

Spanish Foreign Policy From A(znar) to Z(apatero)

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The outcome of Spain's March 14 elections is the worst news ever since the jihad against civilization began more than a decade ago....If Spain is a model, the Europeans are clearly not mature enough to understand, let alone deal with, the global threat posed by the Islamist barbarians.

Michael Radu, www.frontpagemag.com, March 16, 2004

Socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announced a radical new direction in his country's foreign policy...making hasty foreign policy decisions in the wake of a terrorist outrage could backfire.

Isabel Vincent, *National Post* (Canada), March 16, 2004

The Madrid bombings prompted Spanish voters to throw out the old government and replace it with one whose policies are more to al-Qaida's liking. What is the Spanish word for appeasement?

David Brooks, *The New York Times*, March 16, 2004

Since his dramatic election, Zapatero has sought to establish his vision of a 'New Spain' on the Iberian peninsula. He has reversed many of the policies of his predecessor....He has designed and implemented a radically different foreign policy.

Norman Ho, *Harvard International Review*, 2005

The March 11, 2004, train bombings in Madrid and the subsequent election resulted in a change in Spain's government and a withdrawal of Spain's troops from Iraq. This move provoked an outpouring of editorial comments, especially from Americans. Some writers expressed sympathy and compared Madrid to New York; others expressed outrage and shock that Spain would dare change its course in foreign policy and withdraw its troops from Iraq. However, after it was clear that the Socialist Party government was set on "reversing" its foreign policy, Americans, for the most part, lost interest in the country and its continuing fight against terrorism.

But how and why Spanish foreign policy changed after 11-M¹ is still an interesting question to consider for a number of reasons. First, Spain does not garner much attention in the United States. For example, a Google search for "France + terrorism" brings up about 19,400,000 hits; a Google search for "Spain + terrorism" brings up about 6,490,000 hits, despite both the more pronounced presence of domestic terrorism by ETA in Spain and 11-M. Which leads to the second reason why Spain is interesting: Spaniards are experienced in fighting terrorism in the form of ETA since becoming a democracy in 1976. As Antonio Munoz Molina, a citizen of Madrid explains, "we have long known how fragile human life is and how easily disaster can be sowed in the places that seem safest....With [the Madrid bombings and the election results] came scrutiny by those who fail to understand Spain, yet seek to judge us."²

Molina's comment accurately describes many Americans. Despite a limited understanding of Spain, many observers condemned new President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's decision to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq as a dramatic and dangerous reversal in Spanish foreign policy. But there has been no systematic analysis of Spain's foreign policy since

¹ 11-M is how March 11, 2004 is referred to in Spain, like the use of 9/11 for September 11, 2001 in the United States.

² Antonio Munoz Molina, "We Don't Want to Be Alone," *The New York Times*, 20 March 2004: A13.

the 11-M bombings. A detailed analysis of the decision shows that public opinion was not the only factor at work; other traditional foreign policy influences within a state played a role in the change as well. An in-depth look at these factors reveals that, in fact, the new foreign policy made sense. It was not a reversal at all; rather, it was a return to traditional foreign policy before the dramatic changes of the Popular Party administration.

In this paper, I will first provide a more detailed explanation of the March 11th bombings and Spanish foreign policy (specifically, as it relates to terrorism) both before and after the 2004 elections. To explain the change in Spain's foreign policy, I will analyze it in terms of the main factors discussed in the foreign policy literature at the three levels of analysis: systemic, or Spain's place in the global political system; domestic, specifically media, public opinion, domestic terrorism, history, and interest groups; and individual, the personalities of José María Aznar and Zapatero. Although the literature is almost entirely focused on the United States, the factors identified are transferable. However, while Congress is identified as an important foreign policy influence in the United States, I have chosen not to include the Spanish Parliament as it is not very significant in politics, which I will further explain in Chapter 5.

Commentators on Spanish policy after 11-M were correct that Zapatero chose to respond to the public in pulling the troops out of Iraq. Public opinion was key in changing foreign policy in Spain because of the election. If Aznar's Popular Party had won, as expected, his chosen successor probably would have continued Aznar's foreign policy. The 11-M attacks galvanized the public and led many people to doubt the Aznar administration and call for a change in policy.

However, this analysis will show that personality and the media, along with public opinion, also played important roles in the change in Spain's foreign policy. Aznar's intense personal ambitions were key in moving Spain away from Europe and towards the United States.

And the media played an extremely important role in alerting the public to the discrepancies in the 11-M investigation and the fact that ETA might not have been responsible. If the media had just accepted the government line of ETA responsibility, it is likely that the Socialist Party would have remained as a minority government. Aznar's personality was an important factor in foreign policy before 11-M, but the media and public opinion were key to the change in policy after 11-M.

March 11th did not receive nearly as much attention as September 11th, but the significant consequences the terrorist attacks had for Spanish foreign policy make an interesting case study of why countries choose the foreign policies they do. Spain's case is certainly more dramatic than most, but despite the beliefs of many Americans, the Spanish approach to terrorism after March 2004 is neither new nor unprecedented.

Chapter 2: State Responses to Terrorism

Response to terrorism has become a critical foreign and domestic policy issue, especially after September 11th and the recent bombings in London and Madrid. Although the September 11th attacks were certainly unprecedented in their magnitude, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Debates about the meaning, definition, causes, and necessary responses to terrorism have also been ongoing, although these debates have taken on a new urgency in the 21st century. The governmental response to terrorism is a critical foreign policy issue and there has been a proliferation of scholarship on this issue.

First, however, a clarification of terms is necessary. For the purpose of this paper, I will use the definition of terrorism provided by Keith Shimko in his textbook on international relations. Terrorism is “the indiscriminate use or threat of violence to advance social, political, economic, or religious objectives by creating a climate of fear.”³ This definition does leave some gray area in terms of what can or cannot be defined as terrorism. However, it is impossible to find a definition that is completely unproblematic, and all of the elements of this definition are common in any definition of terrorism. Moreover, few would argue that the terrorist actions discussed in this paper, the Madrid train bombings, fall into any gray area.

Cosmopolitanism

Scholars and policymakers generally agree that a state’s response to terrorism can fall into one of two categories, what Shimko labels the cosmopolitan response and the statist response. The cosmopolitan response conceptualizes terrorist attacks as criminal acts. An example would be the 1990 bombing of the Murray Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The U.S. government did not declare itself at war with Timothy McVeigh or the domestic

³ Keith L. Shimko, *International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 294.

organizations with which he was associated. It was viewed as a criminal act, not an act of war.⁴

The classification of terrorism as a criminal act then determines what the appropriate government response is under the cosmopolitan approach.

Because terrorist acts are criminal acts, they require an international and multilateral response within the context of international law and organizations.⁵ For example, after the September 11th attacks, Sienho Yee wrote, “in attempting to punish the perpetrators, we must always give judicial process a chance.”⁶ According to cosmopolitan theorists, the United States should have taken a leading role in working to strengthen international organizations such as the International Criminal Court. Through these organizations the United States and other willing countries can combat terrorism.⁷ Trust in international organizations and multilateralism are key components of the cosmopolitan response.

However, cosmopolitanism refers not only to responses to terrorist attacks that have occurred, but also includes action taken to prevent attacks in the future. James Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank, argues “the war [on terrorism] will not be won until we have come to grips with the problem of poverty and sources of discontent.”⁸ However, poverty is not seen as the only cause of terrorism. The best long-term solution to terrorism is a reform of international and domestic institutions that perpetuate the inequities and injustices that “sustain terrorist organizations by providing fertile breeding grounds of anger and discontent.”⁹ The building of and support for democracy is usually the reform recommended.¹⁰ And this reform must be peaceful. According to the cosmopolitan approach, attempts to combat terrorism with

⁴ Shimko, 300.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁶ Sienho Yee, “Pay Tribute to Reason and Think Long-term: Reflections on the 9-11 Tragedy,” in Keith Shimko, ed., *International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 312.

⁷ James Chace, “Avoiding Empire.” *National Interest* 69 Fall 2002: 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 301.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 302.

¹⁰ F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” *Foreign Affairs* 5 (2005): 1.

force will only make the problem worse.¹¹ Yee writes, “immediate bombing retaliation may only satisfy the yearning for justice; it will not solve any problem...it will leave behind a long-term spiral of hatred and violence.”¹²

The cosmopolitan strategy has its roots in liberal and Marxist theory. Liberals “have historically been more inclined to see international law and organizations as effective embodiments of shared values and interests.”¹³ Because the cosmopolitan approach relies primarily on international organizations to respond to terrorism, it is obvious that this theory derives extensively from liberalism. However, the cosmopolitan focus on poverty and inequality also relates to Marxist theory because social conflict is almost always rooted in economic conflict.

Graeme C.S. Steven and Rohan Gunaratna refer to this approach as the criminal justice model, which “prioritizes the preservation of democratic principles as being the fundamental premise in the fight against terror, even at the expense of reduced effectiveness of counterterrorist measures.”¹⁴ This model is based on the philosophical school of universalism, where one rule should apply to all without exception and liberty can never be traded for safety. Like the cosmopolitan approach, international organizations, cooperation, and reliance on the law are key in combating terrorism.

Statism

The statist response views terrorist attacks as acts of war.¹⁵ For example, after the September 11th attacks, Robert Kagan wrote, “let us make no mistake this time: We are at war

¹¹ Shimko, 302.

¹² Yee, 312.

¹³ Shimko, 302.

¹⁴ Graeme C.S. Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, *Counterterrorism* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC CLIO, 2004), 100-101.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 299.

now.”¹⁶ Terrorist attacks are not simply criminal acts; they are acts of war against a state and must be responded to as such. For example, according to George W. Bush, the “war on terrorism...is committed to find, stop, and defeat every terrorist group within global reach.”¹⁷

Those that advocate the statist approach assume that the most effective strategy for combating terrorism requires putting pressure on those states that actively support or passively tolerate terrorist organizations.¹⁸ States make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.¹⁹ Relying on international organizations to solve the problem is not a viable solution because international level organizations are not developed enough to combat a threat like terrorism.²⁰ As Joshua Muravchik explains, “international law is not self-enforcing, and serves as a barrier only insofar as states, usually meaning the United States, are willing to enforce it...since many do not live up to it, our success depends on our own power.”²¹ States cannot depend on international organizations to adequately combat terrorism; they must take direct action against the perpetrators.

The statist response does not necessarily overlook the root causes of terrorism. Rather, statist argue that it is too easy to simply blame poverty and lack of education as a cause of terrorism. For example, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a Pakistani terrorist who is most well known for the kidnapping and murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, was educated in English schools, including the London School of Economics before dropping out to become a jihadist.²² To statist, this example implies that “the lack of connection between poverty and

¹⁶ Robert Kagan, “We Must Fight This War,” in Keith Shimko, ed., *International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 310.

¹⁷ Cindy C. Combs, *Terrorism in the 21st Century*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 182.

¹⁸ Shimko, 299.

¹⁹ Joshua Muravchik, “The Bush Manifesto” *Commentary* 5 (2002): 1.

²⁰ Shimko, 302.

²¹ Muravchik.

²² Salim Mansur. “Democracy Exploited: Liberal Societies are Most Vulnerable to Threat.” *Calgary Sun* (Alberta). 20 July 2005: A15.

terrorism is striking with regards to September 11th...statists fear that the demand that we attack the root causes of terrorism is a self-righteous excuse or cover designed to allow people to avoid meaningful actions and hard choices.”²³ In the United States, this hard action came in the form of military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Clearly, this theory has its roots in realism. Realism focuses on conflicts among states, and international conflict is simply a specific manifestation or form of social conflict.²⁴ Terrorism is a form of social conflict, so beliefs that shape realism also shape the statist response to terrorism. Statists, like realists, believe that, “the unavoidable reality we need to come to terms with is...the lack of viable alternatives to states’ acting to defend themselves against threats.” So responses to terrorism must be crafted within the limitations of the existing state system.²⁵

Steven and Gunaratna call this approach the “war model,” which views terrorism as “an act of revolutionary warfare...the state must deploy its war-fighting capability in order to counter the problem effectively.”²⁶ Like the statist response, emphasis in this model is placed on the military. Unlike the criminal justice/cosmopolitan model, safety is a higher priority than liberty. This approach is based on utilitarianism, where “any actions or efforts are justified if they are in the interests of the “greater good” or serve the interests of the majority.”²⁷

However, although the statist/war and criminal justice/cosmopolitan approaches seem very different, they do share some common ground. For example, “those favoring a cosmopolitan strategy might admit that in certain instances, a state may have to use military

²³ Shimko, 305-6.

²⁴ Ibid., 299.

²⁵ Ibid., 308.

²⁶ Steven and Gunaratna, 101.

²⁷ Ibid.

force to deal with specific terrorist threats.”²⁸ They are also often intertwined in official policy. The military attack on Iraq is a statist approach; however, the rationale that implementing democracies will lessen the likelihood of terrorism follows cosmopolitan reasoning. The most successful approach combines elements of both strategies in the fight to combat terrorism and its spread.

Counterterrorism Instruments

Unlike Shimko, Paul Pillar does not divide counterterrorism into two distinct approaches. Instead, he identifies several elements of statecraft that should be used in developing a counterterrorism policy, although he admits that “each instrument has distinctive possibilities but also significant limitations.”²⁹ It is these instruments that can be combined to form a coherent policy. He describes diplomacy, criminal law, financial controls, military force, intelligence, and covert action.

Pillar considers diplomacy and intelligence to be the cornerstones of any counterterrorism action. Diplomacy is key because “the essence of diplomacy-articulating policy to foreign interlocutors, persuading them, and reaching understandings or agreements with them-clearly must be part of efforts that necessarily rely so heavily on engagements with foreign groups or states.”³⁰ No matter what combination of approaches, diplomacy has to be an important part of policy because counterterrorism methods often depend on either persuading foreign governments to curb the activity of terrorist groups or getting foreign governments to provide better protection of U.S. interests. This is also true for intelligence. Pillar argues that the intelligence aspect of counterterrorism is not always utilized to its full potential. He points out that “the huge amount of information that is potentially relevant to terrorist threats, and the difficulty of mustering the

²⁸ Shimko, 304.

²⁹ Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 73.

³⁰ Ibid.

analytic resources to exploit it all...means diversion of attention and resources in responding to many reported threats never materialize.”³¹ And this problem with intelligence gathering can lead to problems with the other instruments of counterterrorism.

Military force and covert action are examples of policies that can fail if they are subject to bad intelligence or diplomacy. Covert action used to dismantle terrorist infrastructure always depends on intelligence, which can be incomplete. For example, “a single untrustworthy individual who is either corrupt or sympathetic to the terrorists can blow a major counterterrorist operation.”³² Military force, on the other hand, can be even more prone to failure, and for this reason, Pillar does not advocate it as an effective counterterrorism policy: “terrorists most likely to threaten US interests present few suitable military targets,...the nonphysical effects of a military strike may serve some of the political and organizational purpose of terrorist leaders,...[and] the terrorists’ response to a retaliatory strike may be counter retaliation rather than good behavior.”³³ And of course, there is always the danger of world resentment at the use of unnecessary military force based on dubious intelligence.³⁴

Criminal law and financial controls are the best examples of action states can take against terrorists without involvement from other countries. However, there are limits to the role that financial controls can play in counterterrorism, precisely because it is an action that does not rely on other states: “most of the terrorist financial transactions that might matter take place outside the United States and do not involve institutions subject to US control.”³⁵ This is also the problem with criminal law. Foreign governments may not want to risk their intelligence connections by releasing information that could be used in court, which can make it difficult for

³¹ Pillar, 110, 115.

³² Ibid., 120.

³³ Ibid., 104-105.

³⁴ Ibid., 105.

³⁵ Ibid., 95

prosecutors to build a case.³⁶ So although these actions are the least likely to meet with resistance from the domestic population and other states, they are often the least effective.

Paul Wilkinson, like Pillar, recommends a combination of methods as the best way to fight terrorism, what he terms the “hard-line approach.” This approach is a combination of politics and diplomacy, the use of law enforcement and criminal justice systems, and the role of the military. Key elements of the policy include emphasis on intelligence, all institutions involved in combating terrorism firmly accountable to the government and electorate, no special status for convicted terrorists, no major concessions for terrorists, and frequent review of any special emergency government measures taken to combat terrorism.³⁷ According to Wilkinson, this approach enables a “liberal democratic state to combat terrorism effectively without undermining or seriously damaging the democratic process and the rule of law, while providing sufficient flexibility to cope with the whole range of threats.”³⁸ The hard-line approach combines elements from both the military and the criminal justice model to provide a viable option for counterterrorism policy.

