



Institutional Autonomy and the Protection of Higher Education from Attack

Global Coalition to
Protect Education from Attack





Global Coalition to **Protect** **Education from Attack**

The **Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack** was established in 2010 by organizations working in the fields of education in emergencies and conflict affected contexts, higher education, protection, international human rights, and humanitarian law who were concerned about ongoing attacks on educational institutions, their students, and staff in countries affected by conflict and insecurity.

GCPEA is a unique coalition of leading international organizations including CARA, Human Rights Watch, the Institute of International Education's Scholar Rescue Fund, Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict, Save the Children International, the Scholars at Risk Network, UNICEF, and UNHCR. GCPEA is a project of the Tides Center, a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization.

This report is the result of an external study commissioned by GCPEA and may not reflect the views of the individual member organizations. The study was prepared by Amy Kapit, lead researcher and PhD candidate in the International Education Program at New York University's Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development; Jodut Hashmi, researcher and PhD candidate at Harvard University's Graduate School of Education; and Robert Quinn, research supervisor, editor, and Executive Director of the Scholars at Risk Network.

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Institutional Autonomy and the Protection of Higher Education from Attack

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Vision

A world in which all who wish to learn, teach, and research, at all levels and in all forms of education, and all those who support them, can do so in conditions of safety, security, dignity, and equality, free from fear, consistent with the principles of mutual understanding, peace, tolerance, and academic freedom.

Mission

We advocate for the protection of students, teachers, schools, and universities from attack.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examines the relationship between institutional autonomy and the security of higher education institutions from violent and coercive attacks. The paper includes a review of the limited literature available, as well as a series of examples illustrating different forms of attacks. These include arrests related to classroom content in Zimbabwe, sectarian divisions in Iraq, impunity for murders of academics in Pakistan, and physical intimidation on campuses in Tunisia. The study suggests that institutional autonomy plays a direct and indirect protective function. It directly helps protect systems of higher education from government interference, making it more difficult for states to act as perpetrators. It also indirectly helps preserve higher education against actual and perceived politicization and ideological manipulation, which in turn might help insulate it from attacks by non-state parties. The study suggests a framework for examining questions of autonomy and security, which in turn suggests a need to develop strategies aimed at increasing autonomy and security *simultaneously*. This necessarily requires approaches aimed at encouraging states to fulfill their obligations not to engage in or to be complicit in attacks (negative obligations) and obligations to protect higher education from attack and to deter future attacks by holding perpetrators accountable (positive obligations). The study concludes with brief recommendations on how different stakeholders might work to encourage greater understanding and implementation of these obligations, including further research, expert roundtables and information-sharing, development of guidelines and related advocacy campaigns.

Syrians gather at the scene of an explosion at Aleppo University on January 15, 2013, which killed at least 82 people and injured more than 150.

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Wreckage litters the entrance to the Polytechnic Institute in Athens, Greece, on November 17, 1973, after tanks and troops were used to clear students from the area.

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INTRODUCTION

Institutional autonomy is an internationally recognized condition of top quality higher education.¹ States that recognize the autonomy of their higher education institutions safeguard academic functions against outside interference and thereby maximize educational and research outputs. But institutional autonomy does more than ensure outputs and quality. It also serves to insulate higher education from politicization and ideological manipulation, reinforcing a view of the higher education space as ‘off-limits’ to violent or coercive force. Autonomy therefore has a protective function, safeguarding higher education institutions and personnel against attacks by state and non-state actors.

In implementing autonomy, states are obligated not only to refrain from interference in higher education (negative obligations) but also affirmatively to protect higher education institutions, leadership, academic and professional staff, and students from attacks by third-parties (positive obligations).² This requires states both to abstain from direct or complicit involvement in attacks, as well as to protect higher education from attack and to deter attacks by holding perpetrators accountable. Balancing these obligations can be challenging: while an excessive state security presence limits autonomy and may make higher education more vulnerable by politicizing campuses, too little state involvement in ensuring security also makes higher education institutions vulnerable to attack. This study seeks to develop a framework for exploring the relationship between security from violent or coercive attacks, institutional autonomy, and related state obligations, with the goal of supporting recommendations for action.

There is very little information examining this question. Studies of institutional autonomy typically do not discuss security issues (favoring instead research, funding, and staffing issues). Public information about security systems on higher education campuses is similarly limited, and when it is available, varies greatly between institutions and countries. This study is therefore an important first step in exploring the real-world relationships between violent and coercive attacks, autonomy, and security. The study begins with a review of literature on autonomy and security models in different regions, giving particular attention to Latin and North America, about which more has been written. The goal here is to understand what models exist and the implications of these models for preventing attacks on higher education. This is followed by case examples selected to illustrate different forms of violent attacks arising from different combinations of institutional autonomy and security arrangements. Examples include arrests related to classroom content in Zimbabwe, violent sectarian divisions in Iraq, impunity for politically-motivated murders of academics in Pakistan, and physical intimidation by external social groups in Tunisia. The study concludes with a forward-looking analysis of the topic, anticipating possible next steps and offering recommendations for stakeholders.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of available literature failed to identify significant prior research on the intersection of institutional autonomy, security, and attacks on higher education, highlighting the need for this study. No prior research was found examining the influence of institutional autonomy on the vulnerability of higher education institutions to attack, or on how to provide security to higher education institutions in order to insulate them from attack. Nevertheless, several bodies of literature examined elements of the topic from which some lessons may be drawn. These include works on the concept and models of institutional autonomy, focusing on Latin America since this region has a well-developed historical, legal, and normative base for autonomy claims. Additionally, there is a literature examining the security of higher education institutions, focusing on the United States, where a large higher education sector includes highly developed campus security structures. There is also some scholarship that touches upon both of these issues in other contexts in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This review briefly considers each of these literatures in order to explore the implications of different models for preventing or responding to attacks on higher education.

Autonomy and security in Latin America

Institutional autonomy in Latin America today is rooted in the Cordoba Reforms of 1918, which started as a student movement protesting elite authority over the universities (Arias, 2006; Schwartzman, 2002) and grew to include calls for greater access to higher education for all secondary school graduates, greater student participation through a shared governance structure that included professors, students, and administrators (Arias, 2006; Figueiredo-Cowen, 2002), and *libertad de cátedra*, or freedom of students to decide their own courses of study (Arias, 2006; Brademas, 1961; De La Rosa, 2007). While the Cordoba reformers originally called for state intervention to restructure universities, the movement evolved into one calling for the *autonomía universitaria*, an institution disentangled from the state. These reforms spread region-wide, producing a model of an autonomous university that was self-regulating and free to organize research, courses, hiring and admissions, without outside interference (Schwartzman, 1992; Suchliki, 1972). The autonomous university was also self-regulating for security purposes, with state police requiring permission from institutional leaders before entering the campus, at least in theory. These protections even extended to dissident politicians being able to receive asylum on campuses (Arias, 2006).

These principles of institutional autonomy were severely challenged in the 1960s-80s, under pressure from military dictatorships coming to terms with the expansion of access to education to students of diverse social and economic backgrounds (Figueiredo-Cowen, 2002). Violent confrontations occurred throughout the region, perhaps most famously in 1968 at the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM) when many students were killed after government forces invaded dormitories following protests (Arias, 2006; NPR, 2008). The literature suggests that the tensions between state and higher education stakeholders underlying such incidents may be exacerbated by an absence of independent campus security mechanisms. Without their own security capacity, institutions were unable to take preventive measures, maintain order, reduce confrontations, or respond effectively to violent incidents when they occurred. And in the absence of campus security capacity, states resorted to external state security forces to quell campus unrest, often oppressively, overriding the traditions of autonomy and non-interference (Suchliki, 1972).

Indeed, during the dictatorship era, most pressures on higher education came from the state itself. State authorities restricted the content of teaching and research, fired staff, and discharged students. States also engaged in overtly violent attacks, including forcible occupation of higher education facilities and the arrest, detention, torture, killing, and/or disappearance of thousands of higher education staff and students. In Argentina, for example, universities were subordinated by decree to the Ministry of Education, triggering mass faculty resignations (Arias, 2006). Ultimately, more than 30,000 faculty, students, and other higher education affiliates were arrested and disappeared in a campaign to eliminate dissent (Arias, 2006). In Brazil, large



numbers of professors were dismissed between 1966 and 1974, and the state assumed approval authority over all research by academics. In Chile, the Pinochet government banned disfavored areas of study, including political science and sociology, and forced 2,000 professors and 20,000 students out of the universities (Arias, 2006).

The Mexican army occupies the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México campus in Mexico City, Mexico, September 18, 1968.

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While the memories of this era persist, the situation today is very different with most countries having undergone democratic transformations (Arias, 2006). Attacks on higher education today are more commonly “at the hands of criminals, paramilitary groups, guerillas, and rogue state actors operating outside the law,” although at times with “the tacit approval of some higher ranking state officials” (Arias, 2006). In Ecuador, the *Legión Blanca*, a paramilitary group with alleged ties to the state, reportedly developed lists of academics and students they planned to kill in retaliation for their leftist views (Arias, 2006). In Venezuela, pro-Chavez groups reportedly intimidated academics whose research questioned government policies. In Haiti, institutions with reputations for supporting certain political affiliations have experienced threats from government supporters (Arias, 2006). In Brazil, non-state assailants have attacked professors examining the rights of indigenous persons on their travel to research sites (Arias, 2006). In Guatemala, researchers investigating forensic physical evidence of human rights abuses have suffered death threats (Arias, 2006). And in Colombia, which has suffered perhaps the greatest number of violent attacks in the last two decades, right-wing paramilitary groups murdered at least 33 academics between 1987 and 1999 and have allegedly placed informants on campuses (Arias, 2006), creating an atmosphere of intimidation not seen since the dictatorship era (I. Pacheco, interview, July 9, 2012). Overall the security question has shifted from states imposing too heavy a security presence to



Four students were killed when Ohio National Guard troops fired at some 600 anti-war demonstrators on the campus of Kent State University, Ohio, U.S.A. on May 4, 1970.

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states providing too little security, failing to hold perpetrators accountable, and leaving institutions defenseless against attacks by non-state actors.

While the nature and sources of attacks may differ, a lack of independent campus security mechanisms seems to continue to play a role in violent campus unrest today. For example, where government-imposed higher education restructuring programs have been met with public and student protests (Balan, 2006),

institutions lacking internal security capacity have had to rely on state security forces to intervene. But because many in the sector—particularly students—do not trust the state, the use of state forces may result in greater and more violent confrontations (De La Rosa, 2007). In Chile, for example, increases in university fees triggered student protests that brought higher education activities to a halt. Ultimately state riot police were called in to end the protests, resulting in violence and mass arrests (Franklin, 2011). Similar incidents were seen in other countries, often with similarly violent results (Sepulveda, 2011). This suggests that increasing independent campus security capacity, and in the process increasing institutional autonomy over security functions and reducing state security interventions, may offer potential benefits for protecting higher education from attack.

Autonomy and security in the U.S. & Canada³

The United States has the “largest and most diverse system of postsecondary education in the world” (Trow, 1988, p. 13) comprised of private universities and colleges and state-supported institutions, together serving approximately 20 million students (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). The Canadian system is significantly smaller and less varied, comprised mostly of public institutions and some private, state-supported institutions, together serving more than one million students (Skolnik and Jones, 1992; CICIC, n.d.; Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 2013). In both countries, coordination of higher education is divided between the federal and state/provincial levels, with the latter holding most of the authority.⁴ Both countries also share a common history of significant institutional autonomy. Private and public institutions in the U.S. tend to be governed by lay boards, which preserve a degree of autonomy even while recognizing the need for accountability to state and private stakeholders (Trow, 1988, p. 17). Canadian institutions, while funded or regulated by provincial governments, nevertheless enjoy a degree of autonomy that is possibly even greater than that of comparable U.S. institutions (Skolnik and Jones, 1992; Brown, 2006). Despite periodic challenges to this autonomy, legislatures and courts in both countries have tended to uphold principles of nonintervention on campuses (Frei, 1971).

