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# From Doubt to Unbelief

*Forms of Scepticism in the Iberian World*




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**LEGENDA**

Studies in Hispanic and Lusophone Cultures 42  
Modern Humanities Research Association

2019



## CHAPTER 8



# The Concept of Doubt in the Trial of Miguel de Molinos (1687) and in the Controversy over Quietism

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Miguel de Molinos (1628–96) is one of seventeenth-century Europe's best-known mystics. After a successful career as spiritual director at Rome, which brought him into contact with such important figures as Christina of Sweden,<sup>2</sup> his condemnation by the Roman Inquisition in 1687 involved, *inter alia*, an orthodox Catholic definition of Quietism, and of a series of propositions considered heretical. These would henceforth be used to label one or another belief or practice as 'Quietist', or — using an adjective newly minted for describing such heretical doctrines — as Molinosism. Before Molinos was put on trial, his spiritual teachings and practices as a guide to consciences could be identified with a type of spirituality whose expressions had developed mostly in Spain, France and Italy. The wide reach of these spiritual currents that culminated in Molinos's condemnation, and the repercussions caused by this negative judgement, show how important these affairs were in the context of religious controversy at the end of the seventeenth century.

During Molinos's trial the Roman Church declared 68 of his propositions to be heretical. This number was the result of a refinement process: the 68 propositions condemned on 28 August 1687 were a digest of 263 previous accusations. It is difficult to assess accurately the extent to which these 68 propositions faithfully reflect Molinos's actual thought.<sup>3</sup> Many are not found in his extant works (particularly the widely distributed *Guía Espiritual*), and his trial appears to have been set in motion primarily on the basis of his (and his followers') immoral behaviour, and of doctrinal material lifted mostly from 'old episodes, his former advice, the letters [written to his followers]'.<sup>4</sup> These letters, which were one of the principal bases for his condemnation, have been lost, which only exacerbates the problem of understanding Molinos's thought and of knowing how the inquisitorial trial was put together.<sup>5</sup> What does seem clear is that the 68 propositions constitute a list of what the Church at the end of the seventeenth century considered problematic about Quietist spirituality. This being so, one must see them not as defining what Molinos believed but as representing how the Church constructed the category

of 'Quietism' in order to condemn it. Here we are face to face with a veritable 'construction of a heresy'.<sup>6</sup> After 1687, treatises condemning Quietism proliferated, using the propositions refined by the Roman Inquisition. These even served to condemn *a posteriori* books which had, in a former time, been seen as harmless treatises on Christian spirituality, but which now were included in a new range of teaching labelled Quietist.<sup>7</sup> The Spanish manifestation of anti-Molinist literature has been partly studied by Jesús Ellacuría.<sup>8</sup> While the most serious accusation used against Quietism, and the one with the broadest application and distribution, was *alumbradismo* [illuminationism], a more detailed look at the argumentation used in this controversy furnishes clues about concrete matters such as the cure of souls, and the authority of ecclesiastical institutions and the sacramental order — in sum, the problem of the 'Inner Forum' or Forum of Conscience. In this chapter, I shall attempt to explain not so much matters arising from Molinos's own teaching as those that emerge from the controversy surrounding Quietism. To do this, I shall begin with the concept of doubt as it appears in the 1687 trial.

#### 'Doubt' in anti-Molinist Polemic

Of the 68 propositions of Molinos condemned by the Inquisition, 'doubt' appears in number 11: 'An dubia, quae occurrunt, an rectè procedatur, nec ne, non est opus reflectere'<sup>9</sup> ['There is no need for reflection about doubts that arise regarding whether progress is being made rightly or not'].<sup>10</sup> Why does doubt occur in this proposition, and how is it understood in anti-Molinist literature?

One of Molinos's main opponents in Spain was the Andalusian Dominican Pedro Sánchez (d. 1719), one of Seville's outstanding preachers of the seventeenth century. Towards the end of his life Sánchez composed some *Quodlibeta* to refute Molinos.<sup>11</sup> Sánchez's refutation of Molinos's eleventh proposition occurs within a discussion on the legitimacy of inducing young people to take religious vows.<sup>12</sup> Can a child be obligated to fulfil a vow made before reaching the age of consent? Is paternal consent enough? How can the obligation of a vow be reconciled with free will in the case of someone who does not have full use of his or her mental faculties, even when it is for a good purpose such as entry into the religious life? Sánchez explains the various possibilities of the case, and arrives finally at a kind of obligation not based on force but compatible to some extent with free will; it is the type of obligation entered into through vows, about which Saint Augustine said: 'Felix necessitas, quae in meliora compellit!' ['Happy necessity, that drives one toward better things!'].<sup>13</sup>

This discussion of the conditions under which vows and religious promises are obligatory leads Sánchez to reflect on the different conditions of those who enter the religious path. Those who come to religion are imperfect beings: some have a child's levity, while others are fearful or weak or have some other defect; nevertheless, by perseverance they can arrive at perfection. The critique against Molinos arises from this view of religious life as a road to perfection. Because it is essential to carry out tests and enquiries before taking up such a vocation — and having defined the religious life as a way of perfection — Sánchez concludes that it

is therefore necessary to engage in reflection when doubts arise about whether one is walking in a good or an evil path: 'palpebrae tuae praecedant gressus tuos' ['let your eyelids look straight before you'] (Pr. 4. 25); or, as the Psalmist says, 'gressus meos dirige secundum eloquium tuum' ['Direct my steps according to Your word'] (Ps. 119 [118]. 133). These texts indicate that reflection (i.e., the 'eyelids') precedes walking. To not reflect when doubts arise is to abandon the use of reason: one may be walking well or ill, but failure to doubt means that one is thinking only of the verb ('walk') and not the adverb ('well' or 'ill'). Doubt is therefore an essential tool of the religious life which serves to bring about reflection and reasoning. The Psalms describe the person who abandons these: 'non est Deus in conspectu eius. Inquinatae sunt viae illius in omni tempore, auferuntur iudicia tua a facie eius' ['God is not in all his thoughts; his ways are always grievous; His judgements are far above out of his sight'] (Ps. 10. 4b–5a [9. 26]). This way of sadness is the lot of those who do not have the fear of God before their eyes and who do not know the way of peace; such is the way of the Molinosists.<sup>14</sup>

Another principal opponent of Quietism in Spain was Francisco Barambio, a Capuchin monk; he was confessor in the Capuchin monastery at Madrid, but little else is known about him.<sup>15</sup> Along with *Discursos filosóficos, teológicos y morales*, written to condemn Molinos, Barambio was the author of *Casos reservados a su santidad*.<sup>16</sup> The eleventh of his *Discursos* was aimed at Molinos's eleventh proposition.<sup>17</sup> Barambio begins by defining doubt, as distinct from 'opinion', as:

a type of knowledge in which the understanding, coming to know the reasons that are on each side, completely suspends judgement, and does not know which side to take hold of. There must be knowledge, else it would be ignorance and pure foolishness, and not at all *doubt*.<sup>18</sup>

This doubt can be either speculative or practical:

The first speculates and explores only the truth of the matter, while the understanding remains in doubt. The second regards the truth that ought to be put into practice on certain occasions or in certain circumstances. And one must be aware that, in order to act well, it is unavoidably needful to have arrived at a practical and morally confident judgement that such an act is sure.<sup>19</sup>

For its part, the path can be that of the Commandments of the Law of God or of Prayer. In both cases one is faced with a moral problem: the 'doubt' that presents itself along the pathway ought to be resolved through reflection, which allows one to move beyond the suspension of judgement regarding whether the path is correct or not. This reflection should be done 'in consultation with holy and learned men who have experience of the way of the Law of God', or by returning to 'classical Authors'. In this way, the problem of reflection becomes a question of authority.

When walking the religious path, the passion appropriate for doubt is fear. In order to merit and retain grace, one ought always to be found in God's presence with fear:

Therefore, you should fear when grace applauds you with its presence; fear when it increases for you; fear when it arrives once again; and know that this is always to have fear.<sup>20</sup>

Among the many biblical examples that illustrate fear arising from doubt, and the reflection that follows from it, we have the Virgin Mary, who, while at prayer, received the Angel's visit and was troubled, thinking: what greeting can this be? It was also the case of Saint Theresa of Jesus, who, 'because at this time women had experienced great imaginings and deceit worked by the Devil',<sup>21</sup> began to doubt her own prayers of quietude and union. Faced with such doubts, Saint Theresa sought conversation with a father of the Company of Jesus.

Thus, we find here a 'doubt-judgement-advice' construction that partially evokes the one Saint Thomas Aquinas built around the concept of 'prudence' (that is, 'right reason applied to action') as a fundamental virtue in the practice of governance, whose function it is to direct and command. Because of this, it is a virtue that fundamentally belongs to a man 'in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing'.<sup>22</sup> The potential parts of this principal virtue are: *eubolia*, 'good counsel', 'which concerns counsel'; *synesis*, 'which concerns judgement in matters of ordinary occurrence'; and *gnome*, 'which concerns judgement in matters of exception to the law'.<sup>23</sup> This is a conceptual field developed in order to integrate contingency into moral deliberation: faced with doubt as to how to apply a moral or judicial norm<sup>24</sup> (and not only these) to a particular situation, a set of interpretative and deliberative rules is constructed which includes the capacity for individual interpretation, or recourse to pertinent authorities. Thus the Forum of Conscience is turned, by means of doubt, into a space not only for moral judgement but also for constructing political and moral authority. It is not difficult to understand how and why doubt appeared in Molinos's prosecution: as with other aspects of the trial, the Roman Inquisition understood that Molinos's doctrine was attacking forms of authority and religious mediation when it advocated for unconditional abandonment to God. This was why critics insisted on the need to appeal to ecclesiastical or textual authorities when doubt arose.

In this way, Molinos's trial, in this specific aspect, appears as yet one more episode in the construction of conscience, in two senses: the conscience as moral and religious Subject carrying the capacity for judgement, and the conscience as a space for exercising forms of political government. Doubt is a fundamental tool for this construction, as indicated, for example, by the way in which moral theology developed the category of the 'doubtful conscience'.

### The Conscience

Conscience is a key category for understanding how moral theology viewed the problem of practical moral judgement, and is therefore a preferred concept for understanding the type of conflict within which the trial of Molinos could take place. In order to show this relationship, I will give examples of moral theologians and casuists who were involved, like Barambio, in refuting Quietism.

