John S. Reed ’61, SM ’65

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INTERVIEWER: Today is October 20, 2010. I am Karen Arenson.

We are speaking this afternoon with John S. Reed, who was elected chairman of the MIT Corporation this year. He has been a member of the Corporation since 1980 and a life member since 1985. He has served on the Corporation's Membership, Investment, and Development Committees, as well as on numerous visiting committees.

He was born in the United States, but grew up in Argentina and Brazil, and he served in the US Army Corps of Engineers in Korea. He holds Bachelor's degrees from both MIT and Washington & Jefferson College, and a Master's degree from MIT's Sloan School of Management.

Much of his career was spent at Citibank and Citicorp where he rose to chief executive and chairman, and he was later co-chairman of the successor entity Citigroup. He was tapped as interim chairman and then became chairman of the New York Stock Exchange during a difficult period of its existence. He's been a member of numerous corporate and non-profit boards and advisory groups, including Monsanto, Phillip Morris, The Rand Corporation, The National Bureau of Economic Research, The Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and the Boston Symphony Orchestra.

John, thank you for talking with us today.

REED: Happy to do it.

INTERVIEWER: Some people have suggested that higher education in America could face the same fate as the auto industry. Do you share this concern, either about American higher ed generally, or about MIT in particular?

REED: Yes. It's a real concern. It's funny, a member of the Corporation here at MIT approached me not long ago, maybe a couple of weeks ago, and said, John, we may not exist in a couple of years. I said why? He said, look, it costs approximately $50,000 a year to get an education of the sort that we offer, and that would be true at Harvard or Stanford and the other major schools.

That's an awful lot of money. I mean you're talking about the annual income of the typical family in the United States. Clearly it would be possible, say for India -- just choosing arbitralily - they speak English, et cetera, et cetera -- to offer a first-class engineering education for substantially less because the cost of living wage is the whole structure.

The question is if you could get a fully equivalent education by traveling and living in India for a while, would that begin to attract students away? The answer would be certainly yes. I mean I think medical schools in the United States have certainly seen people go overseas to get medical education more cheaply and then they come back and become licensed in the United States. Engineering particularly, or engineering and science, is a global intellectual activity.

So one could imagine that you could create an equivalent educational experience, particularly at the undergraduate level but not necessarily restricted to that in other locations that were inherently a lot cheaper. At some point that could become a factor.

Now am I staying up nights worrying about it? No. But do I have it out there as sort of a model, asking what does that say to us about us. You know, I listened at MIT, probably in the late '60s, early '70s, to the chairman of General Motors at the time discounting the foreign car imports saying that they were small, not particularly profitable vehicles, and that if the foreigners wanted that part of the market they were welcome to it.

I think probably from that talk until today, General Motors lost market share almost every year since. The world has changed. The distribution of intellectual talent is getting increasingly widespread. Educational systems around the world are getting better and better. Certainly IQ, that is the potential intellectual capability of people is distributed pretty evenly across the world's population. It's certainly not concentrated only in Cambridge.

The unusual circumstances of World War II that resulted in the transfer of a tremendous base of intellectual talent into the US, and particularly into the university systems, that circumstance hopefully will not ever exist again. So people are going to be quite happy to stay in St. Petersburg or to stay in New Delhi or wherever they happen to be if they could pursue their careers and find appropriate things to do and so forth and so on.

So I believe that we have to take into account, as we worry about MIT and where we're going, that we've enjoyed a wonderful period that was somewhat special, not likely to be repeated, that the world in which we're going to live over the next 50 or 60 years is going to probably have a different dynamic. Cost is certainly an issue. I would point out that while it costs $50,000 a year to come here, MIT only gets $20,000 by the time you factor in the student aid and other support.

So we are certainly providing an immense amount of support for these students. Maybe we should provide more because we're going to have to make education reachable by people who aren't of the means to pay the sort of full sticker price.

But this idea that our educational system is expensive, it's certainly going to be expensive compared to alternatives, and that the talent pool is going to become more dispersed. The nature of our educational product is pretty globalized -- it's not like teaching American history, which would be difficult to do in a country outside of the United States.

So yes, I think we should regard ourselves as being in the same competitive situation as the US auto industry was 20 or 30 years ago.

INTERVIEWER: At one point when you were chairman of Citicorp it faced enormous problems. You've said that you thought about whether to step down at that time -- I think it was the early '90s -- but decided to remain because you were the right guy to deal with them. MIT doesn't have problems like that at this point. But what makes you the right guy to be MIT's chairman at this time?

REED: Ah, now there's a question for you.

I have no assurances that I am the right person, because obviously there are other people who might be here-- I don't know who they are. I could speak to what maybe I could try to do. But I certainly can't tell you that there aren't three other people who might have a different agenda that might be better for MIT.

The process was simple. When there was a need to find a new chairman, because Dana Mead decided that he should retire, they appointed a search committee. I presume, I don't know, that the search committee said now what kind of person are we looking for, what sort of thing? When I was first approached I was pleased, I said gee, that's an awfully nice thought. But I really didn't think that I was necessarily the right person, nor that MIT was necessarily the right thing for me to be doing.

But what happened is very simple. I was asked to at least get engaged -- that I probably owed it to MIT about, which I care a lot, to at least consider the thought seriously. So I did. The first thing I did is I called Dana and I said Dana, tell me what this is all about. Then I talked to Susan. By the way, I called and got a copy of the bylaws so that I could figure out what the bylaws say the chairman is. Then I spoke to Susan and I said hey, what are you looking for in terms of somebody who's chair of the Corporation.

Of course the first thing I found was there was no agreement. There was no agreement between the bylaws or the prior incumbent or what Susan was thinking about. So it was very clear that there are a lot of degrees of freedom in the job and that it could be done in many different ways.

Then I met a number of times, probably three times, with Neil Pappalardo who was a chairman of the search committee and of person of deep ties to MIT, and I must say a great contributor at MIT. You can't go to the physics department without running into a laboratory and meeting room and everything else that Neil has made possible.

But Neil and I talked quite a bit. I had never been on the Executive Committee, and Neil, of course, has been on it for a long time. I said what's the Executive Committee thinking about, and so forth and so on. So I sort of triangulated. Then I met with the search committee and I told them, I said look, I'm not here for you to decide or me to decide, we're here to explore. What you should do is probe me to see if I'm sort of what you're looking for, and I'm going to probe you to see if your description of what you're expecting is something that I could sort of identify with.

We had a good discussion, as you might imagine, and at the end I said to myself, I could probably contribute. I love the place. I really do believe that my educational experience here at MIT had a very material impact on my life and how I think, and so forth and so on. My father had gone to school here, so it was sort of something in the family. On the other side, I'm a great believer that discourse counts. What you talk about and how you talk about things makes a difference.

I've obviously had a lot to do with running large organizations, and I have not only done it but I've been on boards and I've thought a lot about it. So I sense that I know a little bit about how large organizations function. I felt that I could come and help change the discourse a little bit. There were areas where I think at the senior level, at the Corporation level, at the senior administrative level, maybe we don't talk about things in the right way, and so forth and so on.

It wasn't that I felt that I would make decisions that would take the Corporation a different direction but I might be able to get the discourse going in a way that would cause us to make decisions that might be different than maybe might otherwise have made.

So that's my goal. I sense that what I can contribute at this particular time is to get the Corporation and the Corporation members engaged to make sure that we're talking about the right things in the right language. I sat down with a blank piece of paper and said, what are the responsibilities of a corporate member. Then I sort of said, how can we organize meetings so that a reasonable observer would suggest that the corporate members would have an informed view on these various issues, because you can't expect a Corporation to behave properly if they haven't been talking about the right sets of issues in the right sort of way.

So my thought was that my contribution might be to help change/modify the discourse, both the interface between the Corporation and administration, and I felt some confidence in terms of that area. So I said, you know, there's no time span. If at the end of a couple of years the Executive Committee were to say, John, you've really been helpful but we'd like to change, I'm perfectly comfortable, I would understand that totally. So that it isn't as if I signed a 10-year contract and MIT's stuck with me - they aren't. Any time that either I felt that I wasn't being constructive or productive, or if, for some reason, the Executive Committee thought that we'd quite happily do something else.

So that's the basis on which I came in. As I say, I can't tell you that there weren't four people who might have been better.

INTERVIEWER: Engagement is an interesting concept. You were on the Corporation for many years and then stepped up your participation at some point, and I assume that there are lots of members of the Corporation who go through similar processes at their times of their life when they can be more engaged and times that are less good in that way. How do you think about it? Do you think you can make people more engaged than they are? What are some of your thoughts?

REED: I agree with you 100 percent. I mean engagement is a function of what else you're doing. Obviously on some circumstances it's very difficult to get engaged because you are fully occupied with other things. But on the other hand it depends a lot on whether things are served up in such a way that you feel your voice makes a difference, and so forth and so on. I must say during some of my years on the Corporation my interest was the same, but the discourse was such that you just didn't feel you had much to contribute. So I didn't. I could have but it wasn't that way.

