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## Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

After the organisation of the new Editorial Board and months of intense work, it is a pleasure to release the fourth issue of *Encuentro Latinoamericano: Journal of Political Science and International Relations*. This journal publishes in-depth studies on Latin American politics, bringing together students and academic from all over the continent and the world.

Therefore, and once again, we kindly thank all the external reviewers, based on various places in the world, voluntary contributed to a rigorous review process that is reflected in the academic fundamentals of the following articles.

We are also thankful for the large response to our ‘calling for papers’, from students all around the world. Particularly, thanks to the seven authors that presented a diverse, original and interesting contribution to the understanding of Latin American politics.

Vol. 3 No. 2 contains the following papers:

*“Tradiciones históricas en la formación del Estado ecuatoriano y sus incidencias en el fortalecimiento y modernización estatal del Presidente Correa”* by **Julio Enrique Paltán López (Ecuador)** explores through an historical analysis the current government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Identifying four historical moments that helped to constitute the state of Ecuador, which the author explains as a process of reconstruction and modernization of the state.

*“Migration from Central America and Mexico to the United States: How Does the Movement of People Affect the Labour Market of the Sending Countries?”* by **Ana Figueroa (El Salvador)**, analyses the effects on the labour market of low skilled and high skilled workers in the context of migration from Central America and Mexico to the US, studying two different moments of the migration process, when migrants leave their country of origin and when they establish in the new one.

*“Environmental Licensing in Brazil: Revisiting the Borders between State and Civil Society”* by **Ariadne de Oliveira Santiago (Brazil)** explains the relationship between state and society through the complex interactions between the state and social movements. She specially look at the institutional context in which the Brazilian National Institute for Environment Licensing take place.

*“Conceptualizing Autonomy in Latin American Foreign Policy: Case Study of Brazil under the PT government (2003-2016)”* by **Igor Stipić (Hungary)**, explores the meaning of autonomy in international relations theory, looking into the complexities that have for peripheral countries to insert in the

international sphere. For this, he specifically study the behaviour that Brazil adopted during 2003 and 2016 with the Workers Party government.

*“Racial democracy myth and the (non) support for race-targeted policies in Brazil: evidences from a survey list-experiment”* by **Nathália F. F. Porto and Robert Vidigal (Brazil)**, discusses the concept of racial democracy myth in Brazil, analysing collage student’s perspectives and their attitude toward racial and social quotas in the University of Brasilia and the Federal University of Minas Gerais.

Finally, *“From intersectionality to the feminist movement: an attempt at conceptualizing feminism as social movement”* by **Valéria Calvi Amaral Silva (Brazil)**, examines the theoretical discussion on feminism and intersectionality. For this, she researches different feminist organisations in Brazil, in order to understand the feminist movement as a social movement.

We are confident the effort of the Board and the authors will meet your expectations, and we hope to count on your contributions in our 2017 volume.

**The Editorial Board**

# Original Articles

# Tradiciones históricas en la formación del Estado ecuatoriano y sus incidencias en el fortalecimiento y modernización estatal del Presidente Correa

*“Todos los cambios, aun los más radicales, siguen grandes líneas de continuidad histórica”*

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## Resumen

*Buscando aportar a los estudios de historia comparada y enriquecer a los análisis políticos hechos a la luz de la historia, este estudio se pregunta cuáles son las cuatro tradiciones presentes en la historia política del Ecuador que con mayor notoriedad han incidido y confluyen en el actual proceso de fortalecimiento del Estado emprendido por el actual presidente ecuatoriano Rafael Correa. Estas cuatro tradiciones constituyen parte de importantes momentos constitutivos del Estado ecuatoriano y son: la modernización católica centralista autoritaria, la liberal del ex presidente Eloy Alfaro, la tradición nacional-popular caudillista y el desarrollismo estatista anti oligárquico. Aplicando el enfoque institucionalista histórico se recopila las características y hechos de esas tradiciones y se analiza como la mayoría de ellas inciden en la reconstitución y modernización del Estado emprendida por el presidente del Ecuador Correa.*

## Abstract

*This article aims to contribute to studies of comparative history, and enrich political analysis by applying a historical perspective. It asks what are the traditions present in the political history of Ecuador that have most significantly influenced the current process of strengthening of the State undertaken by the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. The four traditions highlighted in the article are part of important constitutive moments of Ecuadorian State: authoritarian centralist Catholic modernization, liberal former President Eloy Alfaro, the national-popular caudillo tradition and the anti-oligarchic statist developmentalism. Applying historical institutionalism the features and acts of these traditions are identified. The analysis subsequently shows how most of them affect the reconstruction and State modernization undertaken by the President of Ecuador Correa.*

**Keywords:** development, state, history, institutions, modernization, reformism, tradition

## Introducción

El presente artículo es un estudio de institucionalismo histórico aplicado a la historia política ecuatoriana. Constituye un esfuerzo por entender el presente político en función de los legados y herencias de la historia, es decir no sólo en el sentido de analizar causas y consecuencias en los hechos y procesos políticos, sino más que nada en función de elaborar dos esfuerzos intelectuales que aquí asumimos: por una parte saber cómo ciertos hitos, formas de ejercicio de la política así como ciertas políticas y sus características pueden ser aglutinadas en tipologías de regímenes políticos y por otra en el hecho de saber cómo estas tipologías de gobierno marcan un peso y una determinación a modo de dependencia de sendero o *path dependence* en el quehacer político de un gobierno, es decir lo que sucede hoy es fruto de lo que sucedió en el pasado (Lozada y Casas, 2008).

¿Cuáles son las tradiciones legadas de gobiernos ecuatorianos del pasado así como sus hitos al influenciar a gobiernos del presente como el de Correa? Esta pregunta aquí planteada la empleamos para analizar el peso y legado de la historia política ecuatoriana al confluir en el gobierno del presidente Rafael Correa desde el institucionalismo histórico.

Es relevante este tipo de ejercicio académico por cuanto es necesario fortalecer los análisis históricos comparados en la ciencia política ecuatoriana, superando así la mera narración histórica de los gobiernos y el análisis coyuntural y puntual de un gobierno o presidente ecuatoriano en específico y además porque ayuda a alimentar con un caso latinoamericano y andino a los estudios hechos por el enfoque institucionalista -histórico. Ayuda a mirar analíticamente al gobierno de Correa en función de los gobiernos anteriores.

## Revisión Literaria. Las tradiciones político-ideológicas en la discontinua formación del Estado ecuatoriano

Académicamente para abordar el análisis desde la sociología histórica de América Latina se suele agrupar a gobiernos o a procesos políticos de similares tendencias en tipologías o en conjuntos afines en lo que respecta a perfiles de actor político relevante, a instituciones, a valores, modos de hacer y entender la política, a las políticas públicas o a ideologías. Y que todas ellas se plasman de forma articulada en momentos determinados de la historia, marcando hitos y puntos clave en el proceso histórico de un país. Un país puede presentar uno o varios tipos de tradiciones político-ideológicas relevantes en su historia. Este abordaje metodológico ha sido empleada por el historiador Alan Knight para para aglutinar a diferentes tipos de revoluciones y procesos políticos que según el desafían y han desbaratado al esquema y a la tradición liberal en Latinoamérica. Según



él estas vías son la tradición social- democrata, la reacción-autoritaria, la populista revolucionaria, el estatismo-popular y la revolución socialista (Knight, 2005).

Empleando este mismo esquema analítico podemos hacer similar abordaje clasificatorio con la historia política ecuatoriana, que así mismo presentan tradiciones y tipos de gobiernos en su historia y que tienden a asemejarse –aunque no son estrictamente las mismas- a las empleadas por Knight para el continente. Aunque la tradición liberal democrática problematizada por Knight, ha sido asumida como tal por los estudiosos ecuatorianos y estudiada en sus avatares en los periodos dados entre 1948-1960 y entre 1979 a 2006. En estos aportes sobresalen especialistas ecuatorianos como Pachano (Pachano, 2007), de la Torre, (de la Torre Carlos, 2006) y Moncayo (Moncayo, 2010) por mencionar algunos. Estos estudios coinciden en señalar la corta y problemática existencia de la tradición liberal-democrática, amenazada por su debilidad y por las otras tradiciones, haciendo de la historia política ecuatoriana una inestable lucha entre estas tradiciones.

Así para el caso del proceso histórico de formación del Estado ecuatoriano sostenemos que son cuatro las tradiciones político-ideológicas, tendiendo a converger todas ellas en términos institucionales en el gobierno del presidente Correa y su fuerte reestructuración estatal.

En esta sección veremos al estado del arte general en cuanto se refiere a la formación del Estado ecuatoriano en su historia.

La académica Patricia de la Torre ha sido una de las primeras estudiosas ecuatorianas en observar el proceso discontinuo de construcción histórica del Estado ecuatoriano que se da tras constantes y anómicos ciclos de crisis política que se caracterizan por variables como el predominio de lo local sobre lo nacional y de lo privado sobre lo público, incidencia de la prensa como actor político, crisis económicas e indefinición de límites externos e internos del Estado. Estas crisis presentes en la historia ecuatoriana revelarían los problemas y la falta de constitución del Estado en Ecuador (De la Torre Patricia, 2013).

Ella identifica a cinco presidentes como constructores de Estado ecuatoriano: García Moreno, Eloy Alfaro, Isidro Ayora, Rodríguez Lara y Rafael Correa, los cuales forjan el Estado al emerger de forma autoritaria luego de los mencionados ciclos de constantes y graves crisis políticas. Estos líderes carismáticos- firmes recomponen el Estado al posicionar lo público sobre lo privado y lo central sobre lo local y emplean como herramienta clave a nuevas constituciones para solucionar la crisis. Para la investigadora sus diferencias ideológicas quedan en segundo orden, pues lo fundamental es que construyen el Estado, independientemente del ropaje ideológico que posean: nacionalismo, liberalismo, conservadurismo, etc. (De la Torre Patricia, 2013).

Otro de los académicos ecuatorianos que abordó el tema de configuración del Estado central ecuatoriano y la formación nacional en su problemática articulación con lo local fue Juan Maiguashca, quien sostiene que la construcción de la integración nacional ecuatoriana ha sido obra del propio Estado, el cual sometió a corporaciones como la Iglesia, el ejército y los poderes locales configurados como municipios. Este rol del Estado para la posterior consolidación de la nación obedecía a que en Hispanoamérica la formación de naciones apenas empezaba junto a unas relaciones capitalistas inmaduras, por lo que en Ecuador los agentes históricos más que clases sociales eran fuerzas locales y regionales de dominación (Maiguashca, 1994).

Maiguashca define al Estado en dos dimensiones: una dimensión como aparato burocrático para la dominación y otra como expresión política de un sistema de dominación social. Según este académico el Estado ecuatoriano hizo presencia en el siglo XIX primero como institución burocrática. A su vez la integración nacional se la concibe en una dimensión material e ideal. Dada la pobreza del erario y el subdesarrollo económico de Ecuador en el siglo XIX el Estado hizo poco en la dimensión material de la integración nacional, pero hizo mucho en la dimensión ideológico-jurídica (Maiguashca, 1994).

Así los conflictos para la formación nacional estuvieron dados en el eje territorial sobre fuerzas locales de dominación dadas en: Cuenca, Guayaquil y Quito, las cuales chocaban una y otra vez contra el cuerpo de funcionarios e instituciones que formaban al aparato burocrático del Estado central ecuatoriano y que se expresaban por medio de elites políticas nacionales (Maiguashca, 1994).

Según el historiador Ayala Mora al inicio de la vida republicana en 1830 el Estado ecuatoriano era un ente precario. Hasta la crisis de 1859 el Estado central llegó a ser más débil que los municipios y con una burocracia escasa, sin especialización, dedicados más actividades privadas y conformado por militares y por la jerarquía eclesiástica como miembros privilegiados de la burocracia. Pero para fines del siglo XIX el Ecuador se había ido consolidando como un Estado central, con división de los tres poderes, ejército, municipios, centralizando rentas e ingresos fiscales, empezando a diferenciar lo público de lo privado, robusteciendo la burocracia, con políticas sociales educativas, aunque en lo financiero muy dependiente de préstamos bancarios (Ayala Mora, 2011).

Por otra parte, tras una revisión de la historia de los debates y de la polémica intelectual ecuatoriana en torno a la formación del Estado nacional y la cuestión regional, Mónica Mancero afirma que la resolución de la compleja articulación local-nacional y el carácter del Estado nacional sería uno de los temas que más controversia suscitó entre intelectuales a lo largo de la historia del Ecuador y se decantarían de acuerdo al tipo de poder vigente en cada momento. Entre esos

intelectuales y escritores sobresalen Benigno Malo, Remigio Crespo Toral, Aguirre Abad, Jacinto Jijón y Caamaño, Espinoza Tamayo, Pio Jaramillo, entre otros (Mancero, 2013).

### **Marco teórico: Institucionalismo histórico en la formación estatal**

El institucionalismo histórico es una corriente de la teoría política que enfatiza en las trayectorias nacionales del Estado, a sus instituciones y a las políticas públicas desde una mirada evolutiva y como consecuencia de dependencias históricas que acarrear legados. Así el pasado influencia al desarrollo histórico de las instituciones y también condiciona a las fuerzas sociales junto a sus intereses, identidades y a las opciones políticas. El institucionalismo histórico define a las instituciones como procedimientos formales, normas, rutinas y convenios insertos en la estructura organizacional de la política, de la economía política, de las constituciones o de los hábitos burocráticos, dependientes siempre de legados históricos (Hall & Taylor, 1996). El análisis de la formación del Estado es objeto propio de análisis del institucionalismo histórico y de sus supuestos así como el análisis de las tendencias constantes a lo largo de la vida de los países y que determinan su vida política (Losada y Casas, 2008).

Este marco teórico seleccionado presta una natural y obvia capacidad de adaptación y de conexión con la materia objeto de este trabajo que consiste en ver las etapas claves en la formación histórica del Estado ecuatoriano como asociación de dominio burocrático.

Entendemos al Estado usando la definición del politólogo O'Donnell quien –retomando a Max Weber- asegura que la construcción del Estado es un proceso histórico diferente en cada país y que como tal es un proceso que busca la centralización o monopolización del poder político en un territorio determinado. Ello conlleva concentrar a la administración y a la legislación en esa asociación de dominio para que sea aplicada en todo su territorio y para que sea acatada por todos los grupos sociales que la componen; también implica el diseño y despliegue de aparatos burocráticos jerárquicamente atados al poder central para que apliquen las disposiciones de este poder bajo el precepto de la ley (O'Donnell, 2004). Para O'Donnell el Estado se compone de tres dimensiones: como un conjunto de burocracias, un sistema legal y un ente de identidad colectiva para los habitantes (O'Donnell, 2004).

### **Conceptualización**

Para este trabajo enfatizaremos en la primera de las dimensiones de O'Donnell aplicada a entender como esta se plasma en varias tradiciones político-ideológicas en la evolución y discontinua construcción del Estado ecuatoriano. Esto es: la arista burocrática. Pues por medio

de la configuración burocrática se puede ver las orientaciones, sentidos y sensibilidades de cada tradición política, así como los diseños estatales elaborados por cada tradición política.

Pero en complemento también miraremos a los elementos ideológicos, procedimientos, rutinas políticas formales, las constituciones y formas de liderazgo de esas tradiciones, así como sus políticas que marcaron referencialidades en la historia política ecuatoriana. Tal como lo señala el institucionalismo histórico (Hall & Taylor, 1996), estos elementos son los factores causales que marcarán los hitos en cada trayectoria histórica y son los impactan en el gobierno de Correa y en su particular énfasis en fortalecer el aparato estatal. Por medio de ellos se puede mirar analíticamente la trayectoria nacional del Estado ecuatoriano y sus instituciones de forma evolutiva y convergente.

Las tradiciones políticas que han incidido en la construcción evolutiva del Estado ecuatoriano bajo un enfoque dependiente, serán clasificadas en cuatro de acuerdo a nuestro planteamiento: autoritaria-conservadora, liberal-alfarista, nacional-popular caudillista y reformismo desarrollista-estatista. En ellas se presentará las características esenciales de cada una de ellas –en las políticas, en lo ideológico, en lo burocrático, prácticas, procedimientos, sentidos de entender la política y en sus objetivos-y se revisará a los gobiernos que los dieron sustento a lo largo de la vida política ecuatoriana, marcando secuelas, legados y determinaciones que abonaron a configurar la dependencia del sendero al Estado ecuatoriano; es decir siendo metodológicamente consecuentes con el institucionalismo histórico. Es así como se articula conceptualmente lo que por un lado hemos presentado como tradiciones políticas con el institucionalismo histórico y su manera peculiar de concebir los hechos políticos a la luz del pasado por el otro, ayudando a enriquecer a la segunda.

## **Metodología**

Este estudio se basa en la recopilación de características esenciales y sobresalientes de las tradiciones políticas y de los gobiernos ecuatorianos que las conformaron a lo largo de su historia republicana por medio del uso de fuentes de información secundaria y estudios hechos por historiadores y especialistas de las ciencias sociales en dichos gobiernos. Este tipo de información hace alusión a aspectos tales como el estilo de liderazgo, la orientación de sus agendas, sus instituciones, su inclinación democrática, sus políticas, sus procedimientos, sus objetivos, ideologías y principios y su visión acerca del Estado o la religión.

Para mirar la incidencia de las cuatro tradiciones políticas y su confluencia en el gobierno de Correa, presentaremos a esas cuatro tradiciones políticas, luego exhibiremos una descripción analítica de las características sobresalientes del gobierno de Correa y finalmente haremos una

comparación y un contraste analítico entre las características de esas cuatro tradiciones históricas con las características sobresalientes del gobierno de Rafael Correa (sobre todo en lo que respecta al fortalecimiento del Estado), destacando los aspectos tanto presentes como ausentes de esas tradiciones.

A través de la cantidad de aspectos históricos como las características, configuraciones burocráticas, orientaciones, políticas o modos de ejercer la política que coincidan y confluyan con las del gobierno de Correa, comprobaremos si la afirmación planteada en este trabajo es cierta. Demostrando así nuestro planteamiento acerca de cómo Correa es la síntesis y convergencia de varias tradiciones políticas presentes con fuerza en la historia de los gobiernos del Ecuador y dando respuesta a la pregunta planteada acerca del cómo pesan las trayectorias pasadas -tradiciones- del Ecuador en el régimen del presidente Correa.

### **Datos. Influencias institucionales de las cuatro tradiciones históricas en el retorno estatal de la *Revolución ciudadana* del presidente Correa.**

Con estos antecedentes y tras una revisión de la literatura histórica (información secundaria) sostenemos que las tradiciones políticas más importantes presentes en la historia ecuatoriana para configurar su Estado y dejar secuelas en la vida política ecuatoriana han sido las siguientes:

#### ***La tradición de modernización autoritaria conservadora***

Se ha tendido a poner en dimensiones dicotómicas la modernización social con la dominación eclesiástica-católica. Pero ambos proyectos sociales convergieron en el firme liderazgo disciplinario del ex presidente García Moreno quien lo hizo posible en el siglo XIX. De hecho, la combinación de modernización y conservadurismo católico ha sorprendido y ha sido motivo de polémica. Los conservadores europeos admirarían su gestión al combinar catolicismo y modernidad. La figura de García Moreno sería tratada con mucha polémica y hasta desdén en la memoria ecuatoriana. Su figura además se asemejaría al líder conservador chileno Diego Portales (Henderson, 2010).

García Moreno gobernó Ecuador con firmeza y *mano dura* entre 1861-1865 y entre 1869-1875. A su figura se la considera como un forjador de la nación ecuatoriana. Su presidencia primera emergió luego de una grave guerra civil entre las regiones de Ecuador fruto del fracaso del modelo federal de Estado vigente antes de su gestión, de allí su fuerte convicción de crear un Estado central fuerte que someta a los poderes locales bajo un sentido de orden y disciplina. Para tal tarea García Moreno buscó forjar una nación moderna, desarrollada y cohesionada. Cohesión que vendría de

la mano tutelar del presidente al forjar una identidad católica al pueblo ecuatoriano, para lo cual la Iglesia Católica jugaba un rol destacado (Henderson, 2010).

Su proyecto de centralización estatal, modernización y predominio del poder Ejecutivo se la plasmó en la Constitución de 1869 conocida como *Carta Negra* donde tanto la legislatura como la milicia quedaron sometidas al poder presidencial. (Henderson, 2010) La gestión de García Moreno impulsó la educación con la incorporación de científicos europeos y la modernización con ingenieros estadounidenses. Había que terminar con la fragmentación y el aislamiento de regiones y localidades del Ecuador, para lo cual se empezó con la construcción de redes de telégrafos y caminos, así como el inicio del ferrocarril.

En la modernización del Estado sería el primer presidente ecuatoriano en forjar el servicio civil y la profesionalización burocrática, buscando una gestión gubernamental eficaz y honesta; empezó con la institucionalización y obediencia del ejército al poder civil y con el seguimiento constante del presidente a los asuntos públicos de todo el país (Henderson, 2010).

García Moreno impulsó la creación de símbolos para crear un sentido de unificación nacional como la elaboración del himno nacional y en su afán de unificación católica autorizó la creación de una basílica que represente la consagración católica del Ecuador al Corazón de Jesús, anhelo que se cumpliría en los años 80 del siglo XX.

García Moreno políticamente se alió y se sostuvo con las clases terratenientes de la sierra sur (Azuay), de la sierra norte (Quito), los hacendados exportadores de su natal Guayaquil, con la Iglesia Católica y las órdenes religiosas nacionales y extranjeras. Operaba y se sostenía políticamente en una red de amigos cercanos y familiares, aplastó revueltas de manera sanguinaria y perseguiría terriblemente a sus oponentes políticos al igual que muchos caudillos latinoamericanos del siglo XIX. Fue un presidente odiado y calificado de tirano, por lo que murió en 1875 asesinado en Quito (Henderson, 2010).

### ***La tradición liberal alfarista***

Esta tradición tiene su pilar en la gestión liberal del ex presidente Eloy Alfaro quien gobernó Ecuador entre 1895-1901 y 1906-1911. En la historia, a su lucha guerrillera previa y su gestión presidencial se las conoce como la Revolución Liberal.

La Revolución Liberal significó para Ecuador una modernización de su esfera pública al posicionar un Estado separarlo de la Iglesia, haciendo que sea el poder estatal el que asumiera tareas anteriormente conferidas a la Iglesia como la salud, la educación y el registro demográfico de la población. La mujer se incorporó a la esfera pública. El Estado por vez primera desplegó políticas universales y laicas. Además, profesionalizó al ejército con la creación de la Escuela Militar

Eloy Alfaro, cuyos oficiales protagonizarían poco tiempo después golpes de Estado reformistas anti oligárquicos. (Ayala Mora, 2011) El proyecto de la Revolución liberal se plasmó en la Constitución de 1906.

En el campo de la modernización económica el alfarismo significó la integración de las regiones sierra y costa con transportes como el ferrocarril y en el económico siguió un esquema de protección de la entonces escasa industria local, impulsó al mercado interno y el desarrollo económico (Sánchez, 2011).

Alfaro tuvo una lucha dura contra la prensa (de la Torre Patricia, 2013) y al tratar de mediar los conflictos políticos de la época luego de sus administraciones, terminó siendo apresado y asesinado en 1912 por el pueblo de Quito el cual fue instigado por la prensa y el clero resentido con las reformas del laicismo.

### ***La tradición nacional-popular caudillista***

La historia política del Ecuador está repleta de caudillos civiles o militares y de sus pugnas personales y luchas por el poder. En el siglo XIX sobresalieron muchos de ellos. Los forjadores del Estado nacional ecuatoriano y de sus periodos de modernización fueron caudillos, ese es el caso del propio García Moreno y de Eloy Alfaro que revisamos. El caudillo es el hombre fuerte y luchador que subordina la política a su persona y donde su criterio y figura valen más que los principios e instituciones. El caudillismo es una herencia del cacicazgo de la hacienda tradicional y es garantía a la inestabilidad y a la anarquía, los cual se evitan con la persecución de los adversarios políticos del caudillo. (Hurtado, 1977) Este caudillo carismático no es conciliador sino radical e impone el regreso del orden, la superación del caos y pone fin a la crisis con una nueva constitución (De la Torre Patricia, 2013).

Pero desde los años 1930 y 1940 en el siglo XX en el contexto del crecimiento de las ciudades y de la crisis de la sociedad rural tradicional y con la incorporación del voto a amplias masas de población antes excluidas de la política, configuraron las condiciones para la emergencia del más importante caudillo político del siglo XX: José María Velasco Ibarra, quien llevó la política a las calles y plazas en lugar de los salones y clubs de las elites como había sido anteriormente. Su retórica se dirigía a los marginados y excluidos: la *chusma*, por lo que era querido y apoyado por las masas populares ansiosas de redención y dolidas de su pobreza angustiante (Hurtado, 1977 y De la Torre Carlos, 2015).

El Velasquismo imprimió una profunda huella en la forma de hacer política en el Ecuador y ha dejado algunas constantes en la vida política ecuatoriana como el forjar líderes personalistas que por fuera de los partidos políticos irrumpen y se presentan como mesías y argumentan ser

defensores del pueblo excluido y maltratado por las elites a las que se les asocia como enemigos morales del país. Estos liderazgos irrumpen luego de la crisis dejada por sistemas políticos que colapsaron, ciclos de inestabilidad política o económica y de insurrecciones callejeras. Y son liderazgos que no se han institucionalizado partidos políticos que canalicen su gestión por el peso dado en la figura personal del líder y de sus cambios temperamentales. (De la Torre Carlos, 2015) Por ello y a diferencia de las otras tradiciones abordadas en este trabajo, el Velasquismo fue una fuerza que no construyó institucionalidad estatal ni el sentido legal ni el burocrático, pese a que dejó huella en el modo de hacer política en Ecuador.

El Velasquismo fue una amalgama de ideologías aglutinando a conceptos y figuras políticas tanto del conservadorismo católico, del liberalismo o del socialismo. Su conducción política fue personalista, atropellada y sin acuerdos claros con partidos políticos o instituciones, lo que juntos siempre perjudicarían a su estabilidad y permanencia y además nunca se plasmó en un partido político. Velasco Ibarra fue cinco veces electo presidente, de las que sólo terminó su periodo una vez (1952-1956) y solía proclamarse dictador. Siempre tuvo confrontación e irrespeto con el orden legal y constitucional aun cuando su segundo gobierno se acompañó con la Constitución de 1944 que fue irrespetada por el propio Velasco- y el cual miraba los problemas de país desde un enfoque moralista-religioso (Cueva, 1973).

