

Alert 2008!

Report on conflicts,
human rights
and peace-building

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êçp escola de
cultura de pau

Icaria ✿ editorial

Report completed January 2008.

Edited by: Icaria editorial / Escola de Cultura de Pau, UAB

Printed: Indústria Gràfica Frapé

Covert design: Lucas Wainer Mattosso

ISBN: 978-84-7426-978-9

Legal registry no.:

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The authors are particularly grateful for the help received during their preparation of this report from Vicens Vives publishers, along with the whole team at the UAB's *School for a Culture of Peace*.

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Sumario

Alerta 2008: Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz es un estudio que anualmente realiza la *Escola de Cultura de Pau* de la *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, y que sintetiza el estado del mundo al finalizar el año a partir del análisis de varios indicadores. Para hacer el informe se han utilizado 22 indicadores, agrupados en ocho grandes apartados: conflictos armados, tensiones, procesos de paz, rehabilitación posbélica y acompañamiento internacional, crisis humanitarias, desarme, derechos humanos y justicia transicional y dimensión de género en la construcción de paz. La descripción y el análisis de lo que ha ocurrido en el mundo a lo largo del año a través de estos indicadores pueden ayudarnos a conocer mejor

los avances, los retrocesos y las dinámicas de diversa índole que afectan al conjunto de la humanidad. La mayoría de estos indicadores, una vez entrecruzados, pueden ayudarnos también a comprender las influencias de unos factores sobre otros. La comparación de estos datos con los de años anteriores da al informe un carácter de alerta preventiva sobre algunas tendencias generales o sobre la situación de determinados países, lo que puede resultar útil, entre otras cosas, para el rediseño de las políticas exteriores, de cooperación al desarrollo y de transferencias de armas, así como para elaborar políticas de prevención de conflictos armados y que permitan consolidar procesos de paz y de rehabilitación posbélica en el mundo.

Sumari

Alerta 2008: Informe sobre conflictes, drets humans i construcció de pau és un estudi que anualment realitza l'Escola de Cultura de Pau de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, i que sintetitza l'estat del món al finalitzar l'any a partir de l'anàlisi de diversos indicadors. Per a fer l'informe s'han utilitzat 22 indicadors, agrupats en vuit grans apartats: conflictes armats, tensions, processos de pau, rehabilitació postbèlica i acompanyament internacional, crisis humanitàries, desarmament, drets humans i justícia transicional i dimensió de gènere en la construcció de pau. La descripció i l'anàlisi del que ha ocorregut en el món al llarg de l'any a través d'aquests indicadors, pot ajudar-nos a conèixer millor els avenços, els retrocessos i les dinàmiques de diversa

índole que afecten al conjunt de la humanitat. La majoria d'aquests indicadors, una vegada entrecruats, poden ajudar-nos també a comprendre les influències d'uns factors sobre uns altres. La comparació d'aquestes dades amb les dels anys anteriors dona a l'informe un caràcter d'alerta preventiva sobre algunes tendències generals o sobre la situació de determinats països, la qual cosa pot resultar útil, entre d'altres, per a redisenyar polítiques exteriors, de cooperació al desenvolupament i de transferències d'armes, així com per a elaborar polítiques en termes de prevenció de conflictes armats i que permetin consolidar processos de pau i de rehabilitació postbèlica arreu del món.

Summary

Alert 2008: Report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building is a study carried out annually by the the *School for a Culture of Peace* at the *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. 22 indicators have been used in the preparation of this report, divided into eight large groups: armed conflicts, tensions, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation and international involvement, humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and transitional justice and gender issues in peace-building. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout this year, based on these indicators, helps to provide a greater knowledge of the

advances, reverses and dynamics of various kinds that affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during the previous years means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general tendencies or a particular situation in individual countries, something that may be useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfers, as well as for the development of policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

Sommaire

Alerte 2008: Rapport sur les conflits, les droits de la personne et la construction de la paix est un rapport annuel réalisé par l'École de Culture de la Paix de la *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, qui synthétise l'état du monde de l'année à partir de l'analyse de plusieurs indicateurs. Pour élaborer ce rapport, 22 indicateurs, regroupés en huit grands chapitres, ont été utilisés. À savoir, les conflits armés, les tensions, les processus de paix, la réhabilitation d'après-guerre et accompagnement international, les crises humanitaires, le désarmement, les droits de la personne et la justice transitionnel, et la perspective de genre dans la construction de la paix. La description et l'analyse, par moyen de ces indicateurs, des événements qui se sont produits dans le monde tout au long de l'année peut

nous aider à mieux connaître les progressions, les reculs, et toute autre tendance touchant l'ensemble de l'humanité. La plupart de ces indicateurs, une fois superposés, peuvent aider aussi à comprendre les interdépendances entre certains facteurs. La comparaison de ces données avec celles des années précédentes fait de ce rapport une mise en garde préventive sur certaines tendances générales ou sur la situation de certains pays. Cet instrument peut donc être utile, entre autres, à la redéfinition des politiques extérieures, de coopération au développement et de transferts d'armes, ainsi qu'à l'élaboration des politiques de prévention de conflits armés qui permettent d'assurer la consolidation de processus de paix et de réhabilitation d'après-guerre dans le monde.

List of indicators

1. ARMED CONFLICTS

1. Countries in armed conflict

2. TENSIONS

2. Countries in a situation of tension

3. PEACE PROCESSES

3. Countries with formal peace or negotiating processes or talks in an exploratory phase

4. POST-WAR REHABILITATION (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT)

4. Countries that receive international aid for post-war rehabilitation

5. HUMANITARIAN CRISES

5. Countries facing food emergencies
6. Countries in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced
7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee
8. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 2008

6. MILITARIZATION AND DISARMAMENT

9. Countries whose military spending exceeds 4% of GDP
10. Countries in which military spending exceeds public spending on health and education

11. Countries in which the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population

12. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the UN Security Council

13. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the EU and the OSCE

14. Countries with DDR programmes

7. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

15. Countries that have not ratified the United Nation's main legal instruments on human rights and International Humanitarian Law

16. Countries with serious and systematic human rights violations according to non-governmental sources

17. Countries giving cause for concern in relations with human rights violations according to the European Union

18. Countries giving cause of concern in relation to human rights violations according to reports from the special mechanisms and resolutions adopted at by the UNHRC and the UN General Assembly's Third Committee

19. Countries that apply or maintain the death penalty

20. Countries of origin of people who have obtained political asylum

21. Countries with an ongoing transitional justice processes

8. GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING

22. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

Glossary

- ACH:** Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
ADF: Afghanistan Development Forum
AF: Government armed forces
AIG: Armed Islamic Group
AMIB: African Mission in Burundi
ANA: Albanian National Army
ANDS: Afghan National Development Strategy
APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference
APRD: *Armée Populaire pour la Réstauration de la République et de la Démocratie*
AU: African Union
AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)
BICC: Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BINUB: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BIPP: Islamic Liberation Front of Pattani
BLA: Baluchistan Liberation Army
BONUCA: United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic
BRA: Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BRN: *Barasi Revolusi Nasional*
CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CAP: United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
CARICOM: Caribbean Community
CAR: Central African Republic
CAVR: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CEDAW: Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CERF: Central Emergency Relief Fund
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CLAVE: Latin American Coalition for the Prevention of Armed Violence
CODHES: *Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CPI: Corruption Perception Index
CPLA: Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
CPP: Communist Party of the Philippines
CVO: Civil Volunteer Organization
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID: Department for International Development
DIAG: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
Dollars: US dollars
DRM: Democratic Republican Movement
EAR: European Agency for Reconstruction
ECHA: Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO: European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EEBC: Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission
ELN: *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army)
ESCR: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EU BAM Rafah: EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
EUFOR ALTHEA: EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUJUST LLEX: Integrated EU Mission for the Force of Law in Iraq
EUJUST THEMIS: EU Mission to reform the justice system in Georgia
EUPAT: EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia
EUPM: EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL COPPS: EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL – KINSHASA: EU Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUPOL Proxima: EU Police Mission in Macedonia
EUSEC DR Congo: EU Security Reform Aid Mission in DR Congo
EZLN: *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
FAd'H: *Forces Armées d'Haiti* (Haiti Armed Forces)
FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FCD: Cabindan Forum for Dialogue
FDD: *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
FDLR: *Forces Démocratiques de Libération de Rwanda* (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FKM: *Front Kedaulatan Maluku* (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)
FLAA: *Front de Libération d' Aïr et Azawak*
FLEC-FAC: *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas de Cabinda*
FLEC: *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front)
FNL: *Forces Nationales de Libération* (National Liberation Force)
FUC : *Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique* (United Front for Democratic Change)
GAM: *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Movement for Free Aceh)
GDI: Gender-related Development Index
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GEMAP: Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme
GIMP: Muslim Mujahideen Movement of Pattani
GPP: *Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix* (Patriotic Grouping for Peace)
GRIP: European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security
GSPC: Salafist Group for Call and Combat
HDI: Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HRW: Human Rights Watch
IANSA: International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL: International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICC: International Criminal Court
ICCR: International Criminal Court for Rwanda
ICCY: International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia
ICG: International Crisis Group
ICO: Islamic Conference Organisation
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDA: International Development Association
IDF: Iraq Development Fund
IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
IFM: Isatubu Freedom Movement
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM: IGAD Mission in Somalia
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
IRIS: *Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Institute for International and Strategic Relations)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
ISDR: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
KANU: Kenya African National Union
KFOR: NATO Kosovo force
KNU: Karen National Union
LIPRODHOR: Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights
LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
MDJT: *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad)
MDF: Meckauvi Defence Force
MFDC: *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Movement for Justice and Peace)
MLC: *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)
MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF: *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders)
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Treaty
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCP: National Congress Party
NDC: National Democratic Congress
NDF: National Democratic Front
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Front
NDV: Niger Delta Vigilante
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
NLA: National Liberation Army
NLD: National League for Democracy
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMRD: National Movement for Reform and Development
NPA: New People's Army
NPP: New Patriotic Party
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
NRF: National Redemption Front
NSCN (IM): National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak - Muivah
OAS: Organisation of American States
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA: Official Development Aid
OECD: Organisation for Economic Trade and Development
OLM: Oromo Liberation Front
OMCT: World Organisation Against Torture
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUB: United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUCI: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ONUGBIS: United Nations Office in Guinea-Bissau
OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)
OSAGI: Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCT: Congolese Workers' Party
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PIC: Peace Implementation Council
PIOOM: The Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PULO: Pattani United Liberation Organisation
PWG: People's War Group
RAFD: Rally of Democratic Forces
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RDL: *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté* (Rally for Democracy and Liberty)
RFTF: Results Focused Transnational Framework
RSM: *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of South Moluccas)
SADC: South African Development Community
SCUD: Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy
SFOR: Stabilisation Force for Bosnia Herzegovina
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SSDF: South Sudanese Defence Forces

TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TNG: Transitional National Government
UAB: *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (Autonomous University of Barcelona)
UFDR : *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement*
UFDD: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development
UIC: Union of Islamic Courts
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam
UN: United Nations
UNAIDS: United Nations Programs on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA: United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID: United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIS: United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEP: United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKON: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIOSIL: United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNITA: *União para a Independência Total de Angola* (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN: United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMISSET: United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMPO: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring and Verification of Inspections Commission
UNO: United Nations Organisation
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOTIL: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
UNPOS: United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace-Building Mission
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Middle East
UNTAETN United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste
UNTOP: United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WB: World Bank
WFP: World Food Programme
WHO: World Health Organisation
WPC: Women’s Peace Coalition
WTO: World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

Introduction

“Alert 2008: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building” is a yearbook published by the School for a Culture of Peace of Barcelona Autonomous University, which synthesises the information about the state of the world at the end of the year based on an analysis of various indicators, and highlights the most important information related to conflicts and peace-building.¹

In this current report “Alert 2008”, 22 indicators have been used, grouped under five general headings, namely: conflicts and peace building, humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and transitional justice, and the dimension of gender in peace building. The description and analysis of what has happened in the world during the year based on these indicators can help to give a better understanding of the advances, the setbacks and the different types of dynamics that affect humanity as a whole. Most of these indicators, once they are cross checked, may also help us to understand the influences of certain factors on others, and a comparison of these data with those for previous years gives the report the nature of a preventive warning on some of the general trends and on the situation of certain countries and regions. This can certainly be useful, among other things, for redesigning foreign policy, cooperation for development, control of arms trading, as well as initiating specific policies for the prevention of armed conflicts which will allow the consolidation of peace processes, human rights and contexts of post war rehabilitation.

A general glance at the set of indicators for 2007 shows a consolidation or permanence of many negative trends that should have been given greater attention or handled differently to the way in which they are currently dealt with. The number of armed conflicts has remained stable at levels similar to those in previous years, as has the intensity of many of those conflicts. It should be pointed out that most of these conflicts are not of a very ideological nature. Half of them have had serious repercussions at a regional level, and the situation in the Sudanese region of Darfur is, in this sense, a paradigm of the repercussions that an internal conflict may have on its neighbours, as well as a spotlight on our inability to prevent and mitigate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people. It is also significant that the number of conflicts involving aspirations to identity is on the increase and consequently adequate formulas of self government are sought in many negotiations. Therefore the achievement of an “intermediate political architecture” which satisfies the conflicting parties is still a matter to be resolved in peace building policies, despite the fact that in recent years a wide

range of proposals have been put forward that may lead to positive results in the short term. We can also see the perverse relationship between the possession of important natural resources, especially sources of energy and minerals, and the perpetuation of armed conflicts in the regions which possess such wealth. Added to this are the problems of poverty and marginalisation, and this calls into question the policies of many transnational companies and their lack of social responsibility in those areas where they operate, as well as the complicity of various governments in maintaining situations which provide dividends to the very limited sectors of the population who hold the power.

The report also focuses on the numerous situations of political or social tension found in many countries, whether due to a lack of democracy, of governability, or of respect for human rights, or to economic crises, external dependency or adverse natural factors – the latter being linked to a large extent to global climate change and its negative impact on areas of the world which were already extremely vulnerable. There is an urgent need, therefore, to create global strategies to fight poverty that are linked to global environmental improvement, since the link between many humanitarian crises and the deterioration of the environment is clear, as is the negative ecological impact on some continents, caused by irresponsible industrial and consumer policies whose origins lie far from the lands that they affect.

Unlike the previous two years, 2007 was not a year characterised by the initiation or the finalisation of peace processes. With the exception of the Côte d’Ivoire, which in 2008 may be able to resume a certain degree of normality, the negotiations underway to bring an end to armed violence have run into serious difficulties, and the level of women’s participation in such negotiations along with issues of gender in the agreements that have been reached has continued to be extremely low. Despite this, it is still positive that in three out of four conflicts negotiations at a greater or lesser degree of formality are in place, although they face the same type of challenges that occur year after year (splits in the armed groups that have to enter into negotiations, problems with the mechanisms of mediation or facilitation, insecurity and mistrust between the parties, etc.), but an awareness of such difficulties may help us to avoid some of the most obvious obstacles in these processes. It has also become obvious that it is extremely difficult to begin peace processes in countries that have suffered foreign occupation, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and this forces us to think again about the militarist strategies of the last few years.

1. The “Alert 2008” report completes and analyses the information that the Programme on Conflict and Peace-building publishes fortnightly in “Semáforo”, which covers international current affairs. In turn, “Semáforo” is analysed every quarter in the publication “Barómetro”. Other aspects analysed in this report are also examined in more depth in other publications which can be consulted on our website: www.escolapau.org

Similarly, 2007 has shown that it is enormously difficult to rehabilitate countries in which armed conflicts continue to exist alongside the fears that prevent refugees or displaced persons returning home.


Although there was a slight decrease in the number of humanitarian crises in 2007, there was an increase in the number of refugees caused by armed conflicts and the number of people who, as a result of armed conflicts and natural disasters had to move from their places of origin in conditions of extreme fragility and uncertainty. These conditions also affected the work of the humanitarian organisations, and highlight the decline in many situations caused by a combination of tensions, insecurity, underdevelopment, poor government, accumulation of arms, marginalisation and the looting of natural resources. Related to this situation is the changing trend taking place in the arms race, with a return to the dynamics of the past (increase in military spending, nuclear proliferation, increase in arms exports, lack of control of light weapons traded on the black market, etc.)

Fortunately, a hopeful sign is that societies are becoming more aware of these problems, and many groups are participating in international campaigns aimed at countering these trends. The fight against the mass production of anti-personnel landmines, the recruitment of child soldiers, the degradation of the environment and the proliferation of light weapons, are just a few examples of topics which have moved into the public domain and are appearing on the agendas of many governments and international organisations. Nevertheless, the data provided in this "Alert 2008" report are

an example of the ambivalence that dominates the world, where advances and setbacks occur at the same time. A glance at the situation of human rights throughout the world offers a palpable evidence of the fact that negative dynamics exist and are able to relegate into second or third place what appeared previously to be consolidated advances achieved after many decades of effort. Thus, in this report we have attempted for the first time to include a list of the opportunities for peace that could be resolved satisfactorily during the year, as a way of examining our own ability to transform the present situation. Never in the history of mankind have there been so many possibilities for communication, and that means being able to share information, design strategies to influence and alter what seems negative or destructive and to feel ourselves to be members of a single community, the human community, in which we have to learn to live together in such a way that we do not alter the fragile balance that ensures that the world we live in, although seriously ill, remains alive.

The publication of this yearbook, like the other publications and activities of the *Escola de Cultura de Pau*, has been possible thanks to the support of the Generalitat de Catalunya, and in particular the *Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament*, which has allowed us not only to monitor what is happening in the world, but also to put forward proposals and carry out actions for improvements, wherever possible.

Vicenç Fisas
Director of the *Escola de Cultura de Pau*



1. Armed conflicts

- A total of 30 armed conflicts were reported during 2007, 28 of which remained ongoing at the end of the year.
- The vast majority of armed conflicts can be found in Asia (12) and Africa (10), with the remainder in the Middle East (5), Europe (2) and America (1).
- Hostilities ended in two contexts: Côte d'Ivoire, with positive developments in the implementation of the peace agreement and advances in the DDR process, and Lebanon, where Lebanese armed forces defeated the Fatah al-Islam group at the Naher al-Bared camp for Palestinian refugees.
- The most serious armed conflicts currently being fought are in Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (Kivus), Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan (Darfur).
- The level of hostilities rose in 14 of the 28 conflicts still underway at the end of 2007, while there was a reduction in violence in four contexts: India (Jammu and Kashmir); Iraq; Palestine (between Hamas and Fatah) and Yemen.
- More than half of all armed conflicts in 2007 were connected with demands for increased self-government or questions of identity.

This section contains an analysis of the armed conflicts being fought around the world during 2007 (indicator no. 1). The chapter is divided into four sections: the first includes a map showing the countries in which some form of armed conflict was taking place during 2007, the second offers a description of the different armed conflicts currently underway, the third contains an analysis of global trends in armed conflicts in 2007, while the last discusses the way they have evolved over the past year, with special emphasis on the status of each one at the end of the year.

1.1. Armed conflicts: definition

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving armed groups of regular or irregular forces whose individual aims are seen as incompatible with one another, in which the continuous and organised use of violence: a) claims at least 100 lives per year and/or has a serious impact on the ground (the destruction of infrastructure or natural resources) and human security (e.g. the injury or displacement of civilians, sexual violence, a lack of food security, an impact on mental health and the social fabric or the disruption of basic services); and b) seeks to attain objectives that go beyond common criminality and are normally associated with:

- demands for self-government or questions of identity;
- opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system in a particular state or the domestic or international policies of an individual government, which in either case gives rise to a struggle to accede to or erode power; or
- control over resources or territory.

Figure 1.1. Phases of conflict




Table 1.1. Summary of armed conflicts during 2007

| Conflict ¹ [start date] | Type ² | Main parties involved ³ | Intensity ⁴ Evolution during 2007 |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Africa | | | |
| Algeria [1992] | Internationalised internal | Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb | 2 |
| | System | | ↑ |
| Chad [2006] | Internationalised internal | Government, FUC, UFDD, Fundamental UFDD, RFC, CNT, CAR and SCUD, Janjaweed militias, Sudan | 3 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Côte d'Ivoire [2002-2007] | Internationalised internal | Government, Forces Nouvelles, pro-government militias | 1 |
| | Government, Resources | | Ended |
| Ethiopia (Ogaden) [2007] | Internal | Government, ONLF, OLF | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Nigeria (Niger Delta) [2001] | Internal | Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security forces | 2 |
| | Resources, Identity | | = |
| Central African Rep. [2006] | Internationalised internal | Government, APRD, UFRD, UFR | 2 |
| | Government | | = |
| DR Congo (east) [1998] | Internationalised internal | Government, Mai-Mai militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR, Rasta militias, Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (General Laurent Nkunda), MONUC international mission (UN) | 3 |
| | Identity, Government, Resources | | ↑ |
| Somalia [1988] | Internationalised internal | Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (the Islamic Courts Union, political and armed opposition groups), Ethiopia, Eritrea, USA, warlords, Jihadist insurgency, Hawiye Tradition and Unity Council | 3 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Sudan (Darfur) [2003] | Internationalised internal | Government, pro-government Janjaweed militias, various factions of the SLA armed group, JEM, NRMD, NRF | 3 |
| | Self-government, Resources, Identity | | ↑ |
| Uganda (north) [1986] | Internationalised internal | Government, LRA | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| America | | | |
| Colombia [1964] | Internal | Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries | 3 |
| | System | | = |
| Asia | | | |
| Afghanistan [2001] | Internationalised internal | Government, international coalition (led by the USA), Taliban militias, international ISAF mission (NATO), warlords | 3 |
| | System | | ↑ |
| Philippines (NPA) [1969] | Internal | Government, NPA | 2 |
| | System | | = |
| Philippines (Mindanao -MILF) [1978] | Internal | Government, MILF | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Philippines (Mindanao- Abu Sayyaf) [1991] | Internationalised internal | Government, Abu Sayyaf | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity, System | | ↑ |
| India (Assam) [1983] | Internationalised internal | Government, ULFA, DHD | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| India (Jammu and Kashmir) [1989] | Internationalised internal | Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↓ |

| Conflict [start date] | Type | Main parties involved | Intensity |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | | Evolution during 2007 |
| Asia | | | |
| India (Manipur) [1982] | Internal | Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| India (CPI-M) [1967] | Internal | Government, CPI-M | 2 |
| Myanmar [1948] | System | Government, armed ethnic groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNLA, KNU/KNPLAC, SSNPLO) | = |
| | Internal | | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Pakistan (northwest) [2001] | Internationalised internal | Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias | 2 |
| | System | | ↑ |
| Sri Lanka (northeast) [1983] | Internal | Government, LTTE, LTTE (faction led by Colonel Karuna) | 3 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Thailand (south) [2004] | Internal | Government, armed secessionist groups | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| Europe | | | |
| Russia (Chechnya) [1999] | Internal | Russian federal government, regional pro-Russian government, armed Chechen groups | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity, System | | = |
| Turkey (southeast) [1984] | Internationalised internal | Government, PKK | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Middle East | | | |
| Iraq [2003] | Internationalised internal | International coalition led by the USA/United Kingdom, internal and external armed opposition groups | 3 |
| | System, Government, Resources | | ↓ |
| Israel-Palestine [2000] | International | Israeli government, colonist militias, PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity, Territory | | = |
| Palestine [2006] | Internal | PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades) | 2 |
| | Government | | ↓ |
| Lebanon (Naher al-Bared) [2007] | Internationalised internal | Government, Fatah al-Islam | 2 |
| | System | | Ended |
| Yemen [2004] | Internal | Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen) | 2 |
| | System | | ↓ |

1: Low intensity; 2: Medium intensity; 3: High intensity; ↑: Escalation in violence; ↓: Reduction in violence; = : unchanged; Ended: no longer classified as an armed conflict

1. This column names the states in which armed conflicts are taking place. The reference in brackets indicates the region of the state affected by the conflict or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict, the latter being used when there is more than one armed conflict on the same state or in the same territory within the state, in order to differentiate between them.
2. This report classifies and analyses armed conflicts on the basis of a two-fold classification which, on the one hand, takes account of the causes or the incompatibility of the interests involved and, on the other, looks at the convergence between the place where the conflict is taking place and the parties involved. As far as the causes are concerned, the following basic categories can be identified: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or questions of identity (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system imposed by a state (System) or the domestic or international policies of a particular government (Government), which in both cases lead to a struggle to accede to or erode power; or a fight to control resources (Resources) or territory (Territory). As regards the second method of classification, armed conflicts may be internal, internationalised internal or international in nature. An internal armed conflict is one that involves fighting between armed groups operating exclusively within and from the state in question. An internationalised internal conflict is one in which one of the opposing parties is foreign and/or a conflict in which fighting extends into neighbouring countries. Another factor to be taken into account for classifying a context as being an internationalised internal conflict is whether an armed group has its military bases in a neighbouring state with the collusion of the state in question, launching its attacks from these bases. Finally, an international armed conflict is understood to mean one in which state or non-state forces from two or more countries are engaged in fighting. It must also be remembered that the majority of today's armed conflicts have an important regional or international dimension and influence, due among other factors to the flow of refugees, arms trading, the economic or political interest that neighbouring countries may have in the conflict (such as the legal or illegal exploitation of resources), the participation of foreign combatants and the logistical and military support provided by other states.


1.2. Armed conflicts: global trends in 2007

30 armed conflicts were reported in 2007, 28 of which remained ongoing at the end of the year.⁵ The vast majority were being fought in Asia (12) and Africa (10), with the remainder in the Middle East (5), Europe (2) and America (1). It should be pointed out that apart from the international conflict between Israel and Palestine⁶, approximately half the conflicts were classed as internal (14) and the other half as internationalised internal conflicts (15). Although there are a variety of reasons for almost all of today's conflicts, it is worth noting that 16 of the 30 conflicts refer in the main to a struggle for greater recognition or increased self-government. In the 11 cases in which conflict relates to opposition to a state's political, economic, social or ideological system, eight involve the creation of an Islamic state, among other issues, or have some connection with al-Qaeda (Algeria, Afghanistan, Philippines [Abu Sayyaf], Chechnya, Iraq, Pakistan [north-west], Yemen and the Lebanese Naher al-Bared refugee camp), while in the other three cases (Colombia, Philippines [NPA] and India [CPI-M]), armed groups are seeking the establishment of a socialist-style political and economic regime. In seven cases, five of them in Africa, various armed groups are fighting to accede to power or erode the authority of the central govern-

ment. Finally, in four cases (Nigeria [Niger Delta], DR Congo, Sudan [Darfur] and Iraq), control of resources is a fundamental cause of the conflict, though many other conflicts are also inflamed or heightened by the issue of control over resources or land.

As far as intensity is concerned, in eight cases (Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo [east], Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan [Darfur]) a large part of the year was marked by very high levels of violence that led to well over 1,000 deaths. The majority of conflicts (17) were classed as being of medium intensity, while of the six low-intensity conflicts (India (Jammu and Kashmir), India (Manipur), Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Côte d'Ivoire, Philippines (MILF) and Uganda), peace or cessation of hostilities agreements were signed during the course of this or previous years by the last three. As regards evolution during the year, 15 of the 28 conflicts still underway at the end of the year (54%) saw an increase in hostilities, while the situation showed no significant change in 9 cases and lower levels of violence were reported in the remaining 4 (Iraq; Jammu and Kashmir; between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine; and Yemen). It should also be pointed out that hostilities ended in two contexts: Côte d'Ivoire, with the positive implementation of the peace agreement and advances in the DDR process, and Lebanon, where Lebanese armed forces defeated the Fatah al-Islam group at the Naher al-Bared Palestinian


Graph 1.1. Number of armed conflicts by region



3. The main parties involved in armed conflicts are formed from an amalgam of regular and irregular armed forces. Conflicts usually involve fighting between the government or its own armed forces and one or more armed opposition groups, though they may also extend to other irregular groups such as clans, guerrillas, warlords, armed groups that are fighting one another or the militias formed by ethnic or religious groups. Although those involved mostly use conventional weaponry, particularly small arms (which cause 90% of all deaths in conflict, the victims being mostly women and children), other forms of attack are frequently used, such as suicide bombs, attacks, sexual violence and even starvation as an instrument of war.
4. The intensity of an armed conflict (high, medium or low) and the way it has evolved over the year (escalation in violence, reduction in violence, unchanged) is mainly assessed on the basis of the number of people killed and its impact on the local population and territory. However, other factors need to be taken into consideration, such as the systematisation and frequency of the violence reported and the complexity of the dispute itself (complexity is normally associated with the number and fragmentation of the parties involved, the level of state institutionalisation and capacity and the degree to which the conflict has become internationalised, along with the flexibility of the stated objectives and the political willingness of the parties involved to reach an agreement). Thus, the intensity of an armed conflict is classified as high when more than 1,000 people die every year, large areas of territory and a high proportion of the population are affected and a significant number of parties are involved (with the subsequent alliances, confrontations or tacit coexistence that this entails). Medium- and low-level conflicts are those in which more than 100 deaths are reported every year while the foregoing factors have a smaller range and less impact. An armed conflict is considered to have ended when there is a significant and sustained decrease in armed hostilities, either due to a military victory, an agreement between the sides, or because one of the parties to the conflict gives up or reduces in a significant way the use of the armed struggle as a strategy for the achievement of certain aims. Any of these options does not necessarily imply the resolution of the root causes of an armed conflict and neither does it exclude the possibility of a new outbreak of violence. The formal or tacit temporary suspension of hostilities does not necessarily imply the end of an armed conflict.
5. This year saw the end of one existing armed conflict (Côte d'Ivoire) and the outbreak and end of another (Naher al-Bared), while in Ethiopia (Ogaden) there was a considerable increase in violence during 2007, meaning that it was classified as a new armed conflict. This number of 28 ongoing armed conflicts at the end of the year is the same as it was at the end of 2006, the figure for which was revised upwards on the basis of the definitions used in 2007.
6. Although "Palestine" is not an internationally recognised state, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is classified as an "international" rather than an "internal" one as it involves territory that has been illegally occupied and that is not recognised under International Humanitarian Law or any United Nations resolution as belonging to Israel.

refugee camp at the beginning of September. Finally, mention should be made of the importance in overall terms of the cessation of hostilities between the government and the LRA in Uganda and the government and the MILF in the Philippines, leading to progress in the respective peace processes in both cases.⁷

Graph 1.2. Intensity of armed conflicts



On a regional basis, **7 of the 10 armed conflicts in Africa were classified as internationalised internal conflicts**, which underlines the regional spread and the role of neighbouring countries in these contexts. Particularly notable were the links between the armed conflicts in the triangle formed by the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan (Darfur), Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia, the role played by Rwanda in the armed conflict being fought in the east of DR Congo, the operations by the Ugandan LRA in southern Sudan and the financing provided by Uganda for the insurgency in southern Sudan. This internationalised aspect of the conflicts in Africa suggests that a regional approach should be taken when attempting to find a solution. However, the search for solutions is impeded by the huge numbers taking part in the various situations of conflict on the continent. **In 7 of the 10 conflicts, at least 4 armed groups are actively involved in the fighting**, and in the cases of DR Congo, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and Nigeria (Niger Delta) this number rises to more than 10. It should also be pointed out that only 3 of the 10 conflicts (Algeria, Somalia and Uganda) date back more than 15 years, and six began after 2000. This could be an important factor in the search for a resolution to these situations, as in these cases the sides will not yet be so entrenched in their positions. Finally, 60% of the conflicts being fought in Africa include a struggle either to accede to or erode power, due to opposition to the internal or international policies of the government in question.

Asia displays the opposite of some of the trends reported in Africa, in that two-thirds of all armed conflicts **are linked with demands for self-determination or questions of identity, and the majority (58%) are principally internal struggles in which the international dimension is not so obvious nor significant**. It is also worth pointing out that a large number of the armed conflicts being waged on the continent of Asia have been going on for a long time, and more than half of them (the Philippines [NPA and MILF], India [Assam], India [Manipur], India [CPI-M], Myanmar and Sri Lanka

[northeast]) first broke out 25 years ago more. The two main communist armed insurgencies on the continent (the NPA in the Philippines and the CPI-M in India) date back as far as 1969.

At the same time, mention should be made of some of the issues involved in the other contexts around the world that are suffering similar situations of armed violence. Firstly, there is the grave situation affecting Colombia, the only armed conflict currently being fought on the **American continent**. Secondly, **in Europe**, the violence between the army and the PKK in Turkey increased over the course of the year, leading to cross-border attacks by Turkish soldiers on members of the armed group in Iraq, while particular mention should be made of the split between moderate and radical groups in Chechnya following the announcement by rebel leader Dokka Umarov that the armed struggle was to be extended against the enemies of Islam. Finally, four of the five armed conflicts currently being fought in the **Middle East** saw a reduction in levels of violence and even the end of one, at the Lebanese refugee camp Naher al-Bared. However, this does not mean there have been any positive developments in resolving the underlying political arguments that originally gave rise to these situations.

1.3. Armed conflicts: evolution during the year by region

Africa

a) West Africa

| Côte d'Ivoire | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2002 |
| Type: | Government, resources Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Forces Nouvelles, pro-government militias |
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | ENDED |
| Summary: | During 2002, a group of dissident soldiers who would later form part of the Force Nouvelles alliance attacked Abidjan in a failed attempt to depose President Laurent Gbagbo. Since then they have retained control of the northern part of the country. One of the main causes of the uprising was the exclusion of people from the north from the political and decision-making process, along with the social and economic discrimination suffered by this community. The Linas Marcoussis peace agreement was signed in France in 2003, under which a security zone was created and patrolled by the UNOCI mission and the Forces Licorne in an attempt to quell the fighting and enforce a ceasefire. The failure to implement the peace agreement during successive years made reunification of the country impossible. A further political agreement was signed in March 2007 in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and this signalled an end to the conflict. |

7. See the chapter on peace processes.

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the absence of violent incidents during the first months of the year provided an opportunity for political negotiation. Following the UN Security Council's approval of Resolution 1721 (November 2006), in which then prime minister Charles Konan Banny was afforded greater powers, President Laurent Gbagbo proposed the initiation of direct talks with the leader of the Forces Nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. The aim of this meeting would be to restart the stalled peace process, though it was also used as a strategy by Gbagbo to keep the process under his control and prevent any sharing of his presidential powers. The proposal, which was initially rejected by Soro, gradually received the support of ECOWAS, the UN group of experts and, eventually, the UN Security Council, and it also gained the support of the political opposition, which nevertheless asked that talks be extended to include all the political agents involved.⁸ The signing of a **new peace agreement** in March and the subsequent steps towards its implementation finally marked the **end of the armed conflict**. Nevertheless, **the situation during the months following the signing of the agreement remained very fragile**.⁹

| Nigeria (Niger Delta) | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2001 |
| Type: | Resources, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekere, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Summary: | |
| The conflict in the Niger Delta arose out of the failure to attend to demands for control over the profits earned from the oil resources that abound in the area. Several armed groups, one of the most important of which is the MEND (Ijaw), are seeking compensation for the impact that the oil extraction industry is having on their territory, along with a more equal share in the revenues obtained from oil and greater decentralisation from the Nigerian state authorities. The methods most commonly used by the insurgency include attacks on oil installations and military bases and the kidnapping of people working in the sector. This situation has also led to fighting for control over land and resources between the different communities living in the region. | |

The conflict worsened in the **Niger Delta** at the same time that the level of violence escalated around the rest of the country, though this was particularly felt in the Delta region with the approach of parliamentary and presidential elections in April and subsequent allegations of suspected fraud.¹⁰ Attacks continued on police stations and oil platforms, and there were continuing reports of the kidnapping of oil workers by armed groups, mainly the MEND, in protest against both the organisation and the results of the elections. Some conciliatory measures were seen from June, with the decla-

ration of a ceasefire by both the MEND and the NDV, led by Ateke Tom, in an attempt to facilitate dialogue with the government. In the meantime, NDPVF leader Mijahid Dokubo-Asari was freed on bail for health reasons. However, all these gestures of goodwill were overshadowed by the climate of post-election violence. The situation also worsened with fighting in Port Harcourt (Rivers State) between armed groups and rival gangs who had been stirred up by local politicians in an attempt to intimidate their opponents during the elections. In September, **the MEND announced a formal end to its unilateral ceasefire**, in response to the detention in Angola of one of its leading members and alleged spokesperson, Henry Okah – an announcement that it accompanied with a threat to extend its attacks beyond the region and create a large joint offensive with all the groups operating in the Delta.

b) Horn of Africa

| Ethiopia (Ogaden) | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2007 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, ONLF, OLF armed groups |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | |
| Ethiopia has been the scene of secessionist movements and groups opposing central power since the 1970s. The ONLF emerged in 1984 and operates in the Ogaden region, in the southeast of the country, where it is demanding a greater level of autonomy for the Somali community living in the region. The ONLF has on several occasions engaged in insurgency activities beyond the Ogaden region, in conjunction with the OLF, which has been seeking greater autonomy for the Orimiya region since 1973. The Somali government has supported the ONLF against the Ethiopian government, with which it was involved in fighting over the region in 1977 and 1978, a war in which Ethiopia eventually defeated Somalia. The end of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000 led to an increase in government operations aimed at bringing an end to the insurgency in Ogaden, and since the elections in 2005 the level of fighting between Ethiopian armed forces and the ONLF has gradually increased. | |

The situation in the **Ogaden** region of **Ethiopia worsened seriously over the course of the year, with an upsurge in violence and insurgency and counter-insurgency activities** from both the ONLF and the government. In April, the ONLF carried out an attack on a Chinese oil multinational that left 74 people dead. Since then, the government has launched a huge offensive and levels of fighting have gradually increased, with differing figures suggested for the number of dead on both sides, though outside estimates put this figure at several hundred. The ONLF complained of looting, the burning of villages and the killing of dozens of civilians in the region as a result

8. See the chapter on peace processes.

9. See the chapter on tensions.

10. See the chapter on tensions.

of punishment operations by the Ethiopian armed forces against the civilian population suspected of sympathising with the rebels, a complaint also raised by Human Rights Watch. In November, the government partially lifted its restrictions on humanitarian organisations in the area. The UN sent two delegations in September and November, the latter led by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes, who said that although he did not as yet have firm evidence of a humanitarian crisis, attempts should be maximised to prevent one from emerging, and he called for an investigation into the serious human rights violations committed by the army in the region. The ONLF welcomed Holmes's visit, though it stressed that it had been organised by the government so the impression gained by the delegation may be biased. It also observed that the armed forces had engaged in brutal practices against the local people, including the hanging of civilians. Between 650,000 and 1,000,000 people have been displaced as a result of the violence that has broken out in recent months.

The situation in Ogaden worsened seriously with an upsurge in violence and insurgency and counter-insurgency activities from both the ONLF and the government

new period of violence and insecurity, mainly in Mogadishu, where there were a number of attacks on the political authorities and on Somali and Ethiopian soldiers from militias and groups opposing both the TFG and the presence of foreign troops in the country. The fall of the Islamic Courts resulted in the emergence of a Jihadist form of insurgency. **This upsurge in violence caused the number of displaced people to rise to one million, making the humanitarian crisis affecting the country one of the worst in the world.** Around 60% of the inhabitants of Mogadishu (some 600,000 people) have fled since February in order to

escape the fighting taking place in the capital. Given this situation, the USA, the EU and the United Nations put pressure on the TFG to hold a National Reconciliation Conference, though this once again ended in failure.¹¹ At the same time, a conference was held in Asmara in September which brought together the political opposition and members of Islamic groups, leading to the formation of the ALS. The dispute between the country's president and prime minister over control of oil exploration contracts caused a crisis that led to the prime minister's resignation in October and a split in the TFG, which is on the edge of collapse. The lack of security halted the enlargement of the AU mission, whose role is currently irrelevant, leading the UN Security Council to consider replacing it with a UN mission, against the advice of the Secretary-General.

| Somalia | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1988 |
| Type: | Government Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS, an amalgamation of the Union of Islamic Courts [UIC], the political opposition and armed opposition groups), Ethiopia, USA, Eritrea, warlords, the Jihadist insurgency, Hawiye Tradition and the Unity Council |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | The armed conflict and the absence of any effective central authority dates back to 1988, when a coalition of opposition groups rebelled against the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre, finally succeeding in bringing him down three years later. This situation led to a new struggle within the coalition to take advantage of the power vacuum, which has caused the destruction of the country and the deaths of more than 300,000 people since 1991, despite failed attempts at intervention by the international community at the beginning of the 1990s. The different peace processes aimed at creating some form of central authority have come up against various obstacles, a significant one being the particular nature of Somali society, which is divided into a number of clans. Other factors include interference from Ethiopia and the power wielded by the warlords. The last peace initiative in 2004 led to the formation of the TFG, which has looked to Ethiopia for support in its attempts to recover control of the country. |

The situation in **Somalia** worsened considerably after fighting broke out at the end of December 2006 between the TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops, and UIC militias, who were rapidly defeated. This led to a

| Sudan (Darfur) | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2003 |
| Type: | Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, pro-government <i>Janjaweed</i> militias, various factions of the SLA, JEM, NRMD, NRF |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | The conflict in Darfur began in 2003 as the result of demands for greater decentralisation and development of the region voiced by a variety of insurgent groups, mainly the SLA and the JEM. The government responded to this uprising by using its own armed forces and the Arab <i>Janjaweed</i> militias. After a peace agreement was signed (DPA) between the government and one faction of the SLA in May 2006, levels of violence have risen and opposition groups have fragmented. An AU mission (AMIS) has been operational on the ground since 2004. |

In the Sudanese region of **Darfur**, 2007 was marked by persistently high levels of violence, despite the fact that peace talks still continued and **the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a joint AU/UN peace-keeping mission** known as UNAMID. This force will comprise 26,000 troops, which will include the current members of the AMIS mission. Control and command of UNAMID will be the responsibility of the UN. The majority of the mission's members will be African, and it will act under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the

11. See the chapter on peace processes.

conditions imposed by Khartoum will mean that UNAMID will not become operational until the beginning of 2008, and the restrictions imposed threaten to render it inoperable on the ground. Khartoum announced that it would not accept any European soldiers in the mission and demanded that any non-African members be either Pakistanis or Chinese. The JEM accused China of collaborating with the government because of its interest in oil resources in the area, announcing that Chinese members of UNAMID would not be granted access to the areas under its control. However, the situation in Darfur remained unchanged, with continuing acts of violence, human rights violations, the bombing of civilian targets and the displacement of the population. In a further indication of the prevailing complexity of the situation, two new armed coalitions were formed.¹² The multiplication of the number of armed groups involved, the increasing violence among Arab clans, the new power alliances and the need to include representatives from the Arab population in peace negotiations all increased tensions, according to warnings from the ICG.¹³

In the east of DR Congo the increased violence and the lack of security led to the displacement of half a million people during 2007

in North Kivu province. The fighting between government armed forces and dissident forces from the CNDP led by Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda, along with the human rights violations committed by all sides, led to the displacement of half a million people during 2007, particularly in North Kivu province, bringing the total number of displaced to 1.4 million by November. Acts of violence were also reported in South Kivu. However, in the Ituri district, the demobilisation process advanced favourably and the lack of security was reduced.¹⁴

There was also fighting between Mai Mai militias, the FDLR and Nkunda's militias during the course of the year. It should be remembered that at the beginning of the year Nkunda had reached a ceasefire agreement with the government, under which his forces were integrated into five so-called mixed brigades. These brigades committed human rights violations against the civilian population during the year and also carried out a number of offensives against the FDLR. However, after months of disagreement and threats to call off the ceasefire, Laurent Nkunda finally called a halt to the integration process at the end of August. This was partly caused by the government's decision to suspend the offensive against the FDLR with the aim of resuming talks. Since then there has been an upsurge in violence, and the army has threatened a large-scale military offensive to force the disarmament of all the militias operating in the east of the country, with support from MONUC, as part of the undertaking made by DR Congo and Rwanda in November.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

| DR Congo (east) | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1998 |
| Type: | Government, Identity, Resources Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Mai-Mai militias, armed Ituri groups, Rwandan Hutu FDLR armed group, Rasta militias, Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP, General Laurent Nkunda) |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | The current conflict originated with the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila in 1996 against Mobutu Sese Seko, which eventually caused the latter to hand over power in 1997. During the following year, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, together with a number of armed groups, attempted to overthrow Kabila, who in turn received help from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in a war that has left around four million people dead. Control over the country's natural resources and their exploitation contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict and the continuing presence of foreign troops. The signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1999 and various peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of foreign forces and the formation of a transitional government. This was followed by the introduction of an elected government in 2006, though this has not meant an end to violence in the country, given the presence of factions of groups that have not yet demobilised, as well as the FDLR, which was responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. |

The situation in the east of **DR Congo** was marked by **worsening levels of violence and lack of security, mainly**

| Central African Republic | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2006 |
| Type: | Government Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, APRD, UFRD, UFR |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Summary: | During 2006, the situation in the country worsened considerably as a result of increased activities by a number of insurgent groups who are challenging the legitimacy of the François Bozizé government, which took power following a coup d'état against President Ange Félix Patassé during 2002 and 2003. The Bozizé government has been accused of mismanaging public funds and dividing the nation. The insurgency is being fought on two fronts. Firstly, in the densely populated central and north-western parts of the country, the APRD, led by Bedaya N'Djadder, has challenged the Bozizé government and demanded changes to the way that political power is distributed. Secondly, there has been an increase in insurgency operations in the northeast of the country by groups belonging to the UFDR coalition. The government has worsened the situation further by holding civilian groups responsible for collaborating with the insurgency. |

12. See the chapter on peace processes.

13. International Crisis Group, *Darfur's New Security Reality*, 26/11/07, at <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5180>>.

14. See the chapters on peace processes and disarmament.

The north of the **Central African Republic** continued to suffer a serious humanitarian crisis as a result of the persisting violence and lack of security, leading the number of displaced to rise further to 280,000 people. In September, Human Rights Watch accused government armed forces of executing hundreds of civilians since the middle of 2005, burning more than 10,000 homes and causing the exodus of hundreds of thousands of people in the north of the country. That same month, Amnesty International also accused the armed insurgency, criminal gangs operating in the north of the country and state security forces of serious violations. However, some positive developments were reported during 2007, such as the peace agreement reached between the government and the UFDR coalition, though this has yet to be implemented. At the same time, President Bozizé invited the APRD to take part in the planned process of political dialogue, and he apologised to the Central African people for all the violations committed in the region by state security forces. The committee that is preparing the talks process, the composition of which has been a cause for dispute, will comprise five representatives from the governing majority, five representatives from the opposition, five people representing the public authorities and five people representing civilian groups, along with three representatives from the insurgency. The UN Security Council also gave the go-ahead for the creation of a peace-keeping mission along the border between Chad and the Central African Republic, led by the EU.

| Chad | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2006 |
| Type: | Government Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, FUC, UFDD, UFDD Fundamental, RFC, CNT, CAR and SCUD, <i>Janjaweed</i> militias, Sudan |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | The failed coup attempt in 2004 and the reform of the Constitution which was boycotted by the opposition in 2005 sowed the seeds for an insurgency that intensified its activities during 2006 with the aim of overthrowing the authoritarian regime of Idriss Déby. The opposition is led by the volatile FUC coalition, which comprises a number of groups and disaffected members of the military, particularly important among them the SCUD. The situation is further worsened by antagonism between Arab tribes and the black population along the border between Chad and Sudan, linked to with the spread of the war being fought in the neighbouring Sudanese region of Darfur, due to cross-border operations by armed Sudanese groups and the pro-government Sudanese Arab <i>Janjaweed</i> militias. This group has attacked both villages and camps housing refugees from Darfur in the east of Chad, which has in turn led to an escalation in tensions between Sudan and Chad, both of which support the respective insurgencies. |

Box 1.1. Threats to a mixed EU/UN mission in the triangle formed by the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan?

It is accepted that the war that has affected the Sudanese region of Darfur since 2003 has only served to unevenly exacerbate the internal problems suffered by Sudan's neighbours, Chad and the Central African Republic, during 2006, in spite of the fact that these events received almost no attention in the press (with the exception of the events surrounding the abduction of children by the NGO *Arche de Zoe* in Chad). In mid-February 2007, the UNHCR warned that the climate of violence affecting the east of Chad displayed a number of similarities with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The multi-dimensional violence taking place in the region encompass fighting between the Chadian government and rebel groups based in Sudan, cross-border attacks on Chad's civilian population by Sudanese militias, the presence of Sudanese armed opposition groups on Chadian territory, ethnic violence, internal displacement, inter-community tensions and ordinary criminal behaviour. Given this situation, and following months of talks and confrontations between the international community and Chadian President Idriss Déby (but to a lesser degree than the opposition by Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir to the presence of the UN in Darfur), approval was given in September for the deployment of a peace-keeping force along the border between Chad and the Central African Republic, and along the Sudanese border. However, while the UN Security Council had favoured the deployment of a UN mission comprising between 6,000 and 11,000 soldiers, Chadian reluctance to accept firstly a military presence of this size and secondly one led by the UN resulted in the approval of a smaller, mixed force. This will include forces from both the EU and the UN, with the EU controlling the military contingent of some 4,300 soldiers, and the UN playing a more symbolic role in the field of policing with the provision of between 300 and 400 police officers. As a result, Resolution 1778 of 25 September gave the go-ahead for the creation of this multi-faceted mission, known as EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, accompanied by a UN police mission known as MINURCAT. The mandate for this deployment, under Chapter VII, is limited to creating the security conditions necessary to ensure the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of refugees and the displaced population. France will lead the mission and provide the main military contingent, as the country has major interests in both countries, with a military base in Chad and a military presence in the Central African Republic. However, French troops are perceived as favouring the Chadian President, as in April 2006 they helped to halt an attempt by an armed group to invade N'Djamena, and in the case of the Central African Republic, French forces in the country were involved in sporadic fighting with rebel groups, and it is therefore feared that this new mission will be seen as biased by some rebel movements. Connected to this, at the end of November the armed UFDD Chadian group issued a communiqué in which it declared war on the French army and any other foreign force operating on Chadian territory. Subsequently, the French president announced that the EU-led peace-keeping force would be deployed in Chad, in spite of these threats. Nevertheless, the EU postponed its deployment until the beginning of 2008 due to a shortage of material, logistical and human resources for the mission.

2007 saw a worsening of the situation of violence and lack of security in the east of **Chad**, with serious humanitarian consequences. The region is home to around 400,000 displaced people, 150,000 of whom are from Chad, while the remaining 240,000 are Sudanese refugees who have fled Darfur. Although there were some positive advances towards resolving the political crisis and armed conflict during the first part of the year, **the last few months saw the failure of the two peace agreements signed in 2007**. Mention should however be made of the approval of a mixed peace-keeping mission,¹⁵ and the signing of a peace agreement between the government and most of the political opposition, which included the creation of an independent electoral commission and the postponement until December 2009 of the elections originally planned for December 2007, with a view to facilitating their preparation. Nevertheless, the agreement reached in January between the government and the FUC was frustrated by the armed group's refusal to disarm and the dismissal in November of its leader, Mahamat Nour, from his government post as defence minister. November also saw the breakdown of the agreement reached in Libya on 25 October between the Chadian government and four armed groups, including the UFDD and the RFC, which led to a serious escalation in fighting and left hundreds of people dead. The **UFDD declared war on the French troops and other foreign forces forming part of EUFOR, accusing them of collaborating with Chadian armed forces** during the fighting. For its part, Chad reiterated its accusation that Sudan had provided weapons and supplies to rebel groups.

Uganda (north)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1986 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, LRA |
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Summary: | |

Since 1986, the north of Uganda has been afflicted by an armed conflict in which the LRA armed opposition group, motivated by the religious messianism of its leader, Joseph Kony, has tried to overthrow the government of Yoweri Museveni and install a regime based on the Ten Biblical Commandments. The violence and lack of security caused by the LRA's attacks on the civilian population, the abduction of children to swell its ranks (around 25,000 since the conflict began) and confrontations between the armed group and Ugandan armed forces (together with pro-government militias) has left around 200,000 people dead, with some two million forcibly displaced at the height of the conflict. The LRA extended its activities into southern Sudan, a country that had offered it support, though in 2002 it allowed Ugandan armed forces to enter its territory to pursue the armed group. A peace process has been underway since 2006 and a cessation of hostilities has now been established.

The year 2007 ended with positive prospects for the resolution of the conflict that has affected the north of **Uganda** since 1986. The cessation of hostilities that has been in force since 26 August 2006 has been widely respected by both sides, and LRA forces remain in their cantonments in Ri-Kwangba (on the border with southern Sudan). Peace talks continued to move forwards, though they suffered a number of ups and downs during the course of the year, and the LRA committed several acts of violence against the civilian population in southern Sudan. The demand by the LRA that the International Criminal Court withdraw its arrest warrant as a condition for reaching a definitive peace agreement also remains unresolved. During the last part of the year, the disappearance of Deputy Commander Vincent Otti generated a climate of concern around the peace process.¹⁶

d) Maghreb and North Africa

Algeria

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1992 |
| Type: | System Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

Summary:

This conflict began with the banning of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992 after it had won the municipal (1990) and parliamentary (1991) elections, defeating the party that had historically led the country to independence, the National Liberation Front. The FIS's victory was set against the background of a growing Islamic movement in the 1970s, fuelled by popular unrest and further exacerbated in the 1980s by economic recession and the lack of opportunity for political participation. After the military chiefs of staff banned the FIS and dismissed the government, there began a period of armed struggle between a number of groups (the EIS, the GIA and the GSPC, which split away from the GIA and in 2007 became the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb) and the army, which was in turn supported by self-defence militias. The conflict left 150,000 dead during the 1990s, the majority of them civilians, amid accusations of army involvement in massacres. In spite of the reconciliation processes introduced by the government, the conflict remains ongoing and has claimed thousands of lives since 2000.

In **Algeria**, the escalation in fighting and bomb attacks by the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, which started at the end of 2006, continued, as did military counter-insurgency operations by the government in its attempts to halt the armed group. 2007 saw a worsening of attacks on energy installations and urban areas, mainly in Algiers, which could be due to the increased pressure being brought to bear on the Organisation in some mountain regions. An example of

15. See Box 1.1.

16. See the chapter on peace processes.

this was the attacks on 11 April and 11 December in Algiers (against government headquarters and the Constitutional Council and UN Office respectively), which left around thirty people dead and 200 injured in the first case and a further 60 dead and another 100 injured in the second. A total of more than 500 people died in 2007, marking a reverse in the falling trend seen in previous years, with 480 victims reported in 2005 and 400 in 2006. These attacks, along with the recruitment of young people in city areas, also represent a major setback for the government, and suggest the inability of state security forces to control the situation, heralding a return to the so-called “leaden years” of the 1990s. The government offensive has succeeded in neutralising seven important leaders of the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb in recent months, a particularly notable example being the death in Cabilia in October of Hareg Housier, the Organisation’s alleged second-in-command. Finally, mention should be made of the way that the Organisation is gradually extending its activities throughout the region, particularly in Mauritania.

America

Colombia

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1964 |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, FARC, ELN, new paramilitary groups, AUC |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |

Summary:

In 1964, when a pact was arranged to alternate power between the Liberal and Conservative parties (National Front) and exclude any political alternative, two armed opposition movements emerged: the ELN (which took its inspiration from Che Guevara and had the support of the working classes and academics) and the FARC (which was supported by the peasants and influenced by Communist ideals). During the 1970s, several other groups emerged (M-19, EPL, etc.), which ended up negotiating with the government and supporting a new Constitution (1991) which established the bases for a social state governed by the rule of law. The end of the 1980s saw the emergence of a number of paramilitary self-defence groups that instigated a strategy of terror and were encouraged by some sectors of the armed forces, business people and politicians in defence of the status quo and the maintenance of illegal enterprise. The money earned from drugs is the main fuel that keeps the war alive.

In **Colombia**, 2007 was marked by scandals related to the **infiltration by the paramilitaries into parties close to government and into state institutions**. More than fifty people, including former ministers, members of Congress and intelligence officers were jailed as a result. Studies by the OAS and several NGOs reported that the paramilitaries were rearming, while the killing of union officials and community leaders continued and the

humanitarian crisis caused by the displacement of thousands of the rural population worsened. The FARC held its 9th conference, while the ELN held internal consultations, and both underlined the need to find a negotiated political solution to the conflict, though only the ELN maintained an open process of dialogue with the government. The FARC refused to begin political negotiations with the current executive and continued its insurgency action. The **military budget amounted to 6% of the country’s GDP**¹⁷ and over the next two years the number of people recruited to Colombia’s armed forces will reach half a million. In the fighting between the army and the guerrillas, the FARC lost some important leaders, while the armed forces recorded many losses as a result of the effect of landmines. There was **no progress in the talks between the government and the ELN towards the signing of a ceasefire**. Finally, the deaths of 11 MPs held hostage by the FARC, along with the physical and mental toll taken on the more than 50 politicians and members of the military held by the organisation, attracted **world-wide interest in reaching a humanitarian agreement** that will bring an end to this difficult situation. The G-8, the governments of Europe and Latin America and other leading figures around the world called for a negotiated solution to the drawn out conflict in Colombia.

Asia and the Pacific

a) South Asia

Afghanistan

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2001 |
| Type: | System Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, international coalition (led by the USA), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militias, warlords |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

Summary:

The country has been embroiled in armed conflict almost continuously since the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979, when civil war broke out between government armed forces (with Soviet backing) and anti-Communist Islamic guerrillas (Mujahideen). The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992 against a background of chaos and internal fighting between the different anti-Communist factions led to the rise of the Taliban movement, which had gained control over almost all of Afghanistan by the end of the 1990s. In November 2001, after the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September, the USA invaded the country and overthrew the Taliban regime. Following the signing of the Bonn Agreements, a new interim government was installed, led by Hamid Karzai, and this was subsequently given a full mandate in elections. The level of violence in the country has steadily risen since 2006 as a result of the regrouping of the Taliban militias.

In **Afghanistan**, levels of **violence rose in comparison with previous years**, according to a number of sources, including both the Secretary General of NATO and

17. Isaza Delgado, José Fernando; Campos Romero, Diógenes, *Algunas consideraciones cuantitativas sobre la evolución reciente del conflicto en Colombia* [Some quantitative considerations on recent developments in the conflict in Colombia], Bogota, December 2007.

UNAMA, who put the number of deaths during the year at 6,000, of which 210 were foreign troops and 700 were members of the Afghan security forces. In addition, **the number of suicide attacks was the highest seen in the country since 2001**. The impact of the armed conflict on the civilian population, which accounted for 80% of the victims of these suicide attacks, remained very high. The role of international forces in the deaths of civilians was the subject of complaints during the year and generated serious levels of social unrest. According to the NGO Oxfam International, **half of the 1,200 civilian deaths during 2007 were caused by Afghan and international armed forces**. As far as developments in the conflict itself are concerned, fighting between Taliban militias and NATO forces in the south of the country intensified, as did fighting between militias and the Afghan forces deployed together with US troops in the international coalition in the east. In the meantime, President Hamid Karzai announced that his government had made preliminary contacts with Taliban militias to set up talks. Among the most significant incidents was the death in Kandahar in May of Mullah Dabullah, the main Taliban leader since 2001. There was a particularly serious suicide attack in the province of Baghlan (in the north of the country) at the end of the year, which left 70 people dead, among them six Afghan MPs and several children.

In Afghanistan the number of suicide attacks was the highest seen in the country since 2001

India (Assam)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1983 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, ULFA, DHD |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

Summary:
The ULFA armed opposition group emerged in 1979 with the declared aim of freeing Assam from Indian colonisation and establishing a sovereign state. The demographic changes experienced by the state since the division of the Indian sub-continent, when two million people arrived from Bangladesh, lie at the heart of the claim by those of ethnic Assam origins for recognition of their cultural and civil rights and the creation of an independent state. Levels of violence escalated on a number of occasions throughout the 1980s and 1990s, alongside various failed attempts at negotiation. 2005 saw the introduction of a peace process which led to a reduction in violence, though its breakdown in 2006 resulted in a further escalation of the conflict.

The Indian state of **Assam** experienced an increase in armed violence, particularly at the beginning and in the middle of the year, though there was a steady stream of violent attacks on the Hindi-speaking population throughout 2007. In January, a number of **attacks allegedly perpetrated by the ULFA armed group left 70 people dead** across the state, most of them immigrant workers from Bihar state or local police officers. The army responded with the deployment of 13,000 troops. The second wave of serious violence during the year was seen in August, to coincide with the 60th anniversary

of India's independence, when several acts of violence attributed to the ULFA left more than 30 civilians dead, mainly in the north of the state and around the capital, Guwahati. This escalation in the violence led to the **organisation of strikes at markets, shops and schools** in protest against the attacks. In September, the police detained one of the most influential leaders of the armed group, Prabal Neog, while the PCPIA (a forum that brings together 30 civilian organisations promoting peace initiatives in Assam) called on the government and the ULFA to suspend hostilities and restart the peace process which broke down in 2006. For its part, The Assam Tribune reported the alleged support that the ULFA and the NSCN could be giving to a number of smaller armed groups that have emerged in the state following splits in the larger groups.

India (Jammu and Kashmir)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1989 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen |
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |

Summary:
The armed conflict in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has its roots in the dispute over the region of Kashmir, which since the independence and partition of India and Pakistan has been claimed by both countries. The countries have gone to war over the region three times (1947-1948, 1965 and 1971), and both claim sovereignty over an area that extends into India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1947 led to the current division and the creation of a de facto border between the two countries. Since 1989, the armed conflict has been centred within the actual state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a multitude of insurgent groups supporting the complete independence of the state or unconditional unity with Pakistan have been fighting Indian security forces. Since the start of the peace process between India and Pakistan in 2004, levels of violence have fallen significantly, though various armed groups remain active.

In the state of **Jammu and Kashmir**, the Indian authorities acknowledged that there had been a **substantial fall in levels of violence throughout the year, though some sporadic incidents still occurred, causing the deaths of dozens of people**. Particularly notable among these was the attack at the beginning of the year on a train linking the cities of Lahore and Delhi, in which 68 people died. Activity by insurgent groups also increased mid-way through the year, though this was probably due to the fact that the thaw season gives more freedom of movement to the groups allegedly originating from Pakistan. Although peace talks between the governments of India and Pakistan continued, the Indian authorities accused their Pakistani counterparts of continuing to support the cross-border movement of armed groups. In this regard, the government of Jammu and Kashmir cited the supposed armed activities of these groups as the reason for cancelling the reduction in troop numbers in the region that had been recommended by a panel of

experts following the sustained drop in levels of violence since 2004. Although by the beginning of 2006 India had already withdrawn thousands of the more than 500,000 troops that it had deployed in Jammu and Kashmir, hundreds of students held a demonstration in Srinagar at the end of October in protest against the presence of Indian troops in the state.

| India (Manipur) | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1982 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA |
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | |
| The armed conflict being fought between the government and the different armed groups operating in the state, along with the fighting between several of these groups themselves, can be traced to the demands for independence made by these groups and the current tensions between the different ethnic communities coexisting in the state. A number of armed groups emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, some of them Communist-inspired and others with ethnic attachments, and these groups remained active during subsequent decades. Furthermore, the regional context in a state that is bordered by Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar also has a bearing on developments in the conflict in Manipur, and there are constant tensions between ethnic Manipuri groups and the Naga population. The economic impoverishment of the state and its isolation from the rest of the country have been decisive factors in underlining the sense of grievance of the Manipuri people. | |

Levels of armed violence in the state increased throughout the year, both between Indian security forces and armed groups and between the armed groups themselves. Some sources (South Asia Intelligence Review) put the total number of deaths at 387, though others were more conservative. If this figure is correct, Manipur would be the second worst affected state in northeast India after Assam in terms of levels of armed violence. This is characterised by a multitude of small incidents and attacks affecting the whole state. It should be noted that there was fighting at several points during the year between armed Manipuri groups, especially those from the Kuki ethnic group, and the Naga NSCN (I-M) and NSCN (K) armed groups.

| India (CPI-M) | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1967 |
| Type: | System Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, CPI-M (Naxalites) |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Summary: | |
| The armed conflict being fought between the Indian government and the CPI-M armed Maoist group (known as the Naxalites after the city in which the movement started) affects seven states in India. The CPI-M emerged in West Bengal at the | |

end of the 1960s, demanding the eradication of land ownership and making strong attacks on the democratic parliamentary system, which it viewed as a legacy of the colonial era. Since then it has engaged in constant armed actions while at the same time establishing parallel governing systems in the (mostly rural) areas that it controls. Military operations against the group, which is classed as a terrorist organisation by the Indian government, have been continuous. A negotiation process was introduced in 2004, though this subsequently broke down.

Significant levels of violence were reported during 2007 in the conflict between the Indian government and the Naxalite CPI-M armed opposition group, mainly in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, in which the CPI-M remained particularly active, as the government itself acknowledged. Fighting was constant, and the number of people killed as a result of the violence could exceed 400. During March, a police station in the state of Chhattisgarh was attacked, leaving 50 police officers dead, an incident that demonstrated the capacity of this particular armed group. Also notable was the attack targeting the former prime minister of Andhra Pradesh, Janardhan Reddy, in September, though he emerged unscathed. Civilian targets such as railway stations and roads have also been the subject of attack on several occasions.

| Pakistan (northwest) | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2001 |
| Type: | System Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | |
| The armed conflict in the northwest area of the country dates back to the armed conflict in Afghanistan following the US bombings of 2001. The region comprises the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which have been off-limits to the Pakistani government since 2002, when the first military operations were carried out in the region, and the North-West Frontier Province. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, members of the Taliban militias with alleged al-Qaeda connections took refuge in the region, resulting in large-scale military operations by Pakistani armed forces (around 50,000 troops have been deployed) with support from the USA. The local population, who are mostly ethnic Pashtuns, have been accused of offering support for combatants coming from Afghanistan. Since the first operations began in 2002, the violence has increased. | |

This year was a particularly violent one in the northwest of Pakistan, specially in Waziristan, due to the upsurge in fighting, firstly between rival Taliban militias (some of them home-grown and others made up of Uzbek militants close to the Taliban militias from Afghanistan) which left around 180 people dead, and subsequently between these militias and Pakistani security forces, with fighting continuing throughout the year. From July onwards, the security situation in the region worsened with the **announcement by the armed militias that they were suspending the peace agreement signed with the government in 2006**. This development and the wave

of violence that followed resulted from the operation by the Pakistani army in July against the Islamist militants who had barricaded themselves in the Red Mosque in Islamabad. The second half of the year was marked by continued fighting between government armed forces, which deployed reinforcements in the area, and the militias. In addition, from October onwards the fighting between the army and the pro-Taliban insurgency extended to the neighbouring North-West Frontier Province, where the government deployed around 2,000 soldiers against militants linked with the pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Fazlullah and where, according to the Pakistani government, 200 militant Islamists may have been killed. At the end of the year the various Taliban militias that are active in the FATA announced the formation of a unified organization, called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and led by South Waziristan commander Baitullah Mehsud.

Sri Lanka (northeast)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1983 |
| Type: | Self-government Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, LTTE, LTTE (faction led by Colonel Karuna) |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

Summary:
In 1983, the Tamil armed opposition independence group, LTTE, began a conflict that has devastated Sri Lanka for the last three decades. The growing marginalisation of the Tamil population by the Sri Lankan government, which is mainly composed of members of the Sinhalese elite, following the decolonisation of the island in 1948, has led the armed group to use violence in its struggle for the creation of an independent Tamil state. Since its initiation in 1983, the armed conflict has progressed through three phases, each ending with a failed peace process. Further peace talks, with Norwegian mediation, began in 2002 following the signing of a peace agreement, though the failure of these talks led to a serious resumption in armed conflict in 2006.

Sri Lanka suffered a continuation of the intense levels of violence it has experienced since the collapse of the peace process and resumption of hostilities between government armed forces and the LTTE at the beginning of 2006. According to some sources, **more than 5,000 people could have died in this latest phase (a fifth of them civilians), while a further 20,000 have been forcibly displaced.** The military offensive embarked upon by government armed forces in 2006 led to a notable depletion in the LTTE's military capacity and left the **army in control of a large part of the east of the country, forcing the LTTE to redeploy to forest areas and abandon land that it had controlled for the last 15 years.** Furthermore, the leader of the LTTE's political wing and its main negotiator in recent years was killed in a government bombing raid. As a result, at the end of November, LTTE leader Prabhakaran issued a tacit threat to extend the violence to the entire country if the government also tried to take positions in the north of the country. In this regard, the LTTE showed that it has significant firepower by carrying out its first aerial attacks, even reaching areas close to Colombo. At

the end of the year, the government threatened to ban the LTTE once again (a move that would prevent it from resuming peace talks) and formally withdrew from the 2002 ceasefire (which was in fact interrupted in 2006), alleging that it had been violated on thousands of occasions by the LTTE.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Philippines (NPA)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1969 |
| Type: | System Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, NPA |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |

Summary:
The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, began its armed struggle in 1969, reaching its highest point during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s. Despite internal purges, the country's democratisation and offers of an amnesty weakened the support and legitimacy of the NPA during the 1990s, and it is currently estimated to have around 7,000 members operating in most of the country's provinces. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, its inclusion in the lists of terrorist organisations drawn up by the USA and the EU seriously eroded trust between the parties and to a great extent caused the breakdown of the peace talks being held with Gloria M. Arroyo's government. The NPA, whose main aim is to take power and transform the political system and the socio-economic model, forms part of the National Democratic Front (NDF), the NPA's political reference organisation that brings together various Communist-inspired organisations.

In the **Philippines**, fighting between government armed forces and the NPA in several of the country's provinces led to the deaths of hundreds of people and the displacement of many thousands more. **The government continued the high-level offensive that it began in the middle of 2006 with the aim of crushing the NPA as a military force by 2010.** In spite of this, in mid-September President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo offered the group an amnesty and the chance to resume peace talks if both sides first agreed to a cessation of hostilities. All the government's offers were resoundingly rejected by the NPA, which viewed them as an attempt to achieve the political demobilisation of its combatants. At the end of the year, the president declared that the NPA's military capacity had been reduced by 20% during the previous 12 months, i.e. 1,400 combatants, and that 3,000 further soldiers would be deployed on counter-insurgency duties during 2008. According to the government, while the NPA had 12,000 members in 2001, it now has barely 5,800, the lowest number for the last 20 years. However, the NPA denied most of this information and indicated that in the more than 200 offensives carried out during the course of the year some 200 soldiers had died. As has now become normal, in December the government declared a unilateral suspension of hostilities over the Christmas period, the longest in recent years, though this was not reciprocated by the NPA.

Box 1.2. Dissident guerrillas: fifth columnists of the state?

In many contexts of conflict, the main armed opposition groups have suffered serious schisms. Whatever the causes or the specific circumstances of each individual case, it is often reported that these factions then form tacit alliances or submit to the state that they had previously been fighting against, usually in order to fight against the armed organisations from which they have split. The following are some examples in Asia.

In **Sri Lanka**, the LTTE faction led by Colonel Karuna (Tamilleela Makkal Viduthalao Pulikal) is allegedly collaborating with government armed forces in order to erode LTTE positions in the east of Sri Lanka. Although both Karuna and the government deny any alliance, the military capacity of this faction and the ease with which it operates in certain regions have led to suspicions that it is at least acting in collusion with the state. In **Mindanao**, both the MILF and the MNLF have assisted the Philippine government in the fight to combat criminal activities, which have included activities by Abu Sayyaf. Although Abu Sayyaf is not strictly speaking a faction of either of these two groups, its founding members at the beginning of the 1990s included disaffected members of both the MNLF and the MILF. Manila has threatened to break off its peace talks with the MILF on more than one occasion if it did not publicly demonstrate its opposition to organisations classified as terrorists. In the Indian state of **Assam**, the so-called Surrendered ULFA (SULFA) is collaborating with the police in counter-insurgency actions against the ULFA, with which it engages in constant mutual accusations and sporadic fighting.

Myanmar, one of the countries with the largest number of armed groups in the world, is also one of the places that best demonstrates this factionalism between insurgent groups and the use of this phenomenon by the state. Almost all the main active groups are currently being fought by both the state and by factions that have split away and subsequently signed ceasefire agreements with the military junta. The largest and oldest group in the country, the Karen National Union (KNU) suffered a split in 1994 when militant Buddhists accused the group's leadership of being dominated almost exclusively by Christian commanders. In recent years, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) has carried out several attacks against the armed wing of the KNU and collaborated with the military junta in several ways. Similarly, the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Karenni National Defence Army (KNDA), which respectively split in 1978 and 1995 from the main armed Karenni group, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), have been fighting the KNPP in regions close to the border with Thailand. In Shan state, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) has split into a number of factions that are fighting among themselves. In Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) is facing armed hostilities from a breakaway group, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).

All the cases mentioned above would seem to illustrate two phenomena: first, the **use by the state of a "divide and conquer" strategy**, which generally includes co-opting certain leaders, offering incentives of all kinds to some sections of the armed group in question or sharpening the divisions within a particular organisation whether in terms of religion, geography, ideology or leadership; second, the **opportunism, financial motivation and personal interests of people who frequently hide behind the armed struggle in some groups**. Although it is true that many armed groups decide to abandon the armed struggle and pursue their political aims through other means, it is equally true that a good percentage of insurgencies have ended with the signing of ceasefire or military collaboration agreements with the government and the renunciation of the objectives that had supposedly driven their armed struggle in return for strictly financial incentives that are often limited to the group's leadership. On some occasions, these incentives are used by the state to weaken and split groups or guarantee their loyalty. Similarly, the threat by the state to disarm a group or withdraw some of its privileges explains the ease with which dissident factions can be sent to fight against their former allies.

Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1978 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, MILF |
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Summary: | |

The armed conflict in Mindanao dates back to the end of the 1960s, when Nur Misuari founded the MNLF to demand that the government in Manila grant self-determination for the Moro people, a number of Islamicised ethnic linguistic groups that have been politically organised into independent sultanates since the 15th century. Due to strategic, ideological and leadership issues, the MILF broke away from the MNLF at the end of the 1970s and has continued to pursue the armed struggle ever since, while the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996 that offered a certain degree of autonomy for the Muslim

majority areas of Mindanao (the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Current estimates put the number of MILF troops at 12,000, despite the fact that it signed a ceasefire agreement in 2003 (overseen by an international mission) and has held several rounds of talks with the government in recent years. These talks have been facilitated by Malaysia and have focused on the issue of the ancestral lands of the Moro people.

As regards the MILF, **2007 saw the most intense outbreaks of fighting in the Philippines since the government and the MILF signed their cessation of hostilities agreement in mid-2003, a fact that brought the peace negotiations to the point of collapse** both at the beginning and in the middle of the year. Hostilities gradually increased during the first three months of the year, culminating in fighting in March that led to the displacement of some 18,000 people and around 20 deaths, notably in the province of North Cotabato. Although tensions were considerably reduced in the following months, the government deployed thousands of extra troops at the end of July on the island of Basilan, saying

that it would mount a high-level offensive against the MILF unless it immediately handed over the people allegedly responsible for an ambush that ended with the deaths of 14 soldiers and the subsequent decapitation of several of the bodies. After several weeks of great uncertainty and exchanged accusations, during which thousands of people moved for fear of a resumption of hostilities, an independent research commission found that the people responsible for the decapitations were not members of the MILF and probably belonged to Abu Sayyaf. Subsequently, the MILF agreed to relocate some of its troops in Basilan to allow the armed forces to detain those thought to be responsible. Tensions rose once again at the end of the year after a round of talks in Malaysia on the ancestral lands of the Moro people ended in failure.

2007 saw the most intense outbreaks of fighting in the Philippines since the government and the MILF signed their cessation of hostilities agreement in mid-2003

presence of other groups like the MILF and the MNLF, as well as para-criminal organisations, caused tensions and sporadic confrontations between the different groups. A Human Rights Watch report announced that 1,700 civilians had been killed or wounded in the southern Philippines since 2000 by the actions of armed Islamist terrorist groups, among which it particularly mentioned Abu Sayyaf and the Rajah Solaiman Movement.

Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1991 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity, System Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Abu Sayyaf |
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

Summary:

The Abu Sayyaf group has been fighting since the beginning of the 1990s to establish an independent Islamic state in the Sulu archipelago and western parts of Mindanao (in the south of the country). Although it began by recruiting disaffected members of other armed groups like the MILF and the MNLF, it subsequently started to distance itself ideologically from both movements and began a more systematic use of kidnapping, extortion, decapitation and bombing, which led to its inclusion in the lists of terrorist organisations drawn up by the USA and the EU. The Philippine government has also accused it of maintaining links with groups classified as terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. According to the government, Manila's counter-insurgency strategy, which enjoys military support from the USA, resulted in the deaths in 1998 and 2006 of the leaders of Abu Sayyaf (the Janjalani brothers) and caused a notable reduction in the group's military capacity.

Although the government has made some moves towards a détente with some of the main groups operating in the country, such as the MILF, the MNLF and the NPA, its policy regarding the **Abu Sayyaf** armed opposition group was to intensify its counter-insurgency strategy in the Sulu archipelago, causing a **notable reduction in Abu Sayyaf's military capacity, its break-up into small units and the deaths of some of its leading figures**, like Kadaffi Janjalani, confirmed in January, and Mobin Abdujarak, confirmed in mid-December. In this regard, the fighting during the middle of the year between Abu Sayyaf and government armed forces, assisted by the USA in anti-terrorist strategies, left more than 100 people dead, most of them from Abu Sayyaf. In spite of this, the group continued to instigate armed actions, carrying out kidnappings and controlling some areas of the Sulu archipelago, where the

Myanmar

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1948 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, armed ethnic groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNLA, KNU/KNPLAC, SSNPLO) |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

Summary:

Since 1948, dozens of armed insurgent groups of ethnic origin have been involved in fighting with the Myanmar government, calling for recognition for their ethnic and cultural traditions and demanding either independence or reforms in the way the state is structured. Since the imposition of the military dictatorship in 1962, the country's regular armed forces have fought armed groups in their ethnic states, combining demands for self-determination from the minority with calls for democratisation shared with the political opposition. In 1988, the government introduced a process of ceasefire agreements with some of the insurgent groups, allowing them to continue their economic activities (basically the trafficking of drugs and precious stones). However, military operations have been a constant feature over these decades and have mainly been aimed at the civilian population, with the aim of rooting out the different armed groups at their base. This has caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

In **Myanmar**, particularly in Karen and Shan states, fighting continued between government armed forces and several armed opposition groups, and there were frequent attacks on the civilian population which left hundreds of people dead and caused the enforced displacement of tens of thousands more, some of them fleeing over the border into Thailand. There was also fighting between active armed groups and others that have signed ceasefire agreements with the government, such as the incidents in Karen state between the KNLA and a group that split away from it, the DKBA. At the beginning of the year, the country's main armed group, the **KNLA, suffered another split with the creation of the group now known as the KNU/KNPLAC**. Tensions were also reported between the government and some of the groups that signed cessation of hostilities agreements during the 1990s, which complained that the military junta was pressing them to hand over their weapons and take part in the National Convention. In relation to this, it should be noted that **a breakaway faction of the SSNPLO armed group announced an end to the ceasefire signed in 1994, and it could be holding talks with the SSA-S** to allow it to operate in the south of Shan state. Meanwhile, the UWSA openly defied the

military junta, with which it had signed a ceasefire agreement some years previously, by strengthening its military positions along the border with Thailand. Tensions between the two sides began to rise after the UWSA ignored the government's order to carry out more active attacks on the SSA-S, leading the junta to demand that it hand over its weapons, as well as to threaten to halt its control over economic activities along the Chinese border.

| Thailand (south) | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2004 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, secessionist armed opposition groups |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |

Summary:

The origins of the conflict in southern Thailand date back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the then Kingdom of Siam and the British colonial power in the Malaysian peninsula decided to divide up the Sultanate of Pattani, leaving some territories under the sovereign control of what is now Malaysia and others (the southern provinces of Songkhla, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat) under the control of Thailand. Throughout the twentieth century there were groups fighting to resist the policies of political, cultural and religious homogenisation imposed from Bangkok, with some demanding independence for these provinces, which have a majority Malay Muslim pop-

ulation. The conflict reached its peak during the 1960s and 1970s, abating during subsequent decades as a result of the country's democratisation. However, the arrival in power of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 meant a drastic change in counter-insurgency policy, heralding the upsurge in violence that the region has experienced since 2004.

In the Muslim-majority southern provinces of **Thailand**, the daily incidents of low-level violence continued, leaving **hundreds of people dead, 85% of which were civilians**. The violence, which affected the Buddhist and Muslim populations in similar proportions, had a particularly significant effect on the education sector, causing the destruction or closure of hundreds of schools. After unsuccessfully suggesting exploratory contacts and even offering an amnesty to the armed secessionist groups, the government deployed thousands of extra troops in the south of the country and maintained a state of emergency that gave special powers to the armed forces. This included legislation that allowed the detention without charges of more than 2,000 people suspected of collaborating with insurgent groups, provoking criticism from human rights organisations and disaffection among a large section of the population. There were warnings in some quarters of the **steady deterioration during the year in community relations between Buddhists and Muslims**, encouraged by the alleged presence of foreign armed groups, the increasing use of paramilitary forces by the government and the *modus operandi* of the different armed groups, which consisted of reducing the number of attacks but making them more violent. At the end of the year, the

Box 1.3. The fragmentation of violence in Southeast Asia

One of the shared characteristics of the three main ongoing conflicts in Southeast Asia (Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar) is the huge fragmentation and complexity of the web of all the parties involved.

In **Mindanao**, the Philippine government used the MILF's alleged collusion with the regional Jemaah Islamiyah organisation to discredit it and place conditions on both the timing and political content of negotiations. Similarly, Manila has always maintained that Abu Sayyaf retains links with al-Qaeda and that it both fights and trains jointly with organisations like Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah. Recently, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's executive openly accused some factions of the MNLF, including the one led by Halik Malik, of establishing contacts and collaborating with Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah in the Sulu archipelago. In addition to this array of organisations are the militias working for the different political groups and representatives (such as the Civil Volunteer Organisations associated with the governor of Maguindanao) and an essentially local phenomenon known as the "*rido*", which refers to the historic clashes between different families or ethnic clans that have left hundreds of people dead in recent decades.

In **southern Thailand**, the secessionist insurgent movement had historically been highly fragmented into a number of different groups (BNPP, BRN, Pulo, New Pulo, GMIP), and it was only at the end of the 1990s that it began to coordinate its activities through the Bersatu organisation, which nevertheless achieved little and which today has been more or less dismantled. Despite the fact that the sparse and confused information available makes any analysis very difficult, the majority of experts agree that the actual shape of the insurgency is now very different from the way it was in years gone by and that it is now fragmented into small and independent cells with highly flexible structures and without identifiable leaders or explicit political objectives. Furthermore, the emergence of allegedly state-supported civil self-defence groups, and the recent announcement by the government that the armed groups operating in the south of the country are receiving support and training from radical Muslim organisations in Cambodia and Indonesia introduces further uncertainty as regards the nature, *modus operandi* and the degree of trans-nationalisation of the pro-independence insurgent groups.

Myanmar remains one of the countries with the largest number of armed groups in the world, in spite of the fact that, during the 1990s, the military dictatorship managed to sign ceasefire agreements with more than fifteen different insurgent organisations. At the present time, more than ten armed groups (such as the KNU, KNPP, SSA-S and the ANP) remain active in the seven so-called "ethnic states" in Myanmar, where they are calling for the democratisation and federalisation of the country. Although these groups are mainly involved in fighting government armed forces, it is also true that they occasionally come into

conflict with each other and often have to fight paramilitary groups financed by the government and former armed groups opposed to Rangoon (known as “ceasefire groups”), driven by threats from the military dictatorship to forcibly disarm them, eradicate them militarily and have their access to resources and political and financial privileges cut off if they do not cooperate with its counter-insurgency strategy.

These three cases illustrate how **the prolonged impact of violence creates conditions in which those who are not directly linked with the conflict can come to the fore, and in which alliances may be formed between organisations whose aims and strategies are not necessarily very similar.** Furthermore, the above three cases probably include common factors that explain the fragmentation of the armed participants, such as the length of time that the conflict has lasted (all of them have been ongoing for more than four decades), the political, geographical, media and humanitarian isolation of the regions in which the conflicts are occurring, the mobilisation and trans-nationalisation of some regional armed networks, the predominance of groups classed as terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia, the factionalism and constant schisms within armed opposition groups and the willingness of the governments involved to use counter-insurgency strategies based on both the “divide and conquer” principle and the militarization of civilian society through the creation of paramilitary groups.

Whatever the truth may be, **the fragmented nature of the violence not only makes it difficult to analyse armed conflicts in the region, it also, and more importantly, hinders any search for a solution.** In effect, the wide variety of leadership structures and objectives make any kind of political negotiation difficult. The passage of time leads to the entrenchment of positions and explains the mutation of the original aims of the armed struggle as well as justifies the use of particular strategies to maintain military capacity. The complex network of alliances, cooperation and coexistence between old and new parties to the conflict (which is mostly based on tacit opportunism and not on any ideological affinity) goes against the simplistic logic with which the governments in question, in their almost exclusionist, two-sided approach, have traditionally attempted to resolve any armed conflict.

government announced that the security situation had improved notably, in spite of the fact that almost 30 people were injured in the southern city of Sungai Kolok following the simultaneous detonation of several explosive devices on New Years Eve.

Europe

Russia (Chechnya)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1999 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity, System Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Federal Russian government, regional pro-Russian government, Chechen armed opposition groups |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |

Summary:

After the so-called first Chechen war (1994-1996) in which the Russian Federation fought the republic of Chechnya, mainly over the issue of the latter's independence (which the Republic proclaimed unilaterally on the break-up of the USSR), and which ended in a peace treaty that nevertheless failed to resolve Chechnya's status, the conflict resumed in 1999 in what became known as the second Chechnyan war following incursions into Dagestan by Chechen rebels and attacks on Russian cities. Prior to elections in the republic, the Russian military cited anti-terrorist grounds to justify entering Chechnya once again in order to counter the moderate pro-independence regime that had emerged following the 1st war and that had itself been afflicted by internal disputes and growing criminality. Russia announced that the war had ended in 2001, without victory on either side and with no definitive agreement, offering the republic autonomous status and installing a pro-Russian Chechen administration. However, fighting continued, accompanied by the growing Islamisation of the Chechen rebel fighters and the regional spread of the armed conflict.

The situation in **Chechnya** was marked throughout the year by the **steady stream of confrontations and deaths** among Chechen and Russian security forces and pro-independence armed groups, particularly in the spring and summer. The civilian population once again fell victim to the human rights violations perpetrated by both sides. In the political arena, January marked the end of the amnesty called by the Chechen regime, which was taken up by between 400 and 500 people. Hailed as a success by the authorities, the rebels dismissed the amnesty as a failed propaganda stunt. In the political arena, Ramzan Kadyrov's appointment as Chechnya's new president received the backing of the president of Russia but was criticised by human rights groups. Among the ranks of the rebels, the divisions between the moderate and more radical elements continued to deepen with the **announcement by rebel leader Dokka Umarov that the armed conflict was to become a holy war** against all those attacking Islam, including the USA, Israel and the United Kingdom, and in defence of the imposition of *Sharia* law. His announcement of the creation of an Emirate of the North Caucasus and his declaration that he himself would be Emir drew criticism from the more moderate elements of the armed resistance, who formally stripped him of his position. The year also saw reports of a serious rise in levels of violence in the neighbouring republics, especially Ingushetia and Dagestan, suggesting the spread of the pro-Islamic violence in the northern Caucasus and underlining the democratic fragility of the region, with serious repercussions for the civilian population.

Turkey (southeast)

| | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 1984 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, PKK |
| Intensity: | 2 |

Evolution during the year: ↑

Summary:

The PKK, which was created in 1978 as a political party with Marxist-Leninist leanings and led by Abdullah Öcalan, announced in 1984 that it was going on the offensive against the government. It subsequently embarked on a campaign of military insurgency in an attempt to claim independence for Kurdistan, which was in turn strongly opposed by the government which supported territorial unity. The war that erupted between the PKK and the government had a particular effect on the civilian Kurdish population in the southeast of Turkey, which became caught in the crossfire, suffering persecution and enforced evacuation by the Turkish government. The conflict reached a turning point in 1999 with Öcalan's detention and the subsequent announcement from the PKK that it was abandoning the armed struggle and altering its aims, dropping its demands for independence in order to concentrate on its claims for the recognition of Kurdish identity within Turkey. With Turkey citing the fight against terrorism and the PKK claiming self-defence, the conflict remained ongoing in the form of tensions and subsequently escalated once again in 2007.

In the **southeast of Turkey, fighting between the Turkish army and the PKK increased in terms of the number of both incidents and casualties**, with well over one

Turkish armed forces continued their military offensive against the PKK throughout the year crossing over into northern Iraq in December in both land assaults and aerial attacks on the armed group

hundred people killed. This increase in the violence meant that the unilateral ceasefire called by the PKK in October 2006 and formally renewed the following June was effectively over. Turkish armed forces continued their military offensive against the PKK throughout the year, intensifying their operations in southeast Turkey in September and crossing over into northern Iraq in December in both land assaults and aerial attacks on the armed group. This caused the enforced displacement of thousands of civilians, according to the Autonomous Government of Iraqi Kurdistan. The incursions into Iraq were supported by authorisation from the Turkish parliament to carry out cross-border operations against the PKK, which the army had been calling for since the beginning of the year. The Turkish army also deployed around 100,000 troops along the border with Iraq and set up temporary security zones in several border provinces, restricting the movements of the civilian population. In turn, military action by the PKK, which the group argued was taken in self-defence, was described in the Turkish press as the most deadly of recent years. The PKK, which had called for a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the conflict over the course of the year, announced in December that it would carry out reprisals for the Turkish offensive. In the meantime, the Turkish prime minister announced at the end of the year that he was working with the army

Box 1.4. Journalists in today's conflicts: cannon fodder

As 2007 drew to a close, Iraq was once again, for the fifth year running, the country in which it was most dangerous to work as a journalist. While the exact figures vary depending on the source, the rankings are very similar. The next countries in the list, though a long way behind Iraq, are Somalia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Afghanistan.¹⁸ A look back over the last decade and a half demonstrates how wars have led to an increase in the deaths of media professionals as they engage in their duties. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the death toll has progressively risen, with particularly serious consequences in the case of the war in Iraq. War reporting, always a risky job, has become a particularly dangerous task in the context of today's armed conflicts, a reflection in itself of the way that the terms of conflicts have evolved and the fact that the role of journalists in conflict situations is being redefined to a certain extent.

This evolution in the impact of war on journalists and the way they perform their duties can be demonstrated by some specific cases, with 2007 offering some particularly striking examples. Zakia Kaki, 35, head of the private radio station Peace Radio in the Afghan province of Parwan was shot and killed at his home in June 2007 by unidentified gunmen. Having run the radio station since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Kaki had been criticised by the warlords and had received threats and pressure to close his station down. Mohammed Hilal Karji, a journalist for Baghdad TV, was kidnapped outside his house in Baghdad in June 2007. His body was found in a mass grave the following day. The television station he worked for, owned by the Islamic Party of Iraq, had been repeatedly bombed by insurgent groups during recent months and several of its employees had already been attacked or killed. Bashir Nor Gedi, head of Shabelle Media Network (Somalia) was murdered by unknown gunmen outside his house in a district of the capital, Mogadishu, in October. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) had already tried to close the network down by force in September, as it had been critical of both the TFG and the Islamic insurgency.¹⁹

Examples such as these show how journalists have increasingly become targets in the context of today's armed conflicts, which are characterised, among other things by: a) the heavy impact of the resulting violence on the ordinary population, in a context in which civilians have become the specific target of armed groups and journalists have in turn become a specific target among civilians, with 72% of journalists killed by direct assassination, hugely outnumbering those killed in crossfire or combat scenarios (17.6%), in addition to suffering threats and kidnapping prior to their murder; b) the proliferation of small arms and the heavy impact that this is having on situations of conflict, with 51% of journalists killed by small arms as

18. International Press Institute, *IPI Death Watch 2007*, at <<http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/deathwatch.html>>; Reporters Without Borders, *Press Freedom Barometer*, at <www.rsf.org>; Committee to Protect Journalists, *Deaths Worldwide*, at <www.cpj.org>.

19. International Press Institute, *IPI Death Watch 2007*, at <<http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/deathwatch.html?year=2007>>.

compared with significantly lower numbers killed by heavy weaponry (15.6%) or explosives (9.4%); c) the lack of protection given to civilians in conflicts, in which not only opposition groups but also state forces (supposedly the protectors of civilian rights) are responsible for attacks on civilians, including journalists, and in which there is an increasing rise in criminal activity, as illustrated by the fact that 29% of journalists were killed by the political opposition, 19.3% died at the hands of government agents, 11.5% were killed by criminals, 8% by paramilitaries and 6.5% by the army; d) the impunity attached to violations of International Humanitarian Law, with the vast majority of journalist deaths going unpunished.²⁰

In addition to the impact of today's armed conflicts on the actual physical safety of journalists, the effects of the conflicts themselves extend to the way journalism is practised in situations of war. Already subject to the pressures associated with contemporary media trends (immediacy, visual impact, personalisation and decontextualisation, pressure from the ruling authorities, lack of job security, etc.), the profession also suffers the pressures and consequences arising from the *de facto* loss of the non-combatant status of its members: restriction of movement, a growing dependence on second- and third-hand sources to the detriment of direct information, the increasing use of reporters who are 'embedded'²¹ with one of the warring sides and the limited independence of the resulting information that this implies, the danger for both sources and the people working with journalists (such as translators and drivers), etc. One should also remember the role that some of the media have played in inciting violence and hatred in pre-war and combat situations or contexts of genocide (such as the Balkans, Rwanda).

Although there are formal mechanisms for the specific protection of journalists, such as the recent UN Security Council Resolution 1738 (2006),²² which confirmed the civilian status of journalists in situations of armed conflict and called on all warring parties to adopt the relevant measures, today's armed conflicts keep many journalists in check, and with them the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in times of war and the opportunity to give a true picture of the way an individual conflict is evolving. As a result, the increasing death rates and rising attacks on journalists have tragically become yet another indicator of the way today's armed conflicts have evolved.

on an amnesty plan to encourage desertions within the ranks of the PKK.

has given way since February 2006 to an internal power struggle along markedly sectarian lines, mainly between Shiites and Sunnis.

Middle East

| Iraq | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2003 |
| Type: | System, Government, Resources Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Transitional government, international coalition led by the USA/United Kingdom, internal and external armed opposition groups |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |
| Summary: | The invasion by the US-led coalition in March 2003, using the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction as justification and citing the aim of overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime on the grounds of its alleged links with the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, marked the beginning of an armed conflict that has gradually drawn in an increasing number of factions: international troops, Iraqi armed forces, militias and insurgent groups and al-Qaeda, among others. The new power-sharing arrangement between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds within the constitutional framework introduced following Hussein's overthrow has aroused discontent in many sectors. The level of violence has gradually increased, and the armed opposition to the international presence in the country |

The conflict in **Iraq** reached extremely violent levels during the first part of the year, culminating in a multiple attack in August against two Yazidi towns in the Sinjar region in the northwest of the country, leaving 400 dead and many others injured. Attributed to al-Qaeda by US military sources, this was the most deadly attack since the US-led invasion of 2003. The violence in the country abated somewhat from September onwards, according to some analysts due to the effects of the military operation launched in Baghdad in February by both US and Iraqi forces, the collaboration between the USA and some Sunni factions, the temporary suspension of operations by the el-Mahdi militia in August and the rejection of al-Qaeda by some Arab tribes. The greatest number of refugees and displaced people since the conflict began was recorded in 2007, with UNHCR calculating the figure at some four million Iraqis.²³ Prime minister Nouri al-Maliki supported renewing the mandate of the US-led forces, though he called on US President George W. Bush to hold talks on the future of US troops in Iraq (a reduction of 25,000 soldiers by the end of 2008 was announced by Bush in September). On a political level, there were continuing disagreements between the various factions, with the Shiite ministers from the Moqtda al-Sadr group resigning in April and the main Sunni coalition leaving the government in August. The bombing raids and incursions by the Turkish army against the PKK in the Autonomous Region of

A multiple attack in August against two Yazidi towns left 400 people dead which was the most deadly attack since 2003

20. Committee to Protect Journalists, *Journalists Killed 1992-2007*, at <<http://www.cpj.org/deadly/index.html>>.

21. The term 'embedded reporting' refers in journalistic terms to reporting on the events of war from spaces controlled by one of the parties, e.g. by accompanying a particular army unit.

22. S/RES/1738(2006) of 23 December 2006, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm>.

23. See Box 5.3 in the chapter on humanitarian crises.

Box 1.5. Oil: the apple of discord in Iraq

The Iraqi parliament should have voted on the country's oil law in May 2007, but the end of the year came and went without any progress in approving the draft bill prepared by the government in February. The strategic issue of the country's oil resources and the huge controversy sparked by this law have caused delays in an issue which has become the apple of discord in Iraq's future, along with the extreme violence in which the country has been immersed.

Iraq has proven oil reserves of 115,000 million barrels, giving it the third largest reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, despite this huge wealth, decades of war, sanctions, lack of investment and now violence and looting have meant that some of its facilities are obsolete and have even led to a shortage of fuel in the country itself. The US-led invasion in 2003 caused a sharp fall in oil production, though this began to recover slowly and by the end of December 2007 it had reached around 2.5 million barrels a day, equalling the average output achieved before the conflict began.

The US administration has been pressing for the immediate approval of the oil law so that investment can begin as quickly as possible, in the expectation that this will prove a favourable scenario for foreign companies. At the same time, in the political arena, the US is arguing that the law will help to resolve the differences between the different religious groups and thus contribute to a reduction in the sectarian violence affecting the country. However, it is precisely the deep disagreements between the various groups that have, until now, prevented approval of the law and turned it into a cause for tensions.

Firstly, the Sunnis, who have been pressing for the creation of an oil law, want to see a strong state authority that will prevent the country's fragmentation and their own exclusion from the oil-rich areas (which are mostly controlled by the Kurds and Shiites). The Sunnis accepted the 2005 Constitution, which was intentionally vague as regards the ownership of and control over oil in order to ensure support from the Kurds and Shiites, in return for guaranteeing its subsequent review. The draft bill provides for a central authority that will control almost all the oil, a provision opposed by the Kurds. As a result, the Autonomous Government of Kurdistan approved its own law in August 2007 (classified as illegal by the Executive in Baghdad) which allows the Kurdish government to grant various oil exploitation licences to foreign companies, in spite of threats from the central authorities to prevent the oil from being exported. The Kurdish government insists that it has not broken any national laws and that the profits will be shared throughout the whole country. At the same time, the Sunnis want profits to be redistributed on the basis of population numbers, though there has not been a recent census that would allow one to calculate the figures (it is estimated that the Sunnis make up approximately 20% of the population). While the draft bill acceded to some of the Sunni demands, the community's leaders have said they are willing to effect a blockade unless some of their other requests are taken into consideration.

The tensions surrounding the oil law have a further exacerbating element: the city of Kirkuk, an area with the second highest oil and gas reserves in Iraq. Currently outside the three provinces that form the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan, the city is calling for a referendum to determine its status and future inclusion in the Region, based on Article 140 of the Constitution. Because this is a highly controversial issue, the referendum that was due to be held before 31 December 2007 has been postponed until the middle of 2008.

Iraq's oil has been and remains the cause of great greed, both inside and outside the country. The oil law, which has yet to be agreed upon and approved, lies at the heart of the discord, given that the different political sides are using it as currency as they trade interests. The way events develop during 2008 will depend on the capacity of the various political and regional agents involved to reach some kind of agreement on this and other issues.

Kurdistan further heightened tensions in the region, while a planned referendum to decide the status of the city of Kirkuk was eventually postponed until mid-2008.

| Israel – Palestine | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2000 |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity, Territory International ²⁴ |
| Main parties involved: | Israeli government, colonist militias, PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Summary: | The conflict between Israel and the different Palestinian groups resurged in 2000 with the outbreak of the 2 nd Intifada, |

following the breakdown of the peace process promoted at the beginning of the 1990s (Oslo Process, 1993-1994). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back to 1947, when UN Security Council Resolution 181 divided the territory of Palestine, then under British mandate, into two states. The State of Israel was declared shortly afterwards (1948), though a Palestinian state has still failed to materialise. In 1948, Israel annexed West Jerusalem, while Egypt and Jordan occupied Gaza and the West Bank respectively. In 1967, Israel invaded East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza after winning the Six-Day War against the Arab states. Autonomy for the Palestinian territories was not formally recognised until the Oslo agreements, though its implementation would be prevented by military occupation and the territorial controls imposed by Israel.

In spite of the formal advances achieved in the international peace conference on the **Israeli-Palestinian conflict** in Annapolis (USA) at the end of November, the difficulties in making any real process were illustrated by a number of events: one section of the Palestinian population and its representative body, Hamas, was

24. Although "Palestine" is not an internationally recognised state (though the National Palestinian Authority is a political entity linked with a specific people and territory), the conflict between Israel and Palestine is classified as an "international" rather than an "internal" one as it involves territory that has been illegally occupied and that is not recognised under International Humanitarian Law or any United Nations resolution as belonging to Israel.

excluded from the conference and future negotiations; the building of settlements on the West Bank continued; and, above all, the levels of violence between both sides continued to rise, with a notable increase in attacks by the Israeli army within Gaza in response to the increased number of rockets being launched against Israeli territory, after Hamas ended the cease-fire agreement it had observed since November 2006. More specifically, the rocket attack that left more than 60 Israeli soldiers injured in mid-September, responsibility for which was claimed by the Popular Resistance Committees and Islamic Jihad, was followed by Israel's declaration of the Gaza Strip as a hostile territory, leading to the almost complete closure of its borders and a halt to all fuel supplies. Israel took advantage of the inter-party conflict between supporters of Hamas and Fatah (receiving the backing of some members of the international community) to intensify its isolation of Gaza while at the same time offering political, diplomatic, economic and military support to the president of the PNA, Mahmoud Abbas.

Palestine

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2006 |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | PNA, Fatah (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al-Qassam Brigades) |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |

Summary:

The rivalry between different Palestinian factions in recent decades has mainly involved national non-religious groups on one side (Fatah and its armed wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the FPLP, the FDLP) and religious groups on the other (Hamas and its armed wing, the Ezzedin-al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad). The fighting stems from the struggle for power within the Palestinian territories, and it has in turn resulted in different approaches towards relations with Israel. After Palestinian politics was dominated for years by Fatah (the movement led first by Yasser Arafat and subsequently by Mahmoud Abbas), accusations of corruption and of the failure to defend Palestinian interests in the peace process finally brought Hamas to victory in the elections of January 2006. This led to a battle of words and open armed conflict between the two sides over control of the territories' political institutions and, above all, its security forces.

2007 was marked by a large-scale **intra-Palestinian conflict** with fighting from January onwards between followers of the Fatah party and members of the Hamas Islamist movement, leaving hundreds of people dead. The Mecca Agreement of 8 February and the formation of a Government of National Unity in mid-March failed to halt the fighting, which culminated three months later with the dismantling by Hamas of the security forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas in the Gaza Strip, followed by its assuming power in the territory. The immediate declaration of a parallel emergency government in Ramallah, controlled by Fatah, led to the *de facto* separation of Gaza and the West Bank and mutual repression in both territories. The deaths of eight

Fatah supporters on 12 November at the hands of Hamas forces during ceremonies to mark the death of Yasser Arafat kept tensions high, though Hamas made gestures for inviting President Mahmoud Abbas for talks. Meanwhile, Israel's blockade of Gaza was intensified throughout the year, and the United Nations warned of an alarming deterioration in the situation and the serious humanitarian consequences being caused.

Lebanon (Naher al-Bared)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2007 |
| Type: | System Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Fatah al-Islam |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ENDED |

Summary:

The conflict began in May 2007 when the Lebanese army became involved in fighting at a Palestinian refugee camp in the north of the country with the Fatah al-Islam militia, a group that had emerged in 2006. The Lebanese government had accused the armed group of responsibility for an attack in the Christian part of Beirut in previous months, and it believed that Fatah al-Islam was working for the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon (a fact denied both by the militia group itself and by Syria), as well as belonging to the al-Qaeda organisation. The conflict broke out against a background of extreme political and social fragility (in which Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs had yet to be clarified), with reports of penetration by Jihadist cells in various parts of the country.

Fighting between the army and the Fatah al-Islam militia began on 20 May at the **Naher al-Bared** Palestinian refugee camp, close to the northern city of Tripoli, in **Lebanon**. By 2 September, when the army announced that the conflict was over, the death toll had exceeded 300, including 164 soldiers and 42 civilians. The origins of the armed group and the reasons for the fighting were subject to dispute, though connections with the tense internal political situation and wider regional tensions could not be discounted.²⁵ The conflict was briefly mirrored in another refugee camp close to Sidon, where a group known as Jund al-Sham was involved. The different Palestinian organisations (entrusted with maintaining security at refugee camps in Lebanon) distanced themselves from the actions of the armed groups and supported the Lebanese government's decision to suppress them.

Yemen

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Start of conflict: | 2004 |
| Type: | System Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government armed forces, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (<i>al-Shabab al-Mumen</i>) |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |

25. See the attached Box and the chapter on tensions.

Summary:

This conflict began in 2004, when followers of the cleric al-Houthi, who belonged to the Shiite minority, began an uprising in the north of Yemen with the aim of reinstating a theocratic regime similar to the one that disappeared in 1962 throughout the Sunni parts of the country. The rebels have also accused the government of corruption and of failing to pay attention to the northern mountainous regions of the country, while objecting to its alliance with the USA in the fight against terrorism. The conflict has cost the lives of thousands of people and led to the displacement of many thousands more.

The conflict being fought since 2004 between the army and supporters of Shiite cleric Husein Badr al-Houthi in **Yemen** intensified in January 2007, leaving 1,500

soldiers and 2,000 rebels dead during the first four months of the year, according to local sources. The signing of a peace agreement in June led to a lull in the fighting, though sporadic outbreaks continued through to the end of the year. The continuing bombardment by the army of the northern province of Saada and criticism of al-Houthi for failing to comply with the weapons handover were cited as the reasons for the lack of success of the peace process. The government also accused Iran and Libya of supporting the rebels, an accusation they denied. According to humanitarian agencies, the conflict has caused the displacement of thousands of people. Meanwhile, an attack in July that was attributed to al-Qaeda killed nine people, including seven Spanish tourists.

Box 1.6. The outbreak of conflict in Naher al-Bared and the complexity of an incident that lasted 105 days

From May to September 2007, the Palestinian refugee camp at Naher al-Bared, close to the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, was the scene of a conflict between the Lebanese army and a group calling itself Fatah al-Islam, following an attack by the armed group on a military position that left more than 20 soldiers with their throats cut. While the physical consequences of the fighting were clear (more than 300 people died, the camp was practically destroyed and 31,000 Palestinians were forcibly displaced), the nature and cause of the conflict were less clear.

The official government version pointed to the Syrian government as instigators of the attack (linking it to the forthcoming vote on the establishment of an international court to investigate Syrian involvement in the murder of several leading Lebanese figures), though Syria denied the accusation. However, the government's remarks owed more to the internal political situation in Lebanon, where the governing majority blames Syria for all the country's troubles, than to the actual facts that emerged after the conflict. Other sources underlined the links between Fatah al-Islam and al-Qaeda, while still more attributed the events to conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps.


A recent investigation following the end of the conflict came to several conclusions.²⁶ It first discounted the fact that Fatah al-Islam was an artificial creation of the Syrian intelligence services, or that the latter played a leading role in arming or financing it, though it acknowledged that Syria did not prevent the entry into Lebanon of combatants from Iraq. The investigators also claimed that Fatah al-Islam originally started as a group fighting for Palestinian liberation, but became gradually radicalised with the arrival of Arab fighters (both Palestinians and Syrians) who had fought in Iraq and been forced to flee due to the sectarian violence sweeping the country. The arrival of a former member of Jund al-Sham (another armed group that sprang up in the Ein el Helweh refugee camp), who introduced an extremist *takfiri* approach and was accompanied by Lebanese combatants contributed to the group's radicalisation. Finally, the arrival of a Saudi sheik allied to Osama Bin Laden brought about Fatah al-Islam's gradual transformation from a hierarchical group formed by Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese into a Salafist Jihadist network of decentralised cells peopled with extremist combatants from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It thus passed from a vehicle for the Palestinian cause to an organisation bent on turning Tripoli into an Islamic Emirate.

This new radicalising element created dissension and huge disagreement between new and old members of Fatah al-Islam, to the point that the outbreak of conflict with the attack on 20 May by part of the group took its leader Shaker al-Abssi by surprise. This added to the frictions caused among the mainly secular Palestinian civilian population that had endured the invasion of their home by a violent group of outsiders. Clearly, the difficult situation in Palestinian refugee camps, where the inhabitants have spent decades living in deplorable conditions, is an important element to be borne in mind when explaining these events. The absence of external controls, the frictions between different Palestinian groups and the ease with which external elements were able to infiltrate the camp unquestionably provided a fertile atmosphere for the conflict.

As regards the links between Fatah al-Islam and al-Qaeda that were initially suggested, the group declared that it was sympathetic towards Osama Bin Laden's organisation, but it denied any links. Indeed, neither Bin Laden nor Ayman Zawahiri declared their support for Fatah al-Islam's action against the Lebanese army. Nevertheless, according to analysts, the Fatah al-Islam offensive would not have been possible without financial support from the Saudi branch of al-Qaeda. Furthermore, interesting evidence regarding the composition of Fatah al-Islam would lead to a rejection of the idea of a link between the Jihadist phenomenon in the Lebanon and the Palestinian population and suggests that Lebanese elements form an important part of the movement. It is also known that there are various Lebanese Jihadist cells operating in the Tripoli, Akkar and Koura areas.

As a detailed analysis of the events at Naher al-Bared demonstrates, the numbers, characteristics and complexity of the links between the parties involved makes it important to steer away from a simplistic interpretation that associates the conflict purely with the Syrian regime, the international struggle by Osama Bin Laden or the situation in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. A combination of local, regional and international elements provides a more exact picture of the conflict in Naher al-Bared, the first time that Lebanese armed forces have attacked a Palestinian refugee camp since 1973 and the most serious internal conflict in the country since it was devastated by civil war between 1975 and 1990.

26. Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, *Fatah al Islam: how an Ambitious Jihadist Project Went Awry*, Brookings Institution, 28/11/07, at <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1128_terrorism_saab.aspx>.



■ Countries in a situation of tension (indicator no.2)

2. Tensions

- At the end of 2007, 70 contexts around the world were classified as being in a state of tension, the majority in Africa and Asia. Tensions in 70% of these contexts were markedly internal in nature.
- The outbreak of violence in Kenya following accusations of fraud in the presidential elections left more than 300 people dead in the last week of the year.
- High levels of political tension and social polarisation were recorded in Bolivia following the approval of a new Constitution and confrontations between departments in the east of the country and the central government.
- The growing political tensions and increased violence in Pakistan raised questions about the Pervez Musharraf regime, particularly after the assassination of former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, towards the end of the year.
- Georgia formally called for the withdrawal of Russian peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia in the midst of increased tensions between the *de facto* independent region and the Georgian central government.
- The year ended without a new president being elected in Lebanon, amid serious polarisation and the murder of political and military figures.

This chapter identifies the different contexts of tension seen around the world during 2007 (indicator no. 2) and is divided into two sections: the first describes the contexts of tension and their individual characteristics, while the second contains an analysis of the way tensions have evolved and current trends. The first part of the chapter also includes a map showing all the current contexts of tension around the world.

2.1. Tensions: definition

A situation of tension is considered one in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy the demands raised by different parties leads to high levels of social and political mobilisation and/or the use of violence that does not reach the intensity of an armed conflict but may nevertheless include confrontations, repression, coups d'état, murders and other attacks, the escalation of which could lead to armed conflict under certain circumstances. Tensions normally arise from: a) demands for self-determination and self-government or questions of identity; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system in a particular country or the domestic or international policies of a particular government, which in many cases lead to a struggle to accede to or erode power; or c) control over resources or territory.

Table 2.1. Summary of situations of tension during 2007

| Situation of Tensión ¹ | Type ² | Main parties involved | Intensity ³ Evolution during 2007 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Africa | | | |
| Angola (Cabinda) | Internal | Government, FLEC armed group, political alliance of social and armed groups known as the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue | 1 |
| | Self-government, Resources | | = |
| Burundi | Internal | Government, armed opposition (FNL-PALIPEHUTU, known as the FNL, and a dissident faction of the FNL) and political opposition (faction of the CNDD-FDD led by Hussein Radjabu, UPRONA, FRODEBU) | 2 |
| | Identity, Government | | = |
| Cameroon (Bakassi) – Nigeria | International | Cameroon, Nigeria, Nigerian organisations opposed to the devolution of the Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroon | 1 |
| | Territory | | = |
| Comoros | Internal | Regional government of Anjouan, regional government of Moheli, government of the Union led by Grand Comore | 1 |
| | Self-government | | ↑ |
| Chad– Sudan | International | Chad, Sudan | 2 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Congo | Internal | Government, CNR opposition party and Ninja militias of Reverend Ntoumi | 1 |
| | Self-government, Government | | ↓ |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Internationalised internal | Government, Force Nouvelles armed alliance, pro-government militias, ONUCI, Force Licorne | 2 |
| | Government, Resources | | ↓ |

| Situation of Tensión | Type | Main parties involved | Intensity Evolution during 2007 |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Africa | | | |
| Eritrea – Ethiopia | International | Eritrea, Ethiopia | 2 |
| | Territory | | ↑ |
| Ethiopia | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (CUD, UEDF), EPPF armed group | 1 |
| | Government | | = |
| Ethiopia (Oromiya) | Internal | Government, OLF armed group | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Guinea | Internal | Government, unions, opposition political parties, state armed forces | 2 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Guinea-Bissau | Internal | Government, opposition political parties | 1 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Equatorial Guinea | Internal | Government, opposition political parties, social movements | 1 |
| | Government | | = |
| Kenya | Internal | Government, ethnic militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civilian organisations) | 3 |
| | Identity, Government, Resources | | ↑ |
| Mali | Internal | Government, faction of the ADC armed group led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga | 2 |
| | Identity, Resources | | = |
| Morocco – Western Sahara | International ⁴ | Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), POLISARIO armed group | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity, Territory | | ↑ |
| Niger | Internal | Government, MNJ armed group | 3 |
| | Identity, Resources | | ↑ |
| Nigeria | Internal | Government, political parties, mafias, religious extremist groups | 2 |
| | Government | | = |
| DR Congo | Internal | Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups | 3 |
| | Government, Resources | | ↑ |
| Great Lakes Region | International | DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda | 2 |
| | Identity, Government, Resources | | = |
| Senegal (Casamance) | Internal | Government, MFDC armed group and its different factions | 1 |
| | Self-government | | ↓ |
| Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland) | Internal | Republic of Somaliland, Autonomous Region of Puntland | 3 |
| | Territory | | ↑ |
| Manu River Region ⁵ | International | Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, mercenary groups | 1 |
| | Resources | | ↓ |
| Sudan | Internal | NCP and SPLM political parties, SPLA armed group, pro-government militias, ethnic communities and Dinkas and Nuer clans in the south | 3 |
| | Self-government, Resources, Identity | | = |
| Sudan (East) | Internal | Government, Eastern Front armed group | 1 |
| | Self-government, Resources | | ↓ |
| Zimbabwe | Internal | ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, WOZA social opposition organisation | 2 |
| | Government | | ↑ |

| Situation of Tensión | Type | Main parties involved | Intensity Evolution during 2007 |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| America | | | |
| Bolivia | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and civilian organisations from the eastern departments) | 2 |
| | Government, Self-government | | = |
| Ecuador | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (Congress, peasant organisations and indigenous groups opposed to transnational mining activities) | 2 |
| | Government, Resources | | = |
| Haiti | Internationalised internal | MINUSTAH, government, armed opposition (youth gangs) | 1 |
| | Territory, Government | | ↓ |
| Mexico (Chiapas) | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (EZLN, social organisations) | 1 |
| | Identity, System | | ↓ |
| Peru | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (remaining factions of Sendero Luminoso, peasant organisations and indigenous groups) | 2 |
| | Government | | = |
| Venezuela | Internal | Government, political and social opposition | 2 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Asia | | | |
| Bangladesh | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (AL, BNP) | 1 |
| | Government | | ↓ |
| China (Tibet) | Internationalised internal | Government, political and social opposition (secessionist and human rights organisations), Tibetan government and Tibetan organisations in exile | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity, System | | = |
| China (East Turkistan) | Internal | Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| Philippines | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (discontented sectors in the armed forces, opposition parties, left-wing organisations and human rights groups) | 2 |
| | Government | | = |
| Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF) | Internal | Government, factions of the MNLF armed group | 3 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Fiji | Internal | Government, political and social opposition | 1 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| India – Pakistan | International | Indian government, Pakistani government | 1 |
| | Identity, Territory | | = |
| India (Nagaland) | Internal | Government, armed opposition (NSCN-K, NSCN-IM) | 3 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| India (Tripura) | Internal | Government, armed opposition (NLFT, ATTF) | 1 |
| | Self-government | | = |
| Indonesia (Sulawesi) | Internal | Government, political organisations and armed groups operating along religious lines | 1 |
| | Identity | | ↓ |
| Indonesia (Moluccas) | Internal | Government political organisations and armed groups operating along religious lines | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↓ |
| Indonesia (West Papua) | Internal | Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (pro-autonomy or secessionist organisations, indigenous communities and human rights groups), indigenous Papuan groups, Freeport mining company | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity, Resources | | = |
| Kyrgyzstan | Internal | Government, political and social opposition | 2 |
| | Government | | = |

| Situation of Tensión | Type | Main parties involved | Intensity Evolution during 2007 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Asia | | | |
| Laos | Internal | Government, Hmong political and armed organisations | 2 |
| | System, Identity | | = |
| Myanmar | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (LND opposition party) | 3 |
| | System | | ↑ |
| Nepal (Terai) | Internal | Government, Madhesi political and armed organisations (MRPF), JTMM | 3 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Pakistan | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (PPP opposition party, judiciary), Taliban militias | 3 |
| | Government, System | | ↑ |
| Pakistan (Baluchistan) | Internal | Government, BLA armed group | 2 |
| | Self-government, Resources | | = |
| Thailand | Internal | Government, political and social opposition | 2 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Tajikistan | Internal | Government, political and social opposition, warlords | 2 |
| | Government | | = |
| Timor-Leste | Internationalised internal | Government, International Security Forces, political and social opposition (sympathisers of rebel leader Alfredo Reinado, sympathisers of the FRETILIN party, dismissed members of the military, armed gangs) | 3 |
| | Government | | ↓ |
| Turkmenistan | Internal | Government, political and social opposition | 1 |
| | Government | | = |
| Uzbekistan | Internal | Government, political and social opposition, armed Islamist groups | 2 |
| | System, Government | | ↑ |
| Europe | | | |
| Armenia–Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) | International | Government of Azerbaijan, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity, Territory | | = |
| Belarus | Internal | Government, political and social opposition | 1 |
| | Government | | = |
| Cyprus | Internal | Government of Cyprus, government of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity, Territory | | = |
| Georgia (Abkhazia) | Internationalised internal | Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia, peace-keeping forces from the CIS | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Georgia (South Ossetia) | Internationalised internal | Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| Macedonia (northwest) | Internal | Government, political groups and armed members of the Albanian community | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| Moldova, Rep. of (Transdniester) | Internationalised internal | Government of Moldova, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniester, Russia | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| Russia (North Caucasus) | Internal | Russian government, governments of the republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechnya, armed opposition groups, political and social opposition | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity, System, Government | | ↑ |

| Situation of Tensión | Type | Main parties involved | Intensity Evolution during 2007 |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Europe | | | |
| Serbia (Kosovo) | Internationalised internal | Government of Serbia, government of Kosovo, political and social representatives of the Kosovo Serb community, UNMIK, KFOR | 1 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | ↑ |
| Middle East | | | |
| Saudi Arabia | Internationalised internal | Government, al-Qaeda armed group | 1 |
| | System | | = |
| Egypt | Internal | Government, political and social opposition (Muslim Brotherhood) | 1 |
| | Government, System | | = |
| Iran (northwest) | Internationalised internal | Government, PJAK armed group | 2 |
| | Self-government, Identity | | = |
| Iran – USA, various countries | International | Iran, USA, Israel, EU-3 (France, United Kingdom, Germany) | 2 |
| | System | | ↑ |
| Lebanon | Internationalised internal | Government, political and social opposition | 2 |
| | Government | | ↑ |
| Israel–Lebanon–Syria | International | Israel, Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah armed group | 2 |
| | System, Resources, Territory | | = |

1: Low intensity; 2: Medium intensity; 3: High intensity; ↑: Escalation in tensions; ↓: Reduction in tensions; = : unchanged.

The tensions shown in bold type are analysed in this chapter.

1. This column names the states in which tensions are reported. The reference in brackets indicates the region within that state affected by the tensions or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict, the latter being used to differentiate the different scenarios when there is more than one situation of tension in the same state or territorial region.
2. This report classifies and analyses tensions on the basis of a two-fold classification which, on the one hand, takes account of the causes or the incompatibility of the interests involved and, on the other, looks at the convergence between the place where the conflict is taking place and the parties involved. As far as the causes are concerned, the following basic categories can be identified: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or questions of identity (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system imposed by a state (System) or the domestic or international policies of a particular government (Government), which in both cases lead to a struggle to accede to or erode power; or a fight to control resources (Resources) or territory (Territory). As regards the second method of classification, tensions may be internal, internationalised internal or international in nature. Internal tensions are those that involve tensions between parties operating exclusively within and from the state in question. Internationalised internal tensions are those in which one of the opposing parties is foreign and/or tensions that extend into neighbouring countries. Finally, international tensions are those in which state or non-state forces from two or more countries involved.
3. The intensity of the tensions in a particular context (high, medium or low) and the way they have evolved over the year (escalation, reduction, unchanged) is mainly assessed on the basis of the level of violence reported and the degree of political and social mobilisation.
4. Although Western Sahara is not an internationally recognised state, the tensions between Morocco and Western Sahara are classified as “international” and not internal as this is a territory which is awaiting decolonisation and which is not recognised as belonging to Morocco either under international law or in any United Nations resolution.
5. The Manu River region covers Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is also taken into account here, given its proximity and its influence on the surrounding area. The situation of tension between the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso will also be analysed within the context of this region.

2.2. Tensions: global trends during 2007

At the end of 2007 there were **70 contexts** around the world that were classified as being in a state of tension, **the majority of them in Africa and Asia** (26 and 23 respectively). The remainder were in Europe (9), America (6) and the Middle East (6). It should be pointed out that **70% of these situations of tension were markedly internal in nature**, while the remainder were caused, in more or less the same proportion (15%) by internationalised internal disputes or purely international circumstances. The majority of international situations of tension were to be found in Africa, between bordering states involved in territorial disputes (such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, or Cameroon and Nigeria), and

between countries forming part of regional groupings (the Manu River and Great Lakes regions).

As regards the origins of the disputes behind these situations of tension, it is important to note that, while they were generally multi-faceted in nature, **almost half of all tensions (47%) could be traced back to disagreements between the political sector and social organisations opposed to government policy**. This was the case in 13 African countries (among them Burundi, Congo, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe), and a further 10 in Asia (Bangladesh, Philippines, Fiji, Pakistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste and the majority of countries in Central Asia). Practically all the situations of tension in America were also due to opposition to government policies in the region. This could also be seen in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, which

all saw widespread demonstrations and protests against their respective governments during 2007. However, in Europe and the Middle East the underlying reasons for tension were different. In **Europe, the main cause revolved around demands for self-government** (in places like Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Republic of Transdniestria in Moldova, and Kosovo, which seemed to have effectively become independent from Serbia at the end of the year), while disputes in the **Middle East** arose more as the result of **opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological stances taken by the state** (as was the case in Saudi Arabia with al-Qaeda, Egypt and the opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the international tensions between Iran and the USA, and Israel, Lebanon and Syria). It is also interesting to note that the **disputes relating to demands for self-government usually involved claims for the recognition of a community's identity**, and a combination of both factors was an important element in tensions throughout Africa, Asia and Europe.

The vast majority of these situations of tension either worsened (35%) or remained more or less the same (49%) during 2007. Only a very small proportion (16%) had shown any sign of a reduction in tensions by the end of the year. As far as intensity is concerned, both in terms of the use of violence and the level of mobilisation, this could only be described as high in 15% of cases. **Significantly, all the cases in which tensions were classified as high were in Africa or Asia.** In Africa, Kenya experienced a serious outbreak of violence following accusations of fraud during the December elections, while there was also a serious upsurge in tensions in Niger, DR Congo and Sudan. In Asia, tensions were high in Mindanao in the Philippines, where the MNLF is engaged in an armed struggle, the Indian region of Nagaland, Myanmar, the Nepalese region of Terai, Timor-Leste, and above all in Pakistan. In this last case, the worsening situation led to fears that a conflict of more serious proportions might break out.

All the situations reported around the world involved the government of the country in question, and in 40 of these cases this meant confrontations between the government, opposition political parties and social movements. **30 of the 70 cases also involved some form of armed group, the majority of them armed opposition**

groups, though some involved other kinds of organisations like militias, warlords or mafia groups. As one would expect from the distribution of the contexts of tension reported, Africa and Asia were the regions in which the largest number of armed groups could be found (13 and 12 respectively). The presence of armed participants necessarily means that tensions will normally be pushed to a higher level, though one third of the situations in which an armed presence was reported were classified as being of low intensity. Almost all the countries in situations of tension in which armed organisations were operating resulted from previous situations of armed conflict, where peace agreements had been signed or ceasefires declared in the past.


Looking at things from a regional perspective, it should be noted that the situations of tension reported in **Africa** were mostly internal (with just a few cases in which disputes had become internationalised), even though the continent is the scene of the majority of inter-state conflicts. In **America**, the intensity of tensions was either medium (4 cases) or low (2), and there was little escalation during the course of the year, though there was a continuing stream of mobilisations, protests and violence in several Latin American countries. The situation in **Europe** was similar, with tensions centring around claims for questions of identity and demands for self-government, with a significant internationalising element caused by Russia's influence and intervention in many of the contexts reported. In **Asia**, 20 of the 23 situations of tension were internal, and the only international dispute that remains is the one involving India and Pakistan. The **Middle East** was notable for the international or internationalised nature of most of its situations of tension, something which underlines not only the interaction between the various parties in the region but also the external interests that converge in that part of the world.

2.3. Tensions: evolution during the year by region

Africa

Tensions on the African continent centred around the difficulties experienced in implementing previously

Graph 2.1. Number of situations of tension by region



signed peace agreements. This was true in both Sudan and Burundi, where the FNL hindered the efforts of the commission monitoring the ceasefire. The failure to make any progress in areas in which agreements had supposedly been reached was also the cause of tensions in the two interstate contexts that remained ongoing in Africa: the dispute between Chad and Sudan and the one between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the holding of elections contributed to an increase in tensions in countries like Nigeria and, above all, Kenya, where accusations of fraud from the opposition led to a wave of violence of serious proportions.

a) Southern Africa

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Zimbabwe | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, WOZA social opposition group |

Summary:

The government led by Robert Mugabe, who has been in power as leader of the ZANU-PF party since the country's independence in 1980, continues to pursue its policy of persecuting both members of the opposition and civilians. In recent years, the Mugabe regime has been criticised for its high levels of corruption, its suppression of all political opposition, its poor management of agricultural reforms and the country's economy, and its systematic human rights violations, all of which has led the country to a position of international isolation.

The increasingly serious economic crisis faced by **Zimbabwe** further fuelled protests from civilian organisations and opposition groups, who continued to hold peaceful demonstrations during 2007, calling for Robert Mugabe's resignation and the creation of a new constitution. **The heavy-handed way in which the police put down these protests resulted in a large number of people being detained, with many injuries and even some deaths among the demonstrators** and members of the opposition MDC party. In February, all political demonstrations and meetings were banned for three months though, in practice, rallies by both opposition parties and civilian organisations were prevented from happening throughout the entire year.⁶ As a result of this situation, in the second quarter of the year the SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) suggested that South African president Thabo Mbeki act as mediator in the political crisis between the governing ZANU-PF and its main opposition, the MDC. Mbeki's role as mediator was criticised on many occasions on the grounds that he was too tolerant and flexible with Mugabe and for lacking transparency. Nevertheless, some political agreements were reached after various meetings, such as the approval of an MDC amendment to the constitu-

Serious economic crisis faced by Zimbabwe further fuelled protests from civilian organisations and opposition groups calling for Robert Mugabe's resignation

tion that would allow both presidential and parliamentary elections to be held during 2008. In spite of growing criticism of President Mugabe from both within and outside the country, he was re-elected by his party to stand in the forthcoming elections.

b) West Africa

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Côte d'Ivoire | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |
| Type: | Government, Resources Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Force Nouvelles armed alliance, pro-government militias, ONUCI, Force Licorne |

Summary:

The country has been split since 2002 between the Force Nouvelles, the armed opposition alliance operating in the north of the country, and the government, which controls the south. The signing of a political agreement in Ouagadougou in March 2007 opened the way to the country's reunification. Nevertheless, the lack of progress in implementing the agreement continued to place the peace process at serious risk.

Côte d'Ivoire took a further step towards peace in 2007 with the **signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, which was aimed at starting the process to implement the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreements.**⁷

Although there were no serious episodes of violence other than the attempted assassination of the leader of the Force Nouvelles and current prime minister, Guillaume Soro, during the month of June, several analysts pointed to the potentially destabilising effect of the return of refugees and the displaced to their places of origin, given the absence of any clear strategy to resolve

the disputes that have arisen over land ownership, particularly in the west of the country, the region most affected by the conflict. The ONUCI peace mission complained of acts of violence during the final months of the year in Bouaké, the northern capital which is under the control of the Force Nouvelles armed alliance, including military confrontations, illegal and abusive detentions and summary executions. A number of organisations, including the WFP, also reported an increase in criminal behaviour and the continuing use of extortion and violence against the civilian population, particularly in the north. The stability of the peace process will depend on the proper establishment of electoral lists and the preparation and outcome of the forthcoming elections, though no actual date has yet been fixed.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Guinea | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |

6. See the chapter on human rights.

7. See the chapters on armed conflict and peace processes.

| | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, unions, opposition political parties, government armed forces |

Summary:

The regime led by Lansana Conté, who has been in power since the coup d'état of 1984, has heavily suppressed all political and civilian opposition. The serious situation of political instability, constant human rights violations and the country's economic decline have led on several occasions to increased social tensions and failed coups d'état, as well as a number of assassination attempts on the president. After a general strike was called in 2007, the president declared a state of emergency, which led to the violent suppression of the demonstrators.

In Guinea, the general strike led by the unions, opposition parties and civilian organisations in January was brutally put down by state security forces, ending with the deaths of 113 people, all of them unarmed civilians. Protests had broken out over the rises in the price of fuel and basic foods, along with calls for the resignation of President Lansana Conté, who is accused of political corruption and the maladministration of the country's resources. ECOWAS sent the presidents of Nigeria and Senegal to act as mediators between the president and members of the political and social opposition, given that this serious crisis threatened to spread to other countries in the unstable Manu River region. In the end, a new prime minister, Lansana Kouyaté, was elected following an agreement with the unions, and he announced the creation of an investigation commission to ensure that any crimes committed during the strike would not go unpunished. However, almost one year on from these events, the commission has not yet been installed due to constant political disputes over its make-up, and several analysts have indicated that the crisis could break out once again if the new government fails to provide a response.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mali | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Identity, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, faction of the ADC armed group led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga |

Summary:

The Tuareg were living in the regions bordering the Sahara desert well before Africa's modern borders were created. Since Mali achieved independence, the Tuareg living in the north of the country have led several uprisings, leading to an armed conflict during the 1990s in which they demanded greater economic and political involvement and the development of the regions that they inhabit, which have been seriously affected by increasing drought and the gradual disappearance of trans-Saharan trade. The last peace agreement, signed in 2006 by the government and the armed Tuareg group the Democratic Alliance for Change, identified the development of the economy and infrastructure as key elements in the process to achieve a weapons handover and the end of the conflict.

In 2006, the government of Mali signed a further peace agreement with a faction that had split away from the

armed Tuareg group the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), following attacks on Malian armed forces in the northern region of Kidal. Implementation of this agreement began in early 2007. However, from May onwards, a faction of this same group led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga began a strategy of attacks and kidnappings against members of the army, holding more than 50 soldiers in the Tinzaoatene region in the northeast of the country. The Malian government accused Bahanga of wanting to control the border town in order to obtain control over the drug-trafficking network operating in the region. The detonation of anti-personnel mines killed at least 10 civilians and several soldiers. In August, when the crisis was reaching its most critical point, the leader of the Democratic Alliance for Change of 23 May, Iyad Ag Ghaly, who had been responsible for the fighting in Kidal in 2006, offered to mediate with Bahanga, achieving the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and the promise that the kidnapped soldiers would gradually be released. Finally, the governments of Mali and Niger denounced a supposed alliance between armed Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali, something which was denied by some groups, though September saw the public announcement of the creation of the Tuareg Alliance of Niger and Mali, led by Hama Ag Sidahmed of Mali.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Niger | |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Identity, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, MNJ armed group |

Summary:

The Tuareg were living in the regions bordering the Sahara desert well before Africa's modern borders were created. Since Niger achieved independence, the Tuareg living in the north of the country have led several uprisings, leading to an armed conflict during the 1990s in which they demanded greater economic and political involvement and the development of the regions that they inhabit, which have been seriously affected by increasing drought and the gradual disappearance of trans-Saharan trade. The failure to implement the peace agreements of 1995 has been one of the reasons cited by the MNJ for the initiation of its violent campaign against government armed forces in 2007, along with its lack of control over the natural resources (uranium) mined on its land.

In February, the armed Tuareg group the Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ) began carrying out attacks on military targets and members of Niger's armed forces in the Agadez region in the north of the country. The fighting between the Nigerien army and the MNJ, along with the kidnapping of soldiers, gradually intensified due to the government's failure to recognise the MNJ's political claims, considering the movement to be an arms and drugs trafficker. The strategy employed by the government was little more than to strengthen security by increasing troop numbers in the northern region, pursue security agreements with its neighbours (particularly Mali, but also Algeria and Libya) and impose a state of alert in Agadez, without making any attempt at negotiation – an approach that led to an

upsurge in tensions. Following the detonation of a mine in Niamey, the country's capital, the government announced that the armed group was planning to extend its insurgency campaign to the cities and accused it of terrorism. Government armed forces acknowledged more than 50 casualties while also accepting responsibility for killing seven Tuareg civilians who had got caught in an exchange of fire with MNJ activists. The uranium mines in the north, which are operated by the French company AREVA, were another focus of tensions, as the company's management was accused by both the government and the MNJ of financing the conflict.

| Nigeria | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political parties, mafias, extremist religious groups |
| Summary: | Since 1999, when political power was returned to civilian hands following a succession of dictatorships and coups d'état, the government has failed to install a democratic system in the country. Given the lack of decentralisation in the country, there are still huge financial and social differences between the different states of which Nigeria is made up, as well as a great gulf between the social classes, which has led to instability and outbreaks of violence. At the same time, marked inter-religious, inter-ethnic and political differences have further exacerbated the violence around the country. A lack of transparency and persisting corruption in the political arena are also greatly damaging democracy in Nigeria. Mafia activities and the use of political assassination as an electoral strategy have, at least during the last two elections, hindered the freedom of the ordinary electorate to vote, thus increasing discontentment and incidents of fraud. |

In **Nigeria**, the elections led to an increase in violent incidents between the main parties, with reports that mafia groups were being paid to harass both candidates and voters. **Around 200 people died in fighting associated with the elections, during a process that was characterised by fraud** and in which the successor to PDP President Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Yar'Adua, emerged the winner with 70% of the vote. The northern states, particularly Kano, were also the scene of fighting between Muslim and Christian communities. An Islamist militia known as the Taliban carried out attacks, and several of its members were detained in November, accused of having killed 12 people in an attack on a police station. Violence broke out once again during the local elections held in various states in the north of the country in November and December, leaving dozens of people dead.

| Senegal (Casamance) | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Intensity: | 1 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |
| Type: | Self-government Internal |

| | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Main parties involved: | Government, MFDC armed group and its different factions |
| Summary: | Casamance is a part of Senegal virtually separated from the rest of the country by Gambia, where the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) has been demanding independence since 1982. Fighting between government armed forces and the MFDC reached its most violent during the 1990s, ending in 2004 with the signing of a peace agreement by the armed group's leader, Diamacunde Segnhor. Since then there have been low level clashes between various factions that do not recognise the agreement reached with the government and are fighting to increase their control over the territory. |

In **Senegal**, although **the year began with the death of Diamacunde Segnhor, the MFDC leader who signed the peace agreements** – an event that led to predictions of an increase in violence – tensions in fact decreased throughout 2007, to the extent that no notable incidents were reported in the second half of the year. During the first six months there was fighting between different factions of the armed group along the borders with Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, forcing the displacement of the local population. Government armed forces increased their presence in the region prior to the holding of general elections in the country, a move that may have contributed to the end of the violence. The gradual withdrawal of the army during December aroused fears among the ordinary population. As the year ended, the presidential peace envoy was assassinated in Casamance in an attack that was condemned by both the government and the political leadership of the MFDC.

c) Horn of Africa

| Chad – Sudan | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Government International |
| Main parties involved: | Chad, Sudan |
| Summary: | The outbreak of the war in Darfur in 2003 marked the beginning of a gradual deterioration in relations between the two governments, whose presidents had once been allies in the overthrow of Chadian president Hissène Habré by Idriss Déby in 1990. Although Chad acted as mediator between the Sudanese government and the insurgency in Darfur during 2004, the increased violence, the movement of Sudanese refugees towards Chad and incursions by the pro-Sudanese government Janjaweed militia led to many criticisms of the Chadian government for its neutrality policy. It should be remembered that some of the armed groups in Darfur belong to the same community that is currently in government in Chad, the Zaghawa. In 2004, a number of insurgent movements rose up against Idriss Déby's government, and since then both governments have been supporting the armed opposition in each other's country. |

Turning to relations between **Chad** and **Sudan**, despite the efforts of regional mediators (mainly Libya, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia), the situation remained very tense

due to the failure to implement the peace agreements reached and to the persistence of the violence in Darfur and eastern Chad. Although the Tripoli agreement was signed in February, it was not implemented, and April saw an incursion into Sudanese territory by Chadian troops pursuing armed groups from Chad. As a result of this incursion, Chadian armed forces came up against Sudanese armed forces, leaving 17 Sudanese soldiers dead and a further 40 wounded in **the first actual fighting between the two sides following months of tension and accusations of support for the respective armed groups** operating out of both countries. Following this incident, Saudi monarch Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz attempted to revive the Tripoli agreement in Riyadh at the beginning of May. The subsequent meeting in August of the High-Level Military and Security Committee for Chad and Sudan in Tripoli seemed to produce some advances, with the committee underlining the efforts made by both sides towards stabilising the military and security situation. However, the breakdown in November of the peace agreement between the Chadian government and insurgent Chadian groups reopened old wounds, and both countries once again accused each other of supporting various groups in order to destabilise their neighbour.

The conflict in Somalia further complicated any solution to the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as both countries were offering support to various warring parties in the country

should suspend its functions and establish the border demarcation solely on paper, reiterating that they did not want a return to hostilities, though Ethiopia increased its military budget by 54 million dollars, a rise of 16.7%. Eritrea has stationed 4,000 soldiers in the security zone supervised by UNMEE (on whom Eritrea imposed certain restrictions), with a further 120,000 in the surrounding regions, while Ethiopia has 100,000 soldiers positioned along the border. UNMEE reduced its troop numbers once again (over two years the force has decreased from more than 3,000 soldiers to less than 1,700 for a border that is more than 1,000 km long), and since July 2006 has been unable to arrange a meeting of the Military Coordination Committee (the only body that allows for direct contact between the two sides). The conflict in Somalia further complicated any solution to the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as both countries were offering support to various warring parties in the country.

| Eritrea – Ethiopia | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Territory International |
| Main parties involved: | Eritrea, Ethiopia |
| Summary: | Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993, though the border between the two countries was not clearly defined, leading to fighting between the two sides from 1998 to 2000 in which more than 100,000 people died. A cessation of hostilities agreement was signed in 2000 and the UN Security Council set up the UNMEE peace-keeping mission to supervise the arrangement. The year ended with the signing of a peace agreement in Algiers. This stipulated that both sides would abide by the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), which was charged with establishing a definitive border on the basis of the relevant colonial agreements (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law. In April 2002, the EEBC issued its decision, which assigned the disputed border village of Badme (the epicentre of the conflict which was at that time administered by Ethiopia) to Eritrea, a decision rejected by Ethiopia. |

The tense situation between **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia** worsened during the year as the deadline set by the EEBC for both sides to accept its border demarcation approached. As of 1 December, the border was established virtually on the basis of the colonial treaties. As a result, concern among the international community increased over the volatility of the situation and the risk that it would descend into a new outbreak of violence. However, **both governments rejected the EEBC's suggestion that it**

| Somalia (Somaliland – Puntland) | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Territory Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Republic of Somaliland, autonomous region of Puntland |
| Summary: | Both regions have been involved in a dispute over control of the Sool and Sanaag border regions since 1998. Sool and Sanaag fall geographically within the borders of Somaliland, but the majority of clans living in the region are linked with those in Puntland. In December 2003, forces from Puntland took control of Las Anod, capital of the Sool region. Previously, both authorities had been officially represented in the city. Since then there have been sporadic confrontations and attempts at mediation. Before coming to power in Puntland in 2005, General Muse came up against the then Puntland warlord, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, now president of Somalia, whose militias defeated Muse's forces, which withdrew to the western region of Sanaag where they were taken in by Somaliland forces, a fact that reflects how difficult it will be to resolve this dispute. |

In the dispute between the regions of **Somaliland** and **Puntland**, **troops on both sides were involved in sporadic outbreaks of fighting from September onwards over control of the border town of Las Anod, leaving dozens of people dead** and causing the enforced displacement of around 20,000 people. In October, troops from Somaliland took control of the Sool region. The Puntland parliament originally gave General Mohamed "Adde" Muse one month to recapture Las Anod, the capital of the Sool region. However, in December President Muse asked the country's parliament to give him more time to resolve the dispute. In addition, a number of sources speculated about the existence of a secret agreement signed in 2002 between Muse and the president of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale, in which Puntland limit itself to the recapture of Las Anod. President Muse acknowledged the existence of an agreement with

Riyale but would not reveal any details regarding its contents.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sudan | |
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | NCP and SPLM political parties, SPLA armed group, pro-government militias, ethnic groups and Dinka and Nuer clans in the south |

Summary:

In 2005, the SPLA armed group and the Sudanese government signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) which brought an end to a 20-year armed conflict that had pitted the north of the country against the south. A lack of detail in several parts of the agreement has made any progress in the peace process difficult. In addition, the end of the conflict on a national level led to the resurgence of resentments and disagreements between the various ethnic groups and clans who have to co-exist and compete for the scant resources in the north of the country. The opposing stances of the elites in Khartoum and the Upper Nile states, which control all of Sudan's economic wealth, and the remaining states that make up the country are at the heart of the tension threatening peace in Sudan.

The demarcation of the border with the oil-producing Abyei region was one of the main obstacles to the advance of the peace process in Sudan

management by the semi-autonomous government in the south of the country, which is run by the SPLM, and alluded to the possible misappropriation of funds allocated to the reconstruction of the southern regions. All of this led the SPLM to announce the temporary suspension of its duties in the Government of National Unity, until the president promised to ensure the full implementation of the agreements, which included demarcation of the border with the oil-producing Abyei region –one of the main obstacles to the advance of the peace process. This would establish a line dividing the north from the south of the country in advance of a referendum on self-determination planned for 2011. In addition, failure to comply with the agreed date for the withdrawal of government armed forces from southern regions, especially Abyei, led to tensions between the SPLA, the army and the pro-government militias that had been involved in fighting on several occasions in border areas. Finally, the SPLM agreed to resume its government duties in December. At the same time, fighting continued between different clans in the south over disputes relating to livestock, leaving a large number of people dead. There were also increasing protests against the government's hydrological projects in the north, an issue which the International Crisis Group research centre has indicated could form a further source of tensions in the future.

In **Sudan**, the lack of progress in complying with the CPA has prevented political stability and led to a rise in tensions in the country. **SPLM president and government vice-president Salva Kiir repeatedly accused President Omar al-Bashir of impeding the transparent and fair distribution of oil revenues and of continuing to support the SSDF militias**, which have not yet been demobilised. For his part, al-Bashir complained of poor

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Burundi | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Identity, Government Internal |

Box 2.1. Climate change, armed conflict and world security: some reflections

Warnings about the dangers associated with climate change increased during the year with the publication of the conclusions of the Panel on Climate Change and the climate conference held in Bali at the end of the year.⁸ Climate change is cited as being responsible for environmental, human and economic consequences, among other things, and there is increasing reference to the threat to world security that could be triggered by the phenomenon.⁹ This finding explains why the UN Security Council decided to tackle this issue for the first time,¹⁰ on the basis that the threat to world peace and security caused by climate change made it a legitimate topic for debate by this UN body, along with the fact that Al Gore had received the Nobel Peace Prize (along with the Panel's members) for his work on behalf of the environment.

The idea of climate change as a threat to peace and security is based on a number of circumstances: it is stated that climate change will cause an increase in the number of "natural" disasters (cyclones, storms, flooding, etc.), along with a shortage of water (drought) and the reduction of harvests as a result of both these effects. The consequences will be a shortage of resources (notably water, food and energy) and increased migration (to neighbouring countries, from the countryside to the city, and towards industrialised nations). The argument goes that this shortage of resources combined with the resulting migration could exacerbate conflicts or lead to new tensions.

8. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change Synthesis Report*, November 2007, at <<http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm>>. For the conclusions of the Bali conference, go to <http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php>.
 9. At the Bali conference in November 2007, the United Nations Environment Programme presented a report in which it linked climate change and conflict, listing the places around the world in most danger. German Advisory Council on Global Change, *Climate Change as a Security Risk 2007*, at <<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=523&ArticleID=5720&I=en>>.
 10. Session of the UN Security Council, 12/03/07, at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2666033/k.BE96/Update_Report_No_2brEnergy_Security_and_Climatebr12_April_2007.htm>.

