Baloch march: from Turbat to Islamabad
How has the death of Balaach Mola Baksh contributed to the escalation of the protest in Balochistan and marches to Islamabad? What significance does choosing Islamabad as the venue for protests hold, considering the power dynamics between the provincial and national governments in addressing the Balochistan issue?
The story so far:
In December 2023, hundreds of Baloch people marched to Islamabad protesting enforced disappearances and killings in Balochistan. Despite the Islamabad High Court’s permission to stay and protest, the state used force, arresting and forcefully sending them back. This led to more protests in Balochistan, with complaints about unreleased detainees. Enforced disappearances, killings, and protests reveal a deep-seated conflict between Pakistan’s federal government and Balochistan. The government views Balochistan strategically but disregards it as an equal partner, using tactics like manipulation and repression to control the province, even resorting to using religion to undermine Baloch identity.
What was the Baloch long march to Islamabad all about?
The “long march” started with the killing of Balaach Mola Baksh in November 2023. He was picked up from his home in October in Turbat, by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), and was produced at the court in November. However, in early December, he ended up dead along with three others; according to the initial CTD statement, they were militants who got killed in an encounter. According to his family, Balaach was killed in custody by the CTD, which threw his body along with other unidentified men.
Following the death, the family members of Balaach protested with his corpse against the extra-judicial killing and asked for filing an FIR against the CTD personnel.
After initial reluctance, on December 9, the police filed an FIR against four CTD personnel. However, by then, the protestors had decided to march to Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, and subsequently, to travel to Islamabad. What started as a protest in a town in Balochistan in late November reached the provincial capital during the second week of December and then to the national capital during the third week.
While the initial protest demanded an FIR and an impartial inquiry into the killing of Balaach, it expanded later to bring an end to the enforced disappearances, return of the disappeared and justice for those who got killed so far. Balaach’s death has become a symbol of a larger issue — of enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings in Balochistan.
Who are the disappeared in Balochistan?
According to the Commission of the Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIOED), headed by a retired justice, “Enforced Disappearance/Missing Person” are those “picked up/taken into custody by any Law Enforcing/Intelligence Agency, working under the civilian or military control, in a manner which is contrary to the provisions of the law.”
According to the last annual report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) published in 2023, “the unlawful disappearance of people, especially of political activists, by state agencies continued with impunity through the year.”
According to the report, not only political activists from the province but also Baloch students studying in other provinces “were also forcibly disappeared.”
According to another 2023 HRCP report titled “Balochistan’s Struggle for Hope,” there is a pattern in which “political dissidents, journalists, students and rights activists disappeared for short periods and subsequently released — followed by a string of fresh disappearances soon after.”
Until January 2023, according to the COIOED data, it had received 2192 cases in Balochistan, of which 445 have disappeared. According to the same data, 247 in Punjab, 166 in Sindh, 1335 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 49 in Islamabad have disappeared.
According to the Voice of Baloch missing person (VOBM), an independent civil society Baloch organization, thousands have disappeared during the last three decades after being picked up by security agencies. Given the difference between the numbers by the state and civil society, the exact number may not be easier to arrive at. The above HRCP report quotes Mama Qadeer of the VOBM, claiming that in 2022 alone, 500 had disappeared in Balochistan.
Why choose Islamabad to protest?
This is not the first time, that the protestors have marched to Islamabad. They march for days from Balochistan to Islamabad. At times, by foot. This has been a recurring phenomenon. Sammi Deem Baloch wrote recently in Dawn: “Over the last 14 years, I have traveled to Islamabad many times, holding a framed picture of my father, Dr. Deen Mohammed Baloch, and screaming my heart out, demanding to know his whereabouts. Each time I have come to Islamabad, it is with the hope that one day, the authorities will listen to me and give me back my father.”
Why do they travel to Islamabad to mark their protest? First, the provincial government’s failure is that it is both unable and incapable of addressing disappearances. Since the perpetrators are linked with the security agencies, the provincial government feels helpless. It has remained weak — both by design and default.
Despite being the largest province, Balochistan has the smallest provincial assembly — with just 65 seats. (Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have 371, 168, and 145 seats respectively). With 65 seats, it is easier to manipulate the assembly and form the government with “friendly” national political parties.
Second, the abdication of providing security by the provincial government to the security agencies or the usurping by the latter of security functions in the province. Perhaps, in Balochistan, it is both — abdication and usurpation. In the name of maintaining peace and fighting insurgency, the intelligence agencies and para-military forces have occupied a larger space in provincial governance.