Velasco Ibarra emprendió obras en educación, vivienda, dispensarios médicos y vialidad que ayudaron a mejorar las condiciones de pobreza y miseria de las masas del subproletariado marginado. En torno a su figura se juntó a ciertos sectores de clase media, de la pequeña burguesía y del subproletariado poco interesado en cambios estructurales pero ansiosos de huir de la dominación oligárquica y además apoyado por la gran burguesía de la región costa ecuatoriana. De allí que su figura concentró de forma no institucionalizada y muy atropellada a buena parte de las clases sociales del Ecuador (Cueva, 1973).

### ***La tradición desarrollista-estatista del reformismo militar***

Esta tradición tuvo varios momentos de expresión en el transcurso del siglo XX ecuatoriano. La primera de ellas fue en la denominada *Revolución Juliana* dada 1925-1931, que se sintetizó en un gobierno encabezado por el médico Isidro Ayora quien promulgó la constitución de 1929, la otra fue con la Junta Militar 1963-1966 y la última y más significativa se dio entre 1972-1976 con el gobierno *Nacionalista Revolucionario* del general Rodríguez Lara. Las tres irrumpieron mediante golpes de Estado y se produjeron en momentos críticos donde el poder civil y sus pugnas no prometían estabilidad ni representatividad social. Así los militares se erigieron en árbitros y suplentes de la sociedad y a sus débiles capacidades de representación ante el Estado, forzando a



modernizar a la sociedad y a sus modos de organización y representación (García, 1991). Fueron liderados por generales del Ejército o tenientes con visión reformista, anti oligárquica e ideología nacionalista (Hurtado, 1977).

Los regímenes militares adoptaron agendas de reformas modernizadores donde siempre se buscó la autonomía y el fortalecimiento de las capacidades del Estado central y su complejo sistema técnico-burocrático (García, 1991). En estos regímenes modernizadores se dieron políticas como la protección y fomento la industrialización nacional, creación de aparatos burocráticos, reformas sociales, expansión de servicios básicos, derechos laborales, la nacionalización de sectores importantes de la economía, reformas agrarias y la adopción del Estado de facultades planificadoras y regulatorias para el desarrollo económico. Todos entraron en pugna con la oligarquía tradicional conformada por la alianza de banqueros, comerciantes importadores y agro exportadores, sobre todo guayaquileños (Hurtado, 1977).

El más significativo de estos regímenes modernizadores fue el de los años 1970, que, con el inicio de las exportaciones petroleras gubernamentales, hace que el Estado goce de autonomía económica. El régimen militar de entonces fue de un tipo latinoamericano de autoritarismo modernizante que tuvo represión moderada, impulsó a las clases medias, desató el crecimiento económico, la urbanización y gestó un nuevo empresariado industrial beneficiado por sus políticas (O'Donnell, 1997) (Mills, 1984). Knight si bien menciona a los gobiernos pretorianos de orientación nacionalista como los de los generales Rodríguez Lara en Ecuador y el Velasco Alvarado en Perú, este historiador es cuidadoso de asemejarlos al resto de sus pares latinoamericanos quienes son claramente reaccionarios-autoritarios (Knight, 2005).

En todos los casos los militares reformistas contaron con el apoyo de civiles tecnócratas y profesionales que los ayudaron en la planificación, en asumir la gestión política (Hurtado, 1977) o en facilitar el traspaso del poder a los civiles, diseñando instituciones democráticas (García, 1991).

### ***Modernización estatal del presidente Correa***

Luego de una década de inestabilidad política (1995-2005), desarticulación social y crisis económica-financiera (que implicó la adopción del dólar como moneda) Rafael Correa llega a la presidencia tras ganar la segunda vuelta en 2006 con 57% de los votos. Así triunfa la denominada *Revolución Ciudadana* liderada por el carismático presidente Rafael Correa y su nuevo movimiento de izquierda Alianza País. Correa emergió con un fuerte mensaje en contra de las elites político-económicas de Ecuador a quienes se les acusaba moralmente como causantes de los problemas políticos y económicos del país (Conaghan, 2011). Correa y Alianza País ganarán más elecciones (reelección en 2009 y 2013) y plebiscitos como el de aprobación de la nueva Constitución en 2008

que fue oferta de campana en 2006 (hito simbólico refundacional del Ecuador) y la de 2011 para reformar e intervenir en el poder judicial. El ascenso de Correa se produce luego de la crisis, colapso y desaparición de los partidos políticos tradicionales vigentes desde el fin de los gobiernos militares en 1979 y de la crisis de los movimientos sociales.

Pero la recurrencia a elecciones frecuentes ha hecho que académicos como Levitsky y Roberts lo señalen como un esquema de gobernanza plebiscitaria de izquierda populista en la que presidentes latinoamericanos como Correa apelan directamente a las mayorías para poder impulsar cambios radicales en los campos político y económico tras épocas de crisis en las que las viejas políticas y regímenes existentes fueron impugnados (Levitsky y Roberts, 2011).

Con estos antecedentes Correa ha impulsado un proyecto nacionalista modernizador que en lo económico obedece a un modelo tecnocrático keynesiano-neodesarrollista centrado en el rol activo Estado. Ideológicamente ha sido inspirado en el humanismo católico y la doctrina social de la Iglesia. Ha sido financiado en un esquema neo extractivista, en los altos ingresos tanto tributarios como petroleros (record desde 2005-2014) y en una alta deuda con China que llegó a los 10.000 millones de dólares entre 2007 a febrero de 2014 (Garzón, 2014). Ha sido liderado políticamente por un caudillismo mesiánico-autoritario en el que el poder Ejecutivo controla a los otros poderes del Estado (Hurtado, 2012). Y ha sido legitimado ideológicamente en el carisma presidencial, el cual ha posicionado mediáticamente sobre referencialidades duales la idea de encabezar un proyecto mesiánico que ha redimido al Ecuador de su turbulento pasado y de sus corruptas élites político-económicas tradicionales, imprimiendo así una nueva era según el discurso y propaganda oficial y donde sobresale la confrontación con la prensa. Estilo señalado como populista según algunos académicos como de la Torre (de la Torre, 2015). Pero este liderazgo le ha dado al país un sentido de autoestima que se ha visto reflejado en los altos índices de aprobación e imagen que ha contado el presidente Correa.

Para impulsar su plan de modernización, el gobierno cuenta como instrumento clave su nueva Constitución de 2008 que a la par que reforzaba y ampliaba derechos ciudadanos, instaura un hiperpresidencialismo, pues el presidente Correa sería la figura que protagonizaría y lideraría el proyecto de la *Revolución Ciudadana*.

Han sido muchos los avances del gobierno en los campos de lo social, educativo, económico, infraestructura-pública, (canales de riego, puertos, aeropuertos, poliductos, carreteras, hidroeléctricas, etc.) ciudades del conocimiento y tecnología, derechos de trabajadores, vivienda popular, caída de la pobreza, atención a discapacidades, mejora de servicios públicos, impulso a la producción nacional, informatización y simplificación de trámites y creación de bases de datos digitales públicos. En 2010 la inversión pública total creció un 110% frente a los tres gobiernos

anteriores (SENPLADES), en 2014 la inversión gubernamental como porcentaje del PIB llegó al 11% (SENPLADES, 2015, 48) y entre 2007 al 2014 la inversión pública aumentó de 2.269 a 7.581 millones de dólares en: talento humano, política económica, producción, desarrollo social, universidades, sectores estratégicos y otros (Chakana, 2015, 6-7).

La pérdida de incidencia de poderosos grupos económicos o sindicales en las decisiones gubernamentales y en instituciones oficiales ha hecho que el Estado tenga mucho margen de maniobra y goce de autonomía institucional y financiera, evitando la discrecionalidad con la que operaban estos grupos de poder facticos. Aunque ello supuso una confrontación con los gremios y organizaciones populares de izquierda (Ramírez, 2012) que habían apoyado al inicio a Correa como la Unión Nacional de Educadores UNE y movimientos indígenas como la Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Indígenas del Ecuador CONAIE. El objetivo era recuperar la independencia, fuerza y el carácter público del Estado central y dotarle a este de orientación universalista y soberana (Ramírez, 2012).

El protagonista de la actual modernización ecuatoriana ha sido el Estado, el cual ha crecido vigorosamente (en capacidades, recursos y tamaño) por sobre las esferas de la sociedad civil y el mercado pues ha contado de la voluntad firme modernizadora del líder y la claridad técnica-conceptual de sus altos funcionarios y tecnócratas. Ello ha hecho que se avance bastante en la modernización, unificación, centralización y racionalización de lo que era el caótico, débil y cooptado aparato institucional del Estado y en la mejora de los servicios públicos. (Peña, 2015)

Esta modernización del Estado ha sido ideada y conducida desde el gobierno por la Secretaria Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (SENPLADES) por medio de una sólida política de reforma del Estado que se ha plasmado en:

-El impulso desde el centro al proceso de descentralización de competencias a los gobiernos locales que ha sido conducido vertical, ordenada, obligatoria, disciplinada y técnicamente. (SENPLADES, 2009) Hay la obligación legal dada en el Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomías y Descentralización -COOTAD- de que los gobiernos locales promuevan la planificación bajo parámetros técnicos y guías dadas por la SENPLADES.

-En el rediseño de muchas agencias gubernamentales y su racionalización con miras a lograr su consistencia bajo una visión coherente y universal del aparato estatal y con una arquitectura institucional que no posea entidades con estatus excepcional y discrecional. (SENPLADES, 2009)

-Impulso a la planificación nacional como parte de una acción coherente que guie las intervenciones del Estado. (SENPLADES, 2009) El proyecto de modernización del gobierno se plasma en ambiciosos planes nacionales cuatrienales de desarrollo que atan la inversión pública y las políticas públicas conocido como el *Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir*. En ese sentido ha habido

una alta inversión pública pues entre 2006-2009 creció del 5% al 14% en relación al PIB (Conaghan, 2011).

-El Estado también ha avanzado bastante en la profesionalización y experticia técnica de sus áreas y capacidades, gracias a una nueva generación de jóvenes funcionarios públicos altamente formados (Peña, 2015).

-En la desconcentración de sus ministerios en todo el territorio nacional y la definición clara de roles y competencias de estos. Esta desconcentración para el poder Ejecutivo operará por medio de una división zonal, de circuitos y distritos del país (SENPLADES, 2009).

-En la gestión por resultados con la que buscan guiarse las políticas, inversión y la administración pública de forma técnica.

-En el aumento de los márgenes de acción del Estado con búsqueda de eficiencia y transparencia (SENPLADES, 2009).

Todos estos esfuerzos han dado frutos, pero carecen de vigilancia y de participación ciudadana como lo contempla buena parte de los artículos de la Constitución de 2008 y los propios *Planes Nacionales para el Buen Vivir*.

El gran esfuerzo de construir un Estado modernizador en el Ecuador de hoy ha sido conducido de forma firme y directa por el presidente Correa caudillistamente, junto a su camarilla de leales colaboradores, además de dirigentes políticos provenientes de viejos movimientos de izquierda, caciques locales, tecnócratas, intelectuales y hombres de derecha cercanos al empresariado; aglutinados todos ellos como facciones en el movimiento Alianza País. Pero una de las debilidades de Alianza País es que no ha podido constituirse como un partido de masas e institucionalizado precisamente porque depende en exceso del carismático presidente Rafael Correa quien mantiene cohesionado a una heterogénea composición de altos colaboradores y asambleístas.

Los altos funcionarios y políticos de Alianza País previenen de las provincias y regiones más importantes de Ecuador como Imbabura, Quito, Cuenca, Manabí y Guayaquil, dándole a este movimiento político y al gobierno un carácter nacional, pues antes de Correa los presidentes del Ecuador obedecían a los intereses de las elites locales de Guayaquil, Cuenca o Quito.

Además, el gobierno modernizador de Correa ha favorecido con políticas sociales a las masas populares quienes lo han apoyado. En cambio, por medio del crecimiento de aparato burocrático del Estado ayudó a la clase media y su consumismo y también ha tendió pactos y acuerdos con determinados estratos del empresariado nacional en un contexto de bonanza petrolera (principal producto de exportación de Ecuador y manejado por el Estado). Es una reedición del esquema de alianza de clases del clásico esquema nacional popular latinoamericano.

Este Estado de alta centralización burocrática que se ha edificado, ha logrado modernizarse, racionalizarse, “descorporativizarse” y unificar salarialmente al servicio civil. Pero aún tiene dificultades de hacer efectiva su presencia en todo territorio y desde allí ejercer las regulaciones, controles y aplicar las políticas, en el sentido de capacidad de aplicación de la ley por parte del Estado como lo concibe O’Donnell (2004) También a sus agencias gubernamentales le son difíciles coordinar entre ellas a nivel nacional y local y lograr totalidad eficiencia. Además, ha padecido de problemas como, la homogeneidad de su enfoque y el desconocimiento de las complejas dinámicas locales en un país de gran fragmentación y diversidad socio-demográfica, étnica y territorial como el Ecuador. Esta última limitante obedece a la gran distancia existente entre el proyecto de modernización y la compleja realidad social de Ecuador.

En la tabla que presentamos a continuación expresamos como las cuatro tradiciones de la historia política ecuatoriana confluyen y se expresan en el gobierno modernizador de Correa y en su fortalecimiento del Estado central. También se presenta elementos que diferenciarían a Correa de estas tradiciones, las cuales son pocas en relación a las que coinciden, demostrando como certera la afirmación sostenida en este trabajo: en el gobierno de Correa converge todo el legado histórico de la política ecuatoriana presentes en sus cuatro tradiciones políticas notables: modernización autoritaria-conservadora, liberalismo-alfarista, reformismo desarrollista y caudillismo nacional-popular.

<b>Tabla 1: Confluencia de las tradiciones histórico-políticas en el gobierno de Correa</b>		
<b>Elementos del gobierno de Correa</b>	Elementos incorporados de la tradición <i>modernización autoritaria conservadora</i>	Elementos no incorporados de la tradición <i>modernización autoritaria conservadora</i>
-Voluntad modernizadora en lo social y en la administración pública.  -Moralismo y peso de los postulados de la justicia social católica.  -Fuerte centralización y sometimiento al poder legislativo.	Centralización estatal  Modernización de la administración pública.  Impulso a la carrera y al servicio burocrático.  Subordinación de militares y municipios.	Alianza con la Iglesia católica.  Alianza con la clase gamonal - terrateniente, inexistente en el siglo XXI.

	<p>Autoritarismo centrado en el líder.</p> <p>Estado forja a la nación y rige la moral social.</p> <p>Influencias de la moral católica.</p> <p>Seguimiento constante a los asuntos del país.</p> <p>Símbolos y códigos de unidad nacional.</p> <p>Obra pública</p>	
<b>Elementos del gobierno de Correa</b>	Elementos incorporados de la tradición <i>liberal alfarista</i>	Elementos no incorporados de la tradición <i>liberal alfarista</i>
<p>-Voluntad modernizadora e incluyente.</p> <p>-Discurso enfatiza al ciudadano.</p> <p>-Rol importante concebido al Estado en el desarrollo económico.</p>	<p>Políticas públicas universalistas, obligatorias y laicas.</p> <p>Atención a derechos ciudadanos.</p> <p>Firme voluntad del caudillo.</p> <p>Confrontación y lucha política.</p> <p>Confrontación con la prensa</p> <p>Política económica favorable a la industria nacional.</p>	<p>Lucha armada y violenta</p> <p>Participación de militares en política.</p>

	<p>Enfoque soberanista de política.</p> <p>Infraestructura productiva</p> <p>Obra pública</p>	
<b>Elementos del gobierno de Correa</b>	Elementos incorporados de la tradición <i>nacional-popular caudillista</i>	Elementos no incorporados de la tradición <i>nacional-popular caudillista</i>
<p>-Liderazgo personalista, plebiscitario y fuerte</p> <p>-Preponderancia en la figura del líder mesiánico – autoritario.</p> <p>-Retorica moralista</p> <p>-Conexión con las clases populares.</p> <p>-Confluencia de varias clases sociales en el gobierno.</p> <p>-Movimiento político que es primera fuerza pero carece de institucionalidad.</p> <p>-Cuadros de derecha e izquierda en el gobierno y el movimiento.</p>	<p>Liderazgo fuerte y mesiánico que aparece impugnando al sistema.</p> <p>Condena discursiva a las elites y conexión con estratos populares.</p> <p>Autoritarismo centrado en el líder.</p> <p>Articulación con varias clases sociales.</p> <p>Obra pública</p> <p>Mirada religiosa y moral a los problemas.</p> <p>Rechazo a constituirse en partido político.</p> <p>Gabinete compuesto por hombres de derecha e izquierda.</p>	<p>Conducción atropellada de las instituciones.</p> <p>Rechazo a la modernización estatal, a la estabilidad burocrática y de la administración pública.</p>

<b>Elementos del gobierno de Correa</b>	Elementos incorporados de la tradición <i>desarrollista-estatista del reformismo militar</i>	Elementos no incorporados de la tradición <i>desarrollista-estatista del reformismo militar</i>
<p>-Tecnocracia reformista y recuperación de la planificación gubernamental.</p> <p>-Rol importante concebido al Estado en el desarrollo económico y social.</p> <p>-Reconfiguración y creación de nuevas entidades burocráticas</p>	<p>Creación de agencias gubernamentales de planificación y de regulación.</p> <p>Modernización del Estado y reestructuración tecnoburocrática.</p> <p>Estado tutelar que subordina a lo social.</p> <p>Políticas sociales universales, sensibilidad por los sectores marginados.</p> <p>Desconfianza y ataque a los intereses de la oligarquía y grupos económicos.</p> <p>Reformas sociales y modernización socioeconómica: nacionalizaciones.</p> <p>Obra pública</p>	<p>Ascenso al poder mediante golpes de Estado.</p> <p>Presencia activa de militares en la política y administración gubernamental.</p>

(Fuente: autor)

Ahora veamos como aportan las cuatro tradiciones a la formación y paulatino fortalecimiento del Estado ecuatoriano desde la óptica del institucionalismo histórico, es decir como las cuatro tradiciones dejaron sus aportes que se han mantenido, fortalecido o reordenado y han dejado huellas profundas en el carácter de este Estado andino. Lo haremos enfatizando en la variable de configuración de agencias burocráticas y en menor medida en la legal y en la simbólica o de sentido, en consecuencia, con los componentes del Estado que plantea O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 2004):



<b>Tabla 2: Aportes de las cuatro tradiciones históricas a la configuración institucional del Estado ecuatoriano</b>	
Tradición modernización conservadora- autoritaria	-Estado central unitario -Subordinación de los gobiernos locales -Carrera y profesionalización burocrática -Seguimiento a la gestión y políticas públicas -Himno nacional y sentido ideológico de unidad nacional. -Nueva Constitución
Tradición liberal alfarista	-Políticas públicas laicas universalistas y modernizadoras. -Autonomía de Estado con relación a la Iglesia Católica. -Profesionalización del ejército. -Nueva Constitución
Tradición nacional popular caudillista	-Sentido de firmeza y unidad nacional. -Universalización del voto. -Políticas y obras sociales: creación de colegios y centros de salud. -Nueva Constitución, aunque irrespetada por el líder.
Tradición desarrollista-estatista del reformismo militar	-Agencias de planificación y regulación gubernamentales. Creación de Banco Central. -Modernización tecnocrática de la gestión pública. - “Descorporativización” estatal y autonomía administrativa. -Centralización gubernamental -Nuevas Constituciones

(Fuente: autor)

Estos legados institucionales en la configuración del Estado han sido mantenidos o profundizados por el presidente Rafael Correa entre 2007 - 2017. Un periodo de inédita estabilidad y continuidad política.

## Conclusiones

Como hemos comprobado en los cuadros, observamos como el institucionalismo histórico acierta al afirmar que la historia de un país como la del Ecuador acumula un rico acervo de elementos que están presentes y marcan la evolución y el devenir de políticas, instituciones, referencialidades y pautas de conducta que se manifiestan de manera constante y recurrente en el tiempo. Estas en su conjunto influyen en buena medida procesos sociales y políticos del presente como es el caso del actual gobierno del presidente Correa. Y convergen en su figura a través de la constante manifestación de varias dimensiones o variables como el liderazgo carismático-autoritario del presidente, la firme gestión tecnocrática, el fortalecimiento del aparato burocrático del Estado, las políticas universales e incluyentes y la modernización socio-económica.

Respecto al caso de estudio que nos ha citado, se observan variables como la de que cada uno de estos momentos en los que se expresaron las tradiciones políticas y sus gobiernos ocurrieron de manera discontinua. Pero ello no significa que los componentes incluidos en los legados de las tradiciones precedentes desaparecen -al menos los más significativos de ellos- como la construcción, modernización y perfección del Estado. Este proceso de construcción estatal ha ido de la mano de fuertes liderazgos personalistas y caudillistas que a veces han llegado al autoritarismo o cuyos logros se han dado de la mano de gobiernos militares. Así el estilo de liderazgo y la obra pública son constantes también manifiestas.

Otras constantes son que estos liderazgos que fortalecen al Estado emergen luego de periodos de crisis políticas severas cercanas al caos -ya detectadas por el estudio de Patricia de la Torre- y cuyas líneas de evolución apuntalan hacia la centralización, profesionalización y autonomía del Estado que permiten a su vez desplegar amplias reformas modernizadoras, amplias políticas sociales y económicas, creación de agencias gubernamentales nuevas y fuertes inversiones estatales en diversos campos sociales.

Sobresale de acuerdo a la tabla 2 que la tradición nacional-popular caudillista ha incidido poco en la construcción de los aparatos institucionales de Estado, pero ha dejado huella en los referentes, sentidos y formas de entender la política (como el estilo mesiánico –confrontacional) así como manifiesta una continuidad con la tendencia de impulsar políticas sociales.

Leyendo al proceso histórico, también sobresale que, pese a los intentos de subordinación del poder militar al poder civil, estos frutos no dan resultado, pues precisamente la tradición desarrollista del reformismo militar y su activa presencia mediante golpes y sonadas militares son ejemplo de ello.

Sin duda una conclusión importante de este estudio es que el liderazgo caudillista no ha desaparecido y sigue marcando un notable peso en el modo de hacer política y hacer las políticas en

el Ecuador, incluso la construcción del Estado se ha dado bajo esta pauta. De esta forma los proyectos identificados a la par que construyen el Estado y modernizan la sociedad contribuyen a no asentar una tradición liberal de respeto y estabilidad jurídica -constitucional, pues cada caudillo o proyecto ha impulsado su proyecto constitucional.

Así el institucionalismo histórico acierta al afirmar el rol determinante de la historia y sus hechos en la evolución de la vida política, de las instituciones, de los marcos orientadores y del Estado junto sus instituciones, referentes, arreglos y a las políticas públicas.

## Investigaciones futuras

A fin de tener una lectura más rica y complementaria, en este estudio se presenta la necesidad de complementar con más precisión los factores exógenos que desde el campo de la dinámica social, institucional, coyuntura internacional, económica o desde el juego político de las elites se ayudó al ascenso o a la crisis de cada uno de estas tradiciones políticas. También se presenta como factor clave el saber cómo y en qué grado los legados de cada una de ellas continúan en el tiempo bajo la perspectiva de la dependencia del sendero o *path dependence* en otros períodos históricos y bajo otro tipo de gobiernos o de tradiciones políticas. Ello exige mayor cantidad de información y más precisión de los datos y campos de estudio. Tarea digna de levantamientos de mayor información histórica.

También se requerirán de estudios más precisos acerca de los regímenes que no se han abordado aquí como los caudillismos militares que fueron tan dirimentes en el siglo XIX ecuatoriano y que también configuraron legados institucionales en el campo político. Sobre todo, invita a revisar y examinar con más profundidad el rol de las fuerzas armadas y del ejército en la vida política del Ecuador. Tema que largamente excede el esfuerzo que hemos presentado aquí con el abordaje de la tradición *reformista militar-desarrollista* que aplica al siglo XX. ¿Son los caudillismos militares decimonónicos diferentes a los de las de la tradición *reformista militar-desarrollista*?

Finalmente, también existen pocos estudios para examinar a la tradición de modernización conservadora-autoritaria, pues claramente existió una diferencia entre el conservadurismo católico garciano que era un caudillismo modernizador moralista del conservadurismo ecuatoriano de la primera mitad del siglo XX que asume los principios de la democracia cristiana internacional, el concordato con el Vaticano y del pensamiento social-cristiano-católico. De forma que aquí habría que hacer una escisión en la tradición conservadora y estudiarla con más amplitud.

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# Migration from Central America and Mexico to the United States: How Does the Movement of People Affect the Labor Market of the Sending Countries?

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## Abstract

*This article studies the dynamic effect of outmigration on the labor markets of the sending countries at two moments: when migrants leave their country of origin, and when they establish themselves in the new host country. Additionally, this research analyzes the effect on the labor market caused by low skilled and high skilled workers. This work is based on the New Economics of Labor Migration theory and uses Central America and Mexico as the sample. The data are analyzed through Feasible Generalized Least Squares and Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The results show that total migrant outflows and high skilled workers affects positively the employment in the sending countries. No statistically significant effect was found on wages. Finally, outmigration significantly affects national income, and a statistically significant positive effect was found when migrants arrive to the United States and begin to influence the sending countries as diasporas.*

**Keywords:** labor market, migration, sending countries

## Introduction

The current globalization process has brought enormous changes to the free mobility of ideas, technology, goods, services and capital. Even though the same cannot be said about labor, it certainly has the ability to move as well, albeit not so freely. For some countries, this movement of people in and out of the country is very low, relative to the total population. For other countries, this becomes a major every day phenomenon, having an important share of the population out of the country.

For those countries that lose thousands of migrants a year to outmigration, this constant movements mean major adjustments in their labor markets, as workers leave for better opportunities, leading to a process of international reallocation of labor. Due to the big differences in wages among countries, these flows alter the distribution of income in both, the sending and the receiving countries, and by allowing labor to move more freely would, by principle, narrow global income differences (Hanson, 2008:2). This paper aims to study the dynamic effect of outmigration on the labor markets of the sending countries at two moments: first, when migrants leave their country of origin, and second, when they establish themselves in the new host country. Additionally, this research intends to analyze the effect on the labor market of the sending countries caused by low skilled and high skilled workers. This paper is not concerned with why migrants choose to move. Instead, the concern here is to know what happens to the labor market of the sending countries when they actually move out of the labor market. That is, what happens to the employment, the supply and demand of labor, wages and national income?

Why should we study the impact of migration flows on the sending countries? Most of the studies regarding this issue have focused on the receiving country, which is the country where migrants go for work (Borjas, 2003a:933; Borjas *et al.*, 1997:1; Card, 1997:2, 2005:F300; Huntington, 2004:3). However, only recently, the literature has begun to study the sending countries, but they tend to focus on individual migrants or households, and at most, on the migrant sending cities (Aparicio e Meseguer, 2012:206; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer e Wright, 2015:571; Hanson, 2008:3; Meseguer e Burgess, 2014:1). This study is concerned about how migrants themselves affect the labor markets of their countries back home, shifting from the common perspective of remittances to a human based perspective, and from the destination country perspective to the sending country perspective.