Among them was Friar Martín de Torrecilla, one of Spain's leading casuists in the seventeenth century, and author of an immense work on matters of moral theology. One of his short works is dedicated to refuting Molinos's doctrine.<sup>25</sup> It is

not a systematic refutation of Molinosist Quietism, but rather a defence of a point of Torrecilla's own moral doctrine which might be supposed to have similarities to Molinos — specifically to two of his propositions. The argument is as follows: in his *Suma* Torrecilla had developed his teaching on whether 'it was lawful not to impede upon awakening the pollution begun while asleep, when the danger of consent is past'. For Torrecilla it was indeed lawful not to impede pollution. What was more, some men might find by experience that sleeping in a certain position or eating hot food could be factors increasing the likelihood of pollution while asleep; yet a person should not in this case be obliged to sleep in a different position. Some might consider this teaching to be close to proposition 17 attributed to Molinos in the Roman sentence of condemnation:

If the free will is given over to God, along with the care and governing of one's soul, one should no longer pay attention to temptations nor make any resistance to them, other than denial without striving; and if one's nature is resentful, one must let it be resentful, because it is nature.<sup>26</sup>

This proposition is very close to number 12:

He who has given his free will to God ought not to have a care about anything else, neither from hell nor heaven, nor from a desire for one's own perfection, nor from the virtues, nor from one's holiness, nor from one's own salvation, the hope of which he should expunge.<sup>27</sup>

Torrecilla's tract is dedicated to pointing out the differences between the proposition attributed to Molinos and his own teaching, whose key phrase is 'cesando el peligro del consentimiento' ['when the danger of consent is past']. In fact, says Torrecilla, the central moral problem to be resolved was one of consent, which was linked to the Subject's will. When temptation or the danger of sinning presents itself, the Subject ought to seek divine aid through prayer.

Of course, Torrecilla makes the typical accusation of *alumbadismo* [illuminism] against Molinos, but he also finds an echo of Lutheran and Calvinist thought in these and other propositions regarding free will. What is more, he thinks that Molinos went further than Luther and Calvin dared to go, in his conception of the complete surrender of the will to God.<sup>28</sup> More generally, Torrecilla believes he can detect Calvin's doctrine in the teachings of Molinos when the latter writes:

when God moves the human will by his divine grace, it is moved in such a way that everything it does proceeds from grace alone; and that the will should be only passive, so that it does not cooperate with grace, but *omnino nihil agit positivè*.<sup>29</sup>

The category of 'conscience' was developed in order to define the Subject of moral judgement. Torrecilla himself presented a definition and classification of conscience in his works on casuistry. The conscience is defined as:

an act of the understanding; not just any understanding, but one of judgement, by which it judges what the will ought to embrace or flee from, as being either in accordance with or against reason. [...] It should be distinguished from Synderesis, which judges universal principles, and from moral knowledge or

opinion, which judges universal conclusions, since the conscience only makes judgements about particular conclusions [...] And thus the conscience is the application of knowledge (*ciencia*) to the work that ought presently to be done; or it is a practical judgement of the understanding which says to the will: do this because it is reasonable, or do not do it because it is against reason.<sup>30</sup>

According to Torrecilla, the conscience can be differentiated by categories: *right*, 'that which calls truth, truth'; *erroneous*, 'that which calls error, truth'; *doubtful*, 'which is a suspension of the soul, in which, because there are insufficient reasons on one side or the other to move it to assent or dissent, or because there are equal difficulties in both sets of reasons, the understanding remains indifferent and unable to judge whether the matter is lawful or unlawful'; *probable*, 'which judges that something is probably lawful or unlawful, yet suspects that the opposite could be more true'; and *scrupulous*, which is 'a light suspicion born of insubstantial foundations, by which what is not sin is judged or believed to be sin, but always with the suspicion that the contrary might be true; thus it does not exclude the certain judgement or opinion of the opposite side, and it is more credulity than settled judgement; it is like a disturbance or suspicion which brings with it disquiet, fear, and spiritual alienation'.<sup>31</sup>

Here one can identify categories of conscience as they were exhaustively developed by casuistic and moral theology, as we shall see. Our interest for the purposes of this chapter is in the 'doubtful conscience' and the 'probable conscience'. Both imply doubt, but in different ways. The doubtful conscience refers to a 'suspension of assent' caused by doubt. This can be either negative, if there are no reasons in favour of one or another option, or positive, if there are reasons that favour both options but none is sufficiently strong to induce a choice. If, on the other hand, there are reasons that are sufficiently strong to support one of the options, one can no longer speak of rigorous doubt but rather of 'opinión probable o duda opinativa' ['probable opinion or opinionated doubt']. In other words, there is a distinction to be made between doubt that is incapable of forming an opinion (*conscientia dubia*) and the conscience that stands doubting between two choices, both of them valid (*conscientia probabile*).<sup>32</sup>

Martín de Torrecilla continued making distinctions that followed on from his initial classification of types of doubt. Besides positive or negative, doubts can be by right or in fact, speculative or practical. When a doubt arises, one should attempt to overcome it 'either by questioning or studying, or by searching for a sufficient motive' that will turn the doubt into probable opinion. If the conscience needs to act, either by urgency or necessity, there would be no sin even if the choice reached were improbable; and if the conscience needs to choose the lesser of two evils, there would be no sin in that either. Torrecilla repeats the well-known, apparently contradictory, pair of legal principles whose running argument is present throughout the whole of seventeenth-century polemics concerning moral laxism. The first is, 'melior est conditio possidentis' (that is, when doubt exists about property, the better right of the possessor was recognized); this was one of the basic principles of probabilism. The second was 'in dubiis tutior pars est eligenda' (that is, when in doubt, the more secure side should be chosen); this was the principle

with which the rigorists opposed probabilism. Yet, according to Torrecilla, the two principles are morally complementary since the state of the property helps to define 'the more secure side'.<sup>33</sup> How should 'conditio possidentis' be understood morally? As an example, when faced with the question of whether a non-religious person ought to obey a prelate when such a person is in doubt about whether the command is lawful or whether it exceeds the churchman's authority, the answer is 'yes', because the superior possesses the right of commanding; and, in order for the Subject to excuse himself from obedience, he would have to demonstrate that the command is not rightly issued. However, if the Subject in question is a religious person, then the answer is 'no', because his vow does not obligate him, and he possesses freedom in this case.<sup>34</sup> In reality, the moral adoption of this legal principle implies that, when doubt exists, the balance should tip in favour of the person whose responsibility it is to make a judgement; that is, in favour of the conscience that is in possession of free will.

The categories of conscience, as Torrecilla received and reproduced them, were the product of a complex process. For example, the development of the 'scrupulous conscience' category, and its connection to the world of moral debate concerning probabilism, was not exempt from influence by the spiritual style of the Jesuits, forming part of a history that intimately connected the probabilist controversy to the Company of Jesus.<sup>35</sup> In this sense Torrecilla's book reflects the arrival point of intensive debates about the 'probable conscience' and the rules to which it is subject. Without going into detail regarding Torrecilla's explanations, I shall cite two of his chapters in which he explains his defence of probabilities. The first of these discusses 'the age, sufficiency, and utility of probabilities', concluding that they are very ancient, as old as Adam and Eve ('because they made excuses for certain great sins before the Fall'), Jacob, the Maccabees, the Apostles, and even the angels. On this point Torrecilla contradicted those who, like Prospero Fagnani (a renowned anti-probabilist), affirmed that probabilities were quite recent. Torrecilla attacked Fagnani's proposition, 'opinio probabilis non sufficit', which was also affirmed by Antonio Merienda (another famous anti-probabilist), and by Lutherans, Calvinists and Jansenists. It was a proposition whose orthodoxy was suspect, since Jansen inferred from it his 'Deus impossibilia iubet', which in turn produced several heretical propositions: 'Deus impossibilia praecipit' (this was heretical because there are rarely opinions of absolute certainty in moral affairs, and to oblige a person always to follow these would be to command the impossible), and 'Deus impossibilia potest et solet praecipere'. For Torrecilla, Jansenism leached into opinions such as 'peccant omnes qui in materia conscientiae sequuntur opinionem probabilem'.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, when asking who has the right to debate probabilities, and who are those who have enlarged or narrowed people's consciences, Torrecilla responded that the Canonists had no right to speak about probabilities since they were ignorant of the philosophical subtleties of Moral Theology and worked mostly in the area of external rights. At the same time, in contrast to what their enemies thought, the Moderns had not relaxed people's consciences, but rather extraordinarily restricted them, for this reason: the old Catholics, faced with these two opinions — 'Ecclesia

non vult suis legibus illigare Christianorum conscientias' and 'Ecclesia non potest eorundem illigare conscientias' — had chosen the first and rejected the second. Nevertheless, Luther had defended the second, and the 'common people' had followed him in it; for this reason, modern Catholics had seen the need to reinforce their power over consciences, 'and thus they said *iubet ergo potest*', a position which the Church afterward legitimized.<sup>37</sup>

The genealogy of Martín de Torrecilla's process of argument is clear. He himself explicitly cites Antonino Diana and Juan Caramuel. In fact, Torrecilla closely follows the latter in his *Apologema*.<sup>38</sup> The circumstances of this work have been studied by Julia Fleming.<sup>39</sup> It is a polemical work in which Caramuel defends probabilist doctrine against an attack by Prospero Fagnani, a canonist of the Roman Curia, who had made his assault on probabilism in a commentary on a chapter of the *Decretals Ne inmitaris*. To a great extent it was an argument between the 'prince of rigorists' and the 'prince of probabilists'. In attacking probabilism (not only Caramuel), Fagnani had declared it to be a modern doctrine from the present century. Formerly, moral certainty had been the prerequisite for lawful behaviour, since moralists understood that probable opinion was insufficient.<sup>40</sup> Against this attack Caramuel defended the antiquity of probabilities and their use in the Bible and among the angels, and he made an assault on their true enemies, the Jansenists. Caramuel thought that Fagnani had unintentionally (being a canonist untrained in moral theology) defended a thesis from which the most damnable of Port-Royal's propositions could necessarily be derived — namely, that God could require impossible things of men. He believed that Fagnani's accusation that probabilists were *novatores* was unjust, recalling the label previously applied to Protestants.<sup>41</sup> In any case, probabilist theologians, far from being more lax than the canonists, had been more rigorous.<sup>42</sup> In reality, the fact that Fagnani found support for his position in texts produced in the environment of Port-Royal allowed the accusation of laxism launched against the probabilists to be understood in the context of Jansenist polemic.<sup>43</sup> A detailed (though not final) exposition of Caramuel's moral teaching is found in his *Theologia moralis*, whose third book is dedicated to matters of conscience.<sup>44</sup> The greater part of this book looks at the 'conscientia dubia',<sup>45</sup> a fact which is hardly strange given that the development of moral theology as its own discipline (clearly differentiated, as we have seen, from other areas of knowledge like canonistic science) had much to do with the importance given to the sacrament of confession. In fact, casuistic treatises were in principle written for confessors, to aid them in their work of guiding consciences. In large part, Caramuel was justified in feeling himself to be a 'modern', to the extent that he represented a kind of knowledge dedicated to the various forms of practical moral judgement, which could only be understood in the context of putting such forms into practice; with the consequent rejection of the idea of the perpetuity of the Faith as defended by Jansenism.<sup>46</sup>

