ethnic homogeneity. In such contexts, the notion of bridging civic solidarity between citizens of a state becomes indistinguishable from the concept of bonding solidarity that can only develop between people of shared ethnicity (for a critical commentary on the Finnish perception of national solidarity and ethnic homogeneity, see Lepola 2000, 20–22).

A similar emphasis on Finnish particularity is also conveyed in articulations that link notions of pride in nationally developed structures, the distinctiveness of other cultures and the non-negotiability of existing political arrangements that are considered to produce national solidarity. The perceived interconnected between

these notions is reinforced in solidarity narratives that employ expressions such as “rules of the game of the Finnish labour market,” “norms of the Finnish society” or “becoming a part of the normal Finnish everyday life.” This is particularly true when these expressions are employed in contexts where the actual policy related argument would be comprehensible even without the national attribute:

*The situation is such that when people come to Finland, they live in accordance to our rules. Here we celebrate Christmas in kindergartens and sing Suvivirsi [a religious Finnish hymn] in schools. Once you take these considerations into account – without backing off and fooling around and starting to make demands for exceptions – then we have enough room in here for everyone and we can organize things. – Timo Soini, PS, (PTK 45/2004 vp) (oo).*

A similar “Finns first” solidarity narrative runs through most of the other frames considered, particularly within the instrumentalist costs-and-gains frame. Particularly with many of the left-wing MPs, the exclusionary use of the civic solidarity narrative often overlaps with the instrumentalist narrative according to which labour immigration should not be encouraged out of solidarity towards the fellow citizens “as long as there are Finns out of work” (e.g. Rönni PTK 39/2004 vp). The leftist discussants also justify the control of immigration by articulating a cosmopolitan perspective of global responsibility for conceptualizing solidarity. This way of employing the solidarity narrative emphasize that many of the immigrants’ countries of origin suffer from brain drain, and that solidarity towards these countries entails heightened control of immigration:

*[I]t is not either in the interests of Finland that we would coax the best work force of the small Estonia to come here, rather it [the work force] should be there, taking care of patriotic duties. – Jouko Skinnari, SD, (PTK 195/2002 vp) (h).*

There are a few more rights-oriented ways articulations where the solidarity narrative is employed to challenge the gatekeeper position often attributed to the Finnish state vis-à-vis immigrants. These articulations are commonly presented by MPs from the left and the green spectrum within the parliament:

*Our welfare state facilitates equal treatment and fair society, which also creates security. This requires that our population develops towards a more international mindset [...] Facing the recession, the differences in income are growing increasingly rapidly, risking to turn security into a concept that only applies to a small privileged class, for whom security entails more police officers and security personnel, more prisons and barriers [...] and laws that only protect us from the disadvantaged citizens of our own country. – Matti Kauppila, LA, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (pp).*

These articulations, relating to civic solidarity in more universalist terms, suggest that solidarity has equally important implications to both the autochthonous population and the new residents of Finland. They present a less common, but important contrast point that illustrates how the typically exclusionary emphasis in the high political debates on immigration policy can also be challenged from within the civic solidarity frame.

### ***Justifying the development of immigration policy: consensual decision-making or invoking the Finnish consensus?***

The third narrative frame – “consensualism” – refers to a tradition of doing politics that has been considered particularly pertinent to Finland as a Nordic welfare state. According to this ideal, all interested parties are heard in order to produce an overarching compromise that both facilitates and is facilitated by a encompassing conceptualization of national unity (Lijphart 2007, 93). Indeed, the core elements of consensualism in the Finnish political culture – particularly the pluralist tradition of proportional power-sharing – are often linked in political science literature to bridging solidarity functions (see, for instance, Baron, Field and Schuller 2000, 10). The high political debates on the Aliens Act, however, suggest that the actual implementation of consensualist practices is often questionable. For example, some discussants do criticize the “law of the land” where parliamentary committees ignore “external” dissenting opinions by immigrant NGO’s in the hearing process:



*The committee has also presented changes that I think are very well justified, but unfortunately do not appear to be accepted on the pages of the memorandum developed by the Administrative Committee [...]. [...] I do wonder if we have this dominant practice in which the committee issuing the memorandum still does not necessarily consider the statements as well as we should expect. – Anne Holmlund, SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (qq).*

Often MPs, however, criticize such emphasis on the procedural considerations for securing consensual decision-making in the development immigration policy. Some note that ignoring dissenting viewpoints in this process is “politics as usual” since it has taken place during the preparatory processes of other legislation as well (Pulliainen, G, PTK 39/2004). Discussants also juxtapose consensualist practices with instrumental efficiency in the development of immigration policy:

*I said in my earlier address to the parliamentary floor that this issue [the suggested process for rapid turning away of refugees], and that we should not dramatize it in any way or give the citizens wrong signals concerning this very delicate issue. [...] [I]t is often more important to do right things, rather than doing things right. – Ahti Vielma, NC, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (rr).*

While the hearing of minority members in issues concerning them has a certain legitimizing value, the substantial purpose for hearing minorities as part of the preparatory process remains unclear when weighted against allegedly consensual, but actually somewhat majoritarian practices. To the extent that the officially recorded minority perspectives coincide with the majority ones, the consensualism narratives emphasizing the practice of hearing minorities does create a semblance of a multiculturally-minded administrative process. However, when the minority views challenge the majority’s perspective, the consensualism narrative appears to be employed mainly in the justification of outcome marked by an assimilative, majoritarian bias.

Indeed, while the narrative that emphasizes Finnish consensu-

alism tends to be invoked in addresses that seek to legitimize the legislative process for developing policies for controlling immigration, consensualism is often asserted as a feature of the process that is not evaluated against the outcomes of the process. An excellent example of this narrative reification of consensualism can be found in how the Ministry of Interior defends the preparatory process of the Aliens Act. Legislative counsellor Jorma Kantola – the civil servant in the Ministry of Interior in charge of the preparation of the Act – challenges the NGOs’ critique according to which minority opinions were not properly acknowledged in the process:

*Some NGOs have been disappointed in the Aliens Act claiming that it failed to note opinions expressed by the minorities, but that is not true. All statements were duly noted. But it is not easy to **implement** minority opinions when the majority disagrees.* (Interview with the Legislative Counsellor Jorma Kantola from the Ministry of Interior in 5.12.2008) (c).

The excerpt above indicates that while the consensualism narrative asserts the importance of the tradition of consensual practices in decision-making, the outcome of the political process can be marked with a distinct majoritarian bias. This is in line with how the consensualism narratives are employed in the data. Even the discussants seeking to portray the development of immigration policy as a process that incorporates the Finnish tradition of consensual decision-making in its core, are at loss in terms of how to deal with immigrant viewpoints when they challenge dominant practices. Instead of forming new ways to consensually implement immigration policy in a more heterogenizing society, policy solutions with a distinct majoritarian bias are just presented as outcomes of a “consensual” political process.

This selective and particularist way of employing the consensualism narrative in justifying new guidelines for immigration policy is also present in the Integration Act debates. In these debates, there are references to “immigrant participation,” whereby “more active participation and cooperation with public authorities by immigrants” is sanctioned in a consensual spirit (for instance, Haatainen, SD; Lehtomäki, C; Salo, C; PTK 195/2002 vp). However, articula-

tions concerning how such participation could be implemented or enforced tend to be lacking, and the responsibility for having their opinions heard is often placed on immigrants themselves:

*[C]ivic and immigrant associations should be given the possibility to participate in the preparation and implementation of the municipal integration programme, if they so wish. – Lauri Kähkönen, SD, (PTK 195/2002 vp) (q).*

When some guidelines for acknowledging “immigrants’ needs” in immigration policy are articulated, MPs tend to emphasize that these needs should be acknowledged on the condition that these needs can be operationalized directly in accordance to the existing “Finnish way” of doing things:

*One must remember the adage: when in Rome, do as Romans do, or get out Rome. In this case it means that integration takes place as flexibly and well, so that to the incomer learns the new language and finds employment and through employment the crime rates are kept in check. On the other hand, we should not use the Finnish taxpayers’ monies to support their previous culture very forcibly, considering that the faster they become more Finnish, the quicker they will receive acceptance. [...] I think that would be, in a sense, funding racism. As long as they stay different, there is the danger of facing racism, but as soon as they become more Finnish, if can you such an expression, they are in a way outside of racist fears. They must of course be given the possibility to develop and cherish their own culture [...]. – Pekka Vilkuna, C, (PTK 195/2002 vp) (ss).*

The prevalence of such distinctly conditional endorsement of consensualism suggests that consensual power sharing is commonly understood in the high political arena as a narrative that can legitimize developing immigration policy towards the goal of reinforcing existing ties of bonding solidarity among Finns – and those immigrants who become “Finn-like” enough to be accepted.

### *Immigration policy as the grounds for enhancing the core competences of the welfare state*

The fourth frame – “statism” – incorporates narratives that emphasize the role of the state as a potent actor capable of governing, administering and regulating a wide range of areas of civic life through policy solutions. These narratives seek to justify the development of immigration policy as part of the responsibilities that must be regarded as competences of an internally strong and legitimate Finnish state. This way of articulating the state’s role vis-à-vis its citizens emphasizes the welfare state’s overarching responsibility for developing the civil society. This responsibility is articulated most commonly through two statist narratives of welfare state idealization: the preservation of “civic morals” and national unity of the citizens through universalist implementation of social policy, on the one hand, and paternalist interventions through immigration policy, on the other.<sup>12</sup>

In the parliamentary debates on the Aliens Act, statist narratives are commonly employed by the left wing MPs in conjunction to work related considerations for immigration policy. The discussants commonly establish a clear division between the orderly Finnish working life and the “wild, grey” economy that is attributed to the immigration of a foreign workforce:

*It is very important to act against the grey economy, because if it is allowed to grow [...] it almost inevitably erodes Finnish working morals, Finnish ethics, our conduct. This particularly high ethics, that taxes are paid and fines are paid [...] has, after all, been born in the course of hundreds of years. This kind of moral ethics can also weaken relatively quickly if space is given. – Kari Uotila, LA, (PTK 16/2004 vp) (I).*

In these narratives, the necessity for the state interventions through immigration policy is often justified with reference to the

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12 It must be noted that the emphasis on the necessity of state interventions employed in the statist narratives is not particular to the debates on Finnish immigration policy per se, but are rather considered to belong in the core operating modes of the Nordic variant of universalist welfare state, sometimes portrayed as the “People’s Home” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 67–69).

disruptive effects the labour migration is considered to carry as exemplified in Matti Kangas' (LA) illustrative assertion:

*ungoverned immigration messes up the labour market* (PTK 40/2003 vp) (m).

Kangas' argument attributes disruptions within the labour market to immigration. His choice of verb [*"sotkea"*: to mess up, literally: *"to stain"*] carries a connotation to dirt thus linking immigration to impurity that he implicitly juxtaposes with the orderly Finnish society (for closer examination of the narrative linking of "dirty-ness" to "disorder," see Douglas 1994, 161–162). The emphasis on the state's responsibility to control immigration is, however, more commonly justified in statist narratives with articulations that refer to the exploitative practices against the immigrant labour force by the Finnish employers. According to many discussants, immigration policy must include policies that specifically protect immigrants from exploitation (Laakso, LA, PTK 40/2003 vp).

This paternalist rationale for state interventions is also exemplified in the motion by Esko-Juhani Tennilä (LA) that sought to alter the governmental bill on the Aliens Act. According to Tennilä's motion (which was eventually ruled against by the Administrative parliamentary committee), in labour disputes where a foreign citizen is a party, the state capabilities to intervene should be expanded by effectually allocating minor complainant offences against the immigrations under public prosecution by furnishing the labour market organizations with the right to sue (LA 163/2003 vp).

It is worth noting that here Tennilä argues for corporative representation of immigrants in courts instead of a legally protected right for the immigrants to seek legal counsel from the said organizations. Indeed, the rationale of many of the statist narratives on immigration policy is to help immigrants to integrate by first and foremost having the judicial system "taking care" of them – even if such policy undermines immigrants' own agency and might make it riskier for corporations to hire foreign labour in comparison to native workers. This way of employing the statist narrative frame suggests that the expansion of paternalist state control can be legitimated by implementing the heightened measures of regulation and documentation exclusively to the immigrant population:

*The monitoring [of the working conditions of immigrant workers] cannot be made encompassing unless the register of foreign persons in Finland also includes the working conditions of those foreigners, who are not required to have employee's residence permit. – Jukka Gustafsson, SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (tt).*

The statist narratives often emphasize the state's role in taking care of immigrants as a reason for the state to develop practices for monitoring the immigrants' own activity in the integration process more carefully:

*In the memorandum by the committee, it is stated that integration programme should be something like tray for the immigrant, from which he may choose suitable items. The Perussuomalaiset thinks that the immigrant must be respectively compelled to eat from that tray, meaning that he must include a large enough selection of integration measures in his programme. [...] The authorities' responsibility is to enforce that the immigrant follows his programme. We think that the best measure for enforcement and direction in this case is to appoint a personal supervisor for each immigrant who starts his integration programme. – Raimo Visbacka, PS, (PTK 195/2002 vp) (uu).*

The rationale for “taking care of the immigrants” that runs through the statist narrative frame is also commonly linked to considerations for national solidarity – presented as precarious and threatened by the lack of proper mechanisms for immigration control that deprives ethnic Finns of employment:

*The case of strawberry pickers illustrates that [immigrants'] working conditions cannot be enforced [...]. This is why I think we should [...] first get jobs for Finns. – Esa Lahtela, SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (vv).*

The issue of national solidarity is also employed within the statist narratives by MPs, who propose increased control of immigration and monitoring of foreigners within the country as means to oppose the “sickness of racism” (Tiusanen, LA, PTK 99/2003 vp). The ad-

dresses concerned with racism, analyzed in our earlier article, present foreign labour force and groundless asylum seekers as a hazard for the Finnish society. In an extreme depiction below, an MP even links domestic violence and the management of foreigner policy. Again, the state is called to act and to manage immigration in order to guard the well-being – the morals as well as material security – of Finns.

*[I]f we can handle this foreigner policy right, it will also effectively prevent the furthering of racism, which already now smoulders [...] kind of hidden in many places and in people's minds, but doesn't manifest itself. We [the Finns] are the kind of people that we grouse and grouse and then go behind the house and give the wife and the kids a caning, and talk like 'I would have wanted to say it in the meeting and I should have told those people home truths for once', but as one doesn't dare to say, they go behind the house and do that [the caning]. [...] [W]hen racism really breaks out, like it did in Joensuu, it was indeed because too many folk [foreigners] pack in one place and people [Finns] feel they are now in an unequal position. – Tero Rönni, SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (n).*

It is argued or feared that “the people” (Finns) cannot accept the public spending on the asylum system in which many applicants are not eligible (but “ungrounded”), and/or that “the people” cannot accept being offered lower pay as a result from the “dumping” of wages due to unfair foreign competition. The statist narrative is repeatedly employed in this way in the parliamentary debates, suggesting that without proper expansion of state control over immigration, the autochthonous citizens are likely develop undesired racist attitudes and resentment towards all foreigners, including the “innocent ones”.<sup>13</sup>

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13 With different emphases and angles in: Karhu PTK 39/2004 vp, Kangas PTK 40/2003 vp, Lahtela, E. PTK 39/2004 vp, Peltomo PTK 40/2003 vp, Salo PTK 39/2004 vp, Satonen PTK 39/2004 vp, Soini PTK 45/2004 vp, Tennilä PTK 45/2004 vp, Rajamäki 39/2004 vp.

## **Consolidation of Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Welfare Solidarity in the High Political Arena**

In this chapter I have examined how debates on immigration policy within high political arenas employ narratives that reproduce nationalist and exclusionary conceptualizations of welfare solidarity. Analyzing these debates that took place during the early years of 2000s, serves to contextualize the subsequent analyses (in chapters 5 and 6) that address the rapid growth in political fortunes of Finnish right-wing populism later in to the 2000s. In their mobilization narratives, the welfare nationalist “immigration critics” make extensive use of this nationally particularist way of understanding of welfare solidarity – one that is rooted deeply in the Finnish political culture as exemplified in this chapter. In the following, I summarize the key findings in this chapter, illustrating the interplay between instrumentalist, civic solidarity, consensualist and statist narratives within the Finnish high political debate on immigration.

One of the most striking general findings in the material is that in the parliament and in the ministries, immigration policy is most commonly discussed in conjunction to the concern for “our Finnish” welfare state in a manner that presents immigration as an external threat to the state’s ability to maintaining requisite levels welfare solidarity. The discussants within the high political arena commonly present immigration as a potentially heterogenizing and divisive challenge to welfare state and civic solidarity, but only rarely refer to any “internal” (i.e. non-immigration related) dynamics within the civil society that might contribute to these challenges. By framing the erosion of welfare solidarity as an external ailment to the welfare state, the discussants emphasize the importance of welfare nationalist immigration policy as a crucial means for responding to this, allegedly immigration-induced challenge to the welfare state.

In order to emphasize the narrative reproduction of the welfare nationalist discourse of “immigration as threat to welfare state,” it is useful to contrast the seemingly quantitative calculus in the core of the instrumentalist narratives with the demographic impact of immigration. Even though during the Aliens Act debates Finland received immigrants less than any other EU-15 country (save Luxemburg) (United Nations 2006), instrumentalist narratives consis-



tently refer to “limited resources” and “items of expenditure” to underline the significance of immigration to the Finnish welfare state. It should be noted here, that this is not only a question of the Finnish MPs being explicitly against immigration. Rather, even the pro-immigration addresses to the parliament present immigration as the kind of source of human resources that, if adequately tapped by policy solutions, can resolve many of the challenges the welfare state is facing. In this way, the MPs present the future of the Finnish welfare state as ultimately depending on how immigration is managed, thereby also contributing to the increased saliency of questions of immigration in the high political agenda in Finland.

The instrumentalist narratives that put “the immigration question” into such an elevated position in the Finnish politics often emphasize a statist approach to the management of immigration, suggesting that immigration related challenges must be resolved, first and foremost, through state coordinated interventions. One of the most important outcomes of referring to immigration politics as the cornerstone of responsible development of the welfare state is that the saliency of all kinds of political considerations can be emphasized by linking them to immigration. For example, several Social Democrat and Left Alliance MPs argue that allowing trade unions to represent individual immigrant workers in courts is an efficient strategy for combatting racism by preventing the exploitation of the migrant workforce, because their exploitation causes resentment against immigrants by undermines the working conditions of Finnish workers. Notwithstanding the advantages of preventing exploitation in the labour markets through immigration policy, these statist narratives clearly employ the esteemed positioning of immigration in the political agenda in their attempts to justify increasing the state’s role in the control of the labour markets.

It is interesting that while the role of the state and the national context are becoming less pertinent in the actual process of immigrant integration – especially in comparison to the local and regional level practices of integration (Caponio and Borkert 2010, 9) – articulations of how the state should manage the increase in the allegedly immigration-induced societal heterogeneity appear to proliferate within the high political debates analyzed. Indeed, this emphasis on the state’s competences in the management of

immigration on the national level is common in countries with a long-standing self-understanding as welfare societies that face new serious macro-level challenges, as is particularly the case with the Nordic countries (Hemerijk 2002, 184–185).

Some of the reasons behind this discontinuity between the actual policy-level practices and the national level emphasis in high political narratives can be addressed by looking into the arguments belonging to the “civic solidarity” and “consensualism” narrative frames. First of all, more explicitly than in any of the other of the frames analyzed, the discussants employing civic solidarity narratives refer to “Finnish internal security” and “solidarity” when debating immigration. Right-wing MPs are particularly keen to underline that the task of the parliament is “to take care of our own citizens,” and that in terms of immigration control, this means that “Finns always have the right to decide who and how many come here.” While the narratives within the instrumentalist frame, in and of themselves, emphasize the material implications of immigration, the civic solidarity narratives suggest that the most acute of the supposedly immigration-related challenges to the welfare state are first and foremost symbolic ones, and that this symbolic threat may then manifest as social problems. For example, discussants addressing the projected social challenges of immigration commonly maintain that in order to legitimate the aims of immigration policy to the autochthonous Finns, the development of policy solutions must prioritize the production of national solidarity.

This suggests that what is being debated during the formative years of Finnish immigration politics is often not the solutions to the demographic impact of immigration *per se*. Instead, with the exception of explicit articulations of costs and gains employed in instrumentalist narratives, much of the high political welfare nationalist narratives emphasize the symbolic dimension of national unity and its allegedly immigration-induced challenges. Such a focus can also be partly attributed to the limited demographic impact of immigration. After all, comparatively speaking there are not really that many concrete and acute problems to be solved that relate to volume of immigration. Rather than developing narratives for localized and decentralized policy solutions that address particular

immigration-related problems, the discussants tend to focus on developing justificatory narratives for legitimizing an abstract, nationally particularistic approach to immigration.

The “Finnishness” in the way of relating to immigration in the high political arena is also reflected in the arguments that belong in the consensualist narrative frame. Discussants seek to legitimize the development of mechanisms for controlling immigration by referring to the Finnish tradition of strong power-sharing and majority-restricting discourses in the core of “our” political culture. Indeed, the consensualist narratives commonly present the heavy preparatory process, particularly the extensive hearing of minority NGOs, as the evidence of the procedural fairness in the development of the Aliens Act. However, the analysis of the preparatory material suggests that the participation of immigrant organizations is evaluated by the Ministry of Interior solely on a procedural basis, rather than comparing the outcome of the draft bill with the minority opinions expressed during the hearing process. The most lucid manifestation of the majoritarian reality behind the consensual narratives can be found where the Ministry of Interior defends the modest presence of immigrant viewpoints in the bill on the grounds that “it is not easy to *implement* minority opinions when the majority disagrees.” As such, the consensualist narratives employed in the development of the Aliens Act manifest as narratives for justifying the legislative procedure that is nevertheless based on an ostensibly Finnish consensus on how immigration should be managed “in our country”.

Overall, in the high political debates on immigration politics seem to consist, first and foremost, of negotiations aiming to develop a Finnish national regime of immigration – presented as an institutionalized, legal stance towards the immigrants through which the Finnish welfare solidarity can be defended against the heterogenizing challenges. Herein lies the central blue-and-white paradox with boundary-drawing narratives that consistently frame articulations of immigration management. On the one hand, solidarity is perceived as a naturally pre-existing condition of the Finnish civil society. On the other hand, though, the national welfare solidarity is presented as requiring support from the state in the form of an officially articulated legislative regime through which the welfare

state can alleviate the supposedly solidarity-eroding impact of the supposedly immigration-induced increase in heterogeneity.

This zero-sum approach to the reproduction of welfare solidarity in the Finnish high political immigration debates contributed to a highly particularistic public understanding of national unity and its immigration-related challenges. The findings in this chapter support the decision to build the analytical narrative of this dissertation on the data collected from the high political arena. Having exemplified in this chapter how exclusionary articulations of welfare solidarity were employed in the high political debates on immigration in the early 2000s, it is possible to foreshadow how the common welfare nationalist political discourse became available to be operationalized the neo-populist narratives of political mobilization in mainstream publicity. In short, this chapter has developed the argument that the rationale for heightened immigration control was first justified in high political narratives that were built on the concern for “our” welfare state. In the next chapter, the welfare nationalist rhetoric within the esteemed high political arenas can be treated as an attitudinal seedbed on which neo-populist advocates of welfare nationalism were able to base their political agenda and successful mobilization narratives towards end of the first decade of the 2000s.

## 5

## The Neo-Populist Breakthrough and the Mainstreaming of the Blue-and-White Political Agenda of Welfare Nationalism<sup>14</sup>

Neo-populist political mobilization and the rapidly rising public support for the anti-immigration oriented political agenda became a particularly salient and heatedly debated topic in the Finnish and Swedish mainstream media after the electoral victories of the Perussuomalaiset party (PS) in 2008 and 2011 and Sverigedemokraterna party (SD) in 2010 (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009b, 7; Hannula 2011, 179–185). Towards the end of the first decade of 2000s, public debate grew ripe with contestation between neo-populist advocates and other public discussants concerning the reasons behind the success of populist anti-immigration political agenda. Editorials, blogs and letters to the editor have referred to the electoral victories of the two parties with a great variety of expressions, among others as “redneck elections” (Kononen 2011), “manifestation of resentment towards upper classes” and “the end of consensus” (Räty 2011), “victory of democracy” (Helsingin Sanomat 2011b), “the yeast that

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14 This chapter is based on a peer-reviewed research article ‘This welfare of ours’: Justifying public advocacy for anti-immigration politics in Finland during the late 2000’s (Pyrhönen 2013).

brings the spirit back to politics” (Helsingin Sanomat 2008), a development that “could have been avoided through a more open public debate” (Neuding and Lundberg 2010), and brought about by “the myth of immigration debate being a taboo” (Tydén 2010).

What such interpretations in the mainstream media have in common, is that they attribute the electoral result – the increased support for populist parties – to various latent, macro-level phenomena; resentment, erosion of political consensus or problems in how the public debate functions. It was far less common to encounter accounts that focus on the agency side and emphasize on what the parties and the people affiliated to them actually said or did in order to facilitate the manifold increase in electoral support.

Also regarding the recent academic approaches to anti-immigration advocacy, much of the literature has been looking into the demand side<sup>15</sup> of the phenomenon, fleshing out how factors such as the social psychology of xenophobia and the societal macro-level developments – most importantly globalization and work-related precariousness – facilitate public anti-immigration advocacy (see, for example, Crepaz 2006; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a; Himanen and Könönen 2010; Koivunen and Lehtonen 2011). Another branch of relevant academic literature focuses on the mechanisms through which public media exposure facilitates the electoral success of right-wing populist parties that commonly advocate anti-immigration policies on their agendas (Mazzoleni, Stewart and Horsfield 2003; Ellinas 2010; Horsti and Nikunen 2013). In the Finnish context, Mari Maasilta (2012) conducted an interesting study that indicates how immigration-related topics are channelled from traditional types of media to social media and vice versa during the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011.


Even so, the agency-oriented supply side – that is, what various anti-immigration actors do and say in concrete and empirical terms

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15 Here I refer to the Muddean typology (briefly discussed in the 2.2) that divides approaches seeking to explain the support for European populist radical right parties into supply and demand approaches. The demand side approaches focus more on the macro level societal features that render the potential electorates favorable to the populist political agenda. The supply side approaches, on the other hand, focus on how the parties themselves construct and make use of various “background phenomena,” effectively converting a potential for support to actual support (see Mudde 2007, 201, 232, 256).

in order to actualize the potential for popular support – has been somewhat less studied. Cas Mudde has extensively researched populist radical right parties in Europe in the late 1900’s (2003; 2007; 2010), and Antonis Ellinas has studied how differences in party organization help to explain why some populist parties “survive their initial electoral breakthroughs while others collapse” (2009). These agency-informed studies of anti-immigration parties are invaluable, but unfortunately do not include the Nordic countries or assess the implications of a welfare state context for party behaviour. In her Master’s thesis, Johanna Ryan-Kraujale (2010) assesses how Finnish online discussants construct their anti-immigrant arguments, but without a particular focus on how the advocacy for anti-immigration politics is being justified. Most recently, Milla Hannula (2011) has studied how anti-immigration advocates themselves perceive the change in the attitudinal climate and the increased presence of anti-immigration arguments in the public debate.

Rather than assessing the reasons behind the public demand for introducing anti-immigration issues on the political agenda, this chapter focuses on the narratives through which neo-populist advocates present themselves and their welfare nationalist political agenda in various arenas of public debate. To that end, this chapter analyzes how the advocacy for anti-immigration politics – highly pertinent in both the PS and SD political agendas – is narrated for mainstream audiences during the period between the elections of 2008 and 2011 that marked to rapid increase of neo-populist political fortunes in Finland (see graph 1 next page).



**Graph 1. Support for the leading right-wing populist party in parliamentary elections in the Nordic EU countries.**

The process of “mainstreaming” analyzed here signifies, firstly, to the change in Finnish political climate brought about by the neo-populists’ ability to secure salient coverage in the mainstream media, a historical development that can be roughly traced back to the four-year period between the campaigning for the municipal elections of 2008 and the aftermath of the parliamentary elections of 2011. Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this analysis, “mainstreaming” also refers to the shift in the political rhetoric through which the neo-populists sought to distance themselves from the public critique of xenophobia and radicalism by narrating their political agenda in welfare nationalist terms, thereby reaching for new, increasingly middle class constituencies.

Analyzing the mainstreaming of the neo-populist mobilization narratives entails, firstly, an empirical assessment of how the *necessity* of anti-immigration politics is narrated in a welfare state context by presenting neo-populist advocacy as benign political activism based on mundane political concerns for social policy and the economic sustainability of redistributive welfare mechanisms. Secondly, the analysis elucidates how the justificatory narratives, building



on the notion of necessity, seek to decouple neo-populist advocacy for anti-immigration policies from the public critique of xenophobia which might otherwise undermine the broader social acceptability of neo-populist politics.

These research aims will be met in this chapter through analyses of two sets of empirical data<sup>16</sup> that illustrate how anti-immigration elements in the neo-populist political agenda are embedded in – and justified by – welfare nationalist narratives that focus on questions of social policy and welfare economy. In accordance to the analytical narrative of this dissertation that advances from more formal arenas of public debate to less formal arenas, the first set of data to be analyzed here is collected from two electoral programmes<sup>17</sup> of the Perussuomalaiset party (for 2008 and 2011 elections) and the programme for 2010 parliamentary elections by its Swedish neo-populist counterpart, the Sverigedemokraterna party (SD). While this analysis is not a full-fledged comparative study, using the SD programme as a point of contrast helps to highlight the crucial role that the questions of welfare economy and social policy – mostly lacking in the SD programme – play in the Finnish, welfare nationalist variant of neo-populism.

The analysis of the electoral programmes is complemented by the analysis of the second data set in which the focus is shifted from the party political agency to the grassroots level neo-populism in the online discussion boards of Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Finland's largest newspaper. Rather than looking at the predominately anti-immigration activists' blogs and fora where important debates were also conducted during the period of 2008 to 2011,<sup>18</sup> this set

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16 A more detailed presentation of the data sets, the collection of the data and the methodology of rhetorical discourse analysis employed here can be found in the chapter 3.

17 The PS refers to its manifestos as "programmes," while the SD calls the document a "contract". Considering that the focus of this paper is on the PS, I refer to the manifestos by both parties as "programmes" as a compromise between maintaining the integrity of the primary sources and having the text as fluent as possible.

18 As a result of this delineation of focus, several anti-immigration blogs and pamphlets that have received significant media coverage – such as Jussi Halla-aho's *Scripta*, *Nuiva vaalimanifesti* and *Hommaforum* – are not assessed here. This variety of more radical anti-immigration activism, however, has been studied elsewhere with varying emphases (Puuronen 2001; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a; Förbom 2010; Hannula 2011; Puuronen 2011; Horsti and Nikunen 2013).

of data consists of public narratives aimed at wider audiences. This makes it possible to focus the grassroots level narrative analysis on the process of mainstreaming in a manner similar to the analysis of the electoral programmes.

Both analyses employ the methodology of rhetorical discourse analysis. In addition to being informed by the analytical lens of *nationalist boundary-drawing* that guided much of the analysis in the fourth chapter, this chapter also makes extensive use of the *welfare state idealization* lens. This makes it possible to answer the research questions pertaining to the operationalization of the idealized legacy of the blue-and-white welfare state in narratives seeking to justify the support for exclusionary boundary-drawing. The analysis of grassroots debate data is further informed by the third analytical lens, *strategic neo-populist social action*, shedding light to the research questions concerning the neo-populist advocates' endeavors to emerge as a resonant collective identity.

The analyses lead to a concluding discussion that evaluates the implications that emergence of welfare nationalist narratives in the mainstream publicity may have for the public understanding of the *raison d'être* for the welfare state at large. The discussion also considers the avenues for opening a meaningful political debate with welfare nationalist neo-populists, who base their advocacy on the conviction that their arguments are based on a sound economic assessment of the welfare economy and social policy, and attribute any and all racism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism only to 'extremists'.

### **Justifying Anti-Immigration Policies with Welfare Nationalist Narratives in Neo-Populist Electoral Programmes**

Considering that the period between 2008 and 2011 marked the steepest rise in the electoral success of the Perussuomalaiset party – the most rapidly growing Nordic political party in decades – it is important to complement structural explanations of these victories by assessing the role of the neo-populist agency in their political success. In the previous chapters, I have sketched a picture of the Finnish pre-populist political climate as a fertile ground or seedbed for the neo-populist emergence as a major political force to be reck-

oned with. This chapter continues by analyzing the public narratives with which the neo-populists capitalized on this fertile ground by operationalizing mainstreamed welfare nationalist narratives, facilitating political saliency and social acceptability needed for mobilizing new constituencies behind neo-populist politics.

Before presenting the results from the empirical analysis, it is important to note how much the format varies between the three documents analyzed. The PS programme for the 2008 municipal election totals 21 pages and the programme for the 2011 parliamentary elections incorporates 69 pages – being far more verbose than any other electoral programme in the Finnish 2011 parliamentary elections. The SD programme for the 2010 parliamentary elections – used as a point of contrast to highlight the heavy focus on welfare economy in the PS programme – presents the immigration-pertinent problems and their remedies within the confines of seven pages and largely in a bullet-point format, constructing its boundary-drawing and welfare state idealizing narratives on a significantly higher abstraction level. Thus, even though a direct comparison of these documents is less fruitful an endeavor, it is important to illustrate how the PS elaborates on the concerns for financing welfare policies as the justification for its anti-immigration focus, while the SD relies on abstract, nativist articulations of its ethnocentric political agenda.

The following analysis is structured by an inductive content analysis of the electoral programme data, making it possible to focus the analysis on three themes that are most commonly discussed by the neo-populists in conjunction with questions of immigration. Structuring the analysis around these themes – the labour markets, refugees and national identity – also reflects the discursive choices the parties employ in their programmes in order to construct and emphasize the immigration-related competences of the welfare state and persuade their imagined audiences of their validity.

