



**A Brief History of the U.S.-ROK
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South Korea**

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Abstract

This paper reviews the history of relations between Korea and the United States from the mid-nineteenth century to early 2008. The paper focuses on the growth and expansion of anti-American sentiment in South Korea—and the social movements to which this sentiment gave rise—after Korea’s liberation in August 1945. Its primary argument is that anti-American sentiment and movements in South Korea were a product of the country’s domestic politics. Two political forces are discernible in South Korea: “conservative-rightist” and “progressive-leftist.” The former generally adopts a pro-America and anti-North Korea stance, while the latter tends to be anti-America and pro-North Korea. A significant portion of the progressive-leftist forces regard the United States as a barrier to Korean reconciliation and the unification of the Korean peninsula. During the George W. Bush administration, this group perceived that the United States was preparing to go to war against North Korea. During the period when the conservative-rightist forces assumed political power, the progressive-leftist forces were suppressed, through laws and even state violence. When the progressive-leftist forces controlled the government, between 1998 and 2008, when democratization was well underway, legal restrictions were substantially lifted and state violence could not be exercised. Accordingly, this group could—and did—express its anti-U.S. sentiment more freely.

A Brief History of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and Anti-Americanism in South Korea

*Kim Hakjoon*¹

Since the 1980s, anti-Americanism has been a hotly debated subject, both in the traditionally pro-American Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and in the United States itself. In recent years, research on the subject has proliferated.² With a few exceptions,³ however, scholars have tended to assume that anti-Americanism in the South was a recent trend, involving issues related to the military and North Korean nuclear activities, wartime operational control (OPCON), military base relocation, and economic issues such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the ROK and the United States. This paper challenges this popular assumption by demonstrating that anti-Americanism has a deep-rooted history underpinned by ideological arguments so sophisticated that they constitute a kind of belief system.

What, then, is anti-Americanism? Professor Shin Gi-Wook has suggested that anti-Americanism has three faces: a cultural critique of American society and values primarily evident in Western Europe; a resentment against American political and economic dominance; and an ideological rejection of the United States as the “Great Satan.”⁴ Kim Sung-han has classified anti-Americanism into three kinds: (1) the ideological variety, which is represented by radical student organizations, leftist scholars, and journalists; (2) the pragmatic variety, represented by moderate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and concerned with specific issues such as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), environmental damage, and OPCON, rather than denying the United States itself; and (3) the popular variety, which is episodic and emotionally responsive to certain incidents.⁵

These classifications clearly influenced subsequent debates about the meaning of anti-Americanism. In 2003, Ryoo Jae-kap divided anti-Americanism into two kinds: ideologically bound anti-Americanism, and anti-American sentiments. He added that “anti-Americanism takes its roots in ideological-bound and radical student organizations and among leftist scholars and journalists, who are known to have a pro-North Korean orientation; anti-American sentiments arise from more pragmatic and moderate people or groups as well as people in general who are episodic and responsive to certain incidents or special issues in pragmatic or emotional manners.”⁶ In 2004, Kim Won-soo, a South Korean senior diplomat, also identified three types of anti-American sentiment: ideological, policy-oriented, and emotional.⁷ In 2005, Moon Chung-in “disaggregated” what he called the “anti-American phenomenon” into three parts: anti-Americanism as an ideology; anti-American sentiment “that fluctuates along with events and changing circumstances;” and anti-Americanism as an expression of democratic maturity in South Korea, which rejects “American exceptionalism.” According to Moon, “American exceptionalism used to be a common practice under past authoritarian regimes, which placed the utmost policy priority on national security.”⁸

The most detailed comparative analysis of anti-Americanism in South comes from Meredith Woo-Cumings. She argues that “the charge of ‘anti-Americanism’ is false, misleading, and dangerous for several reasons,”⁹ and goes on to make a critical distinction between “anti-Americanism” and “anti-American sentiment.” The former, she asserts, denies a whole society, people, and culture—not the response most commonly seen in Korea—while the latter approach praises some aspects of American society and condemns others.¹⁰

How, then, to define anti-Americanism? Whether one identifies two or three kinds, anti-Americanism belongs in the broad category of political opposition. According to Samuel P. Huntington and Zbigniew F. Brzezinski, political opposition itself may be divided into orthodox and unorthodox dissent. Orthodox dissent involves “efforts to improve the existing system in keeping with its underlying ideological values,” whereas unorthodox dissent questions the underlying ideological values themselves.¹¹ In the same vein, orthodox dissent may be an equivalent of what Robert A. Dahl terms “nonstructural opposition,” which relates to a change in the personnel and/or specific policies of government, rather than a change in political or socioeconomic structure. Nonstructural opposition is opposed to revolutionary movements. By contrast, unorthodox dissent may be a synonym of “major structural opposition,” which focuses mainly on change in political and socioeconomic structure. Sometimes it includes revolutionary movements.¹²

At the risk of oversimplification, I would argue that in the South Korean context, orthodox dissent is the domain of the conservative-rightist, whereas unorthodox dissent belongs to the leftist and ultra-leftist.¹³ The former distrusts and even hates communism in general and the North Korean regime in particular. Since unification of North and South Korea means the continuation of ROK hegemony over the whole Korean peninsula, as well as the future of the North, orthodox dissenters tend to be “collapsist.” In other words and according to this view, unification means that the

South will absorb the North. Kim Jung-il is considered a merciless despot who starves and oppresses his people, making him the main target of overthrow. While sometimes criticizing the United States on selected issues and even expressing resentment over misconduct by the American military in South Korea, orthodox dissenters regard cooperation with the United States as crucial, not only for keeping the North from provoking the South but also for allowing the South to develop on its own terms.

Unorthodox dissenters, by contrast, regard the North Korean leadership and Kim Jung-il as lifelong partners. Many unorthodox dissenters even argue that Kim Jung-il's dictatorial rule and bellicose behavior can be understood as an inevitable survival strategy developed to counter the United States policy of "suffocating" the North. Unorthodox dissenters also regard peaceful unification between the South and the North, through dialogue and negotiation, as the most valuable national objective, one that transcends ideologies and systems. In this sense, unorthodox dissenters adopt a "non-collapsist" stance. Despite the downfall of socialist regimes in Europe, this group still envisions a unified socialist Korea and considers the United States—coupled with South Korea's "dependence" upon it—to be a major obstacle to that goal. Instead of solidifying an alliance with America, unorthodox dissenters advise the South to seek reconciliation with the North in earnest.

In between orthodox and unorthodox dissent sit the progressives, who oscillate according to the issue. Some progressives believe that anti-Americanism does not necessarily mean a pro-North, leftist stance. Put another way, they assert that a pro-North perspective can even coexist with pro-Americanism.¹⁴ In general, however, progressives tend to support—or at the very least be sympathetic to—unorthodox dissent, whether explicitly or implicitly. This paper therefore focuses on anti-Americanism as it has been derived from the arguments of unorthodox dissent and their influence on ROK-U.S. relations.

The Origins of Anti-Americanism in the Pre-Liberation Period

Anti-Americanism can be traced to the initial phase of relations between Korea and the United States. The first contact between the two countries occurred when a number of shipwrecked American merchants drifted ashore on the east coast of Korea in 1855; they were repatriated via the Chinese court. A similar incident occurred in 1865. These events marked the first real encounter between Korea and the United States.¹⁵ A more serious encounter took place in August 1866, when an American trading vessel, the General Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang, the present capital of North Korea. When its crew abducted a Korean lieutenant commander and killed many people, local officials and people launched a fire-boat attack, destroyed the ship, and killed all its crew. North Korean historians have portrayed these events as the start of U.S. "aggression" toward Korea and the "brave" struggle that the Korean people have waged against the American "imperialists." They even went one step further by claiming that Kim Il-sung's great-grandfather led the attack against the ship.¹⁶ Suh Dae-sook, an internationally recognized authority in the study of Kim Il-sung, has commented that the North Korean claim is a "politically motivated

fabrication of little importance.”¹⁷ However, one hundred and twenty years later, the North Korean regime erected a stone monument to commemorate the attack on the ship, and again asserted that Kim Il-sung’s great-grandfather had been the leader.¹⁸

The American response to the incident was to dispatch the Asiatic Fleet to Korea in 1871, whereupon war broke out; most South Korean historians define it as the first war between the two countries. Although the war lasted only for 43 days, Korean enmity toward the United States reached its zenith when the U.S. Marines annihilated the entire fort at Kanghwa Island near Seoul. The subsequent sudden departure of the American warships was conveniently interpreted as Korea’s “victory,” and the American “defeat” impelled the Korean court to solidify its prior policy of total seclusion.¹⁹

Korea’s isolationist or exclusionist posture could not last long, and the turning point came when Korea, under considerable Japanese pressure, opened its ports to Japan in 1876.²⁰ Thereafter, Korea was forced to give much more serious thought to its foreign relations. One book in particular, *My Recommendations for a Strategy for Korea* (in Chinese), written by a counselor of the Chinese legation in Japan, profoundly influenced the thought of Korea’s ruling elites. This book described the United States as a peace-loving country but pointed with alarm to Russia’s southward advance. It recommended a close alignment between Korea and the United States to curb Russian incursions. In sum, it reiterated China’s basic policy of bringing American influence into Korea to counterbalance the Russians. Soon, Viceroy Li Hung-chang, the Chinese high bureaucrat with primary responsibility for Korean affairs, sought both to neutralize Japanese influence and to forestall Russian incursions into Korea by using the strength of the United States. In Li’s estimation, the United States had no territorial designs and was the most reliable of the Western powers.²¹

This development coincided with a new attitude of the United States toward Korea. After Korea opened its ports, the United States realized that it needed to establish diplomatic relations with Korea, if only to deter Russia from advancing into the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the United States began negotiations with Korea through the good offices of Li Hung-chang, and succeeded in concluding a treaty of amity and commerce on May 22, 1882.²²

Impressive to the Korean court was a stipulation in the first article of the treaty: “If another power deals unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.”²³ Compared to the English-language version of the treaty, the Korean version—written in Chinese—used the much more emphatic *p’ilsu sangjo* (“shall surely render mutual aid”). The Koreans took this as a firm commitment from the United States to come to Korea’s assistance if its sovereignty or independence were threatened.²⁴

After the treaty was complete, American Christian missionaries arrived in Seoul and Pyongyang to open churches, schools, and hospitals. Their friendly activities enhanced the expectations, of both the Korean court and people, that the United States would be a sincere and effective protector.²⁵ North Korean historians have claimed, however, that in the first decade of the 1900s Kim Il-sung’s father fought against the missionaries in Pyongyang, “exposing their basic character as cunning imperialists under the mask of a Christian missionary evangelist.”²⁶

Amid the increasing expectations of the United States among the Korean court and the Korean people, Yu Kil-chun—the first Korean to study in the United States (at Governor Dummer Academy in Massachusetts in 1885)—issued a warning. Pointing out that “there are some people who believe that our country can expect to get the necessary help and support from the United States, since we have established friendly relations with her,” Yu made it clear that he disagreed with such a belief:

The United States is far away from us, separated by the Pacific Ocean; her relationship with us is not so deep, not special. She has been reluctant to interfere with European, as well as Asian, affairs ever since the inauguration of the Monroe Doctrine. Therefore, when our security is threatened, the United States may give us moral support, but will not send her troops to rescue us. . . . The United States may become a good trade partner with us, but not a military defense ally.²⁷

As Yu correctly noted, Korea’s euphoric expectation that the United States would assume an active role in preserving Korean independence and territorial integrity was short-lived. Confronted by an intensifying tug-of-war between China and Japan for control of Korea, the Korean king requested American support. The United States “spoke with two voices, not one.” Simply put, “official American policy was decidedly equivocal at least toward Korea’s fate.”²⁸ Indeed, the United States government had already decided that it was beyond its capacity to intervene actively in a big-power scramble for influence over an already internally weak Korea. In this sense, as Hahm Pyong-choon aptly noted, Article One in the Korea-United States treaty “proved a dead letter.”²⁹

Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War that broke out in 1894 strengthened its influence in Korea and its victory a decade later in the Russo-Japanese War solidified its hegemony over the peninsula. Extremely embarrassed, the Korean king sent Syngman Rhee, a young Korean Christian journalist with an excellent command of English, to the United States as his special envoy. His mission was to mobilize American intervention for the cause of Korea, but the United States supported Japan’s efforts to gain control of Korea.³⁰ On this matter, Theodore Roosevelt observed that “realism demanded the sacrifice of Korean independence” and that “a Korea controlled by Japan was preferable to a Korea controlled by Russia.”³¹

Against this background, a secret U.S.-Japan accord was reached in July 1905 by Willian H. Taft, the U.S. Secretary of War, and Count Katsura Taro, the Japanese prime minister. In this infamous accord, the United States endorsed Japan’s “suzerainty over Korea” in exchange for an assurance that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever against the Philippines,”³² an American colony. Assuming the role of mediator between Russia and Japan, Roosevelt proceeded to have Russia sign the Treaty of Portsmouth with Japan on September 5, 1905. This accord was tantamount to an admission by Russia that Japan controlled the Korean peninsula. Ten weeks later, Korea became a Japanese protectorate.

