AED and Education in Contexts of Fragility:

Providing Support to Education Over the Long Haul

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Felix Alvarado, M.D., Ph.D.

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Acronyms

ABE/Link	Aid to Basic Education-Linkages to Health indefinite quantity contract
AED	Academy for Educational Development
AIR	American Institutes of Research
AMCHAM	American Chambers of Commerce
ARENA	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance), El Salvador
AVANCE	Asociación de Promoción y Desarrollo Socioeconómico (Association for Promotion and Socioeconomic Development), Honduras
BASE	Basic Education and Training Program, Nicaragua
BES	Basic Education Support, Namibia
BESO I	Basic Education System Overhaul program, Ethiopia
BESO II	Basic Education Strategic Objective program, Ethiopia
BEST	Basic Education Strengthening project, Guatemala
BVE	Basic Village Education project, Guatemala
CA	Continuous Assessment
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CAPS	Central American Peace Scholarships
CERCA	Civic Engagement for Education Reform in Central America
CETEBI	Centro de Tecnología Educativa Bilingüe Intercultural (Bilingual Intercultural Educational Technology Center), Guatemala
CIAGO	Comunicación de Información Agrícola Guatemalteca de Occidente (Western Guatemala Agricultural Information Communication project)
CINDE	Centro Internacional de Educación y Desarrollo Humano (International Center for Education and Human Development)
COP	Chief of Party
CPDM	Continuous Professional Development Module
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DfID	UK Department for International Development
EDC	Education Development Center, Inc.
EDUCO	Educación con Participación de la Comunidad (Education with Community Participation), El Salvador

EFA	Education for All
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EQUIP2	Education Quality Improvement Program 2
ESDP	Education Sector Development Program
ESL	English as a Second Language
ETSIP	Education and Training Sector Improvement Programme, Namibia
EU	European Union
EXCELENCIA	Expansion of Centers of Excellence in Nicaragua project
EXCELL	Excellence in Classroom Education at the Local Level project, El Salvador
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEPADE	Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (Business Foundation for Educational Development), El Salvador
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), El Salvador
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista Front for National Liberation), Nicaragua
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
FUSADES	Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development)
GDA	Global Development Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEQIP	Ethiopian General Education Quality Improvement Package
GNI	Gross National Income
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICRE	Intercultural Center for Research in Education
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IEQ	Improving Education Quality Project
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IQPEP	Improving the Quality of Primary Education in Ethiopia
LCE	Learner-Centered Education
LPAI	Learner Performance Assessment Instrument
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MDAC	Management Development Advisory Committee, Namibia
MERECE	Mesa Redonda de Cooperantes Externos de Educación (Donor Roundtable of Cooperation Agencies in Education), Honduras
MIS	Management Information Systems
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia
MOFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ethiopia
NEU	Nueva Escuela Unitaria (New Multigrade School), Guatemala
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PISI	Platform for Integrated Social Information, Guatemala
PRONADE	Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo (National Self-Management for Development Program), Guatemala
REB	Regional Education Bureaus, Ethiopia
RLP	Radio Learning Project, Honduras
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SABE	Strengthening Achievement in Basic Education project, El Salvador
SACMEQ	Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality
SDP	School Development Plans, Namibia
SEPAZ	Secretaría de la Paz (Secretariat for Peace), Guatemala
SIAF	Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera (Integrated System for Financial Administration), Guatemala
SIP	School Improvement Plan, Namibia
SNNPR	Southern Nations and Nationalities and People's Region, Namibia
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach
SWAPO	South-West Africa People's Organization, Namibia
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

FOREWORD

This publication represents many things, but especially a commitment across countries and cultures to ensure that young people can fulfill their right to learn, even when states are less able to provide these opportunities, and that what they learn contributes to the overall improvement of the human condition. From the perspective of an international NGO this work reflects upon lessons learned from accompanying each of six countries over a period of at least 20 years in building more robust education systems as the countries transitioned from more fragile situations to becoming much more resilient.

There are several other reasons why the Academy for Educational Development (AED) wanted to share its experience. The state of the world is indicating that states experiencing fragility will continue to be with us for some time and so the education community must be able to respond in ways that are appropriate and constructive. Increasingly, the gap between the commitment to achieving Education for All (EFA) in its broadest conceptualization and the necessary funds and/or appropriate funding mechanisms is proving to be an obstacle, especially in a growing number of fragile situations. The need to better understand the continuum that exists between fragility and resilience—and education's place in this—is coming to the fore, demanding that all sectors and players share their experience and knowledge. The Accra Agenda for Action and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness on which it builds call for better collaboration among all players, including civil society organizations, in responding to the EFA challenges.

In consideration of all these reasons AED believes that it has experience and a perspective to offer that could be of value. First, as a learning organization, we wanted to understand our own role in working with partners in a variety of contexts. Second, as an active member of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), we are committed to sharing knowledge and practice with the larger community to improve the quality of education around the world. Third, as an organization known for our work in "development," we wanted to share our conceptual underpinnings, which do not separate emergency from development, and to show how we have operationalized them into practical contributions in two continents over an extended period of time. Finally, AED wishes to contribute to the discourse that links theory and practice in ways that reflect reality.

This is a reflective document—one that comes from the perspective of an NGO. We recognize that while it might have limitations, these are well balanced by a total of over 100 years of work in 31 projects described here, helping to strengthen education systems in states that are rebuilding after serious problems.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues for working on this with me and to thank that larger group of colleagues who undertook (and are still undertaking) the work that made this reflection possible.

Mary Joy Pigozzi
Senior Vice President and Director,
Quality Education, Global Learning Group, AED

Education in Crises and Education in Development are a Single Process

Educational development is a long process, and assistance to it requires long-term commitments. These are assertions that few would question by now. However, awareness of the continuity between assistance for education under conditions of fragility and assistance for education in development is much more recent. Only over the last decade and a half has education increasingly been included as an early component of humanitarian assistance (Burde 2005). Previously it was usual to consider education as an element of development assistance that should wait for conditions in a country to "stabilize" before it could be undertaken (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud 2009). The problem with such an approach was that in many cases a whole generation was lost before education assistance was implemented. Sommers (2005) points out that in Southern Sudan, because relief, rehabilitation and development were considered separate stages in the aid process, education had to wait 21 years for the war to end! A further consequence was that international cooperation agencies and international non-government organizations (NGOs) self-defined either as "relief" or "development assistance" entities, with little cross-communication and learning, further deepening the divide between relief and development.

As the walls between relief and development have come down, organizations have begun to reassess their roles and the skills required

to be effective under varying conditions of crisis, fragility and resilience. Researchers and practitioners have recognized the need for conceptual frameworks that help them understand the continuity of education under varying conditions. The essence of the discussion has been the recognition that all children have a right to education, regardless of circumstances (Pigozzi 1999; Tebbe 2009), because "individuals do not forfeit their right to education during emergencies" (INEE 2004:6). Admitting the continuity of assistance to education from fragility to resilience is an acknowledgement of this, as is the recognition of the need for continuity between humanitarian assistance and the provision of educational services. The challenge has been to determine how to actually guarantee the right to education under varying conditions.

Addressing the links between education and fragility is a growing agenda in research and practice. Tebbe (2009) summarizes part of the evidence for this, including the establishment of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Working Group on Education and Fragility in April of 2008, the efforts by major international NGOs to improve knowledge and practices about education and fragility, the engagement by the World Bank, UNESCO, and other UN agencies with key issues and initiatives, and commitments by the EU and USAID to both normative and operational guidelines for education under conditions of fragility.

Education should be part of the solution from the beginning of the rebuilding process. We hope this paper will facilitate that work in the future.

The agenda continues to develop and has proved to be political, much more than technical. It has also brought together national governments in transition, national and international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral international cooperation agencies, and citizens acting both on their own and in organizations. Over its lifetime, AED has been involved in the development of the education sector in a variety of countries as they transit from fragile situations to greater resilience. Based on this experience, what can be said about the role of INGOs, such as AED, that foster development of the education sector in contexts of international assistance? How does the changing understanding of the relationship between fragility and resilience, and between education and development affect our understanding of what project implementation should seek and accomplish? How do the successive finite efforts of projects get strung together into programs that can contribute to development over the long haul, and what are the lessons to be drawn from this?

The purpose of this document is to describe AED's extensive experience in six countries

that have undergone periods of violent conflict or natural disaster followed by extended and complex periods of increasing resilience, and if possible extract lessons learned from it. The focus is on what we have learned about effectively and sustainably restoring education in a context of development. This paper is timely for two reasons. First, the number of low-income countries experiencing crises, especially war, continues to escalate (Collier 2009). Second, there is a growing consensus among countries and donors that restoring education systems should begin as soon as the security of teachers and students can be assured and not wait until the termination of relief efforts. Education should be part of the solution from the beginning of the rebuilding process. We hope this paper will facilitate that work in the future.

STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT

This paper begins by reviewing AED's work over the last two decades in six countries on two continents (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in Latin America, and Ethiopia and Namibia in sub-Saharan Africa), considering their history and education sector as they move from fragility and attempt to consolidate education reform. This section seeks to extract lessons concerning the actual relationship between the education sector and fragility or resilience and what this has meant for AED's role promoting change in the education sector through its interactions with governments and donors. A second section takes the findings and underlines the interaction between donor, recipient, and implementer. A final section suggests paths for conceptual and operational development to better integrate assistance in crises with assistance for development in the education sector, and considers how this may be related to the degree of fragility or resilience, and how this may be further examined.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Donors and implementers provide support to education systems in many countries and under a variety of conditions. In that broad context, this is AED's story of work with one donor (the United States Agency for International Development—USAID) in six countries: it does not intend to generalize to other countries, donors, or implementers, but it does describe commonalities found in AED's work mobilizing technical expertise, providing opportunities for dialogue and brokering relationships, fostering intellectual leadership, and managing international assistance programs and projects. It also does not intend to speak with any voice other than AED's; for governments and donors the education sector is but a piece of a much larger picture. At the same time, the experiences described here, and the commonalities and differences shown, may serve as opportunities to learn about working in the education sector over the long haul

with countries as they move from fragility towards greater resilience.

The document brings together two strands of work. The first is the review of the global state of the art and science reflected in the literature on education for emergencies, crises, and reconstructions, and the literature on education and development. Works were reviewed, summarized, and analyzed in search of common threads describing experiences in education in emergencies, crises, and reconstruction, as well as the concepts used to explain these experiences. A second line of work concerned descriptions of six countries (El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Namibia, and Nicaragua) and the projects AED implemented in these countries. Based on a documentary review, this effort included summarizing the main social, economic, and political trends in these countries and the development of their education sectors over the last three decades, mostly as reflected in documents about the education sector. It also included a review of documents describing, analyzing, and assessing the projects in which AED was involved in these countries.

Further understanding about the education sector and the projects was obtained through a limited set of interviews (thirteen informants), mostly from within but also outside AED, who were most familiar with the projects and their environment. A draft of the document was shared for comments with a panel of internal and external reviewers, including the interviewees who were knowledgeable about the countries and about education under conditions of fragility.

The main limitation in this work derives from the choice of information sources. Limitations in time and resources have meant that beyond the documentary review, sources close to the projects examined were favored given the interest in presenting AED's perspective as an implementer. AED staff provided information through one-on-one interviews in most of the cases examined. Complementing their perspective with the perspectives of donor and government interviewees will hopefully be a follow-on task.

Six Experiences in Assisting Education and Resilience

This section presents and discusses experiences in assistance to education in six countries moving from post-conflict or crisis situations towards greater resilience. The six countries presented are a sample of convenience, and have in common that AED has been present in them for extended periods over the last three decades. Systematic, large-scale cross-national analysis remains the obvious next step in this effort.

Four countries are located contiguously in northern Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and two in sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia and Namibia). Given the interest in understanding the relationship between the development of the state and the development of the education sector, the summaries presented here include a review of the recent history of the state in each case, and an identification of the main trends in the education sector. The role of international assistance is illustrated with a description of the projects implemented by AED, either directly or in partnership with other organizations. Most of this work was centered in specific countries, but one regional project is included because it relates to the four countries in Central America. In most cases the historical review begins in the 1980's. Though this is an arbitrary cut, it provides enough perspective to grasp more general trends in development of both the state and the education sector.

Central America

The end of the 1980s was a time of profound change in northern Central America. War in Nicaragua ended with the exit of the Sandinista government through elections in 1989, the 1990 *Oslo Accord* set the stage for peace negotiations in Guatemala, and the *Chapultepec* peace accord signed in 1992 ended war in El Salvador. Honduras did not experience civil war, but its poverty and vicinity to these three countries made it face significant conditions of fragility. These four countries share a common history, Spanish as the official language, a mixed Spanish and indigenous heritage, and similar, interrelated economies (see Table 1). They also share their proximity to the United States as a geopolitical power and a source of economic influence through commerce, the flow of immigrants and remittances and, unfortunately, drugs and gangs.

The recent history of the region also shows important divergences among countries. In El Salvador, the balance of power at the end of the war forced players to make concessions and address common challenges. In Nicaragua, political positions became increasingly radicalized over the late 20th century. In Guatemala, the unresolved tensions of social, economic, and cultural

Figure 1: Map of Central America

inequity keep the political and institutional system persistently off-balance and at risk of failing, while Honduras' weak economy and unresolved political differences conspire against sustained development.

After the wars, the expected "peace dividends" were not clearly realized in Central America. Donors pledged large amounts of funds with the signing of the peace in the various countries. However, trends in assistance and investment do not appear clearly related to these pledges, and in general official development assistance and aid appear more related to changes in government administrations than to the return of peace to the region. In some cases these changes are accompanied by an increase in foreign direct investment (see Figure 2). For Central America, the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Berlin

Wall in 1989 might have been an especially significant external factor, as European and U.S. assistance priorities and funding shifted to Central and Eastern Europe.

An overview of the four countries in northern Central America suggests that none of them have managed yet decisively to overcome a legacy of uncertain economic survival of families and individuals, weak institutions, and lack of capacity of the state to address unsatisfied basic needs, problems that are compounded, if not perpetuated, by small, hardened conservative elites (Seligson & Booth 1995; Booth, Wade, & Walker 2005; A20091203[1]). More recently external factors have also begun to change the dynamic in the region. The contrasting strands of Latin American left-wing politics—the strident populism of Chávez in Venezuela and the reformist social democracy of Lula in Brazil—have started to stake their claims in Central America, while the United States has yet to engage in clear leadership in the region (Hakim 2009).

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1 References to interviews are coded thus: [reference to interviewee list] [date in year/month/day format].

Table 1: Selected Indicators for Four Central American Countries, 2007 (unless otherwise noted)

	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua
ODA[1] per capita	14.43	30.80	33.70	65.35
FDI[2] per capita	249.82	2.83	54.20	114.86
Income share held by lowest 20%	3.26	3.44	2.45	3.79
Primary education completion rate	90.93	77.08	88.72	74.22
Percentage population with access to improved sanitation[3]	90.00	90.00	78.00	57.00
Percentage population with access to improved water source[4]	84.00	96.00	84.00	79.00
Life expectancy at birth	71.16	70.16	70.21	72.89
Mortality rate, under 5, per 1,000	23.80	39.00	23.90	34.60

Notes: 1 Official Development Assistance; 2 Foreign Direct Investment; 3 2006 data; 4 2005 data.
Source: World Bank, Selected World Development Indicators.