### ***Mitigating the perceived impact of migrant labour force and unemployment on the domestic labour markets***

Controlling working life has typically ranked highly in contemporary welfare policy agendas (Hemerijk 2002, 195), and both the SD

and the PS are keen to refer to working conditions in their critique toward existing immigration policy. In their 2008 programme, the PS discusses the issue of the foreign workforce within the care sector under the subheading “For the Nordic welfare state” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2008, 12. All translations are by the author (NP).). They argue that in the long run, importing inexpensive labour “endangers the education of our own youth as well as their possibilities to be employed with the wage required to cover Finnish living expenses”. Here the welfare nationalist anti-immigration message is conveyed to an autochthonous blue-collar worker “of ours,” juxtaposing the images of an undeserving alien and the image of a poor but deserving Finn, with the latter having an obvious claim to “our” welfare. A person in this category is implied to have much to gain economically from the regulation of labour that the PS portrays as a core competence of the welfare state.

This kind of narrative seeks to appeal to the blue-collar constituencies with an explicit reference to the economic benefits of labour regulation. In order to reach middle class audiences, the anti-immigration narratives rely on the rhetoric that attributes both moral and economic value for the maintenance of the “willingness to pay taxes”. This willingness is presented as threatened by, for example, “ethnically based operations” “endorsed by the parties in power” that serve to promote the “mass migration” of the labour force – a practice that is considered to “increasingly diminish the welfare redistributions to our families” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2008, 5).

In the 2011 programme, the PS steered away from potentially divisive labour market issues, such as the immigration of foreign work force. Instead, the programme makes several references to “non-labour oriented immigration” within the welfare frame, constructing it as “abuse of the welfare system.” The programme further explicates: “Non-labour oriented immigration will cost a lot for Finland.” Distinctions between the categories of asylum-seeker and immigrant are downplayed in the narrative that concludes that the burden of non-labour oriented migration can be alleviated by “handling applications for asylum rapidly and efficiently, in order to save public funds” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 42). The amount of public funds that can be saved is carefully left unmentioned, an instance of a pseudo-quantifying rhetoric (Jokinen, Juhila and

Suoninen 1999, 146), in which the actual quantifications are only implied to and the narrative of prudent spending is left for the audience to fulfil.

Actual labour migration is mentioned only once in the 2011 programme and, contrary to the 2008 programme, no moral hierarchies between the autochthonous Finns and foreign labour force are explicated in conjunction with it. Rather, the whole issue is only discussed in terms of the potential economic loss to the welfare state because of illegal workers: “The Perussuomalaiset does not think that we should accept the kind of labour migration to Finland that involves breaches of Finnish labour regulation or where taxes are not paid to Finland” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 40). The assertion that it is immigration that creates these illegal working practices is both the point of departure and conclusion by the PS, and is thus constructed as a fact that needs no further discussion. The problem in the allegedly ongoing acceptance of these illegal practices is emphasized by referring to the potential benefits in avoiding them in explicitly economic terms: “Eradicating the grey economy will allow society to recoup a multifold amount of the costs involved” (Ibid.). This justificatory narrative idealizes the state’s capabilities to provide welfare by postulating the immigration as the source of grey economy and the severe drain of “our monies.” The narrative is also built on a vague quantification of economic benefits – reinforced with the evocative expression “multifold” – with the purpose of presenting the regulation of immigration as a socially acceptable political agenda; not xenophobic or racist (van Dijk 1992, 94), but only motivated by a firm pro-welfare state stance.

The SD begins its programme by defining itself as a “Sweden-friendly” party and continues directly to the issues of labour. They demand “stricter regulation for labour immigration” because, as they mention in the lead: “In our Sweden, each Swedish wage earner can feel safe with their interests being the top priority” (Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 2). This formulation, taken together as a whole, bears some resemblance to the earlier PS programme in the sense that it seems to address the blue-collar workers whose interests are suggested to be challenged by labour migration. The nativist frame of justification, however, allows no additional resource with which to appeal to middle class taxpayers, and the only economic

justification for stricter labour market regulation is the privileged position given to each individual Swedish wage earner, rather than any reference to welfare economy.

Even though various welfare economic justifications for the anti-immigration stance were given in both of the PS programmes, no justification transcending the immediate economic benefit to the “Swedish wage earner” is postulated or any reference is made to the welfare state in the SD programme. Unlike the PS’s programme, the SD’s approach to labour in their electoral programme appears to corroborate with the prevailing consensus in the current research of political science, according to which economy for right-wing populists an instrumental means to a nationalist core ideology (Mudde 2007, 119–120).

### *The management of refugees and the national responsibility for the victims of global inequality*

While both PS and SD discuss questions related to asylum seekers in their programmes, their approaches diverge significantly when touching upon the issues of human suffering and welfare redistribution in immigrants’ countries of origin. The SD, in demanding “responsible immigration politics,” qualifies this demand with the juxtaposition of Swedish welfare and help to others: “Our Sweden helps people in distress, but Swedish welfare and prosperity must come first” (Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4). What is notable in the SD narrative – prioritizing the promotion of welfare among ethnic Swedes over addressing immigrants’ needs – is that it does not employ any economic rationale in order to justify the juxtaposition between the two groups. Quite the contrary, in the programme SD goes as far as to advocate for “heightened support for the world’s millions of refugees through a multifold increase in the funds for the UNHCR” (Ibid.). Such argumentation positions the SD as an unselfish actor whose arguments for regulating immigration are not justified in terms of potential savings in public spending. Instead, the notion that controlling immigration promotes “Swedish prosperity” – even if it means greatly increasing UNHCR spending – suggests that the central justificatory narrative for anti-immigration

elements in the SD's political agenda is based on cultural, rather than economic considerations.

One of the few significant similarities between the PS and the SD positions on granting asylum is that both advocate addressing refugees' distress with policies implemented outside the receiving country. However, in 2008 the PS programme qualifies this position by constructing the economic "fact" that a border closing anti-immigration policy can be justified in terms of the practical and efficient allocation of economic resources: "The Perussuomalaiset thinks that it would be wiser if the state promoted the safety [of refugees] closer to their countries of origin, where using less economic resources would likely result in an equally good or even better outcome" (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2008, 19).

In the 2011 programme, the PS takes a greater step away from the spending on supra-national bodies that the SD promotes. The programme's focus on welfare economy is emphasized in the narrative that constructs the EU as the common enemy that seeks to overburden the Finnish economy with asylum seekers: "The EU would likely want to increase the number of refugees and migrants taken into Finland [...] Finland must not participate in the sharing of this burden." This welfare nationalist, economyemphasizing narrative for justifying measures of immigration control is further invoked with regard to the question of refugee quotas: "The amount of quota refugees must be adjusted with regard to the general economic development. If public spending and services are cut, refugee quotas must be cut as well" (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 42). The role of PS as an actor actively seeking to regulate immigration is forcefully downplayed in the passage that justifies the opposition to immigration through an instrumentalist narrative of economic necessity. According to this narrative, the idealized welfare state can mitigate the impact that an economic recession imposes on welfare services simply by lowering the refugee quotas. No calculations or estimations are, however, given to support this interpretation that emphasizes the magnitude of the economic impact that refugee quota can exact on public spending.

### ***Reproducing national identity and exclusionary welfare solidarity through immigration policy***

The SD programme employs a nativist narrative that emphasizes the cultural dimensions in the Swedish welfare system, but makes no references to welfare economy in narrating the party's position on national identity. Instead, the programme constructs a homogenic "Swedish society" as being challenged by refugees and other immigrants alike: "Immigrants must adjust to Swedish society and not vice versa" (Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4). The SD's investment in the Swedish identity, culture or lifestyle is repeatedly narrated as an inherent value to be protected: "In our Sweden, the Swedish cultural heritage, the people's home is built on a common value base and the Swedes right to develop their culture as they see fit is protected." In a similar vein – apart from the single reference to "ending the free health and dental health care of illegal immigrants" – their rhetoric established no links to financing the welfare state or its social policy in formulating their anti-immigration policies (Ibid.).

On the PS political agenda, too, national identity is held in very high esteem and both of the programmes argue in several contexts for the importance of protecting "a Finnish unity and communality." However, most commonly these values are presented as instrumental to the preservation of the welfare state, instead of being justified in exclusively nativist or cultural terms or presented as normative ideals sprouting from an idealized notion of Finnishness. Instead, the anti-immigration oriented remedies to the allegedly immigration-induced threats to national values are repeatedly justified in the PS programmes with narratives drawing from an exclusionary understanding of how the welfare economy can be sustained. One of the most explicit narratives for linking the national identity and welfare economy constructs a textbook example of the contested "recognition-redistribution trade-off"<sup>19</sup> as social fact. According

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<sup>19</sup> Recognition-redistribution trade-off refers to the variety of arguments that are based on the assumption that there is an inverse relationship between the degree the state is able to recognize and accommodate the special needs of minorities and the state's ability to redistribute welfare. The trade-off commonly postulates that the recognition policies either crowd-out the redistributive policies from the political agenda, that they corrode the solidarity on which the redistributive policies are based or that they misdiagnose issues rising from economic inequality as minority recognition issues



to the PS, because national solidarity must be protected from the corroding effect of value-heterogenization, “in the integration of immigrants our national identity and patriotism must play a role” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 9). This assimilative response to heterogenization – constructed as a result of immigration – is justified through a narrative according to which a “[u]nified people guarantees the willingness to pay taxes” (Ibid.).

Moreover, the tax populist argument for stricter regulation of immigration seeks to justify why the “Perussuomalaiset thinks that the requirement for economic self-sustainability must be extended to all immigrants coming to Finland on the basis of family reunification” because, “[i]n accordance to the Danish model, it is possible to expect, for example, that a person applying for family reunification has not received income support during the past two years.” The PS further refers to a crowding-out effect that immigration can have for welfare redistribution presented as a zero-sum game (Rydgren 2006, 52), calling it “irresponsible to attempt to gather seniors in our country when at the same time the elder care queues are growing and the age structure of the Finnish population is a cause of concern” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 42–43).

Both the PS and the SD approach the concept of national unity also in nativist terms, occasionally narrating it as an inherent value that the development of immigration policy must respect. In the PS programmes, however, the focus on national unity is also commonly presented in a mainstreamed narrative in order to reach potential middle class constituencies without strong patriotic dispositions. This is established by repeatedly narrating the value of national unity in instrumentalist and welfare nationalist terms; presenting national unity as means for facilitating the requisite levels of in-group solidarity for maintaining an enduring support for welfare redistributions. Moreover, and unlike the SD, the PS also repeatedly justifies the necessity redistribution of welfare in terms of a zero-sum game, where anti-immigration politics are the *sine qua non* for the preservation of the welfare state and the welfare nationalist redistributive regime it entails.

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(For a more detailed account on the recognition-redistribution trade-off, see Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 10–30).

## **Justifying Anti-Immigration Advocacy in Discussion Board Debates**

The mobilization rhetoric of the populist parties with anti-immigration political agenda analyzed in the previous section is only one of the facets of anti-immigration advocacy in public debate – seeing as the electoral programmes are aimed at more or less potential constituencies with the purpose of gaining more votes for the parties. On the other hand, the grassroots level discussants – as private political actors on a mainstream public forum – are highly concerned with the social acceptability of neo-populist narratives and political identities they are representing behind aliases. This is why the grassroots actors, unlike political parties, do not primarily seek to convert their imagined audiences into voters of populist parties. Rather, they hope to present their anti-immigration advocacy as a soundly justifiable political agenda and, accordingly, seek to discursively insulate their political activities from the social stigmas of racism and xenophobia (van Dijk 1992, 87–88).

As such, the analysis of the Finnish discussion board data complements the analysis of anti-immigration political mobilization in electoral programmes in two important ways. Firstly, this analysis illustrates a high degree of transference between the economic justificatory rhetoric used by the party political actors, on the one hand, and the grassroots level of the anti-immigration advocacy on the other. Secondly – by focusing on grassroots level narratives seeking to promote anti-immigration advocacy and insulate this political agenda from stigmatizing criticism (of being xenophobic) – it also allows a broader understanding of the discursive practices through which neo-populist anti-immigration sentiment is advocated and justified as a reasonable position in the public debate.

In order to study the grassroots level of justification discourses for anti-immigration advocacy, the three discussion board threads analyzed are selected from the same time period as the electoral programmes. One of the threads dates four months after the PS electoral victory of 2008, the second dates two months before the 2011 elections, and the discussions in the third thread takes place one month after these elections. In addition to being situated at this critical junction, the selection of the threads is subjected to addi-

tional considerations discussed in the chapter 3.1.

The subsections illustrate all the discourses identified in each thread until the saturation point is reached and continue to quote some of the most illuminating posts and discuss the articulations within in more detail.

The tables in the beginning of each subsection illustrate the relative frequency (in percentages) of different narratives with which the discussants seek to justify their anti-immigration arguments and deny racism in their intentions and goals. The narratives are divided into four main types, depending on whether the justification seeking to insulate anti-immigration advocacy from the critique of being racist invokes the “Rights of the majority,” “Immigrants as the Other,” “Economic redistribution” or “Norms of the public discourse.” Many of the posts employ multiple justificatory discourses, often also belonging in several types of justification. This is why the combined count of justificatory discourses (n) is greater than the total number of posts in each of the three discussion board threads analyzed.

The following analysis is divided into three subsections, each covering one thread of discussion board debate. Each subsection discusses the division of the types of discursive justifications for anti-immigration advocacy and illustrates the function of the particular discourses by quoting the posts that indicate how the discussants in practice formulate the justifications in their posts. Following each discussion board excerpt, the justificatory narratives employed within are indicated in square brackets.<sup>20</sup>


***The neo-populist advocates’ right to freedom of speech:  
“[The Minister of Finance] Katainen demands an open discussion also on problems related to immigration”***  
(Mölsä 2009 February 19th, thread saturated at 168/396 posts).

A few months after the municipal elections of 2008 that marked the beginning of the steep rise in the electoral success of the PS,

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20 For more detailed illustration of the justificatory discourses and their types are coded for the purposes of analysis, see Appendix C: Operationalization of the Justification Types and Discourses in Chapter 5.

the Minister of Finance, Jyrki Katainen, acknowledged the validity of some of the concerns that were regarded in the public debate as immigration-related by calling for an “open discussion.” Diagram 1 (below) indicates how anti-immigration advocacy is being justified in this online debate.



**Diagram 1. Frequencies of the narrative justification given for anti-immigration advocacy in the first online debate (Mölsä 2009).**

Within this debate, the proponents of anti-immigration politics commonly argue that the public debate is marked by taboos that need to be broken in order to achieve an open public debate. Almost half of all the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy pertain to what the discussants consider to be distorted norms of the public debate. This type of justification claims that it has not been possible to critically examine immigration-related phenomena in public and voice what the discussants consider genuine and legitimate concerns. According to this narrative, this is why presenting “immigration critique” as something not marked by racism, subjects the discussant to the risk of being considered a racist. As such, presenting arguments for anti-immigration advocacy vests a discussant with a courageous and unselfish speaker position. Such position, the

narrative goes, deserves respect and, therefore, arguments from such a position deserve a role in public debate, even if the critique does not always meet its mark. This type of meta-narrative is commonly used to justify the position of anti-immigration advocacy regardless of the actual arguments employed.

The following excerpt manifests several of the most prominent narratives through which economic redistribution and the norms of the public debate are employed as justification for anti-immigration advocacy:

*A simple opening towards the direction of an honest and open discussion [...] would entail admitting that so-called humanitarian immigration is an expense, that is, an item of expenditure for taxpayers. Once this is a crystal clear fact for everybody, we can discuss mainly about how big an expenditure this is and how we can affect its magnitude. – alias “malmilainen” [coded narratives: open debate; taxpayer perspective; welfare state macro-level].*

This argument justifies anti-immigration advocacy by asserting that the fact that the officials have not acknowledged humanitarian immigration as an expense for taxpayers means that immigration is not “honestly and openly” discussed in public. This narrative seeks to appeal to its audience’s common sense by referring to the expenses caused by immigration as “a crystal clear fact.” It also implies that it would be simple to remedy the public debate on immigration by forcing all the discussants to present their immigration-related arguments from the perspective of how the state allocates its resources vis-à-vis immigration. Another common avenue of justification links the economic considerations to assertions of how immigrant groups behave, often seeking to carefully insulate the stereotypic characterizations of immigrant cultures from the accusations of being racist by reducing the question to purely an economic one:

*I think that this is not about race, culture or religion but rather about a topic as dreary as money. [...] The immigrants do not integrate well enough. So we would need more money. We have only a couple of options. a) We regulate the number immigrants so that we may focus more resources per individual. b) We gather more resources (money) for example by*

*raising taxes. Not many people are willing to do that. – alias “kauku” [coded narratives: “this is not racism”; scarcity of resources; immigrant behaviour; taxpayer perspective].*

This argument begins by justifying anti-immigration advocacy with explicit speaker positioning narrative that distances the discussant from typical starting points of xenophobic arguments, such as concerns for race, culture and religion (van Dijk 1992). Rather, to the extent that rising taxes are not what the majority wants and nobody can deny that resources are limited, the (unsupported) acknowledgement that immigrants do not integrate well enough results in the conclusion that anti-immigration politics is needed. A common justification for political advocacy of anti-immigration policy measures (Bader 2005, 350–351), also employed here, is that since all-inclusive policies are not feasible and immigrants “obviously” have a weaker claim to common resources than does the autochthonous population, it must be illogical to publicly reprehend advocating exclusionary policies.

The reductive quantification of issues of immigration as merely questions of economic resources – as is done in posts by “malmilainen” and “kauku” is dependent on two narratives of implicit fact constructions. The first one is that the immigrants are not “well enough integrated” (with few attempts to actually define what counts for well enough integration), and the second one is that integrative measures are as efficient as can be, and that only increasing the volume of public spending can facilitate “better integration.”

Both assumptions construct national identity and integration as unproblematic and unquestionable ends. However, it is interesting to note that the concepts are, although undefined, typically connected to justifications that present national identity primarily as an instrumental good, allowing the pursuit of a sustainable, ideal welfare state. The prevalence of this welfare idealizing narrative goes against the Muddean understanding of national identity as a primary populist goal in itself (Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258). This is because the narrative entails that the advocacy for anti-immigration policies is justified as a means to fight the solidarity-corroding effect that supposedly reduces the willingness to pay taxes and thus threatens the sustainability of the welfare state (for a more detailed

discussion on the allegedly immigration-induced “solidarity corroding effect,” see Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 11–12).

Diagram 1 also indicates that the use of welfare economy pertaining justifications is much more accentuated in this thread than nativist justifications (for a nuanced discussion on nativist versus instrumentalist variants of nationalism, see Fetzer 2000). Of course, this is not to say that the narratives would not be *motivated* by ethnocentric perceptions. Below is a particularly lucid example of such imaginative use of reductive quantification in the construction of welfare state macro-level considerations that supposedly justify anti-immigration advocacy:

*When we bring 10 incomers to be supported, 1 of them will get employed who (maybe) supports himself, while the other 9 are covered from tax revenues. With about 70% likelihood, this individual must be educated all the way from the alphabet, and it is pretty certain that he will accumulate expenses from the health service etc. as much as a Finn does [...] (let's be optimistic and say that the expenses incurred for kindergarten, interpretation, bureaucracy, etc. are 0 euro.) So we end up with a calculation that one of these ten becomes a net producer in 33 years and the other 9 never. – alias Jäynääjä [coded narratives: immigrant behaviour; welfare abusing immigrants; welfare state macro-level].*

As Jäynääjä's post reveals, narrative constructions of “economic realities” can take on a life of their own. It is evident that the “calculations” presented constitute little more than prejudiced figments of the contributor's imagination. What is remarkable, nevertheless, is that debaters do construct the welfare economy pertinent justifications for anti-immigration advocacy seemingly out of thin air. This testifies for a strong conviction present on the grassroots level debates that there is great normative, justificatory potential in presenting anti-immigration advocacy as benign and “merely” motivated by welfare economic considerations, and that the narratives built on economic justification can transcend the pejorative assumptions of immigrant cultures as a worthless burden.

The less common narratives of justification in this debate – particularly the ones coded as “rights of the majority” – are hardly

ever evoked on their own, and are usually employed to support narratives constructed around economic redistribution and norms of public debate:

*One would not think that wanting to keep Finland Finnish is somehow an anti-immigrant comment? Or do you think that Finland should become, for instance, an Islamic state, so that [immigrants] could feel themselves “integrated”? [I]t is hard to understand why cherishing the Finnish culture and habits should be somehow a racist activity against people who have come here from other cultures? – alias “Jugi [coded narratives: reaffirming our ways; open debate; “this is not racism”].*

Here the opposition to immigration is first justified on the basis of the concern for the cultural rights of the majority. However, a denial of a racist intention quickly follows the hyperbolic straw man of the “extreme tolerant” position (as in the position that Finland should become an Islamic state). Such justificatory narratives typically employ the logic that since many of the nativist anti-immigration arguments are not really about immigrants themselves (as the proposed justification instead seeks to present a legitimate concern for “the Finnish culture”), it follows that such arguments should not be possible to be defined as racist in the public debate.

The general implication behind the proliferate racism denying narratives in this debate is that as long as the discussants do not refer to explicitly racist goals when supporting anti-immigration policies, their political agenda should not be considered racist, either (van Dijk 1992, 94). Indeed, many neo-populist discussants seek to present the critique of xenophobia issued against them as strategic intervention by their political opponents, who are resorting to unfair use *ad hominem* argumentation. The online advocates of neo-populism hold the position that as long as reaching racist outcomes cannot be shown to be the reason why they advocate anti-immigration measures in the first place, labelling the advocates as racists is an *ad hominem* accusation that cannot be accepted in a healthy public debate. What is remarkable in the justificatory narratives for neo-populist welfare nationalism is the overarching focus of racism as solely as a question of personal *motivation*. The neo-populist on-




line discussants very rarely discuss whether the implementation of the actual policies they are advocating – aiming “to keep Finland Finnish,” for instance – might be likely to carry racist *outcomes*.

***The welfare economic subject matter on the neo-populist political agenda: “The Perussuomalaiset would relocate unemployed immigrants in the peripheries”***

(Helsingin Sanomat 2011a February 25th: thread saturated at 75/241 posts).

This online debate takes place two years later than the previous thread examined, less than three months prior to the Finnish parliamentary elections of April 2011. The news article debated here uses a significantly more critical tone towards the neo-populist advocates in comparison to the news article in the debated in the first analyzed thread, which originated from the Minister of Finance’s nod towards the electoral success of the PS. This thread debates a specific policy proposal – as presented in the PS electoral programme – of accommodating the unemployed immigrants in regions where housing expenses are lower. Diagram 2 (next page) illustrates that here the justifications for anti-immigration advocacy mostly employ narratives related to economic redistribution, these being almost twice as frequent as the second and third most common types of narratives *Norms of public debate* or *Immigrants as the Other*.



**Diagram 2. Frequencies of the narrative justification given for anti-immigration advocacy in the second online debate (Helsingin Sanomat 2011a).**

As this debate originates from the merits of a particular anti-immigration policy measure – presented as an economic remedy to an immigration-related problem by a party soaring in the polls – the discussants are keen to appeal to “economic logic” and “pragmatism.” This way the neo-populist advocates seek to present their anti-immigration agenda as belonging in a “mundane” social political debate that conceptualizes the public economy behind the measures of welfare redistribution in terms of a zero-sum game, similar to the approach in the PS programmes. The general thrust of the justificatory narratives employed this debate is illustrated by quoting posts by aliases “Public PC” and “Riitu S”:

*I guess the immigrants are allowed to reside wherever they please, as long as they cover the expenses themselves. As long as society pays for the accommodation of the immigrant, he shouldn't have anything to complain about the location where society finds an apartment for him. – alias “Public PC” [coded narratives: welfare state macro-level; taxpayer perspective; “this is not racism”].*

In employing the economic redistribution narrative, the discussants justify anti-immigration advocacy through the reductive quantification of complex welfare issues. Many background assumptions of how welfare redistribution works are left implicit, but nevertheless presented as “obviously” internalized by the other reasonable discussants. Firstly, the fulfilment of any socially enabling function for economic redistribution is never articulated as grounds for deciding whether the advocacy for an anti-immigration policy measure is justifiable. This is remarkable in a welfare state context, where the *raison d’être* for redistributions has commonly been understood in terms of a more or less positive understanding of freedom, whereby redistributing monies allows people to have a greater deal of independence than they would have without such redistribution (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3).

Secondly, there is an underlying supposition – commonly linked to liberal regimes of welfare in the academic discussion (as defined in the typology of Esping-Andersen 1990, 26–27) – that the beneficiaries of redistribution should have no say concerning their satisfaction in the outcome of redistributive policies. This supposition manifests itself lucidly in the excerpt from the post by “Riitu S”:

*They are being put in the most inexpensive place possible until they can support themselves. [...] [T]hey reside in the cheapest possible place and immediately when they support themselves, they can freely choose their domicile. Logical, right? – alias “Riitu S” [coded narratives: welfare state macro-level; taxpayer perspective].*

It is remarkable that the justification of anti-immigration policy of regional restrictions for housing subsidies for immigrants as merely “logical” omits any discussion concerning the welfare nationalist logic according to which Finns are implicitly perceived as entitled to the favorable treatment of having regionally unbound access to housing subsidies.

Even the articulations that seek to justify anti-immigration advocacy by presenting immigrants as the Other most commonly construct this Otherness in economic terms, arguing that immigrants live in a way that threatens to excessively strain the resources. In-

deed, these economically based narratives of othering are commonly employed in conjunction with the (counterfactual) assertion according to which the autochthonous population's use of welfare resources is mostly insignificant in comparison to that of immigrants:

*One can move to Helsinki or any other place once one can pay for the costs of one's own accommodation. I think this is quite logical, and although a Finnish social bum can move to a rental apartment of any city this is relatively insignificant, in comparison to the fact that almost all of the humanitarian immigration is like this. – alias "jebbe21" [coded narratives: welfare state macro-level; welfare abusing immigrants; immigrant behaviour].*

Moreover, the economy-related anti-immigration narratives often imply – and sometimes even explicitly argue – that welfare resources used by immigrants are actually abused. In the excerpt from "jebbe21"'s post (above), this type of justification for anti-immigration advocacy is sought by presenting "a Finnish social bum" as the closest point of comparison for humanitarian immigrants in the debate on housing subsidies.

Othering comparisons between immigrants and the autochthonous population can also be employed for the purposes of constructing the narrative in which immigrants are portrayed as challenging the majority's entitlement to scarce welfare resources. For the purpose of justifying anti-immigration advocacy, these comparisons often seek to reinforce the discursive link between the purported nature of immigrants and the "realities" of economic redistribution:

*In Finland, people emphasize equality in everything, also incl. equality between refugees and the Finnish citizens in every possible respect. [...] Actually, the truth to the matter is such that the economic situation of a refugee can be easily shown to be better than that of a poor, Finnish person. [...] Situating [refugees] to peripheries has the added benefit of preventing the concentration of [refugee] accommodation, urban decay, in many cases. – alias "Iivari Tahko" [coded narratives: "this is not racism"; scarcity of resources; majority's entitlement; immigrant behaviour; welfare state macro-level].*

This justification of anti-immigration advocacy moves on multiple discursive levels. First the discussant seeks to pre-empt any accusation of racism by employing a national self-categorization (Billig 1987, 70–73), which presents Finns as people, who emphasize equality between refugees and the autochthonous population “in every possible respect.” By the virtue of being a Finn, who greatly values equality, he then points to the inequality in the asserted fact that the poor Finns are supposedly worse off in their own country than refugees, who are claiming the (housing) resources the poor Finns used to be entitled to.

Anti-immigration policy measures – such as placing refugees on the periphery – are being justified by using narratives that combine discourses of scarcity and the denial of racism. A typical narrative of this kind presents the measures as a way for the majority to remedy the unfair loss of their privileged entitlement to scarce welfare goods. Additionally, the anti-immigration policies tend to be presented as having the ability to address the macro-level solidarity corroding challenges that the heterogenizing welfare state is often portrayed as facing (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 11–12). The issue of urban decay is an example of the kind of a problem that discussants are keen to link to immigration and immigrant behaviour, thus arguably justifying the advocacy for anti-immigration measures for countering the problem.


The analysis of this thread of online debate underlines the important role of a selective linking of anecdotal evidence and macro-economic observations in narratives that are able to present legitimate concerns for maintaining livelihood in Finland as “economic facts” about immigration. Such a construction of facts allows for the employing various narratives in which immigration plays a significant role in the accentuation of the pertinent problems surrounding the welfare state, eventually justifying the advocacy for anti-immigration measures as a simple, effective and socially justifiable means to tackle several contemporary political challenges the welfare state is facing.

***Contesting the neo-populist collective identity with the public critique of racism and xenophobia: “President Halonen urges***

***the government to oppose racism”***

(Silfverberg 2011 May 28th: thread saturated at 137/265 posts)

The news article based on President Halonen’s plea against racism, discussed in this thread, was published only three months after the second online debate analyzed here took place. In the meantime, however, the parliamentary elections of 2011 were held, which radically changed the atmosphere for the public debate on immigration. The electoral result translated the promising polls into a major victory for the PS (as indicated in the graph 1 in the chapter 1.1). This meant that the neo-populist concerns for immigration could be expected to be on the governmental agenda, especially seeing as the formation of the government coalition was still on-going until late June. Against this background, it may be surprising to note, as diagram 3 (below) indicates, that the posts justifying anti-immigration advocacy with narratives on economic redistribution were significantly less common than the ones using other justificatory resources.



**Diagram 3. Frequencies of the narrative justification given for anti-immigration advocacy in the third online debate (Silfverberg 2011).**

One way to address this shift in the use of justificatory narratives between the two threads of online debates in 2011 would be to note that by participating in the domestic political debate by condemning racism, the president clearly put the advocates of anti-immigration politics on the defensive stance. Moreover, the fact that the anti-immigration-oriented political agenda had already succeeded in prevailing in the elections can help explain why the discussants may have experienced less of a need to rearticulate the perceived (economic) assets of their political agenda. The common neo-populist discourse that emphasized the importance of having immigration issues feature high on the political agenda is significantly less pronounced in the debate analyzed here. It is likely that because the electoral result already manifested notable public support for these concerns, more imminent goals – most commonly related to the perception of a tarnished public image of neo-populist advocates in the public debate – can be identified in the justificatory narratives employed in this debate.

The neo-populists' focus on their public image can be observed here in the proliferation of narratives that seek to discursively reposition anti-immigration advocacy in a way that allows insulating it from the public critique. Another observation pointing to this conclusion can be found in the fact that the most common narrative employed in this debate – “this is not racism” – has a much greater lead respective to the second most frequent justificatory narrative (4,6 pp) than the difference between the most common and second most common narratives employed in the first (0,0 pp) and the second (0,9 pp) online debates analyzed.

It seems that in this instance of online debate, the ball is thrown back to the neo-populists as the supporters of the new major political player. This seems to be interpreted by anti-immigration advocates as entailing the responsibility to narrate how they cannot be racists as they themselves can be presented as suffering from a variety of arguably immigration-related phenomena. This interpretation is supported by the dominance of the victimized narratives pertaining to the rights of the majority, which were the least common type of justification in the earlier threads.

Indeed, this debate introduces two new and highly frequent narratives of justification, both of which are closely connected together

and also commonly linked to the most frequent narrative of “this is not racism.” Firstly, many discussants construct the supposedly extensive debate on the difficulties the immigrants face as one pertaining to a relatively insignificant societal issue, but nevertheless “crowding out” (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 10–11) the concerns the Finns would like to put on the political agenda. This common, zero-sum conceptualization of immigration-related issue saliency in a public debate is generally employed for the purposes of asserting, in accordance with a “welfare chauvinist” logic, that the pre-existing, natural and proper dominance of “our concerns” is now being taken over by a focus on immigrants’ concerns (Rydgren 2006, 52). The Finnish way of juxtaposing “deserving” and “undeserving” recipients of welfare benefits (Kangas 2000, 417) is exemplified in the excerpt below:

*In the country unemployment is increasing, treatment of the elderly and the sick is overlooked [...]. And what might our opinion leader [President Halonen] be doing? Venting her points on racism [...] which is not a problem in our country, as opposed to the lack of food and employment [...] Halonen and other politicians should focus on removing these. – alias “eri maailmassako” [coded narratives: displacing majority’s concerns; “this is not racism”; scarcity of goods; majority’s entitlement].*

The narratives painting the picture of scarce resources and displaced majority are commonly employed in conjunction with various denials of racism, as this allows the discussants to present their indifference or hostility towards the immigrant claims-making as not rooted in racism, but rather in the majority’s (sense of) dearth of resources and recognition. Linking these narratives serves to construct a legitimate speaker position for neo-populists that is concerned that the rising salience of the questions of racism threatens to displace other important societal issues that the neo-populists are trying to underline.

This displacement narrative is also linked to the narrative of the vilified majority, in order to construct the position of the majority – represented by the neo-populists – as the victim, whose anti-immigration advocacy should be seen as nothing but the struggle for



its own recognition and survival. Together these narratives suggest that addressing the concerns of minorities in public and political debates is excessive in its current form, which only serves to marginalize the members of the majority group (for an account of similar economy-emphasizing narratives employed in anti-immigration rhetoric, see Fetzer 2000). This is best illustrated in the following, particularly rich excerpt that employs a great variety of justificatory resources, making a case of unfair public treatment against the people with intersecting markers of gender, age cohort, ethnic and moral majority:

*Particularly hetero men with family experience themselves as being discriminated against. They are the self-evidence that is left under the feet of minority groups. Media visibility is given several times a day to [. . .] minorities. Immigrants and language minorities. No one says anything about the wellbeing or the societal importance of an ordinary, white, hetero taxpayer or that of an unemployed male. Why? [...] Is it really so [. . .] important to discuss what is not happening to or done for minorities in their own opinion – rather than discuss what should be done according to the majority who maintains, finances and builds society? – alias “Sosiaalityömies” [coded narratives: reaffirming our ways; vilified majority; displacing majority’s concerns; scarcity of goods; majority’s entitlement; open debate].*

What becomes clear in the excerpt by “Sosiaalityömies” – whose very alias embodies an authoritative speaker positioning as “social working man” – is that the self-proclaimed majority’s (experience of) marginalization is what justifies anti-immigration advocacy, and that the diminishing access to material welfare resources is only one facet of this marginalization. The combination of justificatory resources constructed by “Sosiaalityömies” presents “the minorities and their sympathizers” as taking a prominent role in the public debate and in the media, thereby pushing the majority away from the central position in the public exchange of ideas that the majority should – “obviously” – rightfully occupy.