In his *Apologema*, Caramuel defended Antonino Diana (who had died that same year) against an attack by Fagnani. Diana's name was linked to accusations of moral laxism. As we have seen, Torrecilla also used Diana as one of his main sources. Diana, in his exposition of the categories of 'conscientia dubia' and 'conscientia erronea',

had explained that it was possible to act morally in practice even when speculative doubt existed, and he had suggested a moral application of the principle 'melior est conditio possidentis' — a principle that, as we have seen, would come to legitimize 'freedom of conscience'.<sup>47</sup> Undoubtedly, Torrecilla follows the probabilist tradition, reproducing the polemical context in which Diana and Caramuel produced their works. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that, at the time when Torrecilla was writing against Molinos, probabilism had received a serious blow from Rome. Torrecilla himself had to write an exposition of the propositions condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI.<sup>48</sup> Following this papal condemnation of laxism, treatises on casuistry and moral theology normally included in their introductions the text of the condemnations.<sup>49</sup> In fact, as we have seen, Torrecilla's critique of Molinos had its starting point in a defence of his own teaching, in order to avoid any confusion with Molinosism regarding one critical point — namely, whether the conscience had resisted sin or not. This example indicated the dynamic context in which the process of defining moral doubt was carried on. To put it differently: building up a case against Molinos was the consequence of a long and deep conflict in which the conscience was a battleground for a confrontation between Jansenists and Jesuits, Reformed and Catholic, mystics and sceptics... Thus the definition of conscience arose from a need to conceptualize different positions that were — at least during the second half of the seventeenth century — in conflict, and that involved a complex process. An essential factor in all this was the Company of Jesus, whose position during the probabilist controversy is well known, and which enjoyed a fundamental role in the polemic against Molinos.

### The Jesuits and Molinosism

One of the first polemicists against Miguel de Molinos was Fr Paolo Segneri, who in 1680 (that is, before the verdict against Molinos) published *Concordia tra la fatica e la quiete*.<sup>50</sup> The book was an argument against the Moderns who, in order to guide souls on the road to salvation, promoted the way of prayer over that of meditation. Segneri, beginning with a distinction between infused or mystic contemplation and acquired contemplation, criticized those teachers who conducted souls along the path of contemplation without showing any interest whatsoever in meditation — that is, in the exercise of interior abilities, the imagination, the understanding, or the will. According to them, once one had arrived at contemplation, there was no reason at all to return to meditation. Against this extreme view, Segneri proposed what he considered a middle way, in which the soul ought to return and again take up meditation after communication with God has ended. That is, if one loves God, then every means should be used to know him, both contemplation (near) and meditation (far). The surest rule for Segneri was:

everything that is an object of faith is an object of contemplation [...] just as whatever is an object of contemplation [...] is an object of meditation. Meditation is not distinguished by its object, which is God first of all [...] but rather the two are differentiated by their methods of viewing that object.<sup>51</sup>

One consequence of the Modern contemplatives' ideas was that attention was given to a quite abstract idea of God, with a neglect of the human nature of Christ (so that theological reflection became distant from the sense-world), and a belittling of the mystery of the hypostatic union and the sacrament of the Eucharist.

At the end of the seventeenth century, Segneri's book was one of the most significant works of the anti-Quietist polemic through which a case against Molinos was being built up. Molinos responded to several of Segneri's attacks, specifically regarding the distinction between infused and acquired contemplation, and whether the soul ought to return to meditation once the state of contemplation had been reached.<sup>52</sup> This was an important question. The Jesuit Gottardo Bell'uomo, in his *Il pregio e l'ordine dell'orazione ordinaria e mistiche* — the first significant work against the Quietism of Molinos — explained the differences between ordinary and mystical prayer, the clearest of which was that it was possible 'to give precepts and relevant rules so that ordinary prayers can be perfectly made', whereas this was impossible with mystical prayers. This was so because:

our powers, within the range of their natural ability, can act either well or badly when exercising themselves in prayer, so that they are open to being directed; and thus, *per regulas numquam fallentes* [...] we arrive at the desired result of praying and meditating rightly, just as happens when we exercise any other art, whether mechanical or intellectual.

In contrast, no precept or guide has any value for mystical prayer.<sup>53</sup> Here we find prefigured the problem of doubt: prayer can be exercised well or badly, and therefore it ought to be directed by a series of very precise rules. This is one of the key points of opposition between, on the one hand, abstract contemplation and the abandonment of the sensual world, which depends on direct communication between God and the soul, and, on the other hand, the way of meditation as discourse, which acts upon the soul's powers, imagination, memory, understanding and will. For the Jesuits, the principal model of this kind of meditation was, of course, the *Exercises* of Saint Ignatius.<sup>54</sup>

The works we have mentioned formed part of the reaction to the publication of the *Guía Espiritual* in 1675. In what seemed to be a victory for Quietism, Bell'uomo's and Segneri's books were condemned in 1681, before Molinos was put on trial.<sup>55</sup> Of course, we know that this was only an apparent victory, and that Segneri's work enjoyed a life well beyond the verdict against Molinos. In 1688 it was translated into Spanish, with the addition of 'a brief report on the sect of the Quietists, with the propositions of Molinos, which the Author impugns, and which His Holiness Innocent XI has condemned'.<sup>56</sup> The translator, himself a Jesuit, offered an *a posteriori* reconstruction of the anti-Molinosist quarrel, based on the propositions condemned by Rome, while emphasizing Segneri's role in defending Saint Ignatius's way of prayer against the pernicious doctrine of the Quietists. The latter taught that perfection was achieved through passivity of the powers and senses. The soul should be annihilated, neither considering nor contemplating nor remembering nor loving God. It should not be occupied with external devotion, but should repress all desire for movement or petitioning God (not even for one's own salvation or that of

one's nearest and dearest). It should not resist temptations nor ask for God's aid in resisting them. Quietists despised images, not only physical ones but also those of the imagination. They called sins (no matter how serious) 'violencias del demonio' ['devilish forcefulness'], involving no consent or guilt of the will. In sum, the soul totally resigned its free will into God's hands, and everything that happened thereafter was due to the will of God. Unquestionably, Molinos taught — and this directly touches on the conceptualization of 'doubt' in the context of the verdict against him — that:

those who walk in the *internal way* tread a path far removed from confession, confessionals, cases of conscience, theology and philosophy. And if doubts or scruples arise regarding actions, which they called forcefulness of the Devil, they should be despised. There was no authority on earth that could demand an account of what occurred between the soul and the Director.

The translation of Segneri's work into Spanish included a life of the author, originally written in Italian by Fr Joseph Massei. The volume was republished in 1705 with a new supplement: a 'response by the said Father Pablo Señeri to a great prelate's consultation regarding the probability of opinions'.<sup>57</sup> This was a defence of probabilism, with a definition of 'probable' and its rules of use. Segneri, one of the most important Jesuits of the latter part of the seventeenth century, was a defender of probabilism and one of the principal opponents of the probabiliorism of Tirso González de Santalla, General of the Jesuits at that time. This was a significant quarrel within the Company of Jesus, and it undoubtedly helps us to understand the position taken by many Jesuits with respect to Molinosism within the wider context of the problem of defining the frontiers between conscience and obedience.<sup>58</sup> Here I will point out just one aspect of Segneri's text: his focus on the field defined by the tension between rule and opinion, that is, the problem of freedom of conscience and the cure of souls. According to him, 'today's heretics' (meaning the Jansenists) not only tried to make certain that the common people were advised to follow the most probable opinion, but that they were obligated to do so, with the result that they caused them to fall into despair.<sup>59</sup> This tension is expressed in the proposition of the so-called 'benign opinion'; that is,

that in a clash of opinions it is sometimes lawful to take the side of the less probable one, favouring liberty, against the more probable one, favouring the Precept.<sup>60</sup>

In fact, in terms of political government, the theory of probable opinion excludes those persons who are bound by norms: judges, the prince who must declare war, the bishop who distributes benefices, the physician who must heal... All these are subject to a 'Ley especial indubitabilísima' that limits universal law.<sup>61</sup> This same division between law and liberty of conscience can be found in the tension between canonical and non-canonical writers. Theology needs both: it takes 'efficient' — that is, necessary — arguments from the former, and from the latter it takes probable arguments that are nevertheless proper to their own field. For this reason, probability is linked to truth: not manifest truth ('which cannot shine except in Heaven'), but another, similar truth. Returning to the tension between the Ancients

and the Moderns, Segneri defends the modern doctrine of probability, because the Ancients were themselves modern in their own time. To attack the Moderns was in some sense to act like the Jews who 'praised the prophets of the past and stoned their own contemporaries'.<sup>62</sup>

One can detect in Segneri's texts a common thread running through both his dispute with Quietism and his defence of probabilism: the problem of the conscience that, to the extent that it is a doubtful one, finds itself in need of moral or spiritual guidance. In the tension between meditation and contemplation, Segneri puts the emphasis on the problem of the 'spiritual guide'. And it is from this viewpoint that he criticizes another mystic, the Frenchman François Malaval, in his *Sette principii su cui si fonda la nuova oratione di quiete* (1682), 'non qual uomo, qual cristiano, qual cattolico, qual letterato, solo qual direttore'.<sup>63</sup> The insistence on the theme of confession and the directing of consciences runs throughout Molinos's trial,<sup>64</sup> and places it in the wider context of the topic of the development of instruments of modern discipline in the Catholic world, of 'tribunals of conscience', and the definition — following Trent — of a model of confession that in fact marks out a confessional frontier in Europe regarding the problem of conscience and individual responsibility.<sup>65</sup> The problem of probability is also centred on the issue of guiding consciences, as is evident from the whole of casuistic literature. It also raises, in a concrete way, the problem of the connection between morality and politics, as is shown by the cases of Antonino Diana or Juan Caramuel. For example, Diana, a Sicilian, wrote in defence of the legitimacy of Sicilian institutions against the political and financial pretensions of the Spanish monarchy.<sup>66</sup> For his part, Caramuel used the same method to uphold Spanish pretensions at the time of papal recognition of Portuguese independence in 1641.<sup>67</sup> In any case, we should keep in mind that one of the keys to understanding these theological controversies is the clash between national cultural and political forms, and the centralism and universalism of Rome.

