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Carol - King of Romania
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
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Glory and Gratitude

There are, in the history of each people, crucial moments that mark its evolution decisively and inevitably. In 1918, the Romanians fulfilled their dream of gathering the entire Nation within the same historical boundaries. A long-held dream, justified, but difficult to achieve before, considering the empires that dominated this part of the world in the second half of the last millennium.

In 1918, one of the few glorious years of Romania, Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania got willingly reunited with the mother country, whose territory was often dismembered by forces whose greed for power seemed insatiable.

Entering the Great War after a period of wise neutrality and a difficult but prudent option as far as its position in the political-military arena was concerned, Romania successively went from one extreme to another in terms of collective mindset. The enthusiast assault on the Carpathian ridges up to the core of Transylvania was followed, in the summer of 1916, by the surprise at the crushing defeats in the south of the country, the grief at the loss of the Capital city, the drama and humiliation at the withdrawal in the winter of 1916-1917, the revival of hope and the regenerating retaliation in the hot summer of 1917 at the south gates of Moldavia. Then there followed the disillusionment and helplessness when some allies quitted the game or some backstage disagreements occurred, seeming to irremediably ruin the entire edifice and, again, the enthusiasm, determination and commitment to end the war on the winning side.

Beginning, with uplifting enthusiasm, in the summer of 1916, the Unification March triumphantly resounded on 1 December 1918, when its cadences were heard, simultaneously and consonantly, in the *Plain of Horea* and in the *Hall of the Military Casino* in Alba Iulia as well as under the Triumphal Arch in București. Its reverberations, clearly perceived throughout Europe, announced the determination of Romania to place itself among the free and respectable nations that gained, on their own, the right to self-determination.

The collapse, at the end of the war, of the former empires around Romania meant, to the Romanian population doomed to live temporarily under foreign rule, fear, insecurity, danger. The presence of the Romanian Armed Forces in Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania was intended to be a factor of stability,

confidence, validation of the state authority, and generation of the necessary security for the entire population. Required by the authorities in those territories to ensure democratic order and, implicitly, the opportunity to exercise the freedom of choice as far as the unification with the mother country was concerned, the Romanian Armed Forces did not impose but institutionally supported the building of the Romanian nation. At the foundation of Greater Romania there lay the unanimous will of the people and the political action of its elites, backed by the military determination and sacrifice. To the hundreds of thousands of Romanian military men fallen on the battlefields in the First World War, hundreds of heroes – officers, NCOs, and soldiers were added, fallen on the Unification front. Therefore, again, at another difficult moment in history, the blood of the Romanian soldier was the binder and guarantor of the fulfilment of a justified aspiration. It can be said that then the crown of national reunification shone on the head of each Romanian military man.

“The National Assembly humbly worships the memory of those brave Romanians who, in this war, have shed their blood to fulfil our aspiration, dying for the Romanian nation liberty and unity” – is said in paragraph 7 of the *Resolution of Alba Iulia*, thus acknowledging an incontestable truth: the Romanian soldier sacrifice for the national ideal. As a minimal but well-deserved reward, those fallen in battles rest in the land of reunified Greater Romania.

Victorious and defeated, then fully revived for victory, the Romanian Armed Forces regained the Romanian people’s right to national pride and dignity and the right to demand the deserved respect of the world. Rights enshrined with the blood of our soldiers, as a seal designed to withstand the test of time.

95 years after the Great Unification, the Romanian Armed Forces saluted the nation again. Under the Triumphal Arch in București as well as under other imaginary arches of national pride in the garrisons throughout the country the troops marched in the vibrant cadences of the military music. The presence, at the military Parade in București – the greatest since 1 December was declared Romania’s National Day –, of some detachments of the US, French, Polish and Turkish Armed Forces was not a surprise but a natural and necessary proof of the same cadence with the comrades in NATO.

The presence of the public at this impressive manifestation of national gratitude certifies the common ideals of the nation and its armed forces and reawakens the hope of rebirth of the genuine patriotic spirit, so necessary today, as always, for the preservation of own identity.

Long live Romania!

Long live the Romanian Armed Forces!

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

 *English version by*

Diana Cristiana LUPU

Gloire et reconnaissance

Dans l'histoire de tous les peuples il y a des moments cruciaux, qui marquent définitivement et irréversiblement le jour de demain. En 1918, les Roumains ont accompli leur rêve d'amasser, dans les mêmes fronteaux historiques, notre Nation entière. Un rêve de siècle, justifié, mais difficile à y réaliser, dans la côte des empires qui avaient dominé cette partie du monde au cours du dernier demi-millénaire.

En 1918, l'un des rares années de gloire de la Roumaine, la Bessarabie, la Bucovine et la Transylvanie se sont rentrées, par leur volonté, au corps de leur pays, fréquemment mutilé, au cours du temps, par les forces et le caprice pas possible d'être empêcher.

Entrée dans la Grande Guerre après une éclairé neutralité et après une difficile, mais judicieuse choix de l'emplacement sur l'échiquier politique-militaire du conflit au cours, la Roumanie a passé successivement d'une extrême à l'autre des états collectives d'esprit. L'assaut enthousiaste des crêtes des Carpates au cœur de la Transylvanie, dans l'été de l'année 1916, a été passé par la surprise des défaites acérés du sud du pays, la douleur de la perte de la Capitale, le drame et l'humiliation de la retrait de l'hiver 1916-1917, la renaissance de l'espoir et la vengeance régénératrice de l'été de feu de l'année 1917 aux portes du sud de la Moldavie. Puis, la désillusion et le désespoir avant de quitter le jeu par de certains des alliés ou des accords de coulisse qui semblaient s'effondrer irrémédiablement tout cet édifice et, de nouveau, l'enthousiasme, la détermination et l'engagement d'achever la guerre du côté des vainqueurs.

Commencée, d'une forte impulsion, à l'été de 1916, la Marche de l'Union a fait son écho au 1^{er} Décembre 1918, quand ses accords ont été entendues simultanément et consonant sur *la Plaine de Horea* et dans la salle de *la Casino militaire* en Alba Iulia et au par-dessous de l'Arc de Triomphe à Bucarest. Ses réverbérations, perçues clairement dans toute l'Europe, ont annoncé la décision de la Roumanie de se trouver parmi les nations libres et dignes qui ont remporté, à eux seuls, le droit à l'autodétermination.

Le démembrement, à la fin de la guerre, de anciens empires autour de la Roumanie a représenté, pour la population roumaine destinée à vivre temporairement sous une autorité étrangère, la peur, l'insécurité, le danger. La présence de l'armée roumaine en Bessarabie, en Bucovine et en Transylvanie

voulait être un facteur de stabilité, de confiance, de validation de l'autorité de l'État et de générer une sécurité nécessaire pour toute la population. Requise par les autorités de ces territoires pour assurer l'ordre démocratique et donc la possibilité de manifester la liberté d'expression à une choix pour l'unification avec la patrie-mère, c'est l'armée roumaine qui n'a pas imposé, mais a soutenu, par ses institutions, cette consolidation du peuple roumain. A la fondation de la Grande Roumanie étaient la volonté unanime du peuple et l'action politique de ses elites, soutenus par la fermeté et le sacrifice militaire. Des centaines de milliers de soldats roumaines tombés sur les champs de la Première Guerre mondiale ont été ajoutés, maintenant, sur le front de l'Union, d'autres centaines de héros – officiers, sous-officiers et soldats. Voici que, à nouveau, dans une autre période difficile de l'histoire, le sang du soldat roumain a été le liant et le garant de l'accomplissement d'une juste aspiration. On peut dire que sur la tête de chaque soldat du pays a brillé alors la couronne de la réunification nationale.

„L'Assemblée nationale, avec dévotion, rend hommage devant la mémoire de ces braves roumaines qui, dans cette guerre, ont donné le sang pour la réalisation de notre idéal, mourir pour la liberté et l'unité de la nation roumaine“ – il est écrit au paragraphe 7 de la *Résolution d'Alba Iulia*, en reconnaissant donc une vérité irréfutable: le sacrifice du soldat roumain pour l'idéal national. Par un minime récompense, mais méritée en même temps, ceux qui sont morts au combat ils se reposent dans la terre de la Grande Roumanie réunifiée.


Victorieuse et vaincue, alors réincarnée pleinement la victoire, c'est l'Armée Roumaine qui a retrouvé le droit du peuple roumain à la fierté et la dignité nationale et le droit d'exiger le respect du monde qu'elle en mérite. Des droits que nous les avons consacrés le sang de nos soldats, comme un signe conçu pour surmonter le temps.

A 95 années de la Grande Union, l'armée roumaine a présenté à nouveau ses honneurs à Nation. Sous l'Arc de Triomphe à Bucarest et au dessous d'autres imaginaires voûtes de la fierté nationale des garnisons du pays, les troupes militaires on défile dans les accords dynamiques de la musique militaire. La présence, à la parade militaire à Bucarest – la plus élevée depuis le 1^{er} Décembre a été déclaré la Journée nationale de la Roumanie –, des détachements de soldats américaines, français, polonais et turc n'était pas une surprise, mais une même cadence naturelle et nécessaire avec les camarades de l'OTAN.

La présence du public à cette impressionnante manifestation de la reconnaissance nationale certifie les idéaux communes du peuple et de son armée et raviver l'espoir de la renaissance du véritable esprit patriotique si nécessaire aujourd'hui, comme toujours pour préserver leur propre identité.

Joyeux anniversaire, la Roumanie!

Joyeux anniversaire, l'Armée Roumaine!

 **Version française par**
Alina PAPOI

THE NEW NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND C2 ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPERATIONS

Colonel Dr Crăişor-Constantin IONIŢĂ

The adoption of a new NATO Command Structure, leaner, flexible, reduced and affordable, but operationally orientated, has changed the organisational structure of the Alliance's Command and Control System from the modern functional one to the regular "J"-type divisions, both at strategic and operational levels. Reducing the number of allied HQs from 11 to 7, it has also been reconsidered the reliance on the NATO Force Structure, especially at tactical level, where the member states have to provide numerous Single Service Commands for NATO-led operations, in order to meet the Alliance's Level of Ambition.

Therefore, it has become necessary to describe the way in which the NATO Command Structure will be organised to lead allied forces into operations and the way in which those forces will be commanded and employed in order to establish a flexible and credible military crisis response mechanism to meet the challenges of the full range of NATO-led operations

Keywords: CCOMC; SHAPE; HQ SACT; JFCHQ; "J"-type structure; JTF HQ; NFS JHQs; Single Service Commands; OLRT; FCE; NTM

Many people wonder how NATO looks like after the first decade of the 21st century and how it is prepared to deal with current and future security environment's challenges, especially when there were so many historical changes at all levels of command, starting with the NATO Headquarters and ending with all Allied Military Commands, taking into consideration the fact that the Alliance's participation in operations appears to be substantially reduced after 2014.

One of the decisions that were taken at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 by the heads of state and government was the reform of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and the review of how the Alliance was using its forces in NATO-led operations. The aim of this reform was, in addition to purely economic reasons, to establish a more flexible and reliable crisis response mechanism, in which the cost-sharing would be equally divided between the NCS and the member states through increasing the dependence on the NATO Force Structure (NFS),

Colonel Dr Crăişor-Constantin Ioniță – the Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

in order to meet the Level of Ambition (LoA) established by the 2011 Political Directive.

The Strategic Concept for the defence and security of NATO members, adopted during the same Summit and entitled “*Active Engagement, Modern Defence*”, set three basic missions for the Alliance and its members, namely: *collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security*¹. The Strategic Concept highlighted the importance of the Alliance’s security and its involvement in the global security by establishing concrete measures for cooperation through different types of partnerships.

In the last two decades, no changes were made to the political command structure inside the NATO HQ. Therefore, the new adapted Strategic Concept imposed a general reform of the NATO HQ in Brussels, involving major changes in the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS), along with the reform of the Alliance agencies by reducing them from 14 to 4.

The decision to restructure and reduce the NCS was also taken, starting 2012, by reducing the number of military headquarters from 11 to 7 and the total number of jobs by 35%. This was the fourth largest reform of the NCS since the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact². However, the heads of state and government also requested the review of the governance of NATO forces in operations, by introducing the concept of *modular Joint Forces Command HQ – JTF HQ*.

New NATO Command Structure (NCS)

The continuous economic crisis forced member states to reconsider the rather recently approved and implemented NCS (1 August 2010) by establishing a reduced and affordable one, capable to offset the crisis and put into practice all recent operational experience resulting from NATO-led operations. The reintegration of France in the Alliance military structure and the acceptance of two new members – Albania and Croatia – to contribute to the mutual funds or fulfil NATO posts did not seem to be enough to counterbalance the crisis. Therefore, the NATO Secretary General (SecGen) was urged by some member states to announce the need for a general reform of the entire North Atlantic Alliance organisation, including the NCS. In addition to reviewing the NCS, the new SecGen initiative also comprised the reform of both the NATO HQ and the allied agencies.

¹ PO (2010)0169, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, 19 November 2010, p. 2.

² I presented the three previous changes of the NCS in the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal no. 6/2004, pp. 85-89, no. 4/2011, pp. 30-39 and no. 5/2011, pp. 28-35.

The April 2012 Chicago NATO Summit approved the new NCS reconfiguration, reducing the number of HQs from 11 to 7 and lowering the existing posts by 35%³. At the same time, it encompassed the lessons learned during the planning and conduct of the “UNIFIED PROTECTOR” Operation in Libya by supplying the shortage of allied military command structure, which consisted in the inability to deploy forward C2 elements in the Theatre of Operations (TO). This new structure is shown in *figure 1*⁴.




Figure 1: New NATO Command Structure

The changes made to the new structure refer to the reduction of operational level headquarters, called *Joint Force Command Headquarters (HQ JFC)*, from three to two, one located in Brunssum, the Netherlands and the other in Naples, Italy. These commands are deployable and able to conduct operations up to and including Major Joint Operations (MJO), for 12 months, from which one may be collective defence type (MJO+). They do not have subordinate commands during peacetime.

Moreover, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) will lead, directly or through one of the Commanders JFC HQs, all NATO-led operations. Furthermore, a new concept emerges inside the Allied Command Operations (ACO), which establishes a flexible command structure that could determine

³ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, 20 November 2010, art. 49-51.

⁴ PO (2012)0554-AS1/21 Dec 2012, NAC Approval of the MC 324/3, The NATO Military Command Structure (NCS), 13 December 2012, p. 3.

the most advantageous C2 arrangements on a case-by-case basis, necessary to conduct future operations.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), despite being drastically reduced in the number of posts, will directly coordinate operations, and not through JFC HQs, as it happens now. As a result, the need for a comprehensive operations management structure at strategic level and for implementing adequate skills in all services increases.

Single Service Commands (SSC), from which one is Land, one Air and one Maritime, are directly subordinated to SHAPE and responsible for conducting operations up to Smaller Joint Operations (SJO) (mainly land, sea or air). JFC HQ's role is to coordinate them only.

Allied Command Operations (ACO)

The NCS has a profoundly new operational character, in which each operation's chain of command is approved by NAC, upon the recommendation of SACEUR and the Military Committee (MC) advice. ACO continues to be the only strategic command with operational responsibilities. It is commanded by SACEUR, US General Philip Breedlove, and is located at SHAPE, near Mons, Belgium. ACO coordinates all allied operations and the use of the available forces during peacetime and in crisis situations. SACEUR will always remain the strategic commander for operations.

Although drastically reduced, SHAPE has implemented a new approach to directly conduct NATO-led operations, returning to the *J*-type structure (J1-J9) and developing a specific strategic operations management structure, called the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC). The SHAPE structure is shown in *figure 2*.

SHAPE's five divisions are organised on *J*-type structures, headed by a two-star general/admiral (DCOS) and comprise: Operations – incorporates J2, J3 and J9 and the newly created CCOMC; Planning – includes J5 and J7; Resources – J1, J4 and J8; Communications, Information and Cyber Defence – J6; and Partnerships (the former Military Cooperation). The later division is Bi-SC, having double subordination to the two Chiefs of Staff (COSs) – SHAPE and HQ SACT. *J*-type structures are led by a one-star general/admiral (ACOS). Since the burden on NATO exercises was transferred to the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), ACOS J7 has one single collective training responsibility, namely the evaluation of NATO headquarters and forces. DCOS Resources is responsible for all allied resources except for communications and information (CIS), which remains under the CIS&CD Division. DCOS CIS&CD is




Figure 2: SHAPE Structure

also the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Group and advisor to SACEUR for CIS and cyber defence matters. In addition to the General Staff, there are the Command Group, the Special Staff and the Enabling Staff. Many adviser positions are dual-hatted with the DCOS/ACOS's posture.

The new formed CCOMC is described by SACEUR as “...*the cornerstone of our effort to “Operationalise Lisbon” in accordance with HOSG direction. I am convinced that the CCOMC is an organisation that will strengthen my command ability to think, plan and act strategically effectively and efficiently across the crisis and operations spectrum in support of the security and defence decisions of Nations*”⁵.

The organisation of this structure, being under the direct control of ACOS J3, is shown in *figure 3*.

CCOMC is shaped based on the former Strategic Operations Centre (SOC), existing at SHAPE since 2004 and includes both permanent elements for managing current crisis and operations and temporarily attached elements that can be employed in the Centre, in order to analyse, plan or strengthen existing operation teams in case of newly- arising crises and operations. These elements are: the Intel Fusion Centre (IFC); Missile Defence and Cyber Defence structures; Civil-Military Interface Element; Knowledge Development and Knowledge Management Centres.

At operational level, the two HQ JFCs have a strong regional approach and must be prepared to deploy in order to conduct any NATO-led operation up to a MJO+, for a period of up to one year, providing also main elements of a *Joint Multinational Logistic Support Group (JLSG)*. If the operational situation makes it possible, they can conduct operations from their static locations. However, each HQ may conduct only one operation at a time, with the possibility of the remaining elements in the barracks, after deployment, to ensure limited Reach-Back capability or support other NATO-led operations. The JFC HQ structure is provided in *figure 4*.

Within the *Regional Focus Concept (RF)* designed by SACEUR and approved by the Military Committee (MC) in August 2013, both HQ JFCs are responsible for establishing peacetime relationships with member states and key partners, including regional organisations, in their Area of Responsibility (AoR), to provide additional support for their headquarters in operations, increase military cooperation and help operational partners prepare for NATO membership.

The Joint Operational Commander (OpCdr) is nominated by SACEUR, confirmed by MC and approved by NAC. Usually, he is the commander

⁵<http://www.aco.nato.int/structure.aspx>




Figure 3: CCOMC Structure




Figure 4: HQ JFC Structure

of one of the two HQs JFC and leads a MJO within a modular *Joint Task Force HQ – JTF HQ* deployed in theatre by one of the two HQ JFC or within a deployed operational command of the NFS, called *Joint HQ (JHQ)*.

The OpCdr directly reports to SACEUR. This is a new concept regarding the operational level C2 system that was established by the *Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations (CFAO)* document⁶. A decision in this respect will be taken at the political level.

The generic HQ JFC is organised into three divisions, led by a two-star general/admiral (DCOS) and comprises *J*-type structures – Operations, Plans and Support. It also comprises the Command Group, the Special Staff and the Enabling Staff.

The innovative aspect of these HQs is the deployable module of a 500 troops manning JTF HQ, from which the operational commander will conduct a MJO or MJO+ operation. In addition to the command module, each HQ JFC must deploy and ensure the nucleus (25 pax) for a JLSG. Both deployed structures must be supported up to one year in the TO.

JTF HQ is a *4 block-type* model, being established to provide initial C2 operational capabilities options required by the mission and situation. The establishment of such a modular HQ is shown in *figure 5*⁷.




Figure 5: JTF HQ Concept

⁶ *Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations*, 26 July 2013, pp. 49-52.

⁷ *Ibid*, Annex B.

In achieving such modular command, NATO took into account the experience gained in over 15 years regarding deploying joint commands into TOs and developing specific concepts in this area, not all of them having the opportunity to be experienced in operations.

The *4 blocks* approach provides the necessary flexibility to react and support the conduct of NATO-led operations, as well as the implementation, in the initial stages, of the NATO Crisis Response Measures (NATO CRM) and consists of:

a) Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) – supports the Operation Planning Process (OPP) by providing “*on the spot*” Situational Awareness. It is composed of 10-12 people (experts in information operations, STRATCOM, logistic, medical, financial, contracting and communications) support and is formed on an ad hoc basis, being able to deploy within two days after receiving the Mission Order.

b) Forward Coordination Element (FCE) is the support and coordination module that establishes an Advance Party to support forces deployment through establishing deployment support capabilities, such as Reception, Staging and Onward Movement – RSOM and coordinates all activities with the Host Nation (HN), Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) and other actors in the area. SACEUR approves the deployment of FCE, which may be the forward presence of the Alliance in a specific TO, by shaping the modern battlespace through limited military actions. The dedicated FCE personnel (50-60 posts) are nominated, in advance, in the HQ JFC Peacetime Establishment (PE) and ready to deploy within 15 days.

c) Initial Command Element (ICE) represents the initial operational C2 capability established to ensure the minimum C2 requirements for the OpCdr in TO. When the OpCdr is deployed in TO, ICE becomes the Joint Operational Command HQ, being entirely dependent on the parent headquarters’ Reach-back support. It can conduct a MJO for a short period only, until JTF HQ is established. Like FCE, the staff manning this element (100-140 posts) are nominated in the HQ JFC PE and ready to deploy within 15 days.

The 500-pax who forms the JTF HQ will deploy in TO at SACEUR’s order, within 30 days after receiving the order. JTF HQ is a Joint Operational Command organised in a *J-type* structure and is based on minimal Reach-back support from that parent HQ JFC/JHQ. Its organisation is shown in *figure 6*.

d) Redeployment Coordination Element (RCE) is a subsidiary structure of the JTF HQ, composed of parent HQ JFC experts and personnel from other NATO Agencies. The role of this element is to ensure the hand over-take over functions and transfer of authority to another HQ inside the TO. However, this element supports the redeployment of NATO forces and liaises with HN and other regional organisations to hand over or terminate the current operation




Figure 6: JTF HQ's Organisation for Operations

in TO. Its structure and manning will depend on the mission and existing circumstances.

Single Service Commands (SSC) are directly subordinated to SACEUR and consist of: Headquarters Allied Land Command (HQ LANDCOM) in Izmir, Turkey; Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (HQ MARCOM) in Northwood, the UK; and Headquarters Allied Air Command (AIRCOM HQ) in Ramstein, Germany⁸.

HQ LANDCOM's mission is to provide deployable land C2 capability, as the Land Component Command HQ (HQ LCC) of a MJO+ or MJO, in support of a JTF HQ. It can also be used as the HQ LCC mainly for land operation. LANDCOM HQ is responsible for planning, conducting and directing land operations in support of JFC HQ and is the main Alliance advisor on land issues.

MARCOM HQ provides C2 capability for the full range of maritime operations. From its static location, it plans, conducts and supports joint maritime operations. It provides Alliance maritime competency and is the principal NATO advisor on maritime issues. It maintains situational awareness throughout the maritime environment and is ready to conduct a predominantly maritime operation or act as the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) in a MJO+.

AIRCOM HQ plans and directs the air component of Alliance operations and missions, performing NATO air and missile defence operations, including peacetime permanent missions and support functions, such as Reach-back capabilities for all Combined Air Operation Centre (CAOCs). When directed, AIRCOM HQ can provide the main element of a NATO Joint Forces Air Component (JFAC) that can conduct, with adequate support and augmentation from outside the NCS, all air operations or can change into an Air Component Command (ACC) within a MJO+. It also provides the air competency and is the principal advisor on such issues to the Alliance. It subordinates the following tactical air C2 elements:

a) two CAOCs – Udem, Germany and Torrejon, Spain – consisting of two hybrid structures: a Static Air Defence Centre (SADC) and a Deployable Air Operations Centre (D-AOC);

b) one Deployable Air Command and Control Centre (DACCC), Poggio Renatico, Italy – is a hybrid structure consisting of three elements: a deployable Air Control Centre – Recognised Air Picture Production Centre – Sensor Fusion Post (DARS); a D-AOC; and a set of deployable Sensors Suite (DSS). During peacetime, DACCC is responsible for the preparation and training of the staff JFAC AIRCOM HQ and D-AOCS.

⁸<http://www.aco.nato.int/structure.aspx>

The CIS Group is not part of SHAPE's organisational structure, but an independent structure established in Mons, Belgium, in order to provide direct CIS support for NATO-led operations. This group is responsible for providing deployable CIS capabilities, the conduct of CIS operations, planning and control exercises. The CIS Group is supported by three NATO Signal Battalions – Wesel, in Germany, Grazzanise, in Italy and Bydgoszcz, in Poland, supplemented with numerous smaller Deployable CIS modules in other locations.

Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

The second NATO Strategic Military Command is the Allied Command Transformation, in Norfolk, the USA, led by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), French General Jean-Paul Paloméros.

This command, called HQ SACT, has the primary task to lead the whole Alliance transformation process, including: interoperability; jointness; experimentation; education; and development of new operational concepts. It also has the mission to support NATO's current operations, by providing pre-deployment training, especially through exercises organised and led by NATO, expertise for Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), a Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CMFC), gathering and implementing lessons learned and, more usefully, creating a CIS "network of networks" for operations, called *Afghan Mission Network (ANM)*. No less important is the mission of engaging, interacting and cooperating with member states, partner countries, the European Defence Agency (EDA) of the European Union, the UN and the defence industry.

The changes within ACT are minor and consist of transferring responsibility regarding NATO exercises from ACO and transferring the Undersee Research Centre (NURC) from La Spezia, Italy, to the NATO Science and Technology Agency, which changed the Centres name into the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CEMR).

ACT organisation is shown in *figure 7*⁹.

In addition to HQ SACT, ACT also includes: Joint Warfighting Centre (JWC), in Stavanger, Norway; Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), in Bydgoszcz, Poland; Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned (JALLC) in Monsanto, Portugal. To maintain an uninterrupted transatlantic link, SACT has a strong representation in both SHAPE and Brussels, which provides a permanent connection between the operational and doctrinal domains, called the ACT Staff Element

⁹ <http://www.act.nato.int/headquarters-supreme-allied-commander-transformation>




Figure 7: ACT Organisational Structure

Europe (ACT SEE) for SHAPE and the SACT Representative to the HQ NATO (SACTREPEUR). After the disappearance of USJFCOM, a new link has been established at the Pentagon.

ACT also coordinates the work of the Alliance's schools and education institutions, such as: NATO Defence College, in Rome, Italy; NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; NATO CIS School, recently moved in Portugal; and Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Greece. Moreover, a number of national and multinational Centres of Excellence (COE), specialised in various transformation phases, support the work of ACT.

HQ SACT is organised in five divisions, each headed by a two-star general/admiral (DCOS), with one exception – the DCOS Capability Development, being considered the most important division in ACT, is led by a three-star general/admiral. These divisions are: Plans, Policies and Strategic Concepts (SPP) – focal centre to initiate first steps in developing capabilities and also responsible for defence reforms and partnerships; Capability Development (CD) – identifies capability requirements, identifies and analyses possible solutions; Joint Force Trainer (JFT) – supports and develops forces training at all levels; Resources and Management (R&M) – supports the development of policies for resources, ensures their management inside the entire ACT; Partnerships – provides the employment, interaction and cooperation with all non-NATO Nations and is dual-hated with SHAPE (*figure 8*)¹⁰.

Romania has adapted to the new NATO Command Structure by providing the rotation-based manning of four general positions – SACTREPEUR, a two-star post, the Commander of JALLC, ACOS J2 to JFCBR and DOM to JFCNP, all one-star posts – and 68 *quota* positions for officers and NCOs in all allied military commands.

What the Romanian General Staff (ROU GS) should learn from the new NCS reorganisation is the operational approach based on *J*-type structures at strategic and operational levels and the establishment of efficient tools and mechanisms for the direct conduct of NATO-led operations at the strategic level. ROU GS itself undergoes a process of restructuring, through operationalising the National Military Command Centre (NMCC) and establishing an operational level Joint Force Command (HQ JFC).

Thus, an opportunity has arisen at the ROU GS to come back to *J*-type structures, as it was until 2006, in order to ensure efficient NMCC augmentation

¹⁰<http://www.act.nato.int/role-and-structure>

during crisis and at war with specialised elements organised for planning and conducting operations at the strategic level.

No less important is the inclusion in the NMCC of specific structural elements of the emerging security and defence domains, such as: cyber defence, knowledge development and management, information management, comprehensive approach etc.

The new Allied Regional Focus approach requires that member states establish, during peacetime, adequate relationship with the NATO strategic and operational commands in order to ensure connections and exchanges of information for Situational Awareness in areas of strategic interest, participate in joint exercises and training, as well as actively participate in the regional stability. In order to have such modern headquarters, able to establish professional links with NCS, the General Staff should design a new concept of command and control (C2), and start implementing it as soon as possible.



PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN MILITARY ORGANISATIONS

Captain (N) Dr BEng Ciprian LUNGU

Knowledge Management includes a complex combination of organisational processes, information technologies and creative human capacities. KM is a critical resource for military organisations and plays a key role in organisational adaptation and transformation in response to environmental changes. Military staffs integrate and use collaborative tools in developing strategies and plans and assist execution with knowledge-based communications. In stability operations, OMLTs actively apply KM tools and transfer military expertise via collaboration and mentoring. NEC is a key enabler for KM and in return, KM is an essential contributor to the successful implementation of EBAO concept by enhancing timely and effective decision-making and increasing effective assessment of effects. The success of KM in military organisations is measured through contribution to capacity of forces to sustain operations, coherence in defence and operational planning, development and use of new capabilities, improvement of working and operating methods.

Keywords: *knowledge; system; management; military; organisation; technologies*

Since the material and financial resources have in many cases limited availability, an appropriate way to maximise effectiveness and efficiency in the military organisations is to integrate people, systems, technologies, and information resources under the label of *Knowledge Management – KM*.

In military organisations, data can simply be found in records, and information in messages, while knowledge is embedded in documents or databases, in organisational processes, routines and norms and is obtained from individuals, groups, or organisational routines either through structured media or through person-to-person contact.

Alavi and Leidner¹ defined *Knowledge Management Systems – KMS* as *Information Technology – IT*-based systems developed to support and enhance the organisational processes of knowledge creation, storage/retrieval, transfer, and application.

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¹ Maryam Alavi, Dorothy E. Leidner, *Review: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Management Systems: Conceptual Foundations and Research Issues*, in *MIS Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 114.

In essence, knowledge management in the military organisations is designed to support specific strategic, operational, or tactical decision-making processes, inter-organisational communications, cooperation, and interaction.

According to Maule, Schacher, and Gallup, KM is often used in the broadest sense to include such variables as the management of numerical values obtained from automated collection systems, qualitative data from human subjective opinions, synthetic results from both human and machine simulation, and systems output or result sets tailored to address specific long-range plans or objectives².

Collaborative tools play a significant role in military knowledge systems since they can integrate valuable resources to enhance situational awareness and understanding and to provide guidance for actions. Chat, instant messaging, online meetings, and shared application technologies are core instruments of current knowledge-management projects and initiatives.

Despite of increasing complexity, military staffs are encouraged to integrate traditional knowledge technologies with collaborative capabilities, to use collaborative planning tools in developing military strategies, concepts of operation and operational orders, and to assist execution with knowledge-based communications.

Military portals collect content and offer access, often on a need-to-know basis, to information and knowledge repositories consisting of aggregating Web services, information sites, collaboration tools, and decision-support applications.

The key characteristic of all portal products is the aggregation of content from many different sources, resulting in a virtual collection supported through communities of practice and subject matter experts to ensure an updated and relevant context, available through a single point of access.

Portals are key elements in knowledge dissemination and because of openness to and flexibility in combining a variety of tools and services they can be customised to create a rich knowledge-sharing environment. As an example, *Joint Knowledge Online – JKO* provides joint training resources including training courses, seminars, video library, and communities of interest³.

Metrics are particularly important parameters or measures of quantitative assessment. In KM, metrics are used to measure, compare or track performance of different knowledge initiatives. There are several categories of metrics directly correlated with knowledge functions, which address the value of specific knowledge, the impact on organisation effectiveness, and the return on knowledge investments.

² R. William Maule, *Military Knowledge Management*, in David G. Schwartz, *Encyclopaedia of Knowledge Management*, Idea Group Reference, London, 2006, p. 629.

³ <http://jko.jten.mil/>.

Examples of metrics including for KM in military organisations are listed below⁴:

- *Knowledge Discovery*: metrics addressing acquisition, query optimisation, indexing, filtering, link analysis, ontology, agents, semantics, concurrency, domains, interfaces, visualisation, AI tools, sequences, streams, temporal, spatial, clustering, mining, pattern matching;
- *Decision Support*: metrics addressing effectiveness, efficiency, prediction, integration, representation, reaction, concurrency, optimisation, disambiguation, categorisation, summarisation, pattern matching, cleansing, unification;
- *Collaboration*: metrics addressing the results of human-human interchanges concerning generated information, and the impact of new variables introduced during the course of any given flow of events (ad hoc alliances, changed positions or objectives etc.);
- *Fusion*: metrics may consider the impact of knowledge injects or fusions into specific processes (doctrine development, intelligence, etc.);
- *Work Flow*: metrics would stress integration between supporting technologies (e.g. Network-Enabled Capability), systems (social networks, staffs, and organisational processes (planning, concept and capability development, military transformation etc.);
- *Reasoning*: metrics addressing integration, inconsistency, uncertainty, incompleteness, behaviour, agents, and disambiguation.

The Canadian Knowledge Management System (Ca-KMS)

Ca-KMS was deployed in October 2004 with the purpose to enhance the capability to manage and generate more knowledge faster and more accurate in support of individuals, groups, teams and organisations⁵.

The main goal of Ca-KMS is basically to gather/capture what the individual knows, what others know and what the *Canadian Forces – CF* know and how this information can be used and applied in a simple and efficient manner. Ca-KMS allows *Subject Matter Experts – SMEs* to structure their body of knowledge more efficiently, manage explicit relationships between knowledge objects, share knowledge with one or many groups and gather, receive and capture observations, comments and feedback from key participants on specific subjects or topics.

⁴ R. William Maule, *op. cit.*, p. 631.

⁵ Pierrette Champoux, Joe Costello, Sonia Bourget, *The Canadian Knowledge Management System*, 2005, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/198.pdf.

SMEs track the changes directly from military feedback, through issues determination and recommendation for action and validate relevant changes assessed as making a difference. The work is divided to allow different perspectives on knowledge domains at tactical, operational and strategic level.

The Ca-KMS assists the CF throughout the Knowledge Management Process in managing *Doctrine Domain* (knowledge regarding the “*fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of preset or current objectives*”⁶), *Lessons Learned Domain* (current and historical data such observations and comments gathered and organised from Operations, Exercises, Experiments and Trials), *System Help Domain* (knowledge regarding “*On-Line Help*” for all information applications and for KMS as a whole).

Content of the Ca-KMS consists mainly of:

- Observations and comments gathered through the Chain of Command for each specific activity pertaining to Operations/Rotations, Exercises and Experiments/Trials.
- Doctrine where “*fundamental principles, by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives*”⁷ are defined for guidance;
- Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, which prescribe in more detail how military activities are planned and executed;
- Standard Operating Procedures – SOP’s that define “*a set of instructions covering features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardised procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise*”⁸.
- System Procedures that support the SOP’s related to specific military tasks.

Ca-KMS supports four main phases of the *Knowledge Management Process* – *KMP*:

- *Knowledge Organisation* – authorises visualisation, search and management of knowledge for each knowledge domain and sub-domain;
- *Knowledge Gathering* – allows management of observations, comments and feedback in relation to activities within a domain or a sub-domain;
- *Knowledge Analysis* – seeks knowledge on different topics, validates issues and enhances learning while performing activities (e.g. operations, exercises);

⁶ AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), NATO Standardisation Agency, 2013, p. 2-D-9.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2-S-10.

- *Knowledge in Action* – ensures that appropriate actions are taken and lessons are learned based on recommendations and decisions gathered from staff authorities.

Ca-KMS enables the CF to profit from its own experiences in operations and exercises. By managing knowledge objects instead of documents, Ca-KMS reduces knowledge redundancies that create inconsistencies and avoids duplications of costly historical errors. The user has access to the most appropriate knowledge to address his task, which is embedded into KMS (e.g. Doctrine, TTPs, and System Procedures). Specific topic may be defined once and re-used throughout the different Doctrine Knowledge Structures

Network Enabled Capability (NEC) and KMS

The general purpose of the NEC is to facilitate a dynamic, distributed decision-making process at all levels of military command by involving multiple diverse sensors in the process of generation and maintenance of a common perception of the situation, allowing shared awareness across the battlefield⁹.

Initially developed by UK, based on previous research on *Network-Centric Warfare – NCW* (1998), NEC internationally evolved to *NATO Network Enabled Capability – NNEC*, defined as “*the Alliance’s cognitive and technical ability to federate the various components of the operational environment, from the strategic level down to the tactical levels, through a networking and information infrastructure*”¹⁰.

Alavi and Leidner¹¹ observed that not all KM initiatives will implement an IT solution, but they support IT as an enabler of KM. Maier (2002) expanded on the IT concept for the KMS by calling it an *Information and Communication Technology – ICT* system that supported the functions of knowledge creation, construction, identification, capturing, acquisition, selection, valuation, organisation, linking, structuring, formalisation, visualisation, distribution, retention, maintenance, refinement, evolution, accessing, search, and application.

In this context, NEC is a key enabler for KM in military organisations by providing:

- Technical Network (*Physical infrastructure*) – supports acquisition, generation, distribution, manipulation and utilisation of knowledge;
- Social Network (*Group of interacting people*) – supports transfer, manipulation, integration, sharing of knowledge;

⁹ *Understanding Network Enabled Capability*, Newsdesk Communications Ltd, London, 2009.

¹⁰ *NATO Network Enabled Capability*, <http://nnec.act.nato.int/default.aspx>.

¹¹ Maryam Alavi, Dorothy E. Leidner, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

- Knowledge Network (*Minds of the people*) – supports perception, awareness, understanding, expertise, beliefs and values, decisions.

Furthermore, NEC provides support for knowledge modelling, discovery and creation, integration and sharing by excellent and intuitive ways:

- Advanced techniques and architectures for more effective sharing of information and knowledge across the enterprise’s distributed and heterogeneous information systems (high-performance information grid, integrated sensor grids (satellite imagery, manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, ground sensors), high-speed automated assignment of resources, access to all appropriate information sources, weapons, interactive network, data-sharing technologies);
- Visualisation and geo-spatial systems for enhanced understanding of spatial- and time-related knowledge in complex environments.

In return, KM has a major impact on:

- Value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes, battlefield interaction and synchronisation, increased operational tempo, accuracy, lethality and survivability, synchronised tactical offensive;
- Situational awareness, environment for proper understanding and prompt implementation of command intent.

KMS in NATO stability operations

The *Operational Mentor and Liaison Team – OMLT* programme is a NATO-ISAF initiative aimed at improving the capacity of the *Afghan National Army – ANA* through deploying small OMLT teams to work with ANA forces¹². The main task of OMLTs is to provide training and mentoring to the ANA.

They also serve as a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that the ANA units receive necessary enabling support (including close air support, casualty and medical evacuation). Ultimately, the main purpose of OMLTs is to ensure that ANA units develop in a standardised manner, which will allow them to carry out security tasks effectively and conduct operations with ISAF forces.

Each OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum period of six months. OMLT training is provided in advance to deployment with the aim to prepare the teams and staff assigned to Afghan National Army (ANA) units/HQs to successfully execute their mission of coaching, teaching and mentoring

¹² NATO’s *Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams*, <http://www.aco.nato.int/page26571951.aspx>.

by disseminating one-source knowledge of ANA doctrine, training principles, and the OMLT Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).

Individuals in OMLT organisation are considered experts within a particular domain (reconnaissance, counter-insurgency, combat engineering, artillery, advanced mechanics, medicine, computer systems, and legal proceedings etc.). Expertise is high in tacit knowledge.

The transfer of expertise occurs via consultation, collaboration, mentoring, and observation.

Through personal interaction, an OMLT's member should:

- Be *selective* and *pertinent*, focusing closely on ANA's particular interests and encouraging military personnel to individually find and extract relevant knowledge from handbooks, field manuals, standard operating procedures, terms of references etc.;
- *Interpret* knowledge to suit the context in which the Afghan military will use it (operational planning, field activities, equipment operation, CIMIC activities etc.);
- Be *responsive*, providing knowledge as appropriate for a specific audience to understand it, at an appropriate tempo;
- *Adapt* material to suit the audience's existing knowledge especially for ANA's personnel with previous military background;
- *Listen* to audience and flexible change ways of knowledge transfer to maximise understanding;
- *Demonstrate* physical actions in the field, performing practical demonstrations;
- *Guide experience and experiment* to elevate specific and general knowledge.