Immediately the United States withdrew its legion from Seoul, the first Western country to do so. This action disappointed and even enraged most Koreans. With

such international acquiescence, on August 29, 1910 Japan forcibly annexed Korea into its empire.³³ Two American historians have commented: “That the Koreans tended to depend upon the wrong signals—in this case the written word of the treaty and the unofficial voices of American diplomats, to the detriment of official American policy—was tragic.”³⁴

Korea’s attempts to preserve its independence with the help of the United States came to naught, yet it had little choice but to turn again to the United States for help. Many leaders of the Korean independence movement, including Syngman Rhee, Kim Kyu-sik, and Ahn Ch’ang-ho, traveled to the United States, where they attempted to generate American public support. Their pleas fell on deaf ears. In the meantime, Koreans staged a nationwide independence movement on March 1, 1919. Although the Japanese colonial authorities suppressed it, the event provided a decisive moment for Koreans to establish the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Shanghai on April 13, 1919. Syngman Rhee was elected in absentia to the post of Chief Executive. Ahn Ch’ang-ho also joined the KPG and became active in Shanghai. But Rhee did not forget the goal of mobilizing media and religious circles in the United States in order to bring greater attention to Korea’s plight under Japanese rule. Under Rhee’s leadership, the Central Committee of the Korea National Association drew up a proclamation on March 15, 1919:

Korean residents in the United States are restricted in the performance of their duty due to their situation and environment; but, fortunately, America is a republic where freedom and human rights are most powerfully advocated. Therefore, we will try to arouse international opinion through America’s media and religious organizations.³⁵

Upon hearing that the Naval Disarmament Conference (also known as the Pacific Conference) would be held from November 1921 to February 1922 in Washington D.C., most leaders of the KPG, including Syngman Rhee and Kim Kyu-sik, repeated their hope that the Korean independence issue would be formally included in the agenda. They even went to Washington and presented their case to the United States delegation. However, the conference disregarded the Korean appeal; the problem of Korean independence was not even mentioned at the conference. Moreover, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed to preserve the status quo in the Pacific through the Four-Power Pacific Treaty.

Disillusioned and angered by the United States’ indifference to Korean independence, Kim Kyu-sik contributed an anti-American article, titled “The Asiatic Revolutionary Movement and Imperialism,” to the *Communist Review* published by the Comintern in Moscow. In his introduction, Kim placed the United States on a par with the other “bloodsucker nations” in the Four-Power Pacific Treaty and denounced it as follows:

We often speak of the necessity of a “united front” and “cooperative action” in connection with the revolutionary undertakings of the Far East.

Recently we have come to realize this more than ever, since we have seen how the capitalistic powers of Western Europe and America have combined themselves to jointly exploit the whole of eastern Asia. Even the great republic of America, which has made so much ado about its “altruistic” pretenses and its world-wide “democratic principles,” threw off its mask at the Washington Conference when it formed the hideous Quadruple Agreement with the three notorious bloodsucker nations—England, France, and Japan.³⁶

This article might be the first Korean document to express strong anti-Americanism. Lew Young-ick, who has studied Korea’s relations with the United States, notes that Kim’s “perception of America resembled Lenin’s theory of imperialism, which states that capitalism at the stage of monopoly capitalism develops a global system of imperialism as a result of the close relationship between economic expansion and political control.” Lew added: “In this way, the view of America as an imperialist nation that oppressed and exploited small and weak countries became widely accepted among Korean Communist activists during the 1920s and gradually became further developed.”³⁷

Against this background, 52 Korean independence activists attended the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, held in January 1922 in Moscow under the auspices of the Comintern. Korean participants included Kim Kyu-sik, Yŏ Un-hyŏng, and numerous communists. Lenin received some Korean participants in the Kremlin. He encouraged their struggle against the Japanese imperialists, and supplied them with considerable funds to persevere in that task. His Bolshevik government also officially announced that it was ready to support the independence movements of people living under imperialist rule in Asian colonies. This statement encouraged Korean revolutionaries, some of whom expected Soviet Russia to actively sponsor the Korean independence movement.³⁸ However, Soviet Russia’s help was as short-lived as that of the United States. The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Japan, and expelled Korean revolutionaries from its territory after the Japanese government officially requested it.

From their bitter experiences with the United States and the Soviet Union, Koreans came to believe a common adage—“Don’t be deceived by the Soviets and don’t count on the Americans.”³⁹ Even so, Korean communist activists did not completely abandon their expectations toward Soviet Russia. In April 1925, when the Korean Communist Party (KCP) and the Korean Youth Communist Association were inaugurated in Seoul, with Kim Chae-bong and Pak Hŏn-yŏng serving, respectively, as their chief secretaries. These clandestine organizations both sent emissaries to the Comintern. After confirming that the organizations were inaugurated inside Korea, not within Russian territory, the Comintern conferred its official recognition on both groups. It should be noted that most leaders of the Korean communist movement embraced “anti-Americanism.” An article by Pak Hŏn-yŏng, contributed to the monthly *Kaebŏk* published in Seoul in November 1925, remarked that “the first page in the history of America opens with the slaughter of its indigenous people.”⁴⁰ Pak further defined the United States as a leading imperialist country that oppressed and exploited

Afro-Asian countries. About this time, the contents of the secret accord between Taft and Katsura in 1905 were published to a small number of Korean leaders.⁴¹ They saw the accord as the United States' attempt "to secure her own imperial Asiatic possession elsewhere."⁴² In the postliberation period, this accord became a source of resentment and anti-Americanism among Koreans in both the North and the South.⁴³ For example, North Korean historians have denounced the accord, noting comments that "the U.S. imperialists gave positive support to the occupation of Korea and colonial rule of the country by the Japanese imperialists."⁴⁴

Since the late 1920s, U.S. and Soviet indifference to Korea's destiny became more salient. While the United States refused to officially recognize the KPG (led by rightist Kim Ku) as the government-in-exile, the Comintern ordered the dissolution of the KCP. Under such circumstances, Kim Il-sung, then a young anti-Japanese activist from a Pyongyang suburb, joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and led a small guerrilla unit in Manchuria under its auspices. In late 1940, when the Japanese military forces annihilated most anti-Japanese guerrilla units in Manchuria, he joined the Soviet Far Eastern Forces.⁴⁵ He eventually returned to North Korea with the Soviet forces after the defeat of Japanese imperialism. This action gave rise to the popular perception that he was a Soviet puppet.

When Japan attacked the United States in December 1941, a new chapter opened in relations between Korea and the United States. On the one hand, some Koreans sided with the Japanese authorities' racist propaganda that the Asian people belonging to the "yellow race" should drive out the Anglo-Saxons belonging to the "white race." Yun Ch'i-ho, once an independence movement leader, wrote that "from the racist prejudice stressing the superiority of Anglo-Saxons, Americans have been despising and exploiting Asians." He added that Koreans had better support Japanese, since they belonged to the same "yellow race," and went a step further by proposing cooperation among Japan, Korea, and China, all members of the yellow race, against the white race.⁴⁶

On the other hand, many leaders believed that the war would force the United States to change its Korea policy. The Cairo Conference—held in November 1943 and attended by American President Franklin Roosevelt, Chinese Generalissimo Jiang Kai-shek, and British Premier Winston Churchill—was the first major wartime conference in which the United States committed to the future of Korea. The conference participants asserted that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." However, when the Japanese surrender to the Allied Powers became imminent, the United States opted for joint U.S.-Soviet control of Korea, resulting in the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel.⁴⁷ The Koreans firmly believed that their country should regain its independence upon Japan's surrender, and a territorial division of Korea was the last thing they anticipated. This decision, made unilaterally, without consideration for the wishes of the Korean people, deepened Korean resentment toward the United States. Professor Donald Stone MacDonald, a longtime observer of Korean affairs, admitted that "many Koreans blame the United States for the division of the country in 1945."⁴⁸

Civil War under the American Military Government

After the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, the United States occupied the southern half of the Korean peninsula, and the Soviet Union occupied the northern half. The joint occupation of Korea was originally intended to be only a temporary expedient. But when two separate regimes were established there three years later, the division became permanent, heralding a completely new phase of Korea-United States relations.

The three turbulent years that preceded the establishment of two separate regimes were marked by discord. First, the “Proclamation to the People of Korea,” which General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters issued in Tokyo on September 7, 1945, hurt most Koreans. Nowhere was Korea congratulated on its liberation. Instead, the proclamation dealt with South Korea as territory that U.S. military forces would occupy. As Professor Lim Hy-sop has noted, the proclamation resembled one “that might have been issued by an army of occupation.”⁴⁹ Since that time, “anti-American” activists in South Korea have cited it as proof of “American imperial attitudes” toward South Korea.

Second, the United States would recognize neither the KPG (led by Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik) nor the Korean People’s Republic (KPR), led by so-called left-leaning moderate Yō Wun-hyōng, just before American military forces landed in the South. Instead, the United States established its own military government (USAMGIK) in Seoul, greatly frustrating Korean nationalist sentiment.⁵⁰

At this point, however, leftists alone expressed resentment—but not anti-Americanism—toward the United States. While the KPG-led rightists were willing to cooperate with the USAMGIK, the KCP- and KPR-led leftists complained that USAMGIK, in cooperation with pro-Japanese collaborators, sought to maintain the status quo rather than to help Koreans develop a “socialist revolution” based on land reform and a purge of “national traitors.” Still they did not express anti-Americanism publicly or initiate an “anti-America” movement. Rather, they recognized the United States as a member of the Allied Powers, which had liberated Korea in cooperation with the Soviet Union.

It was only after the rupture of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee in May 1946, when the KCP leftists led by Pak Hōn-yōng began to take a more overt anti-American stance. As the Cold War developed between the United States and the Soviet Union, USAMGIK outlawed the KCP in July 1946 and suppressed the communists in earnest. In response, the KCP announced its struggle against USAMGIK and identified the United States as an enemy of the Korean nation. When USAMGIK attempted to arrest Pak and other leading communists, they fled to North Korea. Soon, a “people’s resistance” against USAMGIK erupted in the Yōngnam region, but USAMGIK—identifying it as a riot—subdued it within two months, in coordination with rightist forces. In November 1946, the leftists started the South Korean Worker’s Party (SKWP) with Hō Hōn as its president. In the North, meanwhile, Soviet occupation forces suppressed landlords, Christians, and “bourgeois rightists.” From June 1946 Kim Il-sung, then chief secretary of the North Korean Communist Party, began actively to foment anti-American sentiment.⁵¹ The suppressed groups took refuge in

the South and eventually became staunchly anticommunist and pro-American.

Soon the American and Soviet authorities went through the formalities to create protégé states in their respective occupying zones. The United States even induced the United Nations (UN) to play a decisive role in administering elections for a separate government in the South. Syngman Rhee supported these efforts, asserting that they were necessary to counter the Soviet Union's attempts to spread communism across the entire peninsula. Sō Chae-p'il (known as Philip Jaisohn in English), a pioneering independence movement leader who later became a medical doctor in the United States, ardently supported the United States and the UN. When the UN finally approved the American draft resolution in 1948 to hold general elections in South Korea, Sō asserted that "the United States is Korea's best friend because she has not only liberated Korea, but also has given the Korean people the right to elect their own governors by their own free will. Besides, the government and people of the United States are now deeply interested in the welfare of the Korean people and are willing to extend their assistance in every way to help Korea to become a free and independent nation."⁵²

Despite such fulsome praise of the United States, many southern leftists, in cooperation with the North, fought against it, railing that external forces were intervening in Korean domestic issues to create a pro-U.S. government. Their struggles—led by the SKWP in Seoul and many other cities and towns—were fierce. In response, USAMGIK harshly suppressed their riots. The most serious confrontation took place on April 3, 1948 on Cheju Island, where tens of thousands of innocent civilians were killed, both by military and right-wing thugs under USAMGIK and by the communists. South Korea plunged into civil war. John Merrill, an American political scientist, observes that the bloody struggle between the rightists and the leftists sowed the seeds of the Korean War, which broke out on June 25, 1950.⁵³ Open discussion of this important historical incident was long prohibited in South Korea. It was only in the late 1970s that it began to enter public discourse, when Hyōn Ki-yōng, who witnessed the incident as a child, published a novel about the massacre. Even then, public security authorities took strong action against the book's publication—it was banned, the writer was arrested under the Anti-Communist Law, and the publisher was closed.⁵⁴

The Soviets, by contrast, authorized Kim Il-sung to hold a conference in Pyongyang with eminent southern nationalists (including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik) in order to create a "unified Korean government" in the North.⁵⁵

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in the South, with Syngman Rhee as its president. On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was born in the North, with Kim Il-sung as its premier.

