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An Examination of Schiller's concept of harmony:
with special reference to the use of the word
"Harmonie" in the philosophical writings.

Presented by

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An Examination of Schiller's concept of harmony: with special reference to the use of the word "Harmonie" in the philosophical writings.

Many recent studies have examined Schiller's use of language within his philosophical essays. S.S.Kerry has suggested that certain words appear here as "concept-myths" - that is, they stand for a complex system of ideas and bear several associations at once. In this thesis it is contended that the word "Harmonie" is one such "concept-myth".

Although the word had been part of the German language since the time of Frauenlob, it was not used widely until the 18th century, when the ideas of Leibniz and Shaftesbury began to be reflected in popular philosophical writings. Schiller extended the use of the word by seeing in the ideas which he felt to be implied by it in its musical sense an analogue for his own concept of the ideal human personality.

This thesis does not undertake to examine every example of Schiller's use of the word "Harmonie", but it is shown that, in the philosophical essays, he uses the word to cover both various agreements between the different sides of the personality and various relationships between the personality and the outside world. There are three types of agreement within the personality (intuitive, moral and counterfeit) and corresponding to these are three harmonious, or seemingly harmonious, relationships between the personality and the outside world, each one of which has its own political and historical implications. Intuitive harmony (sinnlich) and moral harmony (moralisch) are truly harmonious states, whereas counterfeit harmony (falsch) is a compromised condition which may have dangerous consequences. The task of Art is to bring about true harmony in the individual and thus, by implication, in society. To strive towards true harmony is seen by Schiller as the task of each individual and the word "Harmonie" with all its implications thus becomes a code-word containing a guiding principle for all walks of life.

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Berlin. 1904-1906. 16 vols. (SA).

Appendix A.

Diagrams to illustrate the patterns of harmony analysed in Section B. Chapter III.

Appendix B.

Standardisation of references contained in the text of the thesis.

Apologia.*

Appendix B has been thought necessary because the edition of Schiller's works used throughout the text is not a well-known one. I have tried as far as possible, therefore, to give all references again in better known editions. Unfortunately, however, it was found impossible to put all these references in the text itself, so that from p.83 onwards the reader is advised to use the Appendix.

Spelling of quotations from Schiller.

An apology must also be given for the inconsistency in the spelling adopted in the quotations from Schiller. It had been hoped to standardise these and to adopt the present-day forms throughout, but unfortunately the typist was unable to undertake this. I have therefore altered the most glaring inconsistencies, but should like, at a later date, to complete the task.

* All the references to Schiller's works have now been standardised and are given as in
Schillers Sämtliche Werke. Säkular-Ausgabe.
Herausgegeben von E. von der Hellen. Stuttgart & Berlin. 1904-1906. 16 vols. (SA).

Appendix B has still been retained, so that the reader may also refer to NA if he wishes.

A. INTRODUCTION

I. General Introduction

In 1928 Hans Lutz¹ pointed out that, although research had been concerned with the details of Schiller's biography and with the problems of his dramatic and poetic work, the speculative essays had not been fully appreciated. Scholars had indeed tried to elucidate Schiller's aesthetic theories, but their conclusions had been unsatisfactory for two main reasons: the essays had either been studied by literary scholars who had no detailed knowledge of the 18th century philosophical background, or they had been examined by philosophers who had no idea of Schiller's literary development and no feeling for the peculiarities of his language. Among the former Lutz included the studies of Schiller's aesthetic theories by Berger² and Harnack³, both of whom he considered to remain "philosophisch an der Oberfläche".

(1) H. Lutz 'Schillers Anschauung von Kultur und Natur'. *Germanische Studien*. Berlin. 1928.

The works referred to by Lutz are as follows:

- (2) K. Berger. *Schiller*. 2 vols. Berlin 1906-1909.
" *Die Entwicklung von Schillers Ästhetik*.
Weimar. 1894.
- (3) O. Harnack. *Die klassische Ästhetik der Deutschen*.
Leipzig. 1892.

Among the latter he included works by Tomaschek,¹ Überweg² and Kühnemann³, who are all censured for neglecting certain details of literary scholarship. Close examination of the essays was, at the time of Lutz' article, extremely rare. Bertha Mugdan's⁴ study of the development of Schiller's philosophical thought is indeed mentioned by Lutz, but it is primarily concerned in assessing Schiller's relationship to Kant and also to Reinhold and Fichte. Lutz hoped that by tracing the development of Schiller's use of the words "Natur" and "Kultur" throughout the essays he would pioneer a new approach to the study of this side of Schiller's work.

Lutz called his work "eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung" and by his method he was able to isolate 19 different usages of the word "Natur" in Schiller's writings. His analysis also led him to the conclusion that Schiller constantly changed the names of his concepts and made no attempt to work them into a coherent system. "Es ist" he

- (1) K.Tomaschek. Schiller in seinem Verhältnis zur Wissenschaft. Vienna. 1862.
- (2) F.Überweg. Schiller als Historiker und Philosoph. Leipzig. 1884.
- (3) E.Kühnemann. Schiller. Munich. 1914
" Kants und Schillers Begründung der Ästhetik.
Munich. 1884.
" Schillers philosophische Schriften und Gedichte. Auswahl. Leipzig. 1902.
- (4) B.Mugdan. 'Die theoretischen Grundlagen der Schillerschen Philosophie'. Kantstudien. Ergänzungsheft. Berlin. 1910.

writes "als ob er die alten Begriffe vergessen hätte und daher gezwungen wäre, nach neuen zu suchen. Dabei steht sein Ideal ziemlich klar vor ihm, er besitzt aber nicht die Fähigkeit, es in ein philosophisches Begriffssystem einzukleiden. Das zeigt, dass er eben mehr Dichter als Denker ist".¹

Although Lutz indicated new paths for Schiller research, he himself did not perhaps fully appreciate the complexity of Schiller's purpose. He assumed that Schiller wished to expound a philosophical system. Hermann Meyer, however, has tried to show that, in his speculative essays, Schiller did not wish to use the rational language adopted by Kant -- a language which was directed towards the intellect or 'common sense' of the reader, but which did not in Schiller's view appeal to the imagination. As he believed that the ideas of reason could never influence the individual as a whole unless they were presented in a way which did appeal to the imagination, Schiller adopted, according to Meyer, a rhetorical language. Through such a medium Schiller hoped not to construct a philosophical system but to influence people to act in accordance with his ideas. Meyer suggests that the rhetorical style of the essays has been overlooked

(1) op. cit., p.278.

and calls, in a footnote, for a detailed stylistic analysis of them from this point of view. The date of his article¹ (1959) shows that very little had been done in this direction since Lutz' first challenge.

Kühnemann had already indicated the wide field that may be covered by any Schillerian concept. In his opinion the names Schiller gives to his concepts are often ill-fitting: they conceal, rather than clarify, the underlying thoughts. Kühnemann did nevertheless suggest that Schiller's importance lay in his psychological insight and in his ability to combine practical experience with philosophy. "Die völlige Verschmelzung der systematischen Begriffe und der Erfahrungen ist das Grossartige seiner reifen philosophischen Schriften" he says at one point.² Recently scholars have sought to investigate more thoroughly Schiller's psychological insight and, for some of them, the breadth of Schiller's terms, his ability to pack several layers of meaning under one word, has been his peculiar strength and fascination. Professor Wilkinson, for instance, has said that "if Schiller's terms are inexact, it is no

(1) H. Meyer. 'Schillers philosophische Rhetorik. Eine versteckte Entlehnung.' Euphorion. 53. 1959.

(2) E. Kühnemann. Kants und Schillers Begründung der Ästhetik. Munich. 1884. p. 97.

random inexactitude, if inconsistent, not an haphazard inconsistency".¹ The difference between Kant and Schiller, according to Professor Wilkinson, is that whereas Kant was trying to make a clear distinction between the several faculties of mind, Schiller was trying to illustrate "the dynamic interplay between the two fundamental aspects of human nature: sense and spirit, nature and freedom, finite and infinite, or however you like to call them".² Schiller's trick of constantly changing the names of his concepts is not seen by Professor Wilkinson as a weakness on Schiller's part, but as a method of deflecting attention "from the content of the concepts to the dynamic relations between them".³ By thus revealing (often with the aid of admirable diagrams) the nature of Schiller's use of language within one of his most important essays Professor Wilkinson has contributed to a deeper understanding of his thought. S.S. Kerry has suggested that, in his essays, Schiller is developing a mythology of concepts, whereby his concepts assume a semi-human identity. They are thus emotionally charged and capable of bearing several associations at once,

(1) E.M.Wilkinson. 'Some reflections after translating Schiller's letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man'. Schiller Bicentenary Lectures. London. 1960. p. 57.

(2) ibid., p. 59.
(3) ibid., p. 68.

and these associations must all be borne in mind if the essays are to be fully understood. "The bleak abstraction "Freiheit" is charged" he writes "with a quite abnormal potential and irradiates large associated areas".¹ Thus a more favourable interpretation of Kühnemann's criticism that Schiller's terms fit too loosely is revealed.

The peculiar nature of Schillerian terminology has also been explored recently by Olive Sayce. She has found that Schiller did not, as a rule, coin any new terms to express his philosophical ideas, but adopted instead words with already well-established connotations. The difficulty is, she continues, that Schiller by no means abandoned these already established connotations, and within his work words may be found to bear both their traditional and their specifically Schillerian senses. Indeed, they may sometimes bear both simultaneously. Mrs. Sayce discusses Schiller's varying use of the word "Natur" and distinguishes pre-Kantian, Kantian and post-Kantian stages. Seven different meanings of the word "moralisch" are also isolated. Mrs. Sayce also examines the words "naiv" and "sentimentalisch" and shows how failure to appreciate the different senses in which Schiller may use these words can lead to mis-interpretation. She concludes with these words: "Ziel einer sprachlichen

(1) S.S.Kerry. Schiller's Writings on Aesthetics. Manchester University Press. 1961. p.6.

Untersuchung muss es sein, die verschiedenen Bedeutungen eines Wortes aufzudecken, nicht um Schiller der Inkonsistenz zu beschuldigen, sondern als Vorbedingung für ein tieferes Verständnis".¹

In this thesis an examination of Schiller's use of the word "Harmonie" will be undertaken with this goal in mind. From this examination it is hoped to show that the word "Harmonie" bears for Schiller a variety of meanings, both traditional and Schillerian, all of which may nevertheless be inter-related, and that it assumes, too, the proportions of a concept-myth that offers us a guide for both our personal and our public lives.

In Grimm furthermore is the suggestion that the term "Harmonie" only began to spread around 1600. In order to appreciate the wide range of meaning that Schiller gives to this word, it is necessary first of all to consider its standard definitions and its previous history and usage. It may be found listed in Schulz-Basler as follows:

"Harmonie. F. 'Einklang'. Um 1600 aus lat. (griech) *harmonia eingebürgert*, zunächst als musikalischer Term in

(1) O.Sayce. 'Das Problem der Vieldeutigkeit in Schillers ästhetischer Terminologie'. Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft. 6.Jahrgang. 1962. p.176.

techn. (1) dann auch in übertragener Bedeutung. (2)." The earliest reference given in this dictionary is taken from the Thurneysser Onomasticon of 1583 and shows the strict technical use of the word:

"Thon vnd Klang oder Soni der Harmoniae". The form "armonie" was, however, known in the later Middle High German period and is listed in Müller as follows:

"armonie.swf.harmonie.wie die doene schoene loene schenken uz der armonien".

The example given is taken from Frauenlob's Unser vrouwen leich. The same example is also quoted in Grimm as the earliest recorded usage of the word in German. The technical usage of the word "Harmonie" in German can thus be said to date from about the time of the Meistersänger.

In Grimm furthermore is the suggestion that the form "Harmonie" only begins to spread after the revival of interest in the classics during the Renaissance and that it does not acquire widespread currency until the second half of the 18th century "wo es namentlich SCHILLER mit vorliebe braucht". In Grimm, too, the senses of the word are divided into the technical and the figurative as follows:

" 1) (von tönen und farben) die verbindung von einzelnen gleichzeitig angeschlagenen tönen zu einem wolklingenden ganzen, die woltuende anordnung der farben

und gruppen eines gemäldes.

- 2) das harmonisch klingend musikstück selbst.
- 3) in weiterer bedeutung zusammenstimmung, und zwar:
 - a) in ästhetischem, philosophischem, mathematischem sinne
 - b) in der gemeinen sprache des lebens zusammenstimmung, eintracht".

A fourth meaning of the word as a technical term of anatomy is also given, but as this sense does not occur in Schiller's work (although it might well have been known to him) it will not be quoted here. Under 1) are included the Pythagorean concept of a harmony of the spheres and certain other metaphorical usages. To illustrate these metaphorical usages the dictionary quotes Schiller several times: for instance, the line

"Ihr Leben ist die schönste Harmonie"
 which is taken from a very early poem Empfindungen der Dankbarkeit¹ is cited. The earliest figurative usage given in Grimm is taken from the Strasburger Kleiderordnung of 1628:

"(der unterschied der stände) ohn welchen auch die politische harmony inn gutem wohlstand sich nimmer mehr

(1) N.A. vol.1. p.12.1.38. S.A. vol.2. p.10.

befinden wird."

In Schulz-Basler there is an example of a still earlier figurative use from the year 1610. It is taken from Hippolyt Guarinoni's work Die Greuel der Verwüstung menschlichen Geschlechts:

"das menschliche Gemüht müsse ein Harmoniam, gleichsam
ein recht und lieblich zusammenstimmende Musicam inn sich
haben".

Here the development of the figurative sense from the technical can be clearly seen, and the relative newness of the word itself is shown by its Latin declension. The figurative use of the word to mean "Übereinstimmung des Willens, der Neigungen" is said in Adelung (1796) to be frequent, but, unfortunately, few examples of usage are given by this dictionary and it is thus not possible to ascertain from it exactly how far the word had extended its meaning by this time. (Words of foreign origin are not recorded in Campe, but it is perhaps worth noting that the use of "Übereinstimmung" to mean agreement of the inclinations is considered "uneigentlich"). The development of the usage of the word "Harmonie" during the 18th century is perhaps best indicated by August Langen, who writes that during this century musical metaphors came to be used with increasing popularity to express emotional or psychological states, and

among the words that now extend their meaning he cites "Harmonie", "Stimmung" and "tönen". Of "Harmonie" itself he writes "Von Fremdwörtern ist Harmonie am wichtigsten. Es findet sich schon seit dem 17. Jahrhundert in übertragener Bedeutung, wird aber im 18. Jahrhundert wohl mit besonderer Akzent gebraucht".¹ As an example of the extended use of a musical metaphor he quotes the following sentence from F.Jacobi's novel Allwill:

"Es stieg ihre Freundschaft in immer wachsenden Harmonien durch Misslalte--starke und kühne Auflösungen, zum reinsten Engels-gesang empor."²

According to Langen, the use of "Harmonie" to mean "das seelische Gleichgewicht des Einzelmenschen" is rarer, but he stresses the importance for the 18th century of the general concept of harmony. "Darüber hinaus ist Harmonie aus sehr alten Quellen fliessend ein wichtiger philosophischer und ästhetischer Begriff des 18. Jahrhunderts. Namentlich die Philosophie Shaftesburys wirkt hier: Harmonie als Grundgesetz des Weltalls, des Einzelmenschen und -auf ästhetischem Gebiet- des mikrokosmischen Kunstwerks".³ The

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- (1) A.Langen. 'Der Wortschatz des 18.Jahrhunderts' Maurer-Stroh. Deutsche Wortgeschichte. II. Berlin 1959. p.182.
 - (2) Quoted by Langen. op.cit. p.182. The reference given is to a fragment of the novel which appeared in the magazine Merkur. Merkur. 1776.11.17.
 - (3) Langen. op.cit. p.183. (Langen's notes)

word "Harmonie" may thus be said to be first used in German in the late Middle Ages as a technical term of music and to extend its meaning gradually during the Renaissance and post-Renaissance periods. Its figurative use in the sense of 'harmony of the personality' did not, however, become frequent until the 18th century.

As Langen indicates, the concept of harmony itself is very much older. Shaftesbury's ideas can undoubtedly be traced back to Greek sources, notably to Pythagoras and Plato. Indeed, the extension of the word "Harmonie" during the post-Renaissance period can probably be attributed to a revival of interest in these two authors.

The Greek word "harmonia" comes from a root meaning "to join". Guthrie tells us that it meant first of all "the joining or fitting of things together, even the material peg with which they are joined".¹ It then came to mean the stringing of an instrument because, Guthrie suggests, this process was seen as a method of joining the arms of a lyre. The word was then gradually transferred to the sounds made by the strings. Greek music was somewhat different from ours, and the New Oxford History of Music

(1) W.K.C.Guthrie. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol.1. Cambridge. 1962. p.220.

suggests that the meaning of "harmonia" in the musical sense in Greek times was "a musical idiom together with the sound it postulates". These tones (*tonoi*) were based on certain successions of notes held to be pleasing to the ear. Sometime during the 5th century B.C. Pythagoras is reputed to have discovered the mathematical relationship between the frequency of such notes. (Hence is derived the term 'harmonic progression' in physics.) In this way the word "harmonia" came to be associated in the Greek mind with the idea of an underlying order.

Pythagoras and his followers conceived the world, and indeed the Universe, as a single whole which displayed "an order in the relations of its component parts".¹ This order can also be seen in individual living creatures which we call organisms "to indicate that they have all their parts arranged and subordinated as instruments (*organa*) towards the end of keeping the whole being alive".² Hence each individual human being reflects in microcosm the principles of the Universe. Because, too, principles of mathematical order had been found to underlie the "*tonoi*" of music, number came to be regarded as the clue to the nature of all

(1) Guthrie. op.cit. p.207.
(2) ibid. p.207.

things and the harmony of music was seen as an analogy of both the individual and the Universe. To the Pythagorean school is also attributed the theory of the 'harmony of the spheres' a theory which, Guthrie says, is "perhaps the supreme example of the Pythagorean attempt to explain the whole vast cosmic plan by reference to the basic discovery of the founder: the all-pervading influence of, and ~~the~~ the intimate connexion between, the laws of mathematics and music".¹ According to this theory each planet emits its own particular note as it journeys through space and, because the distances between the planets were thought to be mathematically proportional, these notes form a cosmic harmony. The notion of the harmony of the spheres was a favourite one of both Renaissance and post-Renaissance writers. Shakespeare² refers to it several times; Goethe mentions it in the Prolog im Himmel³; and, as will be seen, it occurs quite frequently in Schiller's work. Whether or not these later writers shared the same concept of musical harmony as the Greeks is not an important question for the purposes of this thesis: for all of them the ordered movement

(1) Guthrie, op. cit. p. 295.

(2) cf. Merchant of Venice. Act V. sc. 1. 11. 60-65.

(3) cf. Faust. 11. 243-244.

(1) The Merchant of Venice. Translated by R. M. Coe/Ford, Oxford, 1950, p. 66.

(2) Ibid. p. 66.

of the cosmos finds its natural expression in musical terms.

The Pythagorean ideas were discussed and sometimes enlarged by Plato. He attaches great importance to harmony and rhythm, which are to be used in the education of the citizens of the Republic. "Rhythm and harmony" he says "sink deep into the recesses of the soul and take the strongest hold there".¹ The man who is thus trained to appreciate the ordered harmonies of music will grow to appreciate and desire harmony and order in all walks of life. Such an individual is the 'just man' who combines within himself the three principles of reason, desire and passion (that is, of mind, body and spirit) which Plato compares to the higher, lower and middle notes of the scale. The aim of the 'just man' is to maintain this harmonious condition in all his actions, "whether it be the making of money and satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state".² Thus the idea of a balanced combination of differing or even opposed qualities is added to the implications of the word "harmonia". The concepts of the harmonious personality and of the aesthetic education, which form the principal inter-related themes of Schiller's speculative essays, can thus be seen to be in a direct line of descent from Plato. ~~lopment~~

(1) The Republic of Plato. Translated by F.M.Cornford.
Oxford. 1941, p.88.

(2) ibid. p.139.

The works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) provide one of the mediums by which the Greek concepts of harmony outlined above were conveyed to the 18th century. For the English philosopher the Universe reveals itself as a harmonious whole, and the task of each individual is to re-create within himself that harmony which he sees reflected in the cosmic order. The harmony of the Universe may be discovered by the use of reason: Shaftesbury's own starting point is his observation of the natural world, in which he sees each individual species as ordained to contribute to the good of the whole creation (the fly to the spider, the male to the female, etc). The harmonious individual, for Shaftesbury, is one who can combine his "private" or "egotistic" desires or "affections" with his "public" or "altruistic" ones. There is a clear distinction in Shaftesbury's work between impulses which urge self-preservation and impulses which urge preservation of the species. These latter, in Shaftesbury's view, fall together in the human species with impulses which urge service to the community. His aim is to show that the two sets of impulses really coincide, that one's true self-good lies in the preservation and development of an ordered society. In combining public and private

"affections" the individual gives form to his life as an artist gives form to his work, and, as in artistic creation taste guides the artist in deciding what is relevant to the harmony of the whole, so too taste can be a guiding factor in deciding what is relevant to the harmony of practical life. Grudzinski considers¹ that here the source of all later 18th century attempts to formulate schemes for the aesthetic education of Man may be seen. Grudzinski also believes that Shaftesbury was the first to use the word "harmony" with reference to the inner life of the personality, and Shaftesbury certainly does speak of the "harmony of the affections"² and "the harmony of a mind".³ However, he can scarcely be said to use the word with very great frequency, but when he does it is interesting to note that there is very often a suppressed musical metaphor present. One example may perhaps be quoted:

"Tis a breach of the Harmony of publick Conversation to take things in such a Key, as is above the common Reach".⁴

- (1) H. Grudzinski. 'Shaftesburys Einfluss auf Chr. M. Wieland. Mit einer Einleitung über den Einfluss Shaftesburys auf die deutsche Literatur bis 1760'. Breslauer Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte. Neue Folge. 34. Stuttgart 1913.
- (2) Shaftesbury's Charackteristicks. 4th. ed., 1727. vol. 2. p. 434.
- (3) ibid. vol. 1. p. 207.
- (4) ibid. vol. 1. p. 76.

Grudzinski considers that Shaftesbury's great influence on 18th century thought springs from his desire to make philosophy a practical guide for everyone. (The sentence quoted above shows the very practical way in which he applied the principles of harmony to everyday life.) In England, Grudzinski believes, his ideas can be traced in Richardson's novels which, as is well-known, were later widely read in Germany. Shaftesbury's own writings were translated into German in 1745 by Spalding, and those of his disciples Hutcheson¹ and Ferguson by Lessing (1756) and Garve (1772) respectively. Garve's translation of Ferguson's Principles of Moral Philosophy is one of the few works known for certain to have been read by Schiller in his youth. It made a lasting impression on him and it is probably to this work that the similarity of some of his ideas with those of Shaftesbury can be traced. Ferguson himself hardly uses the word "harmony" at all, but in the main he follows Shaftesbury very closely, stressing that "if benevolence is understood to be an attribute of human nature, the laws of self-preservation and of society coincide in all their tendencies and applications".² The adoption of the dialogue

(1) Hutcheson's System of Moral Philosophy. 1755.

(2) Ferguson's Principles of Moral Philosophy. 3rd ed. 1785.
p. 111.

form by many of the popular philosophers in Germany can also, Grudzinski believes, be attributed to Shaftesbury's influence. Among the more important of these philosophers, as Schiller may have been acquainted with their works, are Sulzer (1720-1799) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Mendelssohn's Phädon in particular contains many interesting uses of the word "Harmonie". Here, once again, the figurative senses can be seen developing from the musical ones, as, for instance, in the following sentence:

"Ist nun die Musik eine Wissenschaft, das Schwache mit dem Starken, das Rauhe mit dem Sanften, und das Unangenehme mit dem Angenehmen in eine Harmonie zu bringen, so kann gewiss keine Musik herrlicher und vortrefflicher sein, als die Weltweisheit, die uns lehrt, nicht nur unsere Gedanken und Handlungen unter sich, sondern auch die Handlungen des Endlichen mit den Absichten des Unendlichen, und die Gedanken des Erdbewohners mit den Gedanken des Allwissenden in eine grosse und wundervolle Harmonie zu stimmen".¹

As a further source for the spread of the frequency of the word "harmony" during the 18th century the philosophy of Leibniz must not be overlooked. As an answer to the

(1) M.Mendelssohn. Phädon. National-Bibliothek der deutschen Classiker. vol.63. p.60. also cf. Gesammelte Schriften. Nach den Originaldrucken und Handschriften Herausgegeben von G.B.Mendelssohn. Leipzig, 1843-1848. vol.II. p.106.

question: How do the monads act on one another, if they are indivisible and incapable of being changed by an external force? Leibniz conceived the theory of the pre-established harmony, by which an action in one monad finds a corresponding action in another. This ultimately leads him back to a theory of the pre-established harmony of the Universe, so that for him, too, the Universe reveals itself as a harmonious whole. The agreements between Leibniz and Shaftesbury have often been pointed out.¹ Grudzinski quotes Leibniz as saying of Shaftesbury's work: "Il ne manque que mon harmonie préétablie, mon banissement de la mort et ma réduction de la matière ou de la multitude aux unités et aux substances simples".² It is interesting to note that, in explaining his theory, Leibniz uses the example of two choirs who, although unseen to each other, sing in harmony because the harmony is pre-established by the score they are using. Here again the musical connotation of the word is used to illustrate its philosophical application. The ideas of Leibniz were popularised, as is well-known, by Wolff (1679-1754) and were probably transmitted to Schiller in this form through his teachers at the Military Academy. Iffert considers it highly unlikely that Schiller knew the

(1) cf. E.Cassirer. 'Schiller and Shaftesbury'. Publications of the English Goethe Society. 1935.

(2) Quoted by Grudzinski. op.cit. p.17.

true philosophy of Leibniz and cites Schiller himself as admitting that, in his youth, he was not acquainted thoroughly with any philosophical system.¹ Wolff had restricted the idea of the pre-established harmony to that between the body and soul. The concept of a pre-ordained harmonious Universe could, however, have been transmitted to Schiller through the poetry of Uz (1720-1796) and Haller (1708-1777) both of whom he greatly admired. Again, these poets do not use the word "Harmonie" itself very frequently (Haller hardly at all) but several instances could be cited of lines describing harmony. Haller, for instance, writes:

"Die Welt ist selbst gemacht zu ihrer Bürger Glück.

Ein allgemeines Wohl beseelet die Natur,

Und alles trägt des höchsten Gutes Spur!"²

Of such poets Grudzinski writes: "Die metaphysischen Grundlagen liefert fast stets Leibniz, während Shaftesbury für den ästhetischen Grundton und den hymnenartigen Schwung der Gedanken verantwortlich zu machen ist".³ Both philosophers may be said to have sounded an optimistic note for the whole 18th century and their ideas may be considered

(1) cf. Iffert: Der junge Schiller. Berlin. 1933. p. 41 ff.

(2) A. Haller. Über den Ursprung des Übels. 11. 62-64. This poem also distinguishes clearly between self-interest and public good. 11. 113-160.

(3) op. cit. p. 18.

as 'Gemeingut' of the writers and thinkers of the period.

Many of the ideas outlined above will be found again in the works of Schiller. It is contended here, however, that in the course of his philosophical speculations Schiller extended the implications of the word "Harmonie" in a way that no previous writer had done. Firstly, by a detailed analysis of human action, he showed how the harmony between the various impulses in Man might be achieved and how the aesthetic education might be possible. At the same time he realised that the creation of harmony through taste is by no means as simple as Shaftesbury imagined it to be. Secondly he saw how the ideas underlying the word in its musical sense could provide a guide for every walk of life from the simplicity of a woman weaving in her cottage to the complexity of the modern state. Thus the word "Harmonie" will be found to have, for Schiller, profound musical, aesthetic, philosophical, psychological, political and social connotations and to be sometimes capable of bearing all these simultaneously.

Among the essays on the subject quoted by Emmy in my *Weits von Delberg entitled Blätter eines Romantikers in die Musik der Geister* (1787). Here

(1) Ritter, 'Lyrische Sprachmusikalität als Ästhetisches Problem der Romantik'. *Jahrbuch der deutschen Philologenwissenschaft*, 1956, p. 161.