Scholars advocate a number of approaches for democracies to fight terrorism. Most divide these approaches into two categories, one which views terrorism as an act of war and one that views terrorism as a criminal act. Other scholars suggest combining elements from each approach. In Spain’s case, Aznar and Zapatero made different choices in their approaches to fighting terrorism, and it is important to look at the factors that determined their choices.

³⁶ Pillar, 84

³⁷ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 94-95.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 94.

Chapter 3: Explaining 11-M

Radical Islamists consider Spain a target for a number of reasons. Before the Iraq War, past arrests of Jihad militants in Spain made revenge a motivating factor.³⁹ Secondly, Osama bin Laden refers to “the tragedy of al-Andalus” when speaking about Spain. He is referencing the Christian conquest of Moorish Spain in the fifteenth century and the collapse of the Islamic Spanish caliphate.⁴⁰ In October 2003, bin Laden promised “crusader Spain” repercussions for participation in the Afghan and Iraq wars.⁴¹ But the term “crusader,” besides referring to Spain’s current actions abroad, also refers to the Catholic monarchs who drove the Muslim population out of the country some 500 years ago after centuries of war.⁴² The network that executed the attacks referred to Spain as the “land of Tarek Ben Ziyad,” after the Arab leader who launched the Islamic conquest of the Iberian peninsula in 711.⁴³ Any land once in Muslim hands is considered fair game for global jihad.⁴⁴

Western states in general are also considered enemies of al Qaeda. Spain has a large number of antiterrorist operations compared to other European countries, troops in Afghanistan, and Madrid works with other governments in the European Union (EU) and the Middle East in antiterrorism efforts. Spain also continues to govern Ceuta and Melilla, two small enclaves on the Moroccan side of the Mediterranean.⁴⁵ However, it should be noted that the recapture of al-

³⁹ Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh. “Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28 (2005), 175.

⁴⁰ Anthony Celso, “The Tragedy of Al-Andalus: The Madrid Terror Attacks and the Islamization of Spanish Politics,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* Summer 2005, 87.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁴² Henry Srebrnik, “Peace in Our Time? Terrorism and appeasement in Spain,” *The Guardian* (Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island), 8 April 2004, A7.

⁴³ Jordán and Horsburgh, “Mapping,” 185.

⁴⁴ Scott Atran, “A Leaner, Meaner Jihad,” *The New York Times*, 16 March 2004, A27.

⁴⁵ Srebrnik, A7.

Andalus and Madrid's cooperation with other governments in antiterrorist activity are probably not the principle motivators of Jihadist activity.⁴⁶

Spain's support for the United States in Iraq is clearly one of the main reasons it is a target for al Qaeda. In December 2003, a document on the Internet entitled "Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Danger" was discovered, which outlined al Qaeda's global strategy. The Norwegian Defense Institute (FFI)'s Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer came across the document, but only skimmed it. After the Madrid bombings, they came back to take a more detailed look at it. The document was prepared by the Media Committee for the Victory of the Iraqi People (Mujahidin Services Centre), and Lia and Hegghammer speculate that this committee refers to a closed circle of al Qaeda followers. They base this assumption on several references within the book to key al Qaeda ideologists and media coordinators.⁴⁷

The author of the paper argues that to make the United States leave Iraq, the occupation would have to become as costly as possible so the United States would be forced to bear the costs alone. The document then analyzes three countries (Britain, Spain and Poland) in depth, with an aim to identifying the weakest link or the domino piece most likely to fall first. The author argues that each country will react differently to violent attacks against its forces because of domestic political factors, and concludes that Spain is the weakest link because "Aznar's position does not express the Spanish popular stance."⁴⁸ The author writes, "We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will

⁴⁶ Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh, "Spain and Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of the Threat and Response 1995-2005," *Mediterranean Politics* 2 (2006), 226.

⁴⁷ Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "FFI explains al-Qaeda document." Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), Norway, 19 March 2004, <http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/article.jhtml?articleID=71589>, "Authorship and Audience."

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, "Major Themes," and "References to Spain."

have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure...it is necessary to make the utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year.”⁴⁹

Lia and Hegghammer think it is likely that the perpetrators of the Spanish attacks were aware of the document. First, the document highlights Spain as a target and the Spanish elections as a convenient time for an attack. Second, the document makes the point that the Iraq War has not had a direct impact on life in Spain and a direct impact is necessary for the Spanish government to make a change. And third, a man on a videotape that appeared claiming responsibility for the attacks was named Abu Dujana al-Afghani, a name that appears on the second page of the document. For these reasons, Lia and Hegghammer conclude that it is very likely the document served as ideological inspiration and policy guidance for the attacks.⁵⁰

Post 11-M Terrorism Policy

In 1996, the Popular Party (PP), oriented towards the center right, came to power after thirteen years of leftist governments.⁵¹ It did not gain a full majority in Parliament so the full program of the PP could not be pushed through immediately. After the 2000 elections, however, the PP held an absolute parliamentary majority.⁵² President José María Aznar took advantage of the absolute majority to gain “nearly absolute control over his government.”⁵³

In 2003, Aznar closely allied himself with Bush’s “war on terror,” and Spain sent 1,300 troops to Iraq. In an open letter to the world in January 2003, Aznar stressed the importance of a close relationship with the United States and the threat that Iraq posed to the world. He also called on the United Nations Security Council to enforce its resolutions, because “The Iraqi

⁴⁹ Lia and Hegghammer, “References to Spain.”

⁵⁰ Ibid., “Relationship with Madrid Events.”

⁵¹ Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Joan Botella, *Democracy in Modern Spain*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 364.

⁵² Ibid., 370.

⁵³ Ibid., 392.

regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security.... We must remain united in insisting that his regime is disarmed.”⁵⁴ Although 85% of the Spanish population opposed the war in Iraq, the Spanish administration made the decision to back the United States.⁵⁵ The choice to go into Iraq with Britain and the United States without the backing of the UN represented a radical departure from Spain’s foreign policy over the past half-century.⁵⁶

March 11, 2004

Despite the widespread opposition to the Iraq War, the election scheduled for March 14, 2004 was expected to be a victory for the Popular Party; their main goal was to keep a majority government in Parliament.⁵⁷ One analyst explained, “Spaniards were eager to be seen taking the ethical line against the war, but in the privacy of the polling booth they were not going to risk the euros in their pocket.”⁵⁸ Unemployment was low and the GDP was strong.⁵⁹ The Popular Party had a strong lead over the Socialists’, about ten percentage points in the polls. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Socialist Party candidate for Prime Minister, was seen as being “soft” on terrorism.⁶⁰

And then came March 11, 2004. Between 7:37AM and 7:42AM ten bombs exploded on commuter trains traveling from the eastern suburbs of Madrid to the city center. Seven bombs went off on two trains nearing Atocha Station, killing nearly one hundred people. Two more

⁵⁴ José María Aznar, et al. “United We Stand,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 Jan 2003.

⁵⁵ Joanne Barkan, “Spain, Italy, Peace, and Terror,” *Dissent* 51 (2004), 35.

⁵⁶ Gunther, Montero, and Botella, 392.

⁵⁷ Raj S. Chari, “The 2004 Spanish Election: Catalyst for Change?” *West European Politics* 5 (2004), 959.

⁵⁸ John Carlin, “Review of the Year 2004: Terrorism: Madrid Bombings: The Day Spain’s Political Destiny was Derailed,” *The Independent (UK)*, 27 Dec 2004.

⁵⁹ Chari, 955.

⁶⁰ Isabel Vincent, “PM’s error: He blamed the wrong terrorists: Videotape found near mosque sealed government’s fate,” *National Post*, 15 March 2004, A1.

bombs went off in El Pozo and one in Santa Eugenia, two suburban stations. In less than fifteen minutes, 191 people died and more than fifteen hundred were injured.⁶¹

By 1:30PM, the Aznar government was publicly announcing that ETA, a Basque separatist group, was behind the attacks.⁶² Aznar instructed the Spanish delegation to the UN to introduce a resolution condemning ETA.⁶³ However, ETA sent a statement to various media outlets strongly denying involvement in the attacks, and police investigations began to turn up evidence linking the bombs to Islamic fundamentalists. The media began to spread the information that a man arrested in the case, Jamal Zougam, had been linked in the past to Islamic fundamentalism.⁶⁴

Because of the contrast between information in the media and information from the government, over three thousand protesters gathered in front of the government party's headquarters demanding "the truth before going to vote." Just before 8PM, police found a tape in a trash bin near one of Madrid's main mosques on which a man claiming to be Abu Dujana al-Afghani, the military spokesman for al Qaeda in Europe, stated, "We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the attacks in New York and Washington....It is a response to your collaboration with the criminal Bush and his allies." In the election the next day, a record 77.2 percent of eligible Spaniards voted, carrying the Spanish Socialist Workers Party to victory.⁶⁵

The Socialist Party increased its support from the previous election by almost 3 million votes, winning a total of 164 out of 350 seats. The Socialist Party was now in the position to

⁶¹ Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad*, (New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 293.

⁶² A more complete explanation of ETA and how its existence has affected Spanish government and policy is in Chapter 6.

⁶³ Vidino, 294.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 295-6.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 296.

form a minority government. It had a plurality, but not a majority of seats.⁶⁶ One smaller party, the Izquierda Union, lost four seats, suggesting the likelihood of many people engaging in strategic voting for the Socialist Party, because it was the only left-wing government that was a feasible alternative to the Popular Party.⁶⁷

Post 11-M Terrorism Policy

Once the Socialists were voted into office they had campaign promises to keep. The fight against Jihadist terrorism was moved to the top of the political agenda in counterterrorist policy.⁶⁸ New President Zapatero had pledged to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq, although he did indicate his willingness to continue participating in the United Nations effort in Afghanistan as part of his greater cooperation with the international community in counterterrorism policy.⁶⁹ Zapatero also identified cooperation with North African countries, specifically Morocco, as a high priority.⁷⁰

Once in office, Zapatero began to move forward on these promises. Spain's troops were moved out of Iraq. The government developed bilateral cooperation agreements regarding Islamic-oriented terrorism with Morocco and other North African countries.⁷¹ Spain has also formed bilateral police investigative teams with France (related to cooperation in fighting Basque terrorism) and pushed for stronger law enforcement, intelligence, and border control cooperation within the EU.⁷² Collective decisions made in the European Justice and Home Affairs Council, a

⁶⁶ Chari, 957.

⁶⁷ Ingrid Van Biezen, "Terrorism and Democratic Legitimacy: Conflicting Interpretations of the Spanish Elections," *Mediterranean Politics* 1 (2005), 102.

⁶⁸ Fernando Reinares, "Do Government and Citizens Agree on How to Combat International Terrorism?" Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 28 July 2006, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/1020.asp>, "Analysis."

⁶⁹ Celso, 98.

⁷⁰ Reinares, "Government," "International Cooperation and Europeanisation."

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Kristin Archick, coordinator. "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism," *CRS Report for Congress*, 24 July 2006, 35.

committee of the EU, were transposed into Spanish law, representing “a considerable Europeanization of Spain’s counterterrorism policy in general.”⁷³

The 11-M Parliamentary Commission identified several problems with terrorism policy that Spain needed to address. Cooperation among agencies was the first problem Zapatero worked to fix. Unlike the United States, Spain has two main national police forces, which are both under the control of the Interior Ministry. The National Police Corps is responsible for security in urban areas, national investigations, and immigration. The Civil Guard, which is more heavily armed, is in charge of rural areas, highways, border patrolling, and security at ports and airports. Both of these groups have antiterrorist units and intelligence bodies.⁷⁴ In April 2004, the government created the National Center for Intelligence Coordination to coordinate sharing of information and analysis among the Police, the Civil Guard, and the National Intelligence Center.⁷⁵ There was an overhaul of national databases to ensure quick, joint, and shared access for all security forces to such databases as national identity cards, weapons and explosives permits, passenger records, and fingerprints.⁷⁶

Lack of resources was the second problem Zapatero addressed. In May 2004 the government created the Executive Committee for the Unified Command of the State Security Forces, which is chaired by the Secretary of State for Security.⁷⁷ This body also developed a Counterterrorist Prevention and Protection Plan, which makes it possible to mobilize police and military resources in line with the estimated threat level.⁷⁸ The Interior Ministry also tripled to 450 the number of full-time antiterrorist operatives. Seventy Arabic translators have also been

⁷³ Reinares, “Government,” “International Cooperation and Europeanisation.”

⁷⁴ *CRS Report*, 35.

⁷⁵ Celso, 94.

⁷⁶ Reinares, “Government,” “Prevention and Protection Plans.”

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, “Boosting Intelligence Capabilities.”

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

hired.⁷⁹ The overall objective is to have close to 1,000 members of state security forces devoted to combating Jihadist terrorism by the end of Zapatero's term.⁸⁰

Finally, greater regulation of immigrants, Muslims, and prisons was put into place. The government took advantage of a dormant measure in the Law on Foreigners, allowing the state to expel foreign nationals who are considered to have participated in acts against national security.⁸¹ The Interior Minister, José Antonio Alonso, began the expedited expulsion of known Islamic militants.⁸² However, despite these expulsions, keeping an open dialogue with Muslim communities is a priority for the Interior Ministry, although they have outlined new initiatives for the registration of mosques and Islamic clerics.⁸³ The government has also taken steps to disperse jihadists among Spanish prisons to prevent them from working together or recruiting from within prison.⁸⁴

The protection of civil liberties, a hotly debated topic in the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, does not warrant much discussion in Spain because these issues have already been long debated in the context of the conflict with ETA.⁸⁵ Attorney General Cándido Conde-Pumpido explains that because of this history with ETA, “the counter terrorism fight at the international level is at the same stage as the fight against ETA twenty years ago: illegal detentions [and] torture, problems which no longer exist in Spain due to an antiterrorism approach based on respect for the rule of law.”⁸⁶ Many Spaniards are leery of “draconian”

⁷⁹ *CRS Report*, 34.

⁸⁰ Reinares, “Government,” “Boosting Intelligence Capabilities.”

⁸¹ “Setting an Example? Counter-Terrorism Measures in Spain.” *Human Rights Watch* 1 (2005).

⁸² Celso, 94.

⁸³ Reinares, “Government,” “Financing, Prisons, Muslims.”

⁸⁴ *CRS Report*, 35.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ “Setting an Example.”

security policies after the years of Franco's authoritarian rule.⁸⁷ So because of these factors, there is very little debate about civil liberties in Spain.

Conclusion

Although American citizens and the American government are considered the primary objectives for Islamic terrorists, Spain is also a target. Support for the war in Iraq seems to be the main reason it is a target, although revenge for the occupation of the Iberian peninsula and arrests of Islamic militants could also play a role. President Aznar acted with the United States to fight terrorism with the war in Iraq, but after the events of 11-M, when a new Socialist government was elected, Zapatero opted to move in a different direction. The factors that went into these policy choices will be detailed in the following chapters.

⁸⁷ *CRS Report*, 33.

Chapter 4: History

A country's history often affects its foreign policy. Spain's history has been described as "tumultuous and unpredictable," and for good reason.⁸⁸ Spaniards throughout the centuries have experienced Muslim rule, Christian reconquest and unification, global military and economic superpower status, brutal Napoleonic occupation, civil war, fascist dictatorship, parliamentary democracy, and domestic separatist movements like ETA.⁸⁹ Because of this rocky history and experience with many forms of government, Spain is a very young democracy compared to the United States and the rest of Western Europe.