Suppressed Anti-Americanism under Civilian Authoritarianism

At the outset, the Rhee government, which is called the First Republic, defined itself as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula and the DPRK an "antistate organization." According to this rubric, the Rhee government branded the DPRK as a destroyer bent on absorbing the ROK through military means. To fight

against this possibility, the Rhee government adopted staunch anticommunism as its guiding principle in steering the state. A rebellion led by military officers from the banned SKWP in October 1948 only strengthened the government's resolve. After it suppressed the uprising, the Rhee government enacted the draconian National Security Law (NSL) in December 1948, thereby institutionalizing anticommunism.⁵⁶ Indeed, when members of the National Assembly drafted a resolution in May 1949 demanding that the United States withdraw its troops from the South, they were imprisoned under the NSL. As Suh Jae-jung has noted, "In 1949 alone, over 100,000 Koreans were arrested and 132 political parties and organizations were disbanded for opposing American policies. And an as-yet-unknown number of Koreans were killed in the South even *before* the Korean War broke out in 1950."⁵⁷

By June 30, 1949, the Truman administration had withdrawn all American troops from South Korea, an act that many South Korean rightists and centrists feared would expedite a North Korean invasion.⁵⁸ And so it came to pass. On June 25, 1950, the North—with Sino-Soviet collaboration—initiated military aggression against the South. The subsequent internecine war, which finally ended with a truce on July 27, 1953, not only strengthened anticommunist sentiment in South Korea but also engendered friendliness toward the United States. This warmth extended particularly to General Douglas MacArthur, whose command of U.S. forces in the conflict had turned the tide decisively in favor of South Korea. Further, the war made South Koreans appreciate the importance of the ROK-U.S. military alliance concluded on October 1, 1953:⁵⁹

The production of the "benevolent Americans" identity was backed by massive inflows of economic benefits from the United States, which provided \$12.6 billion in economic and military aid from 1946 to 1976 alone. That translates into \$600 per capita annually for thirty years, when Koreans in 1960 had a per capita income of \$100. The aid, though primarily motivated by Washington's Cold War considerations, created a solid material pillar supporting Korean amity toward the U.S. military. By conferring benefits that could be captured by various elite groups and economic sectors, the aid created powerful interest groups within Korea that supported the image of a friendly America. Adding in those groups, which benefited from alliance asset specificities and the economic growth in Korea experienced while allied with palpable material evidence to identify the United States as a munificent and benevolent friend of Korea.⁶⁰

Progressive-leftist critics in the ROK had a different view. They argued that South Korea's July 1950 agreement with the United States—which assigned operational control (OPCON) over all ROK forces to the supreme commander of the U.S. forces—deprived South Korea of an important part of its sovereignty. Further, they held that the United States, in providing South Korea with economic aid, sought not to help the country, but to render Korea economically dependent on the United States. Kim Il-sung himself remarked that "Under the ROK-U.S. Agreement on Military and

Economic Assistance, . . . the imperialists are pursuing the policy of colonial plunder more openly.”⁶¹

War-weariness pervaded South Korea, and produced many would-be antagonists of the ROK and the United States. These included (1) bereaved families of those executed or massacred by ROK authorities and U.S. forces during the war; (2) families left behind in the South when their other family members moved to the North during the war; and (3) those who sided with the North during its occupation of the South. The advent in the late 1950s of a “reformist-progressive movement”—a euphemism for the leftist movement spearheaded by Cho Pong-am, a leading member of the KCP during the Japanese colonial period of Korea—might be read in this context. After renouncing Bolshevism publicly in 1946, Cho sought a noncommunist, noncapitalist means to national reconstruction. Under the banner of the peaceful unification of Korea, he inaugurated the Progressive Party. In the 1956 presidential election, which elected incumbent Syngman Rhee for the third time, Cho received more than two million votes (about 23.5 percent), demonstrating the potential power of leftist forces in the South. Between 1958 and 1959, the Rhee administration, fearful of its clout, banned the Progressive Party, imprisoned its cadres, and executed Cho on dubious charges of having violated the NSL.⁶² Indeed, South Korea had become a police state. Public security organs, including the National Police, prosecutorial authorities, and the Special Task Force within the army, exercised almost unlimited power, under the pretext of eradicating communists and procommunists, including anti-American elements. When the Rhee administration rigged the March 1960 presidential election, students and intellectuals rose up in protest, and on April 26, Rhee was forced to resign. Throughout this process, the United States government explicitly supported the demonstrators. South Koreans came to see the United States as a strong supporter of democracy, which further reinforced traditional pro-Americanism in the ROK.

Revived Anti-Americanism under a Democratic Administration

After the Rhee administration fell in the so-called April Revolution of 1960, its apparatus rapidly disintegrated and its law-enforcement officers were discredited. The interim government led by Hō Chōng, a moderate pro-American politician who had previously served as mayor of Seoul and ROK foreign minister, had little authority. The reformist-progressive movement again gathered steam during this period, proposing inter-Korean interchanges and cooperation, mutual reduction of North and South Korean armed forces, and a phased withdrawal of American troops. Some in the movement also demanded a full investigation of “massacres” committed by the ROK authorities and the American military during the Korean War. (Under the Rhee administration, these demands *per se* were illegal.) However, most South Korean people did not support this group’s anti-Americanism. Indeed, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower visited Seoul in May 1960, and the citizens of Seoul welcomed him warmly.

In anticipation of congressional elections scheduled for July 1960, reformist-progressive leaders inaugurated a number of new parties. The most influential was the Socialist Mass Party, a revived version of the banned Progressive Party. However, in

the congressional elections, the reformist-progressive candidates were overwhelmed by the conservative-rightist Democratic Party, which had been the major opposition party during the Rhee era. Han Sung-joo has observed that “[South] Korean voters . . . were securely indoctrinated in anti-communism, and that the July election rather dramatically reflected their anti-leftist, conservative views. They seemed more concerned with the external communist threat than with social injustice and economic oppression at home. They may have rejected Syngman Rhee’s dictatorial rule, but not his conservatism.”⁶³ As a result, a Democratic administration—the Second Republic—led by Yun Po-sŏn as president and John M. Chang as premier was inaugurated.

Both Yun and Chang were anticommunist, pro-American politicians. From the beginning, they rejected the leftist demands on inter-Korean relations. Stressing the importance of South Korea’s alliance with the United States, the Democratic administration attempted to strengthen friendly and cooperative relations with the United States, and Washington responded in kind. Accordingly, at the level of government-to-government relations, there was no discord at all.

However, the Democratic administration was incessantly plagued by reformist-leftist movements. After their crushing defeat in the congressional elections, the progressives and/or leftists were split into three groups: (1) the left reformists represented by the Socialist Mass Party and the Socialist Party; (2) the centrist reformists represented by the Unification Socialist Party; and (3) the right reformists represented by the Nationalist Unification Party. Though the groups’ views differed on the unification issue they agreed that the presence of foreign influence in both Koreas (that is, the United States in the South and the Soviet Union in the North) was the main obstacle to national unification. They concluded, therefore, that those influences should be removed, as a matter of urgency. Since there were no Soviet troops in the North, the progressive-leftists proposed that the United States withdraw its forces from the South, with the ultimate goal of making the entire Korean peninsula a unified—but neutral—country.⁶⁴

In February 1961, most leftists converged to establish the Consultative Committee for the Nationalist and Independent Unification of Korea (CCNIUK). It adopted three principles for Korean unification: national autonomy or independence without resorting to external forces (such as the United States and the United Nations), peace, and inter-Korean reconciliation. More concretely, the CCNIUK argued that, since South Korea was linked to external imperialist forces that opposed inter-Korean reconciliation, the unification movement in the South should begin with an antiimperialist, anticolonial, antifeudal national liberation movement led by the masses.⁶⁵ In a step that encouraged the leftist movement in the South, the North demanded the withdrawal of American troops and proposed a federal system as a means for inter-Korean unification.⁶⁶ Leftists in the South paid little attention to the North’s federation proposal, however, preferring to focus on the anti-U.S. movement. In 1961, when the Democratic administration undertook the Economic and Technical Agreement between the ROK and the United States, leftist elements countered by forming the Committee to Fight against the Korea-America Agreement. The Economic and Technical Agreement, in their view, was yet another American

ploy devised to keep South Korea dependent on the United States. Despite this opposition, the National Assembly ratified the agreement.⁶⁷

The Suppression of Anti-Americanism under Military Authoritarianism

The May 1961 military coup dealt a decisive blow to the reformist-progressive-leftist movement and its anti-U.S. elements. Ironically, its leader, Major General Park Chung-hee, was himself once a communist and renowned for his anti-American sentiments within the army, and the coup's key architect, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-p'il, was the son-in-law of a communist executed by USAMGIK. Unexpectedly, given this history, the military now embraced a policy of anticommunism that was both pro-American and pro-UN. Immediately after the coup, they gave teeth to this by enacting a retroactive special law, under which 3,098 so-called pro-Communists were arrested. Most of these had lobbied for inter-Korean negotiation during the Democratic administration.⁶⁸ Many were ultimately released, but key reformist-leftist leaders did receive prison terms. Soon, the military junta not only strengthened the existing NSL but also added an even more prohibitive Anti-Communist Law (ACL). Under the ACL, anyone who possessed or read books sympathetic to Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, or Kim Il-sung would be punished. The junta also created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the most powerful state organ in South Korea, to control both orthodox and unorthodox dissenters.

Nevertheless, in May 1962, when major newspapers in Seoul reported that South Korean prostitutes had been cruelly treated by American soldiers, university students staged a series of demonstrations—the first to take place under the military government—against the U.S. military. Hyön Sŭng-il, a sophomore in the political science department at Seoul National University, demanded that Samuel Berger, the U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, appear before demonstrators to discuss the conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Hyön also openly criticized what he called “dirty Yankee culture” that was hurting traditional Korean values. Since most South Koreans, regardless of their ideological orientation, sympathized with the students, the military junta could apply neither the NSL nor the ACL to the protesters. From then on, the occasional crimes of American soldiers reinforced nationalistic charges of American imperialism and brought cries of “Yankee go home!” from radicals.⁶⁹

In December 1963, the military junta became a civilian government, with general-turned-politician Park Chung-hee as its president. The Democratic Republican Party (DRP), originally organized by the military junta, and led by Kim Jong-p'il under the banner of “nationalistic democracy,” played a major role in the elections. Calling itself the Third Republic, the resulting civilian administration kept the KCIA, the NSL, and the ACL firmly in place.

Some southern rightists and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul doubted that Park Chung-hee and Kim Jong-p'il had changed their ideological stripes. They pointed out Park's communist past and the DRP's nationalistic democracy, both of which had distinct anti-American overtones.

Between 1961 and 1964, two incidents tested the Park regime's ideological character. The first concerned North Korea's dispatch of an emissary to Park Chung-hee for a negotiated settlement of Korean unification. The emissary was in fact a comrade of Park's older brother, who had been executed in 1946 during the Yöngnam people's resistance. The second event was the public advocacy—by a Park confidant, no less—of an inter-Korean negotiation that would take place in a third country. Such a negotiation would include a nonaggression pact, the withdrawal of American troops from the South, and the introduction of a North-South federal system. Faced with harsh criticism from both the United States and conservative-rightists in the South, the Park regime took drastic steps: it executed the emissary and imprisoned the confidant.⁷⁰

Following these critical events, the Park administration faithfully followed American external policy. Most notably, it hastily concluded the ROK-Japan treaty, which established a diplomatic relationship between the two, and dispatched ROK troops to South Vietnam.⁷¹ In return, the United States at last concluded a SOFA with the ROK in July 1966; South Koreans continued to complain about its substance, but were visibly pleased that it had finally been ratified. This came at a time when American TV programs—with their cultural emphases on peace, hard work, and frontier spirit—were widely broadcast and watched in South Korea. These contributed greatly to the South Korean understanding of the United States as a peace-protecting ally and enhanced the agreeable image that many citizens held of the U.S.-ROK relationship.⁷²

Boosted by its publicly reinforced relationship with the United States, the Park administration became more draconian and even arbitrary in applying the NSL and the ACL. For example, the KCIA imprisoned both the writer Nam Chöng-hyön for his portrayal of South Korea as an American colony in his novel *Punji* [The Land of Excrement],⁷³ and Congressman Sö Min-ho, who attempted to start a democratic socialist party that would cultivate the South's relations with the North. Nevertheless, some former CCNIUK cadres started the clandestine Party for People's Revolution (PPR) in 1962; other leftists inaugurated the clandestine Party for Unification and Revolution (PUR) in 1964. Defining the United States as the Korean nation's "main enemy" in the pursuit of national unification, these groups sought to liberate South Korea from U.S. imperialism and the "lackey" Park regime. For that purpose, members of the PUR established contact with the North but were promptly imprisoned by the KCIA. To be sure, the KCIA's justifications for this punishment stretched the truth, but the action itself greatly strengthened anti-North and pro-American sentiments among traditionally anticommunist South Koreans. The North's bellicose behavior toward the South in the 1960s—notably its dispatch of commandos to attack the presidential office in January 1968 and its seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo a few days later, among other hostile acts⁷⁴—further antagonized most South Koreans. A significant portion of rightists, including Park, demanded that the South and the United States join forces to retaliate against the North, based on the ROK-U.S. defense treaty. When the Johnson administration refused, South Korea criticized Washington for adopting an "appeasement" policy toward the North.⁷⁵

President Richard Nixon's state visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the subsequent release of the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 directly influenced the two Koreas' policies toward each other.⁷⁶ The Communiqué suggested a peaceful settlement of the Korean question not through the UN but through inter-Korean dialogue. The result was secret negotiations between the two Koreas, which culminated in the adoption of the North-South Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972. The North-South Communiqué outlined three principles for national unification: national autonomy or independence without resorting to external forces; peace; and national reconciliation that transcended ideologies and systems.⁷⁷ These principles mirrored those that the CCNIUK had adopted, which meant that the strict anticommunist Park administration was forced to absorb the views of so-called unorthodox dissenters into its official position, at least superficially.

