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Тиждень  
України

international edition

# The Ukrainian Week

№ 10 (33) JUNE 2012

# TRAPPED



**WHY VICTORIES ALWAYS  
TURN INTO DEFEATS  
FOR THE OPPOSITION**

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**The Ukrainian Week**

**The Ukrainian Week** № 10 (33) June 2012  
**Founder:** ECEM Media Ukraine LLC **Publisher:** The Ukrainian Week LLC  
**First published in January 2010**  
 State registration certificate 16412-4884P of March 13, 2010  
 Bohdan Andriytssev, Director, ECEM Media Ukraine LLC  
 Serhiy Lytvynenko, Editor-in-Chief, The Ukrainian Week  
 Natalia Romanec, Shaun Williams, Editors;  
 Anna Korbut, Translator

**Mailing address:** PO Box 2, Kyiv, 03067  
**Publisher address:** vul. Mashynobudivna 37, Kyiv 03067 Ukraine  
**E-mail:** office@tyzhden.ua, **Tel.:** (044) 351-1300  
 www.ukrainianweek.com  
**Print:** TOV SKIMP, TOV ART STUDIYA DRUKU; vul. Boryspiiska 15, Kyiv  
**Ordering number: 8206/12. Print run: 15,000**  
 Sent to print on 14 June 2012  
**Free distribution**



**25 May**  
**Volodymyr Herashchenko,**  
 General Secretary of the National  
 Olympic Committee, **resigns after**  
**allegations of fraud with tickets**  
**for the London 2012 Olympics**



**1 June**  
**Kyiv Mayor**  
**Leonid**  
**Chernovetsky**  
**resigns**



**4 June**  
**19 Ukrainians are**  
**sentenced to 10 years in**  
**prison in Libya** for collabo-  
 ration with the Qaddafi  
 regime

QUOTES

**HRYHORIY SURKIS**  
**is enjoying a peaceful**  
**Euro 2012**

"I'm happy that the Russian team is not playing in Ukraine. The fact that they are playing in Poland makes Euro 2012 here calm and peaceful," says the President of Ukraine's Football Federation



**YEVHENIA TYMOSHENKO**  
**on a big day for her mother**

"26 June will be a key day for my mother as the Higher Special Court will look at the cassation petition on the gas deals," Ms. Tymoshenko's daughter comments for Radio Svoboda



**VOLODYMYR FESENKO**  
**foresees protests**

"There is hidden socio-political tension in Ukraine that can explode after the parliamentary election," says expert and CEO of the Penta Center for Applied Political Studies



**MICHEL PLATINI**  
**on progress in Ukraine**

"Poland and Ukraine had a lot to build from scratch and many problems to solve during the crisis. In preparations for EURO 2012 Ukraine leaped forward 30 years in its development," says the UEFA President.



# "I Knew I Was

## Foreign football fans share their impressions of Ukraine with *The Ukrainian Week*

**ROB, UK**

"I have to admit, I hadn't heard much about Ukraine. I knew where Ukraine was. I knew it had been part of the USSR and it had Chernobyl. But shortly before Euro 2012, the UK press began to open my eyes. That's how I learned the truth. I knew I was going to hell [laughing]. I found out about what happened to your ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko, about corruption, HIV-infected hookers, uncontrolled police, intolerant and aggressive Ukrainians... I was told I'd 'come back in a coffin!' The thing is that every time our fans go somewhere, the UK press writes that the destination country is full of violence and we'll all get killed. Every time, literally. Nothing personal about it! It's just that the media are always looking for sensations, especially tabloids. They need something to grab your attention. Just have one swastika painted on a wall next to the airport English journalists just arrived at and you've instantly turned into a Nazi country. Maybe those guys do believe in it. Or maybe they just

want their papers to sell better. But people are so friendly here. I've met many people and they were all very nice to me."

**OLAF AND ANDERS, SWEDEN**

"We've been in the fan zone for two hours now, just drinking cold beer. Everything seems to be okay so far. There is only one person that's not here. She's beautiful and has this braid. Her name is Yulia Tymoshenko. Have you heard of her? Where is she? I'll be waiting for her. Political repression is unacceptable in a civilized European state. You can't persecute people for their beliefs and views... Your government is just trying to get rid of rivals—and sacrificing its popularity and the respect of the entire world in the process."

**SERGEY, RUSSIA**

"You have these boards with holes where you can stick your head in and take a picture. They are downtown, on the main street, expressing open disdain for the government. One has a guy with a T-shirt



that says 'Thank you, people of Donbas...'<sup>1</sup> against your president. This was what impressed me because this is the sign of freedom in Ukraine. Something like that would never be possible in Russia—not in our dreams, let alone on the Arbat in Moscow."

**TED, SWEDEN**

"I think racism, even if it's widespread in Ukraine,

<sup>1</sup> "Thank you people of Donbas for the jackass president" is a popular slogan launched as a chant by football fans in September 2011.

The month in history

**1 June 1996**



**Ukraine transfers its last nuclear missiles to Russia** and becomes a non-nuclear state

**4 June 1874**



**The Shevchenko Scientific Society devoted to scholarly research holds its first meeting**

**5 June 1910**



**The first flight on a plane designed by Professor Kudashev** from the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, takes place in Kyiv

11 June



**Ukraine wins against Sweden in the first game of Group D at Euro 2012**

13 June



**MEPs Rebecca Harms and Werner Schultz and 50 activists come to the Germany-Holland game in Kharkiv with placards saying *Release all political prisoners and Fairplay in football and politics***

14 June

According to the Kyiv City State Administration, **public land transport will work until 3.30 a.m. on match days during Euro 2012**

# Going to Hell"



should not affect tourists coming for Euro 2012 no matter what their skin colour is. I know that almost every country now has radical rightists. Their views are their views.... But they should realize that people who come for Euro are not staying in Ukraine forever. Tourists are not enemies, even for the most loyal followers of Adolf Hitler or whomever else!... I can't say much about your country.

We've only seen the center of Kyiv. It has beautiful architecture. And the atmosphere in the fan zone is great."

## ADELINE, SWEDEN

"I enjoy wandering around the town and just looking. I've seen a lot in Kyiv during these two days. My biggest impression is that there are so many churches in Kyiv! If I saw the city empty, I might think the locals were fanatically reli-

gious. But I see that most girls and women wear short skirts and high heels. I don't want to insult anyone or say that a girl in a short skirt does not believe in God. But this place is hardly fanatically Christian. I look at what girls wear because our girls are dressed differently, more humbly. They rarely wear such heels without a special occasion. That's what impressed me."

## NUMBERS

Based on a poll by KMIS held on 23 May – 1 June, the united opposition with

**14.4% is 1%**

behind the Party of Regions with 15.1%. Vitaliy Klitschko's UDAR is the most dynamic party so far with its popularity growing from 5.9% to 8.4% over the past month

More than

**72,000**

foreign football fans have arrived to Ukraine by now, says Vitaliy Zakharchenko, Ukraine's Minister of the Interior

In its Global Economic Prospects report published in June, the World Bank projects a decline in Ukraine's GDP

**from 4.0% to 3.8%**

in 2013

**54%**

of teenagers in Ukraine say that they have no problem buying cigarettes, reports UNICEF

According to the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, Ukraine spent

**UAH 108bn**

on Euro 2012 preparations, including UAH 47bn of public funds

**68%**

of Ukrainians believe that the birth rate in Ukraine is declining because of the low quality of life, reports the Research&Branding Group, based on a poll held on 22 March – 1 April

9 June 1847



**Russian Tsar Nikolai II signs a decision, sending Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian poet and painter, to the army**

11 June 1990



Based on parliament's resolution, **Ukraine joins East European Time**

15 June 1941



**Ivan Mykolaichuk, a cult actor, writer and director, is born**

18 June 1709

**The Muscovite army destroys Chortomyk Sich for the support of Ivan Mazepa's autonomous policy**



# All or Nothing for Mr. Yatseniuk

In his pursuit of laurels, as the united opposition's leader, Arseniy Yatseniuk has found himself in a position, which could bring an end to his political future. The only chance for him to maintain his prospects as a national leader is to purge the united opposition of people serving oligarchic and anti-Ukrainian interests

Author:  
Oles  
Oleksiyenko

**A**rseniy Yatseniuk and his comrades-in-arms from the Front of Changes are continuing their integration into Batkivshchyna. However, the recent developments in parliament raise many doubts as to his ability to keep the "united opposition" under control even though political responsibility for

its actions will be his, no matter what.

The draft language law votes on 24 May and 5 June raised doubts as to the true role of Andriy Kozhemiakin, Head of the BYuT-Batkivshchyna faction, among observers, as well as rank and file opposition members. The mass media reported that Mr. Kozhemiakin faced sharp criticism from MP Yuriy Odarchenko at a meeting of the faction, demanding the resignation of the former from his position as Head of the faction. However, Mr. Kozhemiakin soon took the situation under control, appealed to the reputation of the imprisoned Yulia Tymoshenko and succeeded in persuading the majority of those present to pledge loyal to him.

The question of who is running Batkivshchyna remains open, as does the question of what can be expected from the future "united opposition" with such leaders. The problem might involve a group of people in key positions rather than just a few individuals.

Shortly after the opposition surrendered the Russification law to the Party of Regions, Arseniy Yatseniuk said he was shocked by the failure of the plan to prevent what happened and had no explanation for this other than treason. It appears that Mr. Yatseniuk is beginning to realize that the merger with Batkivshchyna he initiated and forced his team into, could be much more dangerous than the threats he had expected. Instead of the expected conquering of the party that has been beheaded by the government and turning into the leader of the united opposition, he has become dependent on people, whose missions and purposes are unknown.

#### WHAT REALLY HAPPENED ON 6 JUNE

Much has been said about the infamous language law vote and the situation is completely clear: Mr. Kozhemiakin intentionally ruined the supposedly serious plan to prevent the vote. Later, the media started to buzz with strange news, the purpose of which was to transfer this responsibility to Volodymyr Lytvyn, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, saying that he allegedly violated voting procedures. In fact, however, the journalists present in parliament that day, including the reporter from *The Ukrai-*

*nian Week*, confirmed that voting on various issues had been posted far in advance. The scenario with Mr. Lytvyn as the bad cop and Mr. Kozhemiakin as the good one does not bear criticism. Moreover, Mr. Lytvyn can play small games but will never risk taking sides in a big game with high stakes.

According to *The Ukrainian Week's* sources, the roles of the government and the opposition were pre-determined beyond the walls of the Verkhovna Rada, to boot. BYuT-Batkivshchyna representatives involved in the organization of the protest near the Verkhovna Rada already knew exactly where the Party of Regions' protesters and the police would stand on the morning of 5 June.

The plan was to bring some Party of the Regions' protesters in front of the parliament at night and early morning of 6 June where they could peacefully (but in violation of the law, without obstacles from the police) occupy in advance the area around parliament. After this, the police formed a border around them, allegedly to stand between protesters from opposite sides. The plan was supposed to satisfy all sides: the government showed that some voters still supported its initiatives and that the approval of the draft language law was being passed in a democratic manner, with no fights. Under the scenario, the police was supposed to look as if it was not blocking the Verkhovna Rada from the opponents of the draft law, but protecting people on both sides from clashing against one another. Meanwhile, the opposition got a chance to wash its hands and pretend that the "criminal party in power" had got there first and they could not possibly break through the police line to the other side where there were also Ukrainians.

The implementation of the plan was 100% successful. Of course, the "it didn't occur" to the opposition to occupy the area next to the Verkhovna Rada at night. The protesters felt betrayed once again.

#### KGB BY BIRTH

Andriy Kozhemiakin was born in 1965 to the family of KGB officer Anatoliy Kozhemiakin who would later co-found the SBU, Ukraine's Security Service. In his interview for [censor.net.ua](http://censor.net.ua) in December 2006, Kozhemiakin Jr. said: "I ▶

PHOTO: UNIAN

come from a family of chekists and I'm proud of it... Until 1991, my father worked in the "fifth line" (fighting undermining ideological centers and the like) in Western Ukraine... My father was always a role model for me as a professional of the special services. I always wanted to be like him." In 1986, Andriy Kozhemiakin graduated from the Kyiv Naval and Political College and served in subversive submarine units of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1988, he graduated from the KGB school in Novosibirsk to continue his service at a "special unit" in Sevastopol.

During the first 14 years of Ukraine's independence, the Kozhemiakin family was in charge of fighting corruption. Kozhemiakin Sr. co-founded and headed

the Main Department for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime at the newly-established SBU in 1991. At that point, his son left the Black Sea Fleet and switched to the SBU, where it took him just ten years to be promoted to Colonel in 2002. After his father died in 2005, he headed the anti-corruption department. In 2005, Andriy Kozhemiakin was a Major General. That was when Oleksandr Turchynov was briefly the Head of the SBU. After his resignation, Kozhemiakin Jr. also quit the special service for politics.

He is often linked to the initiative to establish an internal security service within Batkivshchyna, which played an important role in

strengthening the Turchynov-Kozhemiakin tandem's position and later allowed them to take control. The lead role in the tandem was traditionally given to Oleksandr Turchynov, the co-founder of Batkivshchyna, but recent developments might signal that Kozhemiakin Jr. is the true leader. Moreover, there might be some other people above him.

This could be a coincidence, but family ties could link Andriy Kozhemiakin to people that are close to top Russian officials. His daughter Daryna married Roman Korzh, a representative of Barshchevski & Partners, a Russian law firm in Kyiv. Its founder is Mikhail Barshchevski, known for his close ties to Kremlin leaders. In December 2007, Mr. Barshchevski, Boris Grizlov and Serhei Mironov were the initiators of the nomination of Dmitri Medvedev.

On the other hand, Andriy Kozhemiakin's relations with the Presidential Administration are obscure. His sister's husband, Vladyslav Yartsev, has recently been the subject of criminal persecution. As Deputy Chair of Solomianska District State Administration in Kyiv, he was arrested under suspicion of taking a UAH 50,000 bribe in February 2011. In March 2012, online publications disclosed information from anonymous sources in the Presidential Administration, that Andriy Kozhemiakin personally visited Mr. Yanukovych to negotiate the closing of the case against his in-law. In April 2012, more than a year after the case was initiated, Vladyslav Yartsev was sent home "in the absence of the indications of a crime".

Why did so much time pass between the opening and closing of the case? Is it because Andriy Kozhemiakin was elected head of the BYuT faction in parliament in December 2011, thus becoming the one largely responsible for the actions of its MPs in parliament?

### A BORROWED IDENTITY

On the other hand, there is no reason for Andriy Kozhemiakin to feel guilt for betraying the Ukrainian language or the ratification of the 2010 Kharkiv deals. He is the incarnation of BYuT members for whom





the Ukrainian language as well as other fundamentals of national identity, including Ukrainian history, remains alien. At one point he represented the internal BYuT opposition to Yulia Tymoshenko's foreign policy, when he openly supported Ukraine's neutral status and rejected Euro-Atlantic integration.

The hereditary officer corps of the KGB was a soviet elite with its own original identity that had nothing in common with the national features and values of nations struggling against a totalitarian regime. The chekists were part of a privileged class, and were possibly the most mentally and culturally assimilated, so the collapse of the Soviet Union was a personal tragedy for them that ruined their privileged status.

Mr. Yatseniuk cannot but realize that this is not a reflection of real moods in Ukrainian society, at least the part that is the united opposition's key electorate. If he fails to purge the opposition of such people who have recently publicly discredited it, he will be held responsible for them and as a result, he will continue to lose electoral support.

### **WILL THE VICTORY OF THE OPPOSITION BE YET ANOTHER DEFEAT FOR THE NATION?**

In this context, it is crucial for the nation that another victory of the opposition, which takes ever-more effort each time, does not turn into an immediate defeat, as has been the case in the past six or seven years. There should not be the threat that new MPs will become crossovers in a newly-elected parliament.

A lot will depend on whether the united opposition list or the candidates it promotes in FPP constituencies will include groups controlled by Pinchuk, Martynenko, Zhvania, Kolomoisky, Vadatursky and other oligarchs. Clearly, it will be impossible for Mr. Yatseniuk to control them in the new Verkhovna Rada, in spite of every effort to do so. Meanwhile, available information on the leaders of election

### **UNRELIABLE STAFF**

Batkivshchyna's election team in Sumy is headed by Oleksandr Lysenko who is close to Oleksandr Volkov, the "parliament director" under President Kuchma. Andriy Pavelko is considered to be linked to oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Mr. Pavelko is head of the election team in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Kharkiv branch will be run by Vitaliy Nemilostyivi, member of the Front of Changes, who is linked to Davyd Zhvania.

teams and potential FPP candidates signals the risk of a new surge of crossovers after the election.

Some local branches of the united opposition still list people in key positions that are linked to crossovers who have already switched to the party in power. These are Zhvania's people in Kharkiv and Vasadze's people in Zaporizhzhya.

Meanwhile, Mr. Yatseniuk has found himself in a situation where the rating of his opposition conglomerate has reached the ceiling and further growth is actually impossible. Instead, he is forced to protect his own rating, an uncomfortable position in his political biography, while prior to this, all he had to do was to collect Yushchenko's and Tymoshenko's electorate.

Today, Svoboda and UDAR are chasing his electorate and both parties seem to be much more dynamic than the united opposition. Therefore, if the chaotic policy continues, including the chaotic ideological position and protection of declared priorities, the united front led by Mr. Yatseniuk may fade into oblivion.

The only way for Arseniy Yatseniuk to save face is to start cleansing his political forces. This is the first necessary move. If Mr. Yatseniuk wants to become something more than just the leader of a nominal political project, a statesman supported by the majority of the voters, he will inevitably have to declare realistic political goals in addition to the general democratic blah-blah, that include moving from the oligarch model to the capitalism of equal opportunities, the de-sovietization of all spheres of life with cultural and media de-Russification, etc.

