

Afghanistan: The Uncertain Impact of a Year of Transition

Part Two: Military and Security Aspects

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Warfighting and Violence Challenge

Afghanistan is Still Very Much at War

- **Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.**
- **No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.**
- **Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.**
- **US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.**
- **ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.**
- **Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.**
- **Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below \$4 billion annually uncertain. May need \$6-7 billion.**

Key Developments: End 2015

- Taliban holds roughly 30 percent of districts across the nation, according to Western and Afghan officials,
- Taliban now holds more territory than in any year since 2001, when the puritanical Islamists were ousted from power after the 9/11 attacks.
- Top American and Afghan priority is [preventing Helmand](#), largely secured by U.S. Marines and British forces in 2012, from again falling to the insurgency. Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, told his Afghan counterparts that he was as guilty as they were of “just putting our finger in the dike in Helmand.”
- As of last November, about 7,000 members of the Afghan security forces had been killed this year, with 12,000 injured, a 26 percent increase over the total number of dead and wounded in all of 2014.
- Number of ANSF killed increased 27%
- Attrition rates and Deserters soaring. injured Afghan soldiers say they are fighting a more sophisticated and well-armed insurgency than they have seen in years.
- U.S. Special Operations troops increasingly being deployed into harm’s way to assist their Afghan counterparts.

Excerpts from Briefing by Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, Resolute Support Mission, Afghanistan: January 19, 2016 - I

Resolute Support's mission is train, advise and assist -- train, advise and assist for the Afghan ministries, so that's at the ministerial level, and then down to the Afghan national army corps. And so we do train, advise and assist in four out of their six corps.

And to explain that a little better, that's -- that's advising with contact roughly five times a week. That's what we call level one train, advise and assist. And again, we do that at four out of the six corps.

In the other two corps, and I'll explain more about this later, we do what we call expeditionary advising. So expeditionary advising is sending out teams that are based here in Kabul to connect with those two corps and conducted advising on-site for a period of days or a period of weeks.

Our assessment of their performance in 2015 is that they had mixed results. Whenever they conducted deliberate planned operations, they actually did fairly well. One of the important things is that they applied and learned lessons from one operation to the next. They got better. And the things that they struggled with in one operation, we saw improvements on in the next one, particularly in their ability to integrate their air and integrate their artillery.

Now, where they had trouble and they didn't do so well was in response to crisis situations. When they responded to a crisis, it took longer. It required more time to get forces in position, and then it required more time to stabilize the situation. They did get somewhat better at crisis response, but that remains one of their weaknesses and one of the areas they're going to have to continue to focus on into 2016.

The Taliban throughout 2015 did make some temporary gains. But what they were not able to do is they were not able to hold ground and they were not able to govern. And in almost every case, the Afghan security forces were able to retake the ground that the Taliban took, whether it was a roadway or a district center or key terrain. The Afghan security forces bounced back and retook that...And perhaps the best example of that is the fact that the Afghan security forces retook the city of Kunduz, which is a city of over 300,000 people, in just seven days.

...We have traditionally referred to the fighting season here in Afghanistan as starting in May and ending roughly in the November timeframe when the snow in the mountain passes makes it difficult to travel back and forth across the mountains. That's really an outdated term and it's outdated for a couple of reasons. One is that the -- the fighting really takes place year-round. And I'll point to the fact that the Afghan security forces didn't wait to the start of the declared fighting season to begin their operations. They started security operations in January of this year and have continued that

Excerpts from Briefing by Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner: January 19, 2016 - II

throughout the year... Looking at 2016, there are four fundamental things that the Afghan security forces have got to do to be effective.

The first is to implement a force readiness cycle, and the concept here is a three-phase cycle where the forces will go through a training phase where they're getting ready for combat operations, and then an operational phase where they're in the fight, and then they'll come out of that and they're go into a reset phase.

During the reset phase, soldiers will take leave, equipment will go into maintenance and the unit gets itself reset so that it can begin the cycle again, starting with that training phase.

The second is to reduce checkpoints. President Ghani has made this a major point of emphasis. They've got too many checkpoints and they've got too many of their forces strung out on checkpoints. There's an old military saying that "if you defend everywhere, you defend nowhere," and this is particularly true in Afghanistan. If they have too many forces on checkpoints, then what they don't have is the ability to maneuver. What they don't have is the ability to respond to security crises when they arise. So what we need them to do is to reduce the number of checkpoints and move to strong points, which are well defended and which will provide them enough available combat power so that they can respond when needed.

They've also got to make some tough leadership choices. They've got some leaders that need to be replaced, they've got some leaders that are corrupt that need to go. The Afghan security forces are making these changes. They've made a lot of them in 2015. Those new leaders are going to need some time to get established, and they're going to need some time to form their units, but that's ongoing.

I can tell you that in the 215th Corps, the corps commander has been switched out, two of the brigade commanders in the 215th Corps have been changed out, as have several members, key members, of the staff. These are important changes, and those new leaders are still going through the process of establishing themselves. We're very, very impressed with the new 215th Corps Commander, General Moeen. He leads from the front, he is personally invested in turning around 215th Corps, and we are confident that if he has the support from the rest of the leaders in that formation, that he'll be able to do that.

Recruiting is another area of emphasis. Currently, the Afghan national army has a shortfall of about 25,000 overall. They've established the goal of closing that gap over the next six months, and that'll be a significant -- a significant accomplishment, but something that's got to be done so that they have the combat power to continue into 2016.

Excerpts from Briefing by Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner: January 19, 2016 - III

...On recruiting Afghan security forces in total, it -- the problem is primarily in the Afghan national Army. The Afghan national police are doing better at recruiting and the -- and the national police a little bit different than the army in terms of how they operate. In the Army, it's a national army. One of the challenges is that parts of the country aren't well represented in the army, and that's an issue that they got to -- they've got to address. They -- as I said, it's a six-month campaign to meet that shortfall.

Part of their challenge in manning is not just recruiting, but it's addressing the attrition issue. So the way to look at this is the holistic issue of properly manning the force, so if they can address the attrition issue, that's getting the leadership to make sure that soldiers are paid, that they're fed and that they get their proper leave and they're treated properly, that'll go a long way to retaining the soldiers that they have.

One of the things that they're struggling with is what we would call re-enlisting, and that is getting soldiers to re-contract. Once they fix their challenges in re-contracting, that'll help significantly as well. So it's going to take a combined effort with the -- fixing the re-contracting, addressing attrition and recruiting as many as they can before the fighting season in 2016 starts to demand more and more of their forces.

Afghan security forces continue to build capacity. In fact, just last week, they had their first four A-29 Super Tucano close air support aircraft that arrived. This -- these are the first four of 20 that they'll have in the Afghan air force. This will be a significant increase in their capability to provide their own close air support. Those aircraft should start going into service roughly in the April timeframe.

...Afghan special forces are increasingly capable. Our assessment is that they're the best in the region and they continue to improve. A couple of notable achievements here recently. In the last 45 days, Afghan security forces conducted two raids at night using only Afghan forces and Afghan aircraft, and on two separate occasions raided Taliban prisons freeing Afghan security forces that had been held captive there, in some cases, for over two years.

..the problems in 215th Corps were several. They -- they had problems with equipment maintenance. They had problems with units that had been attrited. They had problems with poor leadership. What we have found when units have an issue with attrition, it typically is traced back to poor leadership.

And there are three fundamental things that have to happen in a unit. Soldiers have got to be paid on time. They've got to be fed on time. And they've got to be given leave when they deserve leave. And if one of those things or a combination of those things doesn't happen, then the soldiers will leave. Now, sometimes they'll come back, but that obviously is no way to run an organization.

[http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/643571/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-shoffner-via-teleconference-from-af.](http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/643571/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-shoffner-via-teleconference-from-af)

Excerpts from Briefing by Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner: January 19, 2016 - IV

And so the fix for that is not sophisticated. It's pretty simple. It's having good leaders. It's having good leaders that take care of their soldiers. And so, that's why it is so important that we get the right leadership in 215th Corps. So, the leaders have been replaced. They're now going through the process of fully manning those units. And once they're manned, they'll go through a retraining period. But again, leadership is the key there.

With regard to Marjah and Helmand, central Helmand remains a contested area. It's been a contested area for several years and it remains so. And that includes central Helmand and the Marjah district as well. I'd like to provide a little bit of context for Helmand and what's been happening there since about the October timeframe. So, in October, the Taliban began an offensive in Helmand primarily focused on the central part of the province, aimed at securing their support bases there in Helmand. In early November, the Afghan security forces began a counter-offensive to counter the Taliban's gains. In the early part of January, a U.S. special forces team was conducting train, advise and assist of an Afghan special forces element in the Marjah area as part of that counter-offensive.

...I want to take just a minute to explain the train, advise and assist role that our forces have there.

So, when we're conducting train, advise and assist, on the conventional side we do that at the corps level. And as I mentioned earlier, that's with the expeditionary advising that's going on in Helmand. With the Afghan special forces, that's conducted down to the tactical level. And so that's what was going on in this case.

I would compare the train, advise and assist role to perhaps a coach and a football team. And so the analogy would be that the coach is there for every practice, he's there for every game, but he's not on the field. He's not throwing the football, he's not making tackles, but he's there and he's coaching, and that's what our forces do in the train, advise and assist role, they coach. And that's what was going on here.

So when our forces are conducting train, advise and assist, they'll assist with planning, they'll assist in integrating intelligence support, they'll assist in integrating air support. They can assist with helping with transportation, but increasingly, the Afghans have been providing the transportation on their own.

What they do though is they separate from the Afghan element prior to that Afghan element going on the objective, and so the U.S. train, advise assist forces are not on the objective. They'll separate, they'll go to an overwatch position or they'll go to a command and control location where they can monitor the execution of the operation.

...Afghanistan has 404 districts in total. We assess that right now, the Taliban have control of only nine of those districts. We assess they have influence in about 17 others. The area in and around Marjah remains a contested area, and that's as far as I'll go there.

[http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/643571/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-shoffner-via-teleconference-from-af.](http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/643571/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-shoffner-via-teleconference-from-af)

Excerpts from Briefing by Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner: January 19, 2016 - V

...What I'd just to put Helmand in context, you know, Afghanistan is a country of a little over 33 million people. In Helmand province, there are about 890,000. So Helmand population-wise constitutes less than three percent of the population in the entire country. It is an important area. It's important to President Ghani. It's the Afghan security forces' main effort. And clearly, it is part of the Taliban's goal to have control of the Helmand area. But I do think it's important to keep it in perspective with regard to the security situation around the country.

In Nangarhar, the Afghan security forces have had significant success against Daesh. There was an attack -- the first high-profile attack we've seen in Jalalabad city last week. But back to Daesh, what we've seen with Daesh in Afghanistan, we currently characterize them as operationally emergent. I'll define that as not having the ability to orchestrate or control operations in more than one part of the country at a time. We're not seeing Daesh elements in Iraq or Syria orchestrating events here in Afghanistan.

What we are seeing is Daesh attempting to establish a base of operations in Nangarhar province. They've largely been pushed back to the southern parts of Nangarhar province. That area is very, very rugged, it's very mountainous, it's on the border with Pakistan, and that's where most of the Daesh in Nangarhar currently is. We have seen Daesh in other parts of the country. What we've seen in other parts of the country are small pockets that mainly consists of low-level recruiting and propaganda; we haven't seen it organized. We're not seeing a significant amount of money coming into Afghanistan to support Daesh

...if somebody's using supplies that are there for personal gain or in any way benefiting from what's happening in terms of the way soldiers and units are resupplied, that would be corruption....And another area where we see corruption is in the pay, and one of the efforts we have underway is to help reform the -- what is called the Afghan pay and performance systems. So this is a way in which Afghan soldiers are paid. Currently, most soldiers in the army are paid based on manual rolls. That's handwritten rolls and the paymasters in the units are given cash to make the payments.

And so really, there's two issues there. The first is, if you don't have proper accountability, you don't know who you have and you can't ensure that you're paying the soldiers that are actually there. And the second, if you're handing cash to the paymasters, that leads itself to corruption.

So there are two efforts underway. One is to automate the database, and so we're going from those manual rolls to a computer-based automated system that is auditable, that is transparent so it can be accessed from anywhere, and it's also accurate.

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Once you have that automated database, then electronic payments can be made to those soldiers using electronic funds transfer. This is taking a little bit longer than it would in the West. Not every soldier has a bank account and there isn't an automatic teller machine, an ATM, at every corner. There is a program underway in the Afghan national police called Mobile Money, which is a check to bank pilot that has been fairly successful. And ultimately, we're going to try to go to that for the Afghan national army.

The Uncertain Structure of Security

- **Data on Afghan Surge show had little or no lasting impact.**
- **NATO/ISAF stopped most meaningful reporting on security trends after fiasco in which misestimated Enemy Initiated Attacks, had to admit no favorable trend existed even for largely meaningless metrics .**
- **After McChrystal left, reverted to only counting data national on tactical trends with no meaningful net assessments of insurgent vs. government influence and control.**
- **No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited data for worst areas of tactical encounters.**
- **No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support.**
- **Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up.**
- **UN casualty data and State Department START data on terrorism highly negative.**
- **No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.**

Department of Defense Threat Assessment: June 2015 - I

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks, including the Taliban, al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and other insurgent and extremist groups, which continue to attempt to reassert their authority and prominence. Favorable weather in the winter prolonged the 2014 fighting season and allowed critical facilitation routes, which would normally have been snow-covered, to remain open. The ANDSF prevented the insurgency from gaining the control of key terrain through both defensive and offensive operations. Although some checkpoints were temporarily seized, insurgents failed to retain any territory or achieve their strategic objectives during this reporting period.

The convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks is pervasive and constitutes a threat to Afghanistan's stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, some areas of Afghanistan have seen a recent increase in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains an extremist safe haven providing sanctuary for various groups, including al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These extremist sanctuaries remain a security challenge for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to regional stability.

The Taliban-led insurgency does not currently represent an existential threat to the Afghan government but continues to test the ANDSF as the coalition draws down, often using indiscriminate, high-profile attacks that harm innocent civilians. Despite an uptick in violence before the fighting season, the ANDSF have proven largely capable of defending against direct insurgent attacks.

...Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continued to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces during the reporting period. In 2014, the insurgency modified its tactics, launching direct attacks against ANDSF checkpoints and smaller garrisons to test the responsiveness of Afghan and coalition forces. However, the overall capability of insurgents remained static while the ANDSF continued to improve and adapt to the drawdown of U.S. and coalition support.

Al Qaeda activities remained more focused on survival than on planning and facilitating future attacks. The organization has a sustained presence in Afghanistan of probably fewer than 100 operatives concentrated largely in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces, where they remain year-round. In the border districts between Kunar and Nuristan provinces, al Qaeda received support from local Taliban and at least tacit support from the local populace. Outside these provinces, the number of al Qaeda fighters fell during the winter, in line with seasonal norms; however, these fighters began to infiltrate back into provinces, including Ghazni, Zabul, and Wardak in the spring.

The resilient Taliban-led insurgency remains an enduring threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as to the Afghan people. The Taliban has been weakened by continued pressure, but has not yet been defeated. Politically, they have become increasingly marginalized. Continued doubts about whether the Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, is still alive may have caused some disagreement within the organization. Other senior Taliban leaders disagreed on the prioritization of their political and military efforts.

Department of Defense Threat Assessment: June 2015 - II

Although the Taliban spread its footprint across the country, it suffered considerable casualties and did not accomplish any of its major strategic or operational objectives in 2014. Early in the reporting period, insurgents emphasized high-profile attacks against soft targets—particularly in

Kabul—in order to undermine perceptions of improved security and increased public confidence in the Afghan government. These strikes garnered considerable media attention, while requiring minimal resources and entailing little risk; however, many of these attacks killed innocent bystanders. These attacks slowed precipitously in January and February 2015. Insurgents continued to seek to conduct high-profile attacks in other population centers – as well as against remote outposts – to garner media attention, to project an image of robust capability, and to expand perceptions of insecurity.

Many Taliban fighters suffered from acute resource shortfalls. Numerous Taliban fighters continue to fight and die at high rates while their senior leaders remain in safe havens in Pakistan. The absence of coalition combat units on the battlefield has also weakened one of the principal propaganda lines for the Taliban armed struggle: that they seek to rid Afghanistan of “malevolent foreign influences.” Now they are fighting almost exclusively against their fellow Afghans.

The Taliban officially announced the beginning of the fighting season as April 24, 2015, stating it would target foreigners and Afghan government officials. In preparation for the fighting season, insurgents sought to prepare the battle space by attempting to secure safe havens and facilitation routes throughout the country. Yet insurgents had to contend with independent and advised offensive ANDSF operations over the reporting period, specifically ANDSF shaping operations in northern Helmand, as well as Pakistani military operations that likely disrupted some Pakistan-based insurgent sanctuaries. Additionally, the insurgency mounted coordinated attacks but was generally overmatched when engaged by ANDSF; it could not capture or destroy well-defended targets and was unable to hold key terrain. Nevertheless, the insurgency remained determined, maintained or consolidated its influence in traditional rural strongholds, and carried out attacks with a similar frequency to a year ago. Although of limited tactical effect, these attacks allowed the Taliban to reap potential publicity gains. The Afghan government will continue to struggle to compete with the Taliban in the information space.

Of the groups involved in the Taliban-led insurgency, the Haqqani Network remained the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces and continues to be a critical enabler of al Qaeda. The Haqqani Network and affiliated groups share the goals of expelling U.S. and coalition forces, overthrowing the Afghan government, and re-establishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network led the insurgency in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost, and demonstrated the capability and intent to support and launch high-profile, complex attacks across the country and in the Kabul region. Recent Pakistani military operations have caused some disruption to the Haqqani Network; however, it has still been able to plan and conduct attacks. In response to several dangerous threat streams against U.S., coalition, and Afghan personnel—particularly in Kabul—U.S. and Afghan special operations forces increased security operations against the Haqqani Network during this reporting period. These operations disrupted several dangerous threats streams that sought to inflict significant casualties on the force.

3/6/2016

Department of Defense Threat Assessment: June 2015 - III

The coalition and the Afghan government watched closely ISIL's attempt to expand its reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The potential emergence of ISIL has sharply focused the ANDSF, NDS, and Afghan political leadership. All are collaborating closely in order to prevent this 27

threat from expanding. Thus far, U.S. forces have seen some evidence of limited recruiting efforts, and a few individuals formerly associated with other militant groups have "rebranded" themselves as members of "ISIL of Khorasan Province." This rebranding is most likely an attempt to attract media attention, solicit greater resources, and increase recruitment. Yet ISIL's presence and influence in Afghanistan remains in the initial exploratory phase. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has publicly expressed support for ISIL as the leader of the global jihad; however, the Taliban has declared that it will not allow ISIL in Afghanistan.

The insurgency remained resilient during this reporting period. Security incidents²³ declined to relatively low levels during this winter, but have begun to increase in line with previously observed seasonal trends (see Figure 4). RS leaders expect to see a continued increase of reported incidents until mid to late summer.

Headquarters, RS has become increasingly reliant on ANDSF operational reporting, as the ANDSF have increased their responsibility for providing security, and coalition unit presence alongside Afghan units has diminished. The ANDSF have developed a working system to compile and consider national security trends, which RS staff monitors. Due to the different collection and input methods, the data's quality differs than during previous years when Afghan forces were typically partnered with coalition forces. A large proportion of Afghan reporting must be translated from Dari into English, which introduces reporting delays and translation errors. Yet overall, the data collected and compiled by the ANDSF is still considered useful and valid when compared to previous years' metrics.

Very few of the incidents from this reporting period involved coalition forces. In line with historical trends, direct fire and improvised explosive device attacks made up the majority of security incidents. Insurgents also continued to conduct high-profile and complex attacks against individuals, population centers, and remote outposts.

SIGAR Threat Assessment: July 30 2015

Conflict-related violence increased in Afghanistan as the ANDSF sought to contain insurgent activity whose intensification resulted in record-high levels of civilian casualties, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

For example, the UN reported a 45% increase in armed clashes the week after the start of the Taliban spring offensive on April 24, 2015, and a 23% increase in civilian casualties over the same period in 2014.⁹⁹ According to the UN, more than 10,000 civilians were killed or injured during 2014, as compared to 8,615 in 2013, and a UNAMA representative predicted an increase in civilian casualties this year in Afghanistan.

Insurgents continued to demonstrate their willingness to target civilians even during the holy month of Ramadan. On July 12, 2015, a vehicle-borne explosive device detonated at an Afghan security forces checkpoint near a village bazaar in Khowst killed 27 civilians and wounded at least 10.

On July 13, 2015, explosives set off at a mosque in Baghlan wounded more than 40 civilians gathered for dinner and for government-sponsored distribution of oil and rice.

...While fewer security incidents were reported than last quarter, as reflected in Figure 3.26, there were fewer days in the latest reporting period, so the incidents-per-day average was higher this period than in the same periods in 2014 or 2013.

The UN reported the southern, southeastern, and eastern regions continued to endure most of the security incidents. But even the relatively safe northern and northeastern regions saw security incidents increase by 12% compared with the same period in 2014.⁵ A UNAMA representative reported that Kunduz Province experienced 250 civilian casualties, the highest of the northeast-region provinces.

The UN recorded 5,033 security incidents from February 15, 2015, through April 30, 2015. The count included 160 assassinations and 40 attempted assassinations, and an increase of 21.3% in abductions over the same period in 2014. Armed clashes (54%) and IED events (28%) accounted for 82% of all security incidents. Although the Taliban announced their main targets would be “foreign occupiers” as well as government offices and Afghan security forces, the UN reported that less than 1% of the incidents were directed against Coalition bases. During one incident, a June 9, 2015, rocket attack on Bagram Airfield, however, a Department of Defense (DOD) civilian was killed.

The majority of the Taliban offenses were directed against the ANDSF and Afghan government officials and facilities.¹⁰⁹ A spokesman for an Afghan advocacy group for NGOs reported 26 humanitarian aid workers had been killed this year, and an additional 17 wounded and 40 abducted. One attack targeted a Czech aid group in Balkh, killing nine workers.

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and to a lesser extent al Qaeda, and other insurgent and extremist groups, which continue to attempt to reassert their authority and prominence. During the reporting period, the ANDSF prevented the insurgency from gaining lasting control of key terrain through both defensive and offensive operations. Although some checkpoints and district centers were temporarily seized, insurgents failed to achieve their strategic objectives for the fighting season with the notable exception of the Taliban briefly seizing the provincial center in Kunduz in late September and early October 2015. However, even in Kunduz, the ANDSF, with coalition assistance, were able to re-take the city only days after the Taliban's initial attack.

Pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan's stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, some areas of Afghanistan have seen an increase in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These extremist sanctuaries remain a security challenge for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to regional stability.

The Afghan government's relationship with Pakistan remains a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. Since the beginning of President Ghani's tenure, leaders from both countries have made a concerted effort to improve relations and better address mutual security interests. Although there was modest improvement in the relationship and a sense of rapprochement early in 2015, several events have cooled progress. Bilateral tensions have increased over the last six months due to a series of high-profile attacks in Kabul in August 2015, an increase in cross-border firing incidents between the ANDSF and the Pakistani military throughout the late summer and early fall, and a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan attack against a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar in September 2015.

Despite these challenges, Afghanistan and Pakistan have maintained regular contact at the most senior levels of government and in the military and RS advisors continue to leverage the ability of the coalition to encourage more robust bilateral communication at all levels. This is especially important as Pakistani military clearing operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have increased militant presence in Afghanistan, requiring greater transparency and cooperation among RS and the Afghan and Pakistani militaries. For instance, through the RS Tripartite Joint Operations Center, Afghan and Pakistani liaison officers meet monthly at the one-star level. In addition, during this reporting period, ANDSF and Pakistani military officials conducted meetings at the corps commander-level to discuss reestablishing Joint Border Coordination Centers to enhance tactical-level coordination, which has decreased since the ANDSF assumed full security for Afghanistan.

In their first fighting season against an Afghan-led counterinsurgency, the Taliban-led insurgent threat remains resilient. Fighting has been nearly continuous since February 2015. As a result, both ANDSF and Taliban casualties increased during the reporting period and 2015 overall when compared to the previous reporting period and 2014 respectively. The levels of violence in typical insurgent strongholds, such as Helmand and Kandahar, were as expected, but the ANDSF were also forced to confront insecurity at a higher level than expected in other parts of the country, such as Kunduz.

DoD Threat Assessments: 12/2015 - II

The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major transit routes, provincial capitals, and nearly all district centers. The ANDSF are generally capable and effective at protecting the major population centers, or not allowing the Taliban to maintain their hold for a prolonged period of time. At the same time, the Taliban have proven capable of taking rural areas and contesting key terrain in areas such as Helmand while continuing to conduct high-profile attacks (HPA) in Kabul. From January 1 to November 16, 2015, there were 28 HPAs in Kabul, a 27 percent increase compared to the same time period in 2014. These attacks achieve one of the Taliban's main objectives of garnering media attention and creating a sense of insecurity that undercuts perceptions of the Afghan government's ability to provide security.

The increase in violence over the reporting period, and the fighting season overall, when compared to last year was reflected in public perceptions of security as well. According to recent polling, only 28 percent of Afghans say that security in their local area is good compared to 35 percent during the same time period in 2014 and 45 percent in 2013.

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. In 2015, the insurgency modified its tactics, launching direct attacks against ANDSF checkpoints and smaller garrisons to test the responsiveness of Afghan and coalition forces. However, the overall capability of insurgents remained static while the ANDSF furthered their ability to execute effective operations and U.S. and Pakistani counterterrorism pressure degraded terrorist groups.

Following Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan, many foreign fighters, including some al Qaeda leaders, were displaced into Afghanistan. Al Qaeda activities remain focused on survival, regeneration, and planning and facilitating future attacks; they remain a threat to the United States and its interests. The organization has a sustained presence in Afghanistan primarily concentrated in the east and northeast.

The resilient Taliban-led insurgency remains an enduring threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as to the Afghan people. Since the July 2015 announcement of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar's death in 2013, Mullah Mansour appears to have largely consolidated his position as emir, and those disagreements that do persist among senior leadership do not immediately threaten the Taliban's operational capability. Nonetheless, the extent to which Mansour will be able to silence internal dissent remains to be determined.

During the reporting period, insurgents had to contend with independent and advised ANDSF offensive and counter-offensive operations, as well as Pakistani military operations that likely disrupted some Pakistan-based insurgent sanctuaries. Additionally, although the insurgency mounted larger coordinated attacks, they were generally overmatched when engaged by the ANDSF. The insurgents could not capture or destroy well-defended targets and were unable to hold key terrain for extended periods of time. Nevertheless, the Taliban-led insurgency remained determined, maintained or consolidated its influence in traditional rural strongholds, dominated the information space, and carried out attacks with an increased frequency compared to a year ago.

Over the last six months, the Taliban conducted attacks across the country including checkpoint overruns and coordinated attacks in Kandahar, Helmand, Faryab, Uruzgan, Ghazni, and provinces surrounding Kabul. The Taliban suffered significant casualties and, with the exception of temporarily seizing Kunduz city, were unable to accomplish their major strategic and operational objectives for fighting season 2015. Although the Taliban briefly occupied the provincial capital of Kunduz, they were unable to hold the territory for an extended period of time. The Taliban did, however, prove adept at executing attacks and threatening rural districts throughout the entirety of the fighting season, forcing the ANDSF into a more reactive rather than proactive posture. Insurgents continued to emphasize high-profile attacks against soft targets – particularly in Kabul – to undermine perceptions of improved security and to decrease public confidence in the Afghan government. These HPAs garnered considerable media attention, while requiring minimal resources and entailing little risk; of note are the four insurgent attacks in Kabul between August 7 and 10, 2015. These attacks gained both national and international attention and caused major public outcry due to the short timespan in which they occurred and the high number of civilian casualties.