Encouraged, the "unorthodox dissenters" expressed their views openly. They argued that the Communiqué's first principle weakened the legitimacy of the argument for stationing American troops in the South and continuing the South's military alliance with the United States. The second principle—peace—could not be attained, they asserted, as long as American troops remained in South Korea. They interpreted the third principle as a means to a "confederal" or "federal" arrangement with the North. The Park administration retorted that neither the American troops in the South nor the ROK-U.S. military alliance should be construed as "external forces;" rather, they helped to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula. As for a "confederal" or "federal" arrangement, the administration dismissed it as the North's scheme to communize the South.

Underground Anti-Americanism

Repressive tactics notwithstanding, the Park regime's anticommunist foundation had begun to crack. Faced with a strengthened opposition and in escalating urban demonstrations, Park staged a palace coup in October 1972. The government adopted the Revitalization (*Yushin*) Constitution, through which Park became lifelong president. The North adopted its own socialist constitution during this period, and power there further concentrated in President Kim Il-sung's hands.

In its first year, the *Yushin* regime continued to silence its opposition, both orthodox and unorthodox, and persisted with inter-Korean negotiations. On June 23, 1973, President Park declared that his government supported a *de facto* two-Korea policy, given that the the North-South Joint Communiqué already semiofficially recognized the existence of the two Koreas on the peninsula. The declaration immediately invited reproach from the North, which argued that the South was seeking to consolidate national division. Then, the North suggested that a Confederal Republic of Korea (later, the Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea [DCRK]) be established, provided that American military forces withdrew and both the NSL and the ACL be abolished. In March 1974, the North went one step further. Terminating its meetings with the South, it proposed bilateral talks with the United States to replace the armistice with a peace agreement. Washington retorted that such an agreement should be negotiated between the two Koreas.⁷⁸

In the South, both orthodox and unorthodox dissenters contended that, since the declaration focused on consolidating national division, the 1972 Joint Communiqué should be discarded. The unorthodox dissenters in particular charged that the Park regime was antidemocratic, antiunification, and against national kinship. When both orthodox and unorthodox dissenters initiated a nationwide anti-*Yushin* movement in April 1974, the KCIA stunned the nation by announcing that “some university students, under the instigation of the Party for People’s Revolution (PPR), formed the underground All-Nation General Federation of Democratic Youths and Students (*Minch’ōng*) to initiate the people’s revolution with the ultimate goal of unifying the Korean peninsula under communism.”⁷⁹

Despite the students’ denials and Christian leaders’ defense, the Park regime executed seven defendants in the PPR case and imposed heavy imprisonment terms on students in the *Minch’ōng* case. These were seminal moments in the combined struggle of university students and Christian leaders against the Park regime, producing the “*Minch’ōng* generation” that played a major role in South Korean politics in the 1990s. The regime responded by imprisoning or expelling the opposition activists from their respective offices, schools, and churches. Kim Dae-jung, who at that time began to represent the voices of both orthodox and unorthodox dissenters, was kidnapped and imprisoned. Kim Young-sam, who represented orthodox dissenters, was not permitted to join the National Assembly. Forced out, these rebels instead formed their own underground sphere, known as *undongkwōn* in Korean. Western scholars and journalists have described the *undongkwōn* as the “underground world of extra-parliamentary opposition forces,”⁸⁰ and confirm that it was an important source of opposition to the *Yushin* regime.

In the United States, the Republican administration of President Gerald Ford had been replaced with Jimmy Carter’s Democratic administration. Carter demanded that Park democratize the South. He also attempted first to withdraw, and then instead to reduce U.S. military forces stationed in the South. Had Carter successfully withdrawn the troops, Park’s image—as a president able to guarantee national security—would have suffered a serious blow. Unorthodox dissenters had developed their own views of the United States. First, they blamed Park for attempting to solidify national division and for giving up the supreme goal of unification in order to protect ruling circles in Seoul and Washington. Indeed, the Ford administration, while still in power, had come to be seen as supporting the *Yushin* regime against the will of the Korean masses. The prizewinning novel *Hwangguūi pimyoŋg* [An Outcry of a Yellow Dog], published in 1974 by Ch’ōn Sūng-se, gave voice to this sentiment.⁸¹ Second, dissenters recalled that Park had been a military officer in Manchukuo, a Japanese puppet-state, prior to Korean liberation, and that he had converted from the South Korean Worker’s Party after liberation. Park had “betrayed” national unification, they alleged, and his actions should be seen as the continuation of past treachery.⁸²

About this time, Li Yōng-hi, a journalist-turned-professor, published a number of books, including *Chonwhansidaeūi nonri* [Logics in the Age of Conversion], which strongly influenced the *undongkwōn*.⁸³ In these books, he put forward the following “revisionist” or “leftist” views of the modern history of Asia:

- In converting from the Cold War to *détente*, we should eradicate anticommunism, pro-Americanism, and the Cold War mentality.
- The PRC represents the legitimacy of Chinese history, whereas the corrupt Kuomintang regime (which South Korean textbooks usually described as “Free China”) was forced to take refuge in Taiwan. China’s Cultural Revolution should be appreciated positively, as Mao Zedong was attempting to change the egoistic nature of the human character for the well-being of the society as a whole.
- The Vietnam War should be seen as an internal civil war between the antiimperialist, nationalist forces led by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and the antinationalist forces who collaborated with the French and Japanese imperialists in Saigon. The United States supported the antinationalist forces in Vietnam, thereby unjustly obstructing Vietnamese unification. The ROK’s dispatch of its troops to South Vietnam at U.S. behest means the ROK also colluded with antinationalist forces in Vietnam.
- ROK-U.S. relations have been shaped for the benefit of the United States in general and for the U.S. military-industrial complex in particular. The ROK has served U.S. interests. The fact that the commander of the U.S. forces in Korea holds wartime operational control (OPCON) over the ROK military means that the ROK is not a sovereign country.
- Under the Nixon doctrine and by reducing its military presence in the South, the United States seeks to induce Japan to re-arm. A re-armed Japan may attempt to “reinvade” the Korean peninsula.
- North Korea is not a country of poverty and hunger. Rather, North Korea is a country that cherishes its own independence and sovereignty. Socialism is much better than capitalism.⁸⁴

When North Vietnam communized South Vietnam in 1975, South Korean dissenters interpreted it as the defeat of U.S. imperialism. The more radical leftist revolutionaries applied the “Vietnam analogy” to Korea, comparing Pyongyang and Seoul to Hanoi and Saigon, respectively. In fact, one year later, those who had joined the PPR and the PUR secretly founded the Preparatory Committee of the South Korean Front for National Liberation (*Namminjŏn*). Defining the South as a neo-colony of “international imperialism led by the United States” and the *Yushin* regime as its “fascist tool,” *Namminjŏn* resolved to wage anti-U.S., antiimperialist, antifascist, democratic revolution in the South. In October 1979, the police publicly arrested a number of dissenters whom they identified as “autogenous communists.”⁸⁵

On October 26, 1979, after a series of struggles between the Park regime and orthodox and the unorthodox opposition factions, the KCIA director assassinated President Park. A rumor soon spread that the United States, in cooperation with the KCIA, had killed him to quash a secret nuclear project ordered by Park. This myth has contributed to portrayals of Park as an anti-U.S. nationalist and become the basis for conservative-rightist anti-Americanism in South Korea.

Anti-Americanism versus Military Authoritarianism

With the fall of the *Yushin* regime, the democratization movement led by Kim Young-sam (representing the orthodox dissenters) and Kim Dae-jung (representing the unorthodox dissenters) gained strength. Kim Jong-p'il, formerly the prime minister under President Park, reorganized the DRP into the New Democratic Republican Party and attempted to join the democratization movement. So began the era of the "three Kims." But on December 12, 1979, a new military junta led by Major Generals Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo staged a coup. When the citizens in Kwangju City, a stronghold of Kim Dae-jung, protested against the junta in late May 1980, the military massacred the demonstrators.⁸⁶ In February 1981, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan's blessing, the new military junta inaugurated the Fifth Republic with General Chun as president.

The Kwangju tragedy had serious repercussions for ROK-U.S. relations.⁸⁷ Many South Koreans believed that ROK troops were moved to Kwangju at the behest of the U.S. military, and that the U.S.-ROK alliance mainly served American imperialist purposes. Dong Wonmo notes that "Perhaps the most important change we find in the demands of Korean student activists since 1980 is the notion of an inseparable relationship between the dictatorial Chun government and the United States, which, according to them, is the root cause of almost all the political, economic, and cultural problems confronting South Korea."⁸⁸ In the end, the Kwangju Democratization Movement offered a vehicle for unorthodox and orthodox dissenters alike to struggle against the Chun regime and the United States.

About this time, several influential books were published that presented a revisionist or "leftist" interpretation of Korean history. The most important of these was Bruce Cumings' two-volume study, *The Origins of the Korean War*, which stressed that the Korean War was not an international war engineered by Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung but a revolutionary civil war. Cumings argued that, contrary to the received wisdom in South Korea, Kim Il-sung was an indigenous national leader who had been shaped by his anti-Japanese guerrilla activities. Other titles, written by Kang Man-gil at Korea University, also presented "leftist" interpretations of Korean history and ROK-U.S. relations. Like Cumings, Kang considered the Korean War to be civil war rather than an international conflict.⁸⁹ All of these books were widely read by South Korean university students and had a significant impact on intellectual and popular thinking.

In February 1985, opposition forces' *de facto* victory in the 1985 National Assembly election encouraged unorthodox activists. Indeed, with the inauguration of the 12th National Assembly, South Korea witnessed the rise of extremism.⁹⁰ First, the National Coalition of the Movements by the Masses for Democracy and Unification (*Mint'ongryŏn*) was born, asserting that it would fight against the military dictatorship and its supporter, the United States. At the same time, about two thousand student representatives from 62 universities across the country organized the National Federation of University Student Unions (eventually renamed the Council of All University Students' Representatives, or *Chŏndaehyŏp*) and declared their struggle against the "fascist" Chun regime and its U.S. patron. One offshoot of

Chōndaehyōp was the Committee for the Struggle for Three-min-ism (abbreviated as *Sammint'u*), which focused on *minjung* (the masses), *minjujuui* (democracy), and *minjokhyōkmyōng* (national revolution). National revolution in particular meant “the revolution based on the struggle against the external forces, including the U.S. imperialists, the monopoly capitalism and the military dictatorship, which are ruling the South.” The Committee for the Struggle for Three-min-ism believed that the United States was backing the new military junta, and stormed into the Cultural Center of the American Embassy in Seoul, demanding an apology for U.S. “support” of or “acquiescence” in the Kwangju massacre.⁹¹

The government’s suppression of *Sammintu* gave birth to the even more radical and militant organizations in 1986. These included the Committee for the Struggle for National Liberation and Democracy Based on Anti-U.S. and Anti-Fascist Movement (*Chamint'u*) and the Committee for the Struggle by the People for the Nation and Democracy Based on Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Fascist Movement (*Minmint'u*). In the meantime, the Constituent Assembly (CA) group was formed within *Minmint'u*, with the goal of establishing a new republic. Encouraged by this expansion of unorthodox opposition forces, *Chamint'u* finally accepted Kim Il-sung’s “thoughts of national identity (*Chuch’e sasang*),” which advocated a “South Korean people’s revolution based on anti-U.S. imperialism.”⁹² All of these organizations were anti-American in character. Lee Manwoo has observed that the anti-U.S. groundswell “can be seen as a resurgence of the dormant Korean nationalism of the left which was crushed by the American occupation authorities and the rightist government of Syngman Rhee in the late 1940s and the 1950s.”⁹³