If Mr. Yatseniuk does not feel comfortable doing this, he should quit. The nation is tired of the mimicry of democracy, the struggle with the regime, the endless pretence protection of the Russian-speaking population and glorification of Stalinist victories and the achievements of the "great state". Time plays against Arseniy Yatseniuk ❏

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# Untied Opposition: Incompetence or Betrayal?

The June 5<sup>th</sup> protests that accompanied the passing of a bill that aims to Russify Ukraine showed that while society is ready for radical resistance to the government's anti-Ukrainian policies, opposition leaders are sitting on their hands.

**Authors:**  
Oles  
Oleksiyyenko,  
Milan Lelich

The June 5<sup>th</sup> protests that accompanied the passing of a bill that aims to Russify Ukraine showed that while society is ready for radical resistance to the government's anti-Ukrainian policies, opposition leaders are sitting on their hands.

June 5<sup>th</sup> 2012 will go down in history as the day the political opposition—in particular within the parliament—was put to the test and utterly failed. The government and the opposition had more than 10 days to prepare for the second review of the draft bill on languages sponsored by Kolesnichenko and Kivalov, both Party of Regions MPs, that would clear the way for the renewed Russification of Ukraine on a national scale. Those in power scored a clear victory in this battle: 234 MPs voted for the bill in the first reading with a minimum of 226 needed for it to pass. Meanwhile, police held back crowds of protesters outside the Verkhovna Rada, and groups of counter-protesters with no actual interest in the language confrontation were hired and driven to the parliament to counterbalance those supporting the Ukrainian language. Yet the parliamentary opposition opted not to stand up for their native tongue.

## ALARMINGLY CARELESS

According to *The Ukrainian Week's* sources, the ruling party employed a wide range of tools—including intimidation, threats of criminal liability, tax raids on businesses and other instruments of coercion—to remind the most resistant crossovers (who refused to support the bill) of the conditions they accepted when switch-

ing to the majority. Almost thirty ex-opposition MPs supported the bill, some of whom had been staunch patriots when the orange government was in power.

Surprisingly, Andriy Kozhemiakin, the newly appointed leader of the BYuT-Batkiivshchyna faction in the parliament and former general in the SBU, the special service of Ukraine, played into the hands of the current government. As Party of Regions MPs took over the parliamentary podium, the opposition was busy decorating the session room with two Ukrainian flags, a banner demanding “Freedom for Yulia!” and a banner depicting a three-headed dragon with the faces of Dmytro Tabachnyk, Mykola Azarov and Viktor Yanukovych exhaling flames corresponding to the colours of the Russian flag. Meanwhile, no one attempted to prevent Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn from starting the session. When he put the Party of Regions-sponsored bill to a vote and 234 MPs supported it within just 10 seconds, journalists observing the proceedings had the impression that the parliament had just passed something trivial, not a fateful decision constituting a massive attack on the Ukrainian language.

Once the vote was finished, Mr. Lytvyn (who was registered as absent on the display of the voting outcome despite actually moderating the session and putting the bill to vote) announced a break, leaving opposition MPs in a panic as they searched for excuses to justify their failure to affect the outcome. In turn, they used Lytvyn as a scapegoat. According to one BYuT MP, “that

political prostitute changed the order in which we were supposed to consider the bills. We had agreed that the language bill would be third and Lytvyn put it up second.” Thus, they portrayed the event as “a tragic coincidence.” In fact, however, the bill was initially listed first on the agenda board, and a secretary replaced it with a new one at 9:20 a.m. with the bill listed second in the vote agenda.

## DOUBLE-DEALING?

Following the vote, annoyed opposition MPs buzzed about a conspiracy, stating, “we had no idea what was happening, but Kozhemiakin sure did,” and “The Party of Regions has got Kozhemiakin in their pocket.” Indeed, if the rank-and-file opposition MPs are, like their opponents, thoughtless soldiers incapable of independent decision-making at a critical moment for the country, why did their “general” fail to react properly? Just before the vote on the bill was announced, many opposition MPs were near the speaker's seat and could have disrupted the vote in a matter of seconds. After all, why did independent MP Andriy Parubiy realize which bill was being put to vote, while Kozhemiakin didn't?

Moreover, comments of some MPs in the media suggest that the opposition could have prevented the vote using their ex-party fellows' cards. According to independent MP Taras Chornovil, “there were about 18 cards be-



longing to independent MPs or those who never show up at parliamentary sessions in a section right next to where the opposition sits...plus, about twenty more ex-BYuT members sit in the middle of the BYuT section with their cards. They now belong to no parliamentary faction and haven't attended sessions lately. There were several Party of Regions MPs there pushing the buttons. Opposition MPs could have easily pulled out those cards, but they had made a deal before to sabotage the vote."

Why did the opposition stand there obediently rather than spring into action, especially after having previously agreed to attack the section of crossover MPs and pull their cards out of the voting slots to disrupt the vote (as stated by sources in the opposition and later confirmed by Arseniy Yatseniuk)? A group of 30 people was supposed to follow this plan, while in fact only the independent MP Andriy Parubiy acted. The

same scenario actually occurred during the ratification of the Kharkiv Deals. Back then, seven MPs from what is now the united opposition were supposed to throw smoke bombs in the parliamentary room to disrupt the session, but betrayed the country instead.

A "coordination council" held prior to the vote behind closed

doors without journalists or the heads of parliamentary committees raises more doubts. This "council" ended up being a meeting of parliamentary faction leaders, i.e. Kozhemiakin and representatives of the majority. Were they negotiating a new game plan? The key question in this context is whom does ex-SBU General Andriy Kozhemiakin actually serve? Could he be in the government's pocket because some of his family members currently face prosecution? Or is it just that there is no such thing as an ex-KGB agent?

### IMITATORS

Backstage, the parliament is buzzing with another scenario: the extremely sensitive language issue is as a bone in the opposition's throat because it forces them to place emphasis on top priority issues as clearly as possible. If the bill is eventually passed, however, the opposition will have a chance to mobilize their electorate by appealing to a declarative struggle against the government's anti-Ukrainian policy, even if not supported by any real actions. BYuT-Batkivshchyna MPs are already trying to play on the naïve electorate using the same message as the Party of Regions: "vote for us because we can solve the language issue in your favor only with a convincing majority in the parliament."

Meanwhile, those who failed to protect the Ukrainian language in the parliament continue to make heroic speeches in public. Andriy Kozhemiakin promised cynically that "our faction met after this notorious vote and decided on a firm position: this bill will never be passed in the Ukrainian parliament, under no circumstances." Arseniy Yatseniuk, leader of the united opposition, appealed to a future promise to disrupt voting during the bill's second reading, admitting that "the opposition should have fought that day but failed to do so and that was definitely a lesson learned." "There will be no law on Rus-





sian as the second language in Ukraine!" he added. "We have lost this battle but we will win the war!"

However, the embarrassing defeats of the united opposition led by Andriy Kozhemiakin in the parliament during both sessions on May 24<sup>th</sup> and June 5<sup>th</sup> raise doubts about whether Yatseniuk and his team will take responsibility if the parliament happens to pass the bill on the third attempt. Will they have enough courage and discretion to admit their incompetence and resign as opposition leaders? If not, the task lies on the rank and file members of the parties in the united opposition. Yet, will they be able to offer voters an alternative that can meet society's demand for radical and crucial change?

Unlike the previous vote of May 24<sup>th</sup>, June 5<sup>th</sup> showed Vitaliy Klitschko's UDAR to be more proactive, as many protesters gathered outside the Verkhovna Rada carrying the party's symbols. The party leader was present as well. However, eyewitnesses were an-

Vitaliy Klitschko says openly that he supports Ukrainian as a language of formal rituals in a multi-lingual environment

**«ALL IN THE FAMILY**

Leonid Slutskiy, Head of the Russian Parliamentary Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Russians Abroad, welcomed the developments in the Ukrainian parliament. "Russia is interested in achieving the highest possible status for the Russian language... [which] will become another impulse toward the development of Russian-Ukrainian relations and integration of post-soviet states," he said.

noyed that at the critical moment when special "Berkut" riot police began attacking the protesters, Mr. Klitschko's bodyguards pushed them aside making a corridor through which their boss fled the hot spot. Based on the comments of civil activists present at the scene, most were shocked by the boxer-politician's behavior in that situation.

The Svoboda (Freedom) party acted just as absurdly on June 5<sup>th</sup> as they had on May 24<sup>th</sup>. At a meeting of its local deputies, the party approved a declarative and barely implementable appeal to Mr. Yanukovych whereby they had to "... throw our decision in his face; unite all our forces and work out a boycott system," according to Iryna Farion, one of its leaders.

Svoboda's rhetoric seemed aggressive indeed, yet it was not backed by any real actions. Last year, in contrast, they protested outside the Verkhovna Rada along with Chernobyl and Afghanistan veterans in order to solve issues that were less important for the

country than the current language issue. Some Svoboda members also behaved radically at a recent gay pride parade. Does this mean that the party views such issues as top priorities, while the struggle against national Russification remains merely an element of the election campaign? Or could it also have made deals with the Presidential Administration? One way or another, the ultra-radicalism imitated by Svoboda on an ongoing basis works only to discredit Ukraine abroad and plays into the hands of both the Ukrainian and Russian governments who aim to paint such patriots as a perfect illustration of "the dangers of Ukrainian Nazism."

**SOCIETY IS GROWING MORE RADICAL, BUT LACKS LEADERSHIP**

Regardless of the circumstances, Ukrainian politicians ignore the Ukrainian language even though they frequently invoke it as a technique to maintain their hold on the Ukrainian-oriented elec-

torate. How long will the latter continue to turn a blind eye to this? June 5<sup>th</sup> proved that ever more people are refusing to be treated like a “primitive electorate.” Civil activists tried their best to distance themselves from the united opposition, whose leaders were reluctant to mobilize the masses to protect the Ukrainian language, opting eventually to do it on their own. The citizens outside the parliament proved much more willing and ready to protect the foundation of Ukrainian identity than the potential national leaders within the parliament. Other cities, including Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Uzhhorod, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kirovohrad, Poltava and Sumy also staged protests against Russification arranged by common citizens.

Evidently, the key problem is that, unlike common people, Turchynov, Kozhemiakin and Yatseniuk do not see the Ukrainian language as their firm principle. Notably, Arseniy Yatseniuk and Oleksandr Turchynov spoke Russian to each other during the anti-language bill protests. Hence the question: is Mr. Yatseniuk embarrassed to speak Ukrainian even at a rally to protect it, or is he worried that someone he is addressing may not understand him? Vitaliy Klitschko also assigns the Ukrainian language purely formal and ritual functions.

#### AT A CROSSROADS

Ukraine is moving in a dangerous direction. Recent developments signal that Russian nationalists have seized full control of the government and will play a lead role in the immediate future. While the big bosses were busy privatizing and re-privatizing government owned assets from their political opponents, they kept the political “clowns” at a distance. As soon as there was a need for ideological positioning on the eve of the parliamentary elections, the Party of Regions showed its true anti-Ukrainian face. The president’s dynasty and tycoons clearly do not want Russians to get hold of their business, yet they are still willing to build an autonomous version of the Russian World for themselves. Only later will they realize

that it was never meant to be autonomous to begin with.

The behavior of the opposition does not answer the question of whether it is capable of properly responding to the challenges Ukraine faces or leading the public to respond to them. The opposition leaders’ abilities to withstand external influences, both from other political camps and other countries, are particularly inadequate. The focus is now on the role of double agents among the leaders of the Ukrainian opposition. Unless stopped by the opposition or a motion of no confidence from society, they could eventually bring the country to a loss of sovereignty.

June 5<sup>th</sup> signaled that Ukrainian society is ready for resistance and is looking forward to crucial changes. Most people are aware of their national identity and want to shed the ruinous soviet heritage and its post-soviet mutations. Yet, they have no one to look up to in



## UKRAINIANS ARE FACING A DILEMMA: THEY CAN GIVE IN TO ANTI-UKRAINIAN FORCES OR RESIST AND FIGHT FOR THEIR RIGHTS


the struggle against the current regime. They fear disenchantment with opposition leaders who could betray their hopes yet again and use society’s potential for their own purposes. This is one of the reasons for the relative inertness of Ukrainians protesting the language bill and attempts by the civil activists outside the Verkhovna Rada to distance themselves from political forces whose inability to withstand the government’s pressure is becoming ever more obvious.

Ukrainians are facing an unprecedented dilemma: they can allow anti-Ukrainian forces to take over completely, losing the little self-respect that they still have and becoming a speechless biomass in a tycoon-controlled model imposed on Ukraine along with the “Russian World,” or resist and fight for their right to be themselves and continue along the path to a European future. The first step is to rid the opposition of leaders who do not share the national interests of Ukrainians. ■




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# Actions Speak Louder Than Words



## The mistakes made by the protectors of the Ukrainian language and how they can take the initiative into their own hands

**Author:**  
**Oleksandr Mykhelson**

**P**olitical battles over the language issue have reached their peak. The war is not likely to abate if the infamous draft language law, sponsored by MPs Kolesnichenko and Kivalov, is eventually passed. Two things are already plain to see. One is that the supporters of the Ukrainian language are slowly and steadily losing ground. The other is that even under the current regime, Russification can be slowed down significantly, or reversed if the government changes. That, however, will require a drastic change in the patriotic rhetoric of the chosen representatives of the people.

### ATTACK IS THE BEST FORM OF DEFENSE

Virtually all critics of the draft language law said that it would lead to the Ukrainian language being squeezed out of use. This often looked like traditional weeping in the style of folk ballads, leaving many with the impression of a battle lost long before it has

come to an end. But this is not the main problem. Neither is the fact that too little is said about other shortcomings of the draft law, which are outlined below. The strategic mistake of those protecting the Ukrainian language is the lack of a clear positive incentive, as all they do is just try to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, they realize well (and state publicly) that the current “linguistic” situation in the country is far from being satisfactory for the preservation of either the Ukrainian language or statehood itself. The processes that the draft law could trigger (such as deepening the language divide of society) are already unfolding today, albeit much more slowly than they would if the latter was passed by parliament. Sociological surveys show that the number of Ukrainian and Russian speakers is increasing continuously at the expense of bilinguals.

Given the fact that Ukrainian-speakers speak Russian much better than Russian-speakers speak Ukrainian, the only solution for the dilemma is to have people learn Ukrainian if they want the

country to be bilingual. As a first move to implement this principle is the submission of a pro-Ukrainian language draft law to counterbalance the imperfect and anti-Ukrainian one proposed by Kolesnichenko and Kivalov. Even if it is not passed by the current parliamentary majority, the draft law would definitely carry certain benefits. It would urge society to consider two alternative bills rather than just one; show that opposition MPs are actually doing their job and leaving some legislative initiatives ready for the future when the current government is no longer in power. So far, though, the united opposition continues to be incapable of doing anything to change the situation.

# han Words

I'm Russian and I don't ask for protection. It's equally dangerous to give a sword to an insane man and power to a crook




PHOTO: VALERIA BURIAKOVA

## THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WINS WARS

Judging by sociological surveys, most Ukrainians do not advertise their interest in the language issue. Whenever it is brought up in politics, people tend to become slightly more radical, but the language issue still never becomes a priority for them.

Most people don't really understand why such issues should concern them, as they feel perfectly comfortable speaking *surzhyk*, a mix of Ukrainian and Russian, which is widespread in rural parts of Central, South-Eastern and Northern Ukraine.

There may be many complaints about how indifferent and inert such "small Ukrainians" are, but they are the ones who will determine the mid-term prospects of the Ukrainian language. Meanwhile, supporters of the Ukrainian language leave them out, appealing only to those who already have an understanding of what is going on. Yet, bringing into the spotlight the amount of public spending the current draft language bill will incur should it be implemented, could have a powerful impact on social preferences (critics should also mention the blatant lies of Kivalov and Kolesnichenko, who state that it "requires no" public spending at all).

## SEEING THE GLASS HALF-FULL OR HALF-EMPTY?

This is where the art of propaganda lies, and the initiators of the language war are much better at it than their opponents.

On the basic level, they include frequent distortions and misleading messages. Inna Bohoslovka, the notorious Party of the Regions' MP, recently wrote in a blog that the draft law protects the right of people to speak their native language in everyday life. In fact, though, the draft law is not about this, and in any case, people have never been deprived of this right. Yet, some voters, including the abovementioned share of the population who are not concerned with the language issue, see these messages as something clear and specific, unlike the obscure pleas of patriots to "save the language."

This means that each and every one of these little messages should be explained to the public. A better solution would be to create an informational background that eliminates any opportunity for absurd claims, even if they seem to be academically reasonable in some cases, such as the claim that the language situation should be regulated by the market and the only task of the government is "to give everyone equal opportunities."

According to Vadym Kolesnichenko, one of the draft law's sponsors, Ukrainians must be voting for Russian as the second official language with their cash, since most books and newspapers in Ukraine are published in Russian. But this is not realistic, as their promotion is largely paid for by Russian oil and gas dollars. It is also misleading, as the fact that Ukrainians read in Russian does not necessarily mean that they would refuse to read in Ukrainian if there were no unfair competition from Russian-language publications (given the support from Russia).

The key manipulation, however, lies in the fact that the market can and should supposedly regulate such issues. Smoking can be used as an example. It, which is legally prohibited in the public establishments of European and now Ukrainian cities. I don't know about the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, but European

governments did not ban smoking at watering holes out of respect for non-smokers, but because smoking-related illnesses are a great burden on social medicine, not to mention labour efficiency. What if the governments had not interfered in the private lives of every smoker? Exactly, the bad habit would have spread further, as it is in the interests of the market. Of course, Russian, just like any other language, cannot be compared to smoking. The point is to show that the market does not necessarily regulate social life in the direction that is good for a given community. On the contrary, it can encourage developments that run counter to the interests of society. Even if the community realized the damage to itself, it is not capable of resisting the market without government interference. This, after all, is the purpose of the government.