The main thrust of the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy in the last online debate analyzed is that immigration is

currently discussed from the wrong angle according to the grass-roots level neo-populists. The narrative emphasizes that by focusing on minorities in general – and immigrants in particular – the norms of “tolerance” within public debate serve to vilify the majority and displace their concerns. The oppositional narrative situates neo-populists as the counterpoise for what they label as the ultra-liberal political elite, justifying the political advocacy for the former by narrating their aims in defensive terms. The neo-populists are presented, accordingly, as advocates for a benign and temperate political movement, only seeking to draw attention back to the majority’s concerns and to address the problems that immigration arguably causes to the welfare state and the just economic redistribution within it.

### **Harnessing Welfare Nationalist Narratives in Neo-Populist Political Mobilization**

Regimes of social policy typically seek to assess how compelling a need an individual is facing as the basis for redistributing welfare accordingly (Goodin 1988, 27–50). Research on the political sociology of welfare redistribution suggests, however, that the perceived legitimacy of these redistributions among the population is commonly challenged by presenting an apparently meritocratic calculus for evaluating who is *entitled* to getting his or her need compensated from public funds (see, for example, Von Oorschoot 2000; Kangas 2000, 5–6). Indeed, even though the personal motivations for advocating immigrants’ disentanglement are commonly understood to have their roots in fears and anxieties regarding the cultural Other (for the Finnish context of such advocacy, see, for example, Puuronen 2011), the narrative analysis carried out in this chapter suggests that advocates of anti-immigration politics rarely articulate these motivations in the narratives employed in the public debate. One reason for rather narrating the public advocacy for anti-immigration measures in meritocratic terms can be linked to neo-populist strategic social action; their advocates understand that presenting explicitly xenophobic motives for exclusionary policies would greatly undermine the public justifiability of neo-populist

politics (van Dijk 1992, 94).

The analysis carried out in this chapter corroborate this body of research. The results indicate that many of the most common public narratives seeking to justify an advocacy for exclusionary welfare nationalism in the neo-populist political agenda do indeed return to the ancient Aesopian themes of desert and entitlement to resources from the common pool. As a justification for their exclusionary immigration policies, the neo-populists consistently employ welfare nationalist narratives for delineating the boundary between those who can and cannot be trusted to work for the common good. However, these narratives are much less explicit regarding the nature of the “national we” whom these goods are supposedly common to. Instead, the neo-populists construct the category of “the entitled” in negative terms. The welfare nationalist policy measures for immigrant disentanglement to equal recognition and redistribution are justified in various narratives that present the normative juxtapositions based on ethnic and cultural stereotypes simply as “common sense” distinctions between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor.

Rather than focusing on the personal motivation behind neo-populist advocates’ anti-immigration attitudes, I have illustrated in this chapter how neo-populists employ various, public justificatory narratives for an anti-immigration oriented political agenda both on the level of partisan manifestos and in grassroots level online debates. The analyses of both levels of neo-populist advocacy reveal a significant commonality between the discourses employed in the electoral programmes and on the discussion boards. There is a clear transference between the narratives employed in the PS electoral programmes and in the discussion board debates. Neo-populist advocates within both arenas of public debate employ welfare nationalist interpretations of the challenges the welfare state is facing. Conceptualizing immigration as an easily quantifiable “extra” strain on “our” welfare system, neo-populists downplay the questions of social justice issued against their anti-immigration measures with narratives that draw from a sense economic necessity and justify the welfare nationalist political agenda as prudently parsimonious social policy for distributing welfare in times of economic distress.

The broad strokes concerning the political themes that feature in the electoral programmes are markedly similar between the PS

programmes of 2008 and 2011. Indeed, even the SD programme of 2010 prioritizes the issues of labour migration, refugees and social solidarity. The analysis conducted here suggests, however, that the narratives with which the PS operationalizes these themes for the purposes of political mobilization have changed in time, drawing significantly more from macroeconomic narratives of justification in 2011 than in 2008.

Concerning the issue of labour, the 2008 programme bears a closer resemblance to the SD programme in the sense that both emphasize the pernicious effect that an influx of inexpensive labour force would carry for the blue-collared working-class. In the 2011 programme, however, the PS appears to reach for middle class constituencies by focusing instead on the increased public spending caused by the burden of non-working immigrants.

Both the 2008 and 2011 programmes, unlike the SD programme, problematize practice of receiving asylum seekers by emphasizing the increased expenses covered by taxpayers' monies. In the earlier programme, however, the PS suggests that by helping refugees in their countries of origin Finland could receive less asylum seekers – a practice that the SD programme also advocates, albeit justifying this with the endeavor of protecting the Swedish culture from external influences. The PS also proposes that the state should “adjust” the volume of Finland’s refugee quota in their 2011 programme, but only with regard to “general economic development.”

The common concern for national solidarity and communality – featuring highly in each of the three programmes – is justified in the SD programme through a narrative that emphasizes nativist focus for maintaining a homogeneous Swedish culture. In comparison, in the PS programmes, the importance of national solidarity is often qualified with an instrumentalist, tax-populist justification. This narrative idealizes the capabilities of the welfare state prior to the influx of immigrants, emphasizing that it is first and foremost the heterogenization of the societal value-base that threatens to diminish the willingness pay the taxes needed to finance the regime an encompassing regime for welfare redistribution.

These themes feature also in the online arena of grassroots level debate, although the narratives appear to develop along a timescale similar to the ones used in the electoral programmes. In 2008, the

neo-populist advocates are keen on defending their right to bring “immigration critical” themes to the political agenda, justifying the neo-populist advocacy against their critics with narratives drawing from freedom of speech. In 2011, the concern for the freedom of speech is less prominent, with the discussants focusing the subject matter of immigration politics through welfare economic justificatory narratives that are very similar to the ones in the programmes.

What is particularly interesting in the online debate taking place after the parliamentary elections is the repeated manifestation of a victimized narrative that reifies the figure of the normal Finn – a vanilla member of the majority or “the white hetero male,” who is unfairly treated as *persona non grata* in the public debate. This victimized narrative juxtaposes the detached flowery-hatted member of elite who controls the mass media and with it “the Finnish people.” Indeed, something of a resonant neo-populist collective identity appears to start forming in the proliferating narrative, whereby the grassroots level advocates consistently position themselves as the protagonists of the “ordinary people” – the silenced pariahs, who must suffer the unfounded accusations of being racists in order to save the welfare state from immigration. In the final chapter of empirical analysis, I proceed to explore this post-2011 consolidation of the neo-populist collective identity in more detail.

## 6

# Scandalized Underdogs of Xenophobic Satirists? Consolidation of a Neo-Populist Collective Identity in Mediatized Contestations

In the previous chapters, I first analyzed the high political narratives in the early 2000s that marked the emergence of welfare nationalist interpretations of the impact of immigration upon welfare solidarity. I then proceeded to examine how these narratives were operationalized in neo-populist political mobilization towards the end of the decade. This last empirical chapter continues the dissertation's scrutiny of the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy. Here the research object shifts from the subject matter of welfare nationalist politics to the mediatized contestations concerning the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. The chapter illustrates how the discussants taking part in two impassionate debates within mainstream and sphericule arenas of public debate collectively construct stories with oppositional subject positionings of neo-populist advocacy, employing what I in my analysis identify as delegitimizing and legitimizing narratives. Furthermore, I analyze how these narrative contestations over the legitimacy of the neo-populist political agenda and public presence catalyze the consolidation of neo-populism as a resonant category of collective identity.

The shift in the analytical focus from welfare nationalism to

neo-populist subject positioning in this chapter reflects some of the recent developments in the Finnish political climate regarding the neo-populist political activism. Once the immigration-related issues on the welfare nationalist political agenda had been extensively debated in public for several years around the electoral victories of the *Perussuomalaiset* party in 2008 and 2011, the most salient political contestations in the mainstream media started to revolve around the critical assessments concerning the emergent neo-populist collective identity. Rather than continuing to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the welfare nationalist political agenda, editorials and interviews of the politicians and academics alike began to examine in more detail how neo-populists present themselves in the public eye. Social media and tabloid journalism, in particular, were able to unearth several blunders by political actors affiliated to the *Perussuomalaiset* party, some of which eventually became framed as frontpage scandals by the more established, traditional media outlets.

These developments took place in the aftermath of the electoral victory of 2011, which was dubbed widely in the media as “Jytky” – a colloquial term coined by the party leader Timo Soini connoting a grand explosion. With the proliferation of the critical media exposure, some neo-populist advocates, especially those close to the party apparatus, grew increasingly concerned with securing the institutional persistence of *Perussuomalaiset* in the day-to-day politics in the future to come. Acutely aware of the other parties’ endeavors to capitalize on the persistent elements of neo-populist radicalism and to mobilize their constituencies with a more moderate stance concerning salient issues on the welfare nationalist political agenda, some of the leading figures in the neo-populist party apparatus became ill at ease with the steady succession of one mediatized scandal after another.

The neo-populist grassroots level collectivity, too, faced the challenge of carefully distancing itself from the delegitimizing scandal narratives – commonly presented in the mainstream media as manifestations of explicit racism and xenophobia in the core of neo-populist politics. These discussants were particularly animated in the online arenas of public debate and endeavored to position themselves as the authentic protagonists of welfare nationalism. In

their rhetoric, they juxtaposed the position of authentic advocates with the category of “misguided individuals” in the neo-populist movement who were harming the true neo-populist cause with their public blunders. In the following, I identify these endeavors as legitimizing subject positioning narratives that construct neo-populism as an emergent and resonant collectivity whose “true identity” their political opponents are willfully seeking to distort and delegitimize in the scandalizing “witch-hunts” organized by the “elite-controlled media.”

In the two-stage analysis presented in this chapter, I examine online debates over the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. Accordingly, as described in greater detail in Chapter 3, the first stage of the analysis constitutes a thematic analysis of the online data collected by reviewing two different online sources. As an example of a mainstream arena, where people of different opinions can be expected to take part and where some form of moderation occurs, I chose the discussion board maintained by the leading news daily *Helsingin Sanomat* [HS]. As an example of a neo-populist sphericule, I chose the *Hommaforum* [Homma]. Homma is not officially linked to the Perussuomalaiset party, but is widely regarded as Finland’s largest “immigration critical” discussion forum with some 9200 registered users and 1.7 million comments posted since it was founded in January 2009 by the most active discussants in Jussi Halla-aho’s [*Perussuomalaiset* MP since 2011] online blog. The presentation of the results of the thematic analysis in this chapter proceeds by identifying the themes around which the most salient narrative contestations on the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy are emerging between certain delegitimizing and legitimizing subject positioning narratives, as well as some of the most interesting general features concerning how these narratives manifest in the two arenas.

For the second, in-depth stage of the analysis, I chose to focus on two particularly heated online debates that developed around the front-page media coverage on sequences of events that the mainstream media framed as neo-populist scandals. The aim of the analysis of these two ‘scandals’ is to explore the emergent mediatized contestations over the legitimacy of the neo-populist agenda. The debates to be analyzed in this chapter occurred in 2012 and 2013, revolving around the question of whether the actions of two new-



ly elected MPs for the *Perussuomalaiset*, Jussi Halla-aho and James Hirvisaari, should be considered to undermine the legitimacy of the neo-populist collectivity and political agenda.

I first briefly describe the subject matter in the two “scandal events” that both feature allegations of racism and xenophobia against a *Perussuomalaiset* MP. I then describe how I compiled four pairs of what I term “oppositional public stories” (OPS) for the purposes of conducting an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of narrative contestation in these debates. Finally, before entering this detailed narrative analysis of the OPS pairs, I highlight some of the findings of a thematic analysis of the online debate data on which the compilation of the OPS pairs is based.

I conclude this chapter with comparative discussion on the results of the narrative analysis of these oppositional public stories, evaluating how the narratives they employ are reproducing, delineating and consolidating a sense of resonant collective identity among the online collectivity of neo-populist advocates.

### **The Halla-aho and Hirvisaari “Scandals” as the Source of Narrative Contestations in the Oppositional Public Stories<sup>21</sup>**

Chronologically the first one of the “scandal” debates, although analyzed in the second and fourth OPS pairs, resulted from online reactions to two newspaper articles published by Helsingin Sanomat in June 2012. The articles cover an ongoing court case involving the two hate crime convictions of the newly-elected *Perussuomalaiset* MP Jussi Halla-aho. The first article (Helsingin Sanomat 2012a) reports the final act in a series of events that began in June 2008, when Halla-aho – at the time a newly elected member of Helsinki City Council – described Islam in his online blog as “pedophile religion”, further elaborating his position by characterizing Somalis

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21 As mentioned above, the second stage of the analysis focuses on the narrative contestations on the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. These contestations are examined in the first stage of analysis on a more general level in the next subsection of this chapter. The contestations were identified in the data with the help of the thematic analysis by operationalizing the most frequently coded narratives in the data into four pairs of collectively produced oppositional public stories (OPS) by employing narrative analysis of public stories (Feldman and Almqvist 2011). The discussion on the data collection as well as on the methodology of narrative analysis of public stories can be found in the chapter 3.

as criminals and parasites:

*[R]obbing bypassers and parasitizing with taxpayers' monies is a national, perhaps even a genetic, characteristic of Somalis* (quoted in the minutes of Korkein oikeus 2012, translation NP).

Halla-aho stood for trial on charges of ethnic agitation and breach of the sanctity of religion. The former charges was dismissed first in Helsinki District Court and then in the Finnish Court of Appeal, but in June 2012 HS reported that the Finnish Supreme Court had found Halla-aho guilty on both charges and sentenced him to pay a fine of 400 euros. Throughout the legal process there was great media attention, during which the *Perussuomalaiset* leader Timo Soini told the media that any convicted members would be removed from the party (Iltasanomat 2009), but after the conviction by the Supreme Court, Soini told that Halla-aho has been punished enough and could continue in the party (Helsingin Sanomat 2012c).

The second news story article that HS published discusses the issue of satire in Halla-aho's line of defense against both the legal charges and public critique in the media (Helsingin Sanomat 2012b). The article points out that the Supreme Court acknowledged in the final resolution that Halla-aho's passage was indeed written as satire, since the formulation of the Halla-aho's passage was copied from an earlier article by the newspaper Kaleva which stated that in Finland "[d]runken killing is a national, perhaps even a genetic, characteristic" (Kaleva 2008).

The second "scandal" debate, the one focusing on the actions of the *Perussuomalaiset* MP James Hirvisaari, was also spurred by two newspaper articles. The first one reports the scandal which emerged in September 2013 when Hirvisaari invited his personal friend, the far right activist Seppo Lehto, as a guest to the Finnish House of Parliament. During the visit, Hirvisaari took a picture of Lehto making a nazi-salute in front of the building and posted the picture on his Facebook wall (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). In the second article (Helsingin Sanomat 2013b), Hirvisaari defends his actions as nothing but a ribald joke, referring to Lehto as "super-humorist" and suggesting that those who took offense from the pictures must

be remarkably uptight individuals. After these statements, Soini removed Hirvisaari from the parliamentary group of *Perussuomalaiset*.

In the later part of the chapter, I analyze these two cases through oppositional public stories, as in both cases the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy was called into question and defended. Two of the OPS pairs (1 and 3) are compiled by using posts from Hirvisaari debates, and other two (2 and 4) are from Halla-aho debates. The first public story in each of the four pairs is compiled from those HS posts that employ a particularly frequent delegitimizing narrative. The second public story in each of the four OPS pairs is compiled from a likewise frequent, but legitimizing counter-narrative that seeks to confront the delegitimizing storyline by reinterpreting the scandal case and positioning the role of neo-populist advocates favorably in the story.

Considering that very few of the posts in Homma were coded as employing a delegitimizing narrative without any legitimizing component (3%), the four delegitimizing stories are constructed exclusively from the posts submitted in the mainstream arena. However, since discussants in both HS and Homma employ narratives that clearly seek to legitimize neo-populist advocacy (39% and 31% respectively), two of the legitimizing stories (in OPS 1 and 2) are compiled from HS posts and the other two (in OPS 3 and 4) from Homma posts (see table 1).

	<b>Oppositional public stories on limits of acceptable humor, all stories compiled from the mainstream arena (HS)</b>	<b>Oppositional public stories on political accountability, legitimizing stories compiled from the sphericule arena (Homma)</b>
<b>The Hirvisaari Case</b>	OPS pair 1: "Why must neo-populists' jokes be taken seriously?"	OPS pair 3: "Are only neo-populists their brothers' keepers?"
<b>The Halla-aho Case</b>	OPS pair 2: "Neo-populist satire: Inciting racial hatred or exercising freedom of speech?"	OPS pair 4: "The system is certainly rigged – but for or against neo-populists?"

**Table 1: Four OPS pairs manifesting the most salient narrative contestations in the data and emerging between the discussants' most commonly employed delegitimizing and legitimizing narratives.**

In the analysis of the narrative contestations illustrated in by the OPS pairs, I place a particular focus on juxtaposing subject positionings and constructions of enemy categories, emphasizing how strategic social action in various arenas of public debate may allow neo-populist discussants to build a resonant collective identity through legitimizing reinterpretations of the scandal publicity and critical media exposure. However, before proceeding with the narrative analysis of the oppositional public stories, I first present some of the most interesting general features concerning the narrative contestations in the overall data that as mentioned above guided the process for selecting the posts around which the OPS pairs are constructed.

### **Is the High Prevalence of Legitimizing Narratives an Indicator of the Consolidation of Neo-Populist Sense of Collectivity?**

One of the most decisive findings in the narrative analysis of the scandal debate data is that the discussants are very keen on debating the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. In six out of ten posts (or in 259 posts in the fifth data set of 429 posts) the discussant employs a subject positioning narrative that addresses the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. This pool of 259 posts is also the source of the posts used for compiling the OPS pairs because the purpose of the narrative analysis is to illustrate how the contestations on the legitimacy of neo-populism serve to consolidate a collective self-understanding of neo-populist advocacy.

Another notable finding concerning the scandal debates is that even though most of the data is collected from the HS discussion boards – a mainstream arena where discussants with all kinds of political allegiances debate – the posts that seek to legitimize the neo-populist advocacy are twice as common as the posts that employ delegitimizing narratives (chart 1).




Chart 1. The distribution of narrative approaches to neo-populist legitimacy in the overall data of 429 posts.

One of the first questions to ask is why should the majority of the discussants feel the need to express support for the neo-populists who are being critiqued for a Nazi salute in the parliament house and the hate crime conviction of a *Perussuomalaiset* MPs? There are several possible explanatory avenues that are common to all of the whole body of the data that can address the high relative frequency of legitimizing narratives, and at least three distinct avenues can be corroborated with the narrative analysis of the data.

Firstly, it is important to emphasize that the subject position that is being positioned favorably by the legitimizing narratives is not necessarily that of the *Perussuomalaiset* politician as the object of the scandal. Rather, many discussants employ narratives that do condemn the scandalous acts as such, but also express identification with and support for the neo-populist collectivity and its political goals. These discussants typically narrate the scandals as illustrations of problems in something else than in the neo-populist collective. Such narratives most commonly either distance themselves from the scandalized individual as the single rotten apple to

be purged from the neo-populist ranks [coded: legitimizing, he is not one of us] or by suggesting that the intensity of the scandal publicity points to a conspiracy instigated by their political opponents and elitist media [coded: legitimizing, others like to bully us, game is rigged against us].

*Hesari [Helsingin Sanomat] does not make screaming headlines if a physically handicapped person bumbles around with a wheelchair. Out patients and people in need of mental care are equal citizens and they, too, have the right to visit the parliament house. Why should their blunders be turned into scandal news so that the MP who has invited such a person – as well as the MPs party – are stigmatized?* [coded: legitimizing, others like to bully us, poor mental patient, no neopopulist responsibility, this is a minor thing] (Homaforum 2013, l. 319–320).

*Incredibly crude decision by the “Supreme” Court [...]. This severely erodes trust in the Finnish legal system. There has not been an equally politicized and personified witch hunt in our country since the grimmest years of Finlandization.* [coded: legitimizing, game is rigged against us] (Helsingin Sanomat 2012a, l. 828–832).

These excerpts exemplify the online debates analyzed within both arenas and in both scandal cases. They both suggest that even when the actual scandalous act may be regarded as condemnable by the discussant employing one of the legitimizing narratives, these discussants commonly seek to narrate a victimized subject position. This position is further supported by the narratives that relativize the importance of the scandal event itself or the media attention revolving around it. Both posts employ narratives typical to posts coded as legitimizing neo-populist advocacy also to the extent that they construct a sense of ill will against the neo-populists in the media or in the judicial system, suggesting that this animosity against them is the primary reason why neo-populist scandals emerge.

The second potential explanatory avenue to account for the prevalence of the legitimizing narratives emphasizes the source of the

data. About one third (160 posts) of all of the posts in the data originate from the neo-populist affiliated sphericule arena, *Hommaforum*. There the support for neo-populism is much stronger than in the mainstream arena, Helsingin Sanomat discussion boards. The distribution of the narrative approaches to neo-populist legitimacy between the different arenas indicates that the discussants on Homma are, unsurprisingly, much less inclined to employ delegitimizing narratives than the discussants on the HS discussion boards (charts 2 and 3). What is interesting, however, is that the legitimizing narratives are even more common in HS than in Homma.





Chart 2. The distribution of narrative approaches to the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy in the 269 posts collected from HS discussion boards.



**Chart 3.** The distribution of narrative approaches to the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy in the 160 posts collected from the Hommaforum.

The high frequency of legitimizing narratives in the posts submitted to the mainstream arena debates suggests that the neo-populist collectivity is driven by the need to justify and legitimize their reference group to mainstream audiences. Since we can assume that the average discussant in HS is generally less likely to express support for the neo-populists than the average user of Homma, the result suggests two features in the neo-populist advocacy. On the one hand, the high frequency of legitimizing narratives in HS suggests that here neo-populist advocates are coming from their own sphericule arena to HS because they are particularly motivated to challenge in mainstream publicity what they regard as delegitimizing scandal narratives of their collectivity. On the other hand, these findings can be interpreted so that also those mainstream discussants with a smaller degree of sympathy for neo-populism are encouraged to employ narratives that legitimize neo-populism when there is already a heated and polarized debate going on.

Finally, the high frequency of legitimizing narratives in the overall data can be explained partly through the observation that the two scandal articles spurring the online debates already employ several delegitimizing narratives themselves. This gives some of the otherwise potential discussants less incentive to submit posts in cases




where they would end up merely rearticulating much of the content in the delegitimizing narratives already presented in the articles. Conversely, those discussants who find themselves disagreeing with the manner in which the articles present neo-populism are more prone submit posts that employ legitimizing narratives. Those who are most strongly driven to participate in the debates, therefore, are the discussants who want to narrate some degree of legitimization for neo-populism. For these discussants, the scandals are commonly interpreted as challenging not only the perpetrators and their acts, but also unfairly delegitimizing their own reference group in the mainstream media. The strong intensity and an intimate sense of outrage that is commonly present in the posts coded as legitimizing neo-populist advocacy points to a strong and deep sense of personal involvement with the neo-populist collectivity whose legitimacy the scandal framings taking place in the mainstream arena is considered to undermine.

*Goddammit! Now even a silent man gets so pissed off. Here we've got ourselves two serious knuckleheads. First Hirvisaari invites a retard to wave around and is then surprised when Hesari capitalizes on this opportunity [...] to score a 6-nil victory [...]. My head hurts, it hurts like a motherf\*\*\*er. [coded: legitimizing, goes against neopopulist cause, he is not one of us] (Hommaforum 2013, l. 233–243).*

*The Green women now got what they wanted. Let the celebration and exultation commence in Käpylä [a posh district in Helsinki with strong support for the populists' political opponents]. For the rest of us, this is a day of shame and sorrow, because this is only the first step towards the utopia of the green khmers. [coded: legitimizing, others like to bully us, freedom of speech threatened, game is rigged against us] (Helsingin Sanomat 2012a, l. 597–599).*

Having discussed some of the most important findings common to the legitimizing narratives in the data, in the next sub-section I explore some of the most common themes that are present in the narrative contestations of neo-populist legitimacy.

In terms of the thematic features of common to the scandal debates, two are particularly prevalent. More than two thirds (180) of the 259 posts that address the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy discuss either *the limits of acceptable humor in political rhetoric* [coded narratives: unacceptable even as a joke, you shouldn't take it literally, freedom of speech threatened] or on *the accountability for political scandals* [coded narratives: it's the party's fault, he is not one of us, game is rigged against us] (chart 4).



**Chart 4. Themes invoked in the 259 posts that address the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy in the two arenas.**

One of the reasons for the prevalence of these two themes in the scandal debates is related to the similarities in how the scandals are framed in the news articles. Both of the scandals were frontpage news in subsequent years, and both scandals are personified in a *Perussuomalaiset* MP. Both of the scandalized subjects have been earlier convicted of a hate crime, and both react to the critical media exposure with justificatory narratives seeking position their role in the center of the scandal publicity as that of a humorist (like Hirvisaari) or a satirist (as Halla-aho).

The relative proportion of posts employing legitimizing narratives varies only within four percentage points between the themes, being consistently about 50% more common than posts construct-

ing delegitimizing narratives. The fact both themes appear equally fruitful for supporting or challenging neo-populism renders the analysis of the oppositional narratives within the same theme particularly fruitful. This is also why the oppositional stories within each of the OPS pair pertain to the same thematic topic; pairs 1 and 2 pertain to narrative contestation on the limits of acceptable humor, whereas pairs 3 and 4 are compiled from posts with narratives that invoke the theme of political accountability.

### *Oppositional public stories on limits of humor*

The first pair of oppositional public stories analyzed here is reconstructed from the posts presented in the Hirvisaari debate solely within the mainstream arena. Here the contestation develops between the posts employing the delegitimizing “unacceptable even as a joke” narrative and the legitimizing “you shouldn’t take it literally” narrative:

The most common of all individual narratives employed in the data is the delegitimizing narrative coded as “unacceptable even as a joke”, manifesting in almost one fifth of the posts concerning the legitimacy of the neo-populist advocacy (46 / 259). These posts seek to challenge the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy by reconstructing and appealing to norms that should regulate the use of humor in political rhetoric. By postulating a set of norms that delineate acceptable behavior for a politician and asserting that these norms have been violated, this narrative positions certain instances of right-wing populist advocacy as publicly condemnable.

OPS pair 1 (Hirvisaari): “Why must neo-populists’ jokes be taken seriously?”

1a: Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 14 HS posts<sup>22</sup> employing the most frequent delegitimizing narrative in the data, coded as “unacceptable even as a joke”):

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<sup>22</sup> The Appendix E includes the graph that illustrates the frequencies of the coded narratives in the data, and presents an exhaustive listing of those original posts in the data from which each of the eight public stories are compiled.

*Who are these retarded guys, anyway?! James Hirvisaari has been caught performing acts like this earlier. An important characteristic of any responsible adult, let alone an MP, is that one does not make the same mistake again, but learns from his own mistakes and from others' as well. Apparently the persus [members of the Perussuomalaiset party] do neither.*

*Indeed, Seppo Lehto had long since made his sympathy for fascist ideology completely clear for everybody through numerous performances like this idiotic Nazi salute. Humorous or not, such performances do not belong anywhere, least of all in the Finnish parliament. Besides, even if Lehto would have acted flawlessly in the parliament – with a tie on and everything – inviting him into the Parliament house in the first place would've been absolutely tasteless and an illustration of awful judgment.*

*Really, this is the third strike for the Perussuomalaiset. This also shows that the political agenda of the party has never been about anything else than bad humor – and surprisingly often Nazi-related at that. Indeed, the closest parallels for the populists' "political humor" can be found from the campaigning of the extreme right Golden Dawn party in Greece. The Greeks soon grew tired with humor that involves Hitler and Mussolini masks in political campaigning. And now we've had enough of these jokes in Finland, too.*

In this delegitimizing public story, neo-populist advocacy is challenged by the observation that for some reason, the option to defend their blunders as jokes or sarcasm has been employed almost exclusively by advocates of neo-populist politics. The main delegitimizing thrust is not in the unacceptable humor by Hirvisaari himself, but rather in the populists' unacceptable incapability to follow the norms of common decency. After all, a good politician should be held fully responsible for his or her actions, humor included, but prominent proponents of neo-populist politics apparently cannot. The limit of acceptable humor is crossed, the discussants argue,

when anything that the neo-populists say might or might not be a joke, depending on who asks or whether the ensuing media attention is considered to benefit the neo-populists or not.

The legitimizing story seeks to reposition right-wing populist advocacy favorably by constructing humor and satire as exceptional devices in political rhetoric that allow otherwise condemnable breaches to be considered acceptable behavior. Posts employing this narrative form a public story where the legitimacy of neo-populism is defended by emphasizing how humorous or satirical intent should invalidate any reason to interpret the event in question as scandal or to position “serious neo-populism” as the scapegoat.

1b: Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 10 HS posts employing the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “you shouldn’t take it literally”):

*Seppo Lehto is known to a large number of people for his quirky sense of humor, and his past attempts to agitate and provoke. We should judge these actions accordingly, as nothing more or less than a poor joke, also taking into account that Lehto is obviously not in full command of his faculties.*

*In any case, what individual, borderline insane “folk artist” posts in social media is inconsequential to serious politics, especially considering that Finland is facing much more acute dilemmas of elite totalitarianism and misguided religion of tolerance. These problems that neo-populists are trying to point out are real. It is quite regrettable that it is so hard to receive media attention for neo-populist remedies to these real problems when everyone and his dog is only talking about instances of asinine humor.*

*But perhaps by resorting to the means of questionable humor we may yet succeed in bringing some real political issues to the fore as well.*

This legitimizing public story in the first oppositional pair of the Hirvisaari scandal seeks to insulate neo-populism from this critique by denouncing the public focus on neo-populist humor. The discussants debating in support of the neo-populists argue that peo-

ple should understand that humor is something completely distinct from neo-populist politics. Instead they suggest that politicians in general – and the advocates of neo-populism in particular – should be evaluated solely on the basis of how they relate to “real problems” in serious arenas, and not how some individuals behave in informal arenas of social media. At the same time, these discussants are supporting the use of humorous hyperboles as a means justified by welfare nationalist political goals that are considered to otherwise receive too little media attention.

The narrative contestation emerging in this OPS pair pertains to the question of how serious we should consider the implications of political humor to be. In the delegitimizing story, the discussants argue that neo-populist politics manifests in and is defined by the limits to which the neo-populists are willing to take political humor in order to advance their political goals. Some political performances are considered simply unacceptable – irrespective of whether the neo-populists regard them as merely jokes. The legitimizing story challenges this critique by presenting the neo-populist collectivity as deserving to be only defined by their underlying political agenda. Even when the discussants concede that neo-populist humor may be strategic and political in the sense that it facilitates more visibility in the mainstream media, they maintain that neo-populist advocacy cannot be meaningfully evaluated by focusing on what takes place outside the “serious” arenas of traditional politics.

OPS pair 2 (Halla-aho): “Neo-populist satire: Inciting racial hatred or exercising freedom of speech?”

The limits of acceptable humor are debated in a quite different manner in the online discussions of the Halla-aho scandal. This is partly because very few discussants employing legitimizing narratives seek to renounce Halla-aho’s satire or distance themselves from its subject matter, but rather seek to reinterpret the role of neo-populists in this narrative contestation in more favorable terms. While the delegitimizing storyline is reconstructed from the posts employing the same “unacceptable even as a joke” narrative as in the previous Hirvisaari OPS, it does not focus on challenging the neo-populists’ poor judgment in the use of satirical registers of political articulation. Rather, the story emphasizes the deplorable soci-

etal implications that Finland could face by allowing neo-populists to make satirical expressions that denigrate members of ethnic minorities.

2a: Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 16 HS posts employing the most frequent delegitimizing narrative in the data, coded as “unacceptable even as a joke”):

*Freedom of speech is not anarchy in any constitutional state. In countries such as Sweden or the USA, an MP writing something like this would have already resigned. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case here in the Western Russia, with an underdeveloped culture of civilized public debate.*

*It should be self-evident that one is allowed to make derogatory comments of Finns, but not on a group of 50 asylum seekers, because the critique of the latter group is directly linked to the relatively few individual members of that group. We humans have not turned so good that ethnic purges could not happen like in Nazi Germany.*

*Possessing a PhD degree, Halla-aho is quite learned in advancing his political agenda with statistics that purposefully lead people astray. These totally made up conjectures about human genetics – without any scientific evidence – are not constructive criticism on immigration politics by any measure. Even Halla-aho’s tone and expressions are just as derogatory as with any hate propaganda. The articulations that neo-populists are defending as sarcasm are nothing but baloney and crude racism that we cannot ignore.*

Whereas the delegitimizing storyline in the previous Hirvisaari case portrayed the neo-populist collectivity as giving a political home for a bunch of loonies whose actions they can conveniently resign from as “humor”, the public story above paints a picture of neo-populist satire as an insidious device for deliberate propagation of ethnic hatred. The legitimizing storyline in the second OPS pair does not explicitly argue against the latter characterization, but

rather seeks to take the contestation to a different level of abstraction by positioning the neo-populist collectivity as the victimized protagonist of everyone's equal right to free speech.