Many Taliban fighters suffered from acute resource shortfalls during 2015 and lower-level Taliban fighters continued to fight and die at high rates while their senior leaders remained in safe havens in Pakistan. The absence of coalition combat units on the battlefield has also weakened one of the principal propaganda lines for the Taliban's armed struggle: that they seek to rid Afghanistan of "malevolent foreign influences." They are now fighting almost exclusively against fellow Afghans.



Of the groups involved in the Taliban-led insurgency, the Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces and continues to be the most critical enabler of al Qaeda. Haqqani Network leader Siraj Haqqani's elevation as Taliban leader Mullah Mansour's deputy has further strengthened the Haqqani Network's role in the Taliban-led insurgency. The Haqqani Network and affiliated groups share the goals of expelling U.S. and coalition forces, overthrowing the Afghan government, and re-establishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Similar to the previous reporting period, the Haqqani Network led the insurgency in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost, and demonstrated the capability and intent to support and launch high-profile, complex attacks across the country and in the Kabul region. Pakistani military operations early in 2015 caused some disruption to the Haqqani Network; however, it has still been able to plan and conduct attacks. During this reporting period, U.S. and Afghan special operations forces increased security operations against the Haqqani Network and disrupted several dangerous threat streams that sought to inflict significant casualties against U.S., coalition, and Afghan personnel, particularly in Kabul.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province has progressed from its initial exploratory phase to a point where they are openly fighting the Taliban for the establishment of a safe haven, and are becoming more operationally active. IS-KP has successfully seized pockets of terrain from the Taliban in Nangarhar Province. The group claimed an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against a UN vehicle in September 2015 and conducted its first attack against the ANDSF later that month when it attacked as many as 10 checkpoints in the same day in Achin district, Nangarhar. The group continues to recruit disaffected Taliban and formerly Taliban-aligned fighters, most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which publically declared allegiance to IS-KP in August 2015. IS-KP has not yet conducted an attack against RS forces, although the group's recruitment of experienced fighters and commanders could increase its capability to do so over at least the next year.


The stability of the Afghan government and the performance of the ANDSF during 2015 and going into 2016 will have a significant impact on the future threat environment in Afghanistan. Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups will present a formidable challenge to Afghan forces as these groups strive to maintain their relevance and prominence throughout the winter months. Both Taliban and ANDSF operations are expected to continue throughout the winter but likely at a lower intensity. The insurgency's strategy will continue to be to exploit vulnerabilities in ANDSF force posture by conducting massed attacks against checkpoints, stretch the reach of the ANDSF into rural areas, isolate areas by staging smaller attacks in the surrounding areas, and impede ground lines of communication ahead of attacks against district or provincial centers.

The Taliban-led insurgency has likely been emboldened by the coalition's transition from direct combat operations to a TAA role and the accompanying reduction of coalition combat enablers. As a result, the Taliban will continue to test the ANDSF aggressively in 2016. The Taliban will likely try to build momentum from their countrywide attack strategy of 2015 and ascertain the limitations of the RS mission. Insurgents will focus on traditional areas of operation, such as in Helmand and Kandahar, while also demonstrating their influence throughout all of Afghanistan with sporadic HPAs and attacks in areas across the north and east and in Kabul. Most insurgent-initiated violence will likely occur away from populated areas. Complex and high-profile attacks will likely continue through the winter and into the next fighting season; and the Taliban will continue to portray localized, temporary tactical successes as strategic victories through the media.

Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq



United Nations Department of Safety and Security Estimate of Security Incidents Per Month



Shift from Tactical clashes to High Profile Attacks in 2012-2014

April 1 – September 15, 2012 vs. April 1 – Sept 15, 2013.

Metric	EIAs	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
% YoY Change	-6%	1%	-1%	-22%	-5%	5%	-18%

October 1, 2012 – March 13, 2013 vs. October 1, 2013 – March 13, 2014.


Metric	EIA	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
% YoY Change	-2%	43%	5%	-24%	-11%	-8%	-15%

April 1, 2013 – August 31, 2014, compared to April 1 – August 31, 2014

Metric	Enemy Initiated Attacks	High Profile Attacks	Direct Fire	IED/ Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attacks	Indirect Fire Attacks
Percentage Year Over Year Change	-27%	16%	-23%	-34%	-31%	-37%

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2013, p. 17. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf; April 2014 report, p.11; October 2014Report, p. 15


Weekly Reported Security Incidents” : 12/2011-4/2015



* Data as of June 8, 2015

Average Number of Security Incidents Per Day: 11/2012 - 10/2015

AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS PER DAY



Source: UN, reports of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International peace and security*, 12/10/2015, p. 5; 9/1/2015, p. 4; 6/10/2015, p. 4; 2/27/2015, p. 4; 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; 3/7/2014, p. 5; 12/6/2013, p. 6; 9/6/2013, p.6; 6/13/2013, p. 5; and 3/5/2013, p. 5.

SIGAR Summary of Security at End–2015 - I

USFOR-A reports that approximately 71.7% of the country's districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of November 27, 2015. Of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 292 districts are under government control or influence, 27 districts (6.6%) within 11 provinces are under insurgent control or influence, and 88 districts (21.6%) are at risk.

In a report issued in December, DOD stated that the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. There are more effective insurgent attacks and more ANDSF and Taliban casualties. However, DOD remains optimistic that the AND continues to improve its overall capability as the capabilities of the insurgent elements remain static.

The insurgency in Afghanistan has achieved some success this past year by modifying its tactics. The most notable example is the Taliban's brief capture of Kunduz in September. The insurgency is spreading the ANDSF thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers. The ANDSF has become reactive rather than proactive, DOD has reported

The UN reported the overall level of security incidents increased and intensified from August 2015 through the end of October, with 6,601 incidents as compared to 5,516 incidents (19% increase) during the same period in 2014. The 6,601 security incidents reported were the most since SIGAR began reporting in November 2012, and the average daily number of incidents that occurred equaled the number in the summer of 2014.

The Taliban temporarily seized Kunduz City, a provincial capital, as well as 16 district centers, primarily across the north during the period. While the ANDSF were able to regain control of Kunduz City and 13 of the district centers, the UN reports approximately 25% of districts remained contested throughout the country at the end of October.

While the majority (62%) of security incidents were in the south, southeast, and east, the UN reported a notable intensification in the north and northeast with Sar-e Pul, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Takhar provinces being the most volatile.

SIGAR Summary of Security at End–2015 - II

The UN reported the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), particularly in Nangarhar Province, and of unconfirmed reports of clashes between ISIL affiliates and the Taliban. The UN reported armed clashes and incidents involving improvised explosive devices continued to account for the majority (68%) of the security incidents, a 20% increase over the same period in 2014.

Among the incidents, 22 involved suicide attacks and 447 involved assassinations and abductions.¹¹⁰ Seventy-four incidents involving attacks against humanitarian personnel, assets, and facilities were registered with the UN and resulted in 21 humanitarian workers killed and 48 injured. The U.S. forces' mistaken attack on the Doctors Without Borders hospital was the deadliest, killing at least 30 persons and injuring at least 37.

Between August 1 and October 31, 2015, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented 3,693 civilian casualties (1,138 persons killed and 2,555 injured), a 26% increase over the same period in 2014.¹¹² Between January and September 2015, some 235,000 individuals were displaced, excluding the 17,000 families temporarily displaced during the Kunduz crisis, an increase of nearly 70% compared to the same period in 2014. The UN believes 2015 may have been the worst year for conflict-induced displacement in Afghanistan since 2002.

The UN reported the breakdown in the rule of law in Kunduz during the insurgent attack. Their occupation created an environment in which arbitrary killings, violence, and criminality occurred with impunity. The fear of violence was a key factor in the mass displacement of women from Kunduz City and the temporary suspension of services protecting women in several adjacent provinces. Attacks on schools decreased from 41 in the prior period to 22. The offensive in Kunduz led to the temporary closure of all 497 schools. In addition, the UN reported the forced closure of six schools in Nangarhar and the departure of education personnel after receiving threats and intimidation.


Due to the increased risks posed by the conflict, particularly in urban areas, the UN and other civilian actors curtailed program activities and temporarily relocated staff from Kunduz, Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Faryab Provinces.

UN Estimate of Incidents vs. Casualties: 1/2013-9/2015

CONFLICT INCIDENTS ²




CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ³



Figures from July to September may change based on updated information


Effective Enemy Initiated Attacks: 12/14 to 10/15



The number of effective enemy-initiated attacks¹⁰ from January 1 to November 30, 2015 – that is, attacks that resulted in casualties – increased by approximately 4 percent when compared to the same period in 2014 (see Figure 4).¹¹ The total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks hovered around 1,000 per month during the reporting period before decreasing in September 2015. This increase in the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is consistent with an increase in the number of ANDSF and civilian casualties over the reporting period, with an overall upward trend over the last two years.

Direct fire remains the leading type of insurgent attack by a wide margin followed by IED and mine explosions (see Figure 5). Indirect fire such as mortars, rockets, and artillery and surface-to-air fire continue to be infrequently utilized insurgent tactics. Although IED and mine explosions are less than half of the number of total attacks, this tactic typically gains more media attention, particularly when conducted as a high-profile attack via either a person-borne or vehicle-borne IED in a population center. Consistent with the previous reporting period and the overall trend since the transition to the RS mission, very few effective enemy-initiated attacks involved coalition or U.S. forces.

Enemy Initiated Attacks by Type: 12/14 to 11/15




**A Focus on Tactical Outcomes
Disguises a Lack of Meaningful
Reporting on the Key Impact of
the Insurgency: Growing
Insurgent Influence and Control
and Declining Support for the
Government**


Radically Different assessment of Trends in Threat Control and Influence

- Official U.S. and Afghan data seem to sharply understate the level of growing threat presence, influence, and control – perhaps because Districts are only counted as under threat control if the District capital is directly controlled and/or because growing threat influence is not measured.
- The estimates made in testimony by General Campbell for the end-2015 state of threat influence and control seem more spin than objective.
- The UN data that follow seem far more realistic in assessing trends, and are supported by the casualty trend data in the next section. They also note that the threat had enough influence or control to reduce civilian casualties in some areas.
- The failure of official reporting to assess corruption and power broker/official links, or agreements that give the Taliban influence and control in some areas casts, much of the public reporting into serious doubt.
- There has been no attempt to publically estimate the level of official control, and government rule of law by district for years.
- As a result, official unclassified data at best provide highly suspect analysis that focuses on tactical issues to the exclusion of the reality that insurgencies are essentially political warfare for control and/or influence.

Peak of Taliban Control: 2000-2001




Denial: Taliban Resurgence: 2002-2006



Overall Assessment of Key Districts


Figure 5 - Overall Assessment of Key Districts, March 18, 2010



Lying By Omission - I: The Last USG Report on District Support for the Afghan Government in April 2010


(Reporting Halted Once Shows Decline. Population only sympathized or support Afghan government in 24% (29 of 121 Key Terrain and area of Interest Districts))

Figure 6 - Comparison of Overall Assessment of Key Districts, December 24, 2009 - March 18, 2010



Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 1230, April 2010,, p. 36.


Lying By Omission - II: The Last USG Report Comparing Security Assessment of Key Districts Over Time in April 2010



Currently 35% (42 of 121) of the Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts are assessed favorably at the “occasional threats”¹³ level or better.

Although the overall security situation has stabilized somewhat since the end of 2009, violence during the current reporting period is still double that for the same period in 2008-2009. However, some individual islands of security exist in the sea of instability and insecurity. A new contiguous island of security is reported by RC-North in the districts surrounding Mazar-e-Sharif. Additionally, a small secure contiguous area exists within RC-South from the Ring Road to the Wesh-Chaman Border Control Point. The limits of security are significantly related to the presence of well-led and non-corrupt ANSF. In a significant number of cities, the secure zone is primarily the inner portion of the city center, with the outlying, more rural areas less secure due to insurgent presence. The location and size of the security zones is primarily the location where improvements in governance and development can occur. Therefore, the expansion of the security zones leads to the opportunity to improve governance and development in those areas.

Insurgent Areas of Operation in Afghanistan April, 2010




Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 1230, April 2010,, p. 23,

https://books.google.com/books?id=5-BBKEPhm4QC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=Figure+3+-+Insurgent+Areas+of+Operation+in+Afghanistan&source=bl&ots=J09HDVvupa&sig=zJ0JjezLHqIJQneZ_Zv_MMjYsAA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEAwAGovChMIqr3dooWcyAIVTgWOCh2b6gSE#v=onepage&q=Figure%203%20-%20Insurgent%20Areas%20of%20Operation%20in%20Afghanistan&f=false

+Insurgent+Areas+of+Operation+in+Afghanistan&source=bl&ots=J09HDVvupa&sig=zJ0JjezLHqIJQneZ_Zv_MMjYsAA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEAwAGovChMIqr3dooWcyAIVTgWOCh2b6gSE#v=onepage&q=Figure%203%20-%20Insurgent%20Areas%20of%20Operation%20in%20Afghanistan&f=false,

German Government Map of Threat Levels from Anti -Government Forces: 11/2014




Source: Die Bundesregierung (German federal government), 2014 Progress Report on Afghanistan, 11/2014, p. 19.

Source: Die Bundesregierung (German federal government), 2014 Progress Report on Afghanistan, 11/2014, p. 19.; UN Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security* reports, 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; and 3/7/2014, p. 5.; and SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2015, p. 93.

ISW/Washington Post Map of Insurgent Activity in 2015

9.29.2015

Source: Tim Craig, Sayed Salahuddin, "Taliban storms into northern Afghan city in major blow for security forces," Washington Post, September 29, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/taliban-overruns-half-of-northern-afghan-city/2015/09/28/53798568-65df-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html




Source: Institute for the Study of War

THE WASHINGTON POST

Taliban Presence

New York Times:
29/9/2015



Source:
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/29/world/middleeast/taliban-support-attack-zone-map.html>.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War


ISW

Insurgent Activity : 7/2015



Militant Attack and Support Zones in Afghanistan: April - October 6, 2015

2. SEP 28-OCT 6, 2015: Taliban militants, possibly with the Akhtar Mansour faction, also launched offensives on strategic areas in Sar-e Pul, and Jowzjan provinces following the September 28 attack on Kunduz city. On October 4 NATO forces conducted night air operations to deter Taliban militants in Faryab province. These Taliban offensives are either coordinated with the ongoing Northern campaign or are follow on operations aimed at exploiting ANSF forces redeploys to northeastern Afghanistan. If coordinated, these offensives in multiple sectors indicate a significant degree of sophistication, prior planning, and an intent to seize and hold terrain before the winter.



KEY	
SUPPORT ZONE	
ATTACK ZONE	
MAJOR TRANSIT ROUTES	
DISTRICT CENTERS UNDER ISIS CONTROL AS OF SEPTEMBER 14, 2015	
DISTRICT CENTERS UNDER TALIBAN CONTROL AS OF SEPTEMBER 14, 2015	
DISTRICT CENTERS AT RISK OF FALLING TO MILITANTS	
SPECTACULAR ATTACK LOCATIONS	
TALIBAN INFIGHTING	
DISTRICT CENTERS CONTESTED DURING NORTHERN OFFENSIVE	

Source: Institute for the Study of War: http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/militant-attack-and-support-zones-afghanistan-april-october-6-2015?utm_source=Copy+of+Militant+Attack+and+Support+Zones+in+Afghanistan%3A+April-October+6%2C+20&utm_campaign=Iraq+Situatio+n+Report+July+28-30%2C+2015&utm_medium=email

Map: Saagar Enjeti
Context: Saagar Enjeti and Rob Danaburg


UN Estimate of Areas of Risk in Afghanistan: 9/2015 - I

- **Districts with extreme threat levels either have no government presence at all, or a government presence reduced to only the district capital; there were 38 such districts scattered through 14 of the country's 34 provinces.**
- **In all, 27 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces had some districts where the threat level was rated high or extreme.**
- **In Oruzgan Province, in southern Afghanistan, four of its five districts were rated under extreme or high threat, with only the capital, Tarinkot, classified as under "substantial" threat. Many local officials predicted that the province might soon become the first to entirely fall to the Taliban.**
- **Similar concerns were raised by officials in two other Oruzgan districts, Dehrawad and Chora. They all reported increased activity by the Taliban in recent months.**
- **In Maimana, the capital of Faryab Province, American airstrikes, along with the arrival of pro-government militiamen, helped beat back the Taliban's effort to overrun the city last week, but the Taliban remain active in districts surrounding the provincial capital.**
- **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan evacuates 4 of 13 provincial— the most it has ever done for security reasons — in October 2015.**
- **Rated threat level in about half of the country's administrative districts as either "high" or "extreme," more than at any time since 2001.**
- **In many districts that are nominally under government control, like Musa Qala in Helmand Province and Charchino in Oruzgan Province, government forces hold only the government buildings in the district center and are under constant siege by the insurgents.**
- **Tempo of the insurgency has increased in many parts of the country where there had been little Taliban presence in the past, including some areas in the north with scant Pashtun populations. The Taliban have been a largely Pashtun-based insurgency and have been historically strongest in Pashtun-majority areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with some pockets in the north, such as Kunduz.**
- **"We have had fighting in 13 provinces of Afghanistan over the past six months, simultaneously," President Ashraf Ghani said this month in response to criticism after the fall of Kunduz.**

UN OHCA Estimate of Areas of Risk in Afghanistan: 9/2015 - II

More than half of the districts in Afghanistan are rated by the United Nations as having either a substantial, high or extreme level of risk.

- Districts with extreme threat levels either have no government presence at all, or a government presence reduced to only the district capital; there were 38 such districts scattered through 14 of the country's 34 provinces.
- In all, 27 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces had some districts where the threat level was rated high or extreme.




Source: United Nations
By The New York Times

UN OHCA Estimate of IDPs As a Conflict Indicator: 9/2015

CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT ⁴



CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENTS ⁶



The conflict in Afghanistan continues to intensify, with notable escalations in violence seen throughout the North, South and East Regions; Faryab, Helmand, Kunduz and Nangarhar experienced large-scale displacement within and to surrounding provinces.

During the quarter, approximately 63,500 individuals were recorded as conflict-displaced, with the total assessed number of forcibly displaced in 2015 reaching 197,000 by the end of September. One trauma care NGO reported a 19 per cent increase

in war-related admissions. The increasing violence culminated with the significant, yet temporary, siege of the provincial capital Kunduz by non-state armed groups (NSAG) at the end of September, which led to a month-long displacement crisis of nearly the entire city's population across the North and North East Regions.

As military operations in North Waziristan continued and expanded, refugees remain in the camp and urban areas of Khost and Paktika provinces; families do not expect to be able to return home in the foreseeable future, thus requiring a focus on more medium-term interventions while still meeting life-saving needs of the most vulnerable.

At the same time, the return of both documented and undocumented Afghans remains high, with nearly 54,000 registered refugees returning mainly from Pakistan in the first nine months of 2015, as compared to only 13,860 in Q3.

Undocumented returnees have also reached higher levels with nearly 440,000 people returning, 80,000 of which are considered particularly vulnerable; the number of vulnerable families and persons with specific needs is also increasing, all contributing to a worsening humanitarian situation in the country and limited capacity to respond.

UN OHCA Estimate of Afghan Aid Needs in 2015 as a Conflict Indicator

Third quarter report of financing and achievements (January to September)

AFFECTED SO FAR IN 2015 ¹

- 231 thousand actually displaced by conflict
- 128 thousand impacted by natural disasters
- 83.5 thousand vulnerable undocumented returns

VULNERABLE UNDOCUMENTED RETURNEES




Spontaneous Undocumented Returns



5 times higher in 2015


2014 69 individuals per day | 2015 331 individuals per day

NATURAL DISASTERS ⁷



FUNDING FOR 2015¹


Clusters




* Budgets have been updated to reflect the mid-year revision.

COMMON HUMANITARIAN FUND

Donor Contributions




Allocations by Cluster




BENEFICIARIES REACHED

Clusters




*Includes only under 5 children



BREAKDOWN OF PEOPLE IN NEED & ASSISTED



Taliban Areas of Control in Afghanistan: 15.10.15



The New York Times | Source: The Long War Journal

UN OHCA Estimate of IDPs As A Conflict Indicator: 11/2015


AFGHANISTAN: Conflict Induced Displacements - Snapshot (1 January - 31 October 2015)

As of October over 270,000 people have fled their homes due to conflict - 102% increase on 2014. Twenty-nine of thirty four provinces had recorded some level of forced displacement in the summer of 2015. Constrained humanitarian access hinders assessments, thus preventing verification of the full extent of displacement and undermining the provision of assistance and services. Displacement affects all individuals differently with needs, vulnerabilities and protection risks evolving over time due to exhaustion of coping mechanisms and only basic emergency assistance provided following initial displacement. Inadequate shelter, food insecurity, insufficient access to sanitation and health facilities, as well as a lack of protection, often result in precarious living conditions that jeopardises the well-being and dignity of affected families.

KEY FIGURES ¹




AGE AND GENDER BREAKDOWN ²



MONTHLY TRENDS (2012 - 2015) ³



IDPS BY REGION (PAST YEAR) ⁴




Notes: (1) Newly displaced populations due to conflict, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 2015, UNHCR Population Movement Tracking System (PMT). (2) Age and gender breakdown of IDPs, UNHCR monthly IDP update, Oct 2015. (3) Newly displaced individuals by month 2012 - 2015, UNHCR PMT, Oct 2015. (4) Conflict IDPs by region of displacement, Sep 2014 - Oct 2015, UNHCR PMT. Creation date: 9 Dec 2015. Doc Name: afg_conflict_idps_2015_jan_oct_snapshot_20151209. Feedback: ocha-afg@un.org Website: <http://www.unocha.org/afghanistan> <http://afg.humanitarianresponse.info>
Disclaimers: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Taliban and Other Threat Forces: 12.15

- **Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour**
- **High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate: Taliban splinter group led Mullah Muhammad Rasool**
- **Hizb-e Islami (HIG) or Islamic Party: a comparatively minor Afghan insurgent group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar**
- **Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Pakistani Taliban**
- **Islamic State (IS): challenges the Taliban's legitimacy and supremacy**
- **Al-Qaeda: supports the Afghan Taliban and has renewed its allegiance to the Taliban leader, Mullah Mansour**
- **Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): Pakistani militant group traditionally focused on India**
- **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ): Pakistani sectarian militant group targeting Shias**
- **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): linked to IS since August 2015**
- **Islamic Jihad Union (IJU): a splinter faction of IMU now loyal to Afghan Taliban**
- **East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM): China-focused Uighur separatist group**

Taliban Presence

New York Times:
29/9/2015



Source:
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/29/world/middleeast/taliban-support-attack-zone-map.html>.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War


ISW Threat Assessment

10/12/2015

Some support zones depicted on the map exceed the bounds of the districts explicitly researched as part of this project. These low-confidence support zone assessments are based upon historical, terrain, and demographic analysis. High-confidence support zones are depicted in districts that were fully researched as part of this project. ISW analysts have assessed conditions in 200 of 409 districts. Taliban militants captured the district center of Reg-e Khan Neshin district, Helmand province on December 9 after prolonged clashes with police and ANSF, the last district center capture portrayed on this map. Taliban militants loyal to Mullah Akhtar Mansour attacked the joint U.S.-Afghan Kandahar Airfield near Kandahar City on December 8. This attack is not represented on the map because it does not constitute an attempt by Taliban militants to control a district center.

Source:
<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map+/151a7e17269d3cb>

3/6/2016



This map partially depicts areas of Taliban control and support and ISIS presence across Afghanistan as of December 10, 2015 as well as the status of district centers that have been attacked by Taliban militants in 2015. Some support zones depicted on the map exceed the bounds of the districts explicitly researched as part of this project. These low-confidence support zone assessments are based upon historical, terrain, and demographic analysis. High-confidence support zones are depicted in districts that were fully researched as part of this project. ISW analysts have assessed conditions in 200 of 409 districts. Taliban militants captured the district center of Reg-e Khan Neshin district, Helmand province on December 9 after prolonged clashes with police and ANSF, the last district center capture portrayed on this map. Taliban militants loyal to Mullah Akhtar Mansour attacked the joint U.S.-Afghan Kandahar Airfield near Kandahar City on December 8. This attack is not represented on the map because it does not constitute an attempt by Taliban militants to control a district center. ISW will update this map as ground conditions change and as analysts continue to assess support zones.

ISW-Washington Post

Threat Assessment

End 2015-Early 2016

According to U.S. statistics, casualties among Afghan security forces increased by nearly 30 percent during the first 11 months of 2015.

“We have not met the people’s expectations. We haven’t delivered,” Abdullah Abdullah, the country’s chief executive, told the high-level gathering. “Our forces lack discipline. They lack rotation opportunities. We haven’t taken care of our own policemen and soldiers. They continue to absorb enormous casualties.”

With control of — or a significant presence in — roughly 30 percent of districts across the nation, according to Western and Afghan officials, the Taliban now holds more territory than in any year since 2001, when the puritanical Islamists were ousted from power after the 9/11 attacks. For now, the top American and Afghan priority is [preventing Helmand](#), largely secured by U.S. Marines and British forces in 2012, from again falling to the insurgency.

As of last month, about 7,000 members of the Afghan security forces had been killed this year, with 12,000 injured, a 26 percent increase over the total number of dead and wounded in all of 2014, said a Western official with access to the most recent NATO statistics. Attrition rates are soaring. Deserters and injured Afghan soldiers say they are fighting a more sophisticated and well-armed insurgency than they have seen in years.


In the confidential October meeting, Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, told his Afghan counterparts that he was as guilty as they were of “just putting our finger in the dike in Helmand.”

But he was highly critical of Afghan security officials for “not managing” their forces in a way that ensured they got enough training, and for allowing “breakdowns in discipline” in the ranks. “The Taliban are not 10 feet tall,” he said. “You have much more equipment than they do. You’re better trained. It’s all about leadership and accountability.”

Source: Sudarsan Raghavan, “A year of Taliban gains shows that ‘we haven’t delivered,’ top, Afghan official says,” *Washington Post*, December 27, 2015; : Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/26/the-u-s-was-supposed-to-leave-afghanistan-by-2017-now-it-might-take-decades/>

3/6/201
6

Taliban and Islamic State presence in Afghanistan



Source: Institute for the Study of War, December 2015

LARIS KARKLIS/THE WASHINGTON POST

Lead US Inspector General Summary of Key Threats 12.2015

TALIBAN

Since the July 2015 announcement that Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Omar died in 2013, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor has largely consolidated his position as the new emir, though some dissenting factions have broken away. The Taliban has proven capable of taking rural areas, fighting for key terrain in Helmand province, and conducting high-visibility attacks in Kabul and Kunduz. However, the group has not been able to hold key terrain for extended periods of time and has suffered significant casualties. The Taliban has presence throughout Afghanistan, but most insurgent activity during the last half of 2015 was carried out in Kabul, Kunduz, Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Uruzgan, Parwan, Faryab, and Ghazni provinces.

AL QAEDA

For most of 2015, al Qaeda was considered to be in a survival mode. U.S. counterterrorism efforts have targeted the terrorist group since 2001. Fewer than 100 core members were estimated to be cooperating with the Taliban, particularly in the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. However, in October, U.S. forces found and destroyed a major training site in a remote part of Kandahar.

HAQQANI NETWORK

With links to the Taliban and al Qaeda, this extremist group is considered the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces. Its involvement with the Taliban has increased, with the appointment of the network's leader, Siraj Haqqani, as deputy to Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor. The network leads the insurgency in Paktika and Khost provinces and uses those areas to launch attacks on Kabul.

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND LEVANT KHORASAN (ISIL-K)

The ISIL-K has been gaining membership from disaffected members of the Taliban and other extremist groups. ISIL-K has been battling the Taliban, and now the Afghan army, in a section of Nangarhar province by the Pakistan border. The group's name refers to an ancient area that included parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The extremist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has pledged support to the ISIL-K, and there are reports of it operating in Zabul and Ghazni provinces, as well as in Kunduz province to the north.