Available at: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135. [Last accessed Nov. 11, 2009].

Figure 2: Northern Central America: Official Development Assistance Per Capita and Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita, 1985-2007

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Notes: ELS—end of war in El Salvador; GUA—end of war in Guatemala; NIC—Sandinistas lose elections in Nicaragua; Mitch—Hurricane Mitch hits Central America. ODA PC–Official Development Assistance Per Capita; FDI PC–Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita; Alternately shaded backgrounds show presidential periods.

Source: Based on World Bank, selected World Development Indicators. Available at: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?meth od=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135. [Last accessed Nov. 11, 2009].

EL SALVADOR

El Salvador is a country of 6.9 million inhabitants (2007). Its gross national income per capita stands at $2,850 (Table 2). The combination of severe inequities, unaddressed grievances among the urban and rural poor, the authoritarian military control of government and the playing out of the Cold War in Central America led to civil war around 1980. Elections were held in 1984 and 1989, but it was not until 1992 that peace accords were signed between the National Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) and the national government. The same factors that led to the war also played out in the education sector: on the one hand, public education services were available mostly to urban populations, while during the war rural communities increasingly self-organized to provide for their own education through informal schools, frequently with formal or informal support from the FMLN.

Unlike its neighbors Guatemala and Nicaragua, which also suffered protracted wars in the late 20th century, El Salvador's government and elites faced a serious threat from an armed revolutionary movement seeking control of the state, leading to a more active engagement with reform than in the other countries. The consequent strengthening of the institutions seems to have served the country well (A20091203). Education reform was recognized as a critical item of social policy with the coming to power of the rightist ARENA party in 1989

and later as part of the peace accords in 1992. The two guiding principles in this were the modernization of the sector through a streamlined bureaucracy, decentralization and privatization of services, and rebuilding of the education system to incorporate all schools and increase access, completion,

Table 2: El Salvador–Selected Indicators

Population	6.9 million
GNI[1] per capita	$2,850 (Atlas method)
Population growth	1.4%
Population under poverty line	37%
Urban population	60%
Life expectancy at birth	72 years
Infant mortality	22 per 1,000 births
Child malnutrition	6% children under 5
Access to improved water	84% of population
Literacy	81% of population 15+
Gross primary enrollment[2]	114% school age population
Male	116% males of school age
Female	112% females of school age
GDP[3] per capita growth	
1987-1997	3% yearly average
1997-2007	1% yearly average
2007	2.8% year

Notes: 1 Gross National Income; 2 Gross primary enrollment is a relation between number of students actually enrolled and number of people of a given age group. Due to overage student enrollment, it can exceed 100%. 3 GDP Gross Domestic Product.

Source: World Bank Country at a Glance Profiles, based on the Development Economics LDB Database.

Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/slv_aag.pdf. [Last accessed December 4, 2009].

The two guiding principles in this were modernization of the sector through a streamlined bureaucracy, decentralization and privatization of services, and rebuilding of the education system to incorporate all schools and increase access, completion, and learning outcomes.

and learning outcomes (Cuéllar-Marchelli 2003, cited in Gillies 2009). Common interests and goals were identified through a broadly participatory sector assessment, sponsored by USAID in 1993, formally set down in the 1995–2005 ten-year plan, and followed up more recently in the 2021 plan of 2005 (Gobierno de El Salvador 2005). The 1995–2005 plan emphasized decentralization and broad participation to expand access to primary education, which translated into, among other things, the *Educación con Participación de la Comunidad*/Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) program, a community-based school management program that quite successfully expanded education coverage and community involvement in rural schools, though the impact was less evident in terms of education quality (Umanzor, Soriano, Vega, Jiménez, Rawlings, & Steele 1997; Di Gropello 2006).

Beyond the sector assessment mentioned, USAID assistance was considerable as

part of the U.S. effort to couple military presence in the Central American region with social policy initiatives and support for the national government in San Salvador. However, the United States also provided important support to civil society actors close to the business sector, helping to establish entities such as *Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo* (FEPADE) and *Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social* (FUSADES), two NGOs with major transformative roles in the education sector. Under a mandate to spend large amounts of money rapidly in social investment, donor support for such entities was considerable and exceptional in the years immediately after the signing of the peace accords (Guzmán 2002, cited in Gillies 2009[2]; H20091221).

Gillies (2009) underlines five key trends that account for the development of the education sector in El Salvador:

- Strong and consistent MOE[3] leadership, which enabled a country-led development effort

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2 Note that the author was unable to track down an original of Guzmán's document.

3 Ministries and secretariats of Education are named differently and use diverse acronyms in the various countries. (El Salvador: MINED; Ethiopia: MOE; Guatemala: MINEDUC; Honduras: SE, Namibia: MEC; Nicaragua: MINED). For consistency's sake in this document the highest education authority in the country is called the Ministry of Education (MOE).

- Participatory development of a sector assessment, strategy and two successive long-term plans, providing a framework for multi-donor assistance and societal consensus

- Stability of MOE mid-level leadership and technical expertise, providing continuity and a basis for deepening institutional capacity[4]

- Continuing commitment to the use of information, evaluation, and communications as part of the sector plans

- Effective (and considerable) technical and financial partnerships with donors, which made available resources enabling key processes and the development of structures over the long term

These trends must be placed against the backdrop of a much more balanced military and political outcome to the war than in Guatemala and Nicaragua, which in El Salvador led to greater recognition of the need for concessions by the government and the ruling elite to equality in social policy.

AED first became involved in the country as part of USAID's assistance under the Strengthening Achievement in Basic

Education project (SABE) (Management and Business Associates 1994, AED 1998), two years after the signing of the peace accords. As will be described further, the successive projects implemented pursued a U.S. assistance agenda seeking to: a) reintegrate an education sector that had been divided by the war and b) mainstream education reform through the modernization of the MOE. In keeping with USAID priorities, almost all efforts focused on developing primary education at the school level, with support to policies and institutional capacities serving that level in the education system. Over time and as funds diminished, a greater emphasis was placed on policy initiatives rather than school-based development.

SABE was awarded in 1991 and lasted until 1998, combining $30 million[5] in donor funds and $26 million from the government of El Salvador. The project concentrated on grades K–6 and included curriculum development and validation, strengthened supervision, decentralization and promotion of community involvement, commodities procurement, and tasks to improve education in ex-conflict areas (40 percent of the national territory), including textbook and materials procurement. Significant early interventions included assistance in dealing with the traumas of war and improving teacher skills and a certification process

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4 One interviewee went further and suggested that the combination of presidents committed to education, and a series of "tough, strong women" leading the MOE was critical: between 1992 and 2009 the MOE was led by four women (13 years) and one man (4 years) (C20090720).

5 All currency amounts are current U.S. dollars except if otherwise noted.

to incorporate informal teachers who had worked in areas controlled by FMLN into the MOE regular civil service (Management and Business Associates 1994, AED 1998; B20091208). In the early period of the project, a significant challenge for AED project directors[6] (E20090720) was achieving agreements and coordination with other donors working in development of textbooks and materials.

SABE played an important role in interaction with the MOE's plans. Beyond being the first major cooperation project providing support to the MOE in El Salvador after the war, it mobilized key inputs for the MOE's 1995–2005 national education plan in the form of a high-level consultant team that prepared the sector assessment leading to the definition of the plan's goals and strategies (MINED 1999). This involvement also provided key theoretical insights on policymaking in education (See especially Reimers and McGinn 1997:159–174), and valuable opportunities for representatives from both sides of the political divide to approach each other on technical issues.

SABE provided important technical lessons, including the value of a broadly participatory process of sector analysis as a basis for consensus on key aspects of policy and project design, the use of schools

directly assisted by the project as mentors for other schools in the system, the need for projects to closely mirror the MOE's priorities, and the importance of ongoing efforts to improve methodologies for teacher education (including work with supervisors and principals), mathematics teaching, school libraries, and training for trainers. It also provided management lessons, especially by showing the importance of incorporating the project management unit into the MOE, hiring a local assistant to the international project director to liaise effectively with national stakeholders, and the use of long-term MOE staff to lead efforts of decentralization at the departmental level (Management and Business Associates 1994, AED 1998). Most importantly, underlines an interviewee, SABE facilitated and sustained the political impetus for education reform in the critical years after the war, when trust between parties was low and challenges significant (B20091208).

Following a hiatus of three years, AED returned to El Salvador in July 2003 to develop the Excellence in Education at the Local Level (EXCELL) project (AIR & AED 2005, AED 2009). At $4.1 million,[7] this two-year project had a considerably smaller total and per-year budget than SABE. The project focused on school principals in 250 rural schools and 140 mid-level managers in the

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6 Known in USAID parlance as "chiefs of party" (COP)—a term that evokes images of white men in khakis and pith helmets.

7 *See:* http://www.equip123.net/webarticles/anmviewer. asp?a=69&z=16 [last accessed April 18, 2010].

MOE central and decentralized offices and sought to improve pedagogical leadership at the school level, planning, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at the institutional level and selected pieces of education policy research. This project already evinced the movement from school-level work to policy initiatives. It was quite effective in helping both principals and mid-level managers focus on the basic mission of the MOE—quality education for all children and pedagogical leadership as a means to achieve it in schools—but also faced varying levels of success in developing the requisite technical and pedagogical skills for this, especially given its short duration, having straddled the change in national government in 2004, and not being tasked nor resourced to work directly with teachers. A notable development was the production of several key studies addressing national education policy priorities, education quality issues, and teacher characteristics in the country, as well as the training of a cadre of specialists in monitoring and evaluation.

Since 2006 and to the present, AED has been implementing the Strengthening Basic Education project. This $6.6 million project, designed to assist the MOE in achieving the goals of the National 2021 Education Plan, seeks to support educational policies aimed at increasing the quality and quantity of social investment and improving transparency of the educational sector, and to increase and improve basic education opportunities. All project activities seek

impact on the national level, but direct interventions are carried out at 500 schools in five departments—a population that includes 500 principals, 3,000 teachers, and 100,000 students. Activities have included curriculum and materials development for graded and multi-grade primary schools, school management improvement programs to develop institutional educational projects and annual programs, and establishment of public–private partnerships with local and international organizations in support of education at the school level. It has also provided opportunities for policy dialogue and support to stakeholders on the sustainability of the national education goals included in the National 2021 Education Plan and helped development of technical tools to improve accountability, transparency, and credibility of public institutions in tracking amounts, sources, use, and distribution of funds for education (AED 2008b, AED 2009).

More recently the project has also provided emergency relief for schools serving refugees from hurricane Ida's damage. Notable in this emergency has been the use of support provided originally to community organizations for after-school activities.[8] The project is scheduled to end in December of 2010.

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8 One interviewee notes that schools invariably suffer in times of natural disasters. If they are not directly damaged, since they are one of the larger public facilities available in many localities, they are pressed into service as shelters, thus disrupting education processes anyway (B20091208).

In the context of the sector trends described by Gillies (2009), above, some of the outstanding trends visible in the projects implemented by AED between 1991 and 2009 include:

- Reduction of total and per-year donor funds

- Alignment of the project's components and activities with MOE priorities

- Transition from critical post-conflict support to ensuring expansion of coverage and re-integration of all schools into the national education system, to classroom-level activities enhancing quality, policy, and systems initiatives, including research

- Support through activities ranging from policy, planning, and organization to teacher development, materials development, assessment, and community engagement

El Salvador has now entered into a radical test: After almost 20 years of uninterrupted right-wing presence in the national government, in which the various political and technical players learned to work together, the FMLN, the left-wing party of the revolutionary movement, won the elections and has now been in power since June of 2009 (A20091203). This transition is made even more complex by the differences in politics and political style between the radical FMLN "old guard"—represented by Vice President Salvador Sánchez (who also serves as Minister of Education)—and President Mauricio Funes, a moderate outsider (B20091208). This difference resonates further with the competing interests between Brazil and Venezuela, both vying for influence in Central America. This political tension has affected specifically the relations with the U.S., perceived historically as an antagonist by the orthodox wing of the FMLN (A20091203), and spilled over into the relationship with AED.

GUATEMALA

Guatemala has the largest population (13 million) and economy in Central America. When the final peace agreement was signed in 1996, it was also the country that had had the longest lasting civil war in Latin America, having started 33 years earlier in the aftermath of the ousting of democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz.[9] The Peace Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation[10] among other issues required guarantees for greater equality

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9 The United States' role in this is well known (Gleijeses 1991) and underlines the ambiguous nature of its assistance in the aftermath of the war.

10 Signed in Mexico City on May 6, 1996, between the National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the Guatemalan government (SEPAZ 1996a).

in educational opportunities for women, increased investment in education, and education reform to serve cultural diversity, poverty alleviation, reduced discrimination, and enhanced productivity. Specific goals included a 50 percent increase in the national budget for education relative to 1995, at least three years schooling for all the population between 7 and 12 years of age and an increase in literacy to 70 percent, to be reached by the year 2000.

The Peace Accord on the Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples[11] promoted the use of all indigenous languages in the education sector, established the basis for an education reform that would address cultural and linguistic diversity through specific measures to develop the curriculum, improve governance and expand use of bilingual intercultural education, committed to an increase in public spending in education, and established a specific commission to follow up on these commitments.

Guatemala has had little continuity in its political party system (see Table 4), leading to considerable swings in public education policy since the signing of the peace accords.

In response to agreements reached in the peace accords, the 1996-2000 administration

Table 3: Guatemala–Selected Indicators

Population	13.3 million
GNI[1] per capita	$2,440 (Atlas method)
Population growth	2.5%
Population under poverty line	…[2]
Urban population	48%
Life expectancy at birth	70 years
Infant mortality	31 per 1,000 births
Child malnutrition	18% children under 5
Access to improved water	96% of population
Literacy	69% of population 15+
Gross primary enrollment	114% school age population
Male	118% males of school age
Female	109% females of school age
GDP[3] per capita growth	
1987-1997	1.6% yearly average
1997-2007	1.1% yearly average
2007	3.2% year

Notes: 1 Gross National Income; 2 No data; 3 GDP Gross Domestic Product.

Source: World Bank Country at a Glance Profiles, based on the Development Economics LDB Database.

Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf. [Last accessed on 12/04/2009].

focused education policy mainly on expanding coverage, increasing funding and improving institutional efficiency in the MOE. This included restructuring the National Program of Self-Management for

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11 Signed in Mexico City on March 31, 1995, between URNG and the Guatemalan government (SEPAZ 1996).

Table 4: Guatemala-Presidents and Political Parties 1986–2009

President	Period	Party and Political Persuasion
Marco Vinicio Cerezo	1986–1991	Christian Democratic (center left)
Jorge Serrano	1991–1993	Solidarity Action Movement (center right, populist)
Ramiro de León	1993–1996	Non-party (elected by the legislature)
Alvaro Arzú	1996–2000	National Advancement Party (right)
Alfonso Portillo	2000–2004	Guatemalan Republican Front (right, populist)
Oscar Berger	2004–2008	Grand National Alliance (multiparty, right)
Alvaro Colom	2008–present	National Unity of Hope (center left, populist)

Over the last decade and a half Guatemala's party politics have shown a persistent swing between left-leaning and right-leaning government administrations, with no party ever repeating in government, either continuously or discontinuously.