2b: Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 29 HS posts employing the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as "freedom of speech threatened"):

*This is a grim day for the freedom of speech. The right to free expression, including the right to write in poor taste, is understood in other Western countries as the cornerstone of a stable democracy. I'm not sure if this will ever be understood here in the Western Russia, where the judicial system has now taken one step towards recognizing a god as part of our legal norms. This process of gradually running down the welfare state is going to be painful, and the right to issue political critique in public will be among its first victims.*

*Halla-aho's writings pose a provocative question to the political elite: are all religious and ethnic groups treated the same in Finland? The politics of race underlying the Supreme Court's verdict indicates they are not. If I were to criticize Scientology, can one not say that it is a criminal sham? Or must one just beat around the bush to remain politically correct? And then people wonder why politicians never say anything clearly.*

*The Finnish people are united against this verdict, because it can see how the very statute on hate speech is a form of tyranny that allows the persecution of any dissenters. But even though the verdict outlaws critical opinions, it does not change how people think – it just hides them from the public eye. Indeed, it was exactly this kind of enforcement of political correctness – quarantining a large group of people outside of public debate – that gave the Perussuomalaiset their massive electoral victory of 2011.*

*So, all you who are ready to fight for freedom of speech – take arms! You others, be welcome in North Korea and Sharia.*



This legitimizing story interprets the verdict as one further piece of evidence that neo-populist advocacy is needed to protect the ethnic Finns. In this story, the discussants underline how the neo-populist anti-immigration political agenda not only protects the material wellbeing of the autochthonous population but also their political and social rights. The story makes use of “nationalized liberal rhetoric” by arguing that freedom of speech is challenged by multiculturalist legislation and unequal judicial practices (for a more detailed discussion on the uses “nationalised liberal rhetoric” by Nordic right-wing populists, see Keskinen 2012, 263). The story depicts the opposition to multiculturalist immigration politics as the only way for countering the developments challenging the freedom of speech and the liberalist set of political and social rights in Finland. The story makes wide use of militant expressions that position the neo-populists as the vigilant *avant-garde* with a wide mandate to protect the rights of the ordinary people and who will not hesitate to speak up when their country is being sold out by the elites.

### ***Oppositional narratives on political accountability***

The second prominent theme in the debates pertains to the issue of who should be held accountable for the emergence of the scandal event and its social and political consequences. Like the limits of humor theme, the political accountability theme is also common to more than one fourth of the posts debating the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy in the data. As this theme invoked particularly commonly in the legitimizing narratives within Homma, both of the legitimizing storylines are compiled from this sphericule arena, while delegitimizing ones originate the mainstream arena.

The third story pair is geared around the second most common delegitimizing narrative “it’s the party’s fault,” which positions the Perussuomalaiset party and the neo-populist collectivity as jointly responsible for all political action its members may enter into.

OPS pair 3 (Hirvisaari): “Are only neo-populists their brothers’ keepers?”

3a: Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 23 HS posts employing the second most frequent delegitimizing narrative in the data, coded as “it’s the party’s fault”):

*It is scary to see how many people only get excited about performances like this. They are the reason why the radicals all around Europe are seated on the extreme right in parliament. These people really do believe that Soini is an honest politician and that the Perussuomalaiset is not a Nazi party. I guess they also regard “sieg heil” as nothing but a dignified salute. With such a strong faith in the populist cause, these people should be able to move mountains and walk on water.*

*Of course, the real reason for all these scandals is money. Hirvisaari, for instance, brings a lot of valuable votes for the Perussuomalaiset party and the votes give them seven million euros worth of party subsidies. It is Soini [the party leader] who decides when there is more harm than benefit in having a person like Hirvisaari in the party. This is why we would need an explicit stance from Soini, but of course he is trying to avoid his responsibility. But that’s just logical behavior from their opportunist leader, under whom the anti-immigration people are both reaching for extremist vote while still trying to flirt with the media. Even the populists should find some kind of a spine.*

*As it stands, there is really no reason for anyone to conduct a smear campaign against the Perussuomalaiset. They appear to be running that campaign against themselves on a weekly basis. The rate at which these “individual occurrences” are emerging indicates that these scandals are not just coincidental poor jokes, but that the whole bunch is nothing but a joke.*

This storyline juxtaposes two delegitimizing neo-populist subject positions. On the one hand, it presents the neo-populist collectivity as zealous throng and controlled by the party’s leading demagogues. On the other hand, the neo-populist elite are portrayed as Janus-faced political strategists and turncoats, who never shirk away from a dirty trick in order to maximize the vote for the party. The

story also ridicules the naivety of the apologist neo-populist collectivity for trying to deny their collective responsibility, which should be obvious to all but the most deeply brainwashed people.

The legitimizing storyline, compiled from the posts coded as “goes against neopopulist cause” seeks to distance the neo-populist collectivity from the scandalous event. By reifying an idealized neo-populist collectivity as true to the welfare nationalist political agenda for saving the welfare state, the discussants contributing to this story place the political responsibility for any unacceptable behavior within their ranks on misguided individuals. They also suggest that the neo-populists’ missteps, sometimes real but often imaginary, are keenly forged into weapons to be used against them by their political opponents connected to the elite-controlled media.

3b: Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 31 Homma posts employing the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “goes against the neopopulist cause”):

*The Perussuomalaiset should be embraced as the only patriotic party that represents the working class in the spirit of the veterans of our wars. It is inconsequential if some individual extremists among us have Nazi sympathies, because every party has its extremists. There is no reason to believe that any scandalous views would be widely shared by the responsible people, who have been working really hard for years in the political arena in order to save the Finland from its catastrophic politics of immigration.*

*The worst thing is not that a mental outpatient like Lehto performs a Nazi salute anywhere. What is much worse is that this makes any flowery-hat lady [politically active women regarded as “pro migration”] look smarter than us. This way they can reduce any serious argument against immigration into hypocritical lamentation about “those horrible populist racists.”*

*Why can't some people see how Hirvisaari is putting his every effort in his attempts to demolish our credibility? And Seppo Lehto is the guy who did his very best to prevent the immigration critics from getting into the parliament in the 2007*

*elections. Everyone should understand by now that immigration critique is not some joke for weird performance artists like Lehto to make fun of. These guys are both certainly agents in the service of the green-leftist faction. Let's throw these fucking snitches out of our party NOW! Once Soini does this, we are in the safe waters again.*

This passionate story for legitimizing neo-populism constructs two categories of enemies, one internal and one external to the true neo-populist cause. The internal enemies, the double agents and the mentally challenged individuals, are juxtaposed with the figure of a true, hard-working neo-populists advocate. The former are presented as undermining the endeavors through which the true neo-populists seek to reach public acceptance as serious proponents of the welfare nationalist political agenda for opposing immigration. The other enemy category is constructed around the image of an ultraliberal, urban female artist, who is constantly looking for ways to undermine the honest, neo-populist working-class, heterosexual male with underhand media maneuvers (for similar observations and more detailed analysis on the gendered metaphoric language employed in right-wing populist rhetoric, see Norocel 2013). By putting the blame for the creation of the scandal frame in the mainstream media on a specific enemy figure, this legitimizing storyline produces an alternative narrative for reinterpreting why neo-populist advocacy is being delegitimized in public, while redeeming the neo-populists from the responsibility of being associated with a person making a Nazi salute in the parliament.

OPS pair 4 (Halla-aho): “The system is certainly rigged – but for or against neo-populists?”

The most common delegitimizing narrative employed in the Halla-aho debates, coded “we must oppose racism” depicts neo-populists oblivious to the human suffering their racist outbursts facilitate. The storyline compiled from this narrative also challenges the neo-populist attempts to monopolize the narratives defining the Finnish culture by pointing out that the judicial system is part of that culture even when it convicts a neo-populist. The discussants contributing to this storyline suggest that the neo-populists raging

against the verdict of the Supreme Court are being instrumentalist and selfish when they disdain the due legal process as un-Finnish.

Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 20 HS posts employing the delegitimizing narrative coded as “we must oppose racism”):

*Our western history has indicated that there are always people among us who try to preserve their own sense of self by subjugating others. After all, it's not so long since Finns themselves were regarded as these others, amounting to the greatest threat for the purity of the Swedish race. The thing is, those that the law against hate speech is intended to protect are real human beings, flesh and blood – not any god or culture. People – just like Somalis, who Halla-aho has previously characterized as “the human scum of the African Horn.”*

*Considering that the populists have been overjoyed when MPs from other parties have been convicted or scandalized, by any logic the persus should be delighted with this verdict. Besides, the Supreme Court is taking a distinctly conservative stand here when it tries to preserve the Finnish national culture of dignified register of political critique.*

*But no – the right-wing populists seem to confuse freedom of speech with the notion that politicians should be free from any responsibility over what they say. They also advocate for harsh punishments for criminals, but seek to challenge the whole judicial system them when one of theirs is found guilty of hate speech. I dare you, name just one PS politician who has not experienced a witch hunt or miscarriage of justice. This kind of denial of racism is the most irresponsible position towards freedom of speech one can imagine.*

By pointing to the neo-populist way of advocating stricter enforcement of laws for immigrants while refusing to be subjected to such laws themselves, the delegitimizing public story emphasizes how the neo-populists' strategic adoption of the role of the victim creates a sense among the neo-populist advocates that they should be above the law. Indeed, the legitimizing storyline picks up

this victimized position, seeking to illustrate why hate speech laws are biased and unfair, and should not command the respect of the neo-populists or the Finnish people.

Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 15 Homma posts employing the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “game is rigged against us”):

*Well, now we know what you are allowed by the law to say about Finns in a widely circulating newspaper such as Kaleva, but not about Somalis in a private online blog. And this is how has been with the immigrants in Finland. If someone was to defecate in a collection bag of a Finnish congregation or to throw the Bible around, the sacristan would just quietly clean up the mess and no one would ever hear about this in public. But I urge you: go proudly and take a dump on the stairs of a mosque and you will be taken to court for compromising the national security!*

*This incomprehensible verdict and the double-standard that it invokes by protecting the immigrants better than the Finns in our own country make it evident that the deeply politicized judicial institutions are fully controlled by the openly anti-Finn factions of the Green-Left. I just wonder if the reason why reaching the verdict took so long isn't somehow related to the upcoming 2015 parliamentary elections for which they needed a convenient political stage trial?*

*Every cloud has a silver lining, though. After observing such an explicit bias against us, at least no one can deny the double standard against us anymore. We just have to take it like Galilei took the Inquisition's persecution.*

Although the legitimizing story does not seek to distance neo-populist advocacy the subject of the scandal as is the case with Hirvisaari storylines, both of the Homma stories are ripe with construction of enemy categories. The Halla-aho story further adds the judicial system to the list of enemies who conspire against the neo-populists and – by extension – against “the persecuted Finnish majority.” Facing unequal treatment from all sides, the discussants

supporting the neo-populist collectivity in this story urge each other to remain defiant, as they believe to have very little to lose. Perhaps, the story goes, if the neo-populists as a collectivity engage in the practice of breaching the biased and unfair laws aiming at protection of minorities, they may be able to make more people realize the supposedly preferential treatment of immigrants and join the neo-populists in protecting the interests of the autochthonous population.

## Conclusion

In the previous chapters, I examined the narratives produced by neo-populist advocates during the electoral breakthrough phase. I illustrated how the public support for and acceptability of neo-populism was commonly assessed in terms of what kinds of goals its advocates claim to adhere to, thereby allowing them to consistently feature in the mediatized debates by discussing their welfare nationalist political agenda.

In the context of the post-2011 institutional persistence phase of the Perussuomalaiset party, examined in this chapter, the neo-populists have been decreasingly able to set the terms of their exposure in the media. As a result of critical media attention, culminating in the scandal-framed news articles, the focus of the narrative contestations concerning the neo-populist advocacy has shifted away from the legitimacy of their welfare nationalist “immigration critical” political agenda to the legitimacy of actions taken by neo-populist politicians.

This kind of shift in the subject matter of the public debate concerning a maturing neo-populist party and its political constituency is not particular to Finland, but reflects the developments in the challenges that right-wing populism has earlier encountered in other European countries. While some these challenges vary greatly in different national contexts, there are certain similarities in how those challenges develop in relation to the maturity of the populist political organization. In particular (as discussed in more detail in the chapter 2.3), the transition from the phase of electoral “breakthrough” into the phase of institutional “persistence” commonly

leads to situation, where the position of a radical alternative to traditional parties is no longer considered to attract requisite levels of media attention or popular support (Schain, Zolberg and Hossay 2002, 3–17).

An important and highly mediatized challenge brought about by this transition pertains to the endeavors of “the radical alternative” (such as the neo-populist welfare nationalism) to produce salient public narratives for presenting itself as a respectable and serious political actor. Once bad publicity is no longer good publicity, but rather a challenge to the institutional persistence of a populist movement (Ellinas 2010, 206–207), successfully developing subject positioning narratives for legitimizing neo-populism in the public debate becomes an important priority for the discussants.

In this chapter, I have illustrated how the neo-populists’ participation in this impassionate public debate in Finland has commonly required them to construct defensive and justificatory subject positioning narratives to mitigate and reinterpret the impact of critical media exposure and the delegitimizing narratives proliferating in the online arena. I have pursued the main research objective of this empirical chapter by employing narrative analysis of four pairs of oppositional public stories – compiled from the most common delegitimizing and legitimizing narratives of neo-populist advocacy from two online arenas of public debate. Through this analysis, I have been able underline how polarization of the public opinion through narrative contestation between distinct pro and anti neo-populist public stories has served to consolidate a neo-populist self-understanding and a sense of collectivity as a resonant collective identity.

One of the main dynamics through which these narrative contestations can facilitate a sense of neo-populist collectivity is related to the fact that the two neo-populist scandal cases analyzed – both receiving the extremely salient front-page exposure in the mainstream media – revolve around political performances that the neo-populist discussants have been keen to frame as “satirical” or “humorous” action. This is hardly a coincidence. Rather, the prominence of this framing can be conceptualized through the “programmatic flexibility” that is commonly considered to characterize neo-populist politics (Ellinas 2010, 74). By narrating their political performances



through the frame of humor or satire, the *Perussuomalaiset* MPs render their mobilization narratives open to several possible interpretations, allowing the neo-populists to seek political support from a wide range of different factions within their heterogeneous political constituency.

The narrative analysis indicates, however, that this feature of impreciseness is also commonly operationalized in the delegitimizing public stories. Each of the four stories that challenge the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy point out that neo-populists are not adhering to some of the most important norms of acceptable humor in political rhetoric, but insist on performing fascist gestures and making racist or xenophobic remarks in public. The delegitimizing public stories also challenge the political accountability in the neo-populist practice of resorting to satirical political rhetoric – regardless of the acceptability of the humor *per se* – on the account that it makes harder for anyone to differentiate “jokes” from those public articulations that the neo-populists are willing to actually stand behind.

In the legitimizing storylines – such as the ones criticizing the Hirvisaari case – the discussants juxtapose humorous acts with serious political performances. They maintain that former should not be subjected to the kind of scrutiny in public as the latter, but that the neo-populists should be allowed to simply resign from the performances if they are deemed in public as “bad jokes.” These stories consider the authors of delegitimizing narratives to unfairly criticizing the neo-populist collectivity, suggesting that the fair treatment of neo-populism in public would require that the performances that their advocates frame as jokes can only be laughed at or not laughed at, but never taken seriously. From the fact that the limits of acceptable humor are nevertheless invoked in the public debate against the neo-populist advocates, the legitimizing storyline suggests that the critics are deliberately hitting the neo-populist collectivity below the belt by insisting that it is important what is done by some “misguided poor sod affiliated to neo-populists.” As such, this legitimizing storyline narrates a victimized sense of collective neo-populist identity, concluding that “they” are obviously out to get “us.”

In Halla-aho’s case, the delegitimizing storylines further challenge neo-populism by suggesting that the instances of neo-populist

satire are not just failed attempts at humor, but are deliberately devised to instill racist and xenophobic attitudes in the public for the purpose of mobilizing less-informed people to support neo-populist politics.

The legitimizing story launched against this critique reproduces a sense on neo-populist collective identity around narratives that seek to operationalize anti-establishment attitudes considered common among neo-populist advocates (Schedler 1996, 303). Rather than entering in a deliberative exchange with the delegitimizing story by debating the proliferation of racism as a possible outcome of using racialized stereotypes in Halla-aho's "satire," the neo-populist discussants position themselves as descendants of "Galileo Galilei," facing a "contemporary Inquisition" in the form in the Finnish Supreme Court. This storyline further juxtaposes "the Finnish people" – represented by the neo-populists who are willing to be convicted in order to protect the freedom of speech – with the tyrannical grey eminence of the political elite.

In addition to reinforcing anti-establishment attitudes, the legitimizing public stories can be also seen as manifestations of the neo-populist collective identity-work based narratives that reify certain specific enemy categories (Canovan 2005, 74–76; Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012, 110). Two such enemy categories – an internal and an external one – feature particularly prominently in the legitimizing stories.

The internal enemy is invoked particularly often in Hirvisaari's case. It consists of "snitches," regarded as purposefully playing into the hands of the political opponents of neo-populism, and "retards" who are indirectly undermining "the cause" by performing any acts that can turn the public opinion against them. The external one is commonly referred to as "the Green-Left faction," the puppeteer pulling strings in the mainstream media and responsible for politicizing the judicial system. The members of this faction, often embodied in the seemingly harmless symbolic figure of a "lady wearing a flowery hat", are thought to be motivated by the joint effort of turning Finland into a multiculturalist dystopia to be eventually led by these ruthless "Green Khmers."

The two arch-enemies are not only narrated as the political opponents of the neo-populist collectivity. Rather, considering that

the “true advocates” of neo-populism are representing the monolithic category of “the Finnish people” at large, their enemies are portrayed as “despicable creatures lashing out against hardworking Finns in their own country.”

In addition to the explicit subject matter in the legitimizing narratives, the consolidation of neo-populist collective identity is also facilitated by implicit features in the public stories that manifest the “emotionalizing logic of media populism” (Mudde 2007, 249–251). The strong emotional attachment to the “true neo-populist cause” is reinforced in the debates through frequent use of exclamations marks, capital letters, obscenities and militant metaphorical language, and these emotional appeals are often employed to encourage the discussants and their audience to join the neo-populists ranks. These appeals typically narrate the available positions vis-à-vis the neo-populist collectivity as reduced into the dichotomy: “Either take arms and fight with us for the freedom of speech NOW!, or go live in a shithole like North Korea embracing Sharia!”

## **7 Results:**

### **Consolidation of Neo-Populist Advocacy in Public Debate through Welfare Nationalist Narratives on the Politics of Immigration**

In this dissertation, I have set out to explore the increasing presence of neo-populist and welfare nationalist narratives in Finnish public debate during the 2000s. While the development of this analytical narrative has been a highly progressive endeavor, with the collection and coding of each data set informing the subsequent delineations of focus for the empirical analysis, two primary research aims have persisted from the very beginning of this process and guided the progressive research design for this dissertation monograph.

First of all, in order to complement the existing body of research literature for explaining the increasing support for neo-populist welfare nationalism and “immigration critique,” I have sought to analyze the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives for mobilizing new constituencies and justifying neo-populist advocacy in various arenas of public debate. In order to achieve this, I first looked into the emergent welfare nationalist rhetoric in the high political arena, prior to the political breakthrough of the neo-populist Perussuomalaiset party. I was able to identify four key narratives through which the political control of immigration was framed as one of the most important issues for supporting an idealized construction

of the encompassing welfare state against its globalized challenges. I then proceeded to explore how this foundational welfare nationalist meta-narrative was operationalized in the highly successful neo-populist political mobilization, both at the party political level of electoral programmes and in grassroots level online discussions.

By the time I started to analyze the material collected from the period after the electoral breakthrough the Perussuomalaiset party, I encountered more opportunities for pursuing the second research aim of illustrating the neo-populist narrative agency and the strategic social action for promoting neo-populism in the mainstream public sphere. I began to notice a pattern structuring the narratives with which neo-populist advocacy began to consolidate in the public debate. While the pre-populist narratives of welfare nationalism were all about the subject matter of the immigration-oriented political agenda, the mobilization narratives incorporated more and more elements, or building blocks, of neo-populist collective identity that were articulated in the interstices of the welfare nationalist political agenda. Once the focus of the empirical analysis shifted towards the less formal arenas of public debate in chapters 5 and 6, the narratives employed in the data appeared to be decreasingly defined by articulations of policy-level approaches to the perceived ailments of the welfare state. Especially in the social media and the online fora, the narratives pertained increasingly to those welfare state pertinent norms and values that the neo-populist advocates employ when positioning themselves as the representatives of the reified category of “the Finnish people.”

By the virtue of having conducted an extensive, multidisciplinary literature review, I was able to advance both research aims simultaneously by operationalizing them into three distinct research questions that could be pursued with specific analytical lenses extrapolated from the body of research literature. By triangulating between the lenses of *nationalist boundary-drawing*, *welfare state idealization* and *strategic neo-populist social action*, I chose to pursue the aims of this doctoral study through an analytical narrative built around three distinct research questions:

1. How do welfare nationalist narratives operationalize the nationalist, blue-and-white conceptualizations of “the nation” and “the

people"? What kinds of narratives link these concepts to the politics of immigration and delineate an exclusionary set of criteria for belonging to the Finnish national community?

2. How are idealized reinterpretations concerning the legacy of the welfare state narrated as the foundation of the welfare nationalist political agenda? What kind of public understanding of welfare solidarity do these mediatized neo-populist narratives promote?

3. How do the neo-populist advocates facilitate salient media exposure for their political presence in various arenas of public debate? How do they seek to make use of this exposure and consolidate support from heterogeneous political constituencies into a resonant neo-populist collective identity?

The following subsections of this chapter discuss the findings in the empirical part of this dissertation. As the empirical chapters each examine different facets of the phenomena that all three research questions pertain to, I chose not to summarize my results chapter by chapter. Instead, in following subsections I construct a synthesizing discussion that answers each of the research questions with the results from the empirical analysis.

### **7.1 Narrating the Importance of Immigration Politics through Welfare Nationalist Boundary-Work**

The first decisive results from the empirical analysis pertain to the data collected from the period I have reconstructed as the first of critical turning points in the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy (for more detailed discussion on the critical turning points, see chapter 3.2). The point of departure in the analytical narrative advanced in this study is that common features in the articulation of welfare nationalism first manifested in the political rhetoric as part of *the politicization of the role of the welfare state in the management of immigration during the early 2000s*.

Facing challenges in the maintenance of the universalist welfare state in the globalized era, the *Perussuomalaiset* – together with dozens of MPs across the party political spectrum of the Finnish parliament – sought to secure public profile as resourceful politicians by presenting themselves as authors of prudent immigration legislation

through which globalized challenges can be tackled. By narrating several potential immigration-related challenges, the parliamentarians sought to draw attention to the importance of their own work in the development of the Aliens Act of 2004, thereby emphasizing the necessity of a heightened role of the state in the management and control of immigration.

This early statist narrative was picked up by the Perussuomalaiset party during the second turning point, *neo-populist mainstreaming of the welfare nationalist political agenda*, in the end of the first decade of the 2000s. By presenting immigration as one of the most pressing socio-political challenges for the welfare state – one that politicians have not yet dared to tackle properly – the neo-populists were able to position themselves as the blue-and-white alternative to the old parties. Rallying around the welfare state as the symbol of national pride – and the reason why it is like “winning the jackpot in a lottery” to be born in Finland – the neo-populists sought to downplay their associations to nationalist radicalism and present a mainstreamed version of welfare nationalist politics. Narrating welfare nationalism as the neo-populist set of tools for tackling problems of immigration that the other parties have not dared to address properly, the neo-populists could position themselves as the representatives of the interests of “the normal Finnish people.”

It must be noted, though, that the parliamentarians in the high political arena who emphasized the state’s role in immigration control employed statist narratives to reach highly divergent conclusions and normative assessments concerning immigration to Finland. Some of the addresses to the parliament floor that sought to establish guidelines for the legislative process interpreted immigration as a dire challenge while others conceptualized immigration as an exceptional opportunity for the Finnish welfare state. Regardless of whether the MPs related to immigration primarily as an untapped labour resource or a socio-political item of expenditure, their addresses commonly employed instrumentalist narratives that emphasized its potential material implications, the costs and the gains of immigration. Very few exact figures featured in the instrumentalist narratives, however, and the costs and gains were instead quantified with imprecise expressions and adjectives. This feature of the early instrumentalist narratives was also adopted in neo-populist narratives of political mobilization.

While occasionally marked by the hope of reaping great economic gains through successful implementation of immigration politics in the future, the early instrumentalist narratives commonly prioritized the prevention of the ill-effects of immigration. This emphasis was justified by referring to the notion that Finland had only very recently become a country of immigration, arguably rendering the Finnish welfare state highly fragile during the period of transition from a relatively homogeneous monoculture to a diverse society.

A shared concern for the future of the country was most explicitly assessed with regard to accentuation of the economic hurdles for financing the welfare redistributions at the core of the welfare state. The emphasis on prudent management of welfare spending commonly manifested in the immigration debates as demands for stricter mechanisms for assessing the need of asylum. The proliferation of these demands contributed significantly to the conflation of the categories of the immigrant and the asylum seeker. When immigration in general was narrated as an item of expenditure for the welfare state, immigrants were perceived in dichotomizing terms in the high political arena. On the one hand, there were the immigrants in legitimate distress, and on the other, there were the “welfare shoppers” and those who submitted bogus applications for asylum. By promising the public to be stringent with the taxpayers’ monies by preventing economic redistribution to the “undeserving” immigrants, the MPs in the high political arena in the beginning of the 2000s and the neo-populist during the 2011 elections alike positioned themselves as important proponents of policy solutions. Without them, the inflow of aspirant immigrants to Finland could excessively burden the public spending and deteriorate the position of the Finnish people.

There is one important commonality related to the way in which “the Finnish people” is invoked in immigration debates analyzed in the first two critical turning points and during the third one – *mediatized catalysis of neo-populist identity-work* – examined in the final empirical chapter. In each of the five data sets, welfare nationalist and neo-populist narratives frequently use the ambiguous term “Finns.” In Finnish, this term denotes both the group consisting of ethnic Finns only as well as the civic community of Finnish citizens. The narrative analysis advanced in three chapters



suggests that this ambiguity is often intentional in the immigration debates. It allows discussants to simultaneously appeal to more radical constituencies with a strong ethno-nationalist “Finns first” agenda, and the majority of moderate civic republicans who were prepared to accept the extension of universalist politics of welfare redistribution to immigrants and other ethnic minorities (if only on arguably “culture blind” terms). In the data collected from the scandal debates, the neo-populist online discussants further operationalized this category in narratives that juxtapose “the real people” with the corrupt political elite and the unpatriotic opponents of the neo-populist advocates. This conceptualization of the people was employed commonly in the public stories seeking to legitimate neo-populist advocacy against its critics, suggesting that those who do not consider neo-populists as their representatives do not belong in the great majority of patriotic Finnish people.

While the costs and gains approach and the concern for the future of the welfare state permeated much of the early immigration debates across the party political spectrum, there was much variation in mechanisms through which immigration was narrated as a particularly significant challenge for the welfare state in the early high political debates. In addition to the direct costs of immigration, many politicians – especially the right-wing conservatives – were also concerned with the implications of immigration to the sense of national solidarity among the people. By suggesting that the heterogenization of the Finnish society is largely immigration-induced, conservatives were able to narrate their political agenda as based on common Finnish values, thereby reinforcing an exclusionary conceptualization concerning the boundaries of belonging to the national community.

In neo-populist political mobilization of the welfare nationalist political agenda, much of the nationalist boundary-work and the emphasis on civic solidarity were, however, justified through instrumentalist narratives. For example, the outspoken rationale given for assimilating immigrants into “the Finnish culture” in the *Perussuomalaiset* electoral programme was that the bonds of solidarity among the citizens of the same nation are instrumental in maintaining the people’s willingness to pay taxes and preserve the welfare state as the crown jewel of healthy national pride. In the

next subsection, I discuss in more detail how this idealized legacy of an empowering and ubiquitous welfare state is invoked as the rallying point of welfare nationalist politics and neo-populist collective identity.

## **7.2 The Idealized Legacy of the Welfare State as the Narrative Justification for Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Solidarity**

In the early high political debates, one of the most common narratives for justifying the state's heightened role in the management of immigration pertained to the Finnish tradition of consensual decision-making. Many of the MPs and the public officials participating in the legislative process of the Aliens Act of 2004 emphasized that the existing practices for hearing minorities guarantee the fairness of the process and its outcome. Some of the discussants, however, pointed out that even though it is occasionally not feasible to implement minority views expressed in the hearing process and in the dissenting voices in the parliament, the process remains legitimate. After all, isn't this the very democratic process in which legislation has "always" been developed in Finland? The notion that Finland would have to change some of its practices to guarantee pluralist power sharing in order to accommodate the diverse needs emerging from the heterogenization of civil society was only rarely raised, and summarily dismissed, in the high political arena during the early 2000s.

Instead, the debates were marked by a strong belief in the idealized capabilities of the Nordic welfare state for ensuring universalist distribution of welfare and fair arbitration between diverse interests. Moreover, these redistributive capabilities were presented in the mainstream arenas of political debate as primarily challenged by developments external to the Finnish welfare state; most significantly by globalization, immigration and the alleged evidence of the irresponsible politics of multiculturalism for managing them in several poorer countries in EU with higher levels of immigration. To the extent that the immigrant voice is not apparent in the outcome of the Finnish political process, the consensualist narrative runs, this is only due to immigrants' collective position as a political mi-

minority. This should not be considered a problem in the democratic process, since every Finn finds himself once in a while in political minority. Some discussants even argued that the Finnish parliament could “do the right thing” in its immigration policy more if it were less concerned with “doing things right.” By suggesting that the procedural requirements to protect minorities are often superfluous in an exemplary democratic country such as Finland, the consensualist narrative reinforces trust in the encompassing and potent welfare state as idealized national project (Wickström 2013, 55).

This kind of welfare state idealization is also employed in statist narratives that call for increased control over immigration. There is, however, a distinct difference in how welfare state idealization was operationalized in the early high political debates and the neo-populist mobilization of welfare nationalist political agenda. As opposed to the later neo-populist narratives of exclusionary welfare nationalism, for many discussants in the high political arena the explicit point of departure in their calls for heightened political control of immigration was *not* that immigration is necessarily a great threat for the welfare state. Rather, the main rationale for increasing political control over immigration was that even if immigration is not a substantial problem in Finland, the state should still be vested with immigration-related policy instruments, because with them the welfare state is able to greatly improve the quality of life of immigrants and the autochthonous population alike.

When neo-populists first began to secure votes from Finnish middle class constituencies, one of the first hurdles they encountered related to their profile that was tarnished in public by various delegitimizing narratives associating the neo-populist advocates with racism, xenophobia and political radicalism. Operationalizing an idealized belief in the capabilities of the welfare state in their mobilization rhetoric, the neo-populists could present a mainstreamed version of their exclusionary political agenda to the public eye.

As the proponents of this emerging welfare nationalism, the neo-populist advocates talked extensively about money – and the challenges in financing the welfare economy in particular. Rather than arguing that the welfare state should maintain national unity, like the *Sverigedemokraterna* did in Sweden at the time, the Perussuomalaiset party turned the argument around in their electoral

programmes in 2008 and 2011. Having identified a growing insecurity in the public debate concerning the future of the welfare state in a globalized era, the *Perussuomalaiset* argued that a sense of joint purpose and national solidarity was essential in the endeavors to save “our” welfare state. Their problem narrative concerning immigration was that it increases the heterogeneity of values in Finland and that this erosion of a common value base threatens the public support for welfare spending

Implicit in this problem narrative was an idealized conceptualization concerning the legacy of the welfare state. According to it, the welfare state – before the introduction of immigration and globalization – was forged by the singular will of the Finnish people and was by that virtue able to redistribute resources equally to among the citizens. Obviously, assessing the contemporary welfare state against this excessively high, reified standard inflates any of its real or imaginary flaws, imperfections and challenges. This gave the *Perussuomalaiset* an excellent position to argue from the opposition. By arguing that the political elite has failed in its task as the caretaker of the welfare state, the neo-populist insistence on stricter immigration policy could be narrated as “the simple remedy” that has hitherto remained untested only due to the timidity, political correctness and corruption in the old parties.

Using the preservation of the welfare state as the justification for their political agenda also allowed neo-populists to conceptualize national solidarity in exclusionary terms, but insulate themselves from the critique of nurturing racists or xenophobes among their ranks. Both the PS party elite and the grassroots level online discussants systematically dismissed such accusations by narrating their political goals with regard to the welfare economy. They asserted that even though the costs of immigration have been deliberately hidden from the public, by cutting the excess in these costs – induced by the bogus asylum seekers and welfare abusers – the welfare state’s days of glory can be restored. When this is eventually achieved by the neo-populists with a political mandate from the Finnish people, and the economic burden on the welfare state is eased, Finland would once again be perfectly prepared to cater the needs of the deserving poor – also including the refugees who have been driven to this country due to a “real distress.”

During the third critical turning point, marked by the mediated challenging of neo-populist advocacy, the key contestations revolve around the legitimacy of the neo-populist collectivity rather than the welfare nationalist political agenda. Even so, the legitimizing public stories of neo-populist advocacy commonly invoke the idealized legacy of the welfare state as the justification for their provocative outbursts in the media, arguing that their laudable welfare nationalist cause should justify occasional resorts to questionable means by the *Perussuomalaiset*. For example, the use of inappropriate jokes is defended by neo-populists as means of securing public exposure for the purpose of raising awareness among “the Finns” on the “real problems” haunting the welfare state. Moreover, some of the most common enemy categories are constructed by positioning the political opponents of neo-populism – such as the pro-immigration “Green Khmers” – as proponents of a “multiculturalist perversion of the welfare state.”

### 7.3 Strategic Social Action in the Consolidation of Neo-Populism as a Resonant Collective Identity in the Public Sphere

In the chapter 2.3, I discussed strategic social action in detail with reference to the sociological theory of fields. In the empirical analysis, this strategic social action manifests most lucidly in the neo-populist mobilization based on loosely defined and constantly evolving welfare nationalist political goals. Indeed, the social skill required for instilling a sense of collective identity across a markedly heterogeneous constituency is in making these goals open-ended enough to justify a wide range of narratives that can be strategically tailored for specific arenas of public debate. (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 47–48). This kind of social skill is particularly important for the chameleonic neo-populist collectivity whose ideological core is in a perpetual state of flux (Taggart 2000, 4, 117).

*Strategic neo-populist social action*, the analytical lens most heavily influenced by these considerations is mostly used in the narrative analysis of third critical turning point, the *mediatized catalysis of neo-populist identity-work*. In hindsight, however, interesting manifestations of strategic social action can also be found in earlier phases

of the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy. For instance, instead of interpreting the neo-populists' emphasis on welfare economy as rational pursuit of a fixed political goal, the welfare nationalist narratives can be interpreted as opportunistic operationalizations of an open-ended agenda for political mobilization. This interpretation finds support in the empirical analysis of the high political arena, where welfare nationalist mobilization only took off after the politicization of "the immigration question" by MPs across the political spectrum. This served to create a niche for political movement with the political agenda where immigration politics features as a priority for the development of social policy in Finland. Responding to an increasing sense of precariousness in public debate with the promise to save the welfare state with heightened measures for controlling guaranteed the advocates of welfare nationalism salient exposure in the media well in the early 2000s, contributing to the first political victory for the *Perussuomalaiset* in the 2008 municipal elections.

