

SURVEY OF ARAB AFFAIRS

A periodic supplement to Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints

SAA:36 5 Sivan 5754 / 15 May 1994

THE ISRAEL-PLO AGREEMENT: PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVES

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Hana Siniora, and Radwan Abu Ayash

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[Editor's Note: After the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation sponsored a conference on Political and Structural Arrangements in the New Era of Israeli-Palestinian Relations, which was held in Jerusalem on December 6-8, 1993. Included among the speakers were four representatives of the Palestinian community — a leading Gaza notable, a professor of political science from Bethlehem, a well-known Jerusalem writer, and a member of the PLO delegation to the peace talks. We include here excerpts of their remarks which throw interesting light on Palestinian attitudes to the peace process and the interim arrangements.]

Hatem Abu Ghazaleh:

The PLO Switch on Autonomy

We prefer not to use the term autonomy. The term autonomy has been very badly received on the

Palestinian side since its inception with the Camp David plan, I think undeservedly so. I was one of the few people, together with the late Mayor a-Shawwa of Gaza, who definitely advocated accepting the autonomy of Camp David as a start, exactly like this agreement is supposed to be. Had the Palestinians and the Arabs accepted our point of view, we would have had much less grief, and also, for sure, a Palestinian state years ago, and all of us would have enjoyed the benefits of peace.

The very same people who opposed the Camp David plan entered into the negotiations that started in Madrid and signed the accords with Mr. Rabin on September 13th. Yet the national interest of the Palestinians has not changed since 1978. From the point of view of the interests of the Palestinian people, it was in their interest to negotiate a start to the end of the occupation. Now many years have passed. It would be interesting to inquire into why these people who in 1978 rejected such a plan, in 1993 made a complete turnabout and, even to

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start with, accepted lesser concessions from Israel.

Mr. Arafat realized that his and his organization's fortunes were going downhill and if he did not agree to negotiations, he would be the loser politically. So once again, the interests of the nation have been subjected to the interests of a ruling clique.

For me as a Palestinian, even if Israel would relinquish all of the West Bank, all of Gaza, and all of east Jerusalem, to sign a peace treaty under those conditions would mean giving up and signing away 82 percent of what I consider my motherland. Nobody could do this and get away with it except the PLO.

Israel's Security Problems

We have to differentiate between security to the individual in Israel as distinguished from the security of the Israeli state as a whole because, from our experience in the past, the Israeli Defense Forces have been very successful in defending the Israeli state and the borders of Israel, while they have not been so successful in actually protecting the individual Israeli from attack. The conclusion to be drawn is that the acquisition of territory should not be the most important factor in determining security. Israel in 1967, from the so-called defenseless borders in the north, south of the Golan, was not only able to repel the Syrians, but was able to occupy their territory. Similarly, you were able to take the West Bank, and all of Sinai. To me, this problem of the need of land for defense is not a major issue. The major issue we should talk about is the protection of individuals.

Cooperation in Health

I often criticize the military government but it is a fact that the medical services in Gaza were bad before the Israelis came. But the Egyptians did not have a better medical system than what we had in Gaza. The Israeli medical system is much better. In this new age, it will be possible for us to develop our medical services because as technicians, as professionals, there are first-rate Palestinians. In a few years, if we properly manage our affairs, we shall not be so far behind the system in Israel, but until then it is very important for us to have strong medical cooperation, whereby we can send patients to specialized centers in Israel that at this point we do not have in Gaza.

Also in the training of personnel, and the specialized training of doctors, I see absolutely no problem with Palestinians going to Israeli medical centers to learn. Learning is something that all individuals should give to each other. I would be very happy for arrangements

whereby our doctors could come to Israeli medical centers to train. There should be no difference from a "nationalist" point of view between sending them to America or to Europe and sending them to Israel. On the contrary, in Israel they will be far nearer to their family and they can help us even while they are being trained.

Learning about Each Other

We should make sure that basic education about each other is carried out on both sides, at least regarding language. We should make Hebrew compulsory for our students, not just for a few years but all along the twelve years. By the end of it, every Arab in the territories should know Hebrew like a Jewish Israeli citizen. I think the same thing should be on the other side, where everybody on the other side should know Arabic like a Palestinian. Also, what goes together with this is knowledge about the cultures of both sides.

