


US ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT McCLELLAN

"The Military Show Place of The South"



SCHEDULE

For the Visit of

The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

22 March 1995

Copy for

Mr. David Lyles

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT McCLELLAN
FORT McCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5000



Itinerary
for the visit of
The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

22 March 1995

APPROVED *ALL*
DATE 3-27-95

ESCORT OFFICER: CPT Ray Manna
DUTY PHONE: 5-4268
HOME PHONE: 435-8060

LEGEND

◆ Briefing Points

- Overflight and Windshield
Tour Points of Interest

DRIVER: SGT Jennifer Williams
DUTY PHONE: 5-5616/3862
HOME PHONE: 237-9693

VIP BUS CELLULAR PHONE: 239-4165

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>ACTION/POC</u>
Wednesday, 22 March		
1042 EST	Arrive Atlanta Airport Via Delta Flight No. 766	Met by MG Lenhardt
1042-1100 EST	Transition from Delta Terminal to Hangar One to AL-ARNG UH60	CPT Frandsen/ MG Lenhardt
1000-1105 CST	Enroute Fort McClellan Pelham Range Via UH60	MG Lenhardt

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 March (Continued)

1105-1130

Aerial Overflight of Pelham Range
and Fort McClellan

MG Lenhardt

PELHAM RANGE

- Combat Vehicle Ranges
- Special Operations Training Site (SOTS)
- Crew Served Ranges
- Alabama National Guard Unit Training Equipment Site (UTES)
- Pelham Range Training Facility
- Maintenance Complex

MAIN POST CANTONMENT

- Elementary School
- Waste Water Treatment
- Joint Tng Area (USAF, ATF, Smithsonian)
- Chemical Area
- WAC Museum
- National Guard Area
- Reilly Airfield
- MOUT Site
- CDTF
- USAR Equipment Concentration Site
- Training Brigade Area
- Military Police Area
- Housing
- Garrison Complex

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>ACTION/POC</u>
------------------	--------------	-------------------

Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)

1130	Arrive Fort McClellan Center Pad (Coordinate FN116553110) (Met by CPT Manna)	MG Lenhardt
1130-1135	Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle	CPT Manna
1135-1137	Enroute Remington Hall (Building 51)	MG Lenhardt
1137-1155	Press Opportunity with Local Media	Mr. Abrams
1155-1158	Transition to VIP Protocol Vehicle	CPT Manna
1158-1203	Enroute 39th Adjutant General Battalion (Building 500) (Met by LTC Frutiger)	MG Lenhardt

- Buckner Circle
- Cane Creek Golf Course Club House
- Child Development Center
- Noble Army Hospital
- Soldier Aid Station

1203-1213	Transition to "Day 2" Room	MG Lenhardt
1213-1315	Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation	MG Lenhardt
1315-1320	Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/ Enroute Sibert Hall, Chemical School/ Transition to Room 2001	CPT Manna/ MG Lenhardt
1320-1420	Community Briefing	Mr. Powell

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)

1420-1440

Walk Thru Sibert Hall

BG Wooten

- ◆ Information Services Center (Fisher Library)
- ◆ Dragon Warfighter Center
- ◆ Bradley Radiological Laboratory
- ◆ NBC Reconnaissance Training Facility (FOX's Den)

1440-1442

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/Enroute U.S. Air Force Disaster Preparedness School

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- Women's Army Corps
Memorial Chapel

1442-1507

U.S. Air Force Disaster Preparedness Technical Training Brief

MAJ Hensley

1507-1515

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/ Enroute Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF)

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- Alabama National Guard
Training Site

1515-1555

Visit Chemical Defense Training Facility

BG Wooten/
LTC Adams

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)

1555-1604

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute Tactical Clearing Center
(TCC) (Building T-800)

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- 39th Adjutant General Battalion
- Decontamination Apparatus
Training Facility (DATF) (Drive
Thru DECON Line)
- Consolidated Maintenance Facility
- Rail Load Facility
- New Permanent Party & Student
Housing (900 Area)

1604-1624

Tactical Clearing Center Brief

COL Foley

1624-1632

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute U.S. Army Military Police
School (Building 3181)

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- 1600 Area (Troop Billets)
- Haynes Gym
- Allen Training Facility
- Training Brigade Complex
- Mock Confinement Facility
- Physical Security (Building 3184)
- Special Operations (Building 3185)
- Department of Defense Polygraph
Institute (DODPI)

1632-1707

U.S. Army Military Police School
Walking Tour

MG Lenhardt

- ◆ Family Advocacy Law Enforcement
Training Facility
- ◆ Military Police Warfighter Center
- ◆ Training Set Forward Observer (TSFO)
- ◆ Ramsey Library

1707-1715

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute Center Pad

CPT Manna
MG Lenhardt

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>ACTION/POC</u>
Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)		
1715-1725	Prepare for Departure	CPT Manna
1725-1730	Transition to Helicopter	CPT Manna
1730-1830 CST	Enroute Warner-Robbins Air Force Base via UH60	MG Lenhardt
1930 EST	Arrive Warner-Robbins Air Force Base	Met by COL Ward

OFFICIAL PARTY

The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Protocol VIP Vehicle Passengers (16-Passenger)
22 Mar, Tour of Installation

Commissioner Davis
Senator Heflin
Senator Shelby
Congressman Browder
MG Lenhardt
MG Moore
BG Wooten
Mr. Lyles
Mr. Powell
COL Mashburn
COL Foley
COL Hurd
CPT Manna, Escort Officer
SGT Williams, Driver

Protocol Follow-On VIP Van (15-Passenger)

22 Mar, Tour of Installation

Mr. Burgess

Mr. Borden

Mr. Gertler

Mr. Young

Mr. Lynch

Mr. Minter

CPT Lee, Escort Officer

PFC Young, Driver

Follow-up Protocol VIP Vehicle #3 (15-Passenger)

LTC Felmet, Escort Officer

Ms. Creedon

Mr. Kaiser

Mr. Nelson

Mr. Payne, Escort Officer

Mr. Levy

PFC John VanNoller, Driver

Mini Van #1 Passengers

22 Mar, Enroute Remington Hall, Fort McClellan from Anniston Airport

Senator Heflin

Mr. Young

COL Hurd

1LT Thomas M. Hawes, Escort Officer

PFC Juan Garcia, Driver

Mini Van #2 Passengers

22 Mar, Enroute Remington Hall, Fort McClellan from Anniston Airport

Senator Shelby

Mr. Lynch

2LT Lisa Marie Zaborowski, Escort Officer

PV2 Lonnie Whitton, Driver

Mini Van #3 Passengers

22 Mar, Enroute Remington Hall, Fort McClellan from Anniston Airport

Congressman Browder
Mr. Minter (T)
CPT Kathleen M. Doran, Escort Officer
SGT James Gill, Driver

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees

The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Congressional Delegation

The Honorable Howell Heflin
U.S. Senator, Alabama

The Honorable Richard Shelby
U.S. Senator, Alabama

The Honorable Glen Browder
U.S. Representative, 3d District, Alabama

Commission Office Representatives

Mr. David Lyles
Staff Director

Mr. Ben Borden
Director of Review and Analysis

Ms. Madelyn R. Creedon
Head, General Counsel

Mr. Ralph A. Kaiser
Associate General Counsel

Mr. Wade Nelson, Jr.
Director of Communications

Mr. J. J. Gertler
BRAC Senior Analyst

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees (Cont'd)

Congressional Staffers

Mr. Mark Young
Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Heflin

Mr. Terence "Terry" Lynch
Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Shelby

Mr. Ray Minter
District Administrative Assistant to Congressman Browder

DA Representative

Colonel Frank Hurd
Chief, Senate Liaison Office
Office of the Secretary of the Army

Community Representative

Mr. Gerald Powell
Chairman, Military Affairs Committee

National Guard Representatives

Major General James E. Moore
Adjutant General
State of Alabama

Fort McClellan Representatives

Major General Alfonso E. Lenhardt
Commanding General/Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Ralph G. Wooten
Deputy Commanding General/Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School

Colonel Peter D. Hoffman
Chief of Staff

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees (Cont'd)

Command Sergeant Major Larry Nettles
Post Command Sergeant Major

Colonel J Harold Mashburn
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School

Colonel David W. Foley
Assistant Commandant, U. S. Army Military Police School

Colonel Richard R. Majauskas
Commander, Training Brigade

Dr. William J. Yankee
Director
Department of Defense Polygraph Institute

Mr. Thomas J. Burgess
Director of Resource Management

Mr. Robert J. Abernathy
Director of Engineering and Housing

LTC Bryan H. Felmet
Staff Judge Advocate

LTC L Z Johnson
Facilities Manager, Alabama Guard Training Site

Mr. Ronald M. Levy
Director of Environment

Mr. Stan Payne
Installation Budget Analyst

Major R. Barry Cronin
Commanding Officer
United States Marine Corps, Marine Detachment, Fort McClellan

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees (Cont'd)

Major Ralph G. Hensley
Commander
Air Force Disaster Preparedness School

Lieutenant Gary D. Shekels
Officer In Charge
Naval Construction Training Center Detachment

Ms. Linda Seymour
President, AFGE Local 1941

Menu

Caribbean Grilled Chicken Caesar Salad
Fresh Fruit
Coffee, Tea, Assorted Sodas

COST: \$ 7.50

UH 60 (Blackhawk) Passengers (4 Passengers; 4 Headsets)
Depart Fort McClellan, 0800, 22 Mar, Enroute Hangar One, Atlanta Airport

MG Lenhardt
LTC Felmet
Mr. Gertler
CPT Lee

UH 60 (Blackhawk) Passengers (10 Passengers; 10 Headsets)
Depart Hangar One, Enroute Fort McClellan, 22 Mar, with Overflight

Commissioner Davis
MG Lenhardt
Mr. Lyles
Mr. Borden
Mr. Gertler
Ms. Creedon
Mr. Kaiser
Mr. Nelson
LTC Felmet
CPT Lee

UH60 (Blackhawk) Passengers (5 Passengers; 5 Headsets)
Depart Center Pad, Fort McClellan, Enroute Robbins Air Force Base, GA, 22 Mar

Commissioner Davis
MG Lenhardt
Mr. Borden
Mr. Kaiser
CPT Williams

Community Briefing Attendees

TBD

NOTES:

1. Senator Heflin, Senator Shelby and Congressman Browder will meet Commissioner Davis upon his arrival at the Press Opportunity Site. They are scheduled to arrive at Anniston Airport at 0935 CST, via C-20, 22 March.
2. Mr. Borden, Ms. Creedon, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Kaiser will arrive Atlanta Airport on Delta Flight 973. They will meet Commissioner Davis upon his arrival on Delta Flight 766. They will fly to Center Pad, Fort McClellan, via UH60.
3. MG Moore, Adjutant General, State of Alabama, will meet Commissioner Davis at the Press Opportunity Site and will accompany the rest of the visit.
4. Commissioner Davis has no dietary restrictions. He drinks Diet Coke and Iced Tea.



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JAMES B. DAVIS, Commissioner

Biography

In August of 1993, General J.B. Davis concluded a thirty-five year career with the United States Air Force as a combat fighter pilot, commander and strategic planner and programmer. He has served as a commander of a combat fighter wing, of the U.S. Air Force's Military Personnel Center, Pacific Air Forces, and United States Forces Japan. On the staff side, he served as the Director and Programmer of the U.S. Air Force's personnel and training, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence Pacific Air Forces, and served his last two years on active duty as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO).

During his career he has had extensive experience in operations, intelligence, human resource management, and political/military and international affairs. He has commanded a nuclear capable organization of about six thousand personnel and a joint service organization of about sixty thousand personnel and several sizes in between.

In the 1990's, he was deeply involved in the successful multimillion dollar negotiations for support of U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japanese financial support of U.S. Forces in Desert Storm. In NATO, he was the chief negotiator with the North Atlantic Council and the United Nations for NATO's participation in the Yugoslavian conflict.

General Davis has lived overseas for more than ten years almost evenly split between the Pacific and Europe. Because of his official duties, he has traveled extensively to all the ASEAN and NATO countries and many of the Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary and Albania, meeting with Ministers of State and Defense, Prime Ministers and Presidents.

General Davis has a B.S. degree in Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Masters degree in Public Administration from Auburn University at Montgomery, and has attended multiple professional schools.

FORT McCLELLAN ALABAMA

"Military Showplace of the South"







Fort McClellan



Sara Grant & ASSOCIATES

MARKETING • ADVERTISING
PHOTOGRAPHY • PUBLISHING

Publisher:

McClellan News®
Redstone Rocket
Valley News

309 S. QUINTARD, ANNISTON, AL
(205) 236-8860

108 B SOUTH SIDE SQUARE, HUNTSVILLE, AL
(205) 539-3980

**U.S. Savings
Bonds make
good business
sense!**

Call today to find
out just how much
Bonds can do
for you



**Breakfast
Chicken
Hamburgers
Salads
And Lots More!**

Lenlock & Anniston



N.E. ALABAMA'S
NEWEST LUXURY MOTEL
65 QUIET LUXURY ROOMS
AT AFFORDABLE PRICES



**ONLY 3 MINUTES
FROM
SUMMERALL GATE**
NEAR SHONEY'S RESTAURANT

1015 HWY 431 N. ADJACENT TO HWY 21 N. ANNISTON AL



- ★ MANAGED BY RETIRED MILITARY
- ★ IN ROOM JACUZZIS
- ★ IN ROOM WHIRLPOOLS
- ★ KING SIZE BEDS (FEATURING SERTA)
- ★ NON SMOKING ROOMS
- ★ HONEYMOON SUITES
- ★ CONVENIENTLY LOCATED TO RESTAURANTS & LOUNGES
- ★ IN ROOM LATEST MOVIE RELEASES
- ★ MILITARY RATES
- ★ REMOTE 36 CH TV (FREE HBO)
- ★ FREE LOCAL PHONE CALLS
- ★ FREE COFFEE
- ★ IDEAL ENVIRONMENTAL LOCATION
- ★ LAUNDROMAT FACILITIES
- ★ SWIMMING POOL
- ★ CLEAN & QUIET ROOMS



**Toll Free Reservations
1-800-467-2525
205-237-2525**

Table of Contents

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Welcome.....	3
Housing.....	4
Services.....	5
Religion.....	11
Medical.....	12
Leisure.....	16
Mission.....	21
History.....	27
The Area.....	29
At A Glance.....	31
Maps.....	33
Emergency Numbers.....	37
Numbers To Know.....	38



The Fort McClellan Newcomers' Guide is a civilian enterprise publication by Sara Grant & Associates of Anniston, Ala., a private firm in no way connected with the Department of the Army, under exclusive written contract with Fort McClellan.

The appearance of advertising in this publication does not constitute endorsement by the Department of the Defense, the Department of the Army, or Sara Grant & Associates of the products or services advertised.


Everything in the publication will be made available for purchase, use or patronage without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, marital status, physical handicap, political affiliation or any other nonmerit factor of the purchaser, user, or patron.

Sara Grant & Associates
309 South Quintard Ave.
Anniston, AL 36201
(205) 236-8860

Editor and Layout Design...H.M. Chapman
Production Supervisor...Angie Finley
Advertising Sales...Ethel Brown and Jim Haynes



Welcome



All personnel arriving on Fort McClellan should report to the Welcome Center (Building 3295) located just off Summerall Gate Road. The center's phone number is 848-4338.

The Welcome Center has newcomer information about facilities on-post and will help you in any way possible. The staff duty officer is also located at the center after duty hours.

You can write a letter to Army Community Service, USACML&MPCEN&FM, Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5000. They will supply you with a welcome packet and other essential information to help make your first days at Fort McClellan go smoothly.

Your Arrival

There is air commuter service between the Anniston Municipal Airport and the Atlanta Airport. The Anniston Airport is located just south of the cities of Oxford and Anniston. Ground transportation is also available from the Atlanta and Birmingham airports. Reservations may be made by calling Alabama Limousine Service at 1-205-820-5990 the day prior to arrival.

Anniston also has rail service. For information contact an AMTRAK

representative. Also, Greyhound serves Anniston.


Hotels And Motels

Several good motels and hotels are located within a few minutes drive of the installation. National chains include Holiday Inn, Days Inn and Quality Inn.

Guest Housing

Guest accommodations consist of two guest houses at the McClellan Lodge. The lodge, which is located across the street from the Post Gas Station, has 50 rooms. For more information, or to make reservations, call 848-4916.

There are also four cottages used for distinguished visiting quarters. Reservations for these cottages are administered by the fort's Protocol Office at 848-5616.



Housing

Directorate of Housing & Engineering

On-post family housing is composed of 571 units; 112 units for officers, including 26 two-bedroom, 76 three-bedroom and 10 four-bedroom. The 459 enlisted units include 168 two-bedroom, 239 three-bedroom and 52 four-bedroom. All quarters have central air conditioning.

The waiting period for on-post housing will vary from 3 to 18 months depending upon the service member's grade and bedroom requirements.

About 426 visiting officer quarters are available for temporary duty student officers. All unaccompanied permanent party officers are required to live off post due to non-availability of permanent party bachelor officer quarters. There are 640 visiting enlisted quarters for temporary duty students and 74 inadequate permanent party bachelor and unaccompanied enlisted quarters.

Housing Division will assist service members in obtaining off-post housing when on-post housing is not available. Housing Referral maintains current listings of homes for rent or sale as well as information on apartments and trailer courts. Maps of the area and other handouts are also available.

Off-post rental housing rates for single-family dwellings range from \$275 to \$325 for unfurnished two-bedroom homes and \$325 to \$550 for unfurnished three-bedroom homes. New homes for purchase are plentiful. Several new subdivisions have been developed near post, most have three-bedroom homes with two baths, central air and heat. Many include a den with fireplace. Prices typically range from \$55,000. Apartment rental opportunities in the area are increasing as new projects are completed. Furnished and unfurnished apartments range from \$225 to \$490 depending on the number of bedrooms

and additional features.

There are many mobile home courts close to the post and in the surrounding communities. Average lot rent is \$60. This normally includes water and garbage pick-up. Furnished mobile

homes usually rent for \$225 to \$400. This generally includes lot rent, water, trash pick-up, and the higher rental rate sometimes includes a utility allowance also. For more information call Family Housing at 848-4730.



Services

Army Community Service

Army Community Service helps in many ways. The Loan Closet, for instance, allows soldiers and their families to borrow household items such as pots, pans and furniture. This service is vital to families waiting for their household goods to arrive.


Another ACS-sponsored program is the Outreach Attic, which gives a helping hand to soldiers who are E-6 and below. This program gives soldiers furniture to keep. The furniture is donated by other soldiers.

ACS holds financial assistance programs, economy cooking classes, helps find "safe houses" for abused spouses and children, and they provides food or funds for soldiers who find themselves a little short.

The Family Member Employment Assistance Office assists military family members in finding a job and filling out the required paperwork needed to apply for a job.

The Exceptional Family Member Program helps families with handicapped members. The EFMP assists the individual through selective assignments who has handicapped family members. The program is designed to include all eligible family members requiring special education, treatment, therapy, training or counseling. Fort McClellan ACS EFMP provides information and referral, family find, advocacy, cultural/recreational activities, and respite care (temporary rest period for family members who are responsible for regular care of handicapped persons).

The Consumer Affairs/Financial Planning Program is also part of ACS and classes on budgeting, financial responsibility, consumer rights, credit and money management. Other classes are available on request. Individual assistance is offered to soldiers and family members to balance a checkbook, set up a budget and work



with creditors to reduce payments. During the months of January-April free income tax assistance is offered. Consumer information is available to include automobile sales, food, insurance, investments, housing, repairs and utilities.

For information on any of these services or to become an ACS volunteer, call 848-4525.

Army Emergency Relief

The Army Emergency Relief works with Army Community Service to provide financial assistance to active duty soldiers, retirees, family members and survivors of deceased military members.

Most forms of assistance involve emergency relief from situations of a temporary nature, such as non-receipt of pay, emergency leave travel, initial rent and deposits for newly assigned families who cannot get on-post housing, and certain other emergencies.

The AER officer also has information

on AER educational assistance loans and scholarships for family members of active duty, retired or deceased soldiers. For more information, call 848-3833.

Thrift Shop

The Thrift Shop (Building 276) accepts used clothing and household items from service members for resale.

All workers are volunteer officers' wives except the manager, assistant manager, cashier and bookkeeper. The shop is open from 8:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., Tuesday and Friday. For more information, call 848-5189.

Utilities Clearing House

Getting the gas, power and telephones turned on is a one-stop proposition thanks to the Utility Clearing House.

Permanent Party soldiers may have their gas, power and telephone utilities turned on without making a deposit.

This applies to those with a good credit rating or no previous credit at all.

Monthly utility bills may also be paid at the UCH, which is located in the Housing Office (Building T-60). For more information call 820-9019.

Alcohol & Drug Abuse Prevention

The Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (Building 283) offers the following services:

- evaluation
- treatment
- referral
- guest speaker service
- consultation
- self help groups

These services are available to military and civilian members, retirees and family members who need help dealing with an alcohol or drug problem. For more information, call 848-6153 or 6163.

Retirement


The Adjutant General Office (Building 2051) has a full time retirement Services Office to assist active duty personnel in their preparation for retirement processing.

In addition, this activity provides a one-stop service for all retired military personnel, their family members and for survivors of active duty and retired service members. For information, call 848-5300.

Directorate of Reserve Components

The Directorate of Reserve Components Support is the principle point of contact at Fort McClellan for coordinating training and logistical support to U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units performing annual training (AT) or inactive duty training (IDT). For information call AVN 865-3556 or commercial (205)848-3556.





Red Cross

The American Red Cross at Fort McClellan (Building 272) is located on 5th Avenue.

Office hours are Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. There is also an after hours worker on call evenings, weekends and holidays for emergency service needs. The after hours worker can be reached by calling 820-9110. Some of the services provided by Red Cross are:

- Factual report about illness, death, or other emergencies in the family
- Assistance with emergency and convalescent leave
- Financial assistance in the form of an interest-free loan or grant of funds
- Communication service in emergencies or birth announcements
- Courses in first aid, CPR, swimming and water safety
- And, youth services programs, disaster preparedness and various activities by Red Cross volunteers.

For more information on Red Cross services, call 848-3169.

Post Locator

A personnel locator service is available to help visitors and new arrivals locate soldiers stationed here or soldiers who have recently departed the installation.

Information on this service can be obtained through the post operator. For information call the Post Locator (Building 1966, co-located with the post office) at 848-3795. After duty hours call 848-3821.

Finance & Accounting Office

The Finance and Accounting Office (Building 142), a division of the Directorate of Resource Management, is responsible for the pay of all assigned military and civilian personnel.

Other responsibilities include the payment of over 1,500 military and civilian PCS and TDY travel vouchers each month. Payment of commercial vendors, claims of military and civilian personnel, and other miscellaneous disbursements are also handled by the office.

It is organized to include operations in the following areas:

- The Accounting Branch
- The Central Accounting Office
- The Installation Check Control Office

Assigned military personnel desiring to process allotment changes, pay option changes or with a pay inquiry should first see their personnel services NCO (PSNCO) for preparation of required forms.

Hours of operation for military pay inquiries are 7:45 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday - Friday.

Travel related actions are prepared without appointments and travel advances are computed and paid within 2 working days of request for rapid customer service. Hours of operation for travel inquiries are also 7:45 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday - Friday. Disbursing

hours of operation are 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m., Monday -Friday.

The FAO is committed to providing the best possible service for assigned personnel. For information call 848-4803.

Staff Judge Advocate

The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate is located in Building 63 on the corner of Buckner Circle and Headquarters Road.

The SJA provides legal assistance and advice on rights and obligations of soldiers, family members and retirees concerning lease agreements, contracts, wills, powers of attorney, immigration, naturalization, domestic relations (including pro se divorce advice and document preparation for soldiers in the grade of specialist and below), federal (including electronic tax filing) and state income tax and other legal matters. The office also sees soldiers on military administrative matters such as reports of survey and OER and NCOER appeals. Clients are generally seen by appointment, but emergency matters and notarizations are seen at any time. Office hours are 7:30 a.m. to 12 noon and 1 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. on Monday to Friday. For more information call 848-3414 or 5334.

Information and assistance to file a claim as a result of damage during a recent move of for any other reason may be obtained in the Claims office. Office hours are from 6:30 a.m. to 12 noon and from 1 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. on Monday to Friday (except for Thursday afternoon when the office is closed). For more information or for an appointment, call 848-3322.

Civilian Personnel

The Directorate of Civilian Personnel (DCP) (Building 143B) provides services and assistance to obtain, develop, use and retain an effective work force in all organizations employing civilians.

The work force serviced includes

more than 1,300 appropriated fund and 350 nonappropriated fund personnel.

DCP also provides advice and assistance to managers and supervisors in the areas of position management and classification, conduct and discipline, management-employee relations and training development.

The Recruitment and Placement Division operates a One-Stop Job Information Center (Building 3213) which provides employment assistance to personnel looking for employment at Fort McClellan and within Department of the Army and the federal government. The One-Stop Job Information Center is open Monday and Wednesday from 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. For information call 848-3289.

The DCP is open Monday through Friday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. For more information call 848-3115.



Military Personnel

The Military Personnel Division consists of a combination of all post military personnel functions for permanent party in one location (Building 162).

The combined organization accomplishes all personnel functions including personnel management, personnel actions, personnel records and Standard Installation/Division Personnel reporting.

A customer service desk is centrally located to provide assistance to military personnel and their families.

Survivor's assistance is provided by the Adjutant General Division and includes initial notification of next-of-kin and aid in securing all federal benefits to which family members of active duty and retired personnel are entitled.

For information, call 848-5192.

Directorate of Training, Mobilization & Security

The Directorate of Plans, Training,

Mobilization and Security (DPTMSEC), building 143A, is responsible for a myriad of functions to include:

- Managing formal service and civilian school quotas as well as tuition requirements for all installation military personnel.
- Scheduling ranges and training areas on Fort McClellan and Pelham Range.
- Scheduling equipment for training.
- Forecasting ammunition for training.
- Conducting Army testing such as SDT, Language Proficiency and Officer Selection Battery.
- Preparing contingency plans for Fort McClellan.
- Operating the Education Center.
- Conducting readiness exercises.
- Managing new equipment fielding.
- Map support.
- Personnel security processing.
- Providing training aids and devices (MILES, GTAs)
- Photographic support.

- Educational television production.
- Illustration support.

Inspector General

The Inspector General determines the state of economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, and readiness of the command through its primary functions of assistance, inspections, and investigations.

Assistance: Soldiers, retirees, family members, DA civilians, and private citizens may submit a complaint, allegation, or request for help in resolving problems related to the Army.

Inspections: The IG conducts special inspections, follow-up inspections, and assessments to pursue systemic issues and identify problems affecting the command, determine their root causes, and recommend responsibility for correcting them.

Investigations: The IG may investigate noncriminal violations of policy, regulation, or law.

Because the IG is an extension of the

eyes, ears, and conscience of the commander, the IG routinely performs other duties as prescribed by the Commanding General.

Assistance may be obtained by calling the IG Office at 848-5392/4775.

Directorate of Logistics

The Directorate of Logistics manages the laundry contract and the contract for off-post bus service to and from local bus stations, the AMTRAK station and Anniston Municipal Airport. DOL has a staff of approximately 90 civilians and 4 military personnel.

Provost Marshal Office

The Provost Marshal Office provides the following services: registration of firearms, motor vehicles and bicycles; disposition of lost and found property; crime prevention programs, such as the Drug Abuse Resistance Program (DARE) and "McGruff" programs; investigations of crimes, incidents and accidents on post; enforcement of game laws and traffic control.

Information concerning these services may be obtained through the Provost Marshal's Office at 848-5178 during duty hours.

The desk sergeant is on duty 24 hours a day for the reporting of crimes, incidents and accidents. The desk sergeant's telephone number is 848-4531 or 5555.

Public Affairs Office

Fort McClellan's Public Affairs Office (Building 144) provides full range of support for internal and external informational activities. The PAO provides point of contact for television and newspaper reporters visiting the installation. The PAO is also responsible for the publication of the fort's Welcome Book.

Publicity for special events and activities is handled through PAO, in-

cluding such events as Armed Forces Day.

The Fort McClellan News, a full service weekly newspaper, is dedicated to reporting on military and civilian personnel and covering items of interest to the large retiree community.

PAO arranges for special tours of the post, and handles requests for speakers in the community. For more information, call 848-5377.

Education Center

A wide range of programs has been designed to suit almost anybody's educational needs at the Fort McClellan Education Center (Building 328). Most of those using the center are soldiers, however, veterans, retirees, family members, and DA civilians can also use it. Besides offering college classes, the center operates an Army Learning Center which includes a Computer Lab and Military Occupational Specialty Library. In the Computer Lab, computer-based instruction is available with over 13,000 hours of individual educational programs designed to enhance academic pursuits as well as military training and career goals. Expert assistance is readily available. Jacksonville State University and Gadsden Community College maintain offices at the center and each college offers a variety of day and evening courses within the center and at various locations on post. Counseling is available from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. on weekdays. No appointment is necessary. For more information, call 848-5419.

Post Exchange

The Post Exchange was completed in September 1977 and contains 67,775 square feet of floor space.

Located in a modern enclosed shopping mall, the complex offers optical and watch repair services, a flower shop,

barber and beauty shops and three snack bars.

Hours of operation are: Monday through Saturday 9 a.m. to 8 p.m.; Sunday 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. For more information, call 820-9400.

Commissary

The Post Commissary in the shopping mall next to the main Post Exchange on 19th Ave carries more than 11,000 line items on the shelves and generates \$20 million in annual sales.

Hours of operation are:

Sunday	12 p.m. - 4 p.m.
Monday	CLOSED
Tuesday	9 a.m. - 6 p.m.
Wednesday	9 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Thursday	9 a.m. - 7 p.m.
Friday	9 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Saturday	9 a.m. - 5 p.m.

SATO

The Scheduled Airlines Ticket Office (Building 241C) represents all major airlines and provides services for official travel purposes.

There is also a SATO Leisure (Building T2099) which handles unofficial travel, military family travel, retiree travel and civilian employee travel.

The SATO Leisure office is open Monday-Friday from 9 a.m. to 5:15 p.m. and Saturday from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. For more information, call 820-7460.

Auto Crafts Shop

The Auto Crafts Shop (Building 1800) is an excellent, 17-bay facility with a two bay, coin operated, 24-hour car wash with vacuum cleaner, air-feshener and carpet shampoo machine. There is also a paint bay, computerized engine analyzer, fuel injection cleaner system, and a wide variety of tools to accomplish almost any repair job. It is

open to all active duty, Reserve Component members, retired military, DoD civilians, and eligible family members. For more information, call 848-5146.

Class Six Store

The Class Six Store (Building 2042) is AAFES operated and contains an excellent selection of imported and domestic wines, spirits and malt beverages. For more information, call 820-9280.

Elementary School

Children who live on post are eligible to attend grades K-6 at the Fort McClellan Elementary School.

Bus transportation is provided. The school is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

You may register your children any time after arrival at Fort McClellan. Medical records, school records and other related documents must be available at the time of registration.

Children entering Kindergarten must be five years old on or before September 1 and must present a birth certificate and a certificate of immunization unless they were enrolled in the

kindergarten classes last year.

The State of Alabama requires all children enrolling in any school system in the state to present a Certificate of Immunization. All students entering the sixth grade must also have the red (MMR) immunization form. (Immunization forms may be obtained at the Pediatric Clinic at Noble Army Community Hospital.)

Each school aged child is required to have a social security number. This number must be provided to the school at registration.

For more information write: Superintendent, Fort McClellan Elementary School, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5000. Questions can also be answered by phone at 820-2420/820-9151.

Child Development Center

Fort McClellan Child Development Services has three delivery systems: Child Development Center (CDC), Family Child Care (FCC), and Supplemental Programs and Services (SPS).

The CDC offers children (6 weeks through 12 years) a developmental program in a "state of the art" facility with

well-trained caregivers. The Center is designed specifically for children and consists of learning centers and well equipped playgrounds. The CDC is accredited by the National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC).

The FCC program is an option to center-based care. This program allows military spouses to care for children in government quarters. The FCC caregivers (providers) are well-trained and offer developmental care in a home environment. Children 4 weeks through 12 years are eligible for care in these homes. The FCC program offers unlimited hours of operation to include weekends, early morning physical training (PT), temporary duty (TDY) and holidays.

The SPS program offers parent education classes, baby-sitter training and referral, a central referral system to local and military child development centers, short term alternative care (STACC) and central registration.

Quality child care in a loving environment with trained staff is what you get at Fort McClellan. For more information regarding these services call 848-3574.



Religion

The congregation of Fort McClellan and their chaplains encourage all to join in religious activities.

A varied program of services, family activities, personal spiritual growth and community events are provided in four chapel locations.

SOLDIER'S CHAPEL

Soldiers' Chapel is the chapel center for thousands of soldiers in the Military Police Corps.

Located on 8th Avenue the chapel serves the religious needs of the soldiers-in-training who are assigned to the military police training battalions here.

CENTURION CHAPEL



Centurion Chapel occupies a lovely pine-covered hill on the corner of Summerrall Gate Road and 16th Avenue. Built in the 1950's the chapel's name is a continuous reminder of the biblical title of "centurion" as a Roman soldier.

SILVER CHAPEL

Silver Chapel is the oldest of the permanent chapels at Fort McClellan.

Built in the 1930's, it is designed with a Spanish motif to complement the other buildings in the post headquarters area. It is named in honor of Horace P. Silver, a distinguished chaplain of the Army and of the United States Military Academy.

A detailed schedule of services is printed weekly in the McClellan News. For more information on chapel programs call 848-5351.



Medical

Medical Services

Dubbed "The Military Showplace of the South", Fort McClellan is home to the small, but progressive, Noble Army Community Hospital.

More than just a hospital, it is a system of clinics and services that provide health care for up to 610 patients each day.

The hospital currently gives priority care to 8,369 active duty family members, 11,285 retirees, 15,009 retiree family members and 9,186 civilian employees. Noble is a 100-bed, three-story hospital with a main floor expansion of specialty clinics.

Since 1987, modernization projects completed include expansion of the Physical Therapy Clinic and of Resource Management Division, the addition of a new x-ray file room, and remodeled patient rooms and Troop Medical Clinic.

Over the years, these renovations

have transformed NACH into one of the Army's most modern and comfortably furnished medical treatment facilities, providing a high quality of care.

In addition to the main hospital, health care is provided at the Consolidated Troop Clinic, the Dental Activity, and the Community Mental Health and Preventive Medicine Services.

Newly Assigned

Newly assigned soldiers should in-process their medical records through Outpatient Records of the Troop Medical Clinic. The unit of assignment should direct the individual to the facility that maintains their records. Families of newly assigned soldiers can turn in their medical records or have records established at the Outpatient record Section. A patient recording card will be established after the record has been inprocessed. The plastic card may be picked up at the Outpatient Record Section during the next visit to

NACH. This recording card must be presented along with a valid identification card for each visit.

Nursing Care

The professional and paraprofessional nursing personnel, consisting of Army Nurse Corps Officers and Department of the Army Civilian Registered Nurses, enlisted nursing paraprofessionals and DAC practical nurses, perform a full range of duties and services for inpatients, outpatients, and community health care recipients.

The major sections, areas and wards staffed by nursing personnel are:

- A 46-bed Medical Ward
- A 44-bed Surgical Ward
- An Obstetrical Ward
- An Operating Room suite

Emergency surgical support is provided on a 24-hour basis, seven days per week. The eight bed post-anesthesia recovery unit is collocated with the operating rooms.

Outpatient clinics staffed by nursing personnel include the 24-hour, seven days per week Emergency Care Section, General Outpatient Clinic, Gynecology and Obstetrics Clinic, Pediatric Clinic, Medical-Surgical Clinic, Physical Exam Section and Troop Medical Clinic.


Community Health

The Community Health Nursing Service (Building 614) provides the following wide variety of services:

- WIC program referral information for new patients
- tuberculosis skin test screening and evaluation
- sickle cell trait counseling
- health risk appraisal
- health promotion programs
- birth control counseling for all new female soldiers

Health education and guidance is given to Active duty, retired military and eligible family members on such topics as smoking cessation, HIV/AIDS prevention, hepatitis counseling, and wellness lifestyle.

Communicable disease evaluation





and control measures to prevent disease in individuals identified as being at risk is conducted by community health nurses to include sexually transmitted diseases, salmonella, hepatitis and tuberculosis.

They also function as health consultants to installation child develop-

ment services and liaison with other health agencies in the civilian community.

Services are provided on an appointment only basis. Appointments are made by calling 848-3981.

Lab Services

The laboratory at NACH is fully

computerized and features state-of-the-art equipment for diagnostic analyses. Most of the laboratory analyzers are interfaced to the laboratory information system, allowing the results to flow from the analyzer directly to the laboratory information system. Additionally, the blood bank section of the laboratory operates a blood donor facility.

An autologous blood donor program is also offered and encouraged for elective surgery. This program allows patients to donate their own blood prior to surgery.

Nutrition Care

The dietitian provides nutrition counseling by appointment on a variety of diets to active duty, dependents and retirees. Active duty personnel can self-refer themselves for dietary counseling. Dependents and retirees are seen on a referral basis.

In addition to individual counseling, the dietitian is available to go out to groups upon request. For more information contact the Nutrition Care Division at 848-2270.

Pharmacy Services

The outpatient pharmacy is located on the first floor of the hospital and the satellite pharmacy is located next to the main entrance to the commissary. Hours of operation for the outpatient pharmacy at the hospital are Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and for the satellite pharmacy Monday through Friday 9 a.m. through 5:30 p.m. The pharmacy fills approximately 900 prescriptions daily.

A refill only phone-in service is available to all patients that obtain their prescriptions originally at NACH pharmacy. To use the phone-in service, call 848-2206 or 2169. Your prescription will be ready at the pick-up window according to the following schedule:

- Prescription called in Monday will be ready Wednesday.
- Prescription called in Tuesday will be ready Thursday.

● Prescription called in Wednesday will be ready Friday.

● Prescription called in Thursday will be ready Monday.

● Prescription called in Friday, Saturday, or Sunday will be ready Tuesday.

Supplies and equipment

NACH supports its outpatient population through the Military Medical Benefits Program. Via this program, patients can receive loans of medical equipment for up to one year or until the patient obtains the material through CHAMPUS.

Consumable supplies are also provided to patients when prescribed by military physicians. These supplies include such things as oxygen, support stockings, and various expendable supplies.

Emergency team

NACH currently maintains a 14-member Emergency Medical Team for use in responding to natural and man-made disasters.

DEERS/Medical Records

All family members age 10 and over should have their own identification card. All family members should be enrolled in the Defense Eligibility Enrollment System (DEERS). Medical records for dependents up to 13 years of age are maintained in the Pediatric Clinic at NACH.

Appointments

Emergency medical treatment is available 24 hours a day in the Emergency Room. This service is for actual medical emergencies and should not be used as an alternative to medical care that can be scheduled in other clinics by appointment.

Patients who need to be seen in one of the specialty clinics must first be seen in the General Outpatient Clinic for referral. Appointments are scheduled by calling 848-4671, Monday

through Friday from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Specialty clinics available include:

- Internal Medicine
- General Surgery
- Obstetrics/Gynecology
- Orthopedics
- Optometry
- Pediatrics

Physical examinations for active duty soldiers are scheduled through the Physical Examination Section at 848-2110. Appointments for Orthopedics are scheduled through the Orthopedic Clinic at 848-2391. A special number has been set aside to schedule Pediatric same-day appointments only ● this number is 848-3780 and it is operational from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.

NACH currently has several physicians who are working under a CHAMPUS Partnership Agreement. Patients who are CHAMPUS eligible only may be scheduled to see these physicians ● appointments are available through the Patient Appointment System. Appointments for the Physical Therapy Clinic and the Dietitian are available through those services.

CHAMPUS news

The Civilian Health and Medical Program for Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) is a cost-sharing program under which military family members may receive medical treatment from civilian sources. For information on programs, and to learn who is eligible and under what conditions they can be used, contact the CHAMPUS advisor at 848-2126.

Dental Services

Dental care is provided at Fort McClellan by the U.S. Army Dental Activity. Routine dental care is provided

at Stout Dental Clinic (Building 1929). The hours for treatment are as follows:

7:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. - Active duty military sick call

9:30 a.m. to 11 a.m. - Active duty annual dental exams

12:45 p.m. to 2 p.m. - Emergencies (Example, toothaches, broken dentures, etc.) For active duty members, retired, and retired family members.

True emergencies such as trauma, tooth knocked out, certain infections will continue to be seen at any time.

Routine care (cleanings, fillings, etc) are by appointment. Dental examinations for categories other than active duty military are by appointment only. Appointments can be made by calling 848-3950 beginning on Tuesdays at 8 a.m. for examinations for the following week. Unfortunately, the demand for examination appointments outweigh our availability.

Fort McClellan is authorized to provide routine dental care to family members and retired personnel on a space available basis. The extent of care which can be provided to family members and retirees varies from time to time. It is highly recommended that Active Duty family members enroll in the Army-sponsored Dependent Dental Insurance Program. Information on this program can be obtained from the Health Benefits Advisor in the CHAMPUS Office at Noble Army Community Hospital, telephone 848-2126.

Personnel with bona fide dental emergencies occurring after normal duty hours should report to the emergency room Noble Army Hospital, where the Dental CQ and Dental Officer-of-the-Day will be contacted.

For further information on dental care and services, please call Stout Dental Clinic at 848-5458 between 7:30 a.m. - 4:15 p.m.

Veterinary Services

The Veterinary Services operates the Veterinary Treatment Facility to control and prevent diseases which are transmittable from animals to man or which may pose a threat to the installation animal population.

The clinic operates as an outpatient

clinic by appointment only. Services include physical examinations for the purpose of issuing health certificates, routine immunizations, limited diagnostic procedures (primarily fecal exams and heartworm checks), and limited treatment of animal diseases. Over-the-counter medications are available for the prevention and treat-

ment of parasitic infestations, such as fleas and ticks. A quarantine facility houses animals involved in human bite cases and has pets available for adoption.

For more information or an appointment, call the VTF (Building 249) at 848-3875/3876.



Leisure

Recreation Areas

Fort McClellan has two fishing lakes complete with recreation and picnic areas.

Reilly Lake is located in the northeast corner of the main post. Yahoo Lake is located on Iron Mountain Road in the southwest corner of the main post.

Recreation and picnic areas are open year-round. A state fishing license and a Fort McClellan license and daily permit must be obtained before fishing.

Cane Creek on Pelham Range is available for fishing. Check with the Outdoor Recreation Office (Building 698) at 848-5663 before fishing.

Game Management

Hunters and fishermen can get information from the Game Management Office for hunting and fishing on post.

It is open during normal duty hours from March through mid-September. From mid-September through February the office is open seven days a week. For more information call 848-5663.

Bingo

Our bingo program is open to the entire Fort McClellan community, Aniston Army Depot and their bonafide guests. The bingo center is located in building 695 on 4th Avenue. Call 820-6699 after 4 p.m. for exact dates and times for the weekly bingo schedule.

Abrams Library

Abrams Library is located across from the Fire Station and just off the main post traffic circle.

In addition to an excellent selection of books and periodicals, the library offers a well-rounded collection of reference books, educational materials, military subjects and popular and classical records and tapes.



Reference services include on-line inter-library loan and database searching.

Videotape movies are also available for viewing in the library. Record players, tape players, a microfilm

reader/ printer, computers, a copy machine and typewriters are also available for use.

The library is open to active duty and retired military members, civilian employees and family members. For

more information call 848-3715 or 4151.

Army Travel

The fort's Army Travel Camp is located on the south side of Reilly Lake.

It consists of eight sites with water and electricity and a bath house with hot water. It is open year-round. For information call 848-4323.

Youth Services

The youth programs at Fort McClellan's Youth Services concentrate on the entire youth in what is known as developmental programs. To accomplish this, the Youth Council is helping to develop programs.

Fort McClellan is a forerunner in this concept. The fort's youth program includes an expanded sports program which is combined with local com-

munity leagues. This provides individual challenge and allows youth to make friends outside the post. In addition, lifetime sports such as golf, racquetball, swimming, fishing, bowling, and tennis are offered by Youth Services.

Youth Services also offers classes in piano, ballet, drama, jazz and folk dances. There is also a Youth Sponsorship Program which helps young people adjust to their new home and environment.

A popular program during the school year is the Homework Supervision Room. This allows children to do their homework in a structured environment where help is available.

The Fort's school-age Latchkey Program provides before- and after-school services for children of dual working parents or single soldiers. Included in this program are before- and after-school bus service to four off-post

elementary school, holiday day camps, AEA day camps, and summer day camps.

For information on these programs, call 848-3607.

Bowling

A 24-lane bowling center is available for all active and retired military members, their families, guests and civilians employed at Fort McClellan.

The center is located across from the Post Exchange and Commissary on 10th Street. The modern facility also houses a large snack bar, game room, and bumper pads for the children to use while bowling. In addition, there is a Pro Shop with ball bags, shoes and accessories and, on-site bowling ball measuring and drilling. Leagues are conducted year-round. The bowling center also has discount theme park tickets available for purchase. For more information call 848-5149.



Go Karts

A go-kart track opposite the PX-Commissary shopping mall, is open from mid-March through October for all active duty and retired military members, family members, guests and civilians employed at Fort McClellan.

Hours and fees vary. Call 848-5357 for more information.

Golf

The Cane Creek Golf Course is open to all active duty and retired military members, their families, guests, federal

the playing season and are announced in the post bulletin. A lighted, full service driving range is also available for practice. For more information call 820-7299.

Athletic Fields

Four softball fields, a running track, and a football field are available for organized intramural and unit play. Teams are organized and fields are scheduled through the sports office.

For information call 848-5249.

court, a sauna and steam bath, a health and exercise room and an indoor heated swimming pool with seating capacity for 150 spectators. The main gym floor has room for two volleyball games or two basketball games. Collapsible bleachers to accommodate 1,200 spectators are available at the gym.

● Miller Sports Arena, 848-4802, is furnished and equipped to accommodate a variety of team and individual sports including basketball, volleyball, badminton, weight lifting, and racquetball. The gym is also equipped with rollaway bleachers. Military members participating in organized sports programs have priority for use of the building.

Swimming

Fort McClellan has 3 swimming pools (1 indoor/2 outdoor) and two children's wading pool for use by active duty military retired military, Reserve Component members, DoD civilians and eligible family members of each. These swimming pools are located at Truman Gymnasium and Building 51. A small fee is assessed. For more information concerning seasons and hours of operation, call 848-5249.

Tennis

Four outdoor double courts and single court are open for tennis players on Fort McClellan.

They are located on 15th Street; 20th Street; 10th Avenue, by Allen Gym; and, 8th Avenue, by Haynes Gym. All are well-lighted for evening play. For more information, call 848-5249.

Family Fitness Center

The Family Fitness Center (Building 128) is located across the street from the post gas station. The center offers a variety of community services, such as



and non-appropriated fund employees, and reserve component soldiers at Fort McClellan.

The clubhouse facility has a pro shop, snack bar, shower and a lounge area. Rental clubs are available.

Tournaments are held throughout

Gymnasiums

Fort McClellan maintains two gymnasiums for use by soldiers, their families and civilian employees.

● Truman Gymnasium, 848-4656, is equipped with a handball/racquetball

aerobic exercise classes, youth activities, unit and private parties, Yosnakai Karate, Nautilus/work-out programs, and skate sessions. It is open seven days a week to all active duty and retired military members, their families and guests, and to civilians employed at Fort McClellan. Skating parties may be scheduled for Tuesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday. The center has available a pro-shop, Nautilus weight-lifting equipment, saunas, shower and locker facilities and a skating rink. Regular skating sessions are scheduled for Sunday. For more information, call 848-5249.

“Q” Lounge

The “Q” Lounge is for officers and eligible DoD civilians and is located in the basement of building 3137 just behind the Fort McClellan Lodge. The lounge opened in January 1991 and is designed for the young and the young at heart. The “Q” features entertainment every Friday and Saturday evening plus special events and parties. To see what’s happening at the “Q”, call 820-0851.

NCO Club

The Non-commissioned Officers’ Club has a spacious ballroom which can accommodate 325 people, a dining room with a seating capacity of 100, cocktail lounge and a casual lounge.

A popular feature of the club is the entertainment program which offers disco on Wednesday and Saturday nights. The club also offers special dining Wednesday through Saturday, 6 - 10 p.m. A spaghetti dinner is available for youngsters. The community Lunch Program is open Monday through Friday from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Membership is open to permanently assigned enlisted personnel in all grades, retired enlisted personnel and civilian employees of Fort McClellan. For more information, call 848-5301 or 5294.

Chemical Museum

The U.S. Army Chemical Corps Museum serves as a depository for Chemical Corps and chemical warfare historical artifacts and archival material

The museum has over 4,000 historical artifacts on display in the ex-

hibit area. This area also encases a World War I bunker and trench with period artifacts displayed inside the walls.

The gift shop inside the museum has many Chemical School and Chemical Corps related items and is open Friday from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. The gift shop also has a mail order section.


The museum is open weekdays from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Special tours and classes may visit the museum by notifying the museum curator three days in advance by letter or calling 848-3355.

MP Museum

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps Museum documents the history of the MP Corps from its earliest beginnings to the present.

The 12,000 square foot facility, located next to the U.S. Army Military Police School, houses historical documents and equipment, displays and photographs. The museum also houses a gift shop with MP specific souvenirs and memorabilia.

The museum is open Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and by appointment on weekends. For more information call 848-3050.



WAC Museum

The Women's Army Corps Museum, located just inside Galloway Gate, depicts the history, tradition and development of women in the Army from 1942 to the present.

The museum first achieved Department of the Army Museum Certification in 1980 and also achieved American Association Museum Accreditation in 1984.

Totaling 12,000 square feet, the museum houses a gift shop, exhibit

gallery, theater/lecture room, and research room.

The museum is open to the public Monday-Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. and by appointment on weekends for groups. There is no charge for admission. For more information call 848-3512.



Mission

HQ Battalion

Headquarters Battalion provides overall command and control, administrative and logistical support to its assigned units. The battalion supports installation engineering and transportation missions as well as providing music for military and recreational functions.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company provides command, control, administrative and logistical function for the soldiers assigned and attached to the company. The company provides the personnel for 14 different directorates which support the installation in everything from finance to security operations.

365th Transportation Company (Light)

The 365th was originally activated April 1944, in New Orleans, La. as the 365th Harbor Craft Company, Transportation Corps, assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, under the U.S. Army Forces Far East.

Effective November 13, 1969, the unit was assigned to Third Army, redesignated the 365th Transportation Company (Light Truck), and activated at Fort McClellan.

In addition to daily training for contingency missions, the company provides transportation assets in support of the installation service schools, Training Brigade, Anniston Army Depot and reserve units.

The company is a deployable FORSCOM unit. On an annual basis, the company sends a detachment to West Point, New York to support the summer training at the U.S. Army Military Academy. The company has participated three times in the large airborne exercise, Market Square. The unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia to support Operation Desert Storm.

Company C, 46th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy)

The 46th Engineer Battalion began in 1917 as the 46th Engineer Railway Maintenance-of-Way Battalion. The unit went through several redesignations from Transportation Corps to General Service to Construction Battalion. Finally, in June 1976, the battalion was designated as Combat Heavy.

The 46th Engineer Battalion has a long and proud history. The unit participated in World War I, fought in the Pacific Theater during World War II,

served in the Vietnam conflict and Operation Desert Storm.

Company C moved to Fort McClellan in 1971, but remains committed to its parent battalion, which is stationed at Fort Rucker, Ala. for training missions and deployment.


The unit provides construction support to the installation such as range maintenance, road construction and repair, renovation of existing buildings and new construction ranging from sidewalks to complete buildings.

The 14th Army Band

The 14th Army Band was originally activated as the 400th Army Women's Army Corps Band at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Following World War II, the band was inactivated, then reactivated during 1948 as the 14th Army band at Fort Meade, Maryland.

In 1954, the band moved to Fort McClellan to provide musical support for the WAC Center. For the next 22 years, the band gained worldwide fame as the world's only military musical organization comprised entirely of women.

In January 1976, Department of the Army began assigning male personnel to the band.





The band maintains a busy schedule in support of troop activities at Fort McClellan, Anniston Army Depot and Redstone Arsenal. The band also actively supports the post's community relations activities and the Montgomery and Nashville recruiting commands.

As the musical representatives of Fort McClellan, the members of the 14th Army Band proudly carry on the tradition of soldier/ musicians in all of their performances.


Basic Training Committee Group

The Basic Training Committee Group includes three training committees: Basic Rifle Marksmanship, Tactical Training, and Basic Military Subjects.

BTCG's mission is to present instruction to soldiers undergoing Initial Entry Training. In addition, BTCG operates the Drill Sergeant School which provides training for drill sergeant candidates and permanent party cadre.

Men and women entering the Army are trained in marksmanship, tactical techniques, and basic military subjects taught by a staff of experienced officers and NCO's.

Instruction and performance-oriented evaluations ensure that new soldiers acquire a foundation in basic soldiering skills in a manner consistent with the BTCG motto of "Always Excellent Training".



Training Brigade

Training Brigade was established in 1977 and includes four battalions.

The 787th MP Battalion and 795th MP Battalion are Military Police One Station Unit Training Battalions. Each has four companies.

The 82nd Chemical Battalion consists of five Chemical One Station Unit Training companies.

The Training Brigade is rounded out by the 39th Adjutant General Battalion which operates the Reception Center and the Fitness Training Company.

All battalions in the Training Brigade have proud and historic lineages. Both of the Military Police battalions were formed in World War II and saw extensive service in connection with that struggle. The 82nd Chemical Battalion was activated in 1942 and also served during World War II. As with the training battalions, the 39th Adjutant General Battalion (Reception) also saw service in World War II.

Training is diversified throughout the brigade and reflects the fast pace and multi-faceted military environment of today.



US Army Chemical School

The United States Army Chemical School which is located in Sibert Hall (Building 1081) is one of the most advanced and sophisticated institutes of its kind in the free world.

The Chemical School is the focal point for all the nuclear, chemical and biological training in the Army. In addition, personnel from sister services attend specialized courses designed to serve their needs.

The Chemical School centers around educating and training personnel in NBC defense operations, smoke, flame and obscurants operations, reconnaissance operations and retaliatory procedures. It is responsible for developing the doctrine, force structure and materiel requirements which will sustain our armed forces well into the future.

Included as part of the curriculum of every course taught in the Chemical School is a live-agent exercise conducted at the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF). This extraordinary facility is the only one of its kind which allows soldiers to train on their wartime missions in a realistic toxic environment.

The Chemical School is also the primary source of instruction on the newest chemical reconnaissance vehicle, the FOX. This highly sophisticated and sensitive piece of equipment was instrumental in providing protection against chemical agent attacks during Operation Desert Storm.





US Army

Military Police School

The United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS) provides instruction annually to some 10,000 Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, civilians and allied students.

USAMPS also provides commanders doctrinal and training publications to train MP's in the field and develops operational doctrine and how-to-fight tactics for military police employment in a wartime environment.

USAMPS performs branch and personnel proponent functions for all military police officers, warrant officers and enlisted personnel worldwide.

The school's accomplishment of its mission is enhanced by some of the most modern training facilities in the Army system.

142d EOD

The 142d Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) was originally formed January 11, 1941, as the 142d Bomb Disposal Squad with activation May 7, 1944, at Naples, Italy.

The squad was reorganized and redesignated as the 142d Ordnance Detachment (EOD) June 25, 1954.

However, the unit remains under the operational control of the 547th Ordnance Detachment at Fort Gillem, Ga.

The unit's mission is to provide explosive ordnance disposal support to Fort McClellan, Anniston Army Depot, 30 counties of Alabama, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Department of State and other locations or agencies as directed. The unit also actively supports the installation's "Project Beware."

DoD Polygraph Institute


Formally dedicated on April 15, 1986, the Institute is an outgrowth of the Army Polygraph School, which was first established at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as part of the Provost Marshal General School. Presently located at Fort McClellan, the Institute provides an intensively broad knowledge of education, research and development activities as relates to the psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD).

The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute was organized to: (1) provide basic and advanced instruction in PPD; (2) furnish educational assistance, instruction and advice on PDD matters to DoD components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, National Security Agency, Defense Investigative Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Inspector General);

and perform scientific research in PDD. Other federal agencies which are serviced by the Institute include the Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Customs; Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Defense Criminal Investigative Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the Department of Energy.

With continued support and guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, OSD, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), and the Commanding General of Fort McClellan, the Institute is vitally involved in the nation's security

(criminal law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence). The objective is to advance the science of psychophysiology as applied to the detection of deception.



History

Rumbling distant guns, firing across the bloody trenches of Europe, were far from the minds of rural Calhoun County, Ala., residents in 1917.

Little did they realize that "The War to End All Wars" in Europe was destined to forever change the area's farmlands and dense forests — with its game trails and berry thickets — into a modern "city" with more than 225 miles of hard surfaced roads and 26 miles of untreated roads.



Today this city is known as Fort McClellan. This year celebrated the 76th anniversary of the birth of the fort which now boasts an annual impact on the local area of more than \$1.2 billion.

How it Began

The Army gained interest in Calhoun county as the potential site of a military installation as early as 1898 during the Spanish-American War. The fourth Alabama Artillery had discovered that the Choccolocco mountains were an ideal background for firing shells.

Federal interest became more acute in

1912 after 20,000 National Guardsmen from the Department of the Southeast trained in the wooded area that would become Fort McClellan. The favorable reports received by the War Department following the training, spurred numerous subsequent visits by Army officers and high civilian officials from Washington to the Anniston area during the next four years.

Finally, in 1917, the federal government decided to purchase the Calhoun County site for use as an artillery range. Congress initially allocated

\$100,000, which was later supplemented by two further appropriations for a total of \$247,000, to buy 18,953 acres. The purchase contract was concluded March 17. Since the federal government had no immediate plans for the site, local farmers had been advised to cultivate their lands on the site during the summer of 1917.

Unbeknownst to the Alabama farmers, these plans would change rapidly only 20 days later when the United States declared war on Germany. It surprised local residents to learn that the nation would join the allied nations in what then U.S. Presi-

dent Woodrow Wilson had previously called a "war with which we had nothing to do."

The nation's sudden reversal of its neutrality in the European-centered conflict forced the War Department to rapidly raise an Army.

Due to the sudden mobilization, the Army notified the Anniston Chamber of Commerce in June 1917 that the federal government required a large portion of the proposed site immediately to begin training soldiers. The unexpected demand created an immediate problem; farmers with crops growing in their fields on the site would need to be paid a higher price than first proposed to compensate them for the loss of their crops. Local officials determined that an extra \$136,000 would be needed.

The congress couldn't react quickly to the unexpected monetary problem but the site was still needed to begin training the "Doughboys" for the war effort. Fortunately, the citizens of Anniston stepped in to save the day by underwriting the added cost incurred by the loss of local crops.

With the size of the fort's annual budget today, and the business brought to town as a result of the Army being here, local merchants now realize more than a million to one return on their investment.

The patriotic gesture by the citizens of Anniston through their Chamber of Commerce, allowed the construction contract to be finalized in June 1917. This paved the way for the War Department to issue General Orders 95 (July 18, 1917) which established "Camp" McClellan as one of 40 World War I mobilization camps around the nation.

This action by the War Department also began the flood of soldiers to Anniston — the flood continues today.

Construction Starts

Issuing orders was one thing but actually building facilities to train



thousands of soldiers in the sweltering heat and mosquito-infested forest was quite another. It took about 3,000 civilians and 2,000 soldiers to clear the trees, drain the mosquito bogs, build the roads and construct the first temporary barracks. Two weeks were needed to dig a trench — 15 miles long and more than a foot deep — for the fort's 10-inch water main.

By late September workers had completed 750 buildings and almost finished another 800. The war boom really hit the formerly rural Alabama area. At war's end in 1918, 1,551 buildings stood on the site built at a cost of \$3,195,452. The camp could then house 57,748 soldiers in summer and 27,152 during the winter.

Camp McClellan officially became Fort McClellan in July 1929. The fort has remained an important part of Calhoun County since. During World War II and estimated 500,000 soldiers trained here. During the battle against Hitler's Nazi Germany and his allies in Japan and Italy, the post doubled as a

Prisoner of War camp for about 3,000 German and Italian troops.

After World War II the fort was inactivated following a 1947 visit by General of the Armies Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff. During three idle years until 1950 the post's facilities deteriorated and the grounds and ranges overgrown. The 44th Engineer Construction Battalion was reassigned from Fort Bragg in January 1947 to begin rehabilitation of the fort in preparation for the planned summer encampment of the 31st National Guard. However, before the work was complete, the engineer battalion was reassigned to the Far East when communist aggression in Korea once again forced the nation to mobilize. A small group of permanent party troops remained to complete the \$10-million modernization project.

The fort was reactivated Jan. 4, 1951 to become the home of the Chemical School. The post was selected because of the extensive areas available for outdoor training and the varied terrain suitable for conducting all types of chemical field training.

The Army also selected the fort as home for the Women's Army Corps in 1951. Construction of the \$14-million Chemical School and the \$8-million WAC Center and School began in 1952.

McClellan Today

The fort currently has the unique honor of being the regimental home to both the Military Police Corps and the Chemical Corps. The post also boasts a Training Brigade, the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute and the free world's only toxic chemical agent training facility.

The post has over 2,900 civilians employed and approximately 8,000 soldiers assigned. During FY 1990 a monthly average of more than 1,500 soldiers participated in Initial Entry Training and One Station Unit Training here. An average of 590 officers,

warrant officers, enlisted members, and allied nation students attended advanced courses at the Military Police School monthly.

Also, nearly 400 officers, enlisted personnel, students from allied nations, and U.S. DoD civilians attended courses at the Chemical School monthly in FY 1990.


More than 50,000 Army Reservists and National Guardsmen participate in annual or weekend training at Fort McClellan. The fort also hosts junior and senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps training for a three-state area.

More than 3,800 military dependents live off-post in Calhoun County. Another 1,500 live on-post. There are more than 27,000 military retirees residing in the fort's area of responsibility. In addition, there are over 40,000 military retiree dependents in the area.

What began as a modest 18,953-acre artillery range 76 years ago has certainly grown. Today, the original site of the installation has expanded to 46,000 acres that really is a modern self-contained city. — Gary Jones, Fort McClellan Public Affairs Staff, 1987.



The Area



Anniston

Fort McClellan's closest neighbor is Anniston — 'The Model City'. Founded by Samuel Noble and General Daniel Tyler in the early 1870's, Anniston was nicknamed 'The Model City' because it was planned and laid out before opening to the public. As a result, this prosperous county seat has grown to a population of approximately 30,000 and has more than 120 industries specializing in everything from cast iron to textiles.

Centrally located along Alabama 21, Anniston serves as a mainstay for many of the county's smaller communities. The Calhoun County Courthouse is located here, as well as Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, a 370-bed facility with a staff of

more than 900, and Stringfellow Memorial Hospital, a technologically advanced health care facility.

Anniston is also a city of culture, and boasts a wealth of historical places. One of the most famous single structures is the Church of St. Michael and All Angels, considered one of America's most beautiful churches. Built by the Noble family, St. Michael's is listed in the National Register of Historic Places, and is renowned for its handcarved ceiling, marble altar, and graceful statues.

For the adventurer, Anniston offers the equally famous Anniston Museum of Natural History just south of Fort McClellan's Summerall Gate on Alabama Highway 21. Situated on 187 acres of parks and nature trails, the museum allows one to step into

Africa's Serengetti, explore a cave, visit with the Indians, or come face to face with a 2,000 year old mummy. The Regar-Warner Collection housed at the museum contains more than 900 specimens of birds and 1,000 eggs.

For those seeking community involvement, Anniston is rich in religious and civic organizations. The Anniston Civic Ballet and Dance Theatre and the Anniston Community are available for arts buffs, and the Knox Concert Series has brought nationally and internationally known acclaimed artists to the area annually.

Athletically speaking, the Anniston Municipal Golf Course, LaGarde Park, and Jaycee Park are but a few of the facilities located in the city.

A vast array of local clubs, organiza-

tions and churches round off the list of cultural offerings.

Educationally, Anniston has a total of nine schools with a total enrollment of approximately 4400. A total personnel count of 491 produces a pupil-teacher ratio of 17 to 1, with 60 percent of the operating budget coming from state appropriated funds.

Anniston is represented by Greyhound Bus, one trolley service and one passenger train service, in addition to freight lines.

Located 10 miles southwest of the city on 18,000 acres, Anniston Army Depot is the area's second largest employer with approximately 4,500 civilian and 60 military workers. The facility is the Department of the Army's sole tank rebuilding facility, and ships and receives over 400,000 tons of supply equipment and ammunition annually.

Oxford

Nicknamed the "Crossroads of Alabama", Oxford is one of Calhoun County's fastest growing cities. With access to Interstate 20, U.S. 78, and U.S. 431, Oxford lies just 20 minutes southeast of Fort McClellan via Alabama 21. From Oxford, Birmingham is about an hour's drive and Atlanta, Ga. is within an hour and a half's distance.

Some of Alabama's landmarks are also close at hand, with Alabama International Motor Speedway 15 minutes away, and both Logan Martin Lake and Jacksonville State University 20 minutes away. Likewise, Mt. Cheaha, Alabama's highest point, can be reached in a 15 minute scenic drive.

It is no wonder, then, that Oxford is growing rapidly, having doubled its population from 4,391 to 8,959 in the last ten years. And the trend is expected to continue as more industry and commerce locates in the county's transportation hub.

The city, incorporated in 1852, exists on the Mayor-Council form of government. Its school system is an integral part of the city, and offers a well-rounded curriculum ranging from athletics to specialties such as horticulture.

In addition to its own civic center, airport and railway system, Oxford boasts over 20 manufacturing companies, numerous hotels/motels and restaurants, and the Quintard Mall and downtown shopping areas.

Perhaps Oxford's newest old feature is the Olde Mill Antique Mall, where shoppers and dealers from all over the Southeast gather to browse through more than 68,000 square feet of antiques.

Jacksonville

Historic Jacksonville, located just 10 minutes north of Fort McClellan on Alabama 21, is Calhoun County's oldest town. From its beginnings as the first county seat, Jacksonville, first called Drayton, has grown to become the area's educational center.

Jacksonville State University, Alabama's fourth largest university, lies in the northern sector of the town and is spread out over more than 340 acres of rolling countryside. Divided into nine colleges, the university has over 7,000 students and functions as the city's largest employer.

The Jacksonville City School System, made up of two public schools with an approximate enrollment of 2,000 reaps many of the benefits of the university's close proximity in that they have served as laboratory schools.

Industry and commerce also benefit from the college town atmosphere.

Twelve larger industries employ close to 1,100 workers who produce a variety of goods from military patches to blended yarns to distribution of auto parts.

While Jacksonville reaches toward the

future with educational and industrial development, the nearly 10,000 residents remain proud of its rich history. The original town was built on acreage purchased from the Creek Indian Chief Ladige shortly after he received the land under the terms of the Treaty of Cusseta in 1832. Soon after the establishment of Benton (Calhoun) County in 1832, Drayton became the county seat in 1833 remained the center of county government until 1899 when the records were moved to Anniston.

The Civil War sent most of the male residents off to fight, and a number of Confederate generals made their headquarters at various times in the town before Federal troops occupied it. In the Jacksonville City Cemetery, a monument stands to Gallant John Pelham, a local boy and Confederate soldier who was killed at the Battle of Kelly's Ford.

Among sites to see in Jacksonville are the beautiful First Presbyterian Church, which served as a Confederate hospital in 1861, and Aderholdt's Mill, built around 1835 by Thomas Riley Williams.

Almost centrally located on the north-south transportation artery of the county, Jacksonville is governed by the Mayor-Council form of city government. The city is connected to other areas through Southern Railway and the Jacksonville Airport. An 89-bed hospital and medical complex add to the city's feeling of self-sufficiency.

Germania Springs, located just north of the city, serves a dual purpose as the city's primary source of water and as a gathering spot for local residents. The city has upgraded the picnic area to include tennis courts, baseball fields, pavilions and playground areas. A newer park is the Henry Farm Park, which consists of ballfields, playground pavilions and a walking trail.

At A Glance

For your information, here are more facts about Calhoun County:

Area Hospitals

Calhoun County has five hospitals which provide more than 730 hospital beds and approximately 2,000 medical professionals. In addition to Noble Army Community Hospital at Fort McClellan, state-of-the-art treatment is offered in Anniston at Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center and Stringfellow Memorial Hospital. The northern sector of the county is served by Jacksonville Hospital and Piedmont Hospital.

Media

In addition to the *McClellan News*, Calhoun County has one daily and three weekly newspapers. *The Anniston Star* is Alabama's largest "home-owned" daily newspaper. Weekly papers are *The Jacksonville News*, *The Piedmont Journal Independent*, and *Oxford Sun*.

Radio Stations within the area are WANA, WDNG, WLJS, WJXL, WOXR, WKFN, WPID, WHMA-AM, and WHMA-Alabama 100.

WJSU-TV-40, a CBS affiliate, is located in Anniston. WBRC-TV 6, an ABC affiliate and WVTM-TV 13, an NBC affiliate, each have news bureaus in Calhoun County. Area cable television is provided through Anniston Newchannels in most of Calhoun County except the Piedmont area, which is serviced by TCI Cablevision of Alabama.

Churches

There are more than 375 churches in Calhoun County representing most denominations.

Government

Calhoun County is governed by a five-man commission elected to a four-year term. The commission has the responsibility of overseeing all county agencies except the school systems.

SatoTravel

"A Full-Service Travel Company"

Building 2099

(Across from Bowling Alley)

(205) 820-7460

We are professionally staffed to handle all types of travel including:

1. Airline Reservations
2. Hotel, Motel Reservations
3. Car Rentals- domestic & international
4. Cruises
5. Tour Packages
6. Group Travel
7. Specialized & Adventure Travel
8. Air Travel Insurance

"Where Good Things Are Happening"

FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF SAKS

4723 Saks Road, Anniston
237-6932

Dr. W. Wayne VanHorn
Interim Pastor

SUNDAY SERVICES

Sunday School.....	9:45 a.m.
S.S. for the Deaf.....	9:45 a.m.
Morning Worship.....	11:00 a.m.
Children's Worship.....	11:00 a.m.
Discipleship Training.....	5:00 p.m.
Evening Worship.....	6:00 p.m.