Educational Development (PRONADE), modeled on the successful EDUCO program in El Salvador, to aggressively expand coverage in rural areas. Over the next 10 years it would reach more than 4,631 schools serving more than 445,000 pre-primary and primary age students (Shuh Moore 2007:2). Impact on enrollment was significant: half of a 26 percent increase in the national net enrollment rate between 1996 and 2000 could be attributed to this program, and by 2007 the program was considered a success in terms of access and completion, serving between 15 percent and 20 percent of all pre-primary and primary school students in a cost-effective way. Despite its relative success, PRONADE was cancelled in 2008 in an effort to regularize teacher contracts and government control over a single unified education system.

Figure 3: Guatemala-MOE Budget Approved for Bilingual Education, 2000–2010 (GTQ millions)

Source: based on data from Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera/Integrated System for Financial Administration (SIAF). Available at: http://transparencia.minfin.gob.gt/transparencia/. [Last accessed December 9, 2009].

Over the last decade and a half the budget of the MOE has shown a five-fold increase at current values (Diálogo 2009). The significance of this increase is not clear, given important devaluations in the national currency, a concurrent inflationary trend, and the overall expansion of the national budget and the country's population. More importantly, the internal distribution of the budget among programs has shown important swings with the changes of administrations and policies. Under the current administration a large conditional cash transfer program in health and education targeting poor families was established under the MOE. Although this program has affected school intake positively, analysts suggest it has also distracted resources from the MOE's programs, especially primary education services (Diálogo 2009).

A persistent orphan in education policy in Guatemala is, unfortunately, bilingual education. Over 25 languages are spoken in the country, belonging to four major language families, including the official Spanish; around half the population speaks an indigenous language. There has been little progress despite this, the commitment voiced, and an ongoing policy debate on the topic supported by USAID and other donors over the last two and a half decades. The budget for bilingual education has increased steadily over the last decade (see Figure 3), but the allocation it receives is still minimal: for 2009 the approved budget for bilingual

education (GTQ 491 million[12]) was still less than 6.5 percent of the total approved budget for the MOE (GTQ 7,588.2 million).

Key trends in the education sector's development in Guatemala can be summarized thus:

- A general commitment to education reform that has not translated into a persistent educational development agenda: quantity of education at the primary level has expanded considerably while other levels remain limited, and quality of education lags far behind

- Repeated abrupt shifts in policy priorities accompanying changes in government and MOE leadership

- Persistent inequities in education, especially along lines of ethnicity, levels of education, and urban/rural distribution

- Persistent underfunding of education both in absolute terms and in terms of the allocation of the budget to critical issues

- Continuing commitment to the development of educational data

- An ongoing role of donors as "institutional memory" bridging the gaps between administrations, but without a clear sense of ongoing donor coordination or MOE leadership vis-à-vis donors

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12 US$ 1.00 = GTQ 7.85 (December 2010).

Table 5: Guatemala–Providing Support to Policy Dialogue over the Long Haul

Name of the Project	Amount	Years	Sectors
Equip2 Education Finance Policy Dialogue	$650,000	2004–2005	Education
Equip2 Dialogue for Social Investment in Guatemala	$2,549,360	2005–2007	Education
ABE/Link Dialogue for Social Investment in Guatemala	$4,280,183	2007–2009	Education and health
ABE/Link Dialogue for Social Investment in Guatemala	$9,813,914 (planned)	2009–2013 (planned)	Education and health

Source: AED records

AED has a long history of engagement with education in Guatemala, under a variety of contracts and agreements with USAID (AED 2009) and spanning the period of active civil war in the country. As in the case of El Salvador, projects show a trend from support at the school level to systems approaches and support to policy development and implementation. Early projects show a considerable continuity in methodologies. Between 1974 and 1979 it implemented the CIAGO (Western Guatemala Agricultural Information Communication) project, at the time when the war was increasing in violence. This activity promoted the adoption of a *Basic Village Education* (BVE) model, which emphasized design based on a culturally sensitive ethnographic methodology. Almost concurrently, between 1975 and 1981 that project was accompanied by the Guatemala Basic Rural Education project, a $1.26 million contract to assist the Government of Guatemala in planning and implementing a national non-formal education program targeting the indigenous population in the Guatemalan Western Highlands. This used some of the methods developed under the BVE model.

In 1986 and 1987 AED implemented the Guatemala Radio Education project, which expanded an educational radio system already supported under the BVE model. The educational radio system provided programs in health, nutrition, agriculture, cooperatives, environmental preservation, family education, and community development (AED 2009).

Between 1990 and 1997 AED implemented the BEST (Basic Education Strengthening) project, a $30 million initiative charged with improving the efficiency, coverage, and administration of basic education services in Guatemala. It was during this period that a cease-fire was declared between the

government and URNG, and the peace accords were negotiated and finally signed in 1996. AED's activities focused on bilingual education for Mayan-speaking peoples, curriculum revision, teacher and supervisor training, alternative education technologies and computerized management information systems for the MOE. BEST included the implementation of the *Nueva Escuela Unitaria*/New Multigrade School (NEU), a landmark methodology of active learning modeled on Colombia's *Escuela Nueva*. This served a total of 283 government schools and more than 1,000 privately funded schools (Leu, Hays, LeCzel, & O'Grady 2005). This project also had a component for interactive radio education in mathematics and Spanish as a second language (N20100217).

Between 2000 and 2002 AED implemented the LearnLink task order, which sought to improve intercultural, bilingual education in Guatemala through teacher development. This project innovatively addressed the mandate of the peace accords by strengthening teacher development in bilingual and multicultural education, using ICTs (information and communications technologies) to improve the knowledge and teaching of indigenous languages, motivate teachers, and promote the production of early childhood development materials in indigenous languages. Through LearnLink, many rural communities first had access to information technologies. Between 2002 and 2004 the implementation of the dot-EDU

Associate Award followed up on the use of ICT tools to prepare bilingual education teachers under the award-winning *Enlace Quiché* project (EDC & AED 2004). This $1 million project established 20 Bilingual Intercultural Education Technology centers (CETEBI) in and around the predominantly indigenous department of Quiché in the Guatemalan Western Highlands. This project also focused on preparing teachers as role models to provide a more welcoming environment for female students and increase girls' participation and interaction in classroom learning activities. *Enlace Quiché* was formally established as a self-sustaining NGO at the end of the project and continues to operate to date.[13] Notable among the efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s was the degree to which the initiatives proposed became institutionalized as national policy in the MOE—especially those in bilingual intercultural education—as a cadre of specialists who cut their policy teeth in these projects moved into positions of leadership (N20100217).

In 2004 and 2005 AED implemented the Education Finance Policy Dialogue project (AED 2009b). This would become the first of four consecutive, tightly inter-linked "Dialogue for Social Investment" projects continuing to date (see Table 5). The dialogue projects have conducted and disseminated policy research, implemented mass and

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13 See: www.enlacequiche.org.

targeted communications and facilitated dialogue activities engaging national government officers, legislators, political parties, business leaders, national and local NGOs, and local governments to discuss and address the need for increased and improved social investment. For the first two projects (2004–2005 and 2005–2007),[14] this covered only the education sector. Since 2007 the projects have engaged both the education and health sectors.[15] Building on the information systems work started in the early 1990s under the BEST project (see above), the Dialogue for Social Investment projects have provided technical support to the development of an innovative *Platform for Integrated Social Information* (PISI), a government tool that integrates a broad range of health and education data sources for policy analysis, accountability, and dialogue (AED 2009a; Alvarado 2009). The current Dialogue for Social Investment project began in 2009 and is expected to run until 2013.

Trends visible in AED's 19 years of work in Guatemala since 1975 include:

- An increasing engagement with education sector policies and systems, rather than work directly in a limited number of schools

- Mobilization of experts and services from a broad range of fields of technical expertise

- Building of information systems that support the education sector and more recently health and other sectors

- Ensuring continuity during changes between governments with considerable differences in priorities on key aspects of education policy

HONDURAS

Unlike its neighbors Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, Honduras did not suffer a civil war in the last decades of the 20th century. However, it has been both a significant player in the regional conflicts and a state subject to considerable challenges due to the combination of poverty and inequality, high national debt, weak institutions, a significant U.S. military presence in the base in Palmerola and its proximity to three countries with internal conflict. Honduras' fragility was much aggravated by hurricane Mitch in the last week of October 1998, which caused extensive damage, killing over 5,600 and leaving 285,000 homeless.[16] Although Mitch affected Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other countries, its effect on Honduras

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14 Implemented under USAID's EQUIP2 mechanism (*see* http://www.equip123.net)

15 Implemented under the ABE-Link (Aid to Basic Education-Linkages to Health) indefinite quantity contract.

16 Numbers quoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/backgrounder2.htm). [Last accessed December 14, 2009].

Table 6: Honduras–Selected Indicators

Population	7.1 million
GNI[1] per capita	$1,600 (Atlas method)
Population growth	1.9%
Population under poverty line	51%
Urban population	47%
Life expectancy at birth	70 years
Infant mortality	23 per 1,000 births
Child malnutrition	9% children under 5
Access to improved water	84% of population
Literacy	80% of population 15+
Gross primary enrollment	118% school age population
Male	119% males of school age
Female	118% females of school age
GDP[2] per capita growth	
1987-1997	0.7% yearly average
1997-2007	2.3% yearly average
2007	4.5% year

Notes: 1 Gross National Income; 2 GDP Gross Domestic Product.

Source: World Bank Country at a Glance Profiles, based on the Development Economics LDB Database. Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf. [Last accessed on 12/04/2009]

was devastating, severely damaging its public infrastructure. As recalled by one interviewee, an estimated 10 percent of schools were lost, and all education records and databases for teachers, students, and schools were lost in one night when flash floods reached the third floor of the MOE building (G20091218).

The Minister of Education's strong leadership immediately after the hurricane helped focus efforts on a clear goal—ensuring that all children returned to school when the school year started in early 1999, a goal that was achieved despite the severe damage to school infrastructure throughout the country.[17] International cooperation agencies in education established a model mechanism for coordinating development assistance, through the establishment of the Donor Roundtable for Cooperation Agencies in Education (MERECE), a coordination structure that persists to this day. One interview underlines that the minister, with donor support, saw the post-Mitch recovery plan not just as reconstruction, but rather as an opportunity to reform the education sector (G20091218).

AED has been engaged in Honduras since the early 1980s in health, water, and sanitation programs.[18] In education, AED's involvement began in 1986 with the implementation of

17 Hurricane Mitch struck Honduras during the break at the end of the school year. Ensuring schools opened and children returned to school was important not just in pedagogical terms, but more broadly to the communities' well-being: Parents and leaders recognized that until schools reopened and children returned to school, business and family life could not go back to normal, points out one informant.

18 The development of U.S. assistance in education in Honduras during the 1980s must be placed against the backdrop of political confrontations between teachers' unions and United States' support to secondary education in Honduras during the 1970s, which even a decade later led USAID to be very cautious about engaging in this sector (H20091221).

the USAID-funded Central American Peace Scholarships (CAPS) program for Honduras. This funded undergraduate, graduate, and short-term educational opportunities in agriculture, health, education and business administration. By 1995, CAPS had facilitated training for 831 people in degree-granting and non-degree programs (AED 1989, AED 1995, AED 2009).

AED also implemented the decade-long Primary Education Efficiency Project (1986–1995) with a budget of almost $23.9 million. The project was charged with assisting the MOE in education research, management information systems (MIS) implementation, teacher development, test development, and social marketing, as well as curriculum development. It successfully implemented child-centered learning environments in classrooms and engaged communities in school management, reducing dropout rates and increasing completion for 4th and 5th graders (CAII 1995). Coincidentally, from 1987 to 1992 AED implemented the Honduras Radio Learning Project (RLP), which provided technical assistance for *Asociación de Promoción y Desarrollo Socioeconómico* (AVANCE), a national NGO, to produce interactive radio instruction courses in mathematics, Spanish-language reading and English as a second language (ESL) for grades 1 through 3 (AED 2009).

Between 1999 and 2002 AED worked in Honduras leading the implementation of the IEQ (Improving Education Quality)

project in partnership with AIR, Education Development Center, Juárez & Associates, and the University of Pittsburgh.[19] This project provided support to *Educatodos*, an alternative secondary education initiative led by the government of Honduras. With USAID emergency reconstruction funds, this project sought to increase literacy among youth and young adults in settings not served by the regular education system, in partnership with private businesses, NGOs, local governments, and religious and community organizations (Spaulding 2002). The IEQ program was very successful. Several evaluations and impact studies showed that student achievement was the same as that of students enrolled in regular schools and employment opportunities improved for students in the program, while the cost per student was a third of that spent in regular schools (AED 2004, Del Cid n.d.). Although the first six grades of *Educatodos* had been developed by USAID before hurricane Mitch, it was the emergency funding provided in the context of the response to the hurricane that allowed it to address the needs of the young out-of-school population that was particularly vulnerable due to hurricane damage (G20091218).

Since 2004, AED, as a subcontractor to AIR, has implemented the MIDEH (Honduras

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19 IEQ was an indefinite quantity contract funded by USAID and led globally by AIR. AED was the technical leader for the project implemented in Honduras under this mechanism (see www.ieq.org).

Improving Student Achievement) project. This $20.1 million project includes policy and institutional support activities in curriculum and materials development, information systems, and strategic planning. It also conducts education policy research, development, planning, and implementation and develops standards and student testing (AED 2009; AED 2010 forthcoming).

The more visible trends in AED's work in Honduras described here include:

- Attention to school-level development and non-formal education options, including content development and delivery mechanisms

- Strategic use of crisis response funds to enhance and expand key education interventions

- Growing involvement in system-level activities, especially those linked to teacher professional development and information systems

Honduras faces persistent challenges to its development. The country was plunged into a constitutional and political crisis when the army deposed president, José Manuel Zelaya, on June 28, 2009. This measure, presented as a response to Zelaya's intention to modify the country's constitution to allow his reelection, was widely considered illegal and was vocally but ineffectively criticized by the international community and Zelaya's

supporters.[20] All MIDEH's activities with the government were suspended as part of the United States' efforts to pressure the government of Roberto Micheletti, Zelaya's substitute, to find a solution to the crisis. However, regularly scheduled elections were held on November 29, 2009. With the election of Porfirio Lobo as president there is the expectation of a return to regular relations,[21] both internally and in the suspended foreign assistance activities.

NICARAGUA

Nicaragua, with close to 5.8 million inhabitants, lies at the lower end of the income scale among the four Central American countries included in this report (see Figure 4). Nicaragua is also probably the country with the least resolved internal political conflict in the region. In 1979 long-time dictator Anastasio Somoza, last in a dynasty that went back to 1936 was ousted after a protracted civil war (1963-1979) (Gillies, Galisson, Drury, & Sanyal 2009). The initial governing junta came

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20 *See for example*: Malkin, E and M. Lacey (2009) "Battle for Honduras Echoes Loudly in Media." *New York Times* September 24, 2009 (available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/world/americas/25honduras.html?_r=1 [last accessed April 15, 2010]).