In accordance with this tradition of autonomy, U.S. higher education institutions tend to be responsible for the security of institutional facilities and personnel. Early campus security efforts started with student governments, and later faculties, engaging in policing activities (Eugene et al, 2003; Falcone and Gehrand, 2003). These were replaced by hired paid patrols or “watchmen” who often lacked formal training and served both custodial and security functions (Etheridge, 1958). With the expansion of student populations in the 1950s and the waves of student protests in the 1960s-70s (particularly the shootings at Kent State University, when federally-mobilized National Guard soldiers shot and killed four students during protests against U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam), “campus administrators soon realized there was a need for ‘police presence’ on campus” (Sloan, 1992, p. 96). Realizing the risks of relying on outside authorities to maintain campus order, including the potential to escalate violence, and risks to institutional autonomy inherent in relying on outside police and courts systems to address intra-institutional issues (Frei 1971), institutions began to create more formal campus security systems wholly independent of but modeled on professional civil police forces (Bromley et al, 1998; Eugene et al, 2003; Falcone and Gehrand, 2003; Sloan, 1992).

Since then the most prevalent threat that U.S. campus security systems have faced is local crime, including, in the most extreme form mass-shootings by current or former students, academics or others within the higher education community. This has been exemplified by the 2007 shootings at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in which an enrolled student killed 32 students and wounded 25 others. Such acts of apparently random, irrational or isolated violence are not the kind of purposeful conduct generally considered an ‘attack’ on education within the meaning of the GCPEA mandate, and therefore are outside of the focus of this study. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that such acts can have an effect on institutional autonomy, strengthening autonomy where institutions demonstrate effective and timely responses, and undermining autonomy where institutions have demonstrated either an inability to provide adequate security or negligence in exercising security responsibilities.⁵

Of greater concern for this study is a recent increase in non-state groups attempting “to generate external political pressure on faculty and universities, and pressing for faculty dismissals” based on the content of teaching, research, or extra-mural expressive activity (Sieber, 2005, p. 13). These groups encourage students and other persons on campuses to serve as confidential surveillance agents, surreptitiously recording or video-taping faculty or student discussions. The groups then use the recordings to wage campaigns against particular faculty or staff members, including at times publishing lists labeling individuals as “dangerous” or otherwise disloyal or threatening to society. At a minimum, these groups pose a challenge to the open, collaborative research and teaching environment that is essential to quality higher education. Their tactics can undermine trust between and among students and academic staff, resulting in self-censorship (because nuanced discus-

sions are easily taken out of context, exposing speakers to unjustified attacks) and a polarization of campus discourse (Downs, 2006; Sieber, 2005). More alarmingly in the context of a deeply politicized society in which public spaces including higher education campuses have suffered mass-shootings and other violent targeted attacks by people espousing extreme views, the act of publicly branding individual academics as threats or dangers to society may reasonably be seen as contributing to a climate of physical intimidation that goes beyond normal intellectual disagreement. This climate of intimidation may be especially pervasive when outside groups charge academics or others with supporting terrorism, terrorist organizations or terrorist ideologies. Such charges have gained urgency with the public and state officials since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., fueled in part by suggestions that the perpetrators abused student visa procedures to enter or remain in the country. Since then, U.S. higher education institutions have been subject to increased government surveillance, including tighter visa restrictions and reporting requirements, video and email monitoring, and searches of campus facilities, including dormitory rooms (Darrow, 2010).⁶ Many of these measures have focused on students and faculty from or working on issues related to Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority countries. For example, it was reported in early 2012 that the New York City Police Department had monitored the activities of Muslim student associations at universities and colleges across the north-eastern U.S., including many hundreds of miles away from their official jurisdiction in New York, without the approval of campus authorities (Hawley, 2012). Such surveillance—whether by state or non-state groups—not only undermines institutional autonomy but can also increase the vulnerability of institutions to further intrusions—including violent and coercive attacks—by politicizing the higher education space.

Fortunately, despite lingering concerns about post-9/11 practices, institutional autonomy in the U.S. remains strong. This may be due in part to the intervening reassessment and condemnation of similar tactics during the McCarthy era,⁷ including a number of legal decisions recognizing various elements of autonomy and academic freedom. These include, for example, a U.S. Supreme Court decision striking down loyalty oaths and restricting “legislative inquiries into political beliefs and associations” (O’Neil, 2006, p. 56, citing *Keyishian v. Board of Regents*, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). It may also be due in part to the widespread existence of independent campus security systems with sufficient capacity to maintain internal security. However, the re-emergence of these tactics in the post-9/11 period is a reminder that erosions of institutional autonomy, even those proposed in the name of security, risk politicizing the higher education space, leaving institutions and personnel more vulnerable to future intrusions. Indeed, these same tactics of surveillance and allegations of disloyalty or threats to national security are increasingly deployed against higher education institutions and personnel around the world. But in situations where higher education lacks the same traditions of institutional autonomy and internal security capacity as in the U.S., such tactics may be much more threatening and much more likely to correspond with violent or coercive attacks.



Smoke billows from a building at Navarra University, in Pamplona, Spain, set on fire by a car bomb on October 30, 2008. The explosion wounded at least 15 people.

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Autonomy and security in Europe

Although higher education institutions have emerged from many traditions, all models of the modern university draw heavily from early European traditions. These include early expressions of institutional autonomy as a negotiation of authority between state and religious officials. Research or teaching that conflicted with religious doctrine was not tolerated, but universities nevertheless gained increasing authority to govern their internal affairs (Brown, 2006). When threats to their autonomy arose, universities could appeal to the highest external powers—the king or the pope—and even resorted to threats to “suspend lectures or close down and migrate elsewhere” if grievances were not recognized (Frei, 1971, p. 356). The concept of academic freedom emerged during the 18th century as a central safeguard against religious interference with academic inquiry, and

developed alongside the concept of institutional autonomy which was seen as necessary to preserve that freedom. (Brown, 2006). These ideas deepened with modernization of higher education, until they were formalized in the 19th century German Humboldtian research university as *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*, the freedom to teach and learn. However these principles were neither complete, as they did not reach to expression outside of the classroom and laboratory, nor sacrosanct, as higher education communities across Europe suffered repeated persecutions throughout the 20th century. Examples of repression occurred after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, under the fascist dictatorships in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece, and under socialist totalitarianism of the former Soviet Union and satellite states (Brown, 2006). Nevertheless, they continued to guide European higher education governance, and after each of the dark periods, institutional autonomy and academic freedom reemerged.

Although variations still exist, European higher education today generally enjoys higher levels of institutional autonomy and physical security than most other areas of the world, including perhaps the U.S.. This is most clear from a 2010 report by the European University Association (EUA), which ranks 29 European higher education systems according to the level of autonomy they have in each of four dimensions. The detailed ranking system testifies to the highly developed understanding of autonomy in the region as well as to sector-wide efforts to understand, measure, and promote it. Equally telling, physical security is apparently not of sufficient concern to have warranted inclusion among any of the 38 specific indicators (See <http://www.university-autonomy.eu/>).⁸

This does not mean that European higher education has not been subject to violent attacks in recent memory. Again, these have tended to occur in cases where higher education has been politicized. For example, prior to the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Great Britain, IRA paramilitaries targeted British and perceived pro-British academics in their attacks, which included threatened violence, kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations. In Spain, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) paramilitaries used shootings and bombings to threaten and kill academics, among others, particularly those who spoke out against the group's terror tactics (Brown, 2006).

Nor does this mean that European higher education is free from pressures on institutional autonomy—indeed, the development of the EUA ranking demonstrates the concerns within the sector. But the threats in the region today tend more toward issues of state interference through the withdrawal of financial support or the imposition of new restrictions or requirements on support that is provided. In France and Italy, for example, the state provides significant support for higher education and in turn controls hiring practices, appointment of university administrators, and infrastructure changes, such as decisions on what buildings can be constructed, all of which influence the quality and type of research that institutions pursue (Brown, 2006). In Great Britain and elsewhere, state vetting procedures include background checks on foreign scholars from various nations invited by universities to pursue research in certain disciplines (Brown, 2006). In Denmark, the higher education system is heavily state-centered. Although there are mechanisms in place to limit political involvement in decisions about curriculum, the number of courses, and length of time necessary for graduation, the state has implemented a point system for evaluating research productivity that is tied to future funding allocations (Brown, 2006). While each of these examples may have the intent of improving higher education functions, including efficiencies, research quality, and accountability, they each may also threaten institutional autonomy and academic freedom. As such, they may do more harm than good, exposing institutions to further and greater interferences in the future. In the near term, however, these examples admittedly do not result from nor appear to contribute to the types of severe physical or coercive attacks on higher education institutions and personnel that Europe has experienced previously and that are frequently experienced elsewhere.

Autonomy and security in other regions

Although Africa, Asia, and the Middle East gave rise to many centers of traditional, religious and scientific learning over many centuries, most higher education systems in these regions today have their roots in institutions established on the European model during the colonial period. Throughout their history, these institutions have generally had little autonomy, making them vulnerable to attack by both state and other societal actors. Under European rule, colonial authorities directly governed the institutions. In Hong Kong, for example, higher education institutions were closely regulated and controlled by a central funding council, the University Grant Committee (Liu, 1996). In then Rhodesia, the colonial government maintained firm control over the universities, including by violently quashing political protest, arresting students, and deporting expatriate lecturers (Mlambo, 1995). Only after independence in the 1960s-80s did institutions begin to gain some degree of autonomy. However the state generally retained significant influence. For example, in many cases the head of state retained the role of Chancellor of the national universities, with appointment power over all vice chancellors (Kopp and Orina, 2002, discussing Kenya). Strong links between the state and higher education governance reflected in part the natural relationship between higher education and national development, with universities in post-colonial settings seen by new national governments, and to some extent by institutions themselves, as instruments of nation building. These links between governments and universities were also strengthened by the fact that these institutions have tended to be fully government funded, with very few private higher education institutions to provide alternative models of autonomy (Lui, 1996, p. 325, discussing limited private higher education options in Hong Kong; Suwanwela, 1996, citing the relatively recent development of private institutions in Thailand).

In Africa, such arrangements often subordinated higher education governance to the priorities of political patronage, resulting in political appointees having significant control over institutional policies, including for example the ability to “block loans, fail or expel dissident students, and prevent the appointments or promotions of intransigent faculty” (Kopp and Orina, 2002, p. 48). Institutions therefore tended to be closely linked to state policies and ideologies (Africa Watch, 1991, p. 12; Anderson and Johnson, 1998). Often this also meant significant state interference in academic appointments and self-censorship on the part of the professors who depended on the state for their positions (Africa Watch, 1991; Sawyerr, 1996). In Morocco, for example, universities were founded through state legislation and administered by a government department in charge of higher education that regulates, among other things, program objectives, degrees, evaluations, and course lists. Today, both administrative and academic staff remain civil servants, meaning that they are beholden to the state for their careers (although universities have some authority in selecting candidates) (Mekouar, 1996).

In Asia, similarly, government control historically resulted in higher education policies closely tracking national economic and political priorities. Prior to the mid-1970s, Chinese higher education institutions were under direct government administration. As China began to transition toward a socialist market economy, universities gained some policy-making authority, but were still expected to serve the state’s socialist modernization program (Guoguang 1996, p. 296-297). The likelihood of state intervention would increase if institutions strayed from fulfilling this central mission. More recently, China’s higher education sector has dramatically grown and diversified, in parallel to the political, social, and economic changes across the country. While this has led to some greater devolution of authority to institutions, the system as a whole remains highly responsive to state political and economic prerogatives, not least because most institutions depend on the state for financial support.