As these sentiments grew stronger throughout the country, a new trend—revisionist scholarship on the modern history of Korea—was gaining favor. Revisionist historians tended to believe that the following:

- (1) The United States divided Korea immediately after the end of World War II and established the ROK with the support of pro-Japanese collaborators during the colonial period in order to prevent a socialist revolution.
- (2) While Syngman Rhee helped to perpetuate societal division by establishing the ROK in cooperation with the United States, Kim Ku pursued inter-Korean unification by participating in North-South negotiations.
- (3) Kim Il-sung was not a Soviet puppet but an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader. The DPRK was not a pure Soviet creature but an indigenous socialist country.
- (4) The Korean War should be viewed as a revolutionary civil war between the legitimate DPRK and the illegitimate ROK. The UN should play no role in Korean domestic affairs.
- (5) Leftists in the South undertook anti-Japanese activities during the colonial period, but they were suppressed by the “rightists,” who were largely pro-Japanese collaborators, working under the banner of the ROK.
- (6) The United States supported ROK dictators and the division of Korea because they served U.S. interests.
- (7) The two Koreas could be peacefully unified through neutralization and/or federalism.⁹⁴

According to these general tenets, the theoretical basis for pro-Americanism, anticommunism, and the *raison d'être* of the ROK were eroding. Faced with fierce resistance from orthodox and unorthodox oppositionists alike, Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, announced a democratization program in June 1987. The ensuing popular presidential election swept Roh to power, thanks to the separate, competing candidacies of Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-p'il.⁹⁵

Democratization and the Easing of Anti-Americanism

With the inauguration of the Roh Tae-woo government in February 1988, the initial process of democratization began. Many international indicators—such as the unfolding *détente* and cooperation between the United States and the USSR—supported this transition. The success of the Summer Olympics held in Seoul in 1988 further encouraged new stirrings of nationalism among South Koreans.⁹⁶ With change in the wind, the unorthodox dissenters, in cooperation with other antiauthoritarian forces, launched a number of nationalist entities and associations, including the daily newspaper *Hankyoreh* [One Nation], the Association of the Attorneys-at-Law for the Democratic Society (*Minpyŏn*), the Korean Council of Academic Associations, the National Teachers' Labor Union (*Chŏnkyojo*), and the National Coalition of Movements for the National-kinship and Democracy (*Chŏnminryŏn*). These groups represented the vanguard in the anti-NSL campaign and staunchly supported rapprochement with the North. In parallel with those organizations, student leaders belonging to the *undongkwŏn* in general and *Chŏndaehyŏp* in particular concentrated their activities on Korean unification. Radical socialist intellectuals and workers even inaugurated the clandestine Socialist Labor League, pledging “a South Korean revolution for the liberation of workers based on the struggle against the American imperialists and their lackeys in the South.”⁹⁷

The tide of public opinion, however, ran counter to unorthodox views on ROK-U.S. relations. A *Dong-A Ilbo* poll published on June 11, 1988 showed that only 3.8 percent of the respondents agreed to that U.S. forces should withdraw immediately. By contrast, 53.3 percent supported the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South. It seemed that the initiation of democratization under a popularly elected government had diminished anti-American sentiment among some sectors of South Korean society. For his part, President Roh accepted a few of the ideas that unorthodox opposition forces proposed. In July 1988, for example, he announced that, under his *Nordpolitik* (which promoted more active approaches and policies toward northern socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and the PRC), he would actively seek exchange and cooperation with all socialist countries, including the North. Both the Southern opposition parties and the North responded positively. In his New Year message of 1989, Kim Il-sung proposed to convene *all* Korean political parties, including the South's governing party, and some social organizations, in Pyongyang. South Korean rightist leaders rejected the plan,⁹⁸ but most unorthodox dissenters agreed to it, and their leaders even visited Pyongyang independently to demonstrate

“the Korean nation’s own ideas and determination to solve the Korean unification issue not by external forces but by the Koreans themselves.”⁹⁹ Some publicly shouted anti-Americanism slogans, including “Yankee go home.” Upon their return to Seoul, they were arrested under the NSL. While Kim Young-sam deplored their “unauthorized” visit to the North, Kim Dae-jung defended the dissenters, advocating a substantial revision of the NSL and the free exchange of civilians between the two Koreas.

Unorthodox dissenters’ activities brought about a right-wing backlash. The *undongkwŏn* saw attendance at their meetings and demonstrations decline sharply. Some radical university activists burned the American flag during U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle’s visit to Seoul in 1989,¹⁰⁰ but generally the student response was muted. While tempers occasionally flared between the two countries, overall relations between the United States and South Korea remained amicable. When domestic and foreign observers talked about the possibility of the South absorbing the North, many unorthodox opposition activists sought an ideologically diluted line. Inaugurating the Masses Party in November 1990, they declared that they would act within the framework of the parliamentary system rather than pursue a revolutionary method. Another branch of unorthodox opposition activists—the Pannational Coalition for Fatherland Unification (*Pŏmmiryŏn*)—received a cold response from the South Korean public after they demanded, again, the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The North, recognizing the seriousness of this new international trend, agreed to the South’s proposal to hold a high-level inter-Korean political conference. From September 1990 to September 1992, the two Koreas convened prime ministerial meetings eight times, alternating between Seoul and Pyongyang. The result was the adoption of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation between the North and South in December 1991, and the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in January 1992. Since the two documents encompassed many of their own ideas, unorthodox dissenters broadly approved of these agreements. The rightists, by contrast, asserted that some clauses in the Nonnuclearization Declaration deprived the South of its “nuclear sovereignty.”¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, having taken the initiative to apply for UN membership, South Korea was admitted in September 1991; the North had opposed simultaneous admission of the two Koreas on the grounds that it would perpetuate Korea’s division. In terms of state capability, the South seemed to have prevailed over the North, which was showing symptoms of economic collapse. When China established diplomatic relations with the South in 1992, this perception grew stronger. Finally, in the 1992 presidential election, the battle lines were again drawn, and the conservative-right Kim Young-sam, of South Korea’s governing Grand National Party (GNP), defeated Kim Dae-jung.

Kim Young-sam began his presidency in February 1993 by pledging that his administration would seek rapprochement with the North. He maintained that stance even after the North declared its intention to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, thereby bringing about the first North Korean nuclear crisis.¹⁰² When the U.S. Democratic administration, led by Bill Clinton, engaged in bilateral talks with the North without including the

ROK, Southern rightists grew angry with the United States. Some “ultra-rightists” denounced Presidents Clinton and Kim for their timidity and advised them to have the courage to prepare the people for war against the North. Responding to their views, Kim changed his stance. Between June and July 1993, he repeatedly stated that North Korea, while preparing its people for war, was manipulating the talks in order to buy time to finish its nuclear project. He demanded that the Clinton administration not make any further concessions to North Korea. In some sectors of South Korean society, the thesis that the South should secure nuclear sovereignty gained momentum, and the myth that the United States had assassinated President Park to eradicate his nuclear project was revived. When Kim Chin-myŏng published *Mukunghwakkoti p'iotssumnida* [The Rose of Sharon Is in Full Blossom] in summer 1993, based on a well-known Korean myth, the three-volume book became a million-copy-seller by the end of that year.¹⁰³ Many readers commented that this novel awakened them to the imperative of “nuclear sovereignty.” Now the United States was seen as the main obstacle for the South to secure its own nuclear sovereignty.

Former U.S. President Carter’s mediation led to a new round of talks between the United States and North Korea, held in Geneva in June 1994. Three weeks later, Kim Il-sung died and his heir-apparent Kim Jung-il assumed full control of the DPRK. The *Hanch’ongryŏn* youth group in South Korea, successor to *Chŏndaehyŏp*, staged demonstrations demanding the dispatch of condolence envoys to pay respects to the late Kim Il-sung and shouting anti-U.S. slogans. To counter these attacks and tarnish Kim Il-sung’s image, President Kim Young-sam released Soviet documents that he had received from Russian President Boris Yeltsin a month earlier in Moscow. The documents showed that Stalin and Kim Il-sung had played active roles in initiating the Korean War. When the facts became public, they discredited the notion that the United States had installed the Syngman Rhee government to start the war. Anti-Americanism waned again.

Kim Il-sung’s death naturally stirred debate about the future of North Korea. Amid these discussions, President Kim Young-sam’s speeches frequently referred to the “possibility of abrupt unification” and the South’s “preparedness for any kind of future situation.” In an interview with the *New York Times* on October 7, 1994, Kim warned that “compromises might prolong the life of the North Korean government and would send the wrong signal to its leaders.”¹⁰⁴ President Clinton barely managed to persuade him that it was in the South’s national interest to approve a nuclear deal with North Korea. Finally, on October 21 in Geneva, the United States and North Korea concluded the Agreed Framework. According to the agreement, the United States would provide fuel oil and humanitarian assistance during the construction of two light water reactors, and in exchange North Korea would freeze its nuclear development program. South Korean conservative-rightists railed that the treaty’s provisions benefited the North and criticized the United States for yielding too much. They also worried that the agreement failed to freeze past nuclear activities completely and that the North could reactivate nuclear projects in the future.

After the Agreed Framework was signed, concern deepened among South Korean conservative-rightists. To them, the United States was moving too fast to improve its

relations with the North. Then, in September 1996, a North Korean submarine ran aground off the port of Kangnung, on the eastern coast of South Korea. President Kim called it a deliberate act of provocation and authorized a defense ministry plan to attack military bases in the North without prior consultation with the United States. In return for Clinton's repeated firm assurances that America would defend the South, Kim agreed to cancel the attack.

In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung, the opposition party's candidate, advocated a so-called Sunshine Policy toward the North. Quoting Aesop's Fables—in which sunshine, not storm, prompts a person to shed his clothes—he contended that a policy of benevolence could reduce the North's fears and mitigate its mistrust of the South. On the basis of mutual confidence, which would be restored through phased cooperation, he argued, the two Koreas could move to replace the present armistice agreement with a permanent peace accord. Then the two Koreas would enter a period of North-South confederation, which would lead to a North-South federation and ultimately a unified Korea. In a departure from the policy of Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung asserted that there was no other serious contender for Kim Jung-il's leadership, and that the North was peculiarly durable and would not collapse easily.¹⁰⁵ Most progressives, including unorthodox activists, supported him, even contending that the Northern economy was doomed to collapse because of its struggle against U.S. "imperialists" with no foreign aid to back it up. Lee Hoi-ch'ang, the governing GNP candidate, retorted that Kim Dae-jung was too naïve and dangerous to become president. Some conservative-rightists recalled Kim's leftist career in 1945 and 1946 and his close contacts with the pro-North leftist Koreans in Japan in 1972 and 1973. However, the support of Kim Jong-p'il (leader of the United Liberal Democrats), whom Kim Dae-jung promised to appoint as prime minister if elected, and his conservative-rightist United Liberal Democrats, enabled Kim to defeat Lee by a slim margin in December 1997.

Anti-Americanism Intensifies under Rapprochement

The inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration in February 1998 meant the birth of a joint regime, based on a coalition between "progressive-leftist and archconservative forces." It also meant that many of the hitherto unorthodox opposition forces led by the *Minch'ŏng* generation took control of the government. Critical and unorthodox views of ROK-U.S. relations again garnered support. Since 1999, occasional disclosures of massacres of innocent South Koreans by U.S. troops during the Korean War reinforced anti-Americanism among progressive-leftist forces in the South. The most shocking revelation was the July 1950 massacre of South Korean civilians committed by the American forces in Nogunri, Yŏngdong County. When Associated Press reporters wrote of the incident, which had previously been unknown, South Koreans were surprised and enraged.¹⁰⁶ Without the NSL—effectively nullified by the Kim Dae-jung administration—citizens voiced their fury without fear of government repercussion, and anti-American civic organizations and movements expanded rapidly.

For its part, the Clinton administration supported Kim's Sunshine Policy, not least because it dovetailed with the U.S. policy of engagement with North Korea. In 1999, William J. Perry, Clinton's North Korea policy adviser, recommended that the White House normalize U.S.-North Korea relations in return for a freeze on the North's programs to develop and export weapons of mass destruction. The North responded with a declaration to suspend missile tests until 2003. Encouraged, Kim Dae-jung announced in March 2000 that he would help the North rebuild its wrecked economy, beginning with an inter-Korean summit. The result was the first-ever inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Held in Pyongyang, the meeting produced the Pyongyang Declaration, which pledged to pursue national unification according to the principle of national autonomy and suggested a federal or confederal arrangement for a unified Korea. While heightening national pride and confidence, the summit simultaneously weakened both the South Korean perception of a North Korean military threat and the rationale for the stationing of U.S. troops in the South. A nationwide poll released on August 16, 2000 by the Seoul-based *Naeil Sinmun* [Tomorrow Newspaper], showed that 58.3 percent of respondents held critical or negative attitudes toward the presence of American troops in the South.