Such arguments should be communicated to different target groups in different ways. The key thing is to make sure that they are expressed clearly and communicated effectively. So far, though, the initiative is entirely in the hands of anti-Ukrainian forces. Most importantly, many Ukrainians see the initiators of the language war from the Party of Regions as victims, who are only protecting themselves from "severe Ukrainianization" even though there has been no consistent, let alone severe, Ukrainianization over the past 20 years, and it is the official status of the Ukrainian language as a single state language that keeps the nation essentially bilingual, while the purpose of initiatives such as the current draft language law, is to ruin this shaky balance.

Frankly, the initiative presented as "the protection of minority languages" is in fact the expansion of the Russian language, while the preservation of bilingualism is referred to as "Ukrainianization", for some reason. Clearly, unless this paradigm is changed, the opposition has no reason to look forward to any strategic accomplishments, while changing the overall language policy is impossible unless pro-Ukrainian forces attain a position of power. Waiting for this to fall into their laps is futile, they have to take action. ■

# Joseph Daul:

“I will support Ms. Tymoshenko until she is released”

**Interviewer:**  
**Alla Lazareva,**  
**France**

**J**oseph Daul is a well-known French politician and Chairman of the European People's Party Group in the European Parliament. He is considered to be a consistent, thorough and slightly conservative politician. In his interview for *The Ukrainian Week*, Mr. Daul comments on the new French president's recent statements about Ukraine and shares his opinion on Ukraine-EU cooperation.

**UW: At a press conference with Vladimir Putin in Paris, François Hollande said that Yulia Tymoshenko was not supposed to be in jail, therefore neither he, nor any of his ministers were coming to the Euro 2012 in Ukraine. As a French politician, do you share this position?**

– I definitely and decisively condemned the way Ukraine's government treats Ms. Tymoshenko, which is simply unacceptable, and I will keep doing that as long as she remains behind bars. I respect the position of those who boycott the tournament for the bad political situation and the decline in human rights in Ukraine. Still, I think Ukrainian people deserve to have a celebration, a chance to enjoy Euro 2012. I hope the tournament will be another chance for the international community and the EU to condemn the way the Ukrainian government behaves.

**UW: You have mentioned recently that you did not call for the boycott of the tournament. Quite on the contrary, you called on European politicians to go to Ukraine and try to visit Ukrainian politicians in prison. Did EPP MPs follow the advice? How many will come to Ukraine?**

– I did not plan to go to Euro 2012. Still, I call on EPP Group members to take this opportunity to meet with Ms. Tymoshenko, Mr. Lytsenko and other imprisoned

politicians, as well as discuss the problems in relations of the Ukrainian government and the EU. The EPP Group will always be on guard for the interests of Ukrainian people. My fellow MPs are ready to help Ukrainians as soon as they request their help. We claim solidarity with all those who struggle to revive democracy in Ukraine.

**UW: What do you think of possible sanctions against Ukraine if the political situation keeps aggravating? How efficient were the sanctions the EU imposed on Belarus?**

– Our vision of the situation in Eastern Europe is as simple as that: the better we collaborate with each other, the deeper the countries integrate into European processes. The more stability inside the country and the more successful the economy, the better the EU's security is protected. Thus, the interests of the Belarus and Ukrainian nations are top priorities for us. We take much caution to make sure that the punishment for top officials who are responsible for violating the key rules and freedoms do not result in the isolation of both nations. The European Parliament has always pursued this sort of policy, while being cautious about average people in its neighbour states.

I believe that European aid should be aimed more at supporting civil society, independent media and cooperation with NGOs. When sanctions were imposed on the Belarus government, the European Parliament increased financial aid to civil society, independent media and NGOs in Belarus to support democracy and all those who campaign to protect the rule of law and human rights. This policy for Belarus has proven effective.

**UW: Some Ukrainian officials hope that the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the**



**EU can be signed without its political component and that that sort of cooperation is sufficient at this point. How would you comment on that?**

– The EU was the first institution to sign a resolution on Ukraine's European prospects on 13 January 2005. Moreover, the European Parliament still supports the European aspirations of Ukrainian people. Still, political instability and slow reforms in Ukraine spoil its relations with the EU.

Given the real political situation today I don't expect any progress in the discussion of Ukraine's association with the EU.

**UW: How can you explain the fact that there is not one French per-**





**son on the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee? Does this signal that Ukraine-France relations are not going all that well?**

– The number of seats on European Parliament delegations is very limited. That was why MEPs join the delegations based on their experience with certain countries. Naturally, the group for cooperation with Ukraine ended up with MEPs from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Baltic States.

This is not a reflection of Ukraine-France relations, which are important. Many EPP MPs in the European Parliament who are not members of the EU-Ukraine delegation are very active in terms of Ukraine. They work on Ukrai-

nian issues in political groups or the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, for instance.

**UW:** There is talk of Greece's exit from the Eurozone. What do you think of the consequences of such

## EUROPEAN AID SHOULD BE AIMED MORE AT SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY, INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COOPERATION WITH NGOS

**move for the future of the EU?**

– We should support the Greeks and remind them that the reforms they have to implement are aimed at improving the way their whole government apparatus

operates and making the Greek economy more competitive. They should realize that they implement reforms for their own future, not the European Union. We should encourage our Greek friends and keep telling them the truth at the same time: the EU will keep showing solidarity with Greece only if Greece fulfills its commitments.

For this, Greece has to appoint a government that will be able to fulfill its commitments. Greece is a sovereign country and it has to choose its own future. No one can do it for them.

The EU can help it, just like it has been helping it for decades. Yet, the EU is not in place to determine the future of its member-states.

**UW:** You have been an MEP for 13 years in which 12 new member-states have joined it. What do you think of the EU's further possible enlargement in the long-term?

– The enlargement has been one of the most successful lines in EU policy. The EPP Group in the European Parliament is an active supporter of enlargement. The opportunity to join the EU should be considered through the prism of its key objectives, including the strengthening of freedom, security, stability, economic development, social equality and solidarity on the continent. Croatia will join the EU soon. This proves that the ideas and concepts on which the EU has been built are still attractive. We should all learn this lesson: European solidarity is a good answer in times of crisis.

**UW:** Have you ever been to Ukraine? Are you considering going to Ukraine as an observer for the upcoming parliamentary election in October?

– I visited Ukraine in 2007, right after I chaired the EPP Group, and met with the Ukrainian Premier of the time. If the political situation is favourable enough, our group will definitely take part in the election observer mission. As always, the EPP Group is an active supporter of the EU's close relations with Ukraine. But we will criticize the Ukrainian government if it continues to ignore fundamental European values. ■

# The French Way

Michel Wieviorka explains why François Hollande won the election and talks about sociological intervention and terrorism as a substitution of notions and a loss of sense

**Interviewer:**  
**Oleksandr**  
**Pahiria**

**M**ichel Wieviorka one of the most prominent intellectuals in contemporary France and a scholar of world renown. He has (co-)authored over 30 books. Wieviorka is an expert in a wide range of areas: from racism and xenophobia to terrorism and social cultural movements. At the same time, the French scholar remains incredibly simple and frank in communication and open to the public. In May, Wieviorka spoke in Kyiv at the Ye Bookstore as part of the European Experience: France project.

**U.W.:** Was the victory of a left-wing candidate in the French presidential election caused by the global financial crisis and the rollback of the welfare state, or is it the consequence of some more general rule?

– The success of François Hollande is, above all, the defeat of Nicolas Sarkozy. The new leader has been preparing for this mission for a long time. He secured the support of the left-wing forces, above all the socialists and the Greens, and was able to win over the French electorate, but to understand how his victory became possible, we need to take a look at the way the country has developed in the past 40 years. It is now in the financial crisis that started in 2008, but the sources of this crisis in the French context can be traced back to the mid-1960s.

The 30-year period after the Second World War went down in the history of France as “the 30 glorious years”. The republic had a nearly perfect employment rate and was a highly developed industrialised country. Migrants came to work (and not just to live) here. It was a country that had confidence in progress, development, education and social ideas. In the mid-1960s, this model of a welfare state fell apart, causing unemploy-

ment, urban and suburban crises and the transformation of immigration. Migrants used to be lonely people who would come to earn money and go back home, but since the second half of the 1960s they would stay in France after losing their jobs and would bring their families over. Most of them were Muslims. Today they are one of our biggest problems. At the same time, the French population grew older, requiring higher government spending on healthcare for the older generation. The welfare state ceased to exist.

It was very hard to overcome these hardships. Some called for neo-liberalism, lower social spending and the privatisation of all state services. This led to great transformations in France. Social inequality between perceptibly deeper. The recent global financial crisis greatly aggravated these processes. This year’s presidential elections were the final phase of the changes I’ve mentioned. Most French citizens voted for Hollande hoping for certain progress in social and economic spheres. All rightists spoke against immigration, claiming that by driving immigrants out of the country we would open the way to ending all hardships and saving national values. Hollande was, on the contrary, very cautious on this issue, avoiding frank conversations on immigration topics. So the French avoided a sharp turn to the right, as the former president suggested, and passed a vote of no-confidence in him at the elections.

**U.W.:** Do you think that the natural and painless integration of immigrants in Western societies is possible, considering the differences in culture, religion, traditions and language?

These topics are being debated in many countries. The participants do not want to look back at the past of those whom we call im-

migrants today and they also forget their own history. Let us take a distant example. At one point in time, a large number of Ukrainians emigrated to Canada, and now they are full-fledged Canadians. Even though part of these Ukrainians still maintain cultural links to their motherland, they have fully integrated. So people are capable of finding a place for themselves in a different society.

However, Europe has certain apprehensions on this account, especially economic considerations that are increasingly taking the form of cultural phobias. Let us look realistically at the number of immigrants in Western European countries. It is not as great as may seem. Of course, there are differences from state to state. For example, France now receives 180,000 migrants per year. However, we do not know how many people leave. We don’t have these statistics. Evidently, a certain portion of them do leave. Moreover, a significant number of newcomers are students. Studies carried out in Great Britain and Spain proved that the influx of foreign students to these countries fosters the growth of their economies. At the same time, demographic growth in most European states is very slow, and migrants inject “new blood” there. Polls in France prior to the presidential elections showed that those who voted against migrants largely lived in regions where there are very few or no migrants.

The situation with foreigners in our country is not as dramatic as is portrayed. Let me give you one example. There was a lot of noise in France over women wearing veils: some said that migrants are imposing Islam on the French which leads to Islamism and that veil-wearing women are vehicles of this idea. We carried out a social survey and found that a mere 350 women in France wear veils, many

of them converts from Catholicism. Most of them did not have either brothers or husbands who would force them to wear these items of clothing. But I do not want to say that the situation is perfect or that we have no problems in this area.

**U.W.: Returning to your research, what is the essence of the sociological intervention method you have applied together with your friends and colleagues to study the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s?**

This method means studying certain social phenomena together with social actors involved in them. When I studied the activities of the Solidarity movement, we analysed — joined with Polish workers — the key senses of their actions, considered whether this organisation was able to step up the workers' and social movements in Poland and defined the functions workers performed in industry. We came to the conclusion that it was a democratic and national movement that was in support of the sovereign rights of the Polish people, against soviet interference in Poland's domestic affairs, against violence and for free elections, freedom of press and democracy.

Our sociological technique enabled workers to think exactly on this level. We gathered together CEOs of shipyards in Gdansk and suggested that we study these issues together with them and experts. We invited people during these meetings to come up with some ideas together. At one point, these included Roman Catholic priest Jankowski and Adam Michnik. The latter contributed to the elaboration of the democratic program of the Solidarity movement. We worked with groups like that in several Polish cities. After we had held these meetings and discussions, we wrote a book and are now planning to hand over all our research materials to the Institute of Solidarity in Gdansk.

**U.W.: In your book *Society and Terrorism* you paint a sociological portrait of terrorism. What are the sources of this phenomenon?**

That question follows another: What is terrorism? To come close to its definition, we need to consider the dual nature

of this phenomenon. Terrorism is above all a very rational instrument used to achieve a certain goal, a method. At the same time, it includes the idea that there is nothing wrong with killing people. I have studied the activities of left radical terrorists in Italy. They seem to act on behalf of the working class, but the local proletariat does not in any way identify itself with them or their actions. What we have here is a substitution of notions, a distortion. The more people resort to violent actions, the greater changes to the sense of their activity. For example, there is ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), a terrorist organisation in Spain which was not originally violent. Under General Franco's dictatorship, the Basque national movement experienced oppression, but the Basques obtained national-cultural autonomy after Spain became a democratic country in 1975. The more their nationalist demands were met, the greater was the power of terrorists and the more blind was their aggression. Therefore, terrorism combines, on the one hand, rational calculation and, on the other, a loss of sense and touch with reality.


**U.W.: Do communism and Muslim terrorism have anything in common?**

The common feature is that both communism and Islamism lend sense to terrorism as a political tool and means of struggle. It reaches far beyond the limits of everyday reality. Both camps call for the creation of a different world, resort to hostile rhetoric and aspire to be speaking on behalf of the entire society, even though it never identifies itself with their terrorist actions. ■

**BIO**

**Michel Wieviorka** was born in 1946 in Paris. One of the most well-known sociologists and intellectuals in France, he is head of Center for Sociological Analysis and Intervention (CADIS) under the School for Sociological Science Studies (l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)). Mr. Wieviorka is an expert in the 2005 public protests in France. In 2006-2010, he was President of UNESCO International Sociological Association, and headed the House of Human Sciences Foundation in 2009. Also, he is the founder and editor of *Le Monde des Debats*, a sociological magazine. In 1989, he was awarded the European Amalfi Prize for Sociology and Social Sciences for his book called *Société et terrorisme* published in 1988 (*The Making of Terrorism* in the English edition of 1993).

PHOTO: ANDRZY LOMAKIN



# Latvian Lessons

The Baltics are growing after austerity—and they resent Mediterranean bail-outs

IT IS hard to believe, walking past gleaming mansions along the sand dunes of Jurmala, that Latvia has endured a crisis as deep as Greece's. Latvia's over-exuberant boom was cut short by the global financial crisis in 2008, bringing a banking crash, a huge budget deficit, a bail-out by the European Union and IMF and one of the harshest austerity regimes in Europe. Unlike Greece, Latvia made the wrenching adjustment with striking speed, and has since returned to robust growth (its prime minister, Valdis Dombrovskis, even managed to be re-elected).

Latvia's neighbours, Estonia and Lithuania, are also recovering. And the Baltic trio managed it while keeping fixed exchange rates. They offer an example to troubled euro countries of how to carry out an "internal devaluation". Where Greece may soon have to leave the euro, Latvia wants to join in 2014. Touchingly, some people still think of the single currency as a good thing.

At a time of acute gloom, EU and IMF bigwigs see hope in this Baltic resilience. At a conference in Riga this week, Christine Lagarde, the IMF's boss, called Latvia's achievement a "tour de force". Her chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, said his scepticism about the currency peg had been proved wrong. For Anders Borg, the Swedish finance minister, Latvia was enjoying a "graduation day"; if it did not qualify for the euro, who could?

It is easy to forget the economic and social cost. Latvia lost more than a fifth of its GDP in two years. Unemployment shot up to 20% (and remains high). Emigration has risen in a country already struggling with a declining population. Productivity is low. And Latvia has some of the EU's most glaring inequalities. Still, the Bal-

tic states are growing faster than any other part of the EU, more than can be said for the recession-hit Mediterranean.

The reasons are complex. The Baltics are in a catch-up phase of development. The Mediterranean has suffered a triple blow: low-tech industries hit hard by globalisation, cost competition from ex-communist members of the EU and the loss of their habitual escape valves of inflation and devaluation. Competitiveness can now be regained only by painfully pushing down wages and prices. Speaking recently in Brussels, the IMF's Nemat Shafik compared such a process of internal devaluation to painting a house.

"If you have an exchange rate you can move your brush back and forth. If you don't have an exchange rate you have to move the whole house."

So can the chilly Baltic teach the balmy Mediterranean this superhuman feat? "We have shown the world there are better solutions than devaluation," says Ilmars Rimsevics, governor of Latvia's central bank. Rather than making adjustment harder, he says, the currency peg was essential for credibility. In any case, devaluation would have pushed up inflation and increased the burden of euro-denominated loans and mortgages.

#### GDP growth in 2011

Estonia  
7.6%

Lithuania  
5.9%

Latvia  
5.5%



The IMF thinks that, where possible, deficits should be cut gradually over the medium term. But Latvia believes that deep, front-loaded austerity is the best way to win back market confidence. In Greece politicians of all stripes blame the EU and IMF, to a greater or lesser extent, for their misery. In Latvia, though, it is international lenders who warn Latvia against too much austerity, and against hastily removing emergency social safety-nets.

As small and open trading economies with flexible labour markets, the Baltics were able to push down wages faster than more rigid and closed Mediterranean countries. The Baltics' main trading partners are northern countries that are doing well. And for all their suspicion of Keynesianism, they were helped by the stimulus policies around them. Now Mediterranean countries must try to recover at a time when most others are tightening their belts as well. Moreover Baltic states benefited by having friendly foreign-owned banks that did not pull out of the region; although



Latvia's Parex bank went bust, Sweden provided a vital backstop to most Baltic banks.

In drawing such north-south comparisons, there is a danger of falling into stereotypes and romanticising, say, Germany's influence through the old Hanseatic League. Post-Soviet Baltics face problems with corruption as deep as those of any Mediterranean country. That said, a history of occupation and hardship may have made the Baltics more willing to put up with austerity. What sticks in the craw for Estonia, which is now in the euro, is having to bail out much richer Greeks.

### A BALTIC MODEL?

All this may mean the Baltic is more of an exception than a model for the euro zone. Still, there are valuable lessons. First, low debt helps. Latvia's contraction more than quadrupled its debt burden to about 45% of GDP, but that is still less than half the debt ratio of Italy and Greece before the crisis. Second, international lenders need to be clear-eyed: if a country cannot repay its debts, they must be restructured early and decisively. Fudged assessments condemned Greece to unsustainable debt and inadequate financing, which fed the constant fear of a chaotic default. Latvia, by contrast, was allocated more money than it needed.