WEDNESDAY NIGHT

Weekly Supper.....	5:00-6:15 p.m.
Adult Bible Study.....	6:30-7:30 p.m.
Youth Bible Study.....	6:30-7:30 p.m.
Children's Mission Groups.....	6:30-7:30 p.m.

SERVICES INTERPRETED FOR THE DEAF
Nursery Provided



Maps



Please see legend next page


NAME	MAP LOC.	BLDG. NUMBER	TELEPHONE NUMBER	NAME	MAP LOC.	BLDG. NUMBER	TELEPHONE NUMBER
39TH AG BN	K-13	500	4829	HAYNES OUTDOOR			
40TH MP BN	R-14	1802	3002	POOL	T-15		3391
82ND CHEM BN	J-9	2262	3917	HOUSING DIV	N-9	T-60	4125
84TH CHEM BN	H-10	1060	4712	IG	O-10	143A	5392
701ST MP BN	R-10	3160	3927	LAKE YAHOU	U-7		INFO 5663
787TH MP BN	T-16	1601	4468	MARSHALL FIELD	H-10		
795TH MP BN	R-14	1801	3511	MEDDAC	K-13	292	2200
HQ TNG BDE	T-17	1602	4107	MILLER GYM	P-11	130	4802
HQ BN	R-7	3161	5200	MPD/MILPO	O-11	162	5192
USACMLS	I-11	1081	5327	MP MUSEUM	R-11	3182	3522
USAMPS	R-11	3181	3028	NCO CLUB	Q-8	3212	5294
				NOBLE ARMY			
ABRAMS LIBRARY	O-11	2102	3715	HOSPITAL	K-13	292	2200
ACS	K-9	2203	4525	OUTDOOR REC			
ALCOHOL & DRUG				CHECKOUT CTR	L-15	699	5205
ABUSE PREV CTR	M-13	283	6163	OFFICERS' CLUB	M-9	51	5406
ALLEN GYM	S-15	1701	4160	ONE STOP JOB			
ARCHERY RANGE	I-14		INFO 5663	INFO CENTER	R-8	3213	3289
AUTO CRAFTS				PAO	O-10	144	5377
SIKOP	H-12	1800	5146	PMO	O-10	63	5178
BOWLING CENTER	Q-13	1928	5149	PX (MAIN PX)	P-14	1965	820-9400
BURGER KING	Q-13	1967	820-9648	POST OFFICE	Q-13	1966	820-6595
CAMP GROUNDS				POST THEATER	P-11	2101	3861
REILLY LAKE	B-15		INFO 5663	PX SERVICE			
YAHOU LAKE	U-7		INFO 5663	STATION	P-11	2109	820-9250
CAR WASH	R-12	1800	5146	RED CROSS	N-13	272	3169
CHEM MUSEUM	K-10	2299	3355	(EMERGENCY			
CHILD DEV CTR	L-11	2213	4857	AFTER DUTY			
CID	Q-10	63	5141	HOURS)			820-9110
CLASS VI STORE	P-13	2042	820-9280	REILLY LAKE	B-15		INFO 5663
CLOTHING SALES	N-12	229	4193	RUNNING TRACK	Q-10		
COMMISSARY	P-14	2041	3130	RV DUMP STATION	D-16		INFO 5663
CREDIT UNION	Q-15	1122	820-1500	SAFETY OFFICE	O-14	2090	5603
DCP	O-10	143B	3115	SILVER CHAPEL	O-10	67	5351
DEH	M-12	215	3215	SJA	O-10	63	5435
DENTAC/STOUT				SKEET & TRAP			
DENTAL CLINIC	Q-14	1929	3911	RANGE	T-7		INFO 5663
DOD POLYGRAPH				SOUTHTRUST			
INSTITUTE	S-11	3165	5915	BANK	P-12	2105	820-2500
DOL	N-12	241	5427	STOUT DENTAL			
DPCA	O-10	143B	4425	CLINIC	Q-14	1929	3911
DPTMSEC	O-10	143A	3588	TENNIS COURTS	M-138		INFO 3091
DRM	P-9	65	5233		R-7		
EDUCATION CTR	N-14	328	5263	TMP	O-12	O-12	4724
EEO	O-10	143A	3227	TRADEWINDS	P-15	1120	820-9530
ELEM SCHOOL	O-3	3681	820-2420	TRANSPORTATION	M-11	241	4625
EO	O-10	143B	5322	TRAINEE/			
FAMILY FIT CTR	P-11	128	5249	STUDENT PROC	O-13	2051	5582
FAMILY HOUSING	N-9	T-60	4125	CENTER	J-11	1012	4656
FT MCCLELLAN				TRUMAN GYM			
LODGE	Q-11	3127	4916	TRUMAN OUTDOOR			
FINANCE	O-10	142	4653	POOL	J-12		3102
GAME MGMT OFF	L-15	698	5663	TSC	N-14	267	4503
GO KART TRACK	P-12	T-2098	5357	UTILITY CLEAR-			
GOLF COURSE	L-8	2250	820-7299	ING HOUSE	O-9	T-60	820-9019
GORDON FIELD	Q-10			WAC MUSEUM	G-11	1077	3512
GULLION FIELD	R-9			WELCOME CENTER	Q-9	3295	4338/3546
HAYNES GYM	S-16	1702	4681	YOUTH SERVICES	O-3	3600	3607

POST BILLETING FACILITIES		
FACILITY	MAP LOC	BUILDING NUMBER
BILLETING OFFICE WELCOME CENTER 205-848-4338/3546	O-9	3295
DVQ BLDG	M-8 N-15 N-16 I-9	57 300 900 1026
VOQ BLDG	J-10	2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2275 2276 2277
	R-12	3133 3134 3136 3137
VEQ BLDG	N-14 O-16	269 937 938 940 941 943 944 945 946

AV CODE 865-XXXX (OP ASST 865-1110)
DIRECT DIAL: AREA CODE 205-848-EXT
*ON POST MILITARY PHONE DIAL 5-XXXX
POST DUTY OFFICER (B-3295) EXT 3821
POST OPERATOR 205-848-4611

Calhoun County
ALABAMA

ANNISTON ♦ JACKSONVILLE ♦ OXFORD ♦ PIEDMONT



- ★ TOURIST INFORMATION CENTER • For complete tourist information on Calhoun County and surrounding areas, stop by the Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Bureau located at 801 Noble Street, Anniston, 237-3536
- ① ANNISTON/CALHOUN COUNTY LIBRARY — ALABAMA ROOM • Trace your Alabama ancestors utilizing one of the most complete genealogy collections in Alabama. 108 E. 10th Street, 237-8501

Continued next page

- 2 **ANNISTON COMMUNITY THEATRE** • Year-round dramatic delights. 1041 Noble Street. For performance information & reservations call 236-8342
- 3 **ANNISTON MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY** • One of the Southeast's finest collections of natural history specimens. Regar-Werner Ornithology Hall, Lagarde African Hall, Egyptian Mummies, Underground Worlds — an Alabama Cave... Hwy. 21 N. in Lagarde Park. 237-6766 (closed Mondays)
- 4 **CANE CREEK FURNACE RUINS** • Part of the iron used to build the MERRIMAC, the famous Confederate ironclad gunboat, was smelted here. Janie Road
- 5 **THE CHURCH OF ST. MICHAEL'S & ALL ANGELS** • Built in 1888 by Anniston's founding families, this church is considered one of the South's most outstanding examples of Gothic architecture. 18th & Cobb Avenue. 237-4011
- 6 **CROSS PLAINS DEPOT & MUSEUM** • Depot construction began before the Civil War and was completed in 1869. Open by appointment and Sundays 2-4 p.m. Ladiga Street, 447-9007
- 7 **DR. J. C. FRANCIS' MUSEUM & APOTHECARY** • 1850's general practitioner's office and apothecary. Books, drug bottles, instruments and medical equipment used by physician and pharmacists of the period. Open by appointment -- Gayle Street, 435-7611 EXT 8
- 8 **FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH** • Congregation formed in 1834. Served as Confederate Hospital during Civil War. Clinton and Church Street
- 9 **FT. McCLELLAN** • Dubbed as the "Military Showplace of the South," Ft. McClellan is one of the nation's largest military bases. Highway 21 N., 848-5575
- 10 **GRACE EPISCOPAL CHURCH** • Called "A Poem in Cedar and Stone," the oldest church in town. Was built by Anniston's founding fathers. 10th and Leighton, 236-4457
- 11 **JACKSONVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY** • "The Friendliest Campus in the South" welcomes you with a number of cultural offerings ranging from theatre to music to visual arts. Highway 21 N., 782-JSU1
- 12 **MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENTAL MUSEUM** • Complete history of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps from the American Revolution to present day. 23rd Street, open Mon.-Fri. 8-4 weekends by appointment, 848-3522
- 13 **NEELY HENRY LAKE** • 11,000 acre lake excellent for skiing, boating and fishing. Hwy. 77
- 14 **NOBLE-McCAA-BUTLER HOUSE** • 1887 Victorian home remaining in the Noble family for 100 years. True Southern Bed and Breakfast Inn. Open for tours 11th and Fairmont, 236-1791
- 15 **OLDE MILL ANTIQUE MALL & VILLAGE** • Antiques and collectibles from over 150 antique dealers await you inside a century old cotton mill. Mill Street, 835-0599
- 16 **OXFORD DEPOT** • The first depot was a casualty of the Civil War, having been razed in 1865 and the current depot was built in 1884. Spring Street, one block off Main Street
- 17 **OXFORD LAKE & CIVIC CENTER** • Recreational facility with paved track around lake, playground, picnic facilities, tennis courts, 3 par golf course and driving range, pool, baseball complex and basketball courts. Highway 78 and I-20 on Recreation Drive, 831-2660
- 18 **PIEDMONT CHALLENGER MEMORIAL PARK & MONUMENT** • Exclusively designed park dedicated to the memory of the 1986 Challenger Crew. Hwy. 21, North
- 19 **TYLER HILL SQUARE HISTORIC DISTRICT** • Centered in a rising crest, a small square park is surrounded by majestic Victorian homes built in the late 1880's. East 6th Street and Lapsley Avenue
- 20 **U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS MUSEUM** • Collection exploding with intrigue and history of chemical warfare from Biblical times to the present nuclear age. 6th Avenue, Open Mon.-Fri. 8-4 weekends by appointment, 848-4449
- 21 **VICTORIA INN** • Built in 1888, The Victoria was home to three prominent Anniston families before its preservation as a Country Inn and Restaurant. Quintard Avenue (Hwy. 21) 236-0503
- 22 **WILLOW POINT MARINA & CAMPGROUND** • Recreational Marina Center. Tent and RV sites, boat rentals, sandy swimming areas, volleyball courts, badminton and horseshoes. Hwy. 77, N., 892-2717
- 23 **WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS MUSEUM** • You'll find no prouder women than those whose history comes to life in the Women's Army Corps Museum. Galloway Gate Road, Open Mon.-Fri., 8-4 weekends by appointment, 848-3512
- 24 **CALHOUN COUNTY BOAT & RECREATION FACILITY** • Boat launch, bait shop, picnic facilities and restrooms, fishing piers. Public Launch. Highway 77 N.

NEARBY ATTRACTIONS

- 25 **CHEAHA STATE PARK** • Mt. Cheaha is the highest point in Alabama. The park provides majestic views, camping accommodations, cabins, fishing and swimming. Hwy. 49, 1-800-ALA-PARK
- 26 **DeSOTO CAVERNS PARK** • Explore DeSoto Caverns, the Lost Trail Maze and pan for the gold DeSoto never found. Other park features include: picnic area, camping facilities, playground and hiking trails. Hwy. 76, Childersburg 378-7252
- 27 **NOCCALULA FALLS PARK** • Named after the legendary Indian Princess Noccalula who leaped to her death in the waters below. Other features include pioneer village, botanical gardens, campgrounds and picnic areas. Off I-59, 549-4663
- 28 **TALLADEGA SUPER SPEEDWAY** • Fastest closed track in the world with records exceeding 200 mph. Off I-20, Talladega, 362-2261
- 29 **ALABAMA INTERNATIONAL MOTORSPORTS HALL OF FAME** • Showcases racing vehicles that have set world speed records and antique automobiles. Adjacent to Speedway, 362-5002

Emergency Numbers

Police

Alexandria.....236-6395
Anniston.....238-1800
Coldwater.....236-6395
Eastaboga.....236-6395
Jacksonville.....435-6448
Ohatchee.....236-6395
Oxford.....831-3121
Piedmont.....447-9091
Weaver.....820-0530
Webster's Chapel...236-6395

Fire

Alexandria.....820-2121
Anniston.....237-3541
Coldwater.....236-6512
Eastaboga.....831-8962
Jacksonville.....435-7911
Ohatchee.....892-3911
Oxford.....831-3125
Piedmont.....447-9011
Weaver.....820-1120
Webster's Chapel...492-3311

Medical

For Ambulance Service, Dial
911

State Troopers

Highway Emergencies Only
Statewide.....1-800-525-5555
Jacksonville.....435-3521

Other

Sheriff.....236-6395
Civil Defense.....237-0982
Poison Control
Center.....1-800-462-0800
Local Poison
Information.....235-5151

Numbers To Know

The Fort McClellan Prefix is 848.
Use unless otherwise indicated.

A

Abrams Library.....3715
AFGE Local 1941.....4339
Airline Office.....820-0400
Ambulance Emergency.....12
American Red Cross
Emergency-Nights/ Holidays/
Weekends & After
Duty Hours.....820-9110
Station Director.....3169
Army Community Service.....3833
Army Emergency Relief.....5309
Arts & Crafts Center.....5642
AUSA.....5535

B

Bank (SouthTrust).....231-4360
Beauty Shop.....820-5940
Billeting Br (Hsg Div).....4916
Bowling Center.....5149
Bulletin3194

C

Center Theater.....3861
Chaplain
Family Life Chaplain.....4259
MP Sch Chaplain.....4244
Religious Education.....3557
Staff Chaplain.....5351
Tng Bde Chaplain.....3811
82nd Chem.....4771
787th MP Bn Chaplain.....4259
795th MP Bn Chaplain.....4259

Chapels

Centurion Chapel.....3113
Religious Activities.....3467
Silver Chapel.....3563
WAC Memorial Chapel.....4771
Chief Transportation Division3020
Child Development.....4857
CIDC 3d Region.....3330
Civilian Personnel Office.....3115
Civilian Pay.....3797
Clothing Sales Store.....4193

Clubs

Golf Clubhouse.....820-7299
Community Rec Ctr.....3502
NCO Club.....5294
Officers Club.....5406
Commercial Taxi.....820-4290

Commissary Sales Store.....3130
Community Counseling Ctr....3708
Community Health Nursing...3694
Community Rec.....3502
Credit Union.....820-1500
Criminal Investigators.....5122

D

Dental Activity.....4675
Department of Dentistry
Reception Desk.....2310
Desk Sergeant MP.....4531
Dial-Care.....2273
Disbursing (FAO).....3931
Duty Chaplain.....3421
Duty Officers

Co C, 46th Engr Bn.....3453
HHC Bn (Prov).....5200
HQ USACML&MP
CEN&FM.....3821
365th Trans Co.....5316
Education Center.....5419
Elementary School.....820-2420
Emergency Room (NACH).12/2345
Equal Emp. Opp. Off.....4874
Equal Opportunity Off.....3404
Exchange Mgt PX.....5621
Explosive Ord Disp Det.....5124

F

Family Advocacy Counselor...4525
Family Housing Br.....4125
Family Member Employment..4721
Federal Credit Union.....820-1500
Finance & Accounting Office
Fin. & Acc. Officer.....4803
Pay Inquiries.....4653
Fire Prevention & Protection

Chief.....3127
Report a Fire (Govt phones)....17
Report a Fire (Fam
Hsg/Coml).....820-1117
Fisher Library.....4414
Fitness Center.....5249
Flower Shop.....820-9480
Family Housing.....5212

G

Game Mgt Office.....5663
Guest House Reservations.....4338

H

Heat/Cold Recording.....3555
H-E-L-P Line.....4357
Household Furn.....5212

Household Goods Br.....4526
Housing Division.....5539

I

Identification Cards.....3641
Information (Hospital).....2341
Inspector General.....3628
Installation Postal Officer.....3872
Intramural Sports Dir.....3848

J

Jacksonville State Ctr.....820-9320
Judge Advocate.....5435

K

Kindergarten820-9180

L

Loan Closet (ACS).....5546
Locator (Post).....3795
Locator (After Duty Hours)....3821

M

McClellan News.....5574
Military Police
Emergency (recorded line)...5555

N

NCO Club.....5294

O

Outreach Coord (DCAS).....5441

P

PAY

Civilian.....3797
Inquiries.....4653
Military.....4092
Reserve.....4653
Personnel
Civilian.....3115
Military.....5615
Nonappropriated Fund.....5343
Pharmacy Service.....2207
Post Office.....820-6595

R

Red Cross

Station Manager.....3169
Emergency.....820-9110
Retirement Services.....5300

S

SATO.....4562/820-0400
Scouts

Boy Scouts.....4891
Cub Scouts.....820-3338
Girl Scouts.....820-3338
Service Station.....820-9310

V


Veterinarian Chief.....4415

Y

Youth Center.....3607

**We've got
something
for everyone.**

Army News
Community
Activities
School News
Sports
Classifieds



**Read All About
It In The**

**McClellan[®]
News**

GIVE YOURSELF A BREAK...

Save Time And Money By
Shopping At Home With
Your Fort McClellan
Newcomer's
Guide!



AIR CONDITIONERS

CARTER'S REFRIGERATION CO.
331 South Noble St.
Anniston..... 236-7494

AIRPLANES- SALES & SERVICE

**ANNISTON EXECUTIVE
AVIATION**
Anniston Metropolitan Airport
Anniston..... 831-4410

APPAREL- MEN'S

ON TIME FASHIONS
1105 Noble St.
Anniston..... 237-7302

APPLIANCES

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY
New and Used Appliances
Jacksonville..... 231-3646
Anniston..... 231-3823

A Heartfelt Thanks For All Those
Who Supported Me During and
After the Passing of My Darling
Wife Dorothy (Millie) on Jan. 5,
1991.-- William John Kontur,
USAF Ret.

DISCOUNT APPLIANCE CENTER

2727 Noble St.
Anniston..... 238-0074

AUTOMOBILES

CLARENCE COX USED CARS
Hwy 78 West
Oxford 831-9145

NORWOOD HODGES VW-MAZDA
104 Greenbrier Road
Anniston..... 237-1742

PEE WEE TURNER MOTOR CO.
In Business Since 1959
512 S. Quintard Ave.
Anniston..... 237-4649

SUPERIOR JEEP-EAGLE
600 Quintard Ave.
Anniston..... 236-8661

SUPERIOR OLDS-BUICK-NISSAN
110-120 S. Quintard Ave.
Anniston..... 237-1656
..... 236-7651

AUTO RACING

TALLADEGA SUPERSPEEDWAY
SWITCHBOARD
.....(205) 362-2261
TICKET OFFICE
.....(205) 362-9064

AUTOMOBILE PARTS

ALEXANDRIA AUTO PARTS
129 Post Oak
Alexandria..... 820-5100

EAST ALABAMA AUTO PARTS

P.O. Box 1469
Anniston..... 237-9461

Please see our display ad this page

EAST ALABAMA AUTO PARTS

WHOLESALE - RETAIL

- AMERICAN & FOREIGN PARTS
- ACCESSORIES
- SHERWIN WILLIAMS AUTO PAINT
- BODY SHOP SUPPLIES

MON - FRI 7:30 AM - 5:00 PM
SATURDAY 8:00 AM - 1:00 PM

MACHINE SHOP SERVICE



237-9416



1920 QUINTARD AV
ANNISTON

236-0351

831-2140

911 W 10TH
ANNISTON

827 SNOW
OXFORD

AUTOMOBILE RENTALS

A&A AUTO RENTAL INC.
MUNDY AUTO SALES
 519 S. Quintard Ave.
 Anniston..... **238-0519**

AUTOMOBILE REPAIRS, SERVICE

431 TIRE & AUTO SERVICE
 4790 U.S. Hwy 431
 Alexandria..... **820-2103**

BENTLEY'S AUTO SERVICE
 3528 N. Noble St.
 Anniston..... **237-3481**

GREENWOOD MOTORS & GARAGE
 724 W. 62nd St.
 Anniston..... **237-1542**
Please see our display ad this page

JOHNSON MUFFLER
 1708 Wilmer Ave.
 Anniston..... **237-9421**
Please see our display ad this page

MIDAS MUFFLER & BRAKE CENTER
 2001 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston..... **238-1566**

SOUTHERN STAR MOTOR COMPANY, INC.
 716 Wilmer Ave.
 Anniston..... **236-5389**
Please see our display ad this page

THORNHILL MUFFLER
 2091 Pelham Rd S.
 Jacksonville..... **435-5565**

BANKS

SOUTHTRUST BANK OF CALHOUN COUNTY, N.A.
 Ft. McClellan Branch
 Ft. McClellan..... **231-4360**
Please see our display ad this page

JOHNSON MUFFLER SHOP
Mufflers, Brakes, Catalytic Converters, Shocks
 Gary Mangum, Owner
1708 Wilmer 237-9421

BARBER/BEAUTY SHOPS

DIMENSIONS FAMILY HAIR CARE
 3608 Noble St.
 Anniston..... **235-2165**
Please see our display ad this page

SHEAR IMAGE BEAUTY SHOP
 814 South Pelham Rd.
 Jacksonville..... **435-2255**

You'll Find It All In The Fort McClellan Newcomer's Guide!

BARBER/BEAUTY SUPPLIES

RITE WAY BEAUTY SUPPLY
 2265 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston..... **237-8880**
Please see our display ad page 43

BICYCLES

FUN WHEELS, INC.
 1801 C Hwy 78 E.
 Oxford **831-9507**



DIMENSIONS Family Hair Care
 3608 Noble Street
 Anniston 235-2165


GREENWOOD MOTORS & GARAGE
 724 West 62nd Street
 Anniston 237-1542

SOUTHERN STAR MOTOR CO., INC.
 Maintenance & Repair Of Fine Imported Automobiles
 716 Wilmer Avenue, Anniston
236-5389

Equipped with the latest test equipment your Bosch Authorized Service Specialist is operated by trained technicians. We're specialists in testing, diagnosing and servicing all European cars equipped with the following Bosch systems:

- Gasoline Fuel Injection
- Electrical Systems
- Anti-Lock Brake Systems
- Hybrid Ignition
- Diesel Fuel Injection
- Electronic Systems

•Accessories



Bosch Authorized Service

SouthTrust Bank 

OF CALHOUN COUNTY, NA

FORT McCLELLAN OFFICE

YOUR BANK ON POST SERVING THE MILITARY WORLDWIDE

10 OFFICES AND 5 CONVENIENT ANYTIME TELLERS FOR YOUR 24-HOUR BANKING NEEDS

TELEPHONE (205) 231-4360
 Toll Free 1-800-443-5351



MEMBER FDIC

BOOK STORES

CAMELOT BOOKS
2201 Quintard Ave.
Anniston.....236-3474

DISCIPLE'S BOOKSTORE
1010 Hwy 431 N.
Anniston.....238-6451
Please see our display ad this page

BUS STATIONS

GREYHOUND BUS STATION
12 West 8th Street
Anniston.....236-6306

CABLE TELEVISION

ANNISTON NEWCHANNELS
620 Noble St.
Anniston.....236-7034
Please see our display ad this page

CATALOG OUTLETS

CATALOG OUTLET
1730 Quintard Ave.
Anniston.....236-2642

CHURCHES- BAPTIST

FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF SAKS-
4723 E. Saks Rd.
Anniston.....237-6932
Please see our display ad page 32

LIGHTHOUSE BAPTIST CHURCH
Free Bus Service
Hwy 431, 400 W. 48th St.
Saks.....238-0339
238-8456

CHURCHES- PRESBYTERIAN

FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF ANNISTON
1701 Henry Road
Anniston.....237-5458

CHURCHES- UNITED METHODIST

MCCOY MEMORIAL UNITED METHODIST CHURCH
2600 Brighton Ave.
Anniston.....236-5141

CREDIT UNIONS

FORT McCLELLAN CREDIT UNION
P.O. Box 5250
Fort McClellan.....820-1500
Please see our display ad inside back cover

DENTISTRY

THOMAS D. SHARP, D.M.D.
2427 Hwy 202
Anniston.....236-5343

ELECTRICIANS

ACKER ELECTRIC COMPANY
Saks Shopping Center
Anniston.....236-8100
Please see our display ad this page

FINANCIAL PLANNING

IDS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC.
PERSONAL & BUSINESS PLANNING
● Investment & Protection Planning
● Retirement Planning
● Tax & Estate Planning
● Over 150 Financial Products & Services
FREE 30 MINUTE CONSULTATION
BOB CHESNUT / JAY FREELAND
Oxford.....831-9204

FISHING TACKLE/BAIT

RON'S BAIT SHOP
8067 Hwy 62
Alexandria.....892-0592

FLORISTS/ FLORAL SUPPLIES

WEAVER FLOWER SHOP
601 Astor St.
Weaver.....820-2593
Please see our display ad this page

WRIGHT'S FLORIST & GIFT
1007 Hwy 431 N.
Anniston.....236-5758

WEAVER
Flower Shop

Flower For All Occasions

*Fresh, Potted Plants
Silk & Dried
We Specialize In Weddings
Bob & Jackie Pettitt
Owners*

**601 Astor St.
Weaver
820-2593**



RITEWAY
BARBER & BEAUTY SUPPLIES



*Clippers *Wigs
*Beauty Products

*BIG DISCOUNT On All Hair Care Products


**226 S. Quintard Ave.
Anniston, AL 36201
(205) 237-8880**

Wire Entertainment!

NewChannels
Cable Television 

236-7034

**620 Noble St.
Anniston, AL
36201**



ACKER

ELECTRIC

COMPANY

BOX 157, ANNISTON, AL 36202

Gerald Acker
President

Aaron Acker
Vice President

Mark Acker
Vice President

Acker Electric is proud to be identified with our military.

Military Contractors


- Commercial
- Industrial
- Institutional
- Service
- Outdoor Lighting
- Power Distribution

A Merit Shop

Five Points Saks - Hill Street - Anniston, AL

(205) 236-8100

FAX (205) 237-1102

DISCIPLE'S  **BOOKSTORE**

To prepare God's people for works of service. Eph. 4:12

Bruce & Sonia Clemments, Owners

Rick Siskey- Manager

- Books
- Gifts

- Bibles
- Video Rentals

- Music
- Cards

Open Mon-Sat 10:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m.; Wed. 10 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

1010 Hwy 431 N., Anniston
238-6451

ALEXANDRIA WHOLESALE FLORIST
7123- 3 Oak Plaza
Alexandria.....820-1620

FUNERAL HOMES

K.L. BROWN FUNERAL HOME
322 Nesbit St.
Jacksonville.....435-7042

FURNITURE

JOHN'S FURNITURE GALLERIES
1714 Hwy 21 S.
Oxford.....831-8891

ANNISTON FURNITURE FAIR
Lowest Discount Prices
Recliners - Furniture - Bedding
Easy Terms - Free Delivery
3400 N. Noble St.
Anniston.....236-4517

HAYES GALLERIES, INC.
324 Monger St.
Across from Red Lobster
Oxford.....831-8477

HOBBIES

CAMELOT BOOKS
2201 Quintard Ave.
Anniston.....236-3474

LENLOCK HOBBIES
Lenlock Center No. 1
Anniston.....820-7304

HOSPITALS

STRINGFELLOW MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
301 East 18th St.
Anniston.....236-8900

HOTELS, MOTELS


AMERICAN INN
1015 Hwy 431 N.
Anniston.....237-2525
Please see our display ad inside front cover

DAYS INN OXFORD
Military, Family Rates
Continental Breakfast - FREE HBO
Pool, Staggerlee Lounge
No. 1 Recreation Drive
Oxford.....835-0300

GAMECOCK MOTEL
1530 Pelham Rd. South
Jacksonville.....435-3300
Please see our display ad this page

HOLIDAY INN ANNISTON/OXFORD
Hwy 78 & 21
Oxford.....831-3410
Please see our display ad this page

Coffee Bars
Direct Dial
Phones



Color Cable TV
Pool

1530 PELHAM ROAD SOUTH JACKSONVILLE
Located Just 5 Minutes From JSU & 10 Minutes From Fort McClellan
435-3300

VANN THOMAS MOTEL
American Owned & Operated
32 Air Conditioned Rooms
Color TV, HBO Swimming Pool
Free Local Telephone Service
Next Door To Shoney's
Rooms \$15.95 & Up

3002 McClellan Boulevard 235-2081

NICE NEAT CLEAN



I-20 at EXIT 185
1007 HIGHWAY 21 SOUTH
OXFORD, AL 36203
(205) 831-6082

REMOTE TV - FREE HBO
FREE COFFEE- FREE LOCAL CALLS
AARP - AAA - COMMERCIAL
GROUP DISCOUNTS

ASK ABOUT OUR SPECIAL MILITARY
& FAMILY RATES

Located Behind Burger King & Arby's
FOR RESERVATIONS 1-800-251-1962
OR CALL DIRECT

SAVINGS IN ANNISTON/OXFORD, AL

Holiday Inn

Hiway 78 & 21 Oxford, AL 36203
Just 2 blocks off I-20 (205)831-3410

20% OFF
November thru March
15% OFF
April thru October
Discount off listed rates

- ◆ London House Restaurant
- ◆ Cambridge Pub
- ◆ Meeting and Convention Facilities

Complimentary Shuttle to Ft McClellan
Not valid with other discounted rates or promotions

LIBERTY INN
6220 McClellan Blvd.
Anniston..... **820-1000**

McCLELLAN INN
5708 Weaver Road
Anniston..... **820-3144**
Please see our display ad this page

NELFORD INN EFFICIENCY MOTEL
Military Rates
Maid Service- HBO
Daily & Weekly Rates
403 S. Wilmer Ave.
Anniston..... **237-2319**

RED CARPET INN
1007 Hwy 21 S.
Oxford..... **831-6082**

VANN THOMAS MOTEL
3002 McClellan Blvd.
Next to Shoney's
Anniston..... **235-2081**
Please see our display ad page 44

VICTORIA INN
1604 Quintard Ave.
Anniston..... **236-0503**
Please see our display ad this page

INSURANCE



The Traveler's Stop Sign
New Name
New Look
New Services

- Newly Renovated Rooms
- Complimentary Continental Breakfast Buffet
- Military and Family Rates
- Extended Stay Rates
- All First Floor Rooms
- Kitchenettes Available
- Outdoor Swimming Pool
- ESPN, CNN and HBO

25 ELM STREET
I-20 AT S.R. 21, EXIT 185
OXFORD, ALABAMA 36203

1-205-831-9480

1-800-441-9888

FOR NATIONAL TOLL FREE RESERVATIONS



The Victoria **236-0503**
A Country Inn Hotel & Restaurant

ELEGANCE AT AN AFFORDABLE PRICE
GOURMET DINING
FRESH SEAFOOD DAILY
CAREFULLY SELECTED IMPORTED WINES
ELEGANT HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS
48 GUEST ROOMS
3 SUITES
FURNISHED WITH PERIOD ANTIQUES

1604 QUINTARD AVE.

Anniston's  *Newest*


McClellan INN

820-3144

- New Comfortable Rooms
- Direct Dial Executive Phones
- Color TV & Radio
- Free HBO & Cable
- Closest to Fort McClellan
- Daily-Weekly-Monthly Rates
- Major Restaurants & Theaters

Nearby

HIGHWAY 21 N.
ON LEFT

Liberty Inn

"AFFORDABLE LUXURY MOTEL"
6220 McCLELLAN BLVD

CONGENIAL SOUTHERN HOSPITALITY
"CLEAN ROOMS GUARANTEED"

820-1000

You're so special.

TOLL FREE FOR RESERVATIONS 1-800-533-3770
Directly across from Fort McClellan On Highway 21 North
1/4 Mile Past Baltzell Gate

- King and Queen Size Beds - 34 Channel Remote Color TV - HBO, ESPN Free
- Refrigerators, Laundromat, Microwave Oven, Picnic Area and Pool (operates 24 hours) - Conveniently located to area restaurants, shopping centers and entertainment - All Major credit cards accepted - AARP, AAA, Military, Commercial, Group and Athletic Rates Available - FAX communication capable
(205) 820-1000 - VCRs and Movies Available -
'Quality For Your Sake - We appreciate your patronage. Our spacious accommodations are affordable and the cleanliness of our rooms is guaranteed.

ALFA INSURANCE-
JOHNNY YOUNG, LUTCF
 1516 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston.....237-8700

ALFA INSURANCE
DISTRICT OFFICE
 Agents Jim Denton & Jim
 Holloway
 429 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston.....237-1635

STATE FARM INSURANCE-
GEORGE J. DOUTHIT &
BILL WARD
 1329 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston.....236-1966

STATE FARM INSURANCE-
BOB KENAMER
 1130 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston.....237-5911

INTERIOR DECORATORS

PLAZA DECORATING
 2427 Hwy 202
 Wellborn Plaza
 Anniston.....237-6948
Please see our display ad

JEWELRY

MARY LOU'S
 1111 Wilmer Ave.
 Anniston
 237-0145
OPEN TUES-SAT
 Nightly Drink Specials
 -Wednesdays-
 Free Admission With
 Military ID
 Dance & Top 40 Music

SISTER'S TREASURES
 815 Snow St.
 Oxford.....835-1594

LOCKSMITHS

ANNISTON SAFE & LOCK CO.
 1230 Wilmer Ave.
 Anniston.....238-1111

MILITARY SUPPLIES

SUPER TROOPER
 100 D Central Pkwy
 Lenlock.....820-0165
Please see our display ad on back cover

MUSEUMS

ANNISTON MUSEUM OF
NATURAL HISTORY
 Exhibits include: African and North
 American mammals, over 400
 specimens of birds, an Alabama cave,
 authentic Egyptian mummies, Changing
 Exhibit Gallery, nature trails, picnic
 areas.
 50% Discount off admission with valid
 military I.D. card
 4301 McClellan Blvd.
 Lagarde Park
 Anniston.....237-6766

NIGHTCLUBS

MARY LOU'S
 1111 Wilmer Ave.
 Anniston.....237-0145
Please see our display ad

OPTOMETRISTS

DRS. BONDS, CHANDLER
& ASSOCIATES
 Jacksonville.....435-8027
 Piedmont.....447-6413
 Anniston.....238-1100
 Gadsden.....492-8000

PAINT

TRIPLETT PAINT &
DECORATING CENTER, INC.
 1800 Wilmer Ave.
 Anniston.....236-5601

PAWN SHOPS

McCLELLAN PAWN & JEWELRY
 3004 McClellan Blvd.
 Anniston.....237-6089
Please see our display ad

PETS

BLAIR'S PET SHOP
 4630 Ala. Hwy 62
 Ohatchee.....892-3106

PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS

BROWN, JOHN O. M.D.
 1460 First Ave. SW
 Jacksonville.....435-2895

PICTURE FRAMING

NUNNALLY'S FRAMING
 1023 Noble St.
 Anniston.....237-5921

PRESCHOOLS


CHILDREN'S CONNECTION,
INC.
 7115 U.S. Hwy 431
 Alexandria.....820-5437

PRINTING

MINUTEMAN PRESS
 1928 Quintard Ave.
 Anniston.....236-1237

eye exam

If the fine print you're reading now is as close as you've come to
 an eye exam in the last year, we're concerned...and you should be too.



Caring, concerned doctors
Personal attention
Thorough, computerized eye exams
Contact lens evaluations
Evening and Saturday hours
24 hour service, 3 year eyewear warranty
CHAMPUS and most insurance plans accepted

DRS. BONDS, CHANDLER & ASSOCIATES
 Quality Eyecare For A Lifetime

Jacksonville 435-8027 Piedmont 447-6413 Anniston 238-1100 Gadsden 492-8000

McClellan
Pawn & Jewelry
 \$ Quick Confidential Loans \$
We Make Loans On
Most Anything Of Value
 GUNS - TVS - STEREOS
 - CAMERAS - VCRS -
3004 McClellan Blvd.
Anniston
 Across From K-Mart By Foot
 Bros. Carpet
237-6089
 Herman Chitwood, Owner

Plaza
Decorating

Floors
 Carpet Vinyl Wood Tile

Walls
 Paint Wallpaper

Windows
 Draperies Blinds Shades

Watch For Our New Location!
 Hours: 8 a.m. - 5 p.m.
237-6948 237-6949

GENTA
MEDICAL CLINIC

JOHN O. BROWN,
M.D.

- EAR, NOSE AND THROAT
- HEAD AND NECK SURGERY
- AUDIOLOGY
- FACIAL PLASTICS

1460 1st AVE SW
JACKSONVILLE
435-2895

WE ACCEPT BLUE CROSS PMD,
 CHAMPUS, CAL-MED, MAIL
 HANDLERS AND OTHER INSURANCE

RESTAURANTS

BETTY'S BAR-B-Q
401 South Quintard Avenue
Anniston.....**237-1411**


CUSTOM PIZZA
1009 Hwy 431 N.
Anniston.....**236-1800**
Please see our display ad

HITCHING POST
7400 McClellan Blvd.
Anniston.....**848-9606**
Please see our display ad page 48

JACK'S
5700 Pelham Rd. Lenlock
Anniston.....**820-1240**
1900 Quintard Ave.
Anniston.....**237-1781**
Please see our display ad inside front cover

LIGHTHOUSE SEAFOOD RESTAURANT
1800 South Quintard Ave.
Anniston.....**835-0058**
Please see our display ad

TOP O' THE RIVER
3220 McClellan Blvd.
Anniston.....**238-0097**



**Before You Shop
In Calhoun
County, Consult
Your
Fort McClellan
Newcomer's
Guide!**



**Buy One, Get One
FREE!**

**BUY ONE
GET ONE
FREE!**

Cheese Sm. \$6.53
Lg. \$9.87
Additional Items
Sm. 90
Lg. \$1.25

MENU ITEMS

Pepperoni
Sausage
Beef
Mushrooms
Ham
Green
Peppers
Onions
Hot Peppers
Olives
Extra Cheese
Anchovies
Thick Crust
Pineapple
Italian Sausage

**CUSTOM
PIZZA
COMPANY**

1009 Highway 431, North
Anniston, Alabama 36201
(Located one block off of McClellan Blvd.)

**Call Us First
236-1800**

Order One Of Custom Pizza Co.'s
Delicious Small Or Large Pizzas
And We'll Give You A Second
Identical Pizza

FREE!

Hours

Sunday - Thursday 11 am until 12 Midnight
Friday & Saturday 11 am until

**SUBMARINE
SANDWICHES**

Italian Sub Lg. \$5.05
Sm. \$2.85

Ham, Cheese, Sausage,
Tomatoes, Lettuce, Onions,
Peppers and Sauce

Ham 'N' Cheese Lg. \$5.05
Sm. \$2.85

Tasty Ham, Cheese, Tomatoes,
Lettuce and Sauce

Bread Sticks \$1.59
Golden Brown Breadsticks
covered with melted butter
and sprinkled with Parmesan
Cheese

12 oz. can
Coke .50

FREE PIZZA AND FREE DELIVERY*

*Limited Delivery Area


Buy One, Get One FREE! 2 Small Pizzas Cheese & 2 Items Plus two 12 oz. cans of Coke \$8.99 <small>No other coupon good with this offer. Prices do not include tax. Monday coupon when ordering.</small>	Buy One, Get One FREE! 2 Large Pizzas Cheese & 2 Items Plus two 12 oz. cans of Coke \$12.99 <small>No other coupon good with this offer. Prices do not include tax. Monday coupon when ordering.</small>	Buy One, Get One FREE! 2 Large Meateaters Pizzas \$13.99 <small>TAX INCLUDED. No other coupon good with this offer. Prices do not include tax. Monday coupon when ordering.</small>	Buy One Get One FREE! 2 Large Specials 7 ITEMS FOR THE PRICE OF 5 Pepperoni, Sausage, Ham, Beef, Onions, Green Peppers & Mushrooms No substitutions \$14.95 <small>No other coupon good with this offer. Prices do not include tax. Monday coupon when ordering.</small>
---	--	--	---

LIGHTHOUSE SEAFOOD RESTAURANT

Home of "Super Seafood Buffet"

Featuring Over 36 Items Including All You Care To Eat:

CRABLEGS - PEEL N' EAT SHRIMP - CLAM STRIPS - RED SNAPPER - BROILED ITEMS
GREEK STYLE CHICKEN - DEVEILED CRAB - PERCH - CATFISH - SALAD BAR - MORE!!



1800 South Quintard Avenue
Anniston, Alabama
835-0058

BUFFET

Monday-Saturday 5:00-9:30

Sunday Noon-9:00 p.m.

**ORDER FROM OUR MENU OR TRY OUR
BUFFETS- ALL ARE BOUND TO PLEASE!**

**CRABLEGS, SCALLOPS, OYSTERS, STEAKS
AVAILABLE FROM OUR MENU ANYTIME!**

HOURS: Monday-Saturday: 4:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m.
Sunday: Noon - 9:00 p.m.

MC/VISA, AMEX, DINERS CLUB WELCOME!

BANQUET ROOM AVAILABLE

SCHOOLS- COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES

JACKSONVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY

Jacksonville....Info 231-5781
Please see our display ad

SCHOOLS- PRIVATE

CARE-X-CEL KINDERGARTEN & PRESCHOOL

5015 Arrow Ave.
Anniston..... 820-2700

JACKSONVILLE CHRISTIAN ACADEMY

831 Alexandria Road S.W.
Jacksonville..... 435-3333
435-2059

SACRED HEART CATHOLIC SCHOOL

1820 McCall Drive
Anniston..... 237-4231
Please see our display ad

TRINITY CHRISTIAN ACADEMY

1500 Airport Rd
Oxford..... 831-3333

TANNING BEDS

TAN TO A TEE

211 H. South Quintard Ave.
Anniston..... 231-1027

VALLEY TANNING BEDS

5373 Hwy 431
Alexandria..... 820-4779

TELEVISION REPAIR

ED'S TV SERVICE

1612 W. 10th St.
Anniston..... 237-8607

TIRES

OK TIRE STORE

1030 Moore Ave.
Anniston..... 236-7523
Please see our display ad

TRANSPORTATION-TROLLEY

ANNISTON EXPRESS

Call for Information
Anniston..... 820-7600
Please see our display ad

TRAVEL AGENCIES

SATO TRAVEL

Building 2099
Fort McClellan..... 820-7460
Please see our display ad on page 32

TRAVEL WORLD

Guaranteed Lowest Prices Available!
AIR-LAND-SEA
Our Services Are Free!
In The Holiday Inn
Oxford..... 831-0664

VETERINARIANS

JACKSONVILLE VETERINARY SERVICE

PAULA THORNE, D.V.M.
385 Greenleaf St. SW
Jacksonville..... 435-4887

Hitching Post

7400 McClellan Blvd.
Anniston, AL
848-9606

'Home of the Wimpyburger'

Call Ahead For Faster Service
Hand-Dipped Ice Cream



"TO SERVE YOU BETTER"

SERVING ANNISTON & CALHOUN COUNTY

SINCE 1951

1030 MOORE AVE.
ANNISTON, ALABAMA
DIAL 236-7523



A New Way to Express Yourself!!

For Public Transportation within the Anniston Metro Area*, call Express Center at 820-7600.

Service Area: Anniston, Hobson City, Fort Mc Clellan



JACKSONVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY

Jacksonville, Alabama

For information contact the Office of Admissions at (205) 782-4000

Sacred Heart School
Kindergarten Thru 8th Grade
1821 McCall Drive, Anniston
(205) 237-4231

- *Small Classes
- *After School Care
- *Active Scouting
- *Music Instruction
- *Affordable Rates
- *Full-time PE Instructor
- *All Teachers State Certified

Please call the school (205) 237-4231 for more information and an application. Sacred Heart School is open to students of all faiths. Sacred Heart does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, creed or national origin.





FORT McCLELLAN

CREDIT UNION

**P.O. BOX 5250
Ft. McClellan, AL 36205
820-1500**

**106 E. 19th Street
Anniston, AL 36201
237-2113**

**In State
1-800-433-6917**

**Out of State
1-800-642-1220**

ACCEPT NO SUBSTITUTES FOR SERVICE


'We're The Only One'

Services Available

**Certificate of Deposit
Share Accounts
Share Draft Accounts (checking)
IRA Certificate
Christmas Club Accounts
Mastercard & Visa Accounts
Commercial Money Orders (CMO)
Automatic Teller Machine Exchange
Network
Bank By Mail
Family Membership
Free Notary Service
Travelers Cheques
Money Orders
Six Flags Tickets (when available)**

**Loans - Signature Line of Credit
New Auto & Used Auto
New Boats & Used Boats
Bill Consolidation
Vacation Expense
First & Second Mortgage Loans
Home Improvement Loans
Mobile Homes, New & Used
Construction Loan
Motorcycle, New & Used
Share Secured Loan
Secured Certificate Loans
Credit Life & Disability
Insurance on Loans
Financial Counseling Service**

Direct Deposit



YOU

**are the
CREDIT UNION**

SUPERTROOPER

FINE MILITARY UNIFORMS AND ACCESSORIES

WELCOMES YOU AND YOUR FAMILY
TO FORT MCCLELLAN , ALABAMA



WE CARRY A COMPLETE LINE
OF MILITARY UNIFORMS AND
ACCESSORIES TO MEET YOUR
EVERY NEED.


- * MEDALS, RIBBONS,
PATCHES AND INSIGNIA
- * DOG TAGS, NAME TAPES
AND NAME TAGS MADE
WHILE YOU WAIT !
- * FIELD UNIFORMS AND
ACCESSORIES
- * STOCK DRESS UNIFORMS
- * CUSTOM MADE UNIFORMS
- * EXPERT TAILORING AND
ALTERATIONS
- * MILITARY GIFT ITEMS

OPEN MONDAY THRU
SATURDAY
9 AM TO 6 PM
SUNDAY NOON TO 4 PM

820-0165

100 D CENTRAL PARKWAY
"IN CENTRAL PARK"

Fort McClellan Post Map & Reference



BIOGRAPHY

MAJOR GENERAL ALFONSO E. LENHARDT

**COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES
ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE
CENTERS AND FORT MCCLELLAN**

**COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES ARMY
MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL**



Major General Alfonso E. Lenhardt is currently the Commanding General, United States Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan and Commandant of the United States Army Military Police School. Prior to that he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Installation Management, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Major General Lenhardt graduated from the University of Nebraska with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice. He also holds a Master of Science Degree in Administration of Justice from Wichita State University, and a Master of Arts Degree in Public Administration from Central Michigan University. Major General Lenhardt is a graduate of the Military Police Officer's Advanced Course, the Criminal Investigations Supervisor's Course, the Physical Security Officer's Course, the F.B.I. National Academy, the Criminal Investigation Logistics Management Course, the F.B.I. Hostage Negotiations Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the National War College, the Senior Officials in National Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the Human Resources Management Program at the Executive Business School, University of Michigan.

Major General Lenhardt's previous assignments have included tours at: The United States Army Recruiting Command, Fort Sheridan; Commander, 18th Military Police Brigade, V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany; Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (EO&SP); Military Representative to the Defense Advisory Committee On Women In The Service (DACOWITS); Executive Officer and Assistant to the Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Commander, 385th Military Police Battalion, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany; and Tactical Officer at the United States Military Academy, West Point.

Major General Lenhardt's military decorations include: the Combat Infantryman's Badge; the Distinguished Service Medal; the Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit (1 OLC); the Bronze Star Medal; the Purple Heart; the Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLC); the Air Medal (2 OLC); the Joint Service Commendation Medal; the Army Commendation Medal (2 OLC); the Army Achievement Medal; the Humanitarian Service Medal; the Good Conduct Medal; the National Defense Service Medal (with star); the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm; the Army Service Ribbon; the Overseas Service Ribbon; Vietnamese Civil Action Medal; the Vietnam Campaign Medal; and the Vietnam Service Medal. Major General Lenhardt is also a military parachutist and has been awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff Identification Badge. Civilian recognition includes his 1976 national selection as an "Outstanding Young Man in America," and recipient of the General Horatio Gates Award presented by the Adjutant General Corps and Regiment.

Major General Lenhardt is married to the former Jacqueline Odell Hill. They have three daughters, Tracey, Kimberly, and Tracey.

July 1994

BIOGRAPHY

BRIGADIER GENERAL RALPH G. WOOTEN

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS AND FORT MCCLELLAN

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL

Brigadier General Ralph G. Wooten, a native of LaGrange, North Carolina, was commissioned in 1968 upon graduation from the Infantry Officer Candidate School. He is also a Graduate of the Chemical Officer Advanced Course, the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, the Defense Systems Management College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Brigadier General Wooten holds a Bachelors Degree in Biology from North Carolina Central University, a Masters Degree in Business Management and a Masters Degree in Logistics Management from Central Michigan University.

Brigadier General Wooten assumed the position as Deputy Commanding General, Fort McClellan, Alabama, and Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School on 2 December 1994. His other major duty assignments have included: Training Officer, Infantry Officer Candidate School, Ft Benning, GA; Platoon Leader and Battalion Adjutant, 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam. After returning from Vietnam, he was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division located at Ft Bragg, NC. During this period (1972-77), he served as a Chemical Officer and Logistics Staff Officer for the Division's Artillery Brigade, Commander, 14th Chemical Detachment, Commander B Company, 782nd Maintenance Battalion and Division Chemical Officer. Other key assignments have included: Branch Chief and Deputy Director, NBC Training Department U.S. Army Chemical School, Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD; Material Readiness Officer and Commander, Material Management Center, 3rd Armored Division, Frankfurt Germany; Deputy Director, Research, Development and Engineering Support Directorate and Chief of Staff, Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, APG, MD; Logistic Planning Officer, ACS, G4 III Corps and Ft Hood, Ft Hood, TX; Commander, 2nd Chemical Battalion, 13th Corps Support Command, Ft Hood, TX; Commander, U.S. Army Environmental Center, APG, MD and Joint Program Manager for Biological Defense, Falls Church, VA.

Brigadier General Wooten's military decorations include the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze star (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), The Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters), the Air Medal (two awards), the Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), and the Army Achievement Medal. He is also a senior parachutist.

Brigadier General Wooten is married to the former Becky Chavis of Henderson, North Carolina. They have two sons: Kevin, an Information Analyst for Paine Weber and Kenneth, a senior at Towson State University,

UNITED STATES ARMY BIOGRAPHY

COLONEL PETER D. HOFFMAN
Chief of Staff
Fort McClellan, Alabama



Colonel Peter D. Hoffman was commissioned through ROTC at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and entered the Army in June 1965 as an Armor Officer. After initial assignments as a Tank Platoon Leader at Fort Hood, and as a Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, S-3 Air and Divisional Military Police Company Executive Officer in Vietnam, he assumed command of Company C, 503d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1967. In 1970 he returned to Vietnam and served as Assistant Provost Marshal, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). From 1972-1974 he was an ROTC Instructor at Washington State University and from 1975-1978 he was a Staff Officer and Assistant Secretary of the General Staff at HQ, FORSCOM. Subsequently, Colonel Hoffman was assigned as Executive Officer, 728th Military Police Battalion in Korea until 1980. Upon returning to the United States he was assigned as the Provost Marshal, 1st Cavalry Division. From 1982-1984 he commanded the 12th Military Police Battalion (OSUT) at Fort McClellan, AL. From 1985 to June 1988, COL Hoffman was assigned to the U.S. Total Army Personnel Agency, Alexandria, VA where he served consecutively as the Chief, Military Police Branch and, later, Chief, Functional Area Management and Development Division in the Officer Personnel Management Directorate. From June 1988 to June 1990 he served as Commander of the 89th Military Police Brigade. From June 1990 to November 1992 he served as Chief of the Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Colonel Hoffman is currently assigned as the Chief of Staff/Garrison Commander, U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan, Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Colonel Hoffman's civilian education includes a BA degree in Government from Georgetown University and a Masters Degree in Police Science and Administration from Washington State University. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, Military Police Officer Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. COL Hoffman and his wife, Eileen, have five children: LT Karen Carlisle, Kristen, David, Whitney, and Michael.

BIOGRAPHY

**U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL and MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT MCCLELLAN
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5000**

**LARRY NETTLES
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
Post Command Sergeant Major, Fort McClellan, Alabama**

Command Sergeant Major Larry Nettles assumed his present position as Post Command Sergeant Major, United States Army Chemical and Military Police Centers, Fort McClellan, Alabama, on 1 November 1992.

Command Sergeant Major Nettles original home is Montgomery, Alabama. He completed basic combat training at Fort Benning, Georgia, in March 1966. Since then, he has completed the Chemical Equipment Repair Course; the Drill Sergeant Course; the Noncommissioned Officers' Academy; the NBC Defense Course; the Recruiters' Basic Course; the Recruiters' Advance Course; the Recruiters' Professional Development Course; the Sergeants' Major Course; and the Command Sergeants' Major Designee Course.


He has served five tours in the Federal Republic of Germany, two tours in the Republic of Vietnam, and a tour in Southwest Asia. He has also served as a Drill Sergeant at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, Recruiter and Station Commander in Oakland and San Jose, California; Platoon Sergeant, and First Sergeant with the 69th Chemical Company; First Sergeant of Alpha Company, 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry; Brigade Chemical Noncommissioned Officer, 22d Signal Brigade; Corps Chemical Sergeant Major, Headquarters, V Corps; Regimental Sergeant Major, United States Army Chemical School Noncommissioned Officers' Academy.

Command Sergeant Major Nettles' awards and decorations are: The Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal; Army Achievement Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters; Good Conduct Medal with eight awards; National Defense Service Medal with two awards; Vietnam Service and Campaign Medal; Southwest Asia Service Medal; and the Liberation of Kuwait Medal.

Command Sergeant Major Nettles has a daughter Tracy, and two sons, Ronald and Marcus.

US ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT McCLELLAN

"The Military Show Place of The South"



SCHEDULE

For the Visit of

The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

22 March 1995

Copy for

Mr. David Lyles

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT McCLELLAN
FORT McCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5000



Itinerary
for the visit of
The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

22 March 1995

APPROVED *ALL*
DATE 3-27-95

ESCORT OFFICER: CPT Ray Manna
DUTY PHONE: 5-4268
HOME PHONE: 435-8060

LEGEND

◆ Briefing Points

- Overflight and Windshield
Tour Points of Interest

DRIVER: SGT Jennifer Williams
DUTY PHONE: 5-5616/3862
HOME PHONE: 237-9693

VIP BUS CELLULAR PHONE: 239-4165

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 March

1042 EST	Arrive Atlanta Airport Via Delta Flight No. 766	Met by MG Lenhardt
1042-1100 EST	Transition from Delta Terminal to Hangar One to AL-ARNG UH60	CPT Frandsen/ MG Lenhardt
1000-1105 CST	Enroute Fort McClellan Pelham Range Via UH60	MG Lenhardt

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 March (Continued)

1105-1130

Aerial Overflight of Pelham Range
and Fort McClellan

MG Lenhardt

PELHAM RANGE

- Combat Vehicle Ranges
- Special Operations Training Site (SOTS)
- Crew Served Ranges
- Alabama National Guard Unit Training Equipment Site (UTES)
- Pelham Range Training Facility
- Maintenance Complex

MAIN POST CANTONMENT

- Elementary School
- Waste Water Treatment
- Joint Tng Area (USAF, ATF, Smithsonian)
- Chemical Area
- WAC Museum
- National Guard Area
- Reilly Airfield
- MOUT Site
- CDTF
- USAR Equipment Concentration Site
- Training Brigade Area
- Military Police Area
- Housing
- Garrison Complex

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)

1420-1440

Walk Thru Sibert Hall

BG Wooten

- ◆ Information Services Center
(Fisher Library)
- ◆ Dragon Warfighter Center
- ◆ Bradley Radiological Laboratory
- ◆ NBC Reconnaissance Training
Facility (FOX's Den)

1440-1442

Transition to Protocol VIP
Vehicle/Enroute U.S. Air Force Disaster
Preparedness School

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- Women's Army Corps
Memorial Chapel

1442-1507

U.S. Air Force Disaster Preparedness
Technical Training Brief

MAJ Hensley

1507-1515

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute Chemical Defense Training
Facility (CDTF)

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- Alabama National Guard
Training Site

1515-1555

Visit Chemical Defense
Training Facility

BG Wooten/
LTC Adams

DATE/TIME

EVENT

ACTION/POC

Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)

1555-1604

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute Tactical Clearing Center
(TCC) (Building T-800)

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- 39th Adjutant General Battalion
- Decontamination Apparatus
Training Facility (DATF) (Drive
Thru DECON Line)
- Consolidated Maintenance Facility
- Rail Load Facility
- New Permanent Party & Student
Housing (900 Area)

1604-1624

Tactical Clearing Center Brief

COL Foley

1624-1632

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute U.S. Army Military Police
School (Building 3181)

CPT Manna/
MG Lenhardt

- 1600 Area (Troop Billets)
- Haynes Gym
- Allen Training Facility
- Training Brigade Complex
- Mock Confinement Facility
- Physical Security (Building 3184)
- Special Operations (Building 3185)
- Department of Defense Polygraph
Institute (DODPI)

1632-1707

U.S. Army Military Police School
Walking Tour

MG Lenhardt

- ◆ Family Advocacy Law Enforcement
Training Facility
- ◆ Military Police Warfighter Center
- ◆ Training Set Forward Observer (TSFO)
- ◆ Ramsey Library

1707-1715

Transition to Protocol VIP Vehicle/
Enroute Center Pad

CPT Manna
MG Lenhardt

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>ACTION/POC</u>
Wednesday, 22 Mar (Continued)		
1715-1725	Prepare for Departure	CPT Manna
1725-1730	Transition to Helicopter	CPT Manna
1730-1830 CST	Enroute Warner-Robbins Air Force Base via UH60	MG Lenhardt
1930 EST	Arrive Warner-Robbins Air Force Base	Met by COL Ward

OFFICIAL PARTY

The Honorable James B. Davis
 Commissioner
 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Protocol VIP Vehicle Passengers (16-Passenger)
 22 Mar, Tour of Installation

Commissioner Davis
 Senator Heflin
 Senator Shelby
 Congressman Browder
 MG Lenhardt
 MG Moore
 BG Wooten
 Mr. Lyles
 Mr. Powell
 COL Mashburn
 COL Foley
 COL Hurd
 CPT Manna, Escort Officer
 SGT Williams, Driver

Protocol Follow-On VIP Van (15-Passenger)

22 Mar, Tour of Installation

Mr. Burgess
Mr. Borden
Mr. Gertler
Mr. Young
Mr. Lynch
Mr. Minter
CPT Lee, Escort Officer
PFC Young, Driver

Follow-up Protocol VIP Vehicle #3 (15-Passenger)

LTC Felmet, Escort Officer
Ms. Creedon
Mr. Kaiser
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Payne, Escort Officer
Mr. Levy
PFC John VanNoller, Driver

Mini Van #1 Passengers

22 Mar, Enroute Remington Hall, Fort McClellan from Anniston Airport

Senator Heflin
Mr. Young
COL Hurd
ILT Thomas M. Hawes, Escort Officer
PFC Juan Garcia, Driver

Mini Van #2 Passengers

22 Mar, Enroute Remington Hall, Fort McClellan from Anniston Airport

Senator Shelby
Mr. Lynch
2LT Lisa Marie Zaborowski, Escort Officer
PV2 Lonnie Whitton, Driver

Mini Van #3 Passengers

22 Mar, Enroute Remington Hall, Fort McClellan from Anniston Airport

Congressman Browder
Mr. Minter (T)
CPT Kathleen M. Doran, Escort Officer
SGT James Gill, Driver

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees

The Honorable James B. Davis
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Congressional Delegation

The Honorable Howell Heflin
U.S. Senator, Alabama

The Honorable Richard Shelby
U.S. Senator, Alabama

The Honorable Glen Browder
U.S. Representative, 3d District, Alabama

Commission Office Representatives

Mr. David Lyles
Staff Director

Mr. Ben Borden
Director of Review and Analysis

Ms. Madelyn R. Creedon
Head, General Counsel

Mr. Ralph A. Kaiser
Associate General Counsel

Mr. Wade Nelson, Jr.
Director of Communications

Mr. J. J. Gertler
BRAC Senior Analyst

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees (Cont'd)

Congressional Staffers

Mr. Mark Young
Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Heflin

Mr. Terence "Terry" Lynch
Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Shelby

Mr. Ray Minter
District Administrative Assistant to Congressman Browder

DA Representative

Colonel Frank Hurd
Chief, Senate Liaison Office
Office of the Secretary of the Army

Community Representative

Mr. Gerald Powell
Chairman, Military Affairs Committee

National Guard Representatives

Major General James E. Moore
Adjutant General
State of Alabama

Fort McClellan Representatives

Major General Alfonso E. Lenhardt
Commanding General/Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Ralph G. Wooten
Deputy Commanding General/Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School

Colonel Peter D. Hoffman
Chief of Staff

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees (Cont'd)

Command Sergeant Major Larry Nettles
Post Command Sergeant Major

Colonel J Harold Mashburn
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School

Colonel David W. Foley
Assistant Commandant, U. S. Army Military Police School

Colonel Richard R. Majauskas
Commander, Training Brigade

Dr. William J. Yankee
Director
Department of Defense Polygraph Institute

Mr. Thomas J. Burgess
Director of Resource Management

Mr. Robert J. Abernathy
Director of Engineering and Housing

LTC Bryan H. Felmet
Staff Judge Advocate

LTC L Z Johnson
Facilities Manager, Alabama Guard Training Site

Mr. Ronald M. Levy
Director of Environment

Mr. Stan Payne
Installation Budget Analyst

Major R. Barry Cronin
Commanding Officer
United States Marine Corps, Marine Detachment, Fort McClellan

Working Lunch/Commander's Orientation Attendees (Cont'd)

Major Ralph G. Hensley
Commander
Air Force Disaster Preparedness School

Lieutenant Gary D. Shekels
Officer In Charge
Naval Construction Training Center Detachment

Ms. Linda Seymour
President, AFGE Local 1941

Menu

Caribbean Grilled Chicken Caesar Salad
Fresh Fruit
Coffee, Tea, Assorted Sodas

COST: \$ 7.50

UH 60 (Blackhawk) Passengers (4 Passengers; 4 Headsets)
Depart Fort McClellan, 0800, 22 Mar, Enroute Hangar One, Atlanta Airport

MG Lenhardt
LTC Felmet
Mr. Gertler
CPT Lee

UH 60 (Blackhawk) Passengers (10 Passengers; 10 Headsets)
Depart Hangar One, Enroute Fort McClellan, 22 Mar, with Overflight

Commissioner Davis
MG Lenhardt
Mr. Lyles
Mr. Borden
Mr. Gertler
Ms. Creedon
Mr. Kaiser
Mr. Nelson
LTC Felmet
CPT Lee

UH60 (Blackhawk) Passengers (5 Passengers; 5 Headsets)
Depart Center Pad, Fort McClellan, Enroute Robbins Air Force Base, GA, 22 Mar

Commissioner Davis
MG Lenhardt
Mr. Borden
Mr. Kaiser
CPT Williams

Community Briefing Attendees

TBD

NOTES:

1. Senator Heflin, Senator Shelby and Congressman Browder will meet Commissioner Davis upon his arrival at the Press Opportunity Site. They are scheduled to arrive at Anniston Airport at 0935 CST, via C-20, 22 March.
2. Mr. Borden, Ms. Creedon, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Kaiser will arrive Atlanta Airport on Delta Flight 973. They will meet Commissioner Davis upon his arrival on Delta Flight 766. They will fly to Center Pad, Fort McClellan, via UH60.
3. MG Moore, Adjutant General, State of Alabama, will meet Commissioner Davis at the Press Opportunity Site and will accompany the rest of the visit.
4. Commissioner Davis has no dietary restrictions. He drinks Diet Coke and Iced Tea.



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

JAMES B. DAVIS, Commissioner

Biography

In August of 1993, General J.B. Davis concluded a thirty-five year career with the United States Air Force as a combat fighter pilot, commander and strategic planner and programmer. He has served as a commander of a combat fighter wing, of the U.S. Air Force's Military Personnel Center, Pacific Air Forces, and United States Forces Japan. On the staff side, he served as the Director and Programmer of the U.S. Air Force's personnel and training, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence Pacific Air Forces, and served his last two years on active duty as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO).

During his career he has had extensive experience in operations, intelligence, human resource management, and political/military and international affairs. He has commanded a nuclear capable organization of about six thousand personnel and a joint service organization of about sixty thousand personnel and several sizes in between.

In the 1990's, he was deeply involved in the successful multimillion dollar negotiations for support of U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japanese financial support of U.S. Forces in Desert Storm. In NATO, he was the chief negotiator with the North Atlantic Council and the United Nations for NATO's participation in the Yugoslavian conflict.

General Davis has lived overseas for more than ten years almost evenly split between the Pacific and Europe. Because of his official duties, he has traveled extensively to all the ASEAN and NATO countries and many of the Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary and Albania, meeting with Ministers of State and Defense, Prime Ministers and Presidents.

General Davis has a B.S. degree in Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Masters degree in Public Administration from Auburn University at Montgomery, and has attended multiple professional schools.

FORT McCLELLAN
ALABAMA
"Military Showplace of the South"



Chemical Defense Training Facility



Protecting the Force

Impact of Chemical Veterans

"Then and now, they (soldiers and leaders) wholeheartedly value the opportunity to train with actual agents, real detectors/alarms and real decontaminants.

The presence of CDTF trained soldiers in every company of the Division directly improves our combat readiness. These soldiers have great confidence that their equipment works. Your training program is right on target."

MG Barry McCaffery, Commanding General 24th ID, in a letter to BG Orton following Operation Desert Storm



**17,000 CDTF
graduates served
in Operation
Desert Storm**

We know that WMD will...

Impact greater on leaders (Command and Control more difficult)

Impact less on units with trained leaders (Than units with just trained specialists)



The critical challenge for the Army as we create Force XXI is to remain trained and ready, while growing more capable.

Open since 1987, the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF), serves as the culmination point in the training of US Army NBC Specialists. A toxic agent training facility, the CDTF meets the need for realistic training in detection, identification and decontamination operations. Truly a world class facility, the CDTF uses cutting edge technology to provide tough, realistic training, while complying with all local, state and federal regulatory agencies.

Constructed at a cost of \$14.7 million, the CDTF features a 7 bay negative pressure training building, a toxic agent preparation laboratory, a technical support section to clean, service and certify protective equipment and a solid/liquid waste incinerator. CDTF cadre produce, neutralize and destroy all toxic agents on-site. State-of-the-art, real time, low level monitoring ensures that no toxic agent is released into the environment.

Originally constructed as an Army facility, the CDTF quickly grew into a joint and international training center. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force NBC Specialists now train at the CDTF. For these specialists, successful completion of the toxic agent training serves as a graduation requirement. Just as airborne students must exit an aircraft, the chemical specialists must face their actual threat.

The international community also recognizes the value of toxic agent training. NBC Specialists from Germany and the United Kingdom train in the CDTF. Toxic agent training acts as a key element in the training program for the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and the Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC) Treaty inspectors. In eight years of safe operation, 35,000 personnel from over 20 nations have trained at the CDTF.

"Train as You Fight" is a way of life at the CDTF. Keeping America's Armed Forces chemical trained and ready remains its mission.

RALPH G. WOOTEN
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Chemical



"CHEMICAL TRAINED AND READY"

Expanding Region


Europe

- Russia still possesses a formidable NBC capability; Materials / technology leakage
- Former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations developed chemical weapons.

Central / South America

- Nuclear Technology
- Missile Development
- Technology Transfer

NBC Weapon



Global NBC Threats

Nonstandard Threat

- Terrorist
- Industrial Chemicals
- Nuclear plants
- Spills, accidents, sabotage

Pacific


- China has nuclear and chemical weapons
- North Korea has CW; possibly nukes & BW
- Other countries pursuing NBC weapons programs

Middle East

- Several countries possess Chem & Bio
- Some pursue Nuclear Weapons programs

Treaties,
Conventions,
Agreements have
not stopped the
spread of WMD

WMD Proliferation



Training Concept

Chemical Trained and Ready
Survivability



Toxic Agent Tng

Simulant Pad Training


Hands on/Field Exercises

Classroom lecture/instruction

Over 35,000 Trained

- From all Services
- From over 20 countries
- From State Dept, CIA, Secret Service, UN

CDTF Training Value



Stress: Soldiers demonstrate higher stress in a toxic environment than a simulated one.

Confidence: CDTF graduates have a higher level of confidence in themselves and their equipment.

Credibility: CDTF graduates have more credibility from their non-chemical peers.

Joint and Coalition Training





FORCE





FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: COMMANDANT, USACMLS, ATTN: ATZN-CMN-D,
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5020, DSN 865-3096, COMMERCIAL (205) 848-3096


**United States Army
Chemical School**




Fort McClellan, Alabama



**Administration Building
Classrooms
Offices**




Training Building
7 training Bays
Redundant environmental controls




Training Building
7 training Bays
Redundant environmental controls


LAB



Filter banks



**Operations and Maintenance
Wastewater treatment**



**Incinerator
Autoclaves**



Simulant Training Pads

CDTF Mission

- Conduct tough, realistic training to improve the NBC readiness of U.S. and Allied Forces.
- Detect, identify, and decontaminate in a toxic chemical environmental.

Characteristics

Chemical Surety site regular inspections and recertification

Over **35,000** trained without incident or mishap

On site Lab for sample analysis and agent production

ADEM permits solid/liquid waste incinerator

Continuous environmental monitoring in effect

1993 Pollution Prevention Award Winner

CDTF Staffing


	Required	Auth	Assigned
Military	28	28	24
DA Civilian	15	13	13
Contractor	14	14	14
Totals	57	55	51

Post Support

DPTMSEC
 Noble Army Hospital
 Fire Department
 Provost Marshall, MP Company
 Safety Office
 Industrial Hygiene
 Dept. of Contracting (Contactor Interface)
 Dept. Eng & Housing (Quality Assurance)




CDTF Training Load



Joint Center of Excellence

Equipment Cost Reductions



Issues

No "as built" engineering drawings of current facility

New Site Construction Estimate (\$ 70M):

Environmental Permit & Documentation	\$ 2M
Incinerator	\$ 40M
Buildings & Facilities	\$ 28M

Estimated Cost to remediate (\$ 43 - 50M)

Time to build and validate new CDTF 6-7 years

Impact on:


Chemical Treaty / Verification process

CWC Treaty Training

CDTF Value

"The presence of CDTF trained soldiers in every company of the Division directly improves our combat readiness. These soldiers have great confidence that their equipment works. Your training program is right on target."

MG McCaffrey, CG, 24th ID
in letter to MG Orton, 2 Mar 92




**NBC Readiness for the
21st Century**



**The more you sweat in training...
the less you bleed in war.**

CDTF Organization



Remediation Breakdown


Required Actions *	\$ Millions
Environmental Investigations	0.5
Dismantlement / Rubbling of Training Building	8-10
Incineration of rubble /contract costs	35-40
Environmental Certification	0.5

*(40 CFR part 270.14(b)(13))

USAF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS SCHOOL




95 BRAC COMMISSION INFORMATION PACKAGE



Welcome
1995 BRAC COMMISSION
to the
United States Air Force
Civil Engineer
Disaster Preparedness School



OVERVIEW



- Mission and History
- Chain of Command
- Curriculum
- Manning, Facilities, and Student Load
- Joint Training
- Tour of Facility

Mission:

- Transition untrained or unqualified individuals into professional Disaster Preparedness personnel capable of effective Readiness Flight operations across the full spectrum, to include day to day operations, major accidents/ natural disaster response, humanitarian aid, low intensity conflict, and general war, to include NBC Warfare Defense.

Disaster Preparedness School


History

- Established at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver, CO in 1961
- Moved to Lowry AFB, CO in 1965
- Relocated to Ft McClellan after Lowry's closure in 1994






Chain of Command




Curriculum

- Teach 12 courses ranging in duration from 5 to 45 days
- Two courses provide apprentice and craftsman certification
- Two courses directly support the White House Military Office, Presidential Contingency Section



Major Course Content

- NBC Warfare decontamination, reconnaissance, plotting and reporting
- Natural Disaster and Major Accident emergency management




Major Course Content (cont)

- Air Base Operability-- Camouflage, concealment, and deception; passive and active defense measures; and damage assessment



Manning, Facilities, and Student Load


- Manning
 - 20 Personnel: 1 Officer, 2 Civilians, 17 Enlisted
- Facilities
 - 19,000 Sq Ft (Classrooms, Offices, Equipment Storage)
- Student Load
 - FY 94 - 873
 - FY 95 - 678
 - FY 96 - 740



Joint Training Efforts

- **Joint Service Integration Group**
- **Chemical Defense Training Facility**
- **Decontamination Facility**
- **Use of Range for Smoke Generators**
- **Land Navigation Course**

Facility Tour



**USAF Civil Engineer Disaster Preparedness School
BRAC 95 Relocation Requirements**

- **HISTORY:** The USAF Civil Engineer Disaster Preparedness School relocated from Lowry AFB, Denver, CO to Ft McClellan in May 1994. This relocation was necessary because Lowry AFB closed under earlier BRAC actions. The Air Force elected to collocate the Disaster Preparedness School at Ft McClellan with the other military service NBC schools. This decision has enhanced joint NBC training efforts and provided an opportunity for Air Force NBC specialists to receive training in the Chemical Defense Training Facility. The Air Force Disaster Preparedness School will relocate with the US Army Chemical School as promulgated in Public Law 103-160.

- **MISSION:** Transition untrained or unqualified individuals into professional Disaster Preparedness personnel capable of effective Readiness Flight operations across the full spectrum, to include day to day operations, humanitarian aid, low intensity conflict, and general war. A major portion of this training involves NBC warfare defense.

- **DETACHMENT MANNING:**

- Two officers (O-4 Detachment Commander, O-3 OIC of officer training)
- Two Civilians (GS-11 Course manager, GS-9 Instructor Supervisor)
- Sixteen Enlisted (E-9, five E-7s, three E-6s, and seven E-5s)

- **COURSES TAUGHT:**

- Disaster Preparedness Officer and Enlisted Apprentice Course: Provides basic skill level training to professional Airmen on major accident and natural disaster planning response actions; nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional warfare survival skills; and civil engineer mobility deployment principles.
- Disaster Preparedness Officer and Apprentice Exportable Correspondence Course: Provides training for Air Force personnel on Readiness Flight duties. When both this course and the Phase Two courses are completed, all AFSC awarding requirements will have been met. Primarily designed for Air Force Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentee component.
- Disaster Preparedness Officer and Apprentice Phase two Course: Provides resident training to Air Force Reserve personnel on Readiness Flight duties. Successful completion of the Phase One Exportable course is a prerequisite for attending this course.
- Disaster Preparedness Indoctrination for Senior Officers: Provides information on

Maj Hensley/Det 5, 366TRS/CC/5-6748/8 Mar 95

Readiness Flight objections, polices, and responsibilities including response actions for enemy attack, natural disasters, and peacetime accidents.

- - Air Base Operability (ABO) Course: Provides training on ABO doctrine, responsibilities, threat to fixed air bases, theater operational requirements, plans and directives, acquisition process, program accomplishments and standards. This course utilizes a table-top exercise to provide students an opportunity to apply ABO principles across the full spectrum of war operations.
- - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Cell Operations Course: Students are trained in chemical and nuclear plotting, and NBC Control Center operations. An eight hour exercise is used to give students an opportunity to utilize skills in a realistic student centered learning environment.
- - Civil Engineer Readiness Refresher Course: Provides training on new equipment acquisition and operational procedures to Readiness Flight personnel. Attendees receive this training every five years.
- TRAINING SPACE REQUIREMENTS: Total of 20,000 square feet of office and classroom space is necessary.
 - - Eleven classrooms/laboratories are required and each classroom must provide desk space for 20 students. One classroom more elaborately decorated for our senior officers course. Another classroom configured as a computer lab for Emergency Information System training. All classrooms approved for discussing classified information.
 - - A student break room with DSN and commercial pay phones.
 - - Four hundred square feet of environmentally controlled equipment storage space (maintained at 65 to 72 degrees F). Must have controlled access to secure radioactive material licensed under Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidelines.
- ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REQUIREMENTS: The following requirements must be grouped together in same facility with classrooms.
 - - Three rooms capable of providing office work spaces for 19 personnel.
 - - Four private offices for the Commander, Director of Training, First Sergeant, and Instructor Supervisor.
 - - One office to provide work space for four personnel. Room must have controlled access.
- UNIQUE FACILITY REQUIREMENTS:
 - - Secure five thousand square feet storage facility to house field training equipment. Must include asphalt or concrete parking area for five to ten vehicles.

- - Riot control agent chamber to conduct mask confidence training
- - The USAF supports joint service requirement to train in live agent training facility as currently available (Chemical Defense Training Facility).

- FIELD TRAINING SITE REQUIREMENTS:

- - Access to field training site configured as an air field to conduct unique Air Force major accident response and base recovery after attack training.
- - Field sites approved for conducting smoke obscurant and decontamination training operations.
- - Field site to conduct compass and Global Positioning System navigation training.

- TOTAL STUDENT LOAD:

- - FY-94 student load was 873.
- - FY-95 student load is 630.
- - FY-96 student load is 740.

- COMPUTER, COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

- - Technical communication support to assist installing antennas and providing two frequencies for our Motorola base station, hand-held radios, cellular phone and two beepers.
- - Computer maintenance support for our personal computers and computer laboratory. We will acquire Sun Sprac computers for our battle lab and they may require maintenance.
- - Telephone line for PC-III (Air Force Personnel Management Computer Link).
- - DOD LAN System Link.

Document Separator



A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
FEBRUARY 1995

tively on those areas that most affect our national interests — for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies.

Second, in all cases the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. On the other hand, our involvement will be more circumscribed when other regional or multilateral actors are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged at the diplomatic level. In every case, however, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force: Have we considered non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of success? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we are entering? What is needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs — both human and financial — of the engagement? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?

The decision on *how* we use force has a similar set of derived guidelines:

First, when we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear mission and, for those operations that are likely to involve combat, the means to achieve their objectives decisively, having answered the questions: What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives?

Second, as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies and friends or of relevant international institutions. If our most important national interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But especially on those matters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportionate commitment from them. Working together increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions, and sharing the responsibilities lessens everyone's load.

These, then, are the calculations of interest and cost that have influenced our past uses of military power and will guide us in the future. Every time this Administration has

used force, it has balanced interests against costs. And in each case, the use of our military has put power behind our diplomacy, allowing us to make progress we would not otherwise have achieved.

One final consideration regards the central role the American people rightfully play in how the United States wields its power abroad: the United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the public. This is true for humanitarian and other non-traditional interventions, as well as war. Modern media communications confront every American with images which both stir the impulse to intervene and raise the question of an operation's costs and risks. When it is judged in America's interest to intervene, we must use force with an unwavering commitment to our objective. While we must continue to reassess any operation's costs and benefits as it unfolds and the full range of our options, reflexive calls for early withdrawal of our forces as soon as casualties arise endangers our objectives as well as our troops. Doing so invites any rogue actor to attack our troops to try to force our departure from areas where our interests lie.

Combating the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles

Weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological and chemical — along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats. We also need to maintain robust strategic nuclear forces and seek to implement existing strategic arms agreements.

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation

A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Countries' weapons programs, and their levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among our most important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral relations.

Through programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction effort and other denuclearization initia-

tives, important progress has been made to build a more secure international environment. One striking example was the successful transfer last fall of nearly six hundred kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material from Kazakhstan to safe storage in the United States. Kazakhstan was concerned about the security of the material and requested U.S. assistance in removing it to safe storage. The Departments of Defense and Energy undertook a joint mission to retrieve the uranium. Similarly, under an agreement we secured with Russia, it is converting tons of highly-enriched uranium from dismantled weapons into commercial reactor fuel for purchase by the United States. The United States is also working with Russia to enhance control and accounting of nuclear material.

As a key part of our effort to control nuclear proliferation, we seek the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its universal application. Achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible, ending the unsafeguarded production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are important goals. They complement our comprehensive efforts to discourage the accumulation of fissile materials, to seek to strengthen controls and constraints on those materials, and over time, to reduce worldwide stocks. As President Clinton announced at last September's UN General Assembly, we will seek a global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

To combat missile proliferation, the United States seeks prudently to broaden membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Administration supports the earliest possible ratification and entry in force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as new measures to deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We also support improved export controls for nonproliferation purposes both domestically and multilaterally.

The proliferation problem is global, but we must tailor our approaches to specific regional contexts. We have concluded an agreed framework to bring North Korea into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, including the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We will continue efforts to prevent Iran from advancing its weapons of mass destruction objectives and to thwart Iraq from reconstituting its previous programs. The United States seeks to cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and

missile capabilities of India and Pakistan. In the Middle East and elsewhere, we encourage regional arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. These tasks are being pursued with other states that share our concern for the enormous challenge of stemming the proliferation of such weapons.

The United States has signed bilateral agreements with Russia, Ukraine and South Africa which commit these countries to adhere to the guidelines of the MTCR. We also secured China's commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines and its agreement not to transfer MTCR-controlled ground-to-ground missiles. Russia has agreed not to transfer space-launch vehicle technology with potential military applications to India. South Africa has agreed to observe the MTCR guidelines and to dismantle its Category I missile systems and has joined the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards. Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Poland have joined the Australia Group (which controls the transfer of items that could be used to make chemical or biological weapons). Hungary and Argentina have joined the MTCR and Brazil has committed itself publicly to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. We continue to push for the dismantlement of all intercontinental ballistic missiles located in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. With the United States and Russia, Ukraine is pressing forward on implementation of the Trilateral Statement, which provides for the transfer of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement in return for fair compensation.

Thus, the United States seeks to prevent additional countries from acquiring chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. However, should such efforts fail, U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend against their use. As agreed at the January 1994 NATO Summit, we are working with our Allies to develop a policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction, so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, we will need the capability not only to deter their use against either ourselves or our allies and friends, but also, where necessary and feasible, to prevent it.

This will require improved defensive capabilities. To minimize the vulnerability of our forces abroad to weapons of mass destruction, we are placing a high priority on improving our ability to locate, identify and disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and storage facilities for such weapons, and their delivery systems.

Nuclear Forces

In September, the President approved the recommendations of the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A key conclusion of this review is that the United States will retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders. The President approved the NPR's recommended strategic nuclear force posture as the U.S. START II force. The forces are: 450-500 Minuteman ICBMs, 14 Trident submarines all with D-5 missiles, 20 B-2 and 66 B-52 strategic bombers, and a non-nuclear role for the B-1s. This force posture allows us the flexibility to reconstitute or reduce further, as conditions warrant. The NPR also reaffirmed the current posture and deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces; the United States will eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability.

Arms Control

Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy. Arms control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggressive intent; reduce the size of national defense industry establishments and thus permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in compliance through effective monitoring and verification; and, ultimately, contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power.

In the area of strategic arms control, prescribed reductions in strategic offensive arms and the steady shift toward less destabilizing systems remain indispensable. Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty — joining Belarus' and Kazakhstan's decision to be non-

nuclear nations — was followed immediately by the exchange of instruments of ratification and brought the START I treaty into force at the December CSCE summit, paving the way for ratification of the START II Treaty. Under START II, the United States and Russia will each be left with between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which is a two-thirds reduction from the Cold War peak. The two Presidents agreed that once START II is ratified, both nations will immediately begin to deactivate or otherwise remove from combat status, those systems whose elimination will be required by that treaty, rather than waiting for the treaty to run its course through the year 2003. START II ratification will also open the door to the next round of strategic arms control, in which we will consider what further reductions in, or limitations on, remaining U.S. and Russian nuclear forces should be carried out. We will also explore strategic confidence-building measures and mutual understandings that reduce the risk of accidental war.

The full and faithful implementation of other existing arms control agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I (START I), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, several nuclear testing agreements, the 1994 Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), Open Skies, the Environmental Modification Convention (EnMod), Incidents at Sea and many others will remain an important element of national security policy. The on-going negotiation initiated by the United States to clarify the ABM Treaty by establishing an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles and update the Treaty to reflect the break-up of the Soviet Union reflects the Administration's commitment to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of crucial arms control agreements.

Future arms control efforts may become more regional and multilateral. Regional arrangements can add predictability and openness to security relations, advance the rule of international law and promote cooperation among participants. They help maintain deterrence and a stable military balance at regional levels. The U.S. is prepared to promote, help negotiate, monitor and participate in regional arms control undertakings compatible with American national security interests. We will generally support such undertakings but will not seek to impose regional arms control accords against the wishes of affected states.

Document Separator

SEP 29 1993

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1993


Dear Glen:

Thank you for sharing your views on some of the urgent chemical weapons issues confronting the United States.

I share your commitment to ensuring that these issues receive the attention they deserve. Fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, is a top priority of my Administration. We are continuing to press other countries to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and are moving forward with our own preparations for ratification. Fort McClellan will play a special role in support of the CWC as a training center for U.S. troops under our chemical defense program and also possibly for international inspectors preparing for CWC implementation.

I hope that I can count on your support as we continue to address these issues in the months and years ahead.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Glen Browder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

GLEN BROWDER
3D DISTRICT, ALABAMA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0103

August 16, 1993

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1221 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0103
(202) 225-3261

DISTRICT OFFICES:
104 FEDERAL BUILDING
POST OFFICE BOX 2042
ANNISTON, AL 36202
PHONE: 236-5655

107 FEDERAL BUILDING
OPELIKA, AL 36801
PHONE: 745-6221

115 EAST NORTHSIDE
TUSKEGEE, AL 36083
PHONE: 727-6490

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to make you aware of serious concerns that I have about chemical weapons issues confronting the United States.

I write as a Member of Congress whose four-year tenure in the House of Representatives has revolved to a great extent around chemical weapons. I chaired a House Armed Services Committee Special Inquiry into the worldwide chemical and biological warfare threat and our nation's ability to counter that threat; and I represent a district which includes Anniston Army Depot, one of the country's eight chemical weapons stockpile sites, and Fort McClellan, home of the Army Chemical School and the only live-agent chemical defense training facility in the free world.

I am concerned about the broad spectrum of chemical weapons policies and programs, particularly the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Chemical Weapons Stockpile Destruction treaties and program, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, and the Pentagon's entire chemical defense program. Collectively, these chemical weapons efforts are at a critical, almost crisis, stage. Many good people are rendering solid public service in this area; but some activities are out of control, and some are at risk because of a lack of comprehensive focus and attention at the national level.

Therefore, I ask you to exert your leadership in this area by taking the following actions:

1. Establish national chemical weapons policy and programs as a priority of your Administration.

2. Assign chemical weapons responsibility and accountability within the White House and among the various departments and agencies.


3. Declare fully your Administration's position on chemical weapons issues.

August 16, 1993
Page 2

4. Develop a more structured relationship with the Congress on these issues.

I will not go into detail in this letter about the problems with our chemical weapons program, other than to repeat that the CWC, chemical demilitarization and chemical defense are at risk if you don't take some decisive action. I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have about this letter, and, hopefully, to work with you in addressing this growing crisis.

Sincerely,



Glen Browder
Member of Congress

GB/vfp

cc: The Honorable Les Aspin
The Honorable John Deutch
The Honorable Harold Smith
The Honorable John Shannon
The Honorable Mike Owen
General Colin Powell
General Jimmy Ross
Major General Robert Orton
Brigadier General Walter Busbee
Colonel Patrick Kirby
The Honorable Warren Christopher
The Honorable Thomas Graham
The Honorable Anthony Lake
The Honorable Ron Brown
The Honorable James Lee Witt
The Honorable John Murtha
The Honorable Ron Dellums
The Honorable Sam Nunn
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
The Honorable Howell Heflin
The Honorable Richard Shelby
The Honorable Mike Synar
The Honorable John Glenn
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
The Honorable Claiborne Pell

Document Separator

**CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING
AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

TABLE OF CONTENTS¹

Preamble	1
ARTICLES	
I. General Obligations	3
II. Definitions and Criteria	4
III. Declarations	8
IV. Chemical Weapons	11
V. Chemical Weapons Production Facilities	14
VI. Activities not Prohibited Under this Convention	17
VII. National Implementation Measures	19
VIII. The Organization	21
IX. Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding	31
X. Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons	36
XI. Economic and Technological Development	39
XII. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, including Sanctions	40
XIII. Relation to Other International Agreements	40
XIV. Settlement of Disputes	41
XV. Amendments	42
XVI. Duration and Withdrawal	44
XVII. Status of the Annexes	44
XVIII. Signature	44
XIX. Ratification	44
XX. Accession	45
XXI. Entry into Force	45
XXII. Reservations	45
XXIII. Depositary	46
XXIV. Authentic Texts	46

¹ To aid the reader, this Table of Contents was compiled by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from the tables contained throughout the Convention text. The last lines of some pages of this document end before the right margin to maintain identical pagination with the document produced by the United Nations.

ARTICLE X ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. For the purposes of this Article, "Assistance" means the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.
4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
5. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties.

The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented.

6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization and to this end to elect to take one or more of the following measures:
 - (a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by the Conference at its first session;

(b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the procurement, upon demand, of assistance;

(c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the Organization. If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph.

8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons if it considers that:

(a) Chemical weapons have been used against it;

(b) Riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or

(c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I.

9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall be submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Executive Council and to all States Parties. The Director-General shall immediately forward the request to States Parties which have volunteered, in accordance with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of chemical weapons or use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in case of serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious threat of use of riot control agents as a method of warfare to the State Party concerned not later than 12 hours after receipt of the request. The Director-General shall initiate, not later than 24 hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in order to provide foundation for further action. He shall complete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report to the Executive Council. If additional time is required for completion of the investigation, an interim report shall be submitted within the same time-frame. The additional time required for investigation shall not exceed 72 hours. It may, however, be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the end of each additional period shall be submitted to the Executive Council. The investigation shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed.

10. The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the situation and shall

Assistance and Protection

take a decision by simple majority within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately transmit to all States Parties and relevant international organizations the investigation report and the decision taken by the Executive Council. When so decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance immediately. For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations. The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.

11. If the information available from the ongoing investigation or other reliable sources would give sufficient proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his disposal for such contingencies. The Director-General shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph.

Document Separator

21 MAR 95

POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Inspector Training

1. PURPOSE. To provide information on USACMLS involvement in CWC training efforts.

2. FACTS.

a. The U.S. and Russian Federation have forged a bilateral agreement for the control and ultimate destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. A similar multilateral agreement (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) should soon be ratified. The CWC is expected to enter into force in mid to late 1995. Both treaties provide for on-site inspections of existing chemical weapons, as well as disposal operations.

b. The USACMLS is providing training in support of both agreements. The Bilateral Treaty Training Program began in June of 1992. To date, fourteen courses have been taught with over 500 inspector/escort personnel trained. The Operational Radiation Safety course is also offered to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) with seven courses and 64 students having been trained.

c. During FY93 the USACMLS developed courses for CWC basic and specialty training in support of the multilateral agreement. Pilot courses were conducted in 1993 and included the following areas: Common Core; Stockpile, Destruction and Production Inspections; and Sampling and Analysis. Lessons learned from the pilot courses and further guidance from the Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) were used to revise and improve the courses.

d. The USACMLS conducted a follow-on Module One Basic Course utilizing the revised Common Core course materials in Mar - Apr 94. Sixteen of the 21 students were from countries other than the U.S. This course was used to validate course content and to demonstrate the ability of the USACMLS and Fort McClellan to provide an ideal environment for the inspector training.

e. The USACMLS with the support of Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR; the Chemical Demilitarization Training Facility, Edgewood, MD; and the U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center; developed Module Two Specialty training courses in the areas of Chemical Stockpile; Chemical Weapons Destruction; Inactivation and Destruction of CW Production Facilities; Team Communication and Management; and Sampling and On-Site Analysis. These courses were taught as pilot courses and have been offered to the OPCW by the U.S. Government. Additionally, U.S. facilities will be used for the conduct of Module Three Inspection Team Training. Anniston Army Depot, Pine Bluff Arsenal, and the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) at Tooele, UT have been offered as Inspection Team training sites.

9 JAN 1995

POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Inspector Training Program

1. PURPOSE. To provide information on USACMLS involvement in CWC training efforts.

2. FACTS.

a. The CWC is a multilateral treaty designed to produce a global verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. An international group of inspectors working for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and headquartered in the The Hague, Netherlands, will be responsible for verifying treaty requirements.

b. The Department of Defense (DOD) determined that it is in the best interest of the United States for OPCW inspectors to be well trained to perform their mission. To this end, the USACMLS has worked with the Defense Nuclear Agency to develop and implement both basic and specialty training programs for these chemical weapons inspectors. To date, the USACMLS has conducted two pilot courses to assist in course material validation efforts. International students from fifteen countries have participated in our pilot courses.

c. The US is expected to ratify the CWC in the near future and the treaty is expected to enter-into-force in early 1995. The USACMLS is preparing to conduct CWC inspector basic training courses utilizing the unique facilities here at Ft McClellan. The USACMLS will also develop and manage specialty training courses to be conducted at other installations utilizing the unique resources to be found at those installations.

3. CONCLUSION. The USACMLS is actively involved in an international training effort in support of the CWC. Training for international chemical weapons inspectors will begin in 1995.

9 JAN 1995

POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Bilateral (US - Russia) Destruction Agreement Training

1. PURPOSE. To provide information concerning the development and implementation of a course of instruction for Chemical Weapons Inspectors/Escorts performing duties related to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) between the US and Russia.

2. FACTS.

a. The USACMLS has worked closely with the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) since Jun 92, to provide training for personnel selected by OSIA to perform duties as inspectors of CW sites in Russia or to serve as escorts for Russian inspectors of US CW sites.

b. The training received at Ft McClellan is a follow-on to an introductory course taught by OSIA in Washington, D.C. The Ft McClellan phase is an intensive, hands-on one week course oriented toward individual safety and protection in a chemical agent environment. All students must satisfactorily complete an exercise in the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) to be certified as inspectors/escorts.

c. To date, the USACMLS has conducted 13 iterations of this course for OSIA, training over 400 personnel. Six courses are scheduled for FY95 to train an additional 200 students.

d. Additionally, the USACMLS provides training in Operational Radiation Safety for OSIA. This training is required in conjunction with use of detection equipment containing radioactive sources. Four courses with a total of 38 students have been taught. An additional 6 courses are scheduled for FY95.

e. All courses are funded on a cost-per-student basis by OSIA.

3. CONCLUSION. The USACMLS is actively involved in supporting the training of US personnel to perform as inspectors or escorts for OSIA.

CWC INSPECTOR TRAINING PROGRAM

- > Module One: Basic Course
 - 7 weeks in length
 - taught at USACMLS
 - U.S. offer of 1 course for 50 students
 - other countries making Mod 1 offers:
 - o France
 - o India
 - o Netherlands

- > Module Two: Specialty Courses
 - Team Communication and Management
 - o 2 weeks in length
 - o taught at USACMLS
 - o U.S. offer of 1 course for 50 students

 - Demil and Destruction of Chemical Weapons
 - o 4 weeks in length
 - o taught at Edgewood and Pine Bluff
 - o U.S. offer of 2 courses of 25 students each

 - Inactivation, Conversion and Destruction of CW Production Facilities
 - o 2 weeks in length
 - o taught at Pine Bluff
 - o U.S. offer of 2 courses of 25 students each

 - Conventional and Chemical Munition
 - o 2 weeks in length
 - o taught at Pine Bluff
 - o U.S. offer of 1 course of 25 students

- Sampling and On-Site Analysis
 - o 7 weeks in length
 - o 3 week taught in Finland and 4 weeks in U.K.
 - o Tri-party offer of 1 course for 15 students

- Non Destructive Evaluation
 - o 3 weeks in length
 - o taught in Germany with U.S. equip/instructors
 - o Bi-party offer of 2 courses for 10 students each

- > Module Three: Inspection Team Training (Mock Inspections)
 - Chemical Weapons Storage Site
 - o Anniston Army Depot
 - o 3 courses of 17 students each

 - Chemical Weapons Production Site
 - o Pine Bluff Arsenal
 - o 3 courses of 17 students each

 - Chemical Weapons Destruction Site
 - o CAMDS, Tooele Army Depot
 - o 3 courses of 17 students each

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTOR TRAINING PROGRAM

Argentina	1
Australia	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	2
China	5
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	1
Finland	2
France	2
Germany	1
India	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Korea	2
Mexico	2
Netherlands	2
Nigeria	1
Pakistan	2
Poland	2
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Russia	1
Spain	1
Swaziland	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
U.K.	1
Ukraine	1
TOTAL	42
TOTAL COUNTRIES	28

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

**The Chemical Weapons
Convention Handbook**

Amy E. Smithson

Editor

Handbook No. 2 September 1993



Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives



Copyright © 1993 by
The Henry L. Stimson Center
21 Dupont Circle, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 223-5956 Fax (202) 785-9034

Project on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a multilateral treaty of unprecedented scope and complexity that will prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. Implementation of the CWC will involve many "firsts." Among those firsts are the Convention's requirements to monitor CWC-related activities extensively within both the government and civilian sectors of States Parties. To date, more than 145 countries have signed the Convention, which will place great demands upon the newly created international monitoring agency. Yet another important first will involve the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction according to the Convention's ten-year timetable.


The extraordinary nature of the efforts needed to implement the CWC prompted the Stimson Center to launch a project to monitor the preparations for implementing the CWC and to serve as a watchdog, information clearinghouse, and advocate for the strongest possible chemical weapons nonproliferation regime. The initiation of the CWC Implementation Project coincided with the signing ceremonies for the Convention, which were held in Paris 13-15 January 1993. Project programming includes:

- A periodic newsletter, *The CWC Chronicle*, to inform officials in government, industry, the diplomatic community, and interested observers about important developments in the Preparatory Commission, which will make numerous decisions crucial to the CWC's implementation. Other topics, such as the ratification process in signatory states, particular issues of interest to industry, and the status of programs to destroy existing chemical weapons stockpiles, are also covered.
- Analytical reports aimed at helping to promote discussion and resolution of difficult issues involved in implementing the CWC. Additional materials highlighting prominent events and problems facing the Convention are published in journals and other publications.
- Occasional meetings featuring knowledgeable speakers and offering an opportunity for round table discussion of various aspects of the Convention's implementation.

The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is directed by Amy E. Smithson.

The Henry L. Stimson Center was founded in 1989 as a non-profit, non-partisan institution devoted to public policy research and education. The Stimson Center concentrates on particularly difficult national and international security issues where policy, technology, and politics intersect. The Stimson Center's projects assess the sources and consequences of international conflict, as well as the tools needed to build national security and international peace. They deal with regional security (peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, and confidence-building measures), U.S. foreign and defense policies, arms control measures and their verification, and other building blocks of international security.

A.E.S.



Contents

<i>Project on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention</i>	iii
<i>Contents</i>	v
<i>List of Tables and Figures</i>	vi
<i>Preface and Acknowledgments</i>	vii
The Chemical Weapons Convention: An Overview	
<i>Donald Mahley</i>	1
Verification of the CWC: An Overview	
<i>Amy E. Smithson</i>	7
Challenges in Implementing the CWC	
<i>Elisa D. Harris</i>	11
Questions Frequently Asked About the Chemical Weapons Convention and Its Implementation	
<i>Amy E. Smithson</i>	15
Overview	15
Central Provisions of the Convention	17
Implementing Organizations and Costs of the CWC	20
Data Monitoring Requirements	22
Routine Inspections	26
Challenge Inspections	31
Destruction of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles and Facilities	34
Special Issues Concerning Chemical Industry	38
Related Arms Control Agreements	40
Adherence and Compliance	42
Selected Bibliography	
<i>Keir A. Lieber</i>	47
Basic Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention	51

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: CWC-Controlled Chemicals.....	18
Table 2: Thresholds for Annual Data Declarations and Routine Inspections	24
Table 3: Guidelines for Routine Inspections	31
Table 4: CWC Timeframe for Chemical Weapons Destruction	35
Table 5: The U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile.....	37
Table 6: Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention	43
Table 7: Non-Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention	44
Figure 1: Timeline for Challenge Inspections	33

Preface and Acknowledgments

This handbook is a product of the Henry L. Stimson Center's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Implementation Project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The project's objectives are to serve as a watchdog, information clearinghouse, and advocate for the strongest possible chemical weapons nonproliferation regime.

Many individuals who have had no prior involvement with the CWC will have to make decisions about its implementation or will be effected by its implementation. This treaty's complexity, however, makes it difficult for newcomers to become acquainted with the art and science of controlling chemical weapons. The purpose of this handbook is to introduce readers to the CWC by breaking it down into digestible pieces and avoiding technical and legal jargon.

The first section of the handbook includes three overview presentations that were made at a press conference in January 1993 to celebrate the opening of the Convention for signature and of the CWC Implementation Project. Donald Mahley, Amy E. Smithson, and Elisa D. Harris were the presenters. Mahley's summary of the CWC's major provisions contains the insights of firsthand experience with the treaty's negotiation. He is the deputy assistant director of the Multilateral Affairs Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and currently heads the U.S. delegation to the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. Smithson reviews the Convention's verification provisions, pointing out the difficulties that will accompany their implementation. A senior associate at the Stimson Center who specializes in arms control verification, Smithson heads the CWC Implementation Project and edited this volume. Harris addresses two of the most challenging aspects of CWC implementation, achieving universality in CWC adherence and destroying chemical weapon stockpiles. Harris, formerly a senior research fellow at The Brookings Institution, is now on the National Security Council staff with responsibilities for the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, missile technology, and conventional weapons.

The second major section of the handbook, written by Smithson, presents a series of questions and answers to take readers deliberately through the fundamental provisions of the Convention and issues associated with it. The Q&A section was designed so that the reader can review it from start to finish or go directly to subject areas of particular interest. The annotated bibliography that follows was prepared by Keir A. Lieber, a research assistant at the Stimson Center who also works on the CWC Implementation Project. As with the Q&A section, the documents listed in this bibliography have been categorized to help guide readers in their search for additional information.

Thanks are due to Michael Krepon, the Stimson Center's president, for his oversight and guidance, as well as to a number of U.S. government officials, who, although they shall remain anonymous, generously gave of their time to review portions of this handbook. Without the skillful assistance of Keir A. Lieber, Celes Eckerman, Jane Lee Dorsey, and Pamela Reed, this handbook could not have been completed.

The Stimson Center is grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, whose funding makes this work possible. We particularly wish to thank David Speedie and Jane Wales for their continued support. Finally, responsibility for the content of this document, for any errors or omissions, rests solely with the editor.

A.E.S.

The Chemical Weapons Convention: An Overview

Donald Mahley

The following discussion outlines the various parts of the treaty and highlights those elements that make it different from previous multilateral arms control efforts.

Article I details the general obligations of this treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires more of its parties than has ever been previously demanded in the world of arms control in general and, more specifically, with regard to chemical arms control. There have been previous inhibitions against the use of chemical weapons, but this treaty bans absolutely the use of chemical weapons, including both first use and retaliatory use. It also bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons. In short, parties that are in compliance with this treaty will be completely out of the chemical weapons business.

Article I also obliges treaty parties to refrain from helping other states—not only other parties, but any other states—engage in any of the activities banned by the treaty. In this sense, the CWC is also a nonproliferation treaty designed to prevent parties from doing things that might assist non-parties in acquiring chemical weapons capabilities.

Article II contains definitions and criteria. This article defines what is in the treaty and the criteria that are used to determine what is included within the scope of the treaty's controls. Most of the definitions are standard. A few definitions do "policy work" for the Convention. For example, the 1925 start date for "abandoned" chemical weapons, which must be treated differently than "old" chemical weapons, is established. This article also states fully what is meant by "purposes not prohibited" by the Convention.

Article III contains the obligations to declare possession of chemical weapons and/or chemical weapons capabilities. To date, only two countries have *formally* declared possession of chemical weapons stockpiles—the United States and Russia. Article III requires declaration of any chemical weapons production and declaration of any transfer of chemical weapons—either out of or into the party's territory. It also provides for declarations about associated activities that could be relevant to the treaty's provisions. Such activities include chemical and manufacturing capabilities and other chemical activities that are not necessarily directly related to chemical weapons but that have an inherent dual-use capability. For example, certain legitimate commercial chemicals are potentially usable as weapons precursors. Facilities that declare they are engaged in or capable of these activities will be subject to inspections.

Article IV is devoted to chemical weapons capabilities. This article requires signatories to destroy chemical weapons and any special facilities for their manufacture. Both the stockpiles and the production facilities marked for destruction are subject to inspection.

This article also stipulates that duplication of bilateral verification efforts should be avoided. The Russians are very worried about the cost of the requisite verification of

Donald Mahley, the deputy assistant director of the Multilateral Affairs Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, currently heads the U.S. delegation to the Preparatory Commission in The Hague.

destruction of their stockpile. They have argued that verification of this destruction process is one of the things Russia simply cannot afford to do in the foreseeable future. In 1990, the United States and Russia, then the Soviet Union, signed a Bilateral Destruction Agreement wherein both countries mutually agreed to undertake destruction of virtually all of their existing stockpiles under bilateral verification. Article IV allows this bilateral verification process to be used for the CWC if it satisfies the treaty's verification requirements. This proviso will help keep Russian verification costs at a minimum. The Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which will administer the treaty, has the right to determine to what degree bilateral verification will substitute for or supplement multilateral verification of the destruction process.

Article V details what is to be done to chemical weapons production facilities. Of particular importance are the stipulations that parties cease all chemical weapons related activities at these facilities and close them within ninety days after the treaty enters into force. Parties must then submit and implement plans for their destruction. Again in response to Russian concerns, this article contains the provision that, under special circumstances and upon petition to the OPCW, States Parties may avoid destroying these facilities in their entirety and simply destroy the specialized equipment that was used for chemical weapons production. This provision would allow for the continued use of the overall facility for the conduct of commercial chemical activities. States that wish to exercise this option must negotiate special verification provisions for these facilities to guarantee that they are not used for purposes prohibited by the treaty.

Various intelligence reports and independent analyses assert that other countries have chemical weapons. If such states join the Convention, Articles IV and V very clearly obligate them to declare the stockpiles and facilities they have. The United States will be expecting some activity in this area from several countries.

Article VI protects all those chemical activities not specifically prohibited by the Convention. It obligates parties to ensure that all facilities engaged in non-prohibited activities, such as the manufacture of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and fertilizers, declare what they are doing. Thereafter, each party is responsible for assuring that these facilities are subject to appropriate verification for their activities. Paragraph 11 of this article levies the generic requirement to implement this article without hampering the economic or technological development of parties.

Article VII details the requirements for national implementation measures. The CWC is the first treaty to explicitly stipulate that governments party to this treaty must take proactive measures to ensure that individuals and firms within their country and their jurisdiction comply with all provisions of the treaty. As a part of national implementation measures, parties to this treaty must enact implementing legislation, or whatever other implementing activities are appropriate to their form of government, that places barriers and penalties against people or firms within their territory that violate the Convention or assist others—including non-parties—in doing so.

This article also requires States Parties to designate a national authority as contact point for the OPCW. A designated point of contact will ensure that the OPCW will be

able to carry out its inspection responsibilities in a timely manner. This is of particular importance in the case of challenge inspections, which are extremely time sensitive.

Article VII also establishes confidentiality standards for information received by parties. States Parties must treat confidentially information from the OPCW that refers to inspection and other treaty-related activities. Such a provision is important to ensure that national security and proprietary information inadvertently discovered in the conduct of treaty business is not disseminated.

Article VIII establishes the OPCW and requires the appointment of the OPCW's Director-General, who will direct the operations of the Technical Secretariat. This article stipulates the roles and responsibilities of the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat. It also establishes a forty-one member Executive Council, composed of treaty party representatives from around the world, which will be responsible for the day-to-day policy operation of the treaty, including assessing inspection reports and making executive decisions. Membership on the Council will rotate on a periodic basis.

This article also establishes the Conference of States Parties and stipulates when and why it convenes. The Conference of States Parties votes on issues of inspection results, ambiguities or questions about compliance, and other concerns raised by the Executive Council.

Article IX establishes the rights of States Parties to request challenge inspections. A state that suspects that prohibited activities are being conducted on another party's territory may request that the Technical Secretariat inspect a specific location for evidence of non-compliance with the treaty.

Challenge inspection, which has rightfully received a great deal of attention, is not the only means by which a State Party can raise a question about and try to resolve an ambiguity with respect to treaty requirements. In connection with the suspected violation of treaty requirements, a State Party has the right to request that another party submit to the Executive Council information relevant to the issue at hand. The requesting state may also submit its own information to the Executive Council. The Executive Council will examine all the information to determine whether there is an ambiguous or untoward situation with which the OPCW ought to concern itself. Admittedly, this option will probably not be exercised nearly as frequently as the option to request a challenge inspection. It is questionable whether a party having what it believes to be hard evidence of a clandestine operation by another State Party would be willing to lose the element of surprise inherent in a challenge inspection by presenting this information and making a direct accusation in open court.

States Parties are not required to go through the Executive Council debate before requesting a challenge inspection. They *are* obligated, however, to ensure that a challenge inspection only be requested to investigate possible non-compliance with the obligations of this treaty. Many states are deeply concerned about the potential for frivolous use or abuse of challenge inspections. This article clearly obligates States Parties to ensure that there is one purpose and one purpose only for a challenge inspection: the investigation of questions of compliance with the Convention.

Article X pledges to provide assistance and protection to any State Party that is threatened by the potential use of chemical weapons or against which chemical weapons are used. Evidence that a hostile neighbor—party to the treaty or not—has begun to pursue a chemical weapons stockpile is sufficient for a State Party to request assistance from the OPCW to nullify the potential effects of a chemical weapons attack. Subscription of funds and equipment for assistance is voluntary and can include things from training to equipment to other kinds of chemical defensive capabilities for the armed forces and the population of the threatened state. This provision enables the treaty to nullify any potential political or military advantage of either a non-party developing chemical weapons or a party clandestinely developing chemical weapons. This provision is one of the reasons why states should not waste their time, money, or effort trying to solve real or perceived national security problems by developing chemical weapons.

Article XI guarantees the continued exchange of chemicals and chemical technologies that do not contribute to activities prohibited by this Convention. Developing states note that access to commercially valuable chemical technology is an important part of a larger effort to facilitate industrial development. This article protects the free exchange of chemicals and chemical-related technology that will not be used for prohibited purposes. Nevertheless, it does not rule out the continuation of collective efforts to control the export of high-risk chemicals and technologies. In fact, the Australia Group, with over twenty members, is expanding both its membership—Hungary and Argentina may soon join—and its activities to include more chemicals and technologies to further strengthen the chemical and biological nonproliferation regimes.

Article XII provides measures to redress noncompliance. The OPCW itself can apply some sanctions against States Parties, primarily the revocation of rights and privileges. This may not sound like much, but if the OPCW revokes rights and privileges, the assistance and protection provided for in Article X is forfeited. Likewise, a sanctioned state can no longer demand challenge inspections.

This article also clearly indicates that, in the event that the OPCW believes other kinds of activities against a non-compliant state are appropriate, it can refer the matter to the United Nations for consideration and further action by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Articles XIII through XXIV are known as “housekeeping articles.” They address such issues as the relation of this treaty to other international agreements, settlement of disputes, and means of amendment. Amendment of the articles of this Convention can only be done by the Conference of States Parties with a two-thirds majority vote. Any such amendment would certainly constitute a significant enough change in the Convention so as to require ratification in the United States by the Senate. On the other hand, amendment of the *annexes* can be accomplished with a simple majority vote of the States Parties.

Annex I of this Convention contains the “Schedules” or lists of chemicals. Chemicals were placed on Schedules to delineate those activities that are prohibited with respect to specific chemical compounds. Schedule 1 lists classic blister or nerve agents and direct precursors to these agents that have no known commercial value. States Parties may only possess a very limited amount of Schedule 1 chemicals, which may be

Parties may only possess a very limited amount of Schedule 1 chemicals, which may be produced or used *only* at one small, declared facility for research and defense purposes.

Schedule 2 chemicals are very toxic chemicals with commercial utility that can be used as precursors to chemical weapons. The CWC does not prohibit activity with these chemicals. However, facilities that consume or produce these chemicals must be declared and are subject to regular inspection procedures.

Schedule 3 chemicals are toxic chemicals produced in large quantities for industrial use that have been used as chemical weapons. Of particular concern to the Convention is the fact that Schedule 3 chemicals are readily convertible for use as precursor agents to chemicals on Schedules 1 and 2. Facilities that produce these chemicals must be declared and will be subject to random inspection to ensure that they do not engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.


In addition to its restrictions of chemicals on Schedules, the Convention requires the declaration and eventual inspection of facilities capable of producing chemicals easily transformed into chemical weapons or weapons precursors. Specifically, those facilities capable of producing non-Scheduled discrete organic chemicals must be declared and will be subject to random inspections, beginning the fourth year after the Convention enters into force.

As noted, the amendment process for the annexes is more flexible than the amendment process for the bulk of the treaty. Advances in chemical technology will likely compel States Parties to add new chemicals to these Schedules. Research may also show that there are valuable uses for some Schedule 1 chemicals, in which case they would be moved from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2.

Annex II details how the various inspections are conducted. Similarly, these provisions were put in an annex rather than in the body of the treaty because new technology and new techniques of inspection may require that some of these details be changed.

In a section dealing with "activities not prohibited," this annex establishes constraints on international movement of Scheduled chemicals. Because parties to the treaty have foresworn chemical weapons, they are permitted to trade with each other in commercially valuable chemicals that have potential use as weapons components. After three years, trade in Schedule 2 chemicals with non-parties will be prohibited. In the interim period, States Parties will be required to obtain end-use certification from non-party recipients of transferrable chemicals.

Annex III is the confidentiality annex. It obliges the OPCW and the inspectors and inspection observers of the Technical Secretariat not to reveal information gathered in the course of an inspection that is not relevant to a violation of the treaty itself. Such ancillary information may either have national security or proprietary value to the state being inspected and the OPCW must treat it with confidentiality.



Verification of the CWC: An Overview

Amy E. Smithson

The verification provisions of the CWC are the product of years of debate and negotiation. The major challenges of monitoring this treaty will revolve around the fact that the same chemicals that are used to make pharmaceuticals, pesticides, fertilizers, and other everyday commercial products can also be used to make chemical weapons. For example, the Schedule 2 chemical thiodiglycol and various phosphorous compounds on Schedule 3 are key precursors for mustard gas and nerve agents, respectively, but these chemicals are widely used in pesticides and other products. Therefore, it was very difficult to draw the line between what would be required to determine treaty compliance and what would be too intrusive. The negotiators were constantly faced with the twin issues of how wide and how deep to cast the so-called verification net for the CWC.

Part of the resolution to this problem was to rank chemicals in order of risk. To review briefly, Schedule 1 lists twelve chemicals that are key to nerve and blister agents. Schedule 2 has fourteen chemicals of significant risk that are not widely used in industry. Schedule 3 lists seventeen precursors and chemicals that are frequently used in industry, but still pose a risk. Two basic kinds of inspections were also established—routine and challenge.

Routine Inspections

The most strict monitoring standards of the routine inspection regime will apply to declared chemical weapons sites, such as former production facilities, storage facilities, and destruction facilities. Inspections at these sites will be conducted on short notice and the inspectors are to be given unimpeded access. Inspectors may take samples and “seal” or mark items for future identification and reference. The inspectors may also leave continuous on-site monitoring devices at these sites to keep tabs on certain activities in their absence.

The treaty permits each party to maintain a single small-scale production facility to conduct medical, pharmaceutical, and protective research with Schedule 1 chemicals. Examples of such research include the development of antidotal vaccines and protective equipment. For these purposes, each party is allowed to manufacture or have on hand one ton of Schedule 1 chemicals. Verification of the activities at this small-scale production facility and at other laboratories that handle Schedule 1 chemicals will be accomplished with “systematic” inspections for which detailed declarations will be required.

Commercial facilities that use Schedule 2 chemicals will declare the nature of their activities depending on the listed chemical and its associated threshold. Schedule 2 facilities will be subject to inspections if their production of the listed chemicals exceed another set of thresholds, which range from a quantity of ten kilograms to ten tons. Schedule 2 facilities will be subject to inspection on forty-eight hours notice. Access during these inspections will in principle be unimpeded, but the extent of access in each case will be determined after an initial “baseline” inspection is conducted at the facility. Specific details will be contained in a facility agreement that is to be negotiated between the host state and the Technical Secretariat at that point.

Declarations are required for commercial facilities that produce more than thirty tons of a Schedule 3 chemical, and facilities that produce over two hundred tons of Schedule 3 chemicals annually will be subject to routine inspections, along the line of those conducted for Schedule 2 sites. Furthermore, routine inspections at facilities that produce more than two hundred tons of other unscheduled discrete organic chemicals—especially those that contain phosphorous, sulfur, or fluorine—are slated to begin four years after the treaty enters into force. These inspections will take place with 120 hours notice.

As noted, inspectors are supposed to have unimpeded access to a facility during a routine inspection. Inspectors will be allowed to request pertinent information, interview personnel at the site, inspect documentation and records, have host personnel take photographs and samples, and use monitoring instruments. Host officials will be present during inspections to exercise their right to see that the inspection does not stray from monitoring compliance with CWC provisions. No state is required to have more than twenty routine inspections per year, and no individual site has to submit to more than two routine inspections annually.

Challenge Inspections

Challenge inspections are designed to detect and deter activities prohibited by the Convention, namely the development, production, storage, acquisition, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. Since chemical weapons can be made from numerous chemicals and under very primitive conditions, cheating on a very small scale will be difficult to detect. However, an effort to produce or stockpile enough chemical weapons for battle-field use would be hard to hide given the Convention's web of monitoring provisions. A country trying to cheat might try to cover up its activities before the inspectors arrive on site for a challenge inspection, but a quick clean-up effort would probably leave behind telltale signs that well-trained and well-equipped inspectors could detect. Nonetheless, a July 1986 U.S. report submitted to the Conference on Disarmament concluded that a single ammunition company could pack 1,230 tons of chemical munitions into trucks or railroad cars in a single workday. Consequently, one of the crucial aspects of the challenge inspection regime is how quickly inspectors have access to a suspect site.

Once a request for a challenge inspection is received by the Technical Secretariat, the Director-General is under obligation to conduct the challenge inspection without delay. No less than twelve hours before the inspection team is due to arrive at the point of entry in the host country, the Director-General will notify the challenged state and the Executive Council of the site to be inspected. The challenged state is obligated to receive and cooperate with the inspection team. The Executive Council, however, can stop a challenge inspection within this twelve hour pre-arrival period if three-quarters of its forty-one members deem the request for the inspection to be abusive or frivolous.

Once this initial notice is given, the clock starts ticking. Within twelve hours, the inspection team arrives and begins to negotiate with host officials about the dimensions of the perimeter to be established at the site. This perimeter must be ten meters outside of any buildings or security structures, such as fences, and it cannot cut through them. The host state must transport the inspection team to the site within thirty-six hours of their arrival. Thus, the inspectors are at the alternative perimeter—the dimensions the

host suggests if the officials cannot agree on the parameters initially requested—forty-eight hours or two days after the host state was first notified of the challenge.

Over the next seventy-two hours, the inspectors and the host officials will negotiate both the final dimensions of the perimeter and the nature of the access that the inspectors will receive inside it. The inspectors will also begin to “secure” the perimeter during this time. They will do so initially by looking at traffic logs, taking photographs and videos, and going under escort to other parts of the perimeter. Once the final perimeter dimensions are settled, the inspectors may take air, soil, and effluent samples and use monitoring instruments within a fifty meter band around the perimeter.

The host officials must allow the inspection team access inside the perimeter 120 hours after receipt of the initial notification. Challenge inspections will be conducted under the principle of managed access, which means that the inspectors and the host officials will negotiate with regard to:

- 1) the extent of access to any particular place or places within the site;
- 2) the nature of the inspection activities; and
- 3) what information the inspected party provides to the inspection team.

The goal of managed access is to provide a balance between what the inspectors need to see to ascertain whether illegal activity is taking place and what a challenged state has the right to protect in terms of sensitive national security data and proprietary commercial information.

In practice, managed access means that the host may remove papers from offices; shroud displays, stores of goods, and equipment; turn off computers; restrict sampling to the presence or absence of Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals and their degradation products; give only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the site; and use random selective access. This latter term refers to an inspection method whereby the inspectors are allowed to choose at random and enter a percentage of buildings and areas within buildings.

Once inside the perimeter, the inspectors have eighty-four hours to complete their work. The Executive Council will review the final report from the inspection and may recommend to the Conference of States Parties measures to redress the situation to ensure compliance. These recommendations may include collective measures to help bring about compliance. If the Executive Council finds that the requesting State Party abused its right to request an inspection, it may recommend that this state bear part of the financial burden of the inspection.

The bottom line is that each challenge inspection will be different because, although access is guaranteed, the nature of that access is negotiable. Some experts have argued that challenge inspections should not be the focus of so much attention, that in effect they should be more like routine inspections. Others argue that challenge inspections will be politically significant events that will probably be far and few in between. Inevitably, challenge inspections, especially the first few, will be major events in the Convention’s verification regime.

Concluding Observations

The Convention's challenge provisions do not promise inspections on a par with what has taken place during the recent dismantlement and destruction of Iraq's programs to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations Special Commission found actual "smoking guns" in Iraq because these inspectors for the most part operated on the basis of *carte blanche* access. With a few highly-publicized exceptions, they could go wherever they wished, whenever they wished. The same liberties will not apply to CWC challenge inspectors, who will operate on timetables and negotiate their way into a facility.

The CWC's verification regime is not perfect. Some will argue that the verification net was not cast far enough in one direction; others will argue that it was cast too deep in another. Still, this verification regime is a very impressive and unprecedented accomplishment. It will fulfill the standard requirements asked of a verification regime: it will provide adequate detection, deterrence, and confidence-building for the Convention.

Challenges in Implementing the CWC

Elisa D. Harris

The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, like the completion of the START II agreement, marks the beginning of a new era in arms control in which treaty implementation is likely to be at least as complex and difficult a task as treaty negotiation.

This increased complexity can be explained by two factors. First, today's arms control agreements are more far-reaching than their Cold War predecessors, requiring radical reductions in or even the complete elimination of weapons long believed to be important, if not critical, components of national deterrent strategies. Under the CWC, some seventy thousand metric tons of chemical warfare agent will have to be eliminated by Russia and the United States alone. This will be a massive undertaking.

Second, post-Cold War agreements require the participation of a large number of countries beyond Russia and the United States. This was true, of course, of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But at the time the NPT was negotiated, in 1968, there were only five confirmed nuclear weapons states. In the chemical weapons field, by comparison, more than a dozen countries are believed today to have chemical weapons programs, with others still attempting to acquire them. This means that the effectiveness of the CWC will be judged at least in part by the extent to which the Convention receives the support of this wider group of countries.

Both of these factors will have an enormous impact on efforts to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. More specifically, the CWC's success in stemming and indeed rolling back chemical weapons proliferation will hinge on whether the major powers—Russia and the United States—are capable of destroying the vast quantities of chemical agents they have in their stockpiles, and whether the Convention is widely adhered to, especially by countries of proliferation concern.

If the Convention enters into force in early 1995, as is expected, the United States and Russia will be required to begin destroying their chemical weapon stocks by early 1997 and to complete the process by 2005. The United States can probably meet its destruction obligations. A prototype destruction facility on Johnston Island in the Pacific is in the last phase of its testing program. Eight more destruction facilities are to be built at stockpile sites in the continental United States. The destruction technology that has been chosen by the Army, known as "baseline," uses high temperature incineration to destroy the munitions after they have been disassembled. Each element of the munition is handled by a separate incinerator with its own pollution control system—one for the chemical agent, a second for metal parts, a third for explosive material, and a fourth for packing crates and other potentially contaminated items.

The U.S. destruction program, it should be noted, has had its share of problems. Two incidents within the past year have resulted in temporary shut-downs on Johnston

Elisa D. Harris, formerly a senior research fellow at The Brookings Institution, is now on the National Security Council staff, with responsibilities for the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, missile technology, and conventional weapons.

Island. In January 1992, an eight inch by two inch hole was apparently blown in one of the incinerators when a propellant charge detonated. And on January 2, 1993, a small fire resulted after a burster charge ignited during the disassembly of a mustard round. It should be emphasized that no agent was released and no one was injured in either incident. Nevertheless, they serve as useful reminders that even the most carefully developed destruction technology is likely to experience problems during its initial period of operation.

The January 1992 incident, coupled with destruction rates substantially slower than what the Army initially expected, has delayed completion of the test program on Johnston Island by more than a year. Meanwhile, public opposition to the overall destruction program has grown. In Aberdeen, Maryland, and Lexington, Kentucky, and to a lesser extent in Indiana and Colorado, the "NIMBY" or "not in my back yard" syndrome presents a different sort of challenge. Kentucky, for example, has passed legislation that would require the Army to certify that incineration is not only the safest existing technology, but also the safest of any technology currently under development. This would appear, on the face of it, to be a nearly impossible certification to make.

In response to these problems—the incidents on Johnston Island, the delays in the test program, and the rising public opposition to the program—Congress took a number of steps last year. Provisions were included in the Department of Defense authorization bill requiring the Army to establish Citizen's Advisory Committees at the sites where public opposition to the program is most severe. The Army is also required to prepare a report by December 1993 on alternative destruction technologies. Other legislation contained provisions prohibiting the Army from constructing any new destruction facilities until Congress has reviewed the Army's report on alternative destruction technologies.

Where does all of this leave the U.S. destruction program? In the end, the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile will cost substantially more money and take longer to accomplish than was originally expected. When this program was first unveiled a little under a decade ago, the Army estimated that it could probably destroy most of the stockpile for about \$1.7 billion. The most recent estimate has the cost of this program at \$7.9 billion. Many believe that the final price tag will be in excess of \$10 billion. As for the timetable of this operation, the Army originally indicated that it could destroy most of the stockpile by late 1994. Last year, the Army notified Congress that it would need until the end of the year 2000 to finish the job. This seems optimistic. Nevertheless, barring any unforeseen developments, the United States should be able to begin full-scale destruction operations before 1997 and complete the process by 2005, as the Convention requires.

Russia, by comparison, will be hard-pressed to meet its CWC destruction obligation. A prototype destruction facility built at Chapayevsk on the Volga River in the late 1980s never opened because of opposition from the local community. Since that time, neither the Soviet Union nor Russia has developed a comprehensive plan for destroying the forty thousand metric tons of chemical agent Moscow says it produced. All of these stocks are now said to be located on Russian territory.

A partial destruction plan is currently before the Russian parliament. It calls for the conversion to destruction operations of an existing chemical weapons production facility at Novoceboksary. The proposed plan also calls for the construction of new destruction facilities at two locations where chemical weapons are currently stored: Gorny and Kambarka. These three facilities would, however, only be able to destroy about forty-five percent of the former Soviet chemical weapons stockpile. Russia is likely to use some combination of chemical neutralization and incineration to destroy the stockpile, although no final decisions have been made. There is also considerable interest in converting the chemical agents into products that can be used in the civilian industry, despite skepticism on the part of Western destruction experts as to whether this would be cost effective.

Two factors help explain why neither the Soviet Union nor Russia has moved quickly to develop and implement a destruction program. First, the program itself is politically unpopular. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Russian people have little confidence in the ability of their government to safely destroy large quantities of highly toxic material. Moreover, chemical weapons destruction is expensive. The Russian stocks may well prove to be cheaper to destroy than U.S. weapons, in part because they are configured differently. Nevertheless, the total price tag is likely to be at least several billion dollars. The Russian parliament is unlikely to embark on a costly chemical weapons destruction program at a time when it lacks the resources to provide adequate housing for troops returning from Eastern Europe.

The U.S. government has tried to assist the Russians by offering to share destruction technology. This could reduce both the cost of and the political opposition to the program. A "made in America" label, in particular, may well evoke more confidence on the part of the Russian people than technologies developed and built by Russians alone. The United States has also tried to aid the Russian program by making \$25 million of the Nunn-Lugar money that was approved in 1991 available for the development of a comprehensive plan for destroying the Russian stockpile and possibly for the purchase of some destruction related technology. This was spelled out in a bilateral agreement signed by senior U.S. and Russian officials in July 1992. Additional money should also be available as a consequence of the Freedom Support Act, the second phase of the Russian aid program which passed the Congress in late 1992.

Clearly, much more is going to have to be done—not only by the United States, but also by other countries—to assist Russia in destroying the enormous stockpile of chemical weapons it inherited from the former Soviet Union. Unless it receives substantial technical and financial assistance from the West, Russia may well be forced to delay ratifying the Convention, not for military reasons, but rather because of the domestic political and financial problems posed by destruction. Alternatively, Russia may ratify the Convention but be forced to request modifications in the destruction schedule. Provisions added late in the negotiations allow a state, in extreme circumstances, to ask the Convention's governing body for an extension of up to five years to meet its destruction obligations. Without Western assistance, Russia almost certainly will have to make such a request.

Either of these developments—a delay in the ratification of the Convention or clear indications that it cannot meet its destruction obligations—could have an impact on CWC

ratification here in the United States. Neither development is likely to block U.S. ratification. But the Senate could decide to hold off on ratifying the Convention until the situation in Russia becomes more clear. Decisions by the two principal chemical weapons possessors to delay ratification could, in turn, influence decisions of other important countries, like China.

This brings us to the other key implementation issue—whether the Convention is going to enjoy widespread support, especially by countries of proliferation concern. In congressional testimony and speeches, former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates and other U.S. officials have claimed that at least fourteen countries have offensive chemical weapons programs. Of these fourteen countries, six co-sponsored a United Nations resolution in the fall of 1992 commending the Convention and calling for it to be opened for signature. Those countries are Iran, Myanmar (previously Burma), Israel, South Korea, India and Vietnam. All of these subsequently signed the Convention, as did China and Pakistan. That leaves six of the fourteen suspected chemical weapons proliferators still outside the CWC regime: Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, North Korea, and Taiwan. Taiwan, of course, is precluded from signing the Convention because of its ambiguous international legal position.

Some of these holdouts eventually will join the Convention. In the Middle East, where most of the holdouts are located, the fate of the CWC clearly is tied to the peace process. The election in Israel last year of a Labor government holds out the prospect of real progress, not only in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, but also in the discussions on confidence-building measures and arms control in the region. This is one reason for being optimistic about the future of chemical disarmament in the Middle East.

A number of Arab countries—Algeria, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates have already joined Israel in signing the Convention. Over time, others almost certainly will follow. In the interim, however, the Arab League is likely to continue to insist upon linking chemical and nuclear weapons in the region.

Objectively speaking, the holdouts have little to gain, and much to lose, by delaying their adherence to the Convention. Nonsignatories will not be able to participate in the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), which began work in February 1993. The PrepCom will spend the next two years working out, among other things, detailed inspection procedures and other critical issues left unresolved by the Geneva negotiations. The holdouts will also find it increasingly difficult to either acquire or use chemical weapons in the future. Provisions agreed to late in the negotiations bar parties from providing certain chemicals needed to make chemical warfare agents to nonparties. Other provisions provide for assistance to countries threatened or attacked with chemical weapons.

In sum, the completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention is but the first step on what will clearly be a long road towards eliminating chemical weapons. Unless the major powers, particularly the United States, devote the same energy to implementing this Convention as they did to negotiating it, the CWC may well be prevented from realizing its full chemical nonproliferation potential.

Questions Frequently Asked About the Chemical Weapons Convention and Its Implementation

Amy E. Smithson

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is perhaps the most complex arms control agreement ever negotiated. In the following pages, a number of standard questions about the treaty and its implementation are posed and answered in terms that can be readily understood by a lay audience. These questions can be read sequentially, or the reader can use the following groupings to focus on areas of particular interest:

- Overview (pp. 15-16),
- Central Provisions of the Convention (pp. 17-20),
- Implementing Organizations and Costs of the CWC (pp. 20-22),
- Data Monitoring Requirements (pp. 22-26),
- Routine Inspections (pp. 26-31),
- Challenge Inspections (pp. 31-34),
- Destruction of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles and Facilities (pp. 34-38),
- Special Issues Concerning Chemical Industry (pp. 38-39),
- Related Arms Control Agreements (pp. 40-42), and
- Adherence and Compliance (pp. 42-45).

The intent of this chapter is to allow readers to gain a working knowledge of the Convention and issues associated with its implementation. For more in-depth knowledge, readers should consult the treaty text and the selected bibliography in this handbook.

Overview

What is the Chemical Weapons Convention?

The Chemical Weapons Convention will prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The Convention was negotiated over a twenty four-year period in Geneva by a group of forty western, eastern, and non-aligned states. Unprecedented in its scope and complexity, the Convention is the most significant agreement to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction since the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. While more than 145 countries have signed the CWC, the treaty will not enter into force before 1995. Ratification, effective implementation, and strict compliance by these signatories will constitute a very significant step toward creating a global norm against the proliferation and possession of chemical weapons.

What is a chemical weapon?

Chemical weapons are super toxic liquid and gaseous substances that can be dispersed in bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery, mines, grenades, or spray tanks. The four basic types of chemical agents are: blister agents that destroy exposed skin tissue (e.g., mustard gas and lewisite); blood agents that when inhaled block oxygen circulation within the body (e.g., hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride); choking agents that inflame the bronchial tubes and lungs, possibly causing asphyxiation (e.g., phosgene and chlorine); and nerve agents that cause the nervous system to overload, resulting in respiratory failure and death (e.g., Tabun, Sarin, Soman, and VX). The Convention defines chemical weapons as, together or separately, toxic chemicals and their precursors, munitions and devices, and any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with these items. A precursor is a chemical that is used in the production of a chemical agent. The Convention places controls on toxic chemicals and their precursors, which are listed on three "Schedules" according to their toxicity, military and commercial utility, and risk.

When and where have chemical weapons been used?

Primitive chemical weapons appeared on the battlefield as early as 431 B.C., with the Greek use of sulfur mixtures. Chlorine and mustard gas were widely used on World War I battlefields and caused over one million injuries. More lethal nerve agents were created just before World War II, but their use on European battlefields did not occur. Chemical weapons were used, however, in North Africa and China by Italian and Japanese forces. Use of chemical weapons since World War II has been sporadic, with the most recent case being the Iran-Iraq War. Properly trained and equipped personnel can protect themselves from the effects of chemical weapons. Those lacking training and protective gear are most susceptible to the effects of a chemical attack.

When will the Convention enter into force?

The Convention was opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993. The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification is deposited or 13 January 1995, whichever comes later. The two-year interim is planned to allow for the establishment of the international administering organization and implementing procedures. During this time, treaty signatories are preparing for the Convention's entry into force by organizing national authorities to supervise domestic implementation requirements and participating in the Preparatory Commission in the Hague. However, the exact date for the treaty's entry into force is dependent upon the speed with which signatories ratify the treaty.

Central Provisions of the Convention

What activities are prohibited by the Convention?

The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Treaty parties are prohibited from engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons. They are obligated to destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities, whether those weapons and facilities are located on their territory or the territory of another State Party. Treaty parties also undertake not to assist, induce, or encourage other states to engage in activities banned by the Convention. The treaty specifically bans all activities using the twelve super toxic agents listed on Schedule 1, with the exception of permitted research activities with these agents, which will be closely monitored.

What are the Convention's "Schedules"?

The negotiators of the Convention devised a system for characterizing chemicals based on their risk to the purpose and objectives of the Convention. This system places chemicals on three lists or "Schedules," according to their toxicity and military and commercial utility. (See Table 1.) Schedule 1 contains military agents and super toxic chemicals with very limited commercial use. Schedule 2 chemicals have low to moderate utility in the commercial sector, but are considered high risk chemicals because they can be used as chemical weapons or precursors to chemical weapons. Examples of everyday products made with Schedule 2 chemicals include: agricultural chemicals such as pesticides and herbicides made with dimethyl methylphosphonate; ceramics made with arsenic trichloride; and the solvent in the ink for ballpoint pens made with thiodiglycol. Schedule 3 chemicals are used in large quantities by commercial industry, but also pose a risk in that they have been used as chemical weapons or precursors. Examples of common commercial products made with Schedule 3 chemicals include: agricultural chemicals, dyes, and flame retardants made with phosphorus oxychloride; plastics made with phosgene; and surfactants—used to make detergents, among other products—and pharmaceuticals made with triethanolamine. Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals will be monitored according to their risk, with the most stringent requirements applied to the chemicals on Schedule 1. The Convention allows for changes in the chemicals listed on these Schedules.

What constraints does the Convention place on riot control agents?

Riot control agents are toxic chemicals that irritate or incapacitate humans, causing tearing, sneezing, disorientation, or tiredness (e.g., tear gas). The effects of these toxic chemicals usually disappear within a relatively short time. The Convention bans the use of riot control agents "as a method of warfare," but allows their use for law enforcement purposes, including domestic riot control.

What activities are not prohibited by the Convention?

Many of the chemical ingredients that can be used to make chemical weapons are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes. Therefore, the Convention does not ban

Table 1: CWC-Controlled Chemicals

Schedule 1: Military Agents with No or Low Commercial Use	
• Alkyl phosphonofluoridates (e.g., the nerve agents Sarin and Soman)	• Alkyl phosphoramidocyanidates (e.g., the nerve agent Tabun)
• Alkyl <i>s</i> -aminoethyl alkyl phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts (e.g., the nerve agent VX)	• Alkyl <i>s</i> -aminoethyl alkyl phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts (e.g., QL, a key precursor for VX)
• Sulfur mustards (e.g., mustard gas)	• Nitrogen mustards
• Lewisites	• Ricin
• Alkyl phosphonyldifluorides	• Saxitoxin
• Chlorosarin	• Chlorosoman

Schedule 2: High Risk Precursors and Toxic Chemicals with Moderate Commercial Use	Chemical Abstract Registry Number
• Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts	78-53-5
• PFIB 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene	382-21-8
• BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate	6581-06-2
• Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl, or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms, e.g., Methylphosphonyl dichloride Dimethyl methylphosphonate Methylphosphinyl dichloride Ethylphosphonyl dichloride Diethyl ethylphosphonate <i>Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphono-thiolothionate</i>	676-97-1 756-79-6 676-83-5 1066-50-8 78-38-6 944-22-9
• N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides e.g., Dimethyl phosphoramidic dichloride	677-43-0
• Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates e.g., Diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidate	2404-03-7
• Arsenic trichloride	7784-34-1
• 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid	76-93-7
• Quinuclidine-3-ol	1619-34-7
• N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-chlorides and corresponding protonated salts e.g., 2-chloroethyl trimethylammonium chloride Diethylaminoethyl-2-chloride	999-81-5 100-35-6
• N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols and corresponding protonated salts e.g., Diisopropylethanolamine <i>Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and corresponding protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding protonated salts</i>	96-80-0 108-01-0 100-37-8
• N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts e.g., 2-Diethylaminoethanethiol	100-38-9
• Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide	111-48-8
• Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol	464-07-3

Table 1: CWC-Controlled Chemicals (cont.)

Schedule 3: High Commercial Volume Dual-Use Chemicals	Chemical Abstract Registry Number
• Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride	75-44-5
• Cyanogen chloride	506-77-4
• Hydrogen cyanide	74-90-8
• Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane	76-06-2
• Phosphorus oxychloride	10025-87-3
• Phosphorus trichloride	7719-12-2
• Phosphorus pentachloride	10026-13-8
• Trimethyl phosphite	121-45-9
• Triethyl phosphite	122-52-1
• Dimethyl phosphite	868-85-9
• Diethyl phosphite	762-04-9
• Sulfur monochloride	10025-67-9
• Sulfur dichloride	10545-99-0
• Thionyl chloride	7719-09-7
• Ethyldiethanolamine	139-87-7
• Methyldiethanolamine	105-59-9
• Triethanolamine	102-71-6

Source: The Convention's Annex on Chemicals.

the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes. The Convention permits the continued production of thirty-one "dual-use" chemicals, which are listed on two additional schedules depending on their degree of toxicity and their military and commercial utility. Activities involving the chemicals on Schedules 2 and 3 must be reported and are subject to inspections to ensure that they are not being diverted from commercial to military purposes. (See Table 1.)

What activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?

Article VI of the Convention allows states to produce, acquire, retain, transfer, and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for research, medical, pharmaceutical, and protective purposes. States are allowed to produce an aggregate of one metric ton or less of Schedule 1 chemicals for these purposes. Examples of medical and protective research include the development of vaccines and antidotes against chemical agents and the testing of protective equipment, like gas masks and other protective clothing. Production for protective purposes is allowed at only two facilities: the one single, small-scale production facility, where the capacity of the reactor vessels is limited to 100 liters, and another designated facility, which can produce up to ten kilograms of Schedule 1 chemicals. Production of lesser amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes—in excess of 100 grams per year but no more than ten kilograms annually per facility—may take place at other declared facilities. Only one type of Schedule 1 activity does not have to be declared and inspected: laboratories and other facilities may *synthesize* an aggregate amount of less than 100 grams of Schedule 1 chemicals per year per facility for research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes. States may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals to other facilities and States Parties for research,

medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes. Permitted activities concerning Schedule 1 chemicals will be closely monitored.

Does the Convention provide for assistance if a state is threatened with a chemical weapons attack?

Article X of the CWC maintains that states have the right to request assistance if they are being threatened with a chemical weapons attack or have suffered an attack in which chemical weapons or riot control agents were used. After a rapid investigation to substantiate the nature of the assistance needed, the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will coordinate any emergency assistance forthcoming from an established voluntary program, including financial, technical, and humanitarian aid. Help provided could include protective and decontamination equipment, detection systems, and medical antidotes. This article also stipulates the right of states to maintain a protective research capacity, as well as protective equipment. In addition to the assistance fund, the international monitoring organization will maintain a database of information on protection against chemical weapons to which States Parties will have free access.

Implementing Organizations and Costs of the CWC

What is the Preparatory Commission?

Appendix I of the Convention established the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) as a political and technical decision-making entity composed of all initial signatories of the treaty. The PrepCom is meeting in The Hague to make "the necessary preparations for the effective implementation" of the CWC. The PrepCom is charged with setting procedures for verification, preparing a budget, recruiting and training inspectors, and establishing the infrastructure and rules of procedure for implementing the treaty. The PrepCom has three working levels in which signatories are entitled to participate: plenary, working groups, and groups of experts. When possible, decisions will be taken by consensus. Once a matter has been brought up for a vote, if consensus cannot be achieved within twenty-four hours, a two-thirds majority of members present will make decisions on matters of substance.

What will the PrepCom decide?

Aside from budgetary and administrative decisions, the PrepCom is filling in the details of the treaty. For instance, the CWC mandates that inspections of declared facilities take place and that samples may be taken at these facilities to ensure that chemical weapons are not being produced. Information collected during these inspections must be treated confidentially. However, the Convention does not stipulate how large inspection teams should be, how national security and commercial secrets will be protected, or what specific equipment and procedures should be used during inspections. The PrepCom is weighing alternative approaches to these operational issues, testing the most promising options, and making decisions about the procedures and equipment that will be used to implement the Convention. The Provisional Technical Secretariat,

forerunner of the CWC's international monitoring agency, is providing staff support for the PrepCom's consideration of technical and policy issues.

What international organization will implement the CWC?

An international monitoring agency, the Technical Secretariat, will be responsible for data monitoring and routine on-site inspections and will also conduct challenge inspections. The Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, will include an inspector corps and other technical specialists. The exact size of the Technical Secretariat has yet to be determined, but the inspector corps is expected to be about 250 strong, plus support and administrative personnel. The Provisional Technical Secretariat, the predecessor to the Technical Secretariat, has a multinational staff of about sixty under the direction of Ian Kenyon of the United Kingdom.

What organizations will govern the Technical Secretariat's activities?

The Technical Secretariat will report to the governing bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Conference of States Parties to which all treaty parties belong, and a smaller forty-one member Executive Council. Chosen on the basis of regional representation, members of the Executive Council will serve two-year terms. The Executive Council will meet regularly and will be responsible for the day-to-day decision making and operational guidance of the Technical Secretariat. In contrast, the Conference of States Parties will meet annually or in special sessions to consider questions about compliance, inspection results, and other issues raised by the Executive Council.

What is a "National Authority"?

The treaty requires participating states to establish a National Authority to be the main point of contact with the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat will notify a country of a pending inspection through the National Authority, which will provide the escorts for inspections and also submit required information on CWC-related activities to the Technical Secretariat. The National Authority will be responsible for ensuring that government and civilian facilities within their country's jurisdiction are complying with the treaty. Some countries will house their National Authority in their defense, foreign affairs, or commerce ministries, while others may form an interagency committee to be the National Authority.

Why is implementing legislation necessary?

While governments are the entities that will be legally bound by the Convention's provisions, corporations and individuals involved in activities related to the treaty also need to be subject to its provisions. Therefore, the Convention requires states to pass implementing legislation that will obligate individual citizens and corporate entities to abide by the treaty. One of the primary features of implementing legislation will be penal codes for individuals within a state's jurisdiction found to be in violation of the Convention. Also included will be regulations requiring the reporting of controlled activities to

the National Authority, the acceptance of routine and challenge inspections, and the harmonization of export control laws in accordance with the Convention's objectives.

What will it cost to implement the CWC?

The costs of CWC implementation can be separated into two general categories: 1) destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles; and 2) monitoring of other, mostly commercial activities. The Convention specifies that states with chemical weapons stockpiles are responsible for the costs to destroy their stocks and to have the Technical Secretariat monitor that destruction. Depending upon the size and nature of the stockpile, destruction costs could vary greatly. For example, the U.S. Army estimates that it will cost over \$8 billion to destroy the U.S. stockpile using high-temperature incineration.

Costs for routine inspections of declared sites and challenge inspections will be financed by all States Parties to the CWC according to the United Nations scale of assessments, which requires financial contributions according to the relative wealth of member states. Therefore, the United States will pay for roughly twenty-five percent of OPCW operations, Japan over twelve percent, and Germany almost nine percent. According to this formula, most participating states will pay approximately one percent of the OPCW's operations. Until the actual number of facilities to be inspected is known, costs for this aspect of the CWC's implementation cannot be reliably estimated. For a rough comparison, however, the International Atomic Energy Agency conducts safeguard inspections at hundreds of nuclear facilities worldwide for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and had a 1992 budget of \$59.4 million. The Technical Secretariat, however, will have to contend with a much larger number of sites.

Data Monitoring Requirements

Why are States Parties required to submit data to the international inspectorate?

Initial and annual data declarations will form the basis upon which the international inspectorate will monitor the destruction of chemical weapons and associated production facilities, guard against the diversion of commercial dual-use chemicals to prohibited chemical weapons production, and oversee permitted activities. Inspectors will spend most of their time correlating activities at declared sites with the data submitted about them. If inspectors find anomalies between the declared data and activities at a site, further investigation could follow. The data submitted will help the Technical Secretariat focus its inspections on "high risk" sites, such as a weapons storage facility or a commercial plant that uses large quantities of Schedule 2 chemicals. The requirement for states to provide this data also means that states share the burden of verification with the international inspectorate. States must provide accurate data about their military and commercial activities on a timely basis in order for the CWC's monitoring provisions to work properly.

What are the data declaration requirements for commercial sites using Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals?

Within thirty days of the CWC's entry into force and annually thereafter, states must declare the nature of the activities at commercial industrial sites that produce, process, or consume the dual-use chemicals on Schedules 2 and 3. In their initial and annual declarations, states must report the aggregate national amount of each Schedule 2 chemical produced, processed, consumed, imported, and exported. The same aggregate reporting requirement exists for each Schedule 3 chemical produced, imported, or exported. These aggregate national declarations must include the country as well as the quantity of chemicals exported or imported.

States must submit data about an individual commercial facility when *yearly* production, processing, or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals or production of Schedule 3 chemicals exceeds threshold quantities. For high risk Schedule 2 chemicals that have been weaponized, such as benzilate, the threshold is set at one kilogram. The threshold for Schedule 2 chemicals that are highly toxic and could be used as chemical weapons, such as Amiton or PFIB, is 100 kilograms. A one metric ton threshold has been set for the other Schedule 2 chemicals, which have been or could be used as precursors. (See Tables 1 and 2.) An initial data declaration must be made for any commercial facility that produced, processed, or consumed a Schedule 2 chemical above the specified threshold amount within the three previous calendar years. Similarly, initial declarations must be made for sites that produced more than thirty metric tons of a Schedule 3 chemical during the previous calendar year. Declarations are not required when facilities use Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals in low concentrations in mixtures. Separate annual declarations are required sixty days before the beginning of the calendar year for anticipated plant activities above the thresholds during the coming year.

What information must be declared for individual Schedule 2 and 3 facilities?

The information that must be provided for individual commercial facilities declared under these guidelines includes the name of the plant site and its ownership, the precise location of the facility, the number and precise location of plants within the declared site, their main activities, and the chemical names, common or trade names, structural formulas, and Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, if assigned. For Schedule 2 plants, the declaration must also include a description of the declared activities (e.g., production capacity, dedicated or multi-purpose plant). Statements about the anticipated production, processing, consumption, import, and export of Schedule 2 chemicals must include the purpose of the activity, the product types involved, and information about the sale or transfer of the chemical to another industrial facility, trader, or state. Declarations about the nature of anticipated production of Schedule 3 chemicals can be made in ranges, such as 30 to 200 metric tons. Plant sites that previously produced Schedule 2 chemicals for weapons purposes must declare such activities, providing information on the plants and chemicals involved, the dates and quantity of production, the recipient parties, and the end product, if known.

Table 2: Thresholds for Annual Data Declarations and Routine Inspections

Type of Facility	Type of Activity to be Reported for Previous Calendar Year and Anticipated for Next Calendar Year	Annual Production Threshold for Reporting	Threshold for Inspections
Schedule 1	Production, processing, consumption, acquisition, import and export data	• 100g	• 100g
Schedule 2	Production, processing, consumption, import and export data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1kg benzilate • 100kg (Amiton, PFIB) • 1 metric ton for other Schedule 2 chemicals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10kg benzilate • 1 metric ton (Amiton, PFIB) • 10 metric tons for other Schedule 2 chemicals
Schedule 3	Production, import and export data	• 30 metric tons	• 200 metric tons
Other chemical production facilities	Production data for previous calendar year only	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30 metric tons for discrete organic chemicals containing phosphorous, sulfur, or fluorine; • 200 metric tons for other unscheduled discrete organic chemicals 	• 200 metric tons

Source: The Verification Annex of the CWC.

What information must be declared about "other" chemical production activities?

In addition to Schedule 2 and 3 activities, each State Party must prepare an initial list of "other chemical production facilities" that is to be annually updated. Facilities in this category are not actually producing any of the chemicals on Schedules 1, 2, or 3, but have the potential to do so. The plant sites that must be listed are those that during the previous calendar year produced by synthesis either more than 200 metric tons of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals or more than thirty metric tons of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine, which are the basic building blocks for making chemical weapons. The plant name and ownership, precise location, main activities, and approximate number of plants in the site producing the above chemicals must be declared for these sites. Declarations about the aggregate amount of production of unscheduled chemicals at these sites can be made using ranges. States are not required to list plants that exclusively produce explosives or pure hydrocarbons.

What are the requirements for data declarations for permitted Schedule 1 activities?

States that produce Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes allowed under Article VI must make declarations regarding the single small-scale facility, as well as other facilities engaged in production. (See "What

activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?" on page 19.) These declarations will include the amount of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, consumed, or stored at the facility, along with a detailed technical description of the facility and its precise location. The aggregate annual amount of Schedule 1 chemicals each state acquires through production, withdrawal from chemical weapon stocks, or transfer cannot exceed one metric ton. Facilities that produce more than 100 grams of Schedule 1 chemicals annually must declare their activities.

What are the data declaration requirements for states that possess chemical weapons stockpiles?

States that possess chemical weapons must declare the size of their stockpile and the types of weapons therein no later than thirty days after the treaty enters into force. This declaration shall include the aggregate quantity of each chemical declared and the precise location and a detailed inventory of each weapon storage facility. Among other details, states must enumerate the associated equipment, munitions, and sub-munitions, as well as the toxicity of the chemicals and their structural formulas. In addition, states that have either transferred or received more than one metric ton of chemical weapons, in bulk or munition form, since 1 January 1946 must declare the specifics of such activity. Those details must include the size and types of weapons, the dates of the transfers or receipts, the names of supplier and recipient countries, and the precise location, if possible, of the agents concerned.

What are the data declaration requirements for states that possess chemical weapons production facilities?

States that have chemical weapons production facilities must halt any production upon entry into force of the Convention and declare the name, precise location, ownership, parties responsible for operating the facility since 1 January 1946, and the type of activity that took place at each such facility. For example, the purpose of the facility could be to manufacture bulk agent, to fill munitions, or both. These declarations are to include laboratories and test and evaluation sites. Among the details that must be provided are the types of agents handled at each facility, the dates of operation, the production capacity of each facility, site diagrams, and the present status of the facility. States must also declare their activities regarding any transfers or receipts of chemical weapons production equipment that have taken place since 1 January 1946. Article I of the Convention requires signatories to destroy all chemical weapons production facilities.

What data must be submitted if a commercial site was previously involved in weapons production?

If a commercial site at any time since 1 January 1946 produced a Schedule 2 or 3 chemical for chemical weapon purposes, the nature of that activity must be stated in the initial data declaration. Information submitted for such sites must include the name of the facility, its ownership and precise location, and the specific plants within the site involved in the declared activity. For each Schedule 2 or 3 chemical produced for weapons purposes, the chemical name, common or trade name, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number must be provided. In addition, the declaration must

include the dates when the chemical was produced, the quantity produced, the location to which the chemical was delivered, and, if known, the final product.

Are data declarations required for abandoned chemical weapons or production facilities?

States that left chemical weapons and production facilities on the territory of other States Parties are required to make declarations about the abandoned munitions and facilities. States Parties finding chemical weapons or production facilities abandoned by another state on their territory must also submit available relevant information to the Technical Secretariat.

What are the declaration requirements for riot control agents?

Not later than thirty days after the CWC enters into force, states are required to specify each riot control agent held in their possession for riot control purposes. The declaration must include the chemical name, structural formula, and, if assigned, the Chemical Abstracts Service registry number. States must update this information no less than thirty days after any change in holdings.

Routine Inspections

What sites will be subject to routine inspection under the Convention?

Sites that are declared because of their activities with Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals as well as other chemical production facilities will be subject to routine inspection. In general, these inspections are to be conducted in a manner that causes the least possible inconvenience to the inspected state and disturbance to the host facility. Unless otherwise agreed, the Technical Secretariat will negotiate a facility agreement for Schedule 1 and 2 sites with the State Party to delineate the specific areas within these sites where the inspection team has access. The inspection team will focus on verifying the accuracy of data declarations. The host state will receive advance notice of a pending inspection, the site to be inspected, the names of inspectors and their assistants, and the place and approximate time of arrival of the inspection team. At the beginning of all inspections, the inspection team will receive a briefing about the facility and its activities and the safety measures to be followed while on the premises. (See Table 3.)

What rights do inspectors and hosts have during a routine inspection?

The purpose of inspections will be to establish relevant facts concerning activities pertinent to the Convention. In accompanying the inspection team throughout its activities, the host state has the right to object to requests from the inspection team if it feels that a request goes beyond that purpose. The inspection team has the right of "unimpeded access" and can select items for inspection. The inspectors are allowed to bring equipment, such as a mass spectrometer or other devices, to assist them with their tasks. The Preparatory Commission and later the Technical Secretariat will select, test, and approve the inspectors' equipment. The equipment carried by the inspectors will be

specifically designed for the type of inspection to be conducted. For example, a team going to a weapons storage site would carry some different equipment from one going to a commercial facility.

Inspectors can interview personnel at the facility, inspect documentation and records, have photographs taken at their request, and request clarification of ambiguities that arise during the inspection. The inspectors can request that samples be taken, for example, from a reactor vessel, an effluent stream, or a bulk storage tank. The analysis of such samples would be done at the site, if possible, but samples could be transferred to approved OPCW laboratories off-site for additional analysis, if needed. Before leaving, the inspection team will meet with host officials to tell them the preliminary findings of the inspection and to clarify any remaining ambiguities. Final reports on inspection activities, due ten days after the inspection is completed, will contain only facts pertinent to the Convention and will be treated confidentially.

What are the general guidelines for routine inspections of permitted activities at Schedule 1 sites?

Schedule 1 sites include the single small-scale production facility and other medical, pharmaceutical, and protective research activities allowed under Article VI. Routine inspections at these sites are aimed at ensuring that the aggregate amount of production does not exceed one metric ton. (See the question "What activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?" on page 19.) The inspectors will also verify that production, processing, and consumption were correctly declared and that the Schedule 1 chemicals are not being diverted for activities other than the permitted research, medical, pharmaceutical, and protective purposes. In addition to routine inspections, the Technical Secretariat may place on-site instruments at these sites to monitor events. Inspections of Schedule 1 activities will begin promptly after the initial data declaration is submitted. Initial Schedule 1 inspections will be conducted with seventy-two hours advance notice, while the host state will receive thirty-six hours notice for subsequent inspections.

More specifically, how will routine inspections at chemical weapons production and storage facilities be conducted?

Inspectors will ensure that weapons production facilities are closed during an initial inspection that will take place between 90 and 120 days after the treaty enters into force. The Technical Secretariat will negotiate a facility agreement with state and host site officials to govern inspection activities at chemical weapons production facilities. This agreement will specify the boundaries within the overall declared site where the inspectors will go about their tasks and the time limits they have to accomplish them. Weapons production and storage sites are to be inspected with forty-eight hours advance notice. The inspectors are allowed to emplace on-site monitoring instruments and seals to assist with continuous monitoring of weapons production and storage sites. For example, inspectors will be allowed to enter all storage buildings, bunkers, and other locations and to identify all weapons with seals or markers to get an accurate count of the original inventory and to maintain that count as munitions are removed for destruction. They may install tamper proof video cameras to monitor the facility in their absence. The same

is true at production facilities, where inspectors will verify that the facility has been rendered inoperable at key junctures in the production process.

During the first ten years after entry into force, inspectors will monitor the destruction of all chemical weapon production facilities. All standard and specialized equipment for the production of chemical weapons, as well as specialized and standard buildings constructed for the production of chemical weapons, are to be physically destroyed. Plants that exclusively produce items related to chemical weapons, such as unfilled munitions and equipment specifically designed for direct use with chemical weapons, are also to be destroyed. The host state can also request that chemical weapons production facilities be converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. If the plan for such conversion is approved by the Conference of States Parties, the site will be subject to very strict provisions and subsequent inspections.

More specifically, how will routine inspections at chemical weapons destruction facilities be conducted?

Inspectors will monitor the destruction of the chemical weapons as states complete destruction of their stockpile over the ten year timeline after entry into force. A chemical weapons production facility can be converted to a chemical weapons destruction facility. Whether the destruction facility is converted or built specifically for the purpose, inspectors will visit each facility before it begins operations to assess the adequacy of the stockpile destruction plan. At that time, the inspectors will also arrange for subsequent verification of the destruction process through continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and inspections. Once stockpile destruction has been completed at a site, inspectors will monitor the destruction of the facilities themselves. A destruction facility will receive thirty-six hours notice of a pending routine inspection. The duration of destruction inspections is not specified in the treaty, but at some facilities, inspectors may be present virtually around the clock until the stockpile and the facility are destroyed.

What are the general guidelines for routine inspections of commercial Schedule 2 facilities?

Commercial facilities that produce, process, or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in quantities in excess of the following thresholds are subject to inspection at any time: ten kilograms of a chemical that has been weaponized, such as benzilate; one metric ton of highly-toxic chemicals, such as Amiton or PFIB, that could be used as chemical weapons; and ten metric tons of other Schedule 2 chemical that have been or could be used as precursors. (See Tables 1 and 2.) These facilities are to receive an initial inspection during which a facility agreement is to be prepared, unless otherwise agreed. The need for and frequency of subsequent inspections at each Schedule 2 site will be based upon evaluations of the nature of the activity taking place and the site's risk factors. The risk criteria for this evaluation are:

- the toxicity of the scheduled chemicals used at the site and of the end-product produced with it, if any;
- the production capacity of the Schedule 2 plants;

- the capability and convertibility of the plants for initiating production, storage, and filling of chemical weapons; and
- the quantity of scheduled chemicals and of feed-stock chemicals for them typically stored at the site.

No site is required to receive more than two routine inspections in a calendar year. Inspections may be less frequent. Inspections at Schedule 2 sites will be conducted with forty-eight hours notice and will last no longer than ninety-six hours, unless otherwise agreed.

What are the guidelines for routine inspections of commercial Schedule 3 facilities and other chemical production facilities?

A commercial facility that produces an aggregate quantity of more than two-hundred metric tons of any dual-use Schedule 3 chemical during the past year or anticipates aggregate production over that threshold during the coming year will be subject to routine inspection at any time. Inspections at other chemical production facilities—sites producing by synthesis unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, especially those that contain phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine—will take place if aggregate production per year exceeds two-hundred metric tons. These inspections will take place with 120 hours advance notice and are to last no longer than twenty-four hours, unless otherwise agreed. The Technical Secretariat will select sites for such inspections randomly, with an emphasis on achieving an equitable geographic distribution of inspections. No one site is required to receive more than two routine inspections per calendar year.

More specifically, how will routine inspections of Schedule 2 and 3 commercial facilities be conducted?

The objectives of Schedule 2 and 3 inspections are to ensure that Schedule 1 chemicals are not being produced, to check that the activities taking place are consistent with data declarations, and that chemicals produced are not being diverted for military purposes. Detailed procedures are being developed by the PrepCom, but the Convention provides that inspectors' access facilities may include:

- areas where feed chemicals or reactants are delivered or stored;
- areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants before they are put into reaction vessels;
- feed lines from these areas to the reaction vessels, along with their associated valves, flow meters, and other equipment;
- the external surfaces of reaction vessels and ancillary equipment;
- lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- or short-term storage or to equipment where further processing with declared Schedule 2 chemicals will take place;
- control equipment associated with any of these items;

- equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling; and
- equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals not up to specification.

A facility agreement will be negotiated during the initial visit at a Schedule 2 site, unless otherwise agreed, but not during an initial Schedule 3 visit, unless requested by the inspected state.

More specifically, how will routine inspections at other chemical production facilities be conducted?

Inspections for other production facilities—those that produce by synthesis unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, especially those that contain phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine (PSF)—will have the same purposes as Schedule 3 inspections. These inspections will focus on the plant or plants involved in PSF production at the site. Host officials can control the access of the inspectors using the rules of managed access. (See “What is managed access?” on page 32.) If agreed, the inspection team may review records and undertake sampling and on-site analysis. As with Schedule 3 facilities, sites for inspection of other chemical production facilities are to be selected randomly, on the basis of the following weighing factors: equitable geographic distribution of inspections, information on the plant site, and proposals by States Parties.

How many routine inspections will be conducted at each state's Schedule 3 and other chemical production facilities?

The total number of inspections a state is required to host for Schedule 3 sites and other chemical production facilities can be calculated using an esoteric formula. The total number of inspections at these facilities will not be more than three plus five percent of the total combined number of sites declared in these two categories, or twenty inspections, whichever number is lower. For example, a state that declares twenty-five Schedule 3 sites and lists fifty sites under other production facilities would be required to receive seven routine inspections per year ($5\% \text{ of } 75 = 3.75 + 3 = 6.75$) at such sites.

When will the onset of routine inspections at other chemical production facilities take place?

The onset of routine inspections at other production facilities will begin by the fourth year after the Convention enters into force, unless the Conference of States Parties decides otherwise. The Conference of States Parties will complete a review of the situation during the third year after entry into force. Decisions about the extent of the inspection regime for these facilities will depend upon the resources available for such inspections, as evaluated in a report to be submitted by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat. Nevertheless, these facilities are subject to challenge inspections.

Table 3: Guidelines for Routine Inspections

Type of Facility	Initial Inspection	Advance Notice of Inspection	Duration of Inspection	Facility Agreement
Chemical Weapons Production	Mandatory	48 Hours	According to facility agreement	Mandatory
Chemical Weapons Storage	Mandatory	48 Hours	According to facility agreement	Mandatory
Chemical Weapons Destruction	Mandatory	36 Hours	According to facility agreement	Mandatory
Permitted Schedule 1 Activities	Mandatory	36 Hours	According to facility agreement	Mandatory
Schedule 2	Mandatory	48 hours	96 hours	Mandatory, unless otherwise agreed
Schedule 3 and other chemical production facilities	Optional	120 hours	24 hours	Optional

Source: The Convention's Verification Annex.

How many routine inspections will the Technical Secretariat conduct cumulatively and in each state per year?

The Technical Secretariat will not know exactly how many inspections it will have to conduct until State Parties submit the data declarations required upon entry into force. Several hundred inspections could be carried out each year, depending on the need and the availability of resources. The number of inspections conducted in each state will depend on whether that state declares possession of chemical weapons and the size of the state's commercial chemical industry. States that have large chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as large commercial industries, can expect dozens of inspections on a yearly basis. The Convention's quotas and requirements for equitable geographic distribution will minimize the burden on heavily industrialized countries. On the other hand, some state parties will declare no chemical weapons capability and will have few, if any, facilities that qualify for Schedule 2 inspections. In states where the chemical industrial base is just beginning to develop, a period of a year or more may pass without a routine inspection.

Challenge Inspections

What are the general guidelines for a challenge inspection?

Any treaty party that suspects another State Party of conducting activities prohibited by the Convention has the right to ask for a challenge inspection of the suspect site. To initiate a challenge inspection, the state making the request must present specific information about the site in question to the Executive Council and the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, who is under obligation to conduct the inspection without delay. The Director-General notifies the state being challenged of the location of the inspection site no less than twelve hours before the inspection team will arrive at the point of entry in the challenged state. Once the inspection team lands, the host state is

obligated to transport the inspectors to the perimeter of the suspect site within thirty-six hours. The dimensions of the perimeter are subject to negotiation, but must be ten meters outside of any building or security structures.

Once at the perimeter, the inspectors are allowed to examine traffic logs, take photographs and videos, and go under escort to other parts of the perimeter. When agreement upon the final perimeter is reached, the inspectors are also allowed to take air, soil, and effluent samples and to use monitoring instruments within a fifty meter band around the perimeter. Host officials must allow the inspectors access inside the perimeter within 108 hours—four and a half days—after the inspection team initially arrives. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspection inside the perimeter will last no longer than eighty-four hours.


What is “managed access”?

Challenge inspections will be guided by the principle of “managed access,” which ostensibly allows inspectors enough access to determine whether the site is indeed involved in prohibited activity while also allowing the facility under inspection to protect sensitive information unrelated to the Convention. The extent of access to any particular place or places within the site, the exact nature of inspection activities, and the information that the host officials are to provide to the inspection team are subject to negotiations between host officials and the inspection team. Officials at the site can turn off computers, protect sensitive business or national security information, and shroud all or parts of sensitive displays, equipment, and stores of goods. Host officials can also restrict sampling to the presence or absence of Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals and their degradation products. While inspectors technically have the right to go into any part of any building, in practice they will rarely cover all areas of a suspect site. In particularly sensitive situations, the inspectors may select a percentage of buildings and random areas within those buildings for inspection. Host officials may request that only an individual inspector enter particularly sensitive areas. In compiling their report, inspectors will take into account the nature of the cooperation and access provided by host officials.

What protections are there against misuse of challenge inspections?

The Convention contains several provisions against using challenge inspections as a pretext for snooping for national security or commercial secrets. If the Executive Council deems a request for a challenge inspection frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope of the CWC, a three-quarters vote of its members within twelve hours can halt the challenge inspection. Otherwise, the challenge inspection proceeds as requested. If, however, the Executive Council finds that a completed challenge inspection was abusive, it can require the requesting state to pay all or part of the costs of the inspection. States are obligated to request a challenge inspection only when it concerns a matter directly related to compliance with the CWC. Subject to the approval of the host state, the state requesting the challenge inspection may send an observer—not an inspector—with the inspection team.

Figure 1: Timeline for Challenge Inspections



Source: The Convention's Verification Annex.

Will challenge inspections be frequent events?

Many arms control experts expect challenge inspections to be relatively rare events, but the ones that occur will be politically-charged and intensely dramatic. After all, the premise underlying the challenge request is that a state may be cheating on its treaty obligations. For this reason, setting the guidelines for challenge inspections was one of the most difficult aspects of the treaty negotiations and execution of challenge inspections promises to be a closely watched aspect of the Convention's implementation.

Can a challenged state clean up incriminating evidence at a suspect site before inspectors arrive?

If a state is very well organized and intent on cheating, workers at the site could try to hide evidence before inspectors gain access to a suspect facility. Attempts to clear out or clean up a site may be observed by national technical means of verification, such as satellites, which the United States will be able to focus on a suspect site in the interim before inspectors arrive. Moreover, telltale signs of cheating are likely to be left behind in the rush to cover up prohibited activities before the arrival of inspectors. All traces of chemical weapons production can be very difficult to hide, especially if state-of-the-art emission controls were not used at the site. Inspectors will be able to take and analyze soil and effluent samples around the perimeter and, with the permission of the inspected party, inside the suspect site. Given adequate access, well-trained and equipped inspection teams have the capability to detect traces of chemical weapons production even if host officials have attempted to clean up the site. The possibility of incurring challenge inspections may also deter states from attempting to establish a covert weapons program.

**Destruction of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles
and Facilities*****How will states go about destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles?***

The treaty defines destruction of chemical weapons as "a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such." Each state that possesses chemical weapons can determine the specific method that it will use to destroy its stocks, but destruction must be accomplished in a manner that ensures public safety and environmental protection. Open-pit burning, land burial, and dumping weapons in any body of water are specifically prohibited as methods of destruction. Possible approaches to the full destruction or demilitarization of chemical weapons include incineration, cryofracture, chemical neutralization, and other thermal processes. Upon entry into force, states must present an overview of their plans for destroying the chemical weapons in their possession. This plan must include a general schedule of the types and approximate quantities of weapons that will be destroyed according to a set timetable, as well as a description of the number of destruction facilities planned, the plans for training personnel in destruction

Table 4: CWC Timeframe for Chemical Weapons Destruction

Percentage of Stockpile Destroyed	Year After Entry Into Force
Planning and Testing	1-2
1	3
20	5
45	7
100	10

Source: The Convention's Verification Annex.

operations, national standards for safety and emissions at such sites, and cost estimates for the program, among other details.

How soon must states possessing chemical weapons destroy their stockpiles?

The treaty stipulates that states possessing chemical weapon must totally destroy their stocks over a ten-year timeframe. Destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is to take place according to a "levelling out" principle, with all possessor states destroying their stockpiles at approximately the same rate. Testing of a state's first destruction facility is to be completed within two years after entry into force. No less than a year later, chemical weapon states are to have destroyed one percent of their stockpile. After five years, twenty percent is to be destroyed. After seven years, the stockpile destruction is to be forty-five percent complete. States can proceed at a faster rate, as long as they destroy their stockpiles in a way that is safe and environmentally sound. (See Table 4.)

What happens if a state cannot destroy its stockpile within the ten-year timeframe?

If a state cannot meet the deadline for destroying its chemical weapons, it can apply to the Executive Council for an extension at least one year before the deadline expires. The request must contain the length of additional time needed, an explanation of why the state has been unable to meet the original deadline, and a detailed plan for accomplishing the destruction of the remaining stocks. The Executive Council will hold any extensions granted to the minimal additional time required, but the most additional time that a state could receive is five years. Any extensions will come with additional reporting requirements and conditions, such as the possibility of more verification measures and specific actions to be taken to correct the problems causing delays in the destruction program.

How soon must states possessing chemical weapons production facilities destroy them?

Chemical weapon production facilities are to be destroyed as soon as possible, with the order of destruction determined by the Executive Council. Production facilities can also be temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities, which are to be destroyed thereafter. As with the chemical weapons, the levelling out principle will govern this process. Production capacity, not the quantity of chemical weapons, will be the factor diminishing on an equal basis. Destruction of production facilities will begin within one year after entry into force and proceed to completion within three levelling

out destruction periods: years 2-5, years 6-8, and years 9-10. International inspectors from the Technical Secretariat and on-site monitoring instruments placed at chemical weapons production, storage, and destruction sites will be on hand to monitor the destruction process very closely.

Where do responsibilities lie for destroying abandoned chemical weapons?

Article I of the Convention clearly requires the state that abandoned the chemical weapons to destroy any munitions it left on the territory of another state. Both states involved are to engage in consultations to develop a mutually agreed plan for the destruction of the abandoned weapons.

What type of chemical weapons stockpile does the United States have?

The U.S. chemical weapons stockpile contains more than thirty thousand metric tons of nerve and blister agents. Most of the stockpile is stored at eight different sites in the continental United States. (See Table 5.) Another seventeen hundred tons of nerve agent are located at Johnston Island in the Pacific, a storage site for chemical weapons, including those withdrawn from the European theater. Destruction of the munitions on Johnston Atoll began in July 1990.

How is the United States planning to destroy its stockpile?

The U.S. Army plans to destroy the stockpile using high-temperature incineration in what is called the "baseline" destruction program. The baseline program uses robotics and manual techniques to disassemble the weapons before sending the different parts into four high-temperature furnaces—one for the agent, one for the explosives and propellants, one for the waste packaging, and one for the contaminated metal components, such as shells and bulk storage containers. After feasibility testing at Toole Depot, Utah, the Army constructed a prototype incineration facility on Johnston Island in the Pacific, called the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System. During operational verification testing between July 1990 and March 1993, the Army claims to have demonstrated successfully the baseline program's ability to destroy chemical munitions without apparent fundamental safety, environmental, or process-related problems. The Army plans to build similar facilities for the eight sites in the continental United States where chemical weapons are stored. Costs for the currently planned destruction program have risen to over \$8 billion. Outside criticism of the baseline program has focused on escalating costs and concerns that the baseline program poses unacceptable risks to the public and the environment. Such concerns have prompted proposals to use other methods to destroy the stockpile. Nonetheless, the baseline program is the most mature approach available and the only one that has been thoroughly tested with the destruction of actual agent.

Has the United States previously used other methods to destroy chemical weapons?

Prior to 1969, the Army disposed of chemical weapons using methods that would be unacceptable in the United States by today's standards and are specifically prohibited

Table 5: The U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile

Site	Percentage of Total U.S. Stockpile	Nerve Agents	Blister Agents
Tooele Army Depot, UT	42.3	Sarin, Tabun*	Mustard, Lewisite*
Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR	12.0	Sarin, VX	Mustard
Umatilla Depot, OR	11.6	Sarin, VX	Mustard
Pueblo Depot, CO	9.9	None	Mustard
Anniston Army Depot, AL	7.1	Sarin, VX	Mustard
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD	5.0	None	Mustard
Newport Ammunition Plant, IN	3.9	VX	None
Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot, KY	1.6	Sarin, VX	Mustard

*Tabun and Lewisite are stored only at Tooele Army Depot in relatively small quantities.

Source: National Research Council, *Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993).

by the Convention. The United States destroyed chemical weapons by open-pit burning, evaporative "atmospheric dilution," and placement of munitions in concrete coffins for ocean dumping. In the 1970s the army used a chemical neutralization process—featuring alkaline hydrolysis—to destroy some eighty-seven thousand chemical munitions at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado. This technique produced large amounts of waste, which also had to be disposed of, and was considered to be inefficient. By 1982, the Army had decided to abandon chemical neutralization in favor of high temperature incineration, the so-called baseline destruction program.

Are there alternatives to high-temperature "baseline" incineration to destroy chemical weapons?

A variety of alternative destruction technologies are being considered, although none of them has been tested with actual agent. Three broad categories of alternative technologies include thermal treatment; low-temperature, liquid-phase processes; and medium- and high-temperature processes. One of the better known alternatives in the first category is cryofracture, which involves the use of liquid nitrogen to freeze the weapon before crushing it and placing it in an incinerator as the final step in the destruction process. The Army, which already has a munitions cryofracture test system at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, is currently examining the possibility of constructing a cryofracture facility in Pueblo, Colorado. Examples of technologies in the second category include biological processes and chemical hydrolysis, while plasma arc and supercritical water oxidation are in the final category.

Have there been authoritative evaluations of alternative destruction methods?

In response to concerns about the baseline program's costs and safety, Congress requested in 1992 that the Army evaluate alternative technologies that could be used to destroy the stockpile. The Army turned to the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, which issued its first report on the subject in June 1993, entitled *Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions*. This report identifies ways that the risk of toxic air emissions can be virtually eliminated for all destruction technologies and stresses the importance of considering costs and development time for alternatives to incineration against the risks of continued storage of chemical weapons. A second National Academy of Sciences report and the Army's final evaluation and recommendations are due by the end of 1993.

Special Issues Concerning Chemical Industry***Is chemical industry supportive of the Chemical Weapons Convention?***

The major trade associations that represent chemical industry have been working for several years in support of the negotiation and implementation of the CWC. For example, the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association, as well as the major trade associations from Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan, have offered industry input into key areas of the treaty, such as the confidentiality provisions, data declarations, and inspections. Some individual chemical companies have also hosted National Trial Inspections to test the verification procedures being developed for the CWC. While on the whole chemical industry is quite interested in seeing the CWC succeed and in demonstrating that chemical weapons are not being produced at commercial sites, on an individual level, many chemical companies are just becoming aware of the CWC and its implications for their business.

How will the Technical Secretariat and their inspectors protect sensitive or proprietary information?

The Convention's verification regime seeks to establish a balance between the need for inspectors to have enough access to detect prohibited activities and the need for countries and chemical companies to protect sensitive information. The Convention's confidentiality rules will govern the data monitoring and inspection process. (See the sections on Data Monitoring Requirements, Routine Inspections, and Challenge Inspections for specific requirements of the Convention.) The Technical Secretariat is obligated to safeguard all confidential or proprietary information derived from data declarations and its monitoring activities at civilian and military facilities, just as States Parties are obligated to treat confidentially any information that the OPCW supplies to them. The Technical Secretariat will establish a classification system and a secure storage capacity to handle sensitive information. The Technical Secretariat will publicly release general information concerning the CWC's implementation but will provide sensitive information concerning a specified activity or facility only when a State Party gives express permission.

While on site, inspectors are to ask for only the minimum amount of information and access needed to accomplish their tasks. The monitoring equipment used by inspectors, such as gas chromatographs and mass spectrometers, will be designed to collect information needed to monitor compliance with the CWC without allowing inspectors to exceed their mandate and collect sensitive and proprietary information that is outside the scope of treaty-related activities. All equipment will be approved by the Technical Secretariat and specifically protected against unauthorized alteration.

How will the CWC affect the international trade of chemicals and related technology?

Many developing countries are concerned that the worldwide effort to eliminate chemical weapons will generate increased controls on the exchange of chemical technology and equipment that is crucial to their continuing commercial and industrial advancement. The CWC attempts to establish a balance between ending the proliferation of chemical weapons and promoting the exchange of scientific and technological knowledge necessary for industrial, agricultural, medical, and pharmaceutical development.

Countries that decide not to join the CWC will be denied access to trade in Schedule 2 chemicals three years after the Convention's entry into force. Thereafter, treaty parties may only trade in Schedule 2 chemicals with other States Parties. Until then, signatories are required to receive assurances (e.g., end-user certificates) that Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals transferred to non-signatories will not be used for purposes prohibited by the Convention. Five years after the CWC enters into force, the Conference of State Parties will weigh the application of trade restrictions on Schedule 3 chemicals, such as barring transfer to non-States Parties. Article XI of the Convention also encourages the "fullest possible" exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific information among treaty parties. States Parties are not to maintain among themselves any restrictions or impediments to chemical trade, development, and promotion of knowledge for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes.

What is the Australia Group?

A number of industrialized states, known as the Australia Group, began meeting on an ad hoc basis in 1985 after the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War to harmonize their export controls to retard chemical weapons proliferation. The coordination of export control policies among Australia Group members is informal and not legally binding. In addition to a list of more than fifty precursor chemicals, the Australia Group has extended its controls to include dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment and technology, such as reactor vessels, heat exchangers, filling equipment, incinerators, and degassing equipment. Australia Group states do not ban the export of these items. Instead, they review applications on an individual basis and deny only those exports that may be used to further chemical weapons proliferation. The Australia Group pledged in August 1992 to review its export control policies with regard to States Parties that remain in full compliance with the provisions of the CWC.

Related Arms Control Agreements

Given widespread adherence to the Geneva Protocol, why is the Chemical Weapons Convention needed?

The Geneva Protocol is the shorthand name for the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Geneva Protocol, which entered into force in 1928 and has over 140 adherent states, bans the use of chemical weapons, but not the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons. Many countries also reserved the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation for a chemical weapons attack. Thus, the Geneva Protocol is essentially a no-first-use agreement. The CWC will take chemical weapons arms control well beyond the limited ban on use and to ban not only all use but an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

What are the U.S. reservations to the Geneva Protocol?

The United States was one of the initial signatories of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but did not ratify the treaty until 22 January 1975. The U.S. Senate attached a reservation that preserves the right of the United States to respond in kind to a chemical weapons attack. President George Bush stated on 13 May 1991 that the United States would foreswear the right to retaliate in kind upon entry into force of the CWC, provided that the USSR, now Russia, was also a Party to the Convention. In addition, the United States continues to hold that the Geneva Protocol does not apply to defensive use of riot control agents that would save lives during war. In this regard, the United States has specified the right to use riot control agents to control rioting prisoners of war; in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided; during rescue missions; and in areas outside the combat zone to protect military convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.

What is the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding?

The September 1989 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the USSR provided for a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange between the two countries, to be carried out in two phases. On 29 December 1989 the United States and USSR exchanged data on their aggregate stockpile size; the types of agents; percent of chemical agents in munitions, devices, or bulk containers; location of storage, production, and destruction facilities; and types of agent and munitions at each storage facility. Phase I was completed with a series of visits to two production facilities, three storage facilities, and two industrial chemical production facilities in each country.

Phase II originally required the parties to exchange detailed data on their chemical weapons capabilities and for each side to conduct five routine inspections and up to ten challenge inspections at undeclared facilities in the other country. The United States and Russia subsequently agreed to strike five challenge inspections from this slate. The first of the remaining five challenge inspections—all of which are to be conducted at declared, not undeclared sites—will be a “practice” challenge, with the host country selecting the site to be inspected. While this revision diminishes the scale of the effort,

the operational procedures agreed by the two sides for the challenge and routine inspections are intended to represent as closely as possible what should happen during CWC inspections, including testing of managed access inspection procedures. To date, Phase II has not been implemented.

What is the Bilateral Destruction Agreement?

The most important provisions of the June 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union require both states to stop producing chemical weapons and to reduce their respective chemical weapons stockpiles to no more than five thousand agent tons by the end of 2002. The bilateral destruction process is to be verified with the continuous presence of inspectors and monitoring instruments on-site at destruction facilities and on-site inspections at storage facilities. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement also requires the United States and Russia to cooperate on establishing safe methods and technologies for destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles. Initially, the parties were to have begun destruction no later than 31 December 1992 and completed the task by 31 December 2002. The Russian government has encountered numerous problems in trying to initiate its destruction program. Enormous economic difficulties make it hard to fund the program, and planners are encountering grassroots resistance from those wary of having a chemical weapons destruction plant operating in their back yard. Given the problems in the Russian destruction program, these deadlines were revised and now call for destruction to begin by 30 June 1997 and end by 30 June 2004. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement will enter into force when the parties exchange instruments accepting the agreement.

What assistance is the United States providing to Russia to help with stockpile destruction?

On 30 July 1992 the United States signed an agreement with Russia concerning the safe, secure, and ecologically sound destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. This agreement outlined several types of technical assistance for the Russian destruction program, including material, training, and services, that the Department of Defense would make available to the Russians at no cost. The original value of the assistance to be provided was not to exceed \$25 million. Aside from a series of informational visits and the initiation of a search for a U.S. contractor to help supervise the Russian destruction program, to date little of these funds has been spent. Congress has added another \$30 million to that amount in 1994 for the construction of an analytical laboratory to support the Russian chemical weapons destruction program.

Is implementation of the bilateral accords a prerequisite for U.S. or Russian ratification and implementation the CWC?

Ironically, one of the stated intentions of the United States and the USSR in signing the bilateral agreements was to spur the completion and implementation of the multi-lateral Convention. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic and political difficulties encountered by the new Russian government have significantly slowed attempts to implement the two bilateral accords. While the Bilateral Destruction Agreement requires the destruction of the large majority of the U.S. and Russian

stockpiles, the CWC requires complete stockpile destruction. Furthermore, the bilateral track would institute chemical disarmament between the two countries with the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles, whereas the CWC would begin a global chemical disarmament process. The bilateral and multilateral agreements pursue complementary goals, but are not legally linked to one another. Both the United States and Russia are initial signatories of the CWC. The bilateral agreements and the CWC can be separately ratified and implemented.

Adherence and Compliance

What states have chemical weapons and have they signed the Convention?

The Convention requires that all parties declare their chemical weapons stockpiles upon entry into force of the treaty. Only the United States and Russia have voluntarily declared possession of chemical weapons in advance of this deadline. The United States holds approximately thirty thousand metric tons of chemical weapons agent in bulk and munition form. Russia has declared a stockpile of about forty thousand metric tons. Iraq's chemical weapons stockpile is being destroyed under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolutions following the Persian Gulf War. The U.S. government has identified an additional fourteen states that have chemical weapons programs: China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Israel, Libya, Myanmar (formerly Burma), North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam. According to expert testimony given before the House Armed Services Committee in February 1993, more than a dozen other countries may possess chemical weapons, including Angola, Argentina, Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, France, Indonesia, Laos, Poland, Romania, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, and Thailand. Afghanistan, Argentina, Chile, France, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand have denied possession of chemical weapons. Of the states believed to probably or possibly possess chemical weapons, Angola, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Taiwan have *not* signed the CWC. (See Tables 6 and 7.)

Can a signatory state destroy its chemical weapons stockpile before the treaty enters into force?

Nothing in the CWC prohibits states from destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles before signature, ratification, or entry into force of the treaty. For example, in 1991 Canada successfully destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile, which was composed of three tons of lewisite, twelve tons of mustard, and one-third ton of nerve agent. States that destroy their stockpile in advance of treaty obligations and therefore outside of the CWC's international monitoring system will still have to declare the nature of their former capability. States will be required to declare whether from 1 January 1946 to the present they have or have had any chemical weapons production facilities, have transferred or received chemical weapons or production equipment, and have designed, constructed, or used other facilities to develop chemical weapons. If a treaty party believes that another State Party is trying to retain a chemical weapon stockpile by falsifying such declarations, challenge inspection provisions may be utilized.

Table 6: Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Afghanistan	Cuba	Italy	Niger	Togo
Albania	Cyprus	Japan	Nigeria	Tunisia
Algeria	Czech Republic	Kazakhstan	Norway	Turkey
Argentina	Denmark	Kenya	Oman	Uganda
Armenia	Dominica	Kuwait	Pakistan	Ukraine
Australia	Dominican Republic	Kyrgyzstan	Panama	United Arab Emirates
Austria	Ecuador	Laos	Papua New Guinea	United Kingdom
Azerbaijan	El Salvador	Latvia	Paraguay	United States
Bahrain	Equatorial Guinea	Liberia	Peru	Uruguay
Bangladesh	Estonia	Liechtenstein	Philippines	Venezuela
Belarus	Ethiopia	Lithuania	Poland	Viet Nam
Belgium	FLJI	Luxembourg	Portugal	Yemen
Benin	Finland	Madagascar	Qatar	Zaire
Bolivia	France	Malawi	Romania	Zambia
Brazil	Gabon	Malaysia	Russian Federation	Zimbabwe
Brunei Darussalam	Gambia	Mali	Rwanda	Total = 148
Bulgaria	Georgia	Malta	Samoa	<i>Last updated :</i>
Burkina Faso	Germany	Marshall Islands	St. Lucia	<i>September 9, 1993</i>
Burundi	Ghana	Mauritania	San Marino	
Cambodia	Greece	MAURITIUS	Saudi Arabia	
Cameroon	Guatemala	Mexico	Senegal	
Canada	Guinea	Micronesia	SEYCHELLES	
Cape Verde	Guinea-Bissau	Moldova	Sierra Leone	
Central African Republic	Haiti	Monaco	Singapore	
Chile	Holy See	Mongolia	Slovakia	
China	Honduras	Morocco	Slovenia	
Columbia	Hungary	Myanmar	South Africa	
Comoros	Iceland	Namibia	South Korea	
Congo	India	Nauru	Spain	
Cook Islands	Indonesia	Nepal	Sri Lanka	
Costa Rica	Iran	Netherlands	SWEDEN	
Cote d'Ivoire	Ireland	New Zealand	Switzerland	
Croatia	Israel	Nicaragua	Tajikistan	
			Thailand	

Note: States listed in all caps have ratified the Convention.
Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Parliamentarians for Global Action.

Table 7: Non-Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Angola	Egypt	Macedonia	Somalia	Turkmenistan
Antigua and Barbuda	Grenada	Maldives	Sudan	Tuvalu
Bahamas	Guyana	Mozambique	Suriname	Uzbekistan
Barbados	Iraq	North Korea	Swaziland	Vanuatu
Belize	Jamaica	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Syria	Yugoslavia
Bhutan	Jordan	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Taiwan	Total = 42
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Kiribati	Sao Tome and Principe	Tanzania	<i>Last updated: September 9, 1993.</i>
Botswana	Lebanon	Solomon Islands	Tonga	
Chad	Lesotho		Trinidad and Tobago	
Djibouti	Libya			

Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Parliamentarians for Global Action.

Are all of the chemical weapons from the former Soviet Union under Russian control?

The Soviets listed no chemical weapons storage facilities outside what is now Russian territory in the data they exchanged under Phase I of the 1989 Memorandum of Understanding. (See "What is the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding?" on page 40.) A February 1993 House Armed Services report on the chemical weapons threat cited several experts who did not list former Soviet states other than Russia as possessing chemical weapons.


Does the CWC have to be universal to be effective?

As with the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), some states may not join the CWC. The NPT is widely perceived to be an important and useful agreement despite its holdouts. Universal adherence to the CWC is the goal, but near-universal adherence can also serve important purposes, such as establishing the global norm against the possession, use, and proliferation of chemical weapons. Universal adherence therefore does not appear to be a prerequisite for combatting chemical weapons proliferation, proceeding with the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, and strengthening global norms against the possession and use of chemical weapons. More than 145 nations have already signed the CWC. States that choose to remain outside the Convention are likely to find themselves increasingly isolated. (See Tables 6 and 7.)

What happens to a signatory that does not comply with the requirements of the CWC?

The Executive Council will give a State Party that does not quickly and satisfactorily resolve compliance concerns remaining after a challenge inspection a limited amount of time to comply. If the offending party fails to do so, the Conference of States Parties, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, may restrict or suspend the violator's rights and privileges under the Convention. A non-compliant state may lose access to the Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals otherwise traded between Convention parties. This state may also forfeit its right to defensive assistance against a chemical weapons attack,

as well as its right to request challenge inspections. In serious cases of noncompliance, the Conference of States Parties may recommend that members of the Convention take collective action against the noncompliant state. No particular actions are specified, leaving the door open for a variety of collective economic and political sanctions. The Convention specifically obligates the OPCW to bring grave violations of the Convention to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council for further action.



Selected Bibliography

Keir A. Lieber

Additional information about the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and issues associated with it can be found in books, reports, journal articles, and specialized newsletters. General category headings have been included in this selected bibliography to assist readers that would like to pursue further study of these issues. In some cases, entries have been annotated.

Newsletters

Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin. Meselson, Matthew, and Julian Perry Robinson, eds., Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation. A quarterly publication, the Bulletin provides an in-depth analysis of important treaty-related issues, as well as a chronology of recent events.

The CWC Chronicle. Smithson, Amy E., ed., The Henry L. Stimson Center. A periodical publication, the Chronicle provides a brief update of recent developments regarding implementation preparations, including events in the Hague, ratification efforts, destruction programs, and items of special interest to industry.

Specialized Journal Issues

"The Chemical Weapons Convention." *UNIDIR Newsletter*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (December 1992). A comprehensive overview of issues related to the implementation of the Convention, including articles on CWC's history, verification regime, destruction process, national implementation measures, economic issues, and views from the chemical industry.

"The Chemical Weapons Convention: Banning the Poisons of War." *Arms Control Today*, CWC Special Issue, Arms Control Association (October 1992). A broad profile of the CWC, including an executive summary of the treaty text and featured articles on the negotiations, chemical proliferation, verification, and stockpile destruction.

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction." *Disarmament*, vol. XVI, no. 1, United Nations (1993).

General Information on the Chemical Weapons Convention

Bernauer, Thomas. "The End of Chemical Warfare." *Security Dialogue* (March 1993): 97-110.

Brin, Jay. "Ending the Scourge of Chemical Weapons." *Technology Review* (April 1993): 32-40. Overview of the CWC with emphasis on the demands of routine and challenge inspections.

Krause, Joachim. *Security Implications of a Global Chemical Weapons Ban*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Pearson, Graham S. "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence." *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1993): 145-62.

Roberts, Brad. "Chemical Disarmament and International Security." *Adelphi Papers* 267. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992. An evaluation of chemical disarmament in terms of the costs and benefits to national and international security.

_____. ed. *The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Issues*. Washington, DC: The Center for International Strategic Studies, 1992. Addresses issues relating to creation of the international treaty administering system, its attendant legal and organizational framework, and U.S. domestic implementation.

Smithson, Amy E. "Chemical Weapons: The End of the Beginning." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (October 1992): 36-40. Examines the history of negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the CWC with an eye to the challenges of implementation.

Utgoff, Victor. *The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. Traces the evolution of and attempts to control chemical weapons technology, analyzes the potential deterrent role of chemical weapons, and projects some major challenges to the United States arising from chemical and biological weapons.

Verification of the Convention

- Altman, J., and J. Rotblat, eds. *Verification of Arms Reductions: Nuclear, Conventional, and Chemical*. Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989.
- Bailey, Kathleen C. "Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban." *Orbis* (Spring 1992): 239-252. Criticizes the CWC as being essentially unverifiable, expensive, and fraught with political disputes.
- Bernauer, Thomas. "The Control and Disarmament of Chemical Weapons." In *Verification of Disarmament or Limitation of Armaments: Instruments, Negotiations, Proposals*, edited by Serge Sur, 73-110. New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992.
- Krepon, Michael. "Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention." In *Chemical Disarmament and U.S. Security*, edited by Brad Roberts, 71-90. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Discusses the extensive verification provisions of the CWC as representative of a careful balancing act between the rights and obligations of the inspected parties and the monitoring organization.
- Lundin, S.J., editor. *Verification of Dual-Use Chemicals Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Case of Thiodiglycol*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 13. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1991. Addresses the technical problems of verifying provisions of the CWC with respect to dual-purpose chemicals with legitimate civilian uses that can also be used to produce chemical warfare agents.
- Smithson, Amy E. "Chemical Inspectors: On the Outside Looking In?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (October 1991): 23-25. Discusses the importance of a strong challenge-inspection regime to detect and deter prohibited activities.
- Walker, John. "Challenge Inspections and Intrusiveness." In *Chemical Disarmament and U.S. Security*, edited by Brad Roberts, 91-96. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

Destruction of Chemical Weapons

- National Research Council. *Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993. Examines various alternative destruction technologies, but makes recommendations mainly for enhancing the emissions safety of whatever technology is eventually selected for each U.S. destruction site.
- Picardi, Alfred, et al. *Alternative Technologies for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An Information Document*. Washington, DC: Greenpeace International, 24 May 1991. Presents a series of alternatives to incineration that could be used to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, including biological, chemical, photochemical, electrochemical, neutralization, and thermal processes.
- Smithson, Amy E. "Chemicals Destruction: The Work Begins." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (April 1993): 38-43. Analyzes the political and economic obstacles to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and the importance of U.S. leadership for implementation of the Convention.
- The MITRE Corporation. *Summary Evaluation of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System: Operational Verification Testing*. MTR-93W0000036. McLean, VA: MITRE, May 1993. An Army contracted evaluation of its prototype high-temperature incineration demilitarization facility on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean, which assesses the safety, environmental, and process performance of the facility and draws inferences for the performance of similar facilities on the U.S. mainland.
- U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. *Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies—Background Paper*. OTA-BP-O-95. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992.

Implications of the CWC for Industry

- Ember, Lois. "Chemical Arms Treaty Makes Unprecedented Demands of Industry." *Chemical and Engineering News* (June 7, 1993): 7-18. Outlines the CWC's likely affect on the U.S. chemical and pharmaceutical industry and notes industry's surprising lack of interest in the Convention to date.
- Olson, Kyle. "Disarmament and the Chemical Industry." In *Chemical Disarmament and U.S. Security*, edited by Brad Roberts, 97-105. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Discusses the global chemical industry's commitment to supporting an effective ban on chemical weapons.
- Trapp, Ralf. *Verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention: On-Site Inspection in Chemical Industry Facilities*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 14. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993. Elaborates the basic provisions and practical details of routine and challenge inspections and then examines some of the difficulties likely to be encountered during inspections at industrial facilities.

Walls, Michael P. "The Private Sector and Chemical Disarmament." In *The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Issues*, edited by Brad Roberts, 42-47. Washington, DC: The Center for International Strategic Studies, 1992.

U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. *The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry*. OTA-BP-ISC-106. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993. Discusses industry's obligations for implementing the CWC, constitutional and other legal issues, protection of proprietary information, and verification technologies.

Proliferation Concerns and Universal Adherence

Burck, Gordon M., and Charles C. Flowerree. *International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation*. New York: Federation of American Scientists and Greenwood Press, 1991. A guide to the threat and proliferation of chemical weapons in various regions and countries, with an analysis of the political factors and anti-proliferation measures that are key to controlling the spread of chemical weapons.

Carus, W. Seth. "The Proliferation of Chemical Weapons Without a Convention." In *Chemical Disarmament and U.S. Security*, edited by Brad Roberts, 47-56. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Analyzes the impact that the presence or absence of a CWC will have on the continued proliferation of chemical weapons and the implications for U.S. national security.

Herby, Peter. *The Chemical Weapons Convention and Arms Control in the Middle East*. Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, 1992. Discusses the importance of successful implementation of the CWC in the Middle East region, an area of considerable tension with recent experience of chemical weapons use and a number of active chemical programs, and presents a framework for approaching the complex military, political, and perceptual issues involved in Middle Eastern decisions on the CWC.

Utgoff, Victor, and Susan Leibbrandt. "On Pursuit of Universal Adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention." In *Chemical Disarmament and U.S. Security*, edited by Brad Roberts, 35-46. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Evaluates the importance of and likely obstacles to universal or near-universal acceptance of the CWC.

Ratification Issues and Costs

Flowerree, Charles. "National Implementation Measures." In *The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Issues*, edited by Brad Roberts, 32-37. Washington, DC: The Center for International Strategic Studies, 1992. Discusses the intrusive national implementation tasks required of States Parties in order to be in compliance with the CWC's basic obligations.

Kellman, Barry, and Edward Tanzman. *Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Legal Issues*. Washington, DC: The Committee for National Security, Fall 1993.

McElroy, Rodney J. "The Geneva Protocol of 1925." *The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification*, edited by Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell. New York: St. Martin's Press and The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1991. An account of the initial efforts to ratify the Geneva Protocol, the treaty that bans the use of chemical weapons. See also the conclusions chapter by Michael Krepon for more discussion on the factors that most influence treaty ratification.

Smithson, Amy E. "Conventional Wait." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 1993). Analyzes the difficulties encountered in implementing two U.S.-Soviet bilateral chemical agreements given the political and economic transition taking place in Russia, as well as the possible implications of this situation for the ratification and implementation of the CWC.

U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. "U.S. Costs of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Treaties." September 1990. See especially pages 37-42.

Basic Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention, which has been signed by over 145 countries, is a complex treaty of almost 200 pages. The Convention's main provisions are summarized below.

Article I bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons, including the use of riot control agents such as tear gas "as a method of warfare." Signatories commit to destroy chemical weapons facilities and stockpiles, including those abandoned on another state's territory.

Article II defines chemical weapons, the basic components of which are toxic chemicals, munitions and devices for delivery, chemical precursors, and special equipment. Chemicals controlled by the treaty are divided into three lists to be monitored according to the risk they pose. **Annex 1** lists these three Schedules. Schedule 1 contains twelve nerve and blister agents. Schedule 2 lists fourteen significant risk chemicals and precursors that are not widely used in commercial industry. Schedule 3 includes seventeen precursors and chemicals that are frequently used in commercial products, but still pose a risk.

Article III stipulates the declarations that signatories must make concerning their possession of chemical weapons, riot control agents, production facilities, and chemicals on Schedules 1, 2, and 3. States must also provide a general plan for the destruction of their chemical weapons. These data exchange requirements are detailed in **Annex 2**.

Article IV sets the schedule for the destruction of chemical stockpiles. Within three years after entry into force, all possessor states are to have destroyed one percent of their stocks; twenty percent within five years; forty-five percent within seven years; and, within ten years, the remainder. **Annex 2** contains requirements for this destruction process. Any state that cannot meet these deadlines can petition the treaty's Executive Council for an extension of up to five years.

Article V requires systematic, on-site monitoring of production facilities, which are to close upon entry into force. Production facilities can be used temporarily to destroy chemical stocks under internationally monitored supervision. Afterwards, the facilities themselves are to be destroyed. Inspection provisions are specified in **Annex 2**.

Article VI allows states to use toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Each state is required to submit facilities that use Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals to data monitoring, routine on-site inspections, and monitoring with on-site instruments, as specified in **Annex 2**. **Annex 3** enumerates steps to be taken by inspectors to protect sensitive facilities and prevent the disclosure of confidential information as a result of inspection activity.

Article VII stipulates that signatories shall adopt legislation that permits the implementation of the Convention, including penal laws. Each state is to establish a

national authority to coordinate its implementation activities, which should be undertaken in a safe manner that protects people and the environment.

Article VIII establishes the three components of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which are: 1) The Conference of States Parties, which includes all parties, meets annually or for special sessions, and votes on issues raised by the Executive Council, which it elects; 2) The Executive Council, which considers compliance issues and makes recommendations to the Conference. The Council's forty-one members serve two-year terms based on regional representation, but states with "the most significant national chemical industry" will essentially be permanent members; and 3) The Technical Secretariat, which carries out the verification and implementation tasks of the convention.

Article IX gives each party the right to request that the Technical Secretariat conduct a challenge inspection of a site in another signatory's territory that is suspected of prohibited activity. Each party is obliged to accept challenge inspections. A three-quarters vote of the Executive Council can cancel an inspection. **Annex 2** delineates the procedures and time lines for challenge inspections. No later than 108 hours after the arrival of the inspection team, the host team must give the inspectors "managed access" inside the suspect site.

Article X pledges to provide emergency assistance to parties under threat of use or that have suffered a chemical attack. Treaty parties are allowed to conduct defensive research and develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, and use detection and protective equipment. The Technical Secretariat will assist and monitor these defensive programs.

Article XI provides for the free and full exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information that will be used for non-prohibited purposes. Parties shall facilitate such exchanges and review national export control policies to harmonize them with the purposes of the Convention.

Article XII provides measures to redress cases of noncompliance, including the restriction or suspension of rights and privileges under the Convention until the matter is satisfactorily resolved, the collective action of treaty parties, and the involvement of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

Article XIII states that the Convention does not limit or detract from a signatory's commitments under the 1925 Geneva Protocol or the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Article XIV provides for the settlement of disputes between treaty parties through the Executive Council, the Conference of States Parties, and the International Court of Justice.

Article XV states that the articles and annexes of the Convention are subject to amendment. Proposed amendments are ratified during an amendment conference with majority support, if no state objects. The Executive Council can approve technical changes to the annexes by unanimous vote. A two-thirds vote of the Conference of States Parties can approve technical changes over the objection of the Executive Council.

Article XVI declares the Convention to be of unlimited duration and requires ninety-days notice before a party can withdraw.

Article XVII notes that the annexes are an integral part of the treaty.

Article XVIII states that the Convention is open for signature before its entry into force.

Article XIX holds that signatories shall ratify the Convention according to their respective constitutional processes.

Article XX allows for states to accede to the Convention at any time after its entry into force.


Article XXI stipulates that the Convention will enter into force 180 days after the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification is deposited or 13 January 1995, whichever is later.

Article XXII states that neither the articles nor the annexes of the Convention are subject to reservations.

Article XXIII designates the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the depository of the Convention.

Article XXIV declares that all texts—Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish—are equally authentic.

A.E.S.



Document Separator

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure; Wednesday, June 23, 1993

Page 175 of 336 Pages

1 themselves. Is that correct?

2 MS CHESTON: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That is correct, Counsel. I

4 appreciate it. Is there any other business or statements

5 that should be made at this time by any of the Commissioners?

6 (No response.)

7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: If not, we will proceed with the

8 Army and Mr. Behrmann. If you would proceed.

9 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, could I just say one

10 thing about the motions? We have drafted just about every

11 conceivable option. There's no prejudice on our part. We've

12 tried to use it as a means of facilitation. I think that

13 there is a dearth of options for you to select from, and I

14 just wanted that to be clear for the record.

15 We'll move right to Ed Brown, who is going to start

16 the brief for us on Army bases.

17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, you are recognized.

18 You may proceed.

19 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I have

20 with me today the entire Army team. The analysts will be

21 talking to you in their respective areas where they have done

22 the work, starting off with me today at the table. On my

Page 176 of 336 Pages

1 half percent.

2 Slide 6 shows the same information for combat

3 support installations, Fort Leonard Wood where they train

4 engineers; Fort Gordon trains signal soldiers; Fort

5 McClellan, both chemical and military police; Fort Huachuca.

6 military intelligence; and Fort Devens, which is in the

7 process of being closed, and the training load is being

8 transferred from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. In this

9 category, there was a reduction of about nine percent.

10 Slide 7 shows the information for combat service

11 support installations. The installations shown along the

12 bottom, I will not detail them. There is a reduction of

13 about 18 percent in training load in these installations

14 through the period.

15 At Tab 2, we have the first installation to be

16 considered, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Slide 8 pictorially

17 shows the DOD recommendation. This recommendation is to

18 close Fort McClellan, move the Chemical School, the Military

19 Police School and the DOD, Department of Defense Polygraph

20 Institute, to Fort Leonard Wood, retain Pelham Range, and

21 establish a reserve component enclave at Fort McClellan and

22 retain the capability for live agent training, the Chemical

Page 176 of 336 Pages

1 left is LTC Brian Duffy and to his left is Mr. John Graham.

2 If I may direct your attention to Slide 1, the top portion of

3 the chart shows the number of categories into which the Army

4 divided its installations for consideration.

5 The number on the right-hand column represents

6 those subjected to military value assessments within each

7 category. Highlighted categories, initial entry training,

8 branch schools, professional schools, command and control,

9 depots and commodity-oriented, have recommended for closure

10 or realignment by the Secretary of Defense or recommendations

11 added for further consideration by the Commission during its

12 hearings on the 29th of March and on May 21st.

13 The box at the bottom reflects the Commissioners'

14 addition of the U.S. Army Reserve Training Facility at Marcus

15 Hook, Pennsylvania, for consideration. This category was not

16 considered by the Army in its military value assessments;

17 therefore, I have separated it from the others.

18 If I may now direct your attention to Tab 1, we

19 have the first category that will be discussed, Initial Entry

20 Training and Branch Schools. The map, which is Slide 2, and

21 the accompanying chart, Slide 3, show the names and locations

22 of the Army's 13 initial entry training/branch school

Page 179 of 336 Pages

1 Decontamination Training Facility, at Fort McClellan.

2 Slide 9 shows the relative locations of Fort

3 McClellan and Fort Leonard Wood. LTC Brian Duffy will

4 discuss Fort McClellan.

5 LTC DUFFY: Mr. Chairman, I'm just waiting for the

6 first slide.

7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you move the mike closer,

8 please, so we have no problem hearing you? Thank you.

9 LTC DUFFY: I think you have a copy of this slide

10 in your packets, Slide No. 10. On this slide, you see the

11 various statistics for the base.

12 I point your attention to the last row. That shows

13 that the recommendation made by the Department of Defense

14 carries with it a one-time construction cost of \$113.9

15 million. It has a steady state savings of approximately \$34

16 million and pays back in the year 2002, which would be three

17 years after the six-year BRAC period. I also point your

18 attention to the cumulative economic impact which is 16.8

19 percent cumulative economic impact.

20 Next slide, please. These are the major issues

21 that I would like to review. Those listed on the left are

22 what I would consider the driving issues for this

Page 177 of 336 Pages

1 installations.

2 The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort

3 McClellan, Alabama be closed, and the Commissioners added

4 Fort Lee, Virginia, for further consideration. Before

5 discussing each installation, I would like to outline the

6 staff's evaluation of the impact of force structure

7 reductions on training loads at these installations.

8 In looking at these charts, it must be remembered

9 that both active and reserve component soldiers are trained,

10 so there cannot be a direct one-to-one correlation in force

11 structure reductions to reduction in the training load.

12 Slide 4 compares the training load at the Army's basic

13 training installations for fiscal years 1992 and 1997.

14 This chart assumes a force structure of 12 active

15 divisions. Through the period, there is a reduction of

16 almost 20 percent. That compares with a total force

17 reduction, both active and reserve, of approximately 18

18 percent.

19 Slide 5 shows the same information for the combined

20 arms installations, those that train the infantry, their

21 defense artillery, armor, aviation and artillery soldiers.

22 Through the period, there's a reduction of about six-and-a

Page 180 of 336 Pages

1 recommendation. Those are the ones I will cover. If you

2 have any questions about the issues on the right, I will be

3 glad to cover those, also.