These aspects notwithstanding, the Clinton administration officially endorsed the summit and set about improving U.S. relations with North Korea. On October 12, 2000, the two countries—with the full support of the Kim administration—agreed to turn the hitherto hostile relationship into a friendly one and to transform the Agreed Framework into a peace agreement. While the North renounced terrorism and pledged to halt long-range missile launches while talks were ongoing, Clinton consented to visit Pyongyang by the end of his presidential term. To organize Clinton's trip, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a historic visit to Pyongyang and met Kim Jung-il on October 23 and 24, 2000.¹⁰⁷

The election of George W. Bush in December 2000 fundamentally altered ROK-U.S. relations. Even before the inauguration, the Bush team made clear that it would not endorse deals with North Korea, including the Agreed Framework and the Pyongyang Declaration. Given this, Clinton elected not to visit North Korea as his term drew to an end.

From the beginning, it was evident that substantive disagreements over North Korea existed between Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush. The most controversial of these differences was over the North's nuclear project. While Kim believed that Bush exaggerated its seriousness, Bush felt that Kim underestimated the danger. At their first talks in March 2001 in Washington D.C., Kim argued that the North's real goal was not to have nuclear weapons, but rather to have diplomatic relations with the United States. Bush responded that he did not trust Kim Jung-il, and the talks ended without progress. The September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States only hardened the Bush administration's stance toward North Korea, which remained on the U.S. terrorist list.

On January 29, 2002, ROK-U.S. and DPRK-U.S. relations entered a new phase. In his state of the union address, President Bush identified North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as "an axis of evil"—countries that were actively arming themselves to shatter

world peace. Outraged, North Korea condemned Bush's comments as an attempt to justify the presence of American troops in South Korea, part of an American "policy of aggression against us."¹⁰⁸ In the South, while the conservative-rightists responded positively, the progressive-leftists strongly criticized Bush, arguing that he sought to wage war against the North, which would in turn threaten peace and security on the Korean peninsula. More fervent progressive-leftists and peace-oriented activists staged fierce anti-U.S. demonstrations, shouting "Yankee Go Home!" A nationwide poll released on March 7, 2002 by weekly *Sisa Jonol* [Journal of Current Affairs] showed that 59.7 percent of respondents disagreed with Bush's remarks. As Kim Seung-hwan observed during this period:

Anti-Americanism is growing at a startling rate in South Korea, potentially escalating into a serious problem that could jeopardize the future of the U.S.-Korean relations. . . . Bush's denunciation of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" and his threat to take preemptive actions against Pyongyang have angered many in South Korea, leading them to believe that the United States was escalating the possibility of a crisis on the peninsula as part of its global war on terrorism.¹⁰⁹

Against this backdrop, Bush and Kim again held talks, this time in Seoul in February 2002. In a joint press conference, both leaders described the summit as "frank and open," and indicated that differences remained over how to handle North Korea. About this time, it also became clear that the target date for completing the construction of two nuclear power reactors in North Korea would have to be pushed back until at least 2008, five years later than the agreed schedule. These delays and other conflicts led North Korea to declare in March 2002 that it would withdraw from the Agreed Framework. In October 2002, the Bush administration accused the North of conducting a nuclear weapons development program using highly enriched uranium (HEU), but the North categorically denied it. The Kim administration defended the North's position against the United States, and ROK-U.S. relations deteriorated further. In January 2003, the North withdrew from the NPT, and the second nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula began.¹¹⁰

Throughout this process, South Koreans almost universally saw the Bush administration as seeking a *casus belli* against the North. Naturally anti-Americanism rapidly expanded. In this context, Moon Chung-in stressed that

[r]ecent anti-American sentiments and movements are targeted not at the United States and its people *per se* but at the Bush administration. Its moral absolutism, unilateralism, and offensive realism—as manifest in the doctrine of preemptive attacks and the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons as well as increased military spending—have become sources of grievances against the United States among the Korean public. Thus, equating "anti-Bushism" with anti-Americanism is tantamount to committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. A change of administration or American foreign policy might significantly ameliorate the anti-American stance in South Korea.¹¹¹

Chae Haesook's empirical research showed the same result. According to her study, "it is mostly the U.S.'s image, its policies and, in particular, its handling of the North Korean nuclear problem, that has affected South Korean sentiments. . . . In other words, the cause of South Korean anti-Americanism lies not with the perception of North Korea, *per se*, but with America's foreign policy towards North Korea."¹¹²

Anti-Americanism flared again in the wake of a June 2002 vehicular accident involving two U.S. soldiers, which killed two South Korean schoolgirls near Seoul. These tragic events had a significant impact of the December 2002 presidential election. They solidified unorthodox opposition forces that favored Roh Moo-hyun, who proudly announced, "I have never visited the U.S." He added that, "If elected, I will deal with the Bush administration with national assertiveness. I will not *kowtow* to Washington. The ROK-U.S. alliance should be transformed into horizontal relations—'equal partnership.'"¹¹³ By a slim margin, Roh defeated Lee Hoi-ch'ang of the GNP, who was seen as representing the pro-American South Korean establishment.

Roh's victory meant that a coalition of nonmainstream groups—including the unorthodox dissenters who had gathered strength and influence since the mid-1970s—finally captured political power. Roh's strategists were from the *undongkwŏn*, including the "*Minch'ŏng* generation" of the 1970s and the three-eight-six (386) generation (people mostly in their thirties who were born in the 1960s and attended college in the 1980s). The 386 generation had spent their university careers under a repressive, anticommunist, anti-North Korean military regime supported by the American government. Many even served prison terms in their struggle for democracy, for independence from the United States, and for inter-Korean rapprochement. Naturally, they came to embrace a mixed sense of antiestablishment, antimainstream, anti-American nationalism, and showed sympathy with North Korea. Their slogan, which can be paraphrased as "inter-Korean cooperation rather than South Korean-American cooperation," should be understood in this context. The 386-ers also passionately pursued drastic reforms in what they saw as a business conglomerate-centered economy predicated on government-business collusion and pro-America diplomacy. Some went a step further by advocating grassroots democracy, which ROK authorities considered to be a variation of North Korean communism. In sum, the 386-ers' policies and proposals contrasted sharply with mainstream ideology.

With Roh Moo-hyun's inauguration in February 2003, the new government reflected the 386-ers' historical and ideological views in official policies. On April 15, 2004, after the congressional election, a large number of unorthodox dissenters entered the seventeenth National Assembly, further bolstering the administration's position.¹¹⁴ The government took three key steps to bring these former dissenters into the fold. First, it noted officially that communists during the Japanese colonial period had made contributions to Korean independence. Second, it identified numerous past national leaders—leaders who had previously been deemed core-conservative rightists—as pro-Japanese collaborators during the Japanese colonial period. Third, the government reexamined so-called wrongdoings against humanity that past authoritarian regimes had committed and stated for the record that the then public security authorities had

extracted false confessions through torture from orthodox and unorthodox dissenters, forcing them to admit to communist or pro-North activities. Collectively, these actions simultaneously tarnished the image of pro-American conservative-rightist forces and improved the image of anti-American progressive-leftist forces.

On the one hand, the Roh government engaged, actively and positively, with the United States. In May 2003, for example, the government dispatched ROK troops to Iraq in accordance with the ROK-U.S. alliance. In 2005, it agreed to the Bush administration's principle of strategic flexibility, resisting pressure from anti-American forces in the South. In 2005, the government opened negotiations for the ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), despite protests from those who believed that it would make the South an "American economic colony." On the other hand, the ROK regularly disagreed with the United States and chose to follow its own path. The ROK objected to President Bush's North Korea policy, which it regarded as collapsist. In November 2004, immediately after Bush's reelection, Roh urged Bush to soften the U.S. stance toward North Korea; U.S. military actions and economic sanctions against the North, he said, were unacceptable. Roh went one step further, saying that the North had made a legitimate point in arguing that it needed to keep its nuclear and missile programs to deter outside threats. Roh offered to have the ROK government mediate the conflict between North Korea and the United States. In the end, South Korea adopted a neutral stance in the Six Party Talks between 2003 and 2005 and—much to the chagrin of the Bush administration—Roh also increased the South's economic assistance to the North during this period.

President Roh's tolerance of leftists and his assistance to the North brought about a conservative-rightist backlash after 2005.¹¹⁵ When he said that he would make the United States "return the wartime control authority from the supreme commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the supreme commander of the ROK forces," conservatives feared that "his reckless decision would endanger the security of the ROK."¹¹⁶ Led by Christians and retired military and police cadres as well as diplomats, this group initiated a series of demonstrations against what they called Roh's pro-North policy and "leftist forces opposing ROK-U.S. military alliance." Some prominent intellectuals, including convertees from Kim Il-sung's "*Chuch'e sasang*," inaugurated the National Coalition of New Right Movements, declaring their struggle against Roh's North Korea and U.S. policies. In this context, Professor Lew Seok-Choon wrote that the New Right Movement "started as a reaction to recent regime's maladministration and incompetence, aiming at defending the democracy of Korea from the left-leaning and pro-North Korea administration."¹¹⁷ All of them agreed that the Kim Jung-il regime should be collapsed and, in order to bring that about, that South Korea and the United States should cooperate in discontinuing economic assistance to the North.

The North's nuclear test on October 9, 2006 reinforced the conservative-rightist backlash. Conservatives again criticized the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations' economic assistance to the North, which, they asserted, had enabled the Kim Jung-il regime to develop nuclear bombs. In contrast, a few leftist organizations defended the North, arguing that the North had no choice but to test

the nuclear bombs in order to force the United States to agree to U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. They denounced the Bush administration's refusal to hold bilateral talks with the North. With the North's nuclear test as a new turning point, the voices of the conservative-rightists gained strength within the South.

The Rightist Backlash against Anti-Americanism

Since 2005 South Korean conservative-rightists, including so-called new right movement activists, have struggled jointly against what they view as Roh's leftist, pro-North Korea, anti-United States policies. Defining the Roh administration in this way impelled leaders of 165 conservative and ultraconservative organizations to create the Emergency National Congress for Liberty and Democracy in Seoul on July 26, 2005. They elected Kim Sang-ch'ol, a former mayor of Seoul, as chairman. Declaring its primary aim to serve as a "safeguard of the legitimacy and constitution of the Republic of Korea,"¹¹⁸ the Congress pledged to fight against any sort of communism, as well as forces supporting the Kim Jung-il regime. The Congress also demanded that the Roh administration restore what they called the "blood relations" between the Republic of Korea and the United States. For their part, the Roh administration, the governing Uri Party, and most pro-Roh media asserted that the Congress was both anachronistic and dangerous, consisting of "outdated old-liners who still stick to the Cold War mentality," and who are "distorting the new historical trend on the Korean peninsula."¹¹⁹ Some scholars who joined the new right movement openly criticized Professors Li Yōng-hi and Kang Man-gil for misleading students with "distorted, leftist historical views."¹²⁰

During the joint Liberation Day celebrations cohosted by the North and South Korean governments, the Congress and groups affiliated with it turned the gathering into a political event. The government responded by prohibiting the use of South Korea's national flag in soccer games in Seoul and instructing the South Korean police to surveil and crack down on southern conservative activities. The Congress cited these activities as evidence of the Roh administration's "pro-North" standpoint. Tensions escalated to such an extent that a prominent columnist—himself a nonpartisan—criticized the slogan "Among Koreans," noting that:

It will do more harm than good if the slogan "Among Koreans" is seen as anti-U.S. and anti-Japan unification efforts by both Koreas. . . . With the concept 'Among Koreans,' we cannot bring peace on the Korean peninsula, which will be the precondition for initiating peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. . . . Now is the time to broaden our horizon beyond the nation and see Northeast Asia and the world."¹²¹

Another well known nonpartisan columnist added that "The emotional assertion that we are the same people will not breach our solemn and very real divide once the brief festivities of tears and excitement are over. . . . The premise 'we are one' is surely beautiful. But it will only have meaning once we have acknowledged that it isn't true."¹²²

The struggle between conservative-rightist forces and progressive-leftist forces became fiercer still in the December 2007 presidential election. While Chŏng Tong-yŏng (from the governing United Democratic Party and a former Unification Minister under President Roh) stressed the primacy of reconciliation and cooperation with the North, Lee Myung-bak—from the opposition GNP, the former CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company, and former mayor of Seoul—pledged that if elected he would do his best to “restore” the ROK-U.S. alliance. The result was Lee’s landslide victory, which ushered in the conservative GNP’s dramatic return to power.¹²³ Lee’s election was widely interpreted as a backlash against leftist, pro-North, and anti-United States forces.