The relevance of knowledge transferred to Afghan military personnel depends on the currency of the knowledge in the context of its application, and it can be extended by renewal and learning.

Nevertheless, improvement of mentoring performance relies on the availability of experts to form OMLTs and the ability of a specific military organisation to quickly locate the required expertise for a given operational situation.

*

KM is a critical resource for military organisations and plays a key role in organisational adaptation and transformation in response to environmental changes and in operational engagements from the individual level in the battlefield to the national strategic commands and further to NATO command and force structures.

By and large, success of implementation and development of KMSs for NATO knowledge users shall be measured in strictly correlation with the guiding lines for reform and transformation stated in the new NATO Strategic Concept¹³.

The success of knowledge management in military organisations turns on how well the choice and execution of strategies, tools and processes fit the organisational context. Different sizes of military organisation need different mixes of KM tools and processes addressing people and technologies.

A successful KMS shall have a positive impact and substantially contribute to maximise the deployability of NATO forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field; ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication; develop and operate capabilities jointly; preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding; improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

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¹³ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*, NATO HQ, 19 November 2010.

CONCEPTUAL-DOCTRINAIRE CHANGES REGARDING AEROSPACE POWER USE (I)

Colonel BEng Daniel BĂNICĂ

Power is one of the most circulated concepts of geopolitics, and the struggle for power is one of the mechanisms leading to the evolution of human civilisation.

The general notion of a state's power includes the potential power and the actual power. The potential power is limited to items such as: population, weapons, infrastructure and national wealth, while real power includes many more factors, many of which are not quantifiable.

Air force robotisation has been assuming more and more classical missions of the vehicles with human crew onboard, from research, electronic warfare to combat missions and air transport.

Keywords: *power; international relations; missile shield; space power; defence; interest*

Generalities

The confrontation between people has always existed ever since the appearance of human beings and has increased as they have set up social formations – families, tribes, unions of tribes, states, empires¹.

The space between the Earth's surface (land and ocean) and the upper limit of the atmosphere is called *airspace*.

Because placing weapons in space is illegal, space powers have chosen to place some platforms – satellites, orbital stations and spacecraft – in outer space, on circumterrestrial orbits. These platforms carry out missions whose results can be used both in the civil and in the military domain².

Space power is defined as *“the ability of a state or non-state actor to achieve its goals and objectives in the presence of other actors on the world stage through control and exploitation of the space environment”*³.

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¹ Mihail Orzeață, *Războiul continuu*, Editura Militară, București, 2011, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

³ James L. Hyatt et al, *Space Power 2010*, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, May 1995, p. 6.

The arsenal of space power includes satellites, anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), manned and unmanned spacecraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), anti-ballistic missiles (ABM), boosters, to which one may add a large network of ground-based radars and other space surveillance sensors, command and control centres, communication networks and facilities of support for launching military operation in space.

The aerospace dimension is achieved by the unity of two sub-dimensions – air and space. The two sub-dimensions are dominated by different laws: the laws of aerodynamics and the ones of celestial mechanics. In this framework, air forces and space forces develop and evolve, acting independently, but complementary and synergistically, in a highly dynamic operational environment. The features of space forces place them at a different level from the air forces. He who has such capabilities will clearly benefit from the presence, perspective, persistence, rapidity of action and destructive potential on a global scale⁴.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to Jimmy Carter and campaign adviser to Barack Obama, stated that “*technological dynamics were changing the relationship between offensive and defensive weaponry and that outer space was becoming the perimeter of national security*”⁵.

The Russian Federation economic growth after 2000, an average of 6% annually, has been the prerequisite for reform and modernisation of the armed forces, a natural action after a long period of stagnation and decline. However, Russia has perceived the US intention to install radars and missile launchers in the Air-Defence Missile System in Eastern Europe as a military threat against its security, considering the system as being directed against it. Therefore, the fundamental concept that lies at the basis of this new military doctrine is the one of *active defence*, which requires the extensive use of preventive strategies⁶.

China is another country with strong space assets and has great possibilities of development mainly because of its steady and sustained growth over the last 20 years. Although Chinese military strategy is not made public in its entirety, same as the Chinese military doctrine, one can draw several conclusions from the sources available. People’s Liberation Army is preparing to upgrade its capabilities, increase the ballistic missiles and cruise missiles stockpiles.

⁴ Colonel Brian E. Fredricsson, *La Force spatiale dans les opérations interarmées*, in *Air & Space Power Journal*, fall 2006, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj/htm>, retrieved on 12 March 2010.

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea dilemă, a domina sau a conduce*, Editura Scripta, București, 2005, p. 25.

⁶ Simona Soare, *Federația Rusă renăscută*, in *Cadran politic*, no. 46/2007, p. 67.

In the long run, if current trends are maintained, the Chinese military capabilities can threaten any other modern armed forces, including in and from outer space⁷. This objective makes the USA consider that the Chinese space capabilities development is a threat to the safety of own space means.

Following the success of the launch into orbit of own manned spacecraft, “China plans to put a robot on the moon in 2012 and an astronaut by about 2020. Therefore, the construction of the carrier rocket Long March 5, with the capacity to carry payloads of up to 25 tonnes of space stations and heavyweight satellites, will be an important step towards these goals”⁸.

The tests with laser weapons capable of striking American satellites were not confirmed by Chinese officials, but China successfully tested its capacity to eliminate one of its low Earth-orbit satellites, destroyed with a land-based anti-satellite missile. On 11 January 2007, China became the third known country – after the USA and Russia – with a proven anti-satellite capability when it conducted an unannounced launch of a Deng Fong-21/Kai Tuo Zhe-1 (DF-21/KT-1) against its own defunct Feng Yun-1C meteorology satellite⁹.

Supported by its growing economy, China is going through a period of transformation and modernisation of all its civil and military space systems¹⁰. It is the third country in the world to send people into space with own means, after the former Soviet Union and the USA (on 15 October 2003, Shenzhou 5 spacecraft, on 12 October 2005 Shenzhou 6 spacecraft and on 25 September 2008 Shenzhou 7 spacecraft)¹¹. The Space Programme of the People’s Republic of China is directed by China National Space Administration, an agency directly coordinated by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party appointed by the Politburo. The task of the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China is to put into practice the military component of the Chinese Space Programme, in cooperation with the National Space Administration. In fact, this task belongs to the Air Force of the People’s Liberation Army¹².

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 39.

⁸ Jonathan Watts, *New Chinese Rocket Raises Concerns of Arms Race in Space*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spaceexploration.china>, retrieved on 07.11.2013.

⁹ James Mackey, *Recent US and Chinese Antisatellite Activities*, in *Air & Space Power Journal*, September 2009, <http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn10999>, retrieved on 02.10.2013.

¹⁰ Information Office of PRC State Council, *White Paper on China’s Space Activities*, 22 November 2000, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_space_program/, retrieved on 04.04.2013.

¹¹ Pierrot Durand, *China va trimite un om pe lună până în anul 2025*, in *French Tribune* on 21 September 2010, <http://frenchtribune.com/teneur/10975-china-man-moon-2025>, retrieved on 17.12.2010.

¹² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Air_Force, retrieved on 17.12.2010.

After the adoption of the Basic Space Law, in May 2008, and the appointment of a Space Development Minister (Fumio Kishida, on 17.06.2008), Japan gave up the prohibition of using space for military defence purposes. Given the importance of space programmes, the Japanese legislated that space studies and use of outer space were aimed “to guarantee international peace and security, to provide state security”¹³ and to protect humanity against various threats (natural disasters, for instance).

Even though it does not have nuclear weapons, Japan has shown its capabilities in terms of satellites launching and space interceptor technologies. In 2007, it successfully launched its first lunar probe satellite, *Kaguya*, using Japanese-produced H-2A rocket carrying a 4-ton payload¹⁴. Moreover, Japan is the key partner of the USA in the development programme of the SM-3/Aegis system that is fielded on its *Kongo*-class warships¹⁵.

Japan intends to accelerate space research and enhance own aerospace industry in order to play a more important role at world level. Consequently, it is more than likely that the Japanese military doctrine will reflect these new political decisions.

New space actors, such as D.P.R. Korea, Brazil, India, Iran, which develop aerospace capabilities and have a strong interest in increasing their space means research and development, will probably include certain elements in their military doctrines to substantiate the creation of their space forces, as well as the ways of using them in various situations.

A key feature of the possible aerospace warfare is the high speed with which some actions take place, which requires that people make decisions more rapidly compared with their current possibilities. For instance, the various components of a missile defence system need to exchange data at speeds that can respond to certain strategic attacks in which people would be incapable of participating as authors of decisions taken immediately (on the spot). The network of satellites, sensors, ground stations and command posts of the Strategic Defence Initiative can be considered a pioneer in this field, in which some parts will operate autonomously in order to meet this essential requirement, namely high speed of reaction.

Thus, while Americans say their National Missile Defence – NMD system is not directed against anyone, their only intention being to protect own citizens

¹³ *Le Japon lève les restrictions pour utiliser l'espace à des fins défensives*, in *Aujourd'hui le Japon*, on 22.05.2008, http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fumio_Kishida#Membre_du_Cabinet, retrieved on 13.11.2010.

¹⁴ *H-II Launch Vehicle*, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2a/design_e.html, retrieved on 13.11.2010.

¹⁵ James Mackey, USAF, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

from attacks by countries such as North Korea or Iran, almost all the rest of the world thinks otherwise.

An announcement according to which the US does not intend to limit to Europe the range of the missile shield was made by US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, Madelyn Creedon, at the beginning of March 2012. According to her, the White House was already negotiating with Australia, Japan and South Korea on implementing SM-3 missile interceptors on their territory.

The new regional missile defence system in Asia will be built “*step by step, using solutions that have already been tested in Europe*”, Madelyn Creedon added in a conference on antiballistic defence held in Washington. Officially, as noted by the *Kommersant*, the missile defence system in Asia is intended to protect the USA and its allies in the event of an attack from North Korea.

The Russians believe that the USA wants to strengthen its military supremacy, and the Chinese worry that the enlargement of the project to Asia under the form of the missile defence shield would free the United States to intervene in China's affairs and to undermine efforts at reunification with Taiwan¹⁶. Small countries did not react. France raised objections¹⁷, Russia was against it and China did not accept such way of action¹⁸. Consequently, former US President George Bush Jr. said that the USA would not ask anyone for permission for the new military strategy. He also called for the termination of the Missile Treaty signed with the former Soviet Union, arguing that “*today's most urgent threat stems not from the thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life*”¹⁹.

Among European countries, the US plan generates a mixture of anxiety and acceptance. Anxiety, because the implementation of the BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) programme is a fantastic incentive for arms race and will lead to new concerns about the military relationship between the US and Europe²⁰. Acceptance, because the Europeans know that their security still depends on the USA, on the American umbrella, achieving common European defence being a long-term project that requires huge funds and, the current economic-financial crisis making

¹⁶ Pavel Podvig, Hui Zhang, *Russian and Chinese Responses to US Military Plans in Space*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 26, 33.

¹⁷ Alain Charmean, *Une défense antimissiles européenne*, in *Defense nationale et sécurité collective*, vol. 63, no. 11, November 2007, pp. 112-116.

¹⁸ Pavel Podvig, Hui Zhang, *op. cit.*, pp. 2 and 31.

¹⁹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgebush>, retrieved on 27.09.2012.

²⁰ Xavier Pasco, *An European Approach to Space Security*, American Academy for Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, USA, 2009, p. 9.

it rather difficult for Europeans to reach their objective. In such circumstances, the cooperation between NATO and Russia “is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security”²¹, and NATO poses no threat to Russia.

On the other hand, the USA believes that Chinese space ambitions are a potential threat to the American satellite system, which is essential to maintain global military supremacy. China launched its first satellite in 1970 and, by October 2002, it designed and launched 47 satellites of various types²². Later, it carried out its first space manned mission – in 2003 –, thus entering the exclusive club which consisted until then of the USA and Russia. In 2005, it completed a second space mission with a crew of two astronauts. Now China hopes that, by the end of 2013, it will launch an unmanned lunar probe²³. China also intends to build its own space station. The Chinese state annually earmarks the equivalent of over 500 million dollars for space programmes, according to official figures, compared to the budget of nearly 25 billion dollars of NASA in 2010²⁴.

As far as the UK is concerned, it is in favour of the BMD project, because it not only provides integration of the Fylingdales radar station, but also ensures proper protection for the entire country. In Denmark, we find the same adhesion, because the shield is to include the island of Greenland, an autonomous territory where there is a US radar base for tracking satellites. Germany has welcomed the intention of the US administration, stressing that its position remains consistent with the need for non-proliferation of weapons in space and, therefore, an active protection against threats coming from outer space is beneficial to all.

The main issue posed by BMD is not how to prepare ourselves for the future world of missile defence, but rather how to reduce current political concerns. Missile defence is the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. The most important confidence-building measure is researching the possibility of active cooperation regarding missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners to achieve this goal²⁵.

²¹ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, adopted in Lisbon on 20 November 2010, art. 33.

²² Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²³ *Chinese Satellites and Spacecraft*, <http://www.spacetoday.org/China/ChinaSatellites.html>, retrieved on 14.01.2013.

²⁴ James E. Oberg, *Space Power Theory*, p. 64, <http://jamesoberg.com/spt.html>, retrieved on 27.09.2012.

²⁵ *Strategic Concept*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Fundamental Doctrinaire Trends

In the future, according to the latest doctrinaire trends that have gradually appeared as a reaction to a series of issues regarding foreign policy, the US armed forces will be repeatedly used as military forces for limited purposes, by avoiding the engagement in land combat actions (this actions being carried out by allies).

The USA will get involved only in small-scale conflicts, which require the deployment of allied forces groups whose superiority must diminish losses and reduce political implications that may lead to conflict escalation, seeking, at the same time, to rapidly put an end to hostilities.

According to US military doctrine, the American force groups will mainly participate in carrying out the following missions:

- defeating and occupying important positions (airfields, ports, communication nodes) on the territory of the “*target state*” or on the territories occupied by belligerent sides;
- controlling troops movement and lines of evacuation-supply of one of the belligerent sides;
- participating in strengthening maritime or land blockades or embargoes on trade;
- creating and securing a protection area for civilians;
- controlling areas of protection against terrorist threats;
- creating conditions for introducing into operation peacekeeping forces or supporting the establishment of civil administration authorities²⁶.

The military doctrine of the Russian Federation dates from the period of transition to market economy, of military reform, of dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. It is focused on defence and is intended as an organic combination of commitment to peace with the firm decision to preserve national interests, and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

The legal basis of the military doctrine are the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws and other legal documents, as well as international treaties signed by the Russian Federation on providing military security.

The Russian Federation has become a great economic and military power. Moscow reconsiders the position of states from that of partner into that of enemy whenever its strategic interests are at stake. The use of nuclear forces is stipulated as a response not only to a potential nuclear attack, but also to a conventional

²⁶ Colonel (r.) prof.univ.dr. Mircea-Dănuț Chiriac, colonel conf.univ.dr. Gheorghe Deaconu, locotenent-colonel lect.univ.dr. Filofteia Repez, *Curs de doctrine politico-militare*, Editura UNAp, București, 2012, pp. 227-231.

attack when there is no alternative. According to the new military doctrine, the Russian armed forces intend to get involved in the former Soviet republics in order to guarantee the security of fellow citizens and, whenever needed, to impose peace, possibly under UN mandate²⁷.

France's defence strategy is designed on the idea that the country does not have a certain enemy, and this determines it to adopt a defensive attitude.

The purpose of the defence strategy is to preserve France's vital interests, in line with its major role in Europe and its international vocation.

The French concept of *nuclear deterrence* aims to maintain the viability of a double credibility – political and technological –, and nuclear forces play a special part in this respect.


We may conclude by stating that the aspects that have been considered are meant to point out the geopolitical status of this power, the way in which it plans the defence of its vital and strategic interests, even through military force, as and when required, and the role it has undertaken in Europe and in other areas in the world, as an actor with universal vocation for preserving peace and world order²⁸.

According to the doctrinaire trends stemming from the current defence and security policy of unified Germany, the German armed forces are, on the one hand, national armed forces, whose purpose is to preserve the sovereignty of the country and, on the other hand, allied armed forces, which must contribute to international security. In these trends, there can be noticed the influence of the German specifics and national interests but also the interconditioning with NATO military strategy.

Considering the fundamental issues of a coalition war, Germany's military doctrine completely matches the NATO military doctrine and the Alliance strategic concepts.

The process of reorganisation of German armed forces is based on increasing the flexibility, manoeuvrability and procurement of rapid interception structures, as well as providing the well functioning of the relation between them and the main defence armed forces. The concept stipulates that forces procurement and training must be carried out on proportional bases.

The transformation of German Armed Forces from defensive into intervention armed forces, in which the land forces are the basic component, is considered as a step forward for Germany's military status after reunification²⁹.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 249-251.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 242-245.

²⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 251-253.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE *TITULESCU-LITVINOV CONVENTIONS* FOR THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION 80 YEARS AFTER THEIR SIGNING

Dr Bogdan AURESCU

The present article points out the importance and actuality of the Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions for the Definition of Aggression of July 1933 as well as their impact on international law, especially on the law on armed conflicts and on the prohibition of the use of force.

It shows the context of the preparation of the Conventions, including not only the bilateral relations between Romania and USSR but also the subsequent evolutions in the shaping of the definition of aggression in the UN framework, and in the International Criminal Court (ICC) context – the definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of ICC, as a result of the 2010 Kampala Review Conference, to which Romania has also made its contribution.

Keywords: *armed attack; aggression; Rome Statute; the crime of aggression*

Introductory Remarks.

The context of the preparations of the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* for the definition of aggression

In July 2013, we marked the anniversary of 80 years since the signing of the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions for the Definition of Aggression*, on 3 and 4 July 1933.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, right after the end of the First World War, although the political and social regimes in Romania and Russia were totally different, diplomatic contacts were established on multiple levels with the purpose of developing an open dialogue leading to the re-launching of the relations between the two countries.

The *General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy*, signed in Paris

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on 27 August 1928 (the famous *Briand-Kellogg Pact*), although a multilateral instrument, was to acknowledge the opening, at bilateral level, of a new stage in the negotiations between București and Moscow, strengthened mainly by the complex activity of Nicolae Titulescu and Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, two iconic personalities of that era.

Nicolae Titulescu's efforts within the League of Nations, where he served twice as President of the Assembly, were directed towards consolidating peace, maintaining stability of the post-war relations and building friendly relations. According to historic accounts, Maxim Litvinov was a cosmopolitan spirit and a supporter of collective security. He worked hard towards tightening relations with France, Britain and the US, and facilitated the accession of the USSR to the League of Nations. In this context, the efforts of the two diplomats happily converged in the negotiations within the World Disarmament Conference that was reconvened in 1933.

The need for a definition of aggression was outlined by Litvinov in early 1933. In his words: *"if we wish to see in action the Briand-Kellogg Pact [...] we shall have to give [...] instructions for its guidance, and that means, first of all, defining war and aggression and the distinction between aggression and defence, and once for all condemning those fallacious justifications of aggression with which the past has familiarised us"*¹. The Soviet proposal of 6 February 1933 contained the essence of the definition, focusing, however, on the aggressor. Furthermore, the *"Politis Report"* of 24 May 1933 proposed that the definition be part of a General Convention for the Reduction of Armaments². As the atmosphere of the Geneva Conference on Disarmaments was one of mistrust and confusion, Romania and the USSR joined efforts to make use of the definition of aggression in order to reinforce regional security. These efforts led to the London Conventions, which made express reference to the *"Politis Report"* and to the Soviet proposal.

and the United States of America on the deployment of the US missile defence system in Romania, signed in Washington, on 13 September 2011, and of the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, adopted on the same day.

¹ See Benjamin B. Ferencz, *Defining International Aggression. The Search of World Peace. Part One, A Documentary History and Analysis*, vol. 1, <http://www.derechos.org/peace/dia/doc/bf1.html#120>

² *Report of the Committee on Security Questions* (Rapporteur: M.N. Politis), League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments General Commission, Conf.D./C.G./108, Conf.D./C.P./C.R.S./9(1), Geneva, 24 May 1933, <http://www.derechos.org/peace/dia/doc/dia17.html>

Presentation and implications of the Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions for the Definition of Aggression

The two *Conventions for the Definition of Aggression* or the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* established the basis of what went on to be a widely accepted definition of aggression and a fundamental landmark for the practice of states in shaping international law. The first Convention was signed by Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Turkey on 3 July, being open to states “*immediately adjacent*” to the Soviet Union, according to its Protocol of Signature, and the second was signed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Yugoslavia, on 4 July, being open to all states. Finland acceded to the first convention on 31 January 1934³.

In the very words of Titulescu, uttered just after the signature of the Conventions, “*The Treaty we signed today has a considerable importance. In a moment when due to so many events the international situation is so confuse, in this moment, in a vast region of the world, and more precisely in one where it is believed that peace is most seriously threatened, the absolute and consistent obligation of nonaggression was established in the most harmonious way... If this formula is accepted by an as larger as possible number of states, it will be possible to work for consolidating the general peace*”. Addressing his words to Maxim Litvinov, Titulescu said: “*Let me add that this treaty has a special significance for my country. It represents a first and important step in the way leading to the normalisation of our relations. ... Romania and USSR are neighbours. ... That means that they are compelled to be friends*”⁴.

In this European context, on 9 June 1934, the public letters exchange by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Romania and the USSR, in Geneva, represented the climax of all diplomatic efforts to re-open normal relations between the two countries, thus resuming the diplomatic relations presenting the opportunity to deepen and develop the București-Moscow relations.

I will refer briefly to the importance and legacy of the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions*. Essentially, the provisions of the two Conventions are identical,

³ For the text of the Conventions, see *Nicolae Titulescu, Politica externă a României (1937)*, Fundația Europeană Titulescu, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1994, pp. 402-411.

⁴ Speech by Nicolae Titulescu on the occasion of the signing of the *Conventions of the Definition of Aggression*, 3 July 1933, the Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

in the sense that they define aggression (or armed attack), they assert the acceptance by the contracting parties of this definition and finally they underline the commitment that no political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as a justification for aggression. These three elements, definition, acceptance and commitment not to act to the contrary were the core of what was then the beginning of fight against war and what is now a general rule of international law.

The signatories of both treaties were also signatories of the *Briand-Kellogg Pact*, which, in its Article 1, condemned the “*recourse to war for the solution of international controversies*” and renounced war “*as an instrument of national policy*”. Nevertheless, the *Briand-Kellogg Pact* did not define aggression. Thus, the preamble of the two Conventions recalled the prohibition of aggression provided by the *Briand-Kellogg Pact* and the necessity to establish such a definition “*in the interest of general peace*” and “*to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries*”.

Both treaties based their definition on the “*Politis Report*” of the Committee of Security Questions submitted on 24 May 1933 to the *Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, in response to a proposal of the Soviet delegation⁵.

In short, the conventions enumerated the five cases of aggression:

- declaration of war upon another state;
- invasion by its armed forces of the territory of another state;
- attack by its land, naval or air forces on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state;
- naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; and
- the case in which a country supported armed bands which set out from its own territory and invaded that of another country, or refusal to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

The conclusion of these conventions was a tangible contribution towards opposing aggression and working out international legal principles designed to help prevent aggression. The definition of aggression comprised in the two conventions has since been widely used in international law.

⁵ *Report of the Committee on Security Questions (Rapporteur: M.N. Politis), op. cit.*

The follow-up to the Conventions for the Definition of Aggression

The legacy of the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* was brought to life on 14 December 1974, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314⁶, which defined acts of aggression and was subsequently used to define the crime of aggression. Acts of aggression were defined by the Resolution as armed invasions or attacks, bombardments, blockades, armed violations of territory, permitting other states to use one's own territory to perpetrate acts of aggression and the employment of armed irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts of aggression.

Although somewhat different in approach, the definitions given in 1933 and in 1974 are fundamentally alike. In fact, it can be argued that it was the intention of the parties to the two conventions to provide a basis for the development and future acceptance by the international community of a generally agreed upon definition of aggression. In this sense, in the preamble of both conventions, the parties deemed necessary to establish the rules defining aggression between them, and I would like to quote here, "*until such time as those rules shall become universal*".

Thus, Resolution 3314 begins by providing a general meaning of aggression, namely the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Thereafter, the Resolution goes on to use almost identical wording as the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* to emphasise what acts constitute aggression.

I have mentioned that a somehow different approach can be noted; indeed, the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* provide not for what acts constitute aggression, such as the Resolution does, but for what actions committed by a state make that state an aggressor. (That is why sometimes the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* are mentioned in the legal doctrine as "*Conventions for the Definition of the Aggressor*"). However, the acts and actions, in essence, are the same. Invasions of territories of other states are, in both cases, on the first place in the list of forms of aggression. Attacks by land, naval or air forces, as well as blockades of the coasts or ports were also incorporated as acts of aggression by Resolution 3314.

⁶ For the text of Resolution 3314, go to [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3314\(XXIX\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3314(XXIX)).

One notable difference refers to acts or actions related to armed bands. While the 1933 treaties provide for a low threshold in what may constitute aggression in relation to armed bands, the 1974 Resolution raises this threshold and articulates different conditions, in order for an act related to these bands to constitute aggression. The Greek politician Nikolaos Politis was behind the inclusion of “*support for armed bands*” as a form of aggression.

Perhaps another cornerstone element in the definition of aggression, found in the two *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions*, was the reference to possible justifications or considerations when aggression could be lawful or, to be more precise, the explicit reference to the fact that there were no justifications or considerations for aggression regardless of their nature, including political, military or economic. These specific provisions were also included in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution.

The *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* can thus be considered as one cornerstone of the definition of aggression in interstate relations. Nevertheless, they also represented a starting point for very important legal developments with respect to the international personal criminal responsibility: the international responsibility for the *crime of aggression*.

Prohibition of aggression has become a value of the humanity. However, history has shown that effective tools are needed, firstly, to deter the commission of the most serious international crimes and, secondly, to fight against the impunity of their perpetrators.

The *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions* were a truly determined effort in an attempt to prevent the replication of the atrocities of the First World War. The lack of universal commitment in the prohibition of aggression generated, *inter alia*, the tragic historic events of the Second World War. These events convinced the international community that more efforts should be invested in the fight against aggression, the most serious of the international crimes, as stated for instance by the Nurnberg Tribunal: “*to initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole*”⁷.

The *Principles of the Nurnberg Tribunal, codified by the International Law Commission in 1950* recalled that “*Any person who commits an act which constitutes*

⁷ Nurnberg Judgment, 1, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, p. 186, reprinted in *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 186, 1947.

*a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment*⁸. Aggression was the first of the international crimes, being defined as “*planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances*”.

This definition of the crime of aggression, in the works of the International Law Commission, as early as in 1950, draws our attention upon the distinctive feature of the crime of aggression. The words “*in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances*” trigger the genuine link between the crime of aggression and the relevant international documents of that period: the *Briand-Kellogg Pact* and the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions*. Therefore, why is the crime of aggression so distinctive, in relation to other international crimes? Because, in its case, individual criminal responsibility cannot be conceived without the international responsibility of the state. There can be no crime of aggression without an act of aggression by a state.

Almost half a century after the *Nurnberg Principles* had to pass until the international community achieved the stage of establishing a permanent International Criminal Court. The month of July can be considered as “*anniversary*” for the International Criminal Court, as the Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. Romania is proud to have been among the first 60 states depositing their instrument of ratification, and among the 10 states that deposited their instrument of ratification on 11 April 2002, during the special ceremony that enabled the entry into force of the Statute on 1 July 2002⁹.

From the perspective of criminalising the crime of aggression, the Rome Statute was at the same time a success and a postponement. As the states participating in the Rome diplomatic conference were not able to agree on the definition of the crime and on the conditions for exercising the jurisdiction, the success was represented by the insertion of the crime of aggression in article 5 paragraph (1), defining the material competence of the Court. According to the second paragraph of the same article, the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression shall be exercised once a provision is adopted, defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect

⁸ *Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session, 5 June-29 July 1950*, Document A/1316, pp. 11-14.

⁹ Bogdan Aurescu, *Sistemul Jurisdicțiilor Internaționale*, 2nd edition, revised and updated, Editura CH Beck, București, 2013, p. 167.

to this crime, on condition that such a provision shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Once a placeholder for the crime of aggression was reserved in the Rome Statute, the Final Act of the Conference directed the Court's Preparatory Commission to submit "*proposals for a provision on aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of Aggression and conditions under which the ICC shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this crime*".

This was the starting point of the activity of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, commonly known also as the "*Princeton Process*" – a process that can be truly considered as a catalyst that brought the definition of aggression to the centre of the international debate. Even if its activity started formally in 2003, debates began right after the Rome Conference, within the Preparatory Committee. Romania made its contribution to this debate by submitting, together with New Zealand and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a proposal on the definition of aggression, which, for the first time, separated the substantive part of the definition from the procedural one. Mention should be made that this approach was maintained by the ongoing negotiations that ended in 2009, shortly before the 2010 Kampala Conference that adopted the amendments to the Rome Statute and it was the basis for the separation between article 8 bis – the substantial part of the definition – and articles 15 bis and ter concerning the procedural aspects¹⁰.

In essence, article 8 bis of the Rome Statute is unavoidably rooted in the concept of the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions*, which was further developed by the *Definition of Aggression* in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 3314 (XXIX) of 1974. In fact, that article quotes the definition of aggression in the UNGA Resolution, and builds upon it the individual responsibility for the *crime of aggression*.

From the substantial point of view, the essence of the *Titulescu-Litvinov Conventions*, which is transposed over time in article 8 bis of the Kampala Amendments, can be summarised as follows: the principle of anteriority of an aggression, followed by a non-exhaustive enumeration of acts that may represent aggression.

It is well known that the Kampala Conference, held between 31 May and 11 June 2010, achieved an important, yet difficult result. However, it is important to outline the difference between the substantial definition and the procedural

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 168-169.

aspects of the exercise of jurisdiction – and to outline that the difficulties concern only the latter. It took the international community 77 years to reach the Kampala compromise. And yet some more years are necessary before the International Criminal Court can exercise the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and, thus, sanction the commission of the crime of aggression. Romania, as one of the main promoters of the fight against aggression, is determined to speedily ratify the Kampala Amendments, and, thus, to contribute to the fulfilment of the conditions that must be met in order for the ICC to exercise the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

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The legacy of the great Romanian lawyer and diplomat Nicolae Titulescu can be found not only in the definition of aggression, which we are invoking today, but also in the idea that the strict respect for international law is a value *per se*, a precondition for the proper functioning of the international society.

Today, for Romania, compliance with international law, as the expression of the rule of law in international relations, is one of the core pillars of its foreign policy. It is Romania's firm belief that strengthening the rule of law should be a permanent process at both national and international levels.

This vision of international rule of law was best captured in Nicolae Titulescu's words. Allow me to quote these words, a fragment from a speech Titulescu delivered in 1937 in Bratislava, which are now inscribed next to his effigy within the courtyard of the Peace Palace in The Hague, the headquarters of the International Court of Justice: "(...) *only when law shines like a rising sun in the soul of all people, like a guideline, like a categorical imperative, like obedience being perceived as organised freedom, only then will mankind be saved, because it is in the peace created by legal order that man can fulfil his destiny (...)*"¹¹.

¹¹ Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice*, Editura Politică, București, 1967, p. 833.

THE STATUS OF THE TRAINER AND OF THE MILITARY INSTRUCTOR (I)

Colonel Dr BEng Aurel-Constantin NEAGU

EU Policies regarding Training for Trainers and the Status of Trainers at European Level

For assuring quality in education, in many European countries there are implemented systems of criteria for the professions of teacher or trainer, consisting in minimum competences that must be met for that certain trainer to be hired. There are different levels of teachers and trainers “professionalisation” in the European Union countries. The author mentions, for instance, Denmark, Germany and Austria, where the stress is put on the importance of “professionalisation” for all teachers, as a consequence of the changes occurred in education and training, as well as following the challenges that must be met by teachers and trainers. Therefore, lifelong education and training are required in order to update the competences of teachers.

Keywords: *education level; lifelong learning; manager; personal development*

According to the most recent European documents, education efficiency and quality are fundamental premises for social cohesion, active citizenship, economic growth and human development, with a view to the transition to knowledge society.

Education and training are essential elements within the Romanian Land Forces transformation and modernisation process. The pragmatic and efficient education system, as an element of the transformation process, seeks to attain an educated and trained fighter, who possesses a high managerial culture, able to operate in a joint multinational environment, take risks, identify critical points or areas and implement change.

In this context, this article intends to make a comparison between the status of the trainer and that of the military instructor¹ and also points out the critical need to certify the viable skills of the military instructor through documents

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¹ Military instructor(s) – generic name for the military specialist performing teaching activities in military education and lifelong professional training units and schools, regardless of the position

acknowledged both by the civil/national education system and by the military education system, by initiating the necessary steps for designing and implementing an initial and continuous training system of the teaching staff in the lifelong military education, with a view to professionalising teaching and managerial career, according to the Romanian Armed Forces operational needs, fully compatible and integrated in the national and Euro-Atlantic education system.

According to *Law no. 1/2011*, the National Education Law, professional training of adults includes *initial professional training* and *lifelong professional training*, organised in other ways than those specific to the national education system. Initial professional training of adults provides the training necessary for acquiring minimum professional competences required to get a job, while lifelong professional training is subsequent to initial training and provide adults with either developing their already acquired professional competences or with acquiring new competences.

Training programmes are an alternative chosen by adults for personal and professional development. Basically, they are a continuation or completion of the formal education system represented by the education system. They are included in non-formal education because, although their system is ratified and authorised by laws implemented ever since 2003 in Romania, they have not been planned yet through education programmes. Their role is to provide skills and competences specific to each profession, needed for the employee to perform at work.

Thus, unlike formal education institutionalised in education stages (primary, secondary, university, masters and doctoral cycle), the role of the training programme as part of informal or non-formal education is to generate specific competences, characteristic of each activity, unlike the general competences offered by the education system. The development of lifelong learning systems has brought about the need to surpass the boundaries between lifelong and initial training.

Lifelong learning has become a priority for global education systems, even for the Romanian military education system, being one of the arguments in support of the need for the initiation/participation in various forms of permanent education.

Under these circumstances, institutional reorganisation has provided the transfer from one education level to another, for teachers and trainers, by adding competences and by appropriate training programmes.

they occupy: instructor, senior instructor, superior instructor or advanced instructor (Annex no. 1 of *Ordinul ministrului apărării naționale (Order of Minister of National Defence)* no. M. 58 of 27 May 2013 for approving *Instrucțiunile privind corpul instructorilor militari (Directives regarding the Military Instructors Body)*).

As far as national objectives in the field of improving education and professional training of teachers and trainers are concerned, they are seeking to meet the EU goals, aiming:

- to identify and develop competences in the context of knowledge society;
- to ensure appropriate conditions to support teachers and trainers in order for them to deal with the challenges of knowledge society, including from the lifelong learning perspective;
- to ensure a sufficient number of teachers and trainers, by taking into account the long-term needs of these professions and by transforming education and training in an attractive activity;
- to involve in education and training people who have professional experience in other areas.

From the perspective of the new challenges of knowledge society, as well as because of the increasingly complex changes and market requirements, it was necessary that teachers and trainers acquired new competences.

The role of teachers and trainers has become much more complex, in the context of labour mobility, development of information and communication technology, and the need for quality assurance in education. Orientation, counselling, teamwork, collaboration with beneficiaries and communication with the parties involved have become extremely important in the tasks of teachers and trainers.

National realities, such as the requirements imposed by legislation and regulations, are often difficult to enforce due to lack of resources and inability to follow the latest technological developments. For these reasons, being a teacher or trainer becomes unattractive. Financial shortfalls caused by the economic crisis in Europe lead to an under-funding of education of all kinds and demotivation of possible specialists attracted to this area.

To assure education quality, in many European countries, systems of criteria are implemented for teaching or training, consisting of minimum competences required for the trainer to be hired.

There are different levels of teachers and trainers “*professionalisation*” in the European Union countries. In Denmark, Germany and Austria, the focus is on the importance of “*professionalisation*” for all teachers, as a consequence of the changes taking place in education and training, as well as following the challenges that must be faced by teachers and trainers. Therefore, the need for continuous education and training is very required, in order for the competences of teachers to be updated. From this perspective, Finland and Belgium’s efforts focus on increasing international mobility within “*professionalisation*” and development of the competences of teachers and trainers.

In other European countries (Denmark, Greece, Norway, Poland), there is a greater focus on basic competencies, combined with Information and Communication Technology competences – ICT.

It is expected that several European collaboration programmes will be developed in the future. In the same countries, great attention is given to *on the job training* for teachers and trainers in order to harmonise as much as possible education and training with market requirements.

Reviewing the impact of national policies on improving education and professional training of teachers and trainers, there can be noticed trends derived from the influence of external factors on the training of specialists in education, which must:

- have the necessary competences to implement research and innovation techniques in relation to the beneficiaries of education and market requirements (see Finland and Norway);
- acquire the competences required for dealing with issues and go beyond conventional teaching topics (see Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Finland);
- be able to assume additional counselling and guidance skills (see Northern Europe countries).

Supporting initial and lifelong training of teachers, trainers and tutors in the education and professional training programme (EPT) is one of the priorities of the EU 2020 strategy (*Europe 2020 – Europe’s Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth*). This priority focuses on developing teaching competences for EPT teachers, trainers and tutors and on providing professional guidance with a view to dealing with future challenges. Regarding this priority, the transfer of innovation will be promoted in terms of:

- the role of EPT professionals in response to systemic changes, for example, focusing on learning outcomes and competence-based systems and increased attention to the validation of previous non-formal and informal learning;
- strengthening links between EPT professionals and the professional environment (companies, professional sectors etc.), developing their capacity to provide counselling on professional life and career;
- developing pedagogical skills of teachers and getting them involved in designing curricula;
- acquiring competences that will make it possible for professionals in education and training to teach transversal competences, and key competences for lifelong learning process.

Types of Roles in the Field of Continuous Professional Training

The roles of trainers have changed a lot for the past two or three decades in Western countries and have triggered change in their associated performance standards. Thus, the development of occupational standards or regulations regarding the quality of the services in the field, that clearly specify the expected performance of the trainers, and the establishment of a European qualifications framework (depending on standards) have become indispensable.

In 1969, Leonard Nadler recommended three main roles and a series of subordinate roles for the trainer:

1. *Learning Specialist*: facilitator of learning; curriculum builder; instructional strategist.

2. *Administrator*: developer of personnel; maintainer of relations; supervisor of ongoing programmes, facilities and financing arranger.

3. *Consultant*: advocate; expert; change agent; catalyst; process specialist².

The image created by Nadler is that of a trainer who must combine expertise with teaching knowledge to use them in support of the specific needs of the organisation. In addition, the trainer must also fulfil an administrative role, as part of his work duties.

Nadler's classification, most of it valid today, is a systematic inventory of specialised functions performed by the personnel from organisations providing training services as well as from specialised departments of large organisations. These functions or roles are exercised in small training departments within organisations as well, but because of their size (associated with the importance given to training and, nowadays, personnel development), they are carried out by a small number of trainers who not only perform learning tasks, including sometimes building the training programme, but are also managers of the training and counselling programmes in the field or even of marketing programmes for the latter ones.

Pretty close to Nadler's typology was that of Rodger and his colleagues at Birkbeck College (1971). When they wanted to know what the priorities of those in charge of professional training in industrial enterprises were, the researchers received the following responses, listed in order of importance by the respondents:

- to present convincingly the benefits of training before the leadership;
- to identify training needs;
- to evaluate the training programme;
- to select trainees;

² Leonard Nadler, *The Variety of Training Roles*, in *Industrial and Commercial Training*, vol. 1, pp. 33.

- to train trainers;
- to discuss the progress made by the trained ones;
- to plan recruitment;
- to set training costs.

Rodger's typology establishes roles according to the main goals of the training departments identified at the time of the study. The focus is more on intention than on reality, respondents showing an image on the priorities that should be considered, according to their opinion, by specialised structures. We notice that both the administrative and the management roles of the structures in charge of training are excluded.

A decade later, in 1982, Pettigrew, Jones and Reason's model³ described, from a completely new perspective, the activities in which trainers were involved, as pointed out practitioners from several organisations:

1. *the provider*: the role meets the traditional concept of personnel development and has the task of providing training services at operational level, with the purpose of improving performance;

2. *the passive provider*: the distinction is made based on the level of proactivity on the part of the trainer. Passive providers do not try to promote their services, maybe because of the lack of experience. Their work takes place only at the lowest levels of the organisation and is not so important for it, nor does it have much influence;

3. *the manager provider*: this role includes planning and resource responsibilities, as well as specialisation in personnel development. It requires coordination of training operations;

4. *the change agent*: this role is focused more on change than on maintaining the organisation, on problem solving through training and development and not just on providing training courses. The trainer acts as an internal consultant;

5. *the provider in transition*: the role refers to the trainer going from the role of training provider to that of change agent, thus including elements from the two roles.