Spain and Ireland show that preserving stability requires more than sound public finances. Private-sector debt can be ruinous, too. But both countries would be helped if, like Latvia, they had external support for their banks. This suggests a third conclusion: the need for a "banking union", a European-level system to regulate, restructure and directly recapitalise ailing banks.

Lastly, the Latvians say the promise of euro membership was vital to keep them on course. The idea of the euro as a haven may seem laughable. Yet besides a fear of collapse, voters need the promise of a better future to underpin austerity. For euro members, this can come only from some future promise—such as joint-liability bonds for those on a credible path of reform. ■

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# Gazprom's Night

Shale gas extraction, if implemented, could turn Ukraine into an influential player on the European gas market



**Author:**  
Dmytro  
Vovnianko

Shale gas is extracted from shale rock

**3,000-4,000m** deep.

Deposited in small amounts (0.2-3.2 billion cu m/sq km), it is extracted from large fields

**U**kkraine has taken yet another step toward extracting its own shale gas. Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron Corporation won a tender to extract gas at the Yuzivka and Oleske fields.

## ENERGY INDEPENDENCE DAY?

At this point, Chevron and Shell representatives and Ukrainian authorities are all optimistic. "We will become fully energy-independent by 2020," Eduard

Stavytsky, Ukraine's Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, promised at a seminar for shale gas exploration and extraction held by the US Civil Research and Development Foundation in Kyiv at the end of May. The Yuzivka and Oleske fields are projected to provide (respectively) 20 and 10 billion cubic meters of shale gas annually. This amount could replace the 30 billion cubic meters of gas Ukraine currently imports from

Russia. Meanwhile, the government is preparing tenders for the Scythian and Foros fields in the Black Sea. According to Mr. Stavytsky, Slobozhanske field in Kharkiv Oblast and gas fields in Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk and Volyn Oblasts are currently being explored as well.

The Cabinet of Ministers denies any prospect of suspending preparations for shale gas extraction for political reasons or due to possible gas price discounts

# ntmare

from Gazprom. This assertion is backed by several powerful international companies that have shown great interest in Ukraine's gas market. Mr. Stavtysky claims that Shell has ambitious plans to begin extracting shale gas in Ukraine in 2015.

Yet, if all ends well and the gas distribution contract is signed in autumn as planned, the winners will have to set up a joint venture with Nadra Ukrayiny (Ukraine's Wealth), a national joint stock company, and SPK-GeoService, a limited liability company with reported links to top Ukrainian officials. Ownership of the potential joint venture would be split evenly between Ukrainian companies and foreign stakeholders. With this in mind, an expected shift of government in Ukraine may subject the deal to later revision and expose it to elements of corruption among the joint venture's Ukrainian partners. This would cause problems for shale gas extraction and prolong project deadlines.

## GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS

America's growing interest in shale gas extraction in the EU and Central and Eastern European countries vulnerable to Russia's energy blackmailing appears promising. This interest is based on purely geopolitical and economic motivations, as US companies are the leaders in shale gas extraction and thus stand to gain the lion's share of the market in countries like Ukraine.

John Tefft, US Ambassador to Ukraine, stated at the above-mentioned seminar that the energy security situation could change dramatically for Ukraine if preliminary estimates of its 9.5 trillion cubic meters of shale gas deposits are confirmed. This may transform the country from an importer into a significant exporter over the course of just a few years. When appointed as the US Ambassador to Ukraine, Mr. Tefft paid special attention

to the need to reform Ukraine's energy sector and noted that the US and EU were ready to provide assistance as they both recognized the realistic energy threat that Putin's Russia poses to Ukraine.

Shale gas extraction in Ukraine could change the situation in Europe's gas market dramatically. If optimistic gas deposit projections come true, Ukraine could export most of its gas. Poland has similar energy prospects but is currently running a few years ahead of Ukraine in terms of exploring its extensive resources of shale gas, while consuming three to four times less than Ukraine. Given these developments, Central Europe may be looking at a revolution. Mr. Tefft expects that shale gas will change the energy security game completely in Ukraine, just like it did in the US. According to experts, Russia will gradually lose its political impact on European governments if shale gas is intensely extracted elsewhere in Europe.

## LAND, WATER AND PROTESTS

Top Kremlin officials and Gazprom executives have said before that shale gas is nothing more than an anti-Russian PR campaign. Indeed, Gazprom's fears

soil around the drilling site. However, the supporters of shale gas extraction claim that drinking water is 300-400m under the surface while shale gas deposits are 3-4,000m deep, preventing the water from the fractures from mixing with drinking water. The contaminated water used for fracking is later re-used. "I'd like to assure you that these companies (Shell and Chevron - ed.) pay a lot of attention to the environmental risks associated with extraction technologies and land reclamation - more than I could expect," Ukraine's Minister of Environment said. "I'm 100% sure that there are no environmental risks in this." Officials suggest that the environmental aspect will cause much speculation and provoke protests, yet they are ready to protect their viewpoint.

Moreover, shale gas extraction technology has many opponents worldwide, especially in the US. Yet, Polish and US experts claim that environment-oriented statements often conceal the business interests of the old masters of the market. Gas importers were involved in protests against shale gas in the US as it stifled their business. According to Mr. Stavtysky, France "is dependant on nuclear energy... so they lobbied the decision (to ban shale gas extraction in France - ed.) in their parliament." Russia's criticism is ever more surprising as Rosneft and Gazprom Neft are among the biggest clients of Schlumberger, a company that does hydrofracturing.

Yet, Gazprom is likely to take every effort to keep hold of the Ukrainian market. With unpredictability as the key sustainable feature of the current government, there is no guarantee that it will not suspend shale gas projects if Russia makes gas price concessions. After all, the Ukrainian government has not completed a single energy initiative to decrease its dependence on Russia over the past two and a half years. It is likely that shale gas projects are yet another instrument used by Ukraine's rulers to blackmail the Kremlin and Gazprom in order to secure a significant gas discount for enterprises owned by Ukrainian oligarchs. ■

The world's shale gas deposits total at

**456 trillion cu m**

China has the most with

**36.7 trillion cu m**

followed by the USA with

**24.4 trillion cu m**

and Argentina with

**21.9 trillion cu m**

Source:  
International Energy Agency

## SHALE GAS EXTRACTION IN UKRAINE COULD CHANGE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE'S GAS MARKET DRAMATICALLY

In 2007, conventional gas cost

**\$400/1,000 cu m**  
in the US.

By 2012, carbon fuel prices fell to

**\$62/1,000 cu m**


with the intensifying extraction of shale gas

are well-founded—until recently, its information campaign struggled to convince the masses that exploring Ukrainian shale gas fields was economically inefficient and unpromising. Yet, one powerful instrument tested in other European countries remains in its arsenal: environmentalists can set public opinion against shale gas exploration, claiming that it "carries the risk of an environmental disaster in densely populated areas."

Meanwhile, government officials insist that the environmental aspects of hydraulic fracturing or "fracking" were analyzed thoroughly as the tender was prepared. According to a widespread statement, these technologies contaminate drinking water and

# The National Budget and Bureaucratic Brazenness

The Ukrainian government is taking money out of the real economy – the receipts of the national budget increased much faster than Ukraine’s GDP in 2010-12



**Author:**  
**Volodymyr Lanovy,**  
**President of**  
**the Center for**  
**Market**  
**Reforms**

Every year the Finance Ministry answers a number of questions. The key one is: How can we take as much money as possible from the economy? Bureaucrats have argued that this is necessary to meet social needs. The second most important objective is maximising spending on government purchases. The argument is that the budget should not be spent on consumption needs; rather, it has to be used to develop the economy. Next comes increased spending on bureaucrats themselves. This process is usually not discussed openly: money is allocated in seemingly unrelated budget lines and comes through

various channels. There is not enough money to satisfy appetites, so some agencies clash fiercely over who gets the bigger share. To them, obtaining a bigger piece of the budget pie means having more influence on society, making the staff more dependent on their decisions and increasing their power. At this point opportunities arise to manipulate things, particularly tax regulations. Bureaucrats know no limits; they do not consider anyone equal to themselves. But these priorities are harmful to the economy.

**Maximising money extracted from the real sector** is the first and foremost task that goes

beyond national markers and borders. Think about the experience of Sweden, France, Italy, Germany and other European countries which embraced social ideas in the 1970s through the 1980s and increased bureaucrats’ financial clout. Their national budgets reached over 50% of their GDP at the time. This led to slower development, unprecedented levels of unemployment and the devaluation of their national currencies. Sweden is often held up as an example of an ideal socialist model, but its GDP fell, the budget deficit reached 13-14% of the GDP and unemployment exploded from 1.5 to 13 per cent for four years run-



ning, starting from 1990. All of Western Europe eventually cast off paternalism and did so in a resolute fashion. Nevertheless, the budget models of European states are still more social than those in southeastern Asia or North America.

The Ukrainian government is taking money out of the real economy – the receipts of the national budget increased much faster than Ukraine's GDP in 2010-12 (**see Inadequate dynamics**). Ways in which the government can fill the budget are well-known: tax receipts and non-tax duties; failure to reimburse of the VAT to exporters; internal and foreign loans (to finance outrageous deficits of national budgets); sale, rent or profitable use of government assets (enterprises, real estate, shares of stock, foreign currency, etc.).

The tax ordeals have already been analysed, but the current leaders crave more. They have continued **the policy of taking out extraordinary loans and have driven short-term national debt to unacceptable heights**, plunging the state into the so-called debt trap. In 2009-10, the budget deficit amounted to around one-third of its spending, while the total amount of loans obtained by or with the involvement of the government was UAH 100 billion and UAH 140 billion, respectively. Ukraine's budget deficit was around 9-10 per cent of its GDP in these years, similar to the situation in the USA and France. But Ukraine is not like any of these two countries: they received 2-3 per cent loans that would mature in 15-30 years, while Ukraine took out short-term foreign-currency loans with sky-high interest rates. The example of "older brothers" inspired other countries – hopelessly indebted nations like Greece, Portugal and Ireland – to take anti-crisis measures. They cranked up financing of budget deficits up to 11-14 per cent. The results are well-known.

But ingenious government officials in Ukraine came up with another, more refined way to extract resources for bureaucratic needs. During the 2008 crisis, **a law on the Stabilization Fund was passed** on the initiative of then president Viktor Yushchenko. This law permitted attracting resources by way of issuing and selling gov-

ernment bonds. These monetary instruments are outside the budget and are used by the government with no need for parliamentary approval. Banks that were nationalised after they went bust during the crisis were found to be useful for these transactions. They sell government bonds and lend financial resources thus attained to contractors working on government-commissioned construction projects or use them to cover the debts of government corporations. The Stabilization Fund is in its essence no different than a budget deficit. Government loans taken out without any supervision are another trick used by bureaucrats to, among other things, underreport the budget deficit. In fact, transactions with money held in this fund contradict the Constitution, but this legal and economic violation persists.

Living on credit leads to a bad

banking system plunged into a critical condition: a lack of payment instruments propelled the interest rates from 2-4 per cent to 20-30 per cent in two years. On the corporate crediting market, the Cabinet of Ministers drove up the interest rates to 35-40 per cent – something we have not seen in the past decade. A deficit of loans halted the redistribution of capital among sectors and preserved the old structure of the economy, while the extra-high interest rates devoured corporate profits.

Foreign loans have also been overblown – they jumped from \$5 billion to \$6.2 billion in 2009-10. This money was used to fix the imbalance between the country's foreign-currency income and expenses. The illusion of a budget surplus was created. In 2010 and the first half of 2011, the NBU reported growing foreign currency reserves. But the government's excessive appetite for international loans drove up the interest rate on sovereign Eurobonds (up to 11-12 per cent) and blocked access to this market for private Ukrainian companies.

In 2012, Ukraine must pay off the debts it has accumulated, and the volume of excessive (deficit) budget financing has to be greatly reduced. This year, nearly UAH 100 billion (about UAH 90 billion in 2011) must be spent to pay off earlier debts and interest. The Ukrainian government plans to attract new loans in sufficient amounts to finance the payment and servicing of the total national debt. The budget deficit is projected at UAH 45 billion. Thus, the country needs a total of some UAH 140 billion in additional resources. Ukraine is in a fix: sources of financing are lacking; credit ratings are going down; and the debt is growing due to higher interest rates. Ukraine has essentially crossed the critical line after which new loans are not available in volumes that would suffice to pay off and service old debts. As it searches for money, the government cuts the financing of current needs and, as always, revises its social commitments. It is presented as the heroism of power-loving bureaucrats in a hardship, as if the lack of financial resources were generated by objective factors. What can the consequences be? Fiscal bodies will perform

## OVER 40% OF NATIONAL WEALTH IS NOW BEING WASTED

In 2009-10, the budget deficit amounted to around 1/3 of public spending, while the total amount of loans obtained by or with the involvement of the government

was  
UAH  
100bn  
and  
UAH  
140bn,  
respectively

ending and paying the interest rates we are paying now is a recipe for disaster. The process started in 2011 and will peak in 2012. Another negative consequence is that most of the loans were provided by Ukrainian banks. So if the government had not obtained them, this money would have gone to the real economy, helping it to grow. Moreover, crediting of enterprises is a process in which financial institutions select the most efficient sectors and projects. It helps carry out structural changes in capital distribution and thus improve the national economy. Now these processes are postponed indefinitely.

There have been also other negative consequences. Under government pressure and in the absence of alternatives financial institutions were forced to set unjustifiably low loan interest rates: 6-7 per cent in hryvnias did not permit them to match the real value of resources. At the time, the NBU's interest rate fluctuated between 8 and 9.5 per cent, while hryvnia deposits cost no less than 10-11 per cent. Only government-owned banks were eventually forced to issue cheap loans – the NBU supplied them with newly issued hryvnias. As a result, the

more arm-twisting on enterprises and financial institutions, and the banking and credit market will be bled white due to excessive borrowing by the government. Also, the NBU may turn on the money presses if the budget is under-fulfilled, and the expected consequences in terms of inflation will result.

Another utterly harmful way to increase budget receipts is **unregulated use of profits generated by government-owned enterprises and the income from their privatization**. The government had a burning desire to build stadiums, hotels, airports and highways with budget money. The national budget is not accumulating resources for this purpose, and private funds should have been the source of investment. But, this is not a problem for the current leadership. It took away profits from state-owned companies as if they were their private property and channeled them into projects that the power-wielding clan needs. That these actions undermine the financial condition and harm the companies (and their counterparties) is of no concern to anyone. Ukrtransgaz is a vivid case in point. The company manages the country's main gas transportation system and secures gas delivery to Europe. It reaps significant profits but cannot, as is known, finance upgrading and fixing the gas transport system, because its profits are used in a non-transparent system arranged for Naftogaz Ukrainy, a company that is formally operating at a loss.

A different principle reigns in privatization: no-one cares about money; government-owned companies are sold for less than half of their value; ownership rights are transferred to the "correct" people. The main thing is for the procedure to be absolutely legal. Undesirable potential bidders are disqualified through specially formulated conditions, and privatization auctions turn into a farce.

This is how they are ruling – fleecing some and giving gifts to others. Moving like a bull in a china shop, they are ruining businesses and squandering finances and social wealth.

**The second most important task for bureaucrats is to channel budget money into government purchases by**

**hook or by crook**. This is where every minister has things to do. He needs to find the "right" suppliers and contractors and make as much ministerial money flow to them under contracts as possible. Moreover, businessmen have infiltrated government structures, so there is no need to search for anyone: they have their own companies that play solo at one-participant competitions to place government orders.

In 2011, salaries in the education system and health care and ordinary pensions were frozen to fulfil this task. (The government backed down only after government buildings were picketed.) Later, in the second half of 2011, payments to Chernobyl disaster victims, Afghan war veterans and "children of the war" were reduced. It is easy to see that social payments are going to be further curtailed as national budget receipts go down.

What is wrong with bigger volumes of government purchases?

With no money going into the Stabilization Fund, the economy will receive at least **UAH 25bn** more per annum (1.6% of GDP)



**THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP TOOK AWAY PROFITS FROM STATE-OWNED COMPANIES AS IF THEY WERE THEIR PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CHanneled THEM INTO PROJECTS THAT THE POWER-WIELDING CLAN NEEDS**

Even discounting corruption (which leads to overpriced products and services and wasted budget resources which go into private pockets), these orders are inefficient. Government officials that manage budget money are, by definition, pseudo-customers: they place orders on behalf of the state and pay with money that is not theirs. Thus, the quality of goods and services is usually unacceptable. If the contractor is a government-owned company, the unexpecting nature of the customer is multiplied by the irresponsibility of the contractor.

What are the main contractors for the Cabinet of Ministers? These are state-owned companies such as Ukravtodor (received some UAH 9 billion of budget money in 2011), Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian RailWay) and other companies managed by the Minis-

A ban on subsidising unprofitable state-owned and communal enterprises will save up to **UAH 40 bn** (2.7% of GDP)

try of Transport and Infrastructure (over UAH 9 billion), companies run by the Ministry of Energy (over UAH 11 billion), and so on. Money flows with little or nothing to show for it. This is not surprising, because part of it fails to be spent on services, and government orders sometimes fail to be fulfilled. And who can control the execution? Ministries and other government agencies? One hand washes the other.

Moreover, there is a trend for government purchases to concentrate in the centre with central government bodies placing orders for increasingly pompous projects. This coincided with Euro 2012 preparations, but megalomania is still there to be seen. Furthermore, not all projects are connected to the football championship. German economist Walter Eucken once noted: "Where a centralised administration is largely in charge of the economy, gigantic investment objects are usually constructed. This was the case in Germany after 1936, in Russia after 1928 and in such dissimilar societies as the Inca Empire ... and Ancient Egypt." The megalomania that devours huge sums of money hampers development by diverting resources away from other social needs. Schools and hospitals are no longer a priority.