It was funny, as you mentioned, I was on the board at Phillip Morris for a long time, maybe 35 years. I don't know. I think we had seven different chairman during my period there. Joe Cullman being the first. I could remember going to one of the chairman, either the third or fourth, I forget who, and saying I've never gone to more boring, less useful meetings.

Now the company was the same, the business we were in was the same. But he simply ran the meetings in such a way that the board members didn't feel like they have much to contribute or maybe they did so after the meeting quietly in the halls. Yet, Joe Cullman, who was the first person who put me in -- I don't know if you ever met Joe, but he was a wonderful, engaging human being, now unfortunately not alive. But Joe had that wonderful facility, which Ronald Reagan had, by the way, of causing everybody to feel that you were the only person and that your views were really important and that he was just waiting to hear what your views were. He would say his board was engaged. I don't think he necessarily did everything that we talked about. But you knew you had a point of view, you were being listened to.

I once had an occasion to go to the White House, and Mr. Reagan, the President at the time, was asking a number of corporate types our opinion about some subject. He had this ability to cause each person to think that he really was listening to their point of view. Then it was funny-- at the end of the meeting he thanked us profusely for being there. He said, by the way I'm not going to do what you all have recommended.

So there we were. We felt important. We felt that we were there for a good purpose. He was kind enough -- most politicians would have let us go and then we would have discovered over time that he wasn't going to do it. But he just said, I basically haven't been persuaded.

But the point is, some of the members of the Corporation are not going to get engaged because they're busy. They have other things to do, and so forth and so on. As you know, attendance is not perfect. We have 75 members. A typical meeting will have 50 maybe. Then you've got a third that are floating around. But if the discourse is right, then you draw out that engagement.

INTERVIEWER: Does MIT look any different to you now that you're four months into the job and have led your first Corporation meeting and sat through some visiting committees and probably a bunch of other meetings?

REED: Yes it does. But not substantially. I mean it's obviously much more textured, and I have a much more detailed understanding of things. I've gotten to know an awful lot of people who I did not know before. Each one of them is different in his or her own way. I have a greater sense of how Susan and Rafael spend their time, and so forth and so on, none of which I had any reason to know before.

But the basic enterprise, no. The basic enterprise is that we're an immensely important research organization that teaches, and our teaching very much surrounds the research. I mean at the graduate level you couldn't teach without the research. At the undergraduate level we still get students amazingly involved in the actual research kind of stuff. That appreciation I had before. The quality of the place, the word excellence -- there are very, very few institutions that I've known that could use the word excellence honestly and have it resonate. That was always here. It's very visible when you're the chair.

So it hasn't in any serious way changed my impression of MIT. It has caused me to be much more familiar with details.

INTERVIEWER: How about the job as chairman? You did a lot of research, you talked to Dana, you read the small print, you talked-- does that job look any different from what you expected?

REED: Yes. I'm more engaged, to use my own word. You do get caught up in sets of things that I did not anticipate getting caught up in. There's a lot of process that needs to be worked on and a lot of talking. I've gotten into buildings to a level that I never would have imagined. I know all about deferred maintenance building by building by building. I have sheets of paper. I also, by the way, I read all of the material that's prepared for the visiting committees. That, allows me to see for each unit the level of detail that when you're on the Corporation you see for those committees on which you happen to sit, but not for the others.

There's more detail than I might have imagined. But my sense, four months into the job is I'm learning a lot, from time to time I think I'm helping occasionally. My sense is it's going to turn out to be potentially useful to the Institute, I hope, and presumably it'll turn out to be fine. I'll get a better balance. You can't say no to anything when you're new. You have to do it once before you say, I really didn't need to do that. That'll come in my second year. I'll begin to get some control.

INTERVIEWER: What else does the chairman do? How much of the job is fundraising, social events? What are the other pieces?

REED: You have ceremonial obligations. You have what I call external ceremonial and internal ceremonial. There are things, like I'm going to a black tie dinner at the end of the month, which is an external ceremonial thing where one of our Corporation members is being honored, and since he's a Corporation member and a great person, it's I think appropriate that I be there.

I have tried to duck some of the internal ceremonial on the theory that that is mainly Susan and Rafael's territory. That if one of our faculty members wins a Nobel Prize, which one did, I think it's primarily Susan and Rafael who should celebrate that, and not the chairman of the Corporation, even though I'm pleased as punch. But it seems to me that from a positioning point of view, the internal ceremonial I am less engaged in.

Fundraising I made clear from the beginning, I'm not any good at fundraising. I have from time to time asked people to give money, and I don't have that wonderful twinkle that causes people to immediately reach into their pocket. I could help organize and think about fundraising, and clearly that's going to be an important part of my job.

Two things that I'm going to have to really work on is to try to help think about how best to organize, to fundraise, and how to position. I mean fundraising's marketing to some degree, and you've got to cause people to feel good about giving and to want to give. To think giving makes sense. That's true of institutions as well, by the way. You've got to ask yourself why do some of the big corporations not feel some need to make sure that the engineers that they hire from us that are trained -- I mean Intel, Boeing, so forth and so on. They live off our product, our students. It would be nice if they would help support these students as they're being developed and formed.

We do a wonderful job for them. Through the admissions process we sort them out, we give them a wonderful education, and then they're available in the workforce and we are not short cash throughout that process. I estimate that we're cash short about $15,000 per student. It would be nice if the people who hired them and got the benefit of all the sorting and training that we've done on their behalf. So maybe we can find a way of motivating people to be supportive, because we play an immensely important role in finding and training these people.

But anyway, so I'm going to have to work to try to help. I mean we have a lot of pros and we have a lot of experienced people in this arena, but still our needs are significant, and my guess is we're not going to be able to raise the capital that we need from the sources that are well developed. We're going to have to broaden and amplify and maybe intensify.

So, helping organize, think about position, fundraising, it's not my favorite subject, but it's something that I think I should do.

The other is investment. If you look at the big research universities in the United States, most of the growth of their endowment, and hence their capacity, comes from the return on their portfolio, not from new moneies coming in. It's been the investment returns on the existing portfolio. So Seth and I have spent a fair amount of time together, because I have said to him, I have said Seth, how much money are you going to earn for us in the next 10 years? Needless to say, he doesn't have a very solid answer.

But we've got to think hard about that. It makes a big difference. If we could earn an extra percent or two, that's material. I've said to Susan, I've said, Susan, our evolutionary pathway is going to be defined by our financial position. Our financial position is derived from only two things. One is what we could earn on our existing money, and number two what we can raise in terms of new money.

We've been living off our existing physical plant and we've probably run that one out. I mean we're having to renew our plant. I would estimate that over the last 10, 15 years, we've probably extracted a couple of billion dollars worth of value out of our existing plant. When we take depreciation, we don't put that money away in a kitty that's separate from the endowment, and so forth and so on. That money disappears -- it's an accounting entry, but there is no cash. The result is that we currently have a lot of pretty well depreciated buildings that we've been living in as if they were free.

So to some extent we're living on historic investments that we've made. As you could see, on campus we've had to start making some new investments. We have a new Sloan School, we have a new Media Lab, we're about to open a new cancer center, and we have to renovate the existing buildings.

So, it seems to me that talking about investment returns, fundraising, and our capital situation, these are things that are part of my job if I like it or don't like it, it just turns out to be what's important.

INTERVIEWER: Is MIT about to start taking care of some of the deferred maintenance?

REED: Yes. But not at a pace that if you really were tough-minded, we add more to deferred maintenance each year than we take out.

INTERVIEWER: How different do you think your approach and your priorities will be from that of your predecessor, from Dana, or from his predecessors?

REED: I think we all change with time. Some of our priorities will be the same. When I talked to Paul Gray, for example, Paul said, John, your most important job is who is on the Corporation. In other words, my role as chairman of the nominating -- you don't call it nominating, it's the equivalent--

INTERVIEWER: Membership?

REED: On the Membership Committee. I chair the Membership Committee. Paul said that will turn out to be your greatest contribution, who you add to the board, and so on and so forth. If that's true, Dana had the same, and his predecessor, d'Arbeloff the same responsibility. We all have the same fiduciary responsibility, vis a vis the board and on the Executive Committee, and so forth and so on. I can't speak to what their priorities were. I think that d'Arbeloff particularly was a good fundraiser. He has extracted various large sums of money from me, so I know all about being on the other end of it.

INTERVIEWER: In a somewhat better economic climate?

REED: It was a better economic climate, but he was good at it. He liked it, by the way. If he were alive -- I'm sorry that Alex isn't -- but were he to be alive, he would judge me strictly on a number of very wealthy people who I got to support us. He was really good at it, and he enjoyed it. So his priorities and mine would be a little different in that regard.

But I would guess that the overlap of prior chairman, certainly in excess of 60 percent. Then the 40 percent is probably a function of the particular circumstances of the times. I don't know who was chairman when Howard Johnson was president and the students were running around burning the place down. But whoever it was clearly had a very different set of priorities than any of his successors.