The works of Fathers Segneri and Bell'uomo indicate that the polemic surrounding 'meditation' and 'contemplation' was centred on the Jesuit milieu and the method of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises*. This fact is made explicit in Molinos's own *Defensa de la contemplación*, written to answer the Jesuit attacks, in which the Aragonese mystic declares that the *Exercises* of Loyola were holy and most useful, and had brought about many conversions, yet were not the immediate means for union with God and perfection.<sup>68</sup> Yet this same Jesuit setting, where the problem of how to act upon the Forum of Conscience is clearly represented by the *Spiritual Exercises*, was part of a much wider European context. First of all, as is well known, so-called Quietism was not a single spiritual school centred on the figure of Molinos, but an international movement with many adherents and varied expressions. I have already mentioned Malaval, but could also cite the names of other spiritual writers (Jeanne Guyon, Fénelon...) who defined a spiritual current in France that would eventually be condemned as Quietist.<sup>69</sup> In Italy, Molinos came to be received within circles that included, for example, Pier Maria Petrucci.<sup>70</sup> These were milieux where the works of the Almerían mystic Juan Falconi had already circulated in French and Italian translation.<sup>71</sup> At the same time, the French context points to one of the

key disputes of the age respecting the problem of free will: Jansenism, whose hostile relationship with the Company of Jesus need not be detailed here. The 'construction of Quietist heresy' cannot be understood independently of this wider context, where the political, moral, and religious subjects were being dynamically defined. Evidence for this is found in interpretations of Quietism from beyond the borders of Italy and Spain, with their distinct perspectives regarding the intellectual or confessional territory at stake.

### Quietism in Europe

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were two key Port-Royal figures, if judged only by their joint authorship of *La logique ou l'art de penser*, an essential work in the history of sign theory in Europe. Both also displayed intensive theological activity, often of a polemical nature. Pierre Nicole published in 1667 *Les visionnaires*, a work directed against certain mystics of the age, in particular Jean Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, a violent anti-Jansenist. Nicole sketched the profile of a spiritual type whom he called 'illuminez', who, though driven by different forms of imagination, had a number of traits in common: they believed that Jesus reveals his secrets mainly to simple and ignorant people who do not know theology, and who receive every thought that comes to them, whether through reading or prayer, as internal illumination of the Holy Spirit. This was a dangerous path, from which arose most heresies,

and especially all the different sects of the Anabaptists, among whom are the Socinians, who have ruined all the mysteries of our faith on the pretext of the text of Scripture alone, explained by itself, that is, by the particular spirit of all who wish to read it. Luther and Calvin gave birth to these monsters, but the unfortunate children have pushed their evil principles further than the parents. These Tremblers of England [i.e., Quakers] are still conducting themselves in the same way. They believe they are illumined (*éclairés*) in everything by the Holy Spirit, and that they speak and act only as moved by him.<sup>72</sup>

The difference between natural and supernatural prayer was really nothing more than different levels of elevation by the Spirit from God; yet these spiritual men believed they could be lifted to a higher grade of contemplation while being full of sin and ignorant of themselves, without ever distinguishing between 'thought and heart sentiment'.<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, they gave credence to every Scripture interpretation that came into their heads, and used allegory, not 'as an artificial *memoire* for retaining certain truths', but rather to explain extraordinary thoughts, to set down new opinions, or to prove false or uncertain things.<sup>74</sup>

Nicole's fierce diatribe against Desmarets and other mystics filters into the subsequent anti-Molinosist polemic, as Jacques Le Brun has clearly shown in relation to the work of Louis-Paul du Vaucel, *Breves consideraciones in doctrinam Michelis de Molinos et aliorum quietistarum*, published anonymously at Cologne in 1688.<sup>75</sup> Du Vaucel was a Jansenist delegate to Rome between 1682 and 1700. His work was therefore the testimony of a contemporary witness to the trial of Miguel de Molinos, as well as an example of how news about the trial reached the rest



of Europe. The work combines the arguments of the 'anti-Quietist Vulgate' put into circulation by Segneri, with others drawn from the previously cited Jansenist tradition of the *Visionnaires* and its anti-mysticism. In fact, as Le Brun indicates, there are clear traces here of the epistolary exchange between Du Vaucel and Antoine Arnauld concerning the affair. Thus the work is not only about the Quietism of Molinos, but also concerns the mystical tradition that includes Malaval and Petrucci.

Du Vaucel begins his attack on Quietism with a distinction between infused and acquired contemplation, and the problematic character of the latter in Quietist doctrine. The difficulty was in thinking that one could arrive at the contemplation of God not only by means of grace but by an act of the will, by 'human effort and the powers of free will',<sup>76</sup> without any intervention of divine grace.<sup>77</sup> Quietist doctrine reminded the author of several theological and philosophical reference points. On the one hand, a purely abstract contemplation of God that leaves aside all sense images put him in mind of the ancient Platonic philosophers, who attempted to know God by the light of reason alone.<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, Quietist impassibility smacked of the old *apatheia* of the Stoics, in the same way that Quietism on a moral level reminded him of the *impeccantia* of the Pelagians.<sup>79</sup> The problem of 'sinlessness' recalled not only the recurrent charge of Pelagianism but also the no less frequent one of *alumbadismo*.<sup>80</sup> For the Jansenists this was a fundamental moral problem. As one can see in the Du Vaucel–Antoine Arnauld correspondence, the most infamous Quietist proposition was that the supposed mystic who fell into 'sordid disorderliness' could not blame his fall on the Devil, since it was God who had allowed it in order to purify him.<sup>81</sup> This was a central theme in which the moral conflict surrounding Quietism was amply expressed in terms of the tension between sin and free will.<sup>82</sup> The connection between moral laxism and the problem of sinlessness is clearly expressed in the phrase: 'Les Molinos et les Molina sont funestes à cette triomphante société' (i.e., the Jesuits).

The way in which these different themes are interconnected in the controversy surrounding Jansenism is illustrated in the work of John Sinnich, an Irish Jansenist theologian. For him, libertinism, spiritualism and probabilism shared the same 'perverse ambition for liberty'. In the wake of radical spiritualist movements, the probabilists had reclaimed the same 'arrogant confidence in their internal regeneration'. From the point of view of Augustinian theology, probabilists represented the arrogance of the human will in its desire to confront the will of God. The trouble with probabilism was not that it attempted to free the conscience from the fear of sin, but that it wanted to liberate it from every sort of scruple.<sup>83</sup>

One of the more interesting texts produced outside Spain concerning Molinos's trial was written by Jean Cornand de Lacroze,<sup>84</sup> a Huguenot who fled France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and took refuge first in Holland and then England, and who collaborated with Jean Leclerc on the *Bibliothèque Universelle et Historique*. In 1688, Cornand de Lacroze published two works having to do with Molinos, in particular a collection of texts about Molinosism that included a French translation of the *Guía Espiritual* and the *Tratado de la comunión cotidiana*.<sup>85</sup> The introduction to this volume was in fact an apology in favour of Molinosism in the

context of anti-Catholic polemic. Cornand de Lacroze began this apology speaking about the linguistic style of mysticism, whose obscure words and convoluted concepts seemed in principle to be far removed from Protestantism and its concept of the simplicity of grace. Yet there were reasons for such obscurity. It is true, he writes, that there are 'ideal' mystics who have not experienced contemplation and who speak about it out of vanity, trying to pass themselves off as wise men by mixing confused ideas from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* with their explanations. On the other hand, many people are incapable of understanding spiritual expressions. Mysticism is a science of the human heart and the love of God. As such, it uses specialized language that common people cannot understand, especially those who are sure that religion is an easy thing; that all it requires is a certain moral purity or the avoidance of actions one knows to be wrong, and that the pinnacle of spirituality is reached simply by doing certain external works of charity — while self-love continues to rule a heart full of 'self and the present age'. Such people are incapable of understanding expressions like 'renouncement', 'abandonment in God', or the true meaning of contemplation as expressed by authentic mystics like Saint John of the Cross, Herp, Molinos or Malaval.<sup>86</sup>

The wisdom of God, continues Cornand de Lacroze, often passes through madness; and thus the mystics are sometimes excessively reserved 'in order not to scandalize the weak, or expose the truth to persecution or to the mockery of the societies in which they live'.<sup>87</sup> There were no mystics in Holland because well-intentioned persons were able to live quietly there and publicly condemn the superstitions of the Roman Church without fear. Rather, mystics have arisen in Catholic countries, where, in most cases, they must shut themselves up in some monastery, unable to leave it without causing a scandal. Nor were mystics favourably looked upon among Protestants. Therefore they had to content themselves with revealing truth to a few chosen disciples, and could only write it in books with extreme care. In order to accomplish their object of correcting the abuses of the Roman Church, the mystics had used the same method that Descartes used to expose 'the false subtleties of Aristotle's philosophy'.

How can Quietist mysticism be compared with Cartesian philosophy? Philosophy's purpose is to push knowledge and the search for truth forward as far as possible. The purpose of mystical theology and Quietism is to purify the soul and unite it to God as far as is possible in this life. In both cases, it was necessary to free human beings from all the prejudices and false opinions they have embraced without examination. To do this, the Cartesians taught that one must begin the search for truth by doubting everything and rejecting all the old knowledge and judgements, in order to re-examine everything. That is why the Roman Church and the scholastics had brought a suit against them, accusing them of Pyrrhonism and of introducing doubt about everything, including God himself, and of mocking all the mysteries of religion and favouring Atheism and Deism. But these were mere calumnies.

Doubt is a disposition of the spirit to philosophize correctly, given that one does not philosophize except in order to stop doubting and assure oneself of the truth. Therefore God should not be offended at the search for rational proofs of his existence, but rather the opposite; and for the same reason, philosophy has never

been closer to religion than with the Cartesians, who have proven the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Besides this, they have applied themselves to reconciling Providence with human freedom and other mysteries of religion — except for Transubstantiation, which they have not been able to explain because it is in fact inexplicable.<sup>88</sup>

For their part, the mystics had faced the same opposition when establishing their system, opposed by superstitious people who worshipped images instead of the invisible Being, who invoked the saints instead of Jesus Christ, and who made divine worship to consist of eternal ceremonies, and the essence of piety to be indulgences, sackcloth, disciplines, and other extravagant practices. Unlike the Reformers, the mystics had not dared to cry openly against abuses and suffer the fury of the common people; rather, they had thought that some of those practices were not evil in principle, and that they might be useful for beginners, but that one need not spend a great deal of time with them, and should move from the state of meditation to that of contemplation in order to gaze on God directly, without shadows or figures, but divesting oneself of all images, forms and species. This was therefore a system that tended towards the destruction of Popery, since 'the stripping away of internal images involves doing the same with the external ones, and with the whole mass of ceremonies that only corrupts the spirit'.<sup>89</sup> The defenders of the Roman Church had realized the danger of this teaching, and had done everything they could to prohibit or censure it.