In his inaugural speech, delivered on February 25, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak repeated his pledge that he would “restore” the ROK-U.S. alliance. The Bush administration responded favorably, while the North attacked the statement. In April, Lee held talks with President Bush at Camp David. They agreed to upgrade the relationship between their countries, so strained and tumultuous over the past decade, and to focus on rebuilding mutual trust. With most South Korean media praising their agreement, it seemed that a new era of close and friendly relations between Seoul and Washington had dawned. But when Lee allowed wholesale imports of U.S. beef into South Korea amid fears of “mad cow” disease, cattle breeders and consumers staged angry protests around the country.¹²⁴ These demonstrations contained undercurrents of anti-American sentiment, proving that it was still a force in the South Korean consciousness. Indeed, the poet Kim Chi-ha, an activist for the antidictatorship movement in the South, sharply observed that leftists’ demonstrations against American beef were successful in large part because they invoked anti-Americanism as part of their argument.¹²⁵

Conclusion

Some scholars have argued that South Korean anti-Americanism is understandable, and even commonplace. Kim Jin-wung considers it to be “a very natural phenomenon, usually witnessed in countries under the strong influence of foreign powers. ... As in many other nations around the world, most South Korean anti-Americanism may be defined as anti-American sentiment or criticism of the United States and as inevitable frictions between two different cultures. In South Korea, most of the people’s criticisms of the United States are issue-oriented.”¹²⁶

Nevertheless, natural or otherwise, the charged relations between the United States and South Korea have impelled other scholars to identify some of those key issues. First, then, it seems likely that increased national confidence—born of economic development, democratization, and heightened nationalism—has led some South Koreans to discount the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance. A related explanation is that some South Koreans now look to China to supplant the United States as an alternative ROK ally. Second, South Korean perceptions of North Korea have changed substantially over the years. South Koreans now widely regard the North not as an enemy but as a partner at best, and an object of pity at worst. This outlook undermines

the rationale that the North is a threat, and that the ROK-U.S. alliance exists in order to counter that danger. Third, there exists the perception in South Korea that the United States covertly supported the 1980 Kwangju Massacre; the impression that the United States supported authoritarian rule in the country still rankles in many ROK quarters. Fourth, the phenomenal growth of specialists in international relations—many of whom earned degrees from universities in the West, sometimes under the supervision of professors who are critical of U.S. foreign policy—has led to a general questioning of the U.S.-ROK alliance, its (to some, suspect) organizing principles, its utility, and its long-term prospects.¹²⁷

In the end, the battle has been joined on the right and on the left, and shows no sign of abating. As one set of scholars puts it, “a new cooperative U.S.-ROK relationship based on a more equal partnership needs to be established to resolve the many tensions associated with Koreans’ various expressions of anti-American sentiment.”¹²⁸

Notes

¹ This paper has been substantially revised since it was first delivered on October 10, 2008 at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), Stanford University. The paper was written during the writer’s residence at Shorenstein APARC as consulting professor during fall quarter 2008. In the text, all Asian names except Syngman Rhee and John M. Chang begin with their respective family names.

² For example, see Manwoo Lee, “Anti-Americanism and South Korea’s Changing Perception of America,” in Manwoo Lee, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon (eds.), *Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 9–27; Samsung Lee, “Kwangju and America in Perspective,” *Asian Perspectives* 12, no. 2 (Fall–Winter 1988): 69–122; Jin-wung Kim, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes,” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 8 (August 1989): 749–63; Taik-Sup Auh, “Korean Perceptions of the U.S.,” in Robert Sutter and Han Sungjoo (eds.), *Korea-U.S. Relations in a Changing World* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1990), 85–97; Kim Jin-wung, *Hankukinüi panmikamchöng* (Koreans’ Anti-United States Sentiments), (Seoul: Ilchokag, 1992); Jae-Kyoung Lee, “Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Media and the Politics of Significations,” unpublished PhD diss. (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa, 1993); Jin-wung Kim, “From Patron-Client to Partners: The Changing South Korean-American Relationship,” *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 303–25; Jin-wung Kim, “The Nature of South Korean Anti-Americanism,” *Korea Journal* 34, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 36–47; Seung-hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002–2003): 109–22; Victor D. Cha, “America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?” *Current History* 102, no. 665 (September 2003): 279–84; Eric Larson et al., *Ambivalent Allies?: A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004); David I. Steinberg, ed., *Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005); Jae-jung Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 112–13.

³ For example, see Manwoo Lee, “Anti-Americanism and South Korea’s Changing Perception of America,” 7; Young Ick Lew, “A Historical Overview of Korean Perceptions of the United States: Five Major Stereotypes,” in Young Ick Lew, Byong-kie Song, Ho-min Yang, and Hy-sop Lim, *Korean Perceptions of the United States: A History of Their Origins and Formation* (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006), 26–31. This book is a translation by Michael

Finch of the writers' *Hankukinūi taemi insik: Yōksachōkūrobon hyōngsōngkwachōng* (Seoul: Minūmsa, 1994). Finch is the author of *Min Yōng-hwan: A Political Biography* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).

⁴ Gi-Wook Shin, "South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 787–803. See also his "Marxism, Anti-Americanism, and Democracy in South Korea: An Examination of Nationalist Intellectual Discourse," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 3, no. 2 (1995): 508–34.

⁵ Sung-han Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-U.S. Alliance," *Korean Journal of Defensive Analysis* 15, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 105–30.

⁶ Jae-kap Ryoo, "U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: An ROK Perspective," *International Journal of Korean Studies* 8, no. 1 (Fall–Winter 2004): 23–52.

⁷ Won-soo Kim, "Challenges for the ROK-U.S. Alliance in the Twenty-First Century," in Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia* (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), 159–76.

⁸ Chung-in Moon, "Between *Banmi* (Anti-Americanism) and *Sungmi* (Worship of the United States): Dynamics of Changing U.S. Images in South Korea," in Steinberg (ed.), *Korean Attitudes toward the United States*, 139–52.

⁹ Meredith Woo-Cumings, "Unilateralism and Its Discontents: The Passing of the Cold War Alliance and Changing Public Opinion in the Republic of Korea," in Steinberg, *Korean Attitudes*, 56–79. The quoted part appears on p. 57.

¹⁰ For this point, see also David I. Steinberg, "The U.S.-ROK Alliance American Perspectives," *International Journal of Korean Studies* 10, no. 2 (Fall–Winter 2006): 1–18.

¹¹ Zbigniew F. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R.* (New York: Viking, 1963), 104–21. Quote appears on pp. 104–05.

¹² Robert Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 342.

¹³ Professor Lew Seok-choon identified the right-conservative forces with "the industrialization generation" and the left-progressive forces with "the democratization generation." See his "Power Structure and Recent Political Development in Korea," *Asian Profile* 35, no. 2 (April 2007): 85–98.

¹⁴ Ko Chong-sōk, "The So-called 'Anti-American, Pro-North Leftist,'" *Korea Focus* 14, No. 3 (Autumn 2006): 10–12.

¹⁵ Byong-kie Song, "The Perception of the United States during the Period of National Seclusion," in Lew et al., *Korean Perceptions of the United States*, 54–74.

¹⁶ Bong Baik, *Kim Il Sung: Biography* (2 vols., Tokyo: Miraisha, 1969), vol. 1 (*From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland*), 14.

¹⁷ Dae-sook Suh, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 5.

¹⁸ *Rodong Sinmun*, September 4, 1986.

¹⁹ Pyong-choon Hahm, "The Korean Perception of the United States," in Youngnok Koo and Dae-sook Suh, eds., *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 26–27.

²⁰ For recent studies on the process that led Korea to open itself to Western powers, see Key-hiuk Kim, *Opening of Korea: A Confucian Response to the Western Impact* (Seoul: Institute for Modern Korean Studies, Yonsei University, 1999).

²¹ Hakjoon Kim, "The Soviet Union in American-Korean Relations," in Koo and Suh, eds., *Korea and the United States*, 198–94. See also C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876–1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 19. For a recent study on the then Chinese policy toward Korea, see Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosōn Korea, 1850–1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008). This book is an

outgrowth of Larsen's PhD dissertation, "From Suzerainty to Commerce: Sino-Korean Economic and Business Relations During the Open Port Period (1876–1919)," submitted to Harvard University in 2000.

²² The American representative for the negotiation was Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt. For part in the proceedings, see Frederick C. Drake, *The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), chs. 13–14. The full text of the treaty is included in this book, pp. 363–68. For Korea's position, see Woong-joe Kang, *The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866–1882* (Lanham, MD: University of Press of America, Inc., 2005).

²³ For the full text of the treaty, see "Appendix A: Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of Korea," included in Koo and Suh, eds., *Korea and the United States*, 373–80. The quoted part appears on p. 373.

²⁴ Hahm, "The Korean Perception of the United States," 30.

²⁵ For studies of American missionaries who came to Korea, see Key S. Ryang, "Horace Grant Underwood (1859–1916) in Korea: The First American Protestant Missionary and Educator," *Journal of Modern Korean Studies* 3 (December 1987): 71–94; In-soo Kim, "Horace G. Underwood (1859–1916) and Korea's Modern Identity," *Journal of Modern Korean Studies* 7 (April 2000): 31–76. His wife, Lillias Horton Underwood, M.D., also published her recollections on Korea, titled *Fifteen Years among the Top-Knots or Life in Korea* (Boston, New York, and Chicago: The American Tract Society, 1904). See also Jong H. Lee, "Samuel A. Moffet's Reform Theology and His Mission in Korea in the Maturing Period: 1920–1936," *Journal of Modern Korean Studies* 4 (May 1990): 53–77. See also Il-p'yong Mun, *Hanmi osipnyönsa: kyosöpüi kiwon kwa pyonch'ön* (A Fifty-Year History of Korea-America Relations: The Origins and Changes in Their Relations), edited and explained by Kwang-rin Yi (Seoul: T'ankudang, 1975), 252–53. Mun originally contributed his articles to *Chosun Ilbo*, beginning on July 16, 1934 and continuing for one hundred installments. This history was the first to be produced by a Korean in the field. Mun appreciated the role that the Christian missionaries played, but he criticized the United States' policy toward Korea after the Russo-Japanese War, as well as the Korean court's "foolish" mentality of dependence on the United States.

²⁶ Chosönrodongdang ch'ulp'ansa (The Publishing House of the Korean Worker's Party), *Pulkulüi panilhyökmyöngt'usa Kim Hyöngjik sönseng* (Pyongyang: Chosönrodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1968), 29.

²⁷ In-kwan Hwang, "A Translation and Critical Review of Yu Kil-chun's *On Neutrality*," *Korean Studies* 9 (1985): 3.

²⁸ Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy, "Duality and Dominance: An Overview of Korean-American Relations, 1866–1997," in Yur-bok Lee and Wayne Patterson, eds., *Korean-American Relations, 1866–1997* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 3.

²⁹ Hahm, "The Korean Perception of the United States," 30.

³⁰ Chong-sik Lee, *Syngman Rhee: The Prison Years of a Young Radical* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 113–19. For Rhee's thoughts on Korea's independence, see his *The Spirit of Independence: A Primer of Korean Modernization and Reform*, Translated, Annotated, and with an introduction by Han-Kyo Kim (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press and Seoul: The Institute of Modern Korean Studies, Yonsei University, 2001).

³¹ John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 332–33.

³² K. G. Tewksbury (comp.), *Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), 21–24.

³³ Taejin Yi, "Forced Treaties and Japan's Annexation of the Great Korean Empire: An Argument for the Illegality of the Annexation," in Taejin Yi, Choonghyun Paik, Boochan Kim, Paekeun Park, Bokhee Chang, Inseop Chung, Hyoungman Kim, and Janghie Lee,

International Legal Issues in Korea-Japan Relations (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), 11–60.

³⁴ Patterson and Conroy, “Duality and Dominance,” 3.

³⁵ Quoted in Ho-min Yang, “The Perception of the United States during the Japanese Colonial Period,” in Lew et al., *Korean Perceptions of the United States*, 242. For a biography of Ahn, see Hyung-chan Kim, *Tosan Ahn Ch’ang-ho: A Profile of a Prophetic Patriot* (Seoul: Tosan Memorial Foundation; Seattle: Korean American Historical Society; and Los Angeles: Academia Koreana, Keimyung-Baylor University, 1996).

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³⁷ Lew, “A Historical Overview of Korean Perceptions of the United States,” 27.

³⁸ Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, 2 vols., (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1972), vol. 1, 23.

³⁹ In-kwan Hwang, *The Neutralized Unification of Korea in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1980), 1.

⁴⁰ Lew, “A Historical Overview of Korean Perceptions of the United States,” 26–28.