Human Rights

Israel has either to marry us or to divorce us. Make us all Israeli citizens, gives us rights like everybody else, and I will probably be the Prime Minister of Israel in ten to fifteen years, if God gives me life. On the other hand, you cannot keep us under subjugation. It may have worked for a while. It may work for another while, but it will not work for the future. I would like people to really look at this Declaration of Principles and work for it to become the solution, i.e., the liberation of the Palestinians under occupation, giving them the right to live peacefully alongside Israel. Otherwise, add us on to the population of Israel.

I always say to the Arabs that we should emulate the Jews in their respect for the individual. I think the State of Israel — and here I am talking about the state because usually it is the state that takes away the rights of individuals — should take great credit for its respect and concern for the rights of the individual Jewish citizen in the state. I would love to see a Palestinian state that would have something nearing that.

We need to put the past behind us and start from now to work toward what I refer to here as political egalitarianism. No state or person in the region should be of a higher status than his neighbor next door. We quite often say in our part of the world that this is a loaf of bread that has to be eaten equally by everybody. Nobody should be left hungry, because the hungry person is not satisfied. If we all work toward that, I look forward and have great confidence in having a model situation in this part of the world.

Free Elections and Democracy

The politics and election of the Palestinian Council are secondary to the basic right of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories to have free and fair elections. Experience has shown, however, that the electoral process was very frequently abused by politics and politicians. Even the most dictatorial and totalitarian regimes used elections of sorts in attempting to legitimize their existence. Such degradation of the electoral process is the most important thing to guard against, if ever the Palestinians are to achieve stability and a responsible government capable of addressing the challenges necessary for building the Palestinian state. Suffrage should be universal and a basic right for all citizens from the very start. The purpose of these elections should be to elect a National Assembly that can approve or reject the proposed Executive Council. It would be best, though not essential, that members of this Council should also be members of the National Assembly.

Who is to vote? We can adopt the Israeli system. There are Jews all over the world, but not all of them are entitled to vote in the Israeli elections. Any Palestinian who is a resident should, as in the State of Israel, be allowed to participate in the voting system, but I certainly do not find it beneficial that people who do not live in the territories, who do not experience life in the territories, should come and decide what should happen to me there. However, the right to residency should be open to all Palestinians in the diaspora.

The Palestinian arena is plagued by a number of problems that proper elections can go a long way toward solving. There are many Palestinian political groups opposed to the recent accords between the PLO and Israel. These opposition factions should be invited to enter the proposed elections and thereby allow the masses of the Palestinians to democratically determine who and what they want to support. These elections will also show the real size of the various organizations. For example, what is the real size of Hamas? People like myself who live in the region day-to-day can tell you confidently that the 40 percent figure is not true. This 40 percent figure really refers to the number of practicing Muslims — the Muslims who go to mosque four or five times a day. The great majority of these are just good Muslims; they are not solid supporters of Hamas, as Hamas would like to say. At the time of the signing of the accords, on the 13th of September 1993, if at that point a survey had been made, Mr. Arafat would have gotten more than 80 percent of the vote in Gaza. Religious convictions, however deep,

are, in my opinion, easily overruled by the stresses of everyday life for the majority of people. People in Gaza, and I am sure in the West Bank, have had enough, and the prospects of what can come to them from the agreement that Mr. Arafat signed at that time were more than enough to override any religious considerations.

Elections can thus be used to rid the Palestinians of the hegemony of the various groups and factions that have been attempting to force their will and views upon them. I think they have every right to their views to oppose the agreement, but come and do it through the electoral system. Do not impose them on the people of Gaza and the West Bank; they have had enough.

A most disturbing feature of the incipient Palestinian regime is the appointment of Mr. Arafat's aides and proteges to important and specialized positions which they are not, in my opinion, qualified to hold. Those who might have done well as "revolutionaries" will most likely be unsuccessful under the new circumstances. Examples from history are numerous. Che Guevara may have been the most famous of revolutionaries, but his appointment by Fidel Castro to direct the Cuban economy caused disaster and damage to that economy that cannot be undone to this day.