Lead US Inspector General: Key Insurgent Leaders: 12.2015

The National Counterterrorism Center, DoD and media reports have identified the following leaders of terrorist and insurgent groups: Leaders of Terror and Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan


Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri became radicalized during his university years in Cairo in the 1970s. After receiving his degree in general surgery in 1978, he became increasingly involved with Islamist groups opposed to the government of Anwar al-Sadat. Following the 1981 assassination of President Sadat, al-Zawahiri was arrested along with other Islamists and received a 3-year prison sentence. He later met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan while both men were supporting anti-Soviet insurgents. He was sentenced in Egypt to death *in absentia* in 1997 for a terrorist attack on foreign tourists. One year later, he merged his group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with al Qaeda. After bin Laden's death, al-Zawahiri became the acknowledged leader of al Qaeda.

Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, Taliban. There is a dearth of reliable information on Mullah Mansoor's background. Another veteran of the fight against the Soviet Union, he is alleged to have been born near Kandahar, studied at a radical Pakistani madrassa, and been an integral part of the inner councils of his now-deceased predecessor, Mullah Omar. During the 1996-2001 Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Mullah Mansoor controlled the nation's civil aviation authority. After the announcement of Mullah Omar's death in 2015, Mullah Mansoor quickly took control of the Taliban. But this was met with opposition from several Taliban leaders. His followers have been involved in several clashes with forces aligned with ISIL-K.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, Haqqani Network. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Haqqani was born in either Afghanistan or Pakistan in the 1970s. He emerged as the network's leader in 2014, after the reported death of his father Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was one of the most powerful leaders of the anti-Soviet insurgency and a sometime ally of the United States. While drone strikes have taken a severe toll on the terrorist network, eliminating many senior figures based in eastern Afghanistan and North Waziristan, Pakistan, the network remains capable of conducting significant attacks.

Hafez Saeed Khan, ISIL-K. Born in Pakistan in the early 1970s, Saeed is reported to have travelled to Kabul after September 11, 2001, to fight alongside the Taliban. He was a member of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, but pledged his allegiance to ISIL after that group splintered in 2014. In January 2015, an ISIL spokesman released a video confirming his leadership of ISIL-K. According to media reports claiming to be based on information obtained by the Afghan National Directorate for Intelligence, Saeed was killed in a July 2015 U.S. drone strike in eastern Afghanistan along with 30 other insurgents. However, ISIL-K denied those reports and neither the U.S. nor Afghan governments confirmed the death.


Lead US Inspector General Summary of High Visibility Activity: 12.2015




Source: Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL Quarterly Report to the United States Congress October 1, 2015–December 31, 2015, p. 5, <https://oig.state.gov/lig-oco>.

Sympathy for Taliban and Armed Opposition Groups

SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS: BY PROVINCE



REASONS AOGs ARE FIGHTING THE GOVERNMENT



Zachary Warren and Nancy Hopkins,
 AFGHANISTAN IN 2015, A Survey of the Afghan
 People, Asia Foundation, 2015,
<http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/155>

Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A

Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016 - I

- 2015 was fundamentally different than previous years of our campaign...First, Afghanistan's government and security forces have managed multiple transitions in 2015. Second, the US and coalition mission and force structure have significantly changed. And third, changing regional dynamics, including evolving threats, have presented both challenges and opportunities for our success.
- With that in mind, I would like to address the concerns over what many feel is an overall declining security situation in Afghanistan. The situation is more dynamic than a simple yes or no answer would adequately address.
 - In fact, as of last week, the units we have on the ground throughout the country report that of the 407 district centers, 8 (or 2%) are under insurgent control.
 - We assess that another 18 (or 4%) are under what we call insurgent influence. Often, these district centers are in remote and sparsely populated areas that security forces are not able to access very often in force.
 - Additionally, at any given time there may be up to 94 district centers (around 23%) that we view as "at risk."
- These figures make two clear points: 1) that approximately 70% of the inhabited parts of Afghanistan are either under government influence or government control; and 2) the importance of prioritizing Afghan resources to ensure key district centers do not fall into insurgent influence or control.
- ...*Afghanistan is at an inflection point.* I believe if we do not make deliberate, measured adjustments, 2016 is at risk of being no better, and possibly worse, than 2015. To place this in context, I would like to emphasize the uniqueness of 2015 and some dynamics I think we should soberly consider as we assess our way forward.
- The enemy has also changed this year. Unlike previous years, the Taliban extended the fighting season, and has continued to conduct operations in Helmand, as called for by Taliban leadership.

Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A

Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016 - II

- **Even so, the Taliban recognize they have no lasting gains to consolidate from last year, and cannot afford to cede the limited ground that they do hold. They are also coming out of a year that saw fracturing of their organization, loss of legitimacy competition from other insurgent groups, and high casualty rates—probably their highest in years.**
- **As I meet with Afghan soldiers and police, I remind them that the Taliban are not 10 feet tall and bullet proof. They face significant challenges and they can be defeated. This fact is often forgotten in prominent media reports. The brief notoriety the Taliban gained in Kunduz and Helmand is still overshadowed by the significant cost of those efforts, which is compounded by the loss of credibility and unity as enemy infighting continues.**
- **The Taliban’s public narrative in Afghanistan is waning too. It is not lost on the people of Afghanistan that the Taliban are killing Afghans—security forces and innocent civilians alike. Recent public information campaigns have also been more forceful, stressing to the public that the Taliban, “...have no plan for the development of Afghanistan; they are here to kill you; they are against women; they are against education; they are against progress for the nation of Afghanistan.” As these messages resonate, the government must show that it is the only viable option for Afghanistan. At the city, district, provincial, and national levels, the people of Afghanistan see that the return of the Taliban represents a return to brutality, criminality, and oppression.**
- **The operating environment is also evolving for the Taliban due to the emergence of other insurgent and terrorist groups. One such group is Daesh in Afghanistan, or Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP). Daesh continues to conduct brutal attacks against civilians, and directly competes with the Taliban for resources to establish a foothold in the country. They have focused their efforts on establishing a presence in Nangarhar and recruiting in other areas. We recently gained the authority to strike Daesh. Since then, we have had considerable success in degrading their capabilities.**

Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A

Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016 - III

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Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A

Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016 - IV

- **The rejection of Daesh by local elders, who are working with Afghan security forces, has also slowed the enemy's progress. The strikes have been effective in mitigating their growth. We must maintain constant pressure on Daesh and dedicate intelligence resources to prevent strategic surprise.**
- **The Taliban has had to adjust this year's strategy in order to counter the emergence of Daesh and other insurgent groups. This dynamic has served as a distraction to the Taliban, resulting in a shift of precious resources from fighting the ANDSF to countering opposition groups. More than just consuming resources, the in-fighting, and resultant inability to maintain cohesion has also severely damaged the credibility of the Taliban's core narrative of being a strong, united organization.**
- **Groups aligned with the Taliban such as al-Qa'eda and the Haqqani Network continue to threaten our national security interests. Al-Qa'eda has been significantly weakened, but as evidenced by the recent discovery of an al-Qa'eda camp on Afghanistan's southern border, they are certainly not extinct. The Haqqani Network remains the most capable threat to US and Coalition forces, planning and executing the most violent high profile attacks in Kabul.**
- **These are certainly not "residual threats" that would allow for peaceful transition across Afghanistan. Instead, they are persistent threats that are adapting to a changing operational environment. Ultimately, the threats Afghanistan faces require our sustained attention and forward presence.**

Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by UNAMA, February 14, 2016 - I

In 2015, Anti-Government Elements (Taliban and other armed opposition groups) focused on challenging Government control of territory, seizing more district administrative centres and holding them for longer than in previous years. They briefly captured Kunduz city, the first provincial capital since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.

Anti-Government Elements focused on population centres (cities, towns, and large villages) – simultaneously challenging Government control of such centres while carrying out regular, deadly suicide attacks in major cities, particularly Kabul. Taliban claimed responsibility for more than half of the suicide and complex attacks resulting in civilian casualties.

...The Government struggled to adequately secure and protect territory and populations as the country underwent simultaneous political, security and economic transitions. The convergence of the trends above combined with these transitions placed civilians increasingly at risk. In 2015, Taliban forces captured 24 district centres, compared to four in 2014, forcing Afghan security forces to fight on multiple fronts simultaneously.

Four of the 24 districts remained under Taliban control at the end of 2015. The losses of Afghan regular forces weakened their ability to protect the civilian population, leading to a loss in public confidence in the Government.

...Following record battlefield casualties of Afghan security forces (more than 12,000 casualties in 2015)¹⁸, branches of the Government began arming pro-Government armed groups and supporting “national uprising movements” while simultaneously pledging to disarm such groups, raising serious concerns for human rights protection in 2016 and beyond. 2015 also bore witness to the operational emergence of more extreme Anti-Government Elements groups, including Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or *Daesh*, that brought with it a dangerous and new, though geographically limited, threat to the population.

...The increase in civilian casualties in 2015 was concentrated in two regions, northeastern and central Afghanistan. Although certain trends, such as the rise in targeted and deliberate killings of civilians and the

Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by UNAMA, February 14, 2016 - II

increase in civilian casualties from airstrikes proved consistent across the country, UNAMA documented decreased civilian casualties in all other regions. This included a six per cent decrease in the southern region, which nonetheless continued to suffer the highest number of civilian casualties followed by the northeastern and central regions.

In the northeast, civilian casualties doubled in 2015 compared with 2014, due to repeated fighting in and around Kunduz city. Following advances in April and June 2015, on 28 September, Taliban launched an attack on and captured Kunduz city, sparking more than two weeks of urban fighting that continued until 13 October, when they formally announced their withdrawal from the city and Afghan security forces regained control. The vast majority of civilian casualties resulted from ground fighting between Taliban fighters and Afghan security forces, although UNAMA documented civilian casualties from targeted or deliberate killings, parallel justice punishments and aerial operations, including the United States airstrike on the *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) hospital on 3 October.

In the central region, notably in Kabul city, complex and suicide attacks caused an 18 per cent increase in civilian casualties. For example, two suicide attacks in Kabul city on 7 August caused 355 civilian casualties (43 deaths and 312 injured) - the highest number of civilians killed and injured in one day since UNAMA began systematically recording civilian casualties in 2009.

...In the second half of 2015, increased ground fighting across Afghanistan, and the Taliban offensive in Kunduz province in September-October 2015 in particular, drove a 60 per cent increase in civilian casualties from ground engagements, reversing the per cent decrease in casualties resulting from this tactic documented by UNAMA in the first half of the year.

...In 2015, fighting intensified in and around civilian populated areas, with Afghan national security forces conducting clearance operations to regain control of population centres and repelling offensives by Anti-Government Elements. Combined with continued use of explosive weapons in civilian-populated areas, this resulted in increasing civilian deaths and injuries attributed to Pro-Government Forces during ground engagements.

Estimate of Government vs. Threat Control by UNAMA, February 14. 2016 - III

...UNAMA attributed 1,256 civilian casualties (341 deaths and 915 injured) from ground engagements to Pro-Government Forces - a 40 per cent increase compared to 2014, accounting for 30 per cent of all civilian casualties caused by ground engagements.

...The increase in civilian casualties attributed to Pro-Government Forces resulted largely from their use of explosive weapons, including artillery, mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles and grenades in civilian populated areas. UNAMA observed that 85 per cent of all civilian casualties caused by Pro-Government Forces during ground engagements resulted from the use of indirect and explosive weapons during fighting. This amounted to a 60 per cent increase compared to 2014.

These findings underscore the critical need for the Government of Afghanistan to put in place robust, practical measures to reduce civilian casualties from the use of explosive weapons by Afghan security forces, and ensure accountability for those personnel responsible for negligent or intentional harm caused to civilians.

Civilian Casualty Challenges

Casualty Data vs. Security Reporting

- **UN casualty data strongly indicate that DoD and command data are being “spun” to disguise growing problems and sharply increasing insurgent influence.**
- **UN casualty data showed striking increase in geographic scope of insurgent attacks until mid-2015.**
- **Casualty data becoming less relevant because insurgent influence is rising in areas without added fighting.**
- **No clear data on trends in**
- **Afghan Forces casualties; being suppressed although some commanders have said is rising to unacceptable levels.**
- **Police and ALP seem to be suffering critical casualty levels, Afghan Army becoming steadily more dependent on limited U.S. air support, and some Kandaks limiting patrol and other operations to reduce casualties.**
- **Casualty data in Helmand and south indicate most surge gains gone except in Kandahar. Warn serious insurgent gains taking place in the north.**

State Department Country Data: Afghanistan 2013

More than half of all attacks in Afghanistan in 2013 (56.7%) were attributed to a perpetrator group, and nearly all of these (98.6%) were attributed to the Taliban.

Two attacks in Afghanistan in 2013, the assassination of Indian author Sushmita Banerjee and a suicide attack targeting the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, were attributed specifically to the Haqqani Network.

Unlike in 2012, when attacks against military targets were 24.3 percent more prevalent in Afghanistan than around the world, in 2013 the percentage of attacks against military targets globally increased and was approximately the same as that in Afghanistan (5.2%).

Attacks against police targets were especially common in Afghanistan in 2013. In fact, 44.6 percent of all attacks in Afghanistan in 2013 primarily targeted the police, especially checkpoints, patrols, and security forces. This is 80.6 percent higher than the percentage of attacks that targeted police globally.

Like in Iraq, suicide attacks continued to be especially frequent in Afghanistan. More than 9 percent of attacks in Afghanistan in 2013 were classified as suicide attacks, compared to 5.3 percent globally.

Terrorist attacks in Afghanistan took place throughout the country in 2013.

Nearly one-quarter of all attacks (21.6%) took place in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the South; however, 24 other provinces experienced more than 10 attacks in 2013.

Taliban and Insurgent Tactics Have Become Lethal and More Challenging

- ISAF/US reporting on cover tactical events, not outcomes and is essentially meaningless, if not dishonest, in showing relative areas of government and insurgent presence and influence.
- UNAMA reporting shows casualty levels never dropped significantly as a result of the surge and got far worse in the first six months of 2014 as ISAF forces withdrew.
- UNAMA reports that targeted attacks by Anti-Government Elements against mullahs (religious leaders) they accused of supporting the Government and in mosques tripled in 2013 and rose again in the first six months of 2014.
- In the first half of 2014, the armed conflict in Afghanistan took a dangerous new turn for civilians. For the first time since 2009 when UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian casualties in Afghanistan, more civilians were found to have been killed and injured in ground engagements and crossfire between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces than any other tactic. In previous years, the majority of civilians were killed and injured by improvised explosive devices.
- Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured) recording a 17 per cent increase in civilian deaths, and a 28 per cent increase in civilians injured for a 24 per cent overall increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.³
- UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces⁵ (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party.
- UNAMA attributed four per cent of civilian casualties to explosive remnants of war, and the remaining one per cent to cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
- Compared with the first six months of 2009, when UNAMA began to monitor civilian casualties, the number of civilians killed by Anti-Government Elements doubled in 2014 (from 599 to 1,208), while the number of civilians killed by Pro-Government forces has been cut by half (from 302 to 158), almost entirely due to reduced civilian casualties from aerial operations of international military forces.

Source: UNAMA/UNHCR, **Afghanistan Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:**

2014 http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m_XyrUQDKZg%3d&tabid=12254&mid=15756&language=en-US, July 2014, pp. 1-2.

DoD Casualty Summary for First Half of 2015

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) conducts comprehensive civilian casualty reporting as part of their efforts to encourage all parties to the conflict to take robust and meaningful measures to protect the civilian population. UNAMA compiles its figures from site visits by locally employed staff who speak with victims, witnesses, and local leaders. Although the most recent UNAMA data available is from the first half of 2015, this data and these trends are consistent with other available sources of civilian casualty information for the reporting period.

UNAMA documented 4,921 civilian casualties (1,592 civilians deaths and 3,329 injured) in the first six months of 2015. This amounts to a one percent increase in overall civilian casualties, with a six percent decrease in civilian deaths and four percent increase in the number injured, as compared to the first six months of 2014.¹³ UNAMA attributed the rise in the overall number of civilian casualties from January through June 2015 to an increase in complex and suicide attacks and to deliberate and targeted killings by insurgents. Ground engagements and IEDs continue to be the two leading causes of civilian casualties.


From January 1, 2015, to June 30, 2015, UNAMA attributed approximately 15 percent of Afghan civilian casualties to the ANDSF and 70 percent to the insurgents. RS figures place insurgent-caused civilian casualties and ANDSF-caused casualties at 90 percent and approximately 2 percent respectively. The Office of the National Security Council is coordinating an inter-ministerial policy to reduce civilian casualties including partnering with UNAMA and the non-governmental organization Civilians in Conflict to implement training programs for the ANDSF and the population. The Afghan government will also assume responsibility for leading a quarterly Civilian Casualty Assessment Board in 2016. Coalition TAA efforts will continue to work to professionalize the ANDSF to help reduce civilian casualties.

On October 3, 2015, a U.S. military airstrike to support Afghan special operations forces on the ground in Kunduz city struck a *Médecins Sans Frontières* (also known as Doctors Without Borders) trauma center. The U.S. investigation determined that this tragedy resulted in the death of 30 staff, patients, and assistants; the injury of 37 others; and was the direct result of human error, compounded by systems and procedural failures. The investigation also included specific recommendations relating to these failures and to personnel to ensure U.S. forces avoid repeating the mistakes that led to this tragic event.

UN Casualty Summary for End 2015

- UNAMA documented 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 deaths and 7,457 injured) in 2015, exceeding the previous record levels of civilian casualties that occurred in 2014. The latest figures show an overall increase of four per cent during 2015 in total civilian casualties from the previous year.
- Ground engagements between parties to the conflict caused the highest number of total civilian casualties (fatalities and injuries), followed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide and complex attacks. Ground engagements caused the most fatalities amongst civilians, followed by targeted and deliberate killings.
- Anti-Government Elements continued to cause the most harm – 62 per cent of all civilian casualties – despite a 10 per cent reduction from 2014 in the total civilian casualties resulting from their attacks.
- Notwithstanding the overall decrease, the report documents Anti-Government Elements increasing use of some tactics that deliberately or indiscriminately cause civilian harm, including targeted killings of civilians, complex and suicide attacks, as well as indiscriminate and illegal pressure-plate IEDs.
- Civilian deaths and injuries caused by Pro-Government Forces caused 17 per cent of civilian casualties – 14 per cent from Afghan security forces, two per cent from international military forces, and one per cent from pro-Government armed groups. The report documents increased civilian casualties caused by Pro-Government Forces, including during ground engagements, aerial operations, and the activities of pro-Government armed groups.
- Fighting between the parties to the conflict, which could not be attributed to one specific party, caused 17 per cent of civilian casualties. Unattributed explosive remnants of war caused four per cent and cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan caused less than half of one per cent. Ground engagements between parties to the conflict caused 4,137 civilian casualties (1,116 deaths and 3,021 injured) – a 15 per cent increase from 2014 – and the leading cause of civilian casualties in Afghanistan.
- Improvised explosive devices caused 2,368 civilian casualties (713 deaths and 1,655 injured). While this represents a 20 per cent decrease it is still the second leading cause of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. In 2015, UNAMA documented a 37 per cent increase in women casualties and a 14 per cent increase in child casualties.
- “In 2015, the conflict caused extreme harm to the civilian population, with particularly appalling consequences for children. Unprecedented numbers of children were needlessly killed and injured last year – one in four casualties in 2015 was a child,” said Danielle Bell, UNAMA Director of Human Rights.


Civilian Deaths and Injuries January to December 2009 - 2015



In 2015, the conflict in Afghanistan continued to cause extreme harm to the civilian population, with the highest number of total civilian casualties recorded by UNAMA since 2009. Following increases in 2013 and 2014, civilian deaths and injuries from conflict related violence increased by four per cent compared with 2014.

Between 1 January and 31 December 2015, UNAMA documented 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 civilian deaths and 7,457 injured), marking a four per cent decrease in civilian deaths and a nine per cent increase in civilians injured. Since UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian casualties on 1 January 2009 up to 31 December 2015, UNAMA recorded 58,736 civilian casualties (21,323 deaths and 37,413 injured).

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Parties to the Conflict: January to December 2015




UNAMA attributed 62 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements and 17 per cent to Pro-Government Forces (14 per cent to Afghan national security forces, two per cent to international military forces and one per cent to pro-Government armed groups). Seventeen per cent of all civilian casualties resulted from ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces not be attributed to one specific party. Four per cent of civilian casualties resulted from unattributed explosive remnants of war.

Between 1 January and 31 December 2015, UNAMA documented 6,859 civilian casualties (2,315 deaths and 4,544 injured) from operations and attacks carried out by all Anti-Government Elements, a 10 per cent decrease from 2014. The decrease resulted from fewer civilian casualties attributed to Anti-Government Elements from IEDs and ground engagements. However, UNAMA documented a 16 per cent increase in civilian casualties attributed to Anti-Government Elements from complex and suicide attacks, and a 27 per cent increase in civilian casualties from targeted killings, which became the second leading cause of civilian deaths in 2015.

Pro-Government Forces – in particular Afghan security forces – continued to cause increasing numbers of civilian casualties in 2015. UNAMA documented 1,854 civilian casualties (621 deaths and 1,233 injured) caused by Pro-Government Forces, a 28 per cent increase compared to 2014

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Parties to the Conflict January to December 2009 - 2015



UNAMA attributed 62 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements and 17 per cent to Pro-Government Forces (14 per cent to Afghan national security forces, two per cent to international military forces and one per cent to pro-Government armed groups). Seventeen per cent of all civilian casualties resulted from ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces not be attributed to one specific party. Four per cent of civilian casualties resulted from unattributed explosive remnants of war.

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
Pro-Government Forces – in particular Afghan security forces – continued to cause increasing numbers of civilian casualties in 2015. UNAMA documented 1,854 civilian casualties (621 deaths and 1,233 injured) caused by Pro-Government Forces, a 28 per cent increase compared to 2014.¹¹ Consistent with trends documented in the UNAMA 2015 Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the majority of civilian casualties caused by Pro-Government Forces occurred during ground engagements, primarily from the use of indirect and explosive weapons such as artillery, mortars, rockets and grenades.

Afghanistan Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2016,


3/6/2016

<http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-annual-report-2015-protection-civilians-armed-conflict-february-2016>, February 14, 2016

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by region January to December 2009 - 2015



Civilian Deaths and Injuries by region January to December 2015




Afghanistan Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2016,

3/6/2016


<http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-annual-report-2015-protection-civilians-armed-conflict-february-2016>, February 14, 2016

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
Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Ground Engagements January to December 2009 - 2015




Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagements by Party to the Conflict January - December 2015




Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagements by region January to December 2009 - 2015




Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Anti-Government Elements January to December: 2009 - 2015




Civilian Deaths by Tactic: Anti-Government Elements January to December: 2009 - 2015



Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by region January to December: 2009 - 2015




Civilian Deaths and Injuries by AGEs Targeted and Deliberate Killings January to December 2009 - 2015



Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Aerial Operations


January to December 2009 - 2015



Source: UNAMA, UNOHCHR, AFGHANISTAN, MIDYEAR REPORT 2015
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED

CONFLICT http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/PoC%20Report%202015/UNAMA%20Protection%20of%20Civilians%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%20Midyear%20Report%202015_FINAL_%205%20August-new.pdf, p. 78

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by region January to June 2009 - 2015




Source: UNAMA, UNOHCHR, AFGHANISTAN, MIDYEAR REPORT 2015

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED

CONFLICT http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/PoC%20Report%202015/UNAMA%20Protection%20of%20Civilians%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%20Midyear%20Report%202015_FINAL_%205%20August-new.pdf, p. 44

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagements by region

January to December 2009 - 2015




Declining Afghan Perceptions of Security

Taliban and US/Allies as Major Threats: Level of Fear by Activity

LEVEL OF FEAR BY ACTIVITY

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH	NATIONAL AVERAGE
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
VOTING IN A NATIONAL / PROVINCIAL ELECTION	46	61	68	69	69	42	32	57	56
PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	55	75	76	81	77	67	55	74	69
RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	64	77	79	78	76	77	52	76	73
ENCOUNTERING ANP	32	54	51	66	58	39	27	41	45
ENCOUNTERING ANA	28	51	46	64	54	35	30	41	42
TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	78	73	86	80	83	79	72	80	80
ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY FORCES ONLY)	74	84	86	86	80	77	60	83	79
ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	90	91	94	88	91	94	94	96	92

Uncertain Perceptions of Security



Zachary Warren and Nancy Hopkins, AFGHANISTAN IN 2015, A Survey of the Afghan People, Asia Foundation, 2015, <http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1558>


Terrorism Challenges

The Uncertain and Dubious Character of Terrorism Statistics


- **The U.S. government no longer has its National Counter Terrorism Center issue unclassified official data.**
- **The START estimates in the trend data that follow are drawn from media sources and are inherently more uncertain.**
- **Much of the sharp rises in the charts that follow seem to be driven more by the violence created by active insurgencies than actual terrorism.**
- **They may still, however, be useful as broad indicators of the overall rise in violence within given insurgencies.**

Rise in Terrorism in Afghanistan: 1970-2013

Afghanistan- Terrorist Incidents




Afghanistan- Fatalities



Source: START Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

Deaths from Terrorism: 2000-2014

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased ninefold since the year 2000.




Source: START GTD

NOTE: In 2011 there was a change in the data collection methodology for terrorist acts. The methodology change did not materially alter the results as the increase in terrorism is verifiable. For more information on the methodology change please see Annex D in the 2014 Global Terrorism Index.

Terrorist Attacks: 2000-2014

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.




Source: Vision of Humanity. *Global terrorism Index Report*, 2014

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 14.

Terror and Conflict


Eighty-eight per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Eleven per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that at the time were not involved in conflict. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.



Source: START GTD, UCDP

Afghan Government and Taliban Battle Deaths: 2014

The conflict between the Government of Afghanistan and its allies and the Taliban recorded the highest number of battle-related deaths in 2014. There were 55 per cent more deaths in this conflict in 2014 than the previous year.



Source: UCDP


Afghan Terrorism Deaths: I



GTI RANK | **2**
GTI SCORE | **9.233**



INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000



ATTACKS BY TARGET

- Police
- Private citizens & property
- Government (general)
- Military, militia or terrorist groups
- Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

- Taliban
- Unknown
- Other



Afghan Terrorism Deaths: II

Terrorism continues to increase in Afghanistan, with 38 per cent more terrorist attacks and 45 per cent more fatalities in 2014 than in 2013. The Taliban was responsible for the majority of these attacks and casualties.

The Taliban remains one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the world. In 2012, 2013 and 2014 it was responsible for around 75 per cent of all terrorist fatalities in Afghanistan. The deadliness of attacks increased in 2014 with the Taliban killing 3.9 people per attack, over 200 per cent higher than 2013.

In 2014 there were terrorist acts in 515 different cities in Afghanistan clearly highlighting the breadth of terrorism across the country. However, the areas of the country where terrorism is most intense are within 100 miles of the border with Pakistan. This is in both the south and east regions of the country with around ten per cent of attacks having occurred in the Helmand Province in the south.

The Nangarhar Province in the east experienced eight per cent of attacks and the two largest cities, Kabul and Kandahar both received seven per cent of the attacks.

Police are the main target of terrorism with 38 per cent of attacks against police. These attacks are among the most lethal with an average of 3.7 people killed per attack. In contrast, when private citizens are the target there is an average of 2.9 deaths per attack.


The number of people killed in an educational institution fell substantially to 13 with 34 injuries. This compares to 21 deaths and 198 injuries in the prior year. In 2013 the Taliban conducted at least seven attacks targeting girls attending school, mostly in the north, resulting in over 160 casualties.

Suicide attacks account for ten per cent of all attacks; however, they are more lethal accounting for 18 per cent of all deaths and 32 per cent of all injuries. For every suicide attack there is on average five deaths and nine injuries. The majority of these attacks are bombings, constituting 93 per cent of all suicide attacks.