According to Pettigrew, the roles of provider and passive provider require distant relationships with the organisation management, the trainers not being perceived as doing something essential for the organisation and the expectations of their contribution being low.

The manager provider requires strong relationships with the company management, interacting with senior managers, having a high level of credibility and expertise.

³A.M. Peetigrew, G.R. Jones, P.R. Reason, *Training and Development Roles in their Organisational Setting*, Sheffield, Manpower Services Commission, 1982.

Moreover, the roles of change agent and provider in transition are based on very good relationships with managers, benefiting from credibility, and their contribution is seen as something highly relevant and valuable.

Pettigrew and his colleagues found that most trainers acted within the limits allowed by the organisation, using traditional learning methods. The extent to which the holders of these roles could become innovators relied on the power given by the position (decision authority), the urgency of the need for training within the organisation, as well as the personal qualities and reputation of the trainer.

Partially contradicting the conclusions of Pettigrew's team, the roles of provider and passive provider are largely predetermined in some organisations and are not related to the personality of the trainer, the professional competence or even the post in the organisational chart, but to other factors, among which the main share belongs to the organisation's core mission, namely the type of organisational structure adopted or, according to R. Mintzberg's typology, the position given to the techno-structure (which includes the training-development department) in the organisation.

In 1983, Bennett and Leduchowicz⁴, in an attempt to define the roles of trainer, started from two questions regarding the motivation of investing in training and related to the way the investment was made:

1. *Why invest in employee development?*

- to maintain the organisation. This means that employee development is focused on replacement (you are developed/trained to replace, occupy a position in the organisation) and requires that employees are aware of the changes in technology and legislation;
- to change the organisation. In this case, development is focused on the ability of employees to do new things/carry out the same professional tasks in new ways. It is related to the leadership style, power relations and organisation culture. The purpose is to support the creation of new forms of organisation.

2. *How to develop employees?*

- the focus is on methods and techniques. We identify two trends: the *educational* one, based on traditional courses, in which teaching methods and techniques tested in school are applied, and the *interventionist* one, which promotes approaches and techniques selected so that they meet the work environment and employee roles.

⁴ Roger Bennett, Tad Leduchowicz, *What Makes for an Effective Trainer?*, in *Journal of European Industrial Training*, vol. 7, 1983, pp. 3-46.

From the answers given to the four questions, they identified four possible roles:

1. The role of *caretaker*: it combines the maintenance of the organisation with educational guidance. The main point is represented by the systems and procedures, and the main method is represented by the standardised courses outside the workplace.

2. The role of *educator*: it combines organisational change with educational orientation. The trainer notices the need to change the form of organisation, but uses traditional methods.

3. The role of *evangelist*: it relies on new development methods and approaches. In contrast to the role of educator, which is more focused on the trainer, this role is focused on the trainee.

4. The role of *innovator*: it combines organisational change with interventionist orientation. It encourages changes in the organisation and is focused on the trainee.

Bennett and Leduchowicz introduced in the classification criteria (and more explicitly than Pettigrew and his colleagues) the tasks assigned by the organisation to the trainers and internal persons responsible with training. The four roles are largely predetermined by the overall mission of the organisation, its size and the stage of organisational development. The roles, especially those of evangelist and innovator, are influenced by the evolution of the theories of organisational development and human resource development, their occurrence being unlikely, for example, in the '50s.

Although the models from the '80s are still of interest, they fail to reflect the profound changes of the '90s and the changing of the focus from "*training*" to "*learning*" and "*personnel development*", which characterises the field of continuous training today.

In 1984, the *Report on the Training of Trainers* identified four essential functions, that could be applied to most specialised posts in terms of training:

1. *determination and leadership;*
2. *planning and organisation;*
3. *direct training;*
4. *counselling and advice.*

The four domains suggest an exhaustive role for the trainer: determining the training requirements, guiding activities, planning and organising training activities, counselling and advice services for colleagues. On this occasion, the Reporting Committee focused its attention on the direct training element, which was divided into four sub-functions, representing the essential aspects of the work of direct trainers:

- *to design training programmes;*
- *to prepare training;*

- to carry out training;
- to assess training results.

The suggested classification systematises the training functions according to the updated diagnosis of the authors.

Martin Sloman said, in the mid-90s, that the continuous training world could not be adequately managed only with training sequences. He proposed two overarching roles of the trainer: internal consultant and strategic facilitator. Later, in the late '90s, starting from Sloman's model, a typology was created consisting of four parts:

1. management: those working as managers in organisations focused on training;
2. services: those who provide a (training) service in the organisation;
3. external role: consultants or those who provide external training services;
4. line manager: one who has the responsibility of training employees.

The existence of these roles was heavily influenced by the increasing importance given to training counselling, development of line managers, head hunting outside the company and the need to establish a very close relationship between the strategic objectives of the organisation and continuous training.


We have noticed that special importance is given to the role of line managers, respectively the direct heads of personnel, regardless of their department or service. The responsibility of training is mostly transferred to those managers, who are indirect beneficiaries of the training services provided by internal departments or external organisations or of the on-the-job-training programmes or even professional self-development programmes.

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In the second part of the article, the author will point out the potential roles in professional training, as well as the dimensions of the trainer's personality.

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 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

TRAINING ACTIVITIES ORGANISATION AND CONDUCT (I)

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Any professional training activity, course or programme must meet the training needs of a certain target audience.

In this respect, the author reckons that the identification of training needs requires that the difference between an existing and a desired state of knowledge and competence should be determined. In fact, this difference represents the added value of the professional training activity, course or programme. The gap between the two states must be the foundation of any training activity, course or programme. In order to identify the needs, it is necessary that a variety of sources of information should be used, including the potential student.

Keywords: *education programme; training strategies; documentary; performance*

1. The trainer role and competences

The dynamics of our society is complex, and achieving performance requires continuous learning. In this context, training programmes play a key role. Being able to adapt and meet the requirements related to the performed activities is not enough. It is important to be able to train people, to be able to organise courses, to bring added value to the team and even to yourself.

According to the Occupational Standard, a trainer is the expert in training who plans, delivers, evaluates and reviews theoretical/practical and/or training and professional skills development programmes in institutions or in the workplace.

This broad definition is consistent with the trainer definitions at European level. The competences below are applicable to trainers in all activity fields and at all qualification levels.

According to the latest occupational standard, trainers must have eight key competences:

A. Training preparation (training objectives definition, training activities planning, learning situations development, training activities organisation, training venue organisation, course and auxiliary material preparation).

B. Training delivery (trainees' information relating to training activities, trainees' motivation, training facilitation, conflict resolution, feedback provision).

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C. Trainees' evaluation (test and evaluation tools development, evaluation sessions organisation, evaluation results recording and training programme/activity reporting).

D. Special training methods and techniques employment (personal reflection and self-training encouragement, group dynamics in learning promotion, teamwork, involving other trainers and resource persons, training situations flexible approach, transversal skills development).

E. Training marketing (organisational training needs identification, training programmes promotion).

F. Training programmes planning (training goals and objectives setting, training resources identification, training support development, training strategy and programme development).

G. Training programmes and sessions organisation (training programme negotiation, training units' establishment, additional facilities provision).

H. Training programmes and sessions evaluation, review and quality assurance (evaluation portfolio development, training programmes effectiveness evaluation, training programmes review, quality assurance systems criteria promotion).

Therefore, the adult trainer should serve as a facilitator, a mentor (model and supporter for trainees), having a flexible and adaptable personality, rather than a transmitter of knowledge, an expert willing to share experience.

A set of *competences* define the personality profile of the trainer that is desired on the educational services market:

- to conduct the learning processes intended for adults so that they could develop practical-applicable, immediately demonstrable skills and competences rather than acquire simple knowledge;
- to identify those concepts and learning activities that are relevant to the real contexts in the trainees' daily life;
- to be a dynamic, flexible person, accepting the expressions of trainees' independence;
- to adapt to the diversity of trainees, to be able to meet their expectations of the training programme (depending on: learning needs, personal traits, knowledge interests), by selecting training strategies that are appropriate to the education needs, prior education, cultural values, age and other personal characteristics;
- to work as a team with other trainers and to also promote teamwork as far as the trainees' activities are concerned;
- to easily communicate with trainees and to streamline communication processes between them;

- to easily make contact with people, institutions as well as with the community interested in delivering educational programmes for adults;
- to boost trainees' motivation, highlighting progress and the practical utility of the taught knowledge;
- to plan an education programme and to evaluate its outcomes¹.

Summarising these competences, the trainer can create a stimulating and efficient learning context, meeting both the trainees and the trainer needs.

The roles of adult trainer focus on:

- *expert in the teaching-learning process*, providing multiple control: new material presentation, discussions and debates control;
- *advisor*: information should not be presented in detail, trainees should be encouraged to discover new things, motivating them to actively participate in the course;
- *facilitator*: facilitates a way to access new contents, orienting trainees to learn to discover new things that are useful for both the training process and everyday life;
- *manager*: encourages trainees to collaborate, to share ideas, knowledge, and especially responsibilities, the trainer having the task of managing each constituted group;
- *guide and initiator*: the trainer may propose projects to maintain the acquired competences;
- *evaluator* of the trainees formed or developed competences as well as of own performance as a trainer;
- *orchestrator*: the trainer has the mission to defuse conflicts.

The defining personality traits for the adult trainer profile are:

- high competence standards in the field of training;
- respect for the abilities of the others;
- willingness to share knowledge;
- willingness to provide support whenever needed;
- empathic capacities;
- communication skills;
- openness, flexibility;
- self-confidence and the ability to develop this feeling in the trainees;
- positive attitude².

¹ L. Ezechil, *Educația adulților*, Editura Paralela 45, Pitești, 2007, pp. 11-12.

² *Ibidem*, p. 33.

Summarising the trainer qualities (skills, personality traits), we identify the following *categories of skills*:

- interpersonal (cultivation of interpersonal relationships);
- planning and development of a training programme;
- communication;
- management;
- conflict resolution;
- in the field of psychological counselling and career guidance.

The training programme assures the acquisition of competences that are appropriate to the occupational standard. Occupational standards are dual-purpose: to serve the evaluation and certification based on competences and to provide the necessary information to develop professional training standards. They are true for both initial and continuing training. Professional training standards serve to plan the training curriculum.

The occupational standard – Trainer – COR Code: 241205 comprises 4 mandatory (basic) competences, which must be demonstrated by all trainers, regardless of the qualification level, and 4 optional competences, which have to be particularly demonstrated by certain categories of trainers.

The trainers having only basic (mandatory) competences deliver, as a rule, a training programme designed by other trainers, may work in teams with other trainers, can guide practice in various institutions, and train future specialists, apprentices.

Optional competences can be developed only in conjunction with or after the basic (mandatory) competences have been acquired and evaluated, as their content is adjacent to basic competences. Thus, the trainers involved in training programmes management and/or the staff of training providers that are in managerial positions should demonstrate, depending on the area of specialisation, one or more of the optional units of competence (training marketing, training programmes planning, training programmes and sessions organisation, training programmes evaluation, review, and quality assurance).

The trainers working with trainees at higher qualification levels should prove the acquisition of the unit of competence “*Application of special training methods and techniques*”.

The trainers of trainers should prove the acquisition of all the competences related to the occupational standard. Training preparation entails the training activity organisation by a trainer, based on the curricula developed and approved in the organisation.

The trainer, based on the occupational standard, decomposes complex professional activities in simple activities, redefines simple activities as learning activities, and recomposes learning activities in demonstrable professional competences.

2. Training preparation

Training preparation is a core competence that should be demonstrated by all trainers. The trainer is the expert in training who plans, develops, evaluates and reviews theoretical/practical activities and/or training and professional skills development programmes, delivered in institutions or in the workplace.

2.1. Objectives definition

The training programme objectives represent the training provider response to the identified needs, and they are appropriate to the occupation basic requirements.

Any activity, course or professional training programme for adults should meet the training needs of a target audience.

The training needs identification entails determining the gap between existing and desired knowledge and competences. This difference represents, in fact, the added value of the professional training activity, course or programme. The gap between the two above-mentioned states should be the foundation of any professional training activity, course or programme. To identify the needs a variety of information sources should be resorted to, potential trainees included.

In response to the identified needs, the provider should specify in a clear and concise document the learning outcomes of the training activity, course or programme.

The learning/training outcomes, expressed in written statements related to objectives centred on the trainees' performance or behaviour, should have the following characteristics:

- to provide a framework for the training activity, course or programme planning;
- to provide a basis for the training content or strategies definition;
- to clearly explain to the trainees what knowledge, competences and/or attitude they should acquire during the training activity;
- to represent the basis for obtaining permanent feedback, progress measurement and final assessment;
- to clearly state what trainees can do following the participation in the training activity, course or programme.

The provider should clearly, concisely and measurably specify the training outcomes based on the identified needs. Trainees should be informed on the expected results of the professional training activity, course or programme.

Operational objectives are specific to training activities. These objectives are translated into observable behaviour of the trainees, providing the trainer with the opportunity to observe the trainees' acquisitions during a training session or activity.

Operational objectives are appropriate to the individual traits of the trainees and to the needs of the trainer provider. When formulating the operational objectives the following aspects should be considered:

- the action to be performed by the trainee (presented in terms of behaviour);
- conditions under which performance should occur;
- performance criteria to localise the expected results.

2.2. Training activity planning

Training activities are defined according to the set operational objectives and they are tailored to the individual characteristics of trainees. They are defined according to the training group dimension and the training provider resources.

Learning contents are tailored to training objectives and target competences. Learning activities are organised from simple to complex to ensure the objectives achievement.

The training content and methods should be appropriate to the expected learning outcomes for each activity, course or programme. Thus, trainees are provided with the opportunity to actively participate in the learning process and to receive feedback on their own performance.

Both trainees and trainers should correctly understand the expected learning/training activity outcomes and the way they can be achieved. The provider should support the logical achievement of objectives through the proposed content, which should be organised in a logical manner, from the basic to advanced levels.

Training strategies are as important as the content. Each expected outcome requires a level of performance so that the trainee can meet the desired outcome. Training methods should appeal to trainees different learning styles, facilitate the interaction between trainees and the trainer, training materials, and colleagues, enable trainees to analyse and understand what they have learned, and provide the feedback that is necessary for effective learning.

2.3. Learning situations development

Learning situations are structured ways of organising and conducting learning activities, including formative assessment (during the learning process). The basics of learning situations are the methods, techniques and procedures for training and for the formative evaluation of training outcomes, as well as the course support, equipment and materials that are used.

3. Training activities organisation

Training conditions are represented by all the factors that favour or, on the contrary, hinder training: physical space, necessary materials and equipment, attitudes and prejudices of people involved, acquisition of support materials, conduct of some learning activities or study of information materials in advance, facilities for breaks and personal hygiene etc.

Training conditions should be provided in accordance with the law and with the training programme and they should be tailored to the individual characteristics of the participants.

Training equipment and materials should be available when needed in the training process.

Visual materials should be legible and attractive. Training resources and materials should be accessible to training participants.

3.1. Training venue organisation

Each training activity should be conducted in a location that is well chosen and organised depending on the programme objectives and target competences. The training venue should be arranged so that the communication between the trainees and the trainer can be facilitated. The training venue should be clearly differentiated from the one for trainees' breaks and relaxation.

Different learning venues can be capitalised on:

➤ *Lecture room*: One way would be to organise all the activities as lectures, namely the trainer teaches the trainees while they listen to him/her. It is a well known situation that can be also called *vertical learning*, in which a person having more knowledge communicates with people who have less knowledge so that they can acquire more knowledge, skills and/or other attitudes.

➤ *Study room*: Another way of organisation is related to the trainees' needs and the conditions imposed by them. Trainees may ask each other questions, trying to learn in network and to improve their knowledge, explicitly exchanging knowledge, and tacitly and mutually identifying knowledge. The trainer role is that of "*facilitator and mentor who provides support*".

➤ *Simulation room*: To establish a closer relationship between theory and practice, participants can simulate reality (case studies or other simulation activities). Simulation can be a good idea, and the trainer role is that of "*advisor who asks questions and listens*", having solid theoretical and practical knowledge.

➤ *Practice room*: Training can be directly related to practice. It means that the outcome can be directly implemented in practice, while trainees' competences are developed. Active learning programmes are very good examples in this regard. The trainer role is that of "*inventor of well executed, appropriate and reflective*

activities". Trainers should be capable of choosing the learning environment that guarantees the best outcomes.

All details should be considered (temperature – controlled or not, furniture, light, acoustics, size, location, sockets, doors, snack bar, obstacles).

Recommendations for the activity in the training venue:

- to check sockets localisation and their functionality;
- to facilitate access in the area near the door;
- to place the snack bar at the back of the room, to avoid attracting attention;
- to lower the blinds if visual aids are used;
- to use natural light not to cause visual discomfort;
- to establish a place where the audience can have copies, if necessary;
- to check if the audience can see the trainer;
- to check the acoustics and the microphone functionality.

3.2. Training venue preparation

The furniture (tables, chairs) arrangement is an often underestimated factor because of its less obvious effects. However, it can turn a training session into a success or a failure.

Advantages	Disadvantages
<i>“ U” arrangement</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to present reports; • the trainer’s good perspective on the trainees; • familiar arrangement as when attending meetings/festivities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • much space is necessary; • great distance between the participants; • if chairs are arranged at the back of the horseshoe some trainees cannot see well.
<i>“Star”-like /group arrangement</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • appropriate to group work; • teamwork is stimulated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • some participants do not have enough space; • there is a relatively large distance between trainees.
<i>Classic school arrangement</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to present reports; • formal, rigorous environment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • participants are more passive; • in general, discussions take place between a trainee and a trainer; • those in the front desks feel exposed/intimidated.
<i>Circle arrangements, without tables</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • there is room for more participants; • stimulate interactivity; • dialogue is boosted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • not all the participants are accustomed to such loose and informal arrangement; • some adults do not feel comfortable or they feel intimidated by the arrangement.

3.3. The success of a good presentation

A good trainer is trained over time through exercise. Any trainer should know the material to be presented very well. In principle, the content of the presentation

should be previously established, and the form of presentation should be tailored to the audience, to the context etc.

Each presentation should have an introduction, main body and conclusion. The golden rule for a successful presentation is that the introduction, the moment when the trainer makes the first impression on the audience, should be very good and the conclusion should be brilliant. The main body should be very concise.

Each speech or presentation should have the following stages:

Preparation stage

When preparing a presentation, the following aspects should be considered:

- who invites and who is invited;
- what personal or institutional objectives are pursued;
- what type of discourse is required;
- what the expectations of the audience are;
- how much time is allotted to the discourse (a very important element, as the allotted time should not be exceeded);
- allotted time for the audience interventions, for discussions;
- what the audience theoretical background is, and how many people there are in the audience;
- the audience attend the presentation willingly or motivation is simulated;
- the acoustics of the training venue and the technical support (retro or video projector etc.).

Documentation stage

It is the stage when the material that is necessary for the presentation or discourse is gathered. Books, different publications, the Internet, as well as experts or own database can be documentation sources. The collected material should be selected.

Structuring stage

This stage results in a discourse draft that should be enhanced. Each discourse is structured according to some keywords. Before having the first rehearsal it is necessary that the discourse should be processed in terms of rhetoric. Every human being is a source of more or less controlled emotions!

Recommendations for emotional control during presentation:

- the discourse should be very well prepared and the speaker should practise it;

- the presence of some friends in the audience may be helpful, especially because they can be very attentive to the speech and, subsequently, they can help you to overcome mistakes;
- before the presentation, have a relaxing activity, doing what you like and help you better control your emotions, and do not forget to think positively;
- at the beginning of the discourse take a deep breath, read or speak rarely, clearly and loudly, which will help you boost your self-confidence;
- imagine that there are people like you in the audience, even if there are only colleagues who often detect just the mistakes you make;
- make the audience listen to you, take breaks, repeat some ideas so that they can be better understood and retained;
- a discourse should not follow the same rules as a written text, and the sentences should be short;
- think, speak, persuade, these are the keywords;
- say what you think, what you say is listened by the audience, what you say should be understood, what the audience understand should be accepted, what is accepted by the audience will be used, and what is used will be, in turn, retained;
- a good presentation is characterised by a concise style, without digressions, matching the content and the form;
- an important role is played by surprise elements, avoidance of generalisations, as well as by the presence of concrete examples.

*

In the second part of the article the author will present the main forms of communication as well as the conditions for efficient learning.

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AIR DEFENCE MISSILE COMPLEXES LIFE EXTENSION, REVITALISATION AND MODERNISATION

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In modern battlefield, the airpower represents a major force-multiplier and a support for any military operation. For this reason, the air defence has the same importance. Among the air defence assets, ground-to-air missiles are the most important features in terms of procurement.

This article presents the basic coordinates for the life extension, revitalisation and modernisation processes focused on missiles and their involvement in the scientific, technical and technological environment of the owners.

An important distinction between the missiles and systems requirements is made. The conclusions are useful for all the military commanders in charge of the maintenance and procurement plans regarding this kind of equipment.

Keywords: *missile; air defence; range; efficacy; modernisation*

Based on the analysis of latest conflicts that have widely employed modern assets in air operations^{1,2}, the following missions can be anticipated for Air Defence (AD):

- *cruise missile combat nearby enemy targets;*
- *credible deterrence when the enemy uses Electronic Counter Measures – ECM and Anti-Radiation Missiles – ARM;*
- *enemy night-time target engagement;*
- *detection and destruction of Remotely Piloted Vehicles – RPV within the limits of system effectiveness;*
- *effectiveness against attack helicopters;*
- *fire capability against saturation attacks;*
- *survival capability in Suppressed Enemy Air Defence operations.*

Defence assets must cover a set of primary conditions against the threat, conditions which are essential to the accomplishment of the missions^{3,4,5}:
- short deployment and reaction time⁶;

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¹ General-maior dr. Corneliu Soare, *Teorii militare contemporane*, Editura Militară, București, 1978.

² C. Weinberger, P. Schweizer, *Următorul război mondial*, Editura Antet, 1997.

³ I.E. Kazakov, A.F. Mișakov, *Aviaționnie upravliaemie raketi*, Editura VVIA “N.E. Jukovski”, 1985.

⁴ Gh. Zarioiu, *Aviația modernă*, Editura Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 1977.

⁵ ****, *Aerei civili e militari di tutto il mondo*, Istituto Geografico DeAgostini, Milano, 2001.

⁶ L. Coșeru, *The Defence of Objectives against Attacks on Low Altitude of Aircraft Using Systems based on Small Air-Defence Calibre Guns*, METRA Symposium, Romania, 2003.

- enhanced information processing capacity;
- integration through data buses in the C4I systems of other echelons;
- video/IR auxiliary fire control system (FCS), which enables passive operation;
- auxiliary thermovision FCS for night-time operations;
- enhanced soft for signal analysis for annihilating jamming;
- enhanced soft for tactical situation analysis and decision-making;
- firepower and capacity of hitting more targets simultaneously;
- accurate effectiveness of ammunition against protected aircraft;
- survival capacity in tactical field;
- operation autonomy in the basic tactical subunit and fire assets.

Under these circumstances, the AD missile complexes, which are defence's main active response asset, capable of a reaction matching the technological level of the threat, must be a priority in the attention of defence structures⁷ management.

Processes of Maintaining AD Missile Complexes in the Effective Active Service

One of the most important synthetic parameters that define the effectiveness of an AD missile complex is its Single Shot Kill Probability – SSKP^{8,9}. This is not a constant parameter, but one that is likely to decrease in time^{10,11}.

On the other hand, air assets, as the main force multiplier of a weapon structure, evolve constantly, in terms of:

- improved vitality, given by the increased resistance of structures, the redundancy of command systems etc., which determine target survival inside the engagement envelope;
- increased tactical speed of the combat engagement of targets;
- changed target interface technical features (RCS – Radar Cross Section, thermal imprint, vulnerable surfaces).

⁷ W.R. McEven, *The Attack and Defense of Targets by Missiles*, Holloman AFB, New Mexico, 1962.

⁸ Teodor Viorel Chelaru ș.a., *Mathematical Calculation Model for Guidance Precision, Target Hit and Target Kill Probability in the Case of Close Range Homing Missile*, in *Journal of Battlefield Technology*, vol. 10, no. 2, July 2007.

⁹ ***, *Rocket Book*, vol. II, Zürich, 1981.

¹⁰ M. Rădulescu, *Creșterea eficacității componentelor de luptă ale rachetelor antiaeriene*, 26th International Scientific Papers Conference, vol. 1, pp. 158-165, Academia Tehnică Militară, București, 1995.

¹¹ ***, *Effets de la munition antiaérienne avancée à fusée de proximité*, in *Armada International*, no. 1, 1983.

This evolution generates the need for periodically recalculating the performances of an AD missile complexes as a basis for the decisions regarding the implementation of programmes for preserving their tactical effectiveness. The methods available to the defence management structure are maintaining the effectiveness of existing systems or purchasing new ones.

In order to maintain existing systems, the main technological processes are: life extension, revitalisation and modernisation.

Life Extension

Life extension is a process meant to check the status of a system at the end of its certified life and to underwrite, through a qualified technical unit, its worthiness for its extended life.

The certified life is the one provided by the supplier, under certain conditions:

- compliance with operating instructions;
- storing capacity in keeping with required specifications;
- absence of incidents;
- other restrictions imposed by the nature of the system.

In reality, there is a difference between the real resource and the one guaranteed by the producers, depending on the way in which the system has been exploited/maintained/stored.

Through the life extension process, the system is not upgraded and major components (subsystems) are not replaced. Sections of the system undergo accelerated aging actions and are pushed to the maximum limit of the respective class of equipment, after which the critical features are checked functionally, based on an algorithm of requirements and within a complex checking programme. If results are adequate, the certified life may be extended, but not more than by 50% from their originally certified life.

Among the standard tests used in such processes, one may mention inducing high stresses such as thermal cycles, shocks and vibrations as well as humidity, salt fog, electromagnetic interference field etc.

During the life extension process, some of the tested samples are destroyed, and in the end, the number of products in the life extension batch is smaller than the initial number of products.

Mention should be made that life extension means safe use is not related to the wear-out period of the equipment.

Revitalisation

Revitalisation is focused on restoring a system whose technical resource expired and cannot be extended without replacing certain damaged subassemblies or parts. Revitalisation requires technology and equipment for:

- dismantling systems;
- replacing subassemblies and parts;
- assembling products;
- short-term and final testing.

Revitalisation is a process similar to manufacture, carried out by a technically-competent entity, equipped with appropriate production and testing means. After revitalisation, the technical resource of the system goes back to normal and can be extended afterwards.

In the process of revitalisation, a larger part of the samples are destroyed, compared with life extension, finally, the number of products from the revitalised batch being smaller than the one that entered the process. A key issue regarding revitalisation is the access to the subassemblies and parts to be replaced, namely that those parts or their equivalents must be found on the market. One can notice that, if the revitalisation requires the replacement of pieces of equipment/parts of the system that are not produced anymore, the process cannot take place.

Revitalisation restores usability of the system at initial values, but does not correct the wear-out period of the equipment.

Modernisation

The modernisation process applied to a system is complex¹² and requires technical-scientific capacities that are superior to life extension and revitalisation processes.

❖ Purpose

Modernisation takes place in order to improve system performance for preventing/reducing system wear-out or meeting new requirements. The process implicitly consists of revitalisation and life extension.

❖ Technical-Scientific Basis of Modernisation

This process is based on a modernisation project, documentation that is similar to the one for manufacturing. Consequently, the technical-economic entity/entities that perform modernisation must have the following capabilities:

- technical-scientific: collectives/centres/research institutes, product and technology design offices/work shops;

¹² Marius Rădulescu, *Argument pentru necesitatea upgradării sistemelor de rachete sol-aer*, in *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, no. 4, 2012, pp. 107-116.

- technical: sections/manufacturing and sub-assembly and complete fitting enterprises;
- testing: sectors/testing fields equipped with devices, stands and pieces of equipment necessary for product validation/certification;
- skilled scientific research, technical-engineering and execution staff,.

System modernisation, in general, and weapon system modernisation, in particular, require a strong scientific and industrial foundation, in direct proportion with the complexity of objects subject to modernisation.

❖ **Subassemblies subject to Modernisation**

The modernisation process can be applied differentially, to critical parts (for instance, more powerful processors), subassemblies of the system (for instance, Identification Friend or Foe – IFF equipment) or all subassemblies of the system.

❖ **Standardisation**

During the modernisation, some features of the system as well as the main performances change, resulting in a new (modernised) product. On this occasion, designers incorporate new subassemblies in the product, which belong to the generations that will further be manufactured/on the market and are also used in the newer generations of similar systems. It is also considered the possibility of providing maintenance of the modernised system, without exaggerated stocks of special spare subassemblies, for the entire restored service duration.

During the modernisation process, a significant part of the samples are destroyed during the approval tests, in the end, the number of modernised products being smaller than the number of the initial products.

Access to new materials and technologies is required, based on own research or through licenses for subassemblies and parts to be replaced.

Modernisation brings the ability to use the system at the correct values of the moment and totally or partially corrects the wear-out period of the equipment.

Missile Modernisation

The surface-to-air missile is a technical combat subsystem, a component of the entire system represented by the AD missile complex.

The missile consists of four main components:

- targeting/guidance;
- flight system;
- warhead;
- engine.

In general, modernising such a missile focuses on all these subsystems, each contributing to increasing combat performance, as follows:

- targeting/guidance – more precise sensors, more powerful processors, more reliable sources whose functioning is adapted to a longer distance, Electronic Counter-Counter Measures – ECCM, Man on the Loop – MoL facilities; the purpose of modernisation is to increase the guiding precision, respectively to minimise total dynamic guidance error;
- flight system – fuel with higher total impulse; the purpose of modernisation is to increase the inclined range, maximum altitude, average flight speed, capacity for manoeuvre;
- warhead – the architecture and weight of the WH – improved warheads, insensitive explosives, more reliable safety and triggering systems, selective proximity warheads; the purpose of modernisation is to increase the probability of destroying the target with an explosion for the entire range of accessible targets;
- engine – it is aimed at ensuring protection against external stress factors, built-in status testers, battery manoeuvring capacity, rapid connection; the purpose of modernisation is to ensure rapid and safe missile integration in the AD missile complex.

One can notice that the modernisation of a missile belonging to this class requires, alongside proper scientific and technical knowledge, gained in specialised institutions, a powerful and complex industrial base that includes manufacturing, fitting and testing facilities for:

- propellant powders;
- explosives;
- targeting systems;
- optoelectronics;
- special materials physics;
- electronic processors;
- information processing systems;
- software;
- mechanical procedures for special materials;
- precision mechanics;
- composite materials manufacturing technologies;
- accurate checking means;
- specialised stands;
- specialised testing areas;
- testing fields;

- appropriate targets;
- test handling facilities.

AD missile systems are generally able to go through 2-3 modernisation programmes, remaining in service for 35-40 years, compared to an initial period of 10-15 years.

Complex Modernisation

Generally, the modernisation of the missile complex is focused on tactical-operative targets, as follows:

- increasing mobility;
- shortening response time;
- increasing survivability;
- increasing target detection and discrimination capacity;
- increasing resistance to jamming;
- adding alternative guidance capabilities;
- integrating in centralised coordinated defence ensembles (CAI – MAD – Multi-layered Air Defence);
- increasing MTBF – Medium Time between Failures and simplifying maintenance.

These objectives are achieved completely or partially, in keeping with a scale of modernisation. Usually, an extensive modernisation applies to systems that have some exceptional features and the sub-assemblies must reach a similar standard or must be replaced with new ones.

In the order of the objectives, the measures taken are the following:

- transition from towed chassis to motor/tracked chassis;
- grouping the equipment on a single platform;
- protection by armour, camouflage in the entire radiation spectrum, ECCM;
- more performing radars, optronic reconnaissance modules, IFF;
- alternative guidance channels – e.g. VOT – Video-Optical Tracker, Datalink (data bus) etc;
- additional equipment for navigation, positioning, information processing and data/voice communication;
- use of solid-state equipment, modular construction of equipment, BITE – Built-in Testing Equipment, containerisation, equipment with embedded manoeuvring equipment.

In the case of an AD complex modernisation, one must take into account the need to integrate it in zonal defence assemblies, namely to be capable of using

ASOC – Air Sovereignty Operational Centre information (for ex. RAP – Recognised Air Picture) and to be compatible with coalition forces (NATO compatible), which necessitates certain software and interface requirements.

Relevant Examples of Modernisation

In principle, even the countries with opportunities to purchase new generation systems do not get rid of the previous generation equipment until its potential is not completely used, including through successive life extension, revitalisation and modernisation procedures.

Among the capable systems that can still be modernised, there are SA-8/OSA, SA-6 KUB and MiM-23/HAWK.

One of the current tendencies is to derive advanced generation air-to-air missiles for AD use, using old AD complexes as support, which are adapted and modernised by moving from the analogical processing to the digital processing of signals, and also by implementing modern interfaces, integrated into the picture of the entire network centric battlefield.



2K12 Complex upgraded with ASPIDE-2000 Missile by the Czech Industry¹³

2K12 Complex upgraded with RIM-7 SPARROW Missile by the Polish Industry¹⁴



¹³ <http://www.dailyairforce.com/962/czech-republic-upgrades-sa6-with-aspide-2000-missiles.html>, retrieved in August 2013.

¹⁴ *Upgrade of 2K12 KUB (SA-6) Anti-Aircraft Missile System*, Wojskowe Zaklady Uzbrojenia, http://www.wzu.pl/ftp/SA_6.pdf.

At the same time, by increasing the transition capacity, on the one hand, and by improving road infrastructure, on the other hand, when modernised, more and more systems are equipped with wheeled chassis, which largely provide better conditions for equipment arrangement and crew comfort.



*NASAMS Norwegian Launcher
for the HAWK system modernised
with AMRAAM-SL Missile¹⁵*

*The SPIDER System used by Georgia
is mounted on a ROMAN
chassis and uses
the PYTHON-5 Missile¹⁶*



This design format is also adopted by some new systems, which focus primarily on the flexibility of use, availability, and, last but not least, the cost/effectiveness relation.

By operating with PYTHON-5 missile, characterised by remarkable agility, the Rafael-SPIDER system turns into the highly capable SHORAD system (Short Range Air Defence), able to adequately cover tactical devices, including against Stand-off weapons (with impact outside the engagement envelope).

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By increasing the computing power onboard the product, new guidance methods can be introduced, which provide increased accuracy, reduced energy consumption and more favourable interception trajectories. At the same time, achieving an adaptive command system allows for a correct response to the entire range of situations for use in combat and of targets hit.

¹⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nasams_lchr_truck.jpg.

¹⁶ <http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/tag/camioane-roman-si-python-5>.

In relation to the evolution of the air threat, defence means and, in particular, missile complexes should be a priority and enjoy permanent attention regarding the effective response capability.

At tactical level, there are needed measures for harmonising the procedures for use in combat with the character of enemy air actions, integration of complexes in zonal defence assemblies containing command centres, sensors, ground and air striking platforms and passive combat measures, as well as high level combat readiness of crews, including through training at the limit of systems effectiveness (engagement range, scenario complexity, targets dynamics, ECM conditions etc.).

At technical level, AD missile life extension, revitalisation and modernisation provide the support for credible deterrence of enemy air actions in the circumstances in which air assets will evolve, in the near future, faster than the defence against them.

Our country currently¹⁷ has available SA-8/OSA, SA-6/KUB or MiM-23/HAWK AD missile complexes, all being suitable for modernisation, considering:

- the remaining resource;
- the thinking ahead regarding the AD structure;
- financial prospects;
- existing technical-economic base;
- logistic support requirements.

Considering our membership in NATO and the EU, the related domestic industry, new partnerships with companies from allied states that have proper equipment and technology, the alternative of the modernisation of these systems is more and more obvious, in the circumstances of the objectively limited budget in the near future.

It is only in this way that they can be a credible deterrence factor as well as a pillar in support of the national territory defence policy.

English version by
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¹⁷ *The World Defense Almanac*, no. 1/2013, *Military Technology*, Monch Publishing Group, vol. XXXVII, pp. 181-183.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF DECEPTION TO PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THE CAMPAIGN (I)

Colonel Eugen Anton POPESCU

In this article, the author points out the different aspects of deception, trying to dismantle it into its basic elements, namely to analyse and condense it so that its role and place in the operation could be pointed out. In the author's opinion, deception is the stratagem itself applied by the commander of the force in order to defeat the enemy.

It is an integral part of the commander's intent and the most efficient method to surprise the enemy.

Deception is the essence of the manoeuvre-like approach to war and, used cleverly, it can be the key to success.

Keywords: *conceptual models; deception; Sun Tzu; concealment; simulation*

Although *deception* has been studied thoroughly in the most important schools of military thought worldwide, and even though the literature in the field is rather abundant at practical-applicative, and even theoretical level, little attention has been given in our country to this matter. The few papers regarding this field have remained quasi-unknown, and the implications for the planning, organisation, procurement and training have been insignificant. The current regulations see deception as a procedure for concealment, together with the procedure for cover and protection of classified information. The expression *concealment* was used in the Romanian Armed Forces after their Sovietisation, in the '50s, when the Soviet military regulations and manuals were translated and implemented. It replaced the term *camouflage*, of French origin, used in the interwar period. For instance, "...*camouflage was used either by hiding in enemies' line of sight or by deceiving the enemy*"¹.

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¹ *Manualul de camuflare pentru toate armele și serviciile*, București, 1934.

Romanian generals and officers paid proper attention to deception neither in the interwar period nor during the Second World War. Camouflage mostly consisted in designing and implementing hiding measures.

After the Second World War, one could notice an orientation towards applying covering measures at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical, both in the theoretical and in the practical-applicative field. This orientation was part of a broader context, whose objectives were maintaining secrecy and, generally, preventing the enemy from collecting information of any kind. Although the term deception was kept in the specialised manuals and regulations, in terms of methodology, it was almost completely neglected. The principles and methods, techniques and measures regarding deception were not studied and the planning process was completely ignored. However, it was in this period that the Soviet term *disinformation* was employed, aiming primarily at the strategic, military, political-military level.

After the '90s, no significant progress was made. Not even the broad process of achieving interoperability with NATO member states, which started before Romania's accession to NATO and accelerated immediately after, brought changes regarding the theoretical and practical aspects of deception, for the simple reason that it was not subject to standardisation.

The causes of this state are mainly subjective. Firstly, there is the idea that sophisticated means for searching and collecting information hinder any attempt to hide the reality. However, although it is perceived as being surpassed by technological development, deception is actually more and more topical. The more sophisticated the systems and tools of a force are, the more vulnerable this force is to measures and actions of deception. Even the most sophisticated sensor systems can be countered by relatively simple and inexpensive camouflage measures. Although sophisticated deception actions require significant resources, their benefits are considerable, being well worth the effort.

Secondly, it is a conceptual matter, in that deception is seen only as a support function used for force protection and operations security, an activity with a higher significance at the lower tactical levels.

The purpose of this article is to highlight the different features of deception, trying to dismantle it into its basic elements, namely to analyse it, then to reconstruct it, namely to condense it, in a form that would allow for pointing out its role and place in the operation. The deception is the stratagem itself applied by the force commander in order to defeat the enemy. It is an integral part of the commander's intent and the most efficient method to surprise the enemy. Deception is the essence of the manoeuvre-like approach to war and, used cleverly, it can be the key to success.

The specialised literature provides a wide range of conceptual models and theories regarding deception, each bringing forward ideas that show another feature of the matter. However, most theorists agree on the goals, content and process of achieving deception, even if the approaches are more detailed in terms of the principles and factors that influence it.

General Considerations regarding Deception

Deception came at the same time with wars. Sun Tzu says: “*All warfare is based on deception*”². Even though in the everyday life deception is illicit, at war deception is legitimate, unless those actions, which are considered “*perfidy*” according to international law on armed conflicts and are entirely forbidden. *Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy:*

- (a) *the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;*
- (b) *the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;*
- (c) *the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and*
- (d) *the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict*³.

According to the same law, “*ruses of war*” are not prohibited. *Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation*⁴. Stratagem is a *procedure used in war to deceive and surprise the enemy*⁵, using a *ploy (trick, scheme)*⁶.

² Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, Chapter I, 17, <http://fisierulmeu.ro/44B8N5O1G539/Sun-Tzu-Arta-razboiului-zip.html>, retrieved on 12.04.2013.

³ *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts*, Art. 37, Para 1.

⁴ *Ibid*, Para 2.

⁵ *DEX (The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language)*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1998, p. 1024.

⁶ *Ibid*.

