

Cognitive Linguistics: A Usable Approach

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ABSTRACT

This introduction first justifies the utility of this special issue for English studies and offers a brief overview of the state of the art in cognitive linguistics. It then comments briefly on each of the articles in this collection, discussing their contribution to each of the major trends in the field, and to English studies in general. The conclusion highlights the usefulness of this approach for a variety of concerns.

KEYWORDS: Cognitive linguistics; overview; intellectual roots; embodied meaning; methodological principles; applications; editor's comments on essays.

RESUMEN

En esta introducción, en primer lugar, se justifica la utilidad del volumen para los estudios ingleses y se hace una breve exposición del estado actual de la lingüística cognitiva. A continuación se comenta brevemente cada artículo, haciéndose hincapié en su aportación a cada uno de los principales sectores de la lingüística cognitiva y a los estudios ingleses en general. Al final se destaca la indudable utilidad de este enfoque por una gran variedad de intereses.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Lingüística cognitiva; visión general; raíces intelectuales; significado corporeizado; principios metodológicos; aplicaciones; comentarios del compilador sobre los diversos artículos.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

I.1. Intellectual roots. Basic assumptions. The discovery of embodied meaning.

'Cognitive linguistics' is the name used for a particular approach to the study of language. It refers thus to a theoretical stance, to a general set of assumptions about what language is, which are its foundations, how it is used, and which are the most adequate methodological principles to be observed in its study.

I shall be commenting on this set of assumptions presently. But a few words may be necessary to justify the suitability of a monograph issue on cognitive linguistics for an

English studies journal, like *Cuadernos de Filología Inglesa*. Most studies in cognitive linguistics have used English as the language of exemplification; in this respect the situation is no different from that in GB (Chomsky's 'Government and Binding') or other generative approaches. However, the fact is that cognitive linguistics still has a minority share in the various disciplines that make up the vast, manifold field of English studies. be it the study of all aspects of the English language, of the literatures in English, or of the cultures shaping and shaped by English: for all these broad areas of research and for their respective component disciplines, cognitive linguistics offers fascinating fresh approaches. new methodological principles, and many recent findings. I have no doubt, thus, that a large sector of the English studies community will welcome this collection of essays.

We can now concentrate on the theoretical assumptions in our approach. The main cause for the emergence of what is now known as cognitive linguistics is to be found in the dissatisfaction that a group of linguists experienced in the late seventies with the dominating generative paradigm in linguistics and in cognitive psychology (see Ruiz de Mendoza's interview with George Lakoff, this volume). This paradigm was felt to be excessively concerned with notational formalism at the expense of descriptive adequacy and psychological realism. On the other hand, some of the major assumptions underlying generative approaches to syntax and semantics (particularly the correspondence theory of truth in semantics and the modularity hypothesis in linguistics and psychology) were clearly at odds with a growing mass of experimental data in linguistics, psychology and other fields, and, as Lakoff (1987) pointed out, with some brilliant pages in the philosophy of language (Austin and, most particularly, Wittgenstein). The 'rebels' (many of whom had initially worked within the generative approach) then embarked upon one of the most exciting intellectual adventures in linguistics in this century: they set out to revise most of the fundamental assumptions held for centuries about language and the foundations of language. The results of this scrutiny, very often carried out in various, though convergent, directions, have been impressive. Two fundamental tenets have emerged from this revision.

The first one affects the very status of language as a human ability, which is now envisaged from a radically different perspective. Cognitive linguists do not regard the ability to learn one's mother tongue as a unique faculty, a special innate mental module, distinct from other general cognitive abilities. The modularity hypothesis is strongly advocated by generativist theorists (see e.g. Chomsky 1986:18, Fodor 1983) and by other more or less faithful followers of Chomsky, including Jackendoff (see e.g. Jackendoff 1996:96)¹. Research in anthropological linguistics (Berlin and Kay 1969, Kay 1975, Kay and McDaniel 1978), cognitive psychology (e.g. Heider² 1971, 1972, Heider and Oliver 1972, Rosch 1973, 1977, 1978, Rosch and Mervis 1975, Rosch 1983), in cultural anthropology (e.g. Berlin, Breedlove and Raven 1974, Kempton 1981, Holland and Quinn 1987), and, to a lesser extent, in neurology and neurophysiology (Damasio 1994, Edelman 1992), rather seems to support a very different view.

This view is that general cognitive abilities, like our kinaesthetic abilities, our visual or sensorimotor skills, and above all, our typically human categorisation strategies. especially our tendency to construct categories on the basis of prototypical basic-level subcategories or exemplars (Neisser 1987, Rosch 1983, Tsohatzidis 1990³) jointly account, together with cultural, contextual and functional parameters, for the main design features of languages and for our ability to learn and use them. The keyword in this approach is *embodiment* (Johnson

1987. Lakoff 1987, 1993a; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 and their forthcoming book). Mental and linguistic categories **cannot** be abstract, disembodied, human-independent, categories. Quite the opposite: we **construct** and understand our categories on the basis of concrete experiences, and under the constraints **imposed**, first and foremost, by our bodies. Human conceptual categories, the meanings of words and sentences, of linguistic structures at any level, are not **just** a combination of a set of universal abstract features, of **uninterpreted** symbols. A very large number of these meanings and structures are more or less directly motivated by experience, in many cases, bodily experience⁴.

So concepts, including linguistic concepts, are *grounded in experience* (bodily / physical experience, or social / cultural experience). This is thus in conflict with an axiom in twentieth century linguistics: that of *l'arbitraire du signe*⁵. The study of conceptual and linguistic grounding has advanced **immensely** in recent years, especially through the detailed investigation of bodily-based metaphorical systems (see below), **and** through the investigation of the psychological reality (see Mandler 1992, Neisser 1987 and Gibbs 1995, Ch. 9) and the neural correlates of basic embodied concepts and of their extension to other concepts (for the neural correlates, see the early **results** of the Berkeley-based L-zero group as reported in Bailey (1997), Narayanan (1997), and Regier (1996)). This **insistence** on embodiment and motivation explains the important role accorded to iconicity in language (Harnad, 1985)

This view of language as a product of general cognitive abilities is in fact a result of the **observance** of a yet more basic **principle** in cognitive linguistics, namely, «**the cognitive commitment**» (Lakoff 1990): linguistic theory and methodology must be consistent with what is empirically **known** about cognition, the brain, and language. Since **empirical** evidence (especially psychological and linguistic evidence) strongly favours the **nonmodularist** hypothesis, most cognitive linguists adopt this hypothesis; but they would take a **modularist** position if the bulk of evidence supported it.

The second fundamental tenet is concerned with the theory of linguistic meaning. Most cognitive linguists **claim** that meanings do not 'exist' independently from the people that **create** and use them, as Reddy **brilliantly** showed long ago in a now classic essay (Reddy 1993 (1979)). Therefore they **reject** what both Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) have termed 'objectivism' in linguistics and philosophy, since there is no **objective** reality which is independent from human cognition. And linguistic **forms**, as Fillmore, Lakoff, or Langacker say (see Ungerer and Schmid 1996:208-209) are **just** clues that **activate** the conceptual structures that we **have** formed in our minds, but **have** no *inherent* meanings in themselves. Meanings 'reside' in our minds and our brains (they can be characterised as neural routines). Linguistic forms just **activate** them, but the (part of the) meaning complex activated in my mind need not be exactly the **same** as the one activated in someone **else's** by an utterance with the same linguistic form, **because**, as was said earlier, meaning is a result of experience, both collective and individual.

Meanings are not **really** inherent in linguistic forms, but they are conventionally *paired*, more or less directly, to linguistic forms, which then **become** 'cues' for the activation of these meanings. As Lakoff (1987: 583) puts it:

The primary function of language is to convey meaning. A **grammar** should therefore show as directly as possible how parameters of form are **linked** to parameters of meaning.

This association is very **often** more or less directly motivated, as we said above. Therefore, the cognitive linguist tends to regard every distinction in form, no matter how small, as in principle being **linked** to a corresponding distinction in meaning (in a very broad sense of 'meaning'). This view is consistent with human rationality: why should linguistic communities develop these formal distinctions if not for the **purpose** of symbolising distinct (sometimes very subtle) meanings? To put it differently, a cognitive linguist is in principle inclined to be suspicious of claims of synonymy, or of paraphrase relations, which in our view can never be absolute (Taylor 1995:55-57), and to try and discover the *symbolic value* of each linguistic form.

1.2. Methodological principles

These two **theoretical** standpoints have a number of important consequences for linguistic methodology. The perception of our linguistic skills as a product of general cognitive abilities has brought about, on the methodological plane, the rejection of what has long **been** held as an archetypal 'scientific' requirement in linguistics, namely that all linguistic analytical categories must **impose** necessary and **sufficient** conditions for membership in the category. Such a requirement entails, for **instance**, that there has to be one abstract, general definition (or a structural description) of passive clauses, which every seemingly passive clause conforms to. But such a definition is actually impossible to arrive at: no matter how sophisticated, it would always exclude some **likely candidates**.⁶ Another consequence of this traditional requirement would be the need for positing general abstract meanings applicable to **all** the senses of polysemous lexical items. These senses would be regarded as related to this abstract, 'core' **meaning**. So the two different senses of *eye* in *She has blue eyes* and in *The eye of the needle* would be considered as related to one general, abstract sense of 'eye' (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: Ch. 18). The serious problem with this **position** is that in many cases, especially where the sense extension is due to metaphor or metonymy (see Sweetser 1986), it is **virtually** impossible to identify such an abstract sense, **unless** we (vacuously) **state** that this sense is 'circular shape'. How can then 'eye' be distinguished from 'wheel' or 'egg', or ...? What is more, which is the abstract sense covering the senses of 'eye' in the two preceding examples **and** in *He has a good eye for beauty*?. However, as we **shall** see presently, **all** of these senses are related, but not through an abstract default sense included in **all** of them.

A cognitive linguistic methodology would take a very different path. One of the basic general cognitive abilities reflected in the **structure** and use of languages is *prototype categorisation*: human categories are normally characterised by having one typical member of a category (the prototype), to which other members are related in a motivated way, these less central members **departing** from the prototype in varying degrees and along various dimensions (see **all** the **references** above to the work by Rosch and others). A cognitive methodology would then identify the prototypical use of *eye* as that referring to a body-part, and would treat the other uses of this lexeme as motivated non-prototypical senses, related in a systematic way to the prototypical sense. In *The eye of the needle* and in *He has a good eye for beauty* the link is metaphorical; in other senses of 'eye' it may be metonymic. There would be no problem, then, in recognising the fact that the **three** senses illustrated by these

examples correspond to the same *polysemous* lexeme⁷. The study of polysemy and of the networks of senses in polysemous **lexical** items (and of grammatical **constructions**) thus becomes central in a cognitive approach⁸ and has been the **subject** of extensive high-quality research by cognitive linguists (see e.g., Sandra and Cuyckens, forthcoming). Of course this interest in sense networks or meaning **chains** is not incompatible with acknowledging the role of abstraction in the mental **construction** of prototypical **senses**.⁹

Similarly, a cognitive grammarian would recognise a central type of passive *construction* (typically describing an action by a voluntary agent, with a dynamic transitive verb, an active correspondence, etc.) and a series (a network) of less central passive constructions motivated by the **prototype**¹⁰. An important point then is that there are seldom any necessary and sufficient conditions in human conceptual categories, including linguistic categories.

A second consequence of the primacy of general cognitive **abilities** is that no strict distinction can be made between encyclopedic, experienced-based knowledge and linguistic meaning. This means that our large, complex conceptual structures are invoked in language use and comprehension, and that conventional meanings (i.e. strictly 'semantic' meanings) arise on the basis of experience and general knowledge. Hence the commonplace claim in cognitive linguistics that meaning is **ultimately** pragmatic, and very often holistic, gestalt-like. Such a claim is obviously at **variance** with the traditions in semantics underlying such constructs as Carnap's meaning postulates or **Katz's** semantic markers and distinguishers. And if experience-based knowledge permeates linguistic meaning at every **level**, these levels are themselves open-ended, there **being** no strict separation between them, especially between symbolic levels, i.e. between lexicon and **grammar**, or between levels in the organisation of meaning, i.e. semantics and pragmatics. Or between synchrony and diachrony. Functional and cognitive approaches to linguistic change **have** concluded that there is not a strict distinction between synchrony and diachrony since historical changes very often **have** the same social, **functional** and cognitive motivation which is directly observable **in** contemporary ongoing changes (especially in grammaticalization and **lexicalization** processes).

This continuum between language and experience explains the fact that the study of *conceptual structures* or *cognitive models* as reflected in language has **been** an important area of research in cognitive linguistics from its very **beginning**. Two complementary tendencies are Fillmore's *frames* (Fillmore 1975, 1976, 1982, 1985; Fillmore and Atkins 1992), and Lakoff's theory of *idealised cognitive models* (Lakoff 1982, 1987: 5-157). Cognitive models very often reflect *cultural models* (see below).

A third consequence of this general **theoretical** position is the essential role of *imagination*, a basic **human** cognitive ability, normally despised in pretendedly 'scientific' theories of language. We humans 'make sense' of our less directly apprehensible experiences (for instance, of our experience of time, of emotions, or of human interaction), on the basis of more directly apprehensible and more **easily** describable experiences, which are usually bodily experiences. Thus we often **project**, for **instance**, **part** of our bodily experience of three-dimensional space onto our experience of time and talk about the **future** being «**up**». Or we map it onto our experience of happiness and talk about being **in** «**high**» spirits, or onto our experience of power and talk about having control «**over**» somebody (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:15-17). In so doing, we use our imagination. There are two basic imaginative cognitive mechanisms: *meraphor* and *metonymy*. They are not **just** rhetorical devices, not **just** a matter

of words. They are complex *mental projections* or *mappings* of our knowledge of one domain of experience to structure our knowledge of a different domain of experience, and they are normally carried out unconsciously and effortlessly. In metaphor we project (part of) of one conceptual domain onto another **separate** domain, e.g. the *source domain* of temperature onto the *target domain* of emotion, as in *He tried to act cool*. In metonymy the projection takes place within the same domain; an example is constituted by *pars pro toto* mappings, as in *He won three golds*, where the concept 'gold' stands for the concept 'gold medal' (example borrowed from Radden and Kovecses 1996). In many cases the more direct experiences mapped are themselves understood metaphorically or metonymically on the basis of *image-schemas* (Johnson 1987), which are preconceptual structures that we acquire as a result of our earliest bodily experiences (basic conceptual complexes like 'container', 'path', 'centreperiphery', 'up/down'). Metaphor and metonymy determine a large part of lexical and grammatical meaning and form (Lakoff 1987:462-585, 1993b, Goldberg 1995, Sweetser 1990: 49-149). The past few years **have** witnessed a steady effort aimed at describing the metaphorical systems in many languages, especially English," and at elucidating in greater detail the nature of metaphor, with important insights like **the invariance principle** (Lakoff and Turner, Lakoff 1990, 1993a, Jackel 1997, who criticises it), the phenomenon of duality and the 'inheritance hierarchies' in metaphor (Lakoff 1993a).

Metonymy has received comparatively less attention than metaphor by cognitive linguists. However Lakoff and Johnson (1980: Ch. 8) and Lakoff (1987, especially Ch 5-8 and case study 2), stress its **importance** in categorisation. Taylor (1995), and Fauconnier (1985, 1994) **also devote** particular attention to it. However **some** recent studies are **beginning** to fill this gap: Panther and Radden (forthcoming) will be a fundamental contribution; a particularly useful paper **among** those that will appear in this collection of essays is Radden and Kovecses 1997. An important area is the interaction between metaphor and metonymy (Goossens et al 1995, Barcelona, forthcoming a, b), especially the conceptual dependency of metaphor on metonymy (Barcelona, forthcoming b).

Both metaphor and metonymy are viewed in cognitive linguistics as largely unconscious, automatic correspondences between experiential domains. A result of this conception is that the number of experiential domains which can be claimed to be understood on their own terms has **been** shown to be dramatically smaller **than** normally admitted by more traditional theories of categorisation and of metaphor and metonymy. For **instance**, apparently 'literal' expressions like *He found the answer* can be shown to be ultimately understood in terms of complex metaphorical models of ideas as objects and of understanding as vision, which **also motivate** a vast number of other linguistic expressions like e.g. *I tried to convey the idea to you*, or *He has clear ideas*.

A recent tendency in cognitive linguistics which **subsumes** metaphor and metonymy as special cases of more general mental mapping mechanisms is the theory of 'blending' or conceptual integration, which is an extension of Gilles Fauconnier's earlier work on mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985, 1994) and has **been** developed by him and Mark Turner (Fauconnier, forthcoming, Fauconnier and Turner 1996, Turner and Fauconnier 1995). This new theory seems to explain how speakers and hearers keep track of referential values and other factors in the conceptual mappings occurring throughout a discourse, often by constructing new, provisional conceptual domains or 'blends'. This work, and related work on recursive metaphorical chains (see, e.g. Rohrer, forthcoming), **also** seems to put in a new

perspective the common claim in cognitive metaphor theory that metaphorical mappings are unidirectional, i.e. that they move only from the source to the target domain, and points to the existence of multiple projections, though not in the way predicted by interactionalist theories of metaphor, like Black's (Black 1962).

The emphasis upon the symbolic character of language (the second basic tenet discussed above) results in the methodological **relevance** given to detailed descriptions rather than to Post mles (mathematical formulae developed by Emil Post) or to other formal systems whose generative or predictive power has then to be constrained by artificial 'filters'. In generative approaches, it is these abstract, formal structures and mles that are supposed to be closer to psychological reality than the morphosyntactic configurations (constmctions) which are claimed to be their output, and which are regarded in these approaches as mere epiphenomena. By contrast, in cognitive linguistics the detailed analysis of *grammatical constructions* as conventional pairings of form and meaning (including pragmatic meaning) becomes of prime interest (Fillmore 1988, Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988, Goldberg 1995 Lakoff 1987: 462-586, Langacker 1987, 1991). The same spirit is applied to the study of the lexicon, as we have seen, and to the study of phonology (Taylor: 222-239).

All of these methodological principles and the specific theories that they have brought about interact in various ways. The cognitive theories of conceptual structures (idealised cognitive models or ICMs, frames) and the lexical and grammatical networks based on them assume, as basic mental mechanisms in concept formation and organisation, prototype categorisation and (especially in Lakoff's theory of ICMs) mapping mechanisms like metaphor, metonymy and mental spaces. In fact many cultural cognitive models are metaphorically structured (for two recent approaches see Palmer 1996 and Shore 1996). On the other hand, most conventional metaphors and metonymies, or the connection between two or more mental spaces, operate on the basis of the conventional 'frame', 'ICM' (or part thereof) of the experiential domains connected. For instance, the metonymic mapping of the food consumed onto the customer which underlies expression like *The cheeseburger has left wirhour paying works* against the background of the conventional restaurant frame or ICM. If image-schemas are basic to cognition, they are doubtless instrumental in the construction of frames or ICMs and in metaphorical or metonymic mappings (Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1990, 1993a). Talmy (e.g. 1978, 1988, 1996) and Langacker (e.g. 1982, 1987, 1991, 1995) have produced extremely illuminating analyses of a vast array of grammatical phenomena understood on the basis of spatial image-schemas and the profiling or foregrounding of parts of them.¹² Construction grammars in general take into account image-schemas and conceptual mappings¹³ as an essential ingredient in their description of the meaning and the form of many of these linguistic phenomena. Finally, Fillmore and Kay's Construction Grammar is designed specifically to interact with frame semantics (Valenzuela 1996).

Of course, not everyone that can be regarded as a cognitive linguist necessarily agrees in every detail on all of these methodological principles. A good example might be Anna Wierzbicka, who despite her outspoken criticism of the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy (Wierzbicka 1986) and her mistrust of unwarranted prototype-based analyses (Wierzbicka 1990), can and should be regarded as a cognitive linguist because she professes the 'cognitive commitment' that characterises every cognitive linguist: in the absence of decisive evidence against her theory of universal semantic primitives, she has firmly maintained her leibnizian conception of linguistic meaning, and done extensive descriptive

research to support it. Another interesting **example** might be Langacker's postulation that speakers often use abstract schemas for many concepts alternating with prototype categorisation (Langacker 1987: 373ff).

One of the criticisms sometimes levelled against cognitive linguistics, as contrasted with e.g. generative approaches, is that its 'rigour' suffers very much from its **frank** rejection of hitherto accepted formal notational systems. A cognitive linguist would reply that notation is just a shorthand for concepts and phenomena that **have** to be clearly understood first, and that generative theories **have all** too often used sophisticated mathematical machinery to **represent** ill-understood linguistic phenomena. Cognitive linguists prefer to **understand** linguistic facts in depth, i.e. both in **their** phenomenological and cognitive complexity and **only** then face the secondary problem of formal representation. By following this strategy, they **have** extended the range of linguistic phenomena for which realistic, **usage**-based descriptions and explanations are now possible, which may in turn lead to more accurate formal representations of **some** (but probably not all) aspects of language **structure** and use.

1.3. Applications

The **immediately** preceding paragraph **takes** us to the issue of applications. I **shall** mainly consider those directly **connected** with English studies. One of them has **been** a more realistic, thus more accurate description of large sectors of English **grammar** and of its lexicon. Historical linguistics has **been** put in a new perspective, as we saw above. Another important application of cognitive linguistics has **been** its contribution to a better understanding of the human mind, since language is one of our major windows into its workings, just as **the** study of mind has improved our understanding of language (Lakoff 1987, Gibbs 1995, Lakoff and Johnson, forthcoming). **A** similar case of cross-fertilisation in recent years has **been** the relation between cognitive linguistics **and** the scientific study of cultural models, normally carried out by sociologists and anthropologists (e.g. see the **references** above to Holland and **Quinn**, Palmer, Shore, and those in Martín Morillas's paper in this volume).

The application to and cooperation with artificial intelligence has already yielded **some** important results, in particular computational implementations of **some** cognitive theories (e.g. Martin 1989)¹⁴ and connectionist studies of **some** image-schematic and metaphorical conceptualisations (e.g. Bamden 1991-94 or the results of the Berkeley L-zero group quoted above). We could **also** add interesting cases **like** the Cog project at MIT, whose team is building a robot with 'embodied' artificial intelligence (**Brooks** and Stein 1993). **All** of this experimental, 'high-tech' research has **taken** seriously Lakoff and Johnson's claims about embodied cognition.

Cognitive linguistics **in** general has **been** instrumental **in** renewing lexicology (Geeraerts, Grondelaers and Bakema, 1994) and lexicography (Geeraerts 1990, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1990). **Frame** semantics in particular has **been** shown to **have** important computational lexicographic applications (Fillmore and **Atkins** 1994, **Lowe**, Baker and Fillmore 1997¹⁵). Cognitive linguistics has led to a better understanding of **first** language learning processes (see e.g., Bowerman 1997). And though **little** has **been** done yet **in** this

direction, there is no doubt that cognitive linguistics can also contribute usefully to second language learning research (see e.g. Correa 1989) and that language teaching methodology will benefit by contact with cognitive approaches (Ungerer and Schmid 1996:267-274); there is today a serious interest in pursuing this line of research.¹⁶

The study of literature and other art forms has benefited enormously by the cognitive theories of metaphor and metonymy and has been shown to be extremely useful as a window into human cognition (see e.g. Hiraga and Radwanska-Williams 1995, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Turner 1987, 1991, 1996).

Even such fields as the study of politics (Lakoff 1992, 1996), ethics (Johnson 1993), law (Winter 1989), science (Boyd 1993), religion¹⁷, philosophy (Lakoff and Johnson forthcoming), and many others have benefited from the methodology developed in cognitive linguistics, most particularly, for the study of metaphor and cognitive models.

This brief review of the main tenets, themes, methodological principles and applications of cognitive linguistics is by no means exhaustive. There are many other important aspects in our approach that I have not been able to mention, but I hope that the preceding pages will have been sufficiently informative for interested members of the English studies community, as a general account of this recent tendency in linguistics.

II. THE ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

The articles in the present volume constitute a fair representation of the trends in cognitive linguistics discussed above. I would like to stress the fact that the large number of articles included is a consequence of the massive response that our call for papers received from various parts of the world, though most of the contributions are from scholars working in Spain. Most of the contributions received were high-quality ones and most of those that were rejected were turned down simply because their topics lay outside the scope of this volume. This large collection of papers is thus evidence both of the ever growing relevance of cognitive linguistics for English studies and of its vitality in Spain.

The classification of the papers, which is reflected in their serial arrangement in the volume, is not meant to be absolutely accurate, since a substantial part of them could have been placed in more than one group. It simply tries to highlight the main focus of each paper, in the editor's view.

II.1. The interview with George Lakoff

The interview with George Lakoff done by Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza wonderfully sets the scene for the rest of the volume. This is the reason why it appears right after this editorial article. It elaborates on many of the topics discussed here and in the papers, and it touches on many other themes with George's characteristic brilliance, sparked off by the interviewer's intelligent, incisive questionnaire. It is also a fascinating narrative, by one of the leading figures in cognitive linguistics, about the socioacademic and intellectual origins and vicissitudes of the cognitive movement.

II.2. Conceptual structures

The first group of papers deals with what we **have generically called** above conceptual structures, i.e., cognitive models in general, cultural models, schemas, frames, etc. The article by José Manuel *Martín Morillas* is a bright, stimulating presentation of what he **calls** the 'cognitive-cultural model' (C-CM), a complex, many-sided conceptual structure that packages and schematises a rich mass of socially shared **information** and knowledge about a **field** of experience. **The meanings** of words are to be interpreted as relevant to such a model. Martín Morillas illustrates **his** presentation with an outline of the C-CM of the categories World and Self. The papers by Celia Wallhead and Encarnación Hidalgo investigate the functioning of conceptual structures **in** the creation and reception of the literary work. Wallhead's article analyses how Salman Rushdie re-tells the story of the relationship between Columbus and **Queen** Isabella of **Spain**, first by triggering up in the reader the conventional cultural models or schemas that would **fit** the historian's account of the facts, and by **later** destroying them by means of the **intrusion** of other conventional schemas, which **leads** to the construction of new, unconventional schemas ('schema refreshment'). Hidalgo's essay applies a reinterpretation of Alan Garnharn's theory of mental models which **takes** into account **Quinn** and Holland's notion of cultural models, to explain the rejection of Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World* by conservative Irish audiences at the beginning of the 20th century, as a clash between **conflicting** mental models.

II.3. Polysemy and semantic change

The second group of papers is concerned with various aspects of lexical and grammatical semantic change **in** polysemous structures, **in** a cognitive **linguistic** framework. Iraide Ibarreche studies the cross-linguistic regularities in the metaphorical extensions of the perception sense of verbs of smelling into mental or emotional domains like 'liking', 'suspecting', 'guessing', etc. in English, Basque and Spanish. Her results challenge Sweetser's claim that what Kovecses (1995) would **call** the metaphorical scope of this perception domain is weaker than that of others like sight or hearing. Enrique Palancar's excellent, carefully documented paper traces the **emergence** of the agentive sense of **by** in passive clauses as an extension from the instrumental sense present in the initial radial semantic network of the preposition. **This** claim disproves **Langacker's** earlier proposal, which had **skipped** the instrumental link.

II.4. Metaphor and metonymy

The **third** set of contributions, by far the largest one, is devoted to various aspects of the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy and its applications. Two of these papers study theoretical issues. Judith Ferenczy applies the cognitive theory of metaphor to study the systematic networks of conventional metaphors («**meta-metaphors**») employed **in three** well-known theories of metaphor, including **Lakoff** and **Johnson's**. The revealing result is

that the metalanguage employed by an interactionalist like Black and a pragmatist like Searle is shown to be itself evidence of the correctness of the cognitive theory of metaphor! *Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza* discusses brilliantly some nuclear areas of the theory of metonymy: he demonstrates convincingly that metonymy is not crucially differentiated from metaphor in 'terms of 'domain highlighting' vs. 'domain mapping' (as Croft claims); he explores some previously unnoticed similarities between metaphor and metonymy that seem to point to a continuum between both mechanisms; he offers some evidence that metonymy is not distinguished from other cases of polysemy in terms of intrinsicness (as Croft asserts), but in terms of centrality of mappings, and finally argues for the complementarity of the cognitive theory of metonymy with relevance theory.

Four papers in this group are case-studies of particular metaphors or specific metaphorically-structured conceptual domains. *Valentina Apresjan*, in her highly suggestive article, attempts to explain the cross-linguistic recurrence of a certain set of emotion metaphors on the basis of the type of source domains, i.e. physiological, cultural, or 'cognitive', and supports her proposal with a vast array of examples drawn from English and Russian. *Laurence Erussard* applies cognitive metaphor to the study of St Matthew's passage «you are the salt of the earth». It is an exercise both in cultural and religious history and in cognitive semantics that brings together the full complexity of the cultural ingredients that must have come into play in the understanding of this passage by Jesus' contemporaries and near contemporaries, the universal and persistent bodily motivation of the basic gustative metaphor having been kept intact through time. *John Newman's* paper is an insightful, carefully documented case study of the metaphorical scope of the prototypical conceptual domains of eating and drinking in English, which he shows to be mapped onto domains as diverse as breathing, the mind, ideas, life, possessing, physical destruction, and others. *Michael White* shows how a small set of metaphors, with just two general source schemas (the weather and living organisms), are recurrently used by three very different British newspapers in their reponing of a currency crisis in the European Monetary System. It is also an interesting analysis of the cohesive role of certain pivotal metaphors in discourse, which is hardly surprising, given the fact that metaphors often structure the reasoning processes materialising in discourse (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

The last two papers in the group study the function of cognitive metaphor in literature. *Pilar Alonso* offers a penetrating analysis of Lakoff and Turner's proposals for the metaphorical analysis and interpretation of literary texts, warning us about the danger of global interpretations whose justification rests solely on an appeal to the system of conventional metaphors in the language in question, without due consideration given to context, macrostructural formal text structure, and microstructural co-text. In her paper, *Lorena Pérez Hernández* makes explicit the ultimately spatial, image-schematic basis of George Lakoff's theory of the metaphorical conceptualisation of the self, by analysing it systematically in terms of Mark Johnson's spatial image-schemas. This enriched version of Lakoff's theory is then used as a tool for showing how spatial metaphors guide the writer's construction of character and how it can guide a plausible interpretation of the meaning of the novel: the behaviour and language of each of the three protagonists are claimed to be somehow 'diagrammatic' with respect to each of the metaphorical constituents of the self, and the novel can be read symbolically as the story, not of three people, but of one disintegrated person.

II.5. Grammar and phonology

The fourth group of papers is concerned with grammar and phonology, i.e. with linguistic form. *Palancar's* paper could also have been included in this group, too, but his essay is more directly devoted to the semantics of a grammatical lexeme ('by'). If, as we said in our overview of cognitive linguistics earlier in this article, the main principle in cognitive linguistics is the cognitive commitment, then a cognitively adequate grammatical theory has to be psychologically adequate. In his article, *Javier Martín Arista* explores the psychological adequacy of Givón's Functional Typological Grammar (FTG). He elaborates a number of adequacy criteria on the basis of Givón's own principles and of those of another two functionalist schools (Dik's Functional Grammar and Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar) as a gauge to evaluate the psychological adequacy of FTG. It is claimed that this theory satisfies most of the criteria, thus qualifying as a cognitive theory, but its bottom-up orientation flouts the 'processing adequacy meta-criterion', and its maintenance of tree-diagram, phrase-structures and transformations seems inconsistent with the emphasis on constructions in most cognitive theories.

Joseph Hilferty applies Goldberg's version of construction grammar to explain the incorrectness of a common assumption in some pedagogical grammars, namely that *been* is a past participle of *go* in expressions such as *I have been to Paris*. He examines the kinds of constructions *go* enters into to refute this wrong assumption by showing that *been* is not an allomorphic variant of *gone*, but *been to* is a special idiomatic construction, with its own syntax and semantics. The brief but insightful paper by *Javier Valenzuela* and *Joseph Hilferty* challenges Michaelis and Lambrecht's claim that *it* in what they call nominal extraposition (as in *It's amazing, the claims they make*) is devoid of meaning because it is not coreferential with the head (*claims*) of the extraposed NP. Showing first that coreferentiality is independent from grammatical concord, they argue persuasively that *it* cataphorically refers to the scene or frame evoked by the extraposed NP. This analysis is more congenial with the cognitive linguistic maxim that form is in principle semantically motivated.

Juana Man'n Arrese's very well-documented, carefully argued article unveils the systematic connection of a series of marked, non-prototypical morphosyntactic constructions in English and Spanish (some *be-* and *ger-* passives, motion adverb constructions, Spanish *se*, etc.), to our conceptualisation of events. On the basis of Croft's accounts of the prototypical event, of natural event chains, and of the natural profiling of aspects of events as coded by verbs, she studies marked constructions in the area of transitivity and voice as syncretisms of various kinds of deviation from the natural profilings or construals of events, and displays their interconnections at three levels on a synoptic semantic space chart, which is also an image of the extensional pathways followed in the appearance of these syncretisms. Finally *Javier Díez Vera* attempts to provide a partial explanation for one of the sound changes that made up the Great Vowel Shift (the raising of ME long *a*) in approximate cognitive terms. His detailed study suggests that the change came about partly as the result of a cognitive process triggered off in listeners by the misunderstandings due to cross-dialectal communication in 16th century London.

II.6. Foreign language learning

The last two articles in the volume exemplify the value of a cognitive perspective in attempts at explaining processes in foreign language learning. Both papers adopt a cognitive perspective in a broad sense. The paper by *Piedad Fernández* and *Flor Mena* studies the role of the inference of the meaning of unfamiliar lexemes in the comprehension of texts by learners of English as a second (and as a foreign) language. This inference is shown to be facilitated by the prior acquisition of the related conceptual structures, the accuracy rate of the reader's 'guesses' being dramatically heightened as a result. Some pedagogical guidelines are suggested on the basis of these observations. The article by *Ana Rojo* interprets the results of her own experiment with a set of British speakers learning four Spanish conjunctions, in terms of Bialystock's 'processing-continuum model', which emphasises the role of automatization (which she claims to be parallel to Langacker's notion of 'entrenchment') in foreign language learning. Although some of the predictions of the model about variability in task performance are not confirmed by the experiment, her conclusions confirm the validity of most of Bialystock's claims.

NOTES

¹ A brief exchange of views between the generative (Victoria Fromkin) and the cognitive (Timo Haukioja) camps was published in *Cognitive Linguistics* 4-4: 395-407.

² Eleanor Heider began publishing under the name Eleanor Rosch after 1973.

³ Tsoharzidis (1990) is an interesting collection of essays with various views on the value of prototype theory for semantics.

⁴ We would want to hypothesize, in fact, that the conventional meaning of most morphemes, words, and syntactic structures was partly motivated and not wholly arbitrary, at least in their genesis as symbolic structures at some stage in the development of a given language or of its parent languages (see Heine 1993, who proposes three basic bodily-spatial semantic schemas as the motivation for grammatical categories; see also Goldberg 1995). According to Lakoff (1990, 1993a), most (if not all) basic abstract concepts, such as causation or time, or quantity (which underlie the meanings and the form of many linguistic structures) originate (via metaphor) in our bodily experience of spatial relations. This is, of course, a radical version of the embodiment claim. But most cognitive linguists agree that our bodily experience plays a major motivating role in the semantic and syntactic structures of languages.

Of course this is not to say that total motivation is the rule in linguistic forms or meanings. In many cases, in fact, the motivation is no longer apparent to the native speaker. Just think of the word sad: there appears to be no apparent motivation for its present meaning. But historical research may discover this motivation: in this case, the emotional meaning is a metaphorical extension from an earlier bodily meaning ('sated', 'full'), on the basis of a basic metaphor that regards the person as a container for emotions (Barcelona 1986, Kovecses 1990).

⁶ Which syntactic or semantic properties do sentences like 'Cash has been replaced by credit', 'Cash has been replaced with credit', 'The computer was smashed by Mike' and 'I am very surprised to see you' have in common? Every experienced grammarian knows their syntactic properties (including their potentiality for active counterparts) are very different, not to mention their semantic ones. Saying that all passives are characterized by containing a *be+past participle* group will not do, because the third sentence can (more accurately) be described as containing *be* and an *adjective phrase* (notice the presence of *very*, which is a typical modifier of adjectives and adverbs).

⁷ I am using the term 'lexeme' in much the same way as Lyons (1977: 19, passim) i.e. as an abstract label for all the forms of a lexical item. But, if I understood properly Lyons's version of lexical field theory (of

which he is a well-known exponent), he would regard related but different senses of the same lexical item as belonging to different lexemes, which would be included in different lexical fields. In my usage of the term 'lexeme' all the (related) senses of the same lexical item are also part of the same lexeme. So in my usage of this technical term, 'eye' is a lexeme whose (written) forms can be *eye*, *eyes* and in rare cases *eye's* or *eyes'*, whose spoken forms are /ai/ or /aiz/, and which has a number of related senses (and morphosyntactic propensities; just think of the verb '(to) eye'), most of which are normally listed by dictionaries.

⁸ See e.g. Brugman (1988), Herskovits (1986), Langacker and Casad (1985), and Vandeloise (1991), on the polysyemy of prepositions, and the studies on the metaphorical polysemy of emotional terms by Kovecses (1986, 1988, 1990), and on that of modal verbs by Sweetser (1990:ch 3). An early attempt at characterizing lexical network analyses was Lakoff and Norvig (1987).

⁹ See Langacker's speculation on the possible construction of a prototype sense for 'tree' (Langacker 1987, 373ff).

¹⁰ These less central constructions being furthermore systematically related to prototypical transitive clauses (which themselves have prototype structure) and to prototypical natural event classes and event constructions. See Marin Arrese's illuminating discussion in this volume.

¹¹ As an example of the growing interest in metaphor by Anglicists we may quote Kovecses (1986, 1988, 1990), Turner (1987, 1991, 1996), Lakoff and Turner (1989), collection of essays like Hiraga and Ranwanska-Williams (1995), or the two recent, highly successful seminars organized last September as part of the 4th Conference of the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE), held at Debrecen (Hungary): «The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy: State of the Art and Applications to English Studies», organized by Antonio Barcelona, with eleven participants among them Margaret Freeman, Zoltán Kovecses, or Günter Radden; a brief report on the Seminar is shortly to appear in *The English Messenger*, ESSE's newsletter. The other seminar was «Cognitive Stylistics», organized by Peter Verdonck, with some important studies of metaphor (especially by Donald Freeman and Peter Stockwell).

¹² The spatial semantic configurations claimed by Talmy and Langacker to be at the core of grammatical meaning and form are similar to the image-schemas of Johnson 1987 and Lakoff 1987, which were in fact inspired by them, especially by Langacker's work: both use typical 'langackerian' notions like *trajector* and *landmark*. But the image schemas of Johnson or Lakoff are cognitively fundamental pre-conceptual abstractions from everyday experience. These are often elaborated or combined in Langacker's (or Talmy's) configurations (e.g. the 'force' image schema merges with the 'source-path-goal' image schema in the conception of an 'action chain', which is basic for describing numerous aspects of clause structure in Langacker 1991:283). Thus, as Langacker says (ibid., 399), «image schemas play an important role in structuring cognitive domains (such as the canonical event model) that support the characterization of basic grammatical constructions».

¹³ Langacker has paid little attention to the metaphorical nature of grammatical categories, but he certainly acknowledges explicitly that many of the cognitive domains invoked by his 'predications' (his semantic description of expressions) are metaphorically structured (Langacker 1991:8) and has sometimes pointed out possible cases of the metaphorical extension of grammatical constructs (1991:274-276, 309-310, 399). But he has paid special attention to the use of metaphor by linguistic theories (1987:452ff; 1991:507-510). On the other hand, he has studied in detail a number of metonymic grammatical phenomena, like 'reference-point constructions' (ibid.: 351; 1993) or his 'active zones' (1987: 271, 1991: 453-457). The central role of conceptual mapping in grammar has recently been demonstrated by Fauconnier and Turner 1996, and by the essays in Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996.

¹⁴ David M Powers organized a theme session during the latest International Cognitive Linguistics Conference (ICLC) called 'Computer Models in Cognitive Linguistics'. The papers presented in it will probably be made available electronically from the organizer (powers@ist.flinders.edu.au).

¹⁵ The Framenet project by Fillmore and his collaborators is at an advanced stage. For information visit its homepage in WWW (<http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~framenet/index.html>).

¹⁶ Susan Niemeier and Renè Dirven organized a theme session on this subject at ICLC last July, and she intends to set up an international network of researchers in the field.

¹⁷ See the symposium organized last April at Duisburg by René Dirven and Ralph Bisschops on metaphor and religion, with numerous papers by cognitive linguists and theologians sympathetic with this approach. The papers will be published in three volumes. Initial versions have been published by L.A.U.D. (Linguistic Agency

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of the university of Duisburg).

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An Interview with George Lakoff

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

George Lakoff teaches linguistics and cognitive science at the University of California, Berkeley. Together with such figures as James McCawley, Paul Postal, and Haj Ross, he was one of the founders of the Generative Semantics movement in the 1960's. This represented the earliest major **departure** from the standard Chomskyan Generative Transformational **Grammar** by demonstrating the fundamental role played by semantics and pragmatics **in grammar**. Since the mid-1970's Lakoff has **become** a leading figure in the development of Cognitive **Linguistics**, which grounds linguistic theory in empirical findings from the **field** of Cognitive Psychology. He has studied conceptual systems in depth, although the bulk of his most recent research has increasingly focused on metaphor and its consequences for abstract **reasoning**.

He is the author of *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, and co-author of *Metaphors We Live By* (with Mark Johnson), and *More Than Cool Reason* (with Mark Turner). His most recent book, *Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don't*, analyses the language of political discourse and **demonstrates** that conservative and liberal ideas are based on opposite metaphorical models of the **family** and morality. At present, he is writing *Philosophy in the Flesh*, in collaboration with Mark Johnson, which **interprets** philosophy from the point of view of cognitive science. He is **also working**, with Rafael Núñez, on the metaphorical **structure** of mathematics.

INTERVIEW'

Good afternoon, Professor Lakoff. First of all, I'd like to go back to the late 1960's and early 1970's. This is the period of Generative Semantics for you and a number of other people, like Paul Postal, Haj Ross, and James McCawley, who had been studying with

Chomsky. What are your recollections from that period? What was going on?

A lot was going on. Generative Semantics started forming as early as 1963. At the time I was just a **first** year graduate student and **I** had previously done work on **the** structure of discourse. I had done an undergraduate **thesis** which was the **first story** grammar. **I** had tried to put a narrative structure into a transformational framework, and in doing so, it occurred to me that one could possibly **generate** whole **stories**, starting with plot structure and working down to sentences.

But in **order** to do that **I** had to **have** a semantic base for the sentences, since the plot structure I proposed was given in semantic **terms**. At that time semantics meant logic, mainly the traditional formal logic. **And** so I asked if it was **possible** to **have** logical forms be underlying structures in a transformational grammar. **I** **figured** out how to **restructure** logical forms so that they would fit transformational rules. Technically, it might be possible. The question was whether there was any independent empirical evidence from **syntax** that this was the right thing and to do. **I** set out to get such evidence.

I conceived the following idea. **Look** at the properties of logical forms. There are **seven** basic properties:

- (1) predicate-argument structure;
- (2) scope differences;
- (3) **co-reference**, that is, identical variables;
- (4) binding of variables by quantifiers;
- (5) propositional function structure (where one or more variable is **unfilled**);
- (6) inferences, and
- (7) sublexical structure.

The question **I** asked back in 1963 was: Do **these** properties of logical forms, most of them structural (except for inferences), show up in **grammar**? Then **I** went looking for evidence.

The first evidence **I** noticed concerned prelexical structure. **I** looked at causative sentences like, *He warmed the milk*, where you **have something** like "he caused the milk to **become** warm". **I** argued that, in **order** to state the **proper generalizations** about (1) the distribution of the word "**warm**" and (2) the **relationship between** the causative, the inchoative, and the stative **constructions**, one would **have** to posit underlying structures, that is, logical forms, in **which** there was an abstract causative predicate and an abstract inchoative predicate. Such **analyses have** now **become commonplace**.

I also looked at **some** sentences from baseball - I was an avid baseball fan at the time. **I** still am. The sentence **I** chose was about a Boston Red Sox player **named** Carl Yastremsky (who was a young player back in 1963, but now is in the Hall Of **Fame**). The example was: *Yastremsky doubled off the wall*, where what went "off the wall" was the ball. The generalization about where directional **phrases** like "off the wall" occur depends on looking at the meaning of the verb "doubled." You **have** to **know** that "double" means to hit a ball so that you run for two bases. "Off the wall" **expresses** where the ball goes; it **requires** a theme that is a moving **entity**. Its syntactic occurrence, therefore, depends in part on the semantics of the verb in the sentence it occurs in.

One could not say, for example, **Yastremsky slept off the wall*, **because** there would be

nothing moving off the wall. Similarly, in *Yastremsky doubled to leftfield*, the ball went to *leftfield*. You can't say **Yastremski stood to left field* because there is nothing going to left field. I argued that, to state the generalizations governing the distribution of such adverbs, one had to postulate abstract underlying logical forms that represented meanings.

That was in 1963. I wrote "Toward Generative Semantics" for a summer research project where I was working with Gil Harman and Jim McCawley, who were then graduate students. That summer, Harman wrote the first paper showing that phrase structure grammars could do everything transformational grammars of a reasonable sort could do (almost 15 years before Gazdar showed the same thing). McCawley was working on phonology. We became friends and I gave him one of the 20 copies I made of the paper. I had met Paul Postal and I also gave him a copy of the paper. And I gave Haj Ross a copy of the paper. Chomsky hated it. He thought the idea of logical form in grammar was ridiculous.

But he later adopted the idea, or didn't he?

He later adopted it, but at first he was dismissive. He thought it was stupid.

Why?

I don't really know. Paul Postal suggested that this was because I suggested this before Chomsky's *Aspects* theory -this was '63. Chomsky's *Aspects* theory was formulated in '64 and published in '65. Postal knew that the *Aspects* theory was being developed and he suggested that, if I waited, then there might be a Chomskyan framework in which to frame my ideas. So I didn't push Generative Semantics right away.

I waited, but meanwhile I looked for more evidence that logical form occurred in grammar. McCawley, Ross, Postal, and I found a great deal of evidence. Consider, for example, evidence for propositional functions. We looked at sentences like *The children are ready to eat and so are the chickens*. On Chomsky's account at that time, the sentence should be four ways ambiguous; that is, *the children are ready to eat* or *be eaten*, and *the chickens are ready to eat* or *be eaten*. But the sentence is actually only two ways ambiguous. That was explained by Jim McCawley, who suggested that the sentence was formed not simply by verb phrase deletion; rather, what occurred was the deletion of a verb phrase paired with its propositional function; if you included the semantics of the verb phrase as well as the syntactic form in the rule of verb phrase deletion, then identical propositional functions would be involved. McCawley's proposal was later decisively demonstrated by Ivan Sag in his dissertation, in a very different framework, about ten years after that.

Then there were other kinds of examples. For example, in Logical Form, a negative is outside of the proposition it negates. The question I asked was: Are there any sentences that indicate that the underlying syntactic structure of negative sentences has a propositional-external negative in it underlying syntactic structure? We found some sentences that indicated that. For example, *John didn't marry Mary although the fortune teller had predicted it*, where the "it" indicates that he *did* marry Mary, and has to refer to a proposition inside the scope of the negative. That is, the negative has to be seen as outside the scope of the sentence as you would have it in Logical Form.

That was another bit of evidence that Logical Form could show up in grammar. I looked at tense logics, where the tense is usually outside of the proposition. In tense logic,

a sentence like *John left* contains the proposition "John leaves", which is **true** in the past. The past tense is an operator **outside** of "John leaves". We found sentences like the *Republicans won in 1968 but it won't happen in 1972*, where the "it" refers to the "Republicans win", without a tense. That means you **have** to be able to isolate the constituent "Republicans win" from the tense, which means that the "it" must **have** as its antecedent a proposition completely inside the scope of the past tense operator, as in tense logic.

Would Chomsky have been able to handle that kind of example?

He never looked at them so **far** as **I** know, and he refused to discuss them with us, and to this day **I** don't know if he has looked at them. He refused to talk to us when we started discussing these examples so **I** simply don't know if he has thought about them at all.

Following the line of discussion we are having right now, would you like to outline briefly your own evolution from being a Generative Semanticist up to your present work on metaphor?

Well, what happened was **this**. In 1974 **I** discovered a class of sentences that showed that there could not be single underlying syntactic structures, whether they were logical forms or not. They were examples that could not be handled by any **transformational** theory, or any theory with syntactic derivations. Not only was Chomskyan transformational grammar inadequate, but Generative Semantics was as well: Generative Semantics could not work **because** both the logic and transformational grammar weren't adequate.

The sentences were called syntactic amalgams, and let me give you an example of one of two or three types. **Take** the sentence *John invited you'll never guess how many people to the party*. These sentences were brought to my attention by Haj Ross, who heard them from Avery Andrews when he was a graduate student at MIT. To handle this sentence, Andrews had postulated a very strange transformation. He said that *John invited you'll never guess how many people to the party*, was to be derived transformationally from *You'll never guess how many people John invited to the party*. He observed that the only way you could do it would be to move "John invited to the party" to the front of the sentence and then stick "you'll never guess how many" into the middle in exactly the right spot.

That seemed to me like a very **unlikely** transformation. But in order to **prove** that it couldn't work that way you **had** to show that you could **have** more **than** one **in** a given sentence, **because** on his **analysis** you would only be able to **have** one such higher sentence to put into the middle of the sentence. So **I** tried constructing sentences with multiple cases. It wasn't hard. **I** wound up **constructing** sentences with as many as **six** **in** the middle. **Here's** one with four: *John invited you'll never guess how many people to you can imagine what kind of a party, for God knows what reason on wasn't it last Saturday?*. That sentence has no single Logical Form or underlying **structure**, and **it** has no single transformational derivation. The reason is that, if it were to be derived transformationally, the topmost clause in the surface form would **have** to be embedded in logical form **in all** the other clauses at once. It just cannot be done **technically**. It occurred to me that you needed a very different notion of grammar, **something** like contemporary Construction Grammar or Cognitive Grammar, in order to account for sentences like this.

That was the beginning of my interest in construction-based grammars, back in 1974.

Then in 1975 I got a small grant from the National Science Foundation to **have** a Summer **Seminar** of eight people on linguistics, logic, and artificial Intelligence. I wanted to see how logic and artificial intelligence **entered** into the study of grammar and I invited **some** remarkable people like David Lewis, **Lauri Karttunen**, **Terry Winograd**, and so on. The word went out **through** the linguistics underground that we were having this **seminar**. Many people asked if they could just come and **join**, and I said yes, and before I knew it 188 people had decided to come to Berkeley. I hired a graduate student at MIT —**Ivan Sag**, now a distinguished professor at Stanford— as my research assistant. He set up **communes** in fraternity houses for anyone who came. He managed to house over 180 linguists **here** for 6 weeks for what **became** an underground **summer** institute. We had no official courses and no official teachers. What we did was set up a schedule of **lectures** from 10 in the morning to 10 at night **in** various rooms around the university, for 6 days a week, with the rule that anyone could **lecture** with 3 days' notice. Anyone who came and wanted to talk could simply talk. You just had to give us three days' notice to put you on the schedule. There were an enormous number of very interesting **lectures** that summer and among these **lectures** where **lectures** that convinced me that formal logic could not work for semantics at **all**.

Let me give you **some** examples of the people who **lectured** that summer. One of the first was Paul Kay. He presented results that he, Brent Berlin, and Chad **McDaniel** had **gotten** on the **universals** of color terms, and he explained these results on the basis of studies of the neurophysiology of color vision that was **being** done in the Psychology Department **here** by Russ DeValois. What Kay and his co-workers had **observed** in their color research was that the central members of colors were the same **all** over the world, even though the boundaries of the categories were different. Moreover that there is a hierarchy of colors constraining how new basic color terms get **introduced** into a language over time. What they showed was that the hierarchy and the centrality of the colors was predictable from the neurophysiology.

When I heard this **lecture**, I was still a believer **in** formal logic and model theoretic semantics. But I knew enough about the **technical** foundations of those fields to understand that this was a counterexample to my **enterprise** of what I had called "natural logic," the attempt to extend formal logic to **deal** with natural language semantics. The reason is this:

Model-theoretic semantics **characterizes meaning** in terms of reference and **truth** conditions. To get the meaning of a sentence, you **have** to relate symbols in the **Logical Form** to things in the world, or **some** set-theoretical model of the world. The mind and the brain are **not** in any formal model. Formal models are supposedly set-theoretical models of the **external world**. The **assumption** is that **meaning** is public, that the world has an objective structure, and that **all meanings** can be given **in** terms of the objective **structure** of the **external world**, with no reference to the mind or brain.

For example, to get the meaning of a sentence like *The chair is red* in formal semantics, you **have** to **assume** that there is a set of red **things** objectively out there **in** the world; the meaning of "red" is given by designating that **set**. The sentence *The chair is red* is true if and **only** is the object designated by "the chair" is in the set of red things **in** the objective **external world**.

What Kay and McDaniel together with DeValois and his co-workers had shown was that there is no such **thing** as a set of red things in the world. Red is created by the color **cones** in your retina and by the neural **circuitry** of your brain given certain conditions **in** the world. But the category red isn't in the world. What you see as red is not strictly a matter

of wave length. It depends on color conditions and **all** kinds of other local physical phenomena; given that, the category is created by your eye and your brain by the fact that you **have three types** of color cones and there are certain kinds of neural circuitry. That means that model-theoretical semantics for natural language cannot work for the meaning of color terms like "red." Since Generative Semantics used **model-theoretic** semantics, there was something fundamentally wrong with Generative Semantics as well. If logic didn't work, Generative Semantics couldn't.

The next week I heard a **lecture** by Eleanor **Rosch**. It was one of her first **lectures** on **basic-level** categories. She was reporting on her new research. What that research had shown was that certain categories were psychologically basic, like "chair" as opposed to "furniture", or "rocking chair". What she meant by 'psychologically basic' was that "chair" was defined partly by mental images —you can get a mental **image** of a chair but not of a piece of furniture— and partly by motor programs and body movements. You **have** motor programs for sitting down in a chair but you **have** no motor programs for interacting generally with a piece of furniture.

What she showed was that this very basic level, which is the level learned first by children, seems to be the optimal level at which people interact with the world with their bodies. That level of categorization, with its special properties, is determined not by anything out in the world but in part by your body and your perceptual system. In short, the conceptual category chair has properties not in the **objective external** world, but rather determined by the body and brain. **Basic-level** categories, like color categories, cannot be handled by model theory, **because** there is no body in model theory. There is no brain or perceptual system in model theory. Again, formal logic didn't work for natural language semantics.

The next important talk I heard in the **summer** of 1975 was Chuck Fillmore's first talk on Frame Semantics, **in** which he discussed semantic fields like "buy", "sell", "cost", "price". He showed that their semantic relationships were determined by holistic structures, like Schankian scripts or scenarios. A word like "buy" or "sell" presupposes a script in which you **have** elements like a buyer, a seller, goods and money. At first the seller has the goods and the buyer has the money, the seller wants the money and the buyer wants the goods. **In** the second part of the scenario, they exchange goods and money, and **in** the third part the buyer has the goods and the seller has the money.

Once you see that you can see the meaning of the words is defined **relative** to this kind of structure —**and Fillmore** gave many, many examples in which the meaning of words requires structures of this **sort**. But the **structures** are not **objectively** out there in the world. **In** fact, sometimes there are alternative frame structures which are inconsistent with one another.

For **instance**, the words "thrifty" and "stingy". The word "thrifty" is defined with respect to a frame in which you are concerned about the efficient use of resources, and **in** that frame the opposite of "thrifty" is "wasteful". A sentence like *He is not thrifty, he is wasteful* makes sense **relative** to such a frame, where the issue is the use of resources.

Now **take** a word like "stingy", whose opposite is "generous". The frame with **how** badly someone wants to keep his money for himself, versus and how much he **is** willing to give it to somebody **else**. In a sentence like *He is not stingy, he is generous*, you are using that frame.

Now consider the sentence *He is not thrifty, he is stingy*. What I'm doing **in** this sentence

is negating one frame and proposing another. I'm saying 'you should not **think** of his actions in terms of efficient use of resources; you should **think** of his actions in terms of **greed**'.

Now there is nothing in formal semantics that allows you to **provide** alternative framings of the world. In formal semantics you **just have simply** a state of the world that exists or doesn't. Fillmore was demonstrating that in a single sentence you could be talking about the way in which you conceptually frame the world. To characterize the meaning of sentence about alternate conceptualizations, you need not a logical theory but a cognitive theory in which one can talk about alternate conceptual framings. In formal logic, there is no cognition, and no capacity for alternative frame in a single sentence. Such examples indicated that formal logic was inherently inadequate for dealing with natural language semantics. Instead, one has to bring the mind into semantics.

The next great talk I heard in the summer of 1975 was by Leonard Talmy. It was one of his first talks on spatial relations. What he showed was that there are certain universals of spatial relations that **have to** do with bodily orientation and with what he called cognitive *topology*, that is, with the topological structures we **impose** on space. For example, the word "in", in its most basic spatial sense, has to do with a bounded region of space — a container with an interior, a boundary, and an exterior. Such a cognitively imposed container can stretch — it can be any size, any shape. Containers preserve a certain topology. Talmy observed that the concept of a path is also topological in this sense. You can stretch or twist a path and it **remains** a path.

In addition to such cognitive topological concepts for spatial relations, Talmy pointed out that other spatial terms **have** bodily orientations, **like** "front" and "back" and "up" and "down" and so on. The fronts and back of objects are not **part** of a mind-free, human-free world. They are **imposed** by human beings in certain regular ways. To characterize the meanings of spatial relations concepts, you **have** to bring in the peculiarities of the human body and the **kind** of cognitively **structured** topology that occurs with **containers**, paths, and other concepts. Again, the body was entering into **natural** language semantics.

So, in the face of **all this** evidence, in the **summer** of 1975, I realized that both transformational grammar and formal logic were hopelessly inadequate and I stopped doing Generative Semantics. I didn't know what to believe, **and threw** myself for a year and a half into rethinking what **all this** meant. I wrote **nothing** for **almost** two years. Finally I wrote "Linguistic Gestalts" (CLS, 1977) in which I argued that constructions were really the basis of **grammar**, the **meaning** of the whole could not be the **meaning** of the parts. Fillmore and I were developing the **same** basic idea about constructions around the same time, talking regularly.

Then, in 1978, I was teaching an undergraduate **seminar** at Berkeley and I came upon evidence of conceptual metaphor. What happened was this: I was teaching Searle's paper on metaphor in the class. I thought it was a terrible paper but I didn't exactly know why at the time. There were five undergraduates **in this seminar**. On the day we were to discuss Searle's paper, one of the women in **the** class came in late, very upset, sat down. After a minute she said "I'm **sorry**, but I'm not going to be able to function **in** the class today. I've had a metaphor problem with my boyfriend. Maybe you can help".

We **all** said "yes". After all, it was Berkeley in the 1970s. **And** it was a **true call** for help. She said: "On the way over **here**, my boyfriend said that our relationship had hit a dead-end street". She said: "I don't know what this **means**". So someone said: "Look, if it's hit a dead-end street, you can't keep going the way you've **been** going". Someone else said:

"Yeah. You might **have** to turn back". And then we realized that there was a whole set of expressions in English for conceptualizing **love** as a journey. Expressions like *The marriage is on the rocks*, or *The relationship is off the track*, or *Look how far we've come*, or *We may have to turn back*, *We are at a crossroads in the relationship*, *We are going in different directions*, *We may have to bail out*.

There are many different linguistic expressions for conceptualizing **love** as a journey. But there was a generalization over all of these **separate** expressions. The generalization could be stated as a **mapping** from the conceptual domain of travel to the conceptual domain of **love**: the lovers are travellers: the **love relationship** is a vehicle; the lovers' **common** life goals are destinations; and **difficulties** in the relationship are impediments to travel. What we **have here** is a conceptual metaphor, a way of conceptualizing **love** as a journey, not just a bunch of metaphorical expressions. This conceptual metaphor is a way of *reasoning* about **love** using the inferential **structure** of the concept of a journey.

Again we **have** a counterexample to formal semantics. The conceptual metaphor is not in the **external** objective world; it is **in** our minds. It characterizes how we conceptualize and reason about **love** in terms of a journey. Formal semantics **cannot** handle such cases. since there is no mind in formal semantics.

That is where the Theory of Metaphor **came** from. **I** then discovered that Michael Reddy, a year earlier, had written a paper called "The Conduit Metaphor" showing the same things. At that point **I started** to ask how many other conceptual metaphors there are in our conceptual systems. Over the following year, **I** discovered 30 or 40 of them.

In 1979, Mark **Johnson** visited Berkeley to teach in the Philosophy Department. I met **him** on the day **after** he **arrived** in Berkeley. He was going to edit a collection of papers on metaphor. We thought we might collaborate on a paper. The first thing we thought we would do would be to use the kinds of examples I'd found to argue against the recent papers by Searle and Davidson.

We thought about it for a week and then we decided that it was impossible to write such a paper. The reason that it was impossible was that, **in** order to argue against someone, you **have** to share **their** presuppositions. But the **evidence** contradicted what Searle and Davidson were presupposing. They **denied** that meaning was **in** the relationship between words and the world.

Instead, there are metaphorical aspects of meaning that are cognitive **in nature**, that are part of metaphorical thought. But Searle's and Davidson's theories excluded the very possibility of the **existence** of metaphorical thought. If **meanings** were **taken** as relationships between symbols and the world, then there could be no room for metaphorical thought.

What we decided to do **instead** was to write **first** an **article** and then a book telling **why** our work contradicted the presuppositions not **only** of Searle and Davidson, but the whole theory of meaning **within** Anglo-American philosophy. We **have been working** on this project ever since, **trying** to show in detail how philosophy has to change **in response** to work on metaphor, categorization and other aspects of Cognitive Science.

How does all this compare with the general development of linguistics in the Anglo-saxon world. I mean, Chomsky and offshoots, and then functional theories, and the increasingly large number of grammars that are being devised?

Well let's start first with generative **grammars** and with Chomsky. Our work

completely goes against it. And **in** an interesting way. When I was doing Generative Semantics, I assumed that it would be possible to fit my work together with Chomsky's. I assumed that for a very long time. And I assumed that the argument between me and Chomsky was an argument within Generative Grammar. It **turned** out that I was wrong about that for a very interesting reason.

I had certain commitments that I undertook when I **started** to do linguistics. The first commitment is what I'll call the 'cognitive commitment'. It's the commitment to see language as part of the study of mind. It implied, therefore, that evidence about the **nature** of the mind could change a linguistic theory. And in fact that's **just** what happened in the work I've just described. That is, when Rosch found there were basic level categories **and** when Kay and McDaniel found that color categories could not be in the **external** world, I was obliged to change my theory of language. The cognitive commitment was my first commitment.

My second commitment was that I was concerned with stating generalizations over every aspect of language and across them if necessary.

The third thing I had originally assumed in Generative Semantics was the classical theory of semantics. I assumed originally that semantics was the study of logic and of the relationship between symbols and things in the world.

And **fourth**, I had accepted in doing Generative Semantics certain aspects of generative linguistics: trees, precisely stated rules of grammar, accounting for **all** and **only** the well-formed sentences, but I included meaning as part of sentences.

What I failed to **recognize** at the time was that Chomsky had a very different understanding of generative **grammar**. Chomsky had a guiding metaphor for grammar, a metaphor so deeply entrenched in his intellectual worldview that he could not possibly give it up. Chomsky's basic metaphor was **this**: A sentence is a string of symbols. A language is a set of such strings. **And** a grammar is a device for generating such sets of strings. That is how *Syntactic Structures* starts out.

Now, a sentence is not just a string of symbols. There is meaning and intonation, and the symbol strings are in writing, not **in** speech or sign. But nonetheless Chomsky adopted that metaphor, for reasons important to his Cartesian philosophical views. The next part of the metaphor is that a language is a set of such strings. This doesn't **have** to be true; and in fact, one could argue that a language isn't a set in the **technical** mathematical sense of set at all. The third part of the metaphor is that a grammar is a generative device for generating this "**set**", that is, a set of rules framed within that peculiar branch of mathematics, which I now see as having nothing whatever to do with real languages.

Chomsky was, of course, committed to his own metaphor, which he saw not as a metaphor but as a necessary **truth**. For **him**, recursive function theory (or equivalently the theory of formal grammars) is to be **taken** for granted as being the right mathematics for linguistics. This has important consequences. One of the **main** ones is that meaning cannot **enter** into the grammar. Why? **Because** the theory of formal grammars is **defined** so that the meaning of symbols cannot **enter** into the rules for manipulating the symbols. If you **have** a commitment to the theory of formal grammars as your required mathematics for doing linguistics, then you **rule** out the possibility that meaning **could** be used **in** rules of syntax. It is a **straightforward** entailment of Chomsky's metaphor. This consequence is called the "autonomy of syntax". It's built into the basic Chomskyan metaphor and it is his highest priority, something he would never give up. Given any **putative** evidence against it, he would **assume** that the "evidence" could not be real evidence, and so would come up with an

auxiliary hypothesis to explain that evidence away —even if it meant missing generalizations about language.

Chomsky's metaphor was something he could not give up, no matter what evidence was provided or generalizations were given. On the other hand, my highest commitment was the commitment to look at evidence from both linguistics and other cognitive sciences, and to take generalizations across different aspects of language very seriously. Because we had different commitments, and we were not able to articulate those differences of commitments clearly, conflict was inevitable. If generative semanticists found evidence that meaning entered into syntax, Chomsky could not accept it as real evidence, since it would conflict with his central metaphor for syntax.

If the face of what we saw as evidence, he just narrowed the scope of the phenomena he called "syntax". Any time semantics or pragmatics was shown to enter into grammatical constructions or the distribution of grammatical elements (e.g., words and morphemes that are clearly part of grammar), Chomsky further limited the scope of syntax. It is now so narrow and uninteresting that it leaves out 95 percent of what traditional as well as early transformational grammarians called syntax. Anyone interested in describing all of a language will find that most of it falls outside of his "core" grammar. That is not a problem for Chomsky. He just isn't interested in most of the phenomena of language.

Functional grammar, on the other hand, are very much in accord with Cognitive Grammar. It just happens to study different things. It looks at discourse function, especially notions like given and new information, topic, focus, and certain aspects of narrative structure. These are very real phenomena that are part of language.

As it happens most cognitive linguists happen to be interested in other things. But Cognitive Linguistics is certainly open to all of functional considerations. We think that they are real and we greatly respect functional grammarians for their empirical approach and their careful study of a much wider range of phenomena in the world's languages than generative linguists study.

How do you feel about Chomsky's emphasis on universalism, on his idea of a Universal Grammar?

I need to talk about what that emphasis is and where it comes from before I can answer that. Chomsky is a Cartesian, a follower of Descartes, in a very deep sense. Chomsky's politics also comes from Cartesianism.

Descartes was an essentialist. He believed that there was a universal human nature and that there were essential properties that all people share that distinguish people from animals. Chomsky agrees with that assumption. He is also an essentialist. Again following Descartes' philosophy, Chomsky assumes that the mind is separate from, and characterizable independently of, the body. Accordingly, he believes that the study of neuroscience can shed no light on the nature of reason or language.

Chomsky also seems to accept other tenets of Cartesian philosophy:

- (1) Mathematics is the best example of human reason.
- (2) Mathematical reasoning is a matter of form, not content.
- (3) Human reason is general is a matter of form not content.
- (4) Reason and language comprise the essence of what it is to be human.

- (5) Since the **mind** is **separate** from and characterizable independently of the body, so reason and language cannot be acquired through the body.
- (6) Therefore they must be innate.

All of this is a priori Cartesian philosophy. There is no reason to accept this philosophical worldview, **and** many reasons to reject it. But let us continue.

What do these aspects of Cartesian philosophy **have** to do with Chomskyan linguistics? The link is **in** certain modern a priori philosophical assumptions that were especially prevalent in certain philosophical circles in the 1950's and 1960's. Let us call this "Formalist Philosophy":

- (1) Precise scientific descriptions can **only** be given by axioms systems. or by algorithms.
- (2) Proof theory **in** mathematical logic, Turing machines, and formal grammars (or Post systems, **formulated** by Emil Post) are equivalent [Church's Thesis].
- (3) **All** conceptual algorithms are characterizable by Turing machines (that is, the theory of recursive functions).
- (4) The study of meaning **in** natural language can be characterized by "semantics" – the relationship of the abstract meaningless symbols of a formal language in mathematical logic to the world, or at least to objectivist set-theoretical models of the world. In mathematical logic, there **is** a "formal language" made up of meaningless symbols. Proofs **operate** independently of the meaning of the symbols.
- (5) Logical proofs (especially in "natural deduction" systems) characterize human reason. Human reason is therefore abstract, a matter of formal symbols. Since proof theory and the theory of formal grammars are the same, the theory of formal grammars can characterize human reason.

Chomsky's metaphor fits the a priori philosophical assumptions of formalist philosophy perfectly. Language is **seen** as a matter of abstract formal symbols. The mathematics of language is the theory of formal grammars, which is the same as proof theory. which is what characterizes human reason.

Chomsky forged a link between 20th century formalist philosophy and 17th century Cartesian philosophy. Formalist philosophy **takes it** for granted that:

- (a) Reason **is** characterizable independently of the body
- (b) **Reasoning** is abstract, and a matter of pure form.
- (c) Reason is universal.

Chomsky's metaphor fits both **formalist** philosophy and Cartesian philosophy perfectly **in** the way it adds language to the picture. Language for Chomsky, **like** Reason for Descartes, is what makes us human, what constitutes our essence, what separates human beings from the apes. (Incidentally, Chomsky for this reason must deny that **animals have** any language at all.)

Language must be universal and must be innate for Chomsky, for that same reason that Reason had to be universal and **innate** for Descartes: It characterizes the essence of what makes *all* of us human (hence universality) and it **cannot** be acquired through the body (hence

innateness).

Language innateness and **universality** theses are not empirical hypotheses for him. They are, for him, necessary **truths** that follow from his a priori philosophical assumptions and his central metaphor.

Moreover, following formalist philosophy, the only way to be scientific is to use axiom systems and formal logic or, equivalently, **algorithms**, or, equivalently, the theory of formal **grammars**. Therefore, the only way to do scientific linguistics is to follow Chomsky's metaphor and use formal grammars.

What is the role of empirical investigation in Chomsky's view of "scientific linguistics"?

For Chomsky, **all** scientific linguistics must be consistent with Chomsky's metaphor, formalist philosophy, and the above elements of Cartesian philosophy. There can be no empirical evidence against these. **All** evidence must be made to **fit** these a priori philosophical assumptions.

These philosophical assumptions fly in the face of a huge body of evidence found by generative semanticists, cognitive linguists, functional linguists —as well as a huge body of evidence in cognitive science and neuroscience.

Is reason purely a matter of **form** rather than content?

The answer is "No". **All** of the work on the embodiment of reason **denies** it, from research on color concepts to **basic-level** concepts to experimental studies of conceptual metaphor to Damasio's evidence of the link of reason to emotion to Terry Regier's modelling of the acquisition of spatial relations concepts and terms on the basis of elements of brain **structures** (such as topographic maps of the visual field). Reason and our conceptual systems arise from the body. Descartes was wrong.

Correspondingly, cognitive studies of **grammar** indicate that syntax is grounded in our conceptual system which is in turn grounded in the body. Chomsky is as wrong as Descartes was.

What would you say about the old Chomskyan idea of an innate Language Acquisition Device and the more modern idea of modularity?

What Chomsky has suggested cannot be true. There is no single place in the brain where language is **located**. There are different centers that do different things and they are linked in various ways. There cannot be such a thing in the brain as a language module.

This is not **just** a matter of localization. A Chomskyan theory might say the language module is really distributed across various centers in the brain. But that would not work either. The reason is **this**: Chomsky's syntactic component has to be characterized in terms of the theory of formal grammars. **That is**, it must consist of symbols that are manipulated (or related to one another) independently of **their meaning** or any other psychological or perceptual or motor or emotional input. **Because** Chomsky's syntax is autonomous, his syntactic module must **also** be autonomous, which means it cannot **have** any input, immediately or ultimately, from **anything** non-syntactic, for example, anything bodily. If you look at Chomsky's drawings of syntax boxes in the mind, they never **have** any input. They cannot if they are to be autonomous. But such autonomy is impossible in a human brain. Brains are just not structured **like** that. There are no brain modules, localized or distributed, without input.

Yes, still there are some psycholinguists that seem to support the idea of modularity.

There are still Skinnerians too. As Tom Kuhn pointed out, old paradigms continue to exist long-after they are viable.

In general the evidence doesn't bear out Chomskyan modularity. Part of the evidence was supposed to be that there are brain damaged people who can form grammatical sentences that are meaningless, and people who are the opposite, who **have** no sense of grammar, who **have** certain kinds of lesions where they cannot put **grammatical** sentences together.

It doesn't quite work out that way. There are people who **have** agrammatism who can make **grammaticality** judgments. They **just** can't say the sentences. Their agrammatism doesn't mean that there **is** a **localized** language box that is damaged. It only means that certain neural connections required by sentence production that **have been severed**.

Liz Bates reports on her research with a **well-known Italian** architect who had a stroke. He had the symptoms of agrammatism. He could only say isolated words, not sentences. She gave him a particular **kind** of sentence to see if he could repeat it. He could not repeat it, but he could say one word in response. That word was the name for the classical Greek "trope" describing what was odd about the grammar of the sentence. This agrammatic **patient**, who supposedly had his "grammar box" damaged, not only could make grammatical judgments but could describe them with the proper ancient Greek terminology!

The point is simple. Agrammatism is not evidence for a grammar module in the brain.

What's your opinion on parallel distributed processing?

PDP **connectionism** is useful for many **things**, like distinguishing sonar signals of mines from those of rocks. It may **also** be a reasonable model for how human beings map sound input into sequences of phonetic features. But it is too unstructured to characterize most of human reason and language. **Parallel distributed** processing ignores the details of brain structure. It asks: how much you can do with the **simplest** kinds of structures. The answer appears to be: a **little** bit but not that much.

What people like Jerry Feldman and Terry Regier **have** done is to **take** connectionist models and model aspects of innate brain structure, for example, topographic maps of the visual field and orientation sensitive **cells**. They then ask what concepts and aspects of language can be learned given those innate **NONLINGUISTIC** structures. The question they ask is: how much of conceptual structure and language is embodied, **in** the sense that it arises out of brain **structures** that exist to **serve** other bodily functions: perception, motor functions, etc.

Let's go back to the end of the 1970s. That was a time when there were some workers in artificial intelligence that used some versions of Frame Semantics. Did that influence any of your thinking at that time? I mean, proposals like Minsky's frames, or Schank & Abelson's scripts, or others?

Yes. They **came** into **being** around the same time as Fillmore's Frame Semantics. Schank's work was based on Fillmore's earlier Case **Grammar**.

I was **very** much influenced by Schank's work. I learned about his work on frames

about the same time as Fillmore was beginning to develop his frame semantics. I spent a month in 1977 in Schank's lab learning what he and his students were doing. I became a part of that community. It was an important experience.

*You have written at length about prototypes and related phenomena in your book *Wornen, Fire and Dangerous Things*, and you discuss *Schema Theory* and *basic-level categorization*. among other things. Have you ever tried to put all this together in a unified framework?*

I have thought it through a lot. I can see how many things might fit together. but I haven't really tried seriously to do it. It would be a huge task, much more than one person can do.

I've been doing other kinds of work. I've been trying to extend metaphor theory, to work out the details and apply it to many areas. That is a big job in itself.

At some time before very long, I would say within the next five years, some of us are going to have to sit down and try to unify all this work. But before then, I want to finish another book with Mark Johnson that we've been working on for some years. It's a big book on philosophy called "Philosophy in the Flesh". It is about the consequences for philosophy of the embodiment of mind, the cognitive unconscious, and metaphorical thought.

Those developments, if taken seriously, would radically change western philosophy. We want to show exactly why it changes it and how it changes it. Before I even think of entering into a project of unifying all of Cognitive Linguistics, I want to finish that book. I also want to do a book on the metaphorical structure of mathematics. Anyway, I don't believe one person can do that unification. It is a job for the field as a whole.

It is a difficult job. One reason why it hasn't been tackled earlier was that the separate parts were not very well worked out. Metaphor Theory had to be worked out, the Theory of Categorization had to be worked out, Langacker's Cognitive Grammar had to be worked out. We had to get some understanding of what image-schemas were. We had to understand what constructions were. Now we have come to the point where it is almost possible to begin to think of the unified theory, although the recent Fauconnier-Turner work on blending shows that there is a lot in those phenomena that needs to be understood better.

Could you give me an idea of what the place of semantics is within grammatical theory in general? What is its relationship to syntax and other components?

I believe, just as Langacker does, and as I believed when I started doing Generative Semantics, that grammatical structure consists of what Langacker called "symbolization" — conventionalized pairings of elements of semantic structure with aspects of phonological structure (including ordering constraints).

I believe that predicate-argument relations of semantics are the predicate-argument relations of syntax, once symbolization —that is, the conventionalization of semantic-phonological pairings— has operated.

I believe that the propositional structure of semantics is syntactic clause structure under symbolization. I believe that semantic event structure is syntactic aspectual structure under symbolization. And so on.

I believe that the kinds of structures that you find in syntax are conventionalized

reflections of semantic-phonological pairings, and that there is NO autonomous syntactic structure at all.

That is something that Langacker has **been trying** to show in very great detail with considerable success, I think. **And** it is something that we **began** to show in the mid 60s while looking at evidence in syntax for logical form.

However, to **really** demonstrate it would take a unification of **all** the subparts of Cognitive Linguistics. I think **all** the evidence points to it, but the unification has to be done and no one has done it.

You are very concerned with reasoning and you have explanations about whar reasoning is from the point of view of metaphor and metonymy. What I would like to know is what yourpoint of view is on work in pragmatics dealing with the same field of reasoning? Like rhe theory of implicature or presupposition.

The **earlier** results in pragmatics that generative semanticists accomplished fits right in with Cognitive Semantics. Much of it can be accommodated in a relatively straightforward way. I think it is possible to take the mechanisms of Cognitive Semantics and Cognitive Grammar and use them to describe what goes on in pragmatics.

For **example**, take Grice's **Principle** of Relevance. That is **just** the use of frames and ICMs. Relevance is **finding** the appropriate ICMs for **framing** an utterance. Once you find them, there are **inferences** in context that **follow naturally**.

Grice's Principle of Quantity can be stated in terms of the metonymic principles involving scales. Indirect speech acts can be characterized metonymically as it was done in a paper at the ICLA meeting last month by Linda Thornburg and Uwe Panther.

Frame Semantics has a presuppositional background built into it. Composition of presuppositions follows the **principles** given in **Fauconnier's** mental spaces. Speech acts too can be characterized **using** frames.

In short, I think every aspect of pragmatics can be expressed in terms of Cognitive Linguistics. The reason it hasn't **been** an issue in Cognitive Linguistics is that many of the practitioners, such as myself, **Fauconnier**, Fillmore, and Sweetser worked on pragmatics in old days back in the 60's and 70's and know how it fits in.

So, it is assumed.

It is **assumed**.

However, for people **outside** Cognitive Linguistics who don't know the Cognitive Linguistic mechanisms, it is far from obvious. A good Cognitive Linguistics textbook **should** discuss the maner.

I don't mean to suggest that **all** the problems of pragmatics **have been solved** already and that Cognitive Linguistics has no new insights. Work now being done by Michael Israel on polarity items **within** Cognitive Linguistics **solves certain** classic problems in that area.

What do you think about structuralist concerns with synonymy, antonymy and all lexical relationships?

I think **they** are superficial consequences of Frame Semantics. If you do your Frame

Semantics right, then synonymy and antonymy fall out. They are **relative** to frames. That is one of Fillmore's major points.

Fillmore has shown that many apparent synonyms are not synonyms at **all** because they are defined by different frames. For example, he distinguishes between "on the ground" and "on land" and he points out that they seem to have the same truth conditions, but they don't really mean the same thing at all. "On the ground" has to do with the frame of airplanes and air travel and it is contrasted with "in the air"; whereas "on land" has to do with sea travel and it is contrasted with "at sea."

Two expressions may have the same truth conditions, but if they are defined with respect to different frames, they are not synonymous. Linguists who just talk about synonymy and antonymy without frames are missing most of the relevant semantics.

What about the idea of semantic fields?

Semantic fields are very real and they are defined **also** with respect to frames. Indeed, the phenomenon of semantic fields is what led Fillmore to develop Frame Semantics.

What Fillmore showed in his very first paper on frames was that words in the same semantic field, like buy, sell, price, goods, cost, and so on, are defined **relative** to a single frame, and that you can **only make** sense of semantic fields with respect to Frame Semantics.

People who just say: these words are **linked** together or they form a set, miss the inferential relationships among **them**. They **also** cannot explain their possibility for metaphorical use, **because** metaphorical use depends on the frame semantic structure.

Is there any way in which Frame Semantics can be put in the form of a dictionary?

Absolutely. It can be and Fillmore is doing it.

Right now?

Right now. Fillmore is the **main** linguistic consultant to the Oxford English Dictionary. He has a major research project now in which he is trying to get computer representations of lexical entries using Frame Semantics. **Some** of his students are trying to incorporate metaphor and metonymy into that as well.

*Can you give me **an** idea of how he is doing that?*

I don't **know** the computational particulars. The analyses are very much those he has done in the past and in many ways like those in **Cognitive Linguistics** in general.

*Yes, how would you define your idea of **an** ICM?. **Because** I believe that you have never attempted to work out a definition in your writings.*

The idea of an ICM is actually very simple. It's basically a frame which can have metaphor appended to it. Its relational **elements** can be characterized in terms of **image**-schemas. An ICM can be of various scopes. It can be extensive enough to be a folk theory. It can function as a narrative structure, or it can be **some** relatively small thing,

characterizing the structure of some small conceptual domain.

Do you think machine translation will be possible?

There are many things that are meant by machine translation....

Computer-aided automatic translation. Programmes that do that on-line, the same way as a flesh-and-bones translator would do. And if it is possible, what would be the starting point?

I think there are real problems with it. And the reason I think there are problems with it has to do with the fact that conceptual **structure** comes out of the body and human experience.

Moreover, different languages may **have** different concepts. Many concepts are universal, but many are **not**. Members of a different cultures may **have** very different experiences and different cultural **images** that lead to different idioms. Sometimes, the conceptual metaphors can be different.

I'm very skeptical about machine translation, though I think that machines can aid in translation in many ways.

As they do right now.

As they do right now.

I think that the best use is in particular domains where there is a limited vocabulary, particularly a largely international vocabulary, as in chemistry papers. There computers may help a lot. But in general I don't expect to see particularly good machine translations.

Would you consider yourself still a linguist or are you a cognitive scientist, or are you midway between the two, or are you both?

I'm both.

I'm very much a linguist. **Let me tell** you what makes me a linguist. I study language including the conceptual structure underlying language. I study linguistic regularities—regular patterns within the language, again including the conceptual system. The methodology I use in studying conceptual systems is an extension of traditional linguistic methodologies. Other fields don't use that methodology.

The methodological ideas that make linguistics what it is are, I think, extremely **powerful**, and can be extended in general to broad issues in cognitive science. That is what I've **been** doing, in **part**. I think **like** a linguist and even when **I'm** doing conceptual analysis of culture.

Now, I'm not the first linguist to do **this**. In fact, my **first** linguistics teacher was Roman Jakobson, who taught structuralism to **Levi-Strauss**. He **knew** that one could use **techniques** of linguistic analysis to study culture. Jakobson was a great **inspiration** to me in this respect.

I once heard Michael Halliday say that the problem with linguistics at present is that

we have not been able to crack the code, but that is something that they have managed to do in the realm of physics and other natural sciences a long time ago. Would you agree with that?

No, I don't agree with that at all.

The notion of "cracking the code" is a very strange notion. A language is incredibly rich. It depends on conceptual systems. Conceptual systems are incredibly rich; they are not a simple-minded code.

To understand conceptual systems you are going to **have** to understand their relationship to the body and neurobiology. Linguistics is inherently a cross-disciplinary enterprise. You cannot **really** understand linguistics without understanding conceptual structures. You cannot understand conceptual structure without looking at **evidence** from psychology and **anthropology**. And you can't understand why we **have** the conceptual structure we **have** without looking at neuroscience.

Often you can't even describe the conceptual structure we **have** without **some** insights from neuroscience. As **Terry** Regier has shown in *The Human Semantic Potential* (MIT Press), certain aspects of spatial structure can be described adequately **only** via neural computation.

That's a very profound result. That indicates that you cannot **separate** off linguistics as an autonomous discipline. **Language** and conceptual structure is enormously rich and it relates to perceptual systems, to motor systems, to **all sorts** of things in the body. It is not just a linguistic code that you are cracking. To understand spatial relations systems, you **have** to understand how relevant aspects of the visual system works. If you are going to do phonetics in an explanatory fashion, you **have** to learn how the auditory and articulatory systems work physically. That is not cracking a code. It is doing cross-disciplinary science.

Your approach is very empirical.

Entirely.

Now, what do you think is the future for linguistics? Where is linguistics heading for right now?

First, I should say that linguistics in **America** is in a very difficult position that Chomsky has placed it in.

There are very few linguistics departments in **America**. There are about 50. That is a very small number, and there are very few jobs for **linguists** in Linguistics departments.

When Chomsky's works **first came** out, a lot of people in other disciplines were very interested in the possibility that they could apply it to their disciplines —to the study of culture or politics or architecture or literature. But **because** Chomsky's theory predominated, and **because** it required that linguistics be autonomous and very narrowly defined, it **became** uninteresting to people in most other disciplines.

These days hardly anyone in literature or architecture or political science cares about generative linguistics **because** it says nothing to them of use for their disciplines. Government and Binding theory doesn't even **tell** you very much about language or thought.

The work in Cognitive Linguistics is very different. I find many people in many other

disciplines that are interested in the work that I'm doing, and that Fauconnier, Langacker, Sweetser, Tumer, and many other people are doing. We find we can talk to people in other disciplines very easily. I get invited to contribute articles to journals in disciplines as diverse as art, political science, mathematics, education, psychotherapy, anthropology, philosophy, computer science, and public policy. As a cognitive linguist, I give lectures in many departments about ways in which Cognitive Linguistics matters to those disciplines.

I think that is wonderful. And I think it is absolutely necessary if linguistics is to thrive as a field that linguistics be of major relevance to other disciplines. I think otherwise it will die.

Cognitive Linguistics is right now in the position of making very serious contributions to many fields. Let me give you an example. I have a colleague in the Political Science department who is doing a study of forms of democracy. In the democracy literature he has found over 600 types of democracy. He has been able to make sense of them using Cognitive Linguistics. He has found that they fit a radial category structure. Using the notion of radial categories, he can make sense of what was previously seen as being chaotic to political scientists. Feature semantics and the classical theory of categories could not make sense of this phenomenon.

The book I'm doing now on morality and politics and the notion of the family in American politics —it's called "Moral Politics"— depends on conceptual metaphor and radial categories. I believe it will allow us to make better sense of American politics and culture.

My sense of things is that Cognitive Linguistics is at the point of being able to be applied usefully and insightfully to virtually every discipline. And it is only if it is applied to a broad range of disciplines that linguistics will thrive and survive. Otherwise, linguistics is such a small field that it is really endangered.

Let me give you an example of the kind of danger that it is in. When the financial crisis at this university hit about two years ago and the university budget was going to be cut a great deal, there was a faculty committee put together to ask which departments should be funded and which part should be cut. The Social Science committee did not contain any linguist. It contained people from political science, history and economics who did not have any use for linguistics as they knew it — generative linguistics. Their report said that linguistics is not a very interesting discipline because it only studies language. They understood language as having not to do with concepts at all but just to do with forms.

Now, if they were talking about Generative Linguistics, they would be correct. Ironically, they happened to be talking about Berkeley where we study conceptual structure, which can be applied to all of their disciplines. Our reply pointed that out.

Do you think Chomsky's Generative Linguistics will perish?

Yes.

Soon?

No.

It will thrive for some time?

I don't think it will thrive. I **think** it will gradually decline, but I think **Kuhn** was basically right. A field doesn't die **until** its practitioners die.

The Linguistic Institute this past **summer** in New Mexico was very interesting in this respect. It was the first completely generative and functionalist Institute. And in fact the first time that any of these ideas was able to be taught at Linguistics **Institutes**, which have been largely dominated by **Generativists**. It was the largest Linguistic Institute ever. It had a wonderful faculty. Researchers in Functional and Cognitive Linguistics **have become** very good at what they do. They **have been** working at it for 20 years now, and many of them are extraordinary scholars.

The students were **suitably** impressed -students from around the country and around the world. Many of the students who came there **came because** they were tired of Generative Linguistics. They couldn't care less about it. They wanted to study real language. They didn't want to study GB. And they were very pleased with what they found. It was a very exciting and interesting Institute. And I think that tells us about how the field is changing.

*One last question. Since you've **been** to Spain at least twice, what is the idea that you have about the development of Linguistics in my country?*

I'm extremely impressed by what I see in Spain. I first went to Spain in 1976 at the time of the first election after Franco's death. That was a wonderful time. I was in Madrid during the election and it was a very beautiful thing to see. I spent that first election day walking through the streets of Madrid.

But in talking to linguists and people in artificial intelligence and people in other disciplines, I found that at that time intellectual life was very much closed off. Intellectual life was so **awful** under Franco that Spain was a very **backward** place.

I went back last year and I was **astonished** at the development that had **taken** place. In under 20 years, Spain has **become** a major intellectual center. In linguistics I found linguists who **knew** about the **latest** work in Cognitive Linguistics, in Functional Linguistics, and all sorts of related ideas that they understood very well.

They were **writing** excellent papers and doing interesting work, asking the deepest possible questions. I couldn't **have been** more impressed. I **think** that the potential of Spain as a center for linguistics is **unlimited**.

*Thank you, Professor **Lakoff**. I appreciate your time.*

Thank you. It's really **been** a pleasure.

NOTES

1. The text that follows is a **revised** version of a transcript from a tape-recorded **interview** that I **held** with Professor Lakoff at Berkeley University (**California**) on **August** 31, 1995. The **revision** was made by Professor Lakoff **himself** in December 1996. I would **like** to express my appreciation to **Lorena Pérez** Hernández for her **assistance** in making **the** transcripts.

The Cultural Cognitive Model: A Programmatic Application

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we propose an integration of cognitive linguistic and cognitive anthropology models. The key concept around the integration revolves is that of 'cultural cognition', manifested in the intersubjective categories and concepts that make up so-called 'cultural models' in language, thought, affect and action, whose main functions include: to represent schematized versions of the world and experience; to help interpret novel symbolic experience; to encode and express intersubjective experience; and to synchronize, direct and motivate social action.

In the first sections of the paper, we describe the theoretical underpinnings of the cognitive-cultural model; and in the last section we offer a sample programmatic application of the model to a possible (cross)cultural dictionary entry of 'World' and 'Self'.

KEY WORDS: cognitive linguistics; cognitive anthropology; cultural cognition; cultural model.

RESUMEN

En este trabajo proponemos una integración de modelos lingüístico-cognitivos y cognitivo-antropológicos. El concepto central sobre el que gira dicha integración es el de 'cognición cultural', que se manifiesta en las categorías y conceptos intersubjetivos que conforman los llamados 'modelos culturales' en lenguaje, pensamiento, emociones y acción, y cuyas funciones incluyen: representar las versiones esquematizadas del mundo y de la experiencia; contribuir a la interpretación de experiencia simbólica nueva; codificar y expresar; y sincronizar, dirigir y motivar la acción social.

En las primeras secciones del trabajo, se describe el modelo cognitivo-cultural, y en la última sección se ofrece una muestra de aplicación programática a una posible entrada de diccionario cultural sobre 'Mundo y Yo/Persona'.

PALABRAS CLAVE: lingüística cognitiva; antropología cognitiva; cognición cultural; modelo cultural.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-seventies, it has become increasingly clear that, in order to account for word-meaning or word-use, linguists must recognize the need for incorporating common intersubjective assumptions (world- and culture-knowledge) to their theoretical constructs. From this period dates the move from classical, checklist-based theories of meaning to prototype-based and frame semantics-based models of meaning (see especially the seminal article by Fillmore, 1975), which developed the idea of prototypical categories and scenarios, scripts or frames relating series of entities or events to properties and attributes thereof in a kind of simplified (ie. schematized) version of the world. Thus, to use Fillmore's well-known example, a 'bachelor' is not just "an unmarried male", a definition which would encompass not only ordinary males but also male adolescents, celibate priests, the Pope, or even certain men with disabling pathologies, etc. But of course language users know full well that the latter instances do not commonly fall within the referential scope of the word 'bachelor' because its denotational referent range normally (a) includes only male persons who stay unmarried beyond the usual age thought to be normal for marrying (in a given society), while (b) excluding male persons who have made special vows of celibacy due to religious reasons, or who, by nature, nurture or accident, become somehow handicapped to get married or lead a "normal" married life.

This culture-bound view of lexical meaning soon incorporated what G. Lakoff has termed "the generalization and cognitive commitments" (1990), namely (a) to characterize the general principles governing all aspects of human language (categories, constructions, inferences, semantic relations, metaphorization, implicatures, discourse, understanding, etc); and (b) to make accounts of human language accord with what we know about the mind and the brain (memory, imagery, conceptualization, perception, embodiment, schemas, etc). In this way, Frame Semantics and Cognitive Linguistics have provided a framework of concepts and insights that has proven extremely useful in furthering the cause of comprehensive accounts of meaning, beyond purely structural, taxonomic, and objectivist accounts (Johnson, 1993).

In a parallel fashion, many cultural anthropologists expressed early on their dissatisfaction with traditional ethnosemantic approaches of meaning analysis. They argued that componential analysis left out of lexical sets relevant information about what speakers have to know in order to use a word or a terminological system (eg. kinship terms) appropriately. Today most current anthropological accounts of meaning accept the premise that the distinction between word-knowledge and world-knowledge is extremely fuzzy, and that often a simple word encodes an implicit world of culture-bound assumptions. More particularly, they argue that word-knowledge and use presume so-called 'folk cultural models' which capture common intersubjective meanings (D'Andrade, 1989). This cognitive anthropological view of meaning has made it possible to bring into a closer relationship disciplines and fields that up to now had remained only loosely connected: cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, symbolic anthropology, cultural anthropology and cultural cognition (D'Andrade, 1995; Stiegler et al., 1990; Taylor and MacLaury, 1995). The implications

following from this newfound partnership **have**, as a corollary, **thrown** into question a number of classical methodological dichotomic separations: word-knowledge and world-knowledge (or semantic cognition and cultural cognition); dictionary and encyclopedia; structural lexicon and mental lexicon, etc. As a result, language, cognition and culture are studied as closely interwoven systems of knowledge (both declarative and procedural). The implications of this view boil down to a set of integrated assumptions and insights: (1) that culture consists of shared systems of meaning and knowledge (the culture-as-knowledge view); (2) that the study of such meaning systems entails **the** integration of thought, talk, emotion and action models; and that (3) the notion of 'cultural cognition' may be **seen** as the encapsulating notion integrating cognitive-cultural meaning systems (Holland and Quinn, 1987).

II. THE STRUCTURE OF CULTURAL MEANING SYSTEMS

The culture-as-knowledge assumption entails a view of symbolic behaviour stressing the constructionist and constitutive nature of the structures and processes of meaning systems (Grace, 1987; Shore, 1990; Searle, 1995). Cultural **meaning** systems get "packaged" into **intersubjective** schemas (or: 'cultural models in language and thought'), made up of constitutive **rules** (ie.: " X counts as Y for Z"), with associated prototypical scripts, scenarios or frames, whose main **functions** are:

- to represent the worldenvironment
- to help interpret the worldenvironment
- to direct and orient **actions**
- to cause systems of affect and emotion
- to **regulate** interpersonal action
- to help **create** new meanings

From this standpoint, a culture is a complex web of cultural **meaning** systems which **provide** its members with schematized versions of the world, motivational forces, belief-systems, evokment potentials, **institutional** orientations, etc. In the words of D'Andrade (1989):

The meanings of **lexical** items or vocabulary presuppose schematically **simplified** worlds: procedural devices used to **make** an interpretation of what, under **certain conditions**, counts as X (eg. a **lie**, a **fit** of anger, a **marriage**, a success) ... A cultural schema is not **just** a network of propositions or an imagistic thought. It is an interconnected pattern of interpretive elements. It **requires** a mental **object** with an addressable memory, priming effects, prototypical effects ... A schema, in **turn**, may be a trigger for action, volition and affect. It interprets and orients action, **belief** and emotion: what is desirable, avoidable, normative.

III. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CULTURAL-COGNITIVE MODEL

The ideal cultural cognitive model should seek to relate system-based notions of meaning to psychological and phenomenological (**subject-centred**) accounts, explaining how the **historically-opaque arbitrariness** of sign-formation can be experienced subjectively as a naturally transparent, motivational significance and agentive force (Martín Morillas, 1993). This account must also incorporate the ontogenesis of meaning consistent with developmental psychology (**early-** and **adult-** symbol-formation structures and processes). At the **same** time that the model grants the historical and local "grounding" of meaning-construction and comprehension (hence its relativity, conventionality and variability), it should acknowledge its permeability and commensurability. One dimension that **this** model seeks to incorporate to the more traditional distinction between conceptual and affective meaning components. is the experiential-sensorial as well as the "existential depth" (explicit, logical, axiological plus unconscious, implicit texture). From a cognitive point of view, the concept of cognition that is explicitly assumed entails a **shift** from formalist, feature-based theories of **cognitive** semantics to prototype and categorisation-based models, but extending the latter to incorporate aspects of social cognition, social cognition models and cultural psychology concepts, as well as **vygotskian** and **neohorvian** models of language thought and culture. Thus, the implication is that an understanding of human cognitive systems cannot limit itself to the specification of structures and processes of knowledge representation following a computationally-based "methodological solipsism" model (Fodor, 1975), but rather should seek to embed the representational schemas in socio-cultural schemes and models including non-computational and non-representational models.

In order to develop a coherent integrated model **servicing** as a general framework for the investigation of cultural-semantic systems, it may be convenient to isolate key **areas** of research. Below are listed **some** of the most relevant ones:

a) Cognitive-semantic studies emphasising the types of schemata and conceptualisations which underlie culture-bound practices. **Here** a number of **areas** of research can be mentioned:

- (i) image-schemata involving sensorial, polysensorial, synesthetic, synergistic concepts and categories;
- (ii) metaphoric and metonymic mappings of cognitive, affective, praxis domains;
- (iii) mental representation of scripts and frames;
- (iv) **folk** cultural models (culture-bound "philosophies of experience"), ideologies, lifestyle, social myths);
- (v) **embodiments** (**rituals**, rites of passage, **institutional** practices).

b) Social cognition and ethnography of **speaking** studies focussing on notions such as: communicative **styles** as a result of socialization practices; social categorisation models based on attribution theory and intergroup communication (eg. in-group and out-group identity; **ethnic** and gender stereotyping, etc. (Clancy, 1986; Gudykunst, 1989).

c) Cultural Psychology studies emphasizing the axiological differences between individualistic and collective orientation systems and their **impingement** on subjective and **intersubjective** values, attitudes and **norms** (Triandis, 1990), such as the following:

- Universal vs localized aspects of human behaviour: psychic unity of mankind (in the Enlightenment or Romantic strands) vs relativistic, **whorfian** differences;
- Subjective culture vs Intersubjective culture;
- **Learning** style and cognitive styles;
- Affective and orientation style (eg. individualistic, self-seeking vs group **harmony** concepts; task-centredness vs human heartedness orientations)

d) Cultural Semiotic studies, whose basic notions concern aspects of the production and consumption of cultural symbols; spheres of knowledge as interest (art, science, morality, entertainment) as well as the ideological aspects of high and low culture (Bourdieu, 1990).

Many examples could be given of concepts and domains illustrating the above notions.

