IMPERIAL GATEWAY

COLONIAL TAIWAN AND JAPAN'S EXPANSION IN SOUTH CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1895–1945

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Cover photograph: A Taiwanese military interpreter wearing an armband with the Japanese character for "interpreter" interrogates a Chinese prisoner of war on Hainan Island, 1940. Mainichi Shimbun/AFLO.

For my parents

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Note to the Reader

Japanese-language words have been transliterated in the modified Hepburn system, except for the place-names Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, and Hokkaido. Chinese-language words have been transliterated in Hanyu Pinyin. Exceptions are made for when an alternate is commonly well-known (for example, Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek, Manchuria) and for Taiwanese scholars whose names are commonly transliterated in Wade-Giles. There is no standard system for transliterating Austronesian (indigenous) names. When possible, I have used the spellings cited by other English-language scholars or the romanized spelling of the Japanese katakana cited by Japanese-language scholars. I follow the standard order of Asian names (surname first, followed by the given name) except for the names of scholars who publish mainly in English.

Though, historically, Taipei was called Taihoku under Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945, I use today's Taiwanese place names instead of colonial-era names in the body text. Transliterations in parentheses throughout the text are Japanese terms: (*dōhō*). When both Japanese and Chinese terms are given, they are indicated separately: (J. *dōhō*, C. *tongbao*). The translations from Japanese and Chinese are all mine unless otherwise indicated.

I adopt the term "Taiwanese" (J. hontōjin, Taiwanjin, C. bendaoren, Taiwanren) as a legal term used by the Japanese for ethnic Han residents in Taiwan with colonial subjecthood. Though colonial Taiwan consisted of Han and indigenous residents, I generally use "Taiwanese" to refer to the Han Taiwanese and "indigenous Taiwanese" to refer to the latter group. I use "overseas Taiwanese" to translate the Japanese term Taiwan sekimin (C. Taiwan jimin), which referred to Taiwanese subjects residing outside of Taiwan in mainland China or Southeast Asia. The "overseas Taiwanese" included both Taiwanese subjects who had migrated abroad and resident ethnic Chinese (in China or Southeast Asia) who had naturalized as Taiwanese subjects. Contemporary Japanese terms for "South China" included Minami Shina, Nanshi, or *taigan* (across the [Taiwan] Strait). At its most expanded form, "South China" could include Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hong Kong, Macau, and Hainan. However, I use the term as the Taiwan Government-General generally did to refer to the

narrower geographical region of Fujian and Guangdong provinces across the Taiwan Strait. Lastly, the Japanese term Nan'yō (literally, the "South Seas") was a malleable geographic designation that referred more or less to the present-day South Pacific, Southeast Asia, or a combination of the two. After Japan occupied Micronesia (Nan'yō Guntō) in the 1910s, the Japanese often referred to Micronesia as the "Inner South Seas" (Uchi Nan'yō) or "Rear South Seas" (Ura Nan'yō) and present-day Southeast Asia as the "Outer South Seas (Soto Nan'yō) or "Front South Seas" (Omote Nan'yō). For the sake of intelligibility, I use the term "Southeast Asia" as the English translation for Nan'yō. The English term "Southeast Asia" is a wartime invention and its geographic parameters remain debated. In this book, "Southeast Asia" generally refers to Siam (Thailand) and the Western colonies of Malaya, North Borneo, the Philippines, Indochina, and the East Indies.

Unless otherwise noted in the endnotes and selected bibliography, all Japanese-language books were published in Tokyo and all Chinese-language books were published in Taipei.



Figure 0.0. East and Southeast Asia. Map by Mike Bechthold.

IMPERIAL GATEWAY

Introduction

One year after Japan annexed the subtropical island of Taiwan in 1895 as its first overseas colony, Taiwan governor-general Katsura Tarō (1848–1913) wrote that "Colonial rule in Taiwan cannot be restricted to the island's borders: it must also involve overseas expansion." Katsura's June 1896 report, which he sent to the Tokyo central government, was titled *Principles of Taiwan Rule* and described his recent month-long observation tour of both the island and, across the Taiwan Strait, South China. He outlined Taiwan's strategic importance to Japan's southern imperial interests: "On the opposite side of Taiwan and the Pescadores is the South China coast connected to the key port of Xiamen; to the south of Taiwan are the islands of the South Seas [Nan'yō Shotō, present-day maritime Southeast Asia]. Taiwan is thus the perfect site from which to gain control of the South China Sea."[1] Katsura's report was the first of many such arguments that framed Taiwan's importance in terms of continued imperial expansion.

Taiwan's modest landmass—13,000 square miles, or less than one-tenth the size of Japan's archipelago—was located at the maritime crossroads of East and Southeast Asia: 100 miles from southwest Japan's Okinawan islands, 100 miles off the coast of South China, and between Japan and the Philippines. Since the seventeenth century, Taiwan had served as a commercial hub for Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, Spanish, British, American, and Southeast Asian traders. It also had been the target of imperial ambitions due to its strategic position

and natural resources. Parts of the island had been governed by the Dutch (1624–62), the Spanish (1626–42), the Sino-Japanese "pirate" Koxinga (C. Zheng Chenggong) and his family (1662–83), and the Manchu Qing dynasty (1683–1895).[2] After the opening of Qing Taiwan's treaty ports to foreign trade in 1860, the island became a site of commercial and geostrategic competition among Britain, France, the United States, and Japan.[3]

Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) led it to annex Taiwan from Qing China (1644–1911), thereby joining the ranks of the Western imperial powers in Asia. The Japanese Meiji government (1868–1912) faced opposition from the local population, which included roughly 2.8 million ethnic Han Chinese and 100,000 indigenous peoples.[4] To quell anti-Japanese resistance, "civilize" the island's residents, and develop the island's economy, the Tokyo central government established the Taiwan Government-General (Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1895–1945) in the colonial capital of Taipei (J. Taihoku). Headed by Japanese military leaders selected from among high-ranking officers in the Imperial Army and Navy, the Government-General was granted complete military and civil jurisdiction over the island.[5]

As hinted by Katsura Tarō's 1896 report, Japanese colonial leaders focused, right from the start, on promoting Taiwan as Japan's "southern gateway" (*nanmon*) through which the nascent Japanese empire could continue to advance. Under Qing rule, Taiwan had been a political and economic appendage of Fujian province. Under Japanese rule, the fourth governor-general Kodama Gentarō (1852–1906, served 1898–1906) wished to reverse the cross-strait relationship to make Fujian into Taiwan's imperial frontier on mainland China.[6] Yet a central paradox of early Japanese colonialism was that Government-General leaders advocated for overseas expansion at a time when they could hardly afford the finances or personnel to undertake it. For the first decade, they were plagued by incessant anti-Japanese uprisings and fiscal insolvency. In 1898, for example, subsidies for Taiwan had so drained Tokyo's finances that some Japanese officials in the central government suggested selling off the island to a Western power.[7]

Over time, however, the Taiwan Government-General did extend its imperial interests across the East and South China Seas. To explain this process, I adopt the concept of the "imperial gateway." From 1895 to 1945, Japanese colonial leaders envisioned the island as an open-ended channel through which they could continually expand Japan's southern frontiers, with colonial Taiwan—both its Japanese colonialists and Taiwanese subjects—mediating Japan's strategic, economic, and military expansion in South China and Southeast Asia.[8] The skills and experiences of Taiwan's institutions and personnel critically shaped Japan's informal empire in prewar South China and military occupation of the

"Southern Regions" (Nanpō, the Japanese term that collectively referred to South China, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific). This book illustrates how Japanese imperial strategies and practices were not merely dictated by the Tokyo central government. Japanese colonial leaders in Taiwan innovated new imperial strategies to compete with Chinese and Western powers for regional hegemony.

The trajectories of the Japanese empire were also shaped by intra-imperial rivalries. Although the Taiwan Government-General sought to expand Japan's imperial power overseas, its objectives were not always aligned with those in the Tokyo central government. The Japanese metropole's imperial aspirations, especially as advanced by the Foreign Ministry and Imperial Army, initially prioritized northern continental advance through Korea and Manchuria over the southern expansion promoted by colonial leaders in Taiwan. Technically, the jurisdiction of the Government-General was circumscribed to the island and remained legally subordinate to Tokyo until 1945. Nevertheless, the Government-General took advantage of Taiwan's geographical proximity to and cultural affinities with South China and Southeast Asia—especially their shared ethnic Han Chinese populations—to elevate its strategic importance in Japan's empire.[9] This book analyzes both the synergies and tensions between the expansionist ambitions of the Government-General and the imperial priorities of Tokyo, including those advanced by the Foreign Ministry, army, and navy.[10]

Even when lacking the support of the Tokyo government, the Taiwan Government-General enacted new imperial strategies centered on mobilizing its overseas Taiwanese subjects. The Japanese legal category of "overseas Taiwanese" (J. Taiwan sekimin, C. Taiwan jimin) included both Taiwanese subjects who had migrated abroad as well as resident ethnic Chinese in South China or Southeast Asia whom the Japanese had naturalized as Taiwanese subjects. In North and Central China, there were significant numbers of Japanese migrant settlers. In South China, by contrast, Japan's economic and demographic representation was weak. In response, the Government-General welcomed thousands of resident Chinese who eagerly sought out Taiwanese subjecthood because it granted them the extraterritorial rights—such as exemption from Chinese taxes and laws and Japanese consular protection—that Japan had obtained after 1895.[11] Such practices, which I call "proxy colonialism," were in sharp contrast to those of rival Western powers in China's treaty ports that increasingly used racialized nationality policies to restrict Chinese naturalization.[12]

Japanese colonial leaders viewed overseas Taiwanese as ideal Sino-Japanese intermediaries. South China's Fujianese dialect, Hokkien (C. Minnanhua), was

similar to the Taiwanese dialect (C. Taiwanhua) and spoken by sizable overseas Chinese populations throughout Southeast Asia. Japanese officials relied on wealthy, well-connected, and even armed overseas Taiwanese as gateway subjects to help mediate Taiwan's economic, geopolitical, and cultural interests across the East and South China Seas. There were limits, however, to how much Japanese authorities could monitor the growing overseas Taiwanese population. Chinese and Taiwanese alike learned to exploit loopholes in nationality laws to pursue individual interests irrespective of national loyalties. Japanese policies toward the overseas Taiwanese were thus as much about reacting to the unpredictable behavior of Taiwanese subjects in South China as they were about directing such behavior.

In Japan's quest for geopolitical and economic supremacy in Asia, neither the processes of colonialism and imperialism nor the boundaries between formal empire (overseas colonies) and informal empire ("semi-colonial" Chinese treaty ports) were neatly divided.[13] Such boundaries fluctuated due to geopolitical contingencies and unforeseen activities by a range of actors who passed through the Taiwan gateway at the crossroads of multiple empires. The agency and flexibility displayed by overseas Taiwanese during the prewar and wartime periods challenge prevailing assumptions that the "colonizers" and the "colonized" occupied clear places within imperial hierarchies: outside Taiwan's territorial borders, gradations of power and categories of identity could be quite fluid. In turn, the geographic orientations and strategic aims of Japanese expansion from Taiwan were ever-shifting and adaptable to the changing international order.

Japan's Annexation of Taiwan

Japan's overseas empire emerged within the context of accelerated Western expansion in Asia. Western empires included both bounded territories under colonial rule and modes of imperial commerce and politics that reshaped life in coastal treaty ports. By the 1850s under the threat of steamships and cannons, Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868), along with China and Siam, was subjected to Western informal empire. The signing of unequal treaties compromised Japan's sovereignty: in coastal treaty ports, Westerners enjoyed tariff immunity and extraterritorial rights exempting them from Japanese laws. After rival samurai from southwest Japan toppled the Tokugawa regime in 1868, the new Meiji government embarked on Western-inspired modernization and military reforms to resist further encroachment and restore complete sovereignty.

At the same time that Meiji leaders strengthened Japan's industrial economy and military, they actively sought opportunities for territorial expansion. Between 1869 and 1879, they extended Japan's national borders through the forceful incorporation of Ezo (Hokkaido), the Kuril Islands (Chishima), the Bonin Islands (Ogasawara), and the Ryūkyū Islands (Okinawa) as part of Japan proper.[14] They also planned to invade Korea in 1873, though those plans were aborted. A military expedition the following year sent 3,600 troops to Taiwan under the staged pretext to avenge the murder of fifty-four shipwrecked Ryūkyūan subjects at the hands of Taiwan's indigenous peoples in 1871. Enlisting Western legal advisors' support, the Japanese contended that under international law, the "uncivilized" indigenous lands in southeastern Taiwan remained outside Qing jurisdiction and thereby open lands available for annexation. During the expedition, one of the officers, Admiral Kabayama Sukenori—who later became navy minister (served 1890–92) and the first Taiwan governor-general (served 1895–96)—highlighted Taiwan's potential as a naval base. General Tani Kanjō went so far as to advance grandiose visions of invading mainland China from Taiwan.[15]

Nothing came of such fantasies, for while the 1874 Taiwan Expedition subjugated the island's southeast indigenous peoples, Meiji leaders were unprepared to go to war with the Qing. Moreover, Britain and the United States were strongly opposed to Japan's incursion: trade in Taiwan's camphor, tea, and sugar had flourished since the opening of the island's treaty ports after the Second Opium War (1856–60). These Western powers did not want to give up their profits, and the Japanese government did not want to antagonize them. In the end, Japan withdrew its forces, and the Qing paid a small indemnity that effectively acknowledged the Ryūkyūs as part of Japan but required no territorial concessions. Over the next few decades, Japanese leaders turned their focus northward to rivalries with the Qing and Russia over the Korean peninsula.

Japan's imperial ambitions toward neighboring regions in Asia were driven as much by preemptive defensiveness as by the pursuit of power and prestige. By the end of the nineteenth century, the kingdoms of Southeast Asia were to be divided into the Western colonies of British Malaya and Burma, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and the US Philippines.[16] Japanese leaders worried that a potential foreign occupation of Korea would make Japan, whose "western gate" (*seimon*) of Tsushima was just thirty miles away, a vulnerable target. Likewise, a Western annexation of Taiwan would similarly leave the "southern gate" (*nanmon*) of their Okinawan islands, one hundred miles away, susceptible to invasion.[17] These fears were warranted. As early as the 1850s, American officials in East Asia, including Commodore Matthew Perry, advocated annexing Taiwan for its commercial value. They did not receive the backing of the US government,

but that did not mean Taiwan was safe from invasion. Over the coming decades, as the French extended their colonial possessions in Indochina northward up to Southwest China's border, they attempted to incorporate Taiwan as well, occupying its northern ports during the Sino-French War (1884–85) to win concessions. The Qing staved off a French takeover only by mounting a successful defense of the rest of Taiwan.[18] For the Japanese navy, the Sino-French War confirmed the strategic importance of Taiwan as a maritime base.[19] A decade later, at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan secured the island for itself.

Since 1885, Japan and the Qing had agreed not to station their respective military forces in the Korean peninsula. When the Qing sent troops to support the Korean court against a peasant rebellion in spring 1894, Japan declared war against the Qing ostensibly "to protect Korea's independence." Over the coming months, Japan's military defeated Qing forces in a series of battles in Korea, Manchuria, and the Yellow Sea. In peace negotiations with the Qing, Japan's Imperial Army lobbied for the Qing to cede South Manchuria as a northern buffer against Russia. Japan's Imperial Navy, meanwhile, pushed for Taiwan as a southern foothold in the East and South China Seas. The April 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the war and ceded both regions to Japan. A week later, however, Russia, France, and Germany mounted what came to be known as the Triple Intervention, pressuring Japan to return South Manchuria to the Qing. Japan was allowed to retain Taiwan by assuring the Western powers commercial access to the island and freedom of shipping in the Taiwan Strait.[20]

Japan's acquisition of Taiwan in 1895 marked the formal start of its overseas empire. In contrast to Hokkaido and Okinawa, for example, which the Meiji government legally incorporated as part of Japan's metropole (*naichi*), Taiwan was governed as a colony (*gaichi*). Some historians have argued that Hokkaido and Okinawa should be viewed as Japan's first colonies. However, while residents of these territories initially faced legal and ethnic discrimination, they were gradually incorporated as citizens of Japan's metropole with civic rights unavailable in colonies like Taiwan.[21] Though Han Taiwanese subjects became Japanese nationals, they did not receive access to primary education, social welfare, and conscription duties equal to those of Japanese citizens in the metropole.[22] Scholars have termed the second-class status of colonial subjecthood, which later applied to Koreans and other colonized Asians, as Japanese "regional citizenship" or "sub-nationality."[23] Still, the Japanese gave the Han Taiwanese more social privileges and opportunities than the upland indigenous Taiwanese (called *banjin* or "savages" by the authorities), who were governed separately in a specially administered indigenous territorial zone in eastern Taiwan.[24]

A decade after acquiring Taiwan, Japan won the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and turned its focused northward. The Japanese occupied Korea, the Kwantung Leasehold in South Manchuria, Karafuto (Sakhalin), and the rest of Manchuria in 1931 before taking over strategic regions in North, Central, and South China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). Previous narratives of Japan's empire have largely focused on these northern advances into continental East Asia.[25] The story of Japan's southern advance is generally told in small bursts, when historians discuss Japanese expansionist fantasies of the South Pacific in the 1870s–80s and the acquisition of Micronesia from Germany during World War I (1914–18).[26] Southern expansion only takes center stage with the Imperial Army and Navy's 1936 unified policy of simultaneous northern and southern advance, which culminated in the Asia-Pacific War (1941–45). Studies of wartime Japanese Pan-Asianist rhetoric and state-building have highlighted the puppet-state of Manchukuo (1932–45), Chinese collaborationist regimes (1937–45), and occupied Southeast Asia (1942–45).[27] Despite the intense scholarly interest in Japan's northern advance, recapturing the importance of southern expansion—especially radiating out from Taiwan—is essential for understanding the broader history of the Japanese empire.

Japan's Southern Advance

Orienting the geographic focus to the understudied southern half of Japan's empire centered on Taiwan, *Imperial Gateway* contends that, even as Japan's Imperial Army and Foreign Ministry prioritized northern advance in Korea and Manchuria from the 1900s up to the 1930s, Taiwan served as a pivotal gateway for Japan's contested southward advance through the Asia-Pacific War. In spite of the multivectored nature of Japanese empire-building, the strategic significance of Taiwan has been largely overlooked in the English-language historiography. Present-day accounts of Taiwan have remained surprisingly consistent with Mark Peattie's 1984 observation that Taiwan was peripheral to Japan's long-term foreign policies: "Taiwan was an imperial accessory, a laboratory where the 'new boy' among the colonial powers could show off his modernizing skills, not the heart of Japan's strategic concerns."[28] Historians have shown in various ways how Taiwan did indeed serve as a colonial "laboratory," but it was much more than a site for experiments.

To be sure, after the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and ensuing political and academic liberalization, historical studies of the island have undergone a radical transformation.[29] Since the 1990s, scholars have begun to rewrite the history of colonial Taiwan not as a local case study in Chinese anti-Japanese

resistance undertaken by China, the narrative previously promoted by the Republic of China government, but from the perspectives of Taiwanese subjectivity and agency. Cultural and literary studies have illustrated the multifaceted nature of Japanese colonial rule and its mutual impact on Japanese and Taiwanese identity formation.[30] Sayaka Chatani, Evan Dawley, Paul Barclay, and Kirsten Ziomek, among others, have furthered our understanding of the limits of Japanese state power vis-à-vis colonial subjects.[31] By highlighting the agency and various intermediary roles of the Han and indigenous Taiwanese, such works have revealed the fluidity of Japan's imperial hierarchies and categories. Hiroko Matsuda, David Ambaras, and Eiichiro Azuma have likewise traced the liminal mobilities of border-crossers to and from Taiwan—whether it be Taiwanese in Okinawa, Japanese adventurers from Taiwan to South China, or Japanese settlers from Hawai'i to Taiwan.[32] Such works have pushed the spatial and analytic boundaries of Japan's empire beyond its formal territorial limits.

Building on such studies that challenge the standard geographies of Japan's empire, *Imperial Gateway* examines the intricate ties between Japanese colonial governance in Taiwan and a broader web of international relations. The conventional focus on bilateral ties between the metropole and its colonies simply cannot account for Japanese rule in Taiwan, which was shaped as much by developments in neighboring South China and Southeast Asia as by the will of leaders in Tokyo. In turn, Taiwan served as a conduit for Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese engagement with Southeast Asia. Approaching colonial Taiwan as an imperial gateway allows us to uncover regional networks and conflicts often neglected due to divisions in the academic subfields of Sino-Japanese, Sino-Taiwanese, Japanese-Taiwanese, and Japanese-Southeast Asian relations.[33] Imperial expansion was a contested process among state agencies and mobile colonial subjects whose interests did not easily map onto national, local, or ethnoracial categories.

Conceptualizing Taiwan as an imperial gateway also expands our understanding of the regional dynamics of Japan's territorial peripheries. No other Japanese colony played a more critical role in informal and formal southern expansion during the first half of the twentieth century. Before annexing Taiwan in 1895, Japanese leaders first viewed Okinawa (formerly known as the Ryūkyūs) as their nation's "southern gateway." Since the sixteenth century, the Ryūkyū Kingdom had served as a critical intermediary for maritime trade between China, Japan, and Southeast Asia.[34] In the 1870s, Japan occupied the Ryūkyūs and incorporated them as Okinawa Prefecture, highlighting their potential for military defense and forward deployment. Yet after 1895, Taiwan replaced Okinawa as Japan's southern imperial gateway. Not only was Taiwan located closer to South China and Southeast Asia and further from Japan's ar-

chipelago, but it also had fifteen times the landmass and population.[35] Unlike in Taiwan and Korea, the Japanese government did not invest significant resources to develop Okinawa's infrastructure and industries. Hundreds of thousands of Okinawans went on to migrate to other parts of the Japanese metropole, Taiwan, Micronesia, the Philippines, Hawai'i, and Latin America for better socioeconomic opportunities but rarely as imperialists like the overseas Taiwanese.[36] As for Japan's northern territories, Hokkaido (formerly Ezo) served as a migratory entryway into colonial Karafuto (Sakhalin). Karafuto, on the other hand, never developed into an imperial gateway into northern Eurasia.[37]

Micronesia, which the Japanese navy took over from Germany in the South Pacific during World War I, served as the empire's secondary southern gateway through the Asia-Pacific War. Yet until the 1930s, several factors prevented Micronesia from becoming as important an imperial gateway as Taiwan until the 1930s. The islands were dispersed—stretching from the Marianas to the Carolines and Marshalls, and totaled only 860 square miles, one-fifteenth the size of Taiwan. Although Micronesia became a center for sugar production—with a sugar industry modelled on that of Taiwan—the islands remained too geographically distant to play a strategic or economic role in prewar East and Southeast Asia.[38] In Japan's hierarchy of colonial administrations, Micronesia, as a League of Nations mandate, ranked below Taiwan and Korea, on par with Karafuto and the Kwangtung Leasehold Territory.[39] The Taiwan Government-General even sought to incorporate Micronesia under its jurisdiction as part of an extended "Southern Regions Bloc" (Nanpō-ken) in the late-1930s (see chapter 6). In addition, Micronesia's mandate status and naval limitations treaties with the Anglo-American powers prevented Japan from fortifying the islands as military bases in the 1920s. Only after the collapse of the arms limitation agreements in the mid-1930s did the Imperial Navy use Micronesia to control strategic shipping lanes between Hawai'i and the Philippines; it also began to covertly construct air, sea, and land facilities in Micronesia that were critical to Japanese attacks against US Pacific territories in 1941.[40]

The closest parallel to Taiwan as Japan's imperial schema was colonial Korea (1910–45), the empire's "northern gateway" to Manchuria in Northeast China.[41] Both the Taiwan and Korean colonial governments sought to extend their spheres of power in order to defend their colonial borders against attacks by anti-Japanese insurgents, to advance cross-border economic and cultural interests, and to elevate their colonies' prestige and strategic relevance within Japan's empire. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Korean-Manchurian borderlands had been a contested site of inter-imperial mobility and sovereignty. Hundreds of thousands of Korean peasants crossed the Sino-Korean border at the Tumen River to settle farmlands in Manchuria. Some Koreans naturalized as Qing or

Russian subjects for legal and economic protections, resulting in disputes over their jurisdiction among China, Korea, and Russia.[42] Japan's occupation of Korea and the Kwantung Leasehold in 1905 did not stop Korean migration into Northeast China. Instead, Japanese officials in the Foreign Ministry, army, and colonial governments used their jurisdiction over transborder Korean subjects to advance economic and strategic interests in the rest of Manchuria.[43] Such imperial practices resembled those by the Taiwan Government-General and Foreign Ministry in South China, where Japanese authorities legitimated police and military intervention using the pretext of "protecting overseas Taiwanese from Chinese violence," as epitomized by the 1900 Xiamen Incident (chapter 1).

To be sure, the Korean Government-General enjoyed higher status and greater resources than its Taiwan counterpart. Korea, after all, had three times the landmass and four times the population.[44] Japan's army stationed many more garrisons in Korea and South Manchuria, which served as defensive buffers against Russia in the north and as military entryways into Northeast China, than it did in Taiwan. Ironically, however, the Foreign Ministry and army's greater attention to the Manchuria-Korean borderlands gave the Taiwan Government-General more leeway to expand its influence in South China. In Manchuria, Foreign Ministry officials competed for jurisdiction over Korean subjects with the Korea Government-General, Kwantung Government-General, South Manchurian Railway Company, and Kwantung Army.[45] By contrast, the Foreign Ministry devoted few resources to South China and largely delegated police and judicial responsibilities to the Taiwan Government-General, which established a foothold in South China with more independence up until the Second Sino-Japanese War. Despite having fewer resources, the Taiwan Government-General had a freer hand and less competition in South China than the Korean Government-General in Northeast China.

Other colonies among the Western empires served as imperial gateways too, and their histories can help throw Taiwan's into further relief. For example, India, which served as Britain's entry point for the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions, possessed more institutional autonomy and greater economic and military power than Taiwan. The Indian Government-General presided over the Indian Army, the British empire's largest force, consisting of majority Indian soldiers and financed by colonial revenues. The Indian Army led incursions in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and the resulting acquisitions—the Straits Settlements, Aden, and Burma, among others—were placed under India's jurisdiction for several decades, until they became separate colonies supervised by the Colonial Office in London.[46] Taiwan, by contrast, never possessed its own independent army or foreign office and remained subordinate to directives issued by Tokyo's

Figure I.1. The Taiwan Government-General headquarters in the colonial capital of Taipei, 1919. The European Baroque-style building was over 400 feet wide with an imposing eleven-story tower in the center 200 feet tall, symbolic of the Government-General's power. Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library.

Imperial Army and Foreign Ministry in its international relations. Yet even with far less manpower and resources than both Korea and India, the Taiwan Government-General helped shape the trajectory of Japan's southern expansion through its use of overseas Taiwanese as gateway subjects.

Gateway Actors

Some historians have contended that Japan's empire differed from its Western counterparts in that the Japanese shared racial and cultural affinities with their colonial subjects in East Asia. Certainly, Japan's early territorial acquisitions in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria were geographically closer to the metropole than the Western powers' far-flung colonies in the Americas, Africa, and Asia.[47] Moreover, when the moral legitimacy of empires came under attack, the Japanese attempted to justify colonial rule through Pan-Asianist rhetoric and assimilation policies predicated on shared heritages, typified by the motto of "same culture, same race" (J. *dōbun dōshu*, C. *tongwen tongzhong*). In

practice, however, Japanese assimilationist rule was rife with contradictions, and just as hierarchical and discriminatory as the colonial governance of the Western imperial powers.[48]

Japan governed based on what Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have called the politics of difference, striving to maintain imperial hierarchies through differentiated ethnic policies.[49] Ethnic Japanese were first-class subjects with civic and social rights, while Taiwanese and Koreans were relegated to second-class status, without equal access to education, welfare, or conscription duties. Still, in official and popular Japanese discourse, the Taiwanese and Koreans were "fellow compatriots" (*dōhō*), and on account of their colonial subjecthood, they ranked above the Chinese in legal and civilizational status.

Most Western imperial powers enlisted colonial subjects as armed soldiers during World War I, but Japan did not.[50] Despite promoting Pan-Asianist rhetoric of a shared ethnocultural heritage among its colonies, the Japanese empire did not trust its colonial subjects to bear arms until the late 1930s, when the outbreak of total war in China demanded a considerable increase in military manpower.[51] Japanese authorities had long trumpeted the common ancestral ties of Koreans and Japanese, and began enlisting Korean subjects first, in 1938. But they saw the Han Taiwanese as more ethnically distinct, sharing heritage with the Han Chinese across the strait in South China, which made the Japanese anxious about Taiwanese loyalty and hesitant to arm them until 1942, several years into the fighting.

Despite fears of pro-Chinese sentiment among Taiwanese subjects, the Japanese also valued that Chinese heritage, which they leveraged to extend Japan's spheres of influence across the East and South China Seas. To compensate for the lack of Japanese settlers and resources in South China, the Taiwan Government-General actively naturalized tens of thousands of resident Chinese as overseas Taiwanese subjects. At the time, the Anglo-American imperial powers were increasingly stringent about extending extraterritorial protection to their ethnic Chinese subjects (from colonial Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines) in China's treaty ports. In contrast, Japanese colonial authorities embraced the growing number of Chinese who wished to benefit from the extraterritorial privileges accorded to Taiwanese subjects. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Taiwanese population in Fujian outnumbered Western settlers, which helped the Japanese claim imperial hegemony in the province. The Taiwan Government-General then sought to take advantage of linguistic and kinship ties that overseas Taiwanese shared with local Chinese to mediate Sino-Japanese partnerships in business, politics, and culture.

But the overseas Taiwanese were not mere pawns of Japan's empire. They often leveraged their liminal status between multiple nationalities and juris-

dictions to pursue illicit enterprises or anti-imperial activities irrespective of state interests. Taiwanese exercised considerable agency by taking advantage of their local Chinese ties and Japanese extraterritorial status. For example, members of prominent Taiwanese families (the Lins of Banqiao and the Lins of Wufeng, no relation) who resided in Xiamen maintained dual Sino-Japanese nationality. Some worked for Taiwan-based companies while concurrently serving as local Chinese officials, taking advantage of economic and political ties with Japanese and Chinese authorities as they saw fit. Thus, South China was a source of both opportunity and anxiety for the Japanese, who could not always control the activities and loyalties of the overseas Taiwanese.

The phenomenon of colonial subjects exerting agency overseas was certainly not limited to Taiwan. The manipulation of nationality and extraterritoriality and the transgression of territorial and social boundaries have been central to the colonial experience at the edges of empires.[52] Yet few other empires had the same ethnocultural advantage that the Han Taiwanese, as ethnic Chinese, provided Japan. In most other cases, empires benefitted not from local naturalization, but from physical migration by colonial subjects. Millions of Indians as British subjects, for instance, traversed the Indian Ocean into Africa and Asia as laborers, merchants, policemen, and soldiers. In China's treaty ports, a sizeable population of Indian and Middle Eastern subjects served as imperial go-betweens.[53] Indian Sikhs made up most British police forces in colonial Hong Kong and concessions in Shanghai and other treaty ports because of their ostensible military background and reputation for loyalty.[54] As for commercial activities in China's treaty ports, Indian and Middle Eastern subjects leveraged extraterritorial rights to manage Britain's opium trade between India and China.[55] What distinguished overseas Taiwanese from their British colonial counterparts was their shared ethnic and linguistic ties to the local Chinese population.

Hundreds of thousands of Koreans settled in Manchuria before Japan took it over from China in 1931. Yet, they too were migrants rather than naturalized Chinese subjects. Korean settlers were largely impoverished farmers who had left Korea in search of greater opportunities in wet rice agriculture. Other Koreans migrated to Manchurian cities as merchants and smugglers, many of whom took advantage of Japanese extraterritorial protection to participate in the illicit opium trade—as did their Taiwanese counterparts in South China. Opium revenues amassed by Koreans were part of Japan's largest narcotics economy, a system controlled by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.[56] By contrast, Taiwanese opium dealers in coastal South China shared their profits with local Chinese authorities, whether it was warlords or the Chinese Nationalist Party, but not with Japanese officials until the occupation of the region in 1938. Some Koreans

also migrated to Manchuria for political rather than economic reasons. Like the Taiwanese who moved to South and Central China to participate in anti-Japanese movements (see chapter 2), Korean activists sought refuge in Manchuria to avoid police persecution and form anti-Japanese resistance groups.[57]

It was only after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific wars that Japanese authorities began to dispatch tens of thousands of Taiwanese overseas to participate in military occupation (in contrast to the prewar strategy of naturalizing South Chinese residents). The Taiwan Government-General lobbied to expand its administrative powers beyond Taiwan as head of a "Southern Regions Colony" that included the South China coast, South China Sea islands, and Micronesia. Supported by Japan's navy, which captured the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea from French Indochina in 1939, the islands were brought under Taiwan's jurisdiction. Ultimately, however, the Government-General was limited to a cooperative, rather than a leading role in Japan's occupation of South China, which remained under the administration of the army and navy. Still, the Japanese military relied on Taiwan's institutions and personnel for regional expertise to administer coastal South China. Especially in wartime Xiamen and Hainan, the navy turned to tens of thousands of Taiwanese—including residents from the prewar period—with bilingual skills to help restore public order and manage businesses and industries.

In wartime South China and Southeast Asia, within the imperial hierarchy, Taiwanese remained relegated to a second-class status below that of the Japanese but in supervisory positions above that of local civilians and Allied POWs. Like their Korean counterparts, Han and indigenous Taiwanese experienced Japanese coercion and social pressure to serve in the military. Many Taiwanese, however, also willingly volunteered out of patriotism and belief in Japan's war mission. From military assistants to nurses, self-professed patriotic Taiwanese fought against the Chinese and Western Allies to prove that they were just as capable and loyal as the Japanese. Even Taiwanese with conflicted feelings toward the Japanese were drawn to wartime opportunities overseas with higher pay and prestige than those in Taiwan. Examining Taiwanese roles in the Asia-Pacific wars allows us to better understand the historical context of war memories, identities, and nationalisms that resulted from Japan's southern advance.

Sources and Chapter Overview

Imperial Gateway draws on source materials in six countries and three languages. In addition to Tokyo-based ministry archives, I make use of Taiwan

Government-General archives in Taipei that were made public in the 1990s after the end of martial law in Taiwan. Only by studying these materials alongside Chinese, British, and American sources can we better understand how the Government-General cooperated with and contested the Foreign Ministry, army, and navy regarding imperial relations in South China and Southeast Asia. Some Taiwanese subjects—most of them educated elites—wrote in Japanese and Chinese about their activities and views regarding Japan's southern expansion, and their archives have been important sources. But most of the Taiwanese individuals I describe—especially the overseas Taiwanese in South China and Southeast Asia—left few records of their own. To understand their experiences, I rely on reports from Japanese, Chinese, and Anglo-American officials in East and Southeast Asia, as well as newspaper coverage on the overseas Taiwanese. For the 1930s and 1940s, I supplement these sources with oral histories by Taiwanese military personnel transcribed since the 1990s. There are certainly methodological challenges in using what Ann Heylen has described as Taiwanese "ego-documents," which retrospectively historicize wartime experiences through selective memory and contemporary views toward the Chinese Nationalist Party, Japan, and mainland China.[58] Still, even if filtered through hindsight, such sources allow us to hear about firsthand experiences of wartime subjects, helping to fill in the gaps that remain in official archives.

This book consists of six body chapters divided into two parts that weave together macro and micro perspectives. Rather than privileging a top-down narrative of state governance or a bottom-up story centered on colonial subjects, each chapter illustrates how Japan's empire-building and on-the-ground activities by local actors were mutually constitutive processes. Part 1, "Overseas Subjects as Gateway Actors," examines how the Taiwan Government-General sought to mobilize Taiwanese overseas to extend Japan's informal empire in prewar East and Southeast Asia. Chapter 1, "Opening a Gateway into China," analyzes how Japan's acquisition of Taiwan initiated new vectors for expansion across the strait in South China. Chapter 2, "Taiwanese in South China's Borders Zones," explores how, even without the Tokyo central government's full support, the Taiwan Government-General mobilized the overseas Taiwanese as imperial intermediaries with ethnolinguistic ties to the local population in South China. At the same time, overseas Taiwanese often took advantage of their dual Sino-Japanese status to pursue individual interests beyond the limits of state control. Chapter 3, "Taiwanese in Southeast Asia," examines how the Government-General promoted Taiwan as integral to Japan's economic advance in Southeast Asia. It was less successful in mobilizing Taiwanese in the Western colonies of Southeast Asia, though, than it had been in China: in these other colonies, the Taiwanese lacked the legal advantages

and sufficient numbers to challenge the dominance of well-established overseas Chinese networks.

Part 2, "The Wartime Gateway," shifts the focus to the Asia-Pacific wars and Taiwan's integral role in Japan's military occupation of South China and Southeast Asia. The Government-General initially sought to extend its administrative powers beyond Taiwan as head of a "Southern Regions Colony" that ranged from South China to Micronesia. While the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea were incorporated as part of Taiwan, intra-imperial rivalries among the army, navy, and Colonial Ministry ultimately curbed the Government-General's aspirations to further expand its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Japan's military services relied on Taiwan for southern regional expertise and personnel unavailable in the home islands.

Chapter 4, "Mobilizing for War," introduces the dilemmas faced by Japanese authorities in sending Taiwanese to the China war front. Even as wartime *kōminka* ("imperial subjectification") policies sought to replace Taiwan's culture with radical Japanization, the Japanese recruited Taiwanese as military interpreters, laborers, and medical personnel precisely because of their Chinese linguistic skills. The Imperial Navy and Army also enlisted Taiwan's personnel to help administer the region—the focus of chapter 5, "Colonial Liaisons in Occupied South China." Tens of thousands of Taiwanese took advantage of wartime opportunities for socioeconomic advancement to work in Japanese-led occupation governments. Chapter 6, "Advancing into the Southern Regions," analyzes how the Japanese deployed Han Taiwanese to mediate between military authorities and the overseas Chinese in occupied Southeast Asia. Indigenous Taiwanese were also enlisted as military assistants for their jungle warfare expertise in the Philippines and the East Indies. All three wartime chapters juxtapose Japanese sources that celebrated the Taiwanese as "model Japanese subjects" with firsthand experiences recounted by Taiwanese in oral testimonies. Lastly, the epilogue explores the postwar aftermath and legacies resulting from the collapse of Japan's empire and the retrocession of Taiwan to the Republic of China.

Part One

Overseas Subjects as Gateway Actors

Chapter 1

Opening a Gateway into China

Four years after Japan annexed Taiwan from the Qing empire, the Taiwan Government-General continued to face Han and indigenous uprisings, tropical diseases, and budgetary deficits. Some Japanese officials in the Tokyo central government worried that the potential upsides of the colony were not worth the financial and human costs. In a June 1899 *Memorandum on the Past and Future of Taiwan Rule* sent to Tokyo, the fourth Taiwan governor-general, Kodama Gentarō (1852–1906, served 1898–1906), charted a course to quell the central government's fears. Kodama advocated for harsher measures to suppress revolts and economic initiatives to increase colonial revenues through government monopolies on opium, salt, and camphor. He also contended that the Government-General could extend Japan's sphere of influence in South China by naturalizing Chinese residents across the strait in Fujian province.[1] The Government-General lacked the finances or personnel to initiate costly overseas ventures on its own, but by expanding numbers of "overseas Taiwanese subjects" (J. Taiwan sekimin, C. Taiwan jimin), it could advance Japanese imperial interests at relatively low costs.

Of particular importance was Fujian's treaty port city of Xiamen, a major entrepôt for deep-water shipping one hundred miles across the strait from Taiwan. Without any deep-water ports of its own, Taiwan had historically relied on Xiamen for long-distance trade of its main commodity exports.[2] Kodama wished to transform Xiamen into an economic sub-port or satellite (*fuzokuchi*) of

Taiwan. However, the Japanese lacked a sizeable settler community in Xiamen and the South China region, especially in contrast to Central and North China. Kodama and his civil affairs chief Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929, served 1898–1906) thus adopted new imperial strategies centered on recruiting South Chinese to naturalize as overseas Taiwanese subjects. For Kodama, Chinese residents in Xiamen held the key to advancing Taiwan's regional business networks.

South Chinese residents had been devastated by Taiwan's cession to Japan just years before, but thousands of Chinese eagerly sought out Taiwanese subjecthood in South China's treaty ports of Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou. Kodama framed their naturalization as one of political affinity, writing in his 1899 memorandum that Xiamen residents "increasingly admire colonial rule in Taiwan. Xiamen residents who wish to naturalize [as overseas Taiwanese subjects] are not only growing daily; they also seek financial backing from the Government-General for various enterprises. The Government-General cannot forgo this opportunity and should make every effort to win over the hearts of the Xiamen people."[3] In fact, their hearts tended to be won over by the promise of enjoying extraterritorial rights obtained by Japan after 1895, including exemption from local Chinese taxes and laws.[4]

The benefits ran both ways. Chinese and Taiwanese manipulated Japanese nationality for their self-interests, but Japanese colonial authorities made constructive use of these overseas subjects, advancing the imperial project by proxy. The Taiwan Government-General welcomed what it called "good" (*zenryō*) or useful Chinese elites to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects, rewarding them with legal extraterritorial protection in exchange for economic and political partnerships. Japanese colonial leaders relied on naturalized overseas Taiwanese to extend Taiwan's shipping, banking, railway, and camphor enterprises in South China, which they called Taiwan's economic lifeline. But South China was also, they insisted, a security threat. In 1900, for example, Japanese officials used the growing Taiwanese community in Xiamen as a pretext for military intervention, where, they claimed, overseas Taiwanese needed Japan's protection. The invasion of Xiamen was ultimately aborted, but the Government-General's other efforts remained largely successful. By the turn of the twentieth century, Fujian was one of China's few coastal regions yet to be carved up by the Western powers into a sphere of influence with railway or mining concessions.

Japanese actions toward South China and the overseas Taiwanese were not based on a unified vision originating from the Tokyo central government. Rather, the Taiwan Government-General negotiated with, and at times contested, the Japanese military services and Foreign Ministry in shaping Taiwan's southern advance according to the strategies it had at hand: naturalizing foreign subjects, making economic inroads, and using individual interests to cre-

ate an empire by proxy. In other words, Taiwan was not a passive colony at the periphery of the empire but an imperial center in its own right.

South China as Taiwan's Security Threat and Imperial Opportunity

The Qing transferred Taiwan's sovereignty to Japan in April 1895, but peace did not follow. Taiwan consisted of 2.8 million Han Chinese—the majority Hokkien (C. Minnanren, "South Fujianese") and minority Hakka (C. Kejiaren, "Guest People") with native-place ties to South China's Fujian and Guangdong provinces—in addition to 100,000 Austronesian indigenous peoples.[5] Thousands of Taiwanese launched some five months of armed resistance against occupation troops, led by Taiwan's first governor-general, Kabayama Sukenori (served May 1895–June 1896).

In a last-ditch attempt to prevent Japan's takeover, former Taiwan governor Tang Jingsong declared an independent Taiwan Republic in Taipei on May 25. Tang hoped that the Western powers would come to Taiwan's defense and pressure Japan to return the island to the Qing, much like the Triple Intervention a month earlier when Russia, France, and Germany had forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula (in South Manchuria) to the Qing. Unable to organize his military forces, Tang fled to mainland China less than two weeks later. General Liu Yongfu founded a successor Taiwan Republic in the southern capital of Tainan, but his troops were defeated by October.[6]

Neither the Western powers nor the Qing government offered support to the short-lived Taiwan Republics. Li Hongzhang, the Qing representative who had negotiated the 1895 Sino-Japanese peace treaty, viewed Taiwan as a remote periphery infested with tropical diseases and unruly bandits; he considered it far less strategically valuable than Manchuria and worth sacrificing to ensure a broader peace.[7] Yet other Qing officials and intellectuals lamented the loss of Taiwan. Scholar-gentry like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in Guangdong feared that relinquishing Taiwan to Japan would result in a maritime threat to South China.[8] The Qing Southern Commissioner Zhang Zhidong similarly viewed the island as a protective shield for China's coastal provinces: "Taiwan is of crucial importance with its proximity to Fujian and Zhejiang: its occupation by the enemy [Japan] will hinder the administration of the Southern Commissioner."[9] Zhang's premonition would turn out to have been prescient.

Governor-General Kabayama's forces crushed the Taiwan Republic and declared the island "pacified" in November 1895, but the Japanese continued to face incessant guerrilla attacks by Han and indigenous residents over the next

decade.[10] Anti-Japanese insurgents, whom Japanese authorities called "bandits" (J. *dohi*, C. *tufei*) or "gangsters" (J. *buraikan*, C. *wulaihan*), were reportedly taking refuge in South China and smuggling arms and troops back into Taiwan. For security purposes, Kabayama instituted strict immigration laws in December 1895.[11] Chinese visitors were required to have Qing government visas and were limited to residency in Taiwan's four ports of Jilong, Danshui, Anping, and Gaoxiong.[12] Japanese colonial police were to deport any Chinese deemed as a threat to public order.

To legally demarcate its new Taiwanese subjects, the Government-General granted the island's Han residents a two-year grace period to choose their nationality.[13] Those who relocated to mainland China by May 1897 remained Qing subjects; those who stayed in Taiwan after the deadline became Taiwanese subjects with Japanese nationality.[14] By the end of the grace period, only an estimated 6,400 Han residents, about 0.2 percent of the total population, had relocated to China.[15] The remaining Han Taiwanese (J. hontōjin, C. bendaoren, or "islanders") legally became Japanese nationals, but they did not receive the same civic rights—such as equal access to education or officialdom—enjoyed by Japanese colonialists from the metropole. Han Taiwanese were legally distinguished from the ethnic Japanese by regional family registration systems: colonial subjects were registered in their respective colonies (*gaichi*) while ethnic Japanese were registered in the metropole (*naichi*).[16] Still, the Japanese gave the Han Taiwanese more social privileges and opportunities than the upland indigenous Taiwanese (*banjin*, or "savages"). The Japanese inherited the Qing custom of not counting indigenous Taiwanese as legal subjects because of their purported economic backwardness. Indigenous Taiwanese were placed in separate "Savage District Registers" and ruled separately from their Han counterparts in a specially administered indigenous territorial zone in eastern Taiwan (see figure 1.1).[17]

With no Japanese officials stationed in Fujian in 1895, Kabayama requested that the Tokyo Cabinet establish a consulate in Xiamen to help monitor Taiwan's cross-strait relations.[18] In March 1896, the Foreign Ministry installed Ueno Sen'ichi as consul of Xiamen with concurrent consular jurisdiction over Fuzhou and Shantou, two other key treaty port cities in South China.[19] Ueno was a veteran China hand with prior experience in Fujian and Taiwan. As Japanese vice-consul in the Fuzhou consulate from 1887 until 1891, Ueno had conducted commercial surveys of Taiwan from 1888 to 1890 for the Foreign Ministry. During his eleven-year tenure as consul of Xiamen (1896–1906), Ueno became an instrumental partner for promoting the Taiwan Government-General's geopolitical and economic interests in South China.[20]

FIGURE 1.1. Japanese colonial postcard titled "Taiwan's Races" (*Taiwan minzoku*), ca. 1904. Pictures of a Han Taiwanese family and indigenous Taiwanese family (top-left). The map divides the island territorially between the "Han race" (*Kan jinshu*) in the west and the "savage race" (*seiban jinshu*) in the east. Courtesy of the Rupnow Collection.

To regulate Taiwanese cross-strait travel in cooperation with Consul Ueno, the Government-General adopted a colonial passport system modeled on British Hong Kong and Malaya.[21] They hoped to institute what historian John Torpey has called "the monopoly of the legitimate means of movement."[22] From May 1897, Taiwanese traveling to China were required to obtain a Japanese passport from the Government-General and to register with the local consulate upon their arrival (see figure 1.2).[23] It mitigated, but by no means staunched, the challenges Japanese colonial and consular authorities faced as

Figure 1.2. Japanese passport of a Taiwanese subject, 1936. Courtesy of the Institute of Taiwan History Archives, Academia Sinica.

they tried to control border crossings in and out of Taiwan. On both sides of the Taiwan Strait, people sold real and counterfeit passports and visas, and found ways to smuggle people and goods across the borders.[24]

As Japanese colonial authorities sought to secure the island's maritime borders from subversive elements from South China, they simultaneously advocated for the extension of Taiwan's imperial sphere of interests across the strait. Katsura Tarō (1848–1913, served June–July 1896) was the first Taiwan governor-general to actively promote the island as Japan's base for "cross-strait strategic policy" (*taigan kei'ei*). Although leaders in the Tokyo central government and Imperial Army continued to push for the occupation of Korea, Katsura believed that Japan's northern advance into the peninsula was unfeasible for the time being: "If we reflect on our position in Korea . . . there are several Great Powers that have managed to extend their interests in that country. Even if the peninsula were to fall, two or three Great Powers would co-annex it. The current reality is that it would not be easy to increase our influence in Korea."[25] Katsura instead focused on Fujian's deep-water shipping port of Xiamen as "a critical area for us politically and economically, as it is a new entrance for our goods and customs."[26]

Katsura was working in a climate of growing imperial competition. After the First Sino-Japanese War, the Western powers jockeyed for Chinese terri-

torial concessions, and by 1898, the Western powers had carved up coastal China into informal imperial spheres of influence with railway and mining rights: Russia in Manchuria's Lüshun (Northeast China); Germany in Shandong's Jiaozhou Bay (North China); France in Yunnan, Guangxi, and Western Guangdong (Southwest China); and Britain in Shandong's Weihaiwei, the Yangzi Delta region (Central China), and Jiulong (as an extension of colonial Hong Kong).[27] Russia and Germany did not have any preexisting colonies near China, but the French and British did; they targeted Southwest China and Jiulong as respective extensions of their adjacent colonies in Indochina and Hong Kong.[28] The Japanese aimed for something similar, extending their power from colonial Taiwan to Fujian. In April 1898, Japan's Foreign Ministry negotiated with the Qing government for de facto primacy in Fujian by citing the province's economic and strategic importance to Taiwan: the Qing agreed not to cede the province to any other power and to consult Japan before any other nation regarding foreign capital and personnel for the construction of local railways.[29]

The fourth Taiwan governor-general, Kodama Gentarō, and his civil affairs chief, Gotō Shinpei, sought to fulfill Katsura's vision of Taiwan as a gateway into South China. Kodama highlighted the commercial interdependence of Taiwan and Fujian and advocated extending Taiwan-based banking, shipping, railway, and camphor industries across the strait as a way to "peacefully occupy" Fujian. Drawing on Taiwan's historical ties to Fujian (the island did not become its own province until 1887), Kodama propagated the vision of cross-strait unity that envisioned Fujian as a geocultural extension of Taiwan.[30]

The lack of Japanese settlers in Fujian, however, posed a significant challenge. By 1900, an estimated 2,000 Japanese had migrated from the metropole to the major port cities of Shanghai (Central China) and Tianjin (North China) to participate in Sino-Japanese trade. In contrast, fewer than one hundred Japanese lived in Xiamen and Fuzhou combined.[31] The few Japanese who had settled in coastal Fujian largely consisted of prostitutes and unemployed vagrants, hardly the type of settlers who could promote Japan's economic interests.[32] Within a short span of time, however, the populations of Xiamen and Fuzhou also included hundreds of Taiwanese subjects. Most "overseas Taiwanese subjects" (J. Taiwan sekimin, C. Taiwan jimin), as they were called by Japanese authorities, had not migrated across the strait. Rather, they were resident Chinese who naturalized as Taiwanese subjects by both legal and illegal means. Japanese opinions on their presence diverged, but Kodama and Gotō were poised to use them to extend Taiwan's geopolitical and economic aims in South China.

Creating and Protecting the Overseas Taiwanese

The Government-General had not set out to rapidly grow the numbers of overseas Taiwanese. Their focus had been on what Eric Tagliacozzo calls "surveillance mechanisms": implementing passport and family registration systems to monitor cross-strait travel and legally differentiate Taiwanese subjects from Chinese foreigners. The Government-General allowed Chinese in South China's treaty ports to apply for Taiwanese passports and subjecthood if they had relatives in Taiwan or if they had evacuated from the island as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. An unexpectedly large number of resident Chinese in Fujian and Guangdong did so, and not always through legal means. Japanese consuls reported that local Chinese with no prior ties to Taiwan often forged, bought, or re-used passports to register as Taiwanese subjects. Some were caught, but many others were able to jump through the hoops to become what Japanese and Chinese officials called "fake overseas Taiwanese" (J. kabō sekimin, C. jiamao jimin). While that dismayed many officials, Kodama and Gotō realized that they could use these naturalized subjects to their advantage.

Chinese residents had good reason to covet Taiwanese subjecthood. As Sawamura Gentarō, a Taiwan Government-General official stationed in Japan's consulate in Xiamen, explained: "If they [Chinese residents] become Japanese nationals, then their businesses in China do not have to abide by Qing laws or taxes. Not only can they avoid paying customs fees, but as foreign nationals they can seek consular protection against meddlesome Chinese officials or attacks by bandits."[33] Enterprising Chinese in South China's treaty ports exploited Taiwanese subjecthood for financial gain. Sawamura observed that "many [Taiwanese] come to the Japanese consulate having concocted fake legal cases relating to money-lending, real-estate, or theft. Their aim is to use their power as Japanese merchants to extort other Chinese." Sawamura complained that such behavior drained the Japanese consulate's resources and damaged Japan's national reputation among the Chinese.[34] Moreover, many "fake overseas Taiwanese" used their foreign extraterritorial rights to pursue illicit enterprises in opium, gambling, and prostitution with a sense of protection from Qing officials.[35]

Since the opening of China's treaty ports in 1842, many Chinese had capitalized on what historian Eileen Scully has described as "the black market in foreign privilege."[36] By obtaining British, French, American, Dutch, and Spanish nationalities during the latter-half of the nineteenth century, some Chinese were able to adapt new concepts and legalities of colonial subjecthood to suit their own needs.[37] By the time Taiwanese subjecthood became an op-

tion at the end of the nineteenth century, British consuls, in particular, were well accustomed to Anglo-Chinese subjects from Hong Kong and Malaya taking advantage of British subjecthood to evade Chinese law and taxes.[38]

What made Taiwanese subjecthood unique among China's marketplace of foreign nationalities was that overseas Taiwanese in China enjoyed equal jurisdictional rights to ethnic Japanese regardless of purported ethnocultural differences. By contrast, Western national privileges in China's treaty ports remained contingent on ethnic and regional backgrounds. By the turn of the twentieth century, ethnic Chinese with Western nationalities often lost their right to Western consular protection once they moved to China from their respective colonies. British, American, and French authorities tried to limit the rights of their ethnic Chinese citizens in China and crack down on their abuses of extraterritoriality.[39]

Taiwanese subjecthood was also comparatively easy to obtain. In 1900, the British consul in Xiamen criticized Taiwan's naturalization policies as reckless compared to those of their British colonial counterparts. Whereas "persons of Chinese blood should show two generations of residence in a British Colony to entitle them to British protection in China, the mere fact of having been resident in Formosa [Taiwan], and in many cases even a slighter qualification is sufficient for a Chinese to secure Japanese protection in Amoy [Xiamen]."[40] Indeed, since the 1880s, Chinese in Hong Kong and Malaya could obtain British nationality only if both parents were already British by birth or naturalization.[41] Chinese who had acquired British nationality in the two colonies but then traveled to China were stripped of British protection and placed under Qing jurisdiction.[42]

American authorities in Fujian were even stricter than their British counterparts concerning migration and naturalization laws for the local Chinese. As in Taiwan, most Chinese residents in the Philippines, annexed by the United States in 1898, originated from Fujian.[43] In 1902, Filipino-Chinese (ethnic Chinese under the Spanish-ruled Philippines) obtained US nationality.[44] Unlike the Taiwanese, however, Filipino-Chinese had limited extraterritorial rights when living in China. Filipino-Chinese who resided in China for over a year without returning to the Philippines legally forfeited their right to US colonial citizenship.[45] Consequently, few Chinese in Fujian's treaty ports attempted to naturalize as US Philippine citizens.[46] French and Dutch nationalities were no more popular in South China. Though Chinese could naturalize as French subjects after three years of residence in colonial Indochina, males had to serve in the French army within three years of reaching adult age.[47] Dutch nationality laws in the East Indies similarly required military conscription from colonial subjects; applicants were also required to show proficiency in the Dutch

language and abide by inheritance taxes that divided property equally among sons and daughters.[48]

The discrepancy in the populations of naturalized subjects in Xiamen throw these policies into relief. From 1896 to 1905, for example, the number of Anglo-Chinese subjects in the city rose from forty-one to fifty, while the number of Taiwanese subjects rocketed from roughly thirty to over 1,000 (see table 1.1).[49] By 1910, Xiamen was home to twenty-three British households, sixteen French households, and forty-seven Spanish households of Chinese descent.[50] Yet there were over 1,000 Taiwanese registered with the Japanese consulate.[51] The Chinese clearly preferred Japanese over other foreign nationalities due to the flexibility and advantages of Taiwan's naturalization policies.

The numbers also reflect the fact that Japanese colonial and consular officials had begun to see the growth of a Taiwanese community in South China as a strategic benefit, and were encouraging naturalization accordingly. In 1899, the British consul in Xiamen reported that Japanese consul Ueno Sen'ichi was "issuing rather freely certificates of Japanese nationality to Formosan [Taiwanese] Chinese" and that "this action is viewed with great suspicion by Chinese authorities and may be a fruitful source of trouble in the future."[52] It was a fair prediction—not just because of the numbers but also the actions of some overseas Taiwanese.

When Taiwan civil affairs chief Gotō Shinpei met with Xiamen magistrate Yan Nian during a visit to Fujian in April 1900, for example, Yan complained that Chinese outlaws took advantage of Taiwan's naturalization policies to evade punishment: "There are those here [in Xiamen] who flee to Taiwan after committing a crime and find ways to obtain Japanese nationality. Such cases present obstacles for us as we no longer have legal recourse to investigate these

Table 1.1 Japanese subject population in China's treaty ports, 1897–1905

	1897	1900	1902	1905
XIAMEN				
Japanese	21	143	200	280
Taiwanese	121	531	632	1,046
SHANGHAI				
Japanese	823	1,172	1,891	1,592
TIANJIN				
Japanese	45	790	1,368	1,931

Chung Shu-ming, "Rizhi shiqi Taiwanren zai Xiamen de huodong ji qi xiangguan wenti (1895–1938)," in *Zouxiang jindai: guoshi fazhan yu quyu dongxiang*, ed. Zouxiang jindai bianji xiaozu (Taipei: Taiwan donghua, 2004), 412; Soejima Enshō, "Senzenki Chūgoku zairyū Nihonjin jinkō tōkei (kō)," *Wakayama Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kiyō, Jinbun Kagaku*, no. 33 (1984): 19, 24.

criminals who are now under your [Japanese] jurisdiction." Gotō brushed off Yan's objections by replying: "Our Government-General has enacted regulations for naturalizing foreign nationals as subjects of Japan. There are no real problems in the enforcement of these regulations."[53]

In fact, Japanese authorities faced major challenges in monitoring the quality and behavior of its growing overseas Taiwanese community in South China. Japanese colonial and consular officials sought to limit naturalization to resident Chinese who could become "good overseas Taiwanese" (zenryō sekimin)—those with capital, connections, and skills that would benefit Japan's regional interests. The Taiwan Government-General and Japanese Foreign Ministry archives contain numerous cases each year where Japanese authorities rejected Chinese applicants for naturalization because they lacked the economic or political pedigree to be considered useful to Japan. However, Japanese authorities could not entirely prevent those they perceived as less desirable characters from finding ways to obtain Taiwanese subjecthood. Some managed to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects through bribery, forgery, and duplicitous methods; others acted in ways beyond the anticipation of Japanese officials. Gotō dismissed Fujian officials' complaints, but Japanese consuls in South China themselves complained of "bad overseas Taiwanese" (furyō sekimin) who committed crimes such as extortion or murder only to seek Japanese protection from Chinese authorities. But so long as delinquent behavior by naturalized overseas Taiwanese did not directly threaten Japanese rule in Taiwan, Gotō and his Government-General colleagues often looked the other way. Institutional tensions thus existed between Japanese consuls and the Government-General over how to handle overseas Taiwanese criminality.

At the same time, the Government-General did show grave concern over a minority subset of the overseas Taiwanese population: anti-Japanese Taiwanese activists who took refuge in South China to avoid punishment in Taiwan. From armed guerrillas to anticolonial radicals, such Taiwanese were not naturalized Chinese but mostly grew up in Taiwan. Still, once they left Taiwan, Japanese colonial and consular officials classified them as "overseas Taiwanese" because of their overseas residential status. In 1899, the Government-General received special permission from Tokyo's Foreign Ministry to directly contact consuls in South China (bypassing the usual protocol of first going through Tokyo headquarters) for matters concerning Taiwan's military and political security.[54] The Foreign Ministry also ordered South China consuls to follow any Government-General requests to arrest those identified as anti-Japanese Taiwanese "bandits" (*hito*).[55] Lai Agan and Jian Dashi, two of the most prominent armed Taiwanese insurgents, were arrested by Consul Ueno in Xiamen in early 1900 and extradited to Taipei for death sentences.[56] Nevertheless, anticolonial

Taiwanese activists continued to find ways to travel back and forth across the Taiwan Strait throughout the colonial period. In 1916, for instance, a Government-General police report noted that out of 3,000 overseas Taiwanese residing in South China, there were an estimated 120 "people who require monitoring" (*yōshisatsujin*), including several dozen bandit refugees.[57]

In 1900, in what came to be known as the Xiamen Incident, Japanese authorities pointed to such anti-Japanese bandits, as well as to purported threats against the growing overseas Taiwanese community, to justify military intervention in South China. In June of that year, anti-foreign Chinese peasants known as the Boxers attacked Beijing's foreign legations.[58] During the Boxer Rebellion, Japan took an active role in the Eight-Nation Allied Expedition (along with Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the United States) by dispatching 22,000 troops, the largest of the forces, to rescue diplomatic staff and pacify the Boxers. With the attention of the Western powers focused on Beijing, Russia and Japan looked to take advantage of the mayhem by annexing additional territory in Northeast and South China, respectively.[59]

In mid-August, after Russia invaded Manchuria without any opposition from imperial rivals, Japanese authorities in Tokyo and Taipei agreed that the time was ripe for taking over Xiamen. Despite repeated assurances by Fujian authorities that foreigners in the province would be protected from the Boxers, the Japanese navy stationed three battleships in Xiamen with orders to land troops at the first sign of turmoil.[60] Kodama prepared to dispatch Taiwan army reinforcements to aid the navy.[61] Around midnight on August 24, the pretext for invasion was set when a Japanese Honganji temple in Xiamen burned to the ground. Blaming the fire on anti-Japanese bandits, Japanese marines landed ostensibly to protect the 800 resident Japanese nationals, 700 of whom were overseas Taiwanese.[62] Local British and American consuls, however, reported that the fire in fact had been started by the Japanese head priest of the temple. Rumors circulated that Kodama had paid him off days before to burn the temple as a pretext for military invasion.[63]

Japanese authorities legitimated the occupation of Xiamen by citing the need to protect the overseas Taiwanese from attacks by anti-Japanese insurgents. Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō telegraphed British, French, German, and American envoys in Japan with the justification that "Xiamen and its neighboring regions have served as bases for rebellious plots against Taiwan, which continue to be a source of Japanese anxiety."[64] Consul Ueno in Xiamen requested Aoki to send additional Japanese troops to protect the 700 "good Taiwanese subjects" from "several Taiwanese bandits who have fled to Xiamen and caused this incident . . . It is not enough to station troops in the consulate; we must dispatch more troops."[65]

Meanwhile, British, American, French, and Russian battleships landed in Xiamen to prevent a Japanese takeover. The Eight-Nation Allied Expedition against the Boxers had suggested cooperation among imperial powers, but inter-imperial competition over China remained fierce. Japan's nominal claim to Fujian from 1898 onward as its sphere of influence had not stopped the Western powers from pursuing their own economic and strategic interests in the province. The British continued to have shipping and trade interests in Xiamen while the French, Americans, and Germans looked to develop provincial mines and railways.[66] Consequently, the Western powers opposed Japan's attempt to occupy Xiamen as a foothold in Fujian and potential extension of Taiwan.

That alarmed the Tokyo central government. Itō Hirobumi, the former prime minister who retained political influence in Tokyo, was particularly worried about a backlash by the Western powers akin to the Triple Intervention of 1895. Itō was able to convince Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo, Army Minister Katsura Tarō, and Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō to abort the occupation. The Tokyo central government called it off in late August, much to the dismay of Japanese officials in Xiamen and Taiwan.[67] Kodama and Gotō had wanted Japan to double down on Xiamen's occupation, even if it meant risking a military confrontation with the Western powers. Gotō angrily sent telegrams to the Tokyo cabinet pleading that it reconsider, noting that "people in Taiwan will be upset by a Japanese retreat."[68] Kodama was so furious that he threatened to resign his position. In the end, Japanese leaders appeased Kodama by appointing him to the dual post of army minister and Taiwan governor-general, and Yamagata resigned as prime minister to accept blame for the aborted invasion.[69]

The Xiamen Incident was only the first of several occasions for decades to come where the Taiwan Government-General called for more aggressive actions in South China than Japanese officials in Tokyo. It marked a turning point: Japan's Imperial Army and Foreign Ministry thereafter redirected their geopolitical priorities from the south toward the north in Manchuria and Korea. The Government-General would continue its push into South China without their support.

Taiwan's Economic Advance in the Imperial Scramble for South China

Although Kodama and Gotō had been unable to realize their goal of occupying Xiamen in 1900, the two continued to push for extending Taiwan's imperial sphere of interests, especially economic ones, in South China. No longer counting on military force, Gotō instead promoted Taiwan's mission across the strait

"to drive out Western capital through economic occupation." He contended that "in order to bring Fujian province, especially Xiamen, under our imperial control, we need to invest capital in the region's commerce and transportation."[70] To compensate for the lack of Japanese settlers in Fujian, Kodama and Gotō turned to the growing overseas Taiwanese community—with over 1,000 Taiwanese and 100 Taiwanese firms registered in Xiamen by 1900—to serve as intermediaries for Japanese shipping, railway, and other economic interests.[71]

Kodama and Gotō aggressively recruited wealthy and well-connected Chinese and Taiwanese in Xiamen who could advance Taiwan's economic sphere of influence (see figure 1.3). They courted two of the most prominent Qing families in Taiwan, the Lins of Banqiao (natives of Taipei) and the Lins of Wufeng (natives of Taizhong), which had sizable fortunes and political influence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Lin Weiyuan (1840–1905) and Lin Chaodong (1851–1904), the respective heads of the Banqiao Lins and Wufeng Lins, had initially supported Tang Jingsong's Taiwan Republic in 1895, but quickly abandoned resistance against Japan. They relocated from Taiwan to Xiamen's Gulangyu islet—the preferred residential area of foreigners and affluent Chinese—with several family members.[72] Though Weiyuan and Chaodong went on to serve the Fujian government as Qing subjects, they made sure that several sons returned to Japanese-ruled Taiwan and naturalized as Taiwanese subjects to manage family property on the island.[73]

Because of Lin Weiyuan's continued influence among the Taiwanese gentry community, Gotō visited Xiamen in April 1900 to try to convince him to naturalize as a Taiwanese subject. Weiyuan and his eldest son Lin Erjia (1874–1951) refused to naturalize, but their decision was not simply out of Qing loyalty, as often depicted in mainland Chinese historiography.[74] Weiyuan and Erjia retained Qing nationality since it was required to serve in the Fujian government. Still, they simultaneously encouraged other family members to obtain Taiwanese status in Xiamen to enjoy extraterritorial rights for their private companies such as remittance banks.[75] Weiyuan and Erjia also donated generously to local Japanese institutions such as the Xiamen East Asia Academy (est. 1900) to prepare Chinese for study abroad in Japan. Erjia became a frequent guest at Japanese consulate banquets and regularly hosted Japanese official visitors from Taiwan (see figure 1.4).[76]

To compete with Western economic interests in Fujian, Gotō also recruited and naturalized Qing merchants from rival foreign companies. A particularly notable case was Lin Lisheng (b. 1868), a Qing entrepreneur based in Xiamen with lucrative tea ventures in Taiwan and banking interests in Hong Kong and Fujian.[77] Lisheng and his family had moved from South China's Guangdong province to Taiwan in the 1880s and relocated to Xiamen after 1895. Since then,

Figure 1.3. Taiwan civil affairs chief Gotō Shinpei (first row center, holding a cane) in front of Xiamen's Nanputuo Temple, May 1899, during a Government-General tour of South China. Source: Anzai Gen'ichirō, *Shashin kurabu: ichimei Taiwan jinbutsu shashinchō* (Taipei: Taiwan Shūhōsha, 1901). Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library.