The remaining suicide attacks were assassinations mainly targeting the police and hostage taking. Targets have included the United States aid organization named Roots of Peace, the Independent Election Commission, the New Kabul Bank where soldiers were collecting salaries and an NGO called Partnership in Academics and Development.


Impact of Key Terrorist Groups: 2014

Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their death tolls from 2013 to 2014.



Source: START GTD

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.




Source: UCDP

NOTE: There were 53,948 battle-related deaths recorded between the Assad regime and Syrian insurgents which includes ISIL amongst other groups. This means the figures of battle-related deaths for ISIL are likely to be much higher.

Terrorism and Refugees : 2008-2014

In countries that have high levels of terrorism, there appears to be a relationship between proportional increases in terrorism and proportional increases in asylum seeker applications to Europe.

● Deaths from terrorism (1 year lagging) ● Asylum seeker applications



Source: Eurostat, START GTD

Number of Years A country Has Been in Top Ten Affected by Terrorism

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Burundi	Angola	DRC	Nepal	Colombia	Nigeria		Somalia	Algeria			Iraq	Afghanistan	India	
CAR	Chad	Israel	Uganda	Sudan	Philippines			Russia				Pakistan		
China	Indonesia	Syria		Yemen	Sri Lanka									
Egypt					Thailand									
Guinea														
Kenya														
South Sudan														
Spain														
Ukraine														
United States														

Iraq had 25 per cent of all terrorist incidents, followed by Pakistan with 14 per cent and Afghanistan with 12 per cent. Nigeria experienced only five per cent of the incidents but had the second highest number of deaths at 23 per cent. Terrorist attacks are much more lethal in Nigeria than any other country. On average there were 11 deaths per attack in Nigeria. In contrast Iraq had an average of three deaths per attack.

There were ten countries which were ranked as being amongst the countries with the ten highest levels of fatalities for only one year out of the last 15 years. This includes the United States, which had 44 per cent of global deaths in 2001 due to the September 11 attack. In contrast, there were 22 countries which were in the group for at least two years.

Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan have all been ranked in the ten countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism for every year in the last ten years. This reflects that terrorism has remained a significant issue in these three countries ever since 2003. Somalia has featured in the ten most affected countries for the last eight years in a row.

2014 was the first time since 2000 that India has not featured among the ten countries with highest fatalities from terrorism. However, this is due to the growth of terrorism in other countries more than to an improvement in India. The number of people killed from terrorism in India increased by 1.2 per cent from 2013 to reach a total of 416.

ANSF Force Strength and Readiness Challenges

Critical Challenges to ANSF

- **Expansion rushed in erratic bursts from 2005 onwards with erratic funding and supply of advisors until CY2010-CTY2011.**
- **Heavy reliance on police and Afghan Local Police for paramilitary functions they are not trained and armed to perform.**
- **Efforts to end combat role by end-2014 cut advisors and advisor role in combat units far below the levels needed. Seriously degraded chances of success.**
- **Election crisis weakened corrupt and already inadequate Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.**
- **Meaningful unclassified reporting on Army and Police readiness at unit level has halted. Supposedly for security reasons but evidently because data would strongly argue against plans to cut number of advisors and phase them out by end-2016.**
- **Strong indications the U.S. is repeating the kind of politicized reporting on ANSF that disguised the problems in the ARVN before the collapse of Vietnam.**
- **Media reporting strongly indicates serious losses in security in many districts, and rising threat to some urban areas.**

Summary Estimates of ANSF by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A - I

(Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016)

- Over the last eight years the Afghan security forces have made advancements, beginning as an unorganized collection of militia and developing into a modern security force with many of the systems and processes of an advanced military. They have proven resilient and continued to make significant strides in only the second year in which Afghan forces assumed the lead for security throughout Afghanistan. They have demonstrated the ability to successfully conduct effective, large-scale, multi-pillar clearing operations across the country, including in Helmand, Ghazni, and Nangarhar. Following insurgent offensives, the Afghan security forces were able to re-take key territory—as they did in Kunduz—with strong performances from all security pillars.
- Simultaneously, while the tactical units were conducting these operations, the security institutions had to continue developing the force. This includes many complex tasks such as budgeting, force generation, personnel management, and national level maintenance, logistics and procurement. These are areas that challenge even the most advanced militaries in the world. I like to say that what we have accomplished here is akin to “building an airplane while in flight.” And while these systems are far from perfect, the foundation has been laid and we continue to advise and assist the Afghans as they build a sustainable security force that is enduring and capable of standing on its own.
- With Afghans in the lead for security for the first time in 2015, the enemy and the naysayers predicted the collapse of the Afghan security forces and the Afghan government. They sought to capitalize on it. Instead, the Afghan security forces fought for the very survival of their country and held firm, they did not fracture, and kept the insurgents from achieving their strategic goals, while inflicting higher casualties on the enemy. They did this while maintaining a significantly higher operational tempo with significantly reduced Coalition support.
- However, the lessons learned in 2015 underscore that Afghan shortfalls will persist well beyond 2016. Capability gaps still exist in fixed and rotary-wing aviation, combined arms operations, intelligence collection and dissemination, and maintenance.

Summary Estimates of ANSF by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A - II

(Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016)

- **More prominently, one of the greatest tactical challenges for the Afghan security forces has been overcoming the Afghan Air Force's extremely limited organic close air support capability. Admittedly, we began building the Afghan Air Force late and are constrained by the time it takes to build human capital.**
- **Those capability gaps notwithstanding, I still assess that at least 70% of the problems facing the Afghan Security forces result from poor leadership. Minister of Defense Stanekzai recognizes this. To date, the Afghan National Army has replaced 92 general officers, including the 215th Corps commander in Helmand. The MoI is lagging behind in making leadership changes, but we are taking steps to remedy this through our train, advise, and assist mission. This kind of change takes time.**
- **I have seen that the consequences of Kunduz and Helmand still weigh heavily on the leadership of both the security forces and the Afghan Government. They realize that, although not strategically significant in a pure military sense, those incidents shaped media coverage and undermined confidence in the government. Their desire to do better runs deep and is genuine. In many ways, these events forced a greater sense of urgency to make the changes they greatly require.**
- **Over the last year, there have been many positive trends. However, Afghan security forces have not consolidated significant gains of their own, nor defeating the insurgency across Afghanistan. Suffice it to say, their performance this year was uneven. To be fair, this was not unexpected, given the overall conditions.**
- **Ultimately, Afghanistan has not achieved an enduring level of security and stability that justifies a reduction in our support in 2016. That is why the President's decision to maintain current force levels through most of 2016 was welcome and important. This decision set the example for NATO, encouraging other Allies and partner nations to maintain, or in some cases increase, their contributions to the Resolute Support mission.**

Summary Estimates of ANSF by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A - III

(Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016)

- During this winter lull, we are focusing on steps to best prepare the ANDSF for summer campaign of 2016. The leadership of the Afghan security forces share this focus and they are dedicated to resetting the force, by implementing reforms to improve training, equipping, and rebuilding of units that have endured unusually high operational tempos for long periods of time, especially those forces in Helmand. Such reforms are critical and are taking root with the Afghan security forces, but broader reforms remain important to success in Afghanistan.
- The Afghan government, including its security institutions, continues to show progress in battling corruption, and achieving other reforms such as gender integration. However, much work still needs to be done...
- So, as I said at the beginning of this statement, we now ask ourselves, “what else can we do to enable the Afghan Security Forces?” And, “What else can the Afghans do for themselves to secure their country?” A strategic stalemate
- without end is not the goal of this campaign. Nor is it true to the reason we came here over 14 years ago. In fact, the recently submitted NATO Strategic Assessment makes recommendations for adjustments to the current NATO OPLAN that, in my best military advice, will help push the campaign past this inflection point and increase the prospect of achieving our shared goals.
- • The measures that NATO is considering include advisory adjustments to give commanders more flexibility on the ground, and shifting from a yearly outlook to a 5-year vision to give all donor nations, and especially Afghanistan, the confidence that comes with predictability of support.
- • The United States must continue to show flexibility with our mission in 2016 and beyond. As the commander, I am responsible for aligning our national objectives with ways and means while managing risk. Now that we have been allocated our resources for 2016, I am assessing the ways in which we ensure that 2016 is not a rerun of 2015.

Summary Estimates of ANSF by General Campbell, CDRUSFOR-A - V

(Excerpts from Opening Remarks to HASC Hearing on February 2, 2016)

- Based on conditions and the performance of the Afghan security forces during this winter lull, I am also reviewing how well those forces will likely perform in 2017 and the U.S. and coalition resources required for their continued development. This is all part of a broader process of which my assessment is only one part. I will provide my assessments of our strategy to my military leadership as well as my successor.
- I think it is important to remember that this time last year, our plan was to transition to a 1,000 troop, Kabul-centric footprint. Due to conditions on the ground, the President made the decision to extend 9,800 through most of 2016, and increased our posture to 5,500 in 2017. This decision provided flexibility to make adjustments and represents the kind of conditions based approach that is so important for our mission in Afghanistan.
- • Key to this long-term success in the region is the resiliency of the Afghan government and its security institutions, and the ability to serve as a regional partner in our combined efforts to counter violent extremism. It's important to remember that the National Unity Government welcomes our assistance. They are a dependable and steadfast counterterrorism partner in South Asia. 2017 marks a significant change in our approach as we focus our efforts to capitalize on the gains of the past decade and build the capacity of the Afghan security institutions.
- We now have a window of opportunity to increase our likelihood of achieving strategic success. Of course, our support should not be open-ended-- I believe our approach is sound. This year we will apply greater conditionality to the Afghans in managing the resources we give them. We are also developing a five-year vision out to 2020 to help better define what we are trying to accomplish, and avoid a year-to-year mentality. I believe that by changing our, and the Afghans', mindset from a cyclic "fighting season to fighting season" view to a genuine, long-term outlook best reflects our commitment.
- We need to provide the Afghans the time and space for them to continue to build their resiliency. Through their spirit and fortitude, they have proven worthy of our continued support. The actions we take now, combined with their resolve to improve, will, over time, develop a sustainable force capable of securing the nation, and in turn helping us secure ours.

Understating Total Afghan Security Force Casualties in 2015

About 4,100 Afghan soldiers and police officers killed and 7,800 wounded in first 6 months of 2015.

Col. Michael T. Lawhorn, a spokesman for NATO and United States forces in Afghanistan, said the casualties of Afghan forces through 2015 were 28 percent higher than in the previous year. Colonel Lawhorn would not go into details about the new casualty report. He stated that it was a difficult year for Afghan forces who now had responsibility for a “significantly increased operational tempo” after the end of the NATO combat mission.

An Afghan official put the number of casualties last year at close to 16,000 soldiers and police officers, with more than 5,000 killed. These numbers may be low because the fighting intensified in the last six months of the year.

Gen. Dawlat Waziri, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, declined to specify the number of soldiers killed. He referred to the ministry’s daily news releases, which often include reports of the day’s casualties. **“All I can say is that compared to 2014, the casualties in 2015 were more,”** General Waziri said.

The NYT reported that. “In the district of Deh Rawood in southern Oruzgan Province, where the police have [long complained of a lack of equipment](#) and ammunition while practically under siege, four security checkpoints were abandoned by the police and later burned down by the Taliban, according to Mohammad Karim Khadimzai, head of the Oruzgan provincial council. Around 30 police officers deserted their posts in Deh Rawood and arrived in Tirin Kot, the provincial capital.

“The reason for deserting their posts, the police said, is a lack of ammunition despite frequently asking headquarters for supplies,” Mr. Khadimzai said.

But the provincial police chief has rejected that claim, saying the reason for the officers’ desertion was that the post’s commander had been fired recently over complaints from local residents that he had mistreated them. The provincial chief said the police officers who had deserted their posts were under investigation.

Dost Mohammad Nayab, a spokesman for the provincial governor, denied that the posts had been burned down by the Taliban, and said new forces had arrived to fill the vacuum.”

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - I

Following successful ANDSF cross-pillar offensive operations in southern and eastern Afghanistan early in the 2015 fighting season, many of the known and persistent challenges and shortfalls became increasingly evident as the Afghan government reacted to Taliban offensives. These shortfalls and challenges hampered ANDSF execution of planned offensive operations and effectively stalled the campaign plan for the second half of 2015 and the corresponding operational initiative. The ANDSF have demonstrated resolve and great resilience, and continue to apply lessons learned from their first year fully responsible for the security of Afghanistan.

An elevated operational tempo this year contributed to significantly higher ANDSF casualties. From January 1 through November 15, 2015, there was a 27 percent increase in ANDSF casualties compared to the same period last year. Coalition advisors and ANDSF leadership are focused on reversing this trend through an increased emphasis on proper training, equipping, casualty treatment, and CASEVAC¹⁶ operations.

The Taliban offensives in Helmand and Kunduz demonstrate that the ANDSF remain reactive. This allows the Taliban to foster the impression that the ANDSF cannot control key population centers. Even when the ANDSF are able to regroup and reclaim key population centers and symbols of Afghan governance, this undermines public confidence that the government can protect the Afghan people and overshadows the numerous successes the ANDSF have had in clearing insurgent sanctuaries. Recent surveys show that over the course of a tough fighting season public confidence in the ANDSF has eroded slightly, though it still remains high at 70 percent compared to 78 percent in March 2015 and 72 percent in June 2015.

A number of initiatives are underway to move the ANDSF towards a more offensive-oriented strategy grounded in intelligence-driven operations, but to-date, these efforts have limited buy-in from some ANDSF and provincial leadership. The ANDSF will be unable to achieve their desired end state of protecting the population until their strategy against the insurgency entails more operations focused on clearing insurgent safe havens and operating areas. A more offensive strategy also includes changes in the employment of the force and force posture. In particular, the ANDSF reliance on static checkpoints detracts from their ability to resource a more offensive approach with sufficient manpower.

The Office of the National Security Council, MoI, MoD, and General Staff continue to develop national-level defense plans, campaign plans, and associated resource allocations with RS support. President Ghani and the ONSC approved the *National Threat Assessment*¹⁸ and the *National Security Policy*¹⁹ documents on June 23 and July 14, 2015, respectively. However, two other critical documents that provide guidance to the Afghan security ministries and articulate the Afghan government's strategy remain unsigned; the ONSC, in coordination with the MoD and the MoI, are continuing to revise both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Campaign Plan*. are more prescriptive and tactical in nature than typical strategic planning documents.

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - II

The five-year *National Campaign Plan* is a critical document intended to inform winter and traditional fighting season campaign strategy and planning documents. These delays can be attributed, in part, to a slow and bureaucratic ONSC system that often strives for consensus-building at the expense of efficiency. Additionally, because of the immaturity of the Afghan government's overall strategic planning structure, planning documents are more prescriptive and tactical in nature than typical strategic planning documents.

The Afghan government relies on international funding for the vast majority of its security costs. The requirement to fund the current ANDSF force structure in fiscal year (FY) 2015 is \$5.4 billion and is expected to decrease to approximately \$5.0 billion in FY 2016. For FY 2015 the United States funded \$4.1 billion of the estimated \$5.4 billion cost of the ANDSF (\$2.9 billion for the MoD and \$1.2 billion for the MoI) through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). Approximately \$2.0 billion of the FY 2015 ASFF was provided directly to the Afghan government (\$1.5 billion for the MoD and \$500 million for the MoI) to fund salaries and incentive pay, equipment, facilities maintenance, and fuel costs. The other \$2.1 billion of the FY 2015 ASFF is executed by DoD primarily through DoD contracts on Foreign Military Sales cases. The remaining \$1.3 billion of ANDSF costs were funded by international donors (\$923 million for ANP salaries, information technology, aviation training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan government (\$419 million, primarily for food and subsistence).

CSTC-A has taken steps to increase the Afghan security ministries' capacity and capability to manage direct contributions responsibly. These steps include improving fiscal transparency and oversight with a conditions-based financial program and an increase in financial and procurement advisors to train, advise, and assist the MoI and the MoD. In addition, CSTC-A's continued development of an integrated pay and personnel enterprise information system for the MoI and MoD will help increase transparency and accountability. These and other efforts to develop repeatable and transparent planning, programming, budgeting, and procurement processes will assist the Afghans as they build their capacity to ensure oversight of the security ministries' financial systems.

The current ANDSF authorized force level remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel plus 30,000 ALP. Effective June 15, 2015, the ALP transitioned to align under the command and control of the AUP. However, the ALP *tashkil* continues to remain independent of the ANP's total authorized end strength.

Monthly attrition rates for both the ANA and ANP increased slightly during the reporting period but have remained close to the two-year historical average of 2 percent. Several soldier "quality of life" issues contribute to the high number of ANDSF personnel who are dropped from the rolls and to the high overall attrition rate.

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - III

Within both the ANA and ANP, insufficient and untimely pay, difficulties accessing pay, the absence or misunderstanding of leave policies, constant combat deployments with little or no leave or training rotations, the lack of casualty and martyr care, and inadequate living and working conditions all pose significant challenges to retaining a professional force. While policies exist to prevent personnel from being absent without leave (AWOL), they are often unenforced and commanders frequently welcome personnel back without exercising any formal discipline.

RS advisors continue to work with the Afghan security ministries to address systemic causes of attrition in order to ensure the long-term health and sustainability of their forces. To overcome these obstacles, the MoD and MoI will need a sustained focus on improving leadership through merit-based selection, better training and development for leaders, and building their capacity in areas such as personnel management including readiness and training cycles, strategic and operational planning, and resource management.

The ANDSF are taking higher casualties in virtually every province this year, particularly in areas with historically higher levels of violence such as Helmand. Although the ANDSF casualty rate is only a small fraction of overall ANDSF personnel end strength and the attrition rate, combat weariness – particularly among young Afghan tactical leaders – is also cited as a factor in the number of soldiers who are considered AWOL and eventually dropped from the rolls.

The ANDSF and MoD and MoI leadership are beginning to recognize the force protection advantage and potential additional offensive combat power from adjusting their force posture. During periods of increased violence, ANA and ANP forces often require a rotational presence or reinforcements from other corps or units. Although the ANDSF are stretched thin, implementation of various force optimization initiatives has been uneven. Until the ANDSF optimizes their force posture, insurgents will take advantage of opportunities to overrun and loot small, isolated ANDSF checkpoints, particularly in areas where insurgents have historical safe havens. National-level leadership must better articulate to commanders and leaders at all levels, particularly the provincial chiefs of police and Members of Parliament, the benefits that consolidation provides in the more efficient use of the force.

As of September 2015, the ANP devoted more than half of its total end strength of approximately 147,000 to checkpoints and fixed sites. ANP leaders are reluctant to consolidate due to civilian perceptions of security and their consideration of community leaders' opinions for tactical-level decisions. By October 21, 2015, the ANA had reduced their total number of checkpoints and fixed sites by almost 40 percent when compared to the beginning of the reporting period, but still had an estimated 53,000 personnel stationed at those sites. While the ANA has had more success than the ANP in reducing the number of static checkpoints, the ANA corps that have consolidated are struggling to translate the additional manpower into offensive combat power.

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - IV

Generally the areas of the country where the ANDSF have been able to optimize their force posture coincide with areas where ANDSF deliberate, offensive operations have occurred or where provincial governors' and powerbrokers' influence is minimal. Though checkpoints and a fixed ANDSF presence, rather than patrols or a rotational presence, is consistent with Afghan perceptions of security – especially in rural areas – the ANDSF reliance on defending static checkpoints has come at a cost of increased ANDSF casualties. This posture also cedes the initiative to the insurgents who can choose to fight when they have the tactical advantage. With the insurgent tactic of massing forces, the ANDSF are being out-maneuvered by an overall numerically inferior insurgent force. Furthermore, broadly emplaced checkpoints compound existing logistics and supply challenges.

The ANDSF's uneven performance this fighting season indicates that capability gaps and developmental shortfalls will persist well beyond this year in fixed and rotary-wing aviation, intelligence, and sustainment. Significant obstacles in areas such as providing organic aerial fires and logistics and maintenance will require several more years of intensive advisory efforts, human capital development, and considerable investments in building sustainable systems and processes. Moreover, cross-pillar synchronization, resource management, and intelligence-driven operations remain areas for continued improvement. These gaps and shortfalls can be reduced over time if the appropriate resources are allocated and, most importantly, as ANDSF leaders continue to mature and develop sufficiently to implement critical reforms.

Despite these capability gaps and developmental shortfalls, the ANDSF possess, and are capable of leveraging, significant enablers that the insurgents do not possess such as mortars, D-30s howitzers, armed Mi-17s, MD-530 attack helicopters, and armored vehicles. Although there is much room for improvement in the ANDSF employment and sustainment of these enablers – a persistent focus of coalition advisory efforts – the ANDSF continue to make significant gains in effectively fielding and employing enablers in support of combat operations.

After a number of large-scale, multi-corps, and cross-pillar operations, such as in northern Helmand and on the Zabol-Ghazni border early in the year, ANDSF offensive operations tended to be much smaller over the reporting period. A majority of operations were conducted at the *kandak* (battalion) and brigade level and were characterized by the need for stronger cross-pillar coordination and intelligence fusion. However, the ANDSF did continue to improve their integration of indirect fire and maneuver with aviation support. Although there have been instances during ANDSF operations when they did not request CAS and ISR support, coalition enablers were essential to ANDSF success during counter-offensives in Helmand and Kunduz.

Given sufficient time, the ANDSF can plan, prepare, and conduct security operations with moderate success. However, until the ANDSF can reduce their enabler gaps, they will require continued coalition support during emergent situations and in order to maintain momentum during and between operations. In addition, ANA and ANP counter-IED units are hampered by logistics and manning deficiencies within ANA units and the misallocation of resources within the ANP.

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - V

Recent offensive operations have been primarily focused on key terrain such as population centers and transit routes and often did not result in the ANDSF establishing military superiority in the most contested insurgent areas. In June and early July 2015, the ANDSF conducted a cross-pillar operation to retake the Chahar Darah and Dasht-e Archi district centers in Kunduz after they were overrun by the Taliban. Senior leaders from across the ANDSF were personally involved in this operation, demonstrating their commitment to ensuring seamless coordination across the force and from the corps level down to the provincial level. ANDSF use of ISR, such as PC-12 aircraft to assist with targeting for artillery highlights the ANDSF's growing ability to employ intelligence equipment to support offensive operations. Although the ANDSF were successful in clearing these districts and restoring security to the region with minimal losses, their gains were not lasting as the insurgency was able to maintain their presence throughout the province.

One of the ANDSF's primary offensive operations over the last six months was Operation Iron Triangle. Conducted in August 2015, this multi-corps, cross-pillar operation included elements of the ANA 201st and 203rd Corps, the 111th Capital Division, the AUP, ALP, AAF, SMW, and ANA Special Operations *Kandaks* (SOKs) with the goal of clearing the Khogyani, Sherzad, and Hisarak districts in Nangarhar Province; Sarobi district in Kabul Province; and Azarah district in Logar Province. These areas had been central hubs for Taliban and other insurgent facilitation networks that supported operations in Kabul. Before the main offensive, the SOKs conducted successful initial offensive operations, and several ANDSF units effectively incorporated ISR and coordinated well amongst air and ground units that relied on MD-530 helicopters for close air attack support. However, the operation was marked by inefficient employment of the force and limited communication and coordination between various ANDSF pillars and the corps involved – a recurring theme throughout the reporting period. Furthermore, security gains made by disrupting facilitation routes into Kabul will not be lasting without a permanent presence of security forces to maintain these gains and prevent insurgents from returning.

Operations in other regions in response to insurgent violence also exposed deficiencies in ANDSF operational capabilities. Leadership challenges in the ANA 215th Corps responsible for Helmand prompted several changes within both the ANA and ANP leadership in the region and heavy losses sustained throughout the fighting season required reinforcements from neighboring ANA corps. Setbacks in Musa Qalah district in Helmand caused the ANDSF to suspend offensive operations, detracted from the momentum of counter-offensives elsewhere in the region, and highlighted ANDSF gaps in aerial fires. In order to avoid detrimental strategic effects to the campaign, the Commander, USFOR-A has the authority to provide *in-extremis* kinetic support to the ANDSF under limited circumstances at his discretion. This most prominently occurred during operations to retake contested areas in and around the Musa Qalah district center in August 2015.

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - VI

Although there are varying levels of threat and insurgent activity across the country and ANDSF units have different levels of overall capability, leadership is often the biggest factor in both ANA and ANP unit performance. RS officials continue to emphasize that effective and accountable leadership is the only way to ensure that the ANDSF continue to improve and that gains are sustained. The selection, placement, and empowerment of the right military and civilian leadership within the security ministries are essential to ANDSF success. While training efforts can improve technical and tactical capabilities, more robust professional development in areas such as command policy and strategic planning is necessary to overcome the human capital limitations within the ANDSF at all levels.

At the ministerial level, delays in resource management and strategic planning processes combined with senior leader intervention at the operational and tactical levels are symptoms of the larger shortfall in leadership experience and depth. Leadership at the ANA corps and police equivalent levels is crucial to increasing and enforcing accountability, improving readiness, sustaining the force; and preventing, reporting, and ultimately reducing GVHRs.

The Afghan government is increasingly taking proactive measures to address leadership and accountability. For instance, after a poor performance amidst persistent violence in Helmand over the summer, several changes were made within the ANA 215th Corps and in October 2015 President Ghani appointed 61 officers to senior positions in the MoD and 22 general officers within the Mol.

The ANDSF operational culture remains dominated by the ANA. RS continues to help the ANDSF embrace a more cross-pillar approach towards the planning and execution of operations. These efforts require substantial leadership at all levels in order to be effective and sustainable. Operation Iron Triangle serves as a clear example of demonstrated ANDSF proficiency in planning and conducting cross-pillar operations. Despite this success, the biggest challenge to increased cross-pillar coordination is at the provincial leader and operational level.

Coordination at the MoD and Mol headquarters level has improved modestly, especially in the area of intelligence fusion through the *Nasrat*. During the reporting period, MoD invited senior Mol officials to participate in the ANA Corps Commanders Conference on November 4 and 5, 2015, to synchronize planning more effectively for the winter campaign plan. With the ongoing restructuring of the Office of the National Security Council, the Afghan government has a major opportunity to improve ministerial coordination at the strategic level through the convening and integration functions of the ONSC.

DoD Summary Assessments of ANDSF Challenges 12.2015 - VII

During this fighting season, the ANDSF demonstrated that they are capable of preventing the Taliban from achieving their long-term strategic goal of overthrowing the government by force. Upon losing key terrain to the Taliban, the ANDSF proved themselves capable of mounting effective counterattacks, frequently re-taking lost terrain in only hours or days, and effectively employing organic aerial fires assets in support of combined armed operations – a further sign they are a learning and growing fighting force on a positive trajectory. The ANDSF also continue to use their special operations forces to prosecute terrorist threats effectively and, with coalition support, deny safe haven to networks across the country.

Despite a positive trajectory, the ANDSF have a long way to go. Although the ANDSF have capability advantages over the insurgent forces, they remain reluctant to pursue the Taliban into their traditional safe havens. Given the ANDSF's current stage of development, they cannot manage the insurgency and ensure security and stability across Afghanistan without further improvement in key enabling capabilities, competent operational-level leaders, and continued development of human capital.

FOUR "LINES OF EFFORT"

COMPLETE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORT AFGHAN TRANSITION
PROTECT THE FORCE
POSTURE THE FORCE

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on completing Afghan Security Forces development, supporting Afghan transition, ensuring the security of Resolute Support forces, and positioning Resolute Support forces to complete the mission.

The main effort is to train, advise, and assist ASI and ANDSF focusing on eight specific areas of concentration or "Essential Functions". These eight Essential Functions are:

- EF 1: Multi-year Budgeting and Execution of Programs
- EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (prevent corruption)
- EF 3: Civilian Governance of the ASI (ANSF as servants of the people)
- EF 4: Force Generation (recruit, train, and equip the force)
- EF 5: Sustainment (supply and maintenance)
- EF 6: Strategy and Policy Planning, Resourcing, and Execution (plan, resource campaigns)
- EF 7: Intelligence
- EF 8: Strategic Communication

WAY AHEAD

ISAF's security mission set the conditions for Afghan reconstruction and success. Coalition and ANDSF worked together to provide security in Afghanistan. Some of the major improvements Afghanistan has witnessed since 2001 are in the areas of medical care, infrastructure, a free and open press, gender equality, stable governance, transportation, education, reliable power, gender equality, and the development of the Afghan Security Forces.



Today capable and confident Afghan Security Forces have assumed full security responsibility and have the support of the Afghan people. With the Resolute Support Mission, this commitment continues in line with what was agreed upon with Afghan authorities at the NATO Summits in Lisbon, Chicago, and Wales.

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04 FEB 2015 draft



On 31 December 2014, the ISAF mission ended. The new NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began on 1 January 2015. The NATO-led Resolute Support Mission builds on the achievements made by the now completed ISAF mission. Resolute Support officially and formally recognizes Afghan Security Forces' growing capabilities and their assumption of full security responsibility for the future of Afghanistan.

The Resolute Support Mission will focus on training, advising, and assisting Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior) and Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) at the ministerial, institutional, and operational levels.



Total Afghan Forces Manning: 2/2014-7/2015

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 2014–JULY 2015

	2/2014	5/2014	8/2014	11/2014	2/2015	5/2015	7/2015
ANA including AAF	184,839	177,489	171,601	169,203	174,120	176,762	176,420**
ANP	153,269	152,123	153,317	156,439*	154,685	155,182	148,296
Total ANDSF	338,108	329,612	324,918	325,642	328,805	331,944	324,716

*Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

**The supporting ANA and AAF numbers do not equal the reported ANA including AAF July 2015 total; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled number.

Source: CSTCA response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, and 10/6/2014; RS, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 3/14/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vettings, 4/10/2015 and 7/12/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/28/2014, 3/24/2015, 6/29/2015, and 9/11/2015.

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, JULY 2015

ANDSF Component	Approved End-Strength Goal	Target Date	Current Assigned as of July 2015	% of Target Authorization	Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals	Difference (%)
ANA including AAF ^a	195,000	December 2014	160,461	82.3%	(34,539)	(17.7%)
ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians	8,004	-	7,048	88.1%	(956)	(11.9%)
ANA + AAF Total	203,004		176,420	86.9%	(26,584)	(13.1%)
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	148,296	94.5%	(8,704)	(5.5%)
ANDSF Total with Civillans	360,004		324,716	90.2%	(35,288)	(9.8%)

Note: AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANA = Afghan National Army; ANDSF = Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces.

^aThe ANA and AAF detail numbers do not equal the reported ANA-including-AAF total number. Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent part or all of the unreconciled variance of 8,911 personnel.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/11/2015.

ANDSF attrition rates are holding steady, according to reporting provided to RS by the MOD and MOI. The ANA had a monthly attrition rate of 2.4% in July 2015, up from 2.3% in May; and more than a one percentage-point decrease from the average monthly attrition rates the ANA endured in 2013 of 3.52% and 2014 of 3.62%.¹²⁵ The ANP's monthly average attrition rate was reported to be holding steady at 1.9% from May through July.¹²⁶ This quarter USFOR-A reported that RS is no longer tracking a monthly attrition goal.

Total Afghan Forces Manning: 10/2015

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, OCTOBER 2015

ANDSF Component	Approved End-Strength Goal	Target Date	Current Assigned as of October 2015	% of Target Authorization	Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals	Difference (%)
ANA including AAF ^a	195,000	December 2014	169,718	87.0%	(25,282)	(13.0%)
ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians	8,004	-	6,894	86.1%	(1,110)	(13.9%)
ANA + AAF Total	203,004		176,612	87.0%	(26,392)	(13.0%)
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	146,026	93.0%	(10,974)	(7.0%)
ANDSF Total with Civilians	360,004		322,638	89.6%	(37,366)	(10.4%)

Note: AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANA = Afghan National Army; ANDSF = Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces.

^a The total "ANA including AAF" numbers for October 2015 is not fully supported by the detailed numbers in the USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled portion.

This quarter, ANDSF assigned force strength was 322,638 (including civilians), according to USFOR-A.159 As reflected in Table 3.5, this is 89.6% of the ANDSF target force strength of 360,004, counting MOD civilian employees. (The commonly cited end-strength goal of 352,000 does not count MOD civilians.) The new assigned-strength number reflects a decrease of 2,078 since July 2015 and 9,306 since May 2015. The ANP bore the brunt of the decrease this quarter with a loss of 2,270 personnel, while the ANA posted an increase of 192 personnel.

However, a January Associated Press report alleged that the actual number of ANDSF security forces is far less because the rolls are filled with nonexistent "ghost" soldiers and police officers. **In that report, a provincial council member estimated 40% of the security forces in Helmand do not exist, while a former provincial deputy police chief said the actual number was "nowhere near" the 31,000 police on the registers, and an Afghan official estimated the total ANDSF number at around 120,000—less than half the reported 322,638.**

The success of military operations is at risk, because – as one Afghan soldier in Helmand said --, they do not have enough men to protect themselves. Additionally, an Afghan lawmaker claimed the government is not responding to the crisis because a number of allegedly corrupt parliamentarians are benefiting from the "ghost" security forces salaries.

"BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT"



Main Points of the BSA (Afghanistan & U.S.)

- ⇒ Effective from 1 January 2015 until the "end of 2024 and beyond" unless it is terminated by either Afghanistan or the U.S. with two years' notice.
- ⇒ The BSA authorizes U.S. forces to maintain existing facilities and undertake new construction, so long as they are agreed upon by both sides. However, the U.S. will not create permanent bases in Afghanistan.
- ⇒ The U.S. shall regard with grave concern any external aggression or threat of external aggression to Afghanistan, and will work together with GIROA to develop "an appropriate response," including considering political, military, and economic measures.
- ⇒ The U.S. will have the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. service members who commit "any criminal or civil offenses" in Afghanistan.
- ⇒ U.S. forces will not enter Afghan homes for the purpose of military operations and searches except under extraordinary circumstances involving the urgent risk to life and limb of U.S. nationals.
- ⇒ U.S. forces shall not arrest or imprison Afghan nationals, nor maintain or operate detention facilities in Afghanistan.

BSA & SOFA: WHAT ARE THEY?

- ⇒ The United States Bilateral Security Agreement and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provide the legal framework for the United States, NATO, and its partner nations' continued commitment to train, advise, and assist Afghan Security Forces.
- ⇒ **The agreements reaffirm the Coalition and Afghanistan's strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of Afghanistan.**
- ⇒ **The agreements emphasize that both the Coalition and Afghanistan will go forward in partnership with confidence because they are committed to seeking a future of justice, peace, security, and opportunity for the Afghan people.**
- ⇒ The agreements place importance on cooperative relationships between Afghanistan and its neighbors conducted on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference, and equality and call on all nations to refrain from interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and democratic processes.

"STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT"

Scope of NATO Operations

- ⇒ The SOFA covers the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION, which is a non-combat, train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission.
- ⇒ TAA for Resolute Support is extended to the tactical level for Afghan Special Operations Forces (at the request and invitation of GIROA).



NATO Forces & Members of the NATO Forces have:

- ⇒ Right to entry, movement, exit, transit, transportation (no visas) within Afghanistan.
- ⇒ Immunity from local Afghan jurisdiction, arrest, and criminal prosecution.
- ⇒ Tax exemption for acquisitions by or on behalf of NATO Forces.
- ⇒ Exempted from licenses and permits.
- ⇒ Provisions almost identical to the BSA.



Goal: Afghan Security Forces that are sustainable, capable of protecting the population, and have full responsibility for Afghanistan's security.

Mixed Support of ANA and ANP



PROVINCES WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST CONFIDENCE IN ANA AND ANP

HIGHEST CONFIDENCE IN		LOWEST CONFIDENCE IN	
ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP
PARWAN	PANJSHIR	GHOR	WARDAK
KABUL	BAGHLAN	WARDAK	GHOR
BAGHLAN	BAMYAN	ZABUL	ZABUL
GHAZNI	TAKHAR	PAKTIKA	PAKTIKA
NANGARHAR	KABUL	DAIKUNDI	LOGAR

Ministry of Defense and ANA Forces and Readiness

Lead US Inspector General: Quality of Afghan Army and Police - I

The Afghan government made leadership changes to improve ANDSF performance, filling 61 senior MoD positions and 22 Mol general officer positions during the last half of 2015.¹³⁵ However, DoD stated that early advancement of officers was also a factor in the poor performance of the 215th Corp in Helmand province (discussed below) which it said was caused in part by an inexperienced corps commander, who was recently replaced.¹³⁶

Resolute Support advisors are addressing a shortage in ANA noncommissioned officers and soldiers by working to improve the quality and efficiency at the Kabul Military Training Center, Regional Military Training Centers, and the Marshal Fahim National Defense University. In addition, advisors are assisting in developing and implementing pre-command courses for brigade and battalion commanders.¹³⁷

Advisors have been advocating that both the Afghan military and police need to reduce their reliance on checkpoints. General Campbell has publicly said that a reliance on a large number of checkpoints rather than undertaking more offensive operations leaves Afghan soldiers and police vulnerable to massed insurgent attacks, leading to increased casualties and equipment loss. (The Afghan government does not publicly release information on Afghan casualties.) Checkpoints are, however, a politically sensitive issue for the Afghan government because many local politicians and police commanders see them as a demonstration to the Afghan citizens that Afghan security forces are present in their area. In the last half of 2015, the Afghan police devoted more than half of its personnel to manning checkpoints and fixed sites, while the ANA had reduced its total checkpoints by almost 40 percent over 6 months but still had an estimated 53,000 personnel at static sites.¹³⁸

While DoD stated that the Afghans are making good use of Mobile Strike Force Vehicles, mortars, howitzers, and other weapons in both offensive and defensive operations, the Taliban were able to choose where they would attack and select positions that were less well-defended. Challenges in the areas of ANA logistics and leadership were clear in late 2015, with DoD reporting two critical problems in its responses to Lead IG questions regarding quarterly performance. Those two issues concerned (1) the Afghan army vehicle readiness and (2) the 215th Corps in Helmand province.¹³⁹

CSTC-A Reported ANA Vehicle Readiness Is in 'Dire' Condition

The ANDSF's logistic systems, particularly supply, distribution, and unit-level maintenance, remains underdeveloped. While developing this capacity is a major focus of coalition efforts, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)—the U.S. command that is responsible for managing

DoD security assistance for Afghanistan—reported that ANA vehicle readiness “is in a dire condition.”¹⁴⁰ CSTC-A reported numerous problems impacting the readiness of the 51,049 vehicles:¹⁴¹

- **Too few mechanics:** The ANA had about 600 fewer mechanics than its required 3,527, and mechanics were often sent to fill infantry shortfalls.
- **Aging vehicles:** Many vehicles require either overhauls or replacement. Previous procurements of vehicles typically were fielded without life cycle sustainment plans or program management support that would have helped to identify ongoing requirements for resetting/replenishing the fleet. DoD states it is now reviewing options and resourcing requirements for such a program.¹⁴²
- **Too many variations:** The fleet is comprised of 68 major model types with over 200 variations. A model is considered a variant if the major assembly, engine, transmission, injection or drive train is unique. Due to the number of different models in the fleet, there are close to 20,000 documented repair parts, increasing the challenge to stock, track, maintain, or issue in an inventory tracking system that is only partially automated and is still under development. The Afghans rely on a mostly paper-based supply system.

Only 8,800 vehicles-- armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles--of the 51,049 fleet are actual combat systems. Most of the rest are Ford Ranger pickup trucks or logistics support vehicles that lack armor. These vehicles were procured over the last decade to rapidly establish a maneuver capability for the ANA, but now that the ANDSF are responsible for the security of Afghanistan, DoD is reviewing a rebalance of the fleet mix to better meet operational requirements.¹⁴³

Lead US Inspector General: Quality of Afghan Army and Police - II

In October 2015, the EF 5 Directorate (force sustainment) completed a comprehensive review of the national-level Materiel Management Center—a key command for approving requisitions from corps—and found that the center was ineffective, which directly degraded ANA readiness. The review found the majority of center personnel were illiterate, had poor computer skills, and had negligible logistics experience. In addition, personnel often were not present for duty. As a result, ANA corps often had to re-requisition supplies, leading to duplicative and excessive requisitions, as well as problems at the supply depot. CSTC-A stated that the current TAA team of 20 personnel could only provide support to the center once a week and that long-term change would require an expert TAA team with nearly daily contact for 6-12 months.¹⁴⁴

The problems at the Materiel Management Center contributed to issues that coalition advisors regularly find regarding reported shortages in operational units. The advisors found that reported shortages were the result of loss of paper records, difficulty in identifying specific needs for corps units, inability to locate stocks at the Central Supply Depot, misplaced stock, and the theft or hoarding of items at the depots. Many of these problems are symptoms of limitations in using the warehouse management system—CORE-IMS. DoD also stated that a further complication was that the Afghans do not have access to the DoD system that tracks inbound supplies procured through the foreign military sales system, although DoD states that efforts are under way to address this gap.¹⁴⁵

Afghan Air Force Aircraft Heavily Employed

The AAF, which is part of the ANA, has an inventory of 91 fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft, largely made up of 49 Mi-17 multi-role helicopters and 24 fixed-wing C-208 providing personnel and casualty evacuation transport. Low pilot manning of the C-208s is expected to continue through 2016 until more pilot candidates make it through training. The Mi-17 remains the workhorse of the AAF, yet the fleet has been unable to meet the ground forces' demand. Increased utilization has resulted in unanticipated maintenance and overhaul requirements. Increased demand is likely to continue in 2016. In an effort to alleviate the strain, coalition advisors awarded a contract in September for rotary-wing aircraft to conduct lift missions. In addition, four weaponized MD-530 helicopters have been delivered this quarter, bringing the fleet to 14. Another delivery is scheduled for May 2016.¹⁵⁴

Afghan Special Security Forces

DoD states that Afghan special forces are increasingly capable but are often misused in a conventional role, in part to fill missions that would otherwise be conducted by two Mobile Strike Force brigades, which provide a strategic reserve to reinforce conventional forces and are stretched thin. Starting in early December, Afghan security forces conducted two successful night raids on Taliban prisons at night using only Afghan forces and Afghan aircraft, freeing Afghan security forces that had been held captive in some cases for over two years. There were no casualties, no prisoners harmed and no damage to equipment.¹⁵⁵

In January 2016, the DoD OIG will begin an assessment of coalition efforts to train, advise, and equip the Afghan Special Operations Forces to determine whether those efforts are sufficient, operative, and relevant.

Afghan National Police

The ANP have sustained a disproportionately higher number of casualties than the ANA because most of the police force is neither intended nor trained to be used for fighting, but units are coming under attack by the Taliban, according to DoD. Only three of seven main branches are trained and equipped to fight massed forces with heavy weapons: the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU).¹⁵⁶ Of those forces, DoD stated that the elite ANCOP and GCPSU have been deployed at a rate that is not sustainable. Coalition advisors have focused on increasing readiness and manpower for these units throughout the winter campaign.¹⁵⁷

In addition, a winter training surge was introduced by NATO Resolute Support to reduce the number of untrained ANP personnel. There are approximately 8,734 untrained Afghan Uniformed Police and 4,564 untrained Afghan Local Police as of December 23, 2015. Based on current training plans, DoD estimates that the combined number of untrained personnel will be reduced to 8,000 by March 31, 2016. The winter police training program for AUP is 8 weeks long; for the Afghan Local Police, 30 days.¹⁵⁸

Lead US Inspector General: Quality of Afghan Army and Police - III

Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, deputy chief of staff for communications, Resolute Support Mission, outlined the key security improvements needed in Afghanistan in 2016 during a Pentagon briefing via teleconference from Kabul:¹⁶⁰

“The first is to implement a force readiness cycle, and the concept here is a three-phase cycle where the forces will go through a training phase where they’re getting ready for combat operations, and then an operational phase where they’re in the fight, and then they’ll come out of that and they’re go into a reset phase. During the reset phase, soldiers will take leave, equipment will go into maintenance, and the unit gets itself reset so that it can begin the cycle again, starting with that training phase.

The second is to reduce checkpoints. President Ghani has made this a major point of emphasis. They’ve got too many checkpoints and they’ve got too many of their forces strung out on checkpoints. There’s an old military saying that ‘if you defend everywhere, you defend nowhere,’ and this is particularly true in Afghanistan. If they have too many forces on checkpoints, then what they don’t have is the ability to maneuver. What they don’t have is the ability to respond to security crises when they arise. So what we need them to do is to reduce the number of checkpoints and move to strong points, which are well defended and which will provide them enough available combat power so that they can respond when needed.

They’ve also got to make some tough leadership choices. They’ve got some leaders that need to be replaced, they’ve got some leaders that are corrupt that need to go. The Afghan security forces are making these changes. They’ve made a lot of them in 2015. Those new leaders are going to need some time to get established, and they’re going to need some time to form their units, but that’s ongoing.

Recruiting is another area of emphasis. Currently, the Afghan national army has a shortfall of about 25,000 overall. They’ve established the goal of closing that gap over the next 6 months (mid-2016), and that’ll be a significant -- a significant accomplishment, but something that’s got to be done so that they have the combat power to continue into 2016. Part of their challenge in manning is not just recruiting, but it’s addressing the attrition issue. So the way to look at this is the holistic issue of properly manning the force, so if they can address the attrition issue, that’s getting the leadership to make sure that soldiers are paid, that they’re fed and that they get their proper leave and they’re treated properly, that’ll go a long way to retaining the soldiers that they have. One of the things that they’re struggling with is what we would call re-enlisting, and that is getting soldiers to re-contract. Once they fix their challenges in re-contracting, that’ll help significantly as well. So it’s going to take a combined effort with the -- fixing the re-contracting, addressing attrition and recruiting as many as they can before the fighting season in 2016 starts to demand more and more of their forces.”

There's an old military saying that 'if you defend everywhere, you defend nowhere,' and this is particularly true in Afghanistan. If they have too many forces on checkpoints, then what they don't have is the ability to maneuver. What they don't have is the ability to respond to security crises when they arise.

Source: Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2015–December 31, 2015, p. 34-36, <https://oig.state.gov/lig-oco>.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT RATINGS (NATO)

RATING MEANING	EF1			EF2			EF3			EF4			EF5			EF6			EF7			EF8			Gender ^a			Total											
	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-	Q1	Q2	+/-						
Ministry of Defense Milestones Assessment																																							
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	1	1	-	0	0	-	2	3	+	0	2	+	6	8	+	2	1	-	0	2	+	3	0	-							0			14	17	+			
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	3	3	-	2	3	+	1	1	-	5	4	-	7	4	-	2	2	-	5	1	-	3	0	-							0			28	18	-			
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	2	2	-	3	2	-	1	0	-	1	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	3	+							1			7	8	+			
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	1	+	0	0	-							2			0	3	+			
EF Total	6	6	=	5	5	=	4	4	=	6	6	=	13	12	-	4	3	-	5	4	-	6	3	-	0	3	=	49	46	-									

MINISTRY MILESTONE ASSESSMENT USING NATO SYSTEM, AS OF NOVEMBER 2015

RATING MEANING	EF1			EF2			EF3			EF4			EF5			EF6			EF7			EF8			Gender			Total								
	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-						
Ministry of Defense Assessment																																				
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	2	=	0	1	+	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	3	+
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	2	2	=	0	0	=	4	4	=	5	5	=	9	9	=	1	1	=	2	2	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	23	23	=			
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	4	4	=	4	4	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	1	1	=	2	1	-	1	1	=	0	3	+	2	2	=				15	17	+			
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	1	+	3	0	-	1	1	=				4	2	-			
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	0	-	0	0	=	0	0	=				1	0	-			
EF Total	6	6	=	4	4	=	4	4	=	6	6	=	12	12	=	3	3	=	4	4	=	3	3	=	3	3	=	45	45	=						

Note: EF = Essential Function; ASI = Afghan Security Institutions; EF1 = Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution; EF2 = Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF3 = Civilian Governance of the ASI; EF4 = Force Generation; EF5 = Sustainment; EF6 = Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution; EF7 = Intelligence; EF8 = Strategic Communications. Q1 = February/March 2015; Q2 = June 2015; Q1 - EF1 & EF7 assessments as of 3/1/2015; EF2 & EF5 - as of 2/26/2015; EF3 & EF6 - as of 2/12/2015; EF4 - as of 2/17/2015; EF8 - as of 2/20/2015.

^a Gender Advisor milestones and tasks were not assessed in Q1.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT



MISSION STATEMENT

The mission of the Afghan National Army is to defend the national sovereignty; safeguard the national interest and freedom, territorial integrity, independence, and Islamic values of Afghanistan.

Objectives:

- Defeat insurgents, Al-Qaeda, terrorism and terrorist groups in Afghanistan
- Continue the development and improvement of Ministry of Defense/ANA capabilities to establish a strong defense sector in support of national interests and security objectives
- Contribute to a stable regional and international security environment



The 195,000 person Afghan National Army is divided into six regional Corps: 201st in Kabul, 203rd in Gardez, 205th in Kandahar, 207th in Herat, 209th in Mazar-i-Sharif, and 215th in Lashkar Gah. The Corps are typically comprised of a headquarters battalion, three to four brigades and various specialty kandaks. The Afghan General Staff provides command/control (C2) over all of Afghanistan's ground and air forces, including all six Corps, the 111th Capital Division, two types of Special Brigades (two Mobile Strike Force Brigades and the National Engineer Brigade), Afghan Detention Operations, ANA Special Operations Command, Air Force, and Special Mission Wing. The Ground Forces Command which used to C2 conventional ground forces is being disestablished.



The Special Operations Command consists of two special operations brigades, a military intelligence kandak, a national strategic reserve operations kandak, and four mobile strike force companies. The kandaks are divided into two main groups: Commandos and Special Forces. They are rapidly deployable, highly mobile, light infantry units trained to conduct expeditionary commando operations.



The Afghan Air Force is responsible for air defense and air warfare in a country largely inaccessible by road. The AAF provides airlift for ANSF, logistics, humanitarian relief support, human remains return (HeRo), casualty evacuation, non-traditional ISR, air assault, armed overwatch and aerial escort. Headquarters AAF is located in Kabul and provides command and control of three wings, the Kabul Air Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, Shindand Air Wing and five detachments respectively located in Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez and Herat. The Special Mission Wing primarily supports Afghan Special Forces and performs intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions as well as air assault, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics missions.

MRAP VEHICLES



Universal weapon mount installed*

Provides ANSF with protected mobility capability against IEDs.

Will have 200 in the inventory.

MOBILE STRIKE FORCE VEHICLES



Universal weapon mount installed*

Available in three variants, the MSFV provides ANSF with mobility, protection, and firepower capability.

Will have 623 in the inventory.

UP-ARMORED HMMWV



Universal weapon mount installed*

High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle provides protected mobility in terrain unsuitable for MRAPs/MSFVs.

Will have 6,381 in the inventory.

* for optional .50cal, M240 (7.62mm), M249 (5.56mm) DSHK

D-30 HOWITZER

122 mm



Provides ANSF with indirect fire capability.

Will have 208 in the inventory.

MD-530 HELICOPTER



Provides close air attack and aerial escort capability with two .50 caliber machine guns.

Will have 17 in the inventory.

PC-12 AIRCRAFT



Provides airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and is primarily flown by the Special Mission Wing.

Will have 18 in the inventory.



MI-17 HELICOPTER



Conducts light lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, air interdiction, aerial escort and armed overwatch missions. 12 aircraft have 23mm Forward Firing Cannons.

Will have 86 in the inventory.

C-208 AIRCRAFT



Provides basic aircraft training, light lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and human remains return capabilities.

Will have 25 in the inventory.

A-29 LIGHT AIR SUPPORT



Provides close air support, armed escort, and armed overwatch capabilities and can be armed with two 500lb bombs, twin .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. The AAF has three aircraft in the US for pilot training.

Will have 20 in the inventory

MI-35 HELICOPTER



Provides close air attack, and armed aerial escort capability with two 23mm forward firing cannons and two SS rocket pods.

Will have 5 in the inventory.

C-130 TACTICAL TRANSPORT




Provides a medium airlift capability, personnel transport, CASEVAC and human relief support capability.

Will have 4 in the inventory.


ANA Manning and Attrition: 4/2014-4/2015

Afghan National Army



The attrition rate in the ANA continues to pose challenges for ANDSF development. The ANA attrition rate dropped to an average of approximately 2.3 percent for the last 12 months (compared to historical norms of approximately 2.6 percent) with a low of 1.8 percent in March 2015 and a peak of 3.0 percent in October 2014. Despite this improved trend, RS advisors estimate that ANA casualties have increased during this reporting period compared to last year based on operational reporting. ANA end strength has increased since October 2014, and ANDSF leaders are working to identify and implement appropriate and effective measures to reduce attrition. RS senior leaders and advisors raised awareness of several key factors that likely contribute to attrition and recommended measures be taken by MoD leaders to address. These areas are leadership and leader accountability; a reliable leave process; timely and accurate pay; soldier assignments; and casualty/martyr care. During this reporting period, several hundred non-commissioned officers and soldiers reenlisted, all from units that were actively engaged in combat operations.

ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries



According to recent surveys, perceptions of the ANA are most positive in Kabul and 201st Corps areas, and poorest in 215th and 207th Corps areas.⁴⁹

Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters *kandak* (battalion), three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*.

In addition, two Mobile Strike Force brigades (wheeled medium armored vehicles) provide an additional seven Mobile Strike Force *kandaks* based in Kabul and Kandahar. These formations are capable of rapid employment in offensive operations.

In addition to these combat capabilities, the ANA has headquarters and training units to generate, sustain, command, and control the force.


The ANA is divided into one division and six regional corps: 111th Capital Division, 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps (see Figure for their respective areas of responsibilities).

Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters *kandak*, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*.


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These formations are capable of rapid employment in offensive operations.

In addition to these combat capabilities, the ANA has headquarters and training units to generate, sustain, command, and control the force.



Afghan National Army Manning: 11/14 to 10/15



Note: The ANA military strength depicted above includes the military members of the AAF, which is a component of the ANA.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANA strength during the reported period.

Attrition rates account for all losses to the force. This includes both planned factors such as separation from military service and retirements and unplanned factors such as ANDSF personnel who are dropped from the rolls, killed-in-action, non-hostile fatalities, and exempted service members. Individuals are dropped from the rolls when they leave their units without authorization for more than 30 days. Some personnel who leave without authorization, including those dropped from the rolls, eventually return to their units. The dropped from rolls category represents the most significant contributor to high attrition rates.

ANA AND OCC-R ASSESSMENT RATINGS: JANUARY AND APRIL 2015

Six ANA Corps, the 111th Capital Division, and AAF (specific ratings classified)

Command Assessment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	N/A
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Leadership	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	N/A
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Combined Arms	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	N/A
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Command & Control	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	N/A
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Personnel & Training	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	N/A
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sustainment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	N/A
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

OCC-Rs (specific ratings classified)

Command Assessment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Leadership	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Intra-ANDSF Command & Control	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Enabler Coordination	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Intel Sharing	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Logistics Coordination	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ICT	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Color Key

● Sustaining	● Fully Capable	● Capable
● Partially Capable	● Developing	● Not Assessed

AAF = Afghan Air Force, OCC-R = Operations Coordination Centers-Regional; ICT = Information, Communications, and Technology.
Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 101.