❖ **Definitions**

There are a number of definitions for deception, each of them pointing out one or more relevant features. The common idea of all these definitions is that deception is a systematic process through which false information is provided to the enemies in order for them to interpret the situation in the battlefield in a wrong way and, consequently, to make decisions that are to their detriment and to the advantage of the other's troops. Deception is defined as "*the deliberate misinterpretation of reality to gain a competitive advantage*"⁷. In the project "*Manual for planning and carrying out deception at operational and tactical levels*", deception is defined as: "*a collection of techniques, measures and actions carried out for deceiving enemy decision-makers by manipulating, distorting and misinterpreting information regarding the disposition, intentions and operations of own troops*"⁸.

❖ **Purposes and Goals of Deception**

The value of deception has been subject to many discussions, much of them contradictory, among military theorists. Sun Tzu, in "*The Art of War*", sees deception as the main asset for success⁹. On the contrary, in "*On War*", Clausewitz has an entirely different opinion regarding this matter, arguing that "*war is the province of uncertainty, the commander has an unclear image of what happens in reality, the creation of false appearances, especially on a large scale, is expensive and can be accepted only based on a fair cost-benefit analysis*"¹⁰. However, "*the weaker the force of the commander-in-chief is, the more he must resort to wisdom*"¹¹.

By deceiving the opponent, the real intentions of own troops are hidden and surprise is achieved in the initial phase of the operation, and the opponent is forced to carry out actions to his disadvantage. Deception is normally used for the following purposes: to surprise the opponent; to maintain security; to ensure freedom of action; to influence the opponent to adopt a certain course of action to his disadvantage and to the advantage of own troops; to minimise losses and buy time.

⁷ Michael Bennett, Edward Waltz, *Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security*, Artech House Inc., 2007, p. 23, apud D. Daniel K. Herbig, *Propositions on Military Deception*, in J. Gooch, A. Perlmutter (eds.), *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*, Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1982, pp. 155-156.

⁸ ***, *Manual privind planificarea și executarea inducerii în eroare a adversarului la nivelurile operativ și tactic (project)*, 2013.

⁹ Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War*, (third edition), Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, p. 171, apud Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Irrespective of the hierarchical level, deception is used for: creating a false perception of the new means that are introduced into operation or countering enemy reconnaissance trying to identify them; distracting the opponent's attention in other areas or other directions; hiding the increase/decrease (or redeployment) of forces and weapon systems detected by the opponent; supersaturating the enemy system of information collection and analysis; creating the illusion of weakness where there is power/force; creating the illusion of power/force where there is weakness; conditioning the opponent with patterns of behaviour/operational models of own troops; creating alternative expectations about the size, activity, location, time, equipment, intention or manner/style of carrying out the mission in order to achieve surprise; coordinating events and actions of deception with those carried out by the upper echelon in order to maintain consistency and to avoid the possibility that the action is discovered¹².

In order to obtain the relative advantage towards an opponent or competitors, it is essential to maintain secrecy about objectives and plans. Any opponent/competitor will make every effort to know these plans, and the first option for attack or counterattack is the administrative one, of maintaining secrecy. However, ongoing operations and their effects can reveal the true intentions. For this reason, a second option is to apply a stratagem by which they competitors or opponents are “*given*” an “*alternative expectation*” that should “*satisfy*” and influence them to adopt a course of action against their objectives. Therefore, a first idea is that deception may be an important element of a type of behaviour, further referred to as *strategic behaviour*, applicable at all levels of operations – strategic, operational, tactical – and an instrument for achieving the objectives of the operation/campaign. We will further analyse the contribution of deception to the achievement of the campaign's objectives starting from how it is understood and applied in the most important armed forces, and then we will examine its role in applying the principles of operation and, finally, the way in which deception can be integrated into the campaign.

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¹² Field Manual 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1988, pp. 1-2.

PECULIARITIES OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Colonel Constantin PAGNEJER

The General Staff is a military structure of the highest level, which provides the coordination of the entire system of forces of the Romanian Armed Forces and is the best symbol possible of the military culture and education.

In order to carry out its duties and tasks, the General Staff has certain specific fields of activity under its responsibility.

This article is intended as a succinct analysis of the activities carried out in order to provide an efficient and timely logistic support for the General Staff, taking into account all the related logistic components.

Updating the stipulations of normative acts that govern this domain on the whole, as well as the norms that direct logistic support is a requirement to be met regularly.

Keywords: *General Staff; Joint Logistic Command; logistic support; areas of responsibility*



The General Staff is a military structure of the highest level, which provides the coordination of the entire system

of forces of the Romanian Armed Forces and is the best symbol possible of the military culture and education. The General Staff must have at its disposal all the levers necessary for providing the planning and command of all types of military operations, irrespective of how and where they take place.

In order to carry out its duties and tasks, the General Staff has certain specific fields of activity under its responsibility, coordinating, planning, organising and conducting activities in keeping with the domains it is in charge of.

The following aspects are considered when defining the concept of *logistic support* of the General Staff, as well as the principles and ways of providing it and of drawing up legal documents for regulating this field of activity:

- a) level of ambition and commitments undertaken;
- b) timely defining and ensuring the required logistic support, in accordance with the situation at one point (peace, crisis, war);

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- c) applying it in order to accomplish the entire range of activities in which the General Staff is involved and, implicitly, implementing the NATO and EU concepts, doctrines, principles, standards and procedures;
- d) cooperating in order to provide logistic support for each activity separately;
- e) identifying solutions to ensure the maximum efficiency of logistic support, which should entirely meet the set requirements, through the optimal/ reasonable costs.

The logistic support of the General Staff is accomplished by the Joint Logistic Command, in most of the functional fields of logistics, both during peacetime and in crisis situations.

The General Staff is a structure with one of the broadest areas of responsibility. According to *Law no. 346/2006 on the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence*, the General Staff carries out activities in the following specific domains:

- commanding, organising, planning and operationalising the Romanian military forces;
- gradually increasing the combat capacity and mobilising the military;
- commanding joint operations;
- planning, preparing and commanding military structures and personnel participating in missions and operations abroad, except for combat intelligence structures;
- establishing the military pieces of equipment needed, in keeping with operational measures and requirements;
- training commands and troops;
- providing basic and specialised training for the military active and reserve forces;
- ensuring individual career management for the military personnel;
- ensuring standardisation in the military domain;
- implementing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance;
- providing the connection with foreign armed forces;
- developing international military relations;
- signing technical understandings with the armed forces of other states and with the international organisations Romania is part of;
- promoting values specific to military traditions, military culture, civic education and military ceremonies;
- ensuring religious assistance for the Ministry of National Defence.

The General Staff is the structure responsible for drawing up Romania's military strategy, takes part in the development and substantiation of the short-, middle- and long-term defence policies and strategies, and sets the force structure operational and capability requirements.

The General Staff permanently develops and updates the Armed Forces organisation during peacetime and at war, in keeping with the Supreme Council of National Defence and the orders of the Minister of National Defence.

As far as joint operations are concerned, the General Staff exercises their command and control during peacetime, in crisis situations and at war, plans and leads operations at strategic level, sets the specific legal framework and conducts the activities regarding the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces with forces and assets in the theatres of operations abroad.

The General Staff provides the management of training, exercises, evaluation and lessons learned, at joint level, determines the way in which training takes place and is evaluated, coordinates the planning, organisation and development of commands' training, coordinates the physical education and sports planning, organisation and development process in the Romanian Armed Forces.

With a view to carrying out all the tasks and responsibilities stipulated by law and in order to provide an optimal and efficient functioning of the Ministry of National Defence, systems of relations, both internal and external ones, are organised and established at the level of its central structures.

Same as any organisation, the military system too must adapt to the new challenges and, at the same time, benefit from the progress made.

Even though the General Staff is a bureaucratic organisation, with standardised activity, subjected to norms, laws, clearly set regulations, in which subordination takes place only vertically, with a well-established hierarchy, I truly believe that the system of relations among the component structures is based on professionalism, seriousness, camaraderie and mutual respect.

The system of internal relations requires relations of hierarchical authority, functional authority, cooperation, control as well as staff. These relations are established between the command and subordinate functions, between the components of the General Staff, as well as among their personnel, according to regulations; moreover, these are relations established between structures, when one of them has a functional authority over the other or is a leader in a domain that requires giving orders, communicating directives, regulations, specifications, procedures etc. In my opinion, the relations of functional authority are those that have a determining stake in the decision-making process. The relations of cooperation are those that determine the common settlement of complex tasks, by structures/microstructures/persons

with functions at the same hierarchy level; they are bridges between structures and persons.

The succession of hierarchical relations between posts and compartments, structures and microstructures at different hierarchical levels form the hierarchical line, through which the information necessary for the normal development of activities and processes in an organisation goes up and down, and a hierarchical level means all the positions, structures, microstructures that are situated at the same hierarchical distance. Starting from the above-mentioned assertions, a hierarchical pyramid consists of the ensemble of posts, bodies, structures and microstructures placed at hierarchical levels and joined by hierarchical lines. In its entirety, the General Staff consists of a pyramid-like system, with a single command – the Chief of the General Staff, yet, as I have already mentioned, it does not exclude other types of relations that are established naturally between structures, microstructures and posts.

The relations of functional authority require the existence of relations established between posts, structures and microstructures when one of these is domain leader or exercises a functional authority over another post, structure, microstructure. In this respect, the domain leader or the one with functional authority gives orders, transmits directives, stipulations, recommendations, regulations etc. meant to standardise a certain activity or to provide appropriate expertise or counselling in that certain domain.

As far as the relation of managerial control is concerned, it is achieved through a collection of specific actions, methods, means, tools whose purpose is to evaluate and make efficient the way the tasks, responsibilities and duties set within the system are accomplished, as well as to take proper measures for addressing the deficiencies. The activity of managerial internal control is a newly implemented activity in the military systems, as a consequence of the European directives, being regulated at country level through a government ordinance¹.

The system of external relations of the General Staff (when it represents the Ministry of National Defence) consists in all the relations, established by law, between it and the central and local public authorities and institutions, non-governmental organisations, business operators, natural and legal persons in the country, as well as the relations with the political-military structures of other states, international organisations Romania is part of etc.

¹ *Ordonanța Guvernului nr. 119/1999, republicată, privind controlul intern/managerial și controlul financiar preventiv.*

The command of force structures is exercised by commanders/chiefs of these structures assigned according to the competences established by order of the Minister of National Defence.

At the General Staff, there is the Chiefs of Staff Committee, having advisory capacity. For improving and harmonising the relations between the structures of the General Staff, working groups, committees and subcommittees were established in order to coordinate the armed forces transformation process and to meet the engagements made within NATO and the EU.

The General Staff plays an extremely important role in the good functioning of the Ministry of National Defence, with specific features depending on the type of tasks and missions carried out in the domain of activity; these features, together with the other ones from the other central structures form an efficient and complex administrative apparatus that conducts and develops specific activities in the field of national defence.

In this respect, logistic support and infrastructure elements must be provided through a unitary concept and a structure that should coordinate them at all (strategic, operational, tactical) levels. The General Staff, to which the force structure is subordinated, must benefit from it, in order to focus its attention on commanding, organising, planning and operationalising it.

Providing the flexibility and sustainability of the General Staff and the subordinated structures in order to achieve the entire range of missions in which they are engaged is possible through an appropriate logistic support ensured by an integrated system established for this particular purpose.

The main courses of action for logistic support are applied for all functional domains of logistics and focus on:

- setting responsibilities;
- proper delegation of authority;
- architecture of the joint system;
- integrated logistics;
- logistic support specific to NATO and the EU;
- logistics command and control;
- cooperation in the logistic domain².

Currently, the logistic support of the General Staff is provided by the Joint Logistic Command in most of the functional domains of logistics, both during peacetime and in crisis situations, as follows: material resources management; maintenance; movement and transportation; infrastructure; campaign services; civil emergencies.

² *SMG/L-1, Doctrina logisticii operațiilor întrunite*, pp. 11-12.

Medical support, environment protection, occupation safety and health, technical supervision of installations, legal metrology and fire protection are provided by each structure by itself. In crisis situations, medical support during evacuation is given by the structures subordinated to the Joint Logistic Command. In addition, the personnel are evacuated to the Central Military Emergency University Hospital “*Dr Carol Davila*”, which provides medical assistance.

Campaign services include mainly services for feeding, washing and equipment cleaning, pest control, mail and courier services, personnel rest and recuperation and funeral services.

Logistic support necessary for civil emergency situations is set based on own action plans and on plans of cooperation with institutions designated by law³.

To provide logistic support for the General Staff during peacetime, the Joint Logistic Command is in charge of:

- a) meeting transportation requirements;
- b) providing maintenance and technical assistance for vehicles, depending on the funds earmarked by the director of the Major Programme *General Staff/Strategic Command*;
- c) providing fuel and lubricants, depending on the funds earmarked by the director of the Major Programme *General Staff/Strategic Command*;
- d) purchasing products and services according to the requirements set by orders of the Minister of National Defence, using funds earmarked by the director of the Major Programme *General Staff/Strategic Command*;
- e) providing material requirements for firing sessions;
- f) providing armament, ammunitions, CBRN, engineering materials, audiovisual equipment, materials for cultural-education and sports activities in accordance with the responsibilities set;
- g) military equipment – including the annual payment – and personnel feeding;
- h) providing escort for motorcades and upon order, ensuring actions for movement control in the areas of responsibility;
- i) participating, upon order, with forces and assets in emergency situations, including in engineering works necessary for dealing with such situations;
- j) planning, organising distribution and transport of materials necessary for providing capacity for immediate response and increasing operational capacity;
- k) providing protocol and support for internal and international representation at the level of the Chief of General Staff;

³ *Normele privind organizarea și funcționarea sistemului logistic integrat în structurile din componerea și subordinea Statului Major General*, pp. 30-57.

- l) providing official/diplomatic passports manufacturing services and obtaining necessary visas, when necessary, as well as ensuring international transport documents, medical insurance;
- m) coordinating and monitoring specific activities regarding the General Staff headquarters, in accordance with the domains of competence, duties and responsibilities approved by specific legal documents in force;
- n) providing, in case of evacuation, the loading of materials and the transportation of personal and material assets, according to the plans drawn up in this respect by the structures in charge;
- o) providing means of transportation and other related material assets, fuels and lubricants, mechanical check-ups, fulfilling other material-technical and financial requirements for military representations and permanent missions abroad.

In crisis situations related to states of emergency, mobilisation, siege or war, the Joint Logistic Command carries on fulfilling the peacetime missions and responsibilities for the General Staff and, moreover, carries out the following specific activities:

- gathering, equipping and transporting the reservists;
- accomodating and feeding the personnel;
- providing materials, in keeping with the rules established.

During peacetime, in crisis situations and at war, the Command provides logistic support for the General Staff through the large units, units and subordinated logistic structures, by employing the orders and directives of the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff in its own plans drawn up in this respect.

There are a series of activities taking place through the agency of the structures of the General Staff during peacetime and in crisis situations, as follows:

- a) providing office equipment and equipment maintenance;
- b) providing protection, access control and intervention in the General Staff headquarters, in keeping with plans and regulations in force (other elements from military services and commands may contribute to this).
- c) supporting military ceremonial events (in cooperation with other structures belonging to the Joint Logistic Command);
- d) providing primary (emergency) medical support.

The logistic support for regional, county military centres, as well as for those from each district of the city of Bucureşti is provided by the military units subordinated to the staffs of the Armed Forces services or branch commands. The domains in which logistic support is given are those specific to the integrated logistic system and focus on material resources management and campaign

services. The funds needed for providing material assets, other than those provided by local public administration authorities, are included in the budget of the Major Programme *General Staff/Strategic Command* and are transferred in the budgets of the other major programmes, depending on requirements⁴.

The commanders (Chiefs) of the structures involved issue stipulations, directives or hierarchical orders of actions, depending on the situation, in order to provide logistic support for the General Staff. In crisis situations, these structures can be placed under different levels of command authority, set by orders of the Minister of National Defence or the Chief of the General Staff. Moreover, it is highly important that the time limit for achieving full operational capability of the structures in charge of logistic support is equal to or less than the one of the General Staff.

Financial resources necessary for the logistic support for the General Staff during peacetime and in crisis situations is provided by the Director of the Major Programme *General Staff/Strategic Command*.

The General Staff plays a special part in the covering, by the Minister of National Defence, of the entire range of missions for fulfilling the main tasks.

Through their active participation in managing and settling crisis situations, the Romanian Armed Forces have proved that they are a real stability factor, asserting themselves as a “*security provider*”. The courses of action and the targets show the option for democracy and market economy and the direct participation in the circuit of universal material and spiritual values.

In order to successfully carry out all missions, the General Staff requires an efficient and timely logistic support that takes into account all the components of logistic support.

The Joint Logistic Command is the execution structure specific to basic logistics, subordinated to the General Staff, meant for providing logistic support for central structures, activities of representation, ceremonial events, military honours and protocol at the level of the Public Administration and the Ministry of National Defence and for restoring the Romanian Armed Forces work capacity⁵.

Currently, the issue of the logistic support for the General Staff is not entirely regulated, as there is no order or directive in force in this respect. The real support is given through precise orders of commanders/chiefs of structures involved at one point.

In this respect, I believe that a directive should be issued by the Chief of the General Staff to regulate the logistic support for the central structures

⁴ *Ordinul șefului Statului Major General nr. SMG 126/2010 pentru asigurarea sprijinului logistic pentru centrele militare prin arondare la alte unități militare*, art. 1-2, 11.

⁵ *Normele privind organizarea și funcționarea sistemului logistic integrat în structurile din componerea și subordinea Statului Major General*, p. 22.

of the Ministry of National Defence. This requirement arose after the abrogation of the *Common directive of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of National Defence no. S.G./S.1/2013 and of the Chief of the General Staff no. S.M.G./S-7/2013 for the approval of "Specifications regarding the logistic support for the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence and those under the immediate subordination of the Minister of National Defence during peacetime and in crisis situations"*, on 20.06.2013.


The order of the Minister of National Defence issued in this respect stipulated that logistic support for central structures was given under the conditions set by the directive of the Chief of the General Staff. After the directive is approved, the Commander of the Joint Logistic Command will be able to issue stipulations or orders for the structures involved with a view to providing efficient and timely logistic support in all functional domains of logistics.

Updating the provisions of the legal documents regulating the domain on the whole, as well as the rules that guide logistic support is a permanent requirement.

Providing logistic support, in a unitary design, through a structure able to coordinate it at all levels will enable the accomplishment of all missions successfully and in due time. Thus, one will be able to easily step in, whenever required, to timely deal with the potential malfunctions. Logistic support must provide the General Staff with the needed assistance for focusing attention on commanding, organising, planning and operationalising forces.

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THE BUDGET

– The Main Coordinate of Public Finance –

Lieutenant Colonel (r.) Anghel STĂMESCU

In modern economy, which is characterised by the increasing redistributive role of the state, the main intervention tool is the budget. In these circumstances, in the author's opinion, the content of the public budget expands significantly, ceasing to be a mere reflection of public revenue and expenditure in a legally binding document or to reflect only financial flows regarding the establishment and use of public financial resources. Thus, the public budget becomes the main financial policy instrument of the state, through which the state intervenes in the field of taxation (fiscal policy) and in the field of public expenditure (budget expenditure policy), in order to ensure socio-economic development, in terms of macroeconomic balance.

Keywords: *balanced budget; individuality; state budget; national safety*

The economic category of “budget” is daily used, in association with other words, in many expressions, such as government budget, local budget, budget execution, budget deficit, fiscal policy, economic agent budget etc. These expressions reflect the common and current meanings of the term *budget*, which is however much older.

In ancient times, the Romans used the word *bulgo*, word that signifies a purse or a money bag. In the Middle Ages, in French, the terms *bougette* or *petit bouge* meant bag or box, words that lay at the root of the word *budget*.

The word *budget* was also used in English, meaning purse, and then leather folder, where the documents related to government revenues and expenditures were kept to be presented to Parliament.

Over time, the category of budget has gained the significance of government revenues and expenditures hence the genesis of the term “government budget”.

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Whatever the form of the expressions that contain the word budget, it is a fundamental category of public finance science and practice as well as of financial and budget legislation.

The concept of budget

As far as the budget, in general, is concerned, the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of the Romanian Language defines this concept as “*the balance of revenues and expenditures during a certain period (usually a year) of a state, a particular institution, organisation, family*” etc. In the same paper, the budget is defined as “*all the revenues and expenditures in such a balance*”¹.

Examining the budget in terms of definition and concept, the idea that emerges is that it deals with both public and private resources. For both categories of resources, the budget includes provisions referring to the revenues and expenditures over a certain period (usually a year) in order to achieve the goals set by the covered entities.

These entities are either public or private entities, being referred to as *institutional units* that, in the national economy, are grouped in the following sectors:

- non-financial corporations and quasi-corporations;
- financial institutions;
- insurance enterprises;
- public administration;
- private administration;
- households.

Public administrations develop and execute public budgets, defined by the current public finance legislation² as “*documents through which are forecast and approved yearly revenues and expenditures or, on a case-by-case basis, only expenditures, depending on the public institutions financing system*”.

The role of the public budget is important at both central and local levels, especially in financial and economic terms.

Financially, the public budget assures the mobilisation and the use of the public financial resources that are necessary to fulfil the functions and duties of the state and of the administrative-territorial units.

From an economic perspective, the public budget is a crucial instrument of the state economic policies, taxation, subsidies, budget transfers and budget expenditures being levers used in achieving financial and macroeconomic balance.

¹ In *Mic dicționar enciclopedic*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1996.

² *Law no. 500/2002 on public finance*, published in *Monitorul oficial*, Part I, no. 597 on 13 August 2002 and *Law no. 273 on 29.06.2006 on local public finance*, published in *Monitorul oficial* no. 618 on 18.07.2006.

At macroeconomic level, the overall balance entails the existence of a volume and a structure of material, human, financial, monetary and currency resources that are consistent with the needs and possibilities of the national economy, in a given period of time.

Having a predictable and enforceable character, the public budget contributes to the achievement of both the *ex ante* state of overall economic equilibrium and the *ex post* state of macroeconomic equilibrium.

The *ex ante* state regarding overall economic equilibrium is the one projected through a plan or programme, while the *ex post* state is the result of material, human and value equilibrium at macroeconomic level³.

Besides public administration, the concept of budget is also connected to the existence of institutional units, the nature of non-financial services or quasi-services, financial institutions and insurance enterprises.

For these units, the budget is a financial plan developed and executed for a financial year, being also a basic instrument of financial management, of decision and analysis relating to the performed activity, and of economic and financial control.

At microeconomic level, the budget is aimed at ensuring financial equilibrium, while using the material, human and financial resources of a unit with maximum efficiency.

The achievement of financial equilibrium through the budget reflects the balance between the financial resources of the units and the own needs, according to their requirements, under the circumstances of profitable economic and financial activity.

At the same time, while achieving this goal, it should be also considered the general, public, interest, through paying taxes, at the terms and under the conditions established by law, meeting obligations to third parties, and repaying the bank loans in due time.

The concept of budget can be also approached in the context of private administration (unions, political parties, associations, foundations etc.) as well as in that of households. For the former institutional units, the budget is a financial plan aiming at the receipts and payments that are expected using own financial resources, while in the case of households the budget is a balance of revenues and expenditures prepared by the bodies that are interested in knowing data relating to working and living conditions as well as to the quality of life and the purchasing power of the population.

³ Ioan A. Szabo, *Buget și trezorerie*, Editura Tribuna Economică, București, 2006.

The content and characteristics of the public budget

In terms of content, the public budget has an *acknowledged significance* and a *modern significance*⁴.

According to the *acknowledged significance*, the public budget is a document, a law, and a system of financial flows. Regarded as a document, the budget is a document in which are set and approved the state revenues and expenditures or only the expenditures in relation to the financing system of the subordinate public institutions.

As the state revenues and expenditures are authorised in legislative form, through adopting the annual budget law by Parliament, the public budget is a legal document (law). From this perspective, it is an act of forecasting, an authorisation act, and an annual act.

As an act of forecasting, the public budget groups public resources as public revenues and their use as public expenditures. As an authorisation act, through it the legislative power empowers the executive to collect public revenues and to use them to meet public needs. Since this authorisation is given for only one financial year, the public budget is an annual act related to the public revenues and expenditures approved by the legislative.

Another acknowledged meaning of the public budget is the economic one, because it is approached as an economic category that expresses financial relations and flows through which public financial funds are fed and distributed in order to finance expenditures related to public needs and the state economic activities.

Financial flows are two-way, to and from public financial funds, being linked by the formation of public resources by taxation, on the one hand, and by their use in the form of budget appropriations, allocations and subsidies, on the other hand.

In *modern economy*, which is characterised by the increase in the redistributive role of the state, its main intervention tool is the budget. Under these conditions, the content of the public budget expands significantly, and it ceases to be a mere reflection of public revenues and expenditures in a legally binding document or to reflect only funding flows related to the formation and use of public financial resources. Thus, the public budget becomes the main instrument of the state financial policy through which the state intervenes in the fiscal field (fiscal policy) and in the public expenditure field (budget expenditure policy) to ensure socio-economic development, under macroeconomic equilibrium conditions.

⁴ *Ibidem.*

The structure of the budget system in Romania

Public budgets, through their economic content, can form a system of specific relationships whose representation is given by features or characteristics in common. The very definition of the budget system can be expressed in the same way, as representing the aggregate of all economic relationships in cash, the result of the distribution of national income, relationships that occur during the formation and distribution of the state or the territorial administrative units centralised funds in order to meet the general interests of the society or communities.

The characteristics that are common to all the mentioned specific relationships are: economic content; value; result of newly created value distribution; creation and distribution of centralised funds; involvement of the state power; meeting public interests.

Public budgets, as operational financial balance, can constitute a system through their content and their form of expression. In their structure, revenues and expenditures are grouped according to financial and administrative (branch) criteria. Revenues are grouped by origin and expenditures by destination so that the subdivisions that express them are placed in a correlated system of public finance indicators. Technically, revenues classification and calculation are based on laws and implementing rules, grounded in common principles and rules, having largely similar operating items (procedures and operations). For example, fiscal revenues have the Fiscal Code and the Fiscal Procedure Code as common reference, besides the fact that each of them has its specific establishment law.

In terms of expenditures, there are the same considerations regarding the content and the form in which the representative indicators are structured using a common classification (public finance indicators), complementarity being supported first by the functional classification and then by the economy. The management of budget expenditures entails the terms used interchangeably starting from budget appropriation and budget appropriation authorising officers, followed by the methods, techniques and procedures of financing, which are generally similar when it comes to public budgets. The information recording employing the three types of documents – statistical, technical-operational, and accounting is also common.

Opposed but not antagonistic to the idea of a system for public budgets is their independence, the individuality that separates them in the above-mentioned complementary system. Differences and, hence, the specificity of each public budget are determined by: the structure of general interests, grouped into local and central; the administrative-territorial division of the country; the increasing public needs to be met, which require more financial means to be mobilised; the more effective

administration or management of public funds by competent and responsible institutional involvement etc.

The budget system or the system of public budgets has therefore distinct, autonomous components, for which the phrase *budget subsystems*⁵ may be used.

The quality of a system with regard to budget relationships is also supported by the principles presented in the literature⁶: annuality, unity, universality, unaffected revenues, budget specialisation, budget balance, publicity, reality. In addition, to support the idea of a system, public finance legislation can be mentioned.

Structurally, the budget system in Romania has, in our opinion, the following main and defining components: the government budget, the state social security budget, local budgets, the public healthcare budget, the special funds budget.

In keeping with the legal framework provided by the public finance legislation⁷, more categories of budgets can be added to those already mentioned. They refer, compared to those mentioned (except the public healthcare budget), to other budgets such as: the budget of the public institutions totally or partially financed from local budgets; the budgets of domestic and foreign loans contracted or guaranteed by the local public administration authorities; the state treasury budget; the budgets of autonomous public institutions etc.

Following the summary presentation of the budget components, starting from the theory of public finance, we consider that the two former interpretations are more relevant compared with the latter, which has the drawback of applying the same judgment, as far as the budget system structure is concerned, to traditional and situational budgets or the budgets of some institutions (in terms of their income management).

As far as we are concerned, we consider that social health insurance, in terms of specific funds mobilisation and allocation as well as management mode (the institutional one included) based on the monopoly the state has – in this respect, through the National Health Insurance House, can be found in the budget system, with similarities to the state social insurance, but also compared to other components. Moreover, the health insurance fund is under the public budget cash accounts execution, whose responsibility lies with the Public Finance Treasury, as the state financial-banking representative in the administrative structure of the Ministry of Public Finance.

The government budget expresses economic relations arising in the national income distribution process during the formation and allocation of a state centralised fund, to address general issues and to meet national interests.

⁵ G. Ștefura, *Proces bugetar public*, Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 2007.

⁶ Iulian Văcărel, *Finanțe publice*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 2003.

⁷ *Law no. 500/2002 on public finance, op. cit.*

As financial balance, the government budget includes a great diversity of revenues and expenditures involving all categories of taxpayers (legal and physical entities) and of consumers of budgetary funds (budget authorising officers) from various fields of activity.

Structurally, in terms of revenues, the government budget includes a variety of sources and indicator categories. The payers are legal entities (companies and public institutions) and individuals (especially employees). Representative revenues, as a percentage, are: payroll tax, profit tax, value added tax, customs and excise duties, which represent about 80 or 90% of the total⁸, with reference to several periods of budgetary management. As for expenditures, there is also a variety of indicators in diverse branches and fields of activity (education, healthcare, culture, justice, defence, scientific research, economy, public order etc.). Having an exclusive character, the following appear as expenditures only in the government budget: defence and national security, justice, public debt, scientific research etc.

For *defence*, budgeting is the process of allocating financial resources for the Ministry of National Defence equipment, personnel, infrastructure and programmes. The outcome is the *defence budget*, namely a chapter estimate of the planned operating resources and expenses necessary for the Ministry of National Defence and associated institutions for a particular period of time. In this respect, the Finance and Accounting Directorate within the Ministry of National Defence shall, according to the law, “achieve the finance and accounting tasks incumbent upon the Minister of National Defence as chief authorising officer”⁹.

The effective management responsibility for the government budget lies with specialised institutions such as the Government, the Ministry of Public Finance and its local units.

Local budgets reflect economic relations arising in the national income distribution process during the formation and allocation of administrative-territorial centralised funds to address general issues and to meet local communities’ interests. These budgets are also known under other names such as: local councils budgets, local government budgets, municipal budgets.

As financial balance, local budgets include revenues, on the one hand, and expenditures, on the other hand. Both indicator categories have a various structure. The revenues from local budgets are in a particular situation, as compared to other system components. Thus, a part of them is represented by the own revenues from local taxes (tax on buildings, tax on land, tax on vehicles etc.), which represent about 30 or 40 % of the total income in relation to several periods of budgetary

⁸ G. Ștefura, *Proces bugetar public, ibidem*.

⁹ See <http://www.mapn.ro/structuri/dfc/>

management. The revenues coming from the government budget are employed to bridge the gap between the income and expenses. Lately, the payroll tax has been used to balance the revenues. If balancing revenues in absolute value cannot bridge the gap between expenses and income, grants are resorted to, which is money without nominating sources from the government budget, where expenses occur in the chapter “*Transfers to local budgets*”.

Higher competencies in terms of expenses related to local budgets are also generated by the need for the involvement of authorities at this level to act in the interests of municipalities and citizens in the mentioned areas, in order to develop and sustain the technical-material base of the institutions involved in education, culture and social assistance. Structurally, local budget expenditures refer to social-cultural activities, municipal administration, local public administration, public order etc.

The local budget management responsibility lies with the councils of the administrative-territorial units, by specialised departments organised for this purpose.

The state social security budget expresses economic relations arising in the national income distribution process during the state centralised formation and allocation of funds to meet the general interests of the population belonging to a particular social-demographic structure.

The specificity of the fund available to the state is given, besides the centralised constitution, by the decentralised distribution on destinations, according to certain situations specific to certain categories of the population (over an age limit, health conditions, mental disability, unemployment, low income, lack of housing etc.)

Through the specific financial balance it expresses, the state social security budget revenues have a relatively simple structure, with reduced sources, the following indicators being representative: the state social security contribution and the unemployment fund contribution, paid by employers and employees. As for expenditures, there are diverse indicators, however, limited to the significance of this budget. Here, a representative share is represented by spending on pensions (old age, sickness, survivor etc.), followed by social protection one, focusing on unemployment.

The health insurance budget expresses economic relations arising from the national income distribution process, during the specific state institutions fund centralised formation and decentralised distribution to meet the health needs of the population. This fund is one of general interest since its beneficiaries are not known exactly when it is established. However, when it is used, the beneficiaries

appear strictly individualised according to directing medical benefits to those who contribute to the fund and are in a position to require specialised services.

The health insurance budget is also a financial-operational balance¹⁰, reflecting revenues, on the one hand, and expenditures, on the other hand. For revenues, there are two specific contributions (having the same name), paid by employees and employers. As for expenditures, the situation is more complex, in terms of materialisation and definition, even if, in relation to indicators, they may be easily identified considering the activities and actions in healthcare institutions. The inclusion of expenses in both the specific budget and the revenues and expenditures budgets of healthcare institutions is performed based on framework contracts for the provision of healthcare services, concluded between the institution specialised in healthcare management (National Health Insurance House) and the institutions in the healthcare system that receive cash funds, distributed depending on certain destinations. Funds are also allotted in the government budget and distributed through the Ministry of Health.

Special funds budgets are a distinct component in the budget system and represent economic relations arising from the national income distribution process during the state centralised formation and allocation of funds to sustain some well defined activities and actions of general interest.

Conclusions

Each special fund has its own budget, as a financial balance, where the revenues are represented by the specific contribution usually paid by the economic operators designated by law and the expenditures are related to the intended destination of a well defined activity or action.

In the case of special funds budgets, the management responsibility lies with some ministries or institutions designated by the executive power.

The government budget is not a simple document showing the state revenues and expenditures but an extensive and complex document which reflects numerous financial and budgetary decisions having an impact on social and economic life.

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English version by
 **Diana Cristiana LUPU**

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

TECHNOLOGY FOR PRELIMINARY LANGUAGE ASSESSMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAMMES

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The rapid pace of technological advancement has a strong impact on all aspects of the society, education included. By employing technology in education, educational products can be accessible anywhere and anytime, as well as available at lower costs to a great number of subjects. Lately, all modern armed forces have employed technology to improve their educational and training processes.

In this regard, the article presents two important projects developed by the Human Resource Management Directorate alongside “Carol I” National Defence University. The first one is aimed at initially assessing the candidates English language skills, and the second one is focused on maintaining and slightly improving the skills acquired at daily courses by means of online English language courses.

Keywords: *online test; online module; English language; electronic resources*

The more and more rapid advance of technology in the information age has a greater and greater impact on the society, economy, the security environment, and, last but not least, on the approach to training and education. New training and education concepts and methods evolve from technology. Their role is to bring a higher degree of attractiveness and interaction, to reduce the effects of space and time elements, and to be available at lower and affordable costs.

A set of studies performed by the Human Resource Management Directorate aiming

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at analysing our learning language system proved that the language courses had low effectiveness compared with the language training needs of the Ministry of Defence personnel imposed by the international engagements that Romania has undertaken as part of the international security bodies.

A lot of factors have been identified to have “*contributed*”, in a lower or higher degree, to certain results that were not always up to our expectation and led to a waste of important resources, to put it bluntly. By that, we mainly refer to the personnel that attended low level language courses, such as beginner, whose number cannot be neglected. Lacking the practice of linguistic skills acquired at daily language courses that lasted too long, sometimes even 6 months, the students got to the point of attending the same language course after 2 or 3 years of pause.

Moreover, as we have mentioned before, language courses were too long for students to be away from their families or for commanders to afford dispensing with them as subordinates, their absence from work triggering leadership and organisation issues.

In such situation and under the pressure of ever drastic budgetary constraints, we really had to think of a training modality that aimed to:

- provide language learning and practice continuity;
- require personnel’s shortest possible absence from units;
- take place as closest as possible to students’ residences;
- have the lowest possible costs for the Ministry of National Defence;
- build and preserve the language skills that each and every employee needs in their current or potential future positions.

Being aware of the international trend of technology integration into training and education, the Human Resource Management Directorate sensed the need for digital resources full use in order to build, manage and provide language training courses fit for distance learning through online communication. Therefore, the authors of this article, having the full support of both the chief of Human Resource Management Directorate and the commander (rector) of “*Carol I*” National Defence University have launched two ample and ambitious projects.

The Online Preliminary Language Assessment

One of our projects aims at providing the instrument to assess the preliminary level of English skills necessary to join the language training programmes that are organised in our language centres following the training needs of the personnel selected by the Ministry of National Defence benefiting structures or other beneficiaries.

The actual assessment consists of a multilevel online test implemented on *RoArmy* e-learning platform (*figure 1*), organised on 4 sections, one for each language skill, namely listening, speaking, reading and writing.



Figure 1: RoArmy E-learning Platform¹

What is typical for this project is the fact that the assessment was performed online, within the military unit of the candidate or in the closest one meeting the minimum technical criteria, namely internet connection, headset and microphone and a default voice recorder.

The assessment was preceded by a one-month period necessary to decide on the units where the test would take place, on the central and local coordinators, supervisors, evaluators and candidates.

The assessment covered five functional areas designated for the three services, one command and the General Staff and central structures. Information for each category of personnel involved in the assessment was posted within each area (*figure 2*).

More than 1 140 individuals were tested in less than a month (*figure 3*). At this point, you are kindly invited to take the following imagination exercise:

What would be the costs if the assessment took place traditionally?

How much room for lunch and accommodation would be needed?

How long would the candidates be absent from work?

What would be the transport costs for candidates and evaluators to go to the testing place?

What material and human resources would be spent to organise, monitor and manage the test results?

Actually, the new online system has eliminated such costs and has brought substantial savings to the Ministry of National Defence budget.

¹ See <https://roarmy.adlunap.ro>.

Categorii		Content
<p> Evaluare initiala SMFT ZONA PENTRU EVALUARE DESTINATA :</p>	<p> INFORMATII PENTRU COORDONATORI contine informatii pentru personalul cu responsabilitati in org changed inside</p>	<p> TEST SECTIUNEA "CITIT" testul pentru sectiunea "Citit", e'</p>
<p> Evaluare initiala SMFA ZONA PENTRU EVALUARE DESTINATA :</p>	<p> INFORMATII PENTRU CORECTORI contine informatii de interes pentru profesorii care co changed inside</p>	<p> TEST SECTIUNEA "ASCULTAT" testul pentru sectiunea "Ascultat"</p>
<p> Evaluare initiala SMFN ZONA PENTRU EVALUARE DESTINATA :</p>	<p> INFORMATII PENTRU CANDIDATI contine informatii despre inscriere, continutul celor 4 changed inside</p>	<p> TEST SECTIUNEA "SCRIS" test pentru sectiunea "Scris". ev</p>
<p> Evaluare initiala CLI ZONA PENTRU EVALUARE DESTINATA :</p>	<p> ZONA DE TESTARE cuprinde testele pentru cele 4 sectiuni: "Citit", "Ascul Status: Offline</p>	<p> TEST SECTIUNEA "VORBIT" test pentru sectiunea "Vorbit", e</p>
<p> Evaluare initiala structuri central EVALUARE INITIALA DESFASURATA IN</p>		

Figure 2: Online Preliminary Language Assessment – Organisation




Figure 3: Share of personnel tested in five functional areas

For each candidate, the assessment comprised two stages. The first one tested the listening and reading skills in one day, while the second one was planned for a different day, testing the writing and speaking skills. For the first two skills that we have mentioned before, the learning management system (ILIAS) sets the skill level automatically, based on the number of correct answers, the skill level being one such as follows: beginner, familiarisation, pre-intermediate, intermediate, post-intermediate and advanced (*figure 4*).

For the writing and speaking skills, the evaluation is performed by teachers that work for our language centres.

The speaking skill has a particularity meaning that after listening to the task, the candidates need to launch the voice recorder, record their answers, save the audio file under their name and task number, upload the file on the platform and close the recorder. The teachers open each candidate's test, click on the audio file of each task, listen to it and grade it manually. Based on the grades given for the four tasks performed, the management learning system sets the skill level automatically. The same procedure is required for writing, only that the files are written texts.

A very important aspect that needs to be mentioned is the fact that the questions of the tests are chosen randomly from pools of questions organised on skill levels. Therefore, the computer will generate a different test for each skill and candidate.

The final level of knowledge for each candidate is set by considering all skill levels using criteria among which productive skills are decisive.




Figure 4: Particularities of online tests for each skill

The Human Resource Management Directorate has provided the entire coordination of this project and has managed the organisation, test performance and evaluation being in permanent contact with the central and local coordinators, as well as with the evaluators. “Carol I” National Defence University through its Advanced Distributed Learning Department has provided the e-learning platform and the training of the Human Resource Management Directorate personnel that coordinated and provided technical assistance during the online assessment.