This approach requires some reflection and a review of some of the suggested implications. On the one hand, the positive correlation between a shortage of resources and armed conflict has not been proven. In fact, there is a certain amount of dispute in this regard, as some studies have revealed a negative correlation between the level of exploitation of resources and the emergence of armed conflict, challenging theories that are seen as being based on the Neo-Malthusianism model.¹¹ It cannot be denied that competition for vital resources like water and land is something that features in several of the conflicts seen at the present time, but one should bear in mind, firstly, that the essential nature of these resources means that they can easily be used as tools in political, identity-based or religious contexts. Secondly, it should be seen in context as just one of the complex issues that form the cause of a conflict. Taking the case of Israel and Palestine as an example, the problem is not the shortage of water in the region but rather the Israeli appropriation, for its own superfluous uses, of the Palestinian's vital water supplies, as just one more tool in its occupation and the politically-based conflict that has brought them into dispute. In this regard, a shortage of water could form the basis for conflict in certain circumstances, but it could also form the basis for cooperation or the search for new approaches (using technical solutions) that enable the survival and welfare of people in such situations.

Similarly, the presence of refugees will not automatically cause or exacerbate a conflict. Their presence may lead to greater pressure on existing resources in a particular region, but this brings us back to the earlier argument. Furthermore, some studies¹² have identified the risk of inter-state conflicts due to the arrival of refugees from a conflict zone, but at the same time this correlation cannot be seen as automatic, nor can it be extrapolated to so-called "environmental refugees", as the factors that may have led to conflict in the former case (the persecution of members of the opposition by the country from which the refugees originate, or attacks by the host country to prevent refugees from entering) are not seen in the latter.

As regards the implications of this view, it is risky to point to climate change as being behind the outbreak of war, as this could mean overlooking or denying the political motivations that might lie behind an armed conflict. To say, as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did, that the Darfur conflict began as the result of an ecological crisis generated, at least in part, by climate change would be to offer a dangerous simplification of the problem and, moreover, exempt the Khartoum regime from any responsibility for the war. There is another danger in linking environmental threats to security, and that is that it offers yet more justification for the increasing militarization of areas such as humanitarian action. A recent CFR report¹³ finds that the increase in extreme climate conditions will be too much for the relevant civilian services and will require the mobilisation of the armed forces. In its recommendations to the US government it therefore proposes the creation of a multi-agency body which, in the case of Africa, will be led by AFRICOM, the general US military force there. The CFR also believes that, given the vulnerability to climate change of regions that are already a cause for concern in relation to US national security (e.g. Indonesia, or several countries in Africa), the US government should take advantage of its military training in environmental disasters and emergencies in order to improve its links with certain countries and obtain the relevant information for its intelligence services. This approach is not new, since current Defence Department strategy already includes the prevention of and response to humanitarian crises as a key part of its strategy for the promotion of stability and security, thus contributing to the much-criticised "militarisation of aid", though the alarmist climate change discourse adds further justification for this approach.

The fight to combat climate change is vital to the survival and well-being of all the world's inhabitants, so any discussion of this issue must be accompanied by the acceptance of responsibility and unstinting action to contribute to its reduction, along with the adoption of mechanisms to mitigate any effects or the exacerbation of existing risk factors. Taking account of the security implications of climate change could offer a powerful argument for taking positive action, though it should not be used as an excuse to dilute political responsibility for the initiation or perpetuation of a conflict, or as a way of simplifying the causes in such a way that will lead to an inadequate response when solutions are required, or, above all, as an excuse for militarising spaces that are already sufficiently militarised.

Main parties involved: Government, armed opposition (FNL-PALIPEHUTU, known as the FNL, and a dissident faction of the FNL) and political opposition (faction of the CNDD-FDD led by Hussein Radjabu), UPRONA, FRODEBU

Summary: The process of political and institutional transition that began with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 ended formally in 2005. The approval of a new Constitution that formally distributed political and military power among the two main communities, the Hutus and the Tutsis, and the

holding of an election process that led to the formation of a new government, were supposed to pave the way towards recovery from the conflict that had begun in 1993, representing the first real opportunity to bring an end to the ethnic and political violence that had affected the country since it gained its independence in 1962. However, there is continuing mistrust and an ongoing power struggle within the governing CNDD-FDD party, as well as between the government and the political opposition, and this is further exacerbated by the stalemate in the peace process with the last armed group, Agathon Rwasa's FNL.

11. Norwegian University of Science and Technology. "No Connection Between Environmental Crises and Armed Conflict, New Study Argues" *Science Daily*, 17 December 2007, consulted on 3 January 2008, at <<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/12/071216133126.htm>>.
12. Salehyan, I., *The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict*, University of Texas, March 2007.
13. Council on Foreign Relations, *Climate Change and National Security: an Agenda for Action*, November 2007, at <<http://www.cfr.org/publication/14862>>.

The internal political situation and the peace process in **Burundi** suffered differing fortunes during 2007. Firstly, the crisis resulting from the removal of Hussein Radjabu from the leadership of the CNDD-FDD party, the disagreements among his supporters within the CNDD-FDD and the absence of dialogue between the government and opposition culminated at the end of September in an agreement aimed at putting an end to the parliamentary deadlock suffered for part of the year. Meetings between the president and the main FRODEBU and UPRONA opposition parties led to the formation of a new government, the sixth since Pierre Nkurunziza became president in 2005. This agreement involves a government power-sharing arrangement, the establishment of guarantees to ensure that parties have the right to hold meetings, measures to counter corruption, security service reforms, progress in the peace process with the FNL and the reinstatement of members of the opposition who were forced to resign by the government. Secondly, **as far as the peace process is concerned, the FNL absented itself from the ceasefire monitoring commission, thus bringing its work to a halt.** It has so far refused to return, demanding talks on its integration into the armed forces and government, talks which the government refuses to consider. The situation deteriorated at the beginning of September, with sporadic outbreaks of fighting between two factions of the FNL who are fighting for leadership of the group with the aim of implementing the agreement.

Kenya

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Identity, Government, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, ethnic militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civilian organisations) |

Summary:

Kenyan politics and the country's economy have been dominated since its independence in 1963 by the KANU party, which is controlled by the largest of the country's ethnic communities, the Kikuyu, to the detriment of everyone else. In 2002, the successor to the authoritarian and kleptocratic Daniel Arap Moi (who had been in power for 24 years) was defeated by Mwai Kibaki, with the promise of an end to corruption and the redistribution of wealth in a country that is hugely poor, with an agricultural economy whose growth (6%) relies on tourism. However, Kibaki's broken promises have given rise to a climate of frustration, and Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo, has become a serious threat to Kibaki's hold on power. Odinga has campaigned not on tribal lines but on a platform for change and the construction of a fairer society. At the same time, various parts of the country are suffering inter-community disputes over land ownership with politically motivated conflicts being stirred up during the elections.

The level of instability in **Kenya** rose seriously as the result of a number of factors. On the one hand, **the ten-**

sions caused by the parliamentary and presidential elections of 27 December 2007 continued to increase and finally culminated in the deaths of more than 500 people and the enforced displacement of a further 250,000 following the announcement of disputed results that returned Mwai Kibaki to power. These results were rejected by the opposition led by Raila Odinga and were not confirmed by international observers, due to the fraud and numerous irregularities reported. The manipulation of the various ethnic groups contributed to the worsening situation. Secondly, there was an increase in inter-community violence in places such as the Elgon district, where a territorial dispute between two communities has left 180 people dead since December 2006 and led to the displacement of the local population; and in other districts of the country such as Laikipia and Samburu, where in May an outbreak of violence linked to the stealing of livestock led to the displacement of thousands of people and outbreaks of fighting in which a further 50 people died. Finally, the police operation against the Mungiki sect ended with the deaths of 56 people suspected of belonging to the sect and 11 police officers, with a further 3,379 people detained. Nevertheless, several analysts warned of a proliferation of groups similar to the sect. A report also denounced the fact that the police had killed 8,040 people as a result of the torture and extra-judicial execution of members of the sect between 2002 (when it was banned) and 2007, and the disappearance of a further 4,070 people following the operation carried out this year.¹⁴

DR Congo

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Government, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups |

Summary:

DR Congo was the scene between 1998 and 2003 of the so-called "African First World War".¹⁵ The signing of various peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) formed by members of the former government, the political opposition, the RCD-Goma, RCD-K-ML, RCD-N and MLC armed groups and the Mai Mai militias. From June 2003, the TNG was led by President Joseph Kabila and four vice-presidents, two of whom belonged to the former insurgency, Azarias Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma and Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC. The TNG drew up a Constitution which was approved in 2005. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held between July and October 2006, in which Kabila was elected president with Jean-Pierre Bemba coming second amid a climate of raised tensions and accusations of fraud. The formation of a new government in 2007 did nothing to resolve the instability and disagreement in the political arena.

The situation in **DR Congo** in 2007 was marked by political instability and a worsening state of violence

14. Oscar Foundation Free Legal Aid Clinic-Kenya, *Youth State Repression, The Killing Fields*, November 2007, at <http://www.oscarfound.org/downloads/youth_State_Repression.pdf>

15. See the summary for DR Congo (east) in the chapter on armed conflicts, and the summary for the Great Lakes region in the chapter on tensions.

and insecurity in the east of the country.¹⁶ The new post-transitional government was formed in February (without participation by members of the political opposition or former armed groups) amid a climate of violence resulting from the suppression of demonstrations in which 87 people had died (10 of them members of the security forces) in fighting between the security forces and supporters of the Christian Bundu dia Kongo movement in the western province of Lower Congo. Subsequently, **further acts of suppression were reported in March, followed by fighting between Jean-Pierre Bemba's private guards and government armed forces** over the issue of disarmament and the reduction of the opposition leader's security forces. This fighting **left 600 dead and resulted in Bemba being exiled to Portugal**, where he remained for the rest of the year, despite various diplomatic attempts to find a political solution to the crisis. In May and June, the Senate discussed lifting Bemba's parliamentary immunity in order to investigate his involvement in the events of March. However, he was subsequently allowed to remain in Portugal. The president announced that this issue, which is central to the reinforcement of democracy in the country, should be resolved by the courts, and he therefore rejected the idea of offering Bemba special status.

| Great Lakes Region | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Identity, Government, Resources International |
| Main parties involved: | DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda |

Summary:

DR Congo was the scene between 1998 and 2003 of the so-called "African First World War", which got its name from the involvement of as many as eight countries in the region.¹⁷ The signing of various peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of hostile foreign troops (mainly from Rwanda and Uganda). These had justified their presence on the grounds that they intended to wipe out the insurgent groups that were operating from Congolese territory, given the unwillingness of the Congolese armed forces to finish them off, while they controlled and exploited natural resources in the east of the country. DR Congo has used these groups which are hostile to Rwanda and Uganda for its own purposes, mainly the FDLR, which was responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Relations between the three countries remain difficult as a result of the continuing existence of these groups and the failure to implement agreements for their demobilisation or defeat.

As regards the **Great Lakes** region, mention should be made of the relative improvement in the situation at a regional level, as demonstrated by several meetings held between countries in the region during the course of the year, though **the fragility of the situation in the east of DR Congo and Rwanda's possible involvement in support for dissident Congolese Tutsi General Lau-**

rent Nkunda contributed to a further deterioration in relations between DR Congo and Rwanda. Nevertheless, both sides reached an agreement in Nairobi in November in which DR Congo undertook to deal with the armed opposition groups operating in the region.¹⁸ However, prospects were not exactly promising, given the failure to comply with earlier agreements on this issue by both countries.

America

The contexts of tension in a number of countries on the American continent were notable for their marked social polarisation, the result of political crisis and institutional deadlock. This was the case in both Bolivia and Ecuador, where the preparation of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly was the source of political discord between government and opposition. Similarly, the reform of the Venezuelan Constitution proposed by President Chavez resulted in a large number of demonstrations across the country, though the vote rejecting these reforms in the referendum held in December temporarily calmed the situation.

| Bolivia | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Self-government, Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and civilian organisations from the eastern departments) |

Summary:

At the end of 2003, then President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada went into exile in the USA after the suppression of various anti-government protests in February and October had caused more than 100 deaths. After a period of uncertainty in which two different presidents temporarily took power, Evo Morales won the elections held in December 2005, becoming the first indigenous leader of a country with a mainly indigenous population. However, the actions of his government, especially its agricultural reforms and the nationalisation of the hydrocarbon industry (Bolivia has the second largest gas reserves in Latin America), were hindered by fierce opposition to his political project from various political parties and elements from the country's eastern regions which, led by the wealthy department of Santa Cruz, are demanding greater autonomy.

There were **high levels of political tension and social polarisation throughout the year in Bolivia, caused principally by the approval of a new Constitution and confrontations between the departments in the east of the country and central government**, though there were repeated demonstrations by some groups of workers (miners, police, teachers and health workers, peasants and traders) and regional protests (Tarija and Beni), which led to road-blocks and outbreaks of fighting. After several months of institutional deadlock resulting

16. See the chapter on armed conflicts.
 17. See the summary for DR Congo (east) in the chapter on armed conflicts.
 18. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

from a number of disagreements between the government and the opposition, the Constituent Assembly approved a draft Constitution in December, though only with the votes of the governing majority and without any contribution from the opposition. The new Constitution, which must be ratified in a referendum during 2008, is entirely rejected by various civilian and political organisations in Sucre, which has throughout the year been claiming local rule and the transfer of executive and parliamentary powers, with demonstrations that have led to many confrontations. Meanwhile, five of the country's nine departments also object to the new Constitution as they view the process as illegal and contrary to the powers of the individual departments. This has led to the outbreak of a number of protest actions against the government and the announcement of unilateral approval of regional statutes of autonomy.

| Ecuador | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Government, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition (Congress, peasant organisations and indigenous groups opposed to transnational mining activities) |

Summary:

After a decade of endless political crises (in which as many as six presidents have been in office) and large civilian demonstrations (the most notable of which were the marches by indigenous peoples and the protests against transnational mining and oil companies), Rafael Correa won the presidential elections in 2006 with the main promise that he would resolve the country's chronic social and political instability, make a break from the traditional political party system and prioritise support for the country's most excluded groups. To this end he pushed through the establishment of a Constituent Assembly with the aim of approving a new constitution that would allow for changes to the political and economic model. Both the establishment of this Assembly and its composition and powers caused numerous conflicts between the president's supporters and critics, as well as between the president himself and Congress.

In **Ecuador**, the friction between President Rafael Correa and Congress, which is controlled by members of the opposition, led to political crisis and institutional deadlock throughout the year, as well as causing sporadic outbreaks of fighting between the president's supporters and critics. Tensions deepened during the campaign to approve a Constituent Assembly, which was defended openly by Correa and which received the support of 82% of the population in a referendum held in April. Subsequently, in another plebiscite held in September, parties close to the president gained broad representation in the Constituent Assembly, charged with preparing a new Constitution which, according to the government, is necessary to resolve the political and social instability that has afflicted the country over the last ten years. At the beginning of

December, tensions rose once again when the Constituent Assembly dismissed the members of Congress and took over their duties. Elsewhere, hundreds of peasants held demonstrations in a number of provinces and blocked several of the country's roads in protest against the impact that transnational copper-mining companies were having on public health and the environment, demanding that the state end the contracts granted to these companies. In the Amazonian province of Orellana there were reports of a number of protests by members of the local population who were demanding greater investment from the oil companies operating in the region. This led to the imposition of a state of emergency in some places and the deployment of additional military troops.

| Peru | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition (remaining factions of Sendero Luminoso, peasant organisations and indigenous groups) |

Summary:

In 1980, the year that the country was returned to democracy, an armed conflict broke out between the government and the Sendero Luminoso armed Maoist group which lasted for two decades and cost the lives of more than 60,000 people. Using its counter-insurgency policy as an excuse, the government drifted towards a more authoritarian approach during the 1990s under Alberto Fujimori, who in 2000 fled into exile in Japan after being deposed by Congress and accused of numerous cases of corruption and human rights violations. Since then, the governments of Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia have had to deal with the activities of some remaining factions of Sendero Luminoso which are allegedly linked with drug-trafficking, and the demands of both the regions and individual groups (miners, peasant coca-growers) who are demanding greater assistance from the state.

In **Peru** there were a number of violent incidents and road-blocks during the demonstrations mounted by various groups seeking improved wages, while regions around the country like Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Puno and Ucayali called for increased state investment. Particularly notable were the demonstrations by some 30,000 miners in the middle of the year, the protests by peasants and teachers which led to riots and the detention of hundreds of people in Andahuaylas and Lima, and the intense and continuing protests by peasant coca-growers against the anti-drug policies of Alan Garcia's government, including the enforced destruction of illegal crops. These protests, which were particularly violent towards the end of May, led to the deaths of several people and the blocking of the country's main roads. The government also increased its counter-insurgency operations against Sendero Luminoso after several members of the state security forces were killed in ambushes allegedly carried out by the for-

In Peru there were a number of violent incidents and road-blocks during the demonstrations mounted by various groups seeking improved wages, while regions around the country called for increased state investment

mer armed group. The government estimates that the group has around 200 members, operating mainly in the Ayacucho region (the epicentre of the armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s), and that it is increasingly involved in drug-trafficking.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Venezuela | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition |

Summary:

After leading a failed coup attempt in 1992 and spending time in prison, Hugo Chávez came to power in 1998 with widespread popular support against a background of broad disillusionment with the traditional political classes due to high levels of corruption and inequality. After reforming the Constitution and renewing his presidential mandate in 2000, he began a series of political and economic reforms which were opposed by a large proportion of the ordinary population and which led to huge demonstrations, a failed coup attempt in April 2002 and a repeal referendum which Chávez finally won in 2004. Since then, political and social polarisation in the country has increased to such an extent that the president brought forward his

so-called “21st Century Socialism”. In spite of this, he won his third term in office with a resounding victory in elections that were boycotted by the opposition.

Venezuela once again experienced huge polarisation between the groups supporting President Hugo Chávez and his so-called “21st Century Socialism” and those citing the gradual erosion of democracy in the country and the accelerated implementation of an increasingly authoritarian and personality-based regime. Against the background of these social tensions, **at the end of May thousands of people**, including a large number of university students, **demonstrated for several weeks in favour of freedom of speech, in protest against the government’s decision not to renew the licence of Radio Caracas Televisión**, the oldest in the country. A number of violent episodes were reported during these demonstrations and a large number of people were injured or detained. **Tensions also began to rise during the second half of the year as a result of the president’s proposed reform of the Constitution**, leading to regular demonstrations over several months by both supporters and critics of the reforms. Finally, in a referendum held without any serious incidents though with a high number of abstentions on 2 December, the reforms were rejected by a close margin. Hugo Chávez accepted the result, though he indicated that he would try to reform the Constitution again while he remained in power.

Box 2.2. A new start for the countries of the Andes?

During the last two decades, the countries of the Andes region (with the possible exception of Colombia) **have experienced similar social and political dynamics that have probably been both mutually influential and a source of common strength.**

The 1990s were characterised by three parallel processes. Firstly, the severe social impact, particularly among the most vulnerable sectors of society, of the neo-liberal economic policies introduced under the so-called “**Washington Consensus**”, including the Structural Adjustment Plan, the prioritisation of exports and repayment of foreign debt, and the privatisation (with assets assigned or sold cheaply) of key sectors of the economy. Secondly, there were the **successive political and institutional crises**, which were characterised by government instability (in Ecuador, no president has completed a full term in office since 1996, while both Bolivia and Peru have experienced several periods of political turbulence and power vacuums) and the dismissal and subsequent exile of various presidents (Abdulá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia). Thirdly, the emergence or greater visibility of new social groups (such as indigenous peoples or peasant organisations) and **growing levels of activism and a desire among social movements to become involved in the public space**, which has led to new forms of social protest like land occupation, the blocking of roads and uprisings or demonstrations by indigenous people.

At the turn of the century, against a **background of growing discontentment with the deteriorating socio-economic situation and exasperation with the traditional political elite**, **Latin America took what was called a “left turn”, and the countries of the Andes saw the emergence of a group of leaders who began an attempt to subvert the dynamics of the 1990s and reshape their respective nations.** Clear examples of this can be seen in the huge support enjoyed by Ollanta Humala in the Peruvian elections of 2006 and the arrival to power of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Lucio Gutiérrez and now Rafael Correa in Ecuador. The current leaders of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia in particular have begun political processes which, while displaying their own individual characteristics, pursue similar ends, use similar methods and lead to comparable social effects.

As far as the **aims** are concerned, there has been a particular drive towards ensuring that the historically most excluded sectors enjoy greater visibility and empowerment, with more direct communications between government and citizens, the strengthening of the state role in the economy (which translates into the nationalisation of basic sectors and resources or greater market regulation), and the defence of national sovereignty and a drive towards both integration and regional independence. This has led to both pragmatic measures (the establishment of strategic alliances and the creation of new forums like the Union of South American Nations, the ALBA and the Bank of the South) and increased rhetoric and action to counter political and economic interference in the region. As regards the necessary **means**, there has been a notable attempt to strengthen executive and presidential powers (often to the detriment of parliament) and introduce constituent processes, as demonstrated during 2007 by the referendum on constitutional reform in Venezuela, the approval of the new draft of the Constitution in Bolivia and the establishment of a Constituent Assembly in Ecuador. Given that they represent an attempt to legally enshrine and reinforce the political objectives of the “popular and democratic revolutions” promoted by the individ-

ual governments, it is these constituent processes which during the last year have provoked the most serious incidents of protest and violence.

Finally, as regards the **effects** that these political processes are provoking, particular mention should be made of the huge polarisation, whether socially (Venezuela, between “*Chavistas*” and “*Antichavistas*”), territorially (Bolivia, between western and eastern parts of the country) or institutionally (Ecuador, between president and Congress), which has led to a substantial increase in conflict and social mobilisation during recent years. Thus, critics of the current leaders accuse them of dividing the population, treating the exercise of public power as a zero-sum game (i.e. when one side wins, the other loses) and basing their political project on populism and demagoguery, authoritarianism, democratic reversal, political sectarianism, disregard for ideological pluralism and a lack of respect for the law and existing constitutionality, as well as for the media and civil and political rights. Nevertheless, the sectors that have traditionally felt unrepresented and that have not had access to the public arena generally support their respective governments, claiming that the tensions currently being experienced in these countries are a necessary part of any process of structural change and are principally due to the refusal of the former elites and wealthy classes to give up their historic privileges and accept the reform of the power structures that have caused the perpetuation of inequality and injustice for decades.

Asia

The situation deteriorated notably in several Asian countries during the course of 2007. In Pakistan, the assassination of the former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, represented the culmination of months of widespread violence. In Nepal, the demands of armed Madhesi groups in the Terai region led to fears of the emergence of a more serious conflict. In Mindanao in the Philippines, fighting between government armed forces and a faction of the MNLF caused the enforced displacement of more than 40,000 people on the island of Jolo. In Myanmar, peaceful protests against the military regime were brutally put down, while mass demonstrations were organised in Thailand to demand the return of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

The political crisis in Kyrgyzstan continued throughout 2007 with disputes between pro-government groups and the political opposition demanding early elections and constitutional reforms

The political crisis in **Kyrgyzstan** continued throughout 2007. Disputes between pro-government groups and the political opposition were particularly tense in April, with demonstrations in the capital and other cities lasting several days. Protesters were demanding early elections and constitutional reforms, and the demonstrations ended in violence. The unstable political situation led to the dismissal of two prime ministers, the legal annulment of the Constitution that had come into force in January 2007, along with an earlier version, and the subsequent approval in a controversial referendum of a new constitution which, according to the opposition, strengthened the president's position but, according to the president, gave more power to parliament. Changes to electoral legislation also provoked more tension. A second electoral threshold, which meant that parties had to obtain at least 0.5% of the vote in each province, left almost the entire political opposition without representation in parliament in the December elections. The subsequent annulment of this threshold by the Supreme Court

was ignored by the authorities, which ratified an almost single-party parliament that supported the president. **The election results led to protests in the streets and hunger strikes among various members of the opposition**, to which the government responded by arresting demonstrators, human rights activists, members of NGOs and some journalists.

a) Central Asia

| Kyrgyzstan | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition |
| Summary: | The authoritarian regime that had been firmly in place since 2000 in the former Soviet republic under President Askar Akayev was overthrown in 2005 in the so-called “Tulip Revolution”, when protests against electoral fraud culminated in Akayev's removal, giving way to a new era and a new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, in spite of the hope of democratisation that this brought, many of the reasons for tension have remained: political authoritarianism, fighting over how power should be shared between president and parliament, internal power struggles, corruption and vote-buying, the marginalisation of ethnic minorities and border tensions, among other things. These tensions have meant that the country has remained in a continuous state of volatility, especially as regards the disagreements between government and opposition. |

| Uzbekistan | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | System, Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, social and political opposition, armed Islamist groups |
| Summary: | The regime led by Islam Karimov, who has been in power since 1989 (first as leader of the Uzbek Communist party and since 1991 as president of the independent country), has been characterised by its systematic suppression of political, social and religious opposition under a personality-based political system, its fierce control over the public arena and its violation of rights and freedoms. Since the end of the 1990s, the country has suffered violent attacks from clan- |

destine Islamist groups, mainly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Tensions in the country rose after May 2005 as a result of the regime's violent suppression of demonstrations in Andijan, which left several hundred civilians dead and caused a large exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries.

In **Uzbekistan**, the situation of tension surrounding the repressive regime of Islam Karimov was particularly notable towards the end of the year, following warnings from international and local NGOs and experts at the United Nations about the serious deterioration of people's human rights and freedom in the country since 2005. The endemic use of torture by the police, persecution on political grounds, control over the media, the mass persecution of Muslims who practiced their religion outside the registered mosques and the harassment of human rights defenders were just some of the causes of tension during the year. **2007 was also marked by uncertainty over the country's political future as a result of the fact that Karimov remained in office despite the formal completion of his presidential term in February.** In spite of the constitutional restriction limiting him to two terms, Karimov won a third term in office in December, which was rejected by the OSCE on the grounds that there was no real competition.

b) South Asia

Nepal (Terai)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Madhesi political and armed organisations (MRPF), JTMM |

Summary:

Tensions in the Terai region can be traced back to the historical marginalisation of the Madhesi people in Nepal and the unrest generated by the peace process that began in 2006 and brought an end to the armed conflict that had devastated the country since 1996. The Terai people, who represent around half the country's population, have historically suffered political, social and economic exclusion. The signing of a peace agreement and the approval of an interim constitution which ignored their grievances and demands for greater recognition led the Madhesi to begin social protests at the beginning of 2007. These erupted into violent confrontations with both the police and the Maoists.

In **Nepal**, the end of the armed conflict gave rise to an **upsurge in tensions in the Terai region** in the south of the country, where various episodes of violence were repeated throughout the year, the worst of them during the first quarter. **Several organisations from the Madhesi community**, the majority ethnic grouping in the south of the country, **demanding changes to the interim constitution that would establish a federal system** that offered them greater representation in the country's different interim institutions. The severity of some of these violent outbursts (which by the end of the year had left 82 people dead) and the emergence of armed

organisations set the alarm bells ringing on several occasions, with warnings that the situation of tension could escalate into armed conflict. However, in November, after several months of talks, **the government announced that it would implement the agreements reached with ethnic organisations** in the region and that it had agreed to create a committee to supervise their implementation, which would include representatives from both the government and the Madhesi organisation, the MPRF.

India (Nagaland)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, armed opposition (NSCN-K, NSCN-IM) |

Summary:

The tensions affecting the state of Nagaland date back to the end of the British colonial era in India, when a Naga movement emerged to demand recognition by the Indian Hindu majority for the collective rights of its mainly Christian people. The emergence of the NCC organisation marked the start of political claims for independence by the Naga people, which over the following decades increased both in terms of their content (independence for Nagaland or the creation of Greater Nagaland, including territory from neighbouring states in which Naga people lived) and as regards their activity, with the initiation of an armed struggle in 1955. The NSCN armed opposition group was formed in 1980 following disagreements with more moderate political factions, and eight years later it divided into two splinter groups, the I-M and the K. Since 1997, the NSCN (I-M) has maintained a ceasefire and entered talks with the Indian government, though recent years have seen an increase in confrontations between the two factions of the armed group.

Repeated fighting was reported throughout the year between the NSCN (I-M) and NSCN (K) armed groups in the Indian state of Nagaland. These incidents left several dozen people dead, and some sources suggest the number may be as many as a hundred. However, there were no reported clashes between Indian security forces and the NSCN (I-M), and the ceasefire that both sides have maintained for the last 10 years was once again renewed. Mention should be made of the objection by the NSCN (K) to the exploration of new oil reserves in the region. Finally, despite the rivalry between the two armed groups, there were repeated reports during the year of a possible agreement between both sides that would put an end to their armed hostilities.

Pakistan

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Government, System Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition (PPP opposition party, judiciary), Taliban militias |

Summary:

In 1999, a coup d'état by General Pervez Musharraf deposed the government of the then prime minister Benazir Bhutto, whose term in office had been characterised by mismanagement and corruption. The coup d'état caused the international isolation of the new regime, though this ended following the attacks of September 2001 when Musharraf became the USA's main ally in the region in its pursuit of al-Qaeda. Musharraf's continuing hold on power, his position as both head of state and head of the country's armed forces, his attempts to put an end to the independence of the judiciary and the growing strength of the Taliban militias operating in the tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan are all contributing to the country's fragile political situation.

Pakistan was the scene of increasing political tensions throughout the year, with high levels of violence and social polarisation along with the deaths of many people and questions raised over the Pervez Musharraf regime. This tense situation culminated with the **assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto at the end of the year following widespread violence around the country**. The crisis caused during the second quarter of the year by President Musharraf's decision to dismiss the president of the country's Supreme Court, Iftikhar Chaudhry, was further exacerbated by the violent clearing of the Lal Masjid Mosque, which had been taken over by Taliban sympathisers. After an eight-day military operation, 70 militants and an undisclosed number of civilians were killed, and the resulting violence spread to various parts of the country, with numerous attacks and outbreaks of fighting between militant Islamists and the security forces. **Following Musharraf's victory in the presidential elections held in October, the year ended with the president's declaration of a state of emergency** that was only lifted after several weeks and that involved the suspension of the Constitution and the appointment of new members of the Constitutional Court. These new appointees, who were close to the president, set aside the appeal filed against Musharraf's re-election, though he finally decided to renounce his role as head of the country's armed forces in an attempt to make his government appear more democratic. The return to the country of two of the main opposition leaders, former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, led to an increase in social tensions, particularly after the attack on the latter as she arrived back in the country in October, an incident that ended with the deaths of around 140 people.

Pakistan (Baluchistan)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Self-government, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, BLA armed group |
| Summary: | |

Since the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1948, Baluchistan, which in spite of being the richest state in terms of natu-

ral resources has the highest levels of poverty in the country, has experienced four periods of armed violence (1948, 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77) in which insurgents have pursued their aim of achieving greater autonomy and even independence. The armed insurgency re-emerged in 2004 and mainly took the form of attacks on infrastructure associated with the gas industry. The BLA armed opposition group has become the main critic of the actions of central government, which it accuses of taking advantage of the province's wealth without reinvesting it in the local population. As a result of the resurgence of armed opposition, a military operation was launched in the region, leading to outbreaks of fighting and causing the displacement of the civilian population.

The situation of tension and violence in the Pakistani province of **Baluchistan** remained unchanged throughout the year. A large number of the attacks reported were directed against infrastructure and government buildings. The most serious incident of 2007 came in July with a bomb attack on a vehicle carrying a number of Chinese engineers. Although the explosion killed 30 people, the engineers themselves were unharmed. China is involved in the construction of various infrastructure projects planned by the Pakistani government in the region, meaning that **Chinese interests and personnel have become a target for the armed groups operating there**. The end of the year brought a **further increase in violence and attacks following the death of BLA leader, Mir Ballach Marri, who was gunned down in Afghanistan**. The Pakistani security forces had asked the Afghan authorities to hand Marri over on several occasions.

c) Southeast Asia and Oceania

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Philippines | |
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition (discontented sectors in the armed forces, opposition parties, left-wing organisations and human rights groups) |

Summary:

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo entered office in 2001 after President Joseph Estrada was stripped of power following several cases of corruption. Since then, the country has been mired in political and social crisis, and the president has had to face pressure from the country's armed forces (which have been involved in two uprisings in 2003 and 2006, as well as an alleged coup attempt in 2006), political opponents (Arroyo has survived two attempts by parliament to remove her from office for alleged corruption, human rights abuses and electoral fraud), left wing groups and human rights organisations, who have accused her of orchestrating or at least supporting the wave of extra-judicial executions that have afflicted the country in recent years. Since the restoration of democracy in 1986, the Philippines have seen seven attempted coups d'état.

Tensions were reported in three different contexts in the **Philippines** during 2007. Firstly, there was the violence surrounding the national elections of 14 May, in which some 17,000 people were elected to public office and which were denounced for numerous irregularities, including acts of intimidation and vote-buying. According to some sources, around 130 people died in violent incidents associated with the elections, which further underlines the way that certain political sectors traditionally resort to violence. Secondly, there were the repeated criticisms of the government from civilian organisations over the **wave of extra-judicial executions of members of sectors linked with the political left**. Complaints of state collusion in the hundreds of deaths reported in recent years intensified following the statement by UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions, Philip Alston, that the military were to a great extent responsible for these murders as part of their counter-insurgency campaign against the NPA. Thirdly, at the end of November a **group of soldiers** (who were later joined by leading politicians and two members of the church) **incited an insurrection in a Manila hotel, calling for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo**. Although the rebels, who had already been involved in a similar uprising in 2003, eventually handed themselves in without incident, several sectors of both political and civilian society declared that they understood the reasons for the insurrection and called on the government to take note of the deteriorating political situation afflicting the country.

Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, factions of the MNLF armed group |

Summary:

Although active for the whole of the 20th century, the independence movement in Mindanao gained political coherence during the 1960s, while the 1970s saw the emergence of the armed struggle in the form of the MNLF. The majority of the estimated 120,000 deaths in Mindanao as a result of the conflict occurred during the 1970s under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. A faction of the MNLF, the MILF, split away from the group shortly after it signed an agreement with the government in 1976 that offered autonomy (but not independence) to Mindanao. In spite of this agreement, the armed conflict continued until 1996, when another peace agreement was signed with conditions very similar to those of 1976. In recent years, some factions of the MNLF that have not yet disarmed have been involved in violent incidents demanding the complete implementation of the peace agreement and the release of the founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, who has been under arrest in Manila since 2001 accused of insurrection.

Also in the **Philippines, fighting between government armed forces and a faction of the MNLF armed opposition group in southern regions of Mindanao left 40 people dead** (most of them rebels) **and caused the enforced displacement of a further 42,000 on the island of Jolo** following an MNLF attack on a military

base in April. At the beginning of the year, an MNLF commander held the government team charged with reviewing implementation of the 1996 peace agreement at a military camp for several days, in an attempt to put pressure on the government. In addition, the fact that the MNLF faction in question is operating from the same place as Abu Sayyaf, a region in which government armed forces have been engaged in a high-intensity military offensive since last year, led to a number of confrontations between the army and this faction, which is led by Halik Malik, regarded as one of the group's most intransigent commanders. Malik accused the armed forces of causing the deaths of members of the civilian population, while the government countered that Malik could be working in collusion with Abu Sayyaf or Jemaah Islamiyah. In spite of this, the government gave way to pressure from the MNLF and the diplomatic efforts of the Islamic Conference Organisation and finally held a meeting with the MNLF in Saudi Arabia in November, where it was agreed that joint working groups would be set up to tackle the full implementation of the peace agreement.

Indonesia (West Papua)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (pro-autonomy or secessionist organisations, indigenous communities and human rights groups), indigenous Papuan groups, Freeport mining company |

Summary:

After being under UN administration during the 1960s, West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) became part of Indonesia in 1969 following a referendum that many commentators regarded as fraudulent. Since then, the region has been home to a well-established secessionist movement and an armed opposition group (OPM) that engages in low-intensity armed attacks. In addition to the constant demands for self-determination, there are other sources of conflict in the region, such as inter-community fighting between a number of indigenous groups, tensions between the local population (the Papuans, who are mostly Animists or Christians) and the so-called transmigrants (who are mostly Javanese Muslims), protests against the trans-national Freeport mining company, the largest in the world, and complaints against the army of human rights violations and illegal profiteering.

In the region of **West Papua**, while the political tensions seen in 2006 as a result of the region's partition were considerably reduced in 2007, the local authorities and several academic organisations and human rights groups denounced the **increased repression and profiteering being perpetrated by state security forces**. Although the OPM engaged in little armed activity, the armed forces continued their active repression of the secessionist movement, and the government ignored requests to repeat the 1969 referendum or to include West Papua in the list of non-decolonised territories, along with demands that Jakarta implement the special autonomy programme agreed some years ago. In addi-

Box 2.3. MNLF: a decade of peace and conflict

The MNLF emerged at the beginning of the **1970s as the revolutionary vanguard and main ideological reference point for various ethnic Muslim communities in Mindanao**, uniting them under the banner of the Moro people and creating a common identity based on Islam, a shared history under the Sultans of Sulu and Maguindanao and resistance against the successive attempts to colonise them by Spain, the USA and subsequently, from the second half of the 20th century, the Philippines. The bitter struggle by the MNLF against the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and its defence of the collective rights and self-determination of the Bangsamoro people has made the MNLF one of the principal and largest insurgency groups on the Asian continent and brought its charismatic leader, Nur Misuari, recognition from the international community.

After more than 20 years of negotiations, a peace agreement was signed in 1996, under the auspices of the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO), which in return for the MNLF's renunciation of independence offered the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), of which Misuari was the first governor. During subsequent years, however, both the inexperience and incompetence of some of the new leaders, along with the Philippine government's explicit refusal to implement some of the provisions of the agreement in full led to deterioration in trust between the parties and a growing frustration with the results of autonomy in Mindanao. All of this culminated in an unnatural alliance between Manila and some of the MNLF's top members aimed at ousting Nur Misuari from his position as governor of the ARMM and MNLF leader. Finally, **at the end of 2001, hundreds of MNLF members rebelled against the government and Misuari was arrested on charges of corruption and rebellion.**

Since then, **several factions of the MNLF have remained active, particularly in the Sulu archipelago, demanding the release of its original leader and full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement.** Both claims have been supported by the ICO, which suggested a tripartite meeting in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) to tackle these and other issues not dealt with in the 1996 peace agreement, such as the MNLF's disarmament.

tion, according to police sources, more than 10 people died and around 200 were injured during the year in **fighting between indigenous groups** (like the Kodagu and the Sani), leading the government to increase its security measures in some regions. Finally, mention should be made of the demonstrations organised in the middle of the year by thousands of employees of the Freeport mining company who were demanding better working conditions, a further cause of tensions in the Timika region.

| Laos | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | System, Identity Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, Hmong political and armed organisations |
| Summary: | During the so-called Indochina Wars in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of the ethnic Hmong community allied themselves with US troops in their fight to halt the advance of Communism in the region. Since then, the Communist government in Laos has suppressed this community, which in turn has engaged in low-level armed action without any sophisticated weaponry. In spite of the fact that around 275,000 ethnic Hmong currently live in the USA and several thousand more have been living in refugee camps close to Thailand in recent years, it is estimated that around 12,000 people are still living in the forests in the north of the country. The harsh humanitarian conditions and military pressure from the governments of Laos and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam, mean that hundreds of people die or simply decide to hand themselves over to the Laotian authorities every year. |

In **Laos**, Hmong communities living abroad and various human rights organisations denounced the **systematic violation of the rights of the Hmong minority** by the

Laotian authorities, along with a number of attacks that cost the lives of dozens of people. Military pressure from the government has meant that around 2,000 people have handed themselves in during recent years. Human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also denounced the repatriation of more than 6,000 Hmong refugees from Thailand to Laos, believing that the minimum conditions required to guarantee their security have not been met. At the beginning of June, **11 people were detained in the USA, accused of organising a coup d'etat** against the Laotian government that would have involved, according to documents that were made public, the murder of thousands of people (including Laos's current political leader), the destruction of public buildings in Laos and the imposition of martial law in the capital, Vientiane. According to the prosecution, the people detained had organised the purchase of sophisticated weapons which they were planning to deliver via Thailand to ethnic Hmong armed groups who have been operating for years against the one-party regime in Laos.

| Myanmar | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | System Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition (LND opposition party) |
| Summary: | A coup d'etat in 1962 marked the establishment of a Military Junta which has remained in power in the country ever since. The military government abolished the federal system and imposed a harsh dictatorship under what it called the "Burmese Way to Socialism". In 1988, the economic crisis caused thousands of people to show their dissatisfaction on the street in protests that were brutally put down by the military regime, leaving |

3,000 people dead. Nevertheless, the government called elections, though the results were never known, since the leader of the democratic opposition Aung San Suu Kyi emerged the winner. She was subsequently arrested and has remained so intermittently ever since. In 2004, the government began a process to reform the Constitution in an attempt to project a more open image of the regime, though political opponents of the dictatorship refused to accept the process.

Myanmar saw an increase in political tensions during the second half of the year after hundreds of thousands of people led by thousands of Buddhist monks held demonstrations in various parts of the country. The rising price of fuel and other basic provisions proved to be the catalyst for the protests, which were brutally put down by state security forces. **Thousands of people were detained, at least 30 were killed and the whereabouts of around 70 were still unknown at the end of the year.** The United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, intensified its efforts to mediate between the political opposition, led by Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military regime. This led to the appointment of a Minister for Relations who held talks with the opposition leader. Subsequently, the military junta authorised a meeting between Aung San Suu Kyi and members of her party, the LND. The Nobel laureate also said she would be willing to enter a process of dialogue with the government. However, the military junta pursued its own roadmap for democratisation and appointed a committee to draw up a new Constitution, a process that was rejected by the opposition.

In Myanmar, thousands of Buddhist monks held demonstrations against the military junta which were brutally put down by state security forces

| Thailand | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Government Internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition |
| Summary: | |

When Thaksin Shinawatra came to power in 2001, many observers denounced his authoritarian style, particularly in view of his campaign to combat drug-trafficking (in which more than two thousand people died) and his militarist approach to the conflict in the south of the country. However, the government's effective management of the situation that followed the tsunami of 2004 brought him a resounding victory in the 2005 elections. From that point, the polarisation between the governing party and the opposition increased so rapidly that at the beginning of 2006, after a case of corruption had come to light, huge demonstrations were held to call for his resignation. The political crisis worsened throughout the year until, in September, a military junta with support from the King mounted a coup d'état, promising to draw up a new constitution and hold elections within a year.

Thailand saw huge demonstrations throughout the year against the provisional government that was put in place following the coup of September 2006, with people calling for both the restoration of democracy and

the return of the former prime minister who had been deposed in the coup, Thaksin Shinawatra. These demonstrations, which mostly went off peacefully, intensified after the Constitutional Court ordered the disbandment, on grounds of electoral fraud, of Thaksin Shinawatra's party (which has gained widespread support and which won an unprecedented victory in 2005), and also announced corruption charges against the former prime minister. A new Constitution was approved by popular consent and with little incident in August, in spite of the fact that many political and civilian organisations regarded it as anti-democratic. Following the approval of the new constitution, **political tensions once again rose in December as a result of the parliamentary elections**, which were won, though without an absolute majority, by the PPP, a party with close ties to Thaksin Shinawatra and his own banned party. Thousands of people demonstrated in several parts of the country after three members of the PPP who had won seats were disqualified for breaking election rules, while a further 63 PPP candidates were investigated on the same charges. The result of the elections, which were held without any significant incidents of violence, opened the way for Thaksin's return.

| Timor-Leste | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 3 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↓ |
| Type: | Government Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, International Security Forces, political and social opposition (sympathisers of rebel leader Alfredo Reinado, sympathisers of the FRETILIN party, dismissed members of the military, armed gangs) |
| Summary: | |

After a quarter of a century of brutal military occupation by Indonesia, Timor-Leste gained its independence in 2002. Since then, various United Nations missions have helped the government to tackle the country's institutional fragility, high levels of poverty (it is the poorest country in Asia), the return of thousands of people who fled during the independence referendum of 1999, incursions by pro-Indonesian militias from West Timor, tensions between western and eastern parts of the country and the activities of youth gangs. At the beginning of 2006, the expulsion of a third of the members of the armed forces led to a wave of violence that caused the enforced displacement of almost 15% of the population, the removal of the prime minister and the deployment of an international force to restore security.

In Timor-Leste, significant outbreaks of violence were once again reported at various times during the year, though they did not reach the levels seen in 2006. Several demonstrations were held in Dili in March, causing thousands of people to flee the city, a few days after five people had been killed in an operation by the International Security Forces (the international contingent deployed the previous year) against rebel leader Alfredo Reinado, whose whereabouts remain unknown, despite

the fact that he has maintained contact with the government. The first presidential elections to be held in the country since its independence in 2002 went off without any significant incident and with a high voter turn-out, resulting in victory for previous prime minister Jose Ramos Horta. Nevertheless, the level of violence rose notably prior to the parliamentary elections held at the end of June, in which the FRETILIN party obtained the highest number of seats, though not enough to govern alone. After several weeks of tension, former President Xanana Gusmao gained the support of enough political parties to be named prime minister. After he had taken office there was a further wave of violence in the country that left several people dead or injured and led to the mounting of roadblocks, the burning and looting of hundreds of buildings, attacks on UN and government vehicles and the enforced displacement of around 5,000 people. However, security conditions improved notably during the second half of the year.

Europe

In Europe, tensions centred around the two regions of Georgia that are claiming independence: violations of the ceasefire in Abkhazia led to serious incidents, while the launch of a missile in South Ossetia, allegedly by Russia, further raised the temperature of the dispute between Russia and Georgia.

a) Caucasus

| Georgia (Abkhazia) | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal |

Box 2.4. The former Soviet Union: “frozen conflicts” or “frozen questions”?

The situations of tension surrounding the unresolved conflicts and complex negotiating processes in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), Transdniestria (Moldova) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) have frequently been described as “frozen conflicts”. The perception of these contexts as conflicts that have become stalled, prolonged, static and irresolvable is in itself problematic, in that it ignores the fact that the situation in these places continues to develop on the ground. It thus serves to perpetuate an approach that is neither ambitious nor imaginative but merely resigned to an acceptance that the deadlock which has endured for more than a decade is unbreakable. It may in fact be the case that it is not the conflicts that are frozen but the approach being taken and the questions being asked.

The dynamic aspects of these four contexts of tension arising from unresolved disputes could once again be clearly seen during last year, with developments such as the creation of a temporary pro-Georgian administration in South Ossetia with all its short- and medium-term consequences for the conflict; the formal request from Georgia that Russia withdraw its peace-keeping forces from Abkhazia and its heavy emphasis throughout 2007 on the need to change the format of the negotiating process; the increasing international pressure to find a resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh before presidential elections are held in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2008 and the consequences that this will have for the two sides; the release by the authorities in Transdniestria in 2007 of the last Moldovan political prisoner; and the growing level of militarism in the region, and particularly in the areas in conflict.

This is why it is important not to confuse complexity with deadlock. The challenge for both the international community and the different parties involved means both identifying and accepting the necessary issues. They must firstly acknowledge the **need to act rather than indefinitely postpone the issue of these non-state entities**. Their paradoxical nature as *de jure* territories that fall within the sovereignty of a particular state but are *de facto* independent territories with their own state structures (control over their own territory and a monopoly over the use of violence, governmental structures, symbols, etc.) has given rise to a breeding ground for isolation and uncertainty. Indeed, these former Soviet non-state entities have economies that display a growing criminal dimension (the trafficking of weapons and people, the creation of mafias, smuggling), with a potential workforce that is dogged by uncertainty and restriction, a lack of protection for civilians as a result of the international legal vacuum in these territories (e.g. human rights abuses, restrictions on the freedom of information and the press), and strong personal interests resulting from the political and economic limbo (governing elites, profiteering from illegal trade, etc.). Although one should be aware of the risks involved in the substantiation of these new territorial divisions through war and ethnic cleansing, which are exacerbated by the complex issue of the different interests in play (the perpetuation of political power, economic power, etc.), the strategies used (human rights violations, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, etc.) and the level of representation as regards demands for sovereignty (majorities in ethnically “cleansed” areas), the fact is that the mythification of existing borders and territorial integrity within the framework of an international system of nation-states does little to help the resolution of conflicts that revolve around aspirations of sovereignty in multi-ethnic contexts. The complexity of these situations requires the creation of intermediate territorial and administrative architectures and an in-depth international debate on self-determination in contexts that differ from the post-colonial model.

Secondly, it is important to strengthen and support a critical mass on each side of the border which, on the basis of a similar range of issues (the dependence of the full social, political and economic development of the territory in question on the actual resolution of the conflict), will help to reduce tensions and force progress in the negotiating process from a more thorough and participative perspective. Otherwise, one runs the **risk that these pseudo-states will become failed pseudo-states**. It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary for regional organisations like the OSCE and the EU to play a truly committed and effective role at various levels in helping to resolve conflicts that compromise the situation in an individual state.

Box 2.5. Kosovo: the challenge of a shared identity

As the process to resolve the definitive status of Kosovo enters a crucial period which seems to be coming ever closer to some form of supervised independence, both the dangers and the opportunities offered by the different potential future scenarios become more apparent, as do the close links between these potential scenarios and the achievements and failures of the last eight years under the protection of the United Nations. Two issues are particularly important when assessing the current situation, namely the omnipresent shadow of inter-ethnic conflict, and the accumulated underlying internal tensions. Both factors are inter-related and combine to make a difficult future for the people of Kosovo.

After eight years as an international protectorate, during which the fragile foundations of a democratic state have been laid, along with a basic rule of law and minimum levels of stability and security, **Kosovo nevertheless remains a territory that is divided along the same ethnic lines that formed the basis for the wars of the 1990s.** During the course of the last eight years, UNMIK has been incapable of ending the *de facto* control held by Belgrade over the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. The Kosovan authorities have been either unwilling or unable to involve either political representatives or the ordinary people from the Serbian majority towns in Kosovo's central and local structures; and the Serbian government has encouraged alienation from Pristina among Kosovo Serbs, a strategy that has been mostly accepted and adhered to, to the point that it is Serbia that controls most aspects of political, economic and social life for Serbs in Kosovo, from the school curriculum to wages.¹⁹ The result is two systems co-existing in parallel within a small territory that is affected by the perpetual overplaying and politicisation of the ethnic issue.

Given this ethno-territorial division, which is fuelled either by the actions or by the omissions of the governments of both Serbia and Kosovo, the international community's stated desire for reconciliation between the two sides (in a context of either independence or autonomy) would seem to be somewhat naive unless it is going to be accompanied by a more complex analysis that takes account of: a) the importance of historical enmities or, at the very least, difficult relations between the two sides, which raises questions about the possibility of any kind of reconciliation without some form of prior conciliation; b) the vested interests in seeing the continuation of a *de facto* divided Kosovo (illegal trade, financial support from the Serbian government for the parallel Serbian institutions in Kosovo, real estate speculation, etc.); c) the importance of social control processes and the lack of civilian empowerment (Serbia's boycott of the integration of Kosovan Serbs in Kosovo while Kosovan Serbs displaced in Serbia are marginalised and ignored; the fact that a number of voices criticise the Kosovan Serb attitude in private but are unable to do so in public due to social pressures; etc.); d) the **importance of ethnic nationalism in relations between Serbia and Kosovo and within both territories internally, which suppresses the development of ordinary civic identity**, and membership of an ethnic grouping that perpetuates the definition of interests and attitudes in relation to the opposing group; and e) the victim mentality on both sides, with the negative consequences that this entails, especially for Kosovan Serbs (e.g. failure to accept that war crimes were committed in the name of the Serbs during the 1990s, the perpetuation of grievances, a lack of empowerment to permit adjustment to a new context in which the inter-community power relationships have changed).

The complex goal of ethnic reconciliation (an aim that the international community has so frequently stated in relation to Kosovo), along with the perpetuation of the ethnic dimension, would seem to have sidetracked a resolution process that required more pragmatism, realism and flexibility on both sides, since the speed of reconciliation on the one hand and the resolution of the territory's status on the other are going, by necessity, to be different. On the other hand, the question of status has been delayed for too long, which has resulted in overemphasis of the ethnic issue and has furthermore diverted attentions away from the areas of internal conflict, which have neither been tackled by the political establishment nor voiced in any great way by the ordinary population. Indeed, the internal problems of post-war Kosovo go beyond any ethno-territorial divisions and include, among other things, widespread corruption, the autocracy of the political parties, high levels of unemployment (with particular impact on women), significant levels of organised and ordinary crime, people-trafficking and forced prostitution, problems with the electricity supply, the failure to provide post-traumatic treatment and the taboos that conceal the psychological damage done by the war, the collapse of the education system and the precarious state of the health service, and violence against women and their exclusion from any decision-making arenas. These are structural problems which could, under certain circumstances, emerge as the cause of further tensions or serve to fuel existing inter-ethnic rivalries.

While these issues are ignored and treated as secondary to the pursuit of independence, **Kosovo's internal problems place the province in a complex and uncertain situation.** Whether the territory eventually obtains some form of supervised independence, or whether its final status remains within the sphere of influence of the state of Serbia or some other difficult-to-imagined formula, the immediate challenge involves tackling the internal problems, both general and specific, facing the Kosovan people, and constructing a long-term collective civil identity that will guarantee, if not conciliation, at least co-existence between the communities and the depoliticised normalisation of the ethnic issue.

Main parties involved:

Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia, peace-keeping forces from the CIS

Summary:

The precarious security situation in the region is the result of a failure to resolve the fundamental issues that led local Abkhaz leaders, with Russian support, to take up arms against the Georgian government between 1992 and 1994. The former were claiming independence for the region while the latter

wanted to maintain the country's territorial integrity during the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement, a negotiating process and an international presence (UN observers and Russian peace-keeping forces), tensions remain, along with regular violations of the ceasefire. Since the end of the armed conflict, which led to the enforced displacement of around 200,000 Georgians, the territory of Abkhazia has been under the control of pro-independence leaders and it operates as a non-state entity that is beyond Georgia's control.

19. USIP, *Kosovo, ethnic nationalism at its territorial worst*, Special Report 172, August 2006.

In the Georgian region of **Abkhazia**, the year was marked by **repeated violations of the ceasefire and troop separation agreement, with some major incidents reported**. Particularly notable was the missile attack in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (an area of Abkhazia that Georgia has controlled since mid-2006), which Georgia indirectly attributed to Abkhazia and Russia, though both denied it. In August, the Georgian government reiterated its criticism of Russia for alleged incursions into its airspace. This fragile climate of military security continued to the end of the year, with fighting in September between Abkhaz and Georgian forces leaving two dead and several injured on the Abkhaz side. The detention of several Georgian police officers by Russian peace-keeping forces further aggravated the situation and led to a **formal request from Georgia for the withdrawal of Russian troops**. The rising tide of Georgian accusations in December over the alleged declaration of a state of emergency in Abkhazia, which was denied by the region's authorities, further increased tensions. In the political arena, elections were held in the region (though they were not internationally recognised), while the political crisis between the government and opposition in Georgia itself raised doubts over Georgia's future position in the conflict.

Russia's ambiguous role in South Ossetia was once again the source of both military and diplomatic tensions, especially when a missile allegedly fired by Russia fell on a Georgian-controlled village

the water supply during the second quarter, with the politicisation of damage to a mains network supplying South Ossetia. The pro-independence authorities denounced Georgia's alleged refusal to carry out repairs, which left the Ossetian capital without water for more than a week. South Ossetia responded with reprisals, cutting water to towns controlled by Georgia within Ossetian territory. Politically, the creation by the Georgian government of a provisional administrative unit in South Ossetia to counteract the pro-independence regime raised the temperature of the dispute.

Middle East

Tensions in the Middle East rose during the course of the year and mainly centred around the possibility of an attack on Iran over its allegedly non-peaceful nuclear programme. This issue threatened to destabilise the entire region and served to increase tensions in already volatile situations, such as Lebanon, along with Syria and Israel.

Iran – USA, various countries

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | System International |
| Main parties involved: | Iran, USA, Israel, EU3 (France, United Kingdom, Germany) |
| Summary: | |

The international pressure being brought to bear on the Iranian regime can be seen as part of the policy introduced by the US government led by George Bush following the events of 11 September 2001, which in January 2002 declared Iran to be a rogue state due to its alleged links with terrorism. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which overthrew the US's ally Shah Reza Pahlavi and proclaimed Ayatollah Khomeini as the country's supreme leader, the US has been accusing Iran of supporting armed groups, like Hezbollah. The victory of ultra-conservative Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of August 2005 resulted in the further accentuation of the nationalist view that the Iranians have the right to develop a nuclear programme for purely peaceful purposes, while the international community continued to raise fears over the imminent capacity of a regime considered hostile to western interests in the region to manufacture a nuclear bomb.

Negotiations within the UN Security Council on the imposition of a third round of sanctions on **Iran** because of its nuclear activities (after a second round was imposed on 24 March) were still ongoing at the end of the year without any agreement having been reached.²⁰ For its part, the EU had imposed a total arms embargo on the country on 23 April, though negotiations between the European representative, Javier Solana, and the new Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, appointed to replace Ali Larijani in November, continued to the end of the year. **The last IAEA report of 15**

Georgia (South Ossetia)

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia |

Summary:

Tensions in the region are linked to the continuation (though now in a non-military phase) of the war that brought local leaders in South Ossetia up against the Georgian authorities in 1991 and 1992. Since then, the parties have maintained their respective positions regarding demands for independence or unification with Russia and defence of Georgia's territorial integrity, without managing to resolve the impasse affecting a large part of the de facto independent region through negotiation. The issue of the forcibly displaced Georgian population, the regular ceasefire violations, the tacit support from Russia for the secessionist authorities and the warlike rhetoric combine to form a continuing source of instability.

Tensions in **South Ossetia** worsened during the second quarter of the year. In terms of military security, there were regular violent incidents which included **exchanges of fire, threats and some road-blocks**, leaving many wounded on both sides. Russia's ambiguous role was once again the source of both military and diplomatic tensions, especially in August, when a missile allegedly fired by Russia fell on a Georgian-controlled village, though there were no casualties. As far as human security was concerned, **the effects of the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia spread to**

20. S/RES/1747 of 24 March 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

November mentioned positive advances in the cooperation offered by the Iranian authorities, though it confirmed the existence of 3,000 operational nuclear centrifuges, in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions. The US continued its constant accusations against Iran during 2007, referring to the country's involvement in the supply of weapons both to insurgents in Iraq and to the Taliban in Afghanistan, an accusation that led it to include sections of the Revolutionary Guard in its list of terrorist organisations. The incident in March in which 15 members of the British navy were temporarily held for allegedly engaging in operations in Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf marked the peak in international tensions with Iran and contributed to the threat of a possible attack on the country by the USA or Israel. In November, the statement by the coordinating body for all the US intelligence agencies that Iran had halted its nuclear armaments programme at the end of 2003 represented a setback for the government of George W. Bush.²¹

| Lebanon | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | ↑ |
| Type: | Govern Internationalised internal |
| Main parties involved: | Government, political and social opposition |
| Summary: | |
| The murder in February 2005 of the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, sparked the so-called "Cedar Revolution" which, following massive demonstrations, finally forced the withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces that had been in the country for more than 3 decades, a move that had been demanded in UN Security Council Resolution 1559 proposed by the USA and France back in September 2004. The immediate polarisation between opponents of Syrian influence on the one side (who, led by Hariri's son, accused the Syrian regime of the murder) and sectors close to Syria (such as Hezbollah) on the other, gave rise to a political, social and institutional crisis infused with confessional divisions. | |

Tensions in **Lebanon** revolved to a great extent around Syria's influence in the country and hindered the election of a new president to replace the current incumbent, Émile Lahoud. **The governing majority and the opposition, led by Hezbollah fought to obtain a president who would favour their respective interests** on issues such as the application of Resolution 1559 or the establishment of an International Tribunal to investigate the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri and others related killings.²² The deaths continued, with the murder of two members of the governing parliamentary majority in June and September, bringing the number of members of parliament killed since 2005

In Lebanon the murder of two members of the governing parliamentary majority in June and September brought to eight the number of members of parliament killed since 2005

to eight. Towards the end of the year, the murder of the candidate tipped to succeed the head of the armed forces, who was himself being groomed as a future president of the country, was a further threat to stability in Lebanon. Incidents such as the confrontations between Sunni and Shiite groups at the university in January, the explosion of a bomb in Christian north Beirut in February and the outbreak of violence at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in May²³ merely added to fears of a wider conflict and concerns about the serious political and institutional crisis being felt on the country's streets.

| Israel–Lebanon–Syria | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Intensity: | 2 |
| Evolution during the year: | = |
| Type: | System, Resources, Territori International |
| Main parties involved: | Israel, Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah armed group |
| Summary: | |
| This context of tension is set against the backdrop of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its consequences for the region. On the one hand, the presence of thousands of Palestinian refugees who set up home in Lebanon after 1948, along with the leadership of the PLO in 1979, led to continuous attacks by Israel on the south of the country until its eventual occupation in 1982. The creation of Hezbollah, a Shiite armed group, at the beginning of the 1980s, with an agenda of resistance against Israel and the liberation of Palestine, led to regular confrontations that culminated in a large-scale Israeli offensive in 2006. In turn, the 1967 war led to Israel's occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights which, along with Syria's support for Hezbollah, explains the tensions between Israel and Syria. | |

The three-sided tensions between **Israel, Lebanon and Syria** continued throughout the year, as a number of events combined to create a situation of serious instability in Lebanon. On the one hand, **Israel continued to violate southern Lebanese airspace, while at the same time denouncing Hezbollah's rearmament via the border with Syria**. The launch of Katushka rockets against Israel in June and December, coupled with the attack on UNIFIL which left six soldiers dead and for which Hezbollah denied responsibility, generated further elements of tension in the south of the country. At the last minute, Syria announced that it would be attending the Annapolis peace conference in the USA in November, after succeeding in having the issue of the Golan Heights included on the agenda. However, **the attack on an alleged nuclear installation at the beginning of September by the Israeli air force led to a rise in tensions between Syria and Israel** following months of troop deployments along their common border.

21. National Intelligence Estimate, *Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities*, November 2007, at <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>.

22. See Panel 2.6 in this chapter.

23. See Panel 1.3 in the chapter on armed conflicts.

Box 2.6. The International Tribunal in Lebanon: a search for truth and a destabilising factor?

On 30 May, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1757 by 15 votes to 5. This provided for the establishment of an international tribunal that would be charged with trying those allegedly responsible for the attack on 14 February 2005 which led to the death of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, along with other connected incidents.²⁴ In spite of the guarantee against impunity that the establishment of the tribunal represents, its creation is not without risk, not only for the stability of Lebanon itself but also for events beyond the country's borders.

Firstly, although there is no specific mention of the country itself, the resolution places Syria at the heart of the attack, based on the preliminary investigations carried out by a UN Commission. Given the strained relations between Lebanon and Syria (after Syria provided protection and troops for many years) and the international position in which Syria has found itself over the past year (i.e. in the eye of the storm due to its relationships with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, and the infiltration of terrorists into Iraq across their common border) the establishment of this tribunal represents a move that is more political than legal.

Secondly, Lebanon is currently suffering from severe internal political divisions, with marked differences between the parliamentary majority led by the son of the assassinated prime minister, and the opposition led by Hezbollah. One of the main reasons for this dispute is specifically that of Syria's influence on Lebanese political life, and while the government have requested the disarmament of Hezbollah (which is an ally of Syria) and were also instrumental in forcing Syrian troops out of the country following the demonstrations of 14 March 2005 that arose after Hariri's assassination, the opposition, particularly Hezbollah, would still like to maintain good relations with their neighbour, though their reasons are many and varied. Thus, while the government asked the UN to set up the tribunal, the opposition strongly objected, meaning that its creation will only deepen existing divisions. Indeed, the refusal of the Parliament's president (the Shiite, Nabih Berri) to convene a parliamentary session to ratify the agreement reached between the UN and the government over the Tribunal's creation made it necessary for a UN resolution to be passed to make this agreement effective.

Thirdly, Resolution 1757 came about as the result of pressure from two external players with significant interests in the country: France and the USA, the former because of its historical associations and its desire to favour certain elements in Lebanon, and the latter because of the strategic importance of countries like Lebanon in the context of its own friendship with Israel and hostility towards Syria. Indeed, the fact that the resolution was supported by France, the USA and the United Kingdom and approved with the abstention of five member states (China, Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and South Africa) reveals the international divisions that have resulted from the decision and places Syria at the heart of the global "good or evil" debate.


The current situation in Lebanon raises particularly serious concerns given the violent events that have occurred during the last two months: more than 300 people died in the fighting that broke out in a Palestinian refugee camp on 20 May between the Lebanese army and an armed group which the government accuses of being supported by Syria;²⁵ a number of bombs have devastated various places around the country; September saw the eighth murder since 2005 of a member of the governing parliamentary party opposed to Syria; and in December, a car bomb killed the general who had led operations against the armed group in the refugee camp and who was supposed to replace the current head of the armed forces, who was in turn going to stand as a presidential candidate. Indeed, many of these incidents occurred around the dates of decisions relating to the Tribunal's creation. Finally, the difficulties encountered in electing a new president generated growing tensions and revealed the desire shown by both sides in obtaining someone who would favour their own interests.

The Tribunal, which has been set up under chapter VII of the UN Charter and can therefore be imposed by force, has a long task ahead of it. It is estimated that the preliminary stages will last at least a year. For the time being, the Netherlands have agreed to host its headquarters, though many delicate issues remain to be resolved: how it will be financed, how its judges (both international and Lebanese) will be appointed, how the security of its officers, witnesses and suspects will be guaranteed and how the handover from the current independent commission to the special tribunal itself will be handled. From this moment on, issues such as how its impact will be felt in terms of instability, given the circumstances mentioned above, and, above all, how effective it will be, have yet to be seen because Syria has announced that it will not allow any Syrian suspect to be tried by the tribunal.

The establishment of the Tribunal must remain detached from the extreme politicisation that has accompanied discussions until now. Its creation could effectively make a positive contribution to the search for the truth, not only regarding Rafiq Hariri's murder but also regarding all the other deaths that have occurred in similar circumstances. And most importantly, its creation could provide succour for the calls for truth and justice that have been voiced by the many sections of Lebanese society that are demanding the right to know what really happened during the conflict that devastated their country over 15 years. For them, the search for the truth that the Tribunal's creation represents will for the first time counter the formula of "forgiving and forgetting" that has been pursued until now.

24. Security Council Resolution 1757, of 30 May 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

25. See the chapter on armed conflicts.



■ Countries engaging in peace processes or formal negotiations (indicator no. 3)

■ Countries in an exploratory phase of the peace process (indicator no. 3)

3. Peace processes

- Peace negotiations were taking place in 3 out of every 4 conflicts during 2007, though the majority of them were experiencing significant difficulties.
- The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire ended and a DDR process began in the country.
- The increasing number of splits in armed groups held back progress in several negotiation processes.
- The government of the Philippines and the MILF agreed on almost all the points on the negotiating agenda, meaning that a peace agreement may be signed during 2008.
- The main reasons for difficulties in negotiations in 2007 were very similar to those encountered in previous years and related to the mediating process, breakdowns in ceasefire agreements, internal dissidence, a lack of security, mistrust and disagreements regarding proposals for self-government.
- Rapprochement and the opening of avenues for dialogue with armed groups is an unavoidable condition for commencing any negotiating process.

This chapter contains an analysis of conflicts in which negotiations to seek a peace agreement are currently underway, regardless of whether these are formal negotiations or currently in an exploratory phase, or whether they are proceeding well or have currently stalled or reached crisis point. There is also an analysis of some cases in which the negotiating or exploratory process is a partial one, i.e. does not include all the armed groups operating in a particular country (such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, for example). The majority of negotiations relate to armed conflicts, though this chapter also contains an analysis of some contexts in which, while there are currently no armed confrontations to speak of, the parties involved have not yet reached any agreement that might bring a definitive end to hostilities and their as yet unresolved differences. Negotiations in these cases are therefore aimed at preventing the outbreak or resurgence of armed fighting. After first explaining some of the concepts referred to, the chapter continues with a region by region analysis of the progress made in negotiations throughout the year, the evolution of the most recent peace processes that have ended in agreement, the main causes of crisis encountered during peace negotiations during the year, the parties involved in dialogue or rapprochement with armed groups and, finally, a graph showing the “peace temperature”, which reflects the monthly state of a selected group of processes. A map pointing out the countries with an ongoing peace process is attached at the beginning of the chapter.

3.1. Peace processes: definition and classification

Negotiation is understood to mean a process in which two or more opposing parties (whether they are in government or represent other internal agents in a particular country) agree to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution. Negotiations may be held directly or with facilitation from third parties. Usually, formal negotiations include a prior or exploratory stage which is used to establish the framework (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.) for the future negotiating process. A **peace process** is understood to mean the consolidation of a negotiation scheme, once the agenda, the procedures to be followed, the schedule and facilitation have been agreed. Negotiation is, therefore, just one of the stages in the process.

Depending on the eventual aims sought and the dynamics experienced during the different negotiating phases, the majority of peace processes can be classified under one of these five **categories or models**, though it may sometimes be the case that a process fits into more than one category:

- a) Demobilisation and reinsertion.
- b) Sharing of political, military or economic power.
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for ending occupation, peace for the recognition of rights, etc.).
- d) Trust-building measures.
- e) Formulas for self-government or an “intermediate” political architecture.

3.2. Evolution of peace processes

This section contains an analysis of 49 negotiating processes, some of which are in a purely exploratory or tentative stage while others are more established, regardless of the results achieved so far. Some cases involve the offer of a ceasefire proposal or the initiation of talks that has not been accepted by the other side (like the PKK's offer in Turkey, for example), while others involve talks that have broken down during the year (as is the case with ETA in Spain). In one case (Côte d'Ivoire), negotiations advanced to such an extent that the conflict can be said to have been halted. More or less formal negotiations are being held in 35 cases, though sometimes with long interruptions,

while there is currently no negotiation (at least, none that is publicly admitted) in 12 cases. In any case, the first conclusion that can be drawn is that **there is an open negotiating space in three out of every four conflicts**, a proportion that has remained fairly stable in recent years. On the negative side, as shown at the end of the chapter, the “temperature of peace negotiations” in 2007 was lower than it had been for the previous three years.

As usual, the majority of negotiating processes ran into difficulties, and a significant number have gone badly. In comparison with the previous year, however, the number of cases involving an exploratory process prior to negotiations increased, whether this involved new armed groups, an existing armed group or groups, or a more recent splinter faction.

Africa

The most positive development on the African continent was the **agreement reached in Côte d’Ivoire** to implement the contents of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which could finally bring an end to a conflict that has lasted for four years. On the negative side, particular mention should be made of the **large number of splinter factions breaking away from many armed groups** currently involved in negotiations. New developments reported during 2007 included the **intense diplomatic activity from Libya**, which has suddenly become one of the continent’s main facilitators, and the **opening of talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front**, aimed at resolving the conflict in Western Sahara.

a) Southern Africa

Although former combatants from the FLEC armed group in **Angola (Cabinda)** began to demobilise at the

beginning of the year, dissident factions within both this organisation and the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD), which signed a peace agreement with the government in 2006, refused to sign up to the demobilisation process. Several members of the FCD were given government posts under the terms of the peace agreement. The leader of the FLEC, however, refused to disarm, and asked the leader of the main Angolan opposition party, UNITA, to act as mediator with the Angolan government with a view to meeting informally in Paris to explore the possibility of talks.

b) West Africa

After almost five years of conflict, a **peace agreement** was finally signed in March in the capital of Burkina Faso between the **Forces Nouvelles (FN) and the government of Côte d’Ivoire (the Ouagadougou agreement)**. It was agreed that a new transitional power-sharing government would be created in which the leader of the pro-government militias was appointed Ambassador for Reconciliation and Peace and the leader of the FN was made prime minister. A joint military command was created to unify the government armed forces and the FN, while a timetable was drawn up for disarmament,

voter-registration and the holding of elections. Agreement was also reached on the dismantling of the security zone controlled by ONUC and French troops, which had been dividing the north of the country from the south. The World Bank granted a loan of 120 million dollars for the country’s reconstruction, including the reintegration of former combatants, though there were a number of delays in the process for their demobilisation and disarmament. Another

active group, the Vavoua Liberation Front also offered to hand over its weapons. Finally, foreign residents from ECOWAS (a quarter of the total population) regained the right to circulate freely, and all reference to ethnic origins was removed from administrative documents.