Afghan Air Force vs. US and Allied Air Support

An Unworkable Afghan Air Force Development Plan Out of Phase with Combat Needs Creates Rising Need for Outside Air Support

- **Afghan Air Force development was timed to 2016, not 2014.**
- **Progress now lagging badly and many of aircraft choices seem questionable in terms of operational status and effectiveness.**
- **Air power is key tool in help ground forces when they are in trouble, compensating for limit ANA numbers, ability to carry out rapid reinforcement. Current Afghan air capabilities fall far below need.**
- **U.S. and allied combat support rose in mid-2015, but fell far below 2014, and is grossly below Afghan needs.**
- **Effective transition requires major outside air component until Afghan forces are far more effective.**

AFGHAN AIR FORCE



The Afghan Air Force is responsible for air mobility and close air attack in a country defined by large mountains in the north and wide-open plains in the south.

Helping reach some of the most remote regions of Afghanistan, the AAF provides air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, human remains return (HeRo), casualty evacuation, non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed overwatch and aerial escort.

Headquarters AAF is located in Kabul and provides command and control of three wings, the Kabul Air Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, Shindand Air Wing and five detachments in Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez and Herat.

The Special Mission Wing performs intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions as well as air assault, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics in support of the Afghan Special Forces. Aircraft numbers include aircraft in the Special Mission Wing.

A-29 LIGHT AIR SUPPORT



The A-29 provides close air support, armed escort, and armed overwatch capabilities and can be armed with two 500lb bombs, twin .50 caliber machine guns and rockets.

The AAF has three aircraft in the US for pilot training.

Will have 20 in the inventory.

As of 04 FEB 2015

MD-530 HELICOPTER



The MD-530 provides close air attack and aerial escort capability with two .50 caliber machine guns. Unarmed MD-530s in Afghanistan being used to train future pilots. The first armed MD-530Fs are expected to arrive in March 2015.

Will have 17 in the inventory.

MI-17 HELICOPTER



The Mi-17 conducts light lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, air interdiction, aerial escort and armed overwatch missions. While every aircraft is armed with two 7.62mm door guns, 12 aircraft have 23mm Forward Firing Cannons.

Will have 86 in the inventory.

MI-35 HELICOPTER



The Mi-35 provides a close air attack, and armed aerial escort capability with two 23mm forward firing cannons and two S5 rocket pods.

Will have 5 in the inventory.

PC-12 AIRCRAFT



The PC-12 provides airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and is primarily flown by the Special Mission Wing.

Will have 18 in the inventory.

C-208 AIRCRAFT



The C-208 provides basic aircraft training, light lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and human remains return capabilities. In an effort to reach more remote regions, the C-208 will provide the capability to land on dirt runways in the future.

Will have 25 in the inventory.

C-130 TACTICAL TRANSPORT



The C-130 provides a medium airlift capability, personnel transport, CASEVAC and human relief support capability.

Will have 4 in the inventory.



Air-to-ground Integration

The Mi-17 and Mi-35 provide aerial fires support to ANSF. Mi-17 crews have the additional ability to provide armed overwatch and aerial escort mission with Night Vision Goggles.

In Fighting Season 2015, the Afghan Air Force aerial fires capacity will grow from five armed Mi-35 helicopters to 29 armed helicopters, including Mi-35s, Mi-17s and the newly armed MD-530s. In 2016, AAF will add A-29s to the aerial fires fleet.

On the ground, the Afghan Air Force completed initial training for 281 Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators, giving the ANSF a new air-ground integration capability. ATACs are combat proven and have already tested these new battlefield skills, enabling ANSF success in several ground engagements that resulted in the enemy's defeat.

3/6/2016

Transport Capabilities


The Afghan Air Force continues to grow its Command and Control functions. Recently, the AAF demonstrated the employment of a hub and spoke concept. This concept uses a combination of Mi-17, C-208 and C-130 aircraft to airlift passengers and cargo to their final destination. Optimized use of aircraft and routing will minimize the use of critically-tasked Mi-17s while still meeting ANSF needs.

In Fighting Season 2015, Afghan Air Force C-130s expect to fly 80% more missions than they did in Fighting Season 2014. The AAF has trained to meet this demand using night and instrument conditions flying-training programs.

Additionally, the Afghan Air Force provides life-saving CASEVAC. In 2014, the Afghan Air Force airlifted more than 2,300 injured to medical care.

Logistics sustainability

Since Jan 2014, the AAF has trained or certified more than 600 maintainers to sustain the Mi-17, C-208, Mi-35, and MD-530 aircraft. This is more than half of the total number required and a great building block for future training. Additionally, the AAF has sent their initial maintenance cadres to the U.S. for training on the A-29 and C-130 aircraft, the newest additions to the AAF inventory.



The Afghan Air Force has already taken responsibility for the air operations across Afghanistan, flying most operations independently. In addition, they are performing much of their own maintenance, to include conducting aircraft maintenance inspections without Coalition assistance.

The Afghan Air Force can now independently plan and execute air operations such as emergency extraction, armed over watch, casualty evacuation, air reconnaissance, close air attack and troop airlift.

AFGHAN MILITARY FORCES SPECIAL MISSION WING



MISSION STATEMENT

The Special Mission Wing (SMW) conducts Day/Night Vision Goggle (NVG) air assault and Day/Night Intelligence, surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), counter-narcotic (CN), and counter-terrorism (CT) operations in support of Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense Special Security Forces (ASSF).

HISTORY

Established from the MoI's Air Interdiction Unit, which was originally organized in 2005, the SMW commenced operations as a Joint MoD/MoI unit in 2012. The unit conducted its first Afghan-pure mission in 2009, and conducted its first Afghan-led NVG mission in 2012. The unit has flown over 250 missions in 2014, conducting multi-functional aviation operations in direct support of Commandos, ANA Special Forces, Ktah Khas, and GPCSU national mission units. The SMW is the only air mobility capability in Afghanistan able to project SOF combat power in low visibility, and provides the only ANSF ISR capability. In early 2015, the SMW was reorganized under the MoD.

ORGANIZATION

The SMW is an MoD independent air wing organized into four squadrons, with the headquarters and two squadrons in Kabul, one squadron in Kandahar, and a future squadron in Mazar-e-Sharif. The unit is comprised of elite pilots and support personnel from the Ministries of Defense and Interior capable of performing the most dangerous airborne operations.




As of 04 FEB 2015

ROLE OF THE MOI AND MOD IN THE SPECIAL MISSION WING

MOI and MOD are responsible for manning, initial training and equipping the SMW. MOI and MOD, through the MOI Deputy Minister for Security and MOD Chief of General Staff, provide joint command and control of the SMW and provide approval of SMW support requests for their organic ASSF units.

C2 LOCATIONS



MISSIONS

COUNTER-TERRORISM

Ensuring Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorism, the SMW provides rapid, precision airlift to aid Afghanistan's elite forces in dismantling terror networks.



COUNTER-NARCOTICS

One of the biggest challenges in this region is drug trafficking. The SMW supports units who help prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics, which is considered a major funding source of terrorism.



CAPABILITIES

NIGHT VISION CAPABLE

The SMW delivers Afghan Special Security Forces in low visibility conditions to fight the enemy when least expected.



INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

The SMW provides Afghanistan's only dedicated manned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, enabling ground force commanders to see the battlespace with aerial full-motion video.



EQUIPMENT

MI-17 HELICOPTER

2x M-240 Machine Gun



Provides ASSF with medium lift air assault infil/exfil, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and QRF.

There will be 30 in the inventory.

PC-12 AIRCRAFT

EO/IR FMV Sensor




Afghanistan's first fixed wing ISR platform, Pilatus PC 12NG. Provides ASSF airborne intelligence, surveil-

There will be 18 in the inventory.




Afghan Air Force Manning and Attrition: 4/2014-4/2015



Logistical sustainment will make or break the AAF in the long-run. The AAF continues to develop its organic maintenance capability, including conducting aircraft maintenance inspections without coalition assistance. However, it currently relies heavily on contracted logistics support for its current fleet and will continue to do so for the near future, particularly to enable integration of new aircraft into the force. Although the capability of current AAF maintenance personnel continues to improve, obtaining the number and skill levels of personnel required to sustain the current and future fleet will remain a challenge.

Additionally, pilot development and availability within the AAF remains a challenge for several reasons. First, pilot training literacy requirements make finding qualified recruits difficult. The AAF currently has approximately 150 of 291 required fully trained pilots, and approximately 90 of the 198 required aircrews available for operations; this does not include any fully trained pilots in training for another type of aircraft, such as the A-29 or MD-530.



The AAF headquarters is located in Kabul and provides command and control of three wings, the Kabul Air Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, Shindand Air Wing, and five detachments in Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez, and Herat. Between FY 2010 and FY 2015 the United States obligated more than \$2.5 billion to help develop the AAF. This includes more than \$905 million for equipment and aircraft. The majority of funding for the AAF is for sustainment followed by training, equipment, and aircraft.

The AAF is authorized up to 7,421 personnel as part of its *tashkil*. As shown, during this reporting period AAF end strength held close to 6,700 and monthly attrition remains well below one percent. As of October 20, 2015, AAF personnel included 55 women.

Afghan Air Force Aircraft and Pilots

	Type of aircraft	Inventory	Planned	Fully trained pilots
Fixed Wing	C-130	3	4	8
	C-208	25	25	34
	A-29	0	20	0
Rotary Wing	Mi-17	56 ³⁴	56	86
	Mi-35	5	0	19
	MD-530	10	17	0
	Cheetah	3	3	4
Total		100	125	147

* as of May 31, 2015

SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

This number does not include the additional 30 Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.

As of May 31, 2015, the AAF had a total of 102 aircraft, which include C-130s, C-208s, Mi-17s, MD-530s, Mi-35s, and Cheetahs.

Afghanistan's fixed-wing platforms included 25 C-208s and 3 C-130s, and its rotary-wing platforms include 5 Mi-35s, 56 Mi-17s, 10 MD-530s (five trainers and five weaponized), and 3 Cheetahs.

The first A-29 Super Tucano aircraft will begin replacing the Mi-35 helicopters later this year when the first class of pilots graduates from training at Moody Air Force Base and returns with their aircraft to Afghanistan. Figure 10 summarizes the number of AAF airframes and associated pilots.

	Type of Aircraft	Inventory	Planned	Fully Trained Pilots
Fixed Wing	C-130	4	4	9
	C-208	24	26	34
	A-29	0 ³⁹	20	0
Rotary Wing	Mi-17	49 ⁴⁰	56	86
	Mi-35	1	0 ⁴¹	10
	MD-530	10	28	18
	Cheetah	3	3	4
Total		91	137	161

* as of November 2015

There are currently 161 fully trained pilots in the AAF; this does not include fully trained pilots in training to transition to another aircraft. There are currently no fully trained A-29 pilots; the first class of nine A-29 pilots is in training at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia and is scheduled to graduate in December 2015

As of November 30, 2015, the AAF has a total of 91 aircraft.³⁷ Fixed-wing platforms include C-208s and C-130s; rotary-wing platforms include Mi-35s, Mi-17s, MD-530s, and Cheetahs³⁸ The first A-29 Super Tucano delivery remains on schedule for January 2016 after the first class of pilots graduates from training at Moody Air Force Base and returns to Afghanistan.

SMW aircraft are not included in this total. The Government of India donated 3 Cheetah helicopters during the last reporting period. ³⁹ There are currently 12 aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia being used for training Afghan pilots and maintenance personnel. ⁴⁰ This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW. ⁴¹ The Mi-35 fleet will likely be retired by the end of 2015 or early 2016.

Type of Aircraft	Inventory	Planned	Fully Trained Pilots	Qualified Crews
Mi-17 ⁴⁴	35	36	74	16
PC-12	17	18	34	8
Total	52	54	108	24

* as of November 2015

- The Special Mission Wing provides expeditionary reach for the ASSF in conducting counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan.
- The SMW enables ASSF helicopter assault force raids and provides overwatch, ISR, resupply, and CASEVAC for ASSF operations using both fixed-wing and rotary-wing platforms.
- Due to the topography and security environment of Afghanistan, this aviation support denies insurgents, terrorists, and drug trafficking networks freedom of movement and safe haven within Afghanistan.
- The SMW currently has three fully operational squadrons. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons are located in Kabul, and the 3rd Squadron is located at Kandahar Airfield.
- The SMW consists of approximately 509 personnel. In addition, there are currently more than 100 personnel undergoing the entry process, which requires background and security checks
- The SMW now possesses 29 of 30 authorized Mi-17V5s, 6 of 6 Mi-17V1s, and 17 of 18 authorized PC-12s

Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2011-2016 Airpower Statistics

UNCLASSIFIED

As of 31 January 2016

OPERATION FREEDOM SENTINEL/RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Close Air Support

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release	
2011	34,514	2011	2,678
2012	28,760	2012	1,975
2013	21,900	2013	1,408
2014	12,978	2014	1,136
2015	4,676	2015	411
2016	422	2016	51

Number of Weapons Released

Less Activity  More Activity

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2011	405	341	337	339	426	610	695	516	597	663	308	174	5,411
2012	170	116	227	252	406	521	504	589	385	414	297	202	4,083
2013	193	297	250	284	368	337	256	158	232	189	118	76	2,758
2014	92	114	95	115	164	272	205	437	441	217	87	126	2,365
2015	40	30	47	31	41	109	79	156	111	203	69	31	947
2016	128												128

Afghanistan

Combined Data (minus OIR)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	38,198	34,937	31,049	32,999	20,666	1,703
Airlift Sorties	57,000	39,000	32,000	17,040	6,900	600
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)	241,000	265,000	201,000	158,400	50,000	3,400
Airlift Passengers	1,233,000	749,000	506,000	202,700	78,000	8,000
OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	80,199,000	41,952,000	10,883,000	28,000	0	0
Tanker Sorties	19,469	16,007	12,319	9,085	5,323	346
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	1,095	980	723	636	201	10
Aircraft Refuelings	90,476	67,020	53,266	46,793	26,162	1,323
Casualty Evacuation Sorties	2,959	2,171	576	115	1	0
Saves	1,611	1,187	219	32	3	0
Assists	2,121	1,646	477	84	0	0

- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

POC: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil

Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces and Readiness

Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces



The Afghan National Police (ANP) maintains civil order, prevents cultivation, production and smuggling of illegal narcotics, and reduces corruption. ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), General Command Directorate of Police Special Units (GCPSU), and Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The AUP, ANCOP, ABP, and AACP are referred to as "Police Pillars" while the others are supporting units.

"Type A" Headquarters are centered around large urban areas and provide oversight to the "Type B" and "Type C" headquarters in their respective regions.



Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace will encounter daily. Although they are now focused on fighting insurgents, the long-term intent for the AUP is to conduct community policing.



Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). ANCOP provides civil order presence patrols and a crisis or counter-terror response capability in urban areas and prevents and responds to violent public incidents.



Afghan Border Police is organized into six zones stretching 50km inward from Afghanistan's international boundaries. The ABP operates at border crossing points and airports, while guarding against illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. In some areas ABP also suppresses insurgent activity.



Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) provides professional criminal investigative support to the Afghan judicial process and conducts proactive counter-terrorism operations to protect the public and governmental institutions. The AACP also manages the national forensics lab and biometrics program.



Afghan Local Police (ALP) is a temporary security force formed to protect those villages and districts most vulnerable to insurgent attacks. The ALP does not have arrest authority, but can detain individuals and turn them over to the ANP. Typically, the ALP do not operate outside of their communities or districts, and report to the district chiefs of police.



Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) provides fixed site, convoy, and personal security as a GIROA state-owned enterprise. It is assuming security missions from Private Security Companies (PSC) as directed by Afghan Presidential Decree #62 in August 2010, which required PSCs be disbanded.



General Command Directorate of Police Special Units (GCPSU) is comprised of national mission units (NMUs) and provincial units. The Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) are special police units under the direction of the Provincial Police Chief.



Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is the lead agency for counter-narcotics. It consists of regular narcotics police and a specialized force in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and Intelligence Investigation Unit (IIU).

Radicalization Trends Among the Afghan Police - I

1498 uniformed rank and file personnel, 151 commissioned officers, and 8 uniformed religious leaders from among the ANP were surveyed on their views toward the political system in Afghanistan, anti-government elements including the Taliban, democracy in light of Islamic values, and women and human rights.

More than 68% of those polled believe that corruption exists among the ranks of the security force and its political and military leadership, while more than 72% believe that armed resistance by the people is justified against those found to be corrupt, despite the presence and jurisdiction of security and defense personnel.

While approximately 11% of service members joined the security force with the aim of securing Afghanistan against Taliban influence, nearly 20% joined primarily for economic incentives. As a consequence, many maintain a hired hand mentality rather than national consciousness.

A majority of green-on-blue incidents were of a personal and intimate nature rather than collective action, suggesting that individual grievances, personal mental states, and ideological beliefs were the underlying motivations.

Of those polled, 83% believe that armed resistance is justified against those who criticize Islam, while 76% of those from Paktia believing that the Taliban are good religious leaders, suggesting that religious ideological tension exists between the center and those in Paktia.

More than 10% from both Paktia and Paktika believe that suicide attacks are a justified form of armed resistance.

Relative to other provinces, those from Kunduz find more so that democracy is not compatible with Islam. These same respondents are also in favor of establishing a caliphate, suggesting that many from Kunduz believe in religious leadership without democracy.


Although this study finds that most are tolerant to ethnic and religious differences, increasingly over the course of their time-in-service nearly 25% believe that ethnic discrimination is a primary cause of conflict in Afghanistan.

Nearly half of those polled believe that international conventions on women and human rights are not necessarily in line with Islamic values, with most of those coming from Kunduz and Qandahar.


More than 80% of those from Qandahar approve of physically reprimanding women for disobeying Islamic law or disrespecting Afghan tradition and culture.

Radicalization Trends Among the Afghan Police –II


POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENT RESISTANCE




LEGITIMACY OF THE TALIBAN




JUSTIFICATION OF ARMED RESISTANCE IN THE NAME OF ISLAM



LEVEL OF CONSERVATIVE BELIEFS



COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY



MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENT RATINGS (NATO)

RATING MEANING	As of June 1, 2015											Gender ^a			Total																								
	EF1			EF2			EF3			EF4			EF5			EF6			EF7			EF8			Q1			Q2			+/-								
Ministry of Interior Milestones Assessment																																							
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	=
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	1	+	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	1	+
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	1	1	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	1	2	+	6	8	+	4	2	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	12	13	+
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	3	4	+	0	1	+	2	4	+	3	1	-	7	4	-	0	0	-	4	3	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	19	17	-
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	2	1	-	4	3	-	2	0	-	1	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	3	0	-	2	0	-	12	6	-			
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	1	0	-	0	1	+
EF Total	6	6	=	4	4	=	4	4	=	5	4	-	13	12	-	4	2	-	4	3	-	3	0	-	0	3	=	43	38	-									

Ministry of Interior Assessment																																				
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	1	+	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	1	+
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	1	-	2	1	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	4	2	-			
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	3	3	=	0	1	+	2	2	=	2	3	+	9	9	=	2	2	=	0	1	+	0	2	+	0	0	=	18	23	+						
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	3	3	=	2	2	=	2	2	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	0	0	=	3	2	-	0	1	+	2	2	=	13	13	=						
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	1	0	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	2	1	-			
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=
EF Total	6	6	=	3	3	=	4	4	=	4	4	=	12	12	=	2	2	=	3	3	=	0	3	+	3	3	=	37	40	+						

Note: EF = Essential Function; ASI = Afghan Security Institutions; EF1 = Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution; EF2 = Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF3 = Civilian Governance of the ASI; EF4 = Force Generation; EF5 = Sustainment; EF6 = Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution; EF7 = Intelligence; EF8 = Strategic Communications. Q1 = February/March 2015; Q2 = June 2015; Q1 - EF1 & EF7 assessments as of 3/1/2015; EF2 & EF5 - as of 2/26/2015; EF3 & EF6 - as of 2/12/2015; EF4 - as of 2/17/2015; EF8 - as of 2/20/2015.

^a Gender Advisor milestones and tasks were not assessed in Q1.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENT RATINGS (NATO) AUGUST , 2015

RATING MEANING	EF-1			EF-2			EF-3			EF-4			EF-5			EF-6			EF-7			EF-8			Gender			Total											
	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-						
Ministry of Interior Assessment																																							
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	=			
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	1	2	+	0	2	+	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	1	4	+			
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	1	3	+	0	0	-	0	2	+	2	2	-	8	9	+	2	2	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	13	18	+			
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	4	3	-	1	2	+	4	2	-	1	0	-	4	1	-	0	0	-	3	3	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	2	+	17	13	-						
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	1	0	-	3	1	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	2	1	-	6	2	-			
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	1	0	-	1	0	-
EF Total	6	6	=	4	3	-	4	4	=	4	4	=	12	12	=	2	2	=	3	3	=	0	0	=	3	3	=	38	37	-									

Note: EF = Essential Function; ASI = Afghan Security Institutions; EF1 = Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution; EF2 = Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF3 = Civilian Governance of the ASI; EF4 = Force Generation; EF5 = Sustainment; EF6 = Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution; EF7 = Intelligence; EF8 = Strategic Communications. Q1 = February/March 2015; Q2 = June 2015; Q1 - EF1 & EF7 assessments as of 3/1/2015; EF2 & EF5 - as of 2/26/2015; EF3 & EF6 - as of 2/12/2015; EF4 - as of 2/17/2015; EF8 - as of 2/20/2015.

* Gender Advisor milestones and tasks were not assessed in Q1.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30, 2015, p. 97.

ANP FORCE STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q1 2015	Q2 2015	Quarterly Change	Q1 2015	Q2 2015	Quarterly Change
AUP	104,695	93,045	(11,650)	100,034	95,389	(4,645)
ABP	22,990	22,742	(248)	21,953	22,021	68
ANCOP	15,223	15,192	(31)	15,010	15,017	7
MOI HQs & IS	-	27,077	27,077	-	22,827	22,827
CID ^a	11,592	-	(11,592)	10,847	-	(10,847)
NISTA	2,500	-	(2,500)	3,539	-	(3,539)
GDoP Reserve ^b	-	-	-	850	-	(850)
Undefined personnel above authorized strength	-	-	-	2,452	-	(2,452)
Required to reconcile to ANP subtotal	-	-	-	-	(72)	(72)
ANP Total (as reported)	157,000	158,056	1,056	154,685	155,182	497

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q1 2015 data as of 2/2015; Q2 2015 data as of 5/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; CID = Criminal Investigation Department; NISTA = Not In Service for Training; GDoP = General Directorate of Personnel; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

^a Q2 CID personnel are included in MOI HQs & IS.

^b Personnel that are pending assignment.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 3/24/2015 and 6/29/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2015 and 6/29/2015.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 115.

ANP FORCE STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE Q2-Q3 2015

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2015	Q3 2015	Quarterly Change	Q2 2015	Q3 2015	Quarterly Change
AUP	93,045	90,139	(2,906)	95,389	86,754	(8,635)
ABP	22,742	22,955	213	22,021	21,775	(246)
ANCOP	15,192	15,223	31	15,017	15,169	152
MOI HQs & IS	27,077	28,523	1,446	22,827	24,598	1,771
Required to reconcile to ANP Subtotal	-	-	-	(72)	-	72
ANP Total (as reported)	158,056	156,840	(1,216)	155,182	148,296	(6,886)

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q2 2015 data as of 5/2015; Q3 2015 data as of 7/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 6/29/2015 and 9/11/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 6/29/2015.

This quarter USFOR-A reported the overall strength of the ANP totaled 148,296 personnel, a decrease of 6,886 since last quarter and 8,704 below the authorized end strength of 157,000.

USFOR-A reported that neither RS nor the ANP are now tracking a monthly attrition goal. The informal 1.4% goal that ISAF promoted was deemed unrealistic. The attrition rates reported will be for one-month periods relative to the previous month-end strength without averaging or smoothing. During the months of May, June, and July, the ANP experienced a 1.9%, 2.0%, and 1.9% attrition

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, October, 2015, p. 108.

ANP FORCE STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE O3-Q4 2015

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q3 2015	Q4 2015	Quarterly Change	Q3 2015	Q4 2015	Quarterly Change
AUP	90,139	91,000	861	86,754	85,976	(778)
ABP	22,955	23,313	358	21,775	21,520	(255)
ANCOP	15,223	16,200	977	15,169	14,511	(658)
MOI HQs & IS	28,523	26,487	(2,036)	24,598	24,019	(579)
ANP Total (as reported)	156,840	157,000	160	148,296	146,026	(2,270)

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q3 2015 data as of 7/2015; Q4 2015 data as of 10/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; MOI = Ministry of Interior; IS = Institutional

As of October 22, 2015, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS), was 146,026, according to USFOR-A.289 This is a decrease of 2,270 ANP personnel since last quarter, when the July 2015 assigned end strength was reported at 148,296, and 10,974 below the authorized end strength of 157,000. Police officers represent the largest component of the ANP with 70,886 members, 49,872 noncommissioned officers, and 25,268 officers.

During the months of August, September, and October, the ANP experienced a 2.35%, 2.32%, and 2.5% attrition rate, respectively. The prior three months' attrition rate was approximately 1.94%. Within the ANP, the Afghan National Civil Order Police continues to endure the highest attrition rates: 4.69%, 4.36%, and 5.53% over the three months. The UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict reported two verified cases of the ANP and ALP recruiting children in a June 2015 report. CSTC-A reported the ANP Inherent Law, dated October 2010, requires that no recruits be under the age of 18. While restricting child police/soldier recruitment is not a condition for U.S. funding in the annual CSTC-A financial-commitment letters, USFOR-A says advisors will forward any human-rights violations to the RS Mission Legal Office

Police and Ministry of Interior Manning

Police by Pillar	Solar Year 1392	Solar Year 1393	Solar Year 1394
Afghan Border Police	23,435	22,955	23,316
Afghan National Civil Order Police	14,588	15,223	16,203
Afghan Uniform Police	85,160	90,139	100,427
Institutional Support	7,791	7,700	15,127
Ministry of Interior Headquarters	6,889	6,959	
Afghan Anti-Crime Police	10,148	10,864	1927
TTHS Accounts	6,000	3,000	0
Total Police Authorized	154,011	156,840	157,000

As part of a major effort to reduce the incidence of “ghost soldiers” within the ALP, as of November 30, 2015, MoI staff had issued ID cards to 25 percent of ALP personnel and are working to close the gap for the remaining 75 percent in 2016.

Currently, more than 14,800 of the approximately 28,000 ALP members rely on “trusted agents”⁴⁵ to deliver monthly salaries, allowing ALP and local officials to siphon salary payments. Coalition TAA efforts are supporting the MoI as it prepares to adopt the APPS to increase personnel accountability and better manage salary payments.

...the ANP Training General Command has developed a comprehensive winter training surge plan to address the approximately 15,000 untrained AUP and 6,000-8,000 untrained ALP nationwide over the next several months. As of November 2015, the ANP had approximately 7,100 soldiers in the training pipeline, well ahead of coalition expectations, to help rectify training shortfalls.

ANP ASSESSMENT RATINGS: JANUARY AND APRIL 2015


ANP Regions (specific ratings classified)

AUP Command Assessment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Leadership	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Integration	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Command & Control	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Personnel & Training	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Sustainment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Command Assessment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Leadership	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Integration	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Command & Control	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Personnel & Training	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Sustainment	January	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	April	●	●	●	●	●	●	●



AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police.
 Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 101.

Afghan National Police Structure: 11//15




The ANP is composed of four pillars – the AUP, the ANCOP, the ABP, and the AACP – the GCPSU, and three sub-pillars.

The sub-pillars – the ALP, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) – are not counted as part of the 157,000 *tashkil* but provide additional security under the MoI.

...The MoI is also identifying personnel to staff the new ANP zone headquarters. With seven zone commanders reporting to MoI headquarters, instead of the current system of 34 provincial chiefs of police, the new ANP zone structure will enhance command and control of all ANP forces.

These new ANP zones will largely align with the ANA corps regions, which will facilitate better cross-pillar coordination.