Elections, to be fair and effective, have to take place in an atmosphere of freedom and security that will allow for a multiplicity of candidates to come forward, without feeling any intimidation or fear. Going through the ritual of the electoral process does not necessarily mean that elections are fair, because people may well have been intimidated beforehand. The spirit of elections, whereby those elected should know that they are the servants of those who elected them, should prevail. The unhappy situation whereby a democratically elected regime can use its incumbency to perpetuate its rule, as also happened in Algeria, should be guarded against, and the Executive should at all times feel that it can be ousted by the elected representatives of the people. What we tragically saw and see in neighboring Arab countries, where elected members of the National Assembly have to start every comment by praising the head of state, and who have to declare that every thought they have emanates from his thoughts and directives, is a disgrace which the Palestinians have to avoid. The tragic mockery of the democratic process we see in some Arab countries around us should not be allowed to happen in the impending Palestinian authority. In short, if the Palestinians are to join the civilized world, they should make sure that their final arbiter will be the ballot box and not the trigger.

Manuel Hassassian:

Pragmatism is the Only Recourse

Israel has never been in the habit of conceding anything to the Palestinians. The Palestinians have only extracted concessions from the Israelis. Palestinians have been considering the DOP with cautious optimism and do not have high expectations in order not to entail higher frustrations. Palestinians have realized that pragmatism is the only recourse toward conflict resolution, and with pragmatism they believe that there are ups and downs and a lot of hurdles to overcome.

The Palestinians have been deprived of territory and denied status as a sovereign state, two important factors that molded their political identity. The Palestinian concept of how much territory is required for a viable sovereign state has changed over time. From an early policy laying claim to all mandatory Palestine, the Palestinians today are settling for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Palestinians, convinced that the symbolic achievements desired by the uprising could not fulfill their national aspirations, viewed participating in the talks as a pragmatic measure they had to pursue. The continued Palestinian frustration and mood of despair created among Palestinians a strong impetus toward political accommodation and reconciliation. Recognition of Palestinian rights by the Israelis was calculated by the Palestinian leaders to be part and parcel of a process in which consequences have to be mutually beneficial.

Pluses and Minuses in the DOP

However, there are concrete barriers to the outcome of the implementation of the DOP, the first being the economic imbalances between Israelis and Palestinians and Arabs in general. Israelis have higher living standards and productivity. The second involves structural barriers, with restrictions of Israeli economic policy on the West Bank and Gaza, which puts the Palestinians in isolation economically and in pursuit of economic nationalism. The third is communications and information inequities, where roads and infrastructure in the occupied territories are almost non-existent and the information and communications systems are not adequate. Fourth is the ideological barrier, with Islam versus modernity.

Let us mention some positive points of the agreement. One is the recognition of the Palestinians' legitimate political rights. There is to be withdrawal of the Israeli army from parts of the West Bank and

Gaza after 26 years of occupation. In doing so, Israel is giving up ideological and practical positions which were thought to be irreversible. The aim of the negotiations is to establish a Palestinian interim self-government authority, the elected council, for a period of five years, thus leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. However, the most negative points of the agreement are the postponement of discussions of major issues such as Jerusalem, the settlements, and the refugees to the negotiations on the permanent status. The agreement does not mention self-determination of the Palestinians or statehood, or Palestinian geographical and governmental control over Jerusalem,

Second, it provides for freedom of movement of the army, settlers, and other Israelis on the roads of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. By the time the agreement has come fully into force, there will be great danger to general security and personal security under Palestinian self-government. Freedom of movement of Israeli army personnel and settlers will be an ongoing provocation to the Palestinian population, and will encourage it to take action against both the army and the settlers.

In addition, there are opposition positions on the Palestinian side to the Declaration of Principles. The factions which oppose the agreement are the Popular Front and the Democratic Front along with Islamic fundamentalist groups like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. The opposition questions the use of force against the supporters of the agreement, but there is the clear danger of confrontations between the opponents and supporters of the agreement. All of the opposition factions have declared that they will not participate in the elections referred to in the agreement.

The Jerusalem area will be outside the jurisdiction of the self-rule authorities, who will receive certain limited administrative responsibilities which they will manage from their headquarters in Jericho, relating to Waqf affairs, the al-Aqsa Mosque, and certain administrative functions in relation to the city's Palestinian population, matters which will be under Palestinian jurisdiction. The PLO leadership, its offices, institutions, and military forces will be moved into the occupied territories from outside, in preparation for the establishment of the state, so as to set up a Palestinian authority capable of ruling efficiently. It is likely, however, that the PLO leadership will be a powerless figurehead. If this occurs, the various political factions could also turn into political movements competing for control.