In 2007 intense diplomatic activity from Libya was remarkable, which has suddenly become one of the continent’s main facilitators

Table 3.1. State of negotiations at the end of 2007

| Going well (4) | In difficulty (16) | Going badly (12) | At an exploratory stage (7) | Resolved (1) |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Philippines (MNLF)</i> | <i>Burundi (FNL)</i> | <i>Armenia-Azerbaijan</i> | Afghanistan | <i>Côte d’Ivoire</i> |
| <i>India (NSCN-IM)</i> | Colombia (ELN) | <i>Colombia (AUC)</i> | Angola (FLEC) | |
| India-Pakistan | Chad | Philippines (NPA) | Ethiopia (Ogaden) | |
| Central African Republic | <i>Cyprus</i> | <i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i> | <i>Myanmar (CNF)</i> | |
| | Philippines (MILF) | <i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i> | <i>Myanmar (NLD)</i> | |
| | India (ULFA) | Iraq | <i>Niger (MNJ)</i> | |
| | Israel-Palestina | <i>Serbia (Kosovo)</i> | Thailand (South) | |
| | <i>Mali</i> | Myanmar (KNU) | | |
| | <i>Nepal (Terai)</i> | Pakistan | | |
| | Nigeria (Delta) | Somalia | | |
| | <i>Indonesia (West Papua)</i> | Sri Lanka | | |
| | DR Congo | Sudan (Darfur) | | |
| | <i>Western Sahara – Morocco</i> | | | |
| | <i>Senegal (Casamance)</i> | | | |
| | Uganda | | | |
| | <i>Yemen</i> | | | |

(The contexts shown in italics have not been resolved but were not in an armed phase at the end of the year or cannot be classified as “armed conflicts”).

In the middle of February, the government of Mali and the armed Tuareg group, the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) agreed to begin the **implementation of the peace agreement for the Kidal region (in the north-east of the country), which had been signed the previous year**. The agreement set out a schedule for the disarmament of rebel groups, which are estimated to number some 3,000 troops. The first weapons hand-over took place in March, through the Algerian ambassador. However, a splinter faction from this group that calls itself **23rd of May** or **ATNM** announced around the middle of the year that a Tuareg alliance between Niger and Mali had been formed to pursue common demands and objectives.

In **Niger**, the government still refused to recognise the Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ) as an armed opposition group with which it could negotiate, branding it an arms and drug-smuggling organisation, in spite of appeals from civilian organisations and some members of the government itself. On several occasions, the MNJ declared itself open to talks with the government. Tuareg groups in Mali and Niger created the ATNM alliance with common demands and objectives. In September, **the president of the government asked for Libya's support in bringing security back to the north of the country**, which could mean Libya's eventual involvement as a facilitator in talks with the MNJ, a group that has threatened to attack French and Chinese companies mining uranium in the region on the grounds that their operations do not bring any benefit to the Tuareg people.

Turning to the conflict affecting **Nigeria (Niger Delta)**, the fight for control over smuggled oil in the region continued throughout the year between various militia groups, as did the kidnapping of oil company employees. After the elections in April, the President appointed Goodluck Jonathan, an ethnic Ijaw, as his new vice president as a gesture of trust aimed at resolving the conflict. An alleged leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (**MEND**) was released, and the group declared a **four-month ceasefire to assist advances in its talks with the government**, though this proved unsuccessful as fighting continued and its spokesperson was detained. Nevertheless, another seven organisations in Rivers state renounced violence and apologised to both the local population and the authorities. A further 25 militias subsequently met to begin talks. **The government said it was preparing a "road map" to resolve the conflict**, which would include key issues such as the identification of the different ethnic disputes among militias active in the region, the establishment of a global peace agreement between the government and the ethnic groups, and the introduction of a process for the disarmament and demobilisation of the militias. It also promised to increase investment in the region. At the end of the year, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan was present at the signing of a **peace agreement between the government of Bayelsa state, the oil companies and several militant groups in the region**. However, several members of the MEND armed group described the meeting as a farce. It is hoped that this agreement will mean that the oil companies can once again operate safely in Bayelsa state. From now on, any action taken

against mining companies will be classified as criminal, according to the state governor.

Finally, it should be noted that the main leader of the MFDC, which operates in the Casamance region of **Senegal**, died in Paris. This group suffered a significant split during the course of the year, making it impossible to comply with the peace agreement signed at the end of 2004.

c) Horn of Africa

In **Ethiopia (Ogaden)**, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) called for international mediation to assist with the opening of negotiations with the Ethiopian government at a time when the humanitarian crisis in the region was reaching huge proportions. It had been suggested on earlier occasions that the USA might perform this role. The ONLF announced a temporary cessation of all its military operations against the Ethiopian army during the deployment of the United Nations mission that was charged with dealing with the humanitarian situation in the region.

Turning to the permanent crisis in **Somalia**, it should be mentioned that **military intervention from Ethiopia in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led to the defeat of the militias of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), though the climate of violence worsened in several regions**, particularly the country's capital. The UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1744, which allowed for the deployment of an AU peace-keeping force (AMISOM) for an initial term of six months. The **Reconciliation Conference** (NGRC) which had been postponed on numerous occasions was finally held in August, though the UIC did not take part and instead held its own conference in Eritrea, creating the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia. In the middle of September, various Somali leaders who formed part of the TFG met in Saudi Arabia, with **facilitation from King Abdullah**, reaching a reconciliation agreement that involved replacing the Ethiopian troops supporting the TFG with a mission made up of Arab and African troops organised by the United Nations, though the Security Council failed to agree on how this mission would be made up. For its part, **Uganda announced in October that it was acting as facilitator in peace talks** between the President Abdullah Yusuf of the TFG and members of the opposition, including all the UIC's armed factions, at a meeting in Asmara, with a view to securing reconciliation and stability in the country. There were many significant changes within the TFG towards the end of the year, particularly the resignation of the prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, and the situation in the country remained unstable in spite of the various efforts at facilitation.

In **Sudan (Darfur)**, continuing divisions between the various armed groups hindered the beginning of talks, as had happened during the previous year. **The leaders of several groups held meetings in Tripoli (Libya) and Arusha (Tanzania) to agree on a stance regarding subsequent negotiations with the Sudanese government**, since all the organisations involved in attempts at facilitating dialogue agreed that such negotiations would

not be possible unless the groups got together and presented a joint programme. The Sudanese government finally accepted the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force in the region, after a long period of opposition, though it still raised a number of obstacles that could severely restrict the force's operational capacity. A large number of armed groups accepted a road map designed jointly by the UN and the AU. At the same time, **five rebel groups joined together under the banner of the United Front for Liberation and Development (UFLD)**, stating that they wanted to take part in the Arusha talks, though several armed groups requested that talks not be held in Libya as they did not regard it as a neutral country. In November, **six factions of the SLA and another two armed opposition groups that were meeting in Juba (the capital of southern Sudan) signed a unification agreement** with the aim of presenting a joint position to the Sudanese government in the forthcoming peace talks, though the main faction of the SLA al-Nur refused to take part in the talks.


d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Following the ceasefire signed by the government and the National Liberation Forces (FNL) in September 2006 in **Burundi**, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) came into operation at the beginning of 2007, though the FNL withdrew from the mechanism a few months later, accusing Burundian armed forces of failing to leave the regions that they controlled. **There were serious divisions within the ranks of the FNL, with supporters and opponents of the talks process ending up fighting each other.** The official FNL

party called for a change of mediator, accusing South Africa of not being neutral, a move that resulted in dual facilitation from both South Africa and Tanzania at the end of the year. The creation of a truth and reconciliation commission awakened serious political and social tensions. Towards the end of the year, the Burundian government issued an ultimatum to members of the FNL faction led by Agathon Rwasa, the group's original leader whose authority was continually questioned throughout the year.

As regards the conflict in **Chad**, the country's president, **Idriss Déby**, and the leader of the **FUC armed opposition group, Mahamat Nour**, reached a peace agreement in early January in **Tripoli**, with facilitation from **Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi**. However, the FUC suffered a number of splits in its ranks. Mahamat Nour was named the country's new defence minister, though he was dismissed from government towards the end of the year, a move that resulted in the breakdown of the peace agreement. Since the beginning of the year, the Chadian government had stated that it would not accept a peace-keeping mission with a military contingent to supervise its border with Sudan but only a civilian mission comprising gendarmes and police officers. In the end, this mission could not be deployed as a result of the lack of security and the increasing hostility directed towards it over the months, not to mention the slowness of the EU's decisions regarding logistics and personnel. **Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his Chadian counterpart Idriss Déby reached a peace and reconciliation agreement with mediation from Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz, which should have brought an end to tensions between**

Graph 3.1. The peace process in Burundi



their two countries, though the situation had once again worsened by the end of the year. Former Chadian President Goukouni Weddeye also offered to mediate with the armed groups, and the government of Gabon put itself forward as a facilitator in any new talks. At the end of October, the government and the four main armed opposition groups in the east of the country reached an agreement with facilitation from Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi in Tripoli. A month later, however, two of the four groups broke the agreement and resumed hostilities. There were also problems with the reintegration of combatants from the groups that signed the peace agreements, and the governments of Chad and Sudan once again accused each other of supporting the armed groups from both countries that were destabilising the region.

At the beginning of February in the **Central African Republic**, the **government and Abdoulaye Miskine, leader of a rebel faction of the UFDR, reached a peace agreement in Syrte (Libya) with mediation from Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi**. Former Minister A. Ringui Le Gaillard, who is the leader of another rebel group opposed to President François Bozizé, the APRD (which is active in the northwest of the country), announced that he would also sign up to the peace agreement, although he subsequently demanded that talks be held in Gabon; however, in December, he did eventually join the process. In April, the other UFDR faction led by Damane Zakaria also reached a peace agreement with the government. The deposed former President Ange Felix Patassé, in exile in Togo, requested peace talks with the country's current president. In mid-April, the Central African Republic and Sudan agreed to normalise their bilateral relations, and in September the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1778, which gave the go-ahead for the creation of an EU-led peace-keeping mission to operate along the border between the Central African Republic and Chad.

Turning to the volatile situation in **DR Congo**, which is affecting the Kivu provinces along, to a certain degree, with the Ituri district, it should be pointed out that **although dissident General Laurent Nkunda, who leads the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), signed a peace agreement at the beginning of the year with mediation from Rwanda, his group continued to be involved in skirmishes**, and while some of its members finally demobilised, others continued to fight. There were also continuing armed incursions by the Rwandan Hutu armed group, the FDLR, throughout the year, leading the governments of DR Congo and Rwanda to reach an agreement at the end of the year under which they would pursue and disarm this group. On the positive side, it should be noted that more than 4,500 fighters from three groups operating in the Ituri district, the FNI, the FRPI and the MRC, were finally demobilised over the course of the year. Finally, in December, **the government of DR Congo called for a peace conference in Goma at the beginning of 2008 that would include all armed, political, economic and social groups from the Kivu region**, aimed at bringing an end to the violence.

In **Uganda**, the warrants issued against the main leaders of the LRA by the International Criminal Court (ICC)

remained one of the main obstacles to the peace agreement. **The LRA's leader threatened to abandon the talks unless both the negotiating team and the location of the talks** (in the south of Sudan) **were changed**, proposing that the process be transferred to Kenya. UN Special Envoy and former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, held a meeting in the Congolese jungle with LRA leader Joseph Kony, and the parties gave each other time to draw up an alternative justice system based on traditional methods, which would be used to try crimes committed in the north of the country. At the end of the year, a delegation from the LRA, led by chief negotiator Martin Ojul, succeeded in persuading the government to agree on a courtesy visit from the LRA to the Ugandan President in Kampala, the first by the rebel group in its entire history. **The LRA suffered splits and desertions**, and was in danger of disintegrating completely, particularly after confirmation of the death of Vincent Otti, who had been responsible for negotiations with the Ugandan government.

e) Maghreb and North Africa

In **Algeria**, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) became the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, and all attempts at rapprochement or negotiation aimed at bringing an end to its attacks failed.

Turning to the peace process in **Western Sahara**, after many delays Morocco finally presented UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon its **proposal for regional autonomy** for the Western Sahara, under which the region would enjoy autonomy in the areas of government, the economy, taxes, infrastructure, culture and the environment. After several years without any talks, **delegations from Morocco and the POLISARIO Front met twice in New York under the auspices of the UN**, in what the organisation called "conversations" prior to negotiations. In spite of their different positions, both parties agreed that the current situation was unacceptable and decided to hold a new round of talks in January 2008. Another potential obstacle to continuing negotiation that should be mentioned is the acquisition by a French company of a licence to exploit the phosphate reserves and to extract uranium in Western Sahara.

America

In the conflict in **Colombia**, early in 2007 President Álvaro Uribe authorised further contact between the **FARC** and the group of friendly countries (Spain, France and Switzerland) to resume talks about a humanitarian agreement. It subsequently **accepted the offer of good offices from Venezuela, though it closed this channel of communication with the FARC after a few months** due to disagreements regarding the process, leaving moves to reach a humanitarian agreement in the hands of the church and offering a "meeting zone" of no more than 150 km². Nevertheless, at the end of the year, the FARC released two of their hostages and the son of one of them following Venezuelan mediation. As regards talks with the **ELN**, the government held five rounds of talks with the guerrilla

group (in Havana and Caracas), though they failed to reach a “basic agreement”. **Talks were stalled by disagreements on where ELN forces would be stationed and the verification of a potential cessation of hostilities**, finally leading the round of talks scheduled for Caracas in December to be suspended, as this opportunity for dialogue had broken down. Mention should also be made of the introduction of the National Peace Council, which is intended to help facilitate talks with all the different insurgent groups. As regards the process with the **AUC**, further links continued to be discovered between paramilitary groups and political, military and economic figures in the country. The lack of sufficient human resources to bring the members of the AUC to trial and obtain reparation for their victims has raised questions regarding the mechanisms set out in the Justice and Peace Act. Furthermore, the country’s Supreme Court handed down a judgement in which it refused to recognise members of the AUC as political criminals. A further cause for concern is the **emergence of new paramilitary structures linked with drug-trafficking**.

Asia

In Asia, the most notable events of the year included: an **agreement between the government of the Philippines and the MILF on the issue that was stalling talks between them** (the ownership of ancestral domains), which could shortly lead to the signing of a peace agreement, the **changes occurring in Myanmar** following demonstrations led by Buddhist monks, and the **emergence of tensions in the south of Nepal**, along with the corresponding negotiating processes.

a) South Asia

Although there is no real peace process to speak of in **Afghanistan**, it should be noted that at the beginning of February the *Wolesi Jirga* or lower chamber of parliament approved a draft amnesty bill for all combatants involved in the conflict. The European Council decided to establish an EU police mission in the country (EUPOL-Afghanistan), which would be charged with reforming and training the local police and strengthening the legal system. **The Taliban announced that they were willing to begin talks with the Afghan government** after President Hamid Karzai made a proposal in this regard, though they conditioned their acceptance on the withdrawal of foreign troops and the imposition of Islamic law in the country. These approaches were made via the National Reconciliation Commission, though they had not led to any concrete results by the end of the year.

As regards the different conflicts underway in **India**, the government said that it would **agree to resume peace talks with the ULFA in the state of Assam**, though it set out several conditions. The ULFA indicated that it would only consider an offer of talks from the government if this came via the People’s Consultative Group (which is charged with facilitating any talks) and if the negotiations included Assam’s sovereignty. There were no advances during the year with respect to the NDFB,

another group operating in the region. In **Nagaland**, the leaders of the NSCN (I-M) consulted the civilian population and religious leaders over the possible creation of the Greater Nagaland. **The Indian government and the NSCN (I-M) agreed in July to extend their ceasefire for a further twelve months**. The armed group may have agreed to remain part of India under a special kind of federal relationship with the country. The NSCM (I-M) objected to the Indian gas company ONGC operating within its territory.

Turning to the dispute between **India and Pakistan** over Kashmir, trust-building measures between the two countries continued in the form of a building block strategy, though the pace was less intense than during the previous two years. The coalition of pro-independence parties in Jammu and Kashmir, the APHC, called for an end to the armed struggle so that the way could be left open for talks aimed at reaching a sustainable peace agreement. One of the proposals that emerged during the year involved making joint use of Kashmir’s water and other natural resources.

In the Terai region of **Nepal**, the parties forming the coalition government agreed to the creation of a federal state (as demanded by representatives of the Madhesi community) but the definitive shape would have to be decided by the Constituent Chamber. During the course of the year, the *Madhesi People’s Rights Forum* (MJF-MPRF) was involved in fighting with former Maoist opponents over the establishment of a federal system in the country, further underlining the divisions between the many groups that already existed or have emerged more recently in the south of the country. **The government and the MJF-MPRF began talks in Janakpur with the aim of reaching a negotiated settlement to calls for independence in Terai province**. The government decided to create a committee that would include the secretariat from the Ministry of Peace and the Interior and members of the Madhesi MJF-MPRF organisation to monitor the implementation of the agreements reached. Another group, the JTMM, sent a letter to the United Nations, asking the organisation to mediate.

Of the various conflicts in **Pakistan** in which attempts are being made to reach at least partial agreement, it should be noted that in March the Pakistani government reached an agreement with local leaders from the Mamoond tribe in the Bajaur region, which is dominated by Taliban from the TSNM. This is the third of this type of agreement, following the ones reached in Baluchistan and Waziristan. In Baluchistan, the head of the Jamali tribe and the governor of Kandahar (Afghanistan) offered to mediate in the conflict in the region, and the Pakistani president offered an amnesty to all rebels who handed themselves in. In mid-December, **the province’s interim prime minister set up various meetings with leaders of the nationalist Baluchi and Pashtun parties**, with the aim of encouraging reconciliation in the province. **The agreement signed by the government of Pakistan and tribal militias in the South Waziristan in 2004 was left in doubt following aerial bombardments by Pakistani armed forces** while Taliban militias intensified their attacks. In spite of this, tribal and religious leaders in South Waziristan

reached an agreement with the Pakistani government under which they agreed not to offer a refuge for Uzbek armed opposition fighters. In mid-December, the Taliban militias operating in Waziristan announced a ceasefire that would remain in place until 1 January in North Waziristan, giving assurances that government facilities would not be attacked during this period.

As regards the lost opportunity in **Sri Lanka**, fighting continued throughout the year between government armed forces and the LTTE, leaving no opportunity to resume negotiations. Furthermore, the end of the year saw the official end of the ceasefire. The dissident faction of the LTTE led by Colonel Karuna and officially known as the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalao Pulikal announced for the first time that it would be willing to disarm if its security could be guaranteed.

Manila offered the MILF, for the first time, the right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro people, though it discounted any possibility of independence from the outset

b) Southeast Asia

In spite of the deadlock encountered since the end of 2006 in the negotiating process between the government and the MILF in the **Philippines**, due to disagreements over the ancestral domains of the Bangsamoro people, informal contact between both parties was maintained throughout the period. **Manila offered the MILF, for the first time, the right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro people, though it discounted any possibility of independence from the outset.** In negotiations held in Saudi Arabia in November, both sides agreed similar positions regarding the ancestral domains of the Moro people, the most controversial

aspect of the entire peace process. The two other important points, which relate to security and rehabilitation and development, had already been agreed and even partially implemented. Nevertheless, **in the last meeting held in December, the parties failed to reach an agreement on the ancestral domains.** Furthermore, some leaders of the indigenous Lumad community called for parallel negotiations with the executive on the demarcation of the ancestral domains of the Moro people. Both, the government and the MILF, agreed to consider their requests. As regards negotiations with the **MNLF, the government reached a significant agreement with the group in a meeting held in Saudi Arabia, where they discussed application of all the provisions set out in the 1996 agreement.** As a result, five working groups were set up to discuss *Sharia* law and the legal system, the security forces, natural resources and economic development, the political and representational system and, finally, education.

Meanwhile, **it proved impossible during the course of the year to restart the talks with the NPA that had been broken off back in mid-2005**, in spite of the efforts of the Norwegian facilitators and the fact that the Presidential Council for the Peace Process had announced that peace talks were not unconditionally blocked and could resume if certain conditions were met. In the middle of September the president of the Philippines offered an amnesty to any members of the NPA who were willing to lay down their arms and rejoin the political process. For its part, the NPA through its political wing, the NDF, insisted on its usual conditions for resuming talks, which include its removal from the lists

Table 3.2. **The demands of the NDF in the Philippines**

| Main NDF demands | Associated issues |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Removal from the lists of terrorist organisations | - Defence of national sovereignty - Respect for the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) - Negotiations in a secure location |
| Support for implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) | - An end to serious human rights violations - Reparations for victims of the Marcos regime - Support for the action of international bodies, particularly United Nations Rapporteurs |
| Continuation of peace talks | - Implementation of the Agreements - Continuation of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) - Continuation of the Working Committees (on human rights and international humanitarian law, social and economic reforms) in informal meetings - Agreement on a continuing and accumulative ceasefire during negotiations |
| Acceptance of the Concise Agreement for an Immediate and Just Peace (CAIJP) | (10-point platform) |
| Withdrawal of the Visiting Armed Forces Agreement | Independence from the USA |
| Respect and support for workers' rights and agricultural reform | Socio-economic projects managed by local organisations |
| Withdrawal of the 1995 Mining Act | |
| Cancellation of foreign debt | |
| Arrest of those responsible for massacres and enforced displacement | |
| Release of political prisoners | |

of terrorist organisations, compensation for victims of the dictatorship of former President Marcos and the withdrawal of US troops. Given its impact on public opinion and its effect on possible future negotiations, particular mention should be made of the publication by Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, of a report in which he indicated that the country's armed forces were responsible to a large extent, as part of their counter-insurgency strategy against the NPA armed opposition group, for the extra-judicial executions carried out over the last six years.

In **Indonesia (West Papua)**, the governors of Papua and West Papua signed a cooperation agreement in mid-February which set the scene for their reconciliation following several months of tensions associated with the creation of the latter province. The agreement provides for the recognition of West Papua, the mobilization of human and material resources from Papua to West Papua and an undertaking to jointly manage some infrastructure items and the public funds provided by Jakarta. In September, the government of Vanuatu expressed its satisfaction over the possibility of offering West Papua observer status in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), with the aim of facilitating dialogue with the Indonesian authorities. At the beginning of October, **the West Papua Coalition for National Liberation (WPCNL), which includes the OPM armed opposition group, requested the start of talks with the Indonesian government, with international monitoring** (possibly from Finland) and discussions on self-government for the region, the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the development of democracy.

As regards the many conflicts affecting **Myanmar, a faction led by General H. Maung broke away from the Karen KNU group and formed the KNU/KNLAPC, signing a peace agreement with the military junta.** As far as the conflict with the Chin community is concerned, it should be noted that **a preliminary two-day encounter took place on Burmese soil, between representatives of the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Burmese military junta,** with mediation from Reverend Chawn Kio. By contrast, ceasefire negotiations between representatives of the armed forces and members of the Shan SSA armed opposition group were suspended when the two sides failed to agree on the location for their talks. Both China and Russia vetoed the draft resolution on Myanmar presented to the UN Security Council by the US in an attempt to bring the conflict in Myanmar onto the Council's agenda. The UN Secretary-General appointed Ibrahim Gambari as his Special Adviser in the country for the implementation of General Assembly resolutions, and for cooperation with the government in the democratisation process. Gambari succeeded in meeting Nobel laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who heads the National League for Democracy (NLD). **Some of the country's main cities saw massive civilian protests led by Buddhist monks** in September, in what became known as the "Saffron revolution", a reference to the colour of the monks' robes. The government agreed to a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in the country, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, who had been prevented from entering Myanmar since 2003. Meanwhile,

Ibrahim Gambari called on the government of Vietnam to offer support in the search for a solution to the political crisis in Myanmar. At the end of the year, **the UN Secretary-General created a Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,** which included representatives from 14 countries.

Finally, in southern **Thailand,** the government announced that it was considering the possibility of introducing some elements of *Sharia* law and an amnesty in three mainly Muslim provinces, as part of its strategy to manage the conflict in the south of the country. **The Indonesian government announced that it had accepted a request from its Thai counterpart to assist in resolving the conflict,** though difficulties remained in identifying the leaders of the groups operating in the region. Nevertheless, the Thai government held exploratory contacts with some members of the insurgency in Geneva and Stockholm. There were also reports of the growing use of paramilitary forces in the south of the country.

Europe

The most notable events in Europe during 2007 were the **breakdown of the process that had been initiated between the Spanish government and ETA,** the permanent deadlock in talks on the **future of Kosovo,** and the **Turkish government's refusal to negotiate with the PKK** on resolving the conflict in Turkish Kurdistan. There was no significant or definitive progress in any of the conflicts taking place on the continent.

Tensions in the dispute between **Armenia and Azerbaijan** over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh rose throughout the year as Azerbaijan significantly increased its military capacity. Negotiations at the OSCE, which included a meeting between the two countries' presidents, failed to provide any solution, and this forum was once again rejected by Azerbaijan, which wants the conflict to be handled by the UN Security Council. Leading figures in Nagorno-Karabakh demanded a direct role in the conflict resolution process, which currently excludes any representative from the authorities in the disputed enclave. At the last OSCE meeting held in December in Madrid, the two countries' foreign ministers studied proposals for a political solution drawn up by their respective governments, without any participation from mediators from the Minsk Group, whose "Basic Principles" document was criticised by both sides.

Turning to **Cyprus,** in January the Turkish-Cypriot authorities demolished a controversial walkway that had been built in 2005 in Nicosia, the island's divided capital, and in March the Greek-Cypriot government demolished the wall in Ledra Street in the capital's historic centre. Nevertheless, the political stalemate continued during the first half of the year, with failure to implement the agreements of 2006. Following international pressure, the leaders of the two communities held a meeting during the second half of 2007, though no significant agreement was reached. A survey carried out by UNFICYP found that **a federal solution to the conflict in Cyprus was the one that had majority back-**

ing from both communities. Greek-Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos presented to the UN a new eight-point proposal aimed at speeding up implementation of the agreements made in July 2006, which included a substantial role for members of the ordinary population.

Half-way through 2007 in **Spain**, ETA issued a formal communiqué in which it announced the end of the “permanent ceasefire” that it had declared in March 2006 but which had been invalidated *de facto* at the end of 2006 when a powerful device exploded in a car park at Madrid airport, killing two people. The attempt to engage in a peace process that would bring an end to the group’s terrorist activities and leave any decisions on changes to the political architecture in the Basque Country in the hands of the normal political establishment was completely suspended following further attacks by ETA during the year, and 2007 ended with no sign of a possible return to some form of similar process.

Given the stalemate in negotiations relating to **Georgia’s** conflict over the region of **Abkhazia**, Georgia proposed updating and modifying the negotiating mechanisms established at the beginning of the 1990s and suggested that the process should move on to the next phase, with direct talks between the two sides without any prior conditions, in an attempt, at least, to restore trust. The EU prepared a package of measures to encourage trust between Georgia and Abkhazia, and Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli presented the UN Security Council with a new proposal for the conflict’s resolution, though his government subsequently announced that it did not need any advice from the UN. Georgia invited the EU to play an important role in the negotiating process and to get more involved on the ground, while Abkhazia insisted on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the upper Kodori Gorge before it would resume any talks. Georgia also underwent a serious political crisis at the end of the year, which forced the resignation of the president and the bringing forward of the elections. The foreign minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Sergei Shamba, also stated that Abkhazia might refuse to accept mediation from any country that recognised Kosovo’s independence but not Abkhazia’s. Turning to the conflict in **South Ossetia**, the Joint Control Commission (JCC) remained useless as a peace-making mechanism, since Georgia regarded it as serving Moscow’s interests, claiming that its composition was not balanced. **Georgia requested changes to the negotiating mechanism that would allow for direct talks between the two sides**, though with facilitation from the USA, the EU and Russia. The Georgian parliament approved the Law for the Creation of the Appropriate Conditions for a Peaceful Resolution in the Former Autonomous District of South Ossetia. Political and diplomatic sources reiterated the need to strengthen trust-building measures and support economic incentives for the whole region. South Ossetia’s main demand during the last full session of the JCC was the preparation of an agreement not to resort to the use of force.

As far as the future of **Kosovo** is concerned, a number of rounds of talks were held during the course of the year, though neither Serbs nor Albanians from Kosovo changed their respective positions on autonomy or independence. In January, the facilitator for the process and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, sent the Secretary-General a draft proposal on the status of Kosovo, which was followed by further rounds of talks in February and March, when he finally presented the Security Council with his definitive proposal. Bosnian President Boris Tadic proposed autonomy for the province and a period of 20 years for the determination of its final status, and July saw the first meeting at which representatives from Serbia and Kosovo had held direct talks since June 1999. The Serbian parliament unanimously approved a new constitution that confirmed its sovereignty over Kosovo, though **the United Nations Special Envoy recommended limited sovereignty**, with a continued international presence and several competences. For its part, Albania said publicly that it was opposed to any unilateral action on the part of Kosovo itself. The main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won the parliamentary elections held in the territory during the month of November. The PDK, led by Hashim Thaci (a former commander of the UCK armed group), obtained 34% of the vote. **The UN Security Council, meeting on 19 September, failed to overcome its own internal divisions and was unable to reach a common position in this regard**, thus increasing the possibility that a solution to the crisis would not involve the Council. The EU meanwhile indicated its increasing willingness to accept a solution that involved the coordinated and gradual recognition of an independent Kosovo under international supervision, without the need to obtain a further resolution from the UN Security Council.

Finally, in **Turkish Kurdistan**, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan issued a proposal at the beginning of the year in which he suggested the creation of a truth and justice commission for the Kurdish conflict, with the aim of moving towards peace between Turks and Kurds. **In June, the PKK once again offered the government a bilateral ceasefire**, with a specific undertaking not to interfere in the electoral process, an offer that the government again turned down. In the July elections, the Kurdish DTP party won 24 seats in parliament, the first time it had been represented in a decade, and September saw the creation of the Turkey Peace Parliament, a body that arose out of the conference held in January to seek solutions to the Kurdish question. This body will provide an independent structure for the offer of political, social and cultural proposals. At the end of November, the PKK published a further declaration in favour of talks, proposing the creation of a platform in which both parties can be represented. However, the Turkish parliament voted by a large majority to authorise the government to order a large-scale operation against the PKK in the north of Iraq, an operation which began at the end of the year.

Middle East

Although there is no overall peace process in **Iraq**, a number of **partial initiatives were implemented throughout the year in an attempt to reach agreements with the different communities and reduce the levels of violence**. A delegation from the Iraqi parliament comprising MPs from the main Shiite and Sunni parties along with Kurdish and other minority groups visited Spain and Germany to study the territorial models in place in both countries in the context of the current debate on constitutional reform in Iraq. A conference on Iraq was held in the Egyptian city of Sharm el Sheik, involving all the country's neighbours, the five permanent members of the Security Council, the EU and the G8. An agreement was signed during the course of this conference, aimed at guaranteeing political and economic stability over the next five years. **Moqtada al-Sadr** addressed his supporters in what was the cleric's first appearance in several months, calling on them to use peaceful methods to oppose the US, Israel and the occupation of Iraq. He subsequently **signed an agreement with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, in an attempt to halt the violence between rival Shiite groups**. Several Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders reached an agreement on reconciliation at the end of August. Finally, the country's vice president and Sunni leader Tariq al-Hashemi met Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani following the presentation of a proposal from al-Hashemi for the country's reconciliation, known as the Iraqi National Compact. Mention should also be made of the fact that the autonomous government of Kurdistan (GAK) agreed to a six-month postponement of the referendum that was to have been held on 31 December in Kirkuk, citing technical reasons. This postponement will allow for the **establishment of a mechanism to resolve the Kirkuk issue with supervision from the UN**.

As regards the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, the **peace conference held in Annapolis** (Maryland, USA), the first talks between Israel and the PNA in seven years, finally ended on 27 November. The confer-

ence brought together more than 40 different countries and international agencies, and even Syria attended, though its presence was not confirmed until the last minute. Hamas did not attend as it was not invited. The conference drew up the framework for the initiation of talks based on the Road Map. Both Israelis and Palestinians announced in a statement that they had agreed to discuss all the main issues without exception in an attempt to create an independent Palestinian state. The basic negotiating issues agreed upon, referred to as the "final status" questions, were the future of Jerusalem, borders, water, refugees and settlements. Elsewhere, Tony Blair was named as the Quartet's Middle East Envoy during 2007, while the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan visited Israel to present a peace plan that had the backing of the Arab League and which included the recognition of Israel if it withdrew from the occupied territories. As regards the conflict between Palestinian factions, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held a meeting with the prime minister, Ismael Haniya and Khaled Meshal, as representatives of Hamas, in Mecca in February. With help from the Saudi king they attempted to find a way of overcoming the stalemate between their two sides. Despite having reached an agreement to form a government of national unity, the seizure of power in Gaza by Hamas in June and the formation of a new executive led by the independent Salam Fayyed and based in Ramallah (West Bank) without any members from Hamas, led to deep divisions between the two parties and the *de facto* separation of the Palestinian territories, a situation that continued to the end of the year. In December, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced that there would be **confidential contacts between Israel and Hamas in Switzerland**, and that this could lead to a long-term ceasefire.

Turning to the political crisis in **Lebanon**, The Secretary General of Hezbollah, N. Nasrallah, whose party led the demonstrations calling for the overthrow of F. Siniora's government, announced that he would support any mediation or initiative that would lead to a solution to the crisis currently affecting the country. The French

Box 3.1. The Helsinki Agreement, 31st of August 2007

Representatives from different Iraqi groups meeting in Helsinki at the end of August 2007 agreed to the following recommendations for negotiations that could eventually lead to national reconciliation:

1. To resolve all political issues through non-violence and democracy.
2. To prohibit the use of arms for all armed groups during the process of negotiations.
3. To form an independent commission approved by all parties, its task being to supervise the process of disarmament of non-governmental armed groups in a verifiable manner.
4. All parties will commit to accept the results of the negotiations and no party can be subject to a threat of force from any groups that reject all or part of any agreement reached.
5. To work to end international and regional interference in internal Iraqi affairs.
6. To commit to protect human rights.
7. To ensure the independence and efficiency of the legal and justice systems, especially the constitutional court.
8. To ensure the full participation of all Iraqi parties and blocs in the political process and agreed governance arrangements.
9. To take all necessary steps to end all violence, killings, forced displacement and any further damage to infrastructure.
10. To establish an independent body to explore ways to deal with the legacy of the past in a way that will unite the nation.
11. All Iraqi parties and blocs have to build Iraq and contribute efficiently to support all the efforts that would make the political process and Iraqi unity successful and to preserve its sovereignty.
12. All participating groups must commit to all of the principles listed above.

government invited various Lebanese political figures to Celle-Saint-Cloud Castle in an attempt to end the tensions of recent months. The meeting, which was held behind closed doors, involved 30 representatives of some 14 political parties and Lebanese civilian groups, including Hezbollah. The last three months of the year saw increased mediation from outside parties, including Spain, France and Italy who, together with the Arab League and Syria, tried to create some rapprochement between the parties through the election of a new president who was acceptable to all sides. As regards the fighting that broke out between the Lebanese army and the Fatah al-Islam militia at the Naher el-Bared refugee camp in May, this finally ended when the army took control of the camp in September, following attempts at mediation from Palestinian groups. Elsewhere, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report on Lebanon in which he recommended establishing an agency to monitor the country's borders.

Finally, months after the government of **Yemen** offered to reach an **agreement with al-Houthi's rebel group** in February 2007, the two sides finally agreed to a ceasefire on 16 June. The government promised to undertake a reconstruction programme (financed by Qatar and other countries) in the rebel provinces in the north, in return for the handover of heavy weaponry and the temporary exile of the rebel leaders. Qatar acted as mediator. However, the process may not succeed due to the failure to comply with the deadline for the handover of weapons and the withdrawal of rebels from their positions, and sporadic outbursts of fighting continued throughout the year. In December, the Yemeni government increased its military presence in the north of the country.

3.3. General evolution of the most recent peace agreements

Small groups of Ninja militias still refused to disarm in **Congo**. The former leader of these militias and current head of the CNR party initially accepted a government post, but he subsequently refused to take up his duties as he felt that his security had not been sufficiently guaranteed.

In **Indonesia (Aceh)**, the former leader of the GAM won 38% of the vote in the elections of December 2006 and was thus declared governor of Aceh. Discussions were held regarding the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission to try cases of human rights abuses, while serious problems were reported in the reintegration programme for former combatants, due to confusion over the aims of these programmes and a lack of both strategy and transparency. There were also internal disputes among the leaders of the GAM.

In **Northern Ireland**, Sinn Fein agreed to support the Northern Irish police force in an historic vote. Under a pact between the British government and Sinn Fein, IRA fugitives and members of the security forces accused of complicity with paramilitary groups will not be brought to trial as this is not regarded as being in the

public interest. Elections were held in Ulster for a new Northern Irish parliament, to be known as the Stormont Assembly, which represents a further step towards the restoration of autonomy for the province and a new era of shared government. The Protestant UVF and UDA paramilitary groups announced that they were renouncing violence and its demobilisation as armed groups.

Turning to the process involving the Maoists in **Nepal**, the UN Security Council expressed its support for the creation of a new United Nations political mission in the country, UNMIN, which would be charged with monitoring the recent peace agreement. Five members of the former Maoist armed opposition group, now the CPN (M) party, were sworn in as interim government ministers, though they subsequently stood down when the deadline they had given for the establishment of a republic expired, leading to a significant political crisis that caused the elections planned for the end of the year to be postponed. Both the Maoists and the Nepalese parliament said that they were in favour of the establishment of a republic. Thousands of combatants had still not been demobilised during the second half of the year.

The peace process in the **Southern Sudan suffered various setbacks during the course of the year**, since months after the peace agreement had been signed there had still not been any definite decision regarding important aspects such as the distribution of oil revenues, the establishment of a clear border, the future of the city of Abyei and its oil resources, the completion of a census or the withdrawal of northern troops from the south. As a result, members of the regional government in Southern Sudan called at the end of the year for mediation from the Ugandan President in order to find solutions those problems that could seriously damage the agreement reached. At the end of the year, however, both sides reached agreement on the disputed issues, and members of the SPLM once again took up their posts in government, having stood down several months previously. As far as the situation in the **Eastern Sudan** is concerned, three members of the Eastern Front former armed opposition group took up posts in government, as stipulated in the peace agreement signed in 2006. The demobilisation process began without problems in June.

3.4. Main reasons for crisis in negotiations during 2007

For a fourth consecutive year, **the most frequently-seen reasons for failure or crisis in negotiating processes were almost exactly the same** as in previous years, with very few differences identified. Mediation mechanisms, dissident factions within armed groups, a lack of trust or confidence between parties, political crises taking place during the negotiating process and differences over substantive issues on the agenda, particularly when this involves seeking formulas for self-government, were the factors that were most frequently seen, as shown in the following panel.

Box 3.2. Main reasons for crisis in negotiations

Very frequent

- Lack of trust in or rejection of the **mediating bodies or individuals**
- Absence of a **ceasefire** or, where one exists, its violation
- **Dissidence** within armed groups
- Absence of **security guarantees** for negotiators
- **Mistrust** between the parties
- **Political crises** and insecurity within the country in question
- Disagreement over the **final status of a territory or the substantive issues on the agenda**

Other issues

- Open military **confrontations**
- **Too many armed groups** involved in the negotiations
- **Leadership struggles** within armed groups
- **Failure to grant political recognition** to armed groups
- Inclusion of groups in the **lists of terrorist organisations**
- Disagreements regarding the approach to the **application of justice and reparation**, and the role to be played by the International Criminal Court
- A lack of reliable and stable channels of **communication**
- Presence of **paramilitary groups** or delays in their demobilisation
- Disagreement over the new **composition of the armed forces**
- **Lack of discretion** in the negotiating process
- **Multiplicity of both the people involved** and the measures to be taken
- Presence of **foreign military forces**
- Deterioration in the **general human rights situation**
- Confrontation with **companies that are exploiting natural resources**
- Re-emergence of **criminal groups** among demobilised combatants
- Calls for the **release of leaders** of armed groups under arrest
- **Border tensions**
- Disagreement over the mission or composition of a **peace-keeping operation**

3.5. Dialogue and rapprochement with armed groups

The international data on the treatment or management of armed conflicts and conflicts which are not officially classified as “armed” but which nevertheless involve violent incidents shows that **exploratory talks, formal negotiations or consolidated peace processes are underway in three out of every four conflicts**. The normal pattern, therefore, is for the main parties in the conflict (usually the country’s government and armed groups)¹ to look for a way of opening communications, either directly or indirectly (in the latter case, through their “political wing”, or through individuals or organisations that are able to pass on messages), in a way that will lead to negotiations over the initiation of a peace process which, if successful, could bring an end to the armed or violent fighting and lead to the armed group’s self-disbandment.

In practice, the normal stages for arriving at a peace agreement are, in chronological order, as follows: exploratory contacts (direct or indirect), direct contact (formal or informal), dialogue (formal or informal), and formal direct negotiations. More than half of all cases involve the presence of external facilitators or mediators (usually from another country), who may in turn be individuals, foreign ministries, specialist organisations

or international bodies, though they will always require the consent of the opposing parties. Statistical data also shows that reaching a final agreement is easier when there is external facilitation.

The fact that an armed group has been placed on the **lists of terrorist organisations** drawn up by the EU or the US, or that it has been unilaterally declared a terrorist group by the government in question, does not usually stop the government from entering negotiations with the group. Thus, for example, the Colombian government is currently in talks with the Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and it is also seeking exploratory measures with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), even though all three organisations feature on the terrorist lists. Likewise, the British government has held talks with the Irish IRA, the government of the Philippines is seeking dialogue with the New People’s Army (NPA), the Palestinian Authority wants talks with Hamas and the Sri Lankan government is in contact with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), among other examples.

In the exploratory or formal negotiations that have taken place with armed groups during the last two years, **the negotiators on the government side have tended to involve teams led by people holding some form of high**

1. The term “armed groups” includes a wide variety of players which, depending on the context, may be guerrillas, paramilitary groups, militias, armed gangs, mafia organisations, etc.

state office. In Côte d'Ivoire, negotiations with the *Forces Nouvelles* were led by the president and prime minister; in Senegal, negotiations with the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) have been carried out by the Interior Minister; the peace process (now complete) between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was headed by a number of officials from the president's own team; in talks with the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) in Darfur, negotiations were placed in the hands of the Sudanese Government's peace commissioner; in Burundi, negotiations currently underway with the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) are being led by the country's president; negotiations in Chad with the United Front for Change (FUC) are being held directly with the minister of state, who is also responsible for opening up new talks with other armed groups in the country; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, talks with the rebel forces of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) are being led by the chief of staff of the Congolese Armed Forces; in the Central African Republic, negotiations with the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) are being led by the minister for justice; in Uganda, the current talks with one of the most malevolent groups in the world, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is mostly formed from child soldiers, are the responsibility of the minister for internal affairs; in Mali, negotiations with the Democratic Alliance for Change are being led by the minister for territorial administration; in Western Sahara, where a ceasefire has been in place for years, the Moroccan government's negotiating team is led by the minister for the interior and the delegated minister for foreign affairs; in Angola, talks with the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue are being led by the minister for territorial administration; in Colombia, negotiations with both the AUC and the ELN are the responsibility of the High Commissioner for Peace, who was appointed by the country's president; in India, negotiations with the Assam National Liberation Front (ULFA) are in the hands of the prime minister and the minister for the interior, while negotiations with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCM) are being directed by the minister for unity, the minister for the interior and the minister of state; in Nepal, where the process recently ended, the government's negotiator with the Maoist CPN was the prime minister, while current negotiations with the MJF are being led by the minister for peace and reconciliation; in Sri Lanka, the government team charged with negotiating with the LTTE is led by the health minister; in the Philippines, negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the New People's Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are being led by the presidential Peace Commissioner; finally, in Indonesia, the recently completed peace process involving the Free Aceh Movement was led directly by the country's vice president, with the help of the minister for justice.

In the exploratory or formal negotiations that have taken place with armed groups during the last two years, the negotiators on the government side have tended to involve teams led by people holding some form of high state office

The majority of these negotiations with armed groups involve not only government teams but also **external facilitators**, who include presidents of other countries (the president of Burkina Faso is assisting in the resolution of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, while the Libyan president is involved in the processes in Chad and the Central African Republic), former presidents (the former president of Finland is acting as facilitator in the process in Indonesia), deputy ministers from other countries (from Sudan in the conflict in Uganda), ministers from other countries (from South Africa in the conflict in Burundi, from Rwanda in the conflict in DR Congo, from Mozambique in the conflict in Uganda, from Norway in the Philippines), diplomats from other countries (Norway, Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.), business people (in the conflicts in Senegal and Indonesia), writers (in several conflicts in India), special envoys or personal representatives of the UN Secretary-General (in the conflicts in Sudan, DR Congo, the Sahara, Myanmar, Colombia, Nepal), and special envoys from regional bodies, such as the African Union, the European Union or the Islamic Conference Organisation (in Darfur, the Philippines and other countries in conflict).

On many occasions, and particularly during the early stages, governments tend to consent to **initial explorations and talks** being carried out **via individuals or civilian or political organisations** which, because they act as the "political wing" of a particular armed group, or because they are ideologically close, or because they share certain objectives, or simply because they have some form of influence or can communicate with the group in question, are able to offer "**good offices**" in providing sufficiently reliable and stable openings that will subsequently allow negotiations to be taken up directly by the government's own negotiating team. This intermediary position is never penalised, in so far as it is understood that its function is not to prolong or exacerbate the conflict or the violence that underlies it but rather to bring it to an end.

Without exception, none of the above individuals taking part in exploratory talks, preliminary negotiations or formal talks, whether as members of government teams or as facilitators, has ever been accused of collaborating with armed groups or gangs, or of engaging in illegal activities. In fact, quite the contrary, since such contact is regarded as essential in order to create the conditions required to open up talks that will end with the laying-down of arms and the renunciation of violence by these groups.

The need for such contacts, dialogue, exploration and negotiation is **supported by the diplomatic practices pursued by all countries, as explained and backed up by a number of UN Security Council Resolutions**,² as well as by the definition given by the UN itself to the

2. In particular, Resolutions 1625 (2005) and 1366 (2001) on the strengthening of conflict-prevention, with emphasis on the role of good offices and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

idea of “establishing peace”, which refers to “*the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. As with preventive action, the United Nations can usually play a role only if the parties to the dispute agree to it. Peacemaking thus excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in United Nations parlance is referred to as “peace enforcement”.*”³ The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Burton Lynn Pascoe recently announced (6 December 2007) that his department would be expanding its current work force of 220 people by a further 100 in order to strengthen its preventive diplomacy, which to a great extent consists of entering into communication with armed (and therefore illegal) groups in order to facilitate the opening of negotiations in the few conflicts in which they do not yet exist, and to strengthen existing negotiating processes.

By way of conclusion, therefore, it could be said that this is a habitual and well-regarded practice in the international arena, and one that can bring all the political and social groups in a particular country together for talks, whatever their legal status, wherever they have the slightest capacity to influence the end of armed fighting and reduce or eliminate any form of existing violence, and thus succeed through dialogue in bringing an end to some violent conflict or at least making progress towards that end.


3.6. The peace temperature in 2007

For several years now, the *School for a Culture of Peace* has drawn up a monthly indicator of the current state of peace negotiations around the world with a view to analysing the general dynamics of these processes. In 2007, this indicator referred to a group of 26 sets of negotiations, 19 of which related to armed conflicts⁴ and 7 to unresolved conflicts.⁵


The indicator shows an average score, calculated by awarding three points to processes that have gone well during the previous month, one point to those that are at a standstill or have not seen any new developments and no points to processes that have experienced problems. Thus, the maximum score would be 3 while the average would be 1.5.

As can be seen from the above figure, **the year ended with a monthly average of just 1.1 (as compared with 1.2 in 2006, 1.3 in 2005 and 1.4 in 2004)**, and the score did not reach 1.5 points during any of the months in 2007. This indicator demonstrates the problems in trying to keep the majority of processes moving forwards in a sustained fashion, and it reflects a worrying downward trend, the consequence of the huge difficulties encountered in the processes and exploratory measures underway in Sri Lanka, Colombia (AUC), Iraq, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur), among other countries.

Figure 3.1. The peace temperature in 2007 and 2006



3. For further information, see the Department of Political Affairs web site at <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/peace.html>>.
 4. Burundi, Colombia (AUC and ELN), DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Philippines (MILF), India (ULFA), India and Pakistan (Kashmir), Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Nepal, Nigeria (Delta), Central African Republic, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (Darfur), Thailand and Uganda.
 5. Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia (Abkhazia), India (NDFB and NSCN-IM), Serbia (Kosovo), Western Sahara-Morocco, and Senegal (Casamance).



■ Countries in post-war rehabilitation phase (indicator no. 4)

4. Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement

- A lack of political willingness to implement the provisions set out in the relevant peace agreement was the main obstacle to progress in the rehabilitation processes in Sudan (South) and DR Congo.
- Some of the difficulties facing Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone include high levels of unemployment, particularly among young people, the absence of a government presence in some parts of the country and incomplete security sector reforms.
- The level of armed violence increased notably in Afghanistan and remained serious in Iraq despite considerable amounts of investment and international intervention, thus highlighting the difficulties involved in both of these processes.
- The provisional parliament in Nepal abolished the monarchy and declared a Federal Democratic Republican State, one of the main demands that had been made by the Maoists.

The following chapter is divided into two sections. The first contains an analysis of developments this year in the **post-war rehabilitation processes**¹ that began after the year 2000 and are currently underway in 11 countries and territories around the world. They have been classified on the basis of the criteria referred to in indicator No. 4, which divides them into three groups of countries. Firstly, there are those in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities has been reached but is going badly, making post-war rehabilitation work difficult (3 countries). Secondly, there are those in which a cessation of hostilities or peace agreement has been signed and is going well (5 countries). Finally, there are the countries that remain either wholly or partially in a state of war but are nevertheless receiving a considerable amount of international aid of a post-war nature, offered in many cases as an incentive to help bring hostilities to an end (3 countries).

Table 4.1. Countries and territories in a post-war rehabilitation phase after the year 2000

| Country | Date and agreement marking the beginning of the rehabilitation process | UN mission and department in charge | Context and evolution |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Côte d'Ivoire | Linás-Marcoussis Agreement (2003) and Ouagadougou Agreement (2007) | UNOCI (PKO) | Post-war, negative |
| Burundi | Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000), Global Ceasefire Agreement with CNDD-FDD (2003), Final Ceasefire Agreement (with Palipehutu-FNL) (2006) | BINUB (DPA/PKO) | |
| Sudan (South) | Peace Agreement –CPA – (2005) | UNAMIS (PKO) | |
| Haiti | Resolution 1542 (2004) | MINUSTAH (PKO) | Post-war, positive |
| Indonesia (Aceh) | Memorandum of Understanding (2005) | AMM (RO) | |
| Liberia | Accra Agreements (2003) | UNMIL (PKO) | |
| Nepal | General peace agreement (2006) | UNMIN (DPA) | |
| Sierra Leone | Lome Agreement (1999), Abuja I and Abuja II Agreements (2001) | UNIOSIL (DPA/PKO) | |
| Afghanistan | Bonn Agreements (2001) | UNAMA (DPA/PKO) | At war |
| Iraq | Resolution 1483 (2003) | UNAMI (DPA) | |
| DR Congo | Lusaka Agreement (1999) and Sun City Agreement (2003) | MONUC (PKO) | |

DPA: Department of Political Affairs. **PKO:** Department of Peace-Keeping Operations. **RO:** Regional Organisation. Coordination of activities has been placed in the hands of the UNDP Representative. Whether political or peace-keeping operations, the missions classified as **DPA** or **PKO** are managed and supported by the department of peace-keeping operations.

AMM: This monitoring mission in Aceh ended on 31 December 2006 and was jointly mounted by the EU, Switzerland and Norway, along with five members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

1. Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling the security of the ordinary population, the encouragement of good governance and participation, social and economic welfare, and the promotion of justice and reconciliation. These four areas are defined with reference to the individual descriptions set out by (among other bodies) the *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, in *Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Task Framework*. May 2002.

The second section of this chapter deals with the most notable events that occurred during 2007 in some of the countries or territories in which certain political or institutional aspects still remain to be resolved, even though the rehabilitation process began earlier than 2000. The territories in this situation analysed here are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, the province of Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

4.1. Analysis of countries in a phase of post-war rehabilitation

The following is an analysis of the most important developments that took place during the year in the countries and territories in which a post-war rehabilitation process began during or after the year 2000. Rather than following a geographical structure, this analysis examines the countries on the basis of the category in which they are placed in accordance with indicator No. 4, in order to offer a comparative analysis between cases, as far as is possible.

a) Countries in a post-war phase in which the rehabilitation process is going badly

| Country | Causes impeding progress in the rehabilitation process |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Côte d'Ivoire | Lack of governmental will, democratic fragility, political exclusion. |
| Burundi | Democratic fragility, corruption and stalling of the peace process with the FNL. |
| Sudan (South) | Lack of willingness on the part of the Government to comply with the agreed undertakings. |

All three countries included in this group have been assigned a United Nations mission, managed in the cases of Sudan (South) and Côte d'Ivoire by the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, and in the case of Burundi, by the Department of Political Affairs. This last case is also being overseen by the Peace-Building Commission. The main obstacle to progress in the rehabilitation processes in Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan (South) was an absence of political will to implement some of the most controversial aspects set out in the respective peace agreements. In the case of Burundi, it was the resistance of Agathon Rwasa's FNL to participate in the mechanisms established under the peace agreement, such as the joint monitoring and verification mechanism for the ceasefire, which brought all the remaining reform processes to a halt throughout the year.

The government of Burundi undertook not to grant amnesties to those found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.

A new agreement was reached in March 2007 in Côte d'Ivoire, aimed at unblocking the disarmament process and holding elections, which have been pending since 2002. Under this Agreement, the Prime Minister, Guillaume Soro, appointed a new transitional government that included representatives from all political sides. He also dismantled the buffer zone between the north and south of the country, replacing it with a green line under international supervision, and published an order guaranteeing amnesty for all crimes committed against national security since September 2000, thus encouraging a climate of impunity that is not assisting the transition process.² As regards the elections, the Prime Minister and other opposition leaders continued to favour greater international involvement, while President Laurent Gbagbo kept raising obstacles to any external supervision and even asked the United Nations to remove its High Representative for Elections, Gérard Stoudmann, from his post. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1756, in which it extended the mandate of the United Nations mission (UNOCI) for a further six months and ended the term of the High Representative for Elections.³ However, his powers, particularly as regards certification of national electoral institutions, passed to the new Secretary-General's Special Representative for the country, Choi Young-jin. As regards the national identification process, which is required before presidential elections can be held, the travelling courts began their work, though only in some parts of the country. In spite of these advances, the elections had to be postponed once again, and the year ended without any definitive decision regarding their date.⁴

The situation in Burundi remained tense throughout the year as a result of the refusal by Agathon Rwasa's FNL (armed opposition group) to comply with the agreements established in the definitive ceasefire of 2006, along with the parliamentary deadlock caused by the breakdown in talks between the opposition and the government.⁵ During the last three months of the year, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced an agreement to break the deadlock which, though positive, still left some of the most controversial issues unaddressed, such as reform of the security sector and the cases of corruption and misappropriation of funds. During the course of the year, the United Nations Peace-Building Commission prepared and approved its Integrated Strategy for Burundi, with the aim of guiding international intervention, both politically and economically.⁶ A donor conference was also held in Bujumbura in May to present the government's Priority Action Plan, which received financial support from those present. In addition to resolving the disputes within parliament itself, the challenges facing the country in 2008 include tackling the process for the reintegration of for-

2. See the chapter on human rights and transitional justice.

3. S/RES/1765 of 16 July 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsco_resolutions07.htm>.

4. See the chapter on peace processes.

5. See the chapter on tensions.

6. The Integrated Strategy in Burundi can be found at <<http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/>>.

mer combatants, reforming the security sector and judicial system, developing the country's economy and rebuilding its infrastructure, not to mention tackling issues of corruption and human rights, along with the resettlement of returning refugees.⁷ As regards transparency in relation to past abuses, the government agreed to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Court to bring to trial those accused of perpetrating atrocities during the civil war, following a visit by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour.⁸

In **southern Sudan**, the rehabilitation process was hindered throughout the year by the lack of political willingness to comply with many of the provisions set out in the peace agreement. **This situation eventually caused the SPLM to leave the Government of National Unity in October.**⁹ The most controversial points related to the sharing of both power and wealth between the

north and south of the country, and security. As regards the latter, the establishment of an interim civilian administration in the Abyei region and the demarcation of the border between north and south remained pending issues. Deadlock over definition of the Abyei region mainly affected distribution between the two sides of the income obtained from this oil-rich area. The lack of distribution of oil revenues by the Khartoum government led to a financial crisis for the government in the south, delaying construction and infrastructure projects and making it difficult to provide assistance to both returnees and the existing population. Donor countries are also partly responsible for the south's lack of liquidity, as they have not yet handed over a significant portion of the funds promised at the conference held in Oslo in 2005. The Security Council referred to this in its Resolution 1784, in which it extended UNMIS's mandate for a further six months.¹⁰ On the issue of security, Sudanese armed forces continued to be

Box 4.1. Results of the UN Peace-Building Commission's work after its first year in operation

In its annual report to the UN General Assembly and Security Council on 27 July 2007, the Commission gave an assessment of its work over its first twelve months of operation and underlined some of the lessons learned.¹¹ The work of the Commission focused mainly on concentrating international attention on Sierra Leone and Burundi, the only two countries that it has worked with since 2005. Several members of the Commission made visits to the two countries in order to prepare Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies in conjunction with the respective governments and other key parties linked with the rehabilitation process. The aim of these Strategies is to guide international intervention, both politically and economically. The Strategy for Burundi was completed during July, while the Strategy for Sierra Leone remained pending until the results of the elections were known. It had not yet been published when this report went to print.¹²

At an organisational level, the Commission agreed to the permanent participation of the IMF, the World Bank and the Islamic Conference Organisation at all of its meetings, unless a particular member state specified otherwise. Some provisional guidelines were also drawn up (to be reviewed six months after the date of their adoption) to govern participation by civilian groups, including NGOs, at the Commission's meetings. Finally, the Commission also established a Working Group on Lessons Learned, charged with compiling best practices and lessons learned in key areas of peacebuilding.

As far as the Peace-Building Fund is concerned, Liberia became the fifth country to be financed from this fund.¹³ Countries can become beneficiaries of the Fund in three ways: either as the subject of direct consideration by the Commission, or following a statement by the Secretary-General, or through a specific country project using the Fund's emergency mechanism. This multi-annual 250 million dollar trust fund has now collected 144 million dollars from donor countries. By the end of 2007 it had financed 21 projects in Burundi and Sierra Leone worth 46 million dollars. It has also allocated 750,000 dollars in emergency funding to assist the talks between the government and opposition parties in Côte d'Ivoire, and 800,000 dollars to support the mediation process in the Central African Republic.

Although the amount of work done by the Commission increased notably in relation to the previous year, its achievements have continued to be fairly formal, and its capacity to influence implementation of the Strategies that it proposes remains to be seen. However, the presentation at the end of 2007 of a monitoring mechanism to follow up improvements in the working areas indicated in the proposed Strategy for Burundi was a good start. It is to be hoped that this mechanism will be used in combination with the funds available to the Commission in order to increase the possibility of obtaining positive results in the area of peacebuilding.

7. See the chapter on humanitarian crises.

8. See the chapter on human rights and transitional justice.

9. See the chapter on peace processes.

10. S/RES/1784 of 31 October 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

11. A/62/137-S/2007/458 of 27 July 2007, at <<http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/>>. For more information, see: School for a Culture of Peace, *Alert 2005 on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding*. Icaria, Barcelona, April 2005.

12. *Op. Cit.* 5

13. The Peacebuilding Fund is a permanent, multi-annual trust fund which was created specifically to support the Commission. It is financed by voluntary contribution, and its aim is to ensure the existence of the resources required in order to implement specific peace-building projects and provide sufficient financing for rehabilitation.

deployed in the south, despite the fact that they should have been replaced by Joint Integrated Units, which have not been deployed in the most troubled states such as South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The lack of progress in the rehabilitation process, combined with the need to balance the contents of the peace agreement for southern Sudan with those agreed in Darfur, are factors that will determine any advance in this process during 2008.

In Sudan, donors still failed to come up with a significant proportion of the funds promised at the Oslo conference held in 2005

problems during the course of the year. Finally, the rehabilitation process underway in the fifth country in this group, **Nepal**, endured a situation of instability caused mainly by the ethnic fighting in the south of the country and the request by the Maoists that the monarchy be replaced by a republic prior to elections for the Constituent Assembly. This demand was accepted by the interim parliament before the end of the year, marking an important step forward in resolving the political crisis that affected Nepal throughout 2007.

b) Countries in post-war phase in which the rehabilitation process is going well

| Country | Main issues pending |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Haiti | Democratic fragility, endemic poverty, urban violence and incomplete reform of the security and justice sectors. |
| Indonesia (Aceh) | Democratic fragility, corruption and unemployment. |
| Liberia | Democratic fragility, incomplete reform of the security and justice sectors, youth unemployment. |
| Nepal | Discrimination against broad sectors of the population and democratic fragility. |
| Sierra Leone | Democratic fragility, endemic poverty and youth unemployment. |

Four of the five cases included in the second category display the common feature of having a government that has been democratically elected following the end of an armed conflict, although in the case of **Indonesia (Aceh)**, this is a provincial government. It can therefore be assumed that these governments enjoy the support of a significant section of the population, as is the case with the administrations of René Préval, who has spent more than two years as the head of government in **Haiti**, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who has led **Liberia** for two years, Irwandi Yusuf, elected as governor of **Aceh** at the end of 2006, and the recently elected Ernest Bai Koroma in **Sierra Leone**. These four cases also display similar problems, such as high levels of unemployment, particularly among young people (in **Liberia** it is running at 85%), difficulties with security sector reforms (still in the early stages in Haiti and incomplete in Liberia), and finally, the absence of an effective government presence across the whole of the territory in question. Both **Haiti** and **Liberia** will still have a significant number of UN peace-keeping troops during 2008, following the renewal of the mandates of the respective missions deployed there, MINUSTAH and UNMIL, while Sierra Leone will have support from the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the UNIOSIL integrated mission. However, following the withdrawal of the regional monitoring mission from **Aceh**, there is now no international presence to take charge of supervising the implementation of the points agreed in Helsinki in 2005, a situation that resulted in more than a few

In **Haiti**, the political instability of the previous year continued, with the government's efforts remaining insufficient in areas such as reform of the security sector and the prison system (still in its early stages), reform of the justice system, management of the public administration and the extension of state control over the whole country. This could be partly due to the fact that many of the economic undertakings made by donors in 2005 were still not met in 2007, as the UN Security Council indicated in its Resolution 1780, in which it extended MINUSTAH's mandate for a further twelve months.¹⁴ Nevertheless, it was clear throughout the year that, almost four years on from the introduction of the rehabilitation process, donor interest has not decreased but quite the reverse, particularly among countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, where there is a clear regional interest in supporting the process both politically and financially. For their part, the EU and Canada made significant financial contributions towards projects relating to administrative improvements and training and reform of the educational sector. The EU remains the largest donor in Haiti if the 300 million euros paid over the last five years is added to the provision of more than 200 million euros allocated for the period from 2007 to 2013. As regards security, the situation improved thanks to the policing operations carried out by MINUSTAH during the year against the armed gangs operating in some districts of the capital, mainly Cité Soleil and Martissant. More than 600 members of these gangs were arrested, including some of their most dangerous leaders. MINUSTAH's new mandate involved a slight increase in its police force and a reduction in its military component, in order to provide a better response to the duties with which the mission is charged. The UN Security Council also recommended that MINUSTAH extend its cooperation with other organisations working in the country.

Administrative confusion and a lack of clear objectives are the two elements that characterise the rehabilitation process in **Indonesia (Aceh)**. The situation was further exacerbated by accusations of corrupt practices and vote-buying levelled throughout the year by members of the ordinary population against members of the GAM former armed opposition group, after they took up local government posts in a large number of districts. The current governor of the province and GAM leader, Irwandi Yusuf, remained unscathed by the accusations

14. S/RES/1780 of 15 October 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

of corruption and misappropriation of funds that have characterised some other administrative structures, though he was criticised for his inability to adopt good governance policies. The International Crisis Group recommended the establishment of an external body that enjoys respect from all sides to supervise implementation of the peace agreement and ensure compliance.¹⁵ As regards the degree to which the peace agreement between the GAM and the Indonesian government has been implemented, some of the bodies provided for in the agreement have still not been set up, such as a Truth and Reconciliation Committee and a Human Rights Court. As regards the latter, the powers originally conferred under the 2005 Agreement were reduced in the Law on Governing Aceh, which was approved by the Indonesian government and which limited the human rights offences that could be tried by the court to those committed following the Law's approval in July 2006, thus excluding all offences committed during the armed conflict itself.¹⁶ Finally, two key issues that will have to be addressed during 2008 are the help and attention required by those affected psychologically by the armed conflict, and the illegal logging activities, which have increased considerably not only as a result of the requirements of the reconstruction process, particularly following the effects of the tsunami, but also because of the increased number of people who are unemployed and who use timber to provide some form of subsistence income.

In **Liberia**, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's administration continued to consolidate its activities to combat corruption and gain control over the country's natural resources, as demonstrated by the introduction of sanctions on diamond trading under Resolution 1753, and the increase in state income as a result of improvements in the tax-collection system.¹⁷ UNMIL's mandate was extended for a further twelve months,¹⁸ although it began a troop-reduction process in preparation for a potential strategic withdrawal. The number of international troops in the country will be gradually reduced over the next three years, depending on progress in the security sector reform process (one of the issues that remain pending). Before the year ended, the President engaged in consultations with key figures in the judiciary, and the legal, economic and financial sectors, with a view to planning some of the other reforms that remain pending, such as the restructuring of the judicial system. Another issue that the government will have to deal with is that of land ownership. Until now, the sale of land and other transactions have been carried out illegally, meaning that disputes over ownership have, in many cases, ended up before the courts. The President accepted that the land issue represented a threat to the country's stability, and she promised to set up a commission for land reform, a promise that became a

UNMIL will begin a troop-reduction process which will continue over the next three years

reality during her election campaign. Finally, local elections will be held in October 2008, according to a statement by Johnson-Sirleaf, which finally resolves the dispute that followed her suggestion that mayors should be appointed by the executive instead of through a democratic electoral process in an attempt to save the 30 million dollars that it is calculated that the organisation and holding of elections will cost.

Turning to the post-war rehabilitation process in **Nepal**, the provisional government proposed the holding of elections to the Constituent Assembly on two occasions, in June and November, though they were eventually postponed until an unspecified date in 2008. The reasons cited for the delay were problems with the preparation of an electoral roll, due to the lack of security in the south of the country, and the slow pace at which electoral legislation is being drawn up. As well as increasing instability, the delay in the election process is affecting the future of the United Nations mission in Nepal, since it was only granted a one-year mandate to carry out highly specific duties, such as monitoring and verifying disarmament, assisting the electoral process, overseeing human rights and supervising compliance with the contents of the peace agreement. The provisional parliament has been particularly active in implementing measures to ease some of the emerging problems, such as the uprising in the south of the country, mainly Terai province, led by ethnic minorities claiming greater autonomy for the region. The provisional chamber responded by allocating a number of parliamentary seats to ethnic minorities as well as to women. The issue of the monarchy, which led the Maoists temporarily to stand down from the provisional government, was resolved before the end of the year following approval by parliament of the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of the country as a Federal Democratic Republican State.

In **Sierra Leone**, international activity centred mainly on assisting the organisation and holding of general elections. Although these were delayed on the recommendation of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), given the need for more time to arrange the dissolution of parliament, the first round of elections finally took place on 11 August, with the second round held a month later. The latter, which was preceded by some violent incidents, ended in victory for Ernest Bai Koroma, the leader of what had until then been the opposition All People's Party. The election process was given a positive assessment by both international and local observers. This was helped by the excellent work done by the NEC, though the Commission itself identified some cases of fraud in areas linked with the SLPP, the party led by former President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The increased corruption and the country's resulting lack of economic

15. International Crisis Group, *Aceh: Post-conflict complications*. Jakarta/Brussels. October 2007, at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/139_aceh_post_conflict_complications.pdf>.

16. The Law on Governing Aceh (LOGA) also reserves all security-related issues for central government and weakens some of the provisions granting authority to the provincial government.

17. S/RES/1753 of 27 April 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

18. S/RES/1777 of 20 September 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

Box 4.2. Social structures in peacebuilding processes

Peacebuilding missions are generally deployed in contexts that are extremely complex, both socially and politically. Nevertheless, the sense of urgency that permeates the majority of these missions during the first months of their operation usually results in this complexity being overlooked, meaning that neither sufficient time nor economic or human resources are devoted to analysing and understanding the social and political structures of the area in question, or the underlying causes of the original conflict. This has dramatic consequences for the development of any mission, as the action that it takes or fails to take during its first months will, generally speaking, have a bearing on the success of the process.

Without suggesting that it is the answer to all the problems facing any kind of international intervention in another country, knowledge of the country's social structures is a valuable asset. However, one of the main obstacles identified in such analyses is a tendency to seek structures that are similar to those of civil society as understood by western countries with all the different historical and cultural variables, NGOs, unions, etc. However, these do not match the wide range of traditional organisational structures that can arise in different societies, such as Afghanistan, for example.

Thus, knowing how to construct links and communication channels between certain communities and groups and using them in the most appropriate way is a key factor in post-war peacebuilding.¹⁹ It also represents a first step towards the use of local resources and knowledge, an element which is so often ignored.

This recognition of local civilian structures will help to create an even-handed exchange between the society providing the aid and the one receiving it, as both will play an appropriate role. Each of the parties involved in a post-war rehabilitation process, be they international or local, plays an important role that will lead to either the success or failure of the process. The element of local responsibility for the process is too often overlooked, and the ordinary population is frequently left without proper information, not only about the achievements made but also regarding the obstacles and problems standing in the way of such achievements. The greater involvement of the local population is a fundamental part of the peacebuilding process, as the eventual continuation and maintenance of the process will ultimately depend on them.

development, despite significant investment from the international community, led Sierra Leoneans to vote for a change in government, thus easing Koroma's path to victory. Among the issues faced by the new government are the endemic corruption in the country's institutions, the ethnic and regional divisions between the Mende in the south, who support the SLPP, and the Temne in the north, who support Koroma's APP, the large number of young people without jobs and the issue of the reinsertion of former combatants. The new government is being assisted by the United Nations Peace-Building Commission through the organisation's UNIOSIL mission. During 2008, the new government will also have to tackle the organisation of local and municipal elections.

c) Countries with ongoing armed conflicts receiving post-war international intervention

| Country | Main causes of crisis |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic manipulation. |
| Iraq | Opposition to the presence of international troops, struggle for political power, access to oil resources and ethnic and religious manipulation. |
| DR Congo | Control of political power, difficulties in handing over power and control over natural resources. |

The countries analysed in this third category are DR Congo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking beyond the armed violence that continues to devastate the people in these countries, and the degree to which the international community is involved, one notable common element is the fact that the United Nations has deployed a mission in each place. In the case of **DR Congo**, the organisation has a proper peace-keeping mission, with international blue berets operating. In the cases of **Afghanistan** and **Iraq** on the other hand, it is operating political missions, whose security is the responsibility of regional organisations like NATO (which in Afghanistan is operating outside its own borders) and, in Iraq, an international coalition led by the US, though a mandate from the Security Council until 2008. Another feature that these three contexts have in common is that they all have an elected government and a new constitution that has been drawn up since the rehabilitation process began. All three, therefore, enjoy a political structure that has, in theory, been legitimised in elections. Nevertheless, all three are still involved in armed fighting, a fact which has an influence on the development of their rather inaccurately named post-war processes, as explained below.

Intervention by the international community in the case of **Afghanistan** remained focused on achieving two objectives that under any circumstances would seem contradictory. On the one hand, there are the military objectives in what the US Administration has called the War On Terror, and on the other, the pursuit of peace

19. Pouligny, B., "Civil societies and post-conflict peacebuilding: Ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies". *Security Dialogue*. 2005, at <<http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/36/4/495>>.

though the construction of state institutions.²⁰ An indication of the international support for this second objective can be found in the Conference on the Rule of Law, held in Rome, and the Conference on the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups and Reform of the Police, which took place in Tokyo, both held during the course of the year. In addition, at the meeting of countries and organisations represented on the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board for the Afghanistan Compact, held during the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly in New York, it was stressed that, while slow, some advances had been made, and that all parties involved in the rehabilitation process should improve their coordination strategies in four key working areas: security and the fight against terrorism, regional cooperation, measures to combat drug-trafficking and governance.²¹ While these meetings were being held outside the country, the violence within its borders spread to Kabul and cities in the north, and opium production continued to increase. The drugs economy emerged as one of the main threats to stability, as it is one of the sources of financing for the Taliban militias. The increased violence, which mainly took the form of suicide attacks, kidnappings and murders, had a negative effect on rebuilding work.²² Finally, the Afghan National Police remained incapable of taking over security duties, and the EU therefore despatched a contingent of 160 police officers to train them. These European officers will work in Kabul and be protected by a private security firm.

In **Iraq**, the lack of basic services further increased the poverty of the population that has chosen to stay in the country, while the violence is now no longer regarded as one civil war but instead as several civil wars involving a large number of parties with varying interests, coupled with widespread criminality.²³ In an attempt to stabilise the country, the international community introduced a number of initiatives, such as the International Compact with Iraq.²⁴ To assist with the development of this Compact, some countries cancelled their foreign debt with Iraq to the tune of 30,000 million dollars. Throughout the year, both the US and the Iraqi governments said that they wanted the United Nations to increase its presence and play a larger role. The UN Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of its mission in the country (UNAMI) for a further

***The increase in
opium production in
Afghanistan raised
concerns about the
possible formation of
a narco-state***

twelve months (Resolution 1770), authorising it to facilitate national dialogue and reconciliation and to work together with the government to provide humanitarian aid to the population and assist with the implementation of the objectives set out in the Compact.²⁵ In this Resolution, the Council also broke the link between UNAMI and the Multinational Forces, a link that had been in place since Resolution 1546.²⁶ The Iraqi executive said that it would be willing to sign a long-term bilateral security agreement with the US, though it did not have the complete support of parliament. Under this agreement, from 2009 onwards US troops would be responsible for overseeing security from barracks located outside the country's main cities, thus legitimising the US military occupation. Among other issues pending resolution during 2008 are the debate on the country's future federal structure and the fragility of the current government, with tensions between the executive and parliament, and above all, the enactment of a law to govern distribution of oil revenues.²⁷ A law that distributes these revenues in an appropriate way could help to guarantee the survival of the Iraqi state.

In **DR Congo**, the reduction during 2007 of the security force assigned to protect Jean Pierre Bemba, former Vice President of the Transitional Government and opposition candidate in the presidential elections, led to fighting between government armed forces and the militias assigned to protect Bemba, leaving 600 dead. Tensions abated after Bemba was forced to leave the country and flee to Portugal, where he remains, in spite of an announcement by the Government of DR Congo offering him the position of Parliamentary Opposition Coordinator.²⁸ After the establishment of the newly-elected Government there was an attempt to initiate the reform of the armed forces, although this was fairly unsuccessful, given that the only development was an exchange of personnel among the top military posts, following a recommendation from the EU Mission for security sector reform (EUSEC), meaning that some of those known to have taken part in massacres remained in command of the military and the police.²⁹ The military census taken by South African officials as part of the EUSEC programme aimed at ensuring that soldiers would get paid, resulted in the elimination of many "ghost sol-

20. Goodhand, J. and Sedra, M., "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'post-conflict' reconstruction in Afghanistan". *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 41-61. London, 2007.

21. The International Compact for Afghanistan is a strategic working framework for the country's reconstruction which was agreed by both the Afghan government and the international community. The Compact was implemented in 2006 and covers a five-year period.

22. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

23. Chatham House, *Accepting realities in Iraq*. Middle East Programme Briefing Paper. London, May 2007, at <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/middle_east/papers/view/-/id/501/>.

24. The International Compact with Iraq is an agreement between the Iraqi government and the United Nations which sets out the bases for promoting political, economic and social development in the country over the next five years. For more information, go to <<http://www.iraqcompact.org>>.

25. S/RES/1770 of 10 September 2007, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

26. S/RES/1546 of 8 June 2004, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.htm>.

27. See the chapter on armed conflicts, Box 1.5.

28. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

29. Misser, F., *DR Congo: A regional analysis*. Writenet. UNHCR. July 2007, at <http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/432_1187941615_2007-07-dr-congo-writenet.pdf>.

diers" and a subsequent wage increase (of between 10 and 25 dollars) for Congolese troops.³⁰ The decentralisation process awaited approval by parliament of the Decentralisation Act. No deadline has been set for a vote on this Act, despite the fact that it represents a key element in the peacebuilding process, and it could be said that its approval does not figure highly among the Government's priorities, given the loss of financial control that its application would involve.³¹ Part of this process to transfer central power to the provinces involves the holding of local elections, planned for 2008. The UNDP has approved a project for these elections which will be allocated a budget of 151 million dollars to assist the organisation of them. This new electoral process will bring new challenges in that it will involve 200,000 candidates, as compared with

the 22,500 who stood in the 2006 elections with vote-counting taking place at a local level.

4.2. Summary of the countries in a more advanced stage of post-war rehabilitation

During this phase, the aim is to consolidate political reforms and encourage sustainable development in order to ensure that the changes made during the early years of the rehabilitation process can be turned into resources for development.³² In some cases, work centres around political and institutional issues or reform processes that

Box 4.3. The influence of donor contributions on rehabilitation processes

The provision of funds by donors is a key element in the success or failure of any rehabilitation process. The financing of the most basic activities, such as the restoration of water supplies or the rebuilding of homes and a communications infrastructure during the early post-war stage is an important factor in demonstrating the peace dividend among the ordinary population by improving their living conditions.

The funds required to begin a rehabilitation process are acquired through donor conferences and appeals (made through the United Nations). These international gatherings, which are usually organised by the World Bank and the United Nations in conjunction with the country forming the subject of the conference in question, are normally attended by representatives of the interested governments, along with the multilateral bodies and financial organisations that want to show their political and, above all, financial support for the process. Although it is usual for participants at these conferences to promise more money than is originally requested; the fact is that donors generally delay the actual handover of the funds that they originally promised. This has been the case in Haiti, for which a conference was held in Madrid in 2006 (following earlier conferences), and Sudan (South), for which a conference was held in Oslo in 2005. The difference between the funds promised and the amounts actually paid over has an adverse effect on the advance of the processes in question, as these are planned on the basis of the amounts promised, not the amounts actually handed over, a circumstance that leads to serious problems in their operation.

Another of the problems encountered is that the interest shown by donors diminishes over time, unless a particular donor has some kind of strategic interest in the country in which the process is taking place. Furthermore, this loss of interest generally coincides with the point at which certain projects that are key to the success of the process require more financial support, such as the reintegration of combatants, with the added disadvantage that the visibility of these processes is generally not as high and, therefore, not so attractive to donors. The trust funds established in recent years to manage the money available to countries coming out of an armed conflict, such as the multiple-donor trust fund for Sudan, created after the Peace Agreement was signed, and the International Fund for Reconstruction in Iraq, have been introduced as one way of getting around these problems.

A key element in ensuring the sustainability of a peacebuilding process and guaranteeing donor pledges in the long term is unquestionably the construction of a state that is capable of collecting and managing public funds in a way that is both effective and fair. Governments that can ensure sustainable public revenue can finance the establishment of democratic institutions, pay the salaries of public-sector workers and encourage the kind of public investment that will generate economic growth and development. Finally, it will help to ensure the rationalisation of the economy, in that it will bring an end to the illegal levies imposed by other agents (such as the taxes exacted by Afghan warlords) and halt the illegal exploitation of the country's natural resources.³³

The economic viability of a state contributes to its stabilisation. The contributions made by donors (which are not always altruistic) are important during the early stages of the process, though it is advisable for the state to assume some kind of financial responsibility at the same time in order to ensure that the process is sustainable in the long term.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Under the Decentralisation Act, the 11 provinces (which under a constitutional mandate will become 26 in two years time) would manage 40% of the country's total budget, thus quadrupling their current revenues.

32. Report by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on transition issues. February 2004. <http://www.peacebuild.ca/dw/documents/3330-UNDG_ECHA_WG_on_Transition_Issues_Report_-_Final_Report.doc>.

33. Boyce, J. K., *Public Finance, Aid and Post-Conflict Recovery*. PERI, University of Massachusetts. Working Paper no. 140. June 2007.

remain pending a final resolution. The countries in which rehabilitation processes began before the year 2000 and which are analysed in this report are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau and Serbia (Kosovo), as these are the ones that are seen as having undergone the most significant changes during 2007.

After several years of discussions, political leaders in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** finally approved the police reforms that would unite the individual police forces of both Bosnia and Herzegovina, which until this point had been divided along the lines of the two territories from which this country is made up. The approval of these reforms ended the deadlock in the process to comply with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, which was signed before the end of the year. Following this advance, the international community's High Representative in the country, the Slovenian Miroslav Lajcak, said that he now intended to focus his office's efforts on the economic reforms that remained pending. Finally, the European Union's military operation in the country, Althea, was renewed for a further twelve months by the UN Security Council.

Timor-Leste saw the holding of general elections in which José Ramos-Horta emerged as the country's new President, while the current leader of the CNRT and former president, Xanana Gusmao, was elected Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government. The former governing party, FRETILIN, led by the former Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, failed to obtain the number of votes required to govern on its own. The announcement of the results of the elections was followed by armed fighting which led to the displacement of some members of the population.³⁴ The United Nations decided to extend its presence on the island, as did the international (mainly Australian) troops that had been deployed for security reasons following fighting between the police and the army in March 2006. Reform of the security sector is one of the rehabilitation processes that has yet to be completed, and the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the country, Atul Khare, said that efforts should focus on four main areas: improving the relationship between the police and the armed forces, strengthening the legal framework of the security sector, increasing skills among the security forces and improving the government's supervision of these forces.

As regards **Guinea-Bissau**, the report on drug-trafficking in West Africa published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime confirmed the international community's fears that the country was becoming a transit point for drug-trafficking between South America and Europe,³⁵ a development that further endangered the already fragile democratisation process in the

country. 2007 saw a motion of censure brought against the Prime Minister, Arisitides Gomes, and he was subsequently replaced by Martinho Ndafo Kabi, who was appointed by President João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira following consensus from all sides. The new government asked the United Nations for help in organising the parliamentary elections planned for 2008. The UN sent an electoral mission to assess the country's requirements, subsequently recommending that the UNDP implement an electoral support programme during 2008. The Prime Minister also requested that Guinea-Bissau be included in the Peacebuilding Commission's programme, an issue that was pending a decision by the Security Council as this report went to press. The Council also had to rule on extending the mandate of the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the country (UNOGBIS), which was due to end in December 2007. Finally, the reform of the country's security sector remained pending, and the UNDP planned an independent census of active armed force members for January 2008, in preparation for the reform process and appeals for support from donors.

As regards the **Kosovo** region, which formally remained part of Serbia, the year ended without any definitive agreement on its new status. This situation of political deadlock was caused by the failure of the negotiating teams in Pristina and Belgrade to reach any kind of agreement, and by Russia's refusal to accept a United Nations Resolution recognising the application of the Ahtisaari Plan, which has been rejected by Belgrade.³⁶ Following this refusal, an international troika (the US, EU and Russia) acted as mediator during the extension of the negotiating term, reporting back to the UN Secretary-General during December. In the meantime, general and municipal elections were held in Kosovo and won by the Democratic Party of Kosovo, led by former Kosovo Liberation Army leader Hasim Thaci, whom the President charged with the task of forming a new government. Thaci announced that he intended to declare the province's independence, though with agreement from the EU and the USA. A meeting held during December ended without any agreement, and the EU announced that it intended to pursue its idea of supervised independence, for which it would deploy a civilian and police mission of 1,800 people that was intended to replace the UN mission currently deployed in the province, though both Serbia and Russia declared that this initiative was unacceptable. In the meantime, the EU offered Belgrade a potential fast track to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, a move that was interpreted as an attempt to obtain Serbia's blessing for its idea of supervised independence for Kosovo, which is openly supported by France, the United Kingdom and the US.³⁷

34. See the chapter on tensions.

35. UNODC, *Cocaine trafficking in Western Africa*. October 2007, at <<http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf>>.

36. For more information, go to <<http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>>.

37. The signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the first step along the road to membership of the EU, remained pending Belgrade's cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia in tracking down and arresting two alleged war criminals from the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

Box 4.4. Civil security following the end of an armed conflict and the reform of the police

It has been demonstrated that during the early stages of a post-war rehabilitation process the danger to the ordinary population increases. Among the main reasons for this are the high number of weapons in circulation, the inadequate demobilisation of armed forces, and the return of people who have been displaced, which brings victim and victimiser face to face once again. At the same time, the expectations of ordinary people are very high following the end of hostilities, meaning that the management of their security during the first weeks and months of a rehabilitation process is key to the process's success, particularly as regards ensuring their support.

Despite the importance of this finding, clauses covering the security of the civilian population are rarely provided for in peace agreements. Generally speaking, any reference to security in peace agreements will usually refer to the combatants who have been involved in the fighting, as it is they who could cause the breakdown of the agreement. There is generally no specific mention of how the security of the civilian population which has suffered the effects of the armed conflict is to be provided for, despite the fact that this is a key factor in the stability of the process and the main manifestation of the government's authority.³⁸ Furthermore, the job of providing civil protection during the first months usually falls to the international troops that have been deployed, and if this is badly handled it can have an adverse effect on the subsequent progress of the rehabilitation process. Examples that illustrate this include the failure of US troops deployed in Baghdad to protect either civilians or basic infrastructure following the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the failure of NATO's international troops to respond to the rising climate of revenge and violence against Kosovan Serbs during the months following the international intervention, which led to more than 150,000 Serbs fleeing Kosovo, along with other minorities like the Roma,³⁹ against a background of terror and impunity. The fact that international troops failed to prevent the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo has had an undoubted influence on the failure of the multi-ethnic projects that have since been introduced in Kosovo. In Iraq, the failure on the part of the international coalition troops deployed in the country to protect almost any group or space (civilians, business, libraries, museums, etc.) except the oil ministry has meant that the ordinary population has reacted adversely both to their presence and to the majority of the processes that the international community has subsequently put in place.

In the majority of cases, after the first (re)organisational stage, the police force that was in place before armed conflict broke out will temporarily be able to assume responsibility for the security of the civilian population, while the process of security sector reform begins. However, it is not unusual for the people making up this police force to have been involved in one way or another in the conflict, either in support of a particular faction, or extorting money from the civilian population, or even actively taking part in the fighting, and they will not therefore have the trust of all the people. In fact, quite the contrary. The police are a key factor in the conflict-management process, and it is often they who will be responsible for dealing with complaints and, therefore, setting the judicial apparatus in motion. Their reform is therefore essential, since a police force that has the support of the local community and is capable of overcoming the lack of security could have a highly positive impact on the economic, social and political development of a particular region.

However, reform of the police is a task that involves countless obstacles. Firstly, there is the financial side, as reform will not only mean training officers but will also require an appropriate infrastructure to support their work. Secondly, there is the political aspect, as control of the police force could give added political weight and authority to a particular individual or party. One example of this was the delay in police reforms experienced in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to both sides' reluctance to see control of the police transferred to the central state authority. Finally, there is the lack of specialised police training personnel among the different peace-keeping missions. The United Nations tried to remedy this with the creation in 2004 of a Standing Police Capacity, which finally began operations in Chad in November 2007, three years after the initiative was first launched.⁴⁰


In any case, the success of police reforms is closely linked with the effective operation of some of the other constituent elements of a state of law, such as the judiciary and prison systems. A weak justice and prison system that fails to follow up the results of the work done by the police force could lead to a corrupt system and an increase in criminal activity.⁴¹



38. Bayley, D. H., *Democratizing police abroad: what to do and how to do it?* National Justice Institute. Washington. June 2001.

39. Collaborative Learning Projects and Care International, *Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A study of the effectiveness of peacebuilding in preventing violence: Lessons learnt from the March 2004 riots in Kosovo*. Pristina, July 2006.

40. For more information, go to <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/police/capacity.shtml>>.

41. Stedman, S., Rothchild, D., Cousens, E., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Lynne Rienner. London, December 2002.



-  Countries in a situation of humanitarian crisis according to Alert 2008
-  Countries facing food emergencies
-  Countries facing enforced displacements
-  Countries in the CAP 2008

5. Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action

- A total of 43 countries were affected by humanitarian crises during 2007, 56% of them African.
- Climate change continued to aggravate the dimensions of humanitarian emergencies, mainly in Africa and Asia.
- The armed conflict in Somalia generated more than 100,000 forced displacements per week in November, bringing the figure to one million internally displaced persons and becoming one of the most serious humanitarian crises.
- The rise in the prices of agricultural products on the international market pushed up the costs of food aid programmes, affecting the funds of organisations such as the WFP.
- The economic blockade against the Government of Hamas had a serious effect on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.
- The Ebola virus broke out once more in the region of Great Lakes and caused hundreds of victims.


This chapter analyses the situation relating to contexts of humanitarian crisis and humanitarian action. The first part deals with the definition of humanitarian crisis and analyses the indicators that have helped to determine which countries faced a situation of crisis in 2007. The second part examines the evolution of each of these contexts, on a region by region basis. The third part reviews the more prominent aspects of humanitarian action practices over the year. A map showing the countries suffering humanitarian crises is included on the first page.

5.1. Humanitarian crisis: definition and indicators

A **humanitarian crisis** is understood as a situation in which there is an exceptional and generalised threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises often appear within a previous situation of lack of protection where a series of pre-existing factors (poverty, inequality, lack of access to basic services), reinforced by the trigger of a natural disaster or an armed conflict, multiply their destructive effects.

Since the end of the Cold War a certain type of humanitarian crisis which has come to be known as a complex emergency has proliferated. Such phenomena, also known as **complex political emergencies**, are man-made situations in which victims are produced by the effect of an armed conflict, displacements and famines, combined with a weakening or total collapse of economic and state structures, and with the possible irruption of a natural disaster. Complex emergencies differ from crises in that they are more prolonged over time, are essentially political in their origin and have an important destructive and de-structuring impact on all aspects of life. Consequently, the response to these crises often involves a great number of agents in addition to the exclusively humanitarian ones, including peacekeeping missions and political and diplomatic agents. Although some of the contexts analysed in this report fall within the strict definition of complex emergency, others do not fulfil all its characteristics, and so a broader concept that encompasses all the situations examined below has been opted for.

Figure 5.1. Appearance of a humanitarian crisis



In this section, **four indicators have been used to determine the countries that suffered a humanitarian crisis in 2007**. Firstly, the reports published regularly by the FAO on prospects for harvests and food situations indicate the existence of **44 countries** in which a **food emergency** took place during 2007 (**indicator No. 5**). Of the total from this group, 27 were African countries, nine were in Asia and the Pacific, six in South America and the Caribbean, one in Central Asia and Europe and one in the Middle East. A slight drop can be seen compared to food emergencies

detected in the previous year (45), although 34 of these countries were in need of foreign aid for at least four months to confront their food deficit. In this sense, the increase in the price of cereals on the international market severely affected Low Income Food Deficit Countries. In spite of the favourable prospects for harvests in 2007, the result of agricultural production was lower than worldwide population growth, which, added to the increased demand for agricultural products for bio-fuels, meant a rise in market prices, and generated an increase in WFP expenses in acquiring the supplies needed to implement its programmes.


Secondly, the evolution of **internal displacements** has also be taken into account (**indicator No. 6**), i.e. those that take place within a country's borders. In this respect, the reports by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) indicate that over the past year **50 countries registered internal displacements**, the same number as for the previous year, although the worst cases, where displacement affects one in every 100 people, rose from 22 to 24. **The overall number of internally displaced persons came to 24.5 million.** The war in Iraq, where the number of displaced persons exceeded two million people, the increase in displacements in the Horn of Africa, with one million displaced persons in Somalia, or Timor-Leste in Asia, where about 11% of the population was affected by displacement, as well as the rising number of displaced persons in Colombia, provide some of the most relevant figures for 2007. The IDMC viewed the increasing involvement of UNHCR in the protection of internally displaced persons as positive, at the same time as denouncing the

For the first time in the last five years there was a significant increase in the number of refugees aided by the agency UNHCR

lack of compliance by the majority of countries with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement approved in 2005. With regard to the situation by region, **Sub-Saharan Africa (20 countries, of which 11 were very severe), Europe and Central Asia (10 countries), the Asian continent (nine countries) and the Middle East (six countries) were once again the most affected areas.**

With the third indicator, which relates to the **number of refugees registered by UNHCR (indicator No.7)**, for the first time in the last five years there was a significant increase in the number of refugees aided by the agency (UNHCR), rising from 8.7 million to 9.9 million during 2006, a **14% increase**, which corresponds to the massive exodus of nationals from Iraq and Lebanon during the period of armed conflict. The largest group under the protection of UNHCR continues to be the Afghans (2.1 million refugees), followed by Iraqis (1.5 million), Sudanese (686,000), the Somalians (460,000) and the refugees from the Congo and Burundi (400,000 each). If the 4.3 million refugees from Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian Occupied Territories under mandate of the UNRWA are added to these figures, the total number of refugees during 2006 would rise to 14 million. The **situations considered as being severe**, in which at least one in every 100 people from a country is a refugee, **increased slightly from 15 to 16 countries**, although **the number of countries with a significant refugee population was 66**, two more than during 2005. The majority of the refugee situations considered as very severe were in Africa (eight of the 16 existing worldwide), followed by Europe and Central Asia with four.

Map 5.1. Number of internally displaced persons in 2007



Source: School for a Culture of Peace using data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and UNHCR

Table 5.1. Refugee population according to UNHCR

| Region | Beginning of 2006 | End of 2006 | Annual difference |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Central Africa and the Great Lakes | 1,193,700 | 1,119,400 | -6.2% |
| Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa | 772,000 | 852,300 | 10.4% |
| Southern Africa | 228,000 | 187,800 | -17.8% |
| Western Africa | 337,200 | 261,800 | -30.6% |
| Whole of Africa* | 2,571,000 | 2,421,300 | -5.8% |
| CASWANAME** | 2,716,500 | 3,811,800 | 40.3% |
| America | 564,300 | 1,035,900 | 83.6% ¹ |
| Asia and the Pacific | 825,600 | 875,100 | 6.0% |
| Europe | 1,965,800 | 1,733,700 | -12.2% |
| Total | 8,653,200 | 9,877,800 | 14.2% |

*Excludes the north of Africa; ** Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Northern Africa and the Middle East.


1. The marked increase in refugees in America is due to changes in UNHCR's calculating methodology.

Source: UNHCR, 2006 Global Refugee Trends. Statistical Overview of population of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and other persons of concern to UNHCR, June 2007.

Lastly, the fourth indicator used is the **Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) (indicator No.8)**, by means of which the United Nations appeals for funds for situations of humanitarian crisis that are considered to be of greater severity or requiring more international aid.¹ For 2008 OCHA launched **10 appeals requesting 3,800 million dollars for providing assistance to 25 million people in 24 countries**. The annual appeal highlighted the fact that humanitarian aid is an important instrument for consolidating peace, and gave as an example the advances achieved in Burundi after seven years of receiving funds from the CAP, of which those in 2007 were the last, given that the focus passed from humanitarian issues to those of development. Furthermore, it was indicated that over the year **15 extraordinary**

appeals were launched as a response to humanitarian emergencies caused by the impact of natural disasters, putting a special emphasis on the new challenges that climate change poses for the poorest countries and for humanitarian organisations. In addition to Burundi, there are three other appeals that are not being repeated this year: Congo (for similar reasons to those described for Burundi) and other regional appeals destined for the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes (arguing that the common trans-border dynamics that caused this regional perspective have lost importance in front of the specific dynamics of each country). The majority of the appeals were maintained and some even doubled compared to the previous year, as in the case of Somalia or the Central African Republic, whereas

Graph 5.1. United Nations Humanitarian Appeal 2008 (millions of dollars)



Source: United Nations, *Humanitarian Appeal 2008*, UN, December 2007.

(*) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

1. The second section of the chapter presents an analysis of the trends in the financing carried out by donor countries both in the framework of the CAP appeals and with regard to global humanitarian aid.

those devoted to the major crises in Sudan and DR Congo fell slightly. The absence of consolidated appeals for relevant humanitarian crisis, such as that for Iraq or Afghanistan, was explained by the impossibility for agencies and organisations to work in the field owing to the lack of security.

An assessment of the data obtained from the four indicators in relation to the information collected during the year by the School for a Culture of Peace, shows that **43 countries suffered a humanitarian crisis during 2007**, decreasing the number of crisis situations by two compared with the previous report. **Improvements in the humanitarian situation in Congo, Lebanon, Malawi, Pakistan and Serbia** meant that these were not present among the most serious emergencies, whereas **Bangladesh, Peru and Yemen appeared as new crises**, the first two as a result of natural disasters.

5.2. Evolution of humanitarian crises

Once again, **Africa remained the principal focus of humanitarian crises, with 56% of affected countries being on the African continent.** In the same way, the list of most affected regions remained in the same order, with Africa being followed by Asia and the Pacific (21%), Europe and Central Asia (9%), Middle East (7%), and America (7%).²

As regards the **evolution** of the various crises, there was a **clear improvement in Burundi, Haiti, Liberia and Rwanda**, whereas other situations such as **Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, DR Congo, Iraq, Myanmar and Palestine, experienced a pronounced deterioration** in the humanitarian situation of their populations. On the other hand, the situation in countries like Colombia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and the

Caucasus region remained invariable, with no major changes during the year.

The combined effects of droughts and flooding that took place in practically all the regions had a serious impact on agricultural production on the African continent

Africa

The combined effects of droughts and flooding that took place in practically all the regions had a serious impact on agricultural production on the African continent, reducing harvests and therefore pushing up the price of the grain substantially, mainly in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the great concentration of stagnant water remaining after the rains became a source of infectious diseases, increasing the incidence of cholera and malaria alarmingly. In addition,

the persistence and worsening of many of the armed conflicts in the countries of the Horn of Africa and central Africa (Chad, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Somalia and Sudan) not only impeded the planting of the main harvests, but also restricted the access to food of millions of people and severely obstructed the work of humanitarian agents, leading to a severe worsening of the humanitarian crisis in these regions. Lastly, the WHO complained of the significant shortage in health workers in 36 of the 53 African countries, with a million more doctors being required to meet the continent's health needs.

a) Southern Africa

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Angola | Natural disasters, epidemics |
| Lesotho | Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS |
| Madagascar | Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS |
| Swaziland | Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS |
| Zimbabwe | Political and economic crisis, international isolation, HIV/AIDS |

Box 5.1. Regional overview of the most prominent humanitarian crises in 2007

AFRICA:

- **DR Congo:** Severe displacement crisis generated in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu contrasted with the progress reached in the return programmes of other provinces.
- **Somalia:** Violence in Mogadishu caused the displacement of a million people over the year.

AMERICA:

- **Colombia:** Strategies for the control of the territory taken over by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries raised internal displacement to over three million people.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:

- **Bangladesh:** At least 3,500 people were victims of typhoon Sidr, causing alarm in view of the possible spread of epidemics due to the concentration of stagnant water.
- **Myanmar:** The ICRC warned of the deplorable sanitary situation of Burmese refugees at the border with Thailand.

EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA:

- **Caucasus:** The governments of the region created new strategies to respond to the situation regarding internally displaced persons, although no political agreement was reached to facilitate a permanent solution.

MIDDLE EAST:

- **Iraq:** Lack of security presented a severe obstacle for humanitarian work, while almost 50,000 people were fleeing the country every month.

2. Only the contexts of humanitarian crises in which events were produced that were relevant during 2007 are analysed.

In southern African the FAO warned that the lack or excess of rains during 2007 would leave five million people in an insecure food situation, mainly in Lesotho, Madagascar, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In the case of **Angola**, the country was affected by torrential rains at the beginning of year, and the incidence of cholera and malaria remained high throughout 2007. Economic growth in the country was not reflected in the badly needed improvement of the health infrastructures, especially in rural areas, as MSF made clear, and the southern part of the country may suffer a serious food shortage due to the impact of the drought on the harvests. Heavy rains also affected Mozambique and Zambia, which received international aid to deal with the severe damage caused.

The government of **Swaziland** declared the year-long drought to be a national disaster. In addition, attempts to respond to the population's increasing needs did not achieve their objective, increasing the negative strategies of confrontation such as the sale of farming implements and agricultural supplies to obtain anti-retroviral drugs, or the exchange of sexual relations for food, thereby increasing the risk of the spread of HIV/AIDS in a country where it is prevalent in over 33% of people aged 15 to 49. In **Lesotho**, drought reduced agricultural production, thereby increasing the food insecurity that affected a quarter of the population. Although the latest rains in the month of November improved the prospects for the next harvest, the effects of the scarcity will also be noticeable in 2008. In **Madagascar** the impact of the cyclones during the first months of the year and the devastating effects of the drought in other regions meant that the humanitarian emergency appeal run by the OCHA had to be doubled a few months after being launched.

But the situation that experienced the greatest deterioration over the last year was undoubtedly that of **Zimbabwe** where inflation of over 7,000%, along with erroneous political and economic strategies, had a serious effect on access to food by the population in both rural and urban areas. In fact, the lack of food led to a significant increase in diseases related to malnutrition, such as Kwashiorkor, which rose by 40 % compared with 2005. The severe recession led to fear in neighbouring South Africa of a mass exodus of Zimbabweans, so the South African authorities attempted to devise a contingency plan to deal with the arrival of immigrants. Lastly, successive attempts by governments to control the activities of the local and international NGOs jeopardised humanitarian work, leading to an overall decrease in protection among the population.

b) Western Africa

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| Côte d'Ivoire | Post-war situation, large number of internal displaced persons |
| Guinea | Political and economic crisis, natural disasters, epidemics |
| Liberia | Regional instability, resettling and return of refugees |

| | |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger) | Natural disasters, political and economic crisis, armed conflict |
| Sierra Leone | Regional instability, economic crisis, resettling of refugees |

The floods that took place in the third quarter of the year in West Africa affected over 800,000 people, mainly in Burkina Faso, Togo, Ghana and Mali, revealing the significant lack of risk-reducing strategies. Elsewhere, the incidence rate for cholera in Guinea, Liberia and Senegal exceeded the regional average, according to WHO data. In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the signing of a new political agreement in Ouagadougou to resume the peace process provided an opportunity for the return of over 700,000 internally displaced persons. However, this return will not be without its difficulties, since the FAO indicated that one in four of the households in rural areas of the country suffered from food insecurity, while the rates of malnutrition are increasing in the north, which is under the control of the armed opposition coalition, the Forces Nouvelles. In addition, a lack of agreements regarding land ownership rights may lead to an increase in community conflicts, mainly in the west of the country, which may in turn lead to new displacements.

In the **Sahel** region, in spite of the good harvests obtained at the beginning of the year, an increase in the price of basic products on the market and the difficulty of access to food distribution points caused a deterioration of the population's food supply situation. In addition, in **Niger**, the conflict that arised in the north between the Government and the armed Tuareg group MNJ made the work of the humanitarian organisations in Agadez province very difficult, forcing an NGO, like MSF, to pull out of the region. Also, the progressive laying of mines by the Tuareg blocked the access routes to the northern localities, thereby further impeding the supply of basic goods. In **Mali**, over 32,000 people lost their homes during the floods in September, and the government announced that, according to the statistical data collected, 12 people were dying every hour in the country after contracting malaria, with 105,000 deaths occurring between 2005 and 2006.

The general strike at the beginning of the year, which restricted productivity in **Guinea** for a month, had severe effects on the Guinean economy, and this, together with the floods in the month of October, created major focal points of food insecurity, with the population having a limited capacity for withstanding the effects of the serious crisis. In **Liberia**, the United Nations' Humanitarian Coordinator, Jordan Ryan, affirmed that, in spite of the improvements on the political front, in security and in the socio-economic conditions of Liberians, needs of a humanitarian nature still persist in the country. In this sense, both the UN agencies and the NGOs highlighted the need to employ a good transition strategy between the humanitarian action and the development programmes, thereby strengthening the ability of the state to take over the provision of basic services, while also preventing aid gaps from occurring. Elsewhere, the WFP concluded its food aid distribution programme for returnees in **Sierra**

Leone, but confirmed that food aid will continue to be crucial during the process of reconstruction as a result of the persisting humanitarian crisis. For its part, UNICEF highlighted that 40% of the deaths among the infant population under five years were produced by malaria, a disease than should not cause death with adequate medical treatment.

About 1.8 million people were affected by government's strategy of attempting to put down the insurgence by preventing the entry of goods and the access to services in all Ogaden

phe and their inability to access the population due to the lack of security.

Finally, in **Sudan**, whereas in the south the process of voluntary return of refugees facilitated by UNHCR continued, the humanitarian situation in Darfur region deteriorated still further during 2007. Over 2.2 million people (a third of the population) remained displaced by the armed conflict, while the rumours increased that the Sudanese government was handing over the lands abandoned by the indigenous population to local Arab communities or those coming from

other countries like Chad or Niger. The government of Khartoum failed to honour its commitment to improving access for humanitarian agents to the population, and continued to obstruct the humanitarian work and expel NGO workers and those of UN agencies. In addition, the armed forces initiated a strategy of siege against displaced person camps, carrying out military search operations within them and arresting several people in South Darfur. Although members of the United Nations confirmed the increasing militarisation within the camps and the increasing insecurity and presence of small arms within them, it considered that the strategy of the Sudanese government heightened the lack of protection of the internally displaced persons by attempting to force them to return without minimal levels of security being in place. In the rest of the country, floods, the increasing number of cholera cases and the spread of Rift Valley fever caused severe harm to the population and to agricultural production, increasing food insecurity and making the resettlement of the displaced population difficult compelling them to move again as a response to the scarcity.

c) The Horn of Africa

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Eritrea | Post-war situation, natural disasters, large number of forced displacements ³ |
| Ethiopia | Armed conflict, natural disasters, large number of forced displacements |
| Somalia | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, natural disasters |
| Sudan | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, natural disasters, epidemics |

Food insecurity remained a problem in all the regions of **Ethiopia** according to the information provided by the OCHA's office in the country, with the population in the territories in conflict with central government, especially Ogaden, experiencing a gradual deterioration of their humanitarian situation. The United Nations indicated that about 1.8 million people were affected by government's strategy of attempting to put down the insurgence by preventing the entry of goods and the access to services in all Ogaden – a measure that mainly affected the civilian population. In addition, the government banned the work of the NGOs in the field until November, and the army put strategies into practice to force the displacement of the population. Meanwhile, in **Eritrea**, the government highlighted the return of 3,400 families that had been compelled to flee during the conflict that took place against Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000, although the drought and the increase in prices pushed up the incidence of food insecurity throughout the whole country.

The Horn of Africa is, without any doubt, the region where the most serious humanitarian crises are to be found on a worldwide level. In Somalia and Sudan, the continued effects of armed conflicts led to the displacement of the population, impeded the planting of crops and obstructed humanitarian action, affecting millions of people. In **Somalia** in particular, the number of internal displaced persons reached one million in November, the majority fleeing from the capital, Mogadishu, which had experienced a severe increase in violence in preceding months, leading to 200,000 new displacements in only two weeks. As a result, 40 humanitarian organisations issued a joint communiqué in October highlighting the dimensions of the catastro-

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Burundi | Post-war situation, large number of forced displacements |
| Chad | Armed conflict, regional instability, large number of forced displacements |
| Kenya | Political crisis, epidemics, large number of forced displacements |
| Central African Republic | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements |
| DR Congo | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, epidemics |
| Rwanda | Regional instability, large number of forced displacements |
| Tanzania | Large number of refugees, natural disasters |
| Uganda | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, natural disasters |

3. The term "forced displacements" includes both internal displaced population and refugee population.

A major feature in this region was **the progress reached in the return of refugees and displaced persons in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda**, which is why UNHCR devoted a large part of its efforts to make both the arrival and resettlement of the population possible. However, the countries in the area were also seriously damaged by the floods, which in the case of **Burundi** affected one in every five people. UNHCR also warned that the rate of return during the year was substantially less than expected (around 20% estimates), which is why they increased cash and food supply aid in collaboration with the WFP in order to encourage the return. In **Uganda**, the third consecutive year of drought in the Karamoja region led to a scarcity of food and the spread of famine. The Karamoja region, where the WFP provided aid to over half a million people, has the country's lowest rate of development, even less than the northern regions where the armed conflict between the government and the LRA continues.⁴

In **Kenya**, the high incidence of violence during the election campaign and the subsequent elections displaced a total of 250,000 people, who sought shelter in provisional camps. These camps had great difficulties in receiving supplies due to increasing insecurity in the main routes. The political crisis that shook the country seriously affected the distribution of humanitarian supplies to other countries in the region, since many organisations that operate in the area have their headquarters in Kenya. In addition, the incidence of Rift Valley fever had disastrous consequences for the population, decreasing the numbers of livestock drastically and heightening the lack of protection and food insecurity in some areas that were also badly affected by the rains. In **Tanzania**, nonetheless, the number of refugees continued to decrease as a result of the UNHCR programmes, a fact that however did not prevent the government from proceeding with the forced expulsion of the Rwandan citizens who found themselves exiled in the country.

The humanitarian emergency in **Chad** and the **Central African Republic** continued to escalate with the displacement of the population as the result of the violence and the increase in the number of refugees from Sudan's Darfur region. The approval of the deployment of a European intervention force at the border between these two countries and Sudan, to enable humanitarian organisations to access individuals affected by the armed conflict, could not be implemented before the end of the year. However, this measure was seen by the armed groups in the region as an attempt by France, the country that presented the proposal, to maintain the status quo in both countries, in order to continue exercising its role as the *gendarme* of the current governments. This view could jeopardise the future of the joint EU/UN operation, increasing the violence and thereby the lack of protection of the population in the border areas of the three countries. Elsewhere, the government of Cameroon declared itself unable to supply

the humanitarian aid needed by the 45,000 Central African refugees that arrived in the country fleeing the violence, and it is feared that the scarce water resources in the area may generate disputes between the host populations and the incoming population.

Lastly, **DR Congo** continued to suffer the most worrying humanitarian crisis in the region, where violence in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (east) led to massive fleeing of Congolese towards Uganda and Rwanda - more than 10,000 new arrivals in a week. From December 2006 to September 2007, 224,000 people were displaced, increasing the total number in North Kivu to 650,000. In total, it is estimated that at present there are 1.4 million internally displaced persons in the country. However, UNHCR was able to continue with the process of returning and resettling Congolese refugees in other provinces, given the relative stability in the rest of the country. Elsewhere, an outbreak of the Ebola virus in the province of Western Kasai (centre) caused the death of 166 people, forcing quarantines in the area to be established to prevent it from spreading.

America

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| Colombia | Armed conflict, large number of internal displaced persons |
| Haiti | Natural disasters, political and economic crisis |
| Peru | Natural disasters |

This year the American continent had to face hurricanes (Dean, Felix, Noel), storms and earthquakes that had diverse effects throughout the area. The Caribbean and Central American regions were especially affected, above all the West Indies and Nicaragua, where the strong winds and rain reduced the harvest severely, leaving a part of the population dependent on food aid.

However, once again this year the crises in **Colombia and Haiti** were the most serious in the continent, joined by **Peru** as a result of the devastating effect of the earthquake in August that caused the death of 550 people and where the rescue and aid work was jeopardized by the lack of coordination and organisation between the government and the humanitarian NGOs in the field. In the end, the large quantity of funds destined for the reconstruction of the affected areas meant that normality was gradually restored. In **Haiti**, the security situation improved throughout the whole country, which in turn improved the access of the humanitarian organisations to various neighbourhoods of the capital, thereby accelerating the implementation of their projects. However, the tropical storms and their effects continued to reveal the country's major deficits in terms of risk prevention and effective evacuation strategies.

4. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

Box 5.2. Displaced persons in Colombia: between legality and reality

In spite of the advances in the legal field for protecting the displaced communities, since the approval of Law 397 in 1997 in Colombia⁵, the government's difficulty in quantifying and identifying this population makes it impossible for these people to have access to the humanitarian assistance envisaged in the legislation. According to data from the Colombian NGO Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), there are close to four million internally displaced persons in the country. This figure contradicts the one presented by the official register of Acción Social, which recognises only 1.9 million people. If this information is correct, the government would at present only be providing aid to half of the displaced population in the country. The reason for this deficiency in government data may be partly due to the fact that ignorance of the legal procedures puts a large number of displaced persons out of the reach of the protection of the law. However, it should be remembered that in order to be registered as an internally displaced person by the official authorities it is necessary to have presented a declaration before the State institutions (Office of the Attorney General, Ombudsman or Municipal or District Representative's Office), and that many people are afraid to reveal their condition as a displaced person for fear of being persecuted, or perhaps because their displacement has been caused by government action as a result of the activities of the armed forces. Furthermore, the first article of the displaced persons act sets out that any person whose displacement has taken place due to the armed conflict is considered to be displaced. However, people that have been displaced by operations of the state security forces against the civil population, which do not involve any other armed parties are not included within this definition. Those people that have been displaced by fumigations of the coca fields, normally preceded by military operations, would also be left out of the definition, as would those who, during their declarations, have not been able to clearly identify the perpetrators or to describe the circumstances in which the displacement was produced; or those people that have not registered themselves within the first year of displacement, according to a report published by Refugees International.⁶

Meanwhile, in **Colombia**, the violence continued to make the return of millions of displaced persons (over three and a half million in the country as a whole) impossible. Fumigations in the coca-producing fields in Nariño, where there was also fierce fighting between the armed forces, paramilitaries and guerrillas from the beginning of the year, generated 27 cases of mass displacements involving over 15,000 people; the fleeing to Ecuador of around 2,000 people escaping the violence in the regions of the north of the country; and the struggle of the internally displaced persons to return to their lands, exploited by African palm multinationals, were the most widely reported events in 2007. In addition, the UNDP indicated that 44% of the national population lives in a situation of poverty, and that six million people are in extreme poverty, a situation that contrasts starkly with an annual economic growth of 7% and reflects the lack of redistribution and the inequality that exists in the country.

Asia and the Pacific

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, natural disasters |
| Bangladesh | Natural disasters |
| Philippines | Armed conflict, natural disasters |
| Indonesia | Post-war situation, large number of forced displacements, natural disasters |
| Myanmar | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, epidemics |

| | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Nepal | Post-war situation, return and re-settlement of displaced persons, natural disasters |
| PDR Korea | Economic crisis, natural disasters |
| Sri Lanka | Armed conflict, large number of forced displacements, natural disasters |
| Timor-Leste | Post-war situation, large number of forced displacements |

In **Afghanistan**, the Independent Commission on Human Rights indicated in a report that the shortage of employment, drinking water, health, education and housing were the main obstacles for the re-settlement of Afghans returning to their country.⁷ In addition, the military strategy of selective bombardments adopted by the alliance of international forces continued to cause displacement of the population. Also, the practices of forced conscription and extortion carried out by the Taliban militias led to the displacement of a large number of people. The difficulties faced by humanitarian groups in accessing mountainous areas suffering food insecurity could have severe consequences for the population during winter, as they would be compelled to move again due to the lack of humanitarian supplies.

The floods that occurred in November in **Bangladesh** in the aftermath of typhoon Sidr caused the death of 3,500 people, leaving over four million people affected, according to United Nations estimates, with the risk of a rapid increase in epidemics being produced. Elsewhere, in the **Philippines**, aid for the victims of typhoon Durian (December 2006), together with support for the communities displaced by the conflict on the island of Mindanao, continued. Meanwhile, in **Indonesia**, the natural disasters (an earthquake in

5. Law 397 of 1997 in <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0397_97.HTM>.

6. Refugees International Bulletin, April 18th of April 2007. <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/files/9981_file_Col_registro0407.pdf>

7. *Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission – Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan II. Summary*, August 2007. <<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&page=SUBSITES&id=46e545682>>.

Sumatra and very heavy rains) contributed to the prolonging of the situation of humanitarian emergency. In **PDR Korea** the incidence of torrential rains in the month of August, which caused serious damage to the infrastructures and the agricultural sector and led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people according to the FAO, plus the poor consecutive harvests, led to a considerable decrease in the production of staple foods during the year, so that close to one million people required urgent food aid.

In **Myanmar**, a report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) about the dynamics of displacement in the areas under government control, pointed to the lack of data collection in these regions and the practices of extortion, re-locations and forced labour used by the government and the Burmese army to control the population.⁸ In addition, the ICRC was forced to abandon the country in the face of government pressure to control its programmes and the continuous obstacles to accessing the populations affected by the displacement. The ICRC also alerted that the refugee camps at the border with Thailand were becoming focal points for epidemics of diseases such as tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and avian flu. Meanwhile, in the east of the country, the armed conflict produced around 76,000 new displacements during 2007, according to data published by the Thailand Burmese Border Consortium. Elsewhere, in **Nepal**, the increase in tension in the Terai region generated the displacement of thousands of people, while the return process in the rest of the country was slow and scarce due to the persistence of insecurity in many areas and the absence of basic services and food at the arrival points. The Nepalese Government approved a 2.8 million dollar package of aid for internally displaced persons produced during the decade of conflict in the country, but only identified around 25,000 displaced persons, while the figures available to the United Nations place the number of displaced persons between 50,000 and 70,000.

In **Timor-Leste**, a year after the riots in Dili broke out, two thirds of the displaced population (100,000 people, 9% of the total population of the country) remained in this situation, despite the fact that the first return numbers (around 40,000 people in the first months) predicted the opposite. Among the main reasons for not returning are the ongoing volatility of the security situation, the lack of trust in the judicial system and in the process of reconciliation, the lack of progress in the programme of housing reconstruction, and the lack of a solution with regard to property matters.⁹ Finally, in **Sri Lanka**, both the LTTE and the armed forces employed strategies of forced displacement against the population, while the various humanitarian institutions drew attention to the return programme initiated by the government, which

occasionally seemed not to be taking into account the principle of voluntary return and the level of security in several areas. The humanitarian organisations and agencies continued to encounter difficulties in accessing the populations isolated by the conflict, mainly in the areas under LTTE control.

Europe and Central Asia

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) | Large number of internally displaced persons, political and economic crisis |
| Russia (Chechnya)* | Armed conflict, large number of internally displaced persons |

* and neighbouring republics (Dagestan, Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia).

In the southern region of the Caucasus, internally displaced persons were still unable to return to their places of origin, even though different strategies approved by the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan may contribute to the improvement of their situation. In the case of **Azerbaijan**, the government implemented a re-housing plan for internally displaced persons, and proceeded to close the collective accommodation centres. This measure was well received by UNHCR, although the location of the new houses, far from the urban centres, made it difficult for displaced people to access the labour market, which is why the rates of poverty and precariousness were of continuing concern. Elsewhere, the government of **Georgia** created a new strategy designed with the collaboration of several United Nations agencies, NGOs and representatives of the civil society aimed at improving accommodation, access to employment, education, health and the legal status for the internally displaced persons displaced from the Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia conflicts, while insisting on the right of these people to return to their locality. This right was backed and counter-signed by the EU (which refused to recognise the result of the referendum for the independence in the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia until the return of displaced Georgian took place) and the UN Security Council, which advocated an improvement in the situation of the internally displaced persons.

Finally, in Russia, UNHCR highlighted the improvement of the living conditions of the displaced Chechen population, although the various provinces of **Chechnya** suffered serious food insecurity, according to FAO data in October. In addition, the displaced persons in Ingushetia complained that they had been the target of forced re-locations by the Russian authorities. Finally, the government declared its intention to close 80% of

8. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. *Forced Migration and Internal Displacement in Burma with an emphasis on Government controlled areas*, May 2007.

9. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Timor-Leste: unfulfilled protection and assistance needs hamper the return of the displaced*, September 2007

the temporary accommodation centres before the end of 2007, and announced the construction of new housing for the relocation of the families displaced by the conflict.

Middle East

| Countries | Causes of the crisis |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Iraq | Armed conflict, natural disasters, political and economic crisis |
| Palestine | Armed conflict, international isolation, political and economic crisis |
| Yemen | Armed conflict, natural disasters, large number of refugees |

In the Middle East, the war in **Iraq** led to 8.4% of the population being forced to leave the country and become refugees in order to flee from the violence, while over two million people were displaced inside Iraqi territory. In addition, the possible spreading of the conflict to areas of the country that until now had remained largely violence-free, as in the case of Kurdistan, led to fears of an increase in food insecurity and greater displacements of the population. To this situation was added the decision of the provincial governments to accept only those people that could provide proof of where they originally came from, with the family of adoption being the one that would assume the

responsibility and the cost of maintaining these people, which put these families under great pressure due to the scarcity of supplies. In addition, the failure of neighbouring countries, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, to ratify the 1951 Convention regarding the Statute of the Refugees, made it difficult for UNHCR's to identify and protect refugees.

During the year the situation became even worst in the occupied territories of **Palestine**, with Gaza Strip suffering the most from external pressure actions against the government of Hamas, with the cutting and the suspension of economic aid, and the economic embargoes by Israel, USA and the EU, which had disastrous humanitarian consequences for the population. The Israeli government's proposal to cut electricity and fuel supplies to Gaza in response to the Qassam rocket attacks, was condemned by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, and by the numerous organisations that operate in the field, which considered this strategy as a form of collective punishment against the civil population in contravention of International Humanitarian Law. Finally, the supply of electricity was maintained as a result of a ruling against its suspension passed by the Israeli courts. In addition, fierce fighting taking place in the occupied territories between Hamas and Fatah militias presented serious difficulties for the development of humanitarian activity in Gaza and the West Bank,¹⁰ forcing the UNRWA to curtail a major part of its activity due to the serious situation of insecurity.

Box 5.3. Four million displaced persons and refugees, or the magnitude of the conflict in Iraq

The magnitude of the tragedy in Iraq could be clearly seen from the number of victims that perished as a result of the violence, but above all in the number of Iraqis that had to move to other areas of the country or abroad to flee from the conflict: four million people. According to the United Nations, this is the biggest population displacement since the Palestinian exodus in 1948.

The danger of suffering attacks, kidnappings or torture, for sectarian, political or other causes, forced thousands of families to flee. Since February 2006, when widespread sectarian violence broke out following the bombing of the Shiite mosque in Samara in July 2007, the Iraqi Ministry of Migrations registered the displacement of 900,000 people. This makes a total of 2.25 million since the beginning of the conflict. The improvement in the security situation in some provinces after the summer, such as Anbar and parts of Baghdad, meant that fewer displacements were registered, although only for those areas. In the rest, the IOM detected that the number of displacements continued to rise, with the aggravating circumstance that 11 of the 18 provinces impeded access due to the impossibility of accommodating them. At the same time, the progressive restrictions to the entry of refugees in countries such as Syria and Jordan led to an increase in movements inside Iraq's own borders. Nonetheless, the neighbouring countries accepted two million people in total, especially Syria with around 1.5 million Iraqis in their territory.

Throughout the year, the humanitarian agencies warned of the lack of economic and material resources to assist this population, while countries accepting refugees complained of the economic pressure placed on them by such large numbers of people. The conditions these people live in fall a long way short of the minimum basic rights with sufficient guaranties, both in terms of education and health. However, at this time, what is alarming is not only their current situation, but that of their return. Under what conditions are the refugees or displaced persons going to return? Will their safety be guaranteed? Will they be able to rebuild their social and employment situations? The answer is that they probably will not, or at least not without a host of difficulties. In fact, at the end of the year several organisations reported the return of thousands of people as a result of increased obstacles for their permanence in neighbouring countries, and given the relative improvements in the situation of violence in the country. However, UNHCR hastened to warn that conditions were not suitable for their return and that this was not the moment either to encourage or organise it. Unfortunately, the violence will continue to batter the country in the short and medium term, and thus the problem of Iraqi refugees will call for firm, immediate and far-reaching solutions. The fact that many countries, headed ironically by the US, have given asylum to only a negligible number of Iraqi, is not good news to begin with.

10. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

Finally, in **Yemen** the humanitarian situation was seen to be deteriorating progressively as a result of three different factors. In the first place, the explosion of violence in the Sa'ada region (north) that led to the displacement of over 50,000 people, while aid relief was obstructed by the closing down of communications and the access restrictions imposed by the government; secondly, the plague of locusts that affected mainly the southern regions, and also spread into Somalia and Sudan, with serious effects on agricultural production due to the absence of an effective strategy for reducing its impact; and lastly, the Yemen government's lack of capacity to respond to the increase in refugees arriving from Somalia and Ethiopia across the Gulf of Aden, registering only Somalis as refugees, without offering recognition to those from other areas and therefore contributing to the lack of protection of people needing asylum. At present, around 84,000 Somali refugees are residing in Yemen.

The Israeli government's proposal to cut electricity and fuel supplies to Gaza was condemned as a form of collective punishment against the civil population

a trend that, as the reports published over the year by various United Nations agencies and research centres indicate, will continue to rise during the coming years as a result of the absence of an effective global response to climate change. In several contexts of conflict, the absence of security, together with the impossibility of continuing with agricultural work and the possibility of droughts or very heavy rains, as in the case of the Horn of Africa, Nepal and PDR Korea, severely aggravated the lack of protection of the population, and required the implementation of strategies of humanitarian action with large-scale coordination and communication, which were not always effective.

tation of strategies of humanitarian action with large-scale coordination and communication, which were not always effective.

Obstruction of access to the victims and attempts by the warring groups to control the humanitarian action in several countries, also presented major challenges for the humanitarian agents, which were forced in some cases, as in the case of the ICRC in Myanmar, to abandon the supply of aid to the population when faced with the impossibility of carrying out an independent humanitarian actions. During the year, the creation of an international force to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to the populations affected by the conflicts in Sudan and Chad, i.e. those that would contribute to the improvements in security for the humanitarian agents, was approved. This type of operation continued to present a **challenge for the humanitarian organisations in terms of assuring their independence and neutrality**, above all to prevent them from being confused or identified as part of a military force and not a civil one, which could seriously obstruct their work, in addition to placing their workers in serious danger.

5.3. Overview of humanitarian action in 2007

Below is an analysis of various aspects related to the humanitarian crises and humanitarian actions during 2007: the main difficulties confronted by humanitarian organisations and the role played by donor countries.¹¹

a) Main difficulties in carrying out humanitarian actions

During 2007 the humanitarian groups had to face an **increase in emergencies produced by natural disasters;**

The resorting to **looting and theft of the humanitarian equipment** in the field continued as a way of financing

Table 5.2. Main obstacles to humanitarian action in 2007

| Problems | Consequences | Scenarios |
|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Insecurity and lack of protection | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attacks against humanitarian staff • Looting of aid • Reduction or indefinite suspension of aid • Withdrawal of organisations and humanitarian staff • Heightening of the lack of protection of the population affected by the crisis | Afghanistan, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Myanmar, Niger, DR Congo, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan |
| Lack of access to victims | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase of vulnerability of the civil population • Forced displacements • Increase in the risk to humanitarian staff | Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Yemen, Zimbabwe |
| Shortage of funds and resources | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suspension of humanitarian supplies • Deterioration and perpetuation of the forgotten crisis • Increase in appeals and donor fatigue | Caucasus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Niger, Palestine, DR Congo, Somalia, Swaziland |
| Poor aid management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased death rate • Mistrust by the donor countries • Reduction in humanitarian items • Political confrontations for the control of the aid | Angola, Palestine, Eritrea, Haiti, Myanmar, Niger, Peru, PDR Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zimbabwe |

11. Humanitarian action is understood to mean that set of activities whose aim is to save lives and alleviate suffering in situations of human crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.

and supplying the armed groups. In addition, the **militarisation of the refugee camps**, with the incursions of armed elements and members of the warring groups to carry out recruiting or increase their support, such as in the case of Darfur (Sudan), also presented a challenge for the neutrality and security of the humanitarian agents, who in some cases had to confront the armed forces when they attempted to enter the camps to decommission weapons or to arrest those suspected of being members of armed groups. The humanitarian staff continued to be the object of violence. **In the Darfur region, the OCHA indicated that attacks had grown by 150% in 2007** compared to the previous year. The local staff was the most affected by violence.

In addition, **violations of International Humanitarian Law** by governments persisted. Especially noteworthy was the strategy of blockading and besieging the population in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, where the government forbade the entry of the humanitarian organisations, as a mechanism to reduce the civil population that they were accusing of collaborating with the armed group ONLF. This same strategy was also used in Yemen to quell the rebellion begun in the north by the followers of the cleric al-Houthi.

The **scarcity of funds**, either due to the lack of response by donor countries, as in the case of the Horn of Africa, or due to the overwhelming forecasts of the real needs of the population, as in the case of UNHCR in Iraq, once again put to the test the capability of the UN agencies to provide aid. In addition, an increase in the price of cereals on the international markets drove up the costs of the WFP's actions aimed at relieving the scarcity or the lack of access to foods. During the year, the economic blockade against the government of Hamas persisted and this, together with the scarce funds collected by the UNRWA, aggravated even further the humanitarian emergency in Palestine.

b) The role of donors and humanitarian reform

The positive trend in financing using the Consolidated Appeals Processes (CAP) continued during the 2007, ensuring that **donors covered 67% of the funds requested by the OCHA**, a slightly higher percentage


than the 63% achieved in 2006. The CAP that received the fewest resources were Côte d'Ivoire (45%), DR Congo (48%) and Liberia (49%), which failed to reach 50%, although they managed to acquire more financing than the three last appeals in the previous year, which varied from 34% to 45%. In fact, the absence of a "headline crisis" meant that the financing of the CAPs balanced out, with the three countries that received most funds (Chad, Burundi and Sudan) not exceeding 92%. It is important to point out that in 2007 **Burundi managed to double the number of contributions compared to the previous year**, which the OCHA took as possibly being due to the support of the Peacebuilding Commission, which would be seen by donors as a guarantee of sustainability of the achievements.

Among the countries that destined most funds to humanitarian action, the US was once in first place in total numbers of global aid. However, if this information is analysed **in terms of the GDP**, the US would be relegated to thirteenth place, with **Norway, Sweden and Ireland being the three countries that have contributed the highest quantities with respect their GDP**.

In addition, joint financing mechanisms, as well as the Central Emergencies Response Fund (CERF), are indicated by the OCHA as responsible for having ensured that 51% of the financing of the CAPs was achieved in the first quarter of the year. It also emphasised that donors are increasingly aware of the need to provide a swift response. However, **imbalances continued to be produced in the financing according to sectors**, since whereas demining obtained 96%, security and operations achieved only 21% of the necessary funds. The OCHA indicated that this problem was remedied in part by the increase in funds provided by the donors without a fixed destination (7% of the total), which gave the agencies a greater flexibility when faced with gaps in the sectorial financing.

During the year, the debate on humanitarian reform focused on **how to maintain in force humanitarian principles (neutrality, independence and impartiality) in a situation of armed conflict, and how to improve the protection mechanisms for internal displaced persons**. A number of reports and declarations by the High Com-

Graph 5.2. Evolution of global humanitarian financing (in millions of dollars)



Source: United Nations, *Humanitarian Appeal 2008*, UN, December 2007.

missioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, stressed the increasingly blurred frontier between internally displaced persons and refugees, and economic migrant populations. Being able to distinguish between a voluntary or forced displacement and the need to understand the reasons, the scale and the trends of displacement in the modern world, are vital to implementing a good response strategy.¹²

Another issue was the improvement in the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian actions. For this reason, in Somalia the United Nations tested out a **new tool for evaluating the impact of disasters**, which allows

comparative analyses with other emergency contexts in any other country in the world, in order to be able to plan and prioritise the response when faced with a crisis. This instrument, developed by FAO and the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), uses a single value to describe the nature and the severity of the crisis, and was given the name of Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC). The aim in creating this instrument was to minimise the value-based and sometimes excessively politicised nature of the priority given to some crises compared to others, achieving objectively measurable data that enable an adequate response.

Box 5.4. Climate change and humanitarian crises

There can be no doubt that climate change currently presents a great challenge for the international community. Reducing CO₂ emissions, devising effective responses to the increase in desertification or recurrent torrential rains, discovering alternatives to fossil fuels and maximising efficiency in the use of water resources is everyone's responsibility. However, the effects of climate change will not be divided fairly between everyone, and they will affect more precisely those countries that have contributed least to global warming, some of which are already experiencing serious humanitarian crises that will increase over the coming years if global agreements are not achieved and strictly complied with. As the latest report of the UNDP on Human Development points out,¹³ donor countries will need to provide two billion dollars more every year for emergency programmes for disasters until 2015, to face food insecurity and the increase in frequency of the occurrence of natural disasters as a result of climate change.

Some of the responses that have arisen so far, such as the bio-fuels alternative, have proven not to be so effective in the reduction of CO₂ emissions. In addition, the increase in cultivated land devoted to cereal production for this purpose influenced the rise in grain prices on the international markets during 2007, and this mainly affected the poorest countries, most of all in Africa, by limiting the access to basic foods. The WFP was compelled to rectify its humanitarian appeals, since the foreseen funds proved to be insufficient to cover the costs of the purchase of food.


15 humanitarian emergency appeals were made during 2007, more than in any other preceding year, of which all, except that generated by the earthquake in Peru, were due to the impact of climatic disasters (typhoons, droughts, hurricanes and torrential rains), a trend that according to the OCHA and the UNDP will continue to rise. However, this increase in the number of extraordinary appeals is also due to the existence of the CERF (Central Emergency Response Fund), which allows the rapid assignment of funds to the agencies to deal with emergencies such as natural disasters, and this may have encouraged the governments to resort to appeals of this kind.

Another of the challenges for humanitarian agents will be the increase in displacements caused by food insecurity and the scarcity of water, as well as the impact that climate change will have on the most dependent economies. This situation will force many people to become displaced inside their own country, and even to cross borders. These will not be refugees in the true sense of the word, yet their motivation to abandon their homes will go beyond the search for economic opportunities and free will. As the High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, has pointed out, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between a refugee and an economic immigrant, since given the absence of legitimate mechanisms they use the same illegal routes to leave their country. Reflecting on the situation of famine in Zimbabwe, and although the solution goes beyond the mandate of the UNHCR, Guterres wondered what should be done with those who flee from famine, and whether it is right to return them to such conditions of extreme scarcity, and advocated the generation of responses that provide some kind of temporary admittance, as the South African Government has suggested.

The latest report on Human Development insists on the need to reduce global warming, but also to increase investment so that countries with fewer resources will be able to adapt and generate strategies to deal with the impact that climatic change is having on their way of life and on their capabilities. It is a question of solidarity and awareness that there is only one world, yet also of being able to establish the signing and ratifying of the Kyoto Protocol as a priority and making progress in the negotiations agreed at the Bali Conference this year. The UNDP has also indicated the need to promote technological transfer and research in order to provide responses to a situation which, even if the appropriate measures are taken, will take years to reverse.

12. ACNUR public information. *Guterres: complex worldwide displacements demand new strategies*. 1st of October 2007.

13. Human Development Report 2007-2008. *Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world*. UNDP, December 2007. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf>.



Embargoed governments
 Embargoed non-governmental actors *Not attributed to any country on the case of Al-Qaeda
 Ongoing DDR programmes

6. Disarmament

- World military spending reached the figure of 1,158,000 million dollars, i.e. 2.5% of the world's GDP and an average of 184 dollars per capita. The US remained the country with the highest level of expenditure, amounting to a total of 46%.
- As of the end of the year, 18 arms embargoes were still in force, after the lifting of the existing sanctions against the armed opposition groups in Rwanda by the United Nations.
- The Oslo Process, aimed at the signing of a treaty banning cluster bombs by the end of 2008, received growing government support.
- DDR programmes were initiated in Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo (Ituri) and in the Sudan (SPLA).


This chapter examines issues of disarmament, with special emphasis on post-war rehabilitation contexts. To set the disarmament processes in context, the analysis begins with an observation of the trends in the arms cycle, especially with regard to military spending (Indicators No.9 and 10), arms exports and the volume of armed forces compared to the population (Indicator No.11). This is followed by an analysis of arms control, looking at the imposition of arms embargoes by the United Nations and the EU (Indicators No. 13 and 14, respectively), and the main international initiatives for reducing small arms. Lastly, a follow-up and analysis is made of former combatants involved in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (Indicator No. 14). The map at the beginning of the chapter shows the embargoed countries and armed opposition groups, as well as indicating the countries with DDR programmes.

6.1. Arms cycle

The methodology used here consists on the observation of the different phases of the arms cycle, which is useful for checking its temporary historical variations in matters of military spending, production and trade. Based on the data provided by the Swedish research centre SIPRI, it can be shown that the worldwide military spending reached the figure of 1,158,000 million dollars in 2006,¹ i.e. 2.5% of the global GDP, similar to the previous year, and an average of 184 dollars per capita. These absolute figures mean a 3.5% increase compared to 2005, and a 37% rise over the last decade. The main explanation for this level of military spending is the group of 15 countries that jointly account for 83% of the worldwide military spending.

Graph 6.1. Estimate of worldwide military spending by regions (1997-2006)

(The figures correspond to thousands of millions of dollars at 2005 prices)



Source: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007*, Table 8.1.

1. The last year for which official details on a global level are available.

By country, the **US** continues to stand out, accounting for 46% of the world military spending. In addition, an increase of 53% in the US military budget since September 11, 2001 has been seen, although the increase was already being prior to that date. The explanation for this spectacular increase in the last five years can be found mainly in its efforts regarding the so-called “global war against terrorism,” something that can also be seen in the constant extraordinary budgetary items for interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have amounted to a total of 432,000 million dollars since 2001. Moreover, the forecasts envisage an 8% increase in its budget for the coming year.

An increase of 53% in the US military budget since September 11, 2001 has been seen

A long way behind the US come countries like **China, France, Japan** and **United Kingdom**, each of which have figures close to 5% of the world military spending. By region, those that experienced the largest percentage increases were Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. In the case of Africa, it is significant that Algeria is responsible for 46% of the military spending in the Maghreb region, while a certain stability was detected in the European continent, which occupies second place with regard to world military spending.

With regard to the Middle East and Asia, the main explanation for the aforementioned increase can be largely found in rearmament in nuclear material occurring in countries like India, Israel and Pakistan (countries that are not signatories of the United Nations Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]) in their attempts to respond to Iran’s nuclear programme. More specifically, the Iranian government insisted that its country would continue the process of uranium enrichment, as a result of which, according to the specialists, it could have nuclear weapons within a year. Nevertheless, reports from both the IAEA and the US intelligence service refuted this point and assured that the Iranian government was beginning to show the first signs of cooperation in this matter.² Another significant element was Russia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, alleging that this text was obsolete.³ This decision should be understood as a reaction to the US project for constructing part of their missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic to prevent possible nuclear attacks from Iran.

And lastly in terms of nuclear issues, there was a much more positive outcome in PDR Korea, whose government agreed to dismantle its nuclear programme at the end of 2007. The counterpart to this dismantling can be found in the delivery of energy materials, mainly from the US and the Republic of Korea. This process coincided with the reactivation of the peace process between the two Koreas, which signed a Peace and

Prosperity Agreement in October, putting an end to the state of armistice that had existed since the conflict between them from 1950 to 1953.⁴ Finally, it must be hoped that the US announcement that it intends to reduce its arsenal of nuclear warheads to a quarter of the levels reached at the end of the Cold War by 2012, may also trigger a positive chain reaction in the same direction between the main powers in this sphere.

With regard to the analysis of military spending compared with GDP for each of the countries (Indicator No. 9), this was carried out using data from the Swedish research centre SIPRI. This analysis was hampered by the absence of completely contrastable data, something which characterises many of the activities concerning military aspects. In the present report it was decided to indicate those countries which, according to the aforementioned source, have military spending of over 4% of their GDP. This is the case of 13 countries, among which six are particularly worth looking at since their military spending surpasses 6% of their GDP, as can be seen in the following table:

Table 6.1. Countries with an elevated level of military spending

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|----------------|----------|----------------|---------|
| Syria | (16.72%) | Burundi | (6.10%) | Morocco | (4.2%) |
| Senegal | (15.36%) | Jordan | (4.9%) | Lebanon | (4.14%) |
| Oman | (13.33%) | Iran | (4.69%) | Russia | (4.03%) |
| Saudi Arabia | (9.54%) | Greece | (4.48 %) | | |
| Israel | (9.51%) | USA | (4.40%) | | |

N.B. In brackets, the military spending for each country compared to GDP. The table shows all the countries that have military spending of **over 4%**.

The above table can be related to the priorities in public spending (Indicator No. 10). In 2006, 14 countries were detected whose military spending was greater than that devoted to education or health, and in some cases (Eritrea and Oman) the expenditure was even higher than the two items together. The fact that public expenditure on health and/or education is lower than military spending indicates that the budgetary priorities place the defence and militarisation of the country before the need to satisfy the basic needs of the population and finance public social services. This fact could denote a strictly militarist conception of security that completely obviates the paradigms of human security promoted for over a decade now by the UNDP.⁵ In addition, it can be used as an indicator to estimate the level of commitment towards development, although the OCDE points out that the integrating of defence sector expenditures within public expenditures should

2. See the chapter on tensions.

3. This Treaty was signed in 1990, and mainly has the function of limiting the deployment of conventional weapons on the continent. For further information with regard to this, see the disarmament section of *Barometer* 14.

4. See the chapter on peace processes.

5. UNDP, *Report on Human Development*, UNDP, 1994.

be advocated, especially in order to improve aid in matters of security.⁶

In terms of arms production, a high concentration of businesses can still be seen, due to the high costs of present-day arms technologies, plus a high degree of collaboration in matters of commercial technology. In figures, it can be seen that the US and Western Europe account for 92% of sales due to arms production worldwide. More specifically, the US concentrates 40 of the 100 companies with highest profits and 63% of sales, whereas the European region contains 32 companies that in turn distribute 29.4% of sales worldwide. This situation is reflected in the creation of the European Defence Agency, which has encouraged the business concentration, with the main objective of saving costs. This Agency aims to promote European cooperation in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, although this does not necessarily mean an increase in military spending, but rather a renewal of its arsenals, in the face of the reduction and restructuring of the armed forces.

On the question of arms transfers, in global terms a growth rate of 50% can be seen since 2003. By country, the US remains in first position, with 30% of the total exports to 68 countries. 39% of the purchases from the US came from countries in the Middle East region, as a defence strategy for the situation of armed conflict that continues to devastate Iraq, as well as a preventive strategy in the face of Iran's nuclear programme. In second place is Russia, with a production system basically centred on foreign trade, and with 28% of the worldwide transfers to 46 countries. Two of the three main importers (China, with 45% of Russian sales, and India, with 25%) are among Russia's biggest customers. In addition to being the largest exporters, the US and Russia are the states that dominate trading in weapons to developing countries, controlling over

Table 6.2. **Main arms exporters and importers in 2006**

(Values are expressed in millions of dollars at 1990 prices)

| Exporters | Value | Importers | Value |
|----------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| USA | 7,888 | China | 3,261 |
| Russia | 6,733 | United Arab Emirates | 2,439 |
| Germany | 3,850 | India | 1,672 |
| France | 1,557 | Greece | 1,452 |
| Netherlands | 1,481 | Rep. Korea | 1,292 |
| United Kingdom | 1,071 | Chile | 1,125 |
| Italy | 860 | Israel | 994 |
| Spain | 803 | Iran | 891 |
| China | 564 | South Africa | 862 |
| Sweden | 472 | Australia | 768 |

Source: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

half the global market, although the total number of sales in 2006 fell by 13% compared to 2005, amounting to almost 40,000 million dollars.⁷

Finally, with regard to the percentage of soldiers compared with the total population of the country (Indicator No. 11), a clear decrease can be seen on a worldwide scale, following the trend that has been taking place for some years, with improvements in arms technology and a reduction and professionalisation of the armed forces in many countries, in combination with the increasingly frequent use of private security companies, as has occurred in armed conflicts such as that of Iraq. Nonetheless, in nine cases the percentage of soldiers compared to the total population is higher than 1.5%.

Box 6.1. **Private security: Consequences of the Blackwater case**

Once again this year, one of the hottest debates with regard to security matters was the presence of private security forces in contexts of armed conflict. These groups seek economic profit only by carrying out services of a military character, and they currently play a crucial role in the sphere of international security. The most significant case during 2007 occurred around the middle of September in Iraq, when the Iraqi Government cancelled the services of the American security company Blackwater, whose actions had caused the death of 20 people in the Mansur neighbourhood of the capital. It is estimated that in Iraq there are between 25,000 and 50,000 security professionals still operating without any kind of legal restriction, either in terms of civil or military law or the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

On certain occasions, a task that should be the responsibility of the state is transferred to private companies. By claiming a lack of logistical capability, the state may also transfer certain actions in which it does not wish to be involved, since these may violate IHL. These types of companies proliferate at the heart of states regarded as fragile, which on certain occasions, as in the case of Haiti, legitimate the existence of these companies by insisting that they are a source of employment in contexts where there is a lack of economic and social development. Nevertheless, the absence of a clearly applicable legal system, and the non extra-territoriality of national laws in this matter enable the expansion of these kinds of companies, and they in turn bolster the uncontrolled proliferation of arms.

6. OECD Development Assistance Committee; *Security System Reform and Governance*, OCDE, 2005, at <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>>.

7. US Congress Report; *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1999-2006*, 2007, at <<http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/110th/RL34187.pdf>>.

Above all, it is the state that should be the main guarantor of security, although the appropriate legal international framework should also be found for regulating the activities of these groups, delimiting their obligations and rights, and clarifying their responsibilities.⁸ Above and beyond the debate over the legitimacy of the existence and presence of these types of companies in contexts of armed violence, if the proper legal framework is found for them, the relationship and degree of cooperation that they should have with civil and military groups should also be dealt with.

6.2. Arms control initiatives

In order to offset a proliferation of arms, on some occasions uncontrolled, a series of global and regional initiatives must be taken into account, such as the present situation regarding arms embargoes and initiatives related to small arms.

a) Arms embargoes

As of the end of 2007, a total of 18 arms embargoes remained in force, both on governments and on armed opposition groups (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3. Countries and armed groups embargoed during 2007

| | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| al-Qaeda | Iraq |
| Taliban groups (Afghanistan) | Liberia |
| Armenia | Myanmar |
| Azerbaijan | RUF and other groups (Sierra Leone) |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Somalia |
| China | Sudan |
| DR Congo | Yemen |
| Rep. Korea | Uzbekistan |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Zimbabwe |

The United Nations made a number of decisions in 2007 (Indicator No.13), as the UN Security Council lifted the arms embargo in force on the government forces in **Rwanda**, which in turn affected the neighbouring countries harbouring armed Rwandan opposition groups: Tanzania and Uganda. The embargo was lifted in recognition of the recent positive advances in this region. On the other hand, the Security Council extended the arms embargo against the armed opposition groups operating in **DR Congo** for a period of six months, insisting that the insurgent groups in the country have enough surface-to-air missiles and explosives coming from **Eritrea** to maintain the armed conflict

against the government.⁹ Something similar occurred in **Liberia**, with the extension of the embargo for a year, due mainly to reports of an increase in criminal acts carried out with small arms. In general terms, the Security Council issued a statement urging all member states to supervise the arms embargoes established in its resolutions, and to destroy any stockpiles of small arms that might be obsolete.