This work is based on the New Economics of Labor Migration theory, which holds that households are part of larger groups, like communities and countries. Because of this, households related to migrants transmit the impacts of migration to other members of those groups, and even households that are not related to migrants are affected by migration when they interact with



migrant related households. Therefore, it is very likely that the impacts of migration can be found even outside of the households that send migrants and receive the remittances directly, extending to the whole economy, and the labor market is very likely to suffer an immediate impact as it loses thousands of workers to outmigration.

For that, Central America and Mexico were chosen as the sample due to their regional importance in migration matters. Central American countries share a similar history. However, not all of them are equal. The region possesses the three most violent countries in the world: Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (Williams, 2016:1). These countries are at the same time the ones that more migrants send to the U.S. and consequently, the ones that receive more remittances in the region. On the one hand, the region includes countries with lower levels of violence, fewer migrants and less remittances, giving us the opportunity to observe some variance in the cases. On the other hand, because of its shared border with the U.S., the number of migrants it sends and the amount of remittances it receives, Mexico makes part of the sample as it shares with Central America their migrant sending profile. Additionally, Mexico also plays an important role as a transit country for all those Central Americans who must cross it in order to arrive to the U.S.

## **Research Questions**

This research is driven by the interest of investigating what happens to the labor markets of the sending countries after people leave and before remittances come in. This means that the product of migration, remittances, is not the focus here, instead, the focus is the migrants themselves and how they can affect their country of origin. That is, what happens when a country loses millions of workers to outmigration but before they arrive to their destination country? Could the movement of people out of the country affect the sending countries in a good way? If so, how? And if outmigration affects the sending countries in a negative way, where exactly are these negative effects found? How is the employment, demand and supply of labor, wages and national income affected by outmigration?

Furthermore, this research seeks to investigate if high skilled outmigration affects the sending countries in the same way as low skilled outmigration. If not, how do the sending countries react to these two different types of citizens leaving? Finally, this study aims to explore what happens in the sending countries once migrants have reached their destination country, that is the United States, and begin to make part of active diasporas.

## Theoretical Review

In an attempt to explain as much as we can, this research is based on the new economics of labor migration theory, which argues that households must be taken into account in the decision to become a migrant. That is, the decision of becoming a migrant is not an individual decision, but rather a collective decision. It is usually a family negotiation. For example, when material assets are scarce, one exit is the reallocation of family resources, like labor. That is, some members of the family might be assigned local economic duties while other members of the household are assigned international duties, becoming migrants. Once established in their new country, they will send remittances and ease the situation (Taylor, 1999:4; Taylor and Dyer, 2009:966; Massey *et al.*, 1993:436).

From this point of view, a wage differential can be a determinant of labor migration, but it is not the main reason, given the fact that in order to minimize risks, families will also diversify through migration. In this sense, migration and local production might work together as complementary activities, that is, migration returns are invested in local production and eventually leading to more migration as a means of resource diversity. This means that economic development might not stop migration. On the contrary, if we follow this line of thought, migration would impact positively the macroeconomic development in sending countries (Massey *et al.*, 1993:436; Jennissen, 2007:411).

Furthermore, this theory points that households are part of larger groups, like communities or countries, which is why households related to migrants transmit the impacts of migration through market interactions even to households that are not related to migrants and do not receive remittances directly. And because migration is a self-perpetuating process (Massey, 2005:131) the sending countries many times specialize in migration and are owners of a huge labor force that they can export given the fact that for them, this would be the abundant factor of production. These huge migrant diasporas work not only in the host country but also in the sending country through different interactions (Taylor, 1999:4). This way, this research tries to analyze the process from the household until it becomes an international feature. It then analyzes the effects of this process at the national and regional level of the sending countries regarding their labor markets, wages and national income.

### ***Impact of Migration on the Sending Countries: Theory and Hypotheses***


This research intends to first study what happens in the sending countries after people leave and before remittances come in. That is, what happens when a country loses millions of workers to outmigration? Could the movement of people out of the country affect it?

Theoretically, the effects could vary. For example, migration is very likely to lead to a drive up of wages benefiting the workers who remain behind, as the competition for limited jobs would decrease and wages would tend to balance. On the other hand, migration can lead to a reallocation of the scarce/abundant labor, as graph 1 shows.

Let us suppose that D1 and S1 represent demand and supply of labor at a moment before migration, that is, before losing workers. The pre-migration equilibrium point in this case is Q1. Of course, this scenario responds to a “balanced” market, where supply and demand eventually find a point where they meet. We should have in mind that for the countries analyzed in this sample, the labor markets represent a surplus of labor and a very low demand relative to the working aged people.

Now let us suppose that S2 represents supply of labor after migration, that is, after the country loses workers. Keeping the demand equal, we would see the decrease in labor supply moving to Q2 and an increment on the wages at W2. In the case that the demand increases, as would be the case of any growing economy, we would also have a point Q3, which still represents a lower quantity of workers required than before migration, at an even higher wage W3. Theoretically, as we can see in this model, wages would increase with every movement described here. However, in reality wages are not very likely to suffer any major changes in the countries analyzed. If we keep thinking theoretically, a freer migration of labor between Central America, Mexico and the United States would, in the long run, tend to balance. That is, wages would rise in Central America and Mexico, while decreasing in the United States, meaning a redistribution of income and the decrease of inequality in the region. Previous research has already found evidence that immigration in the U.S. does affect negatively wages for the low skilled in the country (Borjas, 2003b:1), while this study studies this effect on the sending countries.

In economic theory it is well known that, in the simplest way, countries will export the goods that make intensive use of the relatively abundant factors and import the relatively scarce ones (Heckscher-Ohlin theorem). In an economic theory of migration, sending countries would export labor because that is the abundant factor, and conversely, it would import another factor of production that is scarce, e.g. capital, which is very likely to come in the form of remittances, thus reaching an equilibrium. The main assumption is that migrating is beneficial for who migrates, and that doing so depends on their wealth and the migration policies that will encourage or discourage them (Borjas, 1989:457). In the case that a country loses too many workers with respect to the total labor force, the economy might eventually learn to restructure itself around labor scarcity changing to a less labor-intensive, and consequently a more capital-intensive economy balance (Taylor and Dyer, 2009:970).

**Graph 1. Supply and demand of labor before and after migration**

Source: Author

If the sending country has surplus of labor, production is not very likely to be affected by those who leave, but it would be affected when there are labor shortages as many workers would stop producing goods and services and production would decrease substantially. Additionally, migration can have positive effects by reducing competition for limited jobs when there are high levels of unemployment (Koser, 2007:51). This leads us to our first hypothesis.

*H1. Outmigration flows equilibrate employment and wages through a process of national reallocation of labor in Central America and Mexico due to the fact that there is a surplus of labor relative to a low demand.*

The outmigration of high skilled workers is particularly worrisome for the sending countries as the most educated people decide to work out of the country instead of staying and produce in the nation. Pull and push factors work as well for the high skilled workers. While there is an increasing demand for high skilled workers in the advanced economies that represent better economic opportunities, the labor market at home is not able to absorb all the educated ones. As a result, in developing countries the more skilled have the higher probability of migrating (Docquier, *et. al.*, 2006:151). Research still is contradictory as it predicts that high skilled out migration could stimulate economic growth (Taylor and Adelman, 1996:2), but it might also significantly damage productivity and creates a problem of brain drain. In this sense, production might be one of the most badly affected areas of the sending countries, as it is very likely to face difficulties when migrants take with them human or financial capital (Taylor, 1999:5; Lowell and Findlay, 2001:25).

High skilled migrants are more likely to earn higher wages than low skilled migrants and therefore, they are expected to remit more. Another positive effect is the transfer of the knowledge

they get abroad and use it to their advantage in their home country, which increases productivity and economic development. However, when skilled outmigration reaches high levels, economic growth slows down and poverty increases as a consequence in the sending countries (Haque and Kim, 1995:577). This means that low levels of high skilled outmigration are associated with good effects, while reaching a high level represents negative effects for the sending countries (Mountford, 1997:287).

High skilled outmigration can also work as an incentive for better paid jobs abroad. As citizens aim for a better economic future, they are encouraged to get better education in order to be eligible for a job abroad, boosting both education and economic development in the long run. Competition for scarce jobs reduces and the high skilled left back home might experience an upward in wages. The notion of “brain exchanges” that characterizes globalizing economies act as an incentive for sending countries to insert themselves in the global labor market and boost education of their people and eventually, an overall national well-being. Another aspect of the high skilled migrants is that they are more likely to invest in the sending countries, which boosts the probability of remitting, investment and production in the sending country (Lowell and Findlay, 2001:27). On the other hand, given the fact that high skilled workers leave the sending countries also means that these countries are deprived of the taxes they would pay, and this could in turn affect government investment in public policies such as education and health (Hanson, 2008:26).

On the other hand, low skilled migrants are not expected to affect production badly in the case that the sending country experiences surplus of labor, especially in the lower ranks of the production chain. Additionally, when they migrate, the family is temporarily left without financial support from one of the main providers, if savings do not make part of the family plan, or when the settlement in the host country takes longer than expected. However, low skilled outmigration might also help reach an equilibrium in the employment and wages of the fellow workers behind. That is, with less population, even low skilled jobs would see an increase in their wages as labor becomes scarcer (Rosenzweig, 2005:8). In this sense, Graph 1 presented above would also serve to describe the effect of high skilled and low skilled outmigration on the employment in the sending countries. Based on the above, the following two hypotheses are formulated:

*H2. Low skilled outmigration equilibrates employment and wages through a process of national reallocation of resources in Central America and Mexico due to the fact that there is a surplus of labor relative to a low demand.*

*H3. High skilled outmigration equilibrates employment and wages through a process of national reallocation of resources in Central America and Mexico due to the fact that there is a surplus of labor relative to a low demand.*

Migrant diasporas, on the other hand, are of tremendous importance for the sending countries, as they are decisive not only economically, but also culturally and socially. Diasporas

might influence prospective migrants to decide whether to migrate or not, providing important information about what are the best places to go and economic and political advantages or disadvantages of their prospective new home. And if these people eventually decide to migrate, migrant networks are of great help in finding a new job, settlement issues and re-bonding with their nationals. The bigger the diaspora, the bigger the positive effect on the economies, national income and the well-being of the sending countries. This leads us to our fourth hypothesis.

*H4. Diasporas enhance employment, wages and national income in Central America and Mexico due to the influence they have on the sending countries.*

## **Data and Operationalization of Variables**

For the first independent variable measuring migration, data from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics of the Department of Homeland Security of the United States are used. The data used here is the total of regular immigrants who have entered the United States in a given year. This variable accounts for the ratio of migrants relative to the total population, who leave their home country in Central America and Mexico and go specifically to the United States at time  $t$ . The variable takes on a mean value of 22,250; it is named “migrant flows”, and it is logged. It is expected that this variable equilibrates employment and wages, in the sending countries. It is also expected to have an important effect on national income.

For the second independent variable of the analysis, migrant flows who leave to the United States have been classified into low skilled and high skilled workers. The most common method to define a high or low skilled worker is by their education level. However, this research failed to find this kind of data for all the countries and all the years included in the analysis. Therefore, this work uses the second criterion: occupation (Parsons *et al.*, 2015:9). These data were taken from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics of the Department of Homeland Security<sup>1</sup> that reports the profession/occupation of each migrant at the time of arriving to the country. Both variables represent the ratio of migrants relative to the total population. The high skilled workers variable takes on a mean value of 1,171 and it is expected to affect positively the employment and wages of the sending countries. On the other hand, low skilled workers take a mean value of 19,479 and is also expected to equilibrate employment and wages in the sending countries. Both variables are logged. Both variables are expected to have an important effect on national income.

Additionally, for the fourth independent variable, friends and family networks formed in the United States, once they have entered the country, are taken into consideration in the diaspora

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<sup>1</sup> Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Department of Homeland Security. 2016. Available at <http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics>. Last accessed April 2016.

variable. For this, this study used the work on labor migration from Leblang, Fitzgerald e Teets (2014:406). This variable is the ratio of migrants already in the United States relative to the total population of their home country, and it is expected to affect positively the employment, wages and national income back home through their influence by remittances and transference of knowledge. It takes on a mean value of 1,006,805 and it is logged. For a full summary of statistics of the main independent and dependent variables see Table 1.

**Table 1. Summary Statistics, Independent and Dependent Variables**

<i>Variable</i>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<i>Migrant Flow</i>	245	21,250.31	48,263.88	43	405,172
<i>High Skilled Migrants</i>	245	1,771.45	4,867.52	19	65,059
<i>Low Skilled Migrants</i>	245	19,478.86	44,492.47	24	340,113
<i>Diaspora</i>	245	1,006,805	2,634,864	10,941.14	1.37e+07
<i>Employment</i>	245	5.25	10.59	0.04	44.20

Source: Author, based on the dataset used for the analysis.

Our dependent variable is the employment and it was taken from the Penn World Table<sup>2</sup> dataset. It measures the employment ratio relative to the working age population of the sending country  $i$  at time  $t$ , and this is in order to estimate the impact of the dynamics of migration on the labor market of the sending countries. That is, this research tries to measure four effects: the effect on the economy caused when people move out of the country, the effect of both low and high skilled outmigration, and the effect once they reached the host country through migrant diasporas. This variable was chosen instead of the more commonly used measure of unemployment, due to the lack of the complete data for all the countries and all the years in the sample.

The second dependent variable is the average wage of the sending country  $i$  at time  $t$ . The data are derived from the ILO October Inquiry database WDR 2013 Occupational Wages Around the World. The normalized wages refer to average monthly wage rates for adult workers. This study used the average of the monthly wages in US dollars from all the 49 industries and the 162 occupations of a country  $i$  at time  $t$ . finally, the third dependent variable is the Gross National Income (GNI) for country  $i$  at time  $t$ . The data are from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank and it measures the sum of the country's Gross Domestic Product plus the net income received from abroad, such as employee compensations or property income. In the case of the countries in the sample studied here, the GNI is a useful tool since there is a large scale repatriation of profits from transnational companies based in these countries that does

<sup>2</sup> Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" forthcoming American Economic Review, available for download at [www.ggdc.net/pwt](http://www.ggdc.net/pwt). Last accessed April 2016.

not remain in the nation, as the companies take all that money away to their own countries. This lets us know the production of nationals in the country and abroad. As Hanson (2008:4) points out, the literature is very concerned with the effects of immigration on wages, ignoring the impacts of outmigration on non-labor income, arguing that the first is not enough in order to know the effects on national income. This is why this study includes this variable in the research.

## The Model

This study used a strongly balanced panel data set that contains 248 observations regarding eight countries during a period of 31 years, from 1980 to 2010 in order to test the hypotheses stated above. All the variables used in the models were logged and analyzed for unit roots using the Augmented Dicky Fuller test, finding that most of them had to be differenced once in order to make the time series stationary. The panel errors reported constant variance, that is, they are homoscedastic.

The main linear regression models used takes the form:

$$\Delta DV_t = \Delta DV_{t-1} + \Delta\beta_1 Migration + \Delta\beta_2 Fdi_{t-1} + \Delta\beta_4 Trade_{t-1} + \Delta\delta_1 Dem_{t-1} + \Delta\delta_2 GDP_{growth_{t-1}} + \Delta\delta_3 Pop_{t-1} + \Delta\delta_4 Hom_{t-1} + FE_{year_{t-1}} + \epsilon_{t-1}.$$

Where DV are the dependent variables examines in this study: employment, wages and national income. The first term of the model is a lagged value of the dependent variable in order to control for its dynamics, followed by the variables of interest represented by Migration, which includes migrant flows, high skilled labor, low skilled labor, and diaspora. This is followed by lagged control variables, for the result of the previous year is very likely to influence the present result rather than the current one (Beck and Katz, 2011:331; Wilkins<sup>3</sup>). The model includes a set of time dummies in order to control for yearly shocks and the error term is to include other unobservable shocks to the dependent variables. Country dummies are not included in the model as the variables have been differenced once, which would take the effect of those unobserved unit level effects. However, two dummies were created for Central America and Mexico in order to estimate if the effect is different among them. The analysis was made for Central America and Mexico separately given that due to its massive numbers, compared to Central America, Mexico would push the statistics giving back spurious effects. Central American countries, on the other hand, are very similar.

This research controls for FDI, trade, GDP growth, population, homicide and level of democracy from the previous year. The models for wages and national income also control for inflation. Due to the nature of the data, they were analyzed through Cross-sectional time-series

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<sup>3</sup> Wilkins, A. Working paper. (revise and resubmit at Political Science Research & Methods). Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/~arjunw/LaggedDVs.pdf>. Last accessed April 2016



Feasible Generalized Least Squares to obtain the estimates of the models to test the impact of migration flows, migrant diaspora, high skilled, and low skilled migrants on the labor market of sending countries. This methodology was chosen as it allows for an auto regressive term of nature AR(1) in the model, as well as correlation among the independent variables and panels and heteroscedasticity<sup>4</sup>. When having a dynamic model, methods such as Arellano-Bond GMM and LSDVC (corrected least squared dummy variables) are widely used. However, the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation method was developed for small-T large-N panels, and this study comprises the opposite. On the other hand, the LSDVC estimation method was designed for strictly exogenous variables, and this study might include at least some degree of endogeneity (Bruno, 2005:3).

As robustness check, Panel Corrected Standard Errors were also performed, in addition to the feasible generalized least squares, as there might be correlation within the panels. As the results in Table 3 show, the results vary very little, and the variables are equally and correctly signed, finding that the results obtained are robust to the two methods used.

## Results and Discussion

It is worth to note that the results presented in Table 3 are from different models. That is, for the effect on employment, four different models were designed, one for each of our main independent variables as they are highly correlated with each other (see Table 2), and because of this, the models presented problems of multicollinearity. So it was decided to examine the effect of each main migration related independent variable separately in four models in order to assess their impact independently from the other predictors. In this sense, the results presented in Table 3 account for the coefficients of each of these independent variables that in turn form part of an independent model which controls for FDI, trade, population, GDP growth, productivity, homicide and level of democracy, as well as a whole set of year dummies.

**Table 2. Correlation coefficients amongst main predictors**

	<b>Migrant Flow</b>	<b>High Skilled Migrants</b>	<b>Low Skilled Migrants</b>	<b>Diaspora</b>
<i>Migrant Flows</i>	1			
<i>High Skilled</i>	0.61	1		
<i>Low Skilled</i>	0.83	0.76	1	
<i>Diaspora</i>	0.83	0.79	0.99	1

Source: Author, based on the dataset used for the analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Stata Manuals, 2015. <http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtxtgls.pdf>. Last accessed October, 2015

**Table 3. The effect of migrants on the labor market of the sending countries (Central America and Mexico)**

	<i>FGLS</i>	<i>PCSE</i>	<i>FGLS</i>	<i>PCSE</i>	<i>FGLS</i>	<i>PCSE</i>	<i>FGLS</i>	<i>PCSE</i>
<i>Effect of migration on employment</i>								
	Migrant Flows		High Skilled		Low Skilled		Diaspora	
<i>CA</i>	0.0145*	0.0145*	0.0145*	0.0145**	0.0124+	0.0124*	0.0159+	0.0159*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(2.01)	(2.64)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>Mex</i>	0.0123	0.0123	0.0123	0.0123	0.011	0.011	0.0139	0.0139*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(1.34)	(1.53)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>Effect of migration on wages</i>								
	Migrant Flows		High Skilled		Low Skilled		Diaspora	
<i>CA</i>	0.106	0.0679	0.117	0.0416	0.106	0.0675	0.126	0.104
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
<i>Mex</i>	0.164	0.125	0.178+	0.103	0.164	0.125	0.180+	0.158
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.15)
<i>Effect of migration on national income</i>								
	Migrant Flows		High Skilled		Low Skilled		Diaspora	
<i>CA</i>	0.0771***	0.0771***	0.0733***	0.0733***	0.0741***	0.0741***	0.0800***	0.0800***
	(4.77)	(5.66)	(4.56)	(6.15)	(4.64)	(5.77)	(4.32)	(5.49)
<i>Mex</i>	0.103***	0.103***	0.102***	0.102***	0.104***	0.104***	0.109***	0.109***
	(5.09)	(4.38)	(5.01)	(4.54)	(5.11)	(4.50)	(5.00)	(4.51)

+p<0.10 \* p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard error in parentheses. Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regressions were performed and year fixed effects were used to capture time shocks. Panel Corrected Standard Errors were also performed as robustness checks. These are the individual results of each model. Control variables and year fixed effects were not reported on the table due to space. Source: Author

The first hypothesis was confirmed as the results on Table 3 show. Migrant outflows showed a positive effect on employment as there is labor surplus in the countries in the sample, and outflows of people from the model mean a balance. And even though many citizens migrate when they are not formally working, it makes sense that national statistics show an increase in employment as there is less people who are in working age and unemployed in the country. The results hold for Central America, but they do not reach statistical significance in the case of Mexico. On the other hand, it can be seen from the results that the effect of outmigration on wages is not statistically significant, meaning that even though many workers are getting out of the labor market, wages are not balancing meaningfully in these countries. A statistically significant effect can be seen only from the high skilled ones and the diaspora, and only on the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Models, as they allow for a bigger standard error.

With respect to the second hypothesis, it was also confirmed. The effect of high skilled outmigration on employment is positive, as predicted. Conversely, when high skilled people leave the place for other fellows, statistics show less people who are high skilled and unemployed, balancing the labor market in the sending countries. The same can be said about low skilled labor.

The results hold for Central America, but again, they do not reach statistical significance in the case of Mexico.

Diaspora, on the other hand, showed a positive relationship with employment in the two models. This contradicts previous research that shows that the influence exercised by diasporas through remittances goes mostly for consumption instead of direct investment on new companies or new businesses the economies of the sending countries. If these investments attract more remittances, creation of new employments could derive from them.

Finally, it can be seen that the effect of the outmigration on national income is statistically significant in all the models and all the dependent variables, meaning that the national income does suffer immediate shocks after people leave the labor market. Furthermore, as soon as migrants arrive to their destination country, they begin to produce, send remittances back home and influencing their countries of origin in different ways. This can be seen in the results, which show that the effect of diasporas on national income is important, positive and statistically significant. This also helps us understand the importance of diasporas, who even being far away are able to lower the existent barriers to important issues, such as investment, trade, technology and ideas, and reducing inequality by redistributing international income.

## **Conclusion**

This study is concerned about how migrants themselves affect the labor markets of their countries back home, shifting from the common perspective of remittances to a human based perspective, and from the destination country perspective to the sending country perspective. Additionally, it investigates whether high-skilled migration hurts or benefit the sending countries in the same way as low-skilled migration does. Also, this work seeks to study the effects of migrants on the sending countries once migrants reached their destination country and organize as an active diaspora. In order to do this, choosing Central America and Mexico as the sample countries due to their migration history to the United States. Migrants are of great help to their countries of origin as they not only send financial remittances, but they also transfer social and political remittances, which are seen through values, ideas and knowledge that they acquire in their destination country. All these remittances are used for various purposes back home, from the opportunity to better education, alleviation of poverty and development, to influence elections and politics (Meseguer and Burgess, 2014:1), showing the importance and the influence of diasporas on the sending countries. However, drawing from the results obtained, it seems that the effect of diasporas on the labor market is mostly positive, but not statistically significant.

Amongst the preliminary findings of this research, it was found statistical evidence that suggests that total migrant flows, low and high skilled outmigration affect positively the labor

markets back home. On the other hand, no statistically significant effect was found on wages. Finally, the effect of the outmigration on national income is also statistically significant, meaning that the national income does suffer immediate shocks after people leave the labor market. However, as soon as migrants arrive to their destination country, they begin to produce, send remittances back home and influencing their countries of origin in different ways, reducing inequality by redistributing international income.

From this study, it can be seen that although migration has some negative effects, it might not be so negative after all. There are also great benefits for the sending countries. As migration is not an issue that can be fully controlled, it is worth to recognize and maximize its benefits as much as possible. This is true for the sample selected in this research and the field is open for further research in wider areas of the world that also have long history of migration. Theoretically, the results would be similar. However, the social, political, economic and cultural features of other regions of the world could also affect the results.

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# Environmental Licensing in Brazil: Revisiting the Borders between State and Civil Society

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## Abstract

*If the complex interactions between social and state actors generate a fluid understanding of the distinction between State and social movements, the difference of “challengers” and “challenged” postulated by the classic social movement literature is relativized. This research aims to identify what determines the boundaries between State and society. We maintain that there are structural differences between State and civil society, nevertheless, this separation is considered flexible because of the different political projects that transcend it. In order to understand the boundaries between State and social movements, it is necessary to consider the distinct political projects supported by actors inside the State, considering their institutional context. Through a qualitative case study of an institutional conflict, we have identified two main political projects supported by bureaucracy members of IBAMA – the Brazilian national institution for environment licensing –, and analyzed the institutional constraints they faced to defend their ideas.*

**Keywords:** *bureaucracy, environmental licensing, political project, public policy, social movement*



## Introduction

The literatures of social movements and political institutions define different understandings of the boundaries between the State and the civil society. The contemporary studies on social movements postulate there aren't clear separations between social movements and the state apparatus, due to the complex interactions of social and state actors. This is evidenced by the transition and the coexistence of actors in both spheres, as well as by the defense of common political projects by them (Dagnino, Olvera, and Panfichi, 2006).

The conflict between “challengers” and “challenged” (Tarrow, 2009), once considered a defining characteristic of social movements, receive less attention by the scholars, due to the relevance of consensus and cooperation between the social and the state spheres, both considered heterogeneous (Lavalle, 2014; Trindade, 2015). We observed, then, that part of the literature about social movements and institutional participatory arenas tends to focus on similarities and juxtaposition between the civil society and the State, rather than to understand their differences and limits. Therefore, the goal of this article is to develop an exploratory analysis of these boundaries, addressing them from inside the State, and willing to answer the following analytical question: considering the context of complex interactions among state and social movement actors, what determines the boundaries between State and civil society?

We suggest that the inherent differences between State and civil society are structural, and what distinguish them are the organizational rules and the access to resources and to power of influence in political outputs. Nevertheless, this is still an aspect that must be further analyzed, in order to understand the limits that social movements face when their ideas reach the structure of the State (Abers and Tatagiba, 2015). Thus, it is proposed that in order to understand the limits of the flexible borders between State and civil society, we need to take into account the political projects supported within bureaucracy, along with an analysis of the institutional framework in which the actors are embedded.

To illustrate this point, we study the case of Oil and Gas Coordination (CGPEG), within IBAMA (the Brazilian national institution for environment licensing), which experiences, especially since 2015, an institutional conflict with the Environmental Licensing Board (DILIC) about the environmental licensing process. We aim to answer the following empirical questions: which political projects were conflictual at CGPEG? And what limited the agency of actors inside this department when defending their ideas? The choice of the aforementioned object stems from the analytical advantages that conflictual situations provide (Trindade, 2015) – it gives greater visibility to the political projects at stake and, in the case of institutions, to the organizational rules and power relations involved. The methodology used is a qualitative and exploratory case study –

based on documental analysis, secondary literature and semi-structured interviews with IBAMA environmental analysts.