**Finally, the third objective pursued by bureaucrats is increasing spending on their own official needs and personal welfare.** The government keeps setting records in financing its needs: spending on government agencies has been growing at a much higher rate than budget receipts. The power structures – prosecutors' offices, the police, the security service, the tax administration and the Presidential Administration – lead the pack. (This list does not include lavish decoration of housing and aircraft for top officials.) Despite an existing budget deficit, spending on power structures has been increasing nearly 50 per cent a year. Whence this generosity? What have they done to deserve it, and does it reveal the priorities of the government? Other government agencies – financial, industrial and agricultural – are not far behind. It appears that bureaucrats have sensed that the pendulum of power has swung from democracy to bureau-

cracy and want to compensate for what they was unable to obtain earlier. Interestingly, spending in public administration offices is going up, but the government claims that the number of government employees and their total pay are being reduced. This may be mere populism, or the government may not want to share with ordinary people of which there is an abundance in the government apparatus.

Thus, the current budget redistribution model can best be characterised in such terms as hyper-centralised, brazen, parasitic and unjustifiably spending-heavy. Unfortunately, it drives out competitive companies by preferring only certain structures and figures. Fundamentally, this is a pro-crisis, deficit-based model which limits, in any macroeconomic conditions, opportunities for productive accumulation of capital, its structural modernization and efficient use.

Structural changes in Ukraine's budget system that would greatly relieve financial stress and minimise this system's negative impact on the economy can be summed up as follows:

**A lower budget share in the country's GDP.** This means cutting government loans, no delays in VAT compensation, payment of accumulated VAT arrears, more modest government purchases, no subsidies to unprofitable state-owned companies (including utilities companies and the coal mining industry) and lower expenses on material, technical and social provision for government apparatus members.


The Stabilization Fund, which increases the national debt in a non-transparent way, should be scrapped and the government prohibited from using sovereign loans to pay the debts incurred by state-owned corporations and banks.

A non-deficit budget definitely needs to be adopted. After our trade balance and the balance of payments are fixed, we need to have a surplus budget, which will permit us to gradually pay off foreign debts, give the economy more investment and credit resources and reduce our foreign national debt and expenses on its servicing.

National debt management needs to be optimised, above all, through restructuring our current commitments.

## INADEQUATE DYNAMICS

Growth pace for key macroeconomic indicators in %



**The share of government purchases in budget expenses and Ukraine's GDP should be reduced by half or two-thirds** and later set on the European level of no more than two per cent of the GDP. To this end, the functions of clients and contractors in special industrial, large infrastructure and road construction should be delegated to the private sector. Government monopolies should be divided into 10-15 independent regional companies which ought to be placed in a competitive context.

## GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO 10-15 INDEPENDENT REGIONAL COMPANIES WHICH OUGHT TO BE PLACED IN A COMPETITIVE CONTEXT

Government purchases of more than one million hryvnias should be placed through a bidding procedure. Competitions need to be held to reduce costs and so on.

**Demonopolised state-owned corporations should be privatised through an open procedure** by way of selling shares of stock in separate packages at international auctions. Artificial limitations for participants and transfer of controlling interest should be banned. Timely and complete information delivery about privatization processes has to be secured.

**The share of spending on government apparatus in the budget should be reduced every year.** To this end, regulations need to be introduced that govern their calculation. Government bodies should be stripped of the right to incur capital expenses every year.

Reduced government spending needs to be coupled with several measures in the interests of society. First, less money should be taken out of market circulation by lowering the budget to 23-24 per cent of GDP. This will permit relieving fiscal pressure and introducing a defined contributed pension system. Second, it is worthwhile to start spending two to three times more on human development: education, science, culture, computer science, health care, environment and the housing and communal services sector all of which are now neglected. Third, a much smaller share of corrupt budget transactions will help reduce social differentiation.

Budget spending cuts in unproductive areas could yield stunning results:

Debt management optimization will reduce expenses from UAH 100 billion to UAH 55-60 billion (which will save 2.7-2.8 per cent of GDP).

With no money going into the Stabilization Fund, the economy will receive at least UAH 25 billion more per annum (1.6 per cent of GDP).

A ban on financing budget deficit with receipts from privatization will yield UAH 10 billion or 0.7 per cent of GDP. Transparent privatization auction procedures will bring another UAH 8-10 billion (0.7 per cent of GDP).

A ban on subsidising unprofitable state-owned and communal enterprises will save up to UAH 40 billion (2.7 per cent of GDP).

Decreased financing of government purchases will free UAH 40-50 billion (3.0-3.8 per cent of GDP).

Less spending on the bureaucratic apparatus will bring UAH 8-10 billion (0.6-0.7 per cent of Ukraine's projected GDP in 2012).

Thus, the overall savings may reach UAH 190-200 billion (12.7-13.3 per cent of GDP). To compare, total budget spending will be at about **UAH 450 billion (29-30 per cent of GDP) in 2012. This means that over 40 per cent of national wealth is now being wasted! Together with financing sovereign debt liabilities, this accounts for nearly 60 per cent of the national budget.** ■

Total budget spending will be at about

**UAH 450bn**  
(29-30% of GDP) in 2012

# Elusive Slave Owners

## Why do human traffickers continue to enjoy impunity?

**Author:**  
**Taras Zozulinsky**

The Department for Combating Organized Crime has reported yet another success: it has disbanded a large human trafficking group in the Kyiv Oblast. Based on the latest data, the criminals sold at least 40 women to brothels abroad. Every year, Ukrainian police initiate nearly 50 criminal cases involving human trafficking for sexual exploitation abroad. Most cases end up in court and the guilty are imprisoned. However, nobody knows exactly how many human traffickers escape punishment. Another problem is that the key people behind the “export” of Ukrainian women are often beyond Ukrainian jurisdiction. Therefore, recruiters and transporters are the ones that end up behind bars, while the real bosses remain in the shadow.

### THE PHANTOMS

The verdict against Andrius Mikulenis, a German citizen, and Olha Reznikova, his Lviv-based companion, came into effect last year. They were convicted for the repeated attempt to drag Ukrainian women into prostitution in German brothels. Officially working as a business advisor, Mikulenis traveled to Ukraine on a regular basis and offered women work as prostitutes. Olha Reznikova helped him.

Mikulenis was sentenced to four years in jail while Olha was given a four-year suspended sentence. In fact, the direct executors were punished, rather than the organizers of the scams. A man known as Hans Mayer played an important role in Mikulenis’ scheme. He launched an extensive online advertising campaign. “Attractive uninhibited girls are invited to work at a prestigious club in Germany. A good salary is offered. Those interested in the offer can meet with my business partner.” This was the announcement was posted on dating sites and various forums. Andrius Mikulenis was

the partner. A woman who accepted the offer received an invitation from Pavelas Latyshevas, another Lithuanian-based criminal, to get a visa to Europe.


He drew up labour contracts to employ Ukrainian women as dancers and masseuses. The girls signed up with two companies. One was Kristall owned by Pavelas Latyshevas. The other company was called Cananga Personal Services CJSC, also owned by Mr. Latyshevas. Ukrainian law enforcement officers sent several requests to Interpol and the relevant authorities in Lithuania but did not receive much help from their foreign colleagues.

### UNDERFUNDED LAW ENFORCEMENT

Law enforcement officers claim that finding all the international human trafficking links is a great challenge for them. One police officer with significant experience in similar cases spoke to *The Ukrainian Week* off the record. He believes that a lot of the problems of solving such crimes lie in legislation: it bans any search and investigation actions abroad; working with foreign law enforcement officers is often difficult, and the multilevel system for the approval of international orders slows down the collection of data on foreign parties to a case. Moreover, there is a lack of funds for trips abroad or the translation of questions and answers.

“For instance, the victims name several pimps in the Czech Republic,” the police officer expands. “We get their photographs and addresses. I go to Prague. The only place where I can collect evidence is on the territory of the Ukrainian Consulate, but the Czech police were unable to bring the suspects to me.”

The only option for the police is to email Interpol and the local police, asking them to question specific people on specific details. “But those who will perform the orders don’t know all details of the case,” the police officer says. “What we ask of them is usually done formally: the



local police only ask the questions we stipulate. But what matters, is the extra information that is learned during the interrogation process, which give rise to more questions.”

Even the procedure for establishing data on foreigners is extremely complex because of Ukrainian legislation. For example, an international order has to go through several phases of approval, including a local law enforcement office, the Ministry of the Interior and General Prosecutor’s Office. The reply requires an identical procedure. At each level, the

order can be returned to the investigator with comments. If this happens, the entire procedure starts all over again. The result – answers to international orders take a long time, but the criminal case needs to be submitted to court. Therefore, investigators compile materials on cases related to suspects located abroad into separate proceedings, that are often “frozen” for years.

### THE UNTOUCHABLE CYPRIOTS

Mariana Korytych was recently tried in Lviv. She was found guilty of human trafficking. The lady sent two girls from Lviv into sexual slavery. There may have been more, but charges were only proved on these two.

Teofil Osadets, a lawyer for one of the victims, says that the two girls, who were friends, were met at the airport in the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Joined by other girls, they got into a small bus that took them to a doctor for an examination. Later, the girls ended up at a night club outside of town. In the evenings, they would do a striptease and were forced to work as prostitutes after 11 p.m. 15 women worked in this fashion at any given time.

The organizers told the girls that they owed them USD 5,000 for travel and employment costs. After that, they would impose fines for lame reasons to boost the debt. They would go to clients with guards. One of the girls ended up suffering from nervous breakdowns and psychosis. She was given a ticket and sent back to Ukraine. However, she was warned that if she told the police anything, her friend would only be found in pieces.

Mariana Korotych was punished, but the brothel for which she recruited women continues to operate and new slaves are heading there. The club is called “Sexy Lady”. Located on the outskirts of Gerolakkos, a village near Nicosia, it is owned by Khakki Beiaz. A man called Tahir is the contact person for recruiters in Cyprus. Khakan Samerli (Surmeli) is Beiaz’s right-hand man. He meets the girls at the airport, takes them for medical examinations, imposes fines and beats them.

Interpol reported the following: “It has been established that Khakki Beiaz forces Ukrainian women into prostitution. He is also accused of drug dealing.” But neither the Ukrainian police, nor international

### The geography of slavery



bodies can do anything about him. Why? The response from Interpol – “This territory is under the control of the Turkish Army”.

### THE VICTIM’S FAULT

“Criminal cases on sexual exploitation are often not initiated at all or closed before reaching the court,” says Olena Kalbus, a psychologist at the West-Ukrainian Center “Women’s Prospects”. “The victims are reluctant to contact the police – they fear publicity and the fact that their family, friends and the public will find out about their involvement in prostitution. Many fear revenge on the part of the criminals.”

The criminals keep inventing new schemes. Several years ago, girls would go abroad en masse, allegedly under student exchange programmes. College, vocational school and lyceum students majoring in tourism or hotel management were forced into prostitution during their internship programmes. Now, ever more often, human traffickers use marriage agencies as a cover.

“People profiting from sexual exploitation abroad are wealthy and can afford experienced lawyers,” Olena Kalbus notes. “They can easily “ruin” criminal cases by putting continuous pressure on the victims, using their alleged voluntary decision as an excuse. The lawyers play on the feeling of guilt experienced by most victims of sexual exploitation.”

It is also difficult to identify all the links of human trafficking because victims are being recruited

abroad more and more often, says Ihor Hnat, Director of the Regional Center for Social Adjustment charity. Together with his associates, Mr. Hnat rescues Ukrainian women from sexual slavery.

“There are Ukrainian girls in Europe, the Middle East and Africa who never voluntarily agreed to prostitution; they worked as maids, dishwashers, housekeepers or took care of elderly people,” he says. “They eventually became trapped in the snares of people, who make huge profits from prostitution. The latter have many ways of making a woman work in the sex industry, ranging from the getting them into debt, to threats and fraud.”

“Selling women to perverts is another type of human trafficking,” Mr. Hnat laments. “The pervert plays with her and you never know what happens next. He can sell her on to someone else, lose her in a poker game or kill her. We rescued Svitlana (the name has been changed) from a pervert in a European country. He kept her chained and abused her while recording everything on video. We broke into the house and found her chained, but how can the sadist be brought to justice? We entered his apartment illegally. We couldn’t wait any longer because he was about to take Svitlana elsewhere. So what if we had a huge bag with videos of recorded abuse – it was collected illegally! The pervert would avoid punishment if we went to the police. I, on the other hand, would be criminally liable.” ■

# SPEAKING UP FOR YOU

A number of Ukrainians successfully defend their language rights by using their knowledge of the law


Author:  
Valeria Burlakova

According to law, the language used by employees in government institutions, stores, coffee shops, etc. has to be Ukrainian or some other language acceptable to both sides (see Expert opinion). “This means Ukrainian by default. And only if the client suddenly decides that he should be addressed in a different language – and if it is an acceptable option, say, for waiters – he can receive services in a foreign language,” Yuriy Far-tushny, lawyer for the *Don't Be Indifferent!* movement, explains. He says that it is sometimes enough to simply ask the other person to switch to Ukrainian and thus assure your language rights are respected.

## QUEUING FOR COFFEE

A reporter of *The Ukrainian Week* asked five police officers in Kyiv for directions in Ukrainian and heard back in the same language from two of them. Salespeople in randomly selected shops were not very disappointing, either. In contrast, eateries that have only Russian-language menus are on every corner in Kyiv, such as the Parasol café on Pestel Str. However, a waitress there easily switched to Ukrainian. When asked to bring a menu in Ukrainian, she apologised and explained that they do not have any and offered her services as an interpreter.

Volunteers of the *Don't Be Indifferent!* movement have collected many such stories. The



# OUR MOTHER TONGUE



movement has successfully monitored cafés, bars and restaurants for the past two years to see if they keep the law on languages. Hanna, a student volunteer, returned to the Turgenef restaurant where language rights were earlier violated, as the movement found indicated in the customer feedback book. The administration had ignored the complaint and the restaurant's menu is still in Russian. They promised to introduce a Ukrainian-language one after Euro 2012, saying that a number of foreigners are going to come for the championship who "don't understand it." The staff has yet to learn to speak Ukrainian.

In contrast, the menu in the Fried Potatoes bistro is in Ukrainian, and the staff welcomes clients also in Ukrainian. At the same time, a weird mixture of languages is used in its bills. But they contain the name and surname of the person who served the client, so the latter can easily identify a staff member if he decides to complain. If the staff refuses to speak to you in Ukrainian and requests have no effect, there are other ways of putting on pressure.

"You can simply talk to the owner of the café in question," Fartushny continues. "About 60 per cent of eateries change the situation partly or completely after our volunteer visits them or makes an entry in their customer feedback book. After all, there is protection of consumer rights. And there will be a reaction from relevant government bodies." There is also the option of going to court...

The Don't Be Indifferent movement inspected and monitored over 200 restaurants, and the results show language legislation violations in 72 per cent of cases in 2010 and 64 per cent in 2011. In other words, the situation improved by 8 per cent.

## FINES AGAINST BUREAUCRATS

Ukrainian-speaking citizens often face linguistic discrimination. ▶



Many of them defend their rights on their own. Anatoliy Ilchenko, an elderly man from Mykolaiv, won a number of lawsuits against local officials who refused to speak Ukrainian to him. They had to pay large fines. However, sometimes judges ruled in their favour on absurd arguments, such as “Russian has a ‘special status’” or “it does not belong in the same company as other languages”. Ilchenko tells about one such case: “The city council held a mass event towards Mykolaiv Liberation Day. Everything was in Russian there. I sued them, asking to refrain from speaking in public in a foreign language without interpreting so that I could understand what officials say. Judge Spinchevska turned down my lawsuit, because ‘there is no direct prohibition in legislation to use other languages’. But no such prohibition is needed, because Ukrainian is the working language of the central government and local governments.”

He says it is quite difficult to fight for citizen rights in Mykolaiv: “Ukrainians have forgotten that they are Ukrainians. We do not respect ourselves, so who will respect us?” He recommends those who face linguistic discrimination to “at least file a complaint to a prosecutor’s office.”

Odesa-based journalist Vira Hruzova was told to go to “her Ukrainian-speaking Lviv” and heard other offensive language from another Odesa resident, blogger Vsevolod Nepohodin. But she believes that it is not that difficult to be a speaker of Ukrainian in this city where even the municipal authorities use only Russian. The problem is, she says, that “not every person you come across here is tolerant to language.”

“Citizens outraged by the fact that officials in the city council speak to them exclusively in Russian come to my office fairly often,” says Odesa-based human rights activist Oleksandr Slavsky. “They also take exception to the fact that government officials react in a bad way to the state language or speak disparagingly about it.”

“Teachers often teach in Russian but note: If the head of the department comes, we will continue in Ukrainian,” Hanna, a student at the Philological Fac-



<sup>1</sup>Dmitri Tabachnik, A World Without Ukraine?  
Daria Dontsova, A Lady With Stockings The Beast  
A Murder of KGB Agent  
The Quiet Nights of Siberia

ulty in Illia Mechnikov Odesa National University, says. “In other words, they understand that they are supposed to deliver lectures in the state language but are not doing it. Their language sometimes sounds funny – we even prompt them. Sometimes they ask us ourselves: Now what’s this word?” Hanna says that two teachers, Halyna Yarotska and

Tetiana Ponomarenko, teach in Russian as a matter of principle.

“You need to submit a written complaint to the rector’s office of the education institution and request that classes be taught in Ukrainian,” attorney Antonina Krushynska recommends. “If there is no reaction, you need to write to a directorate of the Ministry of Education



EXPERT OPINION

How Ukrainian speakers can defend their linguistic rights



Ukraine has sufficient legislation to enable an ordinary Ukrainian to defend his linguistic rights if need be. A Constitutional Court of Ukraine decision of 14 December 1999 says that Ukrainian as the state language is a mandatory means of communication across the territory of the country for government bodies and local self-government bodies in performing their functions, as well

as in other public spheres of social life established by law. The services sector is one such public spheres and is governed by the laws "On the Protection of Consumer Rights" and "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" and other regulations. Under Article 17 of the Law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR", Ukrainian or another language acceptable to both sides is used in all areas in which services are offered to citizens. In other words, under the law, employees in the services sector must use Ukrainian in talking to customers. When meeting and communicating with clients, they must welcome them, offer dishes and menus, etc. in Ukrainian, and switch to a foreign language only upon request. But in this case they are not obliged to switch to a foreign language. They have the right to do so and may use it if doing so is acceptable to them.