This project would not have been possible without the total devotion and commitment of several dedicated teachers that work for the three services, “Carol I” National Defence University and the Logistics Joint Headquarters whose creative potential and professionalism led to the development of the test questions that fed the question pools mentioned above.

The Online Tutoring Modules

The second project aims at applying the provisions of the new *Frame-Curriculum for the language courses* organised in the Ministry of National Defence. Besides the existing language programmes, a new type of programme has emerged from the advantages brought by the use of technology and its goal is to maintain the skills already acquired. This new type of programme is called “tutoring” and is implemented on *RoArmy* e-learning platform. It is designed to preserve

the skills acquired at daily courses and it addresses the graduates of those courses (and not only) who have the obligation to maintain and slightly increase the acquired language skills by individual study performed under the supervision of a teacher or tutor. The programme consists of five distinct online tutoring modules or online English courses shown in *figure 5*.




Figure 5: Types of online tutoring modules

For example, an individual that took a daily familiarisation English course is enrolled, according to planning, on an online tutoring module to maintain the skills acquired. Then he/she joins a new daily pre-intermediate course and after that a new online tutoring module. This way, within a certain amount of time, the advanced level can be reached if his/her position or potential positions require so.

The online tutoring modules are organised on series and groups and are taught by teachers of English from the Ministry of National Defence language centres. Each tutor supervises and guides between 18 and 24 students who can be enrolled on different online modules.

The students can access the learning materials anytime, anywhere, on any computer having internet connection. The course comprises several units within which students may find materials grouped on skills or themes. Each lesson has self-evaluation exercises. The units are set to unfold at a certain time

so that a constant learning pace can be set. Besides the learning activities of the course, the tutors may create tasks and give homework that may also be solved on the e-learning platform. These platform exercises tailored for students' needs may have simple or integrated tasks and proper feedback.

The previous academic year hosted three online tutoring modules, namely the familiarisation-pre-intermediate module, the pre-intermediate-intermediate module and the intermediate-post intermediate module. The target for this year is to build up the post-intermediate-advanced module and the advanced module as well.

For this project, the Human Resource Management Directorate provides the training and the selection of educational topics, as well as the coordination and management of the series, tutors, and students. "Carol I" National Defence University turns the educational topics into digital products that are accessible online and provides training sessions for tutors.

The Advantages of Using Online Systems for Training and Education

a) Increased accessibility – The system meets the requirements of an audience spread over a wide geographical area. Basically, all it takes is a computer connected to the internet that can be located anywhere, as its location does not matter.

b) Availability – The system provides high flexibility due to the possibility to access the learning resources 24/7.

c) Cost reduction – This is probably the factor that matters the most. Once an educational topic is turned into a digital product, it can be used by countless students. Moreover, that product may be used again differently, as it is created following the international standards in that field. Cutting out the transport and accommodation expenses as well as the time spent away from the working place is another aspect that is worth mentioning.

d) Self-control – As a system based on self-training, it provides the adult students with the possibility to select the needed educational resources, to set their own working pace within the time limit framed by tutor and to choose the place where they feel most comfortable to study.

e) Cooperation – The online system provides cooperation and training instruments such as the forum and chat room that have no time and space boundaries.

f) Guidance – The students do not lose their way in the briar of paths that they could follow if they studied by themselves. In this system, they benefit from the presence of tutors who evaluate them and engage them in activities that are best fit for their training needs.

g) Personalised training – The online system allows a much easier implementation of personalised training. The learning activities may be built up to take into account the learning style, gender, or the previous learning and life experience of each student.

Conclusions

As the world knowledge doubles every two or three years, it is high time the education and training system turned rapidly. Using technology as part of the training and education system is not a trendy mood but an important requirement. The military profession requests high time and space mobility from its followers. Therefore, it is not only proper but absolutely necessary to set a frame for continuous education and training.



HEALTH AND POSITIVE THINKING

Colonel Dr Leonard VOLOŞIN

Motto:

“Love is the best medicine”.

Paracelsus (1493-1541)

Hippocrates, the father of medicine, defined health as being “a balance of body, mind and environment”, a balance that can be kept, in the author’s opinion, through information, learning and education.

Currently, integrative medicine treats the person as a whole and is focused on approaching all three levels: body, mind and spirit.

Alongside treating the actual condition, it focuses on dealing with the issues associated to the disease, reducing side effects and choosing the right treatment for each person.

Moreover, it has been established that, besides being physically and psychically healthy, one also needs positive thinking. This is the “engine” that supports and motivates us to overcome the experiences with which we are confronted.

Keywords: *emotional health; positive thinking; balance; objective*

“Instead of buying a great deal of medicine, it is better to take care of your own body”, said Emperor Meiji of Japan (1852-1912). Here is how nice someone reminds us, from time to time, what experts now call “prevention” as “the cheapest way” to take care of our health.

Fast-paced lifestyle, stress, daily worries, poor nutrition, polluted environment, daily thoughts, all these act both on the body and the psyche.

Every aspect of our wholeness – physical, mental, emotional and spiritual – needs care to keep the balance. Neglecting or excessively preoccupying with one of them can cause an imbalance that is felt in the others. Of course it may be a greater interest in a particular issue for a period of time, perhaps to redress the balance, but the concern for a common-sense balance, without worrying, is, in general, the best.

Each dimension has its meaning and the proper functioning of one influences the others, and all these together, their balance and harmony,

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convey health. In other words, it can be said that physical health affects mental health, it affects emotional health and, in turn, spiritual health. The cultivation and development of one dimension influence the development of the other, as the neglect of one dimension will influence the other ones.

As we use all five senses to experience the world around us, we need all these dimensions to optimally approach life experiences.

Our body, through *homeostasis*, has the ability to maintain certain balance between physiological parameters to keep us alive. For example, if the ambient temperature increases, the body releases water by perspiration and with it the excess of heat. Also, if sweets are consumed in excess, the pancreas secretes more insulin to normalise the blood sugar level.

Naturally, our body “tells” us, signalling when imbalance occurs in any plane, and if we pay attention to these signals and “do something”, we can improve health. Otherwise, the signals will become increasingly stronger and more pronounced until we have to pay the necessary attention to them and take appropriate action, and if we understand the cause, in its depth, the chances of improvement will increase.

It may seem quite difficult to strive for this balance, but if we have this *concern without worrying* about our attitude and behaviour, today it can be better than yesterday and tomorrow it can be better than today. However, one thing is certain, that *it is up to us* how much we help our body and how we influence it one way or another.

Moreover, it is healthy for our body *not to let ourselves* affected by the events around. Of course life events affect us to some extent, but it depends on us how much and to what degree we “let ourselves” influenced by them, because nobody tells us to get angry, but we choose it, more or less aware of this condition.

The “10/90” principle says that we cannot control 10% of experiences, such as day and night, earthquakes and so on, but 90% of them are influenced by the way we think and react, by our *attitude*. In other words, heredity and environment can be more or less controlled, but the attitude and lifestyle depend on us.

Perhaps it is not coincidentally said “count up to 10” before reacting, bursting out in a way that may be regrettable because, during this period of time, the body breathes, oxygenating the brain and increasing the chances to make a better decision.

Multiple Dimensions of Health

Hippocrates, the father of medicine, defined health as “*a state of balance between body, mind and environment*”, and this equilibrium can be achieved through information, learning and education.

Currently, *integrative medicine* treats the person as a whole considering all three aspects: body, mind and spirit. In addition to treating specific diseases,

it is also considered to resolve the disease-associated problems, to reduce side effects, and to choose the appropriate treatment according to each person. It has been also found that, in addition to being healthy physically and mentally, something more is needed, namely positive thinking. This is the “*engine*” that supports and motivates us to overcome and optimally approach the experiences we face. These aspects are lessons of our forefathers that can be found in various ancient writings or sayings currently addressed from a scientific standpoint.

Physical health refers to the condition of the body and its ability to appropriately respond to external factors.

Mental health refers to the ability to learn from experiences and to appropriately manage the situations we face, to think positively, to be receptive to change, because there is always room for the better, to become aware of the “*positive*” and “*negative*” aspects related to the self, as well as of the attitude we have in various life situations.

To develop harmoniously, it is necessary to know ourselves, with our good and less good parts, because if we are not aware of what we have to improve or develop, we may persist in certain behaviour patterns as we cannot “*see*”, “*hear*”, “*know*” them or, sometimes, we do “*not want*” to see or accept them.

Our body constantly adapts to internal and external conditions, and who cannot adapt cannot meet requirements. Therefore, the “*disease*” can be a warning that we should change something as far as our nutrition, attitude, emotions and other aspects are concerned. Moreover, the body “*emits warning signals*” and that is why it is healthy “*to listen to it*” and do something.

Mentally, as Einstein said, “*The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them. No problem can be solved from the same consciousness that created it*”.

Emotional health refers to the awareness of our emotions and feelings relating to us and the others, situations or life experiences, as well as to the ability to manage them.

The individual emotional state influences both the way of thinking and the effectiveness of the performed activity.

When someone is upset or angry, it is not made manifest only in the head or in the fist, but in the whole body, as a person who loves does not do it only with the eyes but with the whole being. In fact, it is sometimes said that one “*loves from all the heart*”.

Spiritual health refers to the ability of a person to be in a certain state of balance, at peace with him/herself and with those around, with the world the person lives in, with the life he/she lives.

Depending on the way of being, the condition, each person resonates with everything around. However, as the person feels good in certain places or in the presence of certain people, he/she can *“bless the place”* too.

Man resonates with other places or people even if he has never seen them. This may explain why some people seen for the first time are perceived as *“attractive”* or *“unattractive”* or why we feel good in some places and worse in other places.

Given these issues, we can ask ourselves *“Why are some people more influenced and others less?”* or *“Why are some people influenced in a beneficial way and others in a less beneficial one?”*. Of course everything that is around us, be it *“good”* or *“bad”*, acts on all of us, but *it can become manifest where there are optimal conditions for development*. Similarly, a germ in the air can affect only some people, namely those who have low immune system, and the immune system may become low when the physical condition allows it.

In the same vein, it is known the situation when someone is vaccinated preventively against a disease and, in spite of it, the person gets ill. We ask ourselves *“Why?”* or *“What has led to low immunity?”*. Nevertheless, if we talk to the person, we can see that the disease develops following a certain life experience, usually unpleasant, and following a certain manifest attitude, generally sadness.

This attitude is a manifestation of our thoughts, therefore the proverb: *“Watch your thoughts, for they become words. Watch your words, for they become actions. Watch your actions, for they become habits. Watch your habits for they become your character ... Watch your character because it becomes your destiny ..., your life”*.

In a similar vein, Ioan Slavici said: *“May your soul be like your thoughts, your thoughts like your words, and your words like your actions!”*

Sometimes, we may ask ourselves: *“How can a thought result in such changes?”*. We can better understand it if we consider the following example. Each of us has heard the expression *“I get goose pimples”*. So what can cause it? It may be a thought, certain images or the emotions manifested by us. Therefore, a thought or some images can result in physical changes in the human body (*goose pimples*), thermal (mild drop in body temperature), chemical (mild transformation of substances), and perhaps many other changes such as mental, emotional etc. ones.

Of course, certain emotional states can cause certain physiological changes in the body. For example, shame or embarrassment results in a certain blush by locating blood at this level, while an emotional scene in a movie can result in crying, fear can make you appear pale, hence the term *“pale as a ghost”* and the examples may continue.

It is more and more clear that being healthy, besides being physically and mentally healthy, requires something important, namely *“positive”* thinking. *“Positive thinking*

people cope better with difficult situations, have greater physical and intellectual capacity, better withstand stressful situations and they are generally able to get better results than others with similar skills. They also get better faster if affected by an illness or accident, and they seem to have a greater disease resistance¹.

“Positive” thinking is, in fact, an *attitude* that allows us to more easily find solutions to problems and the positive aspects of the situations we face. It refers not only to optimism but also to the constructive orientation such as “let us see what can be done in this situation”².

The concern for our health should be neither excessive nor neglected, as *temperance* tells us that “it is too much of a good thing, and enough is as good as a feast”.

Principles to Stay Physically, Mentally, Emotionally and Spiritually Healthy

❖ **Physically**

- Do physical, respiration and relaxation exercises daily. A simple exercise is to inhale through your nose and exhale through your mouth several times, gently and deeply, as much as it can be done without forcing.

- Have a balanced diet, eat healthy food and drink enough water every day, which refers to nutrition. This aspect is reflected in the words “*you are what you eat*”. Perhaps what is said relating to the fact that eating meat in excess influences aggressiveness is not coincidence.

- Be active. Inactivity decreases the body tone. It is the same with a muscle which, if not used, gets atrophied.

- Allow yourself time for recreation and relaxation every day. The body is very resistant but to “*recharge batteries*” it is advisable to perform activities that make us feel good.

- Rest if and when necessary: “*Every hour of sleep before midnight is equal to two hours of sleep early in the morning*”.

- Be aware of own limits as far as resistance to physical effort and other stresses and strains is concerned.

- *Listen to your body*, as it tells you what you should do.

❖ **Mentally**

- Set the goals you want to achieve. Once they are set and planned, they are integrated in your approaches to life and experiences.

¹ Dr. Irina Holdevici, *Gândirea pozitivă. Ghid practic de psihoterapie rațional-emoțională și cognitiv-comportamentală*, Editura Universitară, 2000, p. 7.

² *Ibidem*.

- Relate, communicate with the others. Thus, your life experience enriches and your approach to life situations gets wiser.

- Be open to new things, because there is always room for improvement.

- Focus on what you do, keep the attention focused on the task that you have to fulfil in order to have maximum efficiency.

- Use autosuggestion. In 1900, Émile Coué helped many people by using and repeating the following statement: *“Day by day in every way I am getting better and better”*. Currently, it is recommended to use: *“I am getting healthier and healthier”*.

- Study what you consider important for your health. Get informed as this aspect enriches your life experience and the way to cope with different situations.

- Have dreams and aspirations. However, pay attention to the gap between them and the ability to fulfil them, not to find in the situation of the frog that inflates itself to the size of an ox but bursts in the attempt, in the fable.

- Think positively, looking for solutions and ways to overcome obstacles and not giving up or *“seeing”* or *“anchoring”* in negative aspects only.

- Learn and apply certain relaxation, autosuggestion, respiration, balance, development techniques that you consider appropriate and effective.

- Learn from own experiences.

- Whenever you meet a person, try to find out what you can learn from that person. Identify the aspects that may be useful for you, those that can be beneficial to your health. Moreover, try to help the person if he/she solicits it.

- Do not get stuck in fixed, useless ideas. Otherwise, they act as thoughts that *“bother”* you and prevent you from being highly effective.

- Do not criticise your fellow beings. Notice how you feel after you criticise someone and you will understand your condition while practicing it.

❖ *Emotionally*

- Express your emotions in a balanced way. It is healthy to express them but to control them and not to let yourself controlled by them.

- Be aware of your feelings so that you can change them when you are not fine.

- Utter gentle words, be gentle with those around you.

- Thank someone for help or kindness. Emit grateful and appreciative thoughts, sincerely uttering words that convey this meaning.

- Live in the present, focusing on the present moment in what you do, in order to be effective in carrying out your task. Otherwise, you are in the past, focusing on what you sometimes did, or in the future, focusing on what you will do, but not in the present, focusing on what you are doing.

- Take responsibility only for what you do. Do not blame yourself for what someone sometimes says under certain circumstances. Perhaps that person

has already retracted or regretted, realising the discrepancy between the situation and the momentary reaction.

- Be creative and elegant in what you do. Thus, elegance and creativity will define you in everything you do.
- Share your experience with those who sincerely ask you to do so.
- It is attitude that makes it easy or difficult to address/fulfil problems/duties at work, in the family and in society.

❖ **Spiritually**

• Be concerned with personal development. Give yourself some minutes daily, for your evolution and development, without worrying about certain aspects. You may take some courses or study some books, articles, materials and documentaries about the scientific discoveries relating to health, harmony, balance, interdisciplinary and integrative approach to healthcare. Learn and apply the acquired knowledge.

• Develop your moral conduct, and especially have respect for the fellow beings.

• Be confident about your abilities. Develop the belief that you have the necessary abilities to overcome difficult situations. Be conscious that it is your faith that strengthens you. Faith means lack of doubt. You can attract into your life only the things you believe in, so learn to believe to attract what you want in your life.

• Be compassionate. Einstein said: *“...Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner security”*.

• Demonstrate gratitude. Since ancient times, wise men have taught us the benefits of gratitude. That is why Einstein used to say *“Thank you!”* many times a day. Gratitude also refers to being grateful for what you have achieved so far. Dissatisfaction generates tension and hampers development and evolution.

• *“Know thyself!”*, said Socrates; Be aware of what you think, say, do and feel.

• Think about what you truly want from life. It helps you in achieving goals.

• Be aware of the importance of positive thinking for your evolution. Negative thinking generates tension, stress, and does not allow the optimal functioning of the body as a whole.

• Be aware of the fact that working in a team can result in superior outcomes. Be aware of the qualities of your team members and cooperate with them.

• Be aware of the fact that man is a whole person, physical, mental, emotional and spiritual, and that man works as a whole.

• Show respect for your forefathers and for your nation, family, and workplace values.

- Listen to those who speak to you. Do not interrupt because, gradually, you will do so in general, with almost anyone. Besides the fact that you cannot grasp the message, listening to what the other person says is a form of respect; a person would like to be listened to as you would.

- Do unto others as you would have them to do!

- Forgive..., be reconciled with the others whenever it is possible. If you do not forgive, you will not be forgiven. Unforgiveness hurts your soul and your body. “*Look*” inside yourself and “*see*” how much tension is created when you cannot forgive someone or look at someone who says that he/she cannot forgive. Prolonged tension exhausts the body and lowers immunity. Be aware of the fact that the “*burden*” of unforgiveness may unconsciously influence your life experience.

- Be reconciled with yourself. If you are in a state of dissatisfaction with yourself, it creates a tension that “*does not let*” you fully manifest yourself, and if you forgive yourself, your relationships with others will be enhanced.

- When you ask yourself questions about life and the meaning of your life, it is an indication that you undergo a profound transformation, and if you want to get answers, you ask questions.

General Principles to Stay Healthy

- *Be moderate and balanced* in everything you do. There are surely situations in life when you need more or less, but the general line is balance, the “*feeling*”, the “*need identification*” in terms of the state of balance being another topic.

- *The state you are in* when performing an activity influences the outcomes. In sports competitions, all participants are very well trained but their efficiency depends on the state they are in and the way they address the competition at that particular moment.

- *Utility*. In the various activities you perform daily, ask yourself if they are useful for your evolution.

- *Love and compassion*. Manifest love and compassion towards those you collaborate with, towards all the people around you.

- *Be yourself*. Being yourself you may express your potential and you may be happy.

- *Ask experts for help* if you consider it necessary. Your health is very important, and you should not defer considering this aspect.

- *Your daily activity* influences your health. As George Enescu put it: “*Have a healthy consciousness and you will have a healthy body*”.

- *Communion*. The union with your fellows and mutual assistance give meaning to your actions. We need each other to survive.

➤ By the end of the day, ask yourself: “*What have I done today for my evolution, for my health?*”, and “*What have I done today to help my fellows?*”.

➤ *Find time to relax.* Relaxation helps to eliminate some tension, to get balanced, to enhance effectiveness, to better concentrate. During relaxation, the heart, mind and the whole body “*recover*”.

➤ *Take care of yourself.* To be able to take care of the loved ones, of those around you, as well as of your colleagues, it is necessary that you should be healthy. Taking care of yourself without worrying, you contribute to the health of your children. If we take care of our health, it is important to address it in its entirety, as a whole. It is more importantly to focus on being better today than yesterday and better tomorrow than today instead of saying that we cannot grasp all the aspects of our life.

Mental attitude affects health and, therefore, positive thinking is one of the ways that help us to effectively address life experiences ..., while tension and stress lead to inappropriate or disproportionate reactions to life events.

William James (1842-1910) said that “*the greatest revolution of our generation is the discovery that human beings, by changing the inner attitudes of their minds, can change the outer aspects of their lives*”.

Adopt a healthy attitude!

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OVERVIEW

OF THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

Mihai Cătălin AVRAM

The goal of this current research is to figure out the events that led to the violence in Syria. In this respect, the author will conduct an open-source analysis focused on online media in order to pinpoint the key events of the conflict in Syria as well as to understand the main reasons for this conflict during its first phase, as seen by the media.

This chronological approach will eventually try to draw a series of up-to-date conclusions regarding the impact of this conflict on the international arena, mentioning President Obama's efforts made during the G20 Sankt Petersburg Summit to convince the participants to get involved in a military mission in Syria as well as the unexpected solution found by Russia, namely to suggest Syria to place its entire WMD stockpile under international control.

Keywords: *Syria; international impact; the UN; chemical weapons; social media*

On 25 November 2013, Washington expressed hope that the peace talks scheduled for 22 January 2014 in Geneva would put an end to violence in Syria¹. This optimistic perspective on ending the civil war is overshadowed by the prospect that Assad will have to renounce power for peace to be brought in the country. Even in this unlikely context, the situation in Syria may not become stable too soon, because of certain local historical factors that may destabilise the state in the long run. This article intends to put things into perspective and, at the same time, to look back at the most important events that have shaped the conflict and will probably influence Syria in the future.

On 15 March 2011, the international press began to report on the fact that approximately 200 protestors gathered in Damascus² were summoning Bashar al-Assad to release all political prisoners and make democratic reforms possible³.

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¹ Jim Kuhnhehn, *White House Hopes Talks Will End Assad Regime*, *ABC News*, 25 November 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/white-house-hopes-talks-end-assad-regime-21007273>, retrieved on 25 November 2013.

² Elizabeth Flock, *Syria Revolution, a Revolt Brews against Bashar al-Assad Regime*, in *The Washington Post*, 15 March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syria-revolution-revolt-against-bashar-al-assads-regime/2011/03/15/ABrwNEX_blog.html, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

³ *Mid-East Unrest: Syrian Protests in Damascus and Aleppo*, *BBC News*, 15 March 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12749674>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

It seemed that, same as in Egypt, protesters managed to organise themselves and formed a group that received support through social media tools such as Facebook⁴. Initially, the open sources reported that force was not being used against the protesters, detaining only six of them⁵, but the situation changed rapidly and, on 16 March, *Reuters* was reporting that security forces were already wielding batons to disperse 150 demonstrators assembled outside the Interior Ministry⁶. On this occasion, reporters could also see how some demonstrators were beaten by security forces. The protesters reportedly gathered outside the Interior Ministry in order to demand the release of an estimated 3 000-4 000 political prisoners held without trial⁷. Yet, the situation got from bad to worse, as sources such as *The Washington Post* announced that Syrian government forces started to fire live ammunition and tear gas rounds against protesters⁸. “At least 14 people” were killed⁹. In an attempt to stop what was already becoming a national issue, Bashar al-Assad decided to release some political prisoners, but his action did not prove to be a solution, because the stories of those who were released, about the time they spent in prison, infuriated the protesters. Some of these stories were published by *The Guardian* on 25 April 2011, when a certain Mahmoud told reporters that the prisoners were detained in conditions that were hard to imagine, just because they were trying to defend their opinions¹⁰. When Mahmoud left the Syrian prisons, the situation in the country had already become much more complicated than initially though, considering that over 200 protesters were reported missing “in the last three days alone, according to human rights monitors”¹¹. The protesters who were not reported missing, but were taken into custody by the authorities went public on the unimaginable tortures they had to go through, such as walking on fire¹². On 20 April 2011, the Syrian government “lifted the 48-year

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Mid-East Unrest...*, *op. cit.*

⁶ Khaled Yacoub Oweis, *Syrian Forces Break Up Damascus Protest*, *Reuters*, 16 March 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/uk-syria-protest-idUKTRE72F2V720110316>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Leila Fadel, *Protesters Shot as Demonstrations Expand across Syria*, in *The Washington Post*, 25 March 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-25/world/35261439_1_sanamein-security-forces-protesters-shot, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

⁹ Leila Fadel, *Syria's Assad Moves to Allay Fury after Security Forces Fire on Protesters*, in *The Washington Post*, 26 March 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-26/world/35260990_1_syrian-unrest-egypt-or-tunisia-security-forces, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹⁰ Katherine Marsh, *Syria's Political Prisoners: It's Hard to Imagine how I Got through It*, in *The Guardian*, 25 April 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/25/syria-political-prisoners>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

state of emergency¹³, but the protesters dismissed this move, as they were not seeking political concessions anymore, but rather their freedom¹⁴.

In April, government forces showed signs of being ready to do whatever it may take to stay in power, by storming into the city of Deraa using tanks to shell it¹⁵. The same thing happened through a sustained attack on Baniyas¹⁶, Homs¹⁷ and Jisr al-Shughour¹⁸. Government forces claimed that the rebels killed over 120 soldiers in Deraa¹⁹. In response, the Syrian armed forces, regime loyalists, sent 200 vehicles, including tanks, as well as military helicopters and army units²⁰. As many as 10 000 citizens fled towards the camps located near the Turkish border²¹. As violence escalated inside Syria, the international community started an assessment of the situation in order to understand the possible security risks derived from the Assad regime.

Different International Perspectives

The International Atomic Energy Agency rebuked Syria for building a North-Korean technology-based nuclear reactor, for bombs, which was in fact destroyed in 2007²². This declaration contributed to the enhancement of international enmity manifested towards a government that appeared to be power-hungry and used the tool of disproportionate violence in order to discipline its citizens. As domestic violence increased, the Arab League suspended Syria over its failure to stop violence and maintain regional peace and for the way it used violence as a weapon

¹³ David Williams, *Syria Lifts 48-Year State of Emergency as Thousands of Protesters Refuse to Leave City Square until Assad Is Ousted*, in *The Daily Mail*, 20 April 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1378406/Syria-protests-48-year-state-emergency-lifted-thousands-demand-Bashar-Assad-ousted.html>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Syrians Protest from Rooftops after Enemy Action*, *Reuters*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/30/us-syria-idUSLDE73N02P20110430>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹⁶ *Syrian Tanks and Troops' Enter Flashpoint Baniyas City*, *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13320326>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹⁷ Martin Chulov, *Syrian Tanks Shell Homs after Arab League Peace Deal*, in *The Guardian*, 3 November 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/03/syrian-tanks-shell-homs>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹⁸ Hannah Godfrey, Martin Chulov, *Syrian Army Tanks Move into Jisr al-Shughour*, in *The Guardian*, 12 June 2011, https://www.google.ro/?gws_rd=cr&ei=SGgzUpHdHM3Iswa3vIGgDg#q=Syrian+Army+tanks+move+into+Jisr+al-Shughour, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Syrian Unrest: Army in Control of Jisr al-Shoughor*, *BBC News*, 12 June 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13741106>, retrieved on 18 August 2013.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Dan Bilefsky, *UN Nuclear Watchdog Pressed Case against Syria*, in *The New York Times*, 4 June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/middleeast/10nations.html?_r=0, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

against own citizens²³. The Arab League also imposed a series of economic sanctions on Syria, hoping that such a gesture would increase pressure on the government apparatus²⁴. On the other hand, the United Nations decided even to back a plan for ending the violence that stipulated “*a daily two-hour ceasefire, troops withdrawal and talks between the opposition and the regime*”²⁵. However, the UN failed to adopt or implement a series of more serious sanctions in the event of continuing conflicts²⁶, given that Russia and China were reluctant from the beginning to impose sanctions on Damascus and blocked very effectively the signing of a UN resolution in this regard²⁷.

All this time, fearing the worse, it seems, the rebel forces in Syria made known their plans, on 29 May 2012, according to which, when their movement was strong enough to topple the government, they would take control of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons²⁸. The announcement proved essential for three big reasons. First of all, the statement showed that at least part of the rebel forces were already considering the issue of governing the state and, implicitly, stabilising it, the issue of controlling chemical military resources thus being essential. Secondly, the information came as a warning that reminded the international environment that the Assad regime still controlled these assets and could use them in any given situation. Thirdly, it is very important that we mention the statement made, according to the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*, by “*an opposition figure described as a former senior officer in the Syrian army*”²⁹, which is, up to one point, an indicator of the fact that opposition forces were starting to derive strategic advantage from the military personnel that defected in order to join the rebels. However, this perspective did not seem sufficient as long as Syria continued to slide down the path of destruction. A new barrier of decency was shattered on 25 May 2012, when governmental forces attacked a collection of farming villages in Houla,

²³ Neil MacFarquhar, *Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown*, in *The New York Times*, 12 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?pagewanted=all>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

²⁴ David Batty, *Syria Suspended from Arab League*, in *The Guardian*, 12 November 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

²⁵ *Syria: UN Security Council Agree to Back Kofi Annan’s Plan Wednesday 21 March 2012*, in *The Guardian*, 21 March 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2012/mar/21/syria-crisis-live-coverage>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *US Urges Syria to Work with Annan Peace Plan*, *BBC News*, 21 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17466453>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

²⁸ Brian Whitaker, Tom McCarthy, *Governments around the World Expel Syrian Diplomats*, in *The Guardian*, 29 May 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/global/middle-east-live/2012/may/29/syria-bashar-al-assad>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

killings of 108 of its members. Among them, the UN said there were 49 children and 34 women³⁰. It seems that some of them were shot at close range³¹. This major violation of international law was severely criticised by France, Germany, Italy, Spain³², Australia³³, which decided to expel all Syrian diplomats from their countries.

The Syrian opposition started to show signs of efficient organisation, as well as of using a wider strategic perspective on the conflict, considering that three of Assad's top chiefs were killed in bomb strikes³⁴. The day of 18 July showed that other two trends were becoming obvious. The regime loyalists were defecting increasingly³⁵ and, secondly, yet, perhaps most importantly, their decision seemed to have been influenced by the fact that government security forces were being issued with gas masks³⁶. The decision to use bombs to kill senior representatives of the Assad regime was yet difficult to consider. At first sight, such a practice seems like a just response to a regime using violence over its own citizens. However, it appears to be rather similar to the tactics generally used by terrorists. Even though it is probably the only asymmetrical instrument the rebels can use in order to derive a relatively increased advantage, this practice raises serious questions regarding the way in which these future potential leaders of Syria will use various means to settle extremely evident and religious divergences once they are in power. Only time will tell.

However, the situation of the chemical weapons posed an immediate danger, as the international community warned that the government forces were moving a large part of their chemical weapons in various locations inside the country³⁷. Despite all efforts of the Syrian regime to deny such accusations³⁸, Western intelligence organisations continued to state the opposite. Barack Obama even warned that the potential use of these weapons would result in consequences³⁹.

³⁰ *Syrian Diplomats around the World Expelled*, in *The Telegraph*, 29 May 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9297399/Syrian-diplomats-around-the-world-expelled.html>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Brian Whitaker, Tom McCarthy, *op. cit.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Martin Chulov, *Syria Crisis: Three of Assad's Top Chiefs Killed in Rebel Bomb Strike*, in *The Guardian*, 18 July 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/18/syria-rebels-kill-elite-damascus>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Matt Williams, Martin Chulov, *Barack Obama Warns Syria of Chemical Weapons Consequences*, in *The Guardian*, 4 December 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/04/barack-obama-syria-chemical-weapons-warning>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

He stated: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus”⁴⁰. Hillary Clinton also said that if chemical weapons were used, the USA would intend to react⁴¹.

Meanwhile, the conflict was spreading across the border. According to *Reuters*, “the Turkish military returned fire after a mortar bomb shot from Syria landed in countryside in southern Turkey”⁴². Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that “his country did not want war but warned Syria not to make a <fatal mistake> by testing its resolve”⁴³. The tensions spiralled when Turkey claimed that “it had found Russian munitions aboard a Syrian passenger jet forced to land in its capital, Ankara”⁴⁴. The plane cargo, which included unspecified munitions, remained in Ankara. The idea of a missile landing on Turkish sovereign territory had immediate effects, and Turkey demanded US protection. On 20 November 2012, the Turkish Foreign Minister said “NATO states had signed off on deploying an advanced Patriot missile system to Turkey to defend against Syrian attacks”⁴⁵.

Meanwhile, in Syria, rebel forces were encountering difficulties in recognising a common leadership. In November, part of the Syrian forces were organised in what they called “The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces”⁴⁶. The Western world, as well as Turkey and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council⁴⁷ recognised it “as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people”⁴⁸. Yet, the Islamic groups such as Al Nursa and Liwa Al Tawhid “refused

⁴⁰ James Ball, *Obama Issues Syria a Red Line Warning on Chemical Weapons*, in *The Washington Post*, 20 August 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Turkish Army Returns Fire after Syrian Mortar Strike*, *Reuters*, 6 October 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/06/us-syria-crisis-turkey-mortar-idUSBRE89503H20121006>, retrieved on 19 August 2013.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Lij Sly, *Turkey Says Syrian Jet Carried Russian Arms, Drawing Moscow Deeper into Crisis*, in *The Washington Post*, 11 October 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-11/world/35501159_1_syrian-mortar-strike-syrian-air-plane-syrian-passenger-jet, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁴⁵ Neil McFarquhar, *Citing a Credible Alternative to Assad, Britain Recognizes Syrian Rebel Group*, in *The New York Times*, 20 November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/middleeast/britain-is-latest-power-to-recognize-syrian-opposition-coalition.html?_r=0, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁴⁶ Arthur Bright, *What Is the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces?*, in *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 November 2012, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2012/1112/What-is-The-National-Coalition-for-Syrian-Revolutionary-and-Opposition-Forces-video>, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁴⁷ Neil McFarquhar, *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ Arthur Bright, *op. cit.*

to endorse it"⁴⁹, considering it a "conspiratorial project"⁵⁰. Therefore, even if there was no power to split and Assad was still in office, the military groups started to argue about state leadership, painting a rather gloomy picture.

All this time, Assad was trying to make several weapons of mass destruction disappear, with the help of the Hezbollah⁵¹. Israel managed to stop the transfer of chemical weapons through airstrikes that targeted the weapons convoy heading from Syria to Hezbollah and killed the Iranian General Hassan Shateri who boarded the convoy headed for Lebanon⁵². According to Israeli intelligence services, Iran cooperated with Hezbollah and the Assad regime⁵³ for building a 50 000-strong force to support the Assad regime⁵⁴ given that the latter had to face rebels that were more and more determined and were gaining more ground.

This was obvious when the rebels managed to capture Governor Hassan Jalili of the province Raqqa, as well as Suleiman Suleiman, Secretary General of the ruling Baath party, when they routed the regime forces from the Northern city of Raqqa⁵⁵. It was the most consistent capture since the war started⁵⁶. Even so, Syrian jets bombed opposition-held buildings in the city in response to the rebels' actions and owing to the fact that the rebels failed to occupy the airbases outside the city⁵⁷.

The Issue of Chemical Weapons

The first reports on the full use of chemical weapons were available in March 2013, when *Reuters* reported that rebels and government forces began to accuse each other of launching chemical attacks in Aleppo⁵⁸. Of course,

⁴⁹ *Syria's Opposition Coalition Suffers First Setback*, *AFP*, 20 November 2012, <http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syria-s-opposition-coalition-suffers-first-setback-1.1107466>, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Phoebe Greenwood, Richard Spencer, *Bashar al-Assad Accuses Israel of Trying to Destabilize Syria*, in *The Telegraph*, 3 February 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9846032/Bashar-al-Assad-accuses-Israel-of-trying-to-destabilise-Syria.html>, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁵² Gabe Fisher, *Israel's Strike on Syria Last Month Killed Top Iranian General*, in *The Times of Israel*, 24 February 2013, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/top-iranian-general-said-target-of-israeli-strike-in-syria>, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁵³ Julian Borger, *Iran and Hezbollah Have Built 50 000 Strong Force to Help Syrian Regime*, in *The Guardian*, 14 March 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/iran-hezbollah-force-syrian-regime>, retrieved on 20 August 2013.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Syria Crisis: Warplanes Bomb Raqqa after Rebel Gains*, *BBC News*, 5 March 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21666917>, retrieved on 22 August 2013.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Syrian Jets Bomb Northern City Overrun by Rebels*, in *The Guardian*, 5 March 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/05/syrian-jets-bomb-city-rebels>, retrieved on 22 August 2013.

⁵⁸ Oliver Holmes, *Alleged Chemical Attack Kills 25 in Northern Syria*, *Reuters*, 19 March 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-syria-crisis-chemical-idUSBRE92I0A220130319>, retrieved on 22 August 2013.

this was not the first time the rebel forces and Assad's forces accused each other of acts of violence, which complicated enormously the possibility of understanding the situation on the ground. On the other side, Western sources stressed that rebels did not have such weapons, but "*Russia, an ally of Damascus, accused rebels of carrying out such a strike*"⁵⁹. It is also worth noting that "*the pro-opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which monitors the conflict, said 16 soldiers were among the dead*"⁶⁰. The fact that the rebels noticed in the past that securing the chemical weapons was an essential element helped neither then nor now, in no way, because that statement opened the possibility of making continue speculations. Russia even made quite a series of investigations, concluding that "*the round of ammunition used near the largest Syrian city of Aleppo in a purported chemical weapons attack in March was not a factory-made item of the Syrian armed forces*"⁶¹ and that "*the used round of ammunition was a homemade item on the basis of rockets made in Syria's north by the so-called Bashair Al-Nasr Brigade*"⁶². Discussions on this issue are far from being over.

In time, there were many alleged chemical weapons attacks, but the biggest by far seemed to be the one in Damascus, on 21 August 2013. Initial reports claimed around 1 300 people were killed after Syrian government forces used chemical weapons⁶³. At the time, "*Syrian activists accuse President Bashar Al-Assad forces of launching the nerve gas attack in what would be, by far the worst reported use of poison gas in the two-year old war*"⁶⁴. Even so, "*the accounts could not be verified independently and were denied by Syrian state television, which said they were disseminated deliberately to distract a team of United Nations chemical weapons experts that arrived three days ago*"⁶⁵. Again, "*a foreign ministry spokesman in Moscow said the release of gas after UN inspectors arrived suggested that it was a rebel 'provocation' to discredit Syria's government*"⁶⁶. However, the USA fought to prove that such perspective was far from the truth and made a statement based on secret intelligence: "*The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Dimitar Dilkoff, *Ammo Used Near Aleppo, Syria in March Was Homemade – Russia*, *Ria Novosti*, 5 September 2013, <http://en.ria.ru/world/20130905/183172658/Ammo-Used-Near-Aleppo-Syria-in-March-Was-Makeshift-Russia.html>, retrieved on 8 September 2013.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Sam Webb, *Syria's Darkest Hour: Hundreds of Children's Bodies Piled High after Nerve Gas Attack near Damascus Leaves Up to 1 300 Dead*, in *The Daily Mail*, 22 August 2013, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2398691/Syrias-darkest-hour-Hundreds-childrens-bodies-piled-high-nerve-gas-attack-near-Damascus-leaves-1-300-dead.html>, retrieved on 24 August 2013.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These all-source assessments are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a significant body of open source reporting”⁶⁷. For the US President, that attack meant that the red line of demarcation mentioned in the passed was crossed. Thus, he “addressed the crisis in Syria, saying he has decided the United States should take military action against regime targets, but that he will seek authorisation from Congress before taking action”⁶⁸. On the other hand, the British Prime Minister lost the government motion on military intervention, “after dozens of Tory MPs joined forces with Labour”⁶⁹, despite the fact that the British intelligence agencies released an assessment that proved, from their point of view, the way in which the Syrian government was responsible for the attack⁷⁰.

Conclusions, short-term solutions and... unanswered questions

The G20 Summit in St Petersburg began with President Obama pushing for support for military strikes in Syria⁷¹, but Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa showed concern that a military strike could hurt the world economy and, implicitly, their status of emerging powers⁷². Russia’s position, which also challenged assertions that Syrian forces have used chemical weapons, was also predictably supported by Iran⁷³. Vladimir Putin even publicly claimed that, out of the whole group of G20 countries, only Turkey, the US, Saudi Arabia

⁶⁷ White House, *Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013*, Office of the Press Secretary, 30 August 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21>, retrieved on 3 September 2013.

⁶⁸ *Obama Says US Should Take Action in Syria, Will Seek Congress’ Authorization for Use of Force*, in *The Huffington Post*, 31 August 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/31/obama-syria-announcement_n_3849108.html, retrieved on 5 September 2013.

⁶⁹ Nicholas Watt, Rowena Manson, Nick Hopkins, *Blow to Cameron’s Authority as MPs Rule Out British Assault on Syria*, in *The Guardian*, 30 August 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/30/cameron-mps-syria>, retrieved on 6 September 2013.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Divided G20 Discusses Syria Crisis in St Petersburg*, *BBC News*, 5 September 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23967567>, retrieved on 8 September 2013.