Spain's first attempt at a democracy, the "First republic" in 1931, was far from consolidated or stable.⁹⁰ The government experienced political violence, extreme fragmentation and polarization of the party system, and the loyalty of the military was questionable.⁹¹ On July 18, 1936, General Francisco Franco proclaimed a Spanish Nationalist uprising, which doomed the Republic and plunged Spain into three years of civil war.⁹² Franco emerged as the victor and began four decades as the head of an authoritarian regime. The government during this period was nationalistic, religious, conservative, and antidemocratic.⁹³

After the death of Franco in 1975, Spain had a second chance at democracy. Franco's death and the collapse of his regime provided an opportunity to bring Spain back into the mainstream of European political life.⁹⁴ The advent of a new democracy was exciting to many Spaniards precisely because it was such a break from the past. Spain had previously been governed by an authoritarian regime, it lacked a tradition of stable, democratic government, and

⁸⁸ Norman Ho, "Spain No More? The Zapatero Administration and Declining Spanish Identity," *Harvard International Review*, 3 (2005): 28.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Gunther, Montero, and Botella, 30.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 30-32.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 33.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁹⁴ Paul Heywood, *The Government and Politics of Spain*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37.

it had a political culture alleged to be “characterized by many unusual aspects seemingly antithetical to democracy.”⁹⁵ Regardless of all of these potential problems, Franco’s death was followed by a “Cinderella-like transformation” from a dictatorship to a modern political democracy that also recognizes the right to regional self-rule.⁹⁶

Spain is officially considered a parliamentary monarchy. However, “such a straightforward designation obscures the fact that, through a combination of constitutional design and political practice, neither parliament nor the monarchy wield effective power in Spain’s democracy.”⁹⁷ Most of the political responsibility in Spain falls to the President because of three characteristics of the government: complete freedom of choice in the formation of the government; considerable incumbency insulation, with forcible removal from office possible only in very specific circumstances; and clear executive functions assigned by the Constitution specifically to the president.⁹⁸ Like the American government, a president who has his party as a majority in the Parliament has much more latitude than one who heads a minority or coalition government.⁹⁹ But the Spanish parliament is the weakest of any European country, following government in a “docile manner, unable to exercise its proper control functions,” because it usually consists of a majority or plurality of the president’s party.¹⁰⁰ Although the democracy of Spain is very stable, its tumultuous history has had three effects on its foreign policy: a tendency to support pacifism, a dislike and suspicion of America, and a desire for cooperation and alliance with Europe.

⁹⁵ Gunther, Montero, and Botella, 5.

⁹⁶ Omar G. Encarnación, “Managing Ethnic Conflict in Spain,” *Orbis* Winter 2003, 91.

⁹⁷ Heywood, *Government*, 83.

⁹⁸ The head of government in Spain is routinely referred to in the press and scholarly literature as the “Prime Minister,” but the Constitution of Spain very clearly refers to a “President of the Government” and “President of the Council of Ministers.” See Heywood, *Government*, 88 and 91.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

Pacifism

Many Spaniards still bear scars from the past that may explain their reluctance to a warlike approach to combating terrorism. William Chislett describes Spain as a “strongly pacifist society, probably because of the trauma of its 1936-39 Civil War, which is embedded in the collective memory.”¹⁰¹ During the War, Spain was besieged by Franco’s army and attacked by German and Italian planes. And because Madrid was loyal to the Spanish republic and not Franco, it suffered a long occupation in the postwar period.¹⁰²

The violence of the two World Wars is another factor. Molina emphasizes the violent history of Spain and the fact that Spaniards are familiar with destruction and violence.¹⁰³ Haizam Amirah Fernández, a scholar at the Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies in Madrid, agrees. He says that “We’ve had the World Wars in Europe, and [because of this] societies do not accept the use of force in the same way as American society does.”¹⁰⁴ Because of this pacifist mentality and reluctance to use force unless absolutely necessary, the troop withdrawal from Iraq was hugely popular.¹⁰⁵

National Review columnist Mark Steyn, on the other hand, is less sympathetic to the Spanish proclivity towards pacifism. He contrasts the decade of the 1970s for Americans and for Spaniards. For Americans, it was a time of “Charlie’s Angels and Jimmy Carter,” but in Spain, “the day before yesterday means dictatorship. The men and women who run Spain today grew up under Franco....For many Spaniards, the desire to reach an accommodation with the forces of history is natural-indeed, the default mode.” Because of a history of repression and violence,

¹⁰¹ William Chislett, “Anti-Americanism in Spain: The Weight of History,” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 11 July 2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/230.asp>, 16.

¹⁰² Molina, A13.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Haizam Amirah Fernandez, personal interview, 24 May 2006.

¹⁰⁵ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 16.

Steyn argues Spaniards have a natural tendency to “cast the great Continental fatalist shrug” and ignore the world’s dangers in hopes that they will be left alone.¹⁰⁶

Cooperation with Europe

Spaniards’ support for pacifism and reluctance to use force are not the only legacies of Franco’s rule. Spain has also been devoted to a role in the world community that emphasizes cooperation, not activism, and a dislike of collaboration with the United States.¹⁰⁷ In fact, the political culture in the post-Franco era is one that shuns political extremism from either the Right or the Left, and emphasizes political consensus and moderation.¹⁰⁸ During the first four years of the new democracy, a commitment to seeking membership in the European Community (EC) was virtually the sole foreign policy objective of the administration.¹⁰⁹ Every political party agreed that Spain should join as a means of ending the isolation caused by Franco and providing a framework for the restoration of political liberties and human rights.¹¹⁰ Membership within the EC was seen by the public as “Spain’s return to where it belongs historically, culturally, and geographically: the West European world.”¹¹¹

This commitment to the European Union continues to the present day. Molina describes the election results of March 14th as “reawak[ening] our desire, long repressed by the Aznar government, to stand with the international community,” meaning European countries, Spain’s traditional partners in foreign policy.¹¹² And Zapatero has done just this, moving back towards greater cooperation with Europe since his election. His goals for the EU are a united EU foreign policy, an EU constitution (Spain under Aznar, along with Poland, stymied the last effort), and

¹⁰⁶ Mark Steyn, “The Spanish Disposition,” *National Review*, 5 April 2004.

¹⁰⁷ Heywood, *Government*, 264.

¹⁰⁸ Omar G. Encarnación, “The Politics of Immigration: Why Spain is Different,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Fall 2004, 178.

¹⁰⁹ Heywood, *Government*, 262.

¹¹⁰ Carlos Closa and Paul Heywood, *Spain and the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 16.

¹¹¹ Heywood, *Government*, 270.

¹¹² Molina, A13.

repaired relations with France and Germany.¹¹³ A recent survey found that Spaniards are among the most eager for the EU to exercise stronger leadership in world affairs.¹¹⁴

A commitment to work within the United Nations is also a significant part of Spain's foreign policy. Spain supports the idea that the United Nations, like the European Union, should become significantly more powerful in world affairs. Chislett speculates that Spaniards prefer the consensus approach in world politics because "[consensus] was what was needed and successfully achieved to overcome the divisions of the Civil War after Franco died and restore democracy."¹¹⁵ Work within the EU and the United Nations are the cornerstones of Madrid's consensus approach.

Anti-Americanism

Not surprisingly, relations with the United States have not been as smooth as those with the EU or the United Nations. Chislett describes several reasons why Spaniards have looked upon the United States with dislike both prior to becoming a democracy and today. The first is the Spanish American War of 1898, when Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Although this seems like ancient history, this is the only war that Spain lost and it is known as the "disaster."¹¹⁶

America's historical lack of support for democratic values in Spain is another major reason many Spaniards resent the United States. Spaniards were angered by Washington's support of Franco after the 1936-39 Civil War, despite his authoritarian regime and America's supposed commitment to the institution of democracy.¹¹⁷ This anger was further exacerbated by the 1953 Pact of Madrid establishing U.S. bases in Spain, which "consolidated the dictatorship

¹¹³ Barkan, 35.

¹¹⁴ Chislett, "Anti-Americanism," 19.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 18.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 1.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 2.

and gave it a pervasive feeling of security...Spanish democrats felt abandoned.”¹¹⁸ And finally, there was very little support for Spain’s transition to democracy because President Ford was more interested in the status of American bases than aiding Spanish democrats in their cause.¹¹⁹

For all of these reasons, Spaniards have been reluctant to support any involvement with the United States. For example, after becoming a democracy, potential membership in NATO was highly unpopular since it was so closely associated with the United States.¹²⁰ Madrid’s conditions for joining NATO were that it would not have to join the integrated military structure, a ban on nuclear weapons in Spain, and a gradual reduction of the U.S. military presence in Spain. These conditions were necessary because overcoming the “Francoist” origin of the bilateral agreement about the bases would only be achieved by reducing the U.S. presence in Spain and not just by joining NATO.¹²¹

Spanish distrust of the United States has continued through the years. Chislett explains it is because of “major and irreconcilable differences over U.S. foreign policy...[and] also a belief among a majority of Spaniards that it is in the country’s best interests to keep a distance and have some leeway in its foreign policy.”¹²² Spaniards see a gap between the democratic values preached in America and what it practices abroad, namely in Latin America, Iraq, Israel and Palestine.¹²³ Maria Jimenez Buedo, a scholar at the Saint Louis University of Madrid, explains further, “we have a tradition of not aligning with the United States in general.”¹²⁴ Clearly, a reluctance to align with the United States in foreign policy has a long history in Spain.

¹¹⁸ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 6.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁰ Heywood, *Government*, 265.

¹²¹ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 9.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 17.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹²⁴ Maria Jimenez Buedo, personal interview, 22 May 2006.

Conclusion

Spain's history has conditioned its foreign policy, which is true in any country. Its violent history has made Spaniards reluctant to engage in wars elsewhere or to promote the use of force as a means of fighting terror. Its relative isolation from the rest of Europe during the Franco years has made most governments eager to forge a relationship with EU countries and to work within the organization. Madrid's relationship with the United States has also been tumultuous. The United States' support of Franco, its history of intervention in Latin America, and Spain's historic tendency to align with Europe are reasons the U.S. is an unlikely partner in foreign policy. When Aznar chose to align with the United States and move into Iraq, he was bucking Spain's historical traditions in foreign policy.

Chapter 5: From a “Dirty War” to Rule of Law: Spain and ETA

No discussion of terrorism in Spain can be complete without an analysis of ETA. ETA (translated to mean Basque Homeland and Freedom) was formed in 1959 and is committed to direct action against the Spanish government to gain an independent, socialist Basque Country.¹²⁵ ETA, despite its violent past and present actually started as a study group.¹²⁶ In July 1961, it became nationally known as an anti-Francoist underground group when it attempted to derail a train carrying Francoist veterans to a Civil War commemoration.¹²⁷ Franco fought this new threat to his regime by using members of the extreme right wing of his party to fight a “dirty war” against ETA, fighting terrorism with terrorism.¹²⁸

However, when the transition to democracy began after Franco’s death, ETA did not end its attack on the Spanish state. Paddy Woodworth identifies three reasons. First, the Basques were convinced that any compromise on full independence was tantamount to betrayal of their values. There was also very little democratic reform to the security forces of the state, as the Civil Guard and police continued violent, undisciplined, and indiscriminate repression in the Basque Country long after democracy had been established. And finally, the Basques were not given a choice, as they had expected, as to whether they wanted to be part of the consolidated Spanish state.¹²⁹

The actions of France did not help the new Spanish Socialist government in their fight against ETA. The Basque separatist group, for the reasons described above, did not temper any

¹²⁵ Jose A. Olmeda, “Fear or Falsehood? Framing the 3/11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Electoral Accountability,” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 5 May 2005.

<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/195.asp>, 7.

¹²⁶ Paddy Woodworth, *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 33.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

of its violent tactics; in fact, killings escalated.¹³⁰ Spanish government officials were disappointed by ETA's failure to offer them any sort of initial truce, and even more disappointed by France's policy of providing exile for ETA members as political refugees. In fact, France refused to fully accept that Spain had become a democracy.¹³¹ The deputy of the Spanish Socialist Interior Minister, Rafael Vera, explained, "there was no sign that the [the French] saw that the reforms which the Spanish people had approved were leading to a real, true democracy. There was much underlying distrust towards the [reform] process." Many French saw ETA as the "inheritor of a noble anti-fascist cause."¹³² France's refusal to provide assistance in the fight against ETA was galling to the Spanish government.

So a new "dirty war" began between the democratic government and ETA. In 1983, support for ETA in the Basque country was declining, as many of its members had opted for a deal with the government in exchange for amnesty. Hardliners who rejected the deal made a last ditch attempt for high profile status by kidnapping an army medical officer, unleashing fury in the military establishment and Spanish police.¹³³ Woodworth writes that this action revealed a "bitter historical irony: a desperate action by a group of terrorists in the process of dissolution provoked a democratic government to unleash its death squads. The barbarities committed by the death squads, in their turn, would legitimize the future actions of the remaining terrorist groups in the eyes of a new generation of its wavering supporters."¹³⁴ Spanish government officials unwittingly made the problem with ETA worse with the start of a dirty war.

The death squads eventually became an organization known as the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups (GAL). The GAL was a government-sponsored organization secretly funded

¹³⁰ Woodworth, *Dirty War*, 63.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 179.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

by the Socialist government's Ministry of Interior.¹³⁵ Investigations into it are still ongoing, but Woodworth speculates that its members were either mercenaries acting on the direction of the Spanish national police or civil guards reporting to their own commanders.¹³⁶ Either way, the group had two goals: to eliminate ETA, and to punish the French government for its unwillingness to cooperate with Madrid by bringing the fight against terrorism across the border into France.¹³⁷

The GAL officially declared war on ETA with a note in the pocket of a kidnap victim saying, "each murder by the terrorists will have the necessary reply, not a single victim will remain without a reply...we will [also] demonstrate our interests of attacking French interests in Europe."¹³⁸ So throughout the early 1980s, the GAL and ETA matched each other in committing atrocities. In total, the GAL killed 27 people, including innocent civilians.¹³⁹ The GAL finally ended its war in 1986 because of a commitment by France to collaborate with Madrid against ETA.¹⁴⁰ The Socialist Party obstructed investigations into the GAL for a long time afterwards until the leadership behind it was finally fully investigated and convicted for their actions in the late 1990s.¹⁴¹

ETA, which has claimed responsibility for over 800 victims in the total period of their fight against the democracy, declared a ceasefire in favor of negotiations in March 2006 for several reasons.¹⁴² First, violence by ETA and support for the group has progressively declined

¹³⁵ Encarnación, "Managing," 97.

¹³⁶ Paddy Woodworth, "Using terror against terrorists: the Spanish experience," in Sebastian Balfour, ed., *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 70.

¹³⁷ Woodworth, *Dirty War*, 82.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹³⁹ Encarnación, "Managing," 97.

¹⁴⁰ Woodworth, *Dirty War*, 171.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 416.

¹⁴² Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, "Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005), 265. The last ceasefire ETA declared was in 1998, and it was revoked fourteen months later in January 2000. See Encarnación, "Managing," 94.

since the end of the GAL action. It experienced an even larger decline in support after 11-M because of the climate of general outrage at any civilian killings.¹⁴³ It also suffered a major setback in October 2004 when French Police arrested many of its top leaders.¹⁴⁴ However, on September 22, 2006, frustrated that the government had not been more forthcoming in negotiations, ETA announced its members will "keep taking up arms." The Zapatero government has said that while it will negotiate for dissolution of the group, it will not make any concessions toward Basque independence. Consequently, violence by ETA is unlikely to stop anytime in the near future.¹⁴⁵

The Effects of Spain's Experience with ETA

Before drawing any conclusions about the significance of Spain's history with ETA, it is important to note that domestic terrorism like ETA is very different from Islamist terrorism. For example, while ETA has only limited and specifically defined goals, al Qaeda cells are worldwide and their various goals aim to change the world order. The two groups have completely different objectives, networks, targets, and outcomes.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, there is evidence that Spaniards differentiate between the two terrorist threats, especially after the March 11th attacks. Presently, at least seven out of ten Spaniards consider international terrorism a bigger threat to Spain.¹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the Spanish experience with ETA and the GAL has had numerous effects on how Spaniards view Islamist terrorism and the necessary response to fighting all forms of terrorism.

¹⁴³ Luis Moreno, "The Madrid Bombings in the Domestic and Regional Politics of Spain," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 16 (2005), 71.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁴⁵ Daniel Woolls, "ETA to 'keep taking up arms' in secession war," *The Independent* (London) 25 Sept 2006, 18.

¹⁴⁶ William J. Crotty, *Democratic development and political terrorism: the global perspective*, (New York: Northeastern Community Press, 2005), 358.

¹⁴⁷ Reinares, "Government," 1.

First, the Spanish population is not “new to the fears and destruction of terrorism” nor to the means necessary to fight them.¹⁴⁸ Woodworth says this is because “the Spanish/Basque government experience shows...that when democracies break their own best rules to fight terrorism, democracies always lose, and lose badly, in principle and in practice.”¹⁴⁹ Although March 11th was a horrible shock to all Spaniards, it was not quite like September 11th to Americans. The level of terrorism was unprecedented, as was the number killed, but the terrorist attack itself was not as surprising to many Spaniards. Fernández explains, “in the case of Spain we had our own home grown terrorism, which means that society gets used to a certain level of violence.”¹⁵⁰ Molina agrees, writing, “we have long known how fragile human life is and how easily disaster can be sowed in the places that seem safest.”¹⁵¹ This is not to discount the scale or shock of the terrorist attack; rather, it is to emphasize the fact that “where the jolt of destruction arrived fresh in New York, it had no novelty in Madrid.”¹⁵²

The second effect of Spain’s history with ETA was that Madrid already had a significant counterterrorist infrastructure in place, spanning from elite autonomous police forces to specialized judges with far-reaching capabilities.¹⁵³ The criminal justice system is already an important part of Spain’s counterterrorist approach, so large scale legislative reform was unnecessary. Terrorist crimes are included in the regular Criminal Code and special law enforcement and judicial powers to combat terrorism are incorporated into the Criminal Code of Procedure.¹⁵⁴ So unlike the United States, after the attack Spain did not have to massively

¹⁴⁸ Molina, A13.

¹⁴⁹ Woodworth, *Dirty War*, 12.

¹⁵⁰ Fernández, interview.

¹⁵¹ Molina, A13.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Crotty, 357.

¹⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch, 18.

reorganize homeland security institutions.¹⁵⁵ The struggle against ETA has provided Spain with a legislative system that is both efficient and accepted by society, so both the Spanish government and public did not consider major changes necessary.¹⁵⁶

Moreover, Spain is also already familiar with collaborating with foreign governments in search of terrorists. France and Spain have made a concerted effort to combine their forces and intelligence in an effort to disrupt potential violent attacks of ETA.¹⁵⁷ When the Parliamentary Commission on 11-M found that no foreign intelligence agency had provided anything more than generic warnings of a coming attack, the government increased its commitment to better coordination with other nations' intelligence agencies.¹⁵⁸

In addition, however, while Spain's history with domestic terrorism provided it with a strong counterterrorist infrastructure, it also dictated that that infrastructure be overwhelmingly focused on ETA, thus neglecting Islamic threats.¹⁵⁹ Most of Spain's intelligence assets had been directed at fighting ETA and neutralizing its political base.¹⁶⁰ Terrorism of radical Islamist groups was a "secondary concern."¹⁶¹

Spanish intelligence had actually penetrated part of the 11-M terrorist network, and there were police informants who had contacts with the terrorists. For example, officials have admitted that the police threw away wiretapping transcripts on March 11 terrorist suspects because they did not have enough Arabic translators.¹⁶² And surprisingly, one of the collaborators in the

¹⁵⁵ *CRS Report*, 32.

¹⁵⁶ Jordán and Horsburgh, "Analysis," 218.

¹⁵⁷ Meredith Moore, "End of Terrorism?" ETA and the Efforts for Peace," *Harvard International Review* 2 (2005), 12.

¹⁵⁸ Jordán and Horsburgh, "Analysis," 215, 219.

¹⁵⁹ Celso, 93.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹⁶¹ Jordán and Horsburgh, "Analysis," 214.

¹⁶² *CRS Report*, 34.

attack was an occasional source for the Civil Guard on narcotics-related issues.¹⁶³ So Spain had numerous warnings and links to an impending attack, but simply did not give them the priority they deserved.

Conclusion

Spain is unique in that it has been fighting terrorism since the inception of its democracy; it is not a new phenomenon. Therefore, while 11-M was still a catastrophic surprise, it cannot be fully compared to 9/11 for several reasons. First, Spanish citizens have been conditioned to terrorist attacks. Secondly, Spain already has a counterterrorist infrastructure in place, so reorganization of institutions and public debate were largely unnecessary in the aftermath. And finally, while Spain does have the resources to fight terror, it must now be careful not to underestimate the Islamic threat in favor of ETA. 11-M was a wake-up call to these realities.

¹⁶³ Jordán and Horsburgh, "Analysis," 215.

Chapter 6: Systemic Level Factors

The first main group of explanations for states' international behavior focuses on influences that are external to the state- systemic level factors. Any analysis of Spain's foreign policy must include an examination of Spain's place in the international system and how that place affects its options for foreign policy. There are three main schools of thought at this level of analysis: classical realism, structural realism, and neoliberalism.

Classic Realism

Realism, which can be traced back to the Greeks, is based on the assumption that states seek power.¹⁶⁴ Anarchy is the "primary metaphor" for the international system, and there is no central authority capable of creating and imposing order.¹⁶⁵ Classical realists emphasize the fearful nature of humankind, applied to states. Morgenthau writes that "human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed."¹⁶⁶ Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection best describes the international system, and peace can only be achieved through hegemony or balance of power.

Because states cannot rely on other states for security, they seek to maximize their own power and minimize dependence on others.¹⁶⁷ Interest is defined as power.¹⁶⁸ The only stability in the world comes from competition. Cooperation is rare, and when it does occur, it is temporary, inconsequential, and ultimately explained by conflict. International institutions are

¹⁶⁴ Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 7.

¹⁶⁵ Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 5.

¹⁶⁶ Morgenthau, Hans J and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2001), 4.

¹⁶⁷ Stein, 5.

¹⁶⁸ Morgenthau, 5.

irrelevant in the system, because “states do not cede any authority to them, and they are powerless to shape state behavior.”¹⁶⁹

Neorealism

Neorealism, or structural realism, a descendant of classical realism, focuses on the structure of the international system to explain the behavior of states, not the nature of humankind. A state’s place in the system makes it act in a certain way, and states with similar places will act similarly. Big states will act in one way, middle states will act another way, and small states in yet another.¹⁷⁰ Spain is a medium sized power in the world, so it is constrained by other states and their relative power.¹⁷¹ As with realism, states are unlikely to cooperate because of fears that cooperation would strengthen the other state.¹⁷² However, unlike realism, they are more concerned with their place in the system, not maximizing power. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power, and thus the goal the system encourages states to seek is security.¹⁷³

According to this line of reasoning, then, domestic politics, public opinion, and individuals do not really matter in the conduct of foreign policy; rather, states act to ensure survival and maintain their positions in the system.¹⁷⁴ However, neorealists disagree as to what type of international system is most stable. The preponderance school contends that stability is more likely if there is an imbalance of power, and one state dominates the system. The rationale behind this theory is that as long as there is one state much more powerful than the rest, no state

¹⁶⁹ Stein, 6.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 35.

¹⁷¹ Ciosa and Heywood, 215.

¹⁷² Keohane, “Realism,” 15.

¹⁷³ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 127.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

will challenge it because any challenger is likely to lose.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, those that support parity argue that an equal distribution of power among states creates stability and war is more likely to occur when there is only one dominant power. Stephen Walt provides the example of Churchill saying, “it would have been easy [to join with the most dominating power]...However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong powers...and thus defeated the Continental tyrant whoever he was.”¹⁷⁶

Churchill’s comment is an example of balancing. States will either balance or bandwagon when confronted with a threat. Balancing is when a state joins those “who cannot readily dominate their allies (allying against the threat), in order to avoid being dominated by those who can.”¹⁷⁷ On the weaker side, states are more appreciated and safer.¹⁷⁸ Bandwagoning is when a state allies with the stronger side, or with the threatening state.¹⁷⁹ Walt found that balancing is much more common than bandwagoning. The action states take depends on what kind of threat the dominate state poses; for example, states are more likely to bandwagon the farther away the threatening state is located in the world, because “the ability to project power declines with distance.”¹⁸⁰

Neoliberalism

Neoliberals argue that there are actually more instances of cooperation than conflict internationally, and they emphasize the importance of institutions. International regimes, organizations, and law create order and predictability in the actions of states because they establish a set of rules, and states are given incentives to follow these rules. The rules and the

¹⁷⁵ Steven L. Spiegel, et al., *World Politics in a New Era*, 3rd ed. (New York: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2004), 43.

¹⁷⁶ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 18.

¹⁷⁷ Walt, 18.

¹⁷⁸ Waltz, 127.

¹⁷⁹ Walt, 19.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 23.

states that follow them establish some order in the world. Joseph Nye explains “neoliberals look for islands of peace where institutions and stable expectations have developed.”¹⁸¹ In fact, neoliberals contend that the anarchy and violence of the international system can be overcome through institutions for international cooperation.¹⁸²

Robert Keohane argues that “intelligent and farsighted leaders understand that attainment of their objectives may depend on their commitment to the institutions that make cooperation possible.”¹⁸³ Neoliberals see states benefiting from working within the confines of international organizations. The future of the European Union will be an important test of these theories: if the trend towards European integration weakens or reverses, the neorealists will claim vindication. If progress toward integration continues, the neoliberals will view this as support for their views.¹⁸⁴

The Aznar Administration

The United States is so important in the international system that no Spanish government would want to position itself as an opponent of the U.S.¹⁸⁵ However, Spain has traditionally opted to follow a European consensus on international issues, not an American one. Therefore, when Aznar sided with the United States in the war in Iraq, he was “breaking the international consensus that had been established since the transition to democracy. It was a conscious decision to follow the hegemon, and thereby to raise the international presence of Spain.”¹⁸⁶ The

¹⁸¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction to Theory and History*, (Boston: HarperCollins, 1993), 39.

¹⁸² Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 246.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 259.

¹⁸⁴ David A. Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5.

¹⁸⁵ Monica Threlfall, Walter Oppenheimer, and Paul Heywood, “Open Forum-Spanish Politics after 11 March: a Chatham House debate,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 1 (2004), 46.

¹⁸⁶ Farrell, Mary. “Spain in the new European Union: in search of a new role and identity,” in Sebastian Balfour, ed., *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 219.

Aznar government wanted Spain to join the leading industrial economies and gain major political influence in the world.¹⁸⁷ Aznar believed that Spain would be taken more seriously within the EU if it had closer ties with the United States. He saw the war in Iraq and the close association with the United States as a means by which Spain might shift from being a middle power to becoming a major player within the EU, alongside the ‘big four’ of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain.¹⁸⁸

The move closer to the United States reflected changes in policy towards other areas of the world as well, not just Europe and Iraq. For example, one of the Popular Party’s first foreign policy steps was to suspend official cooperation with the Cuban government and more actively support the Miami-based opposition to Castro, in line with Washington policy. Aznar also prodded the EU to reduce high-level government visits to Cuba, reduce participation in cultural events, and to invite Cuban dissidents to celebrations at EU embassies as a sign of support for the regime’s opponents.¹⁸⁹

Although most overtly a case of bandwagoning, balancing also played a role in Aznar’s move to ally with America. Aznar hoped a closer alliance with America would allow Spain to act as a counterweight to the Franco-German dominance of Europe and a counterbalance the EU’s eastward enlargement, which would put Spain on the periphery of Europe.¹⁹⁰ There was a concern that “a Franco-German axis would become re-established as the dominant heart of Europe, pushing forward the ‘social Europe’ agenda as opposed to a more market-oriented...stance that was more consistent with what the Aznar government stood for.”¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 50.

¹⁸⁸ Closa and Heywood, 220.

¹⁸⁹ William Chislett, “Spain and the United States: So Close, Yet So Far,” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 25 Sept 2006, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/259.asp>, 19.

¹⁹⁰ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 10.

¹⁹¹ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 49.

Additionally, Spain would have more security along the southern flank of the Mediterranean, the weak point in Spain's defensive alliances.¹⁹²

Mary Farrell argues that tensions between Spain and the EU “go to the heart of Spain's search for identity in the new European Union.”¹⁹³ Aznar looked to the EU to provide greater material goods and political power to Spain, and because there were none immediately forthcoming, turned to the United States. Spain was seen as being neglected in the EU.¹⁹⁴ For example, at the Nice summit in 2000, Spain was allocated 27 votes in the Council of Ministers, whereas Germany, France, Italy and Britain were allocated 29. Then, in 2003, the European Convention sought to change the voting system to make it more in proportion with the population of countries, which represented a further “deterioration” of Spain's position within the EU.¹⁹⁵

Aznar also looked to the United States to help in the fight against both international terrorism and Basque terrorism. He was strongly committed to a more radical approach to fighting terrorism, and after September 11th, he took advantage of Bush's policy to find more legitimacy for his own approach. He wanted to convince Bush that international action had to be coordinated against all types of terrorism, from Islamic to ETA.¹⁹⁶ The September 11th attacks and Bush's response gave a major boost to the Aznar government's policy on anti-terrorism, which was much more hard-line than any Spanish government had taken before.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 10.

¹⁹³ Farrell, 216.

¹⁹⁴ Jaime Galobart, personal interview, 25 May 2006.

¹⁹⁵ Farrell, 222.

¹⁹⁶ Paddy Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course: Aznar's Legacy, Zapatero's Prospects,” *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2004, 13.

¹⁹⁷ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 49.

The Zapatero Administration

After 11-M, however, many Spaniards began to rethink the move away from the EU and towards the United States. After the elections in 2004 the incoming Spanish government declared its intention to move away from the United States and back to the ‘core of Europe,’ meaning France and Germany.¹⁹⁸ Molina explains that Spanish voters were punishing the Aznar government for “its contempt for the common spaces of international sovereignty...[the March 11 attacks] did reawaken our desire, long repressed by the Aznar government, to stand with the international community.”¹⁹⁹ Many scholars view France and Germany as the most important diplomatic partners for Spain, not Britain or the United States.²⁰⁰

Zapatero, unlike Aznar, sees security as a bigger priority than relative power in the EU. He views closer ties with the United States as more dangerous to Spain and sees the European Union as providing more opportunities for security, both economically and in terms of combating terrorism. France and Germany are Spain’s most important commercial and trading partners.²⁰¹ Spain also has political ties with France because of its cooperation in controlling Basque terrorism.²⁰² Because of these ties and the move towards developing a common terrorism policy, Madrid sees Europe as a better partner in providing security against international terrorism.

The Socialist party also broke with American policy on Cuba and Venezuela. The Socialists overturned the Popular Party’s pro-U.S. policy towards Cuba. They concluded that the previous policy was “going nowhere” and successfully led the EU’s efforts to restore normal diplomatic contacts with Cuba as of January 2005. Madrid contends that “Cuba’s future will be

¹⁹⁸ Robert Kagan, “Time to Save an Alliance,” *Washington Post*, 16 March 2004.

¹⁹⁹ Molina, A13.

²⁰⁰ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 52.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 53.

decided within the country and not in Miami...or in Washington.”²⁰³ The Socialists have also defied Washington on policy towards Venezuela with a 1.7 billion euro contract signed in November 2005 to sell unarmed transport and maritime surveillance aircraft and boats to Hugo Chávez.²⁰⁴ In response, Ken Volker, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, called Spain’s decision to sell military ships and aircraft to Venezuela, unarmed but able to be armed, “troubling.”²⁰⁵

However, their move closer to Europe notwithstanding, the Socialists continue to recognize the importance of America in the international system. Despite their differences over foreign policy, “Madrid has established a *modus vivendi* with the administration of George W. Bush and relations have improved substantially since the nadir in 2004.”²⁰⁶ For example, Spain has increased troops in Lebanon and Afghanistan. Zapatero explains, “We are in Afghanistan for the same reasons that we pulled out of Iraq, in order to defend peace, the United Nations, and international law.”²⁰⁷ And after the sale of ships to Chávez, Zapatero has now distanced himself from Venezuela, realizing it is not in the Spain’s best interests “to be associated too closely with the man who called Bush the devil...and who denounced the UN system as ‘worthless.’”²⁰⁸

The Mediterranean is another region that Spain, because of its close proximity, cannot afford to ignore. And here too, it has moved closer to the EU in terms of policy approach. The degree of priority afforded the Mediterranean by Spain has differed over time. Under General Francisco Franco, the government’s tendency toward the region, specifically Morocco and Algeria, was a “‘pendular policy’...when faced with difficult attitudes on the part of one

²⁰³ Chislett, “So Close,” 20.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 19.