21 Carroll, R. (2009). "Honduras elects Porfirio Lobo as new president." *Guardian.co.uk* (available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/30/honduras-lobo-president [last accessed April 15, 2010]).

to be dominated by the left-wing FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional), strenuously opposed by the Reagan administration in the United States. In 1984 Daniel Ortega was elected president on an increasingly radicalized Sandinista ticket, in what is widely considered a free and fair election (Seligson & Booth 1995). However, the "Contra" resistance, which brought together a variety of political and military opponents to the Sandinista government, grew with considerable support from the U.S. government. After more than half a decade of war the weakened Sandinistas were replaced in 1989 through open elections by a coalition government led by Violeta Chamorro, onetime member of the initial junta and widow of a journalist killed during the Somoza regime. Under Chamorro diplomatic relations with the United States improved significantly (F20090722). The United States saw education as an opportunity for stabilization and building of new confidence in the country (C20090720). The Chamorro-led administration initiated a three-pronged reform, which comprised dismantling the Sandinista education system (including cutting government spending on what were perceived as successful, Sandinista-led social programs), removing the ideological content from the previous regime in education (which led to a hurried replacement of textbooks with scant curriculum planning), and implementing a market-oriented model prioritizing primary education human capital and skills building and technical and higher education (Marques & Bannon

Table 7: Nicaragua–Selected Indicators

Population	5.6 million
GNI[1] per capita	$980 (Atlas method)
Population growth	1.3%
Population under poverty line	…[2]
Urban population	56%
Life expectancy at birth	72 years
Infant mortality	29 per 1,000 births
Child malnutrition	8% children under 5
Access to improved water	79% of population
Literacy	77% of population 15+
Gross primary enrollment	116% school age population
Male	117% males of school age
Female	114% females of school age
GDP[3] per capita growth	
1987-1997	-1.3% yearly average
1997-2007	2.2% yearly average
2007	2.9% year

Notes: 1 Gross National Income; 2 No data; 3 GDP Gross Domestic Product.

Source: World Bank Country at a Glance Profiles, based on the Development Economics LDB Database. Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf. [Last accessed on 12/04/2009]

2003; F20090722). Most teachers were part of the Sandinistas' political base and, if not adequately trained, would not qualify under civil service rules to work as government-employed teachers. Interviewees point out that providing resources to the schools and engaging communities created a "space" for goodwill and preliminary opportunities for agreement in the sector (E20090720, C20090720).

However, without strong leadership and lacking national agreements, education policy and the MOE have shown irregular progress, frequent changes of direction and a high dependence on international donor financing ever since (Gillies, Galisson, Drury and Sanyal 2009). This has been aggravated by a series of natural disasters, including an earthquake in 1992 that rendered 13,500 people homeless,[22] and hurricane Mitch, which in 1998 killed over 3,000 people[23] and left hundreds of thousands homeless (F20090722).

During the 1990s the MOE experienced stronger leadership as its two-time minister, Humberto Belli, began a major reform moving away from the centralized management system of the Sandinistas (Gillies 2009). This included implementing a radical Autonomous Schools program, developing a new curriculum and an effort to increase efficiency, modernize information technologies, and increase accountability in the MOE, as well as a short-lived municipalization effort transferring fiscal resources for municipalities to administer school responsibilities. This was suppressed, reputedly because it undermined the role and authority of school councils and gave power

to Sandinistas in municipal-level positions funds (Gershberg 2002 *cited in* Gillies 2009). Gillies, Galisson, Drury, and Sanyal (2009) also mention that during the 2000s a National Education Plan was developed for the 2001–2015 period, and Nicaragua applied and qualified for the Fast Track Initiative (FTI). A SWAp was adopted in 2003 to coordinate donor and government resources. In 2007 a new Sandinista government began to re-centralize education, concerned that school fees charged by autonomous schools under decentralization had led to increases in inequality (Gershberg 2002 *cited in* Gillies 2009). It did, however, keep and institutionalize the Active Schools initiative, and expanded it beyond its original jurisdiction to the rest of the country.

Key trends in the education sector in Nicaragua include (Gillies, Galisson, Drury, & Sanyal 2009):

- Persistent politicization of the education sector and education discourse, making dialogue across party lines very difficult

- As a consequence, radical and repeated policy swings related to the alternation between right- and left-wing governments, which challenge institution building and are not predicated on broad-based political buy-in

- Expanding implementation of active school policies as an example of a bottom-up reform that continues to develop over time and as regimes change

22 Number cited by the U.S. Geological Survey (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1992_09_02.php). [Last accessed April 15, 2010].

23 Number cited by the Inter-American Development Bank (http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/backgrounder3.htm). [Last accessed December 14, 2009]

Figure 4: GNI Per Capita in Four Central American Countries, 1985-2008. PPP, current international US$

Source: based on http://ddp.ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryID=135

- Persistent fiscal weakness and under-funding of the sector due to a large public debt and weak national production

- Persistent reliance on international donors (both through technical and financial assistance) to catalyze coordination, strategic planning and program implementation, as well as bridge policies during changes of government

- Increases in enrollment but persistent inefficiency in the education system (measured by levels of repetition and dropout) and little overall improvement in performance

AED became engaged in Nicaragua in 1993, half way into the period of the government of Violeta Chamorro, through the implementation of the Basic Education and Training Program (BASE I), a $16 million program that lasted until 1999 (ICRE 1996; DevTech Systems 1996). Its main goal was improvement in primary education through the introduction of child-centered teaching methodologies and community support for schools. BASE I introduced the *Escuela Modelo* (Model School) in Nicaragua, adapting the Guatemalan experience with the NEU to the Nicaraguan context (Leu, Hays, LeCzel, & O'Grady 2005). By 1996 the project had reached an estimated 750,000 students,

developed a child-centered curriculum for grades 1 to 4, trained 20,000 teachers to use the new curriculum, and printed and distributed over 426,000 textbooks and over 46,000 teacher guides (DevTech Systems 1996).

BASE I also assisted the MOE with professional development and administrative systems development, implemented a new education management information system (EMIS) and created a group of 68 "model" schools that received dedicated project attention in teacher development, furniture procurement, teaching materials, guides, textbooks, and manuals (DevTech Systems 1996).

Between 1999 and 2005, AED implemented BASE II as a follow-on to BASE I. That project reached a total budget of $21.3 million, including $16.8 million for programmed activities and $4.5 million that were added for school recovery after hurricane Mitch hit Central America in 1998. BASE II expanded the reforms begun under BASE I, with increased emphasis on rural education, bilingual education, parent and community involvement in improving school quality, and educational statistics and applied research (AED 2008a).

BASE II introduced considerable innovation in classroom- and school-level active education methodologies based on the Colombian *Escuela Nueva* (New School) and Guatemalan *Nueva Escuela Unitaria*

(New Multigrade School) experiences. AED engaged Oscar Mogollón, the late Colombian co-founder of *Escuela Nueva* to design and implement this work (C20090720). There was strong evidence that these innovations had a positive impact on the model schools in which they were implemented, including a 30 percent increase in mathematics and Spanish language performance among 3rd and 4th grade students, active parent participation in over 90 percent of schools in the Pacific and Central Regions of the country, retention rates over 90 percent and completion rates over 70 percent. By the end of the project 170 model schools had been implemented in 102 municipalities throughout the country, and the MOE had taken the initiative to replicate the BASE II reforms throughout the entire primary education system.

Between 2003 and 2006 AED implemented the Global Development Alliance[24] / Public-Private Alliance in Education (GDA) project

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24 The Global Development Alliance is a USAID program that promotes the "forging of public-private alliances to stimulate economic growth, develop businesses and workforces, address health and environmental issues, and expand access to education and technology … to arrive at solutions only available through pooled efforts. The resources united are as diverse as the alliances themselves, including technology and intellectual property rights, market creation, best practices, policy influence, in-country networks, and expertise in development programs ranging from international trade to biodiversity protection." (USAID Global Development Alliance: Internet Home. Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/gda/ [Accessed November 16, 2009]).

in Nicaragua (AED 2008c). This project was funded by private sector organizations ($8.9 million) and USAID ($5 million). The project drew on the experience of the BASE projects to develop its education content. This included the introduction of the Model School approach in 136 schools through partnerships with private sector sponsors (AED 2008c). For example, the project engaged AMCHAM (the American Chambers of Commerce) in addressing education quality, an issue where that organization would not otherwise have considered working (Galisson & Brady 2006; F20090722). AED was able to link the activities in this project with its Global Learning Portal,[25] an Internet-based education resource, building a Community of Practice for organizations and persons involved in the active school model.

This project showed that interest in social policy issues could be elicited from private sector leaders, a finding that was previously dismissed out-of-hand by the political left,and promoted a key shift in business support from funding school construction to supporting quality learning and teaching. Essential for this shift was the ongoing involvement of private corporate partners

in several successive steps of a partnership, leading to a growing sense of ownership in the process. The project ended in 2006, before the change in government, and it is a matter of speculation whether it would have survived under the new Sandinista administration (F20090722).

In 2005 AED became involved in the implementation of the Expansion of Centers of Excellence in Nicaragua project (EXCELENCIA) as technical leader, sub-contracted under the American Institutes for Research (AIR) (AED 2009). This $15.9 million project (of which AED implemented a $3.9 million sub-award) focused on curriculum and materials revision and development, strengthening of systems for monitoring and evaluation and data collection, education policy studies and policy development, teacher professional development, support for community and student participatory structures, and school and institutional management and leadership development. It also took up work with some of the schools originally served under the GDA project (see above).

Key trends in AED's work in Nicaragua since 1993 have included:

- A persistent focus on school- and classroom-based work

- Increasing sophistication of the type of support to schools, especially focused on the adaptation of the Escuela Nueva

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25 *See* www.glp.net. The Global Learning Portal is a multi-lingual online knowledge network for educators worldwide, managed by AED. GLP is a global alliance composed of regional groups, international organizations such as UNESCO, bilateral aid agencies such as USAID, private-sector entities, and non-governmental organizations.

model engaging whole school communities and school networks, which demonstrated considerable impact at the school level

- Expansion of support to a large proportion of the country's schools in response to the Nicaraguan government's adoption of the Escuela Nueva model as national policy

- Engagement of private sector leaders in school development and education policy through public-private partnerships

- Ongoing challenges of discontinuity between contrasting policies when government authorities change in a highly polarized political environment

CERCA: A REGIONAL INITIATIVE

In addition to the projects described for each country, between 2002 and 2006 AED implemented the CERCA (Civic Engagement for Education Reform in Central America) project. This $3.4 million project operated in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in Central America, as well as in the Dominican Republic. CERCA sought to strengthen forces for improving education quality in these countries by creating a shared vision among key national and community level stakeholders, facilitating collaborative action among public and non-governmental stakeholders to achieve changes in

policies and practices promoting greater participation by parents, communities, and teachers themselves, and creating broad, well-informed and well-articulated constituencies in each of the countries to ensure sustainability of the reform efforts over time (AED 2005). This project is of interest because it addressed the mutually related aspects of community engagement (at the local and national level), teachers, and schools in improving education quality (A20091203).

CERCA is also important because, having implemented similar activities in each of the countries, it underlined similarities and contrasts between them. For example, while progress in work with teachers in Honduras and Nicaragua—two countries with relatively weak institutions—depended on the personal characteristics of the participants, in El Salvador the conversation with teachers focused much more explicitly on school-level results, while greater attention was paid to the teachers' political agenda in Guatemala. The project also underlined the tension between teachers' interpretations of their social role and their resistance to oversight by the MOE, and especially by communities (A20091203), an issue that becomes critical in attempting to incorporate teachers into a broader development program.

The project focused on developing national participation by setting up a broadly representative "consultative committee"

in each country, and also promoted and rehearsed the use of a "school report card"—a community-based tool with easy-to-understand metrics of school conditions and performance—(Flórez, Chesterfield, & Siri 2006) as a means for engagement and dialogue between communities and schools on education quality. Results were mixed across the region: the will of the MOE to endorse the initiative and give the schools the necessary leeway for local decision making was critical for success (A20091203).

Sub-Saharan and Southern Africa

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is the third largest country by land mass in sub-Saharan Africa, and second largest by population (80.7 million inhabitants). Its size, history, and location make Ethiopia significant not only in the Horn of Africa, but also throughout the continent and globally. One of the oldest human settlements and one of the longest continuously existing countries in the world, Ethiopia features a successful resistance to colonialism, a rich cultural history, and great ethnic and linguistic complexity: 85 languages are spoken[26], and at least 20 languages are used in instruction. A complex recent political history, fragile agricultural environment leading to famine, and persistent poverty make this country a prime example of the challenges to effective aid (MOFED 2006).

Following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 the country experienced

Figure 5: Map of Ethiopia

17 years of a heavy-handed Soviet-supported military dictatorship known as "the Derg," Amharic for "the committee." This was fiercely resisted in many parts of the country. Seventeen years of civil war led to the collapse of the Derg in 1991, facilitated by the withdrawal of Soviet support in 1989. A transition government followed, headed by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition that led the fight against the Derg. The constitution of 1994 established

26 Ethnologue (2009). Languages of the World: Languages of Ethiopia. Available at: http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=et. SIL [Last accessed on December 14, 2009].

Table 8: Ethiopia—Selected Indicators

Population	79.1 million
GNI[1] per capita	$220 (Atlas method)
Population growth	2.6%
Population under poverty line	…[2]
Urban population	17%
Life expectancy at birth	52 years
Infant mortality	77 per 1,000 births
Child malnutrition	35% children under 5
Access to improved water	42% of population
Literacy	36% of population 15+
Gross primary enrollment	91% school age population
Male	97% males of school age
Female	85% females of school age
GDP[3] per capita growth	
1987-1997	-1.3% yearly average
1997-2007	3.3% yearly average
2007	8.4% year

Notes: 1 Gross National Income; 2 No data; 3 GDP Gross Domestic Product.

Source: World Bank Country at a Glance Profiles, based on the Development Economics LDB Database. Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf. [Last accessed on 12/04/2009]

a new federal and democratic state, though political processes are still developing even now (Leu 2005.) Since then the state has developed considerably. One of the more salient aspects of this is a profound decentralization, following lines of language and ethnic identity in parallel to the national identity, and which has effectively shifted responsibility, authority, *and* commensurate

resources to the regions and *woredas* (counties) at the local level (D20091203).

Unfortunately, Ethiopia has faced challenges in developing greater resilience. The war with Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, the country's military involvement in Somalia, the overflow of the ongoing problems in Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan, and violence surrounding the 2005 elections all attest to the difficulty of establishing a solid federal state in a context of great cultural, social, economic, and geopolitical complexity (Leu 2005; D20091203).

Foreign assistance varied significantly over the period described, reflecting the Ethiopian government's changing political allegiances. Under the Derg the Soviet, East German, Cuban, and North Korean technical and financial assistance prevailed. With the fall of the Derg, U.S. assistance returned to the country after almost 20 years of absence (with exception of food and famine relief), developing an important presence together with a variety of other donors. The AED-implemented Basic Education System Overhaul (BESO I) program was USAID's first large intervention in the education sector and an important part of foreign assistance to education after the Derg (D20091203). USAID has funded education reform programs in Ethiopia consistently since 1995 and currently integrates all programs with the government's General Education Quality Improvement Program (GEQIP), which is funded through $417

million of collective investment from the government and the pooled funds of other donors, including resources from a Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Catalytic Fund grant (D20091203).[27]

Over the period since the fall of the Derg, Ethiopia has dramatically expanded access to education with the primary gross enrolment rates rising from around 20 percent to 95.6 percent by 2007 (MOE/ESDPP 2009). This remarkable achievement in expanding the quantity of education has jeopardized quality in Ethiopia as in many countries pursuing the goals of Education for All. The quantity of its resources has been unable to keep up with the explosive growth in enrollment. As a result, the government is now emphasizing improvement of the quality of education as its primary policy objective. In addition, important equity issues are now very visible, including gender imbalances in most areas and regional variation with persistent under-enrolment and under-achievement in the more rural and marginalized areas of the country. Student performance, measured through national learning assessments as percentages of students that pass minimum requirements, also continue to be low in all levels of the system (USAID 2009).