Figure 1.4. Banqiao Lin family leaders (prominent entrepreneurs who moved from Taiwan to Xiamen in 1895) with Qing and Japanese officials in front of the Japanese consulate of Xiamen, 1899. Japanese officials wear Western suits while Chinese officials and Banqiao Lin family members wear Qing robes with queue hairstyles. Front row: Consul Ueno Sen'ichi (third from the right); Lin Weiyuan (fourth from the right). Second row: Bank of Taiwan Xiamen branch head Akabane Sadanori (second from the right); Taiwan Government-General official Sawamura Gentarō (third from the right); Lin Erjia (fourth from the right). Source: Andō Motosada, *Nanshi taikan* (Tokyo: Nihon Gōdō Tsūshinsha, 1937).

Lisheng had become a highly regarded middleman for Britain's Douglas Shipping Company, which monopolized shipping routes between Taiwan and South China.[78] Although he had not returned to Taiwan by the May 1897 nationality deadline, the Government-General made an exception. It naturalized Lisheng as a Taiwanese subject in September 1899 and hired him away from Douglas Shipping so he could help manage the Xiamen Branch for Japan's Osaka Shipping Company.[79] The Government-General's subsidies for Osaka Shipping routes between Taiwan and South China undercut Douglas Shipping's passenger rates, which forced the British firm to withdraw its cross-strait shipping routes by 1902.[80]

Lin Lisheng's dual Sino-Japanese nationality allowed him to circumvent Qing restrictions on foreign investments in South China. Legally, foreigners were not allowed to lease lands more than thirty miles away from the center of treaty ports. In 1902, Lin applied as a Qing subject for permission to lease a water frontage in Zhangzhou, where he built an Osaka Shipping dock to advance the company's launch trade between Xiamen and Fujian's interior ports.[81] Lin also assisted the Taiwan Government-General in constructing a Chaoshan railway in eastern Guangdong.[82]

In Xiamen, Gotō had founded the Sango Company (Sango Kōshi, est. 1902), nominally a Sino-Japanese joint company with half its capital supplied by the Government-General and half by Chinese entrepreneurs. Sango's aim was to promote Japanese interests in South China's railways and camphor.[83] Since 1900, the Taiwan Railway Bureau had dispatched Japanese engineers to inspect lands in eastern Guangdong in preparation for railway construction.[84] However, the Qing provincial governor had refused to grant Chaoshan's railway rights to any foreign power despite offers from Japan, France, and Britain. Because the Qing prohibition of foreign railway rights did not apply to Qing subjects with dual nationalities, Sango director Akuzawa Naoya delegated negotiation duties to Lin Lisheng to conceal Japanese involvement. Lin, who hid his Taiwanese status and presented himself as a Qing subject to the provincial governor, worked together with three wealthy overseas Chinese—Wu Lixiang (Hong Kong), Zhang Yunan (Sumatra), and Xie Rongguang (Penang)—to obtain the Chaoshan railway rights in 1904.[85]

The Chaoshan railway soon became a lightning rod for anti-Japanese protests thanks to the growing Qing rights recovery movement seeking to take back railway privileges from foreign powers. The Chinese charged Lin with holding company shares that were actually held by the Japanese, and in 1908, Qing officials successfully pressured him to sell his shares. The following year, fifty Chinese and six Taiwanese railway employees organized a strike to protest that the Japanese constituted the majority of the company's employees.

To mollify anti-Japanese sentiment, Akuzawa gradually replaced Japanese personnel with Chinese and Taiwanese workers. By 1914, there were 130 Chinese and forty-seven Taiwanese employees, compared to only nine Japanese.[86]

Under Akuzawa's leadership, the Sango Company also sought to extend Taiwan's camphor industry into Fujian. In 1901, Lin Chaodong—the head of the Wufeng Lin family who participated in Qing Taiwan's lucrative camphor business before relocating to Xiamen in 1895—had obtained exclusive rights to Fujian camphor from Qing provincial officials. Lacking the necessary capital to run his camphor business, Lin reached out to Japanese consul Ueno Sen'ichi for a loan from the Bank of Taiwan.[87] Gotō seized this opportunity and dispatched Sango director Akuzawa to negotiate, with the help of Ueno, to acquire Lin's camphor rights in 1902. Sango then established camphor manufacturing and distribution centers throughout Fujian.[88] However, the British consul in Xiamen protested to Japan's Foreign Ministry about the Government-General's attempts to monopolize camphor production in the province.[89] British merchants who had partnered with Lin Chaodong since his Taiwan days were also purchasing Fujian camphor for shipment to Hong Kong, and they did not want to be squeezed out of business.[90]

Taking a broad view of commercial rights in China as a whole, the Tokyo Foreign Ministry concluded that it was not in Japan's strategic interest to alienate the British over camphor rights in Fujian. The Foreign Ministry told Sango to return camphor monopoly rights to the Fujian government, and though the Taiwan Government-General criticized the Foreign Ministry's weak stance in diplomatic negotiations, it ultimately agreed in 1905. Although Sango's camphor production in Fujian continued for a few more years, increasing production costs and falling camphor prices resulted in the company's withdrawal from the business in 1909.[91]

As with the Xiamen Incident, the case of Fujian camphor revealed real disagreements over Japanese policy in South China between the Tokyo central government and Taiwan authorities: Gotō and Akuzawa had desired a Japanese monopoly at the exclusion of the Western powers.[92] The Sango Company's railway and camphor enterprises had mixed successes, but the Government-General did manage to extend its economic interests in South China in significant ways. Overseas Taiwanese and their kinship networks were instrumental to the cause.

By 1903, there were 254 foreign companies registered in Xiamen; 230 were owned by Chinese with foreign nationalities, among which 150 were overseas Taiwanese.[93] With the help of Taiwanese intermediaries like Lin Lisheng, the Japanese were able to overtake British shipping and trading companies in Fujian.[94] The Taiwan Government-General also opened branches of the Bank

of Taiwan in Xiamen (1900), Fuzhou (1905), Shantou (1907), and Guangzhou (1910). Drawing not only on Japanese capital but also on investments by overseas Taiwanese entrepreneurs, the Bank of Taiwan helped circulate Japanese currency, finance Sino-Japanese joint ventures, and provide loans to Chinese officials and companies in South China.[95]

Overseas Taiwanese helped advance Japanese colonial interests, but they were by no means imperial pawns. Rather, they secured Taiwanese subjecthood for their own, varied, and pragmatic reasons. Members of Lin Erjia's family (the Lins of Banqiao), for example, strategically adopted multiple nationalities in Fujian—Chinese, Japanese, French, and British—to extend business and political networks.[96] At the same time that Erjia maintained close ties with Japanese officials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, he also partnered with Westerners in Xiamen by investing in French companies and donating to American schools.[97] Overseas Taiwanese thus at times could become as much a liability as they were an advantage to Japanese interests. That did not stop the Taiwan Government-General's willingness to allow mainland Chinese to seek the security of colonial subjecthood. But it did mean that Japanese policies toward the overseas Taiwanese involved flexibility and compromise in response to Chinese and Taiwanese self-interested behavior. Government-General leaders like Kodama and Gotō judged the risk of unpredictability worth the possible economic and geopolitical gains, both within South China and relative to the Western powers.

The overseas Taiwanese were especially vital to the Taiwan Government-General's imperial ambitions across the Taiwan Strait since it did not always receive the support of the Tokyo central government, as evidenced at the end of the 1900 Xiamen Incident and the Sango Company camphor dispute in Fujian. Government-General leaders like Kodama and Gotō creatively adopted strategies for inter-imperial competition in South China. Unlike Anglo-American policies that restricted Chinese naturalization as Western subjects based on race, the Government-General welcomed Chinese naturalization as overseas Taiwanese in the region. Kodama and Gotō cultivated pragmatic partnerships with overseas Taiwanese that extended Japanese strategic and economic interests across the strait to help reinforce claims to Fujian as Japan's sphere of influence. The result was the elevation of Taiwan's status and strategic importance within Japan's empire as a southern gateway into China.

The rise of the overseas Taiwanese in South China was unique in the history of twentieth-century imperial subjecthood and mobility, because naturalization happened by proxy. The majority of overseas Taiwanese were naturalized Chinese in Fujian who had never even set foot on Taiwan. By con-

trast, hundreds of thousands of Korean subjects physically left colonial Korea for Manchuria in search of farmland during Japanese rule. While the overseas Taiwanese were almost exclusively urban-based merchants, around three-quarters of Koreans in Manchuria were impoverished farmers who settled in rural areas for wet rice agriculture (roughly a quarter worked as urban laborers or participated in the illicit opium trade).[98] In contrast to the relative boom in "fake overseas Taiwanese," there were few cases of "fake overseas Koreans" where Chinese obtained Korean status in Manchuria. Rather, Korean farmers in Manchuria often tried to acquire Chinese nationality, which was legally required to own farmland in the region.[99] Other Koreans, especially anti-Japanese independence activists, sought to naturalize as Chinese nationals in order to evade Japanese jurisdiction.[100] In South China, however, few Taiwanese chose to give up their Japanese nationality in favor of sole Chinese nationality; most remained dual nationals throughout the colonial period.[101]

Yet the overseas Taiwanese were not necessarily more trustworthy in the eyes of Japanese officials. Regardless of economic partnerships with overseas Taiwanese like Lin Lisheng in Xiamen, for example, Japanese consuls continued to voice reservations about their utility. In his March 1910 consular report, Mori Yasusaburō complained that even so-called useful Taiwanese like Lin Lisheng lacked any sense of Japanese loyalty: "Because overseas Taiwanese like him love wealth, they do not give much thought to morals . . . nor do they have a fixed ideology, sense of honor, or loyalty toward a nation."[102] Despite attempts by the Japanese to mobilize the overseas Taiwanese for imperial aims, it was the Taiwanese instead who often exploited colonial subjecthood for their own self-interests. Up through the 1930s, Japanese and Chinese authorities continually faced challenges in navigating the vagaries of the overseas Taiwanese as both sides competed for their allegiance as fellow "brethren" (J. *dōhō*, C. *tongbao*).

Chapter 2

Taiwanese in South China's Border Zones

China's opium trade had been legalized after the Qing defeat to Britain in the Second Opium War (1858–60), but by the early twentieth century, both Chinese and international opinion changed to favor its prohibition. In 1906, the Qing government introduced a national anti-opium campaign of phased abolition over ten years, and the British government agreed to restrict its Indian opium imports.[1] The Hague's International Opium Commission (est. 1909) also offered multinational support against drug trafficking into China.[2] But that did not stop Wu Yunfu (b. 1866), a leading Chinese opium entrepreneur in Xiamen, from continuing to run a profitable business. Nor was Wu alone. While the Qing anti-opium campaign found some success in Fujian, both Chinese and foreign merchants continued to smuggle opium into the province from nearby colonies like Taiwan and Hong Kong, reaping immense profits.[3]

Taiwan Government-General officials could not control the opium trade in South China, but they sought to use it strategically, and naturalization policies helped them do so. Japanese colonial officials naturalized Wu as an overseas Taiwanese subject in 1913. In exchange for obtaining Japanese extraterritorial immunity from Chinese laws, Wu made generous donations to the Government-General and became a leading member of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association (see figure 2.1).[4] Other naturalized Taiwanese like the opium magnate Yin Xuepu struck similar bargains with Japanese colonial authorities. Even though the Government-

General did not directly obtain revenues from South China's opium trade, it sought to extend jurisdiction and protection over naturalized Taiwanese whom they believed could be economically and politically useful in the region.

Local Chinese civilians and officials responded with frustration and animosity toward what they called the "opium representatives" (C. *yapian yiyuan*) and "running dogs" (C. *zougou*) of Japan.[5] Illicit activities by Wu and other overseas Taiwanese became hotly contested among Chinese and Japanese authorities. Bureaucratic disagreements often resulted between Japan's Foreign Ministry consuls and Taiwan Government-General leaders over the utility of disreputable overseas Taiwanese. Whereas the Foreign Ministry supported international anti-opium movements in China, the Government-General willfully ignored Taiwanese opium activities beyond Taiwan's territorial borders. For example, Xiamen consul Kikuchi Girō complained in 1915 that rampant crimes by overseas Taiwanese humiliated Chinese officials and damaged Japan's national reputation. Kikuchi requested that the Government-General limit naturalization cases like Wu's to "increase Chinese people's trust in Japanese authorities." In response, Taiwan civil affairs chief Uchida Kakichi (1866–1933, served 1910–15) contended that Wu's benefits for Japanese regional interests outweighed the costs.[6] Just five years later, in 1920, the Government-General granted Wu a colonial gentry award (*shinshō*) for his financial contributions to Xiamen's Taiwanese schools and hospitals.[7]

While the Government-General successfully collaborated with Wu and other naturalized Taiwanese, there were limits to how much Japanese authorities could monitor the growing overseas Taiwanese population. Taiwanese youth and activists living in South China, for instance, sometimes embraced anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism, ultimately joining forces with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) to defend their "ancestral homeland" (C. *zuguo*). Other overseas Taiwanese took advantage of dual ties to Chinese and Japanese communities to pursue self-interests that did not necessarily align with those of any one government. The overseas Taiwanese thus became a mixed blessing for Japanese officials. At times, the Taiwanese served as useful Sino-Japanese intermediaries, advancing Japan's business and strategic aims. Yet criminal behavior—especially in connection with the opium trade—also helped incite anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese population.

Still, Japanese authorities remained relatively tolerant of Taiwanese delinquency overseas, even when it resulted in violence, because the rewards appeared to outweigh the costs. From the 1910s to 1930s, especially during Sino-Taiwanese disputes and anti-Japanese movements, the Taiwan Government-General repeatedly pointed to "the need to defend overseas Taiwanese from Chinese lawlessness" to justify extending its police networks and jurisdiction in

South China. While a military invasion of the type attempted in the 1900 Xiamen Incident was no longer on the table, the Government-General found other ways to make inroads in South China as it steadily gained more power relative to the Foreign Ministry.

Overseas Taiwanese Associations

For the first few decades of the twentieth century, the Taiwan Government-General continued to increase its overseas Taiwanese population in South China, and particularly in Xiamen, to compensate for the lack of Japanese settlers and institutions there. The Central China city of Shanghai and North China cities of Tianjin and Qingdao had burgeoning Japanese communities that could help advance imperial causes, but the numbers were low in South China due to a relative lack of Japanese economic interest in the region. In their place, however, the number of overseas Taiwanese grew quickly. Whereas Xiamen had been home to only twenty-one Taiwanese in 1897, that number increased, in 1907, to 1,679 (compared to 378 Japanese). In 1917, Xiamen had 2,833 Taiwanese (compared to 271 Japanese), 6,682 Taiwanese (271 Japanese) in 1927; and in 1935, 10,326 Taiwanese (386 Japanese) in 1936 (see table 2.1). This made for a large amount of administrative work for local Japanese consuls of the Foreign Ministry.

Japan's Foreign Ministry consuls in South China, who served concurrently as executive officers for the Taiwan Government-General, were administratively in charge of all local Japanese nationals, including Taiwanese subjects, but they had limited resources.[8] After Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) and acquisition of the Kwantung Leasehold (South Manchuria) in Northeast China, the Foreign Ministry had transferred its institutional priorities northward, reducing its financial support for Japanese institutions in South China. As the Japanese consul in Fuzhou stated in the *Taiwan Daily News* in 1907: "At present, the central Japanese government is busy with plans in Manchuria and does not have the luxury to invest in the region [Fujian province]."[9]

Japanese consuls in South China, understaffed and unable to monitor the growing Taiwanese population and resolve social and economic welfare issues on their own, relied on overseas Taiwanese Associations (J. Taiwan Kōkai, C. Taiwan gonghui) for help.[10] The associations, established by overseas Taiwanese elites in Fuzhou (1900), Xiamen (1906), and Shantou (1915) with the supervision of the Japanese consulates, were modeled on the self-governing bodies of Japanese Resident Associations (Nihon Kyoryūminkai) in Shanghai, Tianjin, and other treaty port settlements. Japanese Resident Associations formed governing assemblies elected by propertied Japanese males to levy

Table 2.1 Japanese subject population in China's treaty ports, 1907–1935

	1907	1917	1927	1931	1935
XIAMEN					
Japanese	378	386	271	365	386
Taiwanese	1679	2,883	6,682	7,957	10,326
FUZHOU					
Japanese	249	347	294	363	389
Taiwanese	609	684	935	1,235	2,021
SHANTOU					
Japanese	150	143	164	141	123
Taiwanese	146	216	386	406	540
GUANGZHOU					
Japanese	188	279	447	307	335
Taiwanese			37	65	148
SHANGHAI					
Japanese	6,212	9,771	25,827	24,235	25,001
Taiwanese			514	444	606
TIANJIN					
Japanese	2,019	3,382	2,789*	3,213	6,446
Koreans		85	889	221	1,332
Taiwanese			28	20	58

Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 66; Chung Shu-ming, "Rizhi shiqi Taiwanren zai Xiamen de huodong ji qi xiangguan wenti (1895–1938)," in *Zouxiang jindai: guoshi fazhan yu quyu dongxiang*, ed. Zouxiang jindai bianji xiaozu (Taipei: Taiwan donghua, 2004), 412–13; Iijima Wataru, "Honkon-Nihon kankei no naka no Honkon Nihon Shōkōkaigisho," in *Kindai Ajia no Nihonjin keizai dantai*, ed. Namikata Shōichi (Tokyo: Dōbunkan Shuppan, 1997), 196; Kimura Kenji, "Zaigai kyoryūmin no shakai katsudō," in *Bōchōsuru teikoku no jinryū*, ed. Ōe Shinobu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 33; Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, *Kaigai kakuchi zairyū Honpōjin shokugyōbetsu jinkōhyō (Taishō 5-nen 6-gatsumatsu genzaichō)* (Tokyo: Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, 1917), table 2; Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, *Kaigai kakuchi zairyū Honpōjin shokugyōbetsu jinkōhyō (Shōwa 2-nen 10-gatsu 1-nichi genzaichō)* (Tokyo: Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, 1927), tables 9–10, 12.

*Population statistics for Tianjin are for 1926.

taxes and manage budgets for expatriate schools, hospitals, and other welfare policies.[11] Taiwanese Associations enjoyed less autonomy than their Japanese counterparts. Half of the twenty-plus representatives were elected by tax-paying Taiwanese members; the other half were appointed by the Japanese consul, who had final approval over all representatives so that Taiwanese interests would not override the consulate's agenda.[12]

Overseas Taiwanese Associations helped collect consular fees and fund education and medical institutions for the local Taiwanese community. The associations were unique in assisting the Japanese consulate with administering Taiwanese population registers and passport applications: such procedures

required the Chinese linguistic and sociocultural ties of the Taiwanese to the local communities. Recommendations by association leaders influenced Japanese decisions on which Chinese to naturalize as colonial subjects and which Taiwanese were sufficiently troublesome to deport to Taiwan.[13] In this way, Japanese control over the resident Taiwanese population was relatively incomplete and relied on the cooperation of overseas Taiwanese elites.

Thanks to Qing (and later the Republic of China) nationality laws, which were based on the jus sanguinis principle, overseas Taiwanese with Chinese ancestry were allowed to simultaneously maintain Chinese nationality.[14] The first three chairmen of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association—Shi Fanqi (b. 1875, served 1906–09), Zhuang Youcai (b. 1874, served 1909), and Zhou Ziwen (b. 1867, served 1910–14)—were dual Sino-Japanese nationals who administered Japanese companies in Xiamen. All three chairmen served not only in the Taiwanese Association but also in Xiamen's Chinese Chamber of Commerce, where they advised municipal officials on economic and political issues (see figure 2.1).[15]

Figure 2.1. Xiamen Taiwanese Association members hosting a banquet for Japanese visitors from Taiwan, 1916. Taiwanese are dressed in Chinese robes with short hair (not Qing queue hairstyles), while Japanese tourists are dressed in Western suits. Source: Yoshitake Gengorō, *Nan'yō Nanshi shashinchō* (Tokyo: Takushoku Shinpōsha, 1916).

At times, the Japanese expressed skepticism about the loyalty of Taiwanese Association leaders, given their multinational ties. In March 1910, for example, Japanese deputy consul Mori Yasusaburō reported from Xiamen about the founding chairman: "While Shi Fanqi is a leading representative of the Taiwanese here, he maintains close ties with Qing authorities as a Qing subject."[16] Shi, a native of central Taiwan, had moved to Xiamen in 1906 to manage the Japanese branch offices of the Bank of Taiwan and the South China Company, which oversaw Chinese migrant labor to Taiwan.[17] Yet, Mori noted, when a US fleet had visited Xiamen in 1909, Shi had accompanied Qing officials and merchants to the US consulate for a welcome reception.[18] In addition to managing an additional Chinese bank, Shi went on to serve in the Republic of China's (est. 1912) Fujian police and economic bureaus.[19]

Mori's concerns notwithstanding, Japanese officials ultimately cared less about Shi's unconditional loyalty toward Japan than about his economic and political utility. After all, the majority of posts in the Chinese government and commercial sector required Chinese nationality. The Japanese judged it an advantage to have allies like Shi in local positions of power as potential Sino-Japanese intermediaries. With personal ties to the local Chinese, Taiwanese Association leaders could, and did, mediate legal and political disputes between the Taiwanese and Chinese. Moreover, Shi and other association leaders provided funding to Japanese consulates and the Taiwan Government-General to promote Japanese acculturation and enhance the welfare of the overseas Taiwanese.

Thanks in part to the financial help of overseas Taiwanese benefactors, the Government-General established its own Chinese-language newspaper in Xiamen in 1907, the *Fujian New Daily* (C. Quanmin xinribao), to combat anti-Japanese news in Chinese papers.[20] In addition, donations from Taiwanese Associations helped support the "Philanthropic Hospitals" (J. Hakuai Byōin, C. Boai yiyuan) that the Government-General established in Xiamen (1918), Fuzhou (1919), Guangzhou (1919), and Shantou (1924). Japanese and Taiwanese doctors who had graduated from the Taiwan Government-General Medical School in Taipei were stationed in the hospitals to treat Japanese and Taiwanese residents as well as local Chinese.[21] The Philanthropic Hospitals distributed free smallpox vaccinations to resident Taiwanese during periodic outbreaks in the region.[22] In the 1920s, medical schools attached to the Xiamen and Fuzhou hospitals additionally offered tuition-free training for Taiwanese youth.[23]

Japanese consuls in South China had noted the need to educate and acculturate overseas Taiwanese youth as early as 1907, when the Japanese consul in Fuzhou, Takahashi Kitsujirō, complained that most overseas Taiwanese were culturally indistinguishable from their Chinese peers. According to Takahashi,

the 270 Taiwanese in Fuzhou were "Japanese subjects in name only, for in reality, nothing differentiates them from other Qing subjects in terms of their language, thought, or economic activities."[24] The only education offered by the Fuzhou Taiwanese Association since 1905 was a Chinese-style curriculum to teach classical Chinese and spoken Mandarin Chinese.[25] Takahashi feared that without Japanese-language instruction, the second generation of overseas Taiwanese would remain culturally Chinese with little patriotism toward Japan.[26] He and other consuls requested financial support from both the Government-General and overseas Taiwanese Associations to establish Japanese-language schools.

The Taiwan Government-General responded by eagerly taking responsibility for educating overseas Taiwanese children. In Taiwan, the Government-General had established Japanese-language "common schools" (J. *kōgakkō*, C. *gongxuexiao*) starting in 1898 exclusively for Taiwanese students; ethnic Japanese separately attended "regular primary schools" (*jinjō shōgakkō*). The Government-General exported the curriculum of Taiwanese common schools to South China by founding the Fuzhou Tōei School (est. 1907) and Xiamen Kyokuei Academy (est. 1910), which aimed to assimilate overseas Taiwanese youth. Two experienced Japanese teachers of Taiwanese common schools were appointed as the principals in Fuzhou and Xiamen.[27] While the Government-General initially paid for the salaries and travel fares of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers, the Taiwanese Associations funded the monthly costs of the schools.[28] Starting in 1915, additional subsidies from wealthy Taiwanese benefactors allowed the Xiamen Kyokuei Academy to abolish its tuition fees and build more dorms and campuses to accommodate several hundred students.[29] In turn, the Government-General bestowed colonial gentry awards to association leaders like Zeng Houkun, Zhuang Youcai, and others who helped finance the school.[30]

The altruism of association leaders was both generous and self-interested: a way to reciprocate for Japanese consular protection that shielded their lucrative opium enterprises from interference from local Chinese authorities. As Japanese nationals, they remained outside Chinese legal jurisdiction and became the principal managers of opium in Xiamen. Zeng Houkun, who worked for Japan's Mitsui Bussan branch office and served as chairman of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association eleven times between 1914 and 1930, relied on Japanese legal immunity to run his illicit opium enterprises—the source of most of his fortune. Zhuang Youcai, Shi Fanqi, and other association leaders expanded their opium businesses during these years as well. By 1917, out of the city's recorded 255 opium-smoking parlors, 237 were said to be run by the Taiwanese.[31]

Within Taiwan, the Government-General had imposed stringent opium laws in 1897—nearly a decade before the Qing laws—that banned opium smoking among its Japanese residents as an "unhygienic, evil custom" of the Chinese.[32] At the same time, the Government-General authorized a monopoly opium trade among licensed Taiwanese distributors and smokers, which became a steady source of colonial tax revenue.[33] Japanese colonial officials were similarly unconcerned about overseas Taiwanese participation in the thriving opium trade in South China. Despite purported attempts to permit only the naturalization of Chinese of "good moral character" as overseas Taiwanese subjects, the Government-General made exceptions especially when it came to Chinese opium magnates whom they could turn to for financial donations or political connections.

In 1911, for example, the Government-General granted Taiwanese subjecthood to the Chinese Yin Xuepu despite his notoriety in Xiamen's narcotics trade. In contrast to Yin's Taiwanese naturalization application that included Japanese official reports vouching for his good character, a 1922 British consular report described him as "one of the syndicate of morphia and cocaine smugglers which makes Amoy [Xiamen] one of its chief centers," noting that "he has a good deal of influence in the official and commercial world of Amoy."[34] It was the latter—that Yin had close connections to Xiamen's political and business circles—that mattered most to Japanese authorities. By the 1920s, Yin was a leading member of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association. It was no wonder that local Chinese residents nicknamed the association leaders "the opium representatives" due to their participation in Fujian's narcotics economy.[35] But where the Taiwan Government-General was concerned, the occupations of the overseas Taiwanese mattered less than their economic and social contributions to the Taiwanese community and Japan's imperial project. With limited resources and personnel in the region, the Government-General and Foreign Ministry made strategic compromises about which Chinese to naturalize and partner with, even if it meant including those who would have been less welcome in Taiwan and Japan.

Taiwanese Gangsters and Cross-Strait Law Enforcement

While the Government-General treated the Xiamen Taiwanese Association elites as model overseas Taiwanese—benefactors of Taiwanese institutions worthy of colonial gentry awards—some Japanese Foreign Ministry consuls in South China expressed misgivings.[36] As overseas Taiwanese became implicated

in armed violence and Sino-Japanese disputes in the 1910s and 1920s, Japanese consular and colonial officials debated who should be considered the "good overseas Taiwanese" (*zenryō sekimin*) as opposed to the "bad overseas Taiwanese" (*furyō sekimin*). These disagreements did not always fall along institutional lines, but they unfolded within the context of efforts, by the Taiwan Government-General, to shore up its sphere of influence. By taking advantage of a weak Chinese state and Japanese Foreign Ministry presence in South China, the Government-General was able to extend its own cross-strait police and jurisdictional networks.

By the 1910s, the growing number of so-called Taiwanese gangsters (*buraikan* or *furōsha*), many whom participated in the opium trade and were members of private militias, struck some Japanese consuls as both troublesome and detrimental to national interests. Some of these gangsters were Taiwanese criminals or unemployed vagrants who had smuggled themselves into South China to evade the Government-General's jurisdiction. In a letter to the Tokyo Foreign Ministry, Xiamen Consul Kikuchi Girō estimated that by 1913, between 1,300 and 1,400 such Taiwanese gangsters had managed to travel to Xiamen without the required Japanese passports from Taiwan. The most notorious among them were the "Eighteen Big Brothers" (C. *Shiba dage*), whom Kikuchi described as "disregarding local laws, alienating Sino-Japanese harmony, and disturbing public order."[37] He complained that they were embroiled in violent conflicts with rival Chinese gangs and with the Chinese police. Their unruly behavior damaged the reputation of the overseas Taiwanese community among Chinese officials and reflected poorly on Japan's diplomatic image.[38]

Other Taiwanese gangsters were local Chinese who had naturalized as overseas Taiwanese to seek refuge from the Chinese police, a reality that led Consul Kikuchi to place much of the blame for the rise in Taiwanese criminality and violence in South China on the Taiwan Government-General. The distinction between "good" (*zenryō*) and "bad" (*furyō*) overseas Taiwanese struck him as deliberately hazy, the product of lax naturalization policies that allowed degenerate criminals in China to obtain Taiwanese subjecthood. Kikuchi even accused the Government-General of outright corruption, citing a recent case where Japanese lawyers and officials in Taipei had reportedly naturalized seven Chinese in Xiamen for a thousand yen each. While the Japanese consulates were willing to arrest and deport Taiwanese criminals to Taiwan, Kikuchi complained, the Government-General rarely enforced strict punishments against them.[39]

Taiwan civil affairs chief Uchida Kakichi disagreed with Consul Kikuchi's accusations of negligence by the Taiwan authorities. He expressed confidence

that the Government-General had actively cooperated with Japanese consuls in recent years to make naturalization practices more stringent and to remove illegal overseas Taiwanese in South China from Taiwan's family registers.[40] The colonial Taiwan archives do contain numerous cases throughout the 1910s where the Government-General approved of Japanese consular proposals to strip "bad" overseas Taiwanese of their colonial status due to criminal behavior or illegal naturalization.[41] Yet it is also clear that many other rule-breakers, especially among the moneyed overseas Taiwanese, went unpunished.

While Japanese consuls like Kikuchi complained about Taiwanese criminals, they had little power over law enforcement. The Tokyo Foreign Ministry did supply consular policemen to places where it perceived considerable security threats. For example, it dispatched hundreds to Jiandao (J. Kantō), in the Manchurian borderlands neighboring Korea to monitor anticolonial Korean activists. The Foreign Ministry police there competed with primacy with the Korean Government-General's policemen.[42] But as of 1916, the Foreign Ministry had stationed only a handful of consular policemen in each of South China's treaty ports, and consuls had to turn to the Taiwan Government-General for police aid.[43] In May 1916, for instance, Consul Kikuchi reported to the Foreign Ministry that a group of armed Chinese and Taiwanese gangsters had taken several wealthy Chinese personages hostage with demands for money. The Xiamen Chinese police implored Kikuchi to help arrest the Taiwanese abductors since they were under Japanese jurisdiction, but Kikuchi lacked the police manpower. He thus requested that the Taiwan Government-General dispatch police officials to Xiamen to detain the suspected Taiwanese.[44] Taipei district police chief Ōto Gaijirō led five Government-General policemen to Xiamen. Together with Japanese consular and Chinese police officials, they arrested a total of sixty armed men, including nine overseas Taiwanese.[45]

When Kikuchi deported the detained Taiwanese to Taiwan, however, the Government-General strongly criticized the decision. The colonial organ *Taiwan Daily News* defended the arrested Taiwanese gangsters as "the vanguard of our [Japanese] southern advance policy" and protectors of the 2,000-plus overseas Taiwanese residents.[46] Kikuchi had hoped to revoke the deported Taiwanese of their Japanese nationality. Instead, the Government-General contended that even though it had dispatched colonial police to arrest the armed Taiwanese in this case, they were generally instrumental in safeguarding Xiamen's Taiwanese and Japanese community since Chinese authorities feared them. Even long-time Japanese residents in Xiamen, including Bank of Taiwan and Mitsui employees, voiced support for the Taiwanese gangsters.[47]

At the same time, the Government-General opportunistically pointed to violent clashes between Taiwanese and Chinese in Fujian as justification to station

its policemen in the province in a more permanent fashion. Denouncing the Chinese authorities' inability to regulate what it called Fujian's "state of anarchy," the Government-General contended that "colonial police should be dispatched to the region."[48] Prior to this point, in treaty ports across China, Japanese police administration was under the formal jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry consulates. But after hosting a conference in September 1916 in Taipei together with Japanese consuls from Xiamen and Fuzhou, the Government-General persuaded the Foreign Ministry headquarters in Tokyo to allow the stationing of Government-General police in South China. The newly-dispatched colonial policemen joined forces with consular policemen in South China under the supervision of local consuls. However, the Government-General now secured de facto control over South China's police forces under the rationale that the region was central to Taiwan's strategic and security interests.[49] Overseas Taiwanese and Japanese associations, which had advocated for a more robust Japanese police presence to protect their lives and property, supported the move.

Fifteen Government-General policemen were stationed in South China's treaty ports, nine of whom manned a new police substation in Xiamen proper. In 1921, the Government-General dispatched an additional four Taiwanese patrolmen fluent in the Xiamen dialect (nearly identical to the Taiwanese dialect) to Xiamen.[50] Local Chinese protested that the staffing of Japanese colonial police was a violation of China's sovereignty.[51] To justify their interventionist policies, Japanese consular and colonial officials responded that they were merely "protecting overseas Taiwanese from Chinese lawlessness."[52] The stationing of Japanese colonial police, however, did little to decrease the number of violent incidents involving the overseas Taiwanese.

Japan's aggressive actions in China during World War I (1914–18) further increased Chinese hostility. Japan's "Twenty-One Demands" on May 9, 1915, which included China's cession of Shandong and Fujian provinces, sparked China's first nationwide protest movement against Japan.[53] In 1919 and 1923, too, there were anti-Japanese boycotts across China; in Fujian, Japanese consulates sought help suppressing Chinese demonstrations from armed Taiwanese led by two members of the Eighteen Big Brothers, Wang Changsheng (b. 1891) and Xie Afa (b. 1890).[54] Euphemistically called "self-governing defense units" (*bōei jichidan*) by the Japanese colonial media, the armed Taiwanese forces proved to be quite effective. In September 1919, the *Taiwan Daily News* reported that "over 250 overseas Taiwanese were successful in quelling anti-Japanese protests" in Xiamen."[55] For their contributions, Wang Changsheng and other members of the Eighteen Big Brothers were granted membership in the Xiamen Taiwan Association.[56] This formalized the mutually beneficial relationship. At this point, both Japanese consuls, who previously

had expressed concerns about the Eighteen Big Brothers, and the Government-General, were on the same page about the importance of using the overseas Taiwanese strategically.

Beginning in 1921, the Taiwan Government-General's imperial power across the strait increased further. The Tokyo central government granted it arbitration rights over Taiwanese legal cases in South China.[57] Previously, Foreign Ministry consuls in South China had presided over Taiwanese legal cases in consulate courts. Higher court appeals were directed to southwest Japan's Nagasaki District Court, which had final arbitration over legal disputes in China involving Japanese nationals. Since the 1910s, however, Japanese consuls in South China and Government-General officials contended that Taiwan, rather than Nagasaki, would be better suited to arbitrating South China cases since most were related to the overseas Taiwanese. Taiwan was geographically closer than Nagasaki to South China (a one-week round-trip instead of a one-month round-trip by ship); its judges and police officials were also more knowledgeable of the local languages and customs.[58] The 1921 arrangement to make Taiwan's capital of Taipei the arbitration center for South China was modeled on other legal exceptions that applied to the higher courts in South Manchuria's Dalian from 1908 and Korea's Seoul from 1911, which respectively oversaw consular cases in the rest of Manchuria and Jiandao.[59] Even with the limitations placed by the Tokyo central government, the Taiwan Government-General thus bolstered its police and jurisdictional power in South China where it could.

Opium and the Limits of State Control over the Overseas Taiwanese

The expansion of Government-General police and legal networks in South China did little to curb the violent and illicit activities of the overseas Taiwanese in the interwar period. Outmanned and outresourced in South China, Japanese authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, working for the Foreign Ministry and the Government-General, continued to rely on overseas Taiwanese leaders to help mediate disputes with Chinese residents and officials, Taiwanese and Chinese gangs, and Japanese and Chinese officials. Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, Taiwanese gangsters and powerful Chinese clans in Xiamen, such as the Wu, Chen, and Ji families, collectively known as the "Three Big Surnames" (C. Sandaxing), clashed over rival interests in opium, gambling, and prostitution businesses.[60] Taiwanese Association members stepped in to mediate. For example, in the 1923 Tai-Wu Incident between armed Taiwanese and



Figure 2.2. 1923 Tai-Wu Incident Mediation Committee—consisting of Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese leaders—in front of Xiamen's Chinese Chambers of Commerce. The committee resolved a violent dispute between rival Taiwanese and Chinese gangsters. Source: Amoi Kyoryūminkai, *Amoi Taiwan Kyoryūminkai sōritsu sanjūgo shūnen kinenshi* (Amoi: Amoi Kyoryūminkai, 1942).

the Chinese Wu family, Wu Yunfu—a member of both the Wu family and the Taiwanese Association—acted as a peace broker and compensated both sides with his own money (see figure 2.2).[61] Three years later during the Tai-Tan Incident, association leaders Zeng Houkun and Shi Fanqi similarly negotiated peace agreements among the Taiwanese, the Chinese Tan family, and Chinese navy commander Yang Shuzhuang.[62]

In exchange for such help, Japanese consuls continued to provide extraterritorial protection to overseas Taiwanese to shield their illicit enterprises—centered on opium—from Chinese law enforcement. Contemporary Chinese-language newspapers portrayed Japanese authorities as actively promoting the Taiwanese opium trade as part of their southern advance strategy in South China.[63] Yet, a closer examination of the region's narcotics economy reveals far more layered and complex dynamics. The attitudes of Japanese officials toward overseas Taiwanese opium activities ranged from indifferent to indignant, but there is little evidence that they supported or profited from the illicit trade.[64] Rather, local Chinese merchants and officials—a succession of regional warlords in the 1910s–20s and then GMD officials in the 1920s–30s—were complicit and dependent on

overseas Taiwanese opium networks for steady revenues. Unlike in Northeast China, where the Japanese Army actively participated in the regional narcotics economy, Japanese colonial and consular authorities did not encourage Taiwanese opium businesses in Fujian.[65] Japanese officials viewed South China's thriving drug trade as beyond their control and condoned overseas Taiwanese participation so long as their actions remained outside the formal colony. They also took advantage of donations provided by Taiwanese opium entrepreneurs to help finance local Japanese and Taiwanese institutions.

As international efforts and pressures to eliminate the use of opium grew, the Tokyo government ratified the Hague International Opium Convention (est. 1912) in 1921, agreeing to help suppress the narcotics trade (except for medicinal drugs).[66] Still, the Japanese were roundly criticized by the League of Nations countries for non-compliance. In contrast to British and American consulates that supported China's anti-opium campaigns that had begun in 1906, Japanese consulates were accused of protecting Taiwanese opium enterprises from Chinese intervention. Interwar Japanese and Chinese records attest to periodic cooperation between Japan's consular police and Chinese police in arresting Taiwanese traffickers and shutting down Taiwanese-run opium dens.[67] Yet contemporary Western and Chinese observers reported that Japanese authorities were too lenient in their punishments. In 1919, for example, the British consul in Fuzhou noted: "In connection with the sale of opium and morphia I should mention that the Chinese Authorities are constantly prosecuting Formosan [Taiwanese] offenders in the Japanese Court, but the punishment for the offence is so light that it has no deterrent effect."[68] Japanese consulates acknowledged that overseas Taiwanese deported to Taiwan for opium crimes were often released with merely a fine by the Government-General courts. Taiwanese smoking remained legal in the colony so long as one had a license; opium infractions were dealt with as minor crimes.[69]

Taiwanese opium smuggling proceeded apace along Fujian's coast as traffickers found various ways to evade Japanese and Chinese restrictions. Taiwanese passengers arriving on ships from Taiwan smuggled opium in their luggage. Other Taiwanese paid off customs officers with bribes or were accompanied by armed guards to prevent police from searching and making arrests.[70] Though Taiwanese traveling to China were required to obtain a passport from the Government-General, many bypassed the passport system by bribing crews to hide them in passengers ships and fishing boats with their contraband.[71] Opium smuggled into Fujian was then sold to hundreds of Taiwanese opium dens and "convenient stores" (J. *benriya*, C. *bianliwu*), which thanks to Government-General policy, could be run with relatively little fear of punishment.[72]

However, the boundaries between Taiwanese and Chinese participation in Fujian's opium trade were much fuzzier than has been portrayed by mainland Chinese historiography, in which resident Chinese were victims of Taiwanese and Japanese opportunism.[73] With the collapse of a centralized government in China by the mid-1910s, regional Chinese warlords came into power. They established what they called "Opium Suppression Bureaus" (C. *jinyanju*): de facto opium monopolies that grew, traded, and taxed the drug to fund their military regimes. Fujian was no exception.[74] Fujian warlords worked closely with leading Taiwanese opium merchants and hired armed Taiwanese gangsters to collect opium taxes. In 1918, the British consul in Fuzhou observed that the Fujian Provincial Opium Suppression Bureau chief, a notorious smoker himself, had entrusted Taiwanese to import and sell opium.[75] In Xiamen, the Municipal Opium Suppression Bureau delegated tax-collection duties in 1919 to Taiwanese Association leaders Zeng Houkun and Wu Yunfu.[76] From 1922 to 1924, the warlord Zang Zhiping similarly distributed opium cultivation privileges to Zeng Houkun and Yuan Shunyong.[77] After taking over Fujian from Zang, Admiral Yang Shuzhuang founded his own opium company managed by the Taiwanese. The Xiamen Taiwanese Association donated ¥900 a month to Yang's Police Bureau as taxes from their opium dens.[78]

Fujian's Chinese opium merchants were similarly opportunistic, working together with the overseas Taiwanese to avoid the taxes and sanctions of Fujian's official monopolies. Chinese paid monthly fees to overseas Taiwanese to borrow their store signs, indicating Japanese nationality, for their opium dens. According to Japanese consular reports, more than half of "Taiwanese" dens in Xiamen were managed by Chinese nationals.[79] The Japanese might have had reason to be defensive on this score, but Chinese-language newspapers concurred. The Xiamen *Shooting Star* reported in 1923 that "Xiamen gangsters purchase Taiwanese store signs so that their opium and gambling dens receive Japanese extraterritorial protection."[80] The sociolegal boundaries between Chinese and Taiwanese participants in Fujian's narcotics economy were thus difficult to distinguish.[81]

Even after Fujian came under the control of Chiang Kai-shek's GMD Nanjing government (1927–37), which nominally unified China, opium continued to be an essential source of state revenue. The GMD publicly adopted a prohibitionist stance by drafting a 1928 anti-opium law and condemning rival warlords and the Japanese for permissive narcotics policies in China.[82] Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, the GMD *Anti-Opium Monthly* criticized the overseas Taiwanese for obstructing Fujian's suppression campaign with over 300 opium dens each in Xiamen and Fuzhou; Chinese police who tried to enforce the ban were reportedly injured or killed by armed Taiwanese.[83] The GMD media even accused the Japanese of promoting Taiwanese illicit activities in

Fujian as part of a larger strategy to take over the province. In 1931, for instance, Xiamen's *Commercial Daily* accused the Taiwan Government-General of "manipulating degenerate Chinese and overseas Taiwanese gangsters to spread rumors and obstruct public order" and "anesthetizing the Chinese population with prostitutes, opium, and alcohol."[84] The GMD government thus attempted to interpret Fujian's opium activities through pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese nationalistic frameworks.

Despite their moralistic attacks against the Taiwanese opium trade, GMD officials, like their warlord predecessors, relied on narcotics revenues in Fujian and other provinces. Throughout the 1930s, GMD Fujian officials collaborated with Taiwanese merchants to manage opium companies and "suppression centers" (which, like the warlords' bureaus were de facto opium monopolies). In 1935, Li Liangxi, a leading member of the Taiwanese Eighteen Big Brothers, was appointed head inspector of the Xiamen Opium Suppression Office to monitor tax revenues.[85] The British-owned *North China Herald* attested to the complexity of Fujian's opium situation in June 1936. Though most of the opium dens in Xiamen and Fuzhou were run by the overseas Taiwanese, the paper reported, local Chinese authorities were suspected of being more interested in obtaining a share of the illicit profits from the drugs than suppressing them.[86] An editorial in September 1936, titled "Fukien [Fujian] Drug Rackets not Japanese Run: Chinese Peddlers Pose as Formosans [Taiwanese]," noted that Chinese newspapers often asserted that "prostitution, blackmail, kidnapping, and smuggling in Fukien were exclusively Formosan." In fact, they were "quite similar to the opium trade—a handful of Formosans lending protection to hundreds of Chinese. All in all, the underworld of Fukien is not so foreign as we have been led to believe."[87] Fujian drug revenues were thus shared among Taiwanese and Chinese merchants and local Chinese officials. Though Chinese authorities attempted to interpret the activities of Fujian opium peddlers through nationalistic frameworks, the peddlers themselves often prioritized business tactics over patriotic sentiments. Contrary to GMD narratives of Fujian's opium trade as dominated by "Japanese-Taiwanese imperialists," the regional narcotics economy constituted of Chinese and Taiwanese participants beyond the control of Japanese officials, at once demonstrating the unexpected consequences and limits of Taiwan's gateway imperialism.

Overseas Taiwanese Youth and Activists in China

In 1923, Du Congming (1893–1986), a prominent Taiwanese doctor and professor at the Taiwan Government-General Medical School, traveled to Xiamen.

After returning from his visit, Du published his observations in the sole Taiwanese-run publication, the *Taiwan People's Newspaper*. He wrote that the reputation of the Taiwanese in China had been "maligned by lower-class Taiwanese notorious as sycophantic lackeys of Japan" for abusing extraterritorial rights in the opium trade.[88] Subsequent Taiwanese travelers to China similarly lamented that Chinese residents viewed them with suspicion due to their Taiwanese status. Despite the ambiguities around nationalities in Fujian's opium trade, the Chinese term for "overseas Taiwanese" (C. Taiwan jimin) had, by the 1920s, become virtually synonymous with criminal behavior in South China.

Yet even in the face of negative Chinese stereotypes of the overseas Taiwanese, hundreds of Taiwanese went to China for different reasons, including, much to the chagrin of Japanese colonial and consular officials, their commitment to anti-imperial movements. While South China was never a hotbed for guerrilla activities on the scale of Shanghai and Jiandao, where anticolonial independence leaders who had fled Korea settled, Japanese authorities still kept close watch on potential problems.[89] A notable example was Lin Jishang (also known as Lin Zumi, 1878–1925) of the prominent Taiwanese Lin family of Wufeng. Lin led anti-Japanese boycotts in Guangzhou in 1908, founded an anti-Japanese Chinese journal called the *Lujiang Monthly* in 1909, and served as a military commander in Sun Yat-sen's GMD army.[90] A 1916 Taiwan Government-General police report identified Lin as one of an estimated 120 Taiwanese "people who require monitoring" (*yōshisatsujin*) in South China.[91] Colonial police officials stationed in Japanese consulates in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou from 1917 paid close attention to activities by Taiwanese like Lin, who were seen as potential security threats to Taiwan.

Japanese officials also sought to monitor Taiwanese youth who attended mainland Chinese secondary schools. Although Taiwanese could attend six-year primary schools—Taiwanese "common schools," segregated from "regular primary schools" for ethnic Japanese—opportunities for higher education remained limited within Taiwan. Having viewed the experience of British India, where Indians educated in the humanities at British universities had incited anticolonial movements, the Taiwan Government-General generally restricted Taiwanese learning to vocational fields. Except for medical and teachers' schools, entry into Taiwan's secondary schools was reserved mainly for ethnic Japanese.[92] As a case in point, when the Government-General founded Taipei Imperial University as Taiwan's first university in 1928, the majority of admitted students were ethnic Japanese.[93] With few opportunities for higher education in the colony, many Taiwanese chose to continue their studies abroad. While most did so in Japan, about one-tenth studied in China,

where they could find lower costs and feel a sense of affinity with their Chinese ancestral homeland (C. *zuguo*).[94]

Japanese consular officials in South China complained that any loyalty toward Japan cultivated in Taiwanese primary schools was quickly undone by education in China. In 1926, Consul Inoue Kōjirō reported that over 200 Taiwanese secondary students in Xiamen came into daily contact with GMD propaganda through Chinese peers, teachers, and publications. Inoue worried that Taiwanese exposed to "Chinese nationalistic ideas" were "increasingly hostile toward Japan's colonial government in Taiwan."[95] Indeed, local Taiwanese youth had joined anti-Japanese groups such as the Fujian Taiwanese Student Union (est. 1924), which consisted of Taiwanese from Xiamen's Chinese and Anglo-American schools.[96] In May 1925, for the tenth anniversary of Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China, the union disseminated print materials critical of the Taiwan Government-General to Chinese students.[97] It also marked the anniversary of Japan's colonization of Taiwan (June 17, 1895) as a "national day of humiliation," hosting lectures and distributing pamphlets.[98]

The Taiwan Government-General attempted to limit the number of Taiwanese students in China through its passport system. Taiwanese who wished to travel to China were required to apply for a passport: those suspected of anticolonial activity, including plans to study in China, were rejected. Throughout the 1920s, Taiwanese activists petitioned the Government-General to abolish colonial passports, which hindered Taiwanese travel to China for business and education.[99] In the meantime, the number of Taiwanese in secondary schools in China was increasing. In 1920, only nineteen Taiwanese were enrolled in secondary schools in China, but by 1923 there were 273 students, and in 1928, 344.[100] Some may have skillfully obtained passports required for travel to China by not mentioning their academic plans to Japanese colonial authorities.

Other Taiwanese youth found ways to circumvent passport restrictions. Xie Dongmin (1907–2001), who joined the GMD and later became vice-president in the Republic of China (served 1978–84), decided to drop out of Taizhong Middle School in 1925 to study overseas in Shanghai. In his postwar memoirs, Xie recalled facing Japanese discrimination and was angered by his Japanese history teacher's condemnation of China as a divided nation. "My friend and I knew that the odds of acquiring a Taiwanese passport for China were low," he wrote, but since passports were neither required for travel between Taiwan and Japan nor from Japan to China, "we decided first to travel to Nagasaki [southwest Japan], then to Shanghai, where we told Chinese customs officials that we were Chinese students returning from studying in Japan."[101]

Once Taiwanese arrived in China, they were not always welcome by their Chinese peers, who sometimes suspected them of being imperial agents of

Japan. To avoid Chinese discrimination, many Taiwanese adopted pseudonyms and pretended to be natives from South China. Xie Dongmin's Chinese classmate at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, Zhang Zhenqian, later recalled that Xie initially referred to himself as Fujianese. Only when Zhang asked him specifically about his hometown did Xie add that he was Fujian Taiwanese.[102] Especially after Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, some Taiwanese visitors to China hid their Taiwanese status to blend in with the Chinese community.[103]

Throughout China's treaty port cities, overseas Taiwanese students and activists formed anti-imperial groups that sought to educate the Chinese about Taiwan and disabuse their preconceptions of Taiwanese as imperial pawns of Japan. Yang Wanxing, for instance, implored anti-Japanese Chinese associations in Shantou "not to discriminate against all Taiwanese and to at least differentiate the good ones from the bad."[104] Taiwanese activists distributed publications portraying Taiwanese as anti-imperial allies of not only the Chinese but also the Koreans, Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese.[105] They adopted Sun Yat-sen's Pan-Asianist rhetoric of promoting an alliance of fellow "weak and small peoples" (C. *ruoxiao minzu*) fighting for independence against the imperial powers.[106] Shanghai's International Settlement and French Concession, which lay outside the jurisdiction of Japanese consular officials, became havens for Taiwanese activists.[107] In 1924, the leftist Taiwanese Youth Society and the Shanghai Provisional Korean Government cofounded the Taiwan-Korea Comrade Society, which promoted mutual support for "fellow colonized Asians" by soliciting Chinese aid against Japan. A Shanghai Taiwanese Student League also met regularly with Korean and Chinese communists in the French Concession.[108]

A growing number of Taiwanese youth also moved to Guangzhou in South China, where Chiang Kai-shek based his GMD headquarters in the first half of the 1920s. Several Taiwanese studied at Guangzhou's Sun Yat-sen University and the Whampoa Military Academy, founded by the GMD in 1924. Zhang Yuedeng (Xiuzhe, 1905–82) and Zhang Shenqie (1904–65), who later became two of Taiwan's most prominent writers, joined the Guangzhou Taiwanese Revolutionary Youth Alliance and participated in GMD anti-Japanese demonstrations.[109] Members of the alliance also published the *Taiwan Vanguard* journal; its first issue included a lecture by Sun Yat-sen University president Dai Jitao, who declared that the "Taiwanese people are Chinese people" and advocated for an alliance against Japan.[110]

However, Sino-Taiwanese partnerships against Japan remained fragile. Taiwanese leftist activists, especially those sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were closely monitored by GMD and Japanese authorities. The GMD and CCP had been part of a united front against warlords, but once Chiang Kai-shek ended that alliance in April 1927, he cracked down on

leftist elements in Guangzhou, including Taiwanese and Koreans suspected of communist ties. Chiang branded the Guangzhou Taiwanese Revolutionary Youth Alliance as leftist and ordered for its disbandment. Japan's consular and colonial police seized the opportunity to arrest twenty-three Taiwanese subversives who fled from Guangzhou to Shanghai, Taiwan, and Japan.[111] Taiwanese communist supporters regrouped in Shanghai to help form the Taiwanese Communist Party (TCP) in the French Concession in April 1928. The Communist International appointed Xie Xuehong and Lin Mushun—Taiwanese members of the CCP who had studied in Moscow's East Asia Communist Workers' University and Sun Yat-sen University—as leaders of the TCP.[112] Within weeks of its founding, however, Japanese consular police arrested five TCP members, and others went into hiding or fled to other regions in China and Japan.[113] The TCP continued its political activities in Taiwan and Shanghai up until fall 1931, when Taiwanese labor strikes in Taipei resulted in the Japanese arrest of 107 TCP members and the dissolution of the party.[114] As for Taiwanese communists who left Shanghai in 1928 to join the CCP's Fujian committee, many were detained by local GMD officials in cooperation with Japanese consular police.[115] CCP members apprehended by the GMD, once they were discovered to be Taiwanese subjects, were handed over to Japanese consulates before deportation to Taiwan.[116]

Even Taiwanese members of the GMD became targets of double discrimination by Japanese and Chinese authorities.[117] In his postwar memoirs, Xie Dongmin, who attended Sun Yat-sen University in the late 1920s, recalled being closely watched by the local Japanese consulate, which kept tabs on him as one of several hundred suspected anti-Japanese Taiwanese in China. The consulate periodically sent undercover agents to ask Xie's Taiwanese friends about his activities. After graduating in 1931, Xie was hired by the university as a Japanese-language lecturer. However, the following year, his contract was not renewed and he went on to open a Japanese cram school. Xie later found out that his troubles at the university had stemmed from the GMD Guangzhou Public Security Bureau blacklisting him as a potential spy for Japan due to his ties to Taiwan.[118]

Xie Chunmu (Xie Nanguang, 1902–69), a Taiwanese journalist-activist and member of the Taiwanese People's Party, captured the precarious state of the overseas Taiwanese. "Our Taiwanese brethren in China are in tragic circumstances," noted Xie in 1930. "Whenever a conflict of interest occurs [between China and Japan], Taiwanese who were treated yesterday by the Chinese as close friends are today cursed at as the 'running dogs of Japan.'"[119] With Japan's military occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, overseas Taiwanese in South China increasingly became the targets of nationwide anti-Japanese

boycotts and violence. In Fujian, Chinese protestors attacked Taiwanese and Japanese institutions such as overseas Taiwanese Associations, hospitals, and newspapers; the Taiwanese head of the Government-General-backed Fuzhou newspaper, *Minbao*, was hospitalized for one week. Chinese companies fired their Taiwanese employees for being "imperialist slaves" (C. *wangguonu*).[120]

Several events during the first half of the 1930s exacerbated Chinese suspicions of the overseas Taiwanese as auxiliaries of Japanese imperialist ambitions in South China. In October 1931, less than a month after the Manchurian Incident, Taiwan Army intelligence officer Asai Toshio visited Fuzhou and contacted Li Luji (1894–1943), an overseas Taiwanese who had previously worked for the *Minbao* newspaper.[121] Asai hired Li to orchestrate the murder of Japanese personnel in Fuzhou and frame it as an anti-Japanese attack by the Chinese. In January 1932, Li and three other Taiwanese conspired to kill a Japanese primary school teacher, Mito Mitsuo, and his wife. The Japanese consulate publicly blamed the murders on local Chinese.[122] But Japan's army headquarters wished to limit its forces to expansion in North China and rejected the Taiwan Army's request to send troops to South China. The Taiwan Army's ambitions to occupy the city did not come to fruition.[123] Despite attempts by Japanese authorities to keep Li and his colleagues' involvement a secret, GMD officials and newspapers in Fujian reported that the overseas Taiwanese were, in fact, the main perpetrators of the Mito Incident.[124] The following November, an anti-Chiang Kai-shek GMD faction led by the Nineteenth Route Army officers occupied Fujian and founded the People's Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Republic. Though Chiang's forces crushed the Fujian Rebellion within a few months, the GMD reported that the Taiwan Army, Taiwan Government-General, and overseas Taiwanese had offered financial and personnel support to the short-lived republic.[125] Once again, ambitions by colonial Taiwan authorities to extend Japan's formal empire into South China stalled.

Chinese-language reports of overseas Taiwanese participation in the 1932 Mito Incident and the 1933 Fujian Rebellion further intensified GMD distrust of the overseas Taiwanese in China, who were branded "traitors of the Han" (C. *hanjian*). At the same time, the GMD media expressed sympathy for the Taiwanese as fellow Chinese "brethren" (C. *tongbao*) who had been victimized by decades of Japanese assimilationist rule. For instance, a 1935 editorial in the GMD Xiamen newspaper *Jiangshengbao* remained optimistic about the possibility of Taiwanese redemption, calling on the Chinese "not to forget that Taiwan is originally part of our country and that Taiwanese are part of our peoples. Although among them are traitors of the Han, running dogs, and gangsters, most of them still hope in the bottom of their hearts that we will take the responsibility to come to their aid."[126]

It is no wonder, then, that the Taiwan Government-General remained anxious about the possibility of anti-Japanese movements by the overseas Taiwanese. GMD officials in China were ready for their aid. Japanese attempts to limit anticolonial activities by the overseas Taiwanese were part of the strategy for gateway imperialism: to have the overseas Taiwanese help, rather than hurt, Japanese geopolitical interests in South China. It remained a delicate balance for Japanese officials and not entirely in their control.

From the turn of the twentieth century, Japanese colonial authorities had endeavored to expand the numbers of overseas Taiwanese in South China in order to extend their regional spheres of interest. While they were concerned about anticolonialists among the population, the "bad overseas Taiwanese" who got the most attention, and concern, from Japanese consuls were gangsters involved in opium enterprises or violent behavior that upset Chinese public order. Such Taiwanese could be burdensome to Japanese consulates, but they were also useful allies in suppressing anti-Japanese Chinese boycotts and navigating Sino-Taiwanese tensions. So were the wealthy Chinese elites in South China who joined and led overseas Taiwanese Associations. In return for their financial contributions to Taiwanese schools and hospitals and efforts to mediate Sino-Taiwanese and Sino-Japanese disputes, they enjoyed Japanese extraterritorial privileges that protected their illicit opium enterprises. In the 1910s–20s, overseas Koreans in Northeast China similarly exploited Japanese extraterritoriality to dominate the opium trade. The difference was that opium revenues amassed by overseas Koreans were part of a major narcotics economy controlled by Japan's Kwantung Army in South Manchuria.[127] By contrast, Taiwanese opium dealers in Fujian shared their profits with local Chinese officials—whether it was warlords or the GMD—but not with Japanese authorities until the 1938 military occupation of South China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Whereas the opium trade in Taiwan generated enormous tax revenues for the Taiwan Government-General, Japanese colonial authorities only indirectly profited from the overseas Taiwanese trade, which helped finance South China's Taiwanese and Japanese institutions.

Part of Japanese colonial strategies for southern expansion was to limit anticolonial dissent in Taiwan from extending into China. During the interwar period, Japanese efforts met with mixed results. The Government-General was not able to prevent hundreds of Taiwanese from studying and working in China, where they formed anti-imperial alliances with Chinese and Koreans to delegitimize Japan's empire. Although Taiwan did not experience any independence movements on the scale of Korea in March 1919, Japanese officials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait remained anxious about Taiwanese

loyalties. By the 1930s, overseas Taiwanese activist groups had helped unite anticolonial Taiwanese rhetoric with anti-imperialist Chinese nationalism.[128]

Meanwhile, Chinese official perceptions and policies toward the overseas Taiwanese remained ambivalent throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The GMD initially welcomed Taiwanese youth into Chinese universities, military academies, and other GMD-sponsored organizations. But with growing Sino-Japanese tensions exacerbated by Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and invasion of North China in 1937, the GMD became increasingly suspect of Taiwanese as potential Japanese spies. Despite efforts by Taiwanese activists to disabuse Chinese biases against the overseas Taiwanese as imperial pawns of Japan, the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War only further strained Sino-Taiwanese relations as thousands of Taiwanese served in Japan's military occupation of South China.

Chapter 3

Taiwanese in Southeast Asia

The Taiwan Government-General viewed the island not only as an entryway into South China but also as integral to Japan's economic advance into Southeast Asia, what the Japanese called at the time the "South Seas" (Nan'yō).[1] Japanese colonial leaders contended that Taiwan's location, experience, and human resources provided an advantage over Japan's metropole to infiltrate Southeast Asia and its markets. Up through the 1900s, the Japanese had been slow to capitalize on Southeast Asia's abundant raw materials and markets for industrialization. The small number of Japanese migrants who had settled in the region mainly consisted of prostitutes (commonly known as *karayuki-san*), who were an embarrassment to Japan's national reputation.[2] In 1909, the Japanese consul in Batavia complained to the Tokyo Foreign Ministry that over half of the ninety or so Japanese in Batavia in the Dutch East Indies were prostitutes.[3] The Japanese could hardly compete with the three million-plus overseas Chinese (J. Kakyō, C. Huaqiao)—the majority with native-place ties to South China—who controlled much of Southeast Asia's commerce.[4] Despite Japan's weak presence in Southeast Asia, Taiwan Government-General officials were optimistic that the Taiwanese could serve as economic intermediaries in the region because of their shared ethnic, linguistic, and native-place ties with the overseas Chinese. When "southern advance fever" (*nanshin netsu*) swept across Japan during World War I (1914–18),

the prospects looked even better now that they had more support from the Tokyo central government.[5]

Years before the war, the Taiwan Government-General had begun pioneering efforts to advance Japanese and Taiwanese economic ties with Southeast Asia. Previous Japanese writings from the early Meiji period (1870s–80s) had classified the South Seas (Nan'yō)—from the South Pacific to Southeast Asia—as geographically and culturally separate from East Asia (Tōyō).[6] By contrast, Government-General leaders reconceptualized the South Seas from the 1910s as a natural extension of Taiwan and East Asia connected by overseas Chinese diasporic networks. Central to Japanese colonial strategies of advancing maritime commercial ties was creating Sino-Japanese alliances between overseas Taiwanese and Chinese merchants. The Government-General promoted Pan-Asianist alliances between Han Taiwanese and the overseas Chinese based on the assumed "same culture, same race" (*dōbun dōshu*) with shared Fujianese speech-group and native-place backgrounds.

With the wartime decline of European goods to Southeast Asia, Japanese exports to the region rose dramatically. Fighting on the side of the Allied powers, the Japanese navy also seized the Micronesian Islands (Nan'yō Guntō) in the South Pacific from Germany. After the war, Japan was granted the Micronesian Mandate (1919–45) by the League of Nations to be ruled as a de facto colony.[7] Japan's economic and territorial gains helped support the vision of southern advance that the Taiwan Government-General was promoting. Like their efforts in South China, Government-General leaders sought to mobilize overseas Taiwanese to further Japanese economic and cultural interests in Southeast Asia.

However, Japanese colonial and consular officials faced significant challenges in Southeast Asia during the interwar period (1918–37). With the region divided among the Western imperial powers (except for Siam), laws on immigration, taxes, and nationality varied from colony to colony. Aside from the Dutch East Indies, where Taiwanese were granted equal rights to those of ethnic Japanese in 1909, there were fewer advantages to being Taiwanese in Southeast Asia than in China. In fact, it could be more of a liability to identify as Taiwanese in the region, particularly during anti-Japanese boycotts by powerful overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in response to Sino-Japanese conflicts in the 1920s–30s. Though the Government-General hoped to make economic inroads in Southeast Asia via overseas Chinese naturalization and partnerships, this strategy was not as successful as in South China. Only with Japan's military occupation of Southeast Asia in the 1940s would tens of thousands of Taiwanese civilian and military personnel come to play a critical role in the region.

Taiwan's Turn toward Southeast Asia

In a 1912 editorial in the *Taiwan Times*, Taiwan civil affairs chief Uchida Kakichi (1866–1933, served 1910–15) lamented the lack of Japanese institutional studies on Southeast Asia. However, he remained optimistic that Taiwan was well-suited to support Japanese research and economic interests farther south as Japan's sole tropical territory. Uchida pointed to Government-General officials recently dispatched to Southeast Asia to conduct surveys of flora, public health, and railways as evidence of Taiwan's geographic value. They were part of an early push to promote Japanese economic, ethnographic, and historical studies of Southeast Asia in order to boost southern expansion. Over the next two decades, colonial officials and scholars compiled statistical surveys to promote Japanese trade and investment in Southeast Asia's economic resources. At the same time, they marshaled historical narratives of racial commonalities among Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia as cultural legitimacy for Japanese economic advance in the region. It was through such research that the Japanese reconceptualized Japan and Taiwan's geopolitical and cultural relationships, conceiving Taiwan as both geographically and economically linked to both East and Southeast Asia.