²⁰⁵ Kurt Volker, “American and Spain: renewing a strategic partnership,” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 21 April 2006. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/959.asp>, para. 47.

²⁰⁶ Chislett, “So Close,” 14.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 17.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 19.

southern partner, to court the other to apply pressure for a return to more accommodating attitudes.”²⁰⁹ After Spain became a democracy, Madrid took a more evenhanded approach towards the region. However, the rise in immigration from Morocco means that the Mediterranean region must figure more prominently in foreign policy for Spanish governments.²¹⁰

Because most of the terrorist threat to Spain is coming from the Mediterranean region, it makes sense that Spain would concentrate on its alliances there rather than in the Middle East, as the United States has chosen to do. The content and rhetoric of the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism is clearly adapted to the European perspective, as opposed to the American approach. Embodying the cosmopolitan response to terrorism, the emphasis is on preventing, containing, and eradicating terrorism by focusing on police and legal action, not military action.²¹¹

In the Code of Conduct, the 25 EU, North African, and Middle East countries take a united stand against terrorism. They condemn it in all its forms, and state their determination to cooperate in accordance with UN resolutions, agreements and developments, the standards established by the International Financial Action Group, and standard bilateral cooperation procedures.²¹² This approach does not always mesh with the United States’ more statist approach to terrorism, which is quicker to use military force. According to the Code of Conduct, increased cooperation using multilateral forums and collective mechanisms that allow for the

²⁰⁹ Richard Gillespie, “Between ambition and insecurity: Spanish politics and the Mediterranean,” in Sebastian Balfour, ed., *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 200.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 202.

²¹¹ Reinares, Fernando. “The Mediterranean Region and International Terrorism: A New Framework for Cooperation?” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 11 January 2006, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/882.asp>, “Summary.”

²¹² *Ibid.*, “Cooperation on Security Issues?”

multilateral exchange of information is necessary because of the complexity and scale of global terrorism.²¹³

Conclusion

Spain's changes in foreign policy make sense using elements of both neoliberalism and neorealism. Aznar came to power before the September 11th attacks. With Spain not facing the threat of international terrorism and the state thus relatively secure, it made sense to try to increase Spain's relative power in the world. Aznar used both balancing and bandwagoning; he bandwagoned with the United States because it was obviously the global hegemon, but it was also a balancing move in an attempt to counter France and Germany's prominence in the EU.

After the 11-M attacks, however, it became clear that the security of the state was still at risk. Zapatero faced growing threats from Islamic terrorism and increasing immigration into Spain from countries in the Middle East. As a neoliberal, Zapatero saw greater cooperation with regional partners as the best way to ensure security against these threats. He is working more closely with both the EU and countries in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean region to better protect Spain. Aznar wanted to gain power for Spain to offset the EU; Zapatero, on the other hand, sees security as the greatest need, and cooperation with other countries as the best way to get it.

²¹³ Reinares, "Framework," "Conclusion."

Chapter 7: Interest Groups

Another factor all scholars identify as affecting foreign policy is interest groups. James Madison warned of the dangers of interest groups, or factions, in Federalist #10. He defined a faction as “a number of citizens...who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of citizens, or to the...interests of the community.” He saw these groups as selfish and bad for democracy, but recognized that their existence was inevitable.²¹⁴

David Truman, unlike Madison, sees competition between interests as having a positive effect on democracies. Interest groups provide a flexible, stabilizing element to the governmental process.²¹⁵ Truman also notes that “the vast multiplication of interests and organized groups in recent decades is not a peculiarly American phenomenon...this linkage we observe in industrialized societies the world over.”²¹⁶ Pluralist theory, derived from Truman’s work, holds that competition between groups is the sole process by which policy is formed. Under this theory, interest groups are an important part of a pluralist state in which “competition among interests, in and out of government, will produce policies roughly responsive to public desires, and no single set of interests will dominate.”²¹⁷

The first critique of the pluralist model is that although there is competition among interests, those groups with more resources will be more successful. Therefore, interests are still represented unevenly and unfairly, with elites having the most control in government.²¹⁸ This critique is best described by C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite*. According to Mills, the

²¹⁴ James Madison, “Federalist No. 10,” in Wootton, David, ed., *The essential Federalist and anti-Federalist papers*, (New York: Hackett Pub. Co., 2003),

²¹⁵ David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 519.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 502.

²¹⁷ Burdett A. Loomis and Allan J. Cigler, “Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics,” in Burdett Loomis and Allan Cigler, eds., *Interest Group Politics*, (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1998), 4.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

decisions that the power elite “make and fail to make carry more consequences for more people than has ever been the case in the world history of mankind.”²¹⁹ There is an upper class bias in the political system because while interest groups do compete among each other, there is only a small group that is consistently successful in getting their interests represented.²²⁰

The second critique, best described by Theodore Lowi, agrees with Mills that interests are represented unevenly. Government itself is supposed to provide a measure of protection against these interests and ensure that all groups get some rewards. In fact, though, it has become captive of the stronger interest groups, meaning that the rest receive only the appearance of rewards. Lowi sees this appearance of (but not actual) representation as a detriment to democracy. When politicians claim to be representing interests, but only provide token recognition of them, Lowi says their actions are at “the expense of genuine flexibility, at the expense of democratic forms, and ultimately at the expense of legitimacy.”²²¹ Government is no longer legitimate because it does not actually represent some interests; it only appears to. Basically, Lowi agrees with Madison that interest groups can be harmful to a democratic government.

Whether one sees them as a positive or negative influence, however, interest groups are generally understood to affect the policy making process by influencing electoral and domestic politics, participating in the policy making process, and lobbying government officials.²²² However, Lester Milbraith, in his study of group impact on foreign policy, concludes that interest group influence on foreign policy is slight.²²³ Most analysts agree with his conclusion

²¹⁹ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 28.

²²⁰ Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, *Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Policymaking*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978), 14.

²²¹ Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd ed, (New York: Norton, 1979), 62.

²²² Jerel A. Rosati, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy* 3rd edition, (Canada: Wadsworth, 2004), 444.

²²³ Lester Milbraith, “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 251.

for a couple of reasons. First, foreign policy tends to be concentrated in the executive branch, which is not easily accessible to interest groups. Second, foreign policy issues are usually not the primary concern of most citizens, making it more difficult to rally support for an international interest than a domestic interest, such as gun ownership or social security.²²⁴

Interest Groups in Spain

Milbraith's conclusions about the influence of interest groups on foreign policy apply in general to Spain. While interest groups may "sporadically influence specific policies, they [can] not alter the broad outlines of the government's...priorities."²²⁵ Casey also remarks on the lack of powerful interest groups in Spain because of "a combination of the weak economic conditions, the relatively recent democracy,...the lack of a volunteer tradition and free time, as well as the prominent role of the family."²²⁶ Although labor is a relatively important group in terms of associations with government and policy, its leaders are largely uninterested in foreign policy relating to terrorism, so I will not discuss it in this paper.²²⁷ Three groups that can occasionally affect foreign policy are the Catholic Church, ethnic minorities such as Moroccans and the large immigrant community, and the defense industry.

The Catholic Church has played an important role in Spanish history and has traditionally had a significant presence in Spanish government policy making.²²⁸ For example, the Aznar government restored obligatory religious instruction in all public and private secondary schools and increased state subsidies to the church.²²⁹ However, with the Socialist government now in

²²⁴ Barry B. Hughes, *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy*, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), 188.

²²⁵ Gunther, Montero, and Botella, 393.

²²⁶ John P. Casey, "Non-Government Organizations as Policy Actors: The Case of Immigration Policies in Spain," Doctoral Thesis. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, 1998. <http://blues.uab.es/mgp/papers/casey2.html>, 88.

²²⁷ Heywood, *Government*, 254.

²²⁸ Gunther, Montero, and Botella, 51.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 391.

power, church influence on government policies has waned. One prominent example of this waning influence is that the Socialists openly support gay marriage and allowing gays to adopt children, stances that are contrary to Catholic beliefs.²³⁰

Evidence of the Church's declining influence can also be seen in Spain's terrorism policy. Ruben Ruiz Rufino, a scholar at the Juan March Institute, a social science research institute in Madrid, gave the example of the church offering its services as an intermediary during government negotiations with ETA in the spring of 2006. The government declined to have the church participate at all. Rufino explains, "The government wants the process to be done at a political level, exclusively at a political level, with no external interference."²³¹ Instead of being regarded as a legitimate interest group, the church is viewed as "interference" by the Zapatero administration.

Although they currently lack much major power in government, ethnic groups are increasingly growing in importance. Immigration has changed the demographic profile of Spanish society. Many North Africans see Spain as an entry point for a better life in Europe, which means that for the past decade, Moroccans have been the largest group within Spain's foreign-born population.²³² They make up about a third of Spain's immigrant population.²³³ Although their presence is acknowledged by the government because of this dramatic increase, they so far lack the organization and the leadership to become a really significant lobbying force. Islamic charities and community groups, aided by Moroccan and Saudi capital, have created a "social buffer" between immigrants and the Spanish government that makes assimilation into

²³⁰ Galobart, interview.

²³¹ Ruben Ruiz Rufino, personal interview, 22 May 2006.

²³² Celso, 95.

²³³ Encarnación, "Politics," 171.

society less necessary.²³⁴ These groups do not have lobbying power in government because of the presence of charities and community groups they can turn to for assistance. Casey explains this is typical of ethnic groups in Spanish society, which are generally small, have few resources, almost no professional staff, and concentrate on maintaining political, cultural and social links with their countries of origin and on immediate settlement issues.²³⁵

It appears that as their political voice grows, it will focus more on international issues. Spanish Muslims seem to relate strongly with the global “*umma*” (brotherhood of the Muslims), so domestic issues like unemployment and education do not really energize them. By contrast, many immigrants had very strong feelings about Spain’s presence in the Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict-namely, that Spain should not have been involved in the Iraq War and needs to better support Palestine.²³⁶ However, these policy preferences did not have an impact on Aznar’s decision making, and they were in line with the general population’s policy preferences after Zapatero came to power.

As a result of immigrants’ growing numbers, the Socialist Party has made decentralization, diversity, and tolerance key priorities and seems predisposed to enhance minority groups’ rights.²³⁷ In fact, many scholars consider Spain’s Muslim integration model one of the most advanced in the EU.²³⁸ Zapatero has worked to reach out to recent immigrants by establishing consultation assemblies with Islamic community groups and legalizing the status of Spain’s working illegal immigrants.²³⁹ He has also added Islamic subjects to public schools in major cities with a significant Muslim presence (a right which once only belonged to the

²³⁴ Celso, 96.

²³⁵ Casey, 110.

²³⁶ Rajiv Mehrotra, “The Looming Shadow of the Crescent: Islam in Spain,” *Perspectives on Business and Economics* 23 (2005), 89.

²³⁷ Celso, 99.

²³⁸ Mehrotra, 90.

²³⁹ Celso, 99-100.

Catholics).²⁴⁰ So although they do not have an official lobbying presence in government, the sheer size of the group does have an impact on policy decisions.

In Spain, the defense industry has very little influence on government. While the U.S. spends \$500 billion a year for defense; Spain spends just \$10 billion a year. It is also small in comparison to the rest of the Europe, described by Cosidó as, “a middling power in the European Union.”²⁴¹ But even though Spain may not be strong in the global defense market, there is a growth in domestic demand, as sales have practically tripled in the last eight years.²⁴² However, the European Union is moving to integrate its defense systems to better compete with the United States. Spain has traditionally been one of the members that supported a common defense policy and an integration of systems.²⁴³ Because this common defense policy will ultimately hurt the domestic defense industry, this is a further indication that the industry does not have much strong lobbying power in the Spanish government. Jaime Galobart, a businessman in Madrid and native Spaniard, provided a good example of this lack of strength. He states that while Spain had numerous military contracts with the United States under Aznar, when Zapatero took power, these contracts were lost amidst little protest.²⁴⁴

Conclusion

Interest groups, while major factors in policy making in most democracies, so far do not have a very strong voice in Spanish foreign policy and did not play a role in Zapatero’s foreign policy decisions. The Catholic Church has been declining in influence over the years, especially with the more liberal Socialist administration in power. The defense industry also does not have

²⁴⁰ Mehrotra, 92.

²⁴¹ Ignacio Cosidó, “The Spanish Defence Industry in the Face of Sector Consolidation in Europe (ARI),” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 20 April 2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/725.asp>, “Conclusion.”

²⁴² Ibid., “Analysis.”

²⁴³ Ibid., “Conclusion.”

²⁴⁴ Galobart, interview.

a prominent voice in government, especially now that Spain has chosen to work with the EU on a common defense policy.

The one interest group that is growing in importance is the immigrant community and the Muslim population. Although they so far lack a very organized or unified voice in government, the sheer size of the immigrant group and increasing importance of integrating Muslims in society means that the government cannot neglect their interests. Therefore, one interest group that will probably increase its influence in Spanish government is the Muslim and immigrant group, and future foreign policy may reflect this change.

Chapter 8: Media

Media is another important factor that can influence foreign policy. Governments traditionally have a mixed relationship with the media. Bernard Cohen explains, “The official wants the press to serve his interpretation of the government’s interests...but the journalist generally believes that the national interest, whatever it may be, is best served by maximum disclosure.”²⁴⁵ There are three roles that most scholars characterize the media as playing: media as actor in the foreign policy process, media as accomplice with the government in foreign policy process, and media as both actor and accomplice.

The first school of thought portrays the press as a participant in the foreign policy process, or acting as a “fourth estate” in government. Nicholas Berry describes this view by writing, “sometimes the press is so vigorous-a few would say, so biased-that government officials complain that their foreign policy is being sabotaged.”²⁴⁶ Cohen is one scholar who follows this school of thought; he sees the press as a political actor with “tremendous” consequences.²⁴⁷ Martin Linksy, in a study of Washington policymakers, agrees with Cohen, concluding that the effect of the press is more substantial in foreign policy than in domestic policy.²⁴⁸

The best example of the media as actor in Spain is the reporting in the mid-90s by *El Mundo*. *El Mundo* became a prominent newspaper in Spain because it broke a number of major scandals involving the Socialist Party government.²⁴⁹ A study of *El Mundo* during the 1993 parliamentary campaign revealed that the paper took an “aggressively hostile” stance towards the

²⁴⁵ Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 266.

²⁴⁶ Nicholas O. Berry, *Foreign Policy and the Press*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), x.

²⁴⁷ Cohen, 268.

²⁴⁸ Martin Linksy, *Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), 224.

²⁴⁹ David C. Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, “Political clientelism and the media: southern Europe and Latin America in comparative perspective,” *Media, Culture, & Society* 24 (2002), 178.

former Socialist President and his government.²⁵⁰ The paper succeeded in making corruption in public office a major issue from 1993 to 1996, contributing to the Socialist party's electoral defeat in that year.²⁵¹ In this instance, journalists acted independently of government and influenced public opinion and electoral results because of their line of reporting.

The second school of thought in scholarly literature portrays the press as an accomplice of the government and, for the most part, as supportive of government policies. The government has the upper hand in the relationship, as "officials stage events, leak selective information, cover-up facts behind a wall of secrecy, overwhelm the press with a barrage of press releases, and yes, lie occasionally to the point that the press becomes putty in the hands of the president."²⁵² Because the press is largely forced to rely on government officials for information, reporters cannot become too critical of officials or their policy because they could lose their access to information. Other constraints on the press include lack of knowledge, patriotism, national security, and the pressure of deadlines.²⁵³

In Spain, the best example of the press as accomplice is that of the initial reports that ETA was behind the 11-M bombings. These reports were in line with the official government policy of blame and condemnation.²⁵⁴ Eventually, however, the press switched to an investigatory role, which leads to the third school of thought on the role of the press in foreign policy.

²⁵⁰ José Ramón Montero, Richard Gunther, and José Ignacio Wert, "The Media and Politics in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy," in Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, eds., *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*, (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 55.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Berry, x.

²⁵³ Tom Wicker, *On Press*, (New York: Viking, 1978), 19.