Some Future Trends

The right of return will no longer be a high priority, in spite of all the good intentions and determination to maintain the rights of Palestinians living abroad. The Palestinians abroad will lose their political leadership factions, political organizations and military forces, and will therefore be barely effective in making their voices heard. Also they will be more ready to submit to the solution of vacating refugee camps and settling down. Inside the occupied territories, the priorities will be those set by the PLO government: more independence and internal control, providing needed infrastructure, achieving economic growth, fighting poverty and unemployment, absorbing thousands of returnees, confronting Islamic extremism, providing security to the new political system, etc.

The transfer of Palestinian forces from abroad to the occupied territories as a police force and a network of interrogators would result in the immediate achievement of two Israeli goals: a) eradication of any Palestinian security threat against Israel from outside which could have been presented by these forces in the future; b) these forces themselves will collaborate with Israel in confronting any internal Palestinian security threat from the Muslim or nationalist opposition against Israel.

When the permanent status negotiations begin, Israel might be ready to accept the existence of a Palestinian state in Gaza and Jericho as a fact, but it will not be ready to make many concessions concerning the rest of the West Bank and Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements outside Gaza. It can be expected that the permanent status negotiations will continue for years, and during this period there may come a turning point in Israeli policy, whereby a right-wing Israeli government attempts to eliminate what independence the Palestinians have had up to that time. The Israelis might insist upon not relinquishing authority over east Jerusalem. They also might insist on refusing to withdraw from additional territory in the West Bank, and might insist on refusing to dismantle most of the settlements. Alternatively, the Israelis might propose a compromise solution to give up most of the remaining occupied territories in the West Bank and to set up a Palestinian state there, one to be united with Jordan, in return for which the Palestinians might agree to relinquish their claims on Jerusalem and the approximately 15 percent of the West Bank land occupied by Israeli settlements. As one can expect that the Palestinians will not immediately accept such a solution, one may assume that the status of the rest of the West Bank will remain unchanged to a great extent. This implies loose authority, a Palestinian-

Israeli condominium, a functional division of authority, and Israeli domination in the realm of security. Internal violence might prevail between Palestinians and Palestinians, and between the Palestinians and the Israeli settlers, which would provide an unstable situation. This situation might prompt the Palestinians to come to the conclusion that it would be best for them to accept Israeli proposals regarding annexation of parts of the western territories.

I cannot see the Palestinians building a viable economic infrastructure without being in one way or another tied to the State of Israel. Now we are in the process of redeveloping our shattered economic infrastructure because for the last 26 years we have been under occupation. That entails the expertise of the Israelis in helping us, in providing us with the knowhow in how to reconstruct our shattered economic infrastructure, but first of all, let us talk about divorce and try from that kind of divorce to rebuild ourselves first, and then try to embark on mutual ventures of economic integration and interdependence.

During the intifada and under occupation, we have managed to build a civil society based on democratic idealism, what I would call neighborhood democracy. If I would relate that to the Arab world, where there is no democracy at all, I think the Palestinians should be encouraged in building such a civil society.

When the PLO comes here and tries to take over the authority, I think that will be the time when we as Palestinians first have to put brakes on the PLO and not accept the practices of the past. It will have to change to reflect the new political realities here on the ground. We are the ones to gauge whether this leadership is democratic or not, and we are going to push for open national elections.

In conclusion, the Declaration of Principles and the mutual recognition agreements do represent a mild breakaway from the hostile and belligerent past. Instead of the traditional unilateral Palestinian and Israeli assertions of the need and/or the desire to destroy each other, the new relationship stresses the need to complement each other and to rebuild one another. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which both parties will be able to concretize what the agreement contains.

Hana Siniora:

Deep Skepticism

Palestinians still are very skeptical at the moment about the peace process, and are going to judge the

whole atmosphere by what is going to come in the future. The Palestinians actually accuse their leadership, and Yasser Arafat personally, of having made too many concessions. Even very highly regarded people from academia, like Edward Said, are accusing this Palestinian leadership of high treason, of becoming like a Vichy government. Some people say that the leadership from the PLO is becoming like the authority of Antoine Lahad in Southern Lebanon. This is a very grave accusation, and it shows how difficult the situation is within the Palestinian camp.

We in the Palestinian camp have been able to move forward since November 1988. We started to operate a democratic decision-making process decided by the majority. We stopped the policy of consensus within the Palestinian camp, because in a consensus policy a small party or organization under the umbrella of the PLO could stop any development or movement forward.