As in other regions, the review of available literature failed to identify significant research on security systems at higher education institutions in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East. But based on published accounts of incidents and in line with significant government control over the higher education systems, it is clear that government security forces in these regions have exercised wide latitude to enter and intervene on campuses and, in at least some cases, serve as the primary agents of campus security. At the same time, higher education institutions in these regions have tended to see greater state intervention in their operations than in Europe, North America,

and Latin America, with governments both holding more legal authority to intervene and more inclined towards doing so (Anderson and Johnson, 1998; Liu, 1996). As a result, institutional autonomy tends to be low, and governments may impose significant limitations on who institutions hire, who they admit to study, the content of researching and teaching, and even on freedom of public assembly on campuses. Indeed throughout these regions, state security forces have intervened on campuses to conduct surveillance, arrest students and faculty, and violently suppress protest. In Botswana, the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), which was created in 2008 partly in response to student demonstrations, has been linked to abductions of student activists and death threats against lecturers and academics critical of government policies (Gwatiwa, 2011). Student leaders in Kenya have faced physical expulsion over demonstrations and in an extreme case, in 1997, a student leader burned to death in his locked dormitory (Klopp and Orina, 2002). In the occupied Palestinian territory, students and faculty have been subjected to prolonged administrative detentions without charge, and institutions have been closed by physical obstructions, including destruction of university access roads and multiple layers of checkpoints (Halileh and Giacaman, 2002; Hammond, 2007). In Egypt, Zimbabwe, China, Ethiopia, Iran, and many other countries, academics, lecturers, teachers, and students have been detained, arrested, tortured, and killed (Akker, 2006). In other cases, perhaps due to the perception that higher education institutions are political rather than neutral spaces, non-state groups have been responsible for violent attacks on higher education, often with little efforts by states to prevent them. In Pakistan, for example, nationalist Balochi groups have been implicated in the assassination of university academics (HRW, 2010). As will be discussed below, the Pakistani government has done little to hold the perpetrators accountable. Significantly, states have used the existence of such insurgencies to justify interventions on higher education campuses, continuing to entangle universities in political battles that may further imperil their grounds and staff. In the Philippines, state military forces shut down universities after attacks on army forces patrolling the campus of Mindanao State University (Alipala and Umel, 2012; Gallardo, 2012). In Sri Lanka, the state used claims of student involvement in insurgency to place monitoring cameras on campuses and to arrest non-violent student protesters (Ratnayake, 2010).

Throughout these regions, violent and coercive attacks on higher education appear to be triggered by a mix of student or faculty protest, state interventions, and/or interferences by non-state groups. The specifics of each incident may vary. In some cases, states may have intervened legitimately to calm unrest. In many others cases, states have either intervened violently to quash nonviolent expressive activity or failed to intervene adequately to protect higher education institutions or personnel from attacks by non-state groups. Most incidents appear to involve some combination of limited traditions of institutional autonomy, coupled with real or perceived politicization of higher education institutions and limited or nonexistent independent campus security capacity. This suggests that increasing the culture of autonomy *simultaneously* with increasing independent security capacity might help protect higher education from attacks.



The Campus Security Office at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) in Sydney, Australia. The office is staffed by UNSW Security Services twenty four hours a day, year round.

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EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS

The literature review revealed limits in available research that will make it difficult to offer comprehensive recommendations for protecting higher education from attack. Nevertheless, when supplemented with case examples, the literature available can support the articulation of a framework for analyzing the autonomy and security dimensions of attacks on higher education, which may in turn help develop new strategies for responding to and preventing such attacks. Toward this goal, the following case examples elaborate on specific types of attacks, including retaliation for classroom content, physical threats in the context of armed sectarian conflict, murders of academic staff, and physical intimidation on campuses by non-state groups. The case examples are based on interviews with higher education professionals from the selected countries, supplemented by research and online media reports. The examples are constrained in several ways, particularly by the limited number of interviews that could be scheduled and completed during the study period.⁹ As a result the examples may be more anecdotal, based on respondents' personal experience and knowledge, than comprehensive and objectively verifiable. The examples also include high profile incidents that drew media attention at the time and were therefore better known to interviewees, but may not represent the most prevalent types of attacks in a given country. Finally, interviews at times were inconsistent, and published reports were sometimes incomplete, inconsistent, or unavailable due to language, time constraints, or other restrictions. Notwithstanding these constraints, the examples provide relatively strong snapshots of particular types of attacks on higher education that have been experienced in multiple countries and regions, both historically and in recent years. As such, they are a useful basis for analyzing how autonomy and security considerations relate to attacks and for developing strategies for improving protection.

Example #1: Retaliation for classroom content in Zimbabwe

On February 19, 2011, Munyaradzi Gwisai, a senior lecturer of law and director of the Labor Law Center at the University of Zimbabwe, Harare, organized on campus a lecture and viewing of videos about the Arab Spring. The intention was to use the videos as a basis for an academic discussion on democracy, and to compare the situations in Egypt and





Supporters of Zimbabwean academics and activists prosecuted for organizing an on-campus lecture and viewing of a video on the Arab Spring at the University of Zimbabwe, demonstrate outside the Zimbabwean consulate in Johannesburg, South Africa on March 20, 2012 .

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Tunisia to that in Zimbabwe. According to reports, a government intelligence officer infiltrated the meeting and summoned police (Dixon, 2011), who surrounded the Center and arrested 45 individuals, including Gwisai, students, and civil society activists in attendance (HRW, 2011). They also seized laptops, computers, DVDs, and a video projector (Zune Scene, 2011). All 45 detained were initially charged with treason and government subversion. However, the prosecution released 39 of the defendants after they spent 16 days in prison (Amnesty International, 2012) and reduced the charge of treason against the remaining six to “conspiracy to commit public violence.” The six charged included Mr. Gwisai and student leader Welcome Zimuto, who both spoke at the event, and four labor and social activists attending the event (Amnesty International, 2012). They spent three weeks in detention, during which time they allege they were tortured. They were then released on bail. In February 2012, the six were convicted and sentenced to a two-year suspended prison sentence, a fine of \$500, and 420 hours of community service. The “relatively light” sentence was celebrated by a group of students (who were arrested for their celebrations), despite the fact that outside observers argued that the trial was flawed and “marred by due process concerns” (CSM, 2012; HRW, 2012). The six appealed their convictions, arguing that the primary evidence given was from a “dishonest witness’ who lied about his true identity as a police officer when he infiltrated the group” (The Guardian, 2012). They also filed papers with the Harare High Court that accused the government of torture, alleging that police and security agents attempted to extract confessions and beat them with broomsticks, wooden planks, and metal pipes (HRW, 2012).¹⁰ About the case, the defendants’ attorney noted “This is the first time we have seen people being charged with treason for having a meeting that is an academic discussion...[T]he state is panicking because of what is happening in Egypt and Tunisia and... Libya” (quoted in Dixon, 2011). Other sources suggested that the arrests were also likely part of a government crackdown on perceived opposition in advance of potential elections in 2013 (Baldauf, 2011; CSM, 2012; HRW, 2011).

The incident described takes place in a context where the primary sources of attacks against academic staff and students are state and state-affiliated groups, including the police, military, and youth militias recruited and trained by the government. Higher education institutions are highly politicized and have an extremely low level of autonomy. The majority are public, state-owned institutions, where the head of state is the chancellor who appoints vice chancellors and other senior leadership. Therefore the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) essentially controls the administration of higher education, privileges academic staff and students who support the party, and violently represses and attacks the opposition. Although there are minimum qualifications for hiring and admissions, the ZANU-PF reportedly reserves places for party officials and beneficiaries, such as those who have been trained in the government-linked youth militia, regardless of their qualifications (Anonymous, Interview, August 11, 2012). Reports also suggest that once appointed, ZANU-PF supporters are not subject to the same surveillance as academics and students affiliated with the opposition. As demonstrated by the example above, ZANU-PF tightly restricts academic content that it perceives as threatening to its control. For example, academics cannot engage freely in research on President Mugabe or on ZANU-PF, unless the resulting findings are positive. When academics express views critical of Mugabe or the party, they are reprimanded, dismissed, or arrested and charged (Anonymous, Interview, August 11, 2012).¹¹ The public spaces of the universities are also tightly controlled by the state, despite higher education institutions theoretically having the autonomy to determine who enters campus and despite the campuses maintaining their own security forces. In fact, campus security forces are structurally linked to the government in that they generally report to a chief security officer, who reports in turn to the vice chancellor and senior university staff, all appointed by the state. Individual campus security officers also frequently have ties to ruling party officials as well as “symbiotic” relationships with local law enforcement through which campus security forces may call on local police to intervene on campus (Anonymous, Interview, August 23, 2012). While such relationships in theory could be unobjectionable, even beneficial, in practice they can be invoked by politically biased campus security to assist in suppressing nonviolent academic or political expression. Secret state intelligence or security agents also frequently operate on campuses disguised as students and staff, providing reports to campus security forces, local police and government offices alike, as in the Arab Spring video incident. All of

these networks help solidify ZANU-PF's control over academic content and the physical campuses; control the state is not hesitant to invoke.¹²

The Arab Spring video incident is one example of attacks on higher education that are facilitated by tight state control over higher education institutions, aided by informants placed on campus and a campus security system that serves the state before the institution.¹³ Additionally, the incident shows how the government considers even nonviolent expression on campus—both the content of presentations and the act of organizing events—to be a threat to the state that justifies violent response. In explaining the judgments of conviction in the case, for example, the presiding judge stated that “[w]atching the video is not a crime; however, the manner at [sic] which they watched it was meant to arouse feelings of hostility to [sic] those present in the meeting... One can safely conclude that the meeting was not innocent and academic, but was meant to urge people to revolt against the government of Zimbabwe” (Alpert, 2012). The example is illustrative of a long pattern of violent state attacks on expression and public gatherings at higher education institutions or involving higher education personnel. For example, in April 2006 at Great Zimbabwe University in Masvingo, state police and other government forces broke up a three-week strike by academic and non-academic staff, with many arrested and required to pay \$20,000 each for violating the Public Order and Security Act (Anonymous, Interview, August 11, 2012). In February, 2007, at Harare Polytechnic, police prevented more than 1000 students demonstrating against fees from engaging in a march; 40 students were detained (SAIH, 2012). One interviewee noted that between 2004 and 2006, more than 1000 student arrests occurred during protests, meetings, and other gatherings, severely weakening the student movement (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012). Another interviewee reported being arrested more than 32 times between 2000 and 2009 (Anonymous, Interview August 11, 2012). In 2007, again at Great Zimbabwe University, campus police removed two student leaders from an examination room during an exam “on the grounds that they had a case pending in courts. They were beaten up and one of them sustain[ed] a broken neck” (SAIH, 2012, p. 19). In 2011, students at one university, attempting to march demanding refunds of fees for cancelled courses, were met by riot police, and their leaders were arrested (Anonymous, Interview, August 11, 2012). People arrested regularly reported inadequate conditions of detention as well as physical abuse and torture, indeed, just as the six convicted after the Arab Spring video incident alleged. And as recently as January 2012 at Bindura University, police broke up a student protest against high tuition fees with teargas and beatings with batons, resulting in high numbers of people being hospitalized (SAIH, 2012, p. 19). Like the Arab Spring video incident, these examples show that the absence of institutional autonomy and independent security capacity exposes higher education institutions in Zimbabwe to violent and coercive attacks by state and state-aligned groups.¹⁴

Example #2: ‘Balkanization’ of higher education in Iraq

Al-Mustansiriya University is one of Iraq’s largest institutions of higher education. Since the 2003 fall of the Baathist government in Iraq, the university has been dominated by various Shiite groups.¹⁵ In March 2009, tension between one of these groups and the University’s president, Dr. Taqi al-Musawi, led to an incident in which outside security forces entered the campus and arrested several group members, triggering large student protests and boycotting of classes (Anonymous, Interview, September 6, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, September 10, 2012). In response, the government minister of higher education, Abeddhiyab al-Ajili, declared a state of emergency at the university, issued a decree removing the president (on the grounds that he should not have allowed security forces to enter the campus without permission), and appointed a new president, Dr. Imad Al-Hussaini (Anonymous, Personal Communication, September 6, 2012).¹⁶ Dr. al-Musawi, supported by academic staff, students, and the University Council, refused to step down however, arguing that the minister did not have the legal authority to remove a sitting president. The dispute went to the Iraqi Parliament where it lingered for months. Meanwhile the university had two presidents functioning from separate offices in separate buildings, each with their own staff, including security staff (Anonymous, Personal Communication, September 6, 2012; Anonymous, Personal Communication, September 9, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, September 10,



An undated photograph shows destruction caused by looters to Al-Mustansiriya University, Baghdad, Iraq, immediately following the 2003 conflict that overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein.