Here we will mention a few ones for the **sake** of exemplification: synesthesia in bio-sensorial percepts (smell/odor); **image-schemata** of experiential-abstract **terms** (el **mar/la mar**; der **Tod/la muerte/Death**); metaphoric and metonymic mappings of functional locus of self (soul/mind/heart- Seele- Dusa); **alma/mente/corazón**; cultural models of emotion **terms** (anger as heating of fluid in container; **love** as a journey); discourse metaphors (war metaphors in business discourse); **folk philosophies** ("senequismo"; "**Schmäh**"; "**kimochi**"); socio-cultural **gendered** models (caballerosidad/machismo); social **ideologies/myths** (the **American** dream of success and achievement); cultural semiotics (**body/self-image** and mental hygiene in advertisement); heteroglossia and **self-construction** (metaphors in self-technologies and self-help morality of psychotherapy discourse); axiological concepts and value systems in individualist and collectivist societies and **groups** ("**familism**"/**philotimo**); stereotyping in genderized talk; embodiment of non-verbal hierarchical signalling, etc.

These examples help to illustrate the consideration of linguistic meaning closely connected to the notion of 'cultural cognition', understood as a people's systemic network of schematized intersubjective mental representations embedded **in their** cultural practices as well as the cultural knowledge grounded in experience and cognition and serving as a guide for action and interpretation of experience (Shore, 1995). **This** view of meaning, cognition and culture, entails placing culture **in** the mind and placing mind **in** the social habitat; that is to say: understanding **the** nexus **linking specific** minds to particular cultural symbols underlying cultural practices. Cognitive-cultural schemata thus synthesise how individuals appropriate intersubjectively symbols from experience to consciousness to action. In this manner, culture is **seen** as a system of cognitive models or schemata which govern social activities and practices (especially language interaction); these models, **in** turn are derived from those activities and practices to **serve** as the mental representations encapsulating the subjective and intersubjective schematizations.

To sum up so far, we **have been arguing** for an integrated cultural-cognitive model of language, thought, affect and action, with a view towards going not only beyond the objectivist, logical-structural view of meaning (by **incorporating** phenomenological and experiential accounts of meaning-construction structures and processes), but **also** beyond **those** solipsistic accounts of meaning that tend to gloss over the intersubjective aspects of meaning-construction processes. We **have likewise highlighted** the functions of such intersubjective meaning systems, namely: to synchronise and coordinate the **creative** aspects

of cognition and social practice; to supply the possibility of sharing common orientations in terms of belief-systems, scenarios, **scripts**, social dramas, myths; to help subjects and groups re-appropriate in a novel and idiosyncratic fashion shared models (eg advertising, poetry); to re-utilise sensori-motor experience as a means of social **symbolisation through** metaphoric signification patterns involving rituals, routines, social micropractices (rites of passage, artistic expression, institutional practices). In the next section we sketch the outlines of an application of the model.

IV. A PROGRAMMATIC APPLICATION OF THE CULTURAL COGNITION MODEL

Lack of space forbids a detailed **analysis** of possible applications of the cognitive-cultural model set out above. Instead, we will just spell out (**rather than flesh out**) the general outlines of a specific **proposal** of application, namely a **sample** of a (cross)cultural dictionary entry. The entry we **have** in mind, which is broken down into AIM, HEURISTIC QUESTIONS, and DOMAINS, may be itemised as follows:

A) AIM: To build an 'emic' model of underlying cognitive structures from empirical facts, using a society's own categorial systems in **order** to describe the cognitive principles by which the society's members apprehend and describe the categories of World and Self.

B) MAIN HEURISTIC QUESTIONS:

- a) Which aspects of the world are saliently important for the culture?
- b) What **labels** are given for them?
- c) How is subjective, intersubjective experience classified?
- d) How do people **think** about and talk about these experiences?
- e) How do talk, thinking, acting, **feeling**, relate to each other and to the overall axiological-cultural system of values, mores, customs, rituals, embodiments, etc.?
- f) What **does** the way a culture "**talks**" about its members and the environment **tell** us about the way it "thinks" about them, that is, the way it typically **cognizes** and categorizes experience of World and Self?

C) DOMAINS INVOLVED:

- a) Categorization and Prototification of Natural and Non-Natural Concepts:

Phenomenologically **speaking**, **the world/environment** consists of a **virtually infinite** number of **discriminably** different stimuli and objects. An essential cognitive-cultural activity is the parcelling-out of the **world/environment** into categories and prototypes, taxonomies and domains. Many non-identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent. Typically, universal principles involve: **focal points**, saliency, codability, prototypes (e.g. **colors**). On the other hand, culture-bound specifics involve: elaboration of **language** categories **organized** into fields and domains with superordinate and subordinate categories; category boundaries may be fuzzy and blended. Categorization for Natural **Categories** (eg. 'colours') is **served** by the constructivist creation of image schemata, metaphoric and metonymic mappings, prototypes, reflecting in a **whorfian** fashion an ontology of first-, second-, third- **order** properties and relations, as well as superordinate and subordinate **features** and attributes. A general principal

for non-natural categories is Searle's principle of constituted categories: "X counts as Y for Z" (eg. 'marriage').

b) Categorization of Emotions (Prototypical Scripts, Scenarios, and Conceptual Mappings):

Most cultures **recognize** at least **six** basic human emotions (happiness, anger, sadness, fear, surprise, **disgust**) each associated with a culture-specific set of somatic-affective expressive correspondences as well as systems of encoding and interpretation schemas, scripts, scenarios and scripts (**Wierzbicka**, 1992). Specific cultural **information** is needed to account for differences in metaphoric mappings, prototypical scenarios and scripts and their attendant ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions (Kovecses, 1995; Matsuki, 1995).

c) Cognitive-Cultural Model of **Self/Person**:

All cultures encode their awareness of individuality, ie what the individual perceives as the boundaries between the self and the world, as well as the self and other selves, the individual and the collective (the 'us' and 'them'). The manifestation of this categorization is likely to be a specific view on the relationship between the demands of **private** life and those of social commitments. From this **conflict** may stem attitudes and concepts toward: relationships, bonding, courting, pnvacy, **altruistic** behaviours, entitlements, commitments, etc. These in turn may shape the manifestation of such values as: solidarity, individuality, membership-acceptance, empathetic ntuals and attitudes, etc.

The cognitive-cultural model of self **is** for the most part culture-bound. For **instance**, the Western Conception of Person, according to C. **Geertz** (1983), is that of a bounded, unique, integrated entity, motivationally and cognitively; a **dynamic** center of awareness, emotion and **judgement organized** into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background. The concept of self or personhood is socio-culturally mediated and socio-culturally **constructed**. This means that people **construct** their own and others' sense of self by **relying** on public resources, as well as on **private** experiences for self-construction. The concept of self of a given culture is an integral part of the cultural model of person of that culture. It includes the **image-schemata**, metaphoric and metonymic mappings, and **script-like information** with which a culture schematizes cognitively-culturally its members (**witness** expressions such as: "s/he has a screw loose"; "s/he is a **cheek**"; "s/he is out of his/her mind"; "slhe feels down"; "slhe has magic"; ""s/he has a **soft heart**"; "a man is **known** by the company he keeps"; "the face is the mirror of the soul", etc.; **Martín Morillas**, in press). It is, by **definition**, an **intersubjective** concept included in the cultural models of that culture, and hence in the cultural **meaning** systems that permeate it. The concept of self may be more or less explicit or **implicit**, conscious or subconscious, but it nevertheless manifests itself **linguistically** in complex and subtle ways: lexically, grammatically, semantically, pragmatically, discursively (ie. in simple or complex lexemes, **word-formation** processes, idioms, proverbs, ways of talking, discourse **patterns**, etc.)

d) Axiological Models (Values, Orientations, Motives, Beliefs, Ideologies):

Along the individualism-collectivism dimension a **number** of **categories** can be placed: **private** and public spheres; in-group and out-group **taxonomies**; concern with self,

achievement, self-esteem; work ethic; health and sickness; self vs group; self vs others (identity, equity, equality, difference, **divergence**). Axiological-orientational systems having motivational and directive force are deeply involved in such categories, as are **value-laden** concepts like power, justice, fairness, cooperation, competition, rewards, sanctions, etc.). Likewise, many of these axiological categories are liable to a stereotyping categorization, which generally betray a number of psycho-social tendencies (**illusory** correlation, essentialist **logic**, rigid cognitive style, etc.; see Hilton and von Hippel, 1996). Gender, **Ethnic**, Self and other stereotypes provide a **fertile** ground for the study of how **subjective** and **intersubjective** mental and cultural models interact.

Since the above categories belong to general and specific semantic domains (constellations and fields), they are liable to onomasiological meaning analyses (in terms of dimensions, parameters and features; see Martín Mingorance (1990), for a programmatic **proposal** developed in **full** by the Functional-Lexematic school), but it can be argued that a cognitive-cultural perspective integrating domains of analysis as well as specific constructs, methods and hypotheses from cognitive **linguistic** and cultural anthropological models may offer more encompassing insights for a proper understanding of the oftentimes seamless relationship of **language** to thought, affect and action.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Cognitive **Anthropology**, in the **wake** of far-reaching cognitive-semantic developments in the '70's, has emphasized the fact that understanding the meaning of a term entails understanding the **implicit** 'cognitive-cultural models' underlying it. A cognitive-cultural model **works** as a sort of intersubjectively-shared "simplified", "schematic" version of experience in the world. Cognitive-cultural models typically encode in a propositional plus motivational format **all** the information members of a culture possess that enables them to coordinate, interpret, and orient, their actions, beliefs, values, norms, etc. For cognitive anthropologists, terms like '**marriage**' 'anger' '**lie**' 'smart', '**self**' etc. are **all** 'constituted signs', **and** as such encapsulate a great **deal** of cultural information and locally-grounded knowledge. Of course the representation of the cultural **meanings** of such constituted signs cannot rely exclusively on declarative- propositional schemas or frames, for they must **also** incorporate procedural and non-representational **aspects**, since cultural meaning systems, as a special type of intersubjectively-shared information, **have** more than **just** representational functions, **possessing** a great **deal** of motivational-directive, affective, evoking and axiological-orientational force (D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992). **Furthermore**, cultural meaning systems work at many **levels**: they package information **simultaneously** about word and world (not **just** the real world, but **also** the ideal or **unreal** one), as well as about cognition, emotion and action. Their description therefore requires the integration of information about cognition, emotion, action and talk (from word through discourse to cultural models) **in** such a way that **justice** may be done to their representational, motivational, orientational, epistemic and axiological functions. From our standpoint, it is advisable for the **linguist** concerned with

the description and explanation of **meaning** systems to view language, cognition, emotion and action as interdependent and, therefore, to be accounted for **in** an integrated fashion. To this end, we favour a merging of cognitive **linguistic** and cognitive anthropological ideas, concepts and models. **The** basic **thrust** of this integration is twofold: that the way we "talk" is a projection of the way we "cognize" and "feel" (ie the way categorize things, **objects**, properties, events, etc., and they way we react to **them**); but, at the **same** time, that the way we cognize, **feel** and talk is for the most **part** also contingent upon the way we "live" socially (ie the way we go about our daily individual and social lives, the **tasks** the social milieu sets to our minds and selves).

From the theoretical cultural-cognitive model expounded above one may derive a number of more practical **projects**: cultural dictionaries, socio-cultural guides in pedagogic **grammars**, ethnographic descriptions, intercultural communication and cultural studies, etc. In this paper we **have outlined some** of **the** notions from the model that might be involved in the specification of **information** for a (cross)cultural dictionary entry of World and Self concepts.

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Schema Disruption in the Re-writing of History: Salman Rushdie's *East, West*

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ABSTRACT

Salman RusMie is well-known for his spectacular new versions of history, both Indian and world history. As he re-writes the events, exploring the contentious fault-lines of cultural debate, he uses an approach that involves inserting the innovative or unexpected into the familiar. In this study, we show how the familiar schema of KINGSHIP is dismpted by its interrelation with other schemata like SALESMANSHIP, LOVE and CHIVALRY, in the stop "Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabella of Spain Consummate Their Relationship (Santa Fé, AD 1492)" in Rushdie's 1995 collection of short stories, "East, West". Through application of Guy Cook's theory which is based upon a combination of discourse analysis, schema theory and literary theory, we can point to the instances in the text where the norms contained in the schemata, which encapsulate the reader's expectations once they have been triggered, are questioned by discourse deviation and schema refreshment. Here, Christopher Columbus is presented as a salesman trying to sell his product, o ra medieval knight fighting for his lady. The formal discourse of the narrarion and of the concept of chivalry is also dismpted by an informal discourse proper to travelling salesmen. Thus the historic and momentous meets the quotidian.

KEY WORDS: Salman Rushdie, *East, West*, discourse deviarion, schema refreshment

RESUMEN

A Salman Rushdie se le conoce por sus nuevas versiones de la historia. tanto de la India, como de otras panes del mundo. Escribe los acontecimientos de nuevo, explorando las contenciosas líneas de falla del debate cultural. Para hacer esto, utiliza un enfoque en que lo novedoso o inesperado se insertan en un fondo familiar. En este estudio, demostramos cómo el "esquema" familiar de "El Rey" es afectado por su interrelación con otros esquemas como "El vendedor ambulante", "El amor" y "El caballero andante", en el relato "Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabella of Spain Consummate Their Relationship (Santa Fé, AD 1492)" en el volumen de cuentos de RusMie de 1995, "East, West". Al aplicar la teon'a de Guy Cook, que se basa en una combinación del análisis del discurso, de la teoná de los esquemas y de la teoná literaria, podemos señalar los ejemplos en el texto donde se cuestiona lo familiar contenido en los esquemas. los cuales representan las expectativas del lector, una vez despenadas. Se cuestiona mediante la desviación del discurso y la actualización o el reciclaje de los esquemas. Cristóbal Colón es presentado como vendedor ambulante o como caballero andante, así que lo trascendental se encuentra con lo cotidiano en una nueva versión de los hechos.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Salman Rushdie, *East, West*, desviación del discurso, reciclaje de esquemas

0. INTRODUCTION

Salman Rushdie has consecrated his life, at great risk to it, to the post-colonial re-writing of world history. While he explores those "most contentious fault-lines of cultural debate --metropolis/periphery, atavism/modernity, fundamentalism/multiculturalism--" (Bhabha 1994), he works in the interstices of another pair of opposites: the momentous/the insignificant. Indeed, his reviewer, the writer Homi Bhabha, says he has "a fine sense of the little things of life" (Bhabha 1994). Another Rushdie hallmark is a tremendous sense of humour, manifested through verbal wit in the tradition of Laurence Sterne. It is small wonder that in one of his latest collections of short stories, *East, West*, (1994) (1), there is a pastiche Shandean re-writing of *Hamlet*, called "Yorick".

This collection questions the strict dichotomy of East/West (it uses a comma rather than a stroke to separate them), and brings the two together, especially in its final section. It has three sections, each with three stories. Section One ("East") has three modern but Oriental tales, Section Two ("West"), starts with the "Yorick" story and ends with one about Spain and the discovery of America: "Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabella of Spain Consume Their Relationship (*Sante Fé*, AD 1492)". The final section, ("East, West"), has three stories which explore East-West relations in literature, the occult, the cinema, and such modern ailments as terrorism. So, for example, in the second story, "Chekov and Zulu", we have diplomats involved in the assassination of Indira Gandhi playing out *Star Trek* fantasies.

On the front cover there is a remark about Rushdie by Nadine Gordimer: "The most original imagination writing today." Like all Rushdie's fiction, *East, West* is a feat of the imagination. For imaginative writing to be successful, the writer must have some control over the imaginations of his or her readers, in order to be able to carry the reader along. Homi Bhabha describes Rushdie's unorthodox method of creating narrative suspense:

In *Midnight's Children*, it is the tic and twitch of Padma's thigh muscles, as they respond to every twist and turn in the story of Cyrus the Great, that provide Saleem Sinai with his first lesson in storytelling: "[...]what happened is less important than what the author can persuade his audience to believe.' [...] The silences in these stories occur when the narrator pauses to make sure, like the young Saleem Sinai, that he is carrying his audience with him; that their muscles are twitching in time with the tale. (Bhabha 1994)

The path of the imagination is run in leaps and bounds by Rushdie, with significant silences interpolated. In this essay, we contend that Rushdie is able to make these leaps and bounds and carry the reader along because he works with schemata which are recognisable to the reader. He may jump from one field to another, there may even be apparent incompatibility of schemata, but because they are inherently structured, the writer knows that some element in the structuring of one schema will tie in somehow with one or more elements in the other schema or schemata evoked in the reader's mind.

To illustrate this thesis, we are going to focus upon the tale about Christopher Columbus. The model for analysis which we are going to use is that invented by Guy Cook to detect, analyse and describe the functions of schemata in texts. It sets up frameworks in the form of scenarios in which the events are re-enacted. Rushdie recreates momentous

events of history --here the discovery of America-- and asks us to review them in a new light, which invariably involves the "little things", the quotidian. In the Columbus story, he explores the interface of power and sex. But the seriousness of the momentous occasion is subverted by his **disrupting** the tone and **register** of the formal discourse with a contemporary informal discourse. Firstly, we will map out the schemata that **dominate** the tale, and then briefly describe Cook's schema theory model. Finally, following Cook's approach, we establish the **structures** in the different schemata and trace the relationships between them that account for the **coherence** and also the verbal wit in the tale.

I. THE PRINCIPAL SCHEMATA INVOKED IN "CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND QUEEN ISABELLA OF SPAIN CONSUMMATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP (*SANTA FÉ*, AD 1492)"

The opening of "Christopher Columbus..." evokes, quite **naturally**, the schema of **KINGSHIP**. but curiously, it evokes at the **same time** a **WOMAN** schema, as the anonymous narrator refers to *Queen Isabella*:

Columbus, a foreigner, follows Queen Isabella for an **eternity** without **entirely** giving up hope. (107)

But the next schema evoked is that of **LOVE**, for an anonymous commentator then speaks:

In what characteristic postures?[...] But, on his first **arrival** at court, when the Queen herself asked him what he **desired**, he [...] mumbled a single, dangerous word. 'Consummation.' (107)

The next schemata introduced are those of a **MAN** schema, and of a **DOOR-TO-DOOR SALESMAN**, with a "**confidence-man's charm**". This "**confidence-man**" has already been described as a foreigner, so the schema of **NATIONAL/FOREIGN** is introduced. A more striking schema is that of the **KNIGHT** in shining armour, where Columbus wants to "tie the **Queen's** favour to his helmet, **like a knight** in a romance." This is subverted by the addition "(He owns no helmet.)", and the next statement of the narrator's which is from an informal register: "He has hopes of cash.", thus breaking the formal tone of the narration. The final scenario evoked in the opening passage is that of children reciting poetry or playing with words at school: "in fourteen hundred and ninety-two, **sailing** across the **ocean blue**."

II. GUY COOK'S MODEL FOR ANALYSING SCHEMATA IN TEXTS

While the main work in which Guy Cook describes his **findings** is his 1994 *Discourse and Literature* (Cook 1994), he offered a preview of his ideas on schema theory in a **plenary lecture** at the *Primeras Jornadas Internacionales de Lingüística Aplicada* held at the University of Granada on 11-15 January 1993:

The general proposal of schema theory **concerning** discourse processing is

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well-known: a schema is a mental representation of a typical instance, and various types of schema have been proposed. The relationship of schemata to discourse would be as follows: enough detail is given in a discourse to trigger the selection of a schema in the receiver's mind. This schema is then used in top-down processing. Other than that, details are given only where there is a divergence from the schema. Unmentioned details - default elements as they are called - can if necessary be retrieved from the share of knowledge, from the share of schema. (Cook 1995, 146)

In his "Introduction" to *Discourse and Literature*, Cook states his intention to clarify certain processes in writer-reader relations that underlie and account for the power of some texts. He says the following: "there is a type of discourse which has a particular effect on the mind, refreshing and changing our mental representations of the world. [...] It derives, I believe, from an interaction of textual form with a reader's pre-existing mental representations." (Cook 1994, 4) Cook traces the history of schema theory from its origins in the Gestalt psychology of the 1920s and 1930s. In reviewing the general principles of schema theory, he acknowledges that pragmatic analysis of discourse assumes both shared knowledge and processing rules, and that he personally belongs to the school which stresses the importance of the former. His definition of the function of schemata is as follows:

A theory of knowledge in interaction with text is provided by the notion of 'schemata'. These are mental representations of typical instances, and the suggestion is that they are used in discourse processing to predict and make sense of the particular instance which the discourse describes. The idea is that the mind, stimulated either by key linguistic items in the text (often referred to as 'triggers' (see Pitrat 1985/1988), or by the context, activates a schema, and uses it to make sense of the discourse. In this sense schemata are 'norms' and individual facts are 'deviations'. (Cook 1994, 11)

The mental ability in the reader to add to the norm, to supply details by reading them in in their absence, is of particular relevance to literary narrative. The reader is prompted by a point of reference and left to use his knowledge or imagination to fill in the possible gaps. This filling in is not totally arbitrary, but governed by the limits of the schema. The postulation of the functioning of schemata at both a conscious and a subconscious level can help to account for the mechanisms of omission and retrieval and the background conditions for the activation of these processes. Charles Fillmore, in his article "Frames and the semantics of understanding" had shown how certain word groups are held together by "the fact of their being motivated by, founded on, and co-structured with, specific united frameworks of knowledge, or coherent schematizations of experience" (Fillmore 1985,223). He uses the general word "frame", drawing upon Minsky, Winograd and Charniak (all 1975). while pointing out that his own earlier "scene" (1977), Bartlett's "schema" of 1932, taken up by Rumelhart (1975 and 1980) and favoured by Guy Cook, Schank and Abelson's "script" (1977), de Beaugrande and Dressler's "global pattern" (1981), Lakoff's "cognitive model" (1983) and Lakoff and Johnson's "experiential gestalt" (1980) are all essentially describing the same phenomenon. Meanings are not "contained" within the text, but are constructed in the interaction between the text and the interpreter's background knowledge. The goal of Fillmore's model of "U-semantics" is to uncover the nature of the relationship

between linguistic texts and the interpreter's **full** understanding of the texts in their contexts (Fillmore 1985, 231). He shows how a frame is invoked when the interpreter, in trying to make sense of a text segment, is able to assign it an interpretation by situating its content in a **pattern** that is known independently of the text. (Fillmore 1985, 232). But Fillmore, with his semantic theory, is not the **only** one to **take** up frame or schema theory, it has **been** pressed into service in other **areas** like second and foreign language learning (e.g. Carrel and Eisterhold 1988) and story processing (e.g. Rumelhart 1975).

Cook picks upon the seminal model of schema theory put forward by Schank and Abelson in their 1977 book *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding*. Despite ongoing modification by the authors, Cook maintains the superiority of this model for his purposes. The main advantage of schema theory, as set out in their model, to explain effects in literature, is that **while** schemata enable us to omit a sequence of well-known causal links, thus saving time and making for compression of thought, they enable us to **provide** them if needed. Hence a writer can **assume** that a reader is following **him** or her, since once a schema has **been** activated, the links in the chain underlie the overt representation made by the selected items, and the reader may be either **consciously** or subconsciously aware of them. If a writer wishes to explicitly **mention** all the links, he or she has that option available for whatever purpose.

Cook claims that the Schank and Abelson version is one of the most "detailed, rigorous, well-known, and **influential**" versions (Cook 1994, 80) of schema theory, but before we can **apply** it in *East, West*, we **must** obviously show how Cook explains and applies it himself. We refer particularly to Chapter **Three** of *Discourse and Literature*. **Here**, Cooks shows that the basic **claim** of schema theory is that human understanding, and **here**, text understanding, can be represented as a hierarchy of levels of schemata in which failure to understand on one level can be corrected by referring to the level above. A theory of **coherence** may be extrapolated from this, whereby failure of correction at a **lower** level may be referred to a higher one. What exactly are these levels that we are talking about? Schank and Abelson define them in the following paradigmatic **terms**:

THEMES
GOALS
SUB-GOALS
PLANS
SCRIPTS

Cook explains these, **working** through the categories from bottom to top.

SCRIPTS

Scripts are structures "that describe appropriate sequences of events in a particular context [...] a **predetermined**, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation" (Schank and Abelson 1977, 41). They fall into three main categories: situational, personal and instrumental. A script may **have** a number of "tracks", which are different but related **instances** of the **same** general category. Each script is represented from the point of view of one of the participants and his or her **role** in it. Each script also has an "essential precondition" and a "main consequence". In addition, each script has a number of "slots" (similar to default elements) whose realization can be assumed **unless** there is **information** to

the contrary. The slots in a script are: a number of props, the roles of participants, the entry conditions, results and scenes and their sequence.

The **distinguishing feature** of scripts, as a type of scherna, is that these slots are instantiated by quite specific **entities** and events. Cook (1994, 81) gives us the example of a "trial" script from the point of view of a **judge**. The props would be a wig or a gavel, and the roles would be defendant, lawyers, witnesses, etc. The entry condition would be "being appointed to hear the case"; the **result** would be the verdict and **punishment** or exoneration. and the scenes would be indictment, plea, defence case, etc. A script, it is claimed, is activated by any one of a number of "headers" **concerning** the preconditions. It can be activated by specific mention of one of the participants, the **occupant** of a slot, or a location habitually associated with the script. In text understanding, script activation enables details to be bypassed, or provided by the default elements of the script, as required. Almost no script would function in a straightforward way **within** a text, however, or it would **have** little to recommend for itself. Most are complicated with obstacles, **deviations**, and errors, usually to foreground one aspect or other. Cook **lists** the following to look for: the incidental mention of potential "headers" for other scripts, the concurrent activation of rival scripts which will then compete to be the one used in understanding, the concurrent **running** of more than one script, or of one script as part of another, "headers" which may **create** "scriptal ambiguity" as to which of a number of scripts that share them **is** the one to activate, obstacles to the course of events which may necessitate either a loop back to an earlier point, or script abandonment, unexpected events which may lead to scripts being abandoned or held in abeyance until the event has run its course, movement from one script to another (Cook 1994, 82).

PLANS

Schank and Abelson define plans and **distinguish** them from scripts by saying that there are experiences which are so novel and unpredictable as to demand interpretation with **reference** to a structure which is not so specific in its elements. A "plan" is therefore a schema in the sense that it **consists** of ordered slots, but it is far less **explicitly connected** to specified places, **individuals**, or locations. **Plans** are ordered in that they realize goals, which may themselves be subordinate to higher goals. The recognition of the goal, or sub-goal, and the stages of the plan to realize it, establishes **coherence**. Suspension of goal revelation by the writer is **accompanied** by growing demand for knowledge of the goal on the part of the reader, which must be satisfied at some **later** point.

GOALS AND SUB-GOALS

Schank and Abelson identify five main goals as **objectives** of possible plans or scripts of agents in a discourse. They are: satisfaction, **enjoyment**, achievement, **preservation** and crisis handling. The dividing **line** between goals and plans **is** fuzzy, but there are certain "basic" goals most people can agree upon. Literary writing very often **concerns** itself with departure from expected goals.

THEMES

Just as plans and scripts demand goals, so goals need explanation too. In text comprehension, if a goal is not **recognized**, or is unfamiliar, recourse may be made to **some**

higher level. Schank and Abelson propose the category of themes, divided into three, as follows: role themes, interpersonal themes and life themes (Cook 1994, 80).

Cook refers to G. Edelman's *Brighr Air, Brillianr Fire* (Edelman 1992), in his conclusion about themes and our understanding of them in texts. He refers to a possible genetic role in the interface of "intelligence" and neurophysiological activity:

This process of explanation at higher and higher levels is potentially endless. but the explanation of themes, as *SPGU* point out, is beyond the scope of the investigation of text understanding. Further speculation would need to consider such issues as the interaction of the nature of intelligence with the neurophysiology of the brain, and the degree to which an intelligence is 'programmed' genetically or environmentally. Indeed, the notion of themes correlates well with the neural Darwinist notion of an innate, individually variable, value system dictating the development of cognitive structure (Edelman 1992). (Cook 1994, 90)

Cook summarises his theory of schemata before making his analyses in Chapter Four, and offers the following symbols:

\$ = script
 II = plan
 I = goal (sub-1 = sub-goal)
 O = theme.

Cook discusses his analysis, noting that the naming, classifying and assigning of schemata in this way is "highly speculative and highly problematic". Yet it is worth the attempt as the results emerging make our intuitions about schemata and coherence more explicit. (Cook 1994, 109). Coherence is created, or may be, depending on the reader, when the reader perceives comections between schemata. The comections may be causal, or inclusive, in that one schema may be contained in another.

Excluding processes may signal deviance. "Deviance" as part of a mutually defining binary pair along with "normality", can only have significance in relation to this norm. Since schemata represent the norm, for they encapsulate the reader's expectations once they have been triggered, the essence of schema theory is that "discourse proceeds, and achieves coherence, by successfully locating the unexpected within a framework of expectation." (Cook 1994, 130).

Cook postulates a theory based upon a combination of discourse analysis, schema theory and literary theory: "A theory of discourse deviation: schema refreshment and cognitive change" (Cook 1994, 181-211), in which he shows how defamiliarization, to use the Russian formalist notion, can make a crucial contribution to a theory of the relation between literary text and reader's mind at work on the text. A writer may introduce a schema only to dismpt and radically alter it. In its static nature, an altered or subverted schema suffers the foregrounding of certain of its components or aspects. This deviation may have a meaningful or aesthetic effect which contributes to the power of the text. The levels at which the defamiliarization may take place are at those of language schemata, text schemata and world schemata. Cook demonstrates three aspects to the introduction of changes in schemata: existing schemata may be destroyed; new ones may be constmcted, and new

connections may be established between existing schemata. Cook calls this "schema refreshment", for which disruption is a pre-requisite. The different procedures are reinforcing, preserving and adding, and the disruptive procedures are refreshing through destroying, constructing and connecting. Cook claims that it is the primary function of certain discourses--particularly literary and publicitary ones--to effect a change in the schemata of their readers.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEMATA OF "CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND QUEEN ISABELLA OF SPAIN CONSUMMATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP (*SANTA FÉ*, AD 1492)"

We have seen that the opening paragraphs of the story activate schemata concerning kingship, salesmanship, love and medieval chivalry, as well as the man/woman and the national/ foreign dichotomies, since Columbus is presented immediately as a foreigner. They also establish a formal narrative tone which is occasionally broken, either by a sudden descent to an informal tone, or by the introduction of humorous word-play. The text also modulates between third person narration by the anonymous narrator, and use of a theatrical approach including the actual dialogue of characters on the scene who appear to be two courtiers. The schemata in this tentative list fall into two categories: schemata about discourse types and schemata about the world.

III.1 SCHEMATA ABOUT DISCOURSE TYPES

III.1.1 Text Schemata

\$\$ (script-like schemata)	II (realising plans)
\$\$ NARRATION (WRITTEN)	II INFORM, ENTERTAIN
\$\$ DRAMA (ORAL)	II INFORM, DRAMATISE
\$\$ CHILDREN'S POETRY (ORAL)	II ENTERTAIN, INSTRUCT

III.1.2 Language Schemata

\$\$ (script-like schemata)	II (realising plans)
\$\$ FORMAL LANGUAGE (WRITTEN)	II INFORM, INSTRUCT
\$\$ INFORMAL LANGUAGE (ORAL)	II INFORM, ENTERTAIN

III.2 WORLD SCHEMATA

\$\$ (script-like schemata)	II (relevant plans)
\$\$ KINGSHIP	II C RULE KINGDOM
\$\$ SALESMANSHIP	II C SELL A PRODUCT
\$\$ MEN	II C PROTECT, EARN LIVING
\$\$ WOMEN	II C LOOK AFTER FAMILY
	DO DOMESTIC TASKS
\$\$ NATIONAL	II C BE BETTER, FAMILIAR

\$\$	FOREIGN	II C	BE DIFFERENT, SUSPECT
\$\$	LOVE: MALE HETEROSEXUAL	II C	PURSUE WOMAN
	FEMALE HETEROSEXUAL	II C	BE PURSUED BY MAN
\$\$	KNIGHT	II C	REPRESENT KING OR WOMAN WIN IN COMBAT

111.3 DISCUSSION

III.3.1 Text Schemata

As Cook points out, "knowledge of what types of **evidence** are reliable is of crucial importance to an individual. To call assumptions into question is to undermine the basis of all knowledge." (Cook 1994, 232) In **this** story, traditional versions of the account of Columbus's persuading of **Queen Isabella** and **King Ferdinand** to be his patrons for the enterprise of sailing westwards to the Indies are **called** into question through the device of presenting, not one, nor two, but three. eye-witnesses. The narrator is the first eye-witness, as he or she presents the events as developing before his or her very eyes. This effect is achieved in **several** ways: **firstly**, through the use of the present tense, which is maintained throughout, right to the end of the tale: "'Yes.' he tells the heralds. *Yes. I'll come.*" (p. 119) The second way is in the narrator's **recall** of the actual words of the protagonists. as in this quotation. Another way is through the **omniscience** of the **god-like** narrator; he has all the answers: "Obvious answers first." (107) The second and third eyewitnesses are the **unnamed** characters who speak in the text, breaking up the narrator's discourse. The first is introduced by a single curved line, and the second by a double one. This discourse is **dramatic** and like a **play** in that it is pure dialogue, with no stage-directions. The **lack** of stage-directions produces silences in between which force the reader to deduce information about the speakers. At the end of the story we deduce that these commentators are heralds, as we see them speaking directly to Columbus, persuading him to return:

The heralds dismount. They offer bribes, plead, cajole.[...] *She's waiting for you in Santa Fé. You **must** come at once.* (119)

As heralds or **courtiers**, they are able to give inside information about **Queen Isabella's intimate** reactions. This, in turn, contrasts with the traditional children's poem "in fourteen hundred and ninety-two, sailing across the **ocean blue**", thus providing an intimist re-writing of the event.

III.3.2 Language Schemata

The tale is **begun** by the narrator using a formal register, referring to "**preferment**" (107) and "**Italianate blandishments**" (108). The anonymous narrator's tone evokes a schema of history books **instructing** us in the **orthodox** version of **important** historical events. This tone is then subverted by the narrator introducing **colloquial** and unconventional speech from a lower register. This is done by the use of exaggerations and anachronisms: "man-sized diapers" (112), "a one-man debauch" (109). **Anachronistic** modern usage, bordering on the disrespectful and offensive, **subverts** with humour, such as when a herald comments on

Columbus's behaviour: "*The nerve!*" (107), or Columbus mentally calls the Queen a bitch (117). Colloquial and metaphorical expressions such as "take a hint", "turn a deaf ear", "go too far", "look after herself", "cuts him dead", "eats like a horse", contribute to the intimist tone of the "inside story" version of the events. The two contrasting scenarios are brought together in exchanges like:

'Her face is a lush peninsula' [...] 'Her legs are not so great.' (113)

III.3.3 World Schemata

Our assumptions about kingship are that the model is usually patriarchal, and that if the monarch is female, then she is, in a way, usurping male power, or at least assuming it. The traditional view of Queen Isabella as being powerful, almost masculine, is maintained. Her husband, King Ferdinand, is called by the narrator "an absolute zero: a blank". There is also humorous word-play here, in that "absolute zero" contrasts with the reference to her as "an absolute monarch" (110). This is no feminist sub-plot, however, as her power lust, her efficiency and energy: "The more of the land she swallows, the more warriors she engulfs, the hungrier she gets." (112) are replaced by a more capricious motivation. Her enigmatic refusal to be satisfied with the known and knowable, is shown to be the hidden reason for her change of mind and decision to become Columbus's patron. Her initial unwillingness is not attributed to lack of faith in his enterprise, or to personal and institutional avarice, as it was in the current mythical views of the events. Her fascination for the new in terms of kingship and imperialism is tied in with a similar sexual curiosity. Rushdie here explores the interface of desire on the imperial level and on the personal level. When Columbus is cast as a foreigner and as a travelling salesman, he both attracts through difference, and has to attract with his product. In this schema, Queen Isabella is turned into a housewife, and as Columbus gets his foot in the door, she is seduced by his product: a paradoxical and risky, but apparently viable, plan to obtain great wealth through travelling to the East via the West. The riskiness for the Queen is emphasised by the fact that his foreign unreliability is exaggerated by his drunkenness and dirtiness, probable side effects of his peripatetic profession. But a step further on from the schema of Columbus as salesman, is that of the great discoverer as lover. This is made explicit in the text by paradigmatic comments by Columbus on his own story:

'The search for money and patronage,' Columbus says, 'is not so different from the quest for love.' (112)

'The loss of money and patronage,' Columbus says, 'is as bitter as unrequited love.' (115)

Medieval knights are also often unrequited lovers, and can be "errant" like travelling salesmen, so again, the next schema is easily assimilated. A model for the Queen Isabella - King Ferdinand - Christopher Columbus triangle, which brings together both the LOVE and CHIVALRY schemata, would be that of King Arthur, Queen Guinevere and Lancelot. In our story, the king is never mentioned by name, his nonentity is summed up in that the only reference to him is as an adjunct to her: "her husband". The fact that King Ferdinand served

as a model of the modern prince for Machiavelli and had four children out of wedlock (2) does not seem to back up this idea historically, which reminds us that Rushdie is re-writing history for fictional purposes.

Queen Isabella's susceptibility to the charms of Columbus as salesman, lover and knight, therefore disrupts the schema which attributes a monopoly of power and decision to the monarch, not to mention the chaste connotations of the Catholic Monarch. In her caprice, based on desire and dream, there is implied negation of the rationalism that was beginning to be felt with the transition from the medieval world to that of the Renaissance. As we examine all the details in the text which belong to the most important world schemata in the story, it will become apparent that these details interrelate and create connections and implicit cohesion.

IV. SUMMARY OF A READER'S INTERPRETING WORLD SCHEMATA

We can postulate the following script-like schemata (\$\$) for the world knowledge in the story. Under each \$\$ we name the words and phrases from the text referring to defaults, and the relationship they have to the main concept. These words are all "headers in the text". We see a dominance of qualities and attributes (IS or HAS) and actions (EVENTS). As Cook says: "it is often shared attributes and actions which create a metaphoric link from one schema to another." (Cook 1994, 219)

1. \$\$ KINGSHIP

INSTANCE: QUEEN ISABELLA OF CASTILLE
 PROPS: HAS a court, a military victory, a *ring often kissed*, *appetites*, castles, armies, battle plans, conquests, citadels, flags, triumphs, *treasure chests*
 IS: an absolute monarch, a tyrant, all-conquering, omnipotent, (default element: IS *not* a man)
 EVENTS: foils conspiracies of assassins, negotiates treaties, swallows land, wins battles

2. \$\$ LOVE

INSTANCE: QUEEN ISABELLA OF SPAIN
 PROPS: HAS an olive hand, hair to braid, breasts to fondle, a *ring often kissed*, sexual *appetites*, flirtatiousness, infidelities, *treasure chests* (= breasts)
 IS: touched by tentacles of warmth, a turbulence
 EVENTS: offers the ecstasy of her glance, reaches peak of ecstasy

INSTANCE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
 PROPS: HAS sexual *appetites*, quest for love, *charm*
 IS: (at end) [like] a requited lover, a groom on his wedding day
 EVENTS: offers the possibility of embracing his scheme with a lover's

abandon

3. SS SALESMANSHIP

INSTANCE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
 PROPS: HAS *a scheme*, a **confidence-man's charm**, a certain saucy vulgarity, shoes [...] a little thin
 IS: knee bent, **fawning**, ingratiating
 EVENTS: is **running** out of sales talk, *offers the possibility of embracing his scheme with a lover's abandon*

4. \$\$ MEDIEVAL CHIVALRY

INSTANCE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
 PROPS: HAS **tuneless** serenades, coarse epistles
 IS: a medieval **knight**, a hero, a knight in a romance, a **man** of action, unrequited, (default element: **is not the husband**)
 EVENTS: **ties the Queen's** favour to his [non-existent] helmet, carries her flag and her favour, wears **man-sized** diapers under [his] armour **because** the fear of death will open the bowels

5. \$\$ FOREIGN

INSTANCE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
 PROPS: HAS sea-dog **raffishness**, excessively **colourful** clothes, the dusty patchwork **cloak** of his invisibility
 IS: (default element: a traveller), invisible
 EVENTS: dreams of entering the invisible world, is [pushed] beyond the frontiers of [the] self, [...] beyond his mind's **rim**

V. CONCLUSIONS

In terms of plans and themes, the enterprises of **Queen** Isabella and Christopher Columbus associate through a common plan on two levels. Isabella's "treasure chests" are to be both filled and fondled by Columbus, and her ring is to be kissed as **Queen** and mistress, **just** as his scheme is embraced by both with a **lover's** abandon. Rushdie conveys the urgency of the **desire** and the inevitable coupling of the two names for **all** time:

[H]e must must must carry her flag and her favour beyond the end of the end of the earth, into exhalation and **immortality**, **linking** her to him for ever with bonds far harder to dissolve than those of any mortal **love**, the harsh and deifying **ties** of history. (117)

Isabella's plans are to extend her sphere of power, and with the hindsight that the **advantage** of time affords us, we know that it was the beginning of a great empire. She used the

foreigner Columbus to achieve her ends, thus engulfing the foreign. Rushdie comments ironically on the controversial centre/periphery dichotomy through one of the heralds: "there are quanners in which (hard as it is to accept) we ourselves would be considered foreign. too!" (108). Within the FOREIGN schema, we have another apparent paradox, which takes us from the visible and concrete to the invisible and abstract, and that is the idea of coloured /colourless. At first, Columbus's colourfulness is censored, but then, in the course of the story, it becomes positive. Columbus depends on Isabella's crucial decision, because it will, and did, make or break him. He is caught in the interstice between the old and the new worlds: "This old world is too old and the new world is an unfound land." (115). He is going mad in a no-man's land of nothingness. Her decision to be his patron saves him from oblivion, or invisibility to history, and makes his foreign colour or colourfulness visible to history and no longer culturally negative. We see from the level of the quotidian that it was a hit or miss affair.

In terms of schema connections, the contents evoked in the text yield a number of cross-references, which we have emphasised with the use of italics. The most obvious is the paradigmatic relationship between the structure of kingship, with the position of the king or queen at the top, and that of love or chivalry, with the lover or knight looking up to the lady. If the cross-reference of "treasure chests" is not understood at the level of the script, then meaning must be sought at higher levels, those of a king/queen or lover's plans and goals, and the general theme of kingship.

Finally, we appreciate the disruption of the KINGSHIP schema when we find the default element of a strong, rational, male monarch absent. In its place, we find contradictory elements in the interplay of strong and weak, rational and irrational, male and female. The accompanying discourse deviation is seen in the disruption of the written, history-book norm by the low-register oral interventions. Rushdie is reviewing history in fiction, where fact matters but is inconsequential, where the momentous is seen to depend upon the "little things of life", and where historical personages turn out to be (fictional) real people with personal problems that are often as interesting as the great feats they have accomplished. Thus the event or the person is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a complex context, and the novelist has a much freer hand than the historian. The lingering suggestion Rushdie throws out to the reader who has followed his imaginative leaps and bounds, is that the original historian may have been as partisan in the creation of history through discourse, as a novelist like him.

NOTES

1. The edition used is Salman Rushdie, (1995) *East, West*, (London: Vintage)
2. Hernando del Pulgar wrote of the King: "amaba mucho a la reina, su mujer, pero dábale a otras mujeres." Quoted in a preview to Juan Eslava Galán, (1996) *La vida y la época de los Reyes Católicos*. (Madrid: Planeta). in *Ideal*. 6 October 1996, "Revista". vii.

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La teoría de los modelos mentales y el fenómeno de la recepción dramática. Sobre el *fracaso* de J.M. Synge.

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RESUMEN

En este trabajo se articula la aplicación de la teoría de los modelos mentales de Garnham a un material tan polémico como las obras de teatro de J.M. Synge, de cuyo análisis se pueden deducir los particulares procesos de interpretación de texto y discurso concebidos por la audiencia del Abbey Theatre a principios del siglo XX. El hecho más significativo derivado de los mismos fue su rotundo fracaso al ser llevadas a escena. La recepción por parte del público, en franca oposición a lo representado por aquella institución dramática, así lo dejó patente. Como se verá, las causas de este fenómeno se pueden reducir básicamente a las que siguen: por una parte, el choque de varios modelos mentales coexistentes y, por otra, la consiguiente inversión de estereotipos y la ruptura de la norma de una retórica tradicionalmente irlandesa que aquellas comedias supusieron.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Crítica lingüística; teoría de los modelos mentales; socio-semiótica del teatro; recepción teatral; ruptura del estereotipo; literatura anglo-irlandesa, Abbey Theatre, J.M. Synge.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to apply Garnham's mental models theory to the analysis of J.M. Synge's most controversial plays. By means of this it will be simpler to deduce through which processes of interpretation the audience at the Abbey Theatre rejected the subverted representation of a traditionally Irish rhetoric, which, on this occasion, had been embodied by the inversion of the very core of Ireland's most sacred stereotypes. The reason of the failure of this institution must be subsequently found in the clash between several coextensive mental models.

KEY WORDS: Linguistic criticism; mental models theory; socio-semiotics of theatre; reception theory; deviation from stereotype; Anglo-Irish literature, Abbey Theatre, J.M. Synge.

El acierto de la psicología cognitiva al introducir el concepto de *modelos mentales* es más que de agradecer en el ámbito de la *psicolingüística*, pero también en el de áreas de estudio que, aun sin dedicarse en exclusiva al análisis de esta cuestión, se pueden beneficiar de sus planteamientos básicos con la aplicación de los principios generales de esta teona. Ése es nuestro caso. El punto de partida de la *teon'a atribucional*, o *teoría de las atribuciones*, de la que se deriva la idea de los modelos mentales, puede sernos de utilidad para acercarnos, desde una perspectiva menos encorsetada que algunas otras posibles, al problema de los procesos de emisión y recepción del fenómeno discursivo iniciado desde el *Abbey Theatre*.

El título de una de las monografías que mejor describen el estado de la cuestión es precisamente el de *Mental Models as Representations of Discourse and Text*. En ésta, Alan Garnham (1987) presenta el armazón teórico en el que se sostiene, formula casos prácticos, interpreta los resultados de algunos experimentos relacionados con la elaboración o particularización de los modelos mentales y, apoyándose en la evidencia empírica, articula un intento de desarrollo de una teona adecuada de comprensión del lenguaje. Garnham parte de la idea de que «*mental representations usually model aspects of the world rather than aspects of linguistic structure*» (p. 15), pero también sabe, y así lo dice, que, aunque no es el lenguaje mismo el que representa el mundo, es éste la única fuente externa «*for setting up a representation of a part of the world*» (p. 16). Esta teona suya, objetivista como es en el sentido de Lakoff (1987), se deriva de la expuesta por Johnson-Laird en 1983 pero se aparta de la misma al admitir que la realidad es en buena medida una creación mental.

El interés de la *psicolingüística* por explicar la construcción y la caracterización de las representaciones del mundo es consecuencia directa de su intento de establecer relaciones entre el lenguaje y el mundo en cuestión, a la manera de Montague y su semántica *modelo-teórica*. Con esta base, la propuesta del autor se concreta algo más. En sus palabras, el objetivo principal de su estudio es acertar a mostrar cómo la representación de un texto es un modelo de parte del mundo (p. 18); según esto, cree necesario considerar el procesamiento de la oración en su contexto con el fin de descubrir qué situación se está describiendo o, lo que es lo mismo, de construir una representación de esa situación (p. 19). A pesar de que la complejidad de esta hipótesis no disminuye con el desarrollo de su argumentación, sí es cierto que poco a poco se desvelan algunas ideas muy puntuales de una agudeza evidente. Esto mismo se puede decir de su descripción de *texto* y *discurso* en cuanto que «*encoded in mental models*» (p. 20) que, en su construcción y para su existencia, dependen tanto de información *lingüísticamente* convenida como de un conocimiento general del mundo, y cuya interpretación se ve afectada por el contexto.

Para explicar la teona de los modelos mentales, Garnham recurre a conceptos anteriores de escuelas de pensamiento más o menos cercanas en un repaso del avance logrado en el área con los estudios de semántica y pragmática, especialmente. Frege, Wittgenstein, Grice o Putnam, entre otros, con sus respectivas aportaciones, son objeto de su revisión crítica. Por ejemplo, sobre las máximas de Grice dice que su conocimiento influye en el modo en que las representaciones de los textos son construidas (p. 37), y de Putnam recoge sus conclusiones acerca de la naturaleza del significado en tanto que constructo que no está en la mente y en el que se incluyen los estereotipos (p. 38).

Las definiciones de los conceptos claves en tomo a los que se formula toda su teoría son atractivos y no siempre precisos. Por *representación* entiende «*a formal object standing in some relation, not necessarily that of physical similarity, to some other thing, often in the*

real world, that it stands for» (p. 42); por *modelo mental*, «a data structure, in a computational system, that represents a part of the real world or of a fictitious world» (p. 43); y, por *modelo discursivo*, en cuanto que concepto intermedio, no simplemente «a representation of a set of entities related to the topic of discussion», sino además «a model of how a person believes the world to be; including beliefs about what the other discourse participants believe» (p. 46).

La investigación sobre el tema a la que se refiere Garnham ha dado frutos interesantes pero no se puede decir que todos sean ni definitivos ni exhaustivos. Lo importante, sin embargo, no es tanto la formulación de unos principios determinados, como la consideración de una toma de postura intelectual, en este caso ecléctica, conciliadora y, sobre todo, revulsiva y comprometida. Está claro que esta teona abre un abanico importante de posibilidades explicativas, pero también que sólo es así en su planteamiento y con sus propuestas generales, ya que, al precisar algo más, se descubre el espejismo de su poder, un poder que creíamos haber identificado con un potencial descriptivo con apenas límites y que sólo es aceptable si adoptamos el sentido menos específico de su definición. La advertencia queda expresa. Nuestra interpretación de esta teoría es sólo una tentativa de reutilización de conceptos ya establecidos que, a juicio de los más ortodoxos, podna resultar escandalosa, pero que parece de indudable valor si es posible adecuarla al marco más complicado de la construcción de sentido a partir de unos modelos mentales pre-existentes que organizan la percepción y la recepción de un producto multidiscursivo como es el teatro. La flexibilidad con la que se formula este acercamiento se desprende, en parte, de algunas sugerencias expuestas por el propio Garnham. El autor recuerda que no hay necesidad de reducir los modelos mentales a la comprensión del discurso; cree que existen otras transacciones lingüísticas, caracterizadas en términos de interacción comunicativa, en las que se considera preciso conocer las creencias de cada una de las fuentes de recepción y emisión, o «linguistic devices», y crear un modelo de la situación descrita. El ejemplo con el que ilustra esta explicación no es definitivo, pero sí esclarecedor; según dice, el modelo «will contain a restricted set of entities, the characters and settings in a novel, for example, and a set of beliefs about the other [linguistic] device» (p. 47).

Los planteamientos básicos de la teona de Garnham son los siguientes. Por una parte, está seguro de que el contexto, que funciona a un nivel más global, selecciona un dominio limitado de entidades pertinentes para la interpretación de lo que se dice en un proceso discursivo concreto. Es consciente de que esa interpretación se inicia cuando comienza la conversación (si es que se trata de una conversación), y supone la construcción de una serie de modelos parciales durante el desarrollo de aquélla, «as a discourse progresses» (p. 137); y observa, en consecuencia, que si son parciales, se puede inferir que tales modelos han de estar abiertos a toda modificación dependiendo de su ajuste o desajuste con la información vertida en las secuencias posteriores. Por otra parte, de acuerdo con una definición aceptada del término, Garnham asume que todo modelo mental es la estructura con respecto a la que las unidades oracionales del discurso son interpretadas; en otras palabras, «[m]ental models are not merely translations of linguistic inputs into an internal representational system, say semantic markerese. They are interpreted data structures standing in well-defined relations to objects in the world» (p. 147). En cuanto al procesamiento de los mensajes y la correspondiente constitución del modelo, dice:

Hearers introduce new tokens if they cannot make sense of what has **been** said in terms of the tokens already in their models. At any point the set of tokens in a model represent the potential referents for expressions in the current discourse. Items not in the discourse model need **not**, in general, be considered. (p. 139)

Y, para terminar, señala cómo, mediante la inferencia, se completa el proceso de comprensión en el que uno de los participantes en el discurso se halla involucrado.'

Lo curioso de todo lo visto hasta aquí es que la imprecisión obligada de parte de las conclusiones de un estudio tan complejo como el acometido por Gamham da pie a una lectura abierta de las mismas y, por ende, a una apropiación legítima por parte de investigadores de otras áreas de los conceptos y presupuestos más originales descritos por el psicolingüista con el fin de completar hipótesis relacionadas, en nuestro caso, concernientes al descubrimiento de los mecanismos implicados en la producción de significado y, especialmente, en su comprensión. Percatado de este hecho, el autor incluye un capítulo final en el que, aparte de tratar cuestiones relativas a los últimos trabajos en este campo, refina algo más su idea de modelo mental en beneficio de nuestra perspectiva, además. Gamham entiende que el concepto de modelo mental es un término apropiado para las representaciones mentales que subyacen a todo razonamiento acerca del mundo, lo que implica que «*everyday world is to have a theory of how it works*» (p. 153). En el fondo, la cuestión gira alrededor del análisis de los procesos de recepción, comprensión e interpretación subsiguiente de texto y discurso como producto resultado de la incorporación a los mismos de mecanismos que auspicien el desarrollo de estrategias de formación de significado. Es a este nivel al que opera el **constructo** del modelo mental, que en conjunción con otros modelos, en especial los modelos de creencias populares, los modelos expertos y, sobre todo, los modelos culturales (cfr. Holland y Quinn, 1987), y, recurriendo también a la actualización de modelos mentales precedentes, desencadena operaciones empíricamente verificables de ordenación, selección y recuperación de información por medio de las que el sujeto receptor es capaz de comprender e interpretar el objeto de la emisión.

De entre las condiciones que facilitan la construcción del modelo mental, Gamham destaca tres: 1) la coherencia textual; 2) la continuidad referencial; y 3) la verosimilitud del texto, esta última dependiente de la relación establecida entre los hechos descritos y el modo en que suceden las cosas en el mundo (cfr. Gamham, Oakhill y Johnson-Laird, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Black, Freeman y Johnson-Laird, 1986). La función de estas entidades mentales, «standing for **things** in the world» (p. 165), no es otra que poner orden en el mundo, en la organización de su conocimiento y, en concreto, en la de la información sensorial ante la que se encuentra el sujeto receptor; y, a través de ellas, resolver el enigma de significado propuesto dentro de y por el proceso discursivo. Por eso, precisamente, nos parece válido expandir los términos de la formulación de esta teona y, así, enmarcar dentro de esta corriente explicativa la descripción del fenómeno de comunicación fallida propiciado por la supuesta incompatibilidad habida entre los diversos patrones conceptuales de categorización del mundo que se dio en el Dublín del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés.

Si recogemos y hacemos nuestra, con la precaución necesaria, una de las conclusiones a la que han llegado Holland y Skinner (1987) relativa a la consolidación de unos modelos culturales en diversos grupos sociales americanos constituidos en torno al concepto de sexo, no es muy difícil entender la adecuación de las premisas de la teona de los modelos mentales a nuestro objeto de estudio. Según la propuesta en cuestión se supone que, si se pretende constituir una comunidad más o menos unificada en sus valores y, de ese modo, generar actos comunicativos totalmente exitosos, la consideración de ciertos hechos conversacionales (conocidos o no), dentro de un proceso de comunicación, debe estar determinada por los principios rectores de un modelo cultural específico. En consecuencia, la introducción de términos desconocidos causará problemas, interferencias. En palabras de las autoras:

Talk about types, new or old, is assumed to be **talk** that can be interpreted according to the cultural model. Even if the individual manages to **think** "outside" the cultural model (which may in fact happen quite frequently), he or she still will face considerable difficulty in **communicating** the alternative models to other people. **Because** it provides the backdrop for interpreting and the conventions for talking about experiences, the cultural model is a social entity not easily **altered** by a single individual. (p. 106)

Así las cosas, nos disponemos a desentrañar nuestra idea de la teona de los modelos mentales y de la interpretación del discurso dramático como ejercicio de validación progresiva de las representaciones teatrales de hechos, relaciones, acciones y entidades con hechos, relaciones, acciones y entidades del mundo real en el que opera un modelo de sentido determinado. Con esta visión alternativa resulta de un atractivo más que palpable la toma en consideración de todo el proceso desencadenado a partir de la puesta en escena de obras de teatro como *The Playboy of the Western World* de John Millington Synge.

La historia en la que se ven envueltos Christy Mahon, Pegeen **Mike**, la viuda Quin, el viejo Mahon, Shawn Keogh, Michael James y todo el Condado de Mayo en *The Playboy of the Western World* es curiosa, extraña, e increíble, según el canon de la moral conservadora imperante; **irrisoria**, simple y comedida, en comparación con los sucesos míticos de los que se nutría la tradición celta y, a través de ella, la memoria colectiva irlandesa. El joven Christy se jacta ante un pueblo **ávido** de emociones y novedades de un acto criminal, un parricidio, que llega a **cometer** tres veces sin el resultado esperado. Entre tanto, su figura se ha engrandecido y, con ello, la forma de relacionarse con él por parte de los demás ha sufrido una modificación apreciable.

Las fuerzas participantes en los sucesos acontecidos a lo largo de más de una semana del mes de enero de 1907 (conocidos por el apelativo de *Playboy riots*), pertenecían **grosso modo** a dos grupos socialmente diferenciados, con credos religiosos reconocidamente distintos y un cúmulo de expectativas muy dispares respecto tanto de la relación entre cultura y política. como de la función del discurso dramático en cuanto que medio de construcción y consolidación de su idea de identidad (*cfr.* Hirsch, 1988:107-8). Según esto, no puede resultar inviable plantearse la existencia de, al menos, dos visiones del mundo también dispares y, por lo tanto, de dos modelos distintos de interpretación discursiva. El hecho

objetivo está claro. Ante una comedia de las características de la polémica *The Playboy of the Western World* y con un público de esa naturaleza, la recepción de la misma tenía que ser un ejemplo, por de pronto, de falta de unanimidad. Pero esto es sólo hacer obvio lo obvio. El haber recurrido a la teona de los modelos mentales tiene una razón de ser muy simple. Partiendo del concepto original de modelo mental, podemos arriesgarnos a considerar varios puntos relacionados con la cuestión analizada directamente por esta teona y que no han sido, sin embargo, desarrollados en este marco. La ambigüedad de las definiciones varias que postula Garnham en las más de cinco ocasiones en las que se propone delimitar con mayor claridad la función y el alcance del modelo mental impide, por una parte, acertar a deslindar con exactitud su papel real, pero, por otra, permite el deambular académico por un área muy prometedora. En su sentido más amplio, el modelo mental del que habla Garnham se constituye a la vez en producto y productor intermediario del proceso de comprensión textual. Mientras, en su calidad de entidad social teóricamente no alterable por mediación de individuos particulares, el modelo cultural impone una estructuración muy determinada sobre la forma en la que los miembros de una comunidad se refieren a, o se relacionan con, sus mundos cognoscitivo y de la experiencia (cfr. Jorques Jiménez, 1995:18). Aunque se supone que debe de haber sólo un modelo cultural por grupo de identidad y se entiende que en este grupo se encuentra incorporada, por lo general, una colectividad global de principios e intenciones, no es absurdo optar por la conveniencia de señalar la posibilidad de otros modelos culturales potenciales que se estarían solapando con el *oficial*, ya que compartirían, de hecho, la mayoría de sus condiciones de existencia pero, a la par, se conformarían como modelos independientes por derivarse su existencia de la existencia de otros grupos de identidad. o mejor, de otras identidades dentro del **grupo**.²

A este argumento le sigue otro que se plantea como consecuencia de la multiplicidad de modelos coexistentes. Si un producto discursivo ya está influido por la construcción de sentido de la comunidad a la que pertenece; o, más aún, no es tanto que sienta su influencia como que se halle inmerso en aquélla y, por lo tanto, no pueda sino manifestarse como parte de ella, entonces, no se sale de la lógica pensar que cada una de las interpretaciones de aquél también estarán mediatizadas por la afiliación del sujeto receptor a un grupo cualquiera. Ahora bien, con esta **afirmación** no se puede pretender responder por completo a todos los interrogantes que tácitamente puedan surgir sobre el fracaso parcial del *Abbey Theatre*. Con esta explicación lo que se logra, eso sí, es descubrir la pertinencia de un acercamiento de corte psicolingüístico en el estudio de un fenómeno de estas características, porque, al hilo de lo visto, **resultaría** muy interesante analizar ciertos modelos mentales en su función de representaciones de una realidad discursiva tan compleja como la de una obra de teatro; o, lo que es lo mismo, sena aclarador desvelar la particularidad de una situación en la que no todos los individuos que procedieron a participar de lo representado podían interpretar lo mismo, al partir de unas premisas ideológicas distintas a las del resto y, así, representar el texto en modelos mentales diferentes movidos por la existencia de modelos anteriores con los que ajustar su codificación del mundo mediante inferencias y referencias a hechos no necesariamente reales, pero sí probables dentro de su concepto de mundo (p. 132).

El desarrollo de nuestra propuesta de aplicación de la teoría de los modelos mentales supone el empleo riguroso de los términos descritos por ésta, pero también la reinterpretación de parte de sus propósitos y la conjunción de otros elementos que tienen que ver más con la sociología de la literatura que con la psicología cognitiva. La dificultad es manifiesta, especialmente tras haber dejado constancia de la diferencia habida entre el tipo de ejemplar discursivo sobre el que se apoyan las investigaciones en las que se basan **Garnham** y demás especialistas, y el que nosotros hemos decidido tomar como objeto de observación. No obstante, puesto que nuestra hipótesis de partida es la idea de la obra de teatro como macroacto de habla en tanto que unidad compleja de comunicación lingüística, parece haberse superado, no sin riesgos, el primer escollo práctico (cfr. Hidalgo Tenorio, 1997).

El segundo problema a resolver radica en otra diferencia más por la que se distingue claramente de nuestro corpus el de los experimentos psicolingüísticos mencionados, en el sentido de que, mientras este último está constituido por textos integrados por signos verbales exclusivamente, en el primero el texto se acompaña de la aportación sígnica visual propia de la iconicidad de la que no se puede prescindir al hablar del fenómeno discursivo teatral. A todas luces, este caso es simplemente más crítico porque la representación dramática, por su naturaleza plurisemiótica, por una parte, impone al receptor en cierta manera la ordenación de objetos, entidades y sus relaciones dentro de modelos generados por la misma estructuración del mundo que implica la presentación escénica y, por otra, facilita la interpretación de lo dicho mediante las imágenes que funcionan de soporte físico de las palabras. Pero, pensándolo bien, esta diferencia no es tal diferencia, o sólo lo es en lo más básico, ya que en realidad nos hallamos ante el mismo fenómeno sólo que por duplicado y, además, en interacción. Ése es el único detalle definitivamente distintivo.

Con todo, aunque estas dos cuestiones concernientes a la distancia existente entre los métodos y los instrumentos de uno y otro acercamiento no son tan problemáticas si se analizan desde una perspectiva amplia, no es aconsejable perder de vista, sin embargo, el hecho de la disparidad de propósitos primarios de los trabajos de **Garnham** y del que vamos a llevar a cabo, ya que el objetivo último de este autor no es sino formular el concepto de modelo mental como entidad no semántica que cumple el papel de representación de texto y discurso, mientras que nosotros partimos ya de la base de la realidad de estos modelos y, de ahí, pasamos a proponer la idea de su confluencia, su contraposición y su habilitación como indicadores de grupalidad y de toda noción de unidad e identidad sociales. Aclarados estos dos puntos de discordia, estamos convencidos de que resultará menos controvertido y algo menos aventurado acceder a una concepción más clara no sólo de lo que es un modelo mental o en qué sentido es efectiva su operatividad, sino también de lo que presupone su constitución y de las ventajas que implica acometer el estudio de un proceso de naturaleza básicamente psicológica y consecuencias tan sociológicamente pertinentes.

Para entrar en materia, consideremos la propuesta teórica nuevamente. Partamos de una hipótesis simplificadora de la percepción del mundo y su representación. Cada ser humano, en tanto que miembro de una colectividad, tenderá a ver en el mundo sólo los objetos particulares de las categorías establecidas para la misma según criterios de pertinencia y necesidad. Así, cualquier construcción conceptual, al tomar como fuente ese **micro-cosmos**,

no puede librarse de la mediación de los principios autorreguladores del mundo concebido y descrito a través de la conjunción de imágenes y sus interpretaciones. Pero, no termina *en* el ciclo de representación del universo de esa entidad cultural ideológicamente marcado. Los individuos que lo integran asumen, más o menos conscientemente, sus valores con la mera repetición de los patrones constituyentes del sistema, generando, a su vez, un sentido de continuidad que estimula la consolidación de la falacia de la univocidad de tal proyecto en común. Insertos en éste, es como se favorece la producción de ideas, deseos, creencias e intenciones. En esta maquinaria cuasi-perfecta de reforzamiento de paradigmas, la existencia del subconsciente colectivo **definidor** se desprende como condición necesaria de su propia existencia. El lenguaje es el medio más directamente implicado en la materialización de la relación entre la realidad y los organismos en sociedad. Con *él*, y a través de *él*, se corporeizan estructuras de poder y solidaridad que también en *él* mismo se manifiestan mediante la lexicalización de jerarquías, mediante la anulación de ciertas distinciones relevantes, o mediante la inclusión y la expansión de características determinadas socialmente, que no **intrínsecas**.³ La reducción a la que el lenguaje somete al mundo real no se limita al ámbito de la representación de la realidad misma. En apoyo de esta hipótesis, será suficiente recordar que tal proceso tiene, aparentemente, un carácter recurrente. De esa recursividad se puede dar constancia en la medida en que, después de nombrar entes y verbalizar estados y acciones, vuelve a interpretar la realidad por medio de constructos más o menos abstractos que pretenden explicar lo particular a través de lo universal, poniendo de ese modo al descubierto sólo ciertas esferas del conocimiento; y, después de ello, o incluso a la par, representa las representaciones de la primera y la segunda fases mencionadas, valiéndose de la recreación literaria (mucho más reduccionista a pesar de su poder de superación de los límites de la propia realidad).

Nuestras percepciones están mediatizadas por todo lo que nos rodea y, también, por todo lo que nos constituye como seres sociales, como miembros de una comunidad concreta que existe tal cual al **aglutinarse** alrededor de unos valores integradores preformados que preceden a la propia constitución del **grupo** en cuestión, y otros valores regulativos que propician su establecimiento, ya conformado. Con estos presupuestos parece oportuno considerar la congruencia de una hipótesis que permite bajar la posibilidad de la descripción de lo social a partir de la formulación de los modelos culturales como marcas genéricas (según las que se estructuran todas las unidades de sentido dentro de un ámbito particular), y de los modelos mentales como conjunto de operaciones (no institucionalizadas necesariamente) que organizan todos los procesos de comprensión y creación de significado instigados desde el nivel primario de representación lingüística de la realidad y desde el nivel secundario de la representación, también lingüística, de esa representación **lingüística** primaria de la realidad.

Nuestra tesis se puede exponer en los siguientes términos. En primer lugar, creemos totalmente probado el fenómeno de la inercia del modelo cultural; de acuerdo con Holland y Skinner (1987:105), «[t]he shared cultural model vastly facilitates communication [and] experiences can be **rapidly** communicated to **other** people if described according to the conventions of the cultural **model**». En segundo lugar, deducimos que, puesto que es posible

encontrarse con casos de incompatibilidad de modelos culturales, los casos de incomunicación, en consecuencia, no han de ser menos; en otras palabras, la evidencia de la falta de comunicación entre individuos de una comunidad, de sus comportamientos conversacionales no cooperativos o de su incapacidad para establecer relaciones de interacción a nivel superior puede explicarse recurriendo al criterio de disparidad existente entre unos modelos culturales determinados y otros. Finalmente, rescataremos el concepto de modelo cultural para proceder a analizar las fuerzas que confluyen en la serie de actos implícitos en la tentativa continua y sucesiva de descifrar los contenidos proposicionales de texto y discurso, construyendo esquemas mentales de aquéllos, integrados por los respectivos participantes de las proposiciones expresas y una especie de metáforas visuales que dan cobertura a la representación espacio-temporal de los entes envueltos y las acciones, estados, relaciones o procesos en los que se vean involucrados. Algunas de las hipótesis de las que estamos convencidos parecen verificables con métodos normalizados en el campo de la psicolingüística; otras, sin embargo, se han de tomar más bien como *actos* de fe en los que se puede o no creer, simplemente. Con todo, nuestro intento de explicación no es ni fruto de la casualidad ni, menos, del capricho. En consonancia con lo planteado, entonces, convendremos en argumentar las piezas claves de nuestra hipótesis como sigue.

Como ya hemos sugerido antes, el origen del conflicto se hallaría en la existencia de varios modelos culturales solapados dentro de la misma comunidad (en este caso la Irlanda de finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX) con sus respectivas conceptualizaciones de la realidad más o menos diferentes, en ocasiones contrapuestas y, en general, poco compatibles. El espejismo del carácter unitario y unívoco de los conceptos básicos sobre los que se articularía la sociedad irlandesa (tal como la idea de nación en tomo a la que se iría acomodando toda una vorágine de otras ideas relacionadas) se infiere indirectamente de la situación descrita. De hecho, históricamente hablando, se tiene constancia del abismo ideológico que separaba a los dublineses que se dieron cita en las representaciones de unas obras de teatro construidas desde un modelo que oficialmente tenía poco o nada que ver con el de quienes las habían de recibir (cfr. Kilroy, 1971). Unos y otros tenían unas expectativas bastante dispares; los autores idealizaron las capacidades de su audiencia, y el público partía de una idealización de la historia y una concepción del arte en tanto que estrategia de manipulación.' Éstas eran las condiciones reales en las que iba a tener lugar la puesta en escena de *The Playboy*. No sólo audiencia y autor se identificaban con presupuestos mentalmente instituidos y socialmente institucionalizados de forma diferente, también entre los miembros de la audiencia se podían percibir sistemas de interpretación dispares.⁵ Ya el mismo título, al escucharse por primera vez, tuvo que producir en el público una serie muy variopinta de construcciones mentales.⁶ Las restricciones de selección del lexema «*playboy*» implicarían el desarrollo de ciertos modelos en los que, de seguro, el área geográfica designada por el sintagma «*of the Western World*» no estaría incluida, ni por asomo, dentro de las posibles adscritas convencionalmente a aquél en términos de colocaciones imaginables y admisibles. Pero, aún hay más; el propio sintagma «*of the Western World*» permite el juego de la ambigüedad de su referencia y, con ello, obliga al receptor a reconstruir los modelos mentales derivados del significado de la palabra «*playboy*» para que se ajusten a la

nueva información añadida por aquél, que, dependiendo del conocimiento de cada uno de los espectadores, de sus expectativas de sentido o de su misma habilidad para inferir una imagen concreta en lugar de otra, suscitaría, metafóricamente hablando, paisajes mentales totalmente distintos mediante los que se **instrumentalizaría** todo un mundo ideológicamente definido de recreación del pasado (*cfr.* Maxwell, 1990:3). Paisajes, para muchos, evocadores de una virtud esencial llevada al extremo, inherente, en su opinión, al concepto más próximo de identidad abanderado por ciertos sectores sociales. A otros, sin embargo, estos mismos paisajes les hicieron orientar su imaginación hacia una estructura conceptual dispuesta en torno a valores de prejuicio relacionados históricamente con determinadas comunidades más atrasadas: el oscurantismo, la ruina y la degeneración de la tierra menos afectada por la influencia *civilizadora* de la corona inglesa.' Con esas asociaciones mentales irían optando, unos y otros, por realidades interpretadas en una clave, de nuevo, diferente y que, en consecuencia, iba a implicar una recepción del conjunto decididamente distinta en cada caso. La cuestión central no es otra que la generación constante de modelos mentales que presentan una modificación sustancial respecto de los que les precedieron, en conjunción con los cuales se va dando forma a la visión poliédrica global de la representación discursiva.

A falta de sujetos experimentales a los que someter a pruebas del tipo de las llevadas a cabo por **Garnham** para validar esta hipótesis, se **podría** poner en tela de juicio el medio del que nos hemos valido para analizar el conflicto surgido a partir de la escenificación de *The Playboy*, y que no es otro que la crónica de los hechos y de las opiniones registradas de boca de sus protagonistas, o tamizadas por la observación crítica y ecuaníme de los historiadores más de ahora que de entonces. No obstante, parece evidente que, al igual que se puede cuestionar la fiabilidad de esta aplicación, también es cierto que es la única a la que podemos recurrir para tal efecto. Por eso, dejando a un lado esta argumentación, creemos que, de acuerdo con lo dicho sobre los modelos mentales hipotéticos impulsados a partir de la recepción acontextualizada del título, no es difícil extender todos y cada uno de los comentarios vertidos con respecto a este punto al estudio de la recepción de la obra en sí desde esta misma perspectiva, en la medida en que esa recepción implica el procesamiento de una información acerca del mundo no siempre descomponible fácilmente ni tampoco fácilmente transferible a unidades mínimas de sentido, conmutables, a su vez, por las piezas de las construcciones mentales inferidas de la presentación de la realidad propuesta por la obra de teatro.

La limitación de la linealidad del lenguaje implica la necesaria consecución de diversas cadenas de unidades que, descodificadas, dan paso al reconocimiento de un complejo de significado determinado que es la suma de múltiples significados individuales que se le han ido agregando a una especie de esqueleto, en principio, semánticamente vacío. Así sucede con la representación dramática. El *esqueleto* puramente lingüístico no es otro que el título. A éste le acompaña el *esqueleto* del armazón escénico en su interacción; ambos introducen al público dentro del mundo recreado por el dramaturgo. La sucesión consiguiente de palabras y cosas rellenará huecos, completará la figura del universo literario propuesto, y perfilará lo que hasta entonces podía haber sido sólo sugerido. La primera sugerencia de interés aparece, precisamente, sugerida en las acotaciones iniciales que **sitúan** la escena «near

a village, on a **wild** coast of Mayo» (Synge, 1986:38). El modelo mental construido a partir de esta breve nota podría ser más que impreciso. La experiencia dramática anterior de *Cathleen ni Houlihan* de Yeats (también localizada en el condado de Mayo) seguramente influyó de manera significativa en la primera toma de contacto con la obra de Synge. Sea como fuere, nos parece que, en consecuencia, si la obra de Yeats había resultado ser una exaltación nacionalista de Irlanda y de sus héroes más desprendidos (en concreto, un campesino que renuncia a su amor por la pasión patriótica), no sería de extrañar que la audiencia esperara encontrarse con personajes, situaciones y mensajes idénticos o, al menos, parecidos por el simple hecho de la semejanza aparente de los sucesos tratados en escena en ambas obras. Sin embargo, poco tardarían en rectificar ese modelo mental. Tan pronto como fueran recibiendo nuevos fragmentos textuales con los que completar la imagen parcial del mundo de la ficción propuesto por Synge, los miembros del público del *Abbey Theatre* tendrían que vérselas con una atrevida intrusión en el discurso tradicional de componentes familiares pero, en este caso, debido a su concurrencia en una pieza teatral, desfamiliarizados y, por ello, desintegradores de ese mismo constructo psicológicamente validado con anterioridad.⁸

Esto fue lo que debió de ocurrir cuando el telón alzado dejó al descubierto el escenario principal. Una joven, con la indumentaria de una campesina, está escribiendo lo que parece ser la lista de un pedido de vituallas sobre una mesa en una tasca «or shebeen, very rough and untidy» (Synge, 1986:41). El desconcierto podía ser total porque el lugar, entre otras cosas, llevaba asociado un aire de regularidad ilegal y de desprecio expreso al concepto de moralidad vigente indudables. Ante la fracción de realidad seleccionada cualquier idea previa quedaría descolocada en el modelo construido sobre los pilares de las expectativas iniciales. Las implicaciones de grandeza, o de descuido, o de libertinaje, o de prestigio del término *playboy* (ya de por sí inquietantemente desestabilizador), junto a los valores atribuidos a la institución del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés, habían podido dar lugar a unos modelos mentales muy diferentes de aquél al que obligaban a adoptar los datos ulteriores desprendidos de la escena. La presencia de una muchacha irlandesa en un lugar como el descrito empieza por no ajustarse a, o incluso por obstruir y romper con, el supuesto mundo ficticio ideal previsto en el marco de una conceptualización característicamente nacional de imágenes posibles e imágenes aceptables. A partir de ahí la colisión continua de modelos mentales no iba a hacer nada más que empeorar. Synge introduce elementos discordantes que desmontan una y otra vez el orden dispuesto por el receptor, en su asunción de continuidad entre la creación artística y las aspiraciones, **unívocamente** consideradas, de la nación, como si se tratara de una entidad completamente **unificada**.⁹ Por eso, también resultaría contradictoria, por inesperada, la aparición de Shawn Keogh, el joven demasiado temeroso de casi todo lo humano y lo divino, un espantajo tan distante de la figura atlética, decidida y violenta del guerrero irlandés más célebre (el Cuchulain de la mitología celta), que no faltaría quien se sintiera incapaz de reconocer en aquella criatura desleal con la voluntad de pasado de la mayoría a alguno de sus compatriotas:

Shawn [*In horrified confusion*]. I would and welcome, Michael James, but I'm afeard of Father Reilly [...] I'm afeard of Father Reilly, I'm saying. Let you not be tempting me, **and** we near married itself [...] Don't stop me, Michael James. Let me out of the door, I'm saying, for the **love** of the Almighty God. Let me out [...] **Leave** me go, Michael James ... you old Pagan, **leave** me go, or I'll get the curse of the priests on you, and of the scarlet-coated bishops of the Courts of Rome. (Primer acto, pp. 45-7)

El asombro de la audiencia iría en aumento a medida que fueran desfilando el resto de los personajes o se les constituyera como entidades físicamente imperceptibles pero psíquicamente presentes, tal como ocurre cuando Pegeen Mike nombra a algunos de sus paisanos, enumerando, a la par, sus taras correspondientes, en apariencia implícitas en la normalidad de ese contexto:

Pegeen [*Looking at him teasingly, washing up ar dresser*]. It's a wonder, Shaneen. the Holy Father'd be **taking** notice of the **likes** of you; for if I was him I wouldn't bother with this place where you'll meet none but Red Linahan, has a squint in his eye, and Patcheen is lame in his **heel**, or the mad Mulrannies were driven from **California** and they lost in **their** wits. We're a queer lot these times to go troubling **the** Holy Father ... (Primer acto, pp. 42-3)

La idea de reconstrucción de los modelos mentales iniciales, dependiente de la inserción sucesiva de nuevas unidades textuales que integran y conforman la realidad discursiva de la que el autor pretendía hacer partícipe al público, queda claramente al descubierto en la presentación **seriada** del protagonista de la obra, Christy Mahon. Ya observamos de pasada algunas de las asociaciones **semánticas** del lexema *playboy* al referimos al papel del título en cuanto que complejo signico operativo a modo de impulso casi eléctrico que inicia e instiga el proceso de interpretación. Ahora, trataremos de dilucidar las varias fases de consolidación del contenido del mismo, apoyándonos en la acumulación de las referencias tanto anafóricas como catafóricas de un referente en el mundo de la realidad ficticia cuya existencia es más imaginaria, o lo que es lo mismo, se plantea como **verbalización**, no como realización. La primera ocasión en la que la audiencia tiene noticias del que después será el *playboy of the Western World* es por medio de Shawn **Keogh**.¹⁰

Shawn [*Going to her, soothingly*]. Then I'm **thinking himself** will stop along with you when he **sees** you taking on; for it'll be a long night-time with great **darkness**, and I'm **after** feeling a kind of fellow above in the **furzy** ditch, groaning wicked like a maddening dog, the way it's good cause you **have**, maybe, to be fearing now. (Primer acto, pp. 43-4)

En ésta su primera presentación de Christy, el autor no da ningún indicio de la altura dramática que, aunque sea por un breve período de tiempo, está a punto de alcanzar aquél entre las gentes de Mayo. Por el contrario, con sus palabras, Shawn parece estar refiriéndose a un ser de dudosa naturaleza humana, un algo o un alguien indefinido que mora en la

oscuridad y causa miedo. Con esos datos, el público podía empezar a hilvanar el modelo mental respectivo en el que tal criatura ocupara un espacio determinado por una animalidad presentida. Un poco más tarde, se vuelve a hacer referencia a un Christy aún sin nombre y, de nuevo, de mano de Shawn Keogh. Al conjunto previo de datos más bien escasos añade otros que refuerzan el constructo mental derivado de los primeros segmentos textuales. El ser al que tanto teme Keogh va tomando forma; además del carácter extraño y peligroso con el que se le caracteriza en primera instancia, se le atribuye un rasgo más que perfila su conducta de inmoral, delincuente y animal: «The queer dying fellow's beyond looking over the ditch. He's come up, I'm thinking, stealing your hens» (primer acto, p. 47). La sorpresa no sería poca para el público que asistía a la representación en el *Abbey Theatre*. Synge consigue que así parezca serlo para los personajes mismos descubrir, tras los reiterados avisos de Shawn, lo que el autor describe como un pobre hombre al que le precede una tos, no un rugido ni un lamento espeluznantes. En una acotación del primer acto, dice el dramaturgo: «For a perceptible moment they watch the door with curiosity. Someone coughs outside. Then Christy Mahon, a slight young man, comes in very tired and frightened and dirty» (pp. 47-8).

Si la imagen de este héroe en ciernes es en principio obra de su más directo rival, la que le sigue va surgiendo de la conjunción de las formulaciones erradas de los otros personajes relativas al tipo de acto criminal cometido por aquél. Con la gravedad creciente de los hechos atribuidos a Christy se desvela un perfil más humano, pero también más grandioso en el sentido de sembrado de hazañas, o al menos así es como parecen entenderlo las gentes que pueblan la ficción de Synge:

Michael. It should be larceny, I'm thinking? [...]

Michael [*Impressed*]. If it's not stealing, it's maybe something big [...]

Jimmy. He's a wicked-looking young fellow. Maybe he followed after a young woman on a lonesome night [...]

Philly [*Turning on Jimmy*]. [...] Maybe the land was grabbed from him, and he did what any decent man would do.

Michael [*To Christy, mysteriously*]. Was it bailiffs? [...]

Michael. Agents? [...]

Michael. Landlords? [...]

Philly. Did you strike golden guineas out of solder, young fellow, or shilling coins itself? [...]

Jimmy. Did you marry three wives maybe? [...]

Philly. [...] Were you off east, young fellow, fighting bloody wars for Kruger and the freedom of the Boers? [...]

Pegeen [*Coming from counter*]. He's done nothing so [...]

Christy [*Twisting round on her with a sharp cry of horror*]. Don't strike me. I killed my poor father, Tuesday was a week, for doing the like of that.

Pegeen [*With blank amazement*]. Is it killed your father? [...]

Philly [*Rerreating with Jimmy*]. There's a daring fellow. (Primer acto, pp. 48-51)

El crecimiento de esta figura sigue hasta el límite del ensalzamiento más hinchado de los acontecimientos descritos. La aparición de su padre, vivo, desinfla lo que sólo era una fantasía sin alevosía. El retrato que hace de él dista notablemente del inspirado por la imaginación: no duda en describirlo en términos totalmente vejatorios:

Mahon. An ugly young streeler with a murderous gob on hirn, and a little switch in his hand [...] It was my own son hit me, and he the divil a robber ... a dirty, stuttering lout [...] and he a liar on walls, a talker of folly. a man you'd see stretched the half of the day in the brown ferns with his belly on the sun [...] raising up a haystack like the stalk of a rush, or driving our last cow till he broke her leg at the hip, and when he wasn't at that he'd be fooling over the little birds he had [...] If he seen a red petticoat coming swinging over the hill, he'd be off to hide in the sticks [...] And he a poor fellow would get drunk on the smell of a pint [...] and wasn't he the laughing joke of every female woman [...] Dark and dirty [...] An ugly young blackguard. (Segundo acto, pp. 79-81)

A lo que añade, todavía más:

Mahon [*Slightly emotional from his drink*]. I'm poorly only, for it's a hard story the way I'm left today, when it was I did tend him from his hour of birth, and he a dunce never reached his second book. the way he'd come from school ... with his legs lamed under hirn, and he blackened with his beatings like a tinker's ass [...] he was the fool of men, the way from this out he'll know the orphan's lot, with old and young making game of him, and they swearing, raging, kicking at him like a mangy cur. (Tercer acto, pp. 89-90)

Con ello no sólo lo empequeñece, también lo ridiculiza, acertando a desmontar desde sus pilares el concepto de heroicidad con el que se le ha investido. El carácter antagónico de la nueva imagen de Christy respecto de la que sus propias palabras, sus acciones ulteriores y las palabras de los habitantes de Mayo habían construido instan a la reconsideración por parte de las audiencias mediata e inmediata de la verdadera naturaleza de este personaje.

A tenor de los disturbios que jalaron el estreno y las posteriores puestas en escena de *The Playboy*, parece indiscutible que el desconcierto con el que el público del *Abbey Theatre* tuvo que ir creando los modelos mentales de aquello que Synge ponía ante sus ojos no era otra cosa que fruto de la disonancia, de la incompatibilidad de estos últimos con aquellos otros, los cuales daban sentido y coherencia a la realidad textualizada.¹¹ Sin duda, ya había trastocado esos modelos la presentación de un héroe que sólo lo es en tanto que haya matado a su padre; pero se desmonta más aún el orden instaurado desde una base tan inestable con el desenmascaramiento de la debilidad del mismo héroe. Es el viejo Mahon quien derrumba el constructo mental erigido sobre la secuencia de información graduada concerniente a la demarcación y caracterización del referente al que se ha etiquetado acertadamente con el apelativo de «playboy del mundo occidental». No obstante, el papel de Pegeen Mike, la heroína, en este destronamiento fulminante y, con ello, en el proceso de

interpretación del discurso precedente. también es muy **notable**, sobre todo porque juega con las mismas o casi las mismas piezas argumentales pero con fines diferentes. Compárense sus primeras palabras de afecto hacia Christy tras su victoria en las carreras de la playa, con las palabras **que más** tarde le dirige, al momento de tener conocimiento de la verdad sobre lo que ahora ya sí le resulta una fechora:

Pegeen [*Tocrowd*]. Go on now, and don't destroy him, and he drenching with sweat ... **have** your tug-of-warring **till** he's dried his skin [...] And what is it **I have**, Christy Mahon, to **make** me fitting entertainment for **the** like of you, that has such poet's **talking**, and such bravery of **heart**? (Tercer acto, pp. 94, 96)

Pegeen [*Glanng at Christy*]. And it's **lies** you told, **letting** on you had him slitted, and you **nothing** at all [...] And to **think** of the coaxing glory we had given him, and he after doing nothing but hitting a soft blow and chasing northward in a sweat of fear. (Tercer acto, pp. 102-3)

En efecto? no podía ser de otro modo puesto que la articulación respectiva de las mismas está claramente relacionada con el ascenso y descenso de un Christy del que la audiencia no llega realmente a saber nada y al que apenas puede reconocer hasta que es **él** mismo quien se revela al final con un tono desafiante y abrumador, que sí que lo define en tonces, y termina por descubrir lo que sólo era un perfil casi vacío o equívocamente completado:

Christy. Go with you, is it? I will then, like a gallant **captain** with **his** heathen slave ... and I'll see you from **this** day stewing my oatmeal and washing my spuds, for I'm master of **all** fights from now. [*Pushing Mahon*] Go on, I'm saying [...] Ten thousand blessings upon **all** that's **here**, for you've turned me a likely gaffer in the end of all, the way I'll go romancing **through** a romping **lifetime** from this hour to the dawning of the Judgement Day. (Tercer acto. p. 110)

Aunque el caso más llamativo con el que poder ejemplificar nuestra aplicación de la teoría de los modelos mentales es el de la creación de un tipo dramático de la talla de Christy Mahon, la obra de Synge ofrece otras posibilidades con respecto al potencial explicativo de la propuesta de Gamham, que muestran más descaradamente incluso la eficacia y la conveniencia de las dos hipótesis defendidas a lo largo de nuestra exposición. Nos estamos refiriendo, por una parte, a los conceptos de conflicto y reorganización de modelos en general y, por otra, a todo lo concerniente a la propia construcción de unos modelos mentales concretos en los que se hallan insertas dos realidades interrelacionadas y controvertidas del mundo que estaba manipulando Synge: la idea de la mujer arquetípica en la comunidad irlandesa y el mismo concepto en sí de comunidad en la que surge la anterior (*cfr.* Bateson, 1972). En otras palabras, la observación del tratamiento por parte de este dramaturgo de dos cuestiones como las arriba mencionadas ayuda a comprobar la solidez de la teona manejada y, así, a justificar con esa seguridad los motivos por los que fracasó el discurso dramático iniciado desde, a través de, y por medio de, J.M. Synge, «**en** **cuyas** **obras**», según comenta

Usandizaga (1988:306), «el público nacionalista no reconocía la imagen del pueblo irlandés que su simplismo patriótico proyectaba».

La representación femenina individualizada en dos personajes perfectamente esbozados, Pegeen Mike y la viuda Quin, ejemplifica el proyecto de subversión apoyado en el seno del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés. Los valores de la comunidad también en este caso se obvian. Synge viene a desestabilizar cualquier orden existente. No sólo se atreve a convertir la escena en tribuna improvisada de los personajes integrantes de un submundo o inframundo paralelo; además, se aventura a introducir en el mundo complementario al urbano (marco de los anhelos de singularidad cultural y política de la clase nacionalista) elementos discordantes y opuestos en gran medida a los que conforman el subconsciente colectivo imperante y operativo en ese momento histórico, con lo que supone de revisión de héroes y mitos, o mejor, de conversión de esos mismos héroes y esos mitos en términos de inversión de significados. El autor reutiliza **significantes** que están integrados dentro del código de sentido de la comunidad, a los que ésta recurre siempre con el fin de validarse como la colectividad que pretende ser, y les atribuye nuevos significados que se enfrentan al compromiso tácito de ese grupo de solidaridad. Con este argumento sin más se puede empezar a plantear el análisis de la recreación de dos entidades tan sumamente idealizadas en aquella época de exaltación romántica como lo fueron el tipo de mujer aceptado, en tanto que socialmente pertinente, y el tipo y la naturaleza del conjunto de convenciones socioculturales del que participaban de un modo u otro autores y audiencia, en su calidad de virtual instrumento integrador.

En un estudio muy reciente en el que trata de reunir a los representantes más significativos de la literatura anglo-irlandesa desde sus orígenes, Ramón Sainero (1995:13) cita un comentario muy interesante de la obra *The History of Topography of Ireland* de Gerald de Gales, uno de los primeros señores normandos de la conquista de Irlanda, que desvela la visión que se fue **forjando** y transmitiendo a lo largo de la historia acerca del pueblo irlandés de inculto, agresivo, salvaje y pecador. Sobre la base de ésta, necesariamente, se tuvo que crear una imagen alternativa igualmente parcial pero libre de su carácter denigrante. El proceso de construcción de tal visión positiva no es en absoluto uniforme. De hecho, del personaje débil, «sumiso, cómico y corto de miras» de Farquar o Samuel Lover (Sainero, 1995:14), o el vocinglero, vivaracho, parlanchín e ingenioso de F.S. Mahony, al dechado de virtudes dimanado de la versión **mítica** y mistificadora de Irlanda en el siglo XIX, hay una distancia no tanto temporal como ideológica más que considerable (cfr. Malone, 1929:156; Eagleton, 1995:214). En ese contexto, las criaturas de Synge, que, en palabras de Sainero, «no podemos considerar que ... tratara de desprestigiar el país por el que tanto hizo, (p. 157), surgen como láminas vivísimas de una realidad desdibujada, exagerada, grotesca, que perturba el orden mental vigente.

Yeats, al recordar en el *Samhain* de 1903 la semejanza que él suponía había en todos los casos de recepción de los experimentos teatrales de la naturaleza del *Abbey Theatre* en otros lugares de Europa, comenta una cuestión que **sirve** para describir en breve la relevancia de Synge en el entorno del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés, un hecho relacionado con esa actitud de ruptura arriba mencionada. Dice Yeats: «Thought takes the same form after

age. and the things that people have said to me about this intellectual movement of ours have, I doubt not, been said in every country to every writer who was a disturber of old life» (1962: 121-3). Obviamente, el dramaturgo ha superado, en primer lugar, el requisito obligado de conocimiento y observación de los tipos con los que recrea historias inverosímiles. anecdóticas y del todo extremosas; y lo curioso es que en ese modelo cultural que la comunidad, tan inmersa en la construcción de una identidad nacional, quiso hacer prevalecer, y que era al que tenía que recurrir el autor, se descubren seres mitad humanos, mitad divinos, paradójicamente ligados a comportamientos y a ideales muy alejados de los que se decía imperaban en aquella sociedad (cfr. Wood, 1985:13-6). Basten algunos nombres para dejar claro lo que a primera vista puede resultar contradictorio.

En las leyendas celtas no faltan infidelidades, traiciones, abusos, violencia o apetitos sexuales irrefrenables descritos y satisfechos sin ambages (cfr. Sainero, 1985; Rutherford. 1987). El gran héroe Cuchulain no evita enamorarse de la diosa Fandde incluso estando casado con Emer; más aún, de su relación con la reina Aoife de Escocia tiene un hijo con el que el destino le obligará a enfrentarse en duelo y al que dará muerte. Mientras, Grania, hija del rey de Irlanda, que por mandato de éste se ha de casar con el anciano Finn MacCumhaill, consiente a ello sin amarlo y, al tiempo, se procura el consuelo de un joven soldado. Por su parte, la apuesta vital de Devorgilla, hija del rey de Meath, supone un conflicto brutal tanto en el ámbito privado como, en especial, en el público; su matrimonio forzado con O'Rourke, rey de Breffny, es el detonante de la invasión de Irlanda por parte de Enrique II de Inglaterra; Diarmuid, rey de Leinster, la rapta; el esposo ultrajado le declara la guerra, pero para ello se ve en la necesidad de pedir la ayuda de la nación vecina, a la que en recompensa del favor prestado le habrá de conceder su propio reino. Por último, el caso del amor entre Deirdre y Naisi, si no llega a conllevar ninguna infidelidad en el sentido más reprobado socialmente, sí que implica, de nuevo, el conflicto de sentimientos de individuos de edades muy dispares, Deirdre y el rey del Ulster; para esta joven la imposición del encierro y el matrimonio con Conchubar significarán la huida con Naisi y, al final, no sólo la muerte de ambos a manos del ofendido, también la caída de la capital del Ulster, Emain Macha.¹²

A tenor de la acumulación de personajes movidos por pasiones incontrolables y de la sucesión de agresiones culturalmente aceptadas, transmitidas a través de un órgano directamente involucrado en la estructuración de la comunidad tal como la literalización de los mitos de la nación, no es de extrañar que los propios personajes de las obras de Synge tomen parte de los valores representados por esos símbolos y los reproduzcan, rompiendo, así, con el otro modelo coexistente en ese momento histórico y básicamente antagónico, según el cual se privilegiaba un concepto de *Irishness*, de lo irlandés, algo diferente, entroncado con la tradición, igualmente arraigada, de cristianización de la sociedad y sus patrones de adscripción de roles dentro de la misma.

Yeats toca la cuestión en varias ediciones de *Samhain*. En el número de 1904 dedicado a la revisión de los principios originarios de la fundación del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés, por ejemplo, recuerda algunas de sus ideas al respecto, no siempre compartidas por el grueso de los dramaturgos mas relevantes del *Abbey Theatre*. El poeta

plantea. inicialmente, lo que se entiende en general por personaje. Invocando la opinión de aquéllos que él denomina hombres de letras, dice: «[T]he characters of a romance or of a play must be typical. They mean that the character must be typical of something which exists in all men because the writer has found it in his own mind» (1962:144).

A continuación, Yeats pone en tela de juicio, precisamente, los tipos auspiciados por los propagandistas, que ya habían empezado a atacarles, los cuales son personificaciones del común de los mortales, o incluso, como él mismo señala, opiniones personificadas. Entre los más esperados menciona el tipo del joven campesino ideal, el del patriota verdadero, el de la esposa irlandesa feliz o el del policía de sus prejuicios; la característica que todos ellos comparten no es otra que la falta de rasgos individualizadores; de hecho, los héroes impuestos por los nacionalistas podían identificarse, según dice, con «those young couples in the Gaelic plays, who might all change brides and bridegrooms in the dance and never find out the difference» (p. 146).¹³

Seguidamente, al hilo de su argumentación en tomo a la función del *Abbey Theatre* como institución dispuesta a quebrantar la relación entre el arte y la causa nacional en su sentido más estrecho, añade un breve comentario sencillamente brillante en el que conjuga, aunque sea de modo intuitivo, los conceptos de expectativa y literatura (adelantándose tangencialmente, así, a las propuestas de la Escuela de Constanza), y avanza uno de los razonamientos más oportunos acerca de las posibles motivaciones del fracaso de la recepción de algunas de las piezas teatrales representadas por el Movimiento Dramático Irlandés:

In a country like Ireland, where personifications have taken the place of life, men have more hate than love, for the unhuman is nearly the same as the inhuman, but literature, which is a pan of that charity that is the forgiveness of sins, will make us understand men no matter how little they conform to our expectations. (pp. 161-2)

En el número siguiente de *Samhain* de ese mismo año, titulado «The Play, the Player, and the Scene», aparecen de nuevo algunas puntualizaciones concernientes a la caracterización del personaje dramático del que se había apropiado el *Abbey Theatre*. De entre todas sus ideas, siempre sofisticadas y no menos fundadas en lecturas muy exhaustivas, hemos de destacar un par que sirven de justificación, aunque no explícita, de la elección por parte de Synge de la serie tan variopinta de personajes con los que puebla todas y cada una de sus obras, a excepción de su versión inacabada de la tragedia de *Deirdre of the Sorrows*. En primer lugar, Yeats rechaza las limitaciones tradicionales convenidas respecto de la naturaleza de los personajes que debían hacer acto de presencia en un escenario; pero no sólo eso, va más allá; apuesta por la introducción de seres alternativos a los considerados parte de la norma. Es en relación con este punto como puede exponer su otra hipótesis sobre la definición del fenómeno del arte y la literatura; dejando a un lado los criterios establecidos de selección de tipos, propone la aceptación de lo excepcional como base para la construcción de personajes artísticamente aceptables y compatibles con el mundo de la ficción. La cita a la que nos referimos es suficientemente significativa:

The scholars of a few generations ago were fond of deciding that certain persons were unworthy of the dignity of art. They had, it may be, an over-abounding preference for kings and queens, but we are, it may be, very stupid in thinking that the average man is a fit subject at all for the finest art. Art delights in the exception, for it delights in the soul expressing itself according to its own laws and arranging the world about in its own panern. (p. 168)

Con su exposición, no sólo defiende la selección menos convencional de Synge. tan interesado por lo marginal, también promueve y saca a la luz su propia concepción de la aristocracia del pensamiento por la que se ha llegado a malinterpretar su obra y a él se le ha juzgado más que severamente. Si en esta ocasión se puede decir que con su digresión Yeats está formulando su apoyo tácito a las proyecciones singulansimas de Synge, con posterioridad no tarda mucho en exponer abiertamente su cercanía, o al menos su acuerdo parcial con algunos de los objetivos y la técnica del autor de *The Playboy*.

En 1905 escribe para *Samhain* un artículo muy completo en el que retoma con más ímpetu, si cabe, temas tratados ya anteriormente sobre el *Abbey Theatre* en cuanto que «a school of Irish drama ... that ... is founded upon sincere observation and experience»; sobre el tipo de audiencia con la que contaban, «that comes to us for the play and the acting» (p. 182); sobre el concepto de arte que ya había postulado, «extravagant, vehement, impetuous, shaking the dust of time from the feet, as it were, and beating against the walls of the world» (p. 193); o sobre la idea de libertad implícita en aquél, en la medida en que el autor esperaba que «no plays will be produced ... which were written, not for the sake of a good story or fine verses or some revelation of character, but to please those friends of ours who are ever urging us to attack the priests or the English, or wanting us to put our imagination into handcuffs that we may be sure of never seeming to do one or the other» (pp. 200-1). Junto a todo esto, Yeats vuelve a proponerse el estudio razonado de la categoría *personaje* al tiempo que reivindica, tal como sugerimos arriba, la validez del método de Synge. De él resalta su individualidad frente al resto de dramaturgos del *Abbey Theatre*, gracias a su capacidad para descubrir un nuevo tipo de sarcasmo que, a la par que lo distancia de una popularidad generalizada y para él sospechosa, lo distingue de los demás autores al permitirle superar la sátira que acepta todo el mundo y que, en sus palabras, «brings no new thing to judgement» (p. 184).