²⁵⁴ Teresa La Porte and Teresa Sádaba, "Mediated Terrorism in Comparative Perspective: Spanish Press Coverage of 9/11 vs. Coverage of Basque Terrorism," in Anandam P. Kavoori and Todd Fraley, eds., *Media, Terrorism, and Theory*, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 85.

Berry argues that the press is not strictly confined to its role as either actor or accomplice; rather he finds that the press's independent role in foreign policy is negligible and its manipulation by government is equally minimal.²⁵⁵ He says that in the early stages of foreign policy, manipulation of the press is not necessary; overall, policy is honestly and accurately reported. However, when the outcome of foreign policy is known and it is a failure, only then does reporting become negative. At this stage, reporters do not have to rely on government officials for information, they can rely on what foreigners say and do.²⁵⁶ Manipulation by officials domestically then occurs when "failure or the imminence of failure activates the damage-control apparatus of the executive branch."²⁵⁷

Patrick O'Heffernan agrees with this assessment that the media is not confined to one role as either actor or accomplice; rather, media and government have a mutually exploitive relationship. He finds that "both organizations [the foreign policy community and the media] promote their own version of reality around the world; the foreign policy apparatus does so to serve its own policy interests; the media do so because that is what they do."²⁵⁸ Whether the relationship is cooperative or competitive, both government and media are simultaneously working to serve their self-interest. In the case of the government, that self-interest is a foreign policy agenda; in the case of the media, that self-interest is accurate reporting.²⁵⁹

This third school of thought is most consistent with the Spanish role of the press in foreign policy. It is especially evident during coverage of the 11-M bombings, the initial

²⁵⁵ Berry, xii.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 140.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., xiii.

²⁵⁸ Patrick O'Heffernan, "A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy," in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, eds., *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 232-233.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 233.

blaming of ETA, and the findings that Islamic terrorism was responsible. The media played an important role in the change in administration, which led to the change in foreign policy.

Media in Spain

The media in Spain has traditionally played an interesting role in political discourse on terrorism. Under Franco, freedom of the press was nonexistent.²⁶⁰ The state viewed the media as a tool that “bored most Spaniards into passivity and acquiescence and deprived them of stimuli that might have triggered political mobilization.”²⁶¹ When ETA attacks first began, many people believed that terrorism was an “extreme and paroxysmal” reaction against the dictatorship and that once Franco fell, terrorism would vanish as well. So the press rallied around ETA in support of their fight (this was after 1966, when some freedom of the press was then permitted).²⁶² Only when it became obvious that the terrorist attacks would continue even under a democratic government, the press began to condemn the attackers and rally around the victims. The media “act[ed] in unison with the government’s position, crying out with one voice against terrorism.”²⁶³ However, over the years various members of the media have developed more specific stances on exactly how the government should approach terrorism.

Spain and Greece are the only two countries remaining in Western Europe in which the ruling party directly controls public broadcasting. So when there is a change in government, the management of the news division of public television changes as well. This means that the news, when necessary, can be mobilized to support the government politically.²⁶⁴ The rest of the media is dominated by two multimedia conglomerates, which have strong political alliances and are intense rivals in both the political and commercial world. Banks have ties to these

²⁶⁰ Montero, Gunther, and Wert, 30.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 38.

²⁶² La Porte and Sádaba, 75.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 78.

²⁶⁴ Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 180.

conglomerates as well, and Spanish journalists and media outlets often describe them as “major powers behind the scenes.”²⁶⁵

The first conglomerate is PRISA, with interests in *El País* (a daily newspaper with the largest circulation), SER radio, cable, and satellite television.²⁶⁶ PRISA is closely aligned with the Socialist Party, and the owner was close to former socialist President Felipe González. The second conglomerate is Telefónica de España, which includes the television company Antenna 3, the radio network Onda Zero, a satellite television platform, the newspaper *El Mundo* (partly owned by Telefónica), the newspaper *ABC*, and the Catholic Church’s radio network of COPE. Telefónica is closely aligned with the Popular Party.²⁶⁷

Because of these open ties to ruling parties, many people do not consider the news truly independent. A survey of Spanish journalists found that 69.3% disagreed with the statement “journalists are independent of political power.”²⁶⁸ Each conglomerate acts as an accomplice to its owning party, largely supporting that party’s policy line. The differences in partisanship are also manifested in readership. *El Mundo*’s readership gives far less electoral support to the Socialist Party than does the Spanish electorate as a whole.²⁶⁹ This finding is true among television and radio listeners as well; studies found that they chose stations compatible with their ideological preferences.²⁷⁰

Another consequence of the close ties between government parties and media conglomerates is that “governments can exercise pressure by enforcing the law selectively, and news media can do so by threatening selectively to expose wrongdoing.”²⁷¹ For example,

²⁶⁵ Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 178.

²⁶⁶ Olmeda, 22.

²⁶⁷ Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 178.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 182.

²⁶⁹ Montero, Gunther, and Wert, 55.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

²⁷¹ Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 187.

charges were brought against Jesús de Polanco, owner of PRISA, once the Socialists were out of power.²⁷² The ties between media and government also have an impact on politics. According to José Ramón Montero, Richard Gunther, and José Ignacio Wert, in their study on Spanish media, *El Mundo*'s attacks and "indiscriminately shrill and rancorous tone" during the 1993 elections, which contributed to the Socialist defeat, have given Spanish politics a "nastiness and an unsavory character" that had previously been lacking.²⁷³ In this case, the media conglomerate is an actor in government to its owning party's opposition. Because of this action, scholars in Spain are increasingly calling for "codified legal accountability" to match the power of the media. The media has so much power in Spain that some have argued that "the weakness of formal institutional checks on the executive means that the function of control has effectively been devolved to the media."²⁷⁴

Citizens are largely aware of the ties between media and government as well. Galobart describes the owner of *El Pais* as the "guy who runs the Socialist party."²⁷⁵ He sees this close connection between party and media as hurting the democratic process because the government has too much control over information. Fernández partially agrees, saying "it's true that, following the elections, there has been a polarization of political positions, and sometimes you see newspapers or radio stations that are openly aligned with certain political options or advisors to a certain political party."²⁷⁶ But he goes on to add that Spaniards have access to a wide variety of sources with differing viewpoints, leaving them free to decide their own opinion. Montero, Gunther, and Wert's findings are consistent with this point as well. They found that while partisan favoritism does exist, the preferences of one network are balanced by the contrary

²⁷² Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 187.

²⁷³ Montero, Gunther, and Wert, 55.

²⁷⁴ Heywood, *Government*, 78.

²⁷⁵ Galobart, interview.

²⁷⁶ Fernandez, interview.

orientations of another, so Spaniards have access to a wide and relatively balanced variety of viewpoints.²⁷⁷

However, globalization is beginning to undermine these close relationships between the parties and the media conglomerates. For example, Telefónica has entered global markets and begun to transform itself into a multinational corporation. There has been recent conflict between the owner of Telefónica, Juan Villalonga, and his allies in the Spanish government, and there is speculation that this conflict is because the globalization of the company has begun to threaten the Popular Party's control over the empire.²⁷⁸ So although there have been close ties between the parties and the conglomerates in the past, this closeness may not continue as globalization occurs.

Coverage of 11-M

Campaigning before elections is different in Spain than it is in the United States. There is a complete ban on advertising on all television networks, but public television and public radio networks allocate free airtime for all political parties to explain their stances.²⁷⁹ Parties are not allowed to campaign until the start of the official election campaign fifteen days before the vote.²⁸⁰ After the 11-M attacks, both parties agreed to cancel the last three days of campaigning that remained before the election.²⁸¹

The proximity of the election date and the focus on responsibility for the attacks led the media to take political postures, and each conglomerate defended a certain position.²⁸² At first, the media reacted as one and blamed the attacks on ETA, in line with the government's position.

²⁷⁷ Montero, Gunther, and Wert, 59.

²⁷⁸ Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 191.

²⁷⁹ Montero, Gunther, and Wert, 65-66.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 66.

²⁸¹ Olmeda, 19.

²⁸² La Porte and Sádaba, 85.

The three main newspaper headlines were “Massacre in Madrid: ETA Murders More than 130 People,” “Murder by ETA in Madrid,” and “Murderers: Profound Shock in Spain after the Savage Attacks by ETA in Madrid.”²⁸³

However, the unanimity in the media did not last. Some members of the media took the government’s side, whereas others accused it of lying and withholding information. Different members of the media played the role of either accomplice or actor. Narciso Michavila explains, “for some, the government manipulated information and hid from voters the evidence of an Islamist hand in the attacks, while promoting the idea that ETA was responsible; for others, news media critical of the government insisted from the night of March 11 that al Qaeda was responsible, based on inconclusive or fabricated evidence.”²⁸⁴

The break in consistent messages occurred because there was an alleged al Qaeda statement of responsibility to a London daily newspaper. Additionally, ETA was sending various messages of denial to media outlets.²⁸⁵ *Cadena Ser*, a radio station owned by PRISA (which also has the largest audience in Spain), began to broadcast rumors that were not consistent with the official government message of ETA responsibility late on the night of the 11th. José Olmeda stresses the immense importance *Cadena Ser* played, saying, “nobody can deny *Cadena Ser*’s role in promoting certain problem definitions and remedies and neglecting or derogating others at this critical juncture.”²⁸⁶ The “star” journalist of *Cadena Ser*, Iñaki Gabilondo, criticized Aznar and hinted that the Iraq war might have charged the Islamist terrorists to attack.²⁸⁷

²⁸³ La Porte and Sádaba, 85.

²⁸⁴ Narciso Michavila, “War, Terrorism, and Elections: Electoral Impact of the Islamist Terror Attacks on Madrid,” Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 6 April 2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/186.asp>, 3.4.

²⁸⁵ Vidino, 295.

²⁸⁶ Olmeda, 22.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

El País insinuated that “the government’s intervention in Iraq has caused the ire of Islamic terrorism to fall upon Madrid,” and questioned the government’s insistence on blaming ETA.²⁸⁸ The editorial continued, “one can only hope that there has not been a concealment of manipulation by the government.”²⁸⁹ On March 13th, as more evidence pointing to Islamic terrorism was found, *El País* said that the government position on ETA was “only a hypothesis, a rational deduction, not the result of direct clues.”²⁹⁰

ABC, on the other hand, continued to accept the government’s insistence that ETA was responsible. An editorial insisted that “the attack could be the result of the imposition of the most radical wing of ETA,” and that government strength was necessary “to keep in the vanguard of defeating terrorism.”²⁹¹ *El Mundo*, the other major conservative newspaper, was slightly more critical. Its editorial said that the BBC had spoken of the possibility of a joint venture between ETA and al Qaeda, but it was necessary to withhold judgment until a full investigation was complete.²⁹² On the third day, March 13th, *ABC* and *El Mundo* continued to caution that ETA was still possibly responsible, consistent with the government line.

Cadena Ser played the biggest role in the election. On the third day, the day before the elections, *Cadena Ser* began to broadcast that CNI (Spain’s intelligence service) was dedicating 99% of its resources to the Islamist terrorist hypothesis. A few hours later, it began to broadcast from the Popular Party headquarters that various web sites were calling for a demonstration outside of the headquarters to protest the lack of information given to the people. They also reported on flash mobs against the government spreading in different cities, and announced another demonstration planned at midnight. At 11:20PM, a journalist called for a Research

²⁸⁸ La Porte and Sádaba, 85.

²⁸⁹ Olmeda, 25.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 27.

²⁹¹ La Porte and Sádaba, 85.

²⁹² Olmeda, 25.

Commission to be set up if “it was confirmed that the government had manipulated, withheld and conditioned information about the terrorist attacks with the aim of avoiding a handicap or looking for an electoral victory.”²⁹³

Conclusion

In this case, the media played a key role in mobilizing public opinion, leading to the high turnout at the polls, the change in government, and ultimately, a change in foreign policy direction. If members of the media had not questioned the official government line, the truth about the attacks would probably not have come out before the elections and ETA would have continued to bear the blame. In fact, *Cadena Ser* played an important role in mobilizing protests against the Popular Party by broadcasting information about where and what time rallies were to be held. Both ETA and the terrorists responsible made use of the “media as actor” by providing information to the media, rather than the government, about responsibility for the attacks. For example, the TV station Telemadrid, not the police, was informed where the tape was located on which al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks.²⁹⁴ Media played a key role in the election, and therefore in the change in foreign policy direction as well.

²⁹³ Olmeda, 27.

²⁹⁴ Vidino, 296.

Chapter 9: Public Opinion

Public opinion is an important factor in policy making in every democracy. The theory of democracy assumes that citizens will make informed choices about government and elect those officials who will best represent their beliefs and interests. Following this logic, public opinion should be the controlling factor in policy making decisions by elected officials. V.O. Key writes that “unless mass views have some place in the shaping of policy, all the talk about democracy is nonsense.”²⁹⁵ Olmeda goes one step further, saying “politics in a democracy depend on public opinion; acting without heeding it is as irresponsible as pandering to it...it is crucial for a political leader to frame policies in such a way as to generate public support for them.”²⁹⁶ However, because mass views are rarely unified and coherent, the role public opinion plays in policy formation is more complicated than it at first seems.

Before I discuss how public opinion impacts foreign policy, it is important to note that most scholars distinguish between two types of public, elite and mass. Bernard Hennessey defines elites as people who have much greater interest, knowledge, and higher participation levels in politics than do ordinary citizens.²⁹⁷ Jerel Rosati distills this group down further by distinguishing between opinion leaders and the attentive public. Opinion leaders are members of society, such as journalists, professors, or business leaders, who hold positions that allow them to transmit their views to the public. These are people that “have great visibility in American society, and their views usually are considered more credible and legitimate by other members of society.”²⁹⁸ The attentive public are those people who are well informed about national and international affairs but whose views are not as widely known. As a group, the elites serve as a

²⁹⁵ V.O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, (New York: Knopf, 1961), 7.

²⁹⁶ Olmeda, 13.

²⁹⁷ Bernard Hennessey, *Public Opinion*, 5th edition, (California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1985), 34.

²⁹⁸ Rosati, 365.

link between the government and the mass public.²⁹⁹ The mass public includes most citizens, those who have little interest in or knowledge of national and international affairs. Their predominant attitude towards foreign affairs is indifference or passivity.³⁰⁰ Reaction, then, to a major event is often one based on emotion, not knowledge, because these citizens look to the opinion leaders to take their cues about politics.³⁰¹

Ole Holsti describes the liberal/realist debate of the importance of public opinion in policy formation, which can be traced far back in history. He writes that the “long liberal tradition, dating back at least to Jeremy Bentham...places public opinion at the center of legitimate and effective public policy.”³⁰² It is legitimate and effective because it holds leaders, who may have war-like tendencies, accountable to the public, who often do not have these tendencies. Unnecessary wars are less likely in democracies because the public acts as a check on its leaders. Realists, on the other hand, have a more pessimistic view of human nature. Realists see public opinion as a “barrier to any thoughtful and coherent foreign policy, hindering efforts to promote national interests that may transcend the moods and passions of the moment.”³⁰³ In this case leaders act as a check on the irrational impulses of the public.

Gabriel Almond takes a pessimistic view of mass public opinion, concluding that “a foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response.”³⁰⁴ But other than crises that demand the public’s attention, citizens are usually indifferent to foreign affairs. James Rosenau describes this passivity by most of the public as

²⁹⁹ Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 81.

³⁰⁰ James S. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Random House, 1961), 35.

³⁰¹ Holsti, 81.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁰⁴ Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1950), 53.

positive for the policy making process, because “the prevalence of the mass public’s passive mood introduces a factor of stability into the foreign policy-making process.”³⁰⁵ Because the public is not as interested in foreign policy, officials do not have to be as attentive to any sudden switches in “mood,” making policy more stable.

Almond and Walter Lippman agree with Rosenau that the public is largely indifferent, volatile, and uninformed, but disagree on how those characteristics affect foreign policy formation. Almond writes that the public’s fluctuations in mood create great difficulties for those who make foreign policy because the “cyclical fluctuations...stand in the way of policy stability.”³⁰⁶ Unlike Rosenau, Almond believes that the public’s mood swings undermine the stability of foreign policy. Lippmann agrees that public opinion poses a danger to foreign policy. He writes that “where mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the true functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to govern.”³⁰⁷ These two men believe that any influence of the public on policy making is to the detriment of foreign policy. Holsti sums up this position: “the essence of the case against public opinion is that effective diplomacy requires three important features, none of which is enhanced by a more active public participation: secrecy, speed, and flexibility.”³⁰⁸

However, some more recent scholars disagree with this analysis. After conducting extensive studies of opinion surveys in America from 1935 to 1990, Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page conclude that the public “holds a number of real, stable, and sensible opinions about public policy and that these opinions develop and change in a reasonable fashion,

³⁰⁵ Rosenau, 37.