4 Next slide, please. The first issue, military

5 value, four installations ranked lower than Fort McClellan,

6 Forts Lee and Eustis in Virginia, Fort Rucker in Alabama,

7 also, and Fort Huachuca. Fort Lee is the Quartermaster

8 Center and School. It has been studied for consolidation

9 along with Fort Eustis and I think that the Commission has

10 taken it under consideration and understands those

11 installations.

12 Fort Rucker is the Army's Aviation Center and

13 School. It's a unique installation that trains aviators. It

14 has 23 stage fields of various sizes, all adding up to a

15 couple hundred acres each. They are located on the outskirts

16 of the installation that makes it rather unique and difficult

17 to replicate.

18 Fort Huachuca is a gaining installation from BRAC

19 '91 and in the Army's recommendation was a gainer in BRAC

20 '93. So, for that reason, it was not considered for closure

21 or realignment.

22 I think the point I would like to make is that

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure:Wednesday, June 23, 1993

Page 181 of 336 Pages
 1 military value is merely the beginning part of the analysis.
 2 and the service did not use military value as the sole
 3 determinant of whether a base should be closed or realigned.
 4 It did allow them to start the study.
 5 At this point, I'd like to talk about the
 6 separation of the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense
 7 Training Facility. What I thought would be more useful was
 8 to show you a picture of what the Chemical Defense Training
 9 Facility is for those Commissioners who did not have an
 10 opportunity to view it.
 11 Mark, if I may have Slide No. 6, this is what the
 12 facility looks like. Those buildings with the roofs that are
 13 colored in orange are the areas where the agent is actually
 14 contained, either in a laboratory, in a training area, or
 15 being evacuated or incinerated. The blue building is an
 16 administration building and classrooms.
 17 Could I have the next slide, please? This shows
 18 you some of the training that is conducted inside. Liquid
 19 agent is poured on military equipment and soldiers are then
 20 given a chance to practice their decontamination skills with
 21 a live agent. Naturally, you can imagine it's rather a
 22 fearful exercise. It's been proven to build their confidence

Page 182 of 336 Pages
 1 and competence and it makes them better trainers. Thank you,
 2 Mark.
 3 The CDTF, if I may use that acronym, is a one-of-a
 4 kind facility. It was built in 1987. Studies commissioned
 5 by the Army have shown this training actually does produce a
 6 higher level of confidence in decontamination equipment and
 7 skills than training in a simulated environment.
 8 Within this facility, binary components are mixed
 9 to produce a live, toxic agent. After completion of the
 10 training, contaminated products are incinerated; thus, it has
 11 a hazardous waste incinerator contained as part of this
 12 facility.
 13 This facility currently operates within the State
 14 of Alabama with a clean air permit and that, to date, is the
 15 only permit that has been required by the State of Alabama.
 16 There has never been an accident or a discharge of toxic
 17 chemicals or any other matter into the environment from this
 18 facility.
 19 As you see on the issues slide, the DOD
 20 recommendation including leaving the CDTF at Fort McClellan.
 21 This was done because it was believed that movement may not
 22 be possible, and the Army saw value in the consolidation of

Page 183 of 336 Pages
 1 the three branch schools. Although separation produces
 2 difficult logistics problems, the potential savings to close
 3 the remainder of Fort McClellan, as well as combine three
 4 maneuver combat branch schools as more attractive.
 5 This part of the DOD recommendation has produced
 6 almost unanimous disagreement with the DOD position from the
 7 community. Their argument is that besides the logistical
 8 nightmare, the resulting effect on doctrine and equipment
 9 testing would be devastating to the development community.
 10 Also, the community has presented the Commission
 11 with the perception that the State of Alabama may require
 12 additional permits for a stand-alone facility, requiring
 13 response forces and adding additional costs if it were to be
 14 left in place while the school moved. Of course, no one
 15 knows the answer to that question, but it is a possibility.
 16 We have looked at the economics of moving the CDTF
 17 with the Chemical School and results show an additional \$10
 18 million savings would be saved each year. This represents
 19 savings in base operations support as well as the movement of
 20 soldiers between Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan.
 21 I think this naturally leads to the question of
 22 whether or not the CDTF can be relocated at Fort Leonard

Page 184 of 336 Pages
 1 Wood, which is the next issue. The community has presented
 2 the Commission with arguments that the CDTF either cannot be
 3 permitted in Missouri, environmental permits, or if possible
 4 it requires so much time that the movement could not be
 5 completed within the six-year time frame required by law.
 6 They base the argument on the time it took to construct the
 7 CDTF in Alabama.
 8 The permit process there was started in 1981.
 9 Construction began in 1983. It was finished in 1986 and the
 10 tested with the first students being trained in 1987. It
 11 was, indeed, a six-year process for this first facility.
 12 community at the Birmingham regional hearing suggested it
 13 would be eight-and-a-half years before you could begin
 14 training students in Missouri.
 15 The Commission communicated with the Missouri
 16 Department of Natural Resources to determine how long permits
 17 would actually take and if there would be a problem. Their
 18 response to the Commission suggests that the entire
 19 permitting process would require from one-and-a-half to two
 20 years for both part one and part two.
 21 This does not include the time it takes to
 22 construct, which would be an additional two years. This

Page 185 of 336 Pages
 1 leaves two years for problems to be resolved, that is, with
 2 the information that they know today about the Chemical
 3 Defense Training Facility. They have seen a copy of the
 4 plans and they have also a copy of the operating SOPs.
 5 In addition, we received two letters from local
 6 Chambers of Commerce and a citizens group that they have not
 7 found any public opposition to the relocation of the Chemical
 8 School activities. Another question was posed back to the
 9 Director of Missouri Natural Resources about the type of
 10 opposition that could be expected from such a facility.
 11 They replied that the public generally does not
 12 oppose hazardous waste generators if they are actually
 13 incinerating material within the state, that is produced
 14 within the state. If the material comes from out of the
 15 state, they have a violent public opposition. In particular,
 16 they mentioned the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant which
 17 itself has a hazardous waste incinerator. It was permitted
 18 within nine months after the application was received by the
 19 State of Missouri.
 20 I don't mean to suggest that the permitting is a
 21 sure thing. I can only tell you what the State has said. My
 22 impressions of the area down there are that public opposition

Page 186 of 336 Pages
 1 would not be significant, if any at all, and that the state
 2 and the post have a very cooperative relationship that will
 3 allow permitting to proceed as quickly as can be expected;
 4 however, I cannot find anybody that would promise that this
 5 will be a sure thing.
 6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't understand your
 7 last sentence.
 8 LTC DUFFY: I'm sorry, sir?
 9 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't hear your last
 10 sentence.
 11 LTC DUFFY: What I said was that I cannot guarantee
 12 100 percent and neither can the state, that this facility
 13 will be built in the four-year time frame that they think it
 14 can, nor that there will be no public opposition.
 15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I can guarantee there's going to
 16 be public opposition to it from my experience in the real
 17 world. I know you're not quite finished your first
 18 presentation.
 19 But this is an issue that we've been living with
 20 and I've been living with for three years, and this
 21 Commission for the last three-and-a-half or four months.
 22 I feel very, very strongly about it, so I'm not going to bring

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure: Wednesday, June 23, 1993

Page 187 of 336 Pages

1 a motion myself at this particular time, but I'd like to open
 2 a discussion.
 3 It basically goes as follows. In 1991, the
 4 Department of Defense, the Army recommendation was to close
 5 the CDTF, close McClellan, keep Anniston open, and rid the
 6 free world of the only live agent training capability that
 7 I'm aware of or anybody is aware of. Indeed, it might be the
 8 only, at the present time, functioning live agent training
 9 facility in the entire world.
 10 We, the Commission, rejected the proposal of the
 11 Army in 1991, and the Army wasn't very pleased with that,
 12 simply because they are always, as all the services,
 13 correctly want to justify their actions and their proposals.
 14 Then it was a surprise to me that they, in fact, backed down
 15 from their 1991 position.
 16 We heard the Army testify in lockstep that, indeed,
 17 a CDTF facility, live agent training facility and
 18 decontamination facility, is essential, and is imperative;
 19 that it's more important for the instructors than anybody
 20 else, because obviously, all recruits can't go through this
 21 facility but it is a major component, and that they had erred
 22 in making that recommendation in 1991.

Page 188 of 336 Pages

1 In 1993, this year, their proposal is saying,
 2 "We'll keep the CDTF open but, in essence, close down
 3 everything else. Move the smoke training to Leonard Wood,
 4 Separate the chemical school by moving that out, moving out
 5 the OOD Polygraph Institute, and leaving just the facility,
 6 the live agent training facility."
 7 As far as I'm concerned, they have it half right
 8 now, but they still don't have it all right, because I'm very
 9 concerned about a number of things. One is the fact that I
 10 don't have great confidence -- and the Army and I, as an
 11 individual, agree that live agent training is important.
 12 I don't have any great confidence that it can
 13 possibly stay or will stay if the chemical school and the
 14 CDTF training is bifurcated and one is in one location and
 15 one is in another. That led, obviously, the very competent
 16 people at Fort Leonard Wood, and they are, and the community
 17 to come back and say, "No problem. We will do the permitting
 18 to build one of these facilities."
 19 Now, a decade ago or more, it took six to seven
 20 years and today, with the increased environmental sensitivity
 21 that communities have, with the great flexibility given to,
 22 and properly, I suppose, latitude given to plaintiffs to sue

Page 189 of 336 Pages

1 and tie up all sorts of important public works projects
 2 throughout the land for decades.
 3 I remember in my State of New Jersey, an interstate
 4 highway wasn't completed for 25 years, and a highway is far
 5 different than a CDTF, than chemical, live agent
 6 capabilities, so it seems to me that if a community, not for
 7 any fault of its own, not because there was official public
 8 resistance to it but private individual resistance
 9 manifesting itself in all sorts of litigation.
 10 And, therefore, difficult funding questions, can
 11 tie up a road for 20 years or 25 years, in almost any state,
 12 not to mention landfills, hazardous waste facilities, burn
 13 facilities, throughout this country, it could be an awfully
 14 long time before a similar capability is built someplace else
 15 and I'm very concerned about that.
 16 And, therefore, it seems to me if you want to err,
 17 you err on the side of giving our men and women the type of
 18 training that everybody recognizes they need. Don't
 19 bifurcate these two capabilities and make sure that they
 20 exist. To me, it's not a pro Fort McClellan argument. It's
 21 a pro-recruit argument and Army argument and Air Force
 22 argument.

Page 190 of 336 Pages

1 It's for our men and women in uniform that we want
 2 this capability and I just don't want to do anything in good
 3 conscience to degrade it. I think separating it will degrade
 4 it and possibly lead to its demise, which the Army and many
 5 of us agree with at this particular time that it should not
 6 happen.
 7 Also, I'm concerned. I know there's conflicting
 8 information the Commission received with regard to Fort
 9 Leonard Wood and its capability with regard to smoke
 10 training. Ed, I believe that -- I mean, we had testimony one
 11 week and then we had the harshest letter you'd ever heard, of
 12 you repeated to me that you'd ever seen, where the Army
 13 criticized, I guess, the commanding officer.
 14 MR. BROWN: It was from the Commander of Fort
 15 Leonard Wood to the Commander of Fort McClellan, Mr.
 16 Chairman.
 17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay. So, there's an internal
 18 disagreement with respect to that, and I don't know who to
 19 believe with regard to the smoke training at Leonard Wood at
 20 the present time.
 21 Also, I'm concerned about the economic impact and I
 22 know it's a smaller criterion and we want to make sure that

Page 191 of 336 Pages

1 it's given its proper weight and it doesn't have the weight
 2 of military criteria, but it seems to me that in this
 3 community, what we're telling this community is that what
 4 we're going to do is to close the base, in essence,
 5 We're going to remove the jobs and the revenue
 6 stream from the community and what we're leaving is a
 7 Chemical Defense Training Facility, live agent training
 8 facility, and a bunch of chemical weapons that have to be de
 9 milled, so it's the worst of all worlds.
 10 I've said earlier in this process and I've said it
 11 today and I've kept my mind open, and I will listen to the
 12 other Commissioners. The deliberative process requires that,
 13 but it seems to me that it's the worst of all scenarios where
 14 you're telling a community you're not only closing their
 15 facility, but basically you can't use it because that which
 16 remains is that which no one community in America really
 17 wants, and that is chemical weapons and chemical
 18 demilitarization training facilities.
 19 So, from the standpoint of the economies of that, I
 20 don't know what all that land could be used for. On the
 21 argument of military value and the degradation of the type of
 22 training, I'm fearful. Based on those two arguments, I feel

Page 192 of 336 Pages

1 very strongly that the Commission would be making a mistake
 2 if they accepted the Army's recommendations, even though they
 3 came a long way from 1991. They're getting close, but I
 4 think these two capabilities should be co-located, and I
 5 guess I've said enough at the present time.
 6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, may I add on to
 7 what you have said? I think one of the things that this
 8 Commission has a responsibility, as we address the list that
 9 was presented to us, and the first four criteria are military
 10 value. I think you spoke very dramatically and correctly, in
 11 the military value of an existing facility, the only one we
 12 know of in the free world and I have to agree with you,
 13 probably the only one in the world.
 14 It hasn't been too long ago when this nation
 15 agonized with a potential threat for a chemical environment
 16 of our troops a half a world away, and the fact that we had
 17 an opportunity, at least, to train and to build that troop
 18 force up to understand how to operate in that type of an
 19 environment.
 20 If we loose this training facility, I think the
 21 next time it is going to be needed, we will not have that
 22 much leeway and I think we will be in a much worse position.

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure:Wednesday, June 23, 1993

Page 193 of 336 Pages

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much. There's a
2 couple of other things I want to mention and that is, I can
3 see, I mean, the State of Alabama making the argument. Now,
4 this facility is either grandfathered or permitted in
5 Alabama, but I am quite sure since it was permitted and
6 created and became a reality, the environmental standards of
7 Alabama are getting more strict, just like they are anyplace
8 else.

9 It wouldn't surprise me if based on the fact that
10 there's now a substantial changed use of that facility that
11 even Alabama, if the CDTF was left there and nothing else,
12 that the State of Alabama would want a reconsideration of the
13 permitting process and reconsideration as to whether this
14 type of use is consistent with the new, now upgraded
15 environmental standards that properly the State of Alabama
16 now has. That is something that concerns me, as well.

17 Finally, I know that this decision costs money and
18 the Commission's function, as much as anything else, is to
19 save money. I know that, by virtue of not closing Fort
20 McClellan, at least at the present time, and the requirement
21 that these two capabilities, the school and the CDTF, be
22 collocated, means \$25-30 million per year. At least, those

Page 194 of 336 Pages

1 are the numbers that were brought to my attention.
2 But I feel so strongly about the fact that we are
3 duty bound to give the very best capabilities to our men and
4 women in uniform, who are charged with the responsibility of
5 going out in battle and the battlefield may, in the future,
6 contain chemical agents, that it's worth the cost.

7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman?
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. McPherson.

9 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I feel like the guy who
10 said, "Outside of that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the
11 play?" I mean, after these very powerful statements, what is
12 the Army's rationale? COL Duffy, if you'd take a few minutes
13 to make the Army's case, it ought to go in the record.

14 LTC DUFFY: My conversations with various people in
15 the Army, the communication we've received from the Director
16 of the Army Basing Study, GEN Ballard, there seem to be two
17 reasons. One is that initially, in 1991, the CDTF would
18 start to be a luxury that the Army could no longer afford.
19 It was not that it was not a requirement. It was a
20 requirement.

21 Everybody recognizes the value of such a facility
22 but when all the requirements were put together, it could not

Page 195 of 336 Pages

1 be afforded. Many important requirements end up being
2 unfunded.

3 The second thing is the reason it may have fallen
4 below the out line, if you will, is that the importance never
5 really was studied. It was only after the '91 Commission
6 that the Army asked the Health Services Command to do a
7 study, which they did, and it was a very detailed study. It
8 involved physiological testing in order to make assumptions
9 about a person's competence level, et cetera, which they did,
10 that conclusively proved that the confidence of a soldier is
11 raised.

12 Again, these are the soldiers that train the
13 trainers. These are not the soldiers that actually are out
14 there on the front lines, but those are the ones that are
15 training the ones going to the front lines.

16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Why do they want to move
17 it to Leonard Wood? Why is the recommendation before us to
18 move it to Leonard Wood?

19 LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation?

20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I mean the '93
21 recommendation. Why is that here before us?

22 LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation was to

Page 196 of 336 Pages

1 leave the Chemical Defense Training Facility mothballed at
2 Fort McClellan in 1991. In 1993, initially, the Army studied
3 the option of moving this to Fort Leonard Wood together with
4 the chemical school, realizing they should be collocated. I
5 do not know the reason why, but at some point in the decision
6 process from the documents we've been provided, it was
7 decided to leave it at Fort McClellan.

8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But a bigger question is:
9 Why move it to Fort Leonard Wood? As I understand the Army's
10 position, very legitimately wanted to take care of the
11 synergism between chemical, military police, engineering, and
12 all that.

13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That's the reason it was
14 given to us a few weeks ago.

15 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, these are the --

16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Would you address that?

17 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. These three branches are the
18 combat support arms that are the direct support for the
19 fighting force, the infantry, the armor, et cetera. They are
20 side by side with them somewhere on the battlefield. They
21 are also the maneuver combat support elements versus those
22 that are fairly stationary or fixed, so they are peas in a

Page 197 of 336 Pages

1 pod, if you will. There is a synergy to collocating them
2 because their operations, military operations, entail a
3 combined arms approach.

4 The engineer depends on the chemical branch and
5 vice-versa. All of us depend on the military police. There
6 is an opportunity here for the combat support arms to develop
7 joint combat support doctrine, to test it at Fort Leonard
8 Wood and by so doing, increase the readiness of the forces.
9 That's the real value of collocating these schools.

10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And that is a genuine
11 value, in your mind?

12 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. As an engineer, I can tell
13 you that's a value.

14 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: All right. So, if it were
15 possible to have these three collocated, those three,
16 training engineers and military police and chemical, in the
17 same place, and to have the chemical facility with them, that
18 would be the ideal situation?

19 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, it would.

20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The problem here is that
21 if you leave behind the chemical weapons, the problem the
22 Chairman has been addressing is that if you leave behind the

Page 198 of 336 Pages

1 chemical weapons and move the chemical training, that soon
2 or later, the emphasis on chemical training will dissipate
3 and if, indeed, it is ever possible to build the facility for
4 the chemical weapons in Missouri, it's going to be some time
5 before that can be done, quite a long time. Is that right?

6 LTC DUFFY: Sir, again, this is an opinion. This
7 is an opinion based on documents we've received, a careful
8 study by the State of Missouri, my discussions with people
9 the State of Missouri. I am left with the impression that
10 the facility can be built.

11 Similar facilities have been built in the State of
12 Missouri, facilities more onerous than this facility, with
13 much public opposition. I use the example of Lake City Air
14 Ammunition Plant because it's a military facility. Military
15 facilities tend to gather a lot of attention just by their
16 nature.

17 This facility burns explosive matter. It releases,
18 it has the potential which will release hazardous chemical
19 into the atmosphere. During the permitting process for this
20 facility, a public hearing was requested. In that public
21 hearing, four questions were received from the public. The
22 questions were successfully answered.

FROM BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure: Wednesday, June 23, 1993

Page 199 of 336 Pages

1 From what I gather, the state requires technology
2 that will produce a 99.5 percent pure product outside of the
3 stack. I think there's a lot of confidence in the state's
4 ability to ensure that the environment is taken care of by
5 the public, so I personally have not yet found the reason to
6 doubt the fact that it could be built. I can't foresee the
7 future, but I have searched and I have just not found it yet.

8 Now, that is owing, of course, for the bias, naturally, of
9 the State of Missouri for the people in that region.

10 COMMISSIONER STUART: Brian, your answer to Mr.
11 McPherson really is that there are advantages of collocation
12 and as you've shown on your chart, the collocation saves
13 money. The Army has basically recommended that the training,
14 except for the live agent training, be given at Fort Leonard
15 Wood.

16 So, my question really is not taking a back seat to
17 the Chairman's concern about live chemical training, because
18 I think the poor man's nuclear bomb is probably the chemical
19 warfare, and I think it's tremendously important that we
20 maintain this capability, but I do sense that it would be a
21 greater cost effectiveness and long-run, that it would be a
22 better solution if we were to accept the Army's

Page 200 of 336 Pages

1 recommendation to close the McClellan base, providing that we
2 can maintain that capability for live agent training.

3 It seems to me that's where the point of
4 disagreement is. I think we're all deeply concerned about
5 the maintenance of this capability. Wouldn't it be possible
6 to support the recommendations of DOD and, at the same time,
7 condition it upon having secured the environmental approvals
8 that are necessary, to make sure that we maintain the
9 capability if, as the Chairman has brought out, it sometimes
10 takes longer than we think?

11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: As Brian mentioned earlier,
12 sir, it will require at least two years to get that
13 permitting and I'm prepared in a few minutes to offer a
14 motion which would require the Army to get the permitting
15 before they bring it back to BRAC '96. Nothing would happen
16 before then, anyway, and then there would be no question
17 about whether it could be moved or not.

18 In visiting Fort McClellan and listening to
19 everyone and reading all the expert advice we've gotten, I'm
20 convinced that the school and the live agent test facility
21 must be together, if it's going to do what's needed, not only
22 for our country but internationally.

Page 201 of 336 Pages

1 It's an international asset to have those two
2 together and operating, and I believe that we ought to keep
3 it at Fort McClellan and ask the Secretary to have the Army
4 gain the permits before they bring it up again in '96, if
5 they desire. That will take care of all the concerns that we
6 have.

7 It also will take away the what-ifs. It will take
8 away -- maybe Missouri doesn't want it or someone else
9 doesn't want it. I'm prepared to make a motion when you're
10 ready, Mr. Chairman.

11 LTC DUFFY: Sir, if I may just mention something
12 about the permitting process, the permitting process starts
13 with the permission to build. That generally takes from nine
14 to 14 months. At that point, then, you can build.

15 The second permit is the important one which takes
16 place after construction and that is the operational test
17 permit. That is where they ensure that the technology
18 installed in the incinerator actually does clean by
19 byproducts to the state standard. That is the difficult one,
20 really.

21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think the first one is the

22 difficult one. There's no doubt in my mind that from a

Page 202 of 336 Pages

1 technological standpoint, given no resistance and all
2 cooperation, the facility can be duplicated. I mean, it was
3 built once. It can be built again.

4 But, whether you get the permit to build, I think
5 is the crucial one and, therefore, I agree with Commissioner
6 Johnson.

7 COMMISSIONER STUART: I just would like to ask
8 Commissioner Johnson, since our mission is to endeavor to
9 save money, move the process along of cutting back on bases
10 as recommended, and we've heard that collocation is the
11 ultimate answer here, why couldn't we accept the DOD's
12 recommendations subject to assurance that they had the
13 environmental approval and the facilities were in place?

14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The problem is, number one,
15 you put the community of Fort McClellan in limbo for many,
16 many years, and you don't have a time table. If we go the
17 opposite direction, it will happen just as quickly if they
18 can gain those permits and certifications.

19 COMMISSIONER STUART: I would like to contend that
20 we keep them on pins and needles, anyway, because logic is
21 the Army thinks these should be collocated and they think
22 Leonard Wood is the place to go.

Page 203 of 336 Pages

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Stuart, it's my
2 understanding that in the recommendation by DOD, it was not
3 to move the CDTF. It was to move the other facilities.

4 COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes.

5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: My understanding in your
6 suggestion right now is to also incorporate moving the CDTF?
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.

8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me mention something about
9 something subject to. My only concern there is that I
10 found from experience that unless our motions are drawn so
11 carefully, with no waseal words whatsoever, no discretion,
12 totally, clearly defined, they're going to be -- the
13 recommendations are not going to be followed or they're going
14 to be tied up in court forever.

15 I found that experience with respect to Fort Ord in
16 California when the intention of the Commission was to do one
17 thing, and it turned out because we weren't artful and
18 careful in our language, something else occurred.

19 Also, when you say "subject to," there's going to
20 be, I think, arguments as to how long that contingency is
21 there. There's going to be legal arguments and I think,
22 perhaps, with merit that this Commission's job was to accept

Page 204 of 336 Pages

1 or reject the recommendations of the services with regard to
2 specific closures and realignments and, if we have to, make
3 other recommendations, but not to do things subject to future
4 actions.

5 I have problems with that in the sense that I'm not
6 sure that is within the parameters of what Congress intended
7 by giving us this responsibility.

8 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, Mr. Chairman, you
9 wanted us to be fiercely independent.

10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, I did.

11 COMMISSIONER STUART: I submit that at Fort Ord, we
12 made that decision in '91 and we got the largest part of that
13 decision made. We have objected and been concerned in
14 discussing the Presidio, which will come up later, that they
15 kept more of that than was necessary, but basically, we made
16 that decision and it stuck.

17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's going to stick
18 because we're going to revisit the question later on this
19 week. Words in motions -- this is my opinion and it may not
20 be others, but I want our work to be so clear, so concise,
21 because if we, in one motion, have the words "subject to,"

Document Separator

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure: Wednesday, June 23, 1993

22 and the next motion we're going to have the words "contingent

22 Commissioner Bowman. Any discussion on the motion?

Page 205 of 336 Pages

Page 208 of 336 Pages

1 upon." and the next motion, it's going to be based on words
 2 such as "subsequent to," and I don't think those are the
 3 types of scenarios that we should get involved with.
 4 I think we have to make decisions that are clear
 5 cut based on all the information we have today rather than on
 6 events that may or may not take place in the future. I think
 7 that's the cleanest way to do it and in the perfect world, if
 8 we were both the Congress and the Executive Branch and the
 9 Secretary of Defense, I wouldn't mind those words, and the
 10 courts.
 11 COMMISSIONER STUART: The reason I'm concerned
 12 about GEN Johnson's proposal is we're postponing a decision.
 13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, we're not postponing
 14 anything. My belief is that we should reject the Department
 15 of Defense's recommendations. If the Department of Defense
 16 feels strongly that McClellan is closed or should be closed,
 17 they should get their ducks in order with regard to the
 18 collocation of these facilities before they come back to
 19 another Commission.
 20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that's what I propose in
 21 my motion, sir, when you're ready.
 22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I empathize with Commissioner

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could I --
 2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Absolutely.
 3 COMMISSIONER STUART: I have a variation, a second
 4 motion, an alternative, and basically, it is what I've been
 5 discussing, collocation subject to the COTF closure being
 6 accomplished with the Army getting the permits in accordance
 7 with the environmental laws and regulations of Missouri, so.
 8 shall I read the --
 9 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart, I'm having a
 10 hard time hearing you. Are you making a motion now or are
 11 you discussing your alternative motion? I thought I heard
 12 you say that you were discussing a possible alternative, and
 13 I might suggest that before you actually make a second
 14 motion, that there be a vote on the first that is pending.
 15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you, Counsel. I
 16 appreciate it. That would simplify things and simplify my
 17 life quite a bit, but I think what we said in the very
 18 beginning, that if a Commissioner felt compelled to offer a
 19 substitute motion, the substitute motion would be recognized;
 20 if it has a second, seconded; there would be discussion; and
 21 then the vote would be on the substitute then followed by the
 22 original motion.

Page 206 of 336 Pages

Page 209 of 336 Pages

1 Stuart but I agree with the Chairman.
 2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, let me very
 3 quickly talk about the difficulty any time you are talking
 4 about moving munitions, any time you are talking about trying
 5 to re-locate a chemical environment, you not only have to go
 6 through the existing state, but you have to get permits from
 7 each and every state that is adjacent or that you're going
 8 through, and those permits are extremely difficult to get.
 9 This is a very, very difficult thing.
 10 This country is fortunate that we happen to have a
 11 facility that is operational and was there when we needed it
 12 not too long ago.
 13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before I
 14 entertain a motion?
 15 (No response.)
 16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson, do you
 17 have a motion? You indicated you may have a motion.
 18 MOTION
 19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir. I move that the
 20 Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated
 21 substantially from the force structure plan and final
 22 criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan.

1 MS. CHESTON: Perhaps I'm just having a hard time
 2 hearing him. I didn't hear him say that what he's doing is
 3 amending the first motion.
 4 COMMISSIONER STUART: No, I'm offering a substitute
 5 motion.
 6 MS. CHESTON: Offering a substitute motion.
 7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart is offering
 8 a substitute motion which, of course, will require a second.
 9 Commissioner Stuart, do you want to read your substitute
 10 motion?
 11 MOTION
 12 COMMISSIONER STUART: The language is lengthy, but
 13 I will read it.
 14 I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense
 15 deviated substantially from Criteria 1 and 4 and, therefore,
 16 the Commission adopted the following recommendation.
 17 Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and
 18 other required training support facilities to be licensed
 19 through the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support
 20 the U.S. Army Reserves, relocate the Chemical and Military
 21 Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, close the
 22 Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan and

Page 207 of 336 Pages

Page 210 of 336 Pages

1 Alabama.
 2 Therefore, the Commission rejects the
 3 recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to close Fort
 4 McClellan, relocate U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police
 5 Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to
 6 Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
 7 It also rejects transfer accountability of Pelham
 8 Range and other required training support facilities through
 9 licensing to the Army National Guard, and rejects retaining
 10 an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves and retaining the
 11 capability for live agent training at Fort McClellan.
 12 The Commission does recommend, if the Secretary of
 13 Defense wants to move the Chemical School and the Chemical
 14 Defense Training Facility in the future, that the Army pursue
 15 all the required permits and certifications from the new site
 16 prior to the 1995 Base Closure process.
 17 The Commission finds this recommendation is
 18 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
 19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
 20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I second.
 21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been seconded by

1 construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood,
 2 subject to the COTF closure being accomplished and the
 3 permits secured by the Army, in accordance with environmental
 4 laws and regulations, and following this, relocate the
 5 Defense Polygraphic Institute to another location determined
 6 by the Department of Defense.
 7 The Commission finds this recommendation is
 8 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
 9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion,
 10 to the substitute motion?
 11 (No response.)
 12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no second to the
 13 substitute motion. The motion fails. Any further discussion
 14 on the original motion, the original motion made by
 15 Commissioner Johnson?
 16 (No response.)
 17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No further discussion. We will
 18 call for a vote, and we will start to my far right with
 19 Commissioner Peter Bowman.
 20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
 21 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."

Base Closure Commission - Base Closure: Wednesday, June 23, 1993

22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.

Page 211 of 336 Pages

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
 2 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
 3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
 4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
 5 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
 6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
 7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Courter votes "aye."
 8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
 9 COMMISSIONER STUART: No.
 10 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "nay."
 11 COMMISSIONER COX: Commissioner Byron.
 12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
 13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
 14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
 15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
 16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
 17 The motion is to reject the Secretary of Defense's
 18 recommendation with respect to Fort McClellan, Alabama. The
 19 vote on the motion is six in favor, one opposed. The motion
 20 passes.
 21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, why don't you
 22 proceed?

Page 212 of 336 Pages

1 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, at Tab
 2 3, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Lee,
 3 Virginia. Fort Lee was added for further consideration on
 4 May 21st.
 5 Slide 16 pictorially shows the option under
 6 consideration, the closure of Fort Lee, the relocation of
 7 Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School and
 8 Center, and the Army Logistics Management College to Fort
 9 Eustis, Virginia, and the Defense Commissary Agency to
 10 Quantico, Virginia.
 11 Slide 17 shows the relative locations of Fort Lee,
 12 Fort Eustis and Quantico. Mr. John Graham will now discuss
 13 Fort Lee. It's in your book at Tab 3.
 14 MR. GRAHAM: Slide No. 18 shows the static
 15 information for Fort Lee. What I'd like to do is highlight
 16 the bottom line. The one-time cost for this proposal would
 17 be a little over \$529 million, a steady state savings of 28.5
 18 million and the payback would be in excess of 100 years.
 19 Next slide.
 20 These are the issues that staff has reviewed in
 21 regards to Fort Lee. I'd like to go through each of them and
 22 I'll start on the next charts. Next slide. First off is

Page 213 of 336 Pages

1 military value. Fort Lee was ranked 11 of 13 within its
 2 category of Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools by the
 3 Army.
 4 The community argued that it was a multi-purpose
 5 installation, that it was both command and control,
 6 professional schooling, as well as initial entry training
 7 and, therefore, should be viewed from the other Initial Entry
 8 Training/Branch Schools, that it was more than a training
 9 center.
 10 Our review showed that the primary mission of Fort
 11 Lee is the training of soldiers, noncommissioned officers and
 12 officers, and that the Army did treat it fairly and it was
 13 consistent in its assignment of installations to this
 14 category, and it was ranked fairly against the others, so the
 15 11 of 13 is a valid military value assessment.
 16 The second issue is that of combat service support
 17 training consolidation. The Army has consolidated some of
 18 its combat service support training at Fort Lee, most notably
 19 in officer training. It is also finalizing plans to
 20 consolidate combat developments, doctrine developments and
 21 training developments and standardization at Fort Lee.

22 Lieutenant General Wakefield, the Commanding

Page 214 of 336 Pages

1 General at Fort Lee, under whose command this initiative is
 2 ongoing, stated that this initiative would save the Army \$54
 3 million a year.
 4 Our review of what has happened at Fort Lee shows
 5 that there is a consolidation ongoing of the officer courses
 6 and that there is in development, but not yet approved by the
 7 Department of the Army or Department of Defense, a plan to
 8 consolidate the training and doctrine development at Fort
 9 Lee, and there will be considerable savings from this
 10 consolidation.
 11 The third issue is unique facilities. The Army
 12 argues that there are four unique facilities, truly unique
 13 facilities on Fort Lee. The first is the Petroleum Training
 14 Facility, which was opened in 1993. This is new. It's an
 15 environmentally safe facility where we train -- we, the
 16 nation -- train soldiers and Marines in inland distribution
 17 of petroleum and bulk petroleum storage.
 18 The second facility that the Army claims is unique
 19 is water purification training where they train all of the
 20 Army soldiers on how to purify water, which, as we found out
 21 in the Gulf War, is a vital requirement.
 22 The Battle Support Center is a computer-assisted

Page 215 of 336 Pages

1 wargaming center, which has the capability to be uplinked to
 2 worldwide organizations from Korea to Germany, and it saves
 3 money from bringing the soldiers to a central location to do
 4 this type of training. The second is as part of the Army
 5 Logistics Management Staff College, there is a satellite
 6 education uplink at the center.
 7 Our review shows that two of these are truly
 8 unique. The POL training facility is the only one in DOD
 9 that does this type of inland distribution and bulk storage
 10 training and the water purification training facility is the
 11 only one within the Army and would have to be replicated.
 12 The other two, the Battle Support Center and the
 13 Satellite Education Center, are not as unique in that they
 14 are not one of a kind, but since they are part of the
 15 instructional requirements for the activities at Fort Lee,
 16 they would have to be replicated wherever we decided to move
 17 those organizations from Fort Lee.
 18 Next slide, Mark. The Army stated that the
 19 Combined Arms Support Command, which is the headquarters at
 20 Fort Lee and is also the command and control element for all
 21 of the combat service support schools within the Army, the
 22 Quartermaster's School, the Army Logistics Management

Page 216 of 336 Pages

1 College, and associated activities, all needed to be
 2 collocated at a given installation.
 3 The Defense Commissary Agency and the Troop Support
 4 Agency, the Troop Support Agency was the Army predecessor to
 5 the Defense Commissary Agency, it is slowly going out of
 6 business but until it does, they need to be collocated. The
 7 remaining units can go anywhere that we can find room for
 8 them on an Army or other service installation.
 9 Our analysis showed that the collocations stated by
 10 the Army were reasonable, that you do get some synergies from
 11 collocating the activities stated. You reduce the overhead
 12 in instructional requirements. You don't have to duplicate
 13 any classrooms or other training facilities by collocating
 14 those activities.
 15 The next item is tenant synergy, which goes along
 16 with the collocation. What we're really saying is that it
 17 exists between these units that need to be collocated. As I
 18 mentioned, they share instructional staff. They share
 19 facilities, and that's the DOD position, and we found that
 20 also was reasonable.
 21 However, if you move the Quartermaster School, the

Document Separator

STATEMENT OF
SENATOR HOWELL HEFLIN
AT THE
CONGRESSIONAL HEARING OF THE
1993 BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION
JUNE 14, 1993

FORT MCCLELLAN

The Army fully endorses live agent training. They also recognize that the live agent training facility cannot be moved or they would have suggested a new one be built at Fort Leonard Wood. The country's highest ranking military officer, General Colin Powell told this commission, and I quote, "It can't be moved, really."

I believe the Army, through its experience with the demilitarization facilities, has come to recognize the power of the environmental movement. The Army's problems in moving the live agent facility would be compounded by the environmental sensitivity of the Ozark forest which borders Fort Leonard Wood. The presence of endangered species in and around that Fort would so greatly complicate the permitting process as to make it impossible to build a nerve gas facility in that location.

Accepting that the live agent training can't be moved, the Army's plan is to make it a stand alone facility. During the hearings, you have heard much testimony regarding the problems inherent in separating the doctrine writers from the laboratory,

and how the Army's plan will increase training costs and times. In truth, the Army's training at the live agent facility is still in an embryonic stage. Much study and research will be performed in the coming years to discover how best to take advantage of this powerful asset. Lessons to be learned range from the simple, such as how to use a telephone when fully masked, to the more difficult, such as the correct preparation for parachuting into a contaminated environment, treating the wounded in such an environment, and loading and firing artillery when fully masked and suited.

Another consideration is the impact on the community. Community acceptance was key in having the live agent facility built in the first place. Will this community acceptance continue when the town's largest employer disappears and they are left with a skeleton crew guarding a nerve gas facility? Certainly this factor should be carefully considered before any decision is made and I mean carefully, carefully considered.

Finally, I ask that if you vote the way I believe you will, that is to keep Fort McClellan open, you grant one additional request. Fort McClellan has suffered more than double jeopardy. Since 1988, when the first rumors of base closure began flying, the people of Anniston have been held hostage by the base closure process. This year, for the third time, they are faced with the fear of losing their livelihood. They fear for the future of the

children and the fate of their families. They haven't been able to sell their homes or get loans to expand or start new businesses. And who from the outside would want to move into or invest in an area so shrouded by economic uncertainty? The community is at a standstill.

I therefore implore you to include such language in your final report as may be needed to keep Fort McClellan off future closure lists. All the Army's true options for the fort will have been exhausted and there will be no point in continuing to hold Fort McClellan and the Anniston area hostage to this uncertain future. I believe it is time to do the right thing by Fort McClellan and by Anniston. Enough is enough.

REDSTONE ARSENAL

In 1991, the commission accepted the Army Materiel Command's plan to merge the Missile Command (MICOM) at Redstone with the Armament, Munitions, & Chemical Command (AMCCOM) and consolidate their logistic functions which are known as Inventory Control Points (ICPs).

Now the Army is reversing itself and recommending that the Rock Island Inventory Control Point remain in place, and that the management and oversight function be moved - hundreds of miles away - to the Tank Automotive Command in Detroit, Michigan. This new recommendation forfeits annual consolidation savings of \$45

Document Separator

May 24, 1993

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman
Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Courter:

Testimony before your Commission, as well as questions raised and comments made during General Johnson's site visit to Fort McClellan, indicate that some commission members are curious about the feasibility of constructing and operating a Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort Leonard Wood. Such questions are not new and were raised by you during the 1991 Base Closure hearings. I would therefore like to address the issue of relocation of the CDTF and the conclusions that were reached on this issue during BRAC 91.

The 1993 Base Closure recommendation from the Defense Department with respect to Fort McClellan, Alabama differs from the recommendation in 1991 in only one material respect. Whereas in 1991 the Army proposed to mothball the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility, the Army now proposes to shuttle soldiers back and forth between Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan for CDTF training. Such proposal by the Army is laudable only to the extent that it acknowledges the essential aspect of the training provided at CDTF. Such acknowledgement is not surprising, given the observations of the Base Closure Commission during the 1991 process and subsequent studies and evaluations concerning the future chemical defense requirements of our military.

There are two assumptions implicit in the Army's recommendation to relocate the Chemical School and transport trainees back and forth for the essential chemical decontamination training. The first of these assumptions is that such training would be effective, with no decrement in readiness. The second assumption is that such shuttling is cost effective and viable. Questions from Commissioners in the 1993 process suggest serious doubt as to the validity of these assumptions. For that reason, some commissioners have questioned whether building a new CDTF at the receiving facility should be an option. I feel it is therefore appropriate to identify the impediments to relocating the CDTF to a new site and the requirements for closure of the existing site.

With respect to the existing facility at Fort McClellan, Alabama, its closure and dismantling would be extremely expensive and time consuming. Most of this cost would be due to the fact that the inner walls of the facility have, of course, been exposed to chemical agents and would have to be incinerated. Further, there will need to be approval by the State of Alabama of the closure process, a full Environmental Impact Statement, and the issuance of a RCRA permit for disposal of the facility itself. The process will include public hearings as well as public comment, inasmuch as the M-13 filters and contaminated building parts can be expected to raise considerable concern on the part of the community. Considering the obstacles listed above, it is unlikely that the closure and the reconstruction process can be completed (including decommissioning of the existing facility) in less than eight years.

With respect to construction of a new Chemical Decontamination Training Facility at the gaining installation, an environmental impact statement will be required in order to address the use of live agent at the new location. An appropriation will be necessary for the construction of the new facility. The existing facility at Fort McClellan represents an investment of over \$14 million dollars. Due to more stringent state permitting requirements since the current facility was constructed and permitted, and increased cost associated with the passage of time, the cost to construct a new facility is likely to be more than double this figure. Further, a Clean Air Act permit will be needed to construct the new facility as well as a similar permit to operate the facility. Since the existing Chemical Decontamination Training Facility was built and permitted at Fort McClellan, there have been two re-authorizations of the Clean Air Act and each has imposed more stringent standards. Further, we can expect OSHA inspections and various activities associated with community right to know laws, all of which will extend the time necessary to design, approve, construct and operate the new facility. Binary component storage requirements must be included in this process. These considerations will increase the cost associated with construction and operation.

As I am sure you are aware, these costs and legal requirements are significantly different from the costs normally associated with the environmental clean up requirements of base closure. These are not costs and requirements generated by past environmental problems, which are obligations of the United States whether a facility remains open or is closed. Rather, these costs are associated with the permitting authority which Congress has seen fit to delegate to the states.

It is noteworthy that the Congress has recently strengthened the hand of state authorities with the passage of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, which unequivocally gives state authorities the legal power to impose fines and penalties upon federal activities for failure to comply with state environmental

requirements. This enactment allows states to ensure strict compliance with the terms and conditions of both existing permits as well as the permitting process. [Given the public sensitivity to chemical warfare activities, it is not unreasonable to expect considerable attention to this matter at both the gaining and losing installations. The protest over the construction of the Chemical Demilitarization Facilities is a case in point. Last year, even as site preparation began upon the first continental U.S. facility, environmentalists succeeded in lobbying Congress to put in place a one year moratorium on all construction. Further delays due to these pressures seem likely. Keep in mind that the Demilitarization facilities were designed to remedy an existing problem at each site, while construction of a new CDTF at Fort Leonard Wood would add a contaminated site that can only be disposed of through chemical demilitarization.]

The time and money associated with the foregoing are significant, and the political implications hard to ignore. I therefore feel it is unlikely that another CDTF could ever be constructed. The Army now recognizes that the training conducted in the CDTF is extremely valuable, and I believe careful questioning will reveal that the Army itself does not believe relocating the CDTF is a viable option. Unfortunately, what the Army continues to ignore is the essentiality of complete chemical defense training, including that obtained through the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility, operated as an integral part of the training mission.

Thank you for your time and consideration of this important issue.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Howell Heflin

HH/mhy

PARAMETERS



US ARMY
WAR COLLEGE
QUARTERLY

VOL. XX NO.3

SEPTEMBER 1990

In This Issue

General Carl Vuono on the Strategic Value of Conventional Forces

Book Reviews

Guenter Lewy glances at William Colby's *Lost Victory*

Harry Ball considers Martin van Creveld's *Training of Officers*

Brian Bond on Rod Paschall's *Defeat of Imperial Germany*

- Military Police in Contingency Operations *Charles A. Hines*
- The New Soviet Defensive Policy:
Khalkhin Gol 1939 As Case Study *Christopher D. Bellamy*
and Joseph S. Lahnstein
- Whence the Big Battalions? *F. J. Chiaventone*
- Thinking About Small Wars *Richard Szafranski*
- The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice *Faris R. Kirkland*
- Junior Officer Development: Reflections of an Old Fud *Mark R. Hamilton*
- Germany, France, and the Future of
Western European Security *Thomas-Durell Young*
and Samuel J. Newland
- On War* : Is Clausewitz Still Relevant? *John E. Shephard, Jr.*
- Deconflicting the Humma-Humma *Doug Naquin*
- View From the Fourth Estate:
Just Cause to Stand Tall, But Not to Stand Pat *David H. Hackworth*

"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE..."

Military Police in Contingency Operations: Often the Force of Choice

CHARLES A. HINES

Within the last decade, the Military Police Corps has often been selected as the preferred force in responding to contingency situations. Military police are uniquely qualified to carry out a variety of peacekeeping and peacetime contingency missions in low-intensity conflict operations. This article explores the unique qualifications of MPs to undertake such roles and discusses the analytical process for determining the contingency situations most appropriate for their use.

The capability to field combat-ready forces in response to worldwide contingencies is one of the Army's primary strategic roles for the 1990s and beyond. The process of tailoring force packages that sufficiently demonstrate US resolve and protect national interests while preventing or de-escalating open military conflict is an essential component of strategic contingency planning. Today's volatile and politically charged international environment challenges strategic planners to design force packages capable of responding to specific contingency scenarios in a wide range of environments. The importance of tailored force-packaging is emphasized in FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*:

Regardless of perspective, the instruments for the resolution of a conflict must be appropriate to its nature. The arsenal of national power includes political, economic, informational, and military instruments. The nature of the conflict environment determines the way leaders employ them.¹

The mix of forces selected for a contingency mission is influenced by the principles of METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time Available) as well as a political element that is becoming increasingly dominant. Clausewitz's assertion that "war is simply a continuation of political


intercourse" applies also to contingency operations, for they too must be viewed as political instruments.² Consequently, particular scrutiny must be given to the political suitability of forces selected for a given contingency situation. Force suitability is not solely a function of mission capability or force structure. Political objectives shape military decisionmaking from the tactical to the strategic levels. Military courses of action, therefore, must be consistent with political aims even if unorthodox or nontraditional force structuring is entailed. Decisionmakers must be completely attuned to the policy goals attending each contingency, which may transcend purely military considerations. When selecting forces for contingency operations, for example, they must be sensitive to the perceptions of the local population, the international community, and the American public.

The last decade has seen a number of contingency situations where the Military Police Corps became the obvious choice. It has participated in events ranging from hurricane disaster relief in St. Croix in the Virgin Islands to Operation Just Cause in Panama. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., has described the military police as "today's cavalry" that goes to the rescue in contingencies around the world.³ While this analogy might curl the spurs on some cavalymen's boots, recent years have shown Colonel Summers' observation to be on the mark. The overwhelming support and gratitude shown to the military police by the people of St. Croix after Hurricane Hugo demonstrated that such soldiers can excel at coming to the rescue.

Force Selection: Military Police Vis-à-vis the Combat Arms

The broad principles for force-tailoring in behalf of military actions falling anywhere on the operational continuum are depicted schematically in the accompanying diagram.⁴ The diagram highlights the missions and appropriate occasions for employment of military police in comparison with those of the traditional combat arms. Unique capabilities of the military police, coupled with their domestic and international acceptability as a security force, frequently make them the most appropriate force for contingencies occurring at the lower end of the operational continuum. Conversely, as the lethality of a situation intensifies

Major General Charles A. Hines is the Commanding General, US Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan, Alabama. He holds a B.S. from Howard University, an M.S. in police administration from Michigan State University, an M.M.A.S. from the US Army Command and General Staff College, and a Ph.D. in sociology from Johns Hopkins University. He is also a graduate and former faculty member of the US Army War College and has attended the Senior Managers in Government Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. General Hines has commanded military police units from platoon through brigade, and served as Provost Marshal of VII Corps in Germany. He was an Operations Officer in the 90th Military Police Detachment in Vietnam during 1966-67.



and combat operations become more certain, the suitability of military police declines while that of the combat arms rises.

The acceptability and capability of a force being considered for a contingency mission determine its *suitability*. Force acceptability is based on a unit's political appropriateness and whether its qualities are consistent with accomplishing national interests and objectives. Force capability, on the other hand, is a measure of a unit's ability to counter an expected threat. A force may possess the capability to accomplish a military mission by virtue of its training, equipment, and structure. If, however, its mere presence inflames the situation, another type of force may need to be considered. The challenge is to apply the right force at the right time. Given the fluidity of contingency situations, this challenge can be most formidable.

Contemplated *missions* span the spectrum of contingency operations from force protection to combat operations. Although military police support

operations across the continuum, they may be the leading actor for operations falling within the left half of it—that of assisting and protecting.

The mission of *assistance* applies to those operations conducted by US forces to aid American and host-nation personnel during periods of heightened tension (e.g. noncombatant evacuation operations, natural or man-made disaster situations, and all other operations where the primary purpose of the force is the reestablishment or maintenance of normal peacetime activities). These operations may often be extensions of habitual missions conducted by US forces as part of their mission-essential task list. Threats in these situations may range from an antagonistic populace engaged in rioting, looting, and demonstrating to more hostile actions by elements who desire to disrupt or discredit governmental operations.

Military police units are uniquely suited to perform assistance missions as a result of their training and experience in dealing with citizens during periods of high stress and confusion. US objectives for these types of missions are support of the local population and protection of US interests and personnel while projecting a non-threatening, politically acceptable signature. Combat units, therefore, may not be the most preferred in these situations. Such units inherently cast a provocative, bellicose profile in the view of international and domestic communities. When the 82d Airborne Division is dispatched somewhere, for example, the entire world sits up and takes notice. Such publicity alone might jeopardize or impair a mission's success. But when a US Army military police battalion is flown to a trouble spot, no alarm bells jangle in capitals around the globe.

The mission of *protection* encompasses operations conducted by US forces providing for the security of American or foreign personnel, sites, facilities, and units. Implied tasks within this mission include those security measures required to deal with threats that have begun to actively target US interests. These are threats at the low end of the operational continuum: sabotage, hostage-taking, bombings, and attacks against individuals, groups, or businesses by terrorists or insurgents. Military police units can successfully perform this type of contingency operation, capitalizing on the low-threat signature they project.

While the organic capabilities of combat units might rate highly against the expected threat in protection scenarios, their use is often counterproductive. Circumstances in such cases usually require operating in a significantly force-restrictive environment against a predominantly covert threat. Maintaining low visibility would be difficult for combat forces. Further, insertion of combat units into this environment might be interpreted by the international community as an act of naked imperialism or aggression, extending well beyond the announced motives of protecting American personnel or facilities.

As the diagram suggests, selection of the most appropriate force becomes more difficult upon entering the transitional zone of the operational

continuum. Military police utility, though diminished here, may be considered adequate in light of overall national policy. Selection of military police might facilitate de-escalation to a protection mission. The lethality of the threat, however, and the threat's potential to increase in lethality must be closely monitored to ensure that military police capabilities are not overwhelmed and combat units are not introduced too late.

Missions involving *low-order combat operations* are those that counter forces threatening US personnel, sites, facilities, and units. The expected threats include those envisaged for the assistance and protection missions as well as operations by small enemy conventional and guerrilla units. Such threats thus include all previously discussed covert activities plus overt tactical operations against US targets by organized forces. Mission requirements for American security forces would now include active external screening and protection missions around critical targets, preemptive operations against threat strongholds and caches, and limited offensive operations. Combat forces are of course highly suited to these types of contingency operations.

While the desirability of military police as principal forces decreases as threat lethality increases, military police traditionally perform many critical tasks in support of forces engaged in combat operations. MP participation throughout all phases of contingency operations can relieve combat forces of tasks that detract from their primary mission. During the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, for example, difficulty in placing military police units on the ground early resulted in a shortage of personnel available to guard detainees. In one instance US troops handed rebel prisoners (Constitutionalists) over to Loyalist soldiers, who promptly shot them.⁵ General Bruce Palmer, Jr., who commanded US forces during the Dominican intervention, summed up his thoughts on the use of military police units as follows: "The military police



MPs search suspects during Operation Just Cause in Panama, December 1989.

were worth their weight in gold. Early in the intervention we found that a major weakness in the initial troop lists was a shortage of MP units, and we soon had to give them a priority on a par with combat units."⁶

Missions designated as *high-order combat operations* involve force-against-force actions where defeat of enemy combat forces per se is the immediate aim of US units. These operations are conducted when the United States has become decisively engaged, and the host-nation government may or may not be sympathetic to American interests. Consistent with American objectives, the function of our units is to close with and destroy opposing forces. Since this is the primary mission for which they were designed, combat forces are obviously best suited to perform operations occurring during this phase of the operational continuum. Here as always, however, military police units will have important collateral missions and must be included in the force package.

Military Police in Past Contingency Operations

We have already glanced at military police involvement during the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; a similar pattern has continued during the past decade. During Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983, military police were sent to Grenada as part of the initial deployment force. While operations by combat units were the focus during the mission's early phases, military police in their protection roles performed a variety of security missions, patrolled, and conducted detainee/internee processing.⁷ When combat operations terminated, the need remained for a force capable of helping host-nation law enforcement authorities regain their effectiveness. Military police were chosen to stay in Grenada and remained there long after the end of Urgent Fury.

Operation Golden Pheasant in Honduras in March 1988 illustrated how contingency missions can range rather widely along the operational continuum. Military police had been performing security and force protection operations in Honduras for some time, demonstrating a non-threatening but tangible US presence. When Nicaraguan Sandinistas crossed the Honduran border, the JCS initiated Golden Pheasant, ordering in combat units as a show of force.⁸ This action achieved the desired results and the Sandinistas withdrew. Combat forces were then redeployed as the military police resumed force protection operations, thus maintaining the desired US presence. These events demonstrated the dynamic interplay of military police and combat forces during contingency operations as the threat waxes and wanes and the US response is adjusted accordingly.

The unique capability of MPs to respond to civil disorders formed the basis for their deployment to St. Croix after the devastation of Hurricane Hugo in September 1989. The hurricane had traumatic effects on the National Guard, police, medical services, and other governmental agencies on the island. Riots and looting threatened the safety of residents, businesses, and property.⁹ A force



XVIII Airborne Corps

MPs proved again during Operation Just Cause that they are well-suited to fill a variety of roles in contingency operations.

was needed capable of imposing firm order on a civilian populace while observing stringent rules-of-engagement safeguards. As Colonel Summers observed:

Until recently, it would have indeed been the cavalry—that is, combat forces—pressed into riot-control duty. But this time the Army sent in more than 1000 combat support men and women especially organized trained and equipped for such duty. . . . These professionals soon had the situation well in hand.¹⁰

Military police were the force of choice for the St. Croix mission. They stopped the looting, reestablished law and order, and demonstrated their ability to work hand in hand with territorial and federal agencies and island residents.

Prior to Operation Just Cause in December 1989, military police had been rotating to Panama to provide security augmentation forces capable of protecting US interests in the area while projecting a nonthreatening political signature.¹¹ The critical need for restraint in the use of force and the necessity to work with Panamanian paramilitary police units made military police particularly appropriate. As Operation Just Cause kicked off and gained momentum, military police intensified site-security operations, performed detainee/internee processing missions, and provided ready-reaction forces.

When the situation de-escalated, military police assisted Panamanian law enforcement agencies in the reestablishment of discipline, law, and order and resumed their security-enhancement duties. A salient aspect of Operation Just Cause was noted by Bernard Adelsberger, writing in the *Army Times*: "The military intervention in Panama highlights the Pentagon's ability to select elements from a wide array of military units for specific missions."¹²

The force-selection process may be initiated at any point along the operational continuum and periodically reassessed and adjusted to accommodate changing international conditions and evolving national policy objectives. Force-mix adjustments by the CINCs and National Command Authorities can serve to escalate, de-escalate, or simply stabilize a situation to allow time for further assessment.

The Dominican Republic, Grenada, Honduras, St. Croix, and Panama have demonstrated the necessity of a guiding concept in the force-selection process—one that factors in the political imperatives and carefully correlates the type of military unit employed with the type of threat to be encountered and the type of military task to be performed. Analysis based upon such a guiding concept will show—perhaps surprisingly—that US interests are often best served not by the trumpeted forced entry of a US expeditionary force bristling with big guns and seconded by the full panoply of war—but rather by the unobtrusive introduction of constabulary soldiers trained to satisfy those basic needs of any society: law, order, security, and civil assistance.

NOTES

1. FM 100-20/AFM 2XY (Final Draft), *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington: Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, 4 August 1989), p. vi.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 605.

3. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Today's Cavalry to the Rescue," *Washington Times*, 28 September 1989, p. F4.

4. The operational continuum consists of three general states: peacetime competition, conflict, and war (JCS Test Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations* [Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1990], pp. 1-6, 7). The degree of force and violence involved generally increases as operations move from left to right along the continuum. The diagram shown here is adapted from a Force Selection Model prepared by the Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, Alabama.

5. Lawrence A. Yates, "Mounting an Intervention: The Dominican Republic, 1965," *Military Review*, 69 (March 1989), 58.

6. Bruce Palmer, Jr., *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1989), pp. 151-52.

7. Allen Gibbs and Allen Grammer, "Grenada Chronology of 82nd MPs," *Military Police Journal*, 11 (Spring 1984), 34-35.

8. Ned B. Ennis, "Exercise Golden Pheasant: A Show of Force," *Military Review*, 69 (March 1989), 20-26.


9. Dennis Hevesi, "Bush Dispatches Troops to Island In Storm's Wake: Looting and Violence Reported on St. Croix," *The New York Times*, 21 September 1989, p. A1.

10. Summers, p. F4.

11. 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) After-Action Report for Panama Security Augmentation, August 1988, p. 2.

12. Bernard J. Adelsberger, "The Army of the Future? Package of Forces Demonstrates Wide Variety of Abilities," *Army Times*, 1 January 1990, p. R3.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT



TO THE U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES A. HINES
COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL

TITLE

This briefing discusses the interface of the Military Police Corps with the U.S. National Military Strategy. Specifically, it addresses Military Police missions and operations that directly support the Foundations and Principles which underpin this strategy.

BRIEFING SEQUENCE

- U.S. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
- U.S. SECURITY & MILITARY STRATEGY
- MILITARY POLICE INTERFACE - FOUNDATIONS
- MILITARY POLICE INTERFACE - PRINCIPLES
- MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT - CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS & WARFIGHTING
- STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE MP CORPS
- SUMMARY

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

"WHAT DO WE WANT AS A NATION?"

- SURVIVAL OF THE UNITED STATES**
- A HEALTHY AND GROWING U.S. ECONOMY**
- COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER NATIONS**
- A STABLE AND SECURE WORLD**

**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES**

"HOW DO WE GET THERE?"

THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER...

- POLITICAL
- ECONOMIC
- DIPLOMATIC
- MILITARY

U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

FOUNDATIONS

- FORWARD PRESENCE
- CRISIS RESPONSE

PRINCIPLES

- READINESS
- STRATEGIC AGILITY
- POWER PROJECTION



FOUNDATIONS


FORWARD PRESENCE

- ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
- COMBATTING DRUGS

CRISIS RESPONSE

- RAPID RESPONSE
- VARIED DETERRENCE

FOUNDATION - FORWARD PRESENCE



ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

- PROVIDE SECURITY AUGMENTATION
- PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS
- NON-THREATENING POLITICAL SIGNATURE

FOUNDATION - FORWARD PRESENCE



SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- ASSIST NATION'S DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY FORCES
- INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE AGENCIES
- ASSIST AND PROTECT LOCAL POPULATION

FOUNDATION - FORWARD PRESENCE



PROTECTION OF CITIZENS

- ANTITERRORISM OPERATIONS
- COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
- INSTALLATION SECURITY
- PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND PERSONAL SECURITY


FOUNDATION - FORWARD PRESENCE

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE



- DEALING WITH PEOPLE DURING PERIODS OF STRESS AND CONFUSION
- IMPOSING FIRM ORDER ON CIVILIAN POPULACE
- OBSERVING STRINGENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

FOUNDATION - FORWARD PRESENCE



COMBATTING DRUGS

- BORDER SURVEILLANCE
- CUSTOMS AUGMENTATION
- MARIJUANA ERADICATION
- TRAINING CIVILIAN AGENCIES

FOUNDATION - CRISIS RESPONSE



RAPID RESPONSE

- ACCEPTABILITY AS A SECURITY FORCE
- DEPLOYABILITY, EXPANSIBILITY, VERSATILITY AND LETHALITY

FOUNDATION - CRISIS RESPONSE

VARIED DETERRENCE



- APPROPRIATE FORCE FOR LIC CONTINGENCIES
- SELECTED TO CONDUCT
 - SHOWS OF FORCE
 - NONCOMBATANT EVACUATIONS
 - RESCUE AND RECOVERY MISSIONS
 - PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS
 - DISASTER RELIEF
 - SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

PRINCIPLES

READINESS

- VERSATILE ORGANIZATION
- TRAINING FOR DEPLOYMENT
- IMMEDIATELY OPERATIONAL

STRATEGIC AGILITY

- CAPABLE FORCE
- WORLDWIDE EMPLOYMENT

POWER PROJECTION

- ENHANCED DETERRENCE
- REGIONAL STABILITY

PRINCIPLE - READINESS



VERSATILE ORGANIZATIONS

- MULTI-FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES ENHANCE THE MP CONTINGENCY ROLE
- ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO INITIAL ELEMENTS OF CONTINGENCY FORCE

PRINCIPLE - READINESS

TRAINING FOR DEPLOYMENT



- PREPARATION FOR FIRST DAY DEPLOYMENT
- MISSIONS ACROSS THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM
- INCREASED TEMPO AND GREATER DISTANCES
- IN-STRIDE REROUTING
- FORCE TRACKING

PRINCIPLE - READINESS

IMMEDIATELY OPERATIONAL



- AIRBORNE, AIR ASSAULT AND LIGHT INFANTRY CAPABILITIES SUPPORT FORCED ENTRY
- 100% DEPLOYABLE
- FULLY MOBILE
- EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES


PRINCIPLE - STRATEGIC AGILITY



CAPABLE FORCE

- UNIQUELY QUALIFIED FORCE
- FLEXIBLE - ASSIST AND PROTECT
- LETHAL - DEFEND AND DEFEAT

PRINCIPLE - STRATEGIC AGILITY



WORLDWIDE EMPLOYMENT

- NON-THREATENING BUT TANGIBLE U.S. PRESENCE
- RELIEVE COMBAT FORCES OF TASKS THAT DETRACT FROM PRIMARY MISSIONS

PRINCIPLE - POWER PROJECTION



ENHANCED DETERRENCE



- ABILITY TO SHOOT, MOVE AND COMMUNICATE MULTIPLIES COMMANDER'S COMBAT POWER
- DETECTION, WARNING AND DISPLACEMENT OPERATIONS PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY

PRINCIPLE - POWER PROJECTION




REGIONAL STABILITY

- DEPLOYMENT OPTION THAT CAN PREEMPT ESCALATION TO COMBAT
- REESTABLISH DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER
- POLICE IMAGE PROJECTS ACCEPTABLE LINK BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AND ITS POPULATION




HONDURAS

MILITARY POLICE CORPS



IRAQ/KUWAIT




PANAMA

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
AND
WARFIGHTING



ST. CROIX




HAWKEYE

MISSIONS

- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE

TASKS

- STOP RIOTING AND LOOTING
- REESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER
- PROTECTION OF CITIZENS, BUSINESSES AND PROPERTY




JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO

MISSION

- FORCE PROTECTION

TASKS

- SITE SECURITY
- ANTITERRORISM OPERATIONS
- AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS
- AIRBASE GROUND DEFENSE



JUST CAUSE

MISSIONS

- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- FORCE PROTECTION
- NATION ASSISTANCE

TASKS

- PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
- SITE SECURITY
- READY REACTION FORCE
- DETAINEE/INTERNEE OPERATIONS
- REESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER



DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM


MISSIONS

- FORCE PROTECTION
- SUPPORT TO WAR FIGHTING
- SUPPORT TO WAR TERMINATION
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE


TASKS

- PORT SECURITY
- MSR/CONVOY SECURITY
- AREA/SITE SECURITY
- EPW OPERATIONS
- ANTITERRORISM OPERATIONS
- RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS

STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE



GLOBAL AREAS OF INTEREST




MILITARY POLICE PARTICIPATION IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

80%




HAWKEYE

6%




DESERT STORM

3.2%




ARMY

14%




JUST CAUSE

43%



GTMO


MILITARY POLICE PROponent ACTIVITIES




TRAINING




DOCTRINE



MATERIEL ACQUISITION




FORCE MANAGEMENT





CONCEPTS & STUDIES

MILITARY POLICE CORPS



A STRATEGIC LINCHPIN
FOR AN EVOLVING
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY





FUNDS

FY 94 ANNUAL OPERATING FUNDS:

	\$ IN MILLIONS
TRADOC OPNS & MAINT ARMY (OMA)	53.5
TRADOC ARMY FAMILY HOUSING (AFH)	2.0
TRADOC RESERVE PERSONNEL ARMY (RPA)	.9
FORSKOM OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE (OMA)	.8
USARC OPNS & MAINT RESERVE (OMAR)	.1
HSC OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE (OMA)	16.9
MAJOR FACILITY MAINT (DOD RPM)	.4
OTHER DOD APPNS	.7
REIMBURSEMENT (OVER 100 CUSTOMERS)	8.9
PAY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (MPA)(EST)	95.0
FOOD/CLOTHING FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL	7.0
TOTAL	186.2
(CIVILIAN PAY PORTION OF TOTAL)	37.7

CURRENT MAJOR CONSTRUCTION

DECON APPARATUS TNG FAC	2.5
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT	4.3
GOLF COURSE CLUBHOUSE (NAF)	1.5
UPGRADE AMMO STORAGE FACILITY	1.8
GENERAL INSTRUCTION FACILITY, PELHAM	1.8
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP, PELHAM	1.0
FAMILY HOUSING REVITALIZATION (60 UNITS)	2.9
DEPENDENT SCHOOL ADDITION	2.6
COMMISSARY ALTER/ADD (DECA)	2.9
TOTAL	21.3

REAL PROPERTY & CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

LAND (ACQUISITION COST)	1.1
UTILITY SYSTEMS & LAND IMPROVEMENTS	36.2
BUILDINGS & STRUCTURES	205.6
TOTAL	242.9

PERMANENT ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY-30 SEP 94

TDA	1,693
TOE	434
ATTACHED	188
TOTAL	2,315

CIVILIANS AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES-30 SEP 94

APPROPRIATED FUNDS	1,168
NONAPPROPRIATED	590
CONTRACTOR	650
PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS	40
TOTAL	2,448

TRAINEES AND STUDENTS - FY 94

	ACTUAL TRAINED	AVG LOAD
MP OSUT	4,437	1,408
CML OSUT	1,574	603
MP STUDENTS	4,953	545
CML STUDENTS	2,384	357
RES/NG (IDT/ADT)	41,517	416
OTHER	5,865	202
TOTAL	60,730	3,531

OTHERS SUPPORTED - 30 SEP 94

MILITARY (SATELLITED)	866
MILITARY DEPENDENTS	3,671
RETIREEES & DEPENDENTS (EST)	70,675
CIVILIANS (SATELLITED)	751
TOTAL	75,963
TOTAL PEOPLE SERVED (EST)	84,000

LAND

	ACRES
CANTONMENT	2,831
MANEUVER & TRAINING AREA	36,735
RANGE & IMPACT AREA	6,113
TOTAL	45,679
(PELHAM RANGE)	22,245
MANEUVER RIGHTS - TALLADEGA NATIONAL FOREST	180,000

HOUSING

OFFICER FAMILY HOUSING	113
ENLISTED FAMILY HOUSING	458
BACHELOR OFFICER QUARTERS	366
ENLISTED BARRACKS SPACES	7,522
FORT MCCLELLAN LODGE ROOMS	50
TOTAL	8,509

UTILITY COSTS

	\$ IN THOUSANDS
ELEC (59,803 K KWH)	3,073.8
NAT GAS (472,373 M CU FT)	2,040.4
PROPANE FUEL (49,015 GAL)	28.4
FUEL OIL (90,883 GAL)	70.9
WATER (457,800 K GAL)	315.9
SEWAGE (396,667 K GAL)	68.9
TOTAL	5,598.3

FACILITIES

	SQ FT IN THOUSANDS
PERMANENT FACILITIES	5,880
TEMPORARY FACILITIES	786
TOTAL	6,666
NUMBER OF BUILDINGS	1,142

Document Separator

**RESOURCE CONSERVATION
AND RECOVERY ACT
HAZARDOUS WASTE PERMIT APPLICATION**
for
**THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL SYSTEM**

Submitted to

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
Montgomery, Alabama

by

ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT
Anniston, Alabama

JULY 1990

JUL 1990
RECEIVED
ECONOMY

-
- DDA RCRA Permit Application to Alabama Dept of Environmental Management
 - AAD Disaster Control Plan
 - Memoranda of Agreement ~~between~~ among AAD, Fort McClellan, and northeast Alabama Hospitals
 - Fort McClellan Chemical Response Plan
 - AAD + Fort McClellan Newspaper accounts of Disaster Drills

PREFACE

Title 14, Part B, Section 1412, of Public Law (P.L.) 99-145, as amended, (the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986) directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out the destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions.

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, currently stores a portion of the stockpile and proposes the construction and operation of a lethal chemical agent and munitions disposal facility within the installation. A hazardous waste management permit to dispose of the lethal chemical agents and munitions is required from the federal Environmental Protection Agency or states delegated with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) authority.

This document contains the RCRA Part A and Part B Applications for the facility. These applications address the facility's management (i.e., treatment and storage) of the lethal chemical agents and munitions and wastes generated. The applications address only that area of the installation pertinent to the lethal chemical agent disposal facility. A Part B Application for the rest of the installation has already been submitted.

This application was developed under United States Army Contract No. DAAA 15-89-D-0003, under the direction of the Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Questions regarding the content of this document should be directed in writing to:

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
ATTN: SAIL-PMM-E
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010-5401

This document consists of the following:

VOLUME I

Section A	RCRA PART A APPLICATION
Section B	FACILITY DESCRIPTION
B-1	General Description
B-2	Topographic Map
B-3	Location Information
B-4	Traffic Information
Section C	WASTE CHARACTERISTICS
C-1	Chemical and Physical Analyses
C-2	Waste Analysis Plan /
C-3	Waste Analysis Requirements Pertaining to Land Disposal Restrictions

VOLUME II

Section D	GENERAL PROCESS INFORMATION
D-1	Process Description
D-2	Detailed Demilitarization Process Description
D-3	Container Design
D-4	Tank Systems
D-5	Liquid Incinerator Design

VOLUME III

Section D	GENERAL PROCESS INFORMATION (cont.)
D-6	Metal Parts Furnace Incinerator Design
D-7	Deactivation Furnace System Design
D-8	Dunnage Incinerator Design

VOLUME IV

Section E	GROUNDWATER MONITORING
Section F	PROCEDURES TO PREVENT HAZARDS
F-1	Security
F-2	Inspection Schedule
F-3	Documentation of Preparedness and Prevention Requirements
F-4	Preventive Procedures, Structures, and Equipment
F-5	Prevention of Reaction of Ignitable, Reactive, and Incompatible Waste

VOLUME V

Section G	CONTINGENCY PLAN
G-1	General Information
G-2	Emergency Coordinators
G-3	Implementation
G-4	Emergency Response Procedures
G-5	Emergency Equipment
G-6	Coordination Agreements
G-7	Evacuation Plan
G-8	Required Reports
G-9	Installation Disaster Control Plan

VOLUME VI-A

Section G	CONTINGENCY PLAN (cont.)
	Attachments G-1 through G-6

VOLUME VI-B

Section G CONTINGENCY PLAN (cont.)
 Attachments G-7 and G-8

VOLUME VII

Section H PERSONNEL TRAINING
 H-1 Outline of Training Program
 H-2 Implementation of Training Program

Section I CLOSURE, POST-CLOSURE, AND FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS
 I-1 Closure Plan
 I-2 Post-Closure Plan
 I-3 Notices Required for Disposal Facilities
 I-4 Closure Cost Estimate
 I-5 Financial Assurance Mechanism for Closure
 I-6 Post-Closure Cost Estimate
 I-7 Financial Assurance Mechanism for Post-Closure
 I-8 Liability Requirements
 I-9 State Financial Mechanism

Section J OTHER FEDERAL LAWS

Section K CERTIFICATION

Section L INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLID WASTE
 MANAGEMENT UNITS

Section M CLOSURE EQUIVALENCY DETERMINATION

Contents pages for each separate volume are included at the beginning of that volume immediately following the Preface. The contents pages are followed by the Acronym and Abbreviations list. Contents pages for all other text volumes of this RCRA application are included after the Acronym list.

Volume VI-A
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

<u>Attachment</u>	<u>Title</u>
Preface	
Acronyms and Abbreviations	
G-1	DATA SHEETS AND DIAGRAMS FOR MUNITION TYPES
G-2	CHEMICAL EVENT RESPONSE AND ASSISTANCE PLAN
G-3	COORDINATION AGREEMENTS
G-4	INSTALLATION FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITIES
G-5	FEDERAL REGISTER, 3-15-88, VOL. 53, NO. 50, PAGES 8504-8507
G-6	AMCR 385-100, SAFETY MANUAL

Section G

CONTINGENCY PLAN [40 CFR 270.14(b)(7), 264.50 through 264.56;
AAC 14-8-.02(5)(b)7., 14-5-.04]

The information contained herein is submitted in accordance with the requirements for a Contingency Plan, as contained in 40 CFR Part 270.14(b)(7) and Part 264, Subpart D. The purpose of the Contingency Plan is to minimize hazards to human health or the environment from fires, explosions, or any unplanned sudden or nonsudden release of hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents associated with the demilitarization facility at Anniston Army Depot. The provisions of this Contingency Plan will be carried out immediately whenever there is a fire, explosion, or release of hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents that could threaten human health or the environment.

The specific responsibilities of key installation personnel for addressing emergency situations involving uncontrolled chemical agent release are described in the installation Chemical Event Response and Assistance Plan (Attachment G-2).

The Anniston Army Depot Commander and Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Director are responsible for distributing the Contingency Plan to include appropriate response personnel (both on and off the facility), appropriate regulatory personnel, and appropriate Major Command elements.

The facility Director is responsible for reviewing and updating the Contingency Plan. Changes will be distributed in the form of inserts to the plan to all individuals on the distribution list.

G-3 IMPLEMENTATION [40 CFR 264.52(a) and 264.56(d);
 AAC 14-5-.04(3)(a), 14-5-.04(7)(d)]

The procedures used at the facility in the event of an emergency are described in Section G-4. The method for communicating and detecting agents, the evacuation plan and self-help and first aid procedures are common for all emergencies, and are discussed in Section G-5. Detailed procedures for actions to be taken in the event of disruption of process equipment, agent emergencies, or detonation of explosives are provided in Section G-4. The installation Disaster Control Plan is discussed in Section G-9 and is included as Attachment G-2.

In case of fire or unplanned release to the environment, the Contingency Plan will be implemented. Implementation will consist of notifying the Chemical Security Officer/Staff Duty Officer. Further procedures are defined in the Chemical Event Response and Assistance Plan.

Disaster Control Plan -
Chemical Event Response Assistance
(DCP-CERA)

Anniston Army Depot



Tony Curdell - -
235-7577

Rec'd 12/11/90
~~12/11/90~~

SOSAN-CS

15 March 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Disaster Control Plan - Chemical Event Response and Assistance

1. This plan has been prepared in support of the DESCOM-DCP. It is published for the information, guidance, and necessary action of Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) activities.

2. This plan supersedes Annex C, (Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance Plan) to ANAD-DCP, 14 Nov 89. Recommendations concerning the content of this plan should be directed to the ANAD Chemical Surety Office (SDSAN-CS).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl
DCP-CERA


GEORGE R. ILIFF
Chief, Military Personnel Division

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1-1. PURPOSE:

a. This plan establishes required organization, policies, responsibilities, and procedures for response and assistance to chemical events (CE) at or near Anniston Army Depot.

b. This plan is applicable after the occurrence of a CE.

1-2. SCOPE: This annex applies to all ANAD organizations, tenant activities, attached activities, and visitors to the Depot.

1-3. PRIORITIES:

a. The first priority is saving lives and evacuating casualties.

b. Reducing or eliminating toxic chemical downwind hazard by contamination control.

c. Preventing further casualties.

d. Providing timely and accurate status reports on operation to EOC/FCP and higher headquarters.

e. Providing timely and accurate information to the media, the public, and their representatives. This is necessary especially when an off-depot hazard exists.

1-4. DEFINITIONS:

a. Chemical Event (CE). A CE is either a Level I, Level II, or Level III emergency. See q., r., and s. below.

b. Chemical Event Site: The geographical location of a CE.

c. Assistance Field Command Post Officer (AFCPO): The individual appointed by the Commander to supervise operations at the CE site.

d. Augmentation Force (AF): Additional military personnel (or units), other than those assigned to a specific security or reserve force, trained and capable of augmenting the security and response forces as required.

e. CE Reaction Forces: All personnel who are required to take action under this plan when notified of a CE.

f. Chemical Event Response and Assistance (CERA): Those actions taken to save life, preserve health and safety, secure chemical surety materiel, protect property, and provide for the controlled release of information during a CE.

g. Operations Officer (OPNSO): The individual designated by the Commander to control all emergency teams and supervise operations at the CE site.

h. Chemical Agent: A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate man through its chemical properties. Riot control agents, chemical herbicides, and smoke and flame materials are excluded.

i. Chemical Surety: Those controls, procedures, and actions which contribute to the safety, security, and reliability of chemical agents and their associated weapons systems throughout their life cycle, including binary munitions and their critical components, without degrading operational performance.

j. Chemical Surety Materiel: All lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and their related weapons systems, or storage and shipping containers, that are either adopted or being considered for military use. Smoke, flame and incendiaries, defoliants, and riot control agents are excluded.

k. Emergency Operations Center (EOC): An organization directed by the OPNSO which will be started to assist the Depot Commander in controlling an emergency at ANAO when a CE or other emergency situation occurs.

l. Hotline: A designated line on the ground, upwind from a CE site, used to control entry to and exit from the CE site to prevent spread of contamination.

m. "MINIMIZE:" It is now mandatory that normal message and/or telephone traffic; i.e., traffic other than related to the emergency, must be reduced drastically in order that vital messages connected with the situation at hand shall not be delayed.

n. Service Response Force Commander (SRFC): A general officer, designated by the responsible major Army Commander, who is normally dispatched to the scene of a CE and assumes responsibility for all operations at the event site.

o. Field Command Post (FCP): A command and control center normally located near the hotline.

p. Field Command Post Officer (FCPO): The individual appointed by the Commander to supervise CERA operations at the FCP.

q. Level I Emergency: Limited Area Emergency: This level will be declared when the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage distance does not extend beyond the chemical limited area (CLA) where the CE occurred.

r. Level II Emergency: Post Only Emergency: This level will be declared when the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage distance extends beyond the CLA, but does not extend beyond the installation boundary.

s. Level III Emergency: Community Emergency: This level will be declared when the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage distance extends beyond the installation boundary.

t. "REDLEG:" Code word used in conjunction with a CE occurring on the Depot. It should not be utilized by personnel from off-depot who may be requesting CERA assistance.

1-5. GENERAL:

a. This Plan will be implemented by the Directorate for Law Enforcement and Security whenever a CE is reported to them. If it is later determined that the situation reported did not require implementation of this Plan, the FCPO or the OPNSO may terminate the implementation of the Plan.

b. CERA exercises, using checklists prepared by Depot elements, will be conducted at least quarterly, to verify the Depot's ability to react to a CE.

c. Changes, additions, and deletions to this CERAP will be coordinated through the Chemical Surety Officer (CSO).

d. Disaster Control Plan - Chemical Event Response and Assistance (DCP-CERA) responsibilities will be included in the Staff Duty Officer/NCO instructions.

1-6. OBJECTIVES: To assure the capability of ANAD to respond rapidly and effectively to any CE.

1-7. POLICIES:

a. Responsible elements will automatically initiate this Plan by calling the Security Desk Operations Officer without further instruction when a CE occurs on Depot.

b. Participants in this Plan are authorized to take immediate, necessary actions to respond to actual emergencies that may occur during rehearsal or testing of this Plan.

c. Ammunition and/or Surveillance supervisors in charge of chemical operations at the time a CE occurs are responsible for all operations at the CE site until the AFCPO arrives.

d. Any individual having knowledge of an abnormal or unusual situation involving chemical surety materiel stored at ANAD or in any way under the cognizance of ANAD will notify the CSO immediately.

e. As a precaution, all personnel working in the CLA, when notified of a CE, will exit through the designated hotline. The supervisor of the crew will take precautions to ensure their route to the hotline will not take them through the contamination. If contamination is unavoidable, the supervisor will ensure the route to the hotline minimizes the crews exposure.

f. Upon implementation of this Plan, personnel and equipment resources required to react to a CE will have priority over all other operational requirements.

g. All personnel working in the CLA at the time of a CE or emergency time members responding to a CE will donate blood samples for cholinesterase (CHE) testing prior to leaving the Depot after a CE involving nerve agent.

h. Team chiefs will coordinate leave requests with duty supervisors to ensure team functions can be implemented at all times.

i. When contamination extends beyond boundaries, CERA will be expanded to off-depot areas as required.

j. Assistance for off-depot CEs:

(1) Depot CE reaction forces are not responsible for responding to CEs involving non-military commercial chemicals in the possession of, or controlled by, civilians, commercial concerns, or civil authorities. In the interest of public safety, military assistance may be given civil authorities. The Commander is authorized to render such assistance to prevent injury or death. Further military assistance would require a request from a Federal Agency and that Federal Agency would have to certify that they have funds available to reimburse the military. Upon completion of the operation, a Standard Form 1080 (Voucher for Transfer Between Appropriations, and/or Funds) would be submitted by the Finance and Accounting Division to the requesting Federal Agency for reimbursement of costs.

(2) ANAD CE Reaction Forces will not be dispatched off-depot unless authorized by the Depot Commander or in his absence the Acting Depot Commander.

(3) In CONUS, non-military chemical spills are handled by the responsible party with reporting to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Coast Guard through the National Response Center (NRC). For assistance beyond the initial protection of the public, civil authorities should be referred to the NRC (800-424-8902), which is operated jointly by the EPA and Coast Guard. The NRC has a DOD representative, who can coordinate any further military assistance. The Army Operations Center (DSN/AUTOVON 225-0441) will be notified, through FORSCOM (DSN/AUTOVON 588-0162/0170), of the request for assistance from the civil authorities.

k. All off-depot non-official queries, including media inquiries, received by persons other than PAO, concerning a CE will be answered as follows: "I have no comment. You may reach the Public Affairs Officer at 235-6281."

l. All requests (to higher headquarters and other sources) for assistance during a CE situation will be routed through the EOC.

m. All information disseminated to or received from off-depot sources (to include local authorities) will be coordinated with the PAO (6281).

n. During CERA operations, requests for tracing of telephone calls or monitoring of telephone conversations will be processed IAW Army regulations.

o. If EOD support is deemed necessary by the AFCPO, and if this support is available within normal response time, no actions (except for evacuation of casualties and decontamination efforts) will be taken at a CE site until EOD has certified the CE site is free of any explosive hazards. All other observations and/or actions will be done from a safe distance. If EOD support is not readily available, the OPNSO will determine what actions to take based on information furnished by AFCPO for the CE site. Public Law restrictions do not prevent the transport and chemical neutralization of lethal material when health or safety of any person is endangered. Normally, immediate disposal should not be necessary.

1-8. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. ANAD is responsible for the immediate control of any CE which may occur on the Depot.

b. Team chiefs are responsible for planning/providing team training, and developing equipment checks/procedures that ensure that their team can effectively implement their assigned portion of this plan and maintain their equipment in proper working order.

c. It is mandatory that each individual involved in the handling of chemical agents be familiar with the provisions of this Plan since immediate reaction is required to minimize the hazards of a CE. Failure of any person to accomplish his assigned function may jeopardize the accomplishment of the Plan and result in serious injury or death to himself or another person.

d. DIRECTORATE FOR AMMUNITION OPERATIONS (DAO) is responsible for:

(1) Executing notification as required in Chapter 3 of this Plan.

(2) Dispatching ambulances and drivers under the control of FCPO to hotline when notified of CE. (Does not include any ambulance already committed to CE support.)

(3) Dispatching eight radio equipped (Ammunition Net) vehicles to Bldg 78 upon notification of CE.

(4) Dispatching Decontamination Teams 1, 63, and 64 to team assembly point when CE occurs unless already involved in CE.

(5) Taking measures to account for Ammunition Operations Division (AUD) personnel who may be working downwind from CE site. Report such personnel to EOC for disposition.

(6) Dispatching one 2-1/2-ton truck with radio on Ammo Net to Bldg 78 for Chemical Defense Team (CDT) and one 5-ton truck to Bldg 78 (CDT Supply Truck). Dispatching two radio equipped bob tails to Bldg 78 to pick up FCP and CDT.

e. CHIEF, AMMUNITION SURVEILLANCE DIVISION (ASD), DPA is responsible for:

- (1) Executing notification as outlined in Chapter 3.
- (2) Dispatching ASD Patient Transfer Vehicle (PTY) driver to hotline, or to the FCP to support CE operations unless already involved in CE.
- (3) Dispatching Decontamination Team 65 to assembly point when CE occurs unless already involved in CE.
- (4) Dispatching eight vehicles, (two with Ammo Net frequency) to Bldg 78 when notified of CE.
- (5) Taking measures to account for ASD personnel who may be working downwind from CE site. Reporting personnel to EOC for disposition.

f. CHIEF, DEPOT EQUIPMENT DIVISION (DED), DEL is responsible for:

- (1) Providing mobile light plants for CERA operations conducted during the hours of darkness.
- (2) Assuring that all vehicles and equipment designated for CERA use are provided priority maintenance service.
- (3) Standby to dispatch additional vehicles and equipment when tasked by the OPNSO.

g. CHIEF, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT DIVISION, (EMD) DEL is responsible for:

- (1) Hazardous pollution substance control IAW Annex G ANAD-DGP.
- (2) Oil spills IAW Annex G ANAD-DGP.

h. CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION, (MPD) DPCA is responsible for:

- (1) Ensuring that SDO/SONCO is advised that in case of a CE the door key to the EOC is located in Radio Room of the Directorate for Law Enforcement and Security (DLES).
- (2) Controlling visitors in conjunction with Protocol during a CE.
- (3) Providing logistical support to visitors.

i. Directors are responsible for:

- (1) Planning and preparing for evacuation of directorate personnel upon order of EOC as specified in Chapter 5.
- (2) Ensuring that notification plans for CERA Teams assigned to their directorate are adequate and workable.
- (3) Ensuring that CERA Teams assigned to their directorates report to their duty stations, as required.

(4) Releasing personnel assigned to CERA Teams and supporting functions when required to perform their assigned functions, including any required training needed to develop skills or maintain proficiency.

(5) Ensuring that assigned teams, as specified below, are adequately supplied and equipped to carry out their mission and functions as established in this Annex. This will include providing property book/hand receipt support for all supplies and equipment not available through normal mission stocks.

RESPONSIBLE DIRECTOR

ASSIGNED TEAMS

DLES	Security
CSO	EOC
DAO	FCP
DEL	Fire & Rescue
DEL	Acft Opn 8r
DAO	AFCPO
DAO	CDT
DAO	Survey
DAO	Decon Tms (Ammo Div)
DPA	Decon Tms (Surv1 Div)
DAO	Medical Tms (Ammo Div)
DPA	Medical Tm (Surv1 Div)
DOIM	Computer Support
DOIM	Radio/Telephone Support

j. Specific responsibilities for the accomplishment of this Plan are outlined by chapter and listed by team in the Index.

1-9. TENANT ACTIVITIES: The following activities are tenant at ANAD: Health Clinic, DOIM-Administrative Branch, Electronics Liaison Office (ELO), Defense Reutilization & Marketing Office (DRMO), Interstate United, Post Restaurant Concessionaire, and Rockwell International Missile System. In case of a CE, the Health Clinic will be notified by DLES on Conference Call 1 and will receive evacuation instructions from the EOC, if required. Rockwell will be notified by a Conference Call 4. DOIM-Administrative Branch, the DRMO will be notified by DEL and will be included in DEL evacuation plans. The ELO will be notified by DSP and will be included in DSP evacuation plans. Frequent visitors to the ammunition limited area are vendors, pulpwood cutters, and maintenance contractors. The destination of these personnel will be maintained by Coosa Gate and effect notification and evacuation of personnel by the most expeditious means. These notification methods include, but are not limited to, radio, telephone, messenger, and vehicle or helicopter mounted PA system.

CHAPTER 16

Request for Assistance and Off-Depot Coordination

16-1. Requests addressed to higher headquarters, civilian agencies, and other installations for assistance to control a CE situation will be routed through the EOC. This will prevent duplicating the requests and ensure that personnel dispatched to the Depot to render assistance are:

- a. Properly cleared.
- b. Granted access to the emergency site.
- c. In possession of required protective equipment and other equipment and supplies to accomplish their mission.
- d. Provided transportation to the site (if required).

16-2. Depot officials responsible for particular technical areas may contact an approved source to request assistance when authorized by the OPNSO.

16-3. Both Fort McClellan, AL and the Augmentation Force have the mission to support ANAD during a CE situation.

a. Fort McClellan has the responsibility to provide functional teams, trained and equipped to render support to ANAD in a timely manner. Notification procedures and teams are listed in para 16-10. A SOP will be maintained and agreed upon by both Commanders.

b. The Augmentation Force identified in the CSO safe supports ANAD. Notification procedure is listed in para 15-8.

16-4. To enable these reaction elements to respond quickly, an alert notification will be telephoned to both Fort McClellan and Augmentation Force as outlined in paras 16-10 and 16-13. The more prior notice that can be afforded both organizations the faster their response capability can be.

16-5. Upon approval of Depot Commander, requests to civilian agencies for assistance may be made by PAO by contacting organizations listed in Tab B to this Appendix.

16-6. The following specific types of assistance can be obtained from AMC or other military sources, if not available from Fort McClellan or the Augmentation Force as indicated below:

a. The Surgeon General's chemical medical consultant can be provided to ANAD by contacting Commander, AMC, ATTN: AMSDS-SU. This person should not be requested until coordination is made with MEDDAC, Fort McClellan (which renders primary chemical medical support to the Depot), and approved by the Depot Commander.

b. Decontaminates, in addition to depot stocks, can be obtained in a CE situation as outlined in para 16-12.

c. USATEU personnel can be obtained from Commander, Edgewood Arsenal, ATTN: CDR, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, Edgewood Area, APG, MD 21010. Routine requests must meet guideline in AR 740-32. Emergency requests are to be made by most expeditious means followed by confirmation in writing.

16-7. The CSO will maintain regular and direct liaison with local civil authorities to ensure that they are fully informed on the Chemical Surety Program and prepared to respond should a CE situation require their support or endanger off-depot civilian areas. As a minimum, liaison and coordination will be maintained with Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency and Alabama State Troopers through Commander Jacksonville Post.

16-8. Emergency requests for PEMA items such as protective masks can be obtained through AMCCOM, Surety Office (309) 782-6609, non-duty hours DSN/AUTOVON 793-1110, ask operator for Staff Duty Officer. Items can be requisitioned telephonically using O2 priority. Items for normal operations will NOT be requisitioned using this procedures.

16-9. Request for SRF will be made directly to DESCOM Plans and Operations Division/Emergency Operations Center, only.

16-10. Assistance - Fort McClellan

a. Request for assistance addressed to Fort McClellan from ANAD during all hours can be obtained by contacting Plans and Operations Office.

(1) Primary - telephone - 848-3116/4835/4773

(2) Alternate - Tactical Radio, EOC (frequency 36.05 MHZ).

b. Requests for assistance to Fort McClellan sources after duty hours will be made by contacting Fort McClellan Staff Duty Officer.

Telephone - 848-3821/3822

c. Request for assistance from the 902 Military Intelligence Group, Fort McClellan, during duty hours can be obtained by contacting the Special Agent in Charge at 848-3415. After duty hours contact through Fort McClellan Staff Duty Officer.

d. CE support teams available from Fort McClellan:

(1) EOD Team. (NOTE: EOD response may be requested directly from the EOD Det as follows: duty hours - 848-5124/5430; non-duty hours - 848-1477. Ask for EOD stand by.)

(2) Decon Team.

(3) Medical Assistance Team.

(4) Security Control Team (Platoon size).

(5) Communications Support Team (wire and radio).

- (6) Rescue Squad, Tigt.
- (7) Public Affairs Officer.
- (8) OPNSO.

16-11. Assistance - Civilian Sources

a. Requests to civilian sources for assistance will be made only when sufficient assistance is not available from Fort McClellan.

b. Approval of the Depot Commander is required prior to any requests to civilian sources or notification to civilian sources of CE at ANAD.

c. Listed below are civilian agencies and telephone numbers of those agencies which may be contacted by the EOC for additional support in the event of an emergency. Other agencies, not listed below, may be contacted when authorized by the Depot Commander.

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>TELEPHONE</u>
Alabama State Emergency Management Agency	(205)242-3519/4378 B'ham
Alabama State Trooper - Jacksonville	435-3521
Anniston City Police	238-1800
American Red Cross	236-0391/831-0265
Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency	237-7023/0982
Calhoun County Sheriff	236-6395
Ambulance Service and Rescue Squad	237-8572
Anniston Fire Department	236-3541
NE AL Regional Medical Center	235-5121
Stringfellow Memorial Hospital	235-8957
Talladega County Emergency Management Agency	761-2125
WANA (Radio Station)	237-1627
WDNG (Radio Station)	236-8291/238-1450
WHMA (Radio Station)	237-8741/4716
WJSU (TV Station)	237-8651/236-4040
FBI	237-0311/(205)252-7705 B'ham

d. Assistance furnished by civilian agencies listed above will be used as a back-up force for depot personnel participating in a CE. These agencies will not be granted access to, or contact with, chemical surety materiel.

16-12. Additional Decontaminantes

a. Request for additional decontaminantes not available at ANAD will be made to Plans and Operations Office, Fort McClellan, as a primary source.

b. If Fort McClellan cannot provide requested decontaminantes, telephonic requisitions will be made as indicated below using O2 issue priority designator. (This procedure will NOT be used to obtain decontaminantes for routine operations.)

c. Chemical decontaminantes:

<u>NSN</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>RQN SOURCE</u>
6810-00-233-1715	Sodium Carbonate, 8ag 100 lb. drum	DGSC, Richmond
6810-00-174-6581	Sodium Hydroxide, 100 lb. drum	DGSC, Richmond
6810-00-255-0472	HTH-HTB, 100 lb. drum	DGSC, Richmond
6850-00-297-6653	STB, 50 lb. drum	DGSC, Richmond
6850-00-656-0926	Antisetting Compound, M2 1/2 lb. can	DGSC, Richmond
6850-00-950-6489	Silicon, Antifoam Agent	DGSC, Richmond

d. Telephone numbers and contact points at supply sources are:

- (1) Defense General Supply Center, Richmond
Emergency Supply Operations Center (ESOC)
duty and non-duty hours: DSN/AV 695-3881 or (804) 275-3881
- (2) AMCCOM, AMSMC-MMN-C
duty hours - DSN/AV 793-4285/5757 or (309) 794-4285/5757
non-duty hours - DSN/AV 793-1110, ask for Staff Duty Officer

e. Household bleach, 1 gal bottle, 6810-00-598-7316, is a local purchase item and is no longer stocked by DGSC, Richmond.

16-13. Augmentation Force

a. Request for Augmentation Force (AF) assistance can be obtained by submitting request directly to the AF. POC is the same as for initial alert notification outlined in para 15-8.

b. Telephonic notification will also be made to HQAMC, ATTN: AMC-PE-S, during duty hours (DSN/AV 284-9565) or AMC Staff Duty Officer during non-duty hours (DSN/AV 284-9223).

c. Stand-by notification will be made whenever intelligence reports or chemical agent operations warrant it. This will increase the AF's response capability and significantly reduce their response time. This notification will include nature of threat or potential hazard, time frame, and any special requirements.

16-14. Explosive Ordnance Detachment

a. MISSION:

(1) For a CE the EOD Detachment can be expected to provide support.

(2) The EOD Detachment provides render safe procedures in case of a CE.

b. NOTIFICATION: EOD Detachment will be notified as specified in Chapter 3.

c. COMMAND: Upon entry to Anniston Army Depot the EOD Team will be under the control of the OPNSO.

d. SIGNAL:

(1) Primary - By EOD radio net frequency 49.70

(2) Secondary - By telephone or messenger.

e. EXECUTION:

(1) The EOD team will report to ANAD during a CE as directed by the ANAD ECC.

(2) Be prepared to accomplish EOD related tasks in removing explosive hazards.

(3) The on site operations will be conducted according to the appropriate EOD SOPs.

(4) The equipment and organization of EOD teams is determined by the detachment leader but will include Level A protective equipment.

Attachment G-3
COORDINATION AGREEMENTS

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

HSXQ-PA

24 October 1988

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This Memorandum of Understanding by and between Anniston Army Depot and U.S. Army Medical Department Activity, Fort McClellan, Alabama, 36205-5083, shall be effective when signed by both parties.

PURPOSES

This agreement shall be considered as supplemental to all regulations, laws, and directives published by competent authorities, and subject to the terms of such regulations and laws. This Memorandum of Understanding shall constitute a mutual understanding between the parties as to methods and procedures to be undertaken in the medical support of Anniston Army Depot.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. U.S. Army MEDDAC (Dear Health Clinic), Fort McClellan, AL will:

a. Program resources to ensure provision of occupational health services required by AR 40-5.

b. Occupational illness or injury. An employee sustaining an illness or disease caused by employment will be furnished necessary care and treatment as follows:

(1) Emergency diagnosis and initial treatment of injury or illness sustained in performance of official duties is authorized as a part of occupational health services provided for civilian employees.

(2) Patients requiring treatment beyond initial or emergency measures will receive care from an Office of Federal Employees Compensation (CFEC) authorized source. If adequate health service personnel and facilities are available, the employee may be treated at an Army medical facility in accordance with AR 40-3. CFEC beneficiaries who require treatment beyond the capability of the medical facility will be referred to a nearby United States Government facility with this capability. The worker may make an initial physician selection of his choice for necessary care, even if convenient Government medical facilities are available.

c. Nonoccupational injury and illness. Definitive diagnosis and treatment of nonoccupational injury and illness cases are not responsibilities of an occupational health service program except:

(1) Illnesses and disorders that are not job related will be treated if on emergency basis. In all other cases, employees will be advised to visit their private physician.

(2) Standing orders. Written medical orders for emergency care and treatment of occupational and nonoccupational illness and injuries will be prepared and signed by the responsible physician to assure proper handling of emergencies by the health service staff in the absence of or prior to the arrival of a physician.

d. Maintain an inventory of chemical, biological, radiological and physical hazards in the work environment of all ANAD activities.

e. Maintain job-related medical surveillance.

f. Perform medical examinations in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements.

g. Support the Hearing Conservation Program by fitting earplugs, counseling employees, and administering audiograms as required.

h. Support the Occupational Vision Program as required.

i. Administer job-related immunizations and chemoprophylaxis.

j. Perform epidemiologic investigations of occupational illness and injury.

k. Maintain occupational health medical and administrative records and reports.

l. Perform industrial hygiene surveys and safety and health inspections.

m. Work closely and coordinate with the ANAD Safety Director to ensure compliance with the health aspects of OSHA.

n. Schedule appointments in coordination with depot and medical requirements. Appointments will be scheduled to maximize clinic personnel and minimize employee waiting time.

o. Make recommendations to the installation commander regarding the health and welfare of the installation populace.

p. Administer the Pregnancy Surveillance Program.

q. Request appropriate outside evaluation/consultation in an effort to improve ongoing health service related programs.

r. Actively participate in MEDDAC Peer Review and Quality Assurance Programs.

2. Anniston Army Depot will:

a. Identify personnel in positions requiring specific standards of physical fitness and job-related medical surveillance.


b. Ensure that scheduled personnel for the indicated preassignment, periodic, termination examinations, and any necessary return visits meet their appointments.

c. Ensure that employees who report for treatment as the result of an occupational disease/injury have in their possession a properly completed:


(1) CA-16, Request for Examination and/or Treatment for Occupational Diagnosis/Disease, for appropriated funds personnel, or

(2) LS-1, Request for Examination and/or Treatment for Occupational Diagnosis/Disease, for appropriated funds personnel, or

d. Utilize all means available, in conjunction with the Medical Program's goals, to ensure a safe and healthful working environment for their employees and assigned personnel.



ROGER V. CADCOL
Colonel, Medical Corps
Commanding



HENRY F. SOBIESKI
Colonel, Ordnance Corps
Commanding

10 Nov 88
DATE

7 Nov 87
DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW

George R. Hegstrum

GEORGE R. HEGSTRUM
Colonel, Medical Corps
Commanding

Date: 16 Dec 89

James W. Whitley

JAMES W. WHITLEY
Colonel, Medical Corps
Commanding

Date: 10 Jan 90

GEORGE R. HEGSTROM, JR, M.D.
Colonel, Medical Corps
Commander, Noble Army Community Hospital

DATE: _____

JOHNNY W. TREN
Captain, Anniston Emergency
Rescue Squad

DATE: _____

MYRA KILGORE
President, Jacksonville Emergency
Ambulance Service

DATE: _____

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN THE

US ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY, FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA

AND THE

NORTHEAST ALABAMA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, ANNISTON, ALABAMA

1. Purpose: The purpose of this memorandum is to express provisions of agreement between the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center concerning the care and treatment of disaster victims resulting from a chemical related accident.

2. Reference: The basic requirement for this memorandum is contained in HQ HSC message, 301840Z September 1980, subject: Medical Support for Chemical Operations.

3. Responsibilities:

a. Commander, U.S. Army MEDDAC, Fort McClellan will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notification of local law enforcement agencies or emergency ambulance routes.

(2) Notification of Alabama State Health Department, City and County Health Departments, and the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center.

(3) Notification of all United States government agencies and/or activities required.

(4) Notification of Post Public Affairs for proper coordination with all news media and control of news releases.

(5) If the accident/incident occurs off post, assist in the medical evacuation and treatment by providing medications and personnel as needed within capability.

b. Director (Chief of Staff), Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Upon notification by MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, or Chief Physician, Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), that assistance is needed, notify hospital staff and prepare to receive casualties.

(2) Ensure actions are coordinated with MEDDAC, Fort McClellan or ANAD, as necessary.

(3) Requests for MEDDAC support will be coordinated with Cdr, MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, during normal duty hours (0730-1600 hours, Monday thru Friday), Telephone No. 238-2200, or with the Staff Duty Officer during non-duty hours and weekends/holidays, Telephone No. 238-2152/2345.

c. Chief Physician, ANAD Occupational Health Clinic, will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notify Cdr, MEDDAC Fort McClellan, immediately of an accident/incident requiring possible back-up support requirements, to include the what, when, where, how and number of casualties (if available) resulting from the accident/incident.

(2) Refer/transfer casualties to MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, unless otherwise instructed or directed by Cdr, MEDDAC, Fort McClellan.

4. Concept of Operations:

a. It is recognized that the increased prevalence of chemical agents used for commercial, industrial and military purposes poses the potential threat of a serious chemical accident to residents of the Anniston area. The U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center agree in principle that a comprehensive area-wide Disaster Plan should contain provisions for the care and treatment of victims resulting from a chemical related accident. It is, therefore, the expressed intent of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center to work with other local emergency medical providers and planning agencies in the event of a chemical accident.

b. The Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center stands ready to receive and treat any military or civilian victim of a chemical accident on a 24-hour, 7-day a week basis. The Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center agrees to provide appropriate and necessary treatment and testing (including Cholinesterase testing) of patients upon their arrival and continued stay at the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center. The medical records of all military and Department of the Army civilian personnel treated for chemical exposure at the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center will be made available to the U.S. Army Medical Department upon receipt of a formal written request from the military physician responsible for each patients' care.


c. Decontamination of patients, attendants, equipment and vehicles will be the responsibility of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity or other trained personnel provided by the U.S. Army. A military physician will certify patients are properly decontaminated prior to transportation to the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center.


d. Patients will be transported to the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center in Government provided ambulances where practical and in appropriately equipped civilian emergency medical vehicles when the patient load exceeds the capacity of Government-owned vehicles. Transportation of patients will be coordinated under separate memorandas of agreement with the local Emergency Medical Services.

e. It should be recognized that doctors, nurses and other emergency medical personnel must have access to educational programs and workshops which provide instruction as to the proper handling and treatment of patients suffering from chemical poisoning. It is understood that the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity will provide and coordinate such training for appropriate emergency medical care providers. The Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center agrees to assist in promoting and coordinating these programs for civilian medical care providers. Participation of civilian medical care providers in the training program will be voluntary and with no reimbursement from the Government.

f. The Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center must have prepositioned 2 PAM Chloride, Atropine, and IV solutions in sufficient quantities to treat a minimum of four patients at all times.

5. Coordination: This memorandum will be in effect for the period of 1 March 1987 through 28 February 1991 and will be reviewed annually by both parties. Either party may cancel the memorandum upon 30 days prior written notice.


Mr. Allen Fletcher
President
Northeast Alabama Regional
Medical Center


ROGER V. CADOL
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department Activity
Commanding

4/3/87
DATE

4/13/87
DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW

Allen Fletcher

ALLEN FLETCHER
Chief Executive Officer
Northeast Alabama Regional
Medical Center

11/7/88

DATE

Roger V. Cadol

ROGER V. CADOL
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Activity
Commanding

3 Nov 88

DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW

Allen Fletcher
ALLEN FLETCHER
Chief Executive Officer
Northeast Alabama Regional
Medical Center

12/11/89
DATE

George R. Hegstrom, Jr. mo
GEORGE R. HEGSTROM, JR., M.D.
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Activity
Commanding

7 Dec 89
DATE

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN THE

US ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY, FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA

AND THE

HOLY NAME OF JESUS HOSPITAL, GADSDEN, ALABAMA

1. Purpose: The purpose of this memorandum is to express provisions of agreement between the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital concerning the care and treatment of disaster victims resulting from a chemical related accident.

2. Reference: The basic requirement for this memorandum is contained in HQ HSC message, 301840Z September 1980, subject: Medical Support for Chemical Operations.

3. Responsibilities:

a. Commander, U.S. Army MEDDAC, Fort McClellan will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notification of local law enforcement agencies of emergency ambulance routes.

(2) Notification of Alabama State Health Department, City and County Health Departments, and the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital.

(3) Notification of all United States government agencies and/or activities required.

(4) Notification of Post Public Affairs for proper coordination with all news media and control of news releases.

(5) If the accident incident occurs off post, assist in the medical evacuation and treatment by providing medications and personnel as needed within capability.

b. Director (Chief of Staff), Holy Name of Jesus Hospital will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Upon notification by MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, or Chief Physician, Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), that assistance is needed, notify hospital staff and prepare to receive casualties.

(2) Ensure actions are coordinated with MEDDAC, Fort McClellan or ANAD, as necessary.

(3) Requests for MEDDAC support will be coordinated with Cdr. MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, during normal duty hours (0730-1600 hours, Monday thru Friday), Telephone No. 238-2200, or with the Staff Duty Officer during non-duty hours and weekends/holidays, Telephone No. 236-2152/2345.

c. Chief Physician, ANAD Occupational Health Clinic, will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notify Cdr. MEDDAC Fort McClellan, immediately of an accident/incident requiring possible back-up support requirements, to include the what, when, where, how and number of casualties (if available) resulting from the accident/incident.

(2) Refer/transfer casualties to MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, unless otherwise instructed or directed by Cdr. MEDDAC, Fort McClellan.

4. Concept of Operations:

a. It is recognized that the increased prevalence of chemical agents used for commercial, industrial and military purposes poses the potential threat of a serious chemical accident to residents of the Annapolis area. The U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital agree in principle that a comprehensive area-wide Disaster Plan should contain provisions for the care and treatment of victims resulting from a chemical related accident. It is, therefore, the expressed intent of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital to work with other local emergency medical providers and planning agencies in the event of a chemical accident.

b. The Holy Name of Jesus Hospital stands ready to receive and treat any military or civilian victim of a chemical accident on a 24-hour, 7-day a week basis. The Holy Name of Jesus Hospital agrees to provide appropriate and necessary treatment and testing (including Cholinesterase testing) of patients upon their arrival and continued stay at the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital. The medical records of all military and Department of the Army civilian personnel treated for chemical exposure at the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital will be made available to the U.S. Army Medical Department upon receipt of a formal written request from the military physician responsible for each patients' care.


c. Decontamination of patients, attendants, equipment and vehicles will be the responsibility of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity or other trained personnel provided by the U.S. Army. A military physician will certify patients are properly decontaminated prior to transportation to the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital.

d. Patients will be transported to the Holy Name of Jesus Hospital in Government provided ambulances where practical and in appropriately equipped civilian emergency medical vehicles when the patient load exceeds the capacity of Government-owned vehicles. Transportation of patients will be coordinated under separate memorandums of agreement with the local Emergency Medical Services.

e. It should be recognized that doctors, nurses and other emergency medical personnel must have access to educational programs and workshops which provide instruction as to the proper handling and treatment of patients suffering from chemical poisoning. It is understood that the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity will provide and coordinate such training for appropriate emergency medical care providers. The Holy Name of Jesus Hospital agrees to assist in promoting and coordinating these programs for civilian medical care providers. Participation of civilian medical care providers in the training program will be voluntary and with no reimbursement from the Government.

f. The Holy Name of Jesus Hospital must have prepositioned 1 PAM Chloride, Atropine, and IV solutions in sufficient quantities to treat a minimum of four patients at all times.

5. Coordination: This memorandum will be in effect for the period of 1 March 1987 through 28 February 1991 and will be reviewed annually by both parties. Either party may cancel the memorandum upon 30 days prior written notice.



Mr. Vic Giamalva
Administrative Officer
Holy Name of Jesus Hospital



ROGER V. CADOT
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department Activity
Commanding

30 Jan 87

DATE

27 Apr 87


DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW



WILLIAM H. DRINKARD
Executive Director
Holy Name of Jesus Hospital

10 Nov 87
DATE



ROGER V. CADOL
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Activity
Commanding

3 Nov 88
DATE

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN THE

US ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY, FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA

AND THE

STRINGFELLOW HOSPITAL, ANNISTON, ALABAMA

1. Purpose: The purpose of this memorandum is to express provisions of agreement between the US Army Medical Department Activity and the Stringfellow Hospital concerning the care and treatment of disaster victims resulting from a chemical related accident.

2. Reference: The basic requirement for this memorandum is contained in HQ HSC message, 301840Z September 1980, subject: Medical Support for Chemical Operations.

3. Responsibilities:

a. Commander, US Army MEDDAC, Fort McClellan will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notification of local law enforcement agencies of emergency ambulance routes.

(2) Notification of Alabama State Health Department, City and County Health Departments, and the Stringfellow Hospital.

(3) Notification of all United States government agencies and/or activities required.

(4) Notification of Post Public Affairs for proper coordination with all news media and control of news releases.

(5) If the accident/incident occurs off post, assist in the medical evacuation and treatment by providing medications and personnel as needed within capability.

b. Director (Chief of Staff), Stringfellow Hospital will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Upon notification by MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, or Chief Physician, Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), that assistance is needed, notify hospital staff and prepare to receive casualties.

(2) Ensure actions are coordinated with MEDDAC, Fort McClellan or ANAD, as necessary.

(3) Requests for MEDDAC support will be coordinated with Cdr, MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, during normal duty hours (0730-1600 hours, Monday thru Friday), Telephone No. 238-2200, or with the Staff Duty Officer during non-duty hours and weekends/holidays, Telephone No. 238-2152/2345.

c. Chief Physician, ANAD Occupational Health Clinic, will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notify Cdr, MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, immediately of an accident/incident requiring possible back-up support requirements, to include the what, when, where, how and number of casualties (if available) resulting from the accident/incident.

(2) Refer/transfer casualties to MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, unless otherwise instructed or directed by Cdr, MEDDAC, Fort McClellan.

4. Concept of Operations:

a. It is recognized that the increased prevalence of chemical agents used for commercial, industrial and military purposes poses the potential threat of a serious chemical accident to residents of the Anniston area. The US Army Medical Department Activity and the Stringfellow Hospital agree in principle that a comprehensive area-wide Disaster Plan should contain provisions for the care and treatment of victims resulting from a chemical related accident. It is, therefore, the expressed intent of the US Army Medical Department Activity and the Stringfellow Hospital to work with other local emergency medical providers and planning agencies in the event of a chemical accident.

b. The Stringfellow Hospital stands ready to receive and treat any military or civilian victim of a chemical accident on a 24-hour, 7-day a week basis. The Stringfellow Hospital agrees to provide appropriate and necessary treatment and testing (including Cholinesterase testing) of patients upon their arrival and continued stay at the Stringfellow Hospital. The medical records of all military and Department of the Army civilian personnel treated for chemical exposure at the Stringfellow Hospital will be made available to the US Army Medical Department upon receipt of a formal written request from the military physician responsible for each patients' care.


c. Decontamination of patients, attendants, equipment and vehicles will be the responsibility of the US Army Medical Department Activity or other trained personnel provided by the US Army. A military physician will certify patients are properly decontaminated prior to transportation to the Stringfellow Hospital.


d. Patients will be transported to the Stringfellow Hospital in Government provided ambulances where practical and in appropriately equipped civilian emergency medical vehicles when the patient load exceeds the capacity of Government-owned vehicles. Transportation of patients will be coordinated under separate memorandas of agreement with the local Emergency Medical Services.

e. It should be recognized that doctors, nurses and other emergency medical personnel must have access to educational programs and workshops which provide instruction as to the proper handling and treatment of patients suffering from chemical poisoning. It is understood that the US Army Medical Department Activity will provide and coordinate such training for appropriate emergency medical care providers. The Stringfellow Hospital agrees to assist in promoting and coordinating these programs for civilian medical care providers. Participation of civilian medical care providers in the training program will be voluntary and with no reimbursement from the Government.

f. The Stringfellow Hospital must have prepositioned 2 PAM Chloride, Atropine, and IV solutions in sufficient quantities to treat a minimum of four patients at all times.

5. Coordination: This memorandum will be in effect for the period of 1 March 1987 through 28 February 1991 and will be reviewed annually by both parties. Either party may cancel the memorandum upon 30 days prior written notice.



GEORGE SIMPSON
Administrator
Stringfellow Hospital


ROGER V. CADOL
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department Activity
Commanding

5 March 87
DATE


11 March 87
DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW



MICHAEL CASSIDY
Administrator
Stringfellow Hospital


18 NOV 88
DATE



ROGER V. CADOL
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Activity
Commanding


3 Nov 88
DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW



MICHAEL CASSIDY
Administrator
Springfield Memorial Hospital

11/5/90
DATE



GEORGE A. HEGSTROM, JR., M.D.
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Commanding

7 Dec 89
DATE

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE
US ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY, FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA
AND THE
PIEDMONT HOSPITAL, PIEDMONT, ALABAMA

1. Purpose: The purpose of this memorandum is to express provisions of agreement between the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Piedmont Hospital concerning the care and treatment of disaster victims resulting from a chemical related accident.

2. Reference: The basic requirement for this memorandum is contained in HQ HSC message, 301840Z September 1980, subject: Medical Support for Chemical Operations.

3. Responsibilities:

a. Commander, U.S. Army MEDDAC, Fort McClellan will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notification of local law enforcement agencies of emergency ambulance routes.

(2) Notification of Alabama State Health Department, City and County Health Departments, and the Piedmont Hospital.

(3) Notification of all United States government agencies and/or activities required.

(4) Notification of Post Public Affairs for proper coordination with all news media and control of news releases.

(5) If the accident/incident occurs off post, assist in the medical evacuation and treatment by providing medications and personnel as needed within capability.

b. Director (Chief of Staff), Piedmont Hospital will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Upon notification by MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, or Chief Physician, Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), that assistance is needed, notify hospital staff and prepare to receive casualties.

(2) Ensure actions are coordinated with MEDDAC, Fort McClellan or ANAD, as necessary.

Requests for MEDDAC support will be coordinated with Cdr. MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, during normal duty hours (0730-1600 hours, Monday thru Friday) Telephone No. 238-2200, or with the Staff Duty Officer during duty hours and weekends/holidays, Telephone No. 238-2152/2345.

c. Chief Physician, ANAD Occupational Health Clinic, will ensure the following actions are taken:

(1) Notify Cdr. MEDDAC Fort McClellan, immediately of an accident/incident requiring possible back-up support requirements, to include the what, when, where, how and number of casualties (if available) resulting from the accident, incident.

(2) Refer/transfer casualties to MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, unless otherwise instructed or directed by Cdr. MEDDAC, Fort McClellan.

4. Concept of Operations:

a. It is recognized that the increased prevalence of chemical agents used for commercial, industrial and military purposes poses the potential threat of a serious chemical accident to residents of the Anniston area. The U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Piedmont Hospital agree in principle that a comprehensive area-wide Disaster Plan should contain provisions for the care and treatment of victims resulting from a chemical related accident. It is, therefore, the expressed intent of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity and the Piedmont Hospital to work with other local emergency medical providers and planning agencies in the event of a chemical accident.

b. The Piedmont Hospital stands ready to receive and treat any military or civilian victim of a chemical accident on a 24-hour, 7-day a week basis. The Piedmont Hospital agrees to provide appropriate and necessary treatment and testing (including Cholinesterase testing) of patients upon their arrival and continued stay at the Piedmont Hospital. The medical records of all military and Department of the Army civilian personnel treated for chemical exposure at the Piedmont Hospital will be made available to the U.S. Army Medical Department upon receipt of a formal written request from the military physician responsible for each patients' care.


c. Decontamination of patients, attendants, equipment and vehicles will be the responsibility of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity or other trained personnel provided by the U.S. Army. A military physician will certify patients are properly decontaminated prior to transportation to the Piedmont Hospital.


d. Patients will be transported to the Piedmont Hospital in Government provided ambulances where practical and in appropriately equipped civilian emergency medical vehicles when the patient load exceeds the capacity of Government-owned vehicles. Transportation of patients will be coordinated under separate memorandums of agreement with the local Emergency Medical Services.

...should be recognized that doctors, nurses and other emergency personnel must have access to educational programs and workshops which offering from chemical poisoning. It is understood that the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity will provide and coordinate such training for appropriate emergency medical care providers. The Piedmont Hospital agrees to assist in promoting and coordinating these programs for civilian medical care providers. Participation of civilian medical care providers in the training program will be voluntary and with no reimbursement from the Government.

f. The Piedmont Hospital must have prepositioned 2 PAM Chloride, Atropine, and IV solutions in sufficient quantities to treat a minimum of four patients at all times.

5. Coordination: This memorandum will be in effect for the period of 1 March 1987 through 28 February 1991 and will be reviewed annually by both parties. Either party may cancel the memorandum upon 30 days prior written notice.


Mr. James Jumper
Administrator
Piedmont Hospital


ROGER V. CADDE
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department Activity
Commanding

April 23, 1987
DATE

April 23, 1987
DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW



BILL JONES
Administrator
Piedmont Hospital

Nov 7, 1988

DATE



ROGER V. CADOL
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Activity
Commanding

3 Nov. 88

DATE

ANNUAL REVIEW

Tommy Allison
TOMMY ALLISON
Administrator
Piedmont Hospital

12/14/89
DATE

George W. Hegstrom, M.D.
GEORGE W. HEGSTROM, JR., M.D.
Colonel, MC
U.S. Army Medical Department
Activity
Commanding

7 Dec 89
DATE




REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF


MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
NOBLE ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AND EAST ALABAMA EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

SUBJECT: Care and Transportation of Disaster Victims Resulting from a
Chemical Related Accident

1. Purpose. The purpose of this memorandum is to express provisions of agreement between Noble Army Community Hospital and East Alabama Emergency Medical Services concerning the care and transportation of disaster victims resulting from a chemical related accident.
2. Problem. It is recognized that the increased prevalence of chemical agents used for commercial, industrial and military purposes poses the potential threat of serious chemical accident to residents of the Anniston area. It is the expressed intent of the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity to work with other health care facilities and local emergency medical providers in the event of a chemical accident in a manner prescribed by law, Army Regulations, and humanitarian concerns.
3. Scope. To define each party's responsibilities.
4. Understandings, agreements, support, and resource requirements.
 - a. It should be recognized that doctors, nurses and other emergency medical personnel must have access to educational programs and workshops which provide instructions as to the proper handling and treatment of patients suffering from chemical poisoning.
 - b. It is understood that Noble Army Community Hospital and East Alabama Emergency Medical Services will cooperate to provide directly or to coordinate with other entities such training for appropriate health care providers as prescribed by law and Army Regulations.
 - c. Noble Army Community Hospital agrees to provide East Alabama Emergency Medical Services and local emergency medical services with a list of preferred drugs and medications which may be needed in the treatment of patients with chemical poisoning.

5. Effective date of this agreement is 1 April 1989. Agreement should be reviewed annually by both parties.


JIM POLLARD
Administrator
East Alabama EMS
DATE 5/23/89


GEORGE R. HEGSTROM, JR., M.D.
Colonel, MC
Commanding
DATE 29 March '89

**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
NOBLE ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, ANNISTON EMERGENCY RESCUE SQUAD, AND THE
JACKSONVILLE EMERGENCY AMBULANCE SERVICE**

SUBJECT: Sharing of Ambulance Service

1. Purpose. The purpose of this memorandum is to express provisions of agreement between Noble Army Community Hospital, Anniston Emergency Rescue Squad and Jacksonville Emergency Ambulance Service.

2. Problem. In the advent of a major accident or natural disaster, one or more of the above mentioned parties' ability to handle the situation could be stressed or over taxed. Back up or an alternative service is a necessity.

3. Scope. To define each party's responsibilities.

4. Understandings, agreements, support, and resource requirements.

a. In the event Anniston Emergency Rescue Squad or Jacksonville Emergency Ambulance Service are unable to respond to an emergency call, the EMS Ambulance Service assigned to Noble Army Community Hospital and located on Fort McClellan will respond, if available, when requested by the above parties. Military ambulance response will be limited to currently established areas of coverage. Civilian patients will be transported to Jacksonville Hospital and Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center. Military patients, to include their dependents, will be transported to Noble Army Community Hospital.


b. In the event the EMS Ambulance Service is unable to respond to an emergency call on Fort McClellan or Pelham Range, Anniston Emergency Rescue or Jacksonville Emergency Ambulance Service, whichever is available, will respond to the emergency call. All patients will be transported to Noble Army Community Hospital, unless directed by medical control at Noble Army Community Hospital to transport to another medical treatment facility. Civilian ambulances will contact the Military Police at telephone number 848-5555 prior to entering Fort McClellan or Pelham Range.

c. In the event of a disaster occurring within this region, the Noble Army Community Hospital Commander, or his designated representative, will determine whether military personnel and ambulances will respond to the accident scene.

5. Effective date of this agreement is the date the last party signs the agreement. The agreement will be reviewed annually by all parties.

Document Separator

**U.S. ARMY
CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE
CENTERS & FORT McCLELLAN
FORT McCLELLAN, ALABAMA**



**FORT McCLELLAN
CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN
(FM-CRP)**

80 90

DISPOSITION FORM

For the use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGO

Reference or Office Symbol
LZN-PTS-B (500-4a)

Subject
Memorandum of Agreement with Anniston Army
Depot--TRANSMITTAL DF

XX THRU Chief of Staff
Deputy Commanding General

FROM DPTMSEC

DATE 8 Apr 88
Mr. Smith/jt/4773

CMT 1

TO Commanding General


1. Purpose. To obtain the Commanding General's approval of the attached Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Anniston Army Depot and Fort McClellan.
2. Recommendation. That the Commanding General approve this transmittal DF and sign the MOA at Tab A.
3. Discussion.

a. A Fort McClellan Chemical Response Plan at Tab B was published 22 March 1988 and replaced the Standing Support Procedures (SSP) at Tab C. The Chemical Response Plan does not require the review and signatures of both commanders as did the SSP.

b. The Chemical Response Plan was written in support of Anniston Army Depot in the event of a chemical accident or incident. The plan replaces the SSP which did not provide sufficient guidance.

c. The plan at Tab B has been coordinated with Anniston Army Depot and they concur with its publication. The plan has also been reviewed by the Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency (CEMA) in the event there is any downwind off-post hazard. Mr. Stone (CEMA) is in support of this plan.

d. The plan, as written, will also support the ANAD Chemical Demilitarization Facility when it is activated.



J. H. PARPART
LTJG, GS
Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization
& Training

COORDINATION:

DOIM concur/nonconcur

DATE: 14 Apr 88

SJA concur/nonconcur

DATE: 12 Apr 88

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED See Tab
Commanding General

DATE: 2 May 88



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT MCCLELLAN
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5000



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

22 MAR 1988

ATZN-PTS-B (500-4a)


MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Fort McClellan Chemical Response Plan (FM-CRP)

1. The Fort McClellan Chemical Response Plan is published to provide guidance to units, and staff activities pertaining to a Chemical Accident/Incident occurring at Anniston Army Depot.
2. The attached plan is effective upon receipt.
3. Commanders and staff elements are required to provide implementing instructions within their activity as specified in the plan.
4. The proponent of this plan is the Director, Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security. Addressees are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) to Commander, U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan, ATTN: ATZN-PTS-B, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5000.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl
as


JAMES H. JOBE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Special



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 US ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS & FORT MCCLELLAN
 FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5000



REPLY TO
 ATTENTION OF

ATZN-PTS-B (500-4a)

26 September 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Change 1 to Fort McClellan Chemical Response Plan
 (FM-CRP)

1. The following page changes will be posted to the FM-CRP as indicated:

REMOVE PAGES

H-1 - H-3

I-1 - I-2

INSERT PAGES

H-1 - H-3 ✓

I-1 - I-2 ✓

Done
28 Sep
J

2. The Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Smith, AUTOVON 865-4773/3116.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS E. LUTCHENDORF
 LTC, GS
 Director of Plans, Training,
 Mobilization and Security

Encl

DISTRIBUTION:
 Special

(3) The actual or attempted penetration of the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) Chemical Exclusion Area.

e. Explanation of Terms. See Annex A.

2. Mission. When assistance is requested by the Commander, Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) to control the effects of a chemical accident/incident at the Anniston Army Depot, the Commander, USACML&MPCEN&FM, will furnish all available assistance which will consist of, but is not limited to, the dispatching of those CAI Reaction Teams and personnel tasked in this plan.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of operations. This plan establishes the required organization, responsibilities, and procedures in the event of an accident or incident at Anniston Army Depot. This plan is not to be implemented with, nor used in, support of the Fort McClellan Chemical Decontamination Training Facility. Upon telephonic notification of an accident/incident at ANAD, all teams, except the emergency medical team, will report to the assembly area in the vicinity of Guillion Field Reviewing Stands (facility 3162) at grid coordinate 11203020. CAI Reaction Teams will be briefed as to the ANAD situation and dispatched to that location as requested by the Chemical Surety Officer. The medical team should deploy directly to the ANAD Health Clinic in lieu of deployment from Guillion Field, once alerted of a CAI, due to the criticality of time.

b. Alert Notification Procedures. See Annex B.

c. Tasks:

(1) The Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLSCH) will--

(a) Designate a Chemical Response Team Chief and alternate. The individuals will be commissioned officers, minimum grade O-3. (See Annex C).

(b) Organize, equip, and train a decontamination team. The team will consist of 10 personnel and two Power Driven Decontamination Apparatuses (PDDA). (See Annex D).

(c) Ensure that all teams are chemically trained in consonance with assigned and implied missions.

(2) The Commander, 142d Explosive Ordnance Detachment, will provide assistance as requested by the CAIRAO. (See Annex E).

(3) The Commander, MEDDAC, will--

(a) Organize and train an Emergency Medical Team to provide medical assistance and guidance in support of this plan.

Headquarters
USACML&MPCEN&FM
Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5000

Fort McClellan Chemical Response Plan (FM-CRP)

22 MAR 1988

1. Situation.

a. General

(1) The purpose of this plan is to establish procedures and actions to be employed by Fort McClellan CAI Reaction Teams in support of a Chemical Accident/Incident occurring on the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) and which is, or will become, a potential hazard to the Depot and surrounding community.

(2) The Commander, Anniston Army Depot, is responsible for the overall control and coordination of the accident/incident site, to include coordination with civilian authorities as required. To perform this function, the Commander has appointed a Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRAO), an Emergency Control Center (ECC) Staff, and supporting emergency response teams, to direct the operation in the field. The responsibility for administrative and logistical support required remains with the Commander, ANAD.

(3) The Commander, USACML&MPCEN&FM, is responsible for providing CAI Reaction Teams as set forth in this plan as required by the Anniston Army Depot, Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRAO). The Commander, USACML&MPCEN&FM, is responsible for ensuring that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated and all USACML&MPCEN&FM teams are properly equipped, supplied (except for those items of equipment or supplies prestocked at ANAD), and trained to support the requirements of the plan. Those items of equipment necessary to support this plan which cannot be maintained by Ft McClellan will be maintained by ANAD.

b. Enemy Forces. See Cdr, FORSCOM/USCINCARRED CONPLAN 7040(U).

c. Friendly Forces. The CAI Reaction Teams and personnel provided by the Commander, USACML&MPCEN&FM.

d. Assumptions. A Chemical Accident/Incident has occurred at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) which has resulted in one or more of the following situations, requiring the assistance of USACML&MPCEN&FM:

(1) The release of a chemical agent which will cause an off-post hazard and may result in injury to personnel or cause the exhibition of physiological symptoms requiring more than standard first aid procedures.

(2) An unintentional or uncontrolled release of a chemical agent where the agent quantity released to the atmosphere is such that a serious potential hazard from exposure is created by exceeding the applicable maximum allowable agent concentration-time levels for exposure of unprotected personnel.

(b) Provide emergency first aid, treatment of casualties of a CAI and augment medical personnel at ANAD as required.

(c) Obtain necessary equipment and medical supplies to support the chemical mission.

(d) The Emergency Medical Team composition will be as specified by the Office of the Surgeon General.

(e) See Annex F.

(4) The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will provide a PAO CAI Reaction Team consisting of a minimum of 3 public affairs specialists, augmentation will be as requested by the ANAD PAO. (See Annex E).

(5) The Provost Marshal will provide one (1) individual (grade E7 or higher) and three (3) non-commissioned officers to assist in the augmentation of the ANAD security force. (See Annex H).

(6) The Commander, Headquarters Battalion (Provisional) will:

(a) Provide 20 enlisted personnel to perform duties as a security force and will be under the operational control of the Provost Marshal. (See Annex I).

(b) Provide 40 personnel to establish Traffic Control Points (TCP's). (See Annex J).

(7) The Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security will--

(a) Activate the EOC upon implementation of this plan for either actual or exercise purposes.

(b) Provide backup radio support (Handie Talkie FM Radios (163.5125MH)) when required.

(c) Provide a mobile communications unit to the Chemical Response Team Chief and ANAD ECC, if requested.

(d) Provide to the Chemical Response Team Chief support as requested to ensure successful accomplishment and execution of this plan.

(8) The Directorate of Logistics will:

(a) Coordinate and provide vehicles equipped with radios as requested by the Chemical Response Team Chief through the Emergency Operations Center. If required, the EOC will establish and provide priorities of issue to the DOL.

(b) Issue MRE's to the CAI Reaction Teams when directed by DPTMSEC.

(c) Issue weapons as required.

(9) The Directorate of Engineering and Housing will be prepared to issue the following to ANAD if requested--

(a) 20 each beds, with mattresses, pillows and linens.

(b) 40 each blankets.

(c) 20 each table lamps.

(d) 20 each wardrobes (lockers).

(e) 20 each easychairs.

(f) 20 each desks and chairs.

(10) The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) will provide a principal and alternate to advise the Chemical Response Team Chief. The SJA representative will implement the Disaster Claims SOP if appropriate.

(11) The Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities, if necessary, will conduct casualty operations IAW AR 600-8-1 and Ft McClellan Regulation 600-1.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) CAI Reaction Teams Chiefs will provide team SOP's to the Fort McClellan Chemical Response Team Chief for review and approval within 60 days of date of this plan.

(2) CAI Reaction Team Chiefs will maintain alert rosters of their team members for duty and non-duty hours. A copy of this roster will be forwarded to the Fort McClellan Chemical Response Team Chief and the Fort McClellan Emergency Operations Center.

(3) Teams will be notified a minimum of 30 days prior to an exercise of this plan.

(4) When this plan is executed, actual and simulated, CAI Reaction Team Chiefs will forward after action reports through the Chemical Response Team Chief to Plans, Operations and Mobilization Division, DPTMSEC within five working days. POM Division will in turn forward the report to the Chemical Surety Officer, ANAD.

(5) The Anniston Army Depot Emergency Control Center will provide specific tasks and assignments to the Fort McClellan CAI Reaction Teams.

(6) Fort McClellan CAI Reaction Teams, under the supervision of the Chemical Response Team Chief, will assist as directed in controlling the CAI IAW tasks specified in the ANAD CAIRAO.

4. Requests for equipment beyond the team capability will be forwarded through DPTMSEC (POM Div) to DOL after coordination with the Chemical Response Team Chief.

5. Command and Signal.

(a) Signal.

(1) Primary communication will be FM radio and alternate will be telephone. Initial entry into the net will be with the Fort McClellan EOC (frequency 52.00Mh). Communications will be maintained on this net until entry to ANAD at which time the frequency will be 36.75. (See Annex K).

(2) In the event of a hostile environment CEOI's will be issued.


(b) Command:

(1) The initial command post will be at the assembly area at grid coordinate 11203020.

(2) Upon entry to Anniston Army Depot command will pass to ANAD and the specific location of the Fort McClellan CP will be designated by the Depot ECC.

WATSON
MG

OFFICIAL:



PARPART
DPTMSEC

Annexes

Annex A - Explanation of Terms and Acronyms

Annex B - Notification and Movement

Annex C - Chemical Response Team Chief and Assistant

Annex D - Decontamination Team

Annex E - Explosive Ordnance Detachment

Annex F - Medical Team

Annex G - Public Information

Annex H - Provost Marshal

Annex I - Security Force

Annex J - Traffic Control

Annex K - Communications

DISTRIBUTION:

Cdr, 547th EODCC, Ft Gillem, GA

Cdr, Second US Army, ATTN: AFKD-OPM-PL

Cdr, TRADOC, ATTN: ATCD-N, ATTG-P

Cdr, Anniston Army Depot, ATTN: SDSAN-CS

Cdr, US Army AMC Surety Field Activity, ATTN: AMXSA, Picatenny Arsenal, NJ
07806-5000

Calhoun County Emergency Agency, Anniston, AL 36201

Alabama State Troopers, Jacksonville Post, Jacksonville, AL 36265

Calhoun County Sheriff Department, Anniston, AL 36201

Cdr, MEDDAC

Cdr, Headquarters Battalion (Provisional)

Cdr, 142d EOD

Asst Comdt, USACMLS

DPTMSEC

DOL

DPCA

DEH

DRM

PM

PAO

Safety

SGS

SJA

ANNEX A (EXPLANATION OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE (FM-CRP)

1. The following is a list of terms used in this plan:

a. Accident/Incident Site. The geographical location of a CAI.

b. CAI Reaction Teams. All teams who are required to take action under this plan.

c. Chemical Accident. Any situation involving an unintentional or uncontrolled release of chemical agent which results in--

(1) Exposure of personnel to a chemical agent that results in a fatality, a lost workday case (away from work), or physiological symptoms requiring more than standard first aid procedures.

(2) Property damage of \$10,000 or more (in accordance with AR 385-40, 1 Apr 87).

(3) Chemical agent presence in the atmosphere outside a Chemical Limited Area that exceeds the permissible exposure limits for nonagent workers and general populace.

(4) A production interruption that will exceed or has exceeded 24 hours, unless voluntarily interrupted pending the outcome of an investigation.

(5) Significantly degraded operational capability.

d. Chemical Accident and Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA). Those actions taken to save life, preserve health and safety, secure chemical surety material, protect property, and help maintain public confidence in the ability of the Army to response to a military CAI.

e. Chemical Accident and Incident Response Assistance Officer (CAIRAO). An individual, appointed by the Commander to control all emergency teams and supervises operations at the immediate accident or incident site until arrival of the OSC.

f. Chemical Agent. A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its chemical properties.

g. Chemical Exclusion Area. The area immediately surrounding one or more receptacles in which chemical agents are contained.

h. Chemical Incident. Any situation involving uncontrolled release of a chemical agent which results in:

(1) Exposure of personnel to a chemical agent that results in a lost workday case (restricted work activity), light duty, or physiological symptoms requiring standard first aid treatment.

ANX A TO FM-CRP

(2) Chemical agent present in the atmosphere within a chemical limited area where unmasked workers normally have access, and the concentration exceeds the permissible exposure limits for unmasked workers but does not meet the concentration criteria for an accident.

(3) Property damage of at least \$1000 that is not reported as an accident.

(4) Loss (other than caused by acceptable laboratory processes), attempted theft, or diversion of chemical surety material, actual or attempted penetration of a chemical limited area, or attempted damage to a storage facility.

i. Chemical Response Team Chief. An officer in the grade of O-3 or higher that is responsible for all Fort McClellan CAI Reaction Teams.

j. Chemical Surety. Those controls, procedures, and actions which contribute to the safety, security, and reliability of chemical agents and their associated weapons systems throughout their life cycle without degrading operational performance.

k. Chemical Surety Materiel. Chemical agents and their associated weapons systems, or storage and shipping containers that are either adopted or being considered for military use.

l. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). An organization staffed to assist the Commanding General in controlling emergency teams and personnel responding to an event at ANAD.

m. Operational Control Point (OCP). A field command post for control and direction of CAIRA operations - normally located near the hotline.

n. Hotline. A designated line on the ground upwind from a CAI site used to control entry to, and exit from, the CAI site to prevent spread of contamination.

2. The following are frequently used acronyms:

a. ANAD - Anniston Army Depot.

b. AOC - Army Operations Center.

c. CAI - Chemical accident/incident.

d. CAIRA - Chemical accident/incident response and assistance.

e. CAIRAO - Chemical accident/incident response and assistance officer.

f. CP - Command post.

- g. CSD - Chemical Surety Officer.
- h. ECC - Emergency Control Center.
- i. ECP - Entry Control Point.
- j. EOC - Emergency Operations Center.
- k. EPA - Environmental Protection Agency.
- l. HL - Hotline.
- m. IED - Improvised Explosive Device.
- n. MACAP - Military assistance to civil authorities plan.
- o. NBC - Nuclear/biological/chemical.
- p. NCS - Net control station.
- q. OSC - On-scene commander.
- r. OCPA - Office of Chief, Public Affairs.
- s. PDDA - Power Driven Decontamination Apparatus.
- t. PDS - Personnel decontamination station.
- u. SDO - Staff duty officer.
- v. TCP - Traffic control point.

ANX A TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ANNEX B (NOTIFICATION AND MOVEMENT) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN
(FM-CRP)

1. NOTIFICATION. The following actions will be taken when notified of a CAI:

a. Duty Hours. The Chief, POM Division, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security will notify the USACML&MPCEN&FM emergency teams by activation of the Installation Alert Telephone Net. In addition, he/she will notify EOC, 2d US Army (AUTOVON 797-3279/3280); TRADOC, (AUTOVON 680-2256); and EOC FORSCOM, (AUTOVON 572-4162/4170). The SJA representative will be notified by calling 238-5435/5436.

b. Non-Duty Hours. The Anniston Army Depot Emergency Control Center (ANAD ECC) (235-4438) will make the initial notification to the USACML&MPCEN&FM Staff Duty Officer (238-3821). The message from Appendix 1 will be completed by the Staff Duty Officer. When the notification by the ANAD ECC has been completed the USACML&MPCEN&FM Staff Duty Officer will "call back" to verify the alert message. This will be accomplished prior to continuing the alert notification. The USACML&MPCEN&FM Staff Duty Officer will notify the Chief, Plans Operations and Mobilization Officer or his/her representative. The Staff Duty Officer will then notify the Chemical School Battalion Duty Officer (3925) and the Headquarters Battalion Duty Officer (4727).

(1) The USACML&MPCEN&FM Staff Duty Officer will notify the following:

- (a) EOD (238-1477)
- (b) MEDDAC (4515/2151)
- (c) Provost Marshal (5555)
- (d) PAO - as specified in PAO personnel alert roster.
- (e) Dispatcher, TMP (5676)
- (f) SJA (5555 - MP Desk to notify the On-Call SJA Officer).

(2) The Chemical School Battalion Duty Officer will notify the following as prescribed by the unit duty officer instructions:

- (a) Chief, Chemical Response Team.
- (b) Assistant Chief, Chemical Response Team.
- (c) Chief, Decontamination Team.

(3) The Headquarters Battalion Duty Officer will notify the following as prescribed by the unit duty officer instructions:

- (a) Security Team.
- (b) Traffic Control Team (only if directed by USACML&MPCEN&FM Staff Duty Officer).

ANX B TO FM-CRP

2. Movement.

a. Team Chiefs are responsible for assuring that their teams are prepared to deploy to ANAD upon arrival to the assembly area grid coordinate FN11203020 (vicinity Guillion Field). The Emergency Medical Team chief is responsible for direct deployment of the team of ANAD.

b. Team Chiefs will report to the Chief, Chemical Response Team and will not deploy their teams to ANAD until directed by the EOC. The Medical Team will deploy directly from Noble Army Hospital to the Health Clinic at ANAD.

c. Anniston Army Depot Emergency Control Center (ANAD ECC) will designate, through the Ft McClellan EOC, emergency routes to be used. USACML&MPCEN&FM teams with a specific mission will continue to the location designated after reporting to ANAD. Those teams without a specific mission will wait at the designated ANAD reporting point for instructions. When directed by the USACML&MPCEN&FM Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to report to Anniston Army Depot all USACML&MPCEN&FM CAIRA response teams dispatched will report to:

(1) Eulaton Gate (Bldg 151) is the Primary Route (Appendix 2). When using this route, USACML&MPCEN&FM will be directed to assemble in the large parking lot in the vicinity of Building 78 (Restricted Area) (Appendix 2).

(2) When using the Alternate Route, (Appendix 3), USACML&MPCEN&FM response teams will enter Anniston Army Depot through Gate CB-3. When using this route, the Anniston Army Depot Emergency Control Center (ANAD ECC) will provide mission information and/or designate assembly location for response teams (Appendix 3).

APPENDIX 1 (ANAD CAI ALERT MESSAGE) TO ANNEX B (NOTIFICATION AND MOVEMENT) TO
FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

ANAD CAI ALERT MESSAGE

1. INITIAL - "This is ANAD. Accident occurred at (DATE TIME GROUP). Assemble your teams. A follow-up message will be transmitted to the EOC/USACML&MPCEN&FM Staff Duty Officer. Use the Primary/Alternate route to ANAD."

2. FOLLOWUP - "THIS IS AN EMERGENCY RED LEG MESSAGE"

FROM	Name, Location, Phone Number and Title of person calling
Line ALPHA (What)	Fully describe the event that has occurred
Line CHARLIE (Where)	Location of event being reported (Area, Igloo Number, or Grid Coordinates)
Line ECHO	Identify the number of munitions involved (if known)
Line FOXTROT (at incident site)	1. Wind Direction (Blowing from) 2. Wind Speed (MPH/KPH)
Line Golf	Report any additional data known and not listed above.

REPEAT "THIS IS AN EMERGENCY RED LEG MESSAGE"

NOTE: If the situation is a test exercise, the word "EXERCISE" will be used instead of "EMERGENCY".


APP 1 TO ANX B TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APP 2 TO ANX B TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX 3 (ALTERNATE ROUTE) TO ANNEX B (NOTIFICATION AND MOVEMENT) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



APP 3 TO ANX B TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ANNEX C (CHEMICAL RESPONSE TEAM CHIEF AND ASSISTANT) FOR FORT MCCLELLAN
CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. General. This annex prescribes the responsibilities of the Chemical Response Team Chief and Assistant in preparation for and upon implementation of this plan.

2. Mission. Train, control, and coordinate the activities of the Fort McClellan CAI Reaction Teams in support of a simulated or actual chemical accident/incident occurring at Anniston Army Depot.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of operations upon telephonic notification by the Fort McClellan Emergency Operations Center (duty hours) or Fort McClellan Staff Duty Officer (non-duty hours) the Chief and Assistant will report to the assembly area in the vicinity of Guillion Field Reviewing Stands (facility 3162) at grid coordinate 11203020. The Emergency Operations Center personnel will provide a verbal situation report to the Team Chief as to what has occurred at ANAD. The CAI Reaction Teams will be dispatched to ANAD by the Team Chief when directed by the EOC.

b. Responsibilities - The Chemical Response Team Chief is responsible for:

(1) Briefing all CAI Reaction Teams upon arrival at the assembly area as to the situation at ANAD.

(2) Verifying with the CAI Reaction Team Chiefs that they have all their required personnel and that their equipment is operational.

(3) Providing situation report to the EOC upon arrival in the assembly area of each CAI Reaction Teams.

(4) Establishing communications (telephonic and radio) with the EOC.

(5) Dispatching each CAI Reaction Team to ANAD (less medical team). Prior to dispatching each team the Response Team Chief will verify with the EOC the wind direction and speed at ANAD and the route that the team will use.

4. Service Support. Dispatch two (2) 1/4T vehicles with AN/VRC-46 radios from Directorate of Logistics (Transportation Division). The vehicles will be used by the Chemical Response Team Chief and Assistant. Substitution of like items of equipment is authorized.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal. Primary communication will be FM radio and alternate will be telephone. Initial entry into the net will be with the Fort McClellan EOC (frequency 52.00MZ). Communications will be maintained on this net until entry to ANAD at which time the frequency will be 36.75.

ANX C TO FM-CRP

b. Command:

(1) The initial command post will be at the assembly area at grid coordinate 11203020.

(2) Upon entry to Anniston Army Depot command will pass to ANAD and the specific location of the Fort McClellan CP will be designated by the Depot ECC.

ANNEX D (DECONTAMINATION TEAM) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. Assumption. In the event of an actual CAI at ANAD, there will be sufficient personnel and materials for the containment, initial response and limited decontamination.

2. Mission. To decontaminate personnel, land, buildings, equipment, or materials that have become contaminated by a CAI at ANAD.

3. Execution:

a. Upon notification that a CAI has occurred at ANAD the Decontamination Team will report to the assembly area at grid coordinate 11203020. The team will consist of one officer and nine (9) enlisted personnel. Two (2) PDDA's will be required by the team.

b. Capabilities of the team will consist of the following:

(1) Decontaminate and monitor personnel, equipment, structures, and land surfaces as directed by the team chief.

(2) Perform other duties as assigned by the Decontamination Team Leader or CAIRAO.

(3) Operate the PDS.

(4) Inspect protective clothing and equipment of team members entering the contaminated area.

(5) Maintain count and record names of all personnel crossing the hotline into and out of the accident site.

(6) Tear down the PDS.

(7) Monitor for contamination on the cold side of the hotline.

d. The M12 PDDA's will be deployed to ANAD without water. The Decontamination Team Chief has the authority to deploy the M12 PDDA's to ANAD with water tanks full, availability of time is the primary consideration.

4. Service Support. The team members will carry the equipment as specified by the Decontamination team leader.

5. Signal and Command.

a. Signal. (See Annex K).

(1) Primary. Radio.

(2) Secondary. Telephone.

ANX D TO FM-CRP

b. Command. Decontamination teams will operate under the control of the Decontamination Team Leader. The decontamination line at ANAD will be at the location directed by the CAIRAO.

APPENDIX I (DECONTAMINATION) TO ANNEX D (DECONTAMINATION) TO FORT MCCLELLAN
CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. The standard decontaminants listed below are stored at Anniston Army Depot, Igloo E-901A, off Coosa Avenue (Grid G-11), ANAD Reservation Map. Access to this igloo will be coordinated through the ANAD Emergency Control Center (ECC).

Sodium Hydroxide
Super Tropical Bleach (STB)
Sodium Carbonate
Sodium Hypochlorite
Anti-Foam (5 gal)
Anti-Set (50 lbs)

NOTE: Quantities of the above decontaminants stored in E901A will vary, however, levels should not drop lower than STB (3000 lbs), Sodium Carbonate (5000 lbs, 100 lb bags), and Sodium Hypochlorite (100 gal, 1 gal containers) which is considered the minimum required for sustaining a large scale decontamination operation.

2. Water for decontamination use can be obtained from the following depot sources:

LOCATION	GRID LOCATION (ANAD Reservation Map)
Loading Dock 607	F-11
Loading Dock 608	F-11
Loading Dock 610	F-8
Loading Dock 611	E-11
Loading Dock 612	E-11
Building 78	M-9
Reservoir (Lake)	L-3

05/21/93

10:23

NO. 267

006

APP I TO ANX D TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ANNEX E (EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DETACHMENT) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. Situation. In the event of a CAI at Anniston Army Depot the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment can be expected to provide support.
2. Mission. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment provides render safe procedures to Anniston Army Depot in the event of a Chemical Accident/Incident.
3. Execution.
 - a. The EOD team will report to ANAD in the event of a CAI as directed by the Fort McClellan EOC or ANAD ECC.
 - b. Be prepared to accomplish EOD related tasks in removing explosive hazards.
4. Service Support. Personnel protective clothing will be used as specified by the EOD team leader.
5. Command and Signal.
 - a. Signal.
 - (1) Primary. EOD Radio Net (49.70mh).
 - (2) Secondary. Telephone.
 - b. Command. The EOD Team will be primarily under the control of the Fort McClellan Chemical Response Team Chief. The command will pass to ANAD CAIRAO upon entry to the Anniston Army Depot.

ANX E TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ANNEX F (MEDICAL TEAM) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. Situation. In the event of a CAI at Anniston Army Depot emergency augmentation to the medical section will be required and assistance will be provided as requested by the CAIRAO.

2. Mission. Fort McClellan Emergency Medical Team (EMT) and EMS Ambulance Section provides augmentation to Anniston Army Depot in the event of a Chemical Accident/Incident.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of operations. Upon notification that a CAI has occurred at ANAD, the Emergency Medical Team will be dispatched from NAH directly to DEAR Army Health Clinic. It will be the team's responsibility to augment the ANAD medical team and provide assistance as requested.

b. Disposition of Casualties. Insofar as possible, military medical facilities will be used for casualties where possibility of contamination exists. Remains of known dead will be released to logistics (Graves Registration/Mortuary) personnel for disposition.

c. Organization and Training. The emergency medical team will be structured as specified by the Office of the Surgeon General. The organization should be as outlined in AR 40-13, paragraph 3-3. All personnel should receive specialized training in treatment of chemical related injuries. The training will include, but is not limited to --

- (1) Triage.
- (2) Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation
- (3) Medical management of chemical casualties
- (4) Medical evacuation of casualties.

4. Service Support.

a. As specified in team SOP.

b. Initial response vehicle(s) will be commercial ambulances assigned to the NAH Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Section. Additional EMT team personnel and equipment will be deployed by available Field Ambulance Section ambulances, if required. The NCOIC, Emergency Medical Team will be responsible for the coordination of transportation requirements of team members to ANAD.

ANX F TO FM-CRP

5. Command and Signal.

- a. Signal - Primary - Radio
- Alternate - Telephone

b. Command. Anniston Army Depot assumes operational control of the Medical Team upon entry to the installation.

ANNEX G (PUBLIC INFORMATION) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. Situation. In the event that a CAI occurs at ANAD, public interest and concern will be highly significant. All planning facets will be directed toward an unusually high degree of public interest.
2. Mission. Augment Anniston Army Depot Public Affairs Office in the event of a Chemical Accident/Incident at the Depot.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operation. The Public Affairs Team will consist of three (3) Public Affairs Specialists and will assemble at grid coordinate 11203020 upon notification that a CAI has occurred at ANAD. When directed to deploy to ANAD from the assembly area by the Chemical Response Team Chief, the team will relocate to the Public Affairs Office at Anniston Army Depot.

b. Tasks. The ANAD Public Affairs Officer is responsible for providing direction and guidance to the Fort McClellan personnel supporting the mission.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Guidance for news releases will be provided by ANAD Public Affairs.

(2) ANAD Public Affairs will provide all releases to the news media.

(3) News releases will use the guidance provided in AR 50-6 and AR 360-5.

d. General Public Affairs Guidance.

(1) When public safety is a major consideration, the releasing officer will use a news release similar to the announcement in AR 50-6, Figure 5-2. It will include only the information necessary to protect public health and safety.

(2) If classified material is exposed and cannot be removed or covered immediately, the military authority at the scene of the accident will--

(a) Inform news media representatives of the presence of exposed classified material and ask them to cooperate in its protection. Photographers will be informed that photographing classified material is a violation of Federal criminal statutes (18 USC 793(D), 795, and 797).

(b) If news media representatives refuse to cooperate in protecting classified material, immediate assistance of civilian law enforcement officials in preventing compromise of material and in recovering all photographs, negatives, and sketches presumed to contain classified information will be sought. The cooperation of superiors of offending news media representatives will be requested, and they will be informed that publication of such

ANX G TO FM-CRP

classified information or the refusal to return it to the military authority is in violation of Federal statutes (18 USC 793 (d), 795, and 797).

(c) If a CAI occurs on the installation and the agent has escaped the confines of an installation, the release of certain information may be required in the interest of public health and safety. If such an accident should occur:

1. The Commanding Officer ANAD or designated representative will be responsible for releasing on-the-spot news and for notifying the proper authorities. (Specific instructions for notifying authorities are cited in AR 50-6, paragraph 5-7d.)

2. The announcements in Figures 5-3 and 5-4, AR 50-6 are basic news releases. They will include only the information necessary for the protection of public health and safety.

(d) Additional contingency releases or prepared announcements (or modifications) may be included in chemical accident information plans to meet particular local contingencies. These must be approved in advance by the OCPA.

4. Service Support. N/A

5. Command and Signal

a. Signal. See Annex K

(1) Primary - Radio

(2) Alternate - Telephone

b. Command. Anniston Army Depot assumes operational command of the Fort McClellan Public Affairs Team upon entry to the Depot.

ANNEX H (PROVOST MARSHAL) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)--
CHANGE 1

1. Situation.

a. General. In the event there is a Chemical Accident/Incident (CAI), (actual or exercise), the requirement exists for augmentation to the ANAD Security Police.

b. Assumption. That an augmentation security force of 20 personnel and a 40 person Traffic Control Team will be required by ANAD upon implementation of this plan.

2. Mission. The Fort McClellan Provost Marshal provides for military police noncommissioned officers to supervise the Security Force and Traffic Control Team which coordinates activities in support of Anniston Army Depot Security Police.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operation. Upon implementation of this plan, the Fort McClellan Provost Marshal provides one (1) individual (grade E-7 or above) officer and three (3) noncommissioned officers to supervise the Fort McClellan Security and Traffic Control Teams. Actions by both teams will be as requested by the ANAD Provost Marshal.

b. Tasks. The Fort McClellan Provost Marshal personnel will --

(1) Supervise the Security Force for operations internal to ANAD and as requested for augmentation to the Security Police.

(2) Supervise the Traffic Control Team that is required to effectively control the Traffic Control Points in coordination with Civil Authorities that will evacuate specific areas. It will be the mission of the Traffic Control Force to control the flow of traffic (vehicular and pedestrians) at specified intersections. This force will not be used in area evacuation.

(3) Ensure that all members of the Security Team are knowledgeable in the use of deadly force.

(4) Ensure that the security and traffic control forces have been issued the proper equipment.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The uniform for personnel assigned to the Security Team will consist of the following:

(a) Battle Dress Uniform (BDU).

(b) Steel or kevlar helmet.

ANX H TO FM-CRP--CHANGE 1

- (c) Armor vest.
- (d) Load Bearing Equipment (LBE).
- (e) Individual weapon.
- (f) Protective mask (combat ready, not training).
- (g) Mopp suit (Combat ready, not training).

(2) The uniform for personnel assigned to the Traffic Control Team will consist of the following:

- (a) Battle Dress Uniform (BDU).
- (b) Field Cap.
- (c) Protective mask (combat ready, not training).
- (d) Load Bearing Equipment (LBE).
- (e) Mopp suit (Combat ready, not training).

(3) Ammunition for the Security Team will be issued by the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) at Fort McClellan.

(4) ANAD Provost Marshal is responsible for directing the use of deadly force by all security personnel.

(5) Members of the Traffic Control Team will not carry weapons.

(6) In coordination with DPTMSEC and ANAD Provost Marshal, exercise key personnel with ANAD Security Police, as required.

d. Control and evacuation of Hazardous area.

(1) Control of Traffic and Isolation of the Hazardous Area. The Security Team will assist the ANAD Security Police as required, to control traffic into the hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. If the civilian community is involved, the Security and Traffic Control Team will provide assistance to civil authorities, as required, in isolating the hazardous area. Activities between the military and civilian police authorities will be coordinated by the Provost Marshal, ANAD, as directed by the ANAD ECC.

(2) Evacuation of the Hazardous Area. In evacuation is directed, evacuees (including casualties) will be routed through a collecting point designated by the ANAD ECC. Personnel being evacuated from the hazardous area

will be assumed to be contaminated until determined otherwise by appropriate procedures at the designated decontamination point. If contamination is suspected, evacuees will be decontaminated IAW ANAD instructions before transfer to a holding care center (school or other building), designated by the ANAD ECC through coordination with civilian authorities.

4. Service Support. n/a

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal. See basic plan.

b. Command. See basic plan.

ANNEX I (SECURITY FORCE) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)--
CHANGE 1

1. Situation.

a. General. In the event there is a Chemical Accident/Incident (CAI), actual or exercise, the ANAD security police will need additional security support.

b. Assumption. That a security force of 20 personnel will satisfy initial depot security augmentation requirements.

2. Mission. Headquarters Battalion provide a security force of 20 personnel to augment the ANAD security police.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Upon implementation of this plan, the Fort McClellan EOC will notify HQ Bn to activate the Security Force for immediate deployment to ANAD. The purpose of the Security Force is to provide additional manpower for security operations. Direction and control of this element, will be provided by the ANAD Provost Marshal with the assistance of the Fort McClellan military police personnel.

b. Tasks.

(1) Headquarters Battalion will:

(a) Provide 20 personnel to the Fort McClellan Provost Marshal to perform duties as security personnel.

(b) Ensure individuals identified for Security Force duty qualify annually with individual weapons.

(c) Exercise with ANAD Security Police as directed by/coordinated with Fort McClellan DPTMSEC and Provost Marshal.

(d) Coordinate with ANAD/Ft McClellan Provost Marshal and ensure that all Security Team members are knowledgeable of basic security force rules of engagement, particularly use of deadly force.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The uniform for personnel assigned to the Security Team will consist of the following:

(a) Battle Dress Uniform (BDU).

(b) Steel or kevlar helmet.

ANX I TO FM-CRP--CHANGE 1

(c) Armor Vest.

(d) Load Bearing Equipment (LBE) (First aid pouch, canteen w/ chemical cap, ammo magazine (4), ammo pouches (2)).

(e) Individual Weapon.

(f) Protective Mask (combat ready, not training).

(g) Mopp Suit (Combat ready, not training).

(2) DOL will issue ammunition for test firing weapons prior to deploying.

(3) Ammunition for the Security Team will be issued by The Directorate of Logistics (DOL) at Fort McClellan.

(4) ANAD Security Police is responsible for directing the use of deadly force by all security personnel.

4. Service Support. n/a

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal. See basic plan.

b. Command. See basic plan.

ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. Situation.

a. General. If a catastrophic CAI event occurs at Anniston Army Depot, it is possible that selected areas of the civilian community will be evacuated. The evacuation, even if well planned and executed, will cause considerable confusion which can be expected to have a significant impact on the civilian population and will result in a great deal of news media speculation.

b. Assumptions.

(1) Civil law enforcement will evacuate the affected area.

(2) Civil law enforcement will not be able to secure all of the traffic control points as designated by the Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency.

(3) The evacuation will be required during hours of limited visibility (night) and during adverse weather conditions.

2. Mission. The Headquarters Battalion (Provisional) provides a Traffic Control Team (40 personnel) to control designated traffic control points.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. When the down wind hazard at ANAD from a CAI is such that selected zones of the civilian population require evacuation ANAD will recommend the evacuation. The decision for evacuation will be made by local civil authorities. The evacuation will be implemented by civil authorities. Traffic control points will be established to ensure that unauthorized personnel do not enter/re-enter the evacuated zone. The description and maps of the zones are at appendices 1-6. When the areas of the zones are evacuated, the traffic control points are established.

b. Tasks.

(1) The Ft McClellan Provost Marshal (two (2) noncommissioned officers) will be responsible for posting the personnel assigned to the traffic control team. Insofar as possible, two (2) personnel will be assigned to each control point. The ANAD ECC will be notified immediately when only one (1) individual is assigned to a traffic control point.

(2) The Headquarters Battalion (Provisional) will provide personnel to establish traffic control points as directed by the ANAD Provost Marshal in concert with this plan and in coordination with civil authorities.

(3) DOL will issue TA-50 Equipment to non FORSCOM units.

ANX J TO FM-CRP

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The uniform and equipment for the traffic control personnel will be:

- (a) Battle Dress Uniform (BDU).
- (b) Field Cap.
- (c) Load Bearing Equipment (LBE).
- (d) Protective mask.
- (e) Flashlights, if required.
- (f) Mopp Suit (Combat ready, not training).

(2) Personnel assigned to Traffic Control Points will not carry weapons.

(3) Personnel assigned to the Traffic Control Points will not perform duties nor act in the capacity of a law enforcement official.

(4) Instructions for personnel at the Traffic Control Points will be provided by the Fort McClellan MP personnel operating under command and control of the ANAD Provost Marshal.

(5) Headquarters Battalion (Prov) will ensure that each two-man Traffic Control Team is issued a military vehicle equipped with one of the following radios:

- (a) AN/VRC 47
- (b) AN/VRC 46
- (c) AN/GRC 160

(6) A composite map of the six zones of evacuation is at Appendix 7.


4. Service Support. n/a

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal. See Annex K, Communication.

b. Command of the Traffic Control Team passes to Anniston Army Depot upon departure from Fort McClellan. The command post location of the traffic control team will be as specified by the ANAD Provost Marshal.

APPENDIX I (ZONE 1) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO FORT
MCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



EZ1

Zone 1 is located within an approximate three mile radius of the chemical agent containment area immediately adjacent to the eastern boundary of the Depot.

This zone is bordered on the north by the southern boundary of Pelham Range and the County Landfill Road.

The eastern boundary of Zone 1 begins at the intersection of new County Road 109 and the Landfill Road, follows new County Road 109 southward to the turnoff of old County 109, then follows old 109 and the Gate 8 Road to the Depot boundary.

The southern and western boundaries of EZ 1 are formed by the Depot boundary itself.

Seven Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this Zone.

Evacuees from Zone 1 will be permitted to exit the area via all roads blocked by TCPs 1-1 through 1-7.

Traffic will be permitted to flow northward and southward on new County Road 109.

TCP 1-1 Blocks the Morrisville/County Landfill Road at new County Road 109; prevents traffic from travelling west on the County Landfill Road.

TCP 1-2 Blocks old County Road 109 at its intersection with new County Road 109; prevents traffic from travelling west on old 109.

TCP 1-3 Blocks the old Leatherwood Road at its intersection with old County Road 109; prevents entry to old 109.

TCP 1-4 Blocks Avenue "G" at its intersection with the Gate 8 Road; prevents entry onto the Gate 8 Road.


TCP 1-5 Blocks Elm Street at its intersection with the Gate 8 Roads; prevents entry onto the Gate 8 Road.

TCP 1-6 Blocks Jean Boulevard at Millie Street; prevents traffic from entering the Gate 8 Road.

TCP 1-7 Blocks the old Eulaton School Road at its intersection with the Gate 8 Road; prevents entry onto the Gate 8 Road.

NOTE: It is assumed that Zone 1 will be evacuated prior to or at the same time that Zone 2 is ordered to evacuate. Therefore, TCPs 1-1 through 1-7 will not be required when Zone 2 is ordered to evacuate.

APPENDIX 2 (ZONE 2) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO
FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



APP 2 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

Evacuation Zone 2 is an area three to five miles due east of the Depot chemical agent containment area.

This zone is bordered on the north by Parkwood Drive (old Buttermilk Road) eastward from new County Road 109 to a point just west of the old Parkwood School site.

The eastern boundary of Zone 2 is an imaginary line running southward from Parkwood Drive, crossing West 22nd Street just west of Tuskegee Drive, to the intersection of the Morrisville Road and West 12th Street and continuing eastward to the intersection of the Morrisville Road and the Eulaton Road.

The southern boundary follows the Eulaton Road westward from its intersection with the Morrisville Road to its closest proximity to the L. & N. Railroad near Wellborn School, then follows the railroad westward to the County Road 109 overpass, and finally follows the Eulaton Gate Road to the Depot boundary.

The western boundary of this zone is formed by Zone 1 and the eastern boundary of Pelham Range.

Seventeen Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this zone.

Evacuees from Zone 2 will be permitted to exit the area via all roads blocked by TCPs 2-1 through 2-16 but not via 2-17.

Traffic will be permitted to flow eastward and westward on Parkwood Drive and the Eulaton Road.

TCP 2-1 Blocks new County Road 109 at Parkwood Drive; prevents traffic from moving south on 109.

TCP 2-2 Blocks the Reaves Road; prevents traffic from entering the Reaves Road.

TCP 2-3 Blocks the Reaves Farm Road; prevents traffic from entering the road.

TCP 2-4 Blocks West 22nd Street just west of Tuskegee Drive; prevents traffic from moving westward on West 22nd.

TCP 2-5 Blocks Ammons Street just east of Elston Street; prevents traffic from moving westward on Ammons and southward on Elston.

TCP 2-6 Blocks West 14th Street on the east side of Elston; prevents traffic from entering Elston.

APP 2 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

TCP 2-7 Blocks West 13th Street on the east side of Elston; prevents traffic from entering Elston.

TCP 2-8 Blocks West 12th Street at the Morrisville Road; prevents traffic from entering the Morrisville Road or turns traffic eastward toward Anniston.

TCP 2-9 Blocks West 11th Street at the Morrisville Road; prevents traffic from entering the Morrisville Road or turns traffic eastward toward Anniston.

TCP 2-10 Blocks the Morrisville Road at the intersection of Eualton Road; prevents traffic from moving westward on the Morrisville Road.

TCP 2-11 Blocks Lomac Drive off the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering.

TCP 2-12 Blocks Waldrep Street off the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering.

TCP 2-13 Blocks Amerson Street off the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering.

TCP 2-14 Blocks Lynne Drive into Grandview Acres off the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering.

TCP 2-15 Blocks Margret Street off the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering.

TCP 2-16 Blocks the Bud Woods Road off the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering.

TCP 2-17 Blocks new County Road 109 at the Eulaton Road; prevents traffic from entering 109.


NOTE: It is assumed that Zone 1 will be evacuated prior to or at the same time that Zone 2 is ordered to evacuate. Therefore, TCPs 1-1 through 1-7 will not be required when Zone 2 is ordered to evacuate.

APP 2 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

J-2-4

APPENDIX 3 (ZONE 3) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO
FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



APP 3 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

Evacuation Zone 3 is an area three to five miles southeast of the Depot chemical agent containment area.

This zone is bordered on the north eastward from the Depot's Eulaton Gate by the Eulaton Gate Road, then by the L. & N. Railroad to just east of Wellborn School, and then by the Eulaton Road to its intersection with the Morrisville Road.

The eastern boundary of Zone 3 is an imaginary line running southward from the Eulaton Road along Lloyd Street, crossing Highway 202 just west of Bell Road, continuing southward to Coldwater mountain and then continuing southwestward along Coldwater Mountain to County Road 109 just north of Circle Drive.

The western boundary of this zone follows the L. & N. Railroad northward from Circle Drive to the Depot's southeastern border and then along the Depot border to the Eulaton Gate Road.

Thirteen Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this Zone, assuming that Zones 1 and 2 are evacuated also.

Evacuees will be permitted to exit the area via all roads blocked by TCPs 2-1 through 2-9 and TCPs 3-1 through 3-4.

TCP 3-1 Blocks the intersection of the Morrisville Road and the Eulaton Road; prevents all westbound traffic on either road.

TCP 3-2 Blocks Highway 202 just west of Bell Road; prevents traffic from moving westward on 202.

TCP 3-3 Blocks County Road 109 just north of the Coldwater School Road; prevents traffic from moving northward on 109.


TCP 3-4 Blocks Highway 202 just east of the L&N Railroad overpass; prevents traffic from moving eastward on 202.

NOTE: It is to be assumed that Zones 1 and 2 will be evacuated prior to or at the same time that Zone 3 is ordered to evacuate. Therefore:

TCPs 1-1 through 1-7 and TCPs 2-10 through 2-17 will not be required.

TCPs 2-1 through 2-9 same as for EZ 2.

APPENDIX 4 (ZONE 4) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



J-4-1

APP 4 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

Evacuation Zone 4 is an area three to six miles south and southwest of the Depot's chemical agent containment area.

This zone is bordered on the north eastward from near Talladega County line to the L. & N. Railroad by the Depot's southern border.

The eastern boundary follows the L. & N. Railroad southward from the Depot border to the Coldwater School Road and then follows the Coldwater Pump Road (County Road 109) to Highway 78.

The southern boundary follows Highway 78 westward from County Road 109 to the Talladega County line.

The western boundary of this zone follows County Road 93 northward from Highway 78 to the Fish Hatchery Road.

Eleven Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this zone.

Evacuees from Zone 4 will be permitted to exit the area via all roads blocked by TCP 4-1 through 4-11.

TCP 4-1 Blocks Highway 202 between Cooper Circle and the L&N Railroad overpass; prohibits westbound traffic on 202.

TCP 4-2 Blocks the Coldwater School Road at its intersection with County Road 109; prohibits westbound traffic entry.

TCP 4-3 Blocks the first road to the north off Highway 78 west of County Road 109; prohibits northbound traffic.

TCP 4-4 Blocks the second road to the north off Highway 78 west of County Road 109; prohibits northbound traffic.

TCP 4-5 Blocks the third road to the north off Highway 78 west of County Road 109; prohibits northbound traffic.

TCP 4-6 Blocks the fourth road to the north off Highway 78 west of County Road 109; prohibits northbound traffic.

TCP 4-7 Blocks the fifth road to the north off Highway 78 west of County Road 109; prohibits northbound traffic.

TCP 4-8 Blocks County Road 26 on the north side of Highway 78; prevents northbound traffic on 26.

APP 4 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

TCP 4-9 Blocks Highway 202 at Highway 78; prevents eastbound traffic on 202.


TCP 4-10 Blocks the Fish Hatchery Road on the north side of Highway 78;
prevents northbound traffic off 78.

TCP 4-11 Blocks the Fish Hatchery Road on the east side of County Road 93;
prevents entry of eastbound traffic.

APP 4 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX 5 (ZONE 5) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



APP 5 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

Evacuation Zone 5 is an area three to five miles west and southwest of the Depot's chemical agent containment area.

This zone is bordered on the north by the Brunner Valley Road eastward to the Depot's western border.

The eastern boundary follows the Depot's western border southward to the Fish Hatchery Road.

The southern boundary follows the Fish Hatchery Road westward to County Road 93.

The western boundary of this zone follows County Road 93 northward to the Brunner Valley Road.

Only three Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this zone.


Evacuees from Zone 5 will be permitted to exit the area via all roads blocked by TCPs 5-1 through 5-3.

TCP 5-1 Blocks the Brunner Valley Road at its intersection with County Road 93; prohibits traffic from moving eastward on the Brunner Valley Road toward the Depot. (Same as TCP 6-4).

TCP 5-2 Blocks the Pettus Road at its intersection with County Road 93; prohibits traffic from moving eastward toward the Depot's Gate 2.

TCP 5-3 Blocks the Fish Hatchery Road at its intersection with County Road 93; prohibits traffic from moving eastward toward the Fish Hatchery. (Same as TCP 4-11).

APPENDIX 6 (ZONE 6) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



APP 6 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

Evacuation Zone 6 is an area three to six miles northwest of the Depot's chemical agent containment area and due west of Pelham Range.

This zone is bordered on the north by County Road 73 (Boiling Springs Road) eastward from County Road 93 to the extreme northwest corner of Pelham Range.

The eastern boundary follows the Brunner Valley Road westward to County Road 93.

The western boundary of this zone follows County Road 93 northward from the Brunner Valley Road to the Boiling Springs Road (County Road 73).

Four Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this zone.

NOTE: For further clarification of EZs refer to the Anniston Army Depot's Off-Site Evacuation Zone Map.

Evacuees from Zone 6 will be permitted to exit the area via all roads blocked by TCP 6-1 through 6-4.

TCP 6-1 Blocks the dirt road exiting southeastward from County Road 73 toward Pelham Range 3/4 miles east of the Boiling Springs Church; prohibits traffic from entering this road.

TCP 6-2 Blocks the old Francis Mill Road at its intersection with County Road 93; prohibits traffic from entering from 93.

TCP 6-3 Blocks the Vinson Cemetery Road at its intersection with County Road 93; prohibits traffic from entering from 93.

TCP 6-4 Blocks the Brunner Valley Road at its intersection with County Road 93; prohibits traffic from entering from 93. (Same as TCP 5-1).

Evacuation Zone 6 is an area three to six miles northwest of the Depot's Chemical Agent containment area and due west of Pelham Range.

This zone is bordered on the north by County Road 73 (Boiling Springs Road) eastward from County Road 93 to the extreme northwest corner of Pelham Range.

The eastern boundary follows the Pelham Range western border southward to the Brunner Valley Road.

The southern boundary follows the Brunner Valley Road westward to County Road 93.

APP 6 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

The western boundary of this zone follows County Road 93 northward from the Brunner Valley Road to the Boiling Springs Road (County Road 73).


Four Traffic Control Points (TCPs) are required to secure this zone.

NOTE: For further clarification of EZs refer to the Anniston Army Depot's Off-Site Evacuation Zone Map.

APP 6 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX 7 (COMPOSITE MAP) TO ANNEX J (TRAFFIC CONTROL) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)



APP 7 TO ANX J TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

1. General. This annex outlines the teams that must be able to communicate in the event of a CAI at ANAD. It is assumed that radio transmissions will be monitored by the civilian community.

2. Mission. In the event of a CAI (actual or exercise), the Chemical Response Team Chief must be able to effectively communicate with all assigned teams.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. When a CAI has occurred at ANAD, all teams upon arrival at the assembly area will enter the radio net. The frequency used will be 52.00 Mh. Only those transmissions required will be used for the mission accomplishment. If the CAI (actual) has occurred, the medical team is the only one authorized to transmit a casualty report and this will only be done to prevent loss of life.

b. Tasks.

(1) The Director of Logistics will provide the FM radios as required for successful implementation of this plan. In the event of an actual CAI at ANAD the Fort McClellan Reaction Teams requested will have first priority on the installation for radios. The quantity and priority of issue will be:

PRIORITY	TITLE/POSITION	QUANTITY	TYPE RADIO
1	Chief, Chemical Reaction Team	1	AN/VRC 46
1	Asst Chief, Chemical Reaction Team	1	AN/VRC 46
1	Decontamination Team	1	AN/VRC 46
1	Public Affairs Team	1	AN/VRC 46
1	Medical Team	1	AN/VRC 46
1	Security Team	1	AN/VRC 46
1	Traffic Control Team	1	AN/VRC 46
2	Traffic Control Team	20 (NTE)	AN/VRC 46 or AN/GRC 160 or AN/PRC 77

NTE - Not to exceed

(2) The Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security will provide back up communications when requested by either the Chemical Response Team Chief or ANAD ECC.

ANX K TO FM-CRP

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The EOC will act as net control station (NCS) for all radio nets when used in support of a CAI at ANAD.

(2) NCS Control of Fort McClellan Reaction Teams will be transferred to ANAD ECC when the teams enter Anniston Army Depot.

4. Service Support. See paragraph 3b(1) above.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal.

(1) The primary means of communication to be used by CAI reaction forces will be crystal-tuned frequency-modulated radio (frequency 52.00 mh). The telephone system will serve as both the auxiliary and secondary communications system. Proper radio-telephone procedure will be used.

(a) FM radio call signs, Appendix 1.

(b) Telephone numbers, Appendix 2.

(2) Upon entry to ANAD, the team will change to frequency 36.75 (ANAD ECC). ANAD ECC call sign is "RED DOG 340."

b. Command. n/a

TAB A (TRAFFIC CONTROL CALL SIGNS) TO APPENDIX 1 (RADIO CALL SIGNS) TO ANNEX K
 (COMMUNICATIONS) TO FORT MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

The primary frequency for Traffic Control is 52.20 mh.

<u>EVACUATION ZONE (EZ)</u>	<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>
1	TCP 1-1 thru 1-7	1-1 thru 1-7
2	TCP 2-1 thru 2-17	2-1 thru 2-17
3	TCP 3-1 thru 3-4	3-1 thru 3-4
4	TCP 4-1 thru 4-11	4-1 thru 4-11
5	TCP 5-1 thru 5-3	5-1 thru 5-3
6	TCP 6-1 thru 6-4	6-1 thru 6-4
	Chief, Traffic Control	Tango Charlie - 6
	Asst C, Traffic Control	Tango Charlie - 5

TAB A TO APP 1 TO ANX K TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

K-1-A-2

APPENDIX 1 (RADIO CALL SIGNS) TO ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO FORT MCCLELLAN
CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>
Response Team Chief	Fox Mike 6
Response Team Alternate Chief	Fox Mike 5
Decon Team Chief	Fox Mike Delta
Security Team Chief	Fox Mike Sierra
Medical Team	Fox Mike November
Public Affairs	Fox Mike Papa
EOD	Fox Mike Echo
EOC	Bravo 3
EOC Spare 1	Bravo 1
EOC Spare 2	Bravo 2
EOC Spare 3	Bravo 4
EOC Spare 4	Bravo 5
Traffic Control	SEE TAB A
ANAD ECC	Red Dog 340
EOD (Frequency 49.70)	EOD
Eulation Gate (Primary Entrance)	Phase Line Zulu
Gate CB-3 (Alternate Entrance)	Phase Line X-Ray

APP 1 TO ANX K TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

APPENDIX 2 (KEY TELEPHONE NUMBERS) TO ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO FORT
MCCLELLAN CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN (FM-CRP)

Military Police	4531/5555
Chemical Response Team Chief	TBP
Chemical Response Alternate Team Chief	TBP
Staff Duty Officer (Post)	3821
Staff Duty Office (USACMLS)	4712
Headquarters Battalion (Provisional)	4727
Emergency Operations Center	4773/4340/3116
Emergency Medical Team	4515
Safety Officer	4723
Public Affairs Office	5377
Director of Engineering and Housing	3215
142d EOD	5124/5430 238-1477 (24 hr comm)
ANAD ECC	235-4438/6664
ANAD SECURITY	235-7595
ANAD PAO	235-6284
ANAD MEDICAL CLINIC	235-4109
FORT MCCLELLAN ASSEMBLY AREA (GRID COORDINATE 11203020)	238-5194

APP 2 TO ANX K TO FM-CRP

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


K-2-2

Document Separator

Document Separator



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

8 AUG 1994

Honorable Glen Browder
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Browder,

In our meeting on June 16, 1994, you and I discussed Department of Defense policy and intentions on several matters related to the Chemical Demilitarization Project scheduled for Anniston Army Depot. You requested that I provide assurances on these matters, and I am pleased to respond to this request. As you know, the Department is eager to conduct its business in a manner that is open and meets community concerns to the maximum extent possible. The "safeguard" assurances you request serve this purpose and therefore deserve the positive responses provided below.

Please rest assured that we share your concern for safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons at Anniston. Specifically:

Prohibition against transportation:

As required in section 8075A of Public Law 103-139, no federal funds will be used to study the feasibility of removal or transportation of unitary chemical weapons from or into Anniston Army Depot, except as permitted by that section.

Enhanced stockpile surveillance:

Anniston is already incorporated into the enhanced stockpile surveillance program and will be monitored until completion of the chemical weapons destruction program.

Site-specific risk assessment:

We will perform a site-specific risk assessment at Anniston before construction of the chemical weapons disposal facility begins.

Neutralization research:

We will continue research into neutralization technology and, should breakthroughs occur early which demonstrate improved safety or environmental performance, we will endeavor to apply the new data to destruction design and operation at Anniston.

Lessons learned:

We will incorporate lessons learned from the Johnston Atoll and Tooele Army Depot destruction facilities into the design and operation of the Anniston facility.

Successful JACADS operation/Third facility contract:

As required in section 2106 of Public Law 103-160, none of the funds appropriated, pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in section 2104(a) for construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility at Anniston will be obligated until the Secretary of Defense submits a certification in accordance with that provision.

Carbon filtration system:

We will incorporate the most effective carbon filtration system available into the design of the Anniston disposal facility.

Monitoring for long-term health effects:

We will coordinate with public health agencies to monitor long-term health effects of the destruction program at Anniston.

Anniston Army Depot/Fort McClellan support resources:

By separate correspondence, I am asking the Secretary of the Army to work closely with the Alabama Department of Environmental Management to respond to the state requirements and to be fully responsive to their concerns.

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program:

We will provide for maximum protection for the environment and human health of the community surrounding Anniston Army Depot by providing effective leadership to ensure the successful implementation of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program.

Destruction of facility upon completion of demilitarization:


The facility constructed at Anniston Army Depot will be used only for destruction of chemical weapons and munitions stored at Anniston Army Depot, and once the elimination of that stockpile is completed, the facility will be dismantled and removed.

Congressional oversight:

We will conduct all operations in full awareness of Congressional oversight through the authorization and appropriations process.

I assure you that the Department of Defense will continue to ensure that the destruction of our chemical weapons stockpile is accomplished in full cognizance of the ongoing need to protect our people and our environment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Deutch". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looped initial "J".



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



AUG 1 1 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ATTN: ASA(IL&E)

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Facility at
Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama

Efforts are ongoing to ensure the successful start of chemical weapons demilitarization operations at Anniston Army Depot. In order to gain the requisite support for these operations, we must ensure the application of certain safeguards which will satisfy local concerns and enhance the safety of the demilitarization process.

We need to be fully responsive to the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, and we must commit appropriate military resources (such as the following, which have been identified at their current location) to support the demilitarization effort:

Anniston Army Depot:

Directorate for Law Enforcement and Security
Directorate for Ammunition Operations
Ammunition Surveillance Division
Depot Equipment Division
Environmental Management Division
Health Clinic
Depot Commander
Electronics Liaison Office

Fort McClellan:


Decontamination Team
Medical Assistance Team
Security Control Team
Communications Support Team
Rescue Squad
Public Affairs Office
Plans and Operations Office
Explosive Ordnance Detachment
Noble Army Community Hospital
Provost Marshal
Traffic Control and Security Force
Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and
Security



Directorate of Logistics
Staff Judge Advocate
Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities
Joint Information Center
Emergency Operations Center

I will appreciate your timely attention in this matter. I hope that you will be able to report to me in the very near future that the coordination required to ensure commitment of appropriate resources has been accomplished.

Please inform Dr. Ted Prociw, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and Biological Matters) on the status of your coordination efforts. Dr. Prociw can be reached at Extension #51097.


R. Noel Longuemare
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition & Technology)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INSTALLATIONS LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110



September 23, 1994

Major General Alfonso E. Lenhardt
Commanding General
U. S. Army Chemical and Military
Police Centers
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205

Dear General Lenhardt:


Fort McClellan and Anniston Army Depot have historically maintained an outstanding relationship. This relationship has resulted in cooperative agreements and mutual support for each installation's unique roles and missions.

Since March 1989, a response plan has provided the basis for procedures and actions to be employed by Fort McClellan in support of a chemical accident/incident should such an event occur at Anniston Army Depot. As we approach construction and ultimate demilitarization operations at Anniston Army Depot, the comprehensive response plan will be a significant document subject to review by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management during the permitting process. It will also become visible to elected officials and local citizens as they evaluate the emergency preparedness posture of Anniston and the surrounding communities.

The commitment to provide appropriate Department of Defense resources is demonstrated in the attached memorandum from the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. Request the Memorandum of Agreement between the U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan and Anniston Army Depot be reviewed and updated to assure the resources referenced in the attached memorandum are specifically addressed. Also, request a copy of the revised contingency plan be provided to my Deputy for Chemical Demilitarization, Colonel James Coverstone, after revision.

I appreciate your cooperation on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert M. Walker". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Robert M. Walker
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

Attachment

CF:
Commanding General, U. S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INSTALLATIONS LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110



September 23, 1994

Major General Dennis L. Benchoff
Commanding General
U. S. Army Industrial Operations Command
Rock Island, Illinois 61299

Dear General Benchoff:


Anniston Army Depot and Fort McClellan have historically maintained an outstanding relationship. This relationship has resulted in cooperative agreements and mutual support for each installation's unique roles and missions.

Since March 1989, a response plan has provided the basis for procedures and actions to be employed by Fort McClellan in support of a chemical accident/incident should such an event occur at Anniston Army Depot. As we approach construction and ultimate demilitarization operations at Anniston Army Depot, the comprehensive response plan will be a significant document subject to review by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management during the permitting process. It will also become visible to elected officials and local citizens as they evaluate the emergency preparedness posture of Anniston and the surrounding communities.

The commitment to provide appropriate Department of Defense resources is demonstrated in the attached memorandum from the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. Request the Memorandum of Agreement between Anniston Army Depot and the U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan be reviewed and updated to assure the resources referenced in the attached memorandum are specifically addressed. Also, request a copy of the revised contingency plan be provided to my Deputy for Chemical Demilitarization, Colonel James Coverstone, after revision.

I appreciate your cooperation on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert M. Walker". The signature is written in black ink and extends across the width of the page.

Robert M. Walker
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

Attachment

CF:
Commander, Anniston Army Depot
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Chemical and Biological Matters,
U. S. Army Materiel Command

Document Separator

Military Value Summary

- **NBC Weapons Threat Increasing**
- **Leadership Role in International and Joint NBC Defense Diminished**
- **Future of Live Agent Training (CDTF) at Risk**
- **National Bio Defense Capability Significantly Delayed**
- **Ability to conduct Smoke and Obscurants Training Severely Limited**
- **Mobilization Capability Not Considered**
- **Chemical Stockpile Destruction at Risk**
- **Return on Investment Highly Questionable**

1995 List of U.S. Military Installations for Closure

Army	Employment Loss (%)
Fort McClellan, Alabama	-17.3
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas	-0.3
Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, Colorado	-0.4
Price Support Center, Illinois	-0.1
Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois	-8.2
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	-4.8
Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan	-0.1
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey	-0.8
Seneca Army Depot, New York	-3.2
Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania	Net+0.2
Red River Army Depot, Texas	-7.7
Fort Pickett, Virginia	-0.8
Navy	
Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska	No Net Impact
Navel Shipyard, Long Beach, California	-.04
Ship Repair Facility, Guam	-10.6
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana	-2.3
Naval Surface Warfare Ctr, Crane Division Det, Louisville, KY	-0.7
Naval Surface Warfare Ctr, Dahlgren Division Det, White Oak, MD	-0.6
Naval Air Station, Souty Weymouth, Massachusetts	-0.1
Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi	-8.0
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey	Net+1.1
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA	-1.2
Air Force	
North Highlands Air Guard Station, California	
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California	No Net Impact
Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York	-6.2
Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York	Net +0.1
Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio	No Net Impact
Greter Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania	-0.1
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas	-0.2
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas	-0.9
Reese Air Force Base, Texas	-2.2
Defense Logistics Agency	
Defense Distribution Depot, Memphis, Tennessee	-0.9
Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah	-0.3

AGENDA

- **Introduction**
- **Economic Impact**
- **Military Value**
- **Environmental Requirements**
- **Return on Investment**
- **Summary**

Military Value Overview

- **Why We are Here**
- **MP School Mission**
- **NBC Warfare Threat**
- **Chemical School Background**
- **Chemical School Mission**
- **CDTF Issues and Risk**
- **Summary**



**82nd Chem troops
head downrange**

page 11

MAY IS...
Correct Posture Month
Physical Fitness & Sports Month
Clean Air Campaign Month
Mental Health Month
...And 5 Other Months
page 3

McClellan News

Volume 25, Number 20

Fort McClellan, Ala.-Serving A Readership of 85,000

May 21, 1993

Chemical incident readiness

Fort, Depot test emergency operations

By Charles R. Evans
Staff Writer

The wail of warning sirens Monday morning kicked off a joint week-long training exercise at Anniston (Ala.) Army Depot and Fort McClellan. The exercise tested the ability of federal, state and local agencies to deal with a chemical accident at AAD and other chemical weapons storage sites throughout the United States.

Despite treaties banning chemical warfare the United States and other countries still have large stockpiles of chemical agents. Most of the agents, and their delivery systems are due to be destroyed as soon as environmental and other concerns are met.

However, until they are destroyed, it is necessary to keep them secure and minimize the danger to the public and the workers who handle them. The Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program and the Full Scale Exercise/Service Response Force were tested in an effort to allow all of the agencies that would be involved in an actual emergency to practice working together as they would during a real incident.

Federal, regional and local participation

Personnel from Calhoun, Talladega, Etowah, Cleburne and St. Clair County Emergency Management Agencies; the State of Alabama Emergency Management Agency; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; military personnel from throughout the Army; local emergency response personnel and elected officials from throughout the region participated in the drill.

According to Joan Gustafson, Public Affairs Officer, AAD, "these exercises are designed to stress people, equipment and capabilities to the maximum extent possible."

To enhance the realism of the exercise very little of the scenario was divulged beforehand. Role players were used to simulate casualties, media or other people likely to be encountered during an actual incident. At Fort McClellan a Joint Information Center was established to handle media inquiries.



TRACKS[®]

U.S. Postage Paid
Bulk Rate
Anniston, Ala. 36201
Permit No. 326

Volume 16, Number 3

June 3, 1993

Anniston, Alabama

short tracks

U.S. Savings Bond campaign begins

There are many reasons for you to save: your children's college education, your retirement, a down payment on a home or any other reason.

Yet, trying to set aside a few dollars every payday is hard to do. But, there is a way you can do it. It's a time proven, easy, almost painless way to save money.

It's called the Payroll Savings Plan for U.S. Savings Bonds. Anniston Army Depot's annual campaign started June 1 and will end June 30. During this period, employees have an opportunity to start or increase their payroll deduction for U.S. Series EE Saving Bonds.

Bonds are issued in denominations starting at \$100. The cost of these bonds is half the face value or \$50 for every \$100. Other denominations are \$200, \$500, and \$1,000 bonds.

mean I have to put aside \$50 every pay period to buy a bond? No! You can set aside a few dollars, starting at \$5 a pay period, until you have enough to buy a bond. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) keeps track of the amount of your deductions and automatically issues a Series EE Bond when you have set aside enough for the purchase.

There are other reasons to sign up for the Payroll Deduction Plan for U.S. Savings Bonds. First, your money is absolutely safe.



SRFX-'93 started with a vehicle accident, but quickly developed into major incident involving county, state and Federal emergency management agencies. Above is the scene that greeted the first members of the depot's IRF responding to the scene of the accident. (U.S. Army photo by Herman Harrelson, DAC)

SRFX-93 over but not forgotten;

SRFX-'93 in photos

(Continued from page 1)
COM and Corps of Engineers) were also soon brought into play.

SRF activated

Because of the expected off-post downwind hazard, the depot commander made the decision to call in the Service Response Force to assist in the rapid resolution of the disaster, and recommended to the local EMAs they consider evacuation of the down wind hazard areas.

When the SRF was called in, the Public Affairs Office moved its operations from the depot to Munson Hall at Fort McClellan, where a Joint Information Center (JIC) was established. Operating from the JIC would be EMA representatives from the six surrounding counties (Calhoun, Cleburne, Clay, Etowah, St. Clair and Talladega), as well as personnel from the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) in Montgomery and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A special support group of Public Affairs specialists totaling nearly 40 would also respond with the SRF with over half of them participating in JIC operations.

The second accident

As cleanup operations continued at the initial accident site, a second inci-

dent occurred near Bldg 88. A parked truck, loaded with 210 rounds of 105mm GB nerve agent projectiles was struck by lightning, exploding 25 rounds and damaging still more. A Security Guard was also injured when he too was struck by lightning.

Members of the IRF team now had to be pulled away from the first incident site to respond to this second incident.



Throughout the afternoon, the level of intensity continued to increase. Casualties were evacuated, decontaminated at the hot line and transported to the Dear Health Clinic. After receiving initial medical treatment they were transported to local hospitals depending on the nature and severity of their injuries and the level of medical treatment they needed. Casualties were sent to Noble Army Hospital at Ft. McClellan and to Anniston's Regional Medical Center and Stringfellow Memorial Hospital.

The next two days of the exercise would test the various response capabilities of all of the participating agen-

For instance, Clay County had a mass casualty exercise planned which was incorporated into the overall exercise play as well. Simulations of area evacuations saw nearly 40,000 people sent to mass care processing centers in

(Continued on next page)





Moving out...

Above, a Survey and Monitoring Team works to mark the location of all munitions found in the area. Recovery teams will soon follow and begin removing the munitions.



One at a time...

Above, two members of the IRT dressed out in "Level A" protective clothing, begin the job of recovering munitions scattered around the accident site. In the course of the recovery operations, every round must be accounted for.



Why We are Here

- **Retired Military**
- **Each with 30+ years of Active Service**
- **Impact on National Security and Readiness of Armed Forces**

Department of the Army Installation Assessment (IA) Process and Supporting Data




Figure 8. Installation Assessment Rankings - TRAINING SCHOOLS

An evaluation using measures from announced DOD selection criteria.

Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons)

**The Threat to
United States National Security**

“The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security.”


President Clinton
Defense 94, Issue 6

“The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons.”

William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
DOD BRAC Report
March 1995



BRAC 95 STRATEGY



BALANCED APPROACH THAT:

- FOCUSES ON FUTURE - FORCE XXI
- CONSISTENT WITH STATIONING STRATEGY
- MEETS OSD EXPECTATIONS (ROBUST LIST)
- MAXIMIZES SAVINGS / MINIMIZES COST

Army Focus 94 - Force XXI


“There are three general levels of military threat to the United States and its interests: **nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons**; standing armies of foreign powers; and **irregular forces ranging from ethnic militias to terrorists and the gunmen of criminal cartels.**

Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are **viewed as potential equalizers** by states that cannot compete with the technology and wealth of the United States. . .Moscow retains the nuclear capability to destroy the United States. . . **biological weapons pose a ‘dark horse’ threat of ferocious potential.** Offensive biological warfare programs are still on the agendas of many nations that are potential adversaries.”

GEN Gordon R. Sullivan
US Army Chief of Staff

Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army

Proliferation of NBC Weapons (Defense Intelligence Agency)



Testimony Before BRAC Commission

“The Commission should consider the negative signals which such closing would send to our friends, allies and potential enemies . . . In my judgment **the closing of Fort McClellan, Alabama, would undermine deterrence** against chemical and biological attacks and engender serious risks for the Armed Forces of the United States.”

Ambassador Edwin L. Rowny (5 Apr 93)

NBC Terrorists

“One of the most nightmarish concerns facing the USA and its Allies is the potential for a terrorist incident involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.”

LTG James Clapper

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (Dec 94)

Terrorist Attack in Tokyo

“It’s a threshold that’s been crossed -- proof that terrorists are now psychologically prepared to use weapons of mass destruction, such as chemicals, germs and perhaps even nuclear devices.”

Vincent Cannistraro

Central Intelligence Agency (21 Mar 95)

1991 DOD position: Live agent training is not essential.
Place CDTF in a caretaker status.
Close Ft McClellan.

1991 BRAC Commission: Live agent training is essential.
Continue to operate CDTF.
Keep Ft McClellan open.

1993 DOD position: Live agent training is essential.
Leave CDTF as a stand alone facility.
Close Ft McClellan.

1993 BRAC Commission: Live agent training is essential.
CDTF is an integral part of the
Chemical School. Keep Ft McClellan
open.

1995 DOD position: Live agent training is essential.
CDTF is an integral part of the Chemical
School. Move the CDTF. Close Ft
McClellan.

Live Agent Training (Background)

- **Before 1973**
Live agent exercises conducted outside
- **1973**
Moved to Aberdeen Proving Ground
 - **Stopped live agent training (used simulants)**
 - **Overall training program degraded**
- **1977**
Revitalize the Chemical Program Study

Finding

It was frequently observed that if students knew that they were **working with simulant agents**, they would neither remember nor follow all the measures outlined in instruction. While in chemical protective clothing, the students, to enhance their personal comfort, **would deliberately compromise the protective clothing**, i.e., lift the mask, open the protective clothing . . . **Deliberate compromise** of protective equipment was **never known to occur when live agents were incorporated** in the training exercises and safety procedures were nearly always strictly adhered to.

Recommendation

Establish a Chemical School with adequate training facilities. "The use of live agents (toxic chemical agents) in training was evaluated in response to DA. The **use of toxic chemical agents is considered absolutely essential** to realistic CW/NBC defense training."

Revitalization Study, 4 February 1977

Live Agent Training (Background)

- **1980**
Moved to Fort McClellan
- **1987**
Live Agent Training Facility became operational
- **1990 - 1991**
 - Desert Shield/Storm (17,000 trained)
 - After Action Reports
- **Present**
 - 35,000 Total Trained
 - 29 Countries, All Services
 - One Trained Chemical Sergeant in each Active and Reserve Company

"The importance of live agent training currently being conducted at the US Army Chemical School and Center cannot be overstated . . . We must provide all of our uniformed personnel the opportunity to be trained in this most realistic environment."

LTG C.A.H. Waller
Dep Cdr in Chief,
Operation Desert Storm (1993)

"The criticality of the CDTF requires that it be given full consideration in determining the final status of Fort McClellan."

GEN Carl E. Vuono
Chief of Staff, US Army (1990)

". . . While TRADOC has invested heavily in simulators and simulations, nothing fully replaces training with live agents . . . Chemical Corps soldiers who have undergone live agent training were instrumental in training and providing confidence to others in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Confident, credible trainers, combined with the lessons learned by training in live agent, are the foundation of an NBC trained and ready Army. The Army must pay the bill for a credible NBC deterrent posture or pay the cost of unpreparedness."

GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Cdr, TRADOC (1992)
Cdr, VIIth Corps, Operation Desert Storm

Our Headquarters (490th Chemical Bn) was activated in September 1990 and deployed to Saudi Arabia in October. We had two companies from South Carolina and one from Alabama. Since we were a chemical unit, we went to Fort McClellan, Alabama, for training. **By far, the most important training we had at Fort McClellan was the live agent training exercise. This boosted our confidence in that we could operate safely in a chemical environment.** Our primary mission was to provide decontamination, but many non-chemical reserve units requested our assistance in chemical preparedness. **They were paranoid about their equipment.** We were popular because we had worn the suits, operated the equipment and performed decontamination with live chemical agents. I personally provided instruction to a Signal unit, a Quartermaster unit, a Water Purification unit, and civilian employees on how the equipment works and personal decontamination. **My major recommendation is that we have more live agent training.**

**Gregory B. Nunelly
MSG, Bn Opn NCO
490th Chemical Bn**

Key Civilian Personnel Skill Requirements

- **Key civilian positions essential in training, training development and combat developments**
- **40% of professional staff are civilians (>100 positions)**
- **Must be NBC specialist as well as functional specialist**
- **Typical skill requirements:**

Chemists

Chemical Engineers

Physicists

Biologists

Operational Research Analysts

Computer Specialists

Test and Evaluation Analysts

NBC Educational Specialists

NBC Training Specialists

Force Structure Analysts

Doctrinal Publication Writers

Force-on-Force Modeling Specialists

Civilian Recruiting and Retention Experience

- **Move to Aberdeen Proving Ground 1973**
 - 80 civilians; 7 moved (9%)
 - Excellent recruiting area
 - 2-3 years to replace
- **Move to Fort McClellan 1979**
 - 38 civilian positions; 4 moved (11%)
 - Good recruiting area
 - 5 years to replace
- **Move to Fort Leonard Wood - ?**
 - Retention expected to be no better
 - Recruiting area?
 - Results in severe loss of expertise and continuity

Chemical School Facilities

(14 years to Acquire)


- **Chemical Defense Training Facility (Live Agent Training)**
- **Ranges (Smoke, Flame, etc.)**
- **FOX's Den (NBC Recon Vehicle Training)**
- **Radiological Laboratory**
- **Biological Training Center**
- **Warfighter Center**
- **Decontamination Apparatus Training Facility**

"One of a Kind Institution"

PRESENT MISSIONS

- **International Mission**
- **Joint Service Mission**
- **Biological Mission**
- **Smoke/Obscurants**
- **Mobilization**

NBC Defense Roles and Missions



International Role – Fort McClellan

(Live Agent Training Facility is the Cornerstone)

- **Recognized as the World's premier Chemical/Biological Training Center**
- **Conducts Chemical Weapons Convention Inspection Program**
 - 75 Treaty Inspectors
 - 21 Countries (Russia, Poland, Ukraine, China, etc.)
- **Conducts special classes for other countries**
 - United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan
- **Training Students from 29 Countries**

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (PL 103-160) Title XVII - Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense

- **Requires that DOD consolidate all CB warfare defense training activities of the DOD at the US Army Chemical School**
- **Designates Army as Executive Agent for doctrine development, policy, risk assessment and acquisition requirements for CB warfare defense for the DOD**

Implementation of PL 103-160

- **Joint Service Agreement signed Aug 94**
- **All Services have permanent training units/cadre at the Chemical School, Ft McClellan**
- **Joint Service Implementation Group (JSIG) activated at Ft McClellan to:**
 - Develop the Joint Service Modernization Plan
 - Coordinate and integrate joint professional training
 - Develop joint doctrine
- **Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives on-board and working JSIG**


BRAC 95 Recommendation

Collocation allows the Army to **focus on the doctrinal and force development requirements of Engineers, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps.** The synergistic advantages of training and development programs are: coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes; and counter-drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.


Department of Defense

Desired Configuration (Gaining Installation)

Desired



Not Desired



PRESENT:

Joint Service Chemical/Biological School

Focus: Joint Missions:
Train, develop doctrine and material requirements with Air Force, Navy and Marines.

PROPOSED:

Department within an Army School

Focus: Army Missions:
Train and develop doctrine and material requirements with Military Police and Engineers.

Mobilization for Chemical Units

- **Ft McClellan designated Lead Station (one of 18)**
- **57 Reserve Component Chemical Units in contingency force pool (70% of total chemical troop force)**
- **Allows Reserve Components to use unique training facilities**
 - Chemical Defense Training Facility
 - FOX Simulator (NBC recon vehicle training)
 - Decontamination Apparatus Training Facility
 - Biological Defense Training Facility

Environmental Permitting Perspective

- BRAC 93 (COM. H. T. JOHNSON): Army should permits in hand. Eliminate the “what ifs.”
- **BRAC 95 Testimony, Mar 7: Dep Sec Def Deutch, Sec Army West, et al**
 - Q. COM Cox: “.... do you think we should close Fort McClellan without the permits in hand?”
 - A. Sec West. “Our recommendation is conditioned on getting the permits.”
 - Q. Chrm. Dixon: “Have any of the necessary permits been obtained by the Army at the receiving installation.”
 - A. Dep Sec Def Deutch: “No, they have not.”

Chrm. Dixon: “And it is our statement to you that we would not act unless they (permits) were in place.”

“....with respect to permits....if those things aren’t resolved by June 22nd, it would be difficult for us to accommodate the services and their recommendations.”

What Permits are Required for CDTF?

- **Missouri Dept of Natural Resources (MDNR) letter, May 19, 1993**
 - Air Pollution Control Program
 - Water Pollution Control Program (NPDES)
 - Hazardous Waste Program (RCRA)
- **MDNR letter to Sec Defense Perry, Dec 23, 1994:**

“....construction of this facility (the CDTF) will require **air pollution** control, **water pollution** control, and **hazardous waste** program-related permits.”

What Permits Have Been Applied For?

- **Only the Construction Permit, Air Source (March 1, 1995)**
- **Construction Permit, Air Source deficiencies:**
 - Based on 1983 data
 - Not based on current CDTF design
 - Does not address all waste streams from CDTF operation
- **No water or hazardous waste application submitted**



UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER CENTER

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Permits

- **Air (Two Required)**
- **Water (One) (Mod to Existing Permit)**
- **Hazardous Waste (Permit Requirement Under Investigation)**



UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER CENTER

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

(Cont)

- **Endangered Species**
 - Two Federally Endangered Species (Bats)
 - Biological Assessment

- **Other Environmental Activities**
 - EIS
 - Health Study
 - Cultural Resources



Missouri Department of Natural Resources
 Air Pollution Control Program
 New Source Review Unit
 P.O. Box 178, Jefferson City, MO 65102
 RECEIVED
 1 PM 3 30

APCP USE ONLY	
Check No. 100	Check Date 3/1/95
Check No. 487	Check Date 3/1/95
Check No. 100	Check Date 3/1/95
Permit Number: 3860-0028	

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT

NOTE: INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF THIS SHEET CONTROL PGM

NAME OF COMPANY/FACILITY TO RECEIVE PERMIT:
U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

COMPANY/FACILITY STREET ADDRESS:
ATTN: ATZT - DPH-EE

COMPANY/FACILITY MAILING ADDRESS:
Same

COMPANY/FACILITY CITY: Fort Leonard Wood	STATE: MO	ZIP CODE: 65473
---	--------------	--------------------

COUNTY: Pulaski	Section: 21	Township: 8W	Range:
--------------------	-------------	--------------	--------

WHAT MISSOURI SENATORIAL DISTRICT IS COMPANY/FACILITY IN?	WHAT MISSOURI REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT IS COMPANY/FACILITY IN?
---	---

NAME OF PARENT COMPANY:
Department of Defense

PARENT COMPANY MAILING ADDRESS:

PARENT COMPANY CITY:	STATE:	ZIP CODE:
----------------------	--------	-----------

THIS APPLICATION IS FOR: MODIFICATION OR ADDITION TO AN EXISTING FACILITY NEW FACILITY

PROJECTED DATE TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION:	PROJECTED DATE OF STARTUP:
--	----------------------------

DESCRIPTION OF NEW OR MODIFIED PROCESSES/EQUIPMENT:

Thermal Treatment Unit to treat waste from a Chemical Decontamination Training Facility

ESTIMATED COST OF BASIC EQUIPMENT: \$ 43M	ESTIMATED COST OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT: \$ Included in basic equipment
--	--

All Applications Must be Accompanied by a \$100 Filing Fee. Processing Fees at the Rate of \$50 per Hour of Staff Time will be Assessed at the End of the Review.

APPLICANT'S CERTIFICATION STATEMENT:
 I certify that I have personally examined and am familiar with the information in this application and believe that the information submitted is accurate and complete. I am aware that making a false statement or misrepresentation in this application is grounds for denying or revoking the construction permit. I may also be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment.

SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE COMPANY: <i>Scott Murrell</i>	DATE: 3/1/95
---	-----------------

TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF SIGNER: Scott Murrell

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SIGNER: Chief, Environmental Division	TELEPHONE NUMBER: 314 595-0859
--	-----------------------------------

Why Hasn't Army Applied for Other Permits?

- **We don't know - some likely reasons?**
 - Working with incomplete information
 - Time constraints (June 22)
 - Probable public opposition to siting a nerve gas facility
 - Applied for easiest one

Permitting Timelines

Hazardous Waste (Incinerator)*	5 years
Air and Water	6-12 months

***NOTE:** Estimate based on actual experience by Army in obtaining permits.

Additional Environmental Considerations

Radiological Laboratory

- 2 NRC licenses
- Dispose/store low level rad waste
- Only certification facility for DOD and other govt agencies

Smoke Training

- At Ft McClellan 77,400 gals of fog oil/year plus smoke pots, brass flakes, colored smokes, graphic powder (radar chaff in 2 yrs)
- Ft Leonard Woods' air source permit addresses only fog oil and original only 1000 gal/year (later modified to 63,000 gal/yr)
- Endangered species at Ft Leonard Wood could be affected
- Smoke training would have to be curtailed

Permit Summary

CDTF Permits

	Application Required	Application Before 1 March	Application After 1 March	Granted
Air Permit to Construct	Yes	No	Yes	No
Air Permit to Operate	Yes	No	No	No
RCRA	Yes	No	No	No
NPDES	Yes	No	No	No
EIS	Yes	Not Initiated		

Smoke Permits

Air Permit	Yes	No	Limited to Fog Oil	No
EIS	Yes	Not Initiated		

NRC Licence (Rad Lab)

Yes	No	No	No
-----	----	----	----

Additional Environmental Considerations

Disposition of Ft McClellan CDTF

- Will leave behind a contaminated facility
- Cannot be abandoned (requires round-the-clock security pending dismantlement)
- Cost \$45-50M to dismantle (not included in ROI calculations)

Ft McClellan Support to Chemical Demil Permit Application at Anniston Army Depot

- RCRA Part B permit application cites extensive support from Ft McClellan
- State concerned about Army plans if Ft McClellan closed
- Army says it will leave behind necessary support
- Support requirements have not been identified or costed


Environmental Summary


- **Gen Colin Powell (93 BRAC): “It can’t be moved, really.”**
- **Sec Army Togo West (95 BRAC): “There are no guarantees in the permitting process....we have no real indication how the process will turn out when a community and a permitting authority begin to come to grips with reality.”**


Full compliance with NEPA, RCRA, and all other permitting requirements has not been adequately addressed, when/if it is, there is a high risk that it will not be successful, thus blocking the CDTF at Fort Leonard Wood.