This new structure and corresponding ANP zone headquarters staff will not change the authorized *tashkil*.




Note: The ANP strength depicted above includes the AUP, the ABP, the ANCOP, and the AACP.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANP strength during the reported period.

Afghan National Police Manning and Attrition: 4/2014-4/2015

Afghan National Police



In April 2015, the ANP reportedly filled 97 percent of the force’s 157,000 authorized positions with approximately 155,000 personnel, including more than 2,100 women. The ANP averaged approximately 1.7 percent attrition for the last 12 months, with a low of 1.0 percent in December 2014, and a peak of 2.4 percent in January 2015. During this reporting period, the ANP average monthly attrition rate was 1.55 percent, as depicted in Figure 13. The ANP is currently projected to recruit between 3,000-5,000 new recruits per month to keep the force near its authorization.

Narcotics Interdiction Trends: 2008-2015

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015*	Total
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	222	3,047
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	441	318	3,265
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	15,528	763,505
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,052	1,676	30,885
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	53,462
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,307	23,647	416,666
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	695,548

Note: *Partial fiscal-year results through 6/22/2015 only. 1 kilogram (kg) = about 2.2 pounds. SIGAR's analysis detected an anomaly in the cumulative FY 2015 data for seizures of precursor chemicals. DOD had yet to confirm the numbers as the report went to press.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 6/29/2015.

This year, the U.S. military stopped providing Afghans with logistical and intelligence support for counternarcotics activities; however, DEA continues to provide mentoring and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. military still provides logistics support to the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW).

Most interdiction activities occurred in the east and capital regional commands.

Previously, interdictions were concentrated in southern regional commands, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. DOD said the continued reduction in seizures and operations is likely a result of the Coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in the east and capital regional commands is not as great as in the southern commands. Coalition forces (and U.S. military forces) are no longer conducting counternarcotics operations

AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police.
Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 133.

Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces and Readiness

A Failed Transition Plan

- **Took U.S. and allies until 2008 to admit how serious the resurgence of the Taliban and other insurgents really was. Delay partly result of focus on Iraq. Partly focus on tactical encounters, rather than rise of insurgent influence.**
- **Transition was then shaped by Presidential decision to end U.S. combat involvement at end 2014 regardless of conditions in the field and combat readiness of the ANSF.**
- **Plans to cut advisors in 2015 and eliminate them by end-2016 were never conditions-based and are now being reexamined, but will not compensate for fact have already removed advisors from combat units.**
- **Have increase role of U.S. air support and joint U.S.-Afghan special forces units, but these forces are too small to tip the balance.**
- **Plans to make Afghan Air Force effective proving steadily more questionable within what seem to be impossible deadlines.**
- **No real plan for Resolute Support Mission. At present is all spin waiting on hard decisions about extending to 2017 and beyond.**
- **Only real positive signs are possible leadership struggles in Taliban.**

U.S. Transition Process: 2014-2018




- BSA goes into effect
- U.S. begins Operation Freedom's Sentinel
- NATO mission Resolute Support (RS) begins
- NATO mission continues as "Enduring Partnership"
- U.S. shifts to a security cooperation element

1/1/2015

1/1/2016




Cuts in US Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq: White House View



The troop surge that the President announced at West Point in December 2009 set the conditions that allowed us to push back the Taliban and build up Afghan forces. In June 2011, the President announced that we had completed the surge and would begin drawing down our forces from Afghanistan from a peak of 100,000 troops. He directed that troop reductions continue at a steady pace and in a planned, coordinated, and responsible manner. As a result, 10,000 troops came home by the end of that year, and 33,000 came home by the summer of 2012. In February 2013, in his State of the Union address, the President announced that the United States would withdraw another 34,000 American troops from Afghanistan within a year -- which we have done.

Today the President announced a plan whereby another 22,000 troops will come home by the end of the year, ending the U.S. combat mission in December 2014. At the beginning of 2015, and contingent upon the Afghans signing a Bilateral Security Agreement and a status of forces agreement with NATO, we will have 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we would reduce that presence by roughly half, consolidating our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end of 2016, we will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, as we have done in Iraq. Beyond 2014, the mission of our troops will be training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qa'ida.

A Different View: Erratic US Military Role in Afghanistan: Surging far Too Late and then Running for the Exits



US surge came several years after insurgent surge reflected in following graphs, and US troops will actually drop in a downward curve in 2015-2016, not steps. Original US plans called for substantial conditions-based US advisory presence through 2016, and US commanders recommended higher levels than President decided upon.

US surge came several years after insurgent surge reflected in following graphs, and US troops will actually drop in a downward curve in 2015-2016, not steps. Original US plans called for substantial conditions-based US advisory presence through 2016, and US commanders recommended higher levels than President decided upon.

Source: US Department of Defense, and Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-troops-in-afghanistan/2014/09/30/45477364-490d-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_graphic.html, accessed October 1, 2014.


US Base Closure Impact

Major American bases closed and open after 2014

At the height of the surge in 2011, there were more than 400 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) bases across Afghanistan, each with personnel numbering from the dozens to the thousands. Many of those small combat outposts have been destroyed and evacuated while the larger forward operating bases have been handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

0 100
MILE

- Closed known coalition bases*
- Permanent known coalition bases, or bases soon to close*
- *Does not include Special Forces bases



NATO and US Advisory Manning Levels

Still Too Few Advisors and Many of the Wrong Kind

- **Data show just how small the advisory role has become. U.S down to around 6,800. Most at Corps level.**
- **Advisor numbers by Essential Function seem far too low.**
- **Level of advisory effort in police and Afghan local police unclear.**
- **Heavy focus on sustainment, corps level advice, rather than combat.**
- **ANSF forces lack civil support, functioning justice system in many areas. No coordinated US. and allied civil-military program seems to exist.**
- **Effective transition requires U.S. and allied forces at Corps and major combat unit until Afghan forces are far more effective.**
- **Need more advisors that are combat oriented – rather than force generators – and need them through at least 2017 and probably 2018 to 2020.**

NATO Plans as of December 1, 2015

- Excluding U.S. counter-terrorism forces, NATO will keep about 12,000 troops in Afghanistan for most of next year, made up of about 7,000 U.S. forces and 5,000 from the rest of NATO and its partners such as non-NATO member Georgia.
- Allies also launch campaign to raise about \$3 billion euros to help pay for Afghanistan's state security forces from 2018.
- Afghan security forces budget, funded by the United States and its NATO allies, is agreed up to the end of 2017. NATO wants to announce further funding for the 2018-2020 period at next summit in July 2016.
- As agreed at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012, non-U.S. NATO allies and partners such as Japan, give a total of \$1 billion a year in addition to the \$4.1-billion that the United States spends on Afghan security forces every year.
- U.S. President Barack Obama had aimed to withdraw all but a small U.S. force before leaving office in January 2017, pinning his hopes on training and equipping local forces to contain Taliban militants fighting to return to power. However, in October he announced he would maintain the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan at 9,800 through most of 2016, reducing it thereafter to about 5,500 and effectively leaving a decision on a full withdrawal to his successor.
- Washington has spent around \$65 billion on preparing the fledgling Afghan security forces, while Afghanistan has also received about \$100 billion in aid from international donors.
- General Hans-Lothar Domroese, a veteran of Afghanistan, Germany's second-most senior general told Reuters that the security situation is "sobering" and "not as stable as we hoped it would be."
- Germany, Turkey and Italy will keep their current deployments, but likely to be reviewed later next year.
- Unlike the United States, NATO has never set an end date to its "Resolute Support" training mission in Afghanistan, a non-combat force that also includes troops from some 40 countries, including NATO members, the United States and their allies.
- NATO has said Afghanistan must eventually take care of its own security and has agreed that no later than 2024, Afghanistan must take "full financial responsibility" for its own security forces, according to a 2012 statement.

Source: SSource: Reuters<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/12/01/us-afghanistan-nato-idUSKBN0TK5C520151201#UO7se6FT0gfpKPGc.99>;
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/12/01/us-afghanistan-nato-idUSKBN0TK5C520151201?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*AfPak%20Daily%20Brief#HxJkRBdFPyUydjgQ.97;
http://www.voanews.com/content/nato-to-keep-twelve-thousand-troops-in-afghanistan-next-year/3082975.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*AfPak%20Daily%20Brief;
http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/12/02/12000-nato-troops-stay-afghanistan-through-next-year?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*AfPak%20Daily%20Brief

U.S. Troop Presence in Fall 2015

- **According to USFOR-A, approximately 8,550 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of August 22, 2015, with approximately 7,000 personnel from other Coalition nations also serving.**
- **Of the U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan, approximately 3,550 are assigned to the RS mission.**
- **Since the RS mission began on January 1, 2015, 11 U.S. military personnel were killed in action and 50 U.S. military personnel wounded in action.**
- **In addition, 17 DOD civilians or contractors have been killed in service and seven wounded. This includes the loss of six U.S. service members and five civilian contractors in the C-130 crash in Jalalabad on October 1, 2015.**
- **Five insider attacks against U.S. forces have occurred in 2015, killing three soldiers and wounding 15 others. Also during 2015, three U.S. civilian contractors were killed and one has been wounded as a result of an insider attack.**
- **A Georgian soldier killed on September 22, 2015, brings to 12 the number of foreign forces (including U.S.) killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the RS mission. The Republic of Georgia is the second-largest force contributor to the NATO-led RS mission after the United States.**

Continuing the U.S. Presence Thru 2017

October 15, 2015, President Obama announces that U.S. will cease withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan through most of 2016 and keep thousands in the country through the end of his term in January 2017.

U.S. forces will continue to perform two critical missions—training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda. said the United States will:

- maintain the current level of 9,800 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through most of 2016,**
- In 2017, reduce to 5,500 troops stationed in Kabul and at a small number of bases including Bagram, Jalalabad, and Kandahar**
- Work with NATO and the Coalition to align the U.S. troop presence in accomplishing the two missions**
- continue to support Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and the national unity government as they pursue critical reforms.**

Original plan had been to cut the number of U.S. troops in half next year and then reduce the U.S. force to about 1,000 troops based only at U.S. Embassy Kabul by the start of 2017

Late November 2015: Reports that NATO agreed will keep 7,000 personnel through end 2016, allies will keep 5,000 for total of 12,000.



Resolute Support Mission

Troop Contributing Nations



	Albania	42		Germany	850		Poland	150
	Armenia	121		Greece	4		Portugal	10
	Australia	400		Hungary	97		Romania	650
	Austria	10		Iceland	4		Slovakia	39
	Azerbaijan	94		Ireland	7		Slovenia	7
	Belgium	43		Italy	500		Spain	294
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	53		Latvia	25		Sweden	30
	Bulgaria	110		Lithuania	70		the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ¹	38
	Croatia	91		Luxembourg	1		Turkey	503
	Czech Republic	222		Mongolia	120		Ukraine	10
	Denmark	160		Montenegro	15		United Kingdom	470
	Estonia	4		Netherlands	83		United States	6,839
	Finland	80		New Zealand	8		Total	13,195
	Georgia	885		Norway	56			

Note on numbers: The number of troops above reflects the overall contribution of individual contributing nations. They should be taken as indicative as they change daily, in accordance with the deployment procedures of the individual troop contributing nations.

- 1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
- 2 See media backgrounder on "[A new chapter in NATO-Afghanistan relations from 2015](#)" and media backgrounder on the [ANA Trust Fund](#).

Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nations, as of May 2015*

Nation	Personnel	Nation	Personnel
Albania	42	Latvia	25
Armenia	121	Lithuania	70
Australia	400	Luxembourg	1
Austria	10	Mongolia	120
Azerbaijan	94	Montenegro	17
Belgium	43	Netherlands	83
Bosnia & Herzegovina	53	Norway	56
Bulgaria	110	New Zealand	8
Croatia	91	Poland	150
Czech Republic	236	Portugal	10
Denmark	160	Romania	650
Estonia	4	Slovakia	39
Finland	80	Slovenia	7
Georgia	885	Spain	294
Germany	850	Sweden	30
Greece	4	FYR of Macedonia	38
Hungary	97	Turkey	503
Iceland	4	Ukraine	10
Ireland	7	United Kingdom	470
Italy	500	United States	6,827
* Numbers of personnel are approximate as they change daily.		NATO	11,325
		Non-NATO	1,874
		Total	13,199



Resolute Support Mission

Troop Contributing Nations



	Albania	42		Germany	850		Poland	150
	Armenia	121		Greece	4		Portugal	10
	Australia	400		Hungary	97		Romania	650
	Austria	10		Iceland	4		Slovakia	39
	Azerbaijan	94		Ireland	7		Slovenia	7
	Belgium	43		Italy	500		Spain	294
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	53		Latvia	25		Sweden	30
	Bulgaria	110		Lithuania	70		the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ¹	39
	Croatia	107		Luxembourg	1		Turkey	503
	Czech Republic	236		Mongolia	120		Ukraine	10
	Denmark	160		Montenegro	17		United Kingdom	470
	Estonia	4		Netherlands	83		United States	6,834
	Finland	80		New Zealand	8		Total	13,223
	Georgia	885		Norway	56			

Note on numbers: The number of troops above reflects the overall contribution of individual contributing nations. They should be taken as indicative as they change daily, in accordance with the deployment procedures of the individual troop contributing nations.

- 1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
- 2 See links to media backgrounder on "A new chapter in NATO-Afghanistan relations from 2015" and to media backgrounder on the ANA Trust Fund.

June 2015

Remaining Allied Forces: 5/2015

Country	Total Personnel	Country	Personnel as % of National Force
United States	6,834	<i>Georgia</i>	2.74
<i>Georgia</i>	885	<i>Iceland</i>	2.00
<i>Germany</i>	850	<i>Czech Republic</i>	0.98
<i>Romania</i>	650	<i>Denmark</i>	0.93
<i>Turkey</i>	503	<i>Australia</i>	0.70
<i>Italy</i>	500	<i>Mongolia</i>	0.69
<i>United Kingdom</i>	470	<i>Croatia</i>	0.55
<i>Australia</i>	400	<i>Bosnia-Herzegovina</i>	0.50
<i>Spain</i>	294	<i>Albania</i>	0.49
<i>Czech Republic</i>	236	<i>the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</i>	0.49
<i>Denmark</i>	160	United States	0.48
<i>Poland</i>	150	<i>Latvia</i>	0.47
<i>Armenia</i>	121	<i>Germany</i>	0.47
<i>Mongolia</i>	120	<i>Romania</i>	0.43
<i>Bulgaria</i>	110	<i>Finland</i>	0.32
<i>Croatia</i>	107	<i>Lithuania</i>	0.32
<i>Hungary</i>	97	<i>United Kingdom</i>	0.30
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	94	<i>Hungary</i>	0.25
<i>Netherlands</i>	83	<i>Armenia</i>	0.25
<i>Finland</i>	80	<i>Slovakia</i>	0.25
<i>Lithuania</i>	70	<i>Bulgaria</i>	0.23
<i>Norway</i>	56	<i>Norway</i>	0.22
<i>Bosnia-Herzegovina</i>	53	<i>Netherlands</i>	0.19
<i>Belgium</i>	43	<i>Sweden</i>	0.19
<i>Albania</i>	42	<i>Montenegro</i>	0.14
<i>the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</i>	39	<i>Italy</i>	0.14
<i>Slovakia</i>	39	<i>Spain</i>	0.14
<i>Sweden</i>	30	<i>Azerbaijan</i>	0.11
<i>Latvia</i>	25	<i>Belgium</i>	0.11
<i>Montenegro</i>	17	<i>New Zealand</i>	0.09
<i>Austria</i>	10	<i>Poland</i>	0.09
<i>Portugal</i>	10	<i>Turkey</i>	0.08
<i>Ukraine</i>	10	<i>Ireland</i>	0.07
<i>New Zealand</i>	8	<i>Estonia</i>	0.07
<i>Slovenia</i>	7	<i>Luxembourg</i>	0.07
<i>Ireland</i>	7	<i>Slovenia</i>	0.05
<i>Iceland</i>	4	<i>Austria</i>	0.04
<i>Estonia</i>	4	<i>Portugal</i>	0.01
<i>Greece</i>	4	<i>Ukraine</i>	0.01
<i>Luxembourg</i>	1	<i>Greece</i>	0.003

Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nations, as of November 2015


As of November 2015, the RS mission was composed of troops from 40 nations (25 NATO Allies and 15 partner nations), consisting of 11,385 NATO and 1,725 partner personnel across 21 bases totaling 13,110 personnel

Nation	Personnel	Nation	Personnel
Albania	43	Latvia	23
Armenia	65	Lithuania	14
Australia	229	Luxembourg	1
Austria	10	Mongolia	233
Azerbaijan	94	Montenegro	14
Belgium	60	Netherlands	83
Bosnia & Herzegovina	53	New Zealand	8
Bulgaria	126	Norway	46
Croatia	106	Poland	113
Czech Republic	222	Portugal	10
Denmark	90	Romania	650
Estonia	4	Slovakia	39
Finland	82	Slovenia	7
Georgia	856	Spain	326
Germany	850	Sweden	27
Greece	4	FYR of Macedonia	39
Hungary	102	Turkey	509
Iceland	2	Ukraine	8
Ireland	7	United Kingdom	395
Italy	760	United States	6,800
* Numbers of personnel are approximate as they change daily.		NATO	11,385
		Non-NATO	1,725
		Total	13,110

Resolute Support HQ Advisors by Essential Function*

RS HQ Advisors by EF (02 FEB 15)

■ Military Advisors ■ Ctrs/ Civilian



Essential Function 1: Plan, program, budget, and execute

Essential Function 2: Transparency, accountability, and oversight

Essential Function 3: Civilian governance of the Afghan security institutions and adherence to rule of law

Essential Function 4: Force generation

Essential Function 5: Sustain the force

Essential Function 7: Develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes

Essential Function 8: Maintain internal and external strategic communication capability





U.S. Civil and Military Aid

Paying the Necessary Price in Aid

- **Long U.S. and allied history of cutting aid funds too soon.**
- **Aid flow has been extremely erratic, lacked central planning and effective financial control and measures of effectiveness in the field.**
- **SIGAR reporting does not reflect any major current improvements in U.S., allied, or Afghan planning, management, fiscal control at civil or military levels.**
- **Afghan dependence on future aid far higher than planned, seems likely to grow, and will extend beyond 2020.**
- **No progress in Tokyo reforms Afghan government had pledged in return for aid.**


History is a Warning: Declare Victory and Leave?

Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions



Following the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.


Declining U.S. Aid: 2008-2015



CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program
AIF: Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
TFBSO: Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
DOD CN: DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities
ESF: Economic Support Fund
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
Other: Other Funding

U.S. Aid Funding Pipeline

CUMULATIVE AMOUNT REMAINING TO BE DISBURSED (\$ BILLIONS)



FY 2015 AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED (\$ MILLIONS)

	Appropriated
ASFF	\$4,109.33
CERP	10.00
ESF	831.90
INCLE	250.00
Total Major Funds	\$5,201.23

Note: Numbers have been rounded. ESF was reduced from an anticipated \$900 million to \$831.9 million during the 653(a) congressional consultation process.

CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED FY 2002–2015 (\$ BILLIONS)


	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed	Remaining
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	\$60.67	\$56.92	\$55.79	\$3.07
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	3.68	2.28	2.27	0.02
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)	0.99	0.79	0.48	0.32
Task Force for Business & Stability Operations (TFBSO)	0.82	0.76	0.64	0.12
DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN)	2.86	2.86	2.86	0.00
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	18.60	17.06	13.54	4.36
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	4.69	4.33	3.54	1.05
Total 7 Major Funds	\$92.31	\$85.01	\$79.10	\$8.93
Other Reconstruction Funds	7.44			
Civilian Operations	9.87			
Total	\$109.62			

Afghan Government Budget Pays for Very Limited Portion of ANSF Costs

ANA Funding Budget Profile




ANP Funding Budget Profile




Erratic and Declining U.S. Security Aid


ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)




ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)




CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




AIF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)




AIF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ MILLIONS)



DOD CN APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)




DOD CN FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Uncertain Other Foreign Aid

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR FY 1394 BY DONOR, AS OF JUNE 21, 2015 (\$ MILLIONS)



...most of the international funding provided is administered through trust funds. Contributions provided through trust funds are pooled and then distributed for reconstruction activities. The two main trust funds are the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).


ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS PAID IN BY DONORS, 2002-AUGUST 22, 2015



Note: Numbers have been rounded. EU = European Union. "Others" includes 28 donors.

The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF. From 2002 to August 22, 2015, the World Bank reported that 34 donors had pledged more than \$9.02 billion, of which more than \$8.28 billion had been paid in. According to the World Bank, donors had pledged nearly \$1.09 billion to the ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1394, which runs from December 22, 2014 to December 21, 2015.³⁴

DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LOTFA SINCE 2002, AS OF OCTOBER 15, 2015



The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior.⁴⁰ Since 2002, donors have pledged more than \$4.32 billion to the LOTFA, of which more than \$4.07 billion had been paid in, as of October 15, 2015.⁴¹ As of October 15, 2015, the United States had committed nearly \$1.53 billion since the fund's inception and had paid in all of the commitment.

The World Bank Projects Rising Dependence on Foreign Aid and Grants Through 2018

(Tentative Staff Projections)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	<i>Actual/Estimates</i>		<i>----- Tentative Staff Projections -----</i>				
Real GDP growth	14.4	3.7	1.5	4.0	5.0	5.1	5.3
Nominal GDP (bn US\$)	20.5	20.3	21.0	22.6	24.4	26.4	28.5
CPI inflation (period average)	6.4	7.7	6.1	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.0
Fiscal			<i>Percent of GDP</i>				
Revenues and grants	23.1	23.5	25.1	27.4	28.9	33.1	34.8
Domestic revenues	10.3	9.7	8.7	9.6	10.8	11.6	12.8
Foreign grants	13.0	14.5	16.5	17.8	18.1	21.5	22.0
Total core expenditures	23.8	24.7	27.3	29.7	30.5	34.7	36.7
Recurrent expenditures	17.1	17.6	19.4	22.2	23.4	27.4	29.1
Development expenditures	6.7	7.1	8.0	7.5	7.1	7.3	7.6
Overall balance (incl. grants)	-0.5	-0.5	-2.1	-2.3	-1.6	-1.6	-1.9
External							
Trade balance	-41.9	-40.8	-39.3	-37.7	-35.5	-33.5	-30.3
Current acct balance (incl. grants)	4.2	3.7	4.1	0.3	-1.9	-3.7	-3.5
External debt	6.4	6.2	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.6	5.5

Source: Staff estimates, tentative and subject to revision

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Fails to Support Afghan Forces Effectively

The FY2017 Department of defense OCO budget request for the Afghan conflict provides a summary of major OCO programs and their costs. It projects a minor increase in total U.S. global OCO funding from \$58.6 billion to \$58.8 billion, with most of the cost in Afghanistan, but a slight decline in funding from \$42.9 to \$41.7 billion.

Iraq and Syria increase substantially from \$5.0 billion to \$7.5 billion, but these costs are minimal compared to Afghanistan and the cost of the fighting in Iraq from 2003-2011. The European Reassurance Initiative acquires its first serious funding level – rising from \$0.8 billion to \$3.4 billion.

The sharp limits to the President’s decision to keep forces in Afghanistan are illustrated by the fact U.S. military personnel drop from 10,012 in FY2015 to 9,737 in FY2016, and then to 6,217 in FY2017. As General Campbell indicated on his departure from command, these levels do not seem to reflect anything approaching a conditions-based assessment of Afghan needs or the security situation.

A supporting documents that provides a detailed justification of the Afghan military effort provides a great deal of information on the training and equipment efforts, and their costs. It is not clear, however, how a force still fighting intense combat and taking significant combat losses of men and equipment can sustainably cut the total cost of U.S. support from \$4.1 billion before transition to \$3.4 billion in FY2017.

The assessment of Afghan military manning also raises issues. The army increases slightly and the air force drops – in spite of the need for more airpower. The police shift substantially towards what seem to be a greater combat role, but this is not explained either here or later in the more detailed section on Afghanistan. The impact of combat and attrition on both the Army and Police are not mentioned and the cost of warfighting seems to be unrealistically minimized.

In broad terms, the FY2017 request only funds a very high risk U.S. effort that is driven more by a continuing effort to cut its size rather than by the conditions is presented in way where these risks are not clear and often ignored. The level of need for added U.S. support in terms of forward deployed train and assist personnel and air power is not addressed.

The budget request provides a great deal of useful detail on the Afghan effort, but when in come to any form of cost-benefit and risk analysis, the entire section is all spin and no substance and more of a warning of future problems than an adequate budget justification.

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request Tables on Afghanistan - I

Figure 7.1 OCO Funding by Activity
(Dollars in Billions)

Operation/Activity	FY 2016 Enacted	FY 2017 Request
Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) and Related Missions	42.9	41.7
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) and Related Missions	5.0	7.5
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)	0.8	3.4
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)	1.1	1.0
National Guard and Reserve Equipment/Restore Military Readiness	1.5	--
Subtotal	51.3	53.6
Prior-Year Rescissions ^{1/}	-0.4	--
Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 Compliance ^{2/}	7.7	5.2
Grand Total	58.6	58.8 ^{3/}

^{1/} From FY 2015 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (\$400M)

^{2/} FY 2016 Enacted 'BBA Compliance' includes Congressional adds and base budget amounts transferred by the Congress (ISR Improvement Fund \$500M, Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative \$250M, and \$7.0B in transfers and increases)^{3/} Excludes the portion of the congressional base budget fuel adjustment that was applied to OCO (\$893.5M)

FY 2017 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)

(Dollars in Billions)

- Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (Afghanistan) and Theater Posture \$41.7
 - Continues responsible transition of in-country presence
 - Includes training and equipping of Afghan security forces (\$3.4 billion)
 - Includes other theater-wide support requirements and costs
 - Includes Coalition Support (\$1.4B)
- Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (Iraq and Syria) \$7.5
 - Supports slightly increased activities
 - Includes training and equipping of Iraqi security forces and vetted moderate Syrian opposition (\$0.9 billion)
- European Reassurance Initiative \$3.4
- Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund \$1.0
- Increases counterterrorism activities in Africa \$0.2
- Base-to-OCO requirements \$5.0
 - Consistent with enacted BBA OCO level of \$58.8B
 - Supports other readiness and readiness support requirements
 - Includes preferred munitions

OCO funding crucial to trans-regional counterterrorism efforts

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request Tables on Afghanistan - II

Figure 7.2. U.S. Force Level Assumptions in DoD OCO Budget
(Average Annual Troop Strength)

Force	FY 2015 Actuals	FY 2016 Enacted	FY 2017 Request
Afghanistan (OFS)	10,012	9,737	6,217
Iraq (OIR)	3,180	3,550	3,550
In-Theater Support ¹	55,958	55,831	58,593
In CONUS ² /Other Mobilization	16,020	15,991	13,085
Total Force Levels	85,170	85,108	81,445

¹ *In-Theater support includes support for Afghanistan/Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HOA / NW Africa CT, and ERI (including approximately 10,500 afloat forces).*

² *In-CONUS = In the Continental United States*

Figure 7.3. OCO Functional/Mission Category Breakout
(Dollars in Billions)

OCO Budget	FY 2016 Enacted	FY 2017 Request
Operations/Force Protection	8.8	8.7
In-Theater Support	14.8	17.0
Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund	0.4	0.3
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	3.6	3.4
Support for Coalition Forces	1.4	1.4
Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)	0.7	0.6
Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF) ¹	–	0.3
Equipment Reset and Readiness	10.1	9.4
Classified Programs	8.1	8.1
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) ¹	1.1	1.0
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)	0.8	3.4
National Guard and Reserve Equipment/Military Readiness	1.5	–
Subtotal	51.3	53.6
Prior-Year Cancellation	-0.4	–
Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 Compliance	7.7	5.2
Total	58.6	58.8

¹ *In FY 2016, Congress did not establish the STEF account, but did authorized the Syria Train and Equip (ST&E) mission. The Department is likely to leverage CTPF funding for the ST&E mission in FY 2016. Numbers may not add due to rounding*

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request.pdf.

