"IT IS A STRUGGLE AS OLD AS RECORDED HISTORY": PRESIDENTIAL WAR RHETORIC IN THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES 1946-2020

Venla Räsänen
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History
Department of History and
Ethnology

Political Science
Department of Social Sciences
and Philosophy

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Tiivistelmä – Abstract

Sota on ollut osa Yhdysvaltojen historiaa sen itsenäistymisestä asti. Tämä heijastuu myös presidenttien puheessa ja retoriikassa, josta vuosittaiset the State of the Union adressit (SOTU) antavat kattavan kuvan. Kenneth Burke muodosti oman teoriansa retoriikasta tässä ajassa tähdäten ihmisten valistamiseen yhteiskunnan taipumuksesta sotaan. Burken klusterianalyysin sekä digitaalisten ihmistieteiden (*digital humanities*) metodien yhdistelmää käyttäen selvitän termin "sota" saamia merkityksiä toisen maailmansodan jälkeisessä ajassa (1946–2020). Termiä ympäröivät ja sen kanssa usein esiintyvät sanat muodostavat ymmärryksen siitä, miten presidentit ovat käyttäneet sanaa sota retoriikassaan. Kolme kategoriaa, jotka muodostin yleisimmin termin kanssa esiintyvistä sanoista, valaisivat ajanjaksolla eniten esiintyneitä retorisia käyttötapoja. Kategoriat sota ja rauha, sota ja talous ja historiapolitiikka eivät siis edusta yksittäisen presidentin retoriikkaa, vaan avaavat toistuvia retorisia strategioita, joita Yhdysvaltain presidentit ovat käyttäneet SOTU puheissaan. Burken metodia seuraten sanojen yhteydet, kuten vastakkaisuudet, alisteisuudet tai syys-seuraus-suhteet, avaavat presidenttien puheiden kerroksia ja sanan sota saamia merkityksiä.

Tarkasteltavan ajanjakson aikana sota sai sekä positiivisia että negatiivisia merkityksiä. Sota ja rauha esitettiin usein vastakkaisina tai syy-seuraus-suhteessa. Sodan ja talouden suhde taas nähtiin usein monitahoisempana, sillä armeijan tai puolustuksellisten menojen argumentointi riippui paljon tilanteesta. Sodan negatiiviset puolet johdettiin toiseuteen, joko Neuvostoliittoon tai myöhemmin terrorismiin ja positiiviset puolet taas skaalautuvat Yhdysvaltojen sankarillisuuteen ja altruismiin. Sota-termin positiivinen sävy nousi selkeimmin esille kotimaan sisäisiä ohjelmien rahoitusta oikeuttaessa sekä historiapoliittisissa argumenteissa. Sodan sankarillinen, moraalinen ja yhteisöllisyyttä herättävä puoli oli käytössä laajasti, kun presidentit hakivat tukea itselleen tai ohjelmilleen. Sota-termin käyttö ja sen saamat merkitykset vaihtelivat kontekstista riippuen. Suurimmat muutokset tapahtuivat kylmän sodan loputtua sekä toistamiseen nuoremman Bushin kauden terrorismin vastaisen sodan jälkeen.

Säilytyspaikka – Depository Jyväskylän yliopiston kirjasto, JYX-julkaisuarkisto

Muita tietoja – Additional information

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1 INTRODUCTION

"And so, in the end, men are brought to that most tragically ironic of all divisions, or conflicts, wherein millions of cooperative acts go into the preparation for one single destructive act. We refer to that ultimate disease of cooperation: war."

(Kenneth Burke 1969b, 22.)

War has been a persistent feature in the political sphere of the United States since the birth of the nation. The official count from the Congressional Research Service argues that out of the 244 years of independence (1776-2020), 144 years can be designated as a period of conflict. (CRS 2020.) According to the statistics compiled from Wikipedia, the history of the independent USA (1776-2017) includes 222 years of conflict from a total 239 years. This would make only 17 years of peace for the nation. Although the unofficial numbers paint a picture of a conflict-driven country, even the official records reveal the undisputable fact: war is and has been continuously present in the U.S. history. This has drawn many theorists to form their take on the rhetoric of the war. The quotation at the beginning presents one of them: Kenneth Burke. While his opinion seems openly aggressive, Kenneth Burke's interest in war rhetoric has drawn many researchers to use his approach. Burke built his practice to rhetoric during the Cold War in the U.S. and was influenced by the contemporary political and rhetorical atmosphere. In Burke's view, American postwar rhetoric sponsored war in the name of peace. (Jensen 2018, 391.) According to Kyle Jensen (2018), Burke wanted

to "teach audiences how to identify rhetorical devices that justify nationalistic warfare in the name of peace." In *The Grammar of Motives* (Burke 1969a) he presented his aim as *Ad bellum purificandum*, towards purification of war, meaning movement towards open and honest discussion and debate, the only kind of war that should exist.

Viewing this perception from today's perspective, wider audiences in the U.S. might share similar hopes with Burke. Since the country's engagement in the World Wars, the role of the guardian of world peace has been laid down on the nation's shoulders by others and themselves. Possessing the most extensive military power and budget in the world, the United States has had the capacity to claim the title of the world police. However, the operations outside the nation's borders have cost heavily, not only when measured per capita. While costs in people and capita often are the most prominent part of the public conversation about war, the discussion about the legitimacy of war actions is always present in the political arena, before, during, and after a war. (Gause 2019, 2-3.) Many of the U.S. presidents have been forced to make difficult decisions during wartime and most importantly, they have been forced to justify them later. The rhetoric surrounding war has been the subject of many books, articles, and thesis. This thesis builds on such literature but introduces a different angle. Many of the studies on the war rhetoric in the U.S. focus on one specific wartime. The Civil War (Pressly 1954), Vietnam War (Priest 2013), or the Second and the First World War (Beaumont 2015; May 1973) are topics that are going to emerge within the analysis chapters of this thesis but widening the timeframe to cover years from 1946 to 2020 and directing our attention to the different uses of the term war, we can form a new point of view on the subject.

Definitions of war vary, and while traditionally war is defined as a military conflict, something concerning violent actions between two or more sides (Holsti 1996, 1), actions surrounding it play an important role. Karl von Clausewitz's theory offered an explanation, which presented war as an act of rational policy: "War is the continuation of politics by other means." (Clausewitz 1832, 87.) Michael Foucault

reversed maxim and presented that politics is a continuation of war. (Deacon 2003, 37-39.) Intertwining of politics and war has spread over the traditional use of the term war to other dimensions. War as a symbolic category can be used to emphasize the seriousness of the matter at hand. For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on Poverty" showed that the rhetoric of war can be extended outside the traditional use.

Providing continuous and comprehensive data for studying war rhetoric, the State of the Union (SOTU) addresses function as the source material of this study, starting from the first speech delivered after the Second World War in 1946 by Harry S. Truman. According to Parry-Giles (2002, xvii), Truman's exceptional use of propaganda during *peacetime* led to more aggressive presidential rhetoric. The timeframe will cover all the delivered SOTUs from the first peacetime SOTU after the Second World War to the present day. The last speech included in the analysis is Donald Trump's last SOTU as an acting president delivered in early 2020. A broad timeline of seventy-four years helps build a more extensive image of presidential rhetoric, and by not limiting our gaze to one president, we might find patterns of the used rhetoric. Using tools of digital humanities for distant reading and combining it with Kenneth Burke's theory on rhetoric, I aim to build a bridge between the two research fields: history and political science. The method of this study takes the best of both worlds and implements the tools from digital humanities (DH) and Kenneth Burke's cluster analysis. The first step is to find the situations in which war rhetoric has been employed, then interpret those instances through implementation of Burkean rhetorical theory. The research questions are presented more substantially in the next sub-chapter.

1.1 Research questions and the structure of the thesis

The focus of this thesis is rhetorical analysis of the U.S. presidents SOTU addresses from 1946-2020 and even with the option of watching recorded addresses

the study is limited to the linguistic dimension of the SOTUs. Focusing on the symbol *war* and finding the connotations which it is associated with I can form clusters that represent Burke's idea "what goes with what" (Burke 1973, 20). Similarly, to Heinz & Lee (1998), the aim of this study is to title chapters of this particular symbol's book. (Burke 1973, 35; Heinz & Lee 1998, 89.) Discovering the most frequent associations to war form the SOTUs, I can "uncover the structure of motivation" (Burke 1973, 20; Heinz & Lee 1998, 89). Possible recurring relationships between symbols can lead to patterns of motives which can "articulate how texts construct and support cultural values" (Heinz & Lee 1998, 90) or, in this case, values that the president's speeches have imposed and reflected.

To provide more objective information on the data, tools of Digital Humanities are used to dissect the most frequently used terms associated with "war". After distant reading the data, more detailed analysis can be conducted placing the situational factors to the analysis. The three most frequently used clusters found are *peace, economy,* and *history politics*. (See more detailed information in the chapter 3.3). In what follows, I shall outline the question why it is useful to consider SOTUs from the perspective of digital humanities and which theoretical framework and methods I shall employ. To cover both research fields, I shall present theoretical outlines of Burke's rhetorical theory and methodology and history politics and digital humanities approach.

Aim of this study is to see, *how* the term war has been used: has it changed or possibly remained the same in the State of the Union addresses after the Second World War. Patterns, similarities, and contradictions hopefully reveal connotations and meanings that the term war holds.

1.2 State of the Union address

"He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." (The article II, section III, clause I, the U.S. Constitution.)

The origins of the State of the Union lie in the Constitution of the United States. George Washington delivered the first address in 1790, when the speech was known as the annual message to Congress. In 1947 the name was changed formally to the State of the Union. (Tulis 1987, 55.) The SOTU has been delivered once a year since the first outing with only a few exceptions. Additionally, in 1937 Franklin Roosevelt suggested that also the outgoing president would leave "specific recommendations for future legislation to be made by the President about to be inaugured". (Franklin D. Roosevelt, SOTU 1937.) Following this idea, Congress and the public received two SOTUs during the change in the administration in 1953, 1969, 1977 and 1981.[1]

During the 1900s the presidential institution has developed into more rhetorical institution. According to Jeffrey Tulis (1987) this change formed the present state, where the rhetorical presidency took the center role in the institutional development. This has also changed the SOTUs delivery, length, and style. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1990) see the modern presidency's State of the Union address as characterized by the process of "(1) public mediations on values, (2) assessments of information and issues, and (3) policy recommendations" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, 54.) Addition to the valuation of these processes, the SOTUs include celebratory notes. Each President has created and continued celebratory processes of national identity and history. (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, 54.)

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[1] See: The American Presidency Project.

These processes are what make the SOTU a specific type of rhetoric that combines both the deliberative and the ceremonial aspects. Policy recommendations need support from the congressional and public audiences. The goals set in the deliberate parts are often argued for in the ceremonial parts of the speech. Thus, both features must be included, since otherwise, the address would not fulfil the requirements of the Constitution nor reach its purpose. (Campbell & Jamieson 1990, 68.) This separates the SOTU from, for example, the inaugural address which is considered to be more or fully ceremonial. (Świątczak-Wasilewska 2014, xxii.)

The change in the delivery style has been influenced by the change in audience and *vice versa*. In the original form, the SOTU was specifically meant for Congress, but as the technological advances stepped into the play, the SOTU has become more and more about the performance and rhetoric. The first one to broadcast the speech on live radio to the American people was Calvin Coolidge, but Franklin Roosevelt was the one to make it a lasting tradition. After Roosevelt, Harry Truman took it one step further, and the speech was shown on television. With growing reach and audience, something that started as a means to deliver information to Congress, grew into a public event. (Murphy 2008, 302; Świątczak-Wasilewska 2014, xxxviii.)

As the SOTU's significance has risen, also the number of studies on the subject has grown. For example, the modern rhetorical presidency institution has been studied trough the SOTU addresses. (e.g., Teten 2003; Murphy 2008; Hoffman & Howard 2006; Rule et al 2014.) While the rhetorical presidency is inextricably connected to evolution of the SOTU, the evolvement of the rhetorical presidency is not the only possible subject of an inquiry. The rhetorical choices of presidents tell their own story, and the rhetoric has been lifted to the center of many studies. For example, Donna Hoffman and Alison Howard (2006) focused on the effectiveness of the SOTUS and measured the impact of the SOTU addresses in the public. Often the SOTUs work as a complementary resource next to inaugural or other presidential or political speeches (e.g., Parry-Giles 2002; Zarefsky 2004.)

Also, the digital humanities and computer assisted methods have been used in charting long-term trends in SOTUs. For example, Chad Murphy's (2008) "The evolution of the modern rhetorical presidency: A critical response" and Elvin Lim's (2002) "Five Trends in Presidential Rhetoric: An Analysis of Rhetoric from George Washington to Bill Clinton" give examples how digital tools help to form results from an extensive period. Murphy uses word count and frequency analysis of the words us and we, to pinpoint the change in presidential institution and Lim, using both SOTUs and inaugural addresses, forms categories with software called General Inquirer (GI) and this way shows the difference in language use in pre- and after-Theodore Roosevelt presidencies.

However, what is clear from the existing literature is that even with a high number of different studies on presidential rhetoric and the SOTUs, the history political aspects have been largely neglected. While the first two analysis chapters focus on more straightforward cluster analysis, adding analysis of political uses of history seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature while still following the findings of the DH analysis.

2 THEORY AND CONTEXT

2.1 *Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory*

The word *rhetoric* refers simultaneously to the art of persuasion and the qualities of discourse itself. (Martin 2014, 2.) The roots of rhetoric can be found in Ancient Greece, and especially Aristotle's idea of rhetoric as a skill of persuasion in different scenarios has guided the way for generations of orators and scholars. The modern-day rhetoric is especially formed based on the trio of the "New Rhetoric", Chaim Perelman, Stephen Toulmin and Kenneth Burke, who reintroduced the rhetorical focus to the academic fields. When Perelman and Toulmin concentrated on the argumentative side of the rhetoric, Burke found the incoherence and messiness of rhetorical actions and the motives behind those acts more compelling. (Summa 1996, 51-58.) Burke exemplifies his interest in *A Grammar of Motives* (1969a, xv) by stating: "What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?"

Kenneth Burke's literary career expands over six decades and his influence even further. Even though he has often been labeled as literary critic, his interdisciplinary actions cannot go unnoticed. He has been often referred as "the man without discipline" (Summa 1996; Simons 1989, Kivivuori 1994), because of his interests across scientific fields. His engagement in the field of rhetorical analysis can be linked to his

views on identification, motives, and symbols. (Foss 2002, 63.) As Hilkka Summa (1996, 55) argues, Burke's notion on the nature of all human action as a symbolic action is crucial. Understanding interaction as use and abuse of symbols leads to a conclusion that to analyze this action, we must focus on the formation and use of these symbols in all their glory and in the way they shed light on the orator's motives. Throughout his career, war and the rhetoric linked to it stayed in Burke's interests. In the War of Words (2018, 242), book that has been put together after his death, Burke states "the essential rhetorical situation resides in the constancy of the invitation to war".

Burke draw his inspiration from the Aristotelian ideas but rejected the classical focus to the act of persuasion and turned his gaze to the identification. Both implicit and explicit messages unify the interests of the orator with the audience, and lead to the identification. Although Aristotle's *Rhetoric* did not include much direct links to identification, Burke valued Aristotle's notions on audiences and their part in rhetoric. For example, Aristotle's three persuasive strategies, presentation of the rhetor's own character and virtues (*ethos*), uses of *topoi* and "commonplaces" or "notions possessed by everybody" and reasoning through a widely accepted fact, can be seen as part of Burke's identification. (Burke 1969b, 55-60; Woodward 2003, 5-7.) In presidential rhetoric, *ethos* might be presented as the presidents' courage and leadership skills in wartime, the use of "commonplaces" might be references to the past war victories of the nation and the reasoning might happen through the fact that expanding military budget strengthen the nation and for that reason the peace is guaranteed.

These strategies are crucial notion on Burke's theory of identification and rhetoric. (Burke 1969b, 55-60; Woodward 2003, 5-7.) As Burke argues: "Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is "meaning", there is "persuasion"." (Burke 1969b, 40-46.) One of Burke's first works on rhetoric was examining Hitler's rhetoric in *Mein Kampf* from 1939. Examining Hitler's rhetoric, Burke outlined the ways in which Hitler used language to foment antipathy, scapegoat Jews and unite Germans against common enemy. (Jensen & Selzer 2018.) As Burke (1939, 165) put it:

"let us try also to discover what kind of "medicine" this medicine-man [Hitler] has concocted, that we may know, with greater accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America." Burke's own purpose and meaning behind the publication was to prevent similar actions from happening in his homeland. (Jensen 2018, 384-389.)