The article is divided in four sections. First, the literature of social movement is discussed, from the classic approaches to the conception of the heterogeneity of the State. Then, we present our theoretical framework, based on the dialogue between the contemporary literature of social movement and the field of institutional analysis. We then present our methodology and data applied in the empirical research. Finally, we proceed to the analysis, in which the political projects of CGPEG's and DILIC's bureaucracies, as well as the limits faced by the actors inside both departments, are identified and characterized.

Some of our findings are that bureaucratic actors from CGPEG and DILIC defended different ideas in terms of the environmental licensing's role and of social participation importance in the process. The institutional conflict studied wasn't limited to Ibama's borders, considering that different social organizations manifested their support to CGPEG's work. In terms of the resources used, we found that the hierarchical structure of Ibama played an important role on the institutional conflict. While DILIC used its power resources to limit and undermine CGPEG's actions, the bureaucrats of this department searched support outside Ibama and manifested its opinion through their professional representation board.

## Literature Review

### *The boundaries between civil society and State*

The classic studies on social movements give centrality to conflict. The Political Process Theory (PPT) approach is the one that mainly aims at this angle. PPT is characterized by emphasis on conflict as a constitutive element of social mobilization (Alonso, 2009:53). In one of the central works of PPT – *Dynamics of contention* (DOC) – McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004) suggest that studies of collective action inherently address what they call *contentious politics*, defined as:

*“Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants”* (Tilly et al., 2004:9)

The authors of DOC deal with cases in which the State is challenged, considering social movement as an “interaction sustained between powerful people and non-powerful actors” (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam, 2009:21), considering the formers the ones with access to institutions (Tarrow, 2009:19). Another school of theory that concentrates on the contentious process is the Theory of New Social Movements (TNSM), which adds a cultural interpretation for social movements by recognizing diverse elements of action that go beyond structural aspects, such as collective identity (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Polletta and Jasper, 2009).

These theoretical perspectives, which deal with contentious politics, are revised by Abers and Bülow (2011). They argue that it is important to consider the groups and the actors that mediate civil society, the market and the State, as well as the transformations across the State (Abers and Bülow, 2011:77). They argue that PTI's ideas start from the concept of strict separation between State and civil society, considering the State as an enemy of social movements (2011:53). It does not contemplate social movements that do not have the State as interlocutor, non-contentious collective action, and agents that belongs to both spheres. Thus, they part from a monolithic and homogeneous notion of State and disregard the interactions within and across State and civil society (2011:62–64).

Other theoretical standpoints try to deal with this gap, taking into account aspects such as cooperation and coordination among different actors. Such conception is relevant for approaches focused in political outputs and impacts of social movements actions (Almeida, 2006), as well as in participative management theories. In Brazil, part of the literature about participation seeks to understand the relationship between the State and social movements in formal decision-making processes – such as participatory institutions (as management councils, national conferences, participatory budgeting, among others) (Lavalle, 2011). In addition to these approaches, it is pertinent to stress that other studies on the interactions between the State and social movements go beyond the formal participatory decision-making spaces.

Tarrow (2012) himself, later on, investigates the role played by activists and its organizations as “*strangers at the gate*”, discussing contentious politics that contains not only conflict, but also cooperation. He argues that these actors must deal with the “various facets of the basic ambiguity of being outside of institutional politics but working within the polity” (2012:10). In the same sense, Goldstone presents a study centered in the inter-dependency between institutional and non-institutional politics (2003:2), arguing that not only social movements must be understood as embedded in an institutional context, but also institutional analysis must take into account the constant structuration caused by social movements. The same actors would conciliate time and resources used for social movements and for institutional politics, simultaneously (2003:5). In a similar direction, Abers and Bülow (2011) propose a network approach to social movements in order to observe the multiple ways of interaction between actors involved in collective action and inside the State apparatus, which puts into question aprioristic establishment of boundaries between the social and the institutional sphere (2011:71–72). It permits an understanding of how social movements might seek their goals working from inside the State.

In Brazil, most empirical studies about the insertion of social movements actors in institutions were developed since Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's government in 2003 (Abers, Serafim,

and Tatagiba, 2014). From then on, many social activists became a part of state institutions, what represented an opportunity to articulate their interests, agenda and practices (Lavallo, 2014:14). As a consequence, other kinds of interaction between State and civil society - besides the contentious ones – gained relevance, which can be called “*interaction repertoires*”. These are created historically in different sectors of politics, and are also based on the creative experimentation of practices (Abers et al., 2014:328). The historical aspect of these encounters is also considered by Rossi (2015) in his concept of “*repertoire of strategies*”, defined as a set of historically limited options of collective action (2015:11). They are built on “*stock of legacies*”, conscious and non-conscious experiences and perceptions about past struggles (2015:22). The interaction between actors would be dynamic and creative, but also limited by historical and institutional aspects. Moreover, these complex interactions impact the organization of both social movements and institutions (Penna, 2013). The institutional permeability would also depend on the profile of decision-makers (2013:12).

The discussion above highlights, then, the heterogeneity of institutions, constituted by bureaucrats with plural ideas, involved in multiple connections. In this sense, the concept of “*political project*” is related to the idea of heterogeneity of the State in a process of democratic consolidation, which is the case of Brazil (Dagnino et al., 2006). It means “a set of beliefs, interests, worldviews, and representations of an ideal life in society which guide the political action” (2006:38). The heterogeneous civil society is the expression of a political, social and cultural plurality of the historical development of Latin America. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of the State comes from the diversity of political moments in which institutions were built, leading to the coexistence of state organizations founded on different organizational principles – both in the vertical (in the different federal levels) and the horizontal perspectives (among the three branches). Such heterogeneity is an expression of the joint action of civil society and state actors defending the same political project, setting “an extraordinarily complex map of possibilities of collaboration and confrontation” (2006:38).

## **Theoretical Framework: Social Movements and Institutional Analysis**

“In general, social life is rife with collective mobilization, and whether these efforts are made by challengers working as outsiders to redefine existing arrangements, insiders seeking change from within, or elites striving to keep existing structures intact, a focus on movements expands our understanding of institutional dynamics.” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008:657)

The ideas presented above point towards an understanding of the state institutions through a fluid notion of the boundaries between society and State. In order to better elucidate this phenomenon, I suggest a dialog between literatures that deal with social movements and those of the field of institutional analysis.

As a point of departure, it is important to discuss the depiction of the idea of conflict itself. Trindade (2015) emphasizes the relevance of conflict for the study of social movements. He revises the Brazilian literature about participative institutions (PI) that focus on consensus, arguing that it tends to delegitimize disruptive actions and combative social movements (2015:8). He defends that conflict is an essential feature of social movements, and that public institutions tend to deaden conflicts rather than clarify them (2015:12). Trindade approaches direct actions and institutional actions as different, but constitutive of the same dynamics of conflict (2015:13). His arguments propel us to understand contentious politics as including struggle not only in social sphere or inside participative institutions, but also inside other state institutions. His work also calls our attention to the risks of considering the boundaries between State and society as fluid, considering that the main challenge might be rather to better understand the differences between them. In this sense, Trindade emphasizes the analytical relevance of conflict – "[the focus on protest actions] helps us to see elements that hardly come to light otherwise" (2015:11). Thus, the notion of flexible boundaries between State and civil society should not set aside their inherent differences. In face of the complex context of interactions between social and state actors, what marks the border between these two arenas?

We suggest the main differences between the social and the state spheres are related to structural constraints that actors inside institutions face, as well as advantages they have access to – such as organizational rules, access to resources and power to influence other's agents actions (Abers and Keck, 2013). Nevertheless, there is still a lot to investigate about these differences, considering the complex and subtle dynamics inside institutions depending on the ideas defended (Abers and Tatagiba, 2015). The entrance of actors in the institutional apparatus that proactively defend ideas and values – different political projects – is related to the conception of fluid boundaries between social and state instances.

To understand the limits of these boundaries, it is necessary to comprehend the political projects defended inside institutions by bureaucrats, and the institutional dynamics in which they are embedded. In this regard, observing institutional conflicts is an adequate analytical strategy because it is where aspects of internal institutional dynamics gain visibility and can potentially cause changes, highlighting the political projects, power relations and rules that are at stake. That is why we promote a theoretical dialogue between the theories of social movements and the institutional analysis to assist in the understanding of institutional dynamics.

### ***Institutional activism***

Some theories on social activism develop analysis addressing not only activities occurring in civil society, but also on actions in political institutions. They consider that the activities of social movements (outsiders) and the activities of conventional politics (insiders) are parallel ways to influence political outcomes often drawn by the same actors, which seek the same goals (Pettinicchio, 2012:506). Thus, insiders, with access to resources and power, who are defending proactively causes corresponding to the ones defended by outsiders are called *institutional activists* – individuals capable of promoting change within organizations and institutions (2012:501).

The studies about institutional activism normally involves different aspects of a bureaucratic agency such as: the causes defended by the state actors; the motive for entrepreneurship, such as personal stories, experiences with the subject, ideology, contacts or career ambition; external relationships; and internal limitations – rules and norms can encourage or inhibit activism inside government. It is noteworthy that institutional activists don't need to belong to a social movement network – considering activism as “kind of action which aims to promote political or social projects realized by the actor as a public or collective nature” (Abers, 2015:148). Thus, the “fight into the State” can also be made “inside” it, or even promote new mobilization opportunities “from” it.

Even institutional activists wielding powers and resources for change face internal constraints to action. Serafim (2014) analyses that participative practices inside an institution varies according to the context of each institution stance, due to “structural limits given by the legacy of sectorial policies and the specific institutional context of the period” (2014:100). Thus, the institutional construction process comprises struggles and strategies for incorporating specific guidelines, through the “dispute between actors within the institutional framework” around different ideas (2014:107). Such disputes are shaped by institutional limits and management practices (2014:109). According to the ability of institutional activists to actualize their ideas through alliances with other actors within and outside the state, based on ideational affinities, they can overcome these institutional limits (2014:116).

The issues raised by Serafim is based on the concept of institution as “commonly accepted way to do things” (Abers and Keck, 2013:3). It is related to the idea of “practical authority”<sup>6</sup> (2013:2), which is achieved by institutions when they find space within an institutional “entanglement”. This notion considers the difficulties for action based on ideas inside the state

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<sup>6</sup> “The kind of power-in-practice generated when particular actors (individuals or organizations) develop capabilities and win recognition within a particular policy area, enabling them to influence the behavior of other actors” (Abers and Keck 2013:2).

apparatus, which can be used to understand the limits for political projects development inside the state.

In this regard, Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) study how theories of social movements and collective action inspire institutional assessments, discussing the tendency of studies on institutions to devalue agency, politics and contestation as explanatory factors for change and origin of institutions (2008:649). The authors (2008) present an analysis model that understands social movements as a political condition for dissemination of institutional practices (2008:662). This depend on the capacity of challenging movements to accumulate political resources, to defend their alternatives and ideas against counterattacks, and to create favorable political context (2008:664–5).

### ***Institutional work and social skills***

Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) relegate most agency power to state actors that promote change and disseminate ideas. The authors care about the ability of institutional actors to mobilize resources and to recruit members, to frame their messages and to take “opportunity structures”<sup>7</sup> (2008:650). The focus on bureaucrat’s agency motivated the production of studies targeted on actors and what they do, as the “institutional entrepreneurs” and “institutional work”<sup>8</sup> (Lawrence, Thomas B., Roy Suddaby, 2009).

The concept of institutional work also considers the state agent as the main vector for institutional practice. One of its key-elements is the consideration of action always inserted in a set of institutionalized rules. Following similar logic, Fligstein (2001) argues that “institutional entrepreneurs” are strategic actors who are able to find ways to bring disparate groups to cooperate (through what he calls “social skill”), by putting themselves in the position of others and creating meanings that attract a large number of actors. The author defends that in some situations where rules and resources are heavily concentrated in powerful groups, “social skills” may be less relevant. On the other hand, in more uncertain and turbulent contexts, they play an essential role. Again, the institutional dynamics influences the actions of the institutional individuals.

Despite the institutional limitations of a given context, actors inside state institutions – defending ideas and specific political projects – are able to create, maintain or change institutions. Thus, the boundaries between State and civil society, from the perspective of political projects defended jointly by actors of social movements and state actors, would be defined by both the

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<sup>7</sup> “Aspects of political institutions that determine the dynamics of the movement and its success, as legacy of previous policies, the receptivity of the authorities regarding requests from “challengers”, the concentration of resources in a field and the prevalence of certain cultural models”(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008:658)

<sup>8</sup> Considered the “purposeful action of individuals and organizations seeking the creation, maintenance or interruption of institutions” (Lawrence, Thomas B., Roy Suddaby 2009)

institutional framework (rules, resources) in which such actors are embedded, as well as by their ability to influence institutions (power to create, maintain or change them).

Based on these ideas, I seek to answer the following empirical question: how does the study of institutional conflict of Oil and Gas General Coordination (CGPEG) helps us understand the limits of the boundaries between the civil social actors engaged in environmental causes and the institutional framework? Or, more specifically, which political projects were in conflict at CGPEG? And what limited the actors inside this department to defend their ideas?

## **Methodology and data**

We developed a case study about an institutional conflict between environmental licensing board (DILIC) and the General Coordination of Oil and Gas (CGPEG) of Ibama (Brazilian federal environmental licensing institution) around a licensing process in 2015. The empirical research is based on the document analysis – laws, open letters, online manifestos and secondary bibliography – and on three semi-structured interviews made with Ibama’s environmental analysts<sup>9</sup>. First, we present environmental licensing board (DILIC) and the General Coordination of Oil and Gas (CGPEG), its functions and attributes. Then, we describe the institutional conflict which emerged in July 2015, willing to identify the main political projects that were at stake, based on a prior study about “advocacy coalition” in environmental politics developed by Araújo (2007). Our analysis is developed through the observation of the different limits faced by state actors involved in the institutional conflict, as well as the resources mobilized by them.

## **Empirical analysis: Environmental licensing from ideas to practices**

The environmental licensing in Brazil is a state management tool for authorization and installation of economic or infrastructure projects with pollution potential, allowing the private use of environmental goods (Serrão, 2012:161–62). It is inherently conflictive, considering that it establishes the limits to economic development and to the public-private relationship. At the same time, it must also deal with many social conflicts of groups in territories affected by big infrastructure projects because it authorizes and legitimizes the exploitation of natural resources by business sectors in them.

In terms of ideas, decisions must be taken in a context in which three political projects are present: the neoliberal, the democratic-participative (Dagnino et al., 2006) and the

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<sup>9</sup> List of anonymous interviews:

Interview 1: Environment analyst from COTRA, in Brasília, 19/10/2015.

Interview 2: Environment analyst from CGPEG, by Skype, 05/11/2015.

Interview 3: Environment analyst from CGPEG, by telephone, 23/11/2015.



“developmentalistic”. The latter gained relevance in Brazil because of the high investments in infrastructure by the government in the last years (Gomide, 2015). In order to analyze the different environment political projects, we recalled a study about advocacy coalitions<sup>10</sup> in the National Biodiversity and Forests Policy (Araújo, 2007). Despite representing the interests of the specific area of forests and biodiversity, the “belief systems” of each coalition in this sector inform us about the main discourses prevalent in the environmental area as a whole, which represents a combination of political projects. These coalitions are:

*“Coalition 01 – clarified technocrats, with the phrase symbol ‘I advocate environmental protection and believe in the technicians’; Coalition 02 – socio-environmentalists, with two possible sentences-symbols, ‘we miss Chico Mendes’ or ‘we will discuss this democratically?’;*

*Coalition 03 – Modern developmentalists, with the phrase symbol ‘I have environmental concerns and I believe in the market’; Coalition 04 – Traditional developmentalist, with the phrase symbol ‘I want old-fashioned economic growth.’” (Araújo, 2007:205)*

The term “belief system”<sup>11</sup> refers not only to society, but also to the State at all levels of the government, which shows great similarity with the concept of “political project”, but mainly applied in public policy studies. Thus, the categorizations made by Araújo will help us in analyzing the heterogeneity of IBAMA regarding the environmental licensing.

At IBAMA, the Environmental Licensing Board (DILIC) is responsible for implementing the environmental licensing at the federal level<sup>12</sup> (see Chart 1 below). The Oil and Gas General Coordination (CGPEG) is linked to DILIC and was created in 1999. It is located in Rio de Janeiro because of the concentration of the oil and gas industry there. Its assignment is mainly to produce previous referrals for decision making process of environmental licensing i.e. a technical report suggesting the license issue’s authorization or denial, assessing the (social) environmental<sup>13</sup> viability of the project. The final word regarding the grant of the license is of exclusive jurisdiction of IBAMA’s Presidency. In some critical cases, a commission for Evaluation and Approval of Environmental Licenses may be convened – which is composed by four directors and a prosecutor (Serrão, 2012:177–83).

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<sup>10</sup> Actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs (political objectives more causal perceptions and others) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and staff of government institutions (Sabatier e Jenkins-Smith, 1993b *apud* Howlett, Ramesh, e Perl 2013, 93).

<sup>11</sup> The concept refers to views about the nature of humanity and the desired end state of facts and events. (Howlett et al. 2013:94).

<sup>12</sup> IBAMA: <http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento-ambiental/dilic-diretoria-de-licenciamento-ambiental/> Access in: 27/11/2015, 23h19.

<sup>13</sup> The very use of the term “socio-environmental” refers to a specific political project regarding licensing.

Chart 1. DILIC/IBAMA organization chart.



Source: IBAMA.

The environmental licensing process developed by CGPEG follows a different structure compared to other DILIC's departments (2012:184). All interviewees emphasized the autonomy of CGPEG to apply their own procedures seeking an efficient licensing. Some of these procedures are: a post-license monitoring, the optimization of new licenses based on previous results, the regionalization of licensing and the formation of "work groups" for specific topics (2012:187). According to respondents, CGPEG's autonomy is related to the geographical distance from DILIC, which could result in a lower political pressure around the processes. Moreover, CGPEG experienced a context of institutional construction that favored innovation, as well as the support and accessibility of the directors of environmental licensing until 2012 (2012:184). These elements are identifiable at the interview:

*"We had this independence because it was the beginning of Lula's government – the people who took over the coordination of CGPEG had no previous experience of coordination and our directors listened to us and facilitated our discussions. There was a strengthening project of licensing, and we were far from political interference. (...) We had the opportunity to develop methodologies that lead to discussion of existing power structures"* (Interview 2).

Additionally, two environmental analysts working at CGPEG in 2015 emphasized the importance of a close dialogue with local communities and organized civil society groups for the environmental licensing process. During the licensing process, CGPEG is opened to suggestions and complaints from stakeholders and civil society movements through informative technical meetings, in a smaller and more informal format, and contact by e-mail and telephone. These are implemented in addition to the formal participatory structure of public hearings. Furthermore, the management made by "work groups" was considered a good practice by the Court of Audit of the Union (TCU) in 2009. Besides being an initiative of forming patterns of action, they released its draft for public consultation during a period, demonstrating an effort for participatory standardization (Serrão, 2012:187).

Another prominent activity of CGPEG was the proposition of guidelines for the Environmental Education Projects (PEAs), required as mitigating/compensatory measures of the

licenses. The environmental education activities aim to minimize the impacts and risks of affected social groups, in order to reduce their vulnerability. Therefore, CGPEG made guidelines for the development of PEAs in 2005 (2012:189). Its central guideline is the need for construction of projects with communities affected by the activity, in order to promote social participation “that considers the self-promotion in the sense of autonomy and self-sustaining, as a process to be lived and conquered” (Saisse, 2012 apud Serrão, 2012:191).

Analyzing the performance of CGPEG, we note that, at least until 2012, the coordination was in institutional building process (Lawrence, Thomas B., Roy Suddaby, 2009), as well as in a process of establishment of practical authority (Abers and Keck, 2013) for diffusion of institutional alternatives to achieve a specific political project. This process was possible because of CGPEG’s autonomy and independence of action. According to Motta and Oliveira (2015), the autonomy of midlevel bureaucracy is marked by a greater or lesser degree of freedom from political pressures and is characteristic of policy building processes – it changes along the bureaucratic performance, depending on the way the bureaucrats are selected and the policy duration.

The predominance of personal trajectories consistent with IBAMA’s field of work characterizes the composition of CGPEG, which is composed by technical and qualified professionals. The experience in CGPEG<sup>14</sup> over time allowed the development of a “culture of action” marked by “the paradigm of the dialogue and the primacy of technical quality” – especially when an interviewee says, “we want to do something we believe in”, “we do not want a technically brainless institution”. Thus, the identity is fundamental to their actions, considering collective identity as “cognitive, moral and emotional connection, an individual with a community, category, practice or broader institution” (Polletta and Jasper, 2009:1).

### ***The institutional conflict***

In May 2015, the new president of IBAMA Marilene Ramos took office, appointed by the Minister of the Environment. Then, Ramos appointed Thomaz Toledo to take over direction of DILIC. During this period, CGPEG was experiencing a speculative race for licenses for seismic companies. Despite CGPEG's attempts to dialogue with the companies and to maintain the level of demand and of technical quality, respondents reported that the direction of DILIC took arbitrary decisions, to the detriment of their technical considerations. So the bureaucrats of CGPEG felt that the “continuity and progress” (Asibama-RJ, 2015) of their environmental licensing project, developed during the 13 years of the coordination, was under threat.

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<sup>14</sup> CGPEG has 80 servers (ASIBAMA/RJ, 20/08/2015). Asibama’s website: <http://asibamario.blogspot.com.br>. Access in: 20/08/15.

The main actions of DILIC that led to the mobilization of IBAMA bureaucrats and installed the conflict with CGPEG were: a Technical Cooperation Agreement signed between IBAMA and the Brazilian Petroleum Institute that allowed direct contact from companies with the licensing board; the creation of the “Situation Room for Earthquake” to question the environmental projects proposed by CGPEG; DILIC’s instruction for companies to manifest disagreements about the CGPEG’s technical analysis. These factors resulted in claims for the exclusion of some “environmental conditioning projects”<sup>15</sup> of the licensing process for seismic in the region. Therefore, the CGPEG maintained its position and the “Evaluation Committee and Approval of Licenses” was convened to examine the case. Since the decision-making in favor of the Norwegian group of seismic surveys “Petroleum Geo-Services” and the exclusion of four environmental projects of the conditions<sup>16</sup> set by CGPEG, the institutional conflict between CGPEG and DILIC became evident and visible.

By observing the contentious relationship between the CGPEG servers and the direction of the board, it is remarkable that the central motive was the perceived threat against the environmental licensing project developed by CGPEG until then. Thus the mobilization of the servers could be considered a *threat-induced mobilization* (Almeida 2007:125), that incurs in a defensive collective action. Moreover, that is a case where the “spread” of institutional alternative practices was challenged and therefore requires the mobilization of people, resources and organization to defend them (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008:664–65). I divide the analysis of the conflict into two parts: the understanding of the *ideas* based on the advocacy coalitions identified by Araújo (2007); and the analysis of *actions* performed by DILIC and CGPEG.

### ***Ideas***

The role of environmental licensing considered by CGPEG is “an achievement of the whole society, the possibility of breaking with the perverse logic where polluters individualize profits and impose the losses on society”; “should provide the public debate about the social and environmental viability of potentially polluting activities and their impacts, as provided in the Constitution” (Asibama-RJ<sup>17</sup>, 2015:1). The CGPEG oppose the idea that environmental licensing

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<sup>15</sup> All licensing process has a set of “conditionings measures” i.e. a set of practices for environmental protection that the entrepreneurs must implement to compensate or mitigate environmental and social impacts of their project.

<sup>16</sup> The Management Board decided to exclude: i) Beaches Monitoring Project; ii) Project Monitoring Marine Mammals by Air Sense; and iii) Larvae Mortality Assessment Project Lobster in Response to Earthquake Impacts. Besides these, the Seismic Vessels in Poultry Management Plan was also cut in the final License forwarded by the Presidency of IBAMA, without justification (Asibama-RJ, 2015).

<sup>17</sup> Asibama-RJ is the servers’ association in the environmental area in Rio de Janeiro. Considering that CGPEG is the only Ibama’s coordination in Rio, it is mainly composed by its bureaucrats. All documents presented here were accessed at Asibama’s website: <http://asibamario.blogspot.com.br>. Accessed on 12/12/16.

is “too slow, bureaucratic, complex, discretionary, expensive, a major obstacle to development” (2015:4).

Regarding the best ways to perform the environmental licensing, CGPEG’s public servants defend that: it should consist of work built with dialogue and technical basis, to ensure the legitimacy and legal security for licenses issued; it should have tools to ensure effective participation of actors “historically excluded from decision-making”; be “judicious and democratic with the implementation of control and mitigation measures in the conditions of the licenses”; must have public character, allowing social control; and needs to remain independent of political and economic pressures<sup>18</sup>. On the opposite side would be an uneven prioritization of few groups’ interests, prioritizing economic development. Heterogeneity of IBAMA and the permeability of the border between the institution and civil society is evident in the following excerpt:

*“We are very sorry for this mistaken position within IBAMA itself and hope that society understands that within the environmental agencies there is also a daily contest between different projects for the country. On the one hand servers committed to an environmental licensing process, which consider the interests of all groups involved in the process, and others who try every way to prioritize the interests of certain groups.”* (“Intervenção na coordenação geral de petróleo e gás”, 2015)

*“What is at stake are the interests not just of these servers, but the general society.”* (Letter of support to Asibama-RJ, 2015)

Several civil society entities, as public institutions, private organizations, trade unions, universities, non-governmental organizations of environmental, labor unions and students, social movements and control bodies supported CGPEG. The “Letter of support to Asibama-RJ was signed by 39 (thirty-nine) organizations – from other associations of IBAMA servers, national and international NGOs and traditional communities’ organizations.

Asibama-RJ also received sixteen public expressions of support, such as from research laboratories, specialists, server groups of environmental area and worker’s unions in general. A page called “In Defense of CGPEG” was created in Facebook (it has around 530 likes) whose description is: “We will report all cases that compromise the actions of CGPEG. We have to fight for the achievements of the environmental licensing of oil and gas.” Thus, the institutional conflict established within IBAMA clearly goes beyond the state borders.

Based on the theory of political projects of Dagnino et al. (2006), we can infer that CGPEG and the organized civil society defend the democratic-participatory project – whose guiding principle are the search for deepening democracy and social participation in decision-making processes (Serrão, 2012:256) – while the direction of DILIC and the business community would be in favor of a neoliberal project – based on the principles of efficiency and market modernization (2012:257). We can note some similarities between the speeches analyzed for the oil and gas sector

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<sup>18</sup> Information obtained in documents published by ASIBAMA-RJ at its website: <http://asibamario.blogspot.com.br>. Accessed on 12/12/16.

and those observed by Araújo (2007) regarding the advocacy coalitions of biodiversity and forests sector. According to “belief systems”, CGPEG’s views draw near what Araújo calls “social-environmentalists”, due to: “emphasis on democratic and participatory processes of government decisions”; “high concern with the peculiarities and regional and local interests”; and the “position of caution regarding the involvement of the private sector in solving environmental problems without coming to dismiss it”. However, CGPEG also approaches the discourse of modern developmentalism, because of the “prioritization of technical and scientific knowledge, sometimes joint with traditional knowledge and cultural aspects.” On the other hand, the direction of DILIC<sup>19</sup> can be associated to two approaches, so-called “modern developmentalism”<sup>20</sup> and one called “traditional developmentalism”<sup>21</sup>.

### ***Practices***

We can now turn to the aspects of *actions* performed to deal with conflict. First, the actions of CGPEG sought visibility of the events, publicizing their discontent and seeking support, through the union of IBAMA’s employees – Asibama-RJ. According to respondents, they developed a strategy because of fear of personal retaliation by the DILIC. On the other hand, the mechanisms used by DILIC’s direction apparently focused on the centralization of licensing procedures. Among its actions were: the limitation of communication of CGPEG servers with other bodies<sup>22</sup>; revocation of the police power of environmental analysts; exoneration of CGPEG General Coordinator; threat of creation of a “Licensing Center for Oil and Gas” in Brasilia that would undermine CGPEG’s duties; limiting servers’ work travels (Interviews 2 and 3); constant meetings with companies; attempt to prevent public hearings (Interview 2); threats of removal from the actual sector<sup>23</sup> (Interview 1), among others.

CGPEG’s actions are markedly defensive, seeking the protection of a licensing project based on technical and social arguments. Thus, it can be considered a movement induced by threat

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<sup>19</sup> I recognize here the bias of my analysis, to have fogged my analysis primarily on information provided by the CGPEG servers.

<sup>20</sup> Proximity to the “beliefs”: defense of a minimal state; “emphatic appreciation of economic instruments for environmental policy”; “somewhat ambiguous position regarding the rights of traditional populations, ranging from default account when discussing conflicts with environmental preservation and disregard when discussing conflicts with economic interests”; “defense of the broad participation of the private sector in the solution of environmental problems” (Araújo 2007:208–9).

<sup>21</sup> Mainly because of the belief: “little regard for participatory decision systems or, at most, admission relevance of participation in government decisions, representatives of selected civil society groups” (Araújo 2007:209–10).

<sup>22</sup> MEM 02001.012017/2014-39 DILIC/IBAMA: “CGPEG does not have autonomy to issue communications to federal agencies, might it be directors, managers centers and conservation units or regional departments ” (Asibama-RJ, 2015). Asibama’s website: <http://asibamario.blogspot.com.br>. Accessed on 12/12/16.

<sup>23</sup> Due to his explicit defense of CGPEG, a server from Brasilia received personal threat that he would be removed from his team.

(Almeida, 2007). The high level of autonomy of the licensing board (DILIC) and the political support of the IBAMA Presidency give it greater power for action.

The barriers faced in the development of environmental licensing political project advocated by the CGPEG, state and civil society actors are perceived by the servers' limitation in terms of autonomy of action. The autonomy of a bureaucrat can be curtailed by structural aspects, such as work overloading, budget limitation and excessive bureaucratic rules. Even more, it depends on the institutional context and the correlation of forces prevailing at a given moment, since the hierarchal resources are manageable and can be used strategically. Analytically, such contextual and structural aspects could be understood as the "institutional opportunity structure" (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008:660) that delimits the flexible boundaries between state and civil society that this research sought to analyze.

## **Conclusion and future research**

Based on this research, it is evident that the institutional analysis and the study of social movements have many points of convergence. The agency power attributed to the state bureaucrats allows us to understand institutional dynamics beyond tight and streamlined rules. This also allows us highlight the heterogeneity of institutions and the discretion of the actors, evident on the study of an institutional conflict.

The empirical case study of CGPEG had much to add in both theoretical and empirical terms. First, the article sought to understand the boundaries between State and civil society in a complex context of multiple interactions between both spheres. It was possible to understand the boundaries between State and civil society in terms of the political projects that pervade them, in addition to structural differences. Due to the fact that the institutional context is determined by organizational rules, the various state actors are endowed with different levels of autonomy. Thus, the correlation of forces of the institutional context in which actors defending a given political project are embedded is central to understand the mutability of State-society boundaries.

The present work advances in different political science literatures. First, it contributes to the operationalization of Paul Almeida's (2007) concept of social movement driven by threat by looking how such conflicts inside institutions operate. It also advances on the comprehension of the environmental policies themselves, which can be deeply understood through conflict analysis (Alonso and Costa 2002). The literature on state bureaucracy is also discussed in this article, considering that it handles with important aspects such as discretion and autonomy of actors in public implementation processes. Finally, our analysis could be helpful to the progress of the

literature on “institutional activism”, focused on three aspects: ideas, the mobilization of resources and the limits faced by bureaucratic activists.

On the other hand, the empirical research could be improved and broadened in different ways. For example, it could be extended in order to apprehend a deeper notion of the political projects defended by the bureaucrats – specially the ideas defended by the ones located at DILIC. The analysis of ideas inside IBAMA could also be enriched by the development of a specific framework of “coalitions of advocacy” for the environmental licensing. A further interesting study would be the investigation of the relation between the actors involved in the institutional conflict and their interactions with actors inside and outside the State. This would help us understand this conflict in a holist way, not restricted to the institutional aspects.



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# Conceptualizing Autonomy in Latin American Foreign Policy: Case Study of Brazil under the PT government (2003-2016)

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## Abstract

*The objective of this article is to conceptualize the meaning of autonomy as a practice of foreign policy. It firstly considers the historical development of this purely Latin American contribution to the theories of international relations, and posteriorly offers specific theoretical framework of autonomy that combines perspectives of realism, interdependency and structuralism. By considering the problematic of international insertion of peripheral countries, the autonomous behavior of Brazil during the Workers Party government (2003-2016) is analyzed as a specific case study. The behavior of distinct variables identified in the theoretical framework is offered as an explanation for changing degrees of autonomy exercised by Brazil during the period considered. Towards the end of the article, impediments that Brazil encounters on its path towards becoming a world power are put into perspective, concluding how this country, for depending on too many factors that are outside of its control, is only a pendulum power.*

**Keywords:** *autonomy, Brazil, dependency, foreign policy, Partido dos Trabalhadores*

## Introduction

The concept of autonomy, just like many other concepts developed and used in the studies of international relations (IR), is characterized by wide range of possible interpretations. Thus historically, but even more so geographically, it has been used in various forms. Considering the development of Westphalian system of sovereign states, autonomy essentially implied the impossibility of foreign forces to exert any type of authority inside the limits of a sovereign state (Krasner 1999). However, and due to the mere fact that historically very few states have enjoyed something that could be called total domestic autonomy, many authors would still argue that Westphalian sovereignty has always been a myth. It should be clear, and especially so if observed from the perspective of the Third World, that certain states are more sovereign than others.

In a nutshell, for Latin American academics, autonomy is a notion that refers to the conduct of foreign policy free from constraints imposed by more powerful countries. As a result of historical reality (filled with obstacles with regards to autonomist insertion in the international arena), and not simply as a fruit of academic speculation, autonomy for these states became an essential concept in the circles of theories of international relations.

The debate in academic circles is never ending. Besides Latin-American academics, who are usually the ones to underline the impossibility of reaching consensus in the IR discipline, some notable academics coming from the 'North' have also called for attention when dealing with "concepts that are essentially contestable because they have political implications" (Brown & Arnley 2005: 11). In this work, we assert that the study of IR not only needs, but also requires multi-level analysis, which incorporates different approaches by taking into account various aspects of the functioning of our global society. Thus, it is indispensable to consider, beside political perspectives, also those of economics and other social sciences in order to get a more comprehensive interpretation.

Consequently, this paper aims to contribute to the mentioned ongoing debate. More specifically, it aims to create a new theoretical framework for assessing autonomy, which could possibly be applied to other countries whose position is vaguely identifiable in the international system. Besides, the study offers a distinct formulation of the concept of autonomy, avoiding absolutist views and instead it considers it as a question of degree. Lastly, the work is a valuable attempt to analyze a truly Latin American issue through European lenses, using theories developed in the southern part of Americas.

Furthermore, this work concentrates on specific case study – that of Brazil during the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) government. The research questions is the following: Which factors in particular have strongly influenced the varying levels of Brazil's autonomy during PT

government and how? Likewise, the article infers upon the ongoing intrigue by answering what kind of power is Brazil.

Finally, the work consists of five sections. The first part explains the historical debates developed around the concept of autonomy. Second part exposes our own theoretical framework for autonomous action in the international arena, which is constructed by combining the perspectives of realism, interdependency and structuralism. In third part the methodology of investigation is explained. In fourth section the specific case study of Brazil under the PT government is analyzed. The article ends by offering certain conclusions around the levels of autonomy enjoyed during the PT rule, it answers what kind of power is Brazil, and it offers some recommendations for posterior research.

## Literature Review

The notion that autonomy and its practice is analyzed through different lenses depending on the background of academics analyzing the international system can be clearly understood by juxtaposing the predominant realist vision on autonomy with the Latin American one. The kind of logic that stems from works of Hans J. Morgenthau (1986) and is also clearly projected in other neorealist works like that of Waltz (1979) represents views predominant in powerful countries. Thus, realists view the system as a structure dominated by anarchy. In this system, autonomy is a question only pertinent to great powers and the most powerful, as they are considered as the only ones that possess the autonomist capacity (Waltz 1979).

On the other hand, pioneering works of Latin American academics on autonomy were closely related to problems that were historically plaguing the region- specifically that of economic (under) development. The ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean) circles based their theories on structural perspective, sustaining how characteristics of the international system were, to a great extent, determinants of the external behavior of the region. According to this current, peripheral countries faced restricted options in terms of international insertion and foreign policy, being very vulnerable and easily absorbable by the centers that control the dynamics of the system (Prebisch 1949). In this way, Latin-American structuralism, even though initially intended to study Latin American economies, was eventually extended to deal with questions of insertion of these economies in the world system, and is thus related to problematic of autonomy and dependency.

Second major development in Latin American thought concerning autonomy was made by the so called “dependency school”. In their book “Dependency and Development in Latin America”, Cardoso and Faletto (1969) concentrated on the way of integration of national

economies into the international markets, concluding how “dependency is not simply an exploitation and coercion, but there exists a community of interests between the dominant local and external groups” (Bernal-Meza 2005: 95). In this sense, these authors were the first to consider interconnection between the internal and external factors of dependency (or lack of autonomy).

Next in line, Juan Carlos Puig (1984) and Helio Jaguaribe (1985), while being largely influenced by the North-American perspectives, created theories that fit into the realist world-view of IR. Here, ideas of a zero-sum game in international politics, questions of power dispute, and stratification of international system depending on power capacities became essential for their interpretations. Nevertheless, they differed from realists in that they rejected the notion that asserts how international system is dominated by anarchy. Instead, these authors claimed that there exists a well-established international hierarchy of vertical order. Besides, unlike North American realists, both Jaguaribe and Puig understood autonomy as a variable changing in time and modifiable - thus relevant for national concerns of any country, and not only of the most powerful. Additionally, these authors are also credited for developing concepts of autonomist practice, national viability, international permissibility and technical-business autonomy.

Furthermore, Fernando Cepeda (1986), by mostly concentrating on the experience of Venezuela, perceived how the root of autonomy can be found in specific material attributes. This author declared that “possibilities of autonomy surge with possibilities of support” (Cepeda 1986: 77). Thus, Cepeda noticed a correlation between economics and international politics, declaring how the economic base is the main factor that determines whether aspiration for autonomy in foreign policy will remain only theoretical or would be effectively consolidated.

Nevertheless, at the beginnings of the 1990s new circumstances marked by the end of the Cold War, increasing globalization, and novelties of democratization and integration in the Southern Cone, resulted in reevaluation of the concept of autonomy. Consequently, a concept of relational autonomy gained relevance. Essentially, it asserted how being autonomous and being dependent stopped presenting two contradictory notions because in an ever more interconnected world states could never be completely free from the influence of others (Russell and Tokatlian 2002).

At the same time and especially encouraged by the changing international climate, some even more derogative visions of autonomy emerged. According to adherents of peripheral realism (Escude, 1992), autonomy stopped being considered as the liberty of action. Here, according to Escude the liberty of action of almost any medium state is exorbitant, even reaching the limit of self-destruction, and as such it does not serve as a definition of autonomy. This current of thought encouraged thorough considerations of costs and benefits of any action undertaken in the

international arena, and essentially recommended strategy of bandwagoning (with the United States (US)) as the best one to pursue at the time.

Nevertheless, despite mentioned challenges, more traditional views of autonomy still offered resistance, principally by undergoing certain degree of remodeling. Most importantly, Manuel Carrillo Volcan (1999) argued that despite living in an interdependent world there are very few cases where interdependency is symmetrical, meaning that living in an interdependent world does not mean the same for every country. For Volcan, “autonomy in relation of interdependency is restricted by interaction, in which the capacity of each player to adapt itself to the situation in which interdependency affects it is proportional to autonomy it possesses” (Carrillo Volcan 1999: 16).

Most recently, Bernal-Meza takes a systemic view of autonomic possibilities of action. Being influenced by world-system theorists like Wallerstein, but also by Latin-American authors like Puig, Bernal-Meza (2005) notes how human groups always enjoy a space – extended or limited – inside of which they develop. “They operate, it is clear, inside of a context – both internal and external, material and sociological – from which they derive various limitations for their actions- and the state is not an exception” (Puig 1987: 31). Due to the fact that most Latin American countries cannot develop as an independent nodes of the system by themselves, works of this author are specifically concentrated around the question of regional integration. Thus, Meza notes how “the best road to overcome underdevelopment and to climb the systemic stratification is integration, not the individualistic alternative” (Bernal-Meza 2013: 46). Likewise, and by following similar line of thought, Miryam Colacrai (2009: 383) coins the notion of “regional autonomy”.

## **Theoretical Framework**

Essentially, the possibility of practicing a desired action is directly conditioned by the degree of autonomy, which has to be exercised inside of the system characterized by high levels of interdependency. However, for being characterized by power asymmetries, interdependence does not imply the absence of dependence, but rather relations of power. The overarching system inside of which countries operate, and seek fulfillment of their national goals, like development or autonomy, is predominantly established and shaped by the economic relations among the states. Basically, no nation has developed independently of the context of the world market (Wallerstein 2000). Since the system is strongly influenced by economic aspects, autonomy cannot be only a question of will, but it rather also has to be a question of ability. The only real autonomous action, even if strongly determined by political will, must be sustained by material support, because it will be of short life if there are no resources to back it up.



Diagram 1.



Source: Author.

This article considers autonomy as a property and desire of any and every country, which differs from the notion that sees autonomy as something that countries either possess or not. In our point of view, autonomy is a question of degree. Therefore, we should not ask whether a particular country possesses autonomy or not, but rather by how much of autonomy it disposes with. In sum, we propose six distinct variables that interact with each other, and establish possibilities and actual levels of autonomy for different countries.

Firstly, base factors are considered necessary to understand country's position in the system in terms of geography, history, culture, international values, military strength, population size, and resource wealth. Essentially, base factors determine a character of country's involvement in the international community and set the range of possible pathways it can undertake in its international behavior. Besides, they also influence creation of specific ideas or world-views that determine country's vision of the system and its place in it.

Next variable is the international system. It is considered to be an independent variable, out of control for many countries. Considered a big abstract interpretation, it represents the order of the day in the world and is influenced by various factors. Essentially, it sets an external framework that establishes certain conditions of international permissibility for any country (Jaguaribe 1985). Even if it does not act directly upon the states, it marks limitations and possibilities of actions. Thus, leaders of various countries cannot avoid taking into account systemic options when evaluating possibilities of external and internal action. As the system is composed of various countries, some will exercise more and some no control over the system. In this sense, big powers of each historical period are those that matter the most. These "repartidores supremos" (supreme distributors) or even some "repartidores regionales" (regional distributors) –

for their central positions in the functioning of international system - impose to a great extent options of potency or dependency on the world or regional scale (Puig 1984: 75).

Moving from external to internal factors we firstly consider national elites. Here, it is important to understand how groups that integrate the most-inner circles of national decision-making (largely those at the top of the national power pyramid) define the national interest, and thus also place their views into the foreign policy. As such, the concept of national interest results from the struggle of various partial interests. It is in these circles, whether concentrated or dispersed in power, where Puig's autonomic practice can effectively be constructed. Consequently, the lack of autonomist practice, or acceptance of dependency, is usually not imposed in a coercive form to a particular state, but has to be assumed by the local political elites (Jaguaribe 1985).

Moreover, the technological-business autonomy is the one that sets the material bases of autonomy in our world. Material support is indispensable for continuous exercise of autonomy. Even though economy was usually considered as low politics in international relations, British economist Ralph Hawtrey demonstrated in his work "Economic Aspect of Sovereignty" (1952) how "the relationship of economic affairs and national security, at least over long term, is reciprocal, as the unequal distribution of economic gains will certainly lead to change in the international balance of economic and military power, and will thus inevitably affect national security" (Gilpin 2001: 80). In this sense, countries that simply react to changes stimulated from other geographic areas do not possess this technological-business autonomy, and thus turn more dependent on the poles of dynamic expansion. Essentially, autonomy of business-technological type fulfils the requirements of executive character, that are of functional order and that can be influenced and changed by the effort of internal factors (Jaguaribe 1985).

Additionally, diversifiers of dependency refer to factors that allow concentration or diversification of both economic and political relations with few or many poles in the system. The fewer international connections a specific country has, the fewer options it possesses to act in the international arena, making itself more dependent on certain global poles of power.

Likewise, among multipliers of autonomy three are essential, and these are regional integration, national social cohesion, and potency of soft power in particular historical era. With respect to question of regional integration, the basic notion of multiplying autonomy is concentrated on questions of increasing regional polarization in the world (Puntigliano 2013; Bernal-Meza & Masera 2008), on economic benefits of integration (Balassa, 1980), and on political benefits of integration (Bernal-Meza 2000; Jaguaribe 1985; Puig 1984; Gilpin 2001). Also, soft power acts (Nye 2004) as a multiplier as it allows the country to gain higher importance in the international arena due to the fact that so many want to mirror its behavior, or simply want to

follow its lead. Finally, high levels of social cohesion act as multiplier of the efficiency of resources. Societies of northern Europe, like Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway are considered to be the archetypes of successful social cohesion, and their international presence is much more significant and influential than the base factors of these countries would suggest.

## **Methodology and Data Collection**

- 1) Qualitative research: We used the available secondary sources (specific publications, journal articles, books) in order to understand the state of the question, construct a theoretical framework and through induction and analogy reach conclusions about the questions posed in this work.
- 2) Empirical Research: We will use internationally available data (World Bank, Latinobarometro, Trademap, CEPAL, OECD, CIA) in order to assess the behavior of specific variables, such as trade flows, production specialization, poverty, education etc.
- 3) Analysis of news media and political discourse: We looked at news stories (Mercopress, BBC Mundo, Pagina 12, El Mostrador, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Economist, Al Jazeera, El Pais) in order to get necessary information that provides context to be analyzed.

## **Analysis of a case study: Brazil during PT**


Brazil's possibilities of action in the international arena are directly related to what we denominate as base factors. Its enormous size, large population, wealth of natural resources, and volume of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) indisputably place it on the map of potential global powers. However, its particular historical development, paired with restrictions that geography imposes in the Inter-American system, has significantly affected the possibilities of its international behavior. Nevertheless, Brazil still stands as the only country in the Western Hemisphere fulfilling conditions to act as rival to United States- the only hegemon in the region and undisputed world superpower (Bandeira 2011). Despite its unfulfilled dreams of greatness, Brazil, conscious of its size and potential, has historically considered itself a contender to position of global power, and has been governed by a prophetic sense with regards to its future (Mejia, 2012). Military has never been a central focus of Brazil, probably due to its relatively pacified neighborhood. Rather, its diplomacy has focused on pacific discourse and juridicism, making itself grotian (Lafer 2000). Still, economic problems of development and poverty, its historical obstacles, strongly shaped its perceptions of the international system and the role it aspired to assume in it, making autonomy and development into central historical concerns of its foreign policy.

During large part of PT's time in power, the international system was characterized by high levels of international permissibility. Here, there are three central factors to take in consideration when talking about permissibility of the international system. First one came in form of political crisis - the illegality of the US-led invasion of Iraq led to growing dissatisfaction with the country's unilateralism, making its global leadership less attractive to other states. Secondly, the growing importance of emerging economies - more specifically of Asia and most specifically of China - came to offer unprecedented opportunities for many countries, especially in form of material attributes of autonomy. Lastly, triumph of leftist governments in South America, historically more reluctant to follow unquestionably Washington's lead, further consolidated opposition to 'Washington Consensus' in the region. All these factors made previously established balances of power more unstable and uncertain, creating the perception that the heyday of US hegemony is over. Taking Huntington's term (1999), the new order in the international arena came to be defined as uni-multipolar, implying an atmosphere more favorable to multi-polarity. In South American region especially, as the possibilities of US leadership became restrained, more space was opened up for Brazil.

Moreover, the election of PT and its arrival to power could not be seen as neutral factor in terms of Brazil's foreign policy. PT got to power mainly thanks to powerful voter's base found among working class, poorer sectors of Brazilian interior, and some left leaning middle classes (Llana 2008). Also, it was the first party in the history of Brazil to win elections thanks to large grassroots support base. This has, without a doubt, played an important role in defining world-views and ideas about the international system in which Brazil was inserting itself. The unprecedented victory of the 'underdog' in Brazilian politics made the democratization of international relations a defining point of Brazil's insertion in the world. More precisely, the internal process of democratization was transposed in the international arena where Brazil came to demand a more open international system. Effectively, PT's national elites, taking advantage of systemic conditions of high international permissibility, took autonomous stance and more independent action in the international arena.


Furthermore, taking advantage of the already mentioned new currents, PT national elites started diversifying its economic and political relations, thus decreasing Brazil's dependence and vulnerability with regard to its international connections (see graphs no.1 and no.2). On the political level, PT made a move of soft distancing from the United States and the West in general, undertaking an important shift in foreign policy orientation with regard to previous administrations. With this in mind, Brazil started looking towards the 'Third World' and the emerging powers.

Chart 1.



Source: Author, based on data from trademap.org.

Chart 2.




Source: Author, based on data from trademap.org.

Rapprochement with the first was important for the assertion of Brazil’s role as the leading spokesman of the global South, giving it a more developmentalist outlook. Additionally, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), taking the role of “executive committee of emerging markets” (Turzi 2011: 102) served as a possible leverage that would eventually make Brazil into a recognized international actor and would allow it to enter the exclusive club of the rule makers that shape the international order. From the economic perspective, the diversification of trade partners led to a new economic geography with emphasis placed on other developing countries (see graphs no.1 and no.2). The greatest change here was the impact produced by China’s economic growth. Initially an insignificant commercial partner of the Southern Giant, China

became the largest exporting market for Brazil’s products by 2009, replacing more than a century long dominance of the United States (Trademap 2016). The economic importance of other regions, especially increasing exchanges with Latin America in general, and with Argentina in particular, were unprecedented in the history of Brazil. As Amorim (2010) noted, the fact that Brazilian exports no longer hinged primarily on the performance of global economic centers implied that the country was less exposed to harmful impact of the financial crisis of 2008-2009.

However, the other effect created by these changes was excessive reliance on China. During the period considered, growth of Chinese economy became a defining factor impacting Brazil’s economic performance. Coming as undesired side effect, new trade relations eventually seem to have led to re-primarization of Brazilian economy (see graph no.3). In this sense, Brazil’s hailed diversification success during the PT turned rather questionable.

Chart 3.



Source: Author, based on data from trademap.org.

Additionally, the incredible compatibility of foreign policies in the region during the PT’s administration served as an important multiplier of Brazilian autonomy in the world. This new policy, based on the “recuperation of Latin identity of Brazil”, meant, even if only for a limited time, a significant expansion of its respective area of international permissibility. PT undertook a project of ‘region construction’, where it specifically imagined and consequently made South America into its priority political area. In this sense, Mercosur (Southern Common Market) would acquire a significance of strategic alliance, strengthening negotiating position and multiplying sources of autonomous action vis-à-vis the United States (Bandeira 2011). Such regional

coordination made its most significant achievement by making Mercosur dividing line of Inter-American System, and at the same time serving as negotiating platform which finally impeded the creation of FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), leading instead to the so-called “Buenos Aires Consensus”. In this sense, creation of UNSUR (Union of South American Nations) in 2008 would represent the highest achievement of South American regional project.

Unfortunately for PT, despite various important accomplishments, regional project was very loosely institutionalized and as such did not have possibilities for long-term success. As Dabene (2009) well perceived, regional integration in South America eventually evolved into opportunities for presidential summitry. As such, it could only provide forums for ad-hoc crisis resolution or interpersonal negotiations, but would not turn into regime that governs interstate relations or binds the actions of their member states (Dabene 2009). In this sense, even Mercosur, a central reference for any kind of region building was left in a less coherent and effective state than it was in the 1990s. This “consensus regionalism” was overly dependent on fully harmonious symbiosis of regional governments and thus unstable. And even if PT was fortunate enough to coexist with regional partners sympathetic to its world-views, the process would be reverted once this condition changed.

Besides regional integration, another important multiplier of Brazil’s autonomy was its increasing soft power. Thanks to the newfound economic growth and incredible international activism of PT administration, all coupled with the charisma of President Lula, Brazil of PT exercised such ‘attractiveness of model’, further expanding its possibilities of autonomous action. Here, decreasing prestige of the US also played an important role, as it opened up more space for Brazil in the Americas and the world, where international action of PT would come to embody desires of international ethical responsibility. In this sense, its successful internal social and political dynamics provided it with greater international credibility, legitimacy and moral supremacy, allowing it to speak with more authority abroad.

Besides, and not less importantly, the apparent success of the Brazilian model to solve social problems and put economic issues in order was so powerful in its image that it established itself as the viable alternative to the Chilean model – which went unchallenged for decades in the region. In this sense, the concept of BRICS served as a strong brand and sort of a trademark that only further pumped the image of Brazil in the world, as it evoked ideas of rising change, magnitude, future and zeitgeist of global restructuring (Turzi 2011). The approval of Brazil’s bid to host both the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics was a clear affirmation of this positive perception of Brazil in the world at that specific moment. Likewise, creation of G20 (Group of 20), G4 (Group of 4), IBSA (India Brazil South Africa), CSN (South American

Community of Nations), UNASUR or CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) are direct outcomes of this foreign policy of prestige, which resulted in Brazil's international positioning congruent with its historical aspirations. However, as soft power is only soft, meaning that it depends excessively on perceptions rather than concrete facts, Brazil would soon discover limits of foreign policy built on soft power. One can only refer to the front page of Economist (see below) to see the boom and bust of Brazilian soft power.