En esta línea, Yeats señala la distinción establecida por sus más directos rivales entre personajes buenos y personajes malos (p. 185), que es lo mismo que distinguir entre personajes patrióticos o personajes antipatrióticos, y, por ende, entre dramaturgos nacionalistas y dramaturgos antinacionalistas. Puesto que se incluye dentro de la clase de los personajes malos a casi todos los del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés, asumiendo la crítica de la que eran objeto como creadores de «slanderers of theu country», a la primera categoría suponemos que sólo podían pertenecer toda la serie de caricaturas mojigatas fruto de un sentimentalismo «found among the middle classes ... which came into Irish literature with Gerald Griffin and later on with Kickham» (p. 187).

Haciendo suyas las palabras del zapatero con el que de niño pasó muchas tardes de conversación, el poeta recuerda cómo, en la base de la construcción del campesino de J.M. Synge, se descubre la conjunción de sensaciones siempre fuertes, tanto de belleza como de fealdad, libres de ese sentimentalismo del que tanto recelara, pero cargadas de una energía a la que recurre con frecuencia, indefinible o al menos intangible, de la que carece el tipo humorístico «whiskey-drinking» aceptado hasta entonces **unánimemente**. Una de las frases recogidas en este artículo resume perfectamente este hecho: «I want to see the people ... shown up in their **naked hideousness**» (p. 191).

The Arrow de 1906, una crónica aún más breve que *Samhain* distribuida durante unos cuantos meses junto al programa, con el título en este caso de «*The Season's Work*», abunda en la misma cuestión. Comparando el surgimiento del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés con otros fenómenos europeos de idéntica o casi idéntica función, apunta hacia la consideración de las condiciones básicas operativas en ese proceso de creación de una institución teatral de tales características. La que destaca con diferencia, en especial, es la relativa a los tipos sobre los que cada escuela nacional fundara su tradición dramática. Tal como reconoce, a los dramaturgos de países como Bohemia, Hungría o la Inglaterra isabelina no se les había acusado de despreocupación respecto de lo que todos habían convenido en denominar *espíritu nacional*, a pesar de que se ocuparan de la rehabilitación de una de las figuras más problemáticas de sus pueblos respectivos; por el contrario, en su opinión, es esa incursión en el análisis de ese y no otro personaje lo que haría de tales intentos supra-artísticos algo más que un mero experimento teatral. Nos quedaremos con algunas de sus opiniones aquí impresas:

Every national dramatic movement or theatre ... has arisen out of a study of the **common** people, who preserve national characteristics more than any other **class**, and out of an imaginative re-creation of national history or **legend**. The life of **drawing-room**, the life represented in most plays of the ordinary theatre of to-day, differs but little **all over the world**, and has as little to do with the national spirit as the architecture of, let's say, **Saint Stephen's Green**, or **Queen's Gate**, or of the boulevards about the **Arc de Triomphe**. (1962:222)

Un año antes, el 27 de enero de 1905, en la publicación del prefacio a la primera edición de *The Well of the Saints* en *The Cutting of an Agate*, Yeats ya concretaba con total claridad los rasgos esenciales que, a su entender, daban forma a los personajes de Synge en tanto que complejos oracionales nominales, yuxtapuestos dentro de una **textualización** enunciada por el autor (*cfr.* Melrose, 1994:291). El contraste con sus propias ideas no le impide reconocer ni el potencial significativo ni la riqueza escénica de tales entidades ficticias. Curiosamente, con la descripción de éstos, analiza de paso el fondo temático de sus obras, basadas en su mayoría en el choque trágico de **en/sueño** y realidad (*cfr.* Price, 1961). En su comentario, Yeats (1961:304-5) dice así:

Mr. Synge, indeed, sets before us ugly, deformed or **sinful** people, but his people, moved by no practical ambition, are driven by a dream of **that impossible life** ... his

Woman of the Glen dreams of days that shall be entirely alive ... and those two blind people of *The Well of the Saints* are so transformed by the dream that they choose blindness rather than reality. He tells us of realities, but he knows that art has never taken more than its symbols from anything than the eye can see or the hand measure [...] though the people of the play use no phrase they could not use in daily life, we know that we are seeking to express what no eye has ever seen.

En opinión del poeta, J.M. Synge era un solitario, objeto del odio de su país por darle a éste simplemente lo que necesitaba: «[A]n unmoved mind where there is a perpetual Last Day, and trumpeting, and coming up to judgement». ¹⁴ Sobre la obra del mismo, ya lo hemos ido sugiriendo, Yeats irá esparciendo en sus escritos más de una reseña crítica que a no pocos estudiosos les ha servido después de base para iniciar las muchas investigaciones que se han sucedido en tomo a este dramaturgo. No obstante, se extiende algo más en un artículo con fecha del 14 de septiembre del año 1910 incluido también en *The Cutting of an Agate*, que tituló «J.M. Synge and the Ireland of his Time». ¹⁵

En esta extensa nota necrológica encubierta de la que se desprende cierto tono elegíaco reprimido, aparte de las digresiones de esperar respecto de su propia filosofía de la vida, la política y el arte, Yeats trata diversas cuestiones relevantes sobre el concepto de literatura en Synge, su papel dentro del Movimiento Dramático Irlandés, su relación con la idea de nación, las fuentes de sus piezas teatrales, o algunas de las posibles causas de sus enfrentamientos casi continuos con los patriotas más fundamentalistas. También recuerda la aparente falta de disposición política de Synge, «by nature unfitted to think a political thought ... with the exception of one sentence, spoken when I first met him in Paris, that implied some sort of Nationalist conviction» (p. 319), y su interés sólo por lo que de salvaje veía en las gentes de su país y en «the grey and wintry sides of many glens» (p. 320). En este ensayo Yeats demuestra con creces esa agudeza interpretativa suya desplegada en todos sus escritos, que aparecen siempre salpicados por, e imbuidos de, un espesísimo subjetivismo y un simbolismo casi inescrutable, derivados ambos, en gran medida, de una sensibilidad extrema y, particularmente, de sus conocimientos cabalísticos y su inmersión en la estética del esoterismo. Dejando a un lado la parafemalia prescindible de su juego retórico, nos encontramos con unos juicios muy valiosos que apuntan hacia algunas de las claves decisivas en el análisis de la obra de Synge. Las más interesantes tienen que ver con su capacidad para construir un mundo diferente del mundo real y, a pesar de ello, profundamente ligado al mismo a través no de su observación sino de su comprensión de esa realidad:

As I read *The Aran Islands* right through for the first time since he showed it me in manuscript, I come to understand how much knowledge of the real life of Ireland went to the creation of a world which is yet as fantastic as the Spain of Cervantes. Here is the story of *The Playboy*, of *The Shadow of the Glen*; here is the ghost on horseback and the finding of the young man's body of *Riders to the Sea*, numberless ways of speech and vehement pictures that had seemed to owe nothing to observation, and all to some overflowing of himself, or to some mere necessity of dramatic construction. (p. 326)

A lo mismo nos estamos refiriendo cuando destacamos otro de sus comentarios. Por lo que dice, parece más fácil tanto determinar las condiciones de selección llevada a cabo por el dramaturgo de ciertos fragmentos de realidad particularmente marginal, como, en consecuencia, sugerir algunos de los motivos supuestos del proceso de recepción de *The Playboy*. Según el poeta, Synge «loves all that has edge, all that is salt in the mouth, all that is rough to the hand, all that heightens the emotions by contest, [and] all that stings into life the sense of tragedy» (pp. 326-7). Con estas palabras, se aproxima el autor a la idea de perturbación del orden conceptual establecido a la que hemos hecho alusión reiteradamente. El argumento esgrimido por Yeats se va desarrollando con la riqueza estilística propia de su preciosismo expositivo. Conjugando en la sencillez aparente de este artículo conocimientos sobre otras literaturas, especulaciones filosóficas y algunos conceptos vistos con anterioridad con los que redondea a un tiempo la imagen caleidoscópica de sí mismo y, por supuesto, del autor objeto de su estudio. Aun siendo cauteloso, su discurso presenta bastantes hipótesis que suponen una postura algo incómoda. Según éstas, da por sentados algunos principios que no eran cuestionables para él, pero sí que causaban controversia entre los representantes más críticos del público dublinés. Por ejemplo, él partía de la distinción entre *escritor imaginativo* y *escritor no imaginativo*; estaba seguro de que era en la primera categoría en la que podía incluirse al grupo de dramaturgos del *Abbey Theatre* y, en concreto, a J.M. Synge, porque la mayona cumplía un requisito que caracterizaba a ese escritor frente a cualquier otro individuo que dijese serlo: su compromiso no tanto con la inmediatez de la acción propagandística como con los valores atemporales, realmente nacionales, que Yeats asignaba al arte (p. 341). En este sentido hemos de entender otra de sus puntualizaciones acerca de los logros artísticos de Synge con la que refuerza la idea ya mencionada de construcción de mundos invertidos. De él dice que, como buen escritor imaginativo que es

[...] shows us the world as a painter does his picture, reversed in a looking-glass, that we may see it, not as it seems to eyes habit has made dull, but as we were Adam and this the first morning; and when the new image becomes as little strange as the old we shall stay with him, because he has, besides the strangeness, not strange to him, that made us share his vision, sincerity that makes us share his feeling. (p. 339)

De todo esto trata W.B. Yeats en un ensayo cargado, como no podía ser menos, de espíritu crítico, una sagacidad admirable y muchas sugerencias de posible desarrollo ulterior. De estas últimas aún nos queda por sacar a relucir una que es indispensable para completar nuestro intento de aplicación de la teoría de los modelos mentales. La sugerencia en cuestión está relacionada con un punto que dejamos planteado con anterioridad y que nos proponemos retomar ahora, partiendo de las palabras de Yeats en tomo a los sucesos que siguieron a la representación de *The Playboy of the Western World*:

About forty young men had sat in the front seats of the pit, and stamped and shouted and blown trumpets from the rise to the fall of the curtain. On the Tuesday night also [they] were there. They wished to silence what they considered a slander upon Ireland's womanhood. Irish women would never sleep under the same roof with a

young man without a chaperon, nor admire a murderer, nor use a word like 'shift'; nor could any one recognise the country men and women of Davis and Kickham in these poetical, violent, grotesque persons, who used the name of God so freely, and spoke of all things that hit their fancy. (p. 311)

A tenor de lo que dice el poeta, no cabe lugar a dudas respecto del hecho de que J.M. Synge estaba irrumpiendo violentamente en el universo idealizado de una comunidad, por lo menos, igualmente idealizada, y de que se disponía a trastocar, así, un orden absolutamente artificial. mediante la desconstrucción de la imagen arquetípica de la mujer irlandesa impuesta por un concepto de moralidad irreal y sin vigencia y, lo que es más importante, por una visión mediatizada al máximo de la idea de nación.

En principio, parecen haber sufrido una inversión radical de mano del autor de *The Playboy* todas las medidas restrictivas que afectan tanto al comportamiento social como al verbal, estrictamente hablando, de la figura femenina auspiciada desde el modelo cultural que organizara conceptualmente los diversos modelos mentales de interpretación de esta realidad discursiva. De entrada, la constitución de los personajes de Synge como contenedores de valores opuestos a los tácitamente instituidos supone, en primer lugar, el cuestionamiento de los mismos; en segundo lugar, la manifestación expresa del conflicto habido entre diversos modos de representación del mundo; y, en tercer lugar, la destitución y el destronamiento escénicos de ciertas carcasas vacías de contenido dramático que, con su reiterada aparición, consolidaban un concepto de normalidad insostenible. A los ojos de Yeats, Synge parece ser el único escritor moderno, a excepción de Edgeworth en *Castle Rackrent*, capaz de, y dispuesto a, contar parte de la vida irlandesa dejando entrever todo aquello que permitiese cambiar «a man's thought about the world or stir his moral nature» (p. 322). Ése es su mérito más destacado; también, su desafío. Eso será lo que consiga el autor cuando ponga ante la mirada de la audiencia (más atónita a medida que se fuese desarrollando la trama de la obra) una serie de personajes problemáticos en tanto que instrumentos portadores de actitudes, creencias y motivaciones en clara contradicción con la ortodoxia hiper-nacionalista. Pegeen Mike y la viuda Quin, en especial, asumen ese papel de proyección textual alternativa por la que se valida la enunciación de unidades discursivas que, por su parte, dan pie a la construcción de modelos mentales consecutivos que se han de ir reformulando a partir de la inclusión de nuevas unidades de información, las cuales obligan al público receptor a considerar la inviabilidad del modelo precedente dentro del marco global de comprensión del macro-acto de habla emitido.

Curiosamente, la primera percepción del público en la representación de *The Playboy of the Western World* es la yuxtaposición de dos entidades moralmente incompatibles (al menos, según la descripción de los nacionalistas más conservadores). Ya hicimos alusión al tipo de espacio físico en el que tiene lugar toda la acción de la obra. Quizás la taberna o *shebeen* en la que se pone a la venta el whisky ilegal de patata @oteen no sea el mejor sitio en el que localizar a una joven irlandesa, que, además, aparece ataviada con el traje típico de campesina. Ver una y otra cosa en conjunción causó por lo menos estupor. En esas circunstancias eran inevitables tanto la asociación automática del significante convenido por

la apariencia de la protagonista (en su calidad de signo escénico) con el contenido convencional asignado a tal, como el necesario conflicto y posterior choque entre los mismos debido a la inestabilidad de esa relación sígnica y la consiguiente adscripción de un nuevo significado a dicha unidad semiótica. Con su presencia, Pegeen Mike tendna que haber inspirado todas y cada una de las posibles virtudes atribuidas a la mujer irlandesa; o, mejor, debena haber servido de refuerzo de esa figura institucionalizada a la que, en un principio, parecía estar representando. No fue así. sin embargo; o, al menos, no lo fue en su sentido más estricto. En esta construcción de sentido en que se constituye la obra de teatro, la audiencia tiene que ir acomodando sus expectativas (organizadas inicialmente a modo de micro-universo invariable) a las secuencias que forman el discurso dramático como una manifestación no necesariamente acorde con aquélla de la que parte el receptor; o, al menos, así debería ser si pretende cumplir su parte del pacto comunicativo establecido entre autor y público. en el preciso instante en el que este último decide sentarse en una butaca de la sala de un teatro. Sin embargo, no se comportó de este modo el público presente en el *Abbey Theatre*. No era para menos; la joven a la que, en primera instancia, se ha presentado con la vestimenta propia de la aldeana del lugar haciendo un pedido con algunas de las cosas que habrá de utilizar el día de su boda no tarda en desmarcarse del estereotipo esperado de sumisión, obediencia y simpleza, poniendo en cuestión la base de la autoridad patriarcal por la que se estipulaba la institución del matrimonio. La figura plana, unidimensional, ideal y falsa de la mujer virtuosa quedaba fuera irremediablemente; en su lugar aparecía una descarada, dominante, fuerte, poderosa y autoritaria; una figura sin las limitaciones de la moralidad impuesta a la mujer y a la esposa irlandesas:

Pegeen. You wouldn't stay when there was need for you, and let you step off **nimble** this time when there's none. (Primer acto, p. 54)

Pegeen [*Seizing his arm*]. **He'll** not stir. He's pot-boy in this place, and I'll not have him stolen off and kidnapped while **himself's** abroad. (Primer acto, p. 61)

Pegeen. If I was your wife I'd be along with you those nights, Christy Mahon, the way you'd see I was a great hand at coaxing bailiffs, or **coining funny nicknames** for the stars of **night** [...] **And** myself, a girl, was tempted **often** to go **sailing** the seas till I'd **marry** a **Jew-man**, with ten kegs of gold, and I not knowing at all there was the like of you drawing nearer, like the stars of God [...] Wouldn't **it** be a **bitter** thing for a girl to go **marrying** the like of Shaneen, and he a middling **kind** of a scarecrow, with no savagery or **fine** words in him at all? (Tercer acto, pp. 96-9)

Su crecimiento como entidad dramáticamente individualizada, desligada del personaje típico con el que el modelo mental inicial del público estaba provisto, permite su evolución independiente de cualquier esquema socialmente restringido; por eso, precisamente, si para una audiencia actual cualquiera no tendna por qué resultar extraño el giro de Pegeen en su alabanza exageradísima de Christy Mahon hacia su repudio más absoluto, salpicado de una brutalidad nada femenina según el **estándar** tradicional de la época, con su nueva contorsión otra vez estaba Synge fabricando un constructo inaceptable por poco idealizado:

Peegen. **And to think** of the coaxing glory we had given him, and he after doing nothing but **hitting** a soft blow and chasing northward in a sweat of fear. Quit off from this [...] [Blowing the *fire* with a *bellows*] **Leave** go now, young fellow, or I'll scorch your shins. (Tercer acto, pp. 103, 108)

Lo mismo se puede decir en el caso de la viuda Quin. Su presencia imponente se hace esperar lo suficiente para que el público pueda haber asimilado ya, en el momento en que se le diera a ésta paso, una imagen alternativa, problemática, nada conciliadora y mucho menos convencional de la mujer irlandesa. Con este personaje, tan desnaturalizado respecto de la normalidad culturalmente instituida, Synge se estaba atreviendo a romper con varios arquetipos relativos al concepto mitificado de femineidad invocado desde casi todos los frentes. De nuevo, la audiencia se habría de ver en la tesitura de tener que modificar bruscamente el modelo mental de la representación discursiva de *partida*.¹⁶ Lo que primero marca la intervención escénica de la viuda Quin son los golpes algo insistentes que da en la puerta de la taberna, cuando Christy, a solas con Peegen, está justificando su acción parricida por el autoritarismo y el bestial comportamiento del viejo Mahon hacia él. No obstante, no es ésa la primera vez que se menciona su nombre. De hecho, muy al comienzo de la obra *Shawn Keogh* la nombra delante de Peegen, al intentar convencerla de que se dejara acompañar por ésta durante la noche, a falta de querer y poder quedarse él mismo; Peegen no acepta, y lo hace con una interrogante que sirve de presentación de la viuda Quin como ente integrante de un orden ficticio desconcertante en el que se vislumbra otro indicio de distorsión del mundo mental del público, organizado sobre las unidades discursivas dispuestas en las escenas precedentes: «**Is it the like of that murderer?**» (primer acto, p. 43).

En la ocasión a la que estábamos haciendo referencia en que la viuda hace acto de presencia, a la pregunta de «**[w]ho's there?**» hecha por la joven, la viuda no vacila en contestar «**me**», lo que obliga a Peegen a inquirir de su interlocutora más precisión, cuestionando de paso la seguridad con la que aquella supone que se había de tomar su respuesta; de ahí que sea necesario que pregunte otra vez, en este caso «**[w]ho's me?**»; a esto la viuda no tiene más remedio que responder con exactitud: «**The Widow Quin**» (primer acto, p. 59). De ese modo es como empieza a formar parte del universo conceptual allí expuesto. La observación de algunos datos bien simples de los que se han constituido en componentes esenciales del modelo mental construido nos conduce hasta la misma realidad discursiva que sorprendió, por de pronto, desorientó y, finalmente, desagradó al público presente. En primer lugar, la hora de visita parece que no es demasiado prudente; el propio Christy dice, con miedo: «**Oh, glory! it's late for knocking, and this last while I'm in terror of the peelers, and the walking dead**» (primer acto, p. 59).

En segundo lugar, se desprende de este hecho una característica más que descoloca al personaje fuera de los esquemas estrictamente codificados en los constructos de consolidación del concepto de cultura e identidad nacionales del público dublinés. La mujer es una temeraria, sale de noche muy tarde y además sola por el mero capricho de conocer al hombre sobre el que ya ha oído alguna cosa que le concede un atractivo especialísimo. Baste sacar a relucir dos comentarios de la otra mujer protagonista de *The Playboy of the*

Western World para entender el grado de distanciamiento de la viuda respecto del estereotipo femenino; o, también, el de un hombre demasiado asustadizo y ridículo como es Shawn Keogh para representar a ningún colectivo de aquella sociedad tan incapaz de tolerar un ejercicio básico de autocritica:

- Pegeen [*Impatiently*]. He is surely, and leaving me lonesome on the **scruff** of the hill Isn't it long the nights are now, Shawn Keogh, to be leaving a poor girl with her own self counting the hours to the dawn of day? [...] Stop tormenting me with Father Reilly ... when I'm asking **only** what way I'll pass these twelve hours of dark, and not **take** my death with the fear. (Primer acto, pp. 42-3)
- Shawn. God help me, he's following me now ... and if he's heard what I said, he'll be having my **life**, and I going home lonesome **in** the darkness of the night. (Primer acto, p. 47)

En tercer lugar, se ha de tener en cuenta lo contradictorio de la posición de la viuda Quin. Su aparición tan imprevista se debe a la premura que, supuestamente, le han impuesto por salvaguardar a la joven de un criminal de la calaña de Christy el padre Reilly y el propio Shawn, dos personajes en absoluta disonancia respecto del grupo que encuentran en esta peculiar portavoz todos los valores de los que ellos abominan en público. Su reacción, no obstante, ante la negativa de Pegeen a dejar marchar a Christy consiga evidencia su verdadera condición de desestabilizadora del ambiguo equilibrio moral hipócritamente mantenido en este particular Condado de Mayo de Synge:

- Widow Quin [*With good humour*]. If it didn't, maybe **all** knows a widow woman has buried her **children** and destroyed her man is a wiser **comrade** for a young lad than a girl, the like of you, who'd go helter-skeltering after any man would let you a **wink** upon the **road**. (Primer acto, p. 61)

Finalmente, en cuarto lugar, se ha de añadir un último rasgo que **podría** operar como principio aglutinador de los mencionados con anterioridad. Con todo lo expuesto hasta ahora se tendna que haber logrado suscitar en el lector la idea que consideramos central para la descripción de un significativo teatral complejo que, al igual que el resto, se constituye en síntesis de una postura vital en abierta discrepancia con lo normal. Tan es así que el personaje de la viuda Quin llega a superar todos los límites dispuestos por esa comunidad sobre el tipo de individuo que debena estar simbolizando. Su exceso la aleja de lo humano, o mejor, le confiere una humanidad distinta, desproporcionada, distorsionadora. **A** los ojos de la audiencia resultaba inaudito tener que presenciar, impasible, la encarnación verbal de lo excesivo, cooperando así con la naturalización de lo más escondido, de lo extraño y lo prohibido, pero no por ello menos reallizable. Por las palabras de **Jimmy** Farrell, parte de la comparsa que acompaña a Michael **James**, ya se había podido conocer lo mucho de **anti**-heroína típicamente irlandesa que Synge había ideado a Pegeen Mike:

Peegen. If I'm a queer daughter. it's a queer father'd be leaving me lonesome these twelve hours of dark, and I piling the turf with the dogs barking, and the calves mooring, and my own teeth rattling with the fear.

Jimmy [*Flatteringly*]. What is there to hurt you, and you a fine, hardy girl would knock the heads of any two men in the place? (Primer acto, p. 45)

Y por medio de las palabras de la joven, en uno de los momentos más álgidos del primer acto, descubrimos a una viuda Quin en íntima relación con la naturaleza en su sentido más polémico, menos aceptable socialmente, más transgresor de convenciones y, por ende, directamente enfrentado a todos los patrones de conducta con cabida en los diversos modelos culturales imperantes entre los miembros de la sociedad irlandesa finisecular, y reproducibles en cada uno de los procesos de interpretación discursiva iniciados y adoptados como punto de comparación en la evaluación de todo fragmento de realidad ficticia o no:

Peegen [*With noisy scom*]. It's true the Lord God formed you to contrive indeed. Doesn't the world know you reared a black ram at your own breast, so that the Lord Bishop of Connaught felt the elements of a Christian, and he eating it after in a kidney stew? Doesn't the world know you've been seen shaving the foxy skipper from France for a threepenny-bit and a sop of grass tobacco would wring the liver from a mountain goat you'd meet leaping the hills? (Primer acto, pp. 61-2)

En este universo de Occidente en el que, según Sara Tansey (otra de las muchas jóvenes aturcidas ante el fenómeno *Christy Mahon*), sus *maravillas*, es decir, sus «pirates, preachers, poteen-makers, with the jobbing jockies; parching peelers, and the juries fill their stomachs selling judgments of the English law» (p. 70), destacan por su *normal* grandiosidad, no queda en pie casi ninguno de los mecanismos principales de reproducción, ni siquiera, tal como se pudo atestiguar en *In the Shadow of the Glen*, el más básico, el del matrimonio:

Shawn [*Shaking himself free, and getting behind Michael*]. I'll not fight him [Christy], Michael James. I'd liefer live a bachelor, simmering in passions to the end of time, than face a lepping savage the like of him has descended the Lord knows where. Strike him yourself, Michael James, or you'll lose my drift of heifers and my blue bull from Sneem. (Tercer acto, p. 101)

Widow Quin [*Impatiently*]. Isn't there the match of her [Peegen] in every parish public, from Binghamstown unto the plain of Meath? Come on ... and I'll find you finer sweethearts at each waning moon. (Tercer acto, p. 106)

Sin duda, de este modo se está banalizando lo que, en general, se consideraba sacrosanto, tal como la virtud y la rectitud de la mujer. Se están sometiendo al juicio de sus mismos defensores instituciones o costumbres instituidas como tales. caducas y harto controvertidas. Y, además, se está promocionando el intercambio o la reformulación de los papeles sociales más usuales y la ambigüedad que ello supone. Diversos modelos mentales de interpretación discursiva han confluído en un mismo punto y no se han dejado absorber

por el otro. A partir de ahí, el conflicto comunicativo parece inevitable.”

NOTAS

Véase la teona de la pertinencia de Sperber y Wilson (1986).

² Téngase en cuenta la idea de *cultural schemata* de Holland y Quinn (1987).

³ Téngase en cuenta el concepto de *habitus* de Bourdieu (1991).

⁴ Tordera Sáez (1978:198) recuerda que el público juzga desde un código que ordena la significación en un momento histórico concreto; los dramaturgos del *Abbey Theatre* lo hacían desde otro código o códigos diferentes al de su receptor más directo.

Hirst (1987:19) comenta que a los dramaturgos del *Abbey Theatre* se les acusó de haber inventado su propia Irlanda como constmcto independiente de la realidad y del concepto adoptado por otros gmpos sociales; Stead (1983:26), por su parte, considera que el problema radicaba en que el público no fue capaz de aceptar imágenes más profundas de las seleccionadas por los *Young Irelanders*.

⁶ Greene y Stephens (1959:140) señalan que, antes de que la obra se titulase *The Playboy of the Western World*, el autor optó por dos alternativas que finalmente descartó: *The Fool of Farnham* y *Murder Will Out*.

⁷ Véase Bourgeois (1913:193-4) para una profusa descripción de los varios significados asociados al sintagma «The Playboy of the Westem World».

⁸ En relación con esta idea no se olvide la pertinencia de los conceptos de *carnivalización* y *polifonía* de Bakhtin (1968. 1973. 1981). Tal como recuerda Fowler (1989:79), «[c]arnival ... rejoices in extremes, negation, inversion, subversion, *antithesis*». *The Playboy* se ajusta básicamente a los principios de tal fenómeno

⁹ Ferreras (1988:136), al considerar la cuestión de las tendencias literarias, distingue entre *tendencias afirmativas* y *tendencias negativas*; a las primeras pertenecen aquellas obras que no ponen en duda los valores de la sociedad; con las negativas o *rupturales*, el sujeto colectivo suele enfrentarse a algún sector de la sociedad, cuestionando o negando sus valores institucionalizados.

¹⁰ Obsérvese la diferencia de las dos traducciones al español del título de la obra de Synge: «El galán de occidente. y «El fanfarrón del mundo occidental». En cada caso la elección de los especialistas supone una concepción del personaje y de su función notablemente distinta. C.J. Reynolds (1983) prefiere denominarla «El galán de occidente., un término que al restringirse al área de lo afectivo resalta la capacidad de atracción con la que el dramaturgo inviste a Christy. Por su parte, el término «fanfarrón», de connotaciones negativas obvias, incluye una gama de significados relacionados con cierta disposición para sobrevalorar lo propio; Sainero (1983), al que le preocupa más esta faceta del comportamiento del personaje, opta por esta versión. A estas dos traducciones hemos de añadir una tercera: «El farsante del mundo occidental». Serrano Valverde (1989:425) la saca a relucir cuando recuerda que, entre los proyectos de Lorca, figuró el montaje de esta comedia, de la que, si existía un texto, había de ser el traducido por quienes tenían concedidos los derechos de toda la obra dramática de Synge en España, Juan Ramón Jiménez y Zenobia Camprubri Aymar.

¹¹ Téngase en cuenta aquí el concepto de *double-bind* de Bateson (1972).

¹² Véanse *The Táin*, para confirmar el tratamiento de la mujer en la antigua Irlanda; Cullingford (1990:10), con algunos ejemplos de mujeres no típicamente femeninas; y Feinstein (1986), que se ocupa del papel de la mujer como instrumento primordial en la consecución del proceso de maduración del hombre.

¹³ Price (1961:30) recuerda que «the nationalists were doing little more than substituting a new stock image that probably flattered the Irish people for an old stock image that certainly libelled them».

¹⁴ «Preface to the First Edition of John M. Synge's *Poems and Translations*», en *Essays and Introductions* (1961:310).

¹⁵ Véase O'Driscoll (1979) para un análisis pormenorizado de la concepción que Yeats tenía de Synge.

¹⁶ Gerstenberger (1990:82) recuerda cómo Willie Fay, que acudió al estreno de esta obra, percibió la primera señal de desorden entre el público con la entrada, precisamente, de la viuda; no gustó desde el principio.

¹⁷ Agradezco sinceramente a todos los lectores de este artículo las muchas sugerencias que tanto lo han enriquecido, en especial a José Manuel Martín Morillas, a José M^a Pérez Fernández y a M^a Soledad Miñán Rojas.

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Smelling and Perception: A Cross-Linguistic Study*

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ABSTRACT

Perception verbs have supplied a rich field of research in linguistics: grammaticalisation (Heine, B. & al. 1991), complementation (Horie, K. 1993) and semantic change (Sweetser E. 1990). Sweetser in From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure (1990) states that inside the semantic field of perception, there are metaphorical mappings from concrete or physical meanings onto abstract meanings and regards vision and hearing as the most salient senses, whereas the sense of smell has fewer and less deep metaphorical connections with the mental domain. The aim of this paper is to show that the verbs of smelling extend semantically into the cognitive domain in more than the ways cited by Sweetser, and that as predicted by her, these connections between the physical and mental domain are not language specific but cross-linguistic. These statements will be supported with data drawn from Basque, Spanish and English.

KEY WORDS: semantic change, perception verbs, smell, cross-linguistic

RESUMEN

Los verbos de percepción han proporcionado un amplio campo de investigación dentro de la Lingüística: gramaticalización (Heine, B. & al. 1991), complementación (Horie, K. 1993) y cambio semántico (Sweetser, E. 1990). Sweetser en From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure (1990) afirma que dentro del cambio semántico de la percepción se producen conexiones metafóricas entre los significados concretos o físicos y los significados abstractos; y presenta la vista y el oído como los sentidos más relevantes, mientras que relega el olfato a un segundo plano, ya que lo considera con menos conexiones y no tan profundas con el dominio mental. El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar que los verbos relacionados con el olfato se extienden semánticamente hacia el dominio cognitivo en más formas de las que Sweetser cita y que, como ella misma predice, estas conexiones entre el dominio físico y mental no son específicas de un idioma sino cross-lingüísticas. Estas ideas se apoyarán con ejemplos del euskera, español e inglés.

PALABRAS CLAVE: cambio semántico, verbos de percepción, olfato, cross-lingüístico

I. INTRODUCTION: SWEETSER'S ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION VERBS

Eve Sweetser (1990) states that our experience and knowledge of the world model how we understand language and thought, how we express ourselves. Our linguistic expressions can be modelled in three ways, which lead to three different domains and these domains are linked metaphorically by our cognitive system.

- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| a. As a description (model of the world) | a. Real world domain |
| b. As an action (an act in the world being described) | b. Speech-act domain |
| c. As an epistemic or logical entity (premise or conclusion in our world of reasoning) | c. Epistemic domain |

Making use of this systematic metaphorical **structuring** of one domain in terms of another, Sweetser claims that the paths of semantic change are unidirectional : from concrete **source** domain to an abstract target domain; from the **external** (sociophysical) domain to our internal (emotional, psychological) domain.

In the field of perception, these metaphorical mappings link our vocabulary of physical perception (external **source** domain) and our vocabulary of internal self and sensations. As a result, she establishes the following connections:

VISION	→→	KNOWLEDGE	
HEARING	→→	HEED	→→ OBEY
TASTE	→→	LIKES / DISLIKES	
TOUCH	→→	FEELINGS	
SMELL	→→	DISLIKEABLE FEELINGS	

These metaphorical mappings seem not to be language **specific**.

In the explanation of the **structure** of these metaphors of perception, Sweetser distributes these senses into two groups: the former comprises vision and hearing and the latter touch and taste. **The** focusing ability of vision and hearing, i.e., their ability to pick up one stimulus more or less consciously is what makes them be **connected** to objectivity and intellect; whereas **subjectivity**, intimacy and emotion are linked to touch and taste, due to their necessity of actual real contact with the thing sensed.

Taking English as a basis, Sweetser establishes the following relations within the sense of smell:

- Bad smell to **indicate** bad character or dislikeable mental **characteristics**. (e.g. stink)
- Detection of such characteristics (e.g. the active verb *smell*)

With **only** these two abstract **meanings**, it is **understandable** that she concludes that smelling is not as salient as the rest of the senses. However, in this **paper**, it **will** be argued that the sense of smell has more meanings than those cited above and that these meanings are shared by different languages, to conclude that smell is a very salient sense **in** terms of the development of cognitive meanings of verbs of perception.

II. THE VERBS OF SMELL IN BASQUE

Basque seems to be very rich in respect to the terms used for the sense of smell. In the *Diccionario Retana de Autoridades del Euskera* (1976) more than twenty-one verbs related to smelling can be found. Many of these verbs are dialectal variations and some of them have very specific meanings such as *usainoneztatu* 'to scent, to perfume' or *ufeztu* 'to stink'.

The most common and central verbs in the field of smell, together with their meanings are shown in Table 1.

Verbs	'smell, sniff'	'suspect'	'guess'	'investigate'	others
<i>usaindu</i>	+	+	+		'stink', 'scent'
<i>usain egin</i>	+	+	+		
<i>usain hartu</i>	+	+	+		'guess right'
<i>usainkatu</i>	+				
<i>usnatu</i>	+	+	+	+	'interfere, meddle'
<i>usmatu</i>	+	+	+		
<i>sumatu</i>	+	+	+		'perceive, notice'
<i>susmatu</i>		+			
<i>susmo hartu</i>		+			

Table 1: Verbs of smell in Basque

The central verb of smell is *usaindu* (*usaitu*, *usendu*, *usandu*). This verb expresses both the perception and the emission of a smell and abstract meanings such as 'suspect, guess'. It is used to express a mental meaning as well as a bad smell. *Usnatu*, *usmatu* and *sumatu* can be used in both senses too, concrete or abstractly. It is worth noticing that in the case of *usnatu* and *sumatu*, the nouns they come from *usna* 'sense of smell' and *suma* 'sense of smell', respectively, do not have this abstract meaning of 'suspicion', which indicates that a semantic shift has taken place from the 'perception of smell' to 'suspect, guess'. A further evidence that corroborates this statement is the verb *susmatu*. In Table 1, *susmatu* means 'suspect' but it does not share any of the other physical meanings. However, if we go back to its etymology, it appears that this verb is also directly connected to the sense of smell. According to Michelena (1990:292) and Mujika (1982:209), *susmatu* has an expressive *s-*, which has been added to the verb *usmatu*. This verb ultimately seems to be related to the Spanish word *husmear* 'sniff (at)'. Thus, *susmatu* is related to smelling in two ways: through *usmatu* and through its Spanish cognate *husmear*.

To sum up, the physical meanings that these Basque verbs lexicalise are both the emission and the perception of smells, either good or bad. As Sweetser claims, bad smells, when interpreted metaphorically, indicate bad characteristics:

- (1) Urrun adi ni ganik, usaindua (Retana:1976)
go away IMP 1.SG:ABL smell:ABS

'Go away from me **stinker!**'

However, contrary to her predictions, Basque verbs seem to establish more **connections** with the cognitive domain than those expected. Basque verbs do not **only** link the physical domain with the mental domain when they are used for the detection of bad characteristics, but **also** the following categorisations seem to take place:

Physical smell → 'suspect'1

- (2) **Poliziak** Mikelen **hitzetan** gemrra usaindu men
 police.ERG **Mike.POSS** words.ABL lie smell 3.SG:PAST
 'The police smelt something fishy in Mike's words'

Physical smell → 'guess'2

- (3) **Arriskua** usaindu men
 danger **smell** 3.SG:PAST
 'He smelt the danger'

Physical smell → 'investigate'

- (4) **Mikel** nere **gauzen** artean usnatzen harrapatu nuen
 Mike my **things.POSS** between.ABL smell catch
 1.SG:PAST
 'I caught Mike **nosing** into my things'

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that Sweetser's **assertion** that the verbs of smell are associated with only two types of perceptual development is false. The question remains whether the Basque data **indicate** a parochial or a cross-linguistic property.

III. THE VERBS OF SMELL IN SPANISH

The most **common** verbs of smell and **their meanings** can be **seen** in Table 2.

Verbs	emit odours	perceive odours	'suspect'	'guess'	'investigate'
<i>oler</i>	+	+	+	+	
<i>olfatear</i>		+			+
<i>husmear</i>		+			+

Table 2: Verbs of smell in Spanish

The central verb of smell in Spanish is *oler*. This verb can be used transitive or **intransitively**, although its Latin cognate *olère* was only used with the **subject** of the thing that emits odour, and *olfacere* was **left** for transitive use.

According to Corominas, J. & J.A. Pascual (1983), *olêre* was used for both transitive and intransitive instances already in Berceo (13th century), where the nominalisation of the verb *oler* as 'the sense of smell' can be found and therefore, it indicates that the verb *oler* was used in the sense of perception of odours. The explanation of this could be found in the loss of the verb *heder* 'to stink, stench' in the vocabulary of the educated people and also in the disappearance of Latin *putêre* 'to decompose; to have a bad smell'; as a consequence, *oler* is used for either good or bad smells. Other Romance languages use different verbs, so that they distinguish between bad and good smell. For instance, French *sentire* 'smell' and the verb for 'stink' *empester* (cf. Spanish *apestar*), *puir*, *puer* (< Latin *putêre*) verb and noun for 'stink'; Italian *sentire*, *odorare* 'smell' and *puzzare* (< Latin *putêre*) 'stink'; Portuguese seems to have only one verb too: *cheirar* 'smell, stink'; it also has *empestar* for 'to smell out' (cf. French *empester*, Spanish *apestar*).

An interesting point here is the fact that some Romance languages have adopted the Latin word *sentire*, in the place of *olêre-olfacere*. *Sentire* 'perceive, feel' is usually the verb used for describing general perception and it can also mean 'perception by the ear', as it is the case of Italian *sentire* and Catalan *sentir*.

The verb *olfatear* and its noun *olfato* 'sense of smell, intuition, instinct' in Spanish can be applied to animals, usually dogs, and to humans. If it is used with dogs, which are known for having an excellent sense of smell, its meaning is not abstract or figurative, but physical; for instance:

- (5) El perro olfatea el rastro
 the dog smells the trail
 'the dog smells the trail'

However, if this verb is used with people, the meaning is both physical and abstract. It means 'to nose into, to pry into' or 'to have instinct for something'. An example with the noun is more illustrative in this case; compare:

- (6) Ese perro tiene buen olfato
 that dog has good sense of smell
 'that dog has a good sense of smell'
- (7) Ese hombre tiene buen olfato
 that man has good sense of smell
 'that man has a good sense of smell/instinct'

Here it can be seen how in (6) the meaning is physical and in (7), the same words can have a physical meaning as well as metaphorical one, when used with human beings; (7) can mean that this man has a good/accurate sense of smell, but also that he has a natural instinct to see things, or that he has an instinct for business, for example.

In conclusion, it seems that both *oler* and *olfatear* have concrete and non-concrete meanings. The concrete meanings 'to perceive and to emit a smell' are already present in their Latin cognates: *olêre* 'to give off a smell, to smell sweet, to stink' and *olfacere* 'to detect the odour of, to smell at'. However, their figurative meanings seem to be particular to the Spanish verbs, as the Latin ones do not share them. This supports the idea that the

semantic change is from concrete to abstract meanings. (Sweetser 1990:30)

Finally, *husmear*, which as **seen** before, seems to be related to Basque *usmatu*, offers another abstract **meaning** 'investigate, nose into', also shared by its Basque cognate. The verb *husmear*, whose primitive form is *usmar*, *osmar*, shares the **same etymological** origin as French *humér* 'smell, inhale', Italian *ormare* 'follow a trace' and Rumanian *urmă* 'follow'. According to Corominas, J. & J.A. Pascual (1983), these verbs could derive from Greek *osmasthanai* > *osmé* 'odour'.

Spanish verbs then seem to support what has **been** said about Basque in the previous section. Sweetser's abstract categorisations do **take** place as in the case of *apestar* 'stink' or in (8), where the sentence can be interpreted both as a physical bad smell or as the detection of something wrong.

- (8) Eso huele mal
that smells badly
'That smells bad'

However, once again, other cognitive meanings are possible too:

Physical smell → 'suspect'

- (9) La policía se olió que algo era mentira
en las palabras de Miguel
the police REFL smelt that something. was lie
in the words of Mike
'The police smelt something fishy in Mike's words'

Physical smell → 'guess'

- (10) Olió el peligro
smelt the danger
'He smelt the danger'

Physical smell → 'investigate'

- (11) Pillé a Miguel husmeando entre mis cosas
caught to Mike nosing between my things
'I caught Mike nosing into my things'

It seems that the cognitive meanings proposed for Basque do work for the Spanish verbs too, and therefore, we **have evidence** for the general **falsity** of Sweetser's statement.

IV. THE VERBS OF SMELL IN ENGLISH

So far it has **been seen** that Basque and Spanish seem to follow the **same** metaphorical mappings into the mental domain, and hence, this **supports** our claim that the sense of smell is not as weak sense in respect to cognitive meanings, as suggested by Sweetser.

As Sweetser based most of her **study** on perception verbs on English, it will be instructive to review the verbs of smell in English in order to see whether these cognitive meanings can be **also** applied to this language.

Table 3 summarises the most common verbs of smelling in English and their meanings.

Verbs	emit odours	perceive odours	'suspect'	'guess'	'investigate'
<i>smell</i>	+	+	+	+	
<i>sniff</i>		+			+

Table 3: Verbs of smell in English

Stink and *stench* have not **been** included in Table 3, **because** of the specific meaning they **have** nowadays, i.e. 'bad smell'. However, it is **worth** noting that Old English *stinc* was **first** used for neutral smell and then, when *smellen* was introduced it **came** to mean 'bad smell'. The development of *srench* is somehow similar, as Old English *stenc* meant 'bad smell' but nowadays it is stronger than *stink* itself. *Stink*, as its cognates in Spanish *apestar* and Basque *ufeztu*, *usaindu*, can be **also** used in the abstract sense to **indicate** dislikeable mental characteristics as in (12):

(12) That idea **stinks** (Sweetser, 1990:37)

Therefore, the cognitive meanings that English verbs develop are:

Physical **smell** → 'suspect'

(13) The police smelt something fishy in **Mike's** words

Physical smell → 'guess'

(14) He smelt **the** danger

Basque and Spanish share **another** meaning, i.e. 'investigate'. This meaning can be expressed with the verb *sniff* as in (15), and **also** with the verb to *nose* (cf. Sp. *meter las narices en algo*). Although, to *nose* is not a verb of perception **itself**, but a verbalisation of the noun *nose*, the *nose* **is** the organ of smell and **hereby**, it is related to this group.

(15) The police **have been sniffing** around **here** again

From the data in Table 3, it can be concluded that English verbs of smell seem to

follow the same **patterns observed** in the other two languages, both **physical**³ and abstract. This **further** supports our **claim** that the verbs of smell do **have** more metaphorical meanings than **those** established in Sweetser's analysis and **also** that these mappings are not language specific.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we demonstrate that in the sense of smell there are more metaphorical connections than the ones identified by Sweetser. From the data supplied, the following connections could be established:

- bad smell → dislikeable characteristics
- smell → detection of these characteristics → suspect (always in a negative context)
- smell → guess, conjecture, **surmise**
- smell → investigate

These cognitive extensions are present in the three languages of the sample. **Languages** with very different backgrounds: Basque (non-IE) and **Spanish** and English (both IE, but Romance and **Germanic** respectively). This fact seems to **indicate** that these mappings are indeed cross-linguistic, and not particular of a specific language.

For other senses such as vision and hearing, Sweetser offers a detailed analysis of their metaphorical connections with their mental domains. Sight is **linked** both with knowledge, intellection and mental vision; and hearing is connected to heeding and to **internal** receptivity. Sweetser considers the sense of smell **less** salient than the rest of the senses. However, throughout this paper, smell has **been proved** to **have** various cognitive meanings. Therefore, we cannot conclude with Sweetser that the sense of smell is weaker than the other senses, but that it should be placed at the same **level** as sight and hearing as far as cognitive **meanings** is concerned.

NOTES

*. I am very **grateful** to Jon **Altuna** for his help **and** comments on previous versions of this paper.

1 The etymological origin of *usmatu* is unclear.

2. *Guess* vs. *suspect*. These **two** verbs could be considered synonyms in **some** cases. However, **based** on the examples, we prefer to regard them as different verbs. *Suspect* always **carries** a negative meaning and **seems** to be a **process** type verb, whereas *guess* has a more **neutral** meaning and seems to be an achievement verb type.

3 In the **Northern dialect** of Labourdii, **some** verbs such as *usnatu* (*üsnatü*) can also be interpreted as "prophesy".

4 In previous subjects, it has **been** mentioned that these verbs could denote either good or bad smells. This is also the case of English. However, it seems that the bad or good quality of the smell **is** not dependable upon the verb of smell **itself**, but upon the other elements of the **sentence**, as well as the context. For **instance**:

(15) The shoes smell

(16) My perfume smells

In (15), *smell* is immediately identified with a "bad smell", whereas (16) is the opposite: it is a very nice smell; the different meaning depends on **the** subject, on the agent that **emits** the odour. The **nature** of subjects, as **well** as other **issues**, such as complementation, are not analysed in depth in this **article** but they **remain** as a **potential field** for **further** research.

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A Private History of the Preposition By in English: From Instrumental to Passive Agent

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I revisit the controversy I origin of the preposition by as marker of the demoted agent in the English passive construction. I claim that this use emerged from instrumental schemata which were once highly prominent in the history of English. I organize in a radial category the most relevant senses by conveys, both from historical times and in PDE. This analysis is intended to represent a polysemic network of meanings which show the motivated process leading to the outcome of an agency schema to express the passive agent.

KEY WORDS: instrumentality, agency, historical linguistics.

RESUMEN

En este estudio he querido retomar el origen algo controvertido del uso de la preposición by en inglés como marcador del agente desfocalizado en la construcción pasiva. En el presente trabajo propongo que varios esquemas instrumentales, que en su día fueron relevantes en la historia del inglés, desempeñaron un papel fundamental en el surgimiento de un esquema de agencia para expresar el agente pasivo. Para ello, varios de los sentidos más relevantes de la preposición by, ya históricos como de uso actual, se organizan aquí formando una categoría con estructura radial. Este análisis pretende representar una red polisémica que ilustre los procesos que motivaron la emergencia del esquema de agencia.

PALABRAS CLAVE: instrumentalidad, agencia, lingüística histórica.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper I account for the emergence of the preposition *by* as a marker of agency in the English passive construction, as in the sentence *the house was built by Mary*. I claim that this use of *by* first emerged as an extension from other instrumental schemata the preposition had been rendering throughout the history of the language in a rather stable way.

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Some of these instrumental schemata **have** got lost in the way, having **been** taken over by other prepositions, namely *with* and *through*. However, they **have** contributed deeply to the forging of the use of *by* as a marker of a demoted agent.

I adopt **here** the cognitive approach already taken by several authors on the subject of polysemic networks, especially on preposition extensional **patterns** (Lakoff, 1987; Lindner, 1982; Langacker, 1991a). I array **several** schemata of *by* in the structural shape of a radial category, where **nodes** are **linked** via image-schema transformations to more central senses (Lakoff, 1987). This type of analysis stems from the belief that patterns of meaning can be accounted as motivated **within** a given conceptual system, and that different senses **may** arise from recurrent extensions elaborated via metaphorical or metonymic processes. In the present analysis I will **only** focus on those senses of *by* which play a relevant role in the **emergence** of the use of *by* as marker of a demoted agent. In this **fashion**, since no exhaustive analysis of the semantic net of *by* is intended **here**, other senses the preposition renders will be thus **ignored**¹.

I present historical data along the paper in **order** to illustrate the productivity of some of the schemata in a prior stage of the language. This is done in the belief that diachronic data are relevant to illustrate the semantic status of the network throughout history. **Besides**, the radial structure has evolved through time to its present state by **virtue** of language being a continuum, and no speaker is believed to make her language up by **starting** from zero, **because** there must be a core structure preserved **and inherited**. The semantic trends existing in the present radial structure were motivated at **some** time in the history of the continuum. Although intermediate crucial steps in the elaboration of the extensions might **have** got lost in the way, the actual shape of the semantic configuration itself is still preserved, and it is well available to the current speaker.

The preposition *by* shows in present-day English (PDE) a large variety of meanings. To illustrate this diversity consider the following examples²:

1. *I have a cottage by the big lake*
2. *Mary drove by her old family house*
3. *The thief came in the house by the back door*
4. *He cherished his lover by giving her presents*
5. *Perer was bitten by a strange creature coming from outer space*

In (1) the preposition renders a static spatial scenario, where a cottage is allocated in the proximity of a lake. In accord with other analysts (Langacker, 1987), I will **call** *the cottage*, or the entity being located, the Trajector (TR), while *the big lake*, or the spatial reference, will be treated as Landmark (LM). This terminology will be kept along more abstract extensions where both TR and LM are no longer spatial. In (2) the schema is dynamic, in the sense that it construes a motion event where *Mary*, the figure of the motion event (Talmy, 1985), **here functioning** as TR of *by*, is taken as moving to the proximity of the LM, *her old family house*. There is yet the **further** implication of Mary not stopping at the house, but driving on. Sentence (3) is an **instance** of an instrumental use of *by*. The LM of the preposition, *the back door* is profiled as the place **used** by *the thief* to **enter** the house. This instrumental sense is **also** present in (4), where the LM is no longer construed as a spatial locus but as an action. In (5) we **have** an **instance** of the canonical coding of a demoted agent in the passive construction. **The** goal of this paper is to show how the use of *by* as **in** (5)

emerges from previous instrumental senses. The claim is further supported by the fact that this use of *by* results as a much later historical preference over other prepositions.

II. SPATIAL SCHEMATA

Spatial schemata will serve to provide basis for further extensions. For analytical purposes, a description to schemata and participants involved will be given in the introduction of the most relevant schemata. Spatial schemata subdivide on the one hand in those schemata which render a static spatial configuration, and on the other, those which further incorporate a temporal dimension, and render dynamic spatial configurations.

II.1. STATIC SPATIAL SCHEMATA

II.1.1. Static Spatial Schema *BY* (1)

Description: Static Spatial Configuration. The TR is described as located in a static fashion within a short spatial distance from the LM. Figure (1) illustrates this configuration. The formalization is done in the shape these characterizations receive in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991a, 1991b):




Figure (1)

Sentence (1) repeated here as (6) illustrates schema *BY* (1):

6. *I have a corrage by rhe big lake*

This basic spatial configuration has been very stable throughout time, and it is widely anested in texts. Sentences in (7) illustrate the schema in different periods of the English language³:

- 7.
- | | |
|------------------|--|
| a. OE (971). | <i>þa sæt þær sum blind þearfa be don wege</i>
'A poor blind sat in need by the path' |
| b. EME (1160). | <i>Hyo sæten be þam strande</i>
'They sat by the beach' |
| c. LME (1400). | <i>To be laid by hir legis</i> |
| d. EModE (1648). | <i>Hard by rhis island is Ruigna</i> |
| e. ModE (1764). | <i>The clock may strike by us wirhour being heard</i> |

- f. ModE (1881). *Where he has been buried by Chaucer and Cowley*

When the LM is construed as a **three** dimensional (3-DIM) entity, it is often the case that it may **also** receive a further characterization as having **sides** and possible front-back and top-bottom orientation. In this case, **BY** (1) allocates the TR with respect to a lateral region of the LM. When the LM is a human being, the region profiled is one **side** of the human body. In sentences (8) and (9) below, the LM is thought to **have** an inherent **side**, for this reason, the configuration can be expressed either by means of **BY** (1) or with the complex expressions, [TR **by the side of** LM] and/or [TR **by LM's side**]⁴.

8. *There is a suspicious man sitting by rhar old lady / by the side of rhar old lady*
 10. *She spend the nighr by him while he was sick. / by his side while he was sick*⁵.

II.1.2. Static Spatial Schema † **BY** (2)

This schema is a metaphorical extension of **BY** (1), and the same description can apply **here**. The LM is construed as a human being. The conceptual metaphor SHARING THE SAME SPACE IS BEING A COMPANION (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), allows the reading of the LM as being the TR's companion. However the schema is no longer productive in PDE, since the preposition **with** has **taken** over to render this configuration, as shown by the modern translation to the historical sentences below:




Figure (2)

11.
 a. OE *Wif þe biþ be anum man* "The woman who lives **wirh** a man"
 b. OE *þa odre be him libben* "The others live **wirh** him"
 c. ME *Heo liveþ bi him* "She lives **wirh** him"

Schema **BY** (2) is **marginally** present in PDE though. It accounts for **construals** where the TR is profiled **in** a state of solitude or doing a given action with no help of others. This reading is achieved **in** inferences made via a complex metaphor: being alone is thought of as being **in** one's own company, hence the TR's self is profiled as the accompanying LM with respect to which the TR is allocated. A further extension accounts for sentences (12) and (13) via metonymic inference, since being alone when involved in an activity **implies** performing the activity without the help of others:

12. *Since rhey gor married rhey have lived by themselves in the mountains*
 13. *He wore the letter all by himself*

The metaphor seems to **have been** stable in Germanic, since it is also evidenced in German *einsam sein* 'one.together be-INF' and Icelandic *að vera einn saman* 'to be-INF one-MASC:NOM together'. Both collocations translate "be alone" or "be by *oneself*" (lit., "be one together"). The same is true for historical English:

14.
 b. ME *Þo heo were al bi hem selve* "They were then all by themselves"
 a. ME (1300). *He fand his cosin Ion, in wilderness bi him allan*
 "He found his cousin Ion, in the wilderness by himself"
 c. EModE (1559). *Weigh this matter by yourself*

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain the comitative use of *with* in PDE as emerging from the **very** same conceptual metaphor SHARING THE SAME SPACE IS BEING A COMPANION. This metaphor is further **taken** up as the **source** to render **some** instrumental configurations, where **instruments** are **seen** as **companions**. This phenomenon can also apply to account for the relevant instrumental reading of *by* in the historical period, treated as *BY* (5), as we will see below in section (III.1). In order to keep track of the **emergence** of instrumental readings, I introduce in the next section the concept of functionality of the LM.

II.2. FUNCTIONALITY OF THE LANDMARK

One of the fundamental entailments from the spatial configurations rendered by *BY* (1) is that the TR is thought to be located in an optimal proximity to the LM so that it can interact with the LM. In this sense, the LM is ascribed certain functionality if the TR is believed to **make** use of the LM for **some** purpose. This is a relevant **feature** of the configuration, **and** instrumental extensions of *by* in PDE emerge from highlighting the functionality of the LM. **When** the functionality of the LM is relevant enough for a given configuration, I mark it in the description of the schema at issue by saying that "**the** functionality of the LM is highlighted". The LM may be further **seen** as having a certain space with functional **property** which I will call "the functional space of the LM". This latter **feature** is especially useful to account for certain expressions in more static configurations, where the LM is **construed** as a location, **and** the functional space of the LM refers to the space where the TR is thought to interact. However, if there is no special functional space ascribed to **the** LM, *BY* (1) will profile then a **mere** spatial configuration within an Euclidean space. As illustration of this concept, **consider** the following configurations, in sentences (14) and (15):

14. *The red chair is by the wooden table*
 15. *Mary knew the Avon-lady was standing by her front door*

In (14) there is no particular functional space ascribed to the LM - *the wooden table* - and consequently either **side** of the table would **serve** equally good as spatial **reference** to **allocate** the TR -*the red chair*. However in (15), the front door is ascribed a functional space by convention and refers to the space of the main **entrance** of a house. According to this reading, the space of the LM in (15) is not restricted exclusively to the actual Euclidean space the door frame occupies. In the contextual **situation** evoked by (15) the Avon-lady as

TR could **have been** moving impatiently around the porch, and she would still be said to be located as "waiting by the front door". In contrast to (15), consider context in (16) below, as an illustration of a **configuration** where the TR is located this time with respect to a door with no **such functional space**, in this case, the wooden board covering the hole of the frame in the wall:

16. *Mary got mad at the Avon-lady and kicked the door shut in a rage. The hinges got loose, and the door fell to the ground. This simply was too much for the poor Avon-lady, who fainted, fell, and lay down by the damaged door until she was found by the milk man.*

II.3. DYNAMIC SPATIAL SCHEMATA

The preposition **by** renders a great **variety** of spatial configurations through different schemata. I will treat **here** only those schemata which contribute to the **emergence** of some instrumental sense. For this purpose consider the following sentences:

17. *The suspicious truck drove by the house*
 18. *The car drove by*
 19. *Mr. Jones stopped by Mary's house in his way home*
 20. *Peter came by my office and had a drink*

In (17) and (18) the **TRs** - *the suspicious truck* and *the car*- do not stop at the **LMs**, *the house* or a **reference** location which is contextually known. In clear contrast, sentences (19) and (20) profile **TRs** -*Mr. Jones* and *Peter*- which do stop at **LMs**, *Mary's house* and *my office*. Sentences (19) and (20) instantiate schemata which highlight the LM as functional, the only difference being that in (20) the LM is treated as goal. I will devote the following sections to illustrate the two schemata motivating (19) and (20).

II.3.1. Dynamic Spatial Schema *BY* (3)

Description: **The** TR moves **and** describes a path in relation to LM by keeping to the spatial configuration of *BY* (1). **The** TR has two destination goals. The **first** and main destination (goal I) is located **further** away from the space of the LM. The LM is treated as a secondary destination (goal II). The functionality of the LM is highlighted. The LM is construed as a location - the schema **does** not allow human beings as functional **LMs**. The LM is located on the **TR's** path, in between the origin and the main destination. Figure (3) illustrates the schema:




Figure (3)

There are several entailments arising from the schema:

1. The TR starts off moving from origin
2. The TR enters the space of the LM, and achieves goal (II)
3. The TR exits the space of the LM in pursue of goal (I)

The following sentences illustrate the schema:

21. *I went by Peter's office on my way home*
22. *The Wise Kings went by Jerusalem on their way back to Persia*

Schema *BY* (3) highlights the functionality of the LM, since the TR is believed to interact with the LM in some way or another. As an illustration, in (21) above, the speaker moves to *Peter's office* as to pursue some goal, namely, speak with him or arrange some schedule. In (22), *Jerusalem* is not thought as the mere landscape in the *Kings'* way back to their homeland, but instead it is believed as a secondary goal in their journey.

The schema can be further extended to cover uses when the functionality of the LM is even more relevant. This is achieved by not mentioning the main destination in the predication. This construal has however a low usage in PDE, and it is highly restricted to particular verbs, as in sentence (23) below, where the verb *come* refers to the deictic motion toward speaker. The same can be said for (24), where *stop* profiles the end-focus of the TR at the space of the LM. Although no overt reference is made to the primary destination, this falls within the default interpretation of the situations referred to, since they evoke a frame of a visit, where the TR stays at somebody else's space for a short while, and then sets off for some other place:

23. *He will come by my office and have a drink*
24. *We stopped by the Simpson's last night*

When the functionality of the LM is backgrounded we get readings like sentences (17) and (18) above, where the TR does not stop its motion to interact with the LM. In this fashion, sentence (25) below, renders ambiguous readings. In schema *BY* (3), locations are the only LMs to be construed as functional, human beings are hence ruled out from these configurations. This is illustrated by the infelicity of (26), which can only render a non-interactional spatial configuration, alike in sentences (17) and (18) above:

25. *She went by her office/ the house*
26. * *She went by Pefer*
intended meaning: 'she moved towards him and stopped close to him'

In historical periods there was no constraint to profile human beings as LMs of *BY* (3). It looks as if *by* had become increasingly more selective with regard to types of LMs, and had opted to favor those with a functional component:

- 27.
- a. EME (1175). *Com bi þis fonvundede mon*
"come nexr to rthis injured man"
 - b. ME (1330). *All þar he came by, he robbed*
"he robbed everyone he carne close by"
 - d. ME (1340). *An angill come & hem forþad ro wend by hym (Herod)*
"an angel carne and forþid him to go close to him"
 - e. EModE (1535). *Seek some means of how you may come by him*
 - f. EModE (1607). *To come by him. where he stands.*

II.3.2. Dynamic Spatial Scherna BY (4)

Description: The LM is construed as a two dimensional (2-DIM) bounded entity. prototypically, a road or a path⁶. The TR moves and describes a path along the space of the LM by keeping a spatial configuration defined by BY (1). The TR has a destination goal. The destination is located further away from the space of the LM. The functionality of the LM is highlighted. The LM is construed as the path.




Figure (4)

The following sentences illustrate the schema:

- 28. *She came ro rhe city by rhe highway*
- 29. *The churches are wirhin 4 miles of one another by rhe nearest road*

In sentence (28) the destination goal is overtly mentioned as *the city*. In (29), *the churches* are construed as **destinations**, although there is no overt TR. The 2-DIM LM can be further construed as not being clearly bounded. In the following sentences, the instrumental reading of the LMs is already a **salient** one:

- 30. *She got here by land*
- 31. *I sent the package by sea ro Singapore*

Historical data support the **existence** of this schema from an early period:

- 32.
- a. OE (888). *Ic þe laede bi dam wege* "I lead you on rthis way"
- b. ME *Pere com a preoste bi de weie* "There carne a priest by that road"
- c. EME (1205). *Comen bi sæ & bi lond feole cunne leoden*
"People **knew** how ro come by see **and** by many lands"
- d. EModE (1630). *He wenr by water ro Greenwich*

- e. ModE (185 1). *Why nor send a parcel by rail?*

The present schema seems to be inter-connected with schema *BY* (3) because it helps to raise instrumental readings. The functionality of the LM is highlighted in both, although only in *BY* (4) as the means for the TR to achieve its destination goal. The schema has a low productivity in PDE if the goal is not profiled and thus the functionality of the LM is backgrounded. Hence, the archaic character of the following sentences:

33. *We chose to go by the scenic route*
 34. *Dorothy chose to go by the yellow brick road*

In the above sentences the TR moves towards an implicit destination goal, only retrievable from contextual knowledge: (33) evokes someone in motion towards a given place, and deciding to take the road that is more scenic in order to enjoy the driving by having a good view; in (34), according to the classical tale, Dorothy is moving to the place where one of the witches is living.

III. INSTRUMENTAL EXTENSIONS

In PDE *by* conveys stable instrumental readings, although it does not render a canonical instrument⁷. Nevertheless, some *by* schemata have succeeded through time to gain abstract instrumental semantics either via metaphor or metonymic inference. These instrumental schemata have contributed to the extension of *by* as a late marker of an agent of passive. I will claim in section (IV) that this coding emerges from viewing a demoted agent as a case of abstract instrument or intermediary in the outcome of the process treated under passive perspective.

In the mean time, I will present in following sections various schemata with relevant instrumental input. These schemata - organized in source-groups (I), (II) and (III) - are taken to shape out an abstract extension I treat as *BY* (INSTR). Besides, this abstract extension would account on the one hand for any configuration where the LM is used as the means for the TR to achieve a given goal, and on the other, it could serve to link and unify all the schemata I present below which yield instrumental nuances at some point in time. The schema I have in mind for *BY* (INSTR) could be represented as follows:




Figure (5)

Schema *BY* (INSTR) would account for a wide range of data in PDE, but it may be further productive to render sub-actions with a relevant instrumental component, as illustrated by

sentences (35) and (36):

35. *The student wrote the paper by putting all his ideas together*
 36. *Mary broke the door open by hitting it with an ax*

In the above sentences, **by** profiles the LM as an action: the student's *putting his ideas together* and Mary's *hitting the door with an ax*. The TRs *the student* and *Mary* are **seen** as agents with an action goal, the writing of the paper and the opening (by breaking) of the door. The action profiled by **the LM** is treated as **the means** for the agent TR to achieve his/her action-goal. Similarly **BY** (INSTR) serves conventionally to construe transpos as means to achieve destination goals, as in (37) and (38):

37. *She came by ship*
 38. *The man arrived here by car*

I proceed now to introduce the different **source** schemata **pertaining** instrumental semantics. These schemata are **organized** in **three** source-groups. PDE seems to **have** favored **source** schemata from group (II) and (111), this observation being based upon the fact that schemata from group (I) are no longer productive in the system, having **been** taken over by *with*. I will claim, however, that coding of agent in passive evolved perhaps from elaboration on schema **BY** (7) plus **further** semantic support from other instrumental schemata already active and productive in the system, including those from source-group (I).

III.1. SOURCE-GROUP (I): INSTRUMENTAL SCHEMA † **BY** (5)

Schema † **BY** (5) is a direct metaphorical extension from † **BY** (2) via the metaphor AN INSTRUMENT IS A COMPANION (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). This metaphor is based on the direct experiential correlation where **objects close to our space** are **seen** as instruments in that we **often make** use of them to achieve a given action-goal. This schema is no longer active in PDE and the configuration it used to render in historical times has **been** taken over by *with* nowadays. This is evidenced by the translations given below to the historical data provided to illustrate the schema:

39.
 a. OE be *hearpan singan* 'to sing with harp'
 b. OE *gif he gangan mæge bi stafe* "if he could walk with a stick"

The **instrumental** semantics provided by schema † **BY** (5) **reinforces** the status of **by** as marker of instrumental **configurations** throughout the system, and contribute in historical times for the **emergence** of an abstract **BY** (INSTR). The schema provided structure in historical times to construe either canonical instruments or more abstract **entities** viewed as instrumental. Sentences in (40) below illustrate this point. More abstract instruments as in (40.c) and (40.d) can still be conveyed by means of **by** although these sentences sound somehow archaic and **restricted** to a formal register. A difference in **meaning** arises however in PDE with the choice of preposition, i.e. in (40.d), **by** does not profile Christ's death as the instrument of Christ's instruction to men, but rather the **type** or **manner** of *dying*:

A Private History of the Preposition *By* in English

- 40.
- a. OE *He leofode be hlafe ond be watre*
"He survived with bread and with water"
 - b. OE *Be hwilcum þingum feddes þu þe*
"What stuff did you feed yourself with?"
 - c. EModE (1548). *Christe drawerh soules unto hym by his bloody sacrifice*
"Christ draws souls unto him *wirhlby* his blood sacrifice"
 - d. EModE (1628). *He instructs men to dye by his example*
"He instructs men to die *wirhlby* his example"

III.2. SOURCE-GROUP (II): INSTRUMENTAL SCHEMA *BY* (6)

Description: The TR is involved in a process to achieve a **certain** goal. The goal of this configuration is another entity, namely a human being, conceived as a "whole", and treated as a ground. The LM is construed as a salient part of this "whole". **The** functionality of the LM is highlighted, **because** it is **seen** as the means for the TR to achieve the ground-goal. The TR keeps a spatial relation to LM as in *BY* (1). The following sentences illustrate the schema:

41. *Mary took the child by the hand*
42. *His wife is leading him by the nose*

In the above sentences, the relation between a TR and a LM is profiled with respect to a ground goal, *the child* in (41) and the husband in (42). In (41) *the hand* is the salient part of *the child* for *Mary* to **take him/her** under her control. Similarly in (42), *the nose* is comically treated as a salient part of the husband for the woman to manage to lead him. In these sentences, the LM is ascribed a marked functionality, and foregrounded as instrumental. The situation **often** evokes conventional frames of human interaction (in the sense "frame" has in Fillmore (1982)), as in (41) where hands are salient **parts** of the human bodies to grasp somebody and set that person under one's control. The schema is well supported by historical data:

- 43.
- a. OE *Hangað sward be smallan þræde*
"Swords hang from small threads"
 - b. OE (1000). *Heo reh hine be his clapum*
"She drew him by his nails"
 - c. EME (1154). *Me hengeð up bi þe fer*
"One would hang by the feet"
 - d. EModE (1526). *A hande sent down roke me by the heer of my heed*
"A hand sent down took me by the hair of my head"
 - e. EModE (1667). *I did give her a pull by the nose*
 - f. ModE (1711). *The little boy offers to pull me by the coat*

In schema *BY* (6), the TR can be **seen** as involved in a mental process. The ground is treated as the goal of this mental process. The LM is thus construed as an abstract entity, a quality or **property** of the ground. This is illustrated by sentences (44) and (45):

44. *She knows him by name only*
 45. *I know my neighbors only by sight*

III.3. SOURCE-GROUP (III):

Schema **BY** (4) was first introduced in section (II.3.2) for it counts as a relevant schema within motion extensions. The schema demands **further** notice **here** due to the instrumental inferences **it provides** via conceptual metonymy, namely PATH STANDS FOR MEANS. This metonymic map results from foregrounding the functionality of the path as means for the moving TR to get to the goal destination. According to this, sentences (28) and (29) repeated **here** as (46) and (47), present a relevant instrumental **sense** since the LMs are construed as means for the TRs to arrive at both *the city* and *the churches*. The same can be said of other spatial construals of **BY** (4) as *by land; by sea; by air*; etc., since they convey various instrumental LMs:

46. *She came to the city by the highway*
 47. *The churches are within 4 miles of one another by the nearest road*

Paths **have** a salient status as conceptual **entities** in the metaphorical understanding of events. Schema **BY** (4) is the **source** for more abstract instrumental readings. These readings arise in the first place from the complex conceptual mapping called the EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR as treated in Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff *et al.* (1994). According to this macro-mapping intended actions presenting a given goal, are conceived in metaphorical terms, as movements along a path where purposes are destinations. The direct experiential correlation of paths being spatial means to achieve destination goals, motivates the conceptual metonymy: PATH STANDS FOR MEANS to achieve destination goals. This metonymy will **motivate** via metaphor the **common** understanding of "means" as paths. These mappings account for the instrumental reading of expressions like *by way of*, as in sentence (48) below:

48. *Master workmen may have received instructions by way of drafts, models or frames*

Sentence (48) renders a group of people as TR. This group of people is involved in a mental process. Via EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, we conceptualize the TR as an entity moving along a path towards a destination goal, i.e.: the state of *receiving instructions*. The *drafts*, *the models*, and the *frames* are diagrams helping people to understand ideas, in this case *instructions*. Via the mapping MEANS ARE PATHS, these diagrams are thought as the path to get to the metaphorical destination.

III.4. OTHER RELEVANT INSTRUMENTAL SCHEMATA

Schemata presented in this section are of special **relevance** for the radial category of **by** to extend to convey the demoted agent in the passive. It is somehow difficult to link any of these schemata to a particular schema within the semantic sources given above. I will

consider this apparent disadvantage as irrelevant for the present discussion. This situation reveals on the one hand how untangled instrumental meanings may be to the core structure of *by*, and on the other, proves how stable and suong these senses are through the radial category.

III.4.1. Instrumental Schema † *BY* (7)

Description: The LM is prototypically construed as a human being. The TR is involved in a goal-oriented process. The functionality of the human LM is highlighted since it is construed as the means for the TR to achieve the action goal.




Figure (6)

Schema *BY* (7) is no longer productive in PDE, since this highly instrumental configuration has been taken over by the preposition *through*, as shown in the translation of the historical sentences in (49) below. The use of *through* was also a favored pattern in Old English, but schema *BY* (7) was given preference from the late Middle Ages, and once it was favored, the schema kept stable for centuries. The following historical sentences evidence this schema, they refer to intermediaries via which a given action-goal is achieved:

- 49.
- a. OE *He him onsænde be his cnihtum twa spyran*
"He sent him two spears *through* his knights"
 - b. ME (1300). *Darie hūr wot by a spye*
"Dario came to know about it *through* a spy"
 - c. ME (1325). *Sche greeres þe wel by me*
"She greets you well *through* me"
 - d. LME (1450). *Thou has herde be my moder the travayle that they hadde*
"You have heard *through* my mother the labour they had"
 - e. EModE (1622). *Harh he more benefit by his horse rhen by his Minisrer*
"He gets more benefit *through* his horse than *through* his minister"
 - f. ModE (1785). *The minisrer could nor adminisrered jusrice in his person bur only by his judges*
 - g. ModE (1833). *Send check by bearer*
 - h. ModE (1866). *The lord was presenr either by person or by a deputy*

III.4.2. Instrumental Schema *BY* (8)

Description: The LM is again construed as an agentive human being. The schema

profiles a frame of progeneration. Both TR and LM are the parents of a child, **here** treated as ground. The parent having the child is **seen** as TR. The LM is the begetting parent by means of whom the TR has the **offspring**. The following sentence illustrates the scherna:

50. *He had a ron by his second wife*

Historical data **serves** again as **evidence** for the productivity of scherna **BY** (8) in former times:

51.

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| a. OE | <i>Be ðære he hæfðe ane dohrer</i>
"He had a daughter by that (woman)" |
| b. ME (1393). | <i>And he had fyue sones by hus furste wyf</i>
"And he had five sons by his first wife" |
| c. EModE (1576). | <i>He begar me by Simplicitie</i>
"He begot me by Simplicity" |
| d. ModE (1805). | <i>A bastard child, which a young woman had had by rhe defendant</i> |

IV. **BY** AS MARKER OF PASSIVE AGENT

In this section I will treat the genesis of the use of **by** as a marker of the agent in the passive construction. For analytical purposes I will refer to this special scherna as **BY** (AGENT). Langacker (1991a) treats **BY** (AGENT) as stemming from **BY** (1). This process could be summarized as follows: from scherna **BY** (1) he proposes an extension to the domain of things created, where the semantic relation between the two participants in the frame, namely "the creator" and "the thing created", would be conceptualized in spatial terms since both entities prototypically share the spatial configuration rendered by scherna **BY** (1), i.e.: "the thing created" is a TR allocated in relation to "the creator" as LM: *the painting by Picasso*, where *the painting* is TR and *Picasso*, LM. The scherna of creation is highlighted, while the spatial salience motivating the application of the spatial scherna remains in the shade. From this highlighted domain of creation, the scherna passes onto a generic domain of activities carried out by agents. In these terms, **BY** (AGENT) emerges when the activity is treated as TR and conceptualized in relation to the agent as LM.

In my present analysis I will reject Langacker's view. I consider the domain of creation too restricted a frame to account for the emergence of the complex semantic structure of **BY** (AGENT), because agentive semantic notions cannot simply arise by metonymic inference from a single frame. Besides, by linking **BY** (AGENT) directly to spatial **BY** (1), this controversial position overlooks the relevant semantic input from the instrumental senses **by** conveys. In my opinion, **BY** (AGENT) can be better accounted as the natural consequence of extending instrumental schemata onto **construing** a denoted agent as the entity by means of which an event **takes** place.

Description: The LM profiles a denoted agent. The TR is an event, **which** profiles as **subject** the patient participant of the transitive event. The LM is construed as the means for the event TR to take place.

It is a common view in linguistic analysis nowadays to regard passive phenomena as a shift in focal perspective by means of which the patient participant is given special

prominence for pragmatic or conceptual purposes (Givón 1990; Chafe 1976). This shift is gained by backgrounding the agent to an oblique position. Languages with such passive constructions along with a viable **instantiation** of the agent differ in the way they **treat** this agentive argument so that it shows up for **informative** purposes as a demoted participant in the predication. English has **been** favoring from early modern times the treatment of demoted agents as instrumentals according to configurations rendered by *by*. However, this coding pattern has **been** competing with others, **namely** *from*, *of* and *through*. In the paragraphs that follow, I will attempt to show how a coding pattern based on *by* gained over **its** historical competitors.

In Old English dialects, the use of the preposition *fram/from* was **common** to convey the agent in the passive construction. This coding pattern was motivated by the **preference** of viewing this agentive argument as the cause of the event. Sentences in (52) illustrate this pattern. In OE there was yet another coding based on the preposition *of*, which was motivated by the very **same** causal pattern as *from*, although it **enjoyed** a marginal use during Anglo-Saxon times. This causal pattern seems to **have been** common across Old Germanic, as modern languages still **evidence**: German von "of/from"; and Scandinavian, Icelandic *af* or Norwegian *av*, both "of/off" (more marginally "from"):

52.
 a. OE *He weard ofslagen from his agnum monnum*
 "He got murdered by his own men"
 b. OE *He wæs gelæred from anum biscope*
 "He was taught by a bishop"

Middle English dialects favored however a **construal** based on *of* throughout the Medieval period. It seems that *of* was foregrounded as innovative while *from* remained more in the shade, and turned rather archaic. Sentences (53.a) and (53.b) illustrate the use of *of* in OE, while (53.c/d/e) show the default coding agents received in Medieval dialects:

53.
 a. OE (893). *Æþelingas wurdon afliesmed of Sciddium*
 "The nobles were pur to flight by Shythians"
 b. OE (1050). *Æðelstan wæs of Myrcum gecoren to cyng*
 "Aethelstan was chosen king by Myrce"
 c. EME (1154). *Wæl luued of the kinge and of alle gode men*
 "(he) was loved by the king and by all good men"
 d. EME (1225). *Ich wolde þet heo weren of alle iholden*
 "I would like that they were kept by all"
 e. ME (1380). *Þe puple trowiþ betere þerto whanne it is seyd of a maistir*
 "People believe it more when that is said by a master"

In Anglo-Saxon we **also find** an alternative coding pattern for the demoted agent based on instrumental **construals**. This instrumental coding pattern was motivated from construing a backgrounded agent as a case of an instrumental agency by means of which a given event **takes** place. In OE, the preposition *through* was often used to convey these instrumental agencies, as shown by sentences in (54). These instrumental senses held rather stable throughout the Medieval period and passed onto modern times, when *through* was **further** **specialized** to render human **intermediaries** as in sentences (54.f) and (54.g):

- 54.
- a. OE (1000). *we þæt gehyrdon þurh halige bec*
"We heard that by means of the holy books"
 - b. ME *all þat sorwe and myschance schall turne ro himself þorg vertu of þat sron*
"all that sorrow and ill-luck will turn onto him by virtue of that stone"
 - c. EModE (1579). *Abel was slayne ... through the handes of his brother Cain*
 - d. Mod (1885). *Every notice sent through the post in a prepaid registered letter*
 - e. PDE *A conception of politics derived through book*
 - f. ModE (1793). *The answer given ro Monsieur Lesardier was through a young gentleman*
 - g. PDE *He applied for the grant through a closefrend*

The preposition *through* served as well in OE as a marginal marker of demoted agent, as illustrated by sentences (55.a) and (55.b) below. This coding choice evinces that an instrumental coding pattern was already active in the mind of Anglo-Saxon speakers. The instrumental based *construal* was highlighted during later Medieval times and competed with the favored causal pattern instantiated already at that time by *of*, as shown in (53) above. We still find examples of *through* as marker of a demoted agent up to the midst of the Early Modern English times, around the 16th century, as illustrated by (55.d) below:

- 55.
- a. OE (900). *Seo hergung wæs þurh Alaricum geworden*
"The ravaging was carried out by Alarice"
 - b. OE (971). *Heofonrices duru sceal þonne þurh þe onrened beon*
"The doors of the Kingdom of Heaven shall be then kindled by you"
 - c. ME (1425). *Vnnethes he was I-draw vp thrgoh his felowes. that mych put har byf in aduentur for ro saw his lif*
"he was almost drown up by his fellows, (for) he put their lives at risk in order to save his"
 - d. EModE (1597). *The skinne beinge lift vp through some seruant, or through the chymrgiane with his pinsers*

As the use of *through* evinces from sentences in (55), the instrumental coding seemed to be at work from early historical times, and competed with the causal pattern realized by *of*. The process leading to the choice of *by* as optimal coding of agent in the passive seems to be derived from several factors. Schemata from *by* and *through* conveyed similar instrumental nuances during the earlier Medieval times, but in a time when the instrumental pattern was still marginal in Old English dialects, and *only* realized by *through*, some schemata from *by* were already active in the system as conveyors of intermediary agencies. As we have seen in section (III.4), *BY* (7) was already active in the system to render this configuration, while *BY* (8) served as well to *construe* the secondary agent in the frame of progeneration in a rather stable way. Sentences (49.a) and (51.a) are repeated here in (56) to illustrate these uses of *by*:

56.
 a. OE *He him onsænde be his cnihtum twa spyrtan*
 "He sent him two spears through his knights"
 b. OE *Be ðære he hæfðe ane dohrer*
 "He had a daughter by that (woman)"

These schemata would often convey instances of possible two-fold interpretations, both as **BY (7)**/ **BY (8)** and/or as **BY (AGENT)**. Consider for this purpose the following sentences, both from OE and EME times:

57.
 a. OE *Pa þing þe be him wærum geworden*
 "The things that were created through/(by) him"
 b. OE *Be þam men ic eom mid childe*
 "I am with a child by that man"
 c. EME (1205). *Ygærne was mid childe bi Uther*
 "Ygaern was with a child by Uther"
 d. ME (1382). *Alle þingis ben maad bi him*
 "All things were made through/(by) him"

Sentence (57.a) profiles a human being as the LM of by and rendered an interpretation based on schema **BY (7)**, as in the modern reading given by *through*, where the construction profiles the agency of an intermediary participant. However, this sentence could also naturally get construed as an emergent schema of **BY (AGENT)**, since the instrumental coding pattern was already active in the conceptual system of an Anglo-Saxon speaker, realized by means of *through*, as shown in (55.a) and (55.b) above. This is somehow clearer in sentences (57.b) and (57.c) rendered by schema **BY (8)**. These sentences profile the pregnancy state of the TR, and this state is thought of as due to the highlighted agency of the other agentive party, LM. Sentence (57.d) comes from a latter period, and could again be ambiguous to the Medieval speaker without the appropriate context. These sentences are given here as evidence of the first sprout of **BY (AGENT)**.

The question that remains is whether **BY (AGENT)** emerged in the system from inferential re-interpretation from actual contextual co-occurrence with instances of schemata **BY (7)** and **BY (8)**. However, it is perhaps too venturesome to signal sentences like those in (57) as the actual pragmatic means for the spreading of the new category (cf. Traugott, 1988), where a direct contextual correlation may occur enabling inferential readings. In my opinion, semantic grounds account for the very emergence of the ambiguity, and they can as well provide conceptual motivation for the extension of the new schema. In other words, **BY (AGENT)** does not only result from direct inference from **BY (7)** (or **BY (8)**), since the choice of **BY (7)** to conceptualize agentive parties in events was not random in the first place, but responded instead, to the instrumental coding pattern already active in Old English where agencies are metaphorically seen as means for a given event to take place.

Historical documents attest schema **BY (AGENT)** in the very late Medieval period. The OED dates the first entry for such an agentive construal as late as 1400, see sentence (58.a) below. Literary texts of this later period normally show a more-conservative register of the dialect being represented, and one could safely posit a much earlier date for the emergence of the schema among the language of the innovative lower classes (Leith, 1983). This claim is further supported by the findings of Peitsara (1992), who has a similar position in this

respect. On the basis of **evidence taken** from a large **corpus** of different sources and **genre**, she demonstrates that **by** was already extremely common in 15th century texts, and concludes that **BY** (AGENT) could hardly **have been** rare in the preceding **century**⁸.

No **matter** how late schema **BY** (AGENT) may **have** arisen, it was **slowly** fore-grounded and **finally** gained over through around the 16th century. It is around **this** time when the coding for the demoted agent based on **by** established **itself** as PDE **BY** (AGENT). This dynamics reminds of the preference of **of over from** with regard to the causal coding pattern. It is **difficult** though, to **provide** convincing explanations for the preference of **by** over through in this **crucial** period in the **formation** of the standard. **They** could perhaps be sought at a **semantic level** since **by** was gaining much ground as a marker of instrumental nuances. On the other hand, the socio-cultural pressure on the hands of **Latinized** grammarians for the **emergence** of a prestigious variety of the **language** as standard (Gorlach 1991) **would** as well **have** motivated a general trend to specialize grammatical markers to grammatical functions. The following are historical sentences illustrating **BY** (AGENT):

58.

- a. ME (1400). *þe Cytee was destroyed by hem of Greece*
"The city was destroyed by those from Greece"
- b. ME (1461). *Assigned be the commissioners*
- c. EModE (1549). *There was ever by the wit of man so well devised*
- d. EModE (1587). *Slaine miserable in prison be the duke Albanie*
- e. EModE (1682). *The walls of it were built by Diocletian*
- f. ModE (1848). *John was compelled by the Barons to sign the articles*

As I have mentioned above, in later Medieval times both the ablative/causal coding pattern realized by **of** and the instrumental one based on **by** (and more marginally on through), were already competing to gain space in the system. As the data suggests the cognitive **salience** of instrumentality won over the causal **pattern**⁹, and as a direct consequence the coding based on **of** ceased to be productive to encode the demoted agent of a prototypical transitive event viewed under passive perspective, but **became** restricted to construe the demoted agent of a mental process, as sentences in (59) illustrate. However, this **later** schema has **also become** unproductive in PDE, and predications **formed** on this pattern may sound rather archaic nowadays:

59.

- a. EModE (1548). *Communion, I am commaunded of God, especially to moue and exhorre you*
- b. EModE (1550). *The Principies of Christen Religion, to be known of the faythful*
- c. EModE (1600). *I have been told so of many*
- d. EModE (1611). *Being wamed of God in a dreame*
- e. ModE (1725). *A wretched stanger, and of all unknown!*
- f. ModE (1847). *Otho was not loved of his kinsfolk in his home*

V. SCHEMA **BY** (9) AS EXTENSION OF **BY** (AGENT):

The schema evokes the frame of creation where a human agent is **seen** as producing a given entity with an esthetic value. Under the conceptual **construal** of such an event the entity being created is given a prominent status and it is treated as TR. Schema **BY** (9) only

profiles the relation between the creator and the creation as two nouns within a single NP, however this relation is based on conceiving the creation event as **conceptually** viewed from the passive perspective. Hence, the creator, or the author, is thought of as a case of demoted agent and it is thus treated accordingly via a natural extension from schema **BY** (AGENT). This claim is further supported by historical data, since schema **BY** (9) does not show up until the Early Modern period of the language, only when schema **BY** (AGENT) had a stable position in the system as conveyer of a demoted agent, as illustrated by sentences in (60) below. This evidence proves as further inadequate Langacker's (1991a) views on this creation frame being the semantic precursor of **BY** (AGENT):

- 60.
- | | |
|------------------|---|
| a. EModE (1570). | <i>The Schoolemaster by Roger Ascham</i> |
| b. EModE (1673). | <i>Poems & c. upon Several Occasions by Mr. John Milton</i> |
| c. ModE (1779). | <i>Can the representations of moon-light, even by Homer, Milton, and Shakespeare, be more exquisitely finished?</i> |
| d. ModE (1832). | <i>I must get 'Manstein' directly, if it be by young Moskoffsky</i> |
| e. PDE | <i>The picture by Picasso</i> |

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have accounted for the emergence of the preposition *by* as the marker of a demoted agent in English passive, in the shape of a schema I have treated as **BY** (AGENT). The analysis has been thought of as an instance of a radial network set up by means of interconnected senses. I have claimed along the paper that schema **BY** (AGENT) arose in *by*'s semantic network as a natural extension from historically prior, rather stable instrumental schemata. I have also introduced different data from different historical periods in an attempt to show how the different senses were diachronically shaping out the radial category. My present claims and analysis of the genesis of **BY** (AGENT) are virtually opposite to Langacker's (1991a). He basically proposes that **BY** (AGENT) is an elaboration from schema **BY** (9) which in turn results as a direct extension from the static spatial schema I have treated as **BY** (1). I have argued along the paper that this solution is inadequate for it ignores both the fundamental linkage relation between instrumental senses and **BY** (AGENT). On the other hand, it does not regard historical data, especially on the late emergence schema **BY** (10). In figure (7) below, I give a representation of the way *by* schemata interconnect in a radial semantic structure from **BY** (1) all the way to **BY** (AGENT) and **BY** (9) via main instrumental extensions.




Figure (7)

≈ : extension via meraphor

Examples to illustrate the schemata:

BY (1): (1). *I have a cottage by the big lake* ; *BY (2)*: (11. a). OE. *Wif þe biþ be anum man* "The woman who lives with a man"; *BY (2')*: (13). *He wrote the letter all by himself* ; *BY (3)*: (21). *I went by Perer's office on my way home* ; *BY (4)*: (28). *She came to the city by the highway* ; *BY (4')*: (48). *Master workmen may received instructions by way of drafts, models or frames* ; *BY (5)*: (39. b). OE *gif he gangan mæge bi srafe* "if he could walk with a stick"; *BY (6)*: (41). *Mary took the child by the hand* ; *BY (INSTR)*: (36). *Mary broke the door open by hitting it with an ax* ; *BY (7)*: (49. b). ME (1300). *Dario hir wor by a spye* "Dario came to know about it through a spy" ; *BY (8)*: (50). *He had a son by his second wife* ; *BY (AGENT)*: (58. a). ME (1400). *þe Cyree was destroyed by hem of Greece* "The city was destroyed by those from Greece" ; *BY (9)*: (60. e). PDE. *The picture by Picasso*.

NOTES

1. Among the large number of schemata of *by* which are not treated in this paper, most relevant perhaps are those concerning temporal extensions as in, *she sleeps by night* or *she got to the station by five*. Further minor schemata are illustrated by the following sentences: *the horse won by two feet*; *she received letters by the thousands*; *she pays by the night*; *that's a by-road*; *it's fine by me*; *she plays by the rules*, etc.

2. PDE data comes **mainly** from **native informants**. I ave **also** consulted the following dictionaries: *Webster's Third New International Dicrionary* (1961). Merriam Company; *The Random House Dicrionary of rhe English Longuage*. Second Edition (1983). NY. Random House; *The Arnerican Heritage Dicrionary of rhe English Longuage* (1980). Boston. Houghton Mifflin Company.

3. The historical data provided in this paper come from different sources: *The Oxford English Dicrionary* (2nd Edition) (1989). Prepared by J. A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford Clarendon Press; *A Middle English Dicrionary* (1963). Bradley. Oxford University Press; *The Oxford Dicrionary of English Etymology* (1966). Onions, C.T. (ed.). Oxford Clarendon Press.

4. This schema has **grammaticized** in complex prepositions in PDE such as: **beside, below, beneath and behind**.

5. Readings with a **by rhe side of** construction may sound redundant to the modern speaker, **because by** alone can render a similar configuration.

6. In historical times the landmark could **also** be construed as a "way", for ways were still prototypical spatial configurations in the landscape. In PDE this strict spatial meaning has **been lost** in favor of a more abstract interpretation based on functionality.

7. I take a canonical **instrument** to be **here** an object used by the agent to achieve an action-goal, as the **hammer** in, *Mary broke rhe window wirh a hammer*.

8. Peitsara (1992) **explains the emergence** of **by** over **of** as due to a tendency to avoid the functional overload that **of** already had in the Medieval system. I am **thankful** to one **of** my anonymous reviewers for pointing this **reference** out to me.

9. There is no apparent explanation for the reason why the instrumental pattern was the one **preferred**. One runs the risk of becoming too speculative **if** arguing for the role played by psychological values in the conception of an individual as a functional **part** of society, which was **under** great modification from a Medieval **rural**-oriented society towards a more city-oriented society in the Renaissance. This explanation **would specially** be fitted for London and the dialect spoken in the area. A similarphenomenon may **also** apply to **the** urban centers of **the** Netherlands where a similar instrumental coding emerges, but it **leaves** unaccounted the **survival** of causal partems in other Germanic urban dialecrs, like those spoken in German or Scandinavian ceries.

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Metaphors for Metaphors

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ABSTRACT

This paper rises the issue of how the concept of metaphor is understood in three views of linguistics and/or philosophical theorizing of metaphor. The theories to be considered are: the interaction theory (as represented by Black 1993), the pragmatic theory (as discoursed by Searle 1993) and the cognitivist theory (as elaborated by Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993). The paper goes even further by taking into consideration the metaphorical ways in which the different authors talk about metaphor. The main findings of the study are the following: (1) scientific language is deeply metaphorical; (2) despite the radically different views on metaphor expressed by the three schools, the metaphorical ways of dealing with metaphor is strikingly similar; and (3) the methods used in cognitive linguistics prove successful even on this metalinguistic level.

KEY WORDS: metaphor for metaphor, meta-metaphor, comparison theory, interaction theory, pragmatic theory, cognitivist theory

RESUMEN

Este artículo plantea el tema de cómo el concepto de metáfora se percibe desde tres perspectivas de la lingüística y/o de la teoría filosófica de la metáfora. Las teorías a tratar son: la teoría de la interacción (representada por Black 1993), la teoría pragmática (planteadas por Searle 1993) y la teoría cognitivista (elaborada por Lakoff y Johnson 1980 y Lakoff 1993). El artículo va más allá al tomar en consideración las formas metafóricas en las que los distintos autores hablan de la metáfora. Los principales hallazgos del estudio son los siguientes: (1) el lenguaje científico es profundamente metafórico; (2) a pesar de los puntos de vista radicalmente opuestos con respecto a la metáfora expresados por estas tres escuelas, las formas metafóricas de tratar la metáfora son notablemente similares; y (3) los métodos empleados en la lingüística cognitiva resultan ser eficaces incluso en este nivel metalingüístico.

PALABRAS CLAVE: metáfora de metáfora, meta-metáfora, teoría comparatista, teoría de la interacción, teoría pragmática, teoría cognitivista

I. INTRODUCTION

The presupposition in **connection** with scientific language has long **been** that it has to be literal, **because** this is the only way reality can be described in a properly - precise and unambiguous, in one word - objective way. No tropes or other examples of figurative language are acceptable in a desirably testable characterization of the surrounding world. This paper is meant to **prove** that scientific language is much less literal than it is thought to be.

The most **intriguing** way to **indicate** this **turned** out to be the promising possibility of looking at the different theories of metaphor just to find that even when discussing metaphor the scientists cannot get rid of metaphorical expressions. To notice this we need a certain meta-linguistic attitude, which focuses not only on *what* is said but **also** on *how* it is conveyed.

As a foundation to my analysis, in the **first** part of my paper **I** will **provide** a short summary of **three** different theories of metaphor: the interaction theory (based on Black 1993), the pragmatic theory (based on Searle 1993 and Sadock 1993) and the cognitivist theory (based on Lakoff and **Johnson** 1980 and Lakoff 1993). In the second part **I** will present a detailed analysis of the metaphors used for metaphors - which **I** will **call** *meta-metaphors* - by the above mentioned linguists. The methods used in the analysis are cognitivist ones, an approach which **I** myself consider the closest to the **nature** of metaphor and the best to **serve** my purposes.

II. METAPHOR AS A CONCEPT IN A VARIETY OF THEORIES

The interaction theory

It **is true** of **all** the theories **I** am going to discuss that they do not accept the traditional Aristotelian view of metaphor as grasping a similarity between two objects. In this so-called comparison theory metaphor is nothing more than a concocted **simile** stating that an object resembles another in **certain** clear aspects. In this view the speaker could **have** as well formulated his description of the object in question in literal statements, which express exactly the same idea in a much more precise way. In other words, any metaphor can be paraphrased, that is, the figurative expression can any time be **communicated** in a **down-to-earth** literal way. The speaker's using **tropological** expressions is a **mere whim**, a deviation, an aberration, so metaphor is parasitic on 'normal usage'. Metaphors are vague, inessential frills, which can be appropriate for the purposes of politicians and poets, but not for 'serious people' **like** scientists.

The interaction theory - summarised by Black in his 1993 work (see bibliography) - **leaves** behind many axioms of the comparison theory while keeping others. For example, it considers metaphor to **mediate some kind of analogy** or **structural** correspondence between two concepts, saying that this is the correct insight behind the classical comparison view of metaphor as an ellipticated **simile**. But it continues by saying that «**Implication is** not the same as covert identity: **Looking** at a scene through blue spectacles is different from **comparing** that scene with something **else**» (Black 1993:30). Moreover, metaphor in Black's view **is** not replaceable, by **uttering** it the speaker means just what he said and feels he had a 'flash of insight' rather than just a perception of a similitude.

The reason why the interaction theory is called so is that the focus is not placed on the resemblance between the two **nodes** of the metaphor but, on the contrary, upon the verbal opposition and interaction between the two semantic contents. The literal-figurative distinction, on the other hand, is still kept: in Black's view the tacit knowledge of the literal meaning induces a feeling of dissonance or tension between the literal **and** metaphorical interpretations of the metaphor.

Another **important** issue the interaction theory raises is the question of the so-called 'dead metaphors'. Black **does** not consider dead metaphors to be metaphors: «This [i.e. the trite opposition between 'dead' and 'live' metaphors] is no more **helpful** than, say, treating a corpse as a special case of a person: A so-called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical **use**» (Black 1993:25).

The interaction theory **also** introduces the idea that metaphors are not necessarily only based on pre-existing connections between two concepts, but can **also generate** new knowledge and insight by changing relationships between the **things** designated. To **illustrate** how metaphors can actually **create** similarities Black uses a metaphor: he asks, 'Did the other side of the moon exist before it was **seen**?'. The answer is undoubtedly 'Yes'. To the question 'Did the view of Mount Everest from a point one hundred feet above its **summit** exist before anybody had **seen** that view?' the answer is again 'Yes', but only in a counterfactual way: If anybody had **been** in the position to view the **mountain** from the point specified, it would **have** looked the same as it **does** now from an aeroplane. If, then, we speak about views, it is logical that we **also** need viewers, and the view that is actually **seen** is a fact about the mountain as well as about the viewer. Therefore, metaphors are cognitive instruments **indispensable** for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then **truly** present (Black 1993: 36-37).

In sum, the interaction theory views metaphor as the interaction between two semantic **fields** expressed by the two end-points of a metaphor; its special effect coming from the tension between the literal and the figurative meanings; metaphors **have** a strong *raison d'être* since they are not replaceable and they can **create** new relationships between two concepts.

The pragmatic theory

Just **like** interactionalists, pragmatists - **primarily** Searle 1993 and Sadock 1993 - also stand off by opposing their views to the traditional comparison theory. In their view, too, metaphors are essentially not paraphrasable, **because** in most of the cases there is no literal expression that conveys exactly what we mean, **because** «without using the metaphorical expression, we **will** not reproduce the semantic content **which occurred** in the hearer's comprehension of the **utterance**» (Searle 1993:111). If we try to paraphrase a metaphor, we either do not **find** a corresponding literal statement or, even if we do, it is somehow inadequate, **something is lost** in meaning. **Similarity** is viewed as a vacuous predicate, **because** any two **things** are similar in **some** respect or another, and how do we know exactly which respect the speaker has **in** mind when uttering a metaphor? (Searle's example is *Sally is a block of ice*. where there do not seem to be any literal similarities between **objects** which are cold and people who are unemotional.) But we still understand the speaker perfectly, and **the** way this **is** done **is** exactly what pragmatists are interested in.

Searle compares metaphors to irony and indirect speech acts in the respect that **in** all three cases there is a break between what the speaker says (**i.e.** sentence meaning) and what he means (**i.e.** utterance meaning). The pattern to this is:

'S is P' means in fact 'S is R',

where the first, that is, the sentence meaning, is never metaphorical, while the second, the utterance meaning, can be metaphorical. The way metaphors are understood is the following: when the utterance is defective if taken literally, the hearer looks for an utterance meaning that differs from the sentence meaning and that is no longer defective (Searle 1993:103). To do this, speaker and hearer must share (i) certain principles that associate the P term with a set of possible values of R, and (ii) some strategies that enable them, given their knowledge of the S term, to restrict the range of possible values of R to the actual value, where only those possible values of R which determine possible values of S can be actual values of R (Searle 1993:107).

While Searle - although conceiving of metaphor as a 'roundabout' (1993:89) way of expression - insists that metaphors are intrinsically irreplaceable, Sadock sees metaphor as an indirect way of assenting something which might have been communicated directly in terms of the conventions of language (1993:43). In explaining this, Sadock states that metaphor appears to be in conflict with the Gricean cooperative principle, therefore the hearer is forced to seek a figurative, but cooperative, intent behind the utterance (ibid.).

What made me list the two authors under the same heading is that both seem to push metaphor out of the realm of descriptive linguistics: Searle suggests that metaphor is not a question of language per se but one of language use; Sadock even risks the statement that all noniiteral speech falls outside the domain of synchronic linguistics, because the basis of, say, metaphor is a kind of indirection that is shared with nonianguage behavior (Sadock 1993:42). In this view, the problem of metaphor is strictly a pragmatic question.

Pragmatists, too, have something to say about dead metaphors: Sadock considers it a commonplace that they were «alive and kicking at some time in the past» (1993:44) (note that in formulating this he places the phenomenon in the realm of diachronic linguistics); Searle goes even further by saying oxymoronically that «dead metaphors have lived on» (1993:88). This means in his interpretation that they have become dead through continual use, but their continual use is a clue that they satisfy some semantic need.

To sum up, in the pragmatic theory metaphor is conceived as the relationship between what is said and what is meant to be said; it is not paraphrasable, but it is essentially not a question of language itself, but one of language use, therefore it is not a proper subject of traditional linguistics.

The cognitivist theory

The most strikingly new idea of cognitive linguistics - represented by Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993 - is the falsity of the whole distinction between literal and figurative meaning (Lakoff 1993:205). In a thorough and detailed manner, Lakoff illustrates very convincingly in his 1993 article that a great many common concepts of ours are metaphorical and that metaphor is a fixed pan of our conceptual system (ibid.).

The cognitivist view takes over and develops many ideas of the theories described above while rejecting others. From the interaction theory it agrees with the idea that metaphors can create new similarities, and that there is a structural correspondence between the two concepts a metaphorical relationship is applied to. On the other hand, it drops the idea that dead metaphors are not real metaphors: conventional metaphors are considered especially interesting for the study of metaphor, because they reveal certain fundamental

processes of thinking, and **fit** into a whole range of correspondences **also** present in novel metaphors.

From the pragmatic theory cognitivists adopt the idea that metaphor can be interpreted as a nonlinguistic behaviour by saying that metaphor is not **simply** a matter of language but of thought and reason (Lakoff 1993:203). However, they reject the somewhat simplifying view that metaphor would just be a **mere** problem of language use. **In** the cognitive interpretation metaphor is a central **part** of synchronic linguistics **because** much of our semantic system is metaphorical (Lakoff 1993:239).

In the cognitivist view metaphor **means** understanding one domain of experience (i.e. target domain) in **terms** of a very different domain of experience (i.e. source domain). The pattern is:

'A is B'

where A is more abstract, less concrete, and B is less abstract, more concrete. Lakoff's 'A is B' is very much different from Searle's 'S is P', **because** 'S is P' is an actual statement expressing a metaphorical relationship between two actually appearing *objects* of the world, while 'A is B' is a metaphorical relationship between two *concepts*, which never appears like this in real-life statements but which has many different linguistic surface-manifestations which relate to each-other in a systematic way. For example, one never encounters the statement THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS - which is an 'A is B' relation - in actual real-life conversations, but one may very well hear utterances such as:

What is the *foundation* of your theory? The theory needs more *support*. We need to *construct* a *strong* argument instead of that *shaky* one. We *have* put together the *framework* of the theory.

These are surface **manifestations** of one and the **same** underlying *conceptual* metaphor (and note, none of them are of the structure 'S is P', but could be **reformulated** as such, if needed).

Cognitivists **also** noticed that metaphors **have** an **inner** structure called *mapping*, which is a set of ontological correspondences between the **two** domains of experience. In these mappings the so-called Invariance **Principle rules**: the mappings preserve the cognitive topology of **the source** domain, consistent with the **inherent structure** of the target domain (Lakoff 1993:215).

The **insight** which gives the cognitivist view great credibility **and** reliability is that these conceptual metaphors are not isolated, but **systematic**: **separate** metaphors are naturally grouped in our conceptual system and, together with relations based on other **principles** (like metonymy). they form so-called *idealized cognitive models (ICMs)*, which structure our thinking and understanding of the world. **Also**, these metaphors do not float **in** the air, but are motivated by being grounded **in** nonmetaphorical experiences.

To illustrate this, let us turn back to Searle's example of an 'S is P' relation: *Sally is a block of ice*. Searle correctly states that there is no literal **similarity** between **objects** that are **cold** and people who are unemotional, but **does** not give a plausible explanation for why the speaker would use this utterance to characterize Sally. Lakoff comes up with a very convincing one: he **notices** that there is a conceptual metaphor of the form 'A is B' that gives rise to a whole range of metaphorical expressions: AFFECTION IS WARMTH (and the

opposite INDIFFERENCE IS COLD) (Lakoff 1993:239).

We received a *warm* welcome. Our friendship has come to be just *lukewarm*.
She is absolutely *frigid*. She sent him an *icy* glance. He was *cool* to me today.

In sum, in the cognitivist approach metaphor is interpreted as understanding one (target) domain in terms of another (source) domain of experience in a way which is systematic and motivated, and which structures our conceptual system and helps us reflect our knowledge from more delineated concepts to less tangible ones in the understanding of the world outside.

III. META-METAPHORS

From a theoretical account let us now turn to a more practical question: what are the metaphors linguists belonging to the above mentioned schools use when talking about metaphor? Is there a basic difference between the ways schools so different in nature use metaphors for metaphors? In seeking an answer to these questions I applied the cognitivist method of grasping the meta-metaphors in 'A is B' structures. In the first unit of this part of my paper I am going to present meta-metaphors that appear in both the cognitivist and the non-cognitivist (interactional or pragmatic) approaches. The second unit will consist of meta-metaphors which only partially overlap in the two kinds of approaches, while the third unit will enumerate meta-metaphors which are totally different, sometimes even contradictory. The examples are taken from Lakoff and Johnson 1980 (hereafter LJ), Lakoff 1993 (hereafter L), Lakoff and Tumer 1989 (hereafter LT) and Black 1993 (hereafter B), Searle 1993 (hereafter Se), Sadock 1993 (hereafter Sa), Shibbes 1971 (hereafter Sh), Kuhn 1993 (hereafter K), Van Noppen and Hols 1990 (hereafter VH) respectively. Groups of examples preceded by 'I.' are cognitivist examples, those preceded by 'II.' are non-cognitivist ones. The Arabic numerals following the abbreviations indicate page numbers.

Overlapping meta-metaphors

The most general meta-metaphor structuring the way linguists on both sides think about metaphors is METAPHOR IS A MEANS. This meta-metaphor is a manifestation of the more comprehensive event structure, which goes like this:

States are locations (bounded regions in space).
Changes are movements (into or out of bounded regions).
Actions are self-propelled movements.
Purposes are destinations.
Means are paths (to destinations).
Difficulties are **impediments** to motion. (...)
Long term, purposeful activities are journeys. (Lakoff 1993:220)

The metaphors we have to do with fit into this general structure like this: the two most basic human activities are conceptualized as 1) ACTIVITY IS WORK and 2) ACTIVITY IS MOTION. And since when using metaphors we are engaged in the activity

of understanding, along the above lines understanding can be conceptualized in the following way: (i) ACTIVITY IS WORK / UNDERSTANDING IS WORK / METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT and (ii) ACTIVITY IS MOTION / UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY / METAPHOR IS A PATH, where both IMPLEMENT and PATH are **subcases** of the concept MEANS. ((ii) is discussed **later**.)

METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT therefore is a **common** meta-metaphor in both camps of linguists:

I. Metaphors are *tools* / devices (LJ193) for understanding, they can be used / handled / applied and they *serve purposes* (LT xi). They are *mechanisms* (L202) (i.e. more sophisticated *instruments*). We understand abstract concepts by *means* of (LJ115) metaphor. Metaphors give us a *handle* (LJ124) on things.

II. Metaphors can be used (B22). They are versatile and *effective* (B25). They can be relatively dispensable (B26), or can lend *themselves* to elaboration (B26). Metaphor is a cognitive *instrument* (B31) which *functions* / *operates* / *works* (B22). Metaphors *express* (= press out) thoughts. They *satisfy* semantic needs (Sa48).

A subtype of METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT is METAPHOR IS A VISUAL INSTRUMENT, which is pan of the very generally applied UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor mapped in the following manner:

UNDERSTANDING	IS	SEEING
The person who tries to understand something	corresponds to	the person who makes use of his organ of sight
Ideas to be understood	correspond to	objects to be seen
METAPHORS	ARE	VISUAL INSTRUMENTS

I. Metaphors give insight *in* vague concepts (LJ7). They *highlight* some aspects of concepts while hiding (i.e. *casting* shadow on) others (LJ61). Metaphors do not **only** *indicate* (LJ135) **similarities**, but **also** *reflect* (LJ46) correspondences.

II. Metaphors present insight (B21), *project* implications (B28), they are ontologically *illuminating* (B39), they focus on (B39) conceptual systems. Metaphors are often vague (Se96) and obscure (B20). Metaphor forces us to see (Sh16) reality in a **certain** way, it *clarifies* things (Sh20).

Note the slight difference between the **two** groups of examples: in the cognitivist one metaphors are always clear and **bright**, while in the noncognitivist one they are sometimes vague and obscure, a difference which iconically shows the degree of transparency of the

problem of metaphor in the two approaches.

Another meta-metaphor that can be found on both sides is THE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM IS A BUILDING / METAPHOR IS ITS FRAMEWORK (with a structure of its own):

I. Metaphors are a *fixed part* (L208) of our conceptual system. They *arefundamental* (L229) in our thinking, we *base* our actions on metaphors which *underlie* everyday expressions (L204). The *system of metaphors is built into* (LJ64) the conceptual system, they *structure* our concepts (LJ46). Metaphors *establish* correspondences (LJ96), they are *grounded* (LJ64) in experience. The system of metaphors itself has a tight *inner structure* (L206), *internal consistency* (LJ43), with *portions* (LJ111). Metaphors need empirical *support* (L246), with which they can *serve* as the *basis* (LJ55) for novel metaphors, that is, *extensions*. Metaphors *sharply delineate* (LJ55) abstract concepts.

II. Metaphor has *grounds* and *relations to its grounding* (B19). Metaphors can be *affirmed* (i.e. made firm) (B30). Metaphors *have* a *basis* of their own (Sa42) with *underlying principles* (Sa42). Is metaphor an *edifice* that *rests* on the *rock bottom* of literal similes (Se97)? Metaphor is *deeply embedded* (i.e. firmly fixed in a mass) in our mode of sensibility (Se99). Metaphors *arefundamental* to science and *have* a *wide bearing* (K538). Metaphor *establishes* links between language and the world (K539). Metaphors are *deep* in our communicative system (VH3).

We can easily observe that this is the most widely used meta-metaphor in both the cognitivist and the noncognitivist works, which on its pan again *proves* how 'deeply embedded' metaphor is in our way of *thinking*.

Partially overlapping meta-metaphors

In this subchapter I am discussing meta-metaphors which *otherwise* correspond to *each-other* in the case of the two *parties*, but which *have* entailments or subtypes that are different and lead to imponent *conclusions*. The first very general meta-metaphor that appears is METAPHOR IS A HUMAN BEING. This has the following examples:

I. We *think* that *dead* metaphors are very much *alive* (LJ55). Metaphor is *robust*; it *embodies* generalizations (L205).

II. Metaphors can be *oíd* (B35) / *dead* / *alive and kicking* (Sa44) / *active* (B25).

A common subtype of this meta-metaphor is METAPHOR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR:

I. Metaphors *sanction* / *justify* / *dictate* / *allow* actions, they *have power over* us (LJ142).

II. Metaphors *have power* (B21) / *force* (26) / *an effect* (Sa43) / *immunity to contradiction* (Sa49). Metaphors can be *successful* / *failed* (B22) / *prove rich* (B26)

/ strike, seize (B31) / be feeble or strong (Se87) / achieve justification (Sh1). Metaphor commits the speaker to certain understandings (Se99), supplies and juxtaposes things (K533), captivates us (Sh3), determines how and what we see (Sh9), and it forces us to see reality in a certain way (Sh16).

It is quite **striking** that this SOCIAL SUPERIOR metaphor has a lot more **examples** in the works of noncognitivist than in those of cognitivist authors. This can be interpreted as showing that the problem of metaphor is 'more superior' or 'has more power on' those linguists who **deal** with metaphor in a more traditional and less effective way than on those who represent a contemporary theory of metaphor.

Another subtype of the HUMAN BEING metaphor is METAPHOR IS A CREATOR / PROGENITOR:

I. Metaphor *gives* meaning to form, it *isproductive* (LM21) in the *sense* that it *creates* new understanding (LJ235).

II. Metaphorical use can be *pregnant* (B25). Metaphor can *generate* knowledge (B38), can be a *surrogate* for verbal formulation (B38). Metaphors *call forth / create* similarities (K533).

But the HUMAN BEING meta-metaphor has a subtype which **only turns up** in the works of cognitivist authors: METAPHOR IS AN ASSISTANT.

I. Metaphors *do the job* of understanding *for us*, they *help us* to perform certain actions (LJ95). They *provide* understanding (LJ154).

It is not surprising to find this, **because** metaphor poses a problem for noncognitivist writers, **and** difficulties are not helpful, they are **impediments** to motion, that is, to action, that is, to understanding (as we **have seen** in the event **structure** presented by Lakoff in above).

Previously I **have** discussed the very general meta-metaphor METAPHOR IS A MEANS, which had **two subtypes**: METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT and METAPHOR IS A PATH. The **latter is part** of the following mapping:

UNDERSTANDING	IS	A JOURNEY
The person who tries to understand something	corresponds to	the traveller.
The abstract concepts to be understood	correspond to	the destination.
The concepts and experiences we already possess	correspond to	the starting point.

METAPHOR

IS

A PATH

This meta-metaphor appears in the following forms:

I. Our *field* of research (L219) is metaphor. Is it true that one *gets away from* concrete physical experience, *starts from* the literal meaning and *winds up / arrives at* a metaphorical interpretation (L205)? We understand abstract concepts by way of / *via* metaphors. The theory of metaphor can be *traced back* to Reddy (L204). The *locus* of metaphor is thought (L204). Metaphor *goes beyond the realm* of conventional language (LJ54).

II. Metaphor is a way of **thinking** (VH3). Metaphor is *open-ended* (Se96). Metaphor communicates in an *indirect* way what might **have been** communicated *directly* (Sa43). 'S is P' is a *roundabout way* of asserting that 'S is R' (Se89). Metaphor is sometimes regarded as a *deviation from the normal route* (Sh11).

It is **worth** noting that, although the meta-metaphor appears in both types of writings, the way it **does** is very much different: for cognitivists the metaphor-path is direct, easy to follow, for noncognitivists it is indirect, a roundabout way, or even a deviation. This, again, shows a basic difference in the **attitudes** of the linguists.

In the common METAPHOR IS A MEANS / UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY meta-metaphor two almost contradictory subtypes occur. In the case of cognitivists it is METAPHOR IS A MAP:

I. A *spatial* type of metaphor is *orientational* metaphor (LJ14).

Metaphors are expressed in **fixed patterns** (L210) / *schemas* (L214) / *projections* (L229) / *templates* (L233), which *fit* (LJ83) experience and preserve the cognitive *topology* (L215) of the target *domain*. Metaphors are *guides* (LJ156) for **future actions**.

In the case of noncognitivists it is METAPHOR IS AN OBSTACLE:

II. Metaphor is sometimes a *stumbling block in the path* of the linguist (Sa51). Metaphor is the *locus* of semantic *change* (Sa57). There is a *boundary* between literally and nonliterally conveyed communication (Sa53), a *limit where* meaning *leaves off and figuration begins* (Sa51). There are also *intractable* cases of metaphor (Sa51).

No comment is needed to explain how these **two** meta-metaphors show the way the two **parties deal** with metaphor.

Non-overlapping metaphors

There is a number of meta-metaphors which only appear in the works of either the cognitive or the noncognitive authors. In the former group **only** one but very **powerful** meta-metaphor can be found, and this is METAPHOR IS A SUBSTANCE / RESOURCE:

I. Metaphors *pervade* (LJ3) our way of thinking (like **smells** or fluids). Cultural values are *deeply entrenched* (LJ23) in metaphors (like **in** ground). Metaphors *suffuse* our thoughts (like colour or moisture), they can be *applied* (like ointments or glue) (LJ103) and they won't *mix* (LJ95). Metaphor is *widespread* and it is a *matter* of thought (L202). Like air, metaphor is *omnipresent*, *accessible* to everyone, *irreplaceable* and *indispensable* (LT xi). It is a rich *source* of elaboration (LJ61).

For noncognitivists metaphor is understood in the following metaphorical ways:

METAPHOR IS A DIFFERENT LANGUAGE / TERMINOLOGY
Metaphors **have** to be *translated* / *interpreted* / *explained* (Se98).

METAPHOR IS A HIDDEN OBJECT
We **have** to *spot* metaphors. We are *on the look-out* for metaphors (Se103)

?METAPHOR IS A GAME / PLAY
Metaphor cannot *begin* until the *referents of game* **have been** established (K537). The S term *plays an important role* in metaphor (Se104).

?METAPHOR IS AN ACCIDENT / MISTAKE
Some metaphors are *fatal* for the *simile* thesis (Se98).

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The very **first** conclusion to be drawn is that scientific language is deeply metaphorical. The data enumerated in the above pages **speak** for themselves, and the fact that the reader **does** not **easily** notice them is not to be explained by saying that they are not metaphorical, but that they are so natural and conventional that a meta-linguistic consciousness is needed to throw light on them.

Moreover, metaphors for metaphors can not only be found in **the works** of cognitive linguists, who celebrate the phenomenon of metaphor, but **also** in the scientific discourse of more or less traditional **writers**, who regard metaphor as either **improper** in scientific writing or not a **subject** to be treated in synchronic linguistics at **all**. Why cannot they free themselves of metaphor even when dealing with metaphor **itself**? **Because** metaphor helps them **understand** and express new ideas, **it serves** as a **handle** when **walking** on **swampy** soil.

It is **true** that throughout the analysis **I have been** using the **methodology** of cognitive linguistics, but **this** in itself is not an **explanation** for the **clarity** of the results. If there is nothing to find, the most fantastic **methods** will **also** fail to reach anything. But the picture of meta-metaphors delineated in my **paper** meets **all** the requirements cognitive linguistics has of metaphors, the network of meta-metaphors **is not haphazard** but systematic, it brings understanding to an abstract concept (**i.e.** metaphor) by relating **it** to more concrete concepts (**i.e.** implements, human beings, paths, maps etc.), of which we **have** a much **clearer** understanding and more basic, cultural or bodily, experience. **The** system of meta-metaphors is not accidental but has strong **links** with other metaphors **commonly** used in our thinking (**e.g.** the event structure).

Regarding the two-way distinction of meta-metaphors, namely that of cognitivist and noncognitivist approaches, the most eye-catching finding is that most of the meta-metaphors are similarly used by both **parties**, as presented in II. Is it not strange, one would ask, that when putting **forth** a totally new theory of metaphors, the metaphorical system cognitive linguists use is not radically different from the one used by traditional writers? I do not consider this a failure of my research, on the contrary, I would put this the other way round: the way noncognitivist authors use meta-metaphors is in total correspondence with what cognitivists *say* about how meta-metaphors work! **Despite** their basically different views, interactionalists and pragmatists display the same metaphorical system as cognitivists do, in other words, what noncognitivists say and do **in** their writing is contradictory. On the other hand, what cognitivists say and do is consistent.

This is to say that cognitive **linguistics** **throws** light on **certain** metaphorical processes in scientific discourse, be it traditional or not, which were present in the scientific discourse of earlier authors, too, but in an unconscious way.

A smaller group of meta-metaphors used by the two **parties** is of those which are different. I regard them as iconically showing the linguists' **attitude** towards their own topic: for cognitive theoreticians metaphor is an assistant, a map to orient their quest, an aid and a **resource** to help and feed them mentally, for noncognitivists it is an obstacle in their way, a language or terminology that has to be decoded, a hidden object that has to be found, that is, a problem not very easy to **solve** and understand.

As a **final** conclusion, I **find** the cognitivist position and its **methods** successful in dealing with metaphors for metaphors and with the phenomenon of metaphor **in** general.

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Cognitive and pragmatic aspects of metonymy

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ABSTRACT

Meronymy has been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as a conceptual mapping within a domain which involves a 'stand for' relationship between entities. In this article this conception is revised in order to draw clearer dividing lines between metonymy and metaphor, on the one hand, and between meronymy and related polysemy phenomena, on the other. Considerations of mapping types and of the status of source-target relationships are brought to bear for the understanding of meronymy; also, an analysis of how metonymies are used referentially and predicatively is provided, which introduces the pragmatic dimension into the account. Finally, it is stressed that a sound understanding of the cognitive processes underlying meronymic expressions allows us to understand better their communicative potential. Then, it is proposed that the actual communicative impact of meronymy (and of metaphor, for that matter) can be best studied with the help of some of the conceptual tools provided in pragmatics by Relevance Theory.

KEY WORDS: Metaphor, metonymy, cognition, pragmatics

RESUMEN

La metonimia ha sido descrita por Lakoff y sus colaboradores como una proyección conceptual interna a un dominio en la que una entidad se usa para representar a otra. En este artículo se revisa esta concepción con el fin de trazar, de la forma más clara posible, los límites entre metonimia y metáfora, por una parte, y entre meronimia y otros fenómenos polisémicos relacionados, por otra. Se estudia la importancia de los distintos tipos de proyección y de la naturaleza de la relación entre los dominios fuente y meta para la comprensión del fenómeno meronímico. Asimismo se estudian los usos referencial y predicativo de la meronimia, lo que introduce la perspectiva pragmática en nuestro estudio. Como conclusión, se hace hincapié en que una buena comprensión de los procesos cognitivos que subyacen al uso de expresiones meronímicas nos permite entender mejor su potencial comunicativo. Finalmente, se defienden las ventajas de la aplicación al estudio del valor comunicativo de la meronimia de algunas de las herramientas conceptuales desarrolladas en pragmática por la Teoría de la Relevancia, aplicación que se puede hacer extensible al caso de la metáfora.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Metáfora, metonimia, cognición, pragmática

I. INTRODUCTION

In Cognitive Linguistics metaphor and metonymy have both been explicitly recognized as central to a theory of knowledge organization (see Lakoff. 1987). Metaphor has been discussed at length by Lakoff and his co-workers (see the seminal studies in Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, Lakoff & Turner, 1989, Kovecses, 1990, Lakoff. 1993, Lakoff. 1996). However, metonymy has received considerably less attention, although some cognitive linguists have produced important studies on the topic (e.g., Goossens, 1990, 1995. Croft, 1993, Barcelona, 1996), and we find (rather brief) treatments in Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff & Turner (1989), Lakoff (1987), and Taylor (1989).

The studies mentioned above deal with metonymy in cognitive terms as a conceptual operation which serves a structuring function of our knowledge and which, in the same way as metaphor, has an experiential basis. However, they seem to neglect one important aspect of all knowledge systems: their use potential. It is not very reasonable to study the nature of a knowledge system without reference to its communicative purpose. This is a point that applied linguist Henry Widdowson was most careful to make a long time ago, when discourse analysts and applied linguists were starting to explore the implications of the theories of knowledge organization for linguistic production and processing (see Widdowson, 1984). Our own study attempts to incorporate the study of metonymy into the wider framework of communication theory. This will help us place the phenomenon in due perspective and criticize adequately the deficiencies of the existing accounts in cognitive linguistics.

II. PROBLEMS IN DEFINING METONYMY

Metaphor and metonymy have both been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as mappings between conceptual domains. By means of metaphor we understand and reason about one conceptual domain in terms of another. For example, if I say *John is in trouble* I am conceptualizing trouble as if it were a container or a bounded region. Or take another common every-day expression such as *He has reached his goal*. In it, a person's goal is seen as the destination in a journey. So, what is relevant about metaphors is not that some expression is substituted for another but that there is some sort of interaction between two conceptual domains. Thus, our knowledge about containers tells us, among other things, that these have boundaries that make it difficult to escape, and that once inside a container an entity is subject to the conditions prevailing in the container and may be affected by them. If a person is "in trouble", he or she is affected by it, and there may be impediments for him or her to solve the problematic situation (ie. to "get out" of the situation). These implications are to some extent part of the logic of the metaphor. Similarly, destinations are part of a system which also has its own logic. Reaching a destination involves effort and overcoming impediments to travel. This same logic can be applied to the activity of figuratively reaching a goal. It is because of logical implications like these that the following sentences make full sense:

- (1) At last he reached his goal
- (2) Too many drawbacks prevented him from reaching his goal

- (3) It was/wasn't easy for him to reach his goal
- (4) He's in trouble and he's doing nothing to get out of it
- (5) He's so deep in trouble there's not much he can do about it

A metaphor is, therefore, a mapping (i.e. a set of correspondences) between two conceptual domains where one domain (called the **source**) **serves** to **structure** and reason about another (called the target).

Metonymy has also **been** described as a mapping, but of a rather different kind. Consider the differences between the two following expressions, which we borrow from Lakoff & Johnson (1980:35):

- (6) Inflation robbed me of my savings
- (7) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check

The word "inflation" **does** not refer to a person, but to an entity to which we impute human qualities (we see inflation as an adversary). In contrast, the expression "ham sandwich" **does** refer to a person, but without ascribing human qualities to it. According to Lakoff & Johnson, the former is a case of metaphor which we **call** personification: in it, a non-human entity is mapped onto a human entity. The latter is a case of metonymy: in it, one entity is made to stand for another.

But there is more that we can say about these two expressions. In (6) inflation is **seen** as an adversary that **does** harm to the speaker. This idea is the central implication of the metaphor (ie. that inflation has done the speaker as much **harm** as a thief that had taken all his or her savings would **have** done). And in **principle** this implication is the **only** one that the speaker is entitled to expect the addressee to derive. However, the addressee may want to derive **further** implications by exploring the **connections** between the **source** and the target in the metaphor. For example, a thief's **unlawful** actions may be felt to be treacherous (i.e. the speaker, as an investor, may **have been** caught by surprise). Or the speaker may **feel** he or she has to **take** precautions for the **future** (for example, by reinvesting his or her money more wisely). **Less** central implications **like** these account for the appropriateness of the following expansions of example (6):

- (8) Inflation robbed me of my savings, but I won't **let** that happen again.
- (9) Inflation robbed me of my savings, which I didn't expect.
- (10) Inflation robbed me of my savings, which was a tremendous nuisance.

and they **also** account for the strangeness of the following (which would be best interpreted as examples of irony):

- (11) **?What a nice thing** inflation robbed me of my savings!
- (12) **?Inflation** robbed me of my savings and I will let that happen again.
- (13) **?Inflation** robbed me of my savings **just as I** wanted.

In contrast to what happens in the metaphor in (6), the metonymy in (7) **does** not seem to convey any **special** implication, neither primary nor secondary. In a restaurant context, (7) may **well** be used by a waitress as a convenient device to identify a customer.

In other words, (7) is a definite description whose purpose in the context given is to achieve successful reference in an economical way. The waitress might **have** said something like *The customer who has ordered a ham sandwich is waiting for his check*, but this would be a rather cumbersome expression if **compared** to the more straightforward one used in (7). Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), and Lakoff & Turner (1989), explicitly **deal** with metonymic expressions like (7) in terms of mappings. However, as they are **careful** to point out, the mappings are **carried** out within a single conceptual domain, which, they argue, is what ultimately makes the difference between metaphor and metonymy. In this view, the ham sandwich is mapped to (i.e. it stands for) the customer and it belongs to the same conceptual domain (i.e. the restaurant situation) as the customer. Furthermore, the ham sandwich is made to stand for the customer **because** of its particular salience from the point of view of the speaker's concerns. We can **illustrate** this if we compare (7) above with other expressions like *The brown wallet is waiting for his check* or *The pair of shoes is waiting for his check*. The former would require a **very** different perspectivization of the restaurant situation, while the latter would be particularly infelicitous to refer to a restaurant customer, unless we had a rather uncommon context.

To sum up, Lakoff and his collaborators define metonymy as a conceptual mapping within a single domain where one entity in a conceptual domain stands for another entity in the same domain, or for the whole domain. They also contend that metonymy is used **primarily** for reference (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 103) and that metonymies are not random occurrences but make up conventional systems. In this connection, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) provide us with a sample list of **some common** metonymies like PART FOR WHOLE (e.g. *We don't hire longhairs*), PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (e.g. *I'll have a Lowenbrau*), OBJECT USED FOR USER (e.g. *The sax has the flue today*), CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED (e.g. *Nixon bombed Hanoi*), INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE (e.g. *Exxon has raised its prices again*), THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION (e.g. *Wall Street is in a panic*), and THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT (e.g. *Watergate changed our politics*)²

However, not **all** these observations are **truly** definitional for metonymy and cannot be used to account for the phenomenon adequately as they stand. We can provisionally point out the following problems:

- It is pointless to say that metonymies are primarily used referentially unless it is explained why this is so. Note that metaphors can also be used referentially. For example, an expression like *The pig is waiting for his check* might be used by a waitress to refer to a particularly unpleasant customer who has kept harassing her. Conversely, it is perfectly **feasible** and appropriate to make a predicative use of a metonymy, as in the utterance *John is a real brain*, **meaning** that John is extremely intelligent.

- Metonymies are said to involve a 'stand for' relationship. Thus, "the ham sandwich" in (7) stands for the customer who has ordered a ham sandwich. But we find the same relationship in *The pig is waiting for his check*, where "the pig" **also** stands for the customer. This observation points to a close connection between the so-called 'stand for' relationship and the referential use of both metaphorical and metonymic expressions.

- Making a distinction between mappings within a single domain and across domains, although **tenable**, is a rather tricky issue. We need **some solid** criteria that **help** us to determine unequivocally when we **have** cases of domain-internal or **domain-external** mappings. **The existence** of sub-domains is usually clear in cases of **straightforward part-**

whole/whole-part relationships or when we **have** taxonomies (the 'is-a-type-of' relationship). But in other cases we need to speak of sub-domains in a rather loose sense. For example, in the sentence *John is a fine working hand*, since a hand is a physical and functional pan of John (as a person), the domain-internal mapping between John and his hand is fairly straightforward. But in *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check*, the ham sandwich is not a pan of the person referred to in the same sense as a hand would be. The difference is all the more obvious if we compare these related expressions:

- (14) The fine working hand is waiting for his pay cheque
 (15) John is a ham sandwich

While it is possible to use the expression "fine working hand" both referentially and predicatively and preserve the domain-internal nature of the mapping, it is impossible to use the expression "ham sandwich" predicatively and **have** a domain-internal mapping at the same time, as evidenced by example (15). This is so **because** a hand is more readily (and more obviously) identified as pan of the conceptual structure for 'customer' than a ham sandwich.

The ham sandwich-customer relationship is mediated by the restaurant context. But there are cases where we **also have** a rather loose association between two concepts without the intervention of any specific context. In a sense, it is possible to say that for the mapping to occur within a domain the speaker needs to **perform** a mental operation by means of which one domain is made to be subsumed, sometimes temporarily -as in the ham sandwich example-, under another. For example, in *He bought a Picasso*, the work of an may be thought to be pan of Picasso's central activity in his life, and therefore, loosely speaking, pan of him. This case is comparable to clear cases of whole-part relationships, like *Hefilled up the car* (meaning that he filled the petrol tank). In *Superman will probably no longer be able to walk again*, "Superman" (the film character) stands for the actor (Christopher Reeve), and can be loosely thought of as pan of his life. This case is comparable to clear cases of pan-whole relationships, like the use of a body pan for a type of person (consider expressions like *All hands on deck!*, *He is a good head for sums*, *She's just another pretty face*, etc.).

Now, consider:

- (16) God is an all-seeing eye

This expression may be used to emphasize God's alleged ability to see **and** observe **everything and** everyone when it is **his** will. If we want to divide metaphor from metonymy on the grounds of whether we **have** a **mapping within** a domain or a **mapping** across domains, an expression like (16) is problematic. Most **believers in** God would not contend that God **actually** has eyes in the physical sense. So, if the relationship between the concepts 'eye' and 'God' is to be one of pan-whole, this has to be in a metaphorical sense. That is to say, God has eyes **only** figuratively in an anthropomorphic conception. At the same time, (16) **makes** an predicative use of the 'eye'-'God' metonymy to highlight God's observing powers. That this is so will be **all** the more evident if we compare (16) to (17) below:

- (17) John is all eyes

People are said to be **all** eyes when they are very **observant** as if constantly looking around them eagerly. A **crucial** difference with (16) is that the relationship between 'eye' and 'John', **unlike** that between 'eye' and 'God', **does** not rest on a metaphor. In (16) there is first a mapping from the domain of human beings, with physical attributes, to the domain of spiritual beings, with non-physical attributes but with comparable functional attributes. This would be a metaphoric mapping since two different domains are involved. Then, there is a second mapping according to which an eye stands for its function. Finally, as a result of a third mapping **-between** 'eye' and 'God'-, God is made to **epitomize** observation capabilities with the **implication** that since he watches everything, he **also** watches one's deeds.

From the discussion above it may be provisionally (but safely) concluded that metonymy is distinguished from metaphor in that metonymy involves a conceptual mapping within a domain, while metaphor involves a mapping across domains. The predominantly referential character of metonymy is not a definitional criterion, nor is it to say that metonymic correspondences are of the 'stand for' type, versus the 'is a' type for metaphors. Our discussion **also** points to the need of making an adequate distinction between process and result in understanding metaphor and metonymy. Since both share referential and predicative uses, we may **have** to find the difference in the type of mapping process of which they **form part**. But before we go into this question, it will **prove** useful to discuss Croft's (1993) distinction between 'domain mapping' and 'domain highlighting'. While the analysis of mapping types **allows** us to distinguish metonymy from metaphor, the **study** of 'domain highlighting' will enable us to draw the boundaries between metonymy and related polysemy phenomena.

III. DOMAIN HIGHLIGHTING

Croft (1993) **follows Lakoff** and his collaborators in arguing that metonymy involves a mapping within a domain (or domain matrix). He adds, however, that metonymy almost invariably involves a conceptual effect **called** "domain highlighting". To give one of his examples, **think** of the expression:

(18) Proust is tough to read

In the encyclopedic view of semantics, which cognitivists uphold, the works of Proust are **part** of the concept 'Proust' although they are not as central as, for example, the fact that Proust was a person. The metonymic shift from Proust to Proust's work is quite natural since Proust is famous as a writer and the work produced is a salient element in the domain of **creative activity**. The effect produced by the shift (i.e. "domain highlighting") is one of making primary what is otherwise (in its literal **meaning**) a secondary domain. Domain highlighting is a necessary but not **sufficient** condition for metonymy. It **also** occurs **in** other types of lexical ambiguity. To borrow two of Croft's examples **in** this respect, contrast:

(19) This book is heavy

(20) This book is a history of Iraq

The concept 'book' is profiled at least in two **primary** domains: physical objects and semantic content. In (19) the domain of physical objects is highlighted; in (20) it is the semantic content domain that is highlighted. (This is due to the requirements of the predicates 'heavy' and 'a history of Iraq' respectively). Although the concepts symbolised by "this book" are different in (19) and (20), the word "book" is not to be treated as metonymic since, according to Croft, the elements profiled in each domain are highly intrinsic, that is, they make no reference to external entities (see Langacker, 1987:160). So, in this view, the difference between metonymy and other cases of domain highlighting would have to do with the extent to which the highlighted domain is considered to be intrinsic to the concept. As an example of this, Croft examines the following two uses of "window":

- (21) I broke the window
 (22) She came in through the bathroom window

We may summarize Croft's explanation as follows: the concept 'window' can be interpreted in the shape and physical object domains; being a physical object is intrinsic to the concept but the interpretation of window as an opening in the shape domain is somewhat extrinsic because it makes reference to external entities around it; however, the shape domain for 'window' seems to be less extrinsic than Proust's writings for 'Proust'; so, the example about Proust above is a clear case of metonymy, but the status of (22) is not so clear. Examples like these tend to show that there is "a continuum between clear cases of metonymy and the highlighting of highly intrinsic facets of a concept" (Croft 1993:350).

While we may agree to some extent with this conclusion and with the relevance of the highlighting process for the understanding of metonymy, there are some crucial aspects of Croft's account which seem to be essentially misled. We shall now re-examine his analysis of examples (21) and (22) above to prove that it is not intrinsicness but centrality that makes the difference between cases of metonymy and other cases of domain highlighting. In fact, the misuse of the concept of intrinsicness in semantic characterizations has led Croft to view (22) as closer to being an example of metonymy than (21), while it may be argued that it is (21) that shares more with the clearest cases of metonymy. To this we shall add the observation that highlighting is applied to metaphor as well and therefore this concept is not useful to distinguish metaphor from metonymy.

First, let us address the question of the intrinsicness of the domains involved in the different uses of the word "window". A property is intrinsic if it makes no reference to external entities. Langacker (1987:160) gives the example of shape for physical objects, in contrast to size, since size is understood by comparison with other objects. If we apply Langacker's logic, a window is a physical object with a certain shape and size; while size is an extrinsic property, shape is an intrinsic property of windows. Interestingly enough, Croft -who intends to apply Langacker's notion of "intrinsicness"- has reached exactly the opposite conclusion. The source of this contradiction is perhaps to be found in that shape can be thought of both as an intrinsic and an extrinsic property of things. It is intrinsic to the extent that, to use Langacker's own words, "it reduces to relations between the parts of an object and does not require interaction or comparison with other entities" (Langacker, 1987:160-161). It is extrinsic to the extent that, when applied to characterize a given entity, it singles the entity out from others'. Thus, if one uses the word "window" to describe a physical object in contrast to other objects in a hardware store showroom, which is Croft's

illustration (Croft, 1993: 349), shape becomes an extrinsic property. But if one is thinking of a window in a wall, a roof, or the side of a vehicle -the places where one would normally expect to find it- its shape is an intrinsic property.

If the interpretation of 'window' both in the shape domain and in the physical object domain involves intrinsic properties of the entity, it is not accurate to say, even using Croft's own logic, that (22) is (nearly) a case of metonymy, at least on the basis of its purported "extrinsicness". But the fact is that it could be argued that (21) is a clearer case of metonymy than (22), since breaking a window is normally interpreted as breaking the "window-pane": 'window' maps onto 'window-pane' (the whole object maps onto a part of the object). So we need to find a more solid criterion to distinguish metonymic from non-metonymic uses. Note that it is possible to have a window without a pane (it still serves its function as an opening in a wall that lets light come in and lets you look out), so (21) focuses on a non-central (or more peripheral) aspect of the concept. (22), on the other hand, focuses on a central aspect, since it is impossible to have a window without an opening. Degree of centrality, therefore, seems to be the criterion we are looking for. Precisely, Langacker (1987) has explained centrality in terms of a combination of criteria: it correlates with the extent to which a specification is conventional (shared by a community), generic (not idiosyncratic with a particular item), intrinsic (making no reference to external entities), and characteristic (unique to the class of items concerned). Intrinsicness is only one of the criteria.

The same division between central and peripheral specifications explains why (19) is not but (20) might be a case of metonymy. A book is a number of sheets of paper bound together. As such, it has the intrinsic property of having weight. The predicate 'heavy' in (19) applies to this central description. We also know that books have information written in them, but the book in (20) has historical information about Iraq. This semantic specification violates all the centrality criteria except perhaps intrinsicness: books are not conventionally histories of Iraq; then, being a history of Iraq is not unique to the class of items designated by "book", nor is it generic knowledge. So, (20), contrary to what Croft seems to suggest, qualifies as a case of metonymy, although to a lesser extent than other cases like (18) which violates all the centrality criteria including intrinsicness.

Let us now turn to the question of "domain highlighting". Remember that Croft argues that metonymy makes primary a domain which is secondary in its literal meaning. This description seems to hold for examples where a whole domain stands for a significant part of the same domain. But consider a different case:

(23) John is a brain

Here "brain" stands for "a person with good intellectual abilities"; part of a domain stands for the whole domain and at the same time highlights a feature which is conventionally, generically, intrinsically, and characteristically associated with brains: intelligence. So, interpretation here does not proceed by making primary a secondary domain but rather by singling out a very central feature of brains which is then attributed to John. In this respect, (23) is not very different from some metaphors. Consider:

(24) John is a lion

In this metaphor, there is a conventional **feature** of lions ('courage') which is attributed to John. **Through** cultural convention based on experience (our **observation** of the **instinctive** behaviour of lions), courage has **become** a central **feature** of our concept of lion. **In** a way similar to what happened with **intelligence** in (23), it is this central **feature** that is highlighted in (24) and then attributed to John.

The fact that there are clear cases of metonymy where no secondary domain is highlighted **does** not invalidate the relevance of the notion of 'domain highlighting' for the description of metonymy but rather places this notion **in** a different perspective. First, highlighting works both for metonymy and for metaphor. **Second**, it works in different ways depending on the status of the relationship between the **source** and target domains involved and on the primary or secondary nature of the source. There are two possibilities for the relationship between **source** and target domains: one, that the target is a conceptually significant **element** of the source, as **in** the Proust example; two, that the **source** is part of the target, as in the ham sandwich and related examples above. If the target (e.g. Proust's work in (18)) is **included** within the **source** (i.e. Proust) we will **have** a clear case of metonymy only if the target is a secondary or non-central domain. This **makes us** regard expressions like (22) or similar ones (e.g. She *looked out of* the window), where the purported target has primary status as non-metonymic or, **in** any event, as borderline cases. If it is the **source** that forms part of the target, it is **immaterial** whether the **source** is **deemed** to be a primary or a secondary domain. Thus, **in** (7) 'ham sandwich' is secondary, but in (23) 'brain' is primary. The 'ham sandwich' stands for 'the customer who has ordered a ham sandwich' **and** 'brain' for 'person with excellent intellectual abilities'. In both one **relevant** attribute is singled out, highlighted, and used to talk about the target, **in** (7) **referentially**, and **in** (23) **predicatively**.

It may be additionally noted that the mapping process precedes and motivates the highlighting process. Thus, **in** (23) the explicit correspondence between John (the target) and the brain (the source) leads the hearer to look for the most relevant **feature** in the **source** to attribute to the target. In (18), the hearer, **in** being confronted with the absence of an explicit target domain, needs to look for it within the **source** domain. Much the same occurs **in** (21) and (22) where the hearer has to **find out** whether **the** speaker is referring to a window-pane or to an opening in a wall.

IV. TYPES OF MAPPING

Examples (23) and (24) above suggest that the **crucial** difference between metaphor and metonymy **is** not a matter of domain mapping versus domain highlighting. Previously, we saw that other criteria, like **its** frequent referential use and the 'stand for' relationship between **source** and target are not **valid** (since they hold both for metaphor and metonymy) and that the only tenable difference has to do with the **domain-internal** or **domain-external** nature of the mapping. If this is **true**, and since a mapping process lies at the base of both metaphor and metonymy, it might be profitable to describe them in **terms** of the type of mapping and the effects involved.

Let us turn again to the metaphor **in** (24). It is obvious that it conveys more than the rough paraphrase "John is courageous". And it must do so, otherwise why bother to use the metaphor at **all** rather than the paraphrase? This point **is all** too obvious, too. What is more

interesting is to see how this happens. The process has been explained in detail by Lakoff & Turner (1989). They discuss the metaphor *Achilles is a lion*, which for them is a case of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS mapping. This metaphor is based on an interaction between the common-sense theory of things called the GREAT CHAIN and the GENEFÜC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. The GREAT CHAIN is defined by attributes and behaviour which apply to each form of being (humans, animals, plants, complex objects, natural physical things) in a hierarchy. For example, animals are endowed with instinctual attributes and behaviour, to which humans add higher-order attributes and behaviour. The GENEFÜC IS SPECIFIC metaphor is used to single out from specific concepts common generic conceptual structure. The interaction allows us to understand animal behaviour in terms of human character. On the other hand, the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS mapping leads us to understand human character in terms of animal behaviour. In *Achilles is a lion* this results in our understanding Achilles's courage in terms of our knowledge about a lion's "courage".

According to Lakoff & Turner (1989: 196), "when we understand Achilles in terms of a lion. we map the lion onto Achilles, the lion's "courage" onto Achilles's courage, and *the relation between the lion and his "courage" onto the relation between Achilles and his courage*" (emphasis theirs). However, this is not entirely correct. Note that by experience-based convention (e.g. our knowledge about the way lions chase their quarry or defend their territory and offspring) we single out only one aspect of the source (animal behavioural attributes) and make them correspond with one aspect of the target (human behavioural attributes). There are other aspects of the target, such as Achilles's physical appearance, his manners, and so on, which play little if any role in the metaphor. Thus, we think of Achilles more readily as a fierce, indefatigable fighter than as a strong, weighty, and powerful man. We have only one mapping (or one correspondence), not three.

Lakoff and his collaborators have failed to note the importance of distinguishing between those mappings where all the implications are derived by virtue of a single correspondence -as is the case with (24) and similar metaphors- from those characterized by invoking a fully-fledged system of correspondences. For example, think of the following expression uttered by an infuriated father who is scolding his teenage son for patent misbehaviour:

(25) You are going nowhere that way!

In the context given, this expression is metaphorical and can be explained under the LIFE IS A JOURNEY mapping (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989:3-4). It must be interpreted as a warning from the father to the son about the son's predictable future. In this metaphor, the son is seen as a traveller who is unaware that he has taken a path that leads to an undesirable destination. The path is mapped onto the son's way of living (what he is doing) and the destination onto a life's goals. It is impossible to interpret (25) correctly if we leave out any of the relevant correspondences. Of course, there are other elements of a journey which are not called up -since they are not needed- but which are essential ingredients of the source for other expressions, like the vehicle in *He jumped on the bandwagon*, or the type of path in *My life has been a long, bumpy road*.

We can, therefore, make a distinction between one correspondence and many-correspondence mappings. There are two differences between these mapping types. One is that while many-correspondence mappings are primarily used to structure and reason about

as many aspects as possible of fairly abstract notions (such as love, life, quantity, etc.), one-correspondence mappings serve primarily to bring into focus and reason about one aspect of the target domain (like Achilles's instinctual courage) and are applied to concrete target domains. Another difference is related to the communicative effect of the mapping since many-correspondence mappings provide us with a wider range of meaning implications to explore, a point which will be taken up again in the next section.

So far, our discussion has made it possible for us to identify metonymies as cases of one-correspondence mappings where the target may be a part of the source or the source a part of the target. Metaphors based on one correspondence share most of their features with metonymies of the latter type. With the other type of metonymy, since the highlighting process has a different function, the similarities are fewer. Finally, the number of similarities between metaphor and metonymy is considerably smaller when it comes to cases of many-correspondence metaphors. If we take these observations into account together with our previous discussion on the role of primary and secondary domains for metonymy we will be in a position to formulate a full definition of metonymy in cognitive terms. Thus, a metonymy may be defined as a one-correspondence conceptual mapping within a domain where, if the target is part of the source, the target is not a primary or central sub-domain of the source.

V. CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATIONS

We have been able to see that it is possible to make both predicative and referential uses of metonymy. The same is true of metaphor, to such an extent that metaphors and metonymies sometimes bear a very close resemblance from the point of view of their communicative effects. Consider the following examples, borrowed from Ruiz de Mendoza (1996a):

- (26) When it comes to debating, John is a real lion
- (27) When it comes to debating, John is the lion
- (28) When it comes to debating, John is a real brain
- (29) When it comes to debating, John is the brain
- (30) When it comes to debating, we need 'the lion' to be with us
- (31) When it comes to debating, we need 'the brain' to be with us

In all these examples there is an interesting combination of mappings. On the one hand, we have the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, which has been discussed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980). In this metaphor we see the person we are arguing with as an opponent in a battle. We plan tactics, attack, defend, and counterattack; we gain or lose ground, we win or we lose. On the other hand, we have the correspondence A PERSON IS A LION, which belongs to the more general PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, and the correspondence A PERSON IS A PART OF THE BODY, which is metonymic in the sense that it is internal to a domain, as discussed above, but which actually belongs to a more general mapping labelled PEOPLE ARE ENTITIES, which, interestingly enough, would cover both cases of metaphor and of metonymy. It may be noted that (26) and (28) make a predicative use of the one-correspondence mappings involved. The rest of the examples make referential use of

them. It is when we make referential use of a mapping that a 'stand for' relationship may be said to hold between the source and target. In predicative uses we have an 'is a' relationship, independently of whether the mapping is carried out within a domain or across domains.

It is also evident that whether the mapping is domain-internal or domain-external is irrelevant in terms of the communicative effect achieved by means of it. In example (26), "a lion" can be roughly paraphrased as "a person with unyielding courage and determination"; and "a brain" in (28) as "a person with excellent intellectual abilities". Note incidentally that the hedge "real" reinforces the prominence of the attribute that is singled out by the mapping. Then, in (27) and (30) "the lion" means "the person with unyielding courage and determination", and "the brain" in (29) and (31) is "the person with excellent intellectual abilities". (27) and (29) are equative sentences where subject and complement are co-referential. Note now that the presence of hedges in referential uses would be highly infelicitous (we would not say "the real lion" or "the real brain") since in such uses attributes are not discussed but taken for granted and highlighted to achieve successful reference.

However, the nature of the mapping system does make a difference. Thus, when not used for mere referential purposes, predicative uses of one-correspondence mappings serve to place in focus and reason about a single relevant aspect of a conceptual domain. Many-correspondence mappings, on the other hand, serve the additional purpose of helping us to explore all the domain in question. It follows that many-correspondence mappings are richer in meaning implications.

One interesting thing about our account of metaphoric and metonymic mappings is that it is fully compatible with the basic requirements of Sperber & Wilson's (1986) well-known Relevance Theory. These authors see verbal communication as a form of ostensive behaviour intended to attract the hearer's attention. For an ostensive stimulus to achieve its purpose optimally it must keep a balance between cognitive economy and the communicative effects produced. Communicative effects are called contextual effects since they involve some sort of modification in the set of assumptions (ie. the hearer's mental context or cognitive environment) that the hearer brings to bear in the communication process. A verbal message will be optimally relevant for the hearer if it achieves (at least) the desired contextual effects for the least processing effort. Contextual effects are achieved when the newly-presented information interacts with the hearer's cognitive environment by strengthening, contradicting, or combining with an existing assumption. The combination of new and existing information produces contextual implications'.

Relevance theorists see metaphor as an economical way of producing a large amount of contextual effects by implication. Consider the brief analysis carried out by Blakemore (1991: 163) of the metaphor *My neighbour is a dragon*. According to this author, metaphors put us to some extra processing effort which is only justified if it is offset by the adequate range of contextual effects. The hearer is thus encouraged to explore a range of contextual implications other than the central (or strong) ones. *My neighbour is a dragon* conveys the strong implications "my neighbour is fierce" and "my neighbour is unfriendly". Other non-central (or weak) implications may have to do with the neighbour's appearance or with her overall behaviour. Since these are weaker implications the hearer must take a greater responsibility for their recovery, but they justify the speaker's utterance. Also, since it would be extremely difficult to find an alternative way of conveying the same range of implications (e.g. by means of paraphrases), the metaphor turns out to be a most convenient (and thereby economical) device.

Blakemore's analysis is based on a one-correspondence metaphor, but it may be extended to cover cases of many-correspondence metaphors. Consider again example (25) above. In it, the central correspondence is GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. From it, we obtain the strong implication that the hearer leads a **purposeless** life (i.e. a life with no "destination"). Other weaker implications may be derived from the central one in combination with the rest of the relevant correspondences. For example, on the basis of the goal-destination correspondence, we may reason that it is possible for the hearer to find an alternative path which leads to a good, beneficial destination. The correspondence between the type of path and the hearer's way of living allows us to reason about the misled nature of the hearer's activities (there is no point in following a path that leads nowhere). And the way we understand the hearer's character traits is based on the traveller-hearer correspondence (what kind of person would take a path that leads nowhere?).

Think now of this other example:

(32) He crashed right after take-off

Imagine (32) as a remark on the **fate** of a basketball player's initially promising but eventually short-lived career in the context of an alcohol abuse problem. (32) is a case of the A CAREER IS A JOURNEY metaphor: a basketball player's career is a **journey** by aeroplane. The traveller maps onto the player, the vehicle onto the player's activities, the take-off onto the **beginning** of the career, the intended destination onto the player's goals and aspirations, the accident onto the **sudden** halt in the player's career, and the cause of the accident onto the player's excessive drinking. The central correspondence is, as with (25). DESTINATIONS ARE GOALS, and the strongest implication is that the player **ruined** his promising career not long after it had started (i.e. he didn't fulfil his aspirations). But we **have** a wider range of contextual effects. Thus, as with aeroplane accidents, we **feel** that the whole event had better never come about, that perhaps something could **have been** done about the player's problem before it **proved** fatal. In the source, we know that during take-off a lot more energy is consumed than during the flight. In the target the **beginnings** of a career as a professional player are harder and require much time, effort, and sacrifice. These **efforts** could **have been highly** rewarding but they were in vain since the player's activities came to an **abrupt end just** as the doomed flight comes to a **sudden**, unexpected, and unwanted **end**. In the **source** we know that an aeroplane can cover very long **distances** in a very short time; in the target we may reason that, much the **same** way, a lot could be expected of this player (progress is **seen** as movement towards the destination). But the promising prospects are thwarted by the untimely accident. And so on.

The cases we **have** examined in **terms** of Blakemore's analysis involve predicative uses of metaphor. We must **assume** that they would hold for cases of predicative use of metonymy as well. Thus, in *John is the brain*, there is a central implication about **John's intelligence**, and perhaps weaker implications about his behaviour, attitudes, etc. But since metonymies are restricted to one-correspondence mappings the number of contextual effects is smaller than with many-correspondence metaphors.

Referential uses of metaphor and metonymy can **also** be explained in **terms** of the balance between cognitive economy and contextual effects. Consider again examples (30) and (31) above. In (30) "the lion" stands for "the person that can be appropriately called **the lion**". Similarly, in (31) "the brain" stands for "the person that can be appropriately called

the brain". "The lion" and "the brain" refer each to a person that has a number of "quintessential" properties which are highlighted as a result of the mapping, as we saw before. The person is identified by these properties. So, all the contextual effects motivated by the mappings **serve** to **uniquely** identify the referent. Note that the metaphor and metonymy achieve in a synthetic, economical, **less cumbersome** way a **better** referential effect than could be achieved by means of a more elaborate definite description, as is the case with (33) below:

(33) When it comes to debating, we need 'the person that has excellent intellectual capabilities' to be with us.

Similar considerations hold for metonymies where the **source** is part of the target. Take the following metonymies, which we quoted at the beginning of this article:

(34)
Exxon has raised its prices again
Wall Street is in a **panic**
Watergate changed our politics

Each of these metonymies is an economical way of referring to a fairly complex target: "the people responsible for the price policies in Exxon", "the investors that buy and sell their stocks in the Wall Street stock market". and "the so-called Watergate affair" respectively. The purpose of this type of metonymy is not to invite the hearer to explore a large number of contextual effects but rather to describe a complex target in a simple way without impairing communicative success.

Metaphor and metonymy are cases of what Sperber & Wilson (1985:16) have called "loose uses" of language or "loose talk". They describe the circumstances in which it happens as follows:

The speaker **wants** to **communicate** to her hearer a certain set of propositions P, . . . P_n. They are **all** quite **easily** derivable as logical or contextual implications of a proposition Q whose truth she **does** not believe and **does** not want to guarantee. **The** best way of conveying this **information** may be to express the single proposition Q, as long as the hearer has some way of selecting those of its logical and contextual implications that **the** speaker intends to convey, and ignoring the others. (Sperber & Wilson, 1985:16, in Davis, 1991: 545)⁸.

Since it is precisely the mapping and **highlighting** processes discussed above that assist the hearer in selecting the contextual implications that the speaker intends to convey, the cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy is a pre-requisite for the pragmatic account, in such a way that the latter becomes complementary to the former. At the same time, the pragmatic account **provides** a general framework within which it is possible to define the use potential of metaphoric and metonymic mappings.

This application of Relevance Theory is contrary to Papafragou's (1995) account of metonymy within the same framework. First, Papafragou⁹ argues **against** the cognitive semantics approach to metonymy and **erroneously** states that this approach can but **deal** with

the most conventionalised metonymies. She suggests that instead of giving inventories of mappings, it is **better** to find a general pragmatic criterion powerful enough to predict "which metonymies are possible in a given context on the basis of the hearer's estimated capacity to understand them" (Papafragou, 1995: 148). Finally, she **argues** that metonymy is a **non-descriptive** use of language (**an** "echoic use" in relevance-theoretic terms) which (i) introduces a new name (the expression of a non-lexicalized ad hoc concept), and (ii) has as its intended referent something which **does not fall** under the normal denotation of the expression (Papafragou, 1995:155).

This view has **been** discussed in greater detail in Ruiz de Mendoza (1996a). **Here** it will be enough to point out **some** of its most fundamental problems. First, even though in **Relevance Theory** communication and cognition are closely related phenomena, Papafragou strangely excludes the cognitive approach to metonymy explicitly. For her, consistency with the principle of relevance (according to which the hearer is entitled to **assume** that the intended interpretation of an utterance creates the intended contextual effects for a minimum of processing effort) is enough to constrain **the** number of possible contextual implications of a metonymy. However, we are nowhere told what processes, if any, **regulate** the creation of contextual effects. **As** we **have seen**, the production of contextual effects is tied to the nature of the conceptual mappings involved, and what properties **become** salient in a mapping is to a large extent a matter of consistency between **domains**⁶ and of convention. Were a mapping not to be conventional or if the hearer had no previous knowledge of the mapping, nevertheless, the metaphor or the metonymy would be worked out on the basis of the hearer's conventional knowledge about the **source** and target domains. If none of these conditions hold, the metaphor or the metonymy **becomes uninterpretable**.

It must be borne **in** mind that the mappings **regulate** how contextual implications are **produced**, and that whatever is to be highlighted in a domain, although motivated by the mapping, is ultimately determined by the conventional conceptual **structure** of the domain in question. In this **connection**, our study of the cognitive processes underlying metaphorical and metonymic expressions fleshes out the rather vague relevance-theoretic proposition that contextual implications are obtained by consistency with the **principle** of relevance. For example, consider the following metonymy:

(35) You should avoid marrying a sheep at all costs (=someone born in the Year of the Sheep)

This metonymy is proposed by Papafragou (1995:148) as an example of "creative, **one-off**" metonymic use, which **cannot** be dealt with in terms of conventional **inventories** of metonymic mappings. But it must be noted that this metonymy is **virtually** impossible to **interpret unless** the hearer has access to a specific, not **easily** available piece of encyclopedic information about the Year of the Sheep (**information** which might as **well** derive from a **well-specified** context in which, for example, someone had **been** discussing the characteristics of the people born **in** that year). Once we can **construct** the **source** domain adequately we are no longer at a **loss** as to how to process (35), and the expression fits in **nicely** with other conventionalised ones like *You should avoid marrying a Pisces*, where the **source** domain is a sign of the zodiac and the target domain is the person born under that sign. Note **also** that, in the absence of the adequate background information, it is **still** possible for the hearer to work out the possible meaning of (35) **precisely** on the basis of the conventional mapping

which we have just described.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have been able to set up the boundaries between metonymy and metaphor, on the one hand, and between metonymy and other semantic phenomena which involve domain highlighting, on the other hand. We have also seen the importance of making a clear difference between predicative and referential uses of metaphoric and metonymic mappings, and we have analysed the communicative import of such uses. Our whole account revolves around the question of the complementariness between the cognitive and the communicative perspectives of metaphor and metonymy. Cognitive processes have not only an organizational or structuring purpose of concepts but also a communicative potential which needs to be explored. We have suggested that Relevance Theory provides us with the necessary conceptual tools to undertake this task and allows us to investigate in great detail the way we use metaphoric and metonymic mappings in common every-day language-related inferential and referential activities.

NOTES

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2. Naomi Leite has compiled a so far unpublished "Master Metonymy List", with 104 metonymies grouped according to different mapping types, which is circulated among Lakoff's students and collaborators. This effort tends to resemble the initial work made by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) with respect to metaphor where mappings were produced on a rather ad hoc basis and were not grouped under more generic headings. However, metaphor is being increasingly treated by Lakoff and his collaborators (eg. Lakoff & Tumer, 1989, Lakoff. 1993) in terms of more abstract mappings. No effort has been made, to my knowledge, to explore more generic metonymies.
3. Note, in contrast, that the concept of size may never be intrinsic to characterize a given entity. Thus, the sentence *My dog is an Alsatian* entails that I have a large dog but does not necessarily entail that I have a large animal if compared to a horse, a cow, or an elephant, for example. Both entailments require that we compare Alsatians with other entities.
4. To give an example of how a contextual implication may be derived, imagine that I have a cousin who likes bathing in the sun too long when he goes to the seaside to the extent that he usually gets sunburnt. One day a common friend lets me know that my cousin is spending the weekend at the seaside. This information allows me to derive the contextual implication that my cousin is likely to get sunburnt again.
5. Loose uses of language are common. It is interesting to note that sometimes we need to make use of hedges like "strictly speaking" or "to be precise" precisely to make it clear that we are not speaking loosely, which is the normal situation. Thus, we have a tendency to speak in rather vague terms unless there are pressing demands in the speech situation to the contrary. For example, people tend to round off figures rather than give the exact amounts, or to use rather imprecise deictic expressions such as "over there" or "then", instead of giving accurate descriptions of time and place locations.
6. As Lakoff (1990, 1993) has cogently demonstrated there are principles like the Invariance Principle which constrain metaphoric mappings. See Ruiz de Mendoza (1996bc) for discussion.

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Emotion Metaphors and Cross-Linguistic Conceptualization of Emotions

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ABSTRACT

While there exists plenty of research on emotion metaphors, monolingual, as well as cross-linguistic, there is still no answer to the question: why is it that certain emotion metaphors are the same across languages, while others display significant cross-linguistic variance? What triggers the conceptualization of emotions in language?

In this paper, I propose a tentative answer to this problem. On the basis of Russian and English data, I suggest that different emotions are linguistically conceptualized through different metaphorization mechanisms, and that linguistic and cross-linguistic behavior of an emotion metaphor depends on the metaphorization mechanism employed in its formation.

KEY WORDS: emotion metaphor, metaphorization mechanism, linguistic properties, cross-linguistic variance

RESUMEN

Si bien se ha investigado mucho sobre metáforas de emoción, tanto monolingües como translingüísticas, no se ha contestado aún a la pregunta de por qué ciertas metáforas de emoción son iguales en distintas lenguas, mientras que otras demuestran una variación trans-lingüística. ¿Qué es lo que estimula la conceptualización de las emociones en el lenguaje?

En el presente artículo, propongo una respuesta tentativa a este problema. Partiendo de datos del ruso y del inglés, sugiero que diferentes emociones son conceptualizadas lingüísticamente a través de diferentes mecanismos de metaforización, y que el comportamiento lingüístico y trans-lingüístico de una metáfora de emoción depende del mecanismo de metaforización empleado en su formación.

PALABRAS CLAVE: metáfora de emoción, mecanismo de metaforización, propiedades lingüísticas, variación trans-lingüística

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I create a classification of language metaphors for emotions which aims at **description**, as well as **prediction** of the relevant linguistic and cross-linguistic properties of metaphoric expressions denoting emotions.

The cognitivists Lakoff and Johnson in their work of 1980, **Metaphors we live by**, as well as their later followers (e.g., Kovecsés 1990), have demonstrated the importance of the language metaphor for describing our mentality, our way of understanding and conceptualizing things (including emotions). However, in their account of emotion metaphors, they do not draw a distinction between different metaphor types. For instance, such intuitively different emotion metaphors as ANGER IS HEAT (stemming from a physiological similarity) and ANGER IS BURDEN (stemming from a cognitive similarity) do not receive a separate treatment within the cognitive framework (this problem is somewhat touched upon in Emanatian 1995).

My claim is that these metaphors have different source domains and employ different **metaphorization mechanisms**. Moreover, on the basis of Russian and English data, I claim that metaphors derived by different metaphorization mechanisms display different **linguistic** and **cross-linguistic properties**. Therefore, an adequate linguistic description should treat them differently.

All emotion metaphors have the same basic structure: they liken a certain **psychological** state (feeling) to a certain **physiological** state (sensation) or to another **material** phenomenon.

Emotion metaphors differ with respect to two factors: phenomena that form the source domain for the metaphorical mapping and the kind of mapping that takes place.

II. PHYSIOLOGICAL METAPHOR TYPE

It is appropriate to begin discussion by characterizing the emotion manifestations, as well as their linguistic expressions, which constitute the source domain for the physiological metaphor type.

II.1. SOURCE DOMAIN OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL METAPHOR TYPE

The source domain of the physiological metaphor type is formed by different emotion manifestations. These emotion manifestations have to meet the following criteria:

(a) they are usually uncontrollable, **immediate physiological** reactions, physiological states, that are short-lasting in time; e.g., the Russian *trjastis' ot straxa* and its English correlate *to shake with fear*, but not *sognut'sja ot gorja* or its English correlate *to bend down with grief*);

(b) they are usually visible or otherwise easily perceptible to an observer: e.g., *krasnet', drozat'* (or their English correlates *to blush, to tremble*), but not *razryvat'sja' ot zalosti* (English *to be torn with pity*);

(c) they are specific to a given emotion or are, at least, its most salient manifestation; e.g., *krasnet' ot styda* (English *to blush with shame*), but not *plakat' ot radosti* (English *to weep with joy*).

Linguistic expressions denoting emotion manifestations in the physiological metaphor type are peculiar in the following way: they do not contain any positive or negative evaluation on the part of the speaker, they merely name their denotate. This criterion allows one to distinguish between such expressions as *pokrasnet'* (English *to blush*), on the one hand, and *pobagrovet'* (English *to turn scarlet*), on the other. *Pokrasnet'* is a mere denotation of a certain physiological state and can be associated with any emotion, whereas *pobagrovet'* bears a negative connotation and can be associated with negative emotions only. This phenomenon is described in Ju. D. Apresjan (1995:72-373).

11.2. MAPPING IN THE PHYSIOLOGICAL METAPHOR TYPE

Since, unlike the source domain, the target domain of emotion metaphors is in no way constrained, I will proceed by describing the peculiarities of the mapping between the source and the target domains in the physiological metaphor type.

In this type of emotion metaphors, the mapping is conditioned physiologically, i.e., the metaphors are based on certain physiological similarities. Indeed, *fear* is linguistically conceptualized as *cold* because the feeling 'fear' and the sensation 'cold' share the same physiological manifestations: the reaction of one's body to 'fear' is the same as the reaction of one's body to 'cold' (shaking, quaking, temporary paralysis, pallor, etc.). By a metaphorical shift, 'fear' becomes conceptualized as 'a feeling that has a certain effect on the mind and body of the experiencer, similar to the effect that cold usually has on the body of the experiencer.'

II.3. METAPHORS IN THE PHYSIOLOGICAL METAPHOR TYPE

This type comprises such metaphors as the Russian STRAX - XOLOD 'FEAR IS COLD,' OTVRASCENIE - TOSNOTA 'DISGUST IS FEELING SICK,' GNEV - ZAR 'ANGER - IS HEAT', as well as their close English correlates. Let us consider these metaphors in more detail.

The metaphor STRAX - XOLOD and its English correlate FEAR IS COLD is based on the following physiological fact: when one feels fear, one's body reacts to this emotion as it reacts to cold. This physiological phenomenon has spread to the understanding of the psychological nature of the feeling. The reaction of the mind to fear became conceptualized by language as the reaction of the body to cold. This conceptualization is reflected in numerous linguistic expressions.

Consider the following expressions as the primary designators of fear: the Russian *drozat' ot straxa* 'to tremble with fear,' *trjastis' ot uzasa* 'to shake with terror,' *ocepenet' <zastyt', poblednet', pokryt'sja muraskami> ot uzasa* 'to freeze <to become cold, to blanch. to have goose-flesh> with terror,' *byt' paralizovannym straxom* 'to become

paralyzed by fear,' *Ego dusa byla skovana straxom* 'His soul was bound by fear'; the English *to get cold feet, blood runs cold with fear. to freeze with terror, to shake with fear, to freeze one's blood, to chill one to the bones, to make one's flesh creep*¹ and the like².

Likewise, the metaphor OTVRASCENIE - TOSNOTA and the corresponding English metaphor DISGUST IS FEELING SICK have a physiological origin: real, physiological sickness is the reaction of one's body to the emotion of disgust. A metaphoric shift likens the feeling of disgust to this bodily sensation. Thus, disgust becomes linguistically and cognitively conceptualized as sickness.

Consider the following linguistic expressions. which confirm the Russian metaphor OTVRASCENIE - TOSNOTA: *tosnit ot orvrascenija* 'one feels sick with disgust,' *krivit'sja ot orvrascenija* 'to pull faces with disgust,' *plevat' ot orvrascenija* 'to spit with disgust,' *brezglivo <gadlivo> morscit'sja* 'to screw one's face with squeamishness <with strong disgust>.'

The English metaphor DISGUST IS FEELING SICK is reflected in such expressions as *to be sick with disgust, to feel nauseated with disgust, to throw up with disgust, to have one's stomach upset, to have one's stomach turned over* and the like.

The metaphor NEGODOVANIE - ZAR and its English correlate INDIGNATION IS HEAT stem from the following physiological fact: the bodily temperature goes up as a result of indignation.

The conceptualization of 'indignation' type emotions in the HEAT metaphor is reflected in such metaphoric expressions as the Russian *vskipet' <vzorvat'sja> ot negodovanija <gneva>* 'to boil <to blow up> with indignation <anger>' and the English *to boil with indignation, to explode with rage <indignation>, in the heat of rage*.

Because of space limitations, I will not proceed with a detailed discussion of this matter; however, I would like to give a representative sample of the metaphors in the physiological type. These include:

(a) 'Passion' metaphors:

Russian (here, I partly avail myself of the material collected in Babenko 1989: Appendix): STRAST' - LIXORADKA 'PASSION IS FEVER': *goret' strast'ju* 'to burn with passion,' *raspalit'sja <strast'ju>* 'to get inflamed <with passion>,' *soxnut' ot strasti* 'to dry out with passion'; STRAST' - OP'JANENIE 'PASSION IS INTOXICATION': *p'janet' ot strasti* 'to be drunk with passion,' *terjat' golovu ot strasti* 'to lose one's head with passion'; NEUTOLENNAJA STRAST' - GOLOD 'UNSATIATED PASSION IS HUNGER': *smotret' na kogo-libo golodnymi glazami* 'to look hungrily at somebody,' *oblizyvat'sja na kogo-libo* 'to lick one's lips at somebody,' etc.

English: PASSION IS FEVER: *to burn with passion <desire>, flaming <glowing, heated> passion*; PASSION IS INTOXICATION: *to be intoxicated with passion, to lose one's head with passion*; PASSION IS HUNGER: *to be hungry with desire, to be starved of passion*.

(b) 'Anger' metaphors:

Russian: GNEV - ZAR 'ANGER IS HEAT': *kipjatit'sja* 'to boil <with anger>,'³ *nakaljat'sja* 'to heat up.'

English: ANGER IS HEAT: *to boil <to seethe> with anger, to be burned up, to do something in hot blood, the heat of anger*. On ANGER IS HEAT metaphor see also Kovacsés

(1986:12-20) and Solomon (1981:31).

II.4. LINGUISTIC PROPERTIES OF THE METAPHORS IN THE PHYSIOLOGICAL METAPHOR TYPE

This "physiological" metaphorization mechanism has a certain impact on linguistic and cross-linguistic properties of the metaphors themselves and those of the corresponding non-metaphoric expressions for emotions.

(a) First of all, it results in the inclusion of certain semantic components into the semantic structure of the corresponding non-metaphoric expressions denoting emotions. If an emotion A is conceptualized in the linguistic metaphor A IS Y (where Y is a certain physiological state), then the linguistic expression X *feels* A (X stands for the experiencer) includes, among, others, the following components:

'1. X's mind experiences something similar to what X's body senses when X is in the physiological state Y;

2. X's body experiences the physiological state Y.'

Let us exemplify this definition with, e.g., the emotion of *disgust*.

The metaphor for *disgust* is DISGUST IS FEELING SICK. Metaphoric expressions for *disgust* are *to be sick*, *to vomit*, *to throw up* and the like. The semantic structure of the lexeme *disgust* thus includes, besides certain other components, also the following:

'1. X's mind experiences something similar to what X's body senses when X is in the state of physiological sickness;

2. X experiences physiological sickness.'

(b) Furthermore, the metaphors of this type can be used metonymically, as the only designators of the emotions they describe. For instance, the Russian metaphors *drozat* 'to shake,' *trjastis* 'to quake,' *kipet* 'to boil,' *tosnit* 'one is sick'; the English metaphors *to get cold feet*, *to explode*, *to be nauseated* are metonymically used as independent designators of 'fear,' 'anger' and 'disgust,' respectively. Without any further clarification, they are **unmistakably** understood as the expressions of the respective emotions. This is a consequence of the following factor: the metaphors in the physiological type are based only on such symptomatic expressions that denote the most salient manifestations of emotions, such that by mentioning them, one can unambiguously identify the emotion.

(c) **Finally**, the metaphors in this type possess the following cross-linguistic property: they display **little** or no cross-linguistic variation. Indeed, it is easy to notice that the metaphors for 'fear,'⁴ 'anger'⁵ and 'disgust' are almost identical in English and Russian.

This property is a consequence of the fact that the metaphors in this type are not based on cultural links, which differ cross-linguistically, but rather on real-world links which often coincide for different cultures⁶.

III. CULTURAL METAPHOR TYPE

This second metaphor type contains metaphoric expressions formed by means of

cultural mapping. That is, the objects in the source domain are likened to the objects in the target domain on the basis of their culture-specific affinity; cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1990:404) on culture-specific metaphors. For instance, positive emotions can be likened to 'light.' since in certain cultures light is conceptualized as spiritual goodness; negative emotions can be likened to darkness, since darkness is conceptualized as spiritual evil.

111.1. SOURCE DOMAIN IN THE CULTURAL METAPHOR TYPE

The source domain of this metaphor type is not as homogeneous as that of the physiological; therefore, it is difficult to give a unified description of its content. The source domain of the second type contains the expressions for various sensations, color terms, terms for different kinds of light and many other semantic classes of expressions.

111.2. MAPPING IN THE CULTURAL METAPHOR TYPE

In this metaphor type, the mapping between the source domain and the target domain is determined by cultural factors. Namely, the objects in the target domain (feelings) are likened to such objects in the source domain with which they share a certain cultural connotation. The metaphors JOY IS LIGHT and ANGER IS DARKNESS illustrate this principle. They liken the feeling, the state of mind and soul, as well as its overt manifestations to the effects of, respectively, light and darkness. Among all emotion metaphors, the ones belonging to the cultural type are the most telling of the so-called **naive picture of the world** (Apresjan Ju.D., 1995:349-352), i.e. a certain system of seeing things, a certain specific mentality inherent in every given language.

III.3. METAPHORS IN THE CULTURAL METAPHOR TYPE

In this type of metaphorical expressions, the metaphoric parallels between the objects in the source domain and the objects in the target domain are usually not limited to one particular emotion. Unlike metaphors of the first type, those of the second can be used as an expression of many different emotions, since they are based not on emotion-specific symptoms, but on more general cultural associations. Thus, it is often the case that one object from the source domain corresponds to several objects in the target domain. Therefore, it is more convenient to present metaphors of this type not as it was done for the physiological type, emotion by emotion, but, rather, to consider larger groups of emotions, depending on what object in the source domain they correspond to.

I will begin discussion with the group of emotions conceptualized in the LIGHT metaphor (extensively discussed on the basis of Russian data in Ju. D. Apresjan, 1995:372-373).

Even though the range of emotions that fall under the LIGHT metaphor is rather wide, there is one general restriction on the type of the feeling. It has to be a feeling with

distinct overt manifestations, a feeling that shows itself in the appearance of the experiencer. Moreover, these manifestations must be of a particular kind; the symptoms of fear or disgust would not meet the requirements for the LIGHT metaphorization. The feeling must be manifested in the brightening of the color of the experiencer's eyes and / or face. This brightening gives the effect of light spreading from the experiencer onto the observers.

There are several subtypes within the FEELING IS LIGHT metaphorization type.

(a) The first subtype is presented with such metaphoric expressions as the Russian *svetit'sja X-om <ot X-a>* 'to shine with X <because of X>' (where X stands for the emotion), *sijat' X-om <ot X-a>* 'to shine, to beam. to be radiant with X <because of X>' and the English *to shine <to beam> with X, to be radiant with X, to light up with X*.

In this first subtype, the source domain expressions denote a bright, soft, warm, pleasant kind of light, which radiates quite strongly. Pragmatically, these expressions possess a positive connotation. They are normally used to denote the light, emanated by pleasant or friendly objects, such as the sun, stars, candles, lamps, etc.

Emotions that can be metaphorically described by means of these expressions have to meet the following requirements (besides the one formulated above):

(a) these emotions have to be positive, warm, kind (*love*, but not *anger* or *hatred*);

(b) these emotions have to be rather strong, able to spread from the experiencer to the observer (e.g., the strong emotion of *happiness*, but not the emotion of *pleasure*, which is not sufficiently strong).

The feelings that meet these requirements are *delight, happiness, love, tenderness, joy*, and the like, cf. the following Russian and English expressions *sijat' ot scastja <radosti, vostorga>* 'to beam with happiness <joy, delight>'; *svetit'sja neznost'ju <ljubov'ju>* 'to shine with tenderness <love>'; *to be radiant with happiness; to shine with love <tenderness>; to light up with joy; to beam with delight; to glow with joy; to look sunny* ('to be joyful'). The FEELING IS LIGHT metaphors are also used to describe the changes in the appearance of the experiencer's eyes and face, caused by such feelings; cf. the Russian *glaza sijajut <svetjatsja>* 'one's eyes are beaming <shining>'; *lico sijaet <svetitsja>* 'one's face beams <shines>' and the corresponding English expressions.

(b) The second subtype comprises such metaphoric expressions as the Russian *goret' X-om <ot X-a>* 'to burn with X <because of X>' (where X stands for the emotion), *pylat' X-om <ot X-a>* 'to flame with X <because of X>', *sverkat' X-om <ot X-a>* 'to glare, to flash with X <because of X>' and the English *to flame with X, to blaze with X, to be afire with X, to flash with X*.

In this second subtype, the source domain expressions denote a bright, harsh, strong, hot light, possibly unpleasant for the eyes. These expressions are often used to denote the light of such unfriendly and dangerous objects as fire, lightning, etc. Due to this, these expressions are often negatively connoted.

Emotions that can be metaphorically described by means of these expressions have to meet the following requirements:

(a) they have to be negative (*anger, hatred*, but not *happiness, love, tenderness*);

(b) they have to be strong and possibly dangerous, leading to aggression (*hatred*, but not *dislike*).

Emotions that meet these requirements are *hatred, anger, rage* and the like, cf. the

following Russian and English expressions: *Glaza gorjat zloboj* 'One's eyes burn with spite'; *Glaza sverkajut <pylajut> ot gneva* 'One's eyes flash <flame> with anger'; *Glaza polyxajut ot gneva* 'One's eyes blaze with anger'; *Glaza mecut molnii* 'One's eyes throw lightning (implied: because of anger)'; *metat' grom i molnii* 'to be very angry; literally: to throw thunder and lightning'; *Glaza gorjat nenavist'ju* 'One's eyes burn with hatred'; *One's eyes flash with anger <hatred>*: *One's eyes blaze with anger*; *One's eyes burn with spite*.

(c) There is one more, smaller subtype within the FEELING IS LIGHT metaphorization type. It is presented with the following Russian and English expressions: *blestet' X-om <ot X-a>* 'to sparkle with X <because of X>' (where X stands for the emotion); *to glitter with X <because of X>*; *to sparkle with X <because of X>*.

In their primary, non-metaphorical meaning these expressions denote a rather weak, reflected light, unable to spread far from its source or to illuminate objects within its reach (unlike the light denoted by the expressions in the first and second subtypes). This type of light is neutral with respect to its possible friendliness or unfriendliness, it is neither necessarily pleasant nor necessarily unpleasant.

Emotions that can be metaphorically designated by the expressions denoting this type of light, have to satisfy the following criteria:

(a) they have to be either positive or neutral (*pleasure, joy or agitation*, but not *irritation*);

(b) they cannot be strong (e.g., *pleasure*, but not *happiness*).

The first requirement can be explained by the fact that in Russian and English linguistic mentalities light has an overall positive connotation, unless explicated otherwise.

The second requirement is trivially explained by the assumption that expressions for a weak light are used to denote weak emotions, just as in the first two subtypes, expressions for a strong light are used to describe strong emotions.

Emotions that meet these requirements are *content, pleasure, agitation* and the like. cf. the following Russian and English expressions: *Glaza blestjat ot udovol'stvija <volnenija>* 'One's eyes sparkle with pleasure <agitation>'; *Glaza blestjat ot umilenija* 'One's eyes sparkle with tender emotion'; *One's eyes sparkle with content <pleasure>*; *One's eyes glitter with agitation*.

The next group of emotions within the cultural metaphor type is associated with different color terms. Again, there are several emotion subtypes within the FEELING IS COLOR metaphorization type, with one common constraint: all emotions belonging to this subtype are (or can be) manifested in the change of facial color.

There are two oppositions within this type. One opposition is between light and dark shades of color. The other one spreads on the entire color scale and distinguishes between such colors as blue, green, red, black, white, gray, yellow, etc. as designators of different types of emotions.

The overall connotation of light in Russian and English cultures is positive, whereas the connotation of darkness is negative⁷. Due to this, light is often metaphorically mapped onto the domain of positive emotions, whereas darkness is associated with negative emotions. This opposition is valid for different shades of red facial color, as the lighter shades of red are associated with positive emotions (*joy, delight*), while the darker ones with negative emotions (*anger*) (Apresjan 1995:372-373). Moreover, this opposition is valid for such

universal designators of facial color changes as *to brighten*, *to clear up*, on the one hand, and *to darken*, on the other. Indeed, the Russian *posvetlet'*, *prosvetlet'* and their English correlates *to brighten*, *to clear up* refer to positive emotions; cf. *Ego lico prosvetlelo ot radosti* 'His face brightened up with joy,' whereas the Russian *potemnet'* and its English correlate *to darken* refer to negative emotions. cf. *On ves'potemnel ot zloby* 'He went dark with spite.'

However, this does not mean that all light facial colors are necessarily associated with positive emotions, although the assumption that dark facial colors necessarily signify negative emotions does hold. Because of the interference of other (e.g., physiological) factors, light facial colors are not always the designators of positive emotions. Indeed, the Russian *pobelet'* or the English *to whiten* signify the loss of facial color due to a strong shock; in other words, they denote an **abnormality**; thus, these expressions cannot refer to positive emotions. even though the color they denote is the lightest existing.

Besides, certain light colors possess a negative cultural connotation, if used with reference to facial color, e.g., the yellow color. Yellow color cannot signify a positive emotion, even though it is a light color. Thus, no generalization is possible and each of the colors requires a special comment as to what emotions it can designate. Below, I will present the remaining FEELING IS COLOR metaphors.

Overall, distinct and unusual facial colors are more often associated with negative emotions, since the change of facial color signifies a physiological abnormality. Only the overall lightening and brightening of the face, as well as different shades of pink color pertain to positive emotions. However, the culture-driven distribution of associations between negative emotions and different colors is interesting and deserves special attention.

Thus, in Russian, *green* is associated with *envy* and with *fury*, cf. the Russian *pozelenet'* or *zavisti* <*zloby*> 'to turn green with envy <**fury**>'. In English, it is associated with *envy* and *jealousy*, cf. *to turn green with envy* <*jealousy*>. Consider also the following example from M. Mitchell's "Gone with the wind": - *Rhett, everybody will be pea-green when they see our house! - Is it very necessary that everyone shall be envious?*

In Russian, but not in English, *yellow* is associated with *envy*, cf. *pozeltet'* or *zavisti* 'to turn yellow with envy.'

Gray is associated with *fear* or *shock*, cf. the Russian *poseret'* or *straxa* 'to turn gray with fear.' Consider the following example from F. Iskander's "The man and his environment": *I vdrug ego xudoe, udlinennoe lico poserelo, i on zatravlenymi glazami ogljadel zastol'je* 'And suddenly his thin, elongated face turned gray and he looked at the feasting people with the eyes of a cornered animal' (the person described in the novel experienced a strong shock).

White is associated with a wide range of negative emotions, such as *fear*, *fury*, *nervousness*, *shock*, *anger* and other emotions of 'fear' and 'anger' types, cf. the Russian *pobelet'* or *straxa* <*jarosti, volnenija, potrjasenija, gneva*> 'to turn white with fear <**fury**, nervousness, shock, **anger**>' and their English correlates.

It must be noted that all of the above-discussed colors, namely, *green*, *yellow*, *gray* and *white* denote, when used in reference to facial color, general pallor of the face. In other words, when they are used in reference to facial color. they are used metaphorically and

refer to more or less the same coloring. That is, the real facial color is never green or yellow or gray or white; all these expressions are different metaphoric indications of the same denotate (pallor) and differ only pragmatically - in their cultural evaluation. Differences in their cultural conceptualization (and not in real physiology) determine the range of emotions these color terms can denote.

Before I turn to other considerations, I will briefly discuss two more metaphors - the FEELING IS WARMTH and FEELING IS COLD metaphors.

The first two metaphors are interrelated. In Russian and English, they are applied to emotions that necessarily have an object, such as *love*, *friendship*, *hatred*, but not *happiness* or *joy* (the latter have a cause, but not an object). In the FEELING IS WARMTH and FEELING IS COLD metaphors, the effect that a feeling has on the mind of its **object** (not its **experiencer**, as in all other metaphors examined so far) is likened to the effect that warmth and cold have on the body of a human being.

Positive, kind emotions, such as *love*, *friendship* are likened to warmth; negative, unfriendly emotions, such as *hostility*, *contempt* are likened to cold (see Searle 1990:324 on the metaphorization of unemotional as cold and emotional as hot. where Searle proves the cultural origin of these metaphors).

Indeed, consider the following Russian and English expressions: *ljubov' sogrevajet* 'love warms'; *gorjacija družba* 'warm (literally: hot) friendship'; *xolodnaja neprijazn'* 'cold hostility'; *led prezrenija* 'ice of contempt'; *warm < cold > attitude*; *to talk to somebody warmly < coldly >* (= 'in a friendly' or 'unfriendly' way, respectively); *warm-hearted* (= 'kind-hearted'); colloquial *cold turkey* ('unemotional person'), *to give somebody the cold shoulder* ('treat somebody with contempt or neglect') and the like.

I would like to mention briefly some more of the metaphors in the cultural type.

(a) RAVNODUSNOE ILI PLOXOE OTNOSENIE - KAMENNOST' 'INDIFFERENCE OR BAD ATTITUDE IS STONYNESS': *kamennoe lico* 'stony <indifferent, untouchable > face', *kamennyj celovek* 'a person made of stone' and their English equivalents.

(b) RAVNODUSNOE ILI PLOXOE OTNOSENIE - SUXOST' 'INDIFFERENCE OR BAD ATTITUDE IS DRYNESS⁸': *suxo razgovarivat'* 'to speak dryly' and its English equivalent.

By themselves, the properties of being made of stone or being dry are neither bad nor good; they do not bear any cognitive evaluation; however, in Russian and English linguistic cultures they are conceptualized as negative and, therefore, associated with negative emotions.

III.4. LINGUISTIC PROPERTIES OF THE METAPHORS IN THE CULTURAL METAPHOR TYPE

Metaphors in this type are formed by the cultural metaphorization mechanism. This means that the associative connections between the source and the target domains are rather weak, since the mapping is determined arbitrarily, subjectively, not on the basis of any objective similarity. This calls forth the following linguistic and cross-linguistic properties

of the metaphors in the cultural type:

(a) The first linguistic peculiarity of metaphors of this type is the following: unlike metaphors of the physiological type, they are not included in the semantic definitions of the emotions they correspond to. The reason for this is weakness of associative connections between the emotion and the source domain object; these associative connections are insufficient to identify the emotion by merely mentioning the source domain object. Metaphors of the cultural type should be commented upon somewhere in the linguistic description of the corresponding emotions but not in their semantic definitions;

(b) linguistically, they usually cannot be used metonymically, i.e., the metaphoric expression of an emotion cannot be used as its independent denotation. For instance, the Russian expression *Serdce razryvaetsja* 'The heart is being torn,' used to describe the emotion *zalost'* 'pity,' if taken out of context, is an insufficient indication of this emotion: it does not imply that the emotion experienced is necessarily 'pity.' Likewise, *to tum black* does not, by itself, mean 'to experience anger'.

This property is not a strict rule (consider the counterexamples *to feel blue* as an independent indication of *sadness* and *to be green* as an indication of *envy*) but rather a strong tendency.

(c) Cross-linguistically, cultural metaphors display a large amount of variation and may differ from culture to culture, even to the point of incomprehensibility. For instance, the Russian metaphor PITY IS PAIN is incomprehensible to an English speaker; likewise, the English metaphorical expression for sadness, *to feel blue*, does not say anything to a speaker of Russian.

More than any other emotion metaphors, the metaphors of this type reflect the naive picture of the world. They reflect naive ethics (cf. the Russian PITY IS PAIN metaphor and its absence in English-speaking cultures); naive religion (cf. the A GOOD FEELING IS LIGHT metaphor); naive psychology (FRIENDLY FEELING IS WARMTH), etc.

IV. COGNITIVE METAPHOR TYPE

The cognitive emotion metaphor type is represented by the following metaphors: GRIEF IS ILLNESS or the Russian GORE - TJAZEST' ('GRIEF IS BURDEN') and GORE - SMERT' ('GRIEF IS DEATH') metaphors, as well as by NADEZDA - VOSKRESENIE, ZIZN' 'HOPE IS RESURRECTION, LIFE' metaphor. The objects in the source domain and the objects in the target domain have a common semantic component (and not a pragmatic one, as in the case of cultural metaphors). For instance, grief and death share the component 'bad, sad occurrence'; hope and life share the component 'good, happy occurrence'. Thus, the likening of the target domain objects to the source domain objects is based on their cognitive affinity.

IV.1. SOURCE DOMAIN IN THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR TYPE

The source domain for the metaphors of this type consists of various physiological

sensations. However, it differs from the source domain of the first, physiological type (which is also constituted by physiological sensations). The difference is as follows: sensations in the first type are the **obligatory** physiological manifestations of the feelings to which they are metaphorically mapped; sensations in the third type are **arbitrarily** chosen and unrelated to the real manifestations of the corresponding feelings.

IV.2. MAPPING IN THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR TYPE

In some respects, the mapping in the cognitive type recalls that in the cultural. Namely, cognitive metaphors, as well as cultural metaphors, are not based on real, strong similarities between the objects in the source and the target domains, but on positive or negative evaluations of these objects. However, these evaluations are of a different nature. If in the second, cultural type these evaluations are determined by purely cultural factors and are often subjective and arbitrary, in the third type they are determined by what I call cognitive factors and are more objective and natural. Thus, in the third type, the mappings between domains are also more objective than those in the second.

In this objectiveness, cognitive metaphors come close to physiological metaphors. Indeed, the mapping between, e.g., 'grief' and 'burden' is not arbitrary: 'grief' is linguistically viewed as having the same effect on a person as 'burden' does. Namely, they both *bend* a person. cf. *On sognulsja pod tjazest'ju meska, kotoryj on nes* 'He was bent under the burden of the bag he was carrying' ("literal burden") and *On sognulsja pod tjazest'ju gorja* 'He was bent under the burden of his grief' ("metaphoric burden").

However, there is an essential difference between the mapping in the physiological and cognitive types.

First of all, in the cognitive type, one emotion can be mapped onto the source domain in many possible ways, as well as one expression from the source domain can be mapped onto many different emotions (same as in the cultural type). In the physiological type, the correlation between emotions and source domain objects is unambiguous.

Secondly (and this is even more decisive), in the first, physiological type, the similarity between the objects in source and target domains is much stronger than in the cognitive type. Let us consider the first type metaphor STRAX - XOLOD 'FEAR IS COLD.' It likens the effect that the feeling of 'fear' has on a person's mind to the effect that the sensation of 'cold' does on a person's body. In this respect, the mapping in the physiological type does not differ from that in the cognitive.

However, there is one more aspect in the metaphor FEAR IS COLD. Namely, this metaphor likens the effect that 'fear' has on the body of a person to the effect that 'cold' does. This effect is the same. One can physically *shake* both with 'fear' and with 'cold': the expression *to shake* is, thus, used literally in both cases. However, if we tried to apply the same strategy to the metaphors of the cognitive type, e.g., GRIEF IS BURDEN, we would fail. This is because 'grief' **does not have** the same effect on one's body as burden does. When we say that *a burden bends one down*, we use the expression *to bend* literally; when we say that *grief bends one down*, we use this expression figuratively. *Shaking* is a physiological symptom of 'fear' as well as a physiological symptom of 'cold'; *bending* is not

a physiological symptom of 'grief'; there is no literal similarity between *grief* and *burden*. 'Grief' is manifested in *rears, screaming, wailing*, but not *bending*. The metaphor GNEF IS BURDEN, thus, does not have a physiological foundation. Thus, the likening of the effect that 'grief' has on one's mind to the effect that 'burden' has on one's body is determined by cognitive factors, not by physiological ones.

IV.3. METAPHORS IN THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR TYPE

I will start the discussion with the metaphors conceptualizing *grief*.

These are the Russian GORE - TJAZEST' 'GNEF IS BURDEN,' GORE - BOLEZN' 'GNEF IS ILLNESS,' GORE - SMERT' 'GNEF IS DEATH' and the English GNEF IS BURDEN and GNEF IS A BLOW metaphors.

The GORE - TJAZEST' 'GNEF IS BURDEN' metaphor is the most prominent metaphor for 'grief' both in Russian and in English. It is represented by such expressions as the Russian *sognut'sja ot gorja* 'to be bent with grief'; *tjazest' gorja* 'the heaviness of grief'; *gore svalilos' na kogo-libo* 'grief fell on somebody'; *byt' razdavlennym gorem* 'to be crushed with grief' and the English *to shudder under the weight of one's grief*; *heavy-hearted*; *to be crushed with grief*; *to be broken with grief*; *to be cast-down*; *to be in heavy spirits*. This metaphor likens the feeling of 'grief' to the sensation of heaviness, of burden.

The association between 'grief' and 'burden' has a cognitive foundation: both concepts have an overall negative cognitive connotation. Both imply an unpleasant experience - emotional in the case of 'grief'; physiological in the case of 'burden.' Both deprive the experiencer of certain abilities - to think, to feel, to react adequately in the case of 'grief'; to move around freely in the case of 'burden.'

The metaphor 'GNEF IS BURDEN' is found both in Russian and English. Another 'grief' metaphor these two languages share is the 'GNEF IS ILLNESS' metaphor.

The 'GRIEF IS ILLNESS' metaphor is presented by such expressions as the Russian *gore susit kogo-libo* 'grief dries one out,' *gore paralizuet kogo-libo* 'grief paralyzes one,' *gore iznurjaet kogo-libo* 'grief wears one out,' *zabolet' ot gorja* 'to fall ill with grief,' *zacaxnut' or gorja* 'to pine away with grief' or the English *to pine away with grief*, *to waste away with grief*, *to be ill from grief* and the like. The effect that *gore* 'grief' has on one's mind is likened to the effect that illness has on one's body. Again, this metaphor is not based on the symptomatics of 'grief,' since its symptomatics does not include being paralyzed or falling ill (at least, not literally), but on the cognitive closeness between 'grief' and 'illness.'

The remaining 'grief' metaphors are language-specific. They are presented below.

The Russian GORE - SMERT' 'GNEF IS DEATH' metaphor is presented by the expression *byt' ubitym gorem* 'to be killed with grief.' This metaphor likens the effects of 'grief' on one's mind to the effects of death on one's body. It should be noted, though, that death has many different aspects and the GNEF IS DEATH metaphor does not employ all of them. The physiological phenomenon of death can metaphorically refer to various psychological states, not only grief. Most frequently it is used to describe the state of spiritual emptiness, the end of spiritual activities. The metaphor *duxovnaja smert'* or *spiritual*

death is based on the following aspect of physiological death: death means the end of evolution, the end of development, the end of life.

The metaphor GRIEF IS DEATH is based on other aspects of death. When we say *byt' ubitym gorem* 'to be killed with one's grief,' we do not imply that one's spiritual life has stopped forever; it merely means that one is in a state of spiritual numbness (possibly temporary), that one is unable to feel anything but grief, unable to do anything but grieve. In other words, in this metaphor, 'death' is not understood as the end of life; rather, it is understood as inability to feel or to act.

The English GRIEF IS A BLOW metaphor is presented by such expressions as *to be hit by grief*, *to be grief-stricken*. This metaphor emphasizes the immediate effect of 'grief' on one's mind: it knocks one out as a sudden stroke.

To conclude the discussion of 'grief' metaphors, I would like to note that they can describe different stages of 'grief.' The GRIEF IS BURDEN metaphor can be equally applied to all stages of 'grief.' The GRIEF IS ILLNESS metaphor describes the long term effects of 'grief.' The GRIEF IS DEATH and GRIEF IS A BLOW metaphors describe the first, the strongest (and, perhaps, the shortest) stage of 'grief.'

Because of space limitations, I will not give any more detailed descriptions of cognitive emotion metaphors; however, I would like to briefly mention some more of them.

(a) 'Taste' metaphors.

1. UUBOV' / UDOVOL'STVIE - SLADOST' and its English correlate LOVE / PLEASURE IS SWEET: *sladost' ljubvi* 'the sweetness of love'; *sladkaja zenscina* 'sweet woman'; *sladostnye momenty* 'sweet moments' ('the moments of pleasure or joy'); *sweet love*; *sweet* ('pleasant') *person*, *sweet dreams*, *to be sweet on somebody* ('to be in love with somebody'), etc.

2. RAZOCAROVANIE - GOREC' and the English 'DISAPPOINTMENT IS BITTER': *gorec' razocarovanija* 'bitterness of disappointment,' *gor'kie mysli* 'bitter thoughts' ('thoughts which lack hope or joy'); *bitter disappointment* < *disillusionment* >; *bitter person* ('one who has lost hope and faith'), etc.

3. 'Sour' also forms cognitive emotion metaphors both in English and in Russian (of the form SOUR IS FEELING BAD). In Russian, *kislyj* 'sour' is metaphorically associated with bad mood, low spirits, pessimism; cf. *kisloe nastroenie* 'bad mood; literally: sour mood'. In English, *sour* refers to irritation, grudging, feeling offended; consider *to be sour on something* 'to be tired of something, disgusted with something.'

It is interesting that the last major taste - salty - does not form cognitive emotion metaphors, at least, not in the languages analyzed. There are no emotion metaphors based on 'salty' either in Russian or in English.

(b) 'Tactile' metaphors.

1. XOROSEE OTNOSENIE - MJAGKOST' 'GOOD ATTITUDE IS SOFTNESS': *mjagkaja ulybka* 'a soft smile,' *mjagko govorit'* 'to speak softly, gently.' The English correlates of this metaphor are, for example, *gentle attitude*, *to speak softly*, *to smile softly*. 'Softness' and 'good attitude' share a positive cognitive connotation: the former is pleasant physically and the latter - psychologically.

2. PLOXOE OTNOSENIE - ZESTKOST' 'BAD ATTITUDE IS HARDNESS': *zestkij celovek* 'hard person,' *zestkoe obrascenie* 'hard, harsh treatment' and their English correlates.

'Hardness' and 'bad attitude' share a negative cognitive connotation.

It is interesting that the lexeme *fverdyj* 'hard, firm,' which is semantically close to *zestkij* 'hard,' has a positive connotation; consider the positively connoted expressions *fverdyj celovek*, *tverdoe resenie* 'firm person,' 'firm decision.'

This difference is explained by the following: in its first, literal meaning, *fverdyj* 'hard, firm' means 'of solid structure.' The property of being of solid structure does not have anything negative in it; moreover, it may be considered as a positive one, since it implies reliability. Therefore, the lexeme *fverdyj* 'firm' is likely to be metaphorically associated with positively evaluated phenomena.

The lexeme *zestkij* 'hard,' however, means 'harder than is normal; harder than it was expected.' To be harder than expected, to be **hard**, while expected to be soft, is a negative property. Therefore, the lexeme *zestkij* is likely to be metaphorically associated with negatively evaluated phenomena.

(c) Pain metaphors.

1. SOVEST' - GRYZUSCAJA BOL' 'REMORSE IS GNAWING PAIN'. Consider the Russian expressions *sovest' gryzet* 'conscience bites one,' *sovest' terzaet* 'conscience tears one to pieces.' The English expressions are *pangs of conscience*, *conscience keeps gnawing*.

2. OBIDA - OSTRAJA VNEZAPNAJA BOL' 'OFFENCE IS SHARP SUDDEN PAIN'; consider the Russian expressions *ukol obidy* 'prick of offense,' *obida ujazvljaet* '<uscemijajet>' 'offense wounds <pinches>' and the English *to be wounded*, *to be hurt*.

IV.4. LINGUISTIC PROPERTIES OF THE METAPHORS IN THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR TYPE

Cognitive metaphors are an intermediate type between physiological and cultural metaphors. They are less arbitrary than cultural metaphors in that they are to a larger extent based on **similarities** between the target and the **source** domain objects. However, they do not **imply** as much **similarity** as physiological metaphors do. This determines their linguistic and cross-linguistic **properties**.

(a) Like the metaphors of the cultural type, they are not included in the semantic definitions of the emotions they correspond to. Metaphors of the cognitive type, like those of cultural should be commented upon somewhere in the linguistic description of the corresponding emotions but not in their semantic definitions;

(b) Next, they cannot **always** be used metonymically, cf. the impossibility of *'byt' razdavlennym* 'to be **crushed**' as a metonymic expression for 'grief'. However, **sometimes** it is possible; cf., the possibility of *ukolot' kogo-libo* 'to prick somebody' as a substitute for *obidet'* 'to offend.'

(c) Cross-linguistically, metaphors of the cognitive type can either display cross-linguistic variation or be invariant. Consider the invariance of the RAZOCAROVANIE - GOREC' and DISAPPOINTMENT IS BITTERNESS or WUBOV' - SLADOST' and LOVE IS SWEETNESS metaphors and the discrepancy in the 'grief' metaphors (e.g., absence of the 'GRIEF IS DEATH' metaphor in English and its **presence** in Russian). However, **unlike** cultural metaphors, cognitive metaphors are often intelligible for a speaker of the language

in which they are absent. If the English cultural metaphor *to feel blue* as an expression for *sadness* is totally uninformative for a speaker of Russian, the cognitive metaphor *byr' ubitym gorem* 'to be killed with grief' is quite comprehensible to a speaker of English. Thus, cognitive metaphors, even when they are not present in a given language, are still somewhat informative and understandable to the speakers of that language because they are based on cognitive connotations, shared by different languages.

NOTES

1. Note that all these metaphors are based on the visible, observable manifestations of 'fear'.
2. Consider also reports on the symptomatics of 'fear', recounted by the experiencers, in Scherer (1988:224-231): cold sweat; feeling cold; wet and cold hands; shaking; paralysis; goose pimples; trembling; pallor, loss of ability to talk; tension of muscles, etc.
3. This metaphor does not have a straight symptomatic basis, since the state of boiling cannot be experienced by a human being and, therefore, cannot be a symptom of emotion. This metaphor is formed in two steps: first, the physical manifestations of anger are likened to the physical state of a boiling liquid and then, the psychological state of the experiencer is likened to these manifestations.
4. This metaphor is found in other languages, as well; consider, e.g., the Greek *tromeros*, from *romeo*, meaning 'trembling' or 'fearful'; the verb *romeo* itself, meaning both 'to tremble' and, when used with an infinitive, 'to fear to do something'; *kruoëis*, meaning 'chilling', as an attribute of 'fear' (I owe these examples to the discussion with Roger Woodard). Note also that the etymological origin of the Russian word *strax* 'fear' is from the verb meaning 'to grow torpid, to freeze'. Its Lithuanian cognate is *stregti, stregiu*, meaning 'to freeze, to turn into ice' (Vasmer 1971:772).
5. Compare the Tok Pisin *belhat* (from the English 'belly hot'), meaning 'angry, impatient, furious, raging'.
6. Of course, real-world background greatly differs from culture to culture in what concerns artifacts, nature and other geography-dependent phenomena; however, human physiology, on which the emotion metaphors of this type are based, is not subject to cross-cultural variation (at least, nor to a great extent).
7. For Russian, this opposition is extremely important; the LIGHT IS GOOD and DARK IS BAD metaphors are very prominent in Russian culture. Consider, for example, the following metaphors (absent in English): LIGHT IS SPIRITUAL GOODNESS AND PURITY (*svetlyj celovek* 'pure, good, spiritual person', literally: 'lucid, radiant person'; *svetloe Kristovo Voskresenie* 'the radiant resurrection of Christ') and DARK IS SPIRITUAL EVIL (*temnyj celovek* 'bad, evil, sinful person'; literally: 'dark person'; *cernye dela* 'evil deeds'; literally 'black deeds').
8. Note, however, the positively connoted FIRMNESS IS RELIABILITY metaphor, reflected in the expression *to be firm as a rock*.
9. The following fact proves the arbitrary, cultural nature of this metaphor: the word *wer*, semantic opposite of *dry*, is not associated with good or interested attitude, as we would naturally expect, if this metaphor were motivated, but with *weakness, inability* to make up one's mind. In this respect, cognitive metaphors differ from cultural ones: the former are more motivated and, if a word A is associated with a property B, then the semantic opposite of A is normally associated with the semantic opposite of B, cf. GRIEF IS BURDEN and JOY IS LIGHTNESS metaphors.

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From SALT to SALT: Cognitive Metaphor and Religious Language.

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner theory of cognitive metaphor can be applied to religious language. After a brief description of the relationship between religion and metaphor, it focuses on the analysis of the saying « you are the salt of the earth » (Mt. 5:13). The reflection reveals that the sentence is a redefinition through the patriarchal Jewish « conceptual system » of an old Semitic mother-centered metaphor. A conclusion that emerges is that a metaphor's meaning may change drastically through the systematic reinterpretation of its signs into a new coherent cultural conceptualization while its « experiential basis » remains universal.

KEY WORDS: cognitive metaphor, religious language, conceptual system, experiential basis.

RESUMEN

Este trabajo trata del modo de aplicar la teoría de Lakoff, Johnson y Turner al lenguaje religioso. Después de una breve descripción de las relaciones entre religión y metáfora, se dirige la atención al dicho « sois la sal de la tierra » (Mateo 5:13). El análisis revela que la oración es una redefinición a través del sistema conceptual » patriarcal Judío de una antigua metáfora semítica basada en la Diosa Madre. Una de las conclusiones es que el significado de una metáfora puede cambiar drásticamente cuando sus diferentes signos son reinterpretados en una nueva conceptualización cultural coherente, mientras que su « base experiencial » sigue siendo universal.

PALABRAS CLAVE: metáfora cognitiva, lenguaje religioso, sistema conceptual, base experiencial

INTRODUCTION

As a conclusion to his article « Metaphor and Religion », Theologian David Tracy remarked that « the study of metaphor may well provide a central clue to a better understanding of that elusive and perplexing phenomenon our culture calls religion » (D.Tracy, 1979:104). Even though this statement is not new, it remains challenging. The idea presupposes an unprejudiced observation of the relationship between religion and metaphor, as well as the selection of relevant methods to analyze the metaphors. This paper will not attempt to investigate the « religious phenomenon » at large by studying the typical metaphorical structures and their religious or theological use in a set of given scriptures, as this has already been done from divergent critical point of views (P.Berger,1981; M.Eliade,1963). After a quick evaluation of the general relationship between religion and metaphor, the discussion will focus strictly on the analysis of the metaphoric content and implications of the expression traditionally ascribed to Jesus: « You are the salt of the earth » (Mt, 5:13)¹.

Most of what might be part of the genuine discourse of the historical Jesus is highly metaphorical as indicated by the very frequent repetition of words such as « is like », « are like », « as if » in all the Gospels canonized in the New Testament collection or in the Gnostics and the Christian sources of Nag Hammadi². The parable genre itself has been defined by modern scriptural scholars and literary critics as an interactive conjunction between narrative form and metaphorical processes. Considering this ubiquitous quality of the scriptures, it seems that the cognitive theory of metaphor, as it has been developed by G.Lakoff (Lakoff, 1992; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989), M. Johnson (Johnson, 1987) and M. Turner(Lakoff & Turner, 1989), may offer valuable methods of analysis. It will be the aim of the following reflections to discover how this cognitive theory may bring into light some of the concepts lurking behind the famous metaphor **disciples as salt of the earth** and might even disclose some surprising deductions which would confirm David Tracy's idea. As indicated by professor R. Maier, it seems that « neither Lakoff nor his followers have examined religious metaphors » extensively, for the time being (R. Maier, 1996 :8). In order to apply this cognitive theory to biblical texts, it could be suggested that, because of the cultural specificity and complexity of religious communication, some historical contextualization and pragmatic features may need to be integrated, as productive tools, to the cognitive and semantic aspects of Lakoff, Johnson and Turner's theory; this process will place the jesuanic metaphor within its historical « conceptual system » (G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980, p 193).

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The relationship between religion and metaphor can be summarized in broad terms. Modern theologians agree that any religion is grounded in a network of metaphors stemming in clusters of images from a few basic, central, epiphanic or normative root metaphors. As explained by D.Tracy, those root metaphors are organizing principles; they are «sustained metaphors», they « both organize subsidiary metaphors and diffuse new ones»(Tracy, 1979:89). For example, **Atman is Brahman** could be seen as the major epiphanic root metaphor of Hinduism; **God is love**, in turn, may be regarded as the basic normative root

metaphor of contemporary Christianity. Those root metaphors feed and shape the mythic images which constitute the overall mythology of the religion. In this way, to continue with one of the previous examples, since all reality is Brahman, there can not exist duality. Consequently, the single mythic image of dark Kali presents a Goddess who gives birth to all being while her long lolling tongue licks up the living blood of her creatures; she is equally their birth and their death. Her related symbols reflect the same unity: this life giver wears necklaces of skulls and a skirt of severed human legs and arms; she is the « cosmic dancer », and dances over the prostrate bodies which she had brought forth (H. Smith 1958, p71; J. Campbell, 1962, p164-165). It becomes obvious that a closely connected mythic image within the same cluster of metaphors will be that of the wheel of rebirths.

The clusters of metaphors and their imagery as well as their deepest roots are themselves metaphorical of the psychological posture of a particular people in answer to the general enigma of the human condition and place in the universe. The whole sociological system is itself coordinate to such posture or reaction and adapted to the local geography, climate, economy and specific ways of life. The entire complex shows two levels: a universal metaphysical and cosmological question about of what it may mean to be a self-conscious human being flung amidst the diversity of the world, and a local level with its resultant impulse to structure accordingly both society and the psychological make up of its individual members. It follows that all the structures of a particular people may be read as symbolic manifestations of the root metaphors born of the general psychological posture of that group and adapted to the imperatives of the environment. Expressions such as scriptures, icons, rituals or sacramental redescrptions can then be seen as metonymies of the root metaphors and as reinforcements of the correlate social order; they also sanctify that social order by investing the relationship between the individuals, their society and their universe with a spiritual sense approved by authority and tradition and coherent with the metaphysical and cosmological views of the mythological system.

This relationship between religion and metaphor, showing religion itself as a metaphor, rules out any substitution theory as method of analysis of religious metaphors and demands the tools of interactive and cognitive approaches. It seems unavoidable to criticise a theoretical stance as Donald Davidson's who affirmed that a metaphor is nothing more than «something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise» (D. Davidson, 1979: 31). Such theories, applied to religious language, can only lead to the erroneous, unenlightened and prosaic reification of the metaphoric images. This has for long been the accepted method of interpretation of many, unfortunately influential, commentators of the three creeds of the Book (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). Such readings have spawned, for example, the popular interpretation of the Virgin Birth as some miraculous biological aberration or of the Promised land as an actual geographical area of the Near East to be conquered by military action. Those undecoded metaphorical readings have taken mythic images for hard facts; they have converted them into cultural views which take for granted the corruption of sex, the body and matter, or which put positive emphasis on a privilege of race and its consequent group narcissism. Such attitudes caused partly by inadequate methods of analysis create a dogmatic situation which demands rereading. It can be hoped that not only may « the study of metaphor provide... a clue to a better understanding of... religion »(D.Tracy,1979:104), it might somehow unravel and demystify oppressive understandings which have become

increasingly shocking. It will be the aim of the following pages to discover how the cognitive theory of metaphor might untangle the assumptions covertly imprinted behind the utterance: « You are the salt of the earth ».

Tradition had ascribed the gospels to disciples or to their followers. However, the discoveries at Nag Harnmadi have shown that those attributions are unlikely to be correct and, in any case, utterly unprovable. Those orthodox assumptions will therefore be rejected and the more contemporary research will be taken as a basis for the purpose of the analysis (E. Pagels 1981: 61-62; C. Panati, 1996:100). According to the Gospel of Matthew (written from 65 to 75 AD), at the end of the eight Beatitudes, during the famous Sermon on the Mount, Jesus would have uttered the famous words: « You are the salt of the earth ». In order to allow a cognitive interpretation of the literal relationship between *salt* and *apostles*, without reference to the rest of the sermon, this statement will be taken momentarily as an authentic, historical fact. Considering the sentence in isolation and following the cognitive method, one could write that Jesus was using metaphorical language to clarify for his disciples the meaning of an abstraction about their role and about the quality of his feelings towards them. The metaphor was a kind of tiny parable which equated the essence, quality and cultural attributes of the source domain, salt, with a target domain corresponding to the ideophatic image that the speaker had of his disciples and of their mission. The intent was not to create poetic language. The aim was clearly pragmatic. The purpose was to transmit an abstraction in the most efficient way. The most direct method to address the disciples was to use for them a conceptual metaphor based on a vehicle whose domain belonged to their everyday life and to which they could relate through an easy process of « imaginative rationality » (G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, 1980:193)

This metaphor illustrates clearly that, as demonstrated by Lakoff's theory, « the locus of the metaphor is thought », not language as claimed by Davidson (Lakoff, 1992: 2). It is not a verbal phenomenon but a « species of thought » or cognitive process through which the conceptual domain of the disciples' duties can be understood in terms of what is known about salt. The metaphor shows that « as soon as one gets away from concrete physical experience and starts talking about abstractions and emotions, metaphorical understanding is the norm » (Lakoff 1992: 4). The role of metaphor is to bring the listeners back to a familiar set of information and experiences through which the idea may be decoded. Such process requires of the receptors an imaginative ability and a capacity for categorizations and inferences which are necessarily subject to a kind of objectivity « relative to the conceptual system of the culture » (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 193). In the light of the relationship which exists between religion and metaphor, it could be proposed that both the choice of the metaphor and its decoding are metonymies of the « conceptual system » of the Jewish community during the first century AD. In that particular instance, the reference to « salt » is particularly felicitous. Salt was for the disciples, most of them fishermen, a very concrete field of daily ontological experience; it also had a current and obvious complex of religious and epistemic references. The cognitive theory assumes that the disciples would « map » the « source domain », salt, onto the « target domain », their role. Through a relatively unconscious mental process, they would establish a set of systematic correspondences between the two domains by transferring information and inferences from the source to the target. A plausible, open-ended, unexhaustive mapping of these correspondences between *salt* and *disciples* can be attempted:

Salt	Disciples
Field of expence.	
Sait gives taste to food, enhances the flavors.	By transmitting the Word and following the Beatitudes. the disciples enhance the meaning of life, investing ir with spirituality .
Field of Knowledge.	
Sait is valuable : Antiochus's gift to Jerusalem of 375 bushels of salt for temple service (W. Smith, 1986:581) Sait used as salary	The metaphor itself can be understood as «you are vaiuable, important, chosen... ■
<u>Sait preserves:</u> food against decay. Was used by the ancients to preserve the bodies of the dead.	The Word preserves good will against sin: preserves the soul against spirituai death, hell.
Field of religious practices :	
Salt is sacred: Old Testament: offerings of sait (Lev, 2:13). Covenant of salt (Nb, 18:19) Story of Lot's wife (Gen, 19:26), permanence of sait = statue.	The Word is sacred Disciples as salt: word as offering. Covenant between Jesus and disciples. Permanence of the Word.
Field of popular beliefs :	
Sait of hospitality: sharing a man's salt created mutual obligation (S. Thompson, 1989, vol 5: 166). <u>Magical powers of salt:</u> Throwing sait over the shoulder as death-repelling charm (B. Walker, 1988:521). Eating sait during storms (C. Miles, 1976:311). Eating salt at the beginning of a journey (C. Miles, 1976:311).	Obligations of the disciples towards Jesus. The Word protects.

Analyzed within the frame of accepted orthodoxy and in **reference** to the rest of Matthew's chapter 5, the metaphor **implies** that if the apostles possessed the qualities enumerated in the eight Beatitudes, they would preserve mankind within a certain **desired**, supernaturally endowed social and ethical order. The quality of salt as preservative is being « mapped » upon the « target domain ». The interpretation is reenforced by the addition of the gustative property of salt in the following fragment: « but if salt has lost its taste, how **shall** its saltness be restored? It is no longer good for anything except to be thrown out and trodden under foot by men. » In other words, the apostles would **lose** their ability to preserve mankind and enhance the meaning of life on **earth** if they lost faith and the qualities of the Beatitudes. Then, they would « no longer be good for anything » (Mat 5:13)

It is surprising to observe that while the metaphor per se opens a wide gamut of possible correspondences underlining the **utmost importance** of the apostles, the surrounding text **closes** the gamut and reduces drastically the span of inferences. The text demands the selection of the preservative and **gustative** properties of salt and defines strictly and exclusively the conditions. There is no **opportunity** for «imaginative rationality». Instead of enlarging the **scope** of the metaphor, the explanations reduce the interpretation and the status

of the disciples as they impose a dogmatic reading. This puzzling effect of the surrounding text upon a cognitive metaphor can, in some cases, be a way to refine positively the purpose of the metaphor, giving to the decoding a level of insight and revelation. This process can be illustrated by observing how it functions in a traditional tale based on another salt metaphor. Just as Shakespeare would have King Lear do it, a King asked his three daughters how much they loved him. In Carmen Bravo-Villasante's version of the folk story, the youngest girl answered that she loved him « como la carne a la sal » (C. Bravo Villasante, 1979, Vol 3:135). At this point, in the first paragraph of the story, the reader does not know if the gustative or the preservative quality of salt or both are being highlighted. But at the end, given an unsalted dinner, the father realizes the value of salt as giver of taste and its cognitive parallel, the love of the girl for her father as giver of meaning to her life. The epiphany kills him, suggesting that the purpose of life was to come to this understanding. This recurrent motive in folk literature always ends in the same way: « experience teaches the father the value of salt » or the ultimate value of love (S. Thompson, Vol. 3:432). In the folk tale, the reduction of scope refines the meaning, pin-points the supreme, infinite importance of love and presents the import of the metaphor as an epiphany. In the gospel, there is a disquieting discrepancy between the set of possible correspondences and the way in which the preservative and gustative qualities of salt are highlighted. All sense of awe and epiphany is gone. The text of the sermon (Mt 5:1 to 7:29) has converted the metaphor into a limiting, authoritarian and self-conscious statement which logically ends with « for he taught them as one who has authority ». The metaphor seems out of place; it does not really fit the text; the cognitive eloquence of the metaphor is buried by the sermon.

This discovery leads the reader to wonder why this metaphor is used. It awakens suspicions and demands closer observation of the surrounding text. Would not the precise description of their expected duties, preceded by the explicit Beatitudes, followed by the long enumeration of rules and including the Lord's Prayer be far more than enough to clarify for the apostles whatever was expected of them? This entire « sermon on the mount » covers seventy verses without any interruption, from Mt.5:1 to Mt.5:28. The length and the difficulty of the text undermine any efficient didactic purpose; this second disquieting fact cannot fail to renew suspicions: the text certainly does not sound like a faithful repon of an actual, spontaneous sermon delivered by Jesus, in Aramaic, to a group of fishermen. Matthew is not the only gospel writer to render the episode. A much shorter passage, in Luke, presents many of the same ideas, in a similar language. However, Luke's beatitudes are only four; according to him, this scene did not take place on a mount but on a « level place » (Lk 6: 17), without the unnatural theatricality implied in Matthew: « seeing the crowds, he went up on the mountain.. » (Mt 5:1). Luke's version occupies less than ten verses and does not include the metaphor **Disciples As Salt of the Earth**. Matthew and Luke's gospels were started on the same year, 65 AD, five years after the completion of Mark's which served as a basis for both and which offers no reference to this sermon. Luke was the traveling companion of Paul (J. Metford, 1983:164, C. Panati 1996:460) who never met Jesus but whose letters predate the synoptic gospels. The first letter to the Thessalonians dates from the Winter of 50-51 AD (A. N. Wilson, 1992:17) almost twenty years after Christ's death. It foretells the imminent return of Jesus (1 Thess 4: 16-18) from the sky and it urges people to remain pure and chaste (1 Thess, 4:3) and to keep a look out on the skies for, as predicted by Daniel, « there would come with the clouds of heaven one like a son of

man »(Dan 7:13-6th BC). In the light of those pieces of information. Matthew's homily appears undoubtedly as a thorough compilation of the essential principles of the pauline selective reconstruction and interpretation of what Jesus's teachings might have been. Matthew gave to this compilation the fictional, narrative frame of the Sermon on the Mount by developing the idea of the Beatitudes found in Luke's text. It would seem that the expression « you are the salt of the earth » has been put into this fictitious sermon on the mount by the religious genius of Matthew, a Jewish tax-collector fascinated by precise and systematic correlations between the Old Testament and Jesus's life. The sentence must then be observed as part of a fictional narrative and as part of a normative compilation.

Since the metaphor does not fit the surrounding text. why does Matthew choose to splice it in? What can be deduced from the cognitive purport of its different signs and is the metaphor and original creation of Matthew? First the metaphor has a role, regardless of its semantic and cognitive content. Worded as it is, the sentence gives the fictional speaker the opportunity to address his receptors directly. This stresses the complexity which arises from the socio-semiotic elements of the situation of communication that is being presented. The direct « you » is the axis of the relationship. It establishes a partnership to decipher the metaphor. Pierre Bourdieu stipulates that, to be productive, religious and political languages must involve a co-construction of meaning between speaker and receptors (P. Bourdieu 1982:15-17; p.149-166). In that sense, the introduction of a cognitive metaphor in direct address could not be more felicitous: it encourages group participation and creativity. Ted Cohen calls this function of the metaphor « an achievement of intimacy » because the speaker and his receptors « become an intimate group as the latter are invited to participate in the decoding of a network of assumptions, hypotheses and inferences » (T. Cohen, 1979:7). Here, of course this opportunity offered by the metaphor is denied by the rest of the text. It could be deduced, therefore, that one of the rhetorical imports of the metaphor is to create an atmosphere of « intimacy », an illusion of possible co-construction: it is an obvious diplomatic and political device. However, the socially stimulating effect of the metaphor is deepened by the Jewish « conceptual system » (G. Lakoff) at work within the pronoun « you ». This « you » is a « thou » in the sense which has been defined by Martin Buber: «When Thou is spoken. the speaker...takes his stand in relation to his audience », (Buber 1958:4). Each disciple is to feel himself as the speaker's « thou...with no neighbor and whole in himself...as he fills the heavens »; yet, « this does not mean that nothing exists except himself, but all else lives in his light » (M. Buber 1958:8). This philosophical interpretation of « you » is the one implied by Matthew who reinforces it through the next, parallel metaphor in the following verse « you are the light of the world » which, incidentally, is an actual borrowing from Mark (4:21), and which combines « you/thou » with « light ».

Following this impact of the pronoun « you », the verb to be in « you are » cannot be read simply as a copula introducing a contingent quality. « You are » expresses existence and reality; it refers to each apostle's essence and true nature. Philosophically, « being » implies, as Erich Fromm underlined, « the concept of process, activity and movement,...being is becoming » (E. Fromm 1976:13). The verb includes a notion of « inner activity », of intent; it requires « the productive use of human powers » (E. Fromm, 1976:76). This productiveness becomes part of the role of the apostles. Since the utterance defines, by its « illocutionary force », the essence of individuals, it may be argued that it constitutes what Austin called a « performative utterance ». The sentence is a « speech act »

because it is not « merely saying something but doing something » (J. Austin 1976, p25). In conclusion, it may be argued that the covert cognitive and socio-pragmatic purpose of the subject and verb of the sentence is performative, which implies symbolically the ritualistic transformation of the apostles through the impact of those signs.

Another element of the utterance. « of the earth », analyzed within the frame of Jewish thought. refers back to the main metaphors of Biblical cosmology and eschatology. Those background metaphors constitute « the conceptual structures» onto which, according to Lakoff, the significance of « of the earth » will be « unconsciously and automatically organized » (G. Lakoff & M. Turner, 1989, p.89). The Jewish « conceptual system » includes the cosmology upon which the whole Old Testament is founded and which was current and plausibly convincing at the time of Abraham (1996 BC). It corresponds basically to the ancient Sumero-Babylonian three-layered cosmos of Heaven, Earth and Water. By the times of Alexander (350 BC) and then through the influences of Aristarchus of Samos's heliocentric model (3rd BC) and later of the Ptolemaic model (Amagest 146 AD), the Greeks had disregarded the old cosmology. However, Paul and the first century AD Jewish and Christian contemporaries of the Bible's compilation do not seem to have been disturbed by this obsolete cosmology. They accepted it because it was part of the « conceptual structures » necessary to the literal understanding of a cluster of mythic images belonging to their faith. This cosmology made possible the literal understanding of Daniel's vision (mentioned earlier), or of such episodes as the one of the Tower of Babel challenging God (c.1700BC, Gen 11: 45), or of Elijah ascending physically « with a whirling wind into heaven...in a chariot of fire drawn by horses of fire » (c.896BC, Chron. 21: 12-15) or again of Ezekiel's dream-vision of the heavenly throne (Ezek 1: 22-28). The assumption of the validity of that cosmology remains basic in the New Testament if the physical ascensions of Jesus and the Virgin Mary are to be read as hard facts, as they have been read by orthodox commentators for the last 2000 years.

This Old Testament cosmology mirrors what may be offered as root metaphor of Judaism and the other faiths of the Book: the image of God as ontological, transcendent Other. A chasm separates God and man; it can only be crossed by the awe of man in prayer and by the will of God in revelation. This sky God is so far away from man and nature that he is unbegotten: there is no theogony in the religions of the Book. He is so far from the earth that nature neither contains him nor exhausts his power. Consequently, the human and the divine are sharply polarized (M. Gauchet, 1985: chapter 4) The earth no longer is the womb and tomb of all life as when Gods and Goddesses, like Ba'al, Asherah or Kali remained in its depth. The earth has become a place of corruption which needs the help of prophets and disciples to be endowed with meaning and afford mankind a path towards salvation in the afterlife. Hence, the Jewish experience is coherently organized according to its root metaphor (G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980, chap. 23). The metaphor being one of chasm between God and man/earth, the relationship becomes one of covenants. God's will confront man with demands. He becomes ubiquitous in human events and history and controls from above.

As stated by professor R. Maier, in religious communication, « not only does the text as such count, but also the other elements of the context, as does the way of presenting the text » (R. Maier, 1996:12). Here the important element is the place, the mount once more. After the episodes at Mt Senai (Ex33:20-23) and at Mt Herob (meaning « mountain of God» 1. Kings 19), after the influential above earth dream visions of the Old Testament and the

recurrent associations of Yahweh with mountains³, the reader cannot avoid a sense of *déjà vu* when Jesus « seeing the crowds...goes up on the mountain » to « teach » the eight Beatitudes: **Matthew's** sermon on the mount is a new covenant. Throughout the Old Testament, God's **theophanies** become more and more elusive. They show God hiding behind metaphors of concealment (a back, a **burning** bush, a throne..), becoming a commanding, yet disembodied voice. In Matthew, God's commands are presented indirectly through the redemptive son. The theophanic and **dogmatic** situation of **divine** communication in the Old Testament is automatically transferring its particularities to the new situation in the New Testament. The Old Testament's episodes **provide** the « context needed for the understanding of the utterance », « you are the salt of the earth », according to the Jewish « conceptual system » (G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980:224). The perception of the situation of the sermon is « mapped » according to the **well** known previous descriptions of mount religious experiences. Those experiences are so deeply engrained into the **world** view that the imagination is constrained to process the new situation in function of the previous ones. What comes out is, once more, automatization and lack of freedom. **Like** the surrounding text, the setting of the sermon **denies** to the apostles the freedom to participate with « imaginative rationality » in the construction of the metaphorical meaning which concerns them so deeply that it pretends to **redefine** their being. They are preconditioned by the cultural context of which the text is both metonymy and reenforcement.

It can be concluded so far that, endowed with sacredness through its mount setting and the Jewish sense of « you are », this saying fulfills two functions: it creates an illusion of co-construction of meaning by allowing an atmosphere of « intimacy » and it imposes the selection of preservative and gustative **qualities** of salt as exclusive correspondences for the duties of the apostles to maintain mankind within a meaningful supernaturally imposed social and moral order. It remains to find out whether Matthew created and was the first one to use the metaphor « you are the salt of the earth ». G. Lakoff and M. Turner point out that adequate understanding « requires knowledge », and they give **some** examples by showing how much « appropriate knowledge » is necessary to enable a reader « to make sense of a Sanskrit poem » (G. Lakoff & M. Turner, 1989:60). The same type of care has to be **taken** with the present metaphor. **Some** research has uncovered the fact that the expression « salt of the earth » is a saying belonging to Canaanite and ancient Near Eastern **cultures**. Contemporaries of the Old and New Testaments had heard these words and must **have** known their meaning. It was a « common **Semitic** metaphor for enlightened seers » and it meant « true blood of the Earth Mother » (B. Walker 1986, p.887). This information shows Matthew's **brilliant grafting** of a previously mother centered mythic image onto a Judeo-Christian patriarchal root metaphor. Matthew's use of this metaphor is an **instance** of what M. Fishbane calls « the many remarkable attempts to absorb, reformulate, or otherwise integrate the mythic **patterns**, images and values of Canaanite and ancient Near Eastern religions (M. Fishbane 1981, p.33). Through this process, the utterance deepens its illocutionary force and performative, ritualistic import; it says to the disciples that « they », male followers of Jesus and not the **females** seers of Mother Earth, are indeed the **true** « salt of the earth ». **The** utterance redefines not only the status of the apostles but **also** the metaphorical « salt of the earth » itself and its switch from matriarchal to patriarchal significance.

Such symbols as the ones related to salt and the metaphors built upon them awaken archetypal interest and imagery. They trigger some deep sense of wonder which echoes in the mind and demands to be tapped through some image. The reason for the force of universal symbols might be found in their « experiential and physical basis» (Lakoff&Johnson, 1980) and their related «bodily basis»(Johnson, 1987) . Lakoff and Johnson apply the « physical basis » principle mainly to « orientational metaphors » (G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980:14-17) but it could be suggested that much of the weight of « salt » in metaphors comes from the physical and experiential basis of that mineral. The taste of salt is the first flavor that touches the gustative cells of the foetus long before its birth. It is the taste of the amniotic fluid, of the micro-ocean of the womb, where life grows. That is probably to match this prenatal environment and hoping for rebirth that Egyptians kept the mummies in a brine solution called « natron » or « birth fluid » (B. Walker, 1986:886). Alchemy offers an impressive testimony of the imprinting of that first taste of life: the alchemical symbol for salt is the same as the symbol for the water element, « the straight sea horizon dividing upper and lower portions of the world » (R. Koch, 1955:65). The same prominence was given by the 16th century Paracelsians who based the universe upon « the tria prima » of which salt was the first mystic principle before sulphur and mercury. « Salt thus appears not as a substance, but a cosmic principle » (M. Haeffner, 1994:198) , so much so that Khunrath (alchemist 1560-1605) called salt the « physical center of the earth » (M. Haeffner, 1994:199) Not surprisingly, salt is related to creation myths: In Norse mythology, for instance, the primaeval cow Audumla

Licked the salty blocks and by the evening of the first day a man's hair had come out of the ice. Audumla licked more and by the evening of the second day a man's head had come Audumla licked again and by the evening of the third day the whole man had come. (K Crossley Holland, 1980:4)

Some early Jewish popular beliefs allege that « salted water may be converted into flesh » (S. Thompson. Vol. 2:56, D 478.10). The symbolic logic of these myths appears clearly if the indestructible qualities of salt are taken into consideration: While the body decays after death, its salts remain, they are the last residue, the leftover, the element which frames the beginning and the end. It endures in contrast with the phenomenal world, and the salt goes back to the physical center of the earth . Since the idea of its own decay is for the ego a terribly repellent and frightening concept, it is not surprising to discover that the value of salt has a deep psychological grounding. At the same time, the living body needs salt in its diet not only as a condiment but as a necessary antidote to the heat of the climate, for both humans and animals, as can be read in the Old Testament (Job 6:6; Is 30:24). There cannot be any doubt about the link between salt and enduring life. Is it, then, mere coincidence to discover that the two great liberating victories of the Israelites happen in a so called « Valley of Salt » (David over the Edomites, 2 Sam 8:13, 1 Chron 18:12 and Amaziah, 2 Kings 14:7, 2 Chron 25: 11)? Scholars do not agree upon the exact geographical situation of that valley but it is thought to be in the area of Mount Jebel Usdum, a mountain composed almost entirely of salt several hundred feet high and seven miles long, not far from the Dead Sea (Gen: 14: 3) and whose original name was Sea of Salt (W. Smith: 581)!

The «experiential basis» for the value of salt can also be extracted from the fact that tears, blood and semen taste like salt. Those three bodily fluids have always been regarded as potent drops. When water evaporates from the tears what is left is salt produced by human emotion. Man is the only animal to shed tears. Tears may form in the eyes of a dog or a cow but they have probably little to do with their feelings. Even babies do not usually cry with tears until they are between one and two months old. Because they represent compassion and suffering, the tears of holy personages are supposed to have healing virtues, while it was thought that witches could not cry. Strikingly, the shortest verse in the whole Bible is one concerning the power of tears: « Jesus wept » (Jn 11:35). Here Christ's tears are believed to represent the outpouring of divine love, compassion, and benevolent power necessary to rise Lazarus from the dead. This same power of tears is pointed out through the disparity between a Norse myth and its parallel in the Old English poem «The Dream of the Rood» (ca. 7th century, anonymous): Odin's son Balder had been killed by the mistletoe twig but could be « wept out of Hel » as long as « each substance of the nine words wept for him ». Only one person refused to weep, the giantess Thokk, condemning Balder to stay among the dead (K. Crossley-Holland:150-161). On the other hand, in line 55 of the « Dream of the Rood », which describes Christ's crucifixion from the point of view of the cross, it is written: « Weop eal gesceaft »; «The whole creation wept» (M. Swanton ed, 1970:93) at the sight of Christ's death and of course, he was risen. The salt of tears is the salt of emotions, miracles and victory over death.

The narrow connection between salt and blood, experienced in their similar taste has already been recognized in the pre-patriarchal meaning of « Salt of the earth » as « true blood of the Earth Mother ». The similarly salty taste of semen probably led to the same organically based, but male-centered, salt/semen/blood mythic complex. The correlation may be briefly illustrated by the Egyptian pharaohs' coronation rites: During the ceremony, a mystical fluid called « Sa », the invisible semen of the God Ra, magically infiltrated the veins of the king, permeated his blood and filled him with Divine power; the pharaoh became, like the Canaanite seers, « true blood », not of the Earth Goddess, but of Ra. A comparable association pervades the sexual views of the Talmud which shows semen as sacred seed and often equates it with blood because both are «fiery fluids» which receive life from the Divine flame (G.Langer, 1990).

Using Hanz Biedermann's wording, the symbolism of blood can be summarized by saying that it « is widely considered the element of divine life that functions in the human body » (H. Biedermann, 1994:43). In the realm of rituals, salt and blood became equated: « salt was accepted as a substitute for the Mother's regenerative blood ... because it came from the sea womb and had the savor of blood (B. Walker, 1986:886). In the Bible, the sprinkling of salt (Lev. 2:13; Num 18:19) was most likely a substitute for the sprinkling with blood. This correspondence can be observed at the linguistic level, in the etymology of such words as « blessing » and « immolate » which are both related to ritualistic offerings. « Blessing » comes from the Old English « betsian » and earlier

Bleatswean » meaning to sanctify by sprinkling with the blood of sacrificial animals or war captives (R. Graves 1958:29, 340). To « immolate » comes from the Latin « mola », a sacred salted flour prepared by the Vestal virgins, and which was sprinkled on the sacrificial animals offered to the Gods (B. Walker, 1986:887).

Since blood and salt are tightly entangled within the concept of sacrifice in the Bible, is it possible to avoid the idea that there might also be a cognitive, epistemic correspondence between sacrificial offering and the performative utterance « you are the salt of the earth »? Could the **immolated object** be the disciples' ego, the ego-centered living which has to be slain so that the heart may become « merciful », « pure »,

meek »...acquire the purified state described in the beatitudes? This notion is echoed by St Jerome who calls Christ himself « the redeeming Salt that penetrates Heaven and Earth » (quoted by H. Biedermann, 1994:294) because He had to be sacrificed to redeem mankind. This sacrifice of the disciples would be like the melting away of the ego so that, through mysticism, the ultimate may eventually be reached. At this point of the interpretation, the hygroscopic property of salt and its affinity with water are being added to the sacrificial epistemic correspondence. These physical properties of salt are « mapped » upon the Western typically (though not exclusively) confrontational concept of religious experience⁴: The ego lets itself dissolve away; like salt in water, it becomes transparent and absorbs the Divine which penetrates it from above; like salt, the ego is invisible but it does not disappear and it is not personally extinguished; it persists in an elevated, purified state, as indestructible as the soul in its incorporeal, orthodox definition.

CONCLUSION

It has become obvious that the interpretation of the sentence «you are the salt of the earth» depends upon two factors. On the one hand the meaning is contingent upon the root metaphors of the religion and the « conceptual system » which inform the imposition of the different signs. On the other hand, at a deeper level, the eloquence of the metaphor is grounded in the universal «experiential basis » which stands behind the mythic images and powerful symbols related to salt.

The force of the metaphor could not be dismissed by Matthew. Perceiving its richness and flexibility, he adapted it to the new faith, grafted it on the Hebrew patriarchal root and imposed its reinterpretation by introducing it within the normative text of a fictional sermon delivered with « authority » and redefining the individual signs of the sentence. The usurpation of the metaphor and its redefinition are both metonymies of the «conceptual system» of the first century AD Jewish and early Christian society. The insertion of the metaphor is actually a multi-leveled political action: Being a patriarchal appropriation of a female-centered mythic image, it is still an attempt to overpower the previous Earth/Mother centered religion, as well as its correlate social, economic and political systems. Much of the Old Testament⁵ tells the struggles of the Israelites to impose, usually by force, their new patriarchal order and distant, male, sky God in a land whose customs and religion were dominated by the female Earth principle. The land of Canaan was indeed a land of « milk and honey » but it was not an empty land, « its inhabitants were a powerful people, the towns were fortified and very big » (Num 13:28). It had to be conquered; the altars were destroyed and the images broken. The expression « salt of the earth », being a linguistic icon, a prepatriarchal mythic image of the religion, its mutation in Matthew's gospel amounts to a violation of sacred material which echoes the burning of the asherim.

Another political level is made obvious by the rhetoric style and the socio-semiotic aspects of the discourse. The « intimacy » created by the metaphor makes more easily acceptable the demands of the text. The Beatitudes encourage the disciples and the dominated social classes not to care about « hunger and thirst », « persecution » and poverty, not to rebel but to « rejoice and be glad » for their « reward is great in Heaven ». for eternity, away from the corrupted earth. This, of course, transforms the organized religion into the political associate of the dominant class. The same principle applies to the husband/wife relationship described further during the sermon.

Matthew's political and religious genius engineered the semantic mutation of the metaphor to meet the purpose of the institution of a new organized religion, but, ultimately this transformation works because the metaphor draws its power from an experiential basis embedded within the body and the senses. As predicted by David Tracy, « the study of metaphor » has afforded a « better understanding » of the religious « phenomenon » expressed in a single metaphor. On one level the study of this metaphor revealed the text as political rather than religious. However, on a deeper level, the metaphor is a mythic image: it stands out as a bloc of gold which can be melted and reshaped but which remains gold. The Canaanite and the Christian metaphors are different but they are made of the same cognitive inferences grounded in the same « bodily and experiential basis ». The salt of the Gospel is like the soda salt used by the glass maker; it is invisible, yet material, concealed into the clear substance of the crystal glass which reflects the light. The Canaanite salt is also the true enduring essence. the material, « true blood » of the Goddess; it is like the thread which is the pattern and the panern which is the thread.

It seems that the cognitive decoding of the « experiential basis » of a religious metaphor is of utmost importance to the understanding of religion. Religious metaphor appears to be rooted deeply into the body, its experiences, fluids and functions. The most spiritual activity of mankind feeds on the material element, the soma, the gross, carnal, dense, natural body, on the arena of the senses. The «bodily basis» is the mysterious, experiential well of power from which the imagination draws the insights that can convert salt, the chemical sodium chloride of daily experience into the mythic image of Salt.

NOTES

1. Standard scriptural abbreviations will be used throughout the text.
2. Nag Hamiota (upper Egypt): discovery in 1945 (two years before the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls) of a large jar containing 48 Coptic Gnostic works, a total of 700 pages. Among the most important texts are: The Gospels of Thomas, Philip and Mary Magdalene. The Gospel of Truth, The Treatise on Resurrection. The Dialogue of the Savior... (J. Campbell, 1964: chap 7).
3. Biblical connections between God and mountains: Exod 3:1, 24:17; Deut 4:10, 4:15, 5:4; and ubiquitously in the Book of Psalms: 48, 78, 99; and linked to the symbolism of the mountain is the reference to «Rock»: Ps 18, 19, 28, 31, 42, 62, 71, 92, 94.
4. See among others accounts by St Francis, St Teresa. St. John of the Cross.
5. Old Testament references to the struggle of the Hebrew to impose Yahweh over the pre-patriarchal deities are too numerous to be quoted; see as typical: Judges 2:13, 3:7; Sam 7:3 - 4; 1 Kings 15:13; 11 Kings 17:9, 23:4 - 15; Deut 12:2-3, 16:21 for the prohibition of «Asherim» as an example of this constant strife for supremacy.

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Eating and Drinking as Sources of Metaphor in English

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ABSTRACT

Eating and drinking are basic acts in ordinary human experience and concepts relating to these acts are sources for metaphorical ways of describing a great variety of events in English and other languages. This paper provides an account of the components of the basic digestive acts and the various metaphorical mappings which each of these components gives rise to in English. Following the orientation of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and most discussion of metaphor since then within the cognitive linguistics movement, metaphor is understood as essentially a relationship between concepts, relating the concepts associated with a source domain to the concepts associated with the target domain.

KEY WORDS: eating and drinking, metaphorical mappings, source domain, target domain

RESUMEN

Comer y beber son actos básicos de la experiencia humana normal y los conceptos relacionados con esos actos son fuentes de donde surgen modos metafóricos para describir una gran variedad de sucesos tanto en inglés como en varios otros idiomas. Esta comunicación da cuenta de los elementos componentes de los actos digestivos básicos y de las diversas transposiciones metafóricas que cada uno de esos actos engendra en inglés. Siguiendo la orientación establecida por Lakoff y Johnson (1980) y la mayor parte de las discusiones sobre la metáfora que siguen desde entonces dentro del movimiento de la lingüística cognitiva, se entiende aquí la metáfora como esencialmente una relación entre conceptos, donde se relacionan los conceptos asociados con un campo de origen (source domain) con los asociados con el campo de meta (target domain).

PALABRAS CLAVE: comer y beber, transposiciones metafóricas, campo de origen, campo de meta

I. INTRODUCTION

A strong theme evident in much of the Cognitive Linguistics movement is the interest in, and respect for, a human perspective, or more broadly, experiential reality (cf. Lakoff 1987:266), in motivating and explicating linguistic phenomena. A natural way to develop this interest is to focus attention on the human body and the way in which it functions as a basic domain, functioning as a source for metaphorical understanding of other, less basic domains. The unique place of the human body in our daily lives makes the human body, and its associated parts and processes, conceptually basic. Hence, body parts, and the processes the body is involved in, serve as natural source domains for many kinds of metaphors. Considerable attention has already been given to body parts and the way in which they are metaphorically extended to various domains, including extensions to quite abstract, grammatical functions (see, for example, Heine et al. 1991a:124-131, Heine et al. 1991b:151-153, Rubba 1994). Equally worthy of attention, as sources of metaphorical extension, are basic acts or events involving our bodies. This interest is already evident in the Cognitive Linguistics literature — cf. the discussion of sense-perception verbs in Sweetser (1990:32-48); “come”/“go” verbs in Radden (1995) and Shen (1995); “stand”/“lie” in Serra Bometo (1995); “give”/“take” in Newman (1996). The present study develops this interest further by examining the concepts of “eating” and “drinking” (surely among the most basic concepts, from the human perspective) as source domains for metaphorical extension in English.

In what follows, I document a representative range of metaphorical extensions of mainly verbal (as opposed to nominal) concepts relating to “eating” and “drinking”. The examples of such extensions do include conventionalized usage in ordinary language, but most of the examples have been taken from British and North American literature (novels and poetry), written within the last 150 years or so. The examples were noted by me as I read through a diverse selection of material drawn from many different authors and writing styles. This way of proceeding enabled me to collect a substantial number of examples, together with the contexts in which they occur — an important consideration in appreciating the full effect of figurative usage of language. The study focuses on the broad category of verbal concepts relating to eating and drinking, rather than the specific verbs *eat* and *drink*. This approach thus follows Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987:276), and Lakoff and Turner (1989:63) in construing metaphor as a relationship between conceptual domains. Throughout this study, the domain of eating/drinking will be the source domain; the target domains, as will be seen, are various, but include the emotional domain, the intellectual domain, and the psychological domain.

II. LITERAL “eat” AND “drink”

Before we enter into a discussion of the metaphorical extensions of “eat” and “drink” words, it is necessary to say something about the processes involved in the eating and

drinking acts. The various extensions of "eat" and "drink" verbs are motivated by facets of these acts and it is **only** by properly identifying these facets that we can properly understand the metaphorical extensions. In **turning** our attention to these basic acts, we must consider the folk theory of these acts, rather than any expert **medical knowledge** of the processes involved. This is consistent with a cognitive linguistic approach which takes experiential reality. in this case how ordinary people understand the acts of eating and drinking, as the relevant kind of reality in helping to explicate linguistic phenomena. If we were considering specifically **medical terminology**, devised by **medical experts**, then of course it would be appropriate to consider the specialized **medical knowledge** which motivates the extension. Dealing as we are, however, with the lay person's use of language, rooted in a folk understanding of the processes involved, it is entirely appropriate that we proceed in this way.

The act of eating is multifaceted. As a convenient way of detailing the act. one may recognize the following components, based on my own conception of what is the most typical kind of eating. It is appropriate to acknowledge an aspect of the larger frame of eating which precedes and is causally connected to the act. namely **some** degree of *hunger*. It is the experience of hunger which encourages one, even compels one, to eat. This is not to deny that one may **have** to eat even when one lacks an appetite. But the overwhelming majority of eating acts coincide with and **result** from an hunger which demands food in satisfaction. Eating is something **desired** and initiated by the eater, not something that happens to the eater. As for the act proper, one may note, first of all, there is an *intake* of some solid-like substance into the mouth, usually achieved by the eater using their own **hand(s)**. This is followed by *mastication* of the food in the mouth, involving **primarily** the teeth, tongue, and the roof of the mouth. The food particles are then passed down the **throat** into the intestines and stomach through a process of *swallowing*. Inside the intestines/stomach is where I understand the food to undergo quite drastic transformations through processes one may refer to as *digestion*. Of course, remaining solids are eventually excreted, though in my own naive conception of eating, the act of eating terminates in the stomach, rather than the excrement. Alongside these components which make up the actual act of eating, one needs to recognize the most important function of eating, namely the *nourishment* it **provides** for the body. Accompanying these purely physical aspects of eating is the **impression** of taste which we may refer to as *gustation*. **Normally**, we eat food which produces pleasant, agreeable taste and normally we avoid food which is not pleasant to taste. Thus, there is an experiential bias towards *enjoyable gustation*.

Drinking may be described in a similar way. There is, typically, a *thirst* which includes a **desire** for liquid, an *intake* of liquid. followed by *swallowing*, and finally *digestion* of the liquid in the stomach. While there is great variety in the kinds of liquids one may drink, *water* is especially salient as a liquid which **all** humans must drink on a regular, indeed daily, **basis**. There **does** not seem to be any comparable food which is universally recognized as essential. There are staple foods (e.g. bread, rice, **sago**, etc.) within individual cultures, but these may be shunned or even completely **unknown** in other cultures. *Nourishment* is a significant function of drinking water and other liquids. *Enjoyable*

gustation, too, is the norm for drinking as it is for eating. In many cultures, including Anglo-Saxon-Celtic cultures, the drinking of alcoholic beverages needs to be given special recognition. Alcoholic beverages give rise to various degrees of *intoxication*, indeed it is most common (and legal) means of becoming intoxicated in these cultures. It is possible to enter "altered" states by eating certain foods (varieties of mushroom, betel nut, "opium fruit" etc.), but within Anglo-Saxon-Celtic cultures it is the drinking of alcohol which is by far the most preferred way of achieving a psychological high through intake of some drug-like substance.

The similarities between eating and drinking, then, involve the intake, swallowing, and digestion of substance, which nourish the body and have an accompanying sensory effect of (normally) enjoyable *gustation*. The two acts are not only similar in **structure** — they often occur together. Not surprisingly, then, languages have words which refer to both acts (cf. *dine* and *feast* which normally involve both eating and drinking, and *consume* which can refer to either eating or drinking). They differ, however, in important ways. In particular, liquid is not masticated in the way that food is and the **form** of the liquid remains much the **same** from the time of intake to the time it enters the stomach. Also, there is a close association between drinking and intoxication which is absent in the case of eating. These differences are crucial in understanding the different ways in which the concepts of eating and drinking are metaphorically extended, as explained below.

III. AGENT-ORIENTED EXTENSIONS

Some metaphorical extensions of eating and drinking words are motivated by properties of the agent, i.e. the consumer, in the process. The agent in eating and drinking **serves** as a strong image of "internalization", i.e. incorporating something into one's personal or private sphere. Firstly, there is the intake of food and drink from **outside** the body into the mouth. This stage involves a clear transition from being visible and **outside** the body to being no longer visible and inside the body. Secondly, there is the swallowing aspect which moves food and drink from being in the mouth, where it can be moved and controlled by the tongue (and still easily spat out of the body), to being in the intestines and eventually the stomach, where it is controlled by involuntary reflexes and processes beyond our conscious control, and requiring a more difficult and sometimes painful act to bring the food out of the mouth again. Note, also, that these two aspects are common to both eating and drinking. These two aspects are the basis for conceptualizing various kinds of events which one might classify as "internalization". Other aspects of eating and drinking relating to the agent's role are: the hunger/thirst element; the work done in masticating, swallowing, digestion; the **nourishment**; and the enjoyable *gustation* accompanying the basic acts. In the set of extensions to be discussed in Section III, it is the role of the eater/drinker which **motivates** the extension, rather than the effect on the thing eaten.

III.1. INHALING

Verbs of eating and drinking may be extended to the intake of something physical, but not food or drink, into the body. *Air* is a common object to such verbs, as in (1).

- (1) a. *He came to this country like a torch on fire and he swallowed air as he walked forward and he gave out light.* (Ondaatje 1987:149)
 b. *I pace the earth, and drink the air, and feel the sun.* (Housman 1896/1939:72, Poem XLVIII)

In (1a), *swallow air* is used in a context describing the optimistic and enthusiastic response of a newly arrived immigrant in the New World. It describes the vigorous breathing in of air through the mouth as the protagonist strides forward. *Swallow* emphasises the wholehearted, direct taking in of air, consistent with the wholehearted embracing of the new country. (1b) is similar in its depiction of the enjoyment of breathing in air. Drinking liquid involves a more or less continuous flow of liquid into the body and in (1b) *drink* has the nuance of taking in air in a plentiful, uninterrupted (and enjoyable) way. In Table 1, I list the essentials of the mapping between the eating/drinking domain and the breathing domain implied in (1a). Here, as in the descriptions of other metaphorical mappings, the source domain and its sub-components are listed on the left and the target domain and its sub-components on the right. The sub-components of the eating/drinking domain in these descriptions will normally include the various facets of eating/drinking as described in Section II. Where appropriate, each sub-component of the source domain is assigned a corresponding sub-component of the target domain, though this is not always possible. In the case of (1a) there are, in fact, three domains involved in a full understanding of this use: the domain of eating and drinking, the respiratory domain of the human organism, and the domain relating to the experience of life in general terms. The passage cited is, within the context of the whole novel, really about embracing life in the New World, which is conceptualized in terms of taking in air, which in turn is conceptualized in terms of the eating/drinking domain.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	RESPIRATORY DOMAIN
hunger/thirst	need for air
intake of food/drink through mouth	intake of air through mouth (metaphorically also taking in of sensation of a new country)
mastication	—
swallowing	wholehearted intake of air (metaphorically also wholehearted embrace of a new country)
digestion	—
nourishment	air is necessary to live
enjoyable gustation	enjoyable experience of being (also enjoyment of new sensations)

Table 1. *Eating/drinking extended to breathing, as in (1a).*

III.2. EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT

A less concrete type of internalization involves taking in external stimuli which add to and support one's emotional state, as in (2).

- (2) a. . . .*waiting to see what she would say to feed my heart with hope.* (Cooper 1982:82)
- b. *Go slow, my soul, to feed thyself
 Upon his rare approach* (Dickinson 1890/1960:565, Poem 1297)
- c. *She was uncritically idolised by an army of fans, male and female. She ate up the adoration . . .* (*Marie Claire* magazine, Feb. 1996:176, on the actress Lana Turner)

In (2a), it is some verbal message which is taken in and translated into hope within the person, with *my heart* functioning metonymically for the emotional side of the person. In (2b), it is the sight of another person which is taken in and adds to the emotional satisfaction of the beholder. Here, *my soul* functions as the locus of the emotions. In (2c), it is the adoration from the public which is taken in by Lana Turner and enjoyed. The mapping between the eating/drinking domain and the emotional domain is extensive, as shown in Table 2. A particular use of an "eat" or "drink" word may profile one of these components more than others, though multiple mappings may be present, adding to the richness of the metaphorical usage. (2b) above, for example, easily invites all these sub-mappings.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	EMOTIONAL DOMAIN
hunger/thirst	desire/need for emotional stimulation
intake of food/drink, which should not be done too fast	taking in the sight of a loved one, which may need to be restrained
mastication	—
	deep part of the beholder
digestion	the image of the loved one is converted into emotional effects
nourishment	love is good for human wellbeing
enjoyable gustation	enjoyable sensation of love

Table 2. *Eating/drinking extended to the emotional domain, as in (2b).*

Closely related to the extension to the emotional domain is the extension to the sexual domain. We see this in (3), which is naturally understood as meaning that the man wanted to engage in sex with the woman.

- (3) *He gave me a look - all the men did, but this was different - a look like he wanted to eat me up. A hungry look.* (De Ferrar 1990:222, talking about a man who had fallen in love with the woman)

The metaphorical sub-mappings implied in (3) are similar to those in Table 2, but with a more specifically sexual emphasis. There is sexual hunger and sexual satisfaction, parallel to the hunger and satisfaction in the eating/drinking domain. There is nothing obvious in the (3), however, which corresponds to food **taken** in. One might consider, say, the drawing or pulling of a woman to one's body as the counterpart of the intake of food, though this is not a particularly compelling correspondence. Probably, it is more the role of eating as an exemplary bodily/sensual act which allows it to be used for conceptualizing other bodily acts. Notice how the use of the *up* panicle in *eat me up* is effective in emphasizing the completeness and fullness of the sexual interaction, making it akin to the sense of *devour* which, of course, has a conventionalized sexual usage.

III.3. INTELLECTUAL NOURISHMENT

The eating/drinking domain may be mapped onto the intellectual domain. In (4a) the metaphorical extension is based on the verb *fatten oneself*. Though lacking an explicit verb relating to eating and drinking, the examples in (4b) and (4c) also set up strong correspondences between the eating/drinking domain and the intellectual domain.

- (4) a. So she built *up* the plaintive, self-deprecating image while privately she fattened *herself* on the 'big books . . .' (Gordon 1984:83-84)
- b. Greek . . . *is* my daily bread, and a keen *delight* to me. (From Virginia Woolf's *Letters* 1900, quoted in Gordon 1984:93)
- c. *Intellectual appetite* must round out the woman's point of view, she *said*, thinking of George Eliot. 'She must reach beyond *the sanctuary* and pluck for herself the *strange* bright *fruits* of *art* and knowledge.' (George Eliot, quoted in Gordon 1984:93)

Each of these examples has its own special connotations, evoked by the particular words used to carry the metaphor. So, in (4a), fatten *herself* suggests a greediness and lack of restraint in the person's approach to reading books; in (4b), the learning of Greek is portrayed as like a religious ritual through the use of the biblical phrase daily bread; in (4c), the use of pluck for herself profiles the need for some initiative on the part of the woman in expanding her intellectual horizon. Table 3 summarizes the main correspondences at work in the Greek is my daily bread example of (4b). There is very robust and complete mapping between these domains, as reflected in the many conventionalized uses of eating/drinking vocabulary, such as food for *thought*, digest ideas, *swallow an* idea etc. (4b), as noted above, has religious connotations, too, though I have not tried to express that in Table 3.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	INTELLECTUAL DOMAIN
hunger/thirst	the mind needs stimulation
intake of food/drink	studying Greek; reading books on Greek and in Greek
mastication	coming to grips with the Greek language; understanding Greek ideas, literature, and philosophy
swallowing	memorizing Greek language and ideas
digestion	working on Greek language and ideas to fully comprehend them
nourishment	knowledge of Greek language and ideas enhances human life
enjoyable gustation	studying Greek language and ideas is a pleasure

Table 3. *Eating/drinking* extended to the *intellectual* domain, as in (4b).

III.4. ACCEPTING IDEAS

There is a conventionalized usage of *swallow*, illustrated in (5a). In this usage, *swallow* collocates with words relating to ideas, suggestions, etc. to mean that one accepts these ideas etc. **unreservedly**, even naively. So, in (5a), the writer is making the point that many people were not **critical** enough of the government's plan and accepted it too easily. Note, however, that the connotation of blameworthy, uncritical acceptance need not always attach to *swallow* in these collocations. In (5b), *swallowing her words*, in the context of the story, is not taken to mean something reprehensible on the part of the listener. Instead, it simply means that the listener was enraptured by the speaker and hung on every word that she said.

- (5) a. *He contends that **many** people **have** 'swallowed' the official **line** (that government had to cut its spending and the resulting gains **have been** worth the pain). He argues the pain is too **severe**.* (Palmerston North Guardian, April 10 1996:6)
- b. *He listens to her, swallowing her words like water.* (Ondaatje 1992:5)

The examples in (5) are similar to the expressions relating to the intellectual domain, involving ideas etc. entering into one's sphere of consciousness or one's **knowledge**, as discussed in the preceding section. However, the metaphors are different enough to warrant being treated separately. The use of *swallow* gives **salience** to that part of eating/drinking where **food/drink** changes from being visible, or at least **in** the mouth, to being invisible and inaccessible. Verbs like *eat*, *chew*, *digest* etc., which focus on the work we do with food in the mouth or in the intestines, would be less appropriate in (5), since they would suggest more mental processing of, or reflection on, the ideas. Table 4 summarizes the uncritical acceptance of ideas, as implied by (5a). It seems appropriate in this case to omit correspondences for a number of the sub-components of eating/drinking — in particular, the notions of mastication, digestion, nourishment, and enjoyable gustation **all** seem irrelevant to this metaphorical extension.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	INTELLECTUAL DOMAIN
hunger/thirst	humans like to have explanations
intake of food/drink	humans do receive explanations
mastication	—
swallowing	one accepts what one is told
digestion	—
nourishment	—
enjoyable gustation	—

Table 4. *Eating/drinking extended to acceptance of ideas, as in (5a).*

III.5. EXPERIENCING LIFE

The experience of life itself can be conceptualized as something to be consumed. A clever example of this mode of conceptualization is (6). Here, the use of *swallow* to suggest a wholehearted engagement with life is contrasted with *nibble* suggesting a timid and limited engagement.

- (6) *'Perhaps I've grown up' . . . this summer she had learned to swallow life whole rather than merely nibble at it edges.* (De Ferrar 1990:157)

Nibbling and swallowing both have correspondences, then, into the mapping onto life's experiences, as shown in Table 5. The intake of food/drink corresponds to an abstract kind of taking in of life's experiences, whereby events in the outside world become part of one's experience and reside, as it were, inside one's self.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	DOMAIN OF LIFE'S EXPERIENCES
hunger/thirst	humans need experiences to grow
intake of food/drink, which can be done in a small way by nibbling/sipping	humans can "take in" life cautiously by limiting their experiences
mastication	—
swallowing, which can be done without breaking up food	humans can react to life's experiences more fully by taking in all of life's experiences
digestion	life's experiences are converted into personal growth
nourishment	life's experiences enable humans to grow as individuals
enjoyable gustation	most experiences are enjoyable

Table 5. *Eating/drinking extended to experiencing life, as in (6).*

In (4c) above, we have an image of fruits on a tree representing different repositories of knowledge, with the plucking and eating of the fruits corresponding to intellectual nourishment. A similar image is also found as a way of construing life's opportunities. One of the most vivid and sustained examples of this metaphor is in (7), which deserves to be quoted in full.

- (7) *I saw my life branching out before me like the green fig-tree in the story. From the tip of every branch, like a fat purple fig, a wonderful future beckoned and winked. One fig was a husband and a happy home and children, and another fig was a famous poet and another fig was a brilliant professor, and another fig was Ee Gee, the amazing editor, and another fig was Europe and Africa and South America, and*

another fig was Constantine and Socrates and Attila and a pack of other lovers with queer names and off-beat professions, and another fig was an Olympic lady-crew champion, and beyond and above these figs were many more figs I couldn't quite make out.

I saw myself sitting in the crotch of this fig-tree, starving to death, just because I couldn't make up my mind which of the figs I would choose. I wanted each and every one of them, but choosing one meant losing all the rest, and, as I sat there, unable to decide, the figs began to wrinkle and go black, and, one by one, they plopped to the ground at my feet. (Plath 1963:80)

Here, the fig-tree corresponds to life, and the individual figs correspond to alternative career choices and role models, choosing (and eating) one of the figs corresponds to making a career choice, and being unable to choose a fig corresponds to an inability to do anything with one's life. The eating of the figs is clearly implied, as part of wanting the figs, though, interestingly, there is no explicit eating/drinking verb used in the passage. Note also the expressions relating to drinking of wine (*my cup overfloweth, getting drunk on life* etc.) to describe the full experience of life.

III.6. ACQUIRING POSSESSIONS

Apart from conceptualizing the taking in of quite abstract entities, such as ideas and thoughts etc., the eating/drinking domain may also be used to visualize the acquisition of material objects, making them part of one's possession. Consider (8) from this point of view.

(8) . . . *Mr Rowland's face, unacceptable as it may have been to liberal Conservatism, has grown plumper with the **ingestion** of more and more enterprises.* (Barnes 1995:29)

(8) refers to how Mr. Rowland has acquired a large number of business enterprises. The basic correspondence, therefore, is between the intake of food/drink and acquisition of possessions (businesses). Table 6 summarizes the range of correspondences which one can establish in an example such as (8).

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	DOMAIN OF BUSINESS AFFAIRS
hunger/thirst	business people like their business to grow
intake of food/drink	business people can absorb other businesses
mastication	—
swallowing	businesses can completely absorb other businesses
digestion	some adjustment is necessary after a business is absorbed by another
nourishment	taking over other businesses helps to keep one's business strong
enjoyable gustation	taking over businesses is satisfying

Table 6. *Eating/drinking extended to acquiring businesses, as in (8).*

(8) is a little more complex than is suggested by the metaphorical mapping in Table 6. The eating/drinking domain extends to a **reference** to the businessman's face having grown plumper, as a result of the new business acquisitions. There is a **chain** of understanding **here** along the lines: acquiring wealth leads to more spending on food/drink; too much food/drink leads to plumpness **in** the body (and face). The notion of eating/drinking is therefore the bridge between understanding (figuratively) the acquisition of wealth and the plumpness. The role of eating/drinking is both metaphorical ("business acquisition is food that is eaten") and literal ("business acquisitions are accompanied by eating too much food/drink") at one and the same time.

IV. PATIENT-ORIENTED EXTENSIONS

We now **turn** our attention to extensions which are motivated by the effect of eating/drinking on the food/drink consumed, i.e. the thematic patient in the eating/drinking process. The role of food/drink in eating/drinking gives rise to quite a different set of extensions, compared with the agent-oriented extensions discussed in Section III. The most striking **feature concerning** food/drink is that it disappears from sight and is taken into an **inaccessible** part of the body. This is true of both food and drink. In the case of food, there is the **further** important fact, noted in Section II, that the food is **subject** to mastication, involving chewing and biting, whereas with drink, this is not the case. Hence, verbs relating to eating (rather than drinking) are especially appropriate as sources for images of destruction. This is quite different from the "intemalization" extensions of Section III. The **eater/drinker's** role is to take something into the body; the effect on the food is the rather violent processing and **transformation** of food into digestible particles. This difference underlies the separation of meanings into those of Section III and Section IV.

IV.1. PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

The example in (9) show eating/drinking verbs extended to a physical form of destruction. In this case, a gorge is conceptualized agentively, destroying mountainside and thereby creating more gorge.

- (9) . . . *she found herself in the high little town called Adeje, from which the long Barranco del Infierno, the gorge called Hell's Valley, ate into the mountainside.* (Cherkawska 1990:166)

The sub-parts of eating which have relevance in understanding this use of *eat (into)* seem limited to the parts affecting the food, in particular mastication, swallowing, and digestion. These parts can be put into correspondence with aspects of physical destruction, as shown in Table 7.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	GEOLOGICAL DOMAIN
hunger	—
intake of food	—
mastication	physical deformation of an object
swallowing	object is made to disappear
digestion	object is transformed into something different
nourishment	—
enjoyable gustation	—

Table 7. *Eating extended to the geological domain, as in (9).*

Earlier, in Section III.5, we remarked upon how the experience of life may be conceptualized in terms of the eating/drinking domain, building upon the "internalization" kind of extension. In that use of the eating/drinking domain, life's experiences corresponded to the **food/drink** which is consumed in the **eating/drinking** process. It is interesting to compare those **examples** with (10), which also describes **experiencing** life, but this time from the point of view of life destroying **the** experiencer. Probably the intended **meaning** is broader than **just** that of physical destruction or ageing, and includes **some** psychological effect on the experiencer, but it is convenient to include it **in** this section.

- (10) *So at last we come to the writer's
Middle years, the hardest yet to bear,
All will agree: for it is now
He condenses, prunes and tries to order
The experiences which gorged upon his youth.* (Durrell 1980:230)

We can "take in" life, like we take in food; but life can also destroy us, our youth etc., just as we destroy food in the act of eating. The **eating/drinking** domain suppons both kinds of **images**, depending on whether one focuses on the agent-oriented aspect of eating (the idea of **internalizing** something which nourishes us) or the patient-oriented aspect (the idea of destruction).

IV.2. PYSCHOLOGICAL TORMENT

Psychological torment, distress, stress etc. may also be conceptualized in terms of eating, again reflecting the destmctive effect that eating has on food consumed. The examples in (11) illustrate this extension. The idea of torment, stress etc. is **typically** a continuous process or state, rather than instantaneous, and the continuous effect is achieved by the use of lexical items, verb particles, modifiers etc. Thus, the use of **away at...** in **eat away at**, in (11a), adds the sense of a continuous, progressive aspect; **gnaw** in (11b) is inherently continuous in aspect; and, in (11c), the modifying phrase **like a persistent toothache** etc. explicitly makes the process a long, continuous one.

- (11) a. *I've seen love do that to a woman, **eat away at the heart of her until she's no more than skin and bone.*** (De Ferrar 1990:157)
 b. ***Trepidation gnawed at her . . .*** (De Ferrar 1990:314)
 c. ***The pain of it ate into her like a persistent toorhache that no dentist could cure.*** (Cherkawska 1990:8)

Table 8 summarizes the correspondences at work in (11a)

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	EMOTIONAL DOMAIN
hunger/thirst	—
intake of food/drink	—
mastication	emotions can keep troubling a person
swallowing	one can be psychologically destroyed by some emotions
digestion	one can be transformed by emotional forces
nourishment	—
enjoyable gustation	—

Table 8. *Eating extended to the emotional domain, as in (11a).*

IV.3. ELIMINATION

The "destruction" and "torment" senses which are evident in the above examples in Sections IV.1 and IV.2 achieve their effect, in part, through the image of food being masticated. It is the biting and chewing in the eating/drinking act which seems to correspond most to the "destruction" and "torment" ideas in the target domains. But the act of swallowing, without any reference to mastication, can also serve as a source image for concepts relating to the elimination of entities, as in (12). As noted in Section II, swallowing makes food relatively inaccessible and swallowing is therefore appropriate as a way of conceptualizing the complete elimination or removal of an entity, without implying the continuous, bit by bit destruction found with the metaphorical extensions of mastication verbs.

- (12) a. *X swallowed Y.* (Said by a broadcaster, describer player X who smothered player Y and the ball in a game of rugby)
- b. *He had changed, and latterly all those good memories had been swallowed up by indifference and uncertainty.* (Cherkawska 1990:8)

In (12a), the image one conjures up is of a sudden and complete enclosure of Y by X. In (12b), the intended meaning is that the memories have been completely erased, with the verb particle *up* adding to the completive, perfective sense. Table 9 summarizes the correspondence suggested by (12b). Although the mapping between the source and target domains is very limited here, I have still shown all the sub-components of the eating/drinking domain to be consistent with the other tables.

EATING/DRINKING DOMAIN	PSYCHOLOGICAL DOMAIN
hunger/thirst	--
intake of food/drink	--
mastication	--
swallowing	memories can be lost by <u>certain</u> psychological events
digestion	--
nourishment	--
enjoyable gustation	=

Table 9. *Swallowing extended to the psychological domain, as in (12b).*

V. EXTENSIONS WITH BOTH AGENT AND PATIENT ORIENTATION

Sometimes, we find metaphorical uses of eating/drinking verbs which build upon both agent-oriented and patient-oriented aspects of eating/drinking. To illustrate this, consider the idiomatic expressions *to eat one's words* "to retract what one has said" and *to eat one's heart out* "to suffer a particular kind of emotional pain as when one is denied a pleasure and must witness someone else enjoying that kind of pleasure".

To eat one's words clearly involves the "destruction" sense discussed above in Section IV.1, building upon the effect of eating on the thematic patient. It is not that any concrete object is literally destroyed, of course, but rather it is the claims, allegations etc. which have previously been made which are cancelled out. *Words* in this expression is metonymic for the larger linguistic entities which are being withdrawn. At the same time, there is the image of an eater having to eat what has previously come out his/her mouth. The act of withdrawing one's claims is thus conceptualized through an unpleasant image of an eater eating something vile, akin to eating one's vomit. Clearly, from the agent's perspective, something very unpleasant is being experienced. Thus the one expression combines the sense of destruction of the thing affected and the sense of a person having to consume something unpalatable. The full effect of the expression is achieved through the combination of both these aspects.

We see a similar intermingling of semantic effects in *to eat one's heart out*. Semantically, this is a very complex expression in the way the parts contribute to the overall meaning. For the present purposes, it is enough just to note how both agent-oriented and patient-oriented extensions of *eat* are present. The agent orientation in the metaphorical extension of *eat* relates to how the person suffers through having to eat something unpleasant. The patient orientation relates to the image of the destruction of the heart, which is here metonymic for one's feelings, passion etc. Again, the overall meaning builds upon the effect on the agent eating something unpleasant and the effect of the locus of emotions being destroyed.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections, the discussion of eating/drinking has **been** couched in terms of the concepts of eating **and** drinking and how those concepts **have been** mapped onto concepts in other domains. That is to say, the discussion has **been in** terms of the concepts "eat" and "drink" rather than **just** the verbs *eat* and *drink*. The preceding discussion has **served**, in other words, to document and emphasize the **richness** of the conceptual mappings between the eating/drinking domain and other domains, rather than document the metaphorical use of the specific verbs *eat* and *drink*. There is, in fact, a great variety of lexical items which are actually employed **in** such conceptual mappings and we **have seen some** of these variety above **in** the use of verbs such as *gnaw*, *swallow*, *ingestion*, *nibble* etc.

As a way of organizing the discussion of metaphorical extensions of the **eat- ing/drinking** domain, it is **useful** to distinguish agent-oriented and patient-oriented extensions. The former describe "**internalization**" images, usually agreeable **ones**, consistent with **the** role of the **eater/drinker in the source** domain. The latter describe types of "destruction", consistent with the effects on **food/drink in the source** domain. **The** eating/drinking domain thus **provides** strong images of two quite different **sorts**, depending on whether one focuses on the agent or the patient **in the eating/drinking** process.

The preceding discussion has given an overview of the main tendencies in the metaphorical mappings which rely upon eating/drinking as the **source** domain. It should be clear that it is a productive and **significant source** domain **in** English, **worthy** of more detailed study. Equally worthy of study, of course, is how other languages utilize eating/drinking as a **source** domain for metaphors and it is to be hoped that such studies will be undertaken with a view towards documenting **fully** the metaphorical potential of the eating/drinking domain.

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The Use of Metaphor in Reporting Financial Market Transactions

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ABSTRACT

The present article examines the use of metaphor in a body of journalism dealing with a specific economic topic - a currency crisis. This examination provides extensive empirical evidence of the widespread and systematic use of metaphor in press discourse. On a basis of this evidence, it is claimed that metaphor plays a key role in articulating textual cohesion and coherence and, furthermore, that it makes an essential contribution to the communicative nature of press discourse.

KEY WORDS: Metaphor, Market, Economics, Currency Crisis, Journalism

RESUMEN

En este artículo, se lleva a cabo un estudio del uso de la metáfora por parte de tres periódicos británicos al cubrir la crisis monetaria de 1992. Se afirma que la cobertura periodística de la crisis recurre sistemáticamente al uso de la metáfora. Se relaciona este uso con los principios establecidos de la lingüística cognitiva y se llega a la conclusión de que el uso de la metáfora provee el discurso objeto de estudio con una cohesión y una coherencia que potencian su vertiente comunicativa.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Metáfora, Mercado, Económicas, Crisis Monetaria, Periodismo

I. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The present article focuses on the currency crisis of September 1992 as it was reported in three distinct types of press - *The Financial Times* (Specialist), *The Times* (quality/upmarket), *The Sun* (Tabloid). During that month unprecedented trading on the foreign exchange markets forced dramatic changes within the member currencies of the European Monetary System (EMS). This whole series of events constituted a landmark in economic and financial history and

the magnitude of those events and their far-reaching repercussions earned the global term 'the Currency Crisis' in the media.

This crisis fulfilled practically all the major criteria of newsworthiness singled out by such scholars as Galtung & Rouge (1965), Bell (1991:155-160) and van Dijk (1985:119-124). Consequently, it gained widespread media coverage, ranging from front page priority to extensive analysis and opinion articles right throughout the whole month of September. It can be safely hypothesised that any issue appearing continuously over such a long period will force the press to deploy to the full its communicative resources in endowing the whole question with fitting importance and in winning and sustaining public interest over such a long period. Hence the body of material available provides a very suitable context and corpus source for the analysis of how the press¹ conceptualises and presents a specific (economic) issue to its reading public and this analysis will show us how crucial a role metaphor plays in the process. By now well established principles of cognitive linguistics will have us expect a wide use of metaphor in the discourse of such a discipline as Economics which entails a considerable degree of abstractness. It will furthermore have us expect to find the target domain, economics, articulated in terms of target domains which are more concrete and which partake of more clearly perceived structures. Those concrete target domains, how they operate and what they have to tell us about the cognitive use of metaphor in the case of the currency crisis in question will now be our focus of attention.

II. THE USE OF METAPHOR

11.1. MARKET TRANSACTION IS A METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENON

Economics, as Henderson (1982:149) and Gerrard (1993:61) point out, is the result of decisions taken by rational agents and the Currency Crisis would clearly fit within this generalisation, being a situation where certain agents (currency dealers) perform certain actions (currency trading) and they do so to such an extent as to bring about a certain result (dramatic changes within currency parities). Essentially this is a quantitative issue: x number of pounds and marks in supply and x number of pounds and marks in demand. Yet as we begin our examination of the use of metaphor, we find that journalists, rather than quantitative or numerical detail, convey the force or thrust of the crisis by recurring to natural phenomena as a source domain and particularly to the sub-domain of meteorology. Thus we can claim the following metaphor to be in operation: *MARKET TRANSACTION IS A METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENON* and we can find this metaphor realised in the reiterative use of the linguistic expressions of turbulence, turmoil and storm as is evident from the following examples:

- 1) Nordic countries hit by Europe's market *turmoil* (FT9:1-H)²
- 2) Financial *turbulence* swept northwards yesterday as Finland allowed the markka to be devalued and Sweden raised interest rates. (FT9:1)
- 3) *Wild days* are here again (FT12/13:6-H)
- 4) If he (Mr. Major) *rides out the storm*, his authority will be unassailable. (FT12/13:4).

This metaphor sets the overall picture of the process which is taking place and by the intensity

of the **linguistic terms** employed immediately communicates the notion of the magnitude of that process. As I have dealt more specifically with this metaphor elsewhere³. I shall now go on to the next important aspect of the conceptualisation of the market.

11.2. FROM MARKET AS PLACE TO MARKET AS AGENT

Financial transactions involve a myriad of people. On the one hand, there are the top political and economic individual figures whose eliteness automatically qualify them as newsworthy sources and hence command coverage (see Bell:1991:158). On the other hand, there are countless brokers and operators who carry out transactions for **innumerable** clients. The anonymity of these latter and hence their low profile as newsworthy individuals preclude their **prominence** in news coverage. Put at its simplest, these people are carrying out acts in a place: concretely, they are trading currency on the foreign exchange markets. Aggregates of their transactions would be what was **significant** in showing tendencies on the market and especially what would carry newsworthiness (see Jucker 1996:375). Now, what is really to concern us is how journalists turn the events so produced into news and the first strategy we find salient in working towards that end is that the market as a place is superseded by the market as an agent. This gives us a metonymy of **THE PLACE FOR THE PEOPLE OPERATING IN THAT PLACE**. Immediately, this **unifies** a very disparate body of people and, in the first place, the metonymic referent makes it easy and economical to talk about them (see Boers & Demecheleer 1994:684-5). But, more important, it sets up a target domain that will be understood via different **source** domains which we shall now go into.

11.3. *THE MARKET IS A LIVING ORGANISM*

The most productive way in which the metonymical market enters into news is provided by the metaphorical process of vivification including, of course, the very pervasive device of personification. Thus, in our 'congruent' account, to use a term of Halliday's (1985:321), of the currency crisis we had **seen** certain actors operating in a place, namely the market. In journalistic discourse, however, we are to find that market metonymically converted into an actor which in its most general **dimension** gives us the metaphor *THE MARKET IS A LIVING ORGANISM*. As such, it will be capable of acting and **being** acted upon and in this way journalists will convey the essential co-ordinates of the currency crisis. Now, while the crisis will be conceptualised via this generic metaphor, it will be the sub-domains and specific realisations accruing which will enable journalists to steer focus in one way or another. Let us now see how this happens.

11.3.1. *The Market Is an Intelligent Agent*

If we take the generic metaphor, *THE MARKET IS A LIVING ORGANISM*, it is quite obvious that sub-domains such as person, on the one hand, and animal, on the other will be available. If we then take the sub-domain metaphor *THE MARKET IS A PERSON*, the **richness** of this concept will allow for further sub-domains to be articulated, for example, the most salient **feature** of a person is his or her intellectual **side** and if this aspect is highlighted we get a further

sub-domain and hence the metaphor *THE MARKET IS AN INTELLIGENT AGENT* applies. Where journalists recur to this sub-domain, we find that the market will be conceptualized as a rational agent, carrying out such rational functions as those of perception, interpretation, evaluation, judgement and decision taking. Empirical evidence for the use of this metaphor abounds as can be seen from the ensuing examples where the predicates denote the hallmarks of intelligent activity:

- 5) However, the markets *are ignorning* the extent to which rates are set to tumble in the next two or three years. (T2:17)
- 6) They (the **plans**) were *quickly intetpreted* by the foreign exchange market as tangible proof that the UK government was determined not to devalue the pound from its DM2.95 parity in the **ERM**. (FT4:1)
- 7) *The speed of the markets' reaction* owed a lot to the way the **treasury** and the Bank of England caught them by surprise. (FT5/6:II)
- 8) Mr. Lamont, the UK chancellor, who chaired the meeting, **altered** the nature of interest rate *expectations on* the financial markets by obtaining the Bundesbank's assent to a statement that it "in the present circumstances has no intention to increase rates". (FT7:2)
- 9) He (**Paul Chestkow**) also believes that the policy vacuum that is **likely** to prevail until the November elections in **America could allow** the market *to beat the dollar down*. (T8:15)
- 10) **In** these matters (economic means and ends) the markets *rule*. (T11:13)
- 11) As the debate intensified yesterday on the reasons for the Bundesbank's *volte face*, the foreign exchange market *was struggling to make up its mind* about the longer term impact of the move. (FT15:22)
- 12) Foreign exchange *reaction was mildly favourable* with the pound climbing away from its floor against the mark and the **dollar** recovering against the mark and the pound. (T15:1)
- 13) To make matters worse, Mr. Major has made a strategic **blunder** by cancelling his trip to Spain. The markets *were quick to conclude* that his nerve is faltering. (FT16:16)

The picture **evolving** from the foregoing examples is that of the market as an active agent which is the endogenous **source** of intellectual acts. But an active intelligent agent may at the same time **typically fulfil** the corollary role of patient, a role where the **source** of intellectual acts is exogenous to it and **acting** upon it **making** it the sufferer or patient. Now, **if** we examine the **co-ordinates** behind the currency crisis, we find that the financial authorities of a **country** clearly **perform** as active agents. **Because** of the key role they play in any national or global monetary and economic policy, currency exchange **values** and their fluctuations are of vital **concern** to the financial authorities of any country (see Samuelson & Nordhaus 1992:709-715). In the face of wild fluctuations, these authorities step in with measures and plans to bring such a situation under control. Now, while we **have** shown above how the transactions on the financial markets were conceptualized through the metaphor *THE MARKET IS AN INTELLIGENT AGENT* it is no doubt indicative of the pervasiveness of this metaphor that the concrete economic measures (or even for that matter, relevant statements of policy, intention or determination) taken by the financial authorities are presented by the **press in consonance** with the metaphor **in** question.

Thus the steps taken by these authorities are conceptualised as moves designed to act on a market which is an intelligent agent and hence, susceptible of being acted upon, of being or not being impressed or convinced by the arguments put forward.

- 14) Yesterday the markets *were not entirely unimpressed* by the British government's decision to up the stakes in the currency game. (FT4:6)
- 15) Italy ... raised **short-term** interest rates by a swingeing 1¼ points to 15 percent and the markets *are still far from convinced* that the lira has **been stabilised**. (FT5/6:6)
- 16) "It is all *a matter of convincing* the markets of our seriousness" (T16:18)

11.3.2 *The Market Is a Sentient Being*

But there is also a sentient dimension to a person and this aspect, if highlighted, also provides a further highly structured sub-domain, giving us the metaphor *THE MARKET IS A SENTIENT BEING*. In this case where the feeling dimension of the person predominates, the characteristic of the market which is put forward is that of vulnerability and fragility with reactions which by contrast to the more rational ones are more of an emotional nature and hence the notion arises of the market as an irrational force which is difficult if not impossible to control. Thus the empirical support for this metaphor will particularly show a market whose reactions evidence such dramatic psychological states as those of tension, nervousness, shock, spasms, uncertainty and disappointment amongst others:

- 17) ... with currency markets *tense* during much of last week, the Bank of England found less than rapturous welcome among investors... (FT1:18)
- 18) The *market's nervousness* was partly blamed on Mr. Alan Larsson... (FT1:18)
- 19) His **comments left the markets confused** about Sweden's future role in the European Economic and Monetary Union and **came** at a time when the markets *were losing confidence* in the ability of the centre-right minority government. (FT1:18)
- 20) A series of **opinion** polls showing that a **majority** of French voters are preparing to **reject** the Maastricht treaty ... sent *a shock wave through the market, which was already reeling* from the blow delivered by Denmark's rejection of the treaty on June 2nd. (FT1:19)
- 21) As the prospects for monetary **union** waned, **Ecu** bonds went to a discount. Since July the market has *gone into spasm*. (FT1:19)
- 22) **Tension** in the exchange rate mechanism ... *provided the main focus of sentiment* in the respective bond markets. (FT 2:16)
- 23) ... repons that the Federal reserve had intervened **in** support of the currency *refuelled bearish sentiment* in the market. (T2:15)
- 24) The pound's **fall** against the mark *upset* the equity market and sent share prices sliding to their lowest for almost 18 months. (T2:15)
- 25) David **Simmonds**, currency analyst at Midland Montague ... expects currency market *scares and rumours*. (T3:15)
- 26) Fears of an increase in the internationally important **German Lombard** rate ... *have preyed on* financial markets since ... mid-July. (FT 7:2)
- 27) *Market uncertainty* about the outcome of the French referendum on the Maastricht

- treaty appears to be waning. (T8:15)
- 28) Currency worries *depress* equities (FT 9:29-H)
- 29) The **sudden** wave of adverse developments in European Currency markets, reflected in a set back in the pound, brought a *vicious reversal* in the UK stock market. (FT9:29)
- 30) Foreign exchange markets *were heading for turmoil* this morning after the shock announcement of the devaluation of the lira ... (T14:17)
- 31) The size of the reductions *disappointed* European markets. (FT15:1-L)
- 32) Bundesbank cites *market pressures* and **future** German policy changes as reasons for cuts. (FT 15:2)
- 33) Foreign exchange markets *reacted with disappointment* yesterday to the Bundesbank's decision to reduce its key lending rate by 0.25 percent. (T15:1)
- 34) By breakfast time yesterday, financial markets *were zig-zagging* at the prospect of a **substantial** rate cut and impressed by the politicians' apparent mastery of Germany's **truculent** central bankers. (T15:2)

Once again, what was shown to **hold** in the former section regarding the intervention of a country's financial authorities **holds**, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of the metaphor of this section. **While** in that case, steps or measures taken by those authorities were designed to **have** an effect on an intelligent market, in this case they are conceptualised as moves taken to act on a market which is a sentient being and hence susceptible to such psychological processes as the placating of fears or the conveyance of reassurance:

- 35) With the pound looking more capable of riding out any **turbulence** this month, *market fears* of a base rate increase *receded*. (FT4:15)
- 36) The authorities in Sweden and Norway *sought to reassure* the markets that they would not follow the Finn's example and decouple their currencies from the ecu. (T9:17)
- 37) Yet the currency markets *do not seem to believe him*. (T11:13)

A point I would now like to make regarding the use of the latter two metaphors is the following. Right **throughout** the crisis period the **magnitude** of the transactions on the foreign exchange market are very much present in the press. Thus the picture of the market which emerges is that of a formidable even **unassailable** force. It is then yet another aspect of **coherence** with the foregoing metaphors that as in the face of such power, measures **in** the normal sense would be of **little** or no **avail** in countering such a force. As a consequence, we then find steps taken by the financial authorities presented not so much as rational or as reassuring acts but as tricks or gambles designed to outwit that intelligent and sentient market. **Let us** now see empirical **evidence** of all these cases.

- 38) ... this *treasury stunt* for supporting sterling pleased the gilt and equity markets, which both managed healthy gains. (FT4:18)
- 39) In a *move that took the financial markets by surprise*... (T4:1)
- 40) **Some** City analysts said the European Governments and central banks were *taking a gamble by raising market expectations* without giving details of the German interest rate move. If the cut **proved** disappointing, speculators **could return** to attack sterling

and other currencies near the bottom of the ERM. (T14:1)

41) If so (i.e. if the French vote "No") the European exchange rate mechanism and the entire shaky edifice of political commitments and *market-rigging* for which it is the foundation would collapse. (T14:13)

42) As high interest rates drag Britain further into the stagnant mire, the government has to face demands for higher public spending, new investment incentives and "temporary" subsidies for the housing market. All of these must eventually become unavoidable in an economy where free markets *are choked* by a falsely valued currency. (T14:13)

II.4. MARKET LOGIC

In the foregoing sections, we have seen the market metaphorised through the source domains of intelligence and higher order sentience. These sub-domains provide elements of structure which are incontestable in our culture: it is in the nature of intelligent beings using this faculty to operate on principles of rationality - to reason, to evaluate circumstances, come to logical conclusions and take logical steps to deal with the situations in question. On the other hand, our target domain, the market, is the result of a metonymy for an enormous and very diverse conglomerate of traders, brokers and investors and the process which the action of this conglomerate triggers. Now such diverse actions could seem unconnected and even chaotic, but if journalists see that activity in terms of the conventional structure of the operation of the faculty of human intelligence, then it will proceed according to the ordinary conventional parameters of that faculty and that is just what our empirical evidence has shown. The very same source and target correspondences hold in the higher order sentient sphere where source domain structure such as the allaying of fears or the transmission of reassurance natural to the sentient level configure how we understand activity on the market as similar conventional behaviour.

This does not, however, exhaust the sub-domains of the living organism which are used to conceptualise and journalistically narrate the currency crisis. A further sub-domain metaphor, which, with one audacious stroke characterises one of the most essential points of the currency crisis and carries very powerful communicative force, remains. That market practitioners will sell weak currencies in times of crisis and that they will do so relentlessly is seen by the press as a matter of straightforward logic and this fact is most strikingly put forward by recourse to the most traditional and productive of our metaphorical resources, namely, the Great Chain of Being (see Lakoff & Turner 1989: chapter 4). Here, the particular stage on the hierarchical level which is chosen will be of primary significance. While still operating within the general domain of living organism, we now move a step down to the animal level, specifically to the predatory animal as source domain, giving us the metaphor *THE MARKET IS A PREDATORY ANIMAL*. In the former sub-domains, the decisive attributes were rationalisation and feeling, the endeavours of intellectual expertise to convince, outwit or deceive, the sentient process of transmitting reassurance and here, given the complexity of the source domain, a certain element of difficulty, unpredictability and even possible misinterpretations are not to be ruled out⁴. In the latter case, the salient feature of the source domain is the predator nature of the animal in question and as Lakoff & Turner (1989:173) maintain "it is the properties that define that level that are of interest" - here that property would be the automatic instinctual response to an

appropriate stimulus. We have then in the metaphor, *THE MARKET IS A PREDATOR ANIMAL*, a very complex intersection of metonymy with different metaphors. something which frequently occurs in natural language (see Goossens, [1990] 1995 a & b, Gibbs, 1994:449-451). The metonymy giving us market as an agent seemed to presuppose market as a person, if we now have the market as a predator animal, that would seem to presuppose the *PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS* metaphor. Furthermore, it is disputable whether the metaphor here arising (*THE MARKET IS A PREDATOR ANIMAL*) is simply a case of understanding one level on the chain of being in terms of another - in this case, a higher level in terms of a lower - or whether also this is a case on a par with Lakoff & Turner's *Achilles* example whereby the animal in question has previously been "metaphorically understood in terms of a character trait of humans" (Lakoff & Turner, 1989:195). Two different factors are relevant here. Firstly, where a *PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS* metaphor applies, the people dimension does not disappear and there is easily a comotation of censure in that such behaviour on the part of a person is not appropriate. Secondly, a perception likewise easily arises of the predator response in terms of the merciless devouring of the weaker and if this is so the anthropomorphic comotations carried by the adjective "merciless" would place the predator metaphor within the *Achilles* type. From the following empirical evidence both these factors seem to be in operation: traders are undoubtedly humans behaving in a way they shouldn't (like predator animals) while, on the other hand, the very predator response which makes relentless use of sheer superiority can easily tend to be seen as merciless.

II.4.1 *The Market as Predatory Animal*

43) The turmoil came after foreign exchange traders pounced on the uncertainty surrounding next Sunday's French referendum on the Maastricht treaty... (FT 17:1)

44) When Schlesinger set the record straight the next day, the private disagreements became public. *The markets smelled blood.*(FT19/20:2)

45) Traders continued to pursue *the "scent of blood"*, buoyed by handsome profits won on the devaluation of the lira. (FT17:6)

46) But the markets *scented blood* (ST20:13)

Furthermore, this metaphor, more than any other and more than any other 'congruent' explanation of the crisis is what conveys a picture of the currency crisis as a process with a dénouement as predictable as it was inevitable, a situation where granted the stimulus (the weakness of sterling on the market) a fitting response (the implacable selling off of the currency on the exchange market) ensues. As a corollary of this fact, the British financial authorities are left in a far from laudatory position since, granted the inevitability of the dénouement, the enormous resources pumped into sustaining an impossible exchange parity (see Mishkin, 1995) could only but be a futile endeavour. Metaphor is, yet once more, the vehicle to get this latter analysis across and the source domain which will provide structure and linguistic expressions for the overall interchange between financial authorities and market practitioners is one which pervades human culture and language, being dealt with extensively in Cognitive Linguistics literature (see P. Morgan, forthcoming), namely that of conflict and specifically that of war and this brings me to the final metaphor conforming the journalistic handling of the crisis.

II.4. THE *CURRENCY CRISIS IS WAR*

The currency crisis clearly presents a conflict scenario: on the one hand, transactions on the market are eroding the value of the pound and on the other the British financial authorities are doing everything in their power to withstand that process. The press typically conceptualises this scenario in war terms and recurs extensively to the domain war and the semantic field of war for structure and linguistic resources. Consequently, the **empirical evidence** for this metaphor abounds in the press's handling of the crisis. We have already seen aspects of this in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in that steps and measures taken by the financial authorities are in actual fact types of strategies tailor-made to counteract the market in accordance with how that market is conceptualised at any given moment (that is, as an intelligent agent, a sentient being or a formidable force). The following examples go on to show how a war framework is explicitly highlighted by tapping detailed structural features of war and by recurring to the basic terms of core war lexis:

- 47) City hails "ingenious" *defence* (T4:1-H)
- 48) On Monday evening it was clear that the government was engaged in a *full scale war* with the financial markets. (T17:2)
- 49) Cabinet *at war* (S19:2-H)
- 50) All morning the Bank of England *had been fighting a desperate battle* to save the pound. (FT19/20:2)
- 51) As the *heavy artillery* in the City began sterling's *day long pounding*, Major took his armour-plated Jaguar the two minute drive down Whitehall to the Admiralty. (FT19/20:3)
- 52) The lira had traded quite strongly on Monday and the Bank of England *had plenty of ammunition to fight* the speculators (FT19/20:2)
- 53) Nonetheless Mr. Major's *quixotic battle* with the speculators still seems the economic equivalent of *the Charge of the Light Brigade*: half a billion, half a billion, half a billion onwards. (T19:15)
- 54) The European Commission yesterday mounted a *solid defence* of the plan for a single currency. (T18:1)
- 55) If the French vote for Maastricht on Sunday, Mr. Major can *struggle on with his battle against* the money markets. (T 16:15)
- 56) Major stakes everything on his *desperate battle* to save pound(S16:2-H)
- 57) **Anxious** premier John Major yesterday *pressed the emergency button* as *the banle* for the pound **turned** into a full scale crisis. (S16:2)
- 58) It is too easy for the Prime Minister to blame City speculators for *blowing his economic policy to smithereens*. (S25:2)
- 59) The statement ... confirmed previously known positions, such as the rejection of any ERM realignment and the readiness *to deploy every available weapon* to counter tension on the parity grid. (T7:17)
- 60) He (Mr. Lamont) **threw** £10 billion into *the battle* before giving up and allowing sterling to *sink*. (S18:8)

III. CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing evidence shows how recourse to metaphor by the press in dealing with the currency crisis is not only widespread but also systematic - a limited number of metaphors provide the essential conceptual structure and each of these metaphors are realised by a multiplicity of linguistic expressions. Moreover, all three press types cited make recourse to metaphor in this manner. What could be the reasons for such extensive metaphor use. Obviously in the first place, as linguistic research (particularly cognitive linguistic research) has been showing, the use of metaphor is well-nigh unavoidable (see Lakoff and co-authors' extensive work, Steen (1994), Dirven & Paprotté (1985), Ortony (1975, 1993), Gibbs (1994), Allbritton (1995) and Richards (1936). But beyond this immediate fact or necessity, what effects may we single out as ensuing from such overwhelming recourse to metaphor in the case of the journalistic discourse in question? One major effect is that the host of interrelated linguistic expressions which accompany each metaphor forcefully contribute to the cohesion of the text while at the same time, the tightness and consistency of the argumentation which results from the structural logic provided by the metaphor structure contributes to such an essential textual feature as is coherence⁵. Cohesion is continuously both established and fortified by the semantic connections triggered anaphorically and cataphorically by the appearance within text of lexical items which establish networks of field relations. For instance, in the journalistic coverage of the currency crisis, the reiteration of lexical items such as 'war', 'battle', 'fight', 'heavy artillery', 'ammunition', 'charge', 'defence', 'struggle', 'weapon', 'deploy', 'sink' obviously set up such a network and hence by that very fact contribute to the cohesiveness of the text. If, at the same time and over and above that relationship, these lexical items operate as linguistic realisations of the metaphor *THE CURRENCY CRISIS IS WAR*, the structure and logic of the war schema (so productive in our conceptual system) thus operating simultaneously cannot but add to the overall sense of cohesion and especially coherence of the text in question. My claim is that this aspect of metaphor use, involving the reiteration of different linguistic realisations is a powerful weapon in making a text communicatively successful.

Finally, Bagnal's (1993:52) statement that "no newspaper story should need to be read twice" reminds us that there is an imperious necessity for newspaper language to display clarity and facilitate in every way the readability of its text. That we find such prevalence of metaphor in journalistic discourse, as exemplified by the case in question, is a homage to the role of metaphor not as a clouding agent but as a sheer contributor to ease of perception on the part of the reader. This claim opposes the widespread idea of metaphor as entailing greater difficulty than literal language and is in line with the psychological evidence adduced by Gibbs (1994:99-106) demonstrating that, in context, metaphor understanding requires no greater response time than literal language does. Furthermore, one of the most essential driving principles of newspaper discourse is the prerequisite of communicability and it also seems fair to conclude that if newspaper discourse recurs to metaphor to such an extent as has been shown above, then it would be hard to deny that this device is likewise performing an essential communicative role in journalism.