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Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki stepped in, appointing another new, fourth president, Dr. Kadhim Kareem al-Jabiri. However the minister of education, reportedly deciding that al-Maliki’s act encroached on ministry authority, encouraged his appointee, Dr. al-Assadi to remain in office, resulting again in multiple active presidents “under the protection of his own guards, militia and supporters” (Anonymous, Interview, September 10, 2012; Cole, 2009). Ultimately, the situation only resolved after al-Assadi stepped down, the university closed temporarily, and the party-based student groups were dissolved (Anonymous, Interview, August 23, 2012; Cole, 2009).

The “multiple presidents” example could be mistaken as an almost comical case of bureaucratic infighting, except for the context of extreme polarization and violence in which it took place. During the period from 2003 to 2008, sectarian violence in Iraq reportedly resulted in the assassinations of more than 400 higher education professionals and caused thousands more to flee the country (Anonymous, Interview, August 9, 2012; Quinn,

2010, p. 104). Academics were targeted for their actual or imputed political views. One interviewee who ultimately fled the country explained that, as an outspoken critic of American policy, he was threatened by people who he said were quick to join “sectarian, conservative, and pro-American political parties” (Anonymous, Interview, August 9, 2012). Academics were also targeted for their religious and ethnic background. One interviewee of Sunni descent reported having to flee the country after being threatened in April, 2007, while living in Mosul, in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012a). Interviewees agreed that killings on Iraq’s campuses subsided after 2008, but attributed this to a ‘Balkanization’ where each campus is now segregated by sectarian and religious groups. Staff and students of opposing groups who were not killed have been pushed out. As one interviewee described it, today “if you are Shiite, you go to [a] Shiite campus” (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012b). According to other interviewees, Sunni religious groups control universities in Mosul, Salahuddin, and Anbar; the University of Diyala, located close to the border with Iran is marked by Shiite-Sunni tensions with interference from al-Qaeda; Baghdad University’s colleges throughout the city are controlled by different sectarian groups; religious Shiite groups control universities in the south, as well as many universities in the Middle Euphrates (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012a; Anonymous, Interview, August 23, 2012). These groups interfere in almost every aspect of campus life, including hiring, admissions, research and course content, and physical security. The lack of overt violence is therefore less an indication of greater security than a result of entrenched sectarian divisions, evident on campus in subtle and overt ways. For instance, Shiite-dominated universities will often have prominent displays of their leading Imam. Campuses will close for religious occasions relating to a particular, dominant sect, or will hold ceremonies on campus with students required to attend even if they belong to other sects. Academics face restrictions on teaching and research, and practice self-censorship to guard against political and social surveillance and the implicit threat of violence for non-compliance (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012a; Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012b; Anonymous, Interview, August 9, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, August 23, 2012). As one interviewee explained “[N]o one group watches you. If you say something, you could anger Kurds, or Sunnis, or Shiites, and they each [could] assassinate you. Or Iran. So there are a lot of people in the same college watching each other now. Now everybody is watching everybody” (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012b). Hiring and admissions are also shaped by sectarian considerations, with students and academics more likely to be accepted at campuses controlled by their own sect.¹⁷

As in the “multiple presidents” example, militant student groups play a role in enforcing sectarian lines, by supporting protests or boycotts or directly threatening professors whose research or teaching content allegedly offends, or who give them low grades (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012b). While the university itself is in charge of hiring security personnel, the sectarian parties and militias that control the area actually run the security apparatus. There also tends to be significant coordination between campus security units and external police and military forces, and often these actors belong to the same sectarian group. The structure of campus security apparatus, therefore, ensures that campuses remain under the control of the dominant sect (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012a; Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012b; Anonymous, Interview, August 9, 2012).

In this context, security and institutional autonomy each have an element of illusion, creating an unstable environment prime for attacks on higher education. Indeed, academics and students appear secure only as long as they do not challenge the dividing lines, and campuses are able to operate without disturbances only if they adhere to the local controlling sect.¹⁸ Higher education in Iraq today might therefore be understood best as in a state of suspended violence, where a decrease or even absence of overt violent attacks masks an underlying violent segregation of the higher education sector as a whole.

Example #3: Accountability for murder of academics in Pakistan

In April 2010, two men on a motorcycle shot and killed Nazima Talib, a Punjabi professor of mass communications for over 25 years, outside the gates of Balochistan University in Quetta, Pakistan (HRW, 2010). A spokesman for the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a militant group seeking an independent Balochistan, claimed responsibility for her murder stating that it was in retaliation for the mistreatment of Baloch women (Baloch, 2011; U.S. Department of State, 2011). In June 2011, gunmen killed Saba Dashtyari, a writer, poet, and professor of Islamic Studies at the same university (Yusuf, 2011). Dashtyari had supported the independence of Balochistan and worked to preserve Baloch literature, culture, and civilization through publications and the founding of Pakistan’s largest Baloch library collection (Yusuf, 2011). One month before he was killed, he had accused a leader of the Frontier Corps, a state-controlled paramilitary force, of a series of kidnappings and killings of Baloch youth and intellectuals (Baloch Community, 2011). No group claimed responsibility for his murder (Baloch, 2011). No investigations of either killing have been made. No one has been charged or convicted.

These examples of impunity for even fatal attacks on higher education personnel call into question the capacity or willingness of the state to protect higher education institutions caught in the middle of conflict between competing militant groups, or between militants and the state’s own forces. In the case of Balochistan, separatist militants have targeted institutions that are dominated by Punjabi groups and other minorities because these institutions are “representatives of the Pakistani state and symbols of perceived Punjabi military oppression of the province” (HRW, 2010). Pakistani armed forces have responded with force against the Baloch groups, including allegedly killing and torturing Baloch nationalists. These attacks in turn exacerbate tensions between Balochistan and the central government of Pakistan, while educators and others in the territory remain unprotected (Walsh, 2011). Although extreme, these murders are, in many ways, the foreseeable consequence of a widespread problem of ideological interference by state and non-state actors in higher education functions.



A Pakistani paramilitary soldier stands guard at the main entrance of Karachi University on October 21, 2009. The university was closed after twin suicide bombings at Islamabad's International Islamic University on October 20, 2009. The Government of Pakistan shuttered all educational institutions after the bombings.

© 2009 AP Photo/Fareed Khan



For example, although higher education institutions in Pakistan generally enjoy relative autonomy over core aspects of curriculum, course content, research subjects, and materials, it is widely understood that content or teaching that could be viewed as anti-religious, or alternatively as excessively critical of the federal armed forces, could result in retribution (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012; T. Rahman, Interview, August 22, 2012). This creates an environment in which academics not only resort to self-censorship and avoid sensitive topics, but universities are not considered politically neutral.

Further deepening this politicization of campuses, vice chancellors and other high officials are often appointed based on political affiliations (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). Admissions and hiring are similarly influenced by outside personal and political influences, with favored candidates circumventing official merit-based processes and advancing through “*sifarish*,” or connections to a high level authority (S. Abbas, Interview, August 5, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, Aug. 13, 2012; T. Rahman, Interview, August 22, 2012). These elements undermine institutional autonomy and academic integrity, adding to the impression that higher education institutions (and, by extension, personnel) are agents of local, national, or provincial political or other groups. This makes institutions and personnel even more vulnerable as external pressure groups, including political parties and religious or ethnic groups, see higher education institutions as means for consolidating their influence over a territory, or in more extreme cases, as legitimate targets for violent action against symbols of their opponents. As a result, external political parties, religious and militant groups, and student wings of political parties, often armed, disrupt campuses in furtherance of their political objectives.¹⁹ Indeed, since at least the late 1970s, security forces, Islamic groups, and political parties have all occupied campuses or otherwise intimidated students and faculty (S. Abbas, Interview, August 5, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). Interviews suggest that this battle continues today between government and pro-government groups, opposition parties, and pressure groups, some of which have religious or ethnic affiliations (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). Additionally, disputes between the student groups, often affiliated with these external actors, over control of campus facilities and resources, not only restrict university operations by leading to changes in class schedules, cancellation of examinations, and temporary closures of campuses, they are also sometimes violent, targeting members of other student groups, administrators, and academic staff (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012; Dawn, 2012).²⁰ At Balochistan University, for example, clashes between Baloch and Pashtoon student groups caused violent injuries to both students and professors (Daily Times, 2012).

To protect their campuses from these threats, higher education administrators have implemented a variety of measures including constructing barbed wire fences around the facilities, installing metal detectors at entrances, and hiring private security and campus guards called *chowkidars* to limit access to campuses, monitor events on campus and, if necessary, quell protests by students or others (T. Rahman, Interview, August 22, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, August 22, 2012). In practice, however, these measures are frequently inadequate to address serious incidents, including large protests, riots, and armed violence. (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). Institutions must then rely on state security forces or state-affiliated paramilitary forces to provide support, likely reaffirming the perception that universities are political spaces (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). In Balochistan, for example, local security forces and campus guards often refuse to take action against perpetrators of political violence on campus, which are often connected to the insurgency, relying instead on government-affiliated paramilitaries to repel insurgent-linked groups. Similar paramilitaries have been a regular presence on Karachi campuses (T. Rahman, Interview, August 22, 2012; Baloch, 2011).²¹ One interviewee stated that higher education leaders justify this abdication of institutional autonomy by arguing that the insurgency is a federal issue and therefore that holding the perpetrators accountable is an external responsibility (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). But even when an incident is an internal matter, such as a dispute between two student groups, higher education leaders sometimes prefer to invite external forces on campus rather than rely on campus guards or private security. This may be, in part, an acknowledgment of the limited capacity of local forces to deal with violent incidents, and in part an attempt to remain “impartial” in disputes between campus groups (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). However, in either case, calling in

state forces further erodes institutional autonomy, and it may in the long run undermine security as it reinforces the view that the campus is a legitimate zone for political combat (T. Rahman, Interview, August 22, 2012).

Example #4: Resisting external pressure groups in Tunisia

In November 2011, a group of approximately 50 to 100 people occupied the Faculty of Letters, Arts, and Humanities at the University of Manouba (“the Faculty”), in the suburbs of Tunis (HRW, 2011; Prince, 2012). The group was comprised mainly of conservative Salafist students and their outside supporters who were protesting the Faculty’s ban on the wearing of the *niqab*, an Islamic head covering for women that reveals only the eyes (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012; Daley, 2012; HRW, 2011). The Faculty had voted earlier that month, on November 2, to allow the *niqab* on campus grounds, including the library and other campus facilities, but to ban it during classes and examinations. Two justifications were given for the ban: 1) by obscuring the student’s face, the *niqab* interferes with faculty-student communication that is essential to in-classroom instruction; and 2) it creates a risk of cheating by concealing the student’s identity during examinations (Bouazza, 2012; HRW, 2011). On November 28, the Salafist group protested by blocking the Faculty entrance, as well as access for students to exam rooms. Habib Kazdaghli, Dean of the Faculty and a professor of contemporary history, detailed how a large group chanted slogans, interrupted classes, and prevented students from taking their examinations (HRW, 2011). The next day, Dean Kazdaghli attempted to restrict access through the campus gate to only those associated with the institution (HRW, 2011). On November 30th, a group of individuals not affiliated with the university forced their way onto the campus, confronting and shoving Kazdaghli. As a result, the academic staff initiated a strike to protest the assault, leading to a cancellation of classes for three days while the demonstrations continued (HRW, 2011). One week later, on December 6th, Dean Kazdaghli was again prevented from entering his office. He described the events:

At 8:35 a.m., I parked my car in the campus lot and headed toward my office. I heard Quranic verses being recited through a loudspeaker. When I got close to my building the recitation of the Quran stopped, and the group standing in front of the administration office shut the doors to the building. ... [O]ne of their leaders but who is not a student of the university, took the microphone and shouted, ‘He must not enter the building.’ I was surprised because I had gotten used to entering and leaving my office while the protesters were there. On this day, however, they formed a human chain. I tried to push my way past them and open the door. Some faculty workers and a professor from the French department joined me. But protesters on the other side of the door pushed back hard, knocking over the professor, who then fainted. After this incident, the professors and the staff of the administration closed their offices and we convened a meeting off-campus, at which we decided to close the Faculty of Letters, Arts and Humanities until further notice and to call for police intervention. (HRW, 2011)

The demonstrators continued their occupation for one month, causing the campus to close and classes and examinations to be cancelled, disrupting academic life for all students. (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012).²² Despite repeated requests from the Dean for support from the state police authorities, it was not until the end of January that state riot police finally arrived to end the occupation (Middle East Online, 2012a). Despite multiple legal complaints filed against those responsible for physical intimidation of academic staff and destruction of campus property, no prosecutions have been made and no one has been held responsible (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). However, a prosecution was brought in criminal court against Dean Kazdaghli, who was accused of allegedly slapping a female student who barged into his office and ransacked his papers (Bouazza, 2012; Prince, 2012; Middle East Online, 2012b).²³

The Manouba occupation shows that although Tunisian higher education institutions have a substantial amount of institutional autonomy to enact and implement their own internal policies, such as the policy on the wearing of the *niqab*, autonomy cannot be exercised without protection from outside groups that seek to disrupt



Protesters blocked access to the Letters, Arts and Humanities Faculty at the University of Manouba, near Tunis, in November 2011, physically intimidating staff and students, resulting in canceling of classes and examinations.

© 2011 AP Photo/Amine Landoulsi

higher education functions. Overall the Tunisian higher education sector is marked by relatively high autonomy over academic functions, with elected “scientific counsels” on each campus that include academic staff and students responsible for decisions about curriculum, materials, and course subjects. Academic staff have historically enjoyed freedom with respect to what is taught and researched, although prior to the 2010-11 revolution, academics would generally self-censor to avoid

direct criticism of the government (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). Autonomy is more limited with regard to budgets, guidelines for programs, degree requirements, appointments, and admissions, which fall under the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (I. Gharbi, Interview, August, 27, 2012).

The present arrangements for institutional autonomy at Tunisia’s universities are at least partially influenced by the country’s past. Generally speaking, prior to the revolution individuals affiliated with the government were appointed to leadership positions in the universities, and the Ministry guided the recruitment commissions that promoted professors and decided on study grants. These arrangements restricted the institutions’ ability to control staffing and research programs (I. Gharbi, Interview, August, 27, 2012). The pre-revolutionary period was also marked by pervasive surveillance on campuses and restrictions on political and religious expression. Police were stationed inside universities to control who entered and left and to monitor student and faculty behavior (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012; I. Gharbi, Interview, August, 27, 2012). They targeted particular students and faculty believed to have ties to student unions and religious groups. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, when Islamic movements in Tunisia were growing, the government cracked down on religious students, accusing them of “offending the public order.” (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). After the

revolution, in an effort to end the abusive surveillance of the past, police were withdrawn from campuses. While in principle this change offered promise of an increase in autonomy and academic freedom, in practice it has left campuses vulnerable to external pressure groups, especially those intent on disrupting unfettered research and instruction. Therefore, it has been relatively easy for groups to disrupt classes and examinations with little fear of repercussions, as in the Manouba example (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). There are also suggestions that these groups, particularly religious groups, have already begun to have some influence on university policies, including on decisions relating to faculty hiring and firing. One interviewee recounted that a teacher “was forced to leave the university and seek [a] transfer because of her liberal approach to Islam” (I. Gharbi, Interview, August, 27, 2012). Whereas political affiliations influenced faculty hiring prior to the revolution, there is concern that now religious affiliation may influence who is able to teach and research, at least at some Tunisian institutions.

Other Tunisian campuses also have seen demonstrations and crises like that which occurred at Manouba, but to a lesser degree. These have all been linked to the increasing strength of external pressure groups (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). For example, a month prior to the Manouba crisis, a Salafist group protested the *niqab* ban at Sousse University (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012; University World News, 2011). Two hundred protesters allegedly stormed the university, also demanding the right to wear the veil. As in the Manouba case, the government was slow to respond to requests for assistance. Many reasons are suggested for this, including delays attributable to a procedure that requires a state official to first go to the campus to document the issue before the police come to the campus, a process that can take several weeks; a reluctance by higher education leaders to call the police, fearing a return to the permanent police presence and monitoring of students and faculty that was the norm prior to the revolution (although this was clearly not the cause in the Manouba example); and a concern on the part of the government that intervening with force could be “an unwelcome reminder of the former regime’s heavy handed treatment of protesters” (Marks, 2011; A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). Apparently reflecting the latter, the Minister of Higher Education, Moncef Ben Salem, treated the Manouba situation as “an internal affair” and stated over the radio that the police would not intervene (Marks, 2011). Still others see the campus disturbances as linked to the growth of the Salafi movement, which has connections to the ruling Islamist political party, Ennahda. They claim the government has been slow to act against Salafi demonstrators because they represent an important political constituency needed in the new elections expected in 2013 (Daley, 2012). Finally, others argue that the new government simply may not have the capability to address the security demands placed on it, including by universities (A. Guellali, Interview, August 22, 2012). Whatever the reason, the greater degree of autonomy granted to Tunisian universities after the revolution is undermined by the lack of security to preserve or fully exercise that autonomy. External pressure groups that were formerly not tolerated on campuses now impose demands on them, enter the campus space, disrupt university operations, and exert influence over policies. The Manouba incident illustrates how this lack of security can interfere with normal campus functions, disrupting the education of thousands and creating risks of violence and serious harm to leadership, academic and nonacademic staff, and students.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The above examples demonstrate several common types of attacks on higher education, including violations of institutional autonomy and/or insufficient levels of security. They also provide a basis for a framework for analyzing attacks on higher education that takes into account both autonomy and security perspectives simultaneously. Such a framework could support future efforts to develop guidelines or other recommendations for states and key stakeholders to meet their obligations to protect higher education communities.

Chart 1A sketches out a framework that conceptualizes institutional autonomy and security each as a continuum ranging from “low” to “high.” For autonomy, this ranges from low levels in which the state or non-state actors may use violent or coercive force to maintain total control of higher education functions, facilities, and personnel, to high levels, in which higher education institutions have wide latitude to govern themselves and make their own decisions. Similarly, the security continuum ranges from low degrees of security for higher education institutions and personnel, such as where killings or other physical violence occur regularly, to high degrees of security where physical violence and coercive force are unusual. **Chart 1B** then attempts to locate each of the four examples described above within the framework.

Neither the framework nor the placement of examples within it are scientific. However the exercise of locating the examples in the framework is useful for exploring how differing degrees of autonomy and security are manifested in different types of attacks. In some cases, placement is relatively easy. For example, Chart 1B shows that retaliatory attacks on classroom content by the government in Zimbabwe are easily located in the




Chart 1A: Autonomy and security framework

“low autonomy, low security” quadrant, since the state tightly controls university operations, and institutions have no means for preventing often violent state interventions. Similarly, the example of external pressure groups operating freely and with impunity in Tunisia is also relatively easily put in the “high autonomy, low security” zone. However, other cases are more difficult to situate. For example, in Iraq, the facts suggest that higher education personnel operating within the Balkanized system—that is, personnel operating within an institution dominated by a sectarian group to which they belong—have relatively good levels of security, but limited autonomy to deviate from sectarian interests. At the same time, higher education personnel who might desire to work or study at an institution dominated by a group to which they do not belong—that is, to operate outside of the Balkanized system—would face severe security concerns as well as limited autonomy. Therefore Iraq is located in the chart both in the “high security, low autonomy” and “low security, low autonomy” quadrants. Finally, the example of the murder of academics in Pakistan is easy to locate in the “low security” areas, but more difficult to place on the autonomy continuum. In the chart it is placed under higher autonomy in recognition that campuses, at least in theory, have the authority to hire and direct their own security, although as discussed above, many have not effectively done so and have even abdicated their autonomy in favor of inviting state intervention (which might favor placement in the “low security, low autonomy” quadrant).

Viewed through this framework, the examples highlight a relationship of autonomy to security, and in particular to the security capacity of higher education institutions. A lack of independent security capacity within the higher education sector played a role in the attacks in all four examples. This was most clear in the Tunisian example, where lack of independent security capacity left institutions vulnerable to intimidation by non-state groups. It is not difficult to imagine that even a modest increase in security capacity could have helped mitigate




Chart 1B: Autonomy and security framework applied

or prevent the incident at Manouba. On the other hand, the Zimbabwe example also shows a lack of sufficient, independent security capacity that left the institution vulnerable to attack. But it is difficult to imagine what level of independent security capacity would have been sufficient to protect the institution from attacks directly perpetrated by the state. In that context, a more robust culture of institutional autonomy, recognized not only within the higher education sector but in the wider society, is necessary to provide some restraining force on the state. In such a context, institutional autonomy, if it could be established, may serve a protective function, perhaps by reducing state willingness to intervene on campuses, or perhaps by raising the political and social costs of such intervention.

The Pakistan example suggests that this protective function of autonomy may not be limited to direct attacks perpetrated by state actors, but may also apply to attacks by non-state parties. In cases like this, increasing the culture of autonomy simultaneously with increasing independent security capacity (and therefore reducing the presence of state forces for security) might help protect higher education from attacks by non-state actors by helping to place campuses off-limits to violent confrontations based on external political disputes. To be clear, this is not to suggest that increasing autonomy alone will increase security. Indeed, the Tunisia example suggests otherwise. But the Zimbabwe and Pakistan examples do suggest the possibility that increasing autonomy and independent security capacity together might help to mitigate or prevent attacks. And the Iraq example suggests the same in counterpoint: Apparent increases in *segregated* security capacity mask a decrease in overall autonomy, resulting in a system which is deeply vulnerable to violence and coercive force if the sectarian lines are challenged.

The literature review, despite its limits, also provides some evidence to support this view that institutional autonomy may have a protective function above and beyond its contribution to research and education outputs. Literature covering primarily Latin America, the United States and Canada, and Europe, reveals highly evolved traditions of institutional autonomy, independent security capacity, or both. While these regions have not been entirely spared from violent or coercive incidents on campuses, in recent years they have had relatively fewer such incidents than places lacking these traditions (especially considering the relatively greater numbers of higher education institutions in Europe and the Americas).