"If Japanese can apply their experience of tropical administration in Taiwan to the Southern Regions [Nanpō] for further economic development," Uchida continued, "it will benefit not only Taiwan but also our greater empire."[8] Since 1905, Taiwan had been a model for colonial rule in continental East Asia, as many Japanese leaders "in Manchuria and Korea first gained their administrative experience in Taiwan."[9] Indeed, the central figures of the South Manchurian Railway Company (est. 1906) led by Gotō Shinpei had previously been leaders of colonial Taiwan.[10] Uchida argued that Taiwan could serve as an even better intermediary base for Southeast Asia than it had been for East Asia because of the island's similar tropical climate and geographical proximity: "Japanese with previous experience in Taiwan will no doubt have more success in the South Seas [Nan'yō] than those who have worked only in the metropole." As a case in point, he noted that "many of those currently engaged in rubber cultivation in Singapore have first worked in Taiwan."[11] Uchida believed that Japanese entrepreneurs of Taiwanese sugar, tea, tobacco, and cotton were similarly well-positioned to advance their industries in Southeast Asia.[12]

Taiwan Government-General aid for overseas ventures, which had previously centered on South China, came to include Southeast Asia by the 1910s. In 1912, Uchida renamed Taiwan's "Budget to Expand the South China Trade" to "Budget to Expand the South China and South Seas Trade."[13] Over the next decade, the Government-General invested millions of yen in subsidizing new

Japanese shipping routes, bank branches, and company offices connecting Taiwan to Southeast Asia.[14] Uchida also partnered with Inoue Masaji (1877–1947), the pioneering Japanese rubber tycoon in Malaya, to establish the South Seas Association (Nan'yō Kyōkai) in 1915.[15] Modeled on the East Asia Association (Tōyō Kyōkai, est. 1907), which sought to educate the Japanese public about current affairs in in China, Korea, and Taiwan, the South Seas Association was conceived by Uchida and Inoue to promote greater interest in the economies and societies of Southeast Asia.[16]

The South Seas Association's main office was initially located in the Taiwan Government-General's Tokyo office, as it was subsidized mainly by Taiwan authorities; branch offices were located in Taipei, Singapore, and across Southeast Asia.[17] Founding members included Yagyū Kazuyoshi (1864–1920, a former Bank of Taiwan president), Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933, an agricultural economist who had revamped the island's sugar industry in the 1900s), and Den Kenjirō (1855–1930, minister of communications who became Taiwan's first civilian governor-general from 1919 to 1923). The association promoted Japanese travel, research, exhibitions, and other educational activities related to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, including Dutch and Malay language courses.[18] It published a monthly journal and book series by its members—officials, scholars, and entrepreneurs—that served as reference guides for Japanese traveling and working in Southeast Asia.[19]

Uchida's successor as Taiwan civil affairs chief, Shimomura Hiroshi (1875–1957, served 1915–21), further promoted the island as Japan's economic gateway to Southeast Asia. Increasing the Government-General budget for the region tenfold from 1915 to 1920, Shimomura oversaw the opening of three branch offices of the Bank of Taiwan in the Dutch East Indies—Surabaya (1915), Semarang (1916), and Batavia (1917).[20] He also subsidized new maritime routes for Osaka Shipping Company and South Seas Mail Shipping Company for trade between Taiwan, Java, Singapore, and Haiphong.[21] In 1918, Shimomura established the Government-General's "Encyclopedia Bureau" (the official English title for Chōsa-ka, literally "Research Bureau") to streamline Taiwan's research on the Southern Regions.[22] The following year, he founded Taipei Commercial Higher School. With its motto, "South China and the South Seas are Our Markets," the school aimed to train Japanese students (Taiwanese made up around 10 percent of each class) for work overseas. Whereas commercial schools in Japan focused on economic training for Central and North China, Taipei Commercial Higher School offered courses such as "South China and South Seas Economic Affairs" in addition to Chinese, Malay, and Dutch languages.[23]

One of Shimomura's largest colonial legacies was hosting the April 1916 Taiwan Promotion Exposition (Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai) to commemorate twenty years of Japanese rule.[24] The one-month exposition in Taipei showcased the apparent successes of colonial development in agriculture (tea, sugar, camphor), transportation (railways, roads), and public health (hospitals and medical research centers) to Japanese visitors from the metropole and foreign guests from China and Southeast Asia.[25] One of Shimomura's goals for the exposition, he wrote, was "to eliminate Japanese stereotypes of Taiwan as a malaria-infested island inhabited by violent savages."[26] By displaying agricultural and commercial goods from Taiwan, South China, and Southeast Asia, the exposition aimed to increase Japanese interests in trade and investment opportunities farther south.[27] Foreign guests, including Fujian Provincial Government officials, were also invited to form economic partnerships with the Japanese and Taiwanese.[28]

Over 800,000 people attended the Taiwan exposition, which was divided into two exhibition centers.[29] Exhibition Center No. 1 was devoted to Taiwanese and Japanese products. The first and second floors displayed 26,000 products from Taiwan, mainly from agriculture and forestry, while the third floor consisted of 16,000 goods from various prefectures in Japan and its colonies in Korea and South Manchuria.[30] Exhibition Center No. 2 included a "South China South Seas Hall," featuring over 60,000 products from South China, Hong Kong, Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Borneo, the East Indies, the Philippines, Micronesia, and even India and Australia (which fit within the exposition's expansive definition of the South Seas). The *Taiwan Daily News* advertised the hall as "a global South Seas exhibition on an unprecedented scale" with samples ranging from rubber and tin to timber to inspire "Japanese interest in the southern countries."[31]

During the exposition, Shimomura also organized a "South China South Seas Tour" to celebrate the opening of a new Japanese shipping route from Taiwan to Southeast Asia. Consisting of sixty-one prominent officials and entrepreneurs from Japan and Taiwan, the tour group traveled for two months in the Philippines, East Indies, Malaya, Borneo, Indochina, and South China to survey agricultural, commercial, and industrial conditions for future Japanese economic development.[32] The tour symbolized the Government-General's initiative to promote Taiwan as the center for Japanese research on the southern regions. Shimomura also followed his predecessor Uchida's lead by dispatching Government-General officials to conduct on-the-ground surveys across the East and South China Seas, which were published as the series titled *South China and South Seas Survey Reports* totaling 230 volumes from 1913 to 1935.

One of the first Japanese researchers sent to Southeast Asia by the Government-General was Matsuoka Masao (1894–1978), an agricultural economist who conducted on-the-ground inspection tours of administrative systems and economies in Malaya, Indochina, the East Indies, and the Philippines.[33] In his 1913 editorial in the *Taiwan Times,* Matsuoka listed four main reasons why Japan needed to conduct further research on Southeast Asia: (1) to find territories suitable for migration to solve its problem of overpopulation; (2) to acquire Southeast Asia's raw materials for further industrialization; (3) to contribute studies of Southeast Asia to the greater academic community; and (4) to advance Japan's "civilizing mission" of uplifting the living standards of Southeast Asian "natives," as Japan had done with Taiwan's indigenous peoples.[34] Matsuoka boasted about Taiwan's pioneering role in southern studies: "At a time when interest in the South Seas has yet to fully arise in the Japanese metropole, those of us in Taiwan should be proud that our colonial leaders have invested funds and personnel to study the region."[35]

Matsuoka also pointed to historical precedent and conceptions of race to justify Japanese economic expansion, praising late sixteenth-century Japan as the height of Japanese activity in Southeast Asia. Under Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (1536–98) reign (1584–98), the Japanese had dispatched "red-seal ships" (*shuinsen*) to Southeast Asia for trade and established "Japantowns" (Nihon-machi). Matsuoka blamed the Tokugawa government's (1603–1868) 1630s policies to "close the country" (*sakoku*)—which prohibited overseas travel and outside trade with all but the Dutch and Chinese—for Japan's loss of influence in Southeast Asia to European imperialists.[36] Yet racially speaking, Matsuoka contended, Japan had a far more legitimate claim to the region, with deep ancestral ties to the south. No doubt drawing on "southern ancestral theories" (Nanpō sosen-ron) then being advanced by Japanese anthropologists, Matsuoka claimed that "the Yamato race is made up of 60 percent Malay blood."[37] In premodern times, he wrote, Malays migrated northward from southern islands and mixed with races from Korea and China to form Japan's "immaculate Yamato race."[38] Because the Japanese originated from the region, he noted, "to study the South Seas today is the equivalent of us studying our ancestral homeland."[39]

In the decades that followed, researching Japan's historical and ethnological ties to Southeast Asia became a focus of academic studies supported by the Taiwan Government-General. The Government-General founded Taipei Imperial University in 1928 as a humanities and science center for Taiwan and Southeast Asia.[40] The university's first professors of Southeast Asian history, Murakami Naojirō (1868–1966) and Iwao Seiichi (1900–88), traced Japan's southern advance back to the fifteenth century when Japanese "pirates"

(J. *wakō*, C. *wokou*) raided the coasts of China and Southeast Asia.[41] Murakami also wrote on Japanese efforts to gain tributary relations with the Philippines and Taiwan in the late sixteenth century and on Yamada Nagamasa (1590–1630), the pioneering Japanese merchant in Siam in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.[42] Iwao specialized in the history of Japantowns and the Tokugawa red-seal licensed trade in Southeast Asia before the 1630s maritime prohibition policies banned travel overseas.[43]

While contemporary scholars blamed Japan's early modern seclusion policies for its lack of economic activity in Southeast Asia, Government-General officials pointed to the region's three million overseas Chinese (Kakyō) as the main impediment to Japanese commercial success in the 1910s–20s. Since Japan's victory over the Qing in 1895, the Japanese had displayed feelings of cultural superiority and national chauvinism (what some scholars have called "Japanese Orientalism") toward the Chinese.[44] However, Japanese officials suggested that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia should be held in much higher esteem. As Taiwan civil affairs chief Shimomura Hiroshi stated in the *Taiwan Daily News* in February 1917: "The very Chinese peoples [Shina minzoku] that we [Japanese] view with contempt" had millions of migrants who "dominated the business circles of the South Seas."[45] The Tokyo journalist-politician Tsuboya Zenshirō (1862–1949), a participant of the Government-General-sponsored 1916 southern tour, was embarrassed to see the poor quality of Japanese goods sold in Southeast Asia, such as hats, umbrellas, watches, and cosmetics. Of more significant concern was that Chinese, rather than Japanese merchants, ran the majority of stores selling such goods. Tsuboya praised the work ethic and frugality of the Chinese in contrast to their Japanese peers. Chinese, he claimed, avoided luxurious accommodations and traveled third-class on buses and ships. Japanese, by contrast, took second-class transportation and stayed in hotels beyond their means.[46]

Japanese colonial officials from Taiwan who conducted on-the-ground surveys in Southeast Asia echoed Tsuboya's opinions on the commercial power of the overseas Chinese. Upon returning from a trip to the East Indies in mid-1918, Government-General police official Umetani Mitsuzawa (1880–1936) wrote in an editorial in the *Taiwan Times* that the overseas Chinese were the "hegemons of the South Seas" (Nan'yō no hasha).[47] Yet Umetani noted that the power of the overseas Chinese merchants and laborers was limited to the economic sphere, where the "majority of the three million overseas Chinese do not have a strong sense of belonging to one country and thus do not wield much political power." Umetani believed that Japan could best form economic and political alliances with the overseas Chinese through Taiwan's "Chinese" residents. Umetani, like most Japanese colonial officials, categorized Taiwan's

Han residents as legally Taiwanese subjects but racially Chinese, and thus akin to the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.[48] "Taiwan's three million Chinese peoples [Shina minzoku]," he wrote, "share the same race [*shuzoku*] as those from Fujian and Guangdong, which are also the hometowns of the three million-plus Chinese in the South Seas." By taking advantage of Taiwan and Southeast Asia's racial ties, Umetani contended, Japan could "advance Sino-Japanese harmony" and establish a commercial foothold in the region.[49] As in South China's treaty ports, Taiwanese in Southeast Asia had the potential as Sinophone intermediaries for Japanese commercial networks.

In an October 1918 editorial in the *Taiwan Times*, Umetani proposed that Japan "allow more overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to obtain our [Japanese] nationality." During his tour of British Hong Kong and Singapore, he had found colonial governments there readily extending British nationality to its Chinese residents. The Japanese, Umetani advised, "should not watch on the sidelines as passive observers but take up this naturalization policy to benefit our country" as well.[50] In fact, the Taiwan Government-General had, in cooperation with Japanese consulates in Southeast Asia, already been encouraging wealthy overseas Chinese in the region to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects. Throughout the 1910s, Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs pointed to Guo Chunyang (Kwik Djoen Eng, 1859–1935)—a Fujian-born naturalized Taiwanese in the Dutch East Indies—as the model overseas Taiwanese entrepreneur. Guo was a tea and sugar magnate with close ties to Taiwan and prominent Chinese merchants in South China and Southeast Asia.[51] The Japanese consul in Batavia reported in 1913 that Guo was a leader in the local Chinese Commerce Association and a respected figure among overseas Chinese from his native Fujian province. Guo was especially helpful in mediating Japanese commercial interests and mitigating anti-Japanese boycotts in the East Indies.[52]

Compared with similar naturalization efforts in South China, which had grown the overseas population to over six thousand Taiwanese in the 1910s, naturalization efforts in Southeast Asia were unsuccessful: in the same decade, the region was home to just a few hundred Taiwanese residing in Southeast Asia.[53] Taiwanese in Southeast Asia did not enjoy the benefits that, in South China's treaty ports, came from Japanese extraterritoriality, including exemption from Chinese taxes and laws. Southeast Asia (except for Siam) had been divided into Western colonies by the late nineteenth century. Aside from the Dutch East Indies, where Japanese nationals (including Taiwanese) enjoyed equal legal status as "honorary Europeans" beginning in 1909, there were few economic or legal advantages for overseas Chinese to naturalize as Taiwanese in Southeast Asia. In the case of the Philippines, moreover, American

Chinese exclusion laws equally applied to the Taiwanese: regardless of their nationality, they were legally categorized as racially Chinese. The legal discrimination that Taiwanese faced in colonial Southeast Asia posed significant challenges to the Taiwan Government-General in its efforts to make economic inroads in the region.

Overseas Taiwanese in Southeast Asia

Extraterritoriality in Siam

The longest-standing overseas Taiwanese in Southeast Asia lived in Siam. In 1897, the Tokyo government signed an unequal treaty with Siam. The Japanese joined the British, French, and Dutch in claiming extraterritorial rights in Siam: their subjects were exempted from local taxes and received legal protection from their respective consuls in Bangkok.[54] Chinese residents, however, were under Siamese law; many therefore sought to obtain foreign nationality to enjoy extraterritoriality. Soon after the 1897 treaty, Japan's consulate in Bangkok became inundated with Chinese applications to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects.[55] The word had no doubt spread that Japanese consuls in South China were encouraging the naturalization of local Chinese as Taiwanese subjects, leading the Chinese in Siam to see about the viability of obtaining Taiwanese status.

Much like his Japanese colleagues in South China, Consul Kokufudera Shinsaku eagerly accepted Chinese applications in Bangkok to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects. With few Japanese residents in Siam, he wished to enlarge trade between Siam and Japan by incorporating Chinese merchants as Taiwanese subjects with what was hoped to be pro-Japanese sentiment. But Japan faced Western competition over the foreign naturalization of the Chinese. Despite criticism from the Siamese government, the Dutch and Portuguese consuls were naturalizing Chinese as colonial subjects of the East Indies and Macau. In April 1899, Kokufudera reported to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō that the French consulate had simplified its registration process and lowered costs for naturalizing Chinese as French colonial subjects of Indochina.[56] Foreign Minister Aoki responded by warning Kokufudera "not to be taken advantage of by the Chinese," but Kokufudera used his consulate office's discretion to grant Taiwanese status to over one hundred Chinese applicants in 1899.[57] He hoped that recruiting new subjects would help Japan compete with other empires and expand its sphere of influence in Siam, but the surge in Chinese naturalization applications led to a shortage of funds and staff in the Japanese consulate of Bangkok.

With a desire to prioritize good diplomatic relations with Siam over making economic inroads in the country, Foreign Minister Aoki appointed Inagaki Manjirō (1861–1908, served as Bangkok consul in 1898) as Japanese minister of Siam in charge of consulate affairs in 1900. A proponent of Japanese economic expansion in Southeast Asia since the 1890s, Inagaki nevertheless prioritized Siamese-Japanese amity. Having participated in signing the 1898 Siam-Japan Friendship and Commercial Treaty, he sought to mitigate diplomatic tensions between the two countries. In line with Foreign Minister Aoki, Inagaki supported Siamese efforts to defend against Western imperial incursions. When the Siamese government requested foreign ministries to recall respective consuls in Bangkok for reckless naturalization of the Chinese, the Portuguese and Dutch agreed to do so; Inagaki followed suit by relieving Kokufudera of his consular duties. Upon review, the large majority of the hundred-plus Taiwanese subjects that Kokufudera had registered turned out to be born in Guangdong province with no family ties to Taiwan. By the end of 1900, all but nine were stripped of their Taiwanese status. To safeguard against further nationality abuses, Aoki and Inagaki required future applicants to submit a Taiwanese passport issued by the Government-General to Taiwanese residents traveling abroad.[58]

In the years that followed, the Taiwan Government-General and Japanese consulate in Bangkok strictly monitored the registration of Taiwanese subjects. Colonial and Foreign Ministry archives demonstrate that Japanese officials accepted only applicants with Taiwanese passports or family registers in Taiwan as overseas Taiwanese subjects in Siam. Japanese consuls in Bangkok rejected Chinese applications for Taiwanese status that did not include documents proving their previous residency in Taiwan. Even those with Taiwanese passports who had migrated to Bangkok in 1896, were registered by Bangkok's Japanese consulate in 1901 only after Taiwan civil affairs chief Gotō Shinpei verified their Taiwan family registers.[59]

Like their predecessor Kokufudera, some Japanese consuls in Bangkok continued to push for the naturalization of prominent overseas Chinese merchants, however dubious their claims for Taiwanese subjecthood might be. In April 1905, Japanese consul Tanabe Nōsaburō appealed to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō to grant Taiwanese subjecthood to Gao Kuishi (b. 1851) and his family of six. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), Gao and his eldest son had donated 300 Siam dollars to the Bangkok consulate in support of Japan's war effort. Since Gao's family were "rich merchants with plenty of capital," Tanabe stated with transparency, "it would not be shameful for us to consider them as Japanese colonial subjects."[60] Gao's application was forwarded to the Taiwan Government-General. Attached to the application was a letter

written by Gao addressed to Governor-General Kodama Gentarō. Gao explained that he and his son were both born in Taiwan but had moved to Siam in 1881 after the passing of his father in 1879. He pleaded to Kodama to make an exception and grant his family Taiwanese status: "We are absolutely no different from other Taiwanese. Though at present we are not Japanese nationals, we still consider Taiwan to be our homeland."[61] In 1907, however, the Government-General rejected his application. Only those who had left Taiwan after 1895 were eligible for retroactive colonial subjecthood.[62] Since Siam was not as strategically essential to imperial efforts as South China, the Government-General seems to have felt that it could afford to follow stricter rules where naturalization was concerned.

Despite such setbacks, overseas Chinese in Siam continued to covet Taiwanese colonial status up through the 1910s. According to the Japanese consul in Bangkok in 1911, Taiwanese subjecthood remained preferable and more practical in Siam than Western colonial subjecthood. French extraterritorial rights, for instance, did not extend to local Indochinese subjects who were placed under Siamese law. Indian colonial subjects enjoyed British consular protection in Siam, but in local court cases, they were only appointed a European legal advisor, whereas British citizens were guaranteed a European judge. In contrast to their Indochinese and Indian counterparts in Siam, Taiwanese were not relegated to second-class imperial legal status. Filipino and Indonesian subjects in Siam enjoyed the same extraterritorial rights as American and Dutch citizens. Still, one had to have been born in the Philippines or East Indies to obtain such colonial status. Thus, in theory, Taiwanese naturalization remained more feasible for overseas Chinese since it did not require birth but rather proof of residency or purchased land in Taiwan.[63]

"Racially Chinese" in the Philippines

When the United States occupied the Philippines in 1898, they restricted Chinese migration to the island. The overseas Chinese population who already lived there—who, like many of Taiwan's Han residents, largely hailed from Fujian province—were allowed to stay and naturalize as Filipino subjects. Under the US Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), though, "all peoples of the Chinese race"—except for the "exempt classes" of merchants, officials, teachers, students, tourists—were denied entry. American justifications for Chinese exclusion were to protect Filipino labor opportunities and to prevent Chinese migration to the United States from the Philippines.[64]

Anti-Chinese immigration laws opened up opportunities for Japanese migrant laborers to enter the Philippines. Between 1901 and 1904, over five

thousand Japanese arrived as construction workers, merchants, fishermen, and farmers. American engineers recruited Japanese laborers for road construction in the northern region of Luzon; Japanese agricultural companies invested in hemp cultivation in Davao; and Japanese merchants established trade and shipping ties with Japan. By the 1930s, the Philippines was home to the largest Japanese expatriate community (20,000) in Southeast Asia.[65] Though most Japanese migrated directly from Japan, a handful of Japanese merchants came from Taiwan. The most prominent entrepreneur to extend his business from Taiwan into the Philippines was Matsuoka Tomio (b. 1871), who first established himself in Taiwan's sugar industry in the 1900s. From 1912, Matsuoka extended his investments into coconut and hemp production in the Philippines. With subsidies from the Taiwan Government-General, Matsuoka founded the Matsuoka Development Company in 1919, which joined Ōta Development Company as one of Manila's major Japanese agricultural firms.[66]

Despite Japan's extensive agricultural and commercial market in the Philippines, few Taiwanese took part in it, because the Chinese exclusion laws kept them out. The reason lay in discrimination by race, not nationality. Japanese citizens like Matsuoka had no problem receiving visas from the US consulate in Taipei as a "subject of Imperial Japan of the Japanese race."[67] Taiwanese, by contrast, were categorized by Americans as Japanese subjects "of the Chinese race" and denied the same visa access.

In December 1901, for example, the Taiwanese Xu Shuiyong was denied entry from Xiamen to Manila by US customs officials despite having a valid Japanese passport. Though he filed a complaint with the local Japanese consulate, Xu was deported by American authorities because he was "of the Chinese race."[68] A decade later in 1911, when Xu was rejected a second time, the American customs official explained to the Japanese consulate in Manila: "Methods of treatment accorded Chinese from Formosa [Taiwan] must of necessity be the same as those accorded Chinese from China or any other foreign country, the change of nationality not having changed the race."[69] Americans considered Taiwanese like Xu a "Chinese person, whether a Japanese subject or not," and thus "subject to the provisions of the Chinese exclusion laws in force in the Philippine islands."[70]

Only Taiwanese who obtained a Section Six Certificate visa—proof that they were of the Chinese exempt classes—from the US consulate in Taiwan were permitted entry.[71] Extant US consular records from Taiwan from the 1900s to the 1930s include hundreds of Taiwanese applications for Section Six Certificate visas for travel to the Philippines. Taiwanese who demonstrated proof of a credible business in Taiwan (or in China) with sufficient capital were eligible for the visas, and applicants who were vetted by the Government-General or promi-

nent Taiwanese entrepreneurs nearly always passed. For example, Li Jinzao (b. 1883), a Taiwanese president of a pharmaceutical company, obtained a visa in July 1931 for his family to inspect the Philippines market for his Chinese medicines. Li's application included a reference by the entrepreneur Xu Bing (1881–1963), whom the American consul described as "one of the most influential Taiwanese."[72] Yu Fengshi (b. 1889) was similarly well-connected as director of Taiwan Shōkō Company, owned by one of the wealthiest Taiwanese, Gu Xianrong (1866–1937). Yu, who imported brown sugar from Manila via Japan, was permitted in 1922 to visit the Philippines to find a way to trade directly with sugar exporters.[73] Other Taiwanese merchants who exported tea, textiles, and marine products to the Philippines also received visas.[74]

Taiwanese who failed to obtain Section Six visas lacked sufficient documentation or capital to qualify as bona fide merchants and were rejected as Chinese laborers.[75] Lim Ching Giam, for example, had worked as a clerk-translator for a Japanese company in Manila for eleven months in 1925 before returning to Taiwan for his wife and daughter. Lim was denied a visa in 1926 because records of his previous trip to the Philippines were missing, and the Japanese consulate in Manila had designated him a laborer.[76] In 1929, Tan Hok-on's visa application was rejected because of his plans to work for a Chinese company. Regarding Tan's case, American authorities noted that "Chinese employees of Chinese merchants are not members of the exempt class and they are not entitled to admission into the Philippines."[77]

Regardless of where they resided in Asia, Taiwanese subjects who wished to travel to the Philippines were required to apply for their Section Six Certificate visas from the American consulate in Taipei. Japanese consulates in China and Southeast Asia did not have the authority to issue passports or visas to the overseas Taiwanese: those who wished to travel to the Philippines had to apply for permission through Taiwan. US State Department records indicate that the American consul in Taipei relied on the Government-General's recommendations for applications by Taiwanese who resided outside the island. For instance, Zhou Ziwen (b. 1867), chairman of Xiamen's Taiwanese Association (see chapter 2), received his Section Six Certificate in 1913 to inspect trade conditions and meet with business partners in the Philippines. The American consul noted that though Zhou hardly had any economic ties to Taiwan, "He is a man of influence in Amoy [Xiamen] where he is President of the Taiwan Kokwai (Taiwan People's Association) . . . The Taiwan Government considers him entitled to go the Philippines for four months for business purposes."[78] Application cases like Zhou's illustrate how the American consulate in Taipei outsourced its immigration vetting procedures to the Taiwan Government-General.

Taiwan's capital of Taipei thus served as the commercial gateway for the Taiwanese—both those in the island and overseas in China and Southeast Asia—to enter the market in the Philippines. Because US anti-Chinese exclusion laws applied to the Taiwanese, who were legally categorized as racially Chinese by American officials, their numbers in the Philippines remained small. Although Taiwanese shared similar Fujianese native-place ties with most of the overseas Chinese in the Philippines, few were able to take advantage of the latter's commercial networks. In 1936, the islands were home to an estimated 25,000 Japanese but only 52 Taiwanese, the highest ratio discrepancy among Japanese-Taiwanese populations in Southeast Asia.[79] Still, even though the regional Japanese population was much higher, the few Taiwanese allowed into the Philippines were merchants, doctors, and other professionals of a higher economic status than their average Japanese counterparts, most of whom were lower-class migrant farmers. In spite of their small numbers, the Taiwanese in the Philippines thus occupied a unique position of greater economic power than Japanese settlers.

"Honorary Europeans" in the Dutch East Indies

The Southeast Asian region where the overseas Taiwanese made the greatest inroads was the Dutch East Indies. By the end of World War I, nearly 300 Taiwanese resided in the East Indies, more than half the total number in Southeast Asia.[80] The East Indies were home to the first wave of Japanese emigrants to Southeast Asia in the 1880s–90s, mostly prostitutes from southwest Japan known as *karayuki-san*.[81] Nineteenth-century Dutch colonial laws were racially trifurcated, with one set applying to Europeans, one to "Natives," and a third to "Foreign Asians."[82] As Foreign Asians, Japanese and Chinese required transit passes and had travel and residency restrictions within the East Indies; they also paid higher taxes than Europeans.[83]

A year after its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Tokyo government signed a Japan-Netherlands Treaty of Commerce and Shipping (1896) that granted Japan the "most-favored-nation clause," which included equal legal status as Europeans in the East Indies starting in 1899. As "honorary Europeans," Japanese nationals quickly became the objects of envy, if not resentment, of hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents.[84] To obtain privileges as honorary Europeans, Chinese began applying to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects with the Japanese consulate in Singapore (which was concurrently in charge of Japanese nationals in the East Indies until a separate Batavia consulate was established in 1909). Chinese applicants submitted testimonies—with varying degrees of veracity—of prior residency, family ties, or property in Taiwan.

Compared to their actions in South China regarding Taiwanese naturalization, Japanese authorities were far more deferential to Dutch interests in the East Indies (as they were to the regional Euro-American colonial powers in general). In cooperation with Dutch colonial officials, the Japanese consulate in Singapore attempted to limit Taiwanese naturalization only to Chinese with valid passports issued by the Taiwan Government-General. By 1909, only thirty Taiwanese were registered as residents of the East Indies.[85] In his travelogue on Southeast Asia, *Notes on the Southern Countries* (1910), the politician-journalist Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865–1950) observed fraudulent Chinese attempts to obtain Taiwanese status in the East Indies. "Our Japanese government looks unfavorably upon this phenomenon. Unless the Chinese applicant manages a business in Taiwan, he is not permitted to naturalize as a Taiwanese. Our government has promised the Dutch authorities to abide by this principle."[86] Japanese consuls thus did not encourage the growth of a naturalized Taiwanese community in the East Indies as they had in South China.

At the same time, Japan's Foreign Ministry did its best to protect its overseas Taiwanese subjects' rights as Japanese nationals in the East Indies. British Indians and French Vietnamese lost their European status upon entering the East Indies and were subject to the same laws as native Indonesians. The Dutch wished to do the same with Taiwanese subjects, stripping them of their Japanese status in the colony. But Takekoshi noted that Japanese consuls refused to accept Dutch appeals to "treat Taiwanese subjects legally the same as the Chinese."[87] However, there were limits to the legal protection that regional Japanese consuls could provide the overseas Taiwanese in the East Indies. The Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Government-General archives contain several cases where Taiwanese were arbitrarily refused entry into the colony. In November 1908, the Japanese consul in Singapore reported to the Foreign Ministry a dispute in Sumatra involving two Taiwanese subjects. Dutch immigration officials had confiscated the passports of the two Taiwanese and deported them to Taiwan. The Dutch justified their actions by explaining how they could not differentiate between the two Taiwanese and the Chinese: the former wore the same clothes as the latter and spoke only Chinese, not Japanese.[88]

Even Guo Chunyang, the most prominent Taiwanese entrepreneur in the East Indies, encountered legal troubles with the Dutch soon after being naturalized as a Taiwanese subject in 1901. Born in Fujian in 1859, Guo had migrated to the East Indies port city of Semarang at age eighteen in 1877 to work in the sugar trade for his uncle Guo Hedong. In 1888, Guo began investing in Taiwan's tea trade. Due to his wealth and extensive trade networks in South China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, Guo was granted Taiwanese subjecthood by the Government-General in 1901.[89] But when Guo left Taiwan to return

to Batavia that year, Dutch authorities refused his entry on the grounds that his Japanese passport had not received prior approval from the Dutch consul in Taiwan, so that he could receive a visa required for all Taiwanese entering the East Indies. After the Government-General vouched for Guo's Taiwanese status, the Dutch authorities admitted him back into Batavia.[90] Similar cases of denying Taiwanese entry due to their lack of Dutch visas from Taiwan continued until 1909, when Japan's Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Government-General successfully negotiated with Dutch authorities to streamline Taiwanese immigration procedures. So long as Taiwanese entering the East Indies brought a Taiwanese passport and a copy of their Taiwan family registry records, they no longer required a Dutch visa.[91]

Still, Japanese consuls in the East Indies remained stringent about limiting the immigration of poor and potentially troublesome Japanese nationals. Between 1912 and 1914, the Japanese consul in Batavia refused entry to thirteen ethnic Japanese (four prostitutes and nine for insufficient capital) and two Taiwanese (also for lack of money).[92] There was also growing discontent by Japanese residents toward Chinese who took advantage of foreign nationalities for self-profit. According to the Japanese consul, ethnic Japanese in Java resented overseas Taiwanese for lacking any shared Japanese culture and believed they did not deserve protection as Japanese nationals.[93] Such anti-Taiwanese sentiments contrasted starkly with the feelings of Japanese residents in South China who advocated for the growing Taiwanese community because of their economic and armed strength. The legal status of Japanese nationals, including the Taiwanese, remained much weaker in the East Indies under Dutch colonial rule than in South China's semicolonial treaty ports.

In August 1913, a Japanese merchant named Isayama went so far as to report a "fake Taiwanese," Zhang Wuxiang to the consulate. Isayama accused Zhang of illegally obtaining a Taiwanese passport and forging his name to register as a Taiwanese subject in Java. In Isayama's claim against Zhang, which the Government-General investigated, he wrote: "I have lived in Java since 1908 and believe that Zhang hurts the character and reputation of Japanese nationals here." According to Isayama, Zhang had bribed a Taiwan official to insert his name into the island's family registry records. Zhang then illegally purchased the Taiwanese passport of the deceased Lin Wenqin and forged his name and photograph to re-enter the East Indies. Though no records remain of the final verdict on Zhang, the case is indicative of ethnonational tensions that accompanied the growth of the overseas Taiwanese population.[94]

Despite the potential ethnic conflicts created by naturalized Taiwanese subjects in the East Indies, Japanese authorities remained optimistic about the utility of the overseas Taiwanese community, which had grown to over 200

by 1913. Under the guidance of the local Japanese consul, Guo Chunyang and other resident Taiwanese entrepreneurs had formed a Java Taiwanese Association.[95] Japanese colonial and consular authorities hoped that Guo and his colleagues could promote Japanese and Taiwanese commercial networks among Taiwan, South China, and the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. In the process, they could replace Japan's historically negative reputation in the region as a source of low-class workers and prostitutes. For the Taiwan Government-General, overseas Taiwanese elites like Guo Chunyang embodied the potential of Taiwan's southern advance through the extension of economic networks across the East and Southeast Asian maritime corridors.

Overseas Taiwanese as Commercial Intermediaries

Throughout the 1910s, Taiwan Government-General and Japanese consular officials posited that cultivating a strong Taiwanese cohort in the East Indies would mutually benefit the Japanese and Taiwanese. In exchange for "honorary European" privileges of lower taxes and consular protection, naturalized Taiwanese were expected to support Japanese financial ventures in the region. In June 1913, the Japanese consul in Batavia, Ukita Kōji, reported to the Tokyo Foreign Ministry that overseas Taiwanese were "grateful and have a growing affinity for Japan" due to the legal protection they received as Japanese nationals. The result was "increasingly harmonious relations between local Japanese and Chinese." Ukita lamented, however, that "the Japanese still have a hard time making inroads in local commerce such as the wheat trade, which is almost exclusively in the hands of the Chinese."

The key to furthering Japan's commercial prospects in Southeast Asia, Consul Ukita contended, was "to take advantage of trustworthy overseas Taiwanese." They could at once mediate Japanese economic interests and mitigate the regional "Chinese problem" (*Shinajin mondai*), which is to say, the anti-Japanese boycotts by overseas Chinese in response to Sino-Japanese conflicts in China.[96] In 1908, for example, Qing officials had seized a Japanese steamboat off the South China coast for smuggling arms in support of Sun Yat-sen's anti-Qing revolutionary activities. In exchange for Japan's agreement to limit future contraband exports, the Qing returned the ship and paid for damages. Enraged by the settlement, which came to be known as the Tatsumaru Incident, Chinese carried out anti-Japanese boycotts throughout China and Southeast Asia. Among those targeted in the East Indies were Japanese merchants and company employees.[97]

Japanese officials especially looked to overseas Taiwanese entrepreneurs like Guo Chunyang to mediate between local Chinese and Japanese interests. Like their Western colonial counterparts, Japanese officials racially categorized the overseas Chinese and Taiwanese as Chinese people (Shinajin) or of the Chinese race (Shina jinshu). Of course, as scholars of the Chinese diaspora and Sinophone studies have illustrated, the overseas Chinese were never a monolithic community with singular identities or cultural and political values.[98] Even those who self-identified as racially Chinese or descendants of China were often subdivided among various speech and native-place groups throughout Southeast Asia.[99] According to Consul Ukita, Guo Chunyang and the majority of other overseas Taiwanese identified as Hokkien-speaking Fujianese people (J. Fukkenjin, C. Fujianren), referring to their native Chinese province of Fujian, while a minority affiliated as Hakka or Cantonese people (from Guangdong province).[100] Nevertheless, they could simultaneously juggle multiple local, regional, and national identities. Three of the wealthiest Taiwanese in the East Indies—Guo, Yan Jiangshou, and Bi Kaixi—concurrently identified themselves as legally Taiwanese and racially Chinese.[101]

As the leading Taiwanese tea exporter to the East Indies, Guo held memberships both in Taipei's Taiwan Tea Merchant Association and Semarang's Tea Agent Association: he worked with Taiwanese tea exporters in the former and overseas Chinese tea importers in the latter.[102] His success in the sugar and tea trade relied less on Chinese ethnic or national ties than on native-place networks among Fujianese merchants that extended from Fujian to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the East Indies. At the same time, as scholars like Lin Man-houng have pointed out, Guo took advantage of multiple nationalities—Japanese (Taiwan), Chinese, Dutch, British—to capitalize on economic and political opportunities throughout East and Southeast Asia.[103] His close ties to Dutch colonial authorities proved instrumental to the Japanese tea trade in the East Indies. When the Dutch introduced protectionist policies restricting foreign tea imports to the East Indies in 1918, the Taiwan Government-General and Tokyo Foreign Ministry turned to Guo, who successfully negotiated the repeal of the Dutch import prohibition in 1919.[104]

In addition to supporting Japanese and Taiwanese trade in the East Indies, Guo also advanced the career of Japanese entrepreneur Tsutsumibayashi Kazue (1873–1938) (see figure 3.1). A native of Yamagata prefecture, Tsutsumibayashi moved to Taiwan in 1896 to work for the Government-General for a few years before meeting Guo and moving to the East Indies as his Japanese interpreter and secretary. With Guo's financial support, Tsutsumibayashi founded his own South Seas Trading Company (est. 1909) in Semarang to import Japanese goods.



FIGURE 3.1. Guo Chunyang, a prominent Taiwanese sugar and tea magnate in the East Indies (fourth from right, back row); Tsutsumibayashi Kazue, Japanese interpreter and secretary for Guo (third from right, back row). Courtesy of the Institute of Taiwan History Archives, Academia Sinica.

He then recruited Japanese secondary school graduates for his trading company, which employed over three hundred Japanese at its peak.[105]

In the mid-1910s, Guo and Tsutsumibayashi began discussions with the Taiwan Government-General about establishing an "Overseas Chinese Bank" (Kakyō Ginkō) in Taipei to finance joint Japanese-Taiwanese overseas Chinese ventures in South China and Southeast Asia. With Tsutsumibayashi as his interpreter, Guo gave a lecture in 1919 titled "South Seas Trade and the Overseas Chinese" to Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs in Taipei. Guo recounted his first visit to Japan in 1899 when the Japanese had been utterly indifferent to Southeast Asia. Since that time, Japan had established consulates, banks, and companies in the region during World War I as European exporters temporarily withdrew from Asian markets. Still, Guo advised the Japanese to make greater efforts to partner with overseas Chinese, who held the keys to Southeast Asian commerce. Overseas Chinese generally felt more amity toward the Western colonial powers—Britain, France, and the Netherlands—than toward Japan, as evidenced by anti-Japanese movements in the

latter half of the 1910s due to Japanese imperial incursions in China. To win over the hearts of the overseas Chinese, Guo proposed taking advantage of the Taiwanese as "Sino-Japanese mediators" since they shared the Fujianese dialects and hometowns with many overseas Chinese.[106]

To raise Taiwanese and Chinese financing for the new bank, Guo and the Government-General recruited Lin Xiongzheng (1888–1946), a Taiwanese sugar magnate of the Banqiao Lin family. In 1918, Lin received approval from Governor-General Akashi Motojirō (1864–1919, served 1918–19) to tour South China and Southeast Asia to recruit support from Chinese investors.[107] The following year the Government-General established the "China and South Seas Bank" (Kanan Ginkō) with a starting capital of ten million yen contributed by Japanese, Taiwanese, South Chinese, and overseas Chinese merchants.[108] As bank director, Lin echoed Guo's calls to capitalize on the "same culture and same race" shared among the Chinese populations in Taiwan, South China, and Southeast Asia.[109] Huang Zhonghan (1866–1924), a naturalized Taiwanese in the East Indies nicknamed the "Chinese Sugar King," exemplified the utility of dual overseas Chinese / Taiwanese intermediaries. Huang established a Japan-China Trade Association in Java that helped alleviate local anti-Japanese boycotts. In addition, Huang received financial support from the China and South Seas Bank to increase overseas Chinese imports of Japanese goods and exports of Java sugar to Japan.[110]

However, the cumulation of the post–World War I depression, the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake, and periodic anti-Japanese boycotts by overseas Chinese collectively weakened Taiwan's financial institutions by the end of the 1920s. Lin Xiongzheng, director of the China and South Seas Bank, reported in 1927 that Taiwan's trade with Southeast Asia had drastically declined.[111] The following year, the bank lost three-quarters of its initial capital by 1928, which led to the closing of branch offices in Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong.[112] As in China, the national affiliation of companies increasingly mattered to many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, though not all participated in anti-Japanese movements; some even profited during the boycotts by re-packaging Japanese products as Chinese.[113] Still, it was not uncommon for Taiwanese in Southeast Asia to hide their Japanese nationality to avoid becoming targets of anti-Japanese hostilities.[114]

Following Japan's 1931 occupation of Manchuria, Japanese nationality became a problem rather than a privilege for the overseas Taiwanese in Southeast Asia. Large-scale anti-Japanese boycotts led by Tan Kah-kee disrupted Japanese trade with Southeast Asia and threatened the livelihood of Taiwanese exports to the region.[115] The Taiwanese tea trade to Malaya, Siam, and Indochina, which had flourished in the 1910s–1920s, declined drastically.[116] The

Singapore Chinese Tea Merchant Association vowed not to import Japanese (including Taiwanese) goods, and the Singapore Taiwanese Association disbanded in the face of growing anti-Japanese boycotts.[117] In 1932, Cai Tianzhu, a member of the Taipei Tea Merchant Association, reported that several Taiwan tea businesses had closed in Singapore, Bangkok, and Saigon.[118] That same year, Chen Tianlai, head of the Taipei Tea Merchant Association, wrote an editorial in the *Taiwan Tea Industries* journal entitled, "Strategic Plans for Baozhong Tea (We Must Find New Markets)." With the unprecedented drop in tea exports to Southeast Asia, Chen urged Taiwanese merchants to expand sales in Japanese-occupied Manchukuo.[119] Indeed, as historian Lin Man-houng has shown, Taiwanese tea exports to Manchuria multiplied after 1932 while trade with Southeast Asia declined. By 1939, Taiwan's trade with Manchuria was eight times that of trade with Southeast Asia.[120]

The Taiwan Government-General's ambitions to mobilize the Taiwanese as economic intermediaries in Southeast Asia thus did not fully come to fruition. Though individuals like Guo Chunyang and Huang Zhonghan profited from overseas Taiwanese-Chinese networks, there were limits to how much they could advance Taiwan's trade in Southeast Asia.[121] With a population of over five million by the 1930s, overseas Chinese continued to dominate the region's commercial networks as entrepreneurs, merchants, and laborers. In contrast, less than 1,000 Taiwanese were registered with Japanese consulates in Southeast Asia, though Japanese officials estimated the actual numbers of Taiwanese to be as high as 3,000 (see table 3.1).[122] Many had avoided registering with local Japanese consulates in order to conceal their Taiwanese status and integrate themselves among the overseas Chinese. Some even participated in anti-Japanese movements when it suited their economic or political goals.

The earlier vision of Japanese colonial leaders, for Taiwan to serve as an imperial gateway not only into South China but also into Southeast Asia, had been imperfectly realized. The Government-General had hoped to extend economic interests from Taiwan into Southeast Asia by promoting Taiwanese as Sino-Japanese intermediaries for overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, yet their ethnocultural affinities did not necessarily benefit Japanese commercial interests in the interwar period. Even in the East Indies, which had the largest Taiwanese population in Southeast Asia with over 600 in 1935, few joined local Taiwanese Associations. Instead, many preferred to pass as self-proclaimed "overseas Chinese" out of fear of anti-Japanese discrimination.[123] Moreover, Japanese consuls in Southeast Asia observed, few overseas Taiwanese partnered with Japanese merchants, and even prominent entrepreneurs like Guo Chunyang, who had made substantial economic contributions to Taiwan, could not

Table 3.1 Japanese subject population in Southeast Asia, 1921–1935

	1921	1926	1931	1935
SIAM				
Japanese	272	245	309	412
Taiwanese	41	85	81	89
PHILIPPINES				
Japanese	8,612	9,807	19,695	21,468
Taiwanese	47	49	33	33
EAST INDIES				
Japanese	4,102	4,533	6,775	6,598
Taiwanese	291	391	776	628
MALAYA				
Japanese	5,762	6,964	6,454	6,487
Taiwanese	96	131	124	138
NORTH BORNEO				
Japanese	363	654	553	870
Taiwanese	15	33	63	35
INDOCHINA				
Japanese	329	300	307	239
Taiwanese	1	9	15	37

Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 66; Chung Shu-ming, *Rizhi shiqi zai Nanyang de Taiwanren* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2020), 2–4; Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, *Kaigai kakuchi zairyū Honpōjin shokugyōbetsu jinkōhyō (Taishō 10-nen 6-gatsumatsu genzaichō)* (Tokyo: Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, 1921), tables 16, 19–20; Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, *Kaigai kakuchi zairyū Honpōjin shokugyōbetsu jinkōhyō (Taishō 15-nen 10-gatsu 1-nichi genzaichō)* (Tokyo: Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, 1926), tables 17–18, 20–21.

be counted upon for unconditional loyalty to Japan. Guo promoted Sino-Japanese partnerships in Taiwan with the same opportunism as Japanese colonialists who trumpeted Pan-Asianist slogans of Taiwanese-Chinese "same race, same culture." Moreover, Fujianese-speaking Taiwanese and overseas Chinese, not the Japanese, reaped most of the profits from trade networks between Taiwan and the East Indies. Until the Government-General began supporting Baozhong tea production in the 1930s, Japanese companies in Taiwan did not make inroads into Southeast Asia's tea markets.[124]

By the mid-1930s, Japanese colonial authorities in Taiwan voiced skepticism about the utility of "unassimilated" Taiwanese in Southeast Asia. In 1935, Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzō (1875–1944, served 1932–36) stated that overseas Taiwanese would continue to immerse themselves among the overseas Chinese community unless they underwent prior assimilation in Japanese language and patriotism. Nakagawa thus advocated for the accelerated "Japa-

nization" of Taiwanese through Japanese-language education to remain loyal to Japan once deployed overseas.[125] That same year, Nakagawa hosted the Taiwan Exposition to commemorate forty years of Japanese rule. Like Shimomura twenty years earlier, Nakagawa used the occasion to re-publicize Taiwan's role as Japan's "southern advance base."

In contrast to 1916, when Taiwan had spearheaded Japan's economic advance, the Tokyo central government in 1935 now adopted maritime "southern advance" as an official policy of equal importance to "northern advance" in continental East Asia.[126] For the first few decades of the twentieth century, the Taiwan Government-General had promoted its southern imperial aims largely through economic and cultural fronts and its naturalized overseas Taiwanese populations without much support from the Tokyo central government. With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific wars of the 1930s and 1940s, however, Japan's military became directly involved in southern advance and actively partnered with the Taiwan Government-General in occupying South China and Southeast Asia. It is these transformations in the bureaucratic relations between the Government-General and Tokyo's ministries and their impact on the wartime experiences of the Taiwanese that we turn to in part 2.

Part Two

The Wartime Gateway

Chapter 4

Mobilizing for War

In July 1937, Japan's military forces invaded North China, marking the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War and Japanese mobilization for total war. Japan's colonial and military leaders now had to decide whether to enlist their Taiwanese subjects as military servicemen and deploy them to the front lines in China. Japan had some five million Taiwanese subjects, the majority Han with ethnic ties to China. Japanese officials categorized them as part of the "Chinese race" (Shina-zoku). A smaller number were indigenous Taiwanese, once derogatorily classified as "savages" (*banjin*) but, by the 1930s, positively reclassified as "the tribal peoples of Taiwan" (Takasago-zoku).[1] The Japanese did not worry about indigenous Taiwanese ties to China since they were perceived as having ethnolinguistic connections with the Austronesian peoples in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.[2] For the first few years of the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese colonial and military leaders focused their energies on the Han Taiwanese. (Though both groups were essential to Taiwan's wartime story, I generally use "Taiwanese" in part 2 to refer to the Han Taiwanese and "indigenous Taiwanese" to refer to the latter group.) Japanese authorities worried about whether decades of colonial rule had sufficiently assimilated the Taiwanese, such that they could be trusted with arms to fight for their Japanese "motherland" (J. *bokoku*, C. *muguo*). What if the Taiwanese sided instead with their Chinese "ancestral homeland" (J. *sokoku,* C. *zuguo*)?

Taiwanese stances toward Japan were varied. The Government-General had endeavored both to foster and enforce Taiwanese loyalty for Japan for years, but anticolonial activities had continued. The Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) had also made efforts to strengthen ties with the overseas Taiwanese population that both China and Japan claimed as their own "brethren" (J. *dōhō*, C. *tongbao*). Japanese officers in the Taiwan Army were therefore skeptical about how much they could trust the Taiwanese. In an intelligence report to Tokyo army headquarters in September 1937, Taiwan Army commander Hata Shunroku wrote, "Taiwanese have been donating funds to the war cause to demonstrate their solidarity with Japan as imperial subjects." But, he went on, this was only a tiny percentage of the Taiwanese population, and he felt that their actions were superficial. "Many Taiwanese still believe in China's power. Because of shared ethnic ties, they view China as their ancestral homeland and remain critical of our country. The majority hope for China's victory and Taiwan's reversion to China."[3]

Yet the massive scale of war and administrative burdens in China soon necessitated that Japan's army and navy draw on Taiwanese manpower. Beginning in the fall of 1937, the military allowed Han Taiwanese to serve in noncombatant civilian roles as "military assistants" (J. *gunzoku*, *gunpu*; C. *junshu*, *junfu*). As part of mixed Japanese-Taiwanese units in Central and South China, the majority of these military assistants worked as porters, farmers, interpreters, patrolmen, and nurses. Not until 1942, when the Japanese implemented the Special Army Volunteer System in Taiwan, were Taiwanese permitted to enlist as armed soldiers. Over the course of the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific wars, an estimated 126,000 Taiwanese served as military assistants, and some 80,000 as armed soldiers, for a total of 207,000 Taiwanese servicemen. Around 30,000 Taiwanese lost their lives in battle.[4]

Japanese wartime mobilization goals in Taiwan were full of ambiguities, and at times worked at cross-purposes. As other scholars have suggested, policies that aimed for what can be translated as "imperial subjectification" (*kōminka*), sought to radically "Japanize" colonial subjects, most notably with the elimination of Chinese-language education and publications.[5] But to spread propaganda and foster loyalty among the Taiwanese, the Government-General violated its own recommendations and communicated in the Chinese language. Moreover, Japanese officials often sought not to eradicate, but to take advantage of, the Chinese-ness of their Taiwanese subjects. Whether Taiwanese were serving as military assistants or later as armed soldiers, they possessed language and other cultural skills that made them distinctively useful for Japan in the China front. Indeed, Han Taiwanese, who were seen as racially Chinese, were allowed to enlist as military assistants four years earlier

than indigenous Taiwanese, who lacked that perceived link. Taiwanese had the tools to navigate the imperial gateway, making them a source not just of Japanese anxiety, but also, a means of furthering ambitious wartime strategy.

Cultivating Taiwanese Loyalty

For nearly two decades before the Second Sino-Japanese War began, anticolonial Taiwanese activists had been developing close ties to China. Japanese colonial officials responded with growing suspicion, and with policies fostering assimilation. By the 1930s, as we saw in chapter 2, some Taiwanese activists took refuge from the Government-General's increasingly strident crackdowns by moving to China. For instance, Xie Chunmu (1902–69), a prominent journalist and activist, had moved to Shanghai after Japanese officials disbanded the Taiwanese People's Party in 1931. He adopted a new name, Xie Nanguang, to try to conceal his Taiwanese identity and blend in with the Chinese community. With the support of GMD funds, he established the China Alliance News Agency in Shanghai to publish anti-Japanese Chinese propaganda. However, Xie and his Taiwanese colleagues in the news agency remained under Japanese consular surveillance.[6]

In the spring of 1936, Xie hosted Lin Xiantang (1881–1956), a leading Taiwanese political and economic figure who was on a two-month tour of China. Lin was quoted by the Chinese media referring to China, rather than Japan, as his "ancestral homeland" (J. *sokoku*, C. *zuguo*). The Japanese consulate police in Shanghai relayed the news to the Taiwan Government-General, which criticized Lin's words in the *Taiwan Daily News* as unpatriotic and hostile to the Japanese nation-state. Upon his return to Taiwan, Lin was interrogated by Japanese colonial officials about his national identity. Lin replied that, based on the dictionary definition, China was indeed his ancestral homeland since his ancestors were descendants of that country. On the other hand, Japan was his "motherland" (J. *bokoku*, C. *muguo*) where he had been raised. Despite publicly affirming his loyalty to the Japanese motherland, Lin was pressured to resign from leadership posts in the Taiwan Governor-General's advisory council and local civic associations.[7] The controversy came to be known as the Ancestral Homeland Incident.

As the year went on, anticolonial Taiwanese activities further exacerbated Japanese anxieties. Taiwan Army intelligence reports and British consular records documented several Taiwanese anticolonial activists caught plotting against Japanese rule in both Taiwan and China.[8] In October, Taiwan Government-General police arrested ten Taiwanese middle school students

for organizing a secret society aimed at Taiwan's secession from Japan.[9] Two months later, Taiwanese identified as "communist supporters of a revolution in Taiwan" were arrested by Japanese consular police in Xiamen and Shanghai and extradited to Taiwan.[10]

The Government-General responded to anticolonial threats not just on a case-by-case basis but with public programs designed to cultivate loyalty through Japanese-language assimilation. In 1929, Japanese colonial officials had launched an aggressive Japanese-Language Outreach Program. The tuition-free, part-time curriculum, offered outside the regular school system, was credited with tripling Japanese-language speakers among the Taiwanese from 12 percent in 1930 to 37 percent by 1937. The intensification of education outreach efforts during the Japanese "national language" movement from 1937, which included the suppression of spoken Chinese and indigenous languages, led to the further rise of Japanese-language speakers in Taiwan to 80 percent by 1943.[11]

During the 1930s, the Government-General launched campaigns centered on the sociocultural assimilation of the indigenous Taiwanese. Previously, the Japanese had prioritized the cultural assimilation and economic incorporation of Han Taiwanese in the western plains over the so-called savages in the central and eastern highlands, who, with a few exceptions, occupied the bottom rungs of Taiwan's colonial hierarchy.[12] Throughout the colonial period, the Government-General had heavily policed the indigenous Taiwanese communities to combat periodic armed uprisings. As late as October 1930, the Atayal peoples staged a massive revolt against the Japanese with the Musha Rebellion. As scholars Kondō Masami and Leo Ching have noted, the rebellion marked a turning point in Japanese indigenous governance. The Japanese soon replaced the derogatory moniker of "savages" with the "tribal peoples of Taiwan" (Takasago-zoku) and raised standards for their education and agricultural training.[13] By the end of the decade, primary school enrollment for indigenous children had risen to 87 percent, with one-third of the indigenous population capable of daily conversation in Japanese.[14] Starting in 1932, the Government-General published articles submitted by patriotic indigenous Taiwanese in the *Aborigine Administrators' Companion* journal.[15] Japanese officials celebrated the transformation of previously "backward," "head-hunting savages" into "enlightened," loyal subjects. Indigenous Taiwanese thus became an integral part of Japanese assimilation policies previously directed mainly at the Han population.

In 1936, the Taiwan Government-General began using the term *kōminka* ("imperial subjectification") to refer to sociocultural policies aimed at the rapid assimilation of both Han and indigenous Taiwanese into loyal subjects.[16] That July, the Government-General assembled a Promotion of Social Customs

Council, consisting of Japanese and Taiwanese representatives, to spread the following practices among the Taiwanese populace: (1) the use of spoken Japanese in place of Chinese not just in public but also in private within the family; and (2) patriotic worship at Japanese Shinto shrines.[17] Japanese officials promoted State Shinto in place of traditional Chinese religions—a blend of Buddhism, Daoism, and folk beliefs.[18] Taiwanese were encouraged to worship at local Shinto shrines, which nearly doubled from thirty-eight to sixty-eight between 1937 and 1943, and to install miniature Shinto altars in their households.[19]

In 1937, Governor-General Kobayashi Seizō stepped up efforts at linguistic de-Sinification for all of Taiwan. In January, the Japanese removed literary Chinese from the Taiwanese primary school curriculum, which had already been in decline since 1922 when it was designated an optional elective.[20] Three months later, the Government-General banned Chinese-language publications. The two proscriptions upset Taiwanese elites like Lin Xiantang and Cai Peihuo, who appealed to colonial officials that written Chinese was critical for most Taiwanese still illiterate in Japanese. Chinese-language publications were still the quickest means for inculcating Taiwanese with Japanese patriotism. Lin and Cai also contended that Chinese-language skills allowed the Taiwanese to conduct business in South China and Southeast Asia to promote Japanese interests in the region.[21]

Even Japanese officials in the Government-General quickly came to question the viability of a Chinese-language ban. During a governors' conference in Taipei in April 1937, the governor of Taidong voiced concerns that the policy was antithetical to Taiwan's goals in South China and Southeast Asia. According to a British consular report from Danshui, the governor echoed Lin and Cai's point that "knowledge of Chinese would be useful to Formosans [Taiwanese] who went abroad to engage in the policy of southward advance."[22] Other Japanese leaders also viewed the language ban as impractical since colonial officials, especially police and medical personnel, still relied on spoken and written Chinese to communicate with the majority Taiwanese population.[23]

The resulting quandary was whether the Government-General could generate pro-Japanese nationalism among the Taiwanese masses without using the Chinese language. As Japan's army advanced its way through North and Central China from mid to late 1937, the Japanese-language colonial media celebrated with jingoistic reports. However, the Government-General worried that news aimed to legitimate the war and boost patriotism could only reach Japanese-educated Taiwanese, a mere one-third of the population. The Taiwan Army's intelligence report on July 27, titled *Summary of Taiwanese Public Opinion*, noted with alarm that many Taiwanese listened to GMD radio broadcasts from Nanjing, which made them doubt the accuracy of Japanese news.[24]

Fearful of GMD war propaganda infiltrating Taiwanese society, the Japanese tried to restrict foreign broadcasts. In fall 1937, British consular reports noted that in Taipei, "Heavy penalties were attached to listening to radio broadcasts from foreign stations . . . [and] extensive domiciliary and personal searches were made, with the double purpose apparently of tracing a secret transmitting station and of searching for arms."[25]

Despite its de-Sinification aims, the Taiwan Government-General soon decided to compromise on its Chinese-language ban. Within weeks of the war, it established an Information Bureau that inaugurated Chinese-language programming from the Taipei radio station aimed at Taiwanese "national spiritual mobilization" (*kokka seishin dōin*). The Information Bureau's news bulletins and radio broadcasts included twenty-minute broadcasts in the Taiwanese dialect (twice a day) and Mandarin and English (once per day).[26] In 1942, the Government-General installed a second radio channel solely in the Taiwanese dialect for the non-Japanese speaking population. The Taipei radio station's multilingual programs were directed not only at Taiwanese but also at Chinese-language speakers in South China and Southeast Asia.[27]

The Taiwan Government-General pamphlet, *A True Account of the China Incident* (1937), "warned all islanders [Taiwanese] of distorted Chinese news propaganda." It described Japanese officials' efforts to distribute radio receivers throughout the island to inform Taiwanese with purportedly correct news.[28] Whether fueled by the popularity of Taiwanese-dialect radio broadcasts or the growing affordability of receivers, the percentage of Taiwanese households with licensed radios rose from 28 percent (12,000 households) in 1937 to over 44 percent (44,000 households) by 1944.[29] To reach a larger Taiwanese audience, Japanese officials also installed loudspeaker radio systems in public venues such as parks, schools, markets, and temple courtyards.[30] While restricting the spread of Chinese-language print media, the Government-General used spoken Chinese for radio propaganda aimed at the Taiwanese public. With Taiwan's ambiguous linguistic status in the wartime empire, Japanese officials attempted to balance competing interests of rapidly assimilating the Taiwanese while still using Chinese to propagate Japanese nationalism among Han residents.

Sino-Japanese Competition over the Overseas Taiwanese as "Brethren"

To generate anti-Chinese sentiment among the Taiwanese, the Taiwan Government-General publicized the wartime victimization of overseas Tai-

wanese "brethren" (J. *dōhō*, C. *tongbao*) in China at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek's GMD military. As Japan's army proceeded from North to Central China in summer 1937, Japanese subjects in South China, where there were no Japanese reinforcements, became vulnerable to Chinese attacks. Faced with the threat of Chiang deploying GMD forces to Fujian and Guangdong, Japanese consuls offered travel subsidies to resident Taiwanese to evacuate to Taiwan.[31] By late August, when GMD troops arrived, 10,000 Taiwanese and 2,000 Japanese had left for Taiwan, with hundreds of Taiwanese also fleeing to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.[32]

The few thousand Taiwanese who chose to remain in South China faced a precarious situation. The *Taiwan Daily News* reported that the GMD military imprisoned or executed hundreds of Taiwanese as suspected spies of Japan.[33] In October 1937, the Taiwan Information Bureau news reports described how anti-Japanese Chinese violence had resulted in countless deaths of Taiwanese brethren in Xiamen.[34] The *Taiwan Daily News* chronicled tragic stories of Taiwanese like Yu Ai, who lost family members while evacuating the city. Yu's husband had been too sick to leave Xiamen with Yu and their five children. After the GMD arrested him as a "traitor to the Han Chinese" (C. *hanjian*), Yu had no choice but to abandon him and flee with their children to Taiwan.[35] The Japanese colonial media also described the GMD destruction of Taiwan-funded institutions like the Xiamen Kyokuei Academy, Xiamen Philanthropic Hospital, and *Quanmin New Daily*, as well as the confiscation of Taiwanese private property.[36]

While Japanese narratives focused on overseas Taiwanese as victims of Chinese violence, mainland Chinese-language newspapers justified the GMD crackdown on Taiwanese for their anti-Chinese behavior. By the 1930s, Taiwanese in South China were notorious for abusing their extraterritorial privileges and profiting from illicit businesses under Japanese consular protection (see chapter 2).[37] The Second Sino-Japanese War exacerbated Chinese fears of Taiwanese spying or fighting on behalf of Japan. During the GMD occupation of Xiamen, for instance, the Taiwanese gangster Wang Changsheng had organized a militia corps with forty other Taiwanese to help protect the Japanese consulate. Most of the corps were killed or arrested by the GMD, although Wang managed to escape to Hong Kong.[38] The GMD also executed several leaders of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association on account of pro-Japanese collaboration.[39] Hundreds of other suspected Taiwanese were captured and relocated to agricultural camps in Chong'an in northern Fujian.[40]

The GMD, however, did not view all resident Taiwanese as enemies. GMD officials in Fujian conducted censuses that allowed pro-Chinese Taiwanese brethren to apply for renaturalization as Chinese nationals and keep their families and property in place. For example, Lin Jinquan, who donated 1,000 yuan to Xiamen's

Anti-Japanese Support Association in September 1937, obtained Chinese nationality for his family of seven.[41] By May 1938, an estimated 1,900 Taiwanese had applied for Chinese nationality.[42] The GMD also recruited anti-Japanese Taiwanese throughout China for propaganda and military activities, including the activist Xie Chunmu. Xie assisted with Chinese intelligence on the Japanese military for the GMD's Research Center on International Problems—first in Shanghai (1937) and Hong Kong (1938) and then in Chongqing (1939–45).[43]

The Taiwan Volunteer Corps (est. 1939) in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces and the Taiwan Revolutionary Alliance (est. 1941) in Chongqing were the two most prominent Taiwanese organizations in China supporting the GMD. The Volunteer Corps was a paramilitary group of several hundred Taiwanese that provided military and medical assistance to GMD troops.[44] The Revolutionary Alliance partnered with the GMD to propagate anti-Japanese publications and radio broadcasts to unify Chinese and Taiwanese brethren against Japan. Its leaders consisted of pro-GMD Taiwanese who had lived in China in the 1920s–30s as students, teachers, and party members—such as Xie Dongmin, Qiu Niantai, and Huang Chaoqin—many of whom went on to high-ranking positions in the post-1945 GMD government in Taiwan.[45] In Chinese journals like *Taiwan Vanguard* and *Wartime Japan*, Revolutionary Alliance members appealed to Chinese officials and the public that not all Taiwanese were "traitors to the Han Chinese" and that many remained loyal to their Chinese homeland.[46] Revolutionary Alliance propaganda pamphlets flown over Taiwan by American aircraft carriers called on the Taiwanese not to join Japan's war effort and "become cannon-fodder for the enemy."[47]

Nevertheless, GMD officials remained suspicious of even self-professed pro-Chinese Taiwanese. GMD Secretary-General Zhu Jiahua admitted that the term "Taiwanese" for him connoted "scoundrels involved in illicit activities."[48] In postwar memoirs, Xie Dongmin and Qiu Niantai wrote that the GMD closely monitored their activities. Huang Chaoqin recalled hiding his Taiwanese status to avoid accusations of being a Japanese spy.[49] Taiwanese in China thus were caught in-between competing nationalist narratives by Chinese and Japanese authorities. On the one hand, hundreds of Taiwanese were imprisoned or executed by the GMD as suspected collaborators. On the other hand, others were reembraced as fellow brethren with bilingual skills useful for anti-Japanese intelligence and propaganda work. Meanwhile, Japanese authorities portrayed the overseas Taiwanese as brethren victimized by the Chinese and in need of military rescue. In this way, wartime mobilization helped promote a pro-Japanese Taiwanese identity grounded in Chinese persecution, while also fostering Chinese distrust of the Taiwanese as traitorous collaborators of Japan.

Mobilizing Taiwanese Military Assistants to China

Prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Taiwan Army had primarily been used to suppress domestic rebellions within the island. During the 1930 Musha Uprising by the indigenous Atayal tribe in eastern Taiwan—the last large-scale armed revolt against Japanese colonialists—the Taiwan Army had recruited Han Taiwanese as military assistant laborers, though they were not entrusted with weapons.[50] With the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the growing need for additional manpower, the Taiwan Army looked to enlist an increasing number of Han Taiwanese as military personnel. Yet Japanese military leaders remained skeptical about whether Taiwanese could be trusted as armed soldiers due to their ethnic and kinship ties to China.

Months into the war, Taiwan Army intelligence reports contained over one hundred police cases involving anticolonial behavior. Though small in scale, they included Taiwanese students who talked back to their Japanese teachers by insisting that China would win the war; public criticism of Japanese discriminatory policies toward the Taiwanese; and the spread of pro-Chinese sentiment.[51] But Taiwan Governor-General Kobayashi Seizō was enthusiastic about incorporating military service as an integral part of the *kōminka* movement, and the Taiwan Army needed more manpower.[52] So, in September 1937, less than two months into the Sino-Japanese War, the Taiwan Army began recruiting Han Taiwanese as noncombatant military assistants. As part of mixed ethnic brigades led by Japanese officers, Han Taiwanese served in noncombatant roles as porters, farmers, interpreters, and nurses. They (like their Korean counterparts) were not segregated into separate units like the British Indians or African-American and Japanese-American minority soldiers during World War II.[53]

In what Japanese authorities celebrated as Taiwanese "volunteer fever" (*shigan netsujō*), military assistant applications increased from 103 in September to 1,953 in October.[54] Japanese colonial officials and the media valorized the new Taiwanese military assistants as model patriots. In an October 1937 radio broadcast, Taiwan general affairs director Morioka Jirō applauded the enthusiastic participation by Taiwanese in the war effort: "The Taiwanese deployed to Central China as porters and farmers have displayed tremendous patriotism and loyalty. Many Taiwanese, including indigenous peoples, have offered their services and donated war funds to express their nationalistic spirit. Taiwanese women, too, have volunteered as nurses." Morioka emphatically described the military assistant applications that included Taiwanese "blood pleas" (*kessho*), which were literally "letters written in blood," as proof of loyalty to the emperor.

One of the first groups of Taiwanese volunteers dispatched to Central China was military farmers, sent to increase Japanese army food production. The Government-General published news reports, films, songs, and textbooks to commemorate the courage of Taiwanese "plow warriors," including a May 1938 film titled, *The Glory of Military Assistants* (*Homare no gunpu*), based on the life of Chen Yang. In August 1937, the forty-nine-year-old Chen had volunteered with his twenty-year-old son for the Shanghai war front, where he became one of the war's first Taiwanese casualties. A tomb was built in his hometown to honor his sacrifice. The Government-General distributed the film to Taiwanese theaters and schools and incorporated Chen's story into ethics textbooks.[55]

Taiwanese were enlisted as military interpreters by the Japanese army and navy in Central and South China (see figure 4.1). The Japanese viewed educated bilingual Taiwanese as ideal interpreters, especially in Fujian and Guangdong provinces, where they shared regional Chinese dialects or could quickly learn them. In early 1939, in front of Taipei's Public Assembly Hall, the Government-General honored fourteen Taiwanese military interpreters—a mix of professional teachers, lawyers, journalists, doctors, and businessmen—for having served in the occupation of South China's Guangzhou in the fall of 1938. In speeches directed at the Taiwanese public, the interpreters spoke

FIGURE 4.1. Taiwanese military interpreters in Japan's South China Expeditionary Army, ca. 1938. Interpreters did not carry rifles but had Japanese swords and wore armbands with the character "tsū" (short for *tsūyaku* or "interpreter"). Source: Takeuchi Kiyoshi, *Jihen to Taiwanjin* (Taipei: Taiwan Shinminpōsha, 1940).

about the "glory of military service," their "willingness to die for the sake of Japan," and their gratitude for participating in the "holy war" against China.[56]

Japanese wartime rhetoric celebrated the patriotism of indigenous Taiwanese too, even though they lacked the Chinese language skills of their Han counterparts. The donation of war funds, worship at Shinto shrines, and submission of blood pleas to volunteer as military assistants were reported as proof of successful assimilation of indigenous Taiwanese.[57] The Japanese media eulogized model patriots such as Sayon, a seventeen-year-old Atayal girl who drowned in a 1938 typhoon while carrying her Japanese teacher's luggage across a river during his sendoff to the war front. Sayon became a martyr whose story was dramatized in songs and paintings and culminated in the film, *The Bell of Sayon* (*Sayon no kane*, 1943).[58]

Still, such inclusionary rhetoric did not translate into the elevation of indigenous Taiwanese from their third-class colonial status. Whereas Han Taiwanese offered Chinese-language expertise and could serve as military intermediaries, Japanese officials viewed indigenous Taiwanese as less acculturated—even primitive or uncivilized—with poor Japanese and without Chinese skills that would translate in wartime China. Few records exist of indigenous Taiwanese servicemen in the China theater (except for several military "comfort women" [*jūgun ianfu*] in occupied Hainan, as we will discuss in chapter 5). It was only after Japanese army forces invaded Southeast Asia in 1941 that Japanese-educated indigenous youth were deployed overseas as military assistants in the Asia-Pacific War.

The following year, both Han and indigenous Taiwanese became eligible for enrollment as armed military soldiers. Between 1942 and 1945, the Government-General dispatched tens of thousands of Taiwanese as military servicemen to the war fronts of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. A wide range of motivations drove Taiwanese to volunteer for military service. Taiwanese youth who grew up with Japanese-language education in the 1920s and 1930s were most receptive to wartime service. Some volunteered out of patriotic ideals, while others enlisted for the high wages, viewing military service as an opportunity for socioeconomic advancement and prestige.[59] Others felt intense pressure from Japanese teachers and officials, in addition to their Taiwanese peers, to prove their Japanese-ness in the form of military sacrifice.[60] Having long been doubly marginalized as third-class subjects by the Japanese and Han communities, many indigenous Taiwanese, in particular, hoped to prove themselves as courageous and capable subjects of the empire.[61] As the scholar Chih-Huei Huang has noted, military service was one of the few paths to economic advancement for the indigenous Taiwanese who had fewer chances at socioeconomic mobility than Han Taiwanese.[62] In other words,

patriotic and pragmatic incentives were not mutually exclusive for the hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese who volunteered.