One of the most decisive exercises in strategic social action – facilitating salient and constant exposure in the media – can be traced back to the profuse denials of racism during second critical turning point when the neo-populist advocates sought to mainstream their welfare nationalist political agenda prior to the 2011 parliamentary elections. In this kind of a situation, the textbook example of rational political action by advocates of a traditional political movement with a fixed goal would have been to clearly articulate their position on the explicit issues on their political agenda, and only respond their to critics as curtly as possible. The neo-populist grassroots level advocates, however, did the very opposite thing. They only alluded to the specifics of their political agenda in a vague and abstract manner, while being particularly keen on debating the accusations of racism.

Although the most vocal accusations of racism pertained to the exclusionary and unequal elements on the welfare nationalist political agenda, the neo-populist discussants employed justificatory narratives that exemplified the personalizing and emotionalizing logic of media populism (Mudde 2007, 249–251). As illustrated in the fifth chapter, the most common narratives with which neo-populists participated in public debate pertained to various ways of denying racism, underlining their personally felt outrage at being crit-

icized. They further insisted that the accusations of racism against neo-populist advocates challenge the most basic right to free political expression in Finland. At the same time the discussants, who mostly debated the racist motivation behind their “immigration critique,” also lamented the sad state of public debate based on the observation that most of the discussion pertains to the discussion itself and its participants, rather than what they suggested was the actual beef, immigration policy.

From the perspective of strategic social action, there is nothing illogical in this behavior by the neo-populist advocates. Taking into account the short attention span, particularly in the tabloid media, it would have been an onerous task to consistently feature in the headlines by relying solely on the relatively simple narratives for justifying the necessity of welfare nationalist revision of immigration politics. On the other hand, with the perpetual proliferation of impassionate emotional contestations, the neo-populists succeeded in securing stable exposure in the mainstream media. The prolonged exposure in the mainstream media also allowed the neo-populists to communicate their message to those constituencies who have been traditionally hard to reach with conventional means by the traditional parties, particularly the abstainers and the dot.net generation who are disproportionately and increasingly represented in the *Perussuomalaiset* electorate (Rahkonen 2011, 434; Vaalitutkimuskon-sortio 2012).

Being able to secure political support from several heterogeneous constituencies at once is one of most desirable outcomes for a political movement. While traditional parties often seek this outcome by rushing to the middle, the neo-populists operationalized their open-ended politics of exclusionary welfare nationalism with a two-pronged strategy. For example, narrating immigration control as the panacea for the ailing welfare state, the Finnish neo-populists were able to play two hands at the same time. On the one hand, they suggested that with strict control of immigration, the net-beneficiaries of welfare redistribution – particularly among the poor and in the working class constituencies – could avoid being cut out as a result of increased public spending on immigration. This kind of argumentation was very common in the 2008 electoral programme of the *Perussuomalaiset* party. In their 2011 programme, however,

the neo-populists sought also to accommodate the middle classes by suggesting that by stopping “the uncontrolled flows of immigration”, the neo-populists could save taxpayers’ monies to a significant degree. As very few exact figures were available for the neo-populists to support this interpretation, they sought to place the blame for this on public officials and corrupt politicians, who are afraid to reveal the exact costs of immigration.

Another important operationalization of this two-pronged strategy can be found in the recent proliferation of neo-populist use of political “satire” for managing their public image (Pyrhönen 2014). This is made particularly lucid in the two high-profile political scandals examined in the last empirical chapter. Conventional political parties are typically wary of welcoming people with criminal convictions or associated with political radicalism. The *Perussuomalaiset* party, however, has sought to make use of the mediatised contestations concerning such people among their ranks by renouncing their actions, while nevertheless accepting new similar people into the party ranks, guaranteeing the steady flow of scandal publicity. This practice, complemented with the strategy of framing the precarious public performances, ensures that the radical portion of the neo-populist advocates knows that their views are at least tacitly represented in the *Perussuomalaiset* party, while the moderates are happy to witness “the spine” and “strong political leadership” in the occasional expulsions of such people from the neo-populist ranks.

The critical media exposure, most lucidly exemplified in the contested scandal debates concerning two *Perussuomalaiset* MPs, also facilitates a victimized sense of collective identity. The consolidation of victimized sense of collectivity is advanced most forcefully within the hermetic sphericules of social media. Reinterpreting the implications of daily headlines from a neo-populist point of view, the advocates – confronted with delegitimizing narratives of public critique – commonly position themselves as champions of the nation whose satire is deliberately misrepresented in the media. Among the most common of these victimized self-depictions is the figure of the underdog in the media war, facing the ruthless political elite and that of the selfless pariah, willing to sacrifice himself in order to save the welfare state for the future generations.



## **8 Conclusions:**

### **Rethinking the Role of Welfare Nationalist Narratives in the Mediatized Consolidation of the Neo-Populist Collectivity**

As a researcher, one of the primary motivations for undertaking this doctoral research project was academic curiosity concerning the advocacy for the so-called “immigration critical” movement. From very early stages of this project, it was clear that I would have to craft an interdisciplinary research design, and employ analytical tools from various research traditions, most importantly from political sociology, political science and media studies, in order to meet the research aims set out in this doctoral study.

In the literature review I conducted, I learned a lot from the existing research traditions on neo-populism and nationalist right-wing radicalism, particularly concerning the explanatory avenues emphasizing the personal motivations and the political opportunity structures behind the rise of these movements. Some of the most concrete dimensions of their public presence, most importantly pertaining to the neo-populist narratives for mobilizing new constituencies and presenting their political agenda with socially acceptable framings, appeared to be understudied – a lacuna I hoped to remedy in this dissertation.

During the literature review, I encountered something of a paradox that I was particularly keen to examine as the first task in filling gaps in the compound academic literature I am referring to as “critical nationalism studies.” Namely, if the role of economy is really only secondary in the political agenda of radical right-wing parties (Mudde 2007, 119–120), how is it that the “immigration critical” movement and its neo-populist advocates have managed to disproportionately shift the focus in Finnish immigration debate to questions of economic costs and gains (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009b, 8)? Obviously, by trying to answer this question, I encountered several others that were not addressed in the existing literature either. Have the Finnish neo-populists purposefully sought to shift the focus of the public debate towards the questions of welfare economy – and are they happy with this outcome – or is it an unwanted consequence of some other important factors at play? And if the latter, what are these factors, and to what extent are they particular to the Finnish context? Based on the literature review, I decided to employ three distinct analytical lenses in this study in order to tackle these questions from different angles, triangulating between several relevant approaches to neo-populism and welfare nationalism.

Employing the lens of *welfare state idealization* as the point of departure for analyzing the narratives of early welfare nationalism, I soon discovered that exclusionary conceptualizations solidarity were not introduced into public debate by neo-populists. Rather, they were reappropriated by neo-populists from the political rhetoric already present in the high political arena well before their successful political mobilization in the second half of the first decade of 2000s. The instrumentalist narratives – emphasizing economic necessities and the lack of political alternatives for diminishing public spending – were first employed by neo-liberal and right-wing politicians in the traditional parties. Although these parties initially considered questions of immigration as something of a minor footnote in the process for restructuring the Finnish welfare state in the globalized era, by employing these narratives they nevertheless inadvertently helped to create a niche for neo-populist politicization of immigration through welfare nationalist mobilization narratives.

Using the ubiquitous fear for the future of the welfare state within the civil society as the seedbed for mobilizing their constituent

cies, the neo-populists were the first to position themselves as saviors of the welfare state with their anti-establishment opposition to immigration politics as the panacea for the welfare state's globalized challenges. This seedbed and the political opportunity structures it entails were not built by the neo-populists alone. During the early 2000s, the established parties had already framed the challenge of immigration as economic in nature, and one bearing important implications for the future prospects of the welfare state. The neo-populists were able to justify their endeavors to further politicize "the immigration question" and present the exclusionary elements on their welfare nationalist political agenda for the mainstream audiences as part of mundane political debate on welfare economy.

Does the *strategic* nature of reasons for employing welfare nationalist narratives in the neo-populist political mobilization suggest that the economic considerations are secondary to their "core ideology", as some political scientist have suggested? Cas Mudde – having provocatively named a chapter in his book "It's *not* the economy, stupid!" – admits that since his empirical material does not cover any of the so-called Nordic welfare states and that the applicability of his conclusion in these contexts should be regarded as a hypothesis to be tested (2007, 5). Accordingly, on the basis of the results of the empirical analysis in this study, I argue that the narratives consolidating a neo-populist collective identity in contemporary Finland necessitate some degree of reassessment of Mudde's hypothesis.

This argument finds some support also in existing literature. Firstly, the significance of the welfare economy discourse for justifying a right-wing populist agenda appears accentuated in the context where an overarching, consensual support for the welfare state exists across a multiparty system and voters (Hemerijk 2002, 175). This makes it difficult for any political actor to mobilize large constituencies by advocating a substantive restructuring of welfare spending in general, and gives considerable justificatory potential to the narratives that present the sustainability of the welfare state a core value. Once people are increasingly mobilized through such economic narratives – even if they are only strategic to begin with – it becomes harder for neo-populist advocates to position welfare nationalism as anything else but a neo-populist core value.

Secondly, Mudde bases his hypothesis (2007, 135) on previous research indicating that when electorates consist of “groups with opposing economic interests (objectively defined),” it is taken for granted that economy is largely a secondary issue (see, for example, Evans 2005; Ivarslaten 2005). It is possible to challenge the extent to which this is applicable in the Nordic context that is marked by a relatively encompassing welfare system. Under such a comparatively universalist system, the economic interests between classes are considered to coincide to a greater degree, since a significant portion of the population belongs simultaneously *both* in financiers *and* net-beneficiaries of the welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1990, 22–23, 68–69). Therefore, Nordic political actors in general – and neo-populists in particular – can play two hands at once. On the one hand, they can appeal to the blue-collared working class that regards itself as net-losers of globalization in general and immigration in particular promising to increase or at least maintain the welfare spending channelled to them as a result of taking off some other extra burden through policy measures. On the other hand, the same political actors can reach middle class constituencies by justifying the very same anti-immigration policies with reference to tax cuts that these policies supposedly allow.

The argument here is that once the number of people entitled to various welfare redistributions is decreased by enacting less immigrant-inclusive social policies, the amount of taxpayers’ money needed for funding the welfare system can then supposedly be reduced, thus enabling tax cuts. Moreover, even the beneficiaries of the welfare redistribution are more likely to perceive such tax cuts as advantageous within a system where the welfare benefits are subject to taxes (as is the case in Finland and Sweden, and unlike in the United Kingdom, for instance). These arguments for the heightened role of welfare economy rhetoric find further support in the fact that neo-populists in Finland were able to rapidly expanding their support among the middle classes, who traditionally emphasize considerations for the economy when aligning themselves politically (Rahkonen 2011).

The empirical analysis in this study nevertheless indicates that neo-populists – even when constructing an economic justification of anti-immigration politics – rarely feel the need to present any

concrete, causal mechanisms through which the implementation of anti-immigration measures they propose would remedy the problems attributed to immigration. As long as substantial arguments against the alleged welfare economic advantages for implementing stricter immigration policy find low saliency in the media, neo-populists can reach moderate and mainstream constituencies with welfare nationalist narratives that downplay the ethno-cultural and xenophobic logic inherent in their opposition to immigration and multiculturalism.

The relatively low impact of economic arguments against welfare nationalism in public debate is not due to a lack of research on the subject. Indeed, several studies indicate that it is highly unlikely that implementing anti-immigration policies would either alleviate the issues welfare states are currently experiencing or help the autochthonous population in any significant way (see, for example, Sarvimäki 2010, 286; Creutz-Kämpfi, Helander and Pyrhönen 2011). Even so, neo-populists' use of welfare nationalist narrative justifications for their anti-immigration agenda is not commonly challenged in terms of the factual accuracy of their assertions. Instead, the public critique against neo-populism is more commonly based on delegitimizing narratives that, quite correctly, underline the racist and xenophobic consequences of exclusionary welfare nationalism. Consequently, the neo-populist have remained quite successful in employing – largely untenable – welfare nationalist narratives that seek to justify anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalist policies as an economically necessary for protect the continuing redistribution of welfare to the autochthonous population. The lack of visibility of economic critique against welfare nationalism in public debate facilitates the internalization of narratives that construct immigration and multiculturalism as the prime causes for the various globalization and heterogenization-related economic and cultural challenges.

As many of these are challenges that Finns (as well as immigrants) indeed commonly face, many neo-populists perceive their critics' emphasis on racism and xenophobia as belittling their authentic and valid concerns. This problem is further accentuated by the fact that their critics – unlike neo-populists themselves – do not present alternative, simple solutions for the complex challenges the

welfare state is facing (mostly because such simple solutions do not exist). Employing narratives that seek to further emotionalize and personalize the public critique, the Finnish neo-populists tend to re-interpret any public critique as unjustly and inaccurately presenting their concerns as motivated by a racialized, ideological conviction, thereby allegedly “vilifying the majority in its own country.”

As I have illustrated in the last chapter of empirical analysis, such narratives that promote a victimized self-understanding have become particularly proliferate and powerful in hermetic online sphericules. In the mediatized contestations of the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy, the subject positionings of the underdog, the pariah and the tragic hero gradually took on a life of their own, proliferating in public stories that still continue to consolidate a victimized collective identity among the neo-populists.

The dilemma is that both the *Perussuomalaiset* politicians and grassroots level neo-populist advocates only employ vague and imprecise narratives for articulating the causal mechanisms through which “immigration critical” policy measures could supposedly benefit the Finnish welfare state. Together with the neo-populist endeavors to personalize and emotionalize the public debate on immigration, it has become increasingly difficult and time-consuming to expose these policy measures as unjust and inefficient with substantial arguments in the hectic and heavily competed media space. At the same time, the abstractness of the welfare nationalist political agenda allows neo-populists to operationalize many real and commonly shared concerns – from the erosion of national solidarity to the future of the welfare state – present these globalized challenges as the outcome of the allegedly immigration-induced heterogenization of the civil society. This furnishes neo-populism and its welfare nationalist political agenda with a semblance of non-racially motivated core that can be operationalized in public to muster support even amongst moderate new constituencies. As a consequence – notwithstanding the overwhelming empirical evidence pointing to anti-immigration policies’ inherently racializing and inequalizing outcomes – much of the advocacy for the mainstreamed variant of neo-populism appears to be motivated and mobilized by a genuine belief in the necessity to resort to neo-populists in an attempt to save the welfare state.

With the *Perussuomalaiset* in the government since this spring, an important avenue for future research lies in assessing how neo-populist narratives continue to develop in the institutional persistence phase of the party. After all, they have already endorsed the austerity measures that cut welfare redistributions to the poor and caved in to the demands to finance the Euro crisis with taxpayers' monies. It would be particularly interesting to analyze if and how the neo-populist advocates able to continue to extend welfare nationalist narratives to justify their responsibility for actions to its heterogeneous constituency and whether the ever increasing pressure on the welfare state translate to even more support for exclusionary policy measures against immigration.

The recent developments might also provide more opportunities to publicly challenge neo-populist narratives for justifying welfare nationalist "immigration critique." One way to achieve this would be to complement the current focus on xenophobia and racism in the delegitimizing public stories in two ways. To begin with, it would be important that public discussants start countering the personalization and emotionalization in public debate on immigration. By calmly focusing on the dearth of projected positive outcomes from the exclusionary welfare nationalist political agenda, it is possible to advance two separate goals. Firstly, this undermines the moral resource the neo-populists find in their ability to present themselves as the brave victims, selflessly championing the cause of the silent majority and carrying the unjustly issued stigma of a racist. Secondly, the focus on concrete political outcomes also creates room for employing narratives that illustrate how the unjust and exclusionary outcomes – resulting from the implementation of neo-populist political agenda – would actually diminish the role the welfare state can take in empowering its citizens and denizens at large.

Finally, there is a distinct need to acknowledge that the concerns for the welfare state are valid and can have a prominent role in the public debate, even in conjunction with questions of immigration. This makes it possible to address and illustrate the inefficiency of anti-immigration measures in tackling issues of welfare that are presented as justifying anti-immigration advocacy. This entails emphasizing that there are very few positive developments that can be expected from the implementation of anti-immigration policies.

With a joint effort to make it perfectly clear that the globalized challenges the welfare state faces are indeed a real and common concern to all Finnish citizens and resident non-Finns alike, it is possible to make it more difficult for neo-populists to place the blame for these concerns to the immigrant Other and other readily available scapegoats.



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## Appendix A: The Exhaustive Listing of All the Data Analyzed

	<b>Description of the data set and its subsets in chronological order:</b>	<b>Year(s) of origin of the data:</b>	<b>Year(s) of collection of the data:</b>	<b>Data analyzed in chapter</b>
<b>Data set 1</b>	<p>Background documents and memoranda used or produced by the Ministries in preparatory process of the Finnish Aliens Act of 2004:</p> <p>A. Application for continued funding for the research project "Haastattelututkimus maahanmuuttajien työhönpääsymahdollisuuksista. Erityiskohteenä Suomessa asuvat Euroopan ulkopuolelta tulevat maahanmuuttajat ja työnantajat (dnro 361/832/98TM)" (Interview Study on the Employment Prospects of Immigrants), ordered by the Ministry of Labour (Institute of Migration 1999)</p> <p>B. Memorandum produced by the Aliens Act task force for a general overview concerning the statements collected from the NGOs and various branches of government during hearing process of Aliens Act ("Yleinen yhteenveto ulkomaalaislakityöryhmän mietinnöstä annetuista lausunnoista")</p> <p>C. Early minutes of the parliamentary plenary session on the revision of the Aliens Act (PTK 40/2003 vp.)</p> <p>D. Motion for an alternative revision of the Act, proposed by the Left Alliance MP Esko-Juhani Tennilä (LA 163/2003 vp.)</p> <p>E. Memorandum of the Administrative parliamentary committee concerning the governmental bill on the Aliens Act and related Acts (HaVM 4/2004 vp.)</p> <p>F. Interview with the Legislative Councillor Jorma Kantola, the public official in the Ministry of Interior responsible for the preparatory process</p> <p>G. The Memorandum of the Parliamentary Administrative Committee (HaVM 4/2003 vp.)</p> <p>H. The General Overview of the Statements Concerning The Aliens Act Memorandum</p>	<p>1999 A</p> <p>2002 B</p> <p>2003 C,D,G,H</p> <p>2004 E</p> <p>2008 F</p>	<p><b>2008</b> - <b>2010</b></p>	4

<b>Data set 2</b>	<p>Minutes of the parliamentary debates on the Aliens Act of 2004 and the Integration Act of 2002:</p> <p>A. Follow-up debate on the Governmental Report on the Implementation of the Integration Act in VNS 5/2002 vp. (PTK 195/2002 vp.)</p> <p>B. Preliminary debate on the governmental proposal of the Aliens Act (PTK 40/2003 vp.)</p> <p>C. Preliminary debate on the supplementary governmental proposal on the Aliens Act (PTK 99/2003 vp.)</p> <p>D. Preliminary debate on the alternative motion by the Left Alliance concerning the revision of the Aliens Act (PTK 16/2004 vp.)</p> <p>E. General debate on the revision of Aliens Act (PTK 39/2004 vp.)</p> <p>F. Comprehensive debate on the revision of Aliens Act (45/2004 vp.)</p>	<p>2002 A</p> <p>2003 B,C</p> <p>2004 D,E</p>	<b>2008 - 2010</b>	4
<b>Data set 3</b>	<p>Electoral manifestos of the Finnish Perussuomalaiset party for the municipal elections of 2008 and the parliamentary elections of 2011 and of the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna party for the parliamentary elections of 2010:</p> <p>A. "Kunnallisvaaliohjelma 2008. Äänestäjän Asialla."</p> <p>B. "99 Förslag För Ett Bättre Sverige. Sverigedemokraternas Kontrakt Med Väljarna 2010-2014."</p> <p>C. "Suomalaiselle Sopivin. Perussuomalaiset R.p.:n Eduskuntavaaliohjelma."</p>	<p>2008 A</p> <p>2010 B</p> <p>2011 C</p>	<b>2011</b>	5

<b>Data set 4</b>	<p>Three exceptionally debated threads on anti-immigration politics, based on online discussions of three news articles published near the elections of 2008 and 2011 within the moderated discussion board of Finland's largest daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat:</p> <p>A. Katainen vaatii avointa keskustelua myös maahanmuuton ongelmista ([The Minister of Finance] Katainen demands an open discussion also on problems related to immigration) (Mölsä 2009). 168 out of 396 posts included in the subset.</p> <p>B. Perussuomalaiset sijoittaisivat työttömät maahanmuuttajat syrjäseuduille ("Perussuomalaiset would relocate unemployed immigrants in the peripheries") (Helsingin Sanomat 2011a). 75/241 posts included.</p> <p>C. Presidentti Halonen vaatii hallitukselta rasismin vastustamista ("President Halonen urges the government to oppose racism") (Silfverberg 2011). 137/265 posts included.</p>	<p>2009 A</p> <p>2011 B,C</p>	<b>2011</b>	5
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<b>Data set 5</b>	<p>Six online debate threads revolving around HS news articles on the political scandals concerning two Perussuomalaiset MPs. Each of the four mainstream arena threads (A, B, D &amp; E) is the follow-up debate based on the titular news article published in HS. Both of the sphericule arena threads (C &amp; F) are the most proliferate Homma debates on the two political scandals. The six threads are:</p> <p>A. "KKO tuomitsi Halla-ahon myös kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan" (The Supreme Court convicted Halla-aho also on the charges of inciting racial hatred) (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 80 out of 110 posts included in the subset.</p> <p>B. "Maallikko ei ymmärrä Halla-ahon tuomiota" (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 80/110 posts included.</p> <p>C. "2012-06-08 KKO tuomitsi Halla-ahon myös kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan" (Hommaforum 2012). 80/2718 posts included.</p> <p>D. "Kansanedustaja Hirvisaaren vieras teki natsi-tervehdyksiä eduskunnassa" (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 80/80 posts included.</p> <p>E. "Hirvisaari: 'Valitan jos jollakulla pipo kiristää'" (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 29/29 posts included.</p> <p>F. "2013-10-03 HS: Hirvisaaren vieras teki natsi-tervehdyksen eduskunnassa" (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a) 80/1158 posts included.</p>	<p>2012 (A-C)</p> <p>2013 (D-F)</p>	<b>2014</b>	6
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## Appendix B: Original Quotations from the Parliamentary Debates on the Aliens Act of 2004

- a) [R]ajat ylittävän muuttoliikkeen lisääntymisen myönteiset puolet oli hyödynnettävä ja samalla oli saatava siihen liittyvät haittavaikutukset niin pieniksi kuin mahdollista. [...] Hallitus on pitänyt tärkeänä, että esitys ulkomaalaislaiksi saatetaan edellä mainituin perustein ja kuten alussa totesin eduskunnan käsiteltäväksi pikaisesti.
- b) Uudistuksen perimmäisenä tavoitteena on ollut löytää tasapainoinen kokonaisuus, jossa otetaan huomioon niin Suomen sisäinen turvallisuus kuin maahan tulevien ja maassa oleskelevien ulkomaalaisten oikeudetkin.
- c) Joissain yhdistyksissä ollaan oltu tyytymättömiä Ulkomaalaislakiin ja on väitetty, että siinä ei ole huomioitu vähemmistöjen näkemyksiä, mutta se ei pidä paikkaansa. Kaikki esitetyt lausunnot on otettu huomioon valmistelussa. Mutta vähemmistön linjauksia ei ole helppo toteuttaa kun enemmistö on eri mieltä.
- d) Lapsen etu on aina yksilöllinen ja sidottu lapsen kulloiseenkin elämäntilanteeseen. Lapsen etu tulee harkita kokonaisuudessaan ottaen huomioon mahdollisuuksien mukaan lapsen toivomukset, mielipiteet ja yksilölliset tarpeet.
- e) Mitä tulee siihen, onko Suomi aivan erillinen valtio [...] itse en usko tähän.
- f) Tämän eduskunnan keskeinen tehtävä, meidän pitää se muistaa, on huolehtiminen omista kansalaisista. Omista kansalaisistamme huolehtiminen edellyttää tietyissä tilanteissa, että me otamme tänne ja ilman muuta ulkomaalaisia työntekijöitä, pakolaisia, pidämme heistä huolen. Se kuuluu siihen kokonaisuuteen. Mutta kuten sanoin, ykkösasia on se, että me päätämme tässä salissa ennen kaikkea suomalaisten ihmisten ongelmista.
- g) Suomella ja suomalaisilla on aina oikeus päättää siitä, keitä tänne tulee ja kuinka paljon. Se on meidän tehtävämme ja meidän oikeutemme tässä maassa, niin kuin turkkilaisilla Turkissa, niin kuin slovekeilla Slovakiassa ja ruotsalaisilla Ruotsissa. Tämä on kansallinen kysymys.
- h) eikä se ole Suomen edunkaan mukaista, että me pienen Viron parasta työvoimaa yrittäisimme houkutella tänne, vaan kyllä sen pitää olla siellä hoitamassa isänmaallisia velvoitteita.
- i) Suomessa asuu tällä hetkellä noin 100 000 ulkomaalaista. Suomella onkin verrattain lyhyt maahanmuuttohistoria. Ehkä siitä johtuen emme osaa



vielä kunnolla tunnistaa ja hyödyntää maahanmuuttajien mukanaan tuomaa sosiaalista, kielellistä ja kulttuurista osaamista. Tämän olemassa olevan, mutta käyttämättömän voimavaran saaminen hyötykäyttöön palvelisi Suomea monella eri rintamalla.

j) Kunpa joku toisi sen luvun suoraan ja kertoisi sen totuuden, ketkä ovat todellisia pakolaisia ja ketkä ovat tulleet vain paremman uskon toivossa [po.”paremman elämän toivossa”? MW].

k) Mitä enemmän meillä on perusteettomasti turvapaikkaa hakevia henkilöitä, jotka ovat saapuneet maahamme pelkästään kokeilemaan sosiaaliturvaamme, sitä vähemmän meille jää resursseja ottaa vastaan niitä henkilöitä, jotka tosiasiaa olisivat turvapaikan tarpeessa.

l) On erittäin tärkeää toimia harmaata taloutta vastaan, koska väkisininkin, jos se päästetään kasvamaan,[...] niin se murentaa suomalaista työmoraalia, suomalaista etiikkaa, meidän käyttäytymistämme. Tämä tällainen varsin korkea etiikka, että verot maksetaan ja sakot maksetaan [...] on syntynyt kuitenkin vuosisatojen kuluessa. Aika lyhyesti tällainen moraalietiikka voi myöskin heikentyä, jos sille tilaa annetaan.

m) Vaarana on, että hallitseman maahanmuutto sotkee työmarkkinat ja työnantajat pääsevät käyttämään hyväkseen ulkomaalaisten hädänalaista asemaa.

n) [J]os me osaamme oikein hoitaa tämän ulkomaalaispolitiikan, se myöskin estää meillä hyvin tehokkaasti rasismien eteenpäintuomista, joka nyt jo kytee [...] monissa paikoissa sillä tavalla piilossa ja ihmisten mielissä, mutta se ei tule esiin. Mehän olemme semmoista kansaa, että jupistaan ja jupistaan ja sitten mennään nurkan taakse ja annetaan muijalle ja lapsille selkään, kun puhutaan, että olisi tehnyt mieli sanoa siellä kokouksessa ja olisi pitänyt sanoa sille porukalle kerrankin kunnan sanat, mutta kun ei kehdata sanoa, mennään nurkan taakse ja tehdään tämmöiset jutut. [...] [K]un tämä rasismi oikein kunnolla pääsee ryöpsähtämään, kuten Joensuussa yhdessä vaiheessa teki, kyllä se johtuu siitä, että sinne yhteen paikkakuntaan pakkautuu liikaa väkeä ja ihmiset kokevat, että he ovat nyt eriarvoisessa asemassa.

o) Kotouttamissuunnitelman tarkoituksena on antaa maahanmuuttajalle tosiasialliset mahdollisuudet oppia oman elämän hallinta ja saavuttaa taito ja kyky hankkia toimeentulo Suomessa.

p) Tuntuu vain, että erillisille viranomaisille, ministeriöille ja eri organisaatioille maahanmuuttajat ovat vain pakollisia olemassaolon objekteja, joita heidän täytyy ohjata taikka neuvoa, tehdä näitä suunnitelmia.

q) kansalais- ja maahanmuuttajärjestöille on annettava halutessaan mahdollisuus osallistua kunnan kotouttamisohjelman valmisteluun ja täytäntöönpanoon.

r) Työpaikka on aikuiselle pakolaiselle lähes ainoa tie päästä mukaan suomalaisen elämänmenoon ja sopeutua uuteen kotimaahansa. [...]

opittaessa maan tavalle.

s) Odotusaikana maahanmuuttajat eivät välttämättä saa mitään tietoa suomalaisesta yhteiskunnasta. [...] ”Ihmiset kyllä lähtökohtaisesti haluavat kotoutua”.

t) Kotoutuminen on kansantaloudellisesti tärkeää, sillä työttömät maahanmuuttajat aiheuttavat yhteiskunnalle vain kuluja eivätkä maksa veroja.

u) [...] 20-vuotias nuori tuo Suomen kansantalouteen 850000 markkaa, koulutettu insinööri, lääkäri tai sairaanhoitaja noin 2,5 miljoonaa markkaa.

v) Työvoiman kokonaistarve on Etelä-Savon TE-keskuksen mukaan kaakkoisessa Suomessa vuoteen 2015 mennessä 75000 henkeä poistuman ja uusien tarpeiden korvaamiseksi.

w) Maahanmuuttajissa on niitä, jotka todella haluaisivat tehdä ammattiaan vastaavaa työtä ja joille työnhaku voisi lainsäädännöllisten muutosten avulla tulla helpommaksi [...]. Eli menetämme monia hyviä veronmaksajia.

x) Maahanmuuttajakoulutukseen käytetään vuodessa noin 30 miljoonaa euroa.

y) Kunnilla on aikaa syyskuun loppuun tehdä suunnitelma jokaiselle, joka ei omin avuin saa työtä. [...] Rahaa kunnille ei annettu.

z) pakolaisilla taitaa harvemmin olla työkokemusta, jota täällä voisi soveltaa

aa) [...] pakolaisille turvataan tilapäinen oleskelu ja heidän paluunsa kotiin turvataan. Heistä ei tule kunnan asukkaita.

bb) Lapsille järjestetään kouluopetusta äidinkielellä. “Lapset omaksuvat nopeasti vieraan kielen, ja se voi hankaloittaa heidän paluutaan kotimaahan” [...]. Aikuisille suomalaista yhteiskuntaa opetetaan juuri sen verran, että he tulevat täällä tilapäisesti toimeen.

cc) Mikä maa ottaa meidät suomalaiset korkeastikoulutetut huippuosaavat työttömät elätettäväkseen?

dd) Milloinkohan syntyisi aloite ja virasto siihen, että suomalaisille nuorille Suomessa tarjottaisiin koulutusta vastaavaa työtä?

ee) Euroopan maahanmuuttajalähiöiden ongelmat halutaan estää Suomessa.

ff) 1980-luvulla Suomessa oli kauhean vähän ulkomaalaisia. Tulijat olivat pieniä ryhmiä, eikä heistä koettu olevan sosioekonomista uhkaa. Laman aikaan tuli pelkoja, että heitä tulee niin hirveän paljon [...].

gg) Meidän tapamme ei ehkä ole ainoa oikea, mutta se on se, jota enemmistö suomalaisista haluaa maassa harjoittavan.

hh) Valtio voi tietyin edellytyksin päättää siitä, ketkä sen alueelle saavat asettua.

ii) Tilannetta ei ole helppo korjata, kun suomalaistenkin työttömyys on korkea, mutta lain mukaan pitää valita pätevin hakija.

jj) Ymmärrän siis oikein hyvin, jos työnantaja on haluton palkkaamaan maahanmuuttajaa. Niin kauan kuin elämme markkinataloudessa, monelle yritykselle maahanmuuttaja on yksinkertaisesti suurempi riski kuin mahdollisuus.

kk) [...] muuttajalle laaditaan koulutusohjelmia. Ellei muuttaja halua osallistua niihin, hänen toimeentulotukensa pienenee asteittain.

ll) [...] kotouttamislaki vaatiiikin viisaasti saattamaan pakolaiset entistä monipuolisempaan vuorovaikutukseen suomalaisen yhteiskunnan kanssa. [...] Tulija sitoutuu vastikkeeksi saamastaan tuesta opiskelemaan maan kielen, täydentämään ammattitaitoaan ja hankkimaan muut Suomessa tarpeelliset tiedot pystyäkseen elättämään itsensä ja osallistumaan muuhun elämään.

mm) Lähtökohdaksi on kotoutumisessa oivallettava, että maahanmuuttajat ovat osa Suomessa asuvaa väestöä ja samalla lailla keskenään erilaisia kuin muukin väestö.

nn) Tavoitteenahan on estää ennalta turvapaikkasäännöstemme ja sosiaaliturvamme väärinkäyttö. Pyritään tietysti siihen, että ne, jotka tarvitsevat suojaa, turvaa vainolta, he sitä Suomessa saavat, mutta ne, jotka pyrkivät väärinkäyttämään järjestelmäämme, heidät palautetaan mahdollisimman pian takaisin. [...] Varsinainen ongelma näiden ihmisten kohdalla on tietysti näiden asianomaisten maiden vähemmistöpolitiikka [...].

oo) Tilanne on se, että kun Suomeen tullaan, eletään meidän sääntöjemme mukaan. Täällä päiväkodeissa vietetään joulua ja kouluissa lauletaan suvivirret. Kun nämä ottaa huomioon eikä lähdetä näissä asioissa lipsumaan ja pelleilemään ja vaatimaan poikkeuksia, niin kaikille on täällä tilaa ja pystytään hoitamaan asiat.

pp) Hyvinvointivaltiomme luo pohjaa tasa-arvoiselle kohtelulle ja oikeudenmukaiselle yhteiskunnallemme, joka synnyttää turvallisuutta. Se vaatii silloin myös kansainvälistymistä väestömme osalta, jotta pysymme mukana muun maailman kansainvälistymisessä. [...] Taloutemme heikentyessä tuloerojen kasvu edelleen kiihtyy ja luo turvallisuudesta käsitteen, joka koskee vain pientä etuoikeutettujen luokkaa, joille turvallisuus tarkoittaa lisää poliiseja ja vartijoita, lisää vankiloita ja suojamureja [...] ja lakeja, joilla voidaan suojautua huonompiosaisilta oman maamme kansalaisilta.

qq) Valiokunta on myös esittänyt mielestäni erittäin hyvin perusteltuja muutoksia, jotka eivät valitettavasti ole päässeet hallintovaliokunnan laatiman mietinnön sivuille saakka [...]. [...] Ihmettelenkin sitä, onko meillä vallitseva tapa, että mietinnön antava valiokunta ei kuitenkaan ota huomioon välttämättä lausuntoja niin, kuin olisi odotettavaa.

rr) Sanoin aikaisemmassa vastauspuheenvuorossani, että tätä asiaa ei tulisi dramatisoida millään tavalla ja kansalaisille ei tulisi antaa väärää signaaleja hyvin herkästä asiasta. [...] [O]n usein tärkeämpää tehdä oikeita asioita kuin asioita oikein.

ss) Pitää muistaa sanonta: maassa maan tavalla, tai maasta pois.