Moreover, under the Law "On the Protection of Consumer Rights", when a client purchases, orders or uses products sold in the territory of Ukraine to meet his personal needs, he has the right to adequate quality. Services have adequate quality if they meet the demands contained in legal regulations. Services that violate effective laws cannot meet quality standards.

Under the same law, consumers have the right to receive necessary, accessible, truthful and timely information about products that will enable them to make informed and competent choices. This information must be provided to the consumer before he purchases a product or orders a service. It should be done according to the law on languages, i.e., in Ukrainian. In this way, the law establishes that a client in a restaurant must be welcomed in Ukrainian, attended to in Ukrainian and receive a Ukrainian-language menu and bill.

If the above requirements are not met, the customer can make an entry to this effect in the customer feedback book and request that violations be eliminated. The administration of the institution then must look into the issue and take the necessary steps to remove violations. If this does not happen, the Directorate for Consumer Right Protection is the agency to turn to. Similar legal argumentation concerning the use of Ukrainian and the order of steps taken in cases when linguistic rights are violated can also be employed in other areas of social life.

**Yuriy Fartushnyy,**  
lawyer of the *Don't Be Indifferent*  
civic movement

**NATIONS DON'T DIE OF A HEART ATTACK. THEY FORGET THEIR LANGUAGE FIRST**

**LINA KOSTENKO**

and say something to this effect: Classes are being taught in Russian at our faculty, which contradicts Article 10 of the Constitution. Please take measures in order to influence the administration." Liudmyla Klochko of the Kharkiv Human Rights Group says a written complaint should also be filed to the prosecutor's office in such cases.

Stories about job applicants being rejected for speaking Ukrainian rarely become public knowledge. Probably the only high-profile exceptions are the cases of Olena Voronova, Yulia Skoroda and Dina Antoshchenko. However, there are many more

sian with bosses from Moscow, English with English customers and Ukrainian with Ukrainians in the Kyiv office." She did not get the job.

If you have problems with job placement because you speak Ukrainian, a lawsuit is a feasible option. "This can be a civil case," Klochko explains. "But I have to note that every person who files a lawsuit must also provide evidence. You need to make an audio or video recording of you being rejected precisely because of the language you speak. Alternatively, you need to find witnesses who will be willing to come to the court hearing." More likely than



such stories. Olha, who lives in Kyiv, tells hers: "An HR woman in one company talked to me exclusively in Russian and explained that this is the language to be used in their company because its bosses are in Moscow. I asked her whether there was anyone from Moscow in their Kyiv office. No, she said. Then I emphasised that I would speak Rus-

not, an employer sued this way will have to revise its position and also pay you damages.

However, the linguistic problem in the corporate sector is, in fact, local. Many recruiting agencies note that most employers tolerate Ukrainian and there is an increasing number of job descriptions that indicate: "Fluency in Ukrainian is a plus." ❏

# When Language Matters

Slavist Yuri Shevchuk on conventional and new scenarios of assimilation, Russification and a pretense statehood



Interviewer:  
Hanna Trehub

Photo:  
Andriy Lomakin

In late May, Yuri Shevchuk, a well-known Slavist, lecturer in Ukrainian at Columbia University and Harvard Summer School, and the founder of Ukrainian Film Club at Columbia University, currently the only permanent forum for Ukrainian films in North America, delivered open lectures on 'Russification in Ukraine: Traditions and Innovations', at Lviv and Kyiv 'Ye' Bookstores under the 'New Trends: Society, Politics and Culture' project. During his visit to Ukraine, Mr. Shevchuk found the time to talk to *The Ukrainian Week*.

**IMPERIALISTIC HERITAGE**  
**UW:** Why, after the USSR collapsed, is Ukraine still undergoing the forced imposition of the Russian language as a dividing element? This is not happening in other post-soviet republics, other than maybe Belarus.

– I would add Kazakhstan to Ukraine and Belarus. It also has a huge problem of Russified culture, language and mindset. The imperialistic policy has been so successful in Ukraine and a failure in virtually all other FSU countries for a number of reasons. Firstly, Ukraine spent much more time under Russian occupation and its assimilation policy was implemented on a massive scale, consistently and often violently. Secondly, Ukraine lacks a strong national elite with enough economic importance to conduct a cultural and language policy of its own, unlike Poland. Thirdly, the myth about how much Ukrainian and Belarusian language, civilization and mindset have in common with those of Russia was always widely promoted until it was so deeply entrenched in local minds it undermined the ability to resist the expansion.

Russian imperialism used assimilation tools against the Ukrainian language that would

never have worked with Baltic and Caucasian languages. Yuri Sheveliov called them the 'tools of internal pressure' on the language that penetrate its system, syntax, phonetics and vocabulary which is the least resistant to assimilation processes. He qualified the intrusion as the original invention of Russian imperialism. Great Britain, Spain or France had never thought of undermining the languages of nations they colonized from inside. Russian imperialists are extremely effective at this, causing some far-reaching impacts. One is making many Ukrainians believe that their language is just a distorted, unoriginal and poor copy of the Russian language.

**UW: What are the most popular scenarios of cultural and language assimilation in the old empires: Great Britain, Spain and France? How similar is the Russian model?**

– External pressures on languages, including first and foremost bans and punishment for using the language. This is followed by the shaping of a cultural and language environment where symbolic capital accumulates on the basis of the dominating language alone. Knowing and speaking the language of the metropolis opened ways to join the empire, get in the game and have career growth (this was typical in British India). No empire can survive without involving members of the colonized community in the mechanisms of oppression, control and governance on a massive scale, because the dominant nation has no sufficient human resources to put administrators everywhere. With Ukraine, the tools of external pressure were identical to those used in Algeria or Morocco, by the French, or South Africa and India by the British.

**UW: Has Russian linguistic imperialism evolved with time? What particular features did it develop in the 21<sup>st</sup> century?**

– Russifiers are definitely inventive as they keep adjusting the tools of assimilation and Russification to the situation in Ukraine, which has changed drastically. In 1989, the Ukrainian SSR passed the law on languages that re-

quired bureaucrats to learn Ukrainian over the next 10 years. This never happened because pretense independence evolved instead, accompanied by a pretense language policy and pretense state. It had all the necessary attributes, including the national anthem, colours, bureaucrats, president and the army, yet it was essentially ruled by Kravchuk and Kuchma, the old red communists. Red directors see this culture and the statehood idea as something deeply hostile and alien, not just strange. What they suddenly realized, though, was that they could get windfall profits from this.

All Western policy analysts I have heard or read said that the Ukrainian political elite lacks the ability to think in terms of the



## UKRAINIAN POLITICAL ELITE LACKS THE ABILITY TO THINK IN TERMS OF THE STATE

state and has zero ambition to leave something other than the statistics of their personal enrichment in history. These are its two key features and typical for each and every Ukrainian president.

### LANGUAGE QUASI-POLICY

**UW: How does the world see bilingualism? Why is Ukrainian bilingualism that you call 'Schizophrenia' dangerous for the nation?**

– Ukraine is the only nation that doesn't care what language it speaks. Yet, it matters everywhere else in the world, including Russia. And we are imposed a sort of pervert internationalism based on the wrong idea that the language does not matter. The spin doctors of this fake internationalism which is, in fact, the concept of Moscow's superiority,

feed us with slogans, such as "I like any language as long as it's Russian." Bilingualism is pure assimilation, a way of speaking just one language, and Russification in the case of Ukraine. We're being imposed what I and many others call language Schizophrenia, whereby Ukrainians hear people speak Ukrainian, and other languages, chaotically within just one minute of a TV show. As a result, each language spoken is primitive and poor. The host, who is a native speaker of Russian, speaks it naturally, while Russian-speaking hosts who speak Ukrainian on TV look like they are turning their brain inside out trying to translate their Russian language thoughts into Ukrainian. The result is a hybrid, a simulacrum that disgusts and repulses the mass of the audience, rather than appeals to it. That is the policy russifiers pursue on Ukrainian TV and radio. Actually, they are brilliant at it. Notably, people who would hardly qualify as cultural cannibals participate in this Schizophrenia enthusiastically. They are the nation's leading writers and intellectuals who agree to being spoken to in Russian on Ukrainian media. I must say that in other places where the languages of colonizers and the colonized are in tight contact with each other, such as Puerto-Rico, Catalonia or Quebec, have no language Schizophrenia policy. In dialogues with people who don't speak Spanish, Catalan or Quebec French respectively, their speech is dubbed into the language spoken on the show.

The language Schizophrenia imposed on the entire country, including the regions where less than 5% of the population speaks Russian, leaves no Ukrainian-language space for native speakers of Ukrainian. The language grows anemic when its native speakers can no longer think in that language alone, as they do in any community that has language freedom. With time, they lose the ability to create their native, not translated, original neologisms and slang, or generate their trendy spoken language, juicy, appealing, exotic and unique. Yuri Sheveliov once wrote that a language without slang is doomed to die because slang is the zone in ▶

### BIO

**Yuri Shevchuk** earned his PhD in Germanic Philology at Taras Shevchenko National University in 1987. He has been lecturing in Ukrainian at Columbia University since 2004 and Harvard Summer School since 1990. He is member of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies; the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages; Shevchenko Scientific Society; Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, and the National Society of Cinematographers of Ukraine. Mr. Shevchuk promotes Ukrainian cinematography and culture in North America and Europe. He compiled *Beginner's Ukrainian* (Hippocrene Books, Inc. New York, 2011), the latest interactive textbook for American universities.

every language that generates new blood. Lesia Stavytska's dictionary of Ukrainian slang has 70-80% of words borrowed or translated from Russian. Ukrainians have no native slang that is as rich as that of Poles, Russians or Brits. In a situation where the nation's government conducts a Ukrainophobic and Russification policy in all areas of life, there is no language doctrine to resist this policy effectively on the scale of civil society and its cells, such as the media, to create the Ukrainian-language environment that no assimilation could break through. Ukrainian media fails to catch new words from playgrounds, colleges and schools, and turn them into commonly used language, unlike elsewhere in the world. I know no TV or radio channel that offers a purely Ukrainian-language product.

**UW: What is the difference in the policy of using a titular nation's language in strategic areas, such as the media, the internet and books, which differs dramatically in Ukraine and the rest of the world?**

– The policy in the West has reached the point where the state no longer needs any mechanisms of implementation, control, encouragement or sanctions for non-compliance. The USA has no law on languages and no provision of the Constitution declares English as the official state language. Yet, it feels reasonable in the state to not want to undermine its strategic role in public life or the web because these two aspects of a language affect each other. No one would think of placing an ad or a banner in French on an English-language website. People just realize that it's counterproductive.

**MAKE IT INTERESTING**

**UW: We often hear that Ukrainian studies are in a state of decline in the world right now. How true is that?**

– Definitely, Ukrainian studies in the West are not as important as they are in Ukraine, even though Ukraine is in Europe and the world. They are in a decline. France does not have much related to Ukrainian studies. It has no institutionalized research centers at its leading universities,



such as Sorbonne and the like. Slavic studies in France still focus on Russian studies in the old imperialistic sense, wiping other cultures, including Ukraine's, out of the interest field. The problem is not as much in the French vision of the Russian language as the first Slavic language, as it is in the outcome of this exceptional attention to it that leaves all other lan-

major in Ukrainian studies find no moral or cultural support in anything that would signal Ukraine's growing importance and prospects in science, diplomacy or business careers for young people.

Another aspect that tends to dilute the role of Ukrainian studies is the field of studies articulated to present Ukrainians and their struggle for independence as fascism and anti-Semitism. Some historians and writers in the West, including those of Ukrainian origin, who write on Ukrainian issues, oppose the study of 'Holodomor', the Famine. They claim that it cannot be compared to the Holocaust because this comparison makes the latter look trivial. This concept in Ukrainian studies has much in common with the propaganda against the Ukrainian Diaspora in the West, which was intensely promoted by soviet special services, where the Ukrainian guerilla movement, the Insurgent Army or UPA, as well as any other ways of the nation's self-organization which were unauthorized by the Kremlin, were portrayed as fascist, anti-Semitic, anti-national and traitor-like activities. ■



**MANY UKRAINIANS ARE MADE TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR LANGUAGE IS JUST A DISTORTED, AND POOR COPY OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE**

guages behind and fuels no interest in them whatsoever. In this environment, Ukrainian studies are pushed to the sidelines, even though we're talking of a 45-million strong nation in the country itself, plus another 10-15 million people elsewhere.

Moreover, the latest political developments do not help promote Ukrainian studies and Ukrainians in the world. This is not just about the lack of financial support. Students who opt to



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# Viacheslav Lypynsky: Champion of

He formulated the idea of a political nation and advocated an aristocratic path toward building a Ukrainian state

**Author:**  
**Ihor Hyrych**


The 130<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lypynsky's birth went quietly unnoticed in Ukraine. Meanwhile, as a political thinker and historian, he is of paramount importance and relevance to present-day Ukraine. Our political establishment would be well served by following his recipes for building the Ukrainian state and society.

The Ukrainian revolution of 1917-18 showed that the local elite had insufficient state-building potential, evidenced by the collapse of Volodymyr Vynnychenko-style radical social demagoguery. Lypynsky offered a different recipe for constructing what he called a classocratic society, one of producers (producer-owners) and creators of settled European culture.

## TERRITORIAL PATRIOTISM

Lypynsky contrasted social peace with class struggle, social revolution, and the power of the crowd over the individual. "We lost the armed struggle but we will not lose Ukraine if we can recruit both the wealthy and poor to the idea of a successful Ukrainian state," Lypynsky stated. There is no irreconcilable social antagonism between the poor and the rich. On the contrary, there is common interest in the prosperity of their country. In contemporary terms, Lypynsky was a champion of the middle class.

Ukrainians have been trapped with the image of themselves as a peasant nation since time immemorial. Lypynsky formulated a postulate of territorial patriotism that served as the prototype for a political nation that unites people not so much by ethnicity as by common territory. Ukrainian territorial patriotism can be readily embraced by both indigenous Ukrainians and other ethnicities living in Ukraine such as Poles, Russians or Jews. According to



# f Conservatism

Lypynsky, the main thing was that the union be rooted in the Ukrainian cultural matrix.

He was one of the first to promote Ukrainian culture to a dominating position in the country. He started his career as a Polish-speaking writer but wrote his first work in Ukrainian already in 1908 and was recognized as one of the most prominent Ukrainian political writers by the time the First World War began. His *Lysty do bratuv-khliborobiv* (Letters to Brothers-Agrarians, 1926) alone bear testament to his outstanding talent as a thinker.

## AN ADVOCATE OF ARISTOCRATISM

Lypynsky became a spokesman for Ukrainian elitism. Here he consciously went against the flow and stood nearly by himself in the circles of the democratic and people-loving intelligentsia that abandoned its "landlordship" and forever lost faith in the need for higher social strata in the Ukrainian cause. He did follow the track trodden by his predecessors, including his teacher and mentor Volodymyr Antonovych. The latter called on the Polonized Ukrainian nobility to return to the people and become declassed. Lypynsky believed that it had to remain what it was but become Ukrainian, serve the cause of national revival and participate in the political life of Ukrainian circles.

Before Lypynsky, the image of a nobleman had a clearly negative connotation in the Ukrainian milieu. However, after his *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (From the History of

DIPLOMATIC SERVICE: Viacheslav Lypynsky with members of Ukrainian Embassy in Vienna, 1918



Ukraine) came out in 1912, the educated public learned that the Bohdan Khmelnytsky movement was spearheaded by the Ukrainian nobility – it was the brains of the liberation struggle. Khmelnytsky, Stanyslav Morozenko, Mykhailo Krychevsky and Ivan Vyhovsky were noblemen by their social origin, which, it turned out, did not prevent them from sensing and expressing authentically Ukrainian political interests. They had a much deeper understanding of social tasks than did rank-and-file Cossacks who were not concerned about strategy and the fine nuances of political agreements. All these things were in the care of the Ukrainian nobility, which traditional Ukrainian historiography left outside the scope of the Ukrainian nation. However, its representatives worked out policies for the Hetman State that maneuvered between two powers, Poland and Muscovy, in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and were the masterminds behind all agreements. They were great champions of Ukraine's political interests.

The Polonized Ukrainian nobility, rather than descendants of Ukrainian Cossack officers who joined the ranks of the Russian nobility in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, launched the national revival in the modern age by calling for a cultural border between what was Russian and Ukrainian. Volodymyr Antonovych, Tadei Rylsky, Osyp Yurkevych and Kostiantyn Mykhalchuk, rather than ethnic Ukrainians that hailed from the former Hetman State (such as Vasyl Tarnavsky, Volodymyr Naumenko, Oleksandr Lazarevsky and Orest Levtsky), became the first

champions of independence. Why? Because all things Ukrainian were never alien to them. Moreover, they remained an indispensable part of their mentality. In the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the experience of the Polonized nobility became the most valuable asset of national political thought, considering that these people were brought up in the spirit of statehood-oriented thinking.

Lypynsky was the first to call on his fellow countrymen to accept, rather than reject, the contribution of the Polish-Ukrainian cultural environment in the border regions to the national cause. He urged Ukrainians to integrate it and make it their own. He opened for Ukraine an entire Atlantis of seemingly foreign, but actually Ukrainian, culture. Even Hetman Mikolaj Potocki, a Uniate and the biggest magnate in Right Bank Ukraine in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, had certain Ukrainian sentiments. Lypynsky expanded the horizons of Ukrainian mentality and offered Ukrainians a broader view on their political tasks. He considered these tasks in primarily political, rather than ethnographic-cultural terms.