NOTES

1. As the newspapers used for the present study are British, **very powerful** criteria of news **values** (such as, for example, 'proximity' and 'relevance' (Bell 1991: 157), will mean that **here** priority of coverage will be assigned to Britain and British-related events.
2. Exemplification references will follow the following code: FT = *Financial Times*, T = *Times* (ST = *Sunday Times*). S = *Sun*. These indications will be followed by a figure which refers to the date issue for the month of September 1992 and this in turn will be followed by a semi-colon plus another figure which is the corresponding page reference. **Where** examples are actual headings, this is indicated by -H following the page entry. For example: FT9:1-H = This is a reference to page one of the *Financial Times* for the 9th September 1992 and the quotation is a heading or S25:2 will mean a quotation from page 2 of the *Sun* for September the 25th 1992.
3. Paper read at the 5th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference.
4. Lakoff & Turner (1989: 169) point out that "it is in general harder to determine a person's moral sense than an animal's predatory instincts **because** the human being can disguise that sense and **because** we can not reliably infer that sense purely from the person's behaviour. Animals do not hide their instinctive nature. and we can reliably determine that nature by **observing** their behaviour".
5. One of the issues underlined in Halliday & Hassan's (1976) historic book has been **amply** righted by Hoey (1991), namely: **lexical** cohesion, which rather than **grammatical** cohesion is what is relevant for our discussion.

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Metáfora y Discurso Literario

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ABSTRACT

*In the third chapter of their book **More than Cool Reason** (1989), Lakoff and Turner claim that, given a previous detailed reading of a text that makes use of metaphorical expressions, it is possible to derive a second metaphorical reading based on the global meaning of the text, independent of its particular linguistic expressions. Their aim is to demonstrate that metaphors are not "a matter of words", but that they are conceptual. The present article does not question the conceptual nature of metaphors, but maintains that interpretations are never free from words. A text consists of multiple components: structural, semantic, cognitive, and pragmatic, which are interdependent, interactive, and mutually influential. All these components play an active part in the construction of the textual macrostructure and in the process of interpretation. The article revises Lakoff and Turner's analysis of a poem by William Carlos Williams and shows that all the global metaphorical interpretations which are proposed by the authors are based on microstructural features implicitly or explicitly contained in the expression of the poem.*

KEY WORDS: Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, Discourse Analysis, metaphor, text, discourse, microstructure, macrostructure.

RESUMEN

*Este artículo revisa la propuesta de Lakoff y Turner en el tercer capítulo de su obra **More Than Cool Reason** (1989), según la cual, dada una lectura detallada de un texto que contiene expresiones metafóricas, se puede realizar una segunda lectura global metafórica del texto independiente de sus expresiones lingüísticas concretas. Lakoff y Turner quieren demostrar con ello la naturaleza conceptual, no lingüística, de la metáfora. Este artículo no invalida esta tesis, pero sostiene que todos los componentes de un texto: estructurales, semánticos, cognitivos y pragmáticos son interdependientes, interactivos y se influyen mutuamente en el proceso de construcción de la macroestructura, por lo que no es posible prescindir de ninguno de ellos a la hora de interpretar un texto. Mediante una revisión del análisis que Lakoff y Turner hacen de un poema de William Carlos Williams se demuestra que todas las interpretaciones globales propuestas se sustentan sobre rasgos microestructurales implícitos o explícitos en la expresión lingüística del texto.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: Teoría Contemporánea de la Metáfora, Análisis del Discurso, metáfora, texto, discurso, microestructura, macroestructura.

En su obra *More than Cool Reason* (1989). Lakoff y Turner exploran los principios teóricos de la lingüística cognitiva relativos a la conceptualización metafórica y su actualización en el discurso literario. Los autores muestran, mediante un análisis detallado de diversos poemas, que las metáforas literarias comparten con las metáforas utilizadas en el lenguaje cotidiano el mismo sistema conceptual de correspondencias entre dominios (ver Lakoff y Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987, 1992; Sweetser, 1989, entre otros). Los dos primeros capítulos de la obra desarrollan esta tesis, basada en la consideración individual de las distintas expresiones metafóricas que aparecen en diversos textos. En el tercer capítulo el objetivo es realizar una lectura global que permita obtener el sentido metafórico de un texto en su conjunto, independientemente, según se afirma, de las expresiones lingüísticas concretas que constituyen el texto en sí (1989, 139). Este artículo pretende revisar la metodología utilizada por Lakoff y Turner para fundamentar este razonamiento y mostrar cómo los aspectos conceptuales y expresivos del plano microestructural influyen sobre la formación de la macroestructura, incluso cuando la lectura es intuitiva y supuestamente asistemática. Se quiere demostrar que no es suficiente apelar a la naturaleza conceptual de la metáfora para explicar una interpretación (metafórica) de un texto dado. Existen otros componentes textuales de carácter estructural, semántico o pragmático que condicionan esa interpretación. Veamos cómo funciona.

Lakoff y Turner establecen una diferenciación entre dos tipos de lectura: una local y detallada y otra posterior, global y genérica, sobre la que se sustentaría la interpretación metafórica total del texto:

given a reading of a poem that makes use of the metaphorical understanding of the expressions in the poem one by one, it is often possible to derive a further second-order metaphorical reading of the poem as a whole. Such global readings are based not on any particular expressions but rather on the overall meaning of the first order reading. Second order metaphorical readings, being free of particular linguistic expressions, make manifest the conceptual nature of metaphor. If metaphor were only a matter of words, such global second order readings would not be possible. (pág.139)

De hecho lo que estos autores proponen es el paso del ámbito oracional al ámbito del discurso. Ahora bien, desde la perspectiva del Análisis del Discurso, esta aproximación a la lectura y comprensión del texto presenta ciertos problemas al asumir que los componentes microestructurales y macroestructurales pueden llegar a ser independientes. El Análisis del Discurso considera que todo texto o unidad discursiva se compone de un micro y de un macro nivel. La microestructura está formada por la suma de unidades de significado (proposiciones en la estructura semántica). La macroestructura representa el significado global de la unidad textual, a la que contribuyen, en mayor o menor grado jerárquico, las diferentes proposiciones de que consta el texto. La microestructura se materializa en un desarrollo lineal y detallado de la expresión lingüística, mientras que la macroestructura recoge el contenido principal del texto en un proceso cognitivo que puede sistematizarse mediante una serie de operaciones (por ejemplo, las macroreglas de van Dijk (1980), o el análisis tópico-temático del texto (Brown & Yule; Alonso, 1995)). En ningún caso es posible acceder a la macroestructura del texto prescindiendo del conocimiento de su microestructura, a no ser que se realice un ejercicio de predicción con información parcial (por ejemplo, a

partir del título) o una abstracción posterior de carácter intuitivo. Ninguno de estos procedimientos garantiza que los resultados sean fiables.

Los conceptos de microestructura y macroestructura son semánticos porque se refieren al significado del texto verbal, pero ninguno de ellos puede entenderse sin tener en cuenta el nivel de expresión que les da forma, el nivel pragmático que los condiciona mediante el contexto, y el nivel cognitivo que gobierna los extremos de producción y recepción. Esto es sin duda una simplificación de la **complejísima** realidad lingüística y comunicativa. De todos modos, es suficiente para recordar que cuando se produce la comprensión e interpretación de un texto mediante un acto de lectura no es posible desligar pensamiento de forma lingüística, como parece deducirse de las palabras de Lakoff y Turner: "global readings are based not on any particular expressions but rather on the overall meaning of the first order reading" (1989, 139). Los niveles de recepción y expresión, al igual que los restantes componentes comunicativos, son interactivos, nunca independientes. Un texto puede activar en un lector una serie de asociaciones conceptuales que no estén directamente contenidas en la forma verbal del mismo, pero éstas no podrían ser tomadas sin riesgo alguno como la interpretación del texto propiamente dicho. Habríamos de tener en cuenta la posibilidad de que se estuviera realizando una lectura o interpretación libres o una divagación a partir de una determinada información.

Lakoff y Turner utilizan esa independencia que atribuyen al segundo orden de lectura global en relación con la expresión lingüística como prueba del carácter conceptual del fenómeno metafórico. No pongo en duda que, como ellos **afirman**, las correspondencias metafóricas se realicen e interpreten en el plano del pensamiento, no de las palabras. La CTM (Contemporary Theory of Metaphor) ha demostrado sobradamente que las expresiones metafóricas pueden variar y las correspondencias metafóricas mantenerse. Sin embargo, esto no implica que las metáforas construídas a nivel local mediante expresiones concretas y analizables pertenezcan necesariamente a un orden distinto del que se obtiene de la lectura global de un texto. La proyección de esas metáforas contenidas en las sucesivas expresiones metafóricas tendrán un alcance local o global dependiendo del uso que el autor haga de ellas (ver P. Werth, 1994). Esto es lo que el lector recoge: las expresiones que no tienen proyección global se descartan a la hora de **reconstruir** la dimensión metafórica de la macroestructura textual; por el contrario, aquellas expresiones metafóricas que trascienden el ámbito de lo local son utilizadas por el lector para realizar su lectura o interpretación metafórica del texto.

La proyección global de las metáforas en una unidad de discurso compleja (un poema, una narración, etc.) se consigue principalmente mediante el recurso de recurrencia parcial y/o total que ha de enmarcarse en el ámbito discursivo de la cohesión y la coherencia textual. La recurrencia, sea **léxica** (por reiteración, repetición, etc.), estructural o conceptual, es uno de los mecanismos más activos a la hora de crear relaciones internas entre las diferentes partes de discursos muy extensos y complejos (Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Werth, 1994; Alonso, 1992; Alonso, en preparación). Siguiendo estas directrices discursivas, pueden considerarse de alcance global todas aquellas correspondencias metafóricas que el autor escoge mantener, desarrollar y relacionar a lo largo del texto o en partes importantes del mismo. Para ello suelen utilizarse diferentes expresiones metafóricas o no metafóricas que ayuden a mantener, con modificaciones o sin ellas, el contenido original de las relaciones conceptuales establecidas entre los dominios "fuente" y "meta". Lo que el lector hace cuando emprende una interpretación general del texto, a partir de su

comprensión global del mismo, es discriminar entre aquellos conceptos temáticos muy localizados, cuya influencia se limita al cotexto más próximo, y aquellos otros conceptos cuya influencia se prolonga, a través de un sistema de recurrencia total o parcial, por la totalidad del texto. Los primeros pueden tener un interés estilístico o estético, los segundos tienen una incidencia importante en la construcción y recepción del mensaje comunicativo. Los dos procesos, el detallado y el global, son interdependientes, prescindir de uno de ellos en la fase de interpretación suprime las garantías de que la lectura realizada sea ajustada y correcta.

Volviendo al tercer capítulo de *More than Cool Reason*, los autores analizan, primero, una a una las expresiones metafóricas utilizadas en el poema *The Jasmine Lighrness of the Moon* de William Carlos Williams. Después realizan una lectura metafórica global del mismo. El orden es significativo porque refleja un indicio de dependencia de la segunda operación con respecto a la primera. Resulta interesante detenerse en la segunda parte del capítulo, denominada "A Global Metaphorical Reading". De entrada, Lakoff y Tumer afirman que "global metaphorical readings are open in certain ways and constrained in others" (pág.146). Aunque admiten que el texto y/o el título del mismo pueden contener indicadores explícitos, presentan la elección del dominio meta ('target domain') por parte del lector como de naturaleza abierta, sometida únicamente a las siguientes condiciones: 1. la elección debe tener sentido y 2. la lectura debe poder justificarse. Añaden que las correspondencias metafóricas deben ser convencionales y fundamentarse en el conocimiento del mundo, tampoco debe existir contradicción entre una posible iconicidad del texto y la lectura que se realice.

Las dos primeras condiciones: que la elección tenga sentido y que la lectura sea justificable, no parece que puedan ser concebidas independientemente de lo que el texto verbal propiamente dicho comunica. De hecho la formulación de ambas condiciones ha sido precedida por una breve mención al título y al texto. El título es generalmente reconocido en el ámbito del Análisis del Discurso como un aglutinador del tópico global del discurso o macroestructura (van Dijk, 1977, 1980; Brown and Yule, 1983) y el texto es el discurso en sí. Tanto el uno como el otro han sido elaborados por el autor mediante un proceso de selección estructural y léxica para formular y transmitir sus pensamientos. Cuando el lector los recibe e interpreta, su acción se encuadra dentro de ese marco cognitivo-comunicativo donde las palabras no suelen ser superfluas, sobre todo si se trata, como en este caso, de un poema. Con relación a las otras condiciones, entran dentro del criterio de convencionalidad y sistematización de las correspondencias conceptuales propugnado por la CTM y no son cuestionables. Nos centraremos pues en comprobar el grado de dependencia que la elección del dominio meta mantiene con relación al nivel de expresión.

Lakoff y Tumer dicen que el poema de William Carlos Williams "lends itself to more than one metaphorical reading". Tomando como base el subtítulo "To a Solitary Disciple" y, suponemos, la condición de poeta del autor especulan con la posibilidad de que el poema pueda ser interpretado metafóricamente como "the poet... addressing one of his own disciples, namely, an apprentice poet" (pág 147), aunque no desarrollan esta lectura. Por el contrario, eligen aquella en la que "the target domain is taken to be religion and instructions about the nature of religious belief and practice" (pág. 147). Los autores sugieren que además hay otras lecturas posibles pero no las formulan. Esto es significativo, porque, si analizamos los componentes léxicos del poema (tanto en el subtítulo como en el cuerpo del mismo) y los campos conceptuales activados por éstos, encontramos que el aspecto

religioso y el poético forman parte de la lectura más básica. Otras interpretaciones del texto, salvo la literal, podrían surgir de un orden paralelo o deducirse una vez analizado el contexto pero no podrían derivarse de ninguna lectura directa, sea esta global o detallada. Para demostrar que esto es así, vamos a reflexionar, primero, sobre los componentes de la expresión que invitan a la interpretación metafórica del poema en términos religiosos, segundo, sobre aquellos que favorecen su lectura en términos poéticos.

Lakoff y Tumer comienzan por el subtítulo, "To a Solitary Disciple", donde aparece ya el concepto "religión" como componente implícito. Si nos detenemos en el núcleo del sintagma nominal, "disciple", e investigamos su significado, encontramos que entre las distintas acepciones del sustantivo la más frecuente es la relativa a este campo semántico. Así definen el término algunos diccionarios consultados:

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY : disciple: **1.** One who follows or attends upon another for the purpose of learning from him: a pupil or scholar.

- a. One of the personal followers of Jesus Christ during his life; esp. one of the Twelve.
- b. Also applied in the N.T. to the early Christians generally; hence, in religious use, absol. a professed follower of Christ, a Christian or believer.
- c. A personal follower or pupil of any religious or (in a more recent use) other teacher or master, (this passes almost imperceptibly into sense 2)
- 2.** One who follows, or is influenced by, the doctrine or example of another; one who belongs to the 'school' of any leader of thought.
- 3.** pl. The name of a denomination of Christians, a branch of the Baptists, which originated in the early part of the 19th c. and is chiefly found in the United States; called also Campbellites.

WEBSTER : **1.** disciple: one who accepts and assists in spreading the doctrines of another: as **a:** one of the twelve in the inner circle of Christ's followers according to the Gospel accounts **b:** a convinced adherent of a school or individual **2 cap:** a member of the disciples of Christ founded in the U.S. in 1809 that holds the Bible alone to be the rule of faith and practice, baptizes by immersion, and has a congregational polity.

COLLINS COBUILD : disciple: **1** If you're someone's disciple, you are influenced by their teachings and try to follow their example. **2** The disciples were the twelve close followers of Jesus Christ during his lifetime.

LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH : **1** follower of any great teacher (esp. of a religious teacher) **2 (often cap.)** One of the first followers of Christ, esp an Apostle.

De un total de 14 acepciones (incluyendo las sub-acepciones) 6 hacen referencia al carácter general del término como seguidor de una escuela o maestro y 8 se refieren de un modo u otro al rasgo religioso. Este componente específico de la carga léxica de "disciple" viene acotado en el poema por la presencia del término "steeple" ya en su primera estrofa (verso 4). El significado de este vocablo nos remite sin alternativa al concepto iglesia con el que se relaciona metonímicamente (en Webster : steeple: a tall structure usu. having a

small spire at the top and surmounting a church tower; broadly: a whole church tower). La relación se mantiene a lo largo de todo el poema con el uso de la recurrencia en forma de reiteración y repetición léxicas (frecuencia 7). Así tenemos, en la tercera estrofa : "steeple", "pinnacle", "little ornament" [of the pinnacle] (versos 4, 5 y 8 respectivamente); en la cuarta estrofa : "converging lines/ of the hexagonal spire" (versos 2 y 3); en la quinta estrofa : "protecting lines" [of the hexagonal spire] (verso 4); y en la sexta estrofa : [the oppressive weight of the] "squat edifice" (verso 3).

Otros elementos léxicos recurrentes al menos una vez en el poema (incluyendo el título) son: moon (frecuencia 4), color (frecuencia 2), early morning (frecuencia 2), jasmine lightness (frecuencia 2). A esto hay que añadir que la expresión "the jasmine lightness of the moon" se utiliza como título del poema y se selecciona también para su conclusión ("...Observe the jasmine lightness of the moon") con lo que adquiere doble relevancia temática, marcadamente buscada por el autor. El término "moon" es además utilizado en posición prominente en la primera estrofa donde aparece como primer sustantivo después de la referencia al discípulo ("Rather notice, mon cher, that the moon..."). Mediante la utilización de estos términos se activan dos campos semánticos derivados: el primero de ellos por colocación (moon/ sky/ early morning); el segundo por hiponimia (color/ shell-pink/ brown stonel slate shine orange/ dark blue) (Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Halliday 1985). Todos ellos son léxicamente cohesivos en referencia al campo de los sentidos, aunque su conjunto no tiene, ni por orden de recurrencia ni por jerarquía sintáctica, el peso específico que poseen los elementos relacionados con el concepto y la imagen de la iglesia.

A todo esto hay que unir el uso recurrente de los verbos de percepción: "notice" (frecuencia 1), "observe" (frecuencia 4), "grasp" (frecuencia 1), "see" (frecuencia 2). Salvo "grasp", todos pueden literalmente adscribirse al campo visual con lo que tendríamos una lectura más o menos básica del poema: un discípulo de arte (o arquitectura) es instruido sobre como valorar los elementos arquitectónicos y los elementos naturales de un paisaje dado. Pero la utilización del término "disciple" como elemento central en el subtítulo complica las cosas. Como hemos visto "disciple" tiene un doble significado: 1. seguidor de una escuela o disciplina, 2. miembro de un conjunto religioso. Al carecer la primera acepción de referencia adicional en el texto frente a la segunda que se sustenta sobre las continuas referencias al concepto (e imagen) "iglesia", ésta se convierte en candidata más que probable.

Aunque en ningún momento siguen este razonamiento, Lakoff y Tumer adoptan esta perspectiva y toman como dominio fuente ("source domain") lo que vienen denominando lectura primera ("primary reading") del texto y como dominio meta el ámbito religioso ("the target domain is taken to be religion and instructions about the nature of religious belief and practice" pág. 147). Para justificarlo se remiten efectivamente al subtítulo "To a Solitary Disciple" y activan para éste un contexto basado en el conocimiento empírico del mundo, sin mencionar que el componente religioso ya está implícito en el término. Así dicen: "A disciple, within a religious context, is commonly someone who is seeking the truths religion has to offer within the framework of a religious institution." (pág.147). Más adelante proponen una interpretación del texto "as addressing a disciple's principal concern—the search for religious truth". De este modo, ven el poema como "a set of instructions for the disciple. telling him how to look at the church metaphorically by looking at it physically", aunque, según ellos, "it does so without ever saying anything overt about religion" (pág. 147).

Lo que es discutible aquí es el término "overt". Se trata de una cuestión de inferencia. El concepto religioso o "eclesiástico" está, como se ha visto, presente en el corpus del poema. El autor lo ha activado mediante el recurso de la selección al elegir recurrentemente términos marcados en esa dirección concreta. Todo ello forma parte del proceso cognitivo de creación y producción de un texto. No sólo existen imágenes, conceptos y correspondencias entre conceptos o campos conceptuales. Las decisiones tomadas por el autor a la hora de plasmar esos conceptos son igualmente determinantes cuando debe interpretarse un texto. El autor ha elegido 1. subtítular su poema y 2. convertir el término "disciple", frente a otros posibles, en elemento central de ese subtítulo. De ahí que la elección de dominio meta no sea arbitraria (como Lakoff y Turner indirectamente admiten cuando dicen "the choice must 'make sense' and the reading must be justified" pág. 146), ni tampoco independiente de la forma o expresión definitiva del texto.

Más adelante los autores proponen que la lectura metafórica global del texto tenga como dominio fuente "the appearance of a particular church" y como dominio meta "the essence of religion". Fundamentan esta decisión en que existe un sistema de correspondencias metafóricas que relaciona ambos niveles. Así citan, entre otras, las siguientes metáforas IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL, LESS IMPORTANT IS PERIPHERAL, y en consecuencia ESSENCE IS CENTRAL; del mismo modo, utilizan la metonimia THE BUILDING STANDS FOR THE INSTITUTION como elemento básico de relación entre el edificio físico y lo que éste representa. No utilizan muchas más metáforas para consolidar su visión del texto. Sólo mencionan, además, las también muy útiles DIVINE IS UP, MORTAL IS DOWN. Con esto cumplen otro de los requisitos establecidos al principio: "that the mapping makes use of conventional conceptual metaphors" (pág.146).

Sin embargo, no pueden evitar que todo el aparato metafórico-interpretativo que construyen se cimiente sobre la descripción detallada y local de las distintas expresiones del poema. Contrariamente a lo que cabría deducir de sus palabras sobre una interpretación metafórica obtenida a partir de una lectura global de segundo orden, la argumentación que desarrollan se sustenta en un análisis pormenorizado del texto verbal (págs. 150-156). Con esto pretendo mostrar que los principios de los que partía el análisis son erróneos. No se puede afirmar que "global readings are based not on any particular expressions but rather on the overall meaning of the first order reading", como tampoco es acertado decir que "second order metaphorical readings, being free of particular linguistic expressions, make manifest the conceptual nature of metaphor". La afirmación "if metaphor were only a matter of words, such global second order readings would not be possible" (pág. 139), sin ser del todo incorrecta, es al menos inexacta. Las correspondencias metafóricas son previas a su actualización mediante un determinado corpus lingüístico, pero, una vez actualizadas éstas, son las expresiones metafóricas las encargadas de su canalización. La interpretación sólo puede prescindir de la expresiones metafóricas en un último estadio donde se produzca la conceptualización de la macroestructura textual. Pero lo realmente importante es que no es posible llegar a la macroestructura sin la microestructura.

Exploremos ahora la base cotextual de la segunda interpretación que Lakoff y Turner sugieren para el poema: la lectura del mismo como una serie de instrucciones que el poeta da a su discípulo. Tampoco aquí la elección es arbitraria y no precisamente porque existan metáforas convencionales aplicables de donde derivarla. Como se ha visto, se da en el poema una segunda red de conexiones léxicas que abren un determinado campo de significado: el de la percepción sensorial que serviría de fundamento a una interpretación

del texto en términos estéticos. En el plano literal esto sería aplicable a la apreciación arquitectónica — ya que el elemento contemplado es una iglesia de líneas armónicas — o, de una manera más general, a la valoración artística. Sin embargo, los autores optan por orientar la interpretación hacia el camino de la poesía por la vía metafórica:

There is a possible reading of this poem in which the title, "To a Solitary Disciple," is taken as suggesting that the poet is addressing one of his own disciples, namely an apprentice poet. Under that reading, the instructions in the poem are to be understood metaphorically as instructions concerning how a poet should go about looking at the world which is the subject of his poetry. (pág. 147)

Esta propuesta de Lakoff y Turner parece partir de una asunción que identifica al productor con el hablante del texto, y puesto que en el texto no hay ningún indicio que pruebe que el hablante es un poeta — más bien al contrario, si tenemos en cuenta que el tema del mismo es la descripción de una iglesia y su entorno natural — hay que fundamentar esa inferencia sobre la base de la identidad del autor y del tipo de texto. La identificación de autor y hablante en el ámbito literario sería insostenible si el texto fuera de ficción y es discutible en poesía porque con frecuencia ésta no es narrativa y consecuentemente no exige la diferenciación entre escritor y narrador. No obstante, el poema de William Carlos Williams presenta un problema pragmático si se apoya en este razonamiento. El conflicto se origina precisamente en el subtítulo que Lakoff y Turner utilizan como punto de partida para sugerir la interpretación en términos de instrucciones poéticas a un discípulo.

Ciertamente, el hablante no está en ningún caso especificado en el poema y podría por tanto identificarse con el autor. Esta lectura implicaría necesariamente una coincidencia entre el contexto comunicativo real y el contexto verbal, donde primaría el contexto real. Como el autor es real, no puede actuar en un contexto ficticio y si el contexto es real, también lo son el hablante y el poema que no podría ser considerado ficción (véase Adams 1985, págs. 20-2). Sin embargo, la decisión no es tan sencilla porque si bien el hablante está lo suficientemente indeterminado como para dejar al arbitrio del lector su identificación con el autor o no, no se puede decir lo mismo del otro participante en la comunicación, el oyente, ya que el poema especifica a quien va dirigido: el discípulo que aparece en el título. En principio no se puede identificar a este oyente con cualquier lector de poesías. No se da por tanto, al menos en términos generales, la coincidencia oyente—lector que el contexto real exige como correlato a la anteriormente establecida de hablante—autor. Si, por el contrario, el oyente explícitamente citado ("a solitary disciple") no fuera sino un lector implícito, habría que asumir que el poema se desarrolla en el plano de la ficción y en consecuencia su hablante también sería necesariamente ficticio con lo que su calidad de poeta quedaba por confirmar. Esta dualidad interpretativa no podría resolverse sin recurrir a un análisis pragmático que permitiera comprobar mediante la constatación de datos concretos (personales, temporales, etc.) si las referencias contextuales contenidas o activadas por el texto verbal encuentran una correspondencia en la realidad.

Es posible, por último, plantear una tercera opción: que el poema fuera de lectura abierta, es decir, que esas instrucciones estéticas dadas al discípulo (tomando el término en su acepción más general) fueran aplicables a un amplio número de campos conceptuales. Esto podría estar más en consonancia con lo que Lakoff y Turner parecen proponer a propósito de una lectura global por encima de las expresiones. Pero, contrariamente a lo que

se deduce de su planteamiento, este hecho tampoco es generalizable ni válido para la interpretación metafórica de cualquier tipo de texto sea o no poético. Se trata nuevamente de una cualidad concreta inherente al componente verbal de este poema, debido al cierto grado de indefinición que ha utilizado el autor a la hora de construirlo, sobre todo en lo que respecta a la (falta de) caracterización del hablante.

La conclusión de estas reflexiones no es otra que la necesidad de ampliar el campo de visión cuando se trata de analizar el discurso. La conceptualización metafórica es, como toda la escuela de la CTM ha demostrado brillantemente en múltiples ocasiones, un elemento esencial en la **construcción** del pensamiento y, como esta escuela también sostiene, las correspondencias metafóricas utilizadas en literatura no difieren de las encontradas abundantemente en el lenguaje cotidiano. Sin embargo, a la hora de recurrir a la metáfora para realizar interpretaciones de textos más o menos complejos, no se puede prescindir del importante número de componentes textuales que, en constante interacción, influyen sobre la configuración textual y sobre su capacidad comunicativa. No niego el protagonismo de las relaciones metafóricas, ni su contribución a esclarecer los entresijos conceptuales de un texto, pero por sí mismas no son suficientes.

Cuando el material analizado consiste en expresiones descontextualizadas es posible prescindir de todo otro elemento que no sea del interés del investigador porque se trabaja en el plano abstracto y no en el comunicativo. La interpretación discursiva, sin embargo, es el extremo final de un proceso comunicativo en el que intervienen factores cognitivos, **lingüísticos** y contextuales que son aislables por necesidades metodológicas, pero no prescindibles. Concentrarse exclusivamente en uno de ellos es realizar un ejercicio parcial. Lakoff y Tumer proponen una lectura global de un poema que, según ellos, no se basa en las expresiones propiamente dichas sino que se deriva del significado global extraído de una lectura anterior y lo presentan como una lectura metafórica efectuada en el plano del pensamiento sin intervención de las palabras. Hemos demostrado que no hay lectura global que no albergue un sistema de relaciones microestructurales organizadas y jerarquizadas de manera compleja. Lakoff y Tumer también lo demuestran indirectamente cuando realizan, primero, un análisis **pormenorizado** del texto y, segundo, una interpretación metafórica global que nuevamente sustentan sobre elementos microestructurales.

Qué duda cabe que todo texto es susceptible de ser interpretado por un oyente o lector de manera más o menos libre mediante una serie de asociaciones metafóricas que pueden conducirle muy cerca o muy lejos de lo que el texto quiso expresar en su origen. Este es un ejercicio cognitivo cuya sistematización exploraría principal y casi exclusivamente la capacidad no sólo interpretativa sino también elaborativa del receptor. Y de esta manera debe presentarse, resaltando su enfoque intencionadamente parcial. Un análisis del discurso que aspire a ocuparse de la globalidad del texto no puede prescindir del carácter integrador que es consustancial a toda unidad de comunicación. Los planos **micro** y **macro** estructurales son interactivos y ambos reflejan el contenido **semántico** del texto: el primero local y pormenorizadamente, el segundo de manera global y genérica. **A** partir del conocimiento microestructural, cada lector organiza en su mente una base textual general que refleja su comprensión particular de la macroestructura. Tomar esta versión como fundamento interpretativo prescindiendo a la vez del nivel de expresión implica cuando menos asumir el riesgo de realizar lecturas libres, incluso libres en exceso. Si queremos lecturas bien fundadas ("**the reading must be 'justified'**" pág. 146) hay que promover el análisis de cuantos más elementos discursivos mejor, incluyendo por supuesto las correspondencias

metafóricas que puedan establecerse. La conjunción de todos estos elementos y la información que generan son una garantía de rigor para la investigación en el plano del texto y el discurso.

Para **terminar** debo insistir en algo que a estas alturas está suficientemente demostrado. Todo texto o discurso complejo posee dos niveles: el microestructural y el **macroestructural**, y ninguno de ellos existe aislado en el proceso comunicativo (van Dijk 1977, 1980). Cualquier adaptación que se quiera hacer de los descubrimientos realizados sobre el comportamiento de las unidades mínimas del lenguaje (conceptos, proposiciones, oraciones, etc.) al comportamiento de las unidades complejas ha de tener esto en cuenta. La CTM ha incorporado al estudio del uso del lenguaje un elemento de suma importancia: las relaciones metafóricas. Este elemento también **actúa** sobre el comportamiento textual y discursivo, pero su actuación debe contemplarse dentro del marco interactivo del que otros componentes textuales —estructurales, semánticos, cognitivos y pragmáticos— también **forman** parte.

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A Cognitive Analysis of Paul Bowles's *The Sheltering Sky*.¹

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ABSTRACT

*This paper attempts to carry out an analysis of Paul Bowles's *The Sheltering Sky* within the framework of Lakoff's (1996) theory of the self and Johnson's (1987) theory of image-schemas. It is our aim to show how the interplay between the two theories sheds some light on the nature of the three main characters and on some aspects of the structure and the overall interpretation of the novel.*

KEY WORDS: cognitive metaphor, image-schemas, literary interpretation

RESUMEN

*En este artículo, realizamos un análisis de la novela de Paul Bowles *El Cielo Protector* dentro del marco de dos teorías cognitivas: la teoría de Lakoff (1996) sobre la estructura interna del concepto 'persona' y la teoría de los esquemas de imagen de Johnson (1987). Nuestra intención es señalar cómo la interacción de estas dos teorías puede aplicar algunos aspectos de la construcción de los personajes y de la estructura narrativa de la obra, así como permitir una nueva interpretación global de la novela.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: metáfora cognitiva, esquemas imagísticas, interpretación literaria

I. INTRODUCTION

According to Lakoff (1987), the nature of human cognitive processes can be studied by looking at the way they **influence some** of our most common activities, especially language. In this **connection**, there is mounting **evidence** that metaphors are more a **matter** of thought than of language, linguistic metaphors being **just** a reflection of the structure of our conceptual system (Lakoff, 1993). Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Lakoff (1993) **have** pointed out that conceptual metaphors are not just the invention of **creative** writers and poets, but that, on the contrary, they belong to our human conceptual system, literary or poetic metaphors being **just** a **creative** exploitation of what is otherwise a common everyday

phenomenon. Since metaphors are cognitive constructs, not just linguistic phenomena, we should be able to find **evidence** for them not only in everyday language, but also in the output of other human activities (e.g. literature). The present paper attempts to apply Lakoff's (1996) theory of the conceptual structure of the self, on the one hand, and Johnson's (1987) theory of image-schemas, on the other, to the analysis of the characters and of some aspects of the narrative structure of Paul Bowles's (1949) novel *The Sheltering Sky*.

In the novel, three North American citizens (Port, Kit and Turner), a couple and one of their friends, **arrive** in Northern Africa in an attempt to flee from the devastation which the Second World War had left behind in the western world. **Then**, they start a journey into the innermost part of the Sahara, during which their authentic personalities are gradually revealed. As they approach the centre of the Sahara, the central episodes of the novel begin to take place. Turner, unable to adapt himself to the extreme life conditions of this part of the continent, **leaves** the couple and returns to a more civilized town. Port is infected by a deadly virus and, **after** a prolonged agony, passes away. Finally, Kit, who seems incapable of coming to terms with her husband's death, **loses** her mind and **runs** away with a **caravan** of nomads. For **some** time, she abandons herself to a relationship with one of the merchants (Belqassim), who keeps her as his mistress. Eventually, fearing for her life, Kit flees from Belqassim, but she still refuses to go back to her former life in the civilized world. Therefore, Turner's efforts to find her are in vain.

Having this in mind, our main aim is to show how the interplay between the two theories mentioned above **provides** the grounds for the construction of the three main characters and how it sheds new light on **some** aspects of the structure and the overall interpretation of the novel. In so doing, we will **provide** further **confirmation** of the theories proposed by Lakoff (1996) and Johnson (1987).² We shall proceed in four stages. First, we shall offer a description of Johnson's (1987) theory of image-schemas and of Lakoff's (1996) theory of the self. Given that a general knowledge of both theories is essential to the understanding of the present paper, we shall offer a lengthy description of them, omitting only those aspects which are not central to **our** study. Whenever **possible**, we will **also** try to exemplify them with passages from the novel. Second, we shall **devote** the central part of our paper to analysing the **importance** of these cognitive theories as regards the construction of the three main characters in *The Sheltering Sky*. This central section of the paper will be further divided into two parts. The **first** one will be concerned with showing how Lakoff's (1996) system of metaphors on the self allows us to understand the nature and reactions of the main characters of the novel, which would **otherwise** be left unexplained. Thus, our main hypothesis will be that the three protagonists (Port, Kit and Turner) can be **taken** to represent respectively the three main constituent parts of a human being: the subject, the **inner** self, and the outer self. The second part of this section will be devoted to another cognitive aspect of the construction of the characters, namely, the fact that it is largely based on spatial structures (image-schemas). The conceptual dependency between these domains (i.e. 'space'-human being') is so noticeable that we **think** it is worthy to **devote some** space to its analysis. Finally, in the third part of the present paper, we shall briefly **deal** with **some** aspects of the structure and meaning of the novel, which can **also** be given an interesting interpretation under the light of both Lakoff's (1996) and Johnson's (1987) theories.

I. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HUMAN BEINGS AND REALITY

According to Johnson's (1987) theory on the nature of human knowledge, 'our understanding and conceptualization of reality is largely based on the existence of **some** non-propositional pre-conceptual abstract⁴ structures known as image-schemas,' which are directly meaningful to us. These are skeletal representations of our knowledge about the organization of space and spatial relations. **Some** such schemas **have been** identified of which we shall consider for this paper the so-called container, path, and verticality schemas (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1989). This pre-conceptual stage of understanding refers **only** to those concrete objects which are related to our own physical experience. In a second stage of understanding, these bodily-based image-schemas are metaphorically mapped onto other concrete and abstract concepts which are different from our own body, thus expanding our knowledge and understanding of the world. As will be shown below, our conceptualization of the concept 'human being', seems to follow a similar cognitive process.

11.1. IMAGE-SCHEMAS AND THE CONCEPT 'HUMAN BEING'

As pointed out by Johnson (1987:21), our conceptualization of the human being is primarily based on the container image-schema, which originates in our own bodily experience. Since our childhood we are aware that our bodies are three-dimensional containers into which we introduce certain substances (e.g. food, air, etc.) and from which other substances emerge (e.g. blood, food wastages, etc.). We are also aware, **through** our daily physical experience, that our bodies are contained in their surroundings (e.g. rooms, clothes, etc.) and **also** that our interaction with objects usually involves placing them into or out of other objects. Out of **all** these everyday physical experiences, we abstract their basic **common structural features** to build the image-schema of a container. The fact that our conceptualization of human beings is founded upon this kind of structure can be observed from a large number of everyday expressions such as the following: *This boy keeps all his feelings inside, he never externalizes them, He looks like a hooligan, but he is a great kid in the inside*, etc. Furthermore, the essential role played by the container image-schema in the understanding of the concept of 'human being' can also be observed from the existence of lexicalized expressions such as 'introverted' or 'egocentric'.

Moreover, Johnson (1987:22) has shown that image-schemas give way to a series of rational entailments which can be expressed propositionally:

1. *To be inside a container entails to be protected from outside forces.* For example, on page 222 of the novel, we read: «His reaction was always the same: a sensation in which **the outer parts of his being rushed inward for protection...**»⁶

2. *To be fixed in a container entails that the fixed object is either accessible or inaccessible to the outer observer.* That is to say, the object is **fixed** in the container either to be observed or to be hidden. The characters in *The Sheltering Sky* exit their habitual container (the postwar American society) and, as the novel unfolds, they gradually **enter** a **diametrically** new container (the inner Sahara). It is precisely the location of **the** characters in a radically different container from their own that allows us to **carry** out an objective observation of their actions, which are **often** marked in contrast to those typical of Northern

African culture.

3. *To be inside a container usually limits and constraints the forces operating within it.* We shall see in the second part of the present paper that as the characters move towards the interior of the Sahara, the signs of western culture **gradually** disappear and together with them, those moral, social, and cultural forces and **rules** that constrain the characters' behaviour **also become** less noticeable. To reach the centre of the Sahara means to **have** exited the usual western social and cultural container completely. And it is precisely at **this** point that the main characters in our novel start to **behave** according to their own selves, regardless of social constraints, **and** that the most relevant episodes of the novel take place.

In a recent paper, Fomés and Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) **have** undertaken an expansion of Johnson's description (1987: 22) of the internal logic of the container image-schema by means of combining it with other experientially basic concepts **like** control, harm, and benefit. As a result, they **have** put forward a list of six generic entailments, two of which stand out for our purposes:

1. Two or more **dynamic entities** can interact more easily if they are within the limits of a container **than** if they are separated by those limits; moreover, if one of those **entities** has a strong will and a capacity for making decisions, it will be able to control the **rest**. This applies to our novel. As pointed out above, the **three** protagonists of the novel **find** themselves within the limits of a new container (Northern Africa), which enables them to interact in a more intense way. Moreover, Port, who represents their rational **subject**, is able to control the others while they are still within the same boundaries. When Tumer moves to a different **village**, however, he is no longer under Pon's influence.

2. If a certain entity which is **outside** the limits of a container wishes to control another entity or **entities** which are within the boundaries of the container, the farther away these are from the limits of the container, the more difficult they will be to control. That is, control may be prevented by container boundaries. This particular aspect of the logic of the container image-schema can be particularly observed with respect to Kit and Tumer's relationship. Tumer is **only** able to influence Kit's feelings or behaviour when they are both sharing the same environment (**e.g.** the train to **Boussif**) or when Kit is **outside** Port's area of influence.


11.2. THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SELF

Spatial structures, such as the container image-schema described above, are **often** used as the **source** domains in metaphoric mappings whose **aim** is to structure more abstract concepts such as the entity 'human being'. This kind of metaphoric mapping has **been** extensively studied by Lakoff (1996) who has **also** put forward a system of conventional conceptual metaphors which seems to be automatically and unconsciously used **in** our understanding of the human being. We shall now **try** to offer a brief description of those metaphors which appear as most productive regarding the construction of the characters **in** the novel.

According to Lakoff (1996), the concept of 'human being' is understood as an ensemble of a **subject** and a self (what he calls the Divided Person Metaphor). The **subject**


is the locus of reason, consciousness, and subjective experience, while the self includes other aspects of a person such as his **body**, emotions, past, etc. The subject is usually in control of the self, especially when it is **in** its usual location: **in** or above the self. But sometimes the subject may **lose** control over the self, which **leaves** the latter without a **guide** (this is the **Lost of Self Metaphor**). Moreover, incompatible aspects or interests of a person are conceptualized as different people in conflict (different selves) or as people being **in** different places (the **Split and Scattered Self**). This metaphor is essential to the understanding of our cognitive analysis of the characters of the novel, since, as will be further explained in the next section, it is the central hypothesis of this paper that its three main characters represent respectively the three main constituent elements of a human being: Port (subject), Kit (inner-self) and Turner (outer-self). Another **significant** metaphor, regarding our analysis of *The Sheltering Sky*, is the so-called **True Self Metaphor**, which refers to the **kind** of self which is compatible with the cosmic values of the subject (**spiritual**, moral, and vocational values). According to this metaphor, the **true** self is conceptualized as the self which shares the same place with the subject. Two other kinds of self which will **also prove** relevant to our analysis are the **private** self and the **public** self, which are conceptualized respectively as the interior self and the exterior self (it should be reminded **here** that a person is usually understood as a container with both an interior and an exterior). As pointed out by Lakoff (1996), these metaphors are usually found in connection with two other mappings: hidden is invisible is out, and essential is **central/inessential** is peripheral. **Finally**, Lakoff refers to the Self as a **Servant Metaphor**,⁹ which will **also** be found in our account of *The Sheltering Sky* and according to which the subject is the master and the self its **servant**.


As can be **observed**, the understanding of most of the metaphors proposed by Lakoff is based on a number of basic spatial relations. Among the image-schemas that function as the **source** domain of the above metaphors, we **have**, as mentioned before, the verticality, path, and container schemas. **Some** metaphors make use of more than one of these schemas or **else** they combine an image-schema with one or more independent metaphors.⁸ **The** Split Self metaphor, for **instance**, requires both the path image-schema and the container schema. Thus, we **find** expressions like the following: *His personality is rather unstable, he is always going back and forth from his more extrovert to his more introverted side and from his rational to his emotional side*. In this example, the metaphor focuses on the path schema, the container schema being implicit.



In other cases, the verticality image-schema is used together with a **very** general metaphor: **GOOD-IS-UP**. As regards the conceptualization of the human being, its most

important, high qualities (traditionally those related to reason and morality) are to be found at the top of an imaginary vertical axis.

 Consciousness, reason,
moral, happiness, etc

 Unconsciousness, passion,
immorality, sadness,
irrationality, etc.

According to this way of conceptualizing reality, we observe that to be conscious is to be up / to be unconscious is to be down, rationality is up / passions, emotions, irrationality are down, and finally, happiness is up / sadness is down. Lakoff (1996) exemplifies these **three** groups of metaphors with the following everyday **language** sentences: ***He fell asleep, He kept control over his emotions, He feels a bit down today.*** None of these expressions could be understood without taking into account the verticality image-schema to which words like 'fell', 'over' or 'down' refer. **Several** examples supporting Lakoff's proposal can also be found in *The Sheltering Sky*.

He **awoke**, opened his eyes. The room meant very **little** to him; he **was too deeply immersed** in the non-being from which he had **just** come (p. 11). // And presently within her, **deeper than the weeping** for the wasted years, **she found a ghastly dread** all formed and growing (p. 218). // **His being was a well** a thousand miles **deep**; he rose **from the lower regions with a sense of infinite sadness** (p.124).

Moreover, it should be noted that the examples found in the novel are more elaborate **instances** of this phenomenon due to schemata **enrichment**. They do not only **illustrate** the combination of the verticality image-schema and the associated metaphor GOOD IS UP, but more **importantly**, they **reveal** the necessity of taking into account one more **cognitive** model, the container image-schema, in order to achieve a **full** metaphorical interpretation. Thus, the above examples invoke the verticality image-schema only indirectly, as an implicit aspect of the container image-schema, which is the one that is actually being focalized by words like "deeper", "well", or "**immersed**". **Every** container has a top **and** a bottom part **and** therefore, it **partakes** of the up-down orientation of the verticality image-schema. However, **some** aspects of the **internal** logic of the container image-schema **allow** us to **explain** in a complementary manner why human positive qualities are **often** conceptualized as being **up**, whereas negative qualities are understood as being down. Thus, positive attributes are conceptualized as being at the top of an imaginary vertical axis, not only **because** there exists a general metaphor (GOOD IS UP) that **allows** this understanding; but also, **because** it follows from the logic of the container **image-schema** (Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza, 1996) that those qualities that are located at the top part of a container are more visible than those

which are at the bottom. Taking this into account, it makes sense that traditionally human qualities such as irrationality and passion **have often been** regarded as belonging to the hidden, innermost part of a person (=container), while rationality and morality, on the contrary, **have been commonly taken** as positive visible qualities which need not be concealed.

III. THE COGNITIVE MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHARACTERS OF *THE SHELTERING SKY*

It is the purpose of this section to show how the cognitive mechanisms described above shed new light on the **construction** of the characters of Paul Bowles's novel. As was advanced in the introduction, this section consists of two different parts. **The** first one will be concerned with the application of Lakoff's theory of the **internal** structure of the self to the analysis of the nature of the characters of the novel; the second part will **deal with the** relationship between the concepts of 'space' and 'human being', as well as with its implications for the understanding of the nature of the three protagonists.

III.1. CHARACTERS AND METAPHORS

Going back to the **first** of our proposals and focusing on the divided person and the split self metaphors, we shall look for evidence in the novel in favour of the view that the three main characters represent different aspects of the **same** human being: Port represents the subject, Kit the interior self, and Turner the exterior **self**.⁹ As we shall shortly see, there are so many passages in the novel that **provide** evidence of such a dissociation of the constituent parts of a human being in the main characters that we believe it is **important** to underline and analyse this fact. Even if such an effect had not **been** consciously sought by the author, the fact that this metaphorical cognitive model of the human being is at work **here** interestingly reveals the unconscious, automatic nature of such mechanisms, which has so often **been** pointed out by Lakoff (1987).

Port is introduced to us as the prototype of rational person, the subject who exerts control over the **actions** and decisions of the self. He is the one who had planned and organized their trip to Africa and the one who had persuaded Kit and Turner to follow **him**.

(...) he had **been** tempted to go back aboard and see about **taking** passage for the continuing voyage to **Istanbul**, but it would **have been** difficult to do without losing face, **since it was he who had cajoled them into coming to North Africa** (p.13).

Because he symbolizes the subject, Port **also** appears as the locus of subjective experience, reason, and consciousness. He **does** not accept his own culture without first comparing it to others (p.13) and he **does** not believe in objective reality. Notice, for instance, his words on page 84: «But my world is not humanity's world. It is the world as **I** see it.» Most of the time, it is Port who decides and **plans** the course of action of the whole group. For instance, although at a certain point both Kit and Port himself want to get rid of Turner, it is Port that **devises** a scheme to do it and carries it out successfully (pp.122-124).

However, his rationalistic supremacy is of little use when he is forced to face his emotional problems with Kit. As should be expected from the fact that he represents the subject (rational part of the human being), he lacks the necessary intuition to get by in the world of feelings and emotions.

Experience had taught him that **reason could not be counted on in such situations**. There was always an extra element, mysterious and not quite within reach, that one had not reckoned with. **One had to know, not deduce. And he did not have the knowledge** (p.130).

Insecurity in this field leads him to refuse to make decisions and to avoid action:

(...) he would temporarily abandon the idea of getting back together with Kit. In his present state of disquiet he would be certain to take **all** the wrong turnings, and would perhaps lose her for good. **Later, when he least expected it, the thing might come to pass of its own accord** (p. 132).

It is also precisely **because he does not feel** in control of the situation when he has to **deal** with feelings and emotions, that his logical attitude towards this **universe** is one of defence, as can be read on page 100: «(...) he was unable to break out of the cage into which he **had** shut himself. **The cage he had built long ago to save himself from love.**»

Kit, on the contrary, has **all** the necessary intuition and knowledge to get by **in** the world of feelings and interpersonal relationships. According to the divided person metaphor described above, she would represent the interior self that forms part of every human being. From the beginning, Kit is presented to us as at the opposite pole of the rational being represented by Port (p.43). Her capacity to face life and to interact with the world and the people that surround her is constrained by an irrational fear and by her belief in an array of omens **and dreams** that can easily paralyse her. While Pon was unable to face and **deal** with emotions, Kit is incapable of rationalizing **and** freeing herself from this irrational, **unjustified** fear of omens. As has already **been** pointed out, it is usually Port that **makes** **all** the decisions, and when she is going through a particularly **critical** phase, she relies blindly on him.

Nevertheless, when it comes to feelings and emotions, Kit feels at ease. She **does** possess **this** kind of knowledge:

It was such places as this, such moments that he loved above **all else** in life; **she knew that, and she also knew that he loved them more if she could be there to experience them with him** (p.100).

The split self metaphor (interior versus exterior self) allows us to **justify** the **presence** of a character, Tumer, whose role in the novel is not always clear and who everybody (the characters, the narrator, and **some** readers, **among** whom **I** would like to include myself) would like to get rid of, **because** of his being mainly a dull character, a hypocrite and an «**essentially simple individual**» (p.67). If Port represents the rational part of a human being (subject) and Kit its emotional counterpart (inner self), Turner seems to **fit perfectly** well within this human puzzle as the exterior self, **i.e.** as that part of every person which is subject to the social and cultural conventions of its own civilization.

Turner's personality **traits** are characterized neither by reason nor by emotions, but by hypocrisy, falsehood (p.46), the art of gossiping (p.20), gallantry (p.66), an extreme obsession for hygiene (p.112), the quiet complying with the conventional **rules** and laws of society (p.253), and by other **features** all of which **have** an equal origin in western society. As he gets immersed in the Northern African environment, his attitudes and habits, deeply ingrained in western culture, clash with those of Africa, to which he can never **fully** adapt himself.

'No', Turner said **obstinately**. 'One thing I can't stand is filth'. 'Yes, you're a real **American, I know**', said Kit."(p.112). // And he would **have** to admit that he had left them and gone off by himself, that he **hadn't been able to 'take' the desert** (p.255).

Unlike Port, who **does** not accept his own civilization without comparing it to others (p.13), Turner complies with social conventions without hardly questioning them (as in the religious ceremony for Port's burial on page 253). In contrast to Kit, who looks for true feelings and for a stable relationship with Port, Turner's attempt to seduce her has **little** to do with **love**. On the contrary, he seems to be seeking a **mere** trophy to exhibit in society:

Assuredly he was not **in love** with the poor girl. His **overtures** to her had **been** made out of pity (**because** she was a woman) and out of vanity (**because** he was a man), and the two feelings together had awakened the acquisitive **desire** of the trophy collector, nothing more (p.254).

As shown above, Turner represents the exterior social self, and as such he is a constituent part of the human being, but **also** a peripheral one, an inessential part of a person which can be easily ignored and which Paul Bowles actually **leaves** out of the novel throughout its central episodes. Nevertheless, he is the only character in the novel who seems to escape a fatal destiny during their trip to the **inner** Sahara, which leads us to wonder if Paul Bowles's intention in this novel is to offer an utterly **pessimistic** view of the human being, as if people **had** to put aside their rational and emotional selves (Port and Kit) **in** order to **survive** in this world. But, **while** this is **just** a hypothesis, what can be easily **proved** is that Turner's main and **only** role **in** this novel is to function as the exterior social **conscience** of the characters.

He dragged Port over in front of the mirror. 'Look at yourself', he commanded." (the morning after Port's adventure with Marhnia. p.50).

The particular view which we **have** put forward on the **nature** of the main characters of *The Sheltering Sky* allows us to explain their behaviour and, especially, it allows us to understand Kit's **course** of action after Port's death. The **three** protagonists together represent one person with an essential part (subject plus interior self) and a peripheral **side** (exterior self). According to the scattered self metaphor, only when **all** these parts exist together can a person function correctly. What happens in the fictional universe of this novel **is** that those three constituent parts **have been taken** apart and as should **logically** follow from the above metaphor, none of them will be able to function properly on its own. Port **dies**. Kit **loses** her

mind. And at first sight, it seems that Turner (exterior self) **does** not suffer the negative effects of such a dissociation. but on the whole, he has **also been** affected since going back to America without Kit, after Port's death, seems to him «**unthinkable** from every point of view» (p.255). Thus, he, too, **is** unable to **carry** on with his normal life.

The first character to disappear from the story, however, is Port (p.235). This episode signals the «**first moments of a new existence**»(p.237) for Kit. A new life in which, Port (her guide, her reason) being dead, Kit will closely **follow** her husband's original **plans** and will continue her journey to the innermost regions of Northern Africa. Port was her consciousness, which she **know** lacks, as can be **seen** on page 238: «**And yet, deeper than the empty region which was her consciousness**, in an obscure and innermost part of her mind, an idea must already had **been** in gestation...».¹⁰ Consistently with the lack of consciousness and reason that Port's death has left behind, Kit's acts from this moment onwards will necessarily be irrational, as the narrator is **careful** to **emphasize** on page 268: «(...) instead of feeling the omens, she now would make them, be them **herself**.» **Because** Port (the subject) has died and is not in control any more, Kit (the self) feels lost and without a guide (Loss of Self Metaphor). In several passages, the narrator insists on the lack of control that Kit experiences over her actions.

Once in the garden **she found herself pulling off her clothes** (p.246). // **She only did the things she found herself already doing** (p.276). // **She let him pull her** along the market (p.302).

On other occasions, the emptiness left by Port's death is directly addressed: «**And yet, deeper than the empty region that was her consciousness..**» p.238. Her behaviour seems to be **ruled** by **mere** physical needs such as hunger, defence against dangers, etc. This can be **observed** in the following passages: «**When she was hungry**, she rose, picked up her bag, and walked **among** the rocks...» p.300.// «'I must get out', she **thought**» (as she realized that she was in danger at Belqassim's. p.294). Kit's life seems to **have been** reduced to **existence**, and her mental activity seems to **have** stopped. We find evidence for this on pages 269: «**She** raised no **problem** for herself; she was content to be relaxed and to see the soft unvaried landscape going **by**» and 267: «**It** was good merely to **lie** there, to exist and ask no **questions**.» Having reduced herself to her most basic status, she even rejects the most characteristic of **human** rational activities, language. And together with language, she avoids thoughts:

It was so long since she **had canalized** her thoughts by **speaking loud**...(p.276). // **The** words were coming back, and inside the wrappings of the words, there would be thoughts lying there (p.302).

Before we move on to the next part of our paper, it is important to point out that the metaphors we **have** just analysed (divided person, split self) constitute the foundation of the whole system of metaphors on the **internal** structure of the self that we **have described** above. Therefore, we **shall also** be able to find evidence within our novel **in favour** of this fact. **Some** of those metaphors on the structure of the self **have** already **been** exemplified above (e.g. loss of the self, exterior self, etc.); others (e.g. true self), **because** of their **intimate** relationship to spatial aspects, will be dealt with in the next part of our paper. But before we

move on to that, we would like to exemplify briefly the last of the metaphors that **make up Lakoff's** system: the Self as Servant metaphor.

As has already **been** pointed out, since the subject represents reason and since it controls and **makes** decisions for the self, it is possible to conceptualize it as the master who tells the self what to do and how to **behave**. This seems to be the case in the novel, where Kit (the **inner-self**) logically represents the slave. As such, she must carry out her master's needs and **desires**: «**And** she had accompanied **him** without reiterating her complaints too often or too **bitterly**»(p.13). She must also please him, **because** she belongs to him: « 'You **know** that means **little** to me (...), but if you'll be happier there- **I** mean healthier- we should go, by **all means**»(p.164); «**Against** her **will**, she forced herself to admit that she still belonged to Port...»(p.45).

III.2. SPACE AND CHARACTERS

We shall now focus our analysis on a number of spatial relationships which form the basis of the characters' **construction**. More specifically, we shall underline **some** of the interrelations that can be observed between the characters' actions and behaviour and the container and verticality image-schemas.

It should be noted again **here**, that most of the cognitive processes that we are about to describe (use of image-schemas and their metaphoric projections) are so deeply ingrained in our cognitive systems that Paul Bowles's use of these mechanisms in *The Sheltering Sky* is very probably unconscious. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to ignore them, since they are **some** of the most **common** mechanisms which we use automatically in order to understand abstract concepts such as personal relationships, passions, rationality, irrationality, death, life, etc. The fact that the author of **this** novel can be shown to **have** made use of these cognitive constructs, especially if it was unconsciously, can be taken as **evidence** that we actually comprehend and conceptualize reality **in** this way.

We would like to **propose** that **in** the novel it is possible to observe at least **three** occasions on which the concepts of space and character cut each other as the latter borrows its **structure** from the **former**.¹¹ This happens as follows:

- *container image schema + essential self*

As has already **been** shown, human beings are often conceptualized as containers with a central part which is essential (subject and self) and another peripheral part which is not as important as the first one (exterior self). Furthermore, the concept 'human being' cannot be understood unless it is contained within a bounded space (e.g. a room, a country, or the biggest container of all: the world). Such a container **also** has a centre and a periphery. In *The Sheltering Sky*, there is a moment when the main characters (Port and Kit), who represent the central and essential parts of the human being, arrive at the innermost central area of the **Sahara**, and it is precisely then that the story reaches its **climax** and the essential episodes (Port's death and Kit's incursion **in** the desert) take place. While this happens, the third protagonist, Turner, nearly disappears from the plot. According to his nature (exterior peripheral self), his **contributions** to the **plot** occur at the beginning and at the end of the novel, while during the central episodes, he only appears sporadically.

Moreover, the narrator's frequent **references** to the fact that the main characters are approaching the central area of the Sahara **serve** the purpose of building an increasingly tense atmosphere which seems to be announcing the most relevant episodes. During their trip to Sba, when Port's **disease** has already **become manifest**, we are reminded: «It had **been** one strict, undeviating course inland to the desert, and now he was very nearly at the **center**.»(p. 198). And it is precisely in Sba where one of the most important episodes of the novel takes place, namely, Port's death, whose temporal proximity had **been announced** by means of the descriptive focalization on yet another aspect of the container image schema: its limits. During Kit and Port's trip to El Ga' a, when Port's illness **first becomes** apparent, the narrator **makes reference** to the **limits** of the world-container": «The new moon had slipped behind the **earth's sharp edge**.» (p.180)

- container image schema + true self

The true self metaphor, that which conceptualizes the self as being compatible with the values of the subject and which stands for a realized person, is equally based on the container image-schema. Therefore, those realized aspects of a human being are **conceptualized** as a self who is **in** the same bounded space as the subject, while those unrealized aspects of a person are understood as a self who is not in the same bounded area as the subject.

Taking into consideration that Port and Kit represent respectively the subject and the self that can be found **in** every human being, it is possible to pose the question of whether those moments when these characters **feel** realized and at ease with themselves and when they appear as compatible characters, can be related to the container-space where they are found at those precise moments. That is, we wonder whether there is **some** kind of correlation between the location of the characters and the state of their personal relationship.

It is easy to **find evidence** for the fact that Kit's happiness seems to depend to a considerable extent on the nearby **presence** of Port. When they part from each other (e.g. journey by train to Boussif), Kit feels bad, lost, without a guide, unable to control her actions or to face life unless she is under the effects of alcohol. In many other passages, what she actually says outlines such a need of Port's physical closeness: «**Don't think** about me. Whatever happens, I'll be **all right** if I'm with you.»(p.129).

The same phenomenon can be observed as regards Port. On page 100, we are told: «It was such places as this, such moments that he **loved** above **else** in life; she knew that, and she **also** knew that he **loved** them more if she could be there to experience them with **him**.» It seems that not only their realization as individuals, but **also** the welfare of their relationship depends on their being in the same place. The narrator refers to this need on page 105: «(...) such bond required that they be alone **together**.». As a matter of fact, those moments when their relationship undergoes a certain tension or when there is an argument between them are underlined with the recurrent scene of one of the characters leaving the shared environment. For **instance**, when Port **teases** Kit regarding her omens about the trip to Boussif (e.g. «**Good night**, she said suddenly, and shut the **door**» p.63), or when Port finally decides to **join** the Lyles in their trip by car to Boussif (e.g. «**Well**, by God, you can go on the train with him, then. And **I** hope there's a wreck! He went into his room and **dressed**» p. 77).

On the contrary, those moments of **intimate communication** between Port and Kit, those when they both **feel** more realized, always seem to take place in bounded **areas**. For

instance, their talk under the mosquito net in Bou Noura : «**When** it was well fastened they slid underneath with the bottle and lay there quietly as the afternoon wore on.»(p.165). When their chat **takes** a tum and they start to argue, Kit gets out of the net : « 'I **refuse** to discuss it', she said haughtily, climbing down from the bed and struggling her way through the folds of netting that hung to the floor.s(p.167).

Logically, Port's death, the moment when their definite separation takes place, is highlighted by the physical **distance** between them. Since they no longer share **life**, they cannot share the same space-container **any** more. Port is in his room in the fort, while Kit is **outside** the fort. As a matter of fact, before Port's death, Kit and Tumer try to return to the room, but to no **avail**, since the door of the fort is closed: «**The** moon had reached the center of the **sky** when they arrived at the fort and found the gate locked.s(p.233). **Because** they no longer share the same space, **all** communication between them is impossible, their relationship has failed and Port's death is unavoidable. Kit herself foresees what is going to happen : «**How** do we know he's not already dead? He could die there **all** alone! We'd never know. Who could stop **him**?» (p.234).

- *verticality schema* + *rational/passional self*

It can also be observed that there is a correlation between those passages where the characters let themselves be ruled either by reason or by passion and the place where they are at that moment. It is now the verticality image-schema that has **been** activated in such a fashion that those actions of the characters that are ruled by reason, consciousness and **morality** take place in high places, while their passional or irrational actions predictably take place in lower scenarios.

At the beginning of the novel, Port's affair with Marhnia involves a gradual descending of the character from the streets of the town to the **valley**. In order to get to Marhnia's tent, he had to **climb** down «**a narrow iron staircase** (which) was fastened to the **side** of the wall. It had no railing and **led straight downward at a steep angle.**» (p.33).

On the contrary, one of the few episodes where Port and Kit **have** a quiet talk and reflect rationally on their relationship, takes place on the top of the **mountains** that surround Boussif (p.99: «**They** started to **climb** upward (...) The desert was directly below them, much **farther** down than the plain from which they had **just climbed.**»)¹³

Finally, Port's death (subject-locus of consciousness and reason) takes place in the fort, which is located on the highest part of the city. **Right after** her lover's death, Kit (the self, the locus of **irrationality** and emotions) **starts** to descend towards the border of the city, which anticipates her incursion in an irrational world ruled by emotions, physical needs, and sheer intuition (i.e. the time of her relationship with the merchant, Belqassim).

She breathed deeply and **walked ahead, down toward the city** (...) **Quickly she descended the hill** (p.240). // **Below, in** the wide black mass **formed** by the tops of the palms, the **drums** were still going. The sound came from the direction of the ksar, the Negro village in the middle of the oasis (...) **Several** walks led off to the oasis, she chose the narrowest...(p.245).

As a matter of fact, from the very moment when Port **becomes** ill and **is**, therefore, unable to carry on with his role as Kit's rational **guide**, the mental states through which Kit

goes are **symbolized** by means of **diverse** spatial references. Together with the verticality schema, which explains her descent **towards** an **irrational** state, we can **also** point out the use of another metaphor, whose **source** domain is represented by the labyrinth of **narrow** streets in El Ga'a and which symbolises the mental blockage that Kit is suffering at that moment.

Even **here** at the edge of town it was still a **maze**. The streets were constructed in such a way that **each stretch seemed to be an impasse with walls at the end** (p.189).// He, **seeing her staring eyes**, and still understanding nothing, put his hand comfortingly on her shoulder and said: 'Come'. **She did not hear him**, but **she let him pull her away** from the wall (...) The sudden darkness of a tunnel **broke into her self-imposed hypnosis** (p.192).

IV. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF "LIFE" AND "WORLD" AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE STRUCTURAL UNITY OF THE NOVEL

Before we finish our analysis of the construction of the characters in Paul Bowles's novel under the new light of the cognitive mechanisms we **have** described above, it is necessary to mention briefly two other conceptual metaphors which make it possible for us to understand two basic concepts of human **existence**, life and the world, both of which **also** play an **important** role in the understanding of the novel.

The metaphorical **treatment** which the **first** of these concepts receives in *The Sheltering Sky* has two main functions. On the one hand, it helps to build up the consistency of the characters, who will be shown to act in the last episodes of the novel according to the restrictions that the previous metaphorical understanding of life as a journey by train **imposes** on them; and on the other hand, it helps to **confer** structural unity to the novel by anticipating in a metaphorical key **some** of its most central episodes: Port's death, Kit's loss of mind, and Tumer's well-being.

Even though this is not the only metaphor that we use in our understanding of life, we **often** conceptualize the former as a journey, as can be **seen** from such everyday language expressions as *Youth is the most beautiful stage of life* or *Before we reach our final destination, we would all like to have had some of our dreams fulfilled*. Such a conventional, very probably even cross-cultural, metaphor can be found in **several** passages of the novel, usually in Port's mouth. He **himself** interprets his dream about a train which kept **putting** on speed and then suddenly came to a stop, as a symbol of life itself (pp. 17-18). **Later** on in the novel, he keeps **elaborating** on the same metaphor:

'You **know what?**'- he said with great earnestness. 'I **think** we're both afraid of the same **thing**. And for the same reason. We've never managed, either of us, **to get all the way into life**. We're **hanging on to the outside** for all we're **worth**, convinced we're going to **fall off at the next bump**. Isn't that true?' (p.101).

In the passage above, Port seems to view life as a journey by train. **The** choice of a train instead of other means of transport such as a bicycle, an aeroplane, or a car seems quite fortunate, given that the domain of trains holds more similarities with the domain of life than the other means of transport to which we **have** just **referred**. For **instance**, it is an essential

difference between travelling by train and travelling by car or on bicycle that in the first case, passengers do not **have** the ultimate control over the direction or speed of their journey. The driver has this control. Likewise, as regards life, people do not **have** control over their final destiny, nor over the way in which a specific stage of their lives will unfold. The length of a journey by train, as opposed to the **brevity** of a journey on bicycle, and the fact that journeys by train usually consist of several stages (cf. **flights**, which are more direct), **makes** this means of transport a better candidate for the **source** domain of the above metaphor. Lakoff and Tumer **have** extensively shown that life is **often** conceptualized as a journey (Lakoff and Tumer, 1989: 3-4). In the context of the novel, we **find** a more specialized metaphor, LIFE IS A JOURNEY BY TRAIN, which gives rise to at least four mappings and **several** entailments:

MAPPINGS:

- Life is a train (**this** mapping arises metonymically from the actual mapping 'Life is a journey by train'.)
- Living is travelling by train.
- People are passengers.
- Bumps are the problems that people **have** to face along their lives.

ENTAILMENTS:

- If one is inside the train, one is deeply involved in his/her life.
- If one is hanging on to the **outside** of the train, one is not really involved in ~~his~~ life.
- If one is inside the train, one is protected against bumps and can concentrate on living his/her life.
- If one is hanging on from **outside**, one can **fall** off at any bump and one is ~~also~~ too afraid of the perils to concentrate on life itself.

The relevant location assigned to the dream episode (right at the **beginning** of the novel) and **also** to its interpretation by **Port** (right during his trip to Boussif with the Lyles), leads us to consider that Kit and Tumer's alternative trip by train is not just sheer coincidence. As a matter of fact, its symbolism within the context of the novel seems to follow logically from what has **been** said above. Kit and Turner choose to travel by train (=life) and in the end, they are the two characters who **survive** their incursion into Northern Africa. Furthermore, Kit gets on the train reluctantly, she is afraid of travelling (=living) and she needs to be under the effects of alcohol to cope with the idea of the **journey**. On the contrary, Tumer travels without a care. He is not scared of travelling in the **least**. **These** differences as regards their attitudes to their journey by train to Boussif appear to be an anticipation of what the last part of their trip along the Sahara will be like. The parallelisms between this episode and the last chapters of the novel are **striking**. In both cases, there is the absence of Pon and the following loss of control by Kit, who **does** not seem to be able to **carry** on with her life when **Port** is not by her **side**; in both episodes, Kit tries to **flee** away from Tumer and, in both cases, her attempt to get rid of **him** involves an incursion into the **unknown** Northern African world and a period of contact with the natives (visit to the third

class **carriage** in the train; relationship with Belqassim); in both episodes, Turner **does** not seem to **have** a care in the world, other than a certain concern for the physical **discomfort** of the **journey** by train, in the **first** case, and the social consequences of **returning** to New York without Kit, in the second case.

The only difference is that in the last chapters of the novel, the **source** domain (travel-train) is not mentioned any more. Nevertheless, the characters' reactions in these climactic episodes had **been** metaphorically anticipated by their reactions to the trip by train to Boussif, which reinforces their psychological plausibility and makes them appear as consistent **well-**constructed characters, at the same time that it confers a higher degree of structural unity on the novel.

The concept of life is intimately related to another notion which is equally essential to human beings: the world. The conceptualization of this entity is central to the understanding of **several** aspects of the novel, from its title to one of its most significant episodes: Pon's death. Furthermore, the fact that this concept is also understood on the basis of the container image-schema shows the natural tendency of the human cognitive apparatus and conceptual systems towards economy (a limited **number** of image schemas constitute the **structural** base upon which we **have** built our **entire** conceptual systems). One of the best instances of the conceptualization of the world in this fashion can be found on page 275: «(...) the **entire** sky was **like** a metal **dome** grown white with **heat**». As depicted in the novel, the world-container seems to consist in the **earth** surface covered by a dome-shaped sky which functions as a sort of lid. As should be expected, our concept of the world, **because** it is based on the container image-schema, logically **partakes** of **all** its rational entailments, hence its protective "sheltering" nature.

'You know', said Port, and his voice sounded **unreal**, as voices are **likely** to do **after** a long pause in an utterly silent spot, '**the sky here's** very strange. I **often** have the sensation when I look at it that it's a **solid** thing up there, **protecting us** from what's **behind**'(p.101).

To such an extent has the world-container metaphor **proved** productive that its elaboration has given way to extensions in which death and its characteristic **features** (darkness, the unknown, fear, etc.) are **conceptualized** as that which is to be found **outside** the world-container. These extensions are **also** to be found in *The Sheltering Sky*, and they are essential to the understanding of the passage in which Port's death is depicted:

He opened **his** eyes, shut his eyes, saw only the **thin sky stretched across to protect him**. Slowly **the split would occur, the sky draw back**, and he would see what he never had doubted lay behind (p.233). // **A black star appears, a point of darkness in the night sky's clarity**. Point of darkness and **gateway to repose**. Reach out, **pierce the fine fabric of the sheltering sky**, take repose (p.235).

V. FINAL REMARKS

The present cognitive analysis of the characters in *The Sheltering Sky* has allowed us to put forward **some** explanations about their behaviour and about **some** of their reactions

which would otherwise be difficult to comprehend (e.g. Kit's loss of mind after Port's death. Tumer's little involvement in the plot during the most relevant episodes...).

Furthermore, the analysis of the characters in terms of image-schemas and their metaphorical **projections** could lead us to an alternative reading of the novel, according to which, the story that is being told to us would not be the story of three persons but the story of a human being who is unable to keep a balance between the constituent elements of its being (rationality, emotions, and social interaction) and would be, therefore, unable to lead a **normal life**.¹⁴ Port's death is unavoidable, since at a given point he himself decides to stop making decisions and to stop reflecting on matters, and his nature being prototypically rational, such an attitude is equivalent to **committing** suicide. By **running** away Kit attempts to avoid the pain and the feeling of emptiness that Port's death has left behind, but Kit is the self, the locus of emotions, and attempting to avoid this suffering requires to **erase** Port completely from her mind, together with **all** feelings and emotions, and therefore, to reject life itself, since they are the same person:

(...)she once had thought that if Port should die before she did, she would not really believe he was dead, but rather that he had **in some** way gone back inside **himself** to stay there, and that he never would be conscious of her again; so that **in reality it would be she who would have ceased to exist, at least to a certain degree** (p 237).

Eventually, as has already **been** pointed out above, the social **external** pan of every human being, represented by Tumer, needs to reencounter at least his emotional counterpart, Kit, in order to be able to go back to his **normal** life in **America**. The second and, most probably conclusive, disappearance of Kit will prevent **him** from going back to his **ordinary** life, since, what kind of a society would readily admit as one of its **members** a being who has lost not **only** its rational nature, but **also** its feelings and emotions?

NOTES

1. This paper is an extended version of a previous one presented at the 5th International Conference on Narrative. University of Kentucky. Lexington (Kentucky), 18th-20th October, 1996. This research has **been** funded by the University of La Rioja. Research project number 96PYB33JMA.

2. Not being a literary critic, I do not intend to carry out a narratological analysis of the novel. My approach is that of a cognitive **linguist** and **I** believe that **some** cognitive theories such as those described in this paper can be used as **analytic** tools in order to carry out a **study** of the novel. **The** results of such an analysis should be complementary to those that **arise** from more traditional approaches.

3. See also Lakoff's (1989) paper for a comprehensive summary on the nature of human conceptual **structure**.

4. In this respect, Ruiz de Mendoza (personal **communication**) has pointed out that **all** **idealized** cognitive models, not just image-schemas, can **attain** abstract status. Thus, there are abstract propositional models such as Schank and Abelson's **plan + goals** modules (1977). Rumelhart and Thorndyke's 'story **grammars**' (1975, 1977), or Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal's '**macroschemas**' (1994, 1995). There are abstract metaphoric and **metonymic** models like Lakoff and Tumer's EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphor (1989) or Peña's ENTITIES-ARE-CONTAINERS metaphor (19%). **And finally, image-schemas** are but another type of abstract model. **All** these generic, abstract **structures** **serve** the purpose of allowing us to **deal** with a large number of reasoning processes in a cognitively economical way.

5. It is not **known** to what extent image-schemas lie at the base of human understanding. Lakoff's (1990) hypothesis is that **all** reasoning is image-schematic. In this **connection**, he **provides** examples of the application of the Invariance Principle in the cases of image metaphors and of **generic-level** structure interpreted in **terms** of image-schematic structure. Nevertheless, Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) makes an interesting observation to the effect that Lakoff's Invariance Principle, in its present formulation, is incapable of offering a satisfactory explanation of other related phenomena. He takes into account metaphors such as *My neighbour is a dragon*, where both the **source** and the target domains are concrete, and which differ considerably from mappings of the LOVE-IS-A-JOURNEY kind, where the **source** domain is concrete, whereas the target domain is abstract. As Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) points out, this kind of mapping is **also** subject to constraints on the correspondences based on **generic-level** structure, but interestingly enough, this generic structure is neither image-schematic nor interpretable in image-schematic terms. It is propositional. Therefore, Ruiz de Mendoza puts **forward** an alternative version of the Invariance Principle, which he tentatively formulates as follows: *Metaphorical mappings preserve the generic-level structure of the source domain in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain.*

6. **Bold** in this and subsequent examples has **been** added by the author of this paper

7. Peña (1996) has observed that the interaction between the container image-schema and the idealized cognitive model of control **results** in a number of generic entailments. One of them states that control **may** be prevented by container boundaries. It **should** be noted **here** that Peña's version of the general **logic** of the container image-schema introduces a degree of generalization which **would allow** Lakoff to dispense with this metaphor. **Because**, given that the **normal** location of the self is within the subject's **boundaries**, it follows logically that the latter can **exert** its control over the former.

8. As pointed out by Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza (1996), image-schemas may **also** be combined with other Idealized Cognitive Models. More **specifically**, they introduce the concept of the 'enrichment' of image-schemas by **means** of projections from other cognitive models, including propositional cognitive models such as the Control ICM.

9. **The birth** of this 'person' is **symbolically** described at the **beginning** of the novel: "The little freighter had spewed them out from its **comfortable** maw the **day** before onto the hot docks..." (p.13). At that moment their journey to the **innermost parts** of **Northern Africa starts**. As **will** be shown **later**, life is **commonly** and unconsciously conceptualized as a journey. The symbolic value of the characters' journey along **Northern Africa** seems to **follow** logically. **Nevertheless**, we shall not pursue this aspect of the novel any **further** since it is not the primary **goal** of our analysis.

10. It is **necessary** to remember that human beings are **conceptualized** as containers in which the subject (**consciousness/reason**) is **prototypically located** over the self. Since Port (=consciousness) has died, this region is now empty. Kit's idea emerges from a deeper region, the locus of **irrationality**. **And** this is reflected in the **nature** of her actions from this moment on.

11. **In** the need of a deeper, more systematic **study**, we do not **dare** to **claim** a universal status for the phenomenon of the **criss-crossing** of 'space' and 'human being'. However, it is our **intuition** that the interrelationship **between** these concepts is not only to be found in the context of Paul Bowles's narrative. On the contrary, we believe that it **could have** a more general applicability if only **because** the understanding of an abstract concept (i.e. 'human being') is always in need of a more concrete concept (i.e. 'space') from which to **borrow** its structure.

12. As shall be **seen** when dealing with the world-container metaphor, death is **usually conceptualized** as whatever there is **outside** the world-container. As opposed to life, which is understood as taking place within the **limits** of that container.

13. **The presence** at the top of the **mountain** of the venerable Arab, who is praying, appears as a **symbol** of morality as **corresponds** to such a **high** scenario, **while** the man they **had** come across at the feet of the mountains, who was shaving his pubic **hair**, seems to symbolize just the opposite.

14. **We acknowledge** that Bowles's novel is, as a matter of fact, the **story** of three characters. It is only by **means** of approaching it from the point of view of cognitive linguistics that this alternative reading **becomes available**.

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La Adecuación Psicológica de la Gramática Funcional Tipológica'

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ABSTRACT

*Although **Functional-Typological Grammar (FTG)**, as stated in Givón (1979, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995), has contributed to the redefinition of **Saussure's** concepts of **diachrony** and **synchrony**, its contribution to the cognitive paradigm is less important. After dealing with **several** methodological and **pre-theoretical** aspects, **two** main conclusions are drawn in this paper: **first**, FTG is **psychologically adequate**, even though Givón follows the cognitive tradition rather than making any significant contributions; and, **second**, FTG achieves psychological adequacy **at the methodological level**, **but not** at the theoretical one.*

KEY WORDS: functionalism, cognitivism, grammar, typology

RESUMEN

*Aunque la Gramática **Funcional Tipológica (GFT)** de Givón (1979, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995)), ha contribuido de manera muy destacada a redefinir los conceptos **saussureanos** de **diacronía** y **sincronía** por medio de la comparación y la generalización interlingüística. su contribución al campo del **cognitivism** resulta más escasa. Tras la discusión de las cuestiones metodológicas y pre-teóricas expuestas en el ámbito de dicha teoría, dos son las principales conclusiones de este trabajo: en primer lugar, la **GFT es adecuada** desde el punto de vista psicológico, si bien Givón adopta ideas procedentes del paradigma cognitivo, más que hacer grandes aportaciones; y, en segundo lugar, la **GFT es psicológicamente plausible** en el plano metodológico, no en el plano **teórico**.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: funcionalismo, cognitivismo, gramática, tipología

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I. INTRODUCCIÓN

La que probablemente ha sido la mayor controversia de las tres últimas décadas dentro del campo de la lingüística teórica se ha desarrollado en torno a la cuestión del procesamiento de las expresiones lingüísticas: en concreto, la discusión se ha centrado en el papel que deben desempeñar la computación por medio de reglas generales y el almacenamiento de información idiosincrática en la producción y comprensión de las expresiones lingüísticas.¹

A lo largo de casi treinta años se ha asumido, más que demostrado, que el coste de la idiosincrasia para el aparato descriptivo de la teoría es mucho mayor que el coste de la computación (Lass 1991: 211; Langacker 1991a: 51). Es bien sabido, sin embargo, que la computación llevada a su extremo crea una especie de monstruo de Frankenstein lingüístico: una gramática con un poder generador ilimitado, una teoría que, al no excluir nada, no es capaz de explicar nada (Horrocks 1988: 27).³ Por otra parte, el uso generalizado de información idiosincrática está produciendo resultados satisfactorios en algunos modelos teóricos, como la Gramática de la palabra (Hudson 1990).

La tradición generativo-transformacional propuso, ya en la década de los sesenta, el principio de la dependencia de las reglas gramaticales, que establece que todas las reglas son dependientes de la estructura a la que hacen referencia (Chomsky 1965: 91), al tiempo que negó el acceso de las reglas a la información contextual por medio del principio de la autonomía de la sintaxis (Chomsky 1977: 36). Conviene destacar el hecho de que el paradigma transformacional ha ido incorporando progresivamente información idiosincrática, si bien ésta no se considera central y se presenta frecuentemente como información computacional. Así, el denominado *Principio de proyección* (Chomsky 1981: 29), que garantiza que la información sobre la subcategorización de la entrada léxica que se encuentra en el lexicón esté presente en todos los niveles de representación sintáctica, introduce información idiosincrática a la que, por lo demás, la información sintáctica debe hacer referencia a lo largo de toda la derivación. Si interpretamos correctamente el alcance del Principio de proyección, la autonomía de la sintaxis parece constituir un artículo de fe y la pretendida economía de la computación respecto a la idiosincrasia resulta, de nuevo, cuestionada.¹

La tradición funcional ha insistido tanto en la inclusión de información semántica de carácter idiosincrático en la caracterización gramatical de las entradas léxicas (Dik 1978, Halliday 1985, Wierzbicka 1988), como en la motivación contextual de las reglas gramaticales (Firbas 1992). En una aproximación que Nichols (1984: 110) denominaría *radical*, algunos funcionalistas (Dik 1989, Givón 1989) han destacado la continuidad existente entre el dominio de las reglas gramaticales y el dominio de las convenciones pragmáticas de naturaleza socio-cultural por una parte; y entre el conocimiento del lenguaje y el conocimiento enciclopédico por la otra (Langacker 1991a, Goldberg 1995).

11. LA GFT: TEORÍA Y META-TEORÍA

En el contexto antes expuesto, la Gramática Funcional Tipológica (GFT) de Givón (1979, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995), que reconoce la continuidad entre la información lingüística y la información pragmática de una parte, y entre el conocimiento lingüístico y el conocimiento extralingüístico de otra, ha contribuido de manera muy destacada a redefinir los conceptos saussureanos de **diacronía** y **sincronía** por medio de la comparación y la generalización **interlingüística**.⁵ Más discutible resulta, sin embargo, la contribución de la GFT al campo del cognitivismo. Por esta razón, en este trabajo nos proponemos explorar la validez -o, de manera más técnica- la adecuación psicológica de la GFT. Para ello, tras la brevísima introducción a la teoría que llevamos a cabo en este apartado, definimos los criterios de adecuación de este modelo lingüístico (apartado III) y, a continuación, los examinamos en relación con las cuestiones metodológicas (apartado IV) y pre-teóricas (apartado V) expuestas en el ámbito de la teoría y, tras una discusión (apartado VI), ofreceremos algunas conclusiones (apartado VII).

La GFT pertenece a la tradición funcional del lenguaje, de origen europeo y de vocación sociolingüística, que se refleja en afirmaciones como éstas de **Halliday** (1973: 7):

A functional approach to language means, first of all, investigating how language is used: trying to **find** out what are the purposes that language **serves** for us, and how we are able to achieve these purposes **through** speaking and listening, reading and writing. But it **also** means more than this. It means seeking to explain the nature of language **in** functional terms: seeing whether language itself has **been** shaped for use, and if so, in what ways - how the form of language has **been** determined by the función it has evolved to **serve**.

Dik (1978: 1) destaca aspectos muy similares:

A language is conceived of in the first place as an instrument of social interaction between human beings, used with the primary aims of establishing communicative relations between **speakers** and addressees. With this approach one tries to **reveal** the instrumentality of language with respect to what people do with it in social situations.

Givón (1993 vol I: 2), situando su teoría de manera inequívoca dentro del paradigma funcional, afirma: "Human language **is** a purposeful instrument designed to **code** and **communicate** information, and (...) **like** other instruments, its **structure** is not divorced from its **function**." En la línea de esta afirmación, Givón (1995: 5ss) se remonta al **estructuralismo** saussureano para referirse a los tres dogmas de los que la tradición funcional debe alejarse: a) el dogma de la arbitrariedad: el **significante** del signo lingüístico es arbitrario respecto a su correlato mental, el significado; b) el dogma de la idealización: el sistema ideal denominado **lengua** debe ser el objeto de estudio de los lingüistas, con la consiguiente exclusión de la realización del sistema: el habla; c) el dogma de la segregación: la dimensión sincrónica y diacrónica de la lengua deben estudiarse por separado. Por el contrario, la GFT

postula el isomorfismo o correlación entre forma y función; la reivindicación de la actuación, por ser ésta el dominio donde se ejercen las presiones de adaptación funcional (Givón 1995: 7); y la integración del eje sincrónico y del eje diacrónico por medio de la tipología lingüística.⁶

En la tradición funcional, el fin comunicativo del lenguaje se describe como la capacidad del éste de cumplir varias *macrofunciones*. El concepto de macrofunción procede del campo de la Gramática Funcional Sistemática (GFS). Halliday (1974: 41) considera que un estudio funcional del lenguaje debe atender a los fines para los que éste se emplea, es decir, a las macrofunciones del lenguaje. Dichas macrofunciones son la representacional -representar nuestra interpretación del mundo tal y como lo experimentamos-, la función interpersonal -interaccionar con los demás para modificar nuestro entorno- y la función textual -organizar el mensaje de manera que permita la representación y la interacción. A esta tercera función también se la conoce como *metafunción* (Downing y Locke 1992: xi), puesto que engloba a las otras dos. En la GFT la definición de las macrofunciones del lenguaje se modifica ligeramente. Para Givón (1993 vol I: 21), la lengua se utiliza con propósitos muy diversos, de los cuales no todos están directamente relacionados con las dos grandes funciones del lenguaje, a saber, la representación de la experiencia y la comunicación con los demás. Otras funciones del lenguaje son el mantenimiento de la cohesión cultural y social de una comunidad lingüística, el establecimiento de relaciones interpersonales y el uso con fines estéticos. Estas funciones periféricas son atendidas también por la gramática de la lengua, pero el fin primordial de ésta es servir de medio de interacción social y de soporte cognitivo.

A modo de recapitulación de lo dicho hasta ahora, los conceptos de función y funcional hacen referencia, en el marco de la teona de la GFT, a la prioridad de la función comunicativa del lenguaje, a la interdependencia sus dominios y a su pertenencia a la cognición humana. Desde la perspectiva de la GFT, estas tres diferencias fundamentales separan un estudio funcional de un estudio formal del lenguaje.'

III. LA DEFINICIÓN DE LOS CRITERIOS DE ADECUACIÓN DE LA TEORÍA

Conviene recordar tres ideas que constituyen puntos de encuentro, si no de partida, entre la GFT y el funcionalismo europeo del tercer cuarto de este siglo: la motivación funcional del uso del lenguaje, la lengua como proceso, y la visión dinámica de la sincronía.

El funcionalismo clásico representado por Martinet (1962) sigue la tradición hurnboltiana de que la lengua no es un producto, sino un proceso ("Die Sprache ist kein Werk, Ergon, sondern eine Tätigkeit, Energie"). Es precisamente esta concepción dinámica de la lengua en la que basa Martinet (1993: 43) su aproximación funcional a los fenómenos lingüísticos: las lenguas deben satisfacer las necesidades comunicativas de los hablantes y, por tanto, no son un producto acabado sino que constituyen un proceso continuo de adaptación a dichas necesidades. Coseriu, a quien normalmente se encuadra dentro de la corriente **estructural-funcional**, es más explícito que Martinet y define la lengua como un proceso cognitivo que consiste en la paulatina creación metafórica de expresiones que pasan

a formar parte de la herencia lingüística. (Coseriu 1977: 71).⁸ Así, la evolución lingüística se explica como una adaptación del conocimiento del lenguaje al uso del lenguaje por necesidades de **instrumentalidad** comunicativa.

Estos dos grandes lingüistas comparten tanto la visión de la lengua como un proceso, como su **posición anti-tipologista**.⁹ Así, Martinet (1993: 93) critica los patrones funcionales greenbergianos como SOV, SVO, etc., y Coseriu (1977: 187) rechaza el *drift* de Sapir y, en definitiva, la predicción en la diacronía con estas palabras:

La explicación por el concepto de 'tendencia' no es de ningún modo aceptable. En efecto, no cabe atribuir tendencias a las lenguas, pues éstas son técnicas del hablar, y no sujetos dotados de intencionalidad: las lenguas como tales no tienden a nada y, en este sentido, hay que estar de acuerdo con Saussure en que *la langue ne prémédite rien*.

A pesar de su desacuerdo con la tipología lingüística anglosajona, o más bien, norteamericana, a la que Martinet (1993: 93) califica de *etnocéntrica*, tanto el lingüista francés como el **rumano**, defienden el carácter dinámico de la sincronía. A este respecto Martinet (1993: 81) afirma que "la sincronía dinámica nos conduce directamente a la diacronía, pero una diacronía renovada en cuanto a que permite reducir la parte hecha de hipótesis informándonos de forma precisa sobre las modalidades del fenómeno evolutivo."¹⁰

Ya hemos citado a Firbas (1992), destacado miembro de la tradición funcional del Círculo Lingüístico de Praga que acuñó el concepto de dinamismo comunicativo. **Halliday** (1985) y **Dik** (1989) siguen la tradición de Praga en lo que se refiere a la motivación comunicativa y la sintaxis en tres niveles, pero la GFS de **Halliday** no tiene la vocación tipológico- diacrónica de la GF de **Dik**, ni trata explícitamente el problema del correlato cognitivo de la gramática, como hace el lingüista holandés. Si tenemos en cuenta el brevísimo repaso de los modelos funcionales que se recoge en las páginas anteriores, bien se podna afirmar que la GFT es el modelo más alejado de la tradición funcional europea, que la GFS es la más cercana a la tradición praguense, y que la GF de **Dik** ocupa una posición intermedia entre la **GFT** y la GFS. Con todo, la GFT toma del funcionalismo clásico europeo, como mínimo, las tres líneas metodológicas que acabamos de repasar: la motivación funcional del uso del lenguaje, la lengua como proceso, y la visión dinámica de la sincronía. En la dirección de dichas líneas, la GFT propone los postulados metodológicos que denominaremos *el Postulado de la orientación funcional*, *el Postulado de la orientación cognitiva*, *el Postulado de la orientación diacrónica* y *el Postulado de la orientación tipológica*, recogidos en (1), (2), (3) y (4) respectivamente:

(1) Postulado de la orientación funcional: el estudio de la función del lenguaje es prioritario respecto al estudio de la estructura del lenguaje.

La interpretación del Postulado de la orientación funcional bien podría ser la siguiente: la función del lenguaje es la comunicación interhumana. El lenguaje sólo cumple su función, esto es, servir de medio de **interacción** social, en un determinado contexto y en

una cierta situación. Así pues, el estudio del lenguaje debe superar la barrera de la oración para situarse en el texto.

(2) **Postulado de la orientación cognitiva:** el estudio del lenguaje forma parte del estudio de la cognición humana.

Del Postulado de la orientación cognitiva se sigue que no se proponen divisiones entre el conocimiento lingüístico y el conocimiento no lingüístico. De manera similar, no se defiende una separación radical entre los componentes o niveles de descripción de la gramática. Se niega de manera explícita la independencia de la sintaxis. Se cuestiona asimismo la validez de la categorización basada en las categorías discretas. Existen filtraciones, esto es, continuidad entre las categorías. Sólo unas categorías basadas en la prototipicidad contribuyen a una descripción psicológicamente plausible de las unidades lingüísticas.

(3) **Postulado de la orientación diacrónica:** la irregularidad de la sincronía es producto de la evolución en la diacronía.

El Postulado de la orientación diacrónica debe entenderse como un intento de superar la dicotomía sincronía-diacronía. Los dos planos del estudio del lenguaje que se han distinguido tradicionalmente deben permanecer tan unidos como la teoría lo permita, puesto que se rechazan las divisiones en dominios discretos. Es el estudio interlingüístico, al que nos referimos a continuación, el que permite la superación de la división entre lo histórico y lo ahistórico.

(4) **Postulado de la orientación tipológica:** las generalizaciones gramaticales deben contar con el mayor grado de validez interlingüística posible.

Existen **jerarquías** de validez universal que se basan en una concepción prototípica de las categorías. Por medio de la comparación interlingüística que dichas jerarquías permiten, se persigue no solo la descripción y explicación en la sincronía sino **también** la predicción en la diacronía.

Estos cuatro postulados metodológicos nos permiten aproximarnos a la cuestión de la validez de la teoría propuesta, ya que resultaría imposible definir los criterios de adecuación sin tener en cuenta las bases filosóficas del modelo, esto es, de manera independiente de la teoría.

Siguiendo el principio de que sólo lo que es verificable es científico, Chomsky (1965: 24ss) fue el primero en sistematizar los criterios de idoneidad de una teoría del lenguaje al afirmar que entre muchas teorías posibles debería escogerse, sobre la base de parámetros bien establecidos, la más adecuada a los postulados metodológicos del paradigma. En la GFT

no se definen de manera explícita estándares de adecuación, a diferencia, por ejemplo, de lo que sucede en el modelo funcional de Amsterdam, que impone, de acuerdo con su concepto del lenguaje como un medio de comunicación interhumana al servicio de fines sociales (Dik 1986: 11), tres criterios para examinar la validez de la teona: la adecuación pragmática, la adecuación psicológica y la adecuación tipológica (Dik 1989: 12)."

Butler (1991a: 62), partiendo de la clasificación de los modelos funcionales de Nichols (1984: 105), ha puesto de manifiesto que los criterios de adecuación de las gramáticas funcionales moderadas debenan ser la adecuación psicológica, la adecuación adquisitiva, la adecuación socio-cultural, la adecuación discursiva y la adecuación tipológica. Más que el listado de criterios, que se basa, a nuestro entender, en un desdoblamiento de la adecuación psicológica de Dik en adecuación psicológica y adecuación adquisitiva y de la adecuación pragmática del lingüista holandés en adecuación discursiva y adecuación socio-cultural, la idea que más nos interesa, implícita en la propuesta de Butler, es que no es necesario formular los criterios de adecuación para cada teoría: es posible formular requisitos de idoneidad válidos para todas las teorías que comparten una concepción del lenguaje y una metodología compatibles, como son las gramáticas funcionales moderadas. A este respecto, no estamos de acuerdo con la afirmación de que la GFT se incluiría dentro de los modelos funcionales radicales, los cuales "deny the existence of a grammar as a structural system, and effectively wish to reduce grammar to discourse" (Butler 1991a: 61). Efectivamente, Givón (1993, 1995) impone un requisito según el cual la gramática debe ser un instrumento de producción de discurso coherente, pero dicho requisito, que no excluye la existencia de la paradigmática y la sintagmática (con su correspondiente descripción y explicación), debe entenderse como un meta-criterio de adecuación que no persigue sino una redefinición del concepto de competencia comunicativa del hablante de una lengua natural. Volvemos a este punto en el apartado V."

Dado que consideramos la GFT un modelo funcional moderado, que aceptamos la posibilidad de evaluar teorías gramaticales de objetivos y metodología similar y que nos parece redundante el desdoblamiento que hace Butler (1991a) de los criterios de adecuación propuestos por Dik (1989), sostenemos que dichos criterios, es decir, la adecuación pragmática, la adecuación psicológica y la adecuación tipológica, son los idóneos para decidir sobre la validez de la teona de la GFT. Justificamos esta afirmación con la definición que hemos dado de los postulados metodológicos de la GFT: la orientación funcional-textual se corresponde con la adecuación pragmática; la inclusión del estudio del lenguaje dentro del campo del estudio de la cognición humana se corresponde con la adecuación psicológica; y la preocupación por formular generalizaciones con validez interlingüística se corresponde con la adecuación tipológica.

En cuanto a la adecuación psicológica, de la que nos ocupamos exclusivamente a continuación, creemos que se puede afirmar que una teoría lingüística es adecuada desde el punto de vista psicológico si es capaz de dar cuenta de los aspectos de adquisición, aprendizaje, producción y comprensión del lenguaje y representación del conocimiento, entendida - a la manera de Weigand (1990: 11)- como el almacenamiento del conocimiento lingüístico y extralingüístico por medio del lenguaje natural.

IV. LA ADECUACIÓN PSICOLÓGICA DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA METODOLÓGICO

En este apartado nos ocupamos de dos cuestiones metodológicas que tienen una relevancia especial a la hora de establecer un juicio sobre la adecuación psicológica de la GFT. Nos referimos a la interpretación continua, en lugar de discreta, de los niveles tradicionales de descripción lingüística y, en consecuencia, de las categorías gramaticales que se distinguen en dichos niveles. Examinamos, en primer lugar, la cuestión de la categorización.

Givón (1989, 1995) indica que el lenguaje es relativo, que los juicios, las categorías y las dicotomías que los lingüistas establecen dependen, como el significado, del contexto. En este sentido, la GFT propone el uso de las explicaciones desde múltiples puntos de vista en lugar de los juicios del tipo *si/no*; una categorización basada en el concepto de prototipicidad de corte wittgensteiniano, la cual permite la consideración de la extensión metafórica - y posterior gramaticalización - como una de las explicaciones del cambio diacrónico (Givón 1989: 54); y la superación de las dicotomías por medio de jerarquías que agrupen diversos fenómenos según su grado de cumplimiento de un determinado parámetro lingüístico. La implicación de la concepción prototípica de las categorías y de la idea de que se producen filtraciones entre ellas es evidente: si permitimos filtraciones entre las categorías debemos aceptar un considerable grado de **permeabilidad** entre lo que tradicionalmente se han considerado distintos dominios cognitivos y, en definitiva, la continuidad entre el lenguaje y el resto de las habilidades cognitivas.

Como hemos visto, la GFT adscribe dos grandes funciones al lenguaje articulado humano: la interacción social y el soporte cognitivo. Este hecho está, sin duda, relacionado con la propuesta de dos sistemas de reglas con los que debe contar una gramática funcional (Dik 1986: 15): las reglas pragmáticas y las reglas lingüísticas. Las reglas pragmáticas se encargan de garantizar que las expresiones lingüísticas modifican el contexto en el sentido deseado por el hablante, mientras que las reglas lingüísticas (semánticas, sintácticas y fonológicas) proporcionan el soporte necesario para la codificación y la descodificación de la información. Esta visión, en la línea del funcionalismo europeo que representa la escuela de **Amsterdam**, es perfectamente compatible con la propuesta a este respecto de la GFT porque no postula una distinción radical entre el dominio cognitivo y el **lingüístico** ni entre los distintos subdominios lingüísticos: estos dos sistemas de reglas no son en modo alguno independientes, ya que la información pragmática se solapa con la información semántica, que, a su vez, interacciona con la información sintáctica.

La GFT recurre a tres dominios funcionales, organizados de manera concéntrica: el dominio funcional de las palabras, el de las cláusulas y el del discurso. Estos tres dominios se corresponden, aproximadamente, con el nivel **semántico**, el nivel sintáctico y el nivel pragmático de los modelos europeos (Halliday 1985, Dik 1989): el dominio funcional de las palabras codifica el significado (información semántica), el dominio funcional de las cláusulas codifica proposiciones (información semántica interpretada sintácticamente) y el dominio del discurso codifica la coherencia (información sintáctica dispuesta según la información pragmática del contexto y la situación dados). Comparada con los modelos europeos, la GFT insiste más claramente en las filtraciones que se producen entre el dominio cognitivo y el lingüístico y entre los distintos subdominios lingüísticos. Es decir, la GFT percibe un

continuo, aunque no tan radical como el descrito por Langacker (1991a), que representa como una disposición concéntrica. En la parte central encontramos las palabras, que codifican nuestros conceptos de la realidad extralingüística. En la parte intermedia se sitúan las cláusulas, que codifican proposiciones, esto es, producen estructuras informativas a partir de las palabras. El contenido **semántico** de estas cláusulas - las proposiciones a las que hacen referencia - puede evaluarse en términos de verdad o falsedad. La información codificada en las cláusulas puede referirse a cualidades, estados o eventos. En la periferia encontramos el discurso, donde las cláusulas individuales se distribuyen atendiendo a requisitos de coherencia discursiva, de manera que la comunicación modifique la realidad extralingüística en el sentido deseado por los interlocutores. Esta disposición confirma que el componente central de la teoría es el léxico, lo que se corresponde, en el plano estrictamente teórico, con el hecho de que las expresiones lingüísticas se construyen, como en el modelo de Halliday y en el de Dik, a partir de la información **semántico-sintáctica** con la que cuentan las entradas léxicas (Givón 1984, 1993).