³⁰⁶ Almond, 239.

³⁰⁷ Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), 15.

³⁰⁸ Holsti, 192.

responding to changing circumstances and new information.”³⁰⁹ According to them, then, the public should not be dismissed as passive or unknowledgeable; in fact, public opinion is a reliable indicator of the salience of policies. Shapiro and Page argue that the cure for problems in a democracy is “not in thwarting the public’s desires but in providing it with good political information and heeding its wishes.”³¹⁰

Whether good or bad, public opinion does affect policy in several different ways. Leslie Gelb argues that the security area of policy inevitably plays an important part in determining citizens’ overall impressions of how the president is doing his job. The mood that elites convey to the public affects public appraisals of the president.³¹¹ No president wants a low approval rating, so he must be somewhat responsive to the current public “mood” in formulating policy. Because of this, public opinion does affect foreign policy because it may tip the balance in favor of one policy or rule out another that may arouse strong public disapproval.³¹² Similarly, leaders also may use public opinion as leverage in bargaining with foreign governments by refusing to adopt positions that they claim could be potentially unpopular with the public.³¹³

How the public understands policy is an equally important component of public opinion. Theodore Roosevelt said, “I did not ‘divine’ what the people were going to think. I simply made up my mind what they ought to think and then did my best to get them to think it.”³¹⁴ Whether this is educating or manipulating the public depends on the information provided. Education is providing correct, helpful political information that “helps [the public] move towards policy

³⁰⁹ Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, *The Rational Public: Fifty Year of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 1.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

³¹¹ Rosati, 363.

³¹² Holsti, 203.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 202.

³¹⁴ Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy* 6th ed., (New York: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2003), 273.

preferences it would make it if were fully and completely informed.”³¹⁵ Manipulation is when “government officials or others mislead the public consciously and deliberately, by means of lies, falsehoods, deception, or concealment.”³¹⁶ The importance of education and manipulation is acknowledgement of the fact that public opinion does matter in policy making, for better or for worse. The public may not be well-informed or interested in foreign policy, but polls, approval ratings, and elections are still important indicators of the success of a president and his policy.

Public Opinion in Spain

Public opinion in Spain was not an important factor in the Aznar administration’s foreign policy making. One of the distinguishing features of Spanish political culture is an extremely low level of public interest in politics and public affairs, which is consistent with the general finding of the scholars discussed above.³¹⁷ Because of this traditionally low level of public interest, polls showing that up to 90% of Spaniards were against the war in Iraq did not prevent Aznar from sending troops into Iraq.³¹⁸

Moreover, Aznar did not try to convince the Spanish public, his cabinet ministers, or even his own party of the merits of his position that Spanish troops needed to be involved in Iraq.³¹⁹ Buedo, a scholar at the Saint Louis University of Madrid, described this lack of action as a very bold move by Aznar. She explains, “It [was] uncommon, and people reacted very badly. There was a complete lack of understanding as to why Aznar wanted to do that. Not only do we have a tradition of not aligning with the United States in general like that, but it was perceived as even weirder to align with Bush.”³²⁰ Aznar did not try to get the public to agree with his

³¹⁵ Shapiro and Page, 356.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Gunther, Montero, and Botella, 6.

³¹⁸ Olmeda, 13.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 12.

³²⁰ Buedo, interview.

position. In fact, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ana Palacio, admitted that the most crucial thing she learned from her experience in office was “how important and difficult it is to explain foreign policy to the public.”³²¹ As a consequence of its disregard of the public, the Aznar administration vastly underestimated the strength of the public opposition to its Iraq policy.³²²

One of the main questions for scholars is whether or not the terrorist attacks had a decisive impact on the elections; which, after all, are one of the best avenues for the expression of public opinion regarding all kinds of policy, domestic and foreign. Despite the lack of political interest in Spain, it is worth noting that participation in important elections, such as the national ones, is normally in the 70-80% range.³²³ Before the election, polls had the Popular Party in the lead over the Socialist Party by about ten percentage points. The results of the March 14 elections were unexpected; just a week earlier, Spanish voters were anticipating a Popular Party victory.³²⁴ Despite the disruption caused by the terrorist attacks, the final results of the election were still close. While many Spaniards expressed disapproval of the war in Iraq and the Spanish government’s support of it, they were more concerned with the economy and domestic issues. The Popular Party received 37.6% and the Socialists received 42.6%, a difference of five percentage points.³²⁵

Extensive studies and polls have been conducted on the question of whether or not the terrorist attacks impacted the election in Spain, and “all research confirms the suspicions of most Spaniards: the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, had a decisive impact on the elections held three days later. This impact, though relatively small, was a determining factor that changed the

³²¹ “Life after 3/11: FP’s Interview with Ana Palacio,” *Foreign Policy* 18 (2004).

³²² Olmeda, 13.

³²³ Michavila, “Spanish Electoral System and Voter Behavior.”

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, “Hypothesis on the Electoral Turnout.”

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, “Latent Change Hypothesis.”

final result.”³²⁶ Polls found that 1.7 million voters were motivated to vote by the attacks, a 4% increase in voter turnout that influenced an already-close election. Michavila explains, “the shock caused by the attacks activated a backlash against the position taken by the Spanish government in the war on Iraq, and this backlash activated a latent desire for change in the segment of voters who became the deciding factor in the election results.”³²⁷ The election in March is a decisive example of voters influencing policy-in this case, causing a switch in policy.

Another important factor that affected the vote was the management of information by the government. As noted above, while governments may not take public opinion directly into account when making policy, they must at least try to convince the public of the merits of their position whether by education or manipulation. Before 11-M, Aznar used neither education nor manipulation, and then after 11-M he tried manipulation. Shapiro and Page say that manipulation is harder than education because “the public is surprisingly resistant to being fooled-so long as competing elites provide at least some alternative voices.”³²⁸ The importance and impact of alternative voices was obvious after the terrorist attack. The media outlets provided the dissenting voice, leading much of the public to believe the government was deliberately manipulating them. Sixty-two percent of citizens in a post-election poll believed the government hid information for electoral reasons.³²⁹ While Michavila’s study found that this belief in manipulation did not have a verifiable effect on the elections, it did tend to reinforce the backlash against the government for its position in Iraq and motivate the desire for change.³³⁰

However, although there was a backlash, the results of the election reveal that many citizens, despite the belief that that government had manipulated information, still chose to

³²⁶ Michavila, “Conclusions.”

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Shapiro and Page, 382.

³²⁹ Michavila, “Dual New Manipulation Hypothesis.”

³³⁰ Ibid., “Conclusion.”

support the Popular Party. When a survey asked whether “the assault on 11-M” had impacted their vote, 69.3% said that this had not been the case.³³¹ Those who I interviewed in Spain held this position as well; not one person said the bombing changed what party he or she was planning on supporting. Interestingly, however, they all agreed that the events influenced the rest of the population. This is also consistent with the survey results; 85.8% of those surveyed said that the bombings affected the vote of the population.³³²

More voters turned out overall compared to previous elections, and they were the ones who had the decisive impact on the election.³³³ These were first-time voters, those who usually abstain, or voters who traditionally vote for other parties (Communists and Christian Democrats) but engaged in strategic voting for the Socialist Party so the Popular Party would be ousted from power.³³⁴ It seems that the bombings did not convince many people to switch votes from one party to another; instead, more people voted who either traditionally abstained or usually supported other parties. The key difference in this election seems to be that there was a larger increase in votes for the Socialist Party than the decline in votes for the Popular Party.

So Zapatero was voted into office and implemented the changes in terrorism policy described earlier. Whereas “Aznar wanted to lead public opinion in foreign policy, Zapatero believed he should follow it.”³³⁵ Fernando Reinares conducted a study to see if the Zapatero administration’s policies are in line with public opinion in Spain. He found that the decisions made by the Interior Ministry as a result of the 11-M attacks comport with a series of generic measures the Spanish public overwhelmingly supports.³³⁶ For example, enhancing international

³³¹ Van Biezen, 107.

³³² Ibid., 107.

³³³ Ibid., 105.

³³⁴ Chari, 960.

³³⁵ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 16.

³³⁶ Reinares, “Government,” “Conclusion.”

cooperation was defined as a priority for the administration, so the government began a considerable “Europeanization” of programs developed to combat international terrorism.³³⁷

These findings are in line with public opinion, as 97% of those surveyed in a recent study indicated they thought cooperation with the EU was key in counterterrorism policy.³³⁸ Public opinion seems to have been a decisive factor in determining terrorism policy in Spain under Zapatero, but not under Aznar.

Conclusion

The effects of public opinion can be seen as either a negative or a positive aspect of Spanish democracy. A scholar of Almond would see the election of March 14th as the perfect example of “the rare occasion when it does awaken from its slumber, the mass public, being no more informed than previously, is impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, unpredictable, capable of suddenly shifting direction or of going in several contradictory directions at the same time.”³³⁹ Using this logic, the terrorist attacks were the catalyst for the shift in policy, but this shift negatively impacted Spanish foreign policy.

However, this “sudden shift” in direction was not really so sudden. What was sudden was Aznar’s decision to align with Bush and go to war in Iraq; this was a major shift in foreign policy, a “contradictory direction” to traditional Spanish foreign policy and public opinion. While the terrorist attack certainly was an awakening for voters, as Michavila concluded, it was not an impulsive or unreasonable shift in direction for the Socialists to come to power. Rather, it was a return to the previous foreign policy that had worked successfully for the government in the past. Shapiro and Page would agree that the March 14th election was a good example of a “rational public” that responded to changing circumstances and new information.

³³⁷ Reinares, “Government,” “International Cooperation and Europeanisation.”

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Rosenau, 36.

Chapter 10: Personality: “*Crispacion to Nuevo Talante*”³⁴⁰

A leader’s personality is the final factor that can affect foreign policy. The “great man” theory of history sees individuals as a driving force in historical events; whereas an opposing view sees heroes and leaders as “merely individuals fortunate enough to be in the right place at the right time.”³⁴¹ In spite of the impact of media, public opinion, other states, and all the other factors that can go into policy making, decisions are often made by one individual. Leadership style varies among individuals, which can have policy implications. Therefore, the personality of key policy makers is always an important determinant of their decisions and, hence, a nation’s policy.³⁴² This is especially true when power is concentrated in the hands of a leader, when institutions are in conflict, or in times of great change or crisis.³⁴³

Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack argue that individuals have a profound effect on foreign policy for four reasons. First, individuals set the ultimate intentions of a state. For example, the German people and generals sought only a greater Germany, but Hitler wanted nothing less than all of Europe.³⁴⁴ Individuals can also be an important component of a state’s diplomatic influence and military power; states may tend toward alliances because of their place in the system, but only individuals can actually build alliances and create concrete threats. Third, individual leaders shape their state’s strategies; again, this often comes in the form of making or breaking alliances with other states. And finally, individuals affect how other states must react to a leader’s “idiosyncratic intentions and capabilities....At times the mere presence of

³⁴⁰ “Agitation” to a “New Mood”

³⁴¹ Spiegel, et al., 90.

³⁴² Joseph H. De Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*, (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), 165.

³⁴³ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” *International Security* 4 (2001), 109.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

charismatic, moronic, bellicose, or puissant figures alters how other international actors behave toward the state.”³⁴⁵

However, how an individual affects history is difficult to study because “their influence does not lend itself to the generalizations that political scientists seek. Simply put, individuals are too individualistic.”³⁴⁶ Consequently, most scholars who emphasize individual level factors in foreign policy have concentrated on decision making and general studies about the effects of personality on foreign policy are harder to locate. Yet there has been more scholarship on this subject in recent years.

Different scholars identify different factors as important in policy making. Joseph de Rivera identifies a leader’s decisiveness, assertiveness, personal view of the national interest, his own personal interests, and personal style of decision making as factors that go into individual policymaking.³⁴⁷ James David Barber describes three components of personality that shape decision making: style, worldview, and character. These traits interact with the power situation he faces and the national climate of expectations at the time a president serves. Barber argues that there are four varieties of presidential character, and that the most important thing to know about a president is where he fits in among these types.³⁴⁸ This is the most well-known of personality categorization schemes.

The first of Barber’s personality types is active-positive, which describes a man with relatively high self-esteem and relative success in relating to his environment. He emphasizes intelligence and action. The second type is active-negative, someone who is striving upward and seeking power. However, life is a hard struggle to achieve and hold power, because it is

³⁴⁵ Byman and Pollack, 135.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 108.

³⁴⁷ De Rivera, 165.

³⁴⁸ James David Barber, *The Presidential Character*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), 4.

“hampered by the condemnations of the perfectionist conscience.”³⁴⁹ The third type is passive-positive, a person who is “a receptive, compliant, other-directed character whose life is a search for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative rather than personally assertive.”³⁵⁰ And finally, passive-negative, one who is in politics because he thinks he ought to be. The personal tendency is to withdraw and escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics.³⁵¹

In addition to being the best known of the various personality typologies, however, Barber’s theory is also one of the most criticized. Scholars have argued that Barber’s typology is too simplistic, that there is confusion about the meaning of the positive-negative dimension, and that there is an unclear relationship to established personality theories.³⁵² Specifically, critics question whether the four character types correspond with observable differences in personality and behavior.³⁵³

As an alternative to Barber’s typology, Michael Lyons advocates the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI rates people on four scales: introversion vs. extroversion, sensing vs. intuition, thinking vs. feeling, and judging vs. perceiving.³⁵⁴ However, like Barber’s approach, this one has also met with criticism. Specifically, some see the MBTI as a personality theory, not a “descriptive typology.”³⁵⁵

Many analysts believe the personalities of Aznar and Zapatero affected the conduct of Spain’s foreign policy. To take Barber’s approach or use the MBTI typology would require access to extensive information and background on the characters on both men. Some of this information is not available because of the short amount of time since both men have been in

³⁴⁹ Barber, 9.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 10.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Michael Lyons, “Presidential Character Revisited,” *Political Psychology* 4 (1997), 793.

³⁵³ Ibid., 795.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 794.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 795.

power and the fact that I am not fluent in Spanish. Consequently, I will use two of the three components of personality that Barber contends shape decision-making, style and worldview, and examine how they have affected Spain's foreign policy under both Aznar and Zapatero. The evidence shows that personality was a decisive factor in both Aznar's original decision to change foreign policy and Zapatero's move back to Spain's traditional foreign policy positions.

José María Aznar

Aznar was born in Madrid on February 25, 1953. His grandfather was a prominent journalist during the Franco era. Aznar joined the People's Alliance (AP) in January 1979, and became the Secretary General of the party in La Rioja until 1980. In February 1981 he joined the AP's national executive committee. He became assistant Secretary General in February 1982, and then, on October 26, 1982, he was elected to the Parliament, representing Ávila. On June 22, 1985, he was elected to the presidency of the AP in Castile-Leon. On June 10, 1987, having resigned his parliamentary seat, he was elected to the Cortes of Castile-León, where he was elected president of this Autonomous Region. Two years later, Aznar was voted by the National Executive Committee to be the new leader of his party, re-established as the Popular Party. On April 19, 1995, only his armored car prevented him from being assassinated by an ETA bomb. In 1996 he won the general election and became president, ending thirteen years of Socialist Party rule. He then served as president until 2004.³⁵⁶

Style

Every description of Aznar's policy making style is somewhat similar. His leadership style was aloof and opposed to close consultations with advisors.³⁵⁷ Heywood describes him as

³⁵⁶ Woodworth, "Spain Changes Course," 9-10.