Thus Descartes and Molinos were similar in their method, destined to destroy, respectively, Scholastic prejudices and the abuses of the Roman Church. They were similar too in the great number of disciples that each was able to attract, and in the hatred they called forth from the Jesuits. The Company of Jesus had accused Descartes of introducing Pyrrhonism, and accused the Quietists of reducing the whole of religion to the contemplation of a vague and confused idea that was neither God nor any created thing, but rather an indeterminate principle, or nothing at all, with the purpose of bringing in atheism.

The Jesuits had used a 'subtle and malicious' trick to make Quietist doctrine hateful: they compared it to the teaching of Confucius's followers. Thus Cornand de Lacroze cites Fr Philippe Couplet's introduction to the work of Prospero Intorceta, *Confucius*.<sup>90</sup> Here Fr Couplet describes the different sects of Chinese philosophy, among whom were found the followers of Foe Kiao, characterized as political atheists. This sect taught that there are two types of doctrine. One consists of various precepts and external ceremonies for the common people; the other is internal, and Couplet describes it in the same terms in which the Quietists were described by their enemies: a sect that desired to reduce all religion to a contemplation of the void, without the use of reason or understanding; identified with a principle that is pure, eternal and immutable, that neither thinks, nor wishes, nor desires anything.<sup>91</sup>

In fact, as we have seen, *Confucius* was published in the same year as Molinos's trial, at a point when Europe — including Paris — was experiencing intense discussions about Quietism.<sup>92</sup> It is true that Couplet did not explicitly cite Molinos, but the Quietist reference in the description of Chinese philosophy would be

clear to someone who, like Cornand de Lacroze, was thoroughly involved in the controversy. For example, Jean Leclerc and Jean Cornand de Lacroze, writing in about 1688, declared that Ignatius of Loyola had done things that were later condemned as heretical by the Jesuits themselves or by the Inquisition. He had taken evangelical poverty to an extreme; he seemed to have believed that the truths of the Faith could not be comprehended except through Scripture or interior illumination; he had believed that the flesh of the Virgin Mary was contained, substantially present, in the Eucharist in the flesh of the Son; and, finally, Ignatius of Loyola had had the same 'sentiments that the Inquisition has just condemned in Molinos'.<sup>93</sup> In any case, the way in which Fr Couplet presented Oriental philosophy in terms recognizable as 'Deist' or 'Atheist' in the European context was extended also to Spinozism, and thus attempted to identify the supposed 'interior' doctrine of the Buddha with the idea of the universe as a single substance whose modifications we perceive as our world.<sup>94</sup> Visible here is a cultural context in which internal spirituality was now understood not only with reference to the mystical tradition, but also in relation to the wider conflict in which interiority created a crisis for forms of religious and political authority, in a manner that harked back, in a general way, to Atheism. We may recall that, when the *Junta de Calificadores* met in Madrid in 1685 to pass judgement on the *Guía espiritual*, one of the accusers, the Jesuit Juan Cortés Osorio found a savour of Atheism in that model of perfection that tolerated no discussion, and that ended up denying external actions and expressions of devotion involving the senses. Modern heretics were those who, like Molinos, believed in a pure and universal faith, to the extent that it was now impossible to tell the difference between an Atheist and a Catholic.<sup>95</sup>

Jean Cornand de Lacroze alludes to other fundamental aspects of Molinos's doctrine, such as his advice that a person should not become upset or feel afflicted by sins committed — one of Molinosism's most controversial points from the viewpoint of morality, as we have seen. Lacroze interpreted this doctrine as referring to venial sins, not mortal ones. According to him, Molinos was thereby attempting to discredit confessors who imposed ridiculous penances and extravagant mortifications, things unknown in the primitive church. Once again we are faced with the crucial question of confession, the directing of consciences, and the relationship of Quietism to the problem of sin and free will.

### Knowledge and the Eucharist

The issue of parallelism between Descartes and Molinos — each of them the inventor of a method for overcoming the prejudices of his epoch — might seem a little surprising, as Cornand de Lacroze himself affirmed. Naturally, within the serious religious conflicts of the time they can both be seen as enemies of the Catholic Church and common enemies of the Company of Jesus. In addition, it is possible to establish a relationship between them with respect to an all-pervasive theme that is central to the polemic surrounding Quietism: knowledge.

As Francisco Barambio wrote in his text about Molinos's condemnation, or as Torrecilla said in his work: doubt, whether speculative or practical, can be defined

as 'a suspension of judgement'. The appearance of the sceptical 'epoché' in these texts can perhaps be understood as the result of the complicated process by which doubt, in the seventeenth century, had colonized the epistemological realm as a key tool of judgement.

One way of understanding this problem is from the viewpoint of mysticism as 'science'. We have already seen how the question of the various sciences and their specialized vocabularies arises at different points in the controversies described in the present text; as, for example, in the defence of Moral Theology by the casuists against the Canonists. As for mysticism, to consider it as 'the science of the knowledge of God and of the interior' is to see it as radically opposed to Theology as a science of 'experience'. In fact, one of the recurrent themes in the entirety of this polemic was the Quietists' affirmation that none but those with an experience of contemplation could make a judgement about it; furthermore, as one of Molinos's condemned propositions states: 'theologians are less disposed toward contemplation'. Thus the polemic surrounding contemplation can also be understood as yet one more expression of modern Europe's reorganization of the ways of knowing as they relate to experience.<sup>96</sup> From this point of view, the Quietist experience of contemplation also implied the undermining of the traditional theory of species, as a description of a process of knowing based on sense-experience. The polemic concerning how to articulate meditation and contemplation raises the question — a fundamental one — of whether the two can be compatible, and of whether a person can do without meditation forever once the state of contemplation has been reached. Is contemplation simply a single moment in time, so that it is not possible to reduce the whole of the believer's religious life to it? How to integrate contemplation into the Scholastic theory of knowledge was an old problem for mysticism, as it attempted to connect forms of sensate knowledge with the knowledge of God, which was not apprehensible via species. Saint John of the Cross had already rejected all ways of knowing God that rested on forms, rather than on 'the obscurity [*oscuridad*, 'darkness'] of faith'; in the same way, he had eschewed the use of images for approaching God, though hiding or softening his rejection perhaps out of 'fear of reprisals'.<sup>97</sup> In one of the first apologies for Saint John of the Cross, Fr José de Jesús María Quiroga spoke of 'conocimiento espiritual y sencillo en quietud de los actos de la razón' ['a spiritual and simple knowledge in the quietness of reason's acts'], and he attempted to explain, using an artistic metaphor, how one could reach a knowledge of God: the image of God can be formed by addition, as with painting, or by subtraction, as with sculpture; the latter is the contemplative method. This is negative knowledge (bringing to mind negative theology), which is brought about by 'stripping the understanding of all the known similitudes with which it, in its coarse and limited way, forms a concept of God'. In this way one can reach 'a greater knowledge of God than what a reasoned discourse can give us'.<sup>98</sup> Thus, here we have a super-substantial concept of God.<sup>99</sup>

Quiroga's text was written in a polemical context, in defence of his idea of contemplation, and is only one example of the way in which far-reaching controversies were reflected in the Molinosist condemnation. The debates

surrounding mental prayer are well known, but I would like to stress one aspect of the Molinosist debate which is crucial to every one of the viewpoints raised throughout this chapter, and which is at the heart of the morality-epistemology nexus: the sacrament of the Eucharist.

The defenders of meditation had pointed out the problem of how contemplation of God without recourse to sense images could integrate the humanity of Christ into the way of mysticism. If contemplation was abstract, and the contemplation of God could not be done based on sensible species, what then should be done with the humanity of Christ, whose blood and body were, according to the doctrine of transubstantiation, made present in the Eucharist? Or, to put it the other way, could frequent communion be considered an instrument of permanent contact with God, beyond confession?

Both questions were central to an understanding of the context which produced the condemnation of Quietism, in its moral and epistemological aspect. A short treatise by Miguel de Molinos, *Breve tratado de la comunión frecuente*,<sup>100</sup> together with two chapters of his *Guía Espiritual*, give a complete picture of Molinos's ideas about the Eucharist, along with his defence of frequent communion for all who are not in a state of mortal sin. Interestingly, one of the passages from the *Guía espiritual* contains one of the few references in the book to the word 'doubt'.<sup>101</sup> After saying that many souls deprive themselves of 'this precious food' for fear of not being sufficiently prepared, he adds:

on this reef of the desire to do the divine will, all difficulties will be broken, and all scruples, temptations, doubts, fears, revulsions and contradictions will be overcome.<sup>102</sup>

Frequent communion was a subject of great controversy at this time, and resulted in a 1679 bull of Innocent XI. The topic would explicitly come up again, even more clearly, in the verdict against Molinos, when the label 'Quietist' was given to the idea that contemplative souls ought not to receive the sacrament of penance before communion, or that while partaking of communion they should repress all feelings of humility, pleading or gratitude.<sup>103</sup>

Reflections about the Eucharist appear constantly in attacks upon Molinos. It is found, for example, in Du Vaucel's *Breves considerationes*, where the defence of daily communion is called 'lax', and weekly communion is advocated so that the believer might approach the heavenly meal with proper respect and preparation.<sup>104</sup> The theme of the Eucharist has a central role in defining a good part of the European theological and philosophical controversies of the day. Pierre Nicole, in his *Visionnaires*, had already had to defend himself against Desmaret's attack on the Jansenists, which claimed that they denied the presence of the body and blood of Christ in communion, leaving only 'a communion of the spirit by faith'. In thus abolishing the Eucharist, the Jansenists supposedly attempted also to abolish frequent masses, making communion a weekly thing only, a ceremony in which the host was eaten only by faith.<sup>105</sup> The Jesuits too accused the Jansenists of denying the presence of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist — an accusation that provoked a response from Pascal in his Sixteenth Provincial Letter.