To be sure, one must remain skeptical of Japanese official statements of Taiwanese "volunteer fever." Taiwan Army intelligence reports included cases of Taiwanese who tried to avoid military service through fraud or flight.[63] Many Taiwanese were volunteers in name only as Japanese police coerced them to apply.[64] Because Japanese authorities censored public statements by the Taiwanese, one must turn to postwar oral histories and memoirs to render a more nuanced picture of motivations for military service. As historians like Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Sayaka Chatani have noted, even with the interpretative challenges of retrospective narratives, firsthand testimonies help shed light on the complicated—if not at times contradictory—emotions and self-perceptions of Taiwanese volunteers.[65]

In postwar interviews, for example, Li Taiping (b. 1918), a member of the 1938 Taiwan Agricultural Volunteer Corps in Central China, said he had been drawn to military assignments as much out of pragmatic self-interest as patriotic ideals. Li said he had signed up for the high wages of ¥30 a month, the equivalent pay of a police officer in Taiwan. After completing his farming duties, he stayed on as a military interpreter, for which his salary doubled to ¥60 a month. Fluent in Japanese and having picked up the local Zhejiang dialect, Li translated Chinese intelligence for the Japanese army. He left his unit in the 1940s to join a Sino-Japanese agricultural company where he earned over ¥100 a month.[66] Li's military service thus opened up profitable opportunities that were not necessarily linked to the nationalism that Japanese officials celebrated.

At the same time, there are extant interviews and memoirs by self-professed patriots who volunteered precisely to prove their loyalty to Japan. When interviewed in the 1990s, Zhang Zijing (b. 1921, Toyomitsu Saburō) explained that Japanese colonial education had successfully turned him into a devoted subject. He believed that Japan, not China, was his motherland, and that it was his duty to fight the Chinese: not once did he view them as brethren, despite his shared Han ethnicity. Following in the footsteps of his two older brothers who were dispatched to occupied Hainan as a policeman and teacher, Zhang served on the same island as a military interpreter and intelligence officer from 1941 to 1945.[67]

As for Taiwanese women, Japanese authorities praised nurse volunteers as exemplars of "the female Yamato [Japanese] spirit" (*josei Yamato damashi*).[68] With the growing need for medical personnel in China, the Government-General recruited Taiwanese nurse assistants for military hospitals in occupied South China. Since the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), the Japanese media

had portrayed military nurses as model female patriots, referring to them as "angels in white uniform" (*hakui no tenshi*).[69] Taiwanese nurse volunteers consisted primarily of educated female graduates from secondary girls' schools or members of patriotic youth groups.[70] Japanese songs paid homage to Taiwanese nurses dispatched to China with lyrics such as: "Little lilies bloom in the mountains [of Taiwan] and leave their fathers and mothers behind to cross the sea to South China and advance with the imperial military."[71]

Like their male counterparts, Taiwanese women volunteered as military nurse assistants out of a mix of patriotism and social pressure (see figure 4.2). Upon graduating from Japanese-language primary school, Fu Xiusong (b. 1928, Toyama Emiko) initially wanted to study medicine in Japan, but her family could not afford it. After working three years at her local Xinzhu police bureau, Fu joined the Imperial Subjects for Public Service Girls' Training Center in 1942. With Fu's older brother already serving in New Guinea, her father encouraged her to apply as a military nurse assistant that year. However, she was rejected for being under eighteen, the required minimum age. Despite opposition from her mother and sister, who feared that she would be killed in battle, Fu applied two more times. In her third application in 1944, after which

Figure 4.2. Taiwanese military nurses in Haikou's Benevolent Hospital Clinic, Hainan Island, May 1939. Courtesy of Asahi Shimbun.

she was accepted and dispatched to Guangzhou, she wrote the lyrics to the Japanese military anthem, "Go Off into the Sea," in her own blood to prove her willingness to die for the country.[72]

Both Fu and Chen Huimei (b. 1927, Azuma Emiko), a fellow Taiwanese nurse assistant in Guangzhou, understood that their official status was lower than that of the ethnic Japanese. In wartime China, Taiwanese nurse assistants wore the same uniforms as their Japanese counterparts but donned different hats to mark their distinct ethnic identity.[73] Still, as patriotic subjects, they eagerly embraced the opportunity to serve the Japanese empire and bring official honor upon themselves and their families. Chen and her secondary school classmates looked up to Japanese military nurses and followed their Japanese teachers' advice to volunteer after graduation. Chen was also raised by a patriotic mother who willingly adopted the Japanese surname, Azuma, for their family and installed a miniature Shinto altar in their household. As head of the local Taiwanese women's association that assisted with wartime savings and air defense drills, Chen's mother was proud of her deployment as a volunteer nurse to Guangzhou.[74]

On the other hand, Taiwanese military assistants like Cai Xinke (b. 1919, Sayama Yasuo) felt more ambivalent about their identity vis-à-vis the Japanese and Chinese. Cai had grown up resentful of Japanese who differentiated themselves as first-class subjects from the Taiwanese who were second-class subjects. He felt the injustice of how Taiwanese paths for higher education were limited and that their salaries were two-thirds of their Japanese counterparts.[75] Having worked his way up to first-rank patrolman in Taiwan, Cai volunteered as a military policeman in 1940s Hainan for higher wages and the opportunity to prove himself equal to his Japanese peers.[76] In postwar interviews, Cai said he felt conflicted about the Chinese he interrogated and even executed based on his Japanese superiors' orders: "Not a single day passed during the war when I forgot that I was ethnically Han, and thus I did not willfully kill the Chinese."[77]

While Japan waited until 1942 to arm Taiwanese for battle, the Tokyo War Ministry, with the backing of both the Korean Army and Korean Government-General, implemented a Special Army Volunteer System for Koreans to begin in April 1938.[78] As in Taiwan, Japanese authorities in colonial Korea and Manchuria worried about anti-Japanese activism and were eager to promote *kōminka* ("imperial subjectification") policies. But the Japanese had other, distinctive reasons to enlist Korean soldiers. Following Japan's 1931 occupation of Manchuria, Koreans had worked in the Manchukuo police and military forces. By the mid-1930s, Japanese officials recognized increasing patriotism among Koreans for "Japan-Korea harmony" (Naisen yūwa) and the development of Manchukuo as a joint Japanese-Korean project.[79] What's more, colo-

nial discourse promoted the idea that Koreans and Japanese shared historical and racial ties (Nissen dōsoron). All this made it easier for the Imperial Army and Navy to mobilize Koreans in the armed forces.[80]

Despite wartime slogans promoting "Japan-Taiwan unity" (Nittai itchi), Japanese rhetoric of racial affinity with the Taiwanese did not exist to the same extent as it did in Korea. However, Japanese claims that Koreans were better suited for military service because they were more acculturated than Taiwanese were disingenuous, at least from a linguistic and educational perspective. Indeed, the low level of Japanese-language speakers among the colonial population was more of a concern for Japanese officials in Korea than in Taiwan.[81] By 1937, thanks to the success of the Taiwan Government-General's Japanese-Language Outreach Program, the percentage of Taiwanese who spoke Japanese was three times that of Koreans (the government in Korea implemented a similar program that same year, nine years after Taiwan). Though Japanese-language speakers in Korea from 1937 to 1943 nearly doubled (12 percent to 22 percent), the average Japanese-language ability in Taiwan remained much higher.[82] Such wartime statistics point to Taiwanese, rather than Koreans, as more assimilated in Japanese-language education and potentially better suited for military service.

For Japan's army and navy leaders, the problem of military enlistment in Taiwan was not so much about Japanese-language abilities but the risk of pro-Chinese sentiment. Han Taiwanese were in a particularly tricky position because of their ethnocultural ties to China. In the end, Japan's wartime mobilization of Taiwanese personnel consisted of multiple tensions and contradictions. On the one hand, the Government-General promoted *kōminka* policies that sought to convert the mother tongue of Taiwanese subjects to Japanese, increase patriotic loyalty, and eliminate pro-Chinese sentiment. Along with active Japanese-language outreach efforts, colonial officials banned Chinese-language education and publications. At the same time, the Japanese encouraged the use of spoken Chinese for pragmatic war aims. The Government-General inaugurated Chinese-language radio broadcasts to promote war propaganda and pro-Japanese nationalism among the Han Taiwanese population (the majority did not yet understand Japanese in 1937). Moreover, the Japanese military dispatched Han Taiwanese as military assistants to China's war front precisely because of their Sino-Japanese bilingual abilities.

Taiwanese volunteers for military service were driven by diverse social, economic, and ideological motivations. Intergenerational differences contributed to much of Taiwanese youth's war fever. Many Taiwanese who grew up with Japanese-language education in the 1920s–30s became patriotic subjects in pursuit of public honor, higher wages, or both by contributing to Japan's

war efforts. Long relegated to second—or even third-class status—Han and indigenous Taiwanese volunteers saw military service as an opportunity to prove they were equally capable and devoted as the Japanese. Interethnic competition in the Japanese military included Han Taiwanese who strove to gain the same army volunteer privileges as the Koreans (who served as armed soldiers four years earlier) and indigenous Taiwanese who sought to outperform the Han Taiwanese.

The Japanese *kōminka* movement's goal was not to transform Taiwanese into ethnic Japanese but to cultivate a Pan-Asianist loyalty and patriotism toward Japan. The Han Taiwanese themselves rarely viewed their status as equal to that of the Japanese. Instead, they often embraced a hybrid Taiwanese identity: ethnic Han who were culturally and legally Japanese nationals and thus different from, and superior to, the Chinese they fought in the war. To be sure, many felt ambivalent and resentful toward the Japanese even as they sought the socioeconomic benefits of military service. Meanwhile, GMD officials largely distrusted Taiwanese in China as pro-Japanese collaborators, as evidenced by the arrest and killing of Taiwanese residents in Xiamen in 1937. At the same time, anticolonial Taiwanese activists were recruited by the GMD for Japanese skills critical to intelligence activities. In this way, Taiwanese in wartime China were in a precarious situation caught in-between nationalist agendas by Chinese and Japanese authorities.

Chapter 5

Colonial Liaisons in Occupied South China

In September 1936, anti-Japanese activists in the South China city of Beihai killed a Japanese shopkeeper. The Imperial Navy, already eager to expand Japan's empire into South China, attempted to use the murder, known as the "Beihai Incident" as a pretext to seize nearby Hainan, China's southernmost island. Roughly the same size as Taiwan and strategically located between Hong Kong and Indochina, Hainan had potential as a naval base with untapped agricultural and mineral resources.[1] The navy drew up occupation plans that included help from the Taiwan Government-General in administering and developing the island. However, the army rejected the navy's proposal. With its strategic priorities in North China and defending against the Soviet Union, the army wished to avoid a conflict in South China with the Anglo-French powers. Plans to invade South China were aborted.[2]

A year later, Japan was at war with China, and the Imperial Navy and Taiwan Government-General tried, again, to convince the Imperial Army and Foreign Ministry to extend Japan's territorial sovereignty along South China's coast and its neighboring islands in the South China Sea. The army, fearful of provoking the Western regional powers, and focused, after all, on other parts of China, maintained its opposition.[3] It had invaded North China in 1937 not with the goal of occupying all of China, but of integrating North China with Manchukuo (Japanese-occupied Northeast China since 1931) into a regional economic bloc. The army wanted a short war that would force Chiang Kai-shek's

GMD government to negotiate a quick settlement.[4] However, the Japanese military met unexpectedly fierce resistance from GMD forces. Even after Japan's brutal occupation of Central China's major cities by late 1937, including the commercial center of Shanghai and the former GMD capital of Nanjing, Chiang's refusal to surrender led to a protracted war of attrition.[5] As Chiang relocated his government first to Wuhan in Central China's interior and then to Chongqing in Southwest China, Japan's army of 600,000 soldiers became overextended and worn down by heavy casualties.[6] Meanwhile, the Anglo-American powers supported Chiang by flying in military and food supplies from Hong Kong.[7]

By mid-1938, Japan's army agreed with the navy and Taiwan Government-General: it was time for a southern military advance. To try to cut off Western aid routes from Hong Kong to GMD forces in Southwest China, the army supported the Japanese occupation of coastal South China—Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou—all of which were overtaken by the end of the year. The army also agreed to the navy's appeals to take over Hainan as a military base to block aid routes from Indochina and Burma to Chongqing. In the navy's largest campaign of the war, Japanese forces—including 10,000 troops from the Taiwan Army—captured Hainan in February 1939.[8] With the start of the Asia-Pacific War in December 1941, Japan's military occupied the international settlement of Gulangyu off the coast of Xiamen.

The Taiwan Government-General hoped that the occupation of South China would allow it to extend its administrative powers over the region. China was too large to be occupied in a unified fashion, and Japan's military services did not have a master plan to oversee a multi-front war. Instead, the planning was often piecemeal, messy, and advanced by different Japanese institutional actors who were sometimes at cross-purposes. Uncertainty surrounded Taiwan's strategic role and whether its subject peoples could be counted on to remain loyal to Japan in the China theater. Still, the Taiwan Government-General proposed that its colonial institutions and personnel were uniquely suited to help the Japanese military govern South China with decades of cross-strait networks and experience. The Government-General's bid to participate in South China's occupation was motivated by nationalism, but also by institutional interests for greater jurisdictional responsibilities. As the occupations got underway, however, Japan's military services made clear that the Government-General would remain subservient to their commands.

Nevertheless, Japan's navy and army ultimately relied heavily on Government-General personnel and expertise to govern the South China coast, especially the strategic sites of Xiamen and Hainan. Just as Japan's military drew on trained Manchukuo personnel (including the South Manchurian Railway Company)

for political and economic assistance in North and Central China, the military tapped into Taiwan's regional networks and experience to help administer South China.[9] In Hainan, for instance, the navy turned to the Taiwan Development Company (a Government-General-backed national policy company, est. 1936) to increase the island's agricultural production by importing Taiwan-based personnel and cultivation techniques. In both Hainan and Xiamen, the Japanese military valued the Taiwanese as Sino-Japanese go-betweens due to their linguistic and regional affinities. Japanese-educated Taiwanese were also viewed as more patriotic and trustworthy than local Chinese personnel. Xiamen's wartime government was unique among China's cities in that it contained a large percentage of Taiwanese officials (over one-quarter). No other Japanese-led administration in China consisted of such a high ratio of colonial subjects.

Japan's military also turned to the Taiwanese for help managing South China's economic and cultural affairs. A few thousand Japanese settlers had moved to South China from the metropole during the war, but their numbers paled in comparison to the large prewar Japanese expatriate communities of North and Central China. In Shanghai, for example, as the number of Japanese firms increased from 137 in 1936 to 342 in 1941, Japan's settler population rose to over 100,000.[10] In Xiamen, the navy instead turned to tens of thousands of Taiwanese—most of whom were prewar residents of the city who had taken temporary refuge in Taiwan from 1937 to 1938—to restore public order and the economy. As for Hainan, which had few Japanese or Taiwanese residents before the war, the navy enlisted thousands of new Taiwanese to serve as interpreters, policemen, and agricultural and medical personnel. In its efforts to transform tropical Hainan into a "second Taiwan," the Japanese military relied on Taiwan-based expertise—linguistic, economic, and cultural—that was unavailable in the Japanese metropole. In this way, the Government-General proved its importance to Japan's wartime empire as a strategic and economic gateway to occupied South China.

Japan's Intra-Imperial Rivalries over South China

In April 1938, the Imperial Navy established a Naval Military Office in Taipei to coordinate occupation plans for South China with Taiwan. While the Imperial Army focused its attention on crushing Chiang Kai-shek's remaining forces in Central China, the Naval Military Office director, Admiral Fukuda Ryōzō (1889–1980, served 1938–39), worked together with the Government-General over the next several months to draft administrative proposals for

Xiamen, Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hainan. The navy and army would oversee military affairs in these coastal areas but would delegate civil and economic administration to Taiwan. The Government-General would dispatch colonial personnel—from policemen and teachers to agricultural and medical advisers—to supervise local Chinese personnel.[11]

The Government-General drew up separate plans for Hainan, which it hoped to administer much like an overseas colony "by applying the experience of Taiwan rule." The goal was to export Taiwan's developmental model, institutions, and personnel to Hainan. The Government-General aimed to construct basic shipping, railway, and airfield infrastructure; make the island self-sufficient in food production by adopting Taiwanese rice strands and cultivation practices; exploit the island's iron ore to aid Taiwan's industrialization; and deploy Japanese and Taiwanese laborers until a more permanent settler-immigration policy was implemented.[12]

Japan's navy began its occupation of South China in May 1938, when it overtook Xiamen (see figure 5.1). The following month, it established a Xiamen Reconstruction Committee consisting of three navy officials, two Foreign Ministry consuls, and four Taiwan Government-General officials to oversee civil-

FIGURE 5.1. Chinese children shown waving Japanese flags to welcome Japan's naval land forces in Xiamen, May 1938. Courtesy of Mainichi Shimbun and AFLO.

ian affairs. The committee oversaw a local regime, the Xiamen Municipal Special Government, composed of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese officials.[13] The navy also contracted Government-General police officials to help maintain order in Xiamen while Fukudai Company (a Taiwan Development affiliate) embarked on the city's economic development.[14]

Precisely which Japanese agencies would oversee the administration of coastal South China became a source of tension among the military services, Foreign Ministry, and Government-General. In the fall of 1938, the Government-General proposed that the navy and army preside over military affairs but delegate civil affairs to the Government-General. The Government-General, rather than the military, would coordinate with local Chinese officials and manage economic development. But the army did not wish to share jurisdiction over occupied China with civilian agencies, and instead sought to consolidate political authority in North, Central, and South China under the military. In September 1938, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) agreed with the military services to establish an Asia Development Board (Kōain) that granted the army and navy joint jurisdiction over occupied China. The Asia Development Board would be headquartered in Tokyo, with five regional offices set up in occupied China: Beijing, Zhangjiakou, Shanghai, Qingdao, and Xiamen.[15] The Foreign Ministry opposed the decision, which effectively ended its power in China.[16] So did the Government-General, which feared that the proposed Asia Development South China Office in Xiamen would diminish its administrative role in the region.[17]

The following month, Taiwan general affairs director Morioka Jirō sent a missive to Prime Minister Konoe requesting that the Asia Development South China Office be stationed in Taiwan rather than in Xiamen. The Government-General had managed four decades of economic and cultural activities in South China, Morioka wrote, and was thus in the best position to lead civil administration in the region. Should the South China Office be established in Xiamen, Morioka implored Konoe to permit the Government-General to work closely with the office.[18] Although Konoe ultimately decided to keep the regional office in Xiamen, he recognized Taiwan's prewar contributions in Fujian and welcomed future collaborations. However, he made it clear that Government-General officials in South China would serve as "contracted personnel under the Asia Development Board to avoid conflict between the two institutions."[19] Indeed, though the Taiwan Government-General remained subordinate to the military services concerning South China policy, it still played an instrumental role in Japan's regional occupation.[20] While the army and navy were formally in charge of South China's administration—the former in

Guangzhou and Shantou, the latter in Xiamen and Hainan—both military services commissioned Japanese colonial officials from Taiwan.

In the Asia Development Board's Xiamen Office, founded in March 1939, eight of its forty-six Japanese officials were deployed from Taiwan.[21] Lieutenant-General Mito Taizō and Admiral Fukuda Ryōzō of the Government-General served as Xiamen Office directors; other colonial officials filled the high ranks of the office's political, economic, and cultural divisions (see figure 5.2).[22]

Both returning and new Taiwanese residents took up high-ranking positions in the Japanese-backed Xiamen Special Municipal Government. For the Chinese mayor of Xiamen, the Imperial Navy appointed Li Sixian (b. 1885), a long-time chairman of the Xiamen Lawyers Association.[23] Like the Japanese-backed Chinese regimes in North and Central China, the Xiamen government was supervised by Japanese military advisers who retained de facto control. What made Xiamen's regime unique compared to its counterparts in other cities like Shanghai or Tianjin, which was staffed by nearly all Chinese personnel, was the large proportion of Taiwanese officials.[24] By 1941, over one-quarter of Xiamen government officials (373 out of 1,314) were Taiwanese.[25] No other urban government in China contained as high a percentage of Japanese colonial subjects as it did in Xiamen.

To maintain Xiamen's public order, Japan's navy recruited hundreds of Taiwan Government-General police and legal officials. In mid-1938, the Taiwan police chief Hosoi Hideo led 107 policemen (eighteen of whom were Taiwanese) to join the navy's Xiamen police corps.[26] In 1939, an additional 115 policemen (including fifty-five Taiwanese) were deployed to Xiamen to supervise Chinese officials in the Xiamen government.[27] By 1942, one-third of the Xiamen Police Department was Taiwanese, with many in supervisory roles.[28] Government-General personnel were equally essential to Xiamen's law courts. The Asia Development Board commissioned Japanese colonial prosecutors as advisors to the Xiamen Higher Court. At the same time, Taiwanese constituted nearly one-quarter of the legal staff assigned to the city's courts and attached prisons.[29] The prominent Taiwanese lawyer Huang Zhongkang (b. 1915) served as head of the Xiamen District Court until his assassination by anti-Japanese Chinese activists in early 1941.[30]

To implement Japanese-language education in Xiamen, the navy turned to Japanese and Taiwanese teachers with prewar experience in the region. It appointed Kitahara Kimio, a former Japanese teacher at Fuzhou's Taiwanese school, as education advisor to the Xiamen government. Kitahara added a Japanese-language curriculum to Chinese primary schools. With his colleagues from the South China Primary School Textbook Committee (formed by the Taiwan Education Bureau), Kitahara replaced anti-Japanese, pro-GMD text-



Figure 5.2. Taiwan Government-General Lieutenant-General Mito Taizō served as the first head of the Asia Development Board Xiamen Office, March 1939–July 1940 (top-right); Government-General Lieutenant-General Ōta Taiji served as the second head of the office, July 1940–May 1941 (top-left); the Asia Development Board Xiamen Office headquarters with flags of Japan and Wang Jingwei's Reorganized National Government (bottom). Source: Bessho Kōji, *Shin Amoi* (Amoi: Bessho Kōji, 1940).

books with Japanese primers, teacher manuals, and education guidelines.[31] Japanese and Taiwanese educators were recruited from Taiwan to train local Chinese teachers in Japanese-language pedagogy.[32] In 1938, the Taiwan Government-General also established the Xiamen Co-Prosperity Association (J. Kyōeikai, C. Gongronghui), which set up Japanese-language centers for the broader Chinese population.[33]

The Government-General not only provided key personnel to the Xiamen regime but also facilitated cross-strait tourist exchanges and training workshops. Japanese colonial officials conducted inspection tours of South China's schools, police forces, and law courts. In turn, Chinese educators, police, and legal staff were invited to Taiwan for on-site training and Japanese-language study.[34] In August 1939, for example, Xiamen Mayor Li Sixian and his group of nine officials toured Taiwan's major cities. In June 1942, Li reciprocated by hosting Governor-General Hasegawa Kiyoshi (1883–1970, served 1940–44) for an inspection tour of Xiamen (see figure 5.3).[35]

In Hainan, the navy established a Special Affairs Division in 1941 for civilian administration, with half its personnel from Taiwan. Government-General officials headed division sections for health, education, finance, agriculture,



FIGURE 5.3. Xiamen Special Municipal Government Mayor Li Sixian (left) hosting Taiwan Governor-General Hasegawa Kiyoshi (right) at a banquet to celebrate the Government-General inspection tour of Xiamen, June 1942. Courtesy of the Institute of Taiwan History Archives, Academia Sinica.

forestry, and marine industries. Taipei Imperial University professors Shimojō Himakazu (Tropical Medicine Research Center) and Tanaka Chōzaburō (Tropical Agricultural Studies) were appointed as chairmen of the division's health and agricultural committees.[36] With incessant guerrilla warfare by GMD and CCP troops who remained in the interior highlands, the navy also commissioned thousands of Japanese and Taiwanese policemen from Taiwan.[37] Government-General police were viewed as effective in managing not only Chinese insurgents but also Hainan's indigenous peoples (the Li and Miao, who made up one-tenth of the island's population of two-and-a-half million), whom the Japanese likened to the indigenous Taiwanese. As the Tokyo politician Ishiyama Kenkichi observed in his 1942 travelogue on Hainan: "It is far more effective to bring over police officials from Taiwan than from Japan's metropole. Not only are they accustomed to the tropical climate, but they also have prior experience dealing with indigenous peoples."[38]

In contrast with Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou, which were not resource-rich regions, Hainan offered agricultural and mineral resources that the navy and Taiwan Government-General sought to exploit for Japan's war industry. According to Japanese officials, Hainan was in a "developmental state similar to pre-1895 Taiwan before Japanese rule." The Taipei Imperial University inspection team described Hainan's residents as "living an animal-like existence" reminiscent of the Taiwanese before Japanese rule.[39] Just as Japan had successfully developed Taiwan's agricultural economy over four decades, the navy and Government-General hoped that Japanese and Taiwanese personnel from Taiwan could elevate Hainan's economic standards within a decade.[40] Unlike prewar Xiamen, which had over 10,000 overseas Taiwanese—the largest colonial subject population in South China—prewar Hainan had few Taiwanese, let alone Japanese, residents. By the start of the Pacific War, however, an estimated 240 Taiwanese translators, 1,500 Taiwanese policemen, and over 2,000 Taiwanese civilians made up two-fifths of Japan's subject population in Hainan.[41] The Government-General and its Taiwanese personnel were counted on to develop the island's agricultural economy and fend off Chinese guerrilla attacks. The navy and Government-General thus shared common interests in securing resources and strategic responsibilities in occupied Hainan.

Taiwanese Military Interpreters

Japan had begun to rely on the Taiwanese as military interpreters early in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The occupation of the South China coast increased the demand for such intermediaries. Though relegated to the lowest rank of

civilian military assistants, Taiwanese interpreters were critical in guiding Japanese soldiers, translating Chinese-language intelligence, and serving as go-betweens for Japanese officials and local Chinese (see figure 5.4). After occupying Xiamen in May 1938, the Imperial Navy requested that the Taiwan Government-General recruit educated Taiwanese to translate the Mandarin, Fujianese, and Cantonese dialects. The Taiwan Education Bureau recommended eighty Taiwanese primary school teachers and twenty-five former teachers and graduates of overseas Taiwanese schools in South China (who had evacuated to Taiwan in 1937) to serve as navy interpreters.[42]

Some interpreters, like Huang Liu, who translated for the navy from 1937 to 1938, were evacuees from South China.[43] A Taipei native and longtime teacher at Xiamen Kyokuei Academy since 1916, Huang also served as chairman of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association from 1934 to 1937.[44] After evacuating to Taipei in August 1937, Huang was appointed by the Government-General to work in the Taipei Radio Bureau, only to be transferred a few weeks later to the navy. Huang translated for the navy for a year until August 1938, when he was discharged and returned to teaching at the reopened Xiamen Kyokuei Academy.[45]

The Japanese military also recruited interpreters from among overseas Taiwanese prisoners freed from GMD custody in Xiamen, including Taiwanese women such as Xue Liangying. A native of Xinzhu and a graduate of Tokyo Girls' Dental Medical School, Xue had been imprisoned from August 1937 to May 1938 by the GMD army. Upon her release, Xue enlisted as a navy interpreter.[46] An even more prominent case was Xu Zhiting (b. 1903), a Taipei native and resident in Xiamen with a cosmopolitan educational background in Japanese, Chinese, and English, followed a similar trajectory, moving from prisoner of war up the imperial hierarchy. After graduating from Hong Kong's Diocesan Boys' School (1919–23), Xu had majored in English at Shanghai Southern University (1923–26). Upon returning to Taipei, he worked as a translator at an American company before moving to Xiamen in 1927 as a school administrator and English teacher at a Chinese middle school. During the Sino-Japanese War, Xu was detained by the GMD for eight months as an unregistered Xiamen resident until Japan's navy released him in May 1938.[47] Xiamen municipal archival documents illustrate how Xu quickly made his way up Japan's imperial hierarchy, starting as a navy interpreter in May 1938 at a monthly salary of ¥70. The following month, Xu was appointed as an interpreter in the Xiamen Police Training Center for local Chinese policemen (¥100). In July 1939, he was promoted to instructor in the Xiamen Special Municipal Government Police Bureau (¥155). Two months later, Xu returned to the education sector as principal of the Municipal Government's No. 1 Middle School (¥130 plus a

Figure 5.4. A Taiwanese military interpreter (front right) wearing a left armband with the Japanese word *tsū*—short for *tsūyaku* or interpreter—interrogating a Chinese POW with hands tied behind his back (front left) in Hainan Island, 1940. Courtesy of Mainichi Shimbun and AFLO.

¥65 bonus). In July 1940, he became principal of No. 1 Girls' Middle School (¥160 plus a ¥175 bonus). Lastly, in January 1942, he served as section manager in the Municipal Government Education Bureau (¥240 plus a ¥528 bonus for a three-year labor award).[48]

Although Taiwanese interpreters left few written accounts from Xiamen, recollections published in *The China Incident and Kyokuei Academy* (1940) provide a brief glimpse—albeit through the lens of Japanese censors—into their activities. According to Xu Rongzong, he and his Taiwanese colleagues in Xiamen translated for the navy and helped supervise Chinese construction workers.[49] Xu's Japanese colleague, Gotō Kaoru (also a teacher from Xiamen Kyokuei Academy), recalled that their duties included interpreting for Japanese interrogators of Chinese prisoners and spies; serving as local guides for military personnel; and promoting Japanese war propaganda.[50]

There were occasions when Taiwanese interpreters could not understand the spoken Chinese of GMD soldiers, whether it was Mandarin or a dialect from outside South China. Most Taiwanese had never received formal Mandarin education in Taiwan, and their spoken Chinese was generally limited to the southern Chinese dialects. In Guangzhou, they also had trouble with the Cantonese dialect, which was mutually unintelligible with the Taiwanese dialects.[51] Indeed, some Japanese army commanders complained that most Taiwanese could not understand Cantonese.[52] In cases where Taiwanese had problems understanding the Chinese, they resorted to "brush talk" (J. *hitsudan*, C. *bitan*)—written communication through Chinese characters.[53]

To meet the military's increasing demand for trained Taiwanese interpreters in various Chinese dialects, the Taiwan Government-General inaugurated three-month-long "Training Workshops to Prepare Those Entering South China." Held five times in Taipei Commercial Higher School from 1938 to 1940, each workshop offered a "South China Curriculum" for one hundred Taiwanese males at least eighteen years old with upper-level primary education or equivalent Japanese-language proficiency. Over two-thirds of the curriculum consisted of Chinese-language classes: Mandarin (96 hours), Cantonese dialect (50 hours), Xiamen dialect (12 hours), and Fuzhou dialect (12 hours).

Since most Taiwanese spoke a form of the Xiamen or Fuzhou dialects or could learn them quickly, more hours were spent studying Mandarin and Cantonese. While Taiwanese teachers were placed in charge of the Fujian dialect classes, Japanese were assigned to teach Mandarin and Cantonese.[54] The Taiwan Education Bureau appointed Tanemura Yasusaburō, a high-ranking translation official, for Mandarin and Yamashita Noboru, a Japanese businessman with years of experience in Guangzhou, for Cantonese.[55] The curriculum also

offered two content courses: "South China Affairs" (24 hours), taught by Taipei Commercial Higher School professor Satō Tasuku, and "Elevating the Imperial Spirit of Those Entering South China" (12 hours), taught by Taipei Imperial University professor Gotō Shunzui.[56] Thus the workshops relied on existing Taiwanese linguistic skills for Xiamen and Fuzhou dialects, yet delegated instruction of Mandarin, Cantonese, and ideological content to Japanese experts. Hundreds of Taiwanese youth completed the training workshops before being deployed to South China as interpreters and policemen.

Yet the linguistic training did not account for the local dialect in Hainan, which was distinct from the Fujianese and Cantonese dialects. So when several thousand Taiwanese military assistants were sent by the navy for guerrilla warfare against Chinese troops in Hainan in 1939, many were unprepared to communicate with local residents. According to Zhang Zijing, the Cantonese he studied in Taiwan did not help him understand Hainanese, so he had to learn the latter from a local Chinese teacher.[57] To help Japanese and Taiwanese learn the various southern Chinese dialects, the Government-General published a series of language primers.[58] In 1941, Wang Jinxiu and Chen Shaozong—Taiwanese interpreters and Japanese-language teachers in Hainan—compiled *A Practical Intensive Hainanese Reader*, while the Taiwan Southern Regions Association published *Colloquial Hainanese*.[59]

Throughout the wartime period, the Japanese colonial media celebrated Taiwanese military interpreters as imperial heroes. But oral testimonies in the 1990s and 2000s by former Taiwanese interpreters in Hainan shed light on distinct challenges they faced. For example, Hu Xiande (b. 1922), a military interpreter and patrolman in Hainan from 1943 to 1945, described how he and other Taiwanese civilian assistants were armed as soldiers because the Japanese military lacked sufficient manpower. Yet the Japanese military continued to retain social distinctions between the Japanese and Taiwanese, and Hu recounted the discrimination he and other Taiwanese faced with bitterness. Though they shared the same meals and lodging as the Japanese, he explained, their uniforms were of a different color and inferior quality to mark their second-class status. Low-ranking Japanese soldiers especially resented Taiwanese interpreters for their higher pay and ostensibly easier work while also looking down on them as pawns of the empire. As for Hu's superior officers, they did not trust him as a "true Japanese" and even called him a "Chinaman" (Chankoro) when he opposed the indiscriminate killing of Chinese civilians. However, because his interpreting duties included interrogating captured Chinese, Hu was viewed with equal hostility by the Chinese population.[60] Even though Taiwanese interpreters were well-compensated for their Chinese-language skills, they were set

apart from both the Japanese imperialists and their Chinese subjects. Taiwanese interpreters epitomized the precarious status of Taiwanese military personnel in the China war front.

Taiwanese Economic Elites in Xiamen

In December 1941, three years into Japan's military occupation of Xiamen, the Taiwan Government-General dispatched a South China inspection team to the city. In its survey report published in the *Taiwan Times*, the inspection team celebrated the contributions by thousands of Taiwanese to Xiamen's wartime development. As owners of property totaling over ten million yen (three million US dollars), the Taiwanese were "major players in social, commercial, and industrial fields with the aid of economic and cultural support from Taiwan." Moreover, the report went on, Taiwanese civilian officials and military personnel constituted Japan's "front line in the Southern Regions" (Nanpō no daiissen).[61] What made Japan's occupation in Xiamen unique from other cities in China was the degree to which it enlisted colonial subjects—the Taiwanese—as imperial intermediaries.

In the occupied cities of North and Central China, which the army deemed to be of higher strategic and economic importance, the Japanese invested large amounts of capital and settled in droves to develop the regional economies. With a dearth of Japanese capital and settlers in wartime South China, the navy instead relied on the Taiwan Government-General to provide Japanese and Taiwanese personnel with regional expertise to restore public order and revamp the local economies.[62] The Taiwan Development subsidiary, Fukudai Company, addressed food shortages and damages to Xiamen's infrastructure by importing commodities from Taiwan and managing transportation and public works.[63] The city's telecommunications were delegated to the Taiwan Government-General's Communications Division.[64]

On the eve of war, in July 1937, Xiamen had an estimated 13,000 Taiwanese residents. By 1938, so many had taken refuge back in Taiwan that only a few thousand remained. After Japan's occupation of Xiamen in May, however, the Government-General and Foreign Ministry provided financial aid to resettle Taiwanese evacuees.[65] Taiwanese passport regulations were also simplified to make it easier for new Taiwanese migrants.[66] The city's Taiwanese population increased to 5,000 by November 1938, tripled to 15,000 by April 1941, and peaked at 21,500 in January 1942.[67]

Returning Taiwanese residents and new Taiwanese migrants took advantage of economic opportunities in trade, finance, and construction.[68] Accord-

ing to GMD reports, the Japanese military gave Taiwanese special privileges in Xiamen: Taiwanese could seize stores and land from local Chinese and administer them as Japanese property; and Taiwanese merchants were granted special customs rates to import goods from Taiwan.[69] Contemporary Fujian newspapers reported that with Japanese military support, the Taiwanese brazenly confiscated property and companies from local Chinese.[70] The Bank of Taiwan colonial archives indeed corroborate, for example, that the navy helped the Taiwanese-managed Xiamen Warehouse Company take over storage duties previously administered by the Bank of China.[71]

Taiwanese businessmen soon came to dominate the majority of companies in occupied Xiamen.[72] In an August 1938 article titled, "The Rape of Amoy [Xiamen]," the *North China Herald* reported that "the real rulers of the city" were the Taiwanese. "Every business of any value has become their property; the method of transfer being simple: just registering their names as owners at the office of the Naval Headquarters and raising the Japanese flag above the entrance."[73] Prewar leaders of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association like Chen Xuehai returned from Taiwan to manage new Xiamen companies for waterworks, electricity, and telephones.[74] A successful entrepreneur in Xiamen since 1918, Chen had served as a chairman of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association from 1933 to 1937.[75] Upon returning to Xiamen in 1938, Chen invested in the Taiwan-backed Fukudai Company to import food and restore the city's water supplies and electricity.[76] He also served in the following key economic institutions: the Japanese-Taiwanese Finance Society, Xiamen Commercial Association, Xiamen Construction Company, Xiamen Industrial Promotion Bank, and the opium-related Fuyu Company.[77] Chen's close ties to Japan's navy were reflected by his regular attendance of banquets hosted by the Asia Development Xiamen Office.[78]

In addition to thriving in the private sector, the Taiwanese also served as high-ranking economic officials in the Xiamen government. Lin Huikun (b. 1902), a graduate of Kyoto University's Faculty of Economics, was appointed head of the Xiamen Construction Bureau's Business Division. Other Taiwanese became division heads of livestock and experimental agriculture farms.[79] The most prominent Taiwanese official in Xiamen was Lin Jichuan (b. 1893).[80] A native of Taizhong who studied commerce at Tokyo's Meiji University, Lin had been employed in Taiwan's rice export industry before working in Shanghai in the 1930s.[81] In 1938, the navy appointed Lin as chairman of the Xiamen Monopoly Bureau, supervised by four Japanese officials from the Taiwan Monopoly Bureau.[82] Lin also teamed up with Taiwanese opium businessmen Chen Changfu and Cai Peichu to administer the Fuyu Company (est. 1938), which imported opium from Shanghai and Hong Kong. Profits from opium taxes collected by Lin's Monopoly Bureau were distributed to the Japanese navy.[83]

With their bilingual skills and prewar experience in Xiamen's economy, overseas Taiwanese entrepreneurs in wartime Xiamen differed from other colonial subjects who accompanied Japan's military in China. From 1937 to 1945, thousands of Koreans followed the Japanese army from Manchukuo and Korea to cities in North China (Beijing, Tianjin) and Central China (Shanghai). However, the majority worked in low-level commerce—especially smuggling and the opium trade—and few were placed in high-ranking positions in the private or public sector like the Taiwanese in Xiamen.[84] Japanese officials were less trusting of Koreans in cities like Shanghai and Tianjin, which were prewar havens for anti-Japanese Korean activism.[85] Most Korean entrepreneurs in China also did not have the same degree of linguistic and cultural ties to the local Chinese population as their Taiwanese counterparts.

To be sure, the Taiwanese retained their second-class imperial status in Xiamen, as their salaries and military rations were lower than the Japanese. Still, Taiwanese officials in Xiamen enjoyed higher wages and standards of living than the local Chinese. Monthly rations were twenty-one pounds of rice for the Japanese, fifteen pounds for the Taiwanese, and less than two pounds for the Chinese.[86] Resident Taiwanese received economic and social privileges from the Japanese military that placed them above the Chinese in the imperial hierarchy. Sino-Taiwanese tensions grew as prominent Taiwanese entrepreneurs who exploited the Chinese came to be called "economic traitors of the Han" (C. *jingji hanjian*). Taiwanese increasingly became targets of anti-Japanese assassinations by Chinese activists, especially in Gulangyu island's International Settlement, off the coast of Xiamen, where they could evade Japanese jurisdiction. In turn, Japanese officials took advantage of anti-Japanese Chinese "terrorist" cases in Gulangyu to promote Taiwanese rights—and, by proxy, Japanese interests—in the British-dominated International Settlement.

Promoting Taiwanese Rights in the Gulangyu International Settlement

When Japan's military began its occupation of Xiamen in 1938, it did not invade the Gulangyu islet out of fear of provoking the Western powers. The International Settlement on Gulangyu, home to Western expats and wealthy Chinese residents, continued to be under the jurisdiction of the multinational Gulangyu Municipal Council. Though Japanese consular officials and businessmen lived on the island, Anglo-Americans constituted most of the municipal council's voters and representatives, and the Japanese remained marginalized in the island's governance and policing.[87] Japan's police forces in Xiamen

proper did not have the authority to arrest anti-Japanese Chinese activists in Gulangyu, even those who had assassinated Japanese personnel. As of 1938, the Gulangyu Municipal Police, led by a British captain with 110 policemen—the majority Chinese and one-tenth British Indians, but no Japanese—maintained sole control over the island's criminal affairs.[88]

Japanese officials pressured the municipal council to add Japanese personnel to the municipal police to counter what they saw as a threat to security. In June 1938, the Japanese accused the British consulate of having assisted the municipal police in arresting and handing over 180 Taiwanese refugees in Gulangyu to GMD officials from August 1937 to May 1938. Japanese newspapers reported that over half of the arrested Taiwanese had been executed.[89] An even more pressing concern for Japanese officials was how Gulangyu had become a haven for "anti-Japanese Chinese terrorists" (kō-Nichi terodan). Much like in Shanghai's International Settlement, undercover GMD agents in Gulangyu disseminated pro-Chinese propaganda and attacked pro-Japanese Chinese personnel.[90] The GMD special agent Lai Guomin, for instance, partook in the destruction of Japanese warehouses and military infrastructure and the assassination of occupation personnel.[91] By the end of 1938, Japanese consular officials finally convinced the municipal council to add a new Japanese-speaking unit to the municipal police, including one Japanese officer and eleven Taiwanese policemen.[92]

In May 1939, Japanese authorities took advantage of two "anti-Japanese terrorist incidents" to demand further concessions from the municipal council. On May 8, a Taiwanese and Chinese reporter for Japanese-backed newspapers in Gulangyu—Huang Zichengzhi of *Quanmin Daily News* and Lin Pengfei of *Fuxing Daily*—were assaulted by three Chinese. Although Lin escaped unharmed, Huang suffered broken teeth and bruises to his body.[93] Just three days later, on the one-year anniversary of Japan's capture of Xiamen, Hong Lixun (b. 1893), the chairman of Xiamen's Chinese Chamber of Commerce, was shot through the chest and died the following morning.[94] The Japanese used the "Gulangyu Incident" to justify landing 150 naval troops. The navy arrested over one hundred Chinese suspected of anti-Japanese activity and blockaded shipping between Gulangyu and Xiamen.[95]

To prevent a Japanese takeover of Gulangyu, British, American, and French battleships arrived to force a standoff with the Japanese navy.[96] In negotiating a settlement to withdraw their respective naval forces from Gulangyu, Japanese consul Uchida Gorō submitted five demands to the municipal council chairman J. M. Morhaus: (1) that the council cooperate in suppressing anti-Japanese activity; (2) that another twelve Japanese nationals be added to the municipal police; (3) that Taiwanese residents gain rights as foreigners to vote

and be elected in the municipal council; (4) that the vacancies of three Chinese council representatives be immediately filled by nominees of the Japanese-backed Xiamen mayor; and (5) that the council authorize Japanese consular police to search and arrest anti-Japanese reactionaries in cooperation with the municipal police.[97]

Morhaus readily agreed to the first and fifth demands, but Western naval officers contended that the other three would result in the "virtual Japanese domination of the settlement," and Morhaus followed suit.[98] The issue of Taiwanese voting rights was hotly debated. Since its founding in 1902, the municipal council had excluded foreign nationals of the Chinese race from the legal category of foreigners allowed to vote and serve on the council. For decades, Japanese consuls had pushed their Western counterparts for Taiwanese enfranchisement but to no avail.[99] Were Taiwanese allowed to vote as ratepayers—residents who paid more than five yuan in yearly taxes—they would give the Japanese a numerical advantage over Westerners in Gulangyu (in mid-1939, there were 334 Taiwanese compared to eighty-two Japanese, ninety-seven British, fifty-seven Americans, and a combined forty-five other Europeans).[100] In response to Consul Uchida's new demands, Morhaus reiterated that the council's land regulations denied foreigner status to those of the Chinese race, including the Taiwanese, "who may by birth or naturalization abroad have become the 'subjects of foreign countries.'" Uchida contended that Taiwanese had obtained Japanese nationality "neither by birth nor by naturalization." Instead, the 1895 Sino-Japanese Treaty had automatically converted them into Japanese subjects. Thus in Uchida's opinion, Taiwanese could be counted legally as foreigners without changing the existing land regulations.[101]

Support for Taiwanese enfranchisement in Gulangyu came from not only Japanese officials but also Taiwanese leaders in Xiamen. In July 1939, the Xiamen Taiwanese Association organized lecture rallies with over a thousand attendees. Taiwanese criticized British officials for aiding the GMD arrests of Taiwanese from 1937 to 1938, defending discriminatory racial policies in Gulangyu, and preventing Japan from constructing a "New Asia." By forming a Taiwanese Resident Anti-British Alliance and threatening to boycott British goods, the Taiwanese galvanized support for Japan's challenge of Anglo-American hegemony in Gulangyu.[102]

The irony that the Japanese had yet to grant the Taiwanese equal election rights in colonial Taiwan was surely not lost on the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese remained second-class subjects throughout the Japanese empire. In the end, Consul Uchida compromised with the council, renouncing his demands for

Taiwanese enfranchisement in exchange for Japanese and Western naval troops' mutual withdrawal in October 1939.[103] In turn, the council agreed to add another two Japanese officers and ten Taiwanese policemen to the municipal police when the necessary funds became available.[104] As anti-Japanese activities continued unabated into 1940, including the Chinese assassination of the Taiwanese entrepreneur Yin Xuepu, the council conceded to Japanese demands and doubled the number of Japanese personnel (with 21 Taiwanese) in the municipal police.[105]

One unintended consequence of the addition of Taiwanese to the municipal police was Indian and Chinese policemen's growing discontent.[106] In 1939, the municipal council had accepted Japanese requests that Taiwanese receive higher salaries (respectively three and four times more) than their Indian and Chinese counterparts (see figure 5.5). In response, Indian and Chinese policemen protested about the wage differential. They contended that their lower base salaries, which had not increased since 1931, could not be justified based on previous police experience, length of service, or living standards.[107] In March 1940, the council agreed to increase Indian wages by 40 percent and Chinese wages by 20 percent, though this still left their respective salaries at one-half and one-third those of the Taiwanese. Japanese officials pointed to the disparity as evidence of British neglect of Indian subjects compared to the Taiwanese. At the same time, they emphasized Taiwanese policemen's superiority due to their ability to speak the local dialect and "better training and discipline." By contrast, Indians faced "linguistic troubles" and "differences in local customs," and Chinese were "almost incapable [of] any political police activities due to the difference of dialect, poorer morale and [their readiness] to back any anti-Japanism."[108]

After the start of the Pacific War in December 1941, the Japanese military seized the Gulangyu International Settlement. Westerners were forced to resign from the municipal council, which was placed under Japanese consular jurisdiction, and the official language in Gulangyu was changed from English to Japanese and Chinese.[109] The revamped municipal police in 1942 consisted solely of Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese personnel.[110] In 1943, in a symbolic act of Sino-Japanese harmony, the Japanese abolished the international settlements in Gulangyu and Shanghai and returned them to Chinese sovereignty to the Japanese-backed Wang Jingwei's "Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China" in Nanjing. This return happened in name only. In practice, the Japanese maintained control over the settlements, which were no longer safe havens for Western and Chinese residents who supported the Allied powers.[111]

Figure 5.5. A Taiwanese patrolman (center) and two Indian patrolmen (left and right) of the multinational Gulangyu International Settlement's Municipal Police, 1941. Courtesy of Asahi Shimbun.

Exporting Taiwan's Agricultural and Medical Experience to Hainan

Taiwan served a similar intermediary role in rural Hainan Island for the Japanese military as it did in urban Xiamen. Whereas the Imperial Navy relied on the Taiwan Government-General to help manage Xiamen's commercial and political affairs, it turned to Taiwan's colonial personnel to transform Hainan into a "second Taiwan" with similar agricultural potential.[112] A month into Hainan's occupation, the Government-General-backed Taiwan Development Company founded its Hainan headquarters in the city of Haikou. Taiwan Development went on to invest most of its overseas capital and personnel to develop the island's transportation, mining, and agriculture.[113] With the island's lack of railways and roads, the company built bus and truck routes and completed a circuit automobile route around the island by 1941.[114] It also constructed deep-water ports and airports to launch shipping and air routes between Taiwan and Hainan.[115]

Before Japan's occupation, over three-fourths of Hainan's two million residents were engaged in agriculture, but only 7 percent of the island was under cultivation. The island had imported rice from mainland China, Indochina, and Siam. Now, the Taiwan Development Company brought in Japanese agricultural experts from Taiwan, such as Taipei Imperial University professors Tanaka Chōzaburō and Tokuichi Shiraki, to survey Hainan's agricultural potential.[116] They proposed applying cultivation techniques that had been successful in Taiwan—including systematic irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and the planting of the Taiwanese Hōrai (C. Penglai) rice strand—to Hainan, which had a similar climate.[117]

The Taiwan Development Company prioritized rice to feed the military and civilian population and as a profitable crop to help fund the development of other raw materials in Hainan.[118] It employed hundreds of Japanese and Taiwanese from Taiwan—ranging from agricultural extension officers to farmers—to work in Hainan's rice industry, which doubled in production by 1942.[119] For instance, Gotō Hokumen, the Japanese head of the company's Taidong office, successfully managed agriculture experimental stations in eastern Taiwan before transferring to Hainan in 1940. Gotō oversaw Hainan's Lushui and Maling offices and imported the Taiwanese Hōrai rice strand, which proved more productive than the indigenous Hainanese strand.[120] By 1941, Taiwan Development also enlisted over 2,000 Taiwanese—about three times as many Taiwanese as Japanese—for its agricultural operations.[121] Japanese officials viewed the Taiwanese as particularly suited to Hainan because they were

acclimated to the tropical environment and quickly picked up the Hainanese dialect.[122]

The Japanese colonial media praised the Taiwanese for their contribution to Hainan's economic development. Japanese officials who visited the island in 1941 reported on the success of Taiwanese youth who guided local farmers and construction workers.[123] Yet within Hainan's imperial hierarchy, the Taiwanese remained second-class colonialists, below Japanese managers but above the Chinese and indigenous peoples (the ethnic Li). The Taiwanese often served in supervisory positions as advisers who oversaw Chinese and indigenous laborers, but they were ultimately managed by Japanese officials, and received lower wages than their Japanese counterparts.[124] According to historian Chung Shu-ming, the daily wages of construction workers, for example, were scaled as follows: ¥0.6 for Hainan's indigenous peoples; ¥0.7 for Chinese from Hong Kong and Guangdong; ¥1.2 for Chinese from Xiamen; and ¥2 for Taiwanese.[125]

The differentials reflect the contempt that the Japanese maintained for both Taiwanese and indigenous workers. In a 1943 report from Hainan, a Japanese official stated that in terms of productivity, "one Taiwanese worker was the equivalent of two-thirds of a Japanese and two Hainan locals."[126] Another Taiwan Government-General report noted that Hainan's indigenous farmers were only one-quarter to one-third as productive as Taiwanese farmers. The Japanese criticized local indigenous males as "lazy in character," undernourished, ridden with tropical diseases, and lacking farming skills.[127]

Little documentation survives on the lived experience of Taiwanese laborers in Hainan, but postwar testimony by the Taiwanese construction worker Huang Shunkeng (b. 1916) offers insight into the liminal position held by many overseas Taiwanese as colonized imperialists. Huang initially worked for a Japanese sugar company in eastern Taiwan, building company dorms. When a Japanese construction company offered Huang the chance to work in Hainan, he accepted. Huang headed one of several construction teams (his group consisted of twenty Taiwanese) to build dorms near Hainan's iron ore mines in Shilu for Chinese forced laborers from Hong Kong and Guangdong. Huang's boss was Japanese, and the work was grueling, but he was well compensated with a monthly salary of ¥200 that afforded him plenty of food and goods from local markets.[128]

Huang looked down on Hainan residents, expressing contempt for their lack of modern hygiene and sophistication. He recalled that local women smelled funny and that the Miao peoples in the mountainous areas remained ignorant about money.[129] Huang's experience in Hainan parallels with that of the prominent Taiwanese writer Wu Zhuoliu (1900–1976), who similarly ex-

pressed disillusionment with China's "backward" circumstances during his first visit to Nanjing in the 1940s.[130] Huang, Wu, and other Taiwanese had internalized Japanese Orientalist views on China and its peoples as "undeveloped" and "unhygienic" in contrast with "modern" and "civilized" Taiwan. Such fraught relations between the Taiwanese and local Chinese populations illustrate the power of Japan's empire. Decades of Japanese rule had conditioned the former to view the latter through the lens of Taiwan's colonial modernity.

Taiwanese perceptions of Hainan were often condescending, but it was true that, in the early stages of the occupation, the island lacked the infrastructure of Taiwan, including its robust medical system. When Taiwanese contracted malaria, which was endemic throughout Hainan, they tended to travel back to Taiwan for treatment. The navy also relied on the Taipei Imperial University Medical Department and Taiwan-backed Philanthropic Society hospitals in South China to provide medical care for the Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese.[131] The Philanthropic Society had temporarily closed down its hospitals in Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou in 1937 due to the Second Sino-Japanese War. However, by 1939 it reopened its hospitals and added new branches in the Hainan port cities of Haikou and Sanya and medical clinics in Nada, Huangliu, Yaxian, Lushui, and Jiaji.[132] The Philanthropic Society doctors and nurses, consisting of Japanese and Taiwanese, vaccinated the local population, sterilized houses, inspected food and water for bacteria, and treated patients afflicted with cholera and malaria.[133]

Taipei Imperial University also dispatched teams of tropical medicine professors and students to Hainan for hands-on research on tropical diseases.[134] In 1939, the first group of eighteen university personnel—ten students and eight staff—was led by medical professor Ōmura Yasuo to examine soldiers, officials, and schoolchildren.[135] The navy's chief doctor praised Ōmura's team "for knowing more about South China's medical problems than Japanese from universities in the metropole." Ōmura noted that "the illnesses we found in Hainan were the same as those in Taiwan."[136] When Huang Shunkeng contracted malaria just a few months after moving to Hainan for his work heading up a construction team, he was fortunate to have Taipei Imperial University medical students interning in Hainan give him the shots and medicine (quinine) that cured him.[137] Malaria and tropical neurasthenia remained prevalent in Hainan, but Japanese and Taiwanese medical personnel from Taiwan were reported to have decreased the number of cases of cholera, plague, and typhus.[138]

Hainan's malaria prevention units were staffed with Taiwanese trained at Taipei Imperial University's Institute for Tropical Medicine (est. 1939). Huang Tianzong (b. 1922) was one of several hundred Taiwanese "military medical assistants" (*eisei gunzoku*) who had studied at the university before serving in

Hainan.[139] He recalled volunteering because of the high wages and assumption that medical work was a safer alternative to regular military service.[140] Huang thought that since he was not from a prominent family with connections, it was only a matter of time before he would be enlisted to fight overseas.[141] He underwent several months of training in Taiwan malaria treatment centers, followed by several months of study at Taipei Imperial University's Institute for Tropical Medicine, where he worked with professors to identify the various types of mosquitos that transmitted malaria.[142]

After completing his training, Huang was deployed to Hainan's Imperial Navy Hygiene Bureau in 1942. In malaria treatment centers and hospitals, he conducted health exams for patients with high fevers and instructed residents on methods for preventing and curing malaria.[143] Huang recalled that medical personnel from Taiwan were equipped with tropical medical expertise lacking among Japanese doctors who came from the metropole: "Japan had no tropical illnesses, so Japanese military doctors had little experience treating malaria. Our main duty in the military was to help doctors understand malaria, especially research on mosquitos."[144] Huang was later dispatched to the island's Tiandu mines to inspect Ishihara Industries' laborers for malaria and teach prevention techniques. With a light workload and wages equal to that of his Japanese colleagues, Huang could afford to live comfortably during the war.[145]

Japanese officials and companies also recruited Taiwanese women to serve as military nurse assistants. They worked in makeshift military hospitals on the war front in South China. Huang Tianzong met his wife, Huang Linbu (b. 1927), when she served as a nurse assistant in a hospital for the Tiandu mines where he worked.[146] Like her husband, Linbu had volunteered from motivations that were more pragmatic than patriotic. A graduate of Taizhong's school for midwives, Linbu signed up for the Ishihara Industries' exam for company nurses to be dispatched overseas. She was attracted by the high wages and the chance to work in Japan, which she had always wanted to see for herself. Only after passing the company exam did she find out that the destinations were chosen by lottery and that she was selected to work in Hainan.[147]

In contrast, Yin Ximei, who had worked before the war as a nurse in the Philanthropic Society Guangzhou Hospital, readily volunteered in 1943 for a Hainan medical unit so she could contribute to Japan's war effort. In a postwar interview, Yin recalled that she was driven by patriotic loyalty and the desire to prove that the Taiwanese were just as capable nurses as the Japanese. During her three-month stint in Hainan, Yin treated injured Japanese soldiers and Allied prisoners of war (POWs) with illnesses like malaria.[148] Over the past few decades, numerous postwar memoirs and testimonies have been published by former Taiwanese nurses in South China and Southeast Asia: many re-

mained self-professed patriots of Japan well after the end of colonial rule.[149] Taiwanese military personnel—from nurses to interpreters and policemen—arrived in Hainan with a mix of motivations, but their efforts ended up assisting Japan's empire.

Taiwanese Comfort Women in the War Front

Among the most controversial Japanese deployments to wartime China and Southeast Asia were military "comfort women" (*jūgun ianfu*), the Japanese euphemism for military sex slaves.[150] A few thousand of the estimated several hundred thousand comfort women were Taiwanese; others were from Japan, Korea, China, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and the Western Allied countries. They served in hundreds of "comfort stations" (*ianjo*) empire-wide.[151] Until the 1990s, few former comfort women had spoken publicly about their experience from fear of discrimination. In postwar Taiwan, as elsewhere, comfort women had been stigmatized as prostitutes who had willingly volunteered for higher wages.[152] However, with the discovery of relevant Japanese official documents and the collection of oral interviews over the past few decades, historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Chu Te-lan have helped illuminate the policies and lived experiences of Taiwanese comfort women, of which there were an estimated few thousand.[153]

Across occupied China, the Japanese military abducted local Chinese women to work in comfort stations, and Hainan, where the Taiwan Development Company oversaw the construction of an estimated sixty-two comfort stations, was no exception.[154] The military also requested additional comfort women—Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese—from Taiwan. Though the exact number of comfort women sent to Hainan remains unknown, Chu Te-lan has estimated that 1,225 Japanese, 689 Korean, and 409 Taiwanese were dispatched from Taiwan to China between 1938 and 1941 (with about 350 of the Taiwanese to South China).[155] Extant Japanese military records show that, in principle, comfort women were compensated on a differentiated pay scale based on their ethnic or regional status. For example, 1938 comfort women regulations in Changzhou (Jiangsu province, Central China) specified that Japanese were paid ¥2, Koreans ¥1.5, and Chinese ¥1 per deed.[156] Although little official documentation remains on comfort women's salaries in South China, Taiwanese postwar testimonies indicate that an imperial ethnic hierarchy applied to comfort women throughout the empire. Several Taiwanese military assistants stationed in Southeast Asia have corroborated that Japanese comfort women were paid higher wages than their Korean and Taiwanese counterparts

(see chapter 6).[157] The ethnoracial differences of comfort women were also apparently marked by differences in clothing.[158]

Numerous former comfort women, including Han and indigenous Taiwanese, have testified to being forcibly raped by Japanese soldiers without pay.[159] They also describe being tricked or coerced by recruiters into working in comfort stations, whether in Taiwan or overseas in China and Southeast Asia.[160] Chu Te-lan's survey of fifteen Taiwanese former comfort women sent to Hainan indicates that ten were deceived by recruiters and officials who had promised them jobs as nurses or waitresses. (Another woman recounted being forced into the job by a Japanese soldier, and two had been sold by their families as comfort women).[161] "Masako" (b. 1926), for example, had grown up in a low-income family of twelve and worked in the Xinzhu sugar industry. In 1943, she agreed to a job offer by a Taiwanese recruiter as a waitress overseas. Along with about thirty other Taiwanese women, Masako was handed over to Japanese military officials and sent to a comfort station in Hainan's Yulin. There, she was forced to have sex with ten to twenty soldiers a day. Even after becoming pregnant in 1944, Masako was not allowed a break from work. Eight months into her pregnancy, she finally returned to Taiwan with a doctor's permission but never received wages from her comfort station manager.[162]

Civilian recruiters and comfort station managers were not exclusively Japanese, but included Taiwanese and Koreans.[163] In postwar interviews, for instance, former Korean comfort women in Taiwan recounted how they were treated worse by Taiwanese managers than Japanese military personnel.[164] Moreover, Taiwanese military servicemen, along with their Korean counterparts, made use of comfort stations themselves.[165] Imperial hierarchies were thus not only determined by ethnicity and country of origin but also by gender.

Within the status hierarchies of Japan's wartime empire, Taiwanese generally ranked below the Japanese but above the Chinese and local ethnic minorities. Despite their second-class status as colonized imperialists, many overseas Taiwanese achieved a meaningful degree of socioeconomic mobility during the war. Putting aside the example of comfort women, relations between Japanese authorities and overseas Taiwanese tended to be more complex than, as some historians have suggested, complete imperial coercion.[166] Some joined the occupation of South China from a sense of allegiance to Japan that made GMD authorities condemn them as pro-Japanese "collaborators" and "traitors of the Han Chinese." However, Taiwanese were often driven more by socioeconomic benefits than by nationalistic ideologies and morals. Many Taiwan-

ese obtained official ranks, properties, and salaries in South China much higher than those available to them within Taiwan.

In Korea, Japanese authorities had promoted the colonization of Manchuria from 1931 as a joint Japanese-Korean project to advance interethnic unity.[167] Similarly, Japanese officials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait viewed wartime South China as a unifying Japanese-Taiwanese imperial mission. In occupied Xiamen and Hainan, two regional centers of South China, Taiwanese found opportunities to earn higher salaries and status as interpreters, educators, merchants, policemen, and nurses. In Xiamen, along with trusted members of the large prewar Taiwanese community, new Taiwanese took up critical positions as heads of Sino-Japanese companies and high-ranking officials in the local government. In Hainan, which had few prewar Japanese residents, the navy welcomed thousands of Taiwanese deemed better acclimated than their Japanese peers, and they contributed to the application of Taiwan-based Hōrai rice cultivation and tropical medicine in Hainan.

Chapter 6

Advancing into the Southern Regions

In May 1940, the *Osaka Daily*'s Taipei office interviewed Taiwan governor-general Kobayashi Seizō (served, 1936–40) on the island's role in the future of Japanese expansion into the "Southern Regions" (Nanpō)—the nebulous geographic term that encompassed South China, the South China Seas, the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. For years, the Japanese public attention had focused on the northern advance in continental China. Now, Kobayashi expressed his delight that those in Japan's metropole were ramping up calls for Taiwan to serve as a "launching pad for the Southern Regions" (Nanpō no kyoten). He stressed that Japan's "southern advance advocates needed to take more seriously Taiwan's favorable location" 800 miles southwest of the home islands. If one included the "New Southern Archipelago" (Shinnan Guntō)—the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea newly incorporated as part of Taiwan in 1939—the colony's boundaries extended 1,500 miles southwest of Japan. Taiwan, Kobayashi suggested, could even be said to constitute a part of Southeast Asia.[1]

Kobayashi also praised Taiwan's unique colonial personnel, who possessed skills and expertise relevant to Southeast Asia "that could not be found elsewhere in the empire." The Han Taiwanese, he said, shared the "same culture, same race" (*dōbun dōshu*) as the region's economically powerful overseas Chinese. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, anti-Japanese movements by the overseas Chinese had hindered Japanese commercial interests. However, Ko-

bayashi believed that the Han Taiwanese, whom he called "enthusiastic supporters of Japan's mission for southern advance," could serve as effective linguistic and economic intermediaries in the region. Taiwan had already applied the island's decades-long agricultural "tropical experience" (*nettai keiken*) to occupied Hainan, and could do the same as Japan developed Southeast Asia.[2]

Historians have described Japan's military advance into Southeast Asia in the 1940s as both the culmination of Japan's Pan-Asianist rhetoric and the product of interservice rivalries and alliances among the army, navy, and Foreign Ministry. Now that the army and navy threw their support behind the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Dai Tōa Kyōeiken), they write, Japan's Asian sphere of influence seemed poised to expand southward.[3] But a great deal of wartime Pan-Asianist ambitions can be traced back to initiatives launched by the Taiwan Government-General in the 1930s. In the lead-up to the Asia-Pacific War in December 1941, the Government-General was sometimes competitive, and sometimes cooperative, with Japan's other institutions, and it played an important role in shaping economic and military expansion farther south. Kobayashi's comments to the *Osaka Daily* reflected many years of hopes, compromises, and disappointments that Government-General officials experienced regarding Taiwan's role in Japan's ever-growing southern empire.

In the 1930s, the Taiwan Government-General launched a series of initiatives to promote Taiwan as an administrative, economic, and strategic center for Japan's southern advance. The Government-General proposed that it head a "Southern Regions Government-General" (Nanpō Sōtokufu) that would bring the South China Sea islands and Japanese Micronesia (Nan'yō Guntō) under Taiwan's control. Even as the Government-General fell short of its goal to administer Micronesia, it successfully obtained jurisdiction in 1939 over the Spratlys: a group of coral reef islands in the South China Sea that the Japanese and French had competed over for their marine resources. The Government-General also extended Taiwan's economic interests in Southeast Asia through its Taiwan Development Company and Taiwan Southern Regions Associations—which, as in South China—supported overseas Taiwanese commercial interests.

By 1940, as Kobayashi's interview signaled, Taiwan's strategic importance was becoming more widely accepted. Japan's military was advancing into French Indochina; to prepare for a large-scale invasion of Southeast Asia, the army coordinated with the Government-General to use Taiwan as a training center for tropical warfare and a base of war operations. At the start of the Asia-Pacific War in December 1941, Taiwan became a staging area for troop movements, as its ports and airfields served as way-stations for the Japanese drive into Southeast Asia.[4] Moreover, with the army and navy's increasing need

for manpower, tens of thousands of Taiwanese were deployed to help administer the heterogeneous populations in the region.

As Kobayashi had mentioned in his 1940 interview, the Japanese viewed the Han Taiwanese as ideal liaisons for the overseas Chinese due to shared linguistic and ethnic ties. Many Taiwanese were already at work on the China war front; by 1942, Taiwanese were assisting with the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia as well. So were indigenous Taiwanese who—unlike in China—were also dispatched as servicemen to the Philippines and New Guinea. Japanese authorities believed that their Austronesian linguistic affinities would help them communicate with local indigenous peoples, and that their "tropical martial skills" were well-suited to the region's mountainous jungles.[5] Whether serving as interpreters, prison guards, agricultural advisers, or company employees, Han and indigenous Taiwanese came to be resented by Asian residents and Allied POWs as "second-class imperialists": inferior to the Japanese but still in supervisory roles with power over them. Taiwan's gateway imperialism resulted in the Taiwanese occupying positions on the southern war fronts that were at once empowering and vulnerable.[6] Taiwanese personnel dispatched overseas earned relatively high wages and were celebrated as patriotic heroes in the Japanese media. Still, they remained at the mercy of their Japanese superiors, who commanded them to abuse and execute Allied POWs or sacrifice their lives in battle. Those who survived the Asia-Pacific War became among the first targets of retribution because many interacted directly with the Allied and Asian populations.

Ambitions for Taiwan's "Southern Regions Colony"

Before the outbreak of a full-scale war with China in 1937 shifted Japan's collective focus to the north, the Taiwan Government-General made efforts in the 1930s to extend its administrative reach further southward into Southeast Asia. It found a willing ally in Japan's navy, which in the wake of the 1931 Manchurian Incident was anxious to expand its budget and operations to keep up with the army's escalating campaigns in northern China.[7] But the ambitions of the Government-General and navy set them on a collision course with the Foreign Ministry, which worried about damaging relations with the regional Western powers.