INTERVIEWER: Besides the question of endowment return and the depreciation or maintenance, what do you think are the other big challenges facing MIT at this point, and how would you assess MIT's shape now?

REED: First of all I think we're in quite good shape. On a scale of one to 10, you'd probably give us an eight or a nine, which even in MIT is a decent grade. The thing where we stand out, our faculty is extremely good. I don't want to say exceptionally good because there are probably five institutions or seven that have faculty of a comparable sort. But there certainly aren't 10.

INTERVIEWER: Globally or nationally?

REED: Globally. I mean the US, this is still an arena in which we are pretty well situated. The faculty is really quite good. The students are exceptional. I do think the undergraduate student body is singular in its make-up. Now part of it is because we're a specialized institution, we're not a university. I think Massachusetts Institute of Technology is an important word -- there's a big difference between being an institution and being a university.

So a Yale or a Harvard or a Princeton, they wouldn't want our freshman class because it's too shaped towards mathematics, engineering, science, and so forth. They wouldn't want as the entering class in Princeton or Harvard or Yale such a concentration of talent in this one domain. But we have really an exceptional undergraduate group. When you talk to the faculty one of their joys is teaching these students, because they are exceptional.

I think that our process of renewal, that is the process by which the faculty renews itself, which is the key formula for a great university, is in spectacular shape. I give it a 10 out of 10. From everything I've been able to find our tenuring process makes very few mistakes. It's rare that people who are here who don't gain tenure go elsewhere and do exeedingly well. It probably has happened, but it is not the pattern certainly. As best I could gather, and I've probed on this, it is also rare that people who we do tenure turn out not to have the promise that was anticipated when they weren't tenured.

So, this ability of the faculty to renew itself in quality is exceptionally important, because without that you'd worry about the institution. So, students, faculty: 10 out of 10. You have to say we're in great shape.

Financially, we're poor -- we're poorer than I realized. Some of it's attractive. It's fun to see that we're not living quite as high on the hog as others. But some of it's a little painful. There are things we should do, including deferred maintenance, but more importantly than that there are academic, substantive things we should do that we don't do for money reasons. From a process point of view, we waste a hell of a lot of time making decisions that needn't be made because we're too busy counting the pennies.

We waste an awful lot of time on that kind of stuff. Decision-making is not crisp, and I don't care about that, but I know how expensive it is for a large organization to be slow and its decision-making because it means you have lots and lots of people who are fundamentally spinning their wheels. It's expensive to spin your wheels. I don't criticize the quality of the decisions taken when they're taken, it's just that we take three months to do things that most people could do in three days. You've got to say to yourself OK, what happened to the other two and three quarters months of time and effort?

So from that point of view we're capital poor, so I couldn't give us a 10 on that, but I'd give us a five maybe, which isn't too bad. We haven't thought about the future very robustly. We're much more likely to extrapolate from where we are today to where we're likely to be tomorrow and unlikely to be the day after than we are to have a vision and try to interpolate between the vision.

There are Corporation members who have said to me, I've already mentioned 20 years from now we're going to be out of business. Interesting thought. There are other Corporation members who have said to me and with good thought, that look, we're allowing maybe 1,000, 1,100 students per year in. We're rejecting, choose a number, 7,000, 8,000, whatever it is, but it's a large number. Most of us would agree that maybe a third of those being rejected, maybe half of those being rejected could, in fact, come here and be perfectly good students and contribute and so forth and so on.

So then the question is do we have some responsibility to be larger because we're short engineers, we're short scientists. MIT certainly gives a quality education -- I don't think you could get a better one. Do we have some moral obligation to be three times as large as we are? That also is a question.

Now we clearly couldn't afford it. We are the size we are in part because of history, but certainly because of money. If we had twice the endowment I think that conversation would get a little more traction than it does. There was a question about that and I couldn't give us a 10 out of 10 on that kind of issue. The whole idea of globalization, what does it mean to us, again, these are arenas where I couldn't say hey, we're in perfect shape because capital-wise some of these evolutionary things-- we're not at the standard that we would set for ourselves.

INTERVIEWER: How much do you think MIT's role in the world has changed over the last 50 years? And how much do you see it changing now and where it's going?

REED: That's a good question. An interesting question. I don't sense that it's changed a lot. I mean 50 years is a long time. We were always seen globally as the engineering school. Our existence is well-known. We have always attracted some of the most talented people from around the world. That hasn't changed. I think we've always trained people who contributed to the global economy.

I was just this morning talking about the Minister of Finance in Egypt who's a PhD from MIT, and that's not unusual. When I was in the banking business you'd be surprised at the number of economists I'd run into in Brazil or Japan or what have you, that were MIT trained. We've had a long history with China. I mean I think there have been people from China coming to MIT and going back to China. It stretches way before the communists in 1948, it goes back probably to 1900.

So our role as a place to go for a really great engineering -- in those days more engineering than science -- education I think hasn't changed. I think it exists today, but I think it did exist 50 years ago and it probably existed before that. Our willingness to take foreign students and train them, and so forth, continues. I don't think it's changed dramatically. I think what's changed is our realization that the world has changed. But I don't think our role has changed particularly. Nor, by the way, do I think that the world's perception of us has changed particularly. But I do think what has changed is our perception of the world.

INTERVIEWER: Let's talk about your life before you first arrived at MIT, which includes some time in the rest of the world. Tell us about where you were born and where you grew up and what your parents did.

REED: I was born in Chicago 71 years ago. When I was about five and a half, six years old, I went down to Argentina during the war. We were still at war during the period. The ship on which I went was blacked out. My dad had worked for Armour and Company, the meatpackers. Argentina was providing a substantial part of the beef for Europe, particularly right after the war when Europe had basically no food. I don't think people remember but in 1951 England was still rationing food.

Anyway, so my dad's job took him back down to Argentina, and my brother, I have an older brother, and I were packed up and off we went to Argentina. I started first grade there. Was in Argentina till about fifth grade, and then we went to Brazil. We went to Sao Paulo. At the time Sao Paulo was a million people, now it's about 20 million. I used to ride my bicycle down Paulista, which is the main business street in Sao Paulo, and there were nothing but big homes. You'd ride your bike in the morning and people would be cleaning the streets. Now they're all big, tall glass buildings. I lived in Brazil from '48 to '51. Came back to Argentina and then graduated from high school in Argentina.

My family came originally from Toledo, Ohio, my mother and father went to the same school. You know, the girl next door deal, it was real. I was wonderfully lucky. I had a wonderful family life and great parents and so forth and so on. So I don't have any of the modern day traumas that people talk about. I do think we went to Argentina in good measure because my parents thought that it would be a great place to raise a family, which it was.

My dad went to MIT, class of '24, electrical engineering, and got his Master's in '25. Left MIT and went to work for IT&T, which in those days was actually a telephone company. It was the International Telephone Company. For an electrical engineer, a telephone company was a normal kind of thing to do. MIT was always important to my dad. He felt that he and really gotten a great education here. So I always had MIT magazines around the house. I can remember my dad was always a member of the local MIT club in Sao Paulo and in Buenos Aires both. So the MIT connection was there.

When I was coming to the states to college, my dad said, hey kid, you're not up to just going -- you know, I never lived in the states really, and in those days we came back every third year on a ship. I mean you weren't flying back and forth. It wasn't a question. There weren't any telephones. I never once spoke to my grandparents on a telephone or anything like that. It was telex and so forth. So anyway, it was going to be what it was, a culture shock to go back to the states.

At the time MIT had a 3-2 program. The 3-2 program was with 12 identified liberal arts colleges. So I applied to the 3-2 program, and I chose Washington & Jefferson just totally arbitrarily. I didn't want to be on the east coast because MIT was on the east coast. Since I didn't know anything about the United States I sort of figured I'd go elsewhere. Reed College was part of it out in Oregon and I was thinking that would be good for my name. But Oregon seemed a long way away, and I ended up at W & J. Now no one would know why W & J, it was 600 men only at the time, small liberal arts school. It had played in the Rose Bowl in 1924.

Now my father graduated in '24. So he had heard of it. Now that's strange but that's true. Anyway, so I just arbitrarily did it. It turned out to be wonderful. I got a good liberal arts education. It was a very small school in not a wealthy part of Pennsylvania -- you know, Pittsburgh is not. So I learned a lot about a world that I had not seen as an ex-pat in Argentina. It was 100 percent American. I don't think there was anybody any place close to the school who had ever been any place else.

I should backtrack. My last part of my schooling, my high school in Argentina was an American school. It was the American Community School, as it was called. There were French schools, there was a Scottish school, a British school, a German school and stuff. So depending where folks were going to go to college you would point them because the educational systems are different. So if you wanted to go to England to go to college you went to Saint George's. If you wanted to go to Scotland you went to Saint Andrews, and so forth and so on.

We sort of collected folks who wanted to go to the states to college. There were only eight Americans in my graduating class, everybody else was foreign. Because of my age, we had a lot of Chinese from the 1948 Communist Revolution. There were a lot of refugees who ended up in Argentina. They wanted their kids to come to the states to college, so they would try to get them into the American school. We had a lot of eastern Europeans who post war had come to Argentina, and Argentina was one of these places where you could get in. People may have wanted to come to the states, but there were quotas, it was difficult, and many people ended up either in Canada, Australia, Argentina. Onassis came to Argentina after the war. People think him as a Greek ship owner, but he started in Argentina.

So anyway, my experience in the American School was the collection of international folks who were pointing their way at coming to college in the United States. By the way, the great bulk of my class did, and I'm still in touch with a lot them, and many of them have had very interesting and successful careers all over the world. But every nationality -- you could imagine, eastern European, we had one Egyptian girl in my class, but a lot of Chinese, and so forth and so on , because of this collective time which doesn't exist.

But anyway, came to the states, W & J worked well, transferred to MIT, enjoyed it. I took courses -- you had to have a minor in those days and I took course three. I decided which degree to get by where you wrote your thesis basically. I debated whether metallurgy, as it was then called, not sophisticated material science. I debated seriously in my mind whether I would stick with that, but decided no, I'd go into a managerial track. In those days 15 was industrial management. It was you were targeting to be a plant manager.

I left there, went to Goodyear. I had taken ROTC in school, and so I became a second lieutenant and served in the army, great experience. I had troops and we met as a unit, went to Korea, plugged in and replaced a unit that was there and came back. Learned a lot about Asia, which I had not been to. We had about 1,500 Koreans working in the -- it was an engineering depot rebuild operation. Tear down engineering equipment and rebuild it and so forth. We were just back of the DMZ.

I had not intended to go to grad school. I learned what I didn't know and said you know what kid, you better go back to school. There's a lot that you don't know. So I came back here and I sort of negotiated a program with Bill Pounds, who was then the dean at the Sloan School. I understood the catalog and everything. So I asked if I were to take these courses would you give me a degree? We had to negotiate around the corner. But in essence I was able to put together my own track, so to speak. I was targeting the things that I really felt that I didn't understand that I wanted to understand.

INTERVIEWER: Which were what types of things?

REED: Mainly economics and sort of mathematical analysis, quantitative things. You can learn a lot about the world by reading books. It's very hard to learn quantitative things just reading. Some people probably do, but I'm not included.

Then I went to work for Citibank. I went to work for Citibank because I thought they'd send me overseas and I'd spend the rest of my life as an ex-pat.

INTERVIEWER: Let me back you up a minute. Were you good at math and science as a kid growing up, and were you drawn to them?

REED: Not exceptionally, no. No, I wasn't exceptionally -- I was not an exceptional student. I think I was exceptionally curious.

INTERVIEWER: Were you a leader?

REED: Yes, probably. I always was enthusiastic about whatever I was doing. That was a great skill. Once I was in trouble in the Army and I spent three days washing garbage pails. I assure you no one has ever washed them as well. I spent three days, I just decided I was going to wash every garbage pail in Fort Belvoir, which I did. And they were going to be awfully clean, which they were. So I could get enthused even doing things that one might wonder why one's doing.

INTERVIEWER: Did you know what you wanted to do as a career when you were growing up? Did you have some goal?

REED: I wanted to run something. In those days I thought I'd run a factory. My idea was I'd be a plant manager--.

INTERVIEWER: Like your father.

REED: He hadn't really been a factory manager, but something like that. I sort of thought that the big thing to do was run a factory that made things. But clearly it was managerial.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that there was some culture shock when you came up to college. What was it like?

REED: Oh, it's just social. I mean if you're raised in a Latin-American environment, it's less harsh than the American--. The American culture is harsh. It was funny. When I was in Citibank we always had our international folks and we'd talk to them about how difficult it was to move. Coming to New York was viewed as one of the hardest moves. I mean Saudi Arabia and New York were viewed as similarly difficult for families and so forth. It's the lack of support systems, sort of the lack of warmth. In a Latin environment the people will surround you more completely and so forth. The US, particularly for teenagers, you could imagine, it was a pretty harsh environment, and I was a little shocked. I don't think I talked to a girl for a year.

So it was a different world. The US is a faster-based society, rule-based rather than relationship-based. It is notably different. I could even sense it today. If I go back to Latin America , in some ways I feel more comfortable just in the ambiance. It's nothing about being there or anything, it's just a different rhythm. France has some of that. As you know, I had a house in France for a while after I retired. It's certainly not Latin America but it has some of that quality about it.

INTERVIEWER: What was your major -- did you have a major at W & J?

REED: No. It was mainly I had to do all the math and science and engineering that was required. W & J, when I had an elective it was 20th century American literature, but I didn't have a lot of electives because we had to do all of the calculus and all of the physics and all of the chemistry. Fortunately in those days biology wasn't on the list.

INTERVIEWER: How well-prepared were you then when you got up to MIT? Did you have the equivalent of two years of math and physics, and a year of chemistry, and were they of the same rigor that you would have gotten here?

REED: The rigor wasn't the same but the learning was the same. In other words, the practice was different. I had no problem. In other words, when I came in my freshman year or my junior year here, I didn't have any particular problem. I certainly wasn't the best student, but I wasn't the worst student. The thing that was much different was the quality of the other people in the class. I mean it was just a different world, and that raised the bar. The intensity -- the problem sets, problem sets, problem sets. Thermodynamics was my first sort of 240. For some reason I took physical chemistry 5-something or other, and that didn't seem quite as bad, but thermodynamics you sort of felt like it was tougher.

But what I noticed most was the quality of the other students. I mean it was just a totally different level and that raises the bar and the intensity and so forth. But I was well-prepared. I had enough of the fundamentals so that I felt comfortable. I never felt that I was under water or anything. I probably worked harder than many in the first year trying to move myself up.

INTERVIEWER: Did you live on campus?

REED: No, I lived at 353 Mass Avenue with three other MITers, one from Argentina who I had known for a long time. By the way, the people with whom you live help a lot, because we all studied together and so forth and so on. One of my roommates, Joe Antobe, who was in course one, was in grad school while I was an undergraduate. So when we got stuck he was around to help.

INTERVIEWER: What were your first impressions of the Institute, do you remember? Had you been on campus before you moved here?

REED: I'd been on campus because Durando, with whom I roomed, who was in Course 16, he was here and all of us from our -- he's an Argentine, I still see him-- all of us from Argentina, we didn't go back home for holidays. In those days one didn't do those things. So Thanksgiving, Christmas, and so forth, we'd all sort of get together and we came up here to MIT once and stayed on campus over Christmas.

So I'd been around and so forth. I'd never seen it before I came to the states for college. In other words, with my parents I had never visited. When my dad came back in, I think it was 1960 or something, it was the first time he had been back on campus since '25. So it was quite different. He lived in the east campus dorms, which I would tell you are still there.

INTERVIEWER: When you were at MIT as an undergraduate, did you become involved in any extracurricular activities?

REED: Nope. I was really very much here to study and learn. I was totally invisible and basically did nothing other than go to class and then back to my apartment at 353. To the best of my knowledge, I was never engaged in any social activities. I ate lunch with the Latin Americans. There was a table full of primarily Mexicans, but since so I spoke Spanish and all this kind of stuff, I ate lunch with them. That was the degree to my social involvement.

INTERVIEWER: In Walker?

REED: Yes, in Walker. That's where I ate all my meals -- breakfast, lunch, dinner. In those days I probably ate a big breakfast, a big lunch and a big dinner -- inconceivable now.

INTERVIEWER: Did you get to know any of your professors? Any classes stand out?

REED: Not really. I loved physical chemistry and I took physical metallurgy -- I think it was Professor Cohen who was the professor, but he was far too formidable a figure for me to want to talk to. No, but I loved it. I enjoyed the learning and I learned a lot. It's funny, I'm now in the Corporation and chairman of the Corporation and everything, and I think back and I think there is nothing that anybody could have seen. Had they been looking for me when I was at MIT, I was invisible. No one knew I came, no one knew I left. I didn't stay around to get my diploma.

My father -- this says something about my father, who, by the way, was a wonderful figure. But he wrote me a letter, he was in Argentina, of course. He said, congratulations on your graduation. He sent me the five volumes of Churchill's history of the American speaking people as a gift. He said, please remit anything left in your checking account. I did, needless to say, and I had zero money, because I just sent him whatever I had had, and I had to get a paycheck.

INTERVIEWER: So you moved out to Goodyear.

REED: I drove to Akron in my car, and I'll tell you, between the Monday I went to work and the Friday that I got my first paycheck, I didn't have any money.

INTERVIEWER: What was your time at Goodyear like? Did you enjoy it?

REED: It was good. I loved it. I loved it. I was building tires. We were in the plant and we worked around the various jobs -- you start unloading crude rubber from box cars and end up loading finished tire. I got to meet all the people, and an interesting set of people -- a lot of them from West Virginia. You'd be amazed at how many interesting people were in the labor force. I had no family, nothing to do except to work, and so I volunteered for all the overtime I could get. So I quite often had 18-hour days.

INTERVIEWER: Were you on the assembly line?

REED: Yes. This was hands-on.

INTERVIEWER: Blue collar?

REED: I had to be a member of the union, the United Rubber Workers, in order to be on the assembly line. In Akron, Ohio they had six-hour shifts. They had four six-hour shifts. So we'd work a six-hour shift on the assembly line, then we had two hours of management training afterwards. But I was very much on the assembly line. I carried the union contract in my hip pocket and I gave our foreman a horribly hard time because I knew every little detail in the contract.

I learned a lot. I learned a lot about people, I learned a lot about how to make tires. Tires, by the way, are a very interesting product. They're a composite material, the design and engineering of tires is composite even today, very intellectually complex, and they model them with super computers. There are a lot of trade-offs to be made as you build them. They really are an interesting thing.

but I learned something about human beings. When you're making treads the rubber goes through a dye basically in the form of the tread, and the rubber's quite hot. So you take it away on a table and it's showered with cold water until it cools down. Then it's measured to make sure that it's right for the tires that are being made. Often you end up scrapping 50 or 60 yards of rubber because the measurement says, that is not right, and then you adjust the dye, but you've got this 50 yards of takeaway that has to be scrapped. You could re-work green rubber, so it's not totally a loss, but certainly a lot of cost.

We noticed on the machine that when one of the takeaway devices was at a certain angle, that we knew things were more likely to be correct than not. So I pointed it out to the foreman that we could adjust by just trying to make sure this takeaway is on the right level and the odds are we're going to have a better product and we'll have less scrap. Next time I came the device was taken away. The foreman didn't want to get rid of the scrap.

INTERVIEWER: Because they had breathing room when something went wrong.

REED: They had breathing room, they had time. But that was my first great understanding that human beings don't necessarily optimize. No, I learned a lot. It was a good experience.

INTERVIEWER: So when you got to Citibank, did you think gee, our management trainees should spend some time as cashiers or loan officers?

REED: Yes, in the old days when I joined Citibank you started out in the back office typically in the letter or credit department doing the back office sort of underlying paperwork associated with foreign trade. You went through accounting and all of that kind of stuff. As we started hiring people from business schools, they were a little uppity and they didn't want to do those things.

But some of our best leaders when I was at the bank were people who had started out in the back office. Jamie Dimon, one of Jamie Dimon's good qualities at JP Morgan Chase now is he knows the details. He's done it all. He brings that to his desk every day. So learning the basics is not a bad idea.

INTERVIEWER: How long did you work in the tire company?

REED: I was only there for about nine, 10 months.

INTERVIEWER: Because you knew you were going to have to go into the army?

REED: You see when you graduate -- I had gone to ROTC. When you graduate they will guarantee that you'll be called up within 12 months. So I was called up in March and so I had graduated in June, so I went to Fort Belvoir March 1.

INTERVIEWER: And there you had the engineering work?

REED: Yeah, and then you go through basic training and all of that kind of stuff -- that's when I was washing garbage pails.

INTERVIEWER: Different lessons from your experience there.

REED: Then I was assigned to pick up a unit of people, train them in Columbus, Ohio, and then we went to Korea to replace an equivalent unit that was phasing back.

INTERVIEWER: At the end you mentioned that you decided you had more to learn and you came back to school?

REED: Oh yes. I did a lot of reading when I was in Korea, as you might imagine. I just decided there was an awful lot that I would benefit by going back to school so I did.

INTERVIEWER: Did MIT and Sloan seem very different to you after your experience in Ohio and in the army?

REED: Yes. I was more mature than most -- most kids in those days finished undergraduate, went straight in to get their Master's degree. I'd been out and I'd been out in the real world, which is different. I was clearly a little older in many ways and saw the world a little differently.

INTERVIEWER: Instead of avoiding professors, you went right to the dean and said here's what I'm interested in?

REED: I went back to school, I knew exactly what I was trying to learn. It's funny, I pulled my letter that I wrote Citibank when I was applying for a job and I was very specific. I said this is what I've learned, this is what I know, and this is what I want to do. I gave them a list of the things I thought I knew and understood. I don't think I've ever seen a letter like that since. It made a difference.

It's funny, I got a job working for Mr. Wriston that I would not have gotten had I just been one of the hundred people that they hired that year.

INTERVIEWER: But you actually applied to more places than just Citibank.

REED: No, I applied to a number of places. In those days you interviewed companies -- they were lucky to be able to hire you. A little different than today. Because for some reason MBAs were in great -- I say MBA -- we weren't MBAs in those days. We had a master of science degree and you had to write a thesis and everything. But the two companies that most interested me were Standard Oil in New Jersey, now Exxon, and Citi, Citi appeared to me to be much more flexible, which in retrospect it is. I mean I think Exxon's one of the best managed companies in the world, but it is not flexible. Citi was. So I did end up in the right place.

INTERVIEWER: You wrote an essay a few years ago that you also saw Citi as a place that was aspirational.

REED: Very much so.

INTERVIEWER: What did you mean by that and why was that important?

REED: I've always been one of these people who sort of tries to identify what you might be and then sort of figures out how to get from here to there. Many people think linearly, where are you today and what can I do tomorrow that's a little different. I tend not to do that. Citi wanted to be something different than it was. They were "building" businesses. The most positive thing that could be said about a person's career at Citi was that he had built a business or she had built a business. It wasn't a question of running a business, it was a question of building a business. We were expanding overseas really intensely. Overseas was what I was all about. I wanted to go back overseas. I joined the overseas division at Citibank.

So it was this pioneering spirit of doing something different and so forth that was attractive to me. Very different than Exxon, which looks for new oil but they basically want to find oil, take it out of the ground and move it around.

INTERVIEWER: Tell us about your career there and some of the highlights.

REED: First of all it was fun. I think one of the things that is true of me and it was true of most of the people of my generation, the thing that made it most fun, a little bit like MIT, was the people with whom you worked. It was a really interesting, bright, diverse, very global organization that the dominant culture was sort of working together and getting things done. We had Indians and Pakistanis working side by side, Jews and Muslims and we never had any problems. What was going on in the global stage -- and we had a lot of Palestinians because a lot of the better educated Palestinians had no sort of roots and they ended up with companies like a Citibank and we were just all Citi bankers. So that was fun.

I was lucky. Wriston and Spencer were running the place. I joined the bank to work in the overseas division. Two years after I was there the head of the overseas division became the chief executive officer.

INTERVIEWER: That was Walter Wriston.

REED: Yes, Walter Wriston. I had worked as sort of his personal handyman. He said I'll empty my wastebasket on your desk in the morning and you can sort of shuffle through it. There were some things that I knew quite a bit about because of my education at MIT that were not particularly known at the time. So I brought new capabilities to the company, something that is not true today. A graduate of the Sloan School today won't know anything that isn't already within the companies, which is too bad.

I probability helped quantify the management of Citi. We had no budget when--.

INTERVIEWER: Of Citi?

REED: Of Citi. We had no budget when I joined. One of the first things Wriston had me do when he became president was create a budget process.

INTERVIEWER: For the bank?

REED: For the bank. Our earnings were what the accountants told us our earnings were at the close of the year.

INTERVIEWER: And this was in the late '60s.

REED: This was 1965.

INTERVIEWER: Mid-'60s?

REED: Yeah. One of the first things I did that caused Mr. Wriston to like me was I would tell him what the earnings of the overseas division were before the chairman knew. So he could tell the chairman, by the way, this month we earned x. Lo and behold the chairman would be very surprised to discover a week later that we, in fact, had earned x.

That was because I had gotten into the bottom of the accounting system and I knew all the accountants and I figured out how we calculated these various things. I would give Wriston a forecast of what I thought the earnings would be each month, which we didn't have, and so forth and so on. While I was in the overseas division I helped him create "a language" to run the place. That language still, when I left 10 years ago, was there.

So when he became president, I spent two to three years building the language, if you will, that we used for running the place, which was a pretty robust and good language. I care a lot about numbers and so forth and so on.

Then Wriston asked me to help the company think about how computers would impact banking. That caused me to try to understand what was going on in the world of computers -- something that I didn't necessarily know. I spent a year running around the country talking to people in computer companies and so forth and so on, getting a sense of what was going on. Then we embraced the idea that what was going to be most important to us were online, interactive real-time systems.

Then we tried to figure out how we could bring such thinking and capability into the company. We ended up doing some start-ups. I was the first occupant of this building that MIT now owns in Kendall Square, the tower there. I think it's 1 Broadway. We've created something called Citibank Systems, Inc. CSI. Then we merged it with a company in California in Santa Monica and moved from here to California.

Frank Newman who later became head of Bankers Trust was one of my first software hires at CSI. We brought this idea, which in its most conventional form takes the form of cash machines today, which is an online, interactive system. We brought that into banking through this work. But we did an equivalent thing on the corporate side with funds transfer where corporate treasurers could move money around the world using terminals in the corporate treasurer's office.

It didn't take a genius to figure out that this same computational capabilities would be useful in the back office of the company, which, if you recall in the '70s was going through a real paperwork crisis. It was one of the few places where Mr. Perot didn't do well.

But anyway, I was then asked to run our back office. If you had looked at the history of the people running our back office, you could tell that it was in trouble because there had been about six people in about six years, which is a sure sign that things aren't working. Number two, that it was a big problem. So I got into the back office and we re-conceived it. It had been thought of as sort of green eye shade accountants in your back office -- the name itself says everything. It was physically behind the platform where you would deal with customers, and then you had your "back office."

It didn't take a long time because of my youth, and so forth and so on, to see it quite differently. This was a flow, a processing flow of transactions. You should view it as you'd view an oil refinery, you want to get the product through and so forth so on. So we reorganized the place totally into flows, and we put people in charge of the flows. Then we started automating pieces that could be automated. We did a lot of things that were interesting and things that you only do when you're young.

We couldn't get NCR, which was one of the big suppliers of equipment, or IBM to give us the equipment we needed. We said the hell with you, and we started putting out requests for others to build equipment, because in those days the major equipment manufacturers said we don't care what the customer thinks, this is our product line, you choose the product that you most like. We said, these products aren't going to do what we want. So we started specifying. We want a check sorter that could sort at this pace and so forth and so on. We were moving big money through the back office. So an hour made a difference because you were collecting this money, and interest rates were not what they were today, they were higher.

So, we totally re-conceptualized the back office.

INTERVIEWER: Mostly out of your head when you looked at it or were there experts--?

REED: Anybody from MIT would have seen it the same way. I mean we saw it as a system, and I had been trained to think that way. I hired a bunch of people mainly out of Ford Motor, and the finance side of Ford Motor was thought, at the time, to be very good and I hired a bunch of their people. That's the other thing, I was the first person to bring in outside talent. We brought in people who wanted to run a back office and for whom this wasn't sort of a clerical function to which you had been delegated because you didn't have any social skills, which is how most people got into the back office of banks.

But interestingly, and this is just an aside, parallel to me was Mr. Bloomberg who was a Salomon Brothers, and he was automating, and I met him when he was there. Then he was lucky enough to be fired and decided that he'd start his own company -- he's doing a lot better and I am, and it's too bad for MIT because if I had his money we wouldn't have the capital problem that we have.

But in any event, so I went through this period--.

INTERVIEWER: John Hopkin's in better shape.

REED: John Hopkin's has benefited.

So I did the back office thing. As you could tell, Wriston protected me from the wolves. We had problems, as you could imagine. There was an attempt to unionize the company, which I was engaged with. We had one week where we were unable to provide the Federal reserve with the weekly reporting member bank's numbers because we couldn't close the books because I had destroyed the accounting system for a day or two. When you change things sometimes there's fallout.

INTERVIEWER: Did you know that would happen? Did you give the Fed a head--?

REED: No, not at all. When it happened we called the Fed and they were perfectly OK. But they'll be an asterisk in the weekly reporting member banks that you'll be able to find estimate for National City or whatever.

INTERVIEWER: Even before Wriston, I mean it was George Moore?

REED: George Moore.

INTERVIEWER: Who was pretty visionary too, yeah?

REED: Wriston was very demanding, very disciplined, but extremely permissive of young people. George Moore was a live wire. George Moore was a free spirit. He had Stillman Rockefeller who was the last of the straightforward traditional bank chairmen.

There was Bernie Stott was there who was an MIT graduate, electrical engineer, and he was the comptroller of the bank. He once saw me without my suit coat on and sent me home. He said if you can't be properly attired we don't want you at work.

INTERVIEWER: [INAUDIBLE].

REED: He didn't work. He was tough -- talk about an MITer who was straight. But in any event, we did the back office, that worked out, and we really turned the place around. It's funny, John Thain told me that Goldman saw what had happened with us, said you know what, these guys are right. They started and they have the best back office at Wall Street today. I never knew any of those ideas had--

INTERVIEWER: This was Weinberg and Whitehead.

REED: It must have been before Weinberg probably, I would guess. It could have been John. I knew John quite well. He was a wonderful, wonderful man.

But in any event, then I went to my then boss, Bill Spencer, who worked with Wriston, and said hey Bill -- Wriston had reorganized the place along customer lines, which by the way turned out to be a genius decision. He had made that decision in '67, something like that. So we had taken what had been a more traditional organization that was sort of product line oriented and geographically oriented and we switched it to customers.

I went to my boss Spencer and said, you know the retail side of this doesn't make any sense. The corporate side we had organized into customer units, but the retail side we still had the metropolitan branch system, and then we had finance companies, and it was arranged in a very strange way. I said to Bill, I said, this doesn't make any sense. He said OK, smart guy, drop the job you're currently in -- I was one of five executive vice presidents at that stage -- and run around the world and tell us what we should do. So I did. I spent a year running around the world trying to figure out what we were doing. Together with a couple of other people.

INTERVIEWER: With confidence that you'd come up with something. That there was a better way, whatever it was.

REED: No, no, no. I just sort of felt that -- you know. If I was wrong, Spencer was going to say, sorry kid, you're wrong. Bill was tough. You didn't get hurt at Citibank if you had an idea that didn't work. I mean you didn't have to hide. If you thought you had a good idea and it didn't turn out to be a good idea, no one killed you.

INTERVIEWER: But they were willing to invest the time. They said [INAUDIBLE].

REED: I mean they took an executive vice president out of his job and floated him around. It's strange, you know.

So I did and we came back and I said, this is how we might organize a consumer group, and I went to the board, made a presentation. We did and I ran the consumer group for 10 years and that was fun. I mean we were right as to what we were doing, we built a great business. My greatest regret was that I wasn't able to sort of stay with it and develop it further.

Then they made me chairman and CEO and my job changed. I had to work not on what I wanted to work on, but what our problems were, and our problem was cross-border debt. We had a Latin American debt crisis. Mexico had quit paying interest in 1982 and I became chairman in '84, so we'd already been a year and a half. Everybody had their head buried under the sand. They were pretending that nothing was happening because it was so large that they didn't know how to deal with it.

Our exposure at the time was probably 125 percent of our capital, so it was a big deal. I was trying to get my mind around this. This was a forbidden subject. No one wanted to talk about it. I didn't fully appreciate it either because I'd been running the consumer business, I didn't know anything about this. Victor Menezes, who's a member of the Corporation here at MIT, was running Hong Kong at the time, and we had a tradition in Citibank that when a country had came in to head office, they'd always have coffee with the chairman so that you could hear what's going on in Hong Kong.

Victor came into my office and said, John, this cross-border debt thing is going to put us out of business. I said tell me about it. He did. So I started looking at it and he was right. It wasn't that I hadn't known about it, but I wasn't quite so fixated with it until Victor said this. I have this quality which has served me well in life that when people give me bad news, I accept it. I never say, oh that isn't true, forget it, go away. My instinct is to accept it and then sometimes I find out that it isn't, but I start out assuming that people who talk to me are, in fact, correct.

So we got our mind around the cross-border debt problem, and it's really funny because in the middle of this I picked up the phone and I called Victor and he was running Hong Kong in Hong Kong. He wasn't there, but I said to his secretary, tell Mr. Menezes that I called and would he please give me a call. Victor came in and said somebody's joking with me because he was four levels down in the organization. The chairman didn't call me really. It took him a while to figure out that I had.

Then he called me back and I said Victor I want you in New York and you're going to help me work on this problem, and he did. He came back to New York and he and I worked -- Bill Rhodes was the principle horse, but Victor and I worked on it hard. Twice in his career Victor played that role with me where he gave me bad news that turned out to be right. But we solved the cross-border debt problem. It took 10 years.

Then we ran into the real estate crisis, which I learned an awful lot. That was a period of time where we really might have been in serious trouble.

INTERVIEWER: This was in the '70s then?

REED: In the '90s. This was '90, '91. We were short capital because of the cross-border debt problem. Our capital was depleted when we took the $4 billion dollar reserve. Then we really had to pull the company together, but we did really quite well. But it was a real crisis. That's when I said, self, it might be best for the company if they were to fire you. I had a sort of week where I wasn't very happy about that prospect.

Then I sort of woke up one morning and I said, you know what? I didn't lie. I didn't steal, didn't cheat. This is not a moral issue, this is a business problem that maybe I can't solve. There's no sin involved. If I can't I can't. But it's not good or bad, it's just you were given a problem set that you were unable to solve. So I said let's not worry about it, let's just see what you could do.

INTERVIEWER: Why with your penchant for looking at metrics and tracking things could something like that even occur? I don't know if that applies to the recent financial crash. In other words, people track things and yet there are still things that escape.

REED: The real estate thing at Citi was just an error of judgment. The person running our corporate bank, who I had put there, came to the conclusion that's correct that you can't make any money from big companies. The solution would have been to shrink down your business. But very few people come and suggest that you shrink down business.

So they were looking at ways of earning a decent return, the places where you could get good returns are typically risky. The three places where banks historically get in trouble are real estate, shipping, and airplanes, because you tend to finance them all, and during good times they're perfectly good, but when there's a slow down they tend to really change in price. We built up a pretty good real estate business, and I must say I didn't pay much attention because the company was running well, the head of our credit policy unit thought everything was fine, and so forth and so on.

Then when the balloon went up, which what happened is the economies around the world were getting a little over-heated and central bankers started raising interest rates, and of course, that tips the economy. It started in Australia and it went from Australia to the States to Canada to England to the continent.

But I wasn't paying much attention. I was relying on our guys in the corporate side to keep their eyes on it. I knew much more about consumer credit than I did about corporate. We had a real crisis on our hands. But I certainly owned it.

INTERVIEWER: You seem to be able to think out of the box. Is there a way to cultivate that approach? Is it easier to do when you're higher or lower in the chain of command? Are there ways to convince others that the results aren't wacky?

REED: You need an environment that tolerates it. So right away, had I gone into work for Exxon I doubt seriously that I would have developed that because I don't think the environment in Exxon--. Maybe the industry doesn't lend itself to that. So you need an environment that's open, where people are willing to listen and take chances and so forth and so on.

You also have to hire people who have that spirit. You have to attract--. You know, when we were running Citi we said hire anybody who looks bright-eyed and bushy-tailed. We don't care if they're a violinist or a mathematician. We could teach them finance. But if they're interesting people and got a lot of energy, a lot of get up and go, let's hire them. So we built up a really great set of people who were willing to be entrepreneurial and take risk.

But we also had a culture that tolerated it, but you have to foster that kind of culture, and you also have to press people to think out of the box and give them permission to think out of the box. Some people aren't going to ever do that. But it's a great quality, and of course, we were trying to build move things, and you don't build new things by thinking linearly.

INTERVIEWER: That kind of thinking probably characterizes at least some of the research at MIT.

REED: I hope a lot of it.

INTERVIEWER: I wonder what extent it carries over into the administrative jobs and the management.

REED: I would guess it doesn't. I'm just guessing. I've been around here through probably four or five administrations. Maybe Jerry Wiesner was somebody who saw MIT more broadly. Sometimes you have a great decision in a negative sense -- I think Howard Johnson was the one who said no to a medical school. That was a great idea. His is having said yes would have been a real jump. But the point is I think other than those two examples, I don't recall the administration--

INTERVIEWER: Opencourseware maybe?

REED: Pardon?

INTERVIEWER: Opencourseware maybe?

REED: That was an interesting innovation. I'd be curious at where it came from. I think it came from the Mellon Foundation, and it was art store and all of this with Bill Bowen.

INTERVIEWER: So somebody said yes.

REED: I don't know the history, you'd have to ask Chuck Vest. But Chuck Vest told me about the OpenCourseWare idea, Mellon gave us the money. My sense is that it was Mellon who approached us with the idea. But I'm not sure of that, you'd have to ask Chuck. Maybe it was his.

INTERVIEWER: Or even a decision like the one to look into the women's space at MIT.

REED: Oh, those kind of initiatives we've had. I do think we're curious and we look at things and we're willing to deal with facts. If we don't have women, that's a fact, and it's worth looking into and figuring out why. We're worried about minorities and professorship right now, and that, again, is being looked at. There I think we're quite good. But I can't remember an administration at MIT that sat back and said number one, can we re-think the whole school, which would be something, or could we just re-think the administrative process - how we run the place, and could we do so in a way that was lighter? Those would be interesting things to do.

Our central service organizations cost, and we could argue about numbers, but they cost something in the order of $200 million a year. That's $4 billion in the endowment. That's for the central service organization. One could ask oneself gee, you know a lot of it is medical and IT support and accounting and HR, and so forth and so on. One could ask oneself could we somehow access these kind of services in a -- it would have be a totally different way. It couldn't be just doing what we're doing today more effectively.

INTERVIEWER: It clearly wouldn't go to zero - you're just pointing out making it significant.

REED: No, no, no. It wouldn't go to zero but is there an alternative. This is this question and we learned this at Citibank as well. In a consumer business we were trying to develop consumer systems in India or in Chile that could be brought back to the States. The point was that the people who were working on these problems in those kind of environments just lived in a very different cost structure.

So the ideas that would stem from these places when applied in the States turned out to be very cost effective. The question you'd have to say to yourself, and this is why the union question comes up, could you create an MIT in India that would allow to have $10,000 tuition? So the question is could you imagine Terry Stone's part of the Institute, not Rafael's part of the Institute.

INTERVIEWER: Executive vice president for--?

REED: Executive vice president for operations, finance, whatever. But she runs the day-to-day, and could you imagine satisfying those needs differently? It would be an interesting thought/experiment.

INTERVIEWER: A few years after you left Citi, you took on the stock exchange job. What was that about?

REED: The stock exchange had a crisis. They had this problem with having seemingly paid their chairman too much money and there was a big fuss about it in the press. For reasons that are still not 100 percent clear, the chairman left. I got a call on a Friday from a friend who was on the board at the stock exchange and said John, we have this crisis. It's really a crisis of credibility because we've had this big to-do about compensation, and the chairman, Mr. Grasso had left. This was Friday, and resigned I guess at a Friday meeting or been fired -- I don't think it was ever legally decided which.

They were confronted with a need to bring somebody in who had some credibility and yet what somewhat knowledgeable and so forth and so on. They said would you be willing to do it? I sort of felt look, I'd had a wonderful career, I was having fun and my retirement, I loved it, but I probably felt a little guilty that I had done so well, and this was payback time.

So I went to my wife and I said hey, Cindy what would you think if I went back to work for a while. She said look, if you think that's the right thing to do, well do it. So I said yes, and I became chairman of the stock exchange. My job really was to sort of clean it up a little bit. Obviously, re-do the whole corporate governance side, and we changed the board and the bylaws and all that kind of stuff, then find a successor and get out.

So I went in, we were successful in doing that. I found John Thain who I had met through the Corporation at MIT and who was at the time at Goldman as president. He came in to run the place. That was a part of my life that I view as having been a success. I was brought in to get something done, we got it done. John Thain was a first-class successor. He did a spectacularly good job. I was able to re-retire. So it was sort of an episode. I learned a lot about the stock exchange, as you might imagine. I learned a lot about the SEC, and a little bit that I hadn't already known about the legal systems in the US.

INTERVIEWER: MIT has spent several years tightening its budget -- some of it as the result of the financial market problems and the plunging endowment. But in an interview with the faculty newsletter recently, you said that if MIT were a company, you would probably be able to identify more savings in the way it's run, but that as a university we're not going to be as efficient as the company. Would you elaborate on that?

REED: What we really have to say is we're a hosting organization. We host our faculty who attract students. We create an environment where the faculty wants to be here, the students love being here, we have to provide sort of physical facilities that attracts them. Our objective here is to create an environment where the best faculty want to come, and we could be pretty sure that if you have the best faculty you're going to have the best students. I don't think that you'd try to create that kind of environment with the same P&L disciplines that you would have in a stockholder owned corporation.

It's a different business. I'm sure that Bell Labs when it was run as Bell Labs was not run with the same discipline of Western Electric or the various operating companies. I'm sure there was quite different discipline because they had different purposes - they were trying to get different things done. So my feeling is look, we're in the business of creating and disseminating intellectual capital, if you will, so we need to create that kind of environment. Efficiency is possibly detrimental to that.

Now, I do think Terry Stone's side of the shop could be run with some discipline, but Rafael's side of the shop, I think we want to create the right environment and make sure that we have the right incentives and the right creativity, and so forth and so on.

INTERVIEWER: Are you satisfied with the metrics that exist to look at MIT in all respects, both in terms of the financials, but also in terms of excellence and whether it's as good as it should be, or whether there are gains of the sort you want?

REED: I look at it from the point of view of the Corporation, not the administration. In other words, Susan may need metrics that I don't because they're not of relevance to us. I think we're reasonably good on the quality of sort of the faculty and the students and so forth and so on.

Interestingly, we say almost nothing to the Corporation about our research activities. We talk to them from time to time about where the money comes from -- so much from NIH and so much from here. But we don't say much about what we do. I doubt that there are many members of the Corporation who could estimate how many people here on campus are involved in research. The number would be about 4,500. We have more postdocs than we have faculty, and they're here because of research. So I would argue that we neither have metrics nor language to talk about that.