II. Introduction to Schiller's concept of harmony.

Before a detailed examination of Schiller's use of the word "Harmonie" in the philosophical essays is undertaken, it might be first of all useful to consider his attitude towards harmony in the musical sense and to ascertain how he uses the word elsewhere in his work. R. Erny has shown that, between the years 1775-1800, the relationship of music and language was the subject of much enquiry. This enquiry was stimulated by Herder's essay on Ossian und die Lieder alter Völker, where the theory that poetry arose from folk-song is developed. Erny shows, much more clearly than does Langen, how, within this period, the word "Stimmung" broadens its meaning so that, by the end of the century, it has come to mean "die Zusammenstimmung (im musikalischen Sinne) der Geister und Seelen zu einer Gott wohlgefälligen Gesellschaft und eine seelische Zuständlichkeit des Menschen, hervorgerufen durch die gefühlsmässige Offenheit gegenüber sinnlichen Eindrücken, wie sie die Musik bewirkt".¹ Among the essays on the subject quoted by Erny is one by Fritz von Dalberg entitled Blicke eines Tonkünstlers in die Musik der Geister (1787). Here

(1) R. Erny. 'Lyrische Sprachmusikalität als ästhetisches Problem der Vorromantik'. Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft. 1958. p.141.

music is seen to reveal the laws on which all human relationships are founded. Erny quotes the following sentence: "In allen Verhältnissen des Menschen, zum Universum, zu Gott, zur Gesellschaft, zu sich selbst oder seiner inneren Natur handelt er nach Gesetzen der Tonkunst".¹ Dalberg is also quoted by Erny as saying: "Auch die innere Beschaffenheit und Regierung der Seele ist wahre Musik und gründet sich auf harmonische Gesetze".² These remarks are interesting in so far as they indicate a general attitude of the time and show how the Greek ideas outlined in Chapter I are echoed by 18th century writers.

Schiller's two most important statements on music are to be found in his notes on Körners Aufsatz über Musik (1795) and in his review Über Matthiessons Gedichte (1794). In the notes on Körner's essay he sees the specific appeal of music as its appeal to the sense of sound. The power of music lies in its ability to evoke certain patterns of sound which correspond to the patterns of our emotions, and for this reason music can exert such a powerful influence upon us. Much the same view is presented in the review of Matthisson's poetry. Here Schiller says that the aim of music is to

(1) Quoted by Erny. op.cit. p. 140.
(2) ibid.

present the form of our emotions or "die inneren Bewegungen des Gemüts durch analogische äussere zu begleiten und zu versinnlichen".¹ The harmony of music, or of any work of art, reflects a harmony of the inner self.

"Jene liebliche Harmonie der Gestalten, der Töne und des Lichts.....jene Stetigkeit mit der sich die Linien im Raum oder die Töne in der Zeit aneinander fügen, ist ein natürliches Symbol der innern Übereinstimmung des Gemüts mit sich selbst und des sittlichen Zusammenhangs der Handlungen und Gefühle, und in der schönen Haltung eines pittoresken oder musikalischen Stückes malt sich die noch schönere einer sittlich gestimmten Seele".² Schiller's own view of music would thus seem to echo the general sentiments of his time on the subject. A better idea of what he really understood by "Harmonie" in its musical sense may perhaps be obtained by examining one or two usages of the word. When Schiller uses the word in its strict musical sense, he has in mind either a combination of different notes or the progressive form of the musical work as a whole. Where a combination of notes is mentioned, it is always the resulting new whole that is stressed. In this new whole, each part is essential

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 454.
 (2) ibid. p. 455.

NA.vol.22.p.272.S.A.vol.16.p.258.
 NA.vol.22.p.273.S.A.vol.16.p.259.

to the others. For example, the eager young man in the poem Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais says:

"Nimm einen Ton aus einer Harmonie

.....

Und alles, was dir bleibt, ist Nichts, solang
Das schöne All der Töne fehlt".....¹

Amalia in Die Räuber and Ferdinand in Kabale und Liebe cite the example of a harmony between two notes in speaking of their loves. Amalia stresses the blending of the notes:

".....wie

Harfentöne in einander spielen

Zu der himmelvollen Harmonie".²

Ferdinand emphasises once again the indivisibility of their union:

"Wer kann den Bund zweier Herzen lösen oder die Töne eines Akkords auseinander reissen ?"³

Thus a process of synthesis, by which two parts form a new complete whole or organic unity is illustrated for Schiller by this similar process in music. In music, too, there is a further process by which the various single harmonies are combined into a complete piece. Here each fresh synthesis

1) S.A. vol. I. p. 208. II. 14-17.

2) S.A. vol. 3. p. 82. II. 10-12.

3) S.A. vol. 3. p. 309. II. 2-4. (zwoer)

is immediately followed by another: throughout the piece there is movement throughout time and yet, when the instruments cease to play, we feel we have been listening to a coherent work and not to an isolated series of chords. This process is sometimes likened by Schiller to a river, which is constantly flowing forwards, but which, to an observer, retains the same form.

"Mein Ohr umtönt ein Harmonieenfluss"¹
he says in the poem Die Erwartung, and in Die Künstler he forms the compounds "Harmonienbach" (1.299) and "Harmonienmeer" (1.307). The idea of incessant movement is also conveyed, in the poem Laura am Klavier, by the verb "wimmeln".

"Seelenvolle Harmonieen wimmeln,
Ein wollüstig Un gestüm,
Aus den Saiten....."²

Thus "Harmonie" in its musical sense suggests to Schiller both a synthesis, whereby a new whole is formed, and a synthetic process, whereby various single harmonies blend into a greater whole. Even in its musical sense the word has thus a dynamic, not a static, quality.

Even in his very early writings Schiller uses musical

(1) SW. vol.1. p.237. l. 30. KA.vol.1.p.186. S.A.vol.1.p.22.
(2) SW. vol.1. p.12. 11. 15-17. NA.vol.1.p.53. S.A.vol.1.p.224.

metaphors to express certain physiological and psychological concepts. In the dissertation which he successfully presented at the Military Academy under the title Über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen he several times employs the word "Harmonie" with reference to physiological mechanisms. The word sometimes applies to one particular organ, as in the account of the state of ecstasy, where Schiller writes:

"die Bewegung des Gehirns ist nicht Harmonie mehr, sie ist Konvulsion".¹

Sometimes the whole physical organism is involved, as in the sentence:

"Aus der Verwirrenheit dieser aller [Sensationen] bildet sich nun die Totalempfindung der tierischen Harmonien".²

From these examples it is clear that Schiller saw the health of the physical organism as depending on certain principles of co-operation and balance between the various parts. This state of health, where all parts of the organism are in tune with each other, may perhaps be designated one of physiological harmony. The musical reference of the word "Harmonie" is

(1) SW. vol.10. p. 34. NA.vol.20. pp.61-62. S.A.vol.II. p.65.II.4-9.
 (2) ibid. p. 29. NA.vol.20. p.58. S.A.vol.II. p.61.II.1-2.

perhaps concealed here, but in the examples quoted the word undoubtedly refers to a process whereby various parts co-operate, or should co-operate, to form an organic whole. (In the Symposium, it might be noted, Plato also speaks of the 'harmony of the body' and draws a parallel between the laws of music which bring about a reconciliation of opposing sounds and the laws of medicine which reconcile the opposing elements in the body).

The thesis presented in Über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen is that a vigorous personality (Geist) demands a healthy and active body and --- more importantly, for Schiller's day and age --- that disturbances of personality can manifest themselves in physical symptoms. To illustrate the inter-dependence of body and soul, of physical organism and personality, musical metaphors are used. The metaphor of two stringed instruments placed side by side is introduced: when a certain note is struck on one, the same note will be heard on the other. "So weckt, vergleichungsweise zu reden, die fröhliche Saite des Körpers die fröhliche in der Seele, so der traurige Ton des ersten den traurigen in der zweiten".¹ Again Schiller tells us that:

"....die allgemeine Empfindung tierischer Harmonie

(1) SW. vol.10. p.37. NA.vol.20.p.64. S.A.vol.II. p.64. II. 13-15.

die Quelle geistiger Lust und die tierische Unlust die Quelle geistiger Unlust sein sollte." ¹

This concept of a pre-established harmony between body and soul may have been familiar to Schiller through Wolff's popular philosophy, but he soon develops his own variations on it. In Die Räuber, when Franz is planning to shorten his father's life, he says: "Philosophen und Mediziner lehren mich, wie treffend die Stimmungen des Geists mit den Bewegungen der Maschine zusammen lauten. Gichtrische Empfindungen werden jederzeit von einer Dissonanz der mechanischen Schwingungen begleitet." ² Thus, Franz argues, he has only to strike a violent note on the instrument of his father's mind to bring about on the instrument of his physical body a note so violent that (Franz hopes) death will result. For Franz the allegory of the two instruments has yet another meaning. If the physical body is destroyed, how can the soul survive? "Empfindung" he says to Pastor Möser "ist Schwingung einiger Saiten und das zerschlagene Klavier tönet nicht mehr". ³ If Schiller's thesis is taken to its logical conclusion, then it would indeed provide

(1) SW.vol.10.p.37. NA.vol.20.p.63. S.A.vol.11.p.69.11.3-6.

(2) Act 2. sc.1. SW. vol.2. p. 53. NA.vol.3.p.38. S.A.vol.3. pp.39-40.

(3) Act 5. sc.1. SW. vol.2. p. 174. NA.vol.3.p.121.

S.A.vol.3. p.139.

Franz with an argument for equating physical with spiritual death. The connection between physical and psychological processes is again stressed in a poem of this period, Melancholie an Laura, where it is once again pointed by a musical metaphor. Here Schiller writes:

"Ach die kühnste Harmonie
 Wirft das Saitenspiel zu Trümmer,
 Und der lohe Aetherstrahl Genie
 Nährt sich nur vom Lebenslampenschimmer".¹

There is an implicit comparison here between the harmony drawn forth from an instrument and the production^s of genius. Just as too violent a vibration may shatter the strings of an instrument, too much intellectual brilliance may shatter the physical body. Thus in some cases the personality may bring about the destruction of the body. Schiller seems to have been quite aware of the deterministic implications of his thesis. Von Wiese² considers that they remained the central problem of his youth, and the French scholar R. Masson thinks that he was unable to counter them effectively until he began to study Kant. The musical

(1) SW. vol.1. p.21. 11. 91-94. It is interesting to note that Shaftesbury has practically the same metaphor cf. Shaftesbury's Charackteristicks. ed. cit. vol.2. p.95.

(2) B.v. Wiese. Schiller. Stuttgart 1959. (See especially Chapters 6 and 7).

Melancholie an Laura. NA.vol.1.p.115. S.A.vol.2. f. 39. II. 91-94

allegory that seems to underlie Schiller's thought here is no great comfort to him, for there can be no harmony without the component parts -- the two notes, the two instruments or the personality and the physical body.

Masson is certainly right when he says that the influence of Schiller's early medical training on his views on psychology is not to be under-estimated. He has shown¹ how Schiller, in treating Grammont, tried to maintain the equilibrium of the physical organism in order that the depressed student's spirits might revive. (Indeed, so skilful was Schiller as a psychiatrist that one is tempted to ask what discoveries he might have made, had he stayed in his appointed profession). The idea of a psychological as well as a physiological harmony -- or, as Dr. Graham has suggested, of a psychic as well as a physical organism² -- certainly arises from these early studies.

At the same time, however, Schiller is using musical imagery in connection with another set of ideas -- ideas which come to him from the general tradition of Leibniz and

(1); R. Masson. 'La psycho-physiologie du jeune Schiller'. Etudes Germaniques. 1959.

(2) See I. Appelbaum-Graham. 'The Structure of the Personality in Schiller's Tragic Poetry'. Schiller Bicentenary Lectures. London. 1960. Pp. 104. ff.

Shaftesbury. The most important of these is the idea of a great creative force flowing throughout the Universe and manifesting itself in all things. This force is love, as is clearly shown by these lines from the poem Fantasie an Laura:

"Sonnenstäubchen paart mit Sonnenstäubchen
 Sich in trauter Harmonie,
 Sphären in einander lenkt die Liebe,
 Weltsysteme dauern nur durch sie".¹

Any combination of different parts into a new whole is a manifestation of this force, and the resulting synthesis, as in music, is called harmony. Indeed, the connection between love and harmony at this stage of Schiller's development is so intimate that he cannot imagine one without the other. For instance, in the poem Der Triumph der Liebe he portrays a loveless world, where:

"Noch mit Liedern ihren Busen
 Huben nicht die weichen Musen
 Nie mit Saitenharmonie",²

but, shortly after Venus appears, love and harmony are linked together. (1.89). A further connection between love and

(1) SA. vol. I. f. 222. II. 13-16.

(2) SA. vol. I. f. 224. II. 18-20

harmony might perhaps be seen in the later poem Die vier Weltalter, where an eternal bond is said to exist between Woman (the bearer of love) and the Singer (the bearer of harmony).¹

In the human world the creative force of love is seen first and foremost in the relationship between the sexes (later so beautifully expressed in the poem Die Geschlechter) and secondly in the bonds of sympathy between friends. To the harmony that springs from love and friendship might be given the name "Seelenharmonie", for in Don Carlos Carlos says:

"Wenn's wahr ist, dass die schaffende Natur

Den Roderich im Karlos wiederholte,

Und unserer Seelen zartes Saitenspiel

"Seelen Am Morgen unseres Lebens gleich bezog"²

and the Princess Eboli, when confessing her feelings towards Carlos, talks of "der Seelen entzückender Zusammenklang".³ Schiller himself does use the word "Seelenharmonie", although mostly of the bonds between husband and wife. In

1) SA. vol. I. p. 15. II. 69 FF.

2) SA. vol. 4. p. 13. II 194 FF.

3) SA. vol. 4. p. 91. II. 1488-1489.

the poem An Körner, written for the occasion of the latter's wedding, he speaks of the ideal wife: "Die sind erlaubt zu verkennen" "Die in schöner Sympathie". This inter-play between Dein Gefühl erreichtet "Seelenharmonie" a dynamic Und in Seelenharmonie for change and development: In Deiner Minna gleichet".¹

In the humourous poem Die berühmte Frau the husband describes in these words how he would have liked his marriage to have been:

"Schon sah ich schöne Kinder um mich scherzen
in ihrem Kreis die schönste sie,
die glücklichste von allen sie,
und mein, durch Seelenharmonie,
durch ewig festen Bund der Herzen".²

"Seelenharmonie" is determined by the ability to share the feelings of another. Even Alba in Don Carlos recognises a harmony of opinions, and not merely one of years, as a basis for love, and he tells the King that Carlos and the Queen were

die "..... verschwistert
durch Harmonie der Meinung und der Jahre".³

1) SA. vol. 2. p. 42. II. 44-80.

2) SA. vol. 1. p. 255. II. 124-128.

3) SA. vol. 4. p. 133. II. 2649-2648.

In all the examples quoted above there is a suggestion of reciprocity: the feelings of one person are allowed to work on those of another, and vice-versa. This inter-play between the partners gives "Seelenharmonie" a dynamic character: there is freedom for change and development; it is not a mere static agreement of interests. In his Theosophie des Julius Schiller lets Julius say:

"Liebe findet nicht statt unter gleichtönenden Seelen, aber unter harmonischen",¹ a sentence which tellingly illustrates both Schiller's concept of musical harmony and his insistence on the dynamic nature of love and friendship. From the ordinary experiences of love and friendship Schiller thus arrives at a concept of harmony, in which the process of harmonization involves reciprocity, and in which the resulting synthesis itself has an active and creative force. For Schiller one such "Seelenharmonie" should generate another, so that eventually the state of world-harmony and brotherhood so enthusiastically proclaimed in such poems as An die Freude and Die Freundschaft is reached. Indeed, in Die Freundschaft the evolution of the human race is compared to a "Ringeltanz":

(1) SW. vol.10. p. 332.

NA.vol.20.p.121. SA.vol.II.p.123. II.31-32.

"Arm in Arme, höher stets und höher,
 Vom Mogolen bis zum griechischen Seher,
 Der sich an den letzten Seraph reiht,
 Wallen wir, einmütig¹ gen Ringeltanzes"

As more and more friendships are formed, new and more complex patterns emerge. Just as the idea of the harmonious personality, of the integrated psychic organism, may be said to have arisen from Schiller's early medical studies, so too his desire for the evolution of a better form of Society may be said to spring from his youthful enthusiasm for friendship.

To the concept of a world-brotherhood may be linked that of the harmony of the Universe as a whole. When speaking of the universal harmony, Schiller sometimes uses the Pythagorean metaphor of the harmony of the spheres. Nowhere is this more forcefully expressed than in the poem Der Tanz. From the standpoint of the observer, the ballroom floor is here a whirl of confused activity and yet, as he watches, he is able to discern an intelligible pattern. As the dance proceeds, one particular pattern may be superseded---perhaps an 18th century quadrille, in which there are several figures, should be imagined--but the general

(1) SW. vol. 1. p. 40. 11. 49-52. NA.vol.1.p.111.5A.vol.2.p.24.

pattern is nevertheless preserved. At first this puzzles the observer, and he asks:

"Sprich, wie geschieht, dass rastlos bewegt die

not only in the moments of the Bildungen schwanken,

Und die Regel doch bleibt, wenn die Gestalten auch

universal harmony may be grasped by anyone who fliehn?"¹

The secret, he discovers, lies in the rhythm which gives a semblance of cohesion and permanence to the whole. The dance is then taken as an allegory of the Universe. The observer now asks:

"Und der Wohllaut der grossen Natur umrauscht dir

vergebens?

Dich ergreift nicht der Strom dieser harmonischen

Welt?"²

(An alternative version of the poem shows:

"Und dir rauschen umsonst die Harmonieen des Welt-
alls?

Dich ergreift nicht der Strom dieses erhabnen

Gesangs?"³

In the Universe, too, there is incessant change and activity

(1) NA. vol. 1. p. 228. 11. 19-20.

(2) ibid. 11. 27-28.

These two quotations are from the first version of the poem which appeared in the Musenalmanach. 1796.

(3) SW. vol. 1. p. 433. 11. 27-28. (This, the more usual version, follows a revision made by Schiller for the publication of his complete works. 1800-1803.) This version will also be found in SA. vol. I. pp. 120-121.

and it is difficult to perceive, at first sight, any underlying order or purpose. Yet the Universe, too, is regulated by a strong central rhythm, which can be observed not only in the movements of the planets, but also in the rhythms of all living creatures. The principles of this universal harmony may be grasped by anyone who understands the principles of music ("das Maass") and the harmonious life is only to be achieved when these principles are understood and obeyed. The link between music, metaphysics and practical life established by Pythagoras appears here in fully-developed form. Elsewhere in Schiller's poetry references to the harmony of the spheres are mostly conventional. For instance in the poem Die Teilung der Erde the poet answers the question put by Zeus:

"Wo warst du denn, als man die Welt getheilet ?" ¹
by saying:

"Mein Auge hing an deinem Angesichte
An deines Himmels Harmonie mein Ohr". ²

In Sehnsucht the wanderer hears sweet harmonies as he approaches the ideal land:

1) SA. vol. I. p. 203. l. 23. 2) ibid. II. 25-26.

"Harmonieen hör ich klingen

Töne süßer Himmelsruh" ¹

and in Bürgerlied (also known as Das Eleusische Fest) Ceres teaches Man to honour the rhythm of the seasons and the cycles of the moon:

"welche still gemessen schreiten

In melodischen Gesang". ²

Perhaps, too, the remark made by Karl at the end of Die Räuber:

"Meint ihr wohl gar, eine Todsünde werde das Aequivalent gegen Todsünden sein? Meint ihr die Harmonie der Welt werde durch diesen gottlosen Misslaut gewinnen?" ³

could be given a Pythagorean interpretation. The harmonious sound of the earth as a planet can be disturbed by the sin of its inhabitants. By drawing an equation between sin and discord, Schiller here gives the Pythagorean concept of the harmony of the spheres a profound moral implication. The examples quoted above of "Harmonie" used in the sense of a harmony of the Universe have been taken at random from the various stages of Schiller's work. Conventional though some of them are, they show that the idea of a harmonious

1) SA. vol. I. p. 19. II. 9-10.

2) SA. vol. I. p. 141. II. 55-56.

3) SA. vol. 3. p. 156. II. 4-9.

Universe runs throughout his work. It can perhaps be called one theme in the Schillerian symphony.

In Schiller's early work there are, as has been shown, two separate concepts of harmony: one of the dependence of psychological on physiological harmony, the other of the idea of a creative, harmonizing force flowing throughout the Universe. The gap between the two, von Wiese¹ considers, remained unbridged by Schiller in his youth. In his youth the two ideas certainly do run parallel. One can perhaps see their gradual reconciliation in the concept of the harmonious individual, who not only has all his inner forces integrated into an organic whole on the analogy of the physical body, but can also maintain a harmonious relationship with the outside world and exert in it an active, creative force. The emergence of the idea of the harmonious personality in this sense can again be traced through musical metaphors.

In Kabale und Liebe Lady Milford compares Luise to a piano that has been touched for the first time. "Auf dem unberührten Klavier der erste einweihende Silberton".² The suggestion is that Ferdinand, as the lover, sets the

(1) v. Wiese. loc. cit.

(2) Act 4. sc. 7. SW. vol.2. p. 469. NA.vol.5.p.74.

whole of Luise's personality in motion, as the player causes the strings to vibrate. An extended use of this metaphor of the personality as a musical instrument may be traced in Don Carlos. Carlos and Posa are two instruments tuned by Nature in the same key, so that the feelings of one should, ideally, harmonize with the feelings of the other. In Act 4 Posa draws an analogy between the Queen and an instrument owned by a person who does not know how to play it. The implication here is that harmony lies hidden in every individual, just as it lies hidden in the strings of an instrument, but that not everyone can draw it out.

"Gehört die süsse Harmonie, die in

Dem Saitenspiele schlummert, seinem Käufer?"¹

asks Posa, and an echo of his question may be heard when Carlos, speaking to the King of Posa after Posa's death, says:

"Dies feine Saitenspiel zerbrach in Ihrer
Metallnen Hand".²

The human personality is seen as a very delicate instrument that demands great skill from its player. A slight, but

(1) Act. 4. sc. 21. SA. vol. 4. p. 230. II. 4358-4359.

(2) Act. 5. sc. 4.

SA. vol. 4. p. 258. II. 4821-4822.

significant, variation of the same theme is seen in Posa's question to the King during the interview:

".....Da Sie den Menschen
Zu Ihrem Saitenspiel herunterstürzten,
Wer teilte mit Ihnen Harmonie ?" ¹

The King has here been compared to God, who creates men in his own image. The King, Posa says, tries to do likewise and must forfeit his own humanity. He plays on his subjects as if they were musical instruments, but there is no-one to hear the resulting harmony. In these examples the human personality is seen as a musical instrument, and relationships between personalities are expressed in terms of one man playing upon another. Posa is able to strike chords in the King that have never been struck before. (To the above question the King replies:

"Bei Gott,
Er greift in meine Seele" ¹

and the verb implies the action of the hands in plucking a lyre or harp). The King plays upon his subjects and arranges their parts in the symphony of the Spanish Empire. In Fiesco, too, the hero declines to show his true intentions until he has sounded out all his compatriots.

(1) Act 3. sc. 10. SW. vol. 3. p. 304. KA. vol. 3. p. 146.

SA. vol. 4. pp. 156-159. 11.3119-3122.

Then, as if he were indeed about to conduct a symphony, he says that all the instruments are now tuned for the macabre concert.¹ The creation of political harmony is thus compared by Fiesco to an orchestral work, where the unity of the whole depends on the conductor's knowing the capabilities and exact timbre of each instrument. All these metaphors show an interest in the inner workings of the human personality and, at the same time, an awareness of the dynamic influence of one personality upon another, an influence that can be used for political ends. The idea of the individual who strives to bring about harmony both within, in his own personality, and without, in the world at large, may be said to be the second great theme running throughout Schiller's work.

A word might be said at this point about some of Schiller's stage-directions. Professor Garland and Professor Mainland have both pointed out the significance of Schiller's stage-directions in the interpretation of his plays. Professor Mainland² has shown how a stage-direction

(1) Act 2. sc. 16. SW. vol.2. p. 269. In her thesis 'Schiller's View of Tragedy in the Light of his General Aesthetics' (D.Phil. London. 1951) Dr. Graham uses this statement in support of her argument that Fiesco "plays" throughout.

(2) W.F.Mainland. Schiller and the Changing Past. London. 1957.

Fiesco's remark will be found in KA.vol.2.p.227.

in Wallensteins Tod may be read to throw suspicion for the deception of Buttler onto Octavio. Professor Garland has said that, in the early plays, the characters often express emotion by physical action---by biting the lip, rushing from the room, etc--- and that these stage-directions illustrate Schiller's thesis of the harmony between physical body and personality. Schiller's stage-directions may also further indicate, according to Professor Garland, "movements or actions which are symbolical".¹ If these remarks are borne in mind and if it is remembered what has been said above about the musical instrument as a metaphor of the personality, it may be thought significant that Schiller sometimes introduces musical instruments into his plays. In Kabale und Liebe, for instance, Ferdinand asks Luise to elope with him, and when she refuses to do so, we read that Ferdinand "hat in der Zerstreuung und Wuth eine Violine ergriffen, und auf derselben zu spielen versucht- Jetzt zerreisst er die Saiten, zerschmettert das Instrument auf dem Boden, und bricht in ein lautes Gelächter aus".² This

(1) H.B.Garland. 'Some Observations on Schiller's Stage-Directions'. German Studies presented to W.H.Bruford. London. 1962. p.156.

(2) Act 3. sc.4. SW. vol.2. p.445. NA.vol.5.pp.57-58.

SA. vol.3. f.361.

may perhaps seem a most obvious thing for a disappointed young man to do, as he is, after all, in the home of a musician. However, if this action is connected with one of Ferdinand's later speeches, it takes on a different meaning. After the poisoned lemonade has been drunk, Ferdinand begins to take a last look at Luise. In so doing, he asks: "Wie kann so viel Wohlklang kommen aus zerrissenen Saiten?" ¹ and proceeds to castigate God for failing to make Luise's soul in keeping with the beauty of her body. Luise is thus compared to a musical instrument, and if these lines are allowed to show that Ferdinand has always subconsciously regarded her in this way, then his destruction of the violin foreshadows his murder of her. He tries to play the violin, fails, and breaks it; he tries to love and understand Luise, fails, and poisons her. Again, in Wallensteins Tod, Wallenstein, who has by now made his fateful decision, asks Thekla to sing and play for him on the zither. She becomes very confused and, although she makes an attempt, "im Augenblick, da sie anfangen soll, zu singen, schaudert sie zusammen, wirft das Instrument weg und geht schnell ab." ²

(1) SA. vol. 3. p. 413. II. 20-21.

(2) SA. vol. 5. p. 253.

Thekla is unable to sing because she is experiencing an inner conflict between her love for Max and her loyalty to her father. This inner discord is underlined by her inability to produce harmony in the strict musical sense. The throwing aside of the instrument may also be taken as a symbolic gesture: from now on harmony has gone out of her life. In Wilhelm Tell a musical sound is used slightly differently to underline the domestic and political harmony of the Swiss. Here the audience hears, as the curtain rises, "das harmonische Geläute der Heerdenglocken, welches sich auch bei eröffneter Szene noch eine Zeitlang fortsetzt".¹ The following variations on this tune sung by the fisherman, herdsman and hunter show the harmony of the Swiss way of life with its ordered activity and closeness to nature. This harmonious state is soon shattered by the thunderstorm, which co-incides with the arrival of Baumgarten and the beginning of the political conflict. The cowbells are not heard again until the end of the play, when justice and liberty have triumphed.²

In conclusion, the suggestion might be ventured that Schiller's concept of harmony arises 'aus dem Geiste der

(1) SA. vol. 4. f. 125.

(2) See stage direction after 1.3241. SA. vol. 4. f. 282.

Musik'. In the process in music whereby two or more notes are combined into a new whole he sees an analogue of various other processes of combination: of the parts of the physical body, of the forces within the personality, of human beings in love and friendship. The progressive form of the musical work as a whole further expresses for Schiller the dynamic nature of such combinations; harmony of the physical body generates psychological health, the harmonious personality forms harmonious relationships with the outside world, and from love and friendship may come an eventual world-brotherhood. The harmonious integration of the forces within the personality and the harmonious personality in action form the subject-matter of the philosophical essays where, it is suggested, the musical metaphor is still retained, although in a less obvious form.

B. AN EXAMINATION OF THE WORD "HARMONIE" IN SCHILLER'S
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS.

I. Schiller's view of the personality as revealed in the
philosophical writings.

When Schiller wrote his first philosophical dissertations and letters he had no real acquaintance with systematic philosophy. His later, and more famous, essays were, however, only written after a long and detailed study of Kant during the years 1791-1794. The influence of Kant can be seen in all these later essays, especially in the terminology employed. Schiller himself admitted to Körner that in the Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen¹ he had to postulate several Kantian ideas without their formal proofs because he wanted to write quickly and succinctly.² Such an admission supports Meyer's contention³ that Schiller's purpose is here to capture the imagination of his readers rather than to construct a completely coherent system of his own. The terminology adopted by Schiller in expounding his view of the personality in these

(1) Afterwards referred to as UAEM.

(2) Letter to Körner 10. Nov. 1794. NA. vol.27. p.80.

(3) loc. cit.

essays often seems inadequate to the modern reader, firstly because the Kantian background is overlooked and secondly because the science of psychology has since evolved terms with more exact spheres of reference. In the 18th century the study of psychology was still very much a branch of philosophy and, according to Blackall,¹ even the philosophical vocabulary of the time was relatively non-specialised and inexact. Even of Kant it has been said that "his epistemological vocabulary is.....far too simple to do the job he requires of it."² The author of this statement, Weldon, then shows that the term "Erscheinung" may, in Kant's writings, have four separate spheres of reference. It is thus not only against Schiller that the charge of linguistic difficulty may be levelled! In his chapter on Kant and Schiller René Wellek has warned us that "We must constantly try to translate what they say into our idiom".³ Any examination of Schiller's concept of the harmonious personality must therefore try to find satisfactory equivalents for his terms.

(1) E.A. Blackall. The Emergence of German as a Literary Language. Cambridge 1959. (esp. Chapter 2).

(2) T.W. Weldon. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Oxford. 1958. p.127.

(3) René Wellek. A History of Modern Criticism: The Later 18th Century. London. 1955. p. 229.

There is ample evidence to show that Schiller really had grasped the essentials of Kant's critical philosophy.

Victor Hell,¹ for instance, has commented on some of the annotations that Schiller made in the margin of a copy of the Critique of Judgement. For the reasons indicated, however, Schiller's analysis of the human personality is not nearly as complicated as Kant's. In their efforts to explain Kant's psychology many interpreters² have had to resort to pages of complicated diagrams. Schiller's analysis of the personality itself does not warrant this: it may be said that he works with four chief divisions or categories, to which he gives the names "Sinnlichkeit", "Vernunft", "Einfühlungskraft" and "Wille". Between these categories various relationships are possible. Schiller says best in,

The term "Sinnlichkeit" and its related adjective "sinnlich" cover, for Schiller, a very wide range. Schiller himself tellingly illustrated their range when he said

- (1) Victor Hell. 'Esthétique et philosophie de l'art: Éléments d'une théorie classique d'après la correspondance de Schiller'. Etudes Germaniques. 1959.
- (2) See the American pioneer psychologist E.F. Buchner's article 'A Study of Kant's Psychology'. The Psychological Review. Monograph Supplement. New York. 1897.

*Kant, Schiller, Goethe. Leipzig. 1923.
Afterwards referred to as V.A. 1897. p. 225.12.
See vol. II. p. 224.132 - p. 225.12.*

SA. vol. II. p. 224.132 - p. 225.12.

"Alles, was in der Zeit ist, ist sinnlich".¹ Vorländer² saw "Sinnlichkeit" as the Schillerian equivalent of Kant's term "Gefühl" from which category, according to Kant, spring all those urges which drive us to immediate action without conscious reflection. Such urges are re-actions to stimuli received through the senses from the world of time and space. In Schiller's work such re-actions may be of two kinds: i) natural needs, and ii) impulsive desires. Natural needs, which Schiller sometimes also calls 'instincts', are perhaps best defined by Schiller in Über Anmut und Würde³ when he writes: "Da einer Naturnotwendigkeit nichts abzudingen ist, so muss auch der Mensch, seiner Freiheit ungeachtet, empfinden, was die Natur ihn empfinden lassen will, und je nachdem die Empfindung Schmerz oder Lust ist, so muss bei ihm ebenso unabänderlich Verabscheuung oder Begierde erfolgen. In diesem Punkte steht er dem Thiere vollkommen gleich, und der starkmütigste Stoiker fühlt den Hunger ebenso empfindlich und verabscheut ihn ebenso lebhaft als der Wurm zu seinen Füssen."⁴ Natural needs may be re-actions either to external stimuli (e.g. a horse runs

(1) See notes on Körners Aufsatz über Musik. NA. vol.22. p.294.

(2) K. Vorländer. Kant, Schiller, Goethe. Leipzig. 1923.

(3) Afterwards referred to as UAW.

(4) SW. vol.11. p.441. NA.vol.20.p.290.

away if it is frightened by an unfamiliar sound) or to internal ones (e.g. a baby cries if it is hungry). Such needs are Nature's method of preserving both the life of the individual and of the species. The animal, according to Schiller, has no choice but to obey its natural needs, and in its case self-preservation and the preservation of the species nearly always co-incide. In Man, on the other hand, for reasons that will be discussed later, the interests of self do not always co-incide with the interests of the species. In the course of his everyday life in the world each individual is faced with countless complex situations. His immediate response is to find a course of action that will ensure his immediate advantage. In other words, he puts his own cause before that of the community. These responses may perhaps be termed 'impulsive desires'. They may in some cases co-incide with natural needs, but the distinction is important if Schiller's own distinction between "reine Natur" and "rohe Natur" is to be appreciated.

Schiller nowhere finds it necessary to give a precise definition of "Vernunft" although he sometimes refers to this category as "das selbstständige Vermögen". "Vernunft" can perhaps best be regarded as the Schillerian equivalent of Kant's term "Bewusstsein", the capacity in Man for conscious reflection on all that he does. The animal does


not have to think where the general good of its species lies: Man has to formulate his own laws through the use of "Vernunft". The laws of "Vernunft" thus legislate for the good of the whole, and it is the duty of the individual to obey them.

For Kant, the general term "Bewusstsein" includes; i) conscious reflection on what is true --- the sphere of thought and knowledge; ii) conscious reflection on what is good -- the sphere of ethics; and iii) conscious reflection on what is beautiful --- the sphere of the imagination and of Art. The beautiful, although a symbol of universal precepts, can only be apprehended through the senses. Imagination thus occupies a mid-way position between the lower regions of undifferentiated sense-impressions ("Gefühl") and the higher regions of "Bewusstsein". This is also the position occupied by "Einbildungskraft" in Schiller's essays. "Einbildungskraft" is the capacity in Man to appreciate the beautiful and is also called by Schiller "der ästhetische Sinn", "das Gefühl für das Schöne" or, simply, "Geschmack".

The Will, for Schiller, is the distinguishing feature of Man. As he says in "Über das Erhabene" : "Alle andere Dinge müssen; der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will".¹

(1) SW. vol.12. p.346. NA.vol.21.p.38. SA.vol.12. p.264.

The will may be defined as the power of conscious choice between one course of action and another. Through the exercise of his will an individual decides whether to follow his impulsive desires or to obey the precepts of duty. The will thus determines the relationship between the two categories referred to above as "Sinnlichkeit" and "Vernunft". Schiller's view of the personality may perhaps be expressed in a very simple diagram as follows:



Within each human personality there are, at any given moment, i) urges towards courses of action in accordance with natural needs or impulsive desires and ii) urges towards courses of action in accordance with the precepts of duty. The course of action to be followed is determined by the Will, the power of conscious choice, but, as will be shown later, in those individuals we call 'cultivated', the imagination, or sense of beauty, may also play a decisive role. Where the courses of action prescribed by desire on the one hand and by duty on the other are at variance, there will be conflict and discord within the personality. Should the two courses of action co-incide,

(1) DR. VOLK - 1945 SA. Vol. 20. p. 280.

SA. vol. II. p. 213. f. II. 21-30.

there will be harmony.

Schiller envisages three basic relationships between "Sinnlichkeit" and "Vernunft", between impulsive desire and conscious duty. These are described in UAW as follows:

"Der Mensch unterdrückt entweder die Forderungen seiner sinnlichen Natur, um sich den höhern Forderungen seiner vernünftigen gemäss zu verhalten; oder er kehrt es um und ordnet den vernünftigen Theil seines Wesens dem sinnlichen unter und folgt also bloss dem Stosse, womit ihn die Naturnotwendigkeit gleich den andern Erscheinungen forttreibt; oder die Triebe des letztern setzen sich mit den Gesetzen des ersten in Harmonie, und der Mensch ist einig mit sich selbst".¹

The first sense of the word "Harmonie" to be distinguished in Schiller's philosophical essays is thus one of a vague general agreement between desire and duty. The word is used to characterise that state where the course of action urged by desire coincides with that urged by duty. In this state the individual knows no conflict and acts as a unified whole. ("einig mit sich selbst"). The maintenance of this

(1) SW. vol.11. p.426. NA.vol.20.p.280.

harmonious state is presented in the same essay as the task of each individual life:

Ex.2. "Es ist dem Menschen zwar aufgegeben, eine innige Über-einstimmung zwischen seinen beiden NATUREN zu stiften, immer ein harmonirendes Ganze zu sejn und mit seiner vollstimmigen ganzen Menschheit zu handeln."¹

Only those actions which spring from the agreement of the two natures, of desire and duty, may be said to be actions worthy of true humanity. The use of the word "vollstimmig" in the above sentence is interesting, because it indicates an underlying musical metaphor. True humanity is a state where both tones blend into harmony, not a state where only one tone is to be heard or where the tones sound together in discord. In the true "Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Sittlichen und Sinnlichen"² both tones are to be sounded with equal force, and this, as Schiller tells us, is "das Ideal vollkommener Menschheit".³ Although such a harmonious state is said in UAW to remain an ideal which can never be attained in the actual world, each individual should nevertheless strive towards it. In this striving he may be assisted by

(1) SW. vol.11. p.440.

NA.vol.20.p.289

{SA.vol.II.p.223.134-p.224.1.1.

(2) SW. vol.11. p.453.

NA.vol.20.p.298

{SA.vol.II.p.233.1120-26.

(3) ibid.

NA.vol.20.p.298

{ibid.

the cultivation of his sense of the beautiful or in other words, by an education "zum Geschmack und zur Schönheit".¹ The aim of the aesthetic education, Schiller writes in UAEIM, is

Ex. 3. "das Ganze unserer sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte in möglichster Harmonie auszubilden".²

The idea that harmony between duty and desire, in so far as it may be brought about at all, may be brought about by the aesthetic sense in Man is to be found again in one of Schiller's earlier essays Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet (1784). Here Schiller writes:

Ex. 4. "Unsre Natur, gleich unfähig, länger im Zustande des Thiers fortzudauern, als die feinern Arbeiten des Verstandes fortzusetzen, verlangte einen mittleren Zustand, der beide widersprechende Enden vereinigte, die harte Spannung zu sanfter Harmonie herabstimmte, und den wechselweisen Übergang eines Zustandes in den andern erleichterte. Diesen Nutzen leistet überhaupt nur der ästhetische Sinn oder das Gefühl für das Schöne".³

The adjective "sanft" here indicates that the harmonious state is characterised by an ease and grace of action, and

(1) SA, vol. 12. p. 48. II. 31 - 33. (Footnote to UAEIM 21)

(2) ibid.

(3) SA, vol. II. p. 89. II. 9-14.

the possibility of a reciprocal inter-play between the two sides of human nature is shown by the expression "den wechselweisen Übergang eines Zustandes in den andern". In that such inter-play is possible, the state of harmony may be said to be a dynamic state. Of it Professor Garland has said "It is not a passive, but an 'energetic' balance; not static, but kinetic; delicately poised it conceals a latent dynamism".¹ It is also interesting to note in the above example a suppressed musical metaphor implied by the words "Spannung" and "herabstimmte". The sounds produced by the instrument of the personality when there is tension between the two natures may be compared to the sounds produced by a musical instrument when the strings have been tensed too much. Such sounds are not in keeping with the true tone of the instrument and harmony can only be drawn from it when the right pitch is obtained. In terms of the personality, harmony can only be obtained when the various parts stand in an easy and reciprocal relationship to each other. The next task of this examination will be to determine the exact nature of this relationship and to ascertain whether Schiller envisaged only one harmonious relationship between the parts of the personality or several.

(1) H. B. Garland. Schiller Revisited. London. 1959. p. 25.

Before the relationship between the parts of the personality is further discussed, however, the relationship of the personality to the outside world must be considered in a little more detail. Life involves changes in space and time. The human being is a continuously changing creature in a continuously changing environment. Through his senses he registers changes in his environment and if these changes are allowed to exert an unrestricted influence upon him he is said to be in a state of passivity. The adjective Schiller generally uses to describe such a state is "leidend". Alternatively the individual may seek to impose his ideas on the world around him, and here Schiller calls him active ("tätig") or creative. ("schaffend"). A clear exposition of these concepts may be found in one of the Kalliasbriefe where Schiller writes: "Bei Betrachtung der Erscheinung verhalten wir uns leidend, indem wir ihre Eindrücke empfangen; thätig, indem wir diese Eindrücke unseren Vernunftformen unterwerfen".¹ To a certain extent these processes are inter-linked: changes in the external world affect each individual, and each individual can cause variation in the outside world. The inter-dependence of the natural world which we know through our senses and the rational world of our own ideas is stated most succinctly

(1) Schiller's Briefe. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Herausgegeben von F. Jonas. 6 vols. Stuttgart, 1892-1896. vol. 3. p. 241. (Letter of 8 February 1793.).

by Schiller in Über den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer Sitten where he writes: "Die Ordnung der Natur ist also von der Sittlichkeit unsrer Gesinnungen abhängig gemacht, und wir können gegen die moralische Welt nicht verstossen, ohne zugleich in der physischen eine Verwirrung anzurichten".¹ The term 'reciprocity' must therefore be applied not only to the dynamic arrangement of the parts within the personality, but also to the relationship between this personality and the changing outside world. This reciprocal relationship may perhaps be said to correspond to the progressive nature of a musical work. As life proceeds, the relationship between the personality and the outside world will manifest different patterns, just as different patterns of harmony come into being as a piece of music is played.

The reciprocal relationship between the personality and the outside world is perhaps examined most fully in UAEM. Here Schiller distinguishes between an essential pattern, which determines the form of each individual, and the different realisations of this pattern in time and space. If the poem Der Tanz is recalled, then the essential pattern ("Person") may be compared to the rhythm which controls and organizes the various figures of the dance,

(1) SW. vol.12. p. 343. NA.vol.21.p.35.

while these figures themselves represent the manifestations of the essential pattern ("Zustand"). For Schiller, the psychological life of each individual is concerned firstly with the manifestation in the outside world of as many different aspects of the essential pattern as possible, for different situations demand different re-actions, and secondly with the sub-ordination of the changes in the outside world to an order imposed from within by this essential pattern. That is: ".....er soll alles zur Welt machen, was bloss Form ist, und alle seine Anlagen zur Erscheinung bringen.....er soll alles in sich vertilgen, was bloss Welt ist, und Übereinstimmung in alle seine Veränderungen bringen: mit andern Worten : er soll alles Innre veräussern und alles Äussere formen".¹ Here again it is the task of each individual to bring harmony into all his manifestations in the outside world. The harmony to be understood by "Übereinstimmung" in the above sentence, however, is the harmony between all these manifestations and the pattern of his ideally-integrated personality which he carries within. The processes described in the above quotation are formulated by Schiller more specifically in

(1) SW. vol.12. pp. 53-54. NA.vol.20.p.344.(UAEM 11).

the concept of the "Stofftrieb", whereby the aspects of the essential pattern seek to become actual, and of the "Formtrieb", whereby the variations in the outside world are given order and significance. In explaining the latter concept Schiller writes:

"Der zweite jener Triebe, den man den Formtrieb nennen kann, geht aus von dem absoluten Dasein des Menschen Ex. 5. oder von seiner vernünftigen Natur, und ist bestrebt, ihn in Freiheit zu setzen, Harmonie in die Verschiedenheit seines Erscheinens zu bringen und bei allem Wechsel des Zustandes seine Person zu behaupten".¹

The word "Harmonie" is used here in the same sense as the word "Übereinstimmung" in the expression "Übereinstimmung in alle seine Veränderungen bringen" (see above). A second sense of the word in Schiller's philosophical essays may now be recorded: that of concordance between the personality and its expression in the outside world. The concept of harmony is now seen to include both the harmony of the integrated personality and the harmony between this integrated personality and the outside world, but it must always be remembered that both harmonies are inter-linked. Indeed, the latter could be described as the harmonious

(1) SW. vol.12. p.56. NA.vol.20.pp.345-346.(UAEM 12).

personality in action. Where a harmonious reciprocal relationship between the personality and the outer world is attained, all actions will be in keeping with the essential pattern and order will be imposed upon life. As Schiller himself says: "Wo beide Eigenschaften sich vereinigen, da wird der Mensch mit der höchsten Fülle von Dasein die höchste Selbstständigkeit und Freiheit verbinden, und, anstatt sich an die Welt zu verlieren, diese vielmehr mit der ganzen Unendlichkeit ihrer Erscheinungen in sich ziehen und der Einheit seiner Vernunft unterwerfen".¹

Just as the reciprocal inter-play between the parts of the personality remains an ideal, so, too, the harmonious reciprocal relationship between inner and outer worlds is said by Schiller to be "die Idee seiner Menschheit, mithin ein Unendliches, dem er sich im Laufe der Zeit immer mehr nähern kann, aber ohne es jemals zu erreichen".² In the striving towards the harmony of the personality the cultivation of taste was seen to play an important role; in the striving towards the harmony between the personality and the outside world the 'play-urge' in Man ("Spieltrieb") must come into action. The 'play-urge' Schiller tells us,

{ 1) SA. vol. 12. p. 48. II. 15-20. (UAEM 13)

2) SA. vol. 12. p. 52. II. 15-19. (UAEM 14)

springs from the reciprocal action of the "Stofftrieb" and the "Formtrieb". It is perhaps nothing more than the desire for harmony which Schiller believed to exist in each individual. The 'play-urge' strives to bring about the harmonious relationship outlined above by robbing the experiences of the outer world of their 'dynamic' quality and by presenting the order demanded by the rational self in such a way that it does not appear tyrannical;¹ that is, it is an attitude of mind which refuses to be driven to immediate action by the stimuli received from the outside world and which refuses to take the moral laws of duty so seriously that they become a chore.

After this discussion on the reciprocal action of inner and outer worlds the musical structure of Schiller's language and thought becomes much more vivid. Not only is the human being conceived as a harmony of various parts, but his whole life, too, is to be one harmonious movement. (There is a hint of this thought in Fiesco when Leonore pleads with Fiesco to flee from the political life of Genoa: "Unser Leben rinnt dann melodisch wie die flötende Quelle zum Schöpfer").² In this movement there is an essential theme and endless variations on it. The musical

{1} → SA. vol. 12. p. 54. I. 19. FF.

{2} → SA. vol. 3. p. 269. II. 16 - 17.

tenor of Schiller's thought is illustrated by his own style, and his constantly changing terminology, his 'jeu de substitution' as Hell has called it,¹ can perhaps be seen as a set of variations on his central theme. As Professor Wilkinson has said, it is almost as if Schiller were trying "to make even a philosophical treatise tend in the direction of the art to which he said all the arts should in some sense approximate"² (i.e. music).

It can thus be said that in the essays Schiller wrote after his study of Kant, although there is very little reference to music itself, the word "Harmonie" still retains its musical connotations. It is now used either of a process by which the various forces within the personality are brought to work together, or of the inter-action between personality and outside world. The first of these processes, it is suggested, corresponds to the one in music whereby separate notes are combined to form a chord; the second to the moving form of a musical work as a whole.

Vermischte, empfangendes und selbsttätiges Vermögen, haben sich in ihren Geschäften noch nicht getrennt, vielmehr stehen sie im Widerspruch miteinander. Diese Empfindungen

(1) op. cit. p. 348.

(2) op. cit. p. 67.

(1) Afterwards referred to as HED.

II. Patterns of harmony within the personality as revealed in the philosophical writings

In the preceding chapter it was seen that the first sense in which the word "Harmonie" is used in Schiller's philosophical essays is that of a vague general agreement between desire and duty, an agreement in which the various forces within the personality stand in an easy and reciprocal relationship to each other. It will now be suggested that Schiller envisaged at least three different kinds of harmonious, or seemingly harmonious, relationships.

A clue to these different relationships is afforded by the following passage from Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung¹:

"So lange der Mensch noch reine, es versteht sich, nicht rohe Natur ist, wirkt er als ungetheilte sinnliche Einheit und als ein harmonirendes Ganze. Sinne und Vernunft, empfangendes und selbstthätiges Vermögen, haben sich in ihrem Geschäfte noch nicht getrennt, vielweniger stehen sie im Widerspruch miteinander. Seine Empfindungen sind nicht das formlose Spiel des Zufalls, seine Gedanken nicht das gehaltlose Spiel der Vorstellungskraft; aus dem

(1) Afterwards referred to as UNSD.

Gesetz der Nothwendigkeit gehen jene, aus der Wirklichkeit gehen diese hervor. Ist der Mensch in den Stand der Kultur getreten, und hat die Kunst ihre Hand an ihn gelegt, so ist Ex.6 jene sinnliche Harmonie in ihm aufgehoben, und er kann nur noch als moralische Einheit, d.h. als nach Einheit strebend, sich äussern. Die Übereinstimmung zwischen seinem Empfinden und Denken, die in dem ersten Zustande wirklich statt fand, existirt jetzt bloss idealisch; sie ist nicht mehr in ihm, sondern ausser ihm, als ein Gedanke, der erst realisirt werden soll, nicht mehr als Tatsache seines Lebens." ¹

In this passage Schiller is laying the foundation for his distinction between the two kinds of poetry. In the state of natural simplicity, he goes on to say,

"wo der Mensch noch, mit allen seinen Kräften Ex.7 zugleich, als harmonische Einheit wirkt" ²
the imitation of Nature will be the poet's task. In the state of civilisation ("Kultur")

"wo jenes harmonische Zusammenwirken seiner ganzen Ex.8 Natur bloss eine Idee ist"³

the task of the poet is to present an ideal. It will be

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 232 (Schiller's italics)

(2) ibid. p. 232

(3) ibid. p. 233

These three references will be found in NA.vol.20.pp.436-437. and in SA.vol.12. pp. 187-188.

clear from the first passage quoted above that the 'first state' mentioned in the clause "die in dem ersten Zustande wirklich Statt fand" refers back to the state of "reine Natur" introduced in the opening sentence. The use of the qualifying demonstrative "jene" shows that the expression "sinnliche Harmonie" is to be associated with the same state. "Sinnliche Harmonie" can therefore be equated with "Übereinstimmung zwischen seinem Empfinden und Denken, die in dem ersten Zustande wirklich Statt fand" and also, through the link with "reine Natur", with "ungetheilte sinnliche Einheit" and "ein harmonirendes Ganze". The expressions "harmonische Einheit" and "jenes harmonische Zusammenwirken" contained in Exs. 7 and 8 above may also be read as variants of "sinnliche Harmonie". A description of a state of "sinnliche Harmonie" may thus be obtained. In such a state the personality is at one with itself, and this unity springs from the reciprocal inter-action of the forces within. There is no conflict here between "Sinne" and "Empfinden" on the one hand and "Vernunft" and "Denken" on the other. Instead, each 'category' plays its part in relating all the activities of the individual into an organic whole. All impressions of the outside world registered by the senses ("Empfindungen") are ordered into the essential pattern of the personality: all thoughts are connected in some way with the outside world ("Wirklichkeit"). Here, then, is that reciprocal inter-play between "Stofftrieb" and "Formtrieb" which

Schiller had described in his earlier essay UAEM. The state of "sinnliche Harmonie" is thus a state of true harmony in that all the forces within the personality work together co-operatively so that there is not only an inner harmony but also a harmonious relationship between the individual self and the outside world. Professor Mainland¹ has noted that this "sinnliche Harmonie" is a characteristic of what Schiller terms "das Naive" but has attempted no further definition of it. Professor Bruford would seem to be referring to the same state when he writes "The 'natural' harmony that we ascribe to the childhood of mankind and to favoured ages in the past like that of Greece in its heyday, he [Schiller] sees now in the behaviour of actual children and simple country people,² but he finds it too by analogy in landscape". One kind of harmonious relationship between the forces within the personality has thus been established. To it Schiller applies the term "sinnlich", and the precise meaning of this word in this context will have to be investigated. (The translation of Schiller's philosophical essays in Bohn's Standard Library³ avoids the issue by rendering

(1) op. cit. p. 154.

(2) W.H. Bruford. Culture and Society in Classical Weimar. Cambridge 1962. p. 288.

(3) Schiller. Essays aesthetical and philosophical. Translated anonymously in Bohn's Standard Library. London. 1899. Bohn p. 285.

"sinnlich" here by the deliciously vague "sensuous").

If it is accepted that "sinnliche Harmonie" is linked in Schiller's thought with the concept of the 'naive', then it must also be associated with the concept of 'genius', for, as Schiller says in UNSD, "Naiv muss jedes wahre Genie seyn, oder es ist keines".¹ As examples of 'genius' Schiller mentions, among others, Sophocles and Shakespeare, Archimedes and Hippocrates, Julius Ceasar and Peter the Great. It is therefore not only to children and simple country people that the state of "sinnliche Harmonie" may be ascribed; great artists, great scientists, and even great statesmen may also qualify. In Schiller's theory of the nature of 'genius', as it is stated in UNSD and in the poem Der Genius which was written at about the same time, the genius is one who is guided by his instincts. In both the essay and the poem the metaphor of a guardian angel is used. In UNSD Schiller writes: ".....bloss von der Natur oder dem Instinkt, seinem schützenden Engel, geleitet, geht es [das Genie] ruhig und sicher durch alle Schlingen des falschen Geschmacks".² In the poem Der Genius he says:

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 213.
(2) ibid.

NA.vol.20.p.424 { SA.vol.12.p.143. 1.32.
NA.vol.20.p.424 } ; b.d. 1.37 FF.

"Hast du, Glücklicher, nie den schützenden Engel
verloren,

Nie des frommen Instinkts liebende Warnung verwirkt,
.....

O dann gehe du hin in deiner köstlichen Unschuld ! ¹ "

Just as an animal has an 'instinct' which tells it to do not only what is right for it individually in any given situation, but also what is at the same time the right action for the general good of its species, so, too, the actions of genius, guided as they are by the guardian angel of 'instinct', are embodiments of universally valid precepts. In UNSD, for instance, Schiller writes: "..... aber seine Einfälle sind Eingebungen eines Gottes (Alles, was die gesunde Natur ~~thut~~, ist göttlich), seine Gefühle sind Gesetze für alle Zeiten und für alle Geschlechter der Menschen".² The same thought is repeated in Der Genius in these words:

".....Was du ~~thust~~, was dir gefällt, ist Gesetz,

Und an alle Geschlechter ergeht ein göttliches
Machtwort."³

(and an echo of the same idea may perhaps be heard in Gräfin Terzky's advice to Wallenstein:

(1) SW. vol.1. p. 438. 11. 37-38 and 1. 45. SA.vol.1. p. 124 FF.

(2) SW. vol.12. p. 213. NA.vol.20.p.424. SA.vol.12. p. 144. II.18-21.

(3) 11. 48-49.

The first version of Der Genius may be found in NA. pp.252-253 under the title of Natur und Schule.

"Denn Recht hat jeder eigene Charakter,
Der übereinstimmt mit sich selbst".¹)

The 'instinct' that guides the genius, however, is of a higher kind from mere 'animal instinct' which, as was shown in the preceding chapter, Schiller sometimes terms 'natural need'. It is a 'moral instinct' by which an individual automatically knows what is in accordance with the universal law. To avoid confusion this 'moral instinct' will here be termed 'intuition'. If the above reasoning is accepted, it may be concluded that where an individual acts from an intuitive knowledge of the universal law, he may be said to be in a state of "sinnliche Harmonie".

In the passage from UNSD quoted at the beginning of this chapter (Ex. 6) it is clear that for most people the state of "sinnliche Harmonie" has been lost. Once this happens, the individual is said by Schiller to be a "moralische Einheit.d.h. nach Einheit strebend". If it is remembered that in this context "Einheit" means the unity of the harmonious personality, then the individual must be now striving towards a postulated "moralische Harmonie". Schiller in fact uses this term a little later on in UNSD in the discussion of the elegiac mode of reflective poetry:

(1) Wallensteins Tod. Act 1. sc. 7. SW. vol.4. p. 231.
NA.vol.8.p.201. SA.vol.5. f. 212. II. 600-602.

"Die Trauer über verlorene Freuden, über das aus der Welt verschwundene goldene Alter, über das entflohe Ex. 9. Glück der Jugend, der Liebe, u.s.w. kann nur alsdann der Stoff zu einer elegischen Dichtung werden, wenn jene Zustände sinnlichen Friedens zugleich als Gegenstände moralischer Harmonie sich vorstellen lassen".¹

In Schiller's usage the word "moralisch" is another word with a wide range of meaning. (Here again the Bohn translation takes the easy way out and renders it without any explanatory note by "moral").² Mrs Sayce has suggested that, in addition to the meanings i) "ethisch--sittlich gut" ii) "geistig" "seelisch" "innerlich", and iii) "vernünftig" which she believes the word to have in UAW, in UNSD the connotations iv) "zur Idee gehörig", v) "als Adj. zu 'Sitten' in allgemeiner Bedeutung" and vi) "als Adj. zu Gesellschaft in der Verbindung 'moralische Welt'" may also be isolated.³ In the context of the passage quoted above (Ex. 9) Schiller says that the elegiac poet may lament either over the distance between the real and the ideal worlds or over the loss of the Golden Age, the loss of the state of natural simplicity. However, the loss of the Golden Age is a fit subject only if its

SA. Vol.12. p.203.11.6.13.

(1) SW. vol. 12. pp.251 ff. (my italics). NA.vol.20. p.450.

(2) ed. cit. p. 297.

(3) op. cit. p. 166. Mrs Sayce also finds that in UAEM "moralisch" may also have the meaning "logisch" or "intellektuell".

portrayal can be understood as a symbol of "moralische Harmonie". "Moralische Harmonie" is thus linked, if somewhat loosely, with an ideal state.