In fact, the literature may even suggest a corollary to the proposition that autonomy has a protective function, namely that measures *reducing* institutional autonomy may *increase* the risk of pressures on campuses, leading ultimately toward violent or coercive attacks. There is some indication in the U.S., for example, that reductions in autonomy stemming from state and non-state surveillance activities following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have contributed to an environment that makes higher education more vulnerable to external pressure. This may be seen, for example, in non-state advocacy groups, and in some cases, elected officials, pressuring U.S. campuses to cancel conferences and lectures by so-called ‘controversial’ visitors. Although explicit credible threats of physical violence are rare,²⁴ campuses have nevertheless cited the lack of adequate security or the costs of providing security when canceling events or rescinding invitations. This suggests not only the link between decreasing autonomy and increasing security risks, but also an attempt to bargain for greater security by limiting research and educational functions (in this case by canceling a conference or a challenged speaker). But as the examples from Pakistan and Iraq suggest, rather than make U.S. campuses more secure, attempts to bargain for greater security by limiting autonomy over campus discourse might ultimately leave campuses vulnerable to greater interference in the future.

Testing the proposed framework, **Chart 1C** locates this U.S. example in the “high autonomy, high security” quadrant as compared to the more severe violent or coercive attacks experienced in Pakistan or Zimbabwe. But within this zone, the decision to accede to external pressures to cancel a conference or lecture might be reflected as a decrease in autonomy and long-term security from outside interference. This suggests that other pressures on the higher education space, short of violent or coercive attacks, could be similarly located in the framework for purposes of exploring the relationship between autonomy and security.




Chart 1C: Autonomy and security framework applied to non-violent pressures on higher education

In either instance—violent or coercive attacks or nonviolent pressures—the framework helps to highlight the view that institutional autonomy may have a protective function above and beyond its contribution to research and education outputs, suggesting that efforts to protect higher education from attack must address autonomy and security concerns *simultaneously*.

Developing strategies for doing so necessitates focusing on the role of the state, which is ultimately responsible for guaranteeing both. **Chart 2** therefore identifies the four state roles found within the case examples: direct perpetrator; complicity; failure to protect/prevent; and failure to hold accountable/deter. Focusing on these

State role	Example
1. Direct role in violation/attack	Zimbabwe
2. Complicity in violation/attack	Iraq? Tunisia?
3. Failure to protect/prevent attack	Iraq, Tunisia, Pakistan
4. Failure to hold accountable/deter attack	Pakistan, Tunisia

Chart 2: State role in attacks on higher education

roles suggests a basis for developing specific, responsive strategies. For example, cooperative strategies such as education campaigns, trainings, and/or guidelines to familiarize state and non-state actors about issues of autonomy, security, and, in particular, state obligations, may be best aimed at situations involving failure to protect, failure to hold perpetrators accountable, and failure to deter or prevent attacks. Such strategies are not likely to be effective responses to direct state involvement or complicity in attacks (although they could be used to mobilize other states to exert pressure on state violators). Where such cooperative strategies are ineffective, established national and international monitoring systems, reporting, and lobbying activities might help to mobilize action in cases of state failure to protect against attacks or state failure to hold perpetrators accountable. Finally, more adversarial approaches including established human rights and even sanctions mechanisms may be explored in instances of systematic and grave direct state involvement or complicity in attacks.

Key stakeholders could begin to develop responsive strategies in the following ways:

Higher education institutions

Near and medium term: Document all violent and coercive attacks on campus facilities or personnel and what is done to address them. Report such incidents to GCPEA or international or regional monitors. Develop institutional protocols for reinforcing the protective function of institutional autonomy, as much as practical. These should encourage a culture of autonomy and resistance to external ideological or political interference even before incidents occur; a culture that includes not only members of higher education communities but also the wider society. These should also address responding to incidents in ways that are supportive of autonomy and security (for example, utilization of on-campus security forces when practical).

Long term: Where practical, work with state and local officials to reinforce the protective function of institutional autonomy by encouraging a culture of autonomy and resistance to external ideological or political interference. Where states are perpetrators or complicit in attacks, work with GCPEA or international or regional higher education monitors to expose attacks on higher education and mobilize both cooperative and adversarial strategies.

States

Near term: Recognize and make every effort to fulfill state obligations to protect higher education from attack in ways that are consistent with institutional autonomy and higher education values. Provide for adequate security of higher education institutions and personnel, whether through direct protection, budgetary allotment, or other suitable arrangement. Investigate all violent and coercive attacks on higher education facilities or personnel. Report on findings of investigations in an open and transparent way. Make all reasonable efforts to hold perpetrators of attacks accountable through proceedings that are fair, transparent, and consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.

Medium and long term: In cooperation with higher education institutions and personnel, work to reinforce the protective function of institutional autonomy, as much as practical, by encouraging a culture of autonomy and resistance to external ideological or political interference even before it occurs. Develop policies, regulations, and laws as necessary to secure and preserve institutional autonomy and security simultaneously. These should include necessary provisions to prevent and deter attacks and to hold perpetrators of attacks accountable.”

CONCLUSION

Violent and coercive attacks on higher education are a widespread problem affecting higher education institutions and personnel throughout the world. This study presents a framework for examining such attacks through the relationship of institutional autonomy and security. Because this relationship is a complex one, there is very little prior research on it. However, because this relationship offers insight into how to better protect higher education, it is worth pursuing.

This study suggests that institutional autonomy may have a protective function above and beyond its contribution to research and education outputs, which therefore indicates that efforts to protect higher education from attack should address autonomy and security concerns *simultaneously*. This necessarily requires strategies for working with states, both because states are ultimately responsible for guaranteeing both autonomy and security, and because states are often implicated in attacks, whether as direct or complicit perpetrators, or by failing to prevent or deter attacks, or to hold perpetrators accountable.

This study concludes that strategies tailored to the role of states in specific contexts may be most effective at increasing protection, whether from state or non-state perpetrators. GCPEA and its members have an important role to play in fostering international discussion and action aimed at developing and implementing these strategies. Next steps may include sponsoring follow-on research, encouraging reporting and monitoring of attacks, convening expert working groups, and/or developing guidelines for protecting higher education that include both institutional autonomy and security dimensions. The ultimate goal of all of these efforts should be to establish a culture of autonomy and security, recognized not only within the higher education sector but in the wider society, in which higher education spaces are “off limits” to attacks, freeing them to develop their research, educational, and social functions fully and with maximum benefit for all.

APPENDICES

Annotated Bibliography

University autonomy and security in Latin America

Argentina Independent. (2012). "Chile: Student Protesters Take to the Streets." Retrieved from <http://www.argentinaindependent.com/tag/student-protests/>.

This article describes recent protests in Chile by secondary school and college students. Students call for free public university tuition and an increased minimum wage so that they can live while they attend school. Their protests have resulted in violent confrontations between police and students. Recent protests have erupted throughout other regions of Latin America due to an increased push for the privatization of higher education. Chilean students have been the first among these nations to protest this trend.

Arias, E.D. (2006). *Formal Freedoms, Informal Violence: Academic Freedom and Human Rights in Latin America*. In E. Gertsman & M.J. Strebb, *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech*.

This article provides a historical overview of academic freedom and university autonomy in Latin America. It describes the Cordoba reforms of 1918 and its impact on Latin American universities during the first part of the twentieth century. The author also provides an overview of how the freedoms gained in the first part of the century set the framework for tensions in the second part of the century, when many Latin American nations were led by dictatorial governments that directly conflicted with the principles of university autonomy and freedom. While violations against the autonomy of universities, academics, and their students decreased after the 1980s and 1990s, there are still various incidents that do occur in and around Latin American campuses. These incidents occur and are exacerbated by a lack of security provided by the state governments of various Latin American nations.

Balan, J. (2006). *Reforming Higher Education in Latin America Policy and Practice*. *Latin America Research Review*, 41(2): 228-246.

This article provides a review of different articles written on the shift from public to private higher education and the tensions within Latin American higher education that have resulted. Government intentions are to regulate through funding while institutions focus on complete autonomy and internal accountability. The article describes this tension with examples from Latin American countries, including Chile and Brazil.

Brademas, J. *Freedom and the University in Latin America*. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 27(19): 588-592.

This article provides a perspective of Latin American universities based upon a Congressman's visit to an Argentinian university in the early 1960s. It highlights the student role on campuses and points out several "deficiencies" within the Latin American higher education system, such as too large a role for students in university governance, too much of an emphasis on studying law, and the influence of Cuban politics in higher education in Latin America.

Figueiredo-Cowen, M. (2002). *Latin American Universities: Academic Freedom and Autonomy: a long-term myth?* *Comparative Education*, 38(4): 474-484.

The author provides an overview of university autonomy and academic freedom in Latin America through three historical periods: 1920s through the 1950s, the 1960s through the 1970s, and the

1980s through the 1990s. She mainly uses Brazil as an example to depict the changes that the Latin American higher education sector experienced, but the issues she describes can be generalized to the greater region.

Franklin, J. (2011). Chile Student Protests Explode into Violence. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/05/chile-student-protests-violence>.

This article describes the Chilean student protest in the winter of 2011, where university and secondary school students protested in various cities to demand lower interest rates on student loans, year-round bus passes, and an end to “for-profit” schools. The article describes how these protests, which started out as peaceful gathering and marches, erupted into violence when students clashed with police.

National Public Radio (NPR). (2008). “Mexico’s 1968 Massacre: What Really Happened?” Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97546687>.

This article describes the 1968 student movement in Mexico City, where police officers and military troops shot out into a crowd of unarmed students. It describes how the movement developed and the lack of investigation into the killings during Mexico’s authoritarian government. New documents provide evidence that the Presidential Guard may have been responsible for the massacre.

Schwartzman, S. (2002). Higher Education and the Demands of the New Economy in Latin America. Background Paper for the World Bank’s report on “Closing the Gap in Education and Technology”, Latin America and Caribbean Department, 2002.

This paper describes the function of higher education in Latin American society and provides an analysis of the challenges Latin American higher education faces. It provides a history of the development of higher education in Latin America and its expansion in the second half of the century, a result of a growing demand for higher education. On autonomy, the article describes the “Reform Movement of the 1910’s”, characterized by arrangements in which the government would be responsible for maintaining the institutions and developing guidelines for processes such as purchasing and accounting, while universities made the decisions on how to use those resources. The article states that this resulted in a system of autonomy with a lack of accountability contributing to confrontation between universities and governments that flared up in the 1960s and 1970s. These confrontations still occur, with the teachers’ unions as the main activists. The author describes the national coordinating bodies that have been developed in different countries to serve as a buffer between governments and institutions and to regulate and assess the contents of course programs.

Security in the North American context

Bromley, M.L. and Reaves, B.A. (1998). Comparing campus and municipal police: the human resource dimension. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 21(3): 534-546.

Traces the evolution of campus police and U.S. university security norms from “traditional watchman-oriented campus police agencies” (p. 534), through the demise of the doctrine of *in loco parentis*, and the development of “full service police agencies” on campus. The article provides additional evidence that campus and municipal police agencies resemble each other in terms of their human resources, despite differences in pay, and numbers of civilian personnel, minorities, and women employed, etc.

Canadian Information Centre for International Credentials (CICIC) (n.d.). Postsecondary Education Systems in Canada: An Overview. Retrieved September 27, 2012 from <http://www.cicic.ca/421/an-overview.canada>.

An overview of the history and current structure of Canadian higher education system.

Darrow, J.J. (2010). *Protecting the Ivory Tower: Sensible Security or Invasion of Privacy?* Available at http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_darrow/5.

Discusses the fact that, although in the U.S. the university is no longer assumed to be a parent-like protector of students, it still has some degree of obligation for student safety. It reviews various recent events of on campus violence perpetrated by faculty or students against other students and discusses that these, in conjunction with the events of 9/11, have led to increasing surveillance on campus. It also reflects on the appropriate balance between surveillance and safety and privacy rights.