In the meantime, social cohesion, a historical issue for country that in 1888 became the last in the Americas to abolish slavery, was not significantly improved during the PT rule. Even though PT rhetoric was emphasizing a more united Brazil, and was likewise coupled with cash transfer programs and more generally supported by economic growth, it is rather difficult to find evidence of improved institutional trust and feelings of belonging (Latinobarometro 2016). Moreover, recently intensified political dynamics in the country have been marked by increasing social polarization, and by the existence of various 'societies' inside of its national borders, where people do not feel like they share one common project or belong to the same reality. All these problems, persistent through times, would only intensify - as they did historically - with the arrival of economic, political and social crisis.

Picture 1. Two Front Pages of The Economist.



Source: The Economist: respectively November 4th, 2008 and September 24th, 2013.

Furthermore, when thinking about continuity versus change in foreign policy the article has underlined that control of technology and economic processes related to development of Brazil has been the most continuous factor in policy of any government. Nevertheless, there have



been some specificities particular to the rule of PT. Investment in R&D (Research and Development) has been on the increase during PT era, contributing additional 31.3 billion USD (US Dollars) to the budget in 2012 with respect to one in 2003 (World Bank 2016). However, even with this sum Brazil still lags significantly behind other advanced economies and China. Another major factors essential for the exercise of technological-business autonomy – those of education and human capital (PISA results) - have not been significantly altered (OECD 2014). Generally speaking, population of Brazil is still very uneducated, a finding supported by the studies conducted by OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and PISA (Program for International Student Assessment). Fortunately for PT, the booming of country's economy, which reached record levels of exports, provided enough financial support for the exercise of autonomy during the big part of PT's mandate.

The real problems for the PT came when the tectonic plates of international system moved once again. First and foremost, the slowdown of Chinese economy, whose growth rates reached lowest levels in decades, represented a detrimental blow to the Southern Giant. Further collapse of Brazilian economy led to low or inexistent growth rates, measuring GDP decline of 3.85 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2016). The resulting loss of material support for autonomy was crucial for the unfolding scenario, and the economic crisis eventually led to the political one. It was at this time that Brazil's model, famed for a whole decade, turned into ashes. Consequently, affected by the corruption scandal in Petrobras – the archetype of Brazilian rise, and by downgrading of Brazil's debt to junk status, the image of Brazil in the world abruptly shattered into pieces and has caused a demise of its soft power. It was at this moment that limits of autonomy without technological-business bases became obvious. This signaled the end of yet another exteriorly-led growth cycle in Brazil. In addition, being the models of growth of neighboring countries even less technologically autonomous, Chinese cough led to Latin American pneumonia, shifting the governments in power, and creating a regional atmosphere very suspicious of the PT leadership, being the arrival of Macri the signal of change. This has in effect led to unraveling of weaknesses of “consensus regionalism” in South America and has once again revealed the inexistence of solid regional integration. Similarly, rising economic issues in the region further impaired Brazilian economic health. At the same time, third systemic effect occurred - the once again changing image of the US in the world. Here, moderate diplomatic style brought about by the President Obama, coupled with the economic recovery from Great Recession, solidified the US as a credible global leader. Thus, as the attractiveness of the ‘Brazilian model’ was waning, governments of the region considered their first best alternative - Washington. In this newly created scenario, countries of the region seemed eager to once again play the well-known bandwagoning strategy. Recent

advancement of the Pacific Alliance (AP) and Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Uruguay's desire to sign a FTA (Free Trade Agreement) with the US, Cuba's exit from the Brazilian orbit, and the declining importance of Mercosur all played into this new narrative of shifting relations in the Western hemisphere. In such scenario, historically unresolved issues of social cohesion and the lack of autonomous economic development resurfaced again, and continued to act as an impediment for international projections of Brazil. These circumstances were too much to handle for the now changed PT national elites, which without Lula lost a big part of their appeal and became just one of the many untrustworthy political elites.

## **Conclusion and Final Remarks**

The main purpose of this work was to grasp better the problems of international insertion of Brazil during two PT governments, or more generally, to address the exercise of autonomy of a peripheral country in the international arena. By constructing a theoretical framework, the article aspired to expose and underline various factors that we consider indispensable for understanding various degrees of autonomy that this country may exercise at any point in time.

The main concept this paper deals with – that of autonomy - is analyzed through the lenses of the interdependent world. However, interdependency, for being asymmetrical, implies power relations inside the international system. System itself is of major importance as it delimits a particular context inside of which various states operate and from which they derive various limitations for their action. Even if it does not act directly upon the states, it imposes constraints and provides possibilities of action, thus setting the degree of international permissibility. Autonomy is understood as the possibility of carrying out a desired action. State's national elites craft foreign policy within the international system, and it is mostly up to them whether to aspire to autonomist practice or not. Nevertheless, autonomous action, even if being a political decision, must be sustained by material support. In this world system, the economic factors are of major importance, but still not the only ones to determine the attainable levels of autonomy. Essentially, they provide the material base - the strongest one being that of technological-business type – without which any conception of autonomy is impossible. But autonomy is not solely dependent on the economic performance of the country. It is a rather complex notion, whose levels correspond to functioning of various variables that influence its possibilities and realities, making it a question of degree, all of which was demonstrated in the analytical part where the case study of PT rule was examined.

The research shows that the levels of autonomy exercised by PT national elites were one of the highest in Brazil's history. This was a result of changes in certain factors that the article has

identified as having influence on the level of autonomy. Thus, reasons for these unprecedented levels of autonomy can be found in relatively higher permissibility of the international system, existence of elites functional to autonomous goals, high levels of harmonization of regional foreign policies, new options for diversification of international commerce, new political connections, high economic growth and perceived success of internal politics and economics that increased the soft power and made Brazil a model to follow.

Nevertheless, during this process of changing international positioning, re-primarization of economy and excessive dependence on exports to China appeared as undesirable side effects. In the meantime, no serious effort was made or change noted with respect to business-technological bases of autonomy and social cohesion. Essentially, the high tide produced by Chinese demand overshadowed these issues and left them unaddressed.

Moreover, the findings that we have obtained during the research make us conclude that Brazil is a pendulum power. Its international autonomy, and thus international standing, depends on the behavior of factors described in this paper, which when conducive to Brazil's foreign policy serve as a trampoline that elevate this country to the status of global power. From one side, its base factors will continue to position it as an important international player that, being aware of its potential, always aspires for change. In the times of higher international permissibility, if paired with economic growth, its power attributes will accentuate. However, country's inability to acquire higher levels of technological-business autonomy, the only one that fulfils requirements of executive character, will continue to seriously impede its autonomous international projections. Besides, factor of social cohesion, overly influenced by poverty and inequality, even if not as detrimental as some other factors, will become essential obstacle for its international standing in times of crisis. In a notch, and following Ferrer (1996), if Brazil desires to reach the first world and thus turn itself into a major power, it will have to keep transforming its comparative advantage in function of the dynamic changes in the world market, thus finding its true technological-business autonomy. In the meantime, while it fails to do so, it will only stay a pendulum power, whose international projections will be strongly influenced by the factors it can hardly control.

Lastly, the main advantage of this thesis, its holistic approach, is also its main limitation. The reason is the difficulty of fully assessing each and every factor we consider important for measuring the autonomy. However, this holistic technique is understood as indispensable for understanding of a country one investigates. In the best case scenario, an inter-disciplinary approach, undertaken by researches from different academic disciplines would be considered as most appropriate. Besides, this research also serves as an invitation to all scientists of international relations to focus more on developing different theories of international involvement and

international action for different countries. The fact that hopefully many shall accept by now is that not every country is the same, and thus many dominant theories of international relations, despite definitely explaining many important phenomena in our world, can still fail to properly account for realities different from those present in the countries where they were produced. Rather than a strong critique to a mainstream views of the functioning of our world, this work aspires to serve as an invitation for expansion of a dialogue among different perspectives of international relations, be it from those that specifically specialize in one discipline, or be it from those that attempt a more inter-disciplinary approach. A more integrated approach is definitely needed due to the huge complexity of the world we live in, and due to various distinct realities present in various parts of our world. Due to limitations that our geographical, social, cultural and psychological environments impose on us, only one singular theory will never be able to account for all the distinct complexities and problems that may be irrelevant for some and major for others.

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## Racial democracy myth and the (non) support for race-targeted policies in Brazil: evidences from a survey list-experiment

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### Abstract

*This paper aims at understanding the strength of the main arguments of the racial democracy myth and its application on shaping Brazilian college students' opinions on the adoption of affirmative actions on public universities. Through an experiment embedded in a survey, we look at the attitudes towards racial and social quotas expressed by college students from the University of Brasília and the Federal University of Minas Gerais, both public institutions in Brazil. The list-experiment technique guarantees the necessary privacy for the respondents to feel free to give honest answers, avoiding the social desirability effect. Empirical data support our hypothesis: the racial democracy myth depreciates racial attributes as explanatory factors to inequalities in Brazil, leaving them only to class and income features. Thus, the opposition to racial quotas is always higher than to social quotas, and social desirability effects affect both quotas systems.*

**Keywords:** *affirmative actions, Brazil, list-experiment, public opinion, racial attitudes, racial democracy myth*

## Introduction

The adoption of racial or social quotas for admission in Brazilian public universities has had its first experience in 2002, when the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) has introduced the reserve of spots to black, brown and indigenous self-declared candidates. This system reserved 20% of the available positions for racial quotas, 20% for social quotas, 5% for people with disabilities and the remaining spots for broad competition.

From 2001 to 2013, affirmative action policies have been extended to other public education institutions, through the Quotas Bill (12.711/2012) sanctioned in 2012, which destines 50% of federal universities spots to students entirely originated from the public education system. The appliance of the Quotas Bill considers the minimum State percentage of blacks, browns and indigenous, according to the National Census (IBGE, 2010).

In late 90's, Brazil has put in the public agenda the discussion on race-targeted policies or affirmative actions (Guimarães, 1999). Traditionally, these policies have been seen by specialists as ways to correct educational and labor inequalities that affect poor population (mainly composed by black people). As race-targeted policies such as racial quotas get stronger in Brazilian public agenda, we can notice that the debate about them also flourishes, engendering favorable and counter opinions.

In the academic environment the affirmative actions have received some attention during the last years, but little has been said about how Brazilians reason and what they think about affirmative action policies. In spite of the lack of research on racial relations in Brazil from the perspective of political attitudes (Telles 2003; Bailey 2009), we analyze how reminiscences of the racial democracy myth are observed in the opinions towards racial or social quotas in public universities.

Bailey (2009) states that even though the persistency of the racial democracy myth has been a trace of Brazilian political culture, Brazilian Political Science has not dedicated itself to investigate the political effects of this discourse, and this is one of our guiding motivations to this paper. The ways in which this ideology is translated into concepts and attitudes among Brazilian public opinion continue to be largely unknown.

The research that originates this paper is justified by this: our central goal is to investigate the strength of the racial democracy myth arguments and its unfoldings on the shaping of Brazilian college students' attitudes on racial relations and, mostly, on the adoption of affirmative actions on public universities. Our main hypothesis (H1) is that, due to the predominance of a point of view in which Brazilian social inequalities are concentrated on income and social class asymmetries, the adhesion to social quotas (reserve of available spots to poor candidates, no matter their color)

is higher than the adhesion to racial quotas. Second, we should expect that social desirability affects the answers about both types of quotas with stronger effects for the racial quotas (H2), since Brazilian social norms state that any race-targeted policy would be a formal discrimination, thus the preference for social quotas will always be higher than to racial quotas (H3).

Among individuals that prefer social quotas to racial quotas, we should presume that explanations that deflate the relevance of racial criteria are dominant, according to the presumptions of the so-called 'racial democracy myth'. By using the 'myth' as a racial belief system, we seek to explore one of the dimensions of the current racial dynamics in Brazil, to which correspond some specific attitudes.

### **Racial Public Opinion and the Racial Democracy Myth**

Considering our main hypotheses, we should investigate which are the main legacies of the so-called 'racial democracy myth' to the interpretation of public opinion on racial relations in Brazil. We have in mind that racial attitudes – specifically, attitudes towards affirmative actions in Brazil - might be due to different elements (color and race features, racial beliefs, political positions etc.), just like Kinder and Sanders (1996) show us. Here, we treat opposition to affirmative actions as a multidimensional system, composed by different factors, that refer to the interaction and processing of racial issues and race-targeted policies.

The research on racial relations is seen as fundamental to Brazilian social dynamics: this discussion has been the target of different reviews as time went by. According to Telles (2003), the 'racial democracy myth' expression has been coined by the Negro Movement in the 60's, to express the assumed fallacious character of freyrean approaches on racial relations in Brazil. We are going to use this expression in this paper, because it denotes an argument that is dear to us, that refers to antirracist explanations on social inequalities in Brazil, that remain in vogue until nowadays. We should note that this 'myth' has basically two dimensions: (i) the appreciation of miscegenation as a genuine Brazilian product and the perception that there is no split between races in the country; and (ii) the predominance of arguments that deflate racial criteria in its influence on labor, educational and income inequalities in Brazil, such as the denial over racism in Brazil. This paper focuses on the second dimension.

However, despite the frequent reviews, the so-called racial democracy myth remains strong. The original formulation of this concept can be found in Gilberto Freyre's work (1900-1987). He discussed the rise of Brazilian society focusing on the interaction between different racial matrixes, mainly European and African. Freyre establishes a change in framing the Brazilian racial studies, centering culture instead of biological-racial determinants. Freyre states that the interaction

of specific cultural forms in the colonial environment has yielded asymmetrical racial relations, though they were seen as soft. The relative fluidness of miscegenation would be visible, therefore, in the absence of institutionalized racism (as in the US) and in the possibility of social mobility.

While in the US the ‘one-drop rule’<sup>25</sup> is used, in Brazil racial ambiguity is celebrated<sup>26</sup>. Much of this racial ambiguity in Brazil, according to Telles (2004), lies with nonwhite individuals: light, dark, brown, darkened, mulatto and black, are the various ‘degrees’ of Brazilian miscegenation. However, people may identify themselves as white, even when displaying black features, stating that color imputation in Brazil is a dynamic process (Muniz 2012). The miscegenation idea in Brazil holds that whites, blacks and Indians socialize, live and mingle biologically to the point that racial distinctions become meaningless.

Although it is not ignored by Freyre, social inequality originated from the maintenance of manorial relations between whites and blacks in colonial environment is not sufficiently treated in his writings, and this is one of the reasons why Freyre is commonly known as an antirracist writer. Here, we understand antirracist approaches as the discourses known for not using the “race” category as a variable or explanatory condition of the asymmetric distribution of resources between whites and nonwhites, deviating the focus of some debates to concepts such as social class. In fact, many reviews of the ‘racial democracy myth’ have stated that one of the consequences of this racial belief system is the persistence of antirracist approaches.

The racial democracy is the “myth” that denies the existence of any kind of racism and it is endorsed by both whites and blacks, serving as a way to delay the possibility of collective action based on specific social groups (Bailey 2004). Denying that racial discrimination causes disadvantages to blacks is a central feature of the myth, which impacts attitudes towards racial policies. This belief would serve as an ideology of denial of racism in Brazilian society, influencing Brazilian social relations by creating a set of beliefs that blacks occupy subordinate positions, while whites were born to higher social positions (Bailey 2004).

In this paper, we test the interaction between race, class and views towards racial dynamics in Brazil in order to shed some light in the discursive differences in reinforcing or denying racial views between racial and class groups. Besides, we aim at clarifying linkages between color and socioeconomic status to understand racial public opinion patterns.

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<sup>25</sup> The “one-drop rule” is a norm of racial classification (formal or not), historically important in countries such as the United States. It states that people with at least one African ancestor are classified as black.

<sup>26</sup> 40% of Brazilians in the 2000 census identified itself as “mixed race”, meanwhile in the US the number is less than 3%.

## Data and Method

The measurement of issues such as the support for affirmative actions is difficult, because it is a socially sensitive issue, that is, it represents the expression of preferences on issues that are not socially consensual. Commonly related to this topic are racial, sexual orientation, drug use and gender issues. Generally, people do not want to answer or publicly disclose their social preferences when faced with a traditional survey (Berinsky 2002; Krysan and Couper 2003), making the answers of respondents suffer an effect of “social desirability”, that is, the answer goes towards what is socially accepted and desired by the social norms.

The effect of social desirability is the propensity of the respondents to answer questions in a way that is well regarded by the others. Since people always want to make a good impression and they care about what others think about them, there is a strong motivational component (Berinsky 2002). This effect may end up overestimating “good attitudes” or underestimating “bad attitudes” according to the social norms. This trend represents a problem for conducting behavioral research with self-reported surveys.

Despite these difficulties, measuring attitudes about socially sensitive issues is possible due to advances in research methods, especially in survey research. Thus, we use a technique known as list-experiment and often used in political science (e.g. Kuklinski et al 1997a; Kuklinski et al 1997b; Sniderman e Carmines 1997) for this type of measurement, because it allows to indirectly question the respondents, ensuring greater sincerity in their answers.

In the list-experiment as originally conceived by Kuklinski et al. (1997b), the control group respondents ( $T_i = 0$ ) receive a list of items ( $J$ ) and should tell the interviewer how many of the listed items they agree with, without specifying which ones. Respondents from the treatment group ( $T_i = 1$ ) receive the same instructions and the same list of items from the control group, however, the list contains one item more ( $J+1$ ) that measures the issue of interest.

Between October 2012 and January 2013, an online survey was designed. In April 2013 the survey was applied to all undergraduate students at the University of Brasilia (UnB), and in June 2013 for all undergraduate students at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) to measure attitudes students on the quotas system, contacted by e-mail to answer voluntarily. Due to similar university profiles, the students' data were treated aggregately.

Students took part in three different studies on student quotas: quotas for students from public schools, quotas for low-income students and racial quotas. In total, 4,121 students answered the racial quotas survey and 4,197 students answered the social quotas survey. Each specific survey had a number between 17 and 18 questions, differing only on the question list control, treated list or a third group with a direct question.

Among the 3,416 racial quotas and 3,535 social quotas surveys completed, 1,354 (racial quotas) and 1,401 (social quotas) received the standard question, 1,367 (racial quotas) and 1,369 (social quotas) received the control list, 1,320 (racial quotas) and 1,347 (social quotas) received the treated list.

The experiment randomly assigned respondents in the control group, treated group or the baseline group. Respondents in the control group were asked a first question on quotas (Appendix 1) and the order of items on both lists (control and treated) are always randomized to minimize the effects of items order. Respondents in the treated group were also asked with the same list, however, with the addition of a sensitive item (Appendix 2).

Bear in mind that all items relate to the access to Brazilians public universities (Appendix 1), which makes it less suspicious and more difficult to the participants identify the research issue. These items were chosen according to the recommendations of how best to build a list from Glynn (2010). Moreover, the items were chosen in order to avoid any ceiling effect. Kuklinski *et al* (1997b) notes that a ceiling effect can occur when a respondent honestly answered yes to all non-sensitive items.

When this occurs with a respondent in the treated group, he/she has no longer enough protection to honestly report his/her response to the sensitive item and therefore he/she may underreport his/her true response. Kuklinski *et al* (1997b) shows an example: in their research, a large part of the control group agreed to all non-sensitive items, and due to the consequent *ceiling effect*, the results were a negative ratio of the sensitive item.

To avoid this, Glynn (2010: 6) recommends the use of a negative correlation between items, which is, among the items (1) and (4) of our list, because someone who believes the ENEM should be adopted as the means of entry to all federal universities should never agree to a free admission system in the universities.

It is from the difference of the means (treated and control groups) that we estimate the racial attitudes, in this case the percentage (just multiplying by 100) of respondents opposed the racial quotas or social quotas. The baseline group received instead of the list-experiment a conventional and direct question about the racial quotas or social policy (Appendix 3).

This third group was created to test how the attitudes and opinions of respondents change when confronted directly with the socially sensitive issue, because the simple embarrassment to admit an antipathy towards another group like blacks, gays, foreigners or women will be sufficient to mask and distort the true answers.

Therefore, false attitudes and opinions not only mean a measurement error, but also mean systematically wrong analysis: wrong estimators, inverted signals and variables without explanatory

power (Corstange 2008). This all makes the fake answers not only an epistemological problem, but “an epistemological problem with teeth” (Corstange 2008: 2). The self-declaration is chosen as the race criteria classification, because it involves the internal process of rejection or acceptance of symbols, traditions and lifestyle associated with certain groups (Telles 2004: 89).

However, the gain on the disposal of social desirability bias and privacy for respondents costs the loss of efficiency because there is the loss of information due to the fact that responses are aggregated (sum of items selected). Notwithstanding, Blair and Imai (2012) and Imai (2012) developed new estimators of maximum likelihood (ML) that enable the realization of multivariate regression analyses to the list of experiments in different research designs. This method helps to estimate values for the different model parameters and thus efficiently explore the individual characteristics of the respondents and the likelihood to agree to the sensitive item, enabling to estimate who is more (or less) likely to agree with the sensitive item.

The key advantage of the regression methodology proposed by Blair and Imai (2012) is its greater statistical efficiency as it allows to recover the loss of information resulting from the aggregation of responses from the list of experiments. However, the validity of the method depends on some assumptions.

A first assumption is the *no design effect*. A design effect can arise when individuals evaluate the items relative to each list to the other. It is assumed that the addition of the sensitive item does not change the sum of the positive responses to the other items control. The presence of a “design effect” would cause the evaluation of the respondent would depend on control items sensitive item, leading to different propensities to agree to control items between the control and treatment groups (Blair and Imai, 2012).

The second assumption is that respondents give truthful answers to the sensitive item, that is, there are no liars. Under the assumptions 1 and 2, the addition of sensitive items does not alter responses to control items (no design effect) and that the response to each item is true (no liars). Thus, the proposed method allows researchers to conduct multivariate statistical analyses to the results of the list-experiment.

## Results

The first step is to confirm that the experimental groups were comparable. Thus, means-in-differences tests between groups were performed and there were no statistically significant differences between the groups in terms of sex, race, income, and political knowledge. Therefore, the random selection was successful. Random selection ensures the basis to assume that the control group behaves like the treated group would behave if it had not received the treatment

(and vice versa). When comparing the average results in the treated group with the average score in the control group, the average treatment effect can be estimated. Therefore, these statistical tests are essential to clarify if the differences between groups occurred simply by chance (sample variance) or if they are results of the experimental treatment (Druckman et al., 2011).

Table 1 shows the results for the *no design effect* test. Here we want to fail to reject to null hypothesis for both quotas. The *alpha* of both lists reach the limit (.05 and .05) and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no design effect, thus both lists are good. No zero or negative values were found, hence no floor or ceiling effects were found.

Table 1: Global estimated average support for racial quotas

y value	Racial Quotas				Social Quotas			
	$\pi_{y0}$	s.e.	$\pi_{y1}$	s.e.	$\pi_{y0}$	s.e.	$\pi_{y1}$	s.e.
0	13.4%	.01	3.8%	.01	6.4%	.007	14.5%	.01
1	24.7	.01	17.1	.02	13.2	.01	23.7	.02
2	13.2	.01	15.5	.01	9.9	.01	19.1	.01
3	3.7	.01	5.6	.009	3.0	.01	6.8	.01
4	0.5	.006	2.1	.004	0.4	.007	2.6	.004
Total	55.5		44.1		32.0		66.7	

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Note. The table shows the estimated proportion for each experimental group ( $\pi_{y,z}$ ) characterized by the total number of affirmative responses to control items (y) and the true answer to the sensitive (1 is affirmative and 0 is negative). Standard errors are also provided for each estimated proportion.

Table 2 shows the average number of items that the respondents agree with, both for control and treatment lists. The difference-in-means (multiplied by 100) indicates the estimated proportion of students (43.8%) who agreed with the sensitive item and thus truly support racial and social quotas at the University of Brasilia and the Federal University of Minas Gerais. This result can be compared to the one obtained from the benchmark group, who answered the direct question with no privacy.

The benchmark group showed a 54.6% average support for the racial quotas. The difference between this group and the result from the list experiment (54.6% - 43.8%) indicates an overestimation of the real preferences on racial quotas. Thus, opposition to racial quotas among students is generally underestimated by almost 11% in conventional surveys, and this percentage represents the social desirability effect. Table 2 also shows the estimated percentage of students who agreed with the sensitive item (multiplied by 100) which was 65.9% and thus truly support



social quotas in both universities. If we compare with the direct question from the benchmark group, a support of 73.4%, we have that the true preferences are overestimated by 7.5% (73.4% - 65.9%).

Table 2: Global estimated average support for racial quotas and social quotas

	Control Group	Treatment Group	A Difference-in-means in %	B Benchmark Group in %	B - A
RACIAL QUOTAS	2.38 (.027)	2.82 (.034)	<b>43.8*</b> (.043)	54.6	<b>10.8</b>
n	1243	1215		1246	
SOCIAL QUOTAS	2.37 (.028)	3.03 (.032)	<b>65.9*</b> (.043)	73.4	<b>7.5</b>
n	1264	1245		1302	

Source: Authors' own elaboration. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. \*p<.05

Table 3 presents the results of white students' support to the racial quotas and social quotas to the list experiment. As we can see, the support for the social quotas is larger than for the racial quotas. While only 33.3% of the white respondents agreed with the racial quotas, 60.9% of the white respondents agreed with the social quotas item.

Table 3: Estimated average support for racial and social quotas by white students

	Control Group	Treatment Group	A Difference-in-means (in %)	B Benchmark Group in %	B - A
RACIAL QUOTAS	2.34 (.037)	2.68 (.047)	<b>33.3*</b> (.059)	48.62	<b>16.44</b>
n	655	621		582	
SOCIAL QUOTAS	2.35 (.039)	2.96 (.044)	<b>60.9*</b> (.059)	67.89	<b>6.85</b>
n	640	677		626	

Source: Authors' own elaboration. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. \*p<.05

Table 4 presents the estimated average support for racial and social quotas by family income. Income groups were classified into tertiles: the first tertile was composed by individuals with family income up to R\$ 3,500, the second tertile was composed by family income of R\$ 3,501

to R \$ 8,000 and finally the third tertile is composed by individuals of family income upper than R\$ 8,001. As shown in Table 4, along with the increase in family income a decrease happens on the support for racial quotas. The higher the income, the lower the support for racial quotas.