There are two other places in UNSD where Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" with a qualifying adjective with reference to an ideal state. When he discusses the idyllic mode of poetry, the subject of which is the presentation of the Golden Age or of the Ideal as actually realised here and now, Schiller says:

"Ex. 10. Er [der Dichter] führe uns nicht rückwärts in unsere Kindheit, um uns mit den kostbarsten Erwerbungen des Verstandes eine Ruhe erkaufen zu lassen, die nicht länger dauern kann, als der Schlaf unserer Geisteskräfte; sondern führe uns vorwärts zu unserer Mündigkeit, um uns die höhere Harmonie zu empfinden zu geben, die den Kämpfer belohnt, die den Überwinder beglückt".¹

The ideal state is here presented as the Coming-of-Age of Mankind ("Mündigkeit"), the achievement of that perfect social order which Schiller had earlier sketched out in UAEM and which Kant had championed in his essay Was ist Aufklärung ? The comparative adjective "höher" invites the reader to contrast the harmony mentioned here with the harmony of an earlier stage, to which, as has been seen,

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 285 (my italics).
NA.vol.20.p.472.(dauren).

Schiller gives the name "sinnliche Harmonie". It is interesting to note that, in these references to a "moral" or "higher" harmony, the harmonious state of an earlier stage is now depreciated and is referred to variously as "jene Zustände sinnlichen Friedens" (Ex. 9) or "Ruhe" or "Schlaf unserer Geisteskräfte" (both Ex. 10). The "higher" harmony is also said to be a reward after battle. (The two clauses "die den Kämpfer belohnt" and "die den Überwinder beglückt" in Ex. 10, of which the latter is a variant of the former, illustrate the musicality of Schiller's language). "Moralische Harmonie" therefore appears to be a state which may only be attained after conflict and in comparison with which "sinnliche Harmonie" seems to be a state of ease. Furthermore, in his criticism of Rousseau, Schiller writes:

"Entweder es ist seine kranke Empfindlichkeit, die über ihn herrscht, und sein Gefühl bis zum Peinlichen treibt; oder es ist seine Denkkraft, die seiner Imagination Fesseln anlegt, und durch die Strenge des Begriffs die Anmut~~h~~ des Gemäldes vernichtet. Beide Eigenschaften, deren innige Wechselwirkung und Vereinigung den Poeten eigentlich ausmacht, finden sich bei diesem Schriftsteller in ungewöhnlich hohem Grad, und nichts fehlt, als dass sie

In formation des idées politiques de Rousseau (1755-1760). - Berlin 1920. p. 65. "Toute cette division n'est point l'effet d'une pure réflexion théorique: elle est dictée par des faits très-sérieux".

sich auch wirklich mit einander vereinigt äusserten, dass seine Selbsttätigkeit sich mehr in sein Empfinden, dass seine Empfänglichkeit sich mehr in sein Denken mischte. Daher ist auch in dem Ideale, das er von der Menschheit aufstellt.....überall mehr ein Bedürfnis nach physischer Ruhe als nach moralischer Übereinstimmung darin sichtbar. Seine leidenschaftliche Empfindlichkeit ist Schuld, dass er die Menschheit, um nur des Streites Ex. 11. in derselben recht bald los zu werden, lieber zu der geistlosen Einförmigkeit des ersten Standes zurückführt, als jenen Streit in der geistreichen Harmonie einer völlig durchgeführten Bildung geendigt sehen.....will".¹

In the first part of this extract Rousseau is criticised for failing to achieve a harmony and balance between all the forces of his personality. He errs now on the side of "Empfindlichkeit" (a criticism with which at least one recent writer would agree)², now on the side of "Denkkraft". The reciprocal inter-play of both ("deren innige Wechselwirkung und Vereinigung") is never achieved. Rousseau experiences a state of conflict and is said to

SA. vol. 12. p. 204. l. 36 - p. 205. l. 21.

- (1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 254. ff. ("Übereinstimmung" Schiller's italics. Otherwise my italics). NA. vol. 20. pp. 451-452.
 (2) cf. R. Hubert. Rousseau et L'Encyclopédie. Essai sur la formation des idées politiques de Rousseau (1742-1756). Paris. 1933. p. 66. "Toute cette évolution n'est point l'effet d'une pure réflexion dialectique: elle est dominée par des facteurs sentimentaux".

prefer peace to "moral harmony" ("mehr ein Bedürfnis nach physischer Ruhe als nach moralischer Übereinstimmung").

The next sentence shows another characteristic musical variation: "geistlose Einförmigkeit" replaces "physische Ruhe" and "geistreiche Harmonie" repeats "moralische Übereinstimmung". The word "geistreich" here implies an intellectual richness, the full use of all one's mental faculties, while the expression "völlig durchgeführte Bildung" suggests a process in which all the varying experiences of life are welcomed and savoured. A second kind of harmonious relationship between the forces within the personality has now been isolated. Whereas the relationship which Schiller termed "sinnlich" seems to be achieved by certain people, this new relationship, to which he applies the adjectives "moralisch", "höher" or "geistreich" seems to correspond more with that ideal of humanity, that "innige Übereinstimmung zwischen seinen beiden Naturen" which was discussed under Ex. 2. in the preceding chapter.

An indication of yet another relationship between the forces within the personality is given at the end of the essay entitled Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen,¹ where Schiller writes as follows:

(1) Afterwards referred to as NG.

"So gefährlich kann es für die Moralität des Charakters ausschlagen, wenn zwischen den sinnlichen und den sittlichen Trieben, die doch nur im Ideale und nie in der Wirklichkeit vollkommen einig sejn können, eine zu innige Gemeinschaft herrscht".¹ The whole context of this statement will be examined at a later stage. For the moment it may be noted that the word "Gemeinschaft" is used with reference to an association between the different forces ("sinnlich" and "sittlich") within the personality. A true harmony between the forces within the personality is, however, once again said to be impossible in the actual world. There may, on the other hand, be an association between these forces which Schiller describes as "zu innig". (In his translation J. Weiss rendered this expression by "too intimate".)² The qualifying "zu" contains a suggestion of falsity: the association between the various forces seems harmonious, but this harmony is too good to be true. Furthermore, in Über das Erhabene Schiller speaks of the man who takes pleasure in living a virtuous life and asks: "Wem wird dieser schöne Einklang der natürlichen Triebe mit den Vorschriften der Vernunft nicht entzückend sejn, und wer

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 194. NA.vol.21.p.27. SA.vol.12.P.148.11.13-14-

(2) The Philosophical and Aesthetic Letters and Essays of Schiller. Translated by J. Weiss. London. 1845. p. 196. The Bohn translation also gives "too intimate" cf. ed. cit. p. 246.

sich enthalten können, einen solchen Menschen zu lieben?"¹

From this sentence there seems to be no doubt that the forces within the personality have achieved a harmonious relationship with each other. ("dieser schöne Einklang"). Yet the rhetorical question again suggests an element of doubt, especially when it is followed by the further one:

"Aber können wir uns wohl, bei aller Zuneigung zu demselben, versichert halten, dass er wirklich ein Tugendhafter ist, und dass es überhaupt eine Tugend gibt?"²

However much the forces within the personality may seem to be in harmony, there is some doubt in Schiller's mind as regards the validity of the claim. Towards the end of the same essay the concept of a 'false' harmony is explicitly expressed. Here Schiller is talking about the purpose in Art of "das Pathetische" and he writes:

"Also hinweg mit der falsch verstandenen Schonung und dem schlaffen verzärtelten Geschmack, der über das ernste Angesicht der Notwendigkeit einen Schleier wirft, und, um sich bei den Sinnen in Gunst zu setzen, eine

Ex.12. Harmonie zwischen dem Wohlsein und Wohlverhalten lügt,

(1) SW. vol.12. p.355.
(2) ibid.

NA.vol.21.p.44. SA.vol.12.p.241.II.4-4
NA.vol.21.p.44. ibid.

wovon sich in der wirklichen Welt keine Spuren zeigen".¹

Here the use of the verb "lügen" shows that the harmony between "Wohlsein", which may be taken to refer to that happy state where the interests of self are satisfied, and "Wohlverhalten", which may be taken to refer to the precepts of duty, has only been achieved by concealing some of the unpleasant truths of actual life. In Schiller's view as expressed here it is utterly worthless and is to be rejected. Nevertheless this 'false' harmony may often beguile us. There is thus a third relationship between the forces of the personality which seems to be a harmonious one, but which is not to be confused ----- theoretically at least ----- with a true or ideal harmony.

In translating the passage quoted above J. Weiss rendered "lügt" by "counterfeits"² and it is proposed to refer to this third relationship from now on as that of 'counterfeit harmony'.

Three more senses in which Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" have now been isolated. Harmony may be "sinnlich", "moralisch" or "counterfeit". (The instrument of the personality, it is suggested, may be tuned in three

(1) SA. vol. 12. p. 249. 1. 34 - p. 260. 1. 5.
 SW. vol. 12. p. 366. (Schiller's italics). NA. vol. 21.
 (2) op. cit. p. 258. pp. 51-52.

different ways). It now remains to investigate these
~~III. further consideration of the patterns of harmony
 three above terms more thoroughly.
 within the personality.~~

In the attempt to analyse the expressions "sinnliche Harmonie", "moralische Harmonie" and "counterfeit harmony" more thoroughly, the essays UAW and NG will be considered in more detail. As Professor Garland has said, "the interest of Über Anmut und Würde is primarily ethical", ¹ for Schiller is here trying to decide what constitutes an ethical action, what constitutes a beautiful action, and whether an action may be both ethical and beautiful at the same time. It has already been shown that, in UAW, Schiller considers the action of an animal to be governed entirely by the stimuli that it receives through its senses. "Auf die Begierde und Verabscheuung erfolgt bei dem Thiere" he says when explaining the term "Naturnothwendigkeit", "eben so notwendig Handlung, als Begierde auf Empfindung, und Empfindung auf den äussern Eindruck erfolgte."² An animal action could perhaps now be formulated as follows:

(1) H.B. Garland, Schiller, London, 1949, p. 161.

(2) SW, vol. 11, p. 467. (From this point onwards the reader is also referred to Appendix 3, where the references are given in the 'Nationalausgabe' (NA).

S.A. vol. II, p. 225, ff. 3-6.


III. Further consideration of the patterns of harmony
within the personality

In the attempt to analyse the expressions "sinnliche Harmonie", "moralische Harmonie" and "counterfeit harmony" more thoroughly, the essays UAW and NG will be considered in more detail. As Professor Garland has said, "the interest of Über Anmut und Würde is primarily ethical", ¹ for Schiller is here trying to decide what constitutes an ethical action, what constitutes a beautiful action, and whether an action may be both ethical and beautiful at the same time. It has already been shown that, in UAW, Schiller considers the action of an animal to be governed entirely by the stimuli that it receives through its senses. "Auf die Begierde und Verabscheuung erfolgt bei dem Thiere" he says when explaining the term "Naturnothwendigkeit", "eben so notwendig Handlung, als Begierde auf Empfindung, und Empfindung auf den äussern Eindruck erfolgte."² An animal action could perhaps now be formulated as follows:

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- (1) H.B. Garland. Schiller. London. 1949. p. 161.
 (2) SW. vol. 11. p. 441. (From this point onwards the reader is also referred to Appendix B, where the references are given in the 'Nationalausgabe' (NA).)

S.A. vol. II. f. 225. II. 3-6.

(1) This section may perhaps be followed more easily if use is made of the descriptive Appendix A, in which this and the following diagram are reproduced.




The actions of an animal correspond to its natural needs, and in its case the needs of the self are nearly always the same as the needs of the species. The animal has no experience of conflict and can thus have no experience of harmony. It could be compared to an instrument that is able to sound only one note.


In Man, on the other hand, the decision to act rests with the Will. A man may, if he so chooses, disobey the urges of natural needs, although he cannot deny the urges themselves. (He may choose to starve himself to death, but he cannot prevent himself from feeling hungry.) Again Man has the freedom to choose between obedience to his own selfish desires and obedience to the laws of duty which he himself has evolved by conscious thought to legislate for the good of the whole. Despite his recognition of this freedom of choice, Schiller is nevertheless clear that the decision should fall on the side of duty. At another point in UAW he writes: "Aber der Wille soll seine Bestimmungsgründe von der Vernunft empfangen, und nur nach

(1) This section may perhaps be followed more easily if use is made of the detachable Appendix A, in which this and the following diagrams are reproduced.

demjenigen, was diese erlaubt oder vorschreibt, seine Entschliessung fassen. Wendet sich nun der Wille wirklich an die Vernunft, ehe er das Verlangen des Triebes genehmigt, so handelt er sittlich; entscheidet er aber unmittelbar, so handelt er sinnlich".¹ In Man, therefore, two types of action may be distinguished. The first is "sinnlich", thus:



The second is "sittlich":



As far as the outcome of the action is concerned, b) is not to be distinguished from a) above, although even in this case Schiller is loth to say that Man is a mere animal. Man would only be reduced to mere animal status "wo der Mensch dem Triebe nicht bloss freien Lauf liesse; sondern wo der Trieb diesen Lauf selbst nähme".² The above actions are all instigated by a sense-stimulus: that is, they are courses of action prescribed by an immediate response to the world of appearances, the world of space

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 444. S.A. vol. II. p. 226. I. 34 - p. 227. I. 6.
(2) ibid. (Schiller's italics) S.A. vol. II. p. 226. II. 25-29.

and time, which we come to know through our senses. In Man, however, there is the possibility of yet a third type of action - namely, an action instigated by the awareness of duty. ("Vernunft"). This action will also be "sittlich", but the Will still has freedom to reject it. Such an action may be represented thus:

d) $V \rightarrow W \rightarrow S$

From an intuitive sense of the moral law. From the

When an action of type c) is referred to "Vernunft"----- that is, when we ask ourselves whether our desires are in accordance with duty, two possibilities are presented. The action may either be approved:

e) $S \rightarrow W \rightarrow V$

Begierde

or it may be rejected:

f) $S \rightarrow W \rightarrow V$

Begierde

Similarly an action of type d) may be obeyed by the Will because it is in agreement with desire:

g) $V \rightarrow W \rightarrow S$

Pflicht

or it may be found to conflict with desire:



When the concept of "sinnliche Harmonie" was discussed in the preceding chapter, there was seen to be a complete "Übereinstimmung zwischen ... Empfinden und Denken" (Ex. 6). It was also said to be a state in which the individual acts from an intuitive knowledge of the moral law. From the above diagrams it will therefore be clear that "sinnliche Harmonie" could only be the result of actions of type e). The desired course of action is, in this case, in tune with the precepts of duty. The action is "sinnlich" in that it has been commanded by intuition, which may perhaps be further defined as a feeling of what is right at any given moment, a feeling that itself springs from an immediate response to circumstances. The action is also "harmonisch" in that the rational side of the personality does not disapprove of it. One explanation of how "sinnliche Harmonie" might be possible has now been obtained. It still remains to be seen how far this explanation corresponds with Schiller's use of the term in the context of UNSD.

From the above diagrams it will also be clear that in actions of type f) where desires are not in line with the

course prescribed by duty, a state of conflict arises.

An individual can now defy duty and follow his own desires, when his action will, in its outcome, be indistinguishable from those of type b). If he chooses to obey duty, however, he will encounter the resistance of his own desires, and the action will here fall together with that of type h). In this situation, he must struggle to suppress his desire and follow duty, for, as Schiller says:

"..... kann eine Handlung der Pflicht mit den

Ex. 13. Forderungen der Natur nicht in Harmonie gebracht werden, ohne den Begriff der menschlichen Natur aufzuheben, so ist der Widerstand der Neigung nothwendig".¹

There are circumstances in which harmony between the forces within the personality, although desirable, may be impossible to attain - circumstances, where self-interest must be visibly conquered. Where such a victory is seen to occur, the individual is said to express himself with "Würde". As Schiller says: "Wo also die sittliche Pflicht eine Handlung gebietet, die das Sinnliche nothwendig leidend macht.....da kann also nicht Anmuth, sondern Würde der Ausdruck sejn".² "Würde" alone, as Lutz pointed

(1) UAW. SW. vol. 11. p. 453. (SA. vol. II. p. 233. II. 36. ff.)

(2) ibid. p. 454.

¹
out, can never be the expression of harmony.

Where duty prescribes a course of action, (type d) harmony can only be achieved if desire voluntarily approves. (type g). A state resulting from an action of type g) might therefore be said to be a state of "moralische Harmonie". An action of type g) is "moralisch" in that it is in accordance with duty, and "harmonisch" in that all the forces within the personality are working co-operatively with each other. If there is no conflict here with desire, the state of "moralische Harmonie" will only be different from that of "sinnliche Harmonie" in that in the former the conscious knowledge of duty, in the latter intuition alone, prescribes the course of action. The state described above (i.e. the state resulting from an action of type g) may be said to be the first kind of "moralische Harmonie". However, even in actions of type f) and h), where there is conflict, Schiller wishes harmony to be brought about. Desire, he tells us, is to come into harmony with the moral law (Ex. 1) and, in the example given above (ex. 13), the use of "gebracht werden" suggests a process of striving towards concord. The moment of conflict may find its expression in "Würde", but once impulsive desires have been conquered,

(1) op. cit. pp. 124 ff.

Schiller wishes self-interest to accept the decision. This second kind of "moralische Harmonie" will again be indistinguishable in practice from "sinnliche Harmonie" and "moralische Harmonie" of the first kind, but it will be theoretically different in that it has only been attained after a period of conflict. (If "sinnliche Harmonie" and the first "moralische Harmonie" are compared to the bottom note of a scale, this second "moralische Harmonie" might be said to sound the octave higher.) It will thus be seen why, in UNSD, Schiller said that "jene Zustände sinnlichen Friedens" could be a symbol of 'moral' harmony (Ex. 9) and why 'moral' harmony was itself referred to as "die höhere Harmonie" (Ex. 10). It will also be seen that in the expression "moralische Harmonie" as it was used in the first example from UNSD (Ex. 9), the word "moralisch" may have at least three of the connotations isolated by Mrs Sayce¹ i.e. i) "ethisch-sittlich gut" ii) "geistig, seelisch, innerlich" (referring to the inner harmony of the personality) and iii) "zur Idee gehörig" (referring to an ideal to be attained).

R. Buchwald, who considered that Schiller came to see all his philosophical studies as "Irrwege",² has said that

(1) loc. cit.

(2) R. Buchwald Schiller. Leipzig. 1937. p. 238. ^{II.}

Schiller never remained in the realms of abstract theory for very long.¹ A few concrete examples might perhaps be welcome here, too. In one of the Kalliasbriefe Schiller,² expanding the parable of the Good Samaritan, tells the story of a man who falls among thieves and who then lies by the roadside, asking passers-by for help. The first man who comes along is willing to help, but cannot bear the sight of suffering. "Gut gemeint, sagte der Verwundete, aber man muss auch das Leiden sehen können, wenn die Menschenpflicht es fodert. Der Griff in Deinen Beutel ist nicht halb so viel werth, als eine kleine Gewalt über Deine weichlichen Sinne". This action Schiller terms "bloss passioniert, gutherzig aus Affect". In this case the individual concerned was unable to fulfil his moral duty properly, because he was unable to control his feelings. His desire is to get away from the scene of suffering as soon as possible, although he knows that he should stay and do something more positive than merely giving the injured man money. He is experiencing the situation illustrated by diagram f) above. Furthermore, he is unable,

(1) op.cit. p. 247. (He cites the Good Samaritan examples from the Kalliasbriefe in proof of this).

(2).Schillers Briefe. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Hrsg. von F. Jonas. vol. 3. pp. 261-265. (Letter of 18. February. 1793.).

through lack of self-control, to bring desire and duty into harmony. Here the failure to achieve harmony springs from what Schiller elsewhere calls "Unvermögen des Subjekts".¹ It must be noted, however, that an impulse that springs purely from self-interest is not, in Schiller's thought, necessarily a bad one. It may be "gutherzig". The man did at least try to do something and did not just pass by on the other side. Another traveller, although himself weak and ill, is prepared to sacrifice his own horse and cloak to the wounded man. "Die Pflicht", he says "gebietet mir, Dir zu dienen". This action, Schiller concludes, was "rein (aber auch nicht mehr als) moralisch, weil sie gegen das Interesse der Sinne, aus Achtung für's Gesetz unternommen wurde". This traveller experienced the state illustrated by diagram h) and the conflict within the personality is shown by the words "und mit sich selbst kämpfend steht er da". His final decision to offer his cloak and horse is a demonstration of "Würde". Finally, a traveller approaches who sees the need of the wounded man and, of his own accord, asks to help him. All self-interest is forgotten. He leaves his own possessions by the roadside

(1) UAW. SW. vol. 11. p. 453. SA. vol. II. p. 233. 1. 24. FF.

in order to carry the wounded man on his back to the next village. This man, says Schiller in the continuation of the letter,¹ acted "als wenn bloss der Instinct aus ihm gehandelt hätte". If the words "als wenn" are studied carefully, they will be seen to imply that this man did not act from intuition, but from a conscious awareness of his duty. Since he obviously wished to help and fulfilled his task without any sign of inner conflict, his action must have been one of the type illustrated in diagram g). i.e. one of moral harmony. In the same letter Schiller calls this action a morally beautiful one. Moral beauty he considers to be "das Maximum der Charaktervollkommenheit" and defines such beauty as a state where "die Pflicht zur Natur geworden ist". The distinction between acting from intuition and acting as if from intuition is perhaps theoretical at this point, but, as will be seen later, it is important in other parts of Schiller's theory.

When he says that the desire to obey duty should become one's second nature, Schiller implies that some process of development must be undergone. As has already been stated, desire and duty are to be brought into harmony through the mediation of taste, the sense of the beautiful.

(1) Letter to KUNNER OF 19 February 1793. Schiller's italics where quoted.
 (1). Schillers Briefe. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Hrsg. von F. Jonas. vol. 3. p. 264. (Letter of the 19. February. 1793.)

(Exs. 3 and 4). This idea, the central theme in Schiller's thought, is to be heard again at the beginning of the essay NG, which, although concerned chiefly with various modes of artistic presentation, also contains some shrewd psychological insights. Here Schiller writes:

"Die Wirkungen des Geschmacks überhaupt genommen sind, Ex. 14. die sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte des Menschen in Harmonie zu bringen, und in einem innigen Bündnis zu vereinigen".¹ The last clause here "in Harmonie zu bringen und in einem innigen Bündnis zu vereinigen" suggests that there has previously been a state of conflict, and the word "Harmonie" may therefore be understood to refer to the state of "moralische Harmonie" discussed above. The layers of meaning concealed by the word "Harmonie" are now beginning to be revealed. This harmony is now to be brought about by taste "dadurch zwar, dass die Begierden sich veredeln und mit den Forderungen der Vernunft übereinstimmender werden".² Taste has therefore to undertake the development of our impulsive desires in such a way that they urge only those courses of action which are in line with the precepts of duty. To distinguish these 'educated' impulses from true intuitions they will be called here 'ennobled desires'.


(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 158. SA. vol. 12. p. 120. II. 11-14.

(2) ibid. p. 187. SA. vol. 12. p. 142. II. 28-30.

In the essay Über den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer Sitten,¹ which may be read as a complementary piece to NG, Schiller cites the action of Duke Leopold von Braunschweig who rowed across a storm-swept river in an effort to save some people "die ohne ihn hülflos waren". This action, says Schiller, was clearly prescribed by duty but, in most circumstances, it would have then have come into conflict with self-interest. "Die Vorstellung der Pflicht ging hier vorher, und dann erst regte sich der Erhaltungstrieb, die Vorschrift der Vernunft zu bekämpfen". This is clearly the situation described by diagram h). If now, Schiller continues, the Duke can be supposed to have an exceptionally well-developed feeling for beauty which "Alles, was gross und vollkommen ist, entzückt, so wird in demselben Augenblicke, als die Vernunft ihren Ausspruch thut, auch die Sinnlichkeit zu ihr übertreten, und er [der Herzog] wird das mit Neigung thun, was er ohne diese zarte Empfindlichkeit für das Schöne gegen die Neigung hätte thun müssen". (Another, more trivial, example could perhaps also be imagined. Anyone, on a warm day, may experience a conflict between the awareness of work to be done indoors and a wish to go outside into the sun. Here a feeling for the beautiful might persuade one of the

(1) SW. vol. 12. For the example of Leopold von Braunschweig see pp. 340. ff. (Where quoted, Schiller's italics)


value of seeing one's work properly and tidily finished first). "Moralische Harmonie" brought about by the mediation of taste may now perhaps be expressed diagrammatically thus:



It must be stressed that this process is instigated by a precept of duty. The education of impulse by taste is only set in action after the precepts of duty are clear. The process shown above might be called the true aesthetic education.

In the essay NG, however, Schiller explains how the education of impulse by taste may prove extremely dangerous, if the precepts of duty are not clearly known. In some works of art, he says first of all, it can be detected that the content has been sacrificed to the form in order to make a pleasing impression on the senses. Here taste has exceeded its legitimate function and the result is not beauty, but superficiality. "Schriftsteller", says Schiller "welche mehr Witz als Verstand und mehr Geschmack als Wissenschaft besitzen, machen sich dieser Betrügerei nur

allzu oft schuldig".¹ If "Betrügerei" is in itself a strong word, Schiller is even more outspoken when he speaks of the dangers that may arise when taste takes control of the human will. "Aber eben diese Willkürlichkeit, auf Maximen des Willens angewandt, ist etwas Böses und muss unausbleiblich das Herz verderben".² There is no escape from the implication of this sentence: Schiller seems to have envisaged a false type of aesthetic education which may, in certain circumstances, have evil consequences. The function of the true aesthetic education is to present the precepts of duty in an acceptable form; the false aesthetic education tries to deceive us into believing that what we want to do is in accordance with duty. In a man of taste, Schiller explains, the impulsive desires have been 'ennobled' and are not generally in conflict with the precepts of duty. This relationship of the forces within the personality may be expressed thus:



This state must be distinguished carefully - in theory, at least - from the states of "sinnliche Harmonie" and


(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 181. SA. vol. 12. p. 138. II. 24-26.

(2) ibid. p. 186. (Schiller's italics). SA. vol. 12. p. 142.
II. 15-18.

"moralische Harmonie". In "moralische Harmonie" as illustrated by diagram i) an awareness of the moral law has been demonstrated. In "sinnliche Harmonie" as illustrated by diagram e) the individual concerned intuitively knows what is in accordance with the moral law. In the state illustrated above the individual has no real awareness of the moral law; his impulses are motivated solely by a desire for the beautiful. Now, Schiller continues in NG, "Je öfter nun der Fall sich erneuert, dass das moralische und ästhetische Urtheil, das Sittengefühl und das Schönheitsgefühl, in demselben Objekt zusammentreffen und in demselben Aussprache sich begegnen, desto mehr wird die Vernunft geneigt, einen so sehr vergeistigten Trieb für einen der ihrgen zu halten und ihm zuletzt das Steuer des Willens mit uneingeschränkter Vollmacht zu übergeben".¹ In the state expressed by diagram j) the individual concerned still referred his desires to his rational nature: that is, he asked himself whether what he wanted to do really was in accordance with his duty. Now he is sure that what he wants to do is morally right and no longer hesitates to think. This new state may be expressed thus:

(1) SW. vol.12. pp. 188- 189. (Schiller's italics).

SA. vol. 12. p. 144. ll. 3-10.



It will be seen that this type of action is not to be distinguished in practice from an action of type b). In both cases, the will acts of its own accord. Such actions, although they may be "gutherzig" or even "pflichtmässig" (to borrow a Kantian term) are nevertheless morally neutral.

In Über den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer Sitten Schiller tells the story of a Greek rebel who is presented with an opportunity of killing his captor while the latter is asleep. The decision to spare his captor's life will only be moral, says Schiller, if it is taken with regard to the law of justice that it is wrong to kill. The rebel, however, is supposed by Schiller to be a cultivated man who refuses to kill "weil er das Widrige, eine Niederträchtigkeit begangen zu haben, nicht ertragen kann".¹ Although the outcome of this action is indistinguishable from what duty would have decreed and the captor's life is spared, it must be remembered that the action itself springs from a feeling for the beautiful alone. In nine cases out of ten the trust placed in the 'ennobled impulses' will be perfectly

(1) SW. vol. 12. p.341.

SA. vol. 12. p. 156. 11.32-34.


justified, but sooner or later a tenth case will arise when the impulse, however noble, will be at variance with the moral law. A process of self-deception now begins. Our desires have always been perfectly moral before; surely they must be so now? Perhaps it is the law itself that is wrong? Schiller describes this process in some detail in NG when he says: "Die veredelte Neigung, welche sich Achtung zu erschleichen gewusst hat, will also der Vernunft nicht mehr untergeordnet, sie will ihr beigeordnet seyn. Sie will für keinen treubrüchigen Untertan gelten, der sich gegen seinen Oberherrn auflehnt; sie will als eine Majestät angesehen seyn und mit der Vernunft als sittliche Gesetzgeberin, wie Gleich mit Gleichen, handeln".¹ We now argue that the moral law be brought into line with our own desires. "Die zufällige Zusammenstimmung der Pflicht mit der Neigung wird endlich als notwendige Bedingung festgesetzt und so die Sittlichkeit in ihren Quellen vergiftet"² writes Schiller at another point. The false aesthetic education now comes into play and, instead of the moral law appearing as our desire, our desire now appears as the moral law. Schiller gives, in NG, several examples. The novel Les

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 190. (Schiller's italics) ?SA. vol. 12. p. 145.