The Spratly Islands, nicknamed the "Balkans of the South China Sea" by the Western powers, became an early flashpoint. The Spratlys were in strategic proximity to Indochina, Borneo, and the Philippines, and in July 1933, the

French navy annexed the islands under Indochina's jurisdiction. Japan's Foreign Ministry refused to acknowledge France's claims over the islands, contending that Japanese settlers from Taiwan had been the first to cultivate the Spratlys' natural resources in the 1910s.[8] According to a December 1933 Government-General survey, Komatsu Shigeharu, a Japanese entrepreneur in Taiwan's northern port city of Jilong, was the first to inspect the islands' economic potential in 1916. Three years later, Komatsu partnered with the Tokyo-based Rasa Phosphate Company to extract phosphate minerals from the Spratlys. Thus, Japanese authorities argued, they, rather than the French, should be entitled to the islands.[9]

In a subsequent April 1935 report to the Foreign Ministry, the Government-General contended that the Spratlys were vital to Japan's southern advance. The islands were full of phosphate minerals, guano, and fisheries; they also had potential as refueling stations for ships and aircraft traveling to Southeast Asia.[10] Later that year, ignoring French sovereignty claims and reservations by the Foreign Ministry—which sought to avoid a diplomatic clash—the Government-General and the navy jointly subsidized Hirata Sueharu's (b. 1893) efforts to develop fisheries, phosphate ores, and transportation infrastructure in the Spratlys.[11] A Japanese entrepreneur based in Taiwan's southern port of Gaoxiong (Takao), Hirata had pioneered the Japanese mining of other South China Sea islands in the Pratas Islands (J. Tōsa Guntō, C. Dongsha qundao) and the Paracel Islands (J. Seisa Guntō, C. Xisha qundao) in the 1920s.[12] Now, the Government-General provided subsidies to Hirata for infrastructure costs such as transportation, wireless communications, meteorology, and refrigeration.[13] The following year, the navy dispatched Japanese soldiers to the Spratlys to help safeguard Hirata's newly-founded Marine Industries Company.[14]

French authorities in Indochina countered Japanese actions in the Spratlys by sending their own colonial proxies: Vietnamese technicians, who developed French maritime infrastructure in the islands in 1938.[15] Later that year, when the French attempted to erect a monument to commemorate their acquisition of the Spratlys, Japanese naval ships from Taiwan responded by occupying the islands and demanding that France withdraw its personnel.[16] On March 20, 1939, the Tokyo Home Ministry announced that the Spratlys had been officially placed under the jurisdiction of Taiwan as part of Gaoxiong city.[17] French protests over the Japanese takeover were supported by the British and Americans, all of whom feared that the islands could be used as airbases to attack their own colonies in Indochina, Singapore, and Borneo.[18] However, growing anxiety over German expansion in Europe in spring 1939 dissuaded the Western powers from committing to a military intervention in the South China Sea.[19]

The Taiwan Government-General publicly celebrated its appointed control of the Spratlys on March 31, 1939, in front of the Gaoxiong Shinto Shrine. The Japanese installed a territorial monument on Spratlys' Itu Aba island, inscribed with "The New Southern Archipelago of Gaoxiong City, Gaoxiong Province" (see figure 6.1).[20] In May, the Government-General permitted Hirata Sueharu to expand his Marine Industries Company to new parts of the islands.[21] In a celebratory report on Taiwan's incorporation of the Spratlys, Hirata expressed his enthusiasm for the opportunity to further advance Japanese fisheries as "Imperial Japan's lifeline in the South China Sea."[22] That same month, the Government-General dispatched twenty officials from Gaoxiong to inspect the islands.[23] Based on survey proposals, the Government-General exported fertile soil to grow vegetable gardens in the Spratlys, stationed Gaoxiong police officials there, and constructed marine and transportation infrastructure.[24]

Taiwan's territorial incorporation of the Spratlys in 1939 emboldened the Government-General to advocate for further extension of its administrative powers over Micronesia, which Japan had taken over from Germany during



Figure 6.1. Photographs by the Taiwan Government-General of its research unit members in Spratlys' Itu Aba island standing next to the territorial monument, "The New Southern Archipelago of Gaoxiong City, Gaoxiong Province," October 1939 (left). The monument celebrated Taiwan's incorporation of the Spratlys as part of Gaoxiong province. The *Tamura-maru* ship that the research unit took from Taiwan to the Spratlys (top-right) and a map of the Spratlys, strategically located 800 miles southwest from Taiwan and 600 miles southeast from Hainan (bottom right). Source: Naikaku Jōhōbu, "Shin Nanguntō," *Shashin Shūhō*, no. 85 (October 1939).

World War I.[25] By the 1930s, the Taiwan Government-General and Micronesia's South Seas Government (Nan'yō-chō) had become intercolonial rivals, both of them allies to Japan's navy and jockeying for power in the push for southern expansion. In 1936, the South Seas Government founded its own South Seas Development Company, similar to the Taiwan Development Company, to extend marine industries and shipping into Southeast Asia.[26] The navy also supported the covert militarization of Taiwan and Micronesia cloaked as peaceful economic development to avoid antagonizing the Western powers.[27]

As early as 1936, several navy officials proposed that Taiwan and Micronesia be unified under the Taiwan Government-General, which would serve as the Southern Regions Government-General.[28] Taiwan's relative proximity to Japan, Micronesia, and the South China Sea, they contended, made it an ideal administrative center for the south. The larger capital investment in Taiwan Development Company (¥30 million) than in South Seas Development Company (¥20 million) further reflected Taiwan's economic primacy for southern advance.[29] In September 1938, the Taiwan Government-General drafted its own, similar proposal to unify Taiwan, Micronesia, Hainan, and the South China Sea islands under its rule.[30] In mid-1939, the *Osaka Asahi News* reported on the Government-General's aspirations to integrate the economies of Taiwan, the Spratlys, and Micronesia into an autarkic "Southern Regions Bloc" (Nanpō-ken) parallel to the "Northern Regions Bloc" (Hoppō-ken) of Japan, China, and Manchuria.[31] According to Taiwan's general affairs director Morioka Jirō, the island's location and accumulated knowledge of the Southern Regions made it ideal for directing Japan's southern economic advance. A Taiwan-led Southern Regions Government-General could consolidate the competing regional agendas of Taiwan and Micronesia and operate on a larger scale reminiscent of the British East India Company.[32] In June 1939, the Taiwan Government-General published a map that visualized Taiwan as a wartime imperial center. Entitled "Taiwan as [Japan's] Base for Southern Expansion," the map centered on Taiwan, shaded in black, with a series of increasingly larger concentric circles drawn around the island out toward the rest of Asia (see figure 6.2).

Japan's Colonial Ministry, which supervised Taiwan and Micronesia, initially supported the Taiwan Government-General's push to form a Southern Regions Government-General. Colonial Minister Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950, served 1939–40), an army general with previous posts as commander of the Manchurian and Korean armies in the 1930s, visited Taiwan in April 1940. Koiso told Governor-General Kobayashi that he favored a unified Southern Regions administration under Taiwan to ease institutional dissent and streamline southern economic policies.[33]

南進の據點臺灣

Figure 6.2. Taiwan Government-General map titled "Taiwan as [Japan's] Base for Southern Expansion." Source: Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Nanshin no kyoten Taiwan," *Buhō*, no. 63 (June 1939).

Despite the Colonial Ministry's backing, the Government-General failed to persuade the military services and Home Ministry in Tokyo to agree to extend its jurisdiction over Micronesia. The Tokyo central government worried that entrusting Taiwan with too much administrative power in the south would upset the balance among Japan's colonial governments.[34] Moreover, Micronesia was located along American shipping lanes between Hawai'i and the Philippines, and by the late 1930s, the Japanese military anticipated war with the Anglo-American powers. The navy, in cooperation with the South Seas Government, ramped up construction of military ports and airfields in Micronesia. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the navy took complete control over major renovations in air, sea, and land facilities. In 1939, the navy formed the Fourth Fleet in Micronesia to oversee the construction of airfields, communication infrastructure, and fuel dumps.[35] In April of that year, the navy issued a "Summary Draft of Our Policy for the Southern Regions," which encouraged the industrialization of Taiwan and Micronesia through acquisition of strategic raw materials in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the navy stressed that the Taiwan Government-General and South Seas Government were to remain subordinate to the strategic imperatives of the military services.[36] The navy viewed its battleships and aircraft stationed in Micronesia as critical in a Japanese attack against the United States, and did not wish to transfer its de facto control over Micronesia to the Government-General.[37] Though some members of the navy had supported the Government-General's bid to administer Micronesia, increasing military preparations meant a consolidation of the navy's power over Micronesia that precluded any interference from Taiwan.

Extending Taiwan's Economic Ties to Southeast Asia

Although Taiwan's ambitions for direct territorial control over Micronesia were ultimately thwarted, Taiwan governors-general Kobayashi Seizō and Hasegawa Kiyoshi (served 1940–44) sought to strengthen the island's ties with Southeast Asia between 1937 and 1942. During this period, the Government-General promoted regional trade and investment in strategic raw materials such as iron ore, rubber, hemp, and foodstuffs. The government-sponsored Taiwan Development Company (est. 1936) and Taiwan Southern Regions Association (est. 1939) trained and dispatched colonial personnel—Japanese and Taiwanese—with linguistic, commercial, and agricultural expertise across Southeast Asia. Through these two colonial institutions, the Government-General stepped up

its efforts to increase Taiwan's economic power in the region with fiscal investment and manpower to combat anti-Japanese movements.

The Taiwan Development Company invested most heavily in mining enterprises in French Indochina. Although relations between Japan and France were strained over the South China Sea islands, Taiwan Development was able to establish a joint Franco-Japanese subsidiary that mined and exported iron ore from Indochina to Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan Development produced 101,335 tons of iron ore that year, nearly triple that of 1937.[38] In Manila, the company founded an additional mining subsidiary in 1940. But US restrictions resulted in the freezing of Japanese assets in the colony, so Taiwan Development had little success in the Philippines before the Asia-Pacific War.[39]

Beginning in 1938, Taiwan Development also partnered with Japan's Nissan Agriculture and Forestry Company to develop hemp plantations in Tawau in British North Borneo. Nissan had been involved in agricultural projects in Tawau dating back to the 1910s; in the late 1910s, the Taiwan Government-General had supplied Nissan with Taiwanese laborers for Tawau rubber and coconut plantations. However, in the post–World War I recession, the venture collapsed and wages plummeted, and most Taiwanese returned to Taiwan.[40] Nissan had gone on to rely on overseas Chinese laborers, but after the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, it was hard to recruit them. In their place, Taiwan Development dispatched Taiwanese laborers on two-year contracts. Taiwan Development subsidized migrants' wages and transportation and trained them in farming skills, but their efforts did not remedy Nissan's worker retention issues. By 1940, Taiwanese dissatisfaction with their training and conditions was becoming clear.[41]

Taiwan Development saw such efforts to encourage Taiwanese migration to Southeast Asia as political as well as economic opportunities. The Japanese government was eager to neutralize anti-Japanese movements by the overseas Chinese, and Taiwanese migrants, the Government-General believed, could help. Since the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the overseas Chinese Tan Kah-kee and Dee Chen-chuan had led anti-Japanese boycotts that hurt Japanese economic interests throughout Southeast Asia.[42] Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs hoped that Taiwanese could mediate, if not replace, overseas Chinese who no longer wanted to work with Japanese companies. As a *Taiwan Times* editorial optimistically stated in 1940, "The ten million overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia come from Fujian and Guangdong provinces like the Taiwanese." Because the two groups shared a common language and ethnicity, "there is no better competitor against the overseas Chinese than the Taiwanese."[43] Others pointed out that Taiwanese migration to less densely

populated regions in Southeast Asia would also help alleviate Taiwan's perceived demographic problem.[44] Taiwan's birth rate was substantially higher than in Japan and Korea, and the island's population had nearly doubled from under three million in 1895 to over five million in 1935.[45]

Yet efforts by the Taiwan Government-General to mobilize the Taiwanese in Southeast Asia as potential solutions to the "overseas Chinese problem" met significant challenges. In the years leading up to the Second Sino-Japanese War, the number of overseas Taiwanese in Southeast Asia had remained small. In 1934, for example, the Government-General reported a total of 1,026 Taiwanese officially registered with consulates in the region: 725 in the East Indies, 121 in Malaya, seventy-six in Siam, fifty-three in North Borneo, thirty-four in the Philippines, and seventeen in Indochina.[46] Japanese officials estimated the actual Taiwanese population, however, to be as large as 3,000 since many purposely avoided disclosing their colonial status.[47] Even in the East Indies, which had the largest Taiwanese population in Southeast Asia, few joined local Taiwan Associations. Many preferred instead to pass as self-proclaimed overseas Chinese to avoid anti-Japanese discrimination.[48]

With the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Taiwanese suffered from overseas Chinese persecution across Southeast Asia. Cai Yingbin, a Taiwanese employee for the Mitsui Company Bangkok office, was assaulted by overseas Chinese who threatened him: "We are going after all the Japanese, and that includes you."[49] Other Taiwanese in Siam who had their lives threatened decided to relocate to Taiwan or South China.[50] In Manila, several Taiwanese were called "the feet of the Japanese" and beaten by overseas Chinese anti-Japanese associations. By 1941, the Manila Taiwanese Association consisted of a mere twelve members.[51] Japanese companies in Malaya experienced the severest wave of anti-Japanese boycotts and lost much of their overseas Chinese labor pool. Although some Taiwanese replaced overseas Chinese laborers, Taiwanese employees and merchants suffered economically as their total number in Malaya decreased to around eighty by 1939.[52]

Unlike Malaya and the Philippines, where the number of Taiwanese quickly declined, Siam offered new Taiwanese opportunities after 1937. In part, this was because the Thai government quickly cracked down on overseas Chinese boycotts to maintain good relations with Japan.[53] It was also due to support by the Taiwan Government-General, which provided financial aid to Taiwanese merchants who remained in Siam to market Japanese products; it also dispatched Taiwanese graduates of Taipei Commercial Higher School to the Bangkok offices of Japanese companies. Taiwanese youth were given travel and language-study funds to work as business interns in Siam, where they quickly

picked up the Thai language.[54] By 1940, the Japan Trade Office head in Bangkok observed: "Japanese merchants are at a disadvantage competing with the overseas Chinese, but we now have Taiwanese who share their language, customs, and lifestyle and serve as our commercial warriors (*shōgyō senshi*). Before 1937 there were only ten Taiwanese stores in Bangkok, but now there are sixty successful ones."[55] There were over 150 Taiwanese in Siam by the eve of the Asia-Pacific War, with the majority working in commerce.[56]

The Taiwan Southern Regions Association, founded by the Government-General in 1939, was also instrumental in training prospective Taiwanese settlers to Southeast Asia. Enlisting scholars from Taipei Imperial University and Taipei Commercial Higher School, the association taught relevant foreign languages including French, Vietnamese, Dutch, Malay, Thai, and Tagalog. Taipei Imperial University professor Shimada Kinji oversaw French instruction while other languages rarely studied in Taiwan, such as Vietnamese, were taught by native speakers recruited from Indochina.[57] Asai Erin, a Taipei Imperial University linguistics professor, edited language textbooks such as *Malay Primer* and *Vietnamese Primer*.[58]

In addition, the association hosted public lectures and film screenings and published an area studies journal on the Southern Regions. In February 1941, for example, the association head discussed current affairs in Siam while Taipei Imperial University professor Tanaka Chōzaburō lectured on "Agricultural Resources in the Southern Regions." Afterward, the association screened the documentary film *Travels in Indochina*.[59] The association's monthly journal, *South China South Seas*, included articles by Japanese and Taiwanese experts on the Southern Regions' history, politics, economics, and culture. Nakamura Takashi (1910–94), a Taipei Imperial University history student, who in the postwar became a leading historian of Japanese-Southeast Asian relations, published on the region's overseas Chinese institutions and Japanese trade.[60] The association also administered the Southern Regions Archives (est. 1940), a repository of Taiwan's government and university library collections that by the end of the war contained 40,000 volumes (in Japanese, Chinese, and Western languages), with nearly one-third on Southeast Asia (see figure 6.3).[61]

Efforts by the Taiwan Government-General to train Taiwanese personnel for migration to Southeast Asia would not come to full fruition until after Japan's military occupation. Starting with Japan's takeover of Indochina (the north in 1940 and the south in 1941), the Taiwan Development Company began dispatching trained Taiwanese agricultural advisers to oversee local farmers, much as they had done in Hainan (see chapter 5).[62] With the start of the Asia-Pacific War, tens of thousands of Taiwanese civilians with multilingual skills accompanied the army and navy to help administer Southeast Asia.

FIGURE 6.3. Library stacks of the Taiwan Government-General's Foreign Affairs Office Research Unit containing thousands of colonial surveys of South China and Southeast Asia. In 1940, the library came to constitute a part of Taiwan's Southern Regions Archives. Courtesy of Asahi Shimbun.

A Military Training Ground for Tropical Warfare

In the years leading up to the Asia-Pacific War, Taiwan served as a training ground not only for overseas commercial expansion but also for military southern advance. During the first few years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the army had sought to avoid further interventions south of China that could antagonize the Western powers. Yet Japan's stalemate in the China theater and the start of World War II (1939–45) in Europe led the army to finally support the navy's push for a military occupation of Southeast Asia. By 1940, an interservice consensus had begun to form within the Japanese military in favor of a large-scale invasion to obtain the strategic materials necessary to win a protracted war.[63]

After Germany occupied France in June 1940, the Japanese government negotiated with Vichy France in July to station troops in northern Indochina in an effort to cut off Anglo-American supply routes to Chiang's Chongqing capital in Southwest China. The United States and Britain countered by issuing economic sanctions against Japan that further escalated tensions.[64] The following month, the army and navy agreed to use Taiwan as a military base for strategic planning for a southern advance campaign. That fall, Army Minister Tōjō

Hideki (1884–1948) formed the Taiwan Army Research Section.[65] In January 1941, Tōjō appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Tsuji Masanobu (1900–68), who had previously served in the China front, as its head officer. Because the army had previously fought only in the temperate regions of Northeast Asia, it was wholly unprepared for tropical warfare. Tsuji's staff was assigned to collect intelligence on various aspects of tropical warfare such as military tactics, equipment, and hygiene for Malaya, the Philippines, the East Indies, and Burma.[66]

With a modest budget and a mere six months to report back to Tokyo's army headquarters, Tsuji turned to the Taiwan Government-General for assistance. Japanese colonial officials and experts instructed the Taiwan Army Research Section on military geography, disembarkation methods, weather forecasting, and coastal conditions. Taipei Imperial University medical professors advised on tropical health and malaria prevention measures, while the Bank of Taiwan director instructed on Southeast Asian finance and trade.[67] In mid-February, Tsuji led a group of staff officers assembled by army headquarters to practice naval maneuvers from Taiwan to the coast of Kyūshū (southwest Japan) using military equipment designed for the tropics. In June, Tsuji's unit conducted secret operations in Fujian to practice transporting men, horses, and equipment in packed ships with temperatures of 120 degrees Fahrenheit; in Hainan, it conducted tropical military exercises with infantry, artillery, and engineers. The culmination of the Research Section's work was the mid-1941 publication of the pamphlet *Read This Alone and the War Can Be Won*. According to Tsuji's postwar memoirs, 40,000 copies were distributed to Japanese officers as they embarked for Southeast Asia during the Asia-Pacific War: the pamphlet was the sole instruction manual on tropical warfare available to the army. Tsuji claimed that the training and information acquired through the Taiwan Army Research Section directly contributed to the success of his Malaya campaign in early 1942.[68]

By June 1941, a month before the army advanced into southern Indochina and moved Japan one step closer to war with the Western powers, the Tokyo cabinet acknowledged Taiwan's increasingly important role in Japan's military strategy. At the same time, it made sure to limit the Taiwan Government-General's administrative reach in the Southern Regions. On June 24, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro issued a statement entitled "On Taiwan's Position in Our Policies toward the Southern Regions." Konoe recognized that Taiwan, with its unique geographical location and characteristics, was Japan's "advance base for the imperial south." Still, he wrote, the Taiwan Government-General should comply with the Tokyo cabinet's southern advance policies and direct its contributions of colonial resources, personnel, and experience to the Japanese military services in Hainan, Indochina, and Siam.[69] Taiwan was thus to complement, rather than compete with, Tokyo's visions for southern expansion.

When the Japanese army stationed in northern Indochina occupied the southern half of the colony in July 1941, the United States countered with an international embargo that cut off all foreign oil to Japan. President Franklin Roosevelt proposed to lift the embargo if Japan completely withdrew from China, including Manchuria, but in October, the Tokyo government rejected the offer.[70] The onset of hostilities with the United States, in turn, lent further impetus to Japan's southern advance. The Japanese military attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, and over the next half year, it occupied Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Borneo, Siam, the East Indies, and the Philippines.[71]

Second-Class Imperialists in Southeast Asia

The fortunes of the Taiwanese who were already living in Southeast Asia changed rapidly after the start of the Asia-Pacific War. Along with thousands of resident Japanese, hundreds of Taiwanese in Malaya, Borneo, and the East Indies were arrested as "enemy subjects" by British and Dutch authorities. Their property confiscated, they were sent to internment camps in Australia and India. But in other regions like the northern Philippines, which Japanese forces quickly occupied weeks into the war, Taiwanese exploited their status as fellow occupiers. In Manila, some Taiwanese took over American residences. Local Taiwanese employees of Japanese companies were concurrently enlisted as military interpreters to mediate between Japanese soldiers and the overseas Chinese communities.[72]

Their experience was by no means isolated. Across Southeast Asia, the Japanese enlisted prewar Taiwanese settlers in Southeast Asia as military interpreters for the overseas Chinese, from Taiwanese farmers in North Borneo to Taiwanese merchants in Siam.[73] Taiwan Army commander Wachi Takaji wrote about this strategy in Taiwan's *Southern Prosperity News* a week after the start of the Asia-Pacific War: "The Taiwanese can contribute not only in the China theater but also as interpreters for the overseas Chinese in the Southern Regions who have economic clout in places like the Philippines. The Taiwanese also have a history of interacting with local indigenous peoples. We should apply this experience in building our Co-Prosperity Sphere."[74]

In occupied Singapore, where the population was more than three-quarters ethnic Chinese, Taiwanese bilingual liaisons were especially important to the army. The Chinese community there had fundraised for Chiang Kai-shek and supported anti-Japanese boycotts; shortly before invading, the army decided to purge resident Chinese it deemed anti-Japanese.[75] After capturing Singapore in February 1942, Japanese soldiers detained and executed thousands of Chinese

in what came to be known as the "Sook Ching Massacre" (C. Suqing).[76] The fear of further such violence helped the army intimidate the resident Chinese into cooperating with, and providing financial support for, Japan.[77] The army selected Wee Twee Kim (Huang Duijin), a long-time Taiwanese employee of Japanese companies in Singapore, as the lead interpreter in charge of obtaining financial support from prominent Singaporean Chinese.[78]

Japan's army had organized a pro-Japanese Overseas Chinese Association and appointed Lim Boon Keng (1868–1957), an esteemed British-educated physician and Singaporean Chinese leader, as its president.[79] Interpreter Wee Twee Kim used the threat of violence against association members to solicit 50 million Singaporean dollars for the army, though only half the amount was ultimately raised (see figure 6.4).[80] Shinozaki Mamoru (b. 1910), a Japanese officer, recalled after the war that Wee was notorious for his brutality toward the Singaporean Chinese. In Shinozaki's view, Chinese hostility extended to other Taiwanese who arrived with the army: "Every Chinese disliked the Formosans [Taiwanese]."[81] Wee managed to avoid prosecution after the war, but three other Taiwanese interpreters were sentenced to death as war criminals by the British court in Singapore for the torture and deaths of hundreds of Singaporean Chinese.[82]

Oral histories compiled by the National Archives of Singapore since the 1980s have attested to the resentment by Singaporean residents toward Taiwanese civilian and military personnel who profited from Japan's occupation. The Taiwanese used their Hokkien-language skills to access regional Chinese markets and suppliers and prospered selling foodstuffs such as rice and sugar.[83] Singaporean Chinese recalled being bullied by Taiwanese merchants with the backing of Japanese officers.[84] Other Taiwanese worked for Japanese companies, banks, and factories that supplied the army with daily goods.[85] Wee Twee Kim, for example, was employed by the South Seas Warehouse Company after completing his interpreting duties for the Overseas Chinese Association.[86]

Taiwanese military personnel were viewed as second-class imperialists and derogatively called "Chinese traitors" by the Singaporean Chinese. According to Tian Soo Lee (b. 1925), an ethnic Chinese employee of Singapore's railway station, Taiwanese military assistants were identifiable by their khaki uniforms, cocked hats, and the walking sticks they used to beat the forced laborers whom they oversaw.[87] Harris bin Abdul Karim Muhammad (b. 1926), a Malay aircraft technician for the Japanese air force in Singapore, observed that Taiwanese and Koreans were relegated to the infantry while the "real Japanese" were in the air force. Muhammad recalls respecting Japanese who were "well-educated and good, not like the Koreans and Taiwanese," whom he could identify from their distinct uniforms and less-fluent Japanese.[88]

FIGURE 6.4. Lim Boon Keng (front-center), president of the Overseas Chinese Association in Singapore, with Japanese military officers and the Taiwanese interpreter Wee Twee Kim (front-right) in front of the association office. Wee and Lim oversaw the collection of financial donations by Singapore's overseas Chinese to the Japanese military. The Overseas Chinese Association presented this photograph as a gift to Lim on March 17, 1943. Courtesy of the National Archives of Singapore.

Not all Taiwanese were so easy to differentiate visually and linguistically from the ethnic Japanese and Chinese. Taiwanese military informers often worked undercover as Chinese civilians in Singapore's companies and government offices.[89] Kim Chuan Lee, for instance, found out only after the war ended about the identity of several Taiwanese who, with their fluent Hokkien, had blended in easily with fellow Singaporean Chinese.[90] Others did not realize that some Japanese-language teachers whom they assumed were Japanese had been Taiwanese. Chen Say Jame (b. 1932) recalled that the principal of the Asia Development Japanese Training School, where Chen studied during the war, turned

out to be Taiwanese. Students could not tell because he used a Japanese name and spoke only in Japanese.[91] That Taiwanese could move undetected between ethnic groups served as both an asset to the Japanese military and a threat to local Singaporeans.

At the same time, some Han Taiwanese discreetly helped the Singaporean Chinese often out of a sense of ethnic kinship. A few Singaporean Chinese corroborated that sympathetic Taiwanese interpreters and prison guards spoke on their behalf to Japanese commanders to release family and friends from POW camps.[92] Others recounted how Taiwanese interpreters supplied them with valuable information to evade Japanese authorities. After taking refuge from Singapore to Sumatra, Hong Peng See was advised by the Taiwanese interpreter Hu Zhifeng to relocate again since the Japanese would soon occupy the region. Hu told Hong that although he worked for Japan, he was "still Chinese" and wanted to protect fellow Chinese. Once Hong arrived in western Sumatra, Hong befriended three more Taiwanese interpreters who warned him to take cover in the impending Japanese air raid.[93] Such examples demonstrate how some Taiwanese in Southeast Asia, despite working for the Japanese military, felt a strong affinity with the ethnic Chinese and were willing to help them, though not to the point of outright subversion.

Across the rest of Japan's southern empire, tens of thousands of Taiwanese military and civilian personnel served in intermediary positions. The Taiwan Government-General dispatched Taiwanese to aid the Japanese military in farming, construction, and transport in Indochina, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and the East Indies.[94] Taiwanese males ages eighteen to thirty-five with previous experience in farming or a primary school degree could be selected for a year of training in Government-General Tropical Agricultural Centers before deployment as agricultural specialists in Southeast Asia.[95] Inspired by their success in Hainan, Japanese and Taiwanese employees of the Taiwan Development Company introduced Taiwanese Hōrai rice strands to Indochina and the Philippines with the aim of producing more rice for Japanese troops and settlers. They also helped extract rubber in Sumatra and oil from Java.[96]

Taiwanese agricultural advisers typically oversaw local farmers in the countryside and reported to their Japanese superiors based in cities. In Indochina, for instance, Taiwan Development stationed its Japanese employees in Hanoi and Saigon and its Taiwanese employees in eight agricultural sites for jute, rice, and cotton production.[97] Lin Wenzhuang (b. 1924), a Taiwanese employee for the Tainan Jute Production Company, was deployed in 1943 to the Bac Ninh countryside, east of Hanoi, to teach Vietnamese farmers how to grow jute and corn. Once a month, he went to his company's Hanoi office to submit a production report and collect his salary. According to Lin, the Japanese received two to

three times the salaries of Taiwanese employees and were housed separately.[98] Though Lin did not initially speak Vietnamese, he and other Taiwanese quickly picked up the language after a few months. In 1945, Lin was sufficiently fluent to serve as an army interpreter for Japanese mining projects in Indochina.[99]

The record on relations between Taiwanese and Japanese colleagues in Southeast Asia is mixed. Lin, for example, resented that the Japanese jute company paid its Taiwanese employees lower salaries, and when Japanese colleagues admonished him for not using honorifics when speaking to them, he quarreled with them.[100] In contrast, Liao Tsu-yao (b. 1925), a Taiwanese employee of Taiwan Development, contended that Taiwanese-Japanese relations were better overseas than in Taiwan. After the war, Liao reminisced about what he called, nostalgically, his dream job in Indochina, including evenings he spent drinking with Japanese colleagues.[101] Both men were identified as imperialists by the Vietnamese and became targets of anticolonial hostility against Japanese rule. Lin recalled a skirmish between Vietnamese farmers and Taiwanese advisers in 1944 that resulted in several Taiwanese deaths.[102] After the war, the Taiwanese and Japanese equally faced retaliatory killings at the hands of the Vietnamese.[103]

Placed in the middle of Japanese imperial hierarchies in Southeast Asia, Taiwanese both benefited and suffered from their second-class status. Despite Japanese official rhetoric that celebrated Taiwanese military volunteers as "loyal Japanese subjects," the Japanese often discriminated against their Taiwanese subordinates. As a former Taiwanese military assistant recalled, "The bottom line was that the Japanese did not trust us Taiwanese. We civilian employees were placed in the second or third line as clerks, agricultural experts, civil engineers, machinists, construction workers, drivers, nurses, chemists, and so on."[104] Wu Pingcheng, a Taiwanese military doctor in Southeast Asia in 1944, contended that Taiwanese overseas remained in an ambiguous position as "semi-colonizer" (*han-seifukusha*) subjects under the Japanese. Yet at the same time, Wu admitted that he and other Taiwanese obtained privileges that accompanied their elevated status as military personnel. Taiwanese were able to work their way up to become officers with much higher salaries and status than they had in Taiwan.[105]

Indigenous Taiwanese in the Southern War Fronts

While the Han Taiwanese servicemen in Southeast Asia were seen as second-class by the Japanese, indigenous Taiwanese occupied a different and lower place in the region's imperial hierarchy. Indigenous Taiwanese had not been deployed to the China war front, but an estimated 4,500 were enlisted by the Japanese military in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific during the Asia-Pacific

War.[106] Japanese colonial and military officials viewed the indigenous Taiwanese as especially suited for jungle and mountainous warfare in the southern tropics. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu (1887–1946), who led Japan's invasion of the Philippines in 1941–42, was the first to request the Taiwan Government-General to recruit indigenous Taiwanese for military service overseas. With previous experience as Taiwan Army commander (1940–41), Homma believed that those accustomed to Taiwan's uplands would be resourceful for his army unit in the Philippines.[107]

The Government-General eagerly granted Homma's request by forming the first of eight installments of the "Indigenous Taiwanese Volunteer Corps" (Takasago-zoku Giyūtai) in March 1942. Five hundred indigenous males, ages seventeen to thirty-three, were selected from over 4,000 applicants.[108] The Japanese colonial media celebrated the indigenous corps as evidence that assimilationist rule had successfully transformed what were formerly "violent savages" into "patriotic volunteers."[109] In southern Taiwan, the indigenous volunteers received a week of training on growing vegetables and transporting military supplies. Upon joining Homma's unit in the Philippines, they underwent another week of training on using rifles and hand grenades.[110] According to Homma, the indigenous volunteers' jungle expertise helped contribute to Japan's victorious battles against American forces in Bataan and Corregidor in the spring of 1942. Indigenous servicemen constructed roads in mountainous and jungle terrain critical for transporting ammunition and food supplies among Japanese military units.[111]

In April 1942, Nakamura Bunji, a high-ranking police official of the Taiwan Government-General's Indigenous Rule Bureau, conducted a two-week survey of Bataan to observe firsthand the indigenous volunteer corps. Nakamura reported in Taiwan's newspapers that Japanese officers praised the indigenous Taiwanese for deftly navigating jungles with "indigenous swords" and not succumbing to malaria as easily as Japanese soldiers (see figure 6.5). They were also commended for their courage in fighting on the front lines, as evidenced by four "brave soldiers" (*yūshi*) who had been hospitalized after attacking an American military base.[112] Nakamura noted that indigenous Taiwanese shared linguistic affinities with indigenous Filipinos and could potentially assist as interpreters in the future.[113] In sum, Nakamura highlighted the volunteers' achievements as the culmination of four decades of Japanese colonial rule that had effectively "civilized" (*kyōka*) the indigenous Taiwanese.[114] He contended that the volunteers' exemplary conduct reflected well on Government-General police officials who had trained them.[115] Of course, such self-congratulatory Japanese colonial rhetoric portrays only one side of the story. Postwar oral testimonies by Japanese officials and indigenous servicemen reveal a less ideal-

FIGURE 6.5. The Japanese colonial media celebrated indigenous Taiwanese servicemen in the Philippines, shown here posing with indigenous swords, for their ability to navigate the jungles for Japanese troops. Courtesy of Mainichi Shimbun and AFLO.

ized, paternalistic relationship between the two groups. During their initial training, indigenous volunteers recalled facing discrimination from Japanese officers who still called them "savages" (*banjin*).[116]

As conditions for the Japanese military deteriorated in the southern war fronts, Japanese soldiers did rely on indigenous Taiwanese for help to survive in the tropics. With Japan's retreat from Guadalcanal in 1943, Allied naval forces cut off resupply routes to New Guinea. In increasingly desperate circumstances, indigenous Taiwanese taught Japanese colleagues how to identify edible plants and hunt wild animals.[117] Japanese officers also recalled that in guerrilla warfare, indigenous Taiwanese "demonstrated an ability several times greater than that of Japanese soldiers." Other Japanese soldiers who had suffered from malaria, cholera, or general exhaustion expressed gratitude toward the indigenous Taiwanese who had taken care of them.[118]

In postwar interviews, indigenous Taiwanese also noted interethnic rivalries among colonial subjects in the Japanese military hidden from official publications. One former indigenous volunteer in the South Pacific recalled that while he and his colleagues took part in guerrilla warfare in the front lines, Han Taiwanese did not like to fight and preferred to stay in the rear growing food or cooking. "We looked down on them [Han Taiwanese] as cowards, but they also

probably looked down on us."[119] A former Japanese lieutenant recalled that indigenous volunteers were "very well-disciplined and obeyed their superiors" and "braver than Japanese soldiers." By contrast, he had viewed Han Taiwanese agricultural laborers in his unit as "untrustworthy."[120] Indigenous Taiwanese like Warisu Piho (J. Yonekawa Nobuo, C. Gao Chengjia, Atayal tribe) also fought alongside Korean soldiers in New Guinea. He observed that while Koreans were well-trained, they had trouble adjusting to the tropical climate and were susceptible to malaria. The two groups showed mutual respect, and indigenous Taiwanese shared food and herbal medicines with Korean colleagues.[121]

Indigenous Taiwanese had a linguistic advantage over other colonial subjects that allowed them to mediate between Japanese soldiers and indigenous residents. With their shared Austronesian linguistic affinities, indigenous Taiwanese quickly picked up local indigenous languages in the Philippines and New Guinea. Pasao (b. 1924, C. Zheng Wangjinzong, Amis tribe) recalled learning Visayan and Tagalog in his spare time from Filipino children, noting that his native Amis language was quite similar to Visayan since they were from the same Austronesian family.[122] In New Guinea, Pawan Taimo (b. 1924, J. Satō Toshiaki, C. Liao Xinyi, Atayal tribe) quickly learned the local Papuan language and interpreted for his Japanese officers. He established cordial relations with indigenous chiefs by exchanging gifts such as Japanese cigarettes and alcohol for pigs. Pawan also taught the Japanese language and agricultural skills to residents and recruited spies against Allied forces that landed in Rabaul. When he found out that one of the residents was a spy for the Allies, Pawan killed him.[123] Like their Han Taiwanese counterparts, indigenous Taiwanese often served in intermediary roles where they were complicit in Japanese violence against Allied soldiers and Asian residents.

Taiwanese Prison Guards of Allied POWs

The layers of imperial relations in Southeast Asia were even more complex than in China because of the hundreds of thousands of Western POWs captured by the Japanese. By May 1942, the Japanese military was in charge of an estimated 270,000 Allied POWs (140,000 servicemen and 130,000 civilians)—far more than initially anticipated.[124] The Japanese lack of manpower, logistical planning, and interest in prioritizing POW care resulted in high casualty rates: over one-quarter of Allied POWs died by the end of the war.[125] They turned to colonial holdings, particularly Taiwan and Korea, for help.

POWs were divided between "Asians" (Indians, Indonesians, Malays, Burmese, Filipinos, Chinese) and "Whites" (British, Australians, Americans,

Dutch).[126] The Japanese released most Asian POWs, though tens of thousands were reorganized into military labor units.[127] Among the 60,000 Indian soldiers taken prisoner in Singapore, 16,000 were reorganized into an Indian National Army that later serviced the Japanese military against British forces in Burma.[128] As for captured Chinese soldiers, before the Asia-Pacific War, the Japanese had not granted them POW status because Japan and China had not been legally at war (Chinese captives were instead executed or forced into labor). Only after Chiang Kai-shek declared war in December 1941 did Japan's military apply international POW regulations to captured Chinese soldiers.[129]

Japan had far more Allied POWs than initially anticipated. The military turned to Taiwan and Korea to help supply POW camp centers and manpower for prison guards. Among the 125,000 "White" POWs, hundreds of high-ranking officers were transported to POW camps in Taiwan and Korea.[130] The rest were placed in camps in Hong Kong, Hainan, Malaya, Borneo, the East Indies, and the Philippines. Between 1942 and 1945, twelve POW camps in Taiwan interned over 8,000 Allied POWs.[131] The Japanese paraded hundreds of Allied POWs arriving from Southeast Asia through Taiwan and Korea's cities as propagandistic displays of Japan's military superiority. By marching captured British, Australian, American, and Dutch soldiers for tens of thousands of Taiwanese and Koreans to witness firsthand, Japanese officials sought to undermine any lingering admiration in the colonies for the Western powers.[132]

In May 1942, the Japanese military began recruiting Taiwanese (mostly Han but also indigenous peoples) and Koreans as POW prison guards to free Japanese soldiers for frontline duties. New volunteers underwent two months of training in their respective colonies before deployment to overseas POW camps. An estimated 1,500 Taiwanese and 3,000 Korean prison guards served in Southeast Asia.[133] The majority of Taiwanese were dispatched to POW camps in Hong Kong, Borneo and the Philippines, while Koreans were sent to Singapore, Siam, and the East Indies.[134]

By the end of the war, Taiwanese and Korean prison guards had become notorious for their excessive cruelty against Allied and Asian POWs. Postwar testimonies by POW survivors have attested to the abuses they suffered at the hands of the Taiwanese and Koreans, including torture and the deliberate withholding of food and medicine.[135] A former Singaporean Chinese POW recalled how Taiwanese guards treated POWs even more violently than Japanese soldiers.[136] As recently as 2014, Arthur Lane, an ex-British POW who had worked on the "Burma-Thailand Death Railway,"[137] was similarly quoted in the British press: "The Japanese guards were bad, but the Koreans and the Formosans [Taiwanese] were the worst." Lane believed that colonial guards had acted excessively toward POWs "to show they were as good as the Japanese" and

because "they had no one else to take it out on other than us POWs."[138] The question of to what degree Taiwanese and Koreans should be held responsible for their violent behavior against Allied POWs continues to be hotly debated. Some historians have criticized the accounts of POWs like Lane for failing to take seriously the colonial status of such prison guards, who—occupying the lowest ranks of the military hierarchy—merely acted according to the orders of their Japanese camp commanders.[139]

Postwar oral histories of Taiwanese prison guards in Borneo, which have been transcribed over the past few decades, can help us better understand what motivated Taiwanese men to volunteer and what pressures and incentives they faced on the job. Like other Taiwanese servicemen, prison guards were well compensated. Zhuang Yincai (b. 1925) left his job at a hardware store to work as a guard so that he could remit the higher wages to his family. Zheng Huoshan (b. 1913) volunteered under the assumption that a guard's job would be less taxing than his work in a coal and iron transport company. Others eagerly enlisted out of a strong sense of patriotism. Lin Shuimu (b. 1927) held Japan's military in high esteem and left his internship as an engineer, having been swept up by Taiwan's "volunteer fever." The Japanese-language school teacher Ke Jingxing (b. 1920) similarly applied as a guard to follow his three brothers who had all signed up for military service. On the other hand, Chen Taishan (b. 1922) had been threatened by Japanese colonial police, who told him, he recalled, that "to not volunteer was to be anti-Japanese" and that "it was the highest honor to die in war for Japan."[140]

These five men were among the first 750 Taiwanese enlisted in July 1942 to undergo two weeks of training as POW prison guards. At a training center in southern Taiwan, Japanese officers instructed them on the use of weapons and corporal punishment to discipline POWs. Taiwanese guards themselves were verbally and physically abused by Japanese superiors, which was standard practice in Japan's military. Though the Japanese government had indicated to the Allied powers in 1942 that it would follow international laws of the 1929 Geneva Convention regarding the proper treatment of POWs, the guards seem to have heard nothing about it.[141] Zhuang Yincai and Lin Shuimu recalled how they had no idea that the Allied powers would later interpret their use of corporal punishment on POWs as a war crime.[142]

After completing their training in Taiwan, the five were sent with 200 Taiwanese guards to Borneo's Kuching POW camp headquarters, where roughly 6,000 Allied POWs had been assembled from Malaya, Burma, and the East Indies.[143] As in other camps across the empire, Taiwanese guards in Borneo oversaw POW forced-labor activities such as constructing roads and airports and transporting military supplies. Lin Shuimu and Zhuang Yincai recalled

feeling sympathy for their POWs. Lin claimed that when he supervised POW laborers for airport construction in Ambon, he tried to give them extra rest.[144] Zhuang asserted that he grew close to POWs through daily interactions and gave them his leftovers or bought them extra food. But once, when Zhuang's commanders found out about his giving out extra food, they beat him in front of the POWs. Lin similarly felt pressure from his Japanese commanding officers: if Taiwanese guards were caught being lax with POWs, they were punished.[145]

Indigenous Taiwanese guards similarly partook in violence against Allied POWs. For example, Zakara (b. 1920, J. Nakano Mitsuo, C. Zhu Duyi, Amis tribe) had volunteered to work as a prison guard for Allied POWs in North Borneo for six months alongside Korean guards. In postwar interviews, Zakara admitted that when POWs escaped during their forced labor assignments, he gave chase and shot those who were captured.[146] Others like Ruradenramakau (b. 1921, J. Kawano Eiichi, C. Gao Rongli, Paiwan tribe), who arrived in the Philippines as part of the second volunteer corps were abruptly assigned to guard American POWs without prior training.[147] In New Guinea, where Japanese forces lacked food supplies by 1944, indigenous Taiwanese admitted that they and Japanese soldiers ate the corpses of POWs to fend off starvation.[148]

According to Ke Jingxing, Allied POWs in Borneo at first enjoyed sufficient amounts of food rations and were allowed to grow vegetables on the side. But after the Japanese naval defeats in the South Pacific in 1942 (Battle of the Coral Sea) and 1943 (Battle of Guadalcanal), Japanese resupply routes to Southeast Asia were increasingly cut off by the Allied powers. As a result, POW camps in Borneo experienced severe shortages in food and medical supplies, which compounded the spread of malaria and dysentery. Between 1942 and 1944, hundreds of Allied POWs in Borneo's Kuching headquarters died from malnutrition, disease, exhaustion from forced labor, and Allied air raids.[149]

In early 1945, anticipating an Allied invasion of Borneo, Japan's military began relocating POWs further inland. In what came to be known as the "Sandakan Death Marches" (January–July 1945), Taiwanese guards, including Ke Jingxing and Zhuang Yincai, led some 2,500 British and Australian POWs through hundreds of miles of mountainous terrain. Japanese officers ordered the Taiwanese to execute POWs who became too sick and weak and were viewed as a burden on remaining rations.[150] Several Taiwanese guards objected to their Japanese commander but were threatened at gunpoint if they disobeyed.[151] By July 1945, all but six POWs had died.[152] Twenty Taiwanese guards, including Ke and Zhuang, were later sentenced in 1946 by the Australian Military Court as war criminals for the execution of POWs during the Sandakan Death Marches (see epilogue).[153]

Not all Taiwanese guards obeyed the orders of their Japanese superiors. According to historian Yuki Tanaka, one Taiwanese guard in Borneo with the Japanese surname of Nakamura warned an Australian POW, Keith Botterill, that his Japanese superior was planning on executing the remaining Allied POWs and that they should escape.[154] Botterill successfully fled, and a few days later, on July 4, 1945, Nakamura attacked four Japanese officers, killing one and wounding two before committing suicide. Botterill, who was rescued by Australian forces in mid-August, later vouched for the integrity of another Taiwanese guard named Li Pishu (Toyoda Kōkichi). Li had been sentenced to twelve years of prison after the war for executing POWs during the Sandakan Death Marches, but thanks to Botterill, who attested to Li's generosity in supplying extra food and not beating POWs under his charge, Li's sentence was shortened to two years.[155]

Because conditions and personnel varied greatly among POW camps across Japan's empire, it is hard to generalize about the behavior of Taiwanese, Korean, and Japanese guards toward POWs.[156] With no coherent official policy by the Japanese military government on POW treatment, guard practices differed depending on commanding generals.[157] Chen Dengzuo, a former Taiwanese prison guard in the Philippines, recalled that his Japanese superiors were "relatively humane and allowed the POWs to govern themselves." Unlike his Taiwanese colleagues in North Borneo, who were taught to beat their British and Australian POWs, Chen witnessed very little violence between Taiwanese guards and American POWs in his camp.[158] Though it would be unfair to exonerate Taiwanese guards from taking responsibility for their actions, they had little control over their war front destination and conditions. Ke Jingxing and other Taiwanese guards were not allowed to return home even after their initial two-year contracts were completed because Japanese superiors did not want to train new recruits. Other Taiwanese initially arrived in Southeast Asia as military laborers but then were assigned as ad hoc POW guards without any say in the matter.[159]

Even as prison guards with supervisory power over Allied POWs, Taiwanese and Koreans remained subordinate to the Japanese. They wore separate uniforms with a red star on their sleeves and carried knives and sticks instead of guns, which visually differentiated them from Japanese soldiers.[160] According to the Singaporean Chinese Tian Soo Lee (b. 1925), even outside POW camps Taiwanese military personnel were identifiable from their khaki uniforms, cocked hats, and walking sticks used to beat forced laborers they administered.[161] Second, rations for Taiwanese prison guards were about one-third less than for Japanese officers, or roughly the same for the POWs.[162] Consequently, Taiwanese faced discrimination from Allied POWs and local ci-

vilians who did not respect them as "true Japanese soldiers."[163] Chen Taishan, one of the five Taiwanese guards in Borneo sentenced to ten years as a war criminal, recalled his disillusionment with Allied POWs for their ethnic biases against the Taiwanese as inferior to the Japanese.[164] Perhaps instances of Taiwanese cruelty toward Allied POWs were driven not only by Japanese military training and anti-Western propaganda, but also resentment at the discriminatory attitudes of both their Japanese superiors and the POWs they were tasked with guarding.

Taiwanese Comfort Women in Southeast Asia

The replication of ethno-imperial hierarchies and second-class citizenship in Southeast Asia were not limited to Taiwanese military personnel but also applied to the Taiwanese military "comfort women" (*jūgun ianfu*). From 1942 to 1945, the Japanese military transported Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese comfort women to comfort stations throughout the region. Extant Japanese military documents reveal that as early as March 1942, the Southern Regions Army ordered the Taiwan Army to dispatch fifty Taiwanese comfort women and three comfort station operators to southern Borneo. Four months later, an additional twenty-five Taiwanese comfort women were requested for the same destination. Military records that month also note that twenty-two Taiwanese comfort women boarded a fleet of ships from Korea that stopped in Taiwan on its way to Singapore with 700 Korean comfort women and ninety comfort station operators and their families.[165] Although the exact number of comfort women and comfort stations in Southeast Asia remains unknown, Yoshimi Yoshiaki has estimated that there were around 100 comfort stations in the region by 1942.[166]

In the 1990s, Chu Te-lan interviewed ten Taiwanese comfort women who had been sent to Borneo, and eleven who had been sent to the Philippines. Like the Taiwanese comfort women in Hainan, the majority stated that Japanese and Taiwanese recruiters had tricked them.[167] For instance, "Setsuko" (b. 1923) had signed up with her friends in 1943 for a Taipei job advertisement for nurses in Southeast Asia that offered to pay ¥200 a month. To her horror, however, she and ten other Taiwanese women were instead shipped off to Borneo's Balikpapan comfort station to work alongside Japanese women from Taiwan. Until the end of the war, they were prohibited from leaving their comfort stations and given only one day off per month.[168]

Other Taiwanese comfort women were deployed to Southeast Asia by the Japanese military after first serving in comfort stations in China. According to "Takako" (b. 1923), her family had sold her off as a prostitute in Taipei before

she was resold to a comfort station in Guangzhou in 1941. After her half-year stay in Guangzhou, she was then transferred along with Japanese and Korean comfort women to a Burma comfort station in 1942. There, Takako gave birth to a child of a Japanese soldier who treated her well and promised to marry her. However, when the Japanese military unit withdrew from Burma in July 1945, Takako gave her child to Burmese villagers whom she thought would have a better chance at keeping it alive, and surrendered herself to an American POW camp.[169]

As in China, comfort stations in Southeast Asia replicated Japanese imperial status hierarchies. In terms of official rankings and wages, Taiwanese and Korean comfort women retained their secondary status below the Japanese but higher than "native" (including ethnic Chinese) comfort women. Unlike in China, however, Southeast Asian comfort stations also consisted of Western and Eurasian comfort women who outranked the Taiwanese and Koreans.[170] Arucu'ucu Rava (b. 1921, J. Noguchi Takichi, C. Lin Dezheng), an indigenous Taiwanese serviceman in New Guinea who admitted to frequenting Rabaul's comfort stations, recalled that Japanese were paid ¥5, Westerners ¥3, and Taiwanese and Koreans ¥2.[171] Within Japan's military hierarchy in Southeast Asia, Taiwanese and Korean male personnel enjoyed higher status over Allied POWs and civilians. By contrast, Taiwanese and Korean comfort women remained subordinate to their Western counterparts, whom Japanese soldiers presumably viewed as more exotic or "civilized" in contradiction to official Pan-Asianist discourse.

Although the Japanese military initially established comfort stations for the benefit of Japanese soldiers, Taiwanese, Korean, and other non-Japanese colonial subjects also took part in the sexual exploitation of comfort women, whether in the colonies or the war fronts. Postwar oral testimonies by Taiwanese servicemen corroborate that they made equal use of comfort stations in Southeast Asia.[172] In the Philippines and New Guinea, for instance, one indigenous Taiwanese confessed to having paid for the services of Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean, American, Filipino, and German comfort women.[173] Taiwanese nurses in the Philippines also witnessed a Taiwanese couple in their fifties who served as comfort station operators in charge of Taiwanese women.[174] In Japan's southern fronts, the Taiwanese thus occupied a range of roles within the empire's ethno-imperial hierarchy, participating both as exploiters and the exploited.

Japanese imperial hierarchies resulted in fraught relations not just between the Taiwanese and Japanese, but also between the Taiwanese and local Asian populations where Japan's military extended its reach. The Taiwan Government-General long had advocated for greater involvement in the imperial project overseas, allying itself with the Imperial Navy in an effort to broaden its ad-

ministrative reach over Japan's newly occupied territories. Though intercolonial rivalries with Micronesia in the South Pacific limited Taiwan's jurisdictional expansion to the Spratlys in the South China Sea, the Government-General sought to strengthen commercial and agricultural ties between Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The Government-General hoped that linguistic and ethnic similarities would help the Taiwanese further Japanese imperial interests, but the overseas Taiwanese—facing both anti-Japanese boycotts and persecution at the hands of the overseas Chinese—were generally ineffective. When Japan's occupation of Southeast Asia began in 1942, however, tens of thousands more Taiwanese were mobilized to the Southern Regions. By the end of the Asia-Pacific War, the Taiwanese had worked as economic intermediaries, comfort women, POW guards, and front-line soldiers in China and across Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

The Japanese imperial worldview, as well as the conditions they faced on the ground, impacted overseas Taiwanese in different ways. Though Han Taiwanese servicemen acquired higher salaries and social status by volunteering in the Southern Regions, they remained subordinate to their Japanese superiors. As military interpreters or prison guards, Han Taiwanese were unarmed and wore separate uniforms that differentiated them from regular Japanese soldiers—flagging their status, in the viewpoint of occupied peoples, as "second-class imperialists." Taiwanese comfort women were sexually exploited by Japan's servicemen—which included Taiwanese and Korean males—yet in theory they retained a higher socioeconomic status above "native" comfort women across wartime Asia. The status of indigenous Taiwanese servicemen also varied across time and space. During the early years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, indigenous Taiwanese were not given the same opportunities as their Han counterparts to volunteer as military assistants on the war fronts. Only during the Asia-Pacific War were they deployed as military assistants to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; still, their numbers remained only a fraction of the Han Taiwanese. Even as they were celebrated as loyal patriots in the Japanese media, indigenous servicemen largely remained third-class subjects under the Japanese and Han Taiwanese.

Indigenous Taiwanese efforts to prove their patriotic loyalty through military service came at extremely high costs. The majority of indigenous volunteers sent to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific during the last few years of the war never returned home to Taiwan. They died in battle or from illness or lack of nutrition.[175] In its desperate defense of the Philippines from invading American forces in fall 1944, Japan's military dispatched Taiwanese reinforcements, including the Kaoru Paratrooper Unit (Kaoru Kūteitai), a *tokkōtai* or "special attack unit" (see figure 6.6). Around ninety indigenous Taiwanese

Figure 6.6. Private First Class Kurihara Masayuki (left) sending off indigenous Taiwanese soldiers in the Kaoru Paratrooper Unit, which carried out suicide aerial attacks on Leyte Island (the Philippines) in fall 1944. Courtesy of Asahi Shimbun.

carried out suicide aerial attacks on advancing American troops in Leyte Island. The Japanese colonial media celebrated the Kaoru unit as emblematic of the courage and "Japanese spirit" (Yamato damashi) of the indigenous Taiwanese volunteers.[176] However, not all were willing to fight to the death on the southern war front. Like their Han counterparts, several indigenous Taiwanese fled their units and hid in jungles or surrendered to Allied forces.[177]

Most of the Taiwanese who were brought into Southeast Asia were Han, and the Japanese assumed that they were more fit than other residents who—except for the overseas Chinese—were believed to be "lazy" and "lacking in skills."[178] The Taiwanese often internalized Japanese Orientalist views of superiority over the Southeast Asian "natives" as supposedly at the bottom of the civilizational hierarchy. In postwar interviews, for example, a former Taiwanese soldier stationed in the East Indies recalled that he had cordial relations with Indonesians, but viewed them as culturally inferior. Though he was aware that such views mirrored how many Japanese had looked down on Taiwanese like himself, it did not prevent him from replicating the Japanese ethno-imperialist worldview.[179] Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that when the war ended, Taiwanese servicemen bore the brunt of anti-Japanese retaliation across China and Southeast Asia.

Epilogue
Postwar Legacies

With the collapse of Japan's empire in August 1945, a half-century of Japanese rule over Taiwan came to an abrupt end. As agreed upon by the Allied powers in the 1943 Cairo Declaration, Taiwan's territorial sovereignty was transferred to the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD).[1] The GMD publicly celebrated the recovery of the island and its six million Taiwanese, especially the majority Han, as fellow brethren who had returned to their Chinese "ancestral homeland." Cai Xinke, a Taiwanese policeman who had worked in wartime Hainan (chapter 5), was moved by this announcement, and recalled that one of his Japanese colleagues even expressed envy: "If Japan had won the war, you would have been among the victors. But even with its defeat, you are still on the winning side!"[2]

Yet many Taiwanese feared that their wartime participation left them vulnerable to Chinese retribution. Over 200,000 Taiwanese had served in Japan's military, with an estimated 40,000 and 60,000 stationed in South China and Southeast Asia.[3] How would the GMD reintegrate the Taiwanese as part of the ROC nation, particularly those who had taken part in the deaths of countless Han Chinese lives? Would Chiang's principle of benevolence toward the Japanese (C. *yide baoyuan*, "repaying evil with kindness") apply to the Taiwanese, or would they be held to a different standard as fellow Han Chinese? By fall 1945, the answers were disheartening. The GMD military detained thou-

sands of Taiwanese—including Cai—in internment camps in South China. Over the next few years, hundreds of Taiwanese were indicted as domestic "traitors of the Han" (C. *hanjian*) or as international "war criminals" (C. *zhanfan*, J. *senpan*). Those fortunate enough to avoid prosecution and be released, including Cai, grew frustrated with Chinese leaders' reluctance to help them return home to Taiwan.[4]

Postwar GMD jurisdiction over the Taiwanese did not immediately extend beyond its territorial borders in Taiwan and mainland China. In Southeast Asia, the Allied powers collectively took charge of interning, prosecuting, and resettling tens of thousands of Taiwanese back to Taiwan. Between 1945 and 1952, Britain, France, Australia, the US, the Netherlands, and the Philippines held their own respective war crimes trials across formerly Japanese-occupied regions in Southeast Asia.[5] The GMD requested that the Taiwanese be granted amnesty as "ordinary overseas Chinese" (C. *yiban huaqiao*). However, the Allied powers administered Taiwanese—as well as Korean and other former colonial subjects—according to their wartime Japanese nationality.[6] Over a hundred Taiwanese were sentenced as "Japanese" war criminals in Southeast Asia for atrocities committed against Allied POWs and local civilians.[7] Only after the ROC and Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952 were Taiwanese internationally recognized as ROC nationals. The socio-legal category of the Taiwanese, which had been ambiguous under Japanese rule, thus remained highly contested throughout the early postwar period.

Recolonizing Taiwan

Upon taking over Taiwan as a newly recovered province of the ROC, the GMD faced significant challenges in transforming the Taiwanese from former Japanese subjects into Chinese nationals. Despite official rhetoric highlighting shared ethnocultural ties across the Taiwan Strait, the GMD and broader Chinese public viewed most Taiwanese with suspicion, if not hostility. Large-scale Taiwanese involvement in Japan's wartime empire left a negative legacy in postwar China of the Taiwanese as "enslaved" (C. *nuhua*) and "Japanized" (C. *Ribenhua*) and thus untrustworthy. Taiwanese anticolonial leaders—especially those who had joined the GMD in wartime China—made efforts to convince Chinese leaders that not all Taiwanese had been loyal to the Japanese, but to little avail.[8]

An editorial in the GMD *Central Daily* on August 29, 1945, contended that the Chinese reassimilation of Taiwan's residents would be far more challenging than in Northeast China (Manchuria). "It is now up to us to undo 50 years

of Japanese enslavement by education and rescue them [Taiwanese] from ignorance and poverty . . . Although our brethren in the Northeast faced the same problem of enslavement by education, it was for a far shorter period of 15 years. Moreover, 95 percent of the region's population are migrants from Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, etc., whose languages are closer to China's [Mandarin], so they are already well-versed in Chinese nationalism."[9] GMD distrust of the Taiwanese stemmed from the long duration of Japanese rule and the linguistic barrier between the Taiwanese dialect and Mandarin, which were mutually unintelligible. Since most Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin, the GMD assumed they lacked Chinese patriotism.

Some Taiwanese initially displayed pro-Chinese sentiment in welcoming the arrival of the GMD to the island. In Taipei, Taiwanese elites formed "Preparatory Committees to Welcome the GMD," and crowds greeted Chen Yi (1883–1950), appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as governor of the island, with ROC flags and anthems. They were optimistic that rule by fellow Han could lead to greater political autonomy and economic opportunities than Taiwan had experienced under Japanese colonialism. Eager to prove their loyalty to China, many downplayed their previous cooperation with the Japanese while others exaggerated their anticolonial credentials.[10]

However, the Taiwanese were quickly disillusioned by the GMD's actions that were reminiscent of Japanese colonialists. GMD officials and Chinese "mainlanders" (C. waishengren) who accompanied them seized former Japanese assets and monopolized leadership positions in Taiwan's government and industries.[11] By late 1946, many Taiwanese viewed the GMD as no less authoritarian and opportunistic than the Japanese. A common saying became: "The dogs (Japanese) had left, but the pigs (Chinese mainlanders) had arrived."[12] Except for a few Taiwanese who had served in the wartime GMD regime, Taiwanese were as shut out from top-level administrative ranks as they were under Japanese rule.[13] In contrast to Japan's colonial bureaucracy, where Taiwanese constituted over half of the 85,000 officials, not even a quarter of the 45,000 officials in Chen's government were Taiwanese.[14] Moreover, while Chen deported the majority of 450,000 Japanese colonists by mid-1946, he retained 7,000 Japanese experts to assist in the island's socioeconomic recovery—positions that instead could have gone to the Taiwanese.[15]

For most Taiwanese, then, GMD rule was more akin to recolonization than liberation from foreign rule.[16] Chen Yi instituted Sinicization policies in education, media, and other fields to remold Taiwanese into patriotic Chinese citizens. By late 1946, the GMD replaced Japanese with Mandarin as the official language of the island.[17] Whereas previously they had been pressured to abandon their native vernaculars to "become more Japanese," Taiwanese were

now discriminated against for lacking the linguistic bona fides of proper "Chineseness." The GMD pointed to their inability to speak Mandarin as a liability and rationale for exclusion from political leadership.[18]

Like their Japanese predecessors, GMD officials imposed second-class citizenship on the Taiwanese. Still, when it came to the question of whether Taiwanese should be punished as *hanjian* for wartime collaboration with Japan, the GMD was largely forgiving. Chen Yi initially received public appeals from the Taiwanese themselves to prosecute Taiwanese political and economic elites who had profited from close ties with Japanese colonial authorities at the expense of fellow islanders, amounting to some 300 accusations. In the end, however, few Taiwanese were prosecuted for their wartime activities.[19]

Instead, Chen prioritized retribution against those who had actively opposed the postwar GMD takeover of the island. In early 1946, he arrested several Taiwanese elites who had conspired with Japanese military officers in August 1945 in an aborted attempt to declare Taiwan's independence from the ROC.[20] Chen absolved the remaining Taiwanese residents of wartime treason since he needed their support to administer the island and fight against Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in mainland China. The Chinese Civil War (1945–49) and Cold War in East Asia significantly reduced the scope of cross-strait connections throughout the Japanese colonial period, perhaps explaining why cross-strait relations have been largely overlooked in the historiography of the period before 1945.

Internment and Adjudication of Taiwanese in South China

Japan's defeat reversed the hierarchies of power not only in Taiwan but also in South China, where GMD officials and Chinese residents were initially much less forgiving than in Taiwan. At the end of the war, there were an estimated 8,000 Taiwanese each in Xiamen and Guangzhou and 24,000 on Hainan Island. Even before the arrival of GMD armies in fall 1945 to reclaim Fujian and Guangdong provinces, Taiwanese faced violent retaliation by local Chinese who sought revenge for the wartime violence and discrimination they had experienced at the hands of the Japanese and Taiwanese. Former Taiwanese interpreters were beaten as conspicuous targets of Chinese retaliation for having mediated Sino-Japanese interactions that included interrogations, torture, and forced labor.[21]

After disarming Japan's military in South China in fall 1945, GMD soldiers detained Japanese and Taiwanese in separate internment camps. The GMD

coordinated with the United States to prioritize Japanese repatriation from South China back to Japan via Taiwan, which was completed by mid-1946.[22] When Japan's navy in Hainan offered to ensure the welfare and repatriation of its Taiwanese personnel, the GMD refused on the premise that Taiwanese were now under its jurisdiction.[23] The rationale for interning all Taiwanese, regardless of their military or civilian status, was as follows: "Many who served the Japanese military worked as spies. But even ordinary Taiwanese took advantage of Japan's power to harm our Chinese brethren. Because their cruel behavior was extensive, we are afraid that if they are allowed to reside freely on the mainland, conflicts will ensue with locals." After investigating their wartime activities, Taiwanese suspected of "harming Chinese brethren" would be tried in local GMD courts; those deemed to be "morally good people" would be released.[24]

From 1945 to 1946, the GMD prepared to indict hundreds of Taiwanese in South China for wartime treason against China. "Regulations for Punishing Traitors of the Han [C. *hanjian*]" (November 1945) at first applied not only to Chinese nationals but also to any ethnic Han, including Taiwanese, who had "collaborated with the enemy state [Japan]" to "benefit the enemy or violate the interests of their native country [China] or its people."[25] By contrast, their Japanese counterparts who had committed atrocities in China would be prosecuted by the GMD as foreign war criminals under international law.[26]

Taiwanese suspected as *hanjian* were primarily based in Xiamen, where they had played an outsized role in the city's wartime government under Japanese occupation. Among the 226 individuals arrested by the GMD in Xiamen as potential *hanjian*, 125 were Taiwanese, most of whom had served as officials, intelligence agents, and policemen under the Japanese regime.[27] Local Chinese officials and civilians clamored for such Taiwanese to be charged for treason with extended prison sentences, if not the death penalty. After much debate, however, the GMD central government announced in August 1946 that *hanjian* regulations would not apply to the Taiwanese since they had been "nationals of the enemy state" (Japanese) and not Chinese nationals during the war.[28] Their former Japanese nationality saved the Taiwanese from punishment for treason against the Chinese nation.

Instead, the most severe cases of wartime atrocities by the Taiwanese became eligible for prosecution as "Japanese war criminals" following international law.[29] From 1946 to 1948, fifty-eight Taiwanese were sentenced in GMD military courts in Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Taipei for "BC-class" war crimes. In contrast with "A-class" war crimes committed by top-ranking Japanese leaders for the planning and execution of "aggressive war," BC-class war crimes were mainly for the abuse and deaths of POWs and civil-

ians.[30] The fifty-eight Taiwanese were one-tenth of the roughly 500 Japanese nationals charged as BC war criminals in China."[31]

With the exception of those charged as war criminals, nearly all Taiwanese suspected as *hanjian* were released by 1947, much to the outrage of the Chinese public.[32] Former high-ranking Chinese officials in the Japanese-backed Xiamen government were convicted as *hanjian* and sentenced to several years in prison. By contrast, the majority of their Taiwanese counterparts were set free.[33] Only nine Taiwanese in Xiamen were later sentenced in 1948 by GMD war crimes courts to prison terms that ranged from three to ten years.[34] Ten additional Taiwanese—military policemen and interpreters as well as merchants—from other regions of South China (Hainan, Shantou, Guangzhou) were also sentenced as war criminals, four to execution.[35] In the end, however, hundreds of Taiwanese accused by Chinese of wartime exploitation, torture, and murder were never convicted.

The postwar experience of the Koreans in Manchuria (Northeast China) offers a helpful comparison to that of the Taiwanese in South China. Like the Taiwanese, Korean officials and military personnel served as second-class imperialists in Japanese-occupied Manchuria: they ranked below the ethnic Japanese but above the Chinese subject population. With Japan's defeat, Koreans similarly became targets of Chinese retaliation.[36] Among the hundreds of thousands who returned from Manchuria to Korea, many were destitute refugees whose property had been confiscated.[37] But whereas overseas Taiwanese who resettled in GMD-ruled Taiwan were largely shut out from top political posts, numerous Korean returnees became prominent leaders in South Korea (Republic of Korea) and North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), both founded in 1948. South Korea's government included former Korean military officials from Manchuria such as Park Chung-hee (1917–79, president 1963–79) and Choi Kyu-ha (1919–2006, president 1979–80).[38] Meanwhile, Kim Il-sung (1912–94, ruled 1948–94) based his political legitimacy in North Korea on decades in Manchuria leading anti-Japanese guerrilla movements.[39]

Aside from the handful of Taiwanese convicted by the GMD as war criminals, documentation on the postwar aftermath of Taiwanese in South China remains sparse. Tens of thousands of interned Taiwanese in Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Hainan not charged as *hanjian* or as war criminals were generally left to their own devices to return to Taiwan. Amid a civil war against the CCP, the GMD failed to prioritize the allocation of sufficient resources to Taiwanese internment (food rations and medical aid) or resettlement (ships and passenger fares). With the help of funds raised by the Relief Association for Overseas Taiwanese Brethren led by Lin Xiantang, Taiwanese in South China managed to relocate to Taiwan by the end of 1946.[40] Numerous Taiwanese

indicted as *hanjian* or war criminals also managed to escape while on parole and went into hiding either in mainland China or in Taiwan. Taiwanese who remained in South China after 1946 included native residents who had naturalized as Taiwanese before the war but were not originally from Taiwan. Others perhaps assumed Chinese identities, concealed their wartime status as Taiwanese subjects, or relocated to other parts of China to start life anew. As late as the 1980s, the Taiwanese from wartime South China remained infamous in Chinese public memory as imperialists supported by the Japanese.[41]

Taiwanese War Criminals in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, where 60,000 Taiwanese servicemen had surrendered by August 1945, the Western Allies collectively took charge of Taiwanese internment, prosecution, and repatriation (see figure E.1).[42] The GMD government had initially sought to gain jurisdiction over Taiwanese stationed in Southeast Asia to protect them from Allied war crimes trials. The Chinese Foreign Ministry sent requests to British, Australian, and Dutch authorities to treat Tai-

Figure E.1. Taiwanese POWs guarded by US troops in Luzon (the Philippines), May 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives of Singapore.

wanese in Southeast Asia as "ordinary overseas Chinese" (C. *yiban huaqiao*) with ROC nationality to expedite repatriation to Taiwan.[43] The GMD contended that Taiwanese colonial subjects had been victims of Japanese imperialism and should not be indicted for war crimes as Japanese nationals (much like what the South Korean government argued on behalf of Korean war criminals).[44] However, the Allied powers rejected such appeals and maintained jurisdiction over Taiwanese war criminals as "enemy Japanese nationals" until the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952.