Table 4: Estimated average support for racial and social quotas by family income

RACIAL QUOTAS				SOCIAL QUOTAS			
Income	Control Group	Treatment Group	Difference-in-means (in %)	Income	Control Group	Treatment Group	Difference-in-means (in %)
1 <sup>o</sup> <i>Tertil</i>	2.43 (.044)	2.97 (.056)	<b>53.9*</b> (.072)	1 <sup>o</sup> <i>Tertil</i>	2.42 (.048)	3.12 (.051)	<b>69.8*</b> (.070)
n	466	479		n	504	486	
2 <sup>o</sup> <i>Tertil</i>	2.33 (.049)	2.78 (.062)	<b>44.7*</b> (.079)	2 <sup>o</sup> <i>Tertil</i>	2.39 (.052)	2.96 (.059)	<b>56.8*</b> (.079)
n	356	334		n	359	359	
3 <sup>o</sup> <i>Tertil</i>	2.36 (.047)	2.66 (.059)	<b>30.5*</b> (.075)	3 <sup>o</sup> <i>Tertil</i>	2.29 (.048)	2.99 (.059)	<b>69.5*</b> (.076)
n	421	402		n	401	400	

Source: Authors' own elaboration. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. \*p<.05

However, the results for the social quotas the same trend does not follow. The support of high income students is as high as the support of low income students, while middle family income students show less support to the social quotas. Yet, these results are only by the economic feature.

While the simple means-in-different test is informative, those first results do not allow us to explore which characteristics are associated with this rejection. Table 5 presents the results for the multivariate analysis. The values of interest are in the column 'sensitive item', which presents the estimates of individuals to the sensitive item of the list-experiment according to each independent variable. Our model includes the control variables, political knowledge and the racial democracy myth attitude coded as dummy<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> The item in the survey stated: “There is no Racism in Brazil”. Answers were in a likert scale: “Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree”.

Table 5: Multivariate analysis for racial and social quotas

RACIAL QUOTAS	Sensitive item		Control items	
	Est.	s.e.	Est.	s.e.
<i>Intercept</i>	.535	.16	1.545	.10
White	<b>-.17*</b>	.09	-.09	.05
Gender (women)	.12	.09	-.17	.06
Income	-.02	.01	.001	.006
Political Knowledge	.04	.03	-.002	.02
Racial Democracy Myth	<b>-.21*</b>	.08	-.06	.05

SOCIAL QUOTAS	Sensitive item		Control items	
	Est.	s.e.	Est.	s.e.
<i>Intercept</i>	.816	.16	1.508	.11
White	<b>-.14*</b>	.09	-.005	.06
Gender (women)	.01	.09	-.09	.06
Income	-.006	.01	-.005	.007
Political Knowledge	.0005	.03	-.009	.02
Racial Democracy Myth	<b>-.13**</b>	.08	-.05	.05

Source: Authors' own elaboration. \* $p < .05$  \*\* $p < .01$  \*\*\* $p < .001$

In order to catch any effects of the myth in the opinions, we have tested the effects of denying of the existence of racism in Brazil, which we have treated as an example of an antiracist point of view, in the opposition for social and racial quotas. The results show that the denial of racism in Brazil decreases the support to both quotas. In both models, being white diminishes the likelihood to support any type of quotas ( $p < .05$ ). While income fails to reach any statistical significance, gender and political knowledge show positive estimates, thus, higher political knowledge and being a woman increase the support for the quotas.

The positive estimates for political knowledge show that it plays an important role on the adoption of democratic norms and political tolerance and the reduction of prejudice and in this sense, would lead to greater support for the quotas (Robinson, 2015). Detailed knowledge on specific policy causes the respondents to take different decisions they would take if they had no such knowledge (Gilens 2001).

## Discussion

According to the data, the social desirability effects remain in both racial and social quotas (H2) and may be identified by several measures of adhesion. However, when we isolate social desirability effects, we can notice that, in an aggregate level, the adhesion to social quotas is clearly

higher than racial quotas. Table 2 brings an information that corroborates, *a priori*, our main hypothesis (H1): the support for social quotas for the admissions in Brazilian public universities is higher than the support for racial quotas, even when we control the social desirability effect by the comparison between treatment and benchmark groups. The net preference for social quotas exceeds the preference for racial quotas in 22%, and it may sign to us that the higher support for social quotas instead of racial quotas is an example of an antirracist remaining approach, one of the main features of the ‘racial democracy myth’. Yet, it is necessary to discuss if these differences may be due to the core myth definitions.

Table 3 shows that the support to the social quotas is almost twice as higher as to the racial quotas between the self-declared white students. We understand, therefore, that the opposition of racial quotas in Brazil is mostly due to one of the most important traits of the racial democracy myth: the antirracist discourse, that is, the argument based on the idea that social inequalities in Brazil are not caused by racial asymmetries. In short, the persistence of an antirracist approach states that race, *per se*, might not produce social injustices in Brazil. Thus, from this point of view, there is no need for racial quotas.

The social desirability effect is clear: in contents in which the interviewed individuals feel more exposed, they tend to choose answers close to the socially desirable, answers that do not cause awkwardness in the interviewer nor take to bad judgements about the respondent. Our results support H2: racial quotas have a bigger social desirability effect (3.3% more) than social quotas, and when we look to whites only this difference grows bigger (9.59% more).

The data also show that social quotas are always preferred over racial quotas (H3), and this trend seems to transcend methodological discussions. About this, Guimarães (1999) postulates that one of the main trends in Brazilians’ racial behavior is the fact that, very often, racial discrimination treats itself as antiracism, and treats any other evaluation of racial attributes (taken as explanatory variables) as manifestations of racism. Therefore, in a nutshell, it is socially desirable to prefer social quotas than racial quotas, once the difference between candidates by race would be, itself, an expression of racism.

Thus, even though social desirability cannot be ignored, it is not the only possible explanation. When we disaggregate data in terms of racial classification and income, we can see that even so the preference for social quotas trespasses racial quotas before and afterwards the demise of the social desirability effect, which provides more evidence to our hypothesis (H3).

Another result that deserves proper attention is that, in the regression models, income is not statistically significant to determine the (non) support for either racial or social quotas, while race shows a high and statistically significant coefficient. These results could also be explained by

the self-interest perspective<sup>28</sup>: according to former contributions (Bobo, 2003), self and group interests could be interpreted as explanatory factors of a possible relevance of income in the evaluation of race-targeted policies. Once the admission in Brazilian public universities has a flavor of competition and thus affirmative actions would do good *a priori* only to the black and brown population that has been traditionally excluded from higher education, from the views of white students these actions would not benefit them in a straightforward logic, since there is no way how to extract personal benefits from these initiatives. This hypothesis is also developed by Kinder and Sanders (1996) and Sears *et al* (2000) in their discussion on the approval of affirmative actions in American universities.

According to this thought, we should expect that, on the other side, blacks and browns would declare themselves more favorable to racial quotas than to social quotas, exactly because they would have more profit from these policies. However, from the multivariate models, we can see that blacks and browns support both type of quotas. Turning to whites' preferences, as shown in Vidigal (2015), the experimental results shown that self-interest theory also has no effect on the support of racial quotas between whites. High income whites are strongly against the racial quotas, while low income whites support it.

As shown in Table 4, the higher the respondents' income, the support to racial quotas gets lower, in consonance with Vidigal (2015). As regards social quotas, we notice a different trend: the support expressed by low and high income students are similar. This data, *prima facie*, indicates that the richest students recognize the existence of inequalities and the need of quotas, but do not link them to racial attributes, thus they support the social quotas and rebuff the racial quotas.

The downward support to social quotas among medium income students may indicate a point identified by Kinder and Sanders (1996): when asked about their support to focused public policies, individuals that occupy intermediate income categories tend to be more conservative. In this case, being conservative means to think that the State is not the responsible to protect minorities and correct inequalities, adopting a 'non-interventionist' perspective.

These results also show us that, in contrast with the endurance of the racial democracy myth and the antirracist approaches, Brazil is not exactly a *color blind society* as commonly thought, once race in our results is way stronger than class in order to explain the opposition to racial and social quotas. Later studies in the social stratification field, such as Osorio (2008), give space to racial criteria as explanatory variables in other ways: racial discrimination and racial resentment. According to these studies, not only inequalities of exposition and access to goods and material,

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<sup>28</sup> However, we should highlight that, in this paper, we are focusing on the attitudes professed by college students, that already had to face selection processes to apply to college. The perception of self and group interests might vary according to the individual and collective context, such as competition for a spot in public universities.

educational and cultural services produce social asymmetries, but also racial discrimination to which most of the afro Brazilian people are exposed in Brazil.

Thus, disadvantages in fields such as labor market entrance and permanence in higher education would be linked not only to the absence/insufficiency of resources, but also to the expression of prejudice and discrimination. As regards this, it is important to verify that, by preferring to the social quotas instead of the racial quotas, Brazilian college students surveyed do not recognize, yet, racial discrimination as a producer of social asymmetries, especially in social status.

According to Guimarães (1999), one of the remarkable tensions in Brazilian citizens' racial attitudes research would be caused by the interchanging between egalitarian and traditionalist presumptions. There would be, according to him, a trend of using some sort of upside-down egalitarianism – different from the egalitarianism approached by Kinder & Sanders (1996) – which postulates that the differences among people by racial criteria would be itself a formal discrimination, even though this differentiation aims at selecting individuals to take part in public policies that, at least theoretically, have been designed to correct social inequalities. According to this trend, being favorable to social quotas would be a way to strengthen egalitarian principles.

Antirracist discourses represented by the famous expression “We are one” devalues the potential of race attributes and assumes that social differences observed among Brazilians are not due to race. Once color/race itself is not taken into account to the discussion of inequalities and social asymmetries, it is not considered on the formation of identities and personal marks that, beyond self-interest, also shape mental structures in which political and social attitudes are processed either.

## **Concluding remarks**

Our goal in this paper was to investigate how the racial democracy myth can be used as a resource for the interpretation of public opinion on racial issues in Brazil. Research on social stratification in Brazil from the 70's on have indicated that racial attributes, once they were intrinsically linked to marginalization and educational segregation conditions experienced by the poor in Brazil should also be considered as explanatory variables as regards social inequalities in Brazil.

The list-experiment could catch important differences as regards the approval to the quotas. Also important differences appear in the support of the quotas as the measuring method changes, the social desirability effect takes place in both quotas: when the respondent feels more

unconstrained to his/her interlocutors' judgements, he/she tends to express his/her opinions more truly.

According to Guimarães (1999), Telles (2003) and Bailey (2009), the racial democracy myth is considered a belief system, that unites considerations and attitudes about social stratification and inequalities, that constrains universal access to education, social space, labor market and income in the country. The racial democracy myth could, thus, be considered as a repository of explanations that have entered in such a strong way in Brazilian social thought that citizens very often appeal to it to formulate their attitudes and opinions on racial issues, directly or not.

We claim that the pertinence of the racial democracy myth on the white students' preferences on affirmative attitudes is a belief system that, by dismissing the racial criteria on social life, deflates racial attributes as explanatory factors to social asymmetries. Even though the Brazilian social stratification has been formed according to racial criteria, the social thought built from there did not link to race the function of hierarchizing social relations component, and, naturally, explanatory as regards social inequalities.

Therefore, the presumptions of the racial democracy myth are linked to the support to the social quotas over the racial quotas. We follow this thought: the racial democracy myth depreciates racial attributes as explanatory factors as regards inequalities in Brazil. Once the affirmative actions in Brazilian public universities are a way of correcting educational and labor inequalities, these actions should not be planned due to racial criteria, but due only to criteria that emphasize class and income differences.

The social thought contaminated by the racial democracy myth credits the existence of these asymmetries to class and status attributes, even though the research on stratification have highlighted that marginalization and social segregation originated from social inequalities have affected mostly afro Brazilian population.

In this paper, we have relied on empirical data to test and develop our hypothesis, that establishes that the presumptions of the racial democracy myth may be useful to explain at least partially the higher levels of support to social quotas as compared to racial quotas. We have seen that, in fact, antirracist theses are fruitful to understand Brazilian college students' attitudes on affirmative actions, but in spite of that, according to Guimarães, "the idea of race in Brazil remains unique in its critical potential" (Guimarães, 1999). Although this is an agenda to be continued in further inquiry, we can also point out Hasenbalg and Silva's assumption that, as economic inequalities and disadvantages suffered by afro Brazilian population rise to public agenda, we can expect a context in which racial relation become a field of social competition (Hasenbalg and Silva 1988).

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1 – Access to Brazilian public universities

*“Now let's talk about the ways to entry in the Brazilian federal universities. From the following list of items, how many you agree? We do not want to know with which you agree, we are interested only in the number of items which you agree”. (random order every time)*

- 1) All universities should adopt the ENEM;
- 2) The increase of vacancies facilitated the entry of low-skilled students;
- 3) All universities should adopt a free admission system;
- 4) The Vestibular is not a good test to select the best students;

The first item refers to the National Secondary Education Examination (ENEM), which is a test conducted by the Ministry of Education of Brazil (MEC). It is used to evaluate the quality of secondary education and its result also serves as access to higher education in Brazilian public universities through the Unified Selection System (SiSU). Enem is the largest exam in Brazil and for some it is a fairer way of admission to a system that is limited and usually requires the students to travel to the location of the desired university to do a specific exam from that institution.

The second item concerns the recent increase in the number of vacancies in the federal universities in the last decade by the government of President Lula, which has broaden almost a third of the number of spots in Brazilian higher education institutions and some believe that this allowed the entry of poorly-qualified students. The third item suggests that universities should abandon the entrance tests in the universities and adopt another form of selection. The fourth item measures attitudes about the traditional exam in Brazilian universities, the Vestibular. The fifth and final item, socially sensitive, measures the attitude of the students against the use of vague reservation system for blacks, which secures a number of places for these candidates.

### Appendix 2 – Access to Brazilian public universities, including a sensitive item

*5) The reservation system for blacks (racial quotas policy) is an important policy.*

### Appendix 3 – (Non) support for racial quotas in Brazilian public universities

*Do you believe that the vacancies reservation policy for blacks in the Brazilian federal universities entrance exam (racial quotas policy) is an important policy?*

1. Yes
2. No

## Da interseccionalidade ao movimento feminista: uma tentativa de conceituação do feminismo enquanto movimento social

*“From intersectionality to the feminist movement: an attempt at conceptualizing feminism as social movement”*

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### Resumo

O Feminismo enquanto movimento social revela-se um grande “guarda-chuva” que abriga diversos discursos e práticas. Embora gênero seja categoria fundamental e definidora de organizações feministas, o conceito de interseccionalidade aponta para as limitações dessa categoria, admitindo outros elementos que, quando considerados, revelam a multiplicidade do sujeito mulher e, com isso, dos feminismos. Isso introduz um problema teórico para os estudos sobre feminismo, a saber, como conceituar o movimento feminista enquanto movimento social a partir da interseccionalidade, que admite como premissa a não-universalidade da categoria “mulher”. Para responder a essa pergunta, parte-se de levantamento quantitativo das organizações feministas existentes no Brasil para então, conceituar movimento feminista enquanto movimento social. Este artigo visa, portanto, contribuir teoricamente em tema que, por vezes, é tratado sem o devido rigor formal.

**Palavras-chave:** Diversidade, Interseccionalidade, Feminismo, Movimento Feminista, Movimento Social

### Abstract

As a social movement, Feminism is an umbrella title under which many discourses and practices are grouped. Although gender is a defining, fundamental category as far as feminist organizations are concerned, its limitations can be brought to light via the concept of intersectionality. This concepts brings to our attention other elements which reveal the multiplicity inherent to woman considered as subject and, consequently, to feminisms in general. This poses a theoretical challenge to studies of feminism: since intersectionality takes as its premise the non-universality of the category “woman”, how are we to conceptualize the feminist movement as a social movement on intersectional grounds? In order to answer that question, I firstly survey the feminist organizations currently active in Brazil, and then, conceptualize the feminist movement as a social movement. In doing so, I aim to provide a theoretical contribution to a subject matter that is seldom tackled with due accuracy.

**Keywords:** diversity, intersectionality, feminism, feminist movement, social movement

O Feminismo enquanto movimento social, ao longo da história brasileira, passou e passa por diversas transformações com relação às causas defendidas e formas organizativas, sendo difícil precisar a quantidade de indivíduos e organizações feministas no país atualmente. Nessa tentativa, optou-se por recorrer a duas plataformas a fim de que se ilustre a diversidade que compõe esse movimento: o site Mapeamento de Coletivos de Mulheres (MAMU) e o site da Secretaria de Políticas para Mulheres da Presidência da República (SPM-PR). O primeiro é uma plataforma desenvolvida por uma mulher identificada com o feminismo e tem por objetivo mapear as organizações e indivíduos que se identificam com o feminismo no país. Para tanto, qualquer pessoa pode se cadastrar no site, sendo aceitos indivíduos, coletivos, ONGs, e órgãos institucionais nos mais variados formatos: com e sem endereço fixo, blogs, redes virtuais, blocos de carnaval, sindicatos, movimentos sociais<sup>29</sup>, grupos de teatro, coletivos estudantis, etc. Estão cadastradas hoje, no MAMU, 278 organizações feministas com os mais variados formatos e bandeiras. Já no site da SPM-PR estão mapeadas 21 organizações que fazem parte do Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Mulher (CONDIM) e 719<sup>30</sup> organismos governamentais<sup>31</sup> (secretarias e coordenadorias estaduais e municipais) que defendem bandeiras feministas. Tem-se, no total, 1018 formas de ser/expressar o feminismo.

Esses dados apontam para a complexificação do movimento feminista e colocam duas questões de extrema importância quando da análise do mesmo, a saber, (i) por que um movimento de e sobre a mulher é tão diverso na sua forma e conteúdo e (ii), considerando-se o movimento feminista um movimento social, como conceituá-lo dadas essas diversidades. Ambas as questões, ainda que possam ser verificadas empiricamente, são e possuem implicações teóricas. A diversidade expressa no movimento feminista parece apontar para a complexificação do sujeito que dele faz parte, a mulher, questionando-se, portanto, as teorizações acerca de um sujeito abstrato e universal apartado daquilo que o diferencia na contingência. Assumir essa complexidade implica analisar o feminismo considerando-o como quadro multifacetado, inviabilizando definições de movimento feminista que sejam demasiadamente estanques, sob pena de desconsiderar expressões e formas organizativas identificadas com o feminismo. Os termos “feminismo” e “movimento social” têm grande aderência na sociedade, o que parece fazer com que prescindam de rigor formal, resultando em imprecisões científicas. Responder a essas perguntas é, pois, questão fundamental para os estudos feministas e nada trivial. Ambas possibilitam o desenvolvimento de análises a partir de sujeitos concretos que cotidianamente constroem o movimento feminista, dando relevo a particularidades que importam no

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<sup>29</sup> O termo aqui é utilizado em sentido *lato*.

<sup>30</sup> Dados referentes a 2015.

<sup>31</sup> Em sentido *lato*.

desenvolvimento do mesmo. Se tanto uma ONG, que possui estrutura física, quanto uma rede de ativismo via internet são consideradas, cada uma, movimento feminista, o que é ele afinal?

Este artigo, portanto, através de análise conceitual e reconstrução de argumentos, visa conceituar o termo “movimento feminista”, considerando-se a pluralidade de atores e formas organizativas descritas anteriormente. A precisão conceitual é condição *sine qua non* para a produção acadêmica, consistindo, aqui, preocupação central. Para tanto, o artigo divide-se em três partes: conceito de interseccionalidade, a fim de que seja respondida à pergunta (i); conceito de movimento social e, por fim, conceito de movimento feminista. Este último, portanto, deriva dos dois anteriores.

## Interseccionalidade

Inicia-se com o questionamento de Sojourner Truth, escrava negra nos Estados Unidos, ao discursar contra a escravidão ao mesmo tempo em que refletia sobre a condição da mulher: não sou eu uma mulher?

Bem, crianças, onde há muito barulho, deve haver alguma coisa fora de ordem, eu acho que entre os negros do Sul e as mulheres do Norte - todos falando sobre os direitos - os homens brancos terão de fazer uma correção em breve. Mas sobre o que é toda essa conversa? Aquele homem ali diz que as mulheres precisam ser ajudadas a entrar nas carruagens, e erguidas sobre as valas, e ter o melhor lugar em toda parte. Ninguém me ajuda a ter um lugar melhor. E não sou eu uma mulher? Eu podia trabalhar tanto, e comer tanto quanto qualquer homem - quando eu podia fazê-lo - e suportar o chicote tanto quanto! E não sou eu uma mulher (...)? Eu tenho tido filhos e visto a maioria deles vendidos como escravos, e quando eu gritei com a dor de mãe, ninguém exceto Jesus me ouviu. E não sou eu uma mulher?<sup>32</sup>

Tal pergunta, lembrada por Brah (2004), já antevia os problemas por que passaria o movimento feminista. O questionamento diz respeito à diferença corporificada, vivida e percebida por Sojourner Truth, mulher, negra e escrava, ao comparar-se com a mulher branca e não-escrava em termos que dizem respeito à esfera econômica, política e cultural. Suas atividades, embora realizadas por um corpo de mulher, não eram as mesmas realizadas por aquelas com quem se comparava. Ela apontava, assim, para a condição não-universal da categoria “mulher” e,

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<sup>32</sup> Discurso proferido em 1851, na Convenção dos Direitos das Mulheres, em Akron, Ohio, EUA. Tradução da autora. No original “Well, children, where there is so much racket, there must be something out of kilter, I think between the Negroes of the South and the women of the North - all talking about rights--the white men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what's all this talking about? That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody helps me any best place. And ain't I a woman (...)? I could work as much, and eat as much as any man--when I could get it--and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne children and seen most of them sold into slavery, and when I cried out with a mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me. And ain't I a woman?”(Brah, 2004: 77).

consequentemente, para a insuficiência da categoria “gênero” na análise das condições sociais em que vivem as mulheres.

Definida a partir da oposição à categoria “homem”, “mulher” diz respeito ao ser humano do sexo biológico feminino. A partir daí se constroem as figuras da mulher e do homem na sociedade – construções de gênero -, possuindo raízes, portanto, no argumento biológico que atribui às diferenças entre mulheres e homens uma causa natural de diferenciação entre os sexos feminino e masculino. Ocorre que a construção das figuras do feminino e do masculino na sociedade não tem implicações apenas no campo da biologia. É a partir da construção dessas figuras que mulheres e homens são socializados e assumem papéis na sociedade. Sendo assim, tem-se uma identidade, que possui implicações sociais, definida por naturezas biológicas diferentes. Disso se segue que os papéis sociais desempenhados por mulheres e por homens são estabelecidos a partir do momento em que nascem e tendem a se reproduzir durante suas vidas.

A negação dessa identidade de mulher, que, segundo o feminismo, é causa da opressão feminina, parte do questionamento dessa relação causal necessária entre natureza biológica e papel social. Alves e Pitanguy afirmam que

O “masculino” e o “feminino” são criações culturais e, como tal, são comportamentos apreendidos através do processo de socialização que condiciona diferentemente os sexos para cumprirem funções sociais específicas e diversas. Essa aprendizagem é um processo social (...). Esse reducionismo biológico camufla as raízes da opressão da mulher, que é fruto na verdade de relações sociais, e não de uma natureza imutável (Alves e Pitanguy, 1982: 55-56).

Portanto, o feminismo atribui às distinções de papéis sociais entre mulheres e homens uma causa social, de construção social dessas identidades. Isso não significa negar a diferença biológica entre o sexo feminino e masculino – o que seria, inclusive, absurdo -, mas sim negar que ela seja, no mínimo, a grande responsável pela e legitimadora da condição social, política e cultural de inferioridade da mulher em relação ao homem. Por serem uma construção social, tais papéis podem ser mudados e é a isso que o feminismo se propõe.

Ocorre que, como afirma Brah (2004), “mulher” e, com isso, sua construção de gênero, não é uma categoria a-histórica e essencialista e, por isso, não é universal. A partir do momento em que o feminismo adentra a esfera da cultura e surge de uma diversidade de lutas, teorizando sobre si mesmo enquanto posto em prática, ele adentra o campo das contingências e passa a lidar não com um sujeito apartado de seu contexto social, mas com mulheres, no plural, que possuem especificidades políticas, sociais e culturais. Se o feminismo assume o compromisso com a

intervenção na vida cotidiana e com a teorização<sup>33</sup> acerca das mulheres, é necessário que se pense as mulheres não como sujeito único isento daquilo que as diferencia, mas como sujeitos que possuem pontos em comum, concomitantes com traços particulares estruturantes das vidas das mesmas. A contingência, portanto, torna-se imperativo para o movimento feminista, constituído, inclusive, por essa diversidade de sujeitos. Assim, o feminismo se configura como alternativa capaz de englobar as mulheres no geral, mas que é atualizado e aprimorado segundo suas especificidades.

Porém, a não universalidade da categoria “mulher” nem sempre esteve no escopo da teoria e prática feministas. Sojourner, ao proferir seu discurso, antecipava os problemas e críticas ao feminismo, porque chamava atenção justamente para os pontos que a diferenciavam das mulheres brancas dos EUA, sem que isso a fizesse abandonar a luta pelos direitos das mulheres. Não só as mulheres negras dos EUA, como também as mulheres negras de outras partes do mundo, inclusive a América Latina, criticaram o movimento feminista, principalmente nas décadas de 1960-70, crítica que se estende no debate feminista até hoje por este ser considerado um feminismo branco. A mulher com que se identificavam e pela qual lutavam as feministas era, para suas críticas, uma mulher pensada como branca, inserida socialmente como branca e possuindo problemas que as mulheres brancas enfrentavam, mas não necessariamente as negras; a mulher defendida era, portanto, produto de uma realidade social na qual as feministas brancas estavam inseridas, generalizando-a para toda e qualquer mulher. À crítica a respeito do recorte racial, somam-se as críticas sobre a falta do recorte de classe e de sexualidade.

Além do feminismo desenvolvido principalmente na Europa e nos EUA ser considerado branco, também foi considerado como sendo de classe média. Em verdade, as lutas sufragistas, incluindo-se o caso brasileiro, que costumam ser consideradas marcos do movimento feminista, foram levadas a cabo por mulheres oriundas dessa classe<sup>34</sup>. O feminismo dos anos 1960-70<sup>35</sup>, do qual as mulheres herdaram muitas das lutas e concepções, também foi feito e formulado por mulheres da classe média, como afirma Pinto: seres de classe média, educadas, principalmente, nas áreas das Humanidades, da Crítica Literária e da Psicanálise (Pinto, 2010: 15). Isso fez com que muitos dos problemas enfrentados pelas mulheres de classes populares não encontrasse ressonância nesse tipo de feminismo. A construção social da mulher como sendo em princípio um ser frágil, mãe devota ao lar, apartada do trabalho fora da esfera doméstica, não corresponde às mulheres populares e

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<sup>33</sup> Ao se falar em compromisso teórico não se está falando propriamente da teoria feminista acadêmica, mas sim da teoria feminista desenvolvidas pelas ativistas feministas, o que Brah chama de *teoria de rua*. Pinto (2010) aponta para a característica muito particular ao movimento feminista de ser “um movimento que produz sua própria reflexão crítica, sua própria teoria” (Pinto, 2010: 15).