Radwan Abu Ayash:

Evacuate the Settlements

No doubt the fate of the settlements is one of the major issues of concern for both Palestinians and Israelis. Settlements are indeed one of the major obstacles to peace. According to UN Resolution 242, from the Palestinian perspective, we consider that Israel should eventually, finally, withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. When we talk about what has been changed in terms of the status of the occupied territories since 1967, we stop with this problem of settlements — the problem of the cement forests built on many tall hills.

In order to maintain a real peace in the region we have to think of a final solution rather than talking about chopping the settlements into pieces. If we are willing to have a democratic secular state made up of settlements, Palestinians, everybody who is in this piece of territory that is located between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea, that immediately clashes with Zionist theory, which calls for a Jewish state with fewer Arabs.

Legally speaking, there is no Israeli jurisdiction over the settlements that exist in the occupied territories. These settlements are illegal and should be dismantled or evacuated. Israel has declared that the settlements had been built for security reasons. Yet if we are talking about peace and a new framework, there will be no need for settlements for security reasons, because security will be replaced by peace.

Some of the settlements have been built for religious/ideological reasons. About these I am afraid we

will have a very warm debate, first to locate which they are and to decide their final status. The ones that were built for investment reasons only, we will have no problem with; this will be solved easily.

In Gaza, today they are talking about how to secure two small settlements: Kfar Darom and Netzarim; how to ensure wide roads; how to establish a one kilometer zone around the settlements; how to build bridges in order to ensure a safe road. What about the West Bank? If we look at the West Bank we discover that it is like the zebra's stripes, it is mixed, as if one is mixing flesh and bones. And one does not need a surgeon to declare what part should be under the control of the Palestinian authority and what part should be under the control of the Israeli authority.

For us, the legal jurisdiction in the occupied territories, or in the free land after Israel withdraws and applies 242 and 338 or implements the accords which were signed in Washington, is derived from the Palestine National Council, which means that it is a modification of Jordanian law, more or less, and which means that we cannot accept two laws in the area that the Palestinians are going to rule or to govern. This means that the settlements will also have to apply Palestinian laws and rules. Otherwise we will then have three laws, not one law in fact: a Palestinian law, an Israeli law for the settlements, and a joint law for both.

Everybody believes that this interim period will be a test for the Palestinians and we have to succeed in this test. Everybody will be happy if this test works, but I am worried about whether we can be sure this experiment will work if we cut the occupied territories into two in terms of legal status. Palestinians are raising the question: What is the meaning of sovereignty for Palestinians? Who will tell whom what to do in this region? Are we free in these two zones, or are we still to have two laws? None of the Palestinians has an answer with the existence of the settlements.

I do not think it will work to isolate the settlements. Some settlements are in isolated places on the tops of hills, and they call them security settlements, and this includes the Jordan Valley. But what about settlements which are adjacent to the Arab population and sometimes inside Palestinian cities? How can you segregate the roads unless you use helicopters for both Palestinians and Israelis to move from one place to another? And are Palestinians willing to accept another law? The answer is no.

The only avenue for the Palestinians, from the legal point and from the safety point for both Palestinians and Israelis, is to think of the final status of the settle-

ments now and to tell the settlers frankly that, "Most, if not all, of you will be evacuated from the region, and you have to accept that if you are willing to have peace." We cannot accept two legal jurisdictions inside an independent state, exactly like the Palestinian-Israelis who are living inside Israel have been citizens throughout the years and to whom Israeli law applies. How can the Palestinians accept two laws under one area of control or under self-rule?

This question about settlements and jurisdiction is one of the most dangerous questions that Palestinians and Israelis alike are going to face, unless they declare openly what their final intentions are. The Palestinians have declared, and their official position is, that 242 means the complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, including the settlers. How to negotiate a possible agreement over the settlements is a matter of practicality more than ideology.

Concerning the chances of building new settlements, I do not agree that the settlement policy has stopped, because we still consider the suburban Jerusalem settlements which surround east Jerusalem to be settlements as well. So when we are talking about Jerusalem, there will be another great problem.

When we are talking about the land free of settlements, or of keeping them, I do not think matters will be so smooth. The negotiations may last for more than the period allocated on paper. Paper or principles are not the real peace. The stereotypes and the frameworks which we used to think about in the past 26 years need to be shifted. This does not only need courage by governments, it also needs courage by the people. It needs more and better understanding for what we are doing.

One State or Two?