In the same way, certain suspicions of non-fulfilment of arms embargoes were voiced. An obvious example of this was **Sudan**, as the result of the appearance of two reports. In one, issued by the United Nations, the Sudanese government was accused of disobeying the sanction against the armed opposition groups, while in the other, produced by Amnesty International, the governments of **China** and **Russia** were denounced for having provided the *Janjaweed* militia with military material during 2005.¹⁰

Amnesty International itself urged the United Nations to impose an embargo on Myanmar as a response to the violent repression against demonstrators during the protests that took place during the year.¹¹ In order to evaluate these embargoes, the Swedish SIPRI and Uppsala University research centres presented a report in which they analysed the 27 arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations since 1990. This report stressed that in no case was the transference of arms to the embargoed country completely impeded, a fact that does not mean that the instrument is useless. The report also revealed that these embargoes are more effective if they are combined with the presence of United Nations peacekeeping forces with a specific mandate to enforce the sanction. Similarly, the report pointed to the highly symbolic nature of arms embargoes, pointing out that they are often respected more if one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council explicitly declares its support for the maintaining of the embargo.¹²

Possible non-fulfilment of their arms embargoes were also detected in the context of the EU and the OSCE (Indicator No. 14). A group of European NGOs denounced the Indian government's intention of transferring helicopters (in design and production of which

8. Abrisketa, J.; *Blackwater: Mercenaries and International Law*, FRIDE, 2007, at <<http://www.fride.org/descarga/blackwater.english.pdf>>.

9. S/RES/1768 complete at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

10. Amnesty International, *Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur*, May 2007, at <<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engaf540192007>>.

11. See the chapter on tensions.

12. SIPRI and Universidad de Uppsala, *United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour*, SIPRI and Uppsala University, 2007, at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=356#>.

European and North American companies had participated) to Myanmar for military use.¹³ Nonetheless, these NGOs indicated the responsibility of the governments of EU member countries, which, given the increasing globalisation of the market, need more and better regulating tools and a greater capability for controlling the arms trade.

b) Small arms

On a worldwide scale, there are three major aspects to be highlighted in the field of small arms: the process toward an international Arms Trade Treaty, the prohibition of cluster bombs and the progress of the treaty against anti-personnel mines.

Beginning with the international Arms Trade Treaty, 2007 was not an exceptional year for the approval of this worldwide legislation, yet a necessary one for progress in the implementation and discussion of its contents. More specifically, 97 member states presented their proposals regarding the basic contents for the first version of this treaty during the year, as can be seen in the following box.

In August representatives from over a hundred governments took part in a meeting in Geneva, sponsored by

Canada and Switzerland, in order to debate the legal aspects needed to reduce the risk of small arms being diverted from legal to illegal markets. The aim of the meeting was to promote discussion about the responsibility of the states in determining the final destination of all their small arms, and the possible measures for achieving this before the next Biennial Meeting of States to be held in 2008, this time of an official nature, at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The governments of countries where these weapons circulate emphasised the need for export and import states, as well as transit countries, to participate in all the decisions related to the authorisation of an international transfer of these kinds of weapons.

The Swiss Small Arms Survey research centre took advantage of the conference to publish a new edition of its yearbook.¹⁴ Among the most significant details was the number of firearms in the world, amounting to around 875 million, 75% of which fall into the hands of the civil population, with special attention being drawn to the USA with some 270 million firearms, i.e. a ratio of 90 weapons for each 100 inhabitants. At the same time, it can be seen that it is the US that possesses a greater level of transparency in its control of arms exports, although it continues to be the only country explicitly opposed to the implementation of an international treaty on arms trade.

Box 6.2. The states' vision of the international Arms Trade Treaty

The fact that, in December 2006, 97 of the 153 countries supported Resolution 61/89 of the UN General Assembly regarding an international and legally binding treaty on arms trade¹⁵ is a clear sign of the global political will to tackle the uncontrolled proliferation of this type of exports. Over and above the logical differences of perspective of each of the countries with regard to this matter, the main points of consensus, classified into three main sections, should be channelled so that the group of experts constituted, made up of 25 states, can be ready to discuss the drafting of this law in the General Assembly House of the UN in 2009.¹⁶

- *Viability*: a consensus regarding the drawing up of a legally binding treaty that establishes international standards for trade in conventional weapons. This viability is made clear by the numerous initiatives already in existence at the moment in the various territorial areas, although there are still certain gaps in the regional coverage and in the plurality of contents of these documents.

- *Scope*: even though the inclusion of all conventional weapons seems to be a good principle for agreement, there is still a need to detect the existing lists of arms in order to draw up one with obligatory compliance for the aforementioned treaty. This list would be the result of merging the current UN Conventional Weapons Registry with the military lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement¹⁷ and the EU. In terms of the kind of transfers, the broadest possible definition has been adopted, including all intermediation activities.

- *Evaluation parameters*: the point of greatest consensus is a respect for international law, under a case by case evaluation by the national authorities. Apart from this, the requirements should be aimed at applying the criteria objectively and transparently.

13. Saferworld, *Indian Helicopters for Myanmar: Making a Mockery of Embargoes?*, 2007, at <http://www.saferworld.co.uk/images/pubdocs/Myanmar_report_July07.pdf>.

14. Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2007. Guns and the city*. Oxford University Press, 2007, at <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/yearb2007.html>>.

15. A/RES/61/89 of 6th December 2006, at <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r61sp.htm>>.

16. Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, *Assessing the Feasibility, Scope and Parameters of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT): an NGO Perspective*, March 2007, at <http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/documents/ATTPositionPaper.pdf>.

17. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies arose in 1996, with the aim of contributing to international security and stability by promoting transparency and responsibility in the exporting of this type of arms. At present, 40 countries have signed.

In addition, once again this year, the British coalition Biting the Bullet, made up of three British research centres,¹⁸ published a new report aimed at preventing and reducing the transfers of unauthorized small arms. This pointed to the states themselves as the main responsible parties in this area, since they make up 90% of the illegal transfers carried out around the world.¹⁹ This is why the maximum attention must be paid to all the existing facets: importing, exporting, transit or jurisdiction where the intermediary agents operate. In order to do it, the states must refuse those transfers that may involve a certain risk, as established by the United Nations Action Programme, and use mechanisms such as the certificate of final use.

In parallel to this, the International Arms Control Campaign published a new report setting out the economic cost of the armed conflicts on the African continent between 1990 and 2005, which amounted to some 300,000 million dollars. The document shows that the African countries affected by conflicts, civil wars or insurgency have seen their average economy reduced by 15%, while the continent has lost an average of 18,000 million dollars a year as a result of armed conflicts. Finally, it was emphasised that 95% of the arms used in these conflicts came from outside of the continent.

Elsewhere, a process that took on a considerable momentum is the demand for a ban on cluster bombs.²⁰ The government of Norway organised an international conference in February, where it was agreed to draw up an international treaty banning the use, production, transfer and storage of cluster bombs, as well as obliging each country to take the necessary steps to eradicate these weapons. Subsequently two new meetings to endorse this position took place in Peru and Austria, with the aim of giving continuity to the so-called Oslo Process. At present, 94 states support the approval of a treaty banning cluster bombs by the end of 2008, although some countries, like Spain, Japan and the United Kingdom, urged the inclusion of certain exceptions in this treaty, mainly in the case that mechanisms of self-destruction could be technically present in this type of weapon. In civil society, the Cluster Munition Coalition initiative, comprising over 200 organisations from 50 countries, held the first Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, urging governments to declare a moratorium on the use, trade and production of these weapons.

On the issue of anti-personnel mines, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines issued a new appraisal of

the Ottawa Treaty, to coincide with the tenth anniversary of its implementation.²¹ Initially, this publication warned that 29 countries needed to comply with the 2009 deadline for completing their commitment to completely de-mine their territory. As a positive counterpoint, four more countries (Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait and Montenegro) signed the aforementioned treaty, bringing the total number of signatory states to 156. During 2006, around 450 km² were cleared of mines, especially in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Iraq, with a total number of 217,000 anti-personnel mines destroyed worldwide. In terms of countries, Myanmar and Russia continue as the states that have this type of weapons in their government arsenals. In addition, eight armed groups were identified with this type of arms, in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan and Russia (Chechnya). Furthermore, 5,751 deaths were registered due to anti-personnel mines and explosives left over from wars – a reduction of 16% compared to 2005. In terms of economic support, 15 of the 20 main donors supplied greater amounts of financing than in the previous year, with a total of 475 million dollars, 100 million more than in 2005, due mainly to the emergency funds for the cleaning up residual war explosives in the south of Lebanon. Subsequently, the Action against Anti-Personnel Mines Service insisted in a report that some 404 million dollars are needed to clear mines in 33 countries or territories during 2008, 25 million less than the previous year.²²

On a continental level, beginning with Africa, the foreign ministers of the The Great Lakes region and Central Africa met to ensure that member states would ratify and implement the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Elsewhere, the first consultative conference for the implementation of the ECOWAS Small Arms Programme was held in Ghana, and attended by political and civil representatives of the member states. A package of measures was agreed to which may serve as a guide for member states in terms of common policies for controlling the millions of small arms circulating in the region.

In America, the murder of 32 people at a US university by a student in possession of firearms generated a debate that led to the passing of the first state weapons control law in the last 10 years. Events like this should be useful for denouncing the ease of access to small arms, establishing certain contexts with high incidences of armed violence in urban areas, yet in ones that do not necessarily constitute an armed conflict.

At present, 94 states support the approval of a treaty banning cluster bombs by the end of 2008

18. The organisations that make up this coalition are the University of Bradford, International Alert and Saferworld.

19. Biting the bullet, *Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfer Controls to Prevent Diversion. Developing and Implementing Key Programme of Action Commitments*, Saferworld, 2007, at <<http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=275>>.

20. Cluster bombs are a type of artefact made up of a "container" that can be launched from land, sea or air, and which opens during its trajectory and ejects between several dozen and several hundred sub-munitions that spread over a wide area and explode on impact with the ground. It is calculated that 98% of the victims of these weapons are members of the civilian population and that 75 countries worldwide possess this type of bomb.

21. ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2007: Towards a Mine-Free World*. ICBL, 2007 at <<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/>>.

22. UN Mine Action Service, *Portfolio of 2008 Mine Action Projects*, UN, 2007, at <http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/map_portfolio_2008_acrobat7.pdf>.

The supposed defence of freedom proclaimed by the National Rifle Association and backed by the Second Amendment of the US Constitution only serves to hide worrying figures for deaths due to firearms in that country - around 30,000 per year, well above that of countries in armed conflict, and a high degree of laxness in legislative and bureaucratic control. For all these reasons, a conference to debate the main causes of insecurity in this sphere was held in Mexico, with the participation of 600 delegates from 42 countries and the aim of developing an international structure to help cities mitigate the level of violence from an urban perspective.

In the case of the Asian continent, the Japanese team for small arms management in Cambodia announced that they had collected some 28,000 small arms between April 2003 and September 2007, as well as over 110,000 explosives and munitions. Elsewhere, the Philippines' Electoral Commission announced that over 2,000 people had been exempted from the strengthened legislation on the use and transport of weapons that it had been applying from the beginning of year, with the aim of preventing violence during the holding of presidential elections. Finally, in Timor-Leste, the UNMIT announced the successful completion of the weapon collection process in the capital Dili, in an operation between the international security forces and the local police to combat urban violence.

On the European continent, the European Parliament voted in favour of strengthening the EU Directive on Firearms, agreeing that all the member states should require arms purchasers to obtain a license, as well as the registering of each new weapon they acquire. In addition, the authorities are required to determine that buyers are not a threat to their own personal safety or to public safety. This strengthening was a rapid response to the events that took place in a Finnish educational centre in the middle of November, with nine people dead and 10 wounded at the hands of a student. In Spain, the parliament approved the first state Law on Arms Trade, presenting certain improvements compared to the proposal initially made by the government, so that from now on compliance with the EU's Code of Conduct criteria will become mandatory.²³ The main modifications include the appearance of the Secretary of State for Trade in the Spanish parliament, and the inclusion of hunting and sports firearms as material that is subject to control. Nevertheless, other aspects such as the lack of control and transparency in the licence approval decision were left untouched, which is why there are still various aspects to be improved in this direction.

In the Middle East, the Secretary-General of the UN urged the Lebanese Government to increase its efforts

in controlling the illegal traffic in small arms from Syria. As a response to this, the Lebanese Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, announced the reinforcing of police numbers in border areas, although he denied the existence of any kind of trafficking of arms since the end of the conflict with Israel in August 2006. Elsewhere, various sources accused Israel of having experimented with new weapons in the Lebanese conflict and in their incursions into Gaza in August 2006. Lastly, the US government announced the loss in Iraq of some 190,000 weapons that should have been transferred to the security forces during 2004 and 2005 due to the absence of serial numbers, in spite of the increase in security measures since 2005.

6.3. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes

This section is divided into two parts: one outlining the main international initiatives that have characterised the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for former combatants,²⁴ and the other revealing how the main programmes evolved during 2007 (Indicator No. 14), with especial emphasis on the phenomenon of child soldiers.

a) Main international initiatives

The Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa was held in June 2007.²⁵ Among its aims was that of enabling the regional integration of efforts in this type of programme, to be able to share knowledge and extract good practices and recommendations. The aspects dealt with were: combatants in foreign territory (especially indicated in the Great Lake region), DDR and Transitional Justice (frequently implemented separately), women and minors associated with armed groups (to deal with the needs of these more vulnerable groups) and the relationship between DDR and the reform of the security sector. In addition, a study carried out by the United Nations Institute of Disarmament (UNIDIR) revealed that 95% of the financial aid aimed at implementing the United Nations Action Programme on small arms in the Great Lakes region and Central Africa is being invested in DDR programmes. The study revealed that Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were the countries that received the most aid for these types of programmes.²⁶

As a major new element in this field, the Development Aid Committee of the OCDE published its manual on the reform of the security sector, with the aim of provid-

23. See the full Code of Conduct in Appendix VII.

24. Understood as being those initiatives that arise in contexts of post-war rehabilitation and whose aim focuses on disarming one or various armed groups that have formed part of the conflict, the demobilisation of military life and the reintegration of their troops in civil life.

25. For further information, see <<http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/ddr2.htm>>.

26. Maze, K. and Parker, S., *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. Findings of a Global Survey*. UNIDIR, 2006, at <http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-ouvrage.php?ref_ouvrage=92-9045-006-B-en>.

Box 6.3. The EU Concept for support to DDR

At the end of 2006, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union approved the *EU Concept for support to DDR*, with the initial aim of discovering to what extent these types of programmes are aimed at the community's security needs.²⁷ The document was drawn up by the Commission and the Council Secretariat, taking into account the recommendations published in a previous report, coordinated by International Alert.²⁸

In terms of the *Concept*, which identifies DDR as a key area in EU activity for the peacebuilding in post-war rehabilitation, we should highlight the classification of EU activities in this field as being complementary to those of the United Nations and the World Bank. In addition, it recognises the conceptualisation of the DDR as part of the reform of the security sector, the possibility of acting in both the short and long term (i.e. from the peace processes to socioeconomic development), as well as the emphasis placed on the subject of recruitment prevention and care for child soldiers.

In the search for a coherent strategy for DDR, the above-mentioned initiatives point in the same direction, although there are certain differences. On the one hand, it celebrates the comparative advantage that the variety of both civil and military instruments available to the EU give it over other agents; and, on the other, it subsumes the DDR in the reform of the security sector, leaving the detailed definition of a common policy for this area. An obvious example of this can be found in the financing mechanisms, since the European institution channels its funds through trust funds and not through direct financing, as other international institutions are able to do.

More specifically, the aforementioned recommendations report urged the EU to focus on the DDR "as an objective", i.e. to adopt a long-term perspective in which broad-based development programmes include objectives of reconciliation, reconstruction, governance or justice, among others. In its *Concept* however, the EU reserves the possibility of the DDR acting "as a programme", i.e. in the dimension of short-term security. In short, the adoption within Europe of its own strategy with regard to a programme type has not succeeded in institutionalising a programme that would make good use of the wide range of resources that this institution has available. On the contrary, it has added certain contradictions and points that still need to be resolved with regard to this matter, and in spite of the good intentions expressed for coordinating agendas in initiatives as closely linked as the reform of the security sector.

ing donors with new guidelines for understanding the relationship between security and development, in addition to demonstrating certain basic techniques for evaluating the design, implementation and evaluation of this type of programme.²⁹ One of the most noticeable weaknesses detected in post-war rehabilitation contexts is the absence of a coherent strategy that includes all the human and economic resources available, as well as the way it is seen to be related to other parallel processes, such as justice or disarmament, within an interconnected system. Other weaknesses discovered were the lack of capacity for supporting these types of processes, along with an urgent need to empower local agents and to provide training in this matter for the government sector.

In addition, an aspect that is closely related to this type of programme is the treatment of one of the most vulnerable groups: child soldiers.³⁰ 2007 was the tenth anniversary of Graça Machel's report evaluating the impact of armed conflicts on minors and thereby highlighting the situation of young combatants, which subsequently led to the passing of legislation against the enforced recruitment in this sector, as reflected in the

latest report of the Secretary-General of the UN with regard to this matter.³¹ During those 10 years, two of the main concerns have referred to the need to include the weapons control, especially small arms, in the new document, as well as concern about the proliferation of child soldiers in contexts of armed violence (especially in urban areas) other than conflict situations. Furthermore, at the beginning of year an international conference was held in Paris, organised by UNICEF and the government of France, in which 58 countries committed themselves to ending the illegal use of children in armed conflicts, and to providing effective aid to those that are currently caught up in the activities of armed forces or groups.

b) Progress of the main DDR programmes during 2007

In 2007, 19 DDR programmes were identified (Indicator No. 14), with a figure of slightly more than a million combatants to demobilise (30% from the armed forces and 70% from armed opposition groups) and with a budget of close to 2,000 million dollars. In order to

27. See the full Concept at <http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU_Joint_concept_DDR.pdf>.

28. International Alert, *DDR: Supporting Security and Development. The EU's Added Value*, 2006, at <http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic_issues/cpp_eu_ddr.pdf>.

29. OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, OCDE, 2007, at <<http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=272>>.

30. In this section, it would have been relevant to analyse the indicator for the presence of minors in armed groups. The fact that the main source for this indicator, the annual report of the General Secretary of the UN on minors in armed conflict, does not contain this information has meant we have had to do without this indicator on this occasion.

31. See the report of the General Secretary on Minors and Armed Conflicts at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

analyse the specific progress of each of these programmes, it was decided to divide them into those that started during 2007, those that ran their course over the 12 months and those that ended in the same period.³²

The countries that initiated a DDR programme (on a state or regional level) were Cote d'Ivoire, DR Congo (Ituri) and the Sudan (SPLA). In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the President, Laurent Gbagbo, and the Prime Minister, Guillaume Soro, presided at the flame of peace ceremony that signalled the beginning of the disarmament process in the country. This process was held up for some months, due mainly to the decision about the number of troops to be demobilised within each armed group and the possibility of maintaining ranks with regard to the creation of the new armed forces. The lack of progress in the DDR led to a rise in the crime rate, mainly in the north, perpetrated by presumed members of the Forces Nouvelles and the pro-government militias, according to declarations by members of the WFP. The disarmament process began in December with two fundamentally symbolic ceremonies in which a detachment from every side withdrew from the front line to stationing points in Tiebissou and Bouaké. The DDR process is expected to last three months, and will see 5,000 soldiers from the government armed forces and 33,000 members of Forces Nouvelles quartered and subsequently disarmed. Some of them will be reinserted into the new national armed forces, and the rest will be demobilised.

In 2007, 19 DDR programmes were identified with a figure of slightly more than a million combatants to demobilise

In July, the UNDP succeeded in starting up the third phase of the DDR, aimed at the militias in the Ituri region of DR Congo, with 3,500 of the 4,500 predicted combatants being disarmed. In the rest of the country, the National DDR Programme succeeded in demobilising almost 14,000 combatants, while the process implemented by the MONUC, which had been repatriating ex-combatants since 2002, was able to help 800 of these. In Sudan, the process of demobilising some 25,000 former SPLA combatants was begun in spite of uncertainty about receiving the reintegration package, due to the delay in funds from the United Nations. In addition, the Sudanese armed forces and the SPLA army agreed to the deployment of the Joint Integrated Units designed to unite the military forces in the region, although none of the troops have received joint training. Elsewhere, in the east of the country, the ex-combatants began to abandon their stationing camps and moved to the designated areas around the region's main towns.

The countries that continued with their programmes in 2007 were Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Central African Republic, Haiti, Indonesia (Aceh), Liberia, Nepal, Rwanda and Uganda. The former DDR programme of the UNDP in Afghanistan, aimed at the state armed forces and completed in 2006, was this

year transformed into an instrument for de-mining and for the disbandment of armed groups (DIAG), and this in turn was extended to 2011. After disarming 274 militias of over 60,000 combatants and collecting almost 35,000 weapons, the Afghan executive considered that the objectives had not been fully met due to the lack of state security forces needed to carry out the plan, and the support that hundreds of militias receive from warlords and terrorist networks. In addition, in agreement with the Afghan government, both the ANBP and the UNDP committed themselves to remaining until December 2007, to follow up the Reintegration Support Projects. Furthermore, the government announced its intention to recruit members of the communities to make up police forces and the armed forces, although they denied any involvement with the creation of new paramilitary forces. In Angola, during the first quarter of 2007 the demobilisation phase was deemed to have been completed, with 97,114 combatants being demobilised, 70% of the number envisaged. The government indicated the importance of reintegrating ex-combatants into civil life, as well as establishing a law that enables disabled ex-combatants to gain employment in both public and private companies. Still on the African continent, there was a certain amount of positive progress in Burundi, with some 23,000 former combatants already demobilised, including 3,015 minors and 502 women (close to 5,400 small arms were also collected), and especially in the care for child soldiers, although episodes of violence were also detected at several quartering camps, in protest at the bad conditions.

In Chad, even though the government committed itself to demobilising minors that were operating both in the armed forces itself and in armed opposition groups, Human Rights Watch condemned the lack of commitment in this sphere,³³ which the government itself attributed to difficulties in the process due to the large number of troops to be demobilised and to the lack of infrastructures to guarantee adequate reintegration. At the end of the year, UNICEF revealed that its programme to demobilise hundreds of child soldiers was paralysed due to the fighting between the armed forces and the armed opposition groups in the east. With regard to DR Congo, Japan and the UNDP signed a two-million dollar agreement for the Japanese Government to finance the disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants with two million dollars as of 2008. According to the MDRP, the project completed the registering of former combatants who had self-demobilised, while the commencement of payment for the reintegration phase, plus the negotiation to link this programme to other projects of an agricultural nature, were still being awaited.

In Haiti, in addition to the progress of the programme itself, with a current balance of barely 200 weapons and 6,000 units of munitions collected, the debate

32. See Appendix VI.

33. HRW, *Early to War. Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict*, 2007, at <<http://hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0707/>>.


focused on the formation of a new security force, in which the FAd'H demanded its re-foundation, independently of the delivery of rehabilitation packages for ex-members who had demobilised themselves voluntarily in March 2006. In Indonesia (Aceh), the government of Japan decided to increase its support to the peace building programme in the region, led by the International Organization for Migration, by donating nine million additional dollars to support the reintegration of former combatants, among other groups. In the case of Liberia, the main concern lay in the 23,000 former combatants who had not yet participated in any training programme, two years after the disarmament process was carried out, thereby putting their effective reintegration in danger; added to this are the demonstrations by hundreds of demobilised soldiers in Monrovia in reaction to the delays in the payment of the pre-established aid.

In Nepal, the process of demobilising the armed forces and the Popular Liberation Army got under way at the beginning of the year, only to be paralysed some months later as a result of disputes between the government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), in which the UNMIN also became involved, due both to mainly material issues (the poor conditions in the holding centres and demands for equal subsidies for the armed forces and for the Maoists), and to markedly political ones (the process of verification and the status of combatants). The process recommenced at the end of the year. In Rwanda the programme continued with the demobilisation of the armed groups. To date 38,731 of the former armed forces have been demobilised (100% of those envisaged), 6,423 adult members of the armed opposition groups (27% of those envisaged) and 662 child soldiers (24% of the predicted number). Finally, in Uganda, military sources claimed to have already demobilised 4,000 soldiers in the restructuring of the country's armed forces. However, UNICEF announced that

over 150 people, including women and children, had died in the two last months in Karamoja, in the north-east region of the country, as a consequence of the confrontations between the government and the militias of shepherd communities in the area, in the framework of a forced disarmament programme that the government was carrying out.

Lastly, attention should be drawn to the end of the process in Colombia, aimed at the AUC paramilitary group, and in the Central African Republic. The Colombian government destroyed over 18,000 weapons at the end of the year, which had been collected during the process of demobilising the AUC. In addition, assurances were given that of the 36,000 former combatants under the charge of the Office of Rehabilitation, 20,000 are working and the remaining 16,000, studying. Nonetheless, the observed resurgence of paramilitary groups, under the phenomenon known as re-paramilitarisation, cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the strategy of demobilisation and reintegration that has been used since 2003, although the diversity of political and criminal motives for the phenomenon means that it is impossible to limit its cause to one single factor. For its part, the Central African Republic announced the completion of the reintegration process for the 7,565 former combatants, of which 5,514 were detected as having been completely rehabilitated (family, social and economic), and the demobilisation of some 500 child soldiers was agreed by means of a community-based integration strategy.

Sierra Leone deserves a special mention. Here the process was completed in 2005, and various experts have indicated that, in addition to establishing a figure of almost 72,490 former combatants demobilised in less than two years, they have also detected a significant decrease in the number of weapons circulating in the country in the last six years.



Countries with serious violations of human rights
 CV Country with Truth Commission
TRC Country with Truth Commission
CPI Country that has established a tribunal
TRI Country that has established a tribunal
Ongoing ICC investigation

7. Human rights and transitional justice

- Analysis of the indicators shows that serious violations of human rights were committed in 57 countries in 2007.
- The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples after 20 years of intense debates.
- Despite several difficulties, the work of the International Criminal Court was consolidated on its fifth anniversary, as well as that of the international courts, by means of new rulings, judgements and pressure on the governments concerned to hand over those suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
- The trial of the ex-president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, who became the first African head of state to be prosecuted by an international criminal court, began before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
- Despite criticisms of the work of some Truth Commissions (Timor-Leste), the possibility of creating this type of body in Burundi, Nepal and Indonesia (Aceh) was considered.

The first **section of this chapter analyses the international human rights situation** based on a series of indicators, which have been produced using non-governmental human rights organisations as sources, as well as intergovernmental and international organisations. The **second part describes the most significant features of the transitional justice processes that are** currently under way. The chapter begins with a map showing the 57 countries with serious human rights violations and the countries in which a transitional justice process is under way (according to indicator No. 21).

7.1. Human rights: analysis of the international situation

a) Commitment of states to the international instruments for human rights and International Humanitarian Law

The signing and ratification process of international human rights treaties is a first step towards compliance by states with their obligations in terms of the protection and promotion of human rights, and also provides an initial international legal basis for demanding respect for human rights (indicator No. 15). The indicator also refers to the ratifications of the additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1949), relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II)¹ due to the fact that armed conflicts increasingly use the civilian population as one of their main targets and that civilians suffer serious violations of human rights by various armed agents, as analysed below. Only thirty states had ratified the series of nine treaties as of 31 December 2007. **Bahrain** and the **Lao PDR** are the two new states that ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2007, and **Argentina** and **Mauritania** are the new states that form part of the recently created International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, after more than 20 years of intense debates

A major milestone in 2007 was the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the **Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples**, after more than 20 years of intense debates and complicated compromises. Furthermore, despite the approval by consensus of two very important international texts, the **Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities** and the **Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances**, the 20 ratifications necessary for them to come into force still had not been collected as of the end of the year.

b) The human rights situation in the world

This section describes the situation of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the world, according to non-governmental and international sources and governments, as well as the issue of the death penalty.

1. 'Non-international armed conflicts' are deemed to be those between regular armed forces and armed opposition groups or between armed opposition groups, within the territory of a single state. These are subject to a more limited series of regulations, and in particular to the provisions of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and the additional Protocol II. Article 3 regulated intra-state armed conflicts until the publication of Protocol II.

As regards the description of the human rights situation provided by the NGOs, it should be pointed out that according to analysis of the annual reports by Amnesty International² and by Human Rights Watch³ (HRW) both of which refer to events taking place in 2006 (indicator No. 16) there was a widespread worsening of the situation compared to the previous year. In specific terms, abuses pertaining to the right to life and personal safety were committed systematically and on a widespread basis in 85 countries; torture and physical abuse was applied in 103 countries; basic freedoms were seriously infringed in 146 countries; and arbitrary detentions took place in 84 countries and 56 countries held trials without due guarantees. As well as all this, there are 74 countries where there is a climate of total impunity in terms of human rights violations.

International and local NGOs also placed special emphasis in 2007 on three areas in which particularly important violations of human rights took place. These are connected to serious restrictions on freedom of expression and opinion and abuses by the state security forces and organisations (targeted at media professionals, human rights defenders and political opponents), violations of human rights and IHL in situations of armed conflict, and the consequences of the fight against terrorism for individual freedom.

With regard to the first area, the NGOs reported that in Africa, the government of **Zimbabwe** persisted with its policy of persecuting defenders of human rights, prohibited all rights to demonstrations and meetings for three months (although *de facto* this was extended throughout 2007) and made it more difficult for NGOs to obtain licences to work in the country. This situation led to the announcement by the EU that it was increasing the list of those new government ministers to be sanctioned for alleged human right violations to five (this penalty already applies to around 100 members of the Executive). According to figures from the main opposition party, there have been 4,122 cases of political violence in the country since January, while the organisation Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum counted a total of 2,333 human rights violations in the same period. In **Guinea**, there was a violent response by the police and armed forces to the demonstrations in January-February 2007 which caused more than 130 deaths and 1,500 injuries, and of those directly and indirectly responsible for these events, who continue to hold their posts in the security forces, remained unpunished in 2007. **Somalia** experienced a wave of attacks against the news media, which even included the murder of two freelance journalists.

In Asia, **Pakistan** experienced an acute crisis of independence of the judicial authorities which led to a

series of protests that met with violence by the armed forces. In late 2007, the state of emergency decreed by Musharraf also led to arrests *en masse* of opposition politicians, human rights activists and lawyers. Elsewhere, the government of **Myanmar**, which in 2007 had persisted with its policy of persecuting human rights organisations, prohibiting them from renewing their registration and establishing a system of direct permission from the government, used heavy repression during the demonstrations against the regime in late 2007, which led to over 30 deaths, according to non-governmental sources. In **Sri Lanka**, dozen of journalists demonstrated in protest at the death and kidnapping of news media workers in the country and highlighted that it is one of the most dangerous in the world for this group. For the first time, HRW published an extensive report on **the Philippines**⁴ which laid out the responsibility of the State security forces in the extrajudicial executions and disappearance of members of left-wing political parties and NGOs, journalists and critics among the clergy, in a climate of total impunity.⁵

The NGOs also highlighted violations of freedom of expression and association in countries in **Central Asia and the Caucasus**. The main victims were political opponents and political prisoners in **Turkmenistan** and journalists critical of the authorities in **Azerbaijan**, the OSCE member state with the highest number of imprisoned journalists. Several international NGOs demanded that the EU should not lift its sanctions against **Uzbekistan** due to the heavy internal repression exerted there, to coincide with its first partial suspension of a co-operation agreement due to a lack of compliance in the human rights field. Amnesty International also highlighted the deterioration in freedom of expression and association in Uzbekistan in 2007, the persistent reports of torture and widespread inhumane treatment of people arrested and the authorities' refusal to suspend executions, despite the presidential decree abolishing the death penalty from 2008 onwards. HRW also called on the EU to exert greater pressure on **Russia** with regard to the restoration of freedom of expression and media freedom, and the withdrawal of the restrictions imposed on NGOs in a pre-electoral context.

As regards the second area, related to violations of human rights in situations of armed conflict, in Africa the serious human rights situation in **Darfur (Sudan)** is particularly worthy of mention. The air attacks by the armed forces in Northern Darfur - which prevent distinction between military and civilian targets - were described by the OHCHR as a serious violation of humanitarian law and human rights. She also accused the government of Sudan of failing to take any effective

The NGOs highlighted violations of freedom of expression and association in countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus

2. Amnesty International, *2007 Report. The state of human rights in the world*. See complete report at: <<http://thereport.amnesty.org/esl/Homepage>>.
3. *Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007*. See complete report at: <<http://hrw.org/wr2k7/>>.
4. Human Rights Watch, *Scared Silent. Impunity for the Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines*, June 2007.
5. Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, declared in his report on the country in February 2007 (A/HRC/4/20/Add.3) that a significant number of extrajudicial executions in the Philippines are clearly attributable to the armed forces.

Box 7.1. Exceptional measures and human rights

While resorting to a state of emergency has always been a tool used by governments of a more authoritarian nature, recently there have been abuses in the adoption of measures of this type by states within the framework of the fight against terrorism all over the world.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights authorises states to unilaterally and temporarily suspend some of their obligations, i.e. to declare a state of emergency. However, there are three essential conditions: the situation must be of an exceptional nature, it must “endanger the nation” and the state imposing it must officially notify the UN. International law considers states of emergency to be legal, but requires strict limits that require that the measures taken to be of an exceptional and temporary nature and may under no circumstances revoke the right to life or to not suffer torture or physical abuse.⁶

States of emergency entail the creation by the state of a framework of an exceptional legal nature in which the powers of the executive and those of the national security forces are usually increased while the powers of the judiciary, and the control it exerts over governments, are seriously weakened. The increase in this type of situations is an attempt by certain governments to create regulations that enable actions that are serious violations of human rights in an ordinary regulatory framework of the rule of law to be justified, such as those in Georgia or in Pakistan at the end of the year.

action to prevent future attacks, or to prosecute those responsible or to compensate the victims. HRW asked the UNO Security Council to impose an embargo on oil production.

In America, Amnesty International also used its annual report to say that despite the decrease in crime (such as murders and kidnappings) in **Colombia**, and in forced displacement, the FARC and ELN guerrillas continued to commit serious and repeated infringements of IHL, such as hostage-taking and the murder of civilians, and the recruitment of minors. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also reported the use of physical, sexual and psychological violence against women as a war strategy and the discrimination arising from the conflict.

In Asia, HRW and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission expressed their concern at the growing number of civilian victims in **Afghanistan** and especially those of bombardments by the American armed forces. According to these organisations, the denial in some cases of responsibility for the events and the resort to a formal discourse of apology in others, is a denial of the basic principles of humanitarian law by United States troops and shows the government's weakness in terms of protection of its civilian population. The organisations also condemned the actions by the security forces in **Sri Lanka**, where they are held responsible for contributing to the kidnapping of children in a context in which serious human rights violations are being committed by the security forces, paramilitary groups and the Tamil guerrillas.

Amnesty International, HRW, the Moscow Helsinki Group, Memorial, and the Demos *think thank* condemned the serious human rights violations arising as a result of anti-terrorist operations by the Russian authorities in **Chechnya** and in the rest of the northern Caucasus, although the Russian organisation, Memorial, highlighted a reduction in kidnappings in Chechnya in

recent months. HRW criticised the fact that despite various Council of Europe organisations having extensively documented the atrocities committed in Chechnya, Russia had not been reprimanded by the organisation due to a requirement for unanimity among the organisation's members before it acts against any of its members. It also declared that Russia has yet to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.

The Middle East continued to be one of the most unstable areas, in which the civilian population also suffered from the worst consequences. With regard to the consequences of the **Israeli-Palestinian conflict** in civil society, the human rights organisations B'tselem and the Civil Rights Association rejected the policy of expropriations and the forced displacements of Palestinians in the West Bank, while the former and the HaMoked Centre for the Defence of the Individual condemned the inhumane conditions under which the 11,000 Palestinian detainees were being kept in prisons in Israel, and the infringement of their procedural rights.

The third area of work by NGOs in 2007 covered the impact of the fight against terrorism and the increasing reports of torture and forced disappearances. They began the year by once again demanding the closure of the detention centre at **Guantánamo**, to end five years of torture and detentions. The NGOs stressed that despite repeated calls by the United Nations, the EU and other organisations for the closure of this centre; more than 400 people remain detained there indefinitely. In late 2007 the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and the French Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH) filed a lawsuit against Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defence, before the Public Prosecutor of the Paris Court of First Instance for his responsibility for the methods of torture used at Guantanamo.

6. General commentary on article 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on states of emergency.

Box 7.2. The media's right to freedom of expression in areas of armed conflict

One of the groups subjected to particular persecution in countries engaged in armed conflict or in a situation of tension is that of the **media professionals**. The ability to pass on information and to generate critical debate makes them one of the main targets for non-democratic regimes, thereby breaching the state's obligation to guarantee freedom of the press and expression. As a result, in his 2007 report, Ambeyi Ligabo, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, condemned the precarious situation in which this group has to work when it goes to areas in conflict and reiterated that the safety of journalists is an essential condition for guaranteeing the freedom of expression and opinion in a country.

HRW described the treatment received by those detained by the CIA as **"forced disappearance"** and **demanding that the United States government provide information on this matter. The NGO stated that these people could have been moved to prisons abroad, where they would remain under the effective control of the CIA, or may have been returned to their countries of origin, which include countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria**, where the torture of those suspected of terrorism is commonplace. In 2007, international NGOs applauded the European Parliament's approval of a report demanding an independent investigation and considered it unlikely that certain European governments were unaware of flights stopping in their airports with illegally detained persons on board. The report also made clear that several European governments violated one of the central principles of the protection of human rights, that of *non-refoulement*, which prohibits sending a person to a country where they are in danger of suffering serious human rights violations.

In Asia, **the Philippines** approved a Human Security Act,⁷ in which the excessively vague definition of terrorism, as is common in legislation of this type can lead to abuses by the authorities. Among the provisions that entail the greatest risks for the respect of human rights are the discretionary powers conferred on the police, who can make arrests without the need for judicial orders, the possibility of sending a person to another

country if they are required to give evidence as part of terrorism investigations and punishments of 40 years in prison with no provision for parole.

As regards the human rights situation described by some intergovernmental and international organisations, the ninth **Annual Report on human rights in the European Union of 2007**⁸ (indicator No. 17), covers the period from July 2006 to June 2007. This provides an overview of all the policies and actions adopted by the EU in the field of human rights, both in terms of bilateral initiatives of the EU with other countries and its actions in multilateral forums. In this respect, the EU co-presented 13 resolutions to the Third Commission of the UNO General Assembly, of which only four were adopted. As its main theme, the EU led a declaration on the death penalty which obtained the support of 85 states. Finally, the first report of the recently created European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on racism and inequality in member countries, describes situations of discrimination in the areas of employment, housing and education, and underlines the increase in racist violence in several member states.⁹

As regards the countries mentioned in the reports, resolutions and declarations of the Human Rights Council (HRC), and in the reports of the special mechanisms of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the resolutions of the Third Commission of

Human Rights Council held a special session on the human rights situation in Myanmar

Box 7.3. Legislations that protect the excessive powers of State security forces

In recent years, some abuses by state security forces have taken place within the legal framework of so-called "national security laws" or "anti-terrorist legislation". After the cases of the **United States** and the **United Kingdom**, one of the countries to follow this trend in 2007 was **Thailand**, with a Draft Internal Security Bill which would enable people to be detained in private centres rather than in police stations for more than seven days without an arrest order, and which would exempt the security forces from disciplinary action and criminal and civil liability, promoting impunity in certain contexts.

In the face of this type of legislation insistence must be made that all public authorities in a state, including security forces, should respect the principles of legality and proportionality in their actions. They must also respect the human rights regulations contained in constitutional texts, international treaties and United Nations codes of conduct which contain guarantees and rights, which are sometimes omitted by anti-terrorist legislation.

7. For more information, see <<http://philippines.ahrchk.net/pdf/HumanSecurityActof2007.pdf>>.

8. European Union Council, *EU Annual Report on human rights - 2007*, Brussels, 18 October 2007, at <<http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st13288-re01.en07.pdf>>.

9. EU, *Report on racism and xenophobia in Member states of the EU, 2007*,

the UN General Assembly (indicator No.18), special reference is made to Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, DR Congo, PDR Korea, Israel, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, Palestine and Sudan. In 2007, the HRC met in three **ordinary sessions** (March, June, September-December), which enabled it to discuss and vote on 51 resolutions, 12 decisions and two presidential declarations.¹⁰ The HRC held a **special session** on the human rights situation in **Myanmar**. After a year of uncertainty and intense negotiations, the HRC finally adopted a document entitled “*Human Rights Council: institutional construction*” in June 2007, which acts as the basis for its working methods.¹¹ This document, which establishes the term of the thematic mandates as three years and that of the country mandates as one year, determines the special procedures that their mandates may carry out for a maximum term of six years. Although the NGOs may present candidates, and may even stand independently, the selection procedure for candidates will remain rigorous.

Similarly, the Council adopted internal regulations confirming that its headquarters will be in Geneva and that there will be at least 10 weeks of meetings a year. Importantly, participation by NGOs will be governed by the categories of resolution 1996/31 of the ECOSOC and by the practices established by the previous Commission. It should also be stressed that the presentation of a resolution on a given country will depend on obtaining the support of at least 15 member states. These agreements brought to an end two years of uncertainty regarding the future and importance of this international forum, and raise the possibility of its work not being demoted to a lower level within the United Nations system.

Lastly, the question of awarding asylum status (indicator No. 20) implies the recognition by the governments of the host states that the security and freedom of applicants is under threat in their country of origin. It therefore entails governmental recognition of human rights violation in the country of origin and/or of persecution due to contexts of armed conflict or tension or other reasons: (discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, nationality or social group). In order of importance, those awarded in 2007 include people from **Somalia** (over 25,000), followed by **Myanmar, China, Colombia** and **DR Congo**. With regard to this issue, the trend towards a lack of respect for the rights of these people in a vulnerable situation persists in all countries. This year, the UNHCR warned of priority being given to security issues alleged by states when processing applications for asylum. The right to asylum is a basic right that is recognised in various international human rights instruments and in the constitutions of numerous countries. This organisation also indicated that the number of applications for asylum from Iraq in industrialised countries increased by 45% in the first half of 2007 (compared with the six previous months), with a total of 19,800 applicants.¹²

In 2007 serious violations of human rights took place in 57 countries

Finally, the existence and application of the **death penalty** (indicator No. 19) is the denial of the most basic right: the right to life. On 18 December 2007, the UN General Assembly approved a historic resolution in favour of a moratorium on the death penalty all over the world. The approval of this resolution is a major step forward towards total abolition. Its adoption by a broad majority also confers substantial moral and political weight on the resolution. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed in 1948, only eight countries had abolished capital punishment. 130 have currently done so by law or in practice, and last year only 25 governments applied the death penalty. In December, the Assembly of New Jersey (United States) approved a draft law to replace the death penalty with life imprisonment. After the draft has been signed by the State Governor, New Jersey will become the first state in the **United States** to abolish the death penalty since the Supreme Court restored it nationally in 1976.

According to data from Amnesty International, almost half the world’s countries abolished the death penalty in their legislation between January and October 2007; 90 countries have abolished it for all crimes; 11 countries have abolished it for all crimes except war crimes; 32 countries can be considered as abolitionist in practice as despite retaining the death penalty in their legislation, they have not carried out any executions in the last 10 years or more. In total, 133 countries have completely abolished it – in their legislation and in practice – and 64 maintain and use it despite the number of countries which carry out executions having fallen during the year. 91% of all the executions taking place between January and October 2007 took place in **China, the United States, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Sudan**. It is estimated that at least 1,010 people were executed in **China**, although it is likely that the real figure is much higher. However, official statistics are a secret in the country, which makes monitoring difficult. **Iran** executed 177 people, **Pakistan** executed 82 and 53 executions took place in 12 states in the **USA**. The estimated total number of prisoners on death row internationally ranges between 19,185 and 24,646 according to information provided by human rights organisations, the media and the very limited figures provided by governments. During the year, Iran executed four people who were minors when they committed their crimes and another minor was executed in Pakistan.

Finally, based on an assessment of these indicators and the trends observed on an international scale with regard to the major challenges faced by the protection and implementation of human rights, a list has been produced showing the countries with serious violations of human rights and basic freedoms. This report also considers that in 2007 **serious violations of human rights took place in 57 countries**.

10. Appendix VIII shows the work of the Council in detail.

11. A/HRC/RES/5/1, 18 June 2007.

12. Iraq was already the leading country of origin for requests for asylum in countries in the industrialised world in 2006.

Table 7.1. Countries with serious human rights violations in 2007

| | | |
|---------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Afghanistan | Philippines | Palestine, N.A. |
| Saudi Arabia | Guinea | Qatar |
| Algeria | Equatorial Guinea | Russian Federation |
| Azerbaijan | Haiti | Sierra Leone |
| Belarus | India | Syria, Arab Rep. |
| Burundi | Indonesia | Somalia |
| Cambodia | Iran | Sri Lanka |
| China | Iraq | Sudan |
| Colombia | Israel | Swaziland |
| DR Congo | Jordan | Thailand |
| PDR Korea | Kazakhstan | Taiwan |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Libya | Tajikistan |
| Cuba | Lebanon | Togo |
| Chad | Malaysia | Turkmenistan |
| USA | Myanmar | Uganda |
| Egypt | Nepal | Uzbekistan |
| UAE | Nigeria | Vietnam |
| Eritrea | Oman | Yemen |
| Ethiopia | Pakistan | Zimbabwe |

7.2. Transitional justice

This section covers the monitoring of some aspects of transitional justice in the peacebuilding (a), judicial processes under way (b, c, d), and the most important work done by Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in 2007. Indicator No. 21 refers to countries that have started some of the processes of transitional justice aimed at dealing both judicially and extra-judicially with the human rights abuses committed in a past context of armed conflict or dictatorial regime.¹³ As regards ordinary justice, the most significant decision in 2007 was the authorisation by Chile's Supreme Court for the extradition to Peru of ex-President Alberto Fujimori, and his trial which began in December 2007.

a) Transitional justice in the construction of peace

One of the most important events in 2007 was the signing in **Uganda** of an agreement on responsibility and reconciliation between the government and the LRA armed opposition group. This agreement is based on the ICC principle of complementarity, and underlines the competence of the national jurisdiction to judge crimes committed during the conflict and also establishes that traditional systems of justice must play a central role in the demand for responsibilities, such as the *Mato Oput* traditional method of justice of the Acholi community.¹⁴

The agreement also established the need to include alternative mechanisms of justice in Uganda which promote reconciliation. However, it did not specify the type of alternatives or mention what levels of responsibility. The parties agreed that the armed forces would be judged in a criminal jurisdiction and the members of the LRA would be judged by criminal and civil law, meaning that the government of Uganda must file a lawsuit of complementarity before the ICC, as this court had already issued an international order for the search and capture against the five main LRA leaders. In this context, the OHCHR in the country published a report on transitional justice which showed how the communities accused both the government and the LRA of human rights violations.¹⁵ Elsewhere, the Human Rights Center at the University of Berkeley published a study written between April and June 2007, based on 2,875 interviews, which showed that 70% of those interviewed stressed the importance of ensuring that human rights violators are held responsible.¹⁶ The majority were also in favour of some form of amnesty as many LRA members are victims of kidnapping. Finally, 52% of those interviewed also said that it is necessary to establish processes of pardon, reconciliation and reintegration in communities.

With regard to the **DR Congo**, Louise Arbour, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, pointed out that the United Nations is against any type of amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity and if the government does not have the means to prosecute those responsible, as a minimum measure, it should under no circumstances give them jobs in the security forces or in government. Finally, in **Côte d'Ivoire**, President Laurent Gbagbo decreed a new law providing an amnesty which covered the crimes committed during the conflict since September 2000. This

13. A range of judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that are implemented in societies in transition from armed conflict to peace or from a dictatorship to democracy in order to deal with a past of systematic violations and abuses of human rights. The main strategies for transitional justice are prosecutions (international, mixed, hybrid or internationalised and traditional courts), reform of state institutions (security forces and government posts), seeking the truth and historical clarification (official, non-official, local and international commissions), reparations to victims (restoration, compensation, rehabilitation, moral compensation/memory and guarantees of non-repetition), and the promotion of reconciliation.

14. '*Mato Oput*' consists of a system of face-to-face meetings between those involved before a council of elders who must establish blame. This must be acknowledged by a representative of the family. After compensation has been decided upon, the agreement is sealed by drinking a beverage prepared with roots that purify those involved of evil spirits (malice is attributed to spirits and must be treated by exorcising them).

15. See the report *Making Peace Our Own: Victims Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda* of 14 August 2007 at: <http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/northern_Uganda_august2007.pdf>.

16. See the report *New Population-Based Data on Attitudes about Peace and Justice* from the Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable Populations in <<http://www.hrcberkeley.org/pdfs/Uganda-survey-research-note.pdf>>.

measure was not applied to economic crimes or those other than attacks against the security of the state. However, crimes against humanity and massive human rights violations by combatants on both sides during the conflict will go unpunished. The president considered this measure to be a way of accelerating national reconciliation.

In Asia, the government of **Thailand** announced its intention to propose the approval of an amnesty to Parliament, covering people involved in the violence unleashed in recent years in the armed conflict in the south of the country. This is a substantial change from the counter-insurgency policy of the previous Shinawatra government. In **Pakistan**, President Pervez Musharraf offered an amnesty to combatants handing in their weapons in the area of tension of Balochistan, and warned that very strict action would be taken against those failing to do so. Elsewhere, the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, created during the armed conflict, stated that the human rights provisions mentioned in the Peace Agreement had not been implemented by either the government or the Maoists. The Commission pointed out that neither side had provided information on the whereabouts of detainees, highlighted the difficulties facing people when returning to their homes and the lack of initiatives by the two sides in the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission, which was included in the peace agreement.

In **Vietnam**, in October the Asian Human Rights Commission reported that 16 years after the signing of peace agreements, the lack of independence of judicial authorities persists, and called on the government to meet its obligations arising from the Paris Peace Agree-

ments. And in **Afghanistan**, the lower chamber of Parliament approved a resolution on National Stability and Reconciliation which included an amnesty for a large number of those responsible for human rights violations. The Independent Human Rights Commission stressed that more than 18 months after the approval of the Action Plan for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, it was being hindered by a lack of political will and the increase in armed violence in the country.

In Europe and Central Asia, the pro-Russian President of **Chechnya**, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that a draft for a new amnesty was being prepared for all Chechens who had left the republic under the influence of negative propaganda, despite having stated in mid-June that there would be no more amnesties of this type. A report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights¹⁷ (IHF) stated that the soldiers amnestied and their families are the population at greatest risk of persecution in the Republic, and condemned the kidnappings, torture and extrajudicial executions which they are subject to, and which are often presented as criminal cases. According to the organisation, the amnesty in Chechnya has been a process of virtual normalisation which has not established justice, human rights or peace and the majority of those amnestied were forced to accept the offer of amnesty to show high figures of combatants putting down their weapons. Finally, in **Tajikistan**, on the tenth anniversary of the National Peace Agreement that ended the conflict there, the Parliament approved an amnesty law that excluded those detained due to the conflict and those who are facing charges of murder, people or drugs trafficking, terrorism or rape.

Box 7.4. Social rights in transitional justice processes

Traditionally, processes for holding people to account for abuses in the past have been limited to assuming responsibilities for violations of civil and political rights and satisfaction of the right to truth, justice and reparation for victims of this type category of rights. Meanwhile, demands concerning infringements of social rights during conflicts have been relegated to the political sphere and to social justice, but not to the legal sphere. However, this legal treatment is not appropriate to the serious consequences for victims of situations such as violations of the right to health, food or work in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which have been condemned by the International Court of Justice, or the million of cases of forced displacement in conflicts such as the one in Sudan, condemned by the quasi-judicial mechanisms of the United Nations.

In this respect, the report *New Population-Based Data on Attitudes about Peace and Justice* states how the victims of the conflict in Uganda include among their priorities health (45.2%), peace (41%), subsistence and land for cultivation (37.2%), food (43.2%) and education for their children (30.5%).¹⁸

There are some innovative decisions in this area, such as that by the ICTY (in the Kupreskic case) which recognised that the destruction of homes and properties could constitute a crime against humanity when they are committed intentionally. Another was the ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Plan de Sánchez case) that the government of Guatemala had to implement health, education and infrastructure programmes for communities that had suffered from human rights violations. These cases show that it is possible and necessary for processes of transitional justice to begin to treat human rights as an indivisible whole. Infringements of social rights must be investigated, those responsible held to account and the victims must be compensated for the injustices suffered.

17. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Amnestied People as Targets for Persecution in Chechnya, 2007*. See complete report at: <http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4402>.

18. See the report *New Population-Based Data on Attitudes about Peace and Justice*, at <<http://www.hrcberkeley.org/pdfs/Uganda-survey-research-note.pdf>>.

b) The International Criminal Court

The **International Criminal Court (ICC)** is the first permanent international judicial body to sit in judgement on serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. In 2007, the ICC celebrated the fifth anniversary of the Statute of Rome, and was described by Ban Ki-moon, the UN General Secretary, as one of the greatest achievements of this century. In 2007, the ICC consolidated its work penalising the conduct of individuals.

In 2007, the ICC Prosecutors' Office identified the first two suspects for war crimes and crimes against humanity in **Sudan (Darfur)**, the ex-Minister for the Interior and current Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Ahmed Haroun, and the man considered to be the main leader of the *Janjaweed* pro-government militias. Both are accused of selecting civilians as targets. However, the government of Sudan not only failed to take any initiative concerning the arrest of the two suspects summonsed by the ICC, but instead one of them is currently the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, something which was described as unacceptable by the ICC Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo. The argument given by the Sudanese government consisted of the ICC's lack of jurisdiction in the case, as the country has not ratified the Statute of Rome, and it also expressed its disagreement regarding the lack of accusations against members of rebel groups in Darfur. However, the work of the ICC is based on UN Security Council resolution 1593 which is the body that referred the situation to the Prosecutor, and which can establish the competence of this body even for countries that have not ratified the Statute of Rome.¹⁹

Another case being investigated in 2007 was that of Thomas Lubanga, for whom the ICC confirmed a formal accusation of crimes of recruitment and enlistment of minors under 15 years of age in an organised armed group and their active use in hostilities in **DR Congo**. This case is especially important because it is the ICC's first case regarding the use of child soldiers.

During the year, the Prosecutor also began investigations into individual responsibilities in the **Central African Republic**. The prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, stressed the significant indications of massive violations of a sexual nature between 2002 and 2003, and announced that this is the first time that accusations of sexual crimes vastly exceed the number of alleged executions. While various NGOs were satisfied at the news, they said that the Prosecutor's decision came four years too late, with the danger of stigmatisation for the victims and the risk of loss of evidence that this entails.

c) Ad hoc International Criminal Courts

The **International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)** presented its annual report, in which the Prosecutor discussed the end of the judgement phase of 27 cases (involving 33 accused) while nine more cases were underway (22 accused). A trend that was consolidated this year was the strengthening of the national judicial system.²⁰ This year saw the cases moving to the national jurisdiction, with the transfer of more than 30 files, with the ICTR forecast to end its mandate in late 2008. Negotiations also began to transfer 15 tribunal cases to the national jurisdictions of other states. Finally, the ICTR announced that it will be unable to meet the schedule set by the UN Security Council to complete its work if it does not receive cooperation from the member states of the United Nations in the arrest of fugitives and acceptance of the transfer of cases and financing of the work to be done in the remaining trials.

Among the rulings given in 2007 were the guilty verdicts handed down against the country's former finance minister, Emmanuel Ndingabizi, and the Catholic priest Athanase Seromba, who were declared guilty of charges of genocide, extermination and crimes against humanity committed in 1994; for Juvénal Habyarimana, ex-mayor of Bujumbura (Kigali Prefecture), who pleaded guilty to participation in mass murder before the ICTR, and François Karerana, ex-governor of the Prefecture of Kigali-Rural.

Around 100,000 people have been judged by traditional *Gacaca* courts, of which only 18,930 have been acquitted. The maximum sentences imposed by these courts range between 30 years' and life imprisonment. During the year, Human Rights Watch nonetheless reported cases in which the principles of independence and impartiality of this method were not respected, and expressed its concern at the procedural errors and said that they should be rectified to generate confidence in this system.

In Europe, the **International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)** continued to focus its efforts on the highest-ranking leaders accused of the most serious crimes, after concluding its actions against 106 of the 161 people facing charges.²¹ One of the main concerns was, as in the case of Rwanda, the arrest of four fugitives, and in particular Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, accused of war crimes and genocide as a result of the Srebrenica massacre. Throughout the year, Prosecutor Carla del Ponte repeated her demand to the Serbian authorities to co-operate with the court by handing over the suspects, and to Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina to increase their efforts for their

19. S/RES/1593 of 31 March 2005, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm>.

20. This court was created by the UN Security Council in resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, in order to prosecute those allegedly responsible for genocide and other serious violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighbouring territories between 1 January and 31 December 1994. See its 12th Annual Report, at <<http://69.94.11.53/default.htm>>.

21. This court was created in 1993 by Security Council Resolution 827,²³ of 25 May 1993, in order to prosecute people responsible for serious violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

search and capture. As a measure of pressure, Carla del Ponte requested that the EU sign no pre-membership agreement with Serbia until the main suspects have been handed over. Serbia's relented in its attitude as the pressure from the EU increased. This pressure took the specific form of the prior condition imposed by the EU concerning full co-operation with the ICTY as a prior step to the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.

In November, Carla del Ponte issued a report which highlighted some improvements in the search for fugitives by Serbia. This report was considered by the EU Expansion Commissioner as a sign of political good faith by the Serbian government, and as a result the EU began talks about this agreement, although it stressed that it would not finally be signed until the two fugitives were arrested.

d) Mixed, hybrid or internationalised courts

One of the highest profile international cases was the beginning of the trial of the ex-president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, before the **Special Court for Sierra Leone**, being the first African head of state placed on trial for serious crimes before an international criminal court. Taylor was accused of 11 crimes against humanity, including murder and mutilation of civilians, the kidnapping of women and girls as sex slaves and the use of children as combatants. Although this trial only covers crimes committed as a consequence of support for the RUF rebel group by the Liberian armed forces, the armed forces have also been accused of being involved in human rights abuses in other West African states, including Liberia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

The trial, which was planned to start on 4 June, was postponed until 20 August. The Liberian ex-president refused to appear before the Special Court in The Hague, alleging a lack of guarantees and inequality of resources between the prosecution and the defence, as he only had one lawyer, compared to the prosecution's nine. Finally, the Court decided that at the request of the accused's new defence counsel, the first hearing would begin on 7 January 2008. The Special Court for Sierra Leone also reached agreement with the United Kingdom for Charles Taylor to be imprisoned in that country if he is convicted.

In 2007, the Court issued its first verdicts and declared guilty three members of the AFRC (an armed group allied to the RUF) accused of the recruitment of minors. This case is especially important, as it is the first time that an international court has issued a verdict on this subject. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the General Secretary's Special Representative for minors and armed conflicts, declared his satisfaction with the ver-

dict. Of particular note was the death before the verdict of one of the accused, the leader of the CDF self-defence militias, Sam Hinga Norman. In the words of Stephen Rapp, Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, this deprived the country of its right to justice.

The United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone also imposed long sentences on three ex-rebel leaders accused of multiple war crimes and crimes against humanity during the civil war that devastated the country in the 1990s. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu were found guilty of eleven charges including acts of terrorism, rape, slavery and recruitment of children aged under 15 years old in armed groups. Finally, the awareness-raising work done by the Court in the country in terms of its mandate and the progress of its work is noteworthy.²²

The **United Nations Special Tribunal for Cambodia**²³ prosecuted Kang Kek Leu, also known as "Duch", on suspicion of having participated in the genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge regime. In 2007, a major arrest was also made - that of the surviving ex-leader of the Khmer Rouge, Nuon Chea, also known as 'Comrade Two', who faces charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes and who is in preventive custody. Another important arrest was that of Ieng Sary, former foreign affairs minister in the regime, who was amnestied during the peace talks in 1989. Sary faces charges of crimes against humanity, as does his wife Ieng Thirith. These arrests are the most important that the Tribunal has made for Cambodia since its creation.

In 2007, progress was also made in the work on approving internal regulations. However, the Tribunal continued to be the focus of intense criticism. Human rights organisations called for the adoption of internal regulations that respect international standards and which ensure the independence of judicial authorities and the protection of victims and the accused. The rapporteur for the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, condemned the lack of impartiality by judges and the excessive power of the Executive in the appointment of judges, which is evidence of the lack of impartiality in the judicial system.

Furthermore, the debate on the immunity enjoyed by King Sihanouk, head of state of the Khmer Rouge regime until 1976, revived the debate on political control of the tribunal and also received various criticisms by these organisations. The Cambodian Action Committee for Justice and Equality demanded that immunity for Sihanouk be withdrawn, but the government immediately issued a communiqué rejecting the proposal. The Executive threatened to dismantle the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia if they tried to illegally accuse the ex-monarch Norodom Sihanouk of crimes committed during the regime.

22. See <<http://www.sc-sl.org/specialcourtannualreport2006-2007.pdf>>.

23. This tribunal was created in 2003 to judge the leaders of the Khmer Rouge responsible for serious violations of human rights committed between 1975 and 1979 and consists of Cambodian and foreign personnel and judges.

However, among international courts, the most controversial case was due to the Security Council's decision to use a resolution to create the **Special Tribunal for Lebanon to consider the assassination of the ex-prime minister of Lebanon**, Rafik Hariri, in an especially complex regional context.²⁴ The then prime minister, Fouad Siniora, expressed his satisfaction at the resolution, while the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, described it as a violation of the country's sovereignty. This argument was supported by Syria, which also rejected the conclusions of a United Nations investigation that had linked it with Hariri's assassination, and threatened not to co-operate with the tribunal, and warned that Syrian suspects would be judged in their own country.²⁵

One of the highest profile international cases in 2007 was the beginning of the trial of the ex-president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, before the Special Court for Sierra Leone

As regards the **Iraqi High Tribunal**, NGOs continued to report procedural errors in the case of the Dujail massacre in which Saddam Hussein and three other people were found guilty of crimes against humanity and executed in December 2006. The NGOs condemned the court's procedural failings and lack of independence and the shortcomings in revealing the prosecution evidence to the defence.

e) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

The most important progress and setbacks in 2007 with regard to these non-judicial mechanisms of transitional justice are listed below.

Table 7.2. **Truth Commissions: progress and setbacks in 2007**

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Liberia | The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Liberia (2006) renewed its work in October, and investigated the atrocities committed since late 2003 in the civil wars. This was after several delays, due among other factors to the Commission deeming it necessary to delay the hearings and continue awareness-raising work among the population to ensure that it was fully informed and able to participate in the hearings. Another reason for the delay in work was the lack of funds. |
| Sierra Leone | The Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission urged the new government and the international community to increase their efforts to achieve the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and to assign the appropriate responsibilities and to obtain support from donor countries. |
| Timor-Leste | The presidents of Timor-Leste and Indonesia announced the extension of the Truth and Friendship Commission (2005) mandate by another six months. This Commission remained subject to suspicion by several organisations in civil society which accused it of promoting impunity. They also expressed their desire for an international court to be established. As a result of this situation, the UN General Secretary issued a communiqué stating the organisation would not support the work of the Commission until it complied with international standards and that the UN would not support amnesties for crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or massive violations of human rights. |
| Other truth commissions (under discussion) | |
| Burundi | The government showed its willingness to create a national commission for truth and reconciliation and a special court. However, the negotiations with the United Nations, which started in 2006, have yet to produce an agreement due to the different stances on the principle of non-immunity or amnesty for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, (despite the clarity of the Arusha Agreement) and on the neutrality and independence of these bodies, and the working relationship between them (the government does not want an independent prosecutor, but instead someone to deal with the cases that the truth commission refers to the court). |
| Indonesia (Aceh) | In late 2007, the provincial government of Aceh raised the possibility of creating a truth and reconciliation committee to resolve cases of human rights abuses. |
| Nepal | The government proposed the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission which would cover serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity, but which would however exclude serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. The draft law was strongly criticised by NGOs for denying victims their rights to truth, justice and reparations. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the country also expressed its concern at a possible amnesty, and recommended the need for prosecution of those responsible for the abuses committed by the state and by the CPN-M armed group. |


24. Russia, China, South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar abstained from the resolution, arguing that the delicate situation in the country did not make an imposition of this type advisable. On the other hand, the United States, the United Kingdom and France said that political assassination must be punished and that the request to the Court had come from the Lebanese government itself. See S/RES/1757 of 30 May 2007, at <<http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc07/scr107.htm>>.

25. See panel 2.6 in the tensions chapter.

Finally, to conclude this chapter, the ruling of the International Court of Justice with regard to Serbia should be mentioned, as this was the most important decision of the year regarding state responsibility for the perpetration of crimes against humanity. Despite the fact that 8,000 people were murdered in Srebrenica according to official figures, the Court deemed that the

only obligation breached by Serbia was that of preventing genocide. This ruling therefore seems to omit the fact that the responsibility of states due to omission has the same legal value and the same seriousness as committing the violation according to various United Nations bodies.²⁶

26. Chapter III of the Draft Articles on State responsibility for internationally illegal acts, adopted by the International Law Commission in its 53rd period of sessions (A/56/10) and an appendix by the GA in its Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.



■ Countries with serious gender inequalities

8. The gender dimension in peacebuilding

- The situation of women was particularly serious in 27 countries, the majority of which were African, as stated by the UNDP.
- The United Nations highlighted the need for efforts to be redoubled to implement Resolution 1325, which so far has only made progress in formal terms.
- There was a proposal for the creation of a single United Nations agency to promote, supervise and assess the integration of gender issues and work done within the United Nations system.
- There were numerous condemnations of the massive use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in Myanmar and DR Congo.
- The UN Secretary-General presented his report on the measures taken to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation by United Nations personnel, and pointed out that the increase in complaints is partially explained by the improvement in the mechanisms available to victims.

This chapter analyses the various initiatives being carried out by the United Nations and various other international organisations and movements in terms of the peacebuilding from a **gender perspective**.¹ This gender perspective shows the different impacts of armed conflicts on women and men, but also to what extent and how the two groups participate in the peacebuilding and what contributions are made by women to this process. The chapter is structured in three main parts: the first is a review of the international situation in terms of gender inequalities by means of an analysis of the Human Development Index as it relates to gender. Secondly, peacebuilding is analysed from a gender perspective, and the last section focuses on the gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts. At the beginning of the chapter is a map showing the countries with serious gender inequalities.

8.1. Gender inequalities

The **Gender-related Development Index** (GDI) (indicator No. 22), shows the differences between men and women in three basic aspects of human development: life expectancy, per capita income and rates of literacy and school enrolment. The importance of this indicator lies in the fact that it is one of the few that is not simply limited to separating the information by sex, but also to producing this information based on the relations of inequality established between men and women, i.e. the fact that it is a gender-sensitive indicator.² Although the GDI does not cover the many facets of gender equality, it does show that **the situation of women is especially serious in 27 countries**, of which 25 are in Africa. In these 27 countries, there are seven situations of armed conflict and eight of post-war rehabilitation. Not all the countries in a situation of armed conflict suffer from serious gender inequalities, but a significant number of them do. This clearly shows how the impact of these situations of armed violence is an obstacle to the improvement of women's living and development conditions, when not making them worse. It should also be added that armed conflicts have a clear impact on the dimensions considered in the GDI, as can be seen by the lower

1. Gender is the "category which underlines the cultural construction of sexual difference, i.e. the fact that the different behaviours, activities and functions of women and men are culturally constructed, rather than biologically determined. The gender perspective does not only allude to the analytical potential of this category but also to its political potential, to transform reality. From this perspective, gender is not only a tool for the analysis of women's situation in the world; it is also a political proposal in that it requires a commitment to the construction of equitable and just gender relations." Murguialday, C. "Género" in Hegoa, *Diccionario de acción humanitaria y cooperación al desarrollo*, 2000, Icaria. The definition given by the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women says that "gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being a man or woman and the relationships between women and men, girls and boys, and the relationships between women and the relationships between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned in the socialisation process. They are specific to a context and a timeframe and can change. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or in a man in a given context [...]" <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/concept-sandefinitions.htm>>.
2. While statistics broken down by sex give factual information on the situation of women, a gender-sensitive indicator provides direct evidence on women's status compared to a given standard or to a control group - in this case, men. Schmeidl, S. and Piza-Lopez, E., *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert at <<http://www.international-alert.org/women/publications/EWGEN.PDF>>. However, this must be qualified by pointing out that the UNDP methodology for producing this indicator only covers questions linked to development and no other factors, which have an enormous influence on gender inequalities, but which are not included here. The consequence of this emphasis on the development aspect is also that the majority of countries included are African and not in other geographical areas, where better development conditions presumably do not entail greater equality between men and women or equal access to this development by women.

schooling rates for girls and teenagers in areas affected by these conflicts, or the enormous difficulties involved in gaining access to healthcare services, and the lack of provision of this type of services aimed specifically at women, such as reproductive health services.

While the disappearance of several countries from this list compared to the 2004, 2005 and 2006 lists (which included 35, 32 and 31 countries respectively) is due to the improvement of conditions of women in some countries, it should not only be attributed to this factor, but also to the lack of updated information for others, such as Haiti. It is a concern that less information is available every year, especially from countries located in the worst positions with regard to women's development, as the availability of this information is vital for the development of public policies aimed at improving living conditions.

Table 8.1. Countries with serious gender inequalities

| | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Afghanistan ³ | Ethiopia | Central African Republic |
| Angola | Gambia | Rwanda |
| Benin | Guinea | Senegal |
| Burkina Faso | Guinea-Bissau | Sierra Leone |
| Burundi | Malawi | Tanzania |
| Chad | Mali | Togo |
| DR Congo | Mozambique | Uganda |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Niger | Yemen |
| Eritrea | Nigeria | Zambia |

8.2. Peacebuilding from a gender perspective

This section analyses some of the main initiatives to include the gender perspective in the various fields of peacebuilding.

a) The international agenda for peace and gender in 2007

September saw the presentation of the UN Secretary-General's report on women, peace and security, which

contained the main steps taken in the implementation process for Resolution 1325, which was approved in 2000 by the UN Security Council.⁴ Since then, in accordance with the mandate established by that body, the Secretary-General has presented an annual report, which is monitored by numerous NGOs. This year, both the UNIFEM and several NGOs highlighted the need for the annual meeting to take place every October to lead to greater efforts towards the effective implementation of this resolution.

Two subjects warrant particular attention this year. Firstly, the well-known absence of women from practically all peace processes, a situation which does not appear to have changed at all since the approval of the resolution in 2000, despite the emphasis given to this question by 1325. Secondly, the high levels of violence against women were evidenced. These levels are much higher in contexts of armed conflict.

The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security,⁵ one of the main coalitions supervising the implementation of the resolution, highlighted some of the greatest challenges still to be fulfilled for this resolution to be fully effective: lack of awareness of the importance of the gender perspective in peace and security and the gender dimension in armed conflicts; limited capabilities, resources and information; the lack of an effective institutional framework for the resolution; and the absence of an accountability process in the UN Security Council.

b) The gender dimension in peace processes

In 2007, the pattern of exclusion of women from peace processes continued, although some initiatives that did take place are worthy of mention. In May, the Government of **Uganda** and the armed opposition group LRA signed the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions to the Causes of the Conflict, considered as the first step towards obtaining a peace agreement between them which would end the armed conflict that has affected the country since 1986. The UNIFEM pointed out that this **agreement includes commitments to gender equality and women's rights**. The agreement says that the government must be representative of the country's social diversity, including gender diversity, and commits the current government to implementing affirmative action policies towards certain groups discriminated against due to their gender, among other reasons, and to guaranteeing the welfare of vulnerable groups such as widows or households headed by women. Final-

3. The figures for Afghanistan have been taken from the report *Afghanistan National Human Development Report: Security With a Human Face* published by the UNDP in 2004.