Downs, D.A. (2006). *Political Mobilization and Resistance to Censorship*. In Gerstman, E. and Streb, M. J. (Eds), *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 61-78.

Deals with the question of censorship within the university itself in the post-9/11 era. This includes informal censorship from other faculty and students and more formal censorship within the university. One of the most prominent sources of censorship are groups that monitor classes and faculty in a way that “can contribute to making the climate hostile to free speech” (p. 75). However, it concludes that political and legal forces, such as free speech norms, protect academic freedom in general.

Etheridge, R. (1958). *A Study of Campus Protective and Enforcement Agencies at Selected Universities*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University.

Cited in Sloan (1992). The article reviews the evolution of U.S. campus police towards a more autonomous and professionalized apparatus.

Eugene, A. Paoline III, J.J., and Sloan III (2003). *Variability in the organizational structure of contemporary campus law enforcement agencies: A national-level analysis*. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 26(4): 612-639.

The authors analyze a nationwide data set to determine whether campus police agencies resemble municipal ones and what factors determine variation in their organizational structures. They find that campus police agencies have come to resemble municipal ones and that environmental variables, such as the campus context (university size, crime rate, location, etc.), have relatively little influence on campus police organizational structure. Instead, internal factors, such as budgets, number of employees, and agency task scope, are more important. The article, therefore, suggests that isomorphic institutional pressures may be more important than context in influencing how a campus security system looks.

Falcone, D.N. and Gehrand, K.A. (2003). *Policing academia in Illinois: the evolution of an American policing model*. *Journal of Crime and Justice*, 26(1): 55-70.

The article traces the evolution of campus security in the United States to the present model in which the campus police department functions similarly to municipal departments but is fully independent. This transition occurred primarily following the shooting at Kent State University, when colleges decided to create more formal police systems on campus, rather than calling on off-campus forces. The security system became increasingly autonomous and professionalized, patterning itself off of urban police departments

Fisher, B.S. (1995). *Crime and Fear on Campus*. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 539: 85-101.

Details the history of university institutional responsibility for campus safety, tracing the evolution from a doctrine of *in loco parentis* in the 19th century, which gave universities parental authority over stu-

dents. Today, however, universities remain liable for student safety based on the question of whether they could reasonably be expected to have foreseen a crime

Frei, M. (1971). Campus Unrest, University Autonomy and the Legal Process. *Utah Law Review*, No. 3: 355-367.

Written soon after the Kent State University events, the article discusses the tension between use of outside police authorities to maintain campus order and university autonomy. It discusses university decisions on how to handle disorder and protest on campus at the time.

Hawley, C. (February 20, 2012). New York Police Department monitored Muslim students all over the Northeast. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved September 28, 2012 from <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0220/New-York-Police-Department-monitored-Muslim-students-all-over-the-Northeast>.

A news article about the surveillance of Muslim students by the New York City Police department following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Lindee, M.S. (2006). Censoring Science: Lessons from the Past for the Post-9/11 Era. In Gerstman, E. and Streb, M. J. (Eds), *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 79-95.

Discusses monitoring of scientists post-9/11, since as technical experts they are “a valuable military commodity.” This is similar to what occurred during the Cold War, when they “were subject to high levels of surveillance and suspicion that had consequences for the practice of science in general” (p. 83).

Nocella, A.J. II, Best, S. and McLaren, P. (Eds.) (2010). *Academic Repression: Reflections from The Academic Industrial Complex*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Reviews historic examples of academic repression, particularly the McCarthy era. The essays in the book include scholars’ descriptions of their experience of academic repression resulting from government surveillance, media scrutiny, censorship of faculty free speech, withdrawal of visas, denial or withdrawal of tenure, cancelation of speaking engagements, and arrest and imprisonment. Also raises the issue of self-censorship on the part of academics.

O’Neil, R.M. (2006). Academic Freedom in the Post-September 11 Era: An Old Game with New Rules. In Gerstman, E. and Streb, M. J. (Eds), *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 43-60.

Discusses whether academic freedom was maintained post-9/11 because of awareness of what occurred in the McCarthy era or where there is potential for a recurrence of what happened in the 1950s. Argues that today is different from the 1950s because of a much stronger basis of case law and Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Peak, K.J., Barthe, E.P., Garcia, A. (2008). Campus Policing in America: A Twenty-Year Perspective. *Police Quarterly*, 11: 239-260.

Examines the evolution of campus police agencies between 1986 and 2006. Finds that these agencies are increasingly professionalized and autonomous, and they resemble more closely municipal police agencies. Increasing numbers of campus police are full-time sworn personnel, with full police powers and statewide (not just campus) jurisdiction. They also reportedly have stronger and more positive relations with local area police.

Price, D.H. (2004). *Threatening Anthropology: McCarthyism and the FBI's Surveillance of Activist Anthropologists*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Looks at FBI investigation of professional anthropologists, who, the author argues, were more targeted than other academics because of their interest in marginal groups and, accordingly, their perceived threat to the normative social order (Reviewed in Gilman, N. (2005). Book Review. *The Journal of American History*, 92(2), 673-674).

Sieber, T. (2005). McCarthyism, Academia, and Anthropology: The Old and The New. *North American Dialogue*, 8(1), 8-14.

The article, in part, reviews Price (2004) and the targeting of anthropologists during the Cold War. The author compares that time with today, arguing that the most pressing problem now is an increase in the number of campus watch groups.

Sloan III, J.J. (1992). The Modern Campus Police: An Analysis of their Evolution, Structure, and Function. *American Journal of Police*, 11(2): 85-104.

Traces the evolution of campus policing, from a predominantly “watchman” function to a “pseudo-police” function in the 1930s and 40s to increasing professionalization in the 1950s. Points out, however, that the greatest transition occurred after the student protests of the 1960s when universities and colleges decided to create their own police departments. Since that time, there has been increasing autonomy of campus police systems from municipal ones, and they have come to closely resemble urban police departments in structure and function.

Sloan III, J.J., Lanier, M.M., and Beer, D.L. (2000). Policing the Contemporary University Campus: Challenging Traditional Organizational Models. *Journal of Security Administration*, 23(1): 1-20.

The article makes the case that campus law enforcement agencies should consider shifting from traditional policing models to “community-oriented policing” (COP) models.

Skolnik, M.L. and Jones, G.A. (1992). A Comparative Analysis of Arrangements for State Coordination of Higher Education in Canada and the United States. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 62(2), 121-142.

Compares the higher education systems in Canada and the United States, arguing that although some of the administrative structures differ, there are similarities in terms of the degree of autonomy provided to universities and freedom provided to academics—although perhaps Canadian universities have slightly higher levels of autonomy and academic freedom.

Streb, M.J. (2006). The Reemergence of the Academic Freedom Debate. In Gerstman, E. and Streb, M. J. (Eds), *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 3-16.

An introductory chapter, providing an overview of the book. Makes the point that both strong and weak governments can pose threats to academic freedom. While government that is too strong may itself impinge on academic freedom, a government that is too weak may not be able to prevent others from doing the same.

Trow, M. (1988). American Higher Education: Past, Present, and Future. *Educational Researcher*, 17(3), 13-23.

A history of the U.S. higher education system, emphasizing its size and diversity. Argues that the system is unique in this sense, and that these features are rooted in its particular history and development, particularly the strength of university presidents and weakness of state authority.

Autonomy and security in a global perspective

Africa Watch (1991). *Academic Freedom and Human Rights in Africa*. New York: Human Rights Watch

Details cases in Africa in which academics and students have faced state repression, often occurring when security agents disguised themselves as students and monitored classes. HRW links this to the fact that Africa's history of colonial rule has led to a weak civil society. In addition, universities, post-independence have tended to follow a utilitarian model, intended to support national development and "encourage a spirit of service in the students" (p. 12).

Akker, J. (2006). *Academic Freedom in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia: Looking to the NEAR Future*. In Gerstman, E. and Streb, M. J. (Eds), *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 99-114.

Reviews post-9/11 threats to academic freedom in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, highlighting the cases that NEAR has worked on and NEAR's work on the issue.

Alipala, J.S. and Umel, R. (2012, August 9). Military shuts down MSU campus in search of 'criminals'. *Philadelphia Daily Inquirer*. Retrieved August 10, 2012 from <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/246667/military-shuts-down-msu-campus-in-search-of-criminals>.

A news article describing an incident at Mindanao State University in the Philippines, during which external actors attacked a military force on campus, and the military temporarily shut down the university in response.

Anderson, D. and Johnson, R. (1998). *University Autonomy in Twenty Countries*. Centre for Continuing Education. Australian National University. Department of Employment, Education, Training & Youth Affairs.

A survey of perceptions of experts on university autonomy in 20 countries, focusing on the degree of authority of government officials to intervene on campuses and the frequency with which they do intervene. The authors divide the countries into three categories: an Anglo-American group, with a history of institutional autonomy but pressures for accountability; a European group, with a history of significant (but declining) central authority over universities; and an Asian group, where universities have historically been viewed as instruments to contribute to national cohesion and development. They find that governments from the Anglo-American group have the least authority and are least inclined to intervene, while those from the Asian group have the most authority and are most inclined to intervene. Europe falls in the middle.

Brown, A. (2006). *Academic Freedom in Western Europe: Right or Privilege?* In E. Gerstmann & M. Streb (Eds.), *Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century* (115-129). Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

The author briefly describes the development of academic freedom and university autonomy in Western Europe and highlights its significance today as the region's campuses have faced security threats from insurgent, nationalist groups. It also describes how government financing of higher education can potentially threaten the autonomy universities have over their own research, curricula, and hiring decisions.

Gallardo, F. (2012, August 9). 5 killed in Marawi attacks. *Minda News*. Retrieved September 29, 2012 from <http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2012/08/09/5-killed-in-marawi-attacks/>.

A second news article describing an incident at Mindanao State University in the Philippines, during which external actors attacked a military force on campus, and the military temporarily shut down the university in response.

Guoguang, M. (1996). Academic freedom and university autonomy: the Chinese perspective. *Higher Education Policy*, 9(4), 295-297.

An article describing the degree to which Chinese universities are autonomous. Argues that autonomy has increased since the 1970s, although the main function of the university is to respond to the needs of the country's socioeconomic growth.

Gwatiwa, T.T. (2011). Intelligence operations as terrorism: Emerging state terrorism in Botswana. *Journal of African Studies and Development*, 3(9), pp. 176-186.

Discusses establishment and activity of the Directorate of Intelligence & Security (DIS) in Botswana, created in 2008. Crackdowns on students and academics by the DIS have been justified in the name of national security. The author argues that this justification is weak since those targeted posed no real threat, and that real threats were ignored.

Halileh, S., & Giacaman, R. (2002). Distance learning—An educational survival strategy in war-like conditions at the Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University, Palestine. Retrieved July 17, 2012 from <http://icph.birzeit.edu/uploads/File/monographs/2002%20DistanceLearning%202002.pdf>.

Discusses the impact of the second Intifada on Palestinian higher education, when it was extremely difficult to access universities. Students and teachers on their way to and from universities often faced road closures, delays, and harassment at checkpoints, and other physical violence.

Hammond, K. (2007). Palestinian Universities and the Israeli Occupation. *Policy Futures in Education*, 5(2), 264-270.

This article includes personal reflections after visiting Palestine in 2007. He discusses the effects of the Israeli occupation on the development of Palestinian universities, highlighting restrictions on travel of academics and administrative detentions.

Klopp, J.M. and Orina, J.R. (2002). University Crisis, Student Activism, and the Contemporary Struggle for Democracy in Kenya. *African Studies Review*, 45(1): 43-76.