In Burke's analysis of Hitler's writing, he alluded the reader of what came after. Burke's perception on dramatism, scapegoating or the purification cycle can be traced to the work he did with *Mein Kampf.* In his later works *A Grammar of Motives* (1945) and *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950)[2] Burke builds his perception of the symbolic action and rhetoric. Following Jouni Tilli's (2012, 16) argument on Burke's theory of symbolic action, "identification and transcendence are the goals at which all persuasion aims in symbolic action." Symbols, according to Burke (1989a, 269), represent collectively understood ideas, sentiments or attitudes. By using symbols both the identification and division emerge, and Burke argued, that without the linguistic substance of life, there would not be a negative nor division among men. (Burke 1969b, 25-26.) According to Burke (1969b, 25):

> "In pure identification there would be no strife. Likewise, there would be no strife in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through a mediatory ground that makes their communication possible, thus providing the first condition necessary for their interchange blows."

This notion on the possibility of identification and separation is the cornerstone of this study: as persuasion's goal is identification, presidents' aim is to create identification with the audience. Identification in Burke's *RM* is explained followingly:

> "A is not identified with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so." (Burke, 1969b, p. 20)

Hugh Duncan (1962, 144) has explained, that Burke "does not tell us simply *what* symbols do in communication, but *how* they do what he says they do." Focus of the method that Burke originally employed in his essay *The Rhetoric of Hitler's "Battle"*, is

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[2] In this study, the books are republished versions, and these years represent the first publication.

on the so-called "god-terms". Burke defines the god-terms as the extensions of God. (Burke 1969b, 299.) Borrowing Tilli's (2012, 22) definition, "rhetorically, god-terms symbolize a variety of motives reduced to an absolute that does not need further legitimation and can demand the sacrifice of all other motives beneath it." Tilli continues by identifying modern-day god-terms such as money, progress, democracy and freedom. (Tilli 2012, 22.) As identification had its counterpart separation, also god-term has its villain: devil-term. Devil-terms emerge from the necessity of pure evil, something that can awaken the need for resistance and rejection. The devil-term does not function as the god-term, it only guides the way of an argument. (Burke 1973, 165-179; Tilli 2012, 67.) For example, "communism" has been often referred as a devil-term in the U.S. politics.

Focusing on the term "war" as the key term, I follow Burke's associational cluster method borrowing Bettina Heinz' & Ronald Lee's (1998) reading of it. Their study *Getting down to the meat: The symbolic construction of meat consumption* (1998) maps the symbolic construction of meat consumption in the U.S. culture. Before going deeper into the methodological applications, further notes about the context and theory needs to be discussed.

2.2 *The presidential rhetoric*

There are numerous studies on presidential rhetoric, especially concerning rhetoric of the president of the United States. The leading institutes of the research on governmental rhetoric in the U.S. is the *Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress*, which publishes the journal *Presidential Studies Quarterly.* As this study is all about the rhetoric of the U.S. Presidents, it is important to have a glimpse to the previous research on the subject. Many of the studies focus on one president and his rhetoric. (For example, see Pollock 1994.) Even though, these studies provide important contextual notions, studies that reach their gaze to a wider timeframe come closer to the subject at hand. Roderick Hart offers an overview of the presidential rhetoric

studies in his article "Why Do They Talk That Way? A Research Agenda for the Presidency" (2002). He presents multiple reasons behind the rhetoric of presidents, pointing at the biographical, philosophical, cultural, institutional, temporal and mediated forces that affect the overall result. Hart argues that these results lead to the understanding that in addition to the emphasis on President's as individual beings, we must see presidency as "part of a continuing story". (Hart 2002, 696-703.) Consequently, people have expectations of the presidential rhetoric, which the presidency fulfills. (Hart 2002, 700.) For example, although Donald Trump's social media presence can be described as unpredictable, his institutionalized speeches did not deviate that much from his predecessors. The possible similarity across time makes room for the studies of patterns and reoccurring features in the presidential speeches.

Jeffery Tulis' book *The Rhetorical Presidency* (1987) attracted a lot of attention by offering a long-timeframe analysis on the development of the U.S. presidential institution. His argument on the formation of the modern rhetorical presidency has been the center in many later studies. He suggests that the United States' presidential history can be divided into two periods[3]: the traditional presidency and the modern rhetorical presidency. The separation of these two eras has caused some debate among scholars. Some suggest that the modern era started at the presidency of Woodrow Wilson in 1914 (Tulis 1998). Others refer to the starting point of Franklin Roosevelt's administration in 1933 (Gamm and Smith 1998; Kernell 1997; Gould 2003). The interpretations which have supported Wilson's administration as the starting point of the modern rhetorical presidency underlined the changes in that period. Rhetorical choices, such as the use of words *we* and *our*, increased considerably and the SOTU was delivered in person. (Teten 2003.) Even though Wilson favored the spoken form of the SOTU, the more permanent change happened after Roosevelt's presidency. After his terms, most of the SOTUs have been delivered in person in front of Congress,

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[3] Some add a third period, separating the era of the founding fathers from 1790–1814. (see Teten 2003.)

which has also seen as the reason for shorter speeches. From the highest count of over 27,000 words during the traditional presidency, the modern rhetorical presidency had kept the word count under 10,000, with few exceptions when the SOTU was delivered as a written message.[4] (Murphy 2008, 306.)

In addition, the changes in the rhetorical choices did not exceed in Wilson's time, and the lasting effect can be traced to Roosevelt's presidency. For example, Chad Murphy (2008) presents statistics of the frequency of *we* and *our* in the SOTUs of presidents from George Washington to G. W. Bush, which supports the interpretation that the modern era initiated from Roosevelt. The use of unifying pronouns states the change in the motives, rather than talking in legislative sense, the presidents aimed at building a nation-wide polity by addressing people directly. Either way, there is no question about the fact that with the modern rhetorical presidency, rhetoric "has become a principal tool of presidential governance." (Tulis 1987.)

With this study's timeframe from 1946 to 2020, the addresses are all considered to be within the modern rhetorical presidency, no matter the placement of the beginning. What does "the rhetorical presidency" actually mean? For example, Shawn J. Parry-Giles (2002, xviii) define it as "a twentieth-century phenomenon where U.S. presidents went over the heads of Congress and spoke directly to the people to achieve administrative ends." Although the previous definition gives us the idea about the rhetorical presidency, it can limit our view of the whole purpose. While "going public"[5] is one dimension of the term, the modern rhetorical president the modern president "uses his rhetorical opportunities for many different purposes." (Neustadt 1960; Teten 2003.) The interaction between the president and the public has grown in importance. With the technological advantages, the rise of a mass audience during the

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[4] After the Roosevelt presidency only four SOTUs were delivered only as written: Truman's first and last, Nixon's fourth, and Carter's last. Also, in 1972 Nixon delivered additional written address after his spoken one and Carter did the same in 1978, 1979 and 1980.
[5] Going public is a term referring to the president's appeal to the public as an alternative to bargaining with the legislature or attempting to use conventional rules of government to accomplish goals.

twentieth century has affected the rhetorical presidency's forming. For example, broadcasting the addresses and speeches first on wireless and later on television has tremendously widened the audience. This change has caused the need to confirm not only the support of Congress but also the support of the nationwide public audience. The identification and symbolic representation as rhetorical tools have turned into the most valuable ways of persuasion. The ways of achieving them are addressed in more detail in the following chapters.

In addition to the previous remarks on the presidential rhetoric and the possible dimensions within, one more comment must be made. Even if we are talking about Wilson's presidency or Roosevelt's presidency, there is always more to be seen than what meets the eye. The presidency is not a one man's job. The staff of the presidential office is vital for effective governing. Thus, no president can be solely credited nor slammed because of the decisions or speeches they make. This same goes for the preparation of the SOTU. The period before the SOTU is the busiest time of the year in the White House, so we might say that even when referring to a president, we are actually referring to the whole institution and its actions at the time. (Świątczak-Wasilewska 2014[6], xxii.)

Rule et al. (2015) have noted, that even with changing presidents and administrations from one party to another, the transitions in the lexical content of the speeches has changed only a slightly. From the beginning of SOTUs, there has been a slow development over time, but the contrast between successors whether they represented the same party or not, has been minimal.[7] In *The War of Words* (2018, 78) Burke presented a set of rhetorical devices, which could be used to reveal strategies of identification. From these devices *The Spokesman* device could explain the continuing similarity between administrations. One of its applications deals with presidential

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[6] Iwona Świątczak-Wasilewska's study (2014) *"The Toughest Season in the White House": The Rhetorical Presidency and the State of the Union Address From 1953 to 1992* presents a great example of the organizational dimension that the presidencies have.

[7] Rule et al. (2015, 10840) show, that average change ratio between two speeches from the same president was 0.31, while difference between president from the same party background was 0.34, and in opposing successor speech score was 0.33 average.

rhetoric: president is not only the Spokesman for his party but his nation. Accordingly, president can choose the target of the identification which often is often aimed towards the people. Although the evolution of the speeches has been minimum in lexical aspects, closer examination of the rhetoric reveals some choices which might have been influenced by the party position of the acting President, which must be mentioned during analysis. The table 1 shows an overview of the Presidents, their party and administration years.

President	Administration years:	Party:
Harry S. Truman	1945 - 1953	Democratic
Dwight D. Eisenhower	1953 - 1961	Republican
John F. Kennedy	1961 - 1963	Democratic
Lyndon B. Johnson	1963 - 1969	Democratic
Richard Nixon	1969 - 1974	Republican
Gerald Ford	1974 - 1977	Republican
Jimmy Carter	1977 - 1981	Democratic
Ronald Reagan	1981 - 1989	Republican
George H. W. Bush	1989 - 1993	Republican
Bill Clinton	1993 - 2001	Democratic
George W. Bush	2001 - 2009	Republican
Barack Obama	2009 - 2017	Democratic
Donald Trump	2017 - 2021	Republican

TABLE 1   Presidents, administration years, and parties.

2.3 Rhetorical uses of war

As mentioned in the introduction, traditionally war is perceived as a military conflict between nations, and often defined as such, for example in the Charter of the United Nations. (Holsti 1996, 1.) While the traditional description of war is still valid in many cases, other definitions have been formed during the course of history. (e.g., Foucault, Clausewitz). Moving towards today, the diversity of definitions has indisputably grown. After the two world wars the nature of military conflicts have

changed with the advanced technology which has also affected in the ways wars are fought. (Wright 1965, 3-6.) Extended conceptions of war reach all the way to the rhetorical use of war. While there is several different approaches and contexts where rhetoric of war has been studied, for the constraints of this thesis, I shall focus on the rhetorical uses of war studied in the field of presidential rhetoric. As leaders of the nations, presidents hold a certain significance in the field of the rhetorical choices concerning war.

David Zarefsky argues in his article "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition" (2004) that crises and war-like situations demand for fast responses which lead favorably to actions. This shifts the foundation where rhetoric is to be used. (Zarefsky 2004, 616.) The urgency of wartime allows the president to take the "persona of the commander-in-chief" and expedite the decision-making processes. (Zarefsky 2004, 616.) The absence of the traditional war does not exclude the possibility of wartime rhetoric. Robert Ivie and Oscar Giner describe the US political culture in their article *Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War* (2007, 580) followingly:

> "The diabolism of presidential war rhetoric, we suggest, functions as an inducement to evacuate the political content of democracy, leaving a largely empty but virulent signifier in its place, which weakens the nation by reproducing a culture of war."

Ivie's and Giner's notion on the political culture is possibly exaggerated but has relevant notions. In the U.S. history, especially after the Second World War, Presidents have declared war on different occasions, many of them not concerning military conflict between nations. For example, in Ivie's and Giner's study the focus was on George W. Bush's use of War on Terror. After the terror attack in 9/11 President Bush rallied against "The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals" which he declared was "like the ideology of communism". (Ivie & Giner 2007, 587.) The thematic idea of a common enemy is present in most studies of rhetoric of war. Terrorism is not the only thing that has been referred in the presidential speeches when creating an enemy to fight, but for example, in the SOTUs wars have been declared against drugs,

poverty, cancer, AIDS and crime in different occasions. [8] Similar urgency of the nation's security or freedom are often the points made when justifying war, whether it has been war in traditional sense or other. Building to these legitimations, other more ceremonial justifications have had their role in the play of rhetoric.

Calling for unity, history, and higher purpose can validate the war and gain the support it needs from the people or opposition. Bostdorff (2011) has discussed the connection between epideictic discourse and war using George W. Bushes War on Terror rhetoric as an example. She argues that war brings out the ceremonial sides of rhetoric – in other words – epideictic rhetoric. Addition to Bostdorff, Murphy (1992) has defined war rhetoric's nature deliberative when gaining support for war and epideictic when presenting war as an honorable action. Pickering and Kehde (1997, 3) have argued, that justification for war is achieved by extracting the narratives from nations past that support unity and harmony and conclude in the mythical nation's identity: something that has always existed. The situation is in a way different for the United States. While Pickering and Kehde do include Americanness in their analysis, the foreverness is an odd label to add when talking about the U.S. Historical events are awoken and used in war rhetoric in the US, but often the exceptionalism (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6) is founded on the mentioning of *new*. Leaving the old world and building a better new one defines America's identity. The exceptional nature of the nation gives something to fight for, or something to argue for. Often the U.S. war rhetoric has an echo of betterment; war is not only to preserve but to make better or greater.

2.4   *Political uses of history*

As seen in the previous sub-chapter, nation's identity and history intertwine closely in war rhetoric. The State of the Union addresses are no exception, and since

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[8] These will be introduced later in the analysis chapters.

one of the characteristics of the SOTUs is to "tie together the past, present and future" (Campbell & Jamieson 1990, 54) it is relevant to review the discussion occurring in the interface of history and politics. National identity grows from shared values, language, culture, and history, so naturally it has inevitable connection with the political sphere. All nations have their official interpretation of history which is promoted through education system, official statements, or other administrative channel. Commemorations, national holidays, and sites of remembrance are all part of the history portrayed in the present. Uses of history is an easy way of sharing one's reality. Paul Connerton (1989, 3) presented frames for collective memory and commemoration within societies by stating that the past usually justifies the present.

Connerton's views followed the ideas developed by Maurice Halbwachs and Aby Warburg. Before the 1920s the focus in collective existence was on the biological factors, but with Halbwach's and Warburg's works the emphasis started to shift into a cultural one. Especially Halbwach's studies on collective memory theorize the effects of a group on an individual memory. Through communication individuals build their image of the past and the feeling of belonging into a group. These groups can be labelled as families, political parties or even nations. (Assmann 1995, 125-127.) Although Halbwach's primary idea linked only to orally delivered history, the thought has been taken further by many following researchers. For example, Jan Assmann builds on the concept of collective memory by introducing the concept of cultural memory. Using texts, images and rituals societies construct their own self-image, that can set up the unity and particularity of the nation. (Assmann 1995, 130-133.)

As Paul Hirst (1985, 49, 51) wrote, history is not only living in the past, but in a way, it is living in the present time in people's minds. Because of its popular form, it can be reused in the present. Hirst uses the Roman emperor Caesar as an example; even after thousands of years, he still lives in proverbs and speeches. These references and variable ideas of history and memory are also used in politics. Ways of using history

are not limited only in the political sphere of the society but can be found almost everywhere. "The use of history" can mean public commemoration, references to historical facts or just plain proverbs that originate from the past. (Grönholm & Nyyssönen 2019, 8-9.) The way nation remembers the past is presented in the institutional uses of history. As Johann N. Neem (2011, 1) argues: "nations form the dominant paradigm by which we organize past."

Like politics, history can be argued and discussed endlessly. The institutional conception of history can be questioned. In Germany between 1986-1989 *Historikerstreit* or the "historians dispute" broke loose. The debate between several historians and political actors started as conversation on how unique evil Nazi-Germany actually had been, which spread in to a debate about ways to remember the horrors of the Second World War. (Troebst 2014.) *Historikerstreit* started a wide conversation about the use of history in politics which has also developed into a way of analyzing these usages. (Nyyssönen 1999, 40.) The Historikerstreit's legacy can be seen in the conceptual and intellectual ways that sort out the uses of history. Historical culture (*Geschichtskultur*) and historical consciousness (*historische Bewusstsein*) sketch the outlines of how we perceive the past. Historical culture functions as the "arena/forum for the use of history". (Torsti 2008, 22.) It mirrors the society's ways of encountering the past in everyday life. This leads us to the historical consciousness, which is understood as the "complex connection of interpretations of the past, perceptions of the present and expectations of the future" (Torsti 2008, 23). Therefore, historical consciousness is understood as a bond between history and future, which can formulate the feeling of continuity. (Torsti 2008, 23.) As interpreting the meanings which people associate with the past, we can also find ways of the political uses of those given purposes.

In the resent years ways of commemoration in the U.S. have been discussed and debated. The project 1619 by journalist Nicole Hannah-Jones started a conversation countering to the general narrative of the U.S. history on slavery and the nation's

origin. The project spread to the education levels but also rose objections and was labeled as propaganda. (Mykkänen HS 23.5.2020.) Similarly, "the statue wars" all over the world spread to the U.S. and statues of the Civil War were questioned and revalued. (Brown 2019, 284.) All together represent societies' debates on questions which concern the ways of remembrance. Which interpretations end up in the history books, are memories valid in history research, or who's history are we promoting?

Political choices and debates are crucial in these decisions. Addition to the concrete choices on commemoration, history and politics intervene in the rhetorical sphere. Heino Nyyssönen (1999) followed Edgar Wolfrums (1996) idea of history as politics (*Geschichte als Politikum*) and used Habermasian concept of "history politics" (*Geschichtspolitik*). History politics means debates and speeches where "the past is used to achieve mobilized, politicized or legitimized effects in the public." (Nyyssönen 1999, 40; Wolfrum 1996.) Torsti (2008, 23-24) built her conception of history politics in the same form but puts the emphasis on to the *intentional* use of history. She argued that history politics is about employing the past, including results of research, common ideas, and conceptions of history to justify and validate arguments concerning today's circumstances. (Torsti 2008, 24.)

Employing the history politics as theoretical tool of this study, offers an opportunity to find the answers to how and for what purpose history is used in a presidential rhetoric. Although the concept of *memory politics* is more prominent in the American research field than the concept of *history politics*, the uses of history has been studied and contested in public. Within this study's timeframe world changed profoundly and the US changed with it. As time moved on, new decades brought new moments to remember and commemorate. In US history there can be found many symbolic moments: defeating Nazis in World War II, dropping the nuclear bombs in Japan, conflicts of the Cold War and almost everything that the Founding Fathers did or said. (Kiewe 1994, 45; Pollock 1994 204-205.) Some parts might have been controversial and the using them have required skill and precision. For example, after successful mission

in Kuwait in 1991, George Bush's stated that "It's a proud day for America, and, by God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." Washing away the disappointment of the failed war decades after, Bush sought redemption and glory for the U.S people. (Pollock 1994, 205.)

The aim of this study is to reveal most common uses of history in SOTUs. The used language and possible patterns in the uses of war are the primary focus. In the next chapter I shall outline the study's methodological tools starting from the digital humanities approach and then moving into the implementation of Kenneth Burke's cluster analysis.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 *Digital Humanities*

The tools of Digital Humanities are becoming more and more employed in the study of history. Used as a complementary tool, many computational approaches enable the use of big data[9] in research. One of the benefits of using a big data type of source material is that we can avoid the limitations that a small, selected sample might have. For example, comparing the previously introduced Ryan Teten's study to Chad Murphy's study, we can see the benefits of computer-assisted methods. While Teten used the sample of sixty-eight SOTUs to represent all, Murphy included all the SOTUs and was able to present a more comprehensive picture of the chosen timeline.

Methods of Digital Humanities do not only offer time-saving options for big data uses but more importantly, provide a new point of view to the used sources. The counterpart for close reading, the method which is often employed in humanities and especially history, is distant reading or quantitative analysis, which offers us certain key indexes, like word collocates and word frequencies. The neologism of distant

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[9] *Big data* is a broad term which refers to the size or the complexity of the used dataset. For example, Beyer & Laney (2012) define big data by the usage of the tools, since if the capabilities of *traditionally used tools* exceed the needed processing or analyzing within a tolerable timeframe, we can label the data as *big data*.

reading was created by Franco Moretti (2000) "to describe the large-scale computational analysis of massive quantities of literary texts." (Hammond 2017, 2.) Distant reading is closely related to the DH and most of the methods used could be labeled under it. Applying methods from the toolbox of the DH, this study follows the path from distant reading to close reading.

Under the category of DH, there fits many options to choose from. Topic modeling, sentiment analysis, network analysis and number or different data mining options offers possibilities for finding patterns in large text collections that might otherwise stay hidden. (Ramsay 2004.) The one of the most used approaches to big data in digital humanities is Corpus Linguistics (CL). In the field of digital humanities Corpus Linguistics is often referred to either as "corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS)" (Partington 2004; 2008) or "corpus-based discourse analysis (CBDA)" (Atkinson and Gregory 2017), but further down I will refer to it in its simplest mode CL. The one of the main interests of CL is to produce concordance lines which can be examined qualitatively (e.g., Baker, Garbrielatos et.al. 2008). In this study, concordance lines will be created concentrating on to lines where term war appears as a target word in the middle. Concordance lines help to find out the common collocations of the word *war*. Collocation means the "the above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within pre-determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the node)" (Baker et al 2008, 278[10]).

The collocates provide insight into word clusters and expanding the inquiry to the larger amount of text surrounding the use of war. The purpose for such approach is that it gives us far greater contextual knowledge about the text and how the term *war* lives both in the text and how it relates to issues outside the text. Compared to the typical CL approach which often is focused on more quantitative and lexical prospects of the text, this strategy will allow for better historical explanation, which is dependent

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[10] The definition of collocation is originally used in the ESRC-funded *project Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press 1996–2006* project, see Baker et al 2008, 278.

on the contextual frameworks inside and outside the text where concordance lines appear.

The primary tool I used in this study was the Voyant Tools. After choosing the key word, the software counts the collocates of the given word, and examining the provided insight, the user can form clusters or topics. It is worthwhile to notice, that this study uses the ready-made stop-word list of the Voyant Tools. The stop-words are not included, for example, when the software calculates collocations or the most used terms. For closer analysis, the contexts tool allows the user to view direct adjacencies of any term. And finally, the insights provided by the data (e.g., number of texts, number of words in sub-corpora, key words, collocations etc.) will be subjected to analysis by using qualitative research methods like Kenneth Burke's cluster analysis. In corpus-assisted analysis there is a lot of room for the researcher's choices and even though it enables the uses of larger datasets, it is no short cut to a successful analysis. Probably its most valuable feature is that the approach eliminates the possibility of "cherry picking", which means the selection of small amounts of data to support researchers' preliminary assumptions or ideological agendas (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 259; Widdowson 2004, 102; Koller and Mautner, 2004; Stubbs 1997). Koller and Mautner have suggested:

> "The hidden danger [of qualitative research] is that the reason why the texts concerned are singled out for analysis in the first place is that they are not typical, but in fact quite unusual instances which have aroused the analyst's attention" (Koller and Mautner 2004, 218).

To prevent picking of the "untypical" texts from the dataset, the order is to move from distant reading to the close reading. The used data has been collected from the site of the *Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress* (CSPC). The CSPC has collected all the SOTUs from George Washington till today and published them with additional information such as the release date and time and delivery style. The data used in the distant reading has been modified to the necessary format. This means that notes about applause or laughter from the audience have been removed with sub-titles, leaving only the content of the text to be analyzed. This has left 576 162 words to be

examined, with the average of 6941,7 *per* address (see Figure 1.). The key term used in this study is "war", which is the 25th most used word in the SOTUs from 1946-2020.[11]

The State of the Union Addresses' word count 1946-2020.

FIGURE 1   The State of the Union Addresses' word count from 1946 to 2020. Orange poles represent the written addresses.

Rule, Cointet and Bearman (2015) have studied the political discourses in SOTUs using DH methods by using a simple and "straightforward idea that words acquire meaning through their relations with other words." With similar idea, finding the patterns in co-occurrences, I shall dissect the categories used in the rhetoric across the timeline of this study. To see, if the chosen topics can be reproduced by topic modeling, I shall see if I have overlooked some general topics. Tools such as statistical natural language processing package MALLET, compose topics from large text corpuses. MALLET is based on the unsupervised latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA; see more Blei et al. 2003) and running various iterations of the chosen data presents several expected and unexpected topics.

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[11] The word war is mentioned 725 times. In comparison, the most frequently used words are new (1898), year (1766) and people (1737). The word lists do not include the so-called stop-words, such as prepositions and articles.

3.2 *Kenneth Burke's cluster analysis*

The close reading method of this study draws from Burke's cluster analysis he developed in the works *Attitudes towards history* and his study of *Mein Kampf*. As William H. Rueckert (1982, 86) summarizes, cluster analysis "is a way of finding out what the term is associated with in the poet's mind." Although, Burke gives some examples of the use of the cluster method, it ends up somewhat vague. For this reason, it is necessary to see some implementations of it. As noted above, William H. Rueckert has written about Burke's cluster method, but for more detailed and practical usage, I looked into Carol A. Berthold's essay "Kenneth Burke's cluster-agon method: its development and an application" (2009) and Bettina Heinz' & Ronald Lee's study "Getting down to the meat: The symbolic construction of meat consumption" (1998).

Starting with Berthold's (2009, 303) instructions: The first priority is to identify the key terms of the rhetor's speech. The key terms can be located by implementing criteria such as high frequency or intensity, high frequency meaning the high occurrence of the word in the text and high intensity referencing to the words that are especially meaningful to the work at hand. DH approach complement the cluster analysis, by formulating the key words of the used dataset. While the basis for the usage of war as the specific term was linked to its significance in the U.S. presidential rhetoric and history, the considerably frequent use of it in the SOTUs across the timeline and its linkage to the many historical and modern-day events bring additional meaning to it. While frequency is one possibility to detect the key terms from text, sometimes even the least frequent words hold symbolical meaning that make them key term worthy. For example, Ronald Reagan's "The evil empire" speech had only one phrase that included the words "evil empire", although those words hold the most significance. (Reagan, 8th of March 1983; Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Even though the corpus includes words that occur more frequently than war, the place it holds in the U.S. history brings additional significance to it. Therefore, the term "war" fills both requirements of a key term.

After locating the key terms, the next step is to examine the broader context of the key terms. (Berthold 2009, 303.) By detecting the terms that are repeatedly connected or associated with the key terms in different contexts, we can form the clusters which help to explain the significance of the key terms. The connection can appear in the form of conjunction, context, cause-and-effect, or close location. For this study, DH approach compliments the cluster method: it assists with the placing of the collocations which leads to the finding of "what goes with what" (Burke 1941, 18). Moving towards close reading and focusing on the equations, oppositions, and hierarchy which these words might have on relation to war, we can reach the meanings behind the words. As Heinz & Lee (1998, 89) see this part of the analysis: "These symbols and clusters may equate with one another, stand in opposition to one another, or merely coexist with one another. These connotations form a pattern of representation."

Berthold continues her analysis to a part called the *Agon Analysis*, which aims to locate the drama and conflict within the text or more specifically, the terms that opposite each other or "what is vs. what" (Berthold 2009, 304; Burke 1973, 58.) Burke's interpretation divides the key terms to "god" and "devil" terms, and for example, in Burke's analysis these terms for Hitler were Aryan against Jew or disunity of Parliament versus unity of German nationality. (Burke 1939.) The Agon Analysis takes place in much similar manner that the Cluster Analysis does. After locating the devil terms, the connection to the god term or lesser devil terms must be examined. Whether the connection is through conjunctions, cause-and-effect, imaginary or even through a third term, the context surrounding the terms reveals the intended or accidental relationships of the key terms. (Berthold 2009, 307-309.) Rather than focusing *per se* on ways presidents legitimize their decisions, cluster analysis reveals values and ideas within the speeches thus sometimes revealing strategies of legitimization.

3.3 Distant reading: results

The final analysis was conducted using the whole corpus, without separating the individual Presidential administrations. While different terms co-occurred with the term war across different administrations, the basis for the categorization of the chapters and analysis points are drawn from the co-occurrence statics of the whole corpus. As choosing to use *war* as the focal point of analysis included choices, the use of the whole corpus did as well. This presented some questions, that needed to be answered. The aim was to build an image of the usage of the term war after the Second World War, and for that reason rather than comparing the individual administrations, the focus settled on the wider scope with the goal to track changes and continuities over time.

As seen in the below (figure 2) the relative frequency[12] changes between presidential administrations, which raises a question on the accuracy of the significance of the results. While numerical frequency dropped in the administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, it did not straightforwardly mean drop in significance. Voyant Tools does not consider the length of the individual corpus, and so the relative frequency might be misleading when considered blindly. For example, Carter's and Reagan's administration delivered part of their SOTUs in written form, which added to the comparable word count making *war* less relative frequent. Consequently, the examination that is grounded in close reading and Burke's methodology is needed to resolve the questions of

significance in relations.

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[12] Voyant Tools presents relevant frequency as to how often the term occurs per 1 million words per corpus.

FIGURE 2   Relative frequency of the term war.

Implementation of DH methods to Kenneth Burke's cluster analysis was conducted primarily through Voyant Tools' collocation feature. Using span of 10 words (5 from each side from the key word), most frequently co-occurring terms were found. As seen in the table 2. the fifteen most frequent collocates for the word war are *II*, *war*, *peace*, *world*, *end*, *expenditures*, *year*, *liquidation*, *terror*, *years*, *win*, *time*, *states*, *program,* and *Vietnam*. Focusing on the most frequent collocates and the connections, that they form, I built three categories which will also represent the three analyzing chapters of this study:

Term	Collocate	Count (context)
war	ii	52
war	war	44
war	peace	36
war	world	32
war	end	29
war	expenditures	21
war	year	20
war	liquidation	19
war	terror	18
war	years	17
war	win	17
war	time	16
war	states	16
war	program	15
war	vietnam	14

1) war and peace,

2) war and economy, and

3) war and history politics.

TABLE 2   Fifteen most frequent collocates of the term war.

Peace itself collocated with words "freedom", "world", "prosperity", "justice", and "security". Comparing these collocates to the ones the term war holds, suggests that peace was often used more symbolically and positively. Words which point towards economic topic, such as program, expenditures, liquidation, collocated mostly with words "billion", "government" or "budget", but also in a lesser extend with "required", "needed" and "purpose". Both categories presented positive connotation

within the distant reading results, but the way they are connected to war, determents the more specific tone.

Rule et al. (2015) have comprehensively studied the State of the Union addresses from 1790 until 2014. They have mapped distinct periods, where variant master categories have been most used in the SOTUs. Categories such as foreign and domestic policy have increasingly taken space from the topics of statecraft and navy from 1917 and even more so from 1950. (Rule et al. 2015, 35.) The timeframe of this study falls under the period of strong trend of foreign and domestic policy rhetoric, which is shown in the topics produced with MALLET. (See figure 3.) As Eranti et al. (2015) argue, vocabularies that orators use reflect the possible justifications in their rhetoric, and following this notion, the MALLET results validate the closer inquiries.

Figure 3 shows seven topics extracted from twenty generated topics. Using interval of 10, the aim was to find the most probabilistic topics from the data. (See Schöch 2016.) These topics were the ones with probability over 1,5 and presented clear connection to the historical period at hand. Themes presented in the topics appeared also within the closer analysis, when the key collocates of the term war were examined.

FIGURE 3   Topics of the SOTUs 1946-2020.

Here topics are used only in comparison to the other distant and close reading results and used on their own could also lead to different kind of analysis.

4   WAR AND PEACE

As it is shown in the results in the distant reading chapter, "peace" has been the one of most frequent collocation with war in the SOTUs. Connection between war and peace is complicated. Peace itself collocates with words "freedom", "justice" and "prosperity" which makes it hold a positive connotation. These ideals and values are presented when peace needs to be achieved, any means necessary. As Burke (1973, 218-219) has mentioned, the paradox within peace is that sometimes war is pursued to uphold the peace, which itself makes the peace impossible. Pere Franch (2018, 319) argued that "the Americans present themselves as a people fighting for freedom, democracy, and individual rights, with God always on their side and confronting a brutal evil". Often political figures have argued that peace without those qualities is no peace at all. For example, the discourse "freedom is not free" can be traced to the era of the Founding Fathers, who fought for the freedom from England. Building a new homeland on the basis for individual rights and equal opportunities justified the impulse to preserve them above all else. Franch extended his argument to cover the legacy for presidential action by stating "the presidents present themselves as responsible for preserving that inherited legacy and, like their predecessors, they fight the enemy who threatens it." (i.e., 2018, 319.) This paradox can be seen across the post-Second World War SOTUs. George W. Bush's address on January 28, 2003 presented an example of this kind of rhetoric:

> "We seek peace. We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all. If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means, sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military, and we will prevail."

Address sought to legitimize the military actions in the Middle East, which were part of the Bush administration's War on Terror. Although the War on Terror actually did not fulfill the requirements or characteristics of traditional war, the rhetoric of a war situation was employed. Presidential rhetoric researchers have often defined crisis rhetorically constructed. When the crisis is not a war action, president can direct the opinion made about the situation. (Kuypers 2006, 3-5.) In the case on 9/11, president defined the situation as war and actions following it accordingly. Bush reassured that peace was what they were after, but if it comes to it, the war that would be fought would be a just one.

The frequency of the collocation of peace and war is most evident during Truman's, Eisenhower's, Carter's, Reagan's and George W. Bush's SOTUs. Mostly the situations have been about the president calling for unity and strength for the battle or needing to justify his actions afterwards. The cooperation and unity are the qualities of war that fulfill the emotional need for people, the moral side of war, and war rhetoric is what turns the attention from the killing to the glory. (See Burke 1973, 273-275.) Even though the five presidents have the most evident and frequent connections in their speeches, only in the speeches of Ford, GHW Bush, Clinton and Obama the collocation between peace and war are nonexistent.[13] In the SOTUs where war and peace are linked, the rhetorical means tend to follow similar patterns, which would support the argument, that the rhetoric in the SOTUs has not been influenced by the president's party.

The aftermath of the First World War and the controversial Wilson's presidency led the U.S. back towards isolationism and the nation detach itself from the League of

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[13] This does not mean that these presidents do not mention these terms since the terms might occur separately thus are irrelevant for this study.

Nations and the treaty of Versailles. Even though the focus shifted from foreign policies to the domestic ones, the U.S. maintained and even expanded the economic relations with the rest of the world. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Only after the decision to join the Second World War the U.S. truly took the the leading role in international affairs and global world order. The presidential rhetoric reflected the trajectory until the election of Donald Trump, whose return to the "America first" ideal caused concern among the U.S.' political elite. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) This can be seen in the SOTU of Donald Trump delivered on February 28, 2017. He starts by declaring that America respects "the foreign rights of all nations" and emphasizes that all nations have right to "chart their own path". Aligning with his objectives in the Middle East, he continued:

> "My job is not to represent the world. My job is to represent the United States of America. But we know that America is better off when there is less conflict, not more. We must learn from the mistakes of the past. We have seen the war and the destruction that have ravaged and raged throughout the world — all across the world."(Donald Trump delivered on February 28, 2017.)

Representing only America's interests, Trump described former conflicts as "terrible, terrible wars" which should not have happened. He positions war as the most horrific situation and peace to be taken wherever it can be found. Trump connected war with words "conflict", "disaster", "mistake" and "destruction" and peace with "freedom", "harmony" and "stability". War and peace were pinned against each other which led to a situation, where war's value was non-existent.

Although it is evident that peace possesses more positive and less negative dimensions than war, the hierarchy of those two terms defines the conclusive purpose of the terms. Depending on the position of "war" in the rhetoric, different rhetorical equations can be detected and the god- or devil-like nature of the term war defined. In the sub-chapters I shall analyze different connections of war and peace and expand the analysis to include situational factors.

4.1 Who is to blame? Rhetorical strategies of association in the SOTUs

Although the State of the Union Addresses are often considered to be about domestic policies, Cohen (1995) has shown, foreign affairs have been consistent and even dominating feature during the late 20th century, war taking a fair share of them. Starting from the Truman administration, the reasons behind the Cold War were seen as one-sided and the blame was pushed solely on the Soviet Union. (Combs 2012, 188-191; Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Pursuing identification with the audience presidents created opposites and division, hence the initial need for identification was in the division. Forming negative images about the opposite side implies a positive on one's own side. (Burke 1969b, 547-549.) The possibility of describing war as justified or necessary needs something to back it up. Truman's address on January 7th in 1953 built on this idea:

> "It is a struggle as old as recorded history; it is freedom versus tyranny. For the dominant idea of the Soviet regime is the terrible conception that men do not have rights but live at the mercy of the state. Inevitably this idea of theirs -- and all the consequences flowing from it -- collided with the efforts of free nations to build a just and peaceful world. The "cold war" between the communists and the free world is nothing more or less than the Soviet attempt to checkmate and defeat our peaceful purposes, in furtherance of their own dread objective."

Using symbols such as *freedom* and *tyranny* to describe the essence of the two nations captured the essence of the situation. Simultaneously the two entities were chosen by the orator to define the sides, and most importantly who's to blame. Dividing world into two opposite camps directed the message not only to the people of America but the rest of the world, who should know that Cold War was forced upon the U.S., the nation with only "peaceful" purposes. Laying out the set up for years to come Truman continued by declaring that "the world is divided, not through our fault or failure, but by Soviet design. They, not we, began the cold war. "

The threat of Soviet rule and communism was so great and over-powering in the presidential speeches of the time, that several researchers have labeled "communism" to have been a devil-term in most of the presidential speeches of the Cold War. (See Davison 2008; Ivie 2009.) Creating opposites and otherness is presented in Burke's

concept of Spiritualization (the *Nostrum*), which showcases multiple situations where unity and identification are obtained.[14] Truman exploited the use of pronouns and emphasizes that *they* and *idea of theirs* is the reason for the war, and *we* only want peace in the world. The "us" versus "them" rhetoric is used to its fullest possibilities: creating the absolute evil gives purpose and motives and most importantly justification for the war actions. During the Cold War era, similar statements were given continuously in the SOTUs. Nuclear arms race, military conflicts in Cuba, the Korean and the Vietnam War and other smaller-scale encounters ensured the continuous othering. President Dwight D. Eisenhower took the juxtaposing one step further:

> "But what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its all-inclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of expansion. Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas – all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion. The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war. The only answer to a regime that wages total cold war is to wage total peace. This means bringing to bear every asset of our personal and national lives upon the task of building the conditions in which security and peace can grow." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 09, 1958.)

Eisenhower emphasized the uniquely historical terror of the communist rule which lifted it up to be even worse than fascism few decades earlier. Purposefully clumsy diction of "waging peace" described the need for actions similar to waging war. Peace and war represented the two superpowers; one's actions produce war and the other's peace, even though the actions might have been the same. In Eisenhower's rhetoric war symbol was made to be a devil-term because of its close connection to Soviet Union and communism.

Although détente politics was the dominant orientation in foreign affairs during the 1960s and 1970s, but moving towards the end of the 1970s, the spread of nuclear technology caused a new rise of Cold War tension. Riding on that wave Ronald Reagan entered the office in 1981 with strong anti-communist rhetoric which had been one of the focal points of his presidential campaign. His "evil empire" speech in early

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[14] Spiritualization (the Nostrum): "Hence the formula: When "mine" or "thine" (the *meum* and the *tuum*) are spiritually merged, the result is "ours" (the *nostrum*)." (Burke 2018, 93.)

1983 set the tone for the rest of the year. The second wave of Cold War reached its high point in 1983, when NATOs Abel Archer military exercise, the heckle over intermediate range nuclear missiles, (Soviet SS-20s and US Pershing II) and the so-called Euro-missile crisis drove the relationship between two countries on a crashing course. (Collins 2007, 195-198; Holmila & Roitto 2018.) After realizing the possibility of a nuclear war, Reagan held a seemingly conciliatory SOTU in 1984 and directing part of his speech to the people of Soviet Union:

> "People of the Soviet, President Dwight Eisenhower, who fought by your side in World War II, said the essential struggle "is not merely man against man or nation against nation. It is man against war." Americans are people of peace. If your government wants peace, there will be peace. "(Ronald Reagan, January 25, 1984.)

Directing his message to the people of Soviet Union, Reagan overrode the Soviet government. Defining American people as people of peace, without further explanation, he validated his next argument. Declaring that peace was a choice for Soviets to make, Reagan implied that the reasons for the war were the actions of the Soviet rule, not the peaceful people of America. While the Cold War and nuclear race of the two superpowers enabled the use of directing the guilt outside the borders of the U.S. and use of war as a devil-term labeled the Cold War rhetoric, similar pattern continued even after the fall of the Soviet Union. According to Holmila and Roitto (2018) Reagan's foreign policy has been described as idealistic and unilateralistic: Reagan's firm belief in the exceptional nature of America and his focus on Soviet Union in foreign affairs shone through his rhetorical actions. He saw US as an example for the rest of the world, especially for the nations struggling in the hands of totalitarianism. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Although in the second term of Reagan's presidency, the new détente replaced the hostile tone in Reagan's rhetoric, "victory" in Cold War ensured his legacy in the history books and US' place in the top of the hill. In its defeat Soviet Union was no longer the "evil empire" of the world. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.)

After the fall of Soviet Union and communism in the early 1990s the U.S. was shortly without an ultimate enemy. (Ivie & Giner 2007, 580-583.) At the start of the new millennial, terrorist act which is primarily remembered from the planes crashing into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center on September 11th in 2001, awoke fear and concern about national security. Bush's administration had had an unpopular start, but the demonstration of power which followed the terrorist attack returned the president in favor of the people. Partially this renewed the unilateral ideas to the U.S. politics and rhetoric. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) The comparison between the old and the new enemy was used in the speeches delivered right after the attack, as it had been used when comparing fascism and communism before. (Ivie & Giner 2007, 584.) During his two terms, President Bush repeatedly returned to the same justification of the war, even with the declining popularity of the War on Terror. In his last SOTU Bush continued to build the new empire of evil. Commemorating the 9/11, Bush remined the audience about the "horrific" nature of strike and the "evil men" who "despise freedom, despise America, and aim to subject million to their violent rule". He continued:

> "Since 9/11, we have taken the fight to these terrorists and extremists. We will stay on the offense, we will keep up the pressure, and we will deliver justice to our enemies. We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the 21st century. The terrorists oppose every principle of humanity and decency that we hold dear. Yet in this war on terror, there is one thing we and our enemies agree on: In the long run, men and women who are free to determine their own destinies will reject terror and refuse to live in tyranny. And that is why the terrorists are fighting to deny this choice to the people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Territories. And that is why, for the security of America and the peace of the world, we are spreading the hope of freedom." (George W. Bush, January 28, 2008.)

Declaring the war against terrorism as the "defining ideological struggle of the 21st century" Bush shifted the audience's attention to the previous ideological struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The justification for war and the ultimate evil was rhetorically found again within a new enemy. Bush defined the terrorist's actions as "horrific", "evil", and "violent" while America's actions are purely "delivering justice" or "spreading the hope of freedom". So even War on Terror was justified, the actual rhetoric does not say that the U.S. was engaged in the war actions. The

assertiveness of this strategy lies in its inconspicuousness. The opposition is defined by negative meanings associated with it and often the strengthening or diminishing its position in hierarchy goes undetected by the audience. (Burke 1969b, 24–25, 54.) Seeking for the justification for the war presidents describe motives of the U.S. as peaceful and just against the tyrannic aspirations of the enemy, who actually waged war instead of peace.

4.2 Dealing with world problems

The headline of this sub-chapter is a direct quote from Jimmy Carter's 1979 SOTU. The text under the headline discussed nuclear arms race and the forming crisis for the U.S. and to that reason, to the world. America's spoken motive for war was often connected to the role of peacekeeper, the savior, and the exceptional nature of the American nation. As Antero Holmila and Matti Roitto (2018, 1-5) argue, the Second World War could be seen as the turning point in the U.S. foreign policy, when "the exceptional nation" started their journey to be the superpower of the world. Decision to move away from the traditional hemispheric orientation and the Monroe doctrine's idea of isolationism towards interventionism and more inclusive foreign policy determined the direction for the future. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Franklin D. Roosevelt, as the acting president during the years of the Second World War, paved the path for later decisions. For example, his implementation of "good neighbor policy" that started in the 1930s, directed to Latin America and cooperation with European democracies had effects that can be traced long after his death. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Also, the Marshall Plan, which was implemented during Truman's presidency, represented the U.S.' commitment, dedication for economic growth and democracy in Europe. (Kipping & Bjarnar 1998, 2-5.) The image of the leader of the world brought responsibilities which had their own part in justifying war.

President Harry S. Truman, pursuing for the financial aid for Europe, emphasized the "inevitable" leadership role of the U.S. In 1948, describing the aid as "vital measure of

our foreign policy" Truman suggested that it was a matter of life and death, which would lead to world peace. After the destructive Second World War, the opposition of war and peace in the SOTUs are evident, but the emphasis of new war-like challenges lied ahead: the war was not over and the leadership was America's, or as Truman framed it, *ours.* As in Burke's rhetorical device of Spiritualization, *the Nostrum*, and in Teten's study (2003), the use of the pronoun *we* create unity and in presidential rhetoric identifies the rhetor with his audience. The word "we" continued to appear in Truman's SOTU:

> "We are following a sound, constructive, and practical course in carrying out our determination to achieve peace. We are fighting poverty, hunger, and suffering. This leads to peace -- not war. We are building toward a world where all nations, large and small alike, may live free from the fear of aggression. This leads to peace -- not war. Above all else, we are striving to achieve a concord among the peoples of the world based upon the dignity of the individual and the brotherhood of man. This leads to peace -- not war."
> (Harry S Truman, January 07, 1948.)

In Truman's case he used repetition with unifying responsibility: *we* are the ones that lead this world to peace – not war. The fight here was presented as a moral duty and choice which must be made which made it not a choice at all. The pronoun also turns the connotation of the war to opposite direction, when *we* are fighting, war can be seen as good and just. In Burke's writings war is presented as the prominent evil, but in rhetorical choices of the orator can make the moral side seem to lead to "salvation". Values such as companionship, cooperation and sacrifices bring out the desirable side of war. According to Burke the communal side of war fulfills the emotional needs of people and draws them into it – discarding the oppression of the other side. (Burke 1973, 274-275.)

The story of a moral, kind, and reluctant giant was a reoccurring feature in the U.S. history culture. Storyline starts with the U.S. altruistically entering the fight to restore peace and democracy, in the form of financial aid, military assistance, or even open war measures. After sacrificing themselves and fulfilling their duties they return home minding their own business. (Franch 2018; Holmila & Roitto 2018.) This narrative has not been limited only to political rhetoric, but for example, can be found in many studies dealing with the significance of the Marshall Plan. In the American research

literature Marshall Plan has been described as the "single most dramatic example in the history of human civilization of noble altruism combined with enlightened self-interest" by researcher James A. Yunker (2014) and similarly Jones, Talbott and Moreland (2017) argue that most important lesson to learn from the Marshall Plan was the American defense of democracy. Some other researchers have made a more cynical interpretation about the motives of the provided financial aid: the appropriation for the Marshall Plan was also to dictate Europe's future and to bring Western Europe under the U.S. control. (See Kunz 1997.) Defending America's own ideological and economic interests might have been hidden behind "peace talk" and assumption of their superiority.

Motives presented for Marshall aid fall to the same category with other actions during Cold War. Following Mao's victory in China in 1949, the U.S.' concerns about Soviet led communist domination in Asia become, in their mind, evident. In addition to financial aid US provided military support beyond its borders. (Medhurst & Brands 2000, 31-32.) Wars in Korea and Vietnam were both justified in the SOTUs by providing peace and defending world against communist rule. So called Munich syndrome, the fear of communist invasion of the world, often led the rhetoric on justification of foreign affairs. For example, the prolonged war in Vietnam was constantly vindicated by evoking fear of communist objectives and stressing the U.S. responsibility to the world. Lyndon B. Johnson's SOTU in 1965 expressed these ideas:

> "In Asia, communism wears a more aggressive face. We see that in Viet-Nam. Why are we there? We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against the Communist aggression. Ten years ago, our President pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it now. Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression now would only increase the danger of a much larger war. Our goal is peace in southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace. What is at stake is the cause of freedom and in that cause, America will never be found wanting." (Lyndon B. Johnson, January 04, 1965.)

First, continuing his predecessors' course of conduct, LBJ plead to the audience's communality to defend a friendly nation from the terrors of communism. LBJ's second point also came from a previous president, Eisenhower's "falling domino" principle. Eisenhower joined the fate of Vietnam to the fate of American security by drawing an

analogy of a falling row of dominos. (VanDeMark 1995, 5.) Giving up on the aggressions would only prolong the necessary fight for freedom. According to VanDeMark (1995, 4) the domino "principle — the doctrine of global containment — extended the range of American interests dramatically, linking national security to the defense of freedom throughout the world." Identifying with the audience through international peacekeeping mission and national burden might have been too abstract to some listeners, but direct threat to homeland's security brought the war closer. Unlike during Eisenhower's presidency, during LBJ's presidency in l965 the U.S. became direct participant in war, which called for more personal approach to the people. (VanDeMark 1995, 36-37.) *'Our own security'* was more plausible for active and justified war than a pure goodwill. In LBJ's SOTU war is presented necessary to achieve peace and to prevent even larger scale war. LBJ inherited a war located far away and the national security needed to be linked in a circuitous way.

In George W. Bush' term there was no need for a rhetorical detour. After an attack on the U.S. soil an abstract illustration of a threat was not necessary and an opportunity to cleanse the dust of Vietnam syndrome off the nation's back presented itself. (Holmila & Roitto 2018.) Renewing the peacekeeper image from the Cold War era George W. Bush' SOTU from 2002 utilized the old storyline:

> "And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace. ---- America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. ---- We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the War on Terror." (George W. Bush, January 29, 2002.)

Leading the world to the better and more just peace and *not* imposing its own culture, US was presented as the ultimate, altruistic good. As the word *opportunity* suggests, the war is not necessary but all in all needed. War is presented as subordinate to peace, but also as a means to achieve it. Overwhelming description of the American values (liberty, freedom, rule of law, respect for women, private property, etc.) are the reasons to go to war, not only for the sake of domestic security but the sake of world.

Instead of demonizing the adversary, praising America and its values pose them as the only right option. Although the dream and promise of the lasting peace through war was pursued in 2002 SOTU and the hoped actions achieved with the military operations in the Middle East (see Holmila & Roitto 2018.), six years later same theme continued in Bush's address:

> "Seven years have passed since I first stood before you at this rostrum. In that time, our country has been tested in ways none of us could have imagined. We faced hard decisions about peace and war, rising competition in the world economy, and the health and welfare of our citizens. These issues call for vigorous debate, and I think it's fair to say, we've answered the call. Yet history will record that amid our differences, we acted with purpose, and together we showed the world the power and resilience of American self-government. Decisions about war and peace: they went to war and it was the right decision. It is a decision not a necessity, but it was a right one, since the world needed to be taught a lesson." (George W. Bush, January 28, 2008.)

From the text one can detect the controversial development of the Iraq war and the War on Terror. During his term (2001-2008) Bush's popularity went down with the popularity of the War on Terror. Bush's rhetoric, which turned the 9/11 into a war situation, rated high on the polls right after the attack. (DiMaggio 2015, 1.) Polling from mid-September of 2001 showed that 79 % of Americans described the attacks as "acts of war" rather than "acts of crime" and almost the same percentage agreed on the choice of military actions against the terrorists. In few years' time the support turned into resistance and in 2008, 63 percent of Americans thought that the war had been a mistake. (DiMaggio 2015, 18, 105.) Trying to deal with the declining support from the public, Bush's SOTU painted a picture of a rightful war with purpose. War and peace were presented opposite to each other, but still war was lifted to be the better choice from the two, and even if the contemporaries would not understand it, history would see the rightfulness in the made decisions.

When Presidents have legitimatized war actions by pleading to the international security, war has had a two folded meaning. Although peace and war were continuously set to the opposite ends, they also were seen in a relationship with security, which led to more of a cause-and-effect situation. Even with the terrors of war, it was presented to lead to security, freedom, and peace.

4.3 War, peace, and economy

Medhurst & Brands (2000, 34) have argued that interests in economic activity, such as trade or investment, have affected the political decisions more than the actual fear of Soviet invasion and conflict. Aligning with responsibilities that came with leading the world, the economic power of the U.S. increased after the Second World War. Unlike other nations, the U.S.' economy was ready for battle when it declared war on Japan in the end of 1941. Owning to Roosevelt's New Deal -program (1933–1937) the national production was settled to start the war industry. (Holmila & Roitto 2018; Rockoff 1998, 81-121.) Some scholars have argued that the war and the massive public investments attach to it were what finally ended the Great Depression for the U.S. (See Higgs 2006.)

After Roosevelt's death Truman was faced with the postwar reality, when reconversion from wartime economy to peacetime market-driven economy needed to be executed. While the return of the Great Depression was expected by most economists, the actual reintegration of labor force and wartime industry happened smoothly and the nation escaped from the economic catastrophes and uncertainties that took place after the First World War. (Higgs 2006, 101.) According to Robert Higgs (2006, 118) "the success of the transition hinged on the expeditious abandonment of the government's command-and-control apparatus and the return to resource allocation via price system." Altering Roosevelt's New Deal -program, Truman restored the trust in within the private sector. Rocketing private investments balanced the decrease in public spending right after the war but change in public opinion about America's role in the world affected the outcome of following years. Growing fear of the Soviet Union's expansion led the way of increasing government's spending on defense and military industry. Emphasis on the role of the world's policeman can be seen in Truman's SOTUs after the war. Protecting the U.S.' political and economic interests across the world and especially in Europe funds were directed in rebuilding outside the homeland's borders. (Kunz 1997.)

As mentioned in previous sub-chapter the justifications behind Marshall Plan were complex and the aid was often pursued with rhetoric filled with blaming the enemy and portraying the U.S.' leadership over the world. Truman's SOTU from 1948 (see page 36) highlighted the importance of financial contribution to the world peace and against Soviet expansion. Similar rhetoric was used by Eisenhower to direct funds in the nuclear development in 1959. Posing nation's objectives solely peaceful and pleading that US had "aggressive designs against no one", Eisenhower transferred the blame on Soviet. Agreements planned after the Second World War on nuclear arms were discarded on both sides (Holmila & Roitto 2018), but President's rhetoric presented the situation differently. Stating that the agreements were "historically considered by us as sacred, are regarded in Communist doctrine and in practice to be mere scraps of paper." Creating a situation, where national and international peace were threatened, President made sure that the investments to warfare seemed a wise response. Burke (2018, 67) described this rhetorical device as *Yielding Aggressively*, meaning that after the Soviets had done something, the U.S. had no choice on the matter. After all diplomatic resources had been used, only similar respond could offer the resolution. Highlighting his message, Eisenhower defines the relation of peace and war:

> "Yet step by step we must strengthen the institutions of peace -- a peace that rests upon justice -- a peace that depends upon a deep knowledge and dear understanding by all peoples of the cause and consequences of possible failure in this great purpose. To achieve this peace we seek to prevent war at any place and in any dimension. If, despite our best efforts, a local dispute should flare into armed hostilities, the next problem would be to keep the conflict from spreading, and so compromising freedom. In support of these objectives we maintain forces of great power and flexibility. Our formidable air striking forces are a powerful deterrent to general war. Large and growing portions of these units can depart from their bases in a matter of minutes." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 09, 1959.)

Stating that *this* peace, the just peace that contained the freedom of the people, must be defended by keeping *our* military force ready, Eisenhower aimed at raising the funds for the military. The scientific and military races between US and the Soviet Union played the leading role in Cold War era and considerable amount of the U.S.' resources were directed at the space race or the nuclear arms race which itself

presented a situation where solely peaceful purposes seemed somewhat implausible. For example, John Lewis Gaddis (1997, 89-90) has argued that the U.S.' nuclear development programs were one of the key agitators that launched the Cold War. According to Gaddis, the U.S. actions were interpretated or could be interpretated as unilateral politics and motives aiming towards world hegemony. (Holmila & Roitto 2018: Gaddis 1997, 89-90.) In Burke's writings the U.S.' strategy to wage war to protect peace, created a situation where peace was actually out of reach. (Burke 1973, 218.) "Balance of terror" was evident and destructive nuclear war soon upon them. Eisenhower's SOTU from 1959 mirrored the controversies awoken by nuclear weaponry and its costs. President's efforts to pursue justification were sought through blaming the Soviet rule and raising fear.

Throughout Cold War era nation's military budget was justified in the SOTUs by Presidents. During active military engagements awaking fear was an effective choice but even in steadier times reassuring was needed. John F. Kennedy (January 14, 1963) argued for the accomplices made "building a world order" by listing free and secure places in the world where the U.S. had been involved in the last years[15]. Following the list Kennedy continued with another one which included the progress made in the domestic economic sector. Contrasting war and peace with economic growth he summarized:

> "In short, both at home and abroad, there may now be a temptation to relax. For the road has been long, the burden heavy, and the pace consistently urgent. But we cannot be satisfied to rest here. This is the side of the hill, not the top. The mere absence of war is not peace. The mere absence of recession is not growth. We have made a beginning – but we have only begun. Now the time has come to make the most of our gains – to translate the renewal of our national strength into the achievement of our national purpose." (John F. Kennedy, January 14, 1963.)

War was paired up with recession which implied a negative stance against it. In peace there was growth which itself indicated future prosperity. Sentence which preceded this juxtaposing awakened a historical argument of exceptional nature of the nation. (See more in Chapter 6). Aiming for fulfilling *our national purpose* Kennedy made war

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[15] Including West Berlin, Laos, Vietnam, Congo, and Cuba.

and peace parallel to economic success and campaigned for continuing efforts home and abroad.

Kindred rhetorical choices resurfaced in Ronald Reagan's SOTU on January 25th in 1988. Reagan started by declaring that "tonight -- we're strong, prosperous, at peace, and we are free." Alike to Kennedy's notions, the SOTU continued with a request for the audience to support the military funding in the future to protect values that come with peace, freedom, strength, and prosperity and more importantly, the U.S. must bring the same values upon the rest of the world:

> "--- our nation has remained at peace for nearly a decade and a half, as we move toward our goals of world prosperity and world freedom. We must protect that peace and deter war by making sure the next President inherits what you and I have a moral obligation to give that President: a national security that is unassailable and a national defense that takes full advantage of new technology and is fully funded. This is a full agenda. It's meant to be. --- And that's why our focus is the values, the principles, and ideas that made America great. Let's be clear on this point. We're for limited government, because we understand, as the Founding Fathers did, that it is the best way of ensuring personal liberty and empowering the individual so that every American of every race and region shares fully in the flowering of American prosperity and freedom." (Ronald Reagan, January 25, 1988.)

Finding an identifying area with the audience president justifies his means without describing the process. American exceptionalism, greatness, derives from the undeniable facts. Today we associate words "America" and "great" to a more contemporary President, but the roots of his rhetoric run deep in the history of the United States of America. As the active thread from the Soviet Union ended during Ronald Reagan's presidency, using the balance of terror and justifying the defense and military spending lost its power. Without an immediate danger to the national security, military investments were hard to sell to Congress or to the public, so the focus of the SOTUs shifted to the more idealistic side. The difficulties are evident not only in the rhetoric, but in the yearly military spending by GDP: the end of Cold War shows as decline in military spending (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

After the fall of Soviet Union, the presidents' rhetoric did not consist only of celebrationary declarations. New challenges in the reunification of Germany and the new threats and conflicts in the Middle East focused the attention elsewhere. Even

with the promise to the next president Reagan left the U.S. economy fronting a new phase. As Cameron (2005, 14) has explained the difficulties, after Reagan's term (1981-1989) and large military expenditures, the U.S. was no longer the creditor of the world and headed towards massive national debt. The postwar role – the leader of the liberal world order – of the U.S. was questioned home and abroad. With growing public debt, military actions overseas and growing of the defense budget did not have the public's opinion on their side. (Cameron 2005, 18-25.) As Higgs (2012, 62-63) have argued, justification on more aggressive and extensive governmental action is easier to achieve during crisis such as war, which influenced the rhetoric after the Cold War.

The connection between peace, war and economy was straightforward: war and military expenditures were presented as a mere object to achieve peace. In the next chapter, the relationship between economy and war is more closely explored.

5 ECONOMY AND WAR

The battle against a prominent evil, starting from fascism and continuing towards communism and terrorism, has been a relevant justification for war. Yet, it has not been the only one. While the previous chapter discussed the connection between peace and war, the other frequent collocations with the war in the SOTUs imply a strong connection between war and economics. A closer analysis revealed different angles of this connection. War affected the quantities of governmental interference in economic life. Raising military funding or defense budget needed support from Congress and the public in approval for tax reforms and fund allocation. The Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union directed resources to develop a wide range of military capabilities, from which the nuclear programs on both sides gave convincing evidence. Even today, the U.S. military budget takes one-third of the military expenditures in the entire world. (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

While the continuing efforts to hold the military strength have been noted in many studies (see Wlezien 1996, Sharp 2019 or Blankenship 2020), some scholars have directed their attention to fast shifts in military funding and the *why* behind such changes. For example, Sharp (2019, 369) has focused on the effects of presidential transitions and war policies on military financing. On the other hand, Medhurst and Brands (2000, 34) have suggested that common international trade and investment interests influence political actions. Sharp meant that such budgetary decisions were

based on personal political gain, and Medhurst and Brands saw the motives as more economically driven. Both views can be argued for examining the rhetoric of the SOTUs. Still, for this study, the more pressing question is *how* these interests are shown in the rhetoric of presidential administrations. While most of the economic related terminology was connected to the start of the Cold War, similar connections were present in later in the corpora. The first sub-chapter focuses on the arguments for expanding military funding in the name of national defense and security. The second sub-chapter opens the rhetoric concerning the link between national and international economy and war. The third sub-chapter deals with domestic affairs, such as crime or poverty, which have been lobbied as a war situation to allocate funds. The last sub-chapter also digs into the debate on War on Terror and its controversial nature.

5.1   Deterrent to war

Although the quick rise of war industry primarily led the nation out of depression during the Second World War, when war was linked to economics, it was nevertheless seen as something "devastating" (Truman 1946). Reinforcing the military or directing money to military research was no longer a necessary act of war but rather an essential part of the "national security mission". In addition to upholding the peace, military expenditures were presented as a fundamental part of restoring world trade, economy, and social well-being. The paradox of the symbol of *war* shone bright in presidents' rhetorical choices throughout the timespan of this study, especially when war was presented as a devil term. Posing war as a negative while pursuing more substantial military power was Burke's primary concern in the post-Second World War political rhetoric. (Jensen 2018, 391.) Large war expenditures were labeled as "needed" (Truman 1946) or "required" (Truman 1947), even though the Cold War was not fought in the trenches. While pursuing active military power, new frontiers of ideology, science, and economy were highlighted. Comparable to Truman, Eisenhower (1957) emphasized the "required" military expenditures:

> "-- truth is that our survival in today's world requires modern, adequate, dependable military strength. Our Nation has made great strides in assuring a modern defense, so armed in new weapons, so deployed, so equipped, that today our security force is the most powerful in our peacetime history. It can punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack us. It is a major deterrent to war." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 10th, 1957.)

Using repetition and a direct threat to make clear to the audience that the U.S. must stay as the world's superpower to "survive", Eisenhower labeled military power as a deterrent to war. Additionally, in later SOTUs of the Eisenhower administration, rhetoric was constructed to highlight the U.S.'s disgust for war while promoting the needed strengthening of the military objectives and the funds to uphold them. Even though some scholars have referred to Eisenhower as a "man of peace" (Chernus 2002, 6), there were direct threats or spikes against the Soviet Union in many of his SOTUs. For example, in the SOTU of 1958, Eisenhower presented the results of developing ballistic missiles and did not fail to mention the facts that the U.S. had only taken "about third as long as the Soviets" in these achievements. He also noted that they had used "more than one billion dollars" on the missiles in 1957.[16] Then, justifying the spending, Eisenhower moved on to showcasing the nation's humane purpose:

> "The world thinks of us as a country which is strong, but which will never start a war. The world also thinks of us as a land which has never enslaved anyone and which is animated by humane ideals. This friendship, based on common ideals, is one of our greatest sources of strength. It cements into a cohesive security arrangement the aggregate of the spiritual, military and economic strength of all those nations which, with us, are allied by treaties and agreements." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 09th, 1958.)

The idea of "the Empire of Humanity" has its roots way back into the end of the 19th century, when developing global power and similarly spreading Christianity was sold with benevolent intentions. (Barnett 2011, 53-54.) Eisenhower's line "never enslaved anyone" seems incomprehensible but fits the rhetorical tradition of self-betterment, not limited to the U.S. leaders. Like his predecessor, Eisenhower advertised the atomic

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[16] Burke (2019, 122) described this situation in his chapter of the rhetorical device *Say Anything.* This device often comes into play when the opposition is not present. Burke build a hypothetical situation of two counties, Perfectland and Loathesomite, where the Perfectland increased their military funding because Loathesomite did so first. Many of the examples from this tale are directly comparable to the rhetoric used in the U.S. presidential rhetoric.

power with the U.S.' peaceful character and war deterring focus. Similar expressions continued in different situations and different presidential administrations, but active war efforts in Vietnam changed the tune slightly. Although Lyndon B. Johnson's SOTU in 1968 showed a more amicable side of the addresses, the connotation of war changed from negative to more positive. Setting up the primary purpose, LBJ praised the progress made with the Soviets after Vienna, the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile crisis. He continued followingly:

> "But despite this progress, we must maintain a military force that is capable of deterring any threat to this Nation's security, whatever the mode of aggression. Our choices must not be confined to total war -- or to total acquiescence. We have such a military force today. We shall maintain it." (Lyndon B. Johnson, January 17th, 1968.)

LBJ stayed on the course set by his predecessors and argued for the military power to deter all threats ahead. "Security", "necessary", "protect", "bravery", and "gallant" described the ongoing war actions and military force. A noble war against the adversaries, which are not directly named or depicted as pure evil, suggested a positive connotation of war. Yet, deterring war with war presents a paradoxical situation. In *Grammar,* Burke questioned this kind of purity of purposes. For example, if peaceful means are offered as a way to peace, does it not already fulfill the objective itself. (Weiser 2007, 298; Grammar, 305.) Reversing this idea, war as a way to deter war seems unsuccessful.

Upholding the military strength as a war deterrent required funding. LBJ referred to his domestic political initiative "war on poverty", which had to be toned down because of the Vietnam war (see more Chapter 5.3), by pressing how significant the expenditures of the actual war were. The line "deter war" continued to surface also in the SOTUs of the next President, Richard Nixon. In his address in 1972, Nixon called for an increase in defense spending to make them "less vulnerable to attack and more effective in deterring war." Blaming the past for ignoring the progress of others in the arms race, he requested a "substantial increase" to budget to maintain the nuclear and sea-based force. (Richard Nixon, January 20th, 1972.) Five years later, President Gerald Ford used the same rhetoric to deliver his message and condemned the "dangerous

decline" in military funding that had taken place before his term. In his words, the Soviet Union had "unmistakably" been building its forces. Still, fortunately in his view, due to his actions, "national defense is effectively deterring conflict today" and "will assure we can deter war in the years ahead." (Gerald R. Ford, January 12th, 1977.) Although after him, Nixon and Ford seemed to aim at increasing the U.S.' military budget and consolidating the superpower status, the actual political atmosphere during the 1970s was more complex. The declining economy and changing situation in Asia forced the U.S. to approach China. Détente politics in Europe led the way in relations with the Soviet Union. (Jones 2008.)

Ronald Reagan's election brought an end to a complacent period in foreign affairs. Recentering the direction to the omnipresent communist threat, Reagan pledged in the name of military strength as the winning ingredient of the Cold War. (Paterson 1989, 257-258.) In the SOTU in 1985, President Reagan called for "the united support of the American people" and pleaded to the Congressmen to vote for funding the Peacekeeper[17] missile, which in itself presented a paradox. This vote was a "critical test of our resolve to maintain the strength we need". As discords had appeared in the debate over nuclear weaponry, Reagan needed to justify his means with an end. Claiming that possibility of a future in nonnuclear defense against ballistic missiles is "ultimately" the initiative's purpose, but "it's not well understood". Implying the opponents of this "most hopeful possibility of the nuclear age" are ignorant of the matter, he verified his expertise. Stating the opposite opinion and labeling it ignorant and then stating his own argument makes the audience seek identification with the speaker (Burke 2018, 127)[18]. Validating his point, Reagan continued:

> "Some say it will bring war to the heavens, but its purpose is to deter war in the heavens and on Earth. Now, some say the research would be expensive. Perhaps, but it could save millions of lives, indeed humanity itself." (Ronald Reagan, February 6th, 1985.)

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[17] "Peacekeeper" was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that was in service 1986-2005.
[18] Burke called this device *Saying Both.* Proving to be acknowledgeable on the subject unlike the opposition makes the orator seem more reliable.

Stressing the urgency of the financing, Reagan used the fear: pointing out that the Soviets had already exceeded the capability of the U.S. in their defense technology, suggested the need for immediate action. (Ronald Reagan, February 06th, 1985.) During Reagan's administration, the arms race, as well as the Cold War, concluded. Funding war machinery to deter war lost most of its rhetorical power with the fall of the "evil empire". The threat upholding the reasoning for a higher military budget vanished and following presidents' SOTUs reflected the problematic transition. Defense and military spending were made harder to justify without an active major adversary. While the Gulf War and the War on Terror bumped up the rhetoric concerning war, the deterring quality did not resurface until Donald Trump's administration. Although the situation deviated severely from the Cold War years, Trump invoked the same rhetoric as his predecessors. He pledged to Congress to "end the dangerous defense sequester and fully fund our great military" to make it "so strong and so powerful that it will deter any acts of aggression by any other nation or anyone else" (Donald Trump, January 30, 2018). Like Reagan, he also presented his hope that someday there would not be a need for such actions, but "we are not there yet, sadly." (Donald Trump, January 30, 2018.)

Looking for funding for deterrents of war forms a negative connotation toward *war*. Balancing between peace and war during the Cold War was evident in the SOTU's of the time. While LBJ's address made an exception in praising the war efforts in Vietnam and presenting active war as a noble cause, it also shows the fine line between the godliness or devil-like nature of the term *war*. His phrase, "Our choices must not be confined to total war -- or to total acquiescence" embodies the dilemma.

5.2 *Protecting the economy*

While the U.S. survived the Second World War with a relatively intact economy and infrastructure, the rest of the world struggled. Especially many of the Eastern Europe's economies were stagnated increasing political tension. From the U.S. point

of view, economic instability and the political atmosphere following it gave the Soviet Union a possibility for an easy expansion in political and economic dimensions worldwide. (Putensen 2008, 308.) The rhetoric of the time reflected that fear, and the economic sphere was often seen as an inalienable part of the ideological and political sphere. References to national and international security led to references to economic endeavors and their position in keeping the peace. Even though national security or "the role of the world's police" were often the most used reasonings for the U.S. interferences worldwide, economic stability and matters attached to it also took their part in presidential rhetoric. Fear of losing economic advantages or resources to the rival on the other side of the world had its weight in the rhetorical choices, especially during the Cold War.

Marshall Aid presented an excellent example of this kind of crossover of motives. Aiding the damaged economies in Europe, the U.S. gained political and ideological validation and formed a market for its domestic surplus production. Switching the output from arms to consumer goods, the U.S. needed a long-term direction to export the surplus products. (Putensen 2008, 308-309.) Harry Truman's address in 1951 expressed these motives and fears of losing valuable markets and resources to the Soviet Union. Stating that their national safety "would be gravely prejudiced if the Soviet Union succeeded in harnessing to its war machine the resources and the manpower of the free nations on the borders of its empire." Painting a horrid picture where Western Europe would fall to the Soviets and supply steel and coal with it. Spreading the terror of the expansion worldwide, Truman included Asia and Africa in his speech by concentrating on the fear of losing "our most vital raw materials, including uranium, which is the basis of our atomic power". (Harry S Truman, January 08th, 1951.) The grim description of the possible future continued:

> "And Soviet command of the manpower of the free nations of Europe and Asia would confront us with military forces which we could never hope to equal. In such a situation, the Soviet Union could impose its demands on the world, without resort to conflict, simply through the preponderance of its economic and military power. The Soviet Union does not have to attack the United States to secure domination of the world. It can achieve its ends by isolating us and swallowing up all our allies." (Harry S Truman, January 08th, 1951.)

Saving the "free" nations from the Soviet rule led to preserving the U.S.' interests in the economic field. Defending resources from the Soviet Union assimilated to the national defense and economic growth. Freedom for all meant "increased production of goods they need and materials we need" (Harry S Truman, January 08th, 1951.) Connecting war and economy with a sense of destruction, Truman showcased the imminent uses of the world resources of both superpowers. Truman relied on the audience to see the better one while presenting both futures. (Burke 2018, 109.) A strong economy for the U.S. inclined peace and freedom, and a win for the Soviets meant their domination of the world.

Eisenhower resumed the same distinction in his speech in 1957 by equating "economic and moral factors" as important as a military power to national security. To compare these three dimensions, economic, moral, and militaristic, Eisenhower presented examples of situations that would endanger national security, "our national will" or "our economy" and result in the loss of strength. He repeated the three different parts in different words multiple times to make a point of their contribution to each other and their importance to achieve "a peaceful world." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 10th, 1957.) The following year, Eisenhower concentrated on the war fought on the economic front. Labeling actions in the economic field "a different kind of war" stressed the urgency of the matter. Praising the work made in the military and defense sector, Eisenhower argued for a similar focus on the economic frontier:

> "But at the very time when the economic threat is assuming menacing proportions, to fail to strengthen our own effort would be nothing less than reckless folly!" (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 09th, 1958.)

As the immediate need for arms production after the Second World War faded, Presidents were forced to put more and more effort into justifying the economic policies concerning spending on national security. Presenting existing concerns on rising taxes in 1964, President Kennedy referred to the "needed" war expenditures. Lining the world's fate with domestic vitality, Kennedy legitimatized the need for a temporary rise in taxes.

"For upon our achievement of greater vitality and strength here at home hang our fate and future in the world: our ability to sustain and supply the security of free men and nations, our ability to command their respect for our leadership, our ability to expand our trade without threat to our balance of payments, and our ability to adjust to the changing demands of cold war competition and challenge. [---] Nothing we could do to help the developing countries would help them half as much as a booming U.S. economy. And nothing our opponents could do to encourage their own ambitions would encourage them half as much as a chronic lagging U.S. economy. These domestic tasks do not divert energy from our security – they provide the very foundation for freedom's survival and success." (John F. Kennedy, January 14th, 1963.)

Reagan's SOTU from 1985 fits the continuum of the idea that freedom of nations contributed to the U.S. security and economy. Quoting Harry Truman, Reagan declared that "our security and the world's hopes for peace and human progress lie not in defense measures or the control of weapons, but in the growth and expansion of freedom and self-government." (Ronald Reagan, February 06th, 1985.) Continuing the same analogy, Reagan's SOTU from 1987 employed the rhetoric of fear and necessity to gather support for his budget. Laying down the extent to which the Soviets spent on the military forces and the cuts the U.S. Congress had made on his previous budgets, Reagan scolded the Congress for neglecting the nation's security and the world. He suggested that there was no other option against the Soviets' "brutal" war than follow his assistance programs. (Ronald Reagan, January 27th, 1987.) Even after the end of the Cold War in 1994, President Clinton called for an end to the defense cuts that were taken place after the fall of the Soviet Union. Wavering justifications rose from Clinton's SOTU when he declared that the actions he proposed to be the "ultimately best strategy". He asked Congress to protect "the readiness and quality of our forces" by approving his defense and military budget suggestion for economic aid to the former Soviet bloc. (William J. Clinton, January 25, 1994). Following his predecessors' footsteps in the foreign aid and military forces seemed difficult without an enemy to fight and turning tables and aiding the former adversary financially made it even more problematic.

Aligning economy, security, and military efforts together continued strongly after the new enemy had entered the stage. In the 2002 SOTU, President Bush inculcated protecting the materials and technology that terrorists would want for themselves. Continuing towards his budget proposal's validation, Bush stated:

"My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war; we will protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy. It costs a lot to fight this war. [---] My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades, because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay. The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our Nation against the ongoing threat of another attack."
(George W. Bush, January 29th, 2002.)

After President Bush's term, the tone linking the war and the economy changed. President Obama started his term with an unpopular war and economic crisis, influencing his rhetorical choices. Instead of the responsibility to uphold the national security for the people, the responsibility speech was aimed at describing the direct responsibility to the people. Obama rhetorically renewed the budgets legitimation by admitting that the Government was "suffering from a deficit of trust". Unlike his predecessors, Obama portrayed the cost of the war as negative but necessary:

"I am committed to restoring a sense of honesty and accountability to our budget. That is why this budget looks ahead 10 years and accounts for spending that was left out under the old rules. And for the first time, that includes the full cost of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. For 7 years, we have been a nation at war. No longer will we hide its price."
(Barack Obama, February 24th, 2009.)

Expenditures linked to war, whether they have been labeled as military or defense, have all had a similar positive connotation that has come from the necessity of the war. The SOTUs after the younger President Bush presented the exceptions to this pattern. Obama's administration had to deal with prolonged war and its costs. Although some scholars have compared the Vietnam War and the War on Terror with each other (Ross 2013), the debatable and uncertain nature of the War on Terror did not present as strong a case as communism and the Soviet threat did during the Cold War. Considering this, the change in the sentiments connected to war with Obama's administration seem unavoidable when the goal of rhetoric is identification.

5.3 The Other Wars

During the Cold War, SOTUs often overshadowed domestic problems by discussing America's foreign responsibilities. Presidents needed to direct their efforts towards issues within the borders and, notably, deployed war rhetoric in domestic

affairs. As war motivated higher defense and military funding, war could be used as a symbol for several domestic policies. Symbols create expectations and ideas of following actions (Burke 1931, 124)[19], and describing a situation as a war creates expectations of drastic measures and emphasizes the severity of issues. Additionally, as in the case of military action, mentioning war can create unity and awaken morale among people.

Utilizing the symbol of the war often coincided with budgetary proposals or notes on expenditures. As Eisenhower's administration sought to decrease the military funding after the Korean War, the allocation of the funds was redirected toward a new war within the borders. Trying to get Government and private investors involved in the "battle" against fatal diseases, Eisenhower labeled the situation as "the war on disease" in his SOTU in 1954. Unlike Eisenhower's effort to raise awareness of diseases, Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty reached the wanted attention. Zarefsky (1986) has pointed out that after President Kennedy's assassination, people were looking for reasons and redemption for themselves. Without an active conflict at hand, President Johnson's administration saw an opportunity to use war "against an ancient, impersonal foe as to how to cater to the national need." (Zarefsky 1986.)

In his SOTU on January 08th, 1964, LBJ stated that "this administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America." LBJ's rhetoric lifted poverty above individual problems by choosing to assimilate the policies and a means to end poverty to the means to fight a war. Continuing his SOTU, LBJ testified that "lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptom." Taking a step back from America's self-made ideals, President portrayed poverty as a national problem due to "our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance". (Lyndon B Johnson, January 08th, 1964.) In Burke's theory, people are always looking for

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[19] Using symbols to create expectations can be condensed to Burke's concept of form as "an arousing and fulfillment of desires." (Burke 1931, 124.)

redemption for their sins (Burke 1969a). LBJ named the sins and sinners but offered redemption through the act of war on poverty.

While the conflict in Vietnam grew and escalated to an active war situation, the domestic war on poverty had to fight its stand against a war fought in the trenches. This created a dilemma of fund allocation: guns or butter? The guns versus butter - debate is based on the assumption that there is a direct trade-off between defense and welfare spending (see Mintz 1989, 1284). Even though budgetary decisions should not be simplified in this way, creating opposites to emphasize the point often highlights the message from a rhetorical point of view. The LBJ's SOTU from 1966 presented an unusual example since he pursued both guns and butter in his rhetoric, suggesting that the United States was strong enough for both. Symbolic representation of the war on poverty continued and was presented with the fight in Vietnam. Directing attention to both causes united, and by that, the funding of the programs was justified:

> "This war -- like the war in Vietnam -- is not a simple one. There is no single battleline which you can plot each day on a chart. The enemy is not easy to perceive, or to isolate, or to destroy. There are mistakes and there are setbacks. But we are moving, and our direction is forward." (Lyndon B. Johnson, January 10th, 1967.)

In 1968, when either of the wars had not concluded or progressed as hoped, LBJ moved the war on poverty backstage while the Vietnam war took more and more off the U.S.' financial capabilities. As a result, the symbolic power of the war metaphor declined during Johnson's term. Burke (1931, 120-125) calls this decline "bureaucratization of the imaginative" since the actual execution of the promised metaphor often does not reach the hoped outcome since people united in the metaphor possess a diversity of perspectives and starting points. After a while, this separation of opinion surfaces, and the use of the symbol loses its strength. From this starting point Richard Nixon constructed his argument in the SOTU of 1970:

> "In referring to budget cuts, there is one area where I have ordered an increase rather than a cut – and that is the requests of those agencies with the responsibilities for law enforcement. We have heard a great deal of overblown rhetoric during the sixties in which the word "war" has perhaps too often been used – the war on poverty, the war on misery, the war on disease, the war on hunger. But if there is one area where the word "war" is appropriate it is in the fight against crime. We must declare and win the war against the

criminal elements which increasingly threaten our cities, our homes, and our lives."
(Richard Nixon, January 22nd, 1970.)

Opposing the usage of the symbol of war in the previous years, Nixon validates his own. Searching for an increase in budget, Nixon waged war against crime. Nixon's administration was not the last to employ the "war against crime". Gerald Ford's SOTU in 1976 proposed Congress authorize a new budget of "almost $7 billion over the next five years to assist State and local governments to protect the safety and property of all their citizens" by pleading to the fact that "they are the frontline fighters in the war against crime." (Gerald R. Ford, January 19th, 1976.) Ford insisted that "we" must protect the victims of crime and support the fighters in the battle: in the same way as in a war situation a nation would do. The same projection of the case also continued in terms of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) but extended the war metaphor to include the "war against drugs," which reached its peak during the time of a more significant drug crisis in 1986-1991. (Mackey-Kallis & Hahn 1994, 1; See also the SOTUs of Reagan 1983 and Bush 1989.)

LBJ's "war on poverty" could not fulfill its promises, but instead, the war declared against crime and drugs has held its position in SOTUs' rhetoric. Situational problematics have played their role in the downfall or victory of these rhetoric choices, but the direction of the blame might have affected the outcome. Mackey-Kallis & Hahn (1994) have presented that scapegoating rhetoric is, in Burkean terms, "dialectically appealing" [20] during a war. Finding or creating common enemies, uniting communities, and justifying action become more appealing during a war situation. However, the "war on poverty" could not find a concrete enough enemy to blame for the alleged "war" while fighting against criminals or drug traffickers offered an easier target. In Burke's words: "if one can hand over his (sic) infirmities to a vessel, or a 'cause', outside the self, one can battle an external enemy instead of battling an enemy within. And the greater one's internal inadequacies, the greater amount of evils one

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[20] Burke 1969, 140.

can load up on the back of the 'enemy'." (Burke 1973, 174; Mackey-Kallis & Hahn 1994, 3-4.)

Afterward, while LBJ's "unconditional war" might have seemed excessive, Reagan did not land very far with his statement:

> "The time has also come for major reform of our criminal justice statutes and acceleration of the drive against organized crime and drug trafficking. It's high time that we make our cities safe again. This administration hereby declares an all-out war on big-time organized crime and the drug racketeers who are poisoning our young people." (Ronald Reagan, January 25th, 1983.)

"All-out war" against their young people gave a reason to fight. In 1989 Bush took the sympathy search even further by telling a story of a letter that he had received. In the letter, a mother spoke about her son, who was addicted to cocaine, and asked the President to end the drug trafficking. Informing the audience of the situation of victims of illegal drugs and appealing to their emotions, Bush concluded: "And I am asking tonight for an increase of almost a billion dollars in budget outlays to escalate the war against drugs. The war must be waged on all fronts." (George H. W. Bush, February 09th, 1989.)

After the high of the drug, wars had passed, and the Cold War had reached its conclusion, the "war" metaphor also experienced inflation in SOTUs for a while. Bill Clinton used it in 1998 to draw attention to the medical field. Referring to the rapid development of science and the closing millennium, he proposed "the largest funding increase in history" to medicine institutes, so "ours will be the generation that finally wins the war against cancer and begins a revolution in our fight against all deadly diseases." (William J. Clinton, January 27th, 1998.) Despite the effort, the war metaphor did not achieve its heights until the controversial War on Terror. President George W. Bush and his rhetoric after the 9/11 have been under a magnifying glass, and opinions differ on the metaphoric nature of the War on Terror. In 2004, Bush defended his point of view followingly:

> "I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments.

After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations and drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got." (George W. Bush, January 20th, 2004.)

While debates on the nature of the War on Terror have taken place, the declaration's effects cannot be undermined. (e.g., Mongoven 2006; Ayoob & Ugur 2013; Stahlberg & Lahmann 2011.) Bush's rhetoric was, in many ways, straightforward and deployed many of Burke's rhetorical tools presented in *the War of Words.* For example, it showed something that already happened as an example for the future, stating the other argument and then answering it and lastly, claiming that actions only followed because of actions of opponents (Burke 2018.). Not only in Bush's rhetoric but in all metaphorical uses of war, it was seen as a god-term, way and means to achieve victory and a better world.

6 HISTORY AND POLITICS

In Burke's terms, one way to identify with the audience is by reference to "common places" or "notions possessed by everybody". (Burke 1969b, 55-60.) Mentioning events, persons of authority, places or other commonly known meanings can help the orator identify with the audience. Following Campbell's and Jamieson's (1990) distinction of SOTU's primary functions, it can be assumed that these notions of the past are an important part of celebrating the nation's identity and finding common ground among diverse audiences. Different wars stood out within the distant reading results, although primarily the Second World War was used in SOTUs after the war was over. The triumph of fascism and totalitarianism in the interwar Europe marked a prominent turn in the United States' politics and ideals: an increased participation in the world affairs and, more specifically, moving towards leading the world. Woodrow Wilson's call for the nation's "self-determination" transformed into more interventionist foreign politics (Kramer 2011, 173), emphasizing missionary and historical rhetoric.

Ideas from the Founding Fathers or other historical figures were promoted to form a picture of a nation fulfilling its purpose and historical calling. The drive to uphold peace and a functioning economy in the two previous chapters were presented within war rhetoric. Rhetorical strategies used were not and are not specific only to this period but have roots deeper in the nation's history and beyond. For example,

justifying war expenditures by the necessity to promote peace can be found already in the rhetoric of George Washington, who said: "To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace." (Jones, Talbott & Moreland 2017, 94.) The past offers a fruitful ground for references and justifications, which often surface in more or less ceremonial speeches, such as the State of the Union addresses. These possible references are presented in this chapter. Significant factors during the timeframe are the anniversaries, which often appear as more detailed commemorations in the SOTUs. Yet while the overlying reason for commemoration has been the anniversaries, the justification and especially the direction of the justification must not be disregarded. The first sub-chapter deals with the examples of the American nation's glorification and exceptionalism. It also presents the needed background for the occurring terminology. The second sub-chapter gives references of authorities from the past, which is already shown in the George Washington´s quote highlighted above.

In the last third sub-chapter, the analysis is directed towards the most rhetorically used war in SOTUs: the Second World War. The unique status was well described in the SOTU of George H. W. Bush in 1990:

> "There are singular moments in history, dates that divide all that goes before from all that comes after. And many of us in this Chamber have lived much of our lives in a world whose fundamental features were defined in 1945; and the events of that year decreed the shape of nations, the pace of progress, freedom or oppression for millions of people around the world. Nineteen forty-five provided the common frame of reference, the compass points of the postwar era we've relied upon to understand ourselves." (George H. W. Bush, January 31, 1990.)

George H. W. Bush' division was a prominent feature in the SOTUs, and the third chapter focuses on the Second World War, and the several interpretations and uses that the war has had.

6.1 Nation's historical purpose

Burke's concept of Spiritualization (the *Nostrum*) showcases multiple situations where unity and identification are obtained. Elevating a nation to "our nation" and alluding

to the "historical" nature of "our nation" paints an image of a predefined purpose. History can be used in building unity, but it can also be a point of comparison. Describing something as "historical" gives the action meaning beyond its own. Declaring military spending, domestic cuts, or other action historical, primarily directs the attention to its remarkable nature. (Holland 2017.) Christian ideals and missionary orientation echo this kind of rhetoric, and the U.S. presidential war rhetoric often resembles a God-like calling. American exceptionalism is rooted in the idea of Americans as God's chosen people (Bellah 1975, 41), and often the nation's history has been seen "as a part of a larger transcendent scheme" (Diez-Bosch & Pere 2017, 2). Not only do these interpretations validate the nation's existence, but they form and unite its core ideals. Beasley (2004) has studied how Presidents in both the inaugural and SOTU speeches consolidate American national identity. She argues that the American people are uncommonly unified in the speeches by the idea that they are God's chosen people. The collective identity traces back to John Winthrop and his address to an audience of pilgrims. Winthrop asked his audience to follow their God-given purpose to act as a beacon for all other nations or as a "city on a hill". (Beasley 2004, 47.) "City upon a hill" according to Wilsey and Fea (2015, 18), "involves at least five theological themes imported from Protestant Christian theology and applied to America: chosen nation, divine commission, innocence, sacred land and glory." Identification with this kind of "commonplaces" or "notions possessed by everybody", and reasoning through a widely accepted fact do not require explanations from the rhetor which makes them powerful. (Burke 1969b, 55-60.)

In *Grammar of Motives*, asking questions about the same subject, Burke introduces the concept of "redemption" to his rhetorical theory. Building over individual and collective guilt, he brings out the possibility to purify this quilt by sacrifice. Burke aspired to lift war to a higher level of discussion and debate, *Ad bellum purificandum*, where man's natural motives of combat would transform into conditions that would be closer to peace. (Burke 1969a, 305.) Instead of this, Burke, in his view, evidenced the contrary use of quilt, which was formed to the nation's projection of own problems

to others, and redemption happened through sacrifice in a physical war. (Ivie 2007, 581.)

Divine purpose and shining salvation can be seen in straight quotations or as more hidden references. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy described the state of the union to be improving in both foreign and domestic affairs. Emphasizing the heavy burden that rested on the nation's shoulders, Kennedy encouraged the nation to move forward since "This is the side of the hill, not the top." Continuing to encourage the audience to continue the path of security and prosperity, Kennedy pointed to "the achievement of our national purpose." (John F. Kennedy, January 14, 1963.) Suggesting a higher purpose created a historical continuum, which has been enforced during different administrations, no matter the subject at hand. Presidents have rhetorically followed the calling of history and have claimed to be making America better than any other time in history. Lyndon B. Johnson's viewpoint was to better any other administration. He declared his vision that this session of Congress would do more for domestic affairs than any other and "calling all-out-war on human poverty" to earn their place "in the history of our Republic". (Lyndon B. Johnson, January 08, 1964.)

Reiterating LBJ's point, but naturally referring to his term, Nixon rallied the Congress to be the "greatest Congress in America's history". During the Vietnam War, Nixon had the difficult task of gathering popularity back to the government:

> "In these troubled years just past, America has been going through a long nightmare of war and division, of crime and inflation. Even more deeply, we have gone through a long, dark night of the American spirit. But now that night is ending. Now we must let our spirits soar again. Now we are ready for the lift of a driving dream. The people of this Nation are eager to get on with the quest for new greatness. [---] It is for us here to open the doors that will set free again the real greatness of this Nation - the genius of the American people. How shall we meet this challenge? How can we truly open the doors, and set free the full genius of our people? The way in which the 92d Congress answers these questions will determine its place in history. More importantly, it can determine this Nation's place in history as we enter the third century of our independence." (Richard Nixon, January 22, 1971.)

While Nixon was not the most generous president in his references to religion (Diez-Bosch & Pere 2017, 7), he used other symbolically charged terms. "American spirit",

"dream", and "our independence" all create a feeling which is reinforced with not-so-delicate praise of the greatness of the American people. Asserting people into the position of simple greatness and genius, which only the Congress was holding back, Nixon created a situation where expectations of the future rest on the Congress' ability to make the given right decisions. While Vietnam War grew its unpopularity, Nixon guided his speech to a possibility of a better future on reach by looking back and at American ideals:

> "But above all, what this Congress can be remembered for is opening the way to a new American revolution – a peaceful revolution in which power was turned back to the people – in which government at all levels was refreshed and renewed and made truly responsive. This can be a revolution as profound, as far-reaching, as exciting as that first revolution almost 200 years ago – and it can mean that just 5 years from now America will enter its third century as a young nation new in spirit, with all the vigor and the freshness with which it began its first century." (Richard Nixon, January 22, 1971.)

The upcoming anniversary was used to awaken patriotic sentiments in the audience. Hoping to achieve something as historic as American independence, Nixon resorted to asking for *renewal*. Exceptionalism in itself could be described as something new, something that has never been before, and thus newness was something to strive for. (See Beasley 2004, 28.) Nixon's administration did earn its place in history, but not as he might have thought. The Watergate scandal in 1974 and Nixon's resignation increased public dissatisfaction with the government, which overshadowed the successor's term. President Ford, who replaced Nixon, also drew strength from the past to address this issue. On the year of 200th anniversary of the United States of America, Nixon presented his case by arguing that "history and experience" guide the way for the "moral progress" of the nation and government. Focusing on the people and the "responsibility worthy of their great heritage", Ford announced America's *new* direction to be right since "it follows the truly revolutionary American concept of 1776, which holds that in a free society, the making of public policy and successful problem solving involves much more than government." (Gerald R. Ford, January 19, 1976.) American exceptional style of governance and democracy drives by the founding moments, which build national belonging and validation. This common-ground reference was meant to bring the torn and unhappy people back to their roots while

problems were heightening in and outside of the borders. Moving back from the government and the people as separate, to the *Nostrum,* to the "us". (Burke 2018, 97.)

The shared purpose and "we" were also continuing themes when justifying the war and calling into one. President George H.W. Bush delivered his SOTU of 1991 in a patriotic ambience during the Gulf War. Using Winthrop's idea of the nation's purpose as a beacon in the dark world, his speech focused on the U.S.' "responsibility to lead the world away from the dark chaos of dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day". Thanking the soldiers for their "hard work of freedom" and highlighting the nature of the war as the vessel to achieve "just and lasting peace", Bush sought justification for the war. Just peace can be equated to "just war". As God's chosen land, the U.S. had a moral ascendancy to act as such: in the time of war, God was called to sanctify the cause and incorporate morality and justice into the otherwise unholy actions. (Chu 2012, 432; Diez-Bosch & Pere 2017, 3.) Religious sentiments echoed through Bush' speech when he concluded: "Time will not be Saddam's salvation. Our purpose in the Persian Gulf remains constant." (George H. W. Bush, January 29, 1991.)

In 2002, in George Bush's SOTU, the War on Terror was presented as a continuum of the higher purpose: "History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight." (George W. Bush, January 29, 2002.) History was also calling to the America in 2010 when President Obama rallied for unity and support to overcome the economic depression. Referencing past wars and economic fights, Obama encouraged the audience to follow their predecessors' footsteps and "answer history's call". While in Obama's case, the purpose was not to justify or start a war but to renew the economy, the rhetoric was the same. Whether God or history has called America to act, the rhetoric has stayed the same. "Evil" opponent, a responsibility given by God or a burden of history, and sacrifices needed to fulfil expectations. (Diez-Bosch & Pere 2017, 8-9; Ivie 2007.)

6.2 *Authorities from the past*

Although higher notions such as religion or history, in general, have been used frequently, also more detailed historical moments have had their place in presidential rhetoric. The U.S. comprises diverse audiences, which generates internal conflicts and crises. Addressing such an audience as a whole, the orator must lift his speech above these conflicts. Burke describes this action under the device of Spiritualization. He describes this as "a 'whom the shoe fits' quality, the shoe being big enough to fit any foot, but the spokesman pointing to one particular wearer." (Burke 2018, 97.) Generalizing the American identity to a uniting quality for citizens who otherwise have little in common overcomes the differences. (Beasley 2004, 28-29.)

Which ideals this "American identity" includes have been an object of scholarly debate for a long time (see Beasley 2004), but the main points have stayed the same in many ways. Concepts of an "American Mission" and "American Ideal" which were defined in 1772 as "love of our country, resignation and obedience to the laws, public spirit, love of liberty, [and] sacrifice of life and all to the public." (Beasley 2004, 33.) Idealizing liberty and emphasis on individual rights have transformed the ideal, but even the rhetorical choices today include echoes of this definition. The creators of these ideals are often present in presidential rhetoric to build bridges between now and then. Ideas of the founding fathers and other great men who gave their life for their country live through American identity. With their words, many actions of later years have been consolidated.

During the Korean War in 1952, President Truman proclaimed that they were "working night and day to bring peace to the world and to spread the democratic ideals of justice and self-government to all people." Highlighting the "remarkable achievements" already made and the sacrifices of the soldiers, Truman continued to vindicate the Korean War:

> "In all we do, we should remember who we are and what we stand for. We are Americans. Our forefathers had far greater obstacles than we have and much poorer chances of success. They did not lose heart, or turn aside from their goals. In the darkest of all winters in American history, at Valley Forge, George Washington said: "We must not, in so great a contest, expect to meet with nothing but sunshine." With that spirit they won their fight for freedom. We must have that same faith and vision. In the great contest in which we are engaged today, we cannot expect to have fair weather all the way. But it is a contest just as important for this country and for all men, as the desperate struggle that George Washington fought through to victory." (Harry S Truman, January 09, 1952.)

In the words of the first U.S. president, who fought for independence and hoped to stay open for the rest of the world when victory was achieved, Truman validated the war actions in Korea. Creating an impression that the American War of Independence was won implied that Korean War was on the same continuum. A positive connection between the war fought centuries ago created one over the other: war does not bring misery and terror; it brings freedom and peace. Repeating the same appeal in 1957, Eisenhower referred to "the founding fathers' struggle for independence" to rally the audience's morale into the fight against communism. Listing the nation's principles, Eisenhower told his listeners to participate in "a new epoch" of mankind:

> "Our pledged word, our enlightened self-interest, our character as a Nation commit us to a high role in world affairs: a role of vigorous leadership, ready strength, sympathetic understanding. The State of the Union, at the opening of the 85th Congress continues to vindicate the wisdom of the principles on which this Republic is rounded. Proclaimed in the Constitution of the Nation and in many of our historic documents, and rounded in devout religious convictions, these principles enunciate: A vigilant regard for human liberty. A wise concern for human welfare. A ceaseless effort for human progress."
> (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 10, 1957.)