⁷² *BRICS States Fear Strike on Syria Could Hurt World Economy*, *Reuters*, 5 September 2013, <http://news.yahoo.com/brics-states-fear-strike-syria-could-hurt-world-144525967.html>, retrieved on 9 September 2013.

⁷³ Greg Botelho, Michael Pearson, *Iranian Leader: US Will Definitely Suffer if It Leads Strike on Syria*, *CNN News*, 6 September 2013, <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/05/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html>, retrieved on 9 September 2013.

and Canada supported the intervention, adding that Russia would take Syria's side in the event of an American attack – a strategic vision and statement reminding us of the *Cold War*, which seemed to have been made also for intimidating Washington's foreign agenda, in general⁷⁴. Again, Putin described the toxic gas incident as a provocation from the rebels to drum up external support⁷⁵.

But even so, on 9 September, Russia came up with a rather unexpected proposal to have Syria put its chemical weapons stockpile under international control, a proposal accepted almost instantly by Walid Muallem, Syrian Foreign Minister⁷⁶. The determination behind the Syrian decision-makers seemed to be confirmed by Syria's willingness to sign an international agreement against the use of such weapons⁷⁷. Russia kept intact, at least for the time being, one of its most important strategic points located in Middle East. Across the world, the strategy was seen as highly beneficial and, in France, they were even suggesting that Putin be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize⁷⁸!

The conflict in Syria is more than one could have imagined initially. What seemed to be a form of *Facebook revolution* has become a turning point in international relations for sovereign actors whose power exceeds the possibilities of the Assad regime. All events brought international community at daggers dawn, a behaviour strikingly resembling the *Cold War*, when weapons of mass destruction were diplomatic arguments and when the struggle for power was not carried out directly between the great actors of the international environment, but indirectly, targeting remote areas of influence. Nevertheless, the situation in Syria is far from being over. When the violence ends, we will not know exactly what will happen with the internal forces that will probably fight each other for supremacy. The idea of placing chemical weapons in the hands of the international community is a possible solution only for... half the problem, as long as it is

⁷⁴ James Kirkup, *Syria: Russia Will Stand by Assad over Any US Strikes, Warns Putin*, in *The Telegraph*, 6 September 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10291879/Syria-Russia-will-stand-by-Assad-over-any-US-strikes-warns-Putin.html>, retrieved on 9 September 2013.


⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Simon Shuster, *Russia's Syria Calculus: Behind Moscow's Plan to Avert US Missile Strike*, in *Time World*, 10 September 2013, <http://world.time.com/2013/09/10/russias-syria-calculus-behind-moscows-plan-to-avert-u-s-missile-strikes/>, retrieved on 13 September 2013.

⁷⁷ Kerry, Lavrov "Committed to Trying" for Renewed Syria Talks, *Deutsche Welle*, 13 September 2013, <http://www.dw.de/kerry-lavrov-committed-to-trying-for-renewed-syria-talks/a-17087033>, retrieved on 13 September 2013.

⁷⁸ Alexander Warkentin, *Russia's Clever Move on Syrian Crisis*, *Deutsche Welle*, 13 September 2013, <http://www.dw.de/russias-clever-move-on-syrian-crisis/a-17085986>, retrieved on 13 September 2013.

unclear if Bashar Al-Assad regime stays in power and at what cost, with what effect on the dichotomy rebels-government forces. The conflict still has serious weak points and the fact that the proposed solution for some of them has helped Moscow's prestigious policy does not mean that the Syrian issue ends. Not even by far, considering that the Syrians were in conflict with each other throughout history and will probably be so in the future. The question raised concerns the means used to wage war in the future. Besides asking questions that will perhaps find the answer in the following years, the Syrian conflict has proved something else: the fact that the UN seems to have no means to deal with such situations before they are totally out of control. From this point of view, we must ask ourselves: how does the UN help in the global arena today and are there structures efficient enough to prevent such situations in the future?

English version by
 *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

HUMINT IMPORTANCE IN THE MILITARY EFFORT TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Case Study: Afghanistan

Ionel RADOVICI

Military operations are always based on well developed plans, which should ensure, at least from the point of view of the person who uses them, if not victory, at least an advantage that can be exploited, thus achieving the desired result. Planners' experience is always decisive but, for the plan to be as complete as possible, it should span much information. The quality of information is also one of the most important issues, which should be treated very seriously. In this context, HUMINT, in spite of current technological advancements, is still necessary to provide information about the enemy intentions, political activity and strategic concepts.

Keywords: *HUMINT; military actions; terrorism; strategy; Afghanistan*

Military operations are always based on well developed plans, which should ensure, at least from the point of view of the person who uses them, victory or at least an advantage that can be exploited, thus achieving the desired result. Planners' experience is crucial; however, so that a plan could be as complete as possible it should span much information. The quality of information is one of the most important aspects, which should be treated very seriously, given the multitude of sources from which information can be derived. Over time, the information from human sources – *HUMINT* – seems to have played a very important and often decisive role in the general context of the fight against terrorism. The modern utility of *HUMINT* formula as an intelligence effective practice is legitimised by extensive historical experience, whose roots can be glimpsed over 2 000 years ago in the comments of a strategic nature made by Sun Tzu.

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Sun Tzu talks explicitly about “the possibility that the war strategy of any state (which should be neutralised) might be known in detail by the leaders of a rival state. It entails, inevitably, efforts to gather relevant information to understand the opponent, as well as the effort to interpret the particular information (so that it could be integrated into a final product that is not only a diagnosis but also an accurate prognosis of the adversary strategic plans)”¹. Under these circumstances, we see how a high-level efficiency of the “politico -military (or strictly military) activity is the result of prior information. In other words, for Sun Tzu, victory also (if not primarily) means the quality secret information obtained by a well organised intelligence system that has sufficient human and material resources”². It is evident that “the intelligence system described by Sun Tzu in the pages of his work is one 100% based on what is today called HUMINT”³. However, from Sun Tzu to the present day has passed a long time, be it in human terms or in terms of history. Over time, the development of modern technology has allowed the development of new branches of intelligence, based on reading the specific signals emitted by various technological elements as well as on tools that use complicated *Crawler*-based search engines to isolate, identify, sort and interpret the open source information that can be found on the internet in huge quantities. However, “HUMINT supporters emphasise that, despite technological advances, traditional espionage, as described by Sun Tzu for example, is still required to provide information about the intentions, political activity and strategic concepts of an enemy country”⁴. In other words, extra attention should be paid to how the reconstruction of Afghanistan can lead to the stabilisation of the region. It is clear that the reconstruction actions can be intensely discredited by local terrorist attacks, by machinations designed to weaken the Allied positions or by improvised explosive devices to strike both military and civilian convoys in order to discredit the potential stability of a particular area.

In this context, it becomes evident that different members of the terrorist movement will have the explicit tendency not to use the technological tools such as the Internet or the radio to communicate with the rest of their operational cells when creating improvised explosive devices designed to discredit the effort to stabilise certain areas. They will rather tend to communicate directly within interpersonal networks to carry out their plan. Thus, infiltration

¹ Florin Diaconu, *Falimentul mașinărilor: War against Terror și încrederea excesivă în SIGINT și ELINT*, in *Revista de politică internațională*, no. XV/2009, p. 79.

² *Ibidem*.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Abram N. Shulsky, Gary J. Schmitt, *Războiul tăcut. Introducere în universul informațiilor secrete*, Editura Polirom, 2008, p. 70.

into these structures and information collection employing *HUMINT*-specific actions are indispensable in the effort to stabilise counterterrorism theatres of operations.

This contemporary utility of *HUMINT* instruments has resulted in a great academic, practical and strategic interest in the term per se. Today, the field of *HUMINT* is very well defined and designates a specific intelligence category, “*derived from information collected and produced by human sources*”⁵. In this branch of intelligence “*human beings are used as both the source of information and primary collection instrument*”⁶. NATO defines *HUMINT* as “*a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources*”⁷.

HUMINT versatility and ability to penetrate international or national groups that are likely to affect the national interest of sovereign actors have shaped the reality that “*HUMINT is necessary to gather crucial information about non governmental targets such as terrorist organisations, which do not have stable locations or communication networks that can be technically operated*”⁸.

Due to its versatile nature, terrorism has changed the rules *HUMINT* was based on; thus, in addition to the recruitment of informers and the infiltration of informers inside terrorist structures, the new model of terrorism requires a new model of *HUMINT* or better to say, a new model of intelligence agent. The intelligence agent that is involved in counterterrorism following September 11 should “*collect and analyse a wider range of information from varied sources and partner services*”⁹. In this respect, the new type of intelligence agent should be aware of “*globalisation*” as far as information collection is concerned.

In this context, “*intelligence services should remain flexible and allow officers to be creative and innovative*”¹⁰. Innovation and creativity represent volatile elements for policymakers who prefer intelligence reports based on concrete data and certitudes. Thus, the new type of *HUMINT*, before becoming fully operational, should be politically accepted by the decision-making factor that can show justifiable scepticism when reports based on creative action rather than on evidence are presented.

⁵ US Department of Defence, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001. p. 249, see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf and also *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, p. 2-h-3 (107), see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/aap_6v.pdf, retrieved on 17.11.2013.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 250.

⁷ AAP-6 (2007), *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (English and French), NATO HQ, Brussels, 2007.

⁸ Abram N. Shulsky, Gary J. Schmitt, *op. cit.*, p. 73

⁹ Steve Tsang, *Serviciile de informații și drepturile omului în era terorismului global*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2008, p. 230.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

Terrorism modern behaviour

The fact that terrorists rely on globality to succeed in propagating violence blocks or, however, has the potential to destabilise the role that globalisation used to have. *“The recent wave of anti-Western Islamic terrorism represents a significant roadblock on the path to globalisation and liberals are faced with a series of intellectual dilemmas and political upheavals for which they have not been ready”*¹¹. Globalisation should be reargued or adjusted by the US if the political apparatus in Washington wants it to remain a strong card, able to best represent the US image in the world.

The USA did not expect terrorists to strike at the very heart of its power as the entire civilised world did not expect the globality very centre of power to be hit. The classic aspect of the terrorist tactics to directly hit the United States derives from the element of surprise that is fully employed. Sun Tzu said (on the effectiveness of war): *“Attack him where he is unprepared; appear when you are not expected”*¹². Terrorism, despite its new character, complies with some classical rules of approaching the enemy.

Currently, terrorist phenomenon is not explicitly the prerogative of a state or the masked projection of an asymmetrical power of a minor sovereign actor against a major sovereign actor. Now, terrorism is, as we have noted, a world of interconnectivity generated, among other aspects, by the frustration of the US hegemonic presence in the international arena. This eminently political frustration translated, to become more digestible, in religious terms is not necessarily a state policy, but a huge form of international relations of invisible, efficient individuals, interconnected in terms of very tight human relationships, aiming at exercising pressure on globalisation and the very idea of safety in the globalised environment. Moreover, the *“new phase of Islamic terrorism is represented by the transition of terrorist groups from activities conducted in their home countries against the <heretical> regimes to activities conducted in the international arena”*¹³. Shock waves, terror and media pressure propagate better and with higher intensity within a large area that is globally interconnected. In fact, in time, terrorism adapts to the world it belongs to, given that *“the orientation to terrorist actions at international level is more the result of factors that are external to terrorist groups rather than of a conscious decision”*¹⁴. The emergence of media and the Internet, the enhancement

¹¹ Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, Jacqui True, *Teorii ale relațiilor internaționale*, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2007, p. 7.

¹² Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, Editura Samizdat, p. 13.

¹³ Vasile Simileanu, *Radiografia terorismului*, Editura Top Form, București. p. 27.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

of communications have all been elements of globalisation that have led to a situation in which information can circulate more quickly, can be accessed more easily and can be more apocalyptically interpreted through various media channels. Terrorists do nothing but adapt to this world that is interconnected in terms of information to convey their message to an entirely new level.

Intelligence officers should identify accurately the targets that are relevant to the terrorist effort. A new type of warfare requires a new type of approaching the enemy. An interconnected and hardly identifiable enemy should be disbanded and hit hard, with less numerous but highly effective troops, after it has been previously infiltrated and implicitly identified. As we will see, intelligence and military services have adopted, in time, an as adaptive attitude as terrorism itself.

The popularity of the terrorist movement derives from the ability of the leaders of the Muslim militant violent world either to martyr the collateral victims of the counterterrorist activity by wilfully eliminating the front lines that traditionally delimit combatants from non-combatants or to deliberately expand the definition of the terrorist on the whole Muslim world. The first step regarding the imposition of moral standards in counterterrorist activity may be represented by the accurate identification of non-combatants hoping to reduce collateral victims and, more importantly, hoping to prevent terrorists from gaining popularity in the Muslim world as a result of some errors in identifying the targets by the coalition. Because *“the new terrorists [...] do not necessarily belong to a group, do not have a stable location, find the necessary funds themselves and attack sensitive targets, leaving no trace, which inflames government security agencies”*¹⁵, the coalition forces have made considerable and visible efforts to exactly identify high profile targets, including by usingUCAVs (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles).

It is therefore evident that *“without valuable information, counterterrorist operations are impossible. The effective collection of information allows us to adopt effective measures against terrorist acts, to trace terrorist and arrest them, which are desirable goals in the war against terrorism”*¹⁶. In the absence of quality information collected by well trained and infiltrated human sources, the fight against terrorism cannot be but a cat-and-mouse game in which the US and its allies will be clearly at a disadvantage.

As we have noted in defining the notion of *HUMINT*, the new type of terrorism puts emphasis on the way human resources plan and conspire, infiltrate in different cultural, social, economic environments to serve a certain common religious

¹⁵ Cristian Barna, *Terorismul, ultima soluție*, Editura Top Form, București, 2005, p. 91.

¹⁶ Cristian Barna, *Sfârșitul terorismului și noua (dez)ordine mondială*, Editura Top Form, București, 2009, p. 130.

purpose. The human resource value is essential for the violent terrorist apparatus, which is why major state actors in the international arena will be practically forced to engage, in turn, considerable human resources to counter terrorist plans. Terrorists, in other words, do not generally benefit from major technical capabilities.

Currently, the use of *HUMINT* resource cannot focus just on this aspect, because of the existence, in the internal organisation of the terrorist movement, of the *networking* element that provides interconnectivity and greater independence than before. Moreover, the literature considers that “*organisation patterns are important but not decisive*”¹⁷ when trying to find the true nature of the terrorist phenomenon.

Terrorists prefer a flexible organisation, able to provide them with maximum effectiveness, to a classical hierarchy as far as their internal organisation is concerned. Thus, intelligence officers specialised in *HUMINT* should intrinsically know the new mode of operation of terrorists before they can hope to defeat them. Focusing on eliminating those at the top of the pyramid, as it happened not long ago¹⁸, is a marginal challenge compared to eliminating terrorist cells one by one. Currently, *HUMINT* should address the terrorist issue at micro level, not at macro one. Conceptually and practically, *HUMINT* should represent, in this respect, the activity conducted by the allied forces to identify terrorist strategies: “*When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing*”¹⁹. Knowing strategies means identifying the really important points to destabilise the terrorist movement.

On the other hand, it should be noted that even terrorist groups fully understand the importance of *HUMINT*-type activities for the front in Afghanistan, so the fight against terrorism greatly changes the way undercover agents should manage their relationship with human sources. We can also deduce that terrorists become increasingly aware of the importance of intelligence, trying to find ways to use it to their advantage.

The general effort directed towards eliminating the terrorist threat largely depends on the way the main solutions that can be applied effectively in the theatres of operations are perceived by policymakers. “*The war against terrorism requires political support*”²⁰. If it lacks, the attempt to eliminate or at least diminish the terrorist

¹⁷ Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict Ideological and Structural Aspects*, SIPRI Research Report No. 23, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 111.

¹⁸ See http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Osama-Laden-SUA-detine-cadavrul_0_473352668.html, retrieved on 17.11.2013.

¹⁹ Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²⁰ Cristian Barna, *Sfârșitul terorismului și noua (dez)ordine mondială*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

phenomenon is doomed to failure. However, the situation is often complicated by the fact that the political support may be interpreted as a change in the administration policies, which will certainly generate a decrease in the desire for cooperation of important decision-making factors. The role of the political decision is thus crucial for the way in which *HUMINT* may be fully employed or not to address the terrorist issue.

The only way the democratic Western world can successfully meet this new challenge is to demonstrate that the *“modern and democratic way of life does not place the Western world in conflict with the Muslim world”*²¹.

To combat the new type of terrorist that is interconnected through interpersonal relationships, most often direct ones, it is necessary to actively employ *HUMINT* resource. It is because *“valuable information will be essential to prevent further terrorist attacks and to annihilate, in the long run, terrorist organisations – not only al-Qaeda but also its related groups that copy its way of action”*²².

As Davis notes, *“first of all, an analyst should be an expert as far as the policymaker world is concerned. [...] Secondly, the analyst should perfect the art of understanding and manage huge amounts of uncertainty. [...] Thirdly, he should become an adept of putting himself in other shoes. [...] Fourthly, analysts should take action and make changes before they become mandatory rather than after the problems occur. [...] Fifthly, analysts should get specialised in the techniques to assess inconclusive evidence. [...]”*²³. Of course, the suggestion list continues. The biggest problem is that there is no consensus in the literature relating to the way in which the relationships between the intelligence analyst, who capitalises on the information collected using *HUMINT*, and the policymaker could be harmonised.

Strategic interpretation related to the reasons for the US military actions effectiveness and ineffectiveness

In what follows we will analyse a number of elements that result in lesser or greater effectiveness as far as the operations in Afghanistan are concerned. We will associate the effectiveness of the military efforts in Afghanistan with the theoretical elements used by Sun Tzu in relation to winning victory

²¹ Steve Tsang, *Serviciile de informații și drepturile omului în era terorismului global*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2008, p. 16.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Jack Davis, *Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Benefits and Dangers of Tensions in the Relationship, Intelligence and National Security 21*, no. 6, December, 2006.

in an armed conflict. This combination will provide the necessary conceptual framework for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the US military effort in Afghanistan, giving us an overview of the reasons why conventional military operations are not sufficient to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan.

Sun Tzu notes that “*Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks, numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us*”²⁴. Afghanistan is a country that has been, at least in recent decades, at war with enemies much larger than it. The USSR and, of course, the United States can be mentioned here. Afghanistan has had low strength and that is why it has had to constantly keep itself in a state of readiness. Terrorists, despite their non-institutionalised fighting form, are thus generally well organised hierarchically and have better experience in fighting in their own country, their own land, their own climatic conditions than the US soldiers, many of them young, without notable military experience, and not accustomed to the climate, the terrain and the war conditions in a country like Afghanistan. The Afghans, despite their limited number, the scarcity of available weapons, and the enormous threats that have hung over this space lately, are well trained, accustomed to conflict situations and have a major advantage, that of the terrain.

War effectiveness and the calculations that each commander should make to hope for victory are elements that are quantified by Sun Tzu using five key factors²⁵. The first is the *troops’ morale*. Morale has always been an element of great interest for the armed forces. Since Napoleonic wars and the trench warfare on the Western Front in the First World War or the Vietnam War morale has represented a key element greatly influencing war. It is a difficult factor to quantify, as Hans J. Morgenthau²⁶ also noticed, but we can make the following observations:

Given the instability of the front in Afghanistan, the great majority of US soldiers probably have the feeling that they fight in an ideological war that, in fact, brings nothing good to them. The only reason to boost their morale may be the pay at the end of the military service or the cost of their education, covered by the US Government, but even this perspective is overshadowed by the thought of a sudden death, caused by an improvised bomb or by a shoot-out with terrorist troops. The troops are also under the constant pressure of the media

²⁴ Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 8-16.

²⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni: Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, translated by Oana Andreea Bosoi, Alina Andreea Dragolea, Mihai Vladimir Zodian, foreword by Andrei Miroiu, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, pp. 174-179.

and even of the analytical and academic apparatus, which constantly highlight the losses of the allied armed forces as well as the lack of a new type of efficiency in the theatre of operations. Moreover, we know for sure that prolonged wars result in eroding the troops' enthusiasm and in systematically decreasing the national morale. On the other hand, terrorist troops have any motive to fight as effectively as possible. Firstly, they mobilise against an enemy that is superior in terms of equipment and they fight for a belief formed during thousands of years of zealous religious practice, that of defending not only a state territory invaded, in their view, by foreign armed forces but also the Muslim world. The idea of defending the national territory may be a very good reason for the coalition of Muslim terrorist efforts. For instance, "*after 2003, anti-government and anti-occupation insurgents have fought for their country territorial integrity*"²⁷. Terrorists' morale is easy to boost if we consider the publicity enjoyed by each accomplishment of the terrorist apparatus, which is usually characterised by attacks that can occur everywhere in the world. "*The war against terrorism, having no clearly defined enemy but strong anti-Islamic connotations, has resulted in the Islamic public hostility to the US*"²⁸. Any Muslim success, no matter how far the Afghan theatre of operations is, is a success of the Muslim world and we can expect it to generate an increase in the morale of insurgents as well as to potentiate the anti-American spirit. However, all these observations have been radically changed by the US action to identify, capture and kill Osama Bin Laden²⁹. This event opened the path to the mechanical erosion of the morale of the network he led. Bin Laden succeeded, over time, in building a terrorist legitimacy enhanced by his placement in the forefront of some of the most important attacks that shook the international community, the attacks on 11 September 2001 being the culmination of his illegitimate efforts. For the terrorist cause, Osama was more than a martyr who lost his life for the cause. He was a living prophet who preached violence, who coordinated the attacks, who, by his infamous career, succeeded in demonstrating perseverance and stoicism in constantly attacking the Western world. His death represented a victory of the democratic world against terrorism, the death of the living essence of contemporary modern terrorism, being, in fact, the evidence of the fact that, in spite of its versatility and the environment it uses to hide, modern terrorism can be defeated. Osama's discovery and capture represented

²⁷ Ekaterina Stepanova, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

²⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *A doua șansă: trei președinți și criza superputerii americane*, translated by Andreea Năstase, Editura Antet, București, 2009, p. 120.

²⁹ Osama Bin Laden was killed by the US Special Forces, see <http://www.gandul.info/international/osama-bin-laden-a-fost-ucis-de-catre-trupele-speciale-americane-a-anuntat-presedintele-sua-barack-obama-video-casa-in-care-a-fost-ucis-liderul-al-qaida-cuprinsa-de-flacari-8214372>

one of the most effective manoeuvres in the effort to combat terrorism as the action eradicated the living proof of its ability to act and left al-Qaeda in the chaos of trying to find a successor. Thus, all these elements have had a massive impact on the general war against terror through the way in which it indisputably tipped the balance in favour of the allies.

The second element mentioned by Sun Tzu refers to “*weather conditions*”. Afghanistan is, from this perspective, an extremely difficult front. In summer temperatures exceed 40 degrees Celsius and in winter they fall well below 0 degrees Celsius, but the worst is that temperatures can vary enormously from one region to another. Terrorists are generally accustomed to these conditions, while coalition members fighting against them must acclimatise to the conditions in one way or another. The effort to resist weather conditions that are radically different from those at home is an ordeal anti-terrorist troops have to face.

The third factor mentioned by Sun Tzu is the *terrain*. Again, we can presume that terrorists have a superior ability to use the terrain in their favour. In this respect, fighting in urban areas is essential to streamline the effort to combat allied troops. Sun Tzu observes, for example, that “*the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative*”³⁰. Terrorists deliberately wage urban warfare, because thus they can organise ambushes and better cope with a numerically superior enemy as narrow spaces usually cancel out the advantages given by employing numerous troops. However, over time, allied troops have been able to build a complex operation recipe, consisting of small land units that rely on the air support provided by either the aviation or the unmanned aircraft (commonly known in the literature as *UAV*). This recipe provides the allied troops with the possibility to protect ground troops, to minimise collateral damage, and to very effectively coordinate operations conducted by relatively small units. In this respect, it becomes absolutely clear that the US troops have succeeded in adapting to the realities of the anti-terrorist front to conduct very well organised operations to counter terrorists at home.

The fourth element discussed by Sun Tzu is the *commander*. We cannot know with certainty which the specific quality of the allied commanders deployed in Afghanistan is. What we can presume is that they have an important theoretical experience and are much better prepared than al-Qaeda commanders who usually transmit ideological mobilisation messages rather than direct plans of attack. It is evident that the death of Bin Laden has clearly tipped the balance in favour of the effort against terror as the operation in Pakistan beheaded the ideological centre of al-Qaeda movement.

³⁰ Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

The fifth element is represented by *doctrine*. Sun Tzu includes here “*organisation, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principal items used by the army*”³¹. Here, things are divided. The USA seems to enjoy better organisation and chain of command than the terrorist one. As far as authority is concerned, things are divided too, as both parties respect a certain form of authority, the institutional one, in the case of joint military effort, and the religious one, legitimised by the participation of some individuals in the organisation of different attacks, in the case of terrorists. The assignment of appropriate ranks to officers is also a divided sub-item. Coalition military men receive military honours and awards while terrorists get a place near Allah, if they die defending their religion, or they get the others recognition, if they orchestrate severe strikes against the military coalition. Although we have initially stated that the problem of authority is divided, it is worth mentioning again that the decapitation of the terrorist network have resulted in an authority void. The strategic advantage of modern and postmodern armed forces is that of institutionalism. The death of any officer in the command body, although a tragedy, does not generate a general extremely strong shock in the military system as long as the military bureaucratic structure is always prepared to replace the dead officer with another officer. It is what we call hierarchical chain. The biggest problem in managing the death of Bin Laden is the blockage in the terrorist hierarchical chain. Blockage, as the death of a charismatic leader, in the Weberian sense of the term, leaves a void of power that questions the structure ability to resist. This aspect decisively tips the balance in favour of the USA and its allies. The regulation of supply routes and the provision of principal items used by the army are sub-items lying with the USA and its allies. As far as logistics is concerned, the US is also better placed because of the allied superior material capabilities. Supply routes have been supported by other sovereign actors in the international arena, such as Russia that, despite a sense of disapproval of the American hegemony, has helped the effort of combating terrorism for various reasons. Either because terrorism was simply too blamed by the rest of international community not to be attacked and, in this respect, a refusal to help the allied troops would have resulted in the isolation of the sovereign states that did not provide aid, or because those states had their own internal ethnic problems, which were solved in the shadow of the fight against terror. Whatever the situation, the allied logistic effort was permanently enhanced in terms of the supply routes. We thus clearly consider the latter item as being in favour of the US and its allies.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

Conclusions

Analysing the elements that are essential in ensuring the success of a military operation, we can see that, except the climate, the Allies have succeeded, over time, in tipping the balance in their favour for 4 of the 5 strategic elements. Especially after the death of Bin Laden, the Allies have managed to gain strategic superiority, which currently seems to yield considerable results.

The duration of the war as such has been an element acting against the coalition. *“Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare”*³². There are several reasons why it happens. We have already explored the moral disability such a war can produce. However, *“if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain”*³³. The US is, without doubt, the most powerful economy today. Nevertheless, if we consider the effectiveness of the US economic efforts, we can see that the Afghan front is an economic burden. Moreover, as far as military efforts effectiveness is concerned, we note that *“in war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns”*³⁴. The solution to all these problems was the death of Bin Laden and the promise to withdraw from Afghanistan. Although a prolonged conflict, the war against terrorism seems to come to an end. It is evident that any conflict, be it conventional or unconventional, ends in relative stability. For instance, classical wars ensured the possibility of reconstruction by providing compensation. The Marshall Plan helped to rebuild Western Europe after the Second World War. Lately, it has become clear that special attention has been paid internationally to the way a conflict ends as far as the general stability of the involved society is concerned. The collective peace goal generates the need to stabilise an area, hoping to minimise the risk of reactivating the factors that initially led to the conflict.

English version by
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³² *Ibidem*, p. 17.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 21.



SEND THE RESERVE! NEW WAYS TO SUPPORT NATO THROUGH RESERVE FORCES

Dr Guillaume LASCONJARIAS

Starting from the Framework Policy on Reserves of the NATO Military Committee, revised in 2012, the author writes about the Reserve Forces and the new ways through which they can support NATO.

First, he points out that reservists are a unique alternative manpower, mentioning that, in specific domains, their expertise is invaluable and unique.

Then, he addresses the issues of employment protection and compensation programmes, also highlighting the need for promoting the reserve as an added value for industries, institutions and employers, across all sectors.

He also refers to businesses that have already understood the benefits of the bridge that reservists provide between the civilian and the military worlds.

To conclude, he emphasises the proven experience, skills and dedication of the reserves, considered an integral and important part of a nation's defence strategy.

Keywords: *Reserve Forces; employment protection; USERRA; financial compensation; statement of support; added value*

In a January 2012 publication, the NATO Military Committee revised its Framework Policy on Reserves: *“As many nations increasingly make use of professional soldiers in their Regular Forces, whilst simultaneously reducing them in size, the need for Reservists will be even greater”*¹. This reflects a position shared across NATO, where most member states recognise the need for volunteer, part-time Defence Forces able to deliver

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¹ MC 0441/2, *NATO Framework Policy on Reserves*, 19 January 2012. This paper is built upon a joint Symposium held in Brno, Czech Republic, 1-2 August 2013, by the National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC), the International Confederation of Reserve Officers (recognised by its French acronym CIOR), and the International Conference on Employer Support for the Reserves (ICESR). CIOR is the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, bringing together associations of reserve officers and reservists from over 35 member and partner nations of NATO. It is recognised by the NATO Military Committee through MC 248/1. See www.cior.net for more information.

significant capability when needed. In a challenging security environment, whilst the Regular Forces are largely reduced and professionalised, Reserve Forces act as a pool to support, reinforce, enhance and improve their regular counterparts². They provide a surge of personnel that can be drawn upon.

In recent years, and especially in the demanding operations of the last decade, few operations could have been sustained without embedding and including reservists, either in individual positions or in units. For several countries, services have been thinking harder about the Reserve Forces as a means of achieving their output goals. In the US, the Army Reserve provides “*a cost-effective way to mitigate risk to national security. For only 6% of the Army budget, the Army Reserve provides almost 20% of the Total force*”³. In the United Kingdom, since 1996, about 10% of every deployed force has been made up of reservists and 25 000 have been mobilised since 2003 – mostly for Iraq and Afghanistan⁴. Australia, a global NATO partner, deploys Reserve Forces to maintain its presence in the Solomon Islands at a cost which has been estimated to be four times cheaper than sending regulars⁵. In short, reserve forces not only play a major role in nations’ military strategies; they are complementary to the Regular Forces. The Reserves offer key niche capabilities in a cost-effective way as well as surge capacity, which is important in times of declining military and defence budgets.

At first glance, Reserve Forces appear to be the panacea. They could be an effective way to mitigate and compensate the shrinking military, providing

NRFC is the National Reserve Forces Committee, an inter-Allied joint committee composed of the senior official responsible for Reserve Forces from each member nation, which reports to NATO’s Military Committee in accordance with MC 392. See <http://www.act.nato.int/nrfc> for more information. ICESR is the International Conference on Employer Support for the Reserves, held every 2 years. Previous conference venues have included Great Britain (2007), Australia (2009) and Canada (2011).

² MC 0441/2: “*Reserve Forces consist of various categories of personnel coming from civilian life and not normally employed on full-time military service. Personnel may be Voluntary, Ex-Regular or Conscript. They may be assigned to organised units or serve as individuals supporting Regular units*”.

³ “*America’s Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation*”, 2013 posture statement, [http://www.usar.army.mil/resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-6-13%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-6-13%20(2).pdf), accessed 3 September, 2013.

⁴ As quoted by Major General Crackett, TD. At a peak in 2004, reservists made up 20% of British forces in Iraq and 12% in Afghanistan.

⁵ According to financial reporting in 2004/2005. For additional information, see Andrew Davies, *Presentation delivered to the Defence Reserves Association 2008 Annual Conference*, 26 August 2008 available on <http://www.aspi.org.au/admin/eventFiles/Andrew%20reserve%20speech.pdf>, accessed 10 August 2013. In the UK, a Regular/Reserve Cost Comparison Model has been developed, based on a light infantry battalion. The audit indicated that the steady-state costs of a Territorial Army (TA) infantry battalion are 20% of those of a Regular battalion of similar size. The costs of a TA infantry battalion mobilised for 12 months, including a six-month operational tour, are 87% of a Regular battalion over the same period. (The Independent Commission to review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, *Future Reserve 2020*, London, Ministry of Defence, July 2011, p. 40, <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/future-reserves-2020-consultation>, accessed 28 August 2013).

not only surge capacity but also specific help in domains where Regular Forces lack skills. Reservists are more than just a “*reservoir of part-time bodies that can be used to fill gaps in the regulars*”⁶. But there are some underlying issues: the question of their training and their ability to undergo a broad range of missions, the additional costs and, in short, the balancing of demands between their civilian employment and reserve service. According to a famous Winston Churchill quote, reservists are “*twice a citizen*”, but when it comes to employing them, competing demands are placed on the individuals, by the military on the one side and their civilian employer on the other side.

For the Ministries of Defence who are more and more dependent on this manpower, it means finding innovative ways to achieve full manning and capability requirements. In short, the key issue is how to get reservists when you need them – that means ensure their availability.

This depends on many important factors, such as political willingness, community encouragement, family and employer support. This paper addresses the issue of availability from the Defence and employer sides. What solutions have, so far, been imagined and proposed? Some examples – mainly taken from Anglo-Saxon NATO member states – might provide useful insights in order to help nations enhance their reserve component and mitigate critical shortfalls.

Reservists: A Unique Alternative Manpower

“*Military reservists today are more than just strategic reinforcements to enhance readiness in time of conflict*”⁷. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the radical transformation of the geopolitical environment has triggered new threats that demand a new mindset, new solutions and new approaches. This evolving security environment can be summed up in the following quote: “*while today our borders know no threats, current threats know no borders*”. Individual nations, but NATO too, have felt the need to adapt their strategy, command structures, expectations and operations, in order to address this evolving environment. Budgetary constraints have also seen defence budgets being severely reduced, with direct impact on future capabilities⁸.

In several countries, this explains why Reserve Forces have become more important to national security, especially where the downsizing of Regular

⁶ Andrew Davies, *Presentation Delivered to the Defence Reserves Association 2008 Annual Conference*, p. 2.

⁷ Colin Busby, “*Supporting Employees Who Deploy: The Case for Financial Assistance to Employers of Military Reservists*”, *Backgrounder no. 123*, C.D. Howe Institute, January 2010, p. 1.

⁸ NATO, *Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Towards NATO Forces 2020?*, 20 May 2012.

Forces requires complementary, additional and ready, part-time soldiers able to support and safeguard their crucial national capabilities⁹. While they cannot substitute all military capability, reserves are able to achieve a range of core tasks in a cost-effective way and, in specific domains, their expertise is invaluable and unique. In the United States, about 206 000 “warrior citizens” currently serve in the Army (19% of the force). They provide nearly 90% of civil affairs personnel, more than half of the medical and quartermasters, more than a third of the chemical and transportation, and a quarter of intelligence and Military Police. In Canada, almost half of the total force is composed of reservists¹⁰. In Australia, reservists make up 43% of the total force. In France, there are almost 60 000 reservists who average about 23 days of service each year¹¹. This French reinforcement amounts to more than 1 000 full-time equivalent regulars, or the equivalent of one additional infantry battalion. Most of these reservists are committed to national operations such as Vigipirate, the codename for the surveillance of public spaces against potential terrorist threats. In Germany, during the last floods, an emergency unit manned by reservists intervened in Lower Saxony with more than 300 German reservists committed during the critical days¹².

Looking at the various types of missions and operations to which NATO member countries may be committed, the full use of skills, experience and capabilities of individual reservists is indeed possible. According to a general officer, a reservist himself, to meet the challenges that lie ahead, reservists – and, in essence, every soldier – must be able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease: he must be a warrior, a strategist, a diplomat, a businessman and a humanitarian operator. He must know how to work with other government entities and to operate in other cultures. He must be multi-skilled, innovative, agile, and versatile¹³.

⁹ Despite the rhetoric, some surveys have found that reductions in the regular forces are not always offset by an increase in the Reserve (see Paul Earnshaw and John Price, *Employer Support for Reserves: Some International Comparisons of Reserve Capabilities*, Australian Defence Force, 2010, pp. 48-49).

¹⁰ The Canadian Reserve force is composed of four subcomponents, but not all deploy on operations. The Primary Reserve (27 000) and Canadian Rangers (5 000) may be employed on operations while the Cadet Instructors (8 000) are not. The Supplementary Reserve (15 000) is a holding list of qualified members and they may be mobilised if required. The Regular Force is 68 000 so if one compares those forces who may be employed on operations, the ratio is almost 50% of the total force.

¹¹ Conseil Supérieur de la Réserve Militaire, *Rapport d'évaluation de la réserve militaire 2011*, juin 2012, pp. 7-8.

¹² Interview of Bundestag deputy Roderich Kiesewetter, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/cdu-politiker-fordert-steuererleichterung-wer-reservisten-freistellt-zahlt-weniger/8342848.html>, accessed 5 September 2013 and feedback about Reservists' commitment in the flood areas, <http://augengeradeaus.net/2013/06/bis-jetzt-332-reservisten-im-hochwasser-einsatz>, accessed 6 September 2013.

¹³ Discussion with Major General Kasulke, 1 August 2013.

While some nations contemplate reducing the size of their Regular Forces, there is an urgent need to redesign the Defence force so as to better integrate regulars, reservists, Government Defence civilians and contractors¹⁴. As identified in other studies, three challenges have to be addressed¹⁵:

- *What is expected of the military in the future and what does that mean for Reserve Forces?*

- *How do we better recruit, train, and retain reservists?*

- *How do we engage with employers and industry, as their support is vital to achieving full manning and capability requirements?*

The first two questions are generally linked with the institutional side, as part of a holistic strategic approach to national security. This mainly concerns Ministries of Defence within their respective portfolios.

The last question illustrates the importance of ensuring reservists are available. If one is to consider that the Reserve Forces must be able to cope with increased operational demands, their availability is an essential component to operational success and, by implication, national security¹⁶. From a Defence perspective, this is potentially a critical vulnerability: will reservists be available and competent, as and when required? Multiple pressures burdening the reservist (e.g. family and financial situation, civil employment and career, defence service) call for additional measures that may encourage and maximise the availability of reservists. In doing so, government officials have to think about all the prerequisites for promoting and furthering such a process. A “*Comprehensive Approach*” has, therefore, to be encouraged, including discussions with representatives of the private sector and those from civil society.

Employment Protection

Relations between a Defence force and its reservists cannot ignore the significant role played by the civil employer for each reservist, whether it be the private or the public sector. In most countries, while legislation addresses issues dealing with military service, it is the responsibility of the reservist employee to give sufficient notice to his employer and advise him that he will be undertaking military service.

¹⁴This “*Whole Force*” is a UK Concept which intends optimising all these components. The UK example thus calls for a proportional increase in the Reserve elements: for additional information, see United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserve 2020, *art. cit.*

¹⁵Some of these issues are addressed by Mark Phillips, “*The Future of UK’s Reserve Forces*”, *RUSI occasional paper*, April 2012, p. V.

¹⁶Colin Busby, *Supporting Employees who Deploy*, *art. cit.*

The employer's responsibility is to assess the impact on his business before giving his answer. Except in rare cases of involuntary service due to a state of emergency that requires the calling up of reservists into active duty (in many nations this would also require a specific Act), reservists are usually authorised to leave their jobs for a period during which their employer has to maintain their rights. In France, for instance, if the military service does not exceed five days, the employer cannot oppose it. If the period extends to over five days, the employer may refuse under certain conditions¹⁷. In several countries, a "hardship clause" may also apply that denies a request for military service, if the employer can justify the difficulties caused by the absence of his employee. Some nations ask for employer support only in cases of employment on operations while others have a broader programme that includes time off for military training, exercises and professional development as well as operations.

In order to better protect, as well as maintain the rights of the employee who undergoes reserve military service, governments have introduced various kinds of legislation. In France, this was done in 1999, at the time the armed forces were shifting from conscription to fully professional forces. In Australia, the Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act was passed in 2001. The Czech Republic is currently undergoing a similar process. In federal states, this issue can be complex. In Canada, increasing use of reservists on operations during the last decade has led to the development of a proliferation of federal and provincial job protection legislation. Each of these measures is unique and therefore a challenge to interpret and apply across the Reserve Force.

Whatever the country, the legislation falls into three generic measures¹⁸:

- *It is an offence to discriminate, disadvantage, hinder or dismiss an employee because of his reservist affiliation;*

- *Employers cannot – except in particular cases – prevent or hinder employees from volunteering or serving in the reserve; in some cases, a clause requires that employers have to release their employees for a certain duration;*

- *After he/she returns, the reservist has to be reinstated without detriment to him/her.*

¹⁷ Article 10 de la loi no. 99-894 (22 octobre 1999) «portant organisation de la réserve militaire et du service de défense», <http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000579308>, accessed 6 September 2013. The text has been slightly reviewed by Law no. 2006-449, 19 April 2006.