Examines government crackdowns on Kenyan campuses relating to student activism. The authors root recent crises in a colonial history and link the fight for university autonomy and academic freedom to a wider struggle for political and economic democratization.

Lui, S.S. (1996). Into an era of autonomy for universities in Hong Kong. *Higher Education Policy*, 9(4), 325-328.

Reviews the state of autonomy at universities in Hong Kong, noting that they have been publically funded, and that, as a colonial context, the main function of higher education has been to develop in the population skills to ensure economic growth. Written immediately before the transfer of authority for Hong Kong to China, and notes that this change will likely bring changes in the governance of universities.

Mekouar, H. (1996). University autonomy and academic freedom in Morocco: elements for a current debate. *Higher Education Policy*, 9(4), 303-307.

Describes the history of Moroccan university autonomy. Universities have been under French colonial authority but the article argues that there were advances in terms of the autonomy held during the 1990s.

Mlambo, A.S. (1995). Student protest and state reaction in colonial Rhodesia: The 1973 Chimukwebe student demonstration at the University of Rhodesia. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 21(3), 473-491.

Analyzes a violent confrontation between African students at the University of Rhodesia and the state,

attributing it to heightened political tensions between the majority African population and the colonial state.

Ratnayake, K. (2010). "Sri Lankan Minister Warns of 'Insurgency' in Universities." World Socialist Web Site. Retrieved from: <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/nov2010/sril-n12.shtml>.

This article describes how the Sri Lankan government targeted universities in 2010 as it attempted to fight an insurgency. It implemented surveillance tactics and warned students of police tactics that would be used against them if they aligned themselves with insurgent movements. It also arrested and suspended students for engaging in protests. The article provides an overview of how the state has interfered with the autonomy of university procedures as it has attempted to fight off insurgent movements.

Sawyer, A. (1996). Academic freedom and university autonomy: preliminary thoughts from Africa. *Higher Education Policy*, 9(4), 281-287.

Discusses the conditions and restrictions on university autonomy across Africa.

Sloan, J.J. III (2007). Campus Police. In Jack R. Greene (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Third Edition. New York, Routledge, pp. 133-135.

An encyclopedia entry describing the development of campus police forces. This is mostly in terms of the United States, but the entry also refers to Europe.

Suwanwela, C. (1996). Academic freedom and university autonomy in Thailand. *Higher Education Policy*, 9(4), 277-279.

A short article on the variations in university autonomy in Thailand over time. Autonomy has tended to exist to some degree, but not as comprehensively as in Latin America.

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NOTES

¹ UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel (1997) [hereinafter UNESCO Rec.], Preamble (“the right to education, teaching and research can only be fully enjoyed in an atmosphere of academic freedom and autonomy for institutions of higher education”), ¶17 (“Autonomy is that degree of self-governance necessary for effective decision making by institutions of higher education regarding their academic work, standards, management and related activities consistent with systems of public accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the state, and respect for academic freedom and human rights. However, the nature of institutional autonomy may differ according to the type of establishment involved.”), ¶18 (“Autonomy is the institutional form of academic freedom and a necessary precondition to guarantee the proper fulfillment of the functions entrusted to higher-education teaching personnel and institutions.”).

² UNESCO Rec., ¶ 19 (“Member States are under an obligation to protect higher education institutions from threats to their autonomy coming from any source.”).

³ The review of available literature failed to identify significant research on security systems at higher education institutions in Canada, although some parallels to U.S. institutions seem to apply. For example, as in the U.S. at least some Canadian campuses would appear to have their own campus police forces (Peak 1987, involving a study based on questionnaires sent to directors of campus law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and Canada). The discussion of security systems in the U.S. may apply also to the Canadian context, although with sometimes significant variations.

⁴ Both countries are unusual among states in that “no central law or authority governs or coordinates” higher education nationally (Trow, 1988 at p. 13 (referring the U.S.), Skolnik and Jones, 1992 (noting Canada is similar)).

⁵ In recent years, for example, in response to concerns about lack of transparency, federal and state authorities have held institutions up to greater scrutiny by requiring them to publish statistics on crimes occurring on or near campuses, including theft, violence against students (particularly sexual assaults), and alcohol and drug-related incidents (Fisher, 1995). Other efforts include regulations relating to screening of students for criminal or psychiatric problems, training of faculty and staff to recognize threatening behaviors, the installation of security cameras, metal detectors, and email, phone, and text warning systems (Darrow, 2010; Lake, 2007). While such measures may be advisable, their imposition by outside authorities could represent an erosion of institutional autonomy.

⁶ Canadian higher education institutions appear to have been more insulated from these types of measures, likely because Canada did not directly experience the 9/11 attacks and because its national government has less authority for intervention on campuses (Brown, 2006).

⁷ In the 1940s-50s, U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy led actions accusing faculty and students of disloyalty, subjecting them to hiring bans, denial or revocations of tenure, withholding of research funds, and travel restrictions, among other negative consequences (Gerstman and Streb, 2006; Sieber, 2005). Of particular concern, in light of current examples, was the role of confidential informants on higher education campuses feeding information on colleagues to political persecutors (Price, 2004; Gilman, 2005 and Sieber, 2005 (reviewing Price); Nocella et al, 2010). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), a federal and provincial security and intelligence service, engaged in similar “counter-subversion” activities in the 1960s, relying heavily on informants and targeting those whose ideas challenged the status quo, but these attacks never reached the levels felt in the U.S. (Skolnik and Jones, 1992 at p. 132 (Stating that “[n]o governments in Canada have ever demanded loyalty oaths from professors... and no governments have dismissed faculty on ideological grounds.”)). Despite parallels and lingering concerns, present threats to institutional autonomy have not reached, and are unlikely to reach, the levels of those eras (O’Neil, 2006).

⁸ Although security issues may not be as prevalent as in the U.S., the review found some research to suggest that security at European higher education institutions may be structured like that in the U.S., with independent campus security forces modeled on local municipal forces (Sloan, 2007).

⁹ Researchers attempted contact with 50 subjects and ultimately completed 20 interviews by voice-over-internet calls (VOIP), telephone, and email, including interviews on Zimbabwe (3), Iraq (7), Pakistan (4), Tunisia (3), and Egypt (4). The Egyptian example was left out of this study due to insufficient information.

¹⁰ On appeal, a magistrate dismissed the convictions on grounds of unlawful arrest. Following the dismissal, Welcome Zimuto completed his studies at Chinhoyi University. Munyaradzi Gwisai is lecturing at the University of Zimbabwe Faculty of Law. Their case alleging unlawful detention and abuse is scheduled for hearing in the High Court in November 2013. (Anonymous, Personal Communication, October 14, 2013).

¹¹ Particular hostility is aimed at those linked to opposition groups such as the Zimbabwe National Student Union (ZINASU), Progressive Teacher's Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), the Movement for Democratic Change, or any other group the government fears might threaten ZANU-PF's power (Lindermann, 2012 at p. 14).

¹² During the 2008 elections, the government reportedly closed the student dormitories at the University of Zimbabwe because they were afraid that "the university would be used as a platform for discussion and mobilization around the elections." At least some of the dormitories still have not reopened (Interview, August 7, 2012). This control also makes it significantly easier for the state to attack members of the opposition. For example, since 2002, the state has used the Public Security and Order Act, which requires that police be notified of any public gathering one week in advance, as a tool for restricting on-campus gatherings by the opposition. Even when organizers file notice that an event will occur, as required under the act, the state police may still enter the campus and arrest and detain students and lecturers. These arrests are often violent, involving beatings and other physical abuse (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012).

¹³ For example, the government uses the campus security forces to prohibit trade unionists, national student leaders, or members of the opposition from entering campuses (Anonymous, Interview, August 23, 2012).

¹⁴ Among outside groups often cited for attacks on higher education is the Zimbabwe's Youth Militia, a pro-government paramilitary group that is allegedly trained "to commit chaos" (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012). Although this group was not an actor in the Arab Spring video example, interviews suggest that the most brutal violence and terror often comes at their hands, with police doing little to prevent attacks and reportedly sometimes operating in concert. For example, one interview subject described being arrested in March 2008 and seriously beaten by both the youth militias *and* police (Interview, August 11, 2012).

¹⁵ These groups included, among others, the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Sadr Movement, the al-Da'wa party, and the pro-Sadrists Students League.

¹⁶ Some sources disagree whether al-Hussaini preceded or followed al-Musawi, but all agree that at some point both were operating as contested, parallel presidents of the university.

¹⁷ In principle, university admissions are based on exams taken during the final year of high school. Students with the highest scores are eligible to go to certain schools, the next highest eligible for a different group of schools, and so on. In practice, however, according to one interviewee, students who sit for exams in areas where particular Sunni or Shiite sects are dominant are allowed to cheat and get higher grades (Anonymous, Interview, August 7, 2012a). The minister of education also has the authority to override the exam results and admit students into different fields than their scores might otherwise warrant. While in principle this authority may be an appropriate discretionary tool, in the particular Balkanized context, where the minister is himself from a partisan sect, this authority can be used as a tool to reward personal or political loyalty over academic merit.

¹⁸ Ironically, the current situation may represent a decrease in both security and autonomy from the Baathist government prior to 2003. At that time, although Baath party members were privileged for university appointments and admissions, and government liaison officers were posted on campuses to monitor teaching and re-

search, academics were generally free from physical safety concerns and free to conduct their work, so long as they did not violate proscriptions on anti-Baathist or anti-Saddam Hussein discourse (Jawad, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, August 7a, 2012; Anonymous, Interview, August 9, 2012).

¹⁹ These groups include Taliban militias, the Pakistan People's Party, Jamiat-i-Islami, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), and the Muslim League (Interview, S.Abbas, August 5, 2012; Interview, T. Rahman, August 22, 2012).

²⁰ Student violence may even occur seasonally, such as at the beginning of a new school year when student wings of political parties battle over resources and campus space (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012).

²¹ One interviewee noted that particular campuses may have very different levels of tension and violence, depending on whether it is located in an urban or rural area, depending on whether the area is politically contested, and depending on whether student groups or others on campus are active in the contesting political parties. Urban universities such as Karachi University, Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, and the University of Lahore, which have different political parties active within each of their institutions, may have different levels or causes of tension from each other or from the more remote Balochistan University (Anonymous, Interview, August 13, 2012). Nevertheless, the politicization of the campus space across the country undermines institutional autonomy in ways that can have near-and long-term negative impacts on security of personnel and facilities.

²² In a related incident, in March 2012, demonstrators climbed the campus gate to pull down the national Tunisian flag from the entrance of the university and replaced it with the flag of the Salafist group (Middle East Online, 2012). The act was interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate the dominance of conservative Islam over the secular, pluralist, national Tunisian state. A young female student from Manouba intervened, attempting to prevent the removal of the national emblem. She was accosted by a Salafi who was not a student and pushed down onto the roof of the university gate on which they both stood (Mamelouk, 2012). The media widely reported on the mistreatment of the female student, and many secular and nationalist commentators and officials condemned it, including the President of the Republic, who met with the student shortly thereafter.


²³ The prosecution attracted extensive media attention with domestic and international advocates for higher education, academic freedom, and free expression mobilizing to support the Dean. After repeated adjournments, the Dean was acquitted of all charges on May 2, 2013. The accuser and another student were convicted of damaging property and interfering with a public servant and given suspended sentences (Lindsey, 2013).

²⁴ This section distinguishes explicit threats based on stated political, social, or cultural goals from apparently random, irrational, or isolated acts of criminal violence, such as the killings at Virginia Tech, supra.


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Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack
2011



Front cover: An employee of Sanskrit University looks at burned books in the university's office in Dang district, western Nepal, on May 15, 2002, a few days after Maoist rebels attacked the university, setting it on fire.

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