(2) ibid. p. 187. (Schiller's italics). 11.4-10.

SA. vol. 12. p. 143. 11.6-9.

Liaisons dangereuses depicts a situation in which the sacrifice of virtue is excused by the suggestion that it was in this case an act of magnanimity. If someone we love is unhappy and this unhappiness can be relieved by an immoral action, "Sollen wir ihn leiden lassen, um ein reines Gewissen zu behalten ?.....heisst das lieben, wenn man bei dem Schmerz des Geliebten noch an sich selbst denkt¹ ?" In this manner, says Schiller, does love itself seek to deceive us, and he continues "Ist unser Charakter nicht durch gute Grundsätze fest verwahrt, so werden wir schändlich handeln bei allem Schwung einer exaltirten Einbildungskraft".² Other examples given by Schiller are the telling of a 'white' lie in order to avoid a breach of good manners, and the justification (preached in Schiller's day by the French Revolutionaries, and by how many others in our own age ?) of the sacrifice of one generation for the sake of the next. These actions, which are the result of a compromise on the part of the moral law may be expressed as follows:



(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 191 (Schiller's italics) (SA.vol.12.p.145.1.38 PF)
(2) ibid. p. 192. {ibid.

This state, which is brought about by the false aesthetic education, is the state of "counterfeit harmony". Because an individual in such a state has deceived himself that his desires are in agreement with the precepts of duty, there is no sense of conflict, but the harmony is based on a compromise, not on a true reconciliation of self-interest and moral law.

It must be stated that, although in the examples above, taste has deceived us into thinking one of our desires to be moral, the deception can also occur where, as Schiller says, "die Pflicht zuerst handelt". Leopold von Braunschweig, for example, could easily have told himself that his love for his own family forbade such a foolhardy action. The possibilities of self-deception are endless. In the parable told in the Kalliasbriefe the passer-by whose action was "rein moralisch" could also have argued that he had a duty not to risk his own life by giving the wounded man his cloak and horse. (Again, on a warm day, when our desire is to go outside even though our duty is to continue our work indoors, we may imagine that our insistence on staying indoors is detrimental to our health, which we also have a duty to preserve). Indeed, any feeling of harmony between the forces within the personality is ambiguous; that is, it is impossible to tell in practice whether the individual

concerned has acted out of accordance with the moral law, as in the states of "sinnliche Harmonie" and "moralische Harmonie" or whether, as in the states of "counterfeit harmony", he has merely deceived himself. When Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" without a qualifying adjective it may therefore be found that all three relationships (i.e. intuitive, moral, and counterfeit) may be implied by it.

Perhaps the best example of the ambiguity of the harmonious state is afforded by a study of the "schöne Seele". Most commentators have seen the "schöne Seele" as the symbol of Schiller's ideal for mankind. Berger,¹ for instance, sees the "sittliche Schönheit" which is exemplified by the "schöne Seele", and the expression of which is "Anmut", as Schiller's answer to Kant's insistence on the division between morality and feeling. Lutz writes: "Die höchste Vollendung zu der sich der Mensch erheben kann, ist also die Anmut. Er soll eine schöne Seele werden".²

(1) K. Berger, Schiller. Munich. 1909, Vol. 2. pp. 183 ff.
 (2) op. cit. pp. 124 ff.

Melitta Gerhard says "In der Übereinstimmung der sinnlichen und geistigen Natur des Menschen, wie sie die schöne Seele besitzt, sah Schiller 'das Siegel der vollendeten Menschheit'".¹ There can be no doubt that the "schöne Seele" is one name for Schiller's ideal of a perfectly-integrated harmonious human being, for in UAW he writes:


"In einer schönen Seele ist es also, wo Sinnlichkeit

Ex. 15. und Vernunft, Pflicht und Neigung harmoniren, und Grazie ist ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung".²

The use of the verb "harmoniren" in this sentence suggests very well the reciprocal inter-play of the forces within the personality, for the active voice seems to imply the way in which the separate notes of desire and duty are mingled with each other so perfectly that it is impossible to tell which was struck first. Where there is a perfect integration of all the forces within the personality, an action may be of type e) where the stimulus comes from intuition, or of type g) where the stimulus comes from a conscious awareness of duty. To illustrate the reciprocal inter-play in such cases, diagrams e) and g) could now be enlarged as follows:

(1) Melitta Gerhard. Schiller. Bern. 1950. pp. 207. ff.

(2) SW. vol. 11. pp. 437 ff. SA vol. II. p. 222. II. 11-13.



It will be clear that this reciprocal state, where duty is desire and desire is duty, is also attained after the process undergone in the true aesthetic education illustrated by diagram i). The verb "harmoniren" in Ex. 15 thus conceals three theoretically distinguishable relationships between the forces within the personality: that of "sinnliche Harmonie", where, as in the case of genius, there is an intuitive awareness of what is right; that of "moralische Harmonie" of the first kind (diagram g) where, like the fifth traveller mentioned in the Kalliasbriefe, an individual gladly performs what he knows to be his duty; and that of "moralische Harmonie" of the second kind (diagram i) which is reached, as perhaps in the case of the Duke of Braunschweig,¹ after a state of conflict and

(1) cf. p. & preceding.

through the mediation of taste, or the sense of the beautiful.

The relationship of the "schöne Seele" with the outside world is necessarily also harmonious. The characteristic expression of the "schöne Seele" in the outside world is grace, and, as Schiller says,

"Zur Anmut muss sowohl der körperliche Bau als der Charakter beitragen; jener durch seine Biegsamkeit,

- Ex. 16. Eindrücke anzunehmen und in's Spiel gesetzt zu werden, dieser durch die sittliche Harmonie der Gefühle".¹

In this sentence the expression "sittliche Harmonie der Gefühle" illustrates by the very balance between "sittlich" and "Gefühle" the reciprocal relationship between desire and duty. The "schöne Seele" does not have to repress feelings and inclinations, because all feelings and inclinations are now already moral. All actions of the "schöne Seele" seem to flow easily and naturally from the whole personality; there are no signs of that rigid insistence on the moral law which, in Schiller's view, indicates a tense and therefore discordant personality. The life of a pedantic "Zögling der Sittenregel" is compared by Schiller to a drawing in which one can still see the first guiding strokes, whereas

(1) SW. vol. 11. pp. 438 ff. 5 A. ool. II. p. 223. II. 1-5.

Seebold: ".....in einem schönen Leben sind, wie in einem Titianischen Gemälde, alle jene schneidenden Grenzlinien verschwunden, und doch tritt die ganze Gestalt nur desto wahrer, lebendiger, harmonischer hervor".¹

Ex. 17. Here also the word "harmonisch" may be said to conceal the three relationships isolated above, while the word "lebendig" indicates once again that, in Schiller's thought, the true harmonious state always has an active, dynamic character. To illustrate the way in which the dynamic character of the harmonious personality generates further harmonies in the outside world, Schiller enlarges in UAW upon his earlier theory of the harmony between body and soul. Physical beauty, he writes, may be ravaged by a discordant spirit, whereas

".....so sieht man auch zuweilen das heitere und in sich harmonische Gemüth der durch Hindernisse gefesselten Ex. 18. Technik zu Hülfe kommen, die Natur in Freiheit setzen, und die noch eingewickelte gedrückte Gestalt mit göttlicher Glorie auseinander breiten",²

and the "schöne Seele" may cast an irresistible grace "auch über eine Bildung, der es an architektonischer

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 437. SA.vol.11.p.222. II. b-10.

(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 404. (Schiller's italics). SA.vol.11.p.196.

II. 18-22

Schönheit mangelt".¹ The theory of the harmony between body and soul now suggests, as Ex. 16 also clearly shows, that actions in the outside world expressed by graceful bodily actions bear witness to an inner harmony which is now discovered to be that state where desire and duty have become synonymous.

Schiller certainly evolved the concept of a "sittliche Harmonie der Gefühle" as an answer to Kant's insistence that the only moral actions are those from which inclination and self-interest have been excluded as motives. In Schiller's view Kant had denied the possibility of both intuition and ennobled desire; that is, he had seemed to deny that desires could in themselves be moral. This position was considered by Schiller to be both dangerous and ridiculous; dangerous, because it seems to deny the possibility of harmony and leads to a repression of one side of the personality; ridiculous, because it may lead to such absurd situations as the one described in Schiller's satirical distiches Die Philosophen.² Here "Gewissenscrupel" complains:

"Gerne diene ich den Freunden, doch th' ich es leider
mit Neigung,

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 438.
(2) SW. vol. 1. p. 484.

The two distiches quoted here may be found in NA. vol. 1. p. 357, where the answer to "Gewissenscrupel" is given by "Decisum". Also in SA. vol. 1. pp. 266 ff.

Und so wurmt es mir oft, dass ich nicht tugendhaft bin"
and "Entscheidung" replies:

"Da ist kein anderer Rath, du musst suchen, sie zu
verachten

Und mit Abscheu alsdann thun, wie die Pflicht dir
gebeut".

In UAW, however, Schiller is honest enough to acknowledge the counter-argument of the "Rigoristen" who, he says, insist that the visible repression of desire is the only means of telling whether an action is moral or not. "Um also völlig sicher zu sein, dass die Neigung nicht mit bestimmte, sieht man sie lieber im Krieg, als im Einverständnis mit dem Vernunftgesetze, weil es gar zu leicht sein kann, dass ihre Fürsprache allein ihm seine Macht über den Willen verschaffte".¹ In other words, how can we ever be sure, in cases where desire and duty seem to co-incide, that our actions are determined by moral precepts, and not by the expectation that the outcome would be to our own advantage? Perhaps, for instance, we serve our friends because we think that they may one day do a good turn for us? Are we quite sure that we should still serve them, if we knew we were going to receive

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 430 (Schiller's italics)

nothing in return? Is the co-incidence of desire and duty a true harmony, or merely a counterfeit one?

In the first part of UAW Schiller defines the "schöne Seele" as follows: "Eine schöne Seele nennt man es, wenn sich das sittliche Gefühl aller Empfindungen des Menschen endlich bis zu dem Grad versichert hat, dass es dem Affekt die Leitung des Willens ohne Scheu überlassen darf, und nie Gefahr läuft, mit den Entscheidungen desselben im Widerspruch zu stehen".¹ If the first part of this sentence is considered, it will be found to describe that state of affairs illustrated by diagram k) where desires are now of such a noble nature that they can, in nine cases out of ten, be trusted. Actions of this type, however, where there is no conscious reference to the moral law, are in themselves morally neutral. They are also "harmonious" in that they do not involve a conflict between desire and duty. It may also be permissible to speak of certain actions of type b), where there is no awareness of the moral law, as "harmonious" in this way, for such actions need not necessarily be amoral and Schiller certainly allows "Anmut" to uncivilised people and to children. "Auch dem rohen Menschen fehlt es nicht an einem gewissen

(1) SW. vol. 11. pp. 436 f. SA. vol. II. p. 221. 11. 19-24.

Grade von Anmut¹, wenn ihn die Liebe oder ein ähnlicher Affekt beseelt, und wo findet man mehr Anmut¹ als bei Kindern, die doch ganz unter sinnlicher Leitung stehen ?"
When Schiller writes therefore:

Ex. 19. "Die Anmut¹ nämlich zeugt von einem ruhigen, in sich harmonischen Gemüth¹ und von einem empfindenden Herzen",² it will be seen that the word "harmonisch" here can refer to at least five different relationships between the forces within the personality (diagrams e,g,i,k and b). The relationships expressed by diagrams k and b can now also be included under the meanings of "harmonisch" in Exs. 15, 17 and 18. It would thus seem that the term "schöne Seele" could be applied to any individual in any of these five states.

A situation must now be imagined where duty and desire clearly come into conflict. The situation faced by the Duke of Braunschweig is once more a good example, for here there is no doubt that self-interest would demand that one's own life be preserved. People with no awareness of a higher moral law will here be ruled entirely by self-interest: a child, for instance, would seek to escape the

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 454. → SA. vol. II. f. 234. II 21-24.

(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 456. → SA. vol. II. f. 236. II. 10-12.

dangers of the rising waters. In more mature people, who may be supposed to have some awareness of moral duties, three re-actions are possible. If their lives have been guided not so much by moral precepts as by self-interest in an ennobled guise, they are now likely to submit themselves to the false aesthetic education illustrated by diagram 1) and persuade themselves that their moral duty is not to attempt to rescue the marooned people but to preserve their own lives. Have they not various important responsibilities elsewhere? If, on the other hand, their lives have been guided by moral precepts, although until now these have always co-incided with ^{desire} ~~duty~~, they may decide to attempt a rescue, although they do not wish to do so. This action will be "rein moralisch" and will be performed with "Würde". Some people, like the Duke of Braunschweig, will however even here be able to bring their desires into line with duty and will brave the flood-waters gladly and willingly. Such people will clearly be seen to have achieved "moral harmony" of the higher kind. (diagram 1). It is now clear why, in the second part of UAW, Schiller says: "Die schöne Seele muss sich also im Affekt in eine erhabene verwandeln, und das ist der untrügliche Probierstein, wodurch man sie von dem guten Herzen oder der Temperament-

(1) 87, vol. II, p. 157. (Schiller's Aesthetic Education)
SA. vol. II, p. 229. 11.6.9.

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stugend unterscheiden kann". As long as there is no clear demonstration of awareness of the moral law and of obedience to it, it is impossible to distinguish the individual whose actions fortuitously co-incide with the moral law ("das gute Herz"), the individual who is moral only as long as it is in his interest to be so ("Temperamentstugend") and who, in time of crisis, easily slips into a "counterfeit harmony", and the individual who has attained a true synthesis of desire and duty. The term "schöne Seele" is to be applied only to the last of these, that is, to the individual who, in times of crisis, can show himself capable of attaining "moral harmony" of the higher kind. Such an individual will, in states of "Anmut", always be aware of the moral law, be it intuitively (diagram e) or consciously (diagram g). Although both these states may in practice fall together with that illustrated by diagram k), where there is no direct reference to the moral law because desires are now trusted to prescribe moral actions, the authority of the moral law over the will can, in the case of the "schöne Seele", at any time be reasserted. Lutz compares the re-assertion of the moral law in times of crisis with the burning of a fuse-wire

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 447. (Schiller's italics).

in an electric circuit: the current of "schöne Sittlichkeit" is momentarily broken, because the harmony between duty and desire has not yet become adjusted to the new situation.¹ There is no inconsistency in Schiller's thought when he asserts that "die schöne Seele muss sich... in eine erhabene verwandeln": he is proposing that his ideal harmonious individual will, on all occasions, be able to obey the moral law willingly, even though such an individual may momentarily experience conflict. Although he agrees with Kant and the "Rigoristen" that "es beim Sittlichhandeln nicht auf die Gesetzmässigkeit der Thaten, sondern einzig nur auf die Pflichtmässigkeit der Gesinnungen ankommt",² he insists on the possibility of a voluntary acceptance of the moral law, which will bear witness to an inner harmony and which will manifest itself in the outside world with "Anmut".

The momentary conflict experienced by the "schöne Seele" in times of crisis is expressed in the outside world by a demonstration of "Würde". As Schiller writes; "Beherrschung der Triebe durch die moralische Kraft ist Geistesfreiheit, und Würde heisst ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung".³ Although at this point in UAW "Würde" is

(1) H.Lutz, op.cit. pp. 124 ff.

(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 430. SA.vol.11.p216.11.24-26.

(3) SW. vol. 11. p. 447. (Schiller's italics). SA.vol.11.p229.

11.24-26.

clearly inconsistent with "Anmut", the outward expression of harmony, a little later Schiller states "Sind Anmut und Würde in derselben Person vereinigt, so ist der Ausdruck der Menschheit in ihr vollendet".¹ Does he now envisage a synthesis of "Anmut" and "Würde", or is he referring here solely to their separate manifestations on different occasions? Lutz considers that there can be no synthesis of the two qualities; in his view Schiller's language is obscure at this point.² Berger attempts very little explanation of the problem and is content to paraphrase Schiller.³ Melitta Gerhard also paraphrases Schiller when she writes that "beides ... zusammen erst das Bild des vollkommenen Menschen verkörpert",⁴ although in her opinion, too, "Anmut" and "Würde" are only to be manifested separately on different occasions. One explanation of the expression "in derselben Person vereinigt" in the sentence quoted above is undoubtedly, as Lutz and Melitta Gerhard imply, that it refers to the potential ability of the ideal "schöne Seele" to manifest now "Anmut", now "Würde" as the situation demands. If, however, diagram

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 457 (Schiller's italics). *SA.vol II.p.236.II.25ff.*
 (2) H. Lutz, op.cit. pp. 124 ff.
 (3) K. Berger. Schiller. Munich. 1909. Vol.2. pp. 183 ff.
 (4) M. Gerhard. op.cit. pp. 208 ff. (author's italics).

i) is considered again it will be seen that, in the attainment of "moralische Harmonie" here, desire first of all struggles against the stern precepts of duty and "Würde" must be demonstrated, but at the same time the process of bringing desire into line with duty through the mediation of taste is already taking place, and finally a state of "Anmut" is again achieved. Thus, although Lutz is right in so far as "Anmut" and "Würde" can logically only appear at separate moments in time, it could perhaps be said that, on occasions when "moralische Harmonie" is achieved, the two qualities may be seen to merge into each other so quickly that a synthesis is suggested.

The question must now be asked: can a true "moral harmony" of the type illustrated by diagram i) ever be attained in real life? Where a conflict between duty and desire occurs, can we ever be sure that, in any resulting agreement, we really have brought desire into line with duty and not vice-versa ? It must be realised that the "counterfeit harmony" illustrated by diagram 1) is never recognised as such by the individual concerned. To him it is a perfectly valid agreement between duty and desire, in other words a "moral harmony". If the state of "Anmut" before the conflict is ambiguous, it seems that the new state of "Anmut" after the conflict must also be so. There

is only one instance envisaged by Schiller where such ambiguity is no longer possible---the instance where duty demands the death of the individual, for here there can be no possible advantage to the self. When Schiller's Maria Stuart sees it as her duty to atone for her past sins and submits to her execution, when Don Cesar realises that the only way to lift the curse over his family is to carry out sentence upon himself and die, true "moral harmony" may be said to be demonstrated. In all other instances the possibility that we have acted out of desire for our own selfish advantage will remain. Thus, only in the supreme instances mentioned can "Anmut" and "Würde" truly be said to blend into each other and the ideal, the completed expression of humanity, be attained. In his remarks on UAW and the "schöne Seele" von Wiese has written "Der volle harmonische Einklang von Geist und Sinnlichkeit, die ungetrübte Einigkeit des Menschen mit sich selbst, bleibt dabei eine regulative Idee im Sinne Kants, wie sie sich im Prozess der Erfahrung immer nur in der Annäherung verwirklichen lässt. Sie ist nie endgültig gegeben, sondern stets von neuem aufgegeben".¹ It could be said that Schiller

(1) v. Wiese op.cit. p. 471.

envises not just one scale, but an ever-ascending scale of harmonies. As each new "harmony" is reached, it in turn becomes the lower note of a new octave, for it too must be shattered and a fresh resolution achieved, a higher note sounded. One is tempted here to quote once again the lines from Schiller's early poem Melancholie an Laura:

"Ach die kühnste Harmonie

Wirft das Saitenspiel zu Trümmer".¹

In his youth Schiller had suggested that too great an intellectual brilliance could shatter the fragile instrument of the physical body. In his mature work he is suggesting that, although each conflict between duty and desire must be resolved, if life is to have beauty and grace, we must always be aware of the ambiguity of the harmonious resolution and realise that the highest and purest harmony that can be attained is the voluntary acceptance of the moral law, where the moral law demands death. Only if we are capable of this final acceptance of duty, can we really qualify for the name of "schöne Seelen".

(1) cf. also pp. 31- 32 preceding.

IV. The significance of the patterns of harmony for society.

At the beginning of this section the reciprocal relationship in Schiller's theory between the inner world of the personality and the outer world of the environment was established. The possible patterns of harmony within the personality have now been investigated, but the relationship of these patterns with the outside world remains to be considered. This relationship between the inner psychological state of an individual and society as a whole is important for the understanding of Schiller's theory of the 'cultural evolution' of Mankind.¹ In the passages in UNSD, for example, where the terms "sinnliche Harmonie" and "moralische Harmonie" are used, Schiller is referring not only to inner psychological states but also to separate stages in the historical development of Mankind. In the assessment of the significance for society of the patterns of harmony account must therefore be taken of Schiller's own historical studies, which began in earnest on his arrival in Weimar in 1787 and culminated in his professorship at Jena during 1789 and 1790. The writings of this

(1) This term is borrowed from Grossman, cf. his article entitled 'The Idea of Cultural Evolution in Schiller's Aesthetic Education'. Germanic Review. XXXIV. 1959. pp. 39 ff.

period, some of which formed the material for Schiller's professorial lectures, throw some interesting light on some of the ideas found in later essays such as UAEM and UNSD. For the purposes of the present investigation perhaps the most important are Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte¹? (1789), Etwas über die erste Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der Mosaischen Urkunde² (1790) and Die Gesetzgebung des Lykurgus und Solon.³ (1790). It should perhaps be noted that the subject-matter of the first and second of these was probably inspired by Kant's Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784) and his Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte. (1786).

Schiller as a historian had many detractors. He was interested neither in discovering new sources nor in ascertaining the accuracy of existing ones. Thus, although he always undertook considerable research before writing his historical essays and plays, he is often not altogether accurate. For instance, most historians consider his portrait of Tilly in the major study Die Geschichte des

- (1) Afterwards referred to as UG.
- (2) Afterwards referred to as MU.
- (3) Afterwards referred to as LS.

Dreissigjährigen Krieges too one-sided, while Überweg points out that in LS Schiller overlooks the fact that both Lykurgus and Solon based many of their laws on traditional practices. According to Überweg, Schiller's value as a historian lies in his ability to seize the meaning of events, to grasp the significance of any one period for the story of Mankind as a whole. It could perhaps be suggested that, in his historical studies as elsewhere, Schiller fits his own description of the 'philosophical spirit' of whom he writes in UG:

"..... seine edle Ungeduld kann nicht ruhen, bis alle seine Begriffe zu einem harmonischen Ganzen sich geordnet haben".²

The 'philosophical spirit' always works with an ideal of wholeness and harmony in mind. Just as, in a piece of music, one would not judge an individual note without reference to the harmony of the whole, so too the 'philosophical spirit' will strive to assess the contribution made by each particular period of history to the harmonious development of the human race. Schiller admits that this harmonious development is postulated, for later in the essay

(1) op. cit. pp. 104 ff.

(2) SW. vol. 10. p. 419. KA.vol.6.p.186. SA.vol. 13. f. 7. II. 13-14.

between the years 1790 and 1793 and translated now
he writes:

"Er nimmt also diese Harmonie aus sich selbst heraus,
und verpflanzt sie ausser sich in die Ordnung der Dinge,
d.i. er bringt einen vernünftigen Zweck in den Gang der
Welt, und ein teleologisches Prinzip in die Weltgeschichte".¹

Ex. 20

This sentence shows very clearly how Schiller extends the meaning of the word "Harmonie" to cover three spheres.

First of all, there is the concept of harmony within the individual. Then there is the attempt by the individual to order the outside world into a harmonious pattern.

Finally there is the further attempt to see this harmonious pattern in the past experience of the whole race. After a further study of the historical essays it will be found, too, that the inner psychological state of the individual determines not only his own personal relationship to his environment but also the historical expression of whole nations and peoples.

In the opening passages of MU Schiller tries to imagine the beginnings of human life on earth. (It should perhaps be remembered that the three voyages of Cook

(1) SW. vol. 10. p. 438 (Schiller's italics). KA.vol. 6.p. 200.

SA. vol. 13. f. 21. II. 6-10.

(1) SW. vol. 10. p. 438. SA. vol. 13. p. 9. 28. FF (16)

(2) SW. vol. 10. p. 438. SA. vol. 13. p. 26. 412. FF

between the years 1768 and 1779 had stimulated much popular interest in anthropology.) According to Schiller, it must be assumed that Man was once little more than an animal and that the first human society, however primitive it may now seem, was in fact a great step forward and "eine ausserordentliche Anstrengung".¹ In his pre-social state, as it is envisaged in MU, Man is seen as a solitary creature guided at first solely by instinct. "Durch Hunger und Durst", writes Schiller, "zeigte sich ihm das Bedürfnis der Nahrung an; was er zu Befriedigung desselben brauchte, hatte sie [die Natur] in reichlichem Vorrath um ihn herum gelegt, und durch Geruch und Geschmack leitete sie ihn im Wählen..... Für die Erhaltung seiner Gattung war durch den Geschlechtstrieb gesorgt".² It will be seen that in this very first stage Man is governed entirely by 'natural needs' and that conflict between his own individual good and that of his species does not arise. Soon, however, the rational powers of Man begin to unfold."..... seine Vernunft, noch von keiner Sorge zerstreut, konnte ungestört an ihrem Werkzeuge der Sprache bauen und das zarte Gedankenspiel stimmen. Mit dem Auge des Glücklichen sah er jetzt noch herum in der Schöpfung; sein frohes Gemüth fasste alle Erscheinungen uneigen-nützig und rein auf, und legte sie rein und lauter in einem

(1) SW. vol. 10. p.423. SA. vol. 13. p. 9. II. 28. FF (UG)

(2) SW. vol. 10. p.443.
SA. vol. 13. p. 24. II. 12. FF.

regen Gedächtniss nieder".¹ These lines bear an unmistakable resemblance to the passage in UNSD where the state of "reine Natur" and "sinnliche Harmonie" was described. There, it will be remembered, Schiller writes "Sinne und Vernunft, empfangendes und selbsttätiges Vermögen, haben sich in ihrem Geschäfte noch nicht getrennt".² At this early stage in Man's history as described in MU "Sinne" and "Vernunft" certainly work together: for example, the instinct to search for food provides the change of surroundings necessary for new experiences, and these new experiences in turn stimulate the developing conscious mind. However, Man has not yet learnt to turn his acquired knowledge against his fellows: for instance, he has not yet fenced off one particular food supply for his own private use. His life is still untroubled by selfish desire. ("Sein frohes Gemüth fasste alle Erscheinungen uneigenmäßig und rein auf").³ In the childhood of Mankind as a race each individual could be said to enjoy the state of "reine Natur" and "sinnliche Harmonie", for, under the guidance of instinct alone, each individual knew as yet no conflict

(1) ibid. p. 444. SA. vol. 13. p. 24. II. 21. FF.

(2) SW. vol. 12. p. 232. SA. vol. 12. pp. 184. FF.

(3) my italics.

between what he wanted to do and what he felt he ought to do. At this point of human history each individual, as Schiller says, was indeed "glücklich".

In MU Schiller interprets the Fall of Man as the falling-away from instinct.¹ ("Abfall von seinem Instinkte"). As von Wiese has pointed out,² Schiller also accepts the Fall of Man in a positive sense. In order to develop at all and to fulfil his destiny as a free, rational being, Man had to outgrow the first happy state described above. The forbidden fruit Schiller sees as the fruit of the "Baum der Erkenntnis" and this can perhaps be interpreted by saying that, as more and more experiences present themselves to the ordering rational mind, a point will sooner or later be reached when Man no longer knows instinctively what to do in face of a new situation. Once this point has been reached he must learn to live by the exercise of his rational powers. In MU Schiller describes how some individuals now learnt to grow crops, others to tame animals. However, the Cains soon came into conflict with the Abels, for the hard-working farmer began to be jealous of the liberty of the nomadic herdsman. Each way of life now

(1) SW. vol. 10 cf. especially pp. 444 - 448. SA. vol. 13. pp. 25-26.

(2) op. cit. cf. especially pp. 342 - 346.

wished to assert its superiority. Selfish desires, which urged the individual to secure his own immediate advantage without regard to the good of the species as a whole, now crept into human life, and the first state of harmony was lost. The childhood of Mankind, the state where everyone experienced "sinnliche Harmonie", was therefore of limited duration.

It might be objected here that two distinct meanings now appear to have been attached to the term "sinnliche Harmonie". In reference to a supposed first state of Mankind (a sense in which it is undoubtedly used in UNSD) the term seems to imply a state in which the individual is guided solely by instinct. In this first state each new experience can be integrated by the ordering mind into a harmonious pattern. Can this definition of the term "sinnliche Harmonie" be reconciled with the definition suggested in the preceding chapter ----- that is, a state where one's desires are intuitively in agreement with the demands of the moral law ? In answering this question the previous statement that, in the childhood of Mankind, the needs of the species fall together with the needs of the self requires further clarification. During the course of evolution, one could say, various species have been produced, of which each member possesses certain character-

istics. For instance, a lion has strong teeth and jaws; a horse has long legs and muscles designed for flight. The instinct of a lion is to attack and fight, of a horse to avoid danger and run away, and in this way the species of both the lion and the horse are preserved. Each animal can be said to fulfil its destiny, or "Bestimmung". For the animal there is no possibility of further development; its destiny is fixed. It never reaches the point where its instinct can no longer guide it, and thus it never experiences conflict. Man, on the other hand, is capable of further development, but once he ceases to be guided by instinct, he may fall victim to the tyranny of selfish desire, and at this point laws become necessary to legislate for the preservation of his species. The destiny of Man could now be said to be that of developing all the potential inside him without coming into conflict with these moral laws. It will now be seen that, in the childhood of Mankind, where limited experience meant limited potential, every individual could be said to have fulfilled his destiny and to have experienced the state of "sinnliche Harmonie" in the sense that he spontaneously obeyed the law of his species. At the present time, if an individual spontaneously desires to do what is right according to the moral law,

he can be said to achieve momentarily the fulfilment of his destiny and to experience that harmony which his ancestors, for a limited period, were able to maintain in all walks of life.

In UNSD Schiller attributes the quality of naivety, which was earlier stated to be linked with "sinnliche Harmonie", to children and unsophisticated people. Such people may be said to be still in the first stages of cultural evolution. Their experience of the world is as yet limited and, like their first primitive ancestors, they have not yet encountered situations where they can no longer rely on an inborn sense to guide them. In UNSD the quality of naivety is also attributed, as has already been noted, to genius. In UNSD Schiller is writing mostly of genius in one particular field, namely literature, but at certain points in the essay and in such poems as Der Genius and Das Glück he seems to envisage the possibility that there are also 'geniuses in living'. Such a person seems to know instinctively the right course of action to take in even the most complex situations. He thus never loses the "sinnliche Harmonie" once shared by the whole race in its first stage and by children and others of limited experience nowadays. His relationship with the outside world always

SA. vol. I. ff. 121. FF.

remains harmonious, and of him it may be said :

"Ein erhabenes Loos, ein göttliches, ist ihm gefallen,
Schon vor des Kampfes Beginn sind ihm die Schläfe
bekränzt".¹

Such a person, who retains "sinnliche Harmonie" under all circumstances, may indeed be said to fulfil his destiny of developing all his potential and yet remaining harmonious. Just as the less gifted may learn style from observing the works of the literary genius, so too those who do not live harmonious lives may learn from observing both the decisions of the intuitively harmonious 'genius in living' and the way in which these decisions are made. Intuitive harmony within the personality thus always means good fortune in the relationship with the outside world. In the childhood of every individual and of the race as a whole this fortunate state is experienced for a limited period. There are, however, people who seem able to maintain this fortunate state amid all the complexities of life. Such people are not only fortunate in themselves but also contribute to the well-being of society.

(1) Das Glück. S.W. vol.1. p. 434. 11. 5-6.
NA.vol.1.p.409.

Once intuitive harmony in either the individual or the race has been lost, the correct course of action must be ascertained by conscious thought. However, because the situations that now arise are so complex, conscious thought may not at first be able to provide a solution and Man is at the mercy of his impulses. In the conflict between the first Cain and Abel the rational course would have been to fix the territorial boundaries of both nomads and farmers, but at first neither side could see this solution and both, acting from impulse, tried to secure the advantage. This stage of Man's development, where selfish desires have the upper hand, is variously designated by Schiller as "rohe Natur" or "blosse Natur" or "wirkliche Natur". Unchecked, the assertion of selfish desire by each individual would quickly bring such anarchy and chaos that the race of Mankind would be in danger of extinction, and in MU Schiller shows how one man, the first King, became strong enough to impose his will over his neighbours and to form, in this way, a community based on some kind of law. Historically speaking, therefore, after the Fall of Man, a social state emerges to which Schiller gives the name "Naturstaat". This state is not to be confused with Rousseau's "état de nature". As Grossman says: "The expression "state of nature" [in Schiller's

sense] is used here to describe a state built upon hazard, necessity and force rather than upon reason --- a viewpoint quite the converse of Rousseau's more widely accepted glorification of a form of life previous to the bondage of society".¹ Schiller's "Naturstaat" is the product of a haphazard collection of laws evolved over the ages to keep the selfish desires of individuals under control. If it should be prematurely dissolved, as Schiller came to believe had happened in France during the Revolution, the tendency to anarchy and chaos, always latent in the individual, will again become manifest. As Schiller writes in UAEM: "In den niedern und zahlreichen Klassen stellen sich uns rohe gesetzlose Triebe dar, die sich nach aufgelöstem Band der bürgerlichen Ordnung entfesseln, und mit unlenksanner Wut^y zu ihrer thierischen Befriedigung eilen".² The individual who is ruled by selfish desire is at the mercy of his every impulse. He can thus achieve no purposeful, harmonious relationship with the outside world, for the stimuli he receives from it urge him first one way and then another. If such individuals form the majority in any society or race, as was the case immediately after the

(1) op.cit. p. 41.

(2) SW. vol.12. p.17. (UAEM 5). SA. vol.12. p.14. II. 31-34.

Fall of Man, anarchy and chaos will be the result.

Once the first King had welded his fellows into the first community, it was recognised that obedience to authority brought at least some order and purpose into life. In some communities it gradually happened that those whose duty it was to formulate the law now tried to regulate every aspect of human life and thus build an ordered and perfectly predictable society unshaken by individual passions. Lykurgus was one such law-giver, and in LS Schiller draws a detailed picture of life in Sparta during his regime.¹ Lykurgus' aim was to create a strong, militaristic state, a self-sufficient body in which the individual was to feel himself a cell. ("Glieder desselben Staatskörpers" writes Schiller.) Accordingly nothing was allowed which might encourage the individual to entertain ideas of his own importance. Schiller describes, for instance, how

"Ein anderes Gesetz verordnete, dass kein Haus ein anderes Dach haben dürfte, als welches mit der Axt

Ex. 21. verfertigt worden und keine andere Thür, als die bloss mit Hülfe einer Säge gemacht worden sei. In ein so schlechtes Haus konnte sich Niemand einfallen lassen,

(1) SW. vol. 10. pp. 501 - 522. SA. vol. 13. pp. 64-83.

kostbare Möbel zu schaffen. Alles musste sich harmonisch zu dem Ganzen stimmen." ¹

Lykurgus' Sparta, it could be said, achieved a certain measure of political harmony in that all possible causes of conflict between citizens were eliminated and in that everything was ordained to contribute to the good of the whole. Later, however, Schiller makes it clear that he considers this to have been a mistaken ideal of political harmony, and thus the word "harmonisch" in the above quotation might almost be said to have an ironic flavour. Schiller certainly recognised the need for some code of authority and for some division of labour within the community, but he deplored the tendency of the state to repress the individual. Thus in UAEM he writes of the individual in such a community:

"Ewig nur an ein einzelnes kleines Bruchstück des Ganzen gefesselt, bildet sich der Mensch selbst als Ex. 22. Bruchstück aus; ewig nur das eintönige Geräusch des Rades, das er umtreibt, im Ohr, entwickelt er nie die Harmonie seines Wesens...." ²

In this sentence the word "Harmonie" obviously refers to

(1) SW. vol. 10. p. 507. SA. vol. 13. p. 42. II. 4-10.

(2) SW. vol. 12. p. 23. (UAEM 6). SA. vol. 12. p. 19. II. 14-22.

the harmonious development of all the potential within each individual, and the state that allows no room for such development is to be condemned. In LS Schiller declares emphatically "Hindert eine Staatsverfassung, dass alle Kräfte, die im Menschen liegen, sich entwickeln; hindert sie die Fortschreitung des Geistes; so ist sie verwerflich und schädlich".¹ It has rightly been said that on no account would Schiller countenance the modern totalitarian state, for, however perfectly it may seem to function, it represents, as has been seen, a false ideal. (It might perhaps be mentioned that these very historical studies, where Schiller so explicitly limits the authority of the state, are often conveniently ignored by his Marxist interpreters.....)² The repression of the individual by the totalitarian state is paralleled in the development of the individual himself by a too rigid adherence to the letter of the law -- a state in which all feelings and inclinations are held to be bad. Both the individual who represses the irrational side of his nature and the state that represses the individual have advanced a little on the path of cultural evolution, in so far as they have learnt to tame the tyranny of mere selfish desire,

(1) SW. vol. 10. pp. 516-517. SA. vol. 13, p. 49. II. 15-19.

(2) cf. for example A. Gisselbrecht, Schiller et la Nation Allemande. Paris, 1956. cf. footnote on p. 117.
"Et l'intermède des études historiques (1787-1795) dont on a vu plus haut l'importance".

but they have not yet reached the goal.

At one point in UAEM, where he is explaining the causes of the lack of harmony within the individual personality, Schiller writes:

"Liegت nämlich seine Vollkommenheit in der übereinstimmenden Energie seiner sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte, so kann er diese Vollkommenheit nur entweder durch einen Mangel an Übereinstimmung oder durch einen Mangel an Energie verfehlen. Ehe wir also noch die Zeugnisse der Erfahrung darüber abgehört haben, sind wir schon im Voraus durch blosse Vernunft gewiss, dass wir den wirklichen, folglich beschränkten Menschen entweder Ex. 23. in einem Zustande der Anspannung oder in einem Zustand der Abspannung finden werden, je nachdem die einseitige Thätigkeit einzelner Kräfte die Harmonie seines Wesens stört, oder die Einheit der Natur sich auf die gleichförmige Erschlaffung seiner sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte gründet".¹

If this passage is studied carefully it will be seen that the expression "Mangel an Übereinstimmung", the inability to bring both sides of the personality into concord, may be equated with a state of tension. ("Anspannung"). In

(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 83-84. (my italics).

this state there can be no harmony, because one side of the personality is pitched too high ("je nachdem...stört") --- that is, the individual concerned is either ruled by selfish desire, or he is ruled by a too rigid insistence on the laws of duty. The political expression of the former has been found to be anarchy, of the latter totalitarianism. How then is the expression "Mangel an Energie" to be interpreted ? The individual who lacks energy is said to be in a state of relaxation. ("Abspannung"). The strings of this instrument, one might say, are so slack that no true harmony may be drawn from them. The expression "gleichförmige Erschlaffung seiner sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte" may perhaps be read as a description of that state of counterfeit harmony examined in the two preceding chapters, especially if it is linked with such passages as the following from Über das Erhabene: "Ohne das Erhabene würde uns die Schönheit unserer Würde vergessen machen. In der Erschlaffung eines ununterbrochenen Genusses würden wir die Rüstigkeit des Charakters einbüßen und, an diese zufällige Form des Daseins unauflösbar gefesselt, unsere unveränderliche Bestimmung und unser wahres Vaterland aus den Augen verlieren".¹

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 368. ("Erschlaffung" my italics - otherwise Schiller's italics.)

Here the insistence on beauty at all costs, instilled into us ^{by} ~~the~~ a refined taste, is said to lead us into a state of "Erschlaffung". If it is accepted that the individual in a state of counterfeit harmony always seeks to avoid challenge and conflict, preferring the easy and most pleasant course, it will be seen that he fails to develop his character to the utmost, that he lacks energy to make sufficient effort. Because such an individual does not rise to the challenge of life, but rather strives to avoid or neutralise it, he cannot be said to be in control of his environment. Instead of trying to impose some pattern upon the outside world, he deliberately avoids any involvement with it that would upset his own comfortable existence. Counterfeit harmony within the individual thus brings about a complacent attitude to the outside world, and this state of complacency, it must be added, is not a creative one, for here the individual is content to let the world take its course, however misguided he knows this course sometimes to be. Perhaps no better description of the way in which counterfeit harmony within the individual manifests itself politically in society is to be found in Schiller's work than in this further passage from UAEM: "Auf der andern Seite geben uns die civilisirten Klassen den noch widrigern Anblick der Schlaffheit und einer Depravation des Charakters, die

mehr

desto ~~emhr~~ empört, weil die Kultur selbst ihre Quelle ist.....Wir verläugnen die Natur auf ihrem rechtmässigen Felde, um auf dem moralischen ihre Tyrannei zu erfahren, und indem wir ihren Eindrücken widerstreben, nehmen wir unsere Grundsätze von ihr an. Die affektirte Dezenz unserer Sitten verweigert ihr die verzeihliche erste Stimme, um ihr, in unserer materialistischen Sittenlehre, die entscheidende letzte einzuräumen. Mitten im Schoosse der raffinirtesten Geselligkeit hat der Egoism sein System gegründet.....Stolze Selbstgenügsamkeit zieht das Herz des Weltmanns zusammen, das in dem rohen Naturmenschen noch oft sympathetisch schlägt, und wie aus einer brennenden Stadt sucht jeder nur sein elendes Eigenthum aus der Verwüstung zu flüchten.....Die Kultur, weit entfernt, uns in Freiheit zu setzen, entwickelt mit jeder Kraft, die sie uns ausbildet, nur ein neues Bedürfnis; die Bande des physischen schnüren sich immer beängstigender zu, so dass die Furcht zu verlieren selbst den feurigen Trieb nach Verbesserung erstickt".¹ In the first sentence of the above passage the more civilised classes within society are chastised by Schiller for being in a state of "Schlaffheit". They are also said to be demoralised, and here one may perhaps recall the passage in NG where

(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 17-19 (Schiller's italics).

Schiller writes of "Betrügerei" and "etwas Böses" with reference to a false use of taste.¹ If the next sentences are studied closely it will be seen that Schiller describes here that process analysed in full in NG and formulated in this thesis as diagram 1). The individual within the more refined classes of society has indeed learned to control his more passionate impulsive desires; he has conventions of decency and good taste which he dare not violate. His actions are still, however, motivated by self-interest without any regard for the general good of the community. When he acts, he acts solely to procure his own advantage, and where he cannot procure it, he turns complacently away. The above passage makes it quite clear that Schiller considered most of the civilised class within his own society to be in a permanent state of "counterfeit harmony". The state of "counterfeit harmony", as has already been seen, is not a dynamic one, and thus the civilised classes may be expected to reject all developments which would upset their own comforts. This situation Schiller deplores, because it hinders Mankind in his cultural evolution.

The goal of the cultural evolution for the individual as well as for society is the attainment of true moral

(1) cf. pp. 96 and 99 preceding.

harmony. The attainment of moral harmony by Society as a whole will be discussed later. For the moment it must be noted that Schiller intended the term "Naturstaat" to apply to the whole of the transitional stage between the intuitive harmony of Mankind before the Fall and the attainment of moral harmony in Elysium, one of Schiller's names for the perfected society. It may, however, prove exceedingly difficult to outgrow this transitional stage. The haphazardly evolved code of laws within the "Naturstaat" itself may suddenly be found no longer strong enough to hold in check the latent tendency towards anarchy -- that is, towards a state in which each individual does exactly as he wishes without any regard for the community. As a consequence, a much stricter code may be evolved and a totalitarian state which again hinders all further development come into being. Thirdly, development may be hindered by the complacency of the more civilised classes within the "Naturstaat" who, in a state of counterfeit harmony themselves, believe themselves to be already in the best of all possible worlds. Indeed, the complacency of this class may itself be the cause of the general decline in the prestige and effectiveness of the laws, and in this way a vicious circle -- chaos, total restraint, complacency -- is formed. (It should be noted that this

SA. vol. 12 p. 215. 11/4/EE

same vicious circle can also be observed in the development of the individual.) Schiller also envisages yet another obstacle to the further development of society. He writes in UNSD:

"Der Geisteszustand der mehrsten Menschen ist auf einer Seite anspannende und erschöpfende Arbeit, auf der andern erschlaffender Genuss. Jene aber, wissen wir, macht das sinnliche Bedürfnis nach Geistesruhe und nach einem Stillstand des Wirkens ungleich dringender als das

Ex. 24. moralische Bedürfnis nach Harmonie und nach einer absoluten Freiheit des Wirkens..... dieser bindet und lähmmt die moralischen Triebe selbst, welche jene Forderung aufwerfen mussten".¹

Here, where harmony is said to be a "moral need" and where the word itself is associated with an unlimited "Freiheit des Wirkens" it may be said that Schiller has the state of true moral harmony in mind. The attainment of this state is now said to be hindered on the one hand by exhaustion caused by too much work (a term which includes both the mental strain of living in society, of having to make decisions at every moment of the day, and the effort of sheer physical work so necessary for the maintenance of

(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 307-308. (Schiller's italics).

the community) and on the other by the stultification of the moral drive, a stultification caused by slackness and complacency. This example is proof of Schiller's great psychological insight into the workings of the individual and of society. In the individual too much work or tension creates a desire for ease, but too much ease generates complacency. Thus a second vicious circle, again inimical to the further development of society, is set up. To break both the vicious circles discussed here (and to open the door to further progress and to the attainment of moral harmony by both the individual and society) is the task of the true aesthetic education.

Before the ways in which Schiller proposes to carry out this task are discussed, the state of moral harmony must itself be explored a little further. When debating at the beginning of UAEM the way in which true moral harmony is to be obtained Schiller writes "Es käme also darauf an, von dem physischen Charakter die Willkür und von dem moralischen die Freiheit abzusondern --- es käme darauf an, den erstern mit Gesetzen übereinstimmend, den letztern von Eindrücken abhängig zu machen".¹ The concept of moral harmony is here given a new dimension.

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 10.

(UAEM 3). SA. vol 12. p. 9. II. 38 ff.

In the above sentence both the inner state of the personality and the relationship of this personality with the outside world are examined. The "moral" part of Man's character, his ability to think and his freedom to take his own decisions, is not to lose touch with the outside world but is to rely for knowledge of this world on the "physical" side of human nature, that is on the impressions received through the senses. The ideal morally harmonious person does not shrink from new experiences of the world, but the new impulses and desires which may be generated by these experiences can always be brought into harmony with the concepts of duty. ("mit Gesetzen übereinstimmend"). Through these new experiences the morally harmonious person will become more and more aware of an ever-increasing complexity and potentiality in life. Such a person could be said to control his environment in that he can order every new experience into the general pattern of his life; he is also open to his environment in that he welcomes challenge, change and new experience. As in the state of intuitive harmony, the relationship between inner and outer worlds is here truly reciprocal. The attainment of moral harmony would therefore bring with it an awareness of the unlimited potential of life and a desire

and ability to experience this to the full; it would, in other words, be a state of infinite possibility. In striving to attain this state, the individual is in fact striving towards the Divine, for God is said by Schiller to be absolute unity and harmony of being ("absolute Einheit des Erscheinens") and at the same time unlimited potential. ("absolute Verkündigung des Vermögens").¹

Just as God may be seen as the ideal for each individual, the "Staat der Freiheit" described in UAEM may be taken as the ideal for society as a whole. It could indeed be said to be the political expression of the attainment of moral harmony by each individual. The morally harmonious individual voluntarily accepts the duties imposed on him by the moral law; in the ideal society everyone would accept restrictions on his own freedom ~~to do exactly as he liked~~ in the interests of freedom for every other member of the community to develop his own particular gifts. There would thus be an equality of opportunity for everyone to expand and explore the possibilities within him, and the society itself would not be a complex piece of machinery, set in motion at some time in the past to ensure a working order, but a living and developing organism. In UAEM Schiller tries to show us

(1) UAEM (Brief 11). SW. vol. 12. p. 52.

how we can attain some degree of approximation to this ideal. In the 8th letter particularly he calls upon us to have the courage not only to fight those physical conditions which make it impossible for the majority of human beings to develop at all but also to cast aside our own complacency and shallowness: "Erkühne dich, weise zu sein."¹

When other works on Greece and the cultural evolution of mankind are taken into consideration, another layer of his thought is revealed.

In the opening letters of UAEM it sometimes seems as if Schiller is proposing the society of classical Greece as an ideal on which modern society might mould itself. For instance, he writes: "Die Griechen beschämen uns nicht bloss durch eine Simplicität, die unserem Zeitalter fremd ist; sie sind zugleich unsere Nebenbuhler, ja oft unsere Muster in den nämlichen Vorzügen, mit denen wir uns über die Naturwidrigkeit unserer Sitten zu trösten pflegen. Zugleich voll Form und voll Fülle, zugleich philosophirend und bildend, zugleich zart und energisch sehen wir sie die Jugend der Phantasie mit der Männlichkeit der Vernunft in einer herrlichen Menschheit vereinigen".² Here the

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 35. (UAEM 8). SA. vol. 12. p. 28. I. 8.

(2) SW. vol. 12. p. 20. (my italics).

(2) (UAEM 6). SA. vol. 12. p. 17. II. 5 - 14.

harmonious nature of Greek society is illustrated by the three complementary pairs of words in the last sentence. ("Form und Fülle"; "philosophirend und bildend," "zart und energisch") In that it could manifest all these qualities at the same time, Greek society is certainly seen by Schiller as one of the finest achievements of humanity to date. Yet if his other remarks on Greece and the cultural evolution of Mankind are taken into consideration, another layer of his thought is revealed.

Schiller's first detailed treatment of a Greek theme -- inspired, it has been suggested, by his envy of the success of Goethe's Iphigenie auf Tauris¹ -- is to be found in the poem Die Götter Griechenlands. It is a lament not so much for the grandeur that was Greece but for the beauty that has now fled from the world. In UAW a Greek myth is used to illustrate the concept of "Anmut" and in the following discussion Schiller speaks of "das zarte Gefühl der Griechen" and of the combination of "Natur und Sinnlichkeit, Materie und Geist" to be found in Greek works of art.² In both the poem and the essay it is the Greek desire for harmony and beauty that is praised. In Schiller's next major essay UAEIM the Greeks themselves are

(1) cf. E.M. Butler: The Tyranny of Greece over Germany. Cambridge. 1935. pp. 164-173.

(2) SW. vol. 11. pp. 384-388. SA.vol. II. pp. 180-185.

described as harmonious beings living in a harmonious society. Schiller now writes: "Damals, bei jenem schönen Erwachen der Geisteskräfte, hatten die Sinne und der Geist noch kein streng geschiedenes Eigentum; denn noch hatte kein Zwiespalt sie gereizt, mit einander feindselig abzutheilen, und ihre Markung zu bestimmen. Die Poesie hatte noch nicht mit dem Witze gebuhlt, und die Spekulation sich noch nicht durch Spitzfindigkeit geschändet. Beide konnten im Nothfall ihre Verrichtungen tauschen, weil jedes, nur auf seine eigene Weise, die Wahrheit ehrte. So hoch die Vernunft auch stieg, so zog sie doch immer die Materie liebend nach, und so fein und scharf sie auch trennte, so verstümmelte sie doch nie."¹ In Greek society, Schiller continues, each individual was a harmonious whole, whereas in modern times the individual is but a fragment, a person who can develop only one specialised part of his potential ability. The question now arises: were the Greeks living in a state of "intuitive" harmony or does Schiller mean us to think that they achieved, for a short time at least, the "moral" harmony, the perfection of both individual and society described earlier in this chapter ?

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 20. (uAEM 6). SA. vol. 12. p. 14. II. 15-26.

The passage quoted above ("Damals.....verstümmelte sie doch nie") bears at first sight a strong resemblance to the description of "sinnliche Harmonie" in UNSD. ("So lange der Mensch.....als nach Einheit strebend sich äussern").¹ In both passages "Sinne" and "Geist" (UAEM) or "Vernunft" (UNSD) are said to work together: in UAEM they have "kein streng geschiedenes Eigenthum" and in UNSD are said to be "noch nicht getrennt". In UNSD, too, Schiller definitely places the Greeks in the category of a "naive" people. Commenting on the different attitudes of Greek and modern poets, Schiller here comes to the conclusion that the Greeks led a simple life, close to Nature. "Sehr viel anders war es mit den alten Griechen" he writes. "Bei diesen artete die Kultur nicht so weit aus, dass die Natur daruber verlassen wurde. Der ganze Bau ihres gesellschaftlichen Lebens war auf Empfindungen, nicht auf einem Machwerk der Kunst errichtet; ihre Götterlehre selbst war die Eingebung eines naiven Gefühls."² However, if Greek society is allowed to represent "sinnliche Harmonie" in the history of the human race, what is now to be said of the passage previously quoted from MU ("....seine Vernunft.....in

(1) cf. pp. 67-68 preceding.

(2) SW. vol.12. p.223. SA.vol.12. p.181. II.6-11.

einem regen Gedächtniss nieder")¹? This passage, it will be remembered, referred to the happy state of Man when he was as yet little more than an animal and could still rely on his instinct to prescribe the right course of action for him in all situations. Had Schiller forgotten about this earlier passage when he wrote about the Greeks in UNSD, or can a more favourable explanation for this apparent discrepancy be found?

If UAEIM is consulted again, it will be found that Schiller did not envisage that the harmony of Greek society would last for ever. It is quite clear that he saw that, at a certain point, this harmony would have to be sacrificed, if the human race were to progress. He writes:

"Sobald auf der einen Seite die erweiterte Erfahrung und das bestimmtere Denken eine schärfere Scheidung der Wissenschaften, auf der andern das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte notwendig machte, so zerriss auch der innere Ex. 25. Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit entzweite ihre harmonischen Kräfte."²

This same process i.e. the process of growing out of one state of harmony in order to acquire new experience,

(1) cf. p. 123-125 preceding.

(2) SW. vol. 12. p. 22. (UAEIM 6). SA. vol. 12. p. 18. II. 21-28.

has already been mentioned with reference to MU. In this latter essay Man was seen to reach a stage where he could no longer rely on instinct as an infallible guide; in UAEM the Greeks are seen to live in harmony until their political institutions proved unable to meet the demands of the increasing complexities of life. It could be suggested, therefore, that Schiller sees both the development of the individual and the "cultural evolution" of Mankind in terms of a scale of harmonies; as soon as one harmonious chord is struck, a higher one still to be heard is postulated. Indeed, Schiller himself speaks in UAEM of "steps" or "degrees" of harmonious development. Greek society, for instance, is now referred to as "ein Maximum, das auf dieser Stufe wieder verharren noch höher steigen konnte."¹ It could not remain on this step, Schiller continues, because, in order to control the increasing complexity of experience, the intellectual faculties in Man had to be more sharply defined. Nor could it ascend higher "weil nur ein bestimmter Grad von Klarheit mit einer bestimmten Fülle und Wärme zusammen bestehen kann. Die Griechen hatten diesen Grad erreicht, und wenn sie zu einer höhern

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 27. (My italics)

SA. vol. 12. p. 22. II. 12-14. (UAEM 6).

Ausbildung fortschreiten wollten, so mussten sie, wie wir, die Totalität ihres Wesens aufgeben, und die Wahrheit auf getrennten Bahnen verfolgen".¹ The childhood of Mankind, as described in MU, may perhaps thus be seen as the first harmony in the scale. When it is broken, a period of anarchy, conflict, and discord follows until, finally, the next harmony, the Greek state, emerges. It will now be seen that, to the man in the first throes of discord after the Fall, the idea of the Greek city-state, had he been able to conceive it, would have appeared as the ideal "moral harmony". To us, at a stage of evolution beyond that of the Greeks, the city-state appears as the lost Golden Age, as a time when each individual was still a harmonious whole, as a lost state of "sinnliche Harmonie". Each new harmony that is heard in the scale of evolution may thus be said to be "moralisch" in relation to the harmony that has preceded it, but "sinnlich" in relation to the higher harmony that is now postulated.² The word "harmonisch" in Ex. 25 may thus be said to have a double reference both forwards and backwards.

(1) [REDACTED] SW.vol.12.p.27. SA.vol.12. p.22. II. 18-24.

(2) Lutz. op.cit. pp. 175. ff. also points out the relativity of all states of harmony. He speaks of a "Totalität erster (niederer) Ordnung" and of a "wiederhergestellte Totalität zweiter (höherer) Ordnung". The former may be a symbol of the latter, as he believes is true of the references to Greece in UNSD.

Throughout this chapter an attempt has been made to trace the correspondence in Schiller's thought between the development of the individual and the development of Mankind as a whole. In the concluding section of the last chapter it was shown how the harmonious individual, the "schöne Seele", must continually be exposed to conflict and challenge if he is not to slip back into the morally ambiguous state of counterfeit harmony. In the concluding section of this chapter an examination of Schiller's views of the Greek state has revealed that he applies the same reasoning to the processes of history. If development is to continue, if complacency is to be avoided, then harmony must be shattered and the search for a new harmony begin.

of Mankind as a whole. It may now be asked how Schiller envisaged that evolution could be accomplished.

The first step in the process to be so to be created through the example of those individuals who are themselves already harmonious. In his later stage Schiller had developed the idea of "people-mates" or "people-friends" between two harmonious people who can draw people into friendship.

(1) Cf. pp. 36-37 previous.

V. Schiller's theory of the creation of harmony.

In the last chapter it was shown how the process of world history has, for Schiller, the character of a development towards ever higher forms of harmony. It was also seen that the new harmony to which, according to Schiller, modern society is now striving is that of the "Staat der Freiheit" outlined in UAEM. This ideal state is only to be attained in so far as each individual member of the community can be brought into a state of 'moral' harmony. The creation of such a harmony within the individual -- or, at least, of a state approximating to it -- is thus of the utmost importance for the development of Mankind as a whole. It must now be asked how Schiller envisaged that such a task could be accomplished.