The Eucharistic question was fundamental to the Jansenists, and was one of the clear lines of demarcation with Protestantism that kept them within the Catholic camp. In large part, the positions adopted by Jansenism with respect to the Eucharist can be explained by their ongoing arguments with Calvinists, which impelled them, for example, to search the texts of the Oriental Church — such as the Coptic — for proofs of the continuity of Christian liturgy since antiquity, in order to demonstrate a continued belief in transubstantiation.<sup>106</sup> The centrality of the Eucharistic question also explains, for example, the fact that one of the largest obstacles that Cartesian philosophy encountered at Port-Royal had to do with the compatibility between its physical ideas and its doctrine of transubstantiation. In fact, one of its principal defenders among the Jansenists, Antoine Arnauld, only decided to take up the Cartesian cause when he became convinced that it was not incompatible with the Eucharist. Nevertheless, Du Vaucel, who wrote about Cartesian philosophy as well as Quietism, believed that the two were incompatible; he thought that Descartes's philosophy was particularly inadequate for explaining the real presence of Christ in the communion, especially because it made extension the essence of matter, which constituted the mark of Cartesianism.<sup>107</sup> On the Jesuits' side, this problem was fundamental to their opposition to Cartesianism and the condemnation of Descartes's works.<sup>108</sup> Thus the Jansenists made an enormous intellectual and theological effort regarding the Eucharist within the characteristic polemical environment in which they confronted Calvinists and Jesuits. By this effort they refined the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and also the significant forms of the remembrance of Christ and of prayer; this effort was crucial to the construction of Port-Royal's logic and the new theory of signs.<sup>109</sup>

Various central aspects of anti-Molinist polemic come together in the issue of the Eucharist. One of the documents reproduced by Cornand de Lacroze in his *Recueil*, with the title 'Extraits d'une lettre angloise',<sup>110</sup> explains from a Reformed viewpoint Father Segneri's critique of Quietism with reference to the problem of remembering the humanity of Jesus Christ: meditation is reflection on His life, birth, miracles and passion; contemplation is a simple vision of God, a pure and momentary act of faith. By concentrating on the humanity of Christ, on his omnipotence and omniscience, the Roman theologians had committed the same error as the Socinians,<sup>111</sup> and had created a dogma that had produced, among other things, worship of the cross and of the Eucharistic bread, making an idol of Jesus. Only a few mystics like François Malaval had dared oppose 'this torrent of superstition' and the abuse that 'the Christians of his communion' gave to the humanity of Christ, to the detriment of his divine condition.<sup>112</sup> The Quietists' attempt to rise above the humanity of Christ had caused them to be accused of being anti-Trinitarians and Deists.<sup>113</sup>

The topic of frequent communion is in any case neither original nor specific to Molinos. The genealogy of spiritualist mysticism in late seventeenth-century Europe includes the outstanding figure of Juan Falconi de Bustamante (1596–1638), a theologian and mystic from Almería who pursued his career in Madrid, authoring a treatise entitled *El pan nuestro de cada día*, which enjoyed extraordinarily

wide distribution in Europe and was translated into Italian and French.<sup>114</sup> The work belongs to a mystical and theological tradition related to this theme; it not only argues that daily communion is recommendable, but also defines the two conditions for participation in it: not to be in a state of mortal sin, and to receive the sacrament 'with the affection and devotion of which each one is capable'.<sup>115</sup> The theme of frequent communion, with its corollary of connected topics (like defining the 'disposition' of the communicant, the equating of the communicant with the priestly dignity, etc.) runs throughout the seventeenth century up to the *Tratado* of Molinos, which was condemned by the Spanish Inquisition in 1685.<sup>116</sup> At the same time, it is worth recalling here that several of Juan Falconi's works were censured in 1688–89, precisely because of his supposed nearness to Quietist propositions.<sup>117</sup> This was one of those examples of spiritual works being defined *a posteriori* as Quietist, and therefore censured.

### Conclusion

One of the important points of Molinos's condemnation has to do with the relationship between obedience and spiritual guidance. Proposition 65 says:

One should obey one's superior in what is external; and the latitude of the vow of obedience of Religious persons extends only to the exterior; the interior is a different matter, where only God and the guide enter.<sup>118</sup>

And 66 reads:

There is a new doctrine in the Church of God that is laughable: that the soul, so far as the interior is concerned, ought to be governed by the Bishop; and if he is not able, the soul should go to him with its Director. I say 'new' because neither Holy Scripture, Councils, Canons, Bulls, Saints nor Authors have ever passed this down to us, nor could they do so, because *Ecclesia non iudicat de occultis*. And the soul has the right as well as the faculty to choose whomever it deems best.<sup>119</sup>

Proposition 67:

to say that one ought to display what is internal to an external Tribunal of superiors, and that not to do so is a sin, is a manifest deception, because the Church *non iudicat de occultis*, and they endanger souls with these deceptions and fictions.<sup>120</sup>

And lastly, number 68:

There is no faculty or jurisdiction in the world for commanding that one should make public the Director's letters regarding what is internal to the soul, and thus it is necessary to be aware that this is Satanic scoffing.<sup>121</sup>

All these propositions help to situate the legal attack upon Quietism within the wider context of the problem of constructing the Subject and of modern means of discipline. Barambio's response to these propositions is no surprise: obedience should be, at one and the same time, internal and external, since the commands of one's superiors compel the conscience; any obedience that is not also internal is poor

obedience. The supposition, 'in the interior only God and me', is an outrageous doctrine, one which every heretic has attempted to introduce into the Church, and in particular the *alumbrados*.

Barambio's refutation of these condemned propositions constitutes a small treatise on interiority, or rather a treatise on how interiority is integrated into a system of canonical and political authority. What is internal (purely mental, related to confession or to prayer) is not actually distinct from what is external, and therefore it falls within the jurisdiction of canonical authority, as does the relationship between the Subject and his Director of conscience. On the other hand, when discussing Proposition 59 ('the internal way is separate from confession, confessors, cases of conscience, Theology and Philosophy'), Barambio affirms that the internal way is necessarily joined to confession — among other things — because the spiritual life is filled with pitfalls, both serious and minor, and with many doubts and difficulties that can only be resolved by confession, cases of conscience, Theology and Philosophy.<sup>122</sup> Here once again we are face to face with the concept of doubt, in a manner that explicitly links the 'Inner Forum', confession, and obedience.

The polemic surrounding moral laxism reproduces the same tension between affirming free will and obedience. Here is a key aspect in how the governing of souls was defined, and this explains why the clash between contemplation and meditation was seen as so important. This was an ancient dispute, but it became intensified during the trial of Quietism that began with the case against Molinos created by the Jesuits, and the reference to the *Spiritual Exercises*. To the extent that defining the Forum of Conscience was central to the entire process of moral reconfiguration in the seventeenth century, one can better understand how the case against Molinos was constructed. The repeated allusions to the problem of religious vows, their conditions and their reach were important also for understanding the aspects of this trial.

Is it true, as some thought, that it was possible to find a likeness between Cartesianism and Quietist mysticism? Both 'methods' were based on considering the distance between external and internal, and reflecting about the relationship between them — a relationship that belongs in principle to the order of knowledge, but that is also political, since it radically involves the forms in which authority is constructed. At the end of the seventeenth century, it was impossible to understand these processes without making reference to doubt. While it is true that doubt had been, since antiquity, a fundamental rhetorical tool of dialectic, at the historical moment we are discussing doubt inevitably contained the dissolvent power of scepticism, and of its importance in defining judgement. Certainly, mystical interiority and sceptical interiority are different. The modern sceptical tradition itself insisted on seeing them this way, and one of its mainsprings was the construction of a definition of faith far removed from any implication of mysticism, circumscribing the limits of all possible knowledge within the human sphere.<sup>123</sup> In any event, the case of Quietism allows us to add a significant element to the history of the controversy surrounding scepticism.

The relationship of Quietism to the development of other philosophical, logical, or scientific methods during the seventeenth century is, at any rate, far from simple

or unambiguous. To give just one example: the sympathy with which Leibniz treated mysticism, especially Quietist mysticism, has been subject to varying explanations: certain affinities relative to the forms of knowing God and the Subject; a lack of confidence in the senses as the source of knowledge; a certain sort of idea about the absolute independence of substances...<sup>124</sup> One of the ways of approaching the knowledge question can be the crucial issue of the Eucharist. I have already cited the well-known example of the Logic of Port-Royal, which explains very well the development of a way of thinking about the relationship between language and truth. The exploration of the relationship between the body of Christ and the word of God constitutes an important theological problem at this moment in Catholic history, which can be studied from the perspective of the 'return to the sources' of Christianity.<sup>125</sup> We have also seen how the polemical framework of the confrontation between Ancients and Moderns appears continuously, as a constant questioning of the ways of constructing tradition in a context as dynamic as the one outlined here. On the other hand, the issue of religious vows requires the present work, in dealing with language and truth, to consider, on the one hand, the problem of constructing the Forum of Conscience, and, on the other, the problem of a logical grammatical system. These two problems are intertwined through their connection to the construction of the moral Subject.

#### Notes to Chapter 8

1. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) / ERC grant agreement no. 323316, project CORPI 'Conversion, Overlapping Religiosities, Polemics, Interaction. Early Modern Iberia and Beyond', led by Mercedes García-Arenal.
2. Susanna Åkerman, *Queen Christina of Sweden and her Circle: The Transformation of a Seventeenth Century Philosophical Libertine* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), pp. 284–94.
3. José Ignacio Tellechea Idígoras, *Moliniana. Investigaciones históricas sobre Miguel de Molinos* (Madrid: FUE, 1987), pp. 55–57.
4. 'viejos episodios, sus antiguos consejos, las cartas', Tellechea Idígoras, *Moliniana*, p. 55. Tellechea Idígoras, *El proceso del doctor Miguel de Molinos* (Madrid: FUE-Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 2007).
5. For example, Francisco Trinidad Solano, 'Miguel de Molinos. La experiencia de la nada', in Miguel de Molinos, *Defensa de la contemplación*, ed. by F. T. Solano (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1983), pp. 13–88 (p. 52).
6. This expression appears in Adelisa Malena, *L'eresia dei perfetti. Inquisizione romana ed esperienze mistiche nel Seicento italiano* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2003), p. 1; and also in Marilena Modica, *Infetta dottrina. Inquisizione e quietismo nel Seicento* (Rome: Viella, 2009), p. 9. On the concept of 'heretical construct', see Jessica J. Fowler, 'Assembling Alumbradismo: The Evolution of a Heretical Construct', in *After Conversion: Iberia and the Emergence of Modernity*, ed. by M. García-Arenal (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 251–82.
7. Malena, *L'eresia dei perfetti*, p. 4.
8. Jesús Ellacuría Beascochea, *Reacción española contra las ideas de Miguel de Molinos (procesos de la Inquisición y refutación de los teólogos)* ([Bilbao]: [Gráf. Ellacuría], 1956).
9. The Latin text of this and other condemned propositions of Molinos is taken from Paul Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol Michel Molinos (1628–1696)* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1921), p. 293.
10. Contemporary Spanish translations of Molinos's propositions can be found in Francisco Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos, teológicos, morales y místicos contra las proposiciones del Doctor Miguel de Molinos [...]*, 2 vols (Madrid: Juan García Infanzón, 1691–92), I, 172.