It was mentioned that the PLO's old strategy was to have a democratic secular state in Palestine. That is what the PLO fought for in the past and said it would have in this country for everybody. At that time there were many illusions that the Palestinians wanted this in order to end the existence of the Jewish state. Yet we pursued this idea because it would solve every problem: the problem of Jerusalem, the problem of the right of return, and the problem of the security of the Jewish state.

Then suddenly we were met by another concession: "Let us have two states — one in the occupied territories of 1967 and one the Jewish state." But what is yours is yours, and what is mine is negotiable, because it was conquered by force. Well, you can keep it, you

can annex it, but you cannot ask for annexation and security. Let us be very frank when we are talking about these issues. It would be very easy for Israel to annex the occupied territories and declare its rule over them and conquer them and continue its occupation. It can be done easily, but we cannot talk about peace at the same time.

We are talking about pragmatic, realistic issues to be addressed directly. There are two states whether you like it or not. We are heading toward creating a state. We will start with the autonomy, but we are willing to have a state of our own with or without the money of Europe, with or without the money of the United States, because it is a matter of existence. We have declared that we support your existence, we are asking for coexistence, but at the same time you cannot have peace unless you have a mutual interest in prosperity. Security may be the major issue for Israel, but not at my expense as a Palestinian.

When we are talking about sovereignty, we are talking about two pieces of land — one full of Palestinians and Arabs, which is the West Bank and Gaza, and one full of Israelis, which is called Israel. The law in Nazareth is Israeli law, whether it is applied to an Arab or a Jew. I want to have the same for the law in Nablus. If there are some settlers living inside Nablus because Joseph's Tomb is there, we cannot have one law for Joseph's Tomb and another law for Nablus.

Israeli citizens living in the Palestinian state: yes, we will accept them. Why not? If they are subject to the law, what prevents them from being citizens? If the Palestinian authority decides that they have legal passage, why not? We are talking about a historic reconciliation.

The Palestinian Police

We have agreed that we are not going to have an army in this state, whether now or later. We are talking about a police force. You like to call them terrorists; that is your problem. We call them a police force, to secure internal security. I am not going to make a comparison between the huge Israeli army and the police force on the other side. Don't we have the right to have even a police force? Even if we started building an army today, we would need maybe 50 years to reach the level of Israel. I understand your worries, but please try to understand my internal problems as well.

* * *

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The published proceedings of the entire conference from which these excerpts were taken will be available shortly from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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A periodic supplement to Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints

SAA:37 25 Elul 5754 / 1 September 1994

PROSPECTS FOR ISRAELI-INDIAN SECURITY RELATIONS

P.R. Kumaraswamy

A History of Limited Military Cooperation / Upgrading Soviet-Supplied Inventories / Upgrading Indian Defense Industries / Preventing Infiltration / Research and Development / Counter-Terrorism / Self-Sufficiency / Battlefield Experience / The New International Environment / Recession in Israel's Defense Industry / Some Limitations to Cooperation / Overcoming Historic Mutual Indifference / Indian Domestic Political Pressures / Alternative Options for India / Exploring a Range of Prospects

[Editor's Note: The question of Israeli-Indian military cooperation impacts on Israeli-Arab relations in a number of ways. Headlines in recent days speak of Pakistani development of the first Islamic atomic bomb. It was announced that the Pakistani prime minister might possibly be the first to make an official state visit to the Palestinian Autonomy to meet with Yassir Arafat, despite Pakistan's lack of diplomatic relations with Israel. Finally, a number of triangular relationships involving the United States and the Middle East also come into play in matters concerning India and Israel. Therefore, we see the question of Israeli-Indian security relations as having definite repercussions on Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors, and offer this analysis by an Indian researcher at Hebrew University who specializes in those relations.]

A History of Limited Military Cooperation

India's decision in January 1992 to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel completed a long

process that began on September 18, 1950, when New Delhi recognized the Jewish state. Even though Israel had opened a consulate in Bombay in the early 1950s, its functions and jurisdiction had been extremely limited and restricted.

This prolonged absence of full ties, however, did not prevent both parties from developing limited military understanding and cooperation, facilitated by two unique factors. First, India was one of the few countries in the world where persecution of Jews or anti-Semitism was alien and non-existent. India had even provided shelter to a number of Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany.

Secondly, since the early 1920s Indian leaders have been sympathetic toward the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict and India earned the distinction of being the only non-Muslim country to have voted against the partition resolution in 1947. Yet India did not strengthen the Arab military forces confronting Israel; its support

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