The first answer is that harmony is to be created through the examples of those individuals who are themselves already harmonious. In his early writings Schiller had developed the idea of "Seelenharmonie"¹ and the co-operation between two harmonious souls was thought to draw other people into friendship and brotherhood. Several passages

(1) cf. pp. 34-37 preceding.

have already been quoted to show that, in his mature work, true harmony again has an active and creative force. The 'genius', for instance, who is still guided by intuition, may be able to solve problems that have baffled others, and in this way he can be said to further harmony and progress in the outside world. The female sex, it seems, must also be mentioned here. In the much-maligned¹ poem Würde der Frauen Schiller says that women are "treue Töchter der frommen Natur" and in Das weibliche Ideal he calls Amanda truly free, because

".....ewig nothwendig
Weisst du von keiner Wahl, keiner Nothwendigkeit mehr.

Ex. 26. Was du auch gibst, stets gibst du dich ganz; du bist
ewig nur Eines,

Auch dein zarterster Laut ist dein harmonisches Selbst".²

Women, too, it may be said, have been able to retain the state of intuitive harmony. They do not have to choose between duty and desire, for they can rely on their natural feelings to provide an infallible guide. They thus know no conflict, and to the observer always appear to act from the whole of their being. ("ewig nur Eines"). It is interesting to note that Amanda is here compared to

(1) cf. A.W.Schlegel's parody of it; given in H.H. Borcherdt's Schiller und die Romantiker. Stuttgart. 1948. p.412.

(2) SW. vol.1. p.473.11.7-10. NA.vol.1.p.287.

a piece of music: each action is related to her personality in the same way as each note is related to the central theme of a musical work. She never acts out of character, despite the complexities of life, and her harmonious influence thus has a soothing effect on the lives of others.

The same theme may be heard again in Würde der Frauen:

"Aber mit sanft überredender Bitte
 Führen die Frauen den Scepter der Sitte,
Löschen die Zwietracht, die tobend entglüht,
 Lehren die Kräfte, die Feindlich sich hassen,
Sich in der lieblichen Form zu umfassen,
 Und vereinen, was ewig sich flieht". 1

Here the italicised expressions all indicate a process of reconciliation and harmonization. To the person seeking harmony, feminine grace and calm appear as qualities to be admired and, if possible, imitated. In this way the harmonious individual has power to heal the discords within other people and thus within society as a whole.

Although the harmonious individual may serve as a guide, each person should ultimately find his ideal inside himself. As Schiller writes in UAEM: "Jeder individuelle

(1) SW. vol. 1. p. 410.11. 57-62 (my italics). For the reference to "treue Töchter der frommen Natur" cf. 1.20.

Würde der Frauen may be found in NA.vol.1.pp.240-243, and in

SA.vol.1. pp.25-29.

Mensch...trägt, der Anlage und Bestimmung nach, einen reinen idealischen Menschen in sich, mit dessen unveränderlicher Einheit in allen seinen Abwechslungen übereinzustimmen die grosse Aufgabe seines Daseins ist".¹ For each individual the ideal will be the same, yet different: the harmonious integration of all the qualities that he alone possesses and of all the experiences that he alone encounters. Each one of us, it could be said, must be led through life by our own personal vision of harmony.

It has already been shown how the appreciation of the beautiful may bring about, in the individual, the desired reconciliation between the impulsive and rational sides of Man's nature. Because this process has such important political and cultural implications (as Schiller says

"Der Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesellschaft weil er Harmonie in dem Individuum stiftet")² it must now be considered in a little more detail, even at

(1) SW. vol. 12. p.12. SA. vol. 12. p. 11. II. 8-12. (UAEM 4).
 (2) UAEM: Brief 27. SW. vol. 12. p. 154.

↓
 SA. vol. 12. p. 118. II. 2-3.

the risk of repeating much of the work that has already been done on this subject.¹ In his review of Bürger's poetry Schiller defines the task of the artist (the creator of beautiful objects) as:

"..... die in mehrern Gegenständen zerstreuten

- Ex. 28. Strahlen von Vollkommenheit in einem einzigen zu sammeln, einzelne, das Ebenmass störende Züge der Harmonie des Ganzen zu unterwerfen, das Individuelle und Lokale zum Allgemeinen zu erheben."²

The work of art, in this case the completed poem, is seen here as an integrated whole, in which all the various parts stand in a balanced relationship to each other. No one part is allowed to dominate and upset the balance.

The purely individual emotions experienced by the poet

(1) In addition to the works already mentioned I should like to add here the following, as I have found them particularly helpful.

H.A.Korff. Geist der Goethezeit. Leipzig. 1930. esp. Teil.II. Klassik. pp. 476 ff.

H.Meng. "Schillers Abhandlung über Naive und sentimentalische Dichtung. Prolegomena zu einer Typologie des Dichterischen". Wege zur Dichtung. Zürcher Schriften zur Literaturwissenschaft. Vol. XXIII. 1936. The Introduction and Notes of W.F.Mainland's edition of Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung. Blackwell's German Texts. Oxford. 1951.

(2) SW. vol.12. pp. 406-407. NA.vol.22.p.253.

SA. vol.16. p. 236. II. 20-24.

(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 406-07. NA.vol.22.p.251.

SA.vol.16. p. 236. I. 25 - p. 234. I. 1.

("das Individuelle und Lokale") have to fit into the harmony of the whole. It is this inner equilibrium between the parts that endows the poem with a symbolic and universal significance. This inner equilibrium is, however, difficult to create. In the same review Schiller lists:

".....ein unedles, die Schönheit des Gedankens entstellendes Bild, ein in's Platte fallender Ausdruck,
Ex. 29. ein unnützer Wörterprunk, ein...unächter Reim oder harter Vers, was die harmonische Wirkung des Ganzen störte...."¹

By drawing attention to themselves such features detract from the totality of a work, and the general impression is not one of harmonious integration, but of a disjointed succession of isolated words and thoughts. From these sentences it is clear that Schiller considers the harmonious effect of a work of art to depend on the ability of the artist to create an impression of an integrated whole, in which there is balance and reciprocal inter-play between the parts. The work of art may thus stand as a symbol of the harmonious personality, for it demonstrates within itself those principles on which the harmony of the personality must be based. The work of art, for Schiller, is furthermore never merely a symbol of

(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 406-407. NA.vol.22.p.251.

SA. vol. 16. p. 233. l. 35 - p. 234. l. 1.

the harmonious personality: it is also an agent that produces, for a short time at least, the state of harmony in the beholder. In NG Schiller says that a truly beautiful work of art

".....wird dem Verstand vollkommen Genüge thun, sobald es studirt wird, aber eben weil es wahrhaft ist, so dringt es seine Gesetzmässigkeit nicht auf, so wendet Ex. 30. es sich nicht an den Verstand insbesondere, sondern spricht als reine Einheit zu dem harmonirenden Ganzen des Menschen, als Natur zur Natur".¹

The appeal of the truly beautiful work of art is not limited to the intellect alone, although the study of the details of its composition (the way in which the colours are arranged in a painting, for instance) would perhaps reveal rational principles. Its appeal is to both sides of the personality at once: to the rational, because it contains within itself a demonstration of the subjugation of the part to the whole; to the impulsive (*sinnlich*), because it can only be apprehended through the senses. The appreciation of such a work thus brings into play all the forces within the personality, as the active force

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 174. (Schiller's italics)

of the word "harmonirend" in the above sentence indicates. Momentarily, therefore, the beholder experiences the harmony of both sides of his personality and becomes aware of his true nature. Thus the work of art, as a symbol of this true nature, and the beholder may be said to stand in the relationship "Natur zur Natur".

Prior to the experience of the state of harmony in front of the work of art the beholder will be in a state of either "Anspannung" (tension) or "Erschlaffung", which may be equated with 'counterfeit' harmony. One of the previous examples of the word "Harmonie" showed how Schiller compared the individual in a state of tension to an instrument that had been pitched too high.¹ In this case, harmony will only be possible when the taut strings are loosened. Similarly an individual in a state of complacency has been said to resemble an instrument that has not been pitched high enough.² Here the loose strings must obviously be tightened. Schiller is thus led to postulate two distinct kinds of aesthetic effect to redress the balance in either case. To these he gives the names

(1) cf. Ex. 4 pp. 58-59 preceding.

(2) cf. pp. 135 - 136 preceding.

of "schmelzende" and "energische Schönheit".¹ In UAEM Schiller writes of the former:

"Für den Menschen unter dem Zwange entweder der Materie oder der Formen ist also die schmelzende Schönheit Ex. 31. Bedürfnis, denn von Grösse und Kraft ist er längst gerührt, ehe er für Harmonie und Grazie anfängt empfindlich zu werden."²

From the context it is reasonably clear that the above sentence contains one of Schiller's favourite figures of speech, that of chiasmus.³ "Materie" can be related to "Kraft" and "Formen" to "Grösse". The individual who is dominated by impulses that come to him from the outside, material world is at the mercy of the most forceful impression occurring at any given moment. The individual who is a slave to the concepts of reason ("Formen") may have been seduced by the moral "greatness" of following duty at the expense of denying the other parts of his nature. In neither case will there be any feeling for true harmony and grace. The task of "auflösende" or "schmelzende Schönheit" is therefore twofold: it must tame the wild impulses in the one case and bring about a

(1) The same theme is repeated in UNSD, where the two types of aesthetic effect appear under the names of "Erholung" and "Veredlung".

(2) SW. vol. 12. p. 81. SA. vol. 12. p. 63. II. 4-2. (UAEM 16).

(3) cf. also Professor Wilkinson's remarks on this figure of speech. op.cit. passim.

recognition of impulse and feeling in the other. In UAEM Schiller further explains how this task is to be accomplished. "Die schmelzende Schönheit" he writes "um dieser doppelten Aufgabe ein Genüge zu thun, wird sich also unter zwei verschiedenen Gestalten zeigen. Sie wird erstlich, als ruhige Form, das wilde Leben besänftigen, und von Empfindungen zu Gedanken den Übergang bahnen; sie wird zweitens als lebendes Bild die abgezogene Form mit sinnlicher Kraft ausrüsten, den Begriff zur Anschauung und das Gesetz zum Gefühl zurückführen."¹ It is from this starting-point that the concept of the play-impulse is finally developed. The artist not only creates an integrated whole; he also creates an illusion or semblance. ("Schein"). By entering into the illusion, by 'playing' (that is, by taking part for the sake of taking part) the individual finds his tensions released. Later in UAEM Schiller writes:

"Der gesetzlose Sprung der Freude wird zum Tanz, die Ex. 32. ungestaltete Geste zu einer anmutigen harmonischen Gebärden- sprache...."²

The leap of joy and the clumsy gesture are purely impulsive re-actions. They follow immediately from an external stimulus and the individual has no control over them. In

SA. vol. 12. p. 66. II. 13-20. (UAEM 14).
 (1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 85-86. (Schiller's italics).
 (2) SW. vol. 12. p. 151.

SA. vol. 12. p. 116. II. 5-4. (UAEM 24).

the art-forms of the dance and the mime, however, he can leap and gesticulate without experiencing any external stimuli at all. Either by performing himself or by watching others he can find an outlet, in 'play', for his urges. He is thus no longer dominated by them and is free to think about his impressions and to develop the rational side of his nature. On the other hand, the individual "unter dem Zwang der Formen" may, on watching a dance or mime, be 'carried away' or 'enlivened' by the action. His repressed impulsive nature finds a momentary satisfaction, again in 'play', and he remembers how to feel. Of "anspannende" or "energische Schönheit" Schiller writes: "Für den Menschen unter der Indulgenz des Geschmacks ist die energische Schönheit Bedürfnis, denn nur allzugern verscherzt er im Stand der Verfeinerung eine Kraft, die er aus dem Stand der Wildheit herüberbrachte."¹ The individual who has been seduced by taste into a state of 'counterfeit' harmony has lost any driving urge to action he may once have possessed. For him challenge is necessary. The movements of the dance or mime must awaken in him the urge to act and exert himself in the outside world. In this way the harmonious work of art may generate harmony

(1) UAEM. Brief. 16. SW. vol. 12. p.81.

in three very different types of individual, and both barriers (i.e. tension and complacency) to Man's further development may be lifted. Schiller summarises this in UAEW by saying:

"Beide entgegengesetzte Schranken werden....durch Ex. 33. die Schönheit gehoben, die in dem angespannten Menschen die Harmonie, in dem abgespannten die Energie wieder herstellt".¹

Ideally, Schiller says, both effects should be generated by one and the same work of art. In practice, however, this will rarely be found, as the artist himself is subject to the limitations of the world and is not necessarily a harmonious being. In UNSD Schiller distinguishes the different modes of feeling that may impel an artist to create. In other words, he is now concerned not with the effect of the work of art as such but with the creative process itself. The 'naive' poet, it could be said, is one who has been able to retain the state of 'intuitive' harmony and thus finds no conflict between himself and the outside world. His aim, Schiller writes, is to present "die möglichst vollständige Nachahmung des Wirklichen".² As examples of 'naive' poets Schiller cites among others

(1) SW. vol. 12. p.84. SA. vol. 12. p. 65. II. 6-9. (UAEW 14).
 (2) SW. vol. 12. p.232. SA. vol. 12. p. 188. II. 26-29.

Shakespeare (whose objectivity had at first alienated him), Homer and Molière. The creations of the 'naive' poet may have both 'relaxing' (auflösend) and 'strengthening' (anspannend) effects. The objective presentation of reality, whereby the 'naive' poet is exposed to the danger of falling into the vulgar or trivial, may not prove palatable to everyone and may thus disturb and arouse the complacent individual. At the same time the 'naive' poet portrays life as a whole, and this portrayal of wholeness, of a harmony in which all elements of life, both tragic and comic, find their own particular place, may enable the release of tension in the ways described above. The 'reflective' poet, on the other hand, may be said to be one who no longer stands under the guidance of intuition. He is not at one either with himself or with his environment but is striving to attain 'moral' harmony. Of his work Schiller says:

"Entweder ist es der Widerspruch des wirklichen Zustandes, oder es ist die Übereinstimmung desselben mit dem Ideal, welche vorzugsweise das Gemüth beschäftigt; oder dieses ist zwischen beiden getheilt. In dem ersten Falle wird es durch die Kraft des innern Streits, durch Ex. 34. die energische Bewegung, in dem andern wird es durch die

SA. vol. 12 p. 221, ll. 30-39.

Harmonie des innern Lebens, durch die energische Ruhe befriedigt; in dem dritten wechselt Streit mit Harmonie, wechselt Ruhe mit Bewegung".¹

In the first case mentioned here there is an awareness of the discrepancy between the actual state of affairs and the ideal which, it might now be said, is the state of 'moral' harmony. Such a feeling, which criticises the actual world, finds its expression in the satirical mode.

In the second case there is a vision of 'moral' harmony ("Übereinstimmung..mit dem Ideal") and this finds its expression in the idyllic mode. In the third case there may be both the presentation of the ideal and the lament that this ideal is nowhere realised. This mixed feeling is expressed by the elegiac mode. The satirical mode is said to satisfy "durch die Kraft des innern Streits, durch die energische Ruhe". By its forceful challenge to existing conditions, by its vivid and sometimes bitter portrayal of the conflict between the ideal and the real, it may be said to exert a 'strengthening' influence on those in a state of complacency. The idyllic mode, which presents a vision of the successfully integrated life and of the energy that flows from it ("die Harmonie des innern

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 276. footnote. (Schiller's italics)

SA. vol. 12. f. 221. II. 30-39.
SA. vol. 11. f. 276. II. 30-35

Lebens... die energische Ruhe"), will encourage a 'tense' person to work for the reconciliation of the opposing forces. Where criticism of the actual world is mixed with the presentation of the ideal 'moral' harmony, as in the elegiac mode, both 'strengthening' and 'relaxing' effects may be expected. The former will be awakened by the portrayal of "Streit" and "Bewegung" and the latter by "Harmonie" and "Ruhe".

If UAEM deals primarily with the effect of a work of art and UNSD with the different kinds of creative impulse in the artist himself, Schiller elsewhere tackles in more detail the question of the subject-matter of the work of art as such. His categories of the beautiful and the sublime may perhaps be considered under this heading. In his Zerstreute Betrachtungen über verschiedene ästhetische Gegenstände Schiller gives us a description of a beautiful landscape and examines its effect upon us:

"Wir sind aufgelöst in süsse Empfindungen von Ruhe, und indem unsere Sinne von der Harmonie der Farben, der Ex. 35. Gestalten und Töne auf das Angenehmste gerührt werden, ergötzt sich das Gemüth an einem leichten und geistreichen Ideengang und das Herz an einem Strom von Gefühlen."¹
Although this passage refers to the beauty of natural objects,

(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 570.

those works of art which portray such objects may be said to have a beautiful subject-matter. Such works please by their depiction or evocation of harmony, achieved perhaps by the harmony of line and colour in painting, of sound in music, or of sound and image in poetry. From what has been said above it will be clear that such works have, first and foremost, a 'relaxing' influence and help to bring about harmony in the beholder in the way already described.

Schiller's analysis of the sublime follows very closely that worked out by Kant in the Critique of Judgment. The feeling of sublimity is evoked when the individual becomes aware of his rational nature. This may happen firstly when, in the face of great physical danger or great physical magnitude, the individual feels within himself something that enables him to challenge such manifestations, and secondly when, in the conflict between duty and desire, he is able to subjugate his selfish impulses to the general good and thus prove that he is more than an animal. In such cases the conflict between the rational and impulsive sides of human nature is often clearly seen. In Über das Pathetische, as in UAW, Schiller refers to the statue of the 'Laokoon' group for an example of a sublime facial expression at variance with the suffering shown elsewhere in the body. He writes:

"An dieser Disharmonie nun zwischen denjenigen Zügen, die der animalischen Natur nach dem Gesetz der Notwendigkeit eingeprägt werden, und zwischen denen, die der selbsttätige Geist bestimmt, erkennt man die Gegenwart eines übersinnlichen

Ex. 36. Prinzip in Menschen, welches den Wirkungen der Natur eine Grenze setzen kann....."¹

Works of art which portray such situations may be said to have a sublime subject-matter. By their portrayal of disharmony they disturb complacency and throw out a challenge to greater effort. The portrayal of the sublime is the task of tragedy, although it may also be portrayed by other genres. As a tragedian himself Schiller was naturally most interested in this dramatic form and he examined it in detail in many of his minor essays e.g. Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen (1792) and Über die tragische Kunst (1792) as well as Über das Pathetische (1793). Schiller's concept of tragedy has already been very fully discussed by many interpreters and only those aspects which seem relevant to the present thesis will be mentioned here.²
 In Über das Pathetische, for instance, Schiller tells us "Das erste Gesetz der tragischen Kunst war Darstellung der

(1) SW. vol. II. p. 483. SA. vol. II. p. 255. I. 36 - p. 256. I. 4.

(2) Perhaps special reference should be made here to the following: "Schicksalsbegriff und Tragik bei Schiller und Kleist". Germanische Studien. Heft 228. Berlin 1940. F. Prader. "Schiller und Sophokles". Zürcher Beiträge zur deutschen Literatur - und Geistesgeschichte. No. 7. Zürich. 1954.

leidenden Natur. Das zweite ist Darstellung des moralischen Widerstandes gegen das Leiden".¹ Tragedy must portray both the conflict between the impulsive and rational sides of the personality (we must see that the protagonist suffers such a conflict) and the triumph of the higher, rational principle. This is the more important way in which the tragedies of Shakespeare (and of other dramatists, be they 'naive' or 'reflective') exert their 'strengthening' effects.

In Über die tragische Kunst Schiller says explicitly that tragedy is perhaps the best medium for presenting such effects, for, unlike the novel or the epic, it shows the action unfolding in the present before our eyes. "Eine Reihe mehrerer zusammenhängender Vorfälle wird erfordert" says Schiller, as he gives advice to the would-be tragedian,² "einen Wechsel der Gemüthsbewegungen in uns zu erregen, der die Aufmerksamkeit spannt, der jedes Vermögen unseres Geistes aufbietet, den ermattenden Thätigkeitstrieb ermuntert, und durch die verzögerte Befriedigung ihn nur desto heftiger entflammt". At the same time, however, great tragedy may also be 'relaxing' as it portrays ultimately, according to Schiller, the harmony of the universal order. The individual's sacrifice to a higher duty contributes to

(1) SW. vol. 11. p.475. SA.vol. II. f. 249 II. 33-35.

(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 558. (my italics)

SA.vol. II. f. 145. II. 15-20.

the harmony of the Universe as a whole, just as one discord may mingle in the overall harmony of a symphony. It is interesting to note the use of this very metaphor in Über die tragische Kunst:

"Dann gesellt sich zu unserem Vergnügen an moralischer Übereinstimmung die erquickende Vorstellung der vollkommensten Zweckmässigkeit im grossen Ganzen der Natur, und die Ex.37. scheinbare Verletzung derselben.....wird bloss ein Stachel für unsere Vernunft, in allgemeinen Gesetzen eine Rechtfertigung dieses besonderen Falles aufzusuchen, und den einzelnen Misslaut in der grossen Harmonie aufzulösen."¹

From this examination of Schiller's theories of the nature and effects of art and artistic creation, it is clear that the true aesthetic education as represented by diagram i) has a two-fold task. This task may perhaps be summarised as "Where there is harmony, conflict; where there is conflict, harmony" if it is borne in mind that 'harmony' in the first half of this suggested maxim refers to the 'counterfeit' state, whereas in the second half it refers to the 'moral' one. The aim of the true aesthetic education is always the establishment of true 'moral' harmony as shown by diagram i) but, as it is almost impossible to distinguish

(1) The expression "moralische Übereinstimmung" does not, I believe, refer here to "moral harmony" but merely to an agreement with the moral law.

(2) SW. vol. 11. p.545.

~~to distinguish~~ the pseudo from the real harmony because of our infinite capacity to deceive ourselves, 'strengthening' effects will always be necessary to disturb complacency. On the other hand, the aesthetic education must always seek, through the effects of 'relaxing' art, to generate in each individual a vision of the possible higher 'moral' harmony still to be attained. Ideally, therefore, Art should ensure that Mankind as a whole continues to progress towards ever higher and more complex forms of harmonious integration. Schiller nevertheless recognises that, in practice, there are several ways in which Art may either serve the false aesthetic education shown in diagram 1) or even fail altogether. In the first instance 'relaxing' art may "suffocate" as Schiller writes in UAEM¹, both the emotional and the moral drives. ".....daher", he continues "wird man in den sogenannten verfeinerten Weltaltern Weichheit nicht selten in Weichlichkeit, Fläche in Flachheit, Korrektheit in Leerheit, Liberalität in Willkürlichkeit, Leichtigkeit in Frivolität, Ruhe in Apathie ausarten.....sehen". The second noun in each of the above pairs might perhaps be regarded as an attribute of the state of 'counterfeit' harmony e.g. "Weichlichkeit" (a state of being ruled by

(1) For the use of "ersticken" and for the following quotation here cf. SW. vol. 12. p. 81.

feelings), "Flachheit" (lack of emotional or intellectual depth), "Leerheit" (the absence of any real guiding principle), "Willkürlichkeit" (the arbitrary following of one's own desires), "Frivolität" (the refusal to take the world seriously) and "Apathie" (the refusal to face challenge and change). Secondly, 'strengthening' art may generate too much energy with the result that, once again, the wilder passions and impulses take control.".....daher", Schiller says,¹ "findet man in den Zeitaltern der Kraft und der Fülle das wahrhaft Grösse der Vorstellung mit dem Gigantesken und Abenteuerlichen, und das Erhabene der Gesinnung mit den schauderhaftesten Ausbrüchen der Leidenschaft gepaart". In this sentence the expressions "das wahrhaft Grösse der Vorstellung" and "das Erhabene der Gesinnung" may be said to represent what 'strengthening' art should achieve, while "gigantic" or "fantastic" ideas and "gruesome outbreaks of passion" bear witness to its dangers. Yet again, as Schiller admits, Art may fail in furthering the aesthetic education, because there will always unfortunately be the individual

".....der ohne Sinn für jene Harmonie immer nur auf

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 81. SA. vol. 12. p. 62. 11. 24-31. (UA EM 16).

das Einzelne dringt, der in der Peterskirche selbst nur die
 Ex. 38. Pfeiler suchen würde, welche dieses künstliche Firmament unter-
 stützen....."¹

The power of the harmonious work of art to generate harmony
 in the beholder is here completely neutralised. Such an
 individual, it must be assumed, is beyond help and is con-
 demned to spend all his life as a fragment, never gaining
 awareness of his full human potential.....

Despite the difficulties outlined above, Art is perhaps
 the sole force which, in Schiller's view, can guide Man
 towards his true destiny. As he writes in the review of
 Bürger's poetry:

"Bei der Vereinzelung und getrennten Wirksamkeit
 unserer Geisteskräfte, die der erweiterte Kreis des Wissens
 und die Absonderung der Berufsgeschäfte notwendig macht, ist
 es die Dichtkunst beinahe allein, welche die getrennten
 Kräfte der Seele wieder in Vereinigung bringt, welche Kopf
 und Herz, Scharfsinn und Witz, Vernunft und Einbildungskraft

Ex. 39. in harmonischem Bunde beschäftigt, welche gleichsam den
 ganzen Menschen in uns herstellt".²

The totality of the individual, in which state there is
 harmonious activity and an awareness of unlimited potential,

(1) NG. SW. vol. 12. p. 175. SA. vol. 12. p. 134. II. 8-11.

(2) SW. vol. 12. p. 398. VNA. vol. 22. p. 245.

SA. vol. 16. p. 229. II. 15-23.

may be restored after either a state of complacency or a state of conflict by the experience of Art. The 'moral' harmony experienced in such moments, if only for a short time, allows each individual to postulate for himself an ideal being, or "schöne Seele", in whom this harmonious state would be constantly maintained. In this way each individual may indeed glimpse his own vision of harmony, which he can then take as the guiding principle of his life.

~~behavior.~~

This preoccupation is again reflected in Schiller's style and speculative method. Again and again in the

In the poem Die Führer des Lebens Schiller gives a warning against one-sided commitment of any kind. "Nimmer widme dich Einem allein"¹ he says, "Never try to play on one theme, and one theme alone, throughout your life". A similar principle is recommended in Licht und Wärme² where the reader is exhorted to combine the warmth and earnestness of enthusiasm with the shrewd, practical gaze of the man of the world. In Die Johanniter³ he saw the Christian religion as a subtle balance of strength and humility. The

(1) SW. vol. 1. p. 449. l. 9. NA.vol.1.p.272. SA.vol.1. f. 260-261.
 (2) SW. vol. 1. p. 447. NA.vol.1.p.383. SA.vol.1. f. 211.
 (3) SW. vol. 1. p. 416. NA.vol.1.p.233. SA.vol.1. f. 262.

In NA the earlier titles are given; thus Die Führer des Lebens appears as Schön und Erhaben, and Die Johanniter as Die Ritter des Spitals zu Jerusalem.

difficulties of obtaining any such balance between opposing forces are indicated in Die schwere Verbindung, where the energy of genius and the discipline of taste fight shy of each other.¹ In Das Ideal und das Leben the ideal of harmony is again presented as unattainable in this life. Even Hercules has to wait for death before he can hear the Olympian music.....² These random examples show Schiller's constant pre-occupation with the concept of harmony and his attempt to find in it a criterion for all action and behaviour.

This pre-occupation is again reflected in Schiller's style and speculative method. Again and again in the philosophical essays opposing forces are weighed against each other; each side is scrupulously examined until a higher concept that unites both is discovered. This process is, moreover, by no means confined to the essays. In Das Lied von der Glocke, for instance, the smelting of the metals is described in similar terms; first a hard metal, and then a soft one is taken, and from their combination comes the harmonious sound.

(1) One of the Votivtafeln. cf. SW. vol. I. p. 465. NA.vol.1.p. SA. vol. I. 150.

(2) SW. vol. 1. pp. 365-371. SA.vol. I. ff. 191-196. 301.

The first version of Das Ideal und das Leben will be found in NA.vol.1.pp.247-251 under the title of Das Reich der Schatten,

"Prüft mir das Gemisch,
 Ob das Spröde mit dem Weichen
 Sich vereint zum guten Zeichen.

Denn, wo das Strenge mit dem Zarten,
 Wo starkes sich und Mildes paarten,
 Da gibt es einen guten Klang".

Indeed, the concept of harmony, for Schiller, could be said to be a 'religious' one in the widest sense of this word. In his youth, in Die Theosophie des Julius, he had written "Das Universum ist ein Gedanke Gottes"² and the whole created world, in all its variety and vastness, had been seen as a work of art conceived and executed by God. Every manifestation of harmony, in nature or in art, was regarded as a reflection of God, the supreme artist.