¹⁸ Colin Busby, *Supporting Employees who Deploy*, art. cit., p. 3.

Some countries are more willing to refer to legislative constraints and binding legislation than others. One very interesting case study is the United States' Uniformed Services Employment & Re-employment Rights Act (USERRA). This act reinforces a previous decision that made clear that *"reemployment statute should be liberally construed for he who has laid aside his private concerns to serve his country in its hour of great need"*¹⁹. Enacted for those who participated in World War II, USERRA was applied in 1994 to cope with Veterans' claims after the Gulf War of 1991. It extends to all employers, federal government, state and local governments, small and large US private employers (in the United States and overseas), including multinational companies that hire reservists²⁰. This legislation is designed to support Reserve Forces, allowing both for their training and for deployment duties. It seeks to prevent difficulties, as the number of reservists undertaking service has increased dramatically over the past decade. Due, primarily, to the Global War on Terror, 875 000 National Guard and reserve members have been called to active duty in the last 13 years – 330 000 of them more than once. Of those, 15 000 have been wounded and 1 200 have died²¹.

USERRA forbids discrimination in reservists' hiring, retention, promotion and benefits. It guarantees that a reservist will return to his/her previous employment, with the added compensation or promotion that peers may have received: this *"escalator principle"* states that *"the returning veteran does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war"*²². Under the Act, there are also obligations on the reserve member. First, the reservist must provide his/her civilian employer with advance notice of service, and may not serve for more than five years on active duty²³. After completing that service, the reservist must return to work in a timely manner and must be released by the Department of Defence without punitive or other-than-honourable discharge.

Despite this protective and tough legislation and the energy put into solving some obvious cases by both the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice, critical issues still appear. According to the Reserve Officers Association (ROA),

¹⁹ US Supreme Court, *Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.*, 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).

²⁰ 38 U.S.C. 4301(b): *"It is the sense of Congress that the Federal Government should be a model employer in carrying out the provisions of this chapter"*. However, there are some exceptions, as religious institutions, Indian tribes, foreign embassies and International organisations are not included.

²¹ Major General (Ret.) Andrew B. Davis, Presentation on USERRA, Brno, 1 August 2013.

²² US Supreme Court, *Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.* An interesting fact is that this escalator can descend as well as ascend, except for Federal employees.

²³ This has some drawbacks for the Reserve Force, as it calls for increased attention to retaining reservists if possible but also to enlisting new candidates.

the unemployment rate for reservists is three times higher than the average (approx. 21% vs. 7,3%)²⁴. While there was great patriotic enthusiasm throughout the country following 9/11, the Global War on Terror has turned into a long war – the longest ever waged by the United States. More importantly, reservists have been mobilised not only for extended periods of service, but multiple times. In addition, the economic situation within the US has been affected by the global financial crisis, leading to high unemployment and job loss. The initial support for the Global War has waned substantially and reservists have suffered “*stealth discrimination*” and “*leave fatigue*” after 13 years of continuous commitment. The ROA, whose mission includes assisting discriminated reservists, reports receiving more than 800 calls per month, pertaining mainly to this issue.

The US situation is of particular interest, as its legislation is currently under scrutiny. Recently, the US Department of Defense tasked the RAND Corporation to consider whether changes are needed to USERRA, to the activation and deployment procedures and to the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve²⁵. One of the key findings is that employer knowledge of obligations is incomplete, while the low response rates to the review’s supporting employer survey and employer unwillingness to participate in interviews suggest that USERRA is not a high-priority issue for employers except when dealing with duty-related absences²⁶. Canada provides another example. The country has traditionally had a history of voluntary employer support, and federal legislation was initially developed to cover potential mobilisation or extended periods of absence when greater numbers of reservists were deployed on operations in the past decade. The problem is that the range of legalisation expanded to also include ten provinces and three territories, and this has caused similar challenges to those noted in the US: “*the legislation came into force (...)*”

²⁴ According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the links between being a reservist and being unemployed is not crystal clear. According to the Employment status of Gulf War era veterans by Reserve or National Guard status: “*Among Gulf War-era II veterans, those who were current or past members of the Reserve or National Guard had an unemployment rate of 7,2 percent in August 2012, lower than the rate for those who had never been members (13,7 percent). Gulf War-era II veterans who were current or past members of the Reserve or National Guard had a higher labor force participation rate than those who had never been members (85,8 and 78,7 percent, respectively). For veterans of Gulf War-era I, labour force participation rates and unemployment rates were similar for members and non-members*”, available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.t08.htm>, data as of 12 August 2012, accessed 8 September 2013.

²⁵ Susan M. Gates, Geoffrey McGovern, Ivan Waggoner, John D. Winkler, Ashley Pierson, Lauren Andrews, Peter Buryk, *Supporting Employers in the Reserve Operational Forces Era: Are Changes Needed to Reservists’ Employment Rights Legislation, Policies, or Programs?* RAND, August 2013, available on http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR152.html#abstract, accessed 9 September 2013.

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 79-32. In the UK, the survey that helped identify the Green Paper for Reserve Issues discovered that reserves were little-known and thought that antidiscrimination legislation was not very effective.

*without forethought, without supporting regulations (...) and without teeth (...): it is nothing more than a 'cuddle blanket' or, more formally, it is 'attitudinal rather than prescriptive'*²⁷.

Making the Benefits Higher and the Costs Less: Compensation Programmes

If the countries counting on their Reserve Forces agree that employment protection is paramount, they also realise that the employer seems to unfairly support the burden of the reservist's military service. In some institutional publicity material, there is a reminder that neither the government, nor the Ministry of Defence "*wants to impose unreasonable burdens on employers*"²⁸. Of course, depending on the company (private or public sector, small or large) the consequences will vary. It is not just the loss of an employee during his/her annual absence but rather the role played in the business by the reservist. The bigger the company, the easier it is to absorb the potential slowdown in production or any additional expenses. Thus, smaller companies tend to suffer more, while self-employed reservists who own their business sometimes have to shut it down. Legislation and goodwill do not address the whole employer support challenge, so many nations are now having discussions about employer compensation and employer engagement.

Both instruments are complementary. Employer engagement begins with a "*statement of support*", a valuable acknowledgement that employers support and will contribute to facilitating reserve military service. Financial incentives recognise that there is a cost incurred by the employer when military leave is granted to one or more employees. This kind of mechanism aims at compensating employers for the disruption caused by the absence of reservists. Compensation may be as simple as a standard stipend or as complex as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred in training or hiring a replacement. Employer compensation recognises and rewards employers for their support, not only to the reserve member but to the nation's armed forces, and augments other tools of employer support. Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Poland have current financial incentive programmes, Canada is in the process of developing one and the Czech Republic is considering introducing financial incentives. In Germany, Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of the Bundestag and the President of the German

²⁷ Valerie Keyes, "*Sustainment of Reserve Service Through Employer Support*", in *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, vol. 12, no. 4, Summer 2010, pp. 63-69. This quote can be found on p. 64.

²⁸ This refers directly to the Australian booklet, *Employer Handbook, Everything You Need to Know about Employing Defence Reservists*, 5th edition, January 2013, p. 11, available on the institutional website, <http://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au>.

Reservists' Association, recently proposed that companies who would agree that some of their employees leave for military duty on a regular basis could get tax deductions²⁹. In Australia, the emphasis has been put on an “*Employer Support Payment Scheme*”. Developing and implementing these schemes is not simple and there are many details to consider, including the source of funding, the administration of the programme, the control over and allocation of funding, the return on investment and the cost/benefit for the employer, the institution, the Defence Forces and the reservist. In Canada, the potential introduction of financial incentives following an extended period of high operational tempo for reservists with completely voluntary employer support raised some interesting questions and considerations about cost, necessity, uptake and practicality. To quote one academic: “*These schemes might in fact be pricing reservists out of the deployment market. If the cost of employing reservists becomes too high, there’s the very real possibility that reserve deployments will be reduced*”³⁰.

The issue of cost is definitely worth considering. The Czech Republic, which puts a strong emphasis on its reserve component, admits that “*financial compensation is indispensable especially in the private sector which is naturally profit-oriented. There has been a debate about some form of a tax relief for the private companies’ support but – similarly as for instance in the UK – this was rejected on the basis of the administrative complexity and cost of such a measure. It is much easier and transparent to pay direct compensation for the working hours spent on reserve activities*”³¹. NATO’s global partner Australia has had such a solution for over a decade. Basically, the Department of Defence provides financial support to employers who release their employees for reservist duty, in order to offset any resulting loss of business or to employ a temporary replacement. Under certain circumstances, part-time employees and self-employed reservists also qualify for this payment. In the Australian case, each employer of a reservist is provided with a booklet that explains how the scheme works and what information the employer has to provide to claim payments. This employer support payment scheme was designed to minimize the administrative burden to defence: the payment awarded is equivalent to the average weekly fulltime adult ordinary time earnings. For the fiscal year 2013/14, this was Aus \$ 1 393/week³². On average, the Australian Department of Defence spends Aus \$35 million in payment and administration. This is considered

²⁹ Bundestag deputy Roderich Kiesewetter in Handelsblatt, 14 June 2013.

³⁰ Valerie Keyes, *Sustainment of Reserve Service through Employer Support*, art. cit., p. 65.

³¹ Ambassador Jiří Šediv, *NATO and Reserve Forces: A Czech View*, Brno, 1 August 2013.

³² <http://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/for-employers/esps-employer-support-payment-scheme.aspx> accessed 11 September 2013. In some circumstances, ESPS may be paid at a higher rate.

acceptable, as the scheme has increased the capability of the Reserve Forces through increased availability of individual reservists for both operational deployments and training.

In the United Kingdom, the compensation scheme was established in 1997 and is therefore more mature, but also more complex. For instance, businesses can claim some costs, such as recruiting agencies' fees for replacement or advertising costs³³. In addition, the employer can claim any difference between the reservist's wage and the replacement employee's wage, subject to a cap of £110 per day. The recently announced UK White Paper will seek to accommodate employers' suggestions to simplify the claim system. Legislation is being changed, to enable companies employing less than 250 employees to be given £500 each month whilst their employees are mobilised. But this financial compensation is only part of a more comprehensive effort to engage employers and convince them of the benefits of having reservists working for them.

Achieving Employer Support and Recognition

Job protection legislation and financial compensation are valuable tools for employer support. However, a key enabler and one of the first considerations in establishing an employer support programme should be to promote the reserve as an added value for industries, institutions and employers, across all sectors. Of course, good communication is critical to this. As Ambassador Jiří Šediv pointed out, *“one should convince the employers that having reservists (who by definition are expected to possess an above-average moral profile and ethics of discipline as well) in their staffs is a good thing for the company and they should be proud of it”*³⁴. On the other side, some incentives, even non-monetary ones, should be considered. Communication programmes should aim at engaging and informing employers and may even help to change their perception of the military and the Reserve Forces. Discussions with them should also allow for the military to gain a better understanding of issues affecting employers and illustrate ways they can enhance their corporate/social responsibility in supporting military service. In short, the core objective of employer engagement is to achieve mutual understanding and mutual support between the employer and the employee.

In several countries, this *“outreach”* approach is at the core of the employer support programme. After initial engagement and commitment of support

³³ Colin Busby, *Supporting Employees who Deploy*, art. cit., pp. 7-8.

³⁴ Ambassador Jiří Šediv, *NATO and Reserve Forces: A Czech View*, Brno, 1 August 2013.

by the employer, the focus should shift from employer support to employer engagement – i.e. staying connected with the employers, to encourage not only their continued support but advocacy within the community on the value (and importance) of Reserve service. This is done through strategic communication and outreach towards all potential sectors, engaging business representatives, government, educators, civil society and, of course, the reservists themselves. Reservists are wonderful spokespersons and their engagement in the employer support process is critical. This will also serve to motivate them, and engage them in delivering key messages and making wider connections in their civilian communities.

Statement of Support

In Denmark, “*InterForce*” was developed back in 1999, as a format for cooperation between civilian companies – private as well as public – and the Danish armed forces on personnel matters. The purpose is to ensure that reserve personnel and volunteers in the Home Guard maintain their affiliation to the Defence forces, retain their civilian jobs while employed by the military, and are given the opportunity and time to participate in military education, training, exercises and operations. “*InterForce*” relies on a “*carrot-better-than-stick*” policy: the idea is not to impose any legal or financial obligations on the company, but to strengthen the “*moral obligation*” to let employees participate in armed forces education and training, or in international and national operations. A supportive company signs a declaration stating that: “*The Company recognises and supports the need of the society to get the Defence Forces’ voluntary personnel and reserve personnel released for military education, national assignments and international missions*”. So far, 1 600 private support companies and 170 public support companies, representing 0,9 million employees (out of a total Danish working force of 2,7 million), have signed this declaration of intent³⁵.

In France, the government established a “*Defence Partner*” label in 2005. The objectives were initially very broad: participating companies could expect to validate military training as part of the employee’s individual training entitlement, and use a specific logo recognizing their efforts, amongst other possible incentives³⁶.

³⁵ Presentation made by Major General (Ret.) Norgaard, Head of the InterForce Secretariat, Brno, 1 August 2013.

³⁶ The official incentives are listed on the official website of the French MoD <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/reserves/reserve-et-entreprises/partenariat-et-conventions/partenariat-et-conventions>, accessed 4 September 2013.

In the early stages, the underlying idea was also to generate new business opportunities for small and medium-sized companies that would support this initiative³⁷. So far, just over 320 companies have signed this agreement – mainly defence and procurement companies, major consulting firms or public-funded businesses. In Canada, the “*Statement of Support for the Reserve Force*” is a key tool to register employer support and engagement. It is distributed at every opportunity with employer support publicity material, using a variety of promotional techniques such as employer visits, speaking engagements, trade shows and mail-outs. Employers who sign a “*Statement of Support*” or who send a copy of their military leave policy receive a letter of appreciation from the national Chair of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council (a national network of civilian volunteers from across business and education who work with the Canadian Forces), as well as a certificate that can be displayed in their workplace³⁸. In the United Kingdom, employers who pledge their support receive a certificate issued by the official Support for Britain’s Reservists and Employers (SaBRE) organisation and also appear on the list of publicly supportive employers, a cost-effective way to attract highly qualified employees but also to advertise free.

Outreach, Awards and Recognition

In order to promote the reserve, some countries have also created programmes that enable employers to interact directly with reservists in the military environment to gain an appreciation of what their employees do on military service. To demonstrate the role of reservists, outreach programmes like “*Boss Lift*” have been established to allow employers and supervisors to visit facilities like military venues, training grounds, vessels and air bases. In this way, they can see first-hand the type and quality of training their employees receive. It is also a unique opportunity for them to talk with Defence representatives and share their insights, making useful recommendations. In the United States, one Boss Lift is organised per year in each state, including airlift on a military aircraft to a military training site. Participation is limited, to make the event seem special. Similarly, the Canadian Forces Liaison Council (CFLC) has developed the “*ExecuTrek*” scheme: employers can not only visit reserve training, exercises and operations, but also take part in specific activities to reinforce the lesson. In Australia, a recent “*Boss Lift*” took 27 business leaders and Human Resources directors to the Solomon Islands, to gain insight into the roles

³⁷ *Défense et PME, la clé du succès*, online editorial by Jean-Marie Bockel, June 2009, p. 5 (available <http://www.cgpme-paris-idf.fr/index.php?module=sspages&id=55>, accessed 4 September 2013).

³⁸ Rear-Admiral Jennifer Bennett, *Exposing Employers to Reserve Service. Canadian Model of Employer Engagement*, Brno, 1 August 2013.

and responsibilities of individual reservists while on operations. The Boss Lift also included participation in a leadership activity that considered the Guadalcanal campaign of 1942³⁹. In Denmark, VIP treatment is given to selected employers, who can accompany the Danish Chief of Defence or other high-ranking officers during visits to Danish units deployed overseas, and attend briefings by the most prominent representatives of the MoD. In September 2013, the participation in “*InterForce*” activities will peak with a concert and buffet in a Royal Palace in the presence of the Queen of Denmark⁴⁰. These social events and opportunities to engage with the military are highly praised by employers.

In addition to employer engagement through special events, some nations have also developed an awards programme to recognise and thank employers for their support. Since 1994, Canada has had a programme for reservists to nominate their employers for awards in a range of categories. Employers are formally recognised and receive an award for their outstanding support in ceremonies held at the local, provincial and national level with dignitaries and Canadian Forces VIPs. National award winners, nominators and their guests are brought to Ottawa for an Awards dinner and special ceremony with dignitaries from Government, the Ministry of Defence and the Canadian Forces. In the United States, the Employer Support for Guard and Reserve scheme grants a series of Department of Defence awards which recognise employers as individuals or as companies that not only respect or encourage the leave of their employees, but go “*above and beyond the legal requirements of USERRA*” or adopt innovative personnel policies. The highest award – the Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award – was instituted in 1996 and the recipients are welcomed in Washington, DC, where they are honoured by senior officials of the Department of Defense. This model is very effective in a country that not only values the military but also acknowledges their social responsibility vis-à-vis the community. This is also the case in Singapore, which grants a “*Total Defence Award*” for firms who employ five or more reservists or nominate an individual reservist on their staff.

All these initiatives share the same goal – to thank the employer and recognise their commitment, while at the same time encouraging their continued support. This outreach activity also opens doors to new partnerships between defence, industry and education, to explore potential mutual benefits and draw society into a more collective responsibility for national security.

³⁹ Financial Review, *Operation Boss Lift*, 5 August 2013.

⁴⁰ Presentation made by Major General (ret.) Norgaard.

Responsible Employers: Where Is the Business Case?

The overarching messages for gaining employer support are linked to the reservists' added value for their employer. Even without incentives, employers have every interest in employing reservists, considered a valuable asset to any company. Employers who have been given this information or who have seen this first-hand often pledge their support to reservists on a completely voluntary basis, without legislation or incentives.

The UK-based SaBRE website insists on the *“wide variety of skills and qualities a whole that can be transferred directly to the workplace”*. This is not just the habitual narrative about team-working, leadership and confidence, but foregrounds practical priorities such as first aid, health and safety, precision, accuracy and organisational skills⁴¹. The underlying idea is that hiring reservists – or former military – is an exceptional added value: a recent UK report, endorsed by the Chartered Management Institute, found that *“an employer would have to purchase over £8 000 of commercial civilian training to provide the same amount of development that an average reservist’s military service provides in a year (this research relates only to the skills that are relevant to the civilian workplace)”*⁴².

In some military cultures, the back and forth movement between civilian life and the military is so common that the Ministry of Defence is able to build and maintain enduring employer partnerships. The US Army, for instance, establishes partnerships with industry, institutions or businesses to give reserve soldiers employment opportunities, with an emphasis on specialties in medicine, engineering, telecommunications, transport and logistics, law enforcement and civil affairs specialties. This Employer Partnership Initiative facilitates the connection between employers and job seekers, and matches skills between service members and civilian sector jobs. It is not just about reducing unemployment, but also about increasing the readiness of the force by counting on civilian skills that enhance unit mission capability through strategic relationships with employers. One of the best-known examples can be found in a major trucking company which uses a state-of-the-art training centre with truck simulator cabs. The Army Reserve drivers, who are employees of this trucking company, use the simulator to confront an array of driving hazards. When these soldiers change their civilian

⁴¹ <http://www.sabre.mod.uk/Employers/What-Reservists-offer/Transferable-Skills>, accessed 10 September 2013.

⁴² Tim Corry, *Businesses Offered Incentives to Employ Reservists*, SaBRE Website, 24 July 2013, <http://blog.sabre.mod.uk/post/2013/07/24/Businesses-offered-incentives-to-employ-Reservists.aspx>, accessed 11 September 2013.

truck for a military one, they are better, more experienced drivers because of the previous training they received from the civilian company. As the report states, “America gets a better, more disciplined, service-oriented employee, a more skilled and capable truck driver, and a stronger soldier”⁴³. So far, the US Army Reserve has signed 1 190 Employer Partnership Agreements. Commercial campaigns proclaim that “it is not just about recruiting soldiers, but employees for America’s industry at the same time”⁴⁴.

Elsewhere, businesses have already understood the benefits of the bridge that reservists provide between the civilian and the military worlds. This is particularly obvious when it comes to new technologies and especially cyber: the ever-increasing sophistication of defence systems and progressive employment of dual use technologies in military affairs require greater and closer cooperation and complementarities between the civilian and military worlds. In France, following the emphasis on the role of “cyber defence reservists”, the French Ministry of Defence tasked some experts from the business world to raise awareness with a view to making cyber defence a national priority⁴⁵. One of their missions is to focus on small and medium sized businesses, providing advice on how to protect against cyber-attacks even without the resources available to larger companies. In this sense, reservists play a major role in alerting the general public to new threats and how to respond. To quote Luc-François Salvador, CEO of Sogeti (a wholly owned subsidiary of Capgemini Group, a leading professional services corporation), the private sector is not always looking at “the [chances of making a] quick dollar”, and some people see themselves as patriots yearning to take part in the defence of their country⁴⁶. This approach is fully endorsed by major companies such as Total, which see their reservists as potential high-level manpower whose education and leadership are definite assets. It also recognises the importance of the armed forces to protect their vast population of expatriate workers, in sometimes difficult situations. For instance, the company decided to extend the authorized military leave from 5 to 10 days, shortening the warning notice and maintaining wages without obliging the reservists to pay back their military salary⁴⁷.

⁴³ Mark Phillips, *The Future of UK’s Reserve Forces*, art. cit., p. 70.

⁴⁴ *America’s Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation*, art. cit., p. 15.

⁴⁵ Jean-Yves Le Drian, *Discours d’ouverture du colloque sur la Cyberdéfense*, Rennes, 3 June 2013, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ministre/prises-de-parole-du-ministre/prises-de-parole-de-m-jean-yves-le-drian/discours-du-ministre-de-la-defense-au-colloque-sur-la-cyberdefense>, accessed on 5 September 2013.

⁴⁶ Luc-François Salvador, *The Industry Perspective by a CEO (& a Reserve Officer)*, Brno, 1 August 2013. In France, the main IS security operators, including Sogeti, are taking part in the Council of Trusted and Security Industries alongside national authorities.

⁴⁷ Interview with Frédéric Bouffard, “réfèrent Défense” of the Total company, 31 July 2013.

Conclusions and Recommendations

*“Having reservists as part of the team is a win-win-win partnership: the employer benefits by having a loyal, well-trained staff member who can bring valuable skills in terms of management, leadership and team-work to an office environment. The reservist benefits by being able to continue his military career without having to sacrifice his civilian (...) livelihood. And the Defence Forces benefit as reservists bring skills to the military environment that might not exist amongst members of the regular forces”*⁴⁸. At a time when the security environment requires agile responses and flexible, adaptable and judicious force generation to meet the challenges of current and future conflicts, a premium must be placed on better integration and “*more sophisticated*” relationships between Ministries of Defence, the private sector and civil society⁴⁹. Reservists not only fill some capability gaps, they can also provide useful surge capabilities, as well as knowledge in domains where the military lacks competency – not only in national missions but also in NATO operations.

To ensure greater availability of reservists, the active backing of employers is paramount. It has to be developed and tailored according to national specific culture and needs, and rooted in the history, social conditions and military cultures of individual militaries. Most countries share useful lessons learned in terms of employer support. At this point, some recommendations may be helpful:

- **Legislation can’t do everything.** First, it is a nation’s individual choice as to whether it wants to develop a legislative arsenal or not. Legislation can be very coercive or limited, comprehensive or prescriptive, but it ultimately depends on the goodwill of the different players.

- **Encourage multifaceted courses of actions.** To provide long-term results, a successful employer support programme has to have some incentives for the employer and these do not necessarily have to be monetary. To allow reservists the flexibility to have time for military service is only one side of the coin; the employers must also be convinced. Communication is an essential requirement for the engagement of employers; a range of tools needs to be developed, to target institutions, unions, business organisations, academic institutions and companies who hire reservists. The benefits of reserve service and the skills that reservists will gain through their military service have to be appropriately illustrated to current and potential employers.

⁴⁸ Valerie Keyes, *Sustainment of Reserve Service through Employer Support*, art. cit., p. 66.

⁴⁹ Mark Phillips, *The Future of UK’s Reserve Forces*, art. cit., p. 91.

- **Financial compensation is only one partial response.** Of course, financial compensation might be important to employers, but financial programmes have real meaning only if they are included in a wider range of programmes. Depending on the individual country's mindset and cultural approach, this may not always be the most cost-effective.

- **Promote the skills of reservists and the added value they bring.** It is still a challenge to document and effectively translate military skills using terms that civilian employers will understand, and to assess the added value that reserve service represents for employers. Therefore, it is important to engage employers using a range of tools and options that allow them to assess the value of the experience and skills their employees are bringing back. How the military can best communicate the resulting added value is thus a major question.

At a time when militaries across the Alliance – but also NATO itself – are undergoing difficult reform processes and strategic reviews, reserves have an opportunity to demonstrate just why they are important: not only are they relevant as the high operational tempo of recent years begins to slacken, but they actually bring considerable added value to national forces and to NATO. However, they must also adapt in order to remain up-to-date and relevant. With increased use of Reserve Forces and greater integration with Regular Forces, reserves are an integral and important part of a nation's Defence strategy. Their proven experience, skills and dedication are a clear benefit to their communities, employers and nations, as well as to the Alliance.



THE “FUEL SOLDIERS”

In theatres of operations, fuel support reflects a number of necessities, such as forward refuelling in remote locations or unsecured areas. The key role in this respect belongs to helicopters, which transport supplies and make it possible for refuelling to take place rapidly. Moreover, an essential part is played by “fuel soldiers”, namely those in charge of supplying and supporting the forces deployed in operations in all environments.

The example used to illustrate this is France, with its military fuels service (SEA) and broad experience in fuel support to forces in both national and multinational operations, including in Kosovo, Chad and Mali. The French General Staff has tasked the SEA with directing NATO’s Smart Defence project on fuel logistics – one of 22 multinational projects approved by the allies at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.

Keywords: *capabilities; France; Smart Defence; fuel support; logistic footprint; SEA*

“Fuel soldiers” have an essential mission: to supply and support the forces deployed to an operation wherever and whenever needed. Many factors have to be taken into account for operational effectiveness. Developing multinational fuel logistics capabilities is also a priority, aimed at reducing the logistic footprint and the cost of operations. France is leading one such multinational project.



“Aviation fuel requires greater safety measures than ground fuel”, says Captain Jean-Luc Soubelet, desk officer for the operations office of the French Army’s inter-staff fuels base. “The solid particles must be removed, as well as any water dissolved in the fuel that might obstruct the aircraft’s fuel lines and kill the engine, with the consequences that one can imagine”.

Water in the fuel may be less critical when refuelling land vehicles but it is still problematic. “For example, in theatres where the winters are especially cold, such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, if the personnel do not make sure to purge the fuel

The article was featured in the *NATO Review, Smart Defence – In Action* issue, 2013, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Smart-Defence-Action/fuel-soldiers/EN/index.htm>

tanks of their vehicles regularly, the water could freeze and prevent them from starting”, adds Captain Soubelet.

In theatres of operations, fuel support reflects a number of necessities, such as forward refuelling in remote locations or unsecured areas. *“Helicopters play a key role in this because they transport fuel supplies and allow the equipment to be refuelled very quickly. The shorter the time we’re in the field, the lower the risk”.*

Equipment can also be fitted out with self-defence capabilities, such as armoured cabs and rocket defence systems, to protect convoys and personnel from attacks.

To simplify fuel logistics in an operation and thereby make it safer, for the past several years allied forces have used a single fuel – aviation fuel, or F-35, a NATO standard – for both aircraft and land vehicles. Aviation fuel offers the advantage of being available everywhere in the world because, unlike other types of fuels, it has an international specification.

The French Connection

France, through its military fuels service (*Service des essences des armées*, or *SEA*), has recognised know-how and broad experience in fuel support to forces in both national and multinational operations, including in Kosovo, Chad and Mali.

Experience has shown that the ability to adapt logistics to changing requirements and to coordinate properly among participating nations is key to success. Moreover, multinational capabilities are more cost-effective, which is a priority in times of financial austerity.



“Smaller defence budgets mean that in future one nation, on its own, will not be capable of providing logistics support to a coalition”, says Colonel Olivier Görlich, Chief of the Operational Support and International Relations Office of the central directorate of the *SEA*.

The French General Staff has tasked the *SEA* with directing NATO's *Smart Defence* project on fuel logistics – one of 22 multinational projects approved by the allies at the *Chicago Summit* in May 2012.

The general idea of the project is to promote sustainable mutual cooperation by volunteer nations to allow combined fuel support solutions to be implemented in a theatre of operations. In practical terms, it involves developing and testing best practices or common procedures for efficient multinational support using resources from different contributors.

Smart Fuel Support

“For now, a small number of nations are working together on the project”, explains Colonel Görlich. *“The aim is to develop ideas, and then make a pre-identified group of nations available to NATO that together can provide fuel support to a coalition, either as a framework nation or as a simple contributor”.*

“The approach is innovative because the full spectrum of operational fuel support is being considered – from technical, administrative and financial aspects to command and control”, he adds.

The training portion of the project is being co-directed by the Prague-based *Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre*, which organised *Exercise Capable Logistician 2013* in Slovakia in June. The exercise provided an opportunity for Captain Soubelet to test out a new, innovative multinational approach to pooling fuel resources for a coalition.

“Pooling the resources decreased the burden that one nation would have to bear if it had sole responsibility for fuel support. This is fully in line with Smart Defence”, says Captain Soubelet. *“The exercise also allowed us to test common procedures and set out a clear breakdown of responsibilities for each of the nations”.*

He is convinced that this Smart Defence project will enable the Alliance to reduce its logistic footprint, be more effective and cut the costs of coalition fuel support.



RHINELAND CRISIS

– THE FIRST “MILESTONE” TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR. ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES AND MEDIA REACTIONS –

Colonel Dr Dan PRISĂCARU

The majority of the historians and international relations analysts see the march of Wehrmacht's troops on 7 March 1936 into the demilitarised zone of Rhineland as a crucial point for the force ratio and the balance of powers in interwar Europe.

The German show of force marked the end of the collective security system established by the 1919 and 1920 Paris Peace Treaties and practically cleared the path to the Second World War.

The Romanian authorities and the national press reactions gave quite an accurate account of the impact of the German military action upon București. Their analysis showed, on the one hand, the concern about the serious damage done to the collective security system Romania was part of, and on the other hand, the calm, restrained attitude the leadership adopted as it did not want to tense the relationship with Germany.

Keywords: *collective security collapse; Rhineland remilitarisation; Romanian authorities; press; balanced attitude; Nicolae Titulescu*

On 7 March 1936, “symbolic detachments” of the Wehrmacht entered the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland¹. Seen by the Nazis as an act of liberation, the action would have repercussions difficult to predict for the international situation².

The event marked a major blow given to the League of Nations and the collective security concept as well as to the entire system of alliances based on the guarantees offered by the Covenant of the League of Nations³.

Colonel Dr Dan Prisăcaru – Military Analyst, the Ministry of National Defence.

Winston Churchill, *Al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Saeculum, București, 1998, pp. 13-161. In the work cited, the British Prime Minister considered a series of events that took place in Europe after 1936: the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Anschluss, Munich Agreement, failure of the tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. He saw them as a line of “milestones to disaster”, leading to that “unnecessary war”, as the British politician labelled the Second World War.

¹ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Istoria relațiilor internaționale 1919-1947*, vol. I, Editura Științelor Sociale și Politice, București, 2006, p. 207. Actually, the German “symbolic detachments” consisted of 19 battalions and 12 artillery detachments, around 30 000 men, in all.

² Emilian Bold, Ioan Ciupercă, *Europa în derivă (1918-1940). Din istoria relațiilor internaționale*, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2001, p. 165.

³ Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, vol. II, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1988, p. 1384.

Many research papers dealing directly or indirectly with the implications of the Rhineland crisis for the preparation and outbreak of the Second World War reflected the significance and historic value of this event.

A.J.P. Taylor's assessments are relevant in this respect: *"The German reoccupation of the Rhineland marked the end of the devices for security which had been set up after the First World War"*. He argued that, when the crisis started, *"The League of Nations was a shadow; Germany could rearm, free from all treaty restrictions; the guarantees of Locarno were no more. Wilsonian idealism and French realism had both failed. Europe returned to the system, or lack of system, which had existed before 1914. Every sovereign state, great or small, again had to rely on armed strength, diplomacy, and alliances for its security. The former victors had no advantage; the defeated, no handicap"*. The original British historian's conclusion was that, with the invasion of the Rhineland area, *"the international anarchy"* was restored in Europe⁴.



The first "symbolic detachments" of Wehrmacht entering the Rhineland on 7 March 1936

If the Little Entente states advocated a strong backlash against the violation of the concluded treaties by Germany, France and the UK had the same hesitant response, delaying and ultimately abandoning any countermeasures against the German show of force.

Winston Churchill considered that attitude *"unnatural"* given that *"France could have commanded the loyalty of the Little Entente"* (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania). In his opinion, the lack of response was even more incomprehensible since *"the Baltic States and Poland were also associated with the French system"* and *"above all, France also had a right to look to Great Britain, having regard*

⁴ A.J.P. Taylor, *Origins of the Second World War*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 1999, p. 88.

to the guarantee we had for the French frontiers against German aggression". His honest conclusion was that "here if ever was the violation, not only of the peace treaty, but of the Treaty of Locarno, and an obligation binding upon all the powers concerned"⁵.

However, contrary to the support the Little Entente was ready to give France – to which the Soviet Union had also rallied – Paris opted just for a British intervention as a possible solution. On 9 March, while Quai d'Orsay was still hoping for a British response, in accordance with their obligations, Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister told the House of Commons: "I am pleased to say that there is no reason to assume that Germany's current action would involve the danger of war"⁶.

In response, on 12 March, trying to make the British government reconsider its position, Pierre Flandin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated: "The whole world, especially small countries, are turning their eyes to England. If Great Britain decides to act, it may take Europe's lead. If you have a firm policy, the world will follow, this way you can avoid the war. This is your last chance. If you do not stop Germany now, everything ends. France will not be able to guarantee for long Czechoslovakia, because it will be impossible even geographically. If you do not have The Locarno Treaty



**Wehrmacht troops being greeted
while entering the Rhineland**

⁵ Winston Churchill, *La deuxième guerre mondiale*, tome 1, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1965, p. 196.

⁶ Martin Gilbert, Richard Gott, *Conciliatorii*, Editura Politică, București, 1966, p. 73.

*complied with, you will be left only to wait for the rearmament of Germany, against which France cannot do anything. If you do not stop Germany today by force, the war is inevitable, even if you manage to do, tentatively, a friendly Entente with it. As for me, I cannot believe a friendship between France and Germany is possible*⁷.

The French diplomacy chief's speech was of particular interest both due to its foresight and for the fact that, at that time, France was in favour of the intervention of Great Britain. In this sense, Pierre Goyet assessed that *"the war can be won without the help of Great Britain, only with that of Poland and Czechoslovakia"*. He also believed that *"General Gamelin can be accused of failing to take into account the second front, which would have been set up by itself"* and that *"given the French decision, other nations would have rallied to the coalition. Not committing yourself to 7 March 1936 means giving Hitler a free hand for other annexations, and recognising the fait accompli policy, abandoning the collective security system, which has proved to be so ineffective"*⁸.

Moreover, Benoist Méchin, analysing the existing conditions at the time, maintained that *"it was easy for France to destroy the small symbolic detachments that crossed the Rhine"* and *"the German generals knew it and could barely manage to master their concern"*, fact experienced by Hitler, too. Later, the Nazi dictator would recognise that *"if he ever lived under pressure, which he hoped never to experience again, then it was during the Rhineland crisis"*⁹. He would also reaffirm that *"48 hours after entering into the Rhine area, I lived the most tense moments of my life. If the French entered then in the Rhine area, we would have been forced to retreat in a shameful manner, as the military forces available to us were insufficient for even a moderate resistance"*¹⁰.

In turn, Erich Kordt appreciated that *"on 7 March 1936, with less energy and goodwill, it could have been possible to save both Germany and the world from Hitler's domination, without having to fire a single bullet"*¹¹.

France and Great Britain's defensive attitude towards this new show of force against the European security produced a deep concern among the small and medium-sized states in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania included. On 7 March 1936, in an intervention addressed to the French Minister in București, V. d'Ormesson, the head of the Romanian diplomacy, Nicolae Titulescu, mentioned that *"the new violation committed by the Third Reich required substantial and effective*

⁷ Winston Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

⁸ Pierre le Goyet, *Le mystère Gamelin*, Presse de la Cité, Paris, 1976, p. 130.

⁹ Benoist Méchin, *Histoire de l'armée allemande*, III, Edition Albin Michel, Paris, 1965, p. 230.

¹⁰ Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-1945*, Athenäumverlag, Bonn, 1950, p. 320.

¹¹ Erich Kordt, *Nicht aus dem Akten*, Stuttgart, 1950, p. 143.

*measures*¹². The same thing was approached in a statement in Geneva, on 11 March 1936, regarding the fact that “*the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact agree to defend by all means the treaties, including the Locarno one*”¹³ had not the desired effect, namely to determine Paris to give the expected response.

In response to Paris and London’s lack of reaction, the President of Czechoslovakia, Edward Beneš, and his colleagues expressed their concerns that “*the weakness shown by the British government was likely to discourage countries from Central and Eastern Europe, facts that were the primary objectives of the Reich*”¹⁴.

The Rhineland episode would end on 19 March 1936 by the nominal vote of the members of the Locarno Powers Council, given on the draft of the resolution proposed by France and Belgium, which acknowledged the offence committed by the German government in regard to Article 45 of the Treaty of Versailles by sending troops into a demilitarised zone.

Paradoxically, it was merely a fact-finding, not a condemnation of Germany for the committed act.

After the vote, von Ribbentrop, the German delegate – at that time Reich’s ambassador in London –, insolently declared, “*the resolution adopted will not be ratified by history*”. This made C. Antoniaade, Romania’s representative to the League of Nations, state: “*this statement would have deserved a more drastic response than those few words spoken too mildly by Flandin, who has merely pointed out that nobody has the right to take justice into his own hands*”¹⁵.

With the adoption of this resolution, a stage of the Rhineland demilitarisation debate held by the Council of the League of Nations ended what, according to Raymond Aron’s assessment, was “*an acute moment in the European crisis*”¹⁶ when “*France and Great Britain, paralysed by their contradictory alliances, had to bear a destiny they could no longer master*”¹⁷.

A minimal synchronic cut in the diachronicity of events showed that “*the two great powers were then paralysed by both their conciliatory commitments and by serious pressure of the groups and parties calling for pacifism, underestimating the Nazi threat*”¹⁸.

¹² *Documentes Diplomatiques Français* (DDF), 2-e série, tome I, doc. no. 309.

¹³ Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice*, Editura Politică, București, 1967, doc. no. 423.

¹⁴ DDF, 2-e série, tome I, doc. no. 373.

¹⁵ *Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe*, colecția Geneva, vol. 25, 1936, f. 78.

¹⁶ Petre Bărbulescu, *România la Societatea Națiunilor, 1919-1939. Momente și semnificații*, Editura Politică, București, 1975, p. 339.

¹⁷ Raymond Aron, *Republique impériale. Les États-Unis dans le monde, 1945-1972*, Calman-Lévy, 1973, Paris, p. 34.

¹⁸ Ladislav Mysyrowicz, *L’image national-socialiste a travers les publications françaises des années 1933-1939*, p. 117.

After 7 March 1936, the credibility of the League of Nations and of the existing treaties began to fall sharply. The small and medium sized countries became increasingly aware of the fragility of the political instruments upon which they based their systems of alliances and of the lack of substance of the commitments made by great powers¹⁹.

Henry Kissinger concluded, in his political magnum opus – *Diplomacy* – that “for Hitler, the reoccupation of the Rhineland opened the road to Central Europe, militarily as well as psychologically. Once the democracies had accepted it as a fait accompli, the strategic basis for resisting Hitler in Eastern Europe disappeared”²⁰.

Pierre Renouvin argued that, by reoccupying the Rhineland, “all data of the mainland policy are transformed” as “together with the remilitarised Rhineland, France tolerates once again a violation of the Treaty of Versailles” and “Germany can now establish a system of fortifications in the Rhine region, whose existence will cripple any offensive action from the French army which could have benefited its allies in Central and Eastern Europe”²¹.

In this context, Romania’s situation, favourable to undertaking effective actions to counter the revisionism, was supported internally, from a military perspective, by the implementation of urgent measures aimed at preparing and putting into action the forces group needed to cover the country’s western border.

On 9 March 1936, King Carol II summoned the Superior Defence Council and discussed the German action’s possible political and military implications for the country, deciding to speed up the preparations that enabled the troops to be ready to intervene in case of a generalised conflict²².