4. <<http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/report07/repl07.htm>>

5. This group consists of Amnesty International, the Boston Consortium on Gender and Security, Human Rights Watch, Femmes Africa Solidarité, Global Action to Prevent War, Global Justice Center, International Alert, the International Women's Tribune Center, the United Methodist Women's Division, Women's Action for New Directions and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Table 8.2. **Secretary-General's report on women, peace and security 2007**

| Strategic spheres of action, 2005 – 2007 action plan | Progress |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Prevention of conflicts and early warning | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Political Affairs and Peacekeeping departments, the Office of Disarmament Affairs, the UNEP and the WFP designed action plans for the inclusion of the gender perspective in the prevention of conflicts. - Several United Nations institutions began to create early warning mechanisms. |
| Establishment and consolidation of peace | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Department of Political Affairs on the ground missions carried out training and qualification programmes to promote the participation of women in all stages of peace processes. - The Security Council missions included gender specialists and included the gender perspective in their mandates. |
| Peacekeeping operations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Priority was given to operational policies and instruments. - The Peacekeeping Operations Department (DPKO) approved a regulatory directive on gender equality in peacekeeping activities. - Of the 18 peacekeeping missions current in progress, 11 have gender advisors and seven have gender co-ordinators. |
| Humanitarian response | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The manual "Women, girls, boys and men: different needs, identical opportunities" was distributed among humanitarian agencies. |
| Reconstruction and rehabilitation after conflicts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Several United Nations institutions participated in post-war rehabilitation processes, providing advice and financial support. |
| Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In December 2006, the DPKO established the Comprehensive DDR Regulations, which include gender questions in these processes. |
| Prevention of violence for reasons of gender in armed conflicts and response to that violence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assistance was provided to member states to adapt their national legal systems to international regulations and provisions, and especially to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). |
| Prevention of acts of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel and response to these acts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The DPKO created specific procedures for investigation and supervision in all peacekeeping missions to detect possible cases of abuse. |

ly, the agreement reaffirms the Equal Opportunities Law, the objective of which is to eliminate gender discrimination and to guarantee equal treatment for all groups. However, despite these commitments, the LRA had yet to release the approximately 3,000 women and children (according to UNICEF) that were kidnapped during the armed conflict. The demands by women's organisations in Uganda for the gender perspective to be taken into account had been made for several months before the agreement was signed. The most important event was the organisation of **a march by women for peace to Juba, the venue for the negotiations between the LRA and the Ugandan Government.** This included female parliamentarians, organisations from civil society and UNIFEM representatives. The march was organised under the slogan "The women of Uganda want peace and peace needs women".

Elsewhere, in the **Mindanao** region of the Philippines, following an increase in violence in August which led to fears for the future of the peace process between the MILF and the Government, the International Women's Peace and Solidarity Mission to Basilan and Mindanao coalition, consisting of women from various organisations from countries in Asia, the Pacific and Europe

(New Zealand, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Japan and the United Kingdom), and women from the Mindanao region itself, visited the island of Basilan, the epicentre of this escalation. In their communiqué issued after their visit to the area, the women called **on the Government and the MILF to resume peace talks and to guarantee the participation of women in the peace process.** They also asked politicians from outside the area to join forces to end the armed violence, and asked the legal authorities to be prudent in terms of accusations and arrests in order not to frighten the population with baseless accusations. Women's organisations in Mindanao have been very active throughout the peace process, demanding that the Government give them

a space for participation, as well as the inclusion of certain issues on the agenda of the negotiations. For example, in 2006 the Mindanao Women's Peace Summit took place, at which 100 women from various organisations produced a series of recommendations for the Government and the MILF.

Finally, there was also **the joint initiative that women from Serbia and of Kosovo are carrying out in order to obtain greater participation in the negotiation process for the final status of Kosovo.** The Serbian Network of

There was also the joint initiative women from Serbia and of Kosovo in order to obtain greater participation in the negotiation process for the final status of Kosovo

Women in Black and the Kosovo Women's Network created the Women's Peace Coalition (WPC), in order to work for peace and the participation of women in the region. The WPC works towards overcoming the national, ethnic and religious divisions in the region.

As a region, the Balkans has a long history of feminist activism for peace and for overcoming the ethnic divisions heightened by the armed conflicts that have taken place in the area. As a result, this work by Serbian and Kosovan women is closely connected to the work previously done by Serbian and Bosnian women. However, the fact that this network was created after the approval of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 has led to both the coalition of Serbian women and Kosovan women and the Kosovo Women's Network

focusing most of their efforts on pressurising both the local authorities and the international community to implement this resolution in Kosovo.

c) The architecture of gender in the United Nations

In 2007, a debate took place based on what the architecture of gender in the United Nations should be. To date, it has been fragmented and distributed among various institutions, none of which have an influence equivalent to that of other agencies within the United Nations system. The main organisations, which the United Nations uses to carry out its work in the area of women's rights and promotion, and to comprehensively

Box 8.1. The case of Kosovo: notes on the participation of women in peacebuilding

In the light of the imminent completion of the process to resolve the status of Kosovo, it is useful to take stock and extract some lessons from it in gender terms. The process, which has taken place since the approval of Resolution 1325, has been conducted in a way completely removed from the international consensus reached on a formal basis regarding the need to promote the participation of women in all areas related to the resolution of conflicts. The Kosovan and Serbian women in the WPC coalition, who have highlighted the gender dimension of the process, have questioned the supposed neutrality of the process and demanded the participation of women in it by means of a consensus figure. While they did not achieve their aim of increasing the negotiation formats to include the participation of a person proposed by mutual agreement by the coalition, the campaign cannot be considered a failure. However, a more detailed reading offers useful lessons for the field of peacebuilding from a gender perspective.

First, the timing for pressurising, demanding or raising the issue of women's participation in official, national and international sectors is a key factor. In the case of Kosovo, despite the local women's movement having a long history dating back to the decade of non-violent resistance against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, its specific campaign for the resolution process seemed late, given that it exerted its greatest efforts in 2006 and 2007, when the process was already under way, with Serbian and Kosovan negotiation teams that were already defined and mechanisms for rounds of discussions already under way. Although the WPC was formally created in May 2006, the relationship between women's organisations on both sides of the border dates back to previous decades. Furthermore, their knowledge of Resolution 1325 was well founded, given that it has been the active members of the international women's movement who have called for the establishment of formal mechanisms for the promotion and guarantee of women's rights since the 1980s. From the above, as some Kosovan women from the gender and peace field pointed out, it could be concluded that the women's campaign was late, thereby losing its potential as an agent for change.

Despite this, the campaign can be considered a success from the perspective of an inclusive and catalytic women's process, which overcame external divisions such as that associated with ethnic-based nationalism which arises in Serbia and Kosovo, as well as those of an internal nature, such as disagreements or sometimes-difficult relationships between some sectors of the Kosovan women's movement. In the former, it was successful because it achieved a common stance for women in Serbia and Kosovo on the future status of the province, which supports the territorial independence and integrity of Kosovo and a civil state with a functioning legal system, which is based on the needs of all its citizens - men and women. In the latter, it was included internally due to the choice of a figure of consensus to guarantee the presence of women in the negotiations: Edita Tahiri, Foreign Minister of the alternative Kosovan political institutions between 1991 and 2000, and the special representative of the Kosovan leader Ibrahim Rugova between 1998 and 2000, and the only women involved in the failed negotiations with Serbia that preceded the NATO bombardments.

The selection of Tahiri is very significant for several reasons, which are mainly: a) her valuable professional experience in the field of official politics and peace negotiations, a dimension that is strategically very useful, but one that is often absent in processes promoting women's participation due to their traditional exclusion from the world of politics; b) her active commitment to the promotion of gender equality, a position she has gradually built up in a personal career in which her role as a politician in the peace negotiations of the 1990s did not make the gender dimension a priority, unlike her current position, which reinforces the importance of the qualitative presence of women who are actively committed to gender equality; c) the fact that she belongs to the sector of women and politics, a sector that is not very homogenous in Kosovo, and that she has not always had close relationships with other women's sectors (e.g. civil society), meaning that she thereby overcomes divisions, promotes the cohesion of the movement and makes the importance of promoting the participation of women in decision-making areas clear, including formal politics; and d) her potential for overcoming inter-generational disagreements within the Kosovan women's movement.

However, there were some obstacles to the promotion of Edita Tahiri in the negotiation process. These were mainly the fact that she belongs to a minority political party which is critical of the political establishment of Kosovo, which was created after Tahiri left Rugova's LDK. In a local context that is highly politicised and personalised, this position led to a rejection by the political class of the demand for Tahiri's inclusion in the negotiation process. They described it as a partisan strategy by a group perceived as critical and with no parliamentary representation. There is therefore a gender dimension in the area of peace processes, and women's political careers can be a positive foundation, but can also be a double-edged sword if other added factors, like those mentioned, are not taken into account and dealt with as a consequence.

The WPC was created as part of a commitment that goes beyond influencing the process of negotiating specific status, and in view of the imminent completion of the process, the challenge is to continue in its role of promoting peacebuilding in its widest sense in the region. A very significant step was taken by the Women in Black in Serbia during the joint conference of the WPC in Macedonia in 2006, when they publicly asked for forgiveness for the crimes committed and the terror imposed in their name by the Serbian regime of Milosevic against the Albanian population of Kosovo. They subsequently repeated this apology on Radio Television Kosova. As well as this measure, there are many others that are being taken in Kosovo itself to promote gender equality in the framework of post-war rehabilitation. This is a broad-based process in which the status negotiations have been a key area, but not the only one, in which the participation of women is to be reinforced.

promote the gender perspective in the work done by the international organisation as a whole, are the UNIFEM, the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues (OSAGI) and the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), all of which are equipped with very few staff members and very few economic resources, and which have little capacity for impact.⁶ Another important body is the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which is responsible for monitoring the compliance with and implementation of the CEDAW.

This **institutional weakness** contrasts with the **importance that the discourse on the gender dimension and women's rights has reached in international terms**. For this reason, there have been numerous demands for a **stronger institutional design** which is able to provide the necessary promotion that policies of gender and equality require the situation of women to progress beyond words to deeds.

The proposal which seems to have the highest level of acceptance (the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, was in favour and expressed his support) is that of **merging** the three main institutions mentioned above —**UNIFEM, OSAGI and DAW**— **into a single agency**, equivalent in influence and resources to others such as UNICEF or UNFPA. This proposal, which has been supported by more than a hundred women's NGOs, was formulated by the High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, which acknowledged that despite the international commitments to the empowerment of

An institutional promotion of gender and equality policies is necessary

women and gender equality, the approach adopted by the United Nations was fragmented and lacking sufficient resources. For example, the total budget of the three institutions responsible for gender issues is currently 65 million dollars, while the budget of the UNFPA is 450 million dollars and that of UNICEF is 2,000 million dollars.

One of the people who has become most heavily involved in the promotion of this new United Nations agency has been the former Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, Stephen Lewis, who has warned on several occasions of some of the difficulties that must be faced for the implementation of the institution to be successful. Firstly, he highlights the difficulties in matching the objectives in terms of the women's rights established by the CEDAW to operational capacity on the ground. The reluctance of numerous governments to fully implement this convention is making the full achievement of women's rights a very slow task with very little specific progress.⁷ Secondly, he underlines the failure to date to implement the strategy of transversality or gender mainstreaming. Thirdly, Stephen Lewis stresses the difficulties in terms of financing. Fourthly, he mentions the possible reluctance of the G7 and China to establish a new agency within the United Nations system, both because of the refusal to increase financial contributions to the United Nations and the opposition by certain countries to the increased importance of the international agenda on gender. Finally, he highlights the criticisms made by numerous NGOs regarding the United Nations' lack of operational capacity, which would be no different in the event of a new agency for women.

6. The UNIFEM works in partnership with the UNDP, and answers to a consultative committee consisting of representatives of all the regions and the UNDP Executive Board. The Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) is part of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and is mandated to formulate policies, global standards and regulations for gender equality and the empowerment of women; promote the implementation of international agreements, including the Beijing Action Platform; support the implementation of CEDAW and promote the transversality of the gender perspective. The OSAGI belongs to the DAW and one of its main functions is to advise the Secretary-General of the UN on gender issues.

7. Many of the countries that have signed and ratified the CEDAW have expressed reservations about compliance, which enables them to maintain legislation that is discriminatory towards women.

8.3. The gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts

This section analyses some aspects that clearly show how armed conflicts and violence have a different impact on the lives of men and women.

a) The gender perspective in the analysis of armed conflicts

Contexts of armed conflict are profoundly influenced by the gender structures present in any society. Gender divisions are usually exacerbated during armed conflicts in the societies that suffer from them. Ideologies legitimising the sexual division of labour in order to reinforce traditional roles for the tasks assigned to men and women are perfectly defined. However, the reality is much more complex, and the social breakdown which usually accompanies armed conflicts means that social roles are interchangeable and changeable. It would therefore appear that in the analysis of armed conflicts and their consequences, it is important to adopt the gender perspective as a methodological tool in order not to render an important part of these consequences invisible.

Armed conflicts affect entire populations. Violence has direct and indirect consequences in the short, medium and long term which lead to very profound social transformations, and form part of collective thought and behaviour in the places affected by the violence. But does violence affect men and women in the same way? Is violence unrelated to gender structures and social inequalities?

Adopting the terminology and the gender perspective has methodological and political consequences that are important to emphasise. First, gender analysis does away with the traditional view of armed conflicts as neutral conditions. As a result, the idea that the origin of armed conflicts is independent of the gender-based power structures that exist in a given society is called into question. Secondly, this approach also raises serious doubts regarding statements that aim to standardise the consequences of conflicts.

However, many of the analyses of armed conflicts that are currently taking place have not included the gender perspective and fail to acknowledge how both national and international power structures and resource distribution patterns are based on gender inequalities.⁸ However, as highlighted by some authors,⁹ when the term gender appears, it often entails women and girls being considered as victims, who have experienced

'special' circumstances and who have 'special' needs, while men are presented as perpetrators. However, the use of the term 'gender' should make it clear that men and women have very varied roles – whether these are stereotyped or not – and help to understand that the changes that take place as a consequence of the armed conflicts in these roles affect gender relations.¹⁰

As Cynthia Cockburn points out, gender power structures shape the dynamics that occur in any arena of human interaction, ranging from the home to the international arena.¹¹ Gender is expressed physically (how the groups of men and women are brought up, what mobility they have, how vulnerable they are to external attack); economically (how money, property and other resources are distributed); and socially (who has power and authority in a community, and who is dependent).

Power is a central feature in the gender perspective. Some authors talk about gender as a sexual division of power, and any change in the distribution of power would undoubtedly have a very direct impact on gender relations as a consequence.¹² The distribution of power that characterises gender relations, in which value components are attributed to biological characteristics, has a considerable influence on women's access to and control of resources, their opportunities for involvement in the collective life of a given society, and even their opportunities to exercise their basic rights.¹³ As a result, the gender dimension cannot be understood without placing the distribution and exercise of power by men and women at the centre of the analysis.

It is therefore necessary to point out that when the gender perspective is used when talking about armed conflicts, women are not being mentioned as victims of armed conflicts. This is an important factor, which must not only not be omitted but must form a central part of the analysis. However, the gender-based view of these conflicts leads to a more complex snapshot, of roles that are imposed and exchanged, social networks and structures that break down and are repaired and transformed, and social divisions that are accentuated. Armed conflicts are processes of destruction and create victims, but may also be an incentive for collective mobilisation against violence and may therefore involve processes of empowerment and awareness-raising.

Armed conflicts are therefore phenomena that have a significant gender dimension. As Sanam Anderlini points out, a deterioration or change in the situation of men or women may be the first sign of some trends in conflicts which point towards violence.¹⁴ Piza-Lopez and Schmeidl, two authors who have worked on producing early warning indicators which enable conflict pre-

8. Byrne, B., "Towards a Gendered Understanding of Conflict" in *Gender and Peacekeeping Training Course*, DFID/DFAIT, 2002.

9. El Jack, A., *Gender and Armed Conflict*. Overview Report, Bridge, 2003.

10. Ibid.

11. Cockburn, C., "Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence" in *Gender and Peacekeeping Training Course*, DFID/DFAIT, 2002.

12. Strickland, R. and N. Duvvury, *Gender Equity and Peacebuilding From Rhetoric to Reality: Finding the Way Hard. A Discussion Paper*, International Center for Research on Women, 2003.

13. Ibid.

14. Anderlini, S., *Women Building Peace. What They Do, Why It Matters*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2007.

vention strategies to be designed from a gender perspective, point out that paying attention to the behaviour patterns of men and women, and to their living conditions, can alert the international community to a possible escalation of violence at very early points in an armed conflict.¹⁵ A significant increase in sexual violence against women or the use of discourse legitimising violence against women may therefore provide a warning of the possibilities of levels of violence in a society rising, as happened for example in Rwanda in prior to the genocide, or in the Balkans before the outbreak of the armed conflicts, when ideologies of hyper-masculinity linked to the emergence of nationalism were promoted.

b) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

Throughout 2007, many contexts of armed conflict were the focus of international attention due to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war on a systematic and very widespread basis. Two of these armed conflicts were particularly serious - the DR Congo and Myanmar. Despite sexual violence being a weapon of war that has been present in armed conflicts through-

out history, it was not until the 1990s, after the armed conflicts in the Balkans and the genocide in Rwanda, that its use and the consequences for female survivors became visible. Hundreds of thousands of women all over the world have been victims of this violence, which despite assuming greater visibility, continues to be a crime that in most cases goes unpunished. Episodes of sexual violence have been documented in almost all of today's armed conflicts, and have reached epidemic proportions in some of them.¹⁶

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the UNIFEM declared that one of the most pressing challenges today is the protection of women from sexual violence in contexts of armed conflict, as stipulated by this resolution.¹⁷

Sexual violence is a weapon of war by means of which several objectives are sought. Firstly, it has an individual aspect: the victim's submission by means of the terror caused by sexual abuse. Many women who are victims of sexual violence also become the combatants' sex slaves, thereby perpetuating the sexual violence over time and ending any hint of the women's personal

Box 8.2. Sexual violence in Myanmar

In 2007, there were numerous reports of the **use of sexual violence as a weapon of war by the armed forces of Myanmar** in counter-insurgency operations carried out in several states where armed ethnic opposition groups were present. These abuses by the Myanmar security forces have been **constant and continuous throughout the years of armed conflict**. The main victims of this sexual violence have been **civilian women** belonging to **the country's various ethnic groups**.

For this reason, the Women's League of Chinland presented the report *Unsafe State. State-sanctioned sexual violence against Chin women in Burma*, denouncing the systematic use of sexual violence against women of the Chin ethnic group, after having investigated 40 reports by female victims.¹⁸ The high level of stigmatisation of the women who are victims of the violence means that the number of reports is minimal; the majority of acts of sexual violence are not reported due to the women's fear of the consequences of reporting them and the exclusion that revealing having been a victim of sexual violence may entail. In its report, the Women's League of Chinland says that **under Myanmar's military regime, women and girls are at constant risk of rape**, and that sexual violence is used by the security forces as a tool of social control to frighten the civil population. The **complete impunity** for these crimes makes it difficult to report them and perpetuates the constant threat to the civilian population. Furthermore, the fact that those **responsible for this violence are high-ranking officials in numerous cases** encourages a view of it as an **acceptable pattern of behaviour among the security forces**. Many of the women who are victims of sexual violence subsequently become **refugees or displaced** as a consequence of it.

On previous occasions, it was women's organisations from other ethnic groups, such as the Karen or the Shan, who reported the systematic use of sexual violence against women accused of providing support or being supporters of the various ethnic armed groups operating in the country. Sexual violence is also used as an **instrument of repression against activists in the political opposition to the dictatorial regime**, but unlike the women belonging to a minority ethnic group, sexual violence against Burmese women (the majority ethnic group) generally occurs as a consequence of their arrest and is not as indiscriminate as the sexual violence against women belonging to a minority ethnic group.

15. See Note 2.

16. The figures given by the United Nations on sexual violence as a weapon of war (<<http://www.stoprapenow.org>>) for some of these conflicts speak for themselves: an average of 40 women are raped every day in South Kivu (DR Congo); between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped in the 1990s in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina; between 50,000 and 64,000 internally displaced women in Sierra Leone may have been victims of sexual violence committed by armed perpetrators; between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. As these figures show, it is not an occasional and isolated phenomenon, but is instead widespread and generalised in a large number of armed conflicts.

17. See the UNIFEM document, *Towards Coherent and Effective Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)* (<http://www.unifem.org/news_events/story_detail.php?StoryID=641>).

18. <<http://www.womenofburma.org/Report/UnsafeState.pdf>>.

or sexual autonomy. As Yolanda Aguilar states, “sexual violence is considered to be the political synthesis of the oppression of women, because it involves appropriation and pain. It is a political fact that synthesises an act, the objectification of the woman and the extreme realisation of the patriarchal masculine condition”.¹⁹ The women’s suffering takes place within a body, which is perceived as something that can be raped, and presented as war booty, and as the place to which the battlefield has been transferred in many armed conflicts.²⁰

The armed forces of Myanmar made extensive use of sexual violence in counter-insurgency operations.

However, sexual violence also has a very important collective dimension, since the aim of its use is to humiliate the entire enemy community and not only the woman who is a victim of it. The woman’s body, which is considered to be the property of males and of society, is the means of transmitting a message of humiliation and power to the enemy. In other words, not only is control exercised by means of women’s bodies, but this control is also disseminated spread throughout the entire enemy society. Women who are victims of sexual violence demonstrate the power that the enemy has over their society. The women’s bodies become transmitters of messages of humiliation, control and power.²¹ Throughout history, the patriarchy has developed a system of thought based on dichotomic binary categories which have served as the basis for the inferiority of women, as opposed to the superiority of rational thought. The body has been constructed as the representative of nature *par excellence*, and is therefore something that must be controlled and over which power must be exerted. Furthermore, a value-based significance is attributed to the difference in the bodies of men and women, which is used to justify and legitimise the subordination and oppression of women, while guaranteeing male predominance in the areas that are considered most important.

In many societies, women are considered to be the repositories of the community’s honour. Women also pass on the values and traditions considered intrinsic to a culture from generation to generation, as they are responsible for the socialisation and education of the members of the community.²² The raping of women breaks this trans-generational chain of honour. This situation is particularly important in ethno-political groups, in many of which the limits of the group have been controlled by means of control of women’s sexuality: the group’s reproduction takes place within established limits. As a result, the objective of sexual violence and the inevitable pregnancies in armed conflicts with an ethnic or nationalist dimension is also to break

down these established frontiers. The best-known example is perhaps the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when thousands of Bosnian women were raped by Serbians with the explicit intention of fathering Serbian children. Many women were also imprisoned during their pregnancy to ensure that they would not seek an abortion.²³ In these cases, it is possible to speak of a twofold control of women’s bodies: on the one hand, that exerted by the community of origin by conferring on women the obligation to reproduce within the limits

of the group in question and according to the patterns imposed by the group; and on the other, the forced control by the enemy when making the women transgress these limits, which also becomes a symbol of the control of the entire group to which the woman belongs.

It should be added here that the process subsequent to sexual violence usually involves the marginalisation and stigmatisation of the women who have been victims of this violence, who are blamed and held responsible for what has happened, for having been unable to prevent it, and who are even accused of having enjoyed the sexual experience. As almost always occurs, female sexuality appears to be surrounded by an aura of guilt, despite the situations being forced and involving extreme violence.

This stigmatisation reinforces the conditions of invisibility in which sexual violence usually takes place, as it is hardly ever reported due to the victims’ fear of being considered guilty. This invisibility perpetuates the impunity of the aggressors, and also increases the obstacles which the victim has to face to overcome what has happened, as the social support that is available is restricted. The stigmatisation also has economic consequences, given that it generally leads to exclusion from the community’s social, employment and production fabric and in many cases, to rejection by the family of women who have suffered sexual violence. Women who are economically dependent or who have very few resources also have much greater difficulties in escaping a situation of violence. This situation is aggravated still further in the case of people who as a result of sexual violence have become infected with sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV/AIDS.

In the month of November, the UN General Assembly approved the resolution for **“eliminating rape and other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestations, including as instruments to achieve political or military objectives”**. This resolution calls on the Secretary-General to monitor the contexts in which sexual violence is used as an instrument to attain political objectives and

19. Aguilar, Y., “El carácter sexual de la violencia contra las mujeres” in *Las violencias en Guatemala. Algunas perspectivas*, UNESCO, Colección Cultura de Paz No. 10. Guatemala, 2005.

20. Bocchetti, A., *Lo que quiere una mujer*, Ediciones Cátedra, Feminismos collection, 1996.

21. Coomaraswamy, R., *A Question of Honour: Women, Ethnicity and Armed Conflict*, 1999
<<http://www.sacw.net/Wmov/RCoomaraswamyOnHonour.html>>.

22. Kandiyoti, D., “Guest Editor’s Introduction. The Awkward Relationship: Gender and Nationalism” in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2000, pp. 491-99.

23. Rehn, E. and Johnson Sirleaf, E., *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-building*, UNIFEM, 2002.

Box 8.3. Sexual violence in DR Congo

In July, the United Nations Special *Rapporteur* on Violence against Women, Yakin Ertük, visited the DR Congo to assess the situation of women in the country on the ground. The visit mainly focused on the issue of sexual violence, due to the seriousness and the impact that this violence is having on women in the country, and especially those living in the east of the country. The Special *Rapporteur* assessed the situation that the women in Kivus are undergoing as being **the most serious crisis in the international realu that she is aware of**. However, Yakin Ertük pointed out that the situation of sexual violence that the women are suffering from cannot be considered in isolation from the ongoing violence to which their homes and communities are subjected to on a daily basis, in a society in which this violence has become perceived as a normal event.

Sexual violence is used on a widespread and systematic basis against women in the DR Congo, and especially in the provinces of South Kivu and Equateur, **by armed opposition groups, the armed forces, the Congolese National Police, and to an increasing extent by the civilian population**. According to figures given by the South Kivu Provincial Synergie on Sexual Violence, consisting of the government, the United Nations and representatives of civil society, in the first six months of the year, there were 4,500 cases reported in this province alone. The local committee on sexual violence also mentioned 5,470 cases reported during the same period. However, these are reported cases, and sexual violence is one of the least reported crimes, suggesting that the real figure for victims is much higher. The health services in the area treat around 3,500 cases every year of women with obstetric fistula caused by sexual assaults. This is one of the most serious consequences of this violence, not only due to the suffering it causes, but also due to the social ostracism which it brings to the women suffering from it.

As well as the magnitude of the figures, the Special *Rapporteur* also placed particular emphasis on the **brutality of sexual violence** in this area, with acts that go far beyond the seriousness of rape.²⁴ Many of the assaults are carried out by members of the foreign armed opposition groups operating in the region, some of which were involved in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. According to the Special *Rapporteur's* declaration, many of the atrocities currently being committed in Kivus are a repetition of the patterns of those previously committed by the Interahamwe militias. This situation clearly shows the long term consequences for the civilian population, and for women in particular, there is also the fact that serious violations of human rights such as the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war remain unpunished.

The security forces in the DR Congo - both the police and the armed forces - are responsible for approximately 20% of the cases of sexual violence reported, according to the *rapporteur's* report. The security forces are not only responsible for the sexual violence committed in areas in armed conflict, but also that which is committed in other areas where the disputes that have been ended, by ex-members of armed opposition groups who have joined the police or armed forces without there having been mechanisms to exclude those responsible for serious human rights violations from these processes. Some demobilised combatants are also responsible for sexual violence, which is becoming increasingly widespread among the civilian population. On several occasions, MONUC personnel have been the subject of reports of acts of sexual violence and investigations of the committee with regard to some of its members.

The report of the Special *Rapporteur* on Violence against Women was seconded by Stephen Lewis, former United Nations Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, who also condemned the seriousness of the situation in DR Congo, defining it as a "holocaust" for women. The former United Nations envoy pointed out that measures such as the increase in the number of troops deployed and the intervention of the International Criminal Court were insufficient and inadequate to deal with a situation like that in the DR Congo, due to the magnitude of the impact of sexual violence.

to report to the General Assembly regarding this monitoring. UNIFEM has stated that **in at least 15 contexts which are currently in a situation of armed conflict, or have been in recent years, sexual violence as a weapon of war has been reported**: Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Liberia, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Darfur, Sudan, Uganda and former Yugoslavia. According to the report published by the research centre Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces this year, the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war by the various armed agents has been

Sexual violence by armed agents has been used in 49 of 51 armed conflicts in the last 20 years

documented **in 49 of the 51 cases** analysed of contexts **which have undergone armed conflict in the last 20 years**.²⁵

This resolution also asks states to redouble their efforts to end impunity and to allocate more resources to caring for victims, especially with regard to sexual and reproductive health and to the psychosocial consequences of this violence. The resolution explicitly recognises that sexual violence is a direct consequence of the unequal power relationships between men and women throughout his-

24. For more information on the crimes committed, consult the public declaration by Yakin Ertük on 27 July at <<http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=15062>>.

25. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector*, 2007.

Box 8.4. Violence against women in the conflict and post-conflict in Liberia

A study recently carried out in Liberia for the UNFPA shows that during the armed conflict that affected the country (1999-2003), over half of the women in the county of Lofa, in the north of the country, reported having suffered from at least one incident of sexual violence. Furthermore, nearly 90% of the women who participated in the study said they had suffered from at least one incident of physical violence. UNFPA says that there are significant indicators that these figures may reflect those in other areas of the country. Among the particular challenges that women currently have to face are those relating to access to sexual and reproductive health services, as these services are not available to the majority of women.

tory, and places special emphasis on the use of sexual violence as an instrument which seeks political objectives such as the humiliation and domination of certain groups of an ethnic or other nature.

c) Peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations are one of the main instruments which the international community uses for the establishment of peace in some of the armed conflicts that are currently taking place. Perhaps as a result of blindness in terms of the gender perspective as one of the key dimensions which should form the basis for peacebuilding, the majority of peacekeeping missions have still not included it as an analytical and working tool, despite many of these missions having a gender

issues advisor. Furthermore, the fact that personnel on these missions have been reported as being responsible for acts of sexual violence and exploitation against the local population on numerous occasions has been widely reported in recent years, which clearly shows that there is a long way to go until these authorities fully include the gender perspective.

As a response to the demand by the UN General Assembly that the United Nations implement a policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse, the UN Secretary-General presented a report on the measures that have been adopted as protection against this abuse and exploitation.²⁶ The report states that vast majority of the cases reported have involved personnel from among the Peacekeeping Operations Department.

Box 8.5. Prevention of sexual abuse in peacekeeping missions

In December 2006, a declaration of commitment to the elimination of this abuse was approved as part of the High Level Conference on Sexual abuse and exploitation by United Nations and NGO workers. This declaration contained ten principles that should facilitate the implementation of the standards established for the prevention and elimination of sexual abuse and exploitation.

1. The development of **specific strategies for each organisation to prevent and respond to** sexual abuse and exploitation. These strategies must include indicators and schedules enabling supervision of their implementation.
2. The incorporation of **standards on sexual abuse and exploitation** in the **training** materials and courses for the personnel of each organisation.
3. **Prevention of the perpetrators of abuse and exploitation being rehired or redeployed on the ground**, by means of consultation of criminal records.
4. A guarantee that the **appropriate mechanisms exist to report** abuse and exploitation and that they are accessible, and that the focal points are knowledgeable and know how to meet their obligations.
5. Measures are to be taken to **guarantee that no reprisals are carried out when** sexual abuse or exploitation is reported.
6. **Investigation of reports of abuse and exploitation in a rapid and professional manner**, including interviews with those reporting the issue and witnesses, and particularly with minors.
7. **The adoption of fast and appropriate measures** against workers who are guilty of sexual abuse or exploitation. These may include administrative or disciplinary action, placing them at the disposal of the pertinent authorities for these to take the appropriate measures, including criminal investigations.
8. **Provision of the necessary emergency assistance** to people reporting sexual abuse or exploitation.
9. **Provision of regular information to personnel on the measures taken to prevent and respond to** sexual abuse and exploitation. This information must include details on the mechanisms for reporting, the results of investigations and the actions taken against perpetrators, as well as assistance given to those reporting and to victims.
10. **Support for communities and governments in the prevention and response to** abuse and exploitation by United Nations and NGO personnel.

26. According to the UN General Secretary's bulletin of 9 October 2003 on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13), "sexual exploitation" means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust of another person, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from sexual exploitation. "Sexual abuse" is deemed to be the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, imposed by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

Conclusions

Below we outline the main conclusions drawn from the eight chapters that make up the report. In **2007 30 armed conflicts were recorded, 28 of which were ongoing at the end of the year.** Most took place in Asia (12) and Africa (10), while the rest took place in the Middle East (5), Europe (2) and America (1). It should be highlighted that about **half of these conflicts were internal and the other half were internal but internationalised.** Although currently almost all armed conflicts are due to multiple causes, it is worth noting that **almost half of them refer mainly to aspirations about identity or demands for greater self-government.** As regards the 11 cases in which the incompatibility is linked to opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, 8 of these refer to, among other issues, the creation of an Islamic state or are related to al-Qaeda –Algeria, Afghanistan, Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Chechnya, Iraq, Pakistan (northwest) or the Lebanese refugee camp of Naher al-Bared– while in the other three cases –Colombia, Philippines (NPA) and India (CPI-M)– the armed groups are seeking to establish a socialist political and economic system. Finally in four cases, Nigeria (Niger Delta), DR Congo, Sudan (Darfur) and Iraq, control of resources was one of the most relevant causes of the dispute although, apart from those already mentioned, many other conflicts were sustained, or exacerbated by a struggle for the control of resources or territory.

As regards the intensity of these conflicts, in eight cases –Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (Kivus), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (Darfur)– for most of the year there were extremely high levels of violence that led to a much higher number of deaths, 1,000 fatalities. As regards annual evolution, **by the end of the year an increase in hostilities had taken place in over half the active conflicts,** whereas in only four cases did we see a reduction in violence: in Jammu and Kashmir; between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine; in Iraq; and in Yemen. It should also be pointed out that hostilities ended in two cases: Côte d'Ivoire, as a result of the positive implementation of the peace agreement and the advance of the DDR process; and in the Lebanon, where the Lebanese armed forces defeated Fatah al Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp of Naher al-Bared at the beginning of September. Finally, it should be highlighted the validity in general terms of the ceasefires in Uganda between the government and the LRA and in the Philippines between the government and the MILF, which facilitated advances in the respective peace processes

At the end of 2007, there were **70 scenarios of tension** in the world, **most of them in Africa and Asia** (26 and 23, respectively). The rest of the tensions took place in Europe (nine) and also in America and the Middle East (six in each region). It is worth noting that **70% of these tensions were of a markedly internal character,** while the rest were, in the same proportion (15%), internationalised internal tensions and international tensions.

Most of the international tensions took place in Africa and in bordering states with territorial disputes (such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, or Cameroon and Nigeria) and in countries integrated in regional groupings (the area of Rio Mano and the Great Lakes).

As regards the causes of the incompatibilities that led to these we should highlight that, despite their multidimensional character, **practically half of these tensions (47%) was explained by the disagreements between sectors of the political and social opposition to government policies.** This was the case of 13 African countries (including Burundi, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, DR Congo or Zimbabwe), and 10 Asian countries (Bangladesh, Philippines, Fiji, Pakistan, Thailand, Timor Leste, and most of the countries of Central Asia). In America, practically all the tensions were motivated by opposition to the policies of the governments of the region. This was the case of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, where during 2007 there were demonstrations and generalised protests against the respective executives. Nevertheless, in regions such as Europe and the Middle East, the main motives of disagreement were others: **demands for self-government, mainly in Europe** (in cases such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Republic of Transdniestria in Moldova, and also in Kosovo, whose independence from Serbia seemed to be a fact at the end of the year), and **opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of the state in the Middle East** (in the case of Saudi Arabia with al-Qaeda, Egypt and the opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the inter-state disputes between Iran and the US on the one hand, and Israel, Lebanon and Syria, on the other). At the same time it is interesting to point out that those **disputes related to demands for self-government had a component related to identity in most cases,** and the combination of both factors was a very present element in the tensions existing on the continents of Africa, Asia and Europe.

In terms of the peace processes recorded during the year, this report notes 49 cases or attempts at negotiation, whether in a purely exploratory or tentative phase, consolidated or not. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the negotiations advanced sufficiently to bring an end to the fighting. In any case, in three out of four conflicts, there have been negotiation attempts; a percentage that has remained unchanged in recent years. As usual, **most of the peace negotiations experienced difficulties, and a significant number ended badly.** With regard to the previous year, nevertheless, the number of cases where attempts were made to open negotiations increased, whether with new armed groups, historical groups already existing in the country or more recent splinter groups.

As regards the negative aspects, and especially in Africa, we should point out the great number of splinter groups that broke away from many armed groups which

were involved in negotiation processes. As opposed to prior years, we should mention the intense **diplomatic activity on the part of Libya, which has become one of the main facilitating countries in the continent**, as well as the beginning of conversations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front to resolve the conflict in the Western Sahara. On the continent of Asia the most important events were the agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF on the ancestral territories of the Moro people on the subject of the block in negotiations (the issue of ancestral lands), which may allow the signing of a peace agreement soon; the changes in the scenario in Myanmar after the demonstrations led by Buddhist monks, and the surfacing of tensions in the south of Nepal, and their corresponding negotiations.

For the fourth year in a row, the most commonly-cited reasons for failure or crisis in negotiation processes were repeated almost mechanically, with very few differences between one year and another. The mechanisms of mediation, splits in armed groups, mistrust or insecurity between the parties, political crises in certain negotiations and differences on substantive issues on the agenda, especially when trying to seek forms of self-government, are the most frequent crisis factors.

As regards those countries in post-war rehabilitation, an analysis of their evolution during 2007 highlights some of the factors that hinder advances in these processes, among which we can point to the especially negative element of a **lack of political willingness** by the parties to put into practice the most controversial points of the peace agreements in those countries which are still awaiting elections. This political obstruction **considerably reduces the likelihood of success in these transition processes**, as could be seen over the year in the southern Sudan where, two years after the signing of a peace agreement, the demarcation of the frontier between the oil rich zone of Abyei or the withdrawal of the Sudanese armed forces from this area of Sudan had still not been achieved, which conditioned the future development of the next steps established in the agreement, such as for example the holding of local elections in 2011. Similarly, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire remained suspended for four years in an almost never-ending cycle of the calling of and cancellation of general elections. In March 2007, the signing of a new agreement in Ouagadougou seemed to augur a breakthrough in this situation, although in the end President Laurent Gbagbo once again succeeded in postponing the elections and the year ended with no new election date being fixed. **Greater international pressure may help to compensate for this lack of political will**, but during 2007 the international community opted to continue acting more in line with their particular strategic interests than with common aims of political stabilization. Other factors which conditioned the advance of countries in post-war rehabilitation where there were elected governments were endemic poverty, unemployment, corruption and democratic fragility, all aspects that especially affect the welfare of the popula-

tion. An improvement in the living conditions of the population should be the main focus of all countries in a phase of rehabilitation, but especially so for the governments of Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the provincial government of Aceh during 2008.

Finally, we should emphasize the **inability to achieve advances in the processes of post-war rehabilitation** when these take place **amid a situation of open armed conflict**, as is the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, especially. International involvement during 2007, which was mainly in the form of major international conferences and large financial contributions, mainly for security issues, did not manage to end the violence that ravages these two countries, and thus the model of intervention adopted should be rethought.

As regards the humanitarian situation, **during the year 43 countries suffered the effects of humanitarian crises**, which represents a slight drop with respect to 2006, in which 45 cases were recorded. The fall in the number of crises however, did not affect the response from donors who allocated funds of a similar amount to those of the previous year, around 6,500 million dollars. It is significant that in **2007 a total of 15 flash appeals linked to the incidence of natural disasters were made**, which meant a clear increase in the use of this mechanism for raising funds, although it was also a **clear reflection of the higher impact of climate change** on humanitarian crises in the world. Moreover, for the first time in the last five years there was an increase in the **number of refugees aided by UNHCR, 14% up on 2005**, mainly due to the effect of the armed conflicts in Iraq and that of Lebanon with Israel during 2006.¹ On the other hand, despite a greater involvement on the part of UNHCR in the protection of internally displaced persons, **governments, which have the responsibility to protect those affected by such displacement, continued to fail in this role in almost all countries**. Thus, the number of countries where the situation of internal displacement was very serious increased from 22 to 24, emphasising the trend of the forcibly displaced population in armed conflicts remaining within their national borders, while their governments have not created sufficiently effective mechanisms to respond to this situation.

Finally, the **work of humanitarian agents continues to be hindered** by the lack of security and limits on access imposed by the Governments of countries in conflict, which undoubtedly contributed to aggravating crises such as those of Somalia, Yemen (north), Sudan (Darfur) or Myanmar. At the same time, **political decisions** such as those taken against the Government of Hamas in Gaza, led to serious deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Therefore the effect that these measures had on the Palestinian population was classified as a collective punishment by the United Nations and therefore contrary to International Humanitarian Law.

As regards the **arms race**, the trend, which has been stable or growing over recent years, was confirmed in

1. The UNHCR report corresponding to 2007 reflects data recorded by the agency during 2006.

2007, and this led to similarities being drawn between the current situation and the period of the Cold War. At the same time, the most recent situation and also the most worrying, is the phenomenon of **nuclear rearmament**, especially in the region of the Middle East. The controversy caused by **Iran's** nuclear programme was accompanied by various reactions at an international level: rearmament of the countries in the region, the proposal by **the USA** to install a missile defence system in Europe and Russia's departure from the Conventional Arms Treaty. Faced with this panorama, it should be pointed out that the emerging powers were not the only ones responsible for the aforementioned nuclear rearmament, but also those countries with a large arsenal, the US at the head. At the same time, new studies continued to show breaches in the sanctions imposed in the form of arms embargoes. Faced with this situation we should point to the role of governments, the primary source of almost all illegal transfers of arms.

As is often the case, advances in the **control of armaments** are always several steps behind the proliferation of the same. Nevertheless, in the field of disarmament in 2007 we could identify initiatives that modified this trend, such as the process initiated at the beginning of the year to eradicate **cluster bombs**. This fact should be taken as a very positive reference, to which can be added all the work that has been done since 2004 for the adoption of an **international treaty on arms traffic**. Regarding this treaty, 2008 will not be the year it is approved, but it should be a year which will advance the drafting process. Finally, after the deployment of a complete strategic and regulatory body to face the challenge of the **DDR programmes**, it was also necessary to address new types of armed violence. In the same way, we saw the importance of linking DDR programmes with more general processes of **reform in the security sector**.

As has been the case in recent years, the balance of 2007 with respect to the situation of **human rights** is clearly ambivalent on a global scale. On the one hand significant advances in areas such as the development of regulations on international law on human rights have been achieved by means of the approval by the General Assembly of the UN of the **Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples** after over 20 years of intense debate, or that of international Justice, with the beginning of the trial of Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, for crimes against humanity, and that of Alberto Fujimori, former president of Peru extradited to Peru from Chile.

Nevertheless, various negative points should be highlighted such as the intense persecution of media pro-

fessionals on various continents, and abuses of power by state security bodies and forces in Europe and on the African continent, and especially towards the end of the year, in Asia. **For yet another year the antiterrorist struggle was instrumentalised by various governments to criminalize political dissent or thought**. Finally, in the field of justice the ruling of the International Court regarding the events in Srebrenica is to be lamented. This ruling discharged Serbia of any responsibility. Also regrettable are the difficulties faced by international judicial bodies to detain and judge suspects of crimes against humanity due to the lack of collaboration, especially on the part of the authorities in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, this report highlights the serious violations of human rights in 57 countries and reiterates the everyday difficulties faced by many people on a global scale to exercise their rights and fundamental freedoms.

In conclusion, regarding the **gender dimension in peacebuilding**, 2007 was characterised by a continuation of the trends that had been seen in recent years since the passing, in 2000, of Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security by the Security Council of the UN. The situation of women in armed conflicts was particularly serious and worrying in a year that saw **alarming levels of sexual violence in various armed conflicts** which are currently ongoing (DR Congo and Myanmar among others). These figures show the **inability and lack of willingness on the part of the international community to guarantee the protection of women in these conflicts**, as well as the enormous importance of patriarchal ideologies and practices in the genesis and development of wars.


As regards the **international agenda**, appeals made for the **creation of a United Nations agency in charge of fostering the organisation's work from a gender perspective** and which would bring together the different efforts that are currently underway in the organization should be highlighted. Additionally once again a major difference between formal and real advances was seen, since on paper there were some advances in the field of gender and peacebuilding while in practice, the **absence of women in peace processes** (Uganda, Kosovo, Philippines), and the aforementioned difficulties in terms of their protection in the face of violence cast a shadow over this progress. Hence another year ended without the gender dimension being incorporated on the international agenda for peacebuilding at the political level that it deserves and in which the formal progress outweighed the real political commitment.

Opportunities for peace 2008

Eight opportunities for peace for 2008

After analysing the progress made in peacebuilding in 2007, the UAB School for a Culture of Peace highlights eight scenarios as being opportunities for peace in 2008. They involve negotiation processes, contexts in the stage of post-war rehabilitation, situations of socio-political tension as well as items on the international agenda, in which a series of positive factors that could facilitate satisfactory progress this year are currently converging. These opportunities lie in geographical scenarios (six cases) and thematic areas (two): the possibility of obtaining peace in Uganda after more than 20 years of armed conflict; the outlook for the unblocking of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire; the feasibility of signing a peace agreement between the two long-established armed groups in the Mindanao region in the Philippines; the outlook for the consolidation of the transition process in Haiti; the opportunity for balancing peace and justice in Burundi in view of the possible improvement in the creation of transitional justice bodies; an open door in Myanmar to a potential democratisation of the country; the steps taken towards the signing of an international treaty banning cluster bombs; and the positive impact that the United Nations declaration on indigenous peoples, signed in 2007 after two decades of debates, may have on conflict resolution.

All these opportunities for peace will require the efforts and commitment of the parties involved and, where appropriate, the support of international agents, so that the synergies and positive factors already present may contribute to peacebuilding. In any case, the analysis by the School for a Culture of Peace aims to offer a realistic view of these scenarios, making clear the difficulties that also exist and which could be obstacles to their becoming opportunities for peace.



1. The peace process in northern Uganda

After several failed attempts by the Government and the LRA to embark upon a peace process in recent years, peace talks were renewed in July 2006 and remained ongoing throughout 2007. The steps taken in recent months may lead to a final peace agreement in 2008, putting an end to more than 20 years of violence which has caused the death of around 200,000 people, the kidnapping of thousands of children and the forced displacement of two million people at the point when the conflict was most acute.

These peace talks led to the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement on 26 August 2006 in Juba, in southern Sudan, which has so far been renewed. This agreement mainly established the quartering of the LRA in two camps near Sudan's southern border, Owiny Ki-Bul and Ri-Kwangba, in order that the peace talks could continue. Although its implementation was subject to various difficulties and delays, the cessation of hostilities was respected and in April 2007 agreement was reached on the establishment of security corridors so that LRA members from the DR Congo and northern Uganda could be quartered in the Ri-Kwangba camp. The following months saw further steps forward in the peace process, such as the *Comprehensive Solutions to the Northern Uganda Conflict* agreement reached on 2 May, and the June agreement on reconciliation and accountability for crimes against humanity, under the terms of which both parties undertook not to hand over the LRA leaders to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to judge those responsible for human rights violations by means of the Mato Oput traditional justice system.

There remain some challenges and difficulties that could lead to the process breaking down, such as the hierarchical and highly personal structure of the LRA, which is based around the messianic and charismatic figure of its leader, Joseph Kony and the arbitrary nature of decision-making within the group. The execution of the LRA vice-commander, Vicent Otti, as a result of his disagreements with Joseph Kony, confirms this analysis. The existence of detention orders by the ICC against the LRA leaders for their responsibility in serious violations of human rights also complicates the process, as the LRA have threatened to call off the negotiations if these are not withdrawn. Furthermore, the agreement reached between the Presidents of

Uganda and the DR Congo in early September to fight the rebel groups operating in the east of the DR Congo, which include the LRA, may also be a threat to the peace process, as the LRA has warned that an attack against its troops in the DR Congo would constitute an invitation to resume the war.

However, there are many factors contributing to expectations that the current process may lead to a peace agreement and permanent reconciliation. For the first time in the history of the rebellion, both sides recognise the existence of a political problem that needs a political solution.

Secondly, the cessation of hostilities signed on 26 August 2006 has generally been respected, strengthening mutual trust compared to previous cessations of hostilities, which were breached by both the Government and the LRA. As regards negotiation, the process is becoming increasingly inclusive, given that the parties gradually allowed participation in the peace process and facilitation task, and the good offices to include local agents (the peace commissioner Betty Bigombe, Ugandan parliamentarians, local leaders of the Acholi community and bishops from the ARLPI - the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative), regional agents (the mediation headed by the vice-president of southern Sudan, Riek Machar and representatives from the DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and Mozambique) and international agents (the ex-President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for the peace process, and US and EU observers).

Of particular note is the obvious weakness of the LRA as a consequence of its gradual loss of troops due to the successive amnesties and conflicts with the Ugandan armed forces, and the difficulties in carrying out a new insurgency campaign due to being based in southern Sudan and the DR Congo, as well as the withdrawal of support for the LRA from the Government of Sudan and its armed forces to counteract the support that the Government of Uganda gave to the SPLA.

Despite the many challenges that have yet to be resolved, the achievement of peace appears increasingly close for northern Uganda, which is tired after 22 years of war, displacements and humanitarian crises and clearly wishes to reconcile this recent past, which has only led to the perpetuation of violence and poverty in the region, and hindered and postponed the start of a new phase based on development of the area.

For the first time in the history of the conflict the Government of Uganda and the LRA recognise the existence of a political problem that needs a political solution

2. The implementation of the peace agreement in Côte d'Ivoire

The signing of the Ouagadougou political agreement of 4 March 2007 could finally lead to the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Linas-Marcoussis in 2003. Since 2002, when a group of northern soldiers, which would subsequently form the Forces Nouvelles alliance, tried to overthrow the Government of Laurent Gbagbo, the country has been virtually divided into two areas, one controlled by the Government in the south and one by the Forces Nouvelles in the north. Although other agreements had previously been signed (six in total) and the UN Security Council had formulated various resolutions for the pacification and reunification of the country, which did not succeed in implementing a final peace process, there are now various factors which favour compliance with the agreed decisions.

Firstly, the agreement has come about as the result of an initiative by President Laurent Gbagbo himself to hold direct talks with the main representative of the armed opposition, the leader of the Forces Nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. Although the ultimate aim of this strategy by Gbagbo is to take complete control of the process and to limit the capacity of the United Nations to interfere with it, the negative aspects of this unilateral action are compensated by the fact that decisions are being fully assumed and implemented (although with delays) by the two signatories. The decision by the international community to accept a somewhat marginal position could mean that this sensation for both leaders that they are in control of events will facilitate the process. However, international organisations should be on the alert to avoid the agreement becoming a mere distribution of power between its signatories.

Secondly, both Gbagbo and Soro so far seem to have sufficient control over their constituencies to make the process of demobilisation and reintegration of their troops in the new armed forces possible. The DDR process finally started on 25th of December, and so far both the army and the members of the armed alliance are remaining stationed in their designated areas. The Ouagadougou agreement also approved the dismantling of the zone of confidence which divides the country,

controlled by international forces of the UNOCI and the French Force Licorne. This decision, accompanied by the creation of joint units of the armed forces and Forces Nouvelles (supervised by the UNOCI) for security work on what is now called the green line, is based on the possibility that the free circulation of people and goods throughout the entire country will resume. It remains to be seen how the demobilisation of pro-government militias and the collection of weapons from the civilian population is handled.

Thirdly, an agreement was reached to implement the process of identification and census of the population, which on previous occasions had been hindered by the presidency. Although the progress of the mobile courts (legal bodies created for this purpose) is slower than expected, it must be remembered that no situation of violence has been recorded with the aim to prevent it from taking place. This is one of the most important factors for achieving peace in the country – obtaining citizens' rights and access to political participation for a large part of the population (mainly in the north) which has so far been excluded from decision-making processes. Gbagbo's decision to permit free circulation throughout the country's territory by foreign nationals from ECOWAS countries and the removal of a reference to ethnic background in identity documents has also been a step towards equality for the citizens of Côte d'Ivoire.

Finally, there is a determination of all those involved politically, including Gbagbo himself, to hold presidential elections in 2008. However, it will be necessary for the elections to be held with all the due guarantees of transparency and independence for them to become good foundations for peace building in the country. The role of the

National Electoral Commission will be vital in this respect, as will efficient voter registration and support and supervision by the international community throughout the electoral process. Furthermore, the implementation of a state administration throughout the territory will be crucial for ensuring that the elections are properly held. However, the path towards peace in Côte d'Ivoire does not end with the holding of elections. Indeed, they are just the start of a process which will need the commitment and goodwill of all those involved.

In Côte d'Ivoire, it must be remembered that no situation of violence has been recorded with the aim to prevent the actual mobile courts process from taking place

3. The signing of the peace agreement in the southern Philippines

The substantial and parallel progress made in the peace processes in 2007 with the two main armed groups operating in the Philippines region of Mindanao, the MNLF and the MILF, has led some analysts and major leaders on both sides to consider that the signing of peace agreements in both cases will be feasible in 2008. The signing of a peace agreement in Mindanao would not only bring to an end the violence in one of the longest-lasting and most active armed conflicts of the last 40 years, but would also provide a precedent, if not a model, for numerous conflicts based on self-determination that are currently taking place all over the world, and especially for those cases in which the secessionist minority mostly professes a religion other than that of the state from which it is demanding the right to self-determination.

As regards negotiation with the MNLF, a group that signed a peace agreement in 1996 but did not disarm and has remained active despite demands for the full implementation of the agreement, after several delays a three-way meeting was finally held in Saudi Arabia in November (under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) which agreed to establish five joint working groups to fully implement the commitments of the peace agreement. Although the MNLF is not demanding the signing of a new peace agreement, the reviews being undertaken by these groups could lead to a political agreement between the two sides, under the terms of which Manila undertakes to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement and the MNLF to completely demobilise. Furthermore, at the end of the year the Government announced the appointment of an MNLF leader as Vice-President of National Security, a post with important counter-insurgency responsibilities.

As regards the peace process with the MILF, which broke away from the MNLF in the late 1970s after the MNLF accepted autonomy rather than independence for Mindanao, there were four factors inviting optimism in 2008. First there is the fact that the Government recognised the right to self-determination of the Moro people for the first time, although it had previously ruled out independence. Secondly, the agreement in principle reached by the two sides after 13 months of deadlock in the peace talks concerning the ancestral

territory of the Moro people, the most important and sensitive point in the negotiation. Thirdly, there is the Government's willingness, announced at the end of the year, to reformulate the Constitution to accommodate a federal state in which the Moro people would have a high level of self-governance. Fourthly, there is the increasing involvement of the international community in the verification of the ceasefire in force since 2003 (through the International Monitoring Mission), the mechanisms of which were perfected after some clashes during the year led to fears that the peace process would collapse.

The agreement in principle between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF concerning the ancestral territory of the Moro people, the most important and sensitive point in the negotiation invites optimism

In both cases, there are significant obstacles and difficulties. As far as the MNLF is concerned, its leader and founder, Nur Misuari, has been imprisoned since 2001 on charges of corruption and rebellion, and his release is demanded by the MNLF and numerous civil organisations in Mindanao.

Some disaffected factions, which sporadically carry out military actions without the consent of the head of the group also have *de facto* autonomy. Leading members of the group are also opposed to signing a possible agreement between the Government and the MILF which would erode and supersede the agreement between the MNLF and Manila. As regards the MILF, the obstacles are even greater. Firstly, there is the disagreement concerning the territories which will be included in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and the advisability or otherwise of holding a referendum to establish it. Secondly, there is the fear expressed by Christian and indigenous (Lumad) leaders of being included in a "Moro nation" and the possibility of this leading to outbreaks of violence in the future. Thirdly, there is the breakdown in trust between those involved. On several occasions they have accused each other of failing to fulfil the commitments agreed upon (the Government) and of acting in league with terrorist or criminal organisations (the MILF).

Despite these difficulties, the conditions for completing a process of negotiation which began more than 30 years ago and to find a once-and-for-all political agreement providing for the national identity aspirations of the Moro people seem to be based on firm foundations. The goodwill of all those involved will be decisive in this, as well as the role of the international agents committed to facilitating negotiation (especially the OIC, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Libya) and the reconstruction and development of Mindanao after the peace agreement has been signed.

4. The consolidation of the transition process in Haiti

In 2008, four years will have passed since Haiti began its process of democratic transition. In a country where, since its independence the historical average period between each *coup d'état* is six years, this is a crucial year in which the progress made since the departure of Jean Bertrand Aristide must be consolidated, and efforts focused on ensuring that the population of Haiti can start to enjoy the benefits of peace, if the achievements obtained are not to be set back. To that end, it will be necessary for the government of René Préval to assume the leadership of the rehabilitation process, which has so far been directed by the international community, and especially by Argentina, Brazil and Chile and the new 2x9 initiative, and in which the donor countries and organisations have so far maintained their level of involvement.

The achievements of the last four years should therefore be consolidated in 2008, but the major reforms postponed in the past, due to the lack of the political stability and security, need to be undertaken. Among the advances are, in terms of governability, the formation of an elected and stable Government and, in security terms, a substantial reduction in violence, thanks partly to the police operations carried out with the help of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) against the leaders of the armed groups – the main security problem in Haiti. Among the challenges still to be met are the reform of the security and justice sectors and the prison system, the conclusion of the electoral process with the holding of elections to the Senate, the extension of the state to the territory as a whole by means of a decentralisation process and finally, the translation of these advances into tangible improvements for the population. The consolidation of Haiti's recovery will depend to a large extent on the success or failure of these pending processes, for which it will be vital not only that Haiti continues to have the support of the international community, but also that the process is led by Haitians. To that end, the MINUSTAH should begin transferring responsibilities to the government at the same time as carrying out a process of institutional reinforcement.

Among the advances made in Haiti is remarkable, the formation of an elected and stable Government

Among the positive aspects that can support this consolidation phase are the strong presence of international troops, deployed under the mandate of the UN Security Council under MINUSTAH, and the major financial contributions made by donor countries either bilaterally or at the donor conferences which have been held for the country since 2004 as a show of unwavering support by the international community, which in this case has been led by the countries of the Southern Cone. It is interesting to note that despite the time that has passed, far from showing signs of "donor fatigue," the international community continues to be strongly committed to the recovery of the Haitian state.

However, a negative aspect is that if this progress, in terms of governability and security and support from the international community, does not immediately lead to a real improvement in the living conditions of the population, in terms both of its purchasing power and its rights in the broadest sense, these will simply be incipient signs of recovery from which the Haitian population is not benefitting, with the consequent risk of harm to the consolidation process.

There is therefore still a long way to go, as the progress made so far is still fragile and continues to rely on external support. It is now, then, that the initiatives carried out by the government, with the support of the international community, need to be more strategic than ever. That is why not only does the international community need to continue to support Haiti, but also this support should be led and co-ordinated by the government of René Préval. It is also necessary to adapt the international response to the country's real needs. The composition of the MINUSTAH international forces is an example of the discrepancies that exist between these needs and the international response. In the case of MINUSTAH, the forces deployed are mainly soldiers when, in order to be able to provide a better response to the challenges identified in the country, they should be police officers, as the UN Secretary-General himself has acknowledged. An increase in police officers and a reduction of military forces, to a greater extent than that carried out when the MINUSTAH mandate was renewed, could be a very positive asset for the incipient police reform process, which is a vital part of the reform process in the security sector.

5. The creation of a Truth Commission and International Criminal Court in Burundi

The declarations of the Burundi Government in 2007 in favour of the establishment of a Truth Commission and a Special Tribunal, under the terms of the Arusha Agreement (2000), and the corresponding process of negotiation with the UN represent a new opportunity and a boost to the consolidation of peace and mechanisms for accountability for past human rights violations from 2008 onwards. The Arusha peace agreement was indeed a starting point for the construction of a process of transitional justice after four decades of conflict but, since then, difficult balances between peace and justice have also arisen in practice. These have mainly been in the areas of temporary immunity and the design of the anticipated bodies of justice, whether formal or informal. That is why 2008 may be an opportunity for peace if some minimum requirements concerning truth, justice and reparations for victims are fulfilled, making Burundi a new benchmark for transitional justice on an international scale.

As regards the model of transitional justice negotiated by the sides involved, the Arusha Agreement requested that the UN Security Council create an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry into genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and create an International Criminal Tribunal for these types of crimes. However, in 2005 the Security Council endorsed one of the conclusions of the Kalomoh Report which recommended that this Commission of Inquiry should not be created due to the overlapping of functions between the various bodies. On the other hand, the need to create a National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, the mandate of which would be to promote measures of reconciliation and pardon, to establish responsibilities and to identify those responsible and the victims. In this context and at the same time, the Government of Burundi began a process of temporary immunity for "political prisoners", as stipulated in the Arusha Agreement. This excluded

acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Pretoria Protocol subsequently extended temporary immunity to all the leaders and combatants of the CNDD-FDD and to the Burundi government security forces. However, as a result of several presidential decrees, around 3,000 people were released in 2006, some of whom were charged with serious human rights violations during the conflict.

However, in this context there remain some relevant aspects that need to be clarified, including the principles of immunity or amnesty for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, despite the clarity of the Arusha Agreement, and the neutrality and independence of these bodies and the working relationship established between them. In specific terms, and as far as the Tribunal is concerned, the Government decided against an independent prosecutor in favour of someone to deal with the cases that the Truth Commission

The mandate for the national commission in Burundi would be to promote measures of reconciliation and pardon, to establish responsibilities and to identify those responsible and the victims

refers to the Tribunal. Given that the Tribunal cannot legally consider serious crimes, the consequence of this would be a lack of justice in serious cases, according to various non-governmental sources. However, despite the Government's emphasis on the provisional nature of the immunity conferred and its emphasis that some of these cases will be judged before the Court or will appear before the commission, the NGOs and victims fear that the delay in the creation of these bodies may lead to *de facto* impunity as regards the acts committed.

In order to restore the declared desire of the Government of Burundi to speed up the process for the creation of bodies responsible for shedding light on the truth and judging those responsible for human rights violations, it is necessary to remember the preamble of resolution 1606 of the Security Council, which highlights the need to provide appropriate international assistance to Burundi in order to end impunity, promote reconciliation and establish a society and government under the rule of law.

6. The process of dialogue and transition for Myanmar

2007 was a turning point in the situation in Myanmar since, for the first time since the popular uprising of 1988 and the elections of 1990, in which the winning candidate, Aung San Suu Kyi, was the subsequent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, massive public protests took place against the military regime that has governed the country in recent decades. For the first time in many years, the door was opened to dialogue with the political opposition, representing an essential step forward for the democratisation of the country. There is therefore an opportunity for the transformation of the internal political situation. For several weeks, hundreds of thousands of people joined the protests headed by Buddhist monks against the rise in the prices of fuels and basic goods, and against the political stubbornness of a regime that, historically, has violently suppressed any attempt at democratisation. The importance of these protests, apart from the value in democratic terms of any non-violent protest by citizens under a dictatorship to demand better living conditions and greater social participation, lies in the consequences that could arise from the international significance that the crisis acquired. It could raise the profile of Myanmar on the international agenda and strengthen the diplomatic efforts being made mainly by the United Nations to promote a process of democratisation.

For weeks, the images of repression of peaceful demonstrators in the streets of Rangoon and Mandalay on the covers of the international press highlighted the situation of a country that is usually absent from the newspapers, and provided it with unprecedented international attention. Although this media attention only lasted a few weeks, and the interest of the international media in Myanmar had disappeared by the end of the year, diplomatic efforts were strengthened, especially those involving the UN, and the response of the regime to these protests – despite their seriousness – was much milder than on previous occasions (in 1988 thousands of people died as a consequence of repression).

Various factors mean that the current situation in the country is an opportunity for democratisation. Firstly, as mentioned above, the massive presence of citizens

in the protests against the regime, a situation not seen since the early 1990s since in those decades the regime had succeeded in marginalising and silencing the political opposition. Secondly, there is another factor which, together with the incipient efforts of international community, could provide the glimmer of an opportunity for transformation in the country. Some of the groups that make up the ethnically-based armed opposition (UWSA, MNDA, NDA and NDAA) have declared their support for the demands stated by the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Aung San Suu Kyi, and her party, the LND. Although this support is far removed from experiences like that in Nepal, where an alliance between the political opposition and the army not only helped end the armed conflict, but also brought down the despotic monarchical regime, the building of bridges between the political opposition and the army based on certain premises could undoubtedly strengthen those wishing to transform political and social conditions in Myanmar. In any event, the question of whether a democratic government in Myanmar would be able to deal with armed violence in the country and the aspirations of self-government of various ethnic communities remains has yet to be answered.

Thirdly, there has also been unprecedented diplomatic effort in recent years. The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Ibrahim Gambari, who has visited the country several times since 2006, and pressure from the USA, EU and several countries in the region, show the existence of a new – albeit delicate – political scenario. The attitude of the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who despite being under house arrest for more than a decade has declared that she is in favour of dialogue with the government, provides further grounds for thinking that this process may have positive consequences in the medium or long term. However, it should be remembered that leading countries in the region, such as China or India, support the Burmese regime and have important economic interests in the country. Russia also helped the military government by vetoing the possibility of a declaration against it by the UN Security Council. In late 2007, Gambari created a group of friendly countries to examine possible solutions to the political and social crisis in the country. This is also an important step towards the start of the transition process to end the dictatorship.

In Myanmar the protests against the regime mobilised the population en masse, a situation not seen since the early 1990s

7. The signing of an international treaty for the banning of cluster bombs

2008 is to be the year that the first international treaty banning the use of cluster bombs is approved. 94 states currently support the signing of this treaty, which is also backed by resolutions by both the OSCE and the European Parliament. Beyond the positive step of including a new global law preventing the signatory countries from using, producing, transferring and storing this type of weapon, its approval could be an opportunity to support the process of approval of the International Arms Trade Treaty, anticipated for 2009.

Cluster bombs are a type of weapon consisting of a "container" that can be launched from land, sea or air which opens in flight, expelling hundreds of which spread over a large area and explode on impact with the ground. This type of weapon has an indiscriminate effect, especially on civilians, due to its dispersion over very large areas and the high percentage of submunitions that do not explode when they hit the ground (between 5 and 30%), which is a clear violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which prohibits indiscriminate attacks. There are currently 34 countries that produce cluster bombs and 73 have arsenals of these weapons. This type of weapon has recently been used in Afghanistan, Iraq and used in the attacks by Israel on southern Lebanon in August 2006.

In terms of arms control legislation, approval of this treaty would be a success considering its amazing progress - in just one year since the initial proposal made by the Government of Norway, embodied in the organisation of an international conference in February 2007, following subsequent meetings in Peru and Aus-

tria, more than one hundred countries have supported the initiative. As a result, approval for this legislation will therefore have been achieved in less than two years. However, there is still a small group of countries unwilling to participate, being some of the leading producers of cluster bombs. Among the most obvious examples are China, the USA, Israel and Russia.

In just one year since the proposal by Norway of a treaty to ban cluster bombs more than one hundred countries have supported the initiative

The ideal scenario would be to obtain the highest possible level of adherence and consensus by all countries. If the process which culminated in the signing of the treaty for the banning of anti-personnel mines (Treaty of Ottawa, signed 10 years ago) is taken as a benchmark, it can be seen how this was effective in raising awareness about these weapons and reaffirming that their use is a clear violation of International Humanitarian Law. Despite the fact that some countries have not signed the treaty, no proliferation of mines has been observed since it came into force.

In this respect, although the implementation of a future International Arms Trade Treaty is more difficult (due to the number of weapons it covers and the complexity of determining the prohibitions on exportation), the boost to the process of cluster bombs (mainly due to the *lobby* structures created and due to the level of awareness and sensitivity that governments may have on this subject) is an opportunity to continue to increase the legal corpus that restricts the production, sale and use of conventional weapons, similar to the regulations on non-conventional weapons (which currently cover weapons of mass destruction). And finally, to provide the civilian population with increased protection and greater respect for International Humanitarian Law and human rights.

8. The impact of the United Nations Declaration on indigenous peoples in the resolution of conflicts

After more than 20 years of debates and deliberations between representatives of states, indigenous organisations and international organisations, the UN General Assembly approved the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September 2007. This is a document which aims to become the main benchmark for the recognition and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and the regulation of their relationship with states. Apart from the importance that the Declaration may have for the defence and promotion of some of the basic aspects of the social, cultural, economic and religious systems of indigenous peoples, it is also worth noting some opportunities that it may provide for the resolution of certain conflicts, especially in those in which self-determination is a central issue and in which indigenous peoples are involved, either as combatant parties or victims of violence.

As regards the protection of indigenous peoples in contexts of armed conflict, Article 30 states that “Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples,” while Article 10 says that “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories.” In several cases, such as in the Philippines (Mindanao), Myanmar, Indonesia (Aceh) and Colombia, hostilities have taken place in the ancestral territories of indigenous peoples, which has led to their forced displacement and the consequent alienation of their traditional ways of life, which are closely linked to the territory.

However, one of the vital aspects of the Declaration is the recognition of indigenous peoples’ right of free determination, by virtue of which they can freely determine their political condition, enjoy autonomy and self-government in internal and local affairs and establish their own strategies for economic, political and social development. As well as this recognition, it also contains other rights, such as the maintenance of their own political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining the right to participation in public

affairs and in the ordinary institutions of the state (art. 5); belonging to an indigenous community or nation (art. 9); participation, by means of their elected representatives in accordance with the procedures considered appropriate, in the adoption of decisions affecting them (art. 18); recognition, possession and legal protection of the lands and resources that they have traditionally held (art. 26); and the establishment of links of political, social and economic co-operation with other indigenous peoples, especially when they are divided by international frontiers (art. 36).

However, the effectiveness and implementation of these provisions is hindered by opposition to the Declaration by countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – all of which have significant influence in the international system and in indigenous affairs – and by the inclusion of article 46, which was vital for many states to vote in favour of the Declaration, which states that none of the provisions of the text will be used to “dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.” Taking into account that this provision prevents any opportunity to interpret the Declaration as an instrument to justify or obtain secession, the international community, and especially the states, have the opportunity and the obligation to explore the political, legal and institutional formulas to guarantee

compliance with the Declaration, i.e. the possibility of indigenous peoples, within previously existing states, exercising their right to free determination and administering and controlling their ancestral territories with full autonomy and according to the institutions, political structures and development strategies that they decide upon.

In short, the moral duty of states to comply with a Declaration that establishes internal sovereignty spaces on a *de facto* basis may become an opportunity for the international community to find institutional arrangements to make two of the main principles of international law compatible (self-determination and the territorial integrity of states) and therefore, to expand the range of options for resolving or dealing with one of the main forms of contemporary political violence – the conflicts arising from self-determination.

One of the vital aspects of the Declaration approved by the UN General Assembly is the recognition of indigenous peoples’ right of free determination

Appendix I. Country and indicator table and explanation of indicators

The following table has been prepared using a list of 22 indicators regrouped in seven categories related to armed conflicts and situations of tension, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and transitional justice, and gender. The indicators refer to 195 countries: 192 member states of the United Nations, the Palestinian National Authority, Taiwan and the Holy See. The bookmark enclosed is helpful for the reading of the table because it shows the numeration and the names of the indicators..

ARMED CONFLICTS

1. Países con conflicto armado

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

The indicator points out the countries involve in armed conflicts. It is possible that more than one conflict is ongoing at the same time in one country. An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving armed groups of regular or irregular forces whose individual aims are seen as incompatible with one another, in which the continuous and organised use of violence: a) claims at least 100 lives per year and/or has a serious impact on the ground (the destruction of infrastructure or natural resources) and human security (e.g. the injury or displacement of civilians, sexual violence, a lack of food security, an impact on mental health and the social fabric or the disruption of basic services); and b) seeks to attain objectives that go beyond common criminality and are normally associated with:

- demands for self-government or a struggle for greater recognition;
- opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system in a particular state or the domestic or international policies of an individual government, which in either case gives rise to a struggle to accede to or erode power; or
- control over an area's natural resources.

- Armed conflict

SITUATIONS OF TENSION

2. Countries experiencing situations of tension

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

A situation of tension is considered one in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy the demands raised by different parties leads to high levels of social and political mobilisation and/or the use of violence that does not reach the intensity of an armed conflict but may nevertheless include confrontations, repression, coups d'état, murders and other attacks, the escalation of which could lead to armed conflict under certain circumstances. Tensions normally arise from:

- demands for self-determination and self-government or the struggle for recognition of identity;
- opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system in a particular country or the domestic or international policies of a particular government, which in many cases lead to a struggle to accede to or erode power;

- or control over a territory's resources.

- Situations of tension

PEACE PROCESSES

3. Countries with formal peace or negotiating processes or talks in an exploratory phase

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

It is understood that a peace process is underway when the parties involved in an armed conflict have reached an agreement to pursue negotiations that will lead them to a peaceful way out of the conflict and regulate or resolve any basic disagreement that they may have. The process may be given a variety of names, but in all cases talks have been formalised, with or without the assistance of third parties. The fact that a negotiating process exists is viewed independently of whether it is evolving well or badly, an aspect analysed in the chapter dealing with peace processes. A peace or negotiation process is regarded as being in an exploratory phase when the parties are involving in a preliminary trial and consulting process, without having reached any final agreement on opening negotiations. This also includes peace processes that have been interrupted or have broken down, where attempts to relaunch them remain ongoing.

PN Countries engaged in formal peace processes or negotiations at the end of the year

EX Countries engaged in exploratory negotiations at the end of the year

POST-WAR REHABILITATION (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT)

4. Countries that receive international aid for post-war rehabilitation

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling the security of the ordinary population, the encouragement of good governance and participation, social and economic welfare, and the promotion of justice and reconciliation, after an armed conflict. The starting point for this analysis from an international involvement point of view is taken as one of three situations: the signing of a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities between all the

parties engaged in the conflict, the victory of one or more of the parties over the rest, or a victory by one or more of the parties that is clearly brought about by international intervention. The cases analysed all involve post-war rehabilitation processes that are regarded as having begun in 2000 and the most remarkable events on countries which started their rehabilitation in 1994 (the date of the Rwandan genocide) or later, and that indeed find themselves on a more advanced phase of the rehabilitation process, although some issues remain unsolved.