Figure 6: Ethiopia-Primary Net Enrollment Rate, 1999–2008

Source: Prepared with data from the Education Policy Data Center database Available at: http://epdc.org/Search.aspx. [Last accessed December 14, 2009]

AED has implemented USAID-funded programs that support access, quality, and equity in education in Ethiopia continuously since 1995 and will accompany the education sector in that country for a further five years with the recently initiated Improvement of Quality in Primary Education Program (IQPEP) (USAID 2009). AED first came to Ethiopia in 1994 as part of a multi-organization team to conduct an assessment and project design for the program that became BESO I. In 1995 AED was awarded the contract and began implementation of the seven-year BESO I program that ended in September 2002. AED led this $35 million initiative with AIR, RTI and Clark Atlanta

27 *See: Ethiopia: Sixteen Million Students to Benefit from World Bank Credit to Improve the Quality of General Education*". Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-TERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22013088~pagePK:64257 043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html?cid=3001. [Last accessed January 28, 2010.]

University as partners. BESO I sought to improve access, quality and equity in primary education in the newly decentralized system of Ethiopia. The program itself was also highly decentralized, with operations in the Tigrai region in the far north and the Southern Nations and Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR), as well as in Addis Ababa in support to the central MOE. This program was designed as a policy-led activity but over time transitioned to greater school- and teacher-focused interventions in response to the MOE's and the Regional Education Bureaus' (REB) needs.

The program started with a relatively large team of international specialists, who were deeply embedded in the REBs, teacher education institutions, and the MOE, with a small but growing number of Ethiopian staff. BESO I played an important role in supporting capacity building in planning, management, and budgeting at the regional, and eventually *woreda*, level. BESO I also worked with the newly decentralized curriculum that followed active learning principles and strengthened school leadership, as well as pre-service teacher education and in-service teacher professional development. As part of the in-service teacher professional development program, BESO I introduced school clusters and school-based teacher development as an in-service model (D20091203). The MOE adopted the cluster model as national policy in 2001, underscoring the value of

effective decentralization and opportunities for experimentation at the local level that eventually informed and shaped central policy (Leu, Hays, LeCzel, & O'Grady 2005; D20091203).[28]

The BESO II (Basic Education Strategic Objective) project started in October 2002 immediately after BESO I and ended in September 2007. This $30.4 million project was also led by AED, in partnership with AIR. Again one of its major objectives was to improve pre-service teacher education. BESO II expanded to work with the Ministry of Education and all REBs in the country to develop stronger admissions procedures, and policies and programs that supported female students and staff in the teacher training institutes (TTIs), and in the teaching profession in general, as well as continuing support to curriculum reform and improved teaching.[29] BESO II extended activities to all nine regions and two city administrations in the country between 2002 and 2004, though paradoxically it also became more centralized in its design and operation, reflecting also the donor's trend toward more detailed project design and a greater focus on

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28 This policy also underlines the central role BESO I was able to play being embedded within the MOE: a federal task force, including 12 Ethiopians and three international specialists representing DfID, Irish Aid, and USAID, drafted the national teacher development policy, named the TESO (Teacher Education Overhaul).

29 According to AED administrative records.

unified quantifiable outcomes (D20091203). The number of international specialists was reduced with respect to the previous project and all were based in the project office at the MOE in Addis Ababa.

Between January 2008 and August 2009 AED implemented the Education Quality Improvement Program 2 (EQUIP2) Building the Capacity of Primary Education Managers and Educators program. This $6.3 million activity was charged with conducting in-service and pre-service teacher education, strengthening monitoring and evaluation (including conducting the third national student assessment[30]), education policy, computer acquisitions, support for Parent-Teacher Associations and school boards, and capacity building for planning and management in the MOE and *woredas* (AED 2010, forthcoming). Almost 4,000 *woreda* officers and 5,474 principals participated in training, and evidence was collected for improved quality of planning at the *woreda* level, increased engagement by education and training board members in schools, and improvement in teacher quality, visible in lesson plans, teacher knowledge, teaching practice and student learning (AED 2009b).

The IQPEP program is a $33.4 million USAID-funded program awarded to AED in August of 2009. It is expected to last until July 2014 (USAID 2009). It has

been charged with focusing support to the Ministry of Education's GEQIP integrating its programs with the ministry's activities in strengthening pre-service teacher education, in-service teacher professional development, decentralized planning and management mainly at the *woreda* level, and promoting gender equity within the education system (*see* USAID 2009:12-13). IQPEP is expected to reach around 40,000 primary school teachers with a comprehensive professional development program and 2,000 primary schools in 200 focus *woredas*.

Trends that run through all the AED-run programs in Ethiopia include:

- An important alignment by the donor and AED with the Ethiopian government's priorities

- Thorough integration into the government's programs and co-location of all programs in the ministry, the regional bureaus, or teachers colleges

- Implementation of large projects with a wide variety of activities centered on access, quality and equity

- Support to the expansion of active learning as an alternative to traditional rote learning as a key approach to improving the quality of basic education at the school level

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30 The first two national student assessments were conducted under BESO I and BESO II, respectively.

NAMIBIA

Namibia was only established as an independent state on March 21, 1990, after 25 years of war with South Africa led by the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). It faces among many challenges a legacy of colonialism and institutionalized racism through apartheid, and an economy of extraction and exportation of natural resources with little added value. Although the country has enjoyed some of the highest per capita income levels in Africa (its per capita GDP was $1,614 in 2001), it has also been one of the most inequitable in its distribution, with almost 10 percent of its population considered extremely poor and another 40 percent as relatively poor. Income also varies dramatically by region, with annual income in 1999 being $175 per person in the Northern region of Ohangwena and $1,090 in the southern region of Karas. Twelve languages are spoken (including English as the national language), and the estimated prevalence of HIV among adults 15–49 years of age was 15.3 percent for 2007 (UNAIDS 2008).

Namibia's education sector at independence reflected the inequity and fragmentation along racial and ethnic lines of pre-independent society (USAID [n.d.]). In the five years after independence the country embarked on a broad education reform focused on transitioning from apartheid to inclusive democracy as a basis for nation building through access, equity, quality,

Figure 7: Map of Namibia

democracy, and efficiency in the education sector (Namibia MEC 1993, *cited in:* USAID [n.d.]; K 20100108). In contrast to the Central American countries discussed in this document, the basis for reform was not a peace accord established in the context of an existing state, but rather the Constitution of a new state, with education strongly endorsed as a policy and budget priority by the post-independent governments, and supported by significant international funding. The seeds for this reform were planted in the refugee camps in Angola, where exiled Namibian

Table 9: Namibia—Selected Indicators

Population	2.1 million
GNI[1] per capita	$3,360 (Atlas method)
Population growth	1.3%
Population under poverty line	…[2]
Urban population	36%
Life expectancy at birth	52 years
Infant mortality	45 per 1,000 births
Child malnutrition	…[2]
Access to improved water	93% of population
Literacy	85% of population 15+
Gross primary enrollment	91% school age population
Male	97% males of school age
Female	85% females of school age
GDP[3] per capita growth	
1987-1997	-1.3% yearly average
1997-2007	3.3% yearly average
2007	8.4% year

Notes: 1 Gross National Income; 2 No data; 3 GDP Gross Domestic Product.

Source: World Bank Country at a Glance Profiles, based on the Development Economics LDB Database. Available at: http://devdata. worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf. [Last accessed on 12/04/2009]

educators trained in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States had the opportunity to test and refine their ideas and applications of constructivism, specifically of learner-centered education (LCE) and continuous assessment (CA) as classroom instruction methodologies (LeCzel & Gillies 2006; K20100108). The various strands of reform were brought together into a single strategic document that continues to guide Namibia's educational development to date (Namibia MEC 1993).

After 1996 government priorities moved increasingly towards learner- or child-centered education in the context of an enthusiastic endorsement of the Education for All (EFA) agenda. As excluded populations—especially blacks in rural poor communities in the north of the country—were increasingly incorporated into the education system, government education priorities in Namibia moved from issues of ensuring access and participation (enrollment and community and parent engagement in schools) to improving and ensuring quality through the extended application of constructivist practices in classroom organization and materials development (LeCzel & Gillies 2006).

In 2001 the Namibian Parliament passed an *Education Act* that focused on implementation of education policies with an emphasis on improving quality, opening what one publication has called a time of reflection and review (LeCzel & Gillies 2006). Attention to quality has translated into a concern for learner performance and performance measures, reflected in the adoption of school self-assessment tools, school improvement plans (SIP) in 2000, in the implementation of nation-wide testing at grades 5 to 7 using the Learner Performance Assessment Instrument (LPAI) and participation in the

Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ) regional examinations, and teacher professional development (Gillies 2009). Since independence, it has not been easy for Namibia to include testing in education, as this was the means used by the apartheid system to exclude the black population from education. This change attests to the maturity that the education sector has now achieved (K20100108). Institutional developments in this period also included the alignment of the education regions with the 13 political divisions in the country through as many Regional Education Offices, though effective decentralization is still a process in the making (LeCzel & Gillies 2006).

Donor presence in the Namibian education sector has also changed over time. USAID, which was initially a significant source of assistance to the sector, no longer has an education program in the country. A broad range of donors were involved in the country soon after independence (USAID/MEC 1994). Meanwhile, the World Bank has expanded its support. In 2003 an education sector review focused on cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the system. In 2006 this translated into the Education and Training Sector Improvement Programme (ETSIP) that currently outlines the government's plans for the sector over a period of 15 years[31], supported with a loan

31 *See:* http://www.etsip.na/about_us.php.

Namibia's attention to education appears to be paying off as enrollment, survival in school, gender parity, teacher development, and test results show improvements.

from the World Bank (World Bank 2007). This shift has echoed changes in government policy priorities, as increasing attention has been paid to the efficiency of the sector and the original constructivist approach has given way to a greater concern for the relationship between inputs and outputs (LeCzel & Gillies 2006).

Namibia's attention to education appears to be paying off as enrollment, survival in school, gender parity, teacher development, and test results show improvements. Survival to 5th grade went from 62 percent to 92 percent between 1991 and 1999-2000. Adult literacy was 81.4 percent according to the 2001 census. The benefits accrued significantly to previously underserved populations: in the northern regions the percentage of 10th grade students scoring above 55 percent of a maximum score of 42 points went from 42 percent in 2001 to 48 percent in 2007 (Gillies 2009, USAID [n.d.]). However, this has not been unproblematic, as during the same period regions with predominantly white and mixed populations showed a precipitous fall in performance. The percentage of all 10th graders scoring above 55 percent in these regions went from 65 percent to 50 percent over the same period

(*see* Gillies 2009:49-51). Less demonstrably but equally important, Namibia appears to be developing a strong sense of democracy, especially among the younger population who have benefited from a reformed education system that values independent thinking.[32]

Gillies (2009) suggests that the development of education in Namibia over the last decade and a half is based on: a) the felicitous combination of democratic, flexible, political will and leadership that did not dispense with Afrikaaner civil servants (and their knowledge) despite the complexities this implied; b) education reform efforts based on solid education research and that included an effective pedagogy (learner-centered education and continuous assessment), school management and governance (school self assessment and school improvement planning), and enhanced decentralized support and professional development; c) institutional reforms, including integration of a single national Ministry of Education and especially a system of teacher and MOE officer professional development that emphasized critical inquiry and reflection in practice and in the culture; and d) long-

term persistent support from donors, including USAID as a major player with a large part of its contribution located in the education sector. This contribution also included establishing a project Steering Committee that served as an effective forum for continuity and integration into national priorities.

LeCzel (n.d.) identifies four elements that serve as lessons from Namibia's education reform initiatives and their relationship to improved learning: a) the vision for change was shared by parents, community members, teachers, and principals; b) identifiable, measurable, and empirical evidence of change available to stakeholders served as impetus for school-level improvement; c) the transition from project-based reform activities to regular program activities in the education system was supported by technical capacity built over time and had systematic feedback mechanisms; and d) donor innovation and intervention could both spur progress toward reform or stall the process, depending on the political and institutional interface with donor objectives.

AED's engagement with Namibia began with the implementation of the BES II (Basic Education Support) project from 2000 to 2004. BES I had been a $18.3 million initiative implemented by another organization from 1995 to 2000, focusing on curriculum development and teacher support through structured materials and manuals for effective use of active

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32 One interviewee underlines that this does not deny that there is still a significant disconnect between the intention of policies favoring constructivism and "mechanistic" practices in the classroom, which also reflect the tension between educators trained outside Namibia during the war and teachers educated under apartheid and who remained in Namibia (K 20100108).

learning and continuous assessment. BES II was a $9.3 million project focused on improving pedagogical support systems, school management and increasing parental and community involvement in school improvement. Its activities included developing and implementing a learner-centered education approach and continuous assessment techniques and school development plans in over 400 schools, and implementing four computer laboratories in regional Teacher Resource Centers (USAID n.d.). BES II implemented "circuit" support teams (including a circuit inspector, advisory teacher, and resource teacher), which brought professional development to teachers in clusters of schools, by mobilizing existing resources in new configurations and building capacity in existing human resources (Leu, Hays, LeCzel, & O'Grady 2005; K20100108).

BES II obtained important system-level results. School inspectors, resource teachers, and school principals modified their roles from administrative functions to being professional development agents; statistical information flows improved with electronic forms. The project supported activities that helped move the MOE's policy of CA into actual implementation in schools by teachers to monitor and assist students. With project support, the MOE also established a successful professional development department, implemented a Management Development Advisory Committee (MDAC) to coordinate all management materials and

training, conducted a sector assessment of the impact of HIV, and established a policy that directs instruction on this subject in all primary schools and training. In the final evaluation, among teachers who were assessed on seven learner-centered education (LCE) techniques[33], 65 percent of teachers across all cohorts (2001 to 2004) were assessed as either 3 (good) or 4 (excellent) on at least two of seven LCE techniques; all schools had school development plans (SDP) on file and 83 percent of all cohort schools were implementing SDP activities for the current year (for a target of 80 percent); all school managers had received continuous professional development modules (CPDMs) and 51 percent of them were using the information contained in these (for a target of 60 percent) (AED 2004a).

From 2004 to 2008, AED implemented the $13.2 million BES III project, expanding services to all 770 schools in the six program regions in the north (Caprivi, Kavongo, Oshikoto, Oshana, Omusati and Ohangwena). Through a school improvement plan (SIP) methodology it built capacity for continuous improvement from within the school community with support from circuit inspectors, lower primary advisory teachers and SIP resource teachers within

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33 LCE techniques include group work, pair work, individual assignments, open ended questions, mixed ability grouping, relating lesson to learner experience and games or role play.

a SIP circuit support team that works with parents, teachers and principals to develop and implement school development plans. BES III also developed curricula and materials, data and information, monitoring and evaluation systems, conducted education policy research, development, planning and implementation, strengthened standardized testing, and provided small grants to implement school feeding at the community level, among other activities.