**FISCAL YEAR 2017 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OCO) REQUEST
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND (ASFF) (Dollars in Thousands)**

I. O-1 Exhibit, Funding by Budget Activity Group and Sub-Activity Group

Budget Activity 1, Afghan National Army (ANA)	FY 2015 ¹	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request ²
Sustainment	2,514,660	2,136,899	2,188,841
Infrastructure	20,000		48,262
Equipment and Transportation	21,442	182,751	60,716
Training and Operations	359,645	281,555	220,139
Total Afghan National Army	\$2,915,747	\$2,601,205	\$2,517,958
Budget Activity 2, Afghan National Police (ANP)	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Sustainment	953,189	869,137	860,984
Infrastructure	15,155		20,837
Equipment and Transportation	18,657	116,573	7,610
Training and Operations	174,732	65,342	41,326
Total Afghan National Police	\$1,161,733	\$1,051,052	\$930,757
Budget Activity 4, Related Activities (RA)	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Sustainment	29,603		
Infrastructure			
Equipment and Transportation			
Training and Operations	2,250		
Total Related Activities	\$31,853	\$0	\$0
Total	\$4,109,333	\$3,652,257	\$3,448,715

¹ FY 2015 column reflects appropriated amount before \$400 million rescission per the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016.

² FY 2017 reflects the requested amount of \$3,448 million for ASFF. See charts on pages 65 and 66 for ANDSF funding sources to include the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the International Community.

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-ASFF.pdf

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request Afghan Force Levels

ANA Force Structure	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017
Combat Forces	149,651	149,651	150,355
Afghan Air Force	8,020	8,020	7,981
Institutional Forces	17,261	17,261	23,305
Afghan National Detention Facility	568	568	
Trainees, Transients, Holdovers, Students	19,500	19,500	13,359
Total	195,000	195,000	195,000

ANP Force Structure	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017
Afghan Uniform Police	81,420	81,420	100,427
Afghan National Civil Order Police	14,568	14,568	16,203
Afghan Border Police	23,086	23,086	23,316
Afghan Anti-Crime Police	8,162	8,162	1,927
Enablers & Others	16,764	16,764	15,127
Trainees, Transients, Holdovers, Students	13,000	13,000	
Total	157,000	157,000	157,000

ALP Force Structure	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017
District Leader	150	150	150
Checkpoint Leader	976	976	976
Guardian	28,874	28,874	28,874
Total	30,000	30,000	30,000

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-ASFF.pdf

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request Afghan Army Funding Does Not Fund Serious Combat and Combat Losses

Budget Activity 1, Afghan National Army (ANA)	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Sustainment	2,514,660	2,136,899	2,188,841
Infrastructure	20,000		48,262
Equipment and Transportation	21,442	182,751	60,716
Training and Operations	359,645	281,555	220,139
Total Afghan National Army	\$2,915,747	\$2,601,205	\$2,517,958

ANA Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Logistics	418,851	172,684	213,550
Personnel	544,480	710,989	615,807
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	780,370	380,402	500,521
Combat Forces	248,401	221,439	227,218
Facilities	111,335	139,797	129,312
Communications & Intelligence	74,925	137,231	252,285
Vehicles & Transportation	301,157	336,366	246,867
Medical	14,137	32,993	
Other Sustainment	21,003	5,000	3,280
Total	\$2,514,660	\$2,136,899	\$2,188,841

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-ASFF.pdf

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request for Afghan Air Force Funding Will Not Fund an Effective Alternative to U.S./ISAF Air Power

ANA Afghan Air Force Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Aviation Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (AVPOL)		39,892	49,740
Other Aircraft Sustainment	5,258	8,000	35,020
Simulator Sustainment	11,674	5,550	5,550
Rotary Wing (RW) Aircraft Sustainment	286,059	42,760	164,823
Light Air Support Sustainment		25,010	87,813
Close Air Support (CAS) Sustainment	59,079	28,930	
Initial Trainer Sustainment	107,798	21,150	
Basic Fixed Wing (FW) & RW Sustainment	10,475		
Ammo/Ordinance	26,818	20,690	30,720
Non-Airframe Sustainment	8,413	102,680	21,832
ATAC/ALO Equipment and Sustainment		630	
Medium Airlift Aircraft Sustainment	51,959	69,610	34,321
Other Flight Line Sustainment	3,155		
SMW Aircraft Sustainment	209,682	15,500	70,702
Total	\$780,370	\$380,402	\$500,521

ANA Afghan Air Force (AAF) Equipment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Maintenance Test / Ground Support Equipment	7,500	7,500	2,000
Basic Rotary Wing Training Aircraft	6,030		
Light Air Support Aircraft	7,912	14,563	24,043
AAF Transportation/Contracted Airlift			14,233
SMW Aircraft Modification, Tooling and Equipment			17,000
Total	\$21,442	\$22,063	\$57,276

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-ASFF.pdf

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request for Afghan Police Force Funding is Also Likely To Fall Short of Need if Intense Combat Continues - I

ANP Personnel Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Police Salaries	175,113	8,252	
Afghan Local Police (ALP) Salaries	41,918	38,905	41,312
Afghan Local Police (ALP) Subsistence		26,397	24,638
Afghan Local Police (ALP) Performance Bonus			445
Afghan Local Police (ALP) Severance Pay			171
Police Food/Subsistence		96,289	
Recruiting and Personnel Management	2,636	23,317	
Mol Civil Servant Subject Matter Experts	3,136	4,000	5,500
Afghan Human Resource Information System (AHRIMS)	1,387	1,544	
ANP Pension Requirement		24,767	
Mol Forensics Laboratory – Mentorship and Sustainment			700
Afghan Personnel and Pay System - Police			1,000
Women in the ANDSF			3,450
Total	\$224,190	\$223,472	\$77,216

Police Forces Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Ammunition	101,139	104,930	72,114
OCIE ANP	17,076	39,840	111,500
Weapons Replenishment		8,300	
Weapons Maintenance Repair Parts	2,136		4,000
ABP 82mm Mortars Sustainment	3,109	4,682	
Total	\$123,460	\$157,752	\$187,614

ANP Vehicles & Transportation Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Transportation Services		1,882	20,040
Vehicle Maintenance / National Maintenance Strategy (ANP)	91,136	92,052	140,000
Special Operation Maintenance and Procurement for Covert Vehicles			175
Total	\$91,136	\$93,934	\$160,215

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-ASFF.pdf

U.S. FY2017 OCO Budget Request for Afghan Police Force Funding is Also Likely To Fall Short of Need if Intense Combat Continues - II

ANP Medical Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Consumables	14,137	32,000	519
Medical Equipment Management	5,381	5,000	
Contracts	1,443	2,500	
Gender Medical Incentive			10
Total	\$20,961	\$39,500	\$529

ANP Training and Operations	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
General Training	78,668	62,558	41,109
Communications & Intelligence	47,757	2,326	12
Other Specialized Training	48,307	457	205
Total	\$174,732	\$65,341	\$41,326

ANP Other Equipment & Transportation	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Military Equipment and Tools			100
CIED/EOD Equipment		8,661	
Transportation (Special Assignment Airlift Mission [SAAM])	18,200		
Electronic Counter Measures	457		
Gender Equipment Requirements			5,110
Additional Provincial Response Companies Equipment Spares		2,400	2,400
Total	\$18,657	\$11,061	\$7,610

ANP General Training	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Fire Department Training	6,356		
Mol Mentors/Trainers and Life Support	65,556	61,349	39,438
Public Affairs Office Training		9	
U.S. Based Training	6,756	1,200	1,200
ALP Travel Pay and Allowances			264
Seminars and Training			207
Total	\$78,668	\$62,558	\$41,109

ANP Other Sustainment	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
CIED/EOD	1,687		2,300
Fire Department Minor Equipment & Supplies	5,137		
Force Protection Upgrades	2,997	1,859	2,615
Counter Terrorism (CT) Equipment Sustainment		739	739
Jammer Sustainment		1,271	
14 x Provincial Response Companies Expansion (PRCs)	7,688	2,991	4,151
GIRoA National Forensics Labs	5,387	4,800	
Commercial Air Movement/Special ANDSF Leave Transportation	2,836	1,700	1,000
ANCOP Crowd Control	1,736		
ABP Blue Border Equipment	6,636	5,481	
General Command Police Special Unit (GCPSU) Evidence Based Operations	1,153	17	55
Heavy Equipment Disaster Response Afghanistan	2,436		
AFG National Fire & Emergency Equipment	4,136		
ANP Route Clearance Company	5,636	74	
Vehicle Mounted Electronic Counter Measure	2,936		
Miscellaneous Requirement Sustainment			70
ANP Public Affairs			771
Interpreters for Mobile Education Teams			21
Gender Travel Allowance			75
GCPSU Weapon Accessories and Sustainment			7,400
Total	\$50,401	\$18,932	\$19,197

ANP Communication and Intelligence Training	FY 2015	FY 2016 Appropriated	FY 2017 Request
Legacy Future Intelligence Training	35,556		
Information Technology (IT) Training	12,201	2,326	
ALP Public Affairs Office			12
Total	\$47,757	\$2,326	\$12

Source: OSD Comptroller Summary Budget Documents, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-ASFF.pdf

An Uncertain Pakistan

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT OF IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, JUNE 2015 - I

The role of Pakistan remains critical to stability in Afghanistan. Since President Ghani's inauguration, Afghan and Pakistani leaders have conducted several high-level engagements to discuss regional security. President Ghani has taken steps toward improving relationships with several countries in the region in an effort to help Afghanistan move forward on a more stable platform of physical and economic security. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan attack on a school in Peshawar, Pakistan, on December 16, 2014, allowed the leadership of both countries to engage each other on counterterrorism issues. This has led to some progress in the Afghanistan-Pakistan military-to-military relationship. The day after the school attack, General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, flew to Afghanistan to meet with President Ghani. By the end of December 2014, the Pakistani government created a National Action Plan to eliminate terrorism from inside its borders; this remains a long-term plan that will have to overcome significant obstacles. Headquarters, Resolute Support facilitates a constructive and effective relationship between the Afghan and Pakistan militaries when necessary.

On May 12, 2015, a Pakistani delegation led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of the Army Staff General Raheel Sharif visited Kabul, where Prime Minister Sharif publicly condemned the Taliban's spring offensive, insisting, "The enemies of Afghanistan cannot be friends of Pakistan." President Ghani reinforced this message by similarly saying that the enemies of Pakistan cannot be the friends of Afghanistan. General Raheel and President Ghani have also pledged to support each other in their fight against terrorism. Afghanistan and Pakistan also share mutual concerns over the potential emergence of elements of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in the region. Pakistani Army operations in the last several months, such as Operation KHYBER II, have applied pressure on extremists operating in the border region. The Pakistani military attempted to coordinate these operations bilaterally with Afghan military representatives, not via U.S. or coalition channels. The ANDSF are now attempting to capitalize on the Pakistani military operations on their side of the border.

President Ghani is matching General Raheel's initiatives to encourage rapprochement between both countries. Encouragingly, both appear to be pushing for political reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban. During the May 12, 2015, meeting between Prime Minister Sharif and President Ghani, Prime Minister Sharif publicly reaffirmed Pakistan's support of an Afghan reconciliation process and vowed to take coordinated action with Afghanistan against militant hideouts along the border.

Both the Afghan and Pakistan governments have indicated a desire to coordinate cross-border security and are in the process of finalizing a Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Although the previous trilateral border SOP expired on December 31, 2014, both militaries are still operating under those procedures until the new SOP is signed.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT OF IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, JUNE 2015 - II

On December 23, 2014, Afghanistan's Army Chief General Sher Mohammad Karimi met with General Raheel Sharif in Pakistan to discuss coordinating Pakistan-Afghanistan military and counterterrorism operations on both sides of the border. General Raheel and General Karimi agreed that their subordinate commanders would begin meeting immediately to coordinate border area security operations. The goal of these meetings is for Afghan and Pakistan military units that regularly operate near the border to work together in a combined effort to eliminate terrorist threats while bringing security and stability to the people of the region.

The subsequent consultations between Afghan and Pakistani corps commanders showed some promise. Notably, Afghan and Pakistan corps-level commanders met on January 18, 2015, in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, and talked about the mutual benefits of building a cross-border network to root out terrorism and bring safety and security to the region. ANDSF and Pakistan Army operational commanders, and a delegation from RS headquarters, participated and openly discussed recent operations in their respective areas, provided intelligence assessments, and talked about future operations. All groups agreed that sharing operational plans and coordination between tactical units is both feasible and necessary along the border. On January 22, 2015, a second meeting occurred that included higher-level Afghan and Pakistani leadership to discuss how to improve security and border cooperation. The parties further discussed the common enemy they face and emphasized the close geographic and cultural ties between the two countries. Additional bilateral security meetings have occurred, including a visit by Afghan Border Police (ABP) leaders to Pakistan to discuss improving border security, including the establishment of common SOPs, sharing intelligence, and conducting joint operations; and a visit by Afghan National Army corps commanders to meet with their counterparts at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.


The Pakistani military also re-extended an offer to provide military training for Afghan security forces. Unlike his predecessor, President Ghani accepted their offer and sent members of the ANDSF for formal training in Pakistan during this reporting period. In February 2015, six ANA cadets arrived to attend an 18-month long course at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad. In April, General Karimi was invited to serve as the guest of honor at a ceremony at the academy. During the ceremony, General Karimi emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan face a common enemy, which requires cooperation between the two countries. Pakistan and Afghanistan have discussed expanding training opportunities to include other ANDSF branches and capabilities.

With considerable time and political will, Afghanistan and Pakistan can build upon the meaningful progress made during this reporting period to make further progress on resolving key bilateral disputes. Afghan-focused militants may continue to pose a threat to this progress from remaining safe havens in Pakistan.


Pakistan Terrorism Deaths: I



GTI RANK | **4**
GTI SCORE | **9.065**



INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000




ATTACKS BY TARGET

- Private citizens & property
- Police
- Military, militia or terrorist groups
- Educational institutions
- Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

- Unknown
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- Other



Pakistan Terrorism Deaths: II

Whilst Pakistan saw a seven per cent reduction in incidents and a 25 per cent reduction in deaths from 2013 to 2014, the country still has the fourth highest number of deaths from terrorism in the world. There were 1,760 people killed from terrorism in Pakistan in 2014.

Terrorism in Pakistan is strongly influenced by its proximity to Afghanistan with most attacks occurring near the border and involving the Taliban. Nearly half of all attacks had no groups claiming responsibility. The deadliest group in Pakistan in 2014, responsible for 31 per cent of all deaths and 60 per cent of all claimed attacks, is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. This group killed 543 people in 2014, slightly down from 618 in 2013. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a jihadi group based in Pakistan, also saw a substantial decline in activity to 45 deaths in 2014 down from 346 in 2013. In addition the leader of the group, Malik Ishaq, was killed by Pakistani police forces in July 2015.

Terrorism in Pakistan has a diverse array of actors. In 2014 there were 35 different terrorist groups, up from 25 groups in 2013. However, seven groups account for the majority of claimed attacks. While many of these groups are Islamist there are also other organizations such as separatist movements for Baloch, the Bettani tribe and Sindhi people. The majority of terrorism occurs in just three provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the north-west, which recorded 35 per cent of the deaths; the Sindh province, in the south east, which recorded 23 per cent of the deaths; and Balochistan in the south-west which recorded 20 per cent of the deaths.

There were 535 cities or regional centers in Pakistan that had at least one terrorist incident in 2014, with at least one death in each of 253 cities. The largest city in Pakistan, Karachi, had the most deaths with 374. Islamabad, the capital, had the second highest deaths from terrorism with 38 deaths. The city of Parachinar in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the closest point in Pakistan to Kabul in Afghanistan, had among the highest rates of deaths per incident with 12 killed per incident.

Bombings and explosions continue to be the most common type of attack accounting for around 40 per cent of fatalities. However, the use of firearms and armed assault attacks has increased. In 2013 armed assaults were responsible for 26 per cent of fatalities whereas in 2014 this had increased to 39 per cent. The numbers killed by armed assaults rose 14 per cent to 685, up from 602 in 2013.

The biggest target for terrorism in Pakistan is private citizens, who are the target of 20 per cent of incidents and account for 29 per cent of fatalities. Educational institutions continue to be targeted. In 2014 there were 103 attacks on schools which caused 201 deaths and 203 injuries. The Pakistani Taliban, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, is opposed to western education and to the education of girls and has targeted schools and advocates of equal education.

Ten countries with the most terrorist attacks, 2013

Country	Total Attacks	Total Killed	Total Wounded	Average Number Killed per Attack	Average Number Wounded per Attack
Iraq	2495	6378	14956	2.56	5.99
Pakistan	1920	2315	4989	1.21	2.60
Afghanistan	1144	3111	3717	2.72	3.25
India	622	405	717	0.65	1.15
Philippines	450	279	413	0.62	0.92
Thailand	332	131	398	0.39	1.20
Nigeria	300	1817	457	6.06	1.52
Yemen	295	291	583	0.99	1.98
Syria²	212	1074	1773	5.07	8.36
Somalia	197	408	485	2.07	2.46

Pakistani Terrorism: State Department Country Profile

- The total number of terrorist attacks reported in Pakistan increased 36.8 percent between 2012 and 2013. Fatalities increased 25.3 percent and injuries increased 36.9 percent.
- No specific perpetrator organization was identified for 86.2 percent of all attacks in Pakistan. Of the remaining attacks, nearly half (49%) were carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Attacks attributed to the TTP killed more than 550 and wounded more than 1,200 in 2013.
- Twenty other groups, including a number of Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch Republican Army, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch Liberation Front, and the Baloch Liberation Tigers, carried out attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan.
- More than 37 percent of all attacks in Pakistan took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, 28.4 percent took place in Balochistan, and 21.2 percent took place in Sindh province. The proportion of attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) decreased from 19.6 percent in 2012 to 9.4 percent in 2013.
- The most frequently attacked types of targets in Pakistan were consistent with global patterns. More than 22 percent of all attacks primarily targeted private citizens and property, more than 17 percent primarily targeted the police, and more than 11 percent primarily targeted general (non-diplomatic) government entities.
- However, these three types of targets accounted for a smaller proportion of attacks in Pakistan (51.1%) than they did globally (61.7%). Instead, terrorist attacks in Pakistan were almost twice as likely to target educational institutions (6.4%) and more than three times as likely to target violent political parties (4.4%), organizations that have at times engaged in both electoral politics and terrorist violence.


Ten Perpetrator Groups with the Most Attacks Worldwide, 2013

Perpetrator Group Name	Total Attacks	Total Killed	Average Number Killed per Attack
Taliban	641	2340	3.65
Al-Qa'ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	401	1725	4.30
Boko Haram	213	1589	7.46
Maoists (India)/Communist Party of India - Maoist	203	190	0.94
Al-Shabaab	195	512	2.63
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	134	589	4.40
New People's Army (NPA)	118	88	0.75
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	84	177	2.11
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	77	45	0.58
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	34	23	0.68


- Of the attacks for which perpetrator information was reported, more than 20 percent were attributed to the Taliban, operating primarily in Afghanistan. In addition to carrying out the most attacks, the Taliban in Afghanistan was responsible for the greatest number of fatalities in 2013.
- Along with the Taliban in Afghanistan, five other groups carried out attacks that were more lethal than the global average (1.84 people killed per attack) in 2013: Boko Haram, al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI)/ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula

Pakistan: Low World Bank Rankings of Governance, Violence, and Stability


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption











The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

Source: [Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi \(2010\), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues](#)

The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.qovindicators.org


Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.

Pakistan: Human Development Comparisons



Pakistan vs. India and Bangladesh

Figure 2: Trends in Pakistan's HDI 1980-2012



World Bank Economy Rankings: Ease of Doing Business: 2014

Economy	Ease of Doing Business Rank ▲	Filtered Rank	Starting a Business	Dealing with Construction Permits	Getting Electricity	Registering Property	Getting Credit	Protecting Minority Investors	Paying Taxes	Trading Across Borders	Enforcing Contracts	Resolving Insolvency
Sri Lanka	99	1	4	2	3	5	3	4	7	1	5	1
Nepal	108	2	4	3	2	1	5	5	4	7	3	3
Maldives	116	3	2	1	4	6	5	7	5	4	2	4
Bhutan	125	4	3	5	1	2	2	6	3	6	1	8
Pakistan * SUBNATIONAL	128	5	7	4	7	3	7	2	8	2	4	2
India * SUBNATIONAL	142	6	8	7	5	4	1	1	6	3	7	5
Bangladesh *	173	7	6	6	8	8	7	3	2	5	8	6
Afghanistan	183	8	1	8	6	7	3	8	1	8	6	7

Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1–189. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. The rankings are determined by sorting the aggregate distance to frontier scores on 10 topics, each consisting of several indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. The rankings for all economies are benchmarked to June 2014.

Source: World Bank: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>

Pakistan

Pakistan's 2012 HDI of 0.515 is above the average of 0.466 for countries in the low human development group and below the average of 0.558 for countries in South Asia. From South Asia, countries which are close to Pakistan in 2012 HDI rank and population size are India and Bangladesh, which have HDIs ranked 136 and 146 respectively (see table B).

Table B: Pakistan's HDI indicators for 2012 relative to selected countries and groups

	HDI value	HDI rank	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (PPP US\$)
Pakistan	0.515	146	65.7	7.3	4.9	2,566
India	0.554	136	65.8	10.7	4.4	3,285
Bangladesh	0.515	146	69.2	8.1	4.8	1,785
South Asia	0.558	—	66.2	10.2	4.7	3,343
Low HDI	0.466	—	59.1	8.5	4.2	1,633

Pakistan's HDI for 2012 is 0.515. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.356, a loss of 30.9 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the dimension indices. India and Bangladesh, show losses due to inequality of 29.3 percent and 27.4 percent respectively. The average loss due to inequality for low HDI countries is 33.5 percent and for South Asia it is 29.1 percent.

Table C: Pakistan's IHDI for 2012 relative to selected countries and groups

	IHDI value	Overall Loss (%)	Loss due to inequality in life expectancy at birth (%)	Loss due to inequality in education (%)	Loss due to inequality in income (%)
Pakistan	0.356	30.9	32.3	45.2	11
India	0.392	29.3	27.1	42.4	15.8
Bangladesh	0.374	27.4	23.2	39.4	17.7
South Asia	0.395	29.1	27	42	15.9
Low HDI	0.31	33.5	35.7	38.7	25.6

Pakistan

The most recent survey data available for estimating MPI figures for Pakistan were collected in 2006/2007. In Pakistan 49.4 percent of the population lived in multidimensional poverty (the MPI 'head count') while an additional 11 percent were vulnerable to multiple deprivations. The intensity of deprivation – that is, the average percentage of deprivation experienced by people living in multidimensional poverty – in Pakistan was 53.4 percent. The country's MPI value, which is the share of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations, was 0.264. India and Bangladesh had MPI values of 0.283 and 0.292 respectively.


Table E compares income poverty, measured by the percentage of the population living below PPP US\$1.25 per day, and multidimensional deprivations in Pakistan. It shows that income poverty only tells part of the story. The multidimensional poverty headcount is 28.4 percentage points higher than income poverty. This implies that individuals living above the income poverty line may still suffer deprivations in education, health and other living conditions. Table E also shows the percentage of Pakistan's population that live in severe poverty (deprivation score is 50 percent or more) and that are vulnerable to poverty (deprivation score between 20 and 30 percent). The contributions of deprivations in each dimension to overall poverty complete a comprehensive picture of people living in poverty in Pakistan. Figures for India and Bangladesh are also shown in the table for comparison.

Table E: The most recent MPI figures for Pakistan relative to selected countries

	Survey year	MPI value	Headcount (%)	Intensity of deprivation (%)	Population			Contribution to overall poverty of deprivations in		
					Vulnerable to poverty (%)	In severe poverty (%)	Below income poverty line (%)	Health	Education	Living Standards
Pakistan	2006/2007	0.264	49.4	53.4	11	27.4	21	37.9	30.8	31.2
India	2005/2006	0.283	53.7	52.7	16.4	28.6	32.7	35.7	21.8	42.5
Bangladesh	2007	0.292	57.8	50.4	21.2	26.2	43.3	34.5	18.7	46.8

UN Pakistan Human Development Indicator Ranking (Minimal growth, Only 146th in the World in 2014)

Trends 1980 - Present



Key Pakistan UN Human Development Indicators

Demography	Population total (millions)	182.14
Health	Life expectancy at birth	66.57
Income/Command Over Resources	Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 PPP \$)	4,651.64
	Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 PPP \$)	4,651.64
	GDP (2011 PPP\$) (billions)	781.2
	GDP per capita (2011 PPP\$)	4,360.35
	Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	10.92
	Domestic credit provided by the banking system (% of GDP)	44.52
Poverty	Population in multidimensional poverty (%)	45.59
	Multidimensional poverty index	0.24
	Population in multidimensional poverty (%)	45.59
	Intensity of multidimensional poverty (%)	52.03
	Population near multidimensional poverty (%)	14.94
	Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%)	26.46
	Population living below \$1.25 a day (%)	21.04
	Share of working poor, below \$2 a day (%)	57
Education	Mean years of schooling	4.73

Post-2016 Security Challenge

Key Warfighting Challenges

- **US., allied, and Afghan Acceptance that as long as Taliban and other insurgents have sanctuary in Pakistan, war will last as long as it lasts.**
- **End focus on tactical clashes, focus on political-military control and protection of key populated areas and LoCs.**
- **Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.**
 - **Tests of 2015 campaign season: “Coming out of the sanctuary closet.”**
 - **Threat ability to choose time and place, intensity and persistence of operations.**
 - **New forms of high profile attacks, political-military structures at urban and district level, focus on ANSF, officials, advisors, and NGOs.**
 - **LOC and commercial threats.**
 - **New role of narcotics, power brokers, corruption in poorer economy**
- **Ensuring popular support of government and ANSF is critical. Deal with Security vs. hearts and minds dilemmas on Afghan terms.**
 - **Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers” to win popular support.**

There is some hope that an adequately resourced ANSF layered defense and US “four quarter” advisory strategy could succeed in provide the necessary security in key populated areas and for key lines of communication, even if Pakistan continues to provide Taliban sanctuaries and comes to dominate less populated areas in the east and South.

Afghanistan is, however, very much a nation at war and success is extremely uncertain given the limited size and duration of the US advisory effort.

ISAF and the US government have stopped all detailed reporting on actual success in war for more than a year. ISAF no longer reports maps or metrics, and the semi-annual Department of Defense 1230 report stopped such reporting in late 2012 and has not been updated since July 2013.

It is clear from a wide range of media reporting, however, that the transition to Afghan forces in 2013 gradually extended ANSF responsibility to many areas still dominated by the Taliban and other insurgents

There has been no meaningful net assessment of the success of Afghan government/ANSF efforts versus those of the Taliban and other threats.

The ANSF will have to cover a large country with a highly dispersed population and 18 major population clusters. Some do not face major threats, but many do face serious risks.

General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission

- **In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.**
- **This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.**
- **In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.**
- **Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.**
- **Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.**

Layered Defense: A Concept that May Still Work with Adequate US and Allied support

- Concentrate ANSF in layered elements to defend population and key lines of communication.
- ANA defends, deters, defeats active Taliban and insurgent forces; ANP plays paramilitary role, with ALP forward in key sensitive areas.
- Accept Taliban and insurgent presence and control in less populated parts of East and South,
- Continued Pakistani sanctuaries unless Pakistan fundamentally changes tactics.
- Support with US advisory presence down to at least level of each of six Afghan corps, key enablers, limited COIN element plus drone and air support.
- German and Italian presence in populated but less threatened areas in the North.
- Support with governance and economic aid.