⁴¹ Tyler Dennett mentioned this agreement in a meeting of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, MA in August 1924. Based on this, he published “President Roosevelt’s Secret Pact with Japan,” *Current History* 21 (1924–1925): 15–21. A year later, he included his discussions on the agreement in his book, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War: A Critical Study of American Policy in Eastern Asia in 1902–1905, Based Primarily upon the Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925), 112–15. This book was republished by Peter Smith Publishing Company in Gloucester, MA in 1959. Dennett’s views have been reexamined in Raymond A. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement: Reality or Myth?” *Journal of Modern History* 31 (March–December 1959): 46–51. According to this article, the agreement was a record of conversations between Taft and Katsura, which were not legally binding.

⁴² Harold Hak-won Sunoo, *Korea: A Political History in Modern Times* (Columbia, MO: Korean American Cultural Foundation and Seoul: Kunkuk University Press, 1970), 197. This book ends with the chapter, “The Liberation.”

⁴³ Donald N. Clark, “Bitter Friendship: Understanding Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” in *Korea Briefing*, ed. Donald N. Clarke (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 147–67. See also Hy-sop Lim, “The Perception of the United States after Liberation in 1945,” in Lew et al., *Korean Perceptions of the United States*, 340–41.

⁴⁴ Baik, *Kim Il Sung*, vol. 1, 43.

⁴⁵ Kim Il-sung, *Sekiwa döpulö* [With the Century] (Pyongyang: Chosönrodongdang ch’ulp’ansa, 1998), vol. 8, 56–81.

⁴⁶ Yöng-ryöl Yu, *Kachwakiüi Yun Ch’i-ho yönku* [A Study of Yun Ch’i-ho during the Enlightenment Period] (Seoul: Hankilsa, 1985), 265–67. See also Kenneth M. Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896–1937* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 175.

⁴⁷ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The British Commonwealth and the Far East* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), vol. 4, 1039.

⁴⁸ Donald Stone MacDonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), edited and revised by Donald N. Clark in 1996 as its third edition after the author’s death in 1993. The quoted part appears on p. 238.

⁴⁹ Hy-sop Lim, “The Perception of the United States after Liberation in 1945,” in Lew et al., *Korean Perceptions of the United States*, 314–15.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 341.

⁵¹ *History of Revolutionary Activities of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983), 226–32.

⁵² Philip Jaisohn, edited by Hong Sun-pyo, *My Days in Korea and Other Essays*, part 4, (Seoul: Institute for Modern Korean Studies, Yonsei Univ., 1999), 375. This book consists of five parts: My Days in Korea: Recollections of Life and Activities in Korea, 1880s to 1898 (part 1); Korea for the Koreans: Writings Relevant to Korean Reform and Independence Movement, 1896–1942 (part 2); Random Thoughts: Commentaries on Human Issues and Global Problems During the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1940 (part 3); The Way to Freedom and Democracy: Radio Broadcasts and Speeches on the Eve of the Birth of the Republic of Korea, 1947–1948 (part 4); and appendices related to Dr. Philip Jaisohn. For other research on Philip Jaisohn, see Se-eung Oh, *Dr. Philip Jaisohn's Reform Movement, 1896–1898: A Critical Appraisal of the Independence Club* (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, Inc., 1995).

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⁵⁷ Jae-jung Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*, 113.

⁵⁸ MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 238.

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⁶¹ Hy-sop Lim, “The Perception of the United States,” 341. See also *Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea: Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 15.

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⁶⁵ T'ae-yöng Chöng, *Hankuk sahoeminjujuüi chöngdangsa* [A History of Social Democratic Parties in Korea] (Seoul: Saemyöngsökwon, 1995), 562–63.

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⁶⁷ *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 15 and 16, 1961.

⁶⁸ *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 17, 1961.

⁶⁹ See MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 238. On the South Korean prostitutes' demonstrations against American servicemen, see Katharine H. S. Moon, “Citizen Power in Korean-American Relations,” in Steinberg, ed., *Korean Attitudes*, 233–46. See also Moon's *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korean Relations* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1997), and “South Korean Movements Against Militarized Sexual Labor,” *Asian Survey* 39, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 310–27. (The former book was published in Korean in 2002.) See also

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⁷⁷ For an excellent analysis of this document, see Young-whan Kihl, "Korean Response to Major Power Rapprochement," in *Major Powers and Korea*, ed. Young C. Kim, (Silver Spring, MD: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), 151–54.

⁷⁸ For the South's declaration, see *Korea Times*, June 24, 1973. For the North's declaration, see *The People's Korea*, June 27, 1973, and *Pyongyang Times*, March 30, 1974.

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⁸¹ The book tells of a Korean woman, portrayed as a yellow dog, who screams as she is raped by an American soldier. This novel was published by Ch'angjak kwa pip'yŏngsa [Creation and Criticism] in Seoul, and is discussed in Hahm, "The Korean Perception of the United States," 44.

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⁸⁸ Wonmo Dong, “Students and Politics in South Korea: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s,” *Journal of International Affairs* 40: no. 2 (Winter–Spring 1987): 233–54.

⁸⁹ See Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (2 vols.: Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), vol. I (*Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947*); and Man-kil Kang, *Hankuk kũndaesa* [Modern History of Korea] (Seoul: Ch’angjakkwa pip’yõngsa, 1984), and *Hankuk hyõndaesa* [Contemporary History of Korea] (Seoul: Ch’angjakkwa pip’yõngsa, 1984). Kang’s former book was revised in 1984. His latter title was revised in 2005 and published as *A History of Contemporary Korea*, trans. John B. Duncan (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005).

⁹⁰ Koon-woo Nam, *South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability* (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1989), 304–7.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 243–47.

⁹² See, for example, an editorial of *Haebang sǒnǒn* [The Declaration of Liberation], 2 (April 17, 1986) in *Wolgan Chosun burok* [Appendix of the Monthly Korea] (January 1996): 425–27.

⁹³ Manwoo Lee, “Anti-Americanism,” 7.

⁹⁴ For example, see *Haebang jǒnhusaũi insik* [Perceptions of the History of the Pre- and the Post-Liberation Period], coauthored by many young scholars. This book spans six volumes and was published between 1979 and 1989 by the Hankilsa Publishing Company in Seoul. For the neutralization of the Korean peninsula, see In-kwan Hwang, *The United States and Neutral Reunited Korea: Search for a New Basis of American Strategy* (Lanham, MD: The Univ. Press of America, 1990). See also his *One Korea via Permanent Neutrality: Peaceful Management of Korean Unification* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Books, 1987).

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⁹⁶ Jinwung Kim, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” 754.

⁹⁷ For a detailed discussion, see the release by the Agency of National Security Planning of South Korea, printed in *Dong-A Ilbo*, October 31, 1991.

⁹⁸ Young Jeh Kim, “Toward a Unified Korea: Problems and Prospective,” *Asian Profile* 18, no. 6 (December 1990): 553–50. See also Young Jeh Kim, *The Political Unification of Korea in the 1980s: Key to World Peace* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989).

⁹⁹ *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 11, 1989

¹⁰⁰ Han-kyo Kim, “The United States and South Korea Since 1982,” in Lee and Patterson, eds., *Korean-American Relations*, 150.

¹⁰¹ Kim T’ae-wu, *Pukhaek, kamki inka am inka* [The North Nuclear: Cold or Cancer] (Seoul: Sidaechõngsin, 2006), 22–32.

¹⁰² For a full account on the first North Korean nuclear crisis, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

¹⁰³ After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, some supporters of Park circulated the rumor that the president had been killed according to a well-planned plot prepared by the U.S. CIA. Without giving proof, these supporters speculated that when the CIA had concluded that Park would develop nuclear weapons (thereby disregarding the advice of the

U.S. government) and so enlisted KCIA Chief Kim to assassinate him. Some novelists even guessed that the U.S. CIA killed the Korean-American physicist, Dr. Benjamin Lee (Hwiso Lee), who was allegedly enthusiastic about Park's nuclear plans. This myth is still alive in some quarters of South Korean society. The Rose of Sharon is the national flower of the ROK.

¹⁰⁴ James Sterngold, "South Korea President Lashes Out at U.S.," *New York Times*, October 7, 1994.

¹⁰⁵ Kim Dae-jung, "The Once and Future Korea," *Foreign Policy*, no. 86 (Spring 1992): 47–52.

¹⁰⁶ See Charles J. Hanley, Sang-hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, with research assistance by Randy Herschaft, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001); Robert L. Bateman, *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002). The North Korean regime maintained that "U.S. imperialists have massacred innocent Koreans." See the 20-page pictorial pamphlet, *The Sinchon Museum: Don't Forget the Bestial U.S. Imperialists!* (Pyongyang: Korea Pictorial, 1989).

¹⁰⁷ For her recollections of her trip and talks with Kim, see Madeleine Albright, *Madame Secretary: A Memoir* (London: Macmillan, 2003), 460–67.

¹⁰⁸ For an account on the crisis over North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship and the the showdown between George Bush and Kim Jung-il, see Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003).

¹⁰⁹ Seung-hwan Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," 109–10. See also Derek J. Mitchell, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002–2003): 123–37.

¹¹⁰ For a detailed account, see Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

¹¹¹ Chung-in Moon, "Dynamics of Changing U.S. Images in South Korea," 146–47.

¹¹² Haesook Chae, "Understanding Anti-Americanism among South Korean College Students," *International Journal of Korean Studies* 9, no. 1 (Spring–Summer 2005): 107–25. The quoted portion appears on 108.

¹¹³ Roh repeated this famous remark throughout his campaigns. One example can be found in *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 15, 2002.

¹¹⁴ According to Ryoo, "the most radical and 'revolutionary' change in representative democratic politics has resulted from the seventeenth general election on April 15." See Ryoo, "U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition," 26. See also Sunwoong Kim, "The Impact of the 2004 National Assembly Elections on the Korean Economy," *International Journal of Korean Studies* 8, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2004): 179–98.

¹¹⁵ A rightist's criticism of "anti-Americanism" before the election of Roh had already appeared in Byong-kuk Kim, *Counter-Antiamericanism in Korea: A Collection of Articles and Essays* (Seoul: Seoul Institute of International Economics, 1996).

¹¹⁶ "Editorial: Wartime Command Authority Should Be Returned to Korea," *Hankyoreh* (October 12, 2005) in *Korea Focus* 13, no. 6 (November–December 2005): 6–7. See also "Editorial: What We Stand to Lose from Gaining Operational Control," *Chosun Ilbo* (October 13, 2005) in *Korea Focus* 13, no. 6 (November–December 2005): 7–8.

¹¹⁷ Lew, "Power Structure and Recent Political Development in Korea," 98.

¹¹⁸ *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 27, 2005.

¹¹⁹ For rightist views, see *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 27, 2005. For leftist views, see *Hankyoreh*, July 27, 2005. Quoted material is taken from *Hankyoreh*, July 27, 2005.

¹²⁰ See Yi Tongho, "Naüi sasangjök süsüng Li Yönghirül pip'anhandä [I Criticize My Ideological Mentor Li Yönghi]," *Wolgan Chosun* (September 2005): 226. See also Yi Chuch'ön, "Naüi süsüng Kang Mankilüi pitulöjin yöksakwanül pip'anhandä [I Criticize

the Distorted Historical Views of My Mentor Kang Mankil],” *Wolgan Chosun* (November 2005): 74.

¹²¹ Kim Young-hie, “Korea’s Problem is Also Asia’s,” *JoongAng Daily*, August 21, 2005.

¹²² Yoon Pyong-joong, “We Aren’t One—Not Anymore,” *JoongAng Daily*, August 19, 2005.

¹²³ Sung-ho Kim, “Korea’s Conservatives Strike Back: An Uncertain Revolution in Seoul,” *Global Asia* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 78–85.

¹²⁴ In-young Chun, “Korea-U.S. Strategic Alliance and Balance of National Interests,” *Korea Focus* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 17–18; Sang-hyun Lee, “ROK-U.S. Relations in “The Lee Myung-bak Government: Toward a Vision of a ‘21st Century Strategic Alliance,”” *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 22, no. 1 (Spring–Summer 2008): 1–32.

¹²⁵ *Chosun Ilbo*, October 10, 2008.

¹²⁶ Jin-wung Kim, “The Nature of South Korean Anti-Americanism,” 45.

¹²⁷ See Hak-joon Kim, “The Growth of Anti-Americanism in South Korea and Its Influence in ROK-U.S. Relations,” delivered at the Contemporary Asia Seminar on October 5, 2006, at Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA, http://aparc.stanford.edu/events/domestic_politics_of_usrok_relations. See also Michael H. Armacost, “The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia,” in *The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia*, ed. Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford Univ.), 11–24.

¹²⁸ Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea,” *Asian Survey* 47, no. 2 (March–April 2007): 327–50. The quoted part appears on p. 350. See also Chang-Hee Nam, “Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture,” *Asian Survey* 46, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 615–31.

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