Noticing that the measures were aimed solely at the western border, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod wondered: “What about the East, as we do not know what will be, although today we are in good relations with the Soviets?”²³.

That was a prophetic question, given that after the failure of Western democracies in the Rhineland crisis the Soviet Union would gradually abandon the collective security policy – adopted after the 1934 for tactical reasons – and would eventually sign the famous agreement with Hitler’s Reich on 23 August 1939²⁴.

¹⁹ Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *op. cit.*, p. 1390.

²⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, Editura All, București, 2002, p. 263.

²¹ Pierre Renouvin, *Les crises du XX siècle II. De 1929 à 1945 (Histoire des relations internationales)*, vol. VIII, Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1958, pp. 93-94.

²² *Arhivele Militare Naționale*, colecția 948, Secretariatul CSAT, fila 12, pp. 5-6.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁴ Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power*, Penguin Books, New York-London, 1990, p. 345.

The decisions adopted by the Superior Council Defence in March 1936 were included by the General Staff in a series of measures aimed at “*improving the military mobilisation plan*” to match especially “*the commitments related to the operational connection with the allied armies*” and “*the need for units as armed and equipped as possible on the Western Front*”²⁵. Following the decisions taken by the Superior Defence Council, the General Staff Operations Directorate delivered the *Little Entente Strategy in a generalised conflict* to policy-makers²⁶. In compliance with the obligations assumed and the positions adopted in the Rhineland crisis, the authors argued that, irrespective of the causes that could lead to the conflict, the two antagonistic camps had the following structure: allies – France, Belgium and members of the Little Entente; enemies – Germany, Austria and Hungary. These two groups could be joined, in order of probability, by: Russia and Turkey, for the allies, – Bulgaria, for the enemy. It remained to be seen what the attitude of Great Britain, Italy, Poland and Greece would be²⁷.

In our opinion, it should be stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff – the structure in charge of the military implementation of the Romanian foreign policy courses of action – considered that the Soviet Union stood “*in order of probability*” before Great Britain, Poland and Greece and even before Romania among Little Entente allies.

This could be explained by the confusion created in București by France’s failure in its security sensitive area – by occupying the Rhineland area, Strasbourg was once again in the German line of fire – and by Great Britain’s reluctance to meet its obligations under the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno.

The question Nicolae Titulescu asked his counterpart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Flandin, was illustrative in this respect: “*If you could not defend yourself on 7 March, how can you defend us against the enemy?*”²⁸.

In the context of the Rhineland crisis, in the Assembly of Deputies, the need to strengthen the armed forces was pointed out, because they represented the only institution able to guarantee the country’s independence and territorial integrity. On this occasion, it was noted that the defence budget should be increased in accordance with the developments generated by the international crisis²⁹.

²⁵ *Arhivele Militare Naționale, op. cit.*, colecția 948, fila 456, p. 178.

²⁶ *Ibid*, colecția 948/RSS3, fila 1414, p. 180.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 187.

²⁸ Geneviève Tabouis, *20 de ani de tensiune diplomatică*, Editura Politică, București, 1965, p. 210.

²⁹ *Parliamentary Debates*, Senate, the 26 March 1936 session in *Monitorul Oficial*, III, 1936, no. 54, pp. 2225-2302 and 2407.

Same as in the Assembly of Deputies, the Romanian Senate did not address the Rhineland crisis until the 10 March 1936 session. Senator Miculescu said: *“The country had to accelerate the arming process, its delay not being compatible with the heavy and full of threats atmosphere that was pressing on the world in these turbulent times”*. He also warned: *“The Rhineland has generated political events of an exceptional gravity, which makes it difficult for anyone to know when the guns are shooting”*³⁰.

It was the only direct reference to the Rhineland crisis made in the Romanian Senate. Nevertheless, the country rearming process was widely discussed, and so was the bill for the calling to arms of the 1936 contingent (11 March)³¹, the law establishing the organisation of Aeronautics and the creation of the Undersecretary of State for Air (30 March)³², the establishment of the national fund for aviation (30 March)³³.

As compared to the Assembly of Deputies, in the Senate, the issue of increasing the country’s defensive capacity was more carefully considered even before 7 March 1936. Thus, during the 10 December 1935 session, it was pointed out that *“since the end of World War I, 158 international conferences were held up, concluded by 115 agreements to strengthen peace. However, world peace has become increasingly threatened, especially by Germany, which is feverishly rearming. As a result, Romania should not remain passive. We must prepare ourselves by equipping and training the armed forces to defend the national territory”*³⁴.

On 4 March 1936, Senator Grigore Gafencu showed that *“between 1918 and 1935, 150 billion lei from the budget were earmarked for the armed forces, but 70% of these funds were intended for staff and only 8% for weapons, which were insufficient”*³⁵. In a subsequent session of the Senate, the Minister of National Defence said that *“the Romanian Armed Forces received only 84 billion lei from the budget between 1918 and 1935, which meant an annual average of 14% while in Poland, this ratio was 35,6%, in Turkey 35%, in Hungary 19,5% and in Bulgaria 22%”*.

³⁰ *Ibid*, the 10 March 1936 session in *Monitorul Oficial*, III, 1936, no. 33, p. 936.

³¹ *Ibid*, the 11 March 1936 session in *Monitorul Oficial*, III, 1936, no. 36, p. 1089.

³² *Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe*, colecția Senat, fila 17562, p. 137.

³³ *Ibid*, fila 1754, p. 340.

³⁴ *Parliamentary Debates*, Senate, the 10 December 1935 session, in *Monitorul Oficial*, III, 1936, no. 12, p. 394-398.

³⁵ *Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe*, colecția Președinției Consiliului de Miniștri, fila 22/1939, pp. 32-36.

In addition, it was brought to the Senate's attention that Germany was spending 287 000 lei for training a soldier, Hungary 215 000 lei, France 145 000 lei, Italy 134 000 lei, Poland 77 000 lei and Romania only 42 000 lei. This meant an average of 342 lei per capita from the military budget, compared to 873 lei in Hungary, 749 lei in Czechoslovakia, 638 in Poland and 458 in Yugoslavia³⁶.

A relevant picture for the Romanian public reaction on the Wehrmacht entering the demilitarised Rhineland came from studying the press of those days. While, according to statistics, approximately 2 300 periodicals were published in Romania in early 1936, out of which about 1 350 were newspapers and 950 magazines, and in total, approximately 750 were political publications³⁷, we will further show only some comments that were published in some major newspapers.

Thus, "*Universul*" (independent, democratic newspaper, with the largest circulation in interwar Romania, respectively 160 000 copies) published, beginning with 8 March, pieces of news taken from various international agencies grouped under the headline "*Important events in Germany*"³⁸. In the 9 March issue, the headlines were more evocative: "*Germany denounced the Treaty of Locarno*", "*European Peace in jeopardy*" or "*Hard times in the international politics*". In their opinion, the occupation of the Rhineland was considered an "*act of extreme gravity, but which required a cool heart and mind*". They expressed the opinion that "*Romania cannot be indifferent to the repudiation of international treaties and especially to the acts that jeopardise peace*". Meanwhile, they wrote: "*Romania, not being a signatory part of the agreements of Locarno, had to wait patiently for the events to unfold and trust the wisdom of those who, like us, based their policy on the support and respect of the treaties and their legal and moral strength*"³⁹. In the article "*Hitler forgets history*", from the 10 March 1936 edition, "*Universul*" disavowed the German action as "*unfounded*"⁴⁰. In the following days' editions, the newspaper again published only news and did not expressed opinions regarding the German show of force.

Instead, the newspaper "*Adevărul*" (independent, democratic, circulation 50 000 copies) consistently promoted a critical attitude, especially with the articles signed by Tudor Teodorescu Braniște and B. Brănișteanu. On 9 March 1936,

³⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 42-45.

³⁷ Nicolae Dascălu, *Evoluția statistică a presei române în perioada interbelică* în "*Revista de Istorie*", 1981, no. 7, p. 1264.

³⁸ "*Universul*", 8 March 1936, p. 15.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 1936, 9 March 1936, pp. 1, 9, 16.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 10 March 1936, p. 1.

“Adevărul” printed, in block letters, on the front page, the headline “Germany has denounced the Treaty of Locarno”⁴¹ and, on 10 March, in the article “Hitler’s gesture”, stressed that “Romania remains faithful to the alliance system to which it is part of because of the geographical, political and vital interests”⁴². On 11 March, “Adevărul” commented on the Rhineland crisis in five⁴³ articles, and, on 13 March, B. Brănișteanu pointed out that “Europe experiences the most critical moments from the end of the First World War”⁴⁴. In the 25 March edition, “Adevărul” argued that, “although Romania was not a party to the Agreements of Locarno, it could not deny its fate and had to support the French line, therefore maintaining the line of civilisation”⁴⁵.

“Viitorul” (official newspaper of the National Liberal Party – PNL, circulation 20 000 copies) started commenting on the Rhineland crisis on 11 March, with the article “Let’s recollect” which held that “the German action triggered an increasing powerful and very dangerous wind for world peace”. Also, the attention was drawn to the fact that, “in the face of danger, Romania’s major interests demanded silence and unity of all forces concerned in maintaining peace”⁴⁶. In the 12 March 1936 edition, the same newspaper underlined that “compliance with the peace treaties was a vital element of the policy of peace” and “The League of Nations had to intervene decisively to solve crisis”⁴⁷. The 13 March 1936 edition indicated that “the situation was comparable to that of 1914. Europe was at a crossroads, the natural question being: Have the lessons of World War I been forgotten?”.

On 10 March 1936, the newspaper “Dreptatea” (semi-official paper of the National Peasants’ Party, circulation 26 000 copies) highlighted, under the signature of M.D. Ralea, that “the German action aroused even the most optimistic politicians from sleep, being clear that a dictatorship would only recur. The Reich obviously wanted war”. On 11 March, the newspaper considered that “Hitler threw Europe on the edge of the abyss and the fait accompli method usually preceded a war”⁴⁸.

“Neamul Românesc” (official newspaper of the National Democratic Party, circulation 15 000 copies) commented the Rhineland crisis on 8 March under the title “Today’s German bomb”⁴⁹, and, after 10 March, the topic was on the first page.

⁴¹ “Adevărul”, 9 March 1936, p. 1.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 10 March 1936, p. 1.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 9 March 1936, pp. 1, 3, 8.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 10 March 1936, p. 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1936, p. 8.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10 March 1936, p. 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 11 March 1936, p. 1, “Dreptatea”, 20 March 1936, pp. 8, 25.

⁴⁸ “Dreptatea”, 20 March 1936, pp. 8, 25.

⁴⁹ “Neamul Românesc”, 8 March 1936, p. 4.

On 11 March 1936, Nicolae Iorga signed the first editorial on the issue mentioning: “*the infringement of treaties generated mistrust and dishonesty, which was detrimental to world peace*”⁵⁰.

“*Epoca*” (official newspaper of the Conservative Party, circulation 15 000 copies) published an article signed by Gr. Filipescu on March 10, who estimated that “*the situation was serious since The Reich infringed a freely consented commitment*” and that “*after the Rhineland, the Anschluss will follow*”⁵¹. Faced with this prospect, intransigent attitude was asked for, as “*Germany has not learned anything from the serious psychological errors of 1914*”⁵².

“*Țara Noastră*” (official newspaper of the National Christian Party, circulation 12 000 copies) wrote on 10 March 1936 that “*the new warning has generated a great spiritual power in Europe, whose future was growing darker and more complicated*” and that “*given the gravity of the decision for treaties, we avoid assessing the value of the act, and of its reasoning*”⁵³. The 12 March edition stated that “*in Europe, harsh winds of gunpowder are blowing*”⁵⁴.

Leftist press openly criticised the German troops entering the Rhineland. Thus, the “*Scînteia*” (the official newspaper of the illegal Romania Communist Party, circulation unknown) pointed out in the 1 May 1936 issue that “*Hitler’s danger became more evident after 7 March 1936*”⁵⁵. “*Lumea nouă*” (the official newspaper of the Social Democratic Party, unknown circulation) wrote a series of articles about the Rhineland crisis under the signature of Constantin Titel Petrescu. He wrote, on 15 March 1936, that “*the League of Nations had to intervene urgently to prevent throwing the world into a holocaust of an unexpected ferocity, caused by the mad fantasy of the <<most sadistic war charmer>>*”⁵⁶.

The Rhineland crisis was also analysed in the national minorities press⁵⁷. Thus, “*Keleti Ujság*”, the official newspaper of the Hungarian Party from Romania, limited its comments to general aspects, such as the article on 14 March 1936, “*What we expect from the London Conference*”⁵⁸. Instead, the social democratic

⁵⁰ *Idem*, 11 March 1936, p. 1, N. Iorga, *Pacea din trîmbițe*.

⁵¹ “*Epoca*”, 10 March 1936, p. 1, Gr. Filipescu, *În așteptarea evenimentelor*.

⁵² *Ibid*, 12 March 1936, p. 1.

⁵³ “*Țara Noastră*”, 10 March 1936, p. 1, I. Lăncrăjan, *Problemele politicii externe se complică*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 12 March 1936, p. 1.

⁵⁵ “*Scînteia*”, 1 May 1936, p. 1.

⁵⁶ “*Lumea Nouă*”, 15 March 1936, p. 1.

⁵⁷ For a wider view, see Nicolae Dascălu, *La presse des minorités nationales dans la Roumanie d’entre deux guerres*, in “*Revue Roumaine d’Histoire*”, 1981, no. 1, pp. 111-130.

⁵⁸ “*Keleti Ujság*”, 14 March 1936, p. 1.

Hungarian language weekly “*Elore*” (circulation 2 000 copies) strongly condemned the military occupation of the Rhineland, because “*it rebrought to mind the terrible image of the world war*”⁵⁹.

A similar position, but in more categorical terms, was adopted by the Jewish press in Romania. “*Renașterea noastră*” (circulation 6 000 copies), “*Curierul Izraelit*” (circulation 8 000 copies) and the Hungarian-language Zionist newspaper “*Uj Kelet*” (circulation 5 000 copies) condemned, in several articles about the Rhineland crisis, the aggressive policy pursued internally and externally by Hitler’s Reich.

The newspapers of the German community from Romania, regardless of political orientation, warmly welcomed the act of 7 March 1936. “*Siebenbürgisch Deutsches Tageblatt*” from 21 March 1936 noted: “*the Germans from Romania cannot be accused of lacking patriotism if they agree with the Reich’s desire for freedom and equal rights*”⁶⁰. Also, “*Bukarester Tageblatt*” (circulation 6 000 copies), “*Kronstadter Zeitung*” (circulation 3 500 copies), “*Volkstimme*” (Nazi orientation, circulation 1 500 copies), “*Reschitzaer Zeitung*” (circulation 650 copies) or “*Banater Bote*” (circulation 1 000 copies) expressed similar views, with some slight differences in terms of details.

A statistical evaluation of the approximately 48 Romanian and minorities’ periodicals showed that 33 condemned the German action, 7 approved it, and 8 adopted a neutral attitude. In relation to the assessment of the effects of the German forces operation, out of 48, 18 predicted a war, 17 highlighted the rise of the Reich and the other 13 did not issue any opinion in this regard. In terms of solutions to the crisis, 30 newspapers avoided giving any reference, 11 opted for intransigence and 7 demanded negotiations with the Nazi dictator⁶¹. We consider that these abridged data are relevant for understanding the position of the Romanian press on the Rhineland crisis.

In conclusion, the German show of force on 7 March 1936 and the passive attitude of the Western democratic powers, especially France, were practically the end of the collective security system established by the peace treaties after the end of the First World War.

Therefore, the illusion of a world set upon the *Wilsonian principles* was crumbling down and the *Realpolitik* was coming back to rule in force.

⁵⁹ “*Elore*”, 14 March 1936, p. 1, *Hitlerismul provoacă război*.

⁶⁰ “*Siebenbürgisch Deutsches Tageblatt*”, 21 March 1936, p. 1.

⁶¹ Nicolae Dascălu, *România și criza renană*, in “*Revista de Istorie*”, vol. 40, no. 12/December 1987, Editura Academiei R.S.R., pp. 1225-1223.

Starting with 7 March 1936, the European countries, especially the small and medium ones, including Romania, had to undergo accelerated rearmament measures in order to review the efficiency of the political and military alliances concluded after the First World War and to seek those solutions that better protected their national interests in the new geopolitical context.

The position of the authorities in București was balanced, although the Foreign Affairs Minister Nicolae Titulescu vehemently condemned the German action. Policymakers appreciated that *“in new international situation, Romania, a country with low defences, had to resort to new ways of action to ensure the country a more reserved, more realistic attitude”*⁶².

In the Romanian Parliament, references to the Rhineland crisis were generally tangential.

The Romanian press, in its great majority, criticised the German show of force and the infringement of the treaties.

Overall, Romania’s position could be evaluated as realistic, consistent with the major interests of the country.

The clouds of war, though still far away, were approaching fast.



⁶² *Directiva politicii noastre externe*, in “*Gazeta de Vest*”, 5 September 1936, p. 7.

THE NAVAL DIMENSION OF THE BALKAN WARS

Captain (N) Dr Olimpiu Manuel GLODARENCO

In February 1913, a seaplane was used for the first time in the naval warfare. Greek pilot Moutoussis left the port of Moudros along with a fellow observer to scout the entry into the Dardanelles Strait and to spot the position of the Turkish squadron. They dropped four bombs on the Turkish ships – which was considered a first – as the author points out, but without inflicting any damage. They reconnoitred the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to find a possible way to force the strait and returned under the impression that a large military arsenal was positioned in the area. The seaplane remained in the air for two and half hours and covered a distance of 112 miles; after it landed on the sea, it was collected by the crew of a destroyer.

Keywords: *the Second Balkan War; Montenegro; seaplane; Moutoussis*

On 17 October 1912, Turkey got involved in a war against the Balkan League, composed of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. Theoretically, the Turkish Navy was clearly superior to those of the allied forces. Among them, only Greece had a small fleet, and Bulgaria had only 6 mediocre torpedo boats to protect its coast. The Greek Navy had only one middle-tonnage vessel, *GEORGIOS AVEROFF* 9 960-ton armoured cruiser, launched in 1910, equipped with four 230-mm cannons and eight 190-mm ones, which had high firepower and rate of fire. Its steel armour was 180 and 200 mm thick and it could reach a speed of 20 knots. There were 3 other Hellenic battle cruisers, *SPETSAI*, *PSARA* and *HYDRA*. They were the same type of 4 885-ton vessels, already obsolete, each of them equipped with two 270-mm and two 150-mm old model cannons. They could reach a speed of 14-15 knots.

The Greek Navy had also 14 destroyers of good quality, of which 4 were fleet leaders capable of reaching a speed of 32 knots, built in England for Argentina. In addition, there was a submarine, *DELPHIN*, built in France, 20 small and obsolete torpedoes and some small battle cruisers, gunboats and patrol boats. The Greeks had the advantage of being a maritime nation over the Turks, and the Turkish Navy made no effort to face its opponent, although a decisive defeat of the Greek fleet, at the beginning of the war, would have greatly influenced the final outcome.

Captain (N) Dr Olimpiu Manuel Glodarenco – Director of “King Ferdinand I” National Military Museum, the Ministry of National Defence.

When the war began, a large part of the Turkish army was deployed in Asia Minor, to counter a possible Italian landing. Therefore, it was impossible for it to be rapidly deployed in Europe.

At the beginning of the war, the Turkish Navy had only 4 greater-tonnage vessels able to fight. Two of them were the old armoured cruisers *TURGUT REIS* and *HAYREDDIN BARBAROSSA*, bought from Germany, launched in 1891, equipped with six 274-mm cannons. In addition, there were 2 light cruisers, *HAMIDIEH* and *MEDJIDIEH*, modern vessels that could reach a speed of 20 knots.

The Greek Navy applied an excellent strategy, the main objective being to close the Dardanelles and annihilate the Turkish squadron. The secondary objective was to ensure the control over the Gulf of Arta, which was entered into from Preveza, through the Turkish forts. Captain Damianos was entrusted with this mission. He commanded a small fleet composed of 2 torpedoes and 6 gunboats. He passed under the forts with the 2 torpedoes without being discovered, on the night of 18 to 19 October 1912. *ANTALYA* torpedo was inside the gulf. Being surprised when Damianos vessels came up, it sank itself. The forts in Preveza surrendered on 4 November, under the attack of a Greek expeditionary force.

To operate against the Dardanelles Strait, the Greek squadron needed a forward naval base to maintain the blockade. Given this situation, Greece decided to occupy the Island of Lemnos, where the excellent port of Moudros was situated. The English and the French used it, although far too late, in the campaign in 1915. To this end, the main Greek forces left Athens on 18 October, under the command of Rear Admiral P. Kountouriotis, being composed of *AVEROFF*, *SPETSAI*, *HYDRA*, *PARSA*, 14 destroyers, 5 modern torpedoes, submarine *DELPHIN*, mining vessel *ARES*, a hospital ship and a significant number of merchant ships converted into transport and auxiliary vessels. The squadron got near the Island of Lemnos on 20 October and the next day 500 people landed on the island and occupied Castro. The next day, the Greeks conquered the islands of Tenedos, Thasos, Imbros, Strati and Samothrace, without encountering any resistance. As they watched the torpedoes in front of the Dardanelles, they paralysed the Turkish fleet.

The old Turkish 2 729-ton armoured corvette *FETH-I-BULEND*, launched in 1870 and rebuilt in 1905, was anchored in Thessaloniki, being assigned the task of guarding the coast. The vessel was attacked, on the night of 31 October, by the old Greek torpedo No. 11 (launched in 1881, equipped with two 356-mm torpedo tubes), commanded by Lieutenant Votsis. The cones of torpedoes contained only a load of 50 pounds of explosive. Votsis entered the roadstead of Thessaloniki at full speed, which was probably less than 10 knots, without being discovered, although the sailing line was scanned by the projectors at the Kara-Burnu fort, placed at the entrance,

and headed for *FETH-I-BULEND*, launching two torpedoes, at 23.35, which hit the enemy vessel at the starboard. The vessel tilted immediately, and Votsis, navigating back, launched another torpedo. Then, seeing that the enemy vessel was sinking, he left the roadstead rapidly, without being hit.

In November, the Greek Navy landed small units in the major islands in Mitylene and Chios. However, both deployed Turkish garrisons resisted for several weeks and they surrendered only in December 1913 and January 1914. The Greek carriers, escorted by warships, served to deploy the Bulgarian troops from Thessaloniki (when it fell into the hands of the Greeks, on 8 November) to Dedeagatch. Throughout this period, the Turkish Navy acted in a derisory manner on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. On 19 October, armoured cruisers *BARBAROSSA*, *TURGUT REIS*, *MESSOUDINEH*, *HAMIDIEH* and four torpedoes came up close to Varna, hunting the Bulgarian torpedoes that were on patrol; on 20 October, the vessels fired 45 missiles over the city. The next day, they bombed a military depot in Kavarna, where they caused some damage and captured 2 small Bulgarian torpedoes.

The rapid advance of the Bulgarian troops on land prompted the Turks to bring their armoured cruisers in the Marmara Sea to support the forces that defended Constantinople. They left only the battle cruisers and torpedoes to block the Bulgarian coast. On the morning of 21 November, 4 Bulgarian torpedoes (launched in 1907, displacement of 100 tons, speed 26 knots, three 450-mm torpedo tubes) executed a courageous and well-directed attack on a Turkish artillery battalion that was at sea, off the coast of Varna. Being dark, the Bulgarian vessels were also intercepted by the Turkish destroyers. However, the Turks opened fire on them from 1 800 meters. Ten torpedoes launched by the Bulgarians missed the targets, but the eleventh, launched from a distance of 200 metres hit *HAMIDIEH*, which was underway, on the starboard, making a 3-m hole in the ship plating. The Turkish ship was badly damaged and it could hardly get to Constantinople, being threatened with sinking any moment because the deck was often underwater. Encouraged by the success, the Bulgarian torpedo boats resumed their attack, but failed to destroy the enemy damaged vessel, and they withdrew without suffering heavy losses, having only two wounded people. The Turks had 8 dead people. The confrontation put an end to the blockade on the Bulgarian coasts.

In the Sea of Marmara, the Turkish armoured cruisers provided valuable support for the army, which kept the lines in Tchataldja, near Constantinople, torpedoing from Chekmedje.

On 3 December an armistice was signed between Turkey, on the one hand, and Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, on the other hand. Greece refused to call

a ceasefire. Under these circumstances, the Turkish squadron was able to manoeuvre at will. A few days before the armistice, a Turkish artillery battalion, consisting of 2 armoured cruisers and 2 battle cruisers, arrived in the Dardanelles and prepared for a naval action. *MEDJIDIEH* was present, on 14 December, outside the strait, along with 4 large destroyers (launched in 1909, displacement of 610 tons, speed 30 knots, two 100-mm cannons). There it found 7 Greek destroyers on alert. They, tracking one of the Turkish destroyers, reached near the forts, thus coming under fire.

Informed by telegraph, Kountouriotis left Lemnos, the same afternoon, with 4 armoured cruisers and 4 large destroyers, to support the small destroyers close to the Dardanelles. He patrolled all night and the next day, on 16 December, in the morning, he noticed *MEDJIDIEH* approaching, accompanied by 8 destroyers. The weather was fine, it was a slight haze, and the sea was calm. At 08.45 the Turkish armoured cruisers were discovered, sailing in the front line: *BARBAROSSA*, the flagship, was on the right flank, then came, at intervals of 2 cables, *TURGUT REIS*, *MESSOUDIEH*, and on the left flank, it was *ASSAR-I-TEWFIK*. The Turkish disposition targeted the Greeks, while *MEDJIDIEH* and the 8 destroyers stationed at forts.

Seeing that the Turks were heading towards him, Kountouriotis called *DELPHIN* submarine and the small destroyers that were in Tenedos, but they could not arrive in time to take part in the action. Under these circumstances, he disposed the 4 armoured cruisers in line, placing the 4 large destroyers in parallel line to port. When they were off shore, the Turks made eight turns to the right, all at once, also forming a line. At 09.30, Kountouriotis, who was on board *AVEROFF*, whose speed exceeded the speed of other ships, signalled the other warships that he executed independent manoeuvres and took distance at full speed, with the intention of cutting the Ottoman disposition. The other three Greek armoured cruisers were disposed in front line and reduced their speed to lure the enemy. The Turkish vessels opened fire at 09.50, from 13 500 metres. The Greeks did not begin firing until 10.00, when the distance shortened to 7 200 meters.

After five minutes, the Turks swerved and the clash ended at 10.30. *MESSOUDIEH* was attacked by *IERAX* destroyer, which fired sixty-five 100-mm shells on it, hitting it several times. It can be concluded that the Turkish naval vessels tried to escape instead of fighting. After this incident, the Turkish squadron was not very affected. Its losses amounted to 58 people. The Turks fired 700 or 800 shots. *AVEROFF* made a brave attempt to use torpedoes and approached to a distance of about 3 000 metres, but it was hit by a shell at the waterline and by other smaller projectiles above the waterline, having a dead and 7 injured

people. *SPETSAI* and *HYDRA* were both shot 5 times, which did not cause serious damage. *PSARA* was not reached by any projectile. Each of the two parties was proclaimed winner, but certainly the Turks were those who withdrew.

On 22 December, a few days after that event, *TURGUT REIS*, *MEDJIDIEH* and other three destroyers sortied, but they rushed to withdraw when they discovered the Greek vessels. Another sortie, more important, was carried out on 18 January. The Turkish light cruiser *HAMIDIEH* sortied from the Dardanelles, on 14 January, after the repairs had been finished, without discovering the Greeks. The Commander of the Turkish squadron, Ramsi Bey, thought that *AVEROFF* was pursuing him. On the morning of 18 January, the 4 Turkish armoured cruisers arrived, rallying around it, coming from Tenedos and Imbros to Lemnos, followed by 13 torpedoes and by *MEDJIDIEH*. When the Turkish squadron was less than 12 miles far from Lemnos, *AVEROFF* appeared, followed by the rest of the Greek fleet. In this situation, the Turks turned heading towards the Dardanelles. As in the previous clash, Kountouriotis manoeuvred independently and tried to stop the enemy squadron. At 11.25 an intermittent action started, which lasted for two hours. In the last phase of the actions, *AVEROFF* approached at about 4 500 metres, creating the impression that the enemy hit numerous times with its powerful cannons.

The Greeks observed fires aboard *BARBAROSSA* and *TURGUT REIS*; it was only later that the experience of Dogger Bank and Jutland showed that fires could occur without seriously affecting the fighting ability of a battleship. *BARBAROSSA* had a central barbette out of action and another barbette of *TURGUT REIS* was also destroyed. The Turks fired 800 shots, most of them 270 mm, and the Greeks reported one man slightly wounded. *AVEROFF* was struck above the waterline, but it had no serious damage. *ASSAR-I-TEWKIK* was hit in many parts; *TURGUT REIS* had a large-calibre turret out of action. The Turkish losses were estimated at 31 dead and 81 wounded. As it usually happens, each party considered itself victorious, but, undoubtedly, the Greeks won the victory.

As for *HAMIDIEH*, it escaped from the Greek torpedoes off the Dardanelles, heading towards the small island of Syra, where the Greeks had large quantities of explosives and depots. The Turkish vessel bombed those depots, firing a dozen shots, without any result. Then it opened fire on the Greek auxiliary cruiser *MACEDONIA*, which was at anchor in the harbour. A shell that hit *MACEDONIA* exploded in the power plant and it was out of service. Moreover, aboard the Greek vessel large fires broke out, which caused the vessel sinking; although it remained on the surface due to the shallow waters, the ship burned completely.

The Greek government thought that *HAMIDIEH* intended to execute a raid on Piraeus, therefore it deployed cannons to defend the port; however, the Turkish

vessel, because of the lack of coal, headed for Port Said, arriving there on 19 January. It was supplied with coal and requested the permission from the authorities, which were Turkish, to stay longer. The British authorities, however, established that the ship could station up to 24 hours. Thus, the cruiser crossed the channel, entered the Red Sea, where it stayed until 9 February, without taking any significant action. From Port Said it headed for Beirut and then for Malta, where it stationed, because of bad weather, until 15 February. The Greeks sent *PSARA* and 4 destroyers to chase the Turkish vessel. However, *PSARA* was too slow to catch up to the enemy vessel. On 11 March, *HAMIDIEH* was in front of Durazzo, in the Adriatic Sea, where it bombed a Serbian position. The next day, it was at Saint Jean de Medua, where it bombed a large number of Greek carriers that carried Serbian troops to Scutari.

The Serbs responded by firing two heavy guns they had landed for that purpose. Then, the cruiser left for Alexandria, where it was supplied with coal, and headed for Beirut again. On 9 April, it entered the Red Sea for the second time, where it conducted military actions. It did not return to the Mediterranean until 24 August, when the war was almost ended. Its combat actions worried the Greek government and resulted in some alarm as far as the most impressionable elements of the Greek population were concerned. But the performed actions were ineffective and had no influence on the conduct of operations.

In February 1913, a seaplane was used for the first time in a naval warfare. The Greek pilot Moutoussis left the harbour of Moudros along with an observer to reconnoitre the entry into the Dardanelles Strait and the Turkish squadron. It released four bombs on the vessels – which was also a first –, but it missed the targets. It examined the Gallipoli Peninsula to find a possible way to force the strait and it returned with the impression that there was a large military arsenal in the area. The seaplane remained in the air for two and a half hours and covered a distance of 112 miles; after it landed, it was recovered by a destroyer. At the same time, the old armoured cruiser *ASSAR-I-TEWFIK* wrecked in the Black Sea.

The last major event of the naval war was the conquest of the Greek Island of Samos, on 14 March 1914. All the islands of the Aegean Sea were taken from the Turks and, as there was no chance to restore their naval situation, peace was signed. The armistice with Bulgaria and Serbia ended on 1 February 1913 and those countries resumed operations against Turkey. On 20 April, a second armistice was signed between Turkey and the Balkan states, this time including also Greece. However, shortly after the conclusion of peace, on 30 May, a new war broke out, on 30 June, between Bulgaria and Serbia. In the Second Balkan War,

there was no significant naval action because Bulgaria had no warships in the Aegean Sea and the actions of the Greek Navy were limited to securing the troop movements and to cover the operations off the coast.

The war determined the great powers to take action against Montenegro, which refused to cease the actions against Scutari: Italy and Austria agreed that the city should belong to Albania. On 5 April 1913, a squadron consisting of 9 British, French, German, Italian and Austrian warships, under the command of Vice Admiral Cecil Burney, grouped on the coasts of Montenegro, which were officially declared, on 10 April, in the state of blockade. On 14 May, the Government of Montenegro handed Scutari over an international force landed from warships and the blockade ended.

The successes of the Greek naval operations against Turkey depended on one vessel, *AVEROFF*, and a successful attack on it with mines or torpedoes would have ensured the supremacy on the sea. Luckily for the Greeks, their opponent was not very entrepreneurial. In the two skirmishes that occurred between the armoured battleships of both parties, *AVEROFF* was very effective, the vessel being able to fire using four 230-mm cannons and four 190-mm cannons. The Greeks thus felt the need to have other armoured cruisers like it. Therefore, immediately after the war, they bought two from the USA and a battle cruiser from Germany.

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 Diana Cristiana LUPU

THE 2012 GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ JOURNAL AWARDS THE 15TH EDITION – 11 November 2013

On 11 November, in the Auditorium of the Ministry of National Defence, the 15th edition of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal Awards took place, once again part of the events dedicated to the General Staff Day (12 November). The Minister of National Defence, Mircea Duşa, and the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Dr Ştefan Dănilă, were present at the ceremony.


Starting from a line of Romanian poet Nicolae Labiş – “*Dacă toate acestea fi-vor învățate*”/“*Should All These Be Learned*”, the chairman of the *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission*, Major General Dr Virgil Bălăceanu, pointed out the quantitative but especially the qualitative value of the books that participated in the competition (over 50), while thanking the members of the Commission for accomplishing the difficult, yet extremely challenging task of deciding the winners: Air Flotilla General (AF) Dr Florian Răpan, Brigadier General Dr Adrian Tonea, Colonel (AF) Dr Ion Crăciun, Major General (r.) Dr Visarion Neagoe and Colonel Dr Mircea Tănase.

The awards, for five different domains, were presented by the Minister of National Defence.



Here are the laureates of the *Journal Awards* for this year:

- The Award “*Army Corps General Ioan Sichițiu*”, for the *Geopolitics and Geostrategy* domain, was presented to **Constantin HLIHOR** for “*Geopolitică. De la clasic la postmodern*”/ “*Geopolitics. From Classical to Postmodern*”.



- The Award “*Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu*”, for the *Military Policy, Security and Collective and National Defence* domain, was presented to **Ioana LEUCEA** for “*Constructivism și securitate umană*”/ “*Constructivism and Human Security*”.

- The Award “*Marshal Alexandru Averescu*”, for the *Military Art* domain, was presented to **Adrian PANDEA** for supervising the first edition of “*Viața și moartea în linia întâi. Jurnal și însemnări de război. 1916-1920, 1941-1943*”/ “*Life and Death on the Frontline. War Diary and Notes. 1916-1920, 1941-1943*”, author Vasile Scârnechi.






- The Award “*Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu*”, for the *Military History* domain, was presented to **Alin SPÂNU** for “*Serviciul de Informații al României în Războiul de Întregire Națională. 1916-1920*”/ “*The Romanian Intelligence Service during the National Unification War. 1916-1920*”.




- The Award “*Brigadier General Constantin Hirjeu*”, for *Troops Organisation, Training, Command and Logistics* domain, was presented to **Ion GIURCĂ** and **Maria GEORGESCU** for “*Statul Major General Român (1859-1950). Organizare și atribuții funcționale*”/ “*The Romanian General Staff (1859-1950). Organisation and Functional Duties*”.





Other nominees for the Gândirea militară românească Journal Awards were:



For the Award “Army Corps General Ioan Sichițiu”:
“Complexul de securitate Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre”/
“The *Black Sea Wider Area* Security Complex”,
author **Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU**, and “Cruciați ai înălțimilor. Grupul 7 Vânătoare de la Prut la Odessa (iunie-octombrie 1941)”/“*Crusaders of Heights. The 7th Fighter Group from Prut to Odessa (June-October 1941)*”,
author **Sorin TURTURICĂ**.



For the Award “Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu”:
“Managementul securității naționale”/“*National Security Management*”,
author **Gheorghe UDEANU**,
and “Aeronautica română în Războiul de Întregire Națională (1916-1919)”/“*Romanian Aeronautics in the National Unification War (1916-1919)*”,
author **Valeriu AVRAM**.



For the Award “*Marshal Alexandru Averescu*”:
 “*Mic tratat de istorie a terorismului*”/“*A Small Treatise on the History of Terrorism*”,
 co-authors **Ion-Aurel STANCIU** and **Vasile SOARE**,
 and “*Infern deasupra Ploieștiului. Bombardamentul american de la 1 August 1943*”/
 “*Inferno over Ploiești. The American Bombing Raid on 1 August 1943*”,
 co-authors **Valeriu AVRAM** and **Alexandru ARMĂ**.



For the Award “*Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu*”:
 “*Vânătorii Reginei Elisabeta. Memoriile unui ofițer din garda regală*”/
 “*Queen Elisabeta’s Riflemen. Memoirs of a Royal Guard Officer*”,
 author **Mihai I. BUTESCU** (edition supervised by **Gheorghe Vartic**),
 and “*Misiunea generalului Coandă la Kiev (1917-1918)*”/
 “*General Coandă’s Mission in Kiev (1917-1918)*”,
 co-authors **Vasile POPA**, **Ion CERĂCEANU** and **Vasilica MANEA**.




For the Award “Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu”:
“Resursele umane ale Armatei României. 150 de ani de istorie”/
“The Romanian Armed Forces Human Resources. 150 Years of History”,
co-authors **Dumitru SESERMAN, Marian MOȘNEAGU,**
Marian TASE and **Doina MUREȘAN,**
and “Calendarul tradițiilor militare”/“Military Traditions Calendar”,
editor **SERVICIUL ISTORIC AL ARMATEI**
(ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL SERVICE).



There were also given two *Certificates of Excellence*:

- to **George Cristian MAIOR**, for “*Noul aliat*”/“*New Ally*” – second edition, revised and updated;




- to **Constantin GIURGINCĂ**, **Constantin MORARU** and **Viorel CIOBANU**, for “*Piramida cantemiristă*”/“*<Cantemir> Military College Pyramid*”, vol. II.





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MILITARY JOURNALISTIC UNIVERSE

Armées d'aujourd'hui, France, no. 382,
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Baltic 2013 – Surveillance of Baltic Air Space • Meeting of Wounded and Disabled Military for Sport Activities • Exercise “*Maine 2013*” to Save Men and their Goods in Case of Floods • Night Operational Flight • Strategic Research is Still Important? • Priority to Data Harmonisation • Participation of Foreign Military Units at France’s National Day Parade • Multidimensional Integrated UN Stabilisation Mission for Mali • Co-operation School • Atlas – Tactical and Strategic Transport Aircraft – Technical and Operational Data • Europe is Responsible for its Own Cybersecurity • French-German Naval Force • Great Battles, Past, Present, Future (File) • Exhibition Concerning the French Resistance Contribution to Allied Intelligence • War and Peace

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


“United Command of all Operations is Assured”. Interview with Lieutenant General Hans-Werner Fritz, Commander of the German Army’s Operations Command on the Subject of the Changes Driven by Reorganisation of the Operations Command • Prospects of the German Navy • High Requirements for the Missions of the German Army’s Territorial Commands regarding Civil-Military Cooperation • “*A Department that Knows Everybody, a Department Everybody Knows*”. Interview with the President of the Federal Bureau of Personnel Management • Fighting Capacity in Urban Operations • Recovery and Rehabilitation of Isolated Personnel in ISAF Operations – A New Capability of the German Army • 15 Years Anniversary of the Centre for Fight Simulation within the German Army • French-German Cooperation in the Field of Training – A True Success • French-German Cooperation in the Horn of Africa • A Consistent Deterrence Policy. Singapore’s “*Total Defence*” • The Military Scientific Institute for Fuels and Raw Materials – Service Provider for the German Army • Command Information Systems Keeping Pace. A Continuous Evolution Towards a Service Oriented System • Eurofighter. Action against Aerial Targets • Future Fighting Systems • Development of Laser Ship-based Guns • Defence Industry in United Kingdom • The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Is It Relevant for the German Army? • The Issue of Asymmetrical Threats

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Cover 1: Romania's National Day: Troops of the Land Forces passing under the Triumphal Arch in București, 1 December 2013.

Photo: Vali Ciobârcă, <http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/album50>

Cover 3: NATO Secretary General visits Latvia and Poland, Steadfast Jazz Live Exercise (LIVEX) demonstration, 7 November 2013, www.nato.int

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