USAID no longer has an education program in Namibia, reflecting that agency's perception that the country has "graduated" from the need for direct technical assistance to this sector. With this, AED's work in Namibia has for now concluded. Over the time the organization operated there, the key trends in the projects implemented included:

- The implementer's ability to adapt its support to the MOE's vision for education in Namibia and adjust it over time

- The implementer's development of a methodology and the capacity, both in terms of personnel and systems, to provide and maintain an ongoing system of school and cluster based teacher professional development responding to locally identified needs

- The consolidation of a project steering committee as a valuable environment for policy dialogue and agreement

- Support to the introduction of testing as a non-threatening tool for education quality determination

What have we learned?

This discussion will be centered on the three-part relationship among government, donor, and implementing agency. However, a few comments about the salient commonalities and differences in the development of the states and their education sectors will help to frame the more specific comments.

STATES IN TRANSITION

In all six cases, we have seen countries pursuing the complex, ongoing task of (re)building the state and its institutions after conflict or natural disaster. Although most faced some kind of natural disaster during this period, Honduras was especially struck after hurricane Mitch, and Ethiopia lives at risk due to its environmental fragility and complex social and political neighborhood. All except Honduras faced war in the last decades of the 20th Century. Only in one case—Namibia—was it war with an external aggressor. All others were internal conflicts over control and direction of the state. However, the close relationship between internal strife and external conditions and pressures—either from immediate neighbors or from a more distant hegemonic power—also appears as a constant. The role of donor countries with these countries is itself ambiguous, as is especially visible in the changing role of the United States in Central America fostering conflict, seeking to control it, and promoting assistance.

All are countries of low or mid-low income, with relatively weak economies that are increasingly open to the global market. All have developed increasingly solid democratic institutions, but challenges and crises continue to emerge periodically. The material summarized suggests the cases fall between two poles. At one end are countries such as Namibia and El Salvador, where national policies and strategies appear to be gaining increasing coherence and providing continuity in the context of a consolidated political system. At the other are countries such as Nicaragua and Guatemala, where it is harder to see policy continuity, in one case due to unresolved political contradictions and in the other to an unstable party system and growing organized crime. Fortunately war has not returned to any of these countries. However, the combination of still weak institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and challenges from external sources (drug traffic and gangs in Central America and conflict in neighboring countries in the case of Ethiopia) have led in many cases to episodic or persistent social violence.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN STATES IN TRANSITION

Education and educational assistance have had a considerable role in post-crisis or post-conflict development in all countries examined. This is scarcely surprising considering the bias in selection. However, the commonalities and differences among the cases are in themselves a matter of interest. The first point worth making is the surprisingly early appearance of education as a national issue for reconstruction in all cases. Education figured as an important part of what national agents wanted to address early on, either through specific commitments in peace accords (Guatemala), plans for reincorporation (El Salvador), revolutionary government policy

and interventions (Nicaragua), political leadership (Honduras), or constitutional and institutional focus (Ethiopia, Namibia). Processes of stabilization included the incorporation of popular teachers into civil service systems, the recognition of inequities in access to education and funding, the critical need for schools as part of the post-conflict and post-crisis rebuilding of communities, and of education as a tool for redefining national identity.

Not surprisingly, in practice the education sector became an arena for the translation of political visions of the state for the future. Where the political vision had a greater level of consensus there also appears to have been more success in carrying forward the development of the sector. Thus El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Namibia show a gradual translation of policy from post-conflict into reform, in line with greater degrees of political agreement (or clear predominance of one party over the education sector). Explicit plans, including follow up and monitoring, appear to be positive tools in ensuring this continuity in countries such as El Salvador and Namibia. By contrast, in Guatemala education reform is shortchanged by unresolved issues of inequity and emerging threats to the state, while in Nicaragua a radicalized political system swings education policies and institutions from one end to the other of the spectrum in step with each change of government.

At the same time, common themes emerge over time, most likely as a combination of practical requirements in the development of the education sector and global agendas set in the context of EFA: initial concern with education quantity (increasing enrollment) gives way to concerns with education quality. Decentralization becomes an option to address geographical inequities and regional and local diversity, while gender imbalances in access and opportunities for education also have risen on the agenda in all the countries. Institutional development is a constant, and an aspect in which donors play a considerable role, as discussed further on. Again, the ability to make the most of these developments appears related to the continuity in national visions and plans. This is especially, but not exceptionally, visible in the challenges that school autonomy and active schooling have faced in Nicaragua.

However, the concern with education quality is not necessarily reflected in improvement in performance. This paradox is especially notable in the Central American countries, as it is in most of Latin America.[34] The introduction of research-based and effective educational approaches and technologies, and their persistent application and improvement appears to be paying off in Ethiopia and Namibia.

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34 For a comment on the relation this has with economic growth see: Hanushek & Woessmann (2009).

PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO EDUCATION IN STATES IN TRANSITION

Where do the donor and AED as an implementer stand in the context of the post-conflict/post-crisis trajectories of states as described in the six cases? A first issue concerns the project as the peculiar way through which international assistance is provided, and its nature as the funding and implementation mechanism through which entities such as AED come into the mix.

Despite agreement that education is a long-term process, all the projects described here range in duration from one year to at most five years. Projects are now a regular part of the implementation toolbox of governments, but are usually applied for specific purposes, such as startup, in the broader context of program implementation, or in building infrastructure for ongoing service provision. Meanwhile, in foreign assistance they mostly comprise the totality of the intervention, and frequently begin to close down just as the staff and systems reach peak performance. Therefore, the ability to link work and lessons learned between projects appears to be a critical issue for assistance to be effective in supporting national initiatives.

In the Central American countries, AED appears to have played a role as a "builder of bridges" among multiple relevant stakeholders and players and over time in the post-conflict environment. The first and most obvious link has been that between AED and the donor agency, namely USAID. Through the ongoing conversation between AED and the donor's technical staff in Washington and in the various countries, a "community of thought" develops: lessons learned in implementation percolate into future project designs, while donor and beneficiary country policies are consciously made operational and assessed in project implementation (C20090720; H20091221).

AED has also played a role mediating between the donor and the country's government mechanisms, again with implications over time. For example, a constant of AED's work in El Salvador since starting work there has been its alignment with government policy priorities. This has been significant more recently, as the FMLN government is finding it can overcome its traditional mistrust of the United States through assistance that is focused on its needs. Interviewees point out that AED's role has been helpful in persuading the donor to maintain relations with the more radical members of the government (A20091203; B20091209). In Africa so-called basket funding is more frequent and a source of contention with U.S. assistance: constraints in accountability of government spending have led to the U.S. government's policy of not placing funds in such common funding mechanisms. Alignment through project mechanisms can let governments lead policy without actually receiving the foreign

assistance funds (C20090720). In Ethiopia, international specialists have been deeply embedded within government structures in the MOE and the Regional Education Bureaus, which an interviewee suggests has been an important mechanism to convey the lessons of innovation in the regions to the national level, even to the point that these lessons led to establishing national policy while respecting Ethiopian leadership and goals (D20091203). An interviewee suggests that in Namibia AED helped to temper the donor's enthusiasm for testing in face of the history that had associated testing to exclusion when it was used as a tool for apartheid at the school level (K20100108).

As an implementer, AED appears to play a role as a catalyst of relations between donor and government. On the one hand, AED's commitment to an ongoing relationship helps to remind everybody that the goal is to strengthen government, not to substitute for it, nor to identify it with the ruling faction, when this is inimical to the donor's interests. On the other, AED serves as a useful "technical ambassador" for the donor vis-à-vis the government.

A second link relates AED to international expertise. In Central America, AED's relations with an extended network of managers, experts, and academics in U.S. universities, Latin American research institutions and donor agencies meant it was well-positioned to find project director candidates and consultants who could

The ability to link work and lessons learned between projects appears to be a critical issue for assistance to be effective in supporting national initiatives.

respond with sound advice to the technical needs of donors and countries, and to identify individuals with the necessary interpersonal skills, independence, and good judgment to "survive" political environments with low levels of trust among local agents. This is not a straightforward task, as achieving the perfect fit between a project director and a given country situation is always very much a trial-and-error process. Managers involved in the early years of AED's engagement in El Salvador recall that at least five project directors led the SABE project over a period of eight years (C20090720). Similarly, the change in priorities and structure between BESO I and BESO II in Ethiopia led to multiple changes in project leadership (D20091203). The ability of project directors to relate successfully to government counterparts and establish (or bring from previous experience) a broad network of national contacts is a critical aspect of their success (G20091218; LL20091203). In Namibia making available a sensitive specialist in assessment ensured a smooth adoption of testing in an environment where the topic was moot (K200100108).

AED also has been able to link to staff in the countries who were both credible and a source of first-hand knowledge about the countries' politics. Such individuals were critical to balance the international independence and credibility of a project director with a deep understanding of the subtleties of the local politics, but also to bridge these two worlds (C20090720). In all countries included in this review, as post-conflict situations or conditions of fragility improved, the number of international managers and specialists diminished and the leadership of local technical staff increased.[35] At the same time, a concern on this topic is the occasional local pressure for political appointments on the project staff (G20091218).

As a long-term implementer, AED has provided technical continuity over time and space between projects that are conceived as finite interventions. This helps smooth into long-term processes the tendency to see activities as "events" in the context of the limited tenure of donor and government authorities, and to integrate finite project activities measured in quantitative terms into long-term people-centered processes measured in qualitative terms (K20100108). Examples are the ongoing building of policy through individual but repeated events

of dialogue in Guatemala; the expansion of school- and classroom-based reform throughout Nicaragua and Namibia through individual school-support activities; and the transformation of teacher development through a series of specific teacher education activities in Ethiopia.

AED has in several cases applied structures of mediation that ensure that the projects dovetail smoothly with national government and civil society representatives. Such was the case of the consultative committees for *Educatodos* in Honduras, EXCELL in El Salvador, the GDA Public-Private Partnership project in Nicaragua, and CERCA in Central America (G20091218; F20090722; A20091203) and the tight embedding of projects within national and decentralized government structures in Ethiopia and Namibia and the BES steering committee in Namibia.

As a result, AED was able to bring together the "demand" for post-conflict education with the supply of expertise, materials, and management that could satisfy short-term needs for stability. The contracting mechanisms that USAID set in place in Central America immediately after the wars in the early 1990s let AED rapidly mobilize resources and respond to the fluid political and institutional circumstances that the public sector presented. However, it was the national and international technical expertise mobilized that added value to these resources.

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35 This must be interpreted in the broader context of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which calls for increasing engagement of receptor country staff in donor-funded projects (OECD 2008a).

An obvious but complex advantage in implementing foreign aid projects is the relative abundance and flexibility of resources available. This was evident in El Salvador, where U.S. foreign policy priorities made large amounts of money available to USAID and thus to AED. Combined with flexible disbursement mechanisms and good communications between managers in AED and the donor, this led to significant opportunities for change (H20091221). The relative abundance of foreign assistance projects also lets implementers "cut deals" with policy- and decision-makers that can lead to the introduction of innovations that would otherwise not have a chance to survive: one interviewee mentions how the assistance provided to a local education officer's initiatives encouraged support from him to introduce innovations in teacher development (D20091203).

However, AED also provided "space" in more subtle ways. In the radicalized environment of post-conflict politics in Central America, certain regional institutions and think tanks, such as UNESCO and *Centro Internacional de Educación y Desarrollo Humano/* International Center for Education and Human Development (CINDE) in Colombia offered a "safe haven" for technical and political agents who were regularly ousted when their political opponents came into power, despite the value they added for their countries. By tapping into these institutions and individuals AED could contribute to

continuity in policies. A similar role was played in Nicaragua in creating opportunities to engage the private sector with government in school-based change and education policies through public-private alliances. AED has been called to play this part more recently too, as it "buys time" for both the new FMLN government in El Salvador and the donor to understand each other and the previous administration's initiatives without losing face (A20091203; B20091208; H20091221). In Namibia the BES project steering committee not only provided leadership and direction to the project, it also created opportunities for MOE national and regional education officers and the donor to meet and develop a shared vision of education over a period of seven years (K200100108).

In addition, AED promoted and in some cases pioneered the use of information in politically driven education dialogue by developing information technology systems in the countries and by facilitating meetings where representatives of different persuasions could build a shared understanding of the issues (D20091203). This has gone beyond enrollment and dropout statistics to examine the financial dimensions of education policy, helping set the stage for countries to discuss education as an investment rather than as an expense (C20090720). In Guatemala and El Salvador this led to the development of large-scale complex information integration systems in education

and health.[36] AED played a similar role in introducing or mobilizing tools and lessons from the global context for use in specific situations. Examples of this are the use of the Global Learning Portal in Nicaragua, the application of school report cards throughout Central America under CERCA, and the introduction of school-cluster-based teacher development in Ethiopia.

AED's role in helping reset the agenda is clearly visible in Ethiopia, where the BESO I projects helped introduce an innovation—school clusters as a basis for school-based teacher development—but also created enough space for that innovation to grow while buy-in was obtained among regional and national authorities (D20091203). In Nicaragua, AED introduced the active school methodology developed under *Escuela Nueva*, which was eventually adopted as national policy. In Namibia, AED was able to take advantage of the relatively open design of the BES II project to introduce circuit support teams and cluster-based teacher education as innovations that provided on-site guidance to teachers within the limits of available resources (K200100108).

However, these examples should not be interpreted to mean that AED *sets* the agenda. Rather, evidence suggests that success depends on the governments setting

the agenda, but implementers and donors can and do help: Leadership in the MOE in El Salvador recognized the importance of education reform for peace. The same applied in Namibia post-apartheid. For example, the donor and the project provided technical solutions and financial support to the involvement of parents in school governance mandated in the *Education Act*, but as interviewees point out, it was the government's initiative that set the process in motion (K200100108). In these and other cases this translated into plans around which players—including international assistance—could organize. The ideas contained in these efforts came from a variety of sources: national technical and political leaders, government, civil society, and donor and AED specialists (H20091221).

In a context of project implementation, providing effective assistance to the education sector in moving beyond conflict or crisis is a subtle three-party minuet requiring clear national leadership, helpful donor policies and resources, and nimble, effective implementers. Consistent with international evidence and agreements (OEDC 2008a), experience in the countries examined suggests that the first of these factors is the most important element in ensuring a successful transition from fragility to a more resilient state, while donor support has a more significant "helping" than "leading"

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36 Known in Guatemala as the "Platform for Integrated Social Information" (PISI) (*See:* Alvarado 2011, forthcoming).

role.[37] Finally, implementers such as AED are effective to the degree that they mobilize relevant expertise, understand political realities, deploy practical solutions, and empower national agents when and as needed.

In El Salvador, the MOE exhibited the strongest and most consistent leadership among the four Central American countries. This was facilitated to a degree by almost 20 years (1989–2008) of continuous government by the same political party. From the outset AED was able to work closely with (and even within) the MOE. Beneath this there is a considerable alignment between private sector leaders and government vis-à-vis education goals, which must not be overlooked (H20091221). The recognition of a long-term interest among at least some members of the economic elite in El Salvador helps to explain differences with other countries in Central America. In Nicaragua, the challenge was much greater, given the periodic radical shifts in power from left to right and back again. On the one hand, AED's project leaders and teams had to allay the donor's concerns about the

left-wing governments'[38] intentions, while at the same time gaining trust from each successive government in the country, after having worked with their predecessor and opponent. In Guatemala, the challenge was amplified by the volatile multi-party system that translates into discontinuities in policy leadership. As a consequence, AED's work on the sector assessment was most profitable to El Salvador as an input to the ten-year plan, while in Nicaragua and Guatemala no long-term frameworks for investment have ever emerged and continuity relies on donors to a much greater degree (E20090720; C20090720).

In Honduras the MOE's strong leadership immediately after hurricane Mitch and its tactical focus on enrollment effectively rallied government efforts and donor support in a coherent direction (G20091218). In Ethiopia the combination of Education Sector Development Programs (ESDPs) and close work by the project within the regional education offices and national MOE headquarters also served to ensure continuity between national leadership and implementer activities. Namibia is also a clear example of the importance of national leadership. Education development there since independence has been clearly driven

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37 Indeed, this role in underlined in the notion of "do no harm" that DfID has incorporated into its guidelines for work in conflict-affected and fragile situations. Donors can more easily do harm through active engagement than through passive, firm support (DfID 2010a).

38 This task is not always successful. Early activities in school materials development had to be interrupted when the Sandinista government insisted on contents that were openly critical of the United States and that the donor would not fund (H20091221).

by the SWAPO education leaders and their constructivist agenda (K20100108).

In Ethiopia, despite significant advances in the education sector and an undoubted consolidation of the decentralized federal state, challenges persist. Partly this answers to external factors, most notably the political instability in the region. There is evidence that limitations to free speech and politicization of teacher appointments have not helped (D20091203). Despite this, the apparently rash commitment to national policies seems to serve the national and regional education authorities well: Lofty goals serve as challenges that are pursued through the persistent development of capacity.[39]

In Namibia, SWAPO's clarity of vision concerning education has propelled reform and ensured the alignment of donors and implementers. In implementing the BES projects, AED benefited from the creation of a project steering committee that included representatives from key MOE units, the regional education officers, and, notably, USAID as a *non-voting* member. Though

the donor had obvious influence derived from funding the project, having the MOE in control ensured that the project was fully owned by the national players (K200100108).

The strength of MOE leadership appears to resonate with other aspects of social and institutional development as well. While in El Salvador strong government leadership was accompanied by solid civil society organizations, such as FEPADE and FUSADES, and private sector engagement, in Nicaragua neither the business sector nor civil society entities show such strong organization and engagement in the education sector. Meanwhile, Guatemalan NGOs and private sector representatives show an inconstancy and discontinuity similar to that of the government. In Namibia the centrality of education in SWAPO's priorities and the reputation of the MOE leaders have played a critical role in keeping the momentum for the development of the education sector and maintaining continuity in education reform. USAID may have both reflected and reinforced such dynamics, for example, through a much greater engagement with NGOs and private foundations in El Salvador and Guatemala than in Nicaragua. Some interviewees suggest that the same dynamic, with a greater range of variation, exists between the donor agency's high engagement with regional civil society and private sector networks in Latin America, and a smaller role in this field in Africa (C20090720).

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39 One interviewee describes this "just do it" ethic of Ethiopian authorities that challenges institutions and people, but also seems to get results. Examples are the almost overnight adoption of an integrated curriculum in 1996–1997 as a means to simplify the previous overloaded nine-subject curriculum without any previous teacher preparation, and the foundation of 13 new universities by decree (D20091203).

As mentioned above, the donor's role appears most valuable in maintaining momentum for policies and avoiding breakdown, rather than in setting the agenda. This might be due to at least two factors. The first is that foreign assistance agencies must respond to a web of conditions defined as a function of the donor country's domestic and foreign policy, not just as a response to perceived recipient country needs and policies. According to several interviewees, while U.S. foreign policy had clear positions about Latin America in the 80s and following decades (which have not necessarily been conducive to, nor consistent with, development in the region), its position has only more recently become clearer and consistent when it comes to education in Africa (C20090720; D20091203). However, the donor's choices in Ethiopia appear to mirror adequately the Ethiopian government's own priorities, moving from enrollment to a mixed concern with enrollment and quality, and finally to a strong emphasis on improving quality (D2091204). By contrast, the lack of continuity between projects due to changes in donor administrations and in local staff has lost in some cases the potential of innovations developed through projects when these are interrupted.[40]

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40 As discussed before, discontinuity is not an exclusive characteristic of the donor's assistance, and plays an important role in the challenges that changes in national government administrations pose to the development of the education sector (H20091221).

The weight of (short-term) U.S. foreign policy priorities on its foreign assistance programs has also led to relatively inflexible positions concerning certain government administrations. In Central America, this has been most visible in the lack of trust in relations between the Sandinista administrations and the U.S. government in Nicaragua even long after the Sandinistas had lost power in 1990. In Ethiopia the United States' commitment to reconstruction of a democratic state after the overthrow of the Derg in that critical geostrategic location made it difficult for the donor to establish distance from the national government (D20091203). At its most effective, USAID assistance immediately after a crisis has enjoyed a considerable degree of flexibility, a lesson that might be hard to apply in a context of increasing bureaucratic strictures in the management of international aid (H20091221; D20091203).

The second factor that might define the donor's important role as a helper rather than a leader in these countries is the high degree of sensitivity it shows to negative feedback from the national governments about specific projects or activities: Decisions in donor assistance move much more quickly to stop projects when there are expressions of dissatisfaction from recipient governments, than to start up new activities or projects or expand existing ones when there are positive expressions from the recipient government. Finally, analyses of a donor's role need to

be tempered by a long-term view of the relationship between the donor and recipient countries.

In Central America, the positive balance of U.S. assistance and the willingness of national agents to engage with U.S. government agencies and their implementers are tempered by the consequences of the United States' very ambiguous involvement in that region during the Cold War.

AED has served as a flexible implementer by adjusting the mix and emphasis on policy, systems and school-level support to the varying situations in the countries over time. A good example of this is the work in Ethiopia. As an interviewee pointed out, BESO I started out with a clear mandate to focus on policy, but given the flexibility allowed in its design, rapidly expanded to address teacher development in response to the demand from the regional bureaus and the teachers themselves (D20091203). Another aspect of flexibility has been the choice of partners. In all the cases discussed in this document the government has been the prime counterpart to the projects. However—and as illustrated especially by the Central American cases—the degree of involvement with local NGOs and the business sector has varied considerably depending on characteristics of the national political environment and the nature of the relations between the countries' governments and the United States.

An interesting aspect of AED's implementation has concerned the capacity for learning. Successful projects are not error-free, but rather capable of changing and adjusting to a context of volatile situations where there are no clear-cut answers. A more ambiguous picture emerges at the headquarters level. Interviewees suggest that support staff plays a critical role in strategic decision making, but is relatively disconnected from the political dynamics of the countries (F20090722).[41]

As an implementer, AED has also played a role taking advantage of windows of opportunity to introduce new approaches or innovations, thus moving the technical agenda forward and pushing the envelope beyond what the local players are capable of envisioning at a given moment (D20091203). This includes the ability to convene credible and respected specialists from within and outside the country and compare experiences, to facilitate analytical approaches across sectors and also to fulfill the role of players that may not exist in a country at a given moment due to conflict, crisis or insufficient institutional development. Interviewees point out that this has been especially notable in areas such

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41 This concern resonates with the Accra Agenda for Action (endorsed September 4, 2008) item 23.d, which states the signatories' intent to delegate sufficient authority to, and develop incentives for donor country offices to ensure their behavior is in line with aid effectiveness principles (OECD 2008a).

as research and professional development in northern Central America, which are frequently weak in government and national institutions (E20090720).

Similarly, AED has also played a role offering opportunities to challenge conventional wisdom. In Nicaragua, AED's work with business leaders and the MOE in the context of the Global Development Alliance (GDA) project led to changes in mutual attitudes: business leaders evolved in their thinking about school support activities, while perceptions changed across the political spectrum about the role the business sector could play in education (F20090722).

A couple of words of prudence are in order here. The first concerns the importance of keeping in mind that the projects described here are, for the most, "success stories." AED, as much as any other organization, has

weaknesses and errors. However, failures are much less reported in documents and maybe also tend to be downplayed in people's memories. More importantly, failed projects are absences of activity, rather than presences of error, and thus leave little trace for examination.

Secondly, though the experiences analyzed here suggest that donors, implementers, and governments can and do play important roles in the development of the education sector in countries advancing from fragility, serendipity is still a critical factor, especially concerning timing (K200100108). The best resources in the complex relationship of international assistance can come to naught if the circumstances are adverse. Similarly, successes frequently owe more to the maturity of a state of affairs than to the deliberate action of the players.

Where next?

The experiences reviewed in this document suggest that there are important features of the relations among governments, donors, and implementers in countries experiencing fragility that need to be considered if assistance to education in crises is to be of help and part of a broader transition towards resilience. Such evidence is consistent with the international community's efforts to increase aid effectiveness (reflected in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness) but also shows some of the specific challenges faced in making that declaration viable (as described in the Accra Agenda for Action) (OECD 2008a).

In this context, each player appears to have features that add a distinctive value. Country political and policy leadership is essential to ensure continuity and consistency with national priorities (Gillies 2010), ongoing donor support must focus more on maintaining pressure for reform than in attempting to set the agenda, and implementer organizations are valuable especially if they are flexible, competent and sensitive to national needs. At its best, this constellation can propel change and improvement out of situations of crisis. When these roles are not respected, interactions among these agendas can reproduce and complicate already

challenging circumstances. In all cases there are lessons to be learned to improve how assistance is provided to education in contexts of fragility.

The story of the implementation of 31 projects in six countries over a little more than two decades underlines an important issue: Despite the recognition that development is a long-term process, international donor funding will likely continue to be fragmented into two- to four-year interventions, mostly following the political and bureaucratic cycles of the donor countries. Making good use of these resources depends on agents knowing what the end game is and aligning resources strategically as these become available. This is the reason why national leadership is so important, why donors can help stay the course in times of change, and why implementers must be nimble to navigate the interface between short-term wishes and long-term needs.

The literature on education in crises, emergencies and reconstruction—more broadly in contexts of fragility—suggests that it might be valuable to think about countries and their education systems as set on trajectories of development, rather than simply as having characteristics of fragility or resilience on the side of the state, or strength or weakness on the side of the education system. While *fragility* or *resilience* may describe the degree to which a state is able to cope with its basic roles and relate to

society, and *strength* or *weakness* can refer to the degree to which the education system is capable of contributing positively to the relations between the state and society in a context of resilience, these two dimensions and the variables that define them are not mutually independent. States can be seen as placed in a space defined by these two dimensions varying in dyadic combinations, from fragile–weak to fragile–strong and resilient–weak to resilient–strong. It is within the space of possibilities defined by these two dimensions that specific countries move over time (ALVARADO 2010).

Work done by Wils and others has modeled trends in the dynamics of education systems over time (Wils & Goujon 1998; Wils 2002; Wils & O'Connor 2004), as well as the negative effects of war and other crises on these. Further work could systematically examine the relationship between fragility and resilience of the state, and trends and outcomes in education, the reasons for change in the direction of trajectories, and the means to induce desirable changes. However, the information presented here is suggestive of a range of possible trajectories: a) persistent and coherent improvement in education and resilience in Namibia and El Salvador; b) change in the education sector facilitated by change in the state in Ethiopia, though more recently facing a slowdown; c) opening of opportunities for change as the system unfreezes after the war in Guatemala, with persistent threats when

What happens in classrooms and schools depends on what happens in policies and systems.

change does not crystallize as a new system; d) ongoing political instability and moderate development of the education sector in Nicaragua; and e) persistent fragility and uncertainty in the state and in the education sector in Honduras. Examining these and other cases systematically will have to wait for more detailed operational definitions and systematic data analyses.

The discussion of trajectories underscores the continuity, not just between the education sector and the state, but equally the continuity in any given society over time. History is punctuated by abrupt change, but revolutions as much as reforms are defined vis-à-vis something that was there before, and find their seeds in preexisting conditions. The breakdown of a state into conditions of fragility, as much as its reconstruction into resilience are part of a permanently changing continuum that can only be successfully understood and affected by reference to what came before, and to trends in its future development (DFID 2010). Similarly, the education sector traverses changes as part and parcel of development. Just as there is an increasing recognition that addressing education in crises must take into account

education in "normality,"[42] examining education in emergencies and post conflict teaches something about education reform under conditions of "normality."

Gillies (2009) has examined the nature of long-term education reform and the role of foreign assistance in this, and found that success in sustained improvement in the education sector depends on broader system change, not just resource transfers. What happens in classrooms and schools depends on what happens in policies and systems. In making sense of successful education reform he underlines the broadly inter-connected nature of change in: a) the technical dimension of education (teachers, school leadership and management, curriculum and materials, parent involvement, standards, expectations, and accountability), b) the institutional framework and capacity of the education sector, including the resource base with which the sector is provided, and c) the political dimension, including the drive of political leadership at all levels. All three dimensions are intimately related to broader contextual forces, including conflict and natural disasters. Learning at the individual

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42 One reviewer correctly points out that normality is a value-laden word, a fact acknowledged here by the use of quotation marks. At the same time, the author considers it reasonable to assume that having an institutional system where all children attend school and learn effectively every day of the school year is an objective good. This should be considered normality, and crises are cases where this desired good is interrupted.

and organizational level then emerges as integration of experience and knowledge from these dimensions.

In that context, more detailed understanding and improved tools are required to link quality in education to contexts of fragility and resilience of the state. The recognition that individuals do not forfeit their right to education during emergencies (INEE 2004) is an indispensable first step in this, as it ties the development of the education sector to broader concerns of citizenship, human rights, and human development that are standing concerns in building resilient states. However, a detailed understanding of how citizen rights translate into education services and systems, and how these are present or vary under conditions of fragility is needed in order to ensure a quality education for children facing such conditions.

INEE's minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises, and early reconstruction are a starting point for this (INEE 2004), although as one expert comments, the language of minimum standards poses the risk of offering an easy way out for states aiming only at the minimum, not at guaranteeing universal rights as a permanent goal (I 20091218).

An immediate way to contribute to this would be to further develop the conceptual and operational definitions of the dimension of weak versus strong education, not just in terms of outcomes but also of inputs and

processes. Applying these in combination with indicators of fragility and resilience to country datasets would test the notion of trajectories as a tool for description, categorization, and planning.

Further effort must focus on understanding better the needs, challenges, and options for ensuring the quality of education for children in contexts of fragility, and for transitioning from such contexts to more resilient states. Key areas for implementation include better processes and tools for teacher recruitment and development, strengthening content and curriculum relevance and certification, and developing means for community empowerment, ownership, and participation. Focusing on policies, processes, and institutional development in order to mainstream education from conditions of fragility into regular education systems is also essential.

Within this framework international assistance to education is not an "either/or" issue, but rather concerns a discussion of *what* needs to be done *when* (at each stage along the fragility–resilience continuum), *how* (with specific strategies geared to needs of children under varying conditions), and *by whom* (government and other entities with a range of skills appropriate to the specific strategies). Persistence is the name of the game (Gillies 2009), with development as a long-term goal, but also a long-term process. In this context, assistance is a changing constellation of responses to an ongoing,

changing process punctuated, but not defined, by crises. This helps to link aid to emergencies with aid to reform.[43]

- *Crisis responses* provide life-saving and life-protecting interventions when state guarantees deteriorate or have broken down, but also limit damage and challenge injustice when the state has stopped serving the needs and interests of the majority.

- *Stabilization* addresses short-term needs, offers structure, and substitutes missing providers.

- *Systems and services development* enhances the capacity of the organizations of the state to absorb resources and perform its functions as it prepares to recover its role in education vis-à-vis its citizens.

- *Sector development* enhances the achievement of performance goals in the broader context of development.

- *Reform is the per*sistent expansion and improvement of existing systems, services, and the sector in step wit*h tran*sformations in society, especially as changes in trends may present in development (such as a demographic transition with a "youth bulge" requiring extensive

school-to-work programs where previously basic education has sufficed).

This list is evidence of the multiple possibilities for assistance to the multifaceted nature of the state in development. If a continuum is not recognized, education in a crisis can very rapidly become a stop-gap measure (Burde 2005) where the moment assistance is suspended all systems stop operating (and in the opposite direction, where the moment circumstances are redefined from "crisis" to "normality" funding is also suspended). Linking interventions for education in times of crisis or more general fragility to long term development starts by seeing them as parts of an ongoing process, and must include building capacity for staff and institutions engaged in crisis response to later serve the sector in development (Tebbe 2009). It also means building policies under crisis that will set the stage for development, rather than hinder it (OECD/DAC 2008). We need to recognize the "path dependency" (OECD/DAC 2008:8) of aid to education. Choices made in aid to a crisis will affect (open or close) future possible service arrangements, even beyond the crisis.

Aid to education under conditions of fragility must be seen in the much broader context of state (re)building, especially because (re)building education is not just about services—it is about establishing, revising, or redefining mechanisms of social reproduction. The importance given to the

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43 See also the DAC categories of states affected by fragility, OECD/DAC 2008.

definition of a curriculum and language of instruction in many cases of post-conflict education and in peace accords around the world attest to this (OECD/DAC 2008; Wedge 2008).

Operational issues to address as these vary over time according to the fragility or resilience of the state include the following.

- *Who leads coordination?* Donor coordination is increasingly recognized as an imperative for effective assistance (OECD 2008a). This has a synchronous dimension, as donors need to agree on how to cover all aspects of a crisis or transition, but also a diachronic dimension, where donors must be able to hand off to each other sequentially as a situation evolves (and hopefully improves). At the same time, donor coordination can only go so far. Agencies and their leaders respond to incentives that align first and foremost with the foreign policy and assistance policy of their home countries, while effective assistance must align with the recipient country's needs. In the final analysis, it is the recipient that must lead coordination, allocating responsibilities according to its needs. This suggests that one of the first capacities to build must be the capacity to lead what the donors do, and coordinate them from within the country.

- *Who provides services?* One of the main differences between conditions of fragility and resilience is the degree to which services can be provided sustainably, effectively, and credibly by the state. Experience has shown that the default option should be to work with the government and strengthen the government's capacity to provide public services. However when a state is weakened or fails, services frequently cannot be provided, and this puts large numbers of people at risk. International and local NGOs and the private sector provide an option for international assistance to substitute and/or complement state services where these are insufficient or nonexistent under conditions of crisis.

  This option is not risk-free, as working with NGOs or the private sector can dilute state accountability for essential services (OECD/DAC 2008),and challenge the legitimacy of the state even further. It might help to keep in mind that the primary role of NGOs and civil society organizations should be to exercise citizenship, and only secondarily act as service providers.

- *What issues drive the agenda?* The agenda of development and overcoming fragility is political much more than technical, and must be addressed thus. When the state cannot assume responsibility for its

citizens, services break down, and solutions must focus on policy and politics, not just on the technologies and techniques of services (Tebbe 2009).

- Beyond strengthening technical capacities for services, international assistance seeks to strengthen the political links that ensure that services are a response (and are responsive) to citizens' rights, needs, and desires. Addressing issues of accountability is especially important for this, including accountability of the state to citizens, accountability of providers to the state and accountability of providers to citizens (*See* OECD/DEC 2008). However, donors pose a real threat here, as they undercut the relationship between citizens and policymakers mediated by democratic processes, by establishing a relationship between the donor and policymakers mediated by aid requests, responses, and conditions (*see* OECD/ DEC 2009:30, figure 4).

Finally, two issues stand out as links between the concerns for education in crises or emergencies, and education reform or development. The first concerns *education quality*. There is a growing recognition of the importance of quality in education under conditions of crisis or emergency (UNESCO 2006) that mirrors the more general concern for education quality as inseparable from access to education (UNESCO 2005). Making this concern operational still lags behind

concerns for access, just us it does in the broader context of education. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between education quality and fragility or stability of the state is not obvious—well-established states have shown time and again that they are capable of providing bad education services (OECD/DAC 2008:15).

Pigozzi (1999:2) has underlined that "[c]hildren in emergency situations must be able to participate in quality primary education that includes the same 'core' of skills, knowledge, competencies, values and attitudes that constitute a basic education, and to which the world committed in 1990 at the Jomtien Conference on Education for All (EFA)" (Pigozzi 1999:2). The same expectations about a quality education in contexts of peace and resilience are valid when talking about education in contexts of fragility: The context is more challenging and the means may be different, but the goal is the same. The INEE has identified minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction that address issues of quality in teaching and learning. This is synthesized in four minimum standards (INEE 2004:55ss): a) *curricula* are socially and linguistically relevant and are appropriate to particular emergency situations; b) *training* [sic] *of teachers and other education personnel* is periodic, relevant and structured according to needs and circumstances; c) instruction [sic] is *learner-centered, participatory and*

inclusive; and d) *assessment is appropriate* to evaluate and validate learning achievements.

Such dimensions and the standards identified offer a good starting point for making operational the notion of a desired education system and tracking its relation to the resilience or fragility of the state. Significantly, it is the quality dimension that provides the continuity between states of fragility and resilient "normality." While during reconstruction and early emergency special activities occur to address immediate challenges—for example the rebuilding of schools or the distribution of textbooks lost to floods—it is the quality dimension of the education—in aspects such as the relevance of the curriculum or the use of the mother tongue—which will continue well into the future as the system settles down after a crisis. Addressing quality in the crisis or emergency period will contribute to ensuring that work done at this point will dovetail into what will come later.

The second issue in relating education in crises or emergencies, with education reform or development is *education resourcing*. Ensuring adequate resources in quantity and quality is a critical aspect of addressing fragility and crises, as much in education as in other sectors. However, it is the states experiencing fragility that are usually also the worst off. The education sector suffers due to lack of commitment, weak capacity, insufficient resources or competing needs

for the resources of the state. Needs for assistance, as identified in the context of global goals such as the Millennium Development Goals and EFA, just become more acute in fragile situations (OPM 2009).

International technical and financial assistance has come to play an important role in addressing that shortfall. However, in the context of a sector already shortchanged by other pressing needs, education in emergencies and crises has frequently taken a distant back seat in access to foreign assistance (OPM 2009; Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud 2009). This has begun to change. Donor and recipient countries' concern to improve the use and impact of international assistance globally (OECD 2008a) is echoed in institutional initiatives such as the EFA-FTI Fragile States Task Team and the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility, which bring together donors, practitioners, researchers, and policymakers who advocate for increased and improved support to education in emergencies (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud 2009).

Assistance can take a broad variety of forms, ranging from the more direct project implementation with donors retaining most if not all control for interventions, to the more hands-off approach of general or sector budget support, where funds are channeled directly to governments on condition of reforms in the education sector by the recipient government. In this array

roles and options are ideally selected based on the actual capacity for implementation by the countries themselves. "In analyzing and defining funding mechanisms choosing channels for service delivery should be the first step: government capacity to deliver, curriculum, education role in conflict, groups with particular needs, etc." (OPM 2009:15). The fact, however, is that a variety of less direct factors linked to donor governments' own policies, legal restrictions, donor policies, and institutional commitments continue to weigh heavily on the choice of funding and assistance mechanisms.

In addition, there is a challenging and ambiguous relationship between international assistance and the recipient's institutions, with a thin line between assistance and dependence, and a nagging doubt about the development model underlying assistance. Gillies (2009:8) points out that "In no case did the Western countries follow an artificial [sic] process in which external resources initiated and propped up new services (schools, clinics, NGOs) which were then absorbed into state or national budgets. Nor was the expansion of social services in donor countries accomplished in a five year project timeframe."

Again however, reality trumps intent, as the fact of the matter is an extended and growing network of international assistance, characterized by a growing desire to introduce order, increase effectiveness, and recognize subjects' rights to self-determination. AED and other organizations like it face a tall order in navigating these waters. Crises will continue to arise, states will experience challenges and people's education will frequently suffer as a consequence. Addressing this successfully and maximizing opportunities for children starts by recognizing the inalienable, persistent, and empowering nature of education as a right for all, committing to the long term development of societies and their states, and seeking practical change that ensures quality of education under local conditions.

Annex

Trends in education, assistance and investment in six countries

This annex presents key education and financial variables relevant to the work. Data in the country discussions come from series available in several institutions,[1] and are the springboard for analyses of the relationship between the education sector and fragility or resilience of the state.

EL SALVADOR

**Primary completion rate, El Salvador 1988-2007**

Data source: 1988-1996 World Bank World Development Indicators ; 1999-2007 World Bank EdStats

Grade 1 gross and net intake rate, El Salvador 1981-2008

Data source: 1981-1989 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

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1 See: http://epdc.org/searchdata/searchdata.aspx

EL SALVADOR (continued)

Gross enrollment rate, El Salvador 1980-2008

Pre-School — Primary — Secondary

Data source: 1980-1998 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Net enrollment rate, El Salvador 1990-2008

Pre-School — Primary — Secondary

Data source: 1980-1998 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gender parity index for gross enrollment rate, El Salvador 1999-2008

Pre-School — Primary — Secondary

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

EL SALVADOR (continued)

Official development assistance received, El Salvador 1960-2003

Official development assistance received (% of GNI)
Official development assistance per capita (current US$)

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), El Salvador 1985-2007

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

GUATEMALA

Primary completion rate, Guatemala 1996-2007

Male   Female

Data source: 1996 World Bank World Development Indicators; 1999-2007 World Bank EdStats

Grade 1 gross and net intake rate, Guatemala 1980-2007

Net intake rate   Gross intake rate

Data source: 1980-1986 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gross enrollment rate, Guatemala 1980-2007

Pre-School   Primary   Secondary

Data source: 1980-1998 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

GUATEMALA (continued)

Net enrollment rate, Guatemala 1990-2007

Pre-School ─●─ Primary ─●─ Secondary

Data source: 1980 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gender parity index for gross enrollment rate, Guatemala 1999-2007

Pre-School ─●─ Primary ─●─ Secondary ─●─ Tertiary

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Transition rate to secondary school, Guatemala 1999-2006

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

GUATEMALA (continued)

Official development assistance received, Guatemala 1960-2003

Official development assistance received (% of GNI) ———— Official development assistance per capita (current US$)

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Guatemala 1985-2007

Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

HONDURAS

Primary completion rate, Honduras 1991-2007

Male ■ — Female ◆

%

Data source: 1991-1993 World Bank World Development Indicators; 2004-2007 World Bank EdStats

Grade 1 gross and net intake rate, Honduras 1980-2008

Net intake rate ◆ — Gross intake rate ◆

%

Data source: 1980-1984 World Bank EdStats; 2000-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gross enrollment rate, Honduras 1980-2008

Pre-School ● — Primary ● — Secondary ●

%

Data source: 1980-1996 World Bank EdStats; 2000-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

AED and Education in Contexts of Fragility: Providing Support to Education Over the Long Haul

HONDURAS (continued)

**Net enrollment rate, Honduras 1980-2008**

Data source: 1980-1991 World Bank EdStats; 2000-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gender parity index for gross enrollment rate, Honduras 1999-2008



Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Official development assistance received, Honduras 1960-2003

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

HONDURAS (continued)

**Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Honduras 1985-2007**

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

NICARAGUA

Primary completion rate, Nicaragua 1988-2006

Male   Female

Data source: 1988-1995 World Bank World Development Indicators; 1999-2006 World Bank EdStats

Grade 1 gross and net intake rate, Nicaragua 1980-2008

Net intake rate   Gross intake rate

Data source: 1980-1990 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gross enrollment rate, Nicaragua 1980-2008

Pre-School   Primary   Secondary

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NICARAGUA (continued)

Net enrollment rate, Nicaragua 1990-2008

Pre-School — Primary — Secondary

Data source: 1980-1990 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gender parity index for gross enrollment rate, Nicaragua 1999-2007

Pre-School — Primary — Secondary — Tertiary

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Official development assistance received, Nicaragua 1960-2003

Official development assistance received (% of GNI) — Official development assistance per capita (current US$)

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

NICARAGUA (continued)

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Nicaragua 1985-2007

Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators

ETHIOPIA

Primary completion rate, Ethiopia 1988-2007

Data source: 1988-1996 World Bank World Development Indicators; 1999-2007 World Bank EdStats

Grade 1 gross and net intake rate, Ethiopia 1981-2008

Data source: 1981-1990 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

### Gross enrollment rate, Ethiopia 1980-2008

Data source: 1980-1996 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

ETHIOPIA (continued)

Net enrollment rate, Ethiopia 1990-2008

Pre-School ● Primary ● Secondary

Data source: 1990 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gender parity index for gross enrollment rate, Ethiopia 1999-2008

Pre-School ● Primary ● Secondary ● Tertiary

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Transition rate to secondary school, Ethiopia 1985-2006

Data source: 1985 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

ETHIOPIA (continued)

Official development assistance received, Ethiopia 1960-2003

Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Ethiopia 1985-2007


Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

NAMIBIA

**Primary completion rate, Namibia 1992-2007**

Male — Female

Data source: 1992-1996 World Bank World Development Indicators; 1999-2007 World Bank EdStats

Grade 1 gross and net intake rate, Namibia 1990-2008

Net intake rate — Gross intake rate

Data source: 1980 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gross enrollment rate, Namibia 1990-2008

Pre-School — Primary — Secondary

Data source: 1990 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

NAMIBIA (continued)

Net enrollment rate, Namibia 1990-2008

Pre-School ● Secondary

Data source: 1990 World Bank EdStats; 1999-2008 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Gender parity index for gross enrollment rate, Namibia 1999-2007

Pre-School ● Primary ● Secondary ● Tertiary

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

Transition rate to secondary school, Namibia 1999-2006

Data source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)

NAMIBIA (continued)

Official development assistance received, Namibia 1971-2003

Official development assistance received (% of GNI)   Official development assistance per capita (current US$)

Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Namibia 1985-2007

Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

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The AED Global learning group improves access to quality education for all, and extends learning opportunities through technical assistance in over 30 countries. In partnership with policymakers, faculty and researchers, educators, students, teachers and community members, AED's programs focus on learners and learning environments across multiple aspects of education.

Our programs address policy, systems and school reform; ready access to data, tools for better presentation, and analysis; applying information and communication technologies (ICT) to accelerate development in schools and communities; applying technology to improve how people and processes operate; and facilitating the emergence of effective leadership with an emphasis on learning, creativity and community building. Promoting the rights of all, especially girls and women, to access high quality education, is a focal point of our work.

AED CENTER FOR ACADEMIC PARTNERSHIPS provides international academic, training and partnership opportunities that help students, scholars, and professionals gain knowledge and expertise to make new contributions to the development of their societies. http://cap.aed.org

AED CENTER FOR GENDER EQUITY promotes, from a gender and equity perspective, the rights of all, especially girls and women, to access high quality education. http://cge.aed.org

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AED GLOBAL EDUCATION CENTER improves basic education systems in ways that are sustainable so every child, grades K-12, has access to education of high quality. http://gec.aed.org

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