- Countries in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities exists but is progressing badly and thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work.
- Countries or territories that have reached a cessation of hostilities or have signed a peace agreement and in which post-war rehabilitation is progressing reasonably well.
- Countries that remain in a state of war but which are receiving considerable amounts of post-war international aid, which is often used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit or fulfilment of an agreement that will allow hostilities to be brought to an end.

HUMANITARIAN CRISES

5. Countries facing food emergencies

SOURCE: FAO, *Crop Prospects and Food Situation*.

FAO alerts refer to countries facing food shortages, whether due to drought, floods or other natural disasters, civil disturbances, population displacements, economic problems or sanctions. Countries are classified as suffering food emergencies when they are facing (or have at some point in the year faced) unfavourable prospects for the current harvest and/or a deficit in food supplies that has not been covered and that requires (or has required during the course of the year) exceptional external aid.

- Food emergency

6. Countries in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced

SOURCES: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; and UNFPA, *State of world population 2007. Unleashing the potential of urban growth*.

This indicator provides an assessment of the situation in a particular country, based on the number of displaced people as a percentage of the total population, while the figure indicates the absolute number of people displaced, as of December 2007. In cases in which the sources give two different figures, an average is shown.

- Situation regarded as very serious: at least 1 in every 100 people is internally displaced.

- Situation regarded as serious: 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced or, where this proportion is not reached, the internally displaced number at least 5,000.

7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee

SOURCES: UNHCR, *2006 Global Refugee Trends. Statistical Refugees, Returnees, Internal Displaced Persons and Stateless Persons*; and UNFPA, *State of world population 2007. Unleashing the potential of urban growth*.

This indicator provides an assessment of the situation in a particular country, based on the number of refugees as a percentage of the country of origin's total population. The numbers show the absolute figure for refugees during 2006.

- Situation regarded as very serious: at least 1 in every 100 people is a refugee.
- Situation regarded as serious: at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee or, where this proportion is not reached, refugees number at least 5,000.

8. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 2008

SOURCE: United Nations, *Humanitarian Appeal 2008, Consolidated Appeal Process*.

Since 1994, the United Nations has made an annual appeal to the donor community through OCHA, in an attempt to collect the funds required to deal with certain humanitarian emergency situations. The fact that a country or region is included in this appeal process implies the existence of a serious humanitarian crisis that has been acknowledged by the international community.

- Countries included in the United Nations CAP for 2008.

DISARMAMENT

9. Countries whose military expenditure exceeds 4% of GDP

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007*, Oxford University Press, 2007 and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*. The report refers to 2006 data or, whenever it is not possible, to the average of the data available for the 2001 to 2005 period.

Military expenditure is understood to include the Ministry of Defence budget along with any costs of a military nature that are distributed among other Ministries.

- Very serious situation: military expenditure exceeds 6% of GDP.
- Serious situation: military expenditure totals between 4% and 6% of GDP.

10. Countries in which military expenditure exceeds public spending on health and education

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007*, Oxford University Press, 2007, and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*. Data on military spending refers to 2003 or the most recent year for which information is available. Data on health refers to 2003; the data on education refers to the most recent year between 2002 and 2004 for which information is available.

- Military spending exceeds public spending on both health and education.
- Military spending exceeds public spending on either health or education.

11. Countries in which the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population

SOURCES: IISS, *The Military Balance 2007*, Oxford University Press, 2007, and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*.

This definition only includes members of Government armed forces. Members of armed opposition groups and paramilitary forces are excluded due to the difficulties involved in calculating their numbers in many countries. The figure reflects the number of soldiers as a percentage of the country's total population.

- Very serious situation: number of soldiers exceeds 2% of the population.
- Serious situation: number of soldiers amounts to between 1.5% and 2% of the population.

12. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the UN Security Council

SOURCE: UN Security Council Resolutions.

An arms embargo is understood as a ban on arms commercialisation imposed to a country or to an opposition armed group as a sign of disapproval, trying to keep a neutrality status on an armed conflict, and/or to restrict the resources of an actor to avoid armed violence.

The imposition or recommendation of an embargo by the United Nations Security Council is understood to represent an acknowledgement that the situation in the country affected is exceptional. As a result, for the purposes of this study, no distinction is made between binding and voluntary embargoes. Voluntary United Nations embargoes take the form of non-binding "appeals" or "emergencies" on arms supplies. Nevertheless, a distinction is made here between sanctions which are imposed on individual countries and those which apply to armed opposition groups.

- Arms embargo imposed on countries.
- Arms embargo imposed on armed opposition groups.

13. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the EU and the OSCE

SOURCES: EU and OSCE, Committee on Senior Officials

The imposition or recommendation of an embargo by European bodies (whether the EU or the OSCE) is understood to represent an acknowledgement that the situation in the country affected is exceptional. As a result, for the purposes of this study, no distinction is made between binding and voluntary embargoes. Nevertheless, a distinction is made here between sanctions which are imposed on individual countries and those which apply to armed opposition groups.

- Arms embargo imposed on countries.
- Arms embargo imposed on armed opposition groups.

14. Countries with DDR programmes

SOURCES: Monitoring of the international situation using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGO, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

Programmes for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants are initiatives implemented in post-war rehabilitation contexts aimed at disarming one or more armed groups that have been involved in the preceding conflict, demobilising their members from military life and reintegrating them into civilian society.

DDR Countries with DDR programmes underway at the end of the year.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

15. Countries that have not ratified the United Nation's main legal instruments on human rights and International Humanitarian Law

SOURCE: UNHCHR and ICRC.

This indicator is based on the total number of legal human rights instruments that a country has ratified from the nine selected by the United Nations. The lack of ratification of Protocol II has been considered as an indicator itself because of the fact that the most of the armed conflicts nowadays are non-international.

- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
- Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)
- International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)
- Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)

- Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003)

- Country that has ratified four or fewer human rights instruments.
- Country that had not ratified the Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions (1949) related to the protection of the victims of non-international armed conflicts. (1997).

16. Countries with serious and systematic human rights violations according to non-governmental sources

SOURCES: Amnesty International, *Report 2007, the state of the world's human rights*, *Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007*, and the School for a Culture of Peace's own monitoring of the current international situation from daily reports by various local and international human rights NGOs (the classification given to countries is the authors' own, as neither Amnesty International nor Human Rights Watch make this type of classification).

Very serious human rights violations are regarded as those abuses which affect the right to life and personal security and which occur in a systematic and widespread way as the result of the state's own actions or omissions, particularly in the case of extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, deaths in custody, torture, arbitrary detention and widespread impunity. Serious human rights violations are all the abuses mentioned above when they occur frequently, in addition to abuses that violate personal, political and civil rights, particularly trials without the necessary minimum procedural guarantees and the existence of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.

- Country regarded as involving very serious violations of human rights.
- Country regarded as involving serious violations of human rights.

17. Countries giving cause for concern in relations with human rights violations according to the European Union

SOURCE: Council of the European Union, *EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2007*.

This indicator refers to countries whose position in human rights issues made them a **cause for concern** or the subject of some kind of action by the European Council during the period between July 2006 and 30 June 2007. (Please see the previous indicator for a definition of very serious and serious human rights violations).

- Country regarded as involving very serious violations of human rights.
- Country regarded as involving serious violations of human rights.
- ▲ Countries that are subject of an EU declaration.

18. Countries giving cause of concern in relation to human rights violations according to reports from the special mechanisms and resolutions adopted at by the UNHRC and the UN General Assembly's Third Committee

SOURCES: UNHCHR and the School for a Culture of Peace's own monitoring of the UNHRC and the UN General Assembly's Third Committee.

This indicator relates to the countries giving cause of concern during 2007 on the special geographic mechanisms of the UNHRC or to the UNHCHR, and the UNHRC resolutions or the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly's Third Committee. Somalia and Sudan had not been considered because of the inability of the geographical mechanisms to travel to both countries.

- Reports from geographical special mechanisms expressing concern over the human rights situation in a country.
- Reports by the UNHCHR expressing concern.
- ▲ Resolution or declaration by the UNHCHR condemning or expressing concern about the situation in a particular country.
- Resolution by the General Assembly's Third Committee condemning or expressing concern about the situation in a particular country.

19. Countries that apply and/or maintain the death penalty

SOURCE: Amnesty International.

This indicator deals with the countries which still **retain the death penalty** (where this penalty is retained for common offences), countries which have **abolished the death penalty for common offences** (though they maintain it for exceptional offences, under military law or in the context of an armed conflict), countries which have **abolished the death penalty in practice** (countries which have maintained it for common offences but have not carried out any executions in the last 10 years, and countries which have undertaken not to apply the death penalty).

- Countries that maintain the death penalty.
- ▲ Countries that have abolished the death penalty in practice.
- Countries that have only abolished the death penalty for common offences.

20. Countries of origin of people who have obtained political asylum

SOURCE: UNHCR, *2006 Global Refugee Trends. Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, Stateless Persons.*

This indicator gives provisional data on people granted asylum. The grant of asylum status, though sometimes subject to national or international restrictions, implies recognition by the host country that the security and freedom of the person seeking asylum is threatened in his or her country of origin. It therefore implies Government recognition of some human rights violations in this country of origin.

- The country of origin of more than a thousand people granted political asylum status.
- The country of origin of between one hundred and a thousand people granted political asylum status.

21. Countries with ongoing transitional justice processes

SOURCES: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

Transitional justice is understood as the set of judiciary and extra-judiciary instruments being used in societies in transition, between armed conflict and peace or between dictatorship and democracy, in order to confront with the systematic violations and abuses of human rights of the past. These instruments will be in charge of judging (international courts, mixed, hybrids or internationalized or traditional), reforming the institu-

tions (security forces and government officials), seeking for the truth and the historical clearance (official commissions, non officials, locals, internationals), reparation to the victims (restitution, compensations, rehabilitation and guaranties to the non-repetition of the facts) as much as giving impulse to the reconciliation. This indicator refers to the countries which have started any of these processes.

- CV** Country that has established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at least in formal terms.
- TRI** Country that has established a juridical organism (tribunal), whether it is international, national or hybrid.
- CPI** Country in which the International Criminal Court has opened an investigation.

GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING

22. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

SOURCE: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2007/2008.*

The GDI measures inequality between men and women in three basic areas of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy and gross schooling levels) and decent standard of living (per capita GDP). The countries indicated are those that scored less than 0.500, this being the point from which the UNDP classifies its Human Development Index as "low".

- Countries with a GDI lower than 0.500.

| Country | Conflicts and peace-building | | | | Humanitarian crises | | | Disarmament | | | | | | | Human rights and transitional justice | | | | | Gender | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|---|----|---|---------------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|---|----|----|----|-----|----|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|-------|---------|-----|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | | 20 | 21 |
| Afghanistan | ● | | EX | ▲ | ● | ○ 132,000 | ● 2,107,519 | | - | - | ○ | ○ | DDR | ■ | ● | ○ | ■ | ● | ● | ● 1,937 | | ● |
| Albania | | | | | | | ○ 14,080 | | | | | | | | | | ○ | ▲ | ○ | ○ 865 | | |
| Algeria | ● | | | | | ○ | ○ 8,353 | | | ○ | | | | | | ● | | ○ | ○ | ○ 269 | | |
| Andorra | | | | | | | | | - | - | | | | | ●■ | - | | | | | | |
| Angola | | ● | EX | | ● | ○ 61,700 | ● 206,501 | | ○ | ○ | | | DDR | ■ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ 354 | | | ● |
| Antigua and Barbuda | | | | | | | | | - | - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | ▲ | | | | |
| Armenia | | ● | | | | ○ 8,400 | ○ 14,918 | | | | ● | ● | | | | ○ | | | | ○ 992 | | |
| Australia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Austria | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Azerbaijan | | ● | | | ● | ● 633,000 | ● 126,068 | | | | ● | ● | | | ■ | ● | ▲ | ○ | ○ | ○ 382 | | |
| Bahamas | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | |
| Bahrain | | | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | | | | | ○ | | ● | | | | |
| Bangladesh | | ● | | | ● | ○ 500,000 | ○ 7,803 | | | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | ● | ○ 637 | | |
| Barbados | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Belarus | | ● | | | | | ○ 9,371 | | | - | | | | | | ● | ●▲ | ○ | ○ | ○ 459 | | |
| Belgium | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belize | | | | | | | | | - | - | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Benin | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | ● |
| Bhutan | | | | | | | ● 108,073 | | - | - | | | | | ●■ | - | ○ | | | | | |
| Bolivia | | ● | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | ▲ | | | | |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | | | | ○ | ● | ● 180,000 | ● 199,946 | | ○ | - | | ● | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ 649 | TRI | |
| Botswana | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ● | | ▲ | | | | |
| Brunei Darussalam | | | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | | ○ | ○ 160 | | |
| Burkina Faso | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | ● |
| Burundi | | ● | | ● | ● | ● 100,000 | ● 396,541 | | ● | ○ | | | DDR | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ 865 | 0 | ● |
| Cambodia | | | | | | | ○ 17,965 | | ○ | ○ | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ●■ | ○ | ○ | TRI | |
| Cameroon | | ● | | | | | ○ 10,384 | | | | | | | | ● | ● | | ● | ○ | ○ 921 | | |
| Canada | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cape Verde | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | |

| Country | Conflicts and peace-building | | | | Humanitarian crises | | | | Disarmament | | | | | | Human rights and transitional justice | | | | | | Gender | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|---|----|---|---------------------|---|---|---|-------------|----|----|----|-----|----|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|--------|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 |
| Central African Republic | ● | | PN | | ● | ● | ● | ● | | ○ | | | DDR | | | ● | | | ○ | ● | ICC | ● |
| Chad | ● | | PN | | ● | ● | ○ | ● | | ○ | | | DDR | | | ● | | | ● | ○ | | ● |
| Chile | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | | ▲ | | | |
| China | | ● | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ● | | | | ● | ● | | ● | ● | | |
| Colombia | ● | | PN | | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | | | | | DDR | | | ● | ● | ■ | | ● | | |
| Comoros | | ● | | | | | | | - | - | - | | | | ● | - | | | | | | |
| Congo | | ● | | | ● | ○ | ○ | | | | | | DDR | | | ● | | | ○ | ○ | | |
| Congo, DR | ● | ● | PN | ▲ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | | ● | DDR | | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ICC | ● |
| Costa Rica | | | | | | | | | - | - | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | ● | ● | | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | | | ● | | DDR | | | ● | ● | | | ● | | ● |
| Croatia | | | | | | ○ | ● | | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | | | | | TRI | |
| Cuba | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | - | - | - | | | | ○ | ○ | ● | | ● | ○ | | |
| Cyprus | | ● | PN | | ● | ● | | | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | | ■ | | | | |
| Czech Republic | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Denmark | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Djibouti | | | | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dominica | | | | | | | | | - | - | - | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | |
| Ecuador | | ● | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | | | | | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| Egypt | | ● | | | | | ○ | | ○ | ○ | | | | | ● | ● | ● | | ● | ○ | | |
| El Salvador | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ▲ | ○ | | |
| Equatorial Guinea | ● | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | ● | | | ● | | | | |
| Eritrea | | ● | | | ● | ○ | ● | | ● | ● | ● | | DDR | | | ○ | ● | | ● | ● | | ● |
| Estonia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ethiopia | ● | ● | EX | | ● | ○ | ○ | | | | | | | | ● | ● | ● | | ● | ● | | ● |
| Fiji | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | | | ■ | - | ○ | | | | | |
| Finland | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| France | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gabon | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gambia | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | ● | | | | ○ | | ● |
| Georgia | | ● | PN | | | ● | ○ | | | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | | ○ | | |
| Germany | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | | ○ | | |

| Country | Conflicts and peace-building | | | | Humanitarian crises | | | | Disarmament | | | | Human rights and transitional justice | | | | | | Gender | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|---|----|---|---------------------|---|---------|---|-------------|--------|----|----|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|--------|-------|--------|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | | 19 | 20 | 21 |
| Nigeria | ● | ● | PN | | | ○ | - | ○ | 13,253 | ● | | | | | | ● | ○ | ○ | 512 | | | ● |
| Norway | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Oman | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | ● | ● | | ● | | | | |
| Pakistan | ● | ● | PN | | | ○ | - | ○ | 25,639 | | | | | | ● | ● | | ● | ● | ● | 1,396 | |
| Palau | | | | | | | | - | | - | | | | | ● | - | | | | | | |
| Palestine | ● | | PN | | | ● | 69,750 | ● | 334,142 | ● | | | | | ■ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | 222 | | |
| Panama | | | | | | | | - | | - | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Papua New Guinea | | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | | ■ | ● | | ○ | | | | |
| Paraguay | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | |
| Peru | | ● | | | | ○ | 150,000 | ○ | 6,985 | | | | | | | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | 219 | | |
| Philippines | ● | ● | PN | | | ○ | 120,000 | | | | | | | | | ● | ● | | | | | |
| Poland | | | | | | | | | ○ | 13,513 | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | |
| Portugal | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Qatar | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | |
| Romania | | | | | | | | | ○ | 7,234 | | | | | | ○ | | | ○ | 148 | | |
| Russian Fed. | ● | ● | | | | ○ | - | ○ | 159,381 | | | | | | | ● | ● | ○ | ● | 5,721 | | |
| Rwanda | | ● | | | | ○ | - | ○ | 92,966 | | | | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● | 2,777 | TRI | ● |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | |
| Saint Lucia | | | | | ● | | | - | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Salomon Islands | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | ○ | 147 | |
| Samoa | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | |
| San Marino | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Sao Tome and Principe | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | |
| Saudi Arabia | | ● | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | ● | ● | ● | | | | |
| Senegal | | ● | PN | | | ○ | 64,000 | ○ | 15,163 | ● | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | 179 | | ● |
| Serbia | | ● | PN | ○ | | ● | 227,500 | ● | 174,027 | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | ● | 1,875 | TRI | |
| Seychelles | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | |
| Sierra Leone | | ● | | ○ | | | | | ○ | 42,863 | ● | | | | | ● | | | ○ | 420 | TRI TC | ● |
| Singapore | | | | | | | | ○ | | | ○ | | | | ● | ○ | | | | | | |
| Slovakia | | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Slovenia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TRI | |

| Country | Conflicts and peace-building | | | | | | | Humanitarian crises | | | | | | | Disarmament | | | | | | | Human rights and transitional justice | | | | | | | Gender |
|----------------------|------------------------------|---|----|---|---|-------------|-----------|---------------------|---|----|----|-----|----|----|-------------|----|----|----|----|----------|-----|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | | | | | | | |
| Somalia | ● | ● | PN | | ● | ● 1,000,000 | ● 463,253 | ● | - | - | ● | DDR | ■ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● 25,668 | | | | | | | | | |
| South Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Spain | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sri Lanka | ● | | PN | | ● | ● 460,000 | ○ 116,966 | | ○ | | | | ■ | ● | ● | ●▲ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● 2,061 | | | | | | | | | |
| Sudan | ● | ● | PN | ● | ● | ● 4,703,163 | ● 686,311 | ● | ○ | ○ | | DDR | | ● | ● | ● | ●▲ | ● | ● | ● 5,193 | ICC | | | | | | | | |
| Suriname | | | | | | | | | - | - | - | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Swaziland | | | | | ● | | | | - | - | | | | | ● | | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sweden | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Switzerland | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Syria, Arab Rep. | | ● | | | | ● 305,000 | ○ 12,337 | | ● | ● | ○ | | ■ | ● | ● | ●▲ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ 549 | | | | | | | | | |
| Taiwan | | | | | | | | | - | - | | | ■ | ● | ● | | | ● | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tajikistan | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | | | ● | ○ | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tanzania | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | ○ | | | | | | | ● | | | | | | | |
| Thailand | ● | ● | EX | | | | | | | | | | ■ | ● | ● | ○▲ | ● | ● | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Timor-Leste | | ● | | ○ | ● | ● 100,000 | | | - | - | | | | | ● | ○ | ○ | | | | TC | | | | | | | | |
| Togo | | | | | | | ○ 27,332 | ● | | | | | | | ● | ● | ▲ | ○ | ○ | ○ 667 | | ● | | | | | | | |
| Tonga | | | | | | | | | - | - | - | | | | ● | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | | | | | | | | | - | - | - | | | | ● | ● | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tunisia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ 111 | | | | | | | | | |
| Turkey | ● | | | | | ● 1,077,000 | ○ 227,232 | | | | | | ■ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | | ● | ● 1,957 | | | | | | | | | |
| Turkmenistan | | ● | | | | ○ | - | | - | - | | | | | ● | ● | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tuvalu | | | | | | | | | - | - | - | | ●■ | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Uganda | ● | ● | PN | | ● | ● 1,310,000 | ○ 21,752 | ● | | | | DDR | | | ● | ● | ■ | ● | ○ | ○ 215 | ICC | ● | | | | | | | |
| Ukraine | | | | | | | ○ 63,723 | | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ 319 | | | | | | | | | |
| United Arab Emirates | | | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| United Kingdom | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Uruguay | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| USA | | ● | | | | | | | ○ | | | | ■ | ● | ● | ● | | ● | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Uzbekistan | | ● | | | | | ○ 9,102 | | | ○ | | ● | | | ● | ● | ●▲ | | ○ | ○ 603 | | | | | | | | | |
| Vanuatu | | | | | | | | | - | - | - | | ● | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Venezuela | | ● | | | | | | | ○ | ○ | | | | | ● | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ 848 | | | | | | | | | |
| Vietnam | | | | | | | ○ 374,279 | | - | - | | | ■ | | ○ | ○ | ●▲ | ● | ○ | ○ 236 | | | | | | | | | |

| Country | Conflicts and peace-building | | | | | Humanitarian crises | | | | | Disarmament | | | | | Human rights and transitional justice | | | | | Gender | |
|------------------|------------------------------|----|----|----|----|---------------------|----------|----|----|----|-------------|----|----|----|----|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|---------|--------|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | | 21 |
| Yemen | ● | | PN | | | ○ 32,500 | | | ● | ○ | | | | | | | | | ● | | | ● |
| Zambia | | | | | ● | | | | - | | | | | | | ○ | | | ● | | | ● |
| Zimbabwe | | ● | | | ● | ● 570,000 | ○ 12,782 | ● | | | | | ● | | | ● | ●▲ | | ● | ● 1,700 | | |
| TOTAL ● | 25 | 64 | | 3 | 44 | 26 | 16 | 24 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 12 | | 25 | 84 | 32 | 11 | 57 | 24 | | 27 |
| TOTAL ○ | | | | 10 | | 24 | 50 | | 8 | 33 | 7 | 1 | 2 | | | 40 | 32 | | 20 | 48 | | |
| TOTAL ▲ | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 16 | 3 | 8 | | | |
| TOTAL ■ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 33 | | | 8 | | | | |
| TOTAL □ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | |
| TOTAL PN/DDR/ICC | | | 28 | | | | | | | | | | | 19 | | | | | | | | 4 |
| TOTAL EX/TIRI | | | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 11 |
| TOTAL TC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 |

Appendix II. Multilateral peace missions

UN peace missions (16 PKO, 2 PO/PKO¹, 11 PO and PBO)

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission ² (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AFRICA | | | | |
| Continent of Africa | (Office in Geneva) | | | Special Adviser for Africa, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) (1997) |
| | (Office in New York) | | | Special Adviser for Africa, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana) (2006) |
| Region of West Africa | UNOWA, SR's Office (PO) since 03/02 | | | SR Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) (2002) |
| Great Lakes region | SR's Office (PO) since 19/12/97 | | | SR Ibrahima Fall (Senegal) (2002) |
| Burundi (1993-2006) | BINUB ³ (PBO) S/RES/1719 | January 2007 | -/8/12 | Executive Representative, Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) (2002) |
| Congo, DR (1998-) | MONUC (PKO) S/RES/1279 | Nov. 1999 | 16,661/735/1,011 | SR William Lacy Swing (USA) (2003) succeeded by Alan Doss (UK) (October 2007) |
| Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007) | UNOCI ⁴ (PKO) S/RES/1528 | April 2004 | 7,834/195/1,130 | SR Pierre Schori (Sweden) (2005) succeeded by Choi Young-Jin (Rep. of Korea) (October 2007) |
| Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000) | UNMEE (PKO) S/RES/1312 | July 2000 | 1,464/212/- | Pending appointment, Acting SR Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia) |
| Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999) | UNOGBIS (PBO) S/RES/1216 | March 1999 | -/2/1 | Shola Omoregie (Nigeria) (2006) |
| Liberia (1989-2005) | UNMIL (PKO) S/RES/1509 | Sept. 2003 | 13,335/199/1,183 | SR Alan Doss (UK) (2005) succeeded by Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) (October 2007) |
| Morocco-Western Sahara * (1975-) | MINURSO (PKO) S/RES/690 | Sept. 1991 | 48/188/6 | SR Julian Harston (UK) (February 2007), and SE Peter van Walsum (Netherlands) (2005) |
| Central African Republic (1996-2000) (2002-2003) | BONUCA ⁵ (PBO) S/RES/1271 | Feb. 2000 | -/5/6 | SR Lamine Sissé (Senegal) (2001) |
| Central African Republic (1996-2000) (2002-2003) | MINURCAT (PKO) S/RES/1778, planned for 2008 | Sept. 2007 | -/3/- | |
| Sierra Leone (1991-2001) | UNIOSIL ⁶ (PBO) S/RES/1620 | Jan. 2006 | -/14/21 | Executive Representative Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal) (2006) |
| Somalia (1988-) | UNPOS ⁷ (PO) S/RES/954 | April 1995 | | SR François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) (2005) |

1. The UNOTIL (Timor-Leste) and UNAMA (Afghanistan) political missions are directed and supported by the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

2. Peace-keeping Mission (PKO), Political Office or Mission (PO) and Peace-building Operation (PBO).

3. It replaces ONUB (PKO). The original AU mission (AMIB) was integrated into ONUB in June 2004.

4. A UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) had been in place since May 2003, and this was joined by 1,300 ECOWAS troops (ECOMICI, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) in April 2004, with support from 4,000 French troops (Operation Licorne).

5. MINURCA (1998-2000) (PKO).

6. UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (OMP), UNAMSIL (1999-2005) (OMP).

7. UNOSOM I (1992-1993) UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with a UN Security Council mandate) UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO). Resolution S/RES/954 agreed the closure of UNOSOM II and established that the UN would continue observing events in Somalia through a Political Office based in Kenya.

UN peace missions (16 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 11 PO and PBO) (continuation)

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AFRICA | | | | |
| Sudan (1983-2004) | UNMIS ⁸ (PKO) S/RES/1590 | March 2005 | 8,803/596/652 | Acting SR Taye-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia) (2006) succeeded by Ashraf Jehangir Qazir (Pakistan) (September 2007) |
| Sudan (Darfur) (2003-) | UNAMID ⁹ (PKO) S/RES/1769, hybrid mission AU-UN | July 2007 | 2/-/227 | Joint SR of the AU and UN, Rodolphe Adada (Congo) (2007) |
| Uganda (1986-) | | | | SR for the areas affected by the LRA armed opposition group, Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) (2006) |
| AMERICA | | | | |
| <i>Region of Latin America**</i> | | | | <i>SA Diego Cordovez (Ecuador) (1999)</i> |
| <i>Guyana-Venezuela**</i> | | | | <i>SR for the border dispute between the two countries, Oliver Jackman (Barbados) (1999)</i> |
| Guatemala (1960 – 1996) | | | | Head of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, Carlos Castresana Fernández (Spain) (2007) |
| Haiti (2004-2005) | MINUSTAH (PKO) S/RES/1542 | June 2004 | 7,062/-/1,841 | SR Edmond Mulet (Guatemala) (2006), succeeded by Hédi Annabi (Tunisia) (2007) |
| ASIA | | | | |
| Afghanistan ¹⁰ (2001-) | UNAMA (PO) S/RES/1401 | March 2002 | -/12/8 | SR Tom Koenings (Germany) (2006) |
| Cambodia (1975-1979) | | Nov. 2005 | | SR for the human rights situation, Yash Gay (Kenya), (2005) |
| India-Pakistan* (1946-) | UNMOGIP ¹¹ (PKO) S/RES/91 | Jan. 1949 | -/44/- | Military head of the observer mission, Colonel Jarmo Helenius (Finland) |
| Myanmar | | | | SE Razzali Ismail (Malaysia) (2000) succeeded by SA Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) (2007) |
| Nepal (1996-2006) | UNMIN (PBO) S/2007/62 S/2007/61 | January 2007 | -/157/5 | SR Ian Martin (UK) (2006) |
| <i>Tajikistan (1992-1997)</i> | <i>UNTOP (PO)</i> | <i>June 2000- July 2007</i> | <i>-/-/1</i> | <i>SR Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria) (2002)</i> |
| Timor-Leste (1975-1999) | UNMIT (PKO) S/RES/1704 | August 2006 | -/33/596 | SR Abu Khare (India) (2006) |
| EUROPE | | | | |
| Continent of Europe | No special adviser ¹² | | | |
| Cyprus*(1974-) | UNFICYP (PKO) S/RES/186 | March 1964 | 861/-/64 | SR Michael Moller (Denmark) (2006) |
| FYR Macedonia-Greece | | | | Personal Envoy for talks between the two countries, Matthew Nimetz (USA) (1999) |

8. The duties of the UNAMIS political mission (created in 2004) were passed on to UNMIS in Resolution S/RES/1590 in March 2005.

9. The AU mission, AMIS, established in 2004, it's integrated on the hybrid mission.

10. This current phase of the armed conflict began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.

11. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).

12. The UN Secretary General's former Special Adviser for European Affairs, Jean-Bernard Merimée (France), officially resigned his post in 2002, and is currently appearing before the courts as a result of his involvement in the UN "Oil for Food" corruption scandal in Iraq. However, until October 2005, Jean-Bernard Merimée still featured as a Special Adviser in the United Nations organisation chart, a fact that has given rise to an important controversy.

UN peace missions (16 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 11 PO and PBO) (continuation)

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| EUROPE | | | | |
| Georgia (Abkhazia)* (1992-1993) | UNOMIG (PKO) S/RES/849 S/RES/858 | August 1993 | -/134/18 | SR Jean Arnault (France) (2006) |
| Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999) | UNMIK (PKO) S/RES/1244 | June 1999 | -/39/2,006 | SR Joaquim Rückner (Germany) (2006) SE for the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) (2005) |
| MIDDLE EAST | | | | |
| Iraq (2003-) | UNAMI (PO) S/RES/1500 | August 2003 | 223/7/- | SR Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) (2004) succeeded by SR Staffan de Mistura (Sweden) (2007) |
| Iraq (2003-) | | | | SGSA for the International Compact for Iraq and related issues, Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) (2007) |
| Iraq-Kuwait (1990 - 1991) | | | | High Level Coordinator for Iraq's compliance with its obligations regarding the repatriation and return of Kuwaitis and other third-party nationals, (vacancy) |
| Israel-Palestine ¹³ (1948-) | UNSCO ¹⁴ (PO) | May 1948 | | SA for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative for the PLO and the PNA, Álvaro de Soto (Peru), (2005) |
| Israel-Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973) | UNDOF (PKO) | June 1974 | 1,062/-/- | Military Head of mission, General Wolfgang Jilke (Austria) (2007) |
| Israel-Lebanon (1967, 1982-2000, 2006) | UNIFIL (PKO) S/RES/425 SRS/426 S/RES/1701 | March 1978 | 13.260/-/- | Military Head of mission, Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) (2007) |
| Lebanon | | | | Head of the International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Daniel Bellemare (Canada) (2007) |
| Middle East (1948-) | UNTSO(PKO) S/RES/50 | June 1948 | -/150/- | Military chief, General Ian Campbell Gordon (Australia) (2006) |
| Middle East (1948-) | | | | SE for compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) (2005) |
| Middle East (1948-) | | | | UN Special Coordinator for the peace process in the Middle East and Personal Representative of the Secretary General for the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestine Authority and Secretary General Envoy to the Quartet, Robert H. Serry (Netherlands) (2007) |

13. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict which began with the 2nd Intifada in September 2000.

14. UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKO) UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKO).

OSCE operations (19 missions)¹⁵

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ASIA CENTRAL | | | | |
| Kazakhstan | OSCE Centre in Almaty (PC/DEC 243, 23/07/98) turn in to the OSCE Centre in Astana (PC/DEC 797, 21/06/07) | January 1999 | | Ambassador Ivar Kristian Vikki (Norway) (2004) |
| Kyrgyzstan | OSCE Centre in Bishek, PC/DEC 245, 23/07/98 | January 1999 | | Ambassador Markus Mueller (Switzerland) (2003) |
| Tajikistan | OSCE Centre in Dushanbe, Min. Council, 01/12/93 | Feb. 1994 | | Ambassador Alain Couanon (France) Succeeded by Vladimir Pryakhin (Russian Fed.) (2007) |
| Turkmenistan | OSCE Centre in Ashgabad (PC/DEC 244, 23/07/98) | January 1999 | | Ambassador Ibrahim Djikic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2005) |
| Uzbekistan | OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Tashkent, PC/DEC 734, 30/06/06) | July 2006 | | Ambassador Miroslav Jenca (Slovakia) (2006) |
| CAUCASUS | | | | |
| Armenia | OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC/DEC 314, 22/07/99 | Feb. 2000 | | Ambassador Vladimir Pryakhin (Russian Federation) succeeded by Ambassador Segey Kapinos (Russian Federation) in October 2007 |
| Azerbaijan | OSCE office in Baku, PC/DEC 318, 16/11/99 | July 2000 | | José Luis Herrero Ansola (Spain) |
| Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994) | Personal Rep. of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference | August 1995 | | Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland) |
| Georgia (1992-1993) | OSCE Mission in Georgia CSO 06/11/92 | December 1992 | | Ambassador Roy Stephen Reeve (United Kingdom) succeeded by Ambassador Terhi Hakala (Finland) in October 2007 |
| EASTERN EUROPE | | | | |
| Belarus | OSCE Office in Minsk, PC/DEC 526, 30/12/02 | January 2003 | | Ambassador Ake Peterson (Sweden) |
| Moldova, Rep. of | OSCE Mission in Moldova CSO 04/02/93 | Feb. 1993 | | Ambassador Louis F. O'Neill (USA) succeeded by Ambassador Philip N. Remler (USA) December 2007 |
| Ukraine | OSCE project Coordinator in Ukraine, ¹⁶ PC/DEC 295 01/06/99 | June 1999 | | Project Coordinator Ambassador James F. Schumaker (USA) (2005) |
| SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE | | | | |
| Albania | OSCE presence in Albania, PC/DEC 160, 27/03/97; updated by PC/DEC 588, Dec. 2003 | April 1997 | | Ambassador Pavel Vacek (Czech Rep.) succeeded by Ambassador Robert Bosch (Netherlands) October 2007 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) | OSCE Mission in B&H, MC/5/DEC 18/12/95 | December 1995 | | Ambassador Douglas Davidson (USA) |

15. Troop deployment figures refer to 2007, and exact figures are not available for the countries not shown. See <<http://www.osce.org/regions>>.

16. Replaced the OSCE mission in Ukraine (1994-1999) devoted to managing the crisis in the Crimea.

OSCE operations (19 missions) (continuation)

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE | | | | |
| Croatia (1991-1995) | OSCE Mission in Croatia PC/DEC 112, 18/04/96; extended in PC/DEC 176, 26/06/97; PC/DEC 748, 23/11/06. OSCE Office in Zagreb PC/DEC 12/12/07 | July 1996 -December 2007 January 2008 | | Ambassador Jorge Fuentes Monzonis-Villalonga (Spain) (2005) |
| Macedonia, FYR (2001) | OSCE Observation Mission in Skopje CSO 18/09/92 | September 1992 | | SR Ambassador Giorgio Radicati (Italy) (2006) |
| Montenegro | OSCE Mission to Montenegro PC/DEC 732 | June 2006 | | SR Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu (Romania) (2006) |
| Serbia | OSCE Mission to Serbia, PC/DEC 733, 29/06/06 ¹⁷ | June 2006 | | SR Ambassador Hans Ola Urstad (Norway) (2006) |
| Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999) | OMiK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo) PC/DEC 305, 01/07/99 | July 1999 | | Ambassador Werner Wnendt (Germany) succeeded by Tim Guldemann (Switzerland) in October 2007 |

NATO missions (5 missions)

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------|--|
| Afghanistan (2002-) | ISAF S/RES/1386 | Dec. 2001 | 33,460/-/- | |
| Europe-Mediterranean | Operation Active Endeavour | 11/09/01 | | |
| Iraq (2003-) | NTIM-I, NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546 | August 2004 | 200/-/- | |
| Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999) | KFOR S/RES/1244 | June 1999 | 15,000/-/- | |
| <i>Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)</i> | <i>Support for the AU in Darfur</i> | <i>July 2005 – June 2007</i> | | |

EU operations (13 missions and 10 SR)¹⁸

| EUROPE AND ASIA | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|--|----------------------------------------------|
| Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) | EU's SR for Central Asia, Joint Action 2005/588/CFSP | July 2005 | | SR Pierre Morel (France) (2006) |
| South Caucasus | EU SR for the South Caucasus Joint Action 2005/496/CFSP | July 2003 | | SR Peter Semneby (Sweden) (2006) |
| Afghanistan ¹⁹ (2002-) | EU SR for Afghanistan. Joint Action 2001/875/CFSP reformed 25/06/02 | July 2002 | | SR Francesc Vendrell (Spain) (2002) |
| Afghanistan (2001-) | UE Police Mission for Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP | June 2007 | | Head of the Mission Jüregen Scholz (Germany) |

17. OSCE Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01, becomes OmiSaM (OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro), PC/DEC 533, 13/02/03, and finally it turns into OSCE Mission to Serbia, PC/DEC 733, 29/06/06

18. The 13 mission figure is the total number of missions that remained active during 2007. However, the EUPOL Kinshasa was closed in June 2007 and was succeeded by another mission, the EUPOL RD Congo. None of the missions were ongoing at the same time.

19. This current phase of the armed conflict began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.

EU operations (13 missions and 10 SR) (continuation)

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| EUROPE AND ASIA | | | | |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) | Office of the High Representative and Special Representative of the EU in B&H. Council Decision 2007/427/CFSP and Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP | December 1995 | | SR Miroslav Lajcak (Slovakia) (2007) |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) | EUPM, EU Police Mission in B&H. Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, later modified | January 2003 | -/-144 | Head of the Mission Vincenzo Coppola (Italy) November 2005 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) | EUFOR ALTHEA, ²⁰ EU Military Operation in B&H. Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP | December 2004 | 2,500/- | Military Chief Ignacio Martín Villalaín (Spain) December 2007 succeeding Hans-Jochen Witthauer |
| Macedonia, FYR | EU Mission in Macedonia, FYR (Special Representative and European Commission Delegation Office), Joint Actions 2007/109/CFSP 2006/123/CFSP 2005/724/CFSP | December 2005 | | Head of the Mission Erwan Fouéré (Ireland), 17/10/05 |
| Moldova | EU Special Representative's Office for Moldova Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP | March 2005 | | SR Kálmán Mizsei (Hungary) 17/02/2007 |
| Moldova-Ukraine | EU Border Mission for Moldova and Ukraine | November 2005 | | |
| Myanmar | EU SE for Burma/Myanmar, appointed by EU High Representative for the CFSP, November 2007 | Nov. 2007 | | SE Piero Fassino (Italy), 6/11/07 |
| Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999) | EU Planning Team (EUPT) in Kosovo, EU Council for Foreign Relations and General Affairs, September 2006 | April 2006 | | Head of Mission, Roy Reeve (UK) 21/12/2007 |
| AFRICA | | | | |
| Great Lakes | EU SR for the Great Lakes, Joint Action, OJ L 87, 04/04/96 | March 1996 | | SR Roeland Van de Geer (Netherlands) 15/02/07 |
| <i>Congo, DR (1998-)</i> | <i>EUPOL Kinshasa, EU Police Mission in DR Congo Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP</i> | <i>January 2005-June 2007</i> | <i>-/-30</i> | |
| Congo, DR (1998-) | EUPOL RD CONGO, EU Police Mission for RD Congo, Council Joint Action 2004/405/CFSP 12/07/07 | July 2007 | | Head of Mission Adilio Custodio (Portugal) |
| Congo, RD (1998-) | EUSEC DR Congo, Mission to Assist Security Sector Reform in DR Congo Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP | June 2005 | 8/- | Head of Mission Pierre-Michel Joana (France) 2005 |
| Central African Republic (2006-) Chad (2006-) | EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (PKO) S/RES/1778, in process; Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP in 17/10/2007 | Sept 2007 | | Mission Commander General Patrick Nash (Ireland) 16/10/07 |

20. The UN Security Council prepared Resolution S/RES/1551 of 09/07/04 to provide the mission with a mandate under the Council's guidance. This mission is a continuation of NATO's SFOR mission and holds the mandate to implement the Dayton Agreement of 1995.

EU operations (13 missions and 10 SR) (continuation)

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AFRICA | | | | |
| Sudan | EU Special Representative's Office for Sudan. Council Decision 2007/677/CFSP and Joint Action 2007/108/CFSP | | | SR Torben Brylle (Denmark), 2007 |
| <i>Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)</i> | <i>AMIS EU Supporting Action for the AU Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP</i> | <i>July 2005-December 2007</i> | | <i>SR Pekka Haavisto (Finland), 18/07/05</i> |
| MIDDLE EAST | | | | |
| Middle East (1948-) | EU Special Representative's Office for the Middle East Peace Process | November 1996 | | SR Marc Otte (Belgium) (2003) |
| Iraq (2003-) | EUJUST LEX, Integrated EU mission for the rule of law in Iraq Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP | March 2005, extended to December 2007 | | Head of the mission Stephen White (UK), March 2005 |
| Israel-Palestine (1948-) | EU BAM Rafah, Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP | November 2005, extended to May 2008 | -/-70 | |
| Israel-Palestine (1948-) | EUPOL COPPS, ²¹ an EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories is created within the EU Special Representative's Office for the Middle East, Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP | January 2006 | -/-9 | |

OAS

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|------|--|
| Colombia (1964-) | Support Mission to the peace process in Colombia, CP/RES/859 | February 2004 | | |
| Haiti (2004-2005) | Special Mission of the OEA for the strengthening of democracy in Haiti CP/RES/806 | June 2004 | -/-2 | |

Operations by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)²²

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|--|
| Georgia (South Ossetia) | Joint Force for South Ossetia (Bilateral, 24/06/92) | July 1992 | 1,420/- | |
| Georgia (Abkhazia) | CIS Peace-Keeping Force in Georgia | June 1994 | 2,000/- | |
| Moldova, Rep. (TransDniester) | Peace-Keeping Force of the Joint Control Commission (Bilateral, 21/07/92) | July 1992 | 1,199/- | |

21. Mission resulting from the prior work done by the EU's Coordination Office to Support the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS), established in April 2005.

22. The figures for CIS peace-keeping missions are taken from SIPRI 2006, op. cit.

CEMAC

| Country (beginning-end of armed conflict) | Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate) | Beginning-end of mission | Soldiers / Military Observers / Police | Special Representative/head of mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE), Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed) |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Central African Republic (Oct. 2002 - March 2003) | CEMAC Multinational Force in CAR, Libreville Summit, 02/10/02 | December 2002 | 380/-/- | |

AU

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------|--|
| Somalia (1988-) | AMISOM S/RES1744 | February 2007 | 1,700/-/- | |
| <i>Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)</i> | <i>AMIS²³ (AU Mission in Sudan)</i> | <i>June 2004</i> | <i>4,980/601/1,346</i> | |

Other operations

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Korea, PDR – Korea, Rep. | NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement | July 1953 | -/10/- | |
| Salomon Islands | RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission Salomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration) | July 2003 | 80/-/300 | RAMSI Special Coordinator, Tim George |
| Israel-Palestine (1948-) | TIPH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron) | January 1997 | -/3/18 | |
| Egypt (Sinai) | Multinational Observer Force (Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel of 26/03/1979) | April 1982 | -/1,687/- | |
| Iraq (2003-) | Multinational Force in Iraq (USA-United Kingdom) S/RES/1511 | October 2003 | 155,000 ²⁴ /-/ 1,000 | |
| Côte d'Ivoire (2002-) | Operation Licorne (France) | Feb. 2003 | 3,500/-/- | |
| Timor-Leste (1975-1999) | ISF (PKO) (Australia) S/RES/1690 | May 2006 | 930/-/- | |

*Situations engaged in unresolved conflicts in 2007 (see the chapter on peace processes). The case of India-Pakistan is analysed from the point of view of a peace process.

**In italics, missions or posts that ended during 2005.

Source: Prepared by the authors and updated in December 2007 and SIPRI 2007

23. Review UNAMID, hybrid mission AU-UN

24. Of these, 140,000 are from the USA, with the remaining 15,000 from the countries that form the Multinational Force in Iraq, excluding those that will result from President G. W. Bush's announcement that a further 23,000 soldiers would be sent to the country. See O'Hanlon, Michael E., Campbell, J. H., Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, 22 January 2007, <<http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex/>>.

Appendix III. Donor response and CAP balance sheet 2007

Response from donors during 2007

| Main humanitarian appeals ¹ | Main bodies receiving funds ² | Main sectors receiving funds ³ | Main donors ⁴ | TOTAL ⁵ |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Aid provided through the United Nations⁶ | | | | |
| 1. Chad (92%) | 1. WFP | 1. Demining | 1. USA (30.3%) | 3,366 million dollars |
| 2. Madagascar Floods Flash Appeal (90%) | 2. UNHCR | 2. Food | 2. ECHO (11.7%) | |
| 3. PDR Korea Flash Appeal (88%) | 3. UNICEF | 3. Protection/human rights/ rule of law | 3. Unearmarked funds by UN (7%) | |
| 4. Sudan Work Plan (80%) | 4. UNWRA | 4. Coordination and support services | 4. CERF (6.9%) | |
| 5. Burundi (72%) | 5. FAO | 5. Agriculture | 5. UK (6.7%) | |
| Global humanitarian funding⁷ | | | | |
| | 1. WFP | 1. Food | 1. USA (27.7%) | 6,449 million dollars |
| | 2. UNHCR | 2. Multisector | 2. ECHO (11.5%) | |
| | 3. UNICEF | 3. Not specified | 3. UK (5.8%) | |
| | 4. ICRC | 4. Health | 4. The Netherlands (5.8%) | |
| | 5. UNRWA | 5. Coordination and support services | 5. Sweden (5.4%) | |

1. Carried out by the United Nations annually. The percentage indicates those that have, up to now, received most financing from the international community, irrespective of amount requested.

2. United Nations agencies or NGOs that have attracted most aid to date.

3. Main sectors to which the agencies or NGOs have decided to assign aid.

4. Donors that have provided most aid, regardless of GDP.


5. Total amount provided for humanitarian crises up to 12th December 2007.

6. Multilateral Humanitarian Aid.

7. Humanitarian Aid provided outside the United Nations framework.

Source: Reliefweb, at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/fts>>.

Total amounts allocated to the various humanitarian appeals 2007



Source: United Nations

Appendix IV. Distribution of CERF Funds during 2007 in dollars

| Country | Rapid response to crisis | Emergencies with a deficit of funds | Total donations |
|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Afghanistan | 5,434,407 | - | 5,434,407 |
| Angola | 3,216,435 | 4,499,828 | 7,716,263 |
| Armenia | 299,787 | - | 299,787 |
| Bangladesh | 25,747,096 | 1,000,000 | 26,747,096 |
| Bolivia | 2,000,000 | - | 2,000,000 |
| Burkina Faso | 1,796,080 | 877,908 | 2,673,988 |
| Burundi | - | 8,500,000 | 8,500,000 |
| Cameroon | 500,000 | - | 500,000 |
| Central African R | - | 6,778,722 | 6,778,722 |
| Chad | 7,281,382 | 978,510 | 8,259,892 |
| Congo | 881,701 | 1,099,971 | 1,981,672 |
| Congo, DR | 2,958,859 | 49,547,719 | 52,506,578 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | 8,494,860 | 8,494,860 |
| Djibouti | 1,575,570 | - | 1,575,570 |
| Dominican Republic | 3,879,893 | - | 3,879,893 |
| Eritrea | - | 3,000,909 | 3,000,909 |
| Ethiopia | 2,266,813 | 10,098,846 | 12,365,659 |
| Georgia | 161,599 | - | 161,599 |
| Ghana | 2,496,956 | - | 2,496,956 |
| Guinea | 10,821,314 | - | 10,821,314 |
| Haiti | 409,817 | 3,276,605 | 3,686,422 |
| Indonesia | 1,255,042 | - | 1,255,042 |
| Iraq | 3,533,359 | - | 3,533,359 |
| Jordan | 1,000,000 | - | 1,000,000 |
| Kenya | 1,944,057 | 3,002,501 | 4,946,558 |
| Korea, PDR | 7,798,300 | 3,300,277 | 11,098,577 |
| Lesotho | 4,742,070 | - | 4,742,070 |
| Lebanon | 5,676,248 | - | 5,676,248 |
| Liberia | 2,199,555 | 1,461,597 | 3,661,152 |
| Madagascar | 3,431,553 | - | 3,431,553 |
| Mali | 1,017,103 | - | 1,017,103 |
| Mauritania | 846,889 | 854,731 | 1,701,620 |
| Mexico | 1,693,550 | - | 1,693,550 |
| Mozambique | 12,232,995 | - | 12,232,995 |
| Myanmar | - | 1,803,312 | 1,803,312 |
| Nepal | 1,000,000 | - | 1,000,000 |
| Namibia | - | 999,999 | 999,999 |

| Country | Rapid response to crisis | Emergencies with a deficit of funds | Total donations |
|--------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Niger | - | 2,000,023 | 2,000,023 |
| Pakistan | 5,806,965 | - | 5,806,965 |
| Palestine | 2,525,949 | 3,632,510 | 6,158,459 |
| Peru | 9,591,713 | - | 9,591,713 |
| Philippines | 938,214 | - | 938,214 |
| Rwanda | 416,325 | - | 416,325 |
| Syria | 1,177,096 | - | 1,177,096 |
| Somalia | 14,664,775 | 1,000,000 | 15,664,775 |
| Sri Lanka | 10,888,085 | - | 10,888,085 |
| Sudan | 19,475,033 | 6,000,000 | 25,475,033 |
| Swaziland | 3,136,815 | - | 3,136,815 |
| Tajikistan | 119,814 | - | 119,814 |
| Tanzania | 1,200,061 | - | 1,200,061 |
| Timor-Leste | 1,300,564 | - | 1,300,564 |
| Togo | 3,802,932 | - | 3,802,932 |
| Uganda | 13,001,015 | - | 13,001,015 |
| Yemen | 3,434,576 | - | 3,434,576 |
| Zimbabwe | 300,000 | 11,699,076 | 11,999,076 |
| TOTAL | 211,878,362 | 133,907,904 | 345,786,266 |

Appendix V. Countries launching flash appeals through the United Nations system to tackle natural disasters in 2007

| Country | Natural Disaster | Amount requested (in dollars) |
|--------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| Bolivia | Floods | 14,295,320 |
| Dominican Republic | Tropical storms | 18,568,825 |
| Ghana | Floods | 12,410,000 |
| Korea, PDR | Floods | 14,517,967 |
| Lesotho | Drought | 22,815,106 |
| Madagascar | Floods, cyclones | 19,466,802 |
| Mozambique | Floods, cyclones | 38,677,251 |
| Nicaragua | Hurricane | 41,724,360 |
| Pakistan | Floods, cyclones | 42,922,297 |
| Peru | Earthquake | 37,826,763 |
| Sudan | Floods | 34,651,239 |
| Swaziland | Drought | 18,710,457 |
| Uganda | Floods | 41,469,801 |
| Zambia | Floods | 8,852,453 |
| TOTAL | | 366,908,641 |

Appendix VI. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes of former combatants

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for former combatants are a very important component of peace-keeping operations and post-war rehabilitation processes. The main objective of this kind of initiative is to ensure the transition of former combatants (including members of both state and non-state armed forces) from military to civilian status.

As the following table shows, these programmes differ widely in terms of the number of **troops to be demobilised** and reintegrated, their **budget** and the **bodies implementing and financing** the process. The table also illustrates the broad role played by international organizations, both as implementing bodies (of a purely international character or in partnership with national institutions) and financing agencies (with bilateral, World Bank or multi-trust funds) though it should be pointed out that funding is too often allocated for the initial stages only, with rather inflexible constraints in terms of timing, duration and objectives, leaving a shortage of resources for the reintegration process. Finally, it is noticeable the common presence in these groups of **child soldiers, women combatants and disabled soldiers** requiring distinct approaches as collectives with specific needs.

Table 6.5. Main ongoing DDR programmes

| Country | Implementing bodies | Period (start and end dates) | Combatants to be demobilised | | Programmes for vulnerable groups | | | Total budget (\$ millions) | Financing formula | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-----------|----------|----------------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|
| | | | SAF | AOG | C | W | D | | WB | M | C |
| Afghanistan | M | 10/03 to 12/08 | 63,380 | | ● | | | 141.2 | | | ● |
| Angola | N | 08/02 to | 33,000 | 105,000 | ● | ● | ● | 255.8 | | ● | |
| Burundi | M | 12/04 to 12/08 | 41,000 | 37,000 | ● | | ● | 84.4 | ● | ● | |
| C. African Rep. | N | 12/04 to 04/07 | - | 7,565 | ● | - | - | 13.2 | | ● | |
| Chad | N | 12/05 to 12/10 | 9,000 | - | - | - | - | 10 | ● | | ● |
| Colombia (AUC) | N | 11/03 to 08/06 | - | 31,671 | ● | | | 302.6 | | | ● |
| Côte d'Ivoire | N | 12/08 to | 5,000 | 42,500 | ● | ● | | 40 | ● | | |
| DR Congo* | M | 01/04 to 12/07 | 23,000 | 127,000 | ● | ● | | 200 | ● | ● | |
| Eritrea | N | 10/02 to | 200,000 | | | ● | ● | 198 | ● | ● | ● |
| Haiti | M | 08/06 to | - | 6,000 | ● | | | 50.1 | | ● | |
| Indonesia (Aceh) | N | 09/05 to 12/09 | - | 5,000 | ● | | | 170 | | ● | |
| Liberia | M | 12/03 to 06/08 | 12,000 | 107,000 | ● | ● | | 71 | | ● | |
| Nepal | M | 12/06 to | | 19,602 | ● | | | 18.4 | | | ● |
| Niger | Int | 03/06 to 12/07 | - | 3,160 | | ● | | 2.39 | | | ● |
| Rep. Congo | M | 12/05 to 12/08 | - | 42,500 | ● | ● | | 25 | ● | | ● |
| Rwanda | N | 12/01 to | 21,684 | 16,000 | ● | ● | ● | 62.5 | ● | ● | ● |
| Somalia | M | 12/05 to | - | 53,000 | ● | | | 32.8 | | ● | ● |
| Sudan | M | 09/05 to 09/12 | - | 24,500 | ● | ● | ● | 85.4 | | ● | ● |
| Uganda | N | 01/00 to 12/08 | - | 16,245 | ● | ● | | 6.74 | | ● | |
| TOTAL (19) | | | 408,064 | 643,743 | 16 | 10 | 5 | 1,769.53 | 7 | 12 | 10 |

Legend:

Implementing bodies: **N**- National / **Int**- International / **M**- Mixed

Troops to be demobilised: **SAF**- State armed forces / **AOG**- Armed opposition groups

Vulnerable groups: **C**- Child soldiers / **W**- Women combatants / **D**- Disabled soldiers

Financing formula: **WB**- World Bank / **M**- Multinational funds / **C**- Country-specific funds

* Several DDR programmes are underway simultaneously in DRC making difficult to determine with accuracy some data.

Appendix VII. EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

Approved by the Council of the European Union on 25 May 1998

The Council of the European Union,

BUILDING on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992,

RECOGNISING the special responsibility of arms exporting states,

DETERMINED to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency,

DETERMINED to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,

WISHING within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,

NOTING complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,

ACKNOWLEDGING the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort,

RECOGNISING that states have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter, have adopted the following Code of Conduct and operative provisions:

CRITERION ONE

Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: the international obligations of member states and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes; the international obligations of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wasse-

naar Arrangement; their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine.

CRITERION TWO

The respect of human rights in the country of final destination.

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States will: not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression; exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU.

For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes.

Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

CRITERION THREE

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

CRITERION FOUR

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the

proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account *inter alia*: the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient; the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.

CRITERION FIVE

The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

Member States will take into account: the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those of friends, allies and other member states, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability; the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or other member states; the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

CRITERION SIX

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

Member States will take into account *inter alia* the record of the buyer country with regard to: its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts; its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

CRITERION SEVEN

The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered: the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity; the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment; the capability of the

recipient country to exert effective export controls; the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).

CRITERION EIGHT

The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

Operative provisions

Each EU Member State will assess export licence applications for military equipment made to it **on a case-by-case basis** against the provisions of the Code of Conduct.

This Code will not infringe on the right of Member States to **operate more restrictive national policies**.

EU Member States **will circulate through diplomatic channels details of licences refused** in accordance with the Code of Conduct for military equipment together with an explanation of why the licence has been refused. The details to be notified are set out in the form of a draft pro-forma at Annex A. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it will first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item of military equipment will remain **at the national discretion of each Member State**. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the member state has refused to authorise the actual sale or physical export of the item of military equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

EU Member States will **keep such denials and consultations confidential** and not to use them for commercial advantage.

EU Member States will work for the **early adoption of a common list** of military equipment covered by the Code, based on similar national and international lists. Until then, the Code will operate on the basis of national control lists incorporating where appropriate elements from relevant international lists.

The criteria in this Code and the consultation procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of the operative provisions **will also apply to dual-use** goods as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP as amended, where there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.

In order to maximise the efficiency of this Code, EU Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to **reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence** in the field of conventional arms exports.

Each EU Member State will circulate to other EU Partners in confidence an **annual report** on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code. These reports will be discussed at an annual meeting held

within the framework of the CFSP. The meeting will also review the operation of the Code, identify any improvements which need to be made and submit to the Council a consolidated report, based on contributions from Member States.

EU Member States will, as appropriate, **assess** jointly through the CFSP framework **the situation of potential or actual recipients** of arms exports from EU Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of the Code of Conduct.

It is recognised that Member States, where appropriate, may also **take into account the effect of proposed exports** on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the above criteria.

EU Member States will use their best endeavours to **encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to the principles of this Code of Conduct.**

This Code of Conduct and the operative provisions will replace any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria.

Appendix VIII: Resolutions issued by the United Nations Human Rights Council

Resolutions and decisions issued by The Human Rights Council. Fourth Session (12/03-30/03)

RESOLUTIONS

4/1 Question of the exercise of ESCR

The Council *urges* all States to give full effect to economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR); *welcomes* the inclusion of the question of the exercise of ESCR in the Durban Declaration and Action Programme and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Council with an annual report on the application of the current resolution.

4/2 Human Rights Situation in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Notes that Israel has hindered the dispatching of urgent fact-finding missions; the Council requests the implementation of Council resolutions S-1/1 y S-3/1 in this respect.

4/3 Intergovernmental Working Group on the Review of Mandates

Requests the Coordinating Committee of the special procedures to extend until the closure of the fifth session of the Human Rights Council, the deadline for the submission of comments on and inputs to the draft manual of special procedures;

4/4 The right to development

Decides to promote an agreement on a programme of work that will lead to raising the right to development to the same level and on a par with all other human rights and fundamental freedoms and to renew also the mandate of the Working Group on the Right to Development, for a period of two years,

4/5 Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

Underlines that development should lead to the full realisation of human rights; *urges* the international community to take stock of slow advance of Millennium development goals and *underlines* the need to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in international economic decision making and the establishment of norm-setting.

4/6 Strengthening of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Emphasizes that the Office of the High Commissioner is a common office for all and should therefore reflect a diversity of backgrounds and *requests* that the Secretary-General present to the General Assembly proposals to correct the imbalance in geographical distribution of staffing existing in said Office. It also, *requests* that the

OHCHR strengthen work on ESCR and the right to development.

4/7 Rectification of the legal status of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Decides to initiate a process to rectify the legal status of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the aim of placing the Committee on a par with all other treaty monitoring bodies;

4/8 Follow-up to decision S-4/101 on "Situation of human rights in Darfur"

Takes note with regret that the High-Level Mission could not visit Darfur; *expresses its deep concern* regarding the seriousness of the ongoing violations of human rights and international humanitarian crises; *calls upon* all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an end to all acts of violence against civilians, *decides to* convene a group to be comprised of experts to work with the Government of the Sudan, the appropriate human rights mechanisms of the African Union to promote the implementation of resolutions and relevant recommendations on Darfur passed by the Human Rights Council and other UN bodies.

4/9 Combating defamation of religions

Expresses concern at negative stereotyping which gives a negative picture of religions and at the intolerance and discrimination existing with relation to questions of religion or belief and *expresses deep concern* at attempts to identify Islam with terrorism, violence and human rights violations; *invites* the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance to report on all manifestations of defamation of religions and in particular on the serious implications of Islamophobia on the enjoyment of all rights.

4/10 Elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief

Requests the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to report on this issue to the Human Rights Council at its sixth session.

DECISIONS

4/101 Dates of the 5th period of sessions of the Council

Decides that the fifth session of the Council will take place from the 11 to 18 June 2007.

4/102 Transitional justice

Decides to extend the presence of the OHCHR in peace-building operations.

4/103 **Human rights and unilateral coercive measures**
Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to pay due attention to the resolution regarding unilateral coercive measures.

4/104 **Enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights**

Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to consult on ways and means to enhance the international cooperation and dialogue in the United Nations Human Rights Council.

4/105 **Postponement of consideration of draft proposals**

Decides to take note of the postponement of the consideration of draft proposals.

Resolutions and decisions issued by The Human Rights Council. Fifth Session (11/06-18/06)

RESOLUTIONS

5/1 **Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council**

Adopts the draft text entitled “United Nations Human Rights Council: Institution-Building”,

5/2 **Code of Conduct for Special Procedures**

Urges all States to cooperate with, and assist, the special procedures and adopts the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders

DECISIONS

5/101 **Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures**

Decides to adopt resolution 5/1 y 5/2.

5/102 **Postponement of work**

Postponement of all draft resolutions and decisions pending.

Resolutions and decisions issued by The Human Rights Council. Sixth Session (10/09-18/09, 10/12-14/12)

RESOLUTIONS

6/1 **Protection of cultural rights and property in situations of armed conflict**

Calls upon all States to respect international law on human rights and urges all parties to strictly observe and respect the rules of international humanitarian law during armed conflict and to respect rules relating to

the protection of cultural property; *emphasises* that, in accordance with international law each of the parties in an armed conflict has the obligation to take all necessary measures to protect cultural property, safeguarding of and respecting such property, in particular cultural property located in occupied territories; *strongly condemns* all destruction of cultural property.

6/2 **Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food**

Decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food for a period of three years; *urges* all governments to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and to give him or her assistance; *requests* that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights provide the Special Rapporteur with all the human and financial resources necessary for the effective fulfilment of his or her mandate.

6/3 **Human rights and international solidarity**

Calls on the international community to urgently study specific measures to promote and consolidate international aid to developing countries with the aim of achieving development and to promote conditions which will lead to the full enjoyment of all human rights; *requests* that the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity continue working on the preparation of a draft declaration on the rights of peoples and persons to international solidarity and to submit a report to the Council

6/4 **Arbitrary Detention**

Decides to extend the Mandate of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention for a new period of three years and *calls on* States to respect and promote the rights of all detained persons

6/5 **Advisory services and technical assistance for Burundi**

Requests that United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees increase the allocation for technical assistance to Burundi through his or her office in Bujumbura and *also encourages* the Government of Burundi to continue the dialogue with the Palipehutu-FNL and its leader Agathon Rwasa; *decides to* extend for one year the Mandate of the Independent Expert in charge of examining the situation of human rights in Burundi and *requests* the Independent Expert to make available a final report to the Council

6/6 **Promoting the enjoyment of cultural rights and respect for cultural diversity**

Reaffirms that cultural rights are an integral part of human rights which are universal, indivisible, interdependent and related to each other and that the appointment of an Independent Expert in the sphere of cultural rights may contribute to the application of the current resolution.

6/7 **Human rights and unilateral coercive measures**

Calls on all States to refrain from adopting unilateral coercive measures which are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles which regulate peaceful relations between States, in particular measures of a coercive character with extraterritori-

al effects which hinder commercial relations between States and hinder the full realisation of those rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other international human rights instruments, especially the rights of persons and peoples to development.

6/8 Human Rights and fair access to drinking water and sanitation

Urges all States to pay due attention to the report issued by UNHCR

6/9 Development of activities of public information in the sphere of human rights

Urges the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat and the OHCHR to continue supporting and, in consultation with the States, to foster national capacity in the field of education and public information regarding to human rights.

6/10 Declaration of the United Nations on education and training in the field of human rights.

Requests that the Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council draw up a draft declaration on education and training in the field of human rights and make available it for examination.

6/11 Protection of cultural heritage as an important element in the promotion and protection of cultural rights

Considers that the promotion and protection of cultural rights and respect for different cultural identities are fundamental elements for the advancement of freedom and progress, as well as for stimulating tolerance, respect, dialogue and cooperation between different cultures, civilizations and peoples.

6/12 Human rights and indigenous peoples. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation and fundamental freedoms of peoples.

Decides to extend the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human right situation and the fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples for a period of three years.

6/13 The Social Forum

Decides that the Social Forum should continue meeting every year and that in the next meeting it should focus on the eradication of poverty in the context of rights and the social dimension of the process of globalisation.

6/14 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery

Decides to appoint for a period of three years a Special Rapporteur to replace the Working Group on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences.

6/15 Forum on Minority Issues

Decides to establish a Forum on Minorities which will serve as a platform to promote dialogue and cooperation on issues related to persons belonging to national or ethnic minorities or ethnic, religious and linguistic groups who provide specialised knowledge for the work of the Independent Expert on minorities.

6/16 Continuation of the work of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations

Decides to ask to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to call a meeting of one and a half days' duration in Geneva open to the participation of all States, indigenous peoples and other interlocutors, before the resumption of the sixth period of sessions of the Council that will be held in December in order to exchange opinions on the most appropriate mechanisms to continue the work of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.

6/17 Establishment of funds for the mechanism of Universal Periodic Review

Requests that the Secretary-General establish a Fiduciary Fund of voluntary contributions for Universal Periodic Review to facilitate the participation of developing countries.

6/18 Situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Requests that resolutions S-1/1 y S-3/1 be applied, including the sending of urgent fact-finding missions and *requests* the President of the Human Rights Council and the UNHCR to report to the Council in their next period of sessions on the measures taken to achieve the application of said resolutions.

6/19 Religious and cultural rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem

Underlines that all the policies and measures adopted by Israel, the occupying power, to limit access by Palestinians to their sacred places, especially to occupied East Jerusalem, based on national origin, religion, birth, sex or any other condition, represent a violation of the provisions of the instruments and resolutions above-mentioned, and must therefore halt them at once; *urges* Israel, the occupying power to respect the religious and cultural rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, and to allow Palestinian believers to have access to their religious centres without restrictions

6/20 Regional Agreements for the promotion and protection of human rights

Requests that the UNHCR organises a workshop in 2008 to exchange opinions on good practice, added value and difficulties posed by the establishment of these regional agreements

6/21 Complementary international regulations to the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination

Decides to call an inaugural period of sessions of the special committee in the first quarter of 2008 to start its Mandate

6/22 Adoption of specific measures against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and other similar forms of intolerance

Decides to reorganize the work and modify the name of the OHCHR Anti-Discrimination Unit, so that hereafter the Unit will be called "the Anti-Racial Discrimination Unit" and its activities will exclusively focus on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and similar forms of intolerance.

6/23 Preparatory Committee for the Durban Review Conference

Requests that the President of the Preparatory Committee for the Durban Review conference in 2009 submit his or her report to the General Assembly on the activities of the Preparatory Committee and the progress made

6/24 World Programme for education in human rights

Decides to extend for two years (2008-2009) the first phase of the World Programme for education in human rights so that all the players may apply the Action plan by focusing on the systems of primary and secondary education.

6/25 Regional Cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia and the Pacific region.

Requests that the OHCHR make available a report on the conclusions of the 14th annual seminar on regional cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia and the Pacific region and to provide information on the progress towards compliance with the current resolution and decides to organise the next annual seminar on regional cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia and the Pacific region in 2008.

6/26 Setting of objectives to be launched in relation to the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of human rights.

Decides to initiate an intergovernmental process, which will allow the setting by consensus of the objectives for the promotion and application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the 60th anniversary of the same.

Alliance of Civilizations

Invites the High representative for the Alliance of Civilizations to submit his or her activities before the seventh session of the Council.

6/27 Extension of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to housing

Decides to extend for three years the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to housing.

6/28 Extension of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur for the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism

Decides to extend for three years the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the fight against terrorism.

6/30 Integration of women into the United Nations system

Calls for the implementation of resolution 59/164 of 2004 on the improvement of the status of women in the United Nations system with the objective of advancing towards equality of gender and guaranteeing the full participation of women in the highest levels of the organisation.

6/29 The Right to enjoy physical and mental health

Decides to extend for three years the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right of all people to enjoy

the highest possible level of physical and mental health.

6/32 Extension of the Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN on the human rights of internally displaced people

Decides to extend for three years the Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN on the human rights of internally displaced people.

6/33 Situation of human rights in Myanmar

Requests the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar to carry out a mission to Myanmar before the seventh session of the Council with the aim of analysing in depth the violations of human rights which have been perpetrated and which are still being perpetrated as a result of the violence in the country.

6/34 Situation of human rights in Sudan

Decides to extend for one year the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan.

6/31 Extension of the Mandate of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Liberia

Decides to extend for one year the Mandate of the Independent Expert on Liberia.

6/36 Rights of Indigenous peoples

Decides to establish a mechanism which will allow the identification of experts in specific topics on human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations.

6/37 Elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief.

Decides to extend for three years the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief.

6/38 Situation of human rights in Darfur

Calls on the Government to continue applying the recommendations submitted by the Group of Experts to of the Council.

DECISIONS

6/101 Working group on Communications

Decides to request the members of the former Working Group on Communications to act as members of the Complaints Procedure.

6/102 Follow-up to resolution 5/1

Adopts the General Directives for the preparation of information within the framework of universal periodic review.

6/103 Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan

Decides to postpone this point until the second part of the sixth session of the Council in December 2007.

6/104 Prevention of genocide

Decides to request that the Secretary-General makes

available an updated report to the seventh session of the Council and invites the Special Adviser to address the body on the activities discharged so far.

6/105 Report of the Preparatory Committee of the Durban Review Conference

Decides to invite the Preparatory Committee of the Durban Review Conference to make available a report to the General Assembly.

President's Statement

6/PRST/1 Situation of human rights in Haiti

The Human Rights Council welcomes the return to the rule of constitutional law in the Republic of Haiti, while still concerned at the persistent criminal activity in some parts of the country, it welcomes current efforts to correct irregularities in the police and justice systems, and encourages the Haitian authorities to continue them, bringing to fruition their plans for stronger inspection units within the police and justice systems, regulations to govern the judiciary, the establishment of a High Council of the Judiciary and the reopening of the Judicial Training College, an end to prolonged detention and improved conditions in detention, the introduction of a legal aid scheme and better staffed forensic science and forensic medical services and also welcomes the Haitian authorities' plans to pass a series of laws on the status of women and reforms of the civil registry and land registry systems.

6/PRST/2 20th anniversary of the entering into force of the Convention against Torture

Calls on all States party to the Convention to comply strictly with their obligations under the Convention against Torture and requests that the Secretary-General provide the staff and the means necessary for the bodies and mechanisms to fight against torture.

**Resolutions and decisions issued by
The Human Rights Council.
Fifth Special Session (02/10/07)**

RESOLUTION – SPECIAL SESSION

S-5/1 Situation of human rights in Myanmar

Strongly deplores the continued violent repression of peaceful demonstrations in Myanmar, and *urges* the Government of Myanmar to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of human rights violations, and *also urges* the Government of Myanmar to release without delay those arrested and detained as a result of the recent repression of peaceful protests, as well as to release all political detainees in Myanmar, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and to ensure that conditions of detention meet international standards and include the possibility of visiting any detainee; and *further urges* the Government of Myanmar to lift all restraints on peaceful political activity of all persons by, inter alia, guaranteeing freedom of peaceful assembly and association and freedom of opinion and expression, including for free and independent media, and to ensure unhindered access to media information for the people of Myanmar; *urges* the Government of Myanmar to engage urgently in a reinvigorated national dialogue with all parties with a view to achieving genuine national reconciliation, democratisation and the establishment of the rule of law; and to cooperate fully with humanitarian organizations, including by ensuring full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to all persons in need throughout the country; *welcomes* the decision of the Government of Myanmar to receive the visit of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, and *urges* the Government of Myanmar to cooperate fully with the Special Envoy to find a peaceful solution and *requests* the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar to assess the current human rights situation and to monitor the implementation of this resolution, including by seeking an urgent visit to Myanmar.

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