Tässä tapauksessa se tarkoittaa sitä, että kotouttaminen todella tapahtuu mahdollisimman joustavasti ja hyvästi, että tulija oppii uuden kielen ja löytää työpaikan ja työpaikan kautta rikollisuus pysyy pois. Toisaalta meidän ei pitäisi Suomen verovaroilla tukea heidän entistä kulttuuria kovin voimakkaasti sikäli, että niin pian kuin he vain suomalaistuvat, sitä äkempää he saavat hyväksyntää. [S]e on minun mielestäni tietynlaista rasismin rahoittamista. Niin kauan kuin he pysyvät erilaisina, on vaara joutua rasismin kohteeksi, mutta niin pian kuin he suomalaistuvat, jos tätä sanaa voi käyttää, niin pian he ovat tavallaan rasismin pelkojen ulkopuolella. Heille pitää antaa kyllä mahdollisuus kehittää ja vaalia omaa kulttuuriaan [...].

## Appendix C: Operationalization of the Justification Types and Discourses in Chapter 5

The four types of justification are indicated as italicized subheadings in bold. The quotes that begin with an italicized claim crystallize the content of the 11 discourses identified in the discussion board analysis. The codes of the discourses, also identified in the three tables are in bold inside parentheses.

### ***Economic redistribution***

*'Influx of immigrants results in...*

- ...taxpayer money to be misplaced.' (**taxpayer money**)
- ...the same amount of goods to be shared among greater number of people.' (**scarcity of goods**)
- ...macro-level problems for the economic sustainability welfare state.' (**welfare state macro-level**)

### ***Rights of the majority***

*'Recognizing immigrant cultures' divergent needs facilitates the development where...*

- ...non-immigrant concerns lose the moral priority they deserve over immigrant ones.' (**majority's entitlement**)
- ...non-immigrant concerns lose their issue saliency in the media and in the political decision-making and can no longer be adequately heard.' (**displacing majority's concerns**)
- ...the majority's concern for its culture and practices are vilified as racist.' (**vilified majority**)
- ...the previously self-evident fact that our ways are better for us must be constantly reinstated in the public debate.' (**reaffirming our ways**)

***Immigrants as the Other***

*'We must oppose immigration and immigrant practices, because...*

*...immigrants and their habits cause all kinds of public disturbance.'* (**immigrant behaviour**)

*...immigrants are being pampered by our welfare system and abuse it without remorse.'* (**welfare-abusing immigrants**)


***Norms of the public debate***

*'It's perfectly ok to publicly advocate anti-immigration politics, because...*

*...our arguments against immigration cannot be linked to any kind of racism.'* (**this is not racism**)

*...only that way immigration-related societal problems get debated more openly and the debate becomes marked by a healthy, critical distance from the pro-tolerance dogmas.'*(**open debate**)

## Appendix D: An Illustration of the Frequency of the Narratives Coded in the Data Set 5



The distribution of the 469 narratives among the 17 codes in the 259 posts addressing the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy (black: delegitimizing narrative (n=160), yellow: legitimizing narrative (n=309))

## Appendix E: The Original Posts Used for Compiling the Four OPS pairs

### OPS pair 1 (Hirvisaari):

#### “Why must neo-populists’ jokes be taken seriously?”

##### Delegitimizing public story: *unacceptable even as a joke*

Aika pellejä. Ei pitäisi pilailla näillä asioilla, sillä pilailua kai tämä oli?  
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:16 [ (225:225)] </ref>

Äärioikeiston kannattajajoukot lisääntyvät mm. Kokoomusnuorissa ja Perussuomalaisissa. Tuommoiset natsitervehdykset ovat hölmöläisten hommia mutta kabineteissa on astetta fiksumpaakin väkeä. Mutta eihän tämä kenellekään yllätyksenä voi tulla ?

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:30 [ (418:418)] </ref>

Seppo Lehto ei ole PS:n jäsen. Hirvisaarelta todella typerää vieraiden valintaa.  
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:32 [ (462:462)] </ref>

Kreikkalaiset kyllästyivät persujen kaltaisella ohjelmalla metelöineeseen Kultainen aamunkoitto-puolueeseen. Näkyi puolueella olevan vaalimateriaalissaan Hitler-ja Musso-lini naamareita ja omalla etiketillä varustettuja viinapullojakin.

Millään ei voi ymmärtää Hirvisaaren menettelyä.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:35 [ (510:511)] </ref>

Kyseinen Seppo Lehto on törttöillyt tuolla tavalla jo vuosikausia, joten James joko on samaa mieltä Lehdon fasistiaatteista tai sitten on niin tyhmä ettei ole tajunnut kaverinsa olevan täysi natsi. Molemmat hyviä syitä olla kenties äänestämättä Jamesta seuraavissa vaaleissa?

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:41 [ (604:604)] </ref>

Tottahan toki melkein kaikilla on kokemusta siitä, miten vaikka joku juhliin kutsuttu henkilö on käyttäytynyt yllättäen ei-toivottavasti. Mutta kun herra S.L:n toiminnassa ei ole mitään yllättävää, hän on varsin tunnettu entiteetti, jota Hirvisaari kuvaili blogissaan 2009 sanoin: ”superlahjakas kansannaurattaja ja kansantaiteilija” sekä ”profeetta”.

Herra S.L. vetää tilaisuuden tullen yhtä varmasti kättä suoraksi kuin aurinko nousee idästä.

Ja vaikka herra S.L. olisi ollut kravatti päällä viimeisen päälle hienosti eduskunnassa, niin silti hänen kutsuminen sinne olisi ollut epämunaus.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:42 [ (616:619)] </ref>

Natsitervehdykset eivät kuulu millekään foorumille tässä maassa. Eivätkä ainakaan eduskuntaan!



<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:53 [ (824:824)] </ref>

Pistetili tuli täyteen ”Asikkalan raikkaalla” eli Erkki James Hirvisaarella. Tunnettu äärioikeistolainen Seppo Lehto oli Hirvisaaren vieraana ja teki lehterillä antaumuksellisen natsitervehdyksen. Hirvisaarelle se merkitsee eduskuntauran päättymistä 2015, sillä yksinäisenä ei ole läpimenomahdollisuuksia. Pieni toivo voi olla, että kristilliset ottavat tämän helluntailaisen ”saarnamiehen” listoilleen.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:56 [ (880:880)] </ref>

Seppo Lehdon tempaukset ovat aina mauttomia ja outoja. Hänen omasta mielestään kaiketi saattavat olla humoristisia ja hauskoja. Hirvisaarelta oli harkitsematonta kutsua Lehto eduskuntaan. Tuo ei kuitenkaan missään tapauksessa ole riittävä syy niin radiokaaliin tekoon kuin Hirvisaaren erottamiseen puolueesta. Hirvisaari ei natsitervehdystä tehnyt, vaan sen teki Lehto.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:57 [ (890:890)] </ref>

Sitähän se on ollut tosiaan tuo perussuomalaisten politiikka, huonoa huumoria, ei mitään muuta. Pipo ei ole kiristänyt edes humalassa rikkollijengin kerhotiloissa eikä missään muuallakaan.

Onneksi kun euroopan talousahdinko alkaa parin vuoden sisällä helpottamaan tämänkin puolueen populismille rakennettu pohja sulaa kokonaan pois. Muistoon jää vain kirkonhätäpääsivarkauksia, rukouskutsumölinöitä, populismia, natsihölmöilyjä ja seitsemän miljoonan puoluetuilla ostettu kerrostalo-osake Helsingin keskustassa. Sitähän voi sitten vuokrata vaikka mille tutuksi tulleelle sakille.

Pahin skenaario on tietysti, että nämä pääsevät valtaan ja rampauttamaan koko suomen pysyvästi.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:6 [ (88:92)] </ref>

Mitenkähän tuo persujen ”humori” on aina natsiaiheista? Keksisivät välillä jotain muuta!

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:7 [ (105:105)] </ref>

Aika monilla pipo kiristää tässä maassa. Se on tulosta ”suvaitsevaisuudesta” - valtauskonnosta papistoineen.

Ilman suvaitsevuutta meillä vallitsisi moraalittomien, vahvojen ja julmien mielivalta heikkojen, köyhien ja inhimillisten ylitse.

Suomi kuitenkin on länsimainen demokratia, jossa JOKAISELLA on mahdollisuus opin ja sivistyksen kautta maksutta hankkia elämisen eväät miten pitkälle ja korkealle tahansa. Yhtä lailla jokaisella on lailliset keinot vaikuttaa.

Vastuullisen aikuisen tunnistaa siitä, ettei hän tee samaa virhettä toistamiseen ja että hän ottaa opikseen myös muiden virheistä. Miksi kukaan äänestää moukan tai rikollisen päättämään asioistaan? Vallan mukana tulee aina vastuu, jota kaikki eivät kykene kantamaan kunnialla. Eivät nimittäin ymmärrä, mitä kunnia tarkoittaa.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:13 [ (210:215)] </ref>

Ihme veikkoja! Ei järki paljon päätä pakota. Ei ole ymmärrystä kehittyneet alakoulu-astetta enemmän. Ymmärrys hoi! Äly älä jätä!

Hetkessä tuhotaan muitten ehkä fiksujenkin työ, kun ei osata käyttäytyä ihmisiksi.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:15 [ (256:257)] </ref>

Ei tarvitsekaan erota heti ja yksin ja kaoottisesti. Kerro mikä muu puolue olisi yhtä eurokriittinen, jos ei kääpiöitä lasketa. EU-vastaisuuden ennustan kyllä kasvavan, kunhan ihmiset alkavat oikeasti näkemään, että Suomi ollaan menettämässä. Toistaiseksi vain Vihreä Liitto on ilmoittanut kannattavansa liittovaltiokehitystä, muilta puolueilta odotelen kovasti kannanottoja asiaan. Sillä aikaa totalitarismi alkaa hivuttautua sisään aina vain lujemmin ja lujemmin, ja se ei TOSIAANKAAN ole tulossa sitä kautta meille, että joku kylähullu vetää heilaamisperformanssia eduskunnassa. Se on vain mautonta, mutta ei se suurin vaara, joka meitä uhkaa, - se tulee tavallaan ihan toiselta suunnalta, ja sillä on kaikki valtamedia puolellaan.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:18 [ (324:324)] </ref>

### Legitimizing public story: *you shouldn't take it literally*

Rakennus sinällään muistuttaa kyllä natsien arkkitehtuuria ainakin ulkoapäin, ehkäpä tyyppi eläytyi liikaa päästyään pyhimpään sisälle, on siellä muuten noita natseja nähty paljonkin ennen aikaan. Joku voi toki pitää nykyistäkin hallintoa natsimaisena ...

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:1 [ (62:62)] </ref>

Huikasti myös Jussi Halla-aho on saatu juttuun mukaan, kun tamperelainen oman vaalilistan viime kunnallisvaalien ehdokas S.L. on häntä päättänyt tukea nettisivullaan. Kyseessä oleva tamperelainen mies taitaa olla aika harmiton ja jopa vitsailijaksikin luonnehdittu, lukuunottamatta nettihäiriköintiä josta tuomiokin on tullut. Ihme kyllä se on, että Hirvisaari hänet haluaa eduskuntaan kutsua.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:10 [ (155:155)] </ref>

voe mualima sentään ! suomi tuntuu nykyisin olevan tilassa, jossa on natsi siellä ja toinen täällä. kohta tulee noottia simo vieseltaa insti TUUTILTA ja joku on oikeudessa jonkun toisen kirjoituksia suomennettuaan ! alkaa mennä jo komiikan puolelle, ollaan ihan, kun ameriikassa !

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:23 [ (317:317)] </ref>

Eikö nykyään pitäisi olla jo selvä, että sillä ei ole yhtään mitään väliä, mitä facebookissa on tai ei ole?

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:37 [ (534:534)] </ref>

Joo, tästä ei kannata niin hirveästi provosoitua. Tässä S.L.:ssa on tietty huumoriaspekti, jolle olen aika paljonkin hihitellyt. Vähän sellaista teekkarihuumorin tapaista... S.L. ei ole uhka kenellekään ja hänellä on oma kylähullun charmsinsa. Parempaa viihdettä S:n seuraaminen sitä paitsi on kuin salatut elämät.

Mikään rankaiseminen tässä ei ainakaan auta. Porukka, jonka sanavarastoon kuuluu "suvaitsevaisto" ja mikä "suvikset" ja jos oikein revitellään niin "suvakki", vain hullaantuvat tästä ja on ikävää katsoa kun kylähullua hakataan.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:38 [ (544:546)] </ref>

Lahjakas provoilija tuo Lehto, kun taas pääsi lehtien etusivuille. Niin minäkin tuon tulkitsen.

Juttujen perusteella ilmeisesti kukaan ei ole nähnyt natsitervehdystä. Vasta Lehdon julkaistua kuvan tervehdys tuli julki ja ollaan loukkaatuneita.

Luulis ettei Hirvisaari arvannut vieraan tekevän natsitervehdyksen, ottavan siitä kuvan ja julkaisevan sen netissä.

Hirvisaari pitää Lehdon saamaa tuomiota liian kovana. Minustakin se näyttää liian kovalta. Ovatko hänen juttunsa niin vaarallisia yhteiskunnalle? Mieshän ei vaikuta vakavasti otettavalta.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:46 [ (687:694)] </ref>

No no. Ei kannata repiä peliverkkareitaan Sepon takia.

Lehto paiskattiin aikoinaan vankilaan kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan. Se oli surullinen tapaus ja jäi kaiheartamaan monen mieltä. Täytyi kylähulluun sillä tavalla käydä käsiksi... Niin petti pokka, että täytyy toistaitoinen vankilaan paiskata, ja sillä siten ilkkua. Kuin komeapaakin voittoa juhliä, että saipa selkäänsä, mitäs huuteli ja itsepä aloitti. Vaikka hyvin näkee että kaveri ei käy ihan kaikilla pytyillä, ja ei sovi ihan samalla tavalla häntä arvioida kuin täysipäisiä.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:52 [ (810:812)] </ref>

Seppo Lehdon tempaukset ovat aina mauttomia ja outoja. Hänen omasta mielestään kaiketi saattavat olla humoristisia ja hauskoja. Hirvisaarelta oli harkitsematonta kutsua Lehto eduskuntaan. Tuo ei kuitenkaan missään tapauksessa ole riittävä syy niin radi-kaaliin tekoon kuin Hirvisaaren erottamiseen puolueesta. Hirvisaari ei natsitervehdystä tehnyt, vaan sen teki Lehto.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:57 [ (890:890)] </ref>

Aika monilla pipo kiristää tässä maassa. Se on tulosta ”suvaitsevaisuudesta” - valtauskonnosta papistoineen.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:3 [ (34:34)] </ref>

Ei tarvitsekaan erota heti ja yksin ja kaoottisesti. Kerro mikä muu puolue olisi yhtä eurokriittinen, jos ei kääpiöitä lasketa. EU-vastaisuuden ennustan kyllä kasvavan, kunhan ihmiset alkavat oikeasti näkemään, että Suomi ollaan menettämässä. Toistaiseksi vain Vihreä Liitto on ilmoittanut kannattavansa liittovaltiokehitystä, muilta puolueilta odotellen kovasti kannanottoja asiaan. Sillä aikaa totalitarismi alkaa hivuttautua sisään aina vain lujemmin ja lujemmin, ja se ei TOSIAANKAAN ole tulossa sitä kautta meille, että joku kylähullu vetää heilaamisperformanssia eduskunnassa. Se on vain mautonta, mutta ei se suurin vaara, joka meitä uhkaa, - se tulee tavallaan ihan toiselta suunnalta, ja sillä on kaikki valtamedia puolellaan.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:18 [ (324:324)] </ref>

## OPS pair 2 (Halla-aho): “Neo-populist satire: Inciting racial hatred or exercising freedom of speech?”

### Delegitimizing public story: *unacceptable even as a joke*

Minusta tämä oli ihan oikea tuomio. Eli aina ei kannata mennä julkisesti sanomaan tai kirjoittamaan asioita, mitä itse ajattelee.

Osaltani ymmärrän, että Halla-ahon kommentin takana oli jotkin tilastolliset faktat esimerkiksi työttömyyden ja rikollisuuden osalta kyseisen väestöryhmän keskuudessa. Halla-aho käytti kuitenkin asian julkituomiseksi täysin tuulesta temmattuja päätelmiä ja väitteitä esimerkiksi ihmisten geeniperimästä. Eli nuo tuulesta temmatut kommentit olivat selvästi kiihottamista kansanryhmää vastaan, koska väitteille ei ole olemassa minkään-

laista tieteellistä näyttöä.

Minusta Suomen keskustelukulttuurissa on jo vuosia ollut se ongelma, että edes tilastollisesti mitattavista maahanmuuttajiin liittyvistä asioista (työttömyydestä, rikollisuudesta, koulutustasosta, sosiaalitukien määrästä, jne) ei ole voitu keskustella edes rakentavassa hengessä, ilman että keskustelut leimataan rasistiseksi. Tästä syystä Halla-ahon kaltaiset ihmiset monesti nostavat tällaisia ongelmia esiin vähemmän rakentavaan tyyliin. Itse en ole varma kumpi on parempi vaihtoehto, se että ongelmat kielletään ja niistä ei voi keskustella, vai se että ongelmista keskustellaan Halla-ahon tyyliin.

Toisin sanoen, liian monen päättäjän on ollut Suomessa vaikeata tunnustaa, että meillä on ollut joidenkin väestöryhmien sopeutumisen osalta jonkinlaisia ongelmia, kun taas toiset väestöryhmät ovat sopeutuneet suorastaan loistavasti. Tämän lisäksi myös eri väestöryhmien sisällä sopeutuminen on vaihdellut merkittävästi, eli myös somalien joukosta löytyy runsaasti Suomalaisen yhteiskuntaan hyvin sopeutuneita yksilöitä ja myös ongelmayksilöitä.

Tämä terveen keskusteluilmapiiriin puuttuminen on ollut kaikkien osapuolien kannalta varsin huono juttu, sillä ongelmien ratkaisua on vaikea aloittaa, ellei ongelmien olemassa oloa ensin tunnusteta. Eihän alkoholismistakaan voi parantua, ellei henkilö ensin tunnusta, että hänellä on alkoholiongelma.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:13 [ (251:259)] </ref>

Mikä takia pykälät kansansyhmää kiihottamista varten pitäisi kumota? Emme me ihmiset ole niin hyviksi muuttuneet, etteivätkö kansanmurhat voisi taas toistua. Minusta näiivi ajatus...

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:15 [ (295:295)] </ref>

Nyt vähän suhteellisuudentajua kehiin. Minkä ihmeen takia sananvapauden piirissä pitäisi olla uskontojen haukkuminen ja etnisiä ryhmiä vastaan kiihottaminen?

Niissä Halla-ahon kyseenomaisissa kirjoituksissa luki mm. että somaleilla on joitakin erittäin kielteisiä geneettisiä erityispiirteitä. Tällaiset kirjoitukset eivät ole mitään rakentavaa kritiikkiä maahanmuuttopolitiikasta vana täyttä humpuukia.

Ne joiden mielestä KKO nyt kieltää esimerkiksi uskontojen piirissä ilmenevän pedofilian käsittelyn pitäisi pysähtyä vähäksi aikaa miettimään omia mielipiteitään. Kummasti esimerkiksi YLE ja HS ovat onnistuneet uutisoimaan ja analysoimaan lestadiolaisliikkeen pedofilia-asioita asiallisesti ja ketään loukkaamatta ja tuomioita saamatta.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:25 [ (583:587)] </ref>

Tuossa lausunnossa onkin aivan oleellinen ero Halla-ahon kommentteihin. Siinäähän kohdistetaan kritiikin kärki sinne, mihin sen kuuluu osoittaa eli radikaaleihin islamisteihin.

Halla-aho sen sijaan lähtee teksteissään yksittäistapauksista ja laajentaa ne muutamin tieteelliseltä näyttävien - mutta ainoastaan siis siltä näyttävien - sanankääntein koskemaan kokonaisia kansanryhmiä, kansallisuuksia ja koko valtaisaan uskontoa. Lisäksi hän pudotelee tekstinsä lomassa näistä kansanryhmisä erilaisia halventamiseen tähtäviä ilmauksia.

Kokonaisuus on samanlainen kuin mikä tahansa vihapropaganda sellaista menneisyydessä ja nykyäänkin harjoitavissa poliittisissa kulttuureissa. Tuomio on aiheellinen. Sananvapaus oikeusvaltiossa ei ole anarkiaa.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:27 [ (621:625)] </ref>

Mielipiteiden ilmaisu ja uhkailu, panettelu ja solvaus ovat eri asioita.

Ihminen joka ei kykene rakentavaan keskusteluun uhkailematta, panettelematta tai solvaamatta vastapuolta ei tule menestymään asiassaan

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:34 [ (729:731)] </ref>

Mietippä mitä olisi tapahtunut jos vastaavan kirjoituksen olisi kirjoittanut kansanedustaja USA:ssa tai Ruotsissa? Em länsimaissa kansanedustaja olisi jo todennäköisesti eronnut, toisin kuin täällä länsi-Venäjällä, jossa sivistynyt keskustelukulttuuri on näköjään lapsenkengissä.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:38 [ (798:798)] </ref>

Oikea tuomio. Ei mennä takaisin toisen maailmansodan aikaisiin rotuoppeihin, eihän, Jussi. Suuri osa somalien ongelmista johtuu ennen kaikkea tiettyjen kantaväestön edustajien mustavalkoisista asenteista. Suurin osa täälläkin kommentoijista tuskin on ikinä edes tutustunut yhteenkään somaliin, ja asiantuntijatiedot tästä väestöryhmästä otetaan valikoivasti iltapäivälehtien lööpeistä. Kyllä hävettää olla suomalainen tänä päivänä.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:42 [ (862:862)] </ref>

Persujen pitäisi nyt olla tyytyväisiä: KO on kulttuurikonservatiivinen ja se haluaa säilyttää suomalaisen kulttuuriin kuuluvan arvokkaan ja asiallisen kielenkäytön ja asioiden arvostelun.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:45 [ (914:914)] </ref>

Kaikkien muiden poliitikkojen tuomioiden ja jopa syytteiden kohdalla persujen kannattajat ja kansanedustajat ovat kilpaan ylistäneet Suomen oikeusjärjestelmää.

Ilmeisesti persut ajavat tässäkin asiassa kaksilla rattaila ja oikeus on väärässä vain kun itselle tulee tuomio. Ei se sivistyneessä maailmassa vain tuollainen lapsellisuus vetele, joko toimitaan lain mukaan tai myönnetään syyllisyyttä. Turha kenenkään on syyttää lakia sen jälkeen kun on sitä rikkonut ja tuomionsa saanut.

Jonkinlainen selkäranka pitäisi populistiltakin löytyä.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:48 [ (952:956)] </ref>

-En tiedä maallikon ”silmästä”, mutta kyllä kai sen vähintään 99% kansalaisista ymmärtää, että nämä lait on tehty vähemmistöjen suojaksi.

Asia on itsestään selvä, kun tutkitaan lainvalmistelun taustaa, ihmisoikeussopimuksia ym. Kansallisuudesta puhuttaessa ei mainita erikseen persuille selkokielellä, että ”tämä koskee vähemmistöjä”, kun kaikki muutkin kohdat ovat selväsanaisesti vähemmistöjä koskevia.

Ylipäättään naurettavaa vaatia, että esim 50 henkilön turvapaikanhakijan ryhmää saisi solvata samalla tavalla kuin suomalaisia. Enemmistön solvaamiskielto vaatisi 500 000 sensoria ja tuhat oikeudenkäyntiä päivässä.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:11 [ (214:218)] </ref>

Salama ei liity tähän mitenkään, mutta Hitlerin Saksa ja keskitysleirit liittyvät.-  
Kun siis tutkii hieman sitä taustaa, miksi näitä kiihottamispykälä ja uskonrauhanrikomispykälä alettiin ottamaan käyttöön sodan jälkeen.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:16 [ (312:312)] </ref>

On oletettavaa että kriminaalipsykologit, kriminologit ja alkoholitutkijat saattavat olla samaa mieltä. Nuo ovat asioita joista on syytä puhua, mutta ne loukkaavat suomalaisen yhteisövapautta juoda viinaa, koska ja missä vaan. Tähän Halla-Aho kai perusti oletamuksensa saada äänestäjiensä tuen, äänestäjiensä joiden minäkuvaan väite loukkaa.

Perussuomalaisten kannattajakunta ei osanne keskustella siitä mikä on mielipide ja mikä tieteellinen tieto tai kokemustieto, jolle yhteiskunnallinen päätöksenteko pohjautuu.

Jos Halla-aho olisi esittänyt edes viitteen siihen, miksi hän väittää somaleilla olevan joitakin geneettisiä ominaisuuksia tai jos hän olisi esittänyt väitteensä tueksi verrokkiryhmän somaliasta, niin teko olisi ollut keskustelua.

Muistettakoon että Halla-Aho on filosofian tohtori, joten hän tietää, miten tilastoja voi käyttää argumentoinnissa - siis toivottavasti tietää.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:17 [ (328:334) ] </ref>

Oh hoijaa.

Suomalainen on enemmistö. Kaikki tästä poikkeavaa on vähemmistöä.

Siksi, koska enemmistöä on 99% kansasta ja 1 % vähemmistöä.

Keksikää jokin muu kiusaamisen kohde - vaikkapa vain alkoholismi, mutta aih, se on niin \_yleistä\_ ja melkein yksi piirre suomalaisissa - kaljan ihannoiminen - että harvemmin suomalainen tuntee, että häntä loukataan, sillä hän tietää, että maailmakin tietää, että suomalaiset juovat. Jos lähden tässä erottelemaan ketkä eivät juo alkoholia, niin siinä olisi yhdelle ihmiselle vähän vaikeuksia, koska mistä \_erotan\_ nyt ne alkoholia juovat? En mistään. En tiedä yhtikäs mistään kuka meistä suomalaisista juo ja kuka ei.

Mutta annas olla kun ihoväritään erilaista ruvetaan soimaamaan ja haukkumaan, että aivan kuin Suomessa ei olisi riittävästi jo rasismia, niin ei tämmöistä jaksa katsoa.

Jopa me jotka emme juo alkoholia olemme turvassa alkoholismien syytökseltä, sillä enemmistö tietää, että enemmistö harvoin tarttuu puukkoon ja viinaan, mutta se, että vähemmistö, joka on muutenkin enemmistöstä poikkeavaa, lisää vielä lisää ennakkoluuloja kehiin viitaten heidän erilaisuuteen etnisesti, on raukkamaista rasismia.

Olen tyytyväinen KKO:n tuomioon, mutta olisi saanut antaa kovemman rangaistuksen. Suomea syydetään lepsuista rangaistuksista, että jos nyt sieltä Euroopan Ihmisoikeuden tuomareilta tulisi se kovempi rangaistus? Vaikkapa kovempi sakko € tai ehdollinen?

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:19 [ (376:388) ] </ref>

Halla-aho myös kyseenalaisti oikeuslaitoksen toiminnan ja piti KHO:n tuomiota vain joidenkin näkemyksinä. Samanlaista laillisen oikeusjärjestyksen häväämisestä on tehty lähinnä natsien ja vastaavien toimesta. Miten nyt lakia ja oikeutta huutavat perussuomalaiset eivät tajua tätä, tai ainakaan monet heistä? :)

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:22 [ (491:491) ] </ref>

Jos on 100 ihmistä, 99 suomalaista ja 1 somali ja sanotaan, että suomalaisissa on juoppoja - on 1/99 mahdollisuus että solvataan tiettyä henkilöä. Mutta jos sanotaan, että somalit ovat varkaita, ei liene vaikea yksilöidä ketä tarkoitetaan. Siinä se pieni ero.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:23 [ (504:504) ] </ref>

No, siitä pääkirjoituksesta ei tullut sen kummempaa, koska hieman aiemmin oli julkaistu paljon mediassakin esiintynyt tutkimus, jossa esiteltiin tieteellistä pohjaa suomalaisten kannattamisen mahdollisesta geenipohjaisesta alttiudesta (mm. Tiede-lehdessä oli juttua).

Halla-aholla taas veti juttunsa ns. takapuolesta, joten tapauksilla eroa on kuin yöllä ja päivällä. Toisin sanoen Halla-aho veti tyhmiä ja tietämättömiä höplästä ja pääsee nyt leikkimään marttyyria.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:28 [ (643:644)] </ref>

### Legitimizing public story: *freedom of speech threatened*

Onko odotettavissa sakot jos sanon että Scientologia uskonto on rikollisten huijaus jolla kerätään rahat herkkäuskoisilta? Vai onko yksi uskonto pyhempi kuin muut koska vahtii etujaan tappokäsyyllä?

Vai onko se tyylä joka ratkaisee? Ja voin todeta että: ” On olemassa viitteitä mielipiteistä että tietyn amerikkalaisyntyisen elämänkatsomuksen menettelytavoissa olisi jotain joka ei ehkä sovi yhteen yleisesti hyväksytyjen normien kanssa.”

Sitten tällaista kieltä harrastavat poliitikot vielä valittavat että heidät ymmärretään väärin.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:3 [ (71:75)] </ref>

Vaikken ole Halla-Ahon kanssa juuri mistään smaa mieltä, olisin odottanut toisenlaista oikeuden tuomiota. Toisaalta korkeimman oikeuden päätös on linjassaan aiemman päätöksen kanssa, jossa se nosti sharia lait suomalaisen lainsäädännön yläpuoliseksi auktoriteetiksi ns. poikalapsen silpomisjutussa.

Suomalainen oikeuskäytäntö on ottanut askeleen kohti jumalan tunnustamista osaksi normistoamme. Tapamoraalin väitetty rapautuminen , on johtamassa jumaluskoisten vastaiskuun demokratiaa vastaan. Lainsäädäntövalta on siirtymässä eduskunnalta instituutioihin.

En ole Halla-Ahon kanssa juuri mistään samaa mieltä. Änkrämäinen vieraiden kansojen torjuminen ei ole mielekästä. Jonain päivänä uusi jääkausi nostaa maamme ylle kaksi kilometriä paksun jääkerroksen. Tuolloin me olemme maasta pakoon lähtevä kansa. Toivottavasti silloin ihmisten kulttuuri on muuttunut ihan päinvastaiskesi kuin Halla-Aho edustaa.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:4 [ (97:101)] </ref>

KKO:n tuomio antaa nyt peruskaavion, miten uskonrauhan rikkominen ja kiihottaminen on tuomittava. Tuomittakoon nyt myös kristinuskkoa solvaavat ja kristittyjen vahingoittamiseen kiihottavat samalla tavalla!

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:7 [ (153:153)] </ref>

KKO on tehnyt päätöksellään rotupolitiikkaa. Maahanmuuttoa ei saa lainvoimaisen päätöksen turvin arvostella edes faktatiedoilla. Muistettakoon, että Halla-aho ei kirjoita scriptaansa vatämällä hatusta, vaan hän pystyy perustelevaan jokaisen väittämänsä tilastoilla. Mielipiteet ovat asia erikseen, mutta ne ovatkin jokaisen henkilökohtaisia. KKO on niin täynnä sidonnaisuuksia ja rakenteellista korruptiota, että tällaista päätöstä saattoi jopa odottaa.

Niille, jotka eivät ko. kirjoitusta ole lukeneet, niin Halla-aho toi esille kiistattomia

faktatietoja koraanista, jossa kerrotaan Mohammedin ja hänen HUOM! lapsivaimonsa elämästä. Koska koraania ei saa islamin mukaan kiistää miltään osin, teki Halla-aho loogisen päätelmän siitä, että Mohammed oli lapsista pitävä vanha mies=pedofiili.

KKO:n mukaan asiallinen kritiikki on kiihottamista ja uskonrauhan rikkomista.  
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:8 [ (163:167)] </ref>

Tämän tuomion valossa seuraava keskustelunaihe: ”Ruotsi ja USA haluavat internet-julkaisuvapaudesta ihmisoikeuden” on suorastaan ironinen. Nuo pykälät kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan ja uskonrauhan rikkomisesta tulisi kumota mitä pikimmiten. En näe miten niitä voidaan mitenkään puolustella minkään oikeushyvän turvaamisella. Kylä Suomessa pitäisi ottaa käyttöön sananvapaus.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:9 [ (177:177)] </ref>

Uskomaton tuomio, näin tehtiin yhdestä ihmisryhmästä tabu jota ei voi kritisoida.  
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:10 [ (188:188)] </ref>

Rehellisyys/totuus on suomessa ollut jo vuosia katoava luonnonvara.

Rehellisestä ihmisestä ei pidetä, kun valheilla ja vääryyksillä asiat halutaan eteepäin viedä.

Minkälainen tilanne olisi ollut, jos jonkun muun puolueen edustaja olisi kyseisiä asioita maininnut ;)?