The Vietnam War created a similar need for legitimization from the nation's history. Petitioning the Congress to uphold international agreements concerning the world's safety, LBJ leaned on the words from biblical and historical sources. Starting with Thomas Jefferson's words: "It is the melancholy law of human societies to be compelled sometimes to choose a great evil to ward off a greater" LBJ created fear of an even greater evil than fighting the Vietnam War, meaning the victory of communism. Consolidating that this war was necessary, LBJ continued with biblical references when praising the U.S. soldiers' sacrifice. Stating that "man is born unto trouble "(Job 5:7)[21] and soldiers have borne well "burden and the heat of the day"

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[21] Job 5:7: People are born into the world as sinners and reconcile their sins to find their way back to God.

(Matthew 20:12)[22], President implies that the way to salvation is through sacrifice. During his speech, he adds quotations from former President Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Paine, who is one of the nation's founding fathers. However, LBJ only mentioned Thomas Jefferson by name; other lines were hidden in the text to be found for those who know.

Richard Nixon's SOTU in 1970 reflected the shadow of the Vietnam War and the plummeting economy. Reminiscing on the nation's history and the victories they had achieved, Nixon asked the audience to gather their efforts to fulfil their forefathers' dream: America's spirit, which would function as "the hope of the world." President Nixon steered the attention away from himself by saying: "Listen to President Thomas Jefferson in 1802: We act not "for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race." (Richard Nixon, January 22, 1970.) In contrast to Nixon, Ford used history to resolve problems within the United States' borders. Resorting to Thomas Paine, Ford argued for unity in troubled times: "Tom Paine aroused the troubled Americans of 1776 to stand up to the times that try men's souls because the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph." (Gerald R. Ford, January 19, 1976.) Following Ford, Jimmy Carter directed his efforts inside the nation's borders. Fighting against economic depression, Jimmy Carter pledged his best efforts and asked the audience to pledge theirs. Carter displayed multiple occasions from the nation's history where "character is measured, and its spirit is tested". Singling out crises such as the war between the states, the Second World War and the economic depression before that, Carter drew attention to the men who had done their duties in those troubled times. Naming Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, Carter presented scenarios where the named men had left a victorious legacy to the nation. Concluding his analogy, he stated:

> "We live in such times now, and we face such duties. We've come through a long period of turmoil and doubt, but we've once again found our moral course, and with a new spirit, we are striving to express our best instincts to the rest of the world. There is all across our

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[22] 20:12: Soldiers have been doing the heavy work until now, but it is not too late to join their sacrifice, since in the eyes of God all are equal.

land a growing sense of peace and a sense of common purpose. "(Jimmy Carter, January 19, 1978.)

After a period of presidents fighting domestic problems, Ronald Reagan took the presidential oath with a great emphasis on winning the Cold War. Justifying the military and defense spending Ronald Reagan called for "the Monroe Doctrine in 1823", which has continued as "our historic bipartisan American policy". Cementing the necessity of the war preparedness, Reagan presented some of the former presidents' thoughts on the matter:

> "Franklin Roosevelt said we "are determined to do everything possible to maintain peace on this hemisphere." President Truman was very blunt: "International communism seeks to crush and undermine and destroy the independence of the Americas. We cannot let that happen here." And John F. Kennedy made clear that "Communist domination in this hemisphere can never be negotiated." Some in this Congress may choose to depart from this historic commitment, but I will not. This year we celebrate the second century of our Constitution." (Ronald Reagan, January 27, 1987.)

He chose his reference points to be former democrat presidents, Reagan as a republican, aimed at cementing his base for congressional support from both sides. Reagan has been described as a skillful narrator who tapped into the mythical idea of America to support his visions for the future. (Hanska 2010, 111.) In addition to his skillset, the Cold War offered a fruitful base for his rhetoric to grow. In contrast to Reagan, when Clinton took office, the time of clear path and purpose was in many ways faded. There was no clear enemy to fight, so the most obvious way to build commonality among people had vanished. As a result, Clinton had to form unity and togetherness from a different angle. (Beasley 2004, 160.) Although recap of history and references to the past remained similar to his predecessors, Clinton used them to rebuild the foundation of the American idea:

> "It has fallen to every generation since then to preserve that idea, the American idea, and to deepen and expand its meaning in new and different times: to Lincoln and to his Congress to preserve the Union and to end slavery; to Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to restrain the abuses and excesses of the industrial revolution and to assert our leadership in the world; to Franklin Roosevelt to fight the failure and pain of the Great Depression and to win our country's great struggle against fascism; and to all our Presidents since to fight the cold war. Especially, I recall two who struggled to fight that cold war in partnership with Congresses where the majority was of a different party: to Harry Truman, who summoned us to unparalleled prosperity at home and who built the architecture of the cold war; and to Ronald Reagan, whom we wish well tonight and who exhorted us to carry on until the twilight struggle against communism was won." (William J. Clinton, January 24, 1995.)

Stating the continuing greatness, Clinton argued for continuing unity. Choosing successors from both parties, he also defines himself to be a President of the whole people, not just one part of it. In a different situation in the SOTU of 2008, President George W. Bush directed the audience's attention to the Founding Fathers to gain support for war actions against terrorism. Referring to "the miracle of America", he pointed toward the "spirit and determination of our people", which in his speech originated from the Founders:

> "When the Federal Convention met in Philadelphia in 1787, our Nation was bound by the Articles of Confederation, which began with the words, "We the undersigned delegates." When Gouverneur Morris was asked to draft the preamble to our new Constitution, he offered an important revision and opened with words that changed the course of our Nation and the history of the world: "We the people." By trusting the people, our Founders wagered that a great and noble nation could be built on the liberty that resides in the hearts of all men and women. By trusting the people, succeeding generations transformed our fragile, young democracy into the most powerful nation on Earth and a beacon of hope for millions. And so long as we continue to trust the people, our Nation will prosper, our liberty will be secure, and the state of our Union will remain strong." (George W. Bush, January 28, 2008.)

Repeating the metaphor of the U.S. guiding other nations like a beacon in the dark, he simultaneously repeats the unification of government and the people, together and not separate. Liberty, prosperity, and safety lie in the constitutional order, seen as the base of American style democracy. Donald Trump has similarly relied on the Founders and other significant figures of the past. Still, unlike most Presidents after the Second World War, he reinterpreted the past to advocate a more isolationist approach. Adducing and thanking a veteran from the Second World War, Trump argued for focusing on matters inside the nation's borders. For example, choosing to mention President Lincoln and Martin Luther King, he deliberately directed credit to people who fought their fights in internal matters.

> "From the pilgrims to the Founders, from the soldiers at Valley Forge to the marchers at Selma, and from President Lincoln to the Reverend Martin Luther King, Americans have always rejected limits on our children's future. Members of Congress, we must never forget that the only victories that matter in Washington are victories that deliver for the American people. The people are the heart of our country, their dreams are the soul of our country, and their love is what powers and sustains our country. We must always remember that our job is to put America first." (Donald Trump, February 04, 2020.)

The same names were brought up in the texts frequently. The Founding fathers have had a significant role in determining the "spirit", "dream", or "ideal" of America in

presidential rhetoric. The symbol of war has been brought up through victories, freedom, and sacrifice, all loaded with a positive connotation. As time passed after the Second World War, also President Truman gained his place in the canon of men in history who defined America. Wars have presented some of the turning points of history, making especially the victorious figures powerful symbols of unity, sacrifice and exceptionalism. Legitimating the present agenda, past has been used in multiple ways. On these occasions, history was not calling for the action, but Presidents were calling on history's help for unity to achieve peace, war, or economic stability; presidents have employed authorities from the past.

6.3 Making the Connection

Although wars such as the Vietnam and Korea were mentioned during the period under scrutiny, they did not have as clear an effect as the Second World War. The Vietnam War was often avoided in the SOTUs after the lingering end as a national shame. Some references to Vietnam veterans were made during George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama's administrations, but as Gambone (2017, 63) has said, soldiers who came back from Vietnam were not greeted as heroes unlike the veterans of the Second World War. While the Korean War was not lost and shunned, it often popped up only as a side note with larger Cold War accomplishments and did not gain as much symbolic power as the Second World War. Besides itself, the Second World War made totalitarianism a useful rhetorical symbol for later years to use, especially since in the West merit of the victory was generally pointed to the U.S. The word immediately invoked feelings; thus, it could be politically valuable. In this way, the historical continuation was significant when presidents specified something "totalitarian". Linking enemies from the 1930s to communism and then later to terrorism suggested that even the concept of totalitarianism changed, underlying rhetorical strategies have been more or less the same.

Right alongside totalitarianism, just plain reference to the Second World War evoked feelings and could be twisted and turned into a justification for war or other purposes. Burke called this kind of rhetorical device 'Making the Connection' (Burke 2018, 109). Mentioning totalitarianism, people thought of the evil and horrors of the war, and when mentioning the Second World War, people moved their thought towards victory, responsibility, and compassion. The Second World War carried meaning beyond just security issues. The economic front, domestic production, and foreign aid are connected closely to the symbolic meaning. Turning depression into a somewhat upturning domestic economy has influenced the image and legacy of the Second World War.

During the Cold War, the tone of the references to the Second World War depended on the situation with the Soviet Union: during peaceful periods, references included a tone of cooperation, but during a conflict, the tone changed to describe the Soviets as the new Nazis. How much credit was given to the Soviets for co-defeating the Nazis was solely circumstantial. In 1966 advocating for the Vietnam War, LBJ hinted at the importance of the legacy and the progress after the Second World War. Fighting "Communist aggression" was aligned with the legacy of the Second World War. (Lyndon B. Johnson, January 12, 1966.) The opposing approach was presented in Nixon's SOTU in 1974 when the cooperation from the Second World War was mentioned as a part of the warming of the relationship. (Richard Nixon, January 30, 1974.) References to the cooperation were few in numbers, and mostly the Second World War was showcased when exceptionalism and the nation's unity needed to be validated.

In 1974, amid the Watergate scandal and economic turmoil, President Ford gathered support from the public and the Congress. He stated:

> "At the end of World War II, we turned a similar challenge into an historic opportunity and, I might add, an historic achievement. An old order was in disarray; political and economic institutions were shattered. In that period, this Nation and its partners built new institutions, new mechanisms of mutual support and cooperation. Today, as then, we face an historic opportunity. If we act imaginatively and boldly, as we acted then, this period will in retrospect be seen as one of the great creative moments of our Nation's history. The whole world is watching to see how we respond." (Gerald R. Ford, January 15, 1975.)

Drawing a line between now and then, Ford stressed the urgent nature of the present situation. Using terms such as "boldly", "great" and "opportunity" Ford focused on building positive image of the moment and mobilizing the audience. During his term, problems were mainly domestic origin, and so the solution did not lie blaming and quilting. Contrary to Ford, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter drew a line between the terrors of the Second World War and the Soviet actions. Stating that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War" suggested Soviet actions to be at least in the same category as the Nazis were. Continuing to highlight the seriousness of the matter, Carter described that the invasion "has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned" (Jimmy Carter, January 23, 1980).

A similar association was used by George H. W. Bush in 1991 when he spoke about the war in the Persian Gulf. Referring to the Second World War, Bush stated that "almost 50 years ago we began a long struggle against aggressive totalitarianism. Now we face another defining hour for America and the world." (George Bush, January 29, 1991.) Advocating the new war with fights with totalitarianism and simultaneously suggesting a possibility to gain such glory as in the past, the Second World War showed its versatility. Presenting a successful occasion of engagement with the world and interventionist foreign policies, the Second World War has functioned as a beneficial reference point.

Unlike his predecessors, President Trump took a different approach. In 2019 he used the Second World War, former Presidents, and America's mission to sell his view of "America first" to the audience. On the 75th anniversary of D-Day and the 50th anniversary of the first steps onto the Moon, Trump brought men from both occasions to the audience to be presented and mentioned President Eisenhower. Emphasizing "the majesty of America's mission and the power of American pride", Trump commemorated the America's part as a victor and savior in the Second World War. Concluding his trip down the memory lane, Trump declared:

"Everything that has come since — our triumph over communism, our giant leaps of science and discovery, our unrivalled progress towards equality and justice — all of it is possible thanks to the blood and tears and courage and vision of the Americans who came before". (Donald Trump, February 05, 2019.)

Remembrance and celebration of the nation's past belongs to the rhetorical traditions of the State of the Union addresses. As wars often present turning points in the nation's development in one way or another, it seems inevitable that they become symbols loaded with different connotations. While the Vietnam War and, to some extent, the Iraq War hold negative sentiments, the Second World War is filled with heroic and inspiring emotions. Burke's concept of "Making the Connection" can be used in different ways, seen in the manifold uses of the Second World War. Whether it has been used as a symbol of economic recovery, vindicating the exceptional nature of the U.S. and triumph over the ultimate evil, or as a proof of the possibility of the existing relationship between the Soviets and Americans, the symbol has always been glorifying and positive.

7 CONCLUSION

While writing this thesis, situation in the world has changed drastically. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war that has followed it, has brought attention to the justifications of the war. Horrific actions against humankind have been broadcasted all over the world, and for this reason, the subject at hand feels contradictory to put into words. As Kenneth Burke argued in his time, the lack of honest debate and discussion can lead the nation's decline to horrific actions called war. The aim of this study was to see, *how* the term war has been used in the State of the Union addresses after the Second World War. Focusing on possible patterns, similarities and contradictions, an image of war in the U.S. presidential rhetoric could be constructed.

Distant and close reading methods complemented each other well, and the advantages of implementing resources from the digital humanities field, are evident. Results from the distant reading analysis did not only give direction of this study but amplified the analysis made with the close reading part of the study. Kenneth Burke's cluster method comported with the use of the Voyant Tools. Choosing the significant collocates from computed selection of terms possibly revealed something else than pure close reading would have. Distant reading guided the analysis to avoid the "cherry-picking", even with the choices that it itself includes. Although researchers' choices are always biased in one way or another, the field of DH certainly will offer

new ways of advancing research methods, whether they are used solely or in combination with other methodologies.

In the State of the Union addresses between 1946-2020, war has revealed to be a constant feature. While the results of the distant reading shows, it frequently co-occurs with categories such as peace, economy, and different wars, the addition of situational factors removed some significance from some of the terms. Wars such as Vietnam and the War on Terror seem to be mentioned only within their time, and thus do not hold a specific place in the patterns of the SOTUs in a longer period. This led to the focus on the Second World War and the analysis of its contradictory symbolism. Presidents presented war rhetoric on many occasions: before, during and after a conflict or to support domestic program. Following Kenneth Burke's idea, the terms can have positive or negative connotation. Presented as a god-term, the term is something good and desirable and in opposition, if presented as a devil-term, the term generates loath and disgust.

The most frequent collocation, peace, was not only presented as a opposite to war, but also in cause-and-effect connection with war. Opposition of the two was awakened, when the U.S. was described as a peaceful nation contradicting otherness. During the Cold War the otherness was found in the Soviet Union and communism (inside and outside of the country), and later in terrorism. The causality surfaced when reasoning and legitimatizing for their own actions were presented as necessary and needed, mostly through connection with security-speech. The collocation between war and economy presented shifts from god-term to devil-term. During the Cold War, raising military or defense funding was justified by linking the Soviets and war to total evil, which should be deterred by any means possible. After the Cold War the ultimate enemy was lost and even with the rhetoric of Gulf War and later War on Terror, the linkage was not the same anymore. Another dimension of the hierarchy between war and economy was to make them parallel to each other. Economy was presented as a frontier of the war, and the justifications of the investments to uphold and defend it reflected that idea. Up until the costs of War on Terror and the economic crisis of 2008

security, economy, and war were used as a needed and required expenditure. After that, presidential administrations were forced to handle the unpopularity of the war and its costs turning the responsibility to the government, and not the enemy.

The most god-like nature of the term war was awakened when war was used as a symbol. Whether war represented domestic program or was used as a commemoratory term, war was associated with positive qualities. History political aspects of the SOTUs analyzed here only scratched the surface and presented the most used strategies connected to war. Rhetorical use of the exceptionalism and nation's purpose, authorities from the past or the Second World War, could be examined even further with other possible historical notions. In addition, comparing rhetorical patterns found in this study to other speeches or other nation's leaders' speeches could present an interesting contrast. Now, the war in Ukraine presents possible changes to the status of the U.S., since after the start of War on Terror, the people's willingness to participate in foreign wars has declined, which was partly reflected in the rhetoric of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. How will war be presented in the future, when western world is again faced with an active war?

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