<sup>34</sup> No Brasil, eram as chamadas *sufrajetes*, lideradas por Bertha Lutz, bióloga, que após seus estudos no exterior, volta ao Brasil em 1910 para iniciar a luta sufragista.

<sup>35</sup> Aqui não estão sendo considerados os processos de organização de grupos de mulheres no meio rural que acarretariam, no início dos anos 1990, na formação das organizações feministas rurais. Sobre isso ver Schaaf (2001).



também às negras, que desde sempre tiveram de trabalhar fora do seu âmbito doméstico por serem escravas e, por isso, não podendo ter a devoção esperada para com seus filhos(as) e lares. Esse modelo de mulher não é o modelo com o qual estas últimas mulheres, portanto, tentam romper. Além disso, inúmeras especificidades como saúde da mulher negra, condições de trabalho, condições materiais de sobrevivência (comida, casa, luz, esgoto, creches públicas) são demandas que compõem o espectro de luta das mulheres pobres, negras, pobres e negras, transbordando o feminismo para além das questões até então colocadas pelas mulheres da classe média (sexualidade e aborto, por exemplo). Grandes contribuições vieram das feministas latino-americanas e caribenhas, que deram relevo a outros tipos de mulheres, inseridas em outras realidades sociais. Completando o quadro multifacetado do feminismo, as mulheres contribuíram com a crítica da heteronormatividade do feminismo.

O feminismo, portanto, devido ao seu compromisso tanto teórico quanto prático de lidar com mulheres que vivem e atuam no campo das contingências, conseqüentemente inseridas socialmente em contextos diversos, assume um caráter multifacetado, moldando-se às realidades locais. Isso traz como consequência a necessidade de se admitir outras dimensões sociais estruturantes da vida das mulheres, pois que gênero torna-se, a partir das contingências, insuficiente.

Segundo Brah (2004), “mulher” e, com isso, sua construção de gênero, não é uma categoria a-histórica e essencialista e, por isso, não é universal. A partir do momento em que o feminismo adentra a esfera da cultura, portanto das crenças e dos costumes, ele adentra o campo das contingências e passa a lidar não com um sujeito apartado de seu contexto social, mas com mulheres, no plural, que possuem especificidades políticas, sociais e culturais. A contingência, portanto, torna-se imperativo para o movimento feminista, constituído, inclusive, por essa diversidade de sujeitos. Hooks (2015) aponta para a diversidade do sujeito mulher ao criticar o desenvolvimento da teoria feminista por feministas brancas que ignoraram questões raciais que diferem mulheres brancas e negras. Considerando-se essa diferença, a autora propõe a construção de uma teoria feminista que considere as mulheres negras como sujeito. A admissão de outras dimensões estruturantes da posição social das mulheres introduz um novo problema, a saber, como articular essas dimensões com a dimensão de gênero na produção teórica e prática feminista? Brah (2004) sugere, para isso, o uso do conceito *interseccionalidade*, definido como significando os complexos, irreduzíveis, variados e variáveis efeitos que decorrem quando múltiplos eixos de diferenciação - econômica, política, cultural, psíquico, subjetivo e experiencial - cruzam-se em contextos historicamente específicos (Brah 2004: 76), tomando-se as mulheres como seres sociais numa dimensão tanto subjetiva (a significação sobre o que é ser mulher por cada mulher a partir de sua experiência)

quanto estrutural. Crenshaw, sobre o conceito de interseccionalidade, afirma que ele busca capturar as conseqüências estruturais e dinâmicas da interação entre dois ou mais eixos da subordinação (Crenshaw, 2002: 177), reafirmando a desuniversalização do sujeito mulher.

Sobre a dimensão estrutural, Mattos (2011), ao discorrer sobre o conceito de interseccionalidade proposto por Nina Degele e Gabriele Winker (2007, 2008 e 2009) aponta para um mínimo consenso existente entre as autoras e autores de que classe, gênero e raça estruturam e legitimam, sob diversas maneiras, desigualdades sociais, constituindo-se como uma tríade mínima de eixos de subordinação. Andersen, por exemplo, afirma que:

Na verdade, gênero, classe e raça importam, e eles importam porque estruturam interações, oportunidades, ideologia, consciência e as formas de resistência que caracterizam a vida americana (...). Eles importam na formação da localização social de diferentes grupos na sociedade contemporânea (Andersen, 1969 apud Brah, 2004: 80).

Cada um desses elementos se entrecruza nas vidas de mulheres, num contexto histórico determinado, com os demais fazendo com que a opressão advinda de cada um deles esteja inscrita Na outra, ou seja, é constituída pela outra e é constitutiva dela (Brah, 2004: 23). Crenshaw (2002), para ilustrar o conceito de interseccionalidade, utiliza a imagem do tráfego: cada via constitui um eixo de poder (e desempoderamento), sendo independente umas das outras. Porém tais vias se cruzam, se sobrepõem, criando intersecções complexas para quem se encontra nesses pontos. Ocorre que é nesses pontos de entrecruzamento que as mulheres existem, vindo daí a afirmação de que cada um desses elementos geradores de opressão existe por meio dos demais, reforçando a necessidade de se pensar as mulheres a partir das contingências.

Esse conceito, premissa deste artigo leva movimento feminista a partir de realidades femininas complexas, o que implica a existência de variados discursos e ações feministas. Uma conceituação do movimento feminista enquanto movimento social, portanto, deve poder abarcar esses inúmeros sujeitos de que trata o feminismo, bem como dos diferentes sujeitos que o constroem.

## **Movimento Social**

Movimento social é um termo controverso devido à imprecisão no seu uso. Talvez o fato de existirem diversas correntes teóricas, cada uma com uma definição do que este venha a ser, tenha contribuído para que ele passasse a funcionar como guarda-chuva sob o qual qualquer movimentação coletiva é abrigada. Se, como visto até aqui, a categoria “mulher” é histórica, se “gênero” é insuficiente para explicar a condição de vida das mulheres, pois que na contingência

outros fatores estruturantes se interseccionam, se o feminismo é um compromisso com a transformação de vida das mulheres, portanto, atuando nas contingências, e se ele possui diversos atores, o conceito de movimento social para que o movimento feminista esteja aí contemplado deve poder abranger todas essas questões. Parte-se da definição de movimento social proposta por Diani (1992).

Segundo o autor, um movimento social é

(...) uma rede de interações informais entre uma pluralidade de indivíduos, grupos e/ou organizações, engajados num conflito político ou cultural, baseados numa identidade coletiva compartilhada (Diani, 1992: 13).

Tal conceito é fruto da análise de quatro teorias concernentes a movimentos sociais - teoria do comportamento coletivo, teoria da mobilização de recursos, teoria do processo político e teoria dos novos movimentos sociais - representando a síntese entre elementos em comum que cada uma delas traz quando do tratamento do conceito em questão. Embora o autor não negue que existam divergências entre elas, apontando, inclusive, que essas já se encontram bastante desenvolvidas e conhecidas, há elementos suficientes para que se chegue a uma definição de movimento social mais abrangente do que as específicas às quatro teorias e que não entram em contradição com as mesmas ao serem condensados nessa nova definição.

O primeiro elemento diz respeito à concepção do movimento social como rede de interações informais, elemento que consiste na primeira parte da definição do conceito. As quatro teorias, cada uma com vocábulos específicos, admitem o movimento social enquanto coletividade organizada que leva em conta seus opositores na positivação daquilo que defende. Mesmo a teoria da mobilização de recursos, para a qual movimento social é um conjunto de opiniões e crenças que representa preferências por mudar alguns elementos da estrutura social e/ou distribuição de recursos de uma sociedade (Diani, 1992: 4), não sendo, portanto, um ator social, pois que opiniões e crenças *per se* não se constituem como tal, coloca ênfase no que atualiza, isto é, põe em ações concretas esse conjunto de opiniões e crenças, a saber, organizações de movimentos sociais. Além disso, a teoria da mobilização de recursos sustenta que tais organizações não são atores isolados; pelo contrário, configuram-se como atores em constante interação, podendo sobrepor-se uns aos outros. A interação, portanto, tem dois sentidos: interação entre os atores e interação entre os atores e opositores. Os próprios atores são admitidos como podendo ser indivíduos ou organizações, sendo que ambos não são auto-excludentes. Ora, se é assim, não é errado dizer que movimentos sociais são redes de interação. A questão da informalidade se deve à afirmação de laços flexíveis entre os membros de um movimento social, ainda que isso não seja necessariamente verdadeiro

no caso das unidades que compõem o movimento, que constituem as organizações de movimento social. Sobre isso, Jenkins (1994) afirma a necessidade de distinguir

(...) entre os movimentos sociais (MS) definidos em função e objetivos amplos e as organizações de movimentos sociais (OMS) definidas por estruturas particulares de organização. Dado que os movimentos sociais se caracterizam normalmente por múltiplas OMS, um modelo multi-organizacional que permita a coexistência de diferentes tipos, geralmente é mais apropriado para avaliar a organização de um único movimento social<sup>36</sup> (Jenkins, 1994: 25).

Até aqui, a definição proposta por Diani (1992) reconhece a pluralidade de atores envolvidos num movimento social e a informalidade dos laços que ligam uns aos outros (Diani, 1992: 8).

Melucci (2001), no que tange à definição de movimento social como rede, vai ao encontro de Diani (1992) ao fazer um contraponto com concepções mais antigas<sup>37</sup> de movimento social, que o tomam como atores unitários, isto é, estruturas bem definidas e homogêneas que possuem existência ontológica independente da existência ou não de processos de ação coletiva em curso. Para essas concepções, os movimentos sociais (ou os atores sociais) são efeitos de uma situação histórica ou de uma determinada conjuntura, derivando-se quase que naturalmente delas, como no caso do marxismo; ou então produto de crenças e de representação compartilhadas entre atores, como no caso do behaviorismo, conformando uma unidade homogênea nos dois casos. Ambas as explicações acabam não por analisar o movimento social em si, mas as crises políticas, econômicas ou morais existentes na sociedade. O foco da discussão, portanto, acaba por deslocar-se do próprio movimento para recair quase que exclusivamente sobre as transformações sociais que gerariam os movimentos, fazendo com que esses emergissem quase que como resultado necessário de determinada etapa histórica e social e, por isso, como unidade homogênea seja de crenças, seja de objetivos, que leva a cabo certos tipos de ação.

Para Melucci (2001) tais explicações encontram limite na complexificação das sociedades contemporâneas, traduzida no enfraquecimento das linhas outrora tão fortemente traçadas entre sociedade civil e Estado, esfera pública e privada; na presença constante da mídia, que mais do que uma maneira de comunicação, transformou-se num instrumento de grande relevância nas transformações e movimentações sociais; no surgimento de movimentos que não pretendem provocar transformações econômicas, mas sim culturais. Para o autor, na contemporaneidade criada

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<sup>36</sup> Tradução da autora. No original: “entre los movimientos sociales (MS) definidos en función de objetivos amplios y las organizaciones de movimientos sociales (OMS) definidas por estructuras particulares de organización. Dado que los movimientos sociales se caracterizan normalmente por múltiples OMS, un modelo multiorganizacional que permita la coexistencia de tipos diferentes resulta en general más apropiado de cara a calibrar la organización de un único movimiento social” (Jenkins, 1994: 25).

<sup>37</sup> O marxismo e o behaviorismo são as concepções de que fala Melucci (2001).

pelo universo das mídias, coexistem todos os ‘estratos geológicos’ da história humana (Melucci, 2001: 24), rompendo com a ideia de uma linearidade histórica encarregada de fazer emergir os movimentos sociais e suas práticas conforme o período histórico em questão.

Aqui, não apenas com as leis da História o autor rompe, como também com as crenças e representações coletivas, uma vez que os movimentos sociais, pela asserção exposta acima, admitem diversas orientações, isto é, diversas crenças e representações. A homogeneidade dos movimentos sociais, portanto, é quebrada.

O que são, então, movimentos sociais? Se a complexificação das sociedades contemporâneas tira, por um lado, a possibilidade de encará-los como simples respostas às crises estruturais ou morais, coloca, por outro, a possibilidade de tratá-los como fenômenos heterogêneos e fragmentados, que devem destinar muitos dos seus recursos para gerir a complexidade e a diferenciação que os constitui (Melucci, 2001: 29). Os movimentos sociais são, novamente e recobrando a definição de Diani (1992), redes complexas que envolvem variados atores e interações para que se produza uma unidade baseada não na uniformidade, mas na pluralidade de discursos e ações.

Do comportamento reativo de outrora (derivação quase que necessária de processos históricos), o movimento social é jogado para a posição de elemento plural ativo que incide sobre diversas áreas do sistema, justamente devido à sua pluralidade de constituintes e, por conseguinte, de ações. Daí Melucci (2001) afirmar que

Processos de mobilização, formas organizativas, modelos de liderança, ideologias e formas de comunicação são níveis de análises significativos para reconstruir internamente o sistema de ação que constitui o ator coletivo. Mas, também, as relações com o exterior, com os concorrentes, aliados, adversários e, em particular, as respostas do sistema político e dos aparatos de controle social, definem um campo de oportunidades e de vínculos dentro do qual um ator coletivo se forma, se mantém ou se modifica no tempo (Melucci, 2001: 23).

Pensar o movimento social como rede implica, portanto, pensá-lo como dinâmica e não como ator isolado, incluindo nessa dinâmica as inúmeras organizações e indivíduos que possuem algo em comum e interagem. As redes são formadas e reproduzidas a partir de uma identidade compartilhada entre seus membros: a identidade coletiva. Segundo Melucci (2001), o processo de formação da identidade coletiva depende da ação coletiva, da interação entre pólos de oposição com relação a uma questão. Essa questão não é apenas aquela que diz respeito ao poder – disputa pelo poder, negação do poder -, mas também de exclusão de representações sociais. Assim, grupos marginalizados que não se vêem como participantes da ordem social também desencadeiam processos de ação coletiva, construindo, com isso, um processo de identificação coletiva.

O que ocorre na ação coletiva é um processo de fortalecimento entre os laços dos indivíduos que compõem os pólos da disputa, um processo de reforço da solidariedade produzida naquele momento, naquele grupo. O autor afirma que a luta tem sempre, também, objetivos instrumentais, mas, em primeiro plano, está o reforço da solidariedade do grupo, a busca da troca simbólica e afetiva” (Melucci, 2001: 84).

Portanto, não é só o atendimento das demandas que está envolvido na ação, mas a própria construção do grupo e aderência do indivíduo a ele, ou seja, a aderência da identidade pessoal à identidade coletiva. O indivíduo está, assim, subsumido no coletivo, sem que isso signifique a perda da sua individualidade. Os problemas pessoais transformam-se em problemas coletivos, abrindo espaço para o sujeito “nós”. Estar em oposição a um ator ajuda nesse processo: o “nós” se opõe ao Outro, a identidade é também forjada na negação. Por ser um processo relacional, a identidade é produzida. Ambos, sujeito e coletivo, se influenciam:

A identidade não se apresenta mais como um ‘dado’ da natureza, nem simplesmente como conteúdo de uma tradição na qual os indivíduos se identificam. Ela não é mais fundada unicamente sobre o pertencimento a ‘associações reguladas normativamente’ (Estados, partidos, organizações). Os indivíduos e os grupos participam com a sua ação na formação de sua identidade, que é o resultado de decisões e de projetos, além de condicionamentos e de vínculos (Melucci, 2001: 89).

Portanto, a identidade tem sua origem em um processo social de aprendizagem e reconhecimento entre os indivíduos na ação coletiva, não mais como dado natural, mas sim construído socialmente a partir da sua capacidade de produzir ação, fortalecendo o grupo, pois que a solidariedade produzida gera coesão. O indivíduo não é suprimido dentro da ação coletiva por esse possuir uma identidade como ator social e por meio de um comportamento mecanizado. Isso porque as demandas pessoais e demandas coletivas não significam coisas necessariamente separadas. Uma necessidade particular pode ser entendida como subsumida numa demanda coletiva como ocorre, por exemplo, com relação ao tema da violência contra mulher. A agressão é materializada em corpos femininos individuais, entretanto uma mulher vítima de violência pode identificar a mesma situação no corpo de sua vizinha, amiga, etc. A partir daí se criam laços de reconhecimento de uma situação individual a princípio, que pode ser generalizada e se tornar uma demanda coletiva a partir da reflexão e estímulos afetivos, que dão coesão para o movimento coletivo. A violência, então, não é um problema exclusivo “meu”, mas sim da sociedade, pois mais mulheres enfrentam a mesma situação. A partir daí, a ação coletiva pode ser formulada em vários termos, forjando a identidade de mulheres enquanto feministas.

O termo ‘identidade coletiva’ é estendido por Diani (1992) de forma a estarem contidos no termo a ideologia proposta pela teoria do comportamento coletivo, o conjunto de crenças e

opiniões compartilhadas segundo a teoria da mobilização de recursos e identidade, conforme a teoria do processo político e teoria dos novos movimentos sociais. É a partir da identidade coletiva que os atores formam o e incluem-se no movimento social, sem que isso signifique a completa homogeneidade entre eles. Ainda que a identidade coletiva seja aquilo que dá significado para eventos coletivos que, de outra forma, apareceriam como eventos isolados, tal significado é, muitas vezes, parcialmente compartilhado pelos membros da rede<sup>38</sup>; o movimento feminista constitui-se como caso exemplar. Embora dele façam parte inúmeras organizações, apenas parcialmente há acordo entre elas, o que pode ser verificado pelas centenas de coletivos registrados no MAMU, cada qual defendendo uma bandeiras (mulheres trans, mulheres negras, mães, etc.). Conectando-se identidade social e movimento social, tem-se que as identidades dentro das redes serão tão heterogêneas quanto forem os agentes que as compõem, fazendo emergir uma multiplicidade de concepções e ações.

O movimento social configura-se como rede de interações informais voltada para a ação conflitiva. O entendimento sobre o tipo de ação que o conflito envolve é diferente para os autores. Para Touraine, conflito diz respeito à historicidade, isto é, à disputa de significados; para Melucci, às ações que desafiam o mecanismo de dominação sistêmica; e, para a Teoria do Processo Político, aos eventos de protesto, incluindo aí aqueles em que ocorrem processos de negociação ao invés de processos de enfrentamento. Porém, mesmo que o conflito não direcione as ações todas para o mesmo ponto, ele figura como elemento motor das mesmas. Por isso, permanece válida a afirmação de que ele é característica definidora de movimento social para os diferentes autores e teorias analisadas. Outra questão, se ele é de cunho político ou cultural é mais uma questão de ênfase do que de incompatibilidade conceitual. Assim, movimentos sócio-políticos e movimentos culturais estão incluídos nesse conceito de movimento social. O conflito é, pois, o terceiro e último elemento, ou o terceiro critério definidor do que seja um movimento social.

Importante salientar que na definição proposta por Diani (1992) não fazem parte a forma como atuam as organizações de movimentos sociais, tampouco a negação da esfera institucional como campo de atuação do mesmo, pois que as primeiras admitem variadas formas e a segunda, vem mostrando-se, segundo o autor, como ponto frágil de qualquer definição que a adote. Com relação ao feminismo, o dilema institucionalização x não institucionalização, pelo menos no Brasil, mostrava-se mais presente à época do regime militar. Com o processo de democratização, muitas ativistas que fizeram parte de organizações feministas, a partir da Constituição de 1988, que previa a criação de espaços institucionais como conselhos e secretarias da mulher, passaram a ver no

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<sup>38</sup> O próprio processo segundo o qual um indivíduo assume para si a identidade de uma organização específica envolve negociações, não se configurando como admissão automática.

Estado não um completo aliado, mas minimamente um espaço de atuação e militância em prol do feminismo. Assim, ONGs foram formadas sem que as mesmas deixassem de pertencer ao movimento social feminista. A institucionalização, portanto, não define quem faz e quem não faz parte do movimento feminista. O ponto não é a institucionalização ou não, mas as formas como as organizações, neste caso feministas, vêm agindo e a partir de que leituras.

(...) a definição de movimentos sociais também muda a ideia de que movimentos sociais são, necessariamente, atores contrários ao sistema. Isso deixa mais espaço para a análise de como os movimentos sociais mudam através do tempo em aspectos como o número e a qualidade dos atores envolvidos em eventos de protesto, as interpretações culturais do conflito, as questões de posicionamento, os repertórios de ação e os graus de radicalização (Diani, 1992: 19).

## **Movimento Feminista**

A partir das considerações feitas acerca do conceito de movimento social, tem-se que o movimento feminista é, pois, uma rede de interações informais entre uma pluralidade de mulheres, grupos e/ou organizações, engajadas num conflito político e/ ou cultural, baseadas numa identidade coletiva compartilhada. Embora haja diferenças entre as mulheres que fazem parte do movimento feminista, todas elas compartilham, pelo menos, um ponto em comum (a identidade apontada por Diane, 1992 e Melucci, 2001), a saber, mudar as relações sociais de poder imbricadas no gênero entendido, segundo Brah (2006), como diferenciações estruturais, relacionais e simbólicas entre mulheres e homens (Brah, 2006: 14), em que as mulheres se encontram numa posição de subordinação.

Ora, se admitirmos que as relações sociais de poder são interseccionais, dentro do movimento feminista não aparecerão apenas as relações de gênero, mas todas aquelas que se entrecruzam com ele, validando um dos critérios definidores de movimento social: a pluralidade de atores, discursos e ações. Ao partir da contingência e desejando possuir incidência sobre ela, o movimento feminista parte não apenas da vida experienciada das diversas mulheres que o compõem, como passa a lidar com a vida de outras mulheres imbricadas nas diversas combinações que podem existir entre as dimensões estruturantes e interseccionalizadas de suas vidas. Assim, vários sujeitos, demandas e ações são constituídos a partir da categoria não homogênea “mulher”, abrindo-se espaço para falar não em feminismo, mas em feminismos como afirma Brah (2004):

(...) diferentes feminismos podem agora ser vistos como representando relações historicamente contingentes, contestando campos de discurso e as múltiplas posições do sujeito<sup>39</sup> (Brah, 2004: 9).

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<sup>39</sup> Tradução da autora. No original: different feminisms could now be viewed as representing historically contingent relationships, contesting fields of discourses, and sites of multiple subject positions.



Ainda sobre a definição de movimento feminista, atentando para a questão dos indivíduos que o compõem, Alvarez (1999) o define como campo discursivo:

(...) [o feminismo] pode hoje ser caracterizado mais adequadamente como um expansivo, policêntrico, heterogêneo campo discursivo de ação que abrange uma vasta ordem de arenas cultural, social e política. (...) Isto é, a reconfiguração do campo do movimento feminista hoje vai muito além das organizações de movimentos sociais ou SMOs, convencionalmente concebidas. Os anos 1990 viram uma dramática proliferação ou multiplicação dos espaços e lugares nos quais as mulheres que se consideram feministas atuam, donde, conseqüentemente, o discurso feminista circula<sup>40</sup> (Alvarez, 1999: s/n).

A definição está de acordo com o conceito de movimento social aqui proposto, do qual deriva o de movimento feminista. Conceber o feminismo como rede significa preservar uma identidade mínima compartilhada entre os atores da rede que se manifesta em pressupostos e objetivos compartilhados, possibilitando a participação tanto de organizações quanto de indivíduos nessa rede. Assim, a dimensão discursiva não se perde e ainda permanecem abertos os novos caminhos para práticas e sujeitos feministas que vieram à tona nos anos 1990 e que se instensificam, com o advento das redes sócias via web, nos anos 2000. Com isso, se alargam as possibilidades de ação do próprio movimento, pois esses indivíduos podem estar em espaços e lugares em que não necessariamente as feministas organizadas estão. O feminismo, ao incidir sobre a esfera “da moral e dos bons costumes” acaba por fornecer embasamento para que cada mulher que compartilhe a identidade mínima feminista possa se afirmar e agir como feminista individualmente. Isso não significa que as organizações perderam seu espaço, tampouco negar o importante papel que têm no sucesso, continuidade, elaboração e reelaboração do discurso feminista, mas que o feminismo possui a particularidade de não ser um movimento que requer a adesão a uma organização específica para que cada pessoa dele sinta parte. A plataforma MAMU atua nesse sentido, permitindo que nela se cadastrem tanto organizações, quanto pessoas que se identifiquem como feministas.

O movimento feminista é, portanto, uma rede complexa que admite uma diversidade de discursos e práticas em torno do que se chama, genericamente, “a causa das mulheres”. Ao falar em movimento feminista, portanto, não se está a fazer referência às unidades que o compõem, mas à rede em geral.

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<sup>40</sup> Tradução da autora. No original: (...) can today more aptly be characterized as an expansive, polycentric, heterogeneous discursive field of action which spans into a vast array of cultural, social and political arenas. (...) That is, the reconfigured feminist movement field today spans well beyond social movement organizations or SMOs, conventionally conceived. The 1990s saw a dramatic proliferation or multiplication of the spaces and places in which women who call themselves feminists act, and wherein, consequently, feminist discourses circulate.

## Concluindo

Este artigo procurou contribuir teoricamente para os estudos feministas através da conceituação do movimento feminista. Partindo-se da verificação de inúmeras organizações e formas organizativas através de duas plataformas virtuais, que, indutivamente, dão pistas da complexidade do movimento, procurou-se conceituá-lo considerando-se a não-universalidade da categoria mulher, expressa pelo conceito de interseccionalidade. Assim, o movimento feminista, entendido como movimento social na concepção apresentada aqui – rede complexa formado por diversos atores -, abarca a diversidade de formas de pensar e agir sobre a questão da mulher. Dado que a prática e a teoria feminista se produzem a partir da realidade com vistas à transformação da mesma, no que diz respeito ao papel social ocupado pela mulher, dado que o ser social mulher é complexo e interseccionado por vários eixos de empoderamento e desempoderamento, haverá tantas formulações e ações quantas forem as especificidades do contingente de mulheres em questão. Assumir essa premissa implica não tratar o movimento de forma única, nem estática, mas percorrer o caminho que, neste caso, as organizações fazem de diferenciarem-se e unificarem-se conforme suas atuações, evidenciando em que elementos elas são distintas e em que elementos pode-se dizer que fazem parte do mesmo movimento. Tais questões constituem campo fértil e pouco explorado nos estudos feministas, principalmente em estudos comparativos entre diferentes organizações com relação às formas de atuação e produção teórica. Considerando-se os conceitos de interseccionalidade de movimento feminista aqui apresentados, é possível explorar como ambos operam na convergência ou não de ações coletivas. Se vários são os sujeitos e os feminismos, analisar, em processos de ação coletiva, o que faz com que as organizações feministas se reconheçam umas nas outras, suas alianças e quem delas não participa é campo a ser explorado.

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
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