Voi Suomen kansalaisia, sananvapaus ja vapaus yleensäkin :(.  
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:11 [ (223:229)] </ref>

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisu tarkoittaa käytännössä sitä, että tietyntyyppinen asioiden julkinen käsittely ja pohdinta on tästedes ennakkotapauksen perusteella laitonta. Ratkaisu on erittäin vakava ja voimakas isku sananvapautta kohtaan täysin siitä riippumatta, onko Halla-ahon kanssa asioista samaa mieltä - itse en ole.

KO:n ratkaisu kiirehtii kyseisen lainkohdan muuttamistarvetta, koska nyt vahvistettu uskonnollisten tuntemusten erityisuoja on selkeästi kansalaisten tasa-arvoisuuden periaatetta loukkaava. Sellaista pykälää tarvitaan ainoastaan pappisvaltaisissa maissa, Suomessa tarvetta ei ole.

Jussi Halla-ahon suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajiin on epäilemättä kielteinen, mutta ne kirjoitukset, joista nyt tuomio tuli, eivät olleet sananjulistusta vaan valtakoneistolle esitetty provosoiva kysymys siitä, kohdellaanko kaikkia väestö- ja näkemysryhmiä samalla tavalla. Korkein oikeus on nyt päättänyt, että ei kohdella.

Minusta KO:n ratkaisu on selkeästi Suomen perustuslain vastainen ja taannuttaa julkista keskustelua entistäkin varovaisemmaksi ja samalla heikentää myös asiallisen maahanmuuttokeskustelun käymistä.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:16 [ (333:339)] </ref>

Köyhtyminen ja hyvinvointivaltion alasajaprosessi tulee olemaan kivulias.

Oikeus kritisoida on ensimmäisten uhrien joukossa.  
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:18 [ (370:372)] </ref>

Hyvä päivää, kirvesvartta.



Keskustellaan sateista...  
 POLiittinen keskustelu on siis tyrehdytetty.  
 (Halla-aholla ja joillakin muillakin kirjoittajilla on ollut suoraan liitetiedostoja, mihin käsitys perustuu. Muhamedin ajoilta kertomuksia, mitä historia tai Koraani siitä kirjoittaa)

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:19 [ (407:410)] </ref>

Eipä taida vaikuttaa mitään. Äänestäjien pitäisi ehkä reagoida asiaan seuraavissa vaaleissa. Mutta jos äänestäjät ovatkin Halla-ahon kanssa samaa mieltä ?

Siinä on sitten ihmettelmistä varsinkin niille, jotka ovat KO:n kanssa samaa mieltä. Korkeintaan oikeus ei voi muuttaa ihmisten mieltä ja sitä mitä ihmiset ajattelevat. Tuomio voi vain painaa mielipiteet piiloon.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:21 [ (461:463)] </ref>

Länsimaissa on ymmärretty sananvapauden merkitys vakauden ja demokratian peruspilarina.

En tiedä ymmärretäänkö sitä täällä Länsivenäjällä koskaan.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:22 [ (531:532)] </ref>

Uskomaton tuomio, näin tehtiin yhdestä ihmisryhmästä tabu jota ei voi kritisoida.

Sananvapauden musta päivä.

Ellet ole huomannut, se on -nimen omaan- koko pointti. Suomalaiset syyllistyvät murhiin, raiskauksiin jne. Tämä on fakta. Mutta jos lähdet välttämään että ”Suomalaiset” ovat murhaajia ja raiskaajia niin kiihotat kansanryhmää vastaan. Ihmisryhmiä kokonaisuudessaan eivät istu minkään yksittäisen leiman alle, yksittäiset ihmiset sen sijaan voi olla vaikka mitään.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:24 [ (568:571)] </ref>

Vihreät naiset saivat nyt mitä halusivat. Alkakoon Käpylässä juhla ja riemu.

Meille muille tämä on häpeän ja murheen päivä, koska tämä on vasta alkua kohti vihreiden khmerien utopiaa. Halla-aho tuomittiin vanhan kiihotuspykälän mukaan, jonka muotoilivat sosiaalidemokraatit EU-kiimassaan 1990-luvun puolivälissä. Sen karumpi ja kammottavampi vihreä versio on ollut voimassa vasta vuoden, jolloin oikeusministeri Braxin kiristysehdotus kiihotuspykälään astui voimaan.

Kiihotuspykälä rikkoi jo alunperin sananvapautta, mutta nyt se on suorastaan tyranniaa.

Nykyisessä muodossaan tämä rikoslain kohta (13.5.2011/511) antaa valtaapitäville mahdollisuuden vainonta kaikkia toisinajattelijoita heidän mielipiteidensä takia.

”Joka asettaa yleisön saataville... mielipiteen..., jossa uhataan, panetellaan tai solvataan jotakin ryhmää ...uskonnon tai vakaumuksen perusteella.. on tuomittava”

Tätähän vihreät khmerit ovat kaiken aikaa tavoitelleet, koska kompostiyhteiskunnan tieltä on raivattava väkivalloin ne, jotka eivät astu hyvällä vihreään paratiisiin.

Vihreän lainsäädännön päässä kielletään kansalaisilta silmälasit ja poltetaan kirjat.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:26 [ (597:609)] </ref>

Uskomatonta!

Voin vain suositella seuraavaa kirjaa ”oikeusoppineillemme”:

- Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide  
 Samaa mieltä

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:28 [ (635:640)] </ref>

”Nyt vähän suhteellisuudentajua kehiin. Minkä ihmeen takia sananvapauden piirissä pitäisi olla uskontojen haukkuminen ja etnisiä ryhmiä vastaan kiihottaminen?”

Entä miksi sananvapauden piiristä tulisi sulkea faktojen kertominen?

”Ne joiden mielestä KKO nyt kieltää esimerkiksi uskontojen piirissä ilmenevän pedofilian käsittelyn pitäisi pysähtyä vähäksi aikaa miettimään omia mielipiteitään. Kummasti esimerkiksi YLE ja HS ovat onnistuneet uutisoimaan ja analysoimaan lestadiolaisliikkeen pedofilia-asioita asiallisesti ja ketään loukkaamatta ja tuomioita saamatta.”

Kyse oli kristillisten herätysliikkeiden toiminnasta. Niiden pimeiden puolien tuominen päivänvaloon on aivan oikein. Mutta miksi islam tulisi jättää kriittisen keskustelun ulkopuolelle?

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:30 [ (669:675)] </ref>

Tohtori Halla-aho tarvitsee nyt tukea.

Kaikki ne, jotka ovat valmiit taistelemaan sananvapauden ja kansanvallan puolesta yötötäkööt kupeensa. Tämä ei jää tähän, me emme myy sananvapautta vihreiden ja vasemmiston likaiselle alttarille.

Tohtori Halla-ahon tuomio on saatettava ihmisoikeus- ja sananvapausjärjestöjen tietoon kautta maailman. Tärkeintä on herättää Yhdysvaltain vapautta vaalivat yhteisöt ja muistuttaa millaisen maan kanssa he ovat Suomessa tekemisissä.

Lähetätkäämme tieto tästä päätöksestä kaikille sananvapauden ystäville ympäri maapallon pienintäkään järjestöä ja bloggaajaa unohtamatta. Muistakaamme viestittää tästä asiasta kaikille ja kaikkialla ketään unohtamatta.

Korkeimman oikeuden päätöksestä on heti myös valitettava Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuimeen. Varojen keräys oikeustoimia varten on aloitettava välittömästi.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:31 [ (685:693)] </ref>

Tietyistä asioista ei siis saa puhua niiden oikeilla nimillä ja totuudenmukaisesti. Hyvästi vapaa Suomi.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:32 [ (703:703)] </ref>

Korkein oikeus on lopullisesti menettänyt jonkun johdolla järkensä. Ensinnäkin se sekaantuu lainsäätämiseen sallimalla yksityisen sakotuksen ja nyt se sekaantuu uskontoon ja mielipiteenvapauteen määräämällä rangaistuksia mielipiteestä, perustellusta mielipiteestä.

Welcome North Korea and Sharia meininkiähän tämä on aivan selvästi.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:33 [ (713:715)] </ref>

Ei Halla-ahoa tämän takia kukaan politiikasta saa syrjään. Päinvastoin - kansa alkaa nyt havaita, että Tarja Halosen aikana Suomen oikeuslaitoksesta tuli sensuuritoimisto. Sananvapautta on nyt todella rajoitettu. Eduskunnassa lait säädetään ja muutosta lakeihin

tarvitaan, niin että tämä kyllä sataa persujen laariin. Veikkaan varsinkin Halla-aholle entistä suurempaa äänivyöryä seuraavissa vaaleissa.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:35 [ (744:744)] </ref>

Korkein oikeus osoitti jälleen täydellisen irtaantumisensa todellisuudesta. Tällä tuomiolla saatetaan sensuuri voimaan.

Halla-Ahon mielipiteistä voidaan olla montaa mieltä, mutta tosiasia on, että hän referoi noissa asioissa suoraan Islamin uskon perusteeksiin. Kuka tahansa voi lukea samat asiat Muhammedin kertomuksista.

Ja korkein oikeus myös sensuroi tieteellisen kommentoinin perimäasiassa. Evoluutio on tietessä tunnustettu asia ja sen perusteella on oikein väittää, että luonnossa tapahtuu sopeutumista ja se päättyy luonnonvalinnan kautta myös geeneihin.

Korkein oikeus sai nyt päätöksellään minut valitsemaan puolueen. Sensuuri ja suvaitsemattomuuspolitiikalle on tultava loppu!

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:41 [ (846:852)] </ref>

Korkein oikeus on lähtenyt mielipidesensuurin linjoille. Valittavaa koko kansakunnalle.

Halla-aho on kirjoittanut täyttä totta noista asioista. Suurin osa kansalaisista tunnistaa ja hyväksyy sen. Kansalaiset ovat suuressa määrässä Halla-ahon tukena tätä vastenmielistä ja väärää tuomiota vastaan,

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:44 [ (884:886)] </ref>

Sotket - kuten useimmat suomalaiset - kaksi perusoikeutta ja perusvapautta keskenään.

Yksityisen ihmisen kunnianluokkaus on rangaistava teko, eikä kenelläkään ole siihen nokan koputtamista. perustulain 10§:säsä on turvattu yksityisyyden suoja. Sitä ei voi toisella vapaudella, sananvapaudella, mielivaltaisesti loukata, vaikka myös sananvapaus on perustuslaissa turvattu sen 12 §:ssä..

Muutoin sananvapaudella ei ole tyyli- tai muotomääräyksiä - eikä mielipiteiden tarvitse olla tosia tai edes miellyttäviä.

Sitä vastoin uskonnot, ideologiat ja poliittiset aatteet ovat vapaissa demokratioissa vapaasti arvosteltavissa - tai anakin niiden tulee olla avoimen kritiikin piirissä. Myöskään kansanryhmät eivät tarvitse lain suojaa, vaikka yksityiset kansalaiset lain turvaa saavatkin.

Suomessa vihreät ja vasemmisto ovat rivosti loukanneet näitä periaatteita.

Rikoslain kiirhotuspykälä on viipymättä poistettava rikoslaista, koska se loukkaa länsimaisen sananvapauden pyhimpiä ja syvimpiä periaatteita. Luuletteko te hyväuskoiset, että vihreiden khmerien rajoitukset jäävät tähän. Tiedossa on tyrannia, jonka äärimmäisen ankaria kulutus- ja käytössääntöjä valvovat vihreät korttelipoliisit ja vihreiden naisten kantelukomiteat.

Siinä yhteiskunnassa ei ole väärää mielipiteitä.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:50 [ (993:1005)] </ref>

Halla-Ahon persoonaa/motiiveja sen kummemmin kommentoimatta myönnän olevani tuomioon todella pettynyt. Mitään muuta uskontoa tai kansanryhmää ei suojella oikeuskäytännössä näin. Islamin erityisasema ei voi perustua siihen että sananvapaus (joka kaikki muut ryhmät kestävät ja joka on länsimaisen yhteiskunnan kulmakivi) loukkaa muslimeita.

Islam kieltää kaiken koraanin tulkinnan ja profeetan elämä on asetettu ikuisen jäljittelyn kohteeksi. Tämä tarkoittaa myös seksin oikeuttamista 9-vuotiaan kanssa, minkä myös Islamin ns.oppineet ovat vahvistaneet. Mitä pedofilia on jos ei keski-ikäisen ja 9-vuotiaan välistä sukupuoliyhteyttä? Vai saako tät enää edes ääneen ihmetellä ilman että syyllistyy rikokseen?

Tuomio ei vastaa suomalaisten vallitsevaa oikeustajua. Häpeä KKO:lle.  
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:51 [ (1043:1047)] </ref>

Me olemme palanneet aikakoneella takaisin vuoteen 1966 (Hannu Salama, jos joku ei muista). Haluan sanoa kaksi asiaa:

- sananvapaus ei ole itsestäänselvyys. Sananvapauden puolesta on jatkuvasti taisteltava
- Suomi on menossa kovaa vauhtia takaisin Impivaaraan. Tätäkö äänestäjät todella halusivat?

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:4 [ (67:69)] </ref>

Eipä nykymaailmassa enää pystytä ihmisiä ennakkosensuroimaan. Sensuurin päivät on netin myötä nähty. Jos seuraat maailman menoa niin kyllä se sananvapauden puuttuminen alkaa olla nykyään enemmän rangaistuksen pelko joka seuraa varomatonta puhetta kuin kyky hallita viestin kulkemista. Harvassa on enää ne maat joissa median kontrollilla viestin välittämistä pystytään estämään niinkuin 80-luvulla tai ennen sitä.

Minusta tässä tapauksessa ongelmana ei ole se etteikö yksilö olisi vastuussa sanoistanaan. Ongelma on se että ainakin minä ymmärsin tekstin kritiikkinä illmanian vastaan, sekä kritiikkinä yhteiskunnallisen keskustelun tilaa, jossa vähemmistöistä ei voida puhua negatiiviseen sävyyn edes tilastojen kanssa sanoen että esittää ne omana mielipiteenään.

Kun yhteiskunnassa estetään tuollainen keskustelu, miten ongelmista voidaan keskustella? Jättämällä ulkopuolelle kokonainen kansanosia joka kokee ongelman isompana kuin muu osa kansasta. Mielestäni juuri tämä käytös on suurin tekijä siinä että perussuomalaiset saivat jytöksä. Vaikka täällä keitetään paljon nurisematta niin joskus tulee raja vastaan, pahoin pelkään että tällä tahdilla edessä on suurempi jytky tulevaisuudessa.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:27 [ (626:630)] </ref>

Koska meillä ei ole perinteitä kovassa, mutta asiallisessa keskustelussa, meidän on hyväksyttävä erilaiset ylilyönnit - roiskuu, kun rapataan. Tätä kutsutaan harjoitteluksi, josta toivottavasti seuraa oppimista. Rujoudestaan huolimatta persut - ja Halla-aho - tekevät merkittävän palveluksen Suomelle pakottamalla keskustelua pois mukavuusalueelta.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:29 [ (733:733)] </ref>

Suomessa uskonrauhan rikkomisesta voi saada rangaistuksen vaikka kirjoituksen perusteella jossa arvostellaan uskontoa, ei sen harjoittajia ja ilman mitään näyttöä mistään tapahtuneesta, ainoastaan silkoista olettamuksista syyttäjän puolelta.

Sen lisäksi on uskonrauhan pykälää muutettu ja tuomio perustui tähän jälkeinpäin tehtyyn muutokseen taannehtivasti.

Kysymys on, miten tämä voi olla mahdollista demokratiassa? Retoorinen vastaus on että sen ei pitäisi olla mahdollista.

Näinollen on mielenkiintoista saada tietä mitä Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuim ajattelee asiasta koska sen tehtävänä on juuri tutkia yksilö vastaan valtion instanssit. ja voi toimia prejudikaattina Suomessakin tulevaisuudessa niin että vallan väärinkäyttö vähe-  
nee.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:35 [ (937:941)] </ref>

Kiitokset minultakin Juhani Mykkäselle, jonka kirjoitus asettaa asian johonkin suhteeseen sekä vallankäyttöön että poliittiseen järjestelmään. Vallanjaon teoriahan ei tee korkeimman oikeuden jäseniä vähemmän epätäydellisiksi ihmisiksi. Kyllä myös heidän ratkaisunsa kumpuavat juridiikan lisäksi muista lähteistä, kun ratkaistavana on tällainen tulkinnanvarainen asia.

Myös Mika Illmanin lausuma (lipsahdus?) antaa perusteita pitää KO:n ratkaisua eettisesti kiistanalaisena, vaikka siitä ei juridisesti voikaan valittaa. Itse tuomiota (pienet sakot) tärkeämpää on käynnistynyt kansalaiskeskustelu, joka toivottavasti johtaa KO:n käyttämän lainkohdan muuttamiseen. Uskonnolliset tunteet eivät tarvitse erityistä suoje-  
lua, mutta vihapuheelte täytyy antaa tarkemmat määritelmät.

Sananvapauden täytyy sisältää oikeus kirjoittaa myös huonolla maulla ja typerästi. Sananvapauden ei kuitenkaan pidä sisältää oikeutta käydä sanallisesti toisen ihmisen kimp-  
puun solvaamisen tarkoituksessa. Laki ei saa olla niin tulkinnanvarainen, että Halla-ahon saama tuomio on mahdollinen tulevaisuudessa.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:38 [ (1102:1106)] </ref>

### OPS pair 3 (Hirvisaari):

#### “Are only neo-populists their brothers’ keepers?”

##### Delegitimizing public story: *it’s the party’s fault*

Vieläkö Soini yrittää selitellä risaa seulaansa jollain tavalla? Näitä ”yksittäistapauksia” ilmenee jo sen verran taajaan, että kyse ei voi olla vitsistä tai sattumasta, ellei koko puolue ole pelkkä vitsi.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:5 [ (104:104)] </ref>

En vieläkään muuten edes ymmärrä miksi perussuomalaiset eivät irtisanoudu näistä kunnolla, hehän vetävät heitä vain koko ajan alaspäin ja vauhdilla.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:6 [ (124:124)] </ref>

Hirvisaari otti heti perussuomalaisten poliitikkojen suosiman kiusaamiskortin käyt-  
töön.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:8 [ (135:135)] </ref>

Eikös se ole jo toinen tapaus parin viikon sisään kun on perussuomalainen lapa pys-  
tyssä arkadianmäellä?

Kohta on aika Soinin tai Ruuhonen-Lernerin aika taas avautua julkisuudessa että  
meillä on sitten nollatoleranssi julkisuudessa tehtyihin natsitervehdyksiin. Lapa pystyyin  
sitten vasta kotona jos siltä tuntuu.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:13 [ (191:193)] </ref>

Ei se mitään, Soini kyllä ymmärtää, median vika oikeastaan, jne. jne.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:14 [ (203:203)] </ref>

Niin, tämä mystinen S. Lehtohan tuon yhdistämisen teki. Media vain raportoi mitä hän on tehnyt. Kuitenkin tuolla sivullaan samassa yhteydessä tervehdyksensä kanssa kissankokoisin kirjaimin toittottaa Halla-Ahoa. Pitäisikö median vaieta?

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:15 [ (215:215)] </ref>

Niin sitä pitää! Kyllä on James kivoja vieraita kutsunut eduskuntaan. Lehtoa sekopäisempää henkilöä ei ole kovin helppo löytääkään. Pisteet myös kotiin välittömästi ajojahti-kommentista. Tuo mukavasti tämä persujen meininki mieleen Kreikan Kultaisen aamunkoiton natsisekoilun.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:26 [ (363:363)] </ref>

Nyt vellihousu-Soini esiin puskesta jo esittämään kantansa tähän tempaukseen. Kohta saattaapi nimittäin tulla jo joku hakemaan, jos ei itse ymmärrä tulla.

Aika pitkään tätä meininkiä nyt katsellaan maltilla. Kyllä muu poppoo jaksaa olla perussuomalaisia kohtaan suvaitsevaisia. Hatun nosto toki sille.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:33 [ (472:474)] </ref>

EU-parlamentissa perussuomalaisten edustaja kuuluu ”Vapaa ja demokraattinen Eurooppa” ryhmään, joka istuu täysistunnossa äärimmäisenä oikealla. Suomen eduskunnassakin PersS-puoluen kansanedustajat pitäisi panna istumaan sinne minne ne oikeasti kuuluvat: äärioikealle.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:36 [ (521:521)] </ref>

Ei teitä persuja näköjään tarvitse erikseen leimata - te teette sen viikottain ihan itse. Mitä tulee noihin loppuihin roska-puheisiin, niin ne ovat taas yksi esimerkki taktiikasta osoittaa sormella muualle kun pitäisi ottaa kantaa itse asiaan. Jotain rotia - mielikuvitusvääntämien ja valheiden viljely ja toisten leimaaminen säälittävillä irvikuvilla on lapsellista - ottaisitte vastuutakin vaihteeksi, edes vähän.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:39 [ (568:568)] </ref>

Eiköhän nämä perussuomalaisten tempaukset jo ala riittää. Ensin kyseenalaisessa Heteropride-tapahtumassa Perussuomalaisten Jani Viinikainen teki natsi-terveydeksen niinikään Eduskunnan kulmilla ja nyt tämä.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:44 [ (639:639)] </ref>

Mitä yrität sanoa? Että Lehto halusi vain tervehtiä Eduskuntaa ilman mitään natsi-taka-ajatuksia ja nyt persuja taas oikeudettomasti lyödään sen takia?

No, jos usko persujen mantrat siitä, kuinka he eivät muka ole natsipuolue, tai että takinkääntömoottori Soini on rehellinen ja luotettava poliitikko, niin kai tämä menee sillä samalla nieläisellä. Mutta jos teidän uskonne on näin vahvaa, niin käyttäisitte sitä mieluummin johonkin hyödylliseen. Vaikka vuorten siirtämiseen tai vetten päällä kävelyyn.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:47 [ (718:720)] </ref>

On todella ikävää ja melkein pelottavaa huomata kuinka moni ihminen vain innostuu näistä perussuomalaisista tempauksista. Heille se on sitä ainoa oikeaa toimintaa.

Soini ja kumppanit saavat tehdä mitä tahansa ja tämä porukka kannustaa innoissaan. Ymmärtämättömät ja muista kaikkeen syyt etsivät katkerat ihmiset ovat saaneet oman puolueen.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:48 [ (732:734)] </ref>

Voisi olla aika seurata Kreikan esimerkkiä ja tehdä Perussuomalaisille se, mitä Kreikka on tehnyt Kultaiselle aamunkoitolle. Muutama pahin ”pilailija” oikeuteen ja koko puolueen määrittäminen järjestäytyneeksi rikollisuudeksi. Pääsisi noistakin idiooteista.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:49 [ (744:744)] </ref>

Eiköhän nyt ole sopiva hetki ottaa Halla-ahon europesti jäistä ja panna se roskiin. Suomella ei ole varaa siihen, että meitä edustaa sellaisen puolueen jäsen, jonka parlamentaarikot kutsuvat natsiyhtyneeksi eduskuntaan.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:51 [ (786:786)] </ref>

Eiköhän koko kansalle ala käydä selväksi, minkä tyyppinen puolue PS oikeasti on. Ei kai ”yksittäistapauksia” voi loputtomiin tulla..? Halla-Aho, Hirvisaari, Hakkarainen, Eerola, Immonen jne. jne.

Ei savua ilman tulta, PS joukossa on valitettavasti useita edustajia, joiden mielipiteitä voi kuvata rasistiseksi. Ymmärtäisivät edes hävetä.

<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:58 [ (912:914)] </ref>

No kyllä yksi superhumortisti Suomen ”maahanmuuttokriittiseen” vitsipuolueeseenkin mahtuisi. Hänhän on itse sanonut olevansa vain ”maahanmuuttokriitikko”... ei siis rasisti tai fasisti.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:2 [ (21:21)] </ref>

Sitähän se on ollut tosiaan tuo perussuomalaisten politiikka, huonoa huumoria, ei mitään muuta. Pipo ei ole kiristänyt edes humalassa rikollisjengin kerhotoiloissa eikä missään muuallakaan.

Onneksi kun euroopan talousahdinko alkaa parin vuoden sisällä helpottamaan tämänkin puolueen populismille rakennettu pohja sulaa kokonaan pois. Muistoon jää vain kirkonhäpäisyvarkauksia, rukouskutsumölinöitä, populismia, natsihölmöilyä ja seitsemän miljoonan puoluetuilla ostettu kerrostalo-osake Helsingin keskustassa. Sitähän voi sitten vuokrata vaikka mille tutuksi tulleelle sakille.

Pahin skenaario on tietysti, että nämä pääsevät valtaan ja rampauttamaan koko suomen pysyvästi.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:6 [ (88:92)] </ref>

Mitenkähän tuo persujen ”humori” on aina natsiaiheista? Keksisivät välillä jotain muuta!

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:7 [ (105:105)] </ref>

Mitenkähän tuo persujen ”humori” on aina natsiaiheista? Keksisivät välillä jotain muuta!

Veikkaisiin että siksi, koska se uppoaa tiettyyn viiteryhmään. Aivan niinkuin rasismikin.

Hirvisaarihan oli myös kieltäytynyt erottamasta avustajaansa ällöttävien hihamerkkiajatusten vuoksi.

Ajatus (ei vielä toteutunut sellainen) Hirvisaaren erottamisesta syntyi haitanteosta puolueelle kokonaisuutena. Sellaista kuvaa ei tullut, että natsitervehdys sinällään olisi erottajien mukaan jollain tapaa ongelmallista.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:9 [ (132:137)] </ref>

Kukapa perussuomalainen poliitikko ei olisi kokenut joko täydellistä oikeusmurhaa tai silmitöntä ajojahtia viattoman huumorin vuoksi.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:16 [ (274:274)] </ref>

Luultavasti Hirvisaarta ei erotetakaan, tässä nyt on vaan menossa sellainen populistimirulianssi, että nyt muka tuli mitta täyteen. Muutaman viikon palkallinen loma tiedossa. Aikaa kirjoitella blogiin samalla tutulla poljennolla.

Hirvisaari tuo perussuomalaisille paljon arvokkaita ääniä. Äänillä saa seitsemän miljoonan puoluetuet. Soini tietysti päättää milloin on enemmän haittaa kun hyötyä.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:17 [ (290:292)] </ref>

Timo Soinista ei koskaan tiedä. Hän asettaa omilleen kaikenlaisia vaatimuksia, rajoja ja kynnyksiä, joilla ei sitten tosipaikan tullen ole mitään merkitystä, koska kaikki hänen puolueessaan määrittänyt hänen itsensä kulloistenkin tulkintojen mukaan.

Sellaista demokratiaa. Yhden miehen puolue.

<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:19 [ (342:344)] </ref>

### Legitimizing public story: goes against neopopulist cause

Hirvisaari se tekee hartiaivoimin hommia uskottavuuden lisäämiseksi. Seppo Lehto?

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:3 [ (10:10)] </ref>

Eikös tämä Seppo Lehto ole sama mies, joka jo vuoden 2007 eduskuntavaalien alla teki kaikkensa estääkseen maahanmuuttokriitikoita pääsemästä eduskuntaan? Veikkaan, että hän on vihervasemmiston agentti.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:4 [ (43:43)] </ref>

Hirvisaari on koonnut näistä pelleistä oman hovinsa. Hitler-naamari päässä natsitervehdystä tehnyt ex-persukin kertoi ostaneensa naamarit Hirvisaaren järjestämiä juhlia varten. Seppo Lehto kävi jo aikaisemmin Hirvisaaren vieraana ja Hirvisaari mainosti vierailua kuvien kera Twitterissä.

Seppo Lehto tekee omaa pientä myyräntyötään julkaisemalla sottablogeja. Vuoden 2007 vaaleissa niistä kärsi aina Teemu Lahtinen. Nyt sitten Halla-aho. Hirvisaari ei persuista puolueena tai yksittäisistä maahanmuuttokriittisten kärkinimistä mitenkään piittaa. Tärkeintä on koota ympärille sottahovi, jossa sitten kukin vuorollaan, myös Hirvisaari itse, heittää paskaa persujen päälle.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:5 [ (48:50)] </ref>

Mun mielestä Hirvisaari joutais Perussuomalaisten / Soinin puhutteluun ja hetkelliselle virkavapaalle eduskunnasta.

Itse en pidä Persuja natseina, vaikkakin myönnän, että tällaista ääriajattelua löytyy joissakin puolueen yksilöjäsenissä. Joka puolueissa on omat ääriajattelijansa. Itse näen Perussuomalaiset ainoastaan isänmaallisena työväen puolueena, sotiemme veteraanien hengessä.

Hirvisaari kuitenkin luo väärää mielikuvaa puolueesta. :facepalm:

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:6 [ (60:64)] </ref>



Hirvisaari ja kuka tahansa joka kimpustaa tamperelaista sananvapauden marttyyria on täysin älykkäpiö tai maksettu myyrä. Kumpi tahansa syy niin ulos perussuomalaisista heti! :facepalm:

Jos tuo pelle on ryssinyt sceneä 90 - luvun alusta asti niin eikö ole täysin selvää että myös sen kaikki kaverit toverit ovat älykkäpiöitä tai maksettuja myyriä , mulle on vitun sama kumpi itse artisti on, työurasta päätellen aito prekaari ja siis kommarien vakaumuksellinen myyrä.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:7 [ (83:85)] </ref>

Juuri tällainen idiotismi pilaa niiden keskustelut, jotka haluavat käydä asiallista dialogia. Paras tapa karkottaa myös äänestäjiä ja äänestäjiksi aikovia.

Mikä pahinta, niin tällainen saa kenet tahansa kukkakatun vaikuttamaan fiksummalta. Sitten taas ihmetellään kun keskustelut jäävät keskusteluksi keskustelijoiden luonteesta.

HS ja kaikki odottavat hattu ojossa näitä tapauksia, joita muistellaan aina kun maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa kritisoidaan. Sitten vielä näiden odotus palkitaan mitä ihmeellisimmillä hölmöilyillä.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:11 [ (138:142)] </ref>

Miksi pitää ehdoin tahdoin antaa lyömäaseita lehdistölle. Kaikki julkisuus ei ole hyvää julkisuutta. En oo kyllä Hirvisaarta pitänyt minään aikoihin, mutta nyt tais vetää kyllä pohjat... Seppo Lehto :facepalm:

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:15 [ (166:166)] </ref>

Mistään vahingosta tässä ei voi olla kyse. Lehdon kutsuminen oli varmasti harkittu juttu ja Hirvisaaren näkökulmasta aivan perusteltua toimintaa. Hirvisaari tarkastelee case Lehtoa sananvapauden näkökulmasta. Eduskuntatalossa hailaava seppo on hänen mielestään oiva keskisormi 'mukasuvaitsevaiselle' vihollisleirille. Se on myös hänen mielestään epäilemättä merkittävä kannanotto sananvapauden puolesta, jokainen eduskuntatalon portailla syyspäivään kajahtava Sieg Heil -edustaa hänelle parempaa maailmaa.

Vaikea uskoa, että persuissa laajemmin jaettaisiin tätä katsantokantaa. En millään voi uskoa muiden kansanedustajien olevan yhtä puusilmäisiä ja fanaattisia. Uskon ja toivon, että tämä oli nyt Hirvisaaren viimeinen tempu persuna.

Kiitos ja näkemiin.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:18 [ (197:201)] </ref>

En ole täydellinen ihminen, enkä sovellu kivien heittäjäksi, mutta uskon kuitenkin kahden vuoden aikana oppineeni olemaan tarjoilematta jatkuvasti helppoja.

Siksi minua harmittaa niin tavattomasti tällainen. Kaikki tietävät, miten maailma reagoi, jos tekee x. On ihan sama, missä kulmassa käsi on, tai mikä on kyseisen käsitervehdyksen alkuperä tai oikea nimi. Natsitervehdys on natsitervehdys, sellaiseksi se ymmärretään, eikä sillä edistetä yhtään mitään asiaa. Paskaa siitä kyllä roiskuu kaikkien lähellä seisovien päälle.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:19 [ (207:209)] </ref>

Nyt on ihan pakko kyllä sanoa, että mitä vittua Hirvisaaren päässä on liikkunut, kun

on kutsunut Sepin vieraakseen eduskuntaan.. ei helvetti sentään. Pitäisi kyllä ymmärtää ettei tuosta seuraa mitään hyvää.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:21 [ (228:228)] </ref>

Ei ju\*\*lauta! Nyt hiljainenkin mies kyr\*\*\*\*tyy.

Siinä meillä on kaksi varsinaista vatipäätä.

Hirvisaari kutsuu tampereen eduskuntaan viittoilemaan ja sitten ihmettelee kun Hesarin käyttää tilaisuutensa hyväkseen ja iskee samantien 0-0 -tilanteesta lukemat kuuteen nolloon, jonka jälkeen peliaika päättyy.

Ja Halla-ahokin saatiin kammettua tähän mukaan tuon blogin kautta.

Piti vielä klikata Hesarin sivuille tämän takia mitä en ole tehnyt kuukausiin.

Sattuu päähän, sattuu niin saa\*\*nasti.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:22 [ (233:243)] </ref>

Jos kuva ei olisi hänen ottamansa, niin kiertelisivö hän tuolla tavalla? Minä ainakin sanoisin: ”en ottanut sitä.” Minusta kansanedustajalta tulee edellyttää jotain kunnioitusta eduskuntaa kohtaan. En tiedä paikkaa (ehkä Synagoogaa lukuun ottamatta), jossa natsi-tervehdys sopisi huonommin.

Riippumatta siitä, pitää itse natsismia coolina vai ei, poliitikolta voi edellyttää enemmän tilannetajua ja tekemiensä päätösten seurausten arviointia. Jos ei ymmärrä tällaisen seurauksia, niin miten voisi ymmärtää erilaisten lakien seurauksia?

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:25 [ (280:282)] </ref>

Palvelee taatusti kukkahattujen ja virhestallarien etua. Taitaa olla Soinin paikka reagoida asiaan. JHA jo teki sen asiallisesti.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:26 [ (299:299)] </ref>

Hyvä, käyttäkää sitä sananvapautta, perkele. Näillä eväin nousuun.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:28 [ (332:332)] </ref>

Herra James potkukelkka, ja muutama muukin pellepersu, näyttää tekevän kavereidensa kanssa kaikkensa että persujen jytky sulaisi.

Ja kyllähän se tällä menolla sulaa, mitään konkreettista ei olla saatu aikaan, kunhan pelleillään, mokaillaan ja nostetaan isoä liksaa...

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:30 [ (399:400)] </ref>

Typerää tosiaan tehdä tälläisiä temppuja. Ylipäättään kannattaisi jättää trollit pois katsomasta, koska iso yleisö ei näe tälläisissä asioissa mitään vitsiä. Saati sitten että tuossa toimintatyylissä ylipäättään olisi mitään järkeä.

Hyvin on saanut Hirvisaarikin olla puolueessa ja saanut hankittua mediatilaa. Vaikka edustaa aikamoista ”ääriajattelua”.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:34 [ (468:470)] </ref>

Maahanmuuttokritiikki ei ole mikään vitsi, jolla performanssitaiteilijat kuten Lehdon Sepi ja Ron Paul voivat mielin määrin rahastaa ja pelleillä. Jos asioita oikeasti halutaan paremmalle tolalle, kuten oletan tällä foorumilla kirjoittelevien haluavan, tukea tulee osoittaa järkeville ja uskottaville tahoille, kuten tohtori Halla-aholle. Tällaisten, oman

ilmoituksesi mukaan itseäskin hävettävien, tahojen minkään sortin tukeminen, fanittaminen tai muu vastaava ”vitsillä vaan” heiluttelu ei edesauta yhtään mitään paitsi sarven soturien asiaa. Ajattelisit joskus.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:36 [ (499:499)] </ref>

Kaiken huipuksi zeimssi olisi todennäköisesti mennyt läpi niin että heilahtaa kun olisi aivan älyttömimmät mölinät, hitlernaamiot ja hailailut pitänyt poissa julkisuudesta. Siis olisi mennyt PS listalta, joltain suomi-isämmää listalta ei todellakaan mene eikä tule harmistus tästä ei.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:37 [ (509:509)] </ref>

Ja jos Hirvisaari on tarkoituksella jaellut paskaa ympäriinsä, niin varsinkin silloin olisi aika sanoa hyvästit.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:38 [ (516:516)] </ref>

Vähän nuorempien jotka eivät sotta-sepen juuria tunne kannattaa ehdottomasti lukea tuo juttu. Sepe on miinoittanut kämysceneä jumalauta jo neljännesvuosisadan häpäisten kaikkia niitä jotka ovat joutain tehneet ja laittaneet itseään likoon asian eteen!

Jos joku ei tätä tajua niin pois vaan perussuomalaisista.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:39 [ (528:530)] </ref>

Saisi herra Soini sanoa Erkki Kaleville että olet loppukaudeksi erotettu Perussuomalaisista. Ja tietenkään et ole ehdolla ensi vaaleissa. Tilanne voi muuttua vain ja ainoastaan jos et enään sekoile, ja pystyt näyttämään että äly riittää asiallisten asioiden läpivientiin. Elikkä perussuomalaisissa jatkamisen ehdoksi se että pystyy itse nostamaan jonkun aidosti tärkeän asian tapetille, ja saamaan siihen muutosta. Eduskunta ei ole oikea paikka kylähullutteluun.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:40 [ (535:535)] </ref>

Vaurioiden minimoiseksi Hirvisaari pitäisi erottaa eduskuntaryhmästä loppukauden ajaksi ja sulkea hänet pois PS:n ehdokaslistoilla. Hirvisaaren hölmöilyt ovat aiheuttaneet vakavaa häitää perussuomalaiset- puolueelle ja maahanmuuttokriitikoille muutenkin. Arvatkaa, kuka jatkossa mediassa esitellään perussuomalaisen ja maahanmuuttokriitikon arkkityyppinä. Soini toimikoon tässä asiassa jämäkästi.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:41 [ (547:547)] </ref>

Sepe perseilee ja törttöilee aina, kaikki tietävät sen. Miksi kansanedustaja kutsuu sellaisen henkilön eduskuntaan?

Tämähän on nyt vähän kuin sanoisit, että Suomen maahanmuuttopolitiikka ei ole syyppää Suomen mamuongelmiin.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:44 [ (604:606)] </ref>

Hirvisaari Sepon sinne eduskuntaan toi ja James tietää hyvin, että Seppo roomalais-tervehcii ihan missä vaan. Seppohan on hauska huumoriveikko ja mukava persoona, mutta voisi olla sekoittamatta perussuomalaisia millään tavalla huumoriinsa.

Nyt jos koskaan olisi tilaisuus potkia Hirvisaari pihalle persuista. Tätä sekoilua on katsottu jo liian pitkään.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:45 [ (623:625)] </ref>

tietysti se on Herra Lehdon vika että hän koittaa hiekoittaa mamukriittisten töitä, ja samoitin Erkki Kalevilta sen verta ajattelematon teko että äijä saa ettiä uuden puolueen

jossa perseillä.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:47 [ (700:700)] </ref>

Pitäisi antaa vaikka ei olisi ottanutkaan kyseistä kuvaa. Hirvisaarelle pitäisi antaa mahdollisuus tulla takaisin vain ja ainoastaan sillä että näyttää kykynsä olla hyödyksi puolueelle.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:49 [ (732:732)] </ref>

James Hirvisaari on kykyjensä ylärajoilla toimiva henkilö, jonka ”kyvyt” eivät ole viimeaikoina ainakaan tuoneet Perussuomalaiselle puolueelle ns.positiivista näkyvyyttä.

Kaikkia ei tarvitse miellyttää, mutta tällaisten irtopallojen antaminen vihervasemiston lekaksi on jo anteeksiantamatonta.

James Hirvisaari Seppo Lehdon eduskuntavierailusta Facebook -profiilissaan: James Hirvisaari: Sepistä tulisi aivan LOISTAVA opas eduskuntaan!

...niin, mutta tuleeko James Hirvisaaresta aivan loistava toisen kauden kansanedustaja?

Seppo Lehto on kuin Pekka Siitoin, hauska kylähullu ja tietynlainen pienempiin naurunaihe. Kumpikaan em.henkilöistä ei kuulu uskottavaan politiikan tekoon.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:51 [ (795:799)] </ref>

Hirvisaari voisi nyt perustaa ihan oman puolueen. Puoluetukia ei kai yksittäinen loikkari saa viedyksi mukanaan (?) mutta kai hän jotain kansliamäärärahoja saisi. Ilman perussuomalaisia hänen huomioarvonsa laskenee huomattavasti.

Muutoin alkaa kyllästyttää nämä kohut niin paljon että toivoisin joka kylähulun maalaavan paikat täyteen hakaristejä ja heiluttelevan kättään, että noilta symboleilta katoaisi kaikki taianomaisuus.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:52 [ (821:823)] </ref>

Vetää kyllä sanattomaksi.

En tiedä mikä tässä on ideana tai taustalla, mutta tietynlaista harkintaa olisi voitu käyttää.

Onko nyt sitten niin että, Hirvisaari kokee olevansa vain vastuussa kannattajilleen / äänestäjilleen. Jos tilanne on tosiaan sellainen, niin jatkossakin on odotettavissa toimintaa, joka on vahingollista puolueelle ja muille perussuomalaisille.

Henkilökohtaisesti tulen tarkastelemaan mm. fb:n kaverilistaa ja tekemään sinne muutoksia.

Tämä kortti on nyt nähty ja kevyeksi todettu.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:53 [ (828:835)] </ref>

Todella ikävää, että yksi ja sama henkilö jatkaa suoraan tai välillisesti tällaisten myyräntöiden tehtäviä. Olen nyt täysin vakuuttunut, ettei Hirvisaarella ole aikomustakaan muuttaa käytöstään. Hänellä on selvästi noussut kusi päähän ja kaikki, jotka kritisoivat hänen toimintaansa ovat ”punavihermädättäjiä”. Hän hakee nyt arvostusta ainoasta paikasta, josta voi sitä enää saada eli Lehdon kaltaisilta hurlumhei-veijareilta. Sieltä löytyy selkään taputtelijoita, jotka kiittävät Hirvisaarta hänen ”suoraselkäisyydestään” ja ”lahjomattomuudestaan”. Ainoa järkevä toimenpide hänen suhteen on eduskuntaryhmästä loppukaudeksi tai määräämättömäksi ajaksi erottaminen.

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:54 [ (840:840)] </ref>

Hirvisaari vaikuttaa myöhäiskeski-ikäiseltä mieheltä, joka olisi omiaan neljäkym-

mentä vuotta nuorempana lähimmän ostoskeskuksen kiljuskini -jengin isoimpana kundina.

Kuinka palvelee Perussuomalaista puoluetta tuoda tamperelainen ”kylähullu” miesliiveissään tekemään natsitervehdyksiä maan parlamenttiin?

Toisaalta Puhkasika -lehti on Tampereelta, onko tässä vaihtoehtokulttuurin ilmentymä?

Tuskin.

James Hirvisaari puolustaa oman tulkintansa mukaan sananvapautta, ja näkee salaliittoa kaikkialla, ja kaikissa jotka arvostelevat hänen toimintaansa. Suuri osa ihmisistä näkee Hirvisaaren toiminassa vain harkintakyvyn ja tilannetajun puutetta, sekä huonoa käytöstä.

Tämä ei varmastikkaan auta vaaliurnilla?

<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:57 [ (883:889)] </ref>

## OPS pair 4 (Halla-aho): “The system is certainly rigged – but for or against neo-populists?”

### Delegitimizing public story: we must oppose racism

Mikä takia pykälät kansansyhmää kiihottamista varten pitäisi kumota? Emme me ihmiset ole niin hyviksi muuttuneet, etteivätkö kansanmurhat voisi taas toistua. Minusta naiivi ajatus...

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:15 [ (295:295)] </ref>

Nyt vähän suhteellisuudentajua kehiin. Minkä ihmeen takia sananvapauden piirissä pitäisi olla uskontojen haukkuminen ja etnisiä ryhmiä vastaan kiihottaminen?

Niissä Halla-ahon kyseenomaisissa kirjoituksissa luki mm. että somaleilla on joitakin erittäin kielteisiä geneettisiä erityispiirteitä. Tällaiset kirjoitukset eivät ole mitään rakentavaa kritiikkiä maahanmuuttopoliitikasta vana täyttä humpuukia.

Ne joiden mielestä KKO nyt kieltää esimerkiksi uskontojen piirissä ilmenevän pedofilian käsittelyn pitäisi pysähtyä vähäksi aikaa miettimään omia mielipiteitään. Kummasti esimerkiksi YLE ja HS ovat onnistuneet uutisoimaan ja analysoimaan lestadiolaisliikkeen pedofilia-asioita asiallisesti ja ketään loukkaamatta ja tuomioita saamatta.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:25 [ (583:587)] </ref>

Tuossa lausunnossa onkin aivan oleellinen ero Halla-ahon kommentteihin. Siinä kohdistetaan kritiikin kärki sinne, mihin sen kuuluu osoittaa eli radikaaleihin islamisteihin.

Halla-aho sen sijaan lähtee teksteissään yksittäistapauksista ja laajentaa ne muutamien tieteelliseltä näyttävien - mutta ainoastaan siis siltä näyttävien - sanankääntein koskemaan kokonaisia kansanryhmiä, kansallisuuksia ja koko valtaisa uskontoa. Lisäksi hän pudettelee tekstinsä lomassa näistä kansanryhmisä erilaisia halventamiseen tähtäviä ilmauksia.

Kokonaisuus on samanlainen kuin mikä tahansa vihapropaganda sellaista menneisyydessä ja nykyäänkin harjoittavissa poliittisissa kulttuureissa. Tuomio on aiheellinen. Sananvapaus oikeusvaltiossa ei ole anarkiaa.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:27 [ (621:625)] </ref>

Oikea tuomio. Ei mennä takaisin toisen maailmansodan aikaisiin rotuoppeihin, ei hän, Jussi. Suuri osa somalien ongelmista johtuu ennen kaikkea tiettyjen kantaväestön edustajien mustavalkoisista asenteista. Suurin osa täälläkin kommentoijista tuskin on ikinä edes tutustunut yhteenkään somaliin, ja asiantuntijatiedot tästä väestöryhmästä otetaan valikoivasti iltapäivälehtien lööpeistä. Kyllä hävettää olla suomalainen tänä päivänä.

<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:42 [ (862:862)] </ref>

Eiköhän tämä Halla-ahon oikeuskäsittelykysymys ole kohta jo loppuunkaluttu ennen seuraavaa lain uhmaamista, jos KKO epäonnistuu tapakouluttajan tehtävässään?

Kuitenkin näin maallikkona väitän, että kansanryhmä ei ole suomalaiset mutta Suomessa asuvat somalit ovat, jonka toivoisi menevän rasismia viljelevän kansanryhmän tietoisuuteen.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:9 [ (173:175)] </ref>

Sitä paitsi: mitä jos Kalevan väite suomalaisten kännissä tappamisgeeneistä olisi käsitelty ruotsinsuomalaisia, ja se olisi esitetty ruotsalaisessa sanomalehdessä?

Suomen oikeus ei olisi silloinkaan käsitelty.

Minustakin ilmiselvä vastaus toiseen kysymykseen lienee, että vähemmistö ja siis heikommassa olevat tarvitsee suojelua.

Lieneekö siinä mitään ihmeellistä.

Miksi esimerkiksi sosiaaliturva ja varansiirrot ovat olemassa?

Eikö se ole niitä varten jotka eivät ole pärjänneet yhtä hyvin kuin varakkaammat??

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:10 [ (190:199)] </ref>

-En tiedä maallikon ”silmästä”, mutta kyllä kai sen vähintään 99% kansalaisista ymmärtää, että nämä lait on tehty vähemmistöjen suojaksi.

Asia on itsestään selvä, kun tutkitaan lainvalmistelun taustaa, ihmisoikeussopimuksia ym. Kansallisuudesta puhuttaessa ei mainita erikseen persuille selkokielellä, että ”tämä koskee vähemmistöjä”, kun kaikki muutkin kohdat ovat selväsanaisesti vähemmistöjä koskevia.

Ylipäättään naurettavaa vaatia, että esim 50 henkilön turvapaikanhakijan ryhmää saisi solvata samalla tavalla kuin suomalaisia. Enemmistön solvaamiskielto vaatisi 500 000 sensoria ja tuhat oikeudenkäyntiä päivässä.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:11 [ (214:218)] </ref>

KO otti huomioon mitä Halla-aho oli aikaisemmin sanonut eli mitä Halla-aho halusi tekstillään sanoa ei suoraan mitä tekstissä luki. Mielestäni oikea tulkinta eli mennään tekstin sisään ja katsotaan kuka sen kirjoittaa ja mitä sama kirjoittaja on aikaisemmin sanonut. Kontekstilla on merkitystä. Jos minä sanon somalialista jotakin on se eri asia kuin jos Katainen sen sanoo tai Halla-aho.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:13 [ (246:246)] </ref>

Salama ei liity tähän mitenkään, mutta Hitlerin Saksa ja keskitysleirit liittyvät.- Kun siis tutkii hieman sitä taustaa, miksi näitä kiihottamisykäläiä ja uskonrauhanrikkomisykäläiä alettiin ottamaan käyttöön sodan jälkeen.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:16 [ (312:312)] </ref>

Mitäs jos maallikko pohtisi vaikka seuraavaa: Mikäli suomalainen arvioi kriittisesti suomalaista, osoittaen mielestään suomalaisille ominaisia, epätoivottuja piirteitä, on vaikea nähdä kyseessä olevan kiihottamista kansanryhmää kohtaan, harva kiihottaa ketään itseään vastaan. Lähin termi voisi olla itsekritiikki. Näin myös, mikäli somali arvioi kriittisesti somaleja. Sen sijaan mikäli suomalainen tekee näin somaleja kohtaan, tai vaihtoehtoisesti somali suomalaisia kohtaan, voi eräiden muiden ehtojen täytyessä olla kyse myös kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan.

Näin on KKO erittäin hyvin argumentoiden arvioinut tässä tapahtuneen. Mitään kaksoisstandardia ei tässä kyllä voi nähdä, ei oikein kovasti yrittääsäänkään.

On kovin hankala kuvitella, että KKO olisi suhtautunut tähän jotenkin kevyesti, tai tarkoitushakuisesti. Kun päätöksen ja sen perustelut lukee, on kovin vaikea olla yhtymättä siihen, että päätös on lain- ja johdonmukainen. Jos joku on sitä mieltä, että se ei ole oikeudenmukainen, on kyseessä kokonaan eri asia. Tällaiseksi lainlaatija on tämän asian KKO:n viimeisen sanan mukaan laatinut ja se on ratkaisu, johon on tyytyminen. Perustellustikin.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:18 [ (361:363)] </ref>

Oh hoijaa.

Suomalainen on enemmistö. Kaikki tästä poikkeavaa on vähemmistöä.

Siksi, koska enemmistöä on 99% kansasta ja 1 % vähemmistöä.

Keksikää jokin muu kiusaamisen kohde - vaikkapa vain alkoholismi, mutta aih, se on niin \_yleistä\_ ja melkein yksi piirre suomalaisissa - kaljan ihannoiminen - että harvemmin suomalainen tuntee, että häntä loukataan, sillä hän tietää, että maailmakin tietää, että suomalaiset juovat. Jos lähdän tässä erottelemaan ketkä eivät juo alkoholia, niin siinä olisi yhdelle ihmiselle vähän vaikeuksia, koska mistä \_erotan\_ nyt ne alkoholia juovat? En mistään. En tiedä yhtikäs mistään kuka meistä suomalaisista juo ja kuka ei.

Mutta annas olla kun ihovärlitään erilaista ruvetaan soimaamaan ja haukkumaan, että aivan kuin Suomessa ei olisi riittävästi jo rasismia, niin ei tämmöistä jaksa katsoa.

Jopa me jotka emme juo alkoholia olemme turvassa alkoholismin syytökseltä, sillä enemmistö tietää, että enemmistö harvoin tarttuu puukkoon ja viinaan, mutta se, että vähemmistö, joka on muutenkin enemmistöstä poikkeavaa, lisätään vielä lisää ennakkoluuloja kehiin viitaten heidän erilaisuuteen etnisesti, on raukkamaista rasismia.

Olen tyytyväinen KKO:n tuomioon, mutta olisi saanut antaa kovemman rangaistuksen. Suomea syydetään lepuista rangaistuksista, että jos nyt sieltä Euroopan Ihmisoikeuden tuomareilta tulisi se kovempi rangaistus? Vaikkapa kovempi sakko € tai ehdollinen?

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:19 [ (376:388)] </ref>

Partamooses ja monet muut tykkäävät sekoittaa sananvapauden siihen, ettei sanoistakaan tarvitsisi vastata. Sananvapaus tarkoittaa ennen kaikkea vapautta ennakkosensuurista. Kukaan ei ennalta sensuroinut Jussi Halla-Ahon blogimerkintää, hän sai kirjoittaa sen vapaasti ja tehdä itse valinnan sen julkaisemisesta.

Sananvapaus on tärkeä arvo. Yhtä tärkeä on oikeusvaltion periaate, ja yksilön vastuu omista teoistaan. Lainkohta kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan on nyt ajankohtais-

empi ja tärkeämpi kuin koskaan aiemmin, kun vähemmistöryhmiä on otettu tähtäimeen korkeimmalla poliittisella tasolla. Kuten kolumnisti arvelee, enemmistöä ei tarvitse suojella. Vähemmistöjä tarvitsee - enemmistöltä.

Sen sijaan laki uskonrauhan rikkomisesta lienee jo nähnyt relevantteimmat päivänsä.  
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:20 [ (401:405)] </ref>

Jos on 100 ihmistä, 99 suomalaista ja 1 somali ja sanotaan, että suomalaisissa on juoppoja - on 1/99 mahdollisuus että solvataan tiettyä henkilöä. Mutta jos sanotaan, että somalit ovat varkaita, ei liene vaikea yksilöidä ketä tarkoitetaan. Siinä se pieni ero.  
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:23 [ (504:504)] </ref>

Se mikä jää kuitenkin tässä huomaamatta on että Hallavuo käyttää hyväkseen blogikirjoituksessaan tätä Kalevan toimittajan tekemää virhettä. Hallavuo on hakemalla hakenut tällaista tekstiä. Kun se löytyi hän pääsi tekemään iskunsa: koska toimittaja on kiukuspäissään kirjoittanut ilkeästi omista heimoveljistään on oikeutettua kaikille esittää arveluja muista ihmisistä perustuen heidän edustamaansa kansanryhmään.

Maallikkona olen sitä mieltä että ihmisen leimaaminen sen perusteella mihin kansanryhmään hän kuulu on edelleenkin epäoikeudenmukaista.  
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:34 [ (919:921)] </ref>

Kyllä laki on kaikille sama. Ei somalikaan saa kiihottaa kansanryhmää vastaan ja kansanryhmällä tarkoitetaan vähemmistöjä. Suomalainen ei taas saa Ruotsissa kiihottaa ruotsinsuomalaista kansanryhmää vastaan.

Luulisin että hommalaisillakin olisi eri ääni kellossa, jos he olisivat kokeneet itse rasismia ja syrjintää, kuten monet suomalaiset ovat kokeneet Ruotsissa ainakin pahimpaan ”En finne igen!”-aikaan.

Ei siitäkään niin kauaa ole kun Rasbiologiska Institutet piti suomalaisia suurimpana uhkana ruotsalaisen rodun puhtaudelle. Avioliitoista varoitettiin. ( suomalaisen kallo on ylhäältäpäin katsottuna pyöreä, kun se ruotsalaiselle on pitkulaisempi. ns pitkäkalloinen rotu-pyöreäkalloiset)  
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:37 [ (1046:1049)] </ref>

Jos suomalainen kirjoittaa suomalaisille leimaavastikin suomalaisista, kyseessä ei ole kansanryhmää vastaan kiihottaminen, vaan ryhmän sisäinen itsekritiikki. Jos suomalainen kirjoittaa leimaavasti ulkomaalaisista suomalaisille, kyseessä ei voi olla ryhmän sisäinen itsekritiikki, mutta sen sijaan kyse voi olla kansanryhmää vastaan kiihottaminen. Tällä ei ole mitään tekemistä sen kanssa, kumpi ryhmä on enemmistö.

Jotta olisi olemassa kaksoisstandardi, pitäisi näyttää, että joku somali tai muu ulkomaalainen on saanut kirjoittaa yhtä leimaavasti suomalaisista kuin Halla-aho on kirjoittanut somaleista ilman tuomiota.

Vähän ihmetyttää, että Mykkäselältä ovat tällaiset perusasiat hukassa.  
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:41 [ (1155:1159)] </ref>

Hyvä Juhani,

Olet ymmärtänyt Halla-ahon retoriikan totaalisen väärin. Kyseessä ei ole sarkasmi vaan raaka rasismi. Olet valinnut artikkeliksi Halla-ahon teksteistä yhden lauseen ja osoitat mielelläsi tuntevasi sen kontekstin KO:n jäseniä paremmin. Lukeneena ihmisenä tiedät varmasti myös sen, että Halla-aho on luonnehtinut somelejä myös Afrikan sarven ihmisistaastaksi. Maltaan tuskin odottaa, miten seuraavassa kommentissasi osoitat tämän



luonnehdinnan leikillisen luonteen.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:42 [ (1209:1210)] </ref>

Yhdenvertaisuus lain edessä ei tarkoita että tuomioiden tulee olla samanlaisia. Yhdenvertaisuus on sitä että sekä ”somialialaiset että suomalaiset” asetetaan samanvertaiseen asemaan. Myös Halla-Aho tietää sen erittäin hyvin. Hmmm.

Asetetaanpa Halla-Aho ja auttavasti suomea puhuva Suomen kansalainen (somali) samasta rikoksesta lain eteen. Halla-Aho ymmärtää täysin mistä on kysymys: Somali -suomalainen ei. Jotta oikeus toimisi perustuslain ja oikeusvaltion periaatteiden mukaisesti ovat Halla -Ahon ja somali-suomalaisen oikeuskäsittely ”hiukan” eri asioita.

Perusteet siihen löytynevät lain tulkinnan ohjeista.

Halla-Ahon tempot ovat pelkästään rasistista kikkailua.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:43 [ (1260:1263)] </ref>

Niin, että mitä minä nyt sanon lapsille? Että rasistista vihapuhetta saa levittää, jos se on ”vain täky”? Että kiusata saa, jos sen tekee sarkastisesti? Vaikea näin maallikkona pysyä yleisen mielipiteen mukana, kun se kovenee (sekä maan pinnalta loittonnee) sellaista vauhtia, että heikommat kyydistä putoaa...

Sen minä jo kerroinkin lapsille, että kansanryhmät koostuvat oikeista ihmisistä. Osaavat sitten vastata, kun opettaja kysyy. Sen ne jo tiesivätkin että oikeat ihmiset ovat lihaa ja verta, eivätkä nettiprovoa. Liittyisiköhän tuo päätös jotenkin siihen?

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:44 [ (1276:1278)] </ref>

Oikeusistuin ei tuomitse ketään vaan sen asiana on antaa oikeussuojaa. Suojaa annetaan - ja pitää viran puolesta antaa - tietysti sellaiseen suojaan oikeuttavalle, joka on jäänyt, tai katsotaan jääneen, sitä paitsi. Koko asetelma aukeaa millaiselle maallikolle tahansa, kun selvitetään kulloisenkin oikeussuojan kohteet.

Uskonrauhakysymyksessä oikeussuojan kohde on ihmisten uskonnollisuus, ”hartaat tunteet”. Niitä - eli ”hartaita tunteita” - on jo vuosisadat katsottu hyväksi suojella toisaalta kansakunnan turvallisuutta luovan kulttuuriperinteen vahvistamiseksi, toisaalta yksityisen pienen ihmisen esim. pahoissa ongelmissaan Herraansa tukeutumisen antaman lohdun vuoksi. Ei suojan kohde ole mikään juutalais-kristillinen Jumala tahi esim. arabi-kulttuurin Allah. Eivät he pienten ihmisten suojaa kaipaa; ajatus on absurdi ja melkoisen sopimatonkin.

Kiihottamispöykälän yhteydessä oikeussuojan kohteena on historian todella karujen opetusten - ja myös esim. filos. Nietzschen ajattelun - antama tietoisuus ja kokemustieto siitä, että keskuudessamme on aina ihmisiä, joilla on taipumuksia etsiä kaunan ja vainon kohteita usein itseään heikommista, mm. vähemmistöistä. Taipumus yrittää alistaa ”säilyttääkseen itse henkisen ryhtinsä”, kuten Nietzsche asian kuvasi. Näitä kohteita - joilla ei juuri koskaan ole mitään osaa eikä arpa kohteeksi joutumisestaan ja, jotka valitettavan usein ovat naisia ja pieniä lapsia - pyritään suojelemaan. On kiellettyä julkisella esiintymisellä vahventaa, ”kiihottaa”, tällaisten vainoon taipuvaisten kielteisiä tunteja, joiden piiriin todellisen olemassaolon on siis historiamme opettanut.

<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:48 [ (1422:1426)] </ref>

### Legitimizing public story: *game is rigged against us*

No, nyt ainakin tietää varmasti, että suomalaisista saa esittää tuon tapaisia väitteitä, mutta somaleista ei.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:1 [ (34:34)] </ref>

Pitää kyllä ihmetellä miten KKO:lla meni noin kauan päätöksen tekemiseen. Kauanko kului aikaa itse käsittelyyn ja päätöksen välillä? En muista enää.

Mutta aika jännä että tuota ei ole vielä muutettu asianomistajarikokseksi, eli että loukatun pitäisi itse vaatia korvausta jos havaitsee tulleen loukatuksi.

edit:

Niin joo tässähan onkin vaalit tulossa sopivasti, niin sehän olikin hyvä syy että tämä poliittinen oikeudenkäynti saatiin valmiiksi. Nyt kun suomalaisista saa sanoa jotain mitä muista ihmisryhmistä ei saa, on kaksoismoraali oikein juridisesti vahvistettu. Lisäksi voidaan tästedes loputtomasti viitata siihen että mikä kauhea vihakirjoittelija Jussi onkaan.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:2 [ (42:47)] </ref>

Oikeuslaitos on vihervasemmiston hallussa ja se on avoimesti suomalaisvastainen. Uskontojen kritisoinnista ja kaksoisstandardien paljastamisesta ei ole tapana rangaista länsimaaisessa sivistysvaltiossa.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:10 [ (347:347)] </ref>

Täytyy nyt ruveta kasaamaan tältäkin palstalta kristinuskon pyhinä pitämiä asioita herjaavia kirjoituksia. Niitähan riittää. SDP:n edustajan eilisen lausunnon, että kaikki uskovaiset ovat mielisaita voisi kansallisesti julkaistava Uutispalvelu Uusi Suomi vaikkapa poistaa heti ja tehdä siitä myös itse rikosilmoituksen kyseistä SDP:n edustajaa ja itseään vastaan :)

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:11 [ (354:354)] </ref>

Aivan käsittämätön päätös. Tämä kiistatta osoittaa, että on olemassa kahdet standardit. KKO:n päätös on mielestäni merkittävä rikkomus tasa-arvoa kohtaan.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:12 [ (366:366)] </ref>

Korkeimman oikeuden tulisi nyt toimia loogisesti ja tuomita Islamin haditheja levittävät uskonrauhan rikkomisesta sekä sanomalehti Kaleva kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan.

Valitettavasti korkein oikeus on lähtenyt epärehellisuuden tielle.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:13 [ (371:373)] </ref>

Suomessa on lainvastaista ainoastaan tietyn uskonnon rauhan rikkominen ja tiettyä kansanryhmää vastaan kiihottaminen.

Vai oletko nähnyt viime aikoina paljonkin tuomioita kristinuskon uskonnonrauhan rikkomisesta ja suomalaisia vastaan kiihottamisesta?

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:16 [ (526:528)] </ref>

Ei pidä paikkaansa. Odottelen syytettä halustani paskantaa kolehtihaaviin.

Ei tuo tosiaan johda mihinkään kokuun, suntio vain siivoaa paskat pois ja joku mummo järkyttyy, jos näkee lehdestä lukea pienen präntrin.

Mutta paskannahan moskeijan portaille tai käy heittämässä siankylyns oviaukosta peremmälle moskeijatiloihin: silloin voit ylpeästi sanoa jo tehneesi jotain!!

Raamatun heittäminen tai kolehtihaaviin paskominen ei ole mitään, siksi sellainenkin hyttely kuin Jari Tervo uskalsi Raamatun heittää.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:17 [ (540:547)] </ref>

Lakien rikkominen ei ole mitään sanavapautta.

Noin sanoi myös inkvisitio Galileille.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:18 [ (554:557)] </ref>

Suomalaisia vastaan kiihottaminen (leimaamalla geneettisesti determinoiduiksi kannirihujiksi) ei kuitenkaan ole tuomittavaa vai? Ainakaan mitään seuraamuksia Halla-ahon parodioimasta alkuperäisestä tekstistä ei tullut.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:19 [ (567:567)] </ref>

Kuka tekee rikosilmoituksen Kalevan alkuperäisestä pääkirjoituksesta? KKO on selvästi eri linjoilla kuin JSN, eli ei ole väliä mitä osaa ”vihapuhekirjoituksesta” kirjoittaja itse pitää totena, jos siinä väitetään että kansanryhmällä on jokin ”halveksuttava piirre”.

Näin ollen Kalevan (ilmeisesti tyyppillisesti nimettömäksi jäänyt nimettömiä nettikirjoituksia vastustavaan valtamediaan kuuluva pääkirjoitustoimittaja, koska nimeä en ole missään nähnyt ja kirjoitus itse on poistettu Kalevan sivuilta) suomalaisiin suuntautuneesta vihapuheesta pitää siis oikeuslaitoksen myös rangaista sakolla, jotta maassa kansalaiset olisivat perustuslain 6 § 1 mom. mukaisesti yhdenvertaisia lain edessä. Oikeastaan sakkoo ankarampaa rangaistusta puoltaa moinen vihapuhe laajalevikkisessä tiedostusvälineessä verrattuna kunnallispoliitikon yksityiseen henkilökohtaiseen blogiin.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:21 [ (708:710)] </ref>

Oletko nähnyt paljonkin viime aikoina suomalaista kansanryhmää kohtaan kriteerit täyttävää kiihotusta tai laissa tuomittavaa kiristinuskon uskonrauhan rikkomista? Ja jos olet nähnyt, niin onko mainituista tapauksista nostettu syyte?

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:27 [ (804:804)] </ref>

Et ilmeisesti ole lukenut Halla-ahon alkuperäistä kirjoitusta, sillä siellähän se esimerkiksi on. Jussin kirjoitus oli nimenomaan vastaus samantyyliiseen, suomalaisista tehtyyn kirjoitukseen. Sama mikä on sallittua sanoa suomalaisista on kiellettyä sanoa somalaisista.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:28 [ (881:881)] </ref>

Tämä koko juttuhan lähti Kalevan pääkirjoituksesta, jossa samoja sanoja käyttäen herjattiin suomalaisia. Kaleva tai pääkirjoittaja ei saanut syytettyä eikä tietenkään tuomioita. JHa näki tämän kaksoisstandardin olemassaolon, ja päätti näyttää sen toteen. Tänäään korkein oikeus todisti hänen olevan oikeassa. Suomalaisesta saa mainita ominaisuuksia joita ei vähemmistöistä saa. Terveisin 50 päiväsakkoa senkin ajatusrikollinen.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:29 [ (892:892)] </ref>

Halla-aho viittasi kirjoituksessaan ([http://halla-aho.com/scripta/muutama\\_taky\\_illmanin\\_mikalle.html](http://halla-aho.com/scripta/muutama_taky_illmanin_mikalle.html)) juuri sellaisiin tapauksiin, jotka eivät olleet johtaneet mihinkään seurauksiin: katso esim. Kalevan pääkirjoituksen sanamuotoa, ja huomaat, että Halla-aho on pyrkinyt nimenomaan osoittamaan asiassa vallitsevan kaksoisstandardin. Tätä kaksoisstandardia hän kritisoi, ja Suomen vasemmistolaisesti politisoitunut ”oikeuslaitos” on nyt vahvistanut tuon kaksoisstandardin olemassaolon.

<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:30 [ (902:902)] </ref>