"Harmonie, Wahrheit, Ordnung, Schonheit, Vortrefflichkeit," Schiller says here, "geben mir Freude, weil sie mich in den thätigen Zustand ihres Erfinders, ihres Besitzers Ex. 40. versetzen, weil sie mir die Gegenwart eines vernünftig empfindenden Wesens verraten und meine Verwandtschaft mit diesem Wesen mich ahnen lassen".³

When Schiller writes "meine Verwandtschaft mit diesem Wesen

{1} SW. vol. 1. p. 393. ll. 85-90. KA.vol.1.p.248. SA.vol.1.p.48.
 {2} SW. vol. 10. p. 324. SA.vol.II. f. 114. l. 19.
 {3} SW. vol. 10. p. 325. SA.vol.II. f. 118. ll. 8-13.

mich ahnen lassen" he implies that, in the Divine work of art, Man must occupy a special place. As has been seen, there is a clear distinction in all Schiller's thought between the world of Nature, in which Man, like the animals, would be guided solely by instinct, and the world of freedom, in which Man shares by his ability to make his own decisions and to determine his own acts. With this distinction in mind, the divine work of art as envisaged by Schiller might perhaps be compared to a drama or musical composition, both of which are dependent for their effect on the competence of the performers. The text or score may be said to correspond to the plan ordained for the world by God, while Man resembles an actor who fails to bring out the full meaning of his text, or a musician who fails to play his instrument in tune. When Karl Moor, for example, asks:

"Es ist doch eine so göttliche Harmonie in der seelen-

Ex. 41. losen Natur, warum sollte dieser Missklang in der vernünftigen ~~sejn~~¹ ? "

he implies not only that the whole Universe should be a piece of harmonious music, but also that Man, unlike the world of Nature which has remained in tune, is failing to carry out his proper task in the great orchestra. By the

(1) Act IV. sc. 5. SW. vol. 2. p. 154. NA. vol. 3. p. 109.

wrong use of his freedom ("unsere schlecht gebrauchte moralische Freiheit", as Schiller calls it in UNSD¹), by choosing to follow his own selfish desire, by allowing himself to be deceived into a state of 'counterfeit' harmony, Man fails to attain the true nature ordained for him by God. It is almost as if the musician were to reject the composer's score and insist on playing different notes altogether.....

The hope expressed by Schiller in his philosophical writings is that Man, if made aware of his true nature, might once again try to live in harmony with it and thus contribute to the harmony not only of his own immediate society but also of the Universe as a whole. The regenerative process, Schiller clearly states, must start within the individual personality. (cf. Ex. 27)². Here the various inner forces are to be integrated into a balanced whole and a harmonious relationship with the outside world is thus to be obtained. The experience of such an integrated state of 'moral' harmony, where there is no conflict between the course urged by duty and that urged by desire, may be inspired either through those individuals who are themselves 'intuitively' harmonious or through Art. At the same time

(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 217. SA. vol. 12. f. 144. II. 14. FF.

(2) cf. p. 156 preceding.

receptive to the feelings of others and yet always in control of his impulses, such an integrated individual would be able, ideally, to bring harmony into the limited social sphere in which he lives. As his own experience and sympathy increase, his love for his fellow-beings also grows and he is able to see in each something of value which may be developed and welded into the whole. Finally, the chain-reaction set in motion by the integrated individual should result in a political harmony, an ideal society in which freedom of the individual is combined with respect for the laws necessary for the life of the community. It is now perhaps easier to see the reconciliation of those two ideas --- harmony of the personality and harmony as a creative force flowing throughout the Universe --- which were noted in the discussion of Schiller's "Jugendschriften".¹

In practice, as has been seen, the integrated state of 'moral' harmony can never be maintained for more than a short time; at most points in our lives we shall only attain degrees of approximation to it. There is in Schiller's realization of Man's capacity for self-deception a concept very similar to the Christian doctrine of original

(1) cf. Chapter II. pp. 23-48 preceding.

sin. For the Christian, however, the inherent sinfulness of Man's fallen nature could only be redeemed by the divine intervention of Christ. For Schiller, the curse may perhaps be lifted if the ambiguity of human motives is recognised. His great tragic characters -- Maria Stuart, Johanna, Don Cesar -- realise the moral ambiguity of their past actions, although these actions had at one time seemed right to them, and make atonement through their voluntary sacrifices. In the everyday world of ordinary life, however, the awareness that we may at every point deceive ourselves into ~~lively, for~~ 'counterfeit' harmony, and that there is always a more complex harmony to be attained, will suffice. It is here that the peculiar structure of Schiller's thought is most clearly seen, for it is as if we were hearing a piece of music, in which a bright, optimistic theme is accompanied all the time by a darker, more sombre one. ~~a whole and, in health,~~ of an active co-operation between them. It can thus be said that, from his very first writings onwards, Schiller works out the musical analogy implicit in the word "Harmony" in a developing and progressive way.

The second type of harmony to be found in those early essays is the harmony between body and soul or, as we might say today, between physiological condition and psychological state. Schiller investigated this relationship with

C. CONCLUSION.

remarkable insight. physiological disharmony

would produce psychological disturbances, and vice-versa.

In the Introduction to this thesis an attempt was made to trace the general development of the figurative senses of the word "Harmonie" from the purely musical ones. It was shown that, for Schiller, harmony in the musical sense implied both a combination of two or more notes into a new chord and an ordered, rhythmic movement through time. The connotations of combination and movement were then found to be present when he used the word figuratively. For instance, in the two early essays Philosophie der Physiologie and Über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen Schiller develops a concept of physiological harmony which bears both the above characteristics. The living organism is an example of the combination of various parts into a whole and, in health, of an active co-operation between them. It can thus be said that, from his very first writings onwards, Schiller works out the musical allegory implicit in the word "Harmonie" in a detailed and original way.

The second type of harmony to be found in these early essays is the harmony between body and soul or, as we might say today, between physiological condition and psychological state. Schiller investigated this relationship with

remarkable insight and showed that physiological disharmony could produce psychological disturbances, and vice-versa. Musical metaphors are again used as illustrations. Body and soul are compared to two stringed instruments placed side by side in such a way that a note struck on one causes a reverberation on the other. One of the sources of Schiller's later theory of the harmonious personality is undoubtedly to be found here, and from now onwards Schiller begins to think of the human soul, or personality, in musical terms.

Elsewhere in Schiller's early writings the word "Harmonie" (sometimes "Seelenharmonie") is used to mean a harmony between friends or lovers. Such people are sometimes said to be tuned in the same key; thus, here again, a musical metaphor is present. Love and friendship are seen by Schiller as two creative forces which flow throughout the world and which will, eventually, unite the world into one harmonious whole. Linked with this idea of world-harmony is the idea of a much greater cosmic harmony. In the poem Der Tanz, for example, Schiller envisages the Universe as a constantly changing, yet unified whole. In other places in his work there are echoes of the ancient Pythagorean concept of the harmony of the spheres, and it is implied that the planet

Earth may not be able to contribute to this cosmic symphony because of the sin of her inhabitants. If it is borne in mind that obedience to the moral laws of society on the part of everybody would bring about a state of world-harmony and thus enable the Earth to play her full part in the cosmic symphony, then Moral Law, as it might now be called, may perhaps be likened to that strong fundamental rhythm which, in Der Tanz, Schiller regarded as the unifying concept in the incessant whirl of activity. As Karl Moor recognises at the end of Die Räuber, when Man disobeys the Moral Law, he commits a crime not only against himself and other human beings but also against the whole Universe. When one recalls this aspect of Schiller's work, it is not difficult to see why Kant's concept of a 'categorical imperative' legislating for the universal good made such an impression upon him. In the philosophical essays, it is true, Schiller does not write about crimes against "die Harmonie der Welt" as he had done in Die Räuber, but the rejection of a course prescribed by duty is an equally serious matter.

In Section B Schiller's use of the word "Harmonie" within his philosophical essays was investigated. It was found that one of the figurative senses in which Schiller uses the word here was that of a vague general agreement

between desire and duty, where desire and duty are seen as different forces within the human personality. (Ex. 1).¹ It was further found that Schiller envisaged three different types of agreement between desire and duty. The first type, in which the course of action urged by desire is in tune with the precepts of the moral law, was represented by diagram e) and it was contended that this was the agreement understood by Schiller when he used the term "sinnliche Harmonie" (Ex. 6).² "Sinnliche Harmonie", or, as it was translated, intuitive harmony, was seen to be the state experienced by those people to whom Schiller attributes the adjective 'naiv'. The second type of agreement between duty and desire was found to be that in which duty prescribes a course of action which desire then accepts. To this agreement was given the name of moral harmony. The acceptance by desire can be immediate, in which case this harmony only differs from "sinnliche Harmonie" in that here the conscious knowledge of duty prescribes the course of action. (diagram g). On the other hand, desire may at first reject the precepts of duty and only come to accept them after a prolonged period of conflict. Such a

(1).cf.p.56.preceding.("...oder die Triebe des letztern setzen sich mit den Gesetzen des ersten in Harmonie").

(2).cf.pp.67-68.preceding.("Ist der Mensch in den Stand der Kultur getreten....so ist jene sinnliche Harmonie in ihm aufgehoben").

conflict, in Schiller's view, may be brought to a harmonious resolution through the mediation of taste, a process represented here by diagram i). However, even if such a resolution takes place, the harmony achieved cannot be maintained for long; indeed, it has to be broken and a "higher" harmony postulated, if, as shown elsewhere, complacency is not to gain the upper hand. It will be seen that a distinction must be made here between a limited moral harmony, represented here by both diagrams i) and g), which is attained every time we carry out our responsibilities willingly, and an absolute moral harmony, which must constantly be re-postulated. It must be admitted that, although this distinction is present in Schiller's thought, he himself never makes it very clearly. Indeed, a typically Schillerian thought structure is revealed, if it is realised that both the limited and absolute states may be understood simultaneously, whenever Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" of this type of agreement. (Ex. 3).¹

The above agreements between desire and duty, whether of the intuitive or moral variety, may be regarded as true harmonies. In both there is a delicate balance between the various forces within the personality. No one force is allowed to become dominant, but each plays its part in determining and executing the course of action. Such a

(1).cf.p.58 preceding.(" das Ganze unserer sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte in möglichster Harmonie auszubilden").

personality manifests to the outside world an integrated, harmonious whole and may perhaps be compared to the single chord formed by the combination of two notes in music.

In the third type of agreement envisaged by Schiller "harmony" between the forces within the personality was found to be achieved only as a result of a compromise on the part of duty. It was a state in which the individual deceived himself into believing that what he wanted to do was, in fact, in accordance with the moral law. (diagram 1). This relationship, however, cannot be considered a true harmony. Schiller himself uses the verb "lügen" with reference to it (Ex. 12) and in this thesis the term applied to it is counterfeit harmony. The revelation of this layer of Schiller's thought is, in my opinion, most important. First of all, it is impossible to distinguish in practice this counterfeit agreement from the limited kind of moral harmony outlined above. In both cases there is no awareness of conflict within the personality. We have, however, no means of ascertaining, as long as the harmonious state is maintained, whether we are really carrying out the demands of duty or whether we are merely deceiving ourselves into thinking we are doing so. It is now perhaps clearer why an absolute moral harmony, which must always remain an ideal, must constantly be postulated.

(1). cf.p.80.preceding.("eine Harmonie zwischen dem Wohlsein und Wohlverhalten lügt").

It is also perhaps easier to understand why, in UAW, Schiller has to find an infallible "Probierstein" to test the morality of the "schöne Seele" and why, in NG, he has to point out the dangers of an education through taste, if it is undergone before moral principles have been established sufficiently firmly.

A second general sense in which Schiller was found to use the word "Harmonie" in the philosophical essays was that of concordance between the personality and its expression in the outside world. (Ex. 5). The harmonious individual is able not only to integrate each new experience into himself but also to impose his own thoughts and ideals on the outside world. It is suggested in this thesis that the reciprocal relationship between personality and environment can be compared to the movement through time of a musical work. In the same way that a work of music moves through time and yet retains an essential unity, so too the harmonious reciprocal relationship between a constantly changing environment and a constantly changing personality should, ideally, never be lost. If the interaction between the individual and the outside world is borne in mind, it is easy to see how Schiller's theory of harmony can be extended to cover social, political and historical spheres.

On the purely personal level it may be said that the (1).cf.p.63 preceding. ("Harmonie in die Verschiedenheit seines Erscheinens zu bringen").

intuitively harmonious individual never experiences conflict with his environment and thus spends his life in a state of good fortune and happiness (Ex. 7).¹ The individual who achieves a limited kind of moral harmony also achieves (at least momentarily) complete harmony with his environment. His confidence in himself is restored and he is able to meet all situations of life with calm and equanimity. This state may be called one of awareness of infinite potential (Ex. 24).² (Obviously if one were able to achieve absolute moral harmony this awareness of infinite potential would never be lost. Such is the state attributed by Schiller to God.) In the states of good fortune and infinite awareness there is furthermore true reciprocity between the personality and the environment. The individual is not dominated by the outside world, nor does he lose contact with it altogether. On the contrary he is able to exert an influence on it and in this way he contributes to the general movement of life. In the state of counterfeit harmony, on the other hand, the relationship between the personality and the environment is not truly reciprocal, for the individual is governed entirely by desires arising from stimuli received from the outside world. Such an individual thus experiences no conflict with the outside world, but he cannot in any

(1).cf.p.68 preceding.("wo der Mensch noch..als harmonische Einheit wirkt").

(2).cf.p.141.preceding.("das moralische Bedürfnis nach Harmonie und nach einer absoluten Freiheit des Wirkens").

sense be said to influence it. His state is one of complacent acceptance (Ex. 23). Although it is thus possible to say that limited moral harmony is a dynamic and active state, whereas counterfeit harmony is a passive one, it must always be remembered that, in practice, it is impossible to make this distinction.

On the political-historical level the state of good fortune is seen by Schiller to correspond to the childhood of Mankind, that is to a time at the beginning of history when everybody was intuitively harmonious (Ex. 10). The state of absolute moral harmony may be said to correspond to a time at the end of history, to an ideal society or "Elysium", to which we must constantly strive and in which we should all be unambiguously morally harmonious (Ex. 10).⁽²⁾ Between these two extremes each society will be the outward expression of the inner state of the majority of its inhabitants. States of inner conflict will manifest themselves in anarchy or totalitarianism, while complacency within the individual will soon lead to political complacency and decadence.

In Schiller's thought the evolution both of the individual and of Mankind as a whole follows a dialectical pattern. After the first state of intuitive harmony is

(1).cf.p.135 preceding.("die Einheit der Natur sich auf dæ gleichförmige Erschlaffung seiner sinnlichen und geistigen Kräfte gründet").It is true that the word "Einheit" is used here, but what is described is an absence of conflict, an apparent harmony.

(2).cf.p.75 preceding.("die innere Harmonie, und new Wunder Welt zu tun".)

lost,¹ a time of conflict or discord is experienced until, in some way, a new harmony may be brought about. This new harmony may be a true moral harmony; on the other hand, it may be a counterfeit one. When a test-situation occurs, counterfeit harmony will reveal itself in a complacent attitude, and here no further development may be expected. A truly moral individual or nation, however, will not shrink from entering a fresh period of conflict, and here the whole process --- harmony, conflict, harmony--- begins again. As each new harmony that is attained will be open to the charge of ambiguity, the dialectical process must be imagined as an infinite one. The comparison of this process to a musical scale is perhaps not helpful at all points, but it does help to illustrate two particular ones. The first is that each new harmony is said to be "higher" than the one that preceded it. (Ex. 10). The second is that each harmonious state comes to be regarded, after it in turn has been shattered, as a lost Golden Age or lost state of intuitive harmony. The top note of each octave, immediately becomes the bottom note of the next. Schiller's use of the word "Harmonie" may often be found, therefore, to have a double reference forwards and backwards (Ex. 25).²

(1) Mankind as a race has lost this state of intuitive harmony, and most individuals lose it in childhood. Some individuals, however, are fortunate enough to maintain it for longer.

(2).cf.p.149 preceding.("und ein verderblicher Streit entft zweite ihre harmonischen Kräfte". "sinnlich" to us today, "moralisch" in comparison with what had gone before.).

For the dialectical process to be maintained it is necessary firstly that, in states of harmony, complacency must be shattered and secondly that, in states of conflict, a new harmony must be brought about. It now becomes clear why, in expounding his theories of the "aesthetic education" of Mankind, Schiller distinguishes two kinds of beauty. One ("die energische Schönheit") disturbs and challenges, while the other ("die schmelzende Schönheit") reconciles tensions into a new balance and synthesis. Theoretically it should be possible for the same aesthetic object to carry out both tasks. The harmony of a work of art (Ex. 28),¹ Schiller believes, or the natural intuitive harmony of the 'genius' or other 'naive' individuals, can not only bring about harmony in those individuals in a state of conflict by presenting moral precepts in an acceptable form, but can also challenge and inspire those in a state of complacency to greater efforts. In practice, however, most works of art will be found to err on the side of either 'relaxing' or 'strengthening' beauty. There is a danger here, specifically pointed out in NG, that some people will be led by purely 'relaxing' art to value the absence of tension above all else and thus the possibility of a 'false' aesthetic education, which leads not to moral, but to counterfeit harmony, arises. Since Schiller realises

(1).cf.p.157 preceding.(["]das Ebenmass störende Züge der Harmonie des Ganzen zu unterwerfen".)

that it would be ridiculous to legislate for this situation (by saying, for example, that certain works of art must only be experienced by certain people) this danger will always remain and can only be countered by firm instruction in moral principles. Hence the aesthetic education alone cannot perhaps be considered entirely sufficient to maintain Mankind's "cultural evolution". It is, however, an indispensable complement to a purely moral education which could never, of itself, bring about harmony.

It must be admitted that, in the philosophical writings, Schiller's concept of harmony is nowhere stated in so consistent a fashion as that outlined above. Nevertheless it can be argued that this consistency is present, if sufficient attention is paid both to the use of language and to the range of the essays as a whole. It might be objected that some of the distinctions made in this thesis complicate, rather than simplify, matters. Would it not be easier, for instance, to see "sinnliche Harmonie" as a simple first state, in which there is no awareness of conflict and in which the individual feels himself at one with the world, and "moralische Harmonie" as a higher complex state achieved after the conflicts generated by experience have been solved and integrated into the personality ? Is it really necessary to see

either state in terms of an agreement between desire and duty ? It could be argued that Schiller himself is here confusing a psychological with a philosophical issue. The ability to know what to do in every situation in life, which might be taken as one definition of "intuition", means that one can integrate each new experience into oneself. 'Naive' people are able to remain harmonious throughout their lives either because their experience remains limited or because they are blessed with the gift of always knowing how to tackle each situation as it occurs. They may serve as a psychological ideal of integration towards which the rest of us should strive. The insistence that desire coincide with duty could be seen as a philosophical idea formulated by Schiller when under the influence of Kant. It would seem, however, that Schiller can be defended against this charge if it is realised that 'integration' for most modern psychologists involves some degree of adjustment to social norms, or acceptance of social duties. Seen in this light, Schiller's theories of the various agreements possible between desire and duty can still have meaning, and one can perhaps see why, in the philosophical essays, so much emphasis is placed on harmony that springs from a voluntary acceptance of the moral law. Furthermore it is through the analysis of the various agreements possible

(in *Kantische Weisung und Begegnung*).

Nature and Life review. SA vol. 3, part II, 23-24.
Dr. C. L. SA, vol. 4, p. 139, n. 2454-2460.

between desire and duty that the existence of counterfeit harmony is most clearly revealed.

If the reader will now check the italicised expressions in the preceding paragraphs it will be found that 21 senses in which Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" may be distinguished. When he uses it with reference to the personality or to the relationship of the personality with the outside world, the musical connotations of combination and ordered movement are still to be borne in mind. For example, in Ex. 17 ("und doch tritt die ganze Gestalt nur desto..... harmonischer hervor") each action of the "schöne Seele" is said to blend into the pattern of the whole, just as, in a symphony, each note is related to a central theme. Furthermore, the revelation of counterfeit harmony means that whenever the word is used a slightly ironic flavour must also be noted.¹ In this respect the possibility that what we think is true harmony may prove to be counterfeit can perhaps be compared -- to take an analogy from piano-playing -- to a sombre note sounded by one hand while the other is still playing

(1) ~~Herewith~~ belowix are included some examples from the dramas, where the word "Harmonie" is used with obvious ironic connotations cf. Kabale und Liebe. Act V. sc. 7. ("...dass Ekel und Scham eine Harmonie veranstalten, die der zärtlichen Liebe unmöglich gewesen ist"). cf. also Don Carlos. Act 3. sc. 4 ("Ihr solltet/Mit dieser beispiellosen Harmonie Jetzt in derselben Meinung euch begegnen ?").

Kabale und Liebe reference - SA. vol. 3. p. 411. II. 23-24.
Don Carlos. SA. vol. 4. p. 139. II. 2454-2460.

vivaciously. A good example of this may be seen in Ex.17 (quoted above) because, as the "Würde" section of UAW makes clear, there is no way of telling, as long as the state of harmony is maintained, whether the "beautiful" life is a truly moral one. Finally it would seem that, because of the reciprocal relationship between Man and Society and because the idea of an ideally harmonious Universe never entirely disappears from Schiller's thought, the psychological, political and metaphysical connotations must always be borne in mind whenever the word "Harmonie" occurs in Schiller's work. Sometimes, as in Ex.27. ("Der Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesellschaft, weil er Harmonie in dem Individuum stiftet") the word is used at two different levels, the first "Harmonie" here implying an ideal political society and the second referring to the psychological state of the individual. Sometimes, as in Ex.11 ("..... als jenen Streit in der geistreichen Harmonie einer völlig durchgeführten Bildung geendigt sehen") both levels may be understood simultaneously. Hence the claim made in the Introduction that "Harmonie" may be seen as another Schillerian concept-myth will, it is hoped, appear justified. The word "Harmonie" may be said to serve as a code-word for all the thoughts and ideas formulated by Schiller as regards his Ideal: or, to

put the matter differently, the whole range of his thought exhibits a musical structure, in which one word or idea can only be understood fully with reference to those other ideas at work in the writer's mind, just as one note within a symphony is meant to be heard in conjunction with all the other notes and themes within the framework of the whole.

discoverable by human reason and all concepts and institutions that impede such enlightenment are to be rejected. In the latter the individual is exhorted to explore his own inner self and listen to the voice of

The 18th century has been called the Age of Revolution.¹ The political upheavals that occurred in France and America, for example, are but the most spectacular manifestations of the changes taking place in human thought. Throughout the Western world, one might say, the individuality of each human being was asserted. In politics, the concept of democracy emerged. In religion, the individual was encouraged to think for himself and, if he so desired, to reject God altogether and form his own "religion naturelle". In philosophy the problems of individual human experience (sense perception,

(1) cf. R.R.Palmer The Age of Democratic Revolution. Vol.I. The Challenge. Princeton University Press. 1959.

the aesthetic experience) began to be explored and eventually a new science, that of psychology, came into being. The movements known broadly as "Aufklärung" and "Empfindsamkeit" may perhaps be seen as two different facets of this process. In the former the progress of Mankind is to be achieved by following certain laws discoverable by human reason and all concepts and institutions that impede such enlightenment are to be rejected. In the latter the individual is exhorted to explore his own inner self and listen to the voice of feeling.

With these new thoughts came new problems. How could one live morally if God were rejected, if the ancient authority of Church and King were denied? How could democracy achieve its aims of liberty, equality and fraternity without degenerating into anarchy? These problems found a variety of answers, and that given by Schiller is by no means a facile one. He has moved a long way away from the popular doctrines of Leibniz with their affirmation that this is the best of all possible worlds, and yet he wishes to preserve the harmonious structure of the Universe, for otherwise even the urge in Man towards harmony might be called into question. The Universe is for Schiller still a harmonious purposeful

whole governed by certain laws, just as a piece of music is governed by laws of rhythm, but Man can choose whether or not to obey these laws. Schiller also champions Shaftesbury's ideal of the 'virtuoso', the man who naturally obeys the moral law, while at the same time he realises the capacity for self-deception to which Man is heir. This important point of divergence from Shaftesbury and his disciples forces Schiller to admit the necessity for some absolute moral law such as that proposed by Kant. In his own work this necessity may be seen reflected in the necessity for Man to postulate an ever-higher ideal, in the necessity for constant questioning and self-examination. If Schiller's thought here and there appears confused, if his distinctions are not subtle enough, if the language of his time seems to tie him down in inconsistencies, he should at least be given credit for tackling a task of overwhelming magnitude: that of providing Mankind with a blueprint for its own future. The goal is a harmonious world, in which each individual will have his unique contribution to make, just as each note contributes to a great symphony. Schiller does not pretend that this goal can ever entirely be realised. He recognised too clearly those streaks in Man's nature that will make the individual put his own selfish interests first and that will render

most human actions ambiguous. In Schiller's dramatic works the ambiguity of human action leads to tragedy, and the lot of Mankind would indeed be tragic if this ambiguity could not in any way be balanced by a more hopeful standpoint. In his philosophical works Schiller provides this balance by postulating an Ideal of absolute moral harmony towards which we can constantly strive and against which we can measure all our actions. Furthermore, to preserve Mankind from falling into absolute despair, he offers us, in the aesthetic experience, the possibility of experiencing this harmony, if only for a few moments. It is this experience which is to give us courage and inspiration to live our everyday lives. In his own time Schiller provided inspiration to many --- perhaps the most fitting example to mention here is that of Beethoven, whose Choral Symphony may perhaps be said to capture the dynamic movement of Schiller's thought --- but his message is just as relevant for us today and also, one would hope, for all future ages.

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
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
Appendix A.

Diagrams to illustrate the patterns of harmony analysed in
Section B. Chapter III.


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
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
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





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

e)

e)¹

ii)



iii)



Appendix B.Standardisation of references contained within the text of
the thesis.

- p.83. (2) NA.vol.20.p.290.
 p.85. (1) NA.vol.20.p.292.
 (2) NA.vol.20.p.292.
 p.88. (1) NA.vol.20.p.298.
 (2) NA.vol.20.p.298.
 p.92. (1) NA.vol.20.p.298.
 p.94. (1) NA.vol.21.p.3.
 (2) NA.vol.21.p.22.
 p.95. (1) NA.vol.21.pp.33.ff.
 p.97. (1) NA.vol.21.p.18.
 (2) NA.vol.21.p.21.
 p.98. (1) NA.vol.21.p.23.
 p.99. (1) NA.vol.21.p.34.
 p.100. (1) NA.vol.21.p.24.
 (2) NA.vol.21.p.22.
 p.101. (1) NA.vol.21.p.25.
 (2) NA.vol.21.p.25.
 p.104. (2) NA.vol.20.p.288.
 p.106. (1) NA.vol.20.p.288.
 p.107. (1) NA.vol.20.p.287.
 (2) NA.vol.20.p.265.
 p.108. (1) NA.vol.20.p.288.
 p.109. (1) NA.vol.20.pp.282-283.
 p.110. (1) NA.vol.20.p.287.
 p.111. (1) NA.vol.20.p.299.
 (2) NA.vol.20.p.300.
 p.113. (1) NA.vol.20.p.294.
 p.114. (2) NA.vol.20.p.283.
 (3) NA.vol.20.p.294.
 p.115. (1) NA.vol.20.p.300.

 p.124. (2) NA.vol.20.p.436.
 p.131. (1) NA.vol.20.p.319.(UAEM 5).
 p.133. (2) NA.vol.20.p.323.(UAEM 6).
 p.135. (1) NA.vol.20.pp.363-364.(UAEM 17).
 p.136. (1) NA.vol.21.p.53.
 p.138. (1) NA.vol.20.p.320.
 p.141. (1) NA.vol.20.p.487.
 p.142. (1) NA.vol.20.p.315.(UAEM 3).
 p.144. (1) NA.vol.20.p.343.(UAEM 11).
 p.145. (1) NA.vol.20.p.331.(UAEM 8).
 (2) NA.vol.20.p.321.(UAEM 6).
 p.146. (2) NA.vol.20.pp.252-255.
 p.147. (1) NA.vol.20.pp.321-322. (UAEM 6).
 p.148. (2) NA.vol.20.pp.430-431.
 p.149. (2) NA.vol.20.pp.322-323.(UAEM 6).
 p.150. (1) NA.vol.20.p.326.(UAEM 6).
 p.151. (1) NA.vol.20.p.326.(UAEM 6).

APPENDIX A.

- p.156. (1). NA.vol.20.p.316.(UAEM 4).
 (2). NA.vol.20.p.410.(UAEM 27).

p.159. (1). NA.vol.21.pp.13-14.

p.161. (2). NA.vol.20.p.362.(UAEM 16).

p.162. (1). NA.vol.20.p.365.(UAEM 17).
 (2). NA.vol.20.409.(UAEM 27).

p.163. (1). NA.vol.20.p.363.(UAEM 16).

p.164. (1). NA.vol.20.p.364.(UAEM 17).
 (2). NA.vol.20.p.437.

p.166. (1). NA.vol.20.p.466.(footnote).

p.167. (1). NA.vol.20.p.225.

p.169. (1). NA.vol.20.p.204.

p.170. (1). NA.vol.20.p.199.
 (2). NA.vol.20.p.166.

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p.173. (1). NA.vol.20.p.362.(UAEM 16).

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