On the financial side at the Corporation level -- I'm not talking about what Rafael has and so forth and so on, but at the Corporation level I would argue we also have not really talked about our capital needs and structures and so forth and so on. Nor have we talked very much about where we're going. You've been around - we don't talk very much about where we might be 10 years from now. We do in terms of real estate all of a sudden, but not in terms of where MIT might be. We're beginning to get into this.

So I think that in some dimensions we have wonderful metrics, in other dimensions, probably because we haven't -- you don't have a language talk about something that you're not worried about. I think there are some areas where we probably need new language and new metrics. By the way, there are things that you can describe that you can't measure, and that doesn't mean you shouldn't describe them.

INTERVIEWER: Then you and the Corporation are certainly very involved with the oversight of the departments through the visiting committee structure, which would include some sense of is this department where it ought to be reputationally, academically. It's part of what you get from having some professors from other colleges on the committees.

REED: I think we get all that. I think we're very good at that. But we don't, even the visiting committees don't usually report on research.

INTERVIEWER: Not explicitly.

REED: They never say, the physics department is wonderful because they've had these great advances and the understanding of cosmology or whatever they're worried about.

INTERVIEWER: But if a department ranking were slipping, that would certainly be something that ended up on the--

REED: That would be. That would certainly be part of it, no question.

INTERVIEWER: It would be a proxy.

REED: No, it would be a proxy.

INTERVIEWER: You also had some interesting observations in that faculty newsletter interview about faculty salaries. You noted that at top universities, faculty are paid far better than they used to be decades ago, and have moved up in the income distribution in America. Some universities, generally not the top tier ones, have tried to cut faculty costs by cutting their tenured faculty and hiring adjuncts, and that's a strategy that's being used in much more limited ways in the top universities, but has crept into certain areas. Do you see change ahead on this area?

REED: I hope not. I hope not. I go back to this idea, our basic reason for existence is to have the faculty, and I'd rather go out and raise money than start cutting the faculty. There are two ways of solving the problem, one's revenue, one's expense. I'd rather go for the revenue. Because the reason we're here, the distinction that we enjoy comes from the quality of the faculty and the renewal process and so forth and so on. I don't think we should start fussing with that.

Whether we could use -- you know, we use TAs, we have for many, many years -- recitation classes and so forth and so on. So there's a mix, and whether we could have instructors as they tend to more in the humanities, but in the math department they have a lot of instructors and so forth who typically are postdocs. But whether we could find a mix that would allow us to maintain our mission that might be a little better or not, it's always worth an experiment. But I don't think the objective should be to cut costs. I'd rather close down a particular activity totally, and just say hey, we can't afford to do that, then I would to start fussing around the edges.

INTERVIEWER: You're a trustee of the Isabella Stewart Gardener museum, and an overseer of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. How do you think about the arts at MIT?

REED: They're really better than I knew. They're really better than I knew. I mean I've just speak -- and we're having, by the way, a visiting committee in the next two weeks, which I'm looking forward to on the arts. Our students come here with a tremendous musical capacity and in some instances with a broader artistic capacity. These students bring with them an interest that they want to nurture.

So it seems to be, and maybe this is something Jerry Wiesner was particularly close to, and this is something that's important to us. We have, I believe, a pretty strong commitment to the arts here. My guess is we'll strengthen it. I think it's important to student life. I mean if you had to choose between an orchestra and a swimming pool, I'd go for the orchestra. Others would rather go swimming. But the point is I think it is very much a part of the intellectual and emotional sort of environment that we want to have.

INTERVIEWER: An essay for the book, Restoring Trust In American Business, which I think MIT Press published about five years ago, you said that all is not well in corporate America and you expressed concern that the trust and confidence is central to free market capitalism had been severely harmed. It was at a time when American industry was showing its most unethical side. There were the Enron and World Com scandals. Do you think ethics can be taught, and do you have any sense of how much it is taught, either at the Sloan School or across MIT in science or other areas?

REED: Look, I certainly think it can be taught. I'd rather have your parents start. I mean it's nice to start early. It would be hard I think if somebody arrived at MIT with no ethics for us to instill them. But on the other hand, as you mature and as you grow up and as you start doing serious work, there's no question that there's ethical standards and moral behaviors that are accepted or not accepted.

Certainly any of our laboratory biologists know full well that their research requires that they respect data and so forth and so on. The professional standards with regard to those kind of things in the academic world are pretty tight. I mean if people start fussing around with data and papers and so forth, they lose their position totally. I mean they're basically banished. So the standards are rigid, and you must learn those as part of your more mature education.

The business schools have done less well in that. Maybe because the standards are less rigid. I mean you could be quite disciplined as to how one behaves in biological labs, and you might spend your entire mature career in such labs where those disciplines hold. You go out into the business world, it's a little more mixed up. There is a selfish side to capitalism that seems alive and well. It's amazing to me how in some business situations, greed is simply part of the deal. I mean people are in it for their own economic or social sort of pay-offs, and that seems to be accepted. Maybe it helps the system work. It's not very pleasant to observe.

One thing I saw in the New York Stock Exchange, you know a penny a share is worth $5 billion a year, and let me tell you, most of the street firms would be quite willing to take a penny a share from their customers in exchange for $5 billion. Treating customers properly in my mind is number one, responsibility, but there's been a lot of customer abuse in the industry and in business.

So I think the business schools have not done the kind of job that you've seen in the scientific disciplines. I think in science there's a set of moral values and ethical values. People are increasingly very sensitive about human subjects and experiments and even in social science experiments. In other words, I've been involved in some things where people are trying to understand how people make decisions with regard to mortgages. There's a lot of discipline in not doing experiments that might mislead people and so forth and so on.

So in the scientific community, in the social sciences, in the physical and engineering side, I think ethics is part of the educational process, I think it's well absorbed and I think it's tightly disciplined. I think the business schools, they don't tend to emphasize it, not 100 percent clear to me that many of the professors would be in a position to say anything very intelligent about it, most of them having never been out in this particular environment. Hence, they wouldn't have credibility with the students. I gave some courses at Sloan and they were very well attended.

Some of my friends over there who are professors said the reason everybody's there is everybody aspires to be you, no one aspires to be a professor. They came not because they thought I had much to say, but they wanted to see what they consider to be a model of what they might be. So the ethical thing would be better taught by people who had been out in the real world where the students could identify with them more than a theoretical sort of version.

That's sort of my sense. It's more difficult to teach to business students than it is to scientists.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned earlier that decision-making here was not crisp -- I think that was the word.

REED: That's correct.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think it could be more so? What did you have in mind, and is that something that's tied to faculty coming together to make decisions, which is not speedy but gets you something in other ways?

REED: It's hard to say. It's very clear that we take a fairly long time to make decisions. In other words, we'll talk about doing something, and quite a bit later we'll get around to doing it.

There's an element, which I'm sure comes from the academic environment, which is appropriate, of getting buy-in. We used to do that in business too. We used to, when we were interviewing candidates, have them interview five or 10 people within the company, and often at the end of the process the candidate would say, why do you guys cause me to interview 10 people. Can't you figure out whether I'm any good or not? You'd say hey, you don't realize it, but if 10 people say you're really good and why don't we hire you, when you come to work here you're going to have 10 people who are invested in your being here, and you're going to have a heck of a lot better time with your job than if we had made the decision and just plopped you into the organization. So getting buy-in causes, you have to spend time to get it.

But on the other hand I do think that we are not aware of that cost of doing things slowly. Example -- and this involves nothing academic. We're very proud that we closed our June 30 books in the middle of September. We're not going to use the information in that closing. It's not we're saying we're not publicly quoted, we don't have to tell our stockholders what we did during the year, we don't look at our financials to make decisions.

So the information has very little time value. But you've got to ask yourself what you were doing for three and a half months. Most big companies close their books three days after the end of a quarter. The process of closing the books at MIT is no different than the process of closing the books at Exxon. It's an accounting exercise, involves accounting staff, there's no faculty involved in closing the books. Yet we're very proud, and we compare ourselves to other universities with whom, apparently, we look pretty good.

But I said to Israel, I said, Israel, I don't care about the timing because we don't use the information for anything anyway. But I'm just wondering if we don't have hundreds of people sort of going around in little circles for three months, and couldn't we use that time to be doing something else? It's very complex-- it's down in departments and so forth and so on. But the fact of the matter is decisions are pretty slow when you take three months to close you books. We have our audit meetings for June 30 stuff, we have the audit meeting in September. It's strange. So I'm observing the reasons -- Israel's quite conscious of what this is all about. I'm just conscious of the cost. Because we must have a lot of people doing a lot of stuff that could be done more quickly. Then they could go on and do other things. Which, by the way, it can't be fun either. I don't think this is enriching the lives of anybody.

So, there are things that we take time in doing, and I think universities are generally less time conscious. I don't care about things that benefit from thought. You know, if thinking and cogitating improves the quality of the ultimate decision, then we should take time to do it. But I am conscious of the bureaucratic cost of taking a long time to do things.

INTERVIEWER: On the subject of time, we are out of it. I thank you for your thoughts.

REED: OK.