V. LA ADECUACIÓN PSICOLÓGICA DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA PRE-TEÓRICO

En el plano pre-teórico de la GFT, las nociones de iconicidad, marca y coherencia son relevantes para la discusión de la adecuación psicológica del modelo: estas tres nociones, que delimitan la relación que se establece entre los elementos de una gramática funcional y entre éstos y las realidades extralingüísticas a las que hacen referencia, trascienden claramente el dominio gramatical, por lo que un estudio de su tratamiento en la GFT puede ofrecer algunas indicaciones sobre la plausibilidad psicológica del modelo de Givón.

Es bien sabido que el concepto de marca procede de la fonología estructural clásica de Trubetzkoy y que está relacionado con el de neutralización de una oposición cuando no es posible decidir, de acuerdo con el contexto, cuál de las dos realizaciones de un archifonema aparecerá en una posición de neutralización". En general, se considera que una estructura lingüística es marcada cuando tiene, en virtud de alguno de sus rasgos, un mayor grado de complejidad estructural y, en consecuencia, una frecuencia de aparición menor. Greenberg (1966) identifica hasta trece factores que producen marca, a partir de los cuales Croft (1990: 92) proporciona los siguientes criterios, que se refieren tanto a la vertiente intralingüística como a la vertiente interlingüística del concepto: la marca estructural y la marca conductiva", que la GFT engloba en el criterio de complejidad estructural, y la frecuencia interlingüística e intralingüística. Por ejemplo, un sujeto paciente es marcado respecto a un sujeto agente, puesto que el primero aparece en una construcción pasiva y el **último** en una construcción activa, menos compleja y más frecuente que la activa (Givón 1990: 573). De estos dos usos del concepto de marca se sigue que la noción fundamental en la que se basa dicho concepto es la de asimetría: los elementos lingüísticos semejantes tienen características distintas (Croft 1990: 64); o, en otras palabras, un rasgo sólo se da en el miembro marcado positivo mientras que no se da en el miembro de la oposición marcado negativo.

La GFT usa el término marca tanto para dar cuenta de la presencia frente a la

ausencia de un rasgo como para evaluar segmentos en términos de frecuencia. Este último es el uso que ya hemos introducido con la ejemplificación de la pasiva en inglés. Estas dos vertientes hay que considerarlas, a su vez, en su dimensión intralingüística e interlingüística: la ocurrencia de una construcción es marcada intralingüísticamente cuando va en contra de las tendencias generales de una lengua natural; un uso es marcado interlingüísticamente cuando va en contra de las tendencias generales de las lenguas. Siguiendo con el ejemplo de la pasiva, el uso de la construcción pasiva frente a la activa es marcado en inglés, como lo es en español. Si podemos encontrar un número significativo de lenguas en que la pasiva es la diátesis marcada - como es el caso - estamos en condiciones de generalizar que desde la perspectiva tipológica la diátesis pasiva es marcada, puesto que es mucho menos frecuente que la activa.

Como ya hemos señalado, la noción de marca puede ser aprehendida en términos cuantitativos (frecuencia) y cualitativos (complejidad estructural). Junto con la complejidad estructural - y directamente relacionada con ésta - el concepto de iconicidad permite determinar el carácter marcado o no marcado de una estructura lingüística de manera no cuantitativa¹⁵. El concepto de iconicidad sugiere semejanza entre lo lingüístico y lo no lingüístico; o, en otras palabras, la fidelidad con la que las estructuras lingüísticas designan la realidad extralingüística. El término *icono* procede de la clasificación de los signos de Peirce¹⁶. En un plano puramente lingüístico, la iconicidad da cuenta del hecho de que la estructura del lenguaje refleja la estructura de la experiencia. Por ejemplo, Haiman (1985: 91) ha concluido que las oraciones coordinadas reflejan incómicamente la sucesión temporal de los eventos, de manera que dos expresiones como *She got married and had a baby* y *She had a baby and got married* no son equivalentes. Las cláusulas subordinadas, por el contrario, no reflejan la secuencia temporal de los eventos de manera icónica, ya que la marca de la subordinación despeja cualquier tipo de ambigüedad respecto al orden de los eventos: *After she got married she had a baby* y *She had a baby after she got married* sí son equivalentes. Estos ejemplos no deberían contribuir a la idea de que la iconicidad es una regla de obligado cumplimiento por las estructuras lingüísticas; no lo es (Givón 1995: 59), pero sí existe en el lenguaje - y, en consecuencia, en la cognición humana - una tendencia a organizar sus estructuras siguiendo patrones que proceden del mundo exterior.

Como hemos señalado en el apartado II, la GFT no ha definido de manera explícita criterios de adecuación que permitan una evaluación de los logros y cuestiones pendientes de la teoría. Hemos tenido que recurrir a criterios aplicables a todos los modelos funcionales moderados (adecuación pragmática, psicológica y tipológica) y justificar la inclusión de la GFT dentro de la tradición del funcionalismo moderado. **A** estos tres criterios creemos conveniente **añadir** el Meta-criterio de adecuación procesual:

(5) **Meta-criterio de adecuación procesual:** una teoría del lenguaje será adecuada en el nivel observacional, en el nivel descriptivo y en el nivel explicativo si y sólo si es capaz de garantizar la construcción de discurso coherente

Este meta-criterio no es más que una constatación del requisito que Givón (1993, 1995) impone a su teoría de forma prioritaria: el requisito de que la gramática debe ser capaz de producir textos coherentes. Por medio de este criterio, podríamos evaluar distintas teorías

que cumplieran los requisitos de adecuación antes citados y decidir cuál de esas teorías es la más adecuada en términos de producción e interpretación de la coherencia textual. En este punto, creemos necesaria una aclaración de lo que se entiende por coherencia en el marco de la GFT.

Givón (1995: 341ss) define la coherencia como el correlato pragmático-cognitivo de la cohesión. Estos dos fenómenos están íntimamente relacionados: cuanto más coherente es un texto, más cohesión existe entre las cláusulas de las que éste consta, y viceversa. Aunque Givón identifica la referencia como el dominio más significativo de la cohesión sintáctica, la GFT se aparta de manera significativa de las líneas trazadas por Halliday y Hasan (1976) en su estudio sobre la cohesión en inglés. Halliday y Hasan, que identifican cuatro grandes áreas dentro de la cohesión léxico-sintáctica (la referencia, la sustitución, la **elipsis** y la conjunción) elaboran un modelo de cohesión sintáctica, más que de coherencia pragmático cognitiva, estático en tanto que la cohesión se considera una cualidad de los textos bien escritos. La GFT entiende la coherencia como un mecanismo para construir, para procesar textos. En este sentido, la gramática, entendida como un modo automatizado de procesamiento **discursivo** (Givón 1989: 256), constituye un medio al servicio de la coherencia.

Este concepto de gramática implica una concepción distinta de las reglas gramaticales. Si bien la irregularidad y la opacidad constituyen la excepción y no la regla en la organización interna de las lenguas, la GFT (Givón 1993 vol I: 4), de acuerdo con su vocación funcional y discursiva, propone la superación del concepto de regla y la consideración del concepto de estrategia comunicativa:

As a unique, human-specific device for coding and **communicating information**, **grammar** may be viewed as the strategy that takes care, in a relatively fast and **rule-governed** fashion, of the **bulk** of cases. This **rule-bound** strategy, however, **leaves** a significant **minority** of cases to be processed by more deliberate, time-consuming, analytic means.

Estas estrategias comunicativas deben entenderse como parte de una actividad de solución de un problema en el sentido dado por Langacker (1991a: 57): cuando una **estructura** no está disponible, es necesario un esfuerzo constructivo adicional por parte del hablante para producirla. Dicho esfuerzo constructivo tiene su origen en aspectos contextuales o situacionales que la estructura existente no es capaz de satisfacer. Así pues, el hablante debe solucionar el problema de qué nueva construcción emplear, o de qué grado de aplicación de la construcción que ya domina se corresponde con la situación o el contexto del hecho comunicativo.

VI. DISCUSIÓN

De los aspectos pre-teóricos que hemos discutido en el apartado III se deduce que la teoría de la GFT (Givón 1984, 1990, 1993) se organiza siguiendo dos grandes líneas: la descripción procede de unidades mínimas a unidades máximas (morfemas, categorías léxicas, categorías sintácticas, cláusula simple, cláusula compuesta, y texto) y de formas a funciones. La GFT es pues una gramática que se construye de abajo a arriba (*bottom-up*, en la terminología inglesa), esto es, a partir de segmentos simples se elaboran otros más complejos. En este aspecto, la GFT se asemeja al modelo dikeano: tanto la GFT como la GF de Dik, tienen una orientación sintagmática, a diferencia de la GFS, que favorece más claramente la dimensión paradigmática (Butler 1990: 20). La organización de abajo a arriba de la GFT choca con el Meta-criterio de adecuación procesual, que evalúa, en el plano lingüístico, la validez discursiva del modelo y, en el plano cognitivo, la competencia procesual del hablante de una lengua natural. En efecto, en un modelo como el de Langacker (1991a, 1991b) se establece que las predicaciones -concebidas como estructuras *semánticas*- se construyen siempre haciendo referencia a un determinado dominio cognitivo; al tiempo que se aclara que las estructuras de un nivel dado son el resultado de operaciones cognitivas que tienen lugar en niveles inferiores. Goldberg (1995) también considera procesos que van de arriba a abajo, como es el caso de la elaboración del significado construccional, en la que las construcciones, que tienen significado propio, imponen dicho significado a los verbos que entran a formar parte de ellas; y procesos de abajo a arriba, como la elaboración del significado verbal, resultado de la combinación de la valencia semántica y sintáctica del verbo. Estas dos visiones, procedentes ambas del campo cognitivista, sugieren que la combinación de la organización gramatical sintagmática con la organización gramatical paradigmática, o de la orientación de abajo a arriba con la orientación de arriba a abajo, es, probablemente, más natural (en el sentido dado a este adjetivo por Langacker) y más adecuada para una teoría del lenguaje que persiga la adecuación psicológica. Volvemos a este punto al tratar la computación y la idiosincrasia. Queda, en cualquier caso, por demostrar que una organización de formas a funciones sea compatible con los requisitos metodológicos del paradigma funcional tal y como se recogen en Dik (1986).

En lo referente a la categorización, la categorización basada en la noción de prototipo goza, sin duda, de la virtud de la naturalidad (Langacker 1991a). Hay que recordar, sin embargo la crítica de Taylor (1991: 90) respecto al hecho de que raramente se puede afirmar que la mayoría de los miembros de una clase dada se agrupan en torno al miembro prototípico de la categoría.¹⁷

Del tratamiento de la iconicidad por parte de la GFT que hemos comentado, la parte más destacable para la discusión que nos ocupa es que Givón (1985: 189), considera no sólo el isomorfismo entre el código y la realidad extralingüística codificada sino también entre las formas, estrategias y correlatos del código. Este concepto de iconicidad es una conclusión lógica de la continuidad entre el conocimiento del lenguaje y el conocimiento extralingüístico. Dicho concepto de iconicidad también tiene, seguramente, que ver con la afirmación de Givón (1995: 394) de acuerdo con la cual "the supportive neurology specific to the processing of human language is an evolutionary outgrowth of the visual information-processing system." A lo largo de este proceso, el lenguaje habría ido perdiendo

parte de su motivación icónica, convirtiéndose de este modo en más arbitrario. La implicación de esta afirmación es que existe continuidad evolutiva entre el lenguaje animal y el lenguaje humano o, en otras palabras, la evolución de la capacidad del lenguaje es gradual (Givón 1989: 396), lo que contradice tanto la hipótesis del creacionismo como la hipótesis del innatismo lingüístico.

Si la evolución del lenguaje está regida por un cambio paulatino de la motivación icónica a la arbitrariedad lingüística, la iconicidad es una tendencia que gobierna, en un principio total y, después, parcialmente, el procesamiento cognitivo. Algo similar sucede con la marca. De hecho, Givón (Givón 1995: 25) define la marca como mera-iconicidad: si la iconicidad implica simetría, la marca significa asimetría. Los criterios de marca antes apuntados, la complejidad estructural y la frecuencia distributiva, normalmente coinciden con un tercer criterio, la marca cognitiva. Este tercer tipo de marca, de relevancia psicológica más evidente que los otros dos, permite a Givón (1995: 63), una vez establecido que si los tres criterios no coinciden se recurrirá a la noción de prototipo, afirmar que "markedness is fundamentally an adaptive cognitive strategy for economy of processing." De acuerdo con esta definición, el polo no marcado de una dimensión cognitiva es el que se utiliza por defecto: así, singular es no marcado respecto a plural, poseedor es no marcado respecto a poseído, grande es no marcado respecto a pequeño, visible es no marcado respecto a invisible, etc. Como estos ejemplos indican, la marca nos permite organizar (producir, comprender y almacenar) tanto dimensiones lingüísticas como dimensiones cognitivas.

En el ámbito exclusivamente lingüístico, la marca no sólo permite relacionar interlingüísticamente propiedades formales en la sincronía^{1*}, sino también en la diacronía: según la teoría de la gramaticalización generalmente aceptada en la tradición funcional (Dik 1989: 239ss; Givón 1995: 60ss) una estructura marcada se convierte por el uso en no marcada y posteriormente en gramaticalizada. En definitiva, el estudio de la marca contribuye a la paulatina aproximación entre el enfoque sincrónico y el diacrónico a través de la tipología lingüística que se favorece en la GFT.

Desde el punto de vista cognitivo, el concepto central de la GFT es, precisamente, el de gramaticalización, entendida como un cambio en la competencia procesual del hablante a través del cual una parte del conocimiento lingüístico empieza a procesarse de manera **automática**.¹⁹ Givón (1979: 208) definió, a partir del estudio de la evolución de las lenguas del tipo SOV a SVO, el concepto de gramaticalización como una noción que agrupa cuatro procesos paralelos: el cambio diacrónico, el desarrollo de la capacidad del lenguaje, la evolución de las lenguas pidgin a las lenguas criollas y la adquisición del lenguaje. Según Givón estos cuatro procesos comparten la sustitución de un modo pragmático (que cuenta con estructura tópico-comentario, yuxtaposición, orden de constituyentes libre, igual número de verbos que de sustantivos y carencia de morfología flexiva) por un modo sintáctico (que se basa en la existencia de la estructura sujeto-predicado, subordinación, orden de constituyentes rígido, más sustantivos que verbos y morfología flexiva). Si bien el proceso de gramaticalización tal y como se describe en Givón (1979) es puesto en duda por Langacker (1981: 441) y Van Valin (1981: 80), la definición, desde una perspectiva cognitiva, de la gramaticalización como la aparición del procesamiento automático (Givón 1989: 256) constituye un gran paso para un modelo que pretende conseguir la adecuación psicológica. De acuerdo con esta definición de gramaticalización, el procesamiento automático está menos controlado, permite más procesamiento paralelo, precisa subsistemas más especializados, es

más rápido, precisa de más estructuras y más categorías pre-activadas, es menos dependiente del contexto y, en consecuencia, requiere una información más predecible que el procesamiento no automático o consciente. Ambos tipos de procesamiento, el automático, que es *bottom-up* y se puede asociar con la computación tal y como la hemos descrito en la introducción a este trabajo, y el procesamiento consciente, que es *top-down* y se puede relacionar con la idiosincrasia, tienen lugar simultáneamente, aunque el procesamiento automático tiende a extenderse a costa del procesamiento no automático (Givón 1989: 260), de manera semejante a como el uso desgasta léxicamente y tiende a gramaticalizar una expresión fruto de la idiosincrasia lingüística.

VII. RESUMEN Y CONCLUSIONES

En este trabajo hemos aceptado los criterios de adecuación pragmática, psicológica y tipológica como válidos para evaluar las gramáticas funcionales moderadas. En lo que respecta a la adecuación psicológica hemos precisado que una gramática funcional que desee contar con plausibilidad psicológica deberá ser capaz de dar cuenta de aspectos de la adquisición, aprendizaje, producción y comprensión del lenguaje, así como de la representación del conocimiento por medio de éste. A estos requisitos, hemos añadido el Meta-principio de adecuación procesual, que establece que una teoría del lenguaje será adecuada en el nivel observacional, en el nivel descriptivo y en el nivel explicativo si y sólo si es capaz de garantizar la construcción de discurso coherente. Creemos que este requisito, trasladado al concepto de usuario de una lengua natural, permite completar el concepto de competencia comunicativa de Hymes (1972), preferido al de competencia gramatical por la tradición funcional.

En cuanto a la validez psicológica de la GFT de Givón, de la discusión anterior se desprenden estas conclusiones:

El concepto de gramaticalización, entendida como un cambio en la competencia procesual del hablante por medio del cual una parte del conocimiento lingüístico empieza a procesarse de manera automática permite una reorientación cognitiva de la controversia, a la que aludimos en la introducción de este trabajo, respecto al papel de la computación y de la idiosincrasia. La solución propuesta es natural, es decir, psicológicamente plausible y coherente con la organización lingüística en en plano teórico.

La redefinición de los principios de iconicidad y marca como estrategias cognitivas que favorecen el procesamiento y almacenamiento del lenguaje son coherentes con la adopción de la hipótesis de que la capacidad del lenguaje fue una extensión del sentido de la vista.

El tratamiento de estos conceptos en el marco de la teoría de la GFT, junto con la concepción del conocimiento del lenguaje como conocimiento y la categorización basada en la teoría de los prototipos, permiten afirmar que la GFT es una teoría lingüística adecuada desde el punto de vista psicológico.

La afirmación anterior no excluye algunas críticas. Primero, decir que la GFT es adecuada psicológicamente no implica que la contribución de dicho modelo a la corriente

cognitivista haya sido fundamental. En absoluto. Nuestra opinion es que Givón adopta ideas procedentes del paradigma cognitivo, más que aportar innovaciones muy significativas. Y segundo y, a nuestro juicio, más importante, es preciso matizar la afirmación de que la GFT es válida psicológicamente distinguiendo el plano metodológico del plano teórico. Hay inconsistencias más que llamativas entre ambos planos. Hemos mencionado en nuestra discusión la organización sintagmática de la sintaxis tipológica y de la gramática del inglés, así como la progresión de las formas a las funciones. Pero hay inconsistencias más graves, como son el recurso a los diagramas de árbol, a las reglas de estructura de frase y a las transformaciones (Givón 1993 vol I: 30) y la argumentación a favor del nudo sintagma verbal y de las categorías vacías (Givón 1995: 180). Si la GFT es psicológicamente plausible en el plano metodológico, ciertamente no lo es en el plano de la teoría.

NOTES

1. La investigación que ha tenido como resultado este trabajo ha sido subvencionada con cargo al proyecto 96PYB33JMA del Vicerrectorado de Investigación de la Universidad de La Rioja, titulado *Aspectos metodológicos de la investigación lingüística en un paradigma funcional: sincronía y diacronía*. Una versión preliminar de este artículo fue presentada en la II Reunión del grupo de trabajo español de lingüísticocognitiva, celebrada en Logroño los días 21 y 22 de febrero de 1997.
2. Vid. Newmeyer (1990) y Harris (1993) respecto a la discusión sobre el concepto y el papel de la representación semántica.
3. Vid. Miller (1986: 171) respecto a la capacidad generadora de las teorías formales y funcionales.
4. Vid Chomsky (1995: 3) para una aproximación histórica a este problema desde una perspectiva formal. También son interesantes para el tema que aquí nos ocupa las reflexiones de este lingüista norteamericano (Chomsky 1995: 129ss) en cuanto a los problemas relacionados con la economía de las representaciones. Botha (1991: 135ss) plantea una crítica peculiar pero relevante de algunos postulados chomskianos. Vid. Bernárdez (1995: 66) en lo concerniente a la idealización.
5. Hacemos uso del término acuñado por Edmondson y Burquest (1994: 167), aunque la denominación *gramática* no nos parece del todo adecuada, tanto por la parcialidad como por las inconsistencias recurrentes que se dan entre los trabajos metodológicos de Givón (1979, 1989, 1995) y sus estudios de contenido principalmente teórico (Givón 1984, 1990, 1993). En un trabajo anterior al de Edmondson y Burquest, Croft (1990:2) se refiere al enfoque -no a la gramática- funcional-tipológico.
6. Vid. Croft (1990: 203ss) en cuanto a la dinamización del paradigma diacrónico-tipológico.
7. Dik (1978: 4-5) proporciona una comparación más detallada entre los principales postulados metodológicos del paradigma formal y del paradigma funcional. Vid. Croft (1990: 2).
8. Sin embargo, el maestro de Tubinga (Coseriu 1977: 73) pone énfasis en la diferencia entre *lógica* y lenguaje, siguiendo así, como ha destacado Vilarnovo (1993: 14), la tradición aristotélica de distinguir entre el *logos semantikos* (oración) y el *logos apophantikos* (proposición). Vid. Coseriu (1982: 235).
9. Respecto a este punto, conviene recordar los estrechos vínculos entre funcionalismo y tipología que Croft (1990: 2) menciona.
10. Hay que tener en cuenta que, mientras que Coseriu tiene una visión cualitativa de la sincronía dinámica, la visión de Maninet es, principalmente, cuantitativa. Vid. Coseriu (1973: 223).
11. Una discusión de las distintas formulaciones de estos criterios en la gramática de Dik se encuentra en Butler (1991b: 506).
12. Vid. Nuyts (1992: 9) respecto a los requisitos que debe cumplir la descripción de un aspecto lingüístico para ser adecuada desde el punto de vista cognitivo.
13. Se recurre a dos criterios: la marca lógica y la marca natural. La marca *lógica* es la característica crítica que tiene uno de los dos miembros de una oposición y que podemos deducir atendiendo a las características interlingüísticas e intralingüísticas de los sistemas fonológicos. La marca *lógica* es, por consiguiente, un

criterio interno que hace referencia exclusivamente a la estructura del sistema fonológico. La marca **natural** es la característica **crítica** de uno de los dos miembros de una oposición que podemos deducir atendiendo a su comportamiento en la cadena **hablada**. La marca natural es, por tanto, un criterio externo que hace referencia a la realización **contextual**. Vid **Anderson** (1985: 100).

14. El término inglés es *behavioural*.

15. **No cuantitativo** no debe confundirse con **no contextual**: que se prescinda del criterio de la frecuencia no quiere decir que no se tenga en cuenta el contexto. En efecto, desde el momento en que comparamos una estructura icónicamente marcada con otra no marcada nos estamos apoyando en el contexto de dicha estructura. En palabras de Givón (1995: 27): *markedness is a context-dependent phenomenon par excellence*.

16. Según esta clasificación, los signos se dividen en símbolos (que se relacionan de manera arbitraria con sus objetos), iconos (que son similares a sus objetos) e indicios (que están físicamente relacionados con sus objetos). Dicha clasificación ha sido criticada por Eco (1979: 178) porque presupone la presencia de un referente que sirva como criterio distintivo. Eco también cuestiona la iconicidad, ya que la relación no convencional en la que se basa no es compatible con la definición del signo como la correlación entre la expresión y el contenido basada en un código convencional.

17. Vid. Taylor (1989: 59) en lo que respecta a las dos formas en las que puede entenderse el prototipo: como el miembro central de la categoría o como un conjunto de miembros centrales de dicha categoría.

18. Vid. Hawkins (1979:618ss; 1982:1ss), donde se tratan aspectos de la marca que pueden servir para restringir el poder de los universales del lenguaje como predictores del cambio lingüístico.

19. Ungerer y Schmid (1996: 255) discuten algunos ejemplos. Vid. Hopper y Closs Traugott (1993: 32ss) y Labov (1994: 543ss).

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Why *Go* Doesn't Have Two Past Participles

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ABSTRACT

The present paper argues that traditionalist-inspired claims (e.g., Swan 1980) alleging that the past participle been (to) is in allomorphic alternation with gone (to) are unsubstantiated by the facts. First, it is shown that gone to and been to are semantically distinct. Then, it is postulated that the preposition to is polysemous in the domain of space and that this polysemy accounts for its ability to collocate with been. Finally, it is suggested that, unlike gone to, been to belongs to an idiomatic grammatical construction, which helps to explain the differences in distribution between the two expressions. Taken as a whole, these arguments strongly indicate that been (to) is categorized as an instance of be and not as an allomorph of go.

KEY WORDS: *Been to*, *gone to*, grammatical constructions, construction **grammar**, prepositional polysemy.

RESUMEN

Cienos autores inscritos en una línea tradicionalista (p. ej., Swan 1980) alegan que el inglés **been** (to) es un participio de pasado en alternancia con *gone* (to); el presente artículo arguye, sin embargo, que una **examinación** detallada de los datos lingüísticos resta credibilidad a tal posibilidad. En primer lugar, se demuestra que *gone to* y **been to** son **semánticamente** distintos. En segundo lugar, se postula que la preposición **to** es polisémica en el dominio del espacio y es justamente esta **polisemia** la que permite la combinación **been + to**. Finalmente, se sugiere que, a diferencia de *gone to*, **been to** constituye una construcción **gramatical** idiomática, lo que ayuda a explicar las diferencias de distribución que existen entre las dos expresiones en cuestión. Considerados en su **globalidad**, estos argumentos indican que **been** (to) se **categoriza** en realidad como una forma de *be* y no como un **alomorfo** de *go*.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Been to*, *gone to*, construcciones gramaticales, **gramática** de construcciones, polisemia preposicional.

I. THE IMPLICIT ARGUMENT

Every once in a while one hears from traditionalist-inspired grammarians that *go* has two past participles (see, e.g., Swan 1980, §101). Though no explicit arguments are offered to substantiate this claim, the basis for it probably rests on grammaticality judgments such as those in (1) and (2).

- (1) a. Henry Hinkleweenie often goes to Arizona.
 b. Henry Hinkleweenie went to Arizona last year.
 c. Henry Hinkleweenie has gone to Arizona only a few times since he got married.
- (2) a. * Henry Hinkleweenie is to Arizona all the time.
 b. * Henry Hinkleweenie was to Arizona last month.
 c. Henry Hinkleweenie has been to Arizona once in the past ten years.

Given the distribution of the data set,¹ the argument would, speciously, take the following form:

Primo: in contrast to *go*, *be* is defective when it collocates with spatial *to*;

Secundo: speakers should agree that *been to* and *gone to* are synonymous, since

Tertio: *to* + PLACE implies movement —ergo, *been* does also;

THEREFORE:

Quarto: *been* is an alternate past participle of the verb *go*.

I believe that this account of the facts is flawed on several counts, not the least of which have to do with such fundamental questions as synonymy, polysemy, and grammatical constructions. I take up these matters each in turn and show that *been* is not an alternate past participle belonging to *go*.

II. SYNONYMY

The first flaw in the above argument relates to the implication that *gone to* and *been to* are synonymous with one another. This means, in other words, that sentences such as those in (3) should be semantically identical.

- (3) a. Ren and Stimpy have gone to Nepal several times.
 b. Ren and Stimpy have been to Nepal several times.

Despite these initial appearances, it is well known that *gone to* and *been to* do not convey quite the same meaning. This is borne out by the differences in interpretation regarding examples such as (4):

- (4) a. Ren and Stimpy have gone to the office.
 b. Ren and Stimpy have been to the office.

Let us start with sentence (4a). This sentence has at least two plausible default interpretations. One interpretation is, roughly, that Ren and Stimpy **have** departed from wherever they were and are now on their way to the office. Another possibility is that they **have** reached the office and *they are still there*. This differs from the interpretation of (4b), which is that they **have** gone to the office, but *they are no longer there*. This point is perhaps more clearly illustrated in (5).

- (5) a. Ren and Stimpy **have** gone to Italy for the month.
 b. * Ren and Stimpy **have been** to Italy for the month

Example (5b) is unacceptable **because** the semantics of *been to* clashes with that of *for the month*. This clash is due to the fact that *been to* implies specifically that Ren and Stimpy are no longer in Italy, whereas *for the month* suggests that they currently are. (To put it in less impressionistic terms, it is impossible to "be and then no longer be" at the same place during the same time span.) By contrast, in example (5a), the semantic structure of the two relevant constituents does not clash. On the present account, *gone to* is in perfect consonance with *for the month*, since they both indicate that Ren and Stimpy are currently in Italy.

This still invites the question of why sentences such as (3a) and (3b) seem to be very close semantically? Such sentences resemble each other **because** they convey basically the same **conceptual content** (in the sense of Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991). They contrast subtly with one another, however, in the way they portray this conceptual content. In this connection, consider the variations of sentences (3) proposed in (6):

- (6) a. Ren and Stimpy **have** gone to the Clinton White House a few times.
 b. Ren and Stimpy **have been** to the Clinton White House a few times.

What makes the meanings of examples (6a) and (6b) so similar is the fact that the adverbial *a few times* denotes that the actions were "recurrent." In essence, then, both sentences describe arrivals at (as well as **departures** from) the White House. This, I believe, is the basis for the apparent synonymy of these examples.

While sentences such as (6a) and (6b) are semantically quite comparable, they are not exactly identical. It is true that they both represent the same event; however, they do so by **perspectivizing** different facets of the situation. For example, in (6a) *gone to* highlights the goal-oriented **trajectory** of Ren and Stimpy, which ends up at the White House. In sentence (6b), on the other hand, *been to* emphasizes the **presence** of Ren and Stimpy at a place located at the endpoint of the **trajectory**.² That is, though a prior **trajectory** is implicit in the semantic structure of *been to*, the expression does not profile a **trajectory per se**. Therefore, even though the same circumstances are being described in both cases, the two sentences carry slightly different nuances of construal. I will explore this observation **further** in the following section.

III. POLYSEMY

Another flawed aspect of the two-participle **argument** has to do with the meaning of the preposition *to*. Though *to* has yet to be given a full description, most accounts of this

preposition do not even entertain the possibility that, in the domain of space, it might not be monosemous. In this section I will show that spatial *to* is actually polysemous. This overlooked detail has significant consequences for **distinguishing *been*** to from *gone to*.

In its prototypical sense, the preposition *to* **highlights** the goal portion of an **entire** trajectory (cf. Hilferty 1993, Taylor 1993). This can be **seen** by considering the following **example**:

- (7) Ray Cokes went to a London pub.

In this sentence, *to a London pub* designates the goal section of **some** larger unspecified trajectory. (**Common** sense dictates that Ray Cokes had to start his trajectory from somewhere). However, when *to* collocates with ***been*** in what I shall **call** the ***been to-construction***, then, **it does** not convey exactly the same meaning as in (7). Rather than highlighting the approach towards the goal, **it** instead focuses on the very endpoint of the trajectory. This remark merits **some** clarification.

Endpoint-focus phenomena **have been** well documented for English path prepositions (e.g., Bennett 1975, Lakoff 1987, Taylor 1993, *inter alia*). **Consider** the contrast in examples (8)-(10). In each of the (a) sentences, the subject effects **some** sort of movement along a path.

- (8) a. Ray Cokes walked over the hill.
b. Ray Cokes lives over the hill.
- (9) a. Ray Cokes ran across the street.
b. Ray Cokes lives across the street.
- (10) a. Ray Cokes **skipped** past the supermarket.
b. Ray Cokes lives past the supermarket.

In the (b) sentences, on the other hand, no such movement is expressed; in these cases, the subject is merely located on the other **side** of the place indicated by the prepositional object. Such data **provides some** independent motivation for assigning an endpoint-focus sense to *to*. If **I am correct**, this static reading of *to* **does** not really underscore the movement toward the endpoint of the goal trajectory. On the contrary, in the context of the ***been to-construction*** I would contend that *to* focuses on the endpoint itself.

While Deane (1993) specifically **denies** the possibility that spatial *to* might **have** an endpoint-focus sense, the ***been to-construction*** seems to suggest otherwise. This said, however, I should **hasten** to add it **is** obvious that *to* cannot combine with **all** sorts of “**motionless**” verbs. In fact, this use of *to* is not very productive at all:

- (11) a. Bill walked to the store.
b. * Bill works to the store.
c. * Bill lives to **the** store.

Despite its limited productivity, the use of *to* described for the ***been to-construction*** is by no means arbitrary. It **is** motivated by the obvious fact that *to be* in a location you must **have**

previously gone there. The restricted distribution of endpoint-focus points to the need for special treatment of *been* to. I take the matter up in the next section.

In any event, there **does** exist additional **evidence** supporting the analysis advanced **here**. For one thing, in a conventional construction such as to the *left/right* of X, the preposition to is perfectly felicitous as the marker of a static relationship.

- (12) a. In this picture, Chelsea is standing to the left of Hilary.
b. **Bill's** picture is to the right of Hilary's picture.

For another, there are examples such as those in (13), indicating 'attachment' (cf. Lindkvist 1950, §638 ff):

- (13) a. The gum was stuck to the bottom of the table (by **Bill**).
b. The gum was stuck to the bottom of the table (and there was no way to get it off).

Such uses **allow** for passive-voice and stative interpretations (examples (13a) and (13b), respectively). On the passive interpretation, the gum is conceived as going roughly from an OFF-relationship to an ON-relationship with regard to the table. On the stative interpretation, change of place is not explicitly denoted, but entailed. Taken together, examples such as (12) and (13b) **provide** good motivation for positing a static endpoint-focus use of to.

The import of ascribing an endpoint-focus sense to to is that *been* maintains its stative meaning in the *been* to-construction. This is a plausible solution, since it is consonant with native-speaker intuitions: gone stresses 'going,' whereas *been* stresses 'being.' On the basis of meaning, then, it is difficult to make the case that *been* (to) is an alternate participle of *go*.³ Now let us turn to a final argument against the stance that *go* has two past participles.

IV. GRAMMATICAL CONSTRUCTIONS

The third point on which the two-participle position **fails** has to do with the nature of grammatical constructions. There exists a trend in current linguistic theory that seeks to explain language in terms of simultaneous syntax and semantics and which are aptly described as construction-based **frameworks**.⁴ Such an approach to language describes the regularities (and "irregularities") of linguistic structure as sets of form-meaning pairings. This view affords a fundamental insight for idiomatic expressions that are less **than fully** productive. **Learned** and stored in memory as semantico-grammatical "chunks," such expressions are deemed to be special **grammatical** constructions, whose overall structure is noncompositional. The idiomatic **patterns** of a language are therefore **seen** as possessing Gestalt qualities, in that they are not the sum of their component parts.

A case in point is of course the *been* to-construction, which clearly is not the **mere** sum of *been* + *to*. We **have** already described the idiosyncratic semantics of the construction in the two previous sections, so there is no need to **belabor** the matter **here**. Instead, I will offer a very rough picture of what the syntax of the construction looks like. At the highest level of generalization, this construction probably takes the form of:

- (14) [[have_{aux.}] [[been] [[to] [PLACE_{NP}]]]]

While the representation used in (14) is a simplified rendering of the *been* to-construction, it is sufficient for present purposes. What it is meant to convey is a verb phrase headed by auxiliary *have*, which **takes *been* +** to as its obligatory complement.⁵ Of special importance here is the fact that not all the "slots" have a lexically filled terminal node. This is the case of the constituent marked [PLACE_{NP}], which licenses any noun phrase whose semantics is that of a place. So, like most other constructions, the *been* to-construction is a cross between lexical, syntactic, and semantic information.

Now, the upshot of (14) is that the *been* to-construction obeys the rules of "perfect" constructions, i.e., it can only be productively in the perfect tenses (e.g., the present perfect and the past perfect), as in (15):

- (15) a. Present perfect: Henry Hinkleweenie has never **been** to Berserkeley.
 b. Past perfect: Henry Hinkleweenie **told** me that he had **been** to **Hell** once but he really didn't like it.

Gone (to), on the other hand, belongs to spatial go. This is significant because it suggests that go (*to*) should display full productivity, namely that it should be able to be used without any problem in all active-voice tenses. This is in fact corroborated by the grammaticality judgments in (1). Thus, the differing distributions of go and be in examples (1) and (2), respectively, are fully explainable via the constructions that they belong to.

As further proof for the proposal presented herein, consider the case of elided questions, such as the following:

- (16) a. Gone to the office yet?
 b. Go to the office yet?
- (17) a. **Been** to the office yet?
 b. * Be to the office yet?

The present account predicts the ungrammaticality of (17b), because there seems to be no stable be to-construction to sanction it. On the other hand, the grammaticality of the corresponding go to-sequence in (16b) is assured (in American English), since it needs no licensing by a special construction. Thus, the "defective" distribution of *been* to falls out directly from the constructional restrictions it is subject to.

Now, the foregoing remarks should not be taken as saying that gone (*to*) does not participate in the present- and past-perfect constructions. Of course it does. What I do mean to say is that be is only able to collocate productively with spatial to through the *been* to-construction (which, no doubt, is a very specific variant of the perfect constructions). These observations suggest strongly that there is no need to posit an ad-hoc allomorphic relationship claiming that *been* is an alternate past participle of go.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, *go* does not have two past participles, but only one: *gone*. The sequence *been to*, far from being an alternant of *gone (to)*, belongs instead to a specific grammatical construction, which is endowed with its own particular syntax and semantics. This, I contend, is the basis for its "defective" distribution. As is often the case with grammatical constructions, *been to* is not the literal sum of its parts and therefore cannot profitably be analyzed as such. Only by analyzing *been to* as an idiomatic construction with its own semantico-syntactic constraints can one come to a natural and realistic account that accords with native-speaker intuitions. Bearing this in mind, it seems clear that the past participles *been* and *gone* do not constitute a case of allomorphy. Instead they are, just as common sense would predict, the past participles of *be* and *go*, respectively.

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NOTES

1. While (2a) and (2b) are clearly unacceptable, Lindkvist (1950, §616) states that it is possible to encounter *be to* + PLACE in tenses other than the present and the past perfect. In fact, he adduces an attested example in which a simple form of *be* is (apparently) used with the spatial preposition *to*:

- (i) Ferdy, having the common love of a free show, was one of the first *to* the rails; he had a good place in the front row. (taken from Lindkvist 1950: 312: the italics are Lindkvist's)

Observe, however, that *to the rails* actually forms a constituent with (*one of*) *the first* and therefore cannot truly be considered an instance of *be to*. This is shown by (ii), where the prepositional phrase must be integrated as part of the noun phrase.

- (ii) a. * One of the first was Ferdy to the rails.
b. One of the first to the rails was Ferdy.

Lindkvist's point is nevertheless well taken. For instance, it seems to me that, given the right context, most native speakers of American English would not "bat an eyelash" if they were to hear a sentence such as (iii) in the stream of discourse.

- (iii) ? It was getting really late and we were only to Santa Fe.

In the context of explaining a trip whose final destination was supposed to be somewhere beyond the capital of New Mexico, sentence (iii) would probably not sound very odd. However, there must be some clear contextual or situational cue indicating that the object of *to* is merely a subdestination: otherwise, such uses are unacceptable. This accounts for the infelicity of (iv):

- (iv) * We were to Santa Fe and we stayed there.

At present, I have embarrassingly little to say about the matter (though see note 5), other than to note that sentences such as (iii) pose an additional difficulty for any analysis that claims that *been (to)* is a form of *go*.

2. As we have seen, *been to* also carries the conventional implicature that the grammatical subject is no longer at the site indicated by the prepositional object. In the case of (6b), this connotation is spelled out more explicitly by the reiterative adverbial of frequency *a few times*.

3. It should be noted that I am not **claiming** that it is impossible for a verb to **have** two past participles, each with different meanings. As is well **known**, in American English *ger* has two past participles: *got* and *gorren*.

- (v) a. **Have** you got enough money?
 b. I'm **sorry**; I've **really** got to go now.
- (vi) a. **Have** you gotten my letter in the mail yet?
 b. **You** mean you **still** haven't gotten there yet?

Though no doubt there is a certain amount of variation, the "pseudo-past participle" *got* is generally used to express possession and obligation (e.g., examples (v)), whereas the true past participle *gorren* usually expresses meanings akin to receiving, **arriving**, and other values associated with *ger* (e.g., examples (vi)). Given the **similarity** of phonological forms, counting *gor* and *gorren* as past participles of *get* is quite natural. *Been* and *gone*, on the other hand, bear little phonological resemblance to one another; suppletion notwithstanding, such a putative allomorphic relationship would **have little claim** to naturalness.

4. See, especially, Fillmore and Kay's Construction Grammar framework (e.g., Bmgman 1988, 1996. Fillmore 1985, 1986, 1988, 1996, Fillmore & Atkins 1992, Fillmore & Kay *in progress*, Fillmore et al. 1988, Goldberg 1994, 1995, 1996, Kay 1984, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, Koenig 1993, 1995, Michaelis 1994. Michaelis & Lambrecht 1994, 1996a, 1996b, Valenzuela 1996). See, also, Lakoff's Cognitive Semantics approach (e.g., Lakoff 1987, Goldberg 1992) and Langacker's Cognitive Grammar (e.g., Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991, Achard 1993). For further arguments in favor of **construction-based grammars**, see Bates & Goodman *in press* and Jackendoff (1995, 1997: ch. 7).

5. Unfortunately, this **formulation does** not explain example (iii) in note 1. A complete account would **ultimately have** to explain the possibility of such a use in discourse (for American English at least, though apparently not for British English). As a **first** approximation to the problem, I would speculate that **examples** such as (iii) **only exist** as extrapolations (i.e., as **extensions** rather than **instantiations**) from the schema proposed in (14). These extrapolations would probably be analogical in character and based on other verb-phrase patterns (perhaps on that of *go to*). This would account, at least in part, for the very **slight** oddness of such utterances, since the grammatical construction they would presuppose would **have** to be assembled "on the fly" and therefore would lack cognitive entrenchment (see Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991 for the notion of entrenchment).

Another aspect of this construction that **deserves** mentioning is the fact that it **does not** account for examples in which the preposition *to* **does not** appear.

- (vii) a. She hasn't **been** to Logroño; she's **been** somewhere **else**.
 b. **Where have** you **been** all this time?
 c. To tell you the truth, I've never **been** there.
 d. I've **been** home twice today.

It is important to note that this same phenomenon happens with other verbs (though in **varying** degrees, to be **sure**). A smattering of examples can be found in (viii):

- (viii) a. She hasn't **gone** to Logroño; she's **gone** somewhere **else**.
 b. Where are you going?
 c. No. I've never driven there before.
 d. I've already **run** home twice today.

In any event, the preposition *to* **cannot** be omitted from the *been to*-construction without allowing for an ungrammatical sequence such as:

- (ix) * I've **been** San Francisco.

My tentative **proposal** for the *been to*-construction would be to say that the preposition *to* can be **overridden** by certain lexical items such as *where*, *somewhere*, *some* place, *there*, *home*, etc. This **amounts to listing** exceptions and I **will not** endeavor to work the **matter** out any **further**.

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On Nominal Extraposition and "Empty" *It*: A Reply to Michaelis & Lambrecht (1994)

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ABSTRACT

Particles have always been a source of embarrassment for most linguistic theories. The reason for this embarrassment, more than anything else, has to do with the semantics of these elements. Such is the case of phrasal-verb constructions, subjects of atmospheric verbs, cleft-sentences, and various types of extraposition. Some theories have no problem with assigning particles no semantic value (e.g., most Chomskyan and post-Chomskyan theories); others, on the other hand, take pains to show that all particles must have some semantic content (e.g., cognitive grammar).

Here we would like to concentrate on just one of these cases, namely the nominal-extraposition construction. It has recently been claimed by Michaelis & Lambrecht (1994) that the subject of this construction has no semantic content. We will show that this is not the case, and, in fact, the problem can be easily solved if a frame-semantics approach is incorporated into the description. The purpose of our paper, then, is not to challenge their analysis, but rather to refine it.

KEYWORDS: Frame Semantics, Empty particles, Construction Grammar, Cataphora, Nominal Extraposition Construction

RESUMEN

Las partículas inglesas siempre han resultado problemáticas para la mayoría de las teorías lingüísticas. La principal razón de estos problemas tiene que ver sobre todo con la semántica de estos elementos. Tal es el caso de las construcciones inglesas de verbos frasales, los sujetos de verbos atmosféricos, las oraciones escindidas y los distintos tipos de extraposición. Algunas teorías no tienen problema alguno en asignar a estas partículas un valor semántico nulo (p. ej., la mayoría de las teorías Chomkianas y post-Chomkianas). Otras, sin embargo, se esfuerzan de manera especial en mostrar que todas las partículas deben tener algún contenido semántico (e.g., la Gramática Cognitiva).

En este trabajo, nos gustaría concenrrarnos en uno de estos casos. a saber, la Construcción de Extraposición Nominal. Se ha afirmado recientemente (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1994) que el sujeto de esta construcción carece de contenido semántico. Mostraremos que tal afirmación no es correcta, y que en realidad, existe una salida sencilla al problema si se incorpora al análisis cienos aspectos de la Semántica de Esquemas. El propósito de este trabajo, por lo tanto, no es cuestionar el análisis de Michaelis & Lambrecht, sino más bien refinarlo.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Semántica de Esquemas, Partículas vacías, Gramática de Construcciones, Catáfora, Construcción de Extraposición Nominal.

INTRODUCTION

Particles **have** always **been** a source of embarrassment for most linguistic theories. The reason for this embarrassment, more than anything **else**, has to do with the semantics of these elements. Such is the case of phrasal-verb constructions, subjects of atmospheric verbs, **cleft-sentences**, and various types of extraposition. **Some** theories **have** no problem with assigning particles no semantic value (e.g., most Chomskyan and post-Chomskyan theories); others, on the other hand, take pains to show that **all** particles must **have** some semantic content (e.g., **cognitive grammar**).

Here we would **like** to concentrate on just one of these cases. namely the **nominal-extraposition construction**. It has recently **been** claimed by Michaelis & Lambrecht (1994) that the subject of this construction has no semantic **content**. We will show that this is not the case, and **in** fact there is an easy way out of the problem if a frame semantics approach is incorporated into the description. **The** purpose of our paper, then, is not to challenge their **analysis**, but rather to refine it.

THE NOMINAL-EXTRAPOSITION CONSTRUCTION

Using Construction **Grammar** as their theoretical framework (Fillmore & Kay, in prog.), Michaelis & Larnbrecht (1994; henceforth, **M&L**), argue that there is a subclass of extraposition construction which must be distinguished from **right dislocation** (RD), namely, the **nominal extraposition** (NE) construction. **M&L** base their arguments on several morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic **factors**. For the purposes of the present paper, we will focus on just two of the relevant morphosyntactic properties that differentiate **the** two constructions, as we **have** no major **qualms** with their other arguments:

- (i) in NE (but not **in** RD), there is a lack of agreement between the pronominal subject and the postverbal NP (**arising** from the lack of coreference between said constituents); and
- (ii) **in** NE (but not **in** RD), the **first** part of the construction cannot stand on its own (again, due to the **nonreferential** nature of the pronominal subject).

We take both arguments up in **turn**.

One of the peculiarities of the NE construction is that NE main-clause subjects do NOT agree with the head of the extraposed NP. **Take** for instance the following example:

- (1) It's terrible the things that happen to sheep. (NE)

It is clear **here** that *it* and things do not agree in number. This fact contrasts with RD, where such agreement is mandatory:

- (2) a. They're cool, those glasses you're wearing. (RD)
b. * It's cool, those glasses you're wearing. (RD)

According to **M&L**, the reason behind this difference is that in (2a) the pronominal subject (they) is coreferential with the dislocated NP (those glasses you're wearing), whereas in NE this is not be the case. They base this claim on the fact that NE cannot have a plural subject even though the extraposed NP is plural:

- (3) * They're terrible the things that happen to sheep. (NE)

From this, **M&L** conclude that the pronominal subject in NE constructions is devoid of all meaning. We will come back to this point later.

The second syntactic difference to be considered **here** has to do with the claim that:

In RD, the sentence minus the dislocated constituent is always syntactically and semantically well-formed and a POTENTIALLY COMPLETE SENTENCE. In NE this is not the case, although this is not *always obvious from* a merely structural point of view. (**M&L**: 363; italics added)

Therefore, according to **M&L**, we can say They're cool (from They're cool, those glasses you're wearing), but not *It's terrible (from It's terrible *the* things that happen to sheep). This is apparently a logical consequence of the fact that they is coreferential with glasses, while *it* is not coreferential with things. That *It's* terrible happens to look grammatical is taken by **M&L** to be merely "a coincidence of English morphology" (**M&L**: 363). They provide supplementary evidence from French as proof for this claim (ibid.):

- (4) a. C'est ÉVIDENT, qu'elle a tort. 'It's obvious, that she's wrong.' (RD)
b. C'est ÉVIDENT. 'It's obvious.'
c. Il est ÉVIDENT, qu'elle a TORT. 'It's obvious that she's wrong.' (EXTRAP)
d. *Il est ÉVIDENT. 'It's obvious.'

Example (4d) is ungrammatical because *il*, being in a NE construction, is nonreferential, and, accordingly, cannot fulfill the valence requirement of evident. However, we believe that it is risky to describe English on the basis of French grammar, especially since in Spanish this line of argument does not work. In Spanish, both constructions share basically the same surface form and are equally replaceable by the "reduced" version.

- (5) a. Son increíbles las cosas que echan por la **tele**. (RD)
 'They're incredible, the things they show on TV.'
 b. Son increíbles.
 'They're incredible.'
 c. Es increíble las cosas que echan por la **tele**. (NE)
 'It's incredible the things they show on TV.'
 d. Es increíble.
 'It's incredible.'

To disregard (5d), we would again **have** to appeal to nonreferentiality and explain its apparent acceptability as another "morphological coincidence." Thus, we believe that whether or not M&L are right about this particular French NE construction, that should not affect their argument about the subject **pronoun** of English NE.

REFILLING "EMPTY" *IT*

In our opinion, a new perspective on the problem can be achieved by adopting a frame semantic approach (Fillmore 1975, 1985). We believe that it is a mistake to equate coreferentiality with agreement. The lack of agreement between *it* and the extraposed nominal head in **example (1)** *It's terrible the things that happen to sheep* does **NOT** necessarily **entail** that the pronominal subject is nonreferential and, hence, meaningless. Such an analysis is based on the **mistaken** assumption that both constituents should be coreferential: instead, we contend that the true referent of *it* is the whole **scene** (i.e., a **state** of affairs). In other words, the referent of the pronominal subject is the scene evoked by the nominal *the things that happen to sheep*, and not merely its head *things*. This, we **argue**, is the meaning of NE *it*.

Perhaps our argument can be seen more clearly by considering the following examples:

- (6) a. **Harry** insulted Mary. It was terrible.
 b. **Harry** insulted Mary and she slapped him. It was terrible.

As is well **known**, *it* can refer back to a whole sentence. This is the case of (6a). Example (6b) is slightly more complex; though there are two actions (insulting and slapping), *it* still refers back **holistically** to just one scene. This is obvious from the fact that it is impossible to say (7) if we are **referring** to each of the individual actions:

- (7) **Harry** insulted Mary and she slapped **him**. * They were terrible.

These facts show that *it* **does not have** to agree with any nominal head, since the **particle** in these cases refers to a whole scene.

Our intuition about the coreferentiality of the pronominal subject in the NE construction can be informally represented as follows:

- (8) **It** 's astonishing what people do for money these days.
 Ref=scene#1 qualifier of subject scene#1

What our notation tries to capture is that the pronominal subject refers cataphorically to the scene **implied** in the extraposed NP; the postcopular **adjective** modifies the **subject** and, consequently, the scene it stands for as well. This analysis accounts for the following exchange:

- (9) A: It's astonishing!
 B: What's astonishing?
 A: What people do for money these days.

Speaker B asks for the referent of A's **initial** utterance, inquiring what *it* refers to exactly. Speaker A **replies simply** by supplying a scene. **This proves conclusively** that the **subject pronoun** does in fact **have reference** and, therefore, is not semantically empty.

CONCLUSION

In concluding we would like to emphasize that our **proposal** does not invalidate M&L's findings about the **existence** of the NE construction. In fact, we endorse the bulk of their analysis. We disagree, however, in their treatment of the **subject pronoun**. Instead of analyzing NE *it* as a meaningless syntactic place holder, we offer an alternative account that accords more with the tenets of cognitive **linguistics**. Syntactic dummies should always be used as a last resort, since the most desirable analysis would be the one that **assigns** meaning to **all** elements of a sentence at **some level** of organization.

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We would like to thank **Anna** Poch and Mar Garachana for their valuable **comments** and suggestions.

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Conceptualization of Events, Transitivity and Voice: A Cognitive Approach¹

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ABSTRACT

Conceptualization of events is intimately associated with the functional domain of transitivity and with voice. The present paper examines the syncretisms involved in coding deviations from the prototypical event view, variations in transitivity and voice alternations. It is argued that transitivity and voice are best understood in terms of a series of cognitive dimensions derived from our construal of 'real world' events.

KEY WORDS: Cognitive, event, transitivity, voice

RESUMEN

La conceptualización del evento está íntimamente asociada al dominio funcional de la transitividad y al sistema de voz. Este trabajo estudia los sincretismos existentes en la coaificación de las desviaciones de la perspectiva prototípica del evento, las variaciones en transitividad y las alternancias de voz. Se argumenta que la transitividad y el fenómeno de voz deben entenderse en términos de una serie de dimensiones cognitivas que se derivan de nuestra conceptualización de los eventos reales.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Cognitiva, evento, transitividad, voz


I. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EVENTS & EVENT STRUCTURE.

From a cognitive perspective, we are concerned with the relation between 'events' in the real world, our cognition of events or 'cognitive constructions', and how this is manifested in a series of semantico-syntactic forms which are the basis for the organization

of the clause (Langacker,1990). In the coding of experience in an utterance, there is a synergetic relation between the various discourse-pragmatic, semantic and morphosyntactic aspects, such that, as Croft (1994a:32) points out:

Language use - communicative and interactive intentions in particular contexts of discourse - largely determines what semantic conceptualization of the experience is to be encoded. The conceptualization largely determines its encoding in the system of signs (words and constructions) of the language - symbolic structures joining form with meaning (the conceptualizations). Both of these processes - from context to conceptualization and from conceptualization to grammatical construction - have both cognitive and interpersonal elements. Communicative and interactional intentions are ultimately formed in the mind, and the conventions of symbolizations are socially established, maintained and altered across time and space.

Croft (1990) proposes a framework for understanding event structure in terms of causation, that is, in terms of a causal chain of events sharing participants and involving transmission of force. It is hypothesized that the internal structure of events is construed as a three-part event sequence, 'cause, change, state', so that verbs or verbal forms prototypically correspond to one of the three types of event or sequence of atomic events. The 'Idealized Cognitive Model' (cf. Lakoff,1987) of an individual event is thus characterized in the following way (Croft,1994a:37):



According to Croft (1990:65), each event view will focus on a different segment of the sequence, the whole causal event, the change of state and or the resultant state, thus foregrounding the various semantic aspects of the (unmarked) event views:

The stative implies an inherent property, without any implication as to the kind of process involved. The inchoative implies a certain kind of process, without any implication of an external (human) cause. The causative implies direct human causation, with the attendant properties of intention and responsibility.

Croft (1994a:37) suggests that verbs express specific segments of the causal chain of events, representing 'naturally' individuated events. Verbs typically select different segments of the tri-partite structure on the basis of the type of event view which is profiled: «they can be 'causative' (profiling the whole segment), 'inchoative' (profiling only the last two segments) or 'stative' (profiling only the last segment; these are often expressed as adjectives)».

- (1) a. The rock (x) broke the window (y)
- b. The window broke.
- c. The window is broken.

Any event may potentially be conceptualized according to the different *event views*

(causative, inchoative and stative), yielding both prototypical and non-prototypical associations between event class and event view. In this way, with a **dynamic** verb of creation for example, deviations from the causative view, typically associated with **this** type of event, will result in marked constructions:

- (2) a. The contractors built the cabin in three months.
 b. The cabin **got** built in three months.
 c. In three months, the cabin was built.
 (Croft, 1990:57)

Similarly, we **find** the same marked constructions in deviations from the basic stative and inchoative conceptualizations:

- (3) a. John is sick (**thanks** to the food **here**).
 b. John got sick (from the food).
 c. The food made John sick.
 (Croft, 1990:56)

- (4) a. He soon recovered from his illness.
 b. The **treatment** made him recover very **quickly**.
 c. He is now completely recovered.

In **Spanish**, the construction with *se* is found in the inchoative view of the causative event (anticausative) and of the stative event. The construction with *estar*, on the other hand codes the stative view of causative and inchoative events:

- (5) a. La puerta se abrió.
 b. Se hace tarde.
 c. La puerta está abierta.
 d. **Está** muerto.

In this paper we will be concerned with patterns of markedness associated with deviations from the most natural **construal** of events into event views. We will **also** examine deviations in transitivity, **and** their relation to voice distinctions: reflexive, **reciprocal**, middle, passive and resultative. **Finally**, we **aim** to identify the relations between these constructions **and** the resultant syncretisms **in coding** in terms of **certain** cognitive dimensions.

II. TRANSITIVITY & VOICE

Transitivity, according to Hopper & Thompson (1980:253), should be characterized as a complex *scalar* notion derived from the **presence** or absence of a series of parameters² or components which basically refer to the effectiveness and intensity with which the action is carried over or transferred from one participant to another, typically from an agent to a patient:

Transitivity, then, viewed in the most conventional and traditional way possible - as a **matter** of carrying-over or transferring an action from one participant to another - can be broken down into its component parts, each focusing on a different facet of this carrying-over in a different part of the clause. **Taken** together, they allow clauses to be characterized as MORE or LESS transitive.

In a similar fashion, Rice (1989:156) identifies a series of transitivity components³ associated with the «**intensional/construal** arsenal available to the speaker* in the interpretation of the event and in communication.

Givon (1995:76) singles out **three** semantic dimensions or core **features** of the prototypical transitive event:

- a. Agent: The prototypical transitive event involves a volitional, controlling, actively-initiating agent who is responsible for the event, thus its salient cause.
- b. Patient: The prototypical transitive event involves a non-volitional, inactive non-controlling patient who registers the event's changes-of-state, thus its salient effect.
- c. Verbal **modality**: The verb of the prototypical transitive clause **codes** an event that is perfective (non-durative), sequential (non-perfect) and realis (non-hypothetical). The prototype transitive event is thus fast-paced, completed, real, and **perceptually-cognitively** salient.

Coding options in grammars, as Givon (1989) observes, reflect different ways in which an event may be viewed **and** conceptualized, so that variations in transitivity **will have certain** morphosyntactic consequences. Thus, when the agent is stereotypical, non-referring, unindividuated or communicatively irrelevant, it is defocused **and** downgraded. The detransitivized event **is** then **coded** as a **construction** exhibiting fewer actants than the basic transitive schema, as in the case of agented or agentless passives and resultative constructions.

In discussing the parameters associated with transitivity and their correlation with foregrounded information in discourse, DeLancey (1987:54) argues that «**the** semantics of both clause- and **discourse-level constructions** are rooted in a **level** of cognitive representation prior to either ... both semantic and discourse-functional facts are reflections of underlying cognitive schemata*. According to DeLancey (1987:60), the transitive prototype is a universal and «**extremely natural category**», its natural⁴ basis being «**the** universal human understanding of the physical fact that events **have** causes, i.e. that the basis of the transitivity prototype is a simple CAUSE ----> EFFECT **schema**» (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Event **construal** is intimately associated with the domain of transitivity. As Croft (1994b) has pointed out, the causative event view represents the prototypical transitive event. DeLancey (1990:304) describes the cognitive **model** of the transitive event structure in terms of a causal chain (cause-effect), parallel to the model proposed by Croft (1990) for event structure, where each **node** represents the EFFECT of the **node** situated directly to its left, which is the CAUSE of the **node** to the right:

ACT OF VOLITION --> ACTION --> EVENT --> RESULTANT STATE


Deviations from the prototype, i.e. cases where «CAUSE and EFFECT are not perceptually distinct» or where «either the CAUSE or the EFFECT event is not fully accessible to an observer» (DeLancey, 1987:61), will give rise to detransitivization constructions.

Also from a cognitive perspective, Kemmer (1994:221-222) argues that categories of voice⁵ must be considered in relation to transitivity:

Voice systems exist in order to express **divergences** from canonical event types that fall at **opposite** extremes along a scale of semantic transitivity, a scale independently motivated by its effects on linguistic marking patterns other than voice. Thus transitivity is the broader phenomenon within the framework of which voice phenomena must be understood.

In coding transitivity **distinctions**, according to Kemmer (1994), events are conceptualized in terms of a schema that is more general than the characterization of transitivity in terms of semantic properties. The 'two-participant event schema' for the *transitive* situation type consists of two participants, Initiator and Endpoint of the event, and an asymmetrical relation between them **construed** as being directed from Initiator to Endpoint. In the *reflexive* situation type, the Initiator acts on itself as Endpoint, but the type of event involved is one in which participants are normally distinct entities. In the case of *middle* situation types⁶, on the other hand, «the two semantic roles of Initiator and Endpoint refer to a single holistic entity without conceptually distinguished aspects» (Kemmer, 1994:207). Finally, in the *intransitive* situation type, as Kemmer (1994:208) notes, «the conceptual differentiation of Initiating and Endpoint facets is uneryly non-existent: there is no Initiator, no Endpoint, but simply one participant of which a state or action is **predicated**».

Kemmer (1994:209) thus **proposes** the following 'Semantic Transitivity Continuum', in terms of the **relative distance** from the two active prototype situation types (transitive-intransitive), as a function of the semantic parameter, *degree of distinguishability of participants*⁷:



This **property** is **subsumed** under the more general conceptual dimension '*relative elaboration of events*', which, as Kemmer (1994:211) suggests, «can be thought of as the degree to which different schematic aspects of a situation are separated out and viewed as distinct by the **speaker**». In passive events, for example, the Initiator or Agent participant is defocused. Similarly, in the spontaneous process type, **the** single participant **coded** is construed as the Initiator and **also** as the Endpoint, since **it** undergoes **some** change of state as well.

III. DEVIATIONS FROM THE PROTOTYPE: SYNCRETISMS IN CODING.

We **have** observed a series of deviations in terms of **the** most natural construal of events, and in terms of transitivity and voice. We will now discuss the **existence** of certain

syncretisms between these marked constructions, both in English and Spanish.

(i) Constructions with *be*: In English, the auxiliary *be* marks both process passives (agented and agentless) and stative passives as well as objective and subjective resultative constructions or statives of basic causatives and inchoatives and of translational motion events (Nedjalkov & Jaxontov, 1988).

- (6)
- a. I was invited by Harriet's doctor, Shafik.
 - b. **Shall** champagne be **served**?
 - c. The church and the churchyard were hidden by trees
 - d. This slipper is **all** chewed up.
 - e. John's eyes are **inflamed**.
 - f. John is gone.

(ii) Constructions with *get*: Reflexive-causative, reciprocal, 'grooming or body care', and other middle situation types are coded with *get* (Givon & Yang, 1994). The passive with *get* typically implies **partial** responsibility of the subject ('catalytic passive', cf. Barber, 1975). *Get* also has the function of expressing the inchoative of basic causatives and statives.

- (7)
- a. I got (**myself**) dressed.
 - b. **After** they got married?
 - c. He got **dressed**/She got **lost**.
 - d. I got arrested **in** Montreal last year,
 - e. The passage got blocked.
 - f. This room **gets** extremely hot.

(iii) Constructions with adverbial **particles** of 'motion': In English **certain** adverbial particles of motion seem to foreground the 'completeness' or perfectivity of the event or the 'change of state' in causatives and inchoatives and thus involve an increase in transitivity ('hypercausative', 'hyperinchoative'). Middle situations, like 'change in body **posture**', are also coded by means of these particles. In the case of translational motion events we also find adverbial particles **implying** motion from **only** one locative point and/or indicating completeness of **the** event.

- (8)
- a. He ate it **all** up.
 - b. **The** bathtub **filled** up in half an hour.
 - c. She lay **down** on the **bed**.
 - d. She went away.

(iv) Constructions with *se*: *Se* is found to code various situation types, reciprocal, reflexive, middle, passive (promotional and non-promotional), and impersonal passive, with **intransitive** or stative verbs (Gómez Torrego, 1992). As in the case of *get* in English, *se* also has the function of expressing inchoativeness in basic causatives and statives (with 'hacer').

- (9)
- a. Se pegaron.
 - b. Se vió reflejada en el espejo.
 - c. Se **perdió**/**Se** **lavo**/**Se** **sentó**.

- d. La biblioteca **se** abre a las diez.
- e. **Se** atendió a los enfermos.
- f. **Se** vive bien en Madrid.
- g. ¡Qué bien **se** está!
- i. **La** puerta **se** abrió.
- j. **Se** hace tarde.

In translational motion events, DeLancey (1982) notes that there is a metaphorical extension from spacial categories to **code** distinctions in transitivity, such that the conceptualization and coding of the intransitive event from **only one locative** point, either 'source' or 'goal' implies a **decrease** in transitivity ('hyperintransitive'). In Spanish the construction with **se** is found in events implying a permanent change of location.

- (10) a. **Se** fue de casa/**Se** fue a Madrid.
- b. *Fue de casa/**Fue** a Madrid.
- c. Fue de Madrid a Logroño en tren.

In this case one might **argue** that in terms of the high transitivity **parameters** identified by Hopper & Thompson (1980), the construction with **se** seems to **indicate** 'perfectivity' of the event **and** would thus involve **an** increase in transitivity. Other cases of constructions with **se**, involving force-dynamic and perfective components **and/or** 'affectedness and individuation of O', are clearly higher **in** transitivity **than** the non-**se** analogs ('hypercausatives' or «**hypertransitives**», cf. Arce-Arenales et al., 1994) and 'hyperinchoatives').

- (11) a. Juan **se** comió todo el pastel.
- b. Juan (***se**) comió o pastel de postre
- c. **Se** murió de un ataque al corazón.
- d. (***Se**) murió en la guerra.

(v) **Constructions with ser & estar**: The construction with **ser** is found in process passives. The construction with **estar**, on the other **hand**, **codes** the stative passive as well as the stative view of the causative and inchoative events:

- (12) a. Yo había **sido** salvada del naufragio ...
- b. **Estaba** prohibida la lectura de periódicos y, ...
- c. La casa **estará** terminada en dos semanas.
- d. **Está** muerto.

IV. SEMANTIC SPACE & RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONSTRUCTIONS: EXTENSION OF GRAMMATICAL MARKERS.

We **have** observed that deviations from the prototypical event view give **rise** to marked constructions, involving causativizing, inchoative and stative resultative morphosyntax. We **have also** observed the **existence** of a cline in transitivity along which passive, reflexive and middle situation types are **located**.

Pederson (1991) argues for the need to examine the relations between these constructions and their **recurrent** extensional structures, by plotting them on a **two-** or **three-** dimensional space where their location will **indicate** the **construals** of the event or scene they best represent. In this paper we will distinguish the following dimensions:

(a) Horizontal dimension representing the degree of transitivity of the event in terms of «the core argument expression of the number of **participants**» (**Pederson.1991:459**) or 'degree of distinguishability of participants' (**Kemmer,1994**), according to which the different event views or situation types would be placed in the following continuum:

CAUSATIVE / TRANSITIVE > PASSIVE > REFLEXIVE > MIDDLE / INCHOATIVE / STATIVE PASS / RESULTATIVE > INTRANSITIVE

(b) Vertical dimension representing voice distinctions in **terms** of the archetypal agent role of the participant **coded** as **subject** in the event, with the attendant properties of 'volition, responsibility and directness of causal **connection**'. **DeLancey (1984:207)** notes that «the prototypical transitive event is one that can be traced back to a single cause from which an unbroken **chain** of control leads to the effect. This **ultimate** cause can **only** be an act of volition on the **part** of a (thus defined) prototypical **agent**». The two poles at the extreme ends of the continuum would thus represent the semantic properties of the two proto-roles⁸: 'Proto-Agent' and 'Proto-Patient' (**Dowty,1991**):

CAUSATIVE / TRANSITIVE > REFLEXIVE / MIDDLE / INTRANSITIVE > PASSIVE / INCHOATIVE > STATIVE PASS / RESULTATIVE

(c) We can identify a third diagonal dimension which **correlates** naturally with the previous values, and which refers to the **internal structure** of events and the type of event view which is profiled, 'cause', 'change' or 'state', and involves prototypical and non-prototypical associations between event **class** and event view (**Croft,1990**):

CAUSATIVE / TRANSITIVE / REFLEXIVE / PASSIVE > MIDDLE / INCHOATIVE / INTRANSITIVE > STATIVE PASS / RESULTATIVE

We can thus identify the following semantic space where each of the constructions is **plotted** according to their values on the **three** dimensions defined above:

	2-P EVENT	1-P EVENT
PROTO-A	ADV-HYPTRANS SE-HYPTRANS CAUSE GET-RECIP SE-RECIP GET-REFLEX-C SE-REFLEX GET-PASS SE-PASS-P SE-PASS-NP BE-PASS SER-PASS CHANGE ADV-HYPINCHO SE-HYPINCHO GET-INCHO-C GET-INCHO-S SE-INCHO-C SE-INCHO-S STATE	GET-MID SE-MID ADV-MID SE-HYPINT ADV-HYPINT BE-RESULT-TM SE-IMPASS-I SE-IMPASS-S BE-RESULT-C BE-RESULT-I ESTAR-RESULT-C ESTAR-RESULT-I
PROTO-P		

Fig.1. Relationships between Grammatical Constructions Coding Deviations in Event View, Transitivity and Voice.

These constructions, as can be **seen**, practically occupy **all** the semantic space in the case of nominative-accusative languages like English and Spanish, except for two **areas** (Pederson,1991:466,n.4):

Two-participant causative event, with a **subject** low in responsibility (non-prototypical transitive verbs).

One-participant event ('medium transitivity') with a **subject** high in responsibility and a backgrounded patient (anti-passives in ergative-absolutive languages).

As regards the extensional structures of these constructions, Pederson (1991:457) observes that «**grammatical** markers typically extend historically from function to function along often predictable pathways~Although the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note that Haspelmath (1990:54), for example, suggests the following universal paths of **grammaticization** of passive morphology:

inactive auxiliary > resultative > passive
 causative > reflexive-causative > passive
 reflexive > anticausative > passive
 generalized subject **construction** > **desubjective** > passive

In the case of Spanish, Gili Gaya (1973:105) holds that the marker *se* has gone **through** the following stages: «**reflexivo** acusativo > reflexivo dativo > dativo ético > signo de participación en la acción > signo de pasiva > signo de pasiva impersonal > signo de impersonal **activo**». A similar extensional sequence is found in Marín (1989), which is **parallel** to the one found for French *se* by Croft et al. (1987): English *get* seems to follow very similar extensional pathways (cf. Givon & Yang,1994):

Causative-transitive > Causative-locative > Reflexive-causative > Inchoative > Get-Passive

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper we **have** observed a relation between a series of constructions, where the same marker is used to **code** a variety of **instances** of deviation from the prototype (prototypical event view, transitive prototype, unmarked voice). There appears to be a relation between **the** type of event view which is **profiled** and the degree to which the various components of the causative-transitive event are optimally distinct **and** accessible. Whenever there is a situation where these components are not perceptually distinct or directly accessible, we will **have** defective instances of the causation schema, and hence deviations from the prototype (DeLancey,1987).

We may thus conclude that transitivity and voice are in effect related **functional** domains, and that voice options are best understood in terms of the transitive prototype. In tum, the **cognitive** dimensions which **subsume** the various parameters of transitivity are intimately **linked** to our **conceptualization** of events, as the **existence** of syncretisms in the marked coding **patterns** for these domains seems to indicate.

NOTES

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2. Hopper & Thompson (1980:252) identify the following parameters of transitivity: Participants, Kinesis, Aspect, Punctuality, Volitionality, Affirmation, Mode, Agency, Affectedness & Individuation.

3. Rice (1989:145) proposes a series of components for the two poles of the transitivity continuum. Some of the terms of opposition are the following: *contact* vs. *proximity/distance*, *force-dynamic* vs. *configurational*, *interaction between co-animatees* vs. *action within a setting*, *independence of participants* vs. *congruence of participants*, *asymmetrical participants* vs. *symmetrical participants*, *maximal differentiation of participants* vs. *minimal differentiation*, *perfective action* vs. *imperfective situation*, *non-spatial cognitive domain* vs. *spatial cognitive domain*.

4. Bernárdez (1994:10-11) notes that cognitive models are all 'naturalistic' in a very similar sense:

[L]a (percepción de la) realidad es responsable de la estructuración lingüística ... La *esquematicidad* de todos los modelos cognitivistas es un resultado de esta naturalidad, pues los esquemas representan la categorización y abstracción de estados o procesos semejantes entre sí ... en forma semejante a los *arquetipos* desarrollados por la TC [Teona de Catástrofes].

The discussion of this model is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to Thom (1985) for a catastrophe theoretic account of transitivity.

5. Klaiman (1988:46-47) provides the following characterization of voice systems:

Voice, a grammatical category of various languages, essentially represents a verbally encoded opposition in views of the Subject's relation to the sentimentally denoted action (i.e. situation). Specifically, a verbal voice system signals whether the Subject is or is not perceived as the affected entity - the participant to which accrue the principal effects of the action. However, as specific criteria for the selection of (underived) subjects differ in various languages, diathesis may be associated with different voice functions in different languages.

6. Kemmer (1993) identifies the following middle situation types: 'Grooming or body care', 'Nontranslational motion', 'Change in body posture', 'Translational motion', 'Naturally reciprocal events', 'Indirect middle', 'Emotion middle', 'Emotive speech actions', 'Cognition middle' and 'Spontaneous events'.

7. Kemmer (1994:206) defines *relative distinguishability of participants* in an event as "the degree to which a single physico-mental entity is conceptually distinguished into separate participants, whether body vs. mind, or non-contrasting Agent vs. contrasting Patient".

8. Dowty (1991:572) lists the features that characterize these role types in the following way:

Contributing propensities for the Agent Proto-Role:

- a. volitional involvement in the event or state
- b. sentience (and/or perception)
- c. causing an event or change of state in another participant
- d. movement (relative to the position of another participant)
- (e. exists independently of the event named by the verb)

Contributing properties for the Patient Proto-Role:

- a. undergoes change of state
- b. incremental theme
- c. causally affected by another participant
- d. stationary relative to movement of another participant
- (e. does not exist independently of the event, or not at all)

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Cognition in Sound Change: The Mate/Meat Paradox from the Listener's Perspective

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ABSTRACT

This paper intends to explore a wide series of questions related to linguistic change from a cognitive point of view. This cognitive approach, propugnated a.o. by Kroch (1989) and Labov (1995), has its basis on Social Psychology, and focuses on the different attitudes of the listener during the process of language decoding.

In this case, and taking as our starting point the pronunciation of mare and meat items in the Belfast vernacular, I offer a cognitive interpretation of contemporary and historical data with the following results: the advancement of the sounds in conflict is directly related to the level of misunderstanding they imply in the interaction between speakers and to the different strategies developed by the listeners of the next generation in order to avoid such misunderstandings.

KEY WORDS: linguistic change, *mate/meat*, Belfast vernacular. sound advancement

RESUMEN

En este artículo se exploran una serie de cuestiones relacionadas con el cambio lingüístico desde un punto de vista cognitivo. El enfoque cognitivo, propugnado entre otros por Kroch (1989) y Labov (1995), tiene su base en la psicología social, y se centra en las distintas actitudes de los oyentes a la hora de "procesar" la información lingüística que llega a su cerebro.

En este caso, y tomando como punto de partida la situación existente en el dialecto de Belfast en cuanto a la pronunciación de pares de palabras como mare y meat, ofrecemos una interpretación cognoscitiva de una amplia serie de datos contemporáneos e históricos acerca de la pronunciación de ambos sonidos, con los siguientes resultados: el avance de los sonidos en conflicto depende directamente del nivel de error que cada uno de ellos implique en la interacción entre los hablantes y de las diferentes estrategias creadas por los oyentes de la siguiente generación para evitar dichos errores.

PALABRAS CLAVE: cambio lingüístico, *mate/meat*, dialecto de Belfast, avance de sonidos

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF LINGUISTIC COGNITION.

I.1. From a socio-psychological perspective, cognition is understood as the set of processes through which the psychic system receives, selects, transforms and organizes information in order to build representations of reality and create knowledge. Cognition develops a regulating activity of adaptation of the individual, who learns to identify and recognize the numerous objects that surround him, giving them a concrete sense (Leyens and Codol 1988: 99).

Cognition is considered a collective or social phenomenon in three different ways (Lukes 1973: 7): firstly, it has a social origin, since it is created and reinforced through social interaction. Secondly, cognition has a social object, as far as it deals with the recognition of what is social. Finally, cognition is socially shared, as it is common to all the members of a given society or social group.

Throughout its history, researchers in the field of Social Psychology have given priority to one of the manifold aspects that conform the process of acquisition of social knowledge (Moscovici 1982), producing five different approaches to the figure of the "social thinker". In general terms, these descriptions represent diverse approaches to the problem of probability matching, i.e. the set of principles that guide the individual's choices in cases of ambiguity. Two radical poles can be distinguished in this sense: (1) choices made on the basis of purely objective data; (2) choices based on the individual's subjective perception of probability.

In order to test empirically the way people make such choices, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) carried out the following experiment: a group of subjects were told that 30 engineers and 70 lawyers had been interviewed in order to get a description of their personalities. Thereafter, they were given a description of the type: «Richard is a 30 year old married man; he is skilled and highly motivated; his colleagues have great esteem for him. Is Richard an engineer or a lawyer?» Since the description included no supporting information about the job of the person in question, each subject had to decide between focusing on the proportion of engineers and lawyers interviewed (i.e. 30% vs. 70%) or simply ignoring it.

In general terms, in the case of the hypothetical thinker who chooses his answer on the basis of the overwhelming rate of lawyers interviewed before the experiment, any unsupported description given by the researchers will immediately be matched to the idea of lawyer, so that the possibility of person X being included into this laboral category will match 100%. Social psychologists usually refer to this type of personality as the naive psychologist (Rosenberg & Sedlack 1972). A second type of thinker, the so-called data processor, will base his answer on the following argument: since the description given by the researchers is not representative of any of the two professions, the possibilities of matching it to one or the other should be the same as the rate of subjects with that profession interviewed in the previous phase of the experiment. For this reason, the possibilities of X being a lawyer would expectedly descend to 70% in this second case.

However, it should be recalled here that none of these two cognitive processes will necessarily induce the subject to give a correct answer. The man of the street is liable to a very high number of mistakes of appreciation when trying to understand the social reality around him. Such misunderstandings can be usually related to two different sorts

of causes: (1) to the **existence of** preconceived ideas on the way **some features** are distributed among the population and on the different ways these **features** are associated, and (2) to errors of calculation during the automatic processing of the information received.

I.2. According to Langacker, it is self-evident that «no two speakers share **precisely the same linguistic system**» (1987: 376). Actually, the fact that speakers **operate** with markedly divergent prototypes had **been** demonstrated by researchers from the fields of anthropology and **linguistics** already in the early 1970s. Labov's innovative experiments on the linguistic categorization of household receptacles (such as cups, bowls and **vases**; see Labov, 1973), showed that the boundaries between the categories are **fuzzy** in the extreme, so that the **same** receptacle can be categorized differently by two speakers. Moreover, whereas certain prototypical receptacles were unanimously and uncontroversially included in the same category by **all the subjects**, other non-so-clear instances had to be disambiguated on the basis of their attributes and their similitude to more prototypical objects. The analysis of the different ways «**language translates meaning into sound through the categorization of reality into discrete units and sets of units**» (Labov 1973: 342) **becomes here** the main goal of linguistic description.

Obviously, in day-to-day exchanges, differences in the conceptual centre are **likely** to pass unnoticed. However, to what extent such differences might hinder human communication, eventually leading to gross misunderstanding, is a matter that **would** merit much more research. A cognitive approach to the problem of linguistic misunderstanding in cross-dialectal communication has **been** recently given by Labov (1994) who, on the basis of the analysis of 613 **instances** of misunderstanding detected in Philadelphia, establishes the following modes of correction:

	%
Corrected by the listener before the utterance was finished	13
Correction elicited by immediate inquiry of the listener	48
Inferred from later utterances in the conversation	27
Corrected from events that followed accidentally	10
Never corrected by hearer or listener [observed by a third person]	2

TABLE 1: Modes of detection of **naturally** occurring misunderstandings

However, it is obvious that the frequency of the last category of misunderstandings is much larger than that expressed in Table 1. In spite of this, the possibility of estimating the approximate rate of misunderstanding that are never corrected **constitutes** a rather **difficult** task. Moreover, recent studies **have** demonstrated that the analysis of linguistic misunderstanding can throw new **light** on our **knowledge** of diachronic processes.

In his approach to the process of development of periphrastic *do* in early Modern English, Kroch (1989) demonstrates that the four basic sentence types distinguished for his research (declarative, interrogative, negative declarative and negative interrogative) show parallel growth rates during a period of 300 years. This means that each generation of speakers of English used a different proportion of periphrases for each type of sentence, that was increased at an identical rate by the following generation. Further, the progressive **decrease** in the use of constructions without *do* (see [1a]) is associated with the linguistic ambiguity developed by them as a consequence of other parallel diachronic processes (such as the loss of case markings), and the development of new, clearer constructions with periphrastic *do* (as in [1b]) is **seen** as a disambiguation strategy.

- [1a] Which knight saw the king?
 [1b] Which knight did the king see?

In Kroch's reanalysis of this process, listeners play a decisive role in the evolution of old and new constructions. Linguistic change is thus conceived as a direct consequence of the superposition of misunderstandings between speakers from one generation and listeners from the following one, that leads to a long-term generalization of the more unambiguous form.

II. DISAMBIGUATING LINGUISTIC AMBIGUITY: A REANALYSIS OF THE BELFAST DATA.

II.1. From the above discussion, it **becomes** clear that listeners are frequently faced with the interpretation of linguistic forms that present a **certain** degree of ambiguity. The listener's reactions to **this** situation will **depend** again on **his** own method of recognition of linguistic **variation**. As **in** the case of the naive psychologist previously **described**, the interpretation of a given case of ambiguity by a naive **listener** will be determined by his own tendency to match unsupported items to the **less** marked linguistic category. On the other **side** of the scale, the data processor who has no previous way of knowing how to interpret such a form will prefer to disambiguate unclear items on the basis of the proportion of clear cases previously determined.

Labov's recent analysis of hypothetical data on plural /s/ deletion in Spanish (1994: 588-596), based on the effects of probability matching on sound change, distinguishes these two types of listeners, **in** order to determine two different types of cognitive processes related to the disambiguation of unclear forms: the Privative Theory and the Facultative Theory. Both theories constitute two ways of cognitive representation, and the interaction between them will determine the progress or decay of a given linguistic item.

Our analysis **here** is based on a set of data on the distribution of *mate* and *meat* items extracted from a previous study by Milroy and Harris (1980) on the different pronunciations of such items in the vernacular variety of English spoken in Belfast. This data, **taken** from the informal observation of 8 male informants, points to a situation of near-merging between both classes of items. However, and although the realizations of these items may sometimes be identical, the research **proves** that lexical misunderstanding

between words from these **two** classes is not a very frequent phenomenon among speakers of the Belfast vernacular. Table 2 represent the distribution of the 159 examples **analysed**, classified by vowel height.

	mate	meat
[ɪe]	33	0
[e]	6	2
[ee]	54	18
[e̞e]	4	18
[e]	2	20
[ɛ]	0	2

TABLE 2: Disuibution of mate and mear items in the Belfast vernacular (based on Milroy and Harris, 1980)

As can be **seen** from the above distribution, both groups of words **have** an **unambiguous form** ([mɪet] for mate and [mɛt] for meat) and, more frequently, a wide number of ambiguous pronunciations. However, from a statistical point of view these realizations can be easily associated with either mate or meat (see Fig. 1), which in general **terms** indicates the **existence** of very low levels of misunderstanding **within** this subsystem¹.




FIG. 1: Relative rates of overlap for six realizations of *mate* (white) and *meat* (shaded) (based on Mfilroy and Harris, 1980)

11.2. In this situation, the listener must be able to disambiguate all the occurrences of [me(e)t] and [mɛ(e)t] by matching them with either mate or meat. Obviously, most of the unclear realizations of each item will be immediately disambiguated by the listener on the basis of linguistic or cultural information. In spite of this, a small rate of these marked forms will remain unsupported (i.e., «not accompanied in the stream of speech by other sources of the information that it carries», Labov 1994: 589), producing an indeterminate number of misunderstandings. In order to get an approximation to these figures, the hypothetical rate of unsupported pronunciations of mate and mate used in this research will be fixed at 5%² (which is the rate used by Labov in his analysis of Spanish final /s/; 1994: 589).

II.3. The Privative Theory foresees that 5% of the occurrences of each of the realizations referred to here as marked will be misunderstood by the listener from the following generation; the relative inputs of three consecutive generations of speakers show the following distribution for every 100 occurrences of mate and meat:

	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	mate	meat	mate	meat	mate	meat
1. [ie]	20.75	0.00	20.75	0.00	20.75	0.00
2. [e]	3.77	1.26	3.84	1.20	3.90	1.15
3. [ee]	33.96	11.32	34.54	10.76	35.08	10.24
4. [eē]	2.52	11.32	2.40	11.46	2.28	11.58
5. [el]	1.26	12.58	1.20	12.65	1.15	12.72
6. [ɛ]	0.00	1.26	0.00	1.26	0.00	1.26
TOTAL	62.26	37.74	62.73	37.27	63.16	36.89

TABLE 3: Hypothetical rates of evolution of mate and meat in three consecutive generations of speakers (Privative Theory)

The long-term result of the evolution of this paradigm under the Privative Theory consists in a progressive generalization of two different pronunciations for each item: [met] (+0.13 after three generations) and [meet] (+1.12) for mate, [mɛt] (+0.26) and [meɛt]. (+0.14) for meat.

Figs. 2.a and 2.b give a graphic representation of the relative evolution of these forms under this model.




FIG. 2.a: Predicted graphs of the evolution of mate under the Privative Theory (1.[mɛt]; 2.[met]; 3.[meɛt]; 4.[mɛt]; 5.[mɛt])




FIG. 2.b: Predicted graphs of the evolution of meat under the Privative Theory (2.[met]; 3.[meet]; 4.[mɛet]; 5.[mɛt]; 6.[mɛ])

11.4. A second way of interpreting linguistic ambiguity consists in giving the same treatment to all the realizations of both mate and meat. Under the Facultative Theory, the listener will calculate the perceived proportion of each item uttered by the speaker by dividing the total number of unambiguous and supported references to it by the number of forms perceived. According to the data in Table 3, the listener from the following generation will perceive a 62.62% of mate and a 36.98% of meat. The next stage of the calculation applies these proportions to the total number of unsupported occurrences of both items. The hypothetical results produced by the application of this algorithm to the outputs of three consecutive generations of speakers are given in Table 4.

	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	mate	meat	mate	meat	mate	meat
1. [ie]	20.75	0.00	20.75	0.00	20.75	0.00
2. [e]	3.77	1.26	3.74	1.29	3.71	1.32
3. [ee]	33.96	11.32	33.68	11.60	33.43	11.85
4. [ɛɛ]	2.52	11.32	2.83	11.02	3.12	10.72
5. [ɛ]	1.26	12.58	1.63	12.20	1.99	11.85
6. [ɛ̃]	0.00	1.26	0.00	1.26	0.00	1.26
TOTAL	62.26	37.74	62.63	37.37	63.00	37.00

TABLE 4: Hypothetical rates of evolution of mate and meat in three consecutive generations of speakers (Facultative Theory)

The progression indicated by the Facultative Theory is radically different to the one sketched in our account on the Privative Theory. In this second case, the long-term solution to this situation of **partial** ambiguity will be finally resolved by the slow generalization of the realizations [mɛt] (+0.73 after three generations) and [mɛɛt] (+0.60) for mate items, [met] (+0.06) and [meɛt] (+0.53) for meat items. Figs. 3.a and 3.b give a graphic representation of the relative evolution of these forms under the model of the Facultative Theory.




FIG. 3.a: Predicted graphs of the evolution of mate under the Facultative Theory (1. [mɛt]; 2. [met]; 3. [meɛt]; 4. [mɛɛt]; 5. [mɛt])




FIG. 3.b: Predicted graphs of the evolution of meat under the Facultative Theory (2. [met]; 3. [meɛt]; 4. [mɛɛt]; 5. [mɛt]; 6. [met])

II.5. The mismatches of production and perception calculated **here** on the basis of the Privative and Facultative Theories are radically opposed, and so are the long-term results predicted by them. In the first case, high vowels (with or without glide) prevail on the low realizations of ME 2, while ME ea **maintains** a lower mid position. In the second, the **relative distance** between the two original vowels is kept, with a slight tendency towards raising.

Furthermore, the balance implied by both theories regarding the use of these forms in the near future points to a stability of the distribution given in Table 2. However, it should be remembered **here** that this data corresponds to a very concrete type of informant: **inner-city** Belfast men who **continue** to make use of this highly stigmatized vernacular. The increasing use of the standard realizations of both items in Belfast is thus to be understood as a disturbance in the system caused by forces of sociolinguistic origin. Our data is not to be **seen** as an exact prediction of future developments, but rather as general tendencies regarding the listener's attitudes towards ambiguity and its role in the process of sound change. The future evolution of these paradigms will depend on the interaction between these attitudes and other **intra**linguistic and **extra**linguistic factors.

III. PROJECTING BACKWARDS: VOCALIC CHANGE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLISH.

III.1. The next step we **have** to take **here** is to apply these two general tendencies to our data on early Modern English³. Our analysis **here** **assumes** the **existence** of a near-merging situation for mate and meat items in 16th-century **London**, that, in general terms, can be paralleled to the one previously sketched for contemporary vernacular Belfast English.

According to Gorkach (1991: 68-9), the raising of ME a to /ɛ:/ took place around 1500 in progressive pronunciations, while ME ea partially maintained its quality until 1600, a date after which it coalesced in /i:/ with ME ē. In his account on this process, **Samuels** (1972: 147) **points** to the **co-existence** of **three** different subsystems for the front series (see Table 5).

System I corresponds to the numerous descriptions given by orthoepists in the 16th and 17th centuries, while System II is based on the **evidence** of rhyming usage. The progressive **transfer** of speakers from these two systems to the third one **becomes** more evident from 1600, a date after which **references** to the different quality of ea and ā start to be frequent **among** contemporary grammarians.

	I	II	III
meed	i:	i:	i:
mead	e:	e:	i:
maid	e:	e:	e:
made	e:	e:	e:

TABLE 5: Three differernt mergers in 16th century London English (Samuels 1972)

Differently to previous approaches to this question, Samuels's analysis of the Great Vowel Shift is based on the functional load **inherent** to the various phonemes involved in the process. **Ambiguity is understood here** as the result of a homophonic clash between items of two phonetic classes, and the speaker's **desire** to avoid linguistic miscomprehensions **becomes** thus a cmcial factor in this explanation of the change. However, this approach to the Great Vowel Shift implies a complete merging between ME \bar{a} and ea in London English and a **later** separation of the resulting sound into two new phonemes that roughly reflect the original **pattern** of distribution of both classes. According to the theoretical **principle** of irreversibility of mergers, the **later** distinction between mate and meat items can not be accounted for on purely intralinguistic **factors**.

Socially oriented approaches to this question (of which Dobson 1968 constitutes an early example) largely rely on the **existence** of socially marked dialects in 17th-century London, the most stereotyped of which roughly corresponds to Samuels's System III as respects to the pronunciation of long front vowels. The **reversal** of the merger is thus conceived as a complete substitution of System II (traditionally associated with the emerging merchant class of London) by the "good English" forms represented by System III. However, this second type of phonological reconstmction fails to explain, among other things, the formation of System III, where ME ea is exporadically raised to /i:/. In short, approaches to this change exclusively based on either intralinguistic or sociolinguistic factors **have** produced very **partial** and incomplete descriptions of it.

Our **claim here** presupposes the absence of a complete merger between ME \bar{a} and ea in London English as the one described by the studies previously sketched (Labov 1994: 387). As in the case of Belfast, the **reported** cases of **confusion** between these two classes by the orthoepists' **observations** and richly attested in puns and rhymes from the 16th century will be treated **here** as near-mergers.

111.2. To start with, we will concentrate on the analysis of the different ways a near-merger of Speaker A can affect Speaker B's **later** output. However, and contrary to Samuels's approach, our study is no longer based on the speaker's need to make himself understand, but on the different consequences of misunderstanding by the listener.

Most accounts of the Great Vowel Shift agree in presenting the raising of ME \bar{a} as the **first** step towards the complete **restructuring** of the English vowel system. This change

is attested by a wide number of misspellings both for ME *ā* and *ea* words (e.g. *mead* for "made", *spake* for "speak"). Further, an apparent merging between these two phonemes in early Modern English is frequently testified by grammarians and orthoepists until the end of the 16th century⁴. Raising of *ā* in 16th century London was apparently more advanced among the merchant class (Labov 1994: 302-3), and its origin is to be found in the dialects spoken in the South-West of England, where a general raising of long tense vowels had previously occurred (Wyld 1936: 41). Since ME *ea* was maintained until one century later, we are bound to suppose that London speakers who adopted the southeastern pronunciation of *ā* (but not that of *ea*) were not able to distinguish between previous minimal pairs of the type *mate/meat* or *hate/heat*. Our approach to this question will focus now on the later evolution of ME *ea* in London English and the subsequent unmerging of these two classes.

The rapid change of *ea* to [e:] in 17th century London has been seen as an acceleration of the existing process of vowel raising produced by the continuous arrival of immigrants from Kent and Sussex. However, this explanation is unsatisfactory to the extent that it fails to explain why, in a situation of merging between *ā* and *ea*, only *ea* items were raised to [e:]. On the other hand, it is widely admitted that the dialects spoken in these regions were highly stigmatized (Leith 1983: 42), which would eventually have prevented London middle-class speakers from adopting or even imitating that pronunciation.

The scenario where this second raising took place could be hypothetically reconstructed as follows, where [/*ē*:/-1] and [/*e*:/+ 1] represent the impressionistic levels of vowel height contiguous to the lower and upper security margins of the phoneme /*e*/:

	mate	meat
[/ <i>ē</i> :/+1]	0	Y ³
/ <i>e</i> /	0	Y ¹
[/ <i>ē</i> :/-1]	X ²	Y ²
/ <i>a</i> /	X ¹	0

TABLE 6: Hypothetical representation of the distribution of *mate* and *meat* items in 16th century London

At the initial stages of the vowel shift, the raising of ME *a* affected a limited quantity of tokens, from which we can infer that X¹ was the predominant realization for the bulk of ME *ā* items. Similarly, Y² and Y³ are intended to represent respectively the most and the less advanced realizations of ME *ea*, so that they will be found in a very scarce group of words.

By applying the principles derived from previous cognitive approaches to the analysis of linguistic changes in progress to this situation, we can try to throw some new

light on this complicated process. Our next task will thus consist in **determining** the results of the application of the two cognitive theories outlined before to the paradigm represented by Table 6.

III.3. As in the case of contemporary Belfast English, by applying the Privative Theory to this distribution we will get a continuous **decrease** of the less frequent realizations of each phonerne, i.e. /ɛ:/ for ME ā and of [e:/-1] for ME ea. Obviously, this process would **have** led to a **conservation** of the system of long vowels characteristic of Middle English, which is not the case of 16th century London English.

On the other hand, the Facultative Theory points towards a progressive elimination of [e:/-1] for ME S, and a completion of the process of advancement of /ɛ:/ at a relatively high speed (depending on the **number** of homophones created by the new phonological situation). This rapid raising of ME S caused a massive transfer of ea items into the [e:/+1] category, in a way that these tokens rose the margin of security of the contiguous phonerne /e:/. Moreover, the **later** evolution of ME ea and ē clearly indicates a full merging of both sounds in /i:/.

Obviously, the quality of the allophones given in Table 6 is not easily **reconstructable**. However, we can get an approximation to their **relative** height by analyzing the behaviour of the three ME ea items of Anglo-Saxon origin that merged with ME ā in early Modern English (Díaz, in preparation). Break, drain and great appear as the only Middle English words with initial clusters of voiced obstruent plus /r/ where the long quantity of the vowel has **been** maintained **until** today⁵. Recent studies **have** demonstrated that front vowels preceded by **obstruent/liquid clusters** tend to be slightly lower and further back than **those** appearing in other environments. In this situation, we can **assume** that during the first phase of raising ā items had fully **collapsed** with these three tokens in their upward movement. The acoustic difference between ME ā and ea at this point can be paralleled to the one found in the present day English pronunciation of /æ/ in fan (which exemplifies the most advanced realization of this phonerne) and flat (with /æ/ neighbouring the security limit of /a/)⁶.

III.4. Raising of ME S and ea has **been seen here** as a consequence of the growing rate of **misunderstanding** created after the invasion of the acoustic space of the second by the first. When facing up to these items, listeners develop different strategies of disambiguation that will **determine** their **later** linguistic usage with regard to the realizations of both phonemes. Given the social situation found in 16th century London, miscomprehension among speakers is to be primarily conceived as a **direct** consequence of cross-dialectal **communication**. Further, social factors related to the stigmatization of **certain** dialectal **features** and to the social aspirations of middle-class speakers can be claimed to account for the progression of the changes among the different social strata. However, the **internal** mechanism of the Great Vowel Shift is to be described within the framework of everyday conversation and exchange **among** individuals who learn to speak by hearing and interpreting what other speakers **utter**.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding pages we **have** presented an analysis of the evolution of ME *ā* and *ea* in two different subsystems of English. Linguistic cognition has **been** understood **here** as the different ways listeners interpret language. From this perspective, sound change appears as a consequence of linguistic misunderstanding between speaker and listener. Obviously, this claim **does** not pretend to account by itself for the whole bulk of sound changes related to the Great Vowel Shift. In spite of **this**, we hope that the reader will **become** aware of the **importance** of the role played by cognitive factors in any process of linguistic change. **Further**, we expect that our initial intention of **linking** language and society on the means of social cognition has **been fulfilled**.

NOTES

¹ This fact constitutes the demonstration that, **contrary** to traditional accounts of this variety of English, no merger has occurred between both classes in the Belfast vernacular (Milroy 1992: 160).

² It should be underlined that this 5% is conceived **here** as a working rate that will allow the approximate **reconstruction** of the whole process of linguistic change; the real rate of linguistic misunderstanding between both lexical items in vernacular Belfast English will not necessarily coincide with this figure, **and** its calculation is out of the scope of the present **research**.

³ For a **full** account on recent approaches to the Great Vowel Shift from different **theoretical** frameworks see Wolfe (1972), Guzmán (1994), **and references** there **cited**.

⁴ Laneham (1575), Bullokar (1580), Bellot (1589) and Delamothe (1592) consider these two sounds to be identical.

⁵ The number of items belonging to this **category** was drastically reduced **after** the shonening of ME *ea* and *o* before **dentals**, e.g. bread, dread (Gorlach 1991: 72).

⁶ Labov (1994: 180) calculates the lowering of the phonerne /æ/ in this environment in 106 Hz, and its backing in 160 **Hz**.

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Inferencia Léxica en la comprensión lectora de textos en inglés como L2

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RESUMEN

El objetivo de este estudio es examinar uno de los mecanismos fundamentales para la comprensión lectora: el de la inferencia léxica. Partiendo de las teorías sobre los modelos de comprensión lectora, se identifican todos los elementos y mecanismos que intervienen en este proceso, para hacer hincapié en la inferencia léxica como elemento clave a la hora de proporcionar pistas al lector que le permitan acceder al significado del texto en la L2. Se parte de que la inferencia es el mecanismo que permite establecer el nexo entre el léxico mental del individuo y la información léxica que aparece en la página. De esa manera, una vez identificados los elementos y analizados los procesos se pueden establecer diversas implicaciones pedagógicas para que así los aprendices de la L2 mejoren sus habilidades y utilicen técnicas más eficaces cuando se enfrenten a la lectura de textos en la L2.