○ Contamination Sites


Fort McClellan
Military Reservation








**Fort McCellan
Military Reservation**





Fort McCallan
Military Reservation

CDTF

Economic Aspects (From the DOD Perspective)

DOD Numbers:

\$259M	One-Time Costs to Implement
\$122M	Net Costs During Implementation
Year 2005	Break-Even

Points for BRAC Commission to Consider:

DOD understated CDTF Rebuild costs

\$70M	Rebuild Cost
— <u>\$30M</u>	DOD Programmed
\$40M	Additional Cost

Economic Aspects (From the DOD Perspective)

- Understatement of CDTF Rebuild Cost (an additional **\$40M**)
- CDTF Remediation at McClellan not considered (**\$40-50M**)
- DOD Polygraph Institute Relocation not fully costed (**\$Unk**)
- A new Biological Defense Company must be organized, recruited, trained and equipped at Ft Leonard Wood (**\$4-5M**)
- By DOD's own figures, total annual increase in medical costs is **\$15.8M**, but these costs are not included in ROI calculations.
- GAO stated during 1993 BRAC process that "The DOD always understates costs and overstates savings."

Will we really save by closing Ft McClellan?


Economic Impact

BRAC Average Employment Loss	1.9%
Fort McClellan Employment Loss	17.3%
Total Calhoun Co. Workforce	44,498
Estimated Job Loss	10,720
Total Unemployment (Calhoun Co.)	~24%

Loss Represents:

- Nearly 2 of 5 Jobs with Incomes Greater than \$15,000
- Nearly One-Third of Revenues for Education and Services to Communities in North Part of County (e.g., Weaver, Saks, Jacksonville)

Document Separator



Welcome
1995 BRAC COMMISSION
to the
United States Air Force
Civil Engineer
Disaster Preparedness School

- Mission and History
- Chain of Command
- Curriculum
- Manning, Facilities, and Student Load
- Joint Training
- Tour of Facility

OVERVIEW



Mission:


- Transition untrained or unqualified individuals into professional Disaster Preparedness personnel capable of effective Readiness Flight operations across the full spectrum, to include day to day operations, major accidents/ natural disaster response, humanitarian aid, low intensity conflict, and general war, to include NBC Warfare Defense.

Disaster Preparedness School History

- Established at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver, CO in 1961
- Moved to Lowry AFB, CO in 1965
- Relocated to Ft McClellan after Lowry's closure in 1994




Chain of Command




Curriculum

- Teach 12 courses ranging in duration from 5 to 45 days
- Two courses provide apprentice and craftsman certification
- Two courses directly support the White House Military Office, Presidential Contingency Section



Major Course Content

- NBC Warfare decontamination, reconnaissance, plotting and reporting
- Natural Disaster and Major Accident emergency management



Major Course Content (cont)

- Air Base Operability-- Camouflage, concealment, and deception; passive and active defense measures; and damage assessment




Manning, Facilities, and Student Load

- Manning
 - 20 Personnel: 1 Officer, 2 Civilians, 17 Enlisted
- Facilities


– 19,000 Sq Ft (Classrooms, Offices, Equipment Storage)

- Student Load
 - FY 94 - 873
 - FY 95 - 678
 - FY 96 - 740



Joint Training Efforts

- Joint Service Integration Group
- Chemical Defense Training Facility
- Decontamination Facility
- Use of Range for Smoke Generators
- Land Navigation Course



Facility Tour

**USAF Civil Engineer Disaster Preparedness School
BRAC 95 Relocation Requirements**

- HISTORY: The USAF Civil Engineer Disaster Preparedness School relocated from Lowry AFB, Denver, CO to Ft McClellan in May 1994. This relocation was necessary because Lowry AFB closed under earlier BRAC actions. The Air Force elected to collocate the Disaster Preparedness School at Ft McClellan with the other military service NBC schools. This decision has enhanced joint NBC training efforts and provided an opportunity for Air Force NBC specialists to receive training in the Chemical Defense Training Facility. The Air Force Disaster Preparedness School will relocate with the US Army Chemical School as promulgated in Public Law 103-160.

- MISSION: Transition untrained or unqualified individuals into professional Disaster Preparedness personnel capable of effective Readiness Flight operations across the full spectrum, to include day to day operations, humanitarian aid, low intensity conflict, and general war. A major portion of this training involves NBC warfare defense.

- DETACHMENT MANNING:

-- Two officers (O-4 Detachment Commander, O-3 OIC of officer training)

-- Two Civilians (GS-11 Course manager, GS-9 Instructor Supervisor)

-- Sixteen Enlisted (E-9, five E-7s, three E-6s, and seven E-5s)

- COURSES TAUGHT:

-- Disaster Preparedness Officer and Enlisted Apprentice Course: Provides basic skill level training to professional Airmen on major accident and natural disaster planning response actions; nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional warfare survival skills; and civil engineer mobility deployment principles.

-- Disaster Preparedness Officer and Apprentice Exportable Correspondence Course: Provides training for Air Force personnel on Readiness Flight duties. When both this course and the Phase Two courses are completed, all AFSC awarding requirements will have been met. Primarily designed for Air Force Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentee component.

-- Disaster Preparedness Officer and Apprentice Phase two Course: Provides resident training to Air Force Reserve personnel on Readiness Flight duties. Successful completion of the Phase One Exportable course is a prerequisite for attending this course.

-- Disaster Preparedness Indoctrination for Senior Officers: Provides information on

Maj Hensley/Det 5, 366TRS/CC/5-6748/8 Mar 95

Readiness Flight objections, polices, and responsibilities including response actions for enemy attack, natural disasters, and peacetime accidents.

-- Air Base Operability (ABO) Course: Provides training on ABO doctrine, responsibilities, threat to fixed air bases, theater operational requirements, plans and directives, acquisition process, program accomplishments and standards. This course utilizes a table-top exercise to provide students an opportunity to apply ABO principles across the full spectrum of war operations.

-- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Cell Operations Course: Students are trained in chemical and nuclear plotting, and NBC Control Center operations. An eight hour exercise is used to give students an opportunity to utilize skills in a realistic student centered learning environment.

-- Civil Engineer Readiness Refresher Course: Provides training on new equipment acquisition and operational procedures to Readiness Flight personnel. Attendees receive this training every five years.

- TRAINING SPACE REQUIREMENTS: Total of 20,000 square feet of office and classroom space is necessary.

-- Eleven classrooms/laboratories are required and each classroom must provide desk space for 20 students. One classroom more elaborately decorated for our senior officers course. Another classroom configured as a computer lab for Emergency Information System training. All classrooms approved for discussing classified information.

-- A student break room with DSN and commercial pay phones.

-- Four hundred square feet of environmentally controlled equipment storage space (maintained at 65 to 72 degrees F). Must have controlled access to secure radioactive material licensed under Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidelines.

- ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REQUIREMENTS: The following requirements must be grouped together in same facility with classrooms.

-- Three rooms capable of providing office work spaces for 19 personnel.

-- Four private offices for the Commander, Director of Training, First Sergeant, and Instructor Supervisor.

-- One office to provide work space for four personnel. Room must have controlled access.

- UNIQUE FACILITY REQUIREMENTS:

-- Secure five thousand square feet storage facility to house field training equipment. Must include asphalt or concrete parking area for five to ten vehicles.

- - Riot control agent chamber to conduct mask confidence training
- - The USAF supports joint service requirement to train in live agent training facility as currently available (Chemical Defense Training Facility).

- FIELD TRAINING SITE REQUIREMENTS:

- - Access to field training site configured as an air field to conduct unique Air Force major accident response and base recovery after attack training.
- - Field sites approved for conducting smoke obscurant and decontamination training operations.
- - Field site to conduct compass and Global Positioning System navigation training.


- TOTAL STUDENT LOAD:

- - FY-94 student load was 873.
- - FY-95 student load is 630.
- - FY-96 student load is 740.

- COMPUTER, COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

- - Technical communication support to assist installing antennas and providing two frequencies for our Motorola base station, hand-held radios, cellular phone and two beepers.
- - Computer maintenance support for our personal computers and computer laboratory. We will acquire Sun Sprac computers for our battle lab and they may require maintenance.
- - Telephone line for PC-III (Air Force Personnel Management Computer Link).
- - DOD LAN System Link.

**ANNISTON MUSEUM
OF NATURAL HISTORY**




**CHEAHA
STATE PARK**


COMMUNITY SUPPORT STRUCTURE

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

- 107 MEMBERS
- HELPS MAKE INTERFACE SMOOTH DAY-BY-DAY
- ACTIVELY SEEKS SUPPORT FOR OUR ARMY



Mr. Gerald Powell, Chairman



Economic Development Center







ANNISTON CITY AREA


Cost of housing in Calhoun County is 27% less than the national average.

The overall cost of living is 11% less than the national average.

COMMUNITY LIFE

The very best of its kind.

JACKSONVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY



Includes Jacksonville State University and Gadsden State College extensions offering continuing education for the military and civilian communities.

**ARMY EDUCATION CENTER
FORT MCCLELLAN**

Women's Army
Corps Museum



WACs Training in
Land Navigation, 1966

TEACHING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Military Police Corps
Regimental Museum



Chemical Corps
Museum

**Community
Support
Facilities**

**Military Personnel
Division**



Veterinary Clinic

**Community
Support
Facilities**

McClellan Club



"Q" Lounge

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Abrams Library



Army Community
Service

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Bowling Center



Spare-Time
Lounge

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Truman Gym



Indoor Pool

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Bowling Center



Spare-Time
Lounge

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Youth Services



Elementary
School

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Gordon Field
Track/Softball Fields



Auto Craft
Shop

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Youth Services



Elementary
School

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Reilly Lake



Cane Creek
Golf Course



**Community
Support
Facilities**

Guest House



Child
Development
Center

**Community
Support
Facilities**

Reilly Lake



Cane Creek
Golf Course

SINGLE SOLDIER LIVING COMMUNITY





WASTE WATER TREATMENT PLANT



This new state-of-the-art facility meets stringent environmental requirements. The original wastewater plant, constructed in 1917, underwent periodic upgrades until 1989. At that time, a stricter environmental requirement dictated the need for a new facility. The new plant was designed by the Mobile District Corps of Engineers and constructed in the "footprint" of the original plant at a cost of \$4.5 million. The capacity of the new trickling filter plant is 2.2 mgpd.



QUALITY OF LIFE

- MODERN POST EXCHANGE AND COMMISSARY
- THREE GYMNASIUMS AND THREE SWIMMING POOLS
- 50-ROOM GUEST LODGE
- 24-LANE BOWLING CENTER WITH AUTOMATIC SCORERS
- 18-HOLE GOLF COURSE
- STATE-OF-THE-ART CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER
- NOBLE ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL (100 BED FACILITY)
- MODERN 28-CHAIR DENTAL CLINIC
- MOVIE THEATER
- TENNIS AND RACQUETBALL COURTS
- OUTDOOR RUNNING TRACK

PELHAM RANGE MAINTENANCE FACILITY

PROJECT DESCRIPTION:

Provide a 10,000 foot Maintenance Facility with 3 bays to perform maintenance for M1059 tracked vehicles and HMMWV's prepositioned at Pelham Range. Currently work is performed in tents and trailers. Provide both MOGAS and Diesel pumping stations at Pelham.

CONTRACT COST: \$1.020 Million

CONTRACTOR: Eugene Turner General Contractor, Inc.

CONTRACT START DATE: 10 March 1994

EST COMPLETION DATE: 1 April 1995

RENOVATION OF AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT

PROJECT DESCRIPTION:

Replace 5 earth covered magazines constructed in early 1940's with modern 10,000 square foot warehouse and 3 new 4,800 square foot earth covered facilities. Bury overhead power and communication lines and pave various roadways to meet safety concerns.

ESTIMATED COST: \$2.5 Million

CONTRACTOR: Unknown

PLANNED START DATE: July 1994

PLANNED COMPLETION DATE: June 1995

Range 57



Range 59



PELHAM RANGE TRAINING FACILITY

PROJECT DESCRIPTION:

Serves as central node for field training/confirmation of task proficiency.
Provides effective balance of classroom-to-field training for battle tasks--Smoke, NBC Recon, Decon. Supports multiservice training requirements (contingency operations/disaster preparedness, etc.)

CONTRACT COST: \$ 1.8 Million

CONTRACTOR: Tom Roberts Construction

CONTRACT START DATE: 21 April 1994

EST COMPLETION DATE: 1 April 1995

PELHAM RANGES

<u>RANGE #</u>	<u>WEAPON TYPES</u>	<u>USE</u>
50	SMALL ARMS UNDER LESS THAN 7.62MM	MULTIPURPOSE/MARKSMANSHIP
51	M16, M203, M72, M2, M60	MULTIPURPOSE FAMILIARIZATION
53	M60	ZERO/TRANSITION/QUALIFICATION
56	MECHANIZED SMOKE	
57	M16	QUALIFICATION (RETS)
59	M16	QUALIFICATION (RETS)
60	MARK 19, M60	
TANK	105MM, .50 CAL	
AFP 2,3,4,5,8,9,10,11&12	105MM, 155MM	ARTILLERY FIRING POINTS
MFP 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8&10	81MM, 107MM	MORTAR FIRING POINTS

MAIN POST RANGES
(Continued)

<u>RANGE #</u>	<u>WEAPON TYPES</u>	<u>USE</u>
21	M16	QUALIFICATION
22	M16	ZERO (25 METER)
23	M16	QUALIFICATION
24 (UPPER)	M16	LIVE FIRE/DEFENSE
24 (LOWER)	M16 (BLANKS)	OBSTACLE LANES
24A	SMOKE, DEMO, FLAME FIELD EXPEDIENT (DEMOLITIONS & SMOKE)	
25	M16, M14, M1, M60 MACHINE GUN	KNOWN DISTANCE

MAIN POST RANGES
(Continued)

<u>RANGE #</u>	<u>WEAPON TYPES</u>	<u>USE</u>
26	M16	LIVE FIRE/ MANEUVER
27	STRESS PISTOL & SHOTGUN (9MM PISTOL AND MACHINEGUN, .38 CAL, .45 CAL AND MACHINE GUN, 12 GAUGE SHOTGUN)	
28	M16 (BLANK)	FIRE & MANEUVER
29	PISTOL (.38 AND .45), M16, M60 MACHINEGUN, AT-4, M72 LAW	
32	HAND GRENADE	

MANEUVER ACREAGE

MAIN POST

14,761

PELHAM RANGE

17,486

CHOCOLOCCO

4,488

TALLADEGA NATIONAL FOREST

180,000

TOTAL

216,735

MAIN POST RANGES

<u>RANGE #</u>	<u>WEAPON TYPES</u>	<u>USE</u>
12	COMPETITIVE PISTOL (.22 CAL THROUGH .45 CAL)	
13	PISTOL	QUALIFICATION
16	HAND GRENADE M203 GRENADE LAUNCH M72 LAW	
17	EXPLOSIVE PROFICIENCY TRAINING AREA (NO LIVE FIRE)	
19	PISTOL (.22, .38 AND .45 CAL)	QUALIFICATION
20	INFILTRATION COURSE (M60 MACHINE GUN)	

FORT MCCLELLAN POWER PROJECTION PLATFORM




Easy access to Interstate
Highway System




Airports:

Anniston
Birmingham
Fort Benning
Gadsden
Fort Rucker



Sea Ports:

Mobile, AL
Savanah, GA
Charleston, SC
Jacksonville, FL



Fort McClellan
Upgraded
Loading Ramp
and Rail System

DS/GS CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE FACILITY



Opened June 1991

Electronic and Communications Shop

Special Purpose Equipment Shop

Small Arms and Artillery Shop

General Support Equipment Shop

Supply Area

Painting, Radiator Repair, Alignment

Hard Stand Area

10 Ton Overhead Crane

Equipped with Monorails

63,000 SQ FT

6,500 SQ FT

8,200 SQ FT

8,200 SQ FT

15,000 SQ FT

8,500 SQ FT


7,000 SQ FT

190,000 SQ FT



GROUND MOVEMENT

- 9 miles to Interstate 20 which connects with Birmingham and Atlanta.
- 32 miles to Interstate 59 which connects with Chattanooga.
- Amtrack station located in Anniston.
- Convoy routes that avoid congested areas.
- Seaports:
 - Mobile - 278 MI
 - Savannah - 332 MI
 - Charleston - 377 MI
 - Jacksonville - 385 MI
- Two railheads with 7 MI of track on post.




Fort McClellan Railhead





GROUND MOVEMENT


- 9 miles to Interstate 20 which connects with Birmingham and Atlanta.
- 32 miles to Interstate 59 which connects with Chattanooga.
- Amtrack station located in Anniston.
- Convoy routes that avoid congested areas.
- Seaports:
 - Mobile - 278 MI
 - Savannah - 332 MI
 - Charleston - 377 MI
 - Jacksonville - 385 MI
- Two railheads with 7 MI of track on post.





AIR DEPLOYABILITY

- Anniston Municipal Airport has been approved for upto C5A as of March 94.
- This provides complete air transportability within 13 Miles of Fort McClellan.
- Fort Benning which is a three hour convoy is our assigned APOE for Mobilization.



Anniston Airport



BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT



What We Do Best

TRAIN


	AT UNITS/INDIV	IDT UNITS/INDIV
USAR	37/2131	66/6203
ARNG	60/5815	187/15,238
SR ROTC		13/1048
JR ROTC	1/ 265	1/400
USMCR		29/3511
INDIVIDUAL TECHNICAL TRAINING		
USACMLS	3958	
(MULTI SERVICE, OSUT, NCO, OFFICER, FUNCTIONAL GENERAL SKILLS COURSES)		
USAMPS	9390	
(MULTI SERVICE, OSUT, NCO, OFFICER, FUNCTIONAL GENERAL SKILLS COURSES AND COUNTER-DRUG TRAINING)		

AND

82 UNITS MOBILIZING
AT FORT McCLELLAN

CHEMICAL - 56
 ORDNANCE - 2
 SIGNAL - 3
 MEDICAL - 6
 PUBLIC AFFAIRS - 1
 ENGINEER - 1
 QUARTERMASTER - 1
 ADJUTANT GENERAL - 2
 TRANSPORTATION - 1
 COMBAT SUPPORT - 3
 MILITARY POLICE - 3
 SCHOOLS - 2
 BATTLEFIELD COORDINATING ELEMENT - 1

PROJECT



AMERICA'S ARMY

BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT

SUCCESS AND CHALLENGES

FUTURE VISION

- ENSURE DENTAL READINESS FOR ACTIVE DUTY PERMANENT PARTY SOLDIERS
- REDUCE NUMBER OF CLASS 3 TRAINEES PRIOR TO PCS
- TRANSITION TO SMALLER WORK FORCE
- CONTINUE TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE CARE FOR THE SOLDIER
- PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION
- TEAM BUILDING
- MODERNIZE DENTAL EQUIPMENT

Dental
Treatment
Room




U.S. ARMY DENTAL CLINIC COMMAND FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA




U.S. ARMY DENTAL CLINIC COMMAND

Patients Treated - FY 94



Total Patients Treated: 23,686

Laboratory
Services



Physical
Therapy
Department

Troop Medical Clinic #3




Pharmacy Teller Windows



Treatment Room

Mammography
Suite



Soldier
Aid
Station

AN AVERAGE DAY AT NOBLE
(As of December 1994)

Admissions	6
Beds occupied	13
Clinic visits	472
Lab procedures	3,507
X-ray procedures	277
Prescriptions filled	741
Food inspected (pounds)	375,729

IMPROVED ACCESS

- MAMMOGRAPHY/ULTRASOUND SUITE
- THREE FULLY OPERATIONAL OPERATING ROOMS
- AMBULATORY SURGERY PROGRAM
- DECENTRALIZED PATIENT APPOINTMENTS
- EXPAND OUTPATIENT CLINIC, STAFFING AND OPERATION HOURS
- CALL-A-NURSE PROGRAM
- 24-HOUR SOLDIER HEALTH CARE ACCESS THROUGH SOLDIER AID STATION
- IMPLEMENTING PHASE I OF COMPOSITE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (CHCS)

U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA





NOBLE ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

COST EFFECTIVE CARE

- TRANSITION FROM GATEWAY-TO-CARE TO TRICARE SERVICES
- FULL STAFFED COORDINATED CARE DIVISION
- INCREASED ACCESS AND DECREASED COST FOR SPECIALTY SERVICES THROUGH VA-DOD SHARING AGREEMENTS/ LOCAL AGREEMENTS
- EXPAND PREFERRED PROVIDER NETWORK
- INCREASED PRIMARY CARE FOCUS
- IMPROVED PHARMACY SERVICES ACCESS

FORT MCCLELLAN HEALTH CARE SERVICES



**ANNUAL TRAINING SCHEDULED FOR FY 95
(PROJECTED)**

	UNITS	PERSONNEL
ARNG	42	7,559
USAR	17	2,023
JROTC	1	400
TOTAL	69	9,982

ANNUAL TRAINING CONDUCTED IN FY 94

	UNITS	PERSONNEL
ARNG	60	5,815
USAR	37	2,131
JROTC	1	265
TOTAL	98	8,211

INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING CONDUCTED IN FY 94

	UNITS	PERSONNEL
ARNG	168	15,238
USAR	66	6,203
SROTC	13	1,048
OTHER RC	29	3,511
TOTAL	276	26,000

EQUIPMENT CONCENTRATION SITE 158



SITUATED ON 8 ACRES ON FORT MCCLELLAN
COMPRISED OF 310 PIECES OF ROLLING STOCK
SUPPORTING 9,000 PIECES OF OTHER EQUIPMENT
STORAGE ACTIVITY FOR 24 UNITS
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY FOR 8 UNITS
EMPLOYING 20 FULL TIME MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
IN FY95 ANTICIPATE RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL 700 PIECES OF ROLLING STOCK

FUTURE USAR ACTIVITIES

- ADDITION OF A MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING UNIT 50 PERSONNEL
- EXPANSION OF ECS BY 13 ACRES STORAGE FOR 76 HET SYSTEMS
- ADDITION OF A U.S. ARMY GARRISON UNIT 97 PERSONNEL
- BIOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION DETECTION COMPANY 5 PLATOONS WITH AC/RC SPLIT

EQUIPMENT CONCENTRATION SITE 158



SITUATED ON 8 ACRES ON FORT MCCLELLAN
COMPRISED OF 310 PIECES OF ROLLING STOCK
SUPPORTING 9,000 PIECES OF OTHER EQUIPMENT
STORAGE ACTIVITY FOR 24 UNITS
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY FOR 8 UNITS
EMPLOYING 20 FULL TIME MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
IN FY95 ANTICIPATE RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL 700 PIECES OF ROLLING STOCK

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (RESERVE COMPONENTS)

Support Provided To:

- 121st ARCOM
- 125th ARCOM
- 87th Division (Exercise)
- 40 ROTC Units
- 39 ROTC Units
- 91 USAR Units
- 2d ROTC REGION, 5th BDE



Units Located In:

- 32 counties in Alabama
- 41 counties in Mississippi
- 2 counties in Southern Tennessee

WILLIAM F. "BILL" NICHOLS USAR CENTER



SITUATED ON 9 ACRES AT FORT MCCLELLAN'S SOUTHEAST CORNER
COMPRISED OF 6 UNITS (358 PERSONNEL)
EMPLOYING 64 FULL TIME MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA

Over 34,000 National Guard and Reserve soldiers trained at Fort McClellan in 1994.

RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT



MISSION



PROVIDE COORDINATION AND SUPPORT FOR RESERVE COMPONENTS OF ALL SERVICES:

- ANNUAL TRAINING (AT)
- INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING (IDT)
- INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
- RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)
- LIAISON FOR STUDENTS ATTENDING INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING (IET) AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- GEOGRAPHICAL SUPPORT UNDER AR 5-9

THE GARRISON



FUTURE MISSIONS

- Advanced Technology Regional Battle Training Center (ATRBTC) (FY95)
- Regional Officer Candidate School (OCS) (FY95)
- National Guard Youth Challenge Program (NGYCP) (FY95)
- Platoon maneuver area with Prime installed (FY96)
- Water Purification/Distribution Training Center (FY95)
- Junior ROTC Training Center (FY95)

CAPABILITIES

- Supports 1 Brigade (LT) on 1 Combined Arms Maneuver Battalion or 3 CS/CSS Battalions
- Supports M1 and M2 gunnery
- Supports small arms qualification
- Provides educational facilities for Alabama Military Academy (OCS, NCOES and MOSQ)
- Provides soldier support and facilities for JROTC
- Provides simulation facilities for Alabama Army National Guard Directorate of Operational Readiness
- Provides facilities for Special Operations Forces (SOF) Training

TRAINING STRENGTH/PAYROLL DATA

30,000 soldiers performed for IDT/AT during FY94

- Average Stay: 7 days for each soldier
- FY94 Payroll: \$21,000,000
- Units from 25 states and 2 territories

35,000 soldiers projected for IDT/AT during FY95

- Average Stay: 7 days for each soldier
- Estimated FY95 Payroll: \$24,500,000
- Units from 16 states and 1 territory


FUNDING

Full Time Support Personnel

<u>Personnel Category</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Military Technician	40	21	Includes OMS 10
Active Guard/Reserve	4	4	Includes NGB TADSS Office
State Employees	53	8	Includes Authorization for Guards
Contractor	2	2	ARTBASS
TOTALS	99	35	

ANNUAL PAYROLL: \$1,100,000

ALABAMA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING SITE ORGANIZATION



----- COORDINATION ONLY

ALABAMA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING CENTER



MISSION

The Alabama Army National Guard Training Center provides year round training facilities. Ranges and maneuver area for the ARNG and other Department of the Army agencies to support the Integrated Training Strategy (ITS) including:

- Support of ongoing and proposed missions of the using units and activities.
- Academic facilities for regional schools and supporting activities.
- Facilities housing simulation systems and other specialized training.
- Administrative, logistical and operational support as required by using units and activities.
- Mobilization planning and support.

ALABAMA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING CENTER



- External Research

- Computer algorithms

- ◆ Analytical (decision-making)

- ◆ Countermeasure detection

- New Measures

- ◆ Cardiovascular

- ◆ ARIS polygraph (Autonomic Response Indicator System)

- Internal Research

- New measures

- ◆ Voice spectrum analysis
- ◆ Brain Waves: P300, N400

- New technology

- ◆ Computerized polygraphs (including Russian)
- ◆ Cardiovascular sensors

- New tests

- ◆ TES (Test of Espionage and Sabotage)
- ◆ ERCT (Event Related Control Test)
- ◆ IAT (Inquiry Accusatory Test)

- Countermeasures

- ◆ Anti-countermeasures

ACADEMIC PROGRAM



- STUDENTS - 24 federal agencies plus state and locals with Psychophysiological Detection of Deception Programs
- FACULTY
 - Strong academic background
 - Vast experiential background
- CURRICULUM
 - Master's Program
 - Continuing education courses

RESEARCH PROGRAM



- In the 1986 DAA, Congress directed SecDef to conduct polygraph research. It stated the program shall include:
 - an ongoing evaluation of the validity of polygraph techniques used by the Department;
 - research on polygraph countermeasures and anti-countermeasures; and
 - developmental research on polygraph techniques, instrumentation, and analysis methods.

AGENCIES SUPPORTED

U.S. Air Force - OSI
OSAF (Office of the Secretary of the Air Force)
U.S. Army CID
U.S. Army Military Intelligence (INSCOM)
Department of Justice Inspector General
U.S. Customs
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS)
Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Internal Review Service (IRS)
U.S. Capitol Police
U.S. Marine Corps (CI/CID)
U.S. Marshal Service
D.C. Metropolitan Police
National Security Agency (NSA)
Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
U.S. Postal Service (USPS)
U.S. Secret Service
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (Department of Treasury)
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Park Police
State and Local Agencies (space available/case-by-case)

SUPPORT DIVISION

- PROVIDE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO RESEARCH AND INSTRUCTION DIVISION
 - Subjects for laboratory practice and research
 - ◆ Trainees/Permanent Party (est.4,000)
 - ◆ Outside civilian subjects (est.1,500)

- LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER
 - Using technology, provide literature search capabilities
 - Obtain timely materials
 - Automate learning resource center to maximum extent
 - Develop to level befitting a master's program


- PERFORM FINANCIAL, REGISTRAR, ADMINISTRATIVE, LOGISTICS, MAINTENANCE, GROUNDS AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS AT THE INSTITUTE

COST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT RESEARCH

- In house laboratory studies
- Expertise for field research

**UNDER THE CONTROL OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMMAND,
CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE**

DODPI



COST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT RESEARCH

- In house laboratory studies
- Expertise for field research

**UNDER THE CONTROL OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMMAND,
CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE**

**DOD POLYGRAPH INSTITUTE
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA**



MISSION*

- Higher Education in Forensic Psychophysiology
- Research in Forensic Psychophysiology

CUSTOMERS

- Provides education and research for 24 federal agencies plus state and local agencies

*Implementation of Joint Security Commission Recommendations would significantly expand both of the Institutes mission.

MISSION*

- Higher Education in Forensic Psychophysiology
- Research in Forensic Psychophysiology

CUSTOMERS

- Provides education and research for 24 federal agencies plus state and local agencies

*Implementation of Joint Security Commission Recommendations would significantly expand both of the Institutes mission.

DOD POLYGRAPH INSTITUTE FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA



Training Brigade Facilities



39th ADJUTANT GENERAL BATTALION



WHAT WE DO BEST - TRAIN QUALITY SOLDIERS

	54B (CML)	95B (MP)	95C (COR)	TOTAL
FY 92	1593	4339	0	5932
FY 93	2255	3925	141	6321
FY 94	1551	3466	319	5336
FY 95 (PROJ)	1786	4054	543	6383

Training Brigade Facilities



WHAT WE DO BEST - TRAIN

QUALITY SOLDIERS

	54B (CML)	95B (MP)	95C (COR)	TOTAL
FY 92	1593	4339	0	5932
FY 93	2255	3925	141	6321
FY 94	1551	3466	319	5336
FY 95 (PROJ)	1786	4054	543	6383




MILITARY POLICE

ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING



- 16 WEEK COURSE OF INSTRUCTION WHICH PRODUCES CERTIFIED 95Bs and 95Cs
- PROVIDES PHASED APPROACH OF SEQUENTIAL INSTRUCTION USING THE SAME CADRE -- CONTINUITY BETWEEN TRAINEES AND CADRE IS ONE OF THE KEY ADVANTAGES TO OSUT
- IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE 787TH AND 795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALIONS
- FOCUSES ON MILITARY POLICE CORPS' MISSIONS OF AREA SECURITY, BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL, EPW, AND LAW AND ORDER
- TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE: BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS, MOUT, 9MM QUALIFICATION, FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE MK19 GRENADE MACHINEGUN, A FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE, AND A LAW AND ORDER EXERCISE




MILITARY POLICE

ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING



- 16 WEEK COURSE OF INSTRUCTION WHICH PRODUCES CERTIFIED 95Bs and 95Cs
- PROVIDES PHASED APPROACH OF SEQUENTIAL INSTRUCTION USING THE SAME CADRE -- CONTINUITY BETWEEN TRAINEES AND CADRE IS ONE OF THE KEY ADVANTAGES TO OSUT
- IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE 787TH AND 795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALIONS
- FOCUSES ON MILITARY POLICE CORPS' MISSIONS OF AREA SECURITY, BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL, EPW, AND LAW AND ORDER
- TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE: BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS, MOUT, 9MM QUALIFICATION, FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE MK19 GRENADE MACHINEGUN, A FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE, AND A LAW AND ORDER EXERCISE



CHEMICAL ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING




- 18 WEEK COURSE OF INSTRUCTION WHICH PRODUCES CERTIFIED 54Bs
- PROVIDES PHASED APPROACH OF SEQUENTIAL INSTRUCTION USING THE SAME CADRE -- CONTINUITY BETWEEN TRAINEES AND CADRE IS ONE OF THE KEY ADVANTAGES TO OSUT.
- IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE 82D CHEMICAL BATTALION
- FOCUSES ON CHEMICAL CORPS' MISSIONS OF NBC DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION, DECONTAMINATION, AND SMOKE OPERATIONS
- TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE: NBC DEFENSE, SMOKE OPERATIONS, DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS, NBC RECON OPERATIONS, FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE M60 AND .50 CAL MACHINEGUNS, LIVE AGENT TRAINING, AND A FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE

TRAINING BRIGADE'S METL

SUPPORT TRADOC AND OUR FORCE PROJECTION
ARMY WITH...

- MISSION FOCUSED, MOTIVATED AND PHYSICALLY FIT CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE SOLDIERS TRAINED IN A TOUGH, REALISTIC, TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT; SOLDIERS WHO POSSESS THE COMPETENCIES ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS IN DIVERSE OPERATIONS.
- SOLDIERS WHO ARE TECHNICALLY AND TACTICALLY PROFICIENT IN THE BASIC SKILLS NECESSARY TO OPERATE THE LATEST INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND EQUIPMENT.
- SOLDIERS WHO UNDERSTAND AND CAN FAITHFULLY EXECUTE CURRENT DOCTRINE IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDER.
- A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT PROMOTES INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT EXCELLENCE.



TRAINING BRIGADE'S METL

SUPPORT TRADOC AND OUR FORCE PROJECTION
ARMY WITH...

- MISSION FOCUSED, MOTIVATED AND PHYSICALLY FIT CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE SOLDIERS TRAINED IN A TOUGH, REALISTIC, TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT; SOLDIERS WHO POSSESS THE COMPETENCIES ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS IN DIVERSE OPERATIONS.
- SOLDIERS WHO ARE TECHNICALLY AND TACTICALLY PROFICIENT IN THE BASIC SKILLS NECESSARY TO OPERATE THE LATEST INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND EQUIPMENT.
- SOLDIERS WHO UNDERSTAND AND CAN FAITHFULLY EXECUTE CURRENT DOCTRINE IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDER.
- A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT PROMOTES INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT EXCELLENCE.

**U.S. ARMY TRAINING BRIGADE
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA**



TRAINING BRIGADE'S MISSION STATEMENT

TRAIN FOR WAR AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

CONDUCT, INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING THAT PRODUCES COMPETENT, MOTIVATED, DISCIPLINED, PHYSICALLY -FIT CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE SOLDIERS WHO ARE PROFICIENT IN BASIC AND MOS SKILLS AND CAPABLE OF TAKING THEIR PLACE IN THE RANKS OF THE FORCE PROJECTION ARMY

- TRAINED IN ESSENTIAL COMPETENCIES
- CAPABLE OF PERFORMING WAR AND OTHER THAN WAR MISSIONS

FOSTER ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE


CREATE A CLIMATE THAT PROMOTES BRIGADE EXCELLENCE

**U.S. ARMY TRAINING BRIGADE
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA**





TREATY VERIFICATION TRAINING SITE



- **Facility for training chemical weapons inspectors/escort officers (bilateral-multilateral)**
- **Program incorporates facilities at various locations (production, destruction, storage, and sampling/analysis)**
- **Modular 1- Basic course centered at USACMLS for treaty protocols, general protection, detection, decontamination, safety, and team management**



U.S. Army Chemical School



DECONTAMINATION APPARATUS TRAINING FACILITY



- **\$2.75 million all weather decon training**
- **Environmentally correct from ground-up**
- **Supports Joint ARMY, USAF, USN, USMC
and Combined NATO / COALITION**



U.S. Army Chemical School



CHEMICAL DEFENSE TRAINING FACILITY




- **“One of a kind” facility**
- **Realistic training in toxic environment**
- **Agents manufactured on site**
- **Meets environmental standards**
- **Joint/Interagency/Multinational asset**



U.S. Army Chemical School



DRAGON WARFIGHTER CENTER



- **Trains Chemical Officers and advanced NCOs**
- **Train on latest automated command and control systems (maneuver control system, automated NBC information system, and brigade/battalion battlefield simulations)**

Training Objectives

- **Army Operations**
- **Integration and synchronization of NBC support**
- **Planning/orders process**
- **Battlestaff Training**



U.S. Army Chemical School



DEPLETED URANIUM AWARENESS TRAINING

Following Operation Desert Storm a GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-93-90) concluded that Army policies and training failed to adequately address depleted uranium (DU) contamination hazards. The DEPSECDEF tasked the SECARMY to provide adequate training to personnel who come in contact with DU material.

- Requirement:**
- U.S. Army Chemical School develop, implement, and conduct DU awareness training and technical training Army wide
 - Work with the U.S. Army Ordnance School and HQ AMC on a DU Contaminated Equipment Recovery Plan

- Status:**
- USACMLS and EAI Coporation preparing 3 tier training program
 - Participating in Bradley and Abrams vehicle burn tests
 - Extensive coordination with AMC, OTSG, TRADOC Schools






U.S. Army Chemical School



Early Operational Capability Test and Evaluation 11th Chemical Company (Decon) Mission



- **Maintain primary FORSCOM wartime mission for equipment decontamination support to contingency corps/theater Army**
- **Support TRADOC early operational capability test and evaluation requirements for new chemical equipment, organization, doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures**
- **Provide initial biological detection capability**
- **Convert to dual purpose (smoke/decon) in FY 98**



U.S. Army Chemical School




ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING

**Environmental
Restoration**

**Environmental
Compliance**

**Natural and
Cultural
Resources
Management**

**Environmental
Considerations and
Documentation**



- Supports Army's proponent for environmental training development
- Focuses on environmental awareness, compliance, management, and documentation for military forces
- Jacksonville State University developing a Masters Degree program in Environmental Management





U.S. Army Chemical School



NBC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

NBC programs support TRADOC
Commander's "Points of Main Effort":

Doctrinal Tenets Drive

Material Requirements:

- Contamination avoidance
- Protection
- Decontamination
- Smoke, obscurants, and other target-defeating mechanisms

National policy has shifted from retaliatory

Essential to improve NBC defensive capability especially BIO defense

• Maintain the Technological Edge:

- Bio Integrated Detection System
- Laser Standoff Detector
- Improve Fox NBC Recon System
- Large Area Smoke System

• Achieve Decisive Victory and Foster Organizational Excellence:

- Bio detection units
- Multipurpose units

• Focus on Soldiers:

- M40 Series Masks
- AirCrew Protective Masks
- Modular Decontamination Equipment



U.S. Army Chemical School



**EURO/NATO NBC DEFENSE
TRAINING CENTER**

**Joint Senior Leader's
Course**

**NATO Commander's
Course**

**Battlefield
Management**


**Toxic
Agent/
Decon**

**Battlefield
Obscuration/
Smoke**

**NATO NBC Battle
Staff Course**

**NBC
Recon**

**Mobile NBC Recon
Course**





U.S. Army Chemical School



BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE PROGRAM

- **Urgent need to develop and field adequate protection**
- **Chairman, JCS high priority**
- **Biological detection assigned as high priority to TRADOC'S
dismounted battle lab**
 - **Validated DIA threat**
- **MOU developed between USACMLS, dismounted battle lab, and CBDCOM
for biological detection efforts**
- **Established a Joint Program Office - Biological Defense headed by a general
officer**
 - **Validated mission needs statement for biological defense**
 - **Biological detection ORD, Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques & Procedures**
 - **Limited user test at Dugway Proving Grounds UT., Complete**
 - **Detection capability fielded in 1996**




U.S. Army Chemical School



WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
IN
LOUISIANA MANEUVERS FY 94 (LAM 94)

- **Doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldier support changes**
- **Biological defense concept**
- **WMD in training exercises**
- **Identify promising defense technologies**
- **Identify Title X impacts**
- **WMD in simulations/models**
- **Assess theater missile defense**





CRITICAL ISSUES
and
INITIATIVES



U.S. Army Chemical School





U.S. Army Chemical School



PL 103 - 160 TITLE XVII: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE

A single office within OSD will be assigned responsibility for management and oversight of the chemical-biological warfare defense and medical defense program using Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process

The SECDEF shall consolidate all chemical-biological warfare defense "training" activities of the DOD at the U.S. Army Chemical School

Requirement:

- Develop a Joint Chemical-Biological Defense Office
- Ensure close and continuous coordination of medical and non-medical (CB defense) programs
- SECARMY assigned "Executive Agent"

Status:

- Developed a proposal for a Joint CB Defense Office to be located at the Chemical School
- Recommended an organizational charter requiring staff positions be joint billets
- Proposal briefed to Assistant to SECDEF for Atomic Energy (ATSD-AE)
- All NBC defense specific list training will be at Chemical School



U.S. Army Chemical School



ALLIED TOXIC AGENT TRAINING

- **24 German classes trained:
743 students (FY 90-current)
5 classes scheduled for FY 95
147 students projected
(+ 4 Netherlands)**
- **1 United Kingdom class trained
16 Students to date
20 Students projected FY 96**







U.S. Army Chemical School



NATIONAL / INTERNATIONAL

**NBC DEFENSE
READINESS**

**SECURITY ASSISTANCE
COUNTERPROLIFERATION**

CONTINGENCY OPNS

**IRAQ-COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
WHMO-MOBILE TNG TEAM**

**INTERNATIONAL
ON-SIGHT TRAINING**

**UNITED KINGDOM
GERMAN ARMY / NETHERLANDS
SENIOR LDR TNG
FMS 19 COUNTRIES**

ARMS CONTROL

**US-RUSSIA BILATERAL TNG
CWC MULTILATERAL TNG**

**6 Courses
480 Trained FY 94
538 + Projected FY 95**



U.S. Army Chemical School



JOINT SERVICES NBC DEFENSE TRAINING CENTER CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION International Inspector Training Center



EDGEWOOD, MD
(Chemical Demilitarization
Training Facility)


**U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL
SCHOOL**
(Chemical Agent Detection
and Protection Training)

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND
(Chemical Agent Sampling and
Analysis Laboratory)

**CHEMICAL DEFENSE
TRAINING FACILITY**
(Toxic Agent Training)

PINE BLUFF ARSENAL
(Chemical Weapons Production,
Chemical Weapons Destruction,
Chemical Weapons Stockpile)

ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT
(Chemical Weapons Storage)





U.S. Army Chemical School



JOINT SENIOR LEADER/ CHEMICAL OFFICER COURSE

FY 91

FY 92

FY 93

FY 94







Rank	No.	Rank	No.	Rank	No.	Rank	No.
MG	1	MG	0	MG	2	MG	1
BG	14	BG	8	BG	10	BG	6
COL	43	COL	28	SES	1	SES	2
LTC	44	LTC	21	COL	5	COL	12
MAJ	19	MAJ	26	LTC	14	LTC	16
CPT	4	CPT	1	MAJ	14	MAJ	15
CW2	1	CW2	0	CPT	9	CPT	5
SES3	1	GS14	2	GM15	2		
GS14	1	GS13	3	GM14	1		
GS13	5	GS12	1	GM13	4	GM13	2
GS12	7	GS11	1	GS12	7	GS12	3
		CSM	2	CSM	3	CSM	1
TOTAL	140	TOTAL	93	TOTAL	72	TOTAL	63




U.S. Army Chemical School



NATIONAL / INTERNATIONAL NBC DEFENSE TRAINING



Pending



Pending





U.S. Army Chemical School



JOINT SERVICES NBC DEFENSE TRAINING CENTER FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT

	ARMY	NAVY	USMC	USAF	JOINT
DOCTRINE	X	X	X	X	X
TRAINING	X	X	X	X	X
LEADER DEVELOPMENT	X	X	X	X	X
ORGANIZATION	X		X		X*
MATERIEL	X	X	X	X	X**

***Synchronization**

****Rationalization, Standardization, Interoperability**



U.S. Army Chemical School



JOINT SENIOR LEADER/ CHEMICAL OFFICER COURSE

- **Structured for Joint and International Service training of senior leaders and staff**
- **Focus is on NBC impact on Warfighting and Operations Other Than War (OOTW)**
- **Conducted two times annually**
- **Course length is 2 1/2 days**





U.S. Army Chemical School



AMERICA'S ARMY NBC DEFENSE TRAINING CENTER

- MOB Station-5 ARNG Chem Units
- Alabama ARNG Military Training Center
 - OCS
 - PLDC
 - ANCOC
 - BNCOC



- MOB Station-52 USAR Chem Units
- Conduct Annual Unit Training
- Conduct Individual Training
- Officer (OB/OA)
- NCO
- Reclass



Training Support

Technical Cadre

Unique Facilities



28K ARNG Soldiers Train Annually

- Regionalization-Fast 21
- Capstone Training-Active/USAR/ARNG
- Centralized Military Skill Training for all USAR & ARNG Chemical Specialists


10.9K USAR Soldiers Train Annually



U.S. Army Chemical School



JOINT SERVICES NBC DEFENSE TRAINING CENTER



10 Courses
680 Training FY 95
1,000 Projected FY 96

19 Courses
3500 Training FY 94
3977 Projected FY 95



3 Courses
440 Training FY 94
710 Projected FY 95



1 Course
310 Training FY 94
205+ Projected FY 95



U.S. Army Chemical School




CHEMICAL CENTER OF EXCELLENCE


AMERICA'S ARMY



JOINT SERVICE



NATIONAL / INTERNATIONAL



DOCTRINE	TRAINING	LEADER DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATION	MATERIEL	SOLDIER
----------	----------	--------------------	--------------	----------	---------



U.S. Army Chemical School



MOBILIZATION STATION FOR CHEMICAL UNITS

- **57 RC Chemical Units mobilize and deploy through Fort McClellan**
- **2 RC Chemical training base units mobilize and remain**
- **Allows RC units to use unique training facilities**
 - **CDTF**
 - **FOX simulator**
 - **DATF**
 - **Dragon Warfighting Center**
 - **Smoke ranges**
- **Status**
 - **USARC established 85-man USAR Garrison Unit Region Coord Element for Total Army School System**
 - **Review the establishment of a chemical equipment concentration site**
 - **Expand existing site to meet Reserve Component individual and collective training requirements**






U.S. Army Chemical School




Doctrine Development Center



- Focal point for developing chemical doctrine
- Develops joint doctrine with USMC, NAVY & USAF
- Coordinates doctrinal development with other nations
- State-of-the-art desktop publishing facility




U.S. Army Chemical School



**CHEMICAL DEFENSE
TRAINING FACILITY**

“TRAINING SYSTEM”



**DECON APPARATUS
TRAINING FACILITY**

SIBERT HALL



FOX'S DEN



**DOCTRINE
CENTER**




**RADIOLOGICAL
LABORATORY**




NBC INFO CENTER

**DRAGON WARFIGHTER
CENTER**



**TREATY VERIFICATION
TRAINING SITE**



- Only Done Here -






U.S. Army Chemical School



RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES (SIBERT HALL)

Edwin R. Bradley
Radiological Laboratories



INSTRUCTIONAL LABORATORIES

*Only DA facility that certifies individuals
in radiological protection, control,
and safety*

• UNIQUE FACILITY • NRC LICENSED


- Radiological calibration
- Radioisotope counting
- Radiation monitoring
- Decontamination
- Radiological instruments
- X-ray instruction
- Laser instruction
- Microwave instruction
- Radioisotope sampling
- Radiological safety standards
- Isotope vault/waste storage
- Health physics office



U.S. Army Chemical School



NBC INFORMATION CENTER




- **Army's central technical reference repository for NBC defense and Chemical Warfare matters**
- **Automated data file with electronic bulletin board linkage to customers**
- **Modeling/simulations for wargaming and sensitivity analysis studies**
- **Supports future design and concepts in doctrine, training and materiel requirements**






U.S. Army Chemical School



FOX'S DEN


“TRAINING SYSTEM”

SIBERT HALL




DOCTRINE

CENTER




NBC INFORMATION

CENTER




RADIOLOGICAL
LABORATORIES





NBC RECON TRAINING FACILITY



- **Integrates state-of-the-art technology for detection and identification of chemical warfare agents**
- **Provides advanced simulation training for certification of operators and crew**
- **Supports mobilization training for wartime deployment**





U.S. Army Chemical School



STUDENT LOAD


COURSE	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96
Officer	432	466	427
Joint Sr Ldr	74	41	0
NCO	639	668	796
Initial Entry TNG--OSUT	1,939	1,898	1,691
Navy (4)	444	535	497
Marines (1)	310	205	115
Air Force (7)	_____	831+	600
Toxic Agent TNG	515	422	0
Allied	145	147	226
NBC Recon	191	201	243
Rad Protection	205	297	222
CWC Inspect Program	159	330	40
Tech Escort	114	100	94



U.S. Army Chemical School



FACILITIES





U.S. Army Chemical School



USACMLS FUNDING

(THOUSANDS)

	FY 1992		FY 1993		FY 1994		FY 1995	
	P8	P2	P8	P2	BA3	BA12	BA3	BA12
Labor	3,503	2,077	2,965	1,574	2,770	1,350	2,833	1,522
Travel	168	352	143	288	177	259	148	187
Contract	2,616	2,600	309	1,725	314	1,270	399	1,504
Printing	10	0	9	0	14	0	9	0
S&E	1,120	58	571	50	413	44	460	36
TOTALS	*7,417	*5,087	3,997	3,637	3,688	2,923	3,849	3,249

***Figures reflect \$3M Chemical Enhancement Funds received from HASC**



U.S. Army Chemical School



TRAINING SYSTEM COURSES

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OFFICER ADVANCED
 OFFICER BASIC
 CHEMICAL PRECOMMAND
 BASIC NCO RECLASSI
 NCO ASIC
 ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING

JOINT SERVICES

JOINT SENIOR LEADER COURSE
 CONTINGENCY SPT MOB TNG DET

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS **NAVY**
 SHIPBOARD DEFENSE
 CBR DEFENSE

NBC DEFENSE **USMC**

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS **USAF**
 CONT SPT TNG TEAM



FUNCTIONAL COURSES

TOXIC AGENT TRAINING
 ALLIED CDTF TRAINING

NBC RECONNAISSANCE
 RAD CALIBRATOR CUSTODIAN
 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
 OPERATIONAL RADIATION


NBC DEFENSE

INITIATIVES

CWC INSPECTOR TRAINING
 ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING
 JOINT TRAINING STEERING GROOP
 MASTER FOX COURSE
 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION SIMULATOR
 DEPLETED URANIUM TRAINING



U.S. Army Chemical School



MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL)

SUPPORT TRADOC AND OUR FORCE PROJECTION ARMY WITH . . .

NBC DEFENSE AND SMOKE **WARFIGHTING CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE** GROUNDED
IN THE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF INITIATIVE, AGILITY, DEPTH, SYNCHRONIZATION
AND VERSATILITY

TRAINED LEADERS AND SOLDIERS WHO UNDERSTAND AND APPLY THE DOCTRINAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE, PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATION,
AND BATTLEFIELD OBSCURATION

FLEXIBLE, DEPLOYABLE, AND TAILORABLE **ORGANIZATION DESIGN** TO ENHANCE
JOINT, COMBINED, AND COALITION OPERATIONS ACROSS THE OPERATIONAL
CONTINUUM

EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION INCORPORATING ADVANCE TECHNOLOGY TO
IMPROVE FORCE PROTECTION AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT PROMOTES **INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT EXCELLENCE**

EFFECTIVE **NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS** FOR SECURITY
ASSISTANCE IN NBC AND ARMS CONTROL



U.S. Army Chemical School



USACMLS AUTHORIZATIONS

	1992	1993	1994	1995
OFFICERS	137	118	101	97
WARRANT OFFICERS	0	0	0	0
ENLISTED	300	254	240	230
CIVILIANS	121	103	105	95
TOTALS	558	475	446	422



U.S. Army Chemical School



USACMLS FUNDING

(THOUSANDS)

	FY 1992		FY 1993		FY 1994		FY 1995	
	P8	P2	P8	P2	BA3	BA12	BA3	BA12
Labor	3,503	2,077	2,965	1,574	2,770	1,350	2,833	1,522
Travel	168	352	143	288	177	259	148	187
Contract	2,616	2,600	309	1,725	314	1,270	399	1,504
Printing	10	0	9	0	14	0	9	0
S&E	1,120	58	571	50	413	44	460	36
TOTALS	*7,417	*5,087	3,997	3,637	3,688	2,923	3,849	3,249

***Figures reflect \$3M Chemical Enhancement Funds received from HASC**



U.S. Army Chemical School



TRAINING SYSTEM COURSES

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OFFICER BASIC
 OFFICER ADVANCED
 CHEMICAL PRECOMMAND
 BASIC NCO
 BASIC NCO RECLASS
 ADVANCED NCO
 ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING

JOINT SERVICES

JOINT SENIOR LEADER COURSE
 CONTINGENCY SPT MOB TNG DET

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS NAVY
 SHIPBOARD DEFENSE
 CBR DEFENSE

NBC DEFENSE USMC

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS USAF
 CONT SPT TNG TEAM



FUNCTIONAL COURSES

TOXIC AGENT TRAINING
 ALLIED CDTF TRAINING

NBC RECONNAISSANCE
 RAD CALIBRATOR CUSTODIAN
 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
 OPERATIONAL RADIATION

NBC DEFENSE


INITIATIVES

CWC INSPECTOR TRAINING
 ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING
 JOINT TRAINING STEERING GROUP
 MASTER FOX COURSE
 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION SIMULATOR
 DEPLETED URANIUM TRAINING





U.S. Army Chemical School



MISSION STATEMENT

Develop technically and tactically proficient soldiers and leaders and provide education and training of selected United States and foreign military and civilian personnel in NBC Defense, Smoke/ Obscurants and Flame, and Chemical Weapons Technology.

Exercise overall responsibility within the America's Army for developing and defining Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Force Development, and Materiel Requirements to support Joint and Combined Arms Operations.

Support National Objectives in Security Assistance in NBC Defense, Treaty Verification, chemical weapons demilitarization, and environmental management and support.

U.S. Army Chemical School

Fort McClellan, Alabama



Lock Arms Rooms






U.S. Army Military Police School



INTERSERVICE AND INTERAGENCY TRAINING



Mock
Confinement
Facility



Protective
Services (PS)
Driving Course





HMMWV
Driving Range
(TA22)



Patrol
Incidents
(TA15)



Special
Reaction Team
(SRT)
Range 27




40mm Grenade
Machinegun
(MK19)
Range 60



Military
Operations
on Urban
Terrain
(MOUT)




Tactical Clearing
Complex (High Risk
Entry Training)



MILITARY POLICE WARFIGHTERS' CENTER

MISSION

TO PROVIDE MILITARY
POLICE PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT STUDENTS
WITH AN INDOCTRINATION
IN THE USE OF SIMULATIONS
AND TACTICAL TRAINING
DESIGNED TO REINFORCE
DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES
THROUGH THE APPLICATION
OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS.




Military Police Varefighters' Center



MILITARY POLICE WARFIGHTERS' CENTER


MISSION

TO PROVIDE MILITARY
POLICE PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT STUDENTS
WITH AN INDOCTRINATION
IN THE USE OF SIMULATIONS
AND TACTICAL TRAINING
DESIGNED TO REINFORCE
DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES
THROUGH THE APPLICATION
OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS.






U.S. Army Military Police School



FACILITIES



Maglin Hall



Basic
Military Police
Training
Department and
NCO Academy


U.S. Army Military Police School

Fort McClellan, Alabama





U.S. Army Military Police School



MISSION STATEMENT

TRAIN FOR WAR AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

- DEVELOP COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, MOTIVATED, DISCIPLINED, PHYSICALLY-FIT LEADERS AND SOLDIERS
 - ✓ SKILLED IN ESSENTIAL COMPETENCIES
 - ✓ CAPABLE OF RESPONDING RAPIDLY TO WAR AND OTHER-THAN-WAR CONTINGENCIES
 - ✓ PREPARED TO SUPPORT JOINT, COALITION, OR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

BUILD FOR THE FUTURE

- DESIGN THE FUTURE MILITARY POLICE CORPS TO SUPPORT OUR FORCE PROJECTION ARMY
 - ✓ DEVELOP MILITARY POLICE WARFIGHTING CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE
 - ✓ DESIGN AGILE, VERSATILE MILITARY POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
 - ✓ MODERNIZE MILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT TO RETAIN THE BATTLEFIELD EDGE

FOSTER ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE

- CREATE A CLIMATE THAT PROMOTES USAMPS AND CORPS-WIDE EXCELLENCE
 - ✓ RECOGNIZE THAT PEOPLE ARE OUR MOST PRECIOUS ASSET
 - ✓ PROVIDE CARING LEADERSHIP; ENCOURAGE CANDOR AND OPEN COMMUNICATION
 - ✓ MANAGE RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY

FORT MCCLELLAN ALABAMA

Military Showplace of the South




FORT MCCLELLAN

ALABAMA

Military Showplace of the South




FORT MCCLELLAN AND SURROUNDING AREA






U.S. Army Military Police School



LEADER DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE



REDESIGNING FOR FORCE XXI


- BATTLEFIELD VISION
- SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
- INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT

LEADDEX





U.S. Army Military Police School




TRAINING FACILITY INITIATIVES

- TACTICAL CLEARING COMPLEX
 - ✓ HIGHLY ADVANCED TRAINING FACILITY
 - ✓ DESIGNED TO EXERCISE BOTH MILITARY AND POLICE TACTICS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND TEAMS
 - ✓ SERVES AS EXCELLENT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT) TRAINING FACILITY
 - ✓ PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED FOR EVALUATION OF NEW OR REVISED TACTICAL CONCEPTS
 - ✓ OFFERS FORCE-ON-FORCE ENGAGEMENTS USING LIVE FIRE .9mm PAINT CARTRIDGES
 - ✓ FULLY EQUIPPED WITH VIDEO CAMERAS AND SPEAKER SYSTEMS



U.S. Army Military Police School




INTERSERVICE TRAINING INITIATIVES

- INTEGRATION OF MARINE LIEUTENANTS IN MILITARY POLICE OFFICER BASIC COURSE
 - ✓ IMPLEMENTED 4TH QTR, FY94
 - ✓ APPROXIMATELY 5 WEEKS OF TRAINING
 - ✓ FOCUSES ON MILITARY POLICE BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS






U.S. Army Military Police School




UPARMORED HMMWV (UAHMMWV)

- PROVEN NEED FOR BALLISTIC PROTECTION COUPLED WITH LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF ASV
- UAHMMWV PROVIDES INCREASED SURVIVABILITY
 - ✓ 7.62 AP PROTECTION (CREW COMPARTMENT ONLY)
 - ✓ LIMITED INDIRECT FIRE AND MINE PROTECTION
- PROGRAM MANAGED BY PROGRAM MANAGER, TACTICAL VEHICLES SPECIAL PROGRAMS
- PROCUREMENT OF 152 VEHICLES BEGINS IN FY 94



U.S. Army Military Police School




AN/GRC-231, HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO


- DOCTRINAL EMPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE PROVE THAT MPs NEED TO COMMUNICATE BEYOND 240K
- CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY IS LIMITED TO 35-70K WITH RETRANS
 - ✓ ARMY WIDE 50% SHORTFALL OF AUTHORIZED IMPROVED HIGH FREQUENCY RADIOS (AN/GRC-193 & AN/GRC-213)
 - ✓ NEW MULTI-BAND MULTI-MODE TECHNOLOGY STILL 16 YEARS AWAY
- AN/GRC-231
 - ✓ STATE-OF-THE-ART CAPABILITIES
 - ✓ RANGE UP TO 4000K
 - ✓ COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
 - ✓ COMPATIBLE WITH EXISTING SYSTEMS/LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTABLE
- NAVY IS DOD PROGRAM MANAGER
- PROCUREMENT OF 205 RADIOS BEING WORKED IN FY96 POM



U.S. Army Military Police School




INITIATIVES AND CRITICAL ISSUES





U.S. Army Military Police School




ARMORED SECURITY VEHICLE (ASV)

- 12 YEARS OF MP DEPLOYMENTS PROVE THE NEED FOR INCREASED BALLISTIC PROTECTION
- ASV PROVIDES
 - ✓ INCREASED SURVIVABILITY
 - 50 CAL BALL BASELINE PROTECTION WITH ADD-ON CAPABILITY OF 50 CAL AP AND IMPROVED FUTURE MUNITIONS
 - 60MM MORTAR AT 10 METERS
 - 12 LB MINES UNDER TIRE
 - ✓ INCREASED LETHALITY
 - DAY/NIGHT SIGHT DEVICE WITH HIGH POWER CAPABILITY
 - MK 19 GMG AND 50 CAL MG
 - ✓ INCREASED MOBILITY
 - GREATER RANGE, SPEED, GROUND CLEARANCE, AND FORDING
 - CENTRAL TIRE INFLATION SYSTEM
- PROGRAM MANAGED BY PROGRAM MANAGER, TACTICAL VEHICLES SPECIAL PROGRAMS
- PROCUREMENT OF 95 VEHICLES BEGINS IN FY 97





U.S. Army Military Police School




INTERSERVICE TRAINING CONSOLIDATED COURSES

- CONDUCTED AT FORT McCLELLAN FOR ALL SERVICES
 - ✓ COMBATTING TERRORISM
 - ✓ MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATIONS
 - ✓ SPECIAL REACTION TEAM (SRT) COURSE, PHASE I
 - ✓ HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS



U.S. Army Military Police School




FORT McCLELLAN HOSTS OTHER POLICE RELATED TRAINING

- BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND FIREARMS TRAINING
- SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION PROTECTIVE SERVICES
- OTHER AGENCIES ON REQUEST:
 - ✓ FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
 - ✓ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS





U.S. Army Military Police School




INTERSERVICE & INTERAGENCY TRAINING FAMILY ADVOCACY

- DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES (CAPIT) IN FY 92 AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION TRAINING (DVIT) IN FY 93
- TRAINS DOD LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATORS
- CAPIT FOCUSES ON CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; DVIT ADDRESSES THE SAME FOR SPOUSE AND GERIATRIC ABUSE
- TAUGHT 4 ITERATIONS (197 STUDENTS) OF CAPIT AND 4 ITERATIONS (168 STUDENTS) OF DVIT IN FY 94
- PROGRAMMED STUDENT LOAD OF 470 FOR FY 95
- FY 94 BUDGET: \$493K; FY 95 BUDGET: \$800K
(CENTRALLY FUNDED BY DOD)



U.S. Army Military Police School




INTERSERVICE TRAINING


MARINE ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (AIT)

- 10-WEEK COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
- IMPLEMENTED JAN 93
- COLLOCATED WITH ARMY TRAINING
- INTERSERVICE PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION (POI)
- SAME RANGES AND FACILITIES AS ARMY COUNTERPARTS
- MIX OF ARMY AND MARINE INSTRUCTORS
- 16 ITERATIONS (750 STUDENTS) TRAINED IN FY 94;
16 ITERATIONS (865 STUDENTS) PROGRAMMED FOR
FY 95





U.S. Army Military Police School




INTERAGENCY TRAINING COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM

- SUPPORTS NATION'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
- TRAINS CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
- PROVIDES RESIDENT INSTRUCTION AND MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
- SIX COURSES FULLY IMPLEMENTED
- TRAINED 1,801 FROM 43 STATES IN FY 94;
PROGRAMMED TO TRAIN 2,364 IN FY 95
- FUNDED \$1,055K IN FY 95



U.S. Army Military Police School



INTERAGENCY TRAINING

COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT

REHABILITATION TRAINING INSTRUCTOR COURSE

- INSTRUCTED BY CORRECTIONS NCOs WITH DRILL INSTRUCTOR EXPERIENCE
- TRAINS CORRECTIONS OFFICERS
 - ✓ IN MOTIVATION AND CORRECTIONS COUNSELING TECHNIQUES
 - ✓ TO BE DRILL INSTRUCTORS
 - ✓ ARMY BASIC TRAINING DISCIPLINE TECHNIQUES
- TWO-WEEK COURSE AT FORT McCLELLAN
- TRAINED 317 CORRECTIONS OFFICERS IN FY 94; PROGRAMMED TO TRAIN 512 IN FY 95
- FUNDED \$285K IN FY 95

TYPE & QUANTITY OF FORT MCCLELLAN FACILITIES
As of 30 Sep 94

Permanent Facilities	5,879,585 SQ FT
Temporary Facilities	786,105 SQ FT
Total Fort McClellan Facilities	6,665,690 SQ FT
Satellited Reserve Centers	578,820 SQ FT

NOTES:

1. 312,073 SQ FT of temporary facilities are licensed to Alabama National Guard.
2. FY 92 - 96 demolition goal for Fort McClellan as set by TRADOC is 358,806 SQ FT. Demolition completed at this time is 326,827 SQ FT.



FORT MCCLELLAN FACTS AND FIGURES

DOLLARS WE USE (FY 94)

\$186,200,000

TRADOC OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE ARMY (OMA)	53,500,000
TRADOC ARMY FAMILY HOUSING (AFH)	2,000,000
TRADOC RESERVE PERSONNEL ARMY (RPA)	900,000
FORSCOM OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE ARMY (OMA)	800,000
HSC OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE ARMY (OMA)	16,900,000
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE ARMY RESERVE (OMAR)	100,000
MAJOR FACILITY MAINTENANCE	400,000
OTHER DOD APPROPRIATIONS	700,000
REIMBURSEMENT FROM OVER 100 CUSTOMERS	8,900,000
PAY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (MPA) (ESTIMATED)	95,000,000
FOOD/CLOTHING FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL	7,000,000

OUR PEOPLE - 30 SEP 94

8,294

CIV APPROPRIATED (1,168)
CIV NONAPPROPRIATED (590)
CIV CONTRACT (650)
CIV PRIVATE ASSOC (40)
MIL PERMANENT PARTY (2,315)
AVG TRAINEES AND STUDENTS MONTHLY (3,531)

Projected FY95
\$ 184,200,000
7,940 People

FAST FACTS

1977-94 -- \$186 MILLION IN CONSTRUCTION COSTS

RECENT CONSTRUCTION --

- Decontamination Apparatus Training Facility \$2.5 MIL
- Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) \$14.2 MIL
- Sibert Hall \$11.8 MIL
- Area 900 Complex \$19.7 MIL
- MOUT Site \$2.5 MIL
- Fort McClellan Lodge (Guest House) \$2.2 MIL
- Polygraph Institute \$1.4 MIL
- Maintenance Facility \$5 MIL
- Sewage Treatment Plant \$4.3 MIL
- Pelham Range Support Complex \$2.8 MIL
- Golf Course and Club House \$1.5 MIL

FORT MCCLELLAN STATUS BOOK

- I. Facts and Figures
- II. Military Police School
- III. Chemical School
- IV. Training Brigade
- V. DOD Polygraph Institute
- VI. Alabama Army National Guard Training Site
- VII. The Garrison
 1. Reserve Component Support
 2. Health Care Services
 - MEDDAC
 - DENTAC
 3. BASOPS
 4. Community Life

FORT MCCLELLAN FACTS AND FIGURES

LAND WE USE

CANTONMENT (2,831 ACRES)
MANEUVER AND TRAINING AREA (36,735 ACRES)
RANGES AND IMPACT AREAS (6,113 ACRES)

45,679


♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦

OTHER LAND ACCESS AVAILABLE (180,000 ACRES)


PEOPLE WE SERVE - AS OF 30 SEP 94

ACTIVE DUTY ON POST (5,430)
ACTIVE DUTY (SATELLITED) (866)
AVERAGE RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL (1,238)
RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL (28,270 EST)
DEPENDENTS OF ACTIVE DUTY (3,671)
DEPENDENTS OF RETIRED (42,405 EST)
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (2,448)
CIVILIANS SATELLITED (751)

85,079



U.S. Army Military Police School




USAMPS FUNDING

(THOUSANDS)

	FY 1992		FY 1993		FY 1994		FY 1995	
	P8	P2	P8	P2	BA3	BA12	BA3	BA12
LABOR	3,129	775	2,904	832	2,776	930	2,670	958
TRAVEL	138	106	89	106	138	74	134	52
CONTRACTS	397	119	220	—	161	—	236	—
S&E	189	30	181	30	331	25	182	22
TOTALS	3,853	1,030	3,394	968	3,406	1,029	3,222	1,032



U.S. Army Military Police School



COURSE OVERVIEW

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT COURSES

PRE-COMMAND
OFFICER ADVANCED
OFFICER BASIC
WARRANT OFFICER
ADVANCED
WARRANT OFFICER BASIC
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
ADVANCED
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
BASIC
OSUT
USMC MP AIT



GENERAL SKILLS COURSES


MILITARY POLICE
INVESTIGATIONS
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS
PHYSICAL SECURITY
PROTECTIVE SERVICES
FRAUD INVESTIGATION
EVASIVE DRIVING
COMBATTING TERRORISM
SPECIAL REACTION TEAM
MARKSMAN OBSERVER
FAMILY ADVOCACY

INTERAGENCY TRAINING
COUNTERDRUG COURSES
REHABILITATION TRAINING
INSTRUCTOR COURSE

HOSTED TRAINING
BATF COURSES
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION




U.S. Army Military Police School




MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

SUPPORT *TRADOC* AND OUR FORCE PROJECTION *ARMY* WITH--

- COMPETENT, CONFIDENT LEADERS WHO UNDERSTAND AND CAN EFFECTIVELY APPLY EMERGING ARMY DOCTRINE AND SOLDIERS WHO POSSESS THE COMPETENCIES ESSENTIAL TO END STATE ACHIEVEMENT
- MILITARY POLICE WARFIGHTING CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE, GROUNDED IN THE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF INITIATIVE, AGILITY, DEPTH, SYNCHRONIZATION, AND VERSATILITY
- FLEXIBLE, DEPLOYABLE, AND TAILORABLE MILITARY POLICE UNITS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE JOINT, COALITION, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM
- MODERNIZATION EQUIPMENT USING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE SURVIVABILITY AND LETHALITY OF MILITARY POLICE ON THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD
- A USAMPS AND CORPS-WIDE COMMAND CLIMATE THAT PROMOTES INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT EXCELLENCE



U.S. Army Military Police School



USAMPS AUTHORIZATIONS

	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1996
OFFICERS	93	85	81	79
WARRANT OFFICERS	7	11	9	9
ENLISTED	323	360	300	283
CIVILIANS	96	110	103	91
TOTALS	519	566	493	462