Ke Jingxing, a prison guard in Borneo's POW camps (chapter 6), initially thought that the end of the war meant his liberation from the Japanese by the Allied powers.[45] Instead, he became one of the hundreds of Taiwanese (and Koreans) who were indicted with their Japanese colleagues for BC war crimes related to the torture and murder of Allied POWs and Asian residents. The British, Australians, French, Dutch, and Americans held their respective war crimes trials across the region from 1945 to 1948, convicting a total of 132 Taiwanese war criminals. Eighteen received the death penalty, while others served their prison sentences in Western war criminal compounds across East and Southeast Asia.[46]

Ke's indictment shocked him: he had never heard about international regulations like the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs.[47] Even before the war crimes trials began, Ke and fellow Taiwanese prison guards had their valuables confiscated and faced retaliatory beatings by Australian and British soldiers.[48] Taiwanese prison guards often had the most direct contact with Allied POWs and therefore became the easiest targets of physical and legal retribution in the postwar period.[49] But in postwar oral interviews, Ke asserted that had he not complied with his Japanese commander's execution orders of Allied POWs during the 1945 Sandakan Death Marches, he would have been severely punished.[50] Other war crimes trial testimonies and oral interviews by Taiwanese and Korean prison guards similarly claimed that their low military rank left them with little choice but to obey their Japanese officers.[51] Meanwhile, Japanese military leaders had tried to deflect responsibility by scapegoating Taiwanese subordinates like Ke. They explained to Allied authorities that POW abuse had occurred due to linguistic and cultural misunderstandings resulting from colonial subjects serving as prison guards.[52] Ke's Japanese commander in Borneo turned over the names of Taiwanese prison guards to the Australian military. In December 1945, Ke was sentenced to death as a war criminal for the mistreatment of Allied POWs. However, a month later, the Australian military showed him compassion by reducing his sentence to ten years in prison.[53]

The Western Allies in Southeast Asia did not limit the prosecution to war crimes committed against their own white citizens, but also sought retribution on behalf of Asian POWs and civilians—such as local Chinese, Indians, Malays, and

Indonesians. After losing their colonies to Japan from 1942 to 1945, the returning Western powers hoped that exhibiting "colonial justice" would help them reestablish their moral authority.[54] In Singapore and Malaya, for example, the British courts prosecuted Japanese nationals, including over twenty Taiwanese, for the torture and murder of Indian POWs and Malay and Chinese residents.[55] As Mike Shi-chi Lan and Chung Shu-ming have noted, Taiwanese interpreters paid a steep price for mediating between Japanese soldiers and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Nine Taiwanese interpreters were sentenced by British military courts, four of whom were executed for participating in the 1942 Sook Ching Massacre.[56]

Though British, Australian, and Dutch military trials all sentenced Taiwanese for war crimes against Indian and Chinese (ROC) POWs and local Chinese civilians, postwar oral histories by former Taiwanese prison guards and interpreters rarely discussed coming into contact with Asian POWs and civilians.[57] Taiwanese instead focused on their relations with Japanese superiors, their treatment of Western POWs, and the subsequent retribution by the Western Allies. Perhaps this is because Taiwanese convicted as war criminals felt that they were unduly punished for actions seemingly beyond their control as colonial subjects.[58] By portraying themselves as dual victims of Japanese coercion and Western "victors' justice," the Taiwanese have elided stories of their complicity as fellow imperialists in the Asia-Pacific war fronts.[59]

Some historians have sympathized with Taiwanese and Koreans convicted of war crimes by the Allied powers. They have criticized the Allied military courts for not taking seriously the colonial status of Taiwanese and Korean servicemen. For instance, Utsumi Aiko has highlighted how Japanese coercion was a primary reason for Korean enlistment as prison guards, yet such factors were never considered in Allied war crimes trials.[60] To what extent should colonial subjects have been blamed for atrocities conducted under Japanese gunpoint? Should Taiwanese and Korean prison guards have been held responsible for inflicting violence on POWs if they had been taught to do so and received similar brutal treatment from Japanese officials? Reading the oral histories of convicted Taiwanese war criminals, I, too, sympathized with how they felt doubly victimized by both the Japanese and Allied powers. Without Japan's military expansion, the Taiwanese would not have been placed in such compromising situations as prison guards and interpreters, let alone soldiers who died in battle. Yet to say that Taiwanese servicemen should not be held responsible for their wartime actions would be to deny them historical agency, however limited it was at the time. The moral dilemmas faced by the Taiwanese were in some ways not very different from those of low-ranking Japanese soldiers.[61] While they were certainly pressured to perform their military duties, they also stood to gain from their active participation. Taiwanese earned

higher wages and prestige by fighting overseas, and had Japan not lost the war, they would perhaps have continued to reign over other Asians as "second-class imperialists." Though the Allied war crimes trials were not morally neutral, they were necessary to make all Japanese nationals reflect, if only momentarily, on their actions against Western and Asian others. Was it only their ignorance of the Geneva Convention regulations that had allowed Taiwanese prison guards to treat POWs the way they had?

I would argue that another potential reason for the general neglect of other Asians in Taiwanese war memory was the internalization of Japan's ethno-imperial hierarchy. In Taiwan, Han Taiwanese had long shared, if not antecededed, Japanese attitudes of cultural superiority over indigenous Taiwanese. As we saw in chapters 5 and 6, Taiwanese servicemen in wartime Hainan and Southeast Asia similarly discriminated against local civilians as inferior, "uncivilized" peoples. Despite Japan's wartime rhetoric of Pan-Asian solidarity, for many Taiwanese—just like their Japanese colleagues—the lives of non-Japanese Asians mattered less and have remained an afterthought in postwar memory. The "victim consciousness" so often associated with postwar Japan applies to nearly the rest of its former colonial empire, including Taiwan. It is much easier for Han Taiwanese to focus on injustices experienced at the hands of the Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, and now Chinese Communists, rather than on the injustices one has inflicted on fellow residents (such as the indigenous peoples) and neighboring regions.

Taiwanese Repatriation and the Costly Legacies of Japan's Southern Empire

As the Allied powers maintained control over Southeast Asia, they began sending those Taiwanese who were not charged with war crimes back to Taiwan in Allied military ships (see figure E.2). Zheng Chunhe, a Taiwanese soldier who had fought in Borneo (chapter 6), cried when he heard of Japan's defeat. In his memoir a half-century later, Zheng recalled that he had been willing to die for what he still believed was Japan's "just war" against the West. After the war, Zheng felt abandoned by Japan as he and other Taiwanese were separated from Japanese colleagues and sent back to Taiwan in mid-1946. He lamented that Taiwanese had not been given a choice to remain as Japanese nationals but were forced to become ROC citizens.[62]

Zheng's continued identification with Japan seems to have been heightened by his disillusionment with GMD rule after returning to Taiwan. Taiwan governor Chen Yi violently suppressed tens of thousands of Taiwanese protestors

Figure E.2. Taiwanese repatriating from Manus Island (Papua New Guinea) to Taiwan after the war. Courtesy of Asahi Shimbun.

demanding greater political and economic rights in what came to be known as the "2/28 Incident" (February 28, 1947). Though the protestors aimed at self-governance, rather than a desire to return to Japanese rule, the GMD viewed Taiwanese veterans as especially active in the 2/28 uprisings and attributed their participation to enduring loyalty towards Japan.[63] Under martial law (1949–87), the GMD promoted anti-Japanese education that criticized the Taiwanese for having been "enslaved" under Japanese rule, which Zheng believed resulted in even greater pro-Japanese sentiment among the Taiwanese.[64]

Many Taiwanese veterans were unable to find stable employment upon returning from the war front. Some could not regain their old jobs, especially administrative ones, since they could not speak Mandarin.[65] Others faced discrimination by the GMD due to the stigma of being a former war criminal.[66] Like their Han counterparts, Taiwanese indigenous veterans voiced similar misgivings about returning to postwar Taiwan, where they were regarded as Japanese collaborators. The GMD forced indigenous Taiwanese, who had never viewed China as their ancestral homeland, to adopt Chinese names. Mainland Chinese transplants encroached upon the indigenous lands in eastern Taiwan, and leaders of indigenous tribes were jailed or executed by the GMD during the 2/28 Incident.[67] In postwar oral interviews in the 1990s, sev-

eral indigenous veterans asserted that they still identified themselves as "Japanese," having preferred Japanese rule to the GMD.[68]

Other Taiwanese veterans in Southeast Asia went into hiding, some for years, even decades. Taiwanese deserted military units towards the end of the war, as did many of their Japanese colleagues, and hid in jungles and mountains to avoid being captured.[69] In 1972 and 1974, two former Japanese army commanders, Yokoi Shōichi (1915–97) and Onoda Hiroo (1922–2014), were discovered hiding in Guam and the Philippines, respectively. Upon returning to Japan, Yokoi and Onoda became media celebrities, receiving a lavish war hero's welcome as well as generous monetary donations from private and public sectors.[70] The most well-known case among the Taiwanese, however, was met with more ambivalence in Japan. Suniyon (J. Nakamura Teruo, C. Li Guanghui, 1919–76), a member of the indigenous Amis tribe, had been dispatched with a Japanese division to Indonesia's Morotai Island in 1944. As the US military decimated the Japanese on Morotai by early 1945, Suniyon and surviving members of the division dispersed among the island's jungles. While others surrendered and left for Japan by 1956, Suniyon remained in hiding until December 1974, when he was discovered by Indonesian soldiers. The Japanese government initially offered Suniyon a mere ¥68,000 ($267) as back pay and travel allowance to Taiwan. In response to criticism in the Japanese and Taiwanese media about Suniyon's inadequate compensation, the Japanese government granted him additional millions of yen as "condolence money," but not as compensation for his military service.[71] Suniyon had been a second-class subject in Japan's wartime empire, but he was no longer a Japanese national in the postwar period. The Japanese government thus contended that it had no legal responsibility to Suniyon and other former Taiwanese soldiers.

Suniyon's homecoming called widespread attention to the long unresolved question of Japanese compensation for Taiwanese veterans and bereaved families. Since 1953, the Japanese government had provided military pensions to Japanese veterans and condolence payments to wounded veterans and families of the war dead.[72] But since Taiwanese veterans were no longer Japanese nationals in the postwar era, they were denied the same privileges as their Japanese counterparts. Galvanized by Suniyon's case, Taiwanese veterans brought a lawsuit against the Japanese government in 1976. Supported by sympathetic Japanese lawyers, academics, as well as veterans and former residents of Taiwan, they demanded compensation to cover costs including lost wages, savings, and health insurance.[73] For years, however, the Japanese government thwarted their activism by defeating Taiwanese compensation lawsuits (see figure E.3).[74]

In the mid-1990s, the Japanese government did agree to pay ¥2 million ($16,700) in "condolence money" to each Taiwanese veteran and bereaved

FIGURE E.3. Former Taiwanese servicemen after their lawsuit against the Japanese government for "equal compensation as Japanese veterans" (demanding a total of ¥65 million) was defeated in the Tokyo court, February 1982. Zheng Sheng (center) speaking on behalf of thirteen former Taiwanese servicemen and bereaved family members. Courtesy of Asahi Shimbun.

family.[75] The amount was far less than what the Taiwanese had demanded, and most refused to accept the payment out of principle.[76] Even more important than monetary compensation was Japanese official recognition of Taiwanese contributions to the wartime empire.[77] Others did not even qualify for condolence money because their official wartime status had been that of "civilian employees in the military," even though many had been armed as de facto soldiers.[78]

Taiwanese veterans and bereaved families have continued to press for proper compensation from the Japanese government up to the present day.[79] They have done so, however, without support from the ROC government. With the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to renounce ROC demands for war reparations from Japan in exchange for support in the US-led Cold War alliance against the People's Republic of China (PRC).[80] In the decades that followed, the ROC government did little to help the Taiwanese advocate for war compensation, nor did it include them in ROC veteran benefits reserved for GMD soldiers.[81] Taiwanese veterans were additionally excluded from ROC-sponsored national histories and commemorations that instead celebrated mainland Chinese resistance in the "Anti-Japanese War" (C. Kang Ri zhanzheng, the Chinese term for the Second Sino-Japanese War).[82]

The Loyal Martyrs' Shrine in Taipei, for instance, honored the hundreds of thousands of GMD soldiers who died in combat against Japan and the CCP; only later were several anticolonial Taiwanese "martyrs" also enshrined.[83]

Until the end of Taiwan's martial law in 1987, it remained politically taboo, if not dangerous, for the Taiwanese to publicly speak about the Japanese colonial period in ways that did not conform to official ROC narratives of Chinese (including colonial-era Taiwanese) "resistance" to Japanese imperialism.[84] Only with the democratization of Taiwan in the early 1990s could voices from the wartime generation speak aloud in Taiwanese politics and academia. Oral histories of Taiwanese veterans conducted by scholars of Academia Sinica's Institute of Taiwan History began to explore questions of colonial memories, identities, and legacies beyond conventional GMD-nationalist frameworks.[85] Through academic forums and the mass media, Taiwanese veterans aired grievances against the Japanese government for lack of reparations and the ROC government for failing to recognize their wartime experiences and support their compensation lawsuits. Controversy over war commemorations erupted in 2006 when a memorial was built in Taipei for the Taiwanese Patriotic Indigenous Volunteer Corps funded by private Japanese donations. Opposed to honoring soldiers who had fought for Japan, local ROC officials removed the memorial the following year.[86]

In contrast to veterans, former Taiwanese comfort women have received more assistance from the ROC government since the 1990s. Like their Korean counterparts, they had largely remained silent about their wartime past for half a century out of shame and fear of discrimination. But after former South Korean comfort women brought lawsuits against the Tokyo government in 1991, and after Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki discovered Japanese official documents on comfort women in early 1992, public interest in Taiwan's comfort women grew.[87] In late 1992, the ROC government commissioned the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation (NGO) to identify and give legal, financial, and medical aid to former Taiwanese comfort women (a total of fifty-nine were subsequently confirmed).[88] In cooperation with the Rescue Foundation, Chu Te-lan of Academia Sinica's Institute of Modern History interviewed survivors and pioneered the study of Taiwan's comfort women system based on Japanese colonial and military archives.[89] In 1995, the Japanese government established an Asian Women's Fund through private donations to compensate each former comfort woman with ¥2 million ($16,700), in addition to medical and welfare costs. However, because the government refused to accept legal responsibility and offer official reparations, most survivors have refused the funds in protest. Those who declined Japanese payments were granted equivalent financial assistance by the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation, which

collected private donations matched by the ROC government.[90] The ROC Foreign Affairs Ministry also supported a lawsuit in 1999 by nine Taiwanese comfort women demanding an official apology and ¥10 million each in compensation from the Japanese government. However, the lawsuit was defeated in Japanese courts in 2005.[91]

Still, in present-day Taiwan, the legacies of Japan's wartime empire have by and large been overshadowed by identity politics and pro-Japanese sentiment in present-day Taiwan. The half-century of Japanese colonial rule, however problematic, has been incorporated as an essential part of how Taiwanese people distinguish their history and identity from that of the PRC in mainland China.[92] Movements for Taiwanese nationalism and independence, however, are not so much drawing on Japan's colonial past as they are reacting to the postwar history of GMD authoritarian rule and the looming threat of unification under an increasingly hegemonic PRC.[93] Political alliances between the ROC and Japan, supported by the United States to contain the PRC, have also contributed to collaborations between pro-independence Taiwanese and Japanese neoconservatives in promoting revisionist narratives of Japanese colonialism as "benevolent" and integral to the "modernization" of Taiwan.[94]

The circulation of such nostalgic portrayals of Japanese rule makes a careful historicization of Taiwan's colonial past all the more important. By examining the island's centrality in Japanese empire-building in China and Southeast Asia over half a century, we have seen at once the range of violence and oppression yet also agency and opportunities that resulted from Taiwan as an imperial gateway. Relations among Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese, Westerners, and a broad spectrum of Asians were precarious and liminal: they differed depending on place and time and cannot be accounted for in nationalist-centered narratives of history. Multi-archival regional approaches to Japan's imperial past can thus push us to think more critically about the diverse and contradictory nature of empire-building to help counter neoconservative uses of history for nationalistic political aims.

Notes

Abbreviations in Notes

Archives and works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

AH	Academia Historica, Taipei
FO	Foreign Office
ITHA	Institute of Taiwan History Archives, Academia Sinica, Taipei
JACAR	Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan
JFMA	Japan Foreign Ministry, Diplomatic Records Office, Tokyo
JMDA	Japan Ministry of Defense Archives, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo
MTGDZ	*MinTai guanxi dang'an ziliao*, eds. Fujiansheng dang'an'guan and Xiamenshi dang'an'guan (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1993).
MTHZJ	*MinTai hanjian zuixing jishi*, ed. Di san zhanqu JinXia hanjian anjian chuli weiyuanhui (Xiamen: Jiangsheng wenhua chubanshe, 1947).
NAJ	National Archives of Japan, Tokyo
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration, United States, College Park, MD
NAS	National Archives of Singapore
NAUK	National Archives, United Kingdom, Kew
RG	Record Group
TGGA	Taiwan Government-General Archives, Taipei
TJ	*Taiwan Jihō* (Taiwan Times), Taipei
TNS	*Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* (Taiwan Daily News), Taipei
XMA	Xiamen Municipal Archives

Introduction

1. Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Taiwan jidai, 1898–1906*, vol. 3 of *Seiden Gotō Shinpei: ketteiban*, rev. and annot. (Ikkai Tomoyoshi Fujiwara Shoten, 2005), 567. On the Japanese geographic term Nan'yō, see "Note to the Reader" in the Front Matter.

2. Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); John R. Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford,

CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Emma J. Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

3. Leonard H. D. Gordon, *Confrontation over Taiwan: Nineteenth-Century China and the Powers* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), chaps. 2–3.

4. Japanese officials called Han Taiwanese subjects who lived in Taiwan "islanders" (J. hontōjin, C. bendaoren) or "Taiwanese" (J. Taiwanjin, C. Taiwanren). The English convention for Taiwan's indigenous peoples since the 1990s has been "Indigeneous Taiwanese" (J. genjūmin, C. yuanzhumin). Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874–1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017). On Austronesians as the island's first inhabitants and their common ancestry with indigenous peoples across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, see Peter Bellwood, "Formosan Prehistory and Austronesian Dispersal," in *Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, and Prehistory*, ed. David Blundell (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 2001), 337–65.

5. Tay-sheng Wang, *Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: The Reception of Western Law* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 38–39.

6. Kodama Gentarō, "Taiwan tōchi no kiō oyobi shōrai ni kansuru kakusho" (June 1899), reprinted in Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 493–506.

7. On the socioeconomic challenges that the Government-General faced during its first few years, see Reo Matsuzaki, *Statebuilding by Imposition: Resistance and Control in Colonial Taiwan and the Philippines* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), chap. 3.

8. On the conceptualization of gates as thresholds and liminal spaces that navigate power, see Daniel Jütte, *The Strait Gate: Thresholds and Power in Western History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015).

9. On migratory ties between South China and Southeast Asia, see Huei-Ying Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires: Chinese Business and Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914–1941* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018); Soon Keong Ong, *Coming Home to a Foreign Country: Xiamen and Returned Overseas Chinese, 1843–1938* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021); Melissa Macauley, *Distant Shores: Colonial Encounters in China's Maritime Frontier* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021).

10. Recent studies on intra-imperial competition among Japanese officials in Korea, Manchuria, and Japan include Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 272–302; Erik Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), chaps. 2–3; Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), chaps. 2–3, 8; Joseph A. Seeley, "Liquid Geography: The Yalu River and the Boundaries of Empire in East Asia, 1894–1945" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2019), chaps. 3–5; David Fedman, *Seeds of Control: Japan's Empire of Forestry in Colonial Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2020), chap. 5.

11. Western powers obtained extraterritoriality in China with the unequal treaties in 1842. Pär Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

12. Eileen P. Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 1844–1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert A. Bick-

ers, "Legal Fiction: Extraterritoriality as an Instrument of British Power in China in the 'Long Nineteenth Century,'" in *The Long Nineteenth Century*, vol. 2 of *Empire in Asia: A New Global History*, ed. Brian P. Farrell and Donna Brunero (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 53–80.

13. By "semi-colonial" China, I adopt Shu-mei Shih's definition of treaty port zones where foreign nationals enjoyed concessions and extraterritoriality. Shu-mei Shih, *The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 30–32; Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Bryna Goodman and David S. G. Goodman, *Twentieth-Century Colonialism and China: Localities, the Everyday and the World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).

14. Takahiro Yamamoto, "Balance of Favour: The Emergence of Territorial Boundaries Around Japan, 1861–1875" (PhD. diss., London School of Economics, 2015), chaps. 3–6; Wendy Matsumura, *The Limits of Okinawa: Japanese Capitalism, Living Labor, and Theorizations of Community* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); David Chapman, "History and the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands: Connecting Japan and the Pacific," in *Routledge Handbook of Race and Ethnicity in Asia*, ed. Michael Weiner (London: Routledge, 2021), 381–92.

15. Robert Eskildsen, *Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: The Taiwan Expedition and the Birth of Japanese Imperialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), chaps. 3–6; Danny Orbach, *Curse on This Country: The Rebellious Army of Imperial Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 38–53.

16. Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 13–24.

17. Gotō Ken'ichi, *Kindai Nihon no 'Nanshin' to Okinawa* (Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 13–22.

18. Gordon, *Confrontation Over Taiwan*, 24–37, 55–66.

19. Liang Hua-huang [Liang Huahuang], *Taiwan zongdufu de "duian" zhengce yanjiu: Riju shidai TaiMin guanxi shi* (Daoxiang, 2001), 29.

20. Gordon, *Confrontation Over Taiwan*, 184–86.

21. Oguma Eiji, *Nihonjin no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made* (Shin'yōsha, 1998), chaps. 1–4; cf. Alan S. Christy, "The Making of Imperial Subjects in Okinawa," in *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*, ed. Tani Barlow (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 141–70.

22. Han Taiwanese were legally distinguished from the Japanese by separate regional family registration systems. Haruka Nomura, "Making the Japanese Empire: Nationality and Family Register in Taiwan, 1871–1899," *Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (April 2010): 69–71.

23. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Prewar Japanese Empire," *Japan Focus* 6, no. 8 (August 2008): 6; Michael Kim, "'Sub-Nationality' in the Japanese Empire: A Social History of the *Koseki* in Colonial Korea, 1910–45," in *Japan's Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification and Documentation*, ed. David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness (New York: Routledge, 2014), 112.

24. The Japanese placed upland indigenous Taiwanese in separate "Savage District Registers" (*bansha daichō*). Masataka Endō, *State Construction of 'Japaneseness': The*

Household Registration System in Japan, trans. Barbara Hartley and ed. Miriam Riley (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2019), 142–43, 168; Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire*.

25. Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001); O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil*; Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*.

26. Jun Uchida, "Island Nation to Oceanic Empire: A Vision of Japanese Expansion From the Periphery," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 42, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 57–68, 81–89; J. Charles Schencking, "The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872–1921," *Modern Asian Studies* 33, no. 4 (October 1999): 771–78; Mark R. Peattie, *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988); Paul Kreitman, *Japan's Ocean Borderlands: Nature and Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

27. On Pan-Asianism and Manchukuo, see Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). On occupied North and Central China, see Kelly A. Hammond, *China's Muslims and Japan's Empire: Centering Islam in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020); Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh, ed., *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai Under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On Japan's occupation of Southeast Asia, see Jeremy A. Yellen, *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019); Ethan Mark, *Japan's Occupation of Java in the Second World War: A Transnational History* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

28. Mark Peattie, introduction to *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 16.

29. In Taiwan under martial law (1947–87), the study of colonial Taiwan other than as a local Chinese case of "anti-Japanese resistance" was politically taboo. Asano Toyomi, "Historical Perceptions of Taiwan's Japan Era," in *Toward a History beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations*, ed. Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), 299–339; Wen-Hsin Yeh, "A Quiet Revolution: Oppositional Politics and the Writing of Taiwanese History," in *Mobile Horizons: Dynamics across the Taiwan Strait*, ed. Wen-Hsin Yeh (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2013), 259–86.

30. Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Faye Yuan Kleeman, *Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of Taiwan and the South* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003); Robert T. Tierney, *Tropics of Savagery the Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative Frame* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Kate McDonald, *Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017). On Taiwanese identity, see Ming-cheng M. Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Shih-jung Tzeng, *From Hōnto Jin to Bensheng Ren:*

The Origin and Development of Taiwanese National Consciousness (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009).

31. Sayaka Chatani, *Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan and Its Colonies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Evan N. Dawley, *Becoming Taiwanese: Ethnogenesis in a Colonial City, 1880s–1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019); Kirsten L. Ziomek, *Lost Histories: Recovering the Lives of Japan's Colonial Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019); Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire*.

32. Hiroko Matsuda, *Liminality of the Japanese Empire: Border Crossings From Okinawa to Colonial Taiwan* (Honololu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018); David R. Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Eiichiro Azuma, *In Search of Our Frontier: Japanese America and Settler Colonialism in the Construction of Japan's Borderless Empire* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), chap. 6; Mariko Iijima, "Sugar Islands in the Pacific in the Early Twentieth Century: Taiwan as a Protégé of Hawai'i," *Historische Anthropologie* 27, no. 3 (December 2019): 361–81.

33. My work is indebted to pioneering scholarship by Nakamura Takashi, Liang Huahuang, Kondō Masami, Chung Shu-ming, Adam Schneider, Lin Man-houng, and Gotō Ken'ichi, who were among the first to trace Japanese and Taiwanese networks between Taiwan, China, and Southeast Asia. See notes and bibliography for their references.

34. Man-houng Lin, "The Ryukyus and Taiwan in the East Asian Seas: A Longue Duree Perspective," *Asia-Pacific Journal* 4, no. 10 (October 2006): 2–3.

35. Gotō, *Kindai Nihon no 'Nanshin' to Okinawa*, 21, 76.

36. Hundreds of thousands of Okinawans migrated to other parts of the Japanese metropole, Taiwan, Micronesia, the Philippines, Hawai'i, and Latin America for better socioeconomic opportunities. Those in Taiwan even enjoyed legal status as Japanese colonialists. Matsuda, *Liminality of the Japanese Empire*; Ronald Y. Nakasone, ed. *Okinawan Diaspora* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).

37. Sidney Xu Lu, *The Making of Japanese Settler Colonialism: Malthusianism and Trans-Pacific Migration, 1868–1961* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), chap. 1; Ziomek, *Lost Histories,* chaps. 1–2, 4, 7; Steven Ivings, "Colonial Settlement and Migratory Labour in Karafuto 1905–1941" (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2014).

38. On intra-colonial relations between Taiwan and Micronesia, see Yamada Atsushi, "Shokuminchi Taiwan kara i'nin tōchi Nan'yō guntō e: nanshin kōzō no kyojitsu," in *Nan'yō Guntō to teikoku, kokusai chitsujo*, ed. Asano Toyomi (Jigakusha Shuppan, 2007), 143–63.

39. Edward I-te Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 242–46, 262–66.

40. Peattie, *Nan'yō*, chap. 8. Because Micronesia was not a formal colony, Micronesian residents never obtained Japanese nationality. Thus unlike the Han Taiwanese, they did not experience overseas mobility or second-class imperialist status until the Asia-Pacific War, when thousands were enlisted as military assistants in Pacific islands taken from the United States. The wartime overseas deployment of Micronesians was more analogous to that of the indigenous Taiwanese. Keith Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu:

University of Hawai'i Press, 2011); Lin Poyer, Suzanne Falgout, and Laurence Marshall Carucci, *The Typhoon of War: Micronesian Experiences of the Pacific War* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).

41. Scholars like Jun Uchida have called colonial Korea a Japanese "gateway" to the Chinese continent. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, chap. 7.

42. Alyssa M. Park, *Sovereignty Experiments: Korean Migrants and the Building of Borders in Northeast Asia, 1860–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), chaps. 1–3; Nianshen Song, *Making Borders in Modern East Asia: The Tumen River Demarcation, 1881–1919* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), chaps. 1–4.

43. Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, chaps. 2–4; Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), chaps. 1–3; Song, *Making Borders*, chaps. 4–6.

44. The Taiwan Government-General was monitored by the Home Ministry but the Korea Government-General was only supervised by the Emperor. While the Korean governor-general required the rank of general or admiral, his counterpart in Taiwan could be a lieutenant general or vice-admiral. Korea also had over twice the number of officials as Taiwan (in 1926, for example, there were 28,657 officials in Korea compared to 11,873 in Taiwan, 3,537 in South Manchuria, 969 in Karafuto, and 288 in Micronesia). Chen, "Attempt to Integrate the Empire," 262–66; Okamoto Makiko, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to Teikoku Nihon* (Sangensha, 2008), 43, 88–96.

45. O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil*; Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*.

46. Thomas R. Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Sugata A. Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

47. Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895–1945," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 96–104.

48. Komagome Takeshi, *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō* (Iwanami Shoten, 1996); Ching, *Becoming "Japanese."*

49. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 11–12.

50. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, ed., *Empires At War: 1911–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); David Killingray and David Omissi, ed., *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

51. Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Brandon Palmer, *Fighting for the Enemy: Koreans in Japan's War, 1937–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013).

52. See, for example, Mary D. Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881–1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, C. 1800–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Sunil S. Amrith, *Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

53. Claude Markovits, "Indian Communities in China, c. 1842–1949," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, ed. Robert A. Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 55–74.

54. Yin Cao, *From Policemen to Revolutionaries: A Sikh Diaspora in Global Shanghai, 1885–1945* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

55. Sarah A. Stein, "Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, the British State, and the Persistence of Empire," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 1 (February 2011): 80–108.

56. Miriam Kingsberg, "Status and Smoke: Koreans in Japan's Opium Empire," in *Mobile Subjects: Boundaries and Identities in the Modern Korean Diaspora*, ed. Wen-Hsin Yeh (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2013), 53.

57. Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, chaps. 3–4; Seeley, "Liquid Geography," chap. 3.

58. Ann Heylen, "Diaries and Oral Histories as Ego-Documents in the Representations of the Taiwanese Nation," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 19, no. 1 (2020): 48–73.

1. Opening a Gateway into China

1. Kodama Gentarō, "Taiwan tōchi no kiō oyobi shōrai ni kansuru kakusho" (June 1899), reprinted in Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Taiwan jidai, 1898–1906*, vol. 3 of *Seiden Gotō Shinpei: ketteiban*, rev. and annot. Ikkai Tomoyoshi (Fujiwara Shoten, 2005), 493.

2. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 504. This would change with Japan's construction of deepwater ports in Jilong (J. Kiirun) in northern Taiwan and Gaoxiong (J. Takao) in southern Taiwan by the 1900s. Evan N. Dawley, *Becoming Taiwanese: Ethnogenesis in a Colonial City, 1880s–1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019), 46–61; Jeremy E. Taylor, "Colonial Takao: The Making of a Southern Metropolis," *Urban History* 31, no. 1 (2004): 48–71. On the history of Xiamen, see Soon Keong Ong, *Coming Home to a Foreign Country: Xiamen and Returned Overseas Chinese, 1843–1938* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021).

3. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 504.

4. The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki granted Japan extraterritorial privileges in China's treaty ports of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Ningbo. On the unequal treaty and extraterritorial legal system in East Asia, see Pär K. Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

5. On the Hokkien and Hakka settlement of Taiwan and their relations with the island's indigenous peoples during the Qing period, see John R. Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

6. On the Taiwan Republic (May–October 1895), see Leonard H. D. Gordon, *Confrontation over Taiwan: Nineteenth-Century China and the Powers* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), chap. 8; Niki Alsford, *Transitions to Modernity in Taiwan: The Spirit of 1895 and the Cession of Formosa to Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2017), chap. 5.

7. Lung-chih Chang, "Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874–1906" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2003), 26–28; Chen Zhongchun, "Zhang Zhidong yu fan ge Tai yundong

guanxi kaolun," in *Taiwan lishi shang de yimin yu shehui yanjiu*, ed. Chen Xiaochong (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2011), 126–42.

8. Wu Mi-cha [Wu Micha], *Taiwan jindaishi yanjiu* (Daoxiang, 1990), 8, 33.

9. Quoted from Chang, "Island Frontier," 133–34.

10. On the series of anti-Japanese uprisings in Taiwan from 1895 to 1915, see Paul R. Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).

11. "Shinkokujin Taiwan jōriku," June 1895, file 7–7; "Shinkokujin Taiwan jōriku jōrei shikō saisoku," December 1895, file 7–8, TGGA.

12. "Zai Amoi ryōjikan ni oite to Tai Shinajin ni shōmeisho shitatsuke no ken Gaiku jikan e kaitō," April 1896, file 28–15, TGGA.

13. A similar case was in 1875 when the Japanese and Russians exchanged Karafuto and Chishima with each other. In Russian Karafuto, Ainu residents were given a three-year grace period to choose Russian or Japanese nationality. Ainu who relocated to Hokkaido became Japanese nationals, while those who remained became Russian nationals. Masataka Endō, *State Construction of 'Japaneseness': The Household Registration System in Japan*, trans. Barbara Hartley and ed. Miriam Riley (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2019), 143–44.

14. Asano Toyomi, *Nihon no shokuminchi hōsei: hōiki tōgō to teikoku chitsujo* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008), 30–50.

15. Among those who left Taiwan, many were Qing literati who wanted to keep their official positions or wealthy gentry with property in China. Harry Lamley, "Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism," in *Taiwan: A New History*, 2nd ed., ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 208; Hsu Hsueh-chi [Xu Xueji], "Rizhi shiqi de Banqiao Lin jia: yi ge jiazu yu zhengzhi de guanxi," in *Taiwanshi lunwen jingxuan*. vol. 2, ed. Chang Yen-hsien [Zhang Yanxian], Li Hsiao-feng [Li Xiaofeng], and Tai Pao-tsun [Dai Baocun] (Yushanshe, 1996), 85.

16. Haruka Nomura, "Making the Japanese Empire: Nationality and Family Register in Taiwan, 1871–1899," *Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (April 2010): 69–71. On inter-ethnic marriages in colonial Taiwan, see Eika Tai, "Discourse of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 40, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 87–116; Paul D. Barclay, "Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in Colonial Taiwan: Japanese Subalterns and Their Aborigine Wives, 1895–1930," *Journal of Asian Studies* 64, no. 2 (May 2005): 323–60.

17. Endō, *State Construction of 'Japaneseness,'* 142–43, 168. See also Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874–1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).

18. "Amoi ryōjikan setchi ringi," June 1895, file 40–34, TGGA.

19. Japan established separate consulates in Fuzhou and Shantou in 1899 and 1900, respectively.

20. Hayashi Masako, "Ueno Sen'ichi: Nisshin Sensō mae no Taiwan ninshiki no senkusha," *Taiwan Kingendaishi Kenkyū*, no. 2 (1979): 30–32.

21. "Honkon ni okeru Eikokuseki Shinkokujin ni ryoken hakkyū hōhō," May 1897, file 132–13, TGGA.

22. John C. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4–10. On Indian colonial passports, see Radhika Mongia, "Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport," in

After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. Antoinette M. Burton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 196–214.

23. "Hontō dochakunin ni kaigai ryokōken hakkyūkata," May 1897, file 132–16, TGGA.

24. "Hontō o nigashite taigan ni senpukusuru hito taiho kata ni kanshi Gaimu Daijin ni hinshin no ken, January 1899, file 11117–24, TGGA. On cross-strait smuggling and piracy, see Hsu Hsueh-chi [Xu Xueji], "Rizhi shiqi Taiwan mianlin de haidao wenti," in *Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Lin Chin-tian [Lin Jintian] (Nantou: Taiwansheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2000), 30–34, 54.

25. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 498–99.

26. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 496–97.

27. W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 70.

28. Robert S. Lee, *France and the Exploitation of China, 1885–1901: A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 7; Robert A. Bickers, "The Colony's Shifting Position in the British Informal Empire in China," in *Critical Readings on the Modern History of Hong Kong*, ed. John Carroll and Mark Chi-Kwan (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 1330.

29. "Fukken fukatsujō ni kansuru kōkan kōbun," April 22, 1898, *Shina ni okeru Nihon no tokushu chii, Shina mondai sankō shiryō*, vol. 2, file B–a–49, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B02130062500.

30. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 504–507.

31. Christian Henriot, "'Little Japan' in Shanghai: An Insulated Community, 1875–1945," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, ed. Robert A. Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, 2000), 148; Kobayashi Motohiro, *Kindai Chūgoku no Nihon kyoryūmin to ahen* (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012), 22–23.

32. "Amoi, Fukushū sonohoka Shinkoku Nangan [Senshū chihō, Fukushū chihō] ni mikkō suru mono torishimarikata Takushokumu Daijin kunrei narabi ni kaku chihōchō ni tsūtatsu," April 1897, file 136–27; "Amoi zairyū Naichijin chū burai no mono torishimarikata ni tsuki dōchi ryōji ni kaitō chihōchō e tsūtatsu," July 1900, file 532-6, TGGA. On Japanese "undesirables" in Fujian from the 1910s to 1930s, including Japanese women purportedly abducted by Fujianese men and Japanese pirates, see David R. Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters At the Borders of Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), chaps. 2–3.

33. "Shinajin Nihon ni kika o kibōsuru no gen'in," August 1896, file 4514–5, TGGA.

34. "Hontōjin ni shite Amoi ni shōten kaisetsushi fusei no kōiranasu mono aru ni tsuki jigo ryoken hakkyū no sai chūikata chiji chōchō e shinshin oyobi Sawamura shokutaku e kaitō," February 1898, file 4556–6, TGGA.

35. Nakamura Takashi, "Taiwan sekimin o meguru shomondai," *Tōnan Ajia Kenkyū* 18, no. 3 (December 1980): 71.

36. Eileen P. Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 1844–1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 95.

37. Man-houng Lin, "Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk (1895–1935)," *Modern Asian Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 2001): 985–1009.

38. Murakami Ei and Peter Thilly have described the numerous legal disputes that arose between Qing and British officials over the jurisdiction of Anglo-Chinese subjects during the second-half of the nineteenth century. Murakami Ei, *Umi no kindai Chūgoku: Fukkenjin no katsudō to Igirisu, Shinchō* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2012), 392–95; Peter Thilly, "Treacherous Waters: Drug Smuggling in Coastal Fujian, 1832–1938" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2015), chap. 2.

39. "Taiwanjin nyūkoku kyojū ni kansuru ken (zai Batabia Somye ryōji hōkoku gaimu jikan yori ichō)," January 1910, file 1733–8, TGGA.

40. "Report on the Trade of Amoy for 1899," forwarded to the British Foreign Office (R. S. Mansfield, Amoy consul), May 16, 1900, FO 228/1357, NAUK.

41. Murakami, *Umi no kindai Chūgoku*, 393.

42. Xiamen Consul Segawa Asanoshin to Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, "Amoi zairyū Taiwan sekimin no jikkyō hōkoku sōfu no ken," September 14, 1907, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1," file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

43. Thousands of Chinese migrant laborers traveled back and forth annually between the two regions. "Subject: 'Chinese in the Philippines; Amoy and Philippine Trade; Japanese Encroachments,' A. Burlingame Johnson, Amoy Consul, to David J. Hill (Assistant Secretary of State)"; "Subject: 'Proposed Japanese Concession at Amoy,' A. Burlingame Johnson," March 14, 1899, *Despatches from the United States Consuls in Amoy, China, (1844–1906)*, Microfilm, NARA.

44. Ethnic Chinese with Philippine citizenship, however, were forbidden to migrate to the United States proper because of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, unless they were of the "exempt classes" (merchants, teachers, officials, and travelers). Richard Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila: Family, Identity, and Culture, 1860s–1930s* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 288.

45. One representative case was that of Mariano Libano, an ethnic Chinese in the Philippines who had naturalized as a Spanish citizen before 1899 and then obtained American Philippines citizenship after 1902. In Xiamen, Libano was stripped of his Philippines colonial citizenship by the American consul. Amoy Consul George Anderson to Francis S. Loomis, Amoy, China, "Chinese Coolies in the Philippines," March 11, 1905, Amoy, China Consular Posts, vol. 14, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

46. According to a 1910 US consular report, only twenty-eight "Citizens of the Philippines" and twelve of their children had been registered in Xiamen. "Complete List of American Citizens residing in the Consular District of Amoy," January 1910, Amoy, China Consular Posts, vol. 9, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

47. Xiamen Consul Segawa Asanoshin to Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, "Amoi zairyū Taiwan sekimin no jikkyō hōkoku sōfu no ken," September 14, 1907, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1," file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

48. Man-houng Lin, "The Power of Culture and Its Limits: Taiwanese Merchants' Asian Commodity Flows, 1895–1945," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 321.

49. "Memorandum on the Return of British Subjects of Chinese descent registered at the H. B. M. Consulate Amoy" (Enclosure No. 2 in Mr. Hausser's Despatch

No. 11), September 28, 1903, FO 228/1497, NAUK; Murakami, *Umi no kindai Chūgoku*, 440–43.

50. "B. Y. Tours to W. G. Max Muller, Peking, 'Return of Foreign Residents of Amoy,'" April 27, 1910, Amoy, China Consular Posts, vol. 64, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

51. Xiamen Consul Segawa Asanoshin to Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, "Amoi zairyū Taiwan sekimin no jikkyō hōkoku sōfu no ken," September 14, 1907, in *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

52. Consular Report from Amoy Consul H. G. Little to British Minister in Peking Claude M. Macdonald, March 31, 1899, FO 228/1320, NAUK.

53. Gotō Shinpei, "Gotō Minsei Chōkan taigan junshi oṡetsu hikki" (April 1900), reprinted in Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 518–24. Up until the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, Xiamen government officials would continue to criticize the overseas Taiwanese for abusing their extraterritorial privileges. For example, see Xiamen official reports in *Xiamenshi minzhengju*, files A10–1–22, A10–1–25, A10–1–30, A10–1–32, A10–1–95, A10–1–111, XMA.

54. "Taiwan Sōtokufu to Amoi, Fukushū oyobi Shanhai, Honkon chūzai teikoku ryōjima no chokusetsu tsūshin no ken," December 1900, file 532–1, TGGA.

55. "Naikun dai-ichi ichigō Amoi narabi Fukushū chihō e tōsōseshi hito taihokata ni tsuki kaku ryōji e kunreiseshi mune kaitō oyobi dōjō no ken kensatsu kyokuchō chiji chōchō e naikunsu," March 1900, file 537–18, TGGA.

56. "Naikun dai-ichi ichigō Amoi narabi Fukushū chihō e tōsōseshi hito taihokata ni tsuki kaku ryōji e kunreiseshi mune kaitō oyobi dōjō no ken kensatsu kyokuchō chiji chōchō e naikunsu"; Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red*, 57.

57. Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Keisatsu Honcho, "Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei oyobi genzai no shisetsu narabi shōrai no hōshin," n.d. [ca. 1917], *Taiwan Sōtokufu seikyō hōkoku narabi zappō*, vol. 2, file 1–5–3–19, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B030416 52300.

58. On the Boxer Rebellion, see Robert A. Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann, ed., *The Boxers, China, and the World* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

59. Marius B. Jansen, "Opportunists in South China during the Boxer Rebellion," *Pacific Historical Review* 20, no. 3 (August 1951): 241–42.

60. Xiamen Consul Ueno Sen'ichi to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō, August 2, 1900, *Giwadan Jihen kankei ikken*, file A–6–1–5, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B02031925800.

61. Army Minister Katsura Tarō to Taiwan Governor-General Kodama Gentarō, August 23, 1900, *Kaigunshō Shinkoku Jihen*, file M33–107–107, JMDA: JACAR Ref. C08040942400.

62. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 567; Ian Hill Nish, "Japan's Indecision during the Boxer Disturbances," *Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 4 (August 1961): 452.

63. Stewart Lone, *Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan: The Three Careers of General Katsura Tarō* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 86; Kobayashi Michihiko, *Kodama Gentarō: soko kara ryojunkō wa mieruka* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2012), 183.

64. Kashiwagi Ichirō, "Taiwan Sōtokufu to Amoi Jiken," in *Kindai Nihon no keisei to tenkai*, ed. Yasuoka Makio (Gannandō Shoten, 1998), 199.

65. Ichirō, "Taiwan Sōtokufu to Amoi Jiken," 200.

66. Andō Mori, *Nanshi no tankōsen* (Taipei: Takushoku Tsūshinsha, 1926), 5–6.

67. Jansen, "Opportunists in South China," 247; Nish, "Japan's Indecision," 453–54.

68. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 582–85.

69. Kashiwagi, "Taiwan Sōtokufu to Amoi Jiken," 205.

70. Tsurumi, *Taiwan jidai*, 511–13.

71. Consular Report from Amoy Consul H. G. Little to British Minister in Peking Claude M. Macdonald, January 5, 1900, FO 228/1320; Consular Report from Amoy Consul R. S. Mansfield to British Minister in Peking Claude M. Macdonald, March 20, 1900, FO 228/1357, NAUK.

72. Hsu, "Banqiao Lin jia," 85. On the origins of the Gulangyu International Settlement, see Ong, *Coming Home to a Foreign Country*, 135–37.

73. Weiyuan ordered his sons, Pengshou and Zushou to return to Taiwan by the May 1897 nationality deadline to protect their family property. Hsu, "Banqiao Lin jia," 88–90.

74. For example, see Hong Buren, "Aiguo aixiang de Lin Erjia," on *Taiwan ernü zuguoqing: ji Xiamen de Taiwanshengji renshi*, ed. Zeng Xiongzhu (Beijing: Taihai chubanshe, 2000), 138–43.

75. Erjia was director of the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce (served 1904–07) and the sole Chinese councilor in the Gulangyu International Settlement's Municipal Council (served 1909–22). Xiamenshi dang'anguan, ed., *Xiamen shanghui dang'an shiliao shiliao xuanbian* (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1993), 33; He Qiying, *Gonggong zujie Gulangyu yu jindai Xiamen de fazhan* (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 42–43.

76. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], *Rizhi shiqi zai Nanyang de Taiwanren* (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2020), 133–34; Ts'ai Hui-guang [Cai Huiguang], "Taiwan Sōtokufu ni yoru Taiwan sekimin gakkō no seiritsu: Tōei Gakudō, Kyokuei Shoin, Tōei Gakkō," *Tokyo Daigaku Nihon Shigaku Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō,* no. 16 (March 2012): 82–84; Hsu, "Banqiao Lin jia," 101.

77. Michael R. Godley, *The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 150.

78. On Douglas Shipping Company's monopoly over cross-strait shipping routes since the 1880s, see Kokaze Hidemasa, *Teikoku shugika no Nihon kaiun: kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu* (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1995), 262–63.

79. Consular Report from Amoy Consul R. S. Mansfield to British Minister in Peking Claude M. Macdonald, March 20, 1900, FO 228/1357, NAUK; "Taiwan sekimin Lin Lisheng nado no Nihon-seki henryū chōsagata no ken," April 1931, file 4142–29, TGGA.

80. Justin Adam Schneider, "The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1900–1936," in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Münich: Iudicium, 1998), 162–65.

81. "Intelligence Report for June Quarter 1902," forwarded by Amoy Consul P. F. Hausser to British Minister in Peking Ernest Satow, July 21, 1902, FO 228/1452, NAUK.

82. For more on the overseas Taiwanese in Shantou (the Chaoshan region), see Lin-yi Tseng, "A Cross-Boundary People: The Commercial Activities, Social Networks, and Travel Writings of Japanese and Taiwanese Sekimin in the Shantou Treaty Port (1895–1937)," (PhD diss., City University of New York, 2014).

83. Camphor was a waxy solid obtained from laurel trees for use in plastics and medicine. Other South China enterprises that Sango invested in were the East Asia Academy, Yuansheng Bank, Shantou irrigation, and Fujian railways. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Shokuminchi kara tairiku e: Taiwan kaikyō o wattata Nihonjin," in *Mosaku suru kindai Nitchū kankei: taiwa to kyōzon no jidai*, ed. Kishi Toshihiko, Tanigaki Mariko, and Fukamachi Hideo (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009), 30–36.

84. Fuzhou Consul Nakamura Takashi to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, "Suwato Chōshū aida tetsudō ni kansuru ken," November 28, 1903, *Suwato tetsudō kankei ikken*, vol. 1, file F–1–9–2–25, JFMA.

85. Akuzawa Naoya to Kodama Gentarō, "Suwato tetsudō ni kansuru ken," February 19, 1904, *Suwato tetsudō kankei ikken*, vol. 1, file F–1–9–2–25, JFMA; Chung, "Shokuminchi kara tairiku e," 30–35.

86. Nakamura Takashi, "Taiwan Sōtokufu no Kanan tetsudō kōsa: Suwato tetsudō o megutte," *Nanpō Bunka*, no. 14 (November 1987): 92–97. Although Sango's railway continued to reap profits into the 1920s, the company relinquished control of the railway in 1922 due to declining support within Taiwan.

87. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Meiji makki Taiwan Sōtokufu no taigan keiei: 'Sango Kōshi' o chūshin ni," *Taiwanshi Kenkyū*, no. 14 (October 1997): 33–36.

88. Schneider, "Taiwan Government-General," 168.

89. "Camphor Monopoly for Fukien Province, Establishment of Government Office under Japanese Management," in Consular Report from Amoy Consul P. F. Hausser to British Minister in Peking Ernest Satow, June 30, 1902, FO 228/1452, NAUK.

90. Chung, "Taiwan Sōtokufu no taigan keiei," 37.

91. Schneider, "Taiwan Government-General," 168; Yagashiro Hideyoshi, "Nanshinron no shozai to shokuminchi Taiwan: Taiwan Sōtokufu to Gaimushō no ninshiki no sōi o chūshin ni," *Waseda Daigaku Gakuin Ajia Taiheiyō Kenkyūka Ronshū*, no. 7 (March 2004): 185.

92. Hideyoshi, "Nanshinron no shozai to shokuminchi Taiwan," 184.

93. Lin, "Power of Culture," 316.

94. Murakami, *Umi no kindai Chūgoku*, 349.

95. Schneider, "Taiwan Government-General," 170–72.

96. Lin, "Power of Culture," 327.

97. Man-houng Lin, "Taiwanese Merchants in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and China, 1895–1937," in *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 218.

98. Miriam Kingsberg, "Status and Smoke: Koreans in Japan's Opium Empire," in *Mobile Subjects: Boundaries and Identities in the Modern Korean Diaspora*, ed. Wen-Hsin Yeh (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2013), 53; Barbara J. Brooks, "Japanese Colonial Citizenship in Treaty Port China: The Location of Koreans and Taiwanese in the Imperial Order," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, ed. Robert A. Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, 2000), 114–16. On population statistics for Koreans in Manchuria, see Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 44; Jaeeun Kim, *Contested Embrace: Transborder Membership Politics in Twentieth-Century Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 29.

99. The exception was in Kantō (C. Jiandao, present-day Yanbian) along the Tumen River in eastern Manchuria where Chinese officials recognized Korean rights to residency and land ownership without Chinese nationality. Park, *Two Dreams*, 19–21, 36, 50–51. For more on the history of the Tumen River border region, see Alyssa M. Park, *Sovereignty Experiments: Korean Migrants and the Building of Borders in Northeast Asia, 1860–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019); Nianshen Song, *Making Borders in Modern East Asia: The Tumen River Demarcation, 1881–1919* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Joseph A. Seeley, "Liquid Geography: The Yalu River and the Boundaries of Empire in East Asia, 1894–1945" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2019).

100. Park, *Two Dreams*, 78–81.

101. Japanese consuls in Manchuria often refused to recognize official certificates supporting Korean claims to Chinese or Russian subjecthood. Still, Koreans found ways to evade Japanese jurisdiction by navigating the Kantō region's multiple sovereignties to their advantage. Park, *Sovereignty Experiments*, chap. 3.

102. Xiamen Deputy Consul Mori Yasusaburō to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, "Taiwan sekimin no jōtai hōkoku no ken," March 14, 1910, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

2. Taiwanese in South China's Border Zones

1. Joyce A. Madancy, *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 3–4; Brian G. Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 45–46.

2. The participating imperial powers of the 1912 Hague Convention supported gradual suppression of the opium trade; Japan ratified the convention in 1921. Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 102, 107; Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), chaps. 6 and 8. On opium regimes in Southeast Asia, see Diana S. Kim, *Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition Across Southeast Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).

3. On inroads made by the Qing anti-opium campaign in Fujian, see Madancy, *Troublesome Legacy*, chaps. 3–4. On opium smuggling in South China, see Philip Thai, *China's War on Smuggling: Law, Economic Life, and the Making of the Modern State, 1842–1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Peter Thilly, "Treacherous Waters: Drug Smuggling in Coastal Fujian, 1832–1938" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2015), chaps. 4–5.

4. "Wu Yunfu hoka jūichimei shinshō kōfu no ken," January 1920, file 3057–13, TGGA.

5. Xiamen Consul Inoue Kōjirō, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwan sekimin mondai," September 1926, *Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken*, file 3–8–2–330, JFMA.

6. "Taiwanseki shutoku ni kansuru hanzai no kenkyo narabi sono torishimari kata (Matsui gaimu jikan)," January 1915, file 5896–21, TGGA.

7. "Shinajin ni Nihon kokuseki o shutoku seshimuru no ken," March 1917, file 2649–1; "Wu Yunfu hoka jūichimei shinshō kōfu no ken," January 1920, file 3057–13, TGGA.

8. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Taiwan zongdufu 'Nanzhi Nanyang' zhengce zhi yanjiu: yi qingbao tixi wei zhongxin," in *Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Lin Chin-tian [Lin Jintian] (Nantou: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 1999)," 695–98.

9. "Nanshin ni okeru Nihonjin no hatten (Takahashi Fukushū ryōjidan)," *TNS*, February 5, 1907, cited in Ts'ai Hui-guang [Cai Huiguang], "Taiwan Sōtokufu ni yoru Taiwan sekimin gakkō no seiritsu: Tōei Gakudō, Kyokuei Shoin, Tōei Gakkō," *Tokyo Daigaku Nihon Shigaku Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō*, no. 16 (March 2012): 138.

10. In the 1930s, the associations were renamed "Taiwanese Resident Associations" (J. Taiwan Kyoryūminkai, C. Taiwan juliuminhui).

11. Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 189–91.

12. On the regulations and history of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association, see *Amoi Taiwan Kyoryūminkaihō sanjū shūnen kinen tokkan* (Amoi: Amoi Kyoryūkai, 1936).

13. Xiamen Deputy Consul Mori Yasusaburō to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, "Taiwan sekimin no jōtai hōkoku no ken," March 14, 1910, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA; "Amoy Intelligence report of 1/2-year ending September 18th, 1924," FO 228/3281, NAUK.

14. Multiple nationalities were allowed under the Qing nationality law promulgated in 1909 and subsequent Republic of China nationality laws of 1912 and 1929. Huei-Ying Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires: Chinese Business and Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914–1941* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 57.

15. "Amoi Zhou Ziwen shinshō haiju no go reijō," May 1914, file 2325–6, 134, 149, TGGA; Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Rizhi shiqi Taiwanren zai Xiamen de huodong ji qi xiangguan wenti (1895–1938)," in *Zouxiang jindai: guoshi fazhan yu quyu dongxiang*, ed. Zouxiang jindai bianji xiaozu (Taiwan donghua, 2004), 404–05.

16. Xiamen Deputy Consul Mori Yasusaburō to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, "Taiwan sekimin no jōtai hōkoku no ken," March 14, 1910, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

17. Man-houng Lin, "Taiwanese Merchants in the Economic Relations Between Taiwan and China, 1895–1937," in *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 234. On the overseas Chinese in colonial Taiwan, see Leo Douw, "The Huaqiao in Taiwan 1895–1945: Their Ambivalent Localization," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 7, no. 2 (January 2011): 143–68.

18. Xiamen Deputy Consul Mori Yasusaburō to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, "Taiwan sekimin no jōtai hōkoku no ken," March 14, 1910, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken,* vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

19. Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 404–05; Lin, "Taiwanese Merchants," 234.

20. Xiamen Deputy Consul Mori Yasusaburō to Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Chief Kurachi Tetsukichi, November 6, 1908, *Shinbun zasshi sōjū kankei zassan, Zenmin Shinnichihō [Quanmin xinribao]*, file 1–3–1–31, JFMA.

21. Nakamura Takashi, "Amoi oyobi Fukushū Hakuaikai iin no seiritsu: Taiwan Sōtokufu no bunka kōsaku," *Nanpō Bunka*, no. 15 (November 1988): 1–57. For more on Taiwanese doctors in China, see Ming-cheng M. Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession,*

Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 96–99, 134–41; Wei-ti Chen, "Cosmopolitan Medicine Nationalized: The Making of Japanese State-Empire and Overseas Physicians in a Global World" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2016), chap. 4.

22. Amoi Hakuaikai, "Jigyō seiseki narabi shūshi kessansho," 1929, *Sankō shiryō kankei zakken: Shina kakuchi Hakuai Byōin kankei*, file H–7–2–0–4–4, JFMA.

23. Amoi Hakuaikai, *Amoi Hakuaikai Amoi iin man go-shūnenshi* (Amoi: Amoi Hakuaikai, 1923), 19–20; Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto Tsuyoshi to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, "Amoi Hakuaikai chōsa jikō," February 1, 1934, *Zaigai Hōjin shakai jigyō kankei zakken dai yonkan,* file I–5–0–0, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B04013220800; Xiamen Consul A. J. Martin to British Embassy, Peking, "Public Health Policy in Fukien, Report by Dr. A. Stampar [League of Nations expert]," June 20, 1936, FO 371/20266, NAUK.

24. "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," April 1908, file 5100–15, 86, TGGA.

25. The Chinese teacher, Lin Jianggao, was hired to teach nine Taiwanese students. Xiamen Consul Terashima Hirobumi to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, "Taiwan sekimin kankei jikō chōsahō ni kansuru ken," December 5, 1930, *Taiwanjin kankei zakken, zaigai Taiwanjin jijō kankei*, file A–5–3–0–3–2, JFMA.

26. "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," April 1908, file 5100–15, 87, TGGA.

27. "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," 93–95, TGGA; Ts'ai, "Taiwan sekimin gakkō," 25–27.

28. "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," 95, TGGA.

29. Kyokuei Shoin, *Dairei kinen jigyō* (Taipei: Kyokuei Shoin, 1925), 19–55; Nakamura Takashi, ed., *Nihon no Nanpō kanyo to Taiwan* (Tenri: Tenri Kyōdō Yūsha, 1988), 65.

30. Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Amoi kyokuei shoin yōran*, 50–51; "Wu Yunfu gai jūichimei shinshō kōfu no ken," November 1920, file 3057–13, 294, 320, TGGA.

31. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce yu yapian wenti," in *Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Lin Chin-tian [Lin Jintian] (Nantou: Taiwansheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2000), 223–56.

32. As Miriam Kingsberg Kadia has noted, the 1906 Qing opium laws emulated those instituted in 1897 by the Taiwan Government-General for gradual prohibition. Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 25. On Japan's Hoshi Pharmaceuticals and Taiwan's opium trade, see Timothy M. Yang, *A Medicated Empire: The Pharmaceutical Industry and Modern Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), chap. 5.

33. Taiwanese caught supplying drugs to Japanese civilians or troops were punishable by death. For more on Taiwan's opium monopoly and laws, see Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 12–24.

34. Xiamen Consul Kikuchi Girō to Foreign Minister Count Uchida Yasuya, December 20, 1912, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA; "Amoy Intelligence Report December Quarter 1922," FO 228/1757, NAUK.

35. Xiamen Consul Inoue Kōjirō, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwan sekimin mondai," September 1926, *Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken*, file 3–8–2–330, JFMA.

36. Amoi Kyokukei Shoin, *Amoi Kyokuei Shoin yōran* (Amoi: Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, 1918), 50–51.

37. Several leaders of the Eighteen Big Brothers such as Wang Changsheng and Lin Gun went on become leading members of the Xiamen Taiwanese Association. Taiwan Shinminpōsha Chōsabu, *Taiwan jinshikan* (Taipei: Taiwan Shinminpōsha), 85, 215, 278; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 431–32.

38. Xiamen Consul Kikuchi Girō to Foreign Minister Count Makino Nobuaki, August 29, 1913, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwanjin furōsha jōtai ni tsuki hōkoku no ken," *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 1, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

39. "Taiwanseki shutoku ni kansuru hanzai no kenkyo narabi sono torishimari kata (Matsui gaimu jikan)," January 1915, file 5896–21, 215–20, TGGA.

40. "Taiwanseki shutoku ni kansuru hanzai no kenkyo narabi sono torishimari kata (Matsui gaimu jikan)," 204–13.

41. For example, see "Chen Changsheng Li Yongnian no kokuseki sakujo kata ni kanshi shōfuku (zai Fukushū ryōji sono hoka)," March 1913, file 5448–12, TGGA.

42. Erik Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), chap. 2; Ogino Fujio, *Gaimushō keisatsushi: zairyūmin hogo torishimari to tokkō keisatsu kinō* (Azekura Shobō, 2005), 160–96.

43. Up through 1916, Taiwanese prisoners in Xiamen were reportedly detained in the Taiwanese Association headquarters due to a lack of space in the Japanese consulate. Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 442.

44. Xiamen Consul Kikuchi Girō to Foreign Minister Count Isshi Kikujirō, May 19, 1916, *Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken*, vol. 2*: fu zai Shina sekimin torishimari ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–7–18, JFMA.

45. Taiwan Government-General Police Superintendent Yūchi Kōhei to Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Chief, "Shina oyobi Shinajin ni kansuru hōhoku (dai-yon hō)," June 11, 1916, *Taiwan Sōtokufu seikyō hōkoku narabi zappō*, vol. 1, file 1–5–3–19, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B03041647400.

46. Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 442.

47. Taiwan Government-General Police Superintendent Yūchi Kōhei to Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Chief, "Shina oyobi Shinajin ni kansuru hōhoku (dai-yon hō)," June 11, 1916, *Taiwan Sōtokufu seikyō hōkoku narabi zappō*, vol. 1, file 1–5–3–19, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B03041647400.

48. Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Keisatsu Honcho, "Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei oyobi genzai no shisetsu narabi shōrai no hōshin," n.d. [ca. 1917], *Taiwan Sōtokufu seikyō hōkoku narabi zappō*, vol. 2, file 1–5–3–19, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B03041652300.

49. "Amoi Fukushū ni ryōji to no aida ni keisatsu jimu ni kansushi kyōgi ketteishitaru jikkō no ken," September 1916, file rui–01367100, NAJ: JACAR Ref. A04018110500. Subsequent cross-strait conferences were held in Taipei for South China consuls and Taiwan Government-General officials in 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1934. Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu 'Nanzhi Nanyang,'" 722–23.

50. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 600; Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu 'Nanzhi Nanyang,'" 707–708.

51. Tian Yu, "Riren zai Xiamenheng she jingcha wenti," *Mingfeng zazhi*, no. 3 (June 1916): 194–96; "Xiamen Riren shejing shijian," *Xinqingnian*, no. 2 (February 1917), 2–3, Shanghai Municipal Archives, D2–0–821–519.

52. "Amoi keisatsuken mondai," *TJ* (January 1917): 49.

53. On the international context of Japan's Twenty-One Demands, see Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), chap. 3.

54. "Wu Yunfu hoka jūichimei shinshō kōfu no ken," January 1920, file 3057-13, TGGA; Miyakawa Jirō, *Amoi hai-Nichi undō no kiroku: Taishō 12-nen 3-gatsu yori 7-gatsu made* (Taipei: Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpōsha, 1923), 7; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 443; Wang Hsueh-hsin [Wang Xuexin], *Riben dui Hua nanjin zhengce yu Taiwan heibang jimin zhi yanjiu (1895–1945)* (Nantou: Taiwan wenxianguan, 2009), 98.

55. "Taiwan jimin huoyue," *TNS*, September 26, 1919.

56. Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 432–33.

57. Wang Tay-sheng [Wang Taishang], Abe Yuriko, and Wu Chun-ying [Wu Junying], *Taiwanren de guoji chu tiyan: Rizhi Taiwan yu Zhongguo kuajieren de liudong jiqi falü shenghuo* (Wunan tushu, 2015), 124.

58. Xiamen Consul Kikuchi Gifu to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, "Nanshin ni okeru ryōjikan no saiban ni kansuru hōritsuan ni tsuki iken gushin no ken," February 23, 1912; Shantou Deputy Consul Yano Masao to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, "Nanshin ni okeru ryōjikan no saiban ni kansuru hōritsuan ni tsuki iken gushin no ken," April 22, 1912, *Nanshi ni okeru ryōji saibanken ni kansuru hōritsu seitei narabi kaishaku kankei zakken*, file D–1–2–0–3, JFMA.

59. Tanino Kaku [Taiwan Government-General Higher Court Director], "Minami Shina no ryōji saiban mondai," *TJ* (January 1921): 25.

60. Nakamura Takashi, "Amoi no Taiwan sekimin to Sandaisei," *Nanpō Bunka*, no. 12 (November 1985): 115–38.

61. Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 442; Wang, Abe, and Wu, *Taiwanren de guoji*, 148–50.

62. Amoi Kyoryūkai, *Amoi Taiwan Kyoryūminkai sōritsu sanjūgo shūnen kinenshi* (Amoi: Amoi Kyoryūminkai, 1942), 191–93; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 432.

63. Peter Thilly has come to a similar conclusion regarding the Japanese government's role in the Fujian narcotics trade. Peter Thilly, "The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900–1937," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, no. 25 (December 2017): 89–90. On Japan's Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company and its illicit trading of Taiwanese opium in Central and Northeast China, see Yang, *A Medicated Empire*, chap. 5.

64. Yang, *A Medicated Empire*, chap. 5. Peter Thilly, "The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900–1937," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, no. 25 (December 2017): 89–90. On Japan's Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company and its illicit trading of Taiwanese opium in Central and Northeast China, see Yang, *A Medicated Empire*, chap. 5.

65. In Japan's South Manchurian Leasehold (1905–31), the opium trade helped fund Japan's regional Kwantung Army. Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 100–11.

66. Japan's Foreign Ministry representatives at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference collaborated in founding the Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (also known as the Opium Advisory Committee). Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 105; Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, introduction to *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 13–15; Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow*, chaps. 6 and 8.

67. Kobayashi Motohiro has made a similar point about prewar Tianjin, where he contends Japanese consular police made "a fairly earnest attempt" to punish Japanese and Korean opium traffickers. By contrast, Miriam Kingsberg Kadia has noted that the Japanese "police virtually ignored the drug traffic" in the South Manchurian Leasehold while the Kwantung Army "protected many traffickers, who paid bribes or kickbacks in exchange for near immunity from legal interference." Kobayashi Motohiro, "Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin," in *Opium Regimes*, 154, 158; Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 119.

68. "Foochow Intelligence Report for December Quarter 1918," FO 228/3278, NAUK.

69. This was also true of Japan's South Manchurian Leasehold regarding opium infractions by Japanese nationals. Xiamen Deputy Consul Ichikawa Shinya to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, "Nanshi ryōji saiban to Taiwan shihō seido tōitsu ni kansuru ken," April 1, 1919, *Nanshi ni okeru ryōji saibanken ni kansuru hōritsu seitei narabi kaishaku kankei zakken*, file D–1–2–0–3, JFMA.

70. "Xiamen tongxun," *Guansheng* 4, no. 3 (1935): 264–65; Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce," 232–35.

71. Xiamen Consul Inoue Kōjirō, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwan sekimin mondai," September 1926, *Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken*, file 3–8–2–330, JFMA.

72. On Taiwanese "convenient stores" that bypassed Chinese customs to sell Taiwanese imports, including narcotics, see Chen Yuqing, "Taiwan Nanshi kan no tokushu bōeki benriya ni tsuite," *Nanshi Nan'yō Kenkyū*, no. 27 (March 1937): 43–74; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 437–39.