11. Pedro Sánchez, *Quodlibeta Divi Thomae Aquinatis, Doctoris Angelici, ad mysticas doctrinas applicata, reflexionibus aliquibus annexis pro securiori via spiritus [...]* (Seville: Francisco Sánchez Reciente, 1719). Ellacuría Beascoechea, *Reacción española*, pp. 266–353.
12. Sánchez, *Quodlibeta Divi Thomae Aquinatis*: 'Utrum liceat inducere Iuvenes ad Religionem voto, vel iuramento', 'Quodlibetum III, Articulus XI', p. 222.
13. Sánchez, *Quodlibeta Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, p. 224.
14. Sánchez, *Quodlibeta Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, pp. 226–27.
15. Ellacuría Beascoechea, *Reacción española*, pp. 117–228.
16. Antonio González Polvillo, *Análisis y repertorio de los tratados y manuales para la confesión en el mundo hispánico (ss. XV–XVIII)* (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2009), no. 4435.
17. Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, I, 172–87.
18. 'un conocimiento con el que el entendimiento, conociendo las razones que ay por una y otra parte, en una cosa, suspende de todo punto el juyzio, y no sabe a qué parte echarse. Ha de aver conocimiento, porque si no será ignorancia y pura nesciencia, y de ninguna suerte *duda*'.
19. 'la primera, especula y discurre solo sobre la verdad de la cosa, quedándose el entendimiento dudoso. La segunda es acerca de la verdad que se ha de practicar en tales ocasiones o circunstancias. Y se advierte, que para obrar bien, forçosamente es menester un juyzio práctico, moralmente cierto, de que tal obra es cierta'.
20. 'teme pues quando la gracia te aplaudiere con su presencia, teme quando se te aumente, teme quando de nuevo viniere, y sabe que esto es tener siempre miedo'.
21. 'como en estos tiempos avían sucedido grandes ilusiones en mugeres y engaños que les avía hecho el demonio'.
22. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a-2a, q. 47, a. 12.
23. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a-2a, q. 48, a. 1.
24. For example, Juan Cruz Cruz, 'Interpretación de la ley según Juan de Salas', *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Español*, 44 (2011), 9–103, (p. 88 and *passim*), which analyses the problem of the interpretation of the law.
25. Fray Martín de Torrecilla, 'En que se refutan las proposiciones del heresiarcha Molinos', in *Consultas, apologías, alegatos, cuestiones y varios tratados morales, y confutación de las más y más principales proposiciones del impío heresiarcha Molinos*, 3 vols (Madrid: Jerónimo de Estrada, 1702), II, 552–62. Torrecilla is not one of the authors studied by Ellacuría Beascoechea.
26. 'Dado que sea el libre arbitrio a Dios, y el cuydado y gobierno de nuestra alma, no se deve hacer más caso a las tentaciones, no se debe hazer otra resistencia, sino negativa, sin usar industria; y si la naturaleza se resiente, es menester dexarla resentir, porque es naturaleza'; Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, I, 272. 'Tradito Deo libero arbitrio et eidem relicta cura et cogitatione animae nostrae, non est amplius habenda ratio tentationum, nec eis alia resistentia fieri debet, nisi negativa, nulla adhibita industria, et si natura commovetur, oportet sinere ut commoveratur, quia est natura'; Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, p. 294.
27. 'El que ha dado el libre arbitrio a Dios no debe dársele nada de cosa alguna, ni de infierno ni de gloria, ni de deseo de la propia perfección, ni de las virtudes, ni de la propia santidad, ni de la propia salud, que también debe perder la esperanza'; Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, vol. I, p. 188. 'Qui suum liberum arbitrium Deo donavit de nulla re debet curam habere, nec de inferno, nec de paradiso, nec debet desiderium habere propriae perfectionis, nec virtutum, nec propriae sanctitatis, nec propriae salutis cuius spem expurgare debet'; Dudon, *Le quiétiste espagnol*, p. 293.
28. Barambio also notes this, *Discursos filosóficos*, I, 274.
29. Torrecilla, 'En que se refutan...', p. 558.
30. 'un acto del entendimiento, no qualquiera sino iudicativo, con que juzga qué es lo que la voluntad debe abraçar o debe huir, por ser conforme o contra razón [...] Diferénciase de la Sínderesis, que juzga los principios universales; y de la ciencia u opinión moral, que juzga de las conclusiones universales; porque la conciencia sólo juzga de las conclusiones en particular [...] Y así conciencia es aplicación de la ciencia a la obra que ahora se a de hazer; o un juicio práctico del entendimiento, que dize a la voluntad: Haz esto, porque es razón; o no lo hagas, porque es sinrazón'; Fray Martín de Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida del R. P. Fr. Martín de Torrecilla,*

- con *Addiciones del tomo de proposiciones condenadas, y del de Obispos y otras* (Madrid: Antonio Román, 1698), p. 1.
31. *recta*, 'que dicta la verdad por verdad'; *errónea*, 'que dicta un yerro por verdad'; *dudosa*, 'que es una suspensión de ánimo, con que, por falta de razones que suficientemente la muevan, ni de una ni de otra parte al assenso ni al dissenso, o por hallar igual dificultad en sus razones, queda indiferente el entendimiento, sin poder juzgar si la cosa es lícita o ilícita'; *probable*, 'que es un juicio probable de que esto es lícito o ilícito, con rezelo de que lo contrario puede ser más verdadero'; *escrupulosa*, 'una leve sospecha, nacida de leves fundamentos, con la qual juzga o cree ser pecado lo que no lo es; pero siempre con rezelo de que lo contrario puede ser verdadero; y así no excluye el juicio cierto o opinativo de la parte opuesta, y más es credulidad que juicio formado; es una como turbación o sospecha, que trae anexa a sí inquietud, temor y alienación de espíritu'. Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida*, pp. 1–2.
32. Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida*, pp. 4–5.
33. Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida*, p. 5.
34. Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida*, p. 16.
35. Jean-Pascal Gay, 'Doctrina Societatis? Le Rapport entre probabilisme et discernement des esprits dans la culture jésuite (XVI<sup>e</sup>–XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles)', in *Le Discernement spirituel au dix-septième siècle*, ed. by Simon Icard (Paris: Nolin, 2011), pp. 23–46.
36. Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida*, p. 28.
37. Torrecilla, *Compendio de la suma añadida*, p. 29.
38. Juan Caramuel, *Apologema pro antiquissima et universalissima doctrina de probabilitate, contra nouam, singularem improbabilemque D. Prosperi Fagnani opinionationem* (Lyon: Laurent Anisson, 1663).
39. Julia Fleming, *Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), pp. 73ff.
40. Fleming, *Defending Probabilism*, pp. 74–75.
41. Fleming, *Defending Probabilism*, p. 80.
42. Fleming, *Defending Probabilism*, p. 80.
43. Fleming, *Defending Probabilism*, pp. 88–89.
44. Juan Caramuel, *Theologia moralis ad prima, eaque clarissima principia reducta* (Leuven: Petrus Zangrius, 1645), pp. 330–97.
45. Caramuel, *Theologia moralis ad prima*, pp. 332–94.
46. Jean-Robert Armogathe, 'Probabilisme et libre-arbitre. La Théologie morale de Caramuel y Lobkowitz', in *Le meraviglie del probabile. Juan Caramuel 1606–1682*, ed. by Paolo Posavino (Vigevano: Comune di Vigevano, 1990), pp. 35–40.
47. Antonino Diana, *Summa Diana* (Valencia: Claudio Macè, 1645), pp. 126–27.
48. Martín Torrecilla, *Consultas morales y exposición de las proposiciones condenadas por nuestros muy santos padres Inocencio XI y Alexandro VII* (Madrid: Juan García Infanzón, 1693).
49. Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 269–70.
50. Paolo Segneri, *Concordia tra la fatica e la quiete nell'orazione, espressa ad un Religioso* (Florence: Ipolito della Nave, 1680).
51. Segneri, *Concordia tra la fatica*, p. 38.
52. Tellechea Idígoras, 'Una apología inédita de Molinos. Scioglimento ad alcune obiettoni fatte contra i libro della "Guida spirituale"', in *Molinosiana*, pp. 193–225.
53. Gottardo Bell'uomo, *Il pregio e l'ordine dell'orazione ordinarie e mistiche* (Modena: Soliani, 1678), pp. 34–36.
54. Bell'uomo, *Il pregio e l'ordine*, p. 46.
55. Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, pp. 126ff.
56. 'una breve noticia de la secta de los quietistas, con las proposiciones de Molinos, que el Author impugna, y la Santidad de Inocencio XI ha condenado'; Paolo Segneri, *Concordia entre la quietud y la fatiga de la oración* (Barcelona: Rafael Figuerò, 1688).
57. Paolo Segneri, *Concordia entre la quietud y la fatiga de la oración* (Barcelona: [n.p.], 1705).
58. Jean-Pascal Gay, *Jesuit Civil Wars: Theology, Politics and Government under Tirso González (1687–1705)* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 143–44 and *passim*.