## THE STATEHOOD INSTINCT

Lypynsky was among the first champions of the idea of an independent Ukraine. Lypynsky, rather than Mykola Mikhnovsky or Yulian Bachynsky (who wrote the first programs for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state), created an ideology for a Ukrainian state, which he conclusively formulated in his Letters to Brothers-Agrarians only in 1926,



LYPYNSKY'S PARENTS. Kazymyr and Klara Lypynsky

## BIO:

**Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882-1931)** was born in a noble Polish family in Zaturka, a village in Volyn Oblast. He went to gymnasiums in Zhytomyr, Lutsk and Kyiv, and studied at Jagellonian University (Krakow) and the University of Geneva in 1903-1907. In October 1917, he co-founded Ukrainian Agrarian Democratic Party of and worked as the Ambassador of Ukraine and Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) in Vienna over 1918-1919. After emigration, he established the Ukrainian Union of Agrarians and Politicians in 1920. Viacheslav Lypynsky died on 26 April 1931 in Austria. His works include *"The Nobility in Ukraine: Its Role In the Life of Ukrainian People and Its History"* (Krakow, 1909), *"The Calling of the Varyags or the Union of Agrarians"* (1925), *"Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine"* (1925) and *"Letters to Brothers Agrarians"* (1926).



FAMILY ESTATE: Mr. Lypynsky with his brother Stanislaw and his family, 1929

when the liberation struggle had already ended.

He became a spontaneous separatist back in his lyceum years when he cooperated with the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party and the Polish Socialist Party at educational institutions in Lutsk, Zhytomyr and Kyiv. To Lypynsky, a man of Polish revolutionary milieu, nothing was taboo when it came to the issue of independence: it was a totally natural phenomenon to him. The Poles had no illusions regarding autonomy and federalism in the Russian state: it was either an independent Poland or Russia in its place. Lypynsky and his ideological followers possessed that same statehood instinct regarding Ukraine's future.

They viewed the subsidiary nature of the psyche of Ukrainians living in Dnieper Ukraine and the universalism of the Orthodox world they inherited in an almost genetic fashion as factors

that made Ukraine permanently dependent on Russian Orthodoxy and Russian autocratic rulers. Russia's influence produced in them a theoretical dualism: Russia's longtime political domination of Ukrainian lands versus the struggle to preserve local cultural features. This doomed symbiosis led one generation of Ukrainians after another to recognize the full victory of Russian cultural space on Ukrainian territory. To the "Polish" Lypynsky, this political division fortunately did not exist. Several years prior to the First World War, he turned down Yevhen Chykalenko's invitation to become the chief editor of the Rada (The Council) newspaper. The reason was that, although a convinced separatist, Chykalenko sought to deflect in every possible way public accusations of separatism hurled by Russian politicians against the Ukrainian movement. Rada con-

**QUOTES:**

Communism is not the beginning of a new era, as some tend to think. It is rather the end and the death of the old era.

Ukrainian democracy had never been able to build anything after its aristocracy was ruined

Nations emerge out of victories or disasters that are psychologically common for all of their members

Nobody will build a state for us as long as we don't build one for ourselves. Nobody will create a nation for us as long as we ourselves do not want to be a nation

Only those destroyed nations can revive, and not kick in their coffins helplessly, which managed to hide and keep their spirit alive, even if outside their country, their body.

*From Viacheslav Lypynsky's books*

sistently affirmed its federalism and loyalty to the Russian state. It never adopted a clear position of this "separatism" or defined Ukrainian national priorities. "We need to train Ukrainians to be independent and assert their normalcy, that is, if they want to remain Ukrainians rather than turn into 'Rus' people," Lypynsky wrote.

He was the ideological mastermind of the Young Ukrainian movement, when a number of social democrats and social revolutionaries departed from social democratic ideology and set up a non-partisan separatist group called *Vilna Ukraina* (Free Ukraine) in 1911-12. It became the prototype of the later Union for Ukrainian Liberation.

Precisely this kind of non-partisan understanding of liberation efforts aimed first at establishing an independent state and then solving other social problems was lacking among the leadership of the Ukrainian Revolution in 1917-18, which led to its defeat by the invading Russian Bolsheviks. Lypynsky was one of the few Ukrainian politicians who viewed the problem of Ukrainian state building through a European, rather than Eurasian-Russian, lens.



**LYPYNSKY BELIEVED THAT THE STATE HAD TO BE BUILT NOT BY A CROWD BUT PRIMARILY BY WEALTHY PEOPLE**

**A UKRAINIAN CENTER-RIGHTIST**

Lypynsky's social philosophy should not be simplified or categorized under specific ideological labels as it is in most scholarly works. It is a mistake to identify

**LEGACY**

In 1960s, V.K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute (EERI) was established in Philadelphia. Initiated by the then director Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, the Institute launched the publication of Lypynsky's works in 25 volumes. After Ukraine gained independence in the early 1990s, Professor Yaroslav Pelensky, the Institute's last director, transferred it to Ukraine where it has been operating as the Institute for European Studies under the National Academy of Sciences ever since. During the past few years, the new administration has been ignoring the key objective of the Institute that is to publish all of his works, correspondence and archive documents currently stored at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome and remain mostly unavailable for researchers. So far, only one third of Lypynsky's legacy has been published.




him only as a champion of the Hetman State and the mastermind behind the Hetman movement, even though he should be credited for the bright political image that Pavlo Skoropadsky enjoys. Lypynsky “Ukrainized” Skoropadsky politically when the latter was already in emigration by editing his memoirs and creating an image of an enlightened Ukrainian monarch. Lypynsky was, above all, a conservative politician and producer of rightist and centrist social values. He left the Ukrainian Agrarian Democratic Party because he disagreed with its narrow politics and instead set up a brotherhood of statehood-minded classocrats.

His later statements on socialist parties earned him a reputation as an extreme opponent of the national democratic movement. But in reality it was more complicated than that. He supported the general democratic movement before the revolution and viewed right-wing national forces as an integral component. He coordinated his actions with the national democratic leadership (Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Serhiy Yefremov and Borys Hrinchenko) and was also friends with Levko Yurkevych and even Vynnychenko, trying but ultimately failing to change the latter’s political views. He had an original interpretation for the behavior of Myron, the protagonist of Vynnychenko’s scandalous work *Shchabli zhyttia* (The Steps of Life), perceiving him as a *déclassé* severed from traditional society. But in 1917–19, Lypynsky became deeply disappointed with the Ukrainian left when it failed miserably to establish a Ukrainian state. This caused him to level caustic criticism against them.

### A CONSERVATIVE ALTERNATIVE

Unlike Ukrainian socialists, Lypynsky believed that the state had to be built not by a crowd, an anarchic revolutionary mass, but primarily by wealthy people who had economic leverage. At the time, this leverage was held by the Russian nobility, as well as Polish landlords and the bourgeoisie. Thus, Lypynsky was convinced that landowners and entrepreneurs had to be recruited to the Ukrainian cause and persuaded that an independent Ukrainian state was an advantage. Rather than being estranged from



IN ACADEMIC CIRCLES: At the convention of Ukrainian historians and painters in Zakopane, 1908

the Ukrainian nation, they had to be recognized as Ukrainian citizens to the same degree that peasants were. Only then, he argued, would the territory they owned—and their consciousness—become Ukrainian. “In order not to drown in Moscow by pulling ourselves away from Poland or in Warsaw by separating ourselves from Muscovy, we must show a different center of gravitation,” Lypynsky wrote. Kyiv was to become such a center, he believed.

In contrast, Vynnychenko

believed. Friends had to be sought among the “disadvantaged”. So the Russian proletariat appeared to be much closer than Ukrainian peasantry.

This “medicine” was deadly for a nation without a statehood instinct. Red Moscow rid itself of the old elite but recruited its representatives to public service. The leading communist stratum was made up of former members of the Russian nobility, bourgeoisie and Jews who were in strong opposition to the old regime. Raised in the spirit of respect for their state, they were Russian patriots and adopted a condescending attitude toward non-Russian nations. They prioritized the social over the national. Now, according to Lypynsky, one of the preconditions for an independent state was the will to have it and the willingness for uncompromising struggle to win it. These thoughts remain as relevant today as they were during Lypynsky’s lifetime. ■

## LYPYNSKY WAS A CONSERVATIVE POLITICIAN AND PRODUCER OF RIGHTIST AND CENTRIST SOCIAL VALUES

and the majority of Ukrainian socialists followed the recipe written by the Russian Bolsheviks. According to this approach, any union was class-based. A landlord was always an enemy, they

# The Hools are Coming

Dougie Brimson, co-author of the “Green Street Hooligans” script, tells *The Ukrainian Week* whether Ukrainians should be afraid of foreign football fans, coming for Euro 2012

**Interviewer:**  
Valeria Burlakova

**D**ougie Brimson is known as the best expert in football fan movements. A one-time ultra himself, he wrote many books including *Barmy Army: The Changing Face of Football Violence*, *The Crew*, and *England, My England: The Trouble with the National Football Team*, and co-wrote the script for the cult *Green Street Aooligans* movie. In his interview for *The Ukrainian Week*, Mr. Brimson comments on the claims about Ukrainian fans being racists spread by the British media, which countries have the most aggressive ultras, and how to avoid disorders at Euro 2012.

**UW: What did you think when you first heard that Ukraine and Poland would host Euro 2012?**

– I have to be honest and say that I was surprised that the tournament would be taking place there, but now I think it will be very good for both countries. I hope so anyway.

I USED TO BE JUST LIKE THEM: Dougie Brimson was a football hooligan not too long ago. He was part of the FC Watford fan group



**UW: What problems can come up in Ukraine during the tournament? How can we expect English fans to behave? Many people think of them as hooligans...**

– I think fear will be the big problem for all sides. There seems to be a lot of worry about English hooligans, for example, but the truth is, that there is nothing for anyone to worry about. The hooligans have been mostly removed from our support-base now and we will be coming to enjoy your country and have fun.

They will drink alcohol and make some noise but that's not dangerous. In many countries, people are friendly towards them and I hope that the Ukrainian police will treat them this way too, and the UK police that will be in Ukraine for the tournament will share their experience with their Ukrainian colleagues. English fans think that the Ukrainian police is not only corrupt, but also uncontrollable. Hence the never-ending talks of boycotting Ukraine. If the police treat English fans as hooligans, this may well cause problems. The same thing could happen if Ukrainian or Polish fans go looking for trouble with England supporters. This will not be good for anyone.

**UW: How would you comment on the claims in the British media that Ukrainians are racists?**

– The British press is free to say whatever it wants to. Sadly, though, journalists sometimes make mistakes. I find it embarrassing that the whole scandal labelling Ukrainians as racists has damaged the image of Ukraine. The British media has been buzzing with stories of racism and other scary things in Euro 2012 host countries, even if most of them are far from the truth. But I'm sure more stories like this will come up soon.

**UW: How different are hooligans in different countries? Can you tell a Ukrainian or a Polish fan by just looking at him/her?**

– I do not know that much about Ukrainian hooligans, other than some of the history which is written in my book “Eurotrashed: The Rise and Rise of Europe's Football Hooligans”. However, if they are anything like some of the other hooligans from countries in the former Soviet Union, they will be strongly influenced by English hooligans from the 80's and films such as “Green Street Hooligans”.

As for Polish hooligans, they are widely regarded as being some of the worst in Europe and I know that it is one place that even hard core English hooligans worry about visiting. That should tell you all you need to know.

**UW: Football hooligans rarely use weapons in Ukraine. They prefer fair play. How about the fans coming to Euro 2012 from elsewhere? Will they use knives in street fights?**

– I think hooligan groups in most countries follow the fair play rule, as it is part of the unwritten code. Only Turkish hooligans don't, and the use of knives by some Ultra groups who follow Italian clubs is standard. My own opinion is that anyone who uses weapons in a fight is a coward.

**UW: Which hooligan group is currently the strongest in the world?**

– This is an impossible question to answer because all hooligans are dangerous in their own way. A punch in the face hurts just the same, whether it comes from an Arsenal fan from London or an Arsenal fan from Kyiv.

**UW: An unpleasant accident occurred in 2006 when Scotland's football team played against a Ukrainian team. Ukrainian hooli-**



**gans beat up regular fans from Scotland, not hooligans. Those people were just having fun downtown. How is it possible to avoid such incidents during the tournament?**

– Sadly, similar things happen all the time. I think that direct discussions with the hooligan groups should be taking place right now in both Ukraine and Poland, warning them that any hooligan activity during the tournament is not acceptable. They must be made to understand that the world will be watching them and if there is hooliganism, it reflects very badly on both their football and their country. Fans often insult the locals and break laws without even knowing that they're doing something wrong. It's too late now. But I think the championship will be fine if the Ukrainian police treat fans with respect.

**UW: What do you think of politics in stadiums?**

– This has always been the case. Football stadiums are places where working class men gather not just to watch the game but to talk and discuss life. Politics is a natural subject for the terraces, especially when things are not so good.

Episodes of *Green Street Hooligans*, a film co-written by Dougie Brimson

**UW: These days, Ukrainian fans often shout out their dissatisfaction with the president in the stadiums.**

– Football grounds are natural places for people to gather and express their views. Politicians know that, which is why they try so hard to be part of the football culture during elections because they try to win the fans' support. But sadly, there are times when things become so bad politically that the terraces explode. Look at what happened in Egypt (on 1 February 2012, 73 people died

**FOOTBALL GROUNDS ARE NATURAL PLACES FOR PEOPLE TO GATHER AND VOICE THEIR VIEWS, SOMETHING THAT POLITICIANS ARE VERY MUCH AWARE OF**

and more than 1,000 were injured during the football riot following a match between two Egyptian teams – ed.) and in former Yugoslavia (a clash erupted between the local Dynamo FC and Red Star Belgrade, involving fans and football players, after the Yugoslavia Cup game in 1990; the game was later called the Death Match. It

was one of the signals of the future war for Croatia's independence – ed.). It is very sad when this happens.

**UW: As a one-time ultra, do you see any difference between the football hooligans of your generation and those of today?**

– I can't criticize them, because I was just like they are today. But you guys should realize that whatever you do has consequences. If you take part in a fight, you can end up in jail. If you beat someone up or use weapons, your opponent can end up in a hospital or a coffin. You might end up there as well. If that happens, your mother will no longer have a son, your wife will no longer have a husband and your kids will no longer have a father. If you realize all this and still want to fight, that's your choice.

**UW: What would you like to see changed in modern football?**

– I would take the game away from the money men and give some control back to the fans. Without us, it would not exist, yet we are never asked for anything but money.

**UW: You've mentioned that every character in your books has a real prototype. How about "Green Street Hooligans"? Could you tell us more about the real Matt Buckner and Pete Dunham?**

– Green Street Hooligans has lots of basis in fact and that includes most of the characters. But I cannot tell you much about the real life Pete or Matt because they are still my friends!

**UW: What are you working on now?**

– I am always working! At the moment I am writing a new comedy novel about football and a film based on the same story. I am also working on a film about British soldiers in Afghanistan.

**UW: Which book of yours is the most important to you?**

– In the football sense, my book "Kicking Off: Why Hooliganism and Racism are Killing Football", which looks at the subject of racism in football, is probably the most important. On a personal level, it is my novel "Billy's Log" because it is a comedy about men like me! ■

Interviewer:  
Liubomyr Krupnytskyi

**F**ame came to Los Colorados from abroad, as it is often the case for Ukrainian musicians. Their cover of Katy Perry's "Hot N Cold", posted on the web, made the Ternopil-based band known worldwide. The upcoming football tournament appears to have given the band a great opportunity to conquer European stages, radio and television. ZDF, one of the most popular TV channels in Germany, is going to play their cover of "I Like to Move It" during football matches. Los Colorados have already signed a contract with Motor Music, a record label known for working with Rammstein, recorded their first album and several videos. *The Ukrainian Week* asks guitarist Rostyslav Fuk and drummer Oleksandr Drachuk how they feel about their unexpected success.

**UW:** At first glance, your breakthrough looks like pure luck. To some extent it is, but luck still had to have fallen into the fertile soil of years in music schools and rehearsals?

**RF:** That's true. We all played in many bands before coming together in this one. Each of us went to music school or took music courses.

**OD:** Each of us is lucky to have an individual musical talent. Serhiy, the bassist, for instance, knows electronics and rents the studio. I'm better with sound engineering. Rostyk does arrangements and translates lyrics from English. Ruslan, the lead singer, has a good ear - he is the one who selects the repertoire. This is how everything comes together and makes it easy for us to work together.

**UW:** When did music become a job rather than just a hobby for you?

**RF:** In the unhappy times when the crisis hit Ukraine and we ended up without jobs, we decided to focus on music, the only thing we were actually good at. Sometimes we would take any offers, even ones where we had to spend more than we



Los Colorados talk about their recent breakthrough in music

# They Like To

## LOS COLORADOS

Band members  
(left to right)

Ruslan Prystupa  
(vocals, accordion)  
Oleksandr Drachuk  
(drums)  
Rostyslav Fuk (guitar)  
Serhiy Masyk (bass)

earned. I guess everyone should go through a hungry spring of sorts, to gather a harvest in autumn. People started to invite us to play gigs for money in 2009 after our "Hot N Cold" cover became popular on the Internet. We used to play for money before, but that was more of a hobby - just to pay for guitar strings or equipment for sound effects. Now, we are professional musicians, because that's what we do for a living.

**UW:** Love for Los Colorados in Ukraine seems natural, as the audience understands the lyrics and knows the tunes. What was it that captured the international audience?