73. See, for example, the portrayal of the Taiwanese and Japanese as the primary drivers of Fujian's opium trade at the expense of Chinese residents. Zhang Kan, *Hubu liandong*, vol. 1 of *Xiamen yu Taiwan congshu*, ed. Kong Yongsong (Fuzhou: Haifeng chubanshe, 2004), 245–51.

74. Madancy, *Troublesome Legacy*, chap. 9; Martin, *Shanghai Gang Green*, chap. 2.

75. "Foochow Intelligence Report for December Quarter 1918," FO 228/3278, NAUK.

76. Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce," 245.

77. "Amoy Intelligence Report, September Quarter 1922," FO 228/3281, NAUK. For more on Zang's opium policies in Xiamen, see Edward R. Slack, Jr., *Opium, State, and Society: China's Narco-Economy and the Guomindang, 1924–1937* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 68–69.

78. Xiamen Consul Miura Yoshiaki to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, February 5, 1933, *Chūgoku ni okeru sozei oyobi futankin kankei zakken, futōka zeikankei*, vol. 7, file E–1–3–2–1, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B08060819900; Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce," 245.

79. Xiamen Consul Inoue Kōjirō, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwan sekimin mondai," September 1926, *Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken*, file 3–8–2–330, JFMA.

80. Hong Xuechen, "Xiamen guancha xiaoji," *Xinghuo*, no. 7 (1923): 4. Shanghai Municipal Archives, D20–0–1750.

81. Peter Thilly has made a similar point about Xiamen's thriving cocaine trade in the 1920s–30s by calling it a joint Taiwanese-Fujianese operation. Taiwanese and Chinese in Xiamen imported cocaine into Xiamen for re-export to South and Southeast Asia. Thilly, "Fujitsuru Mystery," 98.

82. Slack, *Opium, State, and Society*, 66.

83. "Rijimin pohuai Quanmin yanjin," *Judu yuekan*, no. 35 (1929): 47–48; "Fuzhou Taimin fanyan," *Judu yuekan*, no. 71 (1933): 24–25; "Fuzhou Taiji langren qiangsha weibing'an," *Judu yuekan*, no. 73 (1934): 23–24.

84. "Riren tu Min zhi heimo," *Shangxue ribao*, September 5, 1931, cited in Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Hoanka Toshogakari, *Taiwan Shuppan Keisatsuhō*, vol. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1930–32; repr., Fuji Shuppan, 2001), 358–59.

85. Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce," 247–48; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 433.

86. "Drug Traffic," *North China Herald*, June 3, 1936.

87. "Fukien Drug Rackets Not Japanese Run; Chinese Peddlers Pose as Formosans; Protection Sought; Heroin, Morphine Traffic Spreading," *North China Herald*, September 2, 1936.

88. Du Congming, "Taigan Amoi ryokō no zakkan," *Taiwan* 4, no. 4 (April 1923): 69–71.

89. Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 72–73.

90. "Lujiang yuebao no hakkan," *TNS*, November 26, 1909, 4; "Lin Jishang no tokui: Fukken kōgetsugun no shireikan," *TNS*, October 23, 1918, 7; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 406–07.

91. Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Keisatsu Honcho, "Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei oyobi genzai no shisetsu narabi shōrai no hōshin," n.d. [ca. 1917], *Taiwan Sōtokufu seikyō hōkoku narabi zappō*, vol. 2, file 1–5–3–19, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B03041652300.

92. Founded in 1899, Taiwan Medical School offered one of the main areas of secondary education asides from normal schools (*shihan gakkō*) for teacher training and later commercial and industrial colleges. The first Taiwanese middle school (Taizhong Middle School) was founded in 1915 by the Government-General after protracted negotiations with anticolonial activists led by Lin Xiantang. Patricia E. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 22; Lo, *Doctors within Borders*, chap. 3.

93. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education*, 22.

94. Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan kōnichi undōshi kenkyū*, 2nd ed. (Kenbun Shuppan, 2001), 257. Karen Thornber has described Japan's capital of Tokyo in the 1920s as a "literary contact nebula" where Taiwanese could interact with a range of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean students and intellectuals. Karen Thornber, *Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Transculturations of Japanese Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 8.

95. Xiamen Consul Inoue Kōjirō, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwan sekimin mondai," September 1926, *Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken*, file 3–8–2–330, JFMA.

96. Mujunsei (pseud.), "Amoi yori kaerite," *Taiwan Kyōiku*, no. 278 (August 1925): 49; Nakamura, *Nihon no Nanpō Kanyo*, 58.

97. Xiamen Consul Inoue Kōjirō, "Amoi ni okeru Taiwan sekimin mondai," September 1926, *Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken*, file 3–8–2–330, JFMA.

98. Mujunsei (pseud.), "Amoi yori kaerite," *Taiwan Kyōiku*, no. 278 (August 1925): 49.

99. Huang Chengcong, "Shina tokō ryoken seido no haishi o nozomu," *Taiwan* 3, no. 9 (December 1, 1922): 19–29; Huang Chengcong, "Xiwang chefei duhang Zhongguo lujuan zhidu," *Taiwan minbao* 2, no. 21 (October 21, 1924): 1; Wang Zhonglin, "Ryoken teppai undō ni tsuite," *Taiwan minbao,* no. 261 (May 19, 1929): 12.

100. Wakabayashi, *Taiwan kōnichi undōshi*, 257. A 1930 Japanese consular report in Xiamen estimated that 231 Taiwanese students were enrolled in local Chinese and Anglo-American secondary schools. Xiamen Consul Terashima Hirobumi to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, "Taiwan sekimin kankei jikō chōsahō ni kansuru ken," December 5, 1930, *Taiwanjin kankei zakken, zai gai Taiwanjin jijō kankei*, file A–5–3–0–3, JFMA.

101. Xie Dongmin, *Guifan: wo jia he wo de gushi* (Lianjing chuban, 1988), 47–49, 52.

102. Huang Xinxian, *MinTai jiaoyu de jiaorong yu fazhan* (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2003), 144.

103. This was even more the case after the outbreak of the 1937 Sino-Japanese War. See, for example, Taiwanese writer Wu Zhuoliu's experience in 1940s Nanjing. Ping-hui Liao, "Travel in Early-Twentieth-Century Asia: On Wu Zhuoliu's 'Nanking Journals' and His Notion of Taiwan's Alternative Modernity," in *Writing Taiwan: A New Literary History*, ed. David Der-wei Wang and Carlos Rojas (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 285–300.

104. Yang Wanxing, "Shantou de Tairen dui gejie qingyuan," *Taiwan xinminbao* (January 9, 1932): 9.

105. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education*, 201; *Taiwan xianfeng,* vol. 5, cited in Wakabayashi, *Taiwan kōnichi undōshi*, 266.

106. On Sun Yat-sen's Pan-Asianist visions of an alliance of "oppressed nations," see Torsten Weber, *Embracing 'Asia' in China and Japan: Asianism Discourse and the Contest for Hegemony, 1912–1933* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 198–212; Craig A. Smith, *Chinese Asianism, 1894–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2021), chap. 7.

107. Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 65.

108. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi*, vol. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1933), 77–86.

109. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi*, vol. 2, 119, 123; Zhang Shenqie and Chen Fangming, *Zhang Shenqie quanji*, vol. 1 (Wenjing chubanshe, 1998), 314.

110. *Taiwan xianfeng*, vol. 5, cited in Wakabayashi, *Taiwan kōnichi undōshi*, 266.

111. Among the sixty-four Taiwanese in Guangzhou targeted by the Japanese police, twenty-three were arrested while forty-one escaped. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi*, vol. 2, 122–33, 135–37.

112. The Comintern placed the TCP officially under the auspices of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) because a party needed to have a membership of more than one hundred to be recognized as an independent party, for which the TCP did not

qualify. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi*, vol. 2, 588, 661–62; Frank S. T. Hsiao and Laurence R. Sullivan, "A Political History of the Taiwanese Communist Party, 1928–1931," *Journal of Asian Studies* (February 1983): 271.

113. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi*, vol. 2, 662–64, 670, 674.

114. With the disbandment of the TCP, Taiwanese communists who fled to China were absorbed into the CCP. Hsiao and Sullivan, "Taiwanese Communist Party," 276; Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi*, vol. 2, 737–39.

115. Miyakawa Jirō, *Nanshi Kyōsantō to Kanton seikyoku* (Takushoku Tsūshinsha, 1928), 23–24.

116. For example, see the arrests in Xiamen of Jiang Wenlai in 1929 and Zhuang Haihan in 1933. Xiamen Consul Terashima Hirobumi to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, July 27, 1929; Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto Tsuyoshi to Taiwan Government-General Political Affairs Chief Hiratsuka Hiroyoshi, "Yōchūi Taiwanjin Zhuang Haihan ni kansuru ken," June 25, 1934, file A–5–3–0–3, JFMA.

117. For example, see the cases of two GMD-affiliated Taiwanese filmmakers, Liu Na'ou and He Feiguang, who faced discrimination from the Japanese and Chinese in prewar and wartime China. Misawa Mamie, *"Teikoku" to "sokoku" no hazama: shokuminchiki Taiwan eigajin no kōshō to ekkyō* (Iwanami Shoten, 2010), esp. chaps. 2–3.

118. Xie, *Guifan*, 89, 102–105.

119. Xie Chunmu [Xie Nanguang], *Taiwanjin wa kaku miru* (Taipei: Taiwan Minpōsha, 1930), 132.

120. Taiwan Government-General Police Bureau Security Section, "Nanshi chihō ni okeru hai-Nichi eikyō chōsa," January 1932, *Manshū Jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu Ryūjōko bakuha ni yoru Nisshi gun shōtotsu kankei), hai Nichi, hai Ka kankei*, vol. 4, file A–1–1–0–21, JFMA, JACAR Ref. B02030303100.

121. During the period of Taiwan's "civilian rule" (1919–36), the Taiwan Army was separated from the Government-General and placed under the supervision of the army headquarters in Tokyo.

122. On GMD official reports of the Mito Incident, see *Riling ji junjianzhang zai Min tiaoxin*, Ref. 020–010102–0164, January 1932–December 1935, AH.

123. After further investigation of the Mito murders, the Japanese consular police arrested and deported Li and his three colleagues to Taiwan for court trials. With the Taiwan Army vouching for him, however, Lin was acquitted and went on to work for Japanese intelligence in Manchukuo, Tianjin, and Shanghai. Nakamura, "Fukushū Mito Jiken," 216–28.

124. Wang, *Riben dui Hua nanjin*, 135.

125. David R. Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 138–39, 144–46; Matsuura Masataka, *"Dai Tōa Sensō" wa naze okita no ka: han Ajia shugi no seiji keizaishi* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010), 282–83, 568–73; Hashimoto Kōichi, "Fukken Jihen ji ni okeru Nihon seifu no taiō ni tsuite," in *Takakuteki shiten kara mita Nitchū Sensō: seiji, keizai, gunji, bunka, minzoku no sōkoku*, ed. Baba Takeshi (Fukuoka: Shūkōsha, 2015), 78; Chung, "Taiwanren zai Xiamen," 447–48.

126. Po Xiong (pseud.), "Taiwan wanguo sishi zhounian jinian," *Jiangshengbao*, June 19, 1935.

127. Miriam Kingsberg, "Status and Smoke: Koreans in Japan's Opium Empire," in *Mobile Subjects: Boundaries and Identities in the Modern Korean Diaspora*, ed. Wen-Hsin Yeh (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2013), 47–55; Barbara J. Brooks, "Japanese Colonial Citizenship in Treaty Port China: The Location of Koreans and Taiwanese in the Imperial Order," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, ed. Robert A. Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 112, 118.

128. On the discursive role of Taiwan in 1930s Chinese nationalism, see Shi-chi Mike Lan, "The Ambivalence of National Imagination: Defining 'the Taiwanese' in China, 1931–1941," *The China Journal*, no. 64 (July 2010): 179–97.

3. Taiwainese in Southest Asia

1. In the 1910s, the Japanese used the terms Nan'yō ("South Seas"), Nanpō ("Southern Regions"), and Nangoku ("Southern Countries") more or less interchangeably. A malleable concept, Nan'yō at times referred to either present-day South Pacific or Southeast Asia or a combination of the two. For the sake of intelligibility, I use the terms Southeast Asia and South Seas interchangeably as the English translation for Nan'yō. For more on the Japanese term Nan'yō, see Hiroshi Shimizu, "Southeast Asia as a Regional Concept in Modern Japan," in *Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska, Remco Raben, and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 82–112; Chou Wanyao [Zhou Wanyao], "Cong 'Nanzhi Nanyang' diaocha dao Nanfang gongrongquan: yi Taiwan tuozhi zhushi huishe zai Fashu Zhongnanbandao de kaifa wei li," in *Taiwan tuozhi zhushi huishe dang'an lunwenji*, ed. Wang Shih-ching [Wang Shiqing] (Nantou: Taiwan wenxianguan, 2008), 150–58.

2. Bill Mihalopoulos, "The Making of Prostitutes: The *Karayuki-san*," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 25, no. 1 (1993): 42–45.

3. Batavia Consul Someya Seishō to Foreign Minister Count Komura Jutarō, "Ranryō Higashi Indo Shotō ni nyūkoku suru Taiwanjin ni kansuru ken," March 9, 1909, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

4. Chinese migration and diasporic networks—based largely on native-place ties with South China's Fujian and Guangdong provinces—dated back to the sixteenth century. On the history of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

5. Frederick R. Dickinson, *World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 134–41; J. Charles Schencking, "The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872–1921," *Modern Asian Studies* 33, no. 4 (October 1999): 792–94.

6. Jun Uchida, "Island Nation to Oceanic Empire: A Vision of Japanese Expansion from the Periphery," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 42, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 57–68, 81–89; Schencking, "Imperial Japanese Navy," 771–78. On the Japanese historical discourse of Tōyō (literally "East Seas," often translated in English as "the Orient"), see Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

7. Schencking, "Imperial Japanese Navy," 784–94; Mark R. Peattie, *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988), chap. 2.

8. Uchida Kakichi, "Nan'yō shokuminchi shokan," *TJ* (June 1912): 2–3.

9. Uchida Kakichi, "Nan'yō ni hatten seyo," *TJ* (April 1914): 1.

10. Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 54.

11. Uchida Kakichi, "Nan'yō ni hatten seyo," *TJ* (April 1914): 1. On the Government-General-backed Sango Company's rubber enterprises in Malaya, see Justin Adam Schneider, "The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1900–1936," in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Münich: Iudicium, 1998), 168.

12. Uchida Kakichi, *Kokumin kaigai hattensaku* (Takushoku Shinpōsha, 1914), 34, 41.

13. Between 1906 and 1911, the Government-General had provided annual subsidies for Japanese trade between Taiwan and South China. Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 70.

14. On Government-General aid to Japanese companies in Southeast Asia, see Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Taiwan zongdufu de 'Nanzhi Nanyang' zhengce: yi shiye buzhu wei zhongxin," *Taida lishi xuebao*, no. 34 (December 2004): 161–68.

15. A former member of the East Asia Common Culture Association in Shanghai and economic official in colonial Korea (1905–10), Inoue founded his Southern Asia Company in 1911 to invest in Singapore rubber plantations. Inoue Masaji, "Nan'yō to Taiwan (jō)," *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi* 7, no. 3 (March 1921): 9–10; Yokoi Kaori, *Teikoku Nihon no Ajia ninshiki: tōchika Taiwan ni okeru chōsa to jinzai ikusei* (Iwata Shoin, 2018), 171–81.

16. The association established branch offices in Singapore (1916), Batavia (1921), Palau (1923), Manila (1924), Davao (1929), Medan (1929), and in cities throughout Japan. Hyung Gu Lynn, "A Comparative Study of the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nanyō Kyōkai," in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich: Iudicium, 1998), 72–75.

17. The Taiwan Government-General offered the largest aid among the public and private donors of the association. From 1922 to 1936, nearly half of the association's budget was funded by the Government-General. Kawarabayashi Naoto, "Teikoku Nihon no ekkyō suru shakaiteki jinmyaku, Nan'yō Kyōkai to iu kagami," in *Nan'yō Guntō to teikoku, kokusai chitsujo*, ed. Asano Toyomi (Jigakusha Shuppan, 2007), 105.

18. "Nan'yō Kyōkai no enkaku," *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi* 5, no. 6 (June 1919): 112–35; Horiguchi Masao, *Nan'yō Kyōkai jūnenshi* (Nan'yō Kyōkai, 1925), 113–14.

19. For example, Koshimura Nagatsugu's *Things You Must Know for a South Seas Trip* (1919) explained how to apply for visas to Southeast Asia and contained an appendix of practical Malay phrases. Koshimura Nagatsugu, *Nan'yō tokō shūchi* (Taipei: Nan'yō Kyōkai Taiwan Shibu, 1919).

20. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 70.

21. Nakamura Takashi, "'Taishō nanshinki' to Taiwan," *Nanpō Bunka*, no. 8 (November 1981): 242–47.

22. For more on the Encyclopedia Bureau, see Yokoi, *Teikoku Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, 20–50.

23. In 1925, the school added courses such as "Taiwan Affairs," "Colonial Law," "Colonial Policy," "Ethnology," and "Tropical Health." By 1942, the school offered eight different foreign languages and four southern Chinese dialects. Taihoku Kōtō Shōgyō Gakkō Gakugeibu, *Hōyoku*, no. 5 (1926): 278–79; Yokoi, *Teikoku Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, 90–109.

24. The Taiwan Promotion Exposition was modeled on the Korean Promotion Exposition held a year earlier in Seoul. On Japanese colonial expositions, see Noriko Aso, *Public Properties: Museums in Imperial Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), chap. 3; Todd A. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), chap. 3; Lu Shao-li [Lü Shaoli], *Zhanshi Taiwan: quanli, kongjian yu zhimin tongzhi de xingxiang biaoshu* (Maitian chuban, 2005).

25. Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai Kyōsankai, ed., *Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai Kyōsankai hōkokusho* (Taipei: Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai Kyōsankai, 1916), 196–97; Noro Yasushi, "Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai ni tsuite," *TJ* (March 1916): 4.

26. Shimomura Hiroshi, "Kyōshinkai no mokuteki," *TNS*, February 26–27, 1917. On Japanese tourism in Taiwan, including "indigenous sightseeing," see Kate McDonald, *Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), chaps. 2, 4.

27. "Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai shushi," *TJ* (September 1915): 4; Nakamura, "'Taishō nanshinki,'" 224.

28. "Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai Shina no shuppin; Firipin nōsha," *TNS*, April 7, 1916; Lu, *Zhanshi Taiwan*, 236–38. On Chinese travel to colonial Taiwan, see Yajun Mo, *Touring China: A History of Travel Culture, 1912–1949* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), 184–94.

29. Among the total attendees, 112,270 Japanese and 171,885 Taiwanese visited Exhibition Center No. 2, which contained products from South China and Southeast Asia. "Kaiki iyoiyo kippaku seru Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai," *TNS*, March 3, 1916; Lu, *Zhanshi Taiwan*, 232.

30. "Taiwan Kangyō Kyōshinkai shuppin sōsū yon-man kyū-sen yoten," *TNS*, April 12, 1916; Lu, *Zhanshi Taiwan*, 219.

31. "Kaiki iyoiyo kippaku seru Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai," *TNS*, March 3, 1916.

32. "Nanshi Nan'yō shisatsudan," *TJ* (April 1916): 51–52.

33. Matsuoka Masao, "Kinsei shokuminshugi," *Taiwan Geppō* 4, no. 12 (1910); Matsuoka Masao, "Zensekai kakushokuminchi," *Taiwan Geppō* 5, no. 1 (1911); "Matsuoka shokutaku no Nan'yō-kō," *TNS*, Nov. 26, 1912; Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Nan'yō shisatsu fukumeisho* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1914).

34. Matsuoka Masao, "Nihon to Nan'yō to no kankei," *TJ* (December 1913): 24.

35. Matsuoka, "Nihon to Nan'yō to no kankei," 24–25.

36. On Tokugawa Japan's *sakoku* policies, see Robert I. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010).

37. On theories of Japan's "southern origins" by anthropologists like University of Tokyo's Tsuboi Shōgorō (1863–1913), see Kawanishi Kōsuke, "Nihon no Nanpō kigen 'gensetsu' to nanshinron," *Jōchi Shigaku*, no. 46 (November 2001): 127–65.

38. Matsuoka, "Nihon to Nan'yō to no kankei," 26–27.

39. Matsuoka, "Nihon to Nan'yō to no kankei," 26.

40. History departments in Japanese universities usually offered three area concentrations: Japanese history (Koku-shi, "national history"), East Asian history (Tōyō-shi, focused on China and Korea), and Western History (Seiyō-shi). Taipei Imperial University's history department replaced Western history with two concentrations in "South Seas History" and "Anthropology and Folk Customs." On the history departments of Taipei and Seoul imperial universities, see Sakai Tetsuya and Matsuda Toshihiko, ed., *Teikoku Nihon to shokuminchi daigaku* (Yumani Shobō, 2014). On Kenkoku University in Manchukuo, see Yuka Hiruma Kishida, *Kenkoku University and the Experience of Pan-Asianism: Education in the Japanese Empire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).

41. Murakami Naojirō, "Kan'ei sakoku mae ni okeru Nihonjin no Nan'yō hatten," *TNS*, June 19–25, 1929.

42. Murakami Naojirō, "Oranda shiryō ni arawaretaru Yamada Nagamasa," in *Kinen kōenshū*, vol. 3, ed. Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku (Taipei: Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku, 1934), 1–27. For more on Murakami, see Birgit Tremml-Werner, "Narrating Japan's Early Modern Southern Expansion," *The Historical Journal* (September 2020): 139–61.

43. Iwao Seiichi's seminal monograph, *A Study of Japantowns in the South Seas* (*Nan'yō Nihon machi no kenkyū*, 1940), received the prestigious Japan Academy Imperial Prize in 1941. For more on how Iwao's academic and public activities helped legitimate Japanese rule in Taiwan and imperial ambitions in Southeast Asia, see Seiji Shirane, "Iwao Seiichi and Japanese Histories of the 'South Seas' in Colonial Taiwan," *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (forthcoming).

44. Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*.

45. "Kyōshinkai no mokuteki (ge)," *TNS*, February 27, 1917. For more on Japanese perceptions of the overseas Chinese, see Timothy Y. Tsu, "'Jews of the East': Chinese Migrants in Japanese Discourse on Southward Expansion, 1880–1945," *Japanese Studies* 37, no. 3 (November 2017): 331–52.

46. Tsuboya Zenshirō, *Saikin no Nangoku* (Hakubunkan, 1917), 237–41.

47. Umetani Mitsuzawa, "Nan'yō no hasha," *TJ* (June 1918): 21–30. Umetani's writings shaped how 1920s Chinese scholars in Shanghai's Jinan University—a Chinese center for studies on the Nanyang ("South Seas")—viewed overseas Chinese as colonists of Southeast Asia. In 1923, Jinan's Liu Shuimu translated Umetani's 1918 article on the "[Overseas Chinese as] Hegemons of the South Seas" into Chinese. Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), chap. 2, esp. 48–50.

48. This was the case even as Japanese colonial officials were aware of differences in speech groups (Fujianese, Cantonese, Hakka) and native-place groups (those whose ancestors came from Xiamen, Chaozhou, Guangzhou) among the Chinese diasporic population. This was similarly true for Anglophone officials who referred to the Han Taiwanese population interchangeably as "Formosan-Chinese," "Japanese subjects of the Chinese race," "Chinese with Japanese nationality," or "Chinese owing allegiance to Japan."

49. Umetani Mitsuzawa, "Nan'yō no hasha," *TJ* (June 1918): 29.

50. Umetani Mitsuzawa, "Nan'yō shokuminchi ni okeru keisatsu oyobi shōbō," *TJ* (October 1918): 28.

51. Inoue Masaji, "Nan'yō to Taiwan (1–8)," *TNS*, May–June 1914.

52. Yano Tōru, *"Nanshin" no keifu, Nihon no Nan'yō shikan* (Chikura Shobō, 2009), 38–43.

53. Matsukawa Shunji, "Nanshi Nan'yō ni okeru Hōjin no jōkyō," *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi* 9, no. 4 (April 1921): 88–91.

54. Siam's 1855 unequal treaty with Britain later applied to the other Euro-American powers and Japan. They were repealed by the British in 1938. Hong Lysa, "Extraterritoriality in Bangkok in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn, 1868–1910: The Cacophonies of Semi-Colonial Cosmopolitanism," *Itinerario* 27, no. 2 (2003): 125–26.

55. Kawashima Shin, "Sōchi toshite no 'Taiwan' to Nihonjin no gaien," *Nihon Taiwangaku Kaihō*, no. 1 (May 1999): 43–44.

56. On examples of ethnic Chinese with European subjecthood who posed challenges to the Siamese police, see Lysa, "Extraterritoriality in Bangkok," 129–35.

57. Kawashima, "Sōchi toshite no 'Taiwan,'" 43–46.

58. Kawashima, "Sōchi toshite no 'Taiwan,'" 45–49.

59. "Jian Ji zaiseki no umu ni kanshi naimuchōkan ni kaitō," January 1901, file 4644–22, TGGA.

60. "Moto Taiwanjin Gao Kuishi hennyū ganshutsu no ken," May 1905, *Naigai kika kankei zakken*, vol. 2, file 3–8–7–5, JFMA.

61. "Zai Banko-fu Gao Kuishi naru mono no kokuseki hennyūgan funinka no ken," May 1907, file 5026–1, 15–16, TGGA.

62. "Zai Banko-fu Gao Kuishi naru mono no kokuseki hennyūgan funinka no ken," 35.

63. Manila Deputy Vice-Consul Sugimura Tsunezo to Foreign Minister Count Komura Jutarō, "Taiwan sekimin oyobi Chōsenjin no gaikoku ni okeru taigūken kaihō no ken," July 7, 1911, *Zaigai Chōsenjin oyobi Taiwan sekimin no taigū furitorishirabe ikken*, file 3–8–6–30, JFMA.

64. Richard Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila: Family, Identity, and Culture, 1860s–1930s* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 285–86.

65. The majority of Japanese migrants in Davao came from Okinawa Prefecture. Hayase Shinzō, "The Japanese Residents of 'Dabao-kuo,'" in *The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction*, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 251–53; Lydia N. Yu-Jose, *Japan Views the Philippines, 1900–44* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 88.

66. Wu Wen-hsing [Wu Wenxing], Hirose Yoshihiro, Huang Shao-min [Huang Shaomin], Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], Chiu Chun-hui [Qiu Chunhiu], ed., *Taiwan zongdufu Tian Jianzhilang riji*, vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2001), 50; Wu Wen-hsing [Wu Wenxing], Hirose Yoshihiro, Huang Shao-min [Huang Shaomin], Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], Chiu Chun-hui [Qiu Chunhiu], ed. *Taiwan zongdufu Tian Jianzhilang riji*, vol. 2, 152.

67. Tomio Matsuoka to American Consulate, Taihoku, Taiwan, "Declaration of Alien About to Depart for the United States," March 5, 1918, and Visa Granted (No. 78) to Tomio Matsuoka by American Consulate, Taihoku, Taiwan, May 14, 1919, Formosa Consular Posts, vols. 100, 103. RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

68. "Taiwanjin no Beiryō Manira jōriku kyozetsu no ken kaku chōchō e tsūchō," January 1902, file 4675–11, 223–35, TGGA.

69. H. B. McCoy, Insular Collector of Customs, to Japanese Consul in Manila, June 21, 1911, *Zaigai Chōsenjin oyobi Taiwan sekimin no taigū furitorishirabe ikken*, file 3–8–6–30, JFMA.

70. McCoy to Japanese Consul in Manila, June 21, 1911.

71. US Consul James W. Davidson, Tamsui, to Chief of Foreign Section, Formosan Government, "Chinese certificates for Chinese visiting America or Philippines," May 9, 1900, Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vol. 7, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

72. US Vice Consul Charles S. Reed II, "Transmission of Precis in the matter of a Section Six Certificate issued to Mr. Li Kin-san [Li Jinzao], a traveler proceeding to the Philippines Islands," July 7, 1932, Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vol. 146, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

73. American Consulate, Taihoku, Taiwan, Japan, "Precis: In the matter of the application of I Hon-si [Yu Fengshi] for the visa of a Chinese 'Section Six' Certificate," Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vol. 114, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

74. See cases in Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vols. 91, 97, 101, 103, 107, 123, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

75. For examples of Taiwanese who failed to establish their status as merchants, see cases in Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vols. 7, 47, 114, 135, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

76. American Consul C. De Vault, Taipei, to V. Aldanese, Insular Collector of Customs, Manila, September 9, 1926, Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vol. 127, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

77. V. Aldanese, Insular Collector of Customs, reply to American Consul Taipei, June 24, 1929, Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vol. 135, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

78. American Consulate, Tansui, Taiwan, Japan, "Precis: In the matter of the application of Chin Tsu Bung [Zhou Ziwen] for visa of Chinese certificate to go to the Philippines under Section Six," September 5, 1931, Taipei (Taihoku), Formosa Consular Posts, vol. 91, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NARA.

79. For a list of prominent Taiwanese individuals in the Philippines, see Kanan Ginkō, *Firipin ni okeru Taiwan sekimin ni kansuru chōsa* (Taipei: Kanan Ginkō, 1941).

80. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], *Rizhi shiqi zai Nanyang de Taiwanren* (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2020), 2.

81. Mihalapoulos, "Making of Prostitutes," 42–45.

82. Under the 1855 Dutch East Indies racialized legal system, "Natives" consisted of Malays, Buginese, and Javanese, while "Foreign Asians" included the Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Japanese. Nurfadzilah Yahaya, *Fluid Jurisdictions: Colonial Law and Arabs in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), chap. 3.

83. Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 128–39.

84. Peter Post, "Chinese Business Networks and Japanese Capital in South East Asia, 1880–1940: Some Preliminary Observations," in *Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia*, ed. Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown (London: Routledge, 1995), 155.

85. "Taiwanjin nyūkoku kyojū ni kansuruken (zai Batabia Someya ryōji hōkoku gaimu jikan yori ichō)," January 1910, file 1733–8, 120–23, TGGA.

86. Takekoshi Yosaburō, *Nangokuki* (Niyūsha, 1910), 179.

87. Takekoshi, *Nangokuki*, 179–81.

88. Singapore Consul Suzuki Eisaku to Foreign Minister Count Komura Jutarō, "Ranryō Indo Shotō ni okeru Wagyō kanken taido ni kanshi hōkoku no ken," November 25, 1908, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

89. Man-houng Lin, "Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk (1895–1935)," *Modern Asian Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 2001): 985–87; Post, "Chinese Business Networks," 164.

90. "Hontōjin nishite Ranryō Jaba e tokō suru mono, kaigai ryoken shōmei kata no ken," June 1901, file 619–3, 1–6, TGGA.

91. "Kokuji dai hyaku yonjū-ichi gō Ranryō Indo no tokō suru Taiwanjin no ryoken ni Rankoku ryōji no sashō o yōsezaru ken (Takushokukyoku sono hoka)," November 1910, file 1625–2, 57–62, TGGA.

92. Acting 1st Government Secretary Kindermann to the Japanese Consul in Batavia, "List of Japanese to whom since 1st. April 1912 the admittance in Netherlands India has been refused in Java & Madura," October 2, 1915, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

93. "Taiwanjin nyūkoku kyojū ni kansuruken (zai Batabia Someya ryōji hōkoku gaimu jikan yori ichō)," January 1910, file 1733–8, 121–22, TGGA.

94. "Kangai go ni," January 1914, file 5741–9, 91–100, TGGA.

95. Batavia Consul Ukita Kōji to Foreign Minister Count Makino Nobuaki, "Taiwan sekimin ni kansuru ken," June 7, 1913, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

96. Batavia Consul Ukita Kōji to Foreign Minister Count Makino Nobuaki, "Taiwan sekimin ni kansuru ken," June 7, 1913.

97. Huei-Ying Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires: Chinese Business and Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914–1941* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 66; Foreign Minister to Batavia consul Someya Seishō, "Taiwanjin nyūkoku tetsuzuki ni kanshi kaikun no ken," December 16, 1909, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

98. Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949," *Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): 306–37; Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland*; Shu-mei Shih, "The Concept of the Sinophone," *PMLA* 126, no. 3 (May 2011): 709–18; Brian Bernards, *Writing the South Seas: Imagining the Nanyang in Chinese and Southeast Asian Postcolonial Literature* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015).

99. Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires*, 35–40; Kuhn, *Chinese among Others*, 28–41.

100. Foreign Minister to Batavia Consul Someya Seishō, "Taiwanjin nyūkoku tetsuzuki ni kanshi kaikun no ken," December 16, 1909, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

101. Batavia Consul Ukita Kōji to Foreign Minister Count Makino Nobuaki, "Taiwan sekimin ni kansuru ken," June 7, 1913, *Ranryō Indo ni okeru dōchi kanken Honpōjin toriatsukafuru zakken, fu Taiwan sekimin moto Shinjin toriatsukau narabi ryoken hakkyū ni kansuru ken*, file 3–8–6–254, JFMA.

102. Guo Chunyang handled about one-third of all Taiwanese Baozhong tea (a type of flower tea such as jasmine) to Southeast Asia. Kawarabayashi Naoto, *Kindai Ajia to Taiwan: Taiwan chagyō no rekishiteki tenkai* (Kyoto: Sekai Shisōsha, 2003), 20, 69–71, 79–82.

103. Lin, "Overseas Chinese Merchants," 985–93; Post, "Chinese Business Networks," 164–65; Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires*, 82–83, 97.

104. Kawarabayashi, *Kindai Ajia to Taiwan*, 70–72, 83, 120–25; Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires,* 183.

105. For instance, Tsutsumibayashi lectured at Ōba Jōtarō's middle school on Java in 1914. Upon graduating in 1917, Ōba and thirteen other classmates went to work for Tsutsumibayashi's company. Jagatara Tomo no Kai, *Jagatara kanwa: Ran'in jidai Hōjin no sokuseki* (Jagatara Tomo no Kai, 1978), 64; Yano, *"Nanshin" no Keifu*, 38–43.

106. Guo Chunyang, "Nan'yō bōeki to Kakyō," *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi* 5, no. 5 (May 1919): 41–43.

107. Lin Xiongzheng, "Jaba tōgyō ichibetsu," *Tōgyō* 64 (January 1919): 15.

108. Justin Adam Schneider, "The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1900–1936," in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Münich: Iudicium, 1998), 174–75; Hisasue Ryōichi, "The Establishment of the China and Southern Bank and the Southern Warehouse Company: In relation to the Bank of Taiwan's Southward Strategy with Overseas Chinese from the 1910s to the 1920s," *IDE Discussion Papers*, no. 688 (February 2018): 7–9.

109. Lin Xiongzheng, "Taiwan Nanshi Nan'yō to no keizaiteki renraku o shuchō suru," in *Taiwan keizai seisakuron*, ed. Kuboshima Ryūkichi (Taipei: Taiwan no Keizaisha, 1920), 20–22. Between 1919 and 1921, branch offices were opened in Guangzhou, Java, Singapore, Indochina, and Burma. Schneider, "Taiwan Government-General," 172–75; Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires*, 96.

110. Tsutsumibayashi Kazue, "Gojin no tai Nan'yō hōshin" *TJ* (May 1926): 45–60.

111. Lin Xiongzheng, "Nanhua Nanyang jingji zhuangkuang," *Taiwan no Chagyō* 11, no. 7 (November 1927): 30.

112. Several Bank of Taiwan branches in Southeast Asia also closed during this time. Schneider, "Taiwan Government-General," 175.

113. Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires*, 89.

114. On Taiwanese hiding their Japanese nationality and blending in with overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, see Ōta Shūkichi, "Taiwan sekimin no Nan'yō ni okeru katsudō jōkyō," in *Taiwan keizai nenpō (Shōwa 17-nen ban)*, ed. Taiwan Keizai Nenpō Kankōkai (Kokusai Nihon Kyōkai, 1942), 671–94.

115. Miyakawa Jirō, *Nan'yō no hai-Nichi undō* (Takushoku Tsūshinsha, 1928), 25–27; Kuhn, *Chinese among Others*, 272.

116. "Bankoku Saigon hōmen yushutsu funō," *Taiwan no Chagyō*, 12, no. 4 (July 1928): 24; "Nan'yō no haika o yūryo," *Taiwan no Chagyō* 13, no. 1 (January 1929): 28.

117. Huei-Ying Kuo has noted that anti-Japanese boycotts in Singapore were not completely effective as the Government-General redirected its tea trade routes to Shantou, where tea was repacked as "Chinese tea" before being shipping to Southeast Asia. Many Singaporean Chinese were said to have also participated in the Japanese-Taiwanese trade during the 1930s. Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires*, 183–84, 227–32.

118. "Cai Tianzhu Chūka Minkoku nanbu chihō narabi Nan'yō ni okeru chagyō chōsa ni kansuru jimu o shokutakusu, hōkyū, kinmu," July 1932, file 10234–16, TGGA.

119. Chen Tianlai, "Hōshucha no dakaisaku (shin hanro o kaitaku seyo), *Taiwan no Chagyō* 15, no. 1 (December 1932): 1–2. In the 1920s, Chen succeeded Guo Chunyang as the leading Taiwanese merchant of the Baozhong tea trade. Kawarabayashi, *Kindai Ajia to Taiwan*, 81.

120. Man-houng Lin, "The Power of Culture and Its Limits: Taiwanese Merchants' Asian Commodity Flows, 1895–1945," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 322.

121. Tsukui Seiichirō, "Nan'yō Nanshi no michi," *Osaka Asahi Shinbun*, April 16, 1926.

122. Ide Kiwata, *Shina minzoku no Nanpō hattenshi* (Tōei Shoin, 1943), 371; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 66.

123. Fengkui Bian, *Riju shiqi Taiwan jimin zai Dalu ji Dongnanya huodong zhi yanjiu* (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2006), 221–23; Kikuchi Kazutaka, *Sensō to Kakyō: Nihon, Kokumin Seifu Kōkan, Kairai seiken, Kakyōkan no seiji rikigaku* (Kyūko Shoin, 2011), 271–72.

124. Kawarabayashi, *Kindai Ajia to Taiwan*, 82, 102–108, 127.

125. Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Gaijika, *Nan'yō ni taisuru Nihon no keizaiteki shinshutsu* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Gaijika, 1935), 16–20.

126. On Japan's "Fundamental Principles of National Policy" (August 1936), see Mark R. Peattie, "Nanshin: The 'Southward Advance,' 1931–1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 215; Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 44.

4. Mobilizing for War

1. "Takasago" was the seventeenth-century geographical term in Japanese previously used to refer to Taiwan. George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895–1945* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1974), 165.

2. On Austronesians as the first inhabitants of Taiwan and their common ancestry to indigenous peoples across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, see Peter Bellwood, "Formosan Prehistory and Austronesian Dispersal," in *Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, and Prehistory*, ed. David Blundell (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 2001), 337–65.

3. *Hokushi Jihen o tōshite mitaru hontōjin no kōminka no teido* (September 1937), reprinted in Haruyama Meitetsu, ed., *Taiwan Tōnai Jōhō, hontōjin no dōkō* (Fuji Shuppan, 1990), 111–12.

4. By contrast, a total of more than 360,000 Korean servicemen (150,000 military assistants and 214,000 soldiers) served in the Japanese military from 1938 to 1945. Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 18–19; Chen Yingchen, "Imperial Army Betrayed," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 182.

5. For example, see Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), chap. 3; Wan-yao Chou, "The *Kōminka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 48–55; Chen, "Imperial Army Betrayed," 181; Sayaka Chatani, *Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan and Its Colonies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 4–5.

6. "Yakkai na sekimin Xie Chunmu Shanhai ni sōkan," *TNS*, July 17, 1936; Ho I-lin [He Yilin], *Kuayue guojingxian: jindai Taiwan qu zhiminhua zhi lichen* (Banqiao: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2006), 29–30.

7. Ho I-lin [He Yilin], "Taiwan chishikijin no kunō: Tōa Kyōei Kyōkai kara Dai Ajia Kyōkai Taichū Shibu e," in *Shōwa Ajia shugi no jitsuzō: Teikoku Nihon to Taiwan, "Nan'yō," "Minami Shina,"* ed. Matsuura Masataka (Minerva Shobō, 2007), 297–305.

8. British Consulate, Tamsui, Formosa, to Sir Robert Clive, British Embassy, Tokyo, "Annual Report for Formosa for 1936," January 17, 1937, FO 228/3281, NAUK.

9. British Acting Consul, Tamsui, Formosa, to Sir Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador, Tokyo, May 11, 1938, FO 262/1970, NAUK.

10. *Taiwan Tōnai Jōhō*, no. 1 (January 1937), reprinted in Haruyama, *Taiwan Tōnai Jōhō*, 2, 7.

11. Chou, "*Kōminka* Movement," 50–51.

12. On prewar indigenous Taiwanese, including those who took advantage of their ethnoracial difference and intermediary status, see Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874–1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017); Kirsten L. Ziomek, *Lost Histories: Recovering the Lives of Japan's Colonial Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019), chap. 5.

13. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese,"* 136–68; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 262–64.

14. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Takasagozoku no kyōiku* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1941), 1–2; Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 283–305.

15. Chih-Huei Huang, "Ethnic Diversity, Two-Layered Colonization and Modern Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan," in *Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, ed. Andrew D. Morris (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 145.

16. "Kentō no sojō e (1–3)," *TNS*, October 1–3, 1936.

17. "Minfū sakkō o mezashi daikyōgikai hirakaru: Nakagawa sōtoku rinjō no shita ni netsuretsu na iken toro," *TNS*, July 26, 1936.

18. On the impact of *kōminka* on Taiwanese religious life, see Evan N. Dawley, *Becoming Taiwanese: Ethnogenesis in a Colonial City, 1880s–1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019), chap. 4.

19. Chou, "*Kōminka* Movement," 45–46.

20. By 1936, less than one-tenth of Taiwanese primary schools even offered literary Chinese. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 111. By contrast, the Korean language was downgraded to an optional course in Korea in 1938 and then removed from the curriculum altogether in 1941. Chou, "*Kōminka* Movement," 49.

21. Ho, "Taiwan chishikijin," 303.

22. British Consulate, Tamsui, Formosa, to J. L. Dodds, Tokyo, "Political Report on Formosa for June Quarter, 1937," June 26, 1937, FO 262/1961, NAUK.

23. Taiwan Army Commander Hata Shunroku to Army Vice-Minister Umezu Yoshijirō, "Taiwan yoron ni kansuru ken tsūchō," July 27, 1937, *Rikugunshō mitsu dainikki*, file S12–12–22, JMD: JACAR Ref. C01004393000.

24. Taiwan Army Commander Hata Shunroku to Army Vice-Minister Umezu Yoshijirō, "Taiwan yoron ni kansuru ken tsūchō," July 27, 1937.

25. D. F. MacDermot, Acting British Consul, Tamsui, to Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador, Tokyo, "Political Report on Formosa: November, 1937," January 8, 1938, FO262/1961, NAUK.

26. "Japan Broadcasting Association, Inc., *1940 Radio Yearbook*, Tokyo, January 10, 1940," George H. Kerr Papers, Box 4, Folder 7, Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

27. Ho, *Kuayue guojingxian*, 107, 127.

28. Iwaki Ami, *Shina Jihen no shinsō to Taiwan no tachiba* (Taipei: Taiwan Jiji Shinpōsha, 1937), 12.

29. During the same period, the number of Japanese households in Taiwan with licensed radios increased from 31,500 to over 55,000 (though the household percentage declined from 72 percent to 55 percent). Chien-jung Hsu, *The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan's Media, 1896–2012* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 21–22.

30. Kerr, *Formosa*, 184.

31. Japan's Foreign Ministry provided ¥50 to each Taiwanese family head and an additional ¥10–20 per family member. "Amoi e no fukkihi ni jūichiman yen o kafu: Gaimushō to sesshō no Fu, Chen, ryōshi ki-Tai," *TNS*, February 11, 1938.

32. "Xiamenshi RiTairen chetui hui Tai qingxing," *Jiangshengbao*, August 26, 1937, reprinted in *MTGDZ*, 80–81, 85. Government-General statistics estimate that the total Taiwanese population in South China declined from 12,805 in July 1937 to 3,999 by October 1938. Tanaka Ichiji, *Kūbakuka no Minami Shina* (Taipei: Dai Nihon Kokubō Seinenkai Taiwan Sōshibu, 1938), 9–10, 18.

33. "Shina no bōjō wa Taiwan dewa sōzōgai: Amoi kara no hikiagemindan," *TNS*, August 27, 1937; "Okuchi zairyū sekimin no seimei wa sude ni zetsubō ka: Amoi Shinagun no bōgyaku," *TNS*, August 28, 1937.

34. Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Nanshi ni okeru dōhō no katsuyaku to Shina Jihen (1)," *Buhō*, no. 3 (October 1, 1937): 1–20; Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Nanshi ni okeru dōhō no katsuyaku to Shina Jihen (2)," *Buhō*, no. 4 (October 11, 1937), 11–22, reprinted in Katō Kiyofumi and Yagashiro Hideyoshi, ed., *Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu "Buhō,"* vol. 1 (Yumani Shobō, 2005), 79–98, 124–31.

35. "Otto wa kankan no gisei: shiji o tsure hikiagu Amoi kara nogareta sekimin josei," *TNS*, June 22, 1938.

36. "Amoi e no fukkihi ni jūichiman yen o kafu: Gaimushō to sesshō no Fu, Chen, ryōshi ki-Tai," *TNS*, February 11, 1938. Subsequent Japanese and Taiwanese testimonies

on the damages to Xiamen Kyokuei Academy were published in Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Shina Jihen to Kyokuei Shoin* (Taipei: Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, 1940), 29–34, 62, 108.

37. Nantian (pseud.), "Taiwanren zai Fujian," *Guoben* 1, no. 4 (1937): 64–65.

38. "Xiamen de Riji langren," *MTGDZ*, 70.

39. "'Kankan' de Taiwanjin gyakusatsu osoroshiki machi Amoi: urami tokoshi, Hōjin hikiage saigo no hi," *Asahi Shinbun*, May 12, 1938; Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Nanshi ni okeru dōhō no katsuyaku to Shina Jihen (1)," *Buhō*, no. 3 (October 1, 1937): 18–19; Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Shina no Hōjin hakugai to Shinajin e no waga onjō," *Buhō*, no. 6 (November 1, 1937): 18–22, reprinted in Katō and Yagashiro, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu "Buhō,"* vol. 1, 96–97, 210–14.

40. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 450–52; Huang Junling, *Kangzhan shiqi Fujian Chonganxian de Taiwan jimin: xintaishi shiye xia de kaocha* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010).

41. "Taimin huifu guoji banfa," *Jiangshengbao*, September 29, 1937, reprinted in Xiamenshi dang'anju and Xiamenshi dang'anguan, ed., *Jindai Xiamen shewai dang'an shiliao* (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1997), 171. The Xiamen Municipal Archives contain additional cases of Taiwanese who applied to regain their Chinese nationality in fall of 1937. See *Xiamenshi minzhengju*, file A10–1–101, XMA.

42. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 450–52.

43. Ho, *Kuayue guojingxian*, 30–33.

44. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 457–69; Chen Xiaochong, *Riju shiqi Taiwan yu dalu guanxishi yanjiu (1895–1945)* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2013), chap. 5.

45. In postwar Taiwan, Taiwanese who had worked in China for the GMD came to be called the "Half-Mountain People" (C. banshanren). J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937–1945: The Origins of Taiwan's 'Half-Mountain People' (Banshan Ren)," *Modern China* 16, no. 2 (January 1990): 84–118; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 493–518.

46. Liang Hua-huang [Liang Huahuang], *Taiwan zongdufu de "duian" zhengce yanjiu*: *Riju shidai TaiMin guanxi shi* (Daoxiang, 2001), 206–07.

47. "Conscription in Formosa" (May 1942), Extract from Postal & Telegraph Censorship, The Far East, Japanese Activities, WO 208/1362, NAUK.

48. Shi-chi Mike Lan, "Changing Relations: China and Taiwan, 1931–1947" (PhD. diss., University of Chicago, 2004), 122.

49. Lan, "Changing Relations: China and Taiwan, 1931–1947," 130–36.

50. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 18–19. On the Musha Incident, see Ching, *Becoming "Japanese,"* chap. 4.

51. Taiwangun Sanbōbu, *Hokushi Jihen o tōshite mitaru hontōjin no kōminka no teido* (September 1937); Taiwangun Sanbōbu, *Shina Jihen to hontōjin no dōkō*, no. 1 (October 1937), reprinted in Haruyama, *Taiwan Tōnai Jōhō*, 112, 122, 131.

52. See Leo Ching's comparison of wartime *kōminka* (which he translates as "imperialization") and prewar *dōka* ("assimilation"). Ching, *Becoming "Japanese,"* chap. 3.

53. Brandon Palmer, *Fighting for the Enemy: Koreans in Japan's War, 1937–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), 29–40; Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 4–5, 18–21.

54. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 354.

55. Takeuchi Kiyoshi, *Jihen to Taiwanjin* (Taipei: Taiwan Shinminpōsha, 1940), 68–70; Shirayanagi Hiroyuki, "Taiwan kokumin gakkōki shūshin kyōkasho kyōzai 'Kokoro

o hitotsuni' ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu: 'Homare no gunpu' no shūshin kyōkasho kyōzai saiyō keika," in *Teikoku Nihon no tenkai to Taiwan*, ed. Hiyama Yukio (Sōsendō Shuppan, 2011), 174–91; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 360. On the Government-General's use of Japanese films to educate and assimilate the Taiwanese population, see Michael Baskett, *The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 13–20.

56. Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Hontō seinen jūgun tsūyaku toshite seisen ni sanka," *Buhō,* no. 52 (February 11, 1939): 11–37, reprinted in Katō and Yagashiro, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhobu "Buhō,"* vol. 5, 155–81.

57. Shirai Asakichi and Ema Tsunekichi, *Kōminka undo* (Taipei: Taihoku Higashi Taiwan Shinpōsha Taihoku Shikyoku, 1939), 333–37; Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Jikyokuka no Taiwan," *Buhō*, no. 4 (October 11, 1937): 5–9, reprinted in Katō and Yagashiro, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu "Buhō,"* vol. 1, 119–23; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 305–306.

58. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese,"* 161–68; Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire*, 156.

59. Hayashi Eidai, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2000), 166, 171–75.

60. Chou, "*Kōminka* Movement," 65–67; Chatani, *Nation-Empire*, 150–67, 174, 204.

61. Kikuchi Kazutaka, *Nihongun gerira, Taiwan Takasago Giyūtai: Taiwan genjūmin no Taiheiyō Sensō* (Heibonsha, 2018), 68.

62. Chih-Huei Huang, "The Yamatodamashi of the Takasago Volunteers of Taiwan: A Reading of the Postcolonial Situation," in *Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America*, ed. Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis (London: Routledge, 2003), 230.

63. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 353–54; Chatani, *Nation-Empire*, 172.

64. For example, Warisu Piho (b. 1920, Yonekawa Nobuo, Atayal tribe) recounted that he was ordered by colonial police to sign up for military service. Several indigenous Taiwanese who willingly volunteered were never told in advance by Japanese officials that they would be sent to the war front. Kikuchi, *Nihongun gerira*, 50–51; Chou Wan-yao [Zhou Wanyao], ed., *Taiji Ribenbing zuotanhui jilu bing xiangguan ziliao* (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1997), 14–18; Ts'ai Hui-yu [Cai Huiyu] and Wu Ling-ching [Wu Lingqing], ed., *Zouguo liangge shidai de ren: Taiji Ribenbing*, 2nd ed. (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2008), 160–161, 292.

65. Chatani, *Nation-Empire*, 233.

66. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo koushu lishi bianji weiyuanhui, ed., *Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu dalu jingyan*, vol. 1 (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1994–95), 87–92; Minghuang Shao, "Taiwan in Wartime," in *China at War: Regions of China, 1937–1945*, ed. Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary, and Ezra F. Vogel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 99.

67. Hayashi, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi*, 99, 105.

68. Ōya Wataru, *Kangofutachi no Nanpō sensen: teikoku no rakujitsu o seotte* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2011), 187.

69. Aya Takahashi, *The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession: Adopting and Adapting Western Influences* (London: Routledge, 2011), 1–13.

70. On the wartime education of Taiwanese schoolgirls, see Fang Yu Hu, "Gender, Colonialism, and Education in Taiwan: Schoolgirls on the Home Front during the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945," *Twentieth-Century China* 43, no. 3 (October 2018): 232–50.

71. Chen Huimei, *Taiwanjin jūgun kangofu tsuisōki: sumire no hana ga saita koro: Nittai gassaku* (Tendensha, 2001), 29.

72. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 350–51.

73. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 355.

74. Chen, *Taiwanjin jūgun kangofu*, 13–17.

75. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 481.

76. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 496–97; Chou, *Taiji Ribenbing*, 294.

77. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 499–500.

78. Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 44; Palmer, *Fighting for the Enemy*, 43–50.

79. Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 307–27; Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 42–43.

80. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 195–206; Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 22, 54–55.

81. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 380; Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 37.

82. Chou has cited the following reasons for the lower ratio of "national language speakers" in wartime Korea: a higher illiteracy rate to start with (in 1930, 78 percent of Koreans read neither Korean nor Japanese); it had four times the population of Taiwan; and its colonization by Japan was fifteen years later than Taiwan. Chou, "*Kōminka* Movement," 52–54.

5. Colonial Liaisons in Occupied South China

1. Since the 1910s, the Government-General had amassed surveys of Hainan's topography and potential natural resources. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Shokumin to saishokumin: Nihon tōchi jidai Taiwan to Kainantō no kankei ni tsuite," in *Shōwa Ajia shugi no jitsuzō: Teikoku Nihon to Taiwan, 'Nan'yō,' 'Minami Shina,'* ed. Matsuura Masataka (Minerva Shobō, 2007), 314–15.

2. Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 78; Matsumoto Shun'ichi and Andō Yoshirō, ed., *Nanshin mondai* (Kajima Kenkyūjo Shuppankai, 1973), 18–19; Stein Tønnesson, "The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline," *Modern Asian Studies* 40, no. 1 (March 2006): 9, 11.

3. Navy Commander Yokoyama Ichirō, "Kainantō ni tsuite," November 12, 1938, file jō–122, JFMA: JACAR, Ref. B02130983200; Katō Kyōhei, "Nanshi kaihatsu ni kansuru Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha no kibō," January 1938, *Honpō kaisha kankei zakken, Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha*, vol. 1, file E–2–2–1–3–10, JFMA; Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 112.

4. Edward J. Drea and Hans Van de Ven, "An Overview of Major Military Campaigns during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945," in *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945*, ed. Mark R. Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans Van de Ven (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 27–28.

5. On the Nanjing Massacre from December 1937 to January 1938, see Takashi Yoshida, *The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

6. Drea and Van de Ven, "Major Military Campaigns," 28–33.

7. Franco David Macri, *Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations' Proxy War with Japan, 1935–1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 44–48.

8. R. T. Phillips, "The Japanese Occupation of Hainan," *Modern Asian Studies* 14, no. 1 (February 1980): 94–96.

9. Japanese personnel from Manchukuo were brought in to conduct surveys, build infrastructure, and help govern North and Central China. See, for example, Aaron Stephen Moore, *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 80, 111–17; Kelly A. Hammond, *China's Muslims and Japan's Empire: Centering Islam in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 52–53; Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 34–35, 39, 57.

10. Parks M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 45–47, 62; Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh, introduction to *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation*, ed. Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9–10.

11. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō ni tomonau tai Nanpō shisaku jōkyō* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1943), 6–7, 13–15; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 112; Justin Adam Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1998), 237; Chung, "Shokumin to saishokumin," 317.

12. Taiwan Sōtokufu, "Kainantō shori hōshin" (1938), reprinted in Tsunoda Jun, ed. *Nitchū Sensō,* vol. 10, bk. 3 of *Gendaishi shiryō* (Misuzu Shobō, 1963), 453–54; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 239; Chung, "Shokumin to saishokumin," 321.

13. Honjō Hisako, "Kanan ni okeru chōsa," in *Kōain to senji Chūgoku chōsa*, ed. Honjō Hisako, Uchiyama Masao, and Kubo Tōru (Iwanami Shoten), 106–07.

14. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 115–16.

15. Toru Kubo, "The Koa-in," in *China at War: Regions of China, 1937–1945*, ed. Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary, and Ezra F. Vogel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 44–46.

16. Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 195–203.

17. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 115–16.

18. Taiwan Government-General Foreign Affairs Division Head Katō Saburō to Foreign Minister Konoe Fumimaro, "Sōmu Chōkan yori Gaimu Jikan e," October 11, 1938, *Tai Shi chūō kikan setchi mondai ikken (Kōain*), file A–1–1–0–31, JFMA: JACAR, Ref. B02030685400; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 127–28.

19. Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro to Army Minister Itagaki Seishirō, "Kōain setchi ni tomonai dōin to kankei kakuchō to no aida ni jimu bunkai no ken," December 12, 1938, *Rikugunshō dainikki kōshū*, file S13–10–33, JMDA: JACAR, Ref. C01001669200.

20. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 122.

21. Honjō, "Kanan ni okeru chōsa," 106; Wang Chi-ming [Wang Qimin], "Nitchū Sensōki ni okeru Taiwan Sōtokufu no senryōchi kyōryoku ni tsuite: Amoi o chūshin ni," *Hōsei Seijigaku Ronkyū: Hōritsu, Seiji, Shakai*, no. 100 (March 2014): 201.

22. Zhang Maoji, *Shinsei Amoi genkyō* (Amoi, [n.l.], 1944), 20; Minami Shina Kenkyūjo, *Minami Shina nenkan* (Taipei: Taiwan Jitsugyō Gaisha, 1939), 17–18; Man-houng Lin, "The 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere': A New Boundary for Taiwanese People and the Taiwanese Capital, 1940–45," *Translocal Chinese: East Asian Perspectives* 10, no. 2 (October 2016): 177.

23. After the war, the GMD sentenced Lin to fifteen years in prison as a "traitor of the Han" (C. *hanjian*), *MTHZJ*, 117.

24. On wartime Shanghai, see Henriot and Yeh, *Shadow of the Rising Sun*; Wen-hsin Yeh, ed., *Wartime Shanghai* (London: Routledge, 1998). On wartime Tianjin, see Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), chap. 9; Kobayashi Motohiro, *Kindai Chūgoku no Nihon kyoryūmin to ahen* (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012), chaps. 4–5.

25. Liu Tianci, *Xiamen zhiyuanlu* (Xiamen: Xiamen zhiyuanlu faxingsuo, 1942), 11–44; *MTGDZ*, 395–98; Wang, "Nitchū Sensōki," 205.

26. "Chōsaban ya keisatsukan nado o Taiwan yori Amoi ni haken," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 17, 1938; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 74–77, 91–93.

27. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 102–06; Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Nanshi ni okeru dōhō no katsuyaku to Shina Jihen," *Buhō*, no. 94 (April 11, 1940): 7, reprinted in Katō and Yagashiro, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu "Buhō,"* vol. 8, 349.

28. Honjō, "Kanan ni okeru chōsa," 107; *MTHZJ*, 88–89, 97.

29. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Nanshi hōmen shihō jimu shisatsu hōkoku* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1944), 187–88; Zhang, *Shinsei Amoi genkyō*, 49; Asia Development Board Commissioned Official and Municipal Government Advisor Obata Yūjirō, "Amoi hōin no jōkyō oyobi shōrai ni tsuite," March 1940, *Shina ni okeru saibanki kankei zakken, Amoi Kaishin Gamon kankei*, file D–1–1–2–2–1, JFMA.

30. Zhang, *Shinsei Amoi genkyō*, 54.

31. Kitahara Kimio, Matsuda Fukunobu, Ishii Gonzō, and Kurasawa Masao, *Kōa kyōiku kensetsu no kōsatsu to jissai* (Taipei: Zai Chūka Minkoku Fukushū Tōei Gakkō, 1941), 242–50; Matsunaga Kenya, *Nanshi senzen kyōiku jūgunki* (Shōwa Shobō, 1940), 7; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 9–10, 178–180.

32. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 123, 180.

33. The Co-Prosperity Association's Xiamen branch consisted of 115 Taiwanese and 109 Japanese members. The Association would later extend its branches and language centers to Guangzhou, Shantou, Foshan, Chaozhou, and Haikou. Yang Dicui, *Xin Xiamen zhinan* (Xiamen: Huanan Xinribaoshe, 1941), 125, 135.

34. Kitahara, Matsuda, Ishii, and Kurasawa, *Kōa kyōiku kensetsu*, 250–66; Xiamen tebieshi jiaoyuju, *Di san jie liu Tai xiaoxue xiaozhang jiaoyuan ganxianglu* (Xiamen: Xiamen tebieshi jiaoyuju, 1944); Zhang, *Shinsei Amoi genkyō*, 31, 38, 44, 64; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Nanshi hōmen shihō jimu*, 12, 191.

35. Zhang, *Shinsei Amoi genkyō*, 83.

36. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 233; Chung, "Shokumin to saishokumin," 323.

37. "Chian no jūseki o hatashi: Kainantō haken keisatsutai kaeru," *Kōnan Shinbun*, May 16, 1942; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 10.

38. Ishiyama Kenkichi, *Kikō Manshū, Taiwan, Kainantō* (Nihon Shuppan Haikyū, 1942), 588.

39. Hirakawa Masaru, "Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku Kainantō haken gakutodan hōkokusho," *TJ* (October 1940): 95.

40. Hideshima Tatsuo, *Honkon, Kainantō no kensetsu* (Matsuyamabō, 1942), 182.

41. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 10; "Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō ni taisuru Taiwan Sōtokufu no kyōryoku gaikyō," *Nanshi Nan'yō Jihō*, no. 26 (September 1942): 58–59.

42. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 9; Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Shina Jihen to Kyokuei Shoin*, 73; *MTHZJ*, 72, 112.

43. Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Shina Jihen to Kyokuei Shoin* (Taipei: Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, 1940), 60–61; Kitahara, Matsuda, Ishii, and Kurasawa, *Kōa kyōiku kensetsu*, 242.

44. Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Amoi Kyokuei Shoin yōran* (Amoi: Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, 1918), 13; Amoi Kyoryūminkai, *Amoi Taiwan Kyoryūminkaihō sanjū shūnen*, 278.

45. Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Shina Jihen to Kyokuei Shoin*, 61, 113–16, 119–26; Amoi Kyoryūminkai, *Amoi Taiwan Kyoryūminkai sōritsu sanjūgo shūnen kinenshi* (Amoi: Amoi Kyoryūminkai, 1942), 154.

46. "Xiamen kangoku de hakkagetsu shinginshita ichi sekimin: waga senryō ni yori kisekiteki ni seikan, kōgun tsūyaku toshite tachihataraku," *TNS*, May 23, 1938.

47. Starting in 1928, Xu concurrently served as principal of Xiamen Chinese Primary School. Xiamenshi zhengfu jiaoyuju, "Jiayuju zhiyuan lüli (di yi ce)," 2, *Riwei Xiamen tebieshi zhengfu ji qi suoshu jiguan quanzong huiji*, file A63–1–139, XMA.

48. Xiamenshi zhengfu jiaoyuju, "Jiaoyuju zhiyuan lüli (di yi ce)," 2; *MTHZJ*, 131; *MTGDZ*, 182.

49. Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Shina Jihen to Kyokuei Shoin*, 102–104.

50. Amoi Kyokuei Shoin, *Shina Jihen to Kyokuei Shoin*, 108.

51. Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, "Kaigai jōhō: Hontō seinen jūgun tsūyaku toshite seisen ni sanka," *Buhō*, no. 43 (November 11, 1938): 18, reprinted in Katō and Yagashiro, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu "Buhō,"* vol. 4, 292.

52. Takeuchi Kiyoshi, *Jihen to Taiwanjin* (Taipei: Taiwan Shinminpōsha, 1940), 116.

53. Nakata Toshio, "Hitori no Taiwanjin no nokoshita jūgun kansō kiroku: Nanshi haken butaifu rikugun rinji tsūyaku toshite," *Kokugo Kokubun Gakuhō*, no. 70 (March 2012): 43, 48.

54. "Huang Yibin Nanshi hōmen shinshutsusha yōseikai kōshi o meisu," October 1938, file 10259-5; "Chen Wuren Shōwa jūyonendo dai-nikai Nanshi hōmen shinshutsusha yōsei kōshūkai kōshi o meisu," September 1939, file 10099-78, TGGA.

55. In August 1938, Yamashita was hired by the Taiwan Radio Bureau to administer its Cantonese-language broadcasts. "Kanda Tatsuki Nanshi hōmen shinshutsusha yōseikai kōshūkai kōshi o toku," December 1938, file 10259-86; Huang Yibin Shōwa jūyonendo dai ikkai Nanshi hōmen shinshutsusha yōsei kōshūkai kōshi o meisu," June 1939, file 10098–40, TGGA.

56. Satō lectured on South China's history, peoples, customs, and economies, while Gotō covered topics such as "Japan's Mission in East Asia" and "Sino-Japanese Harmonious Cooperation and Moral Principles in Developing the Empire's South

China Economy." Huang Yibin Shōwa jūyonendo dai ikkai Nanshi hōmen shinshutsusha yōsei kōshūkai kōshi o meisu," June 1939, file 10098–40, TGGA.

57. Chou Wan-yao [Zhou Wanyao], ed., *Taiji Ribenbing zuotanhui jilu bing xiangguan ziliao* (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1997), 241; Hayashi Eidai, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2000), 99–100.

58. Kitahara, Matsuda, Ishii, and Kurasawa, *Kōa kyōiku kensetsu*, 239–241.

59. Wang Jinxiu and Chen Shaozong, *Jitsuyō sokusei Kainango dokuhon* (Taipei: Nikkōdō Shōkai, 1941); Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai, *Kainantōgo kaiwa* (Sanseidō, 1941).

60. Chou, *Taiji Ribenbing*, 26, 175–80, 236.

61. Taiwan Sōtokufu Minami Shina Dan Dai-Niban, "Sensō o taiken suru Minami Shina," *TJ* (December 1941), 78–87.

62. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 74–77.

63. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi Jijō* (August 1938), in "Xiamen shiqing zi di yi bao zhi di 14 bao (1)," file T0868_02_02079_0737, 106, ITHA.

64. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi Jijō* (August 1938), 85, 107.

65. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi Jijō* (June 1938), in "Xiamen shiqing zi di yi bao zhi di 14 bao (1)," file T0868_02_02079_0737, 44, ITHA.

66. Chu Te-lan [Zhu Delan], *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu* (Akashi Shoten, 2005), 85; Zhang, *Shinsei Amoi genkyō*, 64.

67. "Amoitō meirōka: sekimin no fukki gosen mei o toppashi," *TNS*, November 13, 1938; Lin, "'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,'" 184.

68. For a list of prominent Taiwanese businessmen and their companies in Xiamen, see Yang, *Xin Xiamen zhinan*, 60–62.

69. "Fujiansheng zhengfu guanyu Guomindang zhong zhiwei mishu chuhan qing shangshu zhuyi Taiwan zongdufu niwang MinYue daliang yisong Taimin de xunling," August 4, 1939, reprinted in *MTGDZ*, 106–107.

70. "Xiamen lunxian qijian Ri-Tairen qinzhan Xiamen chanye qingkuang," March 20, 1941, reprinted in *MTGDZ*, 150–51; Huang Junling, *Kangzhan shiqi Fujian Chonganxian de Taiwan jimin: xintaishi shiye xia de kaocha* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010), 88–89.

71. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi Shiten* (February 1941), in "Xiamen zhidian (1)," file T0868_02_02075_0654, 97–103, ITHA.

72. By 1941, out of a total of 114 companies in Xiamen, seventy-six were owned by the Taiwanese, twenty-nine by the Japanese, and six by the Chinese. Lin, "'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,'" 181, 194.

73. "The Rape of Amoy Described," *North China Herald*, August 10, 1938.

74. *Huazi ribao*, February 12, 1939, reprinted in *MTGDZ*, 577–78; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 450.

75. *MTHZJ*, 10–11.

76. *Xiamenshi shanghui*, file A34–1–171, XMA. "Sidao ranxilu," *Huazi ribao*, February 12, 1939, reprinted in Xiamenshi difangzhi ban'gongshi and Xiamenshi dang'anguan, ed., *Xiamen kang Ri zhanzheng shiqi ziliao xuanbian*, vol. 1 (Xiamen: Xiamenshi dang'anguan, 1986), 224.

77. Xiamenshi dang'anju, ed., *Jindai Xiamen shehui lueying* (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2000), 39.

78. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (October 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 151, ITHA.

79. *MTGDZ*, 182, 395. For biographical information on prominent Taiwanese merchants and officials in occupied Xiamen, see Xiamenshi zhengfu caizhengju, "Zuheyuan mingbo," *Riwei Xiamen tebieshi zhengfu ji qi suoshu jiguan quanzong huiji*, file A63–1–85, XMA.

