

Statement by Pakistan  
**Thematic debate on Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)**  
CD Plenary Meeting, 12 June 2012

Mr. President,

We welcome this opportunity to share views on Negative Security Assurances, commonly referred to as NSAs. The demand for concluding legally binding and effective international Negative Security Assurances by Nuclear Weapon States to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NSAs) has been on the international arms control and disarmament agenda since the 1960s. This demand was also reinforced and crystallized in Paragraphs 32 and 59 of the consensually adopted SSOD-I.

2. While for many decades, the CD has also discussed the need and urgency for concluding NSAs, it is lamentable that we are as distant from this important goal as we were half a century ago.

3. Pakistan considers the issue of NSAs, second only to Nuclear Disarmament, in terms of importance. However, till the time the world is rid of nuclear weapons, it is of utmost importance to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, especially against the states that do not possess them. Pakistan has, therefore, espoused the cause of NSAs since the 1960s and has traditionally played a leading role in this regard.

Mr. President,

4. Every year the UN General Assembly adopts a resolution on NSAs, tabled by Pakistan and co-sponsored by a large number of countries. In 2011, OP-5 of the UNGA Resolution 66/26 called on the member states to "actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international agreements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The same resolution reaffirmed the urgency of concluding such agreements (OP-1) and also recognized the need to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the non-nuclear weapon states (PP-6).

Mr. President,

5. Pakistan believes that the responses of some of the nuclear weapon states to this long-standing demand, as contained in UNSCR 255 (1968), declarations of four of the five nuclear weapons states at SSOD-I and in UNSCR 984 (1995), are insufficient and partial. These unilateral declarations contain qualifiers, the interpretation of which lies with the states giving those declarations. They thus cannot substitute the need for a credible and a legally binding instrument on NSAs.

6. For us, these qualifying declarations are an extension of the discriminatory provisions of the NPT. For example, if a nuclear weapon state can reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in case of "an invasion or any other attack", as their unilateral declarations state, do the non-nuclear weapon states also have the right to build nuclear weapons if they are faced with a threat of invasion or any other attack?

Mr. President,

7. It is important to reiterate here that Pakistan's nuclear programme is a product of its security compulsions and not its desire for prestige and status. As a responsible nuclear weapon state, our strategic doctrine is based on maintaining minimum credible deterrence. Yet we have given our unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states not possessing nuclear weapons and we are ready to transform this pledge into a legally binding international instrument.

8. We have already elaborated our rationale for supporting legally binding instrument(s) on NSAs in several of our previous statements to the CD. Let me briefly summarize them:

- The option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states is not only strategically untenable but morally unacceptable.
- In our view, the principle of non-use of force or threat to use force, as enshrined in the UN Charter, extends to the use of Nuclear weapons. Concluding legally binding agreement(s) on NSAs is therefore an obligation, not an option.
- Since NSAs do not involve any elimination/reduction or freeze on nuclear weapons, they do not undermine the security of any nuclear weapon state
- As long as the goal of Nuclear Disarmament eludes us, NSAs can bridge the security gap between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.
- Concluding and implementing NSAs cause no financial burden and is, therefore, a cost-free exercise with immense benefits for global peace and security.
- Once concluded, NSAs would obviate concerns amongst non-nuclear weapon states on account of new doctrines and technologies regarding use of nuclear weapons, including their tactical use.
- NSAs can make a significant contribution to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. However, their absence would have an opposite effect.
- NSAs would constitute a major Confidence Building Measure between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states thus leading to a genuinely conducive international environment facilitating negotiations on other matters related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
- Commencing negotiations on this agenda item would meet the demands of all member states pushing for the CD to undertake substantial negotiations.

Mr. President,

9. In view of the importance and rationale I have just explained, Pakistan would urge the CD to immediately establish a subsidiary body to negotiate effective international agreement(s) assuring non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We are not alone in making this demand. The G-21, comprising more than half the membership of this august body, has repeatedly called for the same action, as last reflected in CD/1924.

10. In this regard, substantive work can commence on the basis of either of the two draft texts submitted in the CD in 1979; draft text (CD/10) by Pakistan or the draft text (CD/23) submitted by G-21.

11. Negotiations on NSAs will also serve to break the deadlock in the CD that has prevailed for more than a decade.

Mr. President,

12. It is worth reflecting as to why the CD has not been able to commence substantive work on NSAs despite the overwhelming support, as reflected in the relevant UNGA resolutions and the G-21 statements in the CD. In this regard, the states that oppose establishing a subsidiary body to negotiate NSAs should clearly outline their position and take responsibility for the ongoing stalemate in the CD.

13. What also merits attention is an analysis of why these states oppose legally binding instrument(s) on NSAs. If they do not want to unconditionally and legally relinquish their right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, how will they possibly relinquish the nuclear weapons at all? Without unequivocal and legally binding NSAs, how are they contributing to the cause of non-proliferation, which they so dearly espouse? It is clear to us that these states only want selective and discriminatory steps towards non-proliferation, without any quid-pro-quo towards genuine nuclear disarmament, or any step leading thereto, such as NSAs. That was their policy at the time of concluding NPT, as well as at the time of the NPT's indefinite extension. And that is their policy now in the CD, with regard to a FMCT.

I thank you, Mr. President.