59. Segneri, *Concordia entre la quietud y la fatiga*, pp. 219–20.
60. Segneri, *Concordia entre la quietud y la fatiga*, pp. 225–26. This explanation is included in a defence of probabilism against its condemnation by Innocent XI.
61. Segneri, *Concordia entre la quietud y la fatiga*, pp. 222–23.
62. Segneri, *Concordia entre la quietud y la fatiga*, pp. 235–36.
63. Malena, *L'eresia dei perfetti*, p. 119.
64. Among the condemned propositions of Molinos are the following: 'confession is useless and sometimes impossible'; 'one's superior is owed only external obedience'; 'it is deceptive to require the unburdening of the conscience to one's superior'; 'no one has the jurisdiction to require that letters written by one's Director of conscience referring to internal matters must be revealed; to say the opposite is an invention of Satan'; Ellacuría Beascochea, *Reacción española*, pp. 53–54.
65. Adriano Prosperi, 'La confesione e il foro della coscienza', in *Il Concilio di Trento e il moderno*, Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico, Quaderno 45, ed. by Paolo Prodi and Wolfgang Reinhard (Bologna: il Mulino, 1996), pp. 225–54; Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza. Inquisitori, confessori, missionari* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), pp. 219 ff.
66. Santo Burgio, 'La decadenza como risorsa. Diana e il probabilismo in Sicilia negli anni Trenta e Quaranta', in his *Teología barroca. Il probabilismo in Sicilia nell'epoca di Filippo IV* (Catania: Società di Storia Patria per la Sicilia Orientale, 1998), pp. 17ff.
67. Burgio, 'La decadenza como risorsa', in *Teología barroca*, pp. 76–77.
68. Molinos, *Defensa de la contemplación*, p. 132.
69. Jacques Le Brun, *La Spiritualité de Bossuet* (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1972), pp. 439–562.
70. For example, Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, pp. 60–62.
71. Le Brun, *La Spiritualité de Bossuet*, pp. 442–43.
72. Pierre Nicole, *Les Visionnaires ou seconde partie des lettres sur l'hérésie imaginaire* (Liège: Adolphe Beyers, 1667), pp. 28–29.
73. Nicole, *Les Visionnaires*, p. 44.
74. Nicole, *Les Visionnaires*, p. 48.
75. Le Brun, *La Spiritualité de Bossuet*, pp. 445–49.
76. [Louis-Paul Du Vaucel], *Breves considerationes in doctrinam Michelis de Molinos et aliorum quietistarum* (Cologne: Nicolaum Shouten, 1688), p. 3.
77. [Du Vaucel], *Breves considerationes*, p. 29.
78. [Du Vaucel], *Breves considerationes*, p. 13.
79. [Du Vaucel], *Breves considerationes*, p. 31.
80. Stefania Pastore, *Un'eresia spagnola. Spiritualità conversa, alumbriadismo e Inquisizione (1449–1559)* (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 2004), pp. 208ff.; J. Fowler, 'Assembling Alumbriadismo'.
81. Le Brun, *La Spiritualité de Bossuet*, pp. 445–46.
82. To give just one example, see the previously cited Nicole, *Les Visionnaires*, p. 234.
83. Santo Burgio, 'Gnostici, libertini, probabilisti. La perversa genealogia di John Sinnich', in *Filosofia e storiografia. Studi in onore di Giovanni Papuli. II. Età Moderna*, ed. by S. Ciurla (Galatina: Congedo, 2008), pp. 5–15. On another way of approaching the relationship between libertinism and Molinism, in the case of Christina of Sweden, see Åkerman, *Queen Christina of Sweden*, pp. 284–94; though Åkerman stresses Molinos's possible marrano origin.
84. Le Brun, *La Spiritualité de Bossuet*, 455–56.
85. [Jean Cornand de Lacroze], *Recueil de diverses pièces concernant le quiétisme et les quiétistes, ou Molinos, ses sentiments et ses disciples* (Amsterdam: A. Wolfgang and P. Savouret, 1688). The other work is *Trois lettres touchant l'état présent d'Italie écrites en l'année 1687. La première regarde l'affaire de Molinos et des quiétistes* (Cologne: [n. pub.], 1688).
86. [Lacroze], *Recueil de diverses pièces*, pp. 6–14.
87. [Lacroze], *Recueil de diverses pièces*, p. 14.
88. [Lacroze], *Recueil de diverses pièces*, pp. 14–18.
89. [Lacroze], *Recueil de diverses pièces*, p. 20.
90. Philippe Couplet and Prospero Intorceta, *Confucius, Sinarum philosophus, sive Scientia sinensis* (Paris: Daniel Horthemels, 1687), p. xxxii.
91. Couplet and Intorceta, *Confucius, Sinarum philosophus*, pp. 24–25.
92. Urs App, *The Cult of Emptiness: The Western Discovery of Buddhist Thought and the Invention of Oriental Philosophy* (Rorschach and Kyoto: University Media, 2012), pp. 178ff. Also well known is the reference to the Quietism of Molinos made by Pierre Bayle when he speaks, for example, of Hinduism as an experience of nothingness: Bayle, 'Brachmanes', in *Dictionnaire critique et universel. Nouvelle édition* (Paris: Desoer, 1820), IV, 100–02.
93. Jean Leclercq and Jean Cornand de Lacroze, *Bibliothèque Universelle et Historique de l'année 1688*, vol. XI (Amsterdam: Wolfgang, Waesberge, Boom and Van Someren, 1698), p. 131.
94. App, *The Cult of Emptiness*, p. 178. We may recall, too, how the use of contacts with the Oriental world to qualify European polemical categories (such as Jansenism v. Jesuitism) was also used at a later date in the context of the controversy over 'Chinese rites'. See, for example, [Jacques-Hyacinthe Serry], *La calunnia convinta, cioè Risposta ad un libello pubblicato da' difensori de' riti condannati della Cina* (Turin: Gio. Battista Fontana, 1709).
95. Modica, *Infetta dottrina*, pp. 25–26.
96. Modica, *Infetta dottrina*, p. 12. The problem was an old one, and it naturally appeared in the condemnation of *alumbrados*, in which the opposition between knowledge and experience played a fundamental role. Antonio Márquez, *Los alumbrados. Orígenes y filosofía* (Madrid: Taurus, 1972), esp. the chapter titled '¿Conocimiento o experiencia?', pp. 167–77.
97. Joaquín García Palacios, *Los procesos de conocimiento en San Juan de la Cruz. Estudio léxico* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1992), pp. 24–25, and 120 n. 24.
98. 'desnudando al entendimiento de todas las semejanzas conocidas con que a su modo grosero y limitado hace concepto de Dios'; 'mayor conocimiento de Dios de lo que nos podía dar el discurso de la razón'.
99. José de Jesús María Quiroga, *Apología mística en defensa de la contemplación*, ed. by Jean Krynen (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1992), pp. 61 and 103–06.
100. Printed as an appendix to: Pilar Moreno Rodríguez, *El pensamiento de Miguel de Molinos* (Madrid: FUE-Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 1992), pp. 601–30.
101. Tellechea Idígoras, *Léxico de la 'Guía espiritual' de Miguel de Molinos* (Madrid: FUE-Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 1991), *sub voce*.
102. 'en este escollo del deseo de hacer la divina voluntad se han de romper todas las dificultades y vencer todos los escrúpulos, las tentaciones, las dudas, los temores, las repugnancias y contradicciones', Miguel de Molinos, *Guía espiritual*, ed. by José Ángel Valente (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989), p. 113.
103. Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, pp. 80–92.
104. [Du Vaucel], *Breves considerationes*, pp. 60–61.
105. Nicole, *Les Visionnaires*, p. 111.
106. Alastair Hamilton, *The Copts and the West, 1439–1822: The European Discovery of the Egyptian Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 152–59.
107. Steven M. Nadler, 'Arnauld, Descartes, and Transubstantiation: Reconciling Cartesian Metaphysics and Real Presence', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 49 (1988), 229–46.
108. Roger Ariew, 'Descartes and the Jesuits: Doubt, Novelty, and the Eucharist', in *Jesuit Science and the Republic of Letters*, ed. by Mordechai Feingold (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003), pp. 158–94.
109. Louis Marin, *La Critique du discours. Sur la 'Logique de Port-Royal' et les 'Pensées' de Pascal* (Paris: Minuit, 1975), pp. 10–11.
110. Cornand de Lacroze, 'Extraits d'une lettre angloise écrite de Rome en Hollande au sujet des Quiétistes; le 15 de Février 1687', in *Recueil de diverses pièces*, pp. 262–332.
111. The problem of Socinian criticism of the Trinity, with its arguments regarding the concepts of 'person', 'substance', 'transubstantiation'..., were especially virulent in England at this precise moment, in the 1690s. Douglas Hedley, 'Persons of Substance and the Cambridge Connection: Some Roots and Ramifications of the Trinitarian Controversy in Seventeenth-Century England', in *Socinianism and Arminianism. Antitrinitarians, Calvinists and Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, ed. by Martin Mulso and Jan Rohls (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 225–40.

112. Lacroze, 'Extraits d'une lettre angloise', in *Recueil de diverses pièces*, pp. 274–75.
113. Lacroze, 'Extraits d'une lettre angloise', in *Recueil de diverses pièces*, p. 276.
114. Le Brun, *La Spiritualité de Bossuet*, p. 442.
115. 'cada uno con el afecto y devoción que pudiere'. Two chapters of the manuscript of this work are not included in the printed edition. One is titled: 'que no es tan pequeña disposición el estar en gracia como a algunos les parece' ('being in a state of grace is not such a minor disposition as some suppose'), and the other: 'que Cristo dio la Comunión a imperfectos y pecadores, y los Apóstoles también; y así no emos de ser rigurosos en querer negarla a los que fueren' ('that Christ and his Apostles gave communion to imperfect people and sinners; and therefore we ought not to be rigorous in wishing to deny it to those who are such'), Elías Gómez, *Fr. Juan Falconi de Bustamante, teólogo y asceta (1569–1638)* (Madrid: Escuela de Historia Moderna-CSIC, 1956), p. 209.
116. Ellacuría Beascochea, *Reacción española*, pp. 92–95.
117. Tellechea Idígoras, *El proceso del doctor*, pp. 251–61.
118. 'Praepositis obediendum est in exteriori, et latitudo voti obedientiae religiosorum tantummodo ad exterius pertingit. In interiori vero aliter res se habet, ubi solus Deus et director intrant'; Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, p. 299; Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, II, 418.
119. 'Risu digna est nova quaedam doctrina, in Ecclesia Dei, quod anima quoad internum gubernari debeat ab episcopo et quod si episcopus non sit capax, anima ipsum cum suo direttore adeat. Novam dico doctrinam, quia nec S. Scriptura, nec Concilia, nec Canones, nec Bullae, nec Sancti, nec Autores, eam unquam tradiderunt, nec tradere possunt, quia Ecclesia non iudicat de occultis et anima jus habet et facultatem eligendi quemcumque sibi bene visum'; Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, p. 299; Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, II, 438.
120. 'Dicere quod internum manifestandum est exteriori tribunali praepositorum, et quod peccatum sit id non facere, est manifesta deceptio; quia Ecclesia non iudicat de occultis, et propriis animabus praepudicant his deceptionibus et simulationibus'; Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, p. 299; Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, II, 453.
121. 'in mundo non est facultas nec iurisdictio ad praecipendum ut manifestentur epistolae directoris quoad internum animae et ideo opus est animadvertere quod hoc est insultus Satanae'; Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol*, p. 299; Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, II, 454.
122. Barambio, *Discursos filosóficos*, II, 341.
123. Sérgio Cardoso, 'On Skeptical Fideism in Montaigne's *Apology for Raymond Sebond*', in *Skepticism in the Modern Age: Building on the Work of Richard Popkin*, ed. by José R. Maia Neto, John Christian Laursen and Gianni Paganini (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 71–82.
124. Donald Rutherford, 'Leibniz and Mysticism', in *Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion*, ed. by Allison P. Coudert (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 22–37.
125. Jean-Louis Quantin, *Le Catholicisme classique et les Pères de l'Église. Un retour aux sources (1669–1713)* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1999), pp. 515ff.