80. Lin's son, Lin Chaohui (1918–2019, better known as Shi Ming), went on to become a leading Taiwanese independence activist in postwar Japan. Hsu Hsueh-chi [Xu Xueji], "1937–1947 nian zai Shanghai de Taiwan," *Taiwanxue yanjiu*, no. 13 (August 2012): 13.

81. Wang, "Nitchū sensōki," 205.

82. "Xiamen tebieshi jieyanju zhiyuan qinwu baogaobiao," October 1943, *Riwei Xiamen tebieshi zhengfu ji qi suoshu jiguan quanzong huiji*, file A63–1–19; "Gongmaiju zhiyuan mingcebiao," "Jieyanju zhiyuan mingcebiao," August 30, 1943, *Riwei Xiamen tebieshi zhengfu ji qi suoshu jiguan quanzong huiji*, file A63–1–116, XMA; "Lin Jichuan de chenshushu," July 26, 1946, reprinted in Xiamenshi dang'anju and Xiamenshi dang'anguan, *Xiamen kang Ri zhanzheng dang'an ziliao*, 426–32.

83. *MTHZJ*, 28–29; Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce yu yapian wenti," in *Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Lin Chin-tian [Lin Jintian] (Nantou: Taiwansheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2000), 254.

84. Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 75–76, 136–38; Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People*, trans. Ethan Mark (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 110–11; Kobayashi, *Kindai Chūgoku no Nihon kyoryūmin*, 22–23.

85. Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 42.

86. Zhao Guo-hui [Zhao Guohui], *Xiamen Riji Taimin zhi xisong jiefen* (Taipei: Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2013), 304.

87. Both Shanghai and Gulangyu's international settlements were dominated by British officials and firms until the Pacific War in December 1941. Isabella Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 16–18, 79–80.

88. "Kulangsu Municipal Council, Report for the Year Ending 31st December, 1938, Estimates of Expenditure and Revenue for the Year Ending 31st December, 1939," FO 371/23525, NAUK. By contrast, the much larger Shanghai Municipal Police had a total of 4,879 policemen with 219 Japanese and 962 British Indians. Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai*, 96, 102, 117.

89. "Maruchin Eisōryōji no fushin kō hakkakusu: sekimin taiho narabi ni gyakusatsu ni kanshite wagahō wa dankotaru ketsui," *TNS*, June 14, 1938; "Amoi kōbukyoku no bōjō: Taiwan sekimin gyakusatsu o shiji," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 14, 1938; "Execution of 100 Amoy Formosans Alleged," *North China Herald*, June 22, 1938.

90. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi Jijō* (November 1938), in "Xiamen shiqing zi di yi bao zhi di 14 bao (1)," file T0868_02_02079_0737, 28–30; Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (May, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 362–64, ITHA.

91. Yun Xia, *Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017), 53.

92. "Kulangsu Municipal Council, Report for the Year Ending 31st December, 1938, Estimates of Expenditure and Revenue for the Year Ending 31st December, 1939," FO 371/23525, NAUK.

93. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (May 29, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 246, ITHA.

94. "Amoi Koronsu de kō-Nichi tero ga hasshō su: Kō [Hong] sōshō kaichō sogeki saru," *TNS*, May 20, 1939.

95. Five Chinese suspects would eventually confess to killing Hong based on secret orders from the GMD military. "Suspects Confess Death of Amoy Merchant," *North China Herald*, June 28, 1939; Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (May 29, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 207, ITHA.

96. Interdepartmental Cypher, "Landing of British, American and French forces at Kulangsu," May 19, 1939, FO 371/23524, NAUK.

97. From Ambassador Suemasa Okamoto to R. G. Howe, "Situation in Kulangsu," May 17, 1939, FO 371/23524; "Interdepartmental Cypher," May 25, 1939, FO 371/23 524, NAUK.

98. Copy telegram from Commander-in-Chief, China, "Question of withdrawal of forces from Kulangsu," May 31, 1939, FO 371/23524, NAUK.

99. In 1935, the Japanese representative in the municipal council proposed that one Taiwanese serve as a special committeeman on the council to represent the 450 Taiwanese residents. However, the proposal was rejected by a vote of eighty Westerners to twenty Japanese. "Ratepayers Meet at Kulangsu: Japanese and Council Employment: Nationality Question Raised," *North China Herald*, March 13, 1935.

100. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (August 15, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 48–49, ITHA.

101. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (May 22, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 335, ITHA.

102. "Amoi de Taiwan kyoryūmin jikyoku taikai o hiraku, han-Ei no kisei ōi ni agaru," *TNS*, July 8, 1939; "Amoi Taiwanjin kekki: sanken o yōkyū," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, July 8, 1939; Telegram from Amoy Consul to A. Clark-Kerr (Shanghai Embassy), July 17, 1939, FO 371/23525, NAUK; Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (August 15, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 21–23, ITHA.

103. Uchida also postponed negotiations over the appointment of Chinese representatives in the municipal council. "Kulangsu Dispute Settled: Concessions by Both Sides Bring Five-months' Issue to End; U.S. and Japan Sailors Withdraw," *North China Herald*, October 25, 1939.

104. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi jōhō Koronsu mondai* (December 18, 1939), in "Xiamen qingbao Gulangyu wenti (1)," file T0868_02_02085_0736, 198, ITHA.

105. "Amoy Mayor Threatens Action in Kulangsu shooting," *China Weekly Review*, March 30, 1940; Gulangyu gongbuju, *Gulangyu gongbuju baogaoshu* ([s.l.]: [s.n.], 1940), 19.

106. On Indian policemen in the Shanghai Municipal Police, see Yin Cao, *From Policemen to Revolutionaries: A Sikh Diaspora in Global Shanghai, 1885–1945* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

107. Telegram from Amoy Consul Fitzmaurice to Gulangyu Municipal Council Chairman L. H. Hitchcock, January 20, 1940, FO 371/24663, NAUK.

108. Telegram from Amoy Consul Fitzmaurice to Archibald Clark Kerr (Shanghai Embassy), March 14, 1940, FO 371/24663, NAUK.

109. Taiwan Ginkō Amoi Shiten, *Amoi Shiten* (January 6, 1941), in "Xiamen zhidian (1)," file T0868_02_02075_0654, 454–55, ITHA.

110. Liu, *Xiamen zhiyuanlu*, 169–72.

111. On Gulangyu under Japanese military occupation, see He Qiying, *Gonggong zujie Gulangyu yu jindai Xiamen de fazhan* (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 151–69.

112. Hideshima, *Honkon, Kainantō no kensetsu*, 182.

113. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 253–56; Chung, "Shokumin to saishokumin," 324.

114. "Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō," 58–59. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 228–29; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 271–72.

115. "Kainan Kōundō Kaisha setsuritsu," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 6, 1941; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Shina Jihen Dai Tōa Sensō*, 10, 226–27.

116. Tanaka Chōsaburō, "Kainantō shokubutsu shigen," *TJ* (March 1939): 296–302; Tanaka Chōsaburō, "Kainantō no kagaku tanken," *TJ* (March 1939): 272–79; Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku, *Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku dai-ikkai Kainantō* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1942); Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku, *Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku, dainikai Kainantō* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1944).

117. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 232. On Japanese crossbreeding of Hōrai rice in Taiwan, see Wei Yi Leow, "Horai Rice in the Making of Japanese Colonial Taiwan," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, no. 33 (2019): 32–52.

118. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 251–52.

119. "Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō," 65; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 256.

120. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 253–55; Lin Yu-ju [Lin Yuru], *Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha no Higashi Taiwan keiei: kokusaku-gaisha to shokuminchi no kaizō*, trans. Morita Akira and Asamoto Teruo (Kyūko Shoin, 2012), 75–76, 95, 135.

121. "Nōgyō teishindan o haken: Kainantō no zōsan shidōni," *Kōnan Shinbun*, August 9, 1942; "Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō," 65; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 277–78.

122. "Nōgyō teishindan o haken: Kainantō no zōsan shidōni," *Kōnan Shinbun*, August 9, 1942; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Taiwan no Nanpō kyōryoku ni tsuite* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1943), 73; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 277–78; Chung, "Shokumin to saishokumin," 324.

123. "Kainantō ni okeru hontō seinen no katsuyaku wa mattaku mezashi: ki-Tai shita Koike daigidan," *TNS*, May 13, 1941.

124. "Kainantō no kaihatsu niwa kunrensareta hontōjin seinen o: Tokufu Shakaika Furuta Jimukan no shisatsudan," *TNS*, October 26, 1941; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 279–81.

125. The construction workers were 40 percent Taiwanese, 35 percent Hainan's indigenous peoples, and 25 percent Chinese. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Er zhan qijian zai Hainandao de Taiwanren," in *"Taiwanren de haiwai huodong" guoji xueshu yantaohui huiyi ziliao*, ed. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2011), 13.

126. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 281.

127. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Dai Tōa Kyōeiken no kakuritsu to Nihon minzoku no nettai tekiyō seikatsu, Kainantō ni okeru Nihon minzoku no tekiyō seikatsu chōsa hōkoku* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1941), 321.

128. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo koushu lishi bianji weiyuanhui, ed., *Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu dalu jingyan*, vol. 2 (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1994–95), 134–35.

129. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo koushu lishi bianji weiyuanhui, ed., *Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu dalu jingyan*, vol. 2, 135–36.

130. Ping-hui Liao, "Travel in Early-Twentieth-Century Asia: On Wu Zhuoliu's 'Nanking Journals' and His Notion of Taiwan's Alternative Modernity," in *Writing Taiwan: A New Literary History*, ed. David Der-wei Wang and Carlos Rojas (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 285–300.

131. Shimomiya Atsushi, "Yutaka naru Kainantō," *TJ* (March 1939): 251. Founded in 1919 as the Taiwan Medical Vocational School (Taiwan Igaku Senmon Gakkō), the school became Taipei Imperial University's Medical Department (Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku Igakubu) in 1936. The department's Tropical Medical Research Center (Nettai Igaku Kenkyūjo) focused on malaria research and disease prevention.

132. Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Taiwan no Nanpō kyōryoku*, 20, 221–22.

133. Shimomiya Atsushi, "Yutakanaru Kainantō," *TJ* (March 1939): 251; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Taiwan no Nanpō kyōryoku*, 220–22.

134. "Kainantō de kinrō hōshi: Taidai, shochū kyūka ni gakusei o haken," *Kōnan Shinbun*, May 27, 1941.

135. Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Eiseika, *Taiwan no eisei* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Eiseika, 1939), 141; "Kainantō de kinrō hōshi: Taidai, shochū kyūka ni gakusei o haken," *Kōnan Shinbun*, May 27, 1941.

136. Ōmura Yasuo, "Kainantō no igaku hōshi yori kaerite," *TJ* (November 1939): 129–30, 133.

137. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, *Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu dalu jingyan*, vol. 2, 137.

138. Fujisaki Haruo, "Taihoku Teidai Igaku Hōshidan Kainantōki," *TJ* (September 1939): 135; Hirakawa Masaru, "Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku Kainantō haken gakuto-dan hōkokusho," *TJ* (October 1940): 101.

139. "Mararia bōatsu senshi: chikaku Kainantō bōekijin ni sanka," *Kōnan Shinbun*, March 9, 1943.

140. Hayashi, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi*, 118.

141. Chou, *Taiji Ribenbing*, 121, 282.

142. Chou, *Taiji Ribenbing*, 282; Ts'ai Hui-yu [Cai Huiyu] and Wu Ling-ching [Wu Lingqing], ed., *Zouguo liangge shidai de ren: Taiji Ribenbing*, 2nd ed. (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2008), 418–19; Hayashi, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi*, 119.

143. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 422; Hayashi, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi*, 118–121.

144. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 423.

145. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 424–26.

146. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 555.

147. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 556.

148. Yu Chien-ming [You Jianming], "Rizhi shiqi de Taiwan hushi," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan*, no. 23 (June 1994): 393–94.

149. For example, see Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 350–51; Chen Huimei, *Taiwanjin jūgun kangofu tsuisōki: sumire no hana ga saita koro: Nittai gassaku* (Tendensha, 2001); Hong Linxing and Itami Yasuhito, *Taiwanjin jūgun kango joshu to Nihonjin gun'i: Kanton Dai-ni Rikugun Byōin no kizuna wa imamo: Nittai gassaku* (Tendensha, 2006).

150. Scholarship on this topic is vast and contentious. I have referred to pioneering studies such as Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II*, trans. Suzanne O'Brien (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*; C. Sarah Soh, *Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Peipei Qiu, with Su Zhiliang and Chen Lifei, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Pak Yu-ha, *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no takakai* (Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, 2014). On recent debates surrounding the study of comfort women, see Amy Stanley, Hannah Shepherd, Sayaka Chatani, David Ambaras, and Chelsea Szendi-Schieder, "'Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War': The Case for Retraction on Grounds of Academic Misconduct," *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 19, issue 5, no. 13 (March 1, 2021): 1–28.

151. The total number of comfort women in Japan's wartime empire remains contested among historians. Yoshimi Yoshiaki has estimated between 40,000 and 200,000 comfort women while Chu Te-lan has estimated over 400,000 comfort women (100,000–200,000 Koreans, 200,000 Chinese, and several thousand Taiwanese). Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 86–92; Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 13, 18.

152. Yoshimi and Chu differentiate between prostitutes (J. *karyūgyōsha*, C. *hualiuyezhe*) and comfort women, with the latter group officially under Japanese military control. Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 13, 18 26, 44; Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 20–21, 86–87, 91.

153. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 13, 18; Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 86–92.

154. The Taiwan Development Company imported cement, wood, and other construction supplies from Taiwan and Guangzhou. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 95, 102. For oral testimonies by three former Chinese comfort women in Hainan, see Qiu, Su, and Chen, *Chinese Comfort Women*, 126–35.

155. Chu, *Taiwan sōtokufu to ianfu*, 87–88.

156. Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 138; Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 104–105.

157. Hayashi Eidai, *Shōgen: Taiwan Takasago Giyūtai* (Sōfūkan, 1998), 94, 107; Li Chan-ping [Li Zhanping], *Qianjin Boluozhou: Taiji zhanfu shiyuan* (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2005), 99–106; Ōya Wataru, *Kangofutachi no Nanpō sensen: teikoku no rakujitsu o seotte* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2011), 16–17.

158. Peipei Qiu, Su Zhiliang, and Chen Lifei note that in comfort stations in occupied China, Japanese comfort women typically wore Japanese robes, the Koreans were given Japanese robes or military uniforms, and the lowest-ranking Chinese were not given any clothes. They do not include what Taiwanese comfort women might have worn. Qiu, Su, and Chen, *Chinese Comfort Women*, 70.

159. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 194–202, 226–34. By contrast, a 1992 report by the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation noted that forty-four out of forty-eight

former Taiwanese comfort women recalled having been paid in cash. Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 143.

160. Yoshimi Yoshiaki indicates that Japanese and Koreans in Japan's metropole were similarly tricked into thinking they were signing up as hospital assistants, only to be rounded up and taken to Hainan as comfort women. Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 103.

161. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 214–15.

162. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 222–25.

163. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 216–18; Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 81.

164. Pak, *Teikoku no ianfu*, 43–44.

165. Utsumi Aiko, *Kimu wa naze sabakareta no ka: Chōsenjin BC-kyū senpan no kiseki* (Asahi Shinbun Shuppansha, 2008), 107.

166. For example, see Liang Hua-huang [Liang Huahuang], *Taiwan zongdufu de "duian" zhengce yanjiu*: *Riju shidai TaiMin guanxi shi* (Daoxiang, 2001), 203–04.

167. Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 308, 315.

6. Advancing into the Southern Regions

1. Osaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, *Nanpō no shōraisei: Taiwan to Ran'in o kataru*, (Osaka: Osaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1940), 198–99.

2. Osaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, *Nanpō no shōraisei*, 199–200.

3. On recent studies of Japan's occupation of Southeast Asia, see Jeremy A. Yellen, *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019); Ethan Mark, *Japan's Occupation of Java in the Second World War: A Transnational History* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); Satoshi Nakano, *Japan's Colonial Moment in Southeast Asia 1942–1945: The Occupiers' Experience* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); Sven Matthiessen, *Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of World War II: Going to the Philippines is Like Coming Home?* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

4. George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895–1945* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1974), 211–12.

5. Japanese perceptions of shared ethnolinguistic ties among indigenous peoples in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific stemmed from studies by the Taipei Imperial University's Institute of Ethnology (a subfield of the History Department, est. 1928), Japan's center for ethnohistorical studies on the Southern Regions. Utsurikawa Nenozō (1884–1947), the institute's director, formed the university's Southern Regions Ethnology Association (Nanpō Dozoku Gakkai, est. 1929), which published the journal *Southern Regions Ethnology Nanpō Dozoku* from 1931 to 1944. Kokubu Naoto, "Utsurikawa Nenozō: Nanpō minzoku bunka kenkyū no paionia," in *Bunka jinruigaku gunzō*, ed. Ayabe Tsuneo (Kyoto: Akademia Shuppankai, 1985), 167–90.

6. Exceptions were the Taiwanese comfort women, who were by no means empowered in military comfort stations in Southeast Asia, as will be analyzed below.

7. Mark R. Peattie, "*Nanshin:* The 'Southward Advance,' 1931–1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 212–13.

8. "Miyo, itaru tokoro 'Nihon' no kiseki wa katsudō itsukatari: 'Dai Nihon teikokuryō' no hyōchū Futsukoku no sensen wa shōsaiku nomi," *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, September 6, 1933.

9. "Kanete gyōsei saibansho hyōtei Endō Genroku ni ishokushi okitaru Shin Nan'yō Guntō mondai ni kansuru iken kyōetsu sōrōnari," January 1934, file 10511–4, TGGA. For more on Japanese interests in the South China Sea, see Paul Kreitman, *Japan's Ocean Borderlands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), chap. 4.

10. Taiwan Government-General, "Shin Nanguntō shori ni kansuru iken," April 17, 1935, *Kakkoku ryōdo hakken oyobi kizoku kankei zakken, Minami Shinakai Shoshōtō kizoku kankei, Shin Nanguntō kankei*, vol. 1, file A–4–1–0–2, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B020311 61500.

11. Taiwan Government-General, "Shin Nanguntō shinshutsu ni kansuru keikakuan," May 19, 1935; Taiwan Government-General Foreign Affairs Division Head Sakamoto Tatsuki to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, November 19, 1935, *Kakkoku ryōdo hakken oyobi kizoku kankei zakken, Minami Shinakai Shoshōtō kizoku kankei, Shin Nanguntō kankei*, vol. 1, file A–4–1–0–2, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B02031161500.

12. Wakabayashi Shūji, "Shin Nanguntō tokushū no konjyaku," *TJ* (May 1939): 201.

13. Taiwan Government-General Foreign Affairs Division Head Sakamoto Tatsuki to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, November 19, 1935, *Kakkoku ryōdo hakken oyobi kizoku kankei zakken, Minami Shinakai Shoshōtō kizoku kankei, Shin Nanguntō kankei*, vol. 1, file A–4–1–0–2, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B02031161500.

14. Taiwan Government-General Foreign Affairs Division Head Sakamoto Tatsuki to Foreign Ministry European Affairs Bureau No. 2 Division Head Yoshida Dan'ichirō, "Shinnan Guntō yori no kiraishadan ni kansuru ken," May 18, 1936, *Kakkoku ryōdo hakken oyobi kizoku kankei zakken, Minami Shinakai Shoshōtō kizoku kankei, Shinnan Guntō kankei*, vol. 1, file A–4–1–0–2, JFMA: JACAR Ref. B02031161600.

15. Wakabayashi Shūji, "Shin Nanguntō tokushū: Shinnan Guntō no konjyaku," *TJ* (May 1939): 201.

16. Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō and Colonial Minister Hatta Yoshiaki to Prime Minister Count Konoe Fumimaro, "Shin Nanguntō no shozoku ni kansuru ken," December 13, 1938, file rui–02088100, NAJ: JACAR Ref. A02030022900.

17. "Shin Nanguntō (Minami Shinakai no sangoshō): Taiwan Sōtokufu kankatsuka ni Anrī Futsu taishi e tsūkoku," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 1, 1939.

18. "Threat to Interests of Four Powers Seen in Japan's Spratly Seizure," *China Weekly Review*, April 8, 1939.

19. John E. Dreifort, *Myopic Grandeur: The Ambivalence of French Foreign Policy toward the Far East, 1919–1945* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 150–51, 165.

20. "Shin Nanguntō," *Shashin Shūhō*, no. 85, (October 1939), file o–310–0116, NAJ: JACAR Ref. A06031068000.

21. "Kaitakusha sanbyakumei o hikiiru: Hirata shi chikaku Shin Nanguntō e," *TNS*, May 15, 1939.

22. Wakabayashi, "Shin Nanguntō tokushū," 191–200.

23. "Shin Nanguntō chōsa ni kanshi irōkin shikyū ni tsuki naishin narabini hinshin ni kansuru ken," July 1934, file 11521–41, TGGA.

24. "Kotō, Shin Nanguntō ni sosaien o tsukuru: Takao kara yokudo o hakonde," *TNS*, June 21, 1939; "Shin Nanguntō ni gyogyō konkyochi o kensetsu: senryū, tōtai

nado no keihi o rainendo ni keijō," *TNS*, June 22, 1939; "Shin Nanguntō e keisatsukan haken," *TNS*, June 26, 1939.

25. Mark R. Peattie, *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988); Tōmatsu Haruo, *Nihon Teikoku to inin tōchi: Nan'yō Guntō o meguru kokusai seiji, 1914–1947* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2011).

26. Justin Adam Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1998), 58.

27. Japan's militarization of its Micronesia Mandate went against the League of Nations mandate regulations. Peattie, "*Nanshin*," 213–16.

28. "Taiwan, Nan'yō o ichimaru ni Nanpō Sōtokufu o setchi: sōtoku ni Kaigun gunjin kiyōron," *Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun*, February 9, 1936.

29. "Takao Taiwan o chūshin toshite Nanpō keizai seisaku o kakuritsu: Taiwan Sōtoku no kengen o kakudai shi Kaigun no hokushu nanshin saku ni koou," *Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun*, May 2, 1936.

30. Taiwan Sōtokufu, "Nanpō gaichi tōchi soshiki kakujū kyōka hōshin," reprinted in Tsunoda Jun, ed. *Nitchū Sensō*, vol. 10, bk. 3 of *Gendaishi shiryō* (Misuzu Shobō, 1963), 464–65.

31. "Teikoku Nanpō keirin no ichigenka to zen'ei, Taiwan no jūdai shimei: waga nanshin-saku no kansui soko Dai Tōa kensetsu no kagi," *Osaka Asahi Shinbun*, May 22, 1939.

32. "Nanpō seisaku to Taiwan" (1–8), *Osaka Asahi Shinbun*, July 15–23, 1939. Nakamura Akira (1912–2003) and Kusui Ryūzan (1899–1991), prominent economics professors of Taipei Imperial University, additionally contended that Taiwan remained superior to Micronesia in human and natural resources, strategic value, and geographic proximity to Southeast Asia. Nakamura Akira, "Nanpō Sōtokuron," *TJ* (November 1940): 10–13; Kusui Ryūzō, "Nanshin kichiron: kyotensei yori kichisei e," *TJ* (November 1941): 11.

33. Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 121.

34. Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan*, 28, 121–22.

35. Peattie, *Nan'yō*, 249–51; Tōmatsu, *Nihon Teikoku to inin tōchi*, 46.

36. Peattie, "*Nanshin*," 217–18.

37. Peattie, *Nan'yō*, 230, 248.

38. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 185–194, 204; Minato Teruhiro, "Nihon sensōki ni okeru Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha no Futsuin jigyō," in *Shokuminchi Taiwan no keizai to shakai*, ed. Oikawa Yoshinobu (Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2011), 181–83.

39. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 215. Chen Shi-fang has contended instead that the Philippine Industries created the basis for mineral extraction during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines from 1942 to 1945. Chen Shi-fang [Chen Shifang], "Zhanqian Riben 'Yaxiyazhuyi' zai Feilübin de chuanbo: jianlun Taiwan zongdufu zhi rongyu yu xieli," in *Taiwan jindai zhanzheng yantaohui lunwenbian: 1941–1949*, vol. 2, ed. Gaoxiongshi guanhuai Taiji laobing wenhua xiehui (Gaoxiong: Chunhui, 2013), 295.

40. Yutaka Shimomoto and Ravi Mandalam, *Japanese Immigrants and Investments in North Borneo* (Kota Kinabalu: The Sabah Society, 2010), 2–3, 62.

41. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], *Rizhi shiqi zai Nanyang de Taiwanren* (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2020), 409–13.

42. Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 274; Huei-Ying Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires: Chinese Business and Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914–1941* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 276.

43. Ueda Kōdō, "Nanpō seisaku to Taiwan no tokusei," *TJ* (February 1940): 20.

44. Osaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, *Nanshi, Nan'yō o kokusakuteki ni miru* (Osaka: Osaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1935), 9–10.

45. Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha Chōsaka, *Hontōjin no Nan'yō imin jijō* (Taipei: Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha Chōsaka, 1940), 4–6.

46. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 3–4.

47. Ide Kiwata, *Shina minzoku no Nanpō hattenshi* (Tōei Shoin, 1943), 371.

48. Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires*, 227–28; Bian Fengkui, *Riju shiqi Taiwan jimin zai Dalu ji Dongnanya huodong zhi yanjiu* (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2006), 221–23; Kikuchi Kazutaka, *Sensō to Kakyō: Nihon, Kokumin Seifu Kōkan, Kairai seiken, Kakyōkan no seiji rikigaku* (Kyūko Shoin, 2011), 271–72.

49. Honkai Chōsa Hensanbu, "Nanshi Jihen to Nan'yō," *Nan'yō* 23, no. 10 (October 1937): 115.

50. "Tai ni hataraku Taiwanjin (jō), (ge)," *TNS*, October 11–12, 1941. Chung Shuming has estimated that 300 Taiwanese in Southeast Asia returned to Taiwan in 1937. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 7.

51. Amoi Shikyoku, "Shisan tōketsu ni munen hikiage Nanpō shinshutsu no hontōjin Amoi de Firipin, Ran'in o kataru zadankai," *TNS*, November 7, 1941. Lin Man-houng estimates that by 1941, there were a total of twenty-six Taiwanese in the Philippines. Man-houng Lin, "Culture, Market, and State Power: Taiwanese Investment in Southeast Asia, 1895–1945," in *Chinese and Indian Merchants in Modern Asia*, ed. Choi Chi-cheung, Takashi Oishi, and Tomoko Shiroyama (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 268.

52. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 307–08, 332–334; Lin, "Culture, Market, and State Power," 268.

53. E. Bruce Reynolds, "'International Orphans': The Chinese in Thailand during World War II," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 48, no. 2 (September 1997): 365.

54. "Taikoku shinshutsu no kōki hontōjin ga mottomo yūbō," *Taiwan Shinminpō*, January 10, 1940; "Tai ni hataraku Taiwanjin (jō), (ge)," *TNS*, October 11–12, 1941; Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Jōhōka, *Dai Tōa Sensō to Taiwan* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Jōhōka, 1943), 176, 185; Lin, "Culture, Market, and State Power," 268; Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 281–84, 338, 452–59.

55. Matsuura Masataka, *"Dai Tōa Sensō" wa naze okita no ka: han Ajia shugi no seiji keizaishi* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010), 281.

56. Kabushiki-gaisha Kanan Ginkō, *Bankoku ni okeru Taiwan sekimin no gaikyō* (Bankoku: Kabushiki-gaisha Kanan Ginkō, 1941), 1–7; Ōta Shūkichi, "Taiwan sekimin no Nan'yō ni okeru katsudō jōkyō," in *Taiwan keizai nenpō (Shōwa 17-nen ban)*, ed. Taiwan Keizai Nenpō Kankōkai (Kokusai Nihon Kyōkai, 1942), 683.

57. Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai, *Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai jigyō jisshi jōkyō hōkokusho* (Taipei: Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai, 1939), 18; Yeh Pi-ling [Ye Biling], *Xueshu xianfeng: Taibei diguo daxue yu Riben nanjin zhengce zhi yanjiu* (Daoxiang, 2010), 137.

58. Yeh, *Xueshu xianfeng*, 135, 142, 165.

59. Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai, *Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai jigyō*, 17–18; "Jikyoku kōen eigakai raijō kangei," *Kōnan Shinbun*, February 1, 1941; "Nanpō chishiki fukyū no jikyoku dai kōeinkai," *Kōnan Shinbun*, April 22, 1941.

60. See Nakamura Takashi, "Eiryō Marai no Kakyō dantai," *Nanshi Nan'yō* (May 1939): 71–79; Nakamura Takashi, "Nan'yō Kakyō no shinbun jigyō," *Nanshi Nan'yō* (August 1939): 16–33.

61. The Government-General deliberately used the English translation of "Encyclopedia Bureau" for the Japanese term *chōsa-ka* (literally, "Research Bureau"). Suehiro Akira, "Tasha rikai to shite no 'gakuchi' to 'chōsa,'" in *Chiiki kenkyū toshite no Ajia*, ed. Suehiro Akira (Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 11–12; Chen Hong-yu [Chen Hongyu], "Taiwan de Dongnanya yanjiu: huigu yu zhanwang," *Dongnanya jikan* 1, no. 2 (April 1996): 67; Yeh, *Xueshu xianfeng*, 144.

62. Kuwahara Masao, *Taiwan to Nanshi Nan'yō no jissai mondai: sonohoka jiji* (Taipei: Taiwan Keizai Kenkyūkai, 1941), 14–15; "Futsuin no sangyō to Taiwan hontōjin no shinshutsu ni kōteki," *TNS*, August 26, 1941; "Nanpō kaitaku no senpei ni takushi 500 mei o yōsei: chikaku boshū ni chakushu semu," *Kōnan Shinbun*, August 30, 1941; "Nanpō kyōryoku ni Taiwan no keiken: Futsuin ni kōma saibai: hontō kara gijutsu to shushi o teikyō," *Kōnan Shinbun*, March 4, 1942.

63. Peattie, "*Nanshin*," 212.

64. Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 10.

65. General Staff Office, "Taiwangun kenkyūbu rinji hensei yōryō, dōsaisaku no ken," November 4, 1940, *Rikugunshō rikuki mitsu dainikki,* file S15–3–3, JMD: JACAR Ref. C01005520600.

66. Ken'ichi Gotō, "Japan's Southward Advance and Colonial Taiwan," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 3, no.1 (January 2004): 32.

67. Masanobu Tsuji, *Singapore, the Japanese Version*, trans. Margaret E. Lake and ed. H. V. Howe (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3–7.

68. Tsuji, *Singapore, the Japanese Version*, 9–13; Gotō, "Japan's Southward Advance," 33. As early as 1928, the Army Aviation Headquarters first proposed that Taiwan serve as a military base for aircraft to bomb the Philippines. Jürgen Melzer, *Wings for the Rising Sun: A Transnational History of Japanese Aviation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2020), 116.

69. Tsuji, *Singapore, the Japanese Version*, 32; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 129.

70. On the lead-up to the Asia-Pacific War, see Yellen, *Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,* chap. 2; Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, chap. 12.

71. On Japan's occupation of these regions, see Chi Man Kwong and Yiu Lun Tsoi, *Eastern Fortress: A Military History of Hong Kong, 1840–1970* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), chaps. 8–9; Paul H. Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History* (London: Hurst, 1998); Mark, *Japan's Occupation of Java*; E. Bruce Reynolds, *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Lydia N. Yu-Jose, *Japan Views the Philippines, 1900–1944* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), chap. 10; Yellen, *Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, chap. 4.

72. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 249–55, 419, 424–30, 518.

73. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 418, 460.

74. *Kōnan Shinbun*, December 14, 1941, quoted in Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 364.

75. Yamashita Yomoyuki, commander of Japan's Twenty-Fifth Army, adopted the practice of summary execution that he had used while fighting in China. Hayashi Hirofumi, "The Battle of Singapore, the Massacre of Chinese and Understanding of the Issue in Postwar Japan," *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 7, issue 28, no. 4 (July 13, 2009): 3–6.

76. The number of deaths continues to be debated among scholars, with estimates as low as 5,000 and as high as 25,000. Hayashi, "The Battle of Singapore," 1.

77. On Japan's occupation of Singapore and its policies toward the resident Chinese, Malay, and Indians, see Kratoska, *Japanese Occupation of Malaya*; Clay Eaton, "Governing Shōnan: The Japanese Administration of Wartime Singapore" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2018).

78. Wee had arrived in Singapore in 1917 and worked for the Japanese Southern Asia Company (est. 1911), where his job was to manage overseas Chinese laborers. During the occupation, he was an employee of South Seas Warehouse while concurrently serving as a military interpreter. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 318, 343–44.

79. Mamoru Shinozaki, *Syonan, My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975), 25–30; On Lim Boon Keng's prewar activites in Fujian and Singapore, see Soon Keong Ong, *Coming Home to a Foreign Country: Xiamen and Returned Overseas Chinese, 1843–1938* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), chap. 6; Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), chap. 3.

80. Eaton, "Governing Shōnan," 48, 95–106; Kratoska, *Japanese Occupation of Malaya*, 102.

81. Wee was said to have been killed in Singapore after the war by "anti-Japanese forces." Mamoru Shinozaki and Lim Yoon Lin, *My Wartime Experiences in Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), 35–37; Shinozaki, *Syonan*, 45–47.

82. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 345; Shi-chi Mike Lan, "'Crime' of Interpreting: Taiwanese Interpreters as War Criminals of World War II," in *New Insights in the History of Interpreting*, ed. Kayoko Takeda and Jesús Baigorri-Jalón (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2016), 198.

83. Shinozaki, *My Wartime Experiences*, 43–44.

84. Ho Yit Leong, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000383, Reel 4, interview by Tan Beng Luan, July 7, 1984, Oral History Centre, NAS.

85. Kratoska, *Japanese Occupation of Malaya*, 215.

86. Ah Chin Teong, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000047, Reel/Disc 4, June 25, 1984, Oral History Centre, NAS.

87. Lee Tian Soo, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000265, Reel 5, interview by Low Lay Leng, May 8, 1983, Oral History Centre, NAS.

88. Harris bin Abdul Karim Muhammad, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000070, Reel 4, interview by Jalil Miswardi, June 23, 1984, Oral History Centre, NAS.

89. Ong Chye Hock, Chinese Dialect Groups, Accession Number 000135, Reel 25, interview by Chai Yong Hwa, April 3, 1982, Oral History Centre, NAS.

90. Lee Kim Chuan, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000168, Reel 22, interview by Chua Ser Koon, March 26, 1982; Teong Ah Chin, Japanese

Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000047, Reel 4, interview by Tan Beng Luan, June 25, 1984; Soon Kim Seng, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000543, Reel 8, interview by Tan Beng Luan, May 3, 1985; Phoon Kim Seng, Chinatown, Accession Number 002253, Reel 10, interview by Jesley Chua Chee Huan, March 30, 2000, Oral History Centre, NAS.

91. Chen Say Jame, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Reel 2, Accession Number 003038, interview by Lim Lai Hwa, March 24, 2006, Oral History Centre, NAS.

92. Lim Kit Long, Transportation in Singapore, Accession Number 002427, Reel/Disc 2, October 11, 2000; Tan Tian Chor, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 001354, Reel/Disc 3, June 25, 1992, Oral History Centre, NAS. Chung Shu-ming has noted that Zhang Haiteng, a prominent Taiwanese doctor in Manila, similarly requested that the Japanese army be lenient toward the overseas Chinese leaders arrested in the Philippines. Chung, *Nanyang de Taiwanren*, 518.

93. See Hong Peng, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000135, Reel/Disc 25–26, November 21, 1981, Oral History Centre, NAS.

94. "Futsuin no sangyō to Taiwan hontōjin no shinshutsu ni kōteki," *TNS*, August 26, 1941; "Nanpō kyōryoku ni Taiwan no keiken: Futsuin ni kōma saibai, hontō kara gijutsu to shushi o teikyō," *Kōnan Shinbun*, March 4, 1942.

95. "Nanpō kaitaku no senpei ni takushi 500 mei o yōsei: chikaku boshū ni chakushu semu," *Kōnan Shinbun*, August 30, 1941; Schneider, "Business of Empire," 200; Chen, "Riben 'Yaxiyazhuyi' zai Feilübin," 298–305.

96. Amanoya Risuke, "Taiwan nōgyō Nanpō e iku," *TJ* (August 1942): 44; Katō Kyōhei, "Nanpō kensetsu to Taitaku no jigyō," *TJ* (October 1943): 75; Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, *Taiwan no Nanpō kyōryoku ni tsuite* (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1943), 48–50, 63; Kuwahara, *Taiwan to Nanshi Nan'yō*, 14–15; Schneider, "Business of Empire," chap. 5.

97. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 200–203.

98. Yoshizawa Minami, *Watashitachi no naka no Ajia no sensō: Futsuryō Indoshina no "Nihonjin"* (Yūshisha, 2010), 66–68, 122–26, 136–37.

99. Yoshizawa, *Watashitachi no naka no Ajia no sensō*, 76, 127, 142–48.

100. Yoshizawa, *Watashitachi no naka no Ajia no sensō*, 140–41.

101. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 203.

102. Yoshizawa, *Watashitachi no naka no Ajia no sensō*, 137.

103. Schneider, "Business of Empire," 203.

104. Quoted in Chen Yi-ju [Chen Yiru] and Tang Shi-yeoung [Tang Xiyong], ed., *Taibeishi Taiji Ribenbing chafang zhuanji: Rizhi shiqi canyu junwu zhi Taimin koushu lishi* (Taibeishi wenxian weiyuanhui, 2001), 184–85.

105. Wu Pingcheng, *Kaigun gun'i nikki* (Mondai to Kenkyū, 1996), 113, 161; Mingcheng M. Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 136.

106. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 388–89. Huang Chih-huei has estimated a higher number of at least 8,000 indigenous volunteers. Chih-Huei Huang, "The Yamatodamashi of the Takasago Volunteers of Taiwan: A Reading of the Postcolonial Situation," in *Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America*, ed. Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis (London: Routledge, 2003), 225, 248.

107. Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 382, 388; Huang, "Yamatodamashi," 224–25.

108. Nakamura Bunji, "Nanpō ni tatakau Takasago-zoku," *Taiwan Keisatsu Jihō*, no. 319 (June 1942): 42.

109. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese,"* 133, 167.

110. Nakamura, "Nanpō ni tatakau Takasago-zoku," 42; Kondō, *Sōryokusen*, 389.

111. Asahi Shinbunsha, *Nanpō no kyoten, Taiwan: shashin hōdō* (Asahi Shinbunsha, 1944), 8.

112. Nakamura Bunji, "Senzen no Takasago-zoku Giyūdan: Nakamura Keishi shisatsuki (2–3)," *Kōnan Shinbun*, May 19–20, 1942.

113. Nakamura Bunji, "Senzen no Takasago-zoku Giyūdan: Nakamura Keishi shisatsuki (3)," *Kōnan Shinbun*, May 20, 1942; Nakamura Bunji, "Hitō zakkan," *Taiwan Keisatsu Jihō*, no. 320 (August 1942): 26–28.

114. Nakamura Bunji, "Senzen no Takasago-zoku Giyūdan: Nakamura Keishi shisatsuki (1)," *Kōnan Shinbun*, May 18, 1942.

115. Nakamura, "Nanpō ni tatakau Takasago-zoku," 42, 47.

116. Kikuchi Kazutaka, *Nihongun gerira, Taiwan Takasago Giyūtai: Taiwan genjūmin no Taiheiyō Sensō* (Heibonsha, 2018), 57–58.

117. Hayashi Eidai, *Shōgen: Taiwan Takasago Giyūtai* (Sōfūkan, 1998), 179.

118. Huang, "Yamatodamashi," 226–28.

119. Kikuchi, *Nihongun gerira*, 108.

120. Huang, "Yamatodamashi," 227.

121. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 132–33.

122. Ts'ai Hui-yu [Cai Huiyu] and Wu Ling-ching [Wu Lingqing], ed., *Zouguo liangge shidai de ren: Taiji Ribenbing*, 2nd ed. (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2008), 160–61.

123. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 178–79.

124. Sarah Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire: POWs and Their Captors in the Pacific* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 1. There were an estimated 350,000 Allied POWs for the duration of the Asia-Pacific War. Fukunaga Michiko, *Kokoro hatsuru made: Nihon no senpan ni saserareta yonin no Taiwan no otomodachi* (Himeji: Suishō Kōbō, 1995), 13.

125. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 3. By the end of the war, an estimated 30,813 out of 128,363 white POWs had died. Utsumi Aiko, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku* (Aoki Shoten, 2005), 227.

126. By mid-1942, there were an estimated 125,309 white POWs and 162,226 Asian POWs in Southeast Asia with 64,000 members of the British Commonwealth (including 17,000 Australians and 1,600 Canadians), 24,000 Dutch, 15,000 Americans, 44,000 Chinese, and 185,000 resident Asians (including 100,000 Indonesians). Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 180.

127. Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 173, 180, 199, 202, 226–27.

128. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 51–53; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 199–204. On the Indian National Army, see Kratoska, *Japanese Occupation of Malaya*, 40–41, 103–109.

129. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 37–38; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 127–30.

130. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 57; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 204–207, 221–24.

131. Li Chan-ping [Li Zhanping], *Qianjin Boluozhou: Taiji zhanfu shiyuan* (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2005), 72. The Korean Army's three POW camps were on a smaller scale with around one thousand POWs in 1942 and less than 500 by the end of 1942. Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 221–24; Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 123–25.

132. Kerr, *Formosa*, 216; Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 121–23; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 207–11.

133. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 44; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 213.

134. Chung Shu-ming [Zhong Shumin], "Erzhan shiqi Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui yu zhanhou shenpan," in *Jindaishi shilun: duoyuan sikao yu tansuo*, ed. Li Ta-chia [Li Dajia] (Donghua shuju, 2017), 3–5; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 213, 398–99;

135. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 61, 129; Sandra Wilson, Robert Cribb, Beatrice Trefalt, and Dean Aszkielowicz, *Japanese War Criminals: The Politics of Justice after the Second World War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 50, 63.

136. Jimmy Kian Tong Chew, The Public Service, Accession Number 002490, Reels 1 and 3, interview by Jason Lim, February 7, 2001, Oral History Centre, NAS. On the similar reputation of Korean guards as especially brutal, see Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 115, 129; Utsumi Aiko, *Kimu wa naze sabakareta no ka: Chōsenjin BC-kyū senpan no kiseki* (Asahi Shinbun Shuppansha, 2008), 101–102.

137. Tens of thousands of Allied POWs and Asian laborers died during the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railway. Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson, ed., *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993).

138. Julian Ryall, "British ex-POW in Japanese camp 'disgusted' by guard demands for compensation; Survivor of 'Death Railway' says Korean, Taiwanese guards were worst tormentors of Allied prisoners and 'should be whipped,'" *The Telegraph*, November 11, 2014.

139. For example, see Utsumi Aiko, "Korean 'Imperial Soldiers': Remembering Colonialism and Crimes against Allied POWs," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 211–12. Sandra Wilson has argued against Utsumi's contention that Koreans were over-represented or punished more severely after the war as war criminals. Sandra Wilson, "Koreans in the Trials of Japanese War Crimes Suspects," in *Debating Collaboration and Complicity in War Crimes Trials in Asia, 1945–1956*, ed. Kerstin von Lingen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 20–21.

140. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 44–47; Hayashi Eidai, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2000), 235–37; Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 291.

141. This was similarly the case for Korean guards. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 60–61; Utsumi, *Nihongun no horyo seisaku*, 174–75.

142. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 48–49, 61–63; Hayashi, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi*, 237.

143. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 296–97.

144. On similar accounts of Korean guards who showed compassion toward Allied POWs, see Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 7, 115, 129.

145. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 70–72.

146. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 156–60.

147. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 69–70.

148. Huang, "Yamatodamashi," 231–32; Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 82, 94, 107, 136; Li Chan-ping [Li Zhanping], *Fenghuo suiyue: Taiwanren de zhanshi jingyan* (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2005), 15–16.

149. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 299–303.

150. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 303–304.

151. Yuki Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 57–60.

152. Ooi Keat Gin, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 91.

153. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 73–82.

154. Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors*, 61.

155. Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors*, 39–40; Waijiaobu, "Aodaliya lujunbu RiTai zhanfan shenpan jilu (2)," *Aozhou zhanfan shenpan*, May–Dec 1948, Ref. 020–010117–0049, 7, AH.

156. Sarak Kovner has noted how the POW experience differed greatly from camp to camp. Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 4.

157. Wilson et al., *Japanese War Criminals*, 31; Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 3.

158. Li Chan-ping [Li Zhanping], *Zhanhuo wenshen de jianshiyuan: Taiji zhanfu beige* (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2007), 254.

159. Li, *Qianjin Boluozhou*, 93–106; Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 69–70; Lan, "Crime of Interpreting," 206–208.

160. Utsumi, *Kimu wa naze sabakareta*, 105.

161. Lee Tian Soo, Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession Number 000265, Reel 5, interview by Low Lay Leng, May 8, 1983, Oral History Centre, NAS.

162. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 65; Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors*, 42.

163. Utsumi, *Kimu wa naze sabakareta*, 105.

164. Fukunaga, *Kokoro hatsuru made*, 64–65.

165. Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War* II, trans. Suzanne O'Brien (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 80–81; Chu Te-lan [Zhu Delan], *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu* (Akashi Shoten, 2005), 187.

166. Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 86.

167. Chu's findings reveal that the majority had been either recruited (five) or tricked (fifteen) into thinking that they would work overseas as nurses or restaurant waitresses. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 216–18.

168. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 230–34.

169. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*, 226–29.

170. Mark, *Japan's Occupation of Java*, 211.

171. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 94, 107.

172. Li, *Qianjin Boluozhou*, 99–106; Gin, *Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, 67. On Korean servicemen who frequented comfort stations in Southeast Asia, see Utsumi, *Kimu wa naze sabakareta*, 107.

173. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 94, 107.

174. Ōya Wataru, *Kangofutachi no Nanpō sensen: Teikoku no rakujitsu o seotte* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2011), 17.

175. Hayashi, *Shōgen*, 75, 85; Kikuchi, *Nihongun gerira*, 19.

176. Huang, "Yamatodamashi," 225; Kikuchi, *Nihongun gerira*, 238.

177. Li, *Zhanhuo wenshen*, 295–304. Han Taiwanese such as Liu Qiutan and Gao Changqin hid in the jungles of the Philippines and lived off wildlife for several years even after the war ended until they were discovered by the Filipino army in 1956. Li, *Fenghuo suiyue*, 65–74.

178. For example, see Taipei Imperial University professor Asai Erin's 1942 summary of Japanese stereotypes of the "South Seas peoples" (Nan'yōjin) as lazy and unfit for intensive labor due to the tropical climate and abundance of natural resources. "Hontō seinen shinshutsu no aki yōyō shintenchi wa maneku: kokorogamae to Nan'yō jijō Asai kyōju ni kiku," *Kōnan Shinbun*, January 8, 1942.

179. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 58.

Epilogue

1. On the Cairo Declaration and US-GMD wartime negotiations over the postwar fate of Taiwan, see Hsiao-ting Lin, *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 14–19.

2. Ts'ai Hui-yu [Cai Huiyu] and Wu Ling-ching [Wu Lingqing], ed., *Zouguo liangge shidai de ren: Taiji Ribenbing*, 2nd ed. (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2008), 505.

3. A total of ten million Japanese nationals had been mobilized during the war as servicemen, including 240,000 Koreans. Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 115.

4. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 506–09.

5. In fifty-one locations across the Asia-Pacific region, 2,244 BC-class ("minor") war crimes trials were carried out against 5,700 Japanese nationals. Among the 4,403 convicted, 984 were sentenced to death (though many of the convictions were later reduced to prison terms). Yuma Totani, *Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945–1952: Allied War Crimes Prosecutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9–10.

6. Exceptions were Taiwanese (25,000) and Koreans (two million) who resided in US-occupied Japan. From July 1946, the Taiwanese could register with the ROC Mission to enjoy the same rights as ROC nationals. *Zai wai Taiqiao guoji wenti*, October 1945–August 1948, Ref. 020–010118–0019, AH; Kawashima Shin, "'Deimperialization' in Early Postwar Japan: Adjusting and Transforming the Institutions of Empire," in *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia: Deimperialization, Postwar Legitimation and Imperial Afterlife*, ed. Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 37–38; Kushner, *Men to Devils*, 103, 135; Deokhyo Choi, "The Empire Strikes Back from Within: Colonial Liberation and the Korean Minority Question at the Birth of Postwar Japan, 1945–1947," *American Historical Review* 126, no. 2 (June 2021): 556.

7. A total of 132 Taiwanese were sentenced as BC war criminals by the Western powers: four by the US, seven by the Netherlands, twenty-six by Britain, and ninety-five by Australia. Jiu-jung Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese as *Hanjian* or War Criminals and the Postwar Search for Taiwanese Identity," in *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*, ed. Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 293.

8. Steven E. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 53–63; Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese," 306–307.

9. "Taiwan yu Dongbei de fuyuan," *Zhongyang ribao*, August 29, 1945.

10. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, 40–44.

11. On Chinese "mainlanders" (C. waishengren, literally "those from outside Taiwan Province") in post-1945 Taiwan, see Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, *The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Stéphane Corcuff, "Taiwan's 'New Mainlanders,' New Taiwanese?," in *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 163–95.

12. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, 74.

13. Taiwanese who served in the wartime GMD regime came to be called "half-mainland Chinese" (C. banshanren, literally "half-mountain people"). Those who went on to become high-ranking officials in postwar Taiwan included Huang Chaoqin, Xie Dongmin, and Qiu Niantai. J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937–1945: The Origins of Taiwan's 'Half-Mountain People' (Banshan Ren)," *Modern China* 16, no. 2 (January 1990): 100–104; Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, 53–54, 65–67, 70–74, 131–36.

14. Some 36,000 Taiwanese lost their government positions with the change in regime. Tse-han Lai, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 65–66.

15. Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 46–48; Evan N. Dawley, *Becoming Taiwanese: Ethnogenesis in a Colonial City, 1880s–1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019), 252–56.

16. I have borrowed the term "recolonization" (C. *zai zhimin*) from Chen Tsui-lian and Evan Dawley. Chen Tsui-lian [Chen Cuilian], *Taiwanren de dikang yu rentong, 1920–1950* (Yuanliu chuban gongsi, 2008), 382; Dawley, *Becoming Taiwanese*, 249.

17. Kushner, *Men to Devils,* 118.

18. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, 68–69.

19. Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese," 302–305; Dawley, *Becoming Taiwanese*, 275.

20. Among the Taiwanese arrested were Gu Zhenpu (son of the prominent entrepreneur Gu Xianrong), Xu Bing, and Lin Xiongxiang. The GMD ultimately sentenced all three as "war criminals," rather than as "traitors to the Han Chinese," to prison sentences around two years each. Chung Shu-min [Zhong Shumin], "Erzhan shiqi Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui yu zhanhou shenpan," in *Jindaishi shilun: duoyuan sikao yu tansuo*, ed. Li Ta-chia [Li Dajia], (Donghua shuju, 2017), 414–16.

21. Chou Wan-yao [Zhou Wanyao], ed., *Taiji Ribenbing zuotanhui jilu bing xiangguan ziliao* (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1997), 236.

22. This stood in stark contrast to the extreme hardships experienced by Japanese repatriates from postwar Manchuria. See Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*.

23. [Japanese] Hainan Navy Commander to [GMD] Guangdong-Guangxi Southern Region Commander, "Zai Kainantō Taiwan sekimin yikan ni kansuru ken kibō," October 17, 1945, *Kainan Kaigun Keibifu hikiwatasu mokuroku 24/33*, file Chūō–hikiwatasu mokuroku–44, JMDA: JACAR, Ref. C08010721900.

24. *MTGDZ*, 128–29.

25. Between 1945 and 1947, the GMD prosecuted an estimated 30,000 Chinese as *hanjian*, convicting nearly half and absolving 6,000 individuals. Yun Xia, *Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017), 6; Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese," 289, 295.

26. Kushner, *Men to Devils*, 120–23.

27. On the list of suspected *hanjian* in postwar Xiamen, see the table of contents for *MTHZJ*; Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese," 289–90. On GMD policies for confiscating Xiamen property from Taiwanese who collaborated with Japan, see Fujian Provincial Government to Xiamen Municipal Government, "Shi zhengfu guanyu chuli Riwei chanye banfa guiding de dan, daidian, xunling," March 1946, *Xiamenshi shengfu caizhengju*, file A8–1–85, 128–29; Fujian gaodeng fayuan Xiamen fenyuan jianchachu, "Hansong Taimin Yin Xuepu wei mingdan chuan," May 10, 1948, *Xiamenshi shanghui*, file A34–1–51, XMA.

28. "Taijian de chuzhi," *Xingguang ribao*, August 20, 1946; *MTGDZ*, 181.

29. For the GMD "Regulations for Punishing War Criminals" promulgated in Fall 1946, see Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese," 291; Kushner, *Men to Devils*, 93–94, 124.

30. A-class "major" war crimes were defined as "crimes against peace," while BC-class "minor" war crimes were defined as "conventional war crimes" and "crimes against humanity." Twenty-eight Japanese were convicted as A-class war criminals in the Tokyo trials of 1946–48. Yuma Totani, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008); Totani, *Justice in Asia*, 9.

31. Sixteen Korean interpreters in mainland China were also indicted by the GMD as BC war criminals. Chung, "Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui," 388–93, 403; Wada Hideho, "Senpan to kankan no hazama de: Chūgoku Kokumin Seifu ni yoru tai Nichi senpan saiban de sabakareta Taiwanjin," *Ajia Kenkyū* 49, no. 4 (December 2003): 81; Utsumi Aiko, *Kimu wa naze sabakareta no ka: Chōsenjin BC-kyū senpan no kiseki* (Asahi Shinbun Shuppansha, 2008), 6.

32. "Fayuan shujiguan zhu Taijian suozhai," *Jiangshengbao*, August 31, 1946.

33. *MTHZJ*, 39–40, 69, 122–25.

34. The nine Taiwanese war criminals included the spy Hong Wenzhong, three policemen, and a Bank of Taiwan employee who were sentenced for murder; two policemen for false accusations against Chinese; and a policeman and merchant for trafficking in opium. Chung, "Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui," 391, 397; Chaen Yoshio, ed., *BC-kyū senpan Chūgoku, Futsukoku saiban shiryō* (Fuji Shuppan, 1992), 152, 161.

35. Chung, "Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui," 390–91; Chaen Yoshio, ed., *BC-kyū senpan gunji hōtei shiryō: Kanton hen* (Fuji Shuppan, 1984), 175, 178, 180, 182–83, 192.

36. Adam Cathcart, "Nationalism and Ethnic Identity in the Sino-Korean Border Region of Yanbian, 1945–1950," *Korean Studies*, no. 34 (December 2009): 28–32.

37. Michael Kim, "The Lost Memories of Empire and the Korean Return from Manchuria, 1945–1950: Conceptualizing Manchuria in Modern Korean History," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 23, no. 2 (December 2010): 208–210.

38. Mark Caprio, "The Politics of Collaboration in Post-Liberation Southern Korea," in *In the Ruins of the Japanese Empire: Imperial Violence, State Destruction, and the Reordering of Modern East Asia*, ed. Barak Kushner and Andrew Levidis (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020), 27–49.

39. Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 221–30.

40. Lin Xiantang's diary entries for October 25 and November 14, 1945 in Lin Hsien-tang [Lin Xiantang], *Guanyuan xiansheng riji*, vol. 17, ed. and annot. Hsu Hsueh-chi [Xu Xueji] (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2000), 360, 380, 387; *MTGDZ*, 193; Tang Shi-yeoung [Tang Xiyong], "Tuoli kunjing: zhanhou chuqi Hainandao zhi Taiwanren de fan Tai," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 12, no. 2 (December 2005): 168, 174–75, 204.

41. Tai Kuo-hui [Dai Guohui], "Nihon no shokuminchi shihai to Taiwan sekimin," *Taiwan Kingendaishi Kenkyū*, no. 3 (January 1981): 105–107; Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Kaikyō: Taiwan seiji e no shisatsu* (Kenbun Shuppan, 1985), 180–207.

42. In total there were 700,000 Japanese soldiers stationed in Southeast Asia in August 1945. Chen Yi-ju [Chen Yiru] and Tang Shi-yeoung [Tang Xiyong], ed., *Taibeishi Taiji Ribenbing chafang zhuanji: Rizhi shiqi canyu junwu zhi Taimin koushu lishi* (Taibeishi wenxian weiyuanhui, 2001), 33–34; Sandra Wilson, Robert Cribb, Beatrice Trefalt, and Dean Aszkielowicz, *Japanese War Criminals: The Politics of Justice after the Second World War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 51.

43. Dean Aszkielowicz, *The Australian Pursuit of Japanese War Criminals, 1943–1957: From Foe to Friend* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017), 114; *Zai wai Taiqiao guoji wenti*, October 1945–August 1948, Ref. 020–010118–0019; *Taijin renshi qingqiu xiezhu*, 1945–1949, Ref. 020–110400–0001; *Qiansong Xinjiapo Taiqiao hui Tai*, Ref. 020–010118–0014; *Miandian Taiqiao guoji an*, May–October 1947, Ref. 020–011107–0059; *Yuenan Aobei deng di ji Xinan Taipingyang zhudao Taiqiao qianfan*, December 1945–May 1957, Ref. 020-011011-0001, AH.

44. The South Korean government made similar requests for clemency on behalf of Korean war criminals but to no avail. Aszkielowicz, *Australian Pursuit*, 114.

45. Nearly one-sixth of Japanese nationals sentenced by Australia as BC war criminals were Taiwanese (ninety-five out of around 650). Shi-chi Mike Lan, "'Crime' of Interpreting: Taiwanese Interpreters as War Criminals of World War II," in *New Insights in the History of Interpreting*, ed. Kayoko Takeda and Jesús Baigorri-Jalón (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2016), 195; Aszkielowicz, *Australian Pursuit*, 114.

46. Among the eighteen Taiwanese executed by the Western powers, eight were by Australia, six by Britain, two by the Netherlands, and one by the United States. Of the 4,403 Japanese nationals ultimately convicted as BC war criminals, 148 were Korean, and 173 Taiwanese. Wilson et al., *Japanese War Criminals*, 7; Chung Shu-min [Zhong Shumin], "Zhanzheng fanzui yu zhanhou chuli: yi fulu shourongsuo jianshiyuan wei zhongxin," in *'Zhanhou Taiwan shehui yu jingji bianqian' guoji xueshu yantaohui huiyi lunwen*, ed. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2009), 1, 4; *Aodaliya lujunbu RiTai zhanfan shenpan jilu (2)*, May–December 1948, Ref. 020–010117–0049, AH.

47. Fukunaga Michiko, *Kokoro hatsuru made: Nihon no senpan ni saserareta yonin no Taiwan no otomodachi* (Himeji: Suishō Kōbō, 1995), 48–49, 61–63; Hayashi Eidai, *Taiwan no Yamato damashi* (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 2000), 237. On the Japanese government's wartime stance on the Geneva Convention and POW policies, see Totani, *Justice in Asia*, chap. 2.

48. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 308–309.

49. Lan, "'Crimes' of Interpreting," 203.

50. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 303–304. More than a thousand Australian POWs died in the forced marches from Sandakan. Ooi Keat Gin, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 91–98.

51. Wilson et al., *Japanese War Criminals*, 85.

52. Yuki Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 71.

53. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 308–309.

54. Lan, "'Crimes' of Interpreting," 202; Wilson et al., *Japanese War Criminals*, 65.

55. Chung, "Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui," 408–09; Chaen Yoshio, ed., *BC-kyū senpan Eigun saiban shiryō*, vol. 1 (Fuji Shuppan), 110–26; Chaen Yoshio, ed., *BC-kyū senpan Eigun saiban shiryō,* vol. 2 (Fuji Shuppan), 159–68, 255.

56. Overseas Chinese cooperated with Allied investigators by helping to identify Japanese nationals, including Taiwanese personnel, as war crimes suspects. Lan, "'Crimes' of Interpreting," 198–200, 202–203, 206–13, 218; Chung, "Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui," 409. On the Sook Ching massacre, see chapter 6.

57. Chung, "Taiwanren de zhanzheng fanzui," 405–07, 412–13; Chaen Yoshio, ed., *BC-kyū senpan Oranda saiban shiryō, zenkan tsūran* (Fuji Shuppan, 1992), 92–93; Waijiaobu, "Aodaliya lujunbu RiTai zhanfan shenpan jilu (2)," *Aozhou zhanfan shenpan*, May–December 1948, Ref. 020–010117–0049, 12, AH.

58. Taiwanese veteran Zheng Chunhe, for instance, contended in his postwar interview that war crimes against Allied POWs were the responsibility of Japanese commanding officers and not the Taiwanese prison guards. Zheng Chunhe, *Taiwanjin moto shiganhei to Dai Tōa Sensō: itohoshiki Nihon e* (Tendensha, 1998), 85.

59. Mike Shi-chi Lan has made a similar critique. See Lan, "'Crimes' of Interpreting," 199.

60. Sandra Wilson has made this point regarding sympathetic histories written by Utsumi Aiko and Gavan McCormick on Korean prison guards. Sandra Wilson, "Koreans in the Trials of Japanese War Crimes Suspects," in *Debating Collaboration and Complicity in War Crimes Trials in Asia, 1945–1956*, ed. Kerstin von Lingen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 20, 24.

61. For example, see Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People*, trans. Ethan Mark (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

62. Zheng, *Taiwanjin moto shiganhei*, 58–60, 279–80, 337–40.

63. Victor Louzon has contended that Taiwanese veterans who participated in the 228 Incident were less fueled by Japanese patriotism than by a sense of re-empowerment and mission reminiscent of wartime mobilization. Victor Louzon, "From Japanese Soldiers to Chinese Rebels: Colonial Hegemony, War Experience, and Spontaneous Remobilization during the 1947 Taiwanese Rebellion," *Journal of Asian Studies* 77, no. 1 (February 2018): 172–75.

64. Zheng, *Taiwanjin moto shiganhei*, 389.

65. For example, Liu Yinghui who returned from Borneo to Taiwan in April 1946 could not return to his old post because he could not speak Mandarin. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 446–47.

66. Ke Jingxing states that he was unemployed for several years in postwar Taiwan due to the stigma of his wartime past. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 308–19.

67. The percentage of Chinese mainlanders in indigenous mountain regions increased from 1.1 percent in 1955 to 4.9 percent by 1965. Chih-Huei Huang, "Ethnic Diversity, Two-Layered Colonization and Modern Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan," in *Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, ed. Andrew D. Morris (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 146.

68. Zakara was one of the few Taiwanese indigenes to be charged as a BC war criminal; he was convicted by Australia's military court for the murder of Allied POWs. He served his prison sentence in New Guinea before repatriating to Taiwan. Hayashi Eidai, *Shōgen: Taiwan Takasago Giyūtai* (Sōfūkan, 1998), 153–56, 164–65.

69. For example, Liu Qiutan and Gao Changqin were Taiwanese navy laborers who fled their units in the Philippines in late 1944. After sequestering themselves in the jungle for eleven years, they were captured by the Filipino army and repatriated to Taiwan in 1956. Li Chan-ping [Li Zhanping], *Fenghuo suiyue: Taiwanren de zhanshi jingyan* (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2005), 65–73.

70. Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Homecomings: The Belated Return of Japan's Lost Soldiers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), chaps. 6–7; Beatrice Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975* (London: Routledge, 2003), chaps. 6–7.

71. In addition to government and public donations, Suniyon's "condolence money" (*chōikin*) came from the Association for the Warm Welcome of Nakamura Teruo that had been established by Taiwanese residents in Japan. Igarashi, *Homecomings*, chap. 7; Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers*, chap. 8.

72. On the Japanese War-Bereaved Association (Nihon Izokukai, est. 1953), a conservative pressure group that lobbied the government for social welfare and memorialization of veterans, the war dead, and their families, see James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 137–40; Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 61–65, 79.

73. Japanese veterans who supported the compensation movement included Iida Hiroshi, the unit commander for Zheng Chunhe in the East Indies (chapter 6). In 1991, Iida visited Taiwan to apologize for his government's lack of war compensation and donated one hundred thousand yen to Zheng and nineteen other Taiwanese colleagues from his former unit. Katō Kunihiko, *Isshi dōjin no hate: Taiwanjin moto gunzoku no kyōgū* (Keisō Shobō, 1979), 62–87; Chou, *Taiji Ribenbing*, 105–107, 138–41; Zheng, *Taiwanjin moto shiganhei*, 219–20.

74. For more on postwar compensation activism by Zheng Sheng, pictured center in figure E.3, see Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 623–44.

75. In total, the Japanese government paid ¥600 billion to 30,000 individuals in "condolence money" (*chōikin*), not to be confused with "reparations" (*baishō*).

76. Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers*, 169; Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 216–22.

77. Huang Tianzhong (chapter 5), Zheng Chunhe (chapter 6), and other veterans voiced such sentiments in postwar oral interviews and memoirs. Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 431; Zheng, *Taiwanjin moto shiganhei*, 47, 209.

78. For example, see Cai Xinke, the naval policeman in Hainan (chapter 5). Ts'ai and Wu, *Zouguo liangge shidai*, 513.

79. On the Taiwanese compensation movement, see Zhang Zijing, *Taiwan moto Nihon Kaigun Rikusentai gunjin gunzoku izuko ni* (Taizhong: Lianbang shuju, 1984).

80. Robert Hoppens, *The China Problem in Postwar Japan: National Identity and Sino-Japanese Relations* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2015), 27–29; Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-Building*, 218–19. On Japanese military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, notably by Japanese veterans called the "White Group" (C. Baituan) that trained GMD soldiers from 1949 to 1969, see Kushner, *Men to Devils*, chap. 5.

81. Exceptions to ROC veteran benefits were Taiwanese who served in the GMD military against the CCP. On Taiwanese soldiers who fought in the Chinese Civil War (1945–49), see Shi-chi Mike Lan, "L'Etranger across the Taiwan Strait: History of the Civil War Taiwanese Kuomintang Solders," in *Becoming Taiwan: from Colonialism to Democracy*, ed. Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 135–46.

82. Wen-hsin Yeh, "A Quiet Revolution: Oppositional Politics and the Writing of Taiwanese History," in *Mobile Horizons: Dynamics across the Taiwan Strait*, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2013), 263.

83. Shi-chi Mike Lan, "(Re-)writing History of the Second World War: Forgetting and Remembering the Taiwanese-Native Japanese Soldiers in Postwar Taiwan," *positions: asia critique* 21, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 806. On political controversies over Taipei's war memorial in Zhongshan Hall since the 2000s, see Kirk A. Denton, *The Landscape of Historical Memory: The Politics of Museums and Memorial Culture in Post–Martial Law Taiwan* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2021), chap. 5.

84. Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-Building*, 212; Lan, "(Re-)writing History," 802–804, 813–14; Yeh, "Quiet Revolution."

85. Academia Sinica is an ROC-sponsored research institution. Lan, "(Re-)writing History," 814–22.

86. Lan, "(Re-)writing History," 823–30, 833; Huang, "Ethnic Diversity," 134.

87. An estimated 2,000 Taiwanese served as comfort women. Historians have estimated the total number of comfort women across Japan's empire to be as low as 45,000 and as high as 200,000. Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II*, trans. Suzanne O'Brien (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 3, 7–8, 86–92; Chu Te-lan [Zhu Delan], *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu* (Akashi Shoten, 2005), 13, 18.

88. Thomas J. Ward, "The Comfort Women Controversy: Lessons from Taiwan." *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 16, no. 8 (April 2018): 1, 5–6.

89. Chu, *Taiwan Sōtokufu to ianfu*; Ward, "Comfort Women Controversy," 1–5.

90. According to the Asian Women's Fund, more than one hundred former comfort women accepted Japanese payments. Scholars have noted that most were likely from the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Indonesia who had little hope of receiving aid from their own governments. Thomas Ward notes that a number of Taiwanese and South Korean women also accepted the funds. Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*, 23–24; Ward, "Comfort Women Controversy," 5.

91. Peipei Qiu, with Su Zhiliang and Chen Lifei, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 177–78.

92. Asano Toyomi, "Historical Perceptions of Taiwan's Japan Era," in *Toward a History beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations*, ed. Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia

Center, 2012), 304–12; Rwei-ren Wu, "Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism," in *Taiwan's Struggle: Voices of the Taiwanese*, ed. Shyu-tu Lee and Jack F. Williams (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 23–29.

93. Shogo Suzuki, "The Competition to Attain Justice for Past Wrongs: The 'Comfort Women' Issue in Taiwan," *Pacific Affairs* 84, no. 2 (June 2011): 230–32. On Taiwan's strategic importance to the PRC, see Alan Wachman, *Why Taiwan?: Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

94. Suzuki, "Competition to Attain Justice," 233; Leo T. S. Ching, *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019), chap. 4; Barak Kushner, "Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, Taiwan, and China since 1990," *The International History Review* 30, no. 4 (December 2010): 793–820.

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Taiwan Nanpō Dozoku
Taiwan no Chagyō
Taiwan Shuppan Keisatsuhō
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