**RF:** I think it was our positive attitude and humor. We try to keep our personal negativity inside, even if it is considerable at times, and not bring it out to our audience. In fact, people also like the flavor of Ukrainian folk music. Folk music is almost extinct in Germany, for instance. One day, we were drinking tea with our sound producer at the studio and he asked us to play something Ukrainian. We picked up a guitar and sang a song in three- or four-part harmony. "I don't get it, how did you do that? Did you memorize this song?" he wondered. In fact, we played it just once before. It must be in the blood. That's what they want. It would be nice and cool



PHOTO: YURIKO ZELENYI

# Move It

to export something Ukrainian, such as music, or see Germans wearing vyshyvanky (embroidered shirts – ed.). Their pop music is in no better shape, it's too sweet and refined, and the videos on their music channels look like a primitive Ukrainian music show from the 1990s.

**UW:** How come a German record company and TV channel is so interested in your music?

**RF:** The ZDF wanted to shoot a video for Euro 2012, so they were looking for a Ukrainian or Polish band to do it. When we talked to the people in charge of the auditions in Berlin, we learned that they had about 20 options, many of them well-

known bands. Eventually, they had this idea to get some unknown guys rather than celebrities. That's when Los Colorados came to their minds – one of them had seen our video on YouTube. The record deal and the studio followed.

**UW:** You started your European tour with a concert to celebrate your 5th anniversary. Where will you be performing and how long will it last? And how do you work with Motor Music?

**RF:** We were promised at least 50 gigs over a period of four months. That makes one concert per two and a half days. The countries include Austria, Switzerland and Germany. We signed a three-year contract which includes making at least two records. We've already recorded one, which was released on 1 June, in conjunction with the championship. This is a great jump-start because the ZDF will be playing the "I Like to Move It" video five-six times a day.

**UW:** Ukraine is still a terra incognita for many foreigners. What do you tell people abroad about your country?

**OD:** It is possible to say many things, but we immediately invite them to visit Ukraine. Let them see it for themselves and form their own impressions. No matter how much you tell people, nobody can tell what is the truth, and what is a subjective impression.

**RF:** We brought people from the ZDF to Ruslan's village and they took photos of all the potholes there. We apologized for the quality of our roads and they just said, "It's okay, we're all from Eastern Germany, we had the same thing 15 years ago".

**OD:** We just showed them everything as it is. They have to form their own opinion, and I think it will be a positive one.

**UW:** How do you see your music?

**RF:** We are rockers.

**UW:** I wouldn't venture to say that your music is pure rock. It has so many different elements to it.

**OD:** In Germany, they classified our style as polka-punk. We actually have two repertoires. One is in rock and the other is acoustic. Together, they are polka-punk. That's the closest definition of what we play.

**UW:** You also do rap and a capella, don't you?

**OD:** We simply listen to many genres of music. We never stop looking for something new.

**RF:** That's right. Everyone in our band likes different music. We used to argue about that at one point, but later realized that we needed to compromise.

**UW:** You make nice and interesting cover songs but this is possibly not enough, after all, they are remakes. Do you have your own songs?

**OD:** We have 30 or more songs of our own. Of course, people noticed us because of our cover songs. The first album has both covers and our original songs. The initial idea was to promote Los Colorados as a cover band. Luckily, we had some good songs of our own and the German audience was the first to hear and like them. We can do both cover and original songs.

**UW:** One of your recent videos was shot in Lviv about Lviv. Do you think that the people of Ternopil will be offended?

**RF:** Well, we also have to help our brothers. They asked us to do the video, so we figured, why not? Moreover, we know many musicians and have many friends in Lviv, so we wanted to do something nice for the city. We received an invitation from the Lviv City Council and the visitlviv.net portal. They wanted to make a catchy song to invite foreigners to Lviv. The video we shot is a remake of an old hooligan song called *Tilky u Lvovi* (Only in Lviv). It was originally a waltz, but we turned it into a rockabilly or rock song. We added the accordion and electric guitar to the tune and it turned out to be an interesting song and in our style. The plotline of the video is also interesting – as if each of us is using different means to get to Lviv. ■



LOS COLORADOS' DEBUT ALBUM CALLED MOVE IT!

SCULPTURE

# Kyiv's Contemporary Sculpture Festival

The city has been buzzing with big art shows these days. Following Arsenale 2012, the 1<sup>st</sup> Kyiv International Biennale for Contemporary Art open through 31 July, the First Contemporary Sculpture Festival runs from 2 June through 2 July

**Author:**  
Yevhenia  
Kozlovskia

The festival features international and Ukrainian artists, the latter presenting 9 out of 15 pieces from the main collection. They will compete for a grand prize worth EUR 6,000. Five masterpieces by world-renowned sculptors including Jaume Plensa, Nigel Hall, Eva Rothschild, Magdalena Abakanowicz and Sui Jianguo, are also on display. Sui Jianguo presented his landmark *Legacy Mantle*, a sculpture of Mao Zedong's hollow, disembodied jacket symbolizing the leader's ideas that failed to stand the test of time.

Another must-see sculpture is Jaume Plensa's *The House of Knowledge*. Eight meters high, the giant statue is composed entirely of huge aluminum letters of the alphabet combined in a form resembling the human body. From inside the sculpture, the

world is viewed through a prism of symbols. The Spanish sculptor has had a penchant for text since his early childhood, which he spent reading books. Magdalena Abakanowicz's *Seated Figure* shows how helpless an individual is in a crowd.

Oleksiy Sai's *Abandoned Site of Corporate Nomads* displays a sense of humor and straightforwardness uncommon in contemporary art. The artist encourages the audience to contemplate the daily routines of office employees from a different perspective. The white-collar workspace looks more like a pre-historic settlement. Wigwams are crammed with computer parts and a totem pole of scanners and printers towers over the middle of the site.

Some sculptures will change over the course of the month. The rusty metal of *Wind Rose*, for in-

stance, will gradually transform. *The Laws of Nature* featuring old broken cell phones, tapes, keyboards and computer screens made of clay will be ruined by the elements. However, the sculptors promise to touch them up so that they will last until the end of the festival.

The CREVIS art group offers an interesting interpretation of nostalgic childhood memories. Their *Button* sculpture tells the small story of a little thing lost in a birch lane that stayed there and grew with the trees. The soil must have been good, as the *Button* eventually grew 3 meters. Peering through the buttonhole provides a view of the Mother Motherland statue from one side and the Pechersk Lavra bell tower from another, adding another layer of meaning.

Dr. Helen Febi, the festival's curator, believes that art helps

HOW TO GET THERE

Take bus 62 or trolleybus 14 to Botanichnyi Sad (Botanical Garden) from Pecherska metro station

## Events

**22-23 June, 5 p.m. —**  
**Krayina Mriy (Dreamland)**

**Spivoche Pole (Sichnevoho Povstannia vul., Kyiv)**  
Authentic and natural, the international ethnic festival indeed creates a dreamland where music and live communication take over state-of-the-art technologies. The huge space of ethnic and world music unites people into one stream of energy bringing positive thinking and a good mood. Apart from music, guests will see arts and

crafts, folk dance workshops and all kinds of literature and theater performances. For the first time ever, the festival will be an official part of the Euro 2012 programme.



(33) JUNE 2012

**10-14 July —**  
**Ukraine Jazz Summer 2012**

**Club 44, Club Bernadazzi, Oblast Palace of Culture, Crimean Tatar Theater (44b, Khreshchatyk St., Kyiv; 15, Bunina St., Odesa; 3, Ploshcha Sudobudivnykiv, Mykolayiv; 5/1, Mendeleeva St., Simferopol)**  
The festival will take place in Kyiv, Simferopol, Odesa and Mykolayiv, featuring Roy Assaf on piano, Ofer Assaf on sax and Jonathan Voltzok on trombone (Israel-USA), the Kiev Big Band (Kyiv), Volodymyr Alekseev's Big Band (Mykolayiv), Ark Ovrutski on double bass (Ukraine-USA) and Serhiy Manukian on vocals (Russia).

**20-22 July —**  
**Fort.Missia**

**World War I defense forts (Popovychi, Lviv Oblast)**  
Everyone will have the opportunity to see the international art festival. This year's Fort.Missia will expand to the Polish section of unique fortifications and the Borek Fort. The programme includes land art, performances by Ukrainian and Polish musicians, jazz improvisation, literature experiments, fire shows and more surprises. According to the organizers, Fort.Missia is not an simply a festival. It stimulates deeper thoughts, inspiration and ideas.




# Festival: Monuments to the Everyday

change the way people treat their environment. Sally Kidall created an installation with a table and chairs with green grass growing on top of them to symbolize the way people treat nature. The key element of the installation was the plastic on top of it as a symbol of greenhouse effect.

The first visitors to the world-famous Yorkshire Sculpture Park did not understand contemporary sculpture well, but much has changed since then. The purpose of art festivals in Ukraine is to shape the aesthetic taste of the local audience.

**The festival is located at the Hryshko Botanical Garden at 1 vul. Timiriazievskia. The garden entrance fee is UAH 20 for adults and UAH 10 for children over 7.**



**24, 25 July, 8 p.m.** — **Swan Lake**

**Odesa National Academic Opera and Ballet Theater (1, prov. Tchaikovskoho, Odesa)**

The well-known ballet will be performed by The Russian Ballet Theater, directed by Viacheslav Gordeev. The dancers' plastic and refined moves prove the skillful and masterful technique that the group is renowned for in the world. The ballet is comprised of 50 artists, 4 set changes and beautiful costumes. The Russian Ballet is always a firework of dance mastery, charm and simply a spectacular event.



**25 July, 7 p.m.** — **Red Hot Chili Peppers**

**NSK Olimpiysky (55, Velyka Vasylkivska St., Kyiv)**

In the heat of summer, Red Hot Chili Peppers will add a fiery mood in Kyiv. The US rock band will present their new album "I'm With You", their tenth record, released in August 2011. Revolutionary in the band's history, the release was broadcast online in the biggest movie theaters of the world. The UK-based Kasabian and The Vaccines will perform as a warm-up act for the US rockers.



**26-29 July** — **Wiz-Art 2012**

**Lviv Palace of Arts (17, Kopernika St., Lviv)**

Ukraine's arts capital will soon host the 5<sup>th</sup> International Short Film Festival. The four-day marathon will feature many films, workshops, music and art performances at different sites throughout Lviv, although the Palace of Arts will still be the heart of the festival. Guests include Vincent Moon, a well-known French director and traveler, and Iliia Gladstein, the coordinator of Kyiv Molodiſt festival.



# From Goths to Natives

Mangup Kale has become a home for ancient peoples and some of our contemporaries

**Author:**  
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Ivan  
Liubysh-Kirdey

**O**f all the cave towns in Crimea, Mangup has a unique energy and folklore. Only here can one meet people who left their apartments in multistoried buildings for stone homes in natural rock formations, some of them really comfortable with several “rooms”, “windows” and “balconies”. The town has two water springs unlike the ancient citizens of a neighbouring cave town, Eski-Kermen, who had to walk down steps into a scary 40-meter deep well to get water. One cave even served as premises for a monastery.

## WHERE TO STAY

The caves of the medieval fortress town were seldom used as homes. They largely served as refrigerators and storerooms, workshops or prisons (some suggest they were used as churches). People lived in houses built above ground. These did not survive, unlike the undergrounds caves.

Just like any area suitable for life (close to natural springs and crags – perfect protection against enemies, a mild climate and proximity to key trade routes since the

times of ancient Greece), this land was extremely popular with the representatives of various cultures that settled nearby as early as in the 3<sup>rd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> century until the present. Today, the surrounding ravines are filled with the remnants of the burial catacombs of Gothic tribes. Having established their first settlement, they built the first fortifications in the late 5<sup>th</sup> century, while the town was called Doros, and had the status of the Crimean Goths’ capital. In the 6<sup>th</sup> century, a monumental basilica was built on the plateau and Doros became the centre of the Goths’ diocese in Crimea.

In the late 7<sup>th</sup> century, the Khazar Kaganate took over the city, where its garrison was temporarily located. The occupation of Doros fueled a revolt against Khazars led by St. John of the Goths.

The next and probably best-known transformation of Mangup was into the city of Theodoro, the capital of the principality formed during the latter phase of the Byzantine Empire. As South-Western Crimea was under the control of the city from the 8<sup>th</sup> till the 15<sup>th</sup> century, crafts

flourished and monasteries and churches were built.

The Ottoman army tore apart the “golden age” of the even-tempered Byzantine Empire with their swords and fire in 1475. They completely rebuilt the fortification and called it Mangup Kale, a name that has remained until the present. By the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Mangup became the capital of kadylyk, the smallest administrative and territorial unit of the Ottoman Empire. In 1774, the Turks left the fortress. The city gradually fell into decay and its last residents, a Karaites community, moved out, leaving an old cemetery with their typical tombstones and inscriptions.

## THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS

Despite its official status as a reservation and the ban on pitching tents or lighting fires on the territory, Mangup Kale has become one of the most popular destinations for “free wanderers” and “flower children”. Those who stay here for months, or even years, are often called “the natives”. A baby was even born to one such cave family. Many traditionally celebrate the New Year or watch eclipses at





Mangup Kale. The territory is believed to be a place of energy and power. Regardless of the legends, even fit people sometimes find it more difficult to manage the measly 300 meters above the sea level than climb to the summit of Hoverla, the highest peak in Ukraine. They say that this is how Mangup tests people and cleans them of their urban dust. Even the local Crimeans who don't really believe in the supernatural, warn people that they should be particularly careful in Mangup. This land does not tolerate physical or spiritual low-down behaviour, which is why it stays surprisingly clean, at least compared to the lowlands, which tourists have turned into a dump.

Acoustic Cave owes its name to the fantastic sound it generates. People come here with guitars, violins, flutes and Tibetan singing bowls to sing mantras or listen to the unique silence. The cave walls are adorned with Rastafarian decorations (photo 1), which arouse the indignation of archeologists as the layers of paint cover up the remaining fragments of medieval markings on the walls. A cave known as the Holy Thumb is

on the very edge of one of the four Mangup "palaces" (photo 3). It offers breathtaking views. The temperature in the caves barely changes, regardless of the season. For this reason, it is possible to live in them comfortably, even in winter, providing that the drafts have been taken care of.

Two springs, one male and one female, provide pure water for both locals and visitors, reminding everyone of the medieval monas-

teries that used to stand there. The water in one spring contains silver, giving it healing properties. The other, by the nature of its form, makes a perfect natural shower.

### A PASS INTO WONDERLAND

Mangup has long since formed its own infrastructure, mythology and lifestyle. "Make sure you visit Borys Ivanovych!" experienced Mangul travelers tell their friends before a trip to Crimea. Any local or Mangup "native" can show you the house of the man who sells fantastic wine. An amateur archeologist and collector of ancient artifacts and wines, Borys often gives grand presentations of his collections. A short lecture on the history of wine-drinking and different bouquets is followed by the tasting of wines from his collection. He is a generous and friendly host, so tourists can't help buying a few bottles of the fragrant drink, or souvenirs, such as a replica of a Scythian arrow, etc.

The residents of the lowlands at the foot of Mangup Kale are a surprising combination of classical resort greed and unprecedented generosity: while waiters in one ▶

### MANGUP LEGENDS

The story they tell around the fire at nights is about a Mangup Boy, the last heir to the Principality of Theodoro crown. According to one story, the boy was ugly, so he became a laughingstock for the town and people pushed him off the cliff. Another story suggests that the loyal son of his country, the boy rejected an offer to take a high position from the Turks who conquered Theodoro and jumped off the cliff himself, even though historical data proves that the prince actually accepted the offer and made a successful career. Ever since, everyone who gets lost in the mountains or the woods around the old town or is in danger over the local cliffs meets the Mangup Boy. He has thin pale face and long arms after hanging on to the cliff for as long as he managed to. Some say that the Boy lures people to an abyss and others say he rescues people and guides them out of the mist. Perhaps, he does both based on whom he likes or doesn't like. The fact is that a lot of people disappeared in Mangup, though nobody knows whether that was the legendary prince or some psychedelic herbs.



overpriced café can be outrageously rude, the owners of the one next door, Crimean Tartars, give generous portions at a ridiculously low price, offer you a plate of sweets to go with your tea free of charge, have a friendly chat with you and offer recommendations as to where you should go and what you should see, making you feel like a guest rather than a tourist.

Local forest rangers are also worth mentioning. On the one hand, the place is a reservation and tents are banned. On the other hand, they offer everyone tickets for a number of days and allow people to stay there as long as they want. The ticket actually means a certain amount paid to the ranger but no confirmation on paper is provided.

The place now has its own language. For example, the phrase “to go to the store” means to accidentally fall off the cliff. Unfortunately, such accidents are frequent here. Mangup soil has lavish amounts of “bells” – psychedelic plants, which many boil for better effect. In addition to bells, the plateau has a vast amount of healthy and healing herbs, hence the recent introduction of tours and workshops on medical herbs, where visitors learn the names and properties of each plant.

Unofficially, Mangup is divided into districts and sites. A village called Zakatnik is known for its beautiful sunsets. When the sun falls closer to the horizon, the view of the sea becomes particularly

**THE ANNUNCIATION MONASTERY**, once a secret place where a few chosen people could get, welcomes everyone not intimidated by the steep cliffs today

**KARAITE CEMETERY.**  
Karaites were the last residents of the plateau



clear. At the end of the day, people come around and sit silently on the cliffs watching the sunset.

It is amazing how the 90-hectare plateau has room for so many worlds that do not interfere with one another, including official tourist paths along the remnants of a grand citadel (**photo 2**) and Byzantine stone winery and the “reservation” territory of archeologists extracting mysteries from ancient layers of earth (a tourists could happen upon a scary pile of skulls neatly stacked by archeologists after days of excavations, when wandering there in the dark). Bushes conceal barely noticeable paths to the comfortable caves of the barefoot, long-haired “natives”. The trails on the southern slope take visitors to the Annunciation Monastery – needless to say, located in caves.

Mangup Kale is a wonderland on the reverse of a mirror and in another dimension. It can only be reached after overcoming obstacles and tests. There is no sense of time. At nights, the area vibrates with the sounds of gongs and singing bowls and the scents of herbal teas. Meanwhile, the ivy-covered tombstones, the walls that were once a fortification and the rocks keep silent on things known only to them. ☐



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