³⁵⁷ Olmeda, 14.

confrontational.³⁵⁸ Oppenheimer writes that he had “the aggressive style of doing politics.”³⁵⁹ More flatteringly, *Time* magazine described Aznar as a “macho [man] with killer political instincts.”³⁶⁰

Aznar himself admits that he is not a consensus ruler. In his autobiography, he explains, there are two limits to consensus: “you don’t delegate your own responsibilities to the members of the consensus....And second, reaching consensus can never become the sole objective of political action.”³⁶¹ Instead, Aznar believes that strong leadership is necessary to be an effective president. He claims that there was not a single important government matter that he did not head.³⁶² He says that one of the problems of modern leadership is “when governments allow opinion polls and the interests of short-term popularity to influence policy more than their own political responsibility.”³⁶³ This authoritative style is evident in the decisions of his administration.

Aznar’s style is illustrated by the government’s handling of the *Prestige* oil tanker disaster in 2002, when a leaking oil tanker was ordered to leave the coast. Aznar was accused by many of doing little to avoid the disaster off the Galician coast, of hiding data about the magnitude of the disaster from the public, and of doing very little to clean up the unprecedented environmental disaster that followed.³⁶⁴ It took him a month and a day to visit the site of the accident; this tardiness also contributed to the angry response from the public.³⁶⁵ There was very

³⁵⁸ Heywood, *Government*, 392.

³⁵⁹ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 45.

³⁶⁰ James Graff, “The Zen of Zapatero,” *Time Europe*, 27 Sept. 2004

³⁶¹ José María Aznar, *Eight Years as Prime Minister: A Personal Vision of Spain 1996-2004*, Trans. Lisa Dillman, (Barcelona: Planeta, 2005), 84.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, 39.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 38.

³⁶⁴ Chari, 954.

³⁶⁵ Olmeda, 12.

little transparency in his administration in terms of decision making in response to the *Prestige* crisis.

Aznar's abrupt leadership style was also evident during the government project for labor market reform in 2002. He failed to gain consensus with the socialist and post-communist unions about the reforms. This failure led to a general strike by labor unions on June 20, 2002, and marked the end of peaceful industrial relations between the government and labor. There were numerous street protests, strikes, and marches in 2002 to protest Aznar's unilateral decision making on labor market reform.³⁶⁶

Aznar's leadership style was key in the decision to go to war in Iraq. Aznar explains that despite opposition from the public, he pressed forward in Iraq because Spain's position in the world was "stronger and more central" than it had been in the past, and Saddam Hussein's regime did not meet UN resolutions.³⁶⁷ Moreover, at the time of the invasion Aznar did not adequately sell his position to the public. In keeping with his leadership style, he ignored repeated requests from all of the other parliamentary parties to defend this party stance in Parliament.³⁶⁸ Buedo says, "People think that it was a political mistake, and it was because of his own personality and his particular ideas, and maybe he wanted to show his will."³⁶⁹

Although he had his justification for supporting the war, unlike Tony Blair or George Bush, he did not launch a campaign to garner public support for it.

After the 11-M attacks, Aznar faced renewed opposition to his policies and demonstrated his authoritarian style yet again. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Aznar did not summon either the Delegate Commission of the Government for Crisis Situations or the

³⁶⁶ Olmeda, 15.

³⁶⁷ Aznar, 125-6.

³⁶⁸ Heywood, *Government*, 392.

³⁶⁹ Buedo, interview.

Delegate Commission of the Government for Intelligence, although they would be natural options, if not requirements, for consultation.³⁷⁰ The public was angry as well, because Aznar “had over the years used the ‘Trust me’ bid, and was suddenly seen to have been unmasked.”³⁷¹ Like the *Prestige* disaster, there was very little transparency in the administration after 11-M.

Aznar also had an intense personal ambition that played a role in his style of policy making. He wanted to bring Spain into the Group of Eight (G8). When Spain was invited to the 2002 G8 summit in Canada, “a radiant Aznar was photographed with his feet up on the table smoking a cigar with George W. Bush...as if Aznar had reached his zenith.”³⁷² Heywood says that Aznar was deeply committed to Spain having a larger presence in world decision making: “if he could behave as if Spain was a major political player, then people would perhaps come to believe that it was.”³⁷³ In a speech explaining his support for the Iraq war, Aznar himself said that in order to place Spain among the most important countries in the world, Spain must assume its responsibilities when the world is threatened and do so with “courage, determination, and leadership.”³⁷⁴

The close personal relationship between Bush and Aznar also played a role in Aznar’s development of policy. They had a good personal relationship, based upon a political sympathy for common ideas and a similar projection of how the war on terrorism could be handled.³⁷⁵ Aznar explained later that he shared Bush’s view that a country needs a strong leader and a leadership based on rock-solid principles and values.³⁷⁶ However, this close relationship had its downside: “when he visited Mexico to try to get President Vincente Fox on board [with the Iraq

³⁷⁰ Olmeda, 18.

³⁷¹ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 43.

³⁷² Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 13.

³⁷³ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 50.

³⁷⁴ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 14.

³⁷⁵ Rufino, interview.

³⁷⁶ Aznar, 128.

War] he was widely viewed in Spain as a ‘poodle’ of Washington.”³⁷⁷ So although Aznar was proud of the close relationship he shared with Bush, it sometimes hurt his image.

Worldview

Aznar saw ETA and Islamic terrorism as the greatest threats to Spain and the world. Although he says that the attempt on his life by ETA did not change any of his views on how the war on terror should be fought,³⁷⁸ most scholars believe that it led to his tough stance and commitment to fighting terrorism.³⁷⁹ However, Aznar does admit that he feels a “special responsibility to the victims of terror....The moral basis [of my stance against terror] is directly related to the obligation I feel towards the victims of terror.”³⁸⁰ Aznar viewed a close alliance with the United States as the best way of combating terrorism, especially after September 11th. He was strongly committed to the notion that much more had to be done by the world community in a much more radical way to fight terrorism.³⁸¹

Aznar also had very definite opinions about Spain’s place in both Europe and the world that played a role in shaping his foreign policy. He started to develop a more “Atlanticist” position in order to protect Spain in the face of potentially threatening developments within the EU; namely, he worried that Spain would be left out of major decision making.³⁸² Furthermore, Aznar believed that Spain should not confine itself to a position in the EU; rather, it should look beyond the EU to world leadership. He explains this position further in his memoir, saying he is completely convinced Spain is one of the great nations of Europe and the world, but “like all great nations, it has great responsibilities and an important leadership role....Spaniards have to

³⁷⁷ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 13.

³⁷⁸ Aznar, 169.

³⁷⁹ Paul Heywood, “Desperately Seeking Influence: Spain and the War In Iraq,” *European Political Science* 1 (2003), 36.

³⁸⁰ Aznar, 170.

³⁸¹ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 49.

³⁸² *Ibid.*

start looking at the past without an inferiority complex.”³⁸³ Aznar’s worldview of a greater Spain played a major part in his alliances and decision making in foreign policy.

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero

Zapatero was born in Valladolid on August 4, 1960. His grandfather was a captain in the Republican Army (fighting against Franco) during the Civil War and was killed in combat. His father was a lawyer and his mother was a doctor. Like Aznar, Zapatero was actively involved in politics at an early age. He joined the Socialist Party in 1978. After becoming a lawyer, he taught constitutional law at Leon University from 1982-1986, was elected to Parliament in 1988, became secretary-general of the Leon Region branch, and then was elected national leader of the Socialist Party in 2000.³⁸⁴

Style

While the word most frequently used to describe Aznar is arrogant, the word “consensus” is used most often in describing Zapatero’s policy making style. One of the major differences in Spain after the 2004 election is that the years of anger and the tense political atmosphere caused by the disagreements between the two parties, the “*crispación*,” are over.³⁸⁵ Oppenheimer says that Zapatero can take credit for this because of his consensus approach to foreign policy that fits with traditional Spanish policy:³⁸⁶ the “*nuevo talante*” in Spanish politics.³⁸⁷ Zapatero’s “best virtue is probably his character: he is calm, unruffled, he likes to talk things through....He strives to reach political agreement even in the ‘hot’ debates.”³⁸⁸ In fact, this commitment was one of his

³⁸³ Aznar, 78.

³⁸⁴ Michael Radu, “The Fall of Spain?” and “Spain’s Socialist Surrender,” *Dilemmas of Democracy and Dictatorship*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 162.

³⁸⁵ “*Crispación*” means “Agitation.” Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 49.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ “*Nuevo talante*” means “new mood” or “new talant.” Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course,” 24.

³⁸⁸ Threlfall, Oppenheimer, and Heywood, 45.

campaign promises-working with other parties, including regionalist ones, to establish more consensus in policy development.³⁸⁹

However, like Aznar's style, Zapatero's has also met with some criticism. Jaime Galobart says that his willingness to reach out to the Basque political parties indicates that he is weak on terrorism, because he refuses to take a hard line against negotiations.³⁹⁰ Zapatero is also criticized for his increased cooperation with the EU. Norman Ho argues he is willing "to sacrifice Spanish national interests to please Old Europe."³⁹¹ Critics charge that his willingness to reach consensus sometimes comes at the expense of Spain's national interests.

Zapatero also places much more of an emphasis on public opinion than did Aznar. He says that "a modern democracy should be very sensitive to public opinion. That's what I call 'citizen's socialism'-I accept that when an overwhelming majority of citizens says something, they are right."³⁹² It was this response to public opinion that led him to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq and move away from the United States in foreign policy. Zapatero adds that the essence of his policy is citizens counting for more and having more rights, because democratic power is the only voice most citizens have: "I don't want to be a great leader; I want to be a good democrat."³⁹³ Unlike Aznar, who believed that presidents should lead public opinion, Zapatero believes presidents should follow it.

Another example of his consensus style is his work with the Basque and Catalan regional parties. These are areas of Spain that had traditionally been ostracized by the Popular Party.³⁹⁴ His "soft words" for the nationalists won him support from their party representatives

³⁸⁹ Chari, 956.

³⁹⁰ Galobart, interview.

³⁹¹ Ho, 12.

³⁹² "I Don't Want to Be A Great Leader," James Graff and Jane Walker interview with President Zapatero, *Time Europe* 27 Sept. 2004.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Woodworth, "Spain Changes Course," 24.

in the Parliament, which makes it easier for him to gain support for other legislation he wants to pass. He is also discussing further concessions to Vitoria (the Basque capital) and Barcelona. However, there are differences within the Socialist Party itself as to the best policies to deal with these regions, so this continues to be a contentious issue in Spain.³⁹⁵

Another aspect of his policy making is his commitment to equal rights. One of the ideals that Zapatero has devoted himself to is feminism. He says he is not just “antimachismo....The more equality women have, the fairer, more civilized, and tolerant society will be. Sexual equality is a lot more effective against terrorism than military strength.”³⁹⁶ This commitment comes through in his policies as well-his government has as many women ministers as men.³⁹⁷ Zapatero is very conscious of political correctness in his decision making.

Worldview

In terms of the United States, Zapatero has followed the Spanish policy tradition of being wary of close ties, even to the point of direct antagonism. For example, at the 2003 Columbus Day military parade, Zapatero refused to stand as the U.S. contingent and flag passed the dignitaries’ box.³⁹⁸ Although relations have improved since then, Zapatero and the President of Cyprus are the only leaders among the EU-25 who have not been received in the White House. Chislett explains that this is because “at this stage in both the U.S. and Spanish governments, neither leader has anything to gain politically from a meeting.”³⁹⁹

Zapatero also has almost opposite views from Aznar in terms of Spain’s place in the world. He says that “Today, France, Germany and Spain have less of a unitary view of the world [than the U.S. does]. We have a conception that we need a world of civilizations and

³⁹⁵ Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course,” 24.

³⁹⁶ Zapatero, interview.

³⁹⁷ Graff.

³⁹⁸ Chislett, “Anti-Americanism,” 16.

³⁹⁹ Chislett, “So Close,” 14.

understanding.”⁴⁰⁰ He has made it clear that he would like to work more closely with France and Germany, especially within the EU.⁴⁰¹ His consensus approach to policy making carries over to his worldview; he sees Spain as being a part of Europe, not a “great” power in the world alongside the United States and Britain.

Conclusion

Both Aznar’s and Zapatero’s leadership styles and worldviews have had a major impact on Spain’s foreign policy. First, Aznar’s more combative style and intense personal ambitions led to his change in direction of Spain’s foreign policy despite resistance from the public. His desire to be a major player in the world led to his move towards the United States in an attempt to gain status in the world. Spain’s security in the world meant it could now aim for greater influence, but it was up to Aznar to form the close relationship with Bush. And his combative approach to policy meant that public opinion and the weight of other factors were less important in his decision making process. Woodworth refers to it as the “Aznar factor.”⁴⁰²

Zapatero, on the other hand, is almost the exact opposite of Aznar in terms of style and leadership. Unlike Aznar, who was very individualistic, Zapatero focuses on consensus and agreement, very much in line with the European approach to world politics. Similarly, Zapatero sees Spain as more a member of Europe and less a world power in its own right. He is very in tune with public opinion and domestic society, all factors that influenced his decision to return to the more traditional Spanish foreign policy that is centered around Europe and farther from the United States. The changes in direction in Spanish foreign policy are very much in line with the individuals who brought them about.

⁴⁰⁰ Zapatero, interview.

⁴⁰¹ Ho, 12.

⁴⁰² Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course,” 8.

Chapter 11: Conclusions

After an in-depth look at the factors that contributed to Spain's foreign policy after 11-M, it should no longer be surprising that the Spanish government took the direction in foreign policy that it did. American commentators questioned why Spaniards would want a change in government and dismissed the election results as appeasement to the terrorists; rather, Zapatero's administration orchestrated a return to traditional Spanish foreign policy, more in line with Europe and less involved in the rest of the world.

Spain's tumultuous history has impacted its foreign policy in three ways, fostering a proclivity towards pacifism, a dislike and suspicion of America, and a tendency towards working with and aligning with European countries. As a result, Madrid is much more inclined to work with the EU instead of America. Domestic terrorism has also had a major impact on Spain's approach to fighting terrorism. Spain already has an infrastructure and a court system for dealing with terrorism, but ETA distracted the Spanish intelligence community from the Islamic threat. After 11-M Spain did not have to massively reassess its policies; the government only had to change its priorities. Thus, Spain's history and ETA did impact the change in foreign policy; if it were not for these factors, perhaps the public would have been willing to embrace a more statist approach to fighting terrorism in line with America.

Interest groups, in general, do not have a strong presence in Spanish society; however, the growing community of immigrants, especially from Morocco, means that their interests must be addressed in government. The growing Islamic threat in Europe often stems from immigrants. Although they do not have many organizations presently in government, the Zapatero administration has tried to be more responsive to their needs as a tool in fighting terror.

Generally, however, and even after 11-M, interest groups have had very little impact on foreign policy.

Media and public opinion had a major impact on foreign policy decision making in Spain, especially after 11-M. The media played a central role in the change from the Aznar administration to the Zapatero administration. Without the break in the official government line of ETA responsibility for 11-M, it is unlikely that Aznar would have been defeated. And of course, public opinion, spurred by the actions of the media, was the catalyst for change. Without the election of Zapatero, it is unlikely that the change in foreign policy would have been so radical. Consequently, public opinion, as most commentators around the world noted, was key in the change in foreign policy, but the media was also a significant factor.

Finally, both Spain's place in the international system and the role of the individual personalities in power played roles as well Madrid's altered foreign policy course. Aznar, ambitious and arrogant, disregarded public opinion and aligned with America against Europe in his attempt to make Spain a major player in the international system. Zapatero, on the other hand, is much more responsive to public opinion and more of a consensus builder. It makes sense that after the 11-M attacks, when Spain seemed so much more vulnerable, he would look to the security of Spain's traditional place within the EU and Europe. How the individuals in power responded to Spain's place in the international system was key in Spain's foreign policy. If it were not for the ambitious personality of Aznar, it is unlikely that Spain would have taken the foreign policy course it did prior to 11-M.

Thus, although the outcome of the 2004 elections and the subsequent foreign policy change were met with shock and surprise around the world, a close examination of the factors that influence foreign policy indicate that this move is not so surprising. Instead, Aznar's

personal ambitions caused a major change in foreign policy prior to 11-M. Yes, the terrorist attacks and public opinion were the catalyst that caused the change in policy after 11-M. But the media also played an important role in galvanizing public opinion, and Zapatero's personal inclination to respond to public opinion in policy making was an important factor as well. Thus, Zapatero's changes in foreign policy were a new direction, yes, but not an unfamiliar one.

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