KEY WORDS: lexical inferencing, foreign language reading comprehension, schema theory, lexical cues, vocabulary instruction

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to examine one of the main devices in the reading comprehension process: lexical inferencing. First, the main theories on reading comprehension models are discussed in order to identify the elements that take part in this process. The role of lexical inference as a key element for giving cues to the reader that allow him/her to reach the meaning of words in the L2 text is emphasized. Lexical inference is what permits to link the schemas existing in the individual mental lexicon with the lexical information in print. Once the elements and processes have been identified and analysed, several pedagogical implications can be drawn so that the L2 learners can improve their abilities and use more effective techniques when they face the reading of an L2 text.

PALABRAS CLAVE: inferencia léxica, comprensión lectora en L2, teoría de los esquemas, pistas léxicas, enseñanza de vocabulario

I. INTRODUCCION

En este estudio se parte de la idea base de que el proceso de comprensión lectora es un proceso constructivo en el que el lector interviene activamente utilizando todo el conocimiento lingüístico y no lingüístico que posee. Basándose en esta idea se han establecido modelos que intentan describir la relación texto-lector y se han identificado los elementos que toman parte en este proceso. Tanto la relación texto-lector como la participación de dichos elementos se hace posible gracias a los diversos mecanismos de inferencia que el lector pone en funcionamiento.

Uno de los tipos fundamentales de inferencia es el de la inferencia léxica, que capacita al lector para que éste pueda relacionar su conocimiento previo con el léxico del texto al que se enfrenta. El estudio de las inferencias léxicas puede suponer la clave dentro del ámbito de la enseñanza de las lenguas extranjeras a la hora de mejorar no sólo las técnicas de aprendizaje de vocabulario sino también el mismo proceso de comprensión lectora en la L2. El uso de inferencias, por otra parte, no siempre implica un resultado positivo y por ello se hace aún más necesario su análisis y estudio cuando el objetivo es el de establecer las implicaciones pedagógicas pertinentes.

II. LA LECTURA COMO ACTIVIDAD COGNITIVA

Los distintos modelos de lectura se han ido perfilando a medida que nacían y se desarrollaban diversas disciplinas en los campos de la psicología y la lingüística, como la psicolingüística, la lingüística artificial, la psicología cognitiva, la lingüística textual, etc. Cada una de estas áreas ha contribuido a definir y enriquecer el concepto de comprensión lectora, que esencialmente consiste en "la atribución o construcción de significado a través de lo escrito" (Rodríguez Diéguez 1991: 307). Hasta los años 60 se había considerado la lectura como un conjunto de subdestrezas a dominar: el significado residía en el texto y la finalidad del lector era reproducirlo. En los modelos cognitivos de comprensión lectora esta habilidad se concibe como un proceso de especialización gradual, en el cual "los lectores desarrollan estrategias para comprender textos cada vez más sofisticados en contextos situacionales que se van haciendo más complejos" (Dole et alia 1991, p.255). Este proceso es un proceso constructivo, en el sentido de que las estrategias utilizadas y el conocimiento que aporta el lector son necesarios para la construcción del significado; por otro lado, el conocimiento desarrollado en cada acto de lectura sirve de base ("scaffolding") para otros actos posteriores, de manera que se va formando un "entramado cognoscitivo" que permite la especialización antes mencionada. Esto es básicamente lo que propugnan las teorías constructivistas de aprendizaje (Piaget 1954; Ausubel 1963; Bruner 1972; Vygotsky 1977, 1979; entre otros); en ellas hay una visión del aprendizaje como actividad analógica, de relación, de manera que asimilamos nueva información principalmente por la creación de analogías con la que ya poseemos.

El concepto del aprendizaje de las teorías de corte constructivista es compartido en parte por las diversas líneas cognitivistas en la lingüística aplicada, que consideran el procesamiento del lenguaje como una forma de procesamiento del conocimiento en general; la mente se considera como una especie de red ("network") única, donde todo aparece conectado. Los modelos de aprendizaje lingüístico ACT (Adaptive Control of Thought) de

Anderson, de *Procesamiento de Información* de McLaughlin, o *De Competencia*, de MacWhinney (analizados en Cook, 1993) están basados en estos postulados. En el modelo de Anderson sobre adquisición del lenguaje la idea clave es que el conocimiento, y el lenguaje, se adquieren a través de la producción de reglas para llegar a objetivos; la memoria juega un papel fundamental: la memoria activa (*working memory*) se encarga de realizar las reglas de producción; la memoria declarativa almacenaría la información factual, en forma de *proposiciones* o *imágenes*, de naturaleza *semántica*; la memoria procedimental permitiría contrastar los procesos de producción con la información existente en la memoria declarativa. Durante cualquier acto de aprendizaje la mente pasana de un conocimiento declarativo o cognitivo, percibido como "hechos declarativos", a través de unos mecanismos de asociación, para llegar a una etapa autónoma, de generalización de producciones y procedimentalización del conocimiento. Otro concepto clave en la teoría de Anderson y en el resto de postulados cognitivos es el de activación: los aspectos de la mente que se usan más frecuentemente serán "activos", de manera que el acceso a ellos es más fácil. Al ser la mente una red donde todo aparece conectado, la activación se extiende eligiendo siempre el camino más activo. Por eso la teona de Anderson se conoce también como la teoría de la "activación expansible" ("spreading activation theory"). Esta idea es clave para la definición de la comprensión, que entre otras cosas consiste en la activación de esquemas mentales. Por otro lado, la Inteligencia Artificial ha facilitado la aparición de modelos como el de McLaughlin, que contemplan a los individuos como procesadores de información, limitados tanto por la atención que la tarea requiere como por su propia capacidad de procesamiento. El aprendizaje, y la lectura como tipo de procesamiento, comienza siendo un proceso *controlado*, en el que el individuo pone una atención máxima, para gradualmente convertirse en un proceso *automático*, que requiere atención mínima. El modelo de *Competencia* contempla al sistema de procesamiento humano como capaz de utilizar un número limitado de señales a la vez para la construcción de significado, de manera que de las posibles señales existentes - *orden de palabras*, *vocabulario*, *morfología* y *entonación*- cada lengua ha llegado a una forma de ajustarlas en el mismo canal. La adquisición del lenguaje consiste en ir adjudicando a cada tipo de señal su peso relativo dentro del sistema, y esto puede plantear problemas a la hora de leer en una lengua extranjera, donde el peso relativo de los componentes o señales puede variar.

La *Lingüística Cognitiva* va más allá, sin embargo, y considera el componente léxico como central, ya que permite el acceso a las estructuras de conocimiento, de naturaleza semántica, y almacenadas en forma de *esquemas*. Así, Langacker (1987) iguala *significado* con *conceptualización* (como procesamiento cognitivo); en su *Gramática Cognitiva* se defiende que la estructura semántica se corresponde básicamente con estructuras de conocimiento, y se basa en mecanismos imaginativos convencionales - como la metáfora-, de manera que en gran medida es específica de cada lengua. La gramática sena la simbolización de esa estructura semántica, y en ello se asemeja al léxico. Las típicas divisiones entre sintaxis, léxico y morfología no son tales, sino que estas formarían un continuum de estructuras simbólicas, sin un carácter de representación autónomo. Por esta razón la inferencia de tipo léxico va a tener una importancia especial en una teona *cognitiva* de la comprensión lectora, al establecer un acceso directo a los conceptos, almacenados en forma de proposiciones. Por otro lado, las estructuras de conocimiento o esquemas de cada hablante se configuran según su propia vivencia, de manera que cada acto de lectura de cada lector consiste en la creación de un significado con una base pragmática, que no tiene por

qué coincidir con el alcanzado por otro lector, o incluso por el mismo en una situación o momento diferente. Los modelos culturales almacenados en la experiencia del lector en forma de esquema van a determinar en gran medida la interpretación que éste haga de la palabra escrita.

En Bransford y Johnson (1972, 1973) se demuestra mediante diversos estudios empíricos que para el procesamiento de estímulos lingüísticos es necesario un **sustrato** adicional, procedente, bien de experiencias extralingüísticas (como estímulos visuales), bien de oraciones previas, de manera que se evidencia el carácter cognitivo y constructivo de la comprensión lingüística. Sanford y Garrod (1985, entre otros) realizaron asimismo varios experimentos que demuestran el uso del conocimiento previo en la comprensión de textos. Los autores midieron el tiempo utilizado para la lectura de grupos de oraciones, comprobando que el lector identifica marcos de referencia o **escenarios** relacionados con experiencias previas para interpretar el texto nuevo, de manera que si la nueva información no es acorde con las expectativas se produce un fallo de interpretación que obliga a ajustar dichas expectativas o a cambiar el escenario, lo que se traduce en mayor tiempo de procesamiento.

La comprensión lectora conlleva, por tanto, la utilización de dos tipos de información: **lingüística**, y no-lingüística o conceptual, que pueden provenir de dos fuentes: el texto, por un lado, y el lector, por otro. Al mismo tiempo, la comprensión se puede enfocar desde dos perspectivas: la de la recepción por parte del lector, siendo entonces ésta un proceso dinámico, centrado en las condiciones de recepción, o la del texto como producto que ha de comprenderse, siendo en ese caso el énfasis en las condiciones de producción del propio mensaje. Considerando la lectura como un proceso dinámico de interacción texto-lector, se han desarrollado diversos modelos que se diferencian básicamente en la consideración del sentido del procesamiento de información en dicha interacción, y que se pueden englobar en uno de estos grupos: **ascendentes**, **descendentes** e **interactivos**.¹ En el primer grupo, en la línea de la lingüística estructural y la psicología del comportamiento, la lectura se concibe como descodificación o reconocimiento de señales, y el significado se construye partiendo del estímulo visual y en sentido ascendente - pasando de las unidades inferiores (letras, palabras) a las frases, oraciones, etc. Los modelos descendentes, que comienzan a desarrollarse en los años 70, defienden la participación activa del lector, que utiliza su conocimiento previo para interpretar el texto. Desde esta perspectiva habna por tanto dos tipos de información en juego: la no-visual (conocimiento previo) y la visual (el texto escrito); el lector procedena en una dirección descendente, utilizando sus habilidades cognoscitivas para predecir el significado de lo que lee utilizando las claves que encuentra en los sistemas grafo-fonológico, sintáctico y **semántico** y haciendo uso de la redundancia del lenguaje escrito (Goodman 1967, 1971). En oposición a los dos tipos de modelos descritos, de carácter unidireccional, aparecen los modelos interactivos en los que cada fuente de información contribuye a la construcción del significado textual, con procesamiento en ambas direcciones. Destacan en este grupo el modelo en paralelo de Rumelhart (1977) y el modelo de compensación de Stanovich (1980,1982).

Cada uno de los grupos presenta ventajas y puntos débiles para explicar el proceso de lectura (Puente1991). Los modelos ascendentes plantean problemas para explicar el rol del contexto, del conocimiento y de las experiencias previas del lector como variables que facilitan la comprensión. Como contrapartida, enfatizan la importancia de la descodificación en el proceso de lectura. Estos modelos parecen responder mejor a la imagen de un lector

en sus comienzos, en el caso de la lengua materna, y desde luego no servirían para explicar el aprendizaje de la lectura en una lengua extranjera, en cuyo caso el lector aporta el aprendizaje de lectura previo en su propio idioma. Los modelos descendentes plantean problemas para describir el proceso lector en los casos en que el lector no posee conocimiento previo para generar hipótesis; además el tiempo empleado para formulación de hipótesis, reconocimiento, etc.. parece excesivo. Sin embargo se considera la aportación del lector en la comprensión del texto al utilizar éste conceptos, conocimientos y experiencias previas en la interacción con el mismo. Modelos de este tipo parecen más adecuados para explicar el procedimiento de un lector experto, sobre todo en el caso de lectores adultos leyendo en su propio idioma textos con cuyo contenido estén familiarizados. Huckin y Haynes (1995) comentan que el enfoque descendente ha prevalecido en el caso de la **enseñanza** de idiomas en los últimos 20 años porque se defendía que si en la **L1** los lectores adquirían vocabulario principalmente por deducción por el contexto, en la **L2** debía funcionar del mismo modo. El problema es que no parece tan fácil para un aprendiz de la **L2** deducir vocabulario del contexto.

Los modelos interactivos resultan ser los más completos en su descripción y parecen en principio más aplicables a una variedad de situaciones de lectura. Su problema es que al ser más complejos su verificación en la práctica se hace más difícil. Estos modelos se han convertido en el punto de partida de las diversas líneas de investigación que se han seguido desarrollando en relación con la lectura, tanto en la lengua materna como en segundas lenguas o en lenguas extranjeras. Parece lógico tanto que a la **reconstrucción** del significado de un texto contribuyan diversas fuentes de información, como que ciertas destrezas se automaticen o que el conocimiento previo del lector juegue un papel en este proceso, dependiendo de factores como edad, **familiarización** con la temática o experiencia lectora.

Sea cual sea el modelo propuesto, los siguientes elementos aparecen en todos ellos como componentes (Antonini y Pino, 1991: 140-141):

- Identificación de letras.
- Relación de letras con sonidos.
- Identificación de palabras.
- Identificación de oraciones.
- Identificación de estructura gramatical.
- Asignación de significado a palabras y oraciones.
- Establecimiento de relaciones entre las oraciones del texto.
- Utilización del conocimiento previo para predecir información y adivinar el significado de palabras desconocidas.
- Realización de inferencias basadas en el contexto de lo leído y en los esquemas cognoscitivos del lector.

De los elementos enumerados, los cinco primeros implican la identificación de aspectos relacionados con el código lingüístico, mientras que los demás suponen la *interpretación* de la información textual mediante el uso de un conocimiento de tipo extralingüístico, gracias a los mecanismos de *inferencia*.

III. PAPEL DE LA INFERENCIA EN UN MODELO INTERACTIVO DE LECTURA

Si en la actualidad sigue siendo un reto el dilucidar el tipo de interacción entre los componentes del proceso lector, otro de los aspectos que se han seguido desarrollando es el papel del conocimiento que el lector aporta al enfrentarse a un texto. Como afirma Cooper (1986: cap.1): "la información previa del lector es uno de los elementos fundamentales dentro de su capacidad de comprensión" y uno de los factores a tener en cuenta al implementar un programa de comprensión lectora hasta el punto de que "la forma en que cada lector implementa la actividad de la comprensión depende de su información previa". Una vez que está claro que el conocimiento del lector es fundamental en la construcción del significado del texto, y dentro de las teorías sobre los *esquemas de conocimiento previo*, los estudios sobre inferencias como los mecanismos que relacionan el conocimiento previo del lector con la información textual se han centrado preferentemente en los niveles discursivos (van Dijk y Kintsch 1983, etc.). Estos dos autores distinguen dos tipos de inferencia, según la función que éstas cumplen: las inferencias puente, que vertebran la información que aparece de forma explícita y, en palabras de Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (1993), permiten establecer la coherencia textual; y las inferencias *elaborativas*, que aportan nuevos conocimientos sin los cuales no es posible interpretar la información explícita, o en todo caso la interpretación variará dependiendo del grado de conocimiento que el lector posea. Este es el tipo de inferencias que son facilitadas por lo que otros autores llaman conocimiento previo del mundo, conocimiento previo temático, o conocimiento previo general. En este sentido, hay una tradición de estudios sobre esquemas culturales y su incidencia en la comprensión lingüística, sobre todo en contextos bilingües y en el aprendizaje de lenguas extranjeras, donde claramente se pone de manifiesto la relación directa entre la posesión de esquemas previos y la comprensión (Steffensen y Joag-Dev, 1984; Carrell, 1987; Parry, 1987; Roller y Matambo, 1992). Noordman y Vonk (1992) realizan una división parecida a la de van Dijk y Kintsch (1983) al distinguir las inferencias realizadas a partir de una representación textual, de las que son derivadas de información relativa al mundo "exterior al texto" (consecuencia de una representación de un modelo del mundo).

Los procesos de inferencia son especialmente relevantes en el área de aprendizaje de lenguas, ya que en este caso la comprensión se ve afectada, no tanto por la falta de conocimiento previo general o temático, como por deficiencias lingüísticas que afectarían más bien a las inferencias tipo *puente*. Es más, se ha comprobado en diversos estudios (Hammadou 1991; Salager-Meyer 1991; Chikalanga 1993, etc.) que los aprendices de una lengua extranjera se basan con más frecuencia en los conocimientos "exteriores al texto", sobre todo los lectores adultos y expertos en la materia sobre la que leen, compensando así la falta de agilidad para realizar las inferencias que dependen más del conocimiento de la lengua meta, con consecuencias no siempre beneficiosas para la comprensión (Alderson 1984; Peretz y Shohamy 1990; etc.). El conocer cómo funcionan los procesos inferenciales puede ayudar a decidir qué tipo de conocimientos hay que propiciar y en qué casos.

IV. INFERENCIA LÉXICA

El estudio de las inferencias se había centrado fundamentalmente en el nivel discursivo, mientras que sólo recientemente se ha comenzado a producir literatura sobre el

papel de la inferencia a nivel léxico. Ya se ha comentado el papel central del léxico dentro de la lingüística cognitiva, al permitir el acceso directo a las estructuras semánticas en que se almacena la información. Coady (1995: 8-10) señala lo mismo al afirmar

word-forms which are automatically and instantaneously recognized by a reader can be thought of as access **portals** to schemata. In effect, word-forms trigger an already existing network of knowledge which will then interact with other **words/schemata**, enabling a reader to **arrive** at comprehension of the overall meaning of the given text. The **importance** of this view is that schema theory can now be **seen** as **truly** interactive, **connecting** (both) top-down knowledge structures and bottom-up (text-based) word-forms. (p.11)

Faerch, Haarstrup y Phillipson (1984:96) definen la inferencia léxica como "making informed guessings about the meaning of **unknown** vocabulary". Coady reivindica la centralidad del reconocimiento léxico en módulos interactivos de lectura, ya que según demuestran las investigaciones sobre los lectores eficaces, éstos codifican el léxico automáticamente de manera que pueden dirigir su atención a otros niveles, como la oración y el discurso; esto a su vez les ayuda a interpretar palabras nuevas utilizando el significado contextual, cosa que los lectores inmaduros no pueden hacer. Según el autor, muchas de las técnicas que se utilizan hoy en día para enseñar vocabulario son ineficaces porque no inducen al lector a asociar este nuevo léxico con sus esquemas previos y conceptos que ya poseen.

Según la *reón'a de la adquisición léxica* (Coady, Carrell y Natim 1985: 16) hay un modelo universal de identificación léxica que funciona igual en la L1 que en la L2. Las palabras que un lector pueda encontrar en su L1 o en su L2 pueden pertenecer a una de 3 categorías evolutivas:

- a) Las que se reconocen automáticamente sin necesidad de contexto.
- b) Las que son hasta cierto punto familiares y sólo se pueden reconocer en contexto.
- c) Las que son desconocidas y han de inferirse por el contexto, o buscarse en el diccionario, o dejar sin comprender.

Las de tipo (a) se corresponden con el léxico de alta frecuencia, que debería enseñarse en la L2 (y en la L1) ya que su reconocimiento debe ser automático. Las menos frecuentes deberían aprenderse incidentalmente mediante lectura extensiva, pero según los autores, "only after a critical level of automaticity has **been** achieved with the high-frequency or core vocabulary" (p. 16)

Parry (1995) realizó un estudio longitudinal sobre adquisición de vocabulario inglés por parte de una estudiante japonesa; aunque su nivel de L2 era bajo, la estudiante podía leer un texto académico sin que la poca **familiarización** con el léxico le impidiera comprenderlo; esto lleva a Parry a hipotetizar que gran parte de la adquisición léxica es inconsciente, al establecerse asociaciones a lo largo de la lectura debido sobre todo a la riqueza proporcionada por el contexto. Asimismo, la estudiante averiguó el significado de una cantidad de palabras (148 de 168) que había seleccionado como "desconocidas": Parry sugiere que el lector adulto de una L2 utiliza mucha información previa para interpretar lo que lee, y evidentemente no aprende el vocabulario igual que lo haría un niño. De las

averiguaciones hechas, más de 1/3 eran exactas, menos de 1/4 equivocadas, y el resto bastante aproximadas, de manera que "It seems that not only is an ESL reader able to bring a great deal of meaning to an English text. but for a remarkably high proportion of the time it is the right meaning". Uno de los factores que facilitaron a la alumna el éxito en la lectura es, según la autora, el hecho de que estaba leyendo dos libros y asistiendo a conferencias sobre la temática todas las semanas. Parry concluye sobre la necesidad de reproducir en el aula la riqueza contextual que facilita el aprendizaje de vocabulario, mediante la utilización de criterios más temáticos que gramaticales, utilizando como material de lectura libros completos o selecciones de textos agrupados por el contenido; por otro lado, el conocimiento lingüístico ayuda a hacer interpretaciones más concisas y a que el significado no se desvíe, de manera que es necesaria cierta instrucción gramatical, en relación con el contexto lingüístico y la forma de la palabra.

V. UTILIZACIÓN DE PISTAS TEXTUALES EN LA INFERENCIA LÉXICA

Del estudio anterior se desprende que el hablante adulto que lee en una lengua extranjera utiliza gran cantidad de información para deducir el vocabulario necesario y comprender el texto de manera eficaz bajo ciertas condiciones. Faerch et al (1984) distinguían tres tipos de pistas para la deducción del léxico: *contextuales*, *intralingüísticas* e *interlingüísticas*. Las primeras están relacionadas con el conocimiento previo extratextual que el lector posee; las segundas se refieren al conocimiento de la lengua materna y otras lenguas conocidas por el lector y que influyen no siempre positivamente en el reconocimiento de significados de la lengua extranjera en cuestión; las terceras son fruto del conocimiento que el lector ya posee sobre el código de la L2 y sus reglas.

Dubin y Olshtain (1995) establecen una tipología de elementos de apoyo textual, examinando en qué condiciones son los lectores capaces de predecir o generar significados léxicos que se adecúan a un contexto textual particular, y en qué condiciones no ocurre esto. Proponen varios elementos de apoyo textual:

- 1) conocimiento **extratextual** (conocimiento general)
- 2) conocimiento temático (relacionado con la temática del texto)
- 3) semántico **I**: información discursiva, de nivel superior al párrafo
- 4) semántico **II**: información disponible localmente, a nivel de oración o de párrafo
- 5) **sintáctico**: relaciones dentro de la oración o del párrafo.

En un estudio sobre 3 artículos periodísticos a los que se aplica la técnica cloze de modo selectivo, 41 sujetos tenían que completar los textos y especificar qué pistas les habían ayudado; según los resultados, todas estas categorías textuales han de estar presentes para que el sujeto pueda recuperar el significado léxico requerido. Además, parece desprenderse que el contexto inmediato a nivel local es el más decisivo a la hora de tomar la decisión final.

La tipología de Dubin y Olshtain se muestra especialmente exhaustiva al hacer hincapié en las distintas etapas de procesamiento, diferenciando el componente temático del conocimiento del mundo general y separando las pistas lingüísticas a distintos niveles. Sin embargo, carece del elemento contrastivo que refleja la taxonomía de Faerch et al.

Diversos estudios se han centrado en el efecto-positivo o negativo- de la relación entre la lengua materna del lector y la L2, intentando dilucidar qué pistas tienen más peso de entre las descritas por los autores para la inferencia del léxico. Koda (1989) estudia los efectos del conocimiento léxico transferido de la L1 sobre el desarrollo de la habilidad lectora en L2. averiguando que la transferencia de conocimiento léxico aumenta la comprensión lectora, siendo la familiaridad ortográfica una ventaja que aumenta el efecto a medida que las tareas se vuelven más complejas, de manera que el desarrollo global de la habilidad lectora en la L2 se ve estimulado por la transferencia léxica. Los aspectos gramaticales tienen, según Koda una importancia relativa, que viene determinada por la estructura morfosintáctica de cada lengua. Los datos del estudio confirman el uso de conocimiento gramatical de la L1 que es afín a la L2.

Hancin-Bhatt y Nagy (1994) indagan **asimismo** sobre el papel de la transferencia interlingüística en lenguas cercanas como el inglés y el español, res ltando ésta positiva no sólo en cuanto a reconocimiento de léxico individual, sino también en el aprendizaje de morfología derivacional. El conocimiento de mecanismos de derivación de origen común - como “-idad” e “-ity”, en español e inglés, respectivamente, es una fuente para la deducción del léxico, y su uso puede ser potenciado mediante la enseñanza explícita en el aula.

Holmes y Guerra Ramos (1995) destacan **asimismo** la importancia del vocabulario de origen común- “**cognados**”- en la comprensión lectora en la L2. Según los autores este área no se ha investigado lo suficiente porque el papel de la L1 no ha sido considerado como suficientemente como una ayuda:

...although the role of the learner's native language has waxed and waned in **importance** in language learning theory it has **been** more **commonly** looked upon as a **source** of error, interference, or negative transfer, than as an asset in the learning process.

Los autores defienden la importancia de este aspecto en lenguas como el portugués y el inglés, y especialmente en textos académicos, en los que el uso de palabras de origen latino es lo más común. Según ellos, la importancia de los cognados depende de factores como la cercanía entre las lenguas, el género lingüístico o el ámbito de la L2 estudiados. Investigando sobre el papel de este tipo de léxico los autores averiguaron lo siguiente:

- la identificación de cognados es una estrategia natural
- el conocimiento previo extratextual sirvió de gran ayuda en sus experimentos para identificación del contenido textual y de este tipo de léxico
- la falta de conocimiento gramatical puede llevar a la interpretación errónea de cognados, sobre todo en cuanto a clase de palabra
- **asimismo**, esta falta de conocimiento gramatical de la L2 provoca el uso de averiguaciones poco fundadas (“**reckless guessing**”):

We found then, that when **recklessly** guessing, informants were quite happy to employ their previous knowledge of the **subject** to **provide** extra information in their **summaries**, **often** with little **connection** to the real content of the original text. The text spoke with the voice of the reader rather than with that of the author. [...] It seemed important to encourage students to monitor their guesses and to review what

they had understood in the text up to a given moment, to check that it made sense and that the text **interpretation** was structured **coherently**. (p.93)

En el estudio se demuestra cómo la abundancia de conocimiento previo sobre la temática del texto no siempre es buena: en concreto, cuando el conocimiento previo va en contradicción con la información textual, puede interferir en la construcción del significado; los autores averiguaron que el reconocimiento de cognados está bastante ligado a los esquemas de contenido o al conocimiento temático.

En Huckin y Bloch (1995) se reafirma, como en otros estudios, (Haynes 1995, Laufer 1989), el fenómeno de las palabras con formas similares en las dos lenguas. **L1** y **L2**, como el que más confusión produce en la interpretación léxica por hablantes de **L2**. Según ellos, un 20% de averiguaciones erróneas de palabras desconocidas tienen que ver con alguna confusión fnto del parecido formal. Muchas veces este parecido es sólo a a nivel grafémico, de manera que la inestabilidad del sistema fonológico en la **IL**, como puede ser el caso del inglés para hablantes de español, ocasiona un deficiente almacenamiento en la memoria (ej., "changes" por "charges").

Haynes y Baker (1995) comparan la aproximación a vocabulario nuevo por parte de estudiantes universitarios de Taiwan y norteamericanos durante la lectura de textos en inglés. Tras analizar los datos de una **prueba** de recuerdo libre y de re-lectura, con averiguación de léxico desconocido, los autores averiguaron lo siguiente:

- para definir el léxico desconocido, ambos gmpos utilizaron estrategias basadas en el texto y en su propia experiencia.
- el conocimiento experiencial puede interferir con el aprendizaje de léxico nuevo cuando los lectores sobre-enfatizan ilustraciones o situaciones relacionadas con el conocimiento del mundo
- ambos gmpos mostraban fallos de comprensión cuando el vocabulario y el conocimiento experiencial previos no se modificaban (complementaban) con una lectura detallada del texto. Aún así, los americanos, que estaban leyendo en su lengua materna, comprendieron mejor el texto, lo que los autores interpretan del siguiente modo:

For the **Americans** prior vocabulary knowledge **served mainly** to facilitate comprehension of new concepts, whereas for the Chinese limited vocabulary knowledge restricted comprehension of lexical familiarizations. [...] Vocabulary knowledge constitutes **the** central difficulty for this group of **L2** readers: Even though the Chinese students read closely, with considerable strategic flexibility, they could not compensate very well for **their** limited vocabulary.

En Haynes (1995) se demuestra mediante un estudio empírico que la averiguación de términos nuevos mediante el contexto o el uso de análisis formal no siempre funciona; especialmente se han observado los siguientes factores (p.60):

- 1) cuando el lector tiene pistas inmediatas las utiliza de forma efectiva
- 2) si el contexto es insuficiente, o lo son las pistas **globales**, o el alumno carece de demasiado vocabulario, la averiguación se hace muy difícil de llevar a la práctica
- 3) dentro del estudio, los estudiantes de cualquier procedencia lingüística hacían uso del análisis de palabras

4) las pistas **grafémicas** son muy marcadas, y pueden ser más influyentes que las pistas sintácticas

5) los lectores de una L2 suelen ser muy inseguros sobre la familiarización con términos y deben atender a la estructura antes de decidirse a pasar de largo o adivinarla

Haynes defiende el uso de estrategias de inferencia -procesamiento descendente-. a pesar de que no siempre funcionan, con el objeto de desarrollar una flexibilidad para llegar al significado en perjuicio de que se falle en la recuperación léxica directa: "Learning to reevaluate **initial** guessings is as important as **learning** to make a first guess" (p.59).

Lo importante, por lo tanto, sena lograr un dominio en el uso de los tres tipos de pistas - contextuales, intralingüísticas e **interlingüísticas**, siguiendo la terminología de Faerch et al-, de manera que una de las garantías de una interpretación correcta del significado sena el hecho de que no hay conflicto entre ellas.

VI. CONCLUSIONES

Enumeraremos a continuación algunas de las implicaciones que los estudios revisados ofrecen para la enseñanza de lenguas extranjeras, especialmente en el ámbito de la comprensión lectora:

1) Se sugiere en casi todos la necesidad de una instrucción explícita en vocabulario, ya que está demostrado que el conocimiento léxico es uno de los factores más significativos en la comprensión lectora tanto en L1 como en L2 (Koda 1989:537). La automatización del léxico más frecuente mediante la instrucción permitirá la creación de un nivel básico que servirá de apoyo para la inferencia de vocabulario menos frecuente o, al menos, desconocido a ese nivel (Huckin y Haynes 1995: 293-294).

2) En la selección del léxico básico habrá que tener en cuenta el ámbito y los géneros de interés para los alumnos: hemos visto que estos factores, junto con la temática de los textos, están en estrecha relación con la activación de los mecanismos inferenciales.

3) La selección de los materiales de lectura debe aportar la riqueza contextual necesaria para propiciar las interconexiones léxico-semánticas y reforzar tanto el conocimiento del vocabulario básico como el uso natural de la habilidad inferencial.

4) Es necesario explotar los componentes morfológico y sintáctico en la instrucción léxica, especialmente en cuanto a morfología derivacional y clases de palabras.

5) Un enfoque contrastivo es imprescindible para conseguir la máxima eficacia en el uso de recursos comunes a ambas lenguas, explotando así el conocimiento previo de la lengua materna en los aspectos mencionados, y proporcionando instrumentos para la identificación de palabras engañosas ("false friends"). Holmes y Guerra Ramos (1995) proponen la instrucción en estrategias de identificación de cognados ("**skimming** for cognates"), técnica que ellos han utilizado con éxito en el ámbito del inglés con fines académicos.

NOTA

¹ Los términos *ascendente* (*borrom-up*) y *descendente* (*top-down*) provienen del campo de la Inteligencia Artificial.

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Bialystok's 'Processing Continuum Model': a 'Cognitive' Approach to Patterned Variation in SLA.

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ABSTRACT

This paper reports a study which, applying Bialystok's framework for analysing task variation, investigates the proficiency of 52 English learners of Spanish at two different levels -advanced and intermediate- with regard to four Spanish conjunctions across the following task conditions: judging grammatical sentences (GR/GR), judging ungrammatical sentences (UNG/UNG), correcting ungrammatical utterances (UNG>GR), and translating orally (OTJ). All the tasks presented the same linguistic context and were carried out under similar conditions. Results of the study provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the utterances of second language learners show a systematic variability related to task. The study also shows that such variability may be related to the different demands each task imposes on the learners' ability to analyse linguistic knowledge and/or on their ability to control the access to that knowledge. Moreover, we attempt to argue that Bialystok's use of the notions of "analysis" and "control" blurs the traditional distinction "competence/performance", much in the line of Cognitive Linguistics analyses.

KEY WORDS: Bialystok, processing continuum model, language learning

RESUMEN

Este artículo presenta un experimento que, aplicando el modelo propuesto por Bialystok (1982, 1991), investiga la variabilidad en la actuación de 52 estudiantes de español al llevar a cabo cuatro tareas o ejercicios diferentes: evaluación de oraciones gramaticales (GR/GR), evaluación de oraciones no gramaticales (UNG/UNGR), corrección de oraciones no gramaticales (UNG>GR), y traducción oral (OTJ). Los estudiantes pertenecían a dos niveles distintos de español -avanzado e intermedio-. Todas las tareas presentaban el mismo contexto lingüístico y se llevaron a cabo bajo las mismas condiciones. Los resultados del experimento corroboraron la hipótesis que sostiene que la actuación de los aprendices de una segunda lengua es sistemáticamente variable y que dicha sistematicidad está condicionada por el tipo de tarea a realizar. El estudio también muestra que esa variabilidad puede estar relacionada con las diferentes demandas que cada una de las tareas impone en la habilidad de los estudiantes para analizar el conocimiento lingüístico y/o en su habilidad

para controlar el acceso a este conocimiento. Además, intentaremos argumentar que el uso que hace Bialystok de las nociones de "análisis" y "control" difumina la distinción tradicional entre "competencia" y "actuación" conforme a los postulados de la Lingüística Cognitiva.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Bialystok, "processing continuum model", aprendizaje de lenguas

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest difficulties in establishing an overall theory of Second Language Learning which is relevant to the way people learn second languages, has been our inability to define unambiguously the relationship between knowing and using linguistic forms.

It has been claimed (Bialystok 1979, 1982, 1991) that knowing a form does not ensure that the form will be used in every appropriate situation when the circumstances change. Variability has been reported in learner output both between what has been taught and what is used and between what the learners use in different situations (e.g. Tarone, Frauenfelder and Selinker 1976; Bialystok 1982). The question is, if learner output is so variable, how can an adult, native speaker of some language, acquire both the knowledge of a new system and the ability to use that system appropriately both conversationally and linguistically?. The answer to this question lies in what is now one of the most basic assumptions in second-language acquisition research: that the language produced by language learners is variable in a predictable manner. Language-learner language is assumed to be systematic, that is, to be ruled by some underlying principles that enable learners to acquire a second language. But what does it exactly mean to affirm that learner output is systematic when there is evidence that the learner's performance varies from one situation to another?

This paper attempts to approach such a question by presenting our own empirical evidence of variation in learner language. It summarises the main results and conclusions of an experiment carried out as part of my M.A Dissertation submitted at Salford University in 1993. We shall first review some of the main theories proposed to explain the nature and causes of task-related variability in the language produced by second-language learners. It will be argued that task-related variation can only be fully explained by considering inner processing (i.e., cognitive) factors as causes of such variation. Moreover, we will try to show the compatibility of 'cognitive models' of SLA with Cognitive Linguistics postulates, as stated in the work of Langacker (e.g., Langacker, 1987, 1991). Secondly, an inner processing theory, namely, Bialystok's (1982, 1991) psychological processing model, will thus be proposed to describe the systematic causes of task-related variation. And finally, we will introduce the results of an experiment which, applying Bialystok's framework, attempts to investigate empirically both the 'cognitive' constraints that operate to produce variability in learner speech and the principles that contribute to progressive mastery of the language.

II. EXPLANATIONS FOR IL VARIABILITY.

It is now axiomatic that the language produced by second-language learners is systematic (e.g., Corder 1967; Nemser 1971; Selinker 1972). In order to review the variety of methods which have been used to define the nature of such systematicity (and by default, of variation), we will mainly follow Tarone's (1988) study of research on IL variation.

Tarone classifies the SLA theories which **have been** proposed to account for systematicity in IL variation into two general types:

1) Theories which look to psychological processes for causes of variability in IL, or what she calls "inner processing theories". Examples are Krashen's Monitor Model (Krashen 1981,1982), the "Chomskyan" models of **Adjemian** (1976, 1982) and Licerias (1981,1987); the extensions of the "Labovian" models of Dickerson (1975) and Tarone (1983,1985); and Sharwood-Smith and Bialystok's psychological models (Bialystok & Sharwood-Smith 1985, Bialystok 1982).

2) Theories which **provide** social and form-function explanations of IL variation, such as Beebe and Gile's model (1984).

Unfortunately, lack of space **does** not allow a detailed discussion of **all** the theories. Instead, only those theories which we consider to be most relevant to the **purposes** of our study will be reviewed. Since the focus of this work is on 'cognitive processes', a further distinction of the so-called "inner processing theories" will be made into two groups according to the type of variability description they **provide**.

II.1. "INNER PROCESSING THEORIES: THE CHOMSKYAN AND LABOVIAN MODELS".

Some have addressed the problem from a 'linguistic' perspective, placing the emphasis on the conditions eliciting the most systematic **and/** or the most grammatical forms of language. This is the case of "Chomskyan" models of language acquisition, such as those proposed by **Adjemian** (1976, 1982) and Licerias (1981, 1987). Importing Chomsky's views on 1LA to 2LA, these authors argue that learners follow acquisitional sequences determined by an **internal Language** Acquisition Device. Universal **Grammar** Theory holds that learners approach language acquisition endowed with **innate**, specifically linguistic knowledge that is biologically determined and specialised for language **learning**. **In** order to reconcile such a claim for an **innate** language acquisition ability with the undeniable **evidence** of variation in the learner's IL, they resort to the distinction between "competence" and "performance". They claim that IL systematicity lies in the homogeneous system of **rules** or competence, which underlies the learner's efforts at performance. On the contrary, **all** variability is **seen** as a performance aspect and, therefore, non-systematic.

The other "inner processing theory" which investigates variation from a predominantly linguistic point of view is that of **Tarone's** (1983,1985) extension of the "Labovian" models. Such a theory, **in** contrast to "Chomskyan" models, **proposes** that the learner's competence is heterogeneous, made up of a system of variable and categorical **rules** based on particular contexts of use. These contexts are charted along a continuum of styles which range from formal to vernacular. It is the list of these **rules**, both variable and categorical, which **provides** a **definition** of language variability by describing the language under those conditions in the continuum.

Although Tarone still suggests, following **Labov**, that the style learners **call** upon depends on the degree of attention paid to language form, her approach is **here** considered 'linguistic' **because** the determinant for the set of **rules** is primarily given by the point along the style continuum in which the elicitation situation is **placed**. The methodology proposed to investigate variation consists in giving the **subjects** a range of **tasks** ordered from those

which require attention to the **form** of the discourse to those which require attention to the content of the discourse. The assumption is that in the style produced when the learner is paying the least attention to language form, grammatical **forms** will be produced with least accuracy whereas in the style when the learner is paying the most attention to **form**, grammatical **forms** will be produced with most accuracy. Grammatical accuracy is usually measured by the syntactic **presence** or absence of the **form** in obligatory contexts.

Nevertheless, the shortcomings of an explanation based solely on "attention" were revealed in Tarone (1985). She found different patterns of style-shifting for four English **forms** -third person singular present tense verb -s, the article, the **noun** plural -s, and third person singular direct **object** pronouns- across **three** different tasks -test, interview and narrative-. Her results showed that only one form -**the** third person singular- seemed to improve from the interview to the test. The other two either decreased - e.g. articles - or did not shift at **all** - e.g. plural -s-.

Since it would be **unlikely** that learners paid different attention to each language **form** without any particular reason, another type of explanation seemed necessary. The solution was provided by Tarone herself, who, resorting to "**function-form**" explanations traced the causes of such variation to the different communicative demands required by the type of discourse in each task. For **instance**, in order to explain the **decrease** in accuracy of the articles, she argued that accuracy was better in the interview **because** the referential function **performed** primarily by articles and pronouns is very **important in connected** discourse (as reflected in the interview and narration tasks). However, accuracy decreased in the grammatical test **because** the referential function is less important in a task where cohesiveness in discourse **does not matter** so much.

The problem with "discourse" explanations like this is that, although very useful to explain linguistic variation within tasks, there seems to be no easy way to account for the **evidence** supporting the constraint of "attention to speech". How can a function-form explanation account for the general increase in the accuracy of the four **forms** as a whole, from the interview to the test? Moreover, it **cannot** account either for variation across tasks which present **similar amount** and type of discourse but vary in the mental operations required (Lund 1986; Chaudron 1983). Perhaps, re-analyses as that of Tarone's (1985) may **provide some insight** into the process of variation, but first it seems necessary to re-define the **term** function, since it is still **confusing** and undeveloped.

11.2. "THE SOCIAL MODEL"

So far, the assumption of a continuum determined by differing degrees of attention has managed to account for variation in tasks ranging from free speech to grammaticality **judgement** tests. **Furthermore**, in combination with function-form explanations has **also** succeeded in explaining linguistic variation within tasks. Nevertheless, such an approach still **provides** only a **partial** explanation for task variation. As Beebe (1982) and **Bell** (1984) observe, attention can only be at best an **intermediary**, not an explanatory factor. **On** the basis of this **claim**, attempts to determine these end causes of variation **have shifted** the focus of research from "attention" into two different directions.

Some researchers, such as the already mentioned Beebe and **Bell** have focused on **external** social constraints as causes of variation. Instead of attention, they **propose** to

establish what is in the task and in the situation that causes learners to pay attention to speech and, thus, to style-shift. The cause of IL variation in this approach is usually traced to social factors, such as the identity of the interlocutor, the topic of discussion and the social norms activated in the speech situation. Although these theories **have** the advantage that are **all** empirically verifiable, Tarone (1988) has also pointed out that the controls in these studies **have been** too lax, using, for example, more than one variable at a time. Moreover, almost none of them establish a clear relationship between the social constraints they point to and particular linguistic **features** of the IL. The theories are promising in that they point to the importance of social factors in SLA. However, in their current stage, they fail to account for **all the evidence** which keeps social variables constant across tasks.

II.3. "INNER PROCESSING THEORIES: THE COGNITIVE MODELS"

Others, however, **have** taken an approach to the study of SLA which emphasizes the **importance** of "cognitive processes" in influencing both the acquisition and use of IL. They **have** attempted to investigate both situational factors and the **inner** processes these factors cause to **operate**. They aim at discovering the cognitive constraints **imposed** on the learner by various language situations. In this approach, attention is still a factor, but **only** a mediating one between the tasks and the demands they impose on higher cognitive mechanisms. This is the sort of approach illustrated by Krashen's Monitor Model² and Psychological Processing Theories.

These theories, which **have** their roots in research on human information processing and which Tarone (1988) classifies as "psychological processing theories", differentiate "between knowledge and the processes used to implement that knowledge in **communicative** performance" (Tarone 1988: 33).

McLaughlin (1978) outlines the broad characteristics of an approach that reconciles systematicity and variability by emphasizing the cognitive processes involved in the internalization of knowledge. These processes account for how **rules** are accumulated and automated and how **learners** restructure their **internal** representations to match the TL: to **start** with, IL production **requires** 'controlled processes' which demand the learner's attention, but repeated performance leads to the availability of the form via automatic processes³. The result is that less and less attention is required for automated routines and the learner can attend to other **forms** or sequences that are not yet automated. This **finds** a clear parallel in Langacker's notion of **entrenchment**:

Linguistic **structures** are more realistically conceived as falling along a continuous scale of **entrenchment** in cognitive **organization**. **Every** use of a **structure** has a positive **impact** on its degree of entrenchment (...). With repeated use, a novel structure **becomes** progressively entrenched, to the point of becoming a **unit**; moreover, units are variably entrenched depending on the frequency of their occurrence. (Langacker, 1987:59).

McLaughlin (1978) **explains** task-related variation in terms of this distinction between 'controlled and automatic processes'. In this sense, when a learner can use a form in simple tasks, but not in more complex **communicative** ones, it is assumed that the learner is still producing that form by means of controlled processes. Although theoretically plausible, this

explanation posits the problem of empirical validation. As Tarone (1988: 34) points out, this theory seems to identify 'controlled processes' with the learner's performance in simple tasks which allow them to focus their attention, and 'automatic processes' with their performance in complex tasks. But the problem is the distinction between 'simple' and 'complex communicative' tasks: to test this theory empirically we need to specify what is exactly understood by a 'simple' or a 'complex' task.

II.4. CONCLUSIONS.

Thus far, all the theories we have reviewed have failed in one way or another to account for IL variation. The overwhelming evidence on Tarone's stylistic continuum has brought to light the shortcomings of homogeneous approaches to competence. The "Chomskyan" view of variability as part of the learner's non-systematic performance is no longer compatible with the existence of consistent variation patterns in the learner's use of the language.

But the factor of attention to form proposed by "Labovian" models also fails to give a full account of IL variation. Whereas it explains general variation across tasks, it still has to resort to function-form explanations in order to account for differences among several linguistic forms. Furthermore, we are still left with the question of determining those factors inherent to the tasks that cause a shift in the learner's attention.

"Social psychological explanations", such as those of Beebe (1982) and Bell (1984) have tried to answer this question by looking for alternative causes which, unlike "attention", can be empirically observed. However, the evidence on these social factors is very little and almost none of the studies establishes a clear relationship between these factors and particular linguistic features.

Others, like McLaughlin, have attempted to determine the cognitive processes which, in combination with certain situational factors, underlie the reported shift in attention. We believe such a cognitive account is necessary in order to fully account for the existing evidence. As we have seen, differences between tasks eliciting different types of discourse can be described in terms of the functional demands imposed by the different types of discourse (e.g. Tarone 1985). But differences such as those between discriminating and correcting errors (e.g. Lund 1986) seem harder to explain only in linguistic terms.

III. BIALYSTOK'S PROCESSING CONTINUUM MODEL

Bialystok (1978, 1982, 1983) and Bialystok and Sharwood-Smith (1985) attempt to develop an information-processing theory of SLA which overcomes the limitations of McLaughlin's approach by specifying the demands different tasks impose on the learner's cognitive abilities. Following processing accounts, they propose that explanations of learner performance should be related to two dimensions of language proficiency: the way in which knowledge is represented in the learner's mind, and the processing system learners use to control this knowledge during language production.

One of the main points which connects Bialystok and Sharwood-Smith's approach with Cognitive Linguistics postulates is their treatment of 'pragmatic competence'. They

consider pragmatic competence to be part of the learner's knowledge of the language together with 'grammatical competence'. In this way, they abandon the Chomskyan view of pragmatic aspects as part of the learner's performance and, therefore, excluded from his/her competence. Although Bialystok and Sharwood-Smith **still** posit two dimensions of language proficiency (knowledge and control procedures), they are **closely related**. This **relationship** is defined by the authors in terms of what could be called 'the library metaphor':


The language user's mental library may be **said** to contain a number of books as part of its stable repertoire (i.e. information in long-term storage). These books are not treated as totally **unrelated** units, but are arranged together in **some** system⁴ [...] The library user and language user needs to know the required procedure for obtaining information - what is necessary, for **example**, to get information on weight-lifting, yoga, a given author, etc. The user has to know which volumes (i.e. linguistic units and **structures**) will contribute to what goal, where they may be found, and how to get them out efficiently (i.e. with speed and without undue **effort**)⁵. (Bialystok & Sharwood-Smith 1985: 105)

This framework is also used to understand language variability. According to Bialystok (1982), variability in IL performance is due to the way in which different tasks and routines place differing demands upon the learner's knowledge and/or upon the control system. For **instance**, learners may "know" a TL rule **because** they **have** studied it or learnt it, but under communication pressure they may not **have** enough time to retrieve it. In terms of the 'library metaphor' we can say that the book is in the library, but they do not **have** enough time to find it. **Learners** will, therefore, **only** be able to function in a situation when those situational demands are met by his/her competence within the two dimensions.

This is related to a basic tenet of Cognitive Linguistics: linguistic structures are not just "generated" following **some** combination of syntactic categorical requisites (that is, either you know the rule, and are therefore able to **generate** the correct **forms**, or you do not know it, and **cannot**), but are rather part of a larger knowledge structure, a "schemata", which includes more **information** than merely **formal** requisites: facts about use (i.e., performance) are included in cognitive-style linguistic structures. It is this richer set of possibilities that Bialystok's **study** acknowledges and includes accordingly in her explanation.

Bialystok (1991) suggests that the demands of a variety of language uses can be quantified by plotting them along two **orthogonal** axes which represent the two processing components of "analysis of knowledge" and "control". Each axis marks increments in the demands placed upon each of **two** components. Which tasks we expect learners to master depends on the learner's competence within the two dimensions. Language proficiency will develop from those tasks or language uses requiring low analysis and control to those requiring high analysis and control.

Figure 3.1



Bialystok (1991) herself explains this chart as follows:

Positing levels of analysis along the x-axis and levels of control along the y-axis, the Cartesian space created by these axes indicates positions jointly described by the two skill components. These co-ordinate positions provide a means of representing developing language proficiency. Children's language acquisition generally progresses from oral-conversational uses of language, to the literate uses of reading and writing, and finally to the more metalinguistic uses required by tests and special types of problem solving. (p.123).

Bialystok (1982) reports two studies undertaken to investigate the role of these two skill components in the performance of second-language learners. First, she studied the performance of 134 adults learning English as a second language (both intermediate and advanced) on four tasks: a written multiple-choice task, a written discourse completion task, a structural oral-interview role play and an unstructured debate on an assigned topic. The discourse and interview were assigned three different scores assessing three different aspects of the response: a) the ability to recognize target versus non-target forms (T-score), b) syntactic accuracy (S-score); and c) contextual appropriateness (C-score). The tasks and the scoring procedures were designed to vary systematically the two factors underlying the learner's performance: degree of analysis of knowledge and automaticity of retrieval

processes.

	MC Test (SE)	Discourse completion (DIST)	Interview role play (INTT)
	+ Analysed -Automatic		
T-Score: Ability to recognize target vs non-target		+ Analysed + Automatic	-Analysed + Automatic
S-score: Syntactic accuracy		+ Analysed -Automatic	+ Analysed + Automatic
C-score: Contextual appropriateness		+ Analysed -Automatic	-Analysed -Automatic

Table 3.1. Knowledge and processes claimed to underlie scores on three tasks
Tarone's adaptation from Bialystok 1982. (Tarone 1988:75).


In order to support Bialystok's assumptions as to underlying knowledge and control processes, one might predict a high degree of correlation between the scores sharing the same underlying characteristics.

However, such pattern did not emerge. While the scores on **all** three tasks correlate with each other for the intermediates, for the advanced learners only the scores which **captured** the most similar aspects indicated related performance. For example, the T-scores and C-scores on the discourse **and** interview tasks did not correlate with scores on the multiple-choice test for the advanced group.

Nevertheless, Bialystok did not **reject** her assumption of the **structure** of underlying knowledge and processes. She rather argued that the advanced learners' knowledge was in fact qualitatively different. She **claimed** that advanced learners were developing the different types of knowledge differentially, resulting in less consistency of scores across tasks. On the contrary, the **intermediates'** performance was consistently low **because** they had "*not yet begun to show specialization of knowledge in the two ways indicated by the factors analysed and automatic*" (Bialystok 1982:192).

Because of the exploratory **nature** of the **experiment**, Bialystok (1982) carried out a second one reporting **only** on advanced learners. Again, each of the tasks was classified in terms of the categories "+/- analysed" and "+/- automatic". The tasks were: an abstract sentence (AS) task, an oral communication task (OCT) and **three** versions of a **grammaticality judgement** task (GJT) in both a written and an aural format.

Figure 3.2.



Placement of tasks on matrix with factors Analysed/ Automatic and mean scores obtained (Bialystok 1982:197)

In the light of these results, Bialystok drew some conclusions regarding both the qualitative nature of the learner's knowledge and their proficiency progress. Since only the mean scores on tests within each cell in the "analysed" column were significantly correlated, she concluded that learners had gained control over "+ analysed" forms of knowledge and could therefore use them appropriately in tasks requiring analysed knowledge. Moreover, the fact that scores in the "+ analysed, + automatic" cell were lower indicates that these tasks were, in fact, more difficult to solve and would be, therefore, mastered later than those requiring marked information on one factor only or those which did not require marked information.

Bialystok's model has been criticized by a number of authors (e.g. Chaudron 1983, Lund 1986, Tarone 1988), who have claimed that her classification of the tasks is arbitrary. Tarone (1988), for example, argues that Bialystok does not clearly 'operationalize' the distinction "+/- analysed". She outlines that in Bialystok's first experiment (i.e. Bialystok 1982), her requirements for "+ analysed" can be formulated simply as "focused on form", being possible to explain her ordering of the tasks in terms of a continuum, from the task requiring the most attention to form (i.e. the multiple-choice test) to the task requiring the least attention to form (i.e. the unstructured debate). For Tarone (1988:76), "automaticity" is, nevertheless, clearer since "tests are '+ automatic' for the most part when they allow a great deal of time". Surprisingly, Tarone seems to make a mistake here regarding '+ automatic' tests, since Bialystok (1982: 193-4) assigns the label '+ automatic' to those tasks which, allowing little time, demand fluent access to the information.

However, despite the conceptual difficulties with the qualitative description of task demands, Bialystok's method still seems to have several advantages over the reviewed ones. First, as Tarone (1988) mentions in her revision of Bialystok's theory, this model could easily account for those data showing, as in Tarone (1985) or Liceras (1987), that some rules are less accurate on grammaticality judgement tasks than in actual performance: such rules would be less analysed (in the knowledge base), but more automatic (in control). In this way, Bialystok's model accounts for the data in a single explanation when Tarone needs to resort

to function-form accounts of IL variation in addition to the factor of "attention to form". And secondly, Bialystok's specification of the cognitive processes underlying variation provides the explanatory factor which, in combination with the task demands, establishes what there is in the **situation** and in the learner's mind that causes him to pay attention to speech and, therefore, to **style-shift**.⁶

Moreover, as Bialystok and Sharwood Smith (1985) state, psychological processing models differ from "Labovian" ones in that the former **take** into account the demands that using an imperfectly acquired language **impose** on language learners. Arguing that native speakers know more than language learners is not enough to **discover** the underlying **principles** of IL variation. We also need to determine the nature of the differences in knowledge taking into account the differences in available resources. Thus, Bialystok's (1982) experimental framework **proposes** to investigate empirically not only the constraints that **operate** to produce variability at a given point in time, but also the systematic development of such variability by using learners at two different levels and a native control group. This assumption that the learner system changes as **he/she** develops more extensive representations of the TL in terms of both analysis and control, is interesting for a theory of language which integrates the **formal** mastery of linguistic **features** and the applicability of those **features** to certain functions. If the advanced students in Bialystok's study used the **structures** in a different way from native speakers even when both groups showed similar grammatical competence, it must be that native speakers **knew** something about how to use the **rule** that advanced learners did not. A linguistic description in terms of style or context, such as that of Tarone's capability continuum helps to give an accurate account of language variability and the orderliness of the learner's developing competence. However, in order to get **some** information about the nature of such orderliness, it seems useful to follow Bialystok's description in terms of the mental processes underlying language **learning** and use.

IV. THE EXPERIMENT

IV.1. AIM

In order to examine the issue of variability and its role on the development of the learner's IL, we **propose** to apply Bialystok's framework for analysing the way in which different tasks place different demands upon either the knowledge **and/or** upon the control system.

IV.2. TASKS

Our experiment tested 52 learners of Spanish (both **intermediate** and advanced) for their mastery of 4 Spanish **conjunctions** across four tasks varying their demands for analysis of knowledge and control of information. These tasks were:

A. THREE VERSIONS OF A GRAMMATICALITY JUDGEMENT TASK (GJT):

- I. Judging correct sentences (GR/GR);
- II. Judging incorrect sentences (UNG/UNG);
- III. Correcting ungrammatical sentences (UNG > GR) and;

B. AN ORAL TRANSLATION TASK (OT)

Analyses of the tasks reflect the relative matrix position of these tasks along two orthogonal axes which represent the two processing components of "analysis" and "control". This matrix position defines the skill involved in performing these tasks according to Bialystok's predictions:




Figure 4.1. Placement of tasks on matrix according to their demands on both Analysis/Control (adapted from Bialystok 1991:125&131).

Thus, by positing levels of analysis along the x-axis and levels of control along the y-axis, the Cartesian space which is created by the two axes reflects the positions of the tasks jointly described by the two skill components. Such a framework describes, therefore, four major regions. Although the skill components are considered to be continua and not categories (in line with cognitive linguistic postulates of language), Bialystok (1982) considers empirically useful to represent these regions as sharing certain features so that certain generalizations can be made across a range of values. For both factors, the positive value is considered to be marked with respect to the negative. In this way, high levels of analysis (+A) are marked with respect to low levels (-A) and high levels of control (+C) are marked with respect to low levels (-C). The four regions would be thus be characterized as: 1. (-A -C); 2. (+A -C); 3. (-A +C); 4. (+A +C).

Within this framework our experimental tasks would be described as follows:

GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNGR>GR	OT
-A	+A ⁷	+A	+A
-C	-C	-C	+C

Table 4.1. Knowledge and processes claimed to underlie performance on the four tasks.

IV.3. HYPOTHESES.

The following hypotheses follow from this framework:

1. Advanced learners will **have** more knowledge, both in terms of analysis and control, and should, therefore, **perform** better than intermediate students over the whole range of tasks.

2. By analysing the demands on analysis and control made by each task and the learner's **response** to these demands, we will establish an order of difficulty of the tasks, which reflects the development of the **learner's** ability to master tasks requiring increasingly higher levels of both analysis and control. **Learners** should thus begin by mastering tasks which require low levels of both skill components, then succeed in tasks which increase their demands on one factor only, and **finally** master tasks for which high levels are required on both factors:

GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG>GR	OT
-A	+A	+A	+A
-C	-C	-C	+C

Table 4.2. Predicted order of task difficulty in terms of the tasks increasing demands on both Analysis and Control.

3. Although the **structures** required to carry out the tasks are the same, learners will appear to govern those structures only when their **level** of both analysis and control of the linguistic forms matches the task demands. **Thus**, if an analysed concept of the **rule** formation for the conjunctions is required (for example, in restating a sentence with "**pero**" as a sentence with "**sino**" in the correction task), then an unanalysed concept of the **rule** will not be adequate to **provide** the correct answer.

IV.4. METHOD

IV.4.1. TARGET FORMS

In order to respect the need to work within a linguistically defined area, we selected for study four linguistic forms - **pero/sino/sino que/excepto** - which are not **only** related by

the contrastive function they perform in Spanish, but **also** by the fact they **all** translate English "**BUT**".

IV.4.2. SUBJECTS.

The study was conducted with a total of 62 subjects. Of these 10 formed a control group of native speakers of Spanish staying in England either as teachers of Spanish or students in a University Business Degree Exchange. The other 52 were adult learners of Spanish recruited from students of the Bachelor Degree in Modern Languages (Spanish/French/German) at the Manchester Metropolitan University.

All subjects were roughly equivalent in age and education. However, in order to investigate whether task variation develops systematically or not along the route of development, the subjects were selected from two different levels in their fourth-year course: 26 second-year students (intermediate level) and 26 fourth-year students (advanced level).

IV.4.3. DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

IV.4.3.1. DESIGN

The experimental framework was double x sectorial with variation in task. Subjects at two different levels of performance were asked to perform two tasks:

A. A written "**grammaticality judgement task**" consisting of 132 Spanish sentences. Subjects were asked to tick any sentence they considered grammatically acceptable and to correct anything wrong they found in the sentences. Correction was requested as opposed to simple discrimination of errors in order to get a better picture of the level of the learners' analysis of knowledge: while judgements of overall grammaticality are carried out intuitively and do not require analysed knowledge (Bialystok 1979, 1982), correction requires understanding of the linguistic forms in order to detect and correct deviations. Therefore, correction seems to demand a higher level of analysis of knowledge (Bialystok 1979) and increased reliance on executive processes (Anderson, B. 1975).

The items were organized into three sets of oppositions, depending on whether the use of one or another conjunction was semantically, syntactically or pragmatically determined.

A.1. The first set consisted of 36 sentences illustrating the semantic opposition between **pero/sino/excepto**. In order to ensure the purely semantic character of the opposition, all the sentences followed the same syntactic pattern, that is, < **negative + conjunction + affirmative** >. Out of the 36 sentences, each conjunction appeared in 12 sentences, 4 grammatically correct and 8 ungrammatical ones. The ungrammatical sentences followed the same pattern and vocabulary as the grammatical ones but they presented the wrong conjunction. Correcting these sentences therefore involved substituting the right nexus for the wrong one. For example, out of the 12 sentences offering "**sino**", 4 were grammatically correct, 4 wrongly offered "**pero**" where "**sino**" should have appeared, and 4 offered "**excepto**" where "**sino**" should have been supplied :

E.g. *No quen'a ir al cine sino al teatro.*
*No quería ir al cine pero al teatro.**
*No quen'a ir al cine excepto al teatro.**

Once they had been elaborated, they were randomised through the test. In this way, one would predict that if learners knew "sino", they would be able not only to recognize it in the grammatical sentences, but also to supply it, instead of the other two, in the ungrammatical ones.⁸

The same pattern of elaboration was followed in the other sets of oppositions, with the difference that only two items were contrasted in each one.

A.2. In the syntactic or grammatical opposition, "**sino/sino que**" were contrasted. This time only 8 sentences were elaborated with each conjunction, 4 grammatical and 4 ungrammatical ones. The purpose of this opposition was to check if the learners knew the grammatical rule that governs the use of "sino/ sino que" in the same semantic context. Such a rule could be stated in the following way:

< neg. ----- sino + phrase (no finite verb) >

e.g. No estaba llorando sino riendo.

< neg. ----- sino que + sentence >

e.g. No estaba llorando sino que estaba riendo.

A.3. Finally, a pragmatic opposition was elaborated: "**pero/sino**". The purpose of this section was to find out whether the learners knew that when the conjunctions link speech acts, "**pero**" is used as opposed to "sino". Due to the pragmatic character of this opposition, when necessary, we included sentences which provided a context that helped to clarify the way "pero" links its sentence to the previous speech act:

e.g. **A.** "*Los alemanes visten muy mal*"

B. "*Pero fíjate en ese que viene por ahí. Va muy elegante.*"

B. The Oral Translation Task consisted of only 24 English sentences of which 4 were distracters which required a translation of "but" different from "**pero/sino(que)/excepto**". The other 20 sentences studied just two sets of those oppositions analysed in the written task. These were, namely, the semantic opposition "**pero/sino/excepto**" and the syntactic "**sino/sino que**". The pragmatic opposition "**pero/sino**" was left out because it required the creation of a previous context which would have probably resulted in lack of spontaneity. Moreover, the reduction of sentences from the grammaticality test was necessary since, having done a pilot test with 4 students, we realised that the learners got tired after translating approximately 20 sentences.

Unfortunately, due to lack of space, we have not been able to include a sample of the tests in the appendix. Although we are aware that a sample would have clarified the design of the tasks, the description of the experiment had to be inevitably reduced.

IV.4.3.2. PROCEDURE

A. For the written grammaticality test 62 subjects -10 native speakers and 52 second language learners- were selected randomly since they were asked to perform the test voluntarily. The two groups -26 intermediate and 26 advanced students- were allocated in two

different rooms.

Subjects were first given the first part of the test - 94 sentences illustrating the semantic and grammatical oppositions- and were asked to read the instructions carefully before starting. As soon as they performed the first part, they were given the second one, that is, the sentences on the pragmatic uses of the conjunctions. Students were asked to write their names in case of any problem. However, despite the fact that they were told that the experiment was anonymous, fourth year students refused to write their names since they felt their performance was very poor.

B. Out of the 52 students, 12 were selected from each group for the **Oral Task**. Translations were recorded individually and subjects were given instructions to provide a spontaneous and fast translation. It was assumed that by increasing the time constraints, we would also increase the processing demands on the learners' control of information with respect to the written grammaticality test, for which we imposed no time restrictions. Although we are aware that the study of free speech would have probably been more desirable, we unfortunately lacked the very large amount of time which would have been required to record the subjects' free production of the forms. Moreover, we found that the use of a translation task was also very interesting from an empirical point of view. To our knowledge, at the time our experiment was carried out only a few studies had compared performance on a translation task to any other tasks (see LoCoco 1976, Liceras 1987). Interestingly, the only study which had compared explicitly grammaticality judgements to translation skills (i.e. Liceras 1987) reported more approximation to TL forms in the translation task. Our hypothesis held, nevertheless, opposite predictions.

IV.5. RESULTS

In order to facilitate the presentation of the results, percentages were displayed in 10 tables which are included in the appendix. References to the tables will be made throughout the discussion. The analysis of the results will be divided into three different sections, according to the predictions of the hypotheses.

IV.6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

IV.6.1. PERFORMANCE BY GROUP

In this first set of analyses, we have compared the scores obtained by each group across tasks in order to check the progress of knowledge in terms of task variation. (see Table 2).

The results show that, as predicted, native speakers performed better than advanced students and these, in turn, better than intermediate across the whole range of tasks. The three groups were, in fact, ordered in their overall ability to deal with the experimental tasks. So far, as Bialystok (1982) points out, the higher scores of advanced students can be explained by quantitative assessments of proficiency, which predict that advanced students will perform better because they know more. However, such an explanation does not account for differences across tasks. Whereas a quantitative notion of proficiency would predict

equivalent performance across tasks for a given learner or level, our results illustrate task variation not only across groups, but **also** within groups. While the intermediate group has not yet **mastered** the correction of ungrammatical sentences, the advanced group has already reached the 50% level. We, therefore, conclude with Bialystok (1982) that not only do advanced **students** know more than intermediate, but they **also have** more knowledge under analysed and automatic control and so perform differently over the whole range of tasks.

IV.6.2. PERFORMANCE BY TASK TYPE

In this section, we analysed the results displayed in Table 2 and Table 3 in order to test Bialystok's hypothesis that mastery proceeds by the development of two component processes: analysis of knowledge and control of information. As we previously mentioned, the assumption is that language learners will advance **through** different language uses as they increasingly master these two processing components. She predicted that learners will initially be able to **solve** tasks characterized by relatively low demand values for the two processing components, and will progressively advance to more difficult tasks with advances in their mastery of analysis and control. Thus, **taking** into account the processing difficulty predicted for our experimental tasks in terms of their position along the two axes of analysis and control (see Figure 4.1), we expected learners to **solve** our experimental tasks in the order presented in Table 4.1.

However, our results did not **confirm** this hypothesis (see Table 3 in appendix). Contrary to our expectations, learners seemed to find the correction task more difficult than the oral **translation**.⁹ The order of difficulty of the tasks was in fact the following:

GR/GR	UNG/UNG	OT	UNG>GR
-A	+A	+A	+A
-C	-C	+C	-C

Table 4.3. Reported order of task difficulty in terms of the tasks increasing demands on both Analysis and/or Control.

In terms of Bialystok's hypothesis, we would therefore predict that learners would begin by **gaining** control over tasks requiring relatively low levels of both analysis and control (GR/GR and UNG/UNG), and then master tasks which impose high demands on both factors (OT) before tasks which impose high demands on one factor only (UNG>GR). However, such an assumption contradicts Bialystok's (1982) hypothesis that tasks marked for one factor only, that is tasks which impose relatively high demands on one factor only, would be **mastered** before tasks marked for both factors. In the light of these results, we must, therefore, conclude that either Bialystok's predictions for proficiency development in terms of the task demands for increasingly marked information on both analysis and control is empirically inadequate; or the description of the processing demands imposed by the tasks under investigation is not appropriate.

Before disregarding Bialystok's framework, we decided to check the marking of our experimental tasks. In general, it would seem difficult to argue that translation as an activity is less difficult than **grammatical** correction. However, the fact that most learners admitted

to **have** found the GJT more difficult than the translation task made us **think** that this particular one may be. Even native speakers, when asked **after** the experiment, affirmed to **have** found the GJT more difficult than the OT task.

The assumption is that this specific oral translation required either less control or less analysis of knowledge than our correction task. It would in fact seem very difficult to **argue** that the correction task demanded higher control than a task such as our oral translation, which was carried out under specific time restrictions. However, it may well be that the correction task demanded a more analysed knowledge of the **conjunctions** than this particular oral translation. In fact, Bialystok **does** not specify that simultaneous translation requires higher analysis than correction. Her analysis of both tasks is carried out separately on two different diagrams: whereas the correction of sentences is described in the processing framework for metalinguistic uses of language (see Bialystok 1991:131), simultaneous translation is described **with** other oral uses (see Bialystok 1991:125).

Both translating and correcting require a detailed analysis of the meaning and the structure of sentences; the former in order to "translate from one language to another", the **latter** to "convert an ungrammatical sentence into a **grammatical** one". However, when students are prompted to translate automatically, as **in** the case of translating simultaneously or in our OT task, they are not given enough time to analyse the sentences. In these cases, the tasks rely primarily on the students' control of the structures. But, even if we **assume** that our correction task required higher analysis than our oral translation, Bialystok's predictions are still unverified. The translation task is still assumed to require high control and high analysis as opposed to the correction task, which may demand higher analysis but low control. Students are therefore still reported to master a task imposing high demands on both factors (OT) before a task requiring high demand values on one factor only (UNG > GR). We thus conclude that, according to our results, Bialystok's predictions for proficiency development in terms of increasingly marked information on both factors are inadequate. In our experiment the determinant factor for task difficulty seems to be the required level of analysis of knowledge rather than demands on both **factors**. The subjects found the task which required the highest level of analysis more difficult to perform than the OT, irrespective of the high level of control demanded by the learner. In order to investigate the reasons for such a performance, we will examine in the next section the nature of the learners' knowledge of the conjunctions in terms of their ability to match the demands imposed by the different tasks.

IV.6.3. RELATIVE PERFORMANCE BY TARGET FORM

Our third hypothesis predicted that learners would be able to master the linguistic forms only when the task demands match their **competence** levels of analysis **and** control for those structures. In order to test this hypothesis, we calculated the percentages each group obtained for each target form across **all** tasks (Table 4).

A. We first considered the semantic opposition between **pero/sino/excepto**. Concerning our first hypothesis, we discovered that in general advanced students performed better than intermediate learners in every task. However, by comparing the learner's performance on each form, we discovered **three** cases in which intermediate students displayed a higher or at least the same percentage as the advanced learners'. One example

was the **recognition** of grammatical sentences with **"sino"**, where intermediates performed a little higher than advanced learners. This was not, however, considered to be especially relevant since the difference was very small and, as we previously pointed out, the **performance** in "sino" was affected by the learners' confusion with "pero sí" (see note 8). The other two examples reflected the intermediate **learners'** higher performance in the OT task for **"pero"** and **"excepto"**. If we compare the scores with the task demands, we will be able to see that the OT task is the **only** task requiring **+** control (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that the intermediates' **rules**¹⁰ for "pero" and "excepto" **have** similar control levels to those of the advanced students, and that is why both groups performed well in the OT task; but are much less analysed, and that is why they performed lower in the task requiring the highest level of analysis (i.e. the correction task).

Regarding the transferability of each form across the tasks, there were also some variations from the general pattern **reported** in the section investigating the relative performance by task type. As we would now expect, given the results displayed in tables 2 and 3, it would be easier to judge the **un-/grammaticality** of each form than to translate them. Correcting would nevertheless be the most difficult task for each form. However, two exceptions to this pattern were detected with regard to **"pero"**. One was found in the advanced group, who could identify "pero" better in the translation task than in ungrammatical sentences. The other appeared in the intermediate group, who scored higher in "pero" in the OT task than in any version of the GJT, including **judgements** of grammatical sentences.

These results are very difficult to explain. The fact that both groups showed a similar behaviour suggests that there must be some kind of systematic underlying **principle**. **However**, the explanation of this variation in terms of the processing demands imposed by the tasks is hard to ascertain. If, as we assumed, the OT task imposes higher demands on both analysis and control than **making judgements** of grammaticality, students should then perform higher in **judging** the sentences. This finding could only be explained in terms of the task demands by **assuming** that this specific OT task required less analysis than the **UNG/UNG** task, but this seems rather **unlikely**. We then looked for possible linguistic reasons which might **have** caused such a behaviour, but we could not **find** any. The linguistic context of the sentences with **"pero"** was similar to the context of the sentences with "sino" and "excepto". We finally decided to examine the **subjects'** erroneous performance (see Tables 1 & 5). A look at table 5 enabled us to realize that the **subjects** translated "but" as "pero" not only when it was the right thing to do, but **also** when "but" should **have been** translated as 'sino" (Advanced=***39.5%**; Intermediates=***64.5%**). The students, not having **organized** yet the distinction between "pero" and "sino", tended to translate "but" as "pero" in all the cases they were uncertain about.

"Pero" was probably the **first conjunction** they learnt. When **learning Spanish** as a foreign language, English students soon learn "pero" as the translation of English "but" without any explicit grammatical explanation. Then, they **start** to supply "pero" in any of the contexts in which English "but" appears until such a substitution **becomes** consolidated. **Later on**, when students are also taught "excepto" and "sino" as possible translations of "but", they **have** to **restructure** the information they had already stored (i.e. that **"but"** was always translated as "pero") and assimilate the new structures. Our assumption is that at the time this experiment was carried out, the students were still uncertain as to when they should use each form.

We also compared *pero/sino/excepto* in order to establish an order of difficulty of the conjunctions. Interestingly, the order of difficulty slightly varied across tasks and groups.

ADVANCED				INTERMEDIATE			
GWGR	UNG/ UNG	OT	UNG > GR	GWGR	UNG/ UNG	OT	UNG > GR
-A -C	+A -C	+A +C	+A -C	-A -C	+A -C	+A +C	+A -C
<i>pero</i> <i>excepto</i> <i>sino</i>	<i>pero</i> <i>excepto</i> <i>sino</i>	<i>pero</i> <i>sino</i> <i>excepto</i>	<i>pero</i> <i>except.</i> <i>sino</i>	<i>excepto</i> <i>pero</i> <i>sino</i>	<i>pero</i> <i>excepto</i> <i>sino</i>	<i>pero</i> <i>excepto</i> <i>sino</i>	<i>excepto</i> <i>pero</i> <i>sino</i>

Table 4.4. Order of difficulty of the conjunctions in each task as a function of their demands on both Analysis and Control.

A look at the figure above enables us to realize **three** changes in the general order of difficulty: one in the advanced group with the performance of "sino" **surpassing** that of "excepto" in the OT; and two in the intermediate group, who scored higher in "excepto" than "pero" in the GR/GR and the UNG>GR tasks.

The changes in the intermediate students' performance seem to show that this group is still **sorting** out the distinction between "pero" and "excepto" since there seems to be no **correlation** between the demands **imposed** by the tasks and the use of the conjunctions. However, the change in the advanced group can be explained in terms of the task demands on the two processing factors of analysis and control. As we can observe in the table above, the change in the advanced group took place in the OT task, **which** is the **only** task which requires a high **level** of control (+C). We can therefore hypothesize that the advanced learners performed higher in "sino" than in "excepto" in the OT task **because** the **rule** they possess for "sino" is more automated than the rule they possess for "excepto". The advanced students may use "sino" more frequently than "excepto" in everyday conversation, having, therefore, an easier access to the rule.

To **finish** the analysis of *pero/sino/excepto*, we studied the learners' performance in the correction task in order to establish an order of difficulty in terms of functional oppositions. A look at table 5 reveals that both groups found it easiest to distinguish **pero** and **excepto**, then **sino** and **excepto**, and **finally** **sino** and **pero**. If we **assume** that this order of difficulty corresponds to an order of acquisition, we can thus establish that learners first managed to distinguish *pero* and *excepto*, then, managed to differentiate *sino* and *excepto*; and **finally** succeeded in **distinguishing** *sino* and *pero*. From these results, it is possible to hypothesize that "sino" is **harder** to distinguish for intermediates **because** they **have** not yet developed enough analysis or control of the rule to meet the demands of the OT or the correction task. Similarly, advanced students find it more difficult to distinguish "sino" from the other two conjunctions **because** they still **have** not gained enough proficiency of the rule in terms of analysis of knowledge.

B. Secondly, we analysed the syntactic opposition between **sino/ sino que** (see Table 6).

As far as quantitative differences between the two groups are concerned, as in the previous opposition, advanced learners performed higher than intermediates in every task. Furthermore, there were **also** qualitative differences in the knowledge displayed by each group. Thus, whereas the advanced learners' performance was below average in two tasks for "sino" and two for "sino que", the intermediate group neither reached the average level in three tasks for "sino" nor in three for "sino que". These results confirmed again the **initial** hypothesis that advanced learners not only know more than intermediates, but **also have** a qualitatively different **command** of that knowledge.

Moreover, the results in this section **also** confirmed the now familiar order of task difficulty (GR/GR -- UNGIUNG -- OT -- UNG > GR) **reported** in the semantic opposition between *pero-sino-excepto*. This result seemed to **indicate** that the task demands remained the same irrespective of the linguistic characterization of the terms under analysis. However, as far as each linguistic form **is** concerned, there were **some** variations from this order. The subjects' performance in "sino que" was better in the correction task than in the OT. In terms of the proposed framework, this result can be explained in terms of the **mismatch** between the subjects' low control of the rule for "sino que" and the high level of control required by the OT task.

Suppose the subjects **have** only recently learnt the grammatical formation rule for "sino que" through formal instruction, but **have still** not had the **opportunity** to practice that rule in conversational uses of language which require a great effort to retrieve that rule. The subjects would thus lack the necessary control of the rule to efficiently meet the demands of the OT task, which requires an automatic retrieval of information. But the learners' knowledge of the syntactic opposition "sinolsino que" is not only low in control, but **also** in analysis. The fact that they performed below average even in a task such as UNGIUNG, which **is** characterized by relatively low demands on analysis and very low demands on control, indicates that they neither know the rule nor how to use it. The learners seemed to **have** greater difficulty mastering the syntactic differences between these two terms than the semantic aspects of the previous opposition *pero/sino/excepto*. However, we did not find any qualitative difference in the learners' command of the semantic and syntactic rules, that is, in how they applied those rules to situations varying in **their** demands for analysis and for control of those rules.

C. To **finish** the analysis of the results, we shall briefly **comment** on the pragmatic opposition *pero/sino*, which we did not include in the translation task for the reasons already mentioned (see IV.3.1: design of the oral translation task).

C.1. **Although** we **initially** introduced the opposition *pero/sino* in order to check any possible differences between the three different **functions** (i.e semantic, syntactic and pragmatic) it did not develop our hypotheses any further. In fact, with the exceptions already outlined, the same pattern appeared in the three oppositions: advanced learners performed better than intermediates and both groups displayed the same pattern of task **variation**, that is from the recognition of **grammatical** sentences to the correction task, the **only** difference **being** that the OT was not included in the opposition *pero/sino*. **The** surprising finding in this opposition was that advanced students seemed to master "sino" better than "pero" while the intermediate group performed better in "pero" than "sino". Nevertheless, the percentages in both conjunctions are so **close** that is difficult to draw any definite conclusion on the order of difficulty of the conjunctions.

By comparing the percentages in the three sets of oppositions, it seems that the learners in general **mastered** the semantic opposition the best, then, the pragmatic one between **pero/sino** and finally, the syntactic distinction between **sino/sino que**. **This** in fact seems to agree with the assumption of those researchers that affirm that semantics **takes precedence** over syntax (Miller 1967, Osgood 1968, Anderson & Bower 1973). However, as far as our hypotheses are concerned, we **observed** no **significant** differences between the learners' command of knowledge in the three oppositions, since the same pattern of task variation was observed in the three sets of oppositions. The **subjects** appeared to apply their knowledge of the **conjunctions** to the different tasks in a similar way, irrespective of the linguistic characterization of such knowledge.

IV.7. CONCLUSIONS.

Some of the events we interpreted when dealing with the analysis of the results **have important** consequences for a theory of Second Language Acquisition. Following Bialystok's (1982) analysis of data, our results were examined in three sections, in which the **relative** performance across groups, the transferability of knowledge across tasks and the predictability of success on the basis of the task analysis were evaluated.

Regarding our **first** hypothesis, we concluded from the results that having more proficiency **in** a language implies not only having more knowledge in quantitative terms, but **also** being able to use that knowledge in qualitatively different ways. Although the two groups of learners differed from each other with respect to accuracy in their use of the **conjunctions**, they showed the same behaviour with respect to the "use" of these **conjunctions** across a number of tasks, *i.e.* their command of the forms showed the **same** pattern of task variation (see Tables 2 & 3 in the **appendix**). However, the pattern of task variation for the learner groups was **significantly** different from that of native speakers. Specifically, native speakers performed well in **all** the tasks for each of the **conjunctions**.

A quantitative assessment of the learners' knowledge of the **Spanish** "adversative conjunctions" would not predict the pattern of task variation displayed by the learners in the present study. The assumption is that there are different ways of knowing and that these differences refer to the uses that can be made of that knowledge. The description of the students' knowledge of the **conjunctions** under study must thus include the description of those "ways of knowing" in a systematic and developmental way. Such a description would enable us to explain how learners use that knowledge differently and how they advance to more complex ways of knowing. Whereas the intermediate learners did not master the forms in the correction task, the advanced group had already **started** to develop the ability to correct. Moreover, native speakers **mastered** equally every aspect of proficiency. **If** the advanced students were able to use the linguistic forms **in** different ways from the intermediates, it must be that they "knew" something about the forms that intermediates did **not**. Similarly, if native speakers succeeded in every situation, **it** must be that **some** information about the forms was available to them, which was not accessible to advanced or intermediate learners. In order to explain the differences between the groups, we need a description which refers not only to how much knowledge they possess, but **also** to how that knowledge is represented in the learners' minds.

In this paper, we **have** presented Bialystok's (1982,1991) model for such a qualitative description of knowledge. This model is based on two underlying **psycholinguistic** dimensions which describe different aspects of the learner's knowledge of the language :

- a) the extent to which the knowledge is analysed,
- b) the extent to which that knowledge is **accessible** (that is, the degree of entrenchment).

Each dimension constitutes a continuum along which the learner's proficiency of the language develops by gradually achieving higher levels of analysis and control.

The second section of the results tested the applicability of such framework to the explanation of task variation. The assumption was that the use of a language in different situations **inherently** demands greater or **lesser** levels of analysed knowledge and of control, and that the learner will be able to function in a situation only when **his/her** state of knowledge in terms of the two processing factors can meet the situational demands. The implication for the development of proficiency is that tasks imposing low demand values on both dimensions will be **mastered** before those requiring relatively high demands on only one factor and these, **in turn**, will be **mastered** before tasks **highly** demanding on both **skill** components.

In order to investigate this assumption, we compared our subjects' performance to the demands Bialystok (1982, 1991) **attributes** to the following tasks:

- judgements of grammatical sentences. (-A -C)
- judgements of **ungrammatical** sentences or detection of **errors**. (+A -C)
- correction of **errors**. (+A -C)
- oral **translation**.(+A +C)

However, the results were not straightforward and Bialystok's predictions were only **partially confirmed**. As we hypothesized, the subjects responded differentially and systematically to tasks which varied in their demands on analysis and control. Their performance showed the **same** order of increasing task difficulty in both groups (i.e. judgements of grammatical sentences - detection of **errors** - oral translation - correction). But such an order did not correspond to Bialystok's predictions for the development of proficiency. The fact that our subjects performed better in the OT (+A +C) than in the correction task (+A -C) contradicts Bialystok's assumption that tasks requiring information marked on one factor only will be **mastered** before tasks requiring information marked on both **factors**.

These results in fact suggest that Bialystok's predictions were wrong either in the demands attributed to the tasks under investigation or in her assumptions for the development of proficiency. It is possible that, for reasons **unknown** to us, the particular OT task we designed for this experiment demanded low levels of analysis of knowledge, being therefore described as (-A +C). This would thus support Bialystok's (1982) assumption that tasks requiring analysed knowledge are more difficult than those requiring **unanalysed** knowledge. However, it is **also** possible that Bialystok's predictions for the development of proficiency are wrong in that tasks imposing demands on one factor **only** are not always **mastered** before those which impose demands on both **factors**. In fact, it may be that this assumption depends on the state of the learners' knowledge in terms of both analysis and control at the time they carry out the tasks. Suppose that the OT task required, in fact, both high analysis and high control, but **still** required a lower **level** of analysis than the correction task. Suppose as well that at the time of the experiment the learners had developed enough analysis and control of

the forms to meet **only** the demands of the OT task, but not the higher **level** of analysis required by the correction task. The learners would thus perform better in the OT task than **in** the correction one. This hypothesis relies on the assumption that mastery proceeds along the axis of analysis and the axis of control independently of one another. Thus, it would be possible for the learners to develop a **certain level** of analysis of the forms and then **automate** that knowledge by continuous practice before proceeding to higher levels of analysis.

The pattern of task variation reported in this paper would in fact seem difficult to explain in terms of a "sequence of development" not based on processing skills. **Some** authors (e.g. Tarone 1985) **have** described such a "sequence of development" in terms of a syntactic or grammar continuum which is the product of differing degrees of attention reflected **in** a variety of performance tasks. However, the pattern of variation reported in this paper seems hard to account for **in** terms of a syntactic sequence of development which would predict increased grammatical accuracy when learners are paying attention to the form of the discourse.

To **start** with, it is not clear how such a model would account for the differences in accuracy between our experimental tasks, since they **all** required attention to the form of the discourse. They **all** focused on correctness of linguistic form and none on communication of subject matter. Secondly, if we are to arrange the tasks **in** an order of difficulty depending on the degree of attention to form, in order to explain our results, we would **have to assume** that the learners paid more attention to language form in the OT task than in the correction task. Such an assumption is difficult to sustain when the OT task gave the learners no time to focus on the form of the sentences. Thirdly and lastly, the assumption of a grammar continuum would posit serious problems to account for the fact that our subjects performed differently in different conjunctions under identical task conditions. This finding was reported in the last section of our results where we examined the learners' performance on each linguistic form. We, for **instance**, found that in the opposition "**sino/sino que**" each form displayed a different task-variation pattern. **While** the learners' performance in "sino" decreased in accuracy across the following tasks: **GR/GR - UNG/UNG - OT - UNG > GR**; their performance in "sino que" was better **in** the **UNG > GR** task than **in** the OT. An explanation in terms of attention to form would thus imply that the learners' degree of attention to form varied when using different conjunctions. However, there seemed to be no reason why the learners would pay more attention in producing a conjunction such as "sino" than in producing a different one when the task conditions remained the same. A plausible explanation could be found in the different "degree of entrenchment" of each conjunction. However, further **empirical** research would be necessary to **confirm** this idea.

Such differences **in the patterns** of task variation **cannot** thus be predicted in terms of attention to form as the **sole** cause of task-related variation. Moreover, they could not even be predicted in terms of any other type of social or discourse explanations. The linguistic context the conjunctions were embedded in was the same **in all** the tasks and so was the type of discourse required. The learners were given **specific** instructions in **all** the tasks and they **all** had a similar social and linguistic background. Thus, to explain the reported pattern of task variation from a linguistic, social or **situational** point of view would seem inappropriate. In fact, the main difference between the tasks lay in the **cognitive operations they required the students to perform**. An explanation in terms of these cognitive operations seems therefore more appropriate than one based on a syntactic sequence of development. On this basis, Bialystok's assumption of two underlying processing factors seems a plausible

explanation.

We are aware that **some** may argue that the results in this paper **initially** did not **confirm** Bialystok's predictions for the **relative difficulty** of the tasks. However, this framework allows us to explain variation across and within tasks in terms of the learners' ability to match their knowledge of the forms with the task demands on their processing skills. Moreover, her attempts to empirically **validate** the two processing components **have been** supported by experimental **works** in cognitive psychology, which **have also** proposed the distinction between two aspects of **skill** acquisition: the **level** of mental representations and the **level** of access to those representations (e.g. Anderson 1980). One may believe our results contradict Bialystok's framework or may attempt to support them by assumptions rooted in her model. There is no easy way to verify inner processes as causes of IL variation. There are still many gaps in our knowledge about the phenomenon of variation in interlanguage. **After** all, our discussion of the results **also** represents an attempt to frame the **reported evidence** into a theoretical model. Most of the assumptions are nothing **else** than hypotheses waiting to be verified.

But whether Bialystok's model is adequate or not, what is clear is that a satisfactory theory of IL variation must be able to explain how learners use their knowledge of certain language forms differently in different situations. To **serve** this purpose, such a theory must be based on a notion of **competence** which **takes** into account both the formal mastery of linguistic **features** and the applicability of those **features** to certain situations. Again this postulate is in accordance with a basic tenet of Cognitive Linguistics:

Cognitive **grammar** (...) asserts that linguistic **structure** can only be understood and characterized in the context of a broader account of cognitive functioning. **This** has the theoretical consequence (which **I** find neither unnatural nor disturbing) that an exhaustive description of language cannot be achieved without a full description of human cognition" (Langacker, 1987:64).

Our subjects' knowledge of the Spanish conjunctions under study is in most cases sufficient to support oral **translation** from their mother tongue into Spanish but not to **carry** out the correction of formal test items. In order to describe such a knowledge it is no longer enough to know whether the learners **have been** taught "**pero/sino/sino que/excepto**". Rather we need to know the ways **in** which the learners' knowledge of the conjunctions is represented **in** their minds as well as the conditions under which we expect to see the use of those conjunctions. Bialystok **and** Sharwood-Smith (1985) outline **two** implications of this analysis: firstly, that the mastery of linguistic **features** and the applicability of those **features** to certain tasks should be empirically distinct. And secondly, that the appropriate use of **structures** in particular situations should develop systematically, irrespective of **structural** accuracy. Both implications were **in fact** observed **in** our experiment: **Our** subjects' **command** of their knowledge of the conjunctions was not only different across various task conditions, but **also** systematically ordered.

NOTES

¹ A recent contribution which shows the importance of situational factors in cognitive linguistic studies is Jordan Zlatev's *Situated Embodiment: studies in the emergence of spatial meaning* (Zlatev, 1997).

² Although Krashen's theory also emphasizes the role of "cognitive processes" in SLA, for the present purposes I shall here focus my attention on the so-called Psychological Processing Theories, especially on Bialystok's "processing continuum model".

³ An elaboration of this topic from a Cognitive Grammar perspective is Tuggy (1997) "On the storage vs computation of complex linguistic structures: four maxims".

⁴ This assumption of an organized system of knowledge is also one of CL main tenets. Cognitive linguists claim that our knowledge is organized by certain cognitive structures which link together as a system and help us to interpret our experience. The characterization of these structures has varied according to the approach taken (e.g. Fillmore's 'frames', Lakoff's 'ICMs', Langacker's 'schemas', etc.).

⁵ Sperber and Wilson (1986) have also applied this relationship between knowledge and control to communicative behaviour in terms of what they have called 'the principle of relevance'.

⁶ Evidence of the role of attention on the structure of grammar can be found in Talmy (1994), "The Windowing of Attention in Language".

⁷ Although Bialystok (1991:132) places the task of judging incorrect sentences within the Cartesian space described by low levels of analysis and control, she indicates that detecting errors requires a higher level of analysis than judging correct sentences. In order to represent this difference between the tasks in terms of the analysis of knowledge required, the detection of errors is marked as (+A -C). The correction of ungrammatical sentences is also described as (+A -C). However, this task is predicted to be more difficult for learners than the detection of errors since it requires higher level of analysis.

⁸ A problem we had to take into account when interpreting the results of those sentences with "sino" was that the percentage was lowered by the fact that all the subjects, including the native speakers tended to supply "pero sí" instead of "sino" in some of the sentences. The reason is that in Spanish, "pero sí" and "sino" can appear in the same syntactic context but differ functionally in that "pero sí" seems to add an emphatic undertone to the sentence. However, when asking native speakers why they had supplied "pero sí", although they accepted the grammaticality of "sino", they admitted to have answered spontaneously, supplying the form they would probably use in everyday conversation. Interestingly, they affirmed not to be aware of its emphatic value when engaged in communication.

⁹ Our results agree with those of Liceras (1987), who also reported more approximation to TL norms in the translation task than in the grammaticality judgement test. Her experiment also studied the performance of native speakers of English with regard to certain Spanish structures in a GJT and a translation task. Thus, it would be interesting to carry out further investigation of performance on GJT and translation tasks before drawing any definite conclusions on the difficulty of these tasks.

¹⁰ Here the word "rule" does not refer to innate linguistic postulates. On the contrary, it stands for the knowledge of the forms that learners dynamically structure both in terms of analysis and control.

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APPENDIX: TABLES

TABLE 1 (GENERAL)

	ADVANCED										INTERMEDIATE							
	GJT							OT			GJT							OT
	G/G	G/U	?	U/U	U>G	U/G	?	CO%	IN%	G/G	G/U	?	U/U	U>G	U/G	?	CO%	IN%
PERO	94.2	4.8	0.9	77.8	53.8	20.1	1.9	91.6	8.4	87.5	8.6	3.8	68.2	39.9	28.8	2.8	91.6	8.4
SINO	77.8	20.1	1.9	61.0	50.4	37.0	1.9	60.4	39.6	78.8	20.1	0.9	50	35.5	44.7	5.2	35.4	64.4
EXC.	93.2	2.8	3.8	71.6	51.4	25.9	1.4	58.3	41.7	90.3	8.6	0.9	67.7	41.3	27.8	4.3	58.3	41.7
SINO	83.6	16.3	0	52.8	43.2	4.9	1.2	50	50	77.8	19.2	2.8	49.0	28.8	67.9	5.1	43.7	56.3
SINQ	71.5	26.9	1.5	35.8	19.2	45.1	1.9	12.5	87.5	66.9	30.7	2.3	26.9	28.8	49.9	1.9	4.1	95.9
PERO	93.2	5.7	0.9	95.1	81.7	3.8	0.9	-	-	96.1	3.8	0	89.4	72.8	8.6	0.9	-	-
EXC.	97.1	0.9	1.9	72.1	55.7	26.9	0.9	-	-	95.1	2.8	1.9	64.4	31.9	32.6	2.8	-	-
PERO	82.6	14.4	2.8	52.8	44.2	42.3	4.8	-	-	78.8	19.2	1.9	49.0	39.4	50.9	2.8	-	-
SINO	84.6	13.4	1.9	53.8	45.1	41.3	4.8	-	-	76.9	20.1	2.8	46.1	35.5	45.1	5.7	-	-

G/G: grammatically correct sentences recognized as such.
 G/U: grammatically correct sentences wrongly recognized as ungrammatical.
 ? : no response given.
 U/U: ungrammatical sentences recognized as such.
 U>G: ungrammatical sentences corrected by inserting the right conjunction.
 U/G: ungrammatical sentences wrongly recognized as grammatical.
 General description of each group's correct and incorrect performance in each form across all the tasks. For instance, in the task represented as G/G, the percentages reflect the students' ability to recognize grammatical sentences as such. However, in the task represented as G/U, the percentages stand for the number of occasions the students wrongly recognized a grammatical sentence as ungrammatical. Thus, all the percentages under our four experimental tasks, that is, G/G - U/U - U>G - OT, represent the students' correct performance. The rest of the data in the table display either the students' incorrect performance - G/U, U/G - or lack of knowledge - ?.

TABLE 2

	GJT			OT
	GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG>GR	CORRECT %
ADVANCED	96.07%	68.7%	50.7%	54.5%
INTERMEDIATE	82.7%	54.2%	40.01%	46.6%
NATIVE	99.4%	99.4%	91.5%	96.6%

Table 2. Correct performance by each group across the different tasks.

TABLE 3

	GJT			OT
	GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG>GR	CORRECT %
	84.4%	61.4%	45.3%	50.6%

Table 3. Total correct performance across tasks

TABLE 4

	ADVANCED					INTERMEDIATE			
	GJT			OT		GJT			OT
	G/G	U/U	U>G	?	G/G	U/U	G>U	?	
PERO	94.2	77.8	53.8	91.6	87.5	68.2	39.9	91.6	
SINO	77.8	61.0	50.4	60.4	78.8	50.0	35.5	35.4	
EXCEPTO	93.2	71.6	51.4	58.3	90.3	67.7	41.3	58.3	

TABLE 5

Table 4. Correct performance by groups on each task for pero/sino/excepto.

	ADVANCED						INTERMEDIATE					
	GJT			OT			GJT			OT		
	PERO	SINO	EXCEP	BUT = PERO	BUT = SINO	BUT = EXCE	PERO	SINO	EXCEP	BUT = PERO	BUT = SINO	BUT = EXCE
PERO	94.2%	44.2%	56.7%	91.6%	393%	4.1%	87.5%	35.5%	48.07%	91.4%	64.5%	14.5%
SINO	37.5%	77.8%	46.1%	8.3%	60.4%	35.4%	31.7%	78.8%	34.6%	8.3%	35.4%	20.8%
EXCEPTO	70.1%	56.7%	93.2%	0%	0.9	58.3%	48.07%	35.5%	90.3%	0%	0%	58.3%

Table 5. Description of each group's performance for pero, sino and excepto in the correction and translation task. In the GJT, the forms in the horizontal columns represent the total number of sentences which offered pero, sino and excepto in the test. The forms in the vertical column represent the students' ability to either recognize those sentences which offered correct uses of pero, sino, excepto - i.e. the percentages in bold- or to correctly insert these terms when the sentences offered in the test were ungrammatical. For instance, in the advanced group's performance, we are shown that out of all the sentences which offered a grammatical use of "pero", as in the horizontal column, the students were able to detect "pero" as such in a 94.2% of the sentences. Out of all the sentences which offered "pero" but "sino" should have been provided, students correctly inserted "sino" in a 37.5% of the cases. And out of all the sentences which students correctly inserted "excepto" in a 70.1% of the sentences. Similarly, in the OT task the terms in the horizontal column stand for the expected translations of "but" as pero, sino and excepto; and the terms in the vertical column represent the students' actual performance. Thus, out of all the sentences in which "but" should have been translated as "pero", i.e. but = pero, the advanced students actually translated as such in a 91.6% of the cases, but they wrongly translated as "sino" in a 8.3% of the sentences.

TABLE 6

	ADVANCED				INTERMEDIATE			
	GJT		OT		GJT		OT	
	G/G	U/U	U>G	%	G/G	U/U	U>G	%
SINO	83.6	52.8	43.2	50	77.8	49.03	28.8	43.7
SINOQ	71.5	35.8	19.2	12.5	66.9	26.9	7.6	4.1

Table 6. Correct performance by groups on all G tasks for *sino*, *sino que*.

TABLE 7

	GRAMMATICALITY JUDGEMENT TASK					
	ADVANCED			INTERMEDIATE		
	GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG> GR	GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG>GR
PERO	02.61	52.81	44.2	78.81	49.03%	39.41
SINO	84.61	53.8%	45.11	16.91	46.1%	35.5%

Table 7. Description of each group's correct performance for *pero* and *sino* in the grammaticality judgement task.

TABLE 8

	GRAMMATICALITY JUDGEMENT TASK					
	ADVANCED			INTERMEDIATE		
	GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG>GR	GR/GR	UNG/UNG	UNG>GR
PERO	93.2%	95.11	81.71	96.11	89.41	12.81
EXCEPTO	95.1%	72.1%	55.7%	95.1%	64.4%	51.9%

Table 8. Description of each group's correct performance for *pero* and *excepto* in the grammaticality judgement task.

TABLE 9

NATIVE SPEAKERS							
GRAMMATICALITY JUDGEMENT TEST							
	GR/GR	GR/UNG	?	UNG/UN	UNG>GR	UNG/G	?
PERO	100%			100%	95%		
SINO	100%			97.5%	96%	2.5%	
EXCEP	97.5%	2.5%		100%	92.5%		
SINO	97.5%	2.5%		97.5%	90%	2.5%	
SINOQ	100%			100%	90%		
PERO	100%			100%	92.5%		
EXCEP	100%			100%	90%		
PERO	100%			100%	90%		
SINO	100%			100%	87.58		

Table 9. General description of ch. native speakers' correct and incorrect performance for each form across the three versions of ch. GJT.

TABLE 10

	NATIVE SPEAKERS					
	GJT			OT		
	PERO	SINO	EXCEP	BUT = PERO	BUT = SINO	BUT = EXCEP
PERO	100%	97.5%	95%	100%	0%	0%
SINO	87.5%	90%	90%	0%	95%	5%
EXCEPTO	95%	95%	97.5%	0%	5%	95%

Table 10. Description of the native speakers' performance for *pero*, *sino* and *excepto* in the correction and translation tasks.