Third, the march towards Islamabad is both symbolic and realistic. Since the real seat of power that deals with Balochistan rests in the national capital, perhaps at the general headquarters, the protestors are trying to convey a message. It is also symbolic — that they believe in the federation, and they are not militants or insurgents, who want to cede from Pakistan.
An interesting strategy by the protestors now and earlier — has been their choice of venue — the press club in Karachi and Islamabad. During the last two decades, there were multiple occasions with the protestors sitting in front of the press clubs, at times for weeks, with the photos of their loved ones who had disappeared. There are two reasons — unlike Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, which publish reputed newspapers, Quetta does not have strong provincial media. There are a few with limited reach; some had to be closed due to pressure from the intelligence agencies. Few news blogs, mostly run by Baloch youths who are forced to leave Pakistan, get closed down. Besides the lack of their voice at the national level, the Baloch also feels that there is no national news agency that speaks for the province.
Long marches like the one to Islamabad in December 2023, and protests in front of the press clubs do get the media attention, however short they remain. Dawn, wrote in its editorial on December 23: “The Baloch community, long marginalised and voiceless, took to Islamabad’s streets to raise concerns over enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings in Balochistan. These serious allegations warrant thorough investigation, not brutality.”
Where are the political parties and leaders — provincial and national?
The provincial political parties are weak and stand divided over tribal lines. The national parties have a weak presence. Balochistan has multiple political parties, for example, the Balochistan National Party (BNP), National Party (NP) and Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP); however, they are fractured over ethnic identities (Baloch and Pashtun) and tribal loyalties (Bugti, Mengal etc.).
Unlike the Pakistan Muslim League (N), Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, respectively, none of the Baloch political parties have adequate political strength in the provincial assembly to form the government independently.
Nor do the Baloch provincial parties have a strong voice in the national assembly. Though the province is geographically the biggest and strategically crucial with a long border with Iran, the Makran coast and Gwadar, politically, Balochistan is least significant in Islamabad. Out of the total 272 seats in the Parliament, Balochistan has the least — only 20 (Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have 173, 75 and 55, respectively). The largest Baloch political party in the last Parliament was the Balochistan Awami Party — which had four seats. The national parties want to share the Baloch seats in Quetta and Islamabad, but not their woes in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, the Baloch do not have a towering political leader who could unite all tribes and ethnicities living inside Balochistan. The big Baloch names — Akbar Bugti, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, representing three big Baloch tribes with national standing, are no more.
The intra-Baloch and intra-Baloch-Pashtun divide has resulted in the deep state making use of the provincial parties to suit their interests. A case in point was how the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) was formed days before the elections in 2018 but managed to emerge as the largest party with 24 seats out of 64.
How to contextualise the Baloch problem?
Enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, protests and insurgencies are an expression of a larger problem between the federation and the province, between the Establishment (Pakistan’s military based security state) and the Baloch people. Since independence, at the federal level, Pakistan’s political elite looked at Balochistan as its biggest province, strategically located (sharing borders with Iran and Afghanistan and a long coast with Gwadar port) that needs to be controlled. Balochistan considers itself an equal partner of the federation and complains of being treated as a client state whose resources are being plundered.
The Establishment, since the beginning, had assumed a larger role in dealing with Balochistan and had kept the Parliament away from pursuing any political approach. The Establishment’s strategy has been to manipulate the Baloch political leadership that was already divided, militarise the civil society through repression and crush the insurgency. The latest to the list is to use religion to undermine the Baloch identity.
Will the enforced disappearances and the Baloch protests continue?
In the short term — yes. The state aims to silence the society, manipulate the political leadership and neutralise the militants in Balochistan. It has managed to dodge occasional judicial activism led by select judges using suo moto provisions. While its strategies have been consistent with the above, the results are not.
The continuation of civil society activism and initiatives led by the Voice of Baloch missing person, the Baloch Yakjehti Council, and larger women’s participation underlines the societal resistance to the state’s silencing strategy. In terms of political manipulation, the state may have succeeded so far with a divided tribal leadership with a Sardar culture. A growing middle class in the province (cutting across tribal affiliation), youth engagement, and surprisingly strong women participation in the protests and civil society activism should underline the new winds of change in Balochistan.
(D. Suba Chandran is a Professor and Dean at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru)