

The Privatisation of a National Project

The settlements along the trans-Israel Highway since 1977

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Trans-Israel Highway since 1977

Gabriel Schwake

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The Privatisation of a National Project

The settlements along the
Trans-Israel Highway since 1977

DISSERTATION

for the purpose of obtaining the degree of doctor
at Delft University of Technology
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus, prof.dr.ir. T.H.J.J. van der Hagen
chair of the Board for Doctorates
to be defended publicly on
Tuesday, 8 September 2020 at 10:00 o'clock

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“Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do not take part in the scientific game”

Karl Popper, (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.279)

Preface

After graduating from my architectural studies at Tel Aviv University in 2013, I was more than ready to apply my knowledge and enthusiasm in practice. Interested in dwellings, I began working in an architectural firm that focused on residential buildings that had earned its reputation due to a unique public housing project it planned in Tel Aviv. Charmed by the aesthetics of the designs produced by the office and by the seemingly social approach I was sure that I would be involved in improving the housing conditions of the local middle-class. Quite immediately, I understood that I was basically designing the façades of volumes that were already dictated by the speculative interest of the different entrepreneurs. Losing interest in the “*architecture of 20cm*”, as a colleague referred to the work we were doing while indicating the width of the exterior walls we were designing, I chose to move to urban planning. I was hoping that with the capacity to influence urban policy I would contribute to the development of better, more socially oriented and just residential environments. Working on a new neighbourhood in southern Israel I was asked by the client, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, to plan an outline scheme for 1500 units that blend with the natural landscape of the desert. During a work meeting, the project manager from the ministry mentioned that the plan we proposed was perhaps “*nice*”, but far from being “*marketable*”, and thus suggested to replicate another outline from a neighbouring town in order to appeal to a larger number of private developers.

This thesis began as an attempt to understand the mechanism behind the “*marketable*” Israeli residential neighbourhoods. Initially, I thought of concentrating on case studies that are far away from the contested area of the West-Bank and other national frontiers. Nevertheless, while analysing preliminary sites I was drawn to the border area with the occupied territories, where the state’s geopolitical interests of appropriating additional lands and the entrepreneurial growth considerations meet. Consequently, during my research, I understood that these seemingly contradicting interests are quite inseparable, coupled in a reciprocal relationship of national, individual and corporate development. Eventually, this thesis turned into a study of the local social, economic, and political considerations that influence the planning process, and eventually dictate the form of the built environment and the everyday life of the individuals it houses.

Gabriel Schwake
Amsterdam, May 2020

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Conducting my research, I received significant aid and support from various individuals who were willing to dedicate their time, knowledge and documents. These include - Gabi Dor, Avi Cohen, Michael Eitan, Arik and Smadar Gilboa, Uri Fogel, Joseph Abecassis, Daniel Gutwein, Edna Zur, Arnon Soffer, Giora Shiloni, Arie Riskin, Dror Sofer, Amikam Oren, Meir Nir, Dan Mentzel, Dani Lazar, Meir Buchman, Nahoum Dunsky, Yaacov Gil-Ad, Yehiel Korin, Oded Gvuli, Gadi Iron, Haim Kehat, and Simi Fadida. Of course, this research would not have been possible without the assistance of the workers of all archives I attended, which include the Israel State Archives, the Central Zionist Archive, the JNF archive, the ILA archive, the engineering archives of all relevant case studies, the Hebrew University's Faculty of Geography, Tel Aviv University's Faculty of Geography, the archive of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the Beitar Movement archives, the Israel National Library archives, and many others.

Moreover, I am more than thankful to all of those who provided me with external feedback that enabled me to continue developing my research; these include - Professor Pieter Uyttenhove, Professor Haim Yacobi, Professor Philipp Oswald, Dr Gregory Bracken, Professor Ayala Ronel, Dalia Dukanac, Professor Amnon Bar Or, and Professor Wendy Pullan.

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Summary

In Israel, the development of new settlements is a leading national project. This began in the turn of the 20th century as national Zionist organisations established new frontier settlements in Palestine, in the efforts to secure the territory needed for a future state and to encourage a spiritual national renaissance. With its establishment in 1948, the young state of Israel took over the process, continuing the pre-state settlement endeavours of securing spatial control while endorsing a new unified national identity. Accordingly, the state promoted, directed, and executed the construction of a series of rural and industrial settlements that corresponded with the national geopolitical agenda and the hegemonic socialisation policy. Consequently, the architectural and urban features of these settlements were parallel to the ruling political, economic and social values and were thus characterised by reproduced homogeneous and economical residential environments.

During the 1970s, the monolithic state-led development began to transform with the growing privatisation of the Israeli economy. These transformations reached a point of no return with the election of the first liberal and anti-socialist government in 1977; eventually turning into a national consensus. At the same time, the state did not abandon its geopolitical agenda and the attempts of securing spatial control through settlement. Nevertheless, it began dismantling its monopoly over the establishment of new localities, granting selected group spatial privileges and thus turning them into spatial agents that develop the frontier on its behalf. Initially, the privatisation of the national settlement project began with ex-urban and suburban communities, serving favoured societal groups. Eventually, with the growing involvement of private capital, it turned into a large-scale corporate-led development venture, dictated by financial interests while fulfilling geopolitical objectives.

Privatisation, neoliberalism and market-economy are usually used as an antithesis to state involvement, regulation and nationalism. Conversely, this dissertation illustrates that the privatisation of the national territorial project was a state-directed effort intended to align the geopolitical agenda with the prevailing neoliberal order; using the market-economy as a means to enhance the state's control over space. This dissertation focuses on the border area with the occupied Palestinian West-Bank, the Green-Line. Scarcely populated in the first three decades after the establishment of Israel, this area witnessed an ever-growing state-directed development effort following the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967.

Developed by an increasing private involvement, this area constitutes a unique case study on the relationship between geopolitics and market economy; marked by the construction of the first privately developed national infrastructure project in the early 2000s – the Trans-Israel Highway.

To understand the privatisation of this national project since 1977, this dissertation proposes focusing on the settlement mechanism. This comprises the reciprocal interests of the state and various private groups to develop and domesticate the frontier area of the Green-Line. Centring on the spatial privileges the state granted diverse spatial agents, this dissertation examines how different favoured groups were given the power to colonise, plan, develop and market space in return for enhancing the state's power over it. Investigating how this settlement mechanism transformed over the years, including a variety of spatial agents and diverse spatial privileges, this research explores the increasing privatisation of the local economy and culture, as well as the manner in which it was manifested in the built environment. Examining the modifications in the architectural and urban products this mechanism produced, this research analyses the materialisation of the privatised national settlement project and how it transformed together with the changing political and economic interests.

Focusing on the area along the Green-Line, this dissertation starts with examining the Community Settlements of the late 1970s and then moves to the Suburban Settlements of the 1980s. Examining both phenomena, the dissertation explains how their ex-urban and suburban qualities corresponded with the granted spatial privileges, forming a geopolitical tool intended to domesticate the Green-Line. Subsequently, the dissertation concentrates on the mass suburbanisation of the 1990s and the financialisation of the 2000s. Examining both stages, this dissertation illustrates how the state asked to domesticate the frontier by turning it into a real estate market; directing investment while securing the developers' profitability and rentability concerns. Observing these four stages, this dissertation examines the gradual privatisation of the settlement mechanism. Analysing the different settlement phenomena, this research explains how the transforming individual and corporate interests were manifested in the built environment. Eventually, enabling the continuation of the national geopolitical agenda by tying it to the rationale of the market; replacing the former monolithic state-led development by uniform and reproduced corporate-led projects.

Samenvatting

In Israël is de ontwikkeling van nieuwe nederzettingen een toonaangevend nationaal project. Dit begon aan het begin van de 20e eeuw toen nationale zionistische organisaties in Palestina nieuwe grensnederzettingen vormden, in een poging het gebied veilig te stellen dat nodig is voor een toekomstige staat en om een spirituele nationale renaissance aan te moedigen. Met de oprichting van Israël in 1948 nam de jonge staat het proces over en zette de inspanningen van de pre-staatelijke nederzettingen voort om de controle over de ruimte af te dwingen en tegelijkertijd een nieuw verenigde nationale identiteit te onderschrijven. Dienovereenkomstig, leidde en voerde de staat de bouw van een reeks landelijke en industriële nederzettingen uit die overeenkwamen met de nationale geopolitieke agenda en het hegemoniale socialisatiebeleid. Bijgevolg liepen de architectonische en stedelijke kenmerken van deze nederzettingen parallel aan het heersende politieke, economische en sociale waardenstelsel en werden daarom gekenmerkt door homogene gereproduceerde economische woonomgevingen.

In de jaren zeventig, met de toenemende privatisering van de Israëlische economie, begon de monolithische door de staat geleide ontwikkeling te veranderen. Deze veranderingen bereikten een punt van geen terugkeer met de verkiezing van de eerste liberale en anti-socialistische regering in 1977; het resulteerde uiteindelijk in een nationale consensus. Tegelijkertijd had de staat zijn geopolitieke agenda en de pogingen om ruimtelijke controle door vestiging te verzekeren niet opgegeven. Niettemin begon de staat zijn monopolie op de vestiging van nieuwe plaatsen te vermindere en zijn controleapparaat te ontmantelen. Dit werd mogelijk gemaakt door het toekennen van ruimtelijke privileges aan geselecteerde groepen en deze te veranderen in ruimtelijke agenten die de grenszone namens de staat ontwikkelen. Aanvankelijk begon de privatisering van het nationale nederzettingenproject met buitenstedelijke en voorstedelijke gemeenschappen in het belang van begunstigde maatschappelijke groepen. Uiteindelijk, met de toenemende betrokkenheid van particulier kapitaal, veranderde het in een grootschalige en zakelijke-georiënteerde ontwikkelingsonderneming, gedictieerd door financiële belangen en de verwezenlijking van geopolitieke doelstellingen als doel.

Privatisering, neoliberalisme en markteconomie worden meestal gebruikt als antithese tegen betrokkenheid, regulering en nationalisme van de staat. Omgekeerd illustreert dit proefschrift dat de privatisering van het nationale territoriale project

een door de staat geleide poging was om de geopolitieke agenda af te stemmen op de heersende neoliberale orde. De markteconomie wordt gebruikt als middel om de controle van de staat over de ruimte te vergroten. Dit proefschrift richt zich op het gebied dat grenst aan de bezette Palestijnse Westelijke Jordaanoever, de zogeheten Groene Lijn. Nauwelijks bewoond in de eerste drie decennia na de oprichting van Israël, was dit gebied getuige van een alsmear groeiende staatsgerichte ontwikkelingsinspanning na de bezetting van de Palestijnse gebieden in 1967. Dit gebied, ontwikkeld door een toenemende particuliere betrokkenheid, vormt een unieke case study over de relatie tussen geopolitiek en markteconomie. Het wordt gekenmerkt door de bouw van de eerste particulier ontwikkelde nationale infrastructuurproject in de vroege jaren 2000 - de Trans-Israël Snelweg.

Om de privatisering van dit nationale project sinds 1977 te begrijpen, stelt dit proefschrift voor om zich te concentreren op het afwikkelingsmechanisme. Dit omvat de wederzijdse belangen van de staat en verschillende particuliere groepen om het grensgebied van de Groene Lijn te ontwikkelen en te domesticeren. Dit proefschrift concentreert zich op de ruimtelijke privileges die de staat aan verschillende ruimtelijke agenten heeft verleend, en onderzoekt hoe verschillende bevoorrechte groepen de macht kregen om ruimte te koloniseren, plannen, ontwikkelen en op de markt te brengen in ruil voor het vergroten van de macht van de staat erover. Door het onderzoeken van hoe dit afwikkelingsmechanisme door de jaren heen is getransformeerd, gepaard gaand met een verscheidenheid aan ruimtelijke factoren en diverse ruimtelijke privileges, verkent dit onderzoek de toenemende privatisering van de lokale economie en cultuur, evenals de manier waarop het zich manifesteert in de gebouwde omgeving. Dit onderzoek naar de veranderingen in de architectonische en stedelijke producten die dit mechanisme opleverde, analyseert de materialisatie van het geprivatiseerde nationale nederzettingsproject en hoe het samen met de veranderende politieke en economische belangen veranderde.

Het proefschrift, dat zich richt op het gebied langs de Groene Lijn, begint met het onderzoeken van de communautaire nederzettingen van de late jaren zeventig en verplaatst zich vervolgens naar de voorsteden van de jaren tachtig. Het proefschrift onderzoekt beide fenomenen en legt uit hoe hun buiten-stedelijke en voorstedelijke kwaliteiten overeenkwamen met de toegekende ruimtelijke privileges en een geopolitiek instrument vormden dat bedoeld was om de Groene Lijn te domesticeren. Vervolgens richt het proefschrift zich op de massale suburbanisatie van de jaren negentig en de financiering van de jaren 2000. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt beide fasen en illustreert hoe de staat vroeg om de grens te domesticeren door er een vastgoedmarkt van te maken. Zij bleef leidinggeven aan investeringen en tegelijkertijd zorgen over de winstgevendheid en verhuurbaarheid van de ontwikkelaars. In de vier fasen wordt in dit proefschrift de geleidelijke privatisering van het afwikke-

lingsmechanisme onderzocht. Dit onderzoek analyseert de verschillende vestigingsverschijnselen en legt uit hoe de veranderende individuele en zakelijke belangen zich manifesteerden in de gebouwde omgeving. Uiteindelijk maakte dit de voortzetting van de nationale geopolitieke agenda door deze aan de grondgedachte van de markt te koppelen. De voormalige monolithische door de staat geleide ontwikkeling werd vervangen door uniforme en door bedrijven gereproduceerde en geleide projecten.

1 Introduction

1.1 Foreword

For a fee of thirty-four new Israeli Shekels one can enjoy an entire private car-ride along the 200 km of the Trans-Israel highway and witness the ever-increasing construction boom that turned the area from a frontier zone into a blooming real estate market. Built in the early 2000s, the new privately funded four-lane motorway presented the local driver with an uninterrupted drive in an average speed of 130 km per hour, bypassing the heavily crowded Tel Aviv metropolis all the way into the 3rd millennium. At the same time, riding along the highway and observing the new settlements that the state promoted since the late 1970s, it is impossible not to notice shimmers of the West-Bank Separation Barrier that surrounds the Palestinian cities of the occupied territories; despite the efforts to hide it with well-maintained gardening and landscape. The overt private highway and the covert state-constructed barrier constitute a mutually rewarding relationship, where the former contributes to the interests of the latter and vice versa. This thesis asks to understand the nature of this mutually rewarding relationship and how it shapes the local built environment.

This dissertation has its feet in political economy, yet it is written from the perspective of architectural and urban planning history. Correspondingly, architecture and planning are the subjects of this dissertation, while using political economic analyses as a perspective to understand how they are formed. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the production process, rather than the product, using the Israeli settlement mechanism as its object of research in order to understand the built environment that it produced. This mechanism is part of a century-long process that began with the first waves of Zionist immigration to Palestine in the late 1800s, intensified during the British mandate and continued to form an official policy even after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Consequently, forming an integral part of the spiritual and physical Jewish national revival and constituting a leading case study of a state-led geopolitical- spatial development process. With the

global neoliberal turn during the 1970s and the liberalisation of the local economy, the state began privatising its settlement project, merging individualistic interests and speculations with geopolitical considerations.

This dissertation claims that the increasing privatisation of the settlement mechanism since the late 1970s was a state-directed effort to ensure its continuation by harnessing it to the logic of the market. Consequently, leading to a coalition of geopolitical and private interests that dictate the formation of the local built environment. This dissertation focuses on the settlement along the border with the occupied Palestinian West-Bank (the Green-Line) - a former frontier area that the state began intensely developing following the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 and the election of the first right-wing and economically liberal government a decade later. Consistently, the state increased the involvement of the private sector in the area, marked by the construction of the first privatised national infrastructure project in 2002- the Trans-Israel Highway.

This dissertation shows that the settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway are an outcome of various *spatial privileges*, which produced different housing typologies over the past four decades. These privileges are based on the state granting favoured groups of individuals, developers and entrepreneurs the ability to influence the formation of built space as a means to continuously develop and settle the national frontiers. Therefore, the settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway constitute a unique case study of the relationship between the political interest to control space and the ability to form it. Analysing these spatial privileges and the housing typologies they produced this dissertation examines how the state incorporated a variety of private groups into its territorial project, ensuring its continuation while transforming the local built environment. Therefore, unlike the research perspective that sees privatisation as a state-led effort to ensure the survival of capitalism, this dissertation asks to present a contrary scenario of privatisation as an economic means to a geopolitical end. Accordingly, this dissertation challenges the conception of the built environment as a cultural product, as it sheds light on the ability of political and economic agendas to dictate the production of space; drawing a continuous line from the strategical regional planning level, through urban design and all the way to the architecture of the single dwelling unit.

1.2 Research Focus

As an outcome of a privatised geopolitical project, the settlements of the Trans-Israel Highway are a servant of several masters. Accordingly, this research claims that as the state was interested in expanding its *power over* space, it granted selected groups spatial privileges that included the *power to* inhabit, plan and construct it. Therefore, the production of these settlements followed the different functions they were meant to serve. First is the national-territorial aspect of controlling space, which dictates the location and spread of new settling points, which appears in strategic regional plans as dots or continuous ink stains. Second, is the individual and speculative interests of the different private groups that the state involved in its territorial project since the late 1970s, which dictates the manner each ink stain is materialised. Additionally, this research also claims that with the changes in the local economic, political and cultural values, the nature of these selected groups altered, and with it the spatial privileges they received. Thus, as the interests behind the production of the built environment transformed, its architectural and urban product had to transform accordingly. Therefore, this research first aims to identify the changing geopolitical, individual and corporate consideration that influence the formation of the Israeli built environment. Then, it asks to understand how these interests were manifested in built space. Thus, defining the architectural and urban components that define the privatised Israeli national project. Correspondingly, this thesis asks to clarify how the development of the Trans-Israel settlements evolved since 1977 in line with national-economic and geopolitical agendas, and how these were manifested in the settlements' architectural and urban form.

This thesis focuses on the border area with the West-Bank (the Green-Line) since 1977, as both the location and time period signify the privatisation and financialisation of the Israeli economy and the expansion of the national settlement enterprise. This area was sporadically settled by the state during the 1950s-60s, as it preferred to develop other national frontiers.¹ With the occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 and the election of the first right-wing and pro laissez-faire government in 1977, the geopolitical status of the area became a leading national interest while its relative proximity to the Tel Aviv metropolis gave it the potential to answer personal desires and economic speculations.² Located on the fringes of

¹ Gazit and Soffer, *Between the Sharon and Samaria*.

² Berger, *Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel*.

the West Bank, it was ideological enough to become an area of national importance, yet not too ideological like the depth of the occupied territories, and thus appealed to almost all sectors of the Israeli [Jewish] society.³ Correspondingly, it turned into a platform to one of the most intense development processes, which in less than twenty years concluded in the construction of over 30 new localities. As an extension of the Tel Aviv metropolis these new settlements attracted thousands of upper-middle-class families with strong affiliations to the secular and centre-left political sector.⁴ Therefore, giving the territorial project a seemingly apolitical and neutral mask.

Developed by a coalition of geopolitical, personal and financial objectives the settlements along the Green-Line represent the privatisation of the Israeli national geopolitical project. The construction of the adjacent transnational highway in the early 2000s, the first privately built and operated road in Israel, emphasises this further; creating a geographical unit of privatised national projects. Focusing on the manner in which the development mechanism was privatised and the different settlement typologies it produced, this thesis shows how their location, urban fabric and the architecture of their houses corresponds with national-territorial aspirations, private interests, and profitability concerns.

To explain how the settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway took shape, this thesis focuses on four different development phases, each with its specific spatial privileges and its own settlement phenomenon. First is the neo-rural development of the late 1970s, which was based on young urban families seeking a pioneer-like experience in the national frontiers and the small-scale Community Settlements they established. Second, is the gentrification of the Green-Line and the new Suburban Settlements that housed the Israeli upper-middle-class during the 1980s, in its quest for a detached private house in a commuting distance from Tel Aviv. Third, is the mass-suburbanisation of the 1990s, which witnessed an increasing involvement of private developers, leading to reproduced and high-rise residential environments. Concluding, is the current financialisation phase and its speculative projects, which promote the construction of corporate-led settlements, suburban in terms of everyday life, yet urban in terms of scale.

³ Newman, 'Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization'.

⁴ *Ibid*

1.3 Political historiography of [Israeli] architecture and urban planning

The built environment is the human-made space in which we all conduct our everyday life. This consists of the buildings, streets, infrastructure and non-natural landscape that surrounds them. Being a cultural artefact, it reflects the social context in which it was produced. Therefore, in a basic Marxist analysis, the built environment would be part of the *superstructure*, shaped by the *base* that consists of the means and relations of production.⁵ Expanding this analysis, Adorno and Horkheimer, in their writings on the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, coined the term *culture industry*; thus classifying culture as an integral part of the means of production and the base that produces the societal superstructure.⁶ Correspondingly, Lefebvre, in his analyses of built space, claimed that it does not only reflect the existing social order as it is rather an integral part of it, ensuring its continuation while functioning as “*a means of production*” and also as “*a means of control, and hence of domination*”.⁷ While most Marxist and neo-Marxist theoreticians focused on economic classes, Gramsci introduced the concept of *hegemony*, which is the ruling social class. Consequently, explaining additional ruling interests and values that go beyond the simple economic rationale, such as nationalism, conservatism and orthodoxy. The influence of this ruling class, according to Gramsci, is rendered in the built environment, as it controls “*Everything which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly... even architecture, and the layout and names of the streets*”.⁸ Nevertheless, whether the built environment is produced by the social order or whether it reproduces it, they both correlate one to the other. Moreover, as the means and relations of production are constantly changing, the ruling hegemonic values change harmoniously. Respectively, their spatial manifestations are supposed to transform as well. Thus, by studying the planning history of a given place, and in the case of this thesis - Israel, we are able to understand the prominent political, economic and cultural values that dictated its formation and how they changed over the years.⁹

⁵ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, 1:12.

⁶ Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*; Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

⁷ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 26.

⁸ Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, 389.

⁹ Hein, ‘The What, Why, and How of Planning History’, 6-5;8.

The existing scholarship on the politics of the built environment is vast and multifaceted. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several leading approaches that characterise the main research perspectives, analysing the way the power of the state is both reproduced and represented in built space. The representational perspective focuses on the manner architecture “symbolizes,” “expresses,” “houses,” or “displays” the power of the state.¹⁰ Accordingly, the focal point is primarily iconic governmental buildings or national compounds,¹¹ usually of totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany, the USSR or Fascist Italy, which their aesthetics is supposed to idealise the state and thus legitimise and inflict its rule.¹² Besides the common attention to fascist aesthetics, other researchers dealt also with democratic regimes, like the metaphoric aspects of transparency in West-Germany,¹³ or the adoption of Bauhaus architects by the American establishment as a means to represent itself as the protector of democracy and freedom.¹⁴ Similarly, on the urban level, Lawrence Vale’s analyses of capital cities focus on the manner they were used to emphasise the authority of the state and its dominant culture.¹⁵ On the other hand, James Holston and James Scott analyse capitals as a state-led social engineering process, intended to enforce a certain behaviour and everyday life that confirms the ruling socio-political order.¹⁶ In that sense, the focus is more on the built environment’s ability to reproduce the existing power relations and less on its representational capacities.

The emphasis on spatial practices, rather than representation, originates from social-studies theories of the 1960s and 1970s. Whether in Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *Habitus* and the divisions and hierarchies that create a common ideological construct,¹⁷ Anthony Giddens’ analyses of privacy and rules as spatial

¹⁰ Molnar, *Building the State Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in Post-War Central Europe*, 11.

¹¹ Sklair, ‘Iconic Architecture and Urban, National, and Global Identities’, 179–95.

¹² Sontag, ‘Fascinating Fascism’; Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918–1945*.

¹³ Barnstone, *The Transparent State: Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany*, 27–60.

¹⁴ Betts, ‘The Bauhaus as Cold War Legend: West German Modernism Revisited’, 75–100.

¹⁵ Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity*, 3–47; Vale, ‘The Temptations of Nationalism in Modern Capital Cities.’ I’, 196–205.

¹⁶ Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia*, 74–84; Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, 117–30.

¹⁷ Bourdieu, ‘The Berber House’, 98–110.

domination structures,¹⁸ Michel Foucault's study of space's disciplinary power,¹⁹ they all focused on the dominance mechanism produced through built space as an attempt to subjugate the individual to the rule of the state. The innovation and popularity of the social perspective led to a vast architectural and planning history research that is based on the theories of the scholars mentioned above, as well as on other similar approaches.²⁰

At the same time, as stated by architectural and urban critic Kim Dovey, the spatial adaptation of the social sciences perspective usually diminishes the role of individuals, considering them solely as *subjects*, rather than *agents*. Therefore, he suggests a pluralistic approach that considers them as both, with an ability to be “*empowered*” and “*disempowered*” by the built environment.²¹ Drawing on the work of Jeffrey Isaac,²² Dovey emphasises the difference between *power over*, which is the ability to harness the capacities of others to one's interests, and *power to*, which is “[t]he ‘*capacity*’ to imagine, construct and inhabit a better built environment”.²³ Applying this distinction to the development of Israeli settlements, we could easily claim that this was a process where the state enhanced its *power over* space by providing its citizens housing opportunities in frontier areas. Accordingly, this was a state-led social engineering project, which created a spiritual bond between the citizens and the state while securing its legitimacy and territorial rule; using built space to control the citizens on the one hand and using the citizens to control space on the other.

Allegedly, the privatisation of housing development is a process with a potential of turning the individual from a mere subject into an agent. By transferring the responsibility from the state to the individual, the latter is granted the *power to* inhabit, plan and form the built environment. Respectively, Lisa Findley, highlights the role of architecture as a liberating tool of subjected people, confirming their

¹⁸ Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*.

¹⁹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.

²⁰ Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*; Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia*; Findley, *Building Change: Architecture, Politics and Cultural Agency*; Hirst, *Space and Power: Politics War and Architecture*; Stanek, ‘French Post-War Architecture and Its Critics’, 113–25; Molnar, *Building the State Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in Post-War Central Europe*; Barnstone, *The Transparent State: Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany*.

²¹ Dovey, *Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form*, 20.

²² Isaac, ‘Beyond the Three Faces of Power’, 32–55.

²³ Dovey, *Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form*, 10.

participation in cultural production. Therefore, she refers to Le Corbusier's statement that "*Taking possession of space is the first gesture of living things... The occupation of space is the first proof of existence*".²⁴ In this sense, the *power to occupy space* is seen as an essential component of individual liberty that turns one into a spatial agent.²⁵ Similarly, the neoliberal order, which shifts the focus from the state's role as a *provider* to that of an *enabler*, adopts the same discourse of individuals as agents. At the same time, as shown by David Harvey, neoliberal economies that claim to reduce state involvement eventually conclude in major "*special interventions*", meant to encourage "'*good business or investment climate*' for capitalistic endeavours".²⁶ Ultimately, limiting the individual's power to affect the formation of the built environment while harnessing one's interests to those of the market.²⁷ Nevertheless, while Marxist geographical analyses usually depict geopolitics as means serving capitalist objectives,²⁸ complex ethno-territorial contexts, like Israel, usually present an opposite scenario.

Superficially, a privatised national settlement project seems as an oxymoron, as individual interests usually contradict those of the state. Similarly, Charles Jencks in his analysis of architectural production depicts three separate systems - *private*, *public* and *corporate*, all of which have their own motivation – *usage*, *budget*, and *profit*, respectively.²⁹ Nevertheless, Jencks does not mention the ideological or political incentives of the state. Most important, he ignores the fact that it is the state that enables the private and corporate systems to operate, and that their produced architecture is thus subjected to the state's interests as well, especially in a case like Israel.

To analyse the privatising settlement project and the role private agents began playing in it we will be using the term *spatial privileges*. The term is usually used to describe the advantages members of a hegemonic group enjoy within the built

²⁴ Le Corbusier, quoted in Findley, *Building Change: Architecture, Politics and Cultural Agency*, 5.

²⁵ *Ibid*

²⁶ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 70.

²⁷ Graeber, *Debt: The First 5000 Years*, 376.

²⁸ Brenner and Elden, 'Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory'; Brenner et al., 'State Space in Question'.

²⁹ Jencks, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture*, 25.

environment,³⁰ being it a question of race, ethnicity, gender or social class.³¹ Thus, it is an integral part of Logan and Molotch's "*place stratification model*",³² which describes the ability of privileged groups to manipulate the production of space for their own socio-economic benefit.³³ Re-explaining the model, Logan defines "*spatial privilege*" as the objective of hegemonic groups seeking segregation, eventually creating a "*rigid hierarchy of places*".³⁴ However, in this dissertation, we will be using the term to describe the exclusive rights members of favourable groups received from the state as a means to incorporate them in the national geopolitical project with the purpose of ensuring its continuation and constantly recreate the hierarchy of places. Returning to Dovey's analysis, these spatial privileges are an outcome of a *prêt pro quo* relationship that is based on granting favoured groups the *power to plan*, construct, and colonise space, as a means to enforce the state's *power over it*. Therefore, in the privatisation of a geopolitical project, it is by enabling [selected] groups and corporations to participate in the production of new settlements that the state is capable to domesticate its frontiers.³⁵

Ethnically oriented, the state granted spatial privileges to specific socio-economic groups that could ensure the geopolitical objectives of its territorial project and the evolving economic rationale behind it. Haim Yacobi and Erez Tzfadia refer to this process as "*selective privatisation*", as the Israeli Government granted substantial spatial rights to "*selected elites*" in order to promote the settlement of its national

30 Logan, Zhang, and Chunyu, 'Emergent Ghettos: Black Neighborhoods in New York and Chicago, 1880–1940'; Wilton, 'Colouring Special Needs: Locating Whiteness in NIMBY Conflicts'; Leonard, 'Landscaping Privilege: Being British in South Africa'; Dirsuweit and Wafer, 'Suburban Road-Closures and the Ruinous Landscapes of Privilege in Johannesburg'; Neupane and Chesney, 'Violence against Women on Public Transport in Nepal: Sexual Harassment and the Spatial Expression of Male Privilege'; Van Slyck, 'The Spatial Practices of Privilege'.

31 Other uses include pedagogy studies, explaining the relations between the pupils and the teacher inside a classroom and even in computer science, examining the user experience design- see Niu and Gang, 'Enforcing User-Space Privilege Separation with Declarative Architectures'; Engle, Langer-Osuna, and McKinney de Royston, 'Toward a Model of Influence in Persuasive Discussions: Negotiating Quality, Authority, Privilege, and Access Within a Student-Led Argument'.

32 Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: A Political Economy of Place*; Alba and Logan, 'Variations on Two Themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburban Residence', 431–53.

33 Pais, South, and Crowder, 'Metropolitan Heterogeneity and Minority Neighborhood Attainment: Spatial Assimilation or Place Stratification?', 261.

34 Logan, Zhang, and Chunyu, 'Emergent Ghettos: Black Neighborhoods in New York and Chicago, 1880–1940', 1058.

35 Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 36–55; Weizman, 'Principles of Frontier Geography', 84–92.

frontiers and to expand its territorial control.³⁶ This *selective privatisation* is precisely Harvey's *special interventions*, meant to introduce a certain economic climate. Subsequently, creating a unique coalition of private, corporate and national interests, which changed together along with the transformations in the Israeli economy, politics and culture.

The privatisation of Israel is a long and varying process that benefited different social groups in various manners. The global decline of the welfare-state approach, which began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, affected the Israeli economy as well, as the government promoted more liberal approaches instead. This ignited a process of privatisation that intensified throughout the 1970s and 1980s, concluding in comprehensive reorganisation of state-led projects, which included the development of new settlements and housing estates. The state continued to act as the initial planner and initiator of these projects as it still controls more than 90% of available land parcels; their construction and marketing, however, were conducted by private individuals, associations, corporations and entrepreneurs.³⁷ Consequently, privatising the Israeli project. Subsequently, the reciprocal relations between the state's *power over* and the private *power to*, transformed; granting diverse spatial privileges to different selected groups over the years, according to the changing interests of the state and the individual.

Developed by a coalition of individual, corporate and national interests makes the Israeli settlement project a unique case of privatisation and thus an exceptional case study of the influence of political-economic interests on the production of the built environment. To understand the politicisation of housing under a privatised economy, this thesis uses seemingly mundane, ordinary and banal housing projects. These, unlike iconic public or commercial buildings that are usually the focal point in the research of politics, economy and architecture, constitute the vast majority of the built environment while dictating the everyday life of the individuals living in them;³⁸ thus, forming the ultimate research object to study the relationship between the state, the individual and spatial process production.

³⁶ Yacobi and Tzfadia, 'Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel', 6.

³⁷ Yiftachel and Avni, 'Privati-nation'– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps', 225–47.

³⁸ Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945*; Findley, *Building Change: Architecture, Politics and Cultural Agency*; Molnar, *Building the State Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in Post-War Central Europe*.

This thesis studies the role of the built environment in the national geopolitical project while focusing on its production, instead of its architectural and urban products. Similar to the work of Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman's "*A Civilian Occupation*", the thesis discusses how architecture and planning became part of the national territorial agenda. At the same time, focusing on production, this thesis aims to avoid possible oversimplifications. For example, Segal and Weizman cite a 1984 report of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, which recommended orienting the living rooms in settlements towards the open view. Relying on Paul Virilio, they explain that this was intended to create a "*network of observations*", which would control the local Palestinian population.³⁹ In "*Hollow Land*", Weizman repeats this analyses once again, mentioning the Hebrew term of "*Mitzpe*" (lookout) that is used to refer to a new settling point.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, as the same guidelines were published already in 1982 by the Jewish Agency's Settlement Division, in a document with clear instructions on how to increase the "*quality of life*" in mountainous sites,⁴¹ the desire to provide each household with an open panorama constitutes a more reasonable explanation than Weizman's panoptic analyses. Accordingly, the Hebrew translation of "*Hollow Land*" was mockingly criticised in the right-wing national-religious *Makor Rishon* newspaper. Concentrating specifically on this issue, the review claimed that the book is based on unsupported political statements, and that "*in the twisted world of the extreme left, every settler is a spy*".⁴² Schnabel, the reporter who wrote the review, was not horrified from the territorial role attached to settlements, but rather from the claim that the architecture of their houses relies on militaristic principles.

To understand the geopolitical role of the built environment this dissertation studies it as the product of the *settlement mechanism*. Compatibly, the Jewish Agency's plan for the West-Bank spoke of "*settlement tools*",⁴³ which are the different incentives used to attract people to the occupied territories, such as grants, subsidies, real estate speculations, and social seclusion. Therefore, built space was not a *settlement tool* meant to attract settlers or to function as a reconnaissance device, but rather an outcome of the various policies that were intended to stimulate the development of new settlements. Therefore, this thesis studies the *settlement mechanism*, which is

³⁹ Segal and Eyal, 'The Mountain', 85–86.

⁴⁰ Weizman, *Hollow Land*, 130–32.

⁴¹ Naim, 'Lot sizes in Toshavot and Community Settlements with mountainous topography', 1–4.

⁴² Schnabel, 'In the twisted world of the extreme left, every settler is a spy'.

⁴³ Settlement Division, 'The 100.000 Plan', 15.

the coalition between the state, the differing agents it used and the spatial privileges they were granted. To understand how the settlement mechanism works, this thesis concentrates on the changes it went through over the years, examining the various spatial privileges granted to different spatial agents and analysing how these transformed the local built environment. Respectively, with the focus on production, rather than the product, this dissertation deliberately ignores the role of architects and planners as the masterminds of the production of built space, referring to them as mere executors of the settlement mechanism.

This thesis enhances the existing scholarship on the Israeli settlement enterprise by introducing a new layer and an additional perspective. Most of the current literature focuses on the ideological and political aspects, while relatively neglecting the economic standpoint. At the same time, scholars that focus on the privatisation of Israel usually do not deal with its spatial urban and architectural morphology. Accordingly, the focal points are frequently politically contested case studies like the West-Bank, like in the varied work of Weizman, Segal, Newman, Cahaner, Allegra and many others,⁴⁴ or ethnically divided cities, former Palestinian neighbourhoods and peripheral towns inside Israel, like the studies of Pullan, Yiftachel, Nitzan-Shiftan, Yacobi, Tzfadia and Jabaraeen.⁴⁵ While they all discuss the political agenda thoroughly, the link with political-economics is quite preliminary, including several papers like Yacobi and Tzfadia's "*neo-settler colonialism*", Gutwein's concept of "*alternative welfare-state*" or Yiftachel and Avni's short introduction on "*privati-nation*".⁴⁶ Moreover, the existing literature usually studies the regional and urban levels, creating a research gap in the architectural level that would draw a continuous line from the national scale to the individual one. Efrat's ground-breaking work on the "*Israeli Project*" and Allweil's "*Homeland*" are in fact written

⁴⁴ Weizman, *Hollow Land*; Segal and Eyal, *A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture*; Newman, 'Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization'; Cahaner, 'Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank'; Allegra, 'The Politics of Suburbia: Israel's Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem'.

⁴⁵ Pullan, 'Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities'; Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*; Nitzan-Shiftan, *Seizing Jerusalem: The Architectures of Unilateral Unification*; Yacobi, 'Architecture, Orientalism and Identity: The Politics of the Israeli-Built Environment'; Tzfadia, 'Public Housing as Control: Spatial Policy of Settling Immigrants in Israeli Development Towns'; Jabaraeen and Dbiat, *Architecture and orientalism in the country*.

⁴⁶ Yacobi and Tzfadia, 'Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel'; Gutwein, 'The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation'; Yiftachel and Avni, 'Privati-nation' – Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps'.

from an architectural and regional perspective.⁴⁷ Yet, they mainly focus on the nation-building process, discussing its representational and social engineering roles, and thus do not address the territorial, individual and corporate interests of post-1977. Researchers that do deal with the architecture of settlements in the past four decades analyse it as an attempt to normalise occupation through banal and aesthetic spatial practices.⁴⁸ However, this dissertation sates the contrary, claiming that architecture is the product of privatisation and normalisation, rather than their producer.

The case studies that this dissertation examines represent the increasing privatisation of the settlement mechanism and the differing spatial privileges it was based on (fig 1.1). Sal'it, the Reihan Bloc, Nirit and Ya'arit demonstrate the early privatisation measures of the late 1970s, which were based on granting small homogeneous groups the right to form an exclusive Community Settlement. Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut, represent the mid-1980s, which relied on granting privileged groups of well-connected private association and private developers the right to develop and/or populate a new Suburban Settlement. Bat Heffer, Tzoran, Tzur Yitzhak, Tzur Yigal, Matan, Ela'ad, Shoham and Lapid represent the mass-suburbanisation of the 1990s and the shift to private corporations. Harish, the last case study, illustrates the current finance-led development that is based on the *power to* speculate as the main feature in the settlement mechanism.

To understand the development mechanism behind the production of these case studies, we will rely on different types of primary and secondary resources. These include meeting protocols, correspondences, ministerial reports, aerial photos, maps, national strategic plans, urban outline schemes, architectural drawings, photographs and historical news articles. This also includes relevant statistical information on the population and the development process and combines interviews with key figures and documentation of the settlements' current situation. To analyse the mutual geopolitical, individual and corporate interests we will first examine each case study from the strategical level - analysing its location along the Green-Line, its size and affinity to other existing Jewish and Arab towns while clarifying the state's incentive to increase its *power over* this specific space. Then, identifying the

⁴⁷ Efrat, *The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture 1948-1973*; Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860-2011*.

⁴⁸ Handel, Rand, and Allegra, 'Wine-Washing: Colonization, Normalization, and the Geopolitics of Terror in the West Bank's Settlements'; Newman, 'Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization'; Allegra, "'Outside Jerusalem—yet so Near": Ma'ale Adumim, Jerusalem, and the Suburbanization of Israel's Settlement Policy'.

relevant spatial agents, their interests and desires in correspondence with the spatial privileges they were granted, we will analyse the way their *power to inhabit* and form the built environment matched the state's geopolitical agenda.




FIG. 1.1 The different development phases along the Trans-Israel highway and the chosen case studies (highlighted in black) - (Illustrated by the author)

Subsequently, to understand the spatial manifestation of the privatised national agenda, we will analyse each case study from its urban outline to the layout of the single dwelling unit. Starting from the street system, its arrangement and hierarchy, moving to the zoning and distribution of public and private functions, as well as the sites' gross and net density. We will then examine the residential buildings' sizes, height, volume and envelope, as well as the composition and distribution of dwelling units, their inner layout and relationship with the buildings' envelope. Thus, explaining how the architectural and urban products are an outcome of the settlement mechanism (fig 1.2).




FIG. 1.2 Location, Developer, Population composition; Intended everyday routine; Zoning, Density, street Layout; Buildings' size, Buildings' envelope; Units' composition, Units' layout, Units and volume (Illustrated by the author)

1.4 Relevance and contribution

Using the settlements constructed on the fringes of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, this thesis ties the national geopolitical agenda to the seemingly apolitical suburbanisation process and real estate-oriented development. Accordingly, while most of the existing research focuses on large cities like Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, or highly contested areas like Hebron or isolated West-Bank outposts, this dissertation deals with the undisputed settlements along the nation's main arterial road. Respectively, it explores the popular local architecture, which houses the majority of Israeli families; defining their everyday life while shaping the state's urban landscape. Therefore, this thesis offers a new theoretical framework that could explain the current form of Israeli housing and settlement development mechanism.

Examining the geopolitical and economic interests that influence the production of the Israeli built environment, this thesis illustrates the manner in which the

individual's capacity, or *power to* influence the production of built space is entwined with the state's interests to secure its *power over* it. Thus, indicating how even our most intimate environment, our home, is dictated by the greater socio-economic and political order. Analysing these influences, the dissertation challenges the creative role of architects and planners in the production of space, presenting them as an integral part of the political and economic mechanism. Furthermore, focusing on the global phenomenon of neoliberalism, yet in a specific geopolitical context, this thesis presents a local implementation of market-oriented urban development, and a cynical version of critical regionalism. Analysing how the global neoliberal turn received a local implementation, this thesis discusses how it was used by the Israeli Government as a means to constantly revive its geopolitical agenda. Therefore, claiming that while all market economies are alike, each nation-state implements it in its own way.

1.5 Outline

After introducing the main features of the thesis, the following background chapter provides the historical and theoretical context to the development of the Trans-Israel settlements. It explains the geopolitical role of settlements in Israel/Palestine and the manner in which their production mechanism transformed over the last century. Relying on key theories on the welfare nation-state and the global turn towards neoliberalism and market economy, the chapter presents the Israeli version of the phenomenon. Illustrating the entangled relations between nationalism, territoriality, and privatisation this chapter clarifies the complexity of the subject and explains its unique profile. Presenting a general view of the development mechanism of the settlements along the Green-Line and the Trans-Israel highway, the chapter prepares the reader for the following ones, explaining what makes the area a privately developed national project. Each of the following chapters focuses on a singular frontier domestication mechanism and the new type of privatisation it relied on. Accordingly, each chapter includes different selected groups enjoying particular spatial privileges, or *powers to* produce built space, in order to secure and expand its *power over* it. Consequently, generating specific settlement phenomena that corresponded with each of the different phases during which they were shaped.

The third chapter focuses on the neo-ruralisation of the frontier, which forms the first step in the privatised domestication of the Green-Line. Accordingly, it deals with

the Community Settlements - small-scale non-agricultural villages that consist of a limited number of families and a relatively homogeneous character. These were first used by the Israeli Government and its different planning agencies during the 1970s in order to attract city dwellers to frontier areas by offering them a pioneer-like experience. Consequently, granting them the *power to* form their own secluded ex-urban communities while strengthening the state's *power over* areas of national interests. This chapter examines six different settlements that were initiated during 1977-1981 along the Green-Line and constitute first example of early privatisation. First is the settlement of Sal'it. Second is the settlement cluster of Reihan, Hinanit, and Shaked. Then, the chapter introduces Nirit, the only case study built west of the Green-Line and on official Israeli territory. Last is the case of Ya'arit, a West-Bank settlement that was never built, however, being initiated by a private developer it forms an interesting and intriguing example. Illustrating and analysing the development of these six case studies, and how they changed over the years, this chapter shows how the neo-rural experience and the concept of community became the leading force behind the national territorial project in the early 1980s. Then it shows how the focus shifted towards the individual during the 1990s, which eventually gave an emphasis on corporate interests in the early 2000s.

Chapter four deals with the gentrification of the Green-Line, which was a state-led effort to attract upper-middle-class families to settle the area. Accordingly, it focuses on the Suburban Settlement - a spatial phenomenon of the early 1980s that offered the option of spacious houses in a homogeneous commuters' community that suited the desires of the newly forming bourgeoisie class. Concentrating on this new settlement mechanism, this chapter illustrates how the *power to* develop space became a privilege given to restricted upper-middle-class families and contractors the state asked to attract to the area. Consequently, gentrifying the former frontier and eventually enabling its further domestication. This chapter deals with the first Suburban Settlements established along the Green-Line, which are Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut. By presenting their story and analysing the method of their construction, as well as their [sub]urban and architectural characteristics, this chapter illustrates how the changes in the settlement development mechanism led to changes in housing practices and transformed the local built environment. Moreover, it shows how the emerging upper-middle-class was able to promote its own segregated suburban communities, and how the state used the suburban aspirations of this class in order to incorporate the former frontier into the main metropolitan area.

Chapter five concentrates on the mass-suburbanisation of the 1990s, which included an unprecedented involvement of the private sector. Accordingly, unlike earlier examples, where the construction of new settlements was a collaboration of

national institutions, settling movements and small-scale private initiative, by the early 1990s, the state forwarded the process to the hands of large-scale private developers. Consequently, resulting in the mega suburbs of the 1990s – mass-produced residential environments, consisting of tract-housing developments and repetitive architectural typologies. This chapter focuses on the ‘Stars’ settlements – eight new sites initiated by the state in the early 1990s that demonstrate the completion of the transition into a privatised national project. Analysing the architectural and urban characteristics of these new settlements, as well as their development mechanism, location, and intended target population, this chapter provides additional insight to the changing relationship between the private *power to*, and the state’s *power over space*.

Chapter six focuses on the financialisation of the Green-Line, which derived from the increasing attempts to develop frontier settlements by creating a real estate market and relying on the speculative interests of entrepreneurs and investors. Therefore, this chapter deals with the case of Harish, a project that different governments unsuccessfully tried to develop during the last forty years. Its peripheral location and proximity to the West-Bank and other Arab towns on the one hand, and the lack of interest in rural settlement in the other, repeatedly prevented the site’s development. By 2010, the wide demand for new dwelling units, the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and the newly built West-Bank Separation Barrier all contributed to turning Harish into an attractive piece of real estate. Consequently, enabling the Israeli Government to designate it as a city with a target population of 60,000. Focusing on the case of Harish, this chapter illustrates the financialisation of the national settlement project, explaining how the state granted the *power to* develop a real estate market in a certain area, in order to supply the needed dwelling units while expanding the national territorial project. Analysing the urban layout and the housing units in Harish, this chapter explains how this future city embodies the privatisation of the national settlement project and the manner in which architecture turned into a mere product of economic speculations.

Chapter seven discusses the main findings of the dissertation. It draws a continuous line between the different development phases and settlement phenomena presented in the previous chapters and explains how they constitute a gradual process of privatisation. This chapter summarises the different national and private interest in the development of the area along the Trans-Israel highway and explains how this influence was manifested in the local built environment and civilian everyday life. Relying on the case studies presented in the thesis, this chapter concludes with insights that explain the relations between nationalism and neoliberalism, and how the coalition of these two is manifested in built space.

2 Background

The Evolution Of A National Project

Two shorter versions of this chapter were published as:

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2.1 Settle and Rule

To understand the privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism, we must first understand the physical and spiritual role of the local built environment and how it evolved over the past century. Though the initial essence of Zionist settlement in Palestine during the late 19th century was equivocal and consisted of multiple interpretations, it rapidly turned into a territorial project where land control played a leading part. Through the promotion of a territorial sequence of Jewish settlements, while dismantling the Arab one, several leading Zionist organisations (later the state of Israel) asked to fortify and expand their presence, securing their *power over* space.⁴⁹ Therefore, focusing on the act of settlement as a governance apparatus, I would claim that this strategy could be understood as a ‘*settle and rule*’ policy; adopting and adapting the phrase of ‘*divide et impera*’, translated from Latin as *divide and rule*.⁵⁰ This strategy began forming in the turn of the 20th century and it continues to dictate the development of the local built environment into the third millennium. However, as the hegemonic cultural, economic and political values of Zionism and the state of Israel transformed over the last 100 years so did the spatial implementation of this strategy.

⁴⁹ Yiftachel, ‘The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel’, 493–95; Dovey, *Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form*, 9–15.

⁵⁰ Sometimes as divide and conquer

In this chapter we will see how the concept of ruling by settling remained the core of the national territorial project, yet its materialisation transformed with the changing modes and the relations of production. We will first focus on the national geopolitical role of the local territory and built space, which began in the pre-statehood days and continued with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Then we will identify four different modes of spatial production and control, each with its particular state-led efforts to attract people to settle the national frontiers, according to the leading societal values of their time. Beginning with *cultivate and rule* approach led by several Zionist movements in pre-statehood years and included an emphasis on frontier rural settlements. With the privatisation of the settlement mechanism during the 1970s, the state relied more and more on the private sector, and thus incorporated various individualistic and speculative interests by granting spatial privileges to selected groups. Consequently, the state first adopted an approach of *suburbanise and rule*, which harnessed the growing desire for better living standards to the national territorial agenda. With the ever-growing influence of the private market, this eventually gave way to a more corporate-led approach of *financialise and rule*, where investments and real estate speculation became the main driving force behind the development of new settlements.

Zooming into the area of the Green-Line, enables us to grasp the privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism. Using the Trans-Israel Highway as a paradigm to the local implementation of the global neoliberal turn, this chapter discusses the selective nature of Israeli privatisation, explaining what makes it a unique case of a national-oriented market economy. Then, presenting an overview of the development of the area along the Green-Line, this chapter provides an insight to the evolving alliance between individual and corporate interests and the state's geopolitical project; preparing the ground for the next parts of the dissertation that focus on each of the phases discussed in this general overview.

2.2 An evolving national project

“It is not our historic claims that will determine the borders of the land, but rather our posts. Our role now is to seize and settle.” Moshe Shertok⁵¹

The modern development of Jewish settlements in Palestine commenced with the first waves of Zionist immigration to the area in the turn of the 20th century. Despite the inability to speak of ‘a’ unified Zionist doctrine, the leading Practical Zionism approach supported a variety of activities focusing on immigration, land acquisition and settlements, all in order to actively promote the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish nation in Palestine.⁵² What began as a sporadic and relatively insignificant presence, shortly turned into a large settlement enterprise, fuelled by the growing demand for Jewish independence and additional waves of immigration. During the British Mandate (1921-1948), as the dispute with the local Arab-Palestinian population continued to grow, the act of settlement became an act of land appropriation, intended to create a substantial sequence of Jewish presence in the area and to enlarge the future territory of the independent Jewish state.⁵³

Under the British mandate, it became clearer that the future of the area would conclude in a territorial division between the Arab and the Jewish Population. Meaning, that the designated Jewish homeland would be established upon the areas owned and settled by Jews in Palestine, and that the Arab State would take place in areas owned and settled by Arabs. Therefore, land acquisition turned into a zero-sum game of power *over space*, as both sides sought to enlarge and safeguard their future territory. Consequently, the Zionist Federation, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the Jewish Agency (JA), the Palestine Land Development Company and other Zionist organisations carried out an intensified effort to purchase additional lands and to establish new settlements in all parts of Palestine.⁵⁴ Local Arab leadership, on the other hand, concentrated on preventing the transference of Arab land into Jewish ownership. Both these efforts intensified with the Peel Commission, a royal British committee in charge of investigating the causes of the 1936 violent uprising

⁵¹ A quote from 1937; Sharet, *Political Diary B*, 175. (Shertok changed his name to Sharet)

⁵² Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics*.

⁵³ *Ibid*

⁵⁴ Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*; Kano, *The Problem of Land Between Jews and Arabs (1917-1990)*.

and to recommend a solution for the area, which proposed the first concrete division plan. Therefore, it became even more obvious that the international community would eventually endorse a territorial division between the Arab and the Jewish sides.⁵⁵ Accordingly, leading to a fiercer effort to acquire more lands, as stated in the mentioned quote of Moshe Shertok, who acted as the secretary of the JA in Palestine during the Peel Commission. Thus, turning the *settle and rule* approach into the official national policy.

This mission continued to evolve after the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the built environment maintained its geopolitical role. The new government aimed to strengthen and secure its control of former Arab territories and over the new border areas while decentralising the local Jewish population that was heavily concentrated in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area (*Gush Dan*).⁵⁶ Taking responsibility over the settlement mechanism while acting jointly with the pre-state organisations, the state asked to settle the millions of Jewish immigrants across its new borders.⁵⁷ The state thus planned, funded and constructed a series of new industrial towns, aimed to offer housing, subsistence, and occupational opportunities, while creating a unified national identity and promoting its territorial control.⁵⁸

The Israeli national development process was of an ethno-centric nature.⁵⁹ Even in its definition, the term *Leom* that is used as the Hebrew equivalent of *nation*, could also be translated into *ethnicity*. In the pre-statehood days, it was clear that the use of the word *Leom* refers exclusively to the Jewish nation; like the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which was in charge of acquiring *Admot Leom* (lands for the nation) for the sake of a *Bayit Leomi* (national home). Nonetheless, even after the establishment of the state of Israel, with a 20% Arab Palestinian population, the term was never used to refer to an Israeli nation.⁶⁰ In evidence to that is the Israeli civil registration which from the variety of different possible classifications for the term *Leom*, it does not include *Israeli* as one of them, and the majority of Israeli citizens are registered

⁵⁵ *Ibid*

⁵⁶ Efrat and Dash, *The Israel Physical Master Plan*.

⁵⁷ Efrat, *The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture 1948-1973*; Efrat, *The Object of Zionism: The Architecture of Israel*.

⁵⁸ Carmon, 'Housing Policy in Israel: Review, Evaluation and Lessons', 181–208.

⁵⁹ Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 11–50.

⁶⁰ Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People*.

either as members of the Jewish *Leom* or the Arab one.⁶¹ Despite several petitions and appeals the state's official position remained that there is no such thing as an Israeli *Leom*, or nation; a position that was defended by the Israeli High Court of Justice.⁶² Respectively, the terms national considerations, national lands, national priorities, and nation-state refer mainly to ethno-national Jewish ones. This would become official in 2018 with the "Nation-State Bill" that defined Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.⁶³ In this sense, the national settlement mechanism of the state of Israel continued the former pre-state ethno-national Jewish efforts.⁶⁴ Thus turning the terms Israeli settlements and Jewish settlements into synonyms.

The political role of the built environment intensified since the 1970s. The occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 and the attempts to fortify the state's control in the peripheral areas of the northern Galilee and the Negev, were an outcome of a state-directed effort to establish new Jewish settlements. These focused on strengthening the state's presence by creating a Jewish territorial sequence and by disassembling Arab-Palestinian ones.⁶⁵ Though the right-wing religious settlements in the heart of the West-Bank were considered controversial in the eyes of large parts of the Israeli public, those inside the pre-1967 borders, became an integral part of the national consensus. Furthermore, while the efforts in the West-Bank were intended to fortify the Israeli occupation and prevent the formation of an independent Palestinian entity by expanding the state's territory, the ones in the Galilee and the Negev focused on strengthening the state's control inside the pre-1967 borders. Although allegedly these endeavours were different, they used the same basic tactics of establishing new settlements as a tool to secure territorial dominance. Accordingly, using the same planning discourse of

⁶¹ Occasionally, *Leom* is used as nationality, as the civil registration does include an East and West-German *Leom*. A better possible explanation to the term *Leom*, is the difference between the Arabic term for nation: *Qaumiya*, which refers to the general Arab nation, and *Wataniya*, which refers to a specific Arab nation such as Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi etc. see: Sheikh, 'Pan-Arabism: A Tool of Ruling Elites or a Politically-Relevant Ideology?', 93–107.

⁶² Israel High Court of Justice, Ruling 8573/08 - Uzi Arnon against the Ministry of Interior.

⁶³ Knesset of Israel, Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People.

⁶⁴ Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*; Tzfadia, 'Abusing Multiculturalism: The Politics of Recognition and Land Allocation in Israel', 11150–1130.

⁶⁵ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*; Portugali, 'Jewish Settlement in the Occupied Territories: Israel's Settlement Structure and the Palestinians', 26–53; Segal and Eyal, 'The Mountain'.

“Hesech” - “scarcity of Jewish settlement”, “Havira” - “Interconnections between Jewish settlements” and “Hayetz”- “Separation between Arab areas”, to define the “national priority” of a certain area.⁶⁶

The *settle and rule* strategy formed the official development policy in Israel up until the 1990s and to some extent even today.⁶⁷ During the 1990s, the state’s new approach asked to tie the national development process to the needs of the liberalising local economy while implementing a more market-oriented approach.⁶⁸ At the same time, territorial expansion was not forsaken, yet its implementation and method of realisation were adjusted according to the new market-led development perspective. Therefore, the built environment continued to play a leading geopolitical role, while its implementation and method of realisation changed significantly over the years.

2.3 The Frontier: rural pioneers

The logic behind the Israeli settlement mechanism is based on the concept of frontier domestication. Frontiers, unlike borders, are zones of varying widths that are either between two neighbouring states, unpopulated areas within a state or ones that have not yet been incorporated into an adjacent political entity.⁶⁹ Moreover, frontiers are usually sparsely settled areas or populated by indigenous peoples who the settling society considers as part of the natural landscape that needs to be tamed.⁷⁰ Though the act of settling frontier areas dates to pre-modern times, in the era of nation building it became an instrument of the modern state to enforce its sovereignty and to practice its control over a certain territory.⁷¹ Weizman, describes

⁶⁶ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, 29.

⁶⁷ Yiftachel and Kader, 'Landed power: the making of the Israeli land regime', 67–103.

⁶⁸ Shachar, 'Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine', 209–18.

⁶⁹ Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 36–40; Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel*, 1–13.

⁷⁰ Mbembe, 'Necropolitics', 11–40; Weizman, 'Principles of Frontier Geography'.

⁷¹ Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 30–40.

frontier settlements as an archipelago of enclaves and exclaves that are isolated from the geographical context that surrounds them. They constitute an ex-territorial geographic system of settling points and connecting lines, where order and law are exempted. This temporary situation remains until the frontier is domesticated, and larger populations are able to migrate and inhabit it.⁷² Frontier settlement, Weizman claims, is a chaotic and law-less situation which is directed by the remote entity that it serves as a means to expand its control and enforce its law;⁷³ eventually enforcing its “*power over*” space.⁷⁴ Subsequently, in the modern era, frontier areas have been increasingly disappearing and are replaced by borders.⁷⁵ By settling the frontier, states are able to impose both their empirical and juridical sovereignty and thus to rule over it.⁷⁶

The manner in which frontier settlement is practiced changes according to its historical, cultural and socio-economic context. While pre-modern examples usually consisted of civilianised military strongholds, modern ones are often an integral part of the nation-state attempts of creating a national identity.⁷⁷ The frontier, therefore, answered the material need of settler societies for land and resources, as well as their spiritual aspiration to create a new culture.⁷⁸ Perhaps the most immediate example is the American westward expansion, which is usually affiliated with groups of pioneers, outlaws, and vigilantes.⁷⁹ However, though based on the values of individualism and personal freedom, it was heavily dependent on the growth interests of the capitalist urban establishment that funded it.⁸⁰ The Wild-West was thus a coordinated state of chaos, directed by the urban centres, intended to lead to the domestication of the frontier.⁸¹

⁷² Weizman, 'Principles of Frontier Geography', 84–92.

⁷³ Pullan, 'Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities', 15–35.

⁷⁴ Dovey, *Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form*, 10.

⁷⁵ Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*.

⁷⁶ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel*.

⁷⁷ Turner, *The Frontier in American History*.

⁷⁸ Yiftachel, 'Nation-building or Ethnic Fragmentation? Frontier Settlement and Collective Identities in Israel', 149–69.

⁷⁹ Turner, *The Frontier in American History*.

⁸⁰ Hirst, *Space and Power: Politics War and Architecture*.

⁸¹ Weizman, 'Principles of Frontier Geography'; Pullan, 'Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities'.

“*Kibush HaShmama*”, conquering the wilderness, or frontiers, was a leading narrative in the Practical and Labour⁸² Zionist approaches that led to the establishment of the state of Israel.⁸³ In that sense, the well-known concept of “*a land without a people to a people without a land*”, portrayed Palestine as an empty, undeveloped and unsettled area waiting for redemption.⁸⁴ Similar to the American westward expansion, settling the frontier was not only a means to appropriate lands but also to form a territorial-based national identity.⁸⁵ A shared identity, as claimed by Hobsbawm, was a crucial aspect in the formation of the modern nation-state, which significantly relied on a union between the geographic and ethno-national entities.⁸⁶ Thus, it was by the act of settling the “*land without people*” that the “*people without land*” would become a nation. Consequently, settlements, housing, and dwelling units were a leading national mission. The method in which these were developed, however, transformed significantly along the years. While the *settle and rule* approach was maintained, the manner in which it was implemented adapted to the changes in the local economy and culture. Eventually, what began as a pioneer act of conquering the frontier, turned into an elaborated and complex real-estate venture.

In the pre-statehood years, the main frontier settlement efforts were carried out by the various Labour Zionism movements. These movements, headed by the Zionist-Socialist *Mapai* party that formed the ruling hegemony of the Jewish population during the British mandate years, promoted the establishment of small-scale rural settlements all across Palestine. Agriculture and rural settlements were thus used in order to expand the borders of the future Jewish state; or as said in the famous quote of Zionist leader Joseph Trumpeldor “*Wherever the Jewish plough cultivates its last furrow, that is where the border will run*”.⁸⁷ This led to the communal agricultural settlements of the *moshavim* and *kibbutzim*, which expanded the areas populated by Jews while also acting as a disciplinary mechanism, meant to reconnect the Jewish nation to its historic fatherland through its active cultivation.

⁸² An ideological framework that emphasised on creating a new progressive and socialist Jewish society in Palestine.

⁸³ Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 78–97.

⁸⁴ Said, *The Question of Palestine*, 9.

⁸⁵ Yiftachel, ‘Nation-building or Ethnic Fragmentation? Frontier Settlement and Collective Identities in Israel’, 150.

⁸⁶ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*; Hobsbawm, ‘Identity Politics and the Left’; MacIver, *The Modern State*.

⁸⁷ Gordis, Avishay, and Levi, *Israel’s National Security and West Bank Settlements*, 6.

The pioneer agricultural rural experience was thus both end and means; all focused to promote the physical and spiritual Jewish national revival.⁸⁸

These actions, called “*land redemption*” (*Geulat Adama*), meaning redeeming of the Land of Israel to its ‘*rightful*’ owners, included the construction of settlements intended to eventually secure the redeemed land. It was mostly carried out by the Palestine Office of the World Zionist Organisation (*Hamisrad Haeritziyisraeli*), which coordinated the land purchasing procedures funded by various donors, contributors, the JNF, and the actual foundation activities executed by a variety of settling groups. These groups were usually part of what was known as The Labour Settlement (*Hahityashvut Haovedet*), an umbrella term that refers to the different national movements that promoted a mixture of Zionist and socialist values and advocated for pioneer rural settlements.⁸⁹

The pioneer experience was an integral part of the land redemption efforts (fig 2.1-2.2). The new settlements were supposed to enlarge the area populated by Jews, while promoting the formation of a healthy and idealistic society. ‘*Conquering the labour*’ (*kibush haavoda*) and ‘*conquering the wilderness*’ (*kibush hashmama*) were thus complementary terms, as the physical cultivation of the land would eventually complete the rebirth of the Jewish nation in its historic homeland.⁹⁰ The *Halutz*, the pioneer, was perceived as an adventurous, firm and ideological character that is involved in conquering the wilderness through its cultivation and by establishing new rural settlements. The image of the *Halutz* turned into the ideal prototype of Labour and Practical Zionism; a contra to the anti-Semitic image of Jews as a nation of wandering and deformed moneylenders and merchants.⁹¹ Settling the frontier was thus an act of *Hagshama*, fulfilment, where one fulfils one’s individual calling, as part of the greater national mission.⁹²

⁸⁸ Troen, ‘Frontier Myths and Their Applications in America and Israel: A Transnational Perspective’, 1209–30.

⁸⁹ Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics*; Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*.

⁹⁰ Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 80.

⁹¹ Troen, ‘Frontier Myths and Their Applications in America and Israel: A Transnational Perspective’; Neuman, *Land and Desire in Early Zionism*; Almog, *The Sabre - a Profile*.

⁹² Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 81.



FIG. 2.1 Lands owned by the JNF in the Jezreel valley, 1930 (Central Zionist Archive)



FIG. 2.2 NF fundraising poster to purchase land in the Jezreel Valley, 1925. (Central Zionist Archive). In red are lands "redeemed" and in green are lands to be "redeemed"

The pioneer rural settlement in these years followed their settling group's level of communality and agricultural considerations. The kibbutzim, being a communal agrarian settlement, consisted of a hierarchical layout that emphasised its collective nature while limiting the role of the individual. Correspondingly, they were made out of a shared public core that contained the dining hall and all other public functions, surrounded by a ring of communal dwelling units. On the edge of the kibbutz, one could find the shared industrial and agrarian functions. On the other hand, the less communal moshavim, consisted of a more balanced relation between the collective and private spheres. Accordingly, they were based on a public core, surrounded in this case, by single-family detached houses and their private farmlands. Nahalal, for example, designed by architect Richard Kaufman, forms an archetype of the Moshavim, presenting an almost perfect arrangement of a collective entity made out of private units. The *Moshav Shitufi*, was a hybrid prototype, somewhere between the communal kibbutz and the more individualistic Moshav. It consisted of system private households with a communal ownership of the means of production. Consequently, the layout of a the Moshav Shitufi, limited the private sphere to the individual family house, while highlighting the shared public areas for farming, labour, and education (fig 2.3).⁹³

⁹³ Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel*; Chyutin and Chyutin, *Architecture and Utopia: Kibbutz and Moshav*.




FIG. 2.3 A kibbutz; a moshav (Nahalal); a Moshav Shitufi. Illustrated by Arie Sharon, 1951. Arie Sharon Archives. Note the spatial arrangement according to the level of communal living

Whether as a kibbutz or moshav, the various rural settlements were the leading territorial tool in the pre-statehood years. Though differing in their layout and architecture, all these settlements had a leading joint concept - the alliance between agriculture and land redemption. Through rural labour, the settlers were able to physically reclaim the land and to secure its control while fulfilling their pioneer aspirations. This combination of agricultural and defence could be seen in the logo of the Palmach brigades, a sword and wheat crops, which formed the executer and ideological backbone of the Labour Settlement before 1948. This is also evident in the logo of its ideological successor, the *Nahal*,⁹⁴ which consists of a sword, a sickle and wheat crops as well (fig 2.4). It is possible to understand this combination of agriculture and defence as a tactic of *cultivate and rule*.



FIG. 2.4 Palmach logo (left); Nahal logo (right), both depicting a sword and wheat crops to symbolize the connection between agriculture, land and defence. IDF official website. (idf.il)

⁹⁴ Nahal, is an acronym for Noar Halutzi Lohem, literally meaning: Pioneer combatant youth: A military unit that took several national missions, among them the establishment of new small-scale settlements.

2.4 The Internal Frontiers: from pioneers and proletariats to shareholders

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War significantly altered the demographic and territorial balance in the area. In November 1947 the UN assembly agreed on the Partition Plan of Mandatory Palestine. The plan followed the ethnic land ownership and designated most of the Jewish owned land to be part of the future Jewish state, and the Arab owned land as part of the future Arab state (fig 2.5). The partition plan ignited a series of skirmishes between local Arab and Jewish militias, which in May 1948, with the end of the British Mandate and the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel, escalated into a full-scale war between the young Jewish state and its Arab neighbours.⁹⁵ In 1949, with the end of the war, the Jewish state was larger than that proposed in the UN Partition Plan, as it included several Arab areas, as well as around 600 depopulated Arab villages and towns that were vacated by their 700,000 inhabitants, who fled or were deported to neighbouring states.⁹⁶




FIG. 2.5 Land ownership in Mandatory Palestine according to ethnic group, the 1947 Partition Plan and the eventual border of the State of Israel in 1949. (Illustrated by the author)

⁹⁵ Morris, *The Birth of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*; Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*

The official Israeli policy was to prevent the Arab Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes.⁹⁷ To preserve this situation, the construction of new settlements on formerly Arab land, which became state-owned land, began immediately after the war.⁹⁸ These areas, that were either unsettled by Jewish Israelis or predominantly populated by Arabs, became the state internal frontiers, where the government continued the mechanism of *settle and rule*. Settling was now not only an act of physical control, but also of consciousness and narrative, as the Israeli Government asked to rinse the area of its Arab Palestinian heritage through the construction of new localities.⁹⁹

The ethnocentricity of the nation-building process was highly apparent in the management of state-owned lands. In the eve of the 1948 War, less than 13,5% of the future area of the state of Israel was under Jewish ownership. After mass confiscations, more than 90% of the area became state-owned; of which the state sold some 15% to the JNF that incorporated them into its pool of *Admot Leom*. In 1960 the state established the Israel Land Administration (ILA), a body in charge of managing all state-owned lands in Israel, including those of the JNF. The treaty between the JNF and the Israeli Government granted the former half of the seats in the executive council of the ILA, while stating the state's obligation to “*support the JNF in fulfilling its goal to redeem the wastelands*”.¹⁰⁰ Thus, officially turning the state-owned lands into an ethno-national resource (fig. 2.6).

⁹⁷ Morris, *The Birth of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*.

⁹⁸ Benvenisti, *Sacred Landscape*; Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*; Kishk and Bakir, 'Arab Land and Israeli Policy', 121–30.

⁹⁹ Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*; Yacobi, 'Architecture, Orientalism and Identity: The Politics of the Israeli-Built Environment', 94–118; Jabareen and Dbiat, *Architecture and orientalism in the country*; Rotbard, *White City, Black City: Architecture and War in Tel Aviv and Jaffa*.

¹⁰⁰ Abreek-Zubeidat and Ben-Arie, 'To Be at Home: Spaces of Citizenship in the Community Settlements of the Galilee', 209; Israel, *Treaty between the Government of Israel and the JNF*, 2.




FIG. 2.6 The increase in Jewish and state-ownership from the Pre-War (left) to the Post-War(right) period. (Illustrated by the author)

After acquiring the needed lands, the state focused on securing its *power over* them. Unlike the pre-1948 years, the scale and scope were significantly larger as the new Israeli Government had the means of a state to form and spread its ideology over the increasing influx of Jewish immigrants that doubled the local population in several years (fig 2.7). Therefore, the former settling practices, which were sporadic and quite tactical, were replaced by a governmental-controlled strategy that harnessed the development of the state's industry and infrastructure. Thus, the Israeli nation-building process, like the pre-state efforts, had both spiritual and physical aspects as well, with the newly developed settlements providing shelter and housing opportunities; promoting socialisation and territorial control.¹⁰¹

The settlement mechanism corresponded with the concerns of the young state and its quasi-socialist *Mapai* government.¹⁰² These issues included the transformation of an amalgam of Jewish immigrant communities into one unified society, providing them with proper housing solutions, establishing a national industry, and securing the state's new borders. The new strategic plan for the young state called for a hierarchical system of development towns and focused on industry and infrastructure that were meant to disperse the local population, secure the borders and strengthen the state's control over its territory. While earlier the pioneer experience formed an educational role model, now, as a state, the Israeli establishment was able to use its various apparatus, like housing, in order to create a bond with its citizens and

¹⁰¹ Yiftachel and Kader, 'Landed power: the making of the Israeli land regime', 67–103; Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 1–28.

¹⁰² I prefer referring to The Israeli socialism as quasi-socialism, or semi-Keynesian, as the state welfare system was highly selective; especially to the local Arab population, which though being citizens of the state, were under martial law until 1966.

to form a nation.¹⁰³ In this sense, Israel's actions resembled the Fordist-Keynesian welfare-state model,¹⁰⁴ which provided the individual with a variety of social services in exchange for his/her labour and civil obedience, tying his/her personal interests to that of the state and its industry.¹⁰⁵ Housing, as claimed by Peter Marcuse in his critique on the post-war welfare system, was a seemingly benevolent act that tightened the dependence of the individual to the state, and actually helped the latter in controlling the first.¹⁰⁶ Thus, forming an integral part of the state's disciplinary institution.¹⁰⁷ Corresponding with Marcuse's claims, the modernistic Israeli industrial towns of the early statehood years, were a governance tool, intended to construct and shape a new form of collective belonging.¹⁰⁸ Appropriately, granting the newly coming Jewish immigrants the *power to* inhabit certain places while securing the state's *power over* them and continuing the national territorial mission. Or in other words, *industrialise and rule*.




FIG. 2.7 Population in Israel 1948-1953

The young state's strategic plan, composed by Arie Sharon,¹⁰⁹ continued the pre-war Zionist policy of securing territorial ownership by settlement. Based on Walter Christaller's Central Places Theory of the 1930s,¹¹⁰ Sharon suggested dispersing

¹⁰³ Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 6–7.

¹⁰⁴ Filc, *Hegemony and Populism in Israel*.

¹⁰⁵ Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*; Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*; Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*.

¹⁰⁶ Marcuse, 'Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State', 21–26.

¹⁰⁷ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.

¹⁰⁸ Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia*; Yacobi, *Constructing a Sense of Place: Architecture and the Zionist Discourse*.

¹⁰⁹ Architect Arie Sharon (1900–1984). Not to confuse with Ariel Sharon (1928–2014), general, minister and later prime minister.

¹¹⁰ Efrat and Dash, *The Israel Physical Master Plan*; Trezib, *Die Theorie der zentralen Orte in Israel und Deutschland: Zur Rezeption Walter Christallers im Kontext von Sharonplan und 'Generalplan Ost'*.

the Israeli population, from the heavily populated coastal plain into a hierarchical system of new industrial towns that expanded into the country's periphery (fig 2.8). This national decentralisation of the [Jewish] population was, according to Sharon "imperative for national and defence standpoints",¹¹¹ thus preserving the results of the 1948 war by urban development. Michel Foucault, in his analyses of power relations, stated that: "Politics is the continuation of war by other means",¹¹² inverting the famous quote of Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz. In the Israeli case, though the violent aspect of the 1948 war ended in the 1949 Armistice Agreement, it continued through the state's territorial policy, which focused on securing its geographical dominance by the construction of new settlements and dispersing the Jewish population into the state's periphery and internal frontiers.



FIG. 2.8 "Planning or laissez faire" - Sharon's Plan for national decentralisation and population dispersal from the coastal plain to the periphery and internal frontiers. 1951. (Arieh Sharon Archive)

Sharon's plan was based on a coalition between the state's industrial needs and its political interest. In the introduction to the 1951 masterplan he stated that: "The physical planning of a country must be based on economic, social, and defence considerations".¹¹³ Sharon claimed that the new industrial towns would secure the country's geographical frontiers, while enabling the development of the state's

¹¹¹ Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel*, 5.

¹¹² Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 15.

¹¹³ Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel*, 9.

industry, which would be much more productive due to the low operation costs in the periphery.¹¹⁴ Therefore, on the one hand, the new state-owned lands, seized in the 1948 war, functioned as a platform for the principals to develop a dispersed urban system. On the other hand, it functioned also as an objective, to be secured by this new system, as the construction of new towns in peripheral areas was intended to safeguard the new Israeli borders and to ensure the state's control over the ex-Arab lands. Sharon claimed that these new towns would provide the proper habitation, education and employment to the Jewish immigrants and would therefore “*expedite their integration into one organic and productive unit*”.¹¹⁵

This corresponded with semi-Keynesian-Fordist welfare-state approach of the contemporary local ideology. In its first decades, the state of Israel asked to provide its citizens with the basic needs of habitation and employment, while promoting a new unified Israeli identity.¹¹⁶ On the strategic level, Sharon asked to create 24 planning regions, each containing a population of 75-12,000, which would decentralise the local Jewish population, enhance the state's territorial control while developing a balanced industry and proper housing opportunities. Each region would include a medium-sized industrial town, which would function as a regional hub and as a civil centre. In the centralised Israeli economy of the 1950s and 1960s, the state was not only in charge of the planning process, but acted also as the initiator, financier, and constructor of these new towns. Accordingly, the massive state-led construction of new industrial towns in the Israeli periphery became known as the Israeli Project.¹¹⁷ Consequently, their spatial characteristics followed the state's ideology, promoting homogeneous and uniform residential environments that emphasised the role of the individual as an integral part of the collective national organism. Subsequently, they consisted of a top-down hierarchical plan that relied on single-use zoning and a series of reproduced residential estates. The use of separated residential and industrial areas did not only correlate with the state's desire for homogeneity, but also with its aspiration to simultaneously appropriate and ignore the remains of depopulated Palestinian towns; settling the areas surrounding their remnants while leaving them to decay (fig 2.9).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*

¹¹⁵ *Physical Planning in Israel*, 4.

¹¹⁶ Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony*; Filc, *Hegemony and Populism in Israel*.

¹¹⁷ Efrat, *The Object of Zionism: The Architecture of Israel*.



FIG. 2.9 Models for new industrial towns illustrated by Arieh Sharon - Beer Sheva; Ashkelon; Kiryat Shmona. 1951, (Arieh Sharon Archives). Note, in brown are the remains of depopulated Palestinian settlements.

Being part of a large state-led project, the construction of new residential neighbourhoods and development towns was controlled by the governmental ministries. Initially, it was the Planning Directorate in the Ministry of Labour and Construction and the Housing Directorate that guided the development of new residential environments during the 1950s.¹¹⁸ With the growing need to coordinate and concentrate the national development of dwelling units, the Israeli Government established the Ministry of Housing in 1961.¹¹⁹ Though the new ministry did not have additional responsibilities compared to the former directorate, its establishment points out the key role dwelling units played in the young state. As an outcome of a massive state-concentrated effort, the dozens of industrial development towns promoted by the Housing Directorate and later the Ministry of Housing, are considered to be one of the most controversial episodes in Israeli history.¹²⁰ They were forcibly populated, mostly by underprivileged *Mizrahi* immigrants,¹²¹ and as the attempt to industrialise the periphery failed, the term development town turned into a synonym for urban failure, discrimination, and neglect.¹²² In this sense, the participation in the national territorial project was based on the lack of spatial privileges that settled non-hegemonic Jewish groups in anonymous, alienating

¹¹⁸ Shadar, *The Foundations of Public Housing*, 14–15.

¹¹⁹ Shadar, 76.

¹²⁰ Cohen, 'Problems of Development Towns and Urban Housing Quarters', 117–25; El-hanani, 'Feelings of Ethnic Discrimination in two Development Towns', 97–99.

¹²¹ Jews originated from Arab or Islamic countries

¹²² Efrat, 'New Development Towns of Israel (1948-93); Shenhav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity*.

and reproduced housing estates in the state's periphery. With the economically liberalising society of the early 1970s and the shifting focus on self-expression and self-fulfilment the *industrialise and rule* policy promoted through the 1950s and 1960 was replaced by a new one, which focused on living standards and private initiative. This initially began as an attempt to prevent negative immigration from development towns by providing better dwelling opportunities locally, consisting of a detached private household, and later developed as a model for new settlements.¹²³

While the main focus turned towards industrial towns, the agrarian effort was not entirely forsaken. In the early 1950s, the state initiated a series of kibbutzim and moshavim in frontier areas and on previously Arab owned land, mainly adjacent to the newly established borders with Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. The establishment of the military Nahal corps, under the direct orders of prime-minister Ben Gurion, played a key role in these efforts.¹²⁴ In the first three decades up to 1978, Nahal soldiers took a significantly active part and led the construction of almost 150 new settlements. This was carried out in concentrated operations resembling the pre-state Tower and Wall settlements, such as in the case of the Frontier Fortresses Plan and Operation SUS (*sof-sof* – literally meaning “finally”) of 1960. These border settlements were first established by a *Gari'in* (core group), made out of Nahal soldiers, which was in charge of the first preparation stages. After a given period, they were handed to a civilian settling group, in what became to be known as a civilising or naturalisation ceremony. Turning fully civilian, the new settlement would develop according to the new group's ideology: A kibbutz in the case of a socialist group, and a fully private moshav in more liberal cases (or a hybrid form that had both communal and private features). Alongside the Nahal led efforts, several new rural settlements were built through other national agencies, which included the JNF, the Ministry of Agriculture and the World Zionist Organisation.¹²⁵

By the early 1970s, Israeli society would go through significant social and cultural changes. In the late 1960s the Israeli economy entered a process of liberalisation and privatisation, which accelerated in 1977 with the election of the first liberal-oriented right-wing government. In this process, the state sold several key national enterprises and services to the private market.¹²⁶ As a result, the national mission of

¹²³ Berger, *Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel*; Hatuka et al., *Neighborhood-State*.

¹²⁴ Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*.

¹²⁵ Abreek-Zubeidat and Ben-Arie, 'To Be at Home: Spaces of Citizenship in the Community Settlements of the Galilee'.

¹²⁶ Hason, *Three decades of privatisation*; Filc, *Hegemony and Populism in Israel*.

developing and settling was privatised as well, and the local built environment began being influenced not only by national considerations such as ideology, identity, security, and sovereignty, but also by economic and personal ones. Accordingly, in the liberalising Israel, the old ideology of Labour or Socialist Zionism that sought to promote the renaissance of the Jewish nation in its historic homeland by physically returning to it and cultivating it was less relevant.¹²⁷

At the same time, the national mission to continue constructing new settlements was not abandoned. In a way, it even intensified with the occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 and the political turnover of 1977. The economic changes that followed were realised in many aspects of the Israeli culture and society.¹²⁸ Accordingly, the Ministry of Housing, turned into the Ministry of Construction and Housing in 1978, as the emphasis began shifting from state-led construction, to state sponsored private development.¹²⁹ Correspondingly, the national mission of frontier settlement changed as well, and while in the early statehood days the pioneer spirit formed the main driving force behind frontier settlements, in the liberalising Israel this act was no longer merely an ideological deed, but one that is also based on individual and economic interests.¹³⁰ Consequently, the national focus on creating a unified society gave way to the individual chase for “quality of life” in ex-urban and suburban contexts, which became an integral feature in the construction of new settlements.¹³¹ New settlements, offering larger houses in small communities in a communing distance from the main city centres became the main logic behind the national territorial project;¹³² a strategy of *suburbanise and rule*, where the national *Hagshama* (fulfilment) was tied to *Hagshama Atzmit* (self-fulfilment); based on the state granting members of favoured groups the spatial privilege to consume space.

¹²⁷ Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony*.

¹²⁸ Ram, ‘Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local – McDonald’s in Israel’; Ram, *The Globalization of Israel*; Segev, *Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel*.

¹²⁹ Shadar, *The Foundations of Public Housing*, 164.

¹³⁰ Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–520; Newman, ‘Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization’; Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation’.

¹³¹ Billig, ‘The Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria (1967–2008): Historical Overview’, 331–47.

¹³² Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–510; Allegra, ‘“Outside Jerusalem—yet so Near”: Ma’ale Adumim, Jerusalem, and the Suburbanization of Israel’s Settlement Policy’, 48–63.

The decline of the Israeli welfare-state was parallel to the decline of the global one. This eventually brought to the rise of post-modernism, neoliberalism and market economy.¹³³ Consequently, the former welfare system went through a process of privatisation, where key social services began being supplied by corporations instead of the state. Liberalising the welfare system meant that the state privatised its disciplinary institutions, such as the built environment; thus, altering the interests that shaped it. With the new metropolitan-based local-decentralisation efforts of the 1980–90s, which changed the former national distribution strategy,¹³⁴ the state began attaching the national development process to the rationale of the market. Thus, increasing the involvement of private capital in the settlement mechanism, which increased the commodification of the produced residential environments.¹³⁵ The only way the individual was able to participate in this process was by investing from her/his private funds; literally buying a “*piece of capitalism*” while concluding in the “*financialisation of the everyday life*”.¹³⁶

While the early privatised settlement efforts focused on attracting families by promising better living standards, later ones included a growing reliance on large-scale private corporations. Therefore, with the state granting private developers the spatial privilege to produce space, the settlement mechanism transformed into a real estate project. Subjected to the financial logic of the market, a house in a new settlement turned into an investment, its development was based on speculations, and its owner became a shareholder in the national territorial mission of *financialise and rule*. Therefore, in each phase, the state used a different mechanism to enforce its interests on the individual; whether by *forcing* him/her to move to the periphery, *seducing* her/him by the suburban lifestyle, or by incorporating the territorial project into to existing social structure, as an integral part of the market economy.¹³⁷

The geopolitical role of the built environment received an official status with the approval of the controversial Nation-State Bill Law by the Israeli parliament in July 19th of 2018. Among the 11 clauses of this law, which has constitutional status and defines Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, a special paragraph is designated to the issue of Jewish settlement, stating that: “*The state views the*

¹³³ Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*; Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

¹³⁴ Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209–18.

¹³⁵ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

¹³⁶ Graeber, *Debt: The First 5000 Years*, 367.

¹³⁷ Dovey, *Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form*, 3.

development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation".¹³⁸ By mentioning Jewish settlement as a national interest, this bill proves that the strategy of *settle and rule* did not cease, and still constitutes a leading ideological principle. Continuing along the different periods, from the pre-statehood efforts, through the nation-building decades of the 1950s and 60s, to the current neoliberal years of the early 2000s, the *settle and rule* ideology evolved and changed according to the societal, political and economic transitions (fig 2.10). Focusing on the settlements along the Green-Line, which witnessed a growing involvement of private capital, this thesis aims to explain how this gradual privatisation of the settlement mechanism developed over the years and how this transformed the local built environment.




FIG. 2.10 The evolution of Israeli housing typologies according to the different phases in the national settlement Project (Illustrated by the author)

¹³⁸ Knesset of Israel, Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People.

2.5 Privatising and Privatisation: The Trans-Israel Highway

Privatisation is a process in which the state transfers its property, responsibility and control to private hands. The term is often associated with the sale of government companies or public services to private corporations. These include the control of natural resources, the development of civil infrastructure and the national industry, or even basic welfare services such as education, security, or health. Privatisation is basically the liquidation of the post-war Fordist-Keynesian state that controlled the development of the economy, securing the individuals employment and providing one with the basic welfare services. The logic behind privatisation is that a profit-driven private entity would be able to provide the same services as the state, yet better and more efficiently, and most importantly, without '*spending*' public money'.¹³⁹ With the challenges of the 1970s, which were characterised by monetary recession and wide national debts, privatisation turned into the common economic perspective of the industrialised western world; perceived as a means to recover and salvage failing financial systems.¹⁴⁰ This was the main logic behind the rise of the neoliberal agenda, which asked to return to the main concepts of the liberal, pre-war economic rationale.

The privatisation of Israel followed similar paths, yet, it had its own unique characteristics. David Harvey describes neoliberalism as an attempt of the old economic elites to retain their former financial powers by reducing the control of the state. In fact, in industrialised western countries, where the economic inequality decreased significantly during the 1950s and 1960s, it began to increase during the 1970s once again.¹⁴¹ In Israel, which was a young quasi-socialist country, with an economic system that was heavily controlled by the state, it is quite hard to speak of an old economic elite asking to retain its power. Moreover, as a country based on an ethnic-oriented nationalism, and ruled by a certain hegemonic group, Israeli was a semi or quasi-welfare-state. The Arab population, which was under martial rule until 1966, and the Mizrahi sector, received far from similar conditions such as

¹³⁹ Graeber, *Debt: The First 5000 Years*; Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*.

¹⁴⁰ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

¹⁴¹ Harvey, 15–19.

the privileged Ashkenazi sector that was affiliated with the ruling *Mapai* party and Labour Zionism.¹⁴²

The first privatisation measures that took place during the 1960s stimulated the formation of a local middle-class. This group consisted of liberalising members of the Labour Zionism hegemony and other urban white-collar families; an evidence to that is the foundation of the Israeli Liberal Party in 1961.¹⁴³ These would later join forces with marginalised right-wing Revisionist Zionists and large segments of the Mizrahi sector, creating the Likud party and eventually overthrowing the socialist *Mapai* regime in 1977. Promoting a liberal economic agenda was thus both an anti-establishment act, protesting against the discriminating *Mapai* protectionism, and an attempt to support the interests of the emerging middle-class.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, as the state-controlled market and industry was of an ethno-national nature, its privatisation followed a similar path.

1977 was a crucial year in the privatisation of Israel. Under the new government of Menachem Begin, the process, which was already underway, significantly intensified as further and more crucial steps were made to finally free the market from Ben Gurion's "*Bolshevism*".¹⁴⁵ Subsequently, the Israeli economy underwent a cordial inflation in the early 1980s, which led to a stock crash and the bankruptcy of the Labour's union and later the Kibbutzim Movement (the two main *Mapai* institutions). The varied consequences of that time concluded in the loss of union power, further privatisation and a devaluation in the expedience and profitability of agriculture.¹⁴⁶ According to Gutwein, the hegemony of the socialist Ashkenazi sector fully cooperated with the post-1977 privatisation measures in order to retain its power by turning its privileges into financial capital.¹⁴⁷ Gutwein highlights the 1985 Economic Stabilisation Plan. According to him, the fact that it was promoted and approved by the national coalition headed by Prime Minister Shimon Peres from the Labour Party and concluded in significant cuts in government expenditures and privatization of many government-owned businesses, provides a clear proof to this collaboration.

¹⁴² Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony*, 21–29; Shenhav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity*, 136–84.

¹⁴³ Gutwein, 'The class logic of the "long revolution", 1973-1977', 21–57.

¹⁴⁴ Filc, *Hegemony and Populism in Israel*.

¹⁴⁵ Segev, *Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel*, 49.

¹⁴⁶ Hason, *Three decades of privatisation*.

¹⁴⁷ Gutwein, 'The class logic of the "long revolution", 1973-1977'.

Thus, if 1977 accelerated the process of privatisation, 1985 turned into a point of no return where the neo-liberal agenda became the obvious way *'things are done'*.¹⁴⁸

Transforming from state-controlled and ethnic-based socialism into a market-oriented economy, retained the existing social structures. In most cases, the transfer of governmental and public-owned companies to private hands was done to a limited number of emerging businessmen. Due to their political connections these well-connected entrepreneurs were able to receive extremely favourable conditions, which allowed them to purchase the public companies way below their market value. This eventually transformed the state market concentration into a private one, where in a short period of time a limited number of new tycoons were able to take over the local market.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, besides the fact of previously being quasi-socialist, Israel is still an ethnic-based society. Subsequently, the privatisation of the local economy was accompanied by the creation of a series of 'ethno-classes' that are meant to retain the ethnic segregation by widening socioeconomic gaps. Yiftachel and Avni refer to this process as *Privati-nation*, as it consists of selective privatisation, meant to economically empower a specific ethnic group, and thus enhance its social dominance.¹⁵⁰ Correspondingly, Yacobi and Tzfadia highlighted the same "*Selective Privatisation*" as a means to attract privileged groups to frontier areas by promising them exclusive spatial rights; promoting the states control while creating their own ethnically secluded communities.¹⁵¹ Consequently, the forces of the market that are supposedly colour-blind turned into a tool used to prevent social and ethnic integration, promoting spatial privileges as a means to ensure geopolitical and demographic dominance.

The Trans-Israel Highway is perhaps one of the best examples to the local privatisation mechanism. The highway, which began operating in 2002, is one of the largest infrastructure projects in the history of the state of Israel, and the first to be developed and operated by private means. The first ideas of such a highway, which would constitute an eastern parallel to the coastal routs, emerged already in the late 1960s.¹⁵² The National Outline Plan 3 (NOP) mentioned a minimised version of the

¹⁴⁸ Rabinowitz and Vardi, *Driving Forces: Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures in Israel*, 15.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁵⁰ Yiftachel and Avni, 'Privati-nation'– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps', 225.

¹⁵¹ Yacobi and Tzfadia, 'Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel', 2.

¹⁵² Efrat, 'Israel's Planned New "Crossing Highway"'.

current route already in 1976, however, concrete planning did not begin before the late 1980s. With the construction boom that followed the immigration waves of the early 1990s, the Public Works Department (PWD – *Maatz*) resurfaced the idea and turned it into a 300km road connecting Beer Sheva in the south and Yokneam in the North (fig 2.11). In 1991 *Netivei Israel* – the National Transport Infrastructure Company Ltd, conducted a feasibility study that showed an urgent necessity to construct the road, which led to the establishment of the Trans-Israel Road Ltd, a governmental company meant to promote and manage the construction of the new highway.¹⁵³ The company conducted several additional analyses, which pointed out the feasibility and economic potential of such a road. Though the studies ignored other possibilities like developing the national train system and used selective data to support the car-oriented approach,¹⁵⁴ the Israeli Government and all the relevant offices all supported the construction of the new road. This decision was backed by the main political parties, and while the hawkish right-wing factors saw it as a possibility to strengthen the Jewish settlement along the Green-Line, the more dovish factors pictured it as a utopian road of peace, which would one day connect Egypt and Lebanon through Israel.¹⁵⁵



FIG. 2.11 Proposed rout of the Trans-Israel Highway, 1992. (Garb, 2004)

¹⁵³ Trans-Israel Ltd, 'Transisrael'.

¹⁵⁴ Garb, 'Constructing the Trans-Israel Highway's Inevitability', 180–217.

¹⁵⁵ Azrayahu, 'Rabin's Road: The Politics of Toponymic Commemoration of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel', 73–82.

The Trans-Israel Road Ltd encouraged the construction of the highway by private capital. The Israeli Government, headed by Yitzhak Rabin's Labour Party, promoted the proposal to fund the construction process by extra-budgetary sources, with a private corporation funding, paving, and operating the freeway as a toll road - for a 30-year franchise (a BOT format- Built, Operate, Transfer). This decision was undisputed by almost all sides of the political spectrum and shortly after approving the construction of the road in 1994, the Israeli parliament approved the toll road option as well.¹⁵⁶ The rationale behind the decision was that an experienced private corporation would have better managerial skills and planning competencies that would lead to quicker, more efficient, and professional execution. Moreover, the privatisation of the process was justified due to the profit-minded risk management, which would lead to relatively low toll prices.¹⁵⁷ However, as shown by Rabinowitz and Vardi, the governmental guarantees given to the private franchisees promised significant subsidies in case of low usage, preventing major losses, and insignificant dividends in case of over usage, ensuring major profits. Moreover, they also showed how the government repeatedly supported the rise in toll prices, leading to rates that are significantly higher than in comparable examples elsewhere.¹⁵⁸ Thus, the profit was privatised, but the risk remained public.

The franchisee of the Trans-Israel Highway was a private conglomerate named *Derech Eretz* that enjoyed significant support from the state. It started when Canadian Highways International Corporation (CHIC) was interested in competing in the national tender for the highway. Looking for a local partner they first turned to Bank Leumi. The bank, which at that time was nationalised with all other banks following the local banking crisis of the 1980s, directed CHIC to Africa-Israel Ltd, a construction and holding company owned by it. Africa-Israel had almost no knowledge and experience in infrastructure, yet, it was interested in the project due to its recently acquired sub-companies of Packer Steel and Alon energy. Africa-Israel saw the economic potential in the construction materials that Packer Steel would provide for the project and the filling stations that Alon would build along it. Moreover, as a real estate company, the development of the area created new potential investments for Africa-Israel. For CHIC, the partnership with inexperienced Africa-Israel promised the needed contacts and connections with the local authorities. In 1996, as part of the privatisation efforts, the state would

¹⁵⁶ Garb, 'Constructing the Trans-Israel Highway's Inevitability'.

¹⁵⁷ Trans-Israel Ltd, 'Transisrael'.

¹⁵⁸ Rabinowitz and Vardi, *Driving Forces: Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures in Israel*.

sell its shares in Bank Leumi to Lev Leviev, an Israeli-Uzbek businessman and diamond trader, who would also become the owner of Africa-Israel. In 1998, the third partner in Derech Eretz, the French Société Générale would sell its shares to the Israeli *Shikun U'Binui* Ltd. *Shikun U'Binui* was a construction company owned by the *Histadrut*, the decades-old central workers' union, which due to its economic recovery measures in 1995 had to sell its shares to Ted Arison, an Israeli-American businessman. Arison, had already purchased the previously nationalised Bank Hapoalim in 1997, one of the main banks in Israel, which was the one that gave Derech Eretz the credit to build the highway that same year; a deal which was done only after a clear governmental guarantee that would lower the risks taken by the franchisees once again.¹⁵⁹ The soap opera behind Highway 6 thus presents a national infrastructure project, constructed by privatised construction companies that were owned by the same conglomerates as the banks that funded the process, yet all backed by the government and public funds.

The state-backed private congregate was eventually able to minimise all opposition to the project. The main objections were from environmentalists and landowners whose lands were confiscated for the construction of the road. The landowners were mainly Arab and Jewish farmers, yet while the Jewish farmers, enjoyed a tough political lobby and a unified representation, the Arab farmers were divided and poorly represented. In order to appease the Jewish farmers, the state promised them to promote new commercial centres and industrial parks on land parcels owned by them on the roads leading to the new highway. Moreover, the Kibbutzim Movement, which still owned shares in Alon Energy, a filling stations that is part of the Africa-Israel concern, was interested in the future joint real estate projects that both companies could promote. The negotiations with the Arab farmers were done mainly individually, with the majority of them preferring to receive alternative farming parcels. Eventually, the new commercial and industrial compounds that the state promoted in the area contributed mainly to the Jewish localities along the roads, while the alternative lands the Arab farmers received were in a worse state than the ones they previously owned. Thus, the privately built Trans-Israel Highway actively enhanced the existing ethno-economic stratification. Similarly, the battle against the environmentalists was mainly a PR campaign, and *Derech Eretz* used its connections to recruit key figures and decisions makers while conducting an aggressive greenwashing campaign that portrayed those against the highway as irrelevant, privileged, and marginal organisations that prevent the development of Israel.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*

This entangled story of the Trans-Israel Highway turns it into an ideal example of the post-socialist and ethno-nationalist Israel neoliberalism. From its first years, the governmental Netivei Israel company was headed by Moshe Levi. Levi, the former IDF Chief of Staff, was a highly decorated and well-respected general. He was regarded as an honest, trustworthy and authentic officer, whose height and Mizrahi origin added to his public persona. Already his appointment as the head of the Israeli military was an attempt to cleanse it from the controversies of the Lebanon War of 1982. Selecting Levi as the CEO of Netivei Israel gave the project the aura of an undisputed national and patriotic mission; an aura that continued to function as Netivei Israel promoted the interests of the private franchisees building the highway. Therefore, Levi's transformation from a promising young officer, to Chief of Staff and then into a patriotic mask for a privatised project, illustrates the Israeli version of neoliberalism (fig 2.12).



FIG. 2.12 Levi's transition from a promising cadet receiving his ranks from Prime-Minister and Minister of Defence David Ben Gurion in 1955; to chief of staff with Prime Minister Peres in 1986; to the middleman between Lev Leviev (left) and Minister of Infrastructure Ariel Sharon in 1998 (Governmental Press Office-GPO)

2.6 The evolving domestication of the eastern frontier

The border area between the Israeli coastal plain with the occupied West-Bank went through major transformations in the past eight decades. Before the 1948 war, the area had limited Jewish presence and it consisted mainly of Arab Palestinian towns and villages and their farmlands. After the war, the area was depopulated of its Arab Palestinian inhabitants and the 1949 Armistice Agreements shaped the new international border, creating a divide between the new state of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan (fig 2.13). This border, which came to be known as the Green-Line,¹⁶¹ followed the topographical features of the area, leaving the Samaritan hills on the Jordanian side and their western plains on the Israeli one. As a result, the Israeli coastal plain, the Tel Aviv metropolitan area of Gush Dan and its eastern fringes, were of a width of almost a mere 15km, which formed the only connector between Israel's northern area and its centre and thus became known as the country's 'narrow waist'.¹⁶² During the 1950s, to strengthen its control over this new internal frontier, the state promoted the construction of more than 20 new rural settlements in the area, on the sites of former Palestinian villages and along the new border (fig 2.14).¹⁶³

While the state did promote a plan to establish new settlements in the area during the 1960s, it preferred to develop other internal frontiers. This plan, named "The Frontier Fortresses", was not completely fulfilled and produced an irrelevant number of new posts. Though it demonstrates the perception of the area as a neglected, vacant, breached and dangerous zone, which needs to be fortified and protected, its lack of fulfilment points out the state's preferences to settle other internal frontiers, such as the Galilee and the Negev.¹⁶⁴ The strategic perspective of the young state focused on a wide national-scale decentralisation effort, and it thus chose to locate the newly built development towns far from the heavily populated coastal plain.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ The name derives from the colour of the ink that was used to draw the line upon the map

¹⁶² Soffer and Gazit, *Between the Sharon and Samaria*.

¹⁶³ Tal, *The Frontier Fortresses Plan*.

¹⁶⁴ Soffer and Gazit, *Between the Sharon and Samaria*; Tal, *The Frontier Fortresses Plan*.

¹⁶⁵ Efrat, 'Geographical Distribution of the Soviet-Jewish New Immigrants in Israel'; Efrat, *The Object of Zionism: The Architecture of Israel*.

As the state preferred to develop other border areas, this part of the Green-Line was not frontier-like enough to receive the needed attention for its development, and it functioned more as a peripheral border zone.




FIG. 2.13 The Green-Line area in 1949. (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 2.14 New rural settlements along the Green-Line during the 1950s. (Illustrated by the author)

The occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 changed the status of the Green-Line, turning it into an area of national importance. The fact that Israel ruled over both sides of the former border, even though the West-Bank was not officially annexed, turned the area into a transition territory from the Israeli coastal plain to the occupied West-Bank. The new status of the area as a Seam-Zone (*Kav HaTefer*), which simultaneously detaches and connects Israel and the occupied territories, turned it into a frontier to be domesticated. Nevertheless, in the first years after the

1967 war, the state did not adopt a clear agenda for the development of the area. In the plan of Defence Minister Yigal Alon for the future of the occupied territories, which was never officially accepted, the areas east of the Green-Line should have either returned to Jordanian control or become part of a Palestinian autonomous rule;¹⁶⁶ whereas Israel would annex the Judean Desert, the Jordan Valley and areas around Jerusalem (fig 2.15). Subsequently, the non-official state policy was to avoid settling in areas other than those the Alon Plan intended to annex. Therefore, the Labour Government of the 1970s initially tried to limit the actions of the religious right-wing movement of *Gush Emunim* that asked to construct Jewish settlement all across the West-Bank.¹⁶⁷ Even the far reaching “Double Column Plan” (*HaShidra Hakfula*) of 1975, which called for the development of an eastern counterpart to the Israeli coastal plain, all along the borders with Jordan and the eastern part of the occupied Sinai peninsula, had left the heart of the West-Bank out (fig 2.16).¹⁶⁸ This approach would change in 1977 with the rise of the first right-wing Likud regime and Ariel Sharon’s term as Minister of Agriculture.¹⁶⁹

Despite the changing perspective of the new Israeli Government of 1977, the area remained relatively undeveloped. The national-religious settlers like the members of Gush Emunim, preferred settling in the core of the West-Bank, especially in areas with some affiliation to the biblical texts. Their plan was focused on small-scale settlements on the Samaritan hills (fig 2.17), while the plan of the World Zionist Organisation’s Settlement Division and the Israeli Government of 1978 concentrated on groups of settlement blocs (fig 2.18). Besides a few new settlement points, the Seam-Zone was relatively untouched, and the majority of the new sites developed between 1977-1981 had been already authorised by the former Labour Government, before the elections of 1977.¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless, this would introduce a new settlement typology along the Green-Line, the Community Settlement (fig 2.19).

¹⁶⁶ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*.

¹⁶⁷ Gush Emunim, ‘Proposal for Settlement in Judea and Samaria’.

¹⁶⁸ Wachman, ‘The Double Column Plan’.

¹⁶⁹ Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’; Yiftachel, ‘From Sharon to Sharon: Spatial Planning and Separation Regime in Israel/Palestine’, 73–106.

¹⁷⁰ Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*.




FIG. 2.15 The "Alon Plan", 1967 (Tessler, 1994)




FIG. 2.16 The Double Column Plan, 1975. Avraham Wachman. In black are the areas for intense Jewish settlement




FIG. 2.17 Gush Emunim Plan, 1977. (Gush Emunim Movement)




FIG. 2.18 The World Zionist Organisation Plan ('Droble's' Plan), 1978. (WZO)




FIG. 2.19 New neo-rural settlements along the Green-Line area 1977-1981. (Illustrated by the author)

The neo-rural or Community Settlements lacked almost all means of production; industrial, commercial as well as agricultural. Nevertheless, as their objective was not to create a commuter-based community but rather one that is connected to the local natural landscape, they were quasi or neo-rural settlements, and much more counter-urban than simply suburban. As such, they consisted of a small previously organised group, which was usually affiliated to certain settlement movement or a political party. The mechanism behind them relied on the state granting these selected groups the spatial privilege of exclusively settling a site and by that to establish their own homogeneous community away from the urban centres, as a means to increase the state presence and control.¹⁷¹ The establishment of these

¹⁷¹ Yiftachel, 'Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State', 21-47.

sites consisted of a pioneer-like phase of temporary houses that eventually turned into a permanent settlement. Thus, mimicking pre-statehood frontier settlement methods and adopting a frontier-like discourse and lifestyle.¹⁷²

In the early 1980s, the state's development perspective became much more suburban (fig 2.20). This occurred in light of the changes in the national economy and culture, which led to increasing demands for suburban residential environment.¹⁷³ The Settlements Division's plan of 1981 continued to insist on settling the entire West-Bank, yet, it began to incorporate terms as "*areas of high demand*", "*commuting*", "*private initiative*", "*living standards*" and "*middle-class families*".¹⁷⁴ The main assumption of the Settlement Division was that the heart of the West-Bank would attract a more ideological population, while the area close to the Tel Aviv metropolis and the coastal plain would to attract middle-class and upper-middle-class families looking for affordable better living standards.¹⁷⁵

At the same time, both the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH) began encouraging private-led construction in the area, relying on a new set of spatial privileges.¹⁷⁶ As stated in an official report of the MA, the official policy was that "*west Samaria will become a part of Gush Dan*", while directing the "*Pioneer population*" to settle other parts of the West-Bank.¹⁷⁷ The growing private construction in the West-Bank concluded in a public dispute between the Minister of Housing David Levi, and the Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, regarding the responsibility of directing new privately initiated settlements.¹⁷⁸ In this dispute, both offices emphasised their role in promoting private construction. CEO of the MCH, Asher Wiener, claimed that his office was "*a pioneer in bringing private developers to build from their own money*", while both the MA and the Settlement Division state that the MCH is not using the "*demand forces*"

¹⁷² Rotbard, 'Wall and Tower', 39–58; Kemp, 'The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel', 79.

¹⁷³ Gutwein, 'The class logic of the "long revolution", 1973-1977', 21–57; Allegra, 'The Politics of Suburbia: Israel's Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem', 497–510.

¹⁷⁴ Settlement Division, 'The 100.000 Plan', 8–20.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁷⁶ Weismann, 'Private Settlements in Samaria'.

¹⁷⁷ Ministry of Agriculture, 'Renewal of settlement momentum in Judea and Samaria', 2.

¹⁷⁸ Barel, 'CEO of MH Warns Apartment Buyers in the West Bank', 1; Maoz, 'MA and MH agree on cooperation in construction in JS', 1.

as needed.¹⁷⁹ Settling the dispute needed the direct intervention of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and eventually, beside the allocation of sites, the establishment of new settlements became a mission of the MCH's department of rural development; leading to a more organised and controlled suburbanisation process that began relying on larger and more experienced contractors and developers.




FIG. 2.20 Existing settlements and areas of national importance (grey); Settlement areas according to demand areas; needed roads to connect the WB settlements to the coastal plain. 1981, Settlement Division, (WZO)

The suburban focus affected the development of the area along the Green-Line. Accordingly, during the 1980s, the MA and the MCH promoted the gentrification of the area through the construction of ten new Suburban Settlements. Unlike the earlier neo-rural examples, these new settlements relied on creating a suburban residential environment, with spacious houses and a well-maintained landscape, and most important, an easy commute to the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Not surprisingly, the new settling families were far from resembling the allegedly more ideological religious settlers of Gush Emunim, and they consisted mainly of city dwellers looking to improve their living standards. The new population was characterised as an upper-middle-class, more secular and politically left-central leaning, and usually

¹⁷⁹ Wiener, *Letter to Michael Dekel*, 1; Settlement Division, 'Population dispersal policy and development of Judea and Samaria', 2.

not part of the right-wing religious bloc.¹⁸⁰ These new Suburban Settlements began forming the territorial sequence between the coastal plain and the West-Bank that attracted large segments of Israeli society (fig 2.21). The recession of the 1980s and the decrease in the national demand for dwelling units prevented this process from being even larger.¹⁸¹




FIG. 2.21 New suburban settlements along the Green-Line during the 1980s. (Illustrated by the author)

¹⁸⁰ Portugali, 'Jewish Settlement in the Occupied Territories Israel Settlement Structure and the Palestinians', 26–53; Benvenisti, *Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social, and Political Developments in the West Bank*; ICBS, 'Socio-economic index value 2013, cluster of locality'.

¹⁸¹ Razin, 'Urban Economic Development in a Period of Local Initiative: Competition among Towns in Israel's Southern Coastal Plain', 685–703.

The gentrification of the area during the 1980s enabled its mass suburbanisation during the 1990s. These years were characterised by the Jewish immigration from the Former Soviet Union, which increased the Israeli population by 20% in less than ten years, and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that followed the First Intifada of the 1980s.¹⁸² To increase the national supply of dwelling units, which was needed due to the increasing immigration, and to improve its territorial claims in any future negotiation by appropriating more lands, the Israeli Government promoted the construction of new suburban settlements along the Green-Line. The objective of the governmental scheme, known as the “Stars Plan” (fig 2.22-2.23), was to offer middle-class families affordable suburban housing, which would lead them to evacuate their apartments in the Gush Dan area for the use of the newly coming immigrants.¹⁸³



FIG. 2.22 The “Stars Plan”, 1992. (Dunsky Planners)




FIG. 2.23 The suburbanisation of Green-Line area during the 1990s. (Illustrated by the author)

¹⁸² Efrat, 'Geographical Distribution of the Soviet-Jewish New Immigrants in Israel'; Tolz, 'Jewish Emigration from the Former USSR since 1970', 1–27.

¹⁸³ Nahoum Dunsky Planners, 'Development of the Hills' Axis: The Seven Stars Plan'.

The new Stars Plan of the 1990s completed the suburban turn of the Green-Line and finalised its domestication. The plan of 1991 relied on a similar un-executed scheme from 1978 named the 'Hills Axis Plan', prepared by Baruch Kipnis for the MCH and even mentioned it in its subtitle.¹⁸⁴ However, the 1978 plan spoke of creating an alternative urban system that would run parallel to the existing coastal plain all along the country, while the new plan asked to extend the coastal plain eastwards, towards the Green-Line (fig 2.24-2.25).



FIG. 2.24 Hills Axis Plan, site for new urban settlements along the Green-Line, 1978. (Baruch Kipnis)




FIG. 2.25 Division into areas and their connection to the coastal plain, the Stars Plan, 1992. (Dunsky Planners)

¹⁸⁴ Kipnis, 'Potential of Developing Urban Housings along the Hills Axis'.

The intention to create a suburban ring along the Green-Line was part of the new national planning perspective. While during the first statehood decades, the planning strategy asked to create a general national decentralisation of population and means of production, the approach of the 1990s began favouring a concentrated local decentralisation. Both the National Outline Plan 31 (NOP 31) of 1993 and National Outline Plan 35 (NOP 35) of 2005 focused on a metropolitan-based approach, which asked to tie the national strategy to the rationale of the market. At the same time the territorial agenda was not entirely forsaken, and both plans addressed the issue of settling frontier areas.¹⁸⁵ Therefore as the government asked to connect the ‘*areas of high demand*’ with the ‘*areas of national interest*’, internal frontier areas like the Green-Line that also had an economic potential, became the main focus of the national development efforts.¹⁸⁶ Consequently, the Green-Line was blurred, and what was once considered the country’s frontier, or the Seam-Zone, became an integral part of the Tel Aviv Metropolis (fig 2.27). Moreover, the advanced planning of the new Trans-Israel Highway during the mid-1990s implicated that this developing area would become an essential part of the Israeli core.




FIG. 2.26 The development of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area according the CBS (ICBS, 2008)

¹⁸⁵ Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209; Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel’, 17–19.

¹⁸⁶ Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1243.

The development of the area would halt by the early 2000s but regenerate less than ten years later. After the construction boom that followed the mass immigration from the Former Soviet Union, the Israeli building industry entered a stage of recession, caused by an overflow of supply. Subsequently, the construction of new settlements and new dwelling units significantly decreased and the MCH decided to freeze some of the planned projects along the Green-Line; fearing their economic failure (fig 2.27). The violent incidents of the *Second Intifada* which began in 2000 brought an initial decline in the interests in the area. The proximity of the Green-Line settlements to the ongoing attacks, clashes, and raids in the West-Bank turned them into a frontier zone once again.¹⁸⁷ At that time, the Ministry of Defence began carrying out the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier. This land obstacle, which consists of 6-meter concrete walls, barbed wires, a patrol road, guarding posts, and an elaborated surveillance system did not follow the Green-Line, in the intention to leave as many Jewish settlements possible on the 'Israeli' side. Thus, expanding the metropolitan area of Gush Dan further into the West-Bank. The completion of the first segments of the privately developed Trans-Israel Highway during the same years, adjacent to the Separation Barrier, retained the status of the area as a safe, well connected region, which is far enough from the coastal plain, yet so close.




FIG. 2.27 Construction of dwelling units in Israel (CBS)

¹⁸⁷ Levi-Barzilai, 'A House with an attached Tank', 16.

The West-Bank Separation Barrier and the Trans-Israel Highway laid the infrastructure and created the needed economic feasibility, yet it was the 2010 housing crisis that enabled the Israeli Government to use this potential. To address the increasing demands for dwelling units the government sought to enlarge the overall supply. Nonetheless, as it was not able to do so in the areas of demand inside the main metropolitan cities, it tried to expand those areas into the periphery and the internal frontiers by tendering state-owned lands to private developers.¹⁸⁸ The state hoped that the profitable cheap land prices would lead private entrepreneurs to produce the needed units in affordable prices, which would eventually attract large numbers of Israeli families. By financialising the development process, formerly unbuilt or small-scale settlements turned into large-scale housing schemes, and the former frontier turned into a real estate project.

Over the past 40 years, the state promoted the construction of more than 30 new settlements along the Green-Line (fig 2.28). What was once a frontier area, that the state sought to domesticate through sporadic moshavim and kibbutzim during the 1950-60s, became a site for rural-like settlements in the late 1970s. With the growing demand for a suburban lifestyle in the 1980s, the state sought to domesticate the area through its gentrification, promoting the construction of gated upper-middle-class communities. The gentrification of the 1980s, enabled the areas mass suburbanisation during the 1990s, and finally its financialisation during the 2000s. With these transformations in the methods of frontier domestication, the state relied on different agents to whom it granted varying spatial privileges; eventually, leading to the formation of different settlement typologies over the past four decades. First were the small rural, or neo rural, Community Settlements of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which gave way to the first Suburban Settlements of the mid-1980s (chapter III+IV). The intense development during the 1990s consisted of mass-produced suburbs, which eventually led to the high-rise development of the 2000s (chapter V+VI).

The private development of both the Trans-Israel Highway and the current large-scale housing projects along it create a seemingly market-oriented area. However, as claimed by David Graeber: “*Whenever someone starts talking about the “free market,” it’s a good idea to look around for the man with the gun. He’s never far away*”. In the case of the settlements of the Trans-Israel Highway, the “*man with the gun*” is located on the adjacent Separation Barrier, proving Graeber’s claims that it is *States* that create *Markets*. This market was created by a gradual involvement

¹⁸⁸ Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1223–25.

of private capital in the development of the settlements along the Green-Line. This privatisation process was of a selective nature, as the state sought to enhance its territorial project by directing the free market to the use of specific groups. Thus, privatisation was not simply an instrument to fulfil the national settlement agenda, but actually, an integral part of it, as the seemingly colour-blind liberal economic discourse was used to promote the construction of ethnically homogeneous gated suburban communities.




FIG. 2.28 The Green-Line area, 2000-2015. (Illustrated by the author)

The free market façade the state gave to the area eased its merger into the greater national consensus. In 2014, Minister Naftali Bennet, from the religious right-wing *HaBayit HaYehudi* Party, addressed the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). In his 13-minute speech, Bennet stated the threats of establishing a

Palestinian state on “*Highway 6*” and the hazards of having “*hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees protesting*” on its fences; asking whether “*you think they would stop there?*”.

In the following years, Bennet would repeatedly use the highway as a cause to prevent the formation of a Palestinian state, using intimidations as “*ISIS sovereignty on Highway 6*”, “*millions of Palestinians on Highway 6*”, or a “*Palestine on Highway 6*”. Bennet, a young and charismatic politician, is known for his ability to appeal to the wide Israeli consensus, and his use of the highway implies on its wide perception as an integral part of the country’s core. Bennet’s mentions illustrate the manner in which the massive development of the area blurred the existence of the Green-Line, and though *de jure*, it is still the official border of the state of Israel, *de facto*, the privately developed Trans-Israel Highway and the settlements around it moved this border eastward.

2.7 The privatising domestication of the Green-Line

As explained in this chapter, the Israeli built environment retained its geopolitical role over the past century. From the early agricultural settlements in the pre-statehood days, to the current corporate development, the concept of ruling by settling remained a leading national value, a political agenda and a governance strategy that ensured the state’s *power over* space. In contrary to the popular perception of privatisation, which is based on decreasing state control, this version of privatisation was meant to increase state control. In that sense, the privatisation of the settlement mechanism, was a state coordinated effort that continuously harnessed the national territorial agenda to the constantly changing economic climate and cultural values. Therefore, ensuring the survival of the national geopolitical project by tying it the rationale of the market.

The special circumstances of the area along the Green-Line turns it into a unique case study of the privatising settlement mechanism. As the national interest to develop the area increased only in the 1970s, it did not witness a substantial state-led development like other internal frontiers. Consequently, its increasing national importance and economic potential, together with the relatively undeveloped environment, turned the eastern frontier into a clean slate, ready for to be developed

by the different settlers, contractors, speculators and entrepreneurs. Therefore, missing out on the first phases of *cultivate and rule* and *industrialise and rule*, the Green-Line witnessed mainly the more private-led mechanisms of post-1977.

Using the settlements along the Green-Line as a case study, the following chapters analyse and clarify how the settlement mechanism transformed since 1977. With each chapter focusing on a particular stage in the privatising settlement mechanism, they first analyse the evolving entangled geopolitical, individual and economic interests. Accordingly, they each analyse a different processes in the settlement mechanism and the spatial privileges it was based on; examining the differing reciprocal relationships of granting settling groups, or spatial agents, the *power to* colonise, inhabit, plan, develop or market space, as a means to increase the state's *power over* it. Then, examining the settlement typologies, each chapter clarifies how they are a product of the privatising mechanism that generated them and an outcome of the evolving territorial, individual and corporate coalition; from the strategic level of locating new sites along the border, through their layout, all the way to the architecture of the dwelling units. Focusing on the process, each chapter examines a new practice of settlement production and explains the architectural and [sub]urban products it produced.

3 [Neo]Ruralisation & The Community Settlement

A shorter versions of this chapter was published as:

– Schwake, G. (2020). *The Community Settlement: a neo-rural territorial tool*. *Planning Perspectives*, DOI: 10.1080/02665433.2020.1728569

3.1 Introduction: early signs of privatisation

The Community Settlements that began appearing along the Green-Line during the late 1970s corresponded with the liberalising Israeli economy and society of that time. While former frontier domestication efforts focused on communal agricultural settlements or industrial development towns, which derived from the socialist Labour Zionism ideology, these aspects were no longer evident in this new settlement phenomenon. Accordingly, the Community Settlements were based on the desire of homogeneous groups to create their own small-scale localities away from the city and the larger societal context.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the dynamics behind their development relied on granting selected groups spatial privileges that consisted of the *power to* exclusively colonise the frontier by establishing their own ex-urban communities while securing and enhancing the state's *power over* space. As an early example of the privatised settlement mechanism, the development of the Community Settlements was a fusion of individualistic desires and pre-privatisation residues. Consequently, they were inspired by former rural examples, using a pioneer-like framework and the spatial syntax of communal agricultural settlements.¹⁹⁰ Lacking

¹⁸⁹ Yiftachel, 'From Sharon to Sharon: Spatial Planning and Separation Regime in Israel/Palestine', 73–106.

¹⁹⁰ Kemp, 'The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel', 79.

any means of production, the Community Settlements were a neo-rural phenomenon, using agricultural concepts and pioneer discourse as a mere facade, rather than an essential component of the group's everyday life.

Focusing on the cases of Sal'it, Nirit, the Reihan Bloc, and Ya'arit, which constitute the first Community Settlements in the area, this chapter analyses the neo-ruralisation of the Green-Line during the late 1970s and early 80s. Focusing on these early case studies, this chapter sheds light on the changing role of architecture and planning, starting from a territorial and societal role and concluding as an artefact of the privatising settlement mechanism. Analysing how the granted spatial privileges shifted from the *power to* exclusively consume space to the *power to* produce it, this chapter explains how production itself became a settlement tool, with architecture and urbanism turning into its outcome. Studying the changing spatial privileges and their evolving materialisation over the years, this chapter explains how the Community Settlements first corresponded with the neo-rural ambitions of their inhabitants and later became part of the greater suburban turn.¹⁹¹ Thus, transforming from ex-urban settlements to commuter-based localities while shifting the focus from the community to the individual, and later from the individual to the corporate.

3.2 The neo-rural experience

“There are individual men and women, and there are families... There is no such thing as society.” Margaret Thatcher¹⁹²

Rurality, in the Israeli context, was an integral part of the nation-building process. The early agricultural settlements of the kibbutzim and moshavim of the pre-state years, despite being a relatively small portion of the local Jewish population, formed the ideological backbone of the leading Labour Zionist ideology. Focusing on the image of the pioneer, these rural settlements were not only a territorial tool of land

¹⁹¹ Benvenisti, *The West-Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, 32–48; Newman, 'Gush Emunim and Settlement-type in the West-Bank', 33–37.

¹⁹² Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher's Interview on Women's Own.

redemption but also an educational one, intended to lead to the formation of a new and healthy nation, which is connected to its historic land and thus to its past. With the changes in Israeli society, economy and culture, the old pioneer ideology gave way to a pioneer experience, which embraced the pioneer discourse and the act of frontier settlement as a lifestyle.¹⁹³ During the 1950s and 1960s, the common rural house was the one-story units supplied by the Jewish Agency to the moshavim and kibbutzim and thus became known as “Agency House” (*Beit Sochnut*) (fig 3.1–3.2). Consisting of a simple white cube covered by a sloping red roof, it represented the humble and modest housing model that is suitable for an ideological pioneer.¹⁹⁴ Consequently, as this chapter shows, it formed the architectural inspiration for the neo-rural experience.



FIG. 3.1 “Agency Houses” in Moshav Avivim, 1958. (Central Zionist Archive)



FIG. 3.2 “Agency Houses” in Moshav Hayogev, 1953. (Central Zionist Archive)

Neo-rurality is a post-industrial phenomenon that includes the immigration of middle-class and upper-middle-class city dwellers to rural areas. Fuelled by different incentives, such as the despair from urban centres or the renaissance of the countryside, it took variant manifestations. In most cases, this included the transformation of the rural built environment in order to adapt to the lifestyle sought by the newly arriving ex-urban settlers.¹⁹⁵ The rural, therefore, became an experience consumed by the migrating urban upper-middle-class, as part of the

¹⁹³ Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’.

¹⁹⁴ Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*.

¹⁹⁵ Chevalier, ‘Neo-rural phenomena’, 175–91; Smith and Phillips, ‘Socio-Cultural Representations of Gentrified Pennine Rurality’, 457–69; Halliday and Coombes, ‘In Search of Counterurbanisation: Some Evidence from Devon on the Relationship between Patterns of Migration and Motivation’, 433–46.

post-industrial course of *Rurbanisation*".¹⁹⁶ This global phenomenon, which emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, was characterised by a transformation in the patterns of population distribution that included an increase in rural settlements at the expense of urban ones. Categorised by several scholars as *rural gentrification*, it is much more complex than a simple replacement of local low-income communities by new higher income ones.¹⁹⁷ *Neo-rurality* refers also to the new ways of life city dwellers moving to rural areas were seeking to adopt or develop; whether they were working-class groups looking to escape the hardship of urban centres, or others that sought to adopt a peasant-like or an artisan-like lifestyle.¹⁹⁸

Neo-rurality is not mere suburbanisation as it could also be part of a counter-urban process. Most groups moving away from urban centres are usually interested in improving their current living standards while searching for a more tranquil way of life. In *Suburbia* the emphasis is on being away from the city's disadvantages while yet being close enough to all of its advantages. In counter-urban examples of neo-rurality, the emphasis is on the remoteness from the entire urban system.¹⁹⁹ Meaning that the rural idylls are enhanced by the distance from the city. Therefore, though it is sometimes hard to draw the line between both phenomena, counter-urbanisation and suburbanisation are not synonyms, but rather two different manifestations of rural gentrification and neo-rurality.²⁰⁰ As an expression of post-industrialism, which focuses on the production and consumption of experiences, neo-rurality is supposed to supply a new authentic experience, unlike the unauthentic everyday life of the city.²⁰¹ Neo-rurality is thus an experience that is based on a relaxed and pleasant life in affinity to nature and landscape, which is further enhanced by the "*sense of community*" and social empowerment.²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Chevalier, 'Neo-rural phenomena', 176. Hines, 'In Pursuit of Experience: The Postindustrial Gentrification of the Rural American West', 285–203.

¹⁹⁷ Guimond and Simard, 'Gentrification and Neo-Rural Populations in the Québec Countryside: Representations of Various Actors', 449–64; Rose, 'Rethinking Gentrification: Beyond the Uneven Development of Marxist Urban Theory', 47–74.

¹⁹⁸ Halliday and Coombes, 'In Search of Counterurbanisation: Some Evidence from Devon on the Relationship between Patterns of Migration and Motivation'.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰⁰ Guimond and Simard, 'Gentrification and Neo-Rural Populations in the Québec Countryside: Representations of Various Actors'.

²⁰¹ MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*; Liechty, *Suitably Modern Making Middle-Class Culture in a New Consumer Society*.

²⁰² Hines, 'In Pursuit of Experience: The Postindustrial Gentrification of the Rural American West', 296.

The search for a sense of community was not unique to the neo-rural phenomenon but rather part of the larger neoliberal turn. The decline of the welfare-state and the rise of the neoliberal order in the 1970s, did not only challenge the economic system, but also the concept of a society.²⁰³ With the liquidation of the welfare-state the tie between the individuals and society was weakened, forcing them to seek alternative or compensatory systems, often found in smaller, more homogeneous groups that offered a sense of security and belonging.²⁰⁴ Accordingly, Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm would claim that this led to a greater focus to create smaller fragmented *Gemeinschafts* (communities), in contrary to a single unified *Gesellschaft* (society), as seen in separatism, identity politics, sectarianism and neo-nationalism.²⁰⁵ Not surprisingly, Margaret Thatcher, one of the leading figures of neoliberalism, undermined the concept of a society.²⁰⁶ The neo-rural experience, could therefore be understood as an attempt of the post-industrial individual to escape the unauthentic context of the urban *Gesellschaft*, looking for a small-scale and authentic rural *Gemeinschaft*. Therefore, the Israeli Community Settlements, with their emphases on landscape and community life, constitute a new territorial approach, where the Israeli administration asked to turn the neo-rural experience into a new method of frontier domestication, following the former rural and industrial processes. Moreover, the Community Settlements illustrate how neo-rurality is able to eventually become suburban, forming a mere extension of the urban context initially opposed.

²⁰³ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 23; Bauman, *Community Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*.

²⁰⁴ Filc, *Hegemony and Populism in Israel*.

²⁰⁵ Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*; Hobsbawm, *Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism*.

²⁰⁶ Gutwein, 'The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation', 21–33.

3.3 The Community Settlement

The Community Settlement model was an integral part of the West-Bank project.²⁰⁷ It was first mentioned in a report of the Movement for New Urban Settlement of 1975, which represented six Jewish localities in the West-Bank that asked to develop a new framework that differed from the traditional moshav or kibbutz. This report, which was endorsed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), proposed focusing the settlement's inner structure on the community life while promoting a more flexible economic framework than in the cooperative rural settlements.²⁰⁸ The unity in this new framework was not in the joint aspects of labour or production, but rather in the societal aspect of creating a homogeneous group interested in living together. Consequently, one of the main features of the Community Settlements were their relative small size, 250–500 families, and the central role of the admission committee, which made sure that the settling core would have common characteristics, promoting a “closed society” that functions better than the “larger” and “open” one.²⁰⁹ Therefore, this new model was essentially a *gemeinschaft*-oriented framework, expressing the desire of middle-class families to look for “quality of life” in “gated localities”, protected from the greater society.²¹⁰ This report was endorsed by the MA, the JA and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO),²¹¹ which embraced these exclusionary criteria and promoted them as a means to attract families to areas of national interests.²¹²

²⁰⁷ Newman, ‘Gush Emunim and Settlement-type in the West Bank’, 33–37.

²⁰⁸ Appelbaum and Newman, *Between Village and Suburb: New Forms of Settlement in Israel*.

²⁰⁹ Movement for New Urban Settlements, ‘The Community Settlement’, 2; Gush Emunim, ‘Proposal for Settlement in Judea and Samaria’.

²¹⁰ Yiftachel, ‘Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State’, 27; Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–510.

²¹¹ The Settlement Department (המחלקה להתיישבות, *HaMahlaka LeHityashvut*) was the executive arm of the Jewish Agency (JA), in charge of establishing agricultural settlements in the State of Israel, and previously in Palestine during the British Mandate. The department supported the settlements from their initial phases up until the establishment of their own economy, provided them with productive means, farm buildings and residential units. Its activities later dissolved into other departments of the JA. The Settlement Division (החטיבה להתיישבות, *HaHativa LeHityashvut*): Is an independent unit of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and forms the executive arm of the State of Israel for the purpose of developing settlements in the West-Bank and the Golan Heights (Previously also in the Sinai Peninsula). Founded in 1967, it operated as part of the Settlement Department, under the same management (though with different funding sources) in order to expand its works also to the newly occupied areas, until their separation in 1992. The Division is funded entirely by the State of Israel.

²¹² Settlement Division, ‘Community Settlements’.

Lacking farming uses, yet mimicking previous agricultural models, the Community Settlements were a neo-rural phenomenon. This new prototype reused several concepts from agricultural settlements, such as the reliance on an association and the division into households sharing a communal system. Thus, enabling the Community Settlement to produce the experience of a rural lifestyle, without having to physically engage in agricultural work. Not by chance, the development of Community Settlements was carried out by the same institutions that were in charge of the former cooperative rural settlements, such as the JNF, the JA and the MA, while being planned and initiated by the JA's rural settlement unit. The JA's newly established Settlement Division, which was separated from the JA's Settlement Department and focused on the occupied territories, continued the former apparatus and encouraged small-scale groups, often with a common ideological background, to form an initial settling core for a future settlement.²¹³ By promoting these homogeneous communities, the planning officials sought to attract families that were seeking to move out of the city and into small-scale ex-urban communities.²¹⁴

The Community Settlement was a leading feature in the *Drobls Plan*, which presented the Israeli policy for the West-Bank. Unlike the Gush Emunim Plan (see chapter II), in this case, the suggested sites were no longer remote and isolated outposts, but rather clusters of small-scale settlements located one close to the other, sharing civil infrastructure and welfare services while functioning as “*blocs*”.²¹⁵ Furthermore, these blocs would create a Jewish-Israeli territorial chain sequence, while simultaneously disassembling the Palestinian-Arab one.²¹⁶ This was further developed in the more elaborated plan of 1981, titled the 100,000 Plan, which asked to settle 100,000 Jews in the West-Bank in five years.²¹⁷

The pursuit for better ‘*quality of life*’ was a fundamental aspect of the Community Settlement phenomenon. Whether targeting religious and ideological families, or more secular and politically neutral ones, all mentioned settlement plans highlighted the potential of better living standards Community Settlements able to provide. In the late 1970s ‘*quality of life*’ and ‘*living standards*’ revolved around the ability

²¹³ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, 49–58.

²¹⁴ Rosen and Razin, ‘Enclosed Residential Neighborhoods in Israel: From Landscapes of Heritage and Frontier Enclaves to New Gated Communities’, 2895–2913.

²¹⁵ Drobls, ‘Master plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria, 1979–1983’, 2.

²¹⁶ *Ibid*

²¹⁷ Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’.

to live in a small homogeneous community, surrounded by a natural landscape. Compatibly, the Gush Emunim plan called for the creation of “*closed societies*” as promoters of “*vivid communal life*” where “*the individual’s participation is willingly and consciously*”.²¹⁸ The Drobles Plan stated that “*In order to create a widespread of settlements that would consist of high living standards, it is suggested that the settlements in Judea and Samaria would be constructed as Community Settlements*”.²¹⁹ In the 100,000 Plan, Community Settlements were mentioned once again as a way to create “*special social qualities*”, that would attract potential settlers.²²⁰ Nevertheless, as the later plans suggested tying the development of the Green-Line to the private market, the emphasis shifted towards a growing focus on the affordability of spacious and large detached houses in the new settlements, in comparison to the expensive and small apartments in the dense coastal plain.²²¹ Correspondingly, by the mid-1980s, the Community Settlements were no longer the minimalistic and withdrawn residential environments but rather a platform that provided lucrative living standards.

The different settlement agencies applied the Community Settlement model both inside and outside of the West-Bank, using the neo-rural appeal to attract young families to frontier areas. The Settlement Department, in charge of promoting settlement in areas inside official Israeli territory, began using this new model in the late 1970s to attract new families to its areas of responsibility.²²² The Settlement Department would usually start with an open call for settlers through public media, and families interested in joining one of the new settlements would sign up and then attend a joint tour in the area. After passing a selection process, which would ensure the family’s suitability to the project and the future community, they would be included in the first settlement phase, which consisted of temporary houses and limited infrastructure. After constructing the permanent houses (fig 3.3), new families would be accepted only after passing an Admissions Committee, which was made of representatives of the JA, the regional council, and the settlement’s members, ensuring the homogeneity of the community.

²¹⁸ Gush Emunim, ‘Proposal for Settlement in Judea and Samaria’, A3.

²¹⁹ Drobles, ‘Master plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983’, 2.

²²⁰ Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 13–14.

²²¹ Settlement Division, 14.

²²² Abreek-Zubeidat and Ben-Arie, ‘To Be at Home: Spaces of Citizenship in the Community Settlements of the Galilee’, 205–27; Yiftachel, ‘The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel’, 493; Shafir, ‘From Overt to Veiled Segregation: Israel’s Palestinian Arab Citizens in the Galilee’, 1.



FIG. 3.3 A Joint tour to the site of the future settlement of Mitzpe Hila in the Upper Galilee, 1979; Construction of temporary houses in Mitzpe Hila; Permanent Houses in Mitzpe Hila, 1985. (Mitzpe Hila Council)

The spatial privileges enacted in the early Community Settlements were based on the ability of small-scale and uniform groups to exclusively use a certain site and to create their own gated ex-urban compounds. The settlements' Admission Committees excluded vast portions of the greater Israel society, especially its Arab citizens, guaranteeing the desired social seclusion.²²³ Therefore, the better 'quality of life' the Community Settlements had to offer was manifested in small gated communities, isolated from cities and connected with nature. Later, as this chapter shows, the 'quality of life' would consist also of spacious detached single-family houses, which were significantly more luxurious than the urban dwellings middle-class families usually inhabited; shifting the focus from the community to the individual. Subsequently, in the 1980s, the pursuit for 'quality of life', whether due to Community Settlements' pseudo-rural character or better living standards, turned into the most effective promotion technique to settle the state's internal frontiers (fig 3.4).



FIG. 3.4 Commercial for West-Bank Settlements promoted by the World Zionist Organisation, 1983. The title highlights “quality of life, (national) fulfilment and landscape” (Ma'ariv Newspaper)

²²³ Shafir, 'From Overt to Veiled Segregation: Israel's Palestinian Arab Citizens in the Galilee', 20–22.

The Community Settlements combined individual fulfilment (*Hagshama Atzmit*) with national fulfilment (*Hagshama Leomit*). Respectively, with the growing emphasis on better living standards, the Settlement Division, Settlement Department, the different planning administration and the settling families still portrayed the Community Settlement as a pioneer act that is an integral part of the national territorial mission. The Community Settlements were thus a neo-rural phenomenon that merged 'quality of life' and a pioneer-like lifestyle; an ideal post-industrial neo-rural experience. This could not be better described than in a recent commercial to the new neighbourhood of the settlement of Haspin in the Galilee:

"Welcome to Haspin - a religious community located in the heart of nature and Jewish history. Residents of the community enjoy a wide range of services such as a library ... a grocery store, swimming pool, dental clinic, youth hostel and many Torah institutions.... Haspin combines an excellent way of fulfilling the values of settlement with quality of life and community." ²²⁴

The settlements discussed in this chapter, Sal'it, Reihan, Hinanit, Shaked, Nirit and Ya'arit demonstrate how the Community Settlement model started as a counter-urban pioneer-like phenomenon in 1977 that was eventually incorporated into the growing suburbanisation enterprise of the mid-1980s (fig 3.5).




FIG. 3.5 Map of the area and case studies in 2015. Green-Line in green, West-Bank Barrier in red and purple. (Illustrated by the author)

²²⁴ Homee, *Website for Rural Living*.

3.4 Sal'it: a non-agricultural rural settlement

Sal'it constitutes one of the first examples of neo-rural development along the Green-Line. In August of 1977, the new administration of Prime Minister Menachem Begin authorised its establishment as one of the first sites in the state-directed efforts to settle the area. Located a few kilometres east of the rural settlement of Tzur Nathan from 1966 and Kibbutz Eyal from 1950, it formed an extension of the pre-1967 state efforts to strengthen Jewish Israeli presence in the area and was thus first named Tzur Nathan B.²²⁵ Placed between the Palestinian villages of Kufr Sur, Kufr Jamal and Falame in its east and the Arab town of Taybeh, inside of Israel²²⁶, in its west, Sal'it formed a territorial wedge in the area; extending Israeli control eastwards while preventing any possible Arab cross-border connections (fig. 3.6). Though Begin's Likud-led government took the credit for the decision, the initial preliminary authorisation of the site was carried out by the Labour government in April of 1977, a month before the elections and the political turnover.²²⁷ Due to the site's location slightly across the Green-Line, the decision was even declared as "administrative" and "not-political" by the inter-ministerial Settlement Committee.²²⁸ Compatibly, the decision was backed by Ra'anana Weitz,²²⁹ head of the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, who usually asked to focus on settling sites inside the official borders of Israel, rather than in the occupied territories. According to Weitz, the new site corresponded with the unofficial Alon Plan of 1967 that limited Israeli settlements to the border area of the Green-Line, the Jerusalem metropolis and the Jordan Valley.²³⁰ Subsequently, the development of the new settlement was set, receiving an official status and a new name- Sal'it, from the Hebrew noun for Rock (סלע- *Sel'a*), due to the rocky terrain upon it was to be erected.²³¹

²²⁵ Davar, 'The Three Settlements', 2.

²²⁶ Housing Palestinian Citizens of Israel

²²⁷ Waxman, 'Green light for three settlements over the green-line', 3.

²²⁸ Waxman, 3.

²²⁹ (רענן וייץ; 1919-1998): A main figure of the settlement department since 1948, and its director from 1963-1984. Though being in charge of settlement development he ideologically opposed the West-Bank enterprise and advocated for other areas.

²³⁰ *Ibid*

²³¹ Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*, 233-35.




FIG. 3.6 Sal'it in 2015, Located between the Green-Line (green) and the West-Bank Separation Barrier (red and brown), as well as between Palestinian localities inside the West-Bank and inside the pre-1967 borders (Illustrated by the author)

As soldiers of the *Nahal* corps took the lead in the development of Sal'it, mounting the site in December of 1977, its development matched former rural examples. This custom of a military *Nahal* settlement was quite common in developing frontier areas, and it usually consisted of preliminary military outpost settled by a small group of soldiers (*Gar'in*)²³² that safeguarded the area and prepare it for its future as a civilian settlement; housed either by former Nahal soldiers, or by members of another political settling movement.²³³ With the military taking the lead, the territorial importance of the site derived from its strategical importance as a defensive shield to the coastal plain. Respectively, Moshe Nehorai, head of the *Nahal* division in the Ministry of Defence, in his speech to the soldiers of the outpost stated that in “every peace arrangement” the lights of Sal'it “on top of the mountain” will “expand the breath of Israel”, increasing the safety of all “mothers and children in their sleep, [and the] workers in the fields and factories in the lowlands”.²³⁴

As an outpost, Sal'it followed the typical line of a military settlement. Correspondingly, it consisted of five prefabricated buildings that were used as barracks and as a communal kitchen and dining area. Arranged in a U-shaped form, and positioned at the highest topographical point, they created a defensible inner

²³² Gari'in, (גַּרִי'ינִים; Pl.: *Gari'inim*): Hebrew for Kernel. Used to refer to the initial core of a settling group, which would carry out the first phases of foundations. A Gari'in could be a civilian one, belonging to one of the settling movements, or a military one, as part of the Nahal corps.

²³³ Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*, 233; Davar, 'The Three Settlements', 2.

²³⁴ Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*, 233.

courtyard suitable for a military base, which the soldiers used for informal and formal activities. As a site of future rural activity, the soldiers maintained a daily routine that consisted of guarding duties and agricultural work in nearby settlements.

The Settlement Department's rural unit began planning the site before the settling group was chosen, following outlines of agricultural settlements developed by the JA.²³⁵ Located in the West-Bank, Sal'it was officially under the responsibility of Settlement Division. Nevertheless, in the late 1970s, the Settlement Division was still in its initial stages and relied on the experience and knowledge of the Settlement Department and the JA while enabling their planners and administrators to operate in the West-Bank under the cover of a different entity. Correspondingly, the planners began with the common process of studying the boundaries of the state-owned lands and analysing the site's topography, which led to the oblong form of the future settlement with a topographic peak in its core. As the state and the JA controlled the planning process of Sal'it, its future settlers had almost no *power to* influence the procedure, leading the planners to focus on the site's restrictions while using existing settlement practices.

With the rural unit taking the lead, its planners continued using settlement patterns they were familiar with. Respectively, they gave Sal'it the form of a *Moshav Ovdim*; a rural settlement made out of private family households with a cooperative system of purchasing supplies and marketing produced goods. Accordingly, they turned the former military post on the hilltop into the new centre while spreading a system of inner dead-end streets with adjacent private households along it. This *star shape* model indeed resembled the common form of a rural *moshav*, generating a hierarchical order that emphasised the relations between the community and the individual. The planners enhanced the communal aspect by merging the different private parcels into a continuous open space while using a system of pedestrian paths that connected all points of the settlement. Therefore, promoting the perception of the individual as a member of the community, similar to former communal rural settlements. At the same time, as a neo-rural project, the presence of agricultural fields and other means of production was clearly absent and reserved only to the north-western entrance (fig. 3.7). Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) recognised Sal'it as a Community Settlement and was therefore not willing to develop any local agricultural uses.²³⁶ Together with the restricted options due to the rocky and sloping terrain, this limited the future agricultural options and the

²³⁵ Settlement Department, 'Outline Plan for Sal'it'.

²³⁶ Sal'it Council, 'Letter to Deputy Minister Michael Dekel', 1982, 1.

formation of family farming parcels. Therefore, the intentions to shape Sal'it as a rural settlement were clearly figurative and superficial, using only the spatial rhetoric of a *moshav* while discarding its agrarian essence.




FIG. 3.7 planning and preparation of Sal'it - Upper row: Barracks in Sal'it, 1977 (Israel Land Authority); Mapping of state-owned lands in the area, 1977; Topography analyses of the area (Central Zionist Archives) – Lower row: Plan of Sali't, 1977. (Central Zionist Archives)

Parallel to the planning process, the Settlement Division concentrated its efforts to allocate a relevant civilian settling group interested in this neo-rural project, granting it the spatial privilege of using the site. Initially, the Israeli Government thought that the left-leaning *HaShomer Hatzair* movement would take over the site.²³⁷ However, in 1977 it officially stated that it will no longer take part in any settlement action over the Green-Line.²³⁸ Therefore, the MA assigned the site for the right-wing *Herut-Beitar* settling movement, which was part of the right-wing *Herut* Party (and later Likud). Unable to find a suitable group in time, Matityahu Drobles, head of the Settlement Division and the former head of the *Herut-Beitar* settlement movement,

²³⁷ (השומר הצעיר): Literally meaning the young guardian. A Socialist-Zionist youth movement established in 1919. It is also the name of Marxist-Zionist Party active in Mandatory Palestine, which later became part of the Israeli *Mapam* (*Mifleget HaPoalim HaMeuhedet*; The united workers party).

²³⁸ Tzimuky, 'Salit Outpost Naturlises Today', 3.

approached the *B'nai Brith*²³⁹ organisation, which had already organised a settling group and was looking for a fitting location. This group consisted of 16 young urban couples that were interested in leaving the city and adopting a new rural way of living. As members of the politically neutral *B'nai Brith*, the group was not focused on strengthening the Jewish presence in the West-Bank *per se* and were thinking of relocating to other ex-urban regions. At the same time, the offer of the Settlement Division was too attractive to refuse, as the group was not sure whether there will be another possible site in the near future. Drobles, conditioned the allocation of the future settlement to the *B'nai Brith* group by insisting that they would join the *Herut-Beitar* movement;²⁴⁰ officially retaining its control of the site while giving a political frosting to a seemingly non-political deed. As the group agreed to the terms, the Settlement Department granted them the *power to* exclusively colonise the site, turning Sal'it into their home while controlling its societal composition.

The setbacks in the transition into a civilian settlement emphasise that the site was not crucial to defence and security standpoints, but rather a statement of sovereignty and expression of territorial control. The Settlement Division was ready to populate the site quite early, yet, budgetary considerations delayed the project for almost two years. Eventually in May of 1979, after a long dispute between the Ministry of Finance and the Settlement Division, the Israeli Government agreed to double the budget for the West-Bank, designating more than a billion Israeli Liras²⁴¹ for this enterprise and supporting its planned expansion.²⁴² As the Sal'it project was delayed, in the summer of 1979 its site was still undeveloped, lacking the needed infrastructure and proper family dwelling units. At the same time, the military, which initially highlighted the importance of controlling the site, was not interested in maintaining its position and declared that it would leave the outpost by the end of the year. The Settlement Division, afraid of losing this foothold, pressured the group to replace the soldiers and to inhabit their barracks in a temporary manner while the planning process and construction were underway.²⁴³ Despite its temporary form, the '*naturalisation*' of Sal'it was marked by a ceremonial occasion attended by Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon, in which the *Nahal* soldiers handed the

²³⁹ בני ברית) Is a Jewish social organisation founded in New York in 1843. Today, it has about half a million members in 60 countries and is one of the largest Jewish organisations worldwide.

²⁴⁰ Gilboa, Interview in Salit [Interview].

²⁴¹ Approximately 18.000.000 Euros in 2018 standards (calculated according to the Central Israeli Bank statistics)

²⁴² Tzuriel, 'Samaria Is Open for Settlement', 17.

²⁴³ Gilboa, Interview in Salit.

flag of the settlement over to the settling families; symbolising the transition from a military occupation to a civilian one, and from defence concerns to geopolitical considerations (fig 3.8).



FIG. 3.8 Establishment Ceremony; Soldiers in Sali't Establishment Ceremony; Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Agriculture, in Sali't Establishment Ceremony, 1979. (Photographed by Smadar Gilboa)

Replacing the soldiers in Sal'it, the families initially moved into their former barracks, a practically unnecessary step that granted the settlers the sought pioneer experience. The families could have waited for the completion of infrastructure works and the construction of their permanent houses. Still, they consciously chose to inhabit the former military compound on a temporary basis; highlighting their devotion and ideological commitment.²⁴⁴ These barracks consisted of four precasted concrete buildings surrounding an inner courtyard; one functioned as a club and dining hall, while the other three functioned as family dwelling units (fig 3.9). Each building was made out of four smaller units of ca. 16 m², consisting of a bedroom, small kitchen and a bathroom. Families with children received two adjacent units and were able to unite them by opening a door between them, creating a larger two-bedroom apartment. Later, as the families moved into their permanent houses, the former barracks became a historical evidence to the pioneer phase of Sal'it; turning into the public centre of the settlement and housing several key functions such as a clinic, grocery store, club, offices, and most important – temporary dwelling units for new arriving families during their trial period.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ Gilboa.

²⁴⁵ Settlement Department, 'Outline Plan for Sal'it'.




FIG. 3.9 Barracks of Sal'it.
(Illustrated by the author)

In December of 1980 the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), supplied the first permanent housing units, which corresponded with the neo-rural profile of the settlement. They were prefabricated concrete units assembled on site, resembling other mass-produced houses built by *Ashdar* Ltd for the MCH, which became known as *Ashkubit*; a portmanteau of *Ashdar* and *Cube*.²⁴⁶ The houses consisted of two 36 m² cubes, that were placed one attached to the other, with a minor setback; creating an L-shaped form, leading to a larger joint area between every two neighbouring units. According to several of the first settlers, they were able to convince the MCH to improve the common model, and to turn it into a split-level unit with a division between the 'night-uses' of bedrooms and bathroom, and 'day-uses' of the living room and kitchen.²⁴⁷ The 'day-use' cube was the lower one, oriented towards the landscape, yet, as the units consisted of three parallel load-bearing walls, openings in these façades were limited. Appropriately, it was the side façades, which were oriented towards the shared entrance area between each two units, that were more porous; emphasising the communal aspect once more. To enhance the rural appearance of the prefabricated houses, they were covered by a sloping red roof, giving them the shape of ideal countryside cottages (fig 3.10).

²⁴⁶ Ashtrom, 'Milestones'.

²⁴⁷ Gilboa, Interview in Salit.



FIG. 3.10 Infrastructure works in Sal'it and Construction of Houses in Sal'it, 1980. (Smadar Gilboa) Note the “view” from the living room

With the state-supplied units enforcing a unified form and quite minimalistic conditions, the settling families immediately began altering their new houses, promoting their singularity and distinctiveness. Despite being provided by the state and though they were not officially owned by their inhabitants, the Settlement Division enabled the settling families to modify the newly supplied dwelling units. Consisting of two bedrooms, the original houses fitted the needs of the young families in their first years in Sal'it.²⁴⁸ Yet, as these families began growing, the 72 m² units were no longer enough, and the modifications that followed were mainly intended to provide the expanding household with more space. Correspondingly, most alterations were extensions for additional bedrooms, attached to the upper cube. Later alterations included an extension to the lower cube, which, as it was no longer depended on the existing load-bearing walls, could be opened towards the landscape, providing the house with an open panorama suitable for a countryside family. In a more developed stage, some families asked to use the height difference

²⁴⁸ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8/908/0 [Sal'it]'.

in order to build an additional floor on top of the lower cube (fig 3.11).²⁴⁹ Eventually, the changes made in the houses turned them from small spartan prefabricated units into multi-level houses, which several families expanded further, adding even a basement.²⁵⁰




FIG. 3.11 Original and extensions to dwelling units in Sal'it. (Illustrated by the author)

Choosing first to populate the northern part of the settlement, the Settlement Department and MCH promoted a more communal cluster. Unlike the initial idea of creating an alignment of private households, the first setting was much more *gemeinschaft*-oriented and followed the *compound model* of units sharing a collective open space that lacked any parcellation. Slowly, Sal'it began admitting new members and expanding, however, this was done in a significantly slow manner. Each new family would be admitted only following a trial period of one year residing

²⁴⁹ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 852/84 [Sal'it]'; Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8/68 [Sal'it]'; Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8/52 [Sal'it]'.

²⁵⁰ Gilboa, Interview in Salit.

in the former barracks, and after passing the settlements' Admission Committee that decided whether the considered family fits with the community's desired character. Consequently, leading to a maximum growth of two families per year. The slow admission process was reinforced with the frontier location of Sal'it at that time, which still meant a significantly long car-ride from main urban centres and even a guarding duty. Therefore, Sal'it of the 1980s was still an ex-urban frontier settlement with a small community, limited accessibility, and quite spartan conditions which included interrupted water and electricity supply.²⁵¹

Sal'it's definition as a Community Settlement contradicted its moshav layout, turning it into a non-agricultural rural settlement, or in other words - neo-rural. Though the MA did help in developing some agricultural industries in Sal'it, these were insufficient, and as it was not officially categorised as a rural settlement the MA was unable to provide Sal'it with additional means of production. Fearing the lack of development, the Sal'it council sent a complaint letter to the Jewish Agency in 1984, protesting their treatment as "*any other Community Settlement*" while regarding "Community Settlement" as a derogatory term.²⁵² Yet, as the local means of production were not provided, Sal'it began losing its already limited rural characters, and the majority of its families soon left their new agricultural profession and sought other employment, though not yet in cities, due to the undeveloped infrastructure.²⁵³ Consequently, Sal'it, continued to be remote, small and still counter urban while remaining non-agricultural and neo-rural.

With the slow expansion of Sal'it, the spatial privilege of being able to construct a private house amidst nature became the main settling tool, leading to more individualistic models than the first community-oriented units. The newly admitted members, which went through the year-long trial period, were allowed to build their house on one of the vacant plots in the settlement. The new houses were no longer provided by the MCH, nor built in a joint process, but rather an individual procedure carried out by each family in its own pace and according to its needs, demands, and taste.²⁵⁴ Though the building regulations mainly addressed the issues of building rights, dictating the maximum number of floors and overall built area, the new houses followed similar designs. As homes for members that did not belong to the initial veteran group, the newly built houses were more family-focused than

²⁵¹ Aigen, *35 Years for Sal'it*.

²⁵² Ilan, 'Letter to the Jewish Agency regarding payemnt for house redemption', 1984, 1.

²⁵³ Gilboa, Interview in Salit.

²⁵⁴ Shomron Regional Council, 'Building Permits Archive'.

community-oriented. While the earlier setting consisted of shared entrance areas the new houses were fully detached, separated from their surroundings through natural or artificial height difference, enhanced by a closed-off façade and the placement of the family living room area at the rear. Unlike the early spartan prefabricated units supplied by the state, the new houses were much larger and spacious. Still, despite their size, they were not extravagant. Using simple building materials, such as concrete blocks, white plastered walls and common terrazzo tiles, the new houses were modest cubes with minimal openings covered by a double-slope roof.²⁵⁵ Therefore, affordably built and simply designed, they were an enlarged version of the common Israeli countryside house (fig 3.12).




FIG. 3.12 House of a new admitted family in Sal'it. 1986. (Samaria Regional Council)

In the gradual expansion of Sal'it, newly coming families began gradually fulfilling its original plan while shifting the focus from the community to the individual. By the end of the 1980s, the development of the regional infrastructure and the rise in the demand for the area,²⁵⁶ exposed Sal'it to a larger group of potential members. The admission process was not revoked, yet the settlement was now open also for families interested in improving their living standards while staying within the context of the greater metropolitan region. Accordingly, Sal'it began transforming from a frontier settlement into an exclusive community of commuters.²⁵⁷ With the ongoing expansion, the southern arms of the planned *star model* were steadily forming,

²⁵⁵ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8/1 [Sal'it]'; Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8/77 [Sal'it]'.

²⁵⁶ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, 49–58.

²⁵⁷ Sal'it Council, *40 Years for Sal'it*.

developing a more private household-based layout. This change was strengthened by the emergence of surrounding fences and walls, pavements, and even a swimming pool in the late 1980s;²⁵⁸ replacing the former spartan pioneer characteristics with a growing emphasis on private family life and better living standards.

The changes in the planning and execution of Sal'it were parallel to the transition from a rural to neo-rural settlement mechanism. Correspondingly, it was planned as a moshav, consisting of a star-like layout with a clear public centre and an array of private family parcels, backed by a secondary system of pedestrian paths intended to strengthen the physical and social ties inside the settlement. Nevertheless, the absence of agricultural functions turned the rural spatial characteristics of Sal'it into an empty shell, mimicking former settlement methods while lacking its main component - means of production. At the same time, its location, just on the fringes of the coastal area and a couple of kilometres into the West-Bank, ensured the needed distance that would provide the desired disconnection from the city, while yet staying in its proximity. Moreover, placed on a hilltop, Sal'it enjoyed an uninterrupted panoramic view, which strengthened its physical and spiritual affinity to rurality and nature. Therefore, the spatial characteristics of Sal'it continued to form a settlement tool, attracting families interested in a rural-like lifestyle while maintaining their original occupation.

The improvement of nearby infrastructure during the 1990s enhanced the development of a commuter community in Sal'it. Consequently the connection to the coastal plain and the Tel Aviv metropolis was tightened and more families came due to the site's location and landscape and the ability to build a substantially large detached house, rather than the desire to adopt a new lifestyle or reinforce Jewish presence in the area.²⁵⁹ Sal'it, therefore, turned into an attractive Community Settlement and the moshav character remained as a residue from its early years, expressed in the official classification of the settlement, its public core, and the active Agricultural Council, which includes only the veteran families and has minimal symbolic responsibilities. Yet, these excesses, still grant Sal'it a neo-rural character that forms a basic element in its appeal.²⁶⁰ Later, as this chapter shows, this neo-rural character would form a leading role in its corporate-led suburban development, which became the main settlement tool since the early 2000s.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid*

²⁵⁹ Berger, *Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel*, 50–54.

²⁶⁰ Gilboa, Interview in Salit.

3.5 Reihan Bloc: neo-rural, ex-urban and peripheral

The settlements of the Reihan Bloc form a leading example of the developing neo-rural appeal. The Settlement Division developed the Reihan Bloc as cluster of small-scale localities meant to attract city dwellers while enhancing the Jewish Israeli presence in the area. Located south of the predominantly Arab region of Wadi A'ara inside the state of Israel, and north of the Arab-Palestinian region of Jenin, it was meant to create a Jewish territorial sequence across the Green-Line while preventing the formation of an Arab one (fig 3.13). Named after the first West-Bank settlement in the area, Reihan, it was supposed to function as a new regional Jewish presence, strengthening the nearby Mei-Ami that was founded in 1965.²⁶¹ Part of a greater plan for Wadi A'ara, the establishment of the Reihan Bloc intended to introduce additional Jewish settlements in the area, on both sides of the Green-Line and in the future even a city (see chapter VI).²⁶²




FIG. 3.13 The Reihan Bloc between the Green-Line and the West-Bank Separation Barrier, creating a wedge between the West-Bank and localities of Palestinian citizens of Israel in Wadi A'ara (Illustrated by the author)

²⁶¹ Douer, *Our Sickle is Our Sword*, 278–81.

²⁶² JA and WZO, 'A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan'; JA and WZO, 'Nahal Eron Project'.

The Settlement Division put Reihan on the development course of a frontier rural settlement. Correspondingly, in 1977 it began the traditional path of a temporary *Nahal* outpost, turning into a civilian settlement a couple of years later (fig 3.14). Similar to Sal'it, the decision to establish a *Nahal* outpost was taken already before the 1977 elections by the Labour Government of Yitzhak Rabin in April 1977. The site was immediately prepared by the Jewish Agency (JA), yet the *Nahal* soldiers would arrive only in September, following the orders the new Begin administration. Though the soldiers belonged to the left-leaning and the newly anti-West-Bank settlement *Hashomer HaTzair* movement, they began carrying out the preparation works immediately with their arrival. Moreover, the military ceremony held for the inauguration of Reihan focused on the site's strategical importance as a means to expand Israeli territorial control towards the West-Bank and to change the demographical balance of the area.²⁶³



FIG. 3.14 The temporary site of Reihan, 1979. Chanania Herman (GPO)

With the initial rural orientation, the plan for Reihan suited the layout of a typical *Moshav Ovdim*. Accordingly, following the site topographical analyses and the study of state-owned lands, the planners of the JA created a hierarchical outline consisting of a central public area surrounded by the members' dwelling units that shared a common open space. Therefore, the planners placed the public functions of secretariat, grocery store, kindergarten, and club in the settlement's entrance, in the former *Nahal* barracks and in the site's topographical peak. The centrality of the public entrance was highlighted by the circular access road that split out from it, circulating the settlement with diverging smaller dead-end streets, which accessed

²⁶³ Walter, 'Nahal Reihan Outpost Is Goes on Site', 4.

the dwelling units while creating a car-free residential area. Consequently, turning the settlement's core into a continuous open area, consisting of a central square and a system of pedestrian paths, running between the detached family houses and the private lots they were planned on (fig 3.15). At the same time, as a neo-rural environment, the industrial and agricultural uses were not an integral part of the settlement's outline and were planned to be built outside the residential ring,²⁶⁴ thus, disconnecting the link between the settlers and their means of production.



FIG. 3.15 Plan of Reihan, 1979. (Central Zionist Archives)



FIG. 3.16 Houses in Reihan during construction, 1980. (Ma'ariv Newspaper)

After numerous setbacks, caused by the lack of budget, a group of city dwellers arrived in Reihan in June of 1979, receiving the spatial privilege to settle the site and ready to start their new counter-urban experience.²⁶⁵ They were around a dozen of young families and married couples, originating mainly from cities in the Israeli coastal plain, which sought to change to a more rural lifestyle by moving into the geographical periphery.²⁶⁶ These families, in their search for rural living, were directed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) to the liberal *HaOved HaTziona*²⁶⁷ movement, which was in charge of organising the settling group for Reihan.

²⁶⁴ Settlement Department, 'Outline Plan for Reihan'.

²⁶⁵ Davar, 'Rozolio: Setbacks in Settlement in Undisputed Areas', 2; Pripaz, 'Nahal Reihan: Moshav Shitufi', 4.

²⁶⁶ Cohen, Interview in Reihan [Interview].

²⁶⁷ **העובד הציוני** (The Zionist Worker): A settlement movement established in 1936, affiliated with the non-socialist line of Zionism (yet non-revisionist), later the liberal Israeli Progressive Party and the General Zionists.

Receiving the *power* to colonise the site, they became an integral part of the Settlement Division's plan to enhance the state's *power over* the West-Bank. While the majority of West-Bank settlements belonged either to the right-wing *Herut-Beitar* movement or the religious Gush Emunim, the group in Reihan, located slightly over the Green-Line, was affiliated with the centre of the Israeli political spectrum, and to a non-religious movement. This was echoed in the inconsistent statements made by settlers from Reihan in the early phases that included hawkish declarations like "*establishing a Jewish settlement in the heart of the Arab one was close to our heart*"²⁶⁸ or "[*those opposing us*] don't understand the strategical necessity of Reihan"²⁶⁹, and more dovish ones like "*we are from HaOved HatZioni, the liberals, we are not Gush Emunim, we are not settlers... we are in the consensus... agreed upon by all parties*" or "*We are for settling in Judea and Samaria, but not in the sole of the Arabs... we have good relations with the Arabs*".²⁷⁰

After several months of living in temporary dwellings, the MCH supplied the settling families with prefabricated dwelling units that fitted Reihan's frontier profile. These were 16 *Ashkubit* houses, made out of precasted concrete walls, creating two 36 m² cubes and a unit with a total area of 72 m² (figure 3.16). Similar to the units in Sal'it, the central and two external casts were load-bearing walls, forming the unit's structural framework. Divided into a '*public*' cube of a kitchen and a living room and a '*private*' one of bedrooms, bathroom, toilet, and an open study, these two areas did not completely overlap, providing each unit with a front yard. As the settlement's core consisted of pedestrian paths and lacked any significant fences or barriers between the lots, the private front yards formed an extension of the open public space, connecting each household to the greater community. Nevertheless, as the units were assembled on-site, they were in need of an external staircase, which would overcome the height difference and separated each unit from its surroundings (fig 3.17). Fitting the profile of a rural settlement, the non-functional sloping asbestos roofs that covered all units granted the houses of Reihan the appearance of an idyllic countryside environment while disguising the prefabricated concrete cubes.

The lack of means of production, the peripheral location and internal tensions between the members prevented the proper development of Reihan as a rural settlement. Already in 1981, the settlement witnessed a severe crisis that derived from differences regarding social issues. This caused stern divisions between

²⁶⁸ Levav, 'In Reihan Are Worried from Controversy over Other Settlement with the Same Name', 20.

²⁶⁹ Harif, 'Prof Zamir: Haven't yet Finished My Examination Regarding Reihan and Dotan', 1.

²⁷⁰ Levav, 'JNF to establish 3 more points in the triangle area', 4.

the group and concluded in the departure of several families and changes in its leadership.²⁷¹ With the fragmentation of the initial settling group, Reihan would suffer from continuous changes in its populating composition and a severe lack of new families interested in joining the community. Consequently, several of the 16 houses were repeatedly vacated, left uninhabited for long periods, and several families declined sale offers, even at significantly low prices.²⁷²




FIG. 3.17 Dwelling units in Reihan (Illustrated by the author)

Following repeated failed attempts to develop Reihan, the Settlement Division tried to regenerate it by shifting the focus from a communal rural village towards and individualistic Community Settlement. These efforts were not meant to enlarge the overall area of the settlement, but rather to fill the underpopulated existing fabric through the construction of new housing units.²⁷³ Subsequently, the Settlement Division commissioned the Samaria Central Development Company and the right-wing-affiliated *Amana Ltd* to construct 20 of the new units while designating the remaining ten to be built by their future inhabitants.²⁷⁴ Unlike the first spartan prefabricated units, that formed an extension of the public core, these new houses were more spacious and family-oriented. Appropriately, the *Amana* houses were first detached from the public sphere through the topographical differences and surrounding fences. This detachment was further enhanced through the orientation of the bedrooms towards the public core, creating a closed façade, while orienting the joint living room and kitchen area to the rear and emphasising the role of the private backyard, rather than that of the front yard in the former example. Moreover,

²⁷¹ *Ibid*

²⁷² Cohen, Interview in Reihan.

²⁷³ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 12-38/99-01 [Reihan]', 12.

²⁷⁴ החברה המרכזית לפיתוח השומרון (החל"פ; *HaHevra HaMerkazit LePituah HaShomron, Halap*): Is a private company owned by different communities in the Samaria Regional Council and does not receive government assistance; (אמנה): Is a settlement movement established in 1976 by Gush Emunim, aimed to develop settlements in the West-Bank, Golan Heights, Galilee, Negev and Gaza Strip. It was registered as an association in 1978, and later recognised by the World Zionist Organisation

while the sloping roof of the first units functioned merely as ornamentation, in this case, it formed a reserve for prospect construction, enabling the future expansion of the house (fig 3.18-3.19). The emphasis on detachment was manifested also in the self-built units, as they two consisted of the same spatial characteristics of the Amana houses. Likewise, these principles affected also the first units as the inhabiting families began constructing fences, rearranging the inner layout through extensions and replacing the asbestos roof with a more appealing tiled one (fig 3.20).²⁷⁵



FIG. 3.18 The new units in Reihan, Samaria Central Development Company. (Samaria Regional Council Engineering Department Archive)




FIG. 3.19 Plan of Amana House, Reihan (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 3.20 Amana House, Reihan (Illustrated by the author)



FIG. 3.21 Extension in Reihan (Illustrated by the author)

The neighbouring settlements of Reihan and Shaked constitute a further step towards individuality and neo-rurality. Both sites were part of the ongoing state efforts to expand its *power over* the area through the construction of additional Jewish Settlements. Hinanit, initially called Reihan B (חיננית; Hebrew for the

²⁷⁵ Shomron Regional Council, 'Building Permits Archive'.

Daisy flower), was formed out a Gar'in of Herut-Beitar which consisted of Jewish immigrants from the Caucasus that came to Israel in the 1970s; giving it the name the "*Caucasian Gar'in*".²⁷⁶ Shaked (שקד; Hebrew for Almonds) started out as a private initiative of several families that sought to establish a settlement in the West-Bank. Later, it was incorporated into *Herut-Beitar*, and was taken under the personal care of Uri Bar On, Ariel Sharon's assistant for rural settlement, who personally endorsed the settlement by allocating the site to the forming group and by promoting the needed development works.²⁷⁷ Unlike Reihan, both Hinanit and Shaked were officially declared as Community Settlements, forming a clear neo-rural example.²⁷⁸

The societal composition of Hinanit turned it into a unique case of neo-rurality. Consisting of Caucasian families living in coastal town of Hadera, the new residents of Hinanit were interested in moving to the West-Bank and adopting a more rural lifestyle, manifested in private households and small-scale agriculture. However, with land restriction and the limited agricultural options, the proposed site was unable to provide the needed means of production and the families had to settle for limited small-scale farming and livestock. Moreover, Hinanit's profile was not only different in regard to origin, but also in regard to age, as the average adult man in Hinanit was 40 years old, much older than in the surrounding settlements. This also meant that the families were already larger and in need of a bigger house. Moreover, belonging to a conservative and less secular sector, the employment of women was relatively limited, and though the men were interested in agriculture, they lacked any professional experience and had no time to receive the necessary vocational training.²⁷⁹ Nevertheless, by granting the Caucasian families the *power to* colonise the site and develop their secluded neo-rural community, the Settlement Department was able to incorporate them in the attempts to enhance the state *power over* space.

The planners of Hinanit took in mind these rural aspirations, and while it was officially labelled as a Community Settlement its layout featured several agricultural features. Therefore, despite not having a direct ability to influence the process, the settlers of Hinanit had an indirect *power to* impact the formation of their future settlement. Correspondingly, the land parcels designated for each family were significantly large,

²⁷⁶ Caucasian: originating from the Caucasus, and not the term used to describe a white person in the US; JA and WZO, 'A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan'.

²⁷⁷ Ma'ariv, 'Samaria: Uri Bar On Road', 19.

²⁷⁸ JA and WZO, 'A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan'.

²⁷⁹ JA and WZO.

around one dunam,²⁸⁰ almost double the size of parcels in neighbouring settlements. Nevertheless, this was not done to allow the construction of larger houses, but rather to enable the maintenance of small-scale agriculture and livestock in the family plots.²⁸¹ Later, this would also enable the construction of an additional unit on the same parcel for the next generation. Rural-like, Hinanit followed the outline of an entrance holding all public functions and located in the highest point in the settlement, with a circular outer road that followed the topographical lines. The smaller *cul de sac* streets provide access from the circular road to groups of 12 to 20 houses while creating a common car-free inner core, connected through a system of inner pedestrian paths (fig 3.22).²⁸²




FIG. 3.22 Map of Hinanit, 1980.
(Central Zionist Archive)

Despite being provided by the MCH, the houses in Hinanit demonstrate the shifting responsibility from the state to the individual and the evolving spatial privilege of producing space. Unlike earlier examples, Hinanit did not include a preliminary Nahal outpost and the MCH supplied the units already before the arrival of the Gari'n in January of 1981.²⁸³ At the same time, the houses corresponded with the pioneer-like character of the early 1980s and they were simple and minimalistic 70 m² units. Moreover, in Hinanit the MCH used a more efficient model, which did not consist of prefabricated walls, but rather of two precasted cubes assembled on site. Consequently, reducing the construction time and the needed manpower. With one cube containing the kitchen, living room, and an external balcony, forming the more public area, and a cube containing two bedrooms, a bathroom, and open study

²⁸⁰ (Ottoman Turkish: دونم ; Turkish: dönüm) An Ottoman measurement unit that is an equivalent of 1000m².

²⁸¹ JA and WZO, 'A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan'.

²⁸² Settlement Department, 'Hinanit Local Outline Plan'.

²⁸³ Levav, 'First Members of the Caucasian Gari'n Arrive in Reihan B', 4.

forming the more private one, the dwelling units were oblong meek volumes. The simplified character of this model was further enhanced by the lack of the popular ornamental sloping roof and the houses retained the flat one of the prefabricated cubes (fig 3.23-3.24). On the one hand, this might seem that the conditions in Hinanit were harsher than in previous case studies. On the other, using these simple cubes, the houses in Hinanit formed a preliminary unit that the settling families could alter and adapt more freely. Thus, already from the first steps in Hinanit, the Settlement Division promoted self-expression and individual initiative, forwarding the *power to produce space* to the settlers, who immediately began modifying their houses; starting by adding a tilted roof and continued with further expansions and alterations (fig 3.25).²⁸⁴



FIG. 3.23 Houses in Hinanit, 1980. (JNF archives)



FIG. 3.24 Houses under construction in Hinanit, 1980. Amos Levav (Ma'ariv Newspaper)




FIG. 3.25 Original dwelling unit in Hinanit and Shaked and their varying extensions. (Illustrated by the author)

Due to its peripheral location and unique societal composition Hinanit developed in a significantly slow pace, far from reaching its planned size during the 1980s and 1990s. Gradually, new members started joining the settlement, however, this concluded in a mere dozen self-built houses that did not fill up all existing vacant lots. Similar to Reihan, the Settlement Division tried to reignite the development of Hinanit by the construction of an additional dozen new private houses by the

²⁸⁴ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 1503/85 [Hinanit]'.

Samaria Central Development Company during the mid-1990s (fig 3.26). These efforts did introduce new members to the settlement, yet were insufficient to generate the desired development process, which this chapter later shows, would come only twenty years later.



FIG. 3.26 Hinanit, 2005. (govmap.gov.il). Note the alterations to the old housing units in the eastern part, and the newly constructed ones in the western part

As the last site to be developed in the bloc, Shaked had the least rural features in comparison with Reihan and Hinanit. It began as an initiative of a few families interested in settling in the West-Bank. After forming a Gar'in, joining the *Herut-Beitar* movement, advertising a call for families to join and working closely with the MA, the group grew significantly. Most families were relatively secular, upper/middle-class, and living in cities in northern Israel or the central coastal plain. Almost all of them were affiliated with the right-wing of the Israeli political spectrum, and even one former member of the nationalist *Lehi* militia.²⁸⁵ Due to their connections with the ruling Herut administration, the MA offered them the specific location in 1980, granting them the *power to colonise* the site while the Settlement Division began the planning process and the needed groundwork.

Despite the similarity to the neighbouring settlements, the layout of Shaked was less communal and more individual-oriented. Still rural-like, Shaked too consisted of a central public area located in the settlement's entrance and on the site's highest point. At the same time, the layout was much more family-oriented, and

²⁸⁵ לח"י - לוחמי חרות ישראל (Lohamei Herut Israel – Lehi): Literally meaning Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, was a nationalist Zionist paramilitary organisation founded by Avraham ("Yair") Stern in Mandatory Palestine aiming to evict the British authorities from Palestine by force, allowing unrestricted immigration of Jews and the formation of a Jewish state. It split out of the Irgun in 1940, in order to continue fighting the British during WWII.

lacked the common car-free public core. On the contrary, it consisted of an array of private parcels placed along access roads that followed the site's topography; creating a circular and car-oriented arrangement.²⁸⁶ The communal focus did not entirely disappear, as the layout consisted of four different compounds sharing a common public area; all connected through a series of green open spaces and pedestrian paths (fig 3.27). Nevertheless, Shaked was much more fragmented as the plan subdivided each of the compounds into smaller private parcels, rather than promoting a unified collective-minded area.




FIG. 3.27 Plan of Shaked, 1988. (ILA). Note the settled area in the middle of the plan.

The houses in Shaked constitute a further step in the privatising settlement mechanism. Still part of the pioneer-like and neo-rural wave of the early 1980s, they resembled the state-supplied units in Hinanit and they were the same simple prefabricated cubes assembled on site. Moreover, like in the case of Hinanit, Shaked did not include a temporary phase where the settling families waited months in provisional housing. Similarly, following a small ceremony attended by representatives of the WZO and the MA, the families moved in in August of 1981, two months after the MCH supplied the houses (fig 3.28). Subsequently, Shaked began performing as an independent locality and the settling families had the *power* to shape their new settlement; using their exclusive spatial privileges to adjust the site to their needs by altering the units, paving and erecting barriers and fences. Respectively, the settling families chose to decorate the state-supplied units with a sloping red roof, that granted Shaked to image of an ideal rural-like settlement (fig 3.29). Nevertheless, while in Hinanit the state-supplied units filled almost half of the settlement's layout, in Shaked they were less than a fifth, while the majority

²⁸⁶ Settlement Department, 'Shaked - Plan'.

of the settlement would be developed in the Build Your Own House method (BYOH). Therefore, these plain units were not intended only to form the first step of larger individually developed houses, but also an initial phase that would encourage the development of the entire settlement; shifting the *power to produce space* further towards the individual settler.



FIG. 3.28 Houses in Shaked, 1981 (Shaked Council)



FIG. 3.29 Houses in Shaked covered with sloping roofs, 1991. (Shaked council)

The relative success of Shaked, in comparison with Hinanit and Reihan, correlates with the shift from a community-based development towards an individual-oriented one. In its first years, Shaked witnessed some social tensions, mainly between the veteran families and 'new' ones regarding the admission of new members.²⁸⁷ Furthermore, interests in moving to the settlement were low, and most families that were accepted eventually chose not to join.²⁸⁸ Still, compared to Reihan and Hinanit, Shaked was the most attractive settlement in the bloc. Housing a population of a secular families and its upper-middle-class profile, with a more individual

²⁸⁷ Veterans of Shaked, 'A letter to Michael Dekel from residents of Shaked', 16 February 1984; Ministry of Agriculture, 'Rejection of new families', 1984.

²⁸⁸ Schwartzberg, 'Letter from Avi Schwartzberg, secretary of Shaked to Michael Dekel, 2.2.1984', 1984.

oriented layout, Shaked was able to offer new members a more attractive residential environment. Therefore, though Shaked did have an active Admission Committee, newly admitted received a private lot they could develop in the BYOH method, while being more detached from the collective everyday life. Consequently, the settlement admitted additional members by the end of the 1980s, reaching almost 80 families by 1989; while Hinanit had 21 and in Reihan there were around 10.²⁸⁹

Due to its ex-urban context, the Reihan Bloc relatively stagnated during its first two decades. During the 1980s the different planning administrations promoted a variety of plans for the area, all intended to strengthen Jewish presence in the region. Though concluding in the establishment of small-scale settlements such as Katzir, Harish and Tel Menashe, greater plans to develop a new cluster of Community Settlements and an urban centre were not carried out.²⁹⁰ The lack of proper connection to the central metropolises, as well as the inability to develop proper employment opportunities prevented the possibility to continue developing the area. The long commute prevented the settlements of the area to turn into suburban communities, and those living in the Reihan Bloc were mainly employed in other settlements in the West-Bank or in the nearby Afula; a town that lacked proper employment opportunities as well.²⁹¹ Therefore, employment, connection, and accessibility, as well as security considerations remained the main weaknesses of the area; retaining it as neo-rural and preventing its suburban transformation.

Though only Reihan itself was officially a moshav, and Shaked and Hinanit were declared as Community Settlements, they followed the same community-oriented characteristics. While differentiating in the level of fragmentation and independence of the private parcel, they all followed the *compound model* of a circular plan of a public area in its entrance and an enclosing peripheral road surrounding its inner core, consisting of family houses sharing a common open space (fig 3.30). Nevertheless, over the years, with changes and expansions of the settlements, the community-oriented *compound model* gave way to the more individualistic *star model*, as the inner open core turned into access roads and parking places, and the enclosing road became a central street with newly constructed houses along it. Consequently, losing the former rural or rural-like features and becoming more suburban.

²⁸⁹ JA and WZO, 'Nahal Eron Project', 18–20.

²⁹⁰ JA and WZO, 35–59; Kipnis, 'Examination of the need and justification for the establishment of an urban settlement in the area of Iron - Reihan', 20–25.

²⁹¹ JA and WZO, 'Nahal Eron Project', 23–25.




FIG. 3.30 Reihan, Hinanit, Shaked. (Illustrated by the author)

The Reihan Bloc was too marginal to become a cluster of appealing Community Settlements, yet not ideological enough to attract the national-religious right-wing sector. As frontier localities, yet not precisely rural, the settlements of the Reihan Bloc lacked both the agricultural means of production needed for an independent ex-urban context, and the proximity to central areas necessary for a suburban environment. Though initially the Settlement Division intended to develop local employment opportunities, the majority of adults worked outside the bloc. At the same time, as the needed infrastructure was not developed until the late 1990s, commuting to the area was not an easy and comfortable task. Therefore, families in the Reihan Bloc had to rely on the already limited employment options of the area. Accordingly, the Reihan Bloc, was able to provide neo-rural experience of living outside the city, yet, unable to provide the option of commuting or the sufficient occupational opportunities, which resulted in stagnation and lack of development. The location inside the West-Bank and the unstable security conditions did not help as well, minimising the attractiveness of the settlements to the larger Israeli population. At the same time, being far away from the heart of the West-Bank, the area of Reihan was relatively ignored by the backbone of the settlement enterprise, the religious Zionist sector. Consequently, its domestication efforts turned it from a frontier to a periphery, and not precisely the appealing residential environment the planners and officials of the Settlement Division initially had in mind. The neo-rural environment promoted by the state was not the most useful tool, and the spatial privilege of building a private house was not appealing as well. Therefore, as this chapter later shows, as the suburban turn re-ignited the development of the area, it would form a rescue rope from its continuous neglect by appealing to the interests of the private sector and granting it the *power to develop space*; eventually generating new architectural typologies.

3.6 Nirit: a neo-rural settlement on the “Israeli” side of the Green-Line

Nirit, established in 1981, forms a unique case in comparison to other settlements due to its location and development method. It is the southernmost site of the mentioned case studies and it lies adjacent to the Green-Line, yet western to it, making it the only example inside official Israeli borders. Furthermore, promoted by the *Moshavim Movement* and the *Agricultural Centre*,²⁹² it began as an initiative of the rural sector. In moshavim constructed on state-owned lands, only a single child in each family has the right to inherit the parents' household and continue cultivating and inhabiting it. As small settlements surrounded by farmlands, moshavim usually lack substantial expansion options, causing members of the younger generations to search for alternative housing solutions. Consequently, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a growing demand to establish new settlements for continuing generations of the rural sector. Nirit, thus started as an attempt to provide young couples from the moshavim of the area a moshav-like community, though with no agricultural functions. Therefore, it was first defined as a “*landless village*” and later as a Community Settlement.²⁹³

²⁹² תנועת המושבים; *Tnuat Hamoshavim*): Established in 1933 by members of Moshavim to deal with their unique problems vis-à-vis the various national institutions. It is the largest settlement movement in Israel, representing 254 of them. The movement also deals with the representation of the moshavim vis-a-vis state institutions in all matters relating to members rights to land ownership, agricultural and rural policy in the State of Israel and economic development in rural areas; המרכז החקלאי; *HaMirkaz HaHaklai*): Is a Settlement Movement established in the pre-statehood years as a joint framework of the Labour Settlement and the agricultural education workers. It is made out of representatives of the Agricultural Labourers' Union (established 1919), which later formed a central part of the Histadrut (established 1920). With the organisational change of the Histadrut in 1994, the Agricultural Centre disengaged from it. It still represents the interests of farmers and rural settlements vis-à-vis the government institutions. Since 2001, the Agricultural Centre, together with representatives of other agricultural organisations and settlements formed a joint body named The Israeli Farmers Union.

²⁹³ Davar, 'First experiment in Eastern Sharon', 7.




FIG. 3.31 Nirit in 2015 on the western side of the Green-Line, forming an additional settlement point in the area (Illustrated by the author)

The site of Nirit was an integral part of the Settlement Department's efforts to develop new Jewish localities on the western side of the Green-Line as a counterpart to the Settlement Division's work inside the West-Bank. The site was mentioned in the department's plan from 1978, under the name of Mitzpe Zchor, due to the nearby ruins of a former Palestinian village by the same name (figure 3.32). Located west of the Green-Line, on official Israeli territory, and on state-owned land, it was under the responsibility of the Jewish Agency (JA) and the Settlement Department, which conducted the initial analyses of the site and approved its state-ownership before assigning it to the Agricultural Centre. Moreover, outside the occupied territories, the site of Nirit turned into an attractive option for members of the Agriculture Centre and the Moshavim Movement, who were relatively less supportive of the West-Bank settlement project.²⁹⁴ At the same time, located close enough to the West-Bank, Nirit was a frontier settlement, and thus received the support of the JA, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) and the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH).

Rurally affiliated, the planning of Nirit was handled by the Settlement Department's rural unit. The unit's planners initially began with mapping the precise state-owned parcels and then drafted the layout of the first temporary phase.²⁹⁵ Respectively, Nirit's development followed the common trajectory of a moshav, which included a first temporary outpost phase that consisted of a small number of families, a Gar'in, that would hold and safeguard the site while the preparation works and the search for new members were underway. Located on state-owned lands, inside the official Israeli borders made the temporary outpost phase redundant, yet, it gave the entire

²⁹⁴ Davar, 'First experiment in Eastern Sharoin'; Dor, Development of Nirit [Interview].

²⁹⁵ Settlement Department, 'Mitzpe Yarhiv'.

process the sought pioneer-like aspect. Correspondingly, the plans for the temporary phase were *gemeinschaft*-oriented resembling the typical *compound model* and consisted of minimalistic dwelling units sharing a communal open space.



FIG. 3.32 Possible settlement development, 1978, WZO, (Central Zionist Archives) Highlighted in Red is the site of Mitzpe Zchor.

The initial Gar'in of Nirit matched the objectives of the Agricultural Centre as it was formed out of young couples from moshavim in the Sharon area. They consisted of fifteen families that were organised by the Agricultural Centre, which settled the site in 1981 (fig 3.33). Meanwhile, the Moshavim Movement began searching for new members that would form the remaining 80 families in the first development phase and 200 in the final one. The Moshavim Movement launched a call for families interested to join. First, the search was in the moshavim of the Sharon area, but due to low response it expanded to moshavim in other places and eventually even outside of the Moshavim Movement.²⁹⁶ In 1985, eighty-five families were admitted to the settling group, from which more than half were from cities and towns that sought a more rural lifestyle. Still, each joining family had to go through a selection process handled by the Agricultural Centre, in order to make sure they fit the needed rural profile.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶ Glick, 'Nirit: Labour Pain' 21.

²⁹⁷ Dor, Development of Nirit.



FIG. 3.33 Plans of the first units in Nirit, 1983. The Jewish Agency. (Drom HaSahron Regional Council)

The initial phase of Nirit did not form a base for future development, but rather a preliminary and temporary steppingstone for a better-organised development. Unlike previous examples, which relied on the concrete *Ashkubit* units supplied by the MCH, the first units in Nirit were supplied by the JA and were made out of tin walls and an asbestos roof, giving them their common name – *Asbestonim* (fig 3.34). Accordingly, these units were clearly for the temporary phase and were intended to be replaced (and not altered or extended) with the settlement's transition to its permanent stage. They were one-story houses, of approximately 62 m², with an entrance terrace leading to a joint living room and kitchen area in the front, and a bathroom, study and two bedrooms in the back (fig 3.35). The planners of the Settlement Department placed the units on a common open area while creating a system of pedestrian paths that connected between them. Using the *compound model*, the planners oriented the entrance of all units towards the settlement's centre, forming a continuation of it. Nevertheless, the plan for the permanent phase did not use the first settling site as the centre of the future settlement, thus, pointing out that this step was merely a residue of former rural examples, which perhaps enabled the Settlement Department to begin with the needed infrastructural works but did not constitute the base of a future community.



FIG. 3.34 First units in Nirit, 1981-1983. (Nirit Council)




FIG. 3.35 First units in Nirit. (Illustrated by the author)

As a “landless” moshav, the proposed layout of Nirit resembled a typical rural settlement, despite the lack of family farming parcels and any other agricultural functions. The planners of the rural unit did attempt to designate an area for small industrial and agricultural uses, however, they eventually had to revoke this intention and focus on housing, mainly due to lack of lands and due to the need to preserve the forests in the area.²⁹⁸ Preserving some spatial concepts of a moshav, Nirit had a clear public core, which included the settlement’s main public functions and an area for public buildings in front of them. At the same time, the circular moshav-like layout began taking the shape of a more suburban-like system of winding *cul de sac* streets, spreading out of the public area in the entrance of the settlement (fig 3.36). This suburban character would continue to grow with the development of the settlement over the years.

The members’ involvement and *power to influence* the planning and development process led to significant setbacks in the realisation of Nirit. The outline scheme for the permanent phase was authorised in 1985, and the families were supposedly able

²⁹⁸ Planning Administration, ‘Meeting regarding Nirit Outline Plan’, 1–2.

to start building their houses. Yet, inner tensions between the settlers, especially between the veteran fifteen families living in the temporary site and the remaining eighty-five, regarding payments for development works led to serious setbacks, and even to the departure of several members. These differences were eventually solved by the direct involvement of the Agricultural Centre and the Moshavim Movement, which were able to dismantle the existing board and to form an appointed committee in its place. With a majority of representatives from the JA, the Agricultural Centre, the Moshavim Movement, and a minority of Nirit members, the newly appointed committee limited the powers of the existing settlers and was thus able to manage the process more efficiently. Moreover, paying for the development of inner infrastructure, the member families had the power to dictate the construction of roads, pavements, and sewage system inside the settlement; thus, having more control on the hand while causing additional delays on the other. Consequently, though the cornerstone ceremony took place in September of 1986, it would take almost three more years to finish the construction of the houses.²⁹⁹




FIG. 3.36 Plan of Nirit's second phase, 1986. (ILA). note the first houses in the middle and the new public core in brown

In the meantime, though most members of Nirit lived outside the settlement, it functioned as a community in exile. Accordingly, the communal council took an active part together with the Agricultural Centre in contacting the needed developers and managing the construction process. Both bodies were also in charge of monitoring and negotiating the needed payments of all families, leading to a subsidised fee for the cost of the parcel payed to the ILA, the infrastructure development costs to the MCH, and instalments payed to the council for the construction of each dwelling

²⁹⁹ Glick, 'Inconsistent Line', 2; Glick, 'The Price of Cheap Construction', 5.

unit.³⁰⁰ Fostering a sense of community, the Agricultural Centre and Nirit council organised meetings and trips, and even an on-site guarding duty, where each couple (husband and wife from the same family), were responsible for guarding the site of Nirit from 24:00-04:00.³⁰¹ As most couples did not reside in Nirit at that time, it meant that they had to drive from their current house to Nirit, finish their duty and return home to start their day.

Caught between rural development and individual aspirations, the transition from the temporary outpost was almost a decade-long process. This was mainly due to the construction method the Moshavim Movement and the Agricultural Centre chose to conduct. On the one hand, they were not interested in an entire settlement made out the same repetitive model, while on the other, enforcing a BYOH method meant a long and expensive process, which the young couples moving to Nirit would not have been able to sustain. The Agricultural Centre therefore contacted two architects, Michael Azmnaov and Dror Sofer, which already had built themselves a reputation for designing private family houses in the area.³⁰² The architects were asked to propose different models each, producing a pool of possible variants each family was able to choose from. Every model had a full and a partial option, according to the families' needs and abilities, as well as a possibility to add a basement for additional costs.

The selection of the preferred housing model and the allocation of plots promoted both singularity and uniformity. The architects eventually presented the members with twelve different models, which through a voting process were narrowed to six, in order to limit the number of options and rationalise construction. Each family was then able to choose one out of the six models, while the parcels were assigned through a raffle.³⁰³ Designed by two architects, the different house alternatives had similar spatial characteristics. With the ability to reach almost 250 m², the houses were spacious and highly individualistic.³⁰⁴ Focusing on the nuclear family, they were detached from their nearby surrounding environment through an enforced height difference and by orienting the living room area towards the backyard. This

³⁰⁰ Dor, Development of Nirit.

³⁰¹ Nirit Council, 'Guard duty in Nirit'.

³⁰² Sofer, Nirit: Sofer Architects [Interview].

³⁰³ Dor, Development of Nirit.

³⁰⁴ Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, 'Permit 42/103 [Nirit]', 42; Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, 'Permit 44/103 [Nirit]'; Drom HaSharon local construction committee, 'Permit 4184/1020000400 [Kochav Yair]'; Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, 'Permit 52/103 [Nirit]'.

detachment was enhanced through the use of the split-level model, which created additional height differences while arranging the different inner functions according to levels. Moreover, this enabled an expansion of another level, whether in the first construction phase or later (fig 3.37). Despite their significant large size, the design of the houses was relatively simplistic. Consisting of cubic volumes with small windows, made out of inexpensive construction materials, the houses in Nirit were affordable large versions of the ideal rural house.




FIG. 3.37 An example of a house in Nirit with a possible extension level (illustrated by the author)

Managed by organisations with experience in rural settlements, yet with limited knowledge in handling a concentrated production of a series of singular houses, the construction of the permanent houses lasted more than three years. Consequently, despite beginning in 1986, several managerial and bureaucratic issues postponed the completion of the houses until 1989. First, there were problems with the local administration and authorities, mainly in regard to building permits, infrastructure, and lease.³⁰⁵ Second, the contractor hired by the appointed committee was soon bankrupted, leaving the work unfinished. After several failed attempts to find new contractors the appointed committee was still unable to continue the construction works, and in 1988 the houses in Nirit were still only in the skeleton phase (fig 3.38).³⁰⁶ Unable to find a contractor willing and able to complete the project, the committee concluded that each family would continue on its own. The guarantees from the contractors were foreclosed and divided between the members, who were then in charge of contacting smaller private contractors that would finish the

³⁰⁵ Eter, 'Houses with No Permits, Sewage with No Way Out', 4; Pinhas, 'Who can live inside a home', 13.

³⁰⁶ Glick, 'The Price of Cheap Construction', 5.

construction.³⁰⁷ Therefore, to guarantee the completion of the project, the council and Agricultural Centre, had to fragmentise their organisational responsibilities to the member families; granting them the *power to* manage the construction of their own house.



FIG. 3.38 Nirit under construction - Brought in (Pinhas, 1987); (Yediath Ahronot, 1987); (Glick, 1988)

With the completion of the first permanent houses Nirit fulfilled its pioneer-like phase and was on the course to become a regular settlement. By 1990, the Agricultural Centre dissolved the appointed committee and declared the first elections for the cooperative council. Simultaneously, the construction of additional forty-two houses was underway. These houses were built in the same method as the early eighty-five, using the same models and the same construction concept. At the same time, the attractive lease conditions the ILA granted the first settling families were no longer available, which affected the socio-economic composition of the newly admitted members and attracted more upper-class urban families. In the mid-1990s, the regional council of Drom HaSharon, and not the Agricultural Centre, initiated another residential neighbourhood. It commissioned a private firm that composed a linear plan for additional ninety-seven units; consisting of a single winding access road that surrounded the settlement, designed to produce as many private parcels as possible (fig 3.39). While the first two phases were made out of the same housing models, the third phase was built in the BYOH method; thus, contributing to the suburban image of self-expression.³⁰⁸ At the same time, almost half of the units were built by a single developer that constructed the houses and sold them to the newly admitted members.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁷ Dor, Development of Nirit.

³⁰⁸ Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, 'Permit 416/87 [Nirit]'.

³⁰⁹ Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, 'Permit 98288 [Nirit]'; Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, 'Permit 98281 [Nirit]'.



FIG. 3.39 Extension neighbourhood of Nirit, 1996. (ILA)

Despite having no agricultural features, the members of Nirit insisted on maintaining its rural affiliations. By the late 1990s, Nirit housed nearly 200 families of which the majority had no previous or existing connection to agriculture. Still, the first group recruited by the Agricultural Centre continued to operate the pseudo cooperative Agricultural Council. In the first years, this was the only council in Nirit. Nevertheless, as it represented only the veteran families, the Israeli High Court of Justice ordered Nirit, and all other non-agrarian settlements, to hold elections for a civil committee. Consequently, this new civil committee that represents all members became in charge of running all municipal matters in Nirit, like education, public buildings, transportation and maintenance of public facilities. The Agricultural Council, on the other hand, maintained a symbolic role, and retained its responsibility of the water system and the swimming pool.³¹⁰ Thus, the rural affiliation had a spiritual role meant to prevent Nirit from becoming a simple Community Settlement.

Founded to serve members of the Moshavim Movement, Nirit was initially planned as a moshav, yet it quickly turned into a Community Settlement. Consequently, the first *compound model* layout soon transformed into a *star model* consisting of a system of *cul de sacs* (fig 3.40). Nevertheless, with a rural-based layout and background Nirit turned into a Community Settlement with the aura of a pioneer one. Nirit, that in the 1980s was considered as a frontier settlement, had all the needed attributes to become an attractive Community Settlement, affordable lands and spacious houses, just at the fringes of the main metropolitan region. Most important, it was in a politically undisputed location, therefore preventing any ideological constraints

³¹⁰ Dor, Development of Nirit.

to its development. Nevertheless, Nirit was not yet fully suburban, as it still suffered from a lack of proper connection to the cities of the coastal plain, disrupted supply of electricity and proper development of local facilities.³¹¹ This, as this chapter shows, would change only by the end of the 1990s.




FIG. 3.40 Initial and second phases of Nirit. (Illustrated by the author)

3.7 Ya'arit: early signs of corporate involvement

Ya'arit, unlike all other case studies in this chapter, was a private-led West-Bank Community Settlement that was eventually never realised (fig 3.41). Nevertheless, being initiated by a private entrepreneur and meant to be marketed to private individuals interested in purchasing a home in the West-Bank, it incorporates almost all characteristics of the entwined political and economic agenda of the 1980s. The intent to manage, fund and execute such a project by private means points out the rising demands for spacious detached houses in Israel of the same years. Moreover, it also highlights the shift from the seemingly ideological pioneer settlement to a real estate-oriented one; fuelled by the considerations of supply and demand.

³¹¹ Dor.




FIG. 3.41 The site of Ya'arit. (Illustrated by the author)

Ya'arit is an example of the growing involvement of private entrepreneurship in the West-Bank, which became the main settling tool during the 1980s. Though limited in the 1970s, a decade later, the West-Bank witnessed a growing number of companies that began purchasing private-owned Palestinian lands with the intentions to develop new Jewish settlements upon them. While state-led settlements were bound to state-owned lands, privately developed ones were free from these restraints. Therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), and especially Deputy Minister Michael Dekel, encouraged private initiative as a complementary mechanism to the public one.³¹² The Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), however, was less keen to foster this method. Minister of Housing, David Levi and other high-ranking officials, saw this as an uncontrollable, unprofessional and irresponsible process that threatens their authority as the main and sole executor of the government's policy. This led to an open and public clash between the two ministries, which was resolved only after the direct interference of Prime Minister Begin, conditioning every private initiative to first get the approval of the MCH.³¹³ However, the popularity of privately developed settlement was not limited due to the objections of the MCH, but rather due to land ownership issues and the unwillingness of Palestinians to sell lands to Israelis.³¹⁴

The developers of Ya'arit, the *Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Ltd*, demonstrate the growing involvement of private capital in the area. This private company was a developer and entrepreneur in charge of promoting the foundation of

³¹² Ma'ariv, 'Ideology and Money', 45.

³¹³ Yediot Ahronot, 'David Levi Wrote a Furious Letter to Dekel Declaring Disconnection', 1.

³¹⁴ Ma'ariv, 'Ideology and Money', 45.

several new Community Settlements in the West-Bank. Yaari Rozen and Rachel Lahat, who headed the company, were both residents of Tel Aviv that were affiliated with the secular sector of Gush Emunim and were the first organised company to act as a private developer of settlements in the West-Bank. Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Michael Dekel, called them: “*ground-breaking in regard to private initiative*”.³¹⁵ Mixing ideological objectives with economic speculations, both Rozen and Lahat began with mortgaging their own houses in order to fund the company’s activity.³¹⁶ The company’s biggest success was the settlement of Sha’arei Tikva, where they were able to market almost 700 houses to families moving to the West-Bank.³¹⁷ Though the company was involved in several relatively large-scale projects like Sha’arei Tikva, Ganei Mod’in and Elkana C, and received the support of the different settling bodies,³¹⁸ they still operated in a semi-clandestine manner, from their apartments in Tel Aviv and out of their private cars on the road.³¹⁹

The company’s modus operandi concentrated on purchasing private owned lands and then using its political connection to receive substantial spatial privileges that included the *power to plan*, develop and market a future settlement. Lahat, who focused on the land acquisition aspect, would contact Palestinian touts, or profiteers, that would act as middlemen between her and the actual landowners. Selling lands to Jews was considered as a taboo and a controversial deed, threatened by death from the PLO.³²⁰ Around 1982, with the PLO’s withdrawal from Lebanon, as part of the Israeli-Lebanese war of the same year, there was an increase in land trading due to the decrease in the organisation’s influence over the West-Bank.³²¹ Yet, the entire process would remain undercover and confidential, enhancing its clandestine appearance. After purchasing the needed land, the Judea-Samaria

³¹⁵ Ma’ariv, 45.

³¹⁶ Granot, ‘Rachel’s National Foundation’, 146.

³¹⁷ Lanir-Pilansky, ‘Permanent Name’.

³¹⁸ Ma’ariv, ‘Ideology and Money’, 45.

³¹⁹ Granot, ‘Rachel’s National Foundation’, 146.

³²⁰ Granot, 146.; Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the (PLO; منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية, *Munadhamat A’Tahrir Al Falastiniyah*); Is an umbrella organization of several Palestinian national movements established in 1964. The organization’s main and most important movement is Fatah. The organization’s main goals were the political representation of the Palestinian people and armed struggle against the State of Israel (until the Oslo Accords). In 1974 it gained an observer status at the United Nations and was later recognised by the majority of the international community as a legitimate (and the sole, by some) representative of the Palestinian people (including Israel in 1993, though considering it as a terrorist organisation until 1991).

³²¹ Kotler, ‘The Construction Frenzy in Judea and Samaria - at Skyrocketing Prices’.

Residential Neighbourhoods company would start involving the relevant bodies like the MA, MCH, and the regional planning committees, in order to start planning and executing the settlement's construction. In the meantime, the company would begin advertising and selling the future, in order to fund the construction of the settlement's planned infrastructure.

The Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods company implemented a new development process that is much more client-oriented and economically efficient.³²² The planning and construction processes would be accompanied by a *Setup Team*, in charge of the bureaucratic aspect of contacts and discussions with the relevant authorities and agencies; as well as an *Execution Team*, in charge of the construction of the settlement's infrastructure, enabling the later development of each private parcel.³²³ The infrastructure would be funded by the families purchasing lots in the settlement. In doing so the company claimed that the construction costs would decrease significantly from that charged by the MCH, which according to Rozen, were significantly overpriced.³²⁴ Each family would then be able to plan and construct their own house, according to their own design, need and ability. The houses were intended to be built in a *Cost-Plus* method, where the company offered the services of a construction manager that divides the entire procedure into smaller, manageable tasks, which are forwarded to smaller contractors. This, according to the company, would allow better control of the project and significantly reduce construction costs, "*Enabling a larger number of families to move to Judea and Samaria*".³²⁵ Applying this work method, the company asked to convince the different governmental agencies interested in cutting public spending, and private individuals seeking the luxuries of a private house, at an affordable price.

The Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods company analysed its potential clientele, applying promotion methods that matched the interests of the different target groups. The first and most important group was middle-class and upper-middle-class families. These consisted of working professionals, usually owning an apartment in the coastal area, looking for an affordable private detached house in a small community. They are not willing to change their place of work and aspire

³²² Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, 'Residential Neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria'.

³²³ *Ibid*

³²⁴ Kotler, 'The Construction Frenzy in Judea and Samaria - at Skyrocketing Prices', 17.

³²⁵ Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, 'Residential Neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria', 5.

to live not further than a 20km ride from their workplace.³²⁶ Second, are young couples that, with sufficient governmental aid, would be able to purchase a house in the West-Bank, instead of an apartment in the city. Third, are Jews living abroad that are interested in purchasing or building a second house in Israel. However, they might recoil from settlements in the depth of the West-Bank, and therefore might be interested in a settlement of a lighter mode. The company also stated that these three groups are not usually the target of the existing public policy of encouraging West-Bank settlement and should, therefore, be concentrated in the areas close to the Green-Line in order to enable them to commute to the cities of the coastal plain on a daily basis.³²⁷

Ya'arit's planned site made it the ideal location for a private-initiated Community Settlement. It was only a couple of kilometres east of the Green-Line, making it ideological, but not too ideological, yet ensuring that it would get the needed funds and assistance from the government and all other settling agencies. Though located in the West-Bank, it was not surrounded by Palestinian villages, like other settlements, but rather closer to existing ones like Sal'it and Tzur Nathan. The closest Arab population was that of the town of Taybeh, which is inside official Israeli territory. This meant that families moving to Ya'arit would not have to face the geographical isolation that most settlers in the West-Bank did, permitting them to easily continue their existing professional and social lives in the coastal area. Furthermore, located on a hill and overlooking a relatively open view, Ya'arit's site provided the desired pristine landscapes and panoramas that many families moving to the West-Bank anticipated. Most important, was that the lands of Ya'arit, unlike the majority of private lands in the West-Bank, were registered in the Israeli Land Register. Accordingly, the entire process should have been relatively easier, preventing double or fake sales, a phenomenon that was quite common in those days, as land registration in the West-Bank was not documented.

In Ya'arit, the issue of raising living standards was a central and crucial aspect. In a brochure handed out to possible clients, the discourse repeatedly revolved around the political aspect of living in the West-Bank, but also, and even more, around the new *quality of life* families in the West-Bank could achieve for a relatively cheap price:

³²⁶ Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, 2.

³²⁷ *Ibid*

“The massive settling of Judea and Samaria is a national objective of the first order... The “Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods” Company is a private corporation which has taken [upon itself] to establish, by independent means, residential neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria... The ways and means employed by the company in establishing the settlements are such as to enable a broad cross-section of the population to build their homes in Judea and Samaria, at a cost not exceeding that of an average flat in central Israel”³²⁸

The brochure, which was written in both Hebrew and English, highlighted the value of community life in West-Bank settlements. Based on the Community Settlement method, the new developed sites would consist of a small number of families, ensuring the intimate and amiable neighbourhoods most potential buyers are seeking. At the same time, the brochure warned from planning settlements that are too small, which would later have problems in attracting private investors willing to invest and construct local commercial centres and shops.³²⁹

The layout and architecture of the proposed settlement corresponded with the private initiative behind it. Consisting of a public core containing a school, a civic and commercial centre, a synagogue and a series of winding *cul de sac* streets, the layout resembled other Community Settlements. Nevertheless, efficiently and resourcefully using the site, the proposed layout was an effectual method to parcel the area of the settlement and generate the maximal amount of independent marketable private plots (fig 3.42). Thus, shifting from the common *star model* into a suburban tract development system, which simultaneously fragmentises and homogenises space as a means to turn it into a commodity.

Ya’arit followed the exact lines of the work method of the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods company. It was allegedly purchased from members of the Obeid family from Taybeh in 1981. Using their connections, the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Company was able to receive the initial approval of the MA and other relevant authorities like the IDF to start planning the site and marketing lot to private clients. Eventually, between 1981-1982 the company sold almost half of the planned family parcels.³³⁰ Subsequently, in June of 1984, the Ministerial Settlement Committee authorised the establishment of Ya’arit, and gave approval to the on-site construction works.

³²⁸ Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, ‘Residential Neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria’, 3.

³²⁹ *Ibid*

³³⁰ Jerusalem District Court, Arnon et al against the District Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Ltd.

The layout of Ya'arit resembled that of the typical settlement presented in the company's brochure. It was planned by a private architect from Tel Aviv, and not by the Settlement Division's internal team, like in the common case of settlements in the early 1980s. It had a clear public core, which was connected to the settlement's access road, and a spreading system of *cul de sac* that followed the site's topographical lines; allowing immediate and mobilised access to each of the private lots (fig 3.43). This also enabled the independent development of each parcel in the individual pace of each family. The private houses were planned along the ridgeline, while the open green spaces were placed in the less assessable sloping areas. This way, the houses were meant to take the form of the mentioned split-level house, ensuring integration with the given landscape, while increasing the orientation towards the view.




FIG. 3.42 A typical neighbourhood The Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Company. 1981. (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 3.43 Plan for Ya'arit, 1983. (Israel State Archive)

The houses in Ya'arit, like the ones promoted by the company, emphasised on high and luxurious living standards, with a focus on individuality and singularity of design (fig 3.44). Highlighting the split-level typology, the brochure endorsed it as a house that integrates with its surroundings while reducing construction costs.³³¹ Spacious and planned with an emphasis on design and details, the houses were depicted as villas in the midst of nature, mixing with the local topography and landscape and far from the simplistic ideal former rural houses. Thus, the developers targeted urban middle-class families interested in upgrading their living conditions, rather than ones in search of a pioneer-experience; corresponding with the new settlement approach dictated in the “100,000 Plan” earlier that year.³³²




FIG. 3.44 Houses promoted by the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Company, 1981. (Israel State Archives)

³³¹ *Ibid*

³³² Settlement Division, 'The 100,000 Plan', 14.

The favourable status of the private developers enabled them to receive the needed political and bureaucratic result that was enough to launch the process, yet not to complete it. Initially, the Ministerial Settlement Committee conditioned the construction of Ya'arit with the proof that the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhood Company owned the entire area of the site of the future settlement. The company, however, was able to prove only a shared and partial ownership that was not sufficient to get the needed approval for continuing the project. Plia Albeck,³³³ the deputy state attorney, who was famous for her pro-settlement line, stated that as long as the full ownership of the lands of Ya'arit has not been proven, it is illegal to start its construction, and that the state will not be able to defend these actions in a court of law.³³⁴ By that time, the plan for Ya'arit had been approved by the regional committee, and the project received the approval of the ILA. Moreover, the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhood Company had already managed to sell almost 250 lots and to begin with the first stages of infrastructure planning and execution.³³⁵ However, by 1986, as the company and the other owners of the same land parcel were unable to agree on the terms of the deal,³³⁶ the project of Ya'arit was cancelled and the decision of the Ministerial Settlement Committee was revoked. Though initial works in Ya'arit had begun, they were never completed (fig 3.45-3.46), and those who purchased lots in the early 1980s, seeking to affordably construct their own private villa, were never compensated.³³⁷

³³³ פליאה אלבק (1937-2005): A former Israeli jurist that dealt with the legal status of the settlements and the area on which they were established. During her work she was in charge of a vast land survey of the West-Bank that declared intended to allocate unclaimed and unregistered lands that were then declared as state-owned; thus, legally able to be used for settlement purposes.

³³⁴ Albeck, 'The Site of Ya'arit', 1.

³³⁵ Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhood Company, 'Ya'arit'.

³³⁶ Albeck, 'The Site of Ya'arit', 1.

³³⁷ Jerusalem District Court, Arnon et al against the District Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Ltd.



FIG. 3.45 Aerial photo of the site of Ya'arit, 2018. (govmap.gov.il). Note the unfinished layout of roads.



FIG. 3.46 Uncompleted buildings in the site of Ya'arit, 2014

The development mechanism of Ya'arit represents the new phase in the settlement mechanism that relied on the ability of private entrepreneurs to develop new settlements as its main tool. Ya'arit was an outcome of a pairing between politics and real estate investment, and thus had both characteristics. Its geographical location in the West-Bank was highly ideologically motivated, yet its relative proximity to the coastal area made an ideal commuters' settlement. Thus, unlike the other Community Settlements which began as a counter-urban phenomenon, Ya'arit was suburban already from its inception. The tract housing development model enacted in Ya'arit followed the economic and individual interests behind it, as it divided the site into a reasonable number of private parcels available for sale, while promoting a more individualistic setting. Therefore, the layout of Ya'arit was less intended to create a community, but more focused on turning the site into a commodity. The sizes of each private lot were meant to lead to the construction of relatively large houses, enabling the dream of a private house in the midst of nature. The houses depicted in the marketing brochure highly emphasise this, as they were illustrated on sloping terrains and between trees, far away from future neighbours (both Jewish and Palestinian). The promoted daily life here was very dichotomous, there was work in the city, and family time at home. Community here, unlike earlier examples, was merely the combination of private households in one settlement, and a promotion technique designed to attract future buyers.

3.8 Expansion Neighbourhoods: completing the suburban turn

Due to their ex-urban and peripheral location, all settlements discussed in this chapter, except for Nirit, remained relatively stable up until 2006 and their expansion was quite limited. The main reason for their lack of development was the deficit of appropriate infrastructure needed in order to attract the possible families interested in moving to the newly constructed settlements. Even though all settlements were within a relatively short aerial distance from the main metropolitan areas, access to them was yet relatively poor and undeveloped. As a result, the daily commute was still too long to enable a comfortable move from the city to the countryside and the case studies became reasonably accessible only after the development of the road system in the area. Another main reason that prevented further development of the settlements was their proximity to Palestinian towns and villages in the West-Bank. This was more crucial during violent outbursts like the First and Second Intifada (1987-1991; 2000-2005), but also during calmer ones, as Jewish Israelis were not always keen on moving to live too close to Arab concentrations. This was eventually solved with the construction of the West-Bank Barrier, a land obstacle that was intended to block the access of Palestinians to Israel. The barrier, constructed in segments since 2002, did not follow the Green-Line and in many areas ran eastern to it; *de facto* annexing parts of the West-Bank to Israel. Consequently, the studied settlements were cut off their neighbouring Arab environment and incorporated into the Jewish-Israeli geographical sequence.³³⁸ As a result, the former frontier settlements were able to become part of the main metropolitan areas.

The wide national investment in infrastructure was necessary for the development of the area, yet not sufficient, as a rise in demand was needed as well. The 2008 World Economic Crisis affected the local economy, triggering an increasing investment in real estate and a nation-wide surge in property values that almost tripled housing costs in the period from 2006-2018. This created a construction boom that influenced almost all cities, towns and villages across Israel. Suddenly, former remote and undesired places like the Reihan Bloc, turned into reasonably priced potential investments, in comparison to other areas, closer to the big cities of the main metropolitans.

³³⁸ Cohen, 'Israel's West Bank Barrier: An Impediment to Peace?', 682-95.

Consequently, the former stagnating settlements in the Israeli frontier instantly began expanding.³³⁹

Ex-urban, communal and selective, up until the early 2000s, Sal'it remained within its original boundaries despite witnessing a growth in number of families. While during the 1980s and 1990s, the settlement was continuously able to attract a stream of young families that were interested in moving to a rural-like environment, this was still quite limited. The lack of available vacant and unbuilt lots, the selection procedure that lasted more than a year and the fact that the settlement was still quite remote and too close to the West-Bank, all restricted the number of families that were willing to move to Sal'it. Consequently, the majority of new houses built in the settlement were intended to serve the continuing generations that chose to stay in the area.³⁴⁰

With the massive national investment in the area during the 1990s, the MCH and the Settlement Division began promoting a new and more suburban vision for Sal'it. This was a direct result of the increasing state-led development of the entire area as part of the Starts Plan, and the grand infrastructure projects that transformed the Green-Line (see chapter V). By the turn of the millennium, the Settlement Division had issued an extension neighbourhood for Sal'it, doubling its existing size. The first part was merely a westward extrusion of the existing layout and an additional part included five more *cul de sac* ways located in the southern side of the settlement (fig 3.47). Though authorised in 1999, construction was very limited in the first years, and consisted merely of sporadic built houses.³⁴¹ With the decline in violent incidents of the Second Intifada and the increasing investment and property values, this part would witness a construction boom in the post-crisis era. The BYOH units, which previously were enlarged variations of the previous rural model, gave way to more prestigious and luxurious houses. Consisting of white cubic volumes and built from expensive and high-end construction materials and details like metal beams, large windows, marble, wooden panels and architectural concrete they were seemingly minimalistic, yet practically exclusive (fig 3.48).

³³⁹ Charney, 'A "Supertanker" Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel', 1223–43.

³⁴⁰ Council, *40 Years for Sal'it*.

³⁴¹ Moshe Ravid Architects and Planners, 'Sal'it: Urban Outline Plan 112/1/2'.

Lacking the common tilted red roof, which previously decorated all rural settlements, and designed in simple lines, the new houses in Sal'it were neo-modernistic, suiting the revival of the international style in Israel during the beginning of the second millennium,³⁴² and characterised the secular upper-middle-class.³⁴³



FIG. 3.47 Extension plan of Sal'it, 1999. (ILA)



FIG. 3.48 Neo-modern houses in Sal'it, Architect David Kohan, 2015

While the BYOH construction stimulated self-expression, the suburban turn and the growing reliance on private developers promoted a more corporate-led housing. Consequently, the second wave of construction in the southern section was carried out by a single private entrepreneur. Correspondingly, the new houses followed the lines of retail construction, consisting of repetitive models reproduced in the different parcels. Design wise, they resembled the architectural features of the neighbouring BYOH units, and were mainly white cubes with a closed façade towards the street and wide windows towards the backyard and the view.³⁴⁴ Focused on the privacy of the family, they all included a fence as part of the design, as well as a parking place in the entrance of the lot, separating the inner household from its surroundings (fig 3.49).

The second enlargement of Sal'it was much more suburban and corporate-oriented. The plan of 2003 included an additional expansion, yet, it was no longer an extension of the existing fabric of Sal'it, but rather a new compound outside of it. The new layout was a tract-housing model focused on parcelling the site into marketable lots

³⁴² Nitzan-Shiftan, 'Whitened Houses', 227–33.

³⁴³ Rotbard, *White City, Black City: Architecture and War in Tel Aviv and Jaffa*, 8–9.

³⁴⁴ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8-7/1/1 [Sal'it]'; Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 8/84 [Sal'it]'.

while enabling an instant gateway to each of the future houses. Correspondingly, it included three dead-end streets that spread from the main access road and ran along the topographical lines (fig 3.50). Though authorised in 2003, construction began only in 2017, probably due to the Second Intifada and the lack of profitability of the project. With the rise in property values, the ILA granted a single entrepreneur, *Ampa Israel* Ltd, the spatial privilege to exclusively develop the entire neighbourhood. Consequently, this compound too consisted of repetitive cubic models that characterised all new houses (fig 3.51).



FIG. 3.49 Southern expansion of Sal'it, 2015. (Promotion of Sal'it expansion phase A, 2015)



FIG. 3.50 New neighbourhood in Sal'it, 2003. (ILA)



FIG. 3.51 Northern expansion of Sal'it, 2018 (Promotion of Sal'it expansion phase B, 2018)

With the growing development of the area, the Settlement Division began promoting the suburbanisation of the Reihan Bloc as well. While in the case of Shaked there were almost constant small extensions, they were limited to the inner framework of the existing grid. Already in the late 1980s, the planners of the Settlement Division altered the layout of Shaked. Rationalising the construction process, they replaced the layout that consisted of houses situated on a shared open space with a winding access road, thus providing each private lot with immediate car access and a parking place (fig 3.52-3.53). In 1999, the Settlement Division promoted two extension neighbourhood for the settlement that were meant to triple the existing number of dwelling units inside it (fig 3.54). With the privatisation of planning, the Settlement Division commissioned a private architecture and planning firm and stopped relying on its internal team. Corresponding with the growing emphasis on the private family lot, both new plans were based on a non-hierarchical system of streets and *cul de sac* lanes that parcelled the site, creating independent marketable tracts.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁵ Gonen Architects and Planners, 'Shaked: Urban Outline Plan 102/3. Tel Aviv: Israel Land Authority'.

Thirty of the new parcels were developed by the JA and the Samaria Development Company. Managed by Amana, it repetitively constructed the same two-story housing model previously implemented in Reihan. The remaining parcels were marketed by the JA as BYOH lots, to be designed and developed individually by their future owners.³⁴⁶ Nevertheless, though both plans received official approval in 1999 and the Samaria Development Company completed the thirty houses soon after, the majority of the plan's site was undeveloped until 2010, mainly due to the Second Intifada and lack of profitability (fig 3.55).³⁴⁷





FIG. 3.52 New plan for Shaked, 1988. (ILA). note new arrangement of street layout



FIG. 3.53 Houses in Shaked, 2017. Shaked Council. (Shaked HaYeruka, 2017)



FIG. 3.54 Western and eastern expansion plan for Shaked, 1999. (ILA)



³⁴⁶ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 15-231/99 [Shaked]'.

³⁴⁷ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 1008 [Shaked]'.



FIG. 3.55 Shaked, 2005. (govmap.gov.il)

The new expansion neighbourhoods in Hinanit and Reihan followed the same lines and were similar to those in Shaked as well. Up until the late 1990s, there were some new houses built inside the existing frame of both settlements, however, this was still very limited. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Settlement Division planned new extensions for both settlements as an alignment of dead-end streets spreading out from one of the access road that is connected to the main residential area.³⁴⁸ This followed the inner changes inside the existing fabric of the settlements, that turned the communal joint open space into a system of streets and parking places, just like in the former example of Shaked (fig 3.56-3.57). Here too, construction on site began almost 15 years later and both settlements remained relatively undeveloped until then.³⁴⁹



FIG. 3.56 New neighbourhood in Hinanit, 1999. (ILA)




FIG. 3.57 New neighbourhood in Reihan, 1999. (ILA)

³⁴⁸ Shomron Regional Council, 'Building Permits Archive'.

³⁴⁹ Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 12-30/03/-01 [Reihan]'; Samaria local construction committee, 'Permit 5/308/0/0 [Hinanit]'.

The increasing interests to rapidly develop the area shifted the *power to construct* the dwelling units from the individual to the private developer. Consequently, though initially the aim was to create BYOH neighbourhoods, this eventually gave way to a limited number of private construction companies. These entrepreneurs would purchase (or actually lease) the lots from the state and the ILA in order to construct the houses in a concentrated effort, and then market them to families interested in moving to the settlements. This would ensure the development of the new neighbourhoods in a unified manner that will spread over a contracted and control period of time. Most importantly, this would reduce construction cost, enabling cheaper development and increased profitability, while absorbing the risk individual families would have taken. In this method, the likelihood of not developing the neighbourhoods decreased significantly. The BYOH model was not entirely forsaken but became a privilege for continuing generations.³⁵⁰

Built by a limited number of entrepreneurs the houses in all the mentioned settlements followed similar lines. Lying directly on the street they all had a private parking place adjacent to its entrance. The entrance area would then lead to the joint living room and kitchen, and all of these functions would be then located on the same level as the yard. In one level houses, the bedrooms would be located in a separate area adjacent to the living rooms (fig 3.58), while in the two-level houses they would be located in the upper story (fig 3.59). In case the house is built on a site characterised by steep topography it would then be split into two levels. The living room area would be at the same level as the entrance- at the bottom level in case the entrance was from the lower side of the lot, and on the upper level in case the entrance was on the upper side of the lot (fig 3.60). These new houses were actually formed out of two main cubic volumes - one consisting of the entrance and living room area, and the second consisting of the bedrooms. These *cubes* are then located one to the side of the other in case of a one-story building, and one on top of the other in case of a two-story building. Unlike earlier houses that almost all of them had a tilted red tile roof, the new ones built in the mentioned settlements had a flat roof, strengthening and enhancing their cubic character.

³⁵⁰ Cohen, Interview in Reihan.




FIG. 3.58 Single floor house (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 3.59 Double floor house (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 3.60 Terraced double floor house with entrance from the upper level (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 3.61 Terraced double floor house with entrance from the lower level (Illustrated by the author)

While the expansion neighbourhoods promoted the development of the Community Settlements, in some cases they hindered the former neo-rural affiliation. Besides the already mentioned expansions in Nirit, the works on a new neighbourhood began in 2004. The problem was that the site of the new project was east of the Green-Line and outside official Israeli territory. Officially, the new neighbourhood was not part of Nirit, but rather an extension to the settlement of Alfei Menashe, which is more than three kilometres away and is separated from it by an Arab village and the West-Bank Barrier (fig 3.62). Promoting an ‘*extension*’ of an existing settlement, rather than declaring a new one, enabled the Israeli regime to continue settling the occupied territories while avoiding international pressure, in the pretence of natural growth. This was exactly the case of the new neighbourhood that was attached to Nirit. Afraid of being affiliated with a real estate project in the West-Bank, the residents of Nirit objected the new neighbourhood and their appeals reached the Israeli High Court of Justice. Nevertheless, as the court rejected their claims, the construction of the new neighbourhood of Nof Hasharon began in 2005.³⁵¹

³⁵¹ Tzabari, ‘11.8.2018’; Rotem, ‘Nirit Regrets: They Do Not Want a Neighborhood of Alfei Menashe’.

As a private-led real estate project, the layout of the new neighbourhood near Nirit was a tract housing arrangement that parcelled the site into a series of private lots. Consisting of a single access street, the new neighbourhood was connected to Nirit and relied on it for the basic municipal services (fig 3.63). Therefore, though *de jure* Nof HaSharon was part of Alfei Menashe, in practice it was a part of Nirit. Moreover, while the residents of Nirit feared that the affiliation with a private real estate project in the occupied territories would hinder the profile of their seemingly non-ideological settlement, the developer of Nof HaSharon used the proximity to Nirit and its rural background to appeal to potential buyers; turning the neo-rurality into an integral part of the promotion campaign.³⁵²



FIG. 3.62 Extension neighbourhood and surroundings. 2018. (Illustrated on aerial photo from govmap.gov.il)



FIG. 3.63 Plan for extension neighbourhood, 2003. (ILA)

The extension neighbourhoods followed a similar marketing method. In the promotion of almost all new projects in Reihan, Hinanit, Shaked and Sali't the focus was on four main aspects: a high '*quality of life*' that relies on a relatively large detached private house in the midst of nature, a vibrant and intimate community, proximity to main highways and cities in the coastal area, and a relatively affordable price. In the promotion of the new neighbourhood in Shaked for example the developing company, Ariel Yazamut, proclaims that:

³⁵² Glick, 'Nadlan - Nof HaSharon'.2,22]], "issued": {"date-parts": [{"2010"}]}}, "schema": "https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}]

*“[Shaked is] A Community Settlement in which about 250 high-quality families live in a rich communal life. Shaked is located about ... 10 minutes from Route 6 and 7 minutes from Katzir-Harish. The attractive location gives quick access to the cities of central Israel, the Sharon and Haifa. The settlement overlooks the magnificent view of the Jezreel Valley to the north and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. In Shaked you will find a varied educational system for all ages, as well as activities after the school day that include classes, events and various activities. The community offers a wide range of services, such as a large grocery store, swimming pool, synagogues, club, library, animal corner and more”.*³⁵³

The new neighbourhoods in the adjacent Hinanit, under the name “Villa in Nature”, was also advertised in the same method, with the promotion brochure mentioning that:

*“Hinanit is a rural community secular community, located on one of the most spectacular mountains in the area above the settlement of Katzir, characterised by a unique tranquillity ... The settlement is located at a height of ca. 400 m above sea level. On the slope, its northern branches connect to Nahal Zabadun ... The Villa in Nature project combines modern concepts of advanced architectural design, a practical home plan that creates a comfortable living experience and large and pleasant living spaces... a 5-Room Villa... The size of the villa is about 120 Square meters and the total land area is 500 square meters. The variety of financing tracks available to you will enable you to personally tailor your mortgage. You can purchase a house in the Villa in Nature project in an easy and convenient way for you. We will be happy to offer you the best and most convenient way to purchase your villa and fulfil your dreams. Hinanit is a Community Settlement with more than 100 high quality families and an impressive construction momentum. In addition to a rich and diverse community life, there are community services that make the quality of life in the community especially high.”*³⁵⁴

Interesting also is the extension of Reihan, where the developer is a subsidiary company of Amana – Batei Amana, which due to its political affiliation to the former Gush Emunim movement is apparently a more ideological and less profit-driven company. Yet, it uses similar marketing efforts and the discourse continues the same strong points as the other examples, stating that:

³⁵³ Ariel Yazamut, 'Peoject Info'.

³⁵⁴ Laniv Engineering, 'Villa in Nature', 2.

“Reihan is only 7 minutes from Highway 6 and 25 minutes from Hadera and Afula and overlooks a spectacular view of the Samaria hills on the one hand and the reserve of the Reihan forest on the other. You are welcome to come and join us.”³⁵⁵

In Sal’it, the developer of the new expansion neighbourhood Ampa Israel emphasises similar idealistic aspects, declaring that:

“In the heart of the country, next to Highway 6, lies the expansion of the Sal’it settlement, which overlooks an open panoramic view in all directions. The expansion of the settlement, which includes 40 charming homes in Stage A, which is fully occupied, and another 80 houses in Stage B, which is currently being populated, consists of quality families who have chosen to join the quality community”.³⁵⁶

Almost all extensions shown have followed the same outline and a similar development method. They all formed a new detached compound that is adjacent to the existing settlement and not an enlargement of the current fabric. The extension neighbourhoods constitute a physical and morphological addition that is highly apparent and quite hard to ignore. Unlike the former layout of the settlements that had a clear hierarchy, which was based on the different public and private functions and the relations between the community and the different households, the extension neighbourhood consisted of access streets, preferably a *cul de sac*, with a significant emphasis on the private lot. Furthermore, while the first settlement steps were carried out by the state and followed by BYOH projects, the extension neighbourhoods were built by private entrepreneurs. Accordingly, the development of these extensions was more market-led, applying a repetitive typology of housing used in almost all settlements that appealed to a larger number of families, or possible customers, while promoting an image of better ‘*quality of life*’. Consequently, giving the extension neighbourhoods their relative homogeneous and unified character.

³⁵⁵ Reihan Council, ‘Reihan’.

³⁵⁶ Israel, ‘Ampa Israel Website’.

3.9 Conclusions: from a neo-rural lifestyle to a mass-produced suburbia

The settlements described in this chapter illustrate the transition from rural to neo-rural and then to suburban, as well as the shift from state-led to private-led development. Initiated by the state and one of its affiliated organisations like the JA or the WZO, while generating non-agricultural secluded gated communities, the first stages of the discussed case study demonstrate the early privatisation of the settlement mechanism. At the same time, not completely privatised, the first steps were still carried out by the state, as it planned, funded and developed the sites and even supplied the first dwelling units; as seen in Sal'it and the Reihan Bloc. Accordingly, the spartan housing units, ill-developed infrastructure, limited access and lack of security highlighted the pioneer-like aspects of the settlements as moving there was quite a challenging experience and thus inherently counter-urban.

Returning to the equation of the state's *power over* space in return to the individual *power to* colonise it, in the early Community Settlements the individuals' spatial privileges derived from their affiliation to the settling group. Therefore, promoting the development of secluded and isolated communities was the settlement tool enacted by the state. In later phases, with the suburbanisation of the ex-urban neo-rural settlements, the individuals' *power to* design and build their own private houses on lands provided by the state turned into the main settling tool. These increased spatial privileges shifted the focus from the community to the individual, encouraging the interests of additional families to join. Successively, the sharp rise in property values around the years 2008-2010, enlarged the profitability of real estate in the former frontier settlements, and larger agents entered the scene (fig 3.64). Accordingly, the state granted private developers the power to plan, develop and market space, completing the shift from the individual to the corporate.




FIG. 3.64 Worth of 1 square meter in New Israeli Shekel, according to deals done in the area. (Based on info from the Israel Tax Authority)

With the increasing privatisation, the spatial privileges behind the settlement mechanism consisted of the *power to produce space* as the main settlement tool, rather than the *power to consume* it; consequently, altering the layout of the Community Settlements. The first state-led and funded plans were meant to create a community-based settlement and were shaped according to the compound model that consisted of small and simple private households sharing a common open space; like in former examples of rural settlement. With the growing privatisation and suburbanisation, as the state forwarded the settlement mechanism to the individual, the compound model gave way to the star model, that had a hierarchical setting with a centre and branching *cul de sac* streets. Thus, leading to a more family centred and private house focused community. The unbuilt example of Ya'arit, and the extension neighbourhoods form a later variation in the transformation of Community Settlement, as private developers began taking the lead. Consequently, as these received the *power to develop space*, they began promoting non-hierarchical and efficiently marketed parcelled layouts (fig 3.65).




FIG. 3.65 Compound model, Star model, extension model. (Illustrated by the author)

The transition from state to individual and later from individual to market was not reflected only in the layout of the settlement but also in its common houses. The early houses provided by the state were small and minimal dwelling units that were an outcome of standardisation. Later, the spartan units were replaced by a process of customisation, meant to provide '*individuals and their families*' larger tailored houses. With the shift toward corporate-led development, the houses were once again repetitive and homogeneous, this time, however, as an outcome of mass commodification (fig 3.66).



FIG. 3.66 Standardisation, Customisation, Mass commodification (Illustrated by the author)

The interior layout of the houses reflected the changes in the development mechanism as well. In the earlier houses, the more public areas consisting of the kitchen and living room were oriented towards the open public space outside, functioning as a continuation of it. Later, the living room area was oriented towards the view or towards the backyard, enhancing the feeling of better living standards and the inner family circle. In the corporate-led development, the public sphere is even further denied, forwarded by a private parking spot and a small access area, emphasising private car use while suppressing pedestrian accessibility and any possible visual connections (fig 3.67).




FIG. 3.67 Different arrangements of houses in community settlements according to the connection of the family area (red) to the surrounding environment. From the more connected models of the early 1980s (left), to the more isolated ones during the 1990s (centre) and the 2000s (right). (Illustrated by the author)

Initially emerging as an alternative to the city, with the suburbanisation of the Community Settlements they turned into a mere extension of it. Correspondingly, the common everyday life in all case studies examined in this chapter consists of the same daily commute to work, school and all leisure activities. Nevertheless, the pursuit of better *'quality of life'* was the main driving force behind the development of the discussed case studies. Though the interpretation of *'quality of life'* changed over the years, it constantly relied on the desire for a private house, small or large, in a rural-like location close to nature. This was emphasised in the names chosen for the settlements, as they all had a strong affiliation to the local flora and fauna, like in Shaked (almond), Reihan (basil), Hinanit (daisy flower), Ya'arit (forest), Sali't (rocky) and Nirit (false fennel plant). The logos of the settlements express this as well, as the majority of them consisted of a house with a sloping roof and a tree (fig 3.68).



FIG. 3.68 Logos of Shaked, Reihan, Hinanit and Sal'it

The emphasis on personal living standards, instead of national ideology or self-fulfilment was compatible with the changes the Israeli culture and economy went through. The transition from communal life to a more introvert and individualistic housing was parallel to key changes in the local political system and economy, as Israel began shifting from the old quasi-socialist *Mapai* regime to a more *laissez-faire* logic during the 1980s. Therefore, the early pioneer Labour Zionism, of the kibbutz and the moshav that concentrated on redeeming the land of Israel by cultivating it, gave way to a new Real Estate Zionism, which asked to redeem the land of Israel by commodifying it. The neo-ruralisation of the Green-Line was the first step in its domestication, which later enabled its suburbanisation and eventually its financialisation. The following chapter, which focuses on the Suburban Settlements of the 1980s, illustrates the gentrification of the Green-Line, which promoted the area's suburban turn and accelerated its inclusion into the Tel Aviv metropolis and the national consensus.

4 Gentrification & The Suburban Settlement

The New Israeli Bourgeoisie And The Green-Line

Two shorter versions of this chapter were submitted and accepted at *Planning Perspectives* and *Political Geography*:

- Schwake, G. An officer and a bourgeois: Israeli military personnel, suburbanisation and selective privatisation. *Planning Perspectives* (in print)
- Schwake, G. The Bourgeoisification of the Green-Line: The new Israeli middle-class and the Suburban Settlement Journal *Political Geography* (in print)

4.1 Introduction: bourgeoisification for the sake of domestication

The Suburban Settlements of the 1980s form a new step in the domestication mechanism of the Green-Line. They were an integral part of the economic and cultural changes that Israel underwent during the 1980s, which included the formation of a local upper-middle-class and significant modifications in its popular culture. Therefore, unlike earlier examples of city dwellers moving to the periphery in order to adopt a neo-rural and counter urban lifestyle, the exodus of the 1980s was mostly suburban. Fuelled by the desire for better living standards, manifested in a spacious private house in a small community away from the city, yet in a short commute from it, these new settlements were mainly an extension of the main metropolitan area rather than an alternative to it. Consequently, in contrast to former efforts of national decentralisation, which insisted on an equal dispersal of the

population along the country's entire area, the focus in the 1980s shifted towards a more local decentralisation version, which sought to disperse the population more equally inside the existing metropolises.³⁵⁷ Subsequently, transforming the frontier area of the Green-Line into suburbia. As a first step in the suburban turn, the Israeli planning administrations endeavoured to attract the newly forming bourgeois upper-middle-class to the area by granting them unprecedented spatial privileges that consisted of the *power to* plan, develop, and inhabit the frontier. Eventually, this enabled the area's domestication and further suburbanisation, while enhancing the state's *power over* it.

This chapter argues that the Suburban Settlement of the early 1980s were an outcome of a new phase in the national geopolitical project, which derived from the spatial privileges granted to the bourgeoisie middle-class as a means to incorporate it in the evolving efforts to domesticate the Green-Line. Therefore, it focuses on the settlements of Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut; the first Suburban Settlements in the area. Studying their development, this chapter first explains the emergence of the local hegemonic middle-class and how it was incorporated in the national geopolitical agenda. Analysing the spatial privileges granted to the developers of all case studies, this chapter illustrates how the new bourgeoisie middle-class was able to influence the production of the local built environment, and how the *power to* produce space, turned into the leading settlement tool. Accordingly, it analyses how the bourgeoisie desire for social and cultural distinction was manifested in the settlements' [sub]urban and architectural form. Focusing on case studies on both sides of the Green-Line, this chapter explains how this new phenomenon derived from the ability of the secular, politically central-left upper-middle-class to both produce and consume space. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates how the Suburban Settlements of the early 1980s were a state-directed gentrification effort, intended to domesticate the Green-Line by turning it into the dormitory of the new Israeli bourgeoisie; thus, using bourgeoisification for the sake of domestication.

³⁵⁷ Shachar, 'Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine', 209–18.

4.2 The bourgeoisification of the Israeli middle-class

The Suburban Settlement phenomenon is an integral part of the economic and cultural changes that Israel underwent during the 1970s. This process was accompanied by a transition towards a more individualistic and consumerist culture, which several scholars refer to as the *bourgeoisification* of Israeli society.³⁵⁸ These transformations were not manifested only in the accumulation of wealth, but also in changes in the patterns of consumption and living standards, as part of a long societal process that began already during the 1960s.³⁵⁹ Before the establishment of the state, and in the first proceeding decades, the local hegemony was made out of the veteran Jewish socialist Ashkenazi³⁶⁰ sector, which was linked to the ruling *Mapai* party and consisted of the proletarian-agricultural-industrial classes.³⁶¹ Though a local professional-academic white-collar class did exist, according to Bareli and Cohen, its prestige, participation in decision making and access to the country's social and political leadership was limited by the socialist establishment that regarded the emergence of a bourgeois class as a threat.³⁶² This non-socialist group included also traditional middle-class merchants, homeowners, and craftsmen who did not share the same concerns from the centralised state-led economy.³⁶³

With the economic growth of the 1960s, this middle-class was expanded by an evolving new group of public officials and executives, technocrats, military officers, and members of the private sector. Correspondingly, Ben Porat claims that it is during these years that the Israeli bourgeois would become a leading social group.³⁶⁴ The influence of this emerging class, according to Gutwein, would

³⁵⁸ Gutwein, 'The class logic of the "long revolution", 1973-1977', 21–57; Segev, *Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel*; Ram, *The Globalization of Israel*.

³⁵⁹ Ram, *The Globalization of Israel*; Filc, *Hegemony and Populism in Israel*.

³⁶⁰ Jews originating from European countries

³⁶¹ Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony*.

³⁶² Bareli and Cohen, *The Academic Middle-Class Rebellion Socio-Political Conflict Over Wage-Gaps in Israel*; Heilbronner, 'The Israeli Victorians', 128–68.

³⁶³ Rozin, *A Home for All Jews, Citizenship, Rights, and National Identity in the New Israeli*.

³⁶⁴ Ben-Porat, *Where are those bourgeois?*

continue the *Mapai*-led apparatus and some of its pioneering cultural values while adopting bourgeois-like socio-economic patterns, in what he refers to as “*Pioneer Bourgeoisie*”.³⁶⁵ The new emerging bourgeoisie hegemony consisted of the emerging white-collar classes, which according to Gutwein, would later align with the economic liberal right-wing *Herut* Party that represented the anti-socialist Zionist sector and large segments of the underprivileged Mizrahi Jews, and enable the 1977 political turnover that brought an end to the decades-long *Mapai* rule.³⁶⁶

The Bourgeoisification of Israel corresponded with the national suburban turn. Gonen and Cohen highlight the growing focus on the private family life during the 1970s, as an essential element in the new isolated and retreated private houses in the outskirts of cities.³⁶⁷ Though such neighbourhoods existed in the early statehood years, their scope was yet limited, and the majority of white-collar middle-class families inhabited urban quarters such as Rechavia in Jerusalem, Hadar in Haifa, or the Old North and Ramat Aviv in Tel Aviv. With the suburban turn of the 1970s-80s, the production of housing would become entirely low-rise oriented, composing up to 80% of the yearly built dwelling units.³⁶⁸ This suburban turn served the existing secular Ashkenazi middle and upper-middle-class, as well as other socially upward groups such as the new Mizrahi middle-class.³⁶⁹ Consequently, while in the neo-rural phases ‘*quality of life*’ dependent on a small-scale community, surrounded by nature and away from the city, in the new suburban pattern this shifted towards the autonomy and detachment of the nuclear family. As shown in a 1982 document of the settlement division, and latter also by the MCH, “Quality of life” was basically a mathematical equation of optimally dividing a certain area while providing each family with a large private parcel, enhanced perception of privacy and maximised panoramic views.³⁷⁰ Both documents advocated for setting the residential parcels perpendicular to streets, using the topographic conditions to increase the seclusion of the private family life while enlarging the achieved sight (fig 4.1-4.3).

³⁶⁵ Gutwein, ‘Pioneer Bourgeoisie’, 685.

³⁶⁶ Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’, 21–57.

³⁶⁷ Gonen and Cohen, ‘Multi-Faceted Screw-up of Neighborhoods in Jerusalem’, 9–27.

³⁶⁸ Environmental Protection, *Residential Building Pattern in Israel*, 8.

³⁶⁹ Cohen and Leon, ‘The New Mizrahi Middle Class: Ethnic Mobility and Class Integration in Israel’, 51–64.

³⁷⁰ Naim, ‘Lot sizes in Toshavot and Community Settlements with mountainous topography’, 1–4; Segal and Eyal, ‘The Mountain’, 85–86; Weizman, *Hollow Land*, 130–32.

These guidelines would become the standard parameters for frontier suburban development in the West-Bank, the Galilee and the Negev alike.³⁷¹




FIG. 4.1 Suggested parcellation (left) to increase “quality of life”. 1982. (Settlement Division)



FIG. 4.2 Suggested setting (left) to increase views and with it “quality of life”. 1982. (Settlement Division)




FIG. 4.3 Housing types according to the site's topography. (Settlement Division)

While seemingly similar, the suburbanisation patterns of the bourgeoisie middle-class differed from other groups with similar socio-economic backgrounds and focused on social and cultural distinction. This need for distinction, as explained by Bourdieu, is essential to the bourgeoisie middle-class as it enables its members to elevate their social status by distinguishing themselves from other parts of society through an emphasis on cultural capital, achieved through education, arts, manners, specific consumer patterns, and taste.³⁷² Correspondingly, distinction is an

³⁷¹ *Ibid*

³⁷² Bourdieu, *Distinctions*; Hines, 'In Pursuit of Experience: The Postindustrial Gentrification of the Rural American West', 285–308.

integral part of Logan and Molotch's "*place stratification model*",³⁷³ which is based on the desire, and ability, of hegemonic groups to preserve their social, physical and cultural separation from other "*groups they view as undesirable*".³⁷⁴ This was highly apparent in the American suburbanisation, which created racially and socially separated communities that went beyond economic classifications;³⁷⁵ while in Israel this matched the national demographic-based geopolitical agenda.

The desire for distinction was first of all a matter of detachment and segregation, enabled by the capability of the bourgeoisie middle-class to influence spatial production. As noted by Yiftachel, this was expressed in the ability of "*influential groups*" to move to "*suburban localities, 'protected' from the proximity of 'undesirables'*".³⁷⁶ Among these influential groups, Yiftachel includes also the private developers who target "*upwardly mobile groups who seek 'quality of life'*" and thus profit from the construction of gated communities.³⁷⁷ Respectively, Yacobi and Tzfadia highlight the selective nature of Israeli privatisation that consisted of granting social elites favourable conditions as a means to attract them to frontier areas.³⁷⁸ Nevertheless, while Yacobi and Tzfadia emphasise property rights, instead of planning rights, as the main feature of these spatial privileges,³⁷⁹ this chapter shows that in the early 1980s the social elite of the bourgeoisie middle-class still had a significant ability to impact the production of space. Therefore, applying the distinction between the *power over* and *power to*, the state in this case granted the bourgeoisie upper-middle-class and well-connected developers the *power to* organise, plan and inhabit Suburban Settlements, in order to expand its *power over* space.

The desire for distinction was expressed not only in the settlements' physical segregation but also in their different architectural and [sub]urban features.

³⁷³ Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: A Political Economy of Place*; Alba and Logan, 'Variations on Two Themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburban Residence', 431–53.

³⁷⁴ Pais, South, and Crowder, 'Metropolitan Heterogeneity and Minority Neighborhood Attainment: Spatial Assimilation or Place Stratification?', 261.

³⁷⁵ Logan and Alba, 'Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs: An Individual-Level Analysis of Segregation'.

³⁷⁶ Yiftachel, 'Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State', 36.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid*

³⁷⁸ Yacobi and Tzfadia, 'Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel', 9.

³⁷⁹ Yacobi and Tzfadia, 'Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel', 9.

Accordingly, the bourgeoisie suburban environments were characterised by simplistic “good houses”,³⁸⁰ in comparison to the nouveau riche and flamboyant Built Your Own House (BYOH) neighbourhoods that housed many of the emerging Mizrahi middle-class of the peripheral Development Towns and the rural frontier.³⁸¹

The suburban turn did not only serve the new consumer patterns of the bourgeoisie middle-class, but also its economic aspirations. The significance of the different forms of capital, whether economic, social or cultural corresponds with the leading hegemonic values of the relevant period.³⁸² Appropriately, in the early statehood years, one’s social capital was of significant value, as the affiliation with the ruling *Mapai* party or the hegemonic Labour movement, granted one substantial privileges regarding employment, housing, education and other welfare services.³⁸³ Therefore, as noted by Bareli and Cohen, the bourgeoisie middle-class was first interested in gaining cultural capital and entering the existing hegemony.³⁸⁴ This would change with the global and local neoliberal turn, which financialised all aspects of individual and social everyday life and strengthened the importance of one’s economic capital.³⁸⁵ Therefore, according to Gutwein, parts of the upwardly old socialist *Mapai* hegemony and the bourgeoisie middle-class fully cooperated with the privatisation processes that followed the 1977 Turnover, in order to transform their social privileges into economic ones, and by that to maintain their hegemonic status.³⁸⁶ Fittingly, according to Filc, the Israeli neoliberal turn opened a way “to different expressions of exclusionary populism” that privatised the public sphere and commodified the welfare system while highlighting the existing ethnic, social, and religious polarisations.³⁸⁷ This eventually resulted in the accumulation of private wealth by distinguished groups, an emphasis on individualistic values, and a greater focus on living standards, both as social privileges and a means to promote territorial control; all realised in the Suburban Settlements.

³⁸⁰ Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 14.

³⁸¹ Shadar, *The Foundations of Public Housing*.

³⁸² Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, 241–53.

³⁸³ Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony*, 11–20.

³⁸⁴ Bareli and Cohen, *The Academic Middle-Class Rebellion Socio-Political Conflict Over Wage-Gaps in Israel*.

³⁸⁵ Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*; Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*; Graeber, *Debt: The First 5000 Years*, 378.

³⁸⁶ Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973–1977’, 21–57.

³⁸⁷ Filc, *The Political Right in Israel*, 5.

4.3 Settlement and socio-economic classes

The 1980s witnessed the rise of a new spatial phenomenon - the Israeli Suburban Settlement. Interchangeably referred to as *Yeshuv Parvari* or *Toshava*³⁸⁸ it was used by the Israeli administrations to attract middle-class and upper-middle-class families to the fringes of the Tel Aviv metropolis and the coastal plain, easing the pressure off existing cities and settling regions of national interest, such as the border area of the Green-Line. Unlike earlier national decentralisation efforts that included peripheral development towns or small-scale rural settlements, the Suburban Settlements were independent localities housing up to 2000 families, offering spacious and relatively affordable houses in isolated homogeneous communities;³⁸⁹ all just a car-ride away from main Israeli cities. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, there are currently around 20 localities that fit the description of a Suburban Settlement. They are all located close to the “*internal frontiers*” of the predominantly Arab Galilee, the occupied Palestinian West-Bank and the Negev.³⁹⁰ Yet, still close to the main metropolitan areas of Haifa, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Beer Sheva. They are all characterised by an upper-middle-class socioeconomic Jewish Ashkenazi population,³⁹¹ and except for two West-Bank settlements they all belong to the religiously secular and politically central-left leaning sector.³⁹²

The ability of the settlement enterprise to appeal to a variety of social groups was a well-coordinated project managed by the Settlement Division and the Israeli Government. The Division's 1981 plan intended to create this appeal and thus focused on classifying the different areas in the West-Bank according to their demand and national importance, as well as the different settlement types according to their size, preferred location and target group. This included the City (*I'ir*), Town (*Kiryá*), Suburban Settlement (*Toshava*), Community Settlement (*Yeshuv*

³⁸⁸ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, 49; Nahoum Dunsky Planners, 'Development of the Hills' Axis: The Seven Stars Plan', 2; Fogel Hertz Schwartz Architects and Planners Ltd, 'Local Outline Plan: New Mazor GZ/BM/195', 1–8.

³⁸⁹ Settlement Division, 'The 100.000 Plan', 16.

³⁹⁰ Yiftachel, 'The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel', 493.

³⁹¹ ICBS, 'Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by selected countries of origin'.

³⁹² ICBS, 'Localities in Israel'; Central Elections Committee, 'Result of 2015 Elections'; Central Elections Committee, 'Results of 2019 Elections'.

Kehilati), and Rural Settlement (*Yeshuv Haklai*).³⁹³ The different types did not only differ in their sizes, more than 10,000, 3000-5000, 500-2500, and 500 families respectively, but also in their target population and location. The settlement plan defined the demand areas according to the travel time from the main metropolises, high-demand areas were less than 30 minutes from Tel Aviv and 20 minutes from Jerusalem, medium-demand were between 35-50 minutes from both cities and exceeding that were the low-demand zones (fig 4.4). The plan suggested reserving the use of community and rural settlements to medium and low-demand areas while developing several larger *Krayot* (towns) nearby, which would provide the needed regional services. The high demand areas would be developed privately, offering low-rise houses in *Toshavot* (Suburban Settlements) close to the Green-Line and the Tel Aviv metropolis, or denser cities close to the medium-demand areas (fig 4.5).³⁹⁴




FIG. 4.4 The 100,000 plan for the West-Bank. Division areas of demand



FIG. 4.5 New suburban settlements in the Master Plan for the Central District 3/2. 1980 (authorised in 1988). Note the planned suburban settlements in orange

³⁹³ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, 49; Settlement Division, 'The 100,000 Plan', 15-16.

³⁹⁴ Settlement Division, 'The 100,000 Plan', 16.

Concerning the changes in Israeli society, these settlements answered the new demands for better living standards. And Indeed, they all consisted of spacious private houses, well-developed infrastructure, green areas, and very good educational opportunities. At the same time, the mechanism behind the construction of these settlements also enabled parts of the privileged middle-class to improve their economic situation. The Suburban Settlements were mainly developed by associations or private developers. In the case of the associations, they consisted of well-connected middle-class families, that were usually affiliated with one of the main political parties, or a powerful organisation like the military, the Ministry of Defence or the aerospace industry. These associations were then able to use their social status and political connections in order to gain access to state-owned lands, where they were allowed to build their new suburban community. Then, they were able to use their collective strength to reduce construction costs and to make the dream of a private house even more affordable. Thus, the social capital of these associations was transformed into spatial privileges and the ability to improve their members' living standards. Moreover, these members eventually became owners of very attractive real estate, gaining concrete capital out of their social ones. The same goes for the privately developed settlements. Here, the developers were initially small-scale contractors with good ties to the government and other important ministries, which eventually supported their entrepreneurial efforts and helped them as well to turn their political capital into an entrepreneurial project. Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut (Fig 4.6), the focus of this chapter, illustrate how both an association-led and developer-led options were used to attract a specific societal group to the area, gentrifying it and enabling its further development.




FIG. 4.6 Case Studies along the Green-Line and the West-Bank Barrier (Illustrated by the author)

4.4 Kochav Yair: turning political capital into spatial privileges

Kochav Yair, presents one of the first examples of the participation of the newly forming bourgeoisie class in the national territorial project during the 1980s (Fig 4.7). It was initiated and established by a group of young upper-middle-class families who the state granted the *power* to develop and settle the site in exchange to enhancing its *power over* the area. Consequently, while this group of families was initially associated to the right-wing *Herut-Beitar* Settlement movement, Kochav Yair quickly lost its political affiliation and turned into an attractive bourgeoisie suburban settlement suitable for young upper-middle-class.³⁹⁵ Correspondingly, it houses a significantly well-established community of 10,000 inhabitants; consisting of several former high-ranking officers and politicians, and it is made out almost entirely of single-family houses, with more than 90% owner-occupancy.³⁹⁶




FIG. 4.7 Kochav Yair in 2015. Creating a territorial wedge between the West-Bank and the towns of Palestinian Citizens of Israel west of the Green-Line while enhancing Jewish presence in the area. (Illustrated by the author)

³⁹⁵ Berger, *Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel*, 23–49; Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair [Interview].

³⁹⁶ ICBS, 'Localities in Israel'.

The site of Kochav Yair was an integral part of the state-led frontier domestication efforts and an ideal setting for the suburban desires of the emerging bourgeoisie. The specific location was chosen by the Jewish Agency (JA) already in 1978, as its Settlement Department led an effort to locate potential settlement sites that would enhance the state's control over the Green-Line while creating a western counterpart to the West-Bank project.³⁹⁷ Located between the “southern-triangle”,³⁹⁸ the predominantly Arab district of Taybeh and Tira inside Israel, and the West-Bank, settling the site prevented a cross-border Palestinian sequence while promoting a stronger Israeli presence in the area. The site was initially called Mitzpe Sapir and it was part of three other settlement points in the triangle area, which formed the southern version of the Settlement Department's *Mitzpim* Plan that focused on promoting Jewish presence in the northern Galilee, inside official Israeli territory as well.³⁹⁹ At the same time, located on the Israeli side of the Green-Line and just 15 kilometres east of Tel Aviv, the site lacked the negative political affiliation of a West-Bank settlement and enabled the formation of an exclusive commuters' community.

The allocation of the site to the settling families was a clear example of selective privatisation. While the Settlement Department was in charge of tracing potential locations, the nature of the settlement and its future population were decided by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), which functioned as a sort of land broker; in charge of allocating a settlement site for a settlement group interested in taking part in the greater national mission. Simultaneously, a group of young members of the right-wing *Herut-Beitar* movement, the ideological backbone of the then ruling right-wing *Herut* party, was organising to establish a settlement of their own. The group was led by Michael Eitan; head of *Herut-Beitar* Youngsters and later a parliament member and minister on behalf of the Likud party and a key figure in the suburban turn of the Green-Line (see chapter V).⁴⁰⁰ The group consisted almost entirely of middle-class city dwellers that were interested in improving their living standards and to move to a private house, while retaining their existing workplaces in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Their demand was thus for a suburban type of settlement, characterised by a relatively high quality of life, which was not more than 30 minutes car-ride away from Tel Aviv; enabling them to commute to work on a daily basis. The group was

³⁹⁷ Levav, 'JNF to establish 3 more points in the triangle area', 4.

³⁹⁸ The Triangle is the term that refers to the Arab concentrations eastern to the Green-Line, inside the state of Israel. The Northern Triangle refers to the area of the towns of Kufr Qara, Ar'ara, Baqa al-Gharbiyye and Umm al-Fahm, while the southern one refers to Qalansuwa, Taybeh, Kufr Qasem, Tira, Kufr Bara and Jaljulia.

³⁹⁹ Soffer, 'Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment', 24–29.

⁴⁰⁰ The successor of Herut

first interested in settling in the western edges of the occupied West-Bank, just over the Green-Line. Yet, in a meeting in 1981 with the then Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, Michael Eitan was offered the site of Mitzpe Sapir. The site's proximity to the coastal area and the ideological mission to increase Jewish presence in the Triangle area appealed to the young group and they accepted Sharon's suggestion.⁴⁰¹

The development of Kochav Yair included ideological aspects and relied on individualistic aspirations, constituting an example of pioneer-bourgeoisie settlement. Accordingly, the group initially functioned in similar lines like the previous ideological *Gari'inim* (nucleus) that formed the pioneer core group of settlers in previous rural examples. Emphasising their ideological features, the initial members that belonged to *Herut-Beitar* chose to name the settlement after the leader of the pre-state nationalist *Lehi* Militia, Avraham Stern, whose *nom de guerre* was *Yair*.⁴⁰² As the MA and the Israel Land Administration (ILA), decided to enlarge the planned settlement, the group turned into a registered association, as appropriate for a more organised and corporate project. As a well-connected agency, the association was granted unprecedented spatial privileges by the MA and ILA, which included the ability to dictate the profile of joining members and the *power to control* the [sub]urban and architectural characteristics of the future settlement. Consequently, the newly admitted members were not reached through the private market, but rather through personal connections and recommendations, managed by the associations; making sure that new families suited the required pioneer-bourgeoisie profile.⁴⁰³

Acting as the developer, contractor and representative of settling families, the association still asked to be seen as an ideologically motivated organisation. In 1981, 15 families volunteered to settle the site of *Mitzpe* Sapir as a temporary outpost (fig 4.8-4.10); a decision that did not have any practical justification and was mainly a residue of former settlement methods, granting Kochav-Yair the aura of a pioneer act. Likewise, in an official letter sent to the Minister of Construction and Housing David Levy, the association voiced their complaints against the ministry's lack of assistance in the settlement's development, stating that:

⁴⁰¹ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

⁴⁰² Kochav in Hebrew is literally a Star - *Stern* in German. Therefore, Kochav-Yair, is a pun that means Yair's Star, but also Yair Stern.

⁴⁰³ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

“The Jewish Agency, under the orders of the Israeli Government , established a settlement in western Samaria, on the 67 lines, in order to Judaize the area that is populated by tens of thousands of minorities, in a hostile environment... Herut-Beitar has taken upon itself to establish and develop a settlement in this place, which will be called Kochav Yair.”⁴⁰⁴

Claiming that the location of Kochav Yair is located in Western Samaria, and not the Eastern Sharon where it actually resides, the association highlighted the connection to the West-Bank project. This is further emphasised by mentioning the Green-Line and the “hostile” environment, and by stating that the association had “taken upon itself...this mission”; thus, promoting the image of a pioneer act once more.



FIG. 4.8 Zoning scheme for Mitzpe Kochav Yair. 1981. (ILA)




FIG. 4.9 JA dwelling unit in Mitzpe Kochav Yair, 1984. (JA)



FIG. 4.10 Houses in Mitzpe Sapir. 1983 (Kochav Yair Collection)



⁴⁰⁴ Kochav Yair Association, ‘Letter to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Construction and Housing David Levy’, 1981, 1.

The ideological front of the Kochav Yair project ensured a wide ministerial support, which promoted the attractiveness of the project further. While the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH) refused to back up the project, due to an inter-ministerial feud with the MA concerning the overlapping planning responsibilities, the development of Kochav Yair enjoyed the growing support of the JA and the ILA.⁴⁰⁵ Consequently, the latter ensured the exclusive use of the settling group and subsidised the sale of the state-owned lots by a “*conditional loan of 40% of the land value (according to the appraiser’s estimate), which will turn into a grant for each settler that will live there for a period of five years after the completion of construction*”.⁴⁰⁶ Eventually, the lack of professional support from the MCH forwarded several planning responsibilities to the association, granting it additional spatial privileges and the *power to influence the production of the settlement*; ensuring that it would turn into the desired suburban environment the settling families were interested in. Consequently, the attractive location, the affordable price of land, the decision of the ILA and the JA to enlarge the project and the practiced spatial privileges appealed to large groups of young families.

As the Kochav Yair project expanded it retained its selective and exclusive nature. While the dominance of the original members declined admission was still reserved to well-connected bourgeoisie families. The MA conducted negotiations with different lobbying groups and allocated 200 lots to *Herut-Beitar*, 100 to the *Lehi* veterans, 100 to members of the Defence Forces, and additional 100 to members of the South-Africa Zionist Federation. This selective privatisation, which granted well-connected families such privileges is perhaps best seen in a letter from the assistant of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, to Michael Eitan, asking him to admit “*an old member of the Herut movement, a son of an old member*”.⁴⁰⁷

The first zoning plan for Kochav Yair corresponded with the increasing individuality and focus on the private family. Accordingly, the ILA issued a plan that was based on the seclusion and isolation of the family parcel.⁴⁰⁸ Unlike a common tract housing development, where a given area is subdivided into smaller parcels, the plan for Kochav Yair started with the single parcel; reproducing it across the planned area

⁴⁰⁵ Barel, ‘CEO of MH Warns Apartment Buyers in the West Bank’, 1; Maoz, ‘MA and MH agree on cooperation in construction in JS’, 1; Wiener, *Letter to Michael Dekel*, 1–2.

⁴⁰⁶ ILA, ‘Resolution No 262’, 1.

⁴⁰⁷ Malka, *Letter to Michael Eitan, Jerusalem: Ministry of Agriculture - Found at Israel State Archive: ISA-Moag-DeputyMinister-0013y15*, 1.

⁴⁰⁸ ILA, ‘Kochav Yair’.

while creating housing clusters. Together with the nearly perfect contour of roads, which followed the site's topography and decreased the needed groundwork, the proposed arrangement promoted a flowing and continuous car-ride through town, eventually providing the sought comfortable car access to each of the parcels. Using separated housing clusters and a system of winding roads and streets, the proposed outline emphasises the desire to create a commuters' town that focuses on detached private households, and less on an integrated and involved community. The repeated use of the *cul de sac* secluded each housing cluster further from the greater context and ensured a higher level of privacy. The use of the private parcel as the basis for the plan and the circular setting created an abundance of left-over spaces in the intersection of the streets and between the housing clusters, which the planners used to promote the formation of secluded and isolated housing assemblages (fig 4.11).



FIG. 4.11 Kochav Yair Zoning Scheme, 1984. Israel Land Administration. (ILA)

The clusters of Kochav Yair consisted of different suburban types that suited its profile as bourgeois settlement. First and most simple sort was the array of private lots along the main winding roads of the town. Though very easy to execute, this type was not very common due to the lack of privacy and proximity of dwelling units to the town's traffic, making it less attractive to future inhabitants. The most popular variation was that of the *cul de sac*. Here, a dead-end street stretched out of the main road and provided a more private access to each of the lots. To enhance the feeling of privacy and separation the private lots were partitioned from the main road by a "green strip". An adaptation of the *cul de sac* typology was that of the common access. In this case, the access street was much shorter and functioned more like a shared admittance and parking area for the adjacent houses (fig 4.12). The first plan for the settlement included several larger lots, intended for larger housing

typologies. Later, however, as the association took over the planning process, it commissioned architect Meir Buchman's office to re-arrange the settlement's proposed layout, parcelling the larger lots into the same private housing clusters as in the rest of Kochav Yair.⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, ensuring that Kochav Yair would consist only of detached houses suitable for an upper-middle-class suburban community, unlike denser residential buildings that could harm the settlement's morphological and societal homogeneity.




FIG. 4.12 Access street; cul de sac; joint access (Illustrated by the author)

The spatial privileges the members of Kochav Yair enjoyed, enabled them to produce private houses that suited their profile as upper-middle-class bourgeoisie. Regardless of their former political affiliation, each joining family became part of the Kochav Yair association, which was based in *Metzudat Zeev*, the headquarters of the Herut movement. Each member family was then entitled to a private lot in the future settlement, choosing from three options ranging from 500-1000 m², while the exact location was decided through a raffle. With the association managing the design and construction of the houses, they were interested in promoting individuality on the one hand, while enforcing uniformity on the other. Therefore, together with Buchman, the association composed specific design regulation that with the ideal Zionist “good house”⁴¹⁰ and promoted a homogeneous environment made out of two-story detached family houses, with simplistic white cubic features and a sloping read-tile roof. As claimed by Eitan, the association feared the BYOH -style “cacophony” where everyone does “whatever he wants” and therefore decided to create a limited number of housing models that each member could choose from.⁴¹¹ The construction of repetitive models was also meant to reduce construction costs and to ensure a quicker and more efficient procedure. Approaching six different architectural offices,

⁴⁰⁹ Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, ‘Modification Plan SD/1002/7 A: Kochav Yair’.

⁴¹⁰ Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 14.

⁴¹¹ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

the association invited them to propose several housing models, according to the different lot sizes, location, and topography. In an event held in *Metzudat Zeev* in 1983, the architects presented their ideas to the first 500 members, who were then supposed to vote for the model of their choice (fig 4.13).⁴¹² Eventually, 80% chose the three models of a single architectural office while the remaining 20% chose two additional types.⁴¹³



FIG. 4.13 Promotion drawings of a house model in Kochav Yair. 1984. The South African Zionist Federation

As bourgeois houses, they followed modest architectural characteristics and focused on the nuclear family and its privacy. Significantly large with an average area of 200 m², they consisted of a clear division between the bedroom area and the joint living room and kitchen space; a division heightened by the use of the split-level home, which characterised all of the different models.⁴¹⁴ Though the popularity of this typology could be explained by the topography of the site, it is also possible to notice that it was used also in lots that had almost no height differences or any significant topographical features. The family's privacy was further enhanced by orienting the living room area towards the backyard while the bedrooms faced the street. Consequently, creating a closed façade towards the street, shutting the house off of its neighbouring environment, while the more open façade was in the secluded family area (figure 4.14-4.15).

⁴¹² Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair [Interview].

⁴¹³ Mitzpe Afek Council, 'Building Permits Archive'.

⁴¹⁴ Riskin, Houses in Kochav Yair and Reut [Interview]; Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.




FIG. 4.14 A model House - upper row: main facade to street, backyard façade, side façade. Lower row: Section (Note the family area in the lower part and the bedrooms area in the upper one, oriented towards the street); Plan. Gil-Ad & Yosef Architects.




FIG. 4.15 C model House - upper row: main facade to street, backyard façade, side façade. Lower row: Section (Note the family area in the lower part and the bedrooms area in the upper one, oriented towards the street); Plan. Gil-Ad & Yosef Architects.

The association's ability to control the entire process enabled it to construct these seemingly luxurious and spacious houses in a tight and limited budget. According to one of the main architects involved in the project, the houses in Kochav Yair were "*villas with a budget of social housing*".⁴¹⁵ Nonetheless, the well-managed and well-connected association of Kochav Yair was able to use the recession of the early 1980s, its contacts with leading contractors, and the purchasing power its members to significantly reduce the price of construction materials.⁴¹⁶ With the help of the newly used computer-aided drawing software, the architects were able to produce repetitive plans for the different models and their various implementations.⁴¹⁷ The use of reproduced details and lists was also crucial, and along with the fact that the contractors had to deal with a small number of architects, construction costs were significantly reduced. To create some variety and sophistication in the houses, the architects tried to design breaks and interruptions in the continuous façades

⁴¹⁵ Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.

⁴¹⁶ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

⁴¹⁷ Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.

by creating setbacks used for balconies and entrances. Furthermore, they also used large concrete beams to frame two or more small windows and to create the appearance of a larger one.⁴¹⁸ Maintaining low construction costs met the economic restraints of some of the young families, which though enjoying access to political power as part of the emerging middle-class, this was not (yet) translated into economic wealth. Consequently, due to the well-maintained budget, they succeeded in building their “*villa*” in the price of a “*social housing*” unit.

The managerial rights and the support the association enjoyed in Kochav Yair enabled a concentrated and efficient construction process. The association enacted a development process that included developing the needed infrastructure before marketing the lots to their future buyers. In doing so, the association basically invested the development payments paid by existing members, which they hoped to get back once the lots in the new neighbourhoods were sold. This proved to be highly efficient, as it ensured that all the public facilities such as schools, kindergartens and the country club, would be constructed before reaching the settlement’s full capacity. Nevertheless, this speculative management was made possible mainly due to the help of the ILA, which gave the association the needed support for the entire settlement before all lots were marketed; significantly reducing the risk taken. Eventually, despite a short period during the First Intifada when sales were low and some families chose not to move to the settlement, this economic model enabled the continuous construction of houses and the admission of new families. Subsequently, by the beginning of 1991, Kochav Yair became a home for almost 1000 families.⁴¹⁹

The scope of construction was crucial to the character of Kochav Yair as an exclusive settlement. The fact that almost the entire infrastructure and all houses were developed in several years ensured that the settlement will not turn into a construction site for a long period of time. Furthermore, building Kochav Yair in three concentrated and consecutive phases also enabled the first 500 families to enjoy the infrastructure and facilities that were meant to serve the whole 1000 families, which were crucial for the image of an appealing Suburban Settlement. With the completion of the third wave in the early 1990s, Kochav Yair was a done deal (fig 4.16).⁴²⁰ This meant that unlike other earlier and similar settlements, Kochav Yair had almost

⁴¹⁸ Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 4184/1020000400’; Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 21486/1020068000’; Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 250/1020032200’.

⁴¹⁹ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

⁴²⁰ Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, ‘Permit 1715/210014’.

no extensions or expansion neighbourhoods. Consequently, the homogeneous architecture and [sub]urban fabric were maintained, and the main changes since then were mostly in the level of the individual lot, as new families moving into the settlement would sometimes prefer demolishing the existing house they had bought and build a new one instead.⁴²¹ However, as the houses in Kochav Yair were already large and relatively spacious, this was done quite seldom.



FIG. 4.16 Fig 4.16 (left-right): Houses in Kochav Yair - 1989, Tzvika Israel; 1986. Nati Harnik (GPO)

Known as the home of several generals, ministers and even an acting Prime Minister, Kochav Yair enjoyed the reputation of an ultimate Suburban Settlement with an ideal high-class community (fig 4.17-4.18). Consequently, it continued to attract the same upper-middle-class sector that enhanced its elitist nature. To retain this status, Kochav Yair resisted, quite successfully, almost all attempts of the ILA and the MCH to expand and change its character. These plans included annexing new settlements to Kochav Yair and turning it into a large regional centre that would serve the entire area. The objections did not concern only the changes planned in the settlement, but also the changes in the character of the region. In the mid-1990s for example, Kochav Yair voiced their disapproval to the MCH's plan to build a new town in the area of Yarhiv Forest, which is more than 10km away, in fear that this would change the rural atmosphere of the region.⁴²² For a period, Kochav Yair was also against the construction of Tzur Yigal in its southern edge. An objection that was eventually moderated with the promise the new settlement would also be a low-rise, spacious and significantly small one, designed for upper-middle-class families as well. In 2003

⁴²¹ Mitzpe Afek Council, 'Building Permits Archive'.

⁴²² Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, 'Report on the MCH plans for Kochav Yair and Yarhiv Nirit', 1-3.

both settlements were merged by the Ministry of Interior into one municipal entity. Anyhow, they maintained their independence as no significant physical connection, such as streets or paths, were created between them and they were still accessible from two different entrances.⁴²³



FIG. 4.17 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak Meeting Yasser Arafat in his private residence in Kochav Yair (left), 2000. Amos Ben Gershom (GPO). Note the corner window.



FIG. 4.18 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his wife Nava watering the garden of their private residence in Kochav Yair, 2000. Amos Ben Gershom. (GPO)

The concept of detachment was an integral part of both the [sub]urban and architectural layouts, which is also emphasised by the lack of commercial uses. Though there are a few stores and public facilities inside Kochav Yair, the main commercial and recreational functions are found in its fringes. This includes the commercial centre that is located in the nearby gas-station compound, which consists of several stores, banks, and cafés, as well as the nearby industrial zone that contains office buildings, shops, and even a supermarket. The gated community aspect is then heightened by a physical barrier and a check post that separate the residential area with its nearby environment and controls those coming in, as well as those going out. To make this procedure more efficient and less troublesome for the residents, the access road consists of two lanes, one for the residents of Kochav Yair and one for guests. A remote identification system opens the barrier for cars owned by residents automatically while guests are able to enter only after an inspection of the security guards at the entrance. A similar inspection takes place also while exiting Kochav Yair, to prevent cases of car theft and burglary.⁴²⁴

⁴²³ Arye Soninio Architects, 'Urban Plan ZS/BM/1002/10 (Eyal North) Tzur Yigal'.

⁴²⁴ Council, 'Security in Kichav Yair'.

The inspection of non-residents is usually visual and based on appearance, meaning that the security guards distinguish by appearance those who fit the profile of possible guests.

Already during its construction, Kochav Yair was considered as a success story. Its location, which was close but not too close to Tel Aviv, attracted the potential young commuters that wanted to get away from the city while still remaining close to it. Its proximity to the Green-Line ensured that the ideological aspect of territorial settlement will be present, which enabled the financial and bureaucratic support of the state and its different administrations and settling organisations. Yet, as it was on the Israeli side of the line and not on occupied territory, Kochav Yair was attractive to upper-middle-class Israelis from all around the political and religious spectrum. Moreover, this also reduced the uncertainty that typically characterises settlements in the West-Bank, making people insecure to invest their savings in real estate in the area. The spacious houses and the intimate community appealed to many seeking spacious houses in a secluded community amidst nature, yet with all the services the cities close by are able to provide. Nevertheless, admittance to the settlement and the exposure to the project was maintained to close connected families with ties to the associations and one of its founding groups. All these aspects were clearly stated in a 1984 promotion film of the South African Zionist Federation, one of the partners in Kochav Yair, which was directed to members of the federation and began by claiming that:

*“Today, sophisticated technology and a great deal of thought of quality of life are building Kochav Yair. Located in the vicinity of Ra’anana and Kfar Sava Kochav Yair is in easy reach of Tel Aviv and is located entirely in the pre-67 borders of Israel. It is easy to work in Tel Aviv and benefit from it culturally, yet to live in a small town. Kochav Yair will have a maximum of 1200 homes each with a private garden. These homes and the Kochav Yair lifestyle are available at a price no other quality suburb can offer and in travelling distance from the centre...”*⁴²⁵

One of the South Africans moving to Kochav Yair, who was quoted in the promotion film, went further and stated that:

⁴²⁵ Boxer, *Kochav Yair*.

*"One thing I want to tell you about the houses in Kochav Yair; They are not what one envisions when coming on Aliyah, we are talking about luxury houses, spacious ... so this standard of housing is very high, very similar to what we have in South Africa, very similar"*⁴²⁶



FIG. 4.19 Kochav Yair, 1992.
Saar Yaacov (GPO)

Developed by and for a specific group, Kochav Yair is a classic case of gentrification and place stratification. Moreover, the ability of the association to lead such a massive construction feasibly and efficiently could not have been done without the support of the different administrations, which demonstrates the selective privatisation enacted by the state. The focus on the detached family unit and simplistic design features, together with the well-perceived core settling families, offered this selected group the suburban dream of a spacious house and a garden in a distinct community while incorporating them into the national-territorial mission. Subsequently, in the early 1990s, as the Israeli Government asked to construct additional Jewish settlements in the area, it referred to them as "Stars" (*Kochavim*) as it sought to create several new reproductions of Kochav Yair along the Green-Line, which formed the prototype of the ideal Suburban Settlement.

⁴²⁶ Boxer.

4.5 Alfei Menashe: patches of differing spatial privileges

Developed at the same time as Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe presents a further step in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism (fig 4.20). Promoted by the state, yet, built by private developers, it forms an interesting case study of the private-national coalition to incorporate young, secular middle-class families in the West-Bank project. It is located five kilometres east to the Green-Line, mostly on state-owned lands, which were controlled by the Israeli Custodian of Absentees' Property, a governmental agency that is in charge of managing the properties of absent Palestinians. It was built three kilometres from the Palestinian city of Qalqilya, and around ten kilometres from the Israeli city of Kfar Sava. Therefore, it became part of the suburban projects that were referred to as the “five minutes from Kfar Sava” settlements;⁴²⁷ a slogan that derived from the marketing technique used by several private developers during the 1980s in order to portray the newly built settlements as part of the Israeli central area.




FIG. 4.20 Alfei Menashe in 2015, surrounded by the West Bank Separation Barrier (Illustrated by the author)

The dynamics behind the portrayal a process of selective privatisation, benefiting a well-connected and privileged group. The joint committee of the Israeli Government and the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) authorised the establishment of the

⁴²⁷ Kislev, 'Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava', 7.

settlement that would later become Alfei Menashe in August of 1979.⁴²⁸ Located near the existing Karnei Shomron the new settlement was initially named Karnei Shomron C. While in most cases, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) would assign the location of a settlement to members of a political movement, in this case the representatives of the Ministry of Defence (MD) insisted that the new site would house families of military officers (IDF) and other employees of the Israeli Security Establishment.⁴²⁹ The Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH) and the MA agreed to this demand, yet due to the site's harsh topographic conditions they first asked to assign the MD with an alternative location nearby. The MCH pointed out the site's challenging topography, which is suitable to denser corporate-led construction than a low-rise environment that interested the MD (see fig 4.3 again). The representatives of the MD rejected the alternative site as it was too deep into the West-Bank and insisted on the proximity to the coastal plain. Moreover, to ensure this proximity the representatives of the MD required also a direct road connecting the site to the city of Kfar Sava while stating that they were willing to participate in funding some of the high development costs. The MD also insisted on an exclusive status for its officers, forcing the MCH to commit that all units would first be marketed only to members of the security forces, and only in case some houses remain unsold, then the MCH could have the opportunity to sell them to other individuals, yet only after receiving the prior consent of the MD.⁴³⁰

The selective privatisation continued to the choice of contractors, where the MCH granted favourable meant to guarantee the completion of the project. Tendering a project to a private corporation was a common conduct since the 1970s. Nevertheless, with the intentions of the MD to create a high-end residential environment for its officers it advocated for handing the project over to a single large corporation that would take the responsibility for the entire process. The MCH would retain its managing roles while developing the needed infrastructure outside the settlement while the private developers would be in charge of the interior ones. Due to the foreseen high development costs, caused by the site's steep and rough topography, the MCH agreed to grant the future corporation easier terms than other private developers, which included larger governmental loans and higher development grants. These favourable terms were improved by the MCH's agreement to purchase 50% of all unsold future units, further reducing the risk taken by the

⁴²⁸ Simply referred to as the "settlement committee"

⁴²⁹ IDF: Israel Defence Forces; Security establishment (Ma'arach HaBitahon): is an umbrella term that refers to the military, police, the General Security Service (*Shabak*), and the Mossad.

⁴³⁰ State Comptroller of Israel, 'The Establishment of Alfei Menashe', 104–15.

private corporation. As existing large-scale construction companies were less interested in taking part in this project, In April 1981 the MCH signed a contract with *Tzavta* Construction and Housing Ltd, a private corporation made out of eight small and medium-scale private construction and development companies with strong ties to the ruling Likud Party and the MA. With these connections, *Tzavta* was able to secure even better conditions than those initially promised by the MCH; this included larger governmental subsidies and even an option to construct 80% of the future units in the settlement.⁴³¹ Subsequently, due to its monopole over the settlement, the name *Tzavta* turned into a synonym for Alfei Menashe.⁴³²

The exclusive status of Alfei Menashe included also an inclusive design, prepared according to the guidelines of the MD and carried out by one of the leading local architectural firms. In 1981, the MCH commissioned Avraham Yaski to compose Alfei Menashe's masterplan and to dictate its design regulations.⁴³³ Choosing Yaski, one of Israel's most successful and famous architects, emphasises the desire of creating an attractive suburban environment suitable for the status of the military officers.⁴³⁴ Yaski's plan of 1982 corresponded with these requirements as in consisted of a series of retreated and detached family parcels, which he placed along the site's topography and system of curving streets; ensuring the direct and independent car access to each private household. Retaining the highest point in the settlement as an area for public functions Yaski repeated the common public centre we have already seen in previous settlements. However, this public area did not form the core of the settlement, but rather an isolated compound that Yaski separated from the exclusively residential area. Dealing with the site's topography, Yaski created a system of descending terraces, which ensured the segregation of each house through the created height differences while expanding the given panorama (fig 4.21). Despite being commissioned for the first 500 units in Alfei Menashe (*Tzavta A*), Yaski's plan included also his larger vision for a larger urban scheme of almost 1500 units (*Tzavta B*) (fig 4.22). While this greater plan ignored questions of land ownership and municipal boundaries, and for this reason it later had to be adjusted, Yaski still offered a unified vision for Alfei Menashe as a residentially oriented Suburban Settlement, consisting of tract houses along curving roads that are home to a well-established commuters' community.⁴³⁵

⁴³¹ State Comptroller of Israel, 104–15.

⁴³² Kislev, 'Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava', 7.

⁴³³ Yaski and Partners Architects and Planners, 'Tzavta A. Tel Aviv'.

⁴³⁴ Kislev, 'Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava', 7.

⁴³⁵ Yaski Partners Architects and Planners, 'Detailed Plan 1 15/4: Alfei Menashe'.




FIG. 4.21 Plan for Karnei Shomron C [Alfei Menashe], 1982. Yaski Architects & Partners (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 4.22 Alfei Menashe, Phases A+B, 1982. Yaski Architects & Partners (Israel State Archives)

Yaski's plan included very detailed design guidelines that promoted an exclusive yet restrained residential environment that is based on singularity and uniformity. Locating the detached houses on the inner rings and the semi-detached on the external roads, Yaski reduced the needed groundwork and used the site much more resourcefully. This concern was also manifested in the guidelines' emphasis on the quite obvious manner of placing the houses along the topography, assigning each row or street to one latitude line. Consequently, creating the desired uniform sloped terraces and ensuring a higher level of perceived density. Therefore, the regulation stressed the need to level up each lot while constructing the houses in two levels; the lower one contained the kitchen and living room, surrounded by a private garden, while the upper level contained the bedrooms. The access to each house was either through the upper level in case the house was located beneath the level of the street, or through the lower level in case the house was higher than the street. In any case, the privacy of the nuclear family was ensured as the kitchen and living room, as well as the backyard, were always retired from the adjacent environment. The guidelines went also into the design of the houses, dictating a Mediterranean-like appearance of white cubes with setbacks that blended with the topographical differences; lacking the common country-side style of a cottage house with a sloping roof (see chapter III). Nevertheless, apparently even an avid modernist like Yaski could not avoid the popularity of tilted roofs during the 1980s and permitted their use. Still, he insisted on a unidirectional slope, limiting the diversity of its design and promoting the sought clean cubic form (fig 4.23).




FIG. 4.23 Design regulations for Alfei Menashe, Yaski Architects. 1984. (Israel State Archives)

Yaski's proposed design contradicted the regulations of the MCH, and was enabled only due to the demands of the MD. While in site's with similar conditions the MCH dictated the construction of denser housing typologies that reduced development costs, in Alfei Menashe the MD insisted on a multi-terraced development of secluded single-family houses. With the strong influence of the MD, the MCH and the commissioned architects were not in the position to argue and thus offered no other planning alternatives. A report from the Office of the State Comptroller from 1984 heavily criticised the lack of alternatives and blamed the blind collaboration of the MCH on its confidence that all the units in Alfei Menashe would be purchased by IDF officers. According to the report, the MCH was sure that the high development costs would eventually be paid by the new homeowners from the security forces, who would receive the material support of the MD. An assumption that later would prove to be false.⁴³⁶

In the design of the houses, Tzavta continued the emphasis on the seclusion of the nuclear family as an essential element to the concept of 'quality of life'. Accordingly, they offered four types of houses, which though differing in size, number of rooms, or height, all consisted of variations of the same architectural concepts. Correspondingly, the different dwelling types were based on the separation of the different areas of the house through the use of levels, which helped in merging units with the site's topography while ensuring the family's segregation from its surroundings. Similar to Yaski's guidelines, Tzavta proposed different implementation options for each housing type, according to the location of the lot in regard to the neighbouring street (fig 4.24).

⁴³⁶ State Comptroller of Israel, 'The Establishment of Alfei Menashe'.



FIG. 4.24 House model in Alfei Menashe, 1982. Tzavta Ltd. (Israel State Archives)

As the dependence on military officers proved to be unreliable, Tzavta had to launch a vast marketing process that targeted upper-middle-class families as their desired clientele. While initially, more than 400 officers expressed their interest in purchasing a house in Alfei Menashe, eventually only 110 did, leaving all the rest unsold. In search of new customers, Tzavta initiated an advertising campaign that included several funded promotion articles in leading newspapers and a sales office in downtown Tel Aviv. By choosing newspapers and locating the sales office in Tel Aviv, Tzavta directed its efforts the established bourgeoisie families interested in moving to the developing suburbia. Correspondingly, the promotion articles constantly highlighted the size and spaciousness of the houses in Alfei Menashe, as well as the community life and the allegedly high level of education it offered.⁴³⁷ Tzavta also emphasised the financial aspect of purchasing a house in Alfei Menashe, promoting the project not only as a desired living environment but also as an investment that would reap profits in the near future with the ever-increasing property values. Most interesting was the use of the military profile of the settlement for marketing purposes, as Tzavta hoped that the image of a settlement populated by IDF officers would form a guarantee for possible purchasers interested in a community of a higher level.⁴³⁸ The marketing efforts lasted for more than four years, and included a

⁴³⁷ Ma'ariv, 'A Fresh Method for New Settlements', 106; Ma'ariv, 'God's Little Acre in Alfei Menashe', 41.

⁴³⁸ Harnish, 'Peace Now wants to stop annexation', 1; Kislev, 'Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava'; Pinhas, 'Tzavta in Alfei Menashe: a success story', 142.

significant price reduction of almost 20%, making Alfei Menashe the only settlement that witnessed a decrease in real estate prices during those years.⁴³⁹

With the first families moving into their houses in the summer of 1983, the flaws of the peculiar relationship between the MCH and Tzavta began to surface. As the preparations for the second phase were underway, the MCH still counted on Tzavta to lead the project, thus labelling it as Tzavta B. Nevertheless, the families living in Alfei Menashe had severe complaints against the execution of the project, leading to several demonstrations against what they considered as lack of infrastructure development, building defects and insufficient public facilities.⁴⁴⁰ At the same time, the relationship between Tzavta and the MCH, which gave the company a monopoly over the construction in Alfei Menashe, was criticised by the Office of the State Comptroller and several parliament members, leading almost to a criminal investigation due to suspicions of possible corruption and conflict of interests.⁴⁴¹ These complaints were backed by the lack of satisfaction from the MCH regarding the pace of construction and its over participation in the development costs. Consequently, the MCH decided to market the majority of planned dwelling units in the new neighbourhood to other private developers; reclaiming the *power to* develop space and fragmentising it to smaller contractors. Tzavta tried to sue the MCH for breach of contract, and in return, the latter sued Tzavta for the support in infrastructure works that were eventually not carried out. By the end of the 1980s, Tzavta's role in Alfei Menashe had officially passed.⁴⁴²

With the loss of the MD support and the reliance on smaller construction company the MCH had to readapt the planned layout, taking in mind more corporate interests. Moreover, as vast parts of the northern area were not state-controlled but rather privately owned by Palestinians, the MCH had to redraft the boundaries of the new neighbourhood. Consequently, it adjusted Yaksi's plan and proposed a much smaller tree-shaped arrangement that consisted of a main access street and diverging *cul de sacs*. To reduce construction costs caused by the site's topography, the MCH chose to turn half of the planned detached and semi-detached houses into row- and double-family houses. Thus, reducing the ground preparation works while diversifying the neighbourhoods' composition and ensuring the developers profitability (fig 4.25-4.26).

⁴³⁹ Kislev, 'Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava'.

⁴⁴⁰ Naveh, 'In Aflei Menashe they don't believe promises', 11.

⁴⁴¹ Bar-Yossef, 'Earth on fire', 13; State Comptroller of Israel, 'The Establishment of Alfei Menashe'.

⁴⁴² M.C.H., *Letter from MCH Legal Department to State Attorney of the Jerusalem District - Tzavta*, 2.



FIG. 4.25 Original Zoning scheme for the northern neighbourhood, 1987. Yaski Architects (Israel State Archives)




FIG. 4.26 New Zoning scheme for the northern neighbourhood, 1991. Gavrin Architects. (Israel State Archives)

Despite the seemingly larger variety, the houses followed comparable spatial characteristics as the ones of the first phase. Similarly, the houses were significantly family-based, consisting of a living room and kitchen area that is detached from the nearby neighbouring environment. Correspondingly, in the row-houses, this detachment was achieved by orienting the relatively closed façade of the kitchen area and service room towards the street while the living room was oriented towards the backyard and the bedrooms were on the upper floor. In the double-family houses, where the flats were a single-floor apartment, this division was created by orienting the bedrooms towards the street, and the living room and kitchen towards the backyard (fig 4.27). The single-family houses followed the logic of the earlier phase of separation through topography. Though the topography was less sharp, and the houses were terraced, the setting used the height differences order to enhance the notion of separation and privacy. Later, as each house had its private parking place and a two-meter fence in the entrance, the spatial seclusion and separation was enhanced further. Though in regard to spatial characteristics the new models resembled former ones, in regard to design they were less similar. Unlike the first houses that were mainly with a flat roof, in the new parts almost all new units were decorated with a titled red-tiles roof. This would turn into a new design regulation adopted by the Alfei Menashe council, intended to promote a more “country-like” appearance to the settlement, and would thus characterise all future housing units.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³ Sofer, *Design Regulations to Tzavta B, Savion: Sofer Architects - Founf in Israel State Archive: ISA-Moch-CentralRegion-000gw6n*, 2.



FIG. 4.27 Row houses in Alfei Menashe, 1992. Dror Sofer; Double-Family houses in Alfei Menashe, 1992. Peleg Architects; Arrangement of the row houses and double family houses in the northern neighbourhood, 1992. MCH (Israel State Archives)

To secure the continuous development of Alfei Menashe, the MCH needed to constantly reduce the risks taken by the private developers. Therefore, while the houses in the northern part were significantly denser and apparently more economically constructed, the contractors still dependent on the MCH for subsidies and support. Almost all companies involved in the new neighbourhood reported high development costs and approached the MCH for additional aid that would guarantee the project profitability and enable its completion.⁴⁴⁴ Consequently, the MCH, fearing that an unfinished construction project would hinder the future development of Alfei Menashe was willing to enlarge its participation in ground preparation works.⁴⁴⁵ Thus, using public resources in order to enable a privately constructed project.

The development of the inner circle of Alfei Menashe presents a further step in the growing corporate involvement. Yaski's plan designated the core of the settlement as an area for public buildings and residential uses but did not propose any detailed layout. In 1985, two years after the first families moved in, the MCH led a new plan titled "*the central area*", which received the approval of the regional council.⁴⁴⁶ It consisted of a mixed-use compound of public buildings, which included a kindergarten, school, supermarket and a clinic, sharing a recreational open green space and surrounded by a ring of multi-family residential buildings. Planned as terraced tenements the residential project efficiently blended with the site's sharp topography while bridging the height difference between the public core on the hilltop and the streets around it. Through the use of the topography and by orienting

⁴⁴⁴ Amitai, 'Letter from Avraham Amitai CEO of Tzavta to head of central district MCH', 1987; Milman, 'Letter for CEO of Shikun u Pituah to MCH David Levy', 1987.

⁴⁴⁵ Hameiri, *Letter from Head of MCH's Central District to Amnon Ashuri, Head of Population Department.*

⁴⁴⁶ Perlstein Architects Planners, 'Detailed Plan 115/2'.

the living room and kitchen area towards the open landscape, the multi-family buildings mimicked some of the spatial features that characterise the single-family house, such as a private entrance, its own backyard and undisturbed panorama (fig 4.28). Consequently, reducing development costs and increasing the profitability of the project. Such a dense and resourceful use of the site suited the requirements of the MCH to efficiently adapt to the topographic conditions of the Samaritan hills. Had it not been to the spatial privileges of the MD, it is likely that the entire area of Alfei Menashe would have consisted of similar typologies.




FIG. 4.28 The Central Area Plan – Upper row – layout (left) and zoning (right). Bottom row: section. 1985. Perlstein Architects & Partners (ILA)

While Alfei Menashe witnessed a growing corporate influence, the development of its eastern part presents a project dictated by the interests of a privileged organised association. Unlike all other parts that were initiated by the MCH, Kfir Yosef was an initiative of Herut-Beitar, which organised a *Gar'in* made out of young members of the movement that were interested in moving to the West-Bank. *Kfir*, though literally meaning a young Lion, was actually a portmanteau of the words *Kfar* (village) and *Ir* (City), which emphasised the aspiration to create a suburban community of commuters, somewhere between the urban and the rural. Yosef, on the other hand, referred to Yosef Kamerman, a politician and former parliament member on behalf of the Herut Party, who passed away in 1981.⁴⁴⁷ The members of *Gar'in*, which gave the name to the neighbourhood, were first interested in forming their own settlement. With the direct intervention of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, the

⁴⁴⁷ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

group was assigned state-owned parcels adjacent to Alfei Menashe;⁴⁴⁸ receiving the exclusive *power to colonise* and develop the area. Nevertheless, to ensure a swift administrative process the MCH and the MA decided to regard Kfir Yosef as a neighbourhood of Alfei Menashe, and thus spared the bureaucracy needed for a new settlement.⁴⁴⁹

With the spatial privileges this group enjoyed, they were able to dictate the layout of their neighbourhood and the design of their houses. Accordingly, the group, which was headed by a Herut-Beitar association, used the same development method practiced in Kochav Yair; and in fact, it was managed by same person, Michael Eitan. Nevertheless, the group enjoyed better spatial rights, and while in Kochav Yair the association was able to change the proposed layout, in Kfir Yosef they were those that commissioned the planning scheme; thus, dictating it from the first planning phase. Accordingly, the group commissioned the same planner, Meir Buchman, and the architects designed and managed the construction of most houses in Kochav Yair. Therefore, the Kfir Yosef association acted as the developer, planner and a well-organised buyers' club, in charge of coordinating the payments and funds and eventually the construction of the future houses.⁴⁵⁰

Fitting the group's bourgeois profile the proposed layout and houses were significantly individualistic. Resembling the plan of Kochav Yair, Buchman drafted a house-oriented layout, which was based on the repetitive production of the private family parcel and its reachability with a private car.⁴⁵¹ Taking the outline of Kochav Yair further, Buchman proposed a tract housing arrangement intended to parcel the area into individual private lots; thus, using the site more efficiently while creating a more organic layout. This organic shape was maintained also when land ownership issues restricted the planning area, and while an entire section was left out the arrangement proposed by Buchman was left intact (fig 4.29). The similarity to Kochav Yair continued into the level of the house, as the office of Gilad & Yossef proposed the same family-oriented split-level models.⁴⁵² On top of being a privately led project built on public lands, the families of Kfir Yosef received additional funding from the MCH to cover construction costs, as well as special subsidies that most

⁴⁴⁸ Dekel, *A Letter from Deputy MA, Dekel to Ministry of Defence*.

⁴⁴⁹ Eitan, *The construction of Kockav Yair*.

⁴⁵⁰ Eitan.

⁴⁵¹ Buchman, *Kochav Yair*.

⁴⁵² Gil-Ad, *Houses in Kochav Yair*.

members were not entitled to as they have already owned an apartment.⁴⁵³ Thus, enabling this well-connected group to affordably build their own spacious private houses with substantial bureaucratic and material assistance.



FIG. 4.29 Kfir Yosef zoning scheme, Meir Buchman, 1984 (left). Kfir Yosef zoning scheme, Meir Buchman, 1984 (right) Note the areas that were removed due to land ownership. (ILA)

As the MCH tried to further enlarge Alfei Menashe it encountered several administrative restrictions and the suspicion of the families living in the settlement that feared losing its exclusive status. Already in the late 1980s, the MCH began promoting a more corporate-led neighbourhood in the southern part of Alfei Menashe, Giva'at Tal. Therefore, it commissioned architect Israel Bar Lev to plan a new urban neighbourhood that would not consist of small single-family houses, but rather of 3-4 story multi-family buildings over a ground floor, with a nearby hotel and even a Zoo.⁴⁵⁴ However, several issues turned this large-scale project into a complicated task. The first problem the planners had to cope with was land ownership. Apparently, not all the lands in the southern area of Alfei Menashe were owned by the state and it consisted of significant portions privately owned by Palestinians from neighbouring villages. Initially, the MCH thought that the Palestinian families would be willing to sell their lands and ordered the planners to think of a cohesive overall scheme. Conversely, as the Palestinian refused to cooperate Bar Lev had to readjust his plan and give up the intention to creating a cohesive scheme and shifted towards two separate residential compounds, which were

⁴⁵³ Hameiri, *Letter from Head of MCH Central District, Yehdua Hameiri to CEO MCH Amos Unger*; MCH, 'Meeting Protocol - Minister of Construction and Housing David Levy at Alefi Menashe 21.10.1989'.

⁴⁵⁴ MCH, 'Planning report for Giva'at Tal. Akfei Menashe'.

not even connected to Alfei Menashe (again due to land-ownership).⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, with the advancement in the negotiations between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Israel applied a “*construction freeze*” in the West-Bank, which caused several setbacks in the planning process and dragged it for almost a decade. An additional objection was raised by the Alfei Menashe council as it feared that a new urban neighbourhood would harm the image of an exclusive suburban settlement and the high living standards it asked to be affiliated with. In a steering meeting in 2000, Eliezer Hasdai, head of the Alfei Menashe council, claimed that they pressured the MCH to plan larger, and relatively more expensive units, in order not to attract weaker families that would harm the settlement’s status.⁴⁵⁶ Ultimately the plan for Giva’t Tal consisted of clusters of semi-detached houses and lots for multi-family high-rise buildings, resembling the high-rise suburbs that began emerging in the nearby area at the same time (fig 4.30) (see chapter V). Yet its construction would start almost twenty years after the plan’s approval.

The development of Alfei Menashe consisted of different suburban patches that fitted the profile of their developers and future settlers. This was caused by the sporadic nature of the development process, which was dictated by the differing demands, economic interests and corporate speculations. Alfei Menashe began as a classic state-led gentrification project, where the state asked to attract upper-middle-class families to the area by granting them generous spatial rights. While in the first years the residents of the settlement asked to exhibit a positive image to their relationship with the Palestinian villages and towns, which they referred to as the “Arab neighbours”, the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 caused a significant decrease in the perceived security. The settling families, which were initially proud of the lack of defensive measures such as a guarding post and a perimeter fence in Alfei Menashe that granted the settlement an image of a normal locality, soon began demanding stronger military presence and the construction of new bypass roads.⁴⁵⁷ Consequently, the interest in Alfei Menashe decreased, and the recurring construction freezes and land ownership issues did not help in attracting contractors.⁴⁵⁸ Therefore, as we saw here, the state kept on granting different spatial privileges to a variety of private agencies, in order to maintain the development of the settlements. Consequently, leading to a variety of suburban typologies.

⁴⁵⁵ Bar Lev, ‘A letter from Arch Israel Bar Lev to MCH’, 1994.

⁴⁵⁶ DMR Development Planning Ltd, ‘Alfei Menashe Master Plan Steering Committee’, 3.

⁴⁵⁷ Rabinovic, ‘Residents from Alfei Mensashe and Kochav Yair: the attack on eyal road was expected due to weaknes of defence forces and government’.

⁴⁵⁸ Katan, ‘Letter to Benjamin ben Elizer, Minister of Housing’, 1994.




FIG. 4.30 Giva'at Tal zoning scheme. Upper row: 1989 (left); 1990 (right). Bottom row: ca. 1995. Bar Lev Architects. (Israel State Archives)

While the state planned a more corporate-led development for Alfei Menashe, its location and status prevented this from taking place until the 2010s. The Second Intifada did not improve Alfei Menashe's image and the settlement did not witness any significant growth during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Only after the construction of the West-Bank barrier that surrounded Alfei Menashe and separated it from the neighbouring Palestinian towns and villages and the national housing crisis, was the construction renewed. The works on Giv'at Tal, which was authorised in 1996, began almost 20 years later. The same goes for the two smaller extension neighbourhoods, one in the northern part Alfei Menashe, and one almost 16km east to it (see chapter III); both of which were privately initiated on lands bought from individual Palestinians. The construction of the West-Bank barrier did not only lead to better security, but it also allowed Alfei Menashe to shake off the West-Bank settlement image, and to be marketed as just another suburban community only a car ride away from Tel Aviv.

Alfei Menashe began as a classical Suburban Settlement, which became more corporate-oriented as it grew. Its initial size and layout matched the desire to create a somewhat exclusive and small-scale residential environment. Moreover, the mechanism behind its initial phases constitutes an interesting case study of power relations between the different groups like the military, the contractors and the state. Therefore, as the latter was interested in developing the area and to upgrade its image as an attractive suburban environment, it gave the military the *power*

to dictate the formation of space. Consequently, promoting the suburban lifestyle desired by the officers, all in order to attract them to the area and gentrify it. The contractors, on the other hand, were able to use their connections to receive an exclusive *power* to develop and market the settlements while continuously receiving public aid in order to complete the construction process.

Alfei Menashe was a classic example of selective privatisation. The first waves consisted of well-connected middle-class families that were able to transform their social and political capital into spatial privileges, using the state's interests to gentrify the area and to improve its image. As the town grew the state continued with the method of creating secluded and separated residential compounds (fig 4.31). Therefore, though it reached almost 10,000 inhabitants, Alfei Menashe is practically an assemblage of different detached neighbourhoods that share the same municipal services (fig 4.32). Each neighbourhood has its own access to the external road system and is thus an independent area. The development of separated compounds served two main objectives. On the one hand, it enabled Alfei Menashe to spread over a larger area, which strengthened Israeli presence in the West-Bank, as seen in the extreme case of Nof Hasharon neighbourhood (chapter III). On the other hand, by creating these secluded clusters, Alfei Menashe retains the small-scale suburban atmosphere that families moving to the area are interested in purchasing. This also ensures that the larger projects that are being built today would not hinder the village-like image of the existing neighbourhoods, and that the current residents would not heavily resist all new real estate ventures. As seen above, suburbanisation, territorial expansion, and privatisation were thus the main forces that dictated the location, the layout and the form of Alfei Menashe, and they continue to do so today.




FIG. 4.31 Area of Alfei Menashe, 1986. Blue line is the existing parts and in yellow are the parts to be added. Note Kfir Yosef in the north-east corner; Area of Alfei Menashe, 1988. Note the added area of Giva'at Tal in the south. Area of Alfei Menashe, 1992. Note the scattered areas added south west to the settlement ,IDF. (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 4.32 Different parts of Alfei Menashe, 1989, MCH. (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 4.33 Alfei Menashe, 2018. (Govmap)

4.6 Oranit: a monopoly of a private corporation

Oranit illustrates an intriguing case study of the coalition between national and private interests and the gentrification of the Green-Line. It is a West-Bank settlement, less than a kilometre inside the occupied territories (fig 4.34), which houses an upper-middle-class community of 9000 inhabitants and belongs to the 2nd highest socio-economic decile of Israeli localities. Similar to other settlements in the area it is affiliated with the secular central/left side of the political map, and not the religious right-wing West-Bank settlers.⁴⁵⁹ It was established in 1983, and it lies in the fringes of the West-Bank, in the slopes of the western Samarian hills. It borders Horashim forest and Israeli-Arab⁴⁶⁰ village of Kufr Bara in the west, the Arab-Israeli town of Kufr Qasem in the south, the Arab-Palestinian villages of Azzun Atma in the east and that of Abu Salem in the north. The relatively sparse Palestinian population around Oranit, the natural landscape surrounding it and its proximity to the central coastal area were leading features which ensured that Oranit would become an ideal location for families looking for a house in the developing suburban ring.

⁴⁵⁹ ICBS, 'Localities in Israel'; ICBS, 'Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by selected countries of origin'.

⁴⁶⁰ Referring to the Palestinian Citizens of Israel




FIG. 4.34 Oranit in 2015 between Palestinian localities on both sides of the Green-Line (Illustrated by the author)

Oranit constitutes an additional step in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism. Unlike all other settlements discussed in this chapter, Oranit was almost entirely privately developed. It started as an initiative of *Delta* Ltd that was formed by five different and quite unrelated individuals, with minimal knowledge and experience in development, real estate or planning.⁴⁶¹ The company began purchasing lands from local Palestinians in the area, in the hope of eventually establishing a new Jewish settlement. They enjoyed close connections to the reigning Likud party and the Israeli Government, specifically with deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, who was in charge of new rural settlements in the West-Bank and was known as an enthusiastic supporter of the settlement project in general; particularly privately initiated ones (figure 4.35-4.36). In September of 1982 Delta was personally promised by Dekel, after expressing his enthusiasm, that he will support their project and promote the establishment of Oranit.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ Shiloni, Development of Oranit [Interview].

⁴⁶² Dekel, 'A letter to Delta Ltd', 1982.



FIG. 4.35 Deputy Minister Dekel (middle of picture) visiting the future site of Oranit, 1982. (Ma'ariv)



FIG. 4.36 Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (left) and Deputy Minister Dekel (right) visiting the construction site of Oranit, 1984. (Ma'ariv Newspaper)

The authorisation of Oranit by the Ministerial Settlement Committee in 1983 was a clear act of selective privatisation spatial privilege. Beyond the common decree, the committee's order stated that Oranit will be privately developed, and most importantly, that Delta would be its sole developer.⁴⁶³ The unprecedented order to give a private company an exclusive status will later prove to be very problematic. The incentive behind this decision could be explained by the government's attempt to hand out its full responsibility to one clear developer that would act as its representative and be responsible for the entire project. Yet, in 1994, Dekel would be indicted and found guilty of receiving bribes from different West-Bank developers and land merchants that were connected to Delta. Considering the company's lack of experience and knowledge, the explanation that this decision was taken mainly due to the company's ties with the government is highly reasonable.

Confident in governmental support, Delta began planning and developing the site even before the official authorisation. It approached Giora Shiloni, a road engineer that had recently returned from working in the US. Shiloni made the initial layout, which was later processed into a more detailed urban planning scheme.⁴⁶⁴ Focused on generating an alignment of residential lots the proposed layout was quite simplistic and recreated the common arrangement of main roads and inner *cul de sac* streets. The attempt to create a distinctive low-rise and low-density environment continued to evolve, and while the first plans included triple-family houses in the settlement's main area, these were later concentrated in its fringes, not interfering with the sought distinct character (fig 4.37-4.38). Land ownership issues constantly played a major role and though Delta undertook an intense effort to purchase private

⁴⁶³ Government of Israel, Decision 1 196.

⁴⁶⁴ Shiloni, Development of Oranit.

lands from their Arab owners, these efforts were not always successful. Several were unwilling to sell their lands to Israelis, leaving undeveloped enclaves inside the settlement (fig 4.39), while other owners later claimed that their lands were taken from them unwillingly or by fraud, in what will be known as the “*Lands Affair*”.⁴⁶⁵



FIG. 4.37 Oranit, 1982. Yosef Sivan and Giora Shiloni, Delta Ltd 1982. (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 4.38 Oranit, 1983. Yosef Sivan and Giora Shiloni (Israel State Archives). Note the enclaves of unresolved or unbought private lands



FIG. 4.39 Oranit, 1991. Yosef Sivan (ILA). Note the changes in the allocation of lots along the streets, the yellow lots for more dense units are at the fringes of the settlements and no longer along the main street.

The marketing process was of a selective nature and targeted a specific profile. Aiming to attract families searching for a suburban lifestyle, the houses marketed in Oranit were significantly large, yet still affordable. Labelled as a “*city in nature*”, Oranit was depicted as a tranquil and pleasant small-scale settlement, which is surrounded by a pristine and pleasant landscape, yet, close to the main metropolitan area.⁴⁶⁶ The ideal location and the affordable prices, which were less than half of a similar house in cities nearby, enabled Delta to engage in a relatively quiet marketing campaign that relied more on word of mouth and targeted specific well-profiled and well-connected families. These included officials in the Israeli Aerospace Industries, where one of the developers was previously employed, or physicians from Tel-Hashomer Hospital.⁴⁶⁷ In doing so, they ensured the desired homogeneous character

⁴⁶⁵ Naveh, ‘Arabs sold lands and then complained that it was stolen in order not to take a bullet’, 13.

⁴⁶⁶ Delta Ltd, ‘Oranit’.

⁴⁶⁷ MCH, ‘Oranit’, 1987.

of the future population while attracting families with similar profiles. Consequently, almost all homebuyers were upper-middle-class families from cities in the coastal area and several American Jews interested in moving to Israel.⁴⁶⁸

The distinctive profile of the population was expressed also in the layout and design of the houses. Referred to as *villas*, and not cottages like in earlier cases, Delta intended to construct 300 out of the 500 lots while the remaining 200 were meant to be developed in a BYOH method. To retain the homogeneity and reduce costs Delta adopted the model system and proposed the families moving to Oranit seven different options of single and double-family houses.⁴⁶⁹ Though designed by three different offices that, according to the architects, enjoyed substantial professional freedom, the different models were significantly similar and focused on the privacy of the nuclear family living in spacious, yet unpretentious, houses. Accordingly, they repeated the popular split-level typology and the division between the different areas of the house while maintaining a quite humble appearance, as seen in the marketing pamphlets issued by Delta Ltd. Fittingly, it emphasised the “good” family house that was depicted in the middle of nature, with no neighbours, surrounded by trees and an open landscape (fig 4.40).⁴⁷⁰ These similar architectural concepts were strengthened by the construction of almost all houses by the same contractor and the use of the same designs in the BYOH lots.⁴⁷¹

Adequate to the profile of the families, Delta referred to them as “*purchasers*” or “*clients*”, and not merely settlers.⁴⁷² Delta also referred to the act of purchasing a house as an “*investment*” to be refunded in case the Israeli Government chooses to withdraw from the West-Bank before the end of construction.⁴⁷³ This perspective was mutual, as seen in several residents’ comments in a 1985 interview addressing land ownership issues, stating that “*we invested here and we will continue to invest here*”.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁸ Delta Ltd, ‘List of Homebuyers in Oranit’.

⁴⁶⁹ Iron, Houses in Oranit [Interview].

⁴⁷⁰ Delta Ltd, ‘Oranit’.

⁴⁷¹ Globes, ‘High profits from sales in Oranit’.

⁴⁷² Delta Ltd, ‘Oranit’, 2.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid*

⁴⁷⁴ Naveh, ‘Arabs sold lands and then complained that it was stolen in order not to take a bullet’, 13.




FIG. 4.40 House models in Oranit - Upper Row: Model B, Kaplan, Iron, Shachar; Model C, Peri Architects; Model D, Kaplan, Iron, Shachar; Model H, Yacobovic Architects; Model F (double family), Kaplan, Iron, Shachar. Bottom row: Model B, Section; Model C, Section; Model D, Section; Model H, Section; Model F, Section, Delta Ltd. 1982. (Israel State Archives)

After the initial selective marketing that granted Oranit the image of an attractive and exclusive settlement, Delta was able to promote a limited number of denser housing units. In the eastern part of the settlement, detached from the core of private houses, Delta developed a series of four-story buildings, which though being multi-family tenements, their design implies that they were planned to recreate the appearance of a private house. Using setbacks, roof terraces and separate entrances, the units were planned as separate apartments offering a high level of privacy to their dwellers (fig 4.41). A similar case were the terraced houses in the northern part of Oranit, which were planned to ensure a higher level of privacy while giving the family a feeling of living in a private house, as seen in the detachment of the units from their surroundings and their ornamentation with a tilted roof (fig 4.42).

The mentioned “*Lands Affair*” fractured the image of Oranit as an exclusive and not too ideological settlement and affected its further development. After the completion of the first phase, Ashdar, one of Israel’s largest construction companies, was supposed to develop the nearby site of Tzamaraot, owned by a different private company. Due to the bad publicity and setbacks in the project, as well as the monopoly of Delta that was not revoked until the mid-1990s, Ashdar eventually withdrew, and though initial plans were made during the late 1980s this project remained on hold for more than 20 years.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁵ Baron, ‘Also here people donated to the Likud’, 23.




FIG. 4.41 Plan of double family house. Yosef Sivan, Delta Ltd. 1982, (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 4.42 Oranit, 2000. Moshe Milner. (GPO). Note the denser houses on the left side of the photo



FIG. 4.43 First houses in Oranit, 1985. Baruch Naeh, (Ma'ariv Newspaper)

By the beginning of the 1990s, the problems of this selective privatisation and the monopoly granted to Delta began to surface. The main complaints of the newly established local council were that Delta did not develop the inner infrastructure as promised and that the roads that it did pave were done inappropriately. Privately developed meant that the MCH was not allowed to subsidise any of the inner infrastructure works. Consequently, the Oranit council had to allocate funds from its own budget to complete or repair the unfinished works. This meant that it had to issue a road tax for all households, significantly increasing their cost of living.⁴⁷⁶ Moreover, in 1990 the office of the State Attorney gave a very strict interpretation to the exclusive status of Delta in Oranit, as it claimed that the company was the only entity that has the legal right to commission any new planning schemes or projects

⁴⁷⁶ Cohen, 'Letter to MCH regarding infrastructure in Oranit', 1990.

in the area of the settlement.⁴⁷⁷ Thus, limiting even further the responsibility and authority of the local municipal council. This issue eventually turned into a power-play between Delta, the local council, and the MCH, and the exclusive status was revoked only in 1996.⁴⁷⁸

Though seemingly a private project, Oranit received significant governmental support that went beyond bureaucratic issues. Located in the occupied West-Bank and not in the official area of the state of Israel, several crucial planning regulations followed the Jordanian planning law and not the Israeli one. One of these is the percentage of public uses in a newly planned residential area. Using the Jordanian regulations, which were much less generous regarding public functions, Delta was able to maximise the amount of marketable residential lots.⁴⁷⁹ Subsequently, the ILA had to assign public lands south of the settlement for the uses of a high school and cultural centre, contributing public property to a private endeavour. Later, due to the lack of available public lands, the MCH planned to expand Oranit across the Green-Line (on its Israeli side), on state-owned land reserves assigned to the Israeli Arab village of Kufr Bara (fig 4.44).⁴⁸⁰ The plan, which started as a conceptual option in the late 1980s, became very concrete in the mid-1990s and received the support of leading politicians like Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres, and even left-wing ones like Yosi Sarid, a fierce opponent of the settlement enterprise.⁴⁸¹ Eventually, however, it was not implemented, mainly due to the inability to have one entity on both sides of the Green-Line, though there were several original solutions, such as having two different legal entities but a sole practical one.⁴⁸² Consequently, the only expansion possibilities were the small-scale sites whose ownership was resolved (fig 4.45).

⁴⁷⁷ Albeck, 'Delta: Oranit'.

⁴⁷⁸ Government of Israel, Decision 905.

⁴⁷⁹ Shiloni, Development of Oranit.

⁴⁸⁰ MCH, 'Oranit', 1991.

⁴⁸¹ Elgazi, 'A settlement into the Green-Line', 8.

⁴⁸² Shiloni, Development of Oranit.




FIG. 4.44 A plan to extend Oranit westwards, 1991, MCH. (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 4.45 New area added to Oranit in deep grey, 1992, IDF. (Israel State Archives)

Due to its location and population, Oranit continued to attract newcomers over the years. Quite detached from the West-Bank, except for a few incidents and temporary feelings of insecurity, the settlement was not significantly affected by the violent outbreaks of the First Intifada. The relative stagnation the settlement witnessed through the 1990s was not an outcome of political tensions or lack of attractivity, but mainly due to the mentioned land ownership issues. The inhabitants of Oranit, well aware of the reputation of their settlement, were interested in maintaining it. As a result, they opposed the possibility that people outside of the settlement would come to use public functions inside it, like the school or the new sports club, and therefore insisted on high prising.⁴⁸³ Oranit was practically a gated community, physically, as it is surrounded by a security fence, and socially as well.

The reputation of Oranit as an attractive and legitimate settlement increased with the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier in 2006. Physically detached from the occupied territories and becoming *de facto* part of the official area of Israel, Oranit was cleansed from the stigma of a West-Bank settlement, as well as the defence and legal repercussions that came with it. By that time, the majority of land issues in the nearby Tzamarot area were resolved and two different urban planning schemes were authorised around the year 2000, both by private companies (fig 4.46). Though planned separately, the area did have a relatively unified character, which resembled the existing private-house-oriented fabric of Oranit. Unrealised for some time, probably due to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, they were fulfilled after the construction of the separation wall in 2006 that gave it needed economic feasibility. Ashdar, which was supposed to be the neighbourhood's initial

⁴⁸³ Oranit Council, 'Council Meeting Protocol - 20.3.1993', 1–5.

developer in the 1980s,⁴⁸⁴ bought some 150 dunams in the area,⁴⁸⁵ developed them and began marketing prepared lots to individual purchasers. Concurrently, smaller privately developed projects were also taking place in other parts of the settlement. Delta Ltd planned and marketed the last lands in owned in the south-western part of Oranit, while other private entrepreneurs promoted the construction of new terraced housing units in the north-western fringes of the settlement's original site; enjoying the spatial privileges granted by the state while adopting denser housing typologies (fig 4.47).



FIG. 4.46 Tzamarot Zoning scheme, 1997. Yosef Sivan; Southern Extension, 2000. Ilon Marom Architects and Planners; Eastern extension plan 2001, S.S architects. (ILA)



FIG. 4.47 Terraced houses in Oranit, D.M Architects and Planners, 2011. (ILA)

The story behind the establishment of Oranit consists of a mixture of private, economic and national interests. The state, interested in developing Jewish settlement in the area, was willing to hand out its sovereignty to a private contractor, and by giving it unprecedented spatial privileges that included the *power to produce space* the state literally privatised the settlement enterprise. The developers, on the other hand, were able to use the relatively comfortable terms in the West-Bank, their ability to purchase Palestinian lands in the area and their ties with the government in order to receive a monopoly over Oranit and by that to conduct a significantly

⁴⁸⁴ Priel, 'Dozens of large development companies are engaged in JS', 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Yamin, 'Ashdar purchased 150 dunams in Oranit'.

economic and efficient process. At the same time, the families moving into the settlement were attracted by the location, the affordability, and the relatively small and high-class community. These three interests were entangled one with the other, until Delta's economic interests began contradicting those of the inhabitants, the local council and the MCH. Yet, once this issue was resolved, the coalition of interest between the state, private developers and upper-middle-class families continued onward. In Oranit, the implementation of the national mission of settling the area was entirely handed over to the private market. Its development thus needed to answer the economic calculations of its developers and demands of their bourgeoisie clientele. In the 1980s this group was interested in distinctive family-oriented villas, and after they received the sought dream houses, the private developers were able to continue developing Oranit as enclaves of low-rise houses and larger-scale complexes, surrounded by Arab-owned lands (fig 4.48).



FIG. 4.48 Oranit and the smaller new residential compounds surrounding it, 2018. (Govmap)

4.7 Reut: the IDF as an omnipotent (private) spatial agent

Reut represents the status of military officers as an integral part of the emerging Israeli upper-middle-class and their leading role in the gentrification of national peripheries and frontiers. Perceived as a stable, ideological and rewardable group by the different planning administrations, mid-level military personnel became a dominant factor in the development of the local suburbia in the mid-1980s and later.⁴⁸⁶ Unlike in earlier examples, like in Alfei Menashe, where military officers were seen simply as potential customers, by the end of the 1980s they began organising associations that enabled them to take on the role of an entrepreneur. Later, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) would establish an internal unit named the Housing Administration (*Minhelet HaMegorim*), which would become responsible for organising such housing associations and projects. The young officers' interests for suburban living met those of the government to enlarge the Jewish population and presence in frontier areas. Moreover, different struggling localities that sought to improve their situation saw the potential in attracting young families of military officers that would strengthen the local socio-economic composition and promote the popular image of their town, eventually attracting also other upper-middle-class families. The mechanism behind the new military neighbourhood was relatively simple. The military, or one of its branches, would organise an association that would manage the construction of a new town or neighbourhood. The Israel Land Administration (ILA) would then assign the association a site, whether in the edges of an existing town, or in frontier areas, in order to promote its development.⁴⁸⁷ The association would then manage the planning and construction of the new neighbourhood while administrating the possible funding and governmental financial support available to the young military families (fig 4.49). The Reut project is perhaps the best example of this mechanism.

⁴⁸⁶ Berger, *Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel*, 140–48.

⁴⁸⁷ Berger, 140–48.



FIG. 4.49 Illustration of the different special mortgages and funding possibilities for military families, which include three main sources: the MCH, IDF and MD. All managed by the Administration. (IDF Housing Administration)

One of the first examples of this new method was the military neighbourhood in Yavne. Yavne, a development town in the larger Tel Aviv metropolitan was considered up until the 1980s as a weak and unattractive locality. The young mayor of at that time, Meir Shitrit, who was keen on bringing a new influx of established young families to his town, initiated together with the Personnel Branch of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) a new residential neighbourhood to house its officers (fig 4.50-4.51). The construction of Neot Idan neighbourhood was managed by an association organised by the head of the IAF Personnel Branch, Colonel Zvi Gov-Ari, who named it after his eldest son, Idan. This model, that proved to be very successful, both for the town of Yavne and the IAF officers, gained much popularity, and similar initiatives followed. What began as an inner unit of the IAF, would later become part of the larger military's Human Resources Directorate, serving officers and non-commissioned officers from all branches of the IDF.



FIG. 4.50 Neot Idan neighbourhood, Yavne. 1980s. (Neot Idan collection)



FIG. 4.51 The IAF Yavne quire, 1987. (Neot Idan collection)

Located in the developing national frontiers and housing one of the state's most privileged groups turned Reut into an ideal Suburban Settlements. Today it constitutes one of the boroughs of the larger city of Modi'in, yet it preceded it and began as separated residential project meant to house families of IDF officers. Located midway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, in the then yet undeveloped and relatively pristine regional council of Modi'im,⁴⁸⁸ it enjoyed a rich natural landscape, an open view towards the coastal plain, and a moderate climate (fig 4.52). Moreover, Reut is adjacent to the Green-Line, just across the developing new settlement of Maccabim, that was built in the former no man's land between Israel and Jordan. Due to its profile as a Pilots' settlement, together with its location and socio-economic composition, Reut became an attractive settlement and was considered as a typical suburban success story. After the establishment of the city of Modi'in in 1996, it was annexed to it, together with Maccabim. Yet, it still retains a relatively distinct character and is managed by its own borough council.




FIG. 4.52 Reut in 2015, between the city of Modi'in and the Green-Line (Illustrated by the author)

Developing the site of Reut was part of the new state-led efforts to domesticate the area along the Green-Line. The ILA declared the area of Reut as a site for future settlement already in the late 1970s, which was then a military training zone and by settling it the ILA sought to transform its frontier-like nature and to incorporate it into the Tel Aviv metropolitan region. The army personnel were therefore used by the ILA in order to demilitarise the area,⁴⁸⁹ fitting the common phrase that “*the only*

⁴⁸⁸ Not to confuse the city of Modi'in with the regional council of Modi'im

⁴⁸⁹ Ministry of Defence, 'Draft Resolution'.

one that can move the IDF, is the IDF".⁴⁹⁰ The district outline plan that was under planning since 1980, had already designated the location for future settlement (fig 4.53), yet its nature was not yet decided. Parallel to the regional planning process, the ILA and the IDF had already been surveying possible sites for a military settlement that would form a duplicate of the Yavne project. Nevertheless, unlike Yavne, this project would be much larger with an emphasis on younger officers no older than thirty-five years of age. This, according to IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Moshe Levi, was the only way to encourage good officers to extend their service in the existing "*budget constraints*".⁴⁹¹ Therefore, while the ILA proposed other locations for the IDF, the latter insisted on this specific site, due to its availability, size, proximity to different military bases and designation as a Suburban Settlement in the draft for the new district outline plan.⁴⁹²



FIG. 4.53 The Future site of Reut, Regional Plan 3/2, 1980-1988. (Israel Land Administration)

Reut was an outcome of a reciprocal collaboration between the IDF, the ILA and the MCH.. After the ILA and the IDF's agreement, the military housing project needed the approval of the government, and thus the blessing of the MCH. Therefore, in 1984, Chief of Staff Levi sent an official letter to the Minister of Construction and Housing David Levi,⁴⁹³ asking for his assistance in the ministerial committee while highlighting the project as "*crucial for Israel's security*".⁴⁹⁴ To relief the minister from budget concerns, Chief of Staff Levi mentioned that the project would be planned, developed

⁴⁹⁰ Mentzel, Reut and Rosh Ha'ayin [Interview]; Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements [Interview].

⁴⁹¹ Levi, 'Letter to Minister of Construction and Housing - Housing Project for Military Personnel', 1984, 1.

⁴⁹² Eldor, 'Letter to CEO of MCH - Modi'in - 2.3.1987', 1987.

⁴⁹³ No family ties. Levi is a common family name in Israel

⁴⁹⁴ Levi, 'Letter to Minister of Construction and Housing - Housing Project for Military', 1984, 2.

and constructed by the military.⁴⁹⁵ In a meeting at the office of the CEO of the MCH that discussed the planning of a future city in the area, which at that time was still preliminary and spoke of possible locations on both sides of the Green-Line, it was agreed to allocate the “*wanted hills*” for the Ministry of Defence, as it is “*a serious group that had already proven itself in Yavne*”.⁴⁹⁶ Therefore, although the ministry officials were less interested in developing another “*secluded*”, “*inefficient*” low-rise settlement, they highlighted the importance of attracting a “*strong population*” to the area, which could “*ease directing future ventures*”.⁴⁹⁷ Therefore, the ministry was willing to support the IDF’s demands and to grant it substantial spatial privileges, yet for a residential neighbourhood that would be a starting point for the planned city in the area.⁴⁹⁸ Consequently, the ministry asked to refrain from designating the site as a Community Settlement, due to its selective nature, and asked to coordinate its development with all settlements nearby, east and west of the Green-Line, in order to aid in the development of the future city.⁴⁹⁹

The far-reaching support for the military housing project concluded in the decision of the Israeli Government to authorise the establishment of Reut in December of 1985. The official statement declared the project as a “*neighbourhood for military personnel*” that would eventually “*be part of an urban settlement... planned by the MCH*”.⁵⁰⁰ This decision was not received well by all planning agencies and administrations, and the national emergency of developing the area was equivocal. The initial policy of the MCH was to refrain from vast public investment in the area, in order to focus more on areas of “*political preferences*” and to rely more on small scale private investment.⁵⁰¹ Correspondingly, the Authority of Rural and Agriculture Planning and Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency, warned that such a development like in Reut, would eventually harm the plans to

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁹⁶ MCH, ‘Meeting Protocol 1.4.1985’, 1.

⁴⁹⁷ Eldor, ‘Letter from the Head of the MCH’s department of urban development, Sofia Eldor, to the CEO of MCH, Asher Wiener - 25.10.1984’, 1985, 1.

⁴⁹⁸ Eldor, ‘Letter to IDF Housing Administration - 20.4.1985’, 1985.

⁴⁹⁹ Eldor, *Letter to Cabinet Secretary, Jerusalem: Ministry of Construction and Housing - Found at Israel State Archive*.

⁵⁰⁰ Government of Israel, Decision 1196, 1.

⁵⁰¹ Ravid, *Modi'im Area, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Construction and Housing, Administration of Rural Construction*, 1.

“populate and strengthen areas of national importance, and especially Jerusalem”.⁵⁰² Nevertheless, as the decision was already taken, and no one wanted to confront the IDF and its *“need to grant 1000 officers housing solutions”*,⁵⁰³ Reut was a done deal. Furthermore, though several economically struggling towns in the district like Ramleh, Lod and Rosh Ha’ayin initially protested against the project as they hoped to attract the military families, they ultimately gave in as the MCH promised to promote new plans for low-rise suburban-like neighbourhoods in their jurisdiction, with a possibility of attracting military personnel as well.⁵⁰⁴

The spatial privileges the state granted to the IDF were more than the exclusive use of the site, and the omnipotent status of the HA enabled it to control all aspects of the project’s development, even its location. As both the ILA and the government saw the military neighbourhood as a preliminary stage in the development of the future city of Modi’in, and due to the IDF’s strong political and social capital, the IDF Housing Administration (HA) had substantial planning rights. According to Colonel (retired) Oren, the head of the HA at that time, though the official decision stated a specific location for the project, the HA was able to move it by more than a kilometre, bypassing the governmental decree and choosing a site with better topographic conditions.⁵⁰⁵ The authority of the HA continued to the planning process, as the ILA declared that the site would be planned and developed by the HA. Usually, while issuing a plan for a new residential neighbourhood, the entrepreneur requires the consent of the local council. However, as Reut was a new project the HA was not only the entrepreneur but also the local council, thus subjected only to the authority of the district level. Initially, the HA asked to avoid this level as well, asking that the MCH to create a special independent committee that would speed up the process.⁵⁰⁶ The MCH was able to convince the HA that this is not needed, only after assuring it that the existing district council is unable to object the project as it is backed by both the government and the national planning council.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰² Moran, ‘Analysis of Population in Modi’in Area’, 5.

⁵⁰³ Moran, 6.

⁵⁰⁴ Eldor, ‘Letter to CEO of MCH - Modi’in - 2.3.1987’, 1987.

⁵⁰⁵ Oren, Reut [Interview].

⁵⁰⁶ Morag, ‘Letter to CEO of MCH: Military Personnel in the Modiin area’, 1986.

⁵⁰⁷ Eldor, ‘Special Planning Committee’, 1986.

With the significant spatial privileges the IDF received, it was able to improve its housing production mechanism; controlling the planning and construction more efficiently. Initially, the newly established housing association continued in the same method of Yavne, and was even named *Neot-Idan B* (later *Neot-Reut*).⁵⁰⁸ Though the target group, in this case, was not exclusively the Airforce, but rather from the larger military, the HA remained under the command of the IAF Personnel Branch due to its previous experience. Moreover, while in Yavne the planning work was assigned by the local council,⁵⁰⁹ in Reut, it was commissioned by the HA and the association, enabling them to dictate the layout of the future neighbourhood according to its need as a developer and as a representative of the future inhabitants. Accordingly, the HA hired the office of Meir Buchman, which had already been mentioned in the chapter.⁵¹⁰ The experience of the HA, the planning expertise of Buchman, the connections and power of the IDF and the omnipotent status of the association in Reut, guaranteed that the project would be planned and accomplished efficiently and resourcefully.

Commissioned by the association, which was simultaneously the developer and end-user, Reut's layout followed both suburban desires and efficiency aspirations, while lacking any rentability concerns of a private entrepreneur. Buchman's proposed layout was a purely residential and housing-oriented setting that resembled other suburban projects of the time. Yet, while the common suburban layout consisted of parcels of different sizes, Buchman focused on a single dimension (ca. 450 m²), creating a non-hierarchical and uniform layout; fitting the egalitarian nature of the military. As the IDF was not a profit-driven developer interested in obtaining the full real-estate potential of the site, Buchman's layout was not an outcome of subdividing a given area into marketable parcels, as commonly practised in a typical tract housing development, but rather a result of combining parcels into housing clusters. Accordingly, Buchman opted for a system of a main winding access road and a series of *cul de sac* streets which used the site's topography to form independent compounds of about fifteen houses each (fig 4.54-4.55).

The association's lack of profitability concerns enabled Buchman to plan a secluded settlement surrounded by a well-developed landscape. Respectively, his plan consisted of 30% residential areas,⁵¹¹ whereas in similar projects it is more than 50%. This enabled him to surround the isolated housing clusters with

⁵⁰⁸ Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, 'Detailed Plan GZ/117'.

⁵⁰⁹ Nahoum Zolotoz Architects, 'Outline Plan YV-132-1'.

⁵¹⁰ Buchman, Kochav Yair.

⁵¹¹ Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, 'Detailed Plan GZ/117'.

an abundance of open public spaces that addressed the main interests of the military officers for a secluded settlement. At the same time, while the popular tract housing layout that followed the economic optimisation of the site's parcellation located all public functions outside of the settlement, Buchman was free from such considerations and was thus able to propose a public centre in Reut; implying on its communal character.




FIG. 4.54 Reut, 1986. Meir Buchman. (Israel Land Administration)




FIG. 4.55 Reut, extension, 1992. Meir Buchman. (Israel Land Administration)

The architectural design of the houses in Reut was an outcome of the officers' desire for customisations and the association's interests in standardisation and optimisation. As already stated in a memo from the Cabinet of the Chief of Staff in 1986, the dwelling units were to be planned with considerations of "quality and costs".⁵¹² Fittingly, commissioning leading architects like Chyutin, Riskin, Bracha & Hakim and others, ensured the quality of future houses.⁵¹³ Additionally, the association asked the architects for a number of housing models with an option for partial or full construction according to the needs and economic abilities of each officer. Each family was then able to choose their preferred model with a maximal size of around 250 m². Though the apparent abundance of choice, the different housing models were significantly similar, following the same spatial characteristics and design regulation dictated by Buchman and the association.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹² Chief of Staff Cabinet, 'Housing Project - Modi'in Plan', 3.

⁵¹³ Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, 'Permit 1715/210014'; Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, 'Permit 1435/210030'; Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, 'Permit 524/210001'.

⁵¹⁴ Buchman, Kochav Yair.

This included an insistence on single-slope roofs, specific cubic dimensions, and white exterior walls,⁵¹⁵ which gave Reut the appearance of an idyllic suburb, made out of rows of homogeneous white houses (fig 4.56-4.57).⁵¹⁶



FIG. 4.56 Houses in Reut under construction, 1989. (IDF housing Administration)



FIG. 4.57 Reut, 1997. Moshe Milner (GPO). in the background the city of Modi'in during construction.

The architectural guidelines imposed by the association went beyond mere design and included specific instructions that ensured the formation of a withdrawn, introvert and homogeneous residential environment. Beyond the mentioned aesthetic instructions, the guidelines imposed by Buchman and the association included specific parameters for the placement of each house in the lot, creating a buffer zone that disconnects it from the nearby street and emphasises the centrality of the backyard and the private family area.⁵¹⁷ Accordingly, the different models consisted of a split-level home, which used the site's topography to create an inner division between the family area and the bedrooms while orienting the living room towards the backyard (fig 4.58-4.60). The only case where the association asked to place the family area in the front of the house was in parcels that were higher than the adjacent street. Yet, this was meant to increase the panoramic view from each living room and not to better connect the family to the community, especially as each parcel was then forwarded by a retaining wall that secluded it from the street.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁵ IDF Housing Administration, 'Reut B'.

⁵¹⁶ Oren, Reut.

⁵¹⁷ Riskin, Houses in Kochav Yair and Reut.

⁵¹⁸ Oren, Reut.




FIG. 4.58 Model for a house in Reut B, Arik Riskin. 1991. (IDF Housing Administration)



FIG. 4.59 Model for a house in Reut B, Izik & Wieser Architects. 1991. (IDF Housing Administration)




FIG. 4.60 Drawings of one of the models in Reut, planned by Arik Riskin. Note the offset from the street and the orientation of the family area towards the backyard, closed façade the street (middle right) and open façade to the back (middle bottom). 1991 (IDF Housing Administration)

With the association's control over the entire construction process, it was able to enforce broad standardisation that significantly increased the homogeneity of Reut while optimising its development. Though each family was able to select the model of its choice, the location of the lot was decided by the association, as the latter wanted to create single-model compounds that would consist of the same housing type. This would enhance the uniformity of the residential environment, as suitable for a military-led project, while rationalising the construction process.⁵¹⁹ To optimise the process further, the association established a parallel development company, named *Megorei Modi'in* ltd, which was run by the same officers, yet as a private corporation, and it was thus able to manage the procedure economically, ensuring the quality of construction in relatively low prices.⁵²⁰ Consequently, the first phase of Reut, which included around 1000 housing units, was a concentrated construction effort that the association was able to conclude in around three years. This was an unprecedented case of non-governmental suburban development that enabled the construction of 500 additional houses directly afterwards.⁵²¹

Three decades after its completion, Reut continues to form a privileged housing project, even after the construction of Modi'in which it was supposed to merge with. With a single gated entrance and no physical connections to other localities nearby, Reut was run by the same local council as Maccabim and functioned as separated upper-middle-class gated settlement. By the early 2000s, as the Ministry of Interior asked to merge the two with Modi'in, the citizens of Reut tried to resist the merger, fearing they would lose their unique small-scale suburban character by becoming part of a city. Eventually, even though Reut became officially a part of the city of Modi'in-Maccabim-Reut, it still retains its unique quality, tone and independence. The borough of Reut is still managed by the Neot Reut Association, which is in charge of running the daily municipal services and developing the area, and the built area of Reut and that of Modi'in still maintain their segregation through a series of open green spaces and lack of connecting streets. Consequently, Reut is still regarded as the idyllic suburban upper-middle-class settlement and the home of the pilots of the IAF.

Reut, with the omnipotent status of the IDF personnel in its development, presents a unique case in the selective privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism. The unprecedented spatial privileges granted to the IDF enabled it to control almost all

⁵¹⁹ Mentzel, Reut and Rosh Ha'ayin.

⁵²⁰ Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, 'Permit 910127/4560'.

⁵²¹ Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements; Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

aspects of Reut's production. Eventually, leading to a unique settlement, which was an outcome of its developers' desires for quality suburban lifestyle, as well as their interests for an optimised, efficient and resourceful construction process. Therefore, the suburban features that characterise Reut, are not simply a tool used by the state in order to attract officers and their families to its frontier, but rather an outcome of the unique development method that turned the military into both the producer and consumer of the new settlement. Thus, it was not the built environment in itself that functioned as a territorial tool, but rather the ability to develop it.

With the success of Reut in offering military officers an exclusive residential environment while gentrifying the Green-Line, it turned into a prototype for further IDF and ILA cooperation. Consequently, following Reut, the HA continued developing additional housing projects in the Israeli periphery. First were the military neighbourhoods of Rosh Ha'ayin, which the MCH and IDF suggested to develop already in 1987 as a way to appease the town's discontent from choosing the site of Reut for the military housing project.⁵²² Consequently, the underprivileged and neglected Rosh Ha'ayin of the 1980s, attracted young and well-established families and was thus able to continue developing, turning into one of Israel's emerging cities. Later, were smaller compounds in the new city of Modi'in or new neighbourhoods in other underdeveloped peripheral towns like Nazareth-Illit, Negba, Karkur, Akko, Gadera or Beer Sheva.⁵²³ Nevertheless, in all following projects, the HA had to work with an existing local council and a prevailing local masterplan, which decreased its exclusive status and ability to dictate every aspect of the project. At the same time, as a representative of the IDF, the HA was still able to negotiate over key planning issues for the benefits of the military families. The logic behind these projects was maintained, as it included promising officers large houses in cheap prices while extending their service and gentrifying under-developed areas.⁵²⁴ Accordingly, these military neighbourhoods were secluded and segregated residential areas, as implied by their names, which almost always consisted of the words *Naveh* or *Neot* (Hebrew for Oasis). These Oases, with their unique method of gentrification, prepared the transformation of the public image of the areas they were built in, turning them from frontier regions or impoverished towns to fertile ground for larger investments, and the ILA was thus willing to privatise both property and planning rights.

⁵²² Eldor, 'Letter to CEO of MCH - Modi'in - 2.3.1987', 1987.

⁵²³ IDF Housing Administration, 'Nofei Ramot. Marketing Brochure, Petah Tikva'.

⁵²⁴ Bar-Eli, 'IDF Housing Administration Offers Officers Offers They Can't Refuse'.

For years the slogan of the IDF's education corps was "*the nation builds the army that builds the nation*" (*A'm Bone Tzava Boneh A'm*).⁵²⁵ Whether this sentence is valid for Israeli society in the individualistic 21st century or not, it still implies the role of the IDF as an integral part of the local culture and identity. However, in the case of Reut, it may be more suitable to claim that "*the nation builds an army that creates real-state*", as it was through this unique case of selective privatisation that the state sought to develop its frontier, leading to one of the largest development projects in its history- Modi'in.

4.8 Conclusions: localised American suburbs and state-oriented gentrification

More than the appeal of the suburban dream house, it was the spatial privilege of being able to produce it that formed the main tool in the privatised settlement mechanism during the 1980s. In their analyses of place stratification, Logan and Alba claim that in many cases "*most successful members [of the minority group] may live in worse locations than even the lowest-status members of the majority*".⁵²⁶ Claiming this, they explain how favoured groups are able to use their privileges to secure their desired residential preferences. In Kochav Yair and Reut the state gave a small group of privileged families the permission to build an exclusive and secluded Suburban Settlement by granting them the *power to plan*, develop and inhabit state-owned lands. Consequently, these families significantly improved their living standards, as they were able to affordably obtain a spacious private house in a homogeneous secluded community while transforming their social and political capital into real estate. In Alfei Menashe the *power to form space* was first granted to the privileged group of military personnel and specific well-connected contractors. As these two were either uninterested in the site or unable to develop it properly, the state then approached other privileged contractors and civic groups, forwarding to them the *power to develop* and inhabit the settlement. In Oranit, it was the private

⁵²⁵ Sasson-Levy, 'Where Will the Women Be? Gendered Implications of the Decline of Israel's Citizen Army', 183.

⁵²⁶ Logan and Alba, 'Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs: An Individual-Level Analysis of Segregation', 244.

developers' political capital that was put to use, as the received governmental support granted them a monopoly over the construction process, and an almost unlimited *power to plan*, construct, commodify and market space. For marketing reasons, the developers sought to attract the same upper-middle-class families, which would grant Oranit the image of a high-class project and eventually lead to its success. Therefore, though all cases were supported by right-wing politicians, whose main electoral power consists of the blue-collar and middle-class Mizrahi sector, it was eventually the upper-middle-class centre/left Ashkenazi sector that inhabited these settlements.

The ability of the bourgeoisie to both produce and consume space concluded in the similar architectural and [sub]urban characteristics of all case studies presented in this chapter. The appeal to upper-middle-class families was the settling tool applied by the state, and architecture and planning were thus the product of this specific tool. Applying this new settlement tool, the state promoted the development of a new typology – i.e. the Suburban Settlement, which significantly differed from former Israeli urban and rural precedents. While in the communal rural settlements and in the quasi-socialist development towns the focus was on creating a unified community, in the Suburban Settlements the focus was on the individual family. This was echoed in the use of the single unit as the focal point of the entire planning process. In Kochav-Yair and Reut, the process was carried out by a non-profit oriented association and the layout was based on duplicating the basic parcel and paving the site with it. In Oranit, and also in Alfei Menashe, as the development was handled by a private corporation, the site was subdivided into smaller parcels, while resourcefully using the land's real estate potential. Nevertheless, in both methods, the new settlements were purely residential, lacking any apparent hierarchy or diversity. Therefore, the layout of this new settlement typology, derived from its settlers' interests in social seclusion and from its developers' economic incentives.

Characterised by homogeneous lines, the architectural qualities of all settlements fitted the distinct profile of the new pioneer bourgeoisie. The repeatedly used split-level houses, whether in a single, double or row-house variation, which continued the sequence of separations and enhanced the focus on the private family life. The tract housing development and the focus on the private family parcel as the basis of planning were clearly inspired by the American suburban model. In that sense, the chase of the bourgeoisifying Israeli middle-class for better living standards in the developing suburbia corresponded with the American Dream of a detached private house, a garden and a car. Nevertheless, American Suburbia was not implemented as is, but rather received an Israeli interpretation. The main difference was in the positioning of the houses and their relation to their surrounding environment (fig 4.61). In the American example, the houses are usually built parallel to the access

street, while orienting an entrance porch and the living room to it. In this case, the private front yard formed a symbolic buffer zone between the public and the private spheres, while enhancing the homogeneous character of the neighbourhood. In the Israeli version, the houses were constructed mainly perpendicular to the street, minimising the relation to it, while orienting the living room towards the backyard, as far as possible from the neighbouring environment. Augmenting the seclusion further, the front yard, which functioned mostly as a parking area, was cut off from the street by a physical wall. In the Israeli suburban dream, the private households were meant to function as independent entities or *monades*, forming an extreme case of its American inspiration (fig 4.62).



FIG. 4.61 Levittown Long Island, 1954 (Bettmann/Corbis); right- Kochav Yair, 1986. Nati Harnik (GPO)



FIG. 4.62 American Suburb; right- Israeli Suburb (Illustrated by the author)

The Israeli Suburban Settlement forms a local spatial implementation of globalisation. In his writing on the Americanisation of Israel, Uri Ram, claims that globalisation is a dual process, while using the example of the *McFalafel* to illustrate the Americanisation of the local, but also the Localisation of the American.⁵²⁷ In a

⁵²⁷ Ram, 'Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local – McDonald's in Israel', 11–31; Ram, *The Globalization of Israel*, 179–206.

way, the Israeli version of the American suburb, realised in Suburban Settlements, constitutes the spatial version of the *McFalahel* phenomenon. And this *McFalahel* was precisely what the upper-middle-class families moving from cities were looking for, as its anti-communal features formed a contra to all former socially oriented Israeli residential models; transferring the *Tower and Stockade* approach from the level of the community to that of the family. Correspondingly, as the following chapters show, the secluded family unit would continue to form the main focus of planning in all future residential developments.

Using the upper-middle-class to domesticate the Green-Line was a coordinated gentrification process that turned the former frontier area into suburbia. Through this state-supported endeavour, this hegemonic group was *seduced* by the privileged spatial rights, as Kim Dovey would claim, to settle along the Green-Line and to enable its domestication. Turning the area from a region inhabited by pioneer-like settlers into the dormitory of doctors, academics, high-ranking officers and senior officials concluded in its legitimisation; eventually becoming an integral part of the national consensus. As we have seen here, the development of all case studies promoted the economic feasibility of larger housing projects, whether inside the settlements or surrounding them. Consequently, the following projects that we will encounter in the next chapters would no longer be the same low-rise and detached residential environments, but rather high-rise and denser housing typologies. The Suburban Settlement thus functioned as a real estate *avant-garde*, gentrifying the area and preparing it for its mass suburbanisation (fig 4.63-4.64) (chapter V).



FIG. 4.63 General view of a Suburban Settlement (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 4.64 Future development around the Suburban Settlements (Illustrated by the author)

5 Mass-suburbanisation & the stars settlements

Supply-side territoriality

A shorter version of this chapter was submitted and accepted at *Space and Polity*:
– Schwake, G. Supply-side territoriality: reshaping a geopolitical project according to economic means.
Space and Polity. (in print)

5.1 Introduction: from gentrification to suburbanisation

Following its gentrification during the 1980s, the Green-Line became an attractive and appealing area. Consequently, this enabled the further privatisation of the settlement mechanism and a growing reliance on private capital. Therefore, the state enacted a supply-side housing policy, securing the developers' interests as a means to ensure the area's continuous development. Subsequently, unlike earlier examples, where the focus was on granting future settlers the *power to* colonise space, this shifted to granting private entrepreneurs the *power to* develop and market it. Accordingly, rentability became a crucial aspect in planning and executing new settlements, as the new outline schemes had to take in mind the private developers' investment and financial interests, eventually, reshaping the built environment. Therefore, as the Israeli Government had to deal with the local housing crisis caused by the mass Jewish immigration from the Post-Soviet Bloc, the corporate-led

mass-suburbanisation of the Green-Line during the 1990s was a state-organised development that intended to enlarge the national supply of dwelling units while enhancing the state's *power over* its frontiers.

This chapter focuses on the 'Stars' settlements that present a new step in the privatisation of the geopolitical project and a new set of spatial privileges (fig 5.1). These were eight new sites initiated by the state in the early 1990s as part of the national efforts to expand the existing housing reserves. This chapter explains how the settlement mechanism relied on supply-side housing policy as its main method, turning into the new settlement tool. Analysing the spatial features of the 'Stars' settlements, this chapter demonstrates how this newly applied supplied-side territoriality affected the production of the built environment, concluding in new architectural and [sub]urban typologies, which were part of the transformation of the Green-Line into real estate; eventually, finalising its domestication.




FIG. 5.1 Case Studies in 2015 along the Green-Line and the West-Bank Barrier (Illustrated by the author)

5.2 Peace talks, immigration and a national housing crisis

The early 1990s was a period of significant political changes. By 1991, the declining violent uprising of the First Intifada and the Arab-American coalition during the first Gulf War, as well as the improving relations between the US and Russia, created an opportunity to revive the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian peace process. This led to the Madrid Conference, already during the right-wing government of Yitzhak Shamir. Though eventually the immediate consequences were limited, it was a crucial rapprochement between both sides that enabled future talks. Moreover, as part of the negotiations, the US administration promised the Israeli Government substantial financial aid in the absorption of Jewish immigrants coming from the collapsing USSR. With the election of Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister in 1992 the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian representatives were restarted, eventually leading to the Oslo Accords; a series of agreements signed by the State of Israel and the PLO, as part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, intended to lead to a permanent solution. As an interim agreement, it created the autonomous Palestinian Authority, as a momentary self-governing body, in charge of the newly created areas A+B in the West-Bank and the Gaza Strip. These consisted of the major Palestinian cities and towns, while Israel retained its control over all other areas (Area C). The agreements included mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel, while leaving the issues of the nature of the future Palestinian State and its borders, the status of Jerusalem and the question of Palestinian refugees to be dealt with in later agreements.

The political and diplomatic efforts, together with new waves of immigration affected the development and suburbanisation of the Green-Line. In 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev lifted all immigration restrictions off of the Jewish population in the USSR. The Israeli Government, which sees itself responsible for the fate of the entire world Jewry, sought to encourage this immigration, which would also aid in the local demographic competition with the Arab Palestinian population, hopefully guaranteeing a Jewish majority. The estimation was that in several years more than one million immigrants (referred to as *O'lim*) would arrive in Israel, adding up to 20% of the local population, which at that time included less than five million inhabitants. The estimations would initially come true, as in 1990–1991 more than 300,000 USSR Jews came to Israel.⁵²⁸

⁵²⁸ Tolz, 'Jewish Emigration from the Former USSR since 1970', 1–27.

This ignited, once again, the national plans of absorption and redistribution of the country's population,⁵²⁹ while consequently causing an increase in the overall demand for dwelling units. The assurances to the US administration that its financial support of this immigration would not be invested in new West-Bank settlements, and later the 'construction freeze' the Rabin government placed over the occupied territories as part of the peace talks with the PLO, all caused the state to focus its new development efforts outside of the West-Bank. At the same time, strengthening the Israeli presence along the Green-Line would help create an Israeli sequence with [some] of the inner settlement blocs. Therefore, limiting the creation of Jewish enclaves in a future Palestinian state, and thus ensuring the attachment of these settlement blocs to the state of Israel, in case of a territorial compromise. Moreover, a stronger Israeli presence all along the Green-Line would prevent any Palestinian claims to seize lands outside of the West-Bank as a compensation for the Jewish Settlement blocs that remained annexed to Israel. Thus, preventing any potential land swaps and minimising the size of a future sovereign Palestinian entity.⁵³⁰

The involvement of private capital in the developments along the Green-Line grew substantially during the 1990s. Already in the first plans for the area, during the tenure of Ariel Sharon as Minister of Construction and Housing, the governmental plan was to enlarge the supply of dwelling units by encouraging private developers. The new Rabin government, though led by the seemingly socialist Labour Party, did not withhold the privatisation processes, and even expanded it significantly.⁵³¹ Among the leading measures the government took were the privatisation of several state-owned companies and eventually also the construction of the planned transnational highway. By the 1990s, privatisation was thus a given fact, supported by almost the entire political spectrum.⁵³² At the same time, the areas on the Israeli side of the Green-Line, which as we have seen were ideological enough to be seen as an area of national priority, yet not too ideological to be left outside the national consensus. Thus, their development was supported by almost the entire political spectrum as well, turning into an ideal platform for the suburban turn of the 1990s. This mass-suburbanisation eventually completed the domestication of the former frontier and incorporated it into the greater Tel Aviv metropolis.

⁵²⁹ Efrat, 'Geographical Distribution of the Soviet-Jewish New Immigrants in Israel', 355–63.

⁵³⁰ Adiv and Schwartz, *Sharon's Star Wars: Israel's Seven Star Settlement Plan*.

⁵³¹ Hason, *Three decades of privatisation*.

⁵³² Rabinowitz and Vardi, *Driving Forces : Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures in Israel*.

5.3 Pushing, pulling and supplying

In the process of suburbanisation, there are usually two main forces that generate urban immigration. First, there are the *pull factors* of suburbia, which usually consist of a better quality of life, manifested in a large private house, a well-established community, and affinity to nature. Second, are the *push factors* of the city, such as crime, taxes and ethnic/economic tensions.⁵³³ While this is usually true for the upper-middle-class, or '*white suburbanisation*',⁵³⁴ that of lower classes is more of an urban '*spill over*', caused by high rents that push the poor to the fringes of cities; creating an extension of the low-income ghettos.⁵³⁵ In a way, the pull factors of the suburbanisation along the Green-Line during the 1980s, were created by the state. By allocating lands to homogeneous communities or by subsidising construction costs and mortgages, the state stimulated the demand for housing units in the area, while supporting the decentralisation efforts.

With the ongoing privatisation of the Israeli economy, the development method of its built environment significantly changed by the 1990s, as already demonstrated in the previous chapters. Earlier, the state took the role of both the planner and developer. Yet, the increasing dependence on private construction companies, first led to the involvement of private contractors, which later turned into developers and entrepreneurs. The state withheld its status as planner, but relied on marketing the parcels of each newly planned site to private contractors, which were later supposed to develop each lot and to sell the constructed units to private families.⁵³⁶ Thus, similar to other neoliberal economies, Israel began applying a *supply-side* housing policy, which included a variety of economic measures, policies and deregulations,⁵³⁷ all intended to "*enabling the markets to work*".⁵³⁸

⁵³³ Marshall, 'White Movement to the Suburbs: A Comparison of Explanations', 975.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid*

⁵³⁵ Lake and Cutter, 'A Typology of Black Suburbanization in New Jersey since 1970', 172.

⁵³⁶ Carmon, 'Housing Policy in Israel: Review, Evaluation and Lessons', 200–208.

⁵³⁷ Brenner and Theodore, 'Cities and the Geographies of "actually Existing Neoliberalism"', 349–52.

⁵³⁸ Rolnik, *Urban Warfare: Housing under the Empire of Finance*, 20; World Bank, 'Housing: Enabling Markets to Work'.

In this housing approach, dwelling units are supplied by safeguarding the interests of the developers in the hope that this would eventually benefit the end-users.⁵³⁹

In the Israeli territorial version of supply-side housing policy, the MCH sought to develop the frontier by turning it into real estate. Thus, it had to make sure that the new settlements were '*marketable*', meaning that the building rights and regulations would also ensure the profitability of the construction. In 1990, the Israeli Government would take an additional crucial step towards a supply-side housing market as it would exempt income from rented properties from the overall taxed income. By enacting a maximal 10% tax rate, the state sought to encourage homeowners to put their properties out on the market and to enlarge the national housing stock.⁵⁴⁰ The financial support to settling families could on the one-hand be seen as *demand-side* housing policy, while on the other, it could be seen as an extension of the supply-side strategy, as it is intended to create a demand for housing in a specific area.⁵⁴¹ Thus, ensuring that the supplied apartments would eventually be bought.

During the 1980s, the involvement of private developers west of the Green-Line was minimal. While in the West-Bank, the state actively attracted developers by financing construction costs and promising to purchase unsold units, on the Israeli side of the frontier there were mainly contractors, commissioned by one of the housing associations.⁵⁴² Demand for suburban housing did exist, yet not in the scope of large-scale private investment. The recession in the building industry of the 1980s, prevented private developers from taking part in large-scale projects where the governmental support was minimal. On this side of the line, the state assigned subsidised public lands to small groups (like Kochav Yair or Reut, see chapter IV), who then had the ability to build their own suburban settlements. This step gentrified the area and turned it into an exclusive environment while making future investments possible. In an internal meeting of the MCH regarding housing settlements for IDF officers, the report clearly states that these are

⁵³⁹ Galster, 'Comparing Demand-side and Supply-side Housing Policies: Sub-market and Spatial Perspectives', 561–77; Graeber, *Debt: The First 5000 Years*, 377.

⁵⁴⁰ Israeli Tax Authority, 'Israeli Tax Authority'.

⁵⁴¹ Gutwein, 'The class logic of the "long revolution", 1973-1977'.

⁵⁴² Maggor, 'State, Market and the Israeli Settlements: The Ministry of Housing and the Shift from Messianic Outposts to Urban Settlements in the Early 1980s', 140.

“a factor that attracts additional populations to the area, ‘creates’ hundreds of housing units per year and is able to assist the ministry from an organizational point of view”.⁵⁴³ As the state substantially developed the West-Bank in the 1980s, as well as the infrastructure that connected it to the coastal plain, the area was no longer considered as a geographical periphery. Subsequently, with the national shortage in dwelling units in the 1990s, private developers and entrepreneurs would take over the development of the area; leading to an accelerated process of mass suburbanisation. Starting with mass-produced low-rise residential environments and ending with a high-rise suburbia.

With the transition into a supply-side approach, the residential parcel became the focus of planning. To enact an optimised marketable system, the MCH began implementing specific dimension for each housing type. For example, in the planning process of a new eastern neighbourhood in Rosh Ha’ayin during the early 1990s, the ministry equipped the planners with specific dimensions of parcels needed for each dwelling types and a list of the desired composition of housing units (fig 5.2). The planners were then in charge of implementing this list in their proposed outline. The art of urban planning was thus the ability to create a harmonious system of fixed parcels, while the essence of the architectural task was to optimise the building rights of each parcel, generating the optimal sizes and number of dwelling units.




FIG. 5.2 Instructions for Tzamarot neighbourhood - Left: desired dimensions of residential parcels; Right: desired dwelling types and composition (Israel State Archive)

543 MCH, Meeting Regarding Construction for Military Personnel 2.9.1990, 1.

The Modi'in project of the mid-1990s is perhaps the best example of this transition. The idea of establishing the city (or even a city) of Modi'in first rose up in the late-1960s. The initial thoughts included a new suburban town in the fringes of Gush Dan⁵⁴⁴ (in a different location of today). The concept was of a satellite town, which would redistribute the population inside the Tel Aviv Metropolitan area more equally.⁵⁴⁵ In the late 1970s, the current site of the city was mentioned in the 'Hills Axis Plan', as potential settlement area, which would become part of the overall national effort to develop an eastern counterpart to the coastal plain, along the hilly area of the Green-Line.⁵⁴⁶ The idea re-emerged in the 1980s, when the emphasis was on enlarging the supply of residential units east of Tel Aviv.⁵⁴⁷ Meant to control the suburbanisation of the metropolitan area by directing it eastwards along the connection between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the MCH asked to develop the city of Modi'in "by private developers [and] by means of various governmental incentives".⁵⁴⁸ Modi'in, according to the director of the MCH's urban department at the time, was "based on economic efficiency, private initiative and indirect government involvement".⁵⁴⁹ Thus, developed with a focus on encouraging private investments instead of relying on public ones.

In 1988 the MCH commissioned Israeli-born Canadian architect Moshe Safdie to compose a skeleton plan for the future city. Safdie's general concept consisted of an orthogonal grid system, which he then adjusted to the local topography; developing the upper parts as residential neighbourhoods, while leaving the lower ones as open green spaces and access roads. Safdie's design concept for each neighbourhood included terraced buildings along the topography with a park and a residential high-rise landmark on a hilltop.⁵⁵⁰ The MCH then divided the entire area into six compounds, assigning an architectural firm to plan each of them. The firms of Safdie, Meromi, Buchman, Gershon, Hashimshoni, and Kaiser, were then in charge of composing a detailed outline plan for their own site. After the approval of the detailed plan, the MCH was able to market the different parcels in each site to private developers, who would then construct the planned neighbourhoods.

⁵⁴⁴ The Tel Aviv Metropolitan area

⁵⁴⁵ IPD, 'Modi'in'.

⁵⁴⁶ Kipnis, *Potential of Developing Urban Housings along the Hills Axis*.

⁵⁴⁷ Eldor, 'Letter from the Head of the MCH's department of urban development, Sofia Eldor, to the CEO of MCH, Asher Wiener - 25.10.1984', 1985.

⁵⁴⁸ Eldor, 'A new town in Modi'in', 2.

⁵⁴⁹ Eldor, 3.

⁵⁵⁰ Moshe Safdie Architects Ltd, *Modi'in: A New City*.

The realisation of Modi'in was an unprecedentedly efficient process that represents the new supply-side approach of the MCH. In a relatively short period of time, the formerly vacant site turned into a city of tens of thousands of families. The efficiency of the construction process was not only in the assembly line production method, but also in the '*closed market*' policy, that dictated that all revenues from the project had to be invested back in infrastructure and development, in order to attract more private investment.⁵⁵¹ Modi'in was thus a classical supply-side story, and the homogeneous architecture, as well as the fact that the different neighbourhoods are still referred to as '*sites*', bearing the names of the architects that planned them, highlights this even more. While the planning and execution of the first phases in Modi'in was a decade long coordinated process managed by the MCH and a vast crew of planners, project managers and other ministerial officials, the smaller settlements nearby, the Stars, were developed in a significantly shorter period of time. Built in order to rapidly answer present needs, they were thus more an outcome of an improvised process controlled by private developers, than a long and complex procedure. Therefore, the story of their development tells a more genuine and unique narrative on the selective privatisation of the local settlement mechanism, and the architectural typologies and [sub]urban models it generated.

5.4 The Stars: from private associations to private corporations

The *Stars (HaKochavim)*, is a term that refers to a series of localities that were developed along the Green-Line in the 1990s and form a new step in the privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism. This usually includes the new sites of Harish, Bat Hefer, Tzoran, Matan, Tzur Yigal, Ela'ad, Tzur Yitzhak, Shoham and sometimes even the city of Modi'in. Though today the *Stars* refer to a variety of settlements in different sizes and socio-economic backgrounds, the original idea was to develop small-scale suburban localities along the Green-Line, meant to attract young families seeking better living conditions manifested in suburban lifestyle. The Israel Land Administration (ILA), together with the Ministry of Housing and Construction (MCH)

⁵⁵¹ MCH, 'Ela'ad: adjusting land costs and analysing apartment prices'.

initially sought state-owned lands in the area for precisely this purpose. By the mid-1990s, as the state led an intense effort to disperse the population in the area, due to political reasons and the national shortage in dwelling units, it significantly stimulated the development of the region by promoting the enlargement of existing localities, the acceleration of on-going planning efforts and the transformation of several sites from suburban to more urban settlements.

The state promoted the 'Stars' settlements as an improved and more efficient version of the Suburban Settlement of the 1980s. One of the main driving forces behind the Stars was Parliament Member Michael Eitan, who already played a leading role in the development of Kochav Yair (see chapter IV). Offering upper-middle-class families an affordable detached house in commuting distance from the main metropolitan area while expanding the state territorial control, Kochav Yair was considered as a suburban and territorial success. Eitan, and several other politicians and planning officials, were interested in repeating this success and thus began promoting plans for multiple Suburban Settlements. The means were very simple as they included the cooperation of the ILA to locate and assign vacant lands along the Green-Line and the government's financial support for young families interested in relocating to the area. At first, Eitan's plan included seven new settlements, which he called the *Seven Starts (Shiva'at HaKochavim)*. *Stars (Kochavim)*, referring to the Kochav Yair model, yet also to the Seven Stars Flag, which 19th-century Zionist leader and thinker Theodor Herzl suggested for the future Jewish state.⁵⁵²

Targeting young families living in Gush Dan, the new settlements were also part of the future national struggle against the upcoming housing shortage, which was due to occur by the anticipated mass immigration of Jews from the post-Soviet bloc. The planned suburbanisation would free occupied apartments and thus enlarge the overall supply of dwelling units. Nevertheless, with the American support in absorbing the post-Soviet immigration wave came a demand to invest in settlements inside official Israeli territory, rather than in the occupied West-Bank. Consequently, while the initial intentions were to enhance Israeli presence on both sides of the Green-Line, the Stars had to be built only west of it.⁵⁵³ The territorial objectives were not forsaken but focused on expanding the main metropolitan area eastwards and to fortify the Israeli presence along the border with the West-Bank.

⁵⁵² Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair [Interview].

⁵⁵³ *Ibid*

A stronger presence would later limit the possibility of cross-border connections between Palestinian localities in the West-Bank and ones inside of Israel, while also minimising potential Palestinian claims over lands west of the Green-Line as a compensation for areas annexed to Israel east of it.⁵⁵⁴

As a territorial project, the efforts to detect potential sites were directed by the geopolitical importance of each possible location; analysing each location according to concepts of scarcity (of settlements), interconnections (between Jewish settlements) and separations (between Arab areas). As a Parliament Member and head of the subcommittee for Construction and Housing, Eitan was in charge of coordinating the work of the ILA, the MCH and the parliament, while working closely with the Jewish Agency (JA) and heads of the regional councils. At the same time, as a supply-side oriented project, the discussions were attended by representatives of the Association of Israeli Contractors and each site was also examined according to its availability and practicality (fig 5.3). The report included seven new locations near the existing settlements of Kfar Ruth, Kochav Yair, Yarhiv and Sha'ar Ephraim, and the relatively uninhabited (by Israeli Jews) sites of Yad Hannah, Budrus and Rantis.⁵⁵⁵ Each site was first analysed according to its feasibility. For example, in the case of Yad Hannah (Bat Heffer today), the report stated that as Kibbutz Yad Hannah Meuhad,⁵⁵⁶ to whom the site was previously assigned by the state, was going through a process of dissolution and liquidation, which would enable the ILA to retake the parcels in question. Still, it was the territorial importance that the report highlighted, emphasising the “*high importance for the site of this settlement on the Green-Line, as in this area there are only a few small Jewish settlements*”.⁵⁵⁷ The same goes for Sha'ar Ephraim, where the report claimed that “[we] must state that beside Nitzane Oz, the settlement is surrounded by large Arab towns... [it] is on the Green-Line in the narrowest part of the state of Israel, only 15km from the seashore”. The geopolitical agenda is made even more obvious in the recommendation for a “*lookout or a military base*” near the Arab villages of Ibtin, Marja and Beit a Siqa.⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁴ Soffer, The Stars [Interview]; Soffer and Gazit, *Between the Sharon and Samaria*, 77–87.

⁵⁵⁵ ILA, ‘Planning and Establishing New Settlements Along the Green-Line’.

⁵⁵⁶ A different group from the neighbouring Kibbutz Yad Hannah that was established in the 1950s.

⁵⁵⁷ ILA, ‘Planning and Establishing New Settlements Along the Green-Line’, 2.

⁵⁵⁸ ILA, 2.



FIG. 5.3 Detailed lots of proposed sites (from left): Upper row - Yad Hannah (Bat Heffer); Tzur Yigal, Matan; Kfar Ruth (Lapid) – Lower row - Holot Geulim (Tzoran) - Khirbet Mazor (Ela'ad) - Budrus (not built) – (ILA) (Courtesy of Michael Eitan)



FIG. 5.4 Detailed lots of proposed sites (from left): Upper row - Yad Hannah (Bat Heffer); Tzur Yigal, Matan; Kfar Ruth (Lapid) – Lower row - Holot Geulim (Tzoran) - Khirbet Mazor (Ela'ad) - Budrus (not built) – (ILA) (Courtesy of Michael Eitan)

The preliminary attempts to locate sites for new settlements would receive the full support of the MCH and turn into a large-scale national plan. The pro-settlement Minister of Construction and Housing Ariel Sharon endorsed the project in a personal meeting with Eitan in October of 1990, asking “*why only seven?...*”, advocating for a larger scale of development.⁵⁵⁹ With the MCH on board, its Directory of Rural Settlement took the lead, as the ministry’s vision focused on small-scale suburban localities as well. With the first report’s geopolitical analyses, the Directory of Rural Settlement and the ILA collaborated in analysing further the feasibility of each site. Subsequently, as two sites were problematic in regard to land ownership and availability, the joint report from November 1990 recommended the development of two alternative sites – Mazor, and Holot Geulim (fig 5.4).⁵⁶⁰

The Stars were integrated into the new supply-side approach that focused on decreasing planning bureaucracy and promoting corporate efficiency and profitability as a means to reignite the stagnating construction industry and to mitigate the upcoming housing crisis. Therefore, besides the financial aid and guarantees to developers to purchase unsold apartments, in 1990 the government authorised the Special Measures in The Planning and Building Law, designed to swiftly authorise and execute large-scale residential projects.⁵⁶¹ While in the existing planning routine a new urban outline plan is required to go through several planning administrations, in a process that could take several years, the new measures were made to reduce this into a few months. The Ministry of Interior, who was in charge of the national planning process, formed a special housing committee in each planning district, which concentrated all needed authorities in a single team, and dealt and authorised only feasible large-scale residential compounds. Consequently, enabling the mass production of housing units that would enlarge the overall national supply, wherever possible. Initially valid for six months, the government repeatedly extended the special measures, and all the sites of the Stars presented in this chapter were authorised by one of the special Housing Committees.

⁵⁵⁹ Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.

⁵⁶⁰ MCH Directorate of Rural Construction, ‘Land allocation for new settlements’.

⁵⁶¹ Alterman, *Planning in the Face of Crisis*.

Simultaneously, the 'Stars Plan' was officially authorised by the Israeli Government in December of 1990 as a demographic and geopolitical project. Being part of the early 1990s immigration policy, it was discussed and approved by the Ministerial Committee for Aliyah⁵⁶² and Integration. Decision A/82 thus stated that:

*“Part of the governmental policy regarding Aliyah and integration [we decide] to authorise the “Seven Stars” plan for the development of communal-suburban settlements along road number 6, which constitutes part of the larger plan for a nation-wide housing solutions for new O’lim and those entitled to by the Ministry of Construction and Housing.”*⁵⁶³

The authorised plan had three main objectives: “1. *Preparing housing solutions ... by enlargement of housing supply.* 2. *Establishing a mixed communal fabric of new O’lim and Israelis....* 3. *Creating a settlement sequence in the Hills Axis, in the aim to thicken the [Jewish] settlement in the area, and to execute the population dispersal policy”.*⁵⁶⁴

The Stars Plan was highly suburban, with a significant emphasis on commuting and a growing dependence on private initiative. The governmental decision also declared that the plan will consist of 12 new settlement points, offering 28,000 dwelling units to 100,000 inhabitants, which would be developed by the MCH, Housing associations and Housing companies. While larger than the preliminary plan, the decision continued with the initial suburban focus stating that the new settlements “*would be of communal suburban character, while especially focusing on maintaining the principles of quality of life and environment*”, and that these would be relying on “*the existing employment, education and cultural centres in Gush Dan and the central cities*”. Creating a series of dormitory suburbs, the plan thus relied on developing the “*needed roads and connections to the Tel Aviv metropolitan*”, which were crucial to its success.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶² (lit: ascent) A term that is used to refer to Jewish immigration to Israel; a Jewish immigrant is referred to as O’le (plural: O’lim)

⁵⁶³ Ministerial Committee Aliyah, 'Decision A/82', 3.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 4.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 5.

Keen on accelerating the process, the MCH began promoting the planning and development of the suggested sites simultaneously to the governmental approval. Already in 1990 it commissioned different architecture and planning offices for each of the sites and provided them with detailed programs regarding the character of each settlement, the nature of the desired environment, the density and type of dwelling units, the planned socio-economic composition of the future population. Attuned to the initial suburban focus, the instructions of the MCH consisted of low-rise, low-density Suburban Settlements mainly made out of private houses, in a detached, semi-detached and row-houses options. Correspondingly, the target population was predominantly what the ministry referred to as *housing improvers*, young upper-middle-class families that were interested in better living standards in a suburban community.⁵⁶⁶

The comparable target groups and planning guidelines generated similar urban schemes that were property-oriented layouts, simultaneously fragmentising and homogenising the chosen sites, as expected from the increasing involvement of the private sector. The different plans (except for Mazor which will be discussed later), were very alike and relied on the same planning principles. Respectively, they all focused on creating a tract development scheme that parcels each site into individual private plots and a system of primary and secondary roads. Lacking an apparent hierarchy, the proposed outlines were concentrated on the private house, the privacy of the private family and car accessibility. The implementation of these principles varied, as the planners had to adjust to each site's restrictions and topographical characteristics. For example, the outline of Tzoran, a site with minimal height differences and size limitations consisted of an open grid of primary roads and *cul de sac* streets that could have continued endlessly having not been bound; thus, forming an abstraction of the contemporary suburban ideals. In all other sites, which were located on a hillier terrain and closer to the Green-Line, highways and other localities, the planners had to project the abstract suburban grid on the given topography while squeezing it between the fixed given boundaries. Nevertheless, despite the small nuances, the suburban characteristics of all plans were quite evident, promoting the formation of homogeneous communities housing car-dependent commuters (fig 5.5).

⁵⁶⁶ Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements [Interview].




FIG. 5.5 Urban Outline Plans for the new sites - Upper row: Tzur Yigal, 1991 - Not Kochav Yair in the north, Kibbutz Eyal in its west and the Green-Line dictating its eastern border; Matan, 1991 - Note Yarhiv in its west, and the Green-Line in its east; Lapid, 1991. Note the Green-Line in its west, Kfar Ruth in its south and a road on its east; Bottom row: Bat Heffer, 1991 - Note the Green-Line on the right side and an existing road and the future transnational highway on the left; Tzoran, 1991. (ILA)

The initial strategy saw the future settlers as part of the supplying side and the state sought to develop the new settlements in the method of organised housing associations. First, the MCH planned and authorised the new settlements. Then it commissioned one of the governmental construction companies, *Shikun U Pituah* (SHOP) or *Arim* to conduct the groundwork and to develop the needed infrastructure. Subsequently, generating different parcelled compounds that the ministry would tender out to different housing associations. While in former precedents such as Kochav Yair and Reut, the associations in charge had significant spatial privileges that included the *power* to influence the proposed plan and dictate its own design regulations, in the Stars settlements these *powers* to form space were maintained by the state. Therefore, the associations involved were basically exclusive marketing agencies that ensured the suited profile of upper-middle-class [Jewish] families. Therefore, the spatial privileges of the associations and their members were

restricted to the level of the private parcel and the ability to control the societal composition of the settlements. Consisting of registered and admitted members, the new associations retained the *power to* shape the character of the future community, enacting different selection criteria and ensuring a homogeneous composition. Consistently, the first membership rules for the ZP association, which would later inhabit parts of Matan and Lapid, being Jewish was listed as one of the main demands for joining members.⁵⁶⁷ Later, this demand was eased into a more politically correct one, listing military service as a necessity, which as the Arab population in Israel is not mandatory drafted, essentially also means Jewish.⁵⁶⁸

With differing organisational skills and varying political affiliations and support, the associations' abilities changed from one case to the other. In Tzur Yigal, with four active groups, the Tzur Yigal Association began working in 1991, targeting potential members and admitting new families. Organised by experienced members from the neighbouring Kochav Yair, such as Parliament Member Michael Eitan, the association conducted an elaborated marketing campaign emphasising the possibility to achieve better living standards in Tzur Yigal, while stressing out the economic feasibility of purchasing a house there (fig 5.6).⁵⁶⁹ The association's persuasive recruitment methods concluded in admitting almost 1000 members, while Tzur Yigal was planned to house 1300 families.⁵⁷⁰



FIG. 5.6 A single-family houses; a double family houses, a row-house in Tzur Yigal, 1991. Gil-Ad Architects (Courtesy of Michael Eitan)

⁵⁶⁷ Yahad Shiveti Yisrael, 'Association Rules', 5.

⁵⁶⁸ ZP Association, 'Association Rules', 5.

⁵⁶⁹ Tzur Yigal Association, 'Tzur Yigal'.

⁵⁷⁰ Lerer Bobrov Advocates, 'Tzur Yigal Association', 1991.



FIG. 5.7 Allocation of the areas to developers, 1996 - Upper row - Tzur Yigal; Matan (Yarhiv); Lapid (Kfar Ruth); Bottom row: Tzoran (Pink and Yellow are parts for associations, Orange, Blue Green and White are private developers); Bat Heffer (Israel State Archive)

Eventually, due to the amateur nature of the non-profit association and the state's interests in mass development, the MCH was quite reluctant to continue in this model and began relying more on private corporations. While a few associations were able to manage the process efficiently, on the long run, both the MCH and ILA saw them as inefficient and unreliable partners.⁵⁷¹ This was an outcome of the first tenders from 1992, where the majority of associations that the ILA granted compounds to, were unable to keep with the demanding schedule and witnessed a significant loss of members. Consequently, causing severe setbacks and inability to populate all of the tendered parcels. To keep up to schedule, the associations tried once again to attract

⁵⁷¹ MCH, 'Construction Through Associations', 137–51.

new members, in different advertisements promising villas and cottages in the Stars settlement. As these attempts were not very successful, the MCH began shifting from tendering specific areas or compounds to private contractors instead. As a result, in Tzur Yigal, Matan, Lapid, and Tzoran more than half of the settlements were tendered to private developers, who then took on themselves the task of construction, marketing and sales. In Bat Heffer, which was tendered out later, all of the different compounds were tendered to private developers, and no associations were active (fig 5.7).

The corporate development mechanism enacted by the MCH significantly homogenised the new settlements, implementing limited suburban models and housing types. Whether developed by an association or a private contractor, all new projects consisted of a single housing model, implemented in the different lots, with differing size options.⁵⁷² Consequently, due to the uniform architecture of its houses, each part of the settlement received an obvious and undeviating character. Focusing on the privacy of the nuclear family, the houses repeated the already popular isolation method that separated the inner parts from the surrounding environment. Yet, the 1980s' popular split-level model disappeared, and almost all houses in the Stars were uni-level, whether being one or two stories high. At the same time, the emphasis on seclusion was enhanced with the central role separating fences and walls played in the new settlements, as they formed an integral part of the planning principles and design regulations; creating a continuous uniform barrier to each row of houses.⁵⁷³ Suiting a suburban environment, the single-slope red-tile roof remained a must, decorating all new houses. Accordingly, creating compounds of reproduced white cubes covered with red roofs and surrounded by stripes of green, roads and parking places, which turned into the hallmark of the Israeli suburbia along the Green-Line (fig 5.8-5.10).

⁵⁷² Emek Hefer local council construction committee, 'Permit 940304 (Bat Heffer)'; Emek Hefer local council construction committee, 'Permit 940433 (Bat Heffer)'; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 'Permit 95256/440031401 (Tzur Yigal)'; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 'Permit 93060/440249702 (Tzoran)'.

⁵⁷³ Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 'Permit 93205/440139000 (Tzur Yigal)'; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 'Permit 93466/440155300 (Tzoran)'; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 'Permit 94031/440243502 (Tzur Yigal)'.




FIG. 5.8 Positioning plan in Tzur Yigal, 1993. (Drom HaSharon Construction Committee) Note the same repetitive model




FIG. 5.9 Fence in Tzur Yigal, 1993, Gilad & Yosef Architects. (Drom HaSharon Construction Committee)




FIG. 5.10 Double Family House, Bat Heffer, 1994, Elmagor Architects; Double Family House, Bat Heffer, 1994, Bareli, Levitzky, Ksif Yosef Architects; Single Family House, Bat Heffer, 1996, Feig Architects (Drom HaSharon Construction Committee)

The strategy behind the stars was of a supply-side housing policy integrated in the national geopolitical project. In order to provide housing solutions for the new ex-Soviet Jewish immigrants, the overall supply of dwelling units had to be enlarged. Enlarging this supply did not only mean constructing new apartments for the use of the new O'lim, but also releasing already occupied ones in the coastal plain by offering their inhabiting families better living standards in the new developing suburbia. This, as explained in the plan, had also other national objectives, which included strengthening the Israeli presence in the area and expanding the Tel Aviv metropolis eastwards. In light of the national privatisation measures, the state granted specific private developers and housing associations the *power to* construct and inhabit space, as long as they would enhance the state's *power over* it. Eventually, though the plan did mention the integration of O'lim in the new settlements, that rarely happened. In the sites presented here more than 95% of the population was born in Israel,⁵⁷⁴ and they are mostly well-earning upper-class,⁵⁷⁵ secular Ashkenazi Jewish families with more than 90% house ownership.⁵⁷⁶

The Stars Plan was based on a descending order of supply-side mechanisms that eventually led to a new settlement typology. To stimulate the housing market, the government regarded upper-middle-class families as part of the supplying-side, hence, by giving them the option to affordably purchasing a new suburban house, they would '*supply*' vacant apartments in the coastal area. Then, the initial thought was on increasing the demand for suburban environments through the use of housing associations. With the desire for a more efficient development, the government eventually chose to involve more private developers by tendering out entire compounds, thus enabling them to optimise the construction process and to '*supply*' the demanded private houses in a faster and more feasible manner. The supply-side approach had a great effect on the seemingly monotonous new suburban environments that consisted of repetitive rows of private houses and reproduced residential compounds. In the later developed sites, the supply-side factor would be even more enhanced, leading to an even more evident monotony.

⁵⁷⁴ Ministry of Aliyah Integration, 'O'lim 1989-2015 according to settlements'.

⁵⁷⁵ ICBS, 'Wages and income from work by locality and various economic variables - 2013'.

⁵⁷⁶ ICBS, 'Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by selected countries of origin'.

5.5 Shoham: an assemblage of corporate compounds

Shoham (שוהם), presents a further step in the mass-suburbanisation and domestication of the Green-Line (5.11). It is a town located in the central district, adjacent to the Trans-Israel Highway and several kilometres west of the Green-Line. As of 2016, it has a population of just over 20,000 inhabitants. It enjoys a very high socioeconomic status, listed 9 in a scale of 10.⁵⁷⁷ Similar to the neighbouring settlements of Bareket and Leshem, it carries the name of one of the stones of the *Hoshen*, the biblical sacred breastplate believed to be worn by a Jewish high priest. The town's population is characterised as upper-class, highly educated white-collared families. Politically and religiously, the inhabitants of Shoham are affiliated with the central-left oriented side of the Israeli political spectrum, and most families are considered as secular or traditional. Almost all families own the house they are living in, while almost all professionals are occupied outside of town.⁵⁷⁸ Despite being much larger than other previous case studies, Shoham, due to its architectural and urban features, as well as the commuting lifestyle of its inhabitants, is practically a large suburb. Developed during the early 1990s, Shoham is often regarded as one of the Stars, though it was for long part of the Israel Land Administration's (ILA) settlement plan.




FIG. 5.11 Shoham in 2015 adjacent to the Trans-Israel Highway and the Green-Line (Illustrated by the author)

⁵⁷⁷ ICBS, 'Localities in Israel', 2018.

⁵⁷⁸ Madlan, 'Statistics on Settlements'.

The ILA began promoting the development of the site of Shoham already as part of the previous rural mechanism, long before the suburban turn of the Green-Line. Located on the lands of the former Palestinian village of Dayr Tarif, which was depopulated during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, it was part of the national effort to construct Jewish settlements on former Arab sites.⁵⁷⁹ In 1949, a group of Jewish immigrants from Bulgaria established the moshav of Beit Arif on a segment of the abandoned village's lands. During the early 1950s, the Jewish Agency (JA) began planning a new rural settlement in the remaining area, under the name of Nablat (fig 5.12). A decade later, As this plan was not carried out, the JA and its construction company *Rassco* (Rural and Suburban Settlement Company), attempted to establish a new moshav named Shoham in the same area, which it designated for Jewish immigrants from Argentina.⁵⁸⁰ The plans did proceed and *Rassco* even began building the initial infrastructure and some of the first buildings, starting with a water tower, fitting the initial rural character. After several setbacks, the plans re-emerged in the early 1970s but were shortly abandoned due to the decline in the interest of Argentinian immigrants.⁵⁸¹ The location remained a suggested settlement spot and during the 1970s the ILA, together with *Rassco*, tried to re-ignite the construction of Shoham. As these attempts were no longer of a rural character, they were rejected and withheld by the Israeli Planning Administration (IPA), mainly due to the objection of the moshavim and the Committee for the Protection of Agricultural Land and Open Areas (VLKHSHP).⁵⁸²




FIG. 5.12 Plan for a rural settlement. 1953. JA (Central Zionist Archives)

⁵⁷⁹ Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*.

⁵⁸⁰ Dokatz, 'The Agency will discuss problems of Olim from South-America', 2.

⁵⁸¹ Ma'ariv, 'Argentinian Olim will build a new settlement in the area of Modiin', 4.

⁵⁸² Regional Planning Committee, 'Plan HZ/53/1'; VLKHSHP: *HaVa'ada LeShmira Al Karka'a Haklait U'Shtahim Ptuhim*

In light of the objection from the side of the rural sector, the ILA and Rassco began initiating a plan to serve the nearby moshavim. Consistently, the initial idea included a regional centre for the rural settlements of the surrounding regional council of Modi'im⁵⁸³, which lacked an administrative and educational centre. The designed centre would consist of the needed schools, administration facilities, and the regional council building. However, unlike former examples of regional centres, which functioned only during the day, and were thus called "day centres", this plan included a residential area, which was supposed to offer housing opportunities for the workers of the regional centre; teachers, clerks, and other officials (fig 5.13). The plan's appeal to the rural sector continued by designating residential lots to young families from the nearby moshavim that wanted to stay and live in the area, but were unable to find available housing solutions due to the restriction of the ILA on the number of siblings entitled to inherit a household built on state-owned lands.⁵⁸⁴

The suburban turn in the development of Shoham during the 1980s transformed the former rural vision. Previously, as the state's official agenda was for a national decentralisation, some of the concerns regarding Shoham were that it was not peripheral enough, stating that a settlement in this area would be an unjust use of rural lands that also hinders the national effort of population dispersal.⁵⁸⁵ By the mid-1980s, as the agenda changed towards regional decentralisation, Shoham turned into a site of national importance as it enabled the expansion of Gush Dan eastwards.⁵⁸⁶ Consequently, it was mentioned in the new outline scheme for the central district as a future Suburban Settlement, and the ILA began expanding the early plan for the regional centre, adding additional residential compounds (fig 5.14).

As the vision for Shoham changed the proposed outline had to transform accordingly, becoming much suburban and targeting upper-middle-class commuters. Therefore, while the plans for a regional centre were not forsaken, the surrounding residential area was detached from it, and the planned outline gave way to a tract housing development scheme meant to generate private parcels of 500 m² (fig 5.15). The ILA did not give up the appeal to the rural sector and gave preference to young couples and families from the surrounding moshavim in the marketing process, granting the general public access only to the remaining lots.

⁵⁸³ Not to confuse with the city of Modi'in that was built in 1996.

⁵⁸⁴ Abecassis, Shoham [Interview].

⁵⁸⁵ VLKHSHP, 'Committee meeting 192', 1.

⁵⁸⁶ Shachar, 'Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine', 209–18.

With the growing demand for a suburban lifestyle and the increasing interests in Shoham, the ILA decided to enlarge the settlement further, adding additional residential compounds and turning it into a town.⁵⁸⁷



FIG. 5.13 Plan for a Regional Centre for Modi'im Regional Council, GZ/69/2. 1981 (ILA)



FIG. 5.14 Regional Outline Plan, TMM/3/3. 1982. (ILA)



FIG. 5.15 The initial site from the 1991 masterplan. (ILA)

With the expansion of the Shoham project, it was incorporated into the state-led urban development ventures of the early 1990s. As it entered the national efforts to enlarge the overall supply of dwelling units, the ILA commissioned Industrial Buildings Corporation Ltd (IBC; *Khevrat Mivne Ta'asiya Ltd*), a formerly state-owned private construction and real estate company, to manage the planning and execution of the enlarged project. Before its privatisation, IBC was a governmental company established in 1961, in charge of constructing industrial buildings in development areas on behalf of the Ministry of Economy.⁵⁸⁸ As the state was interested in developing more industrial areas, it expanded the company's responsibilities, putting it in charge of entire compounds, including the needed planning, infrastructure and ground preparation works. Though it was completely privatised during the rearrangement of the government-owned companies in the 1980s, it retained its functions as a governmental contractor. By assigning the development of residential areas to IBC, the ILA sked to use its experience in mass production, in order to contribute to the national housing effort. Accordingly, by 1991 IBC was in command of developing the framework for almost 22,000 dwelling units altogether, of which Shoham was part of.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁷ Abecassis, Shoham; Soffer, *The Stars*.

⁵⁸⁸ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Mivne Ta'asiya Ltd. Jerusalem'.

⁵⁸⁹ Industrial Buildings Company Ltd, 'Industrial Buildings Company Ltd'.

With the purpose of developing a new town, IBC promoted a new masterplan for Shoham that suited its new vision and development method. Therefore, it commissioned local architect Joseph Abecassis, who was already involved in the earlier stages. Suitable for a company with experience in industrial areas, the new outline did not include a new inclusive urban concept but rather consisted of ten isolated purely residential areas, to be developed separately according to the expansion of the construction process. Correspondingly, the areas' spatial characteristics were dictated by their location on the development timeline and not by the desire to create a morphological urban hierarchy. Consequently, the first constructed western parts were low-rise private houses, and the eastern parts consisting of denser and higher compounds that grew further with the town's northward extension.

With the desire to optimise the planning process, the planned layout proposed an efficient grid that subdivided the area into smaller tracts, creating an arrangement of different housing compounds. Consequently, the popular use of *cul de sac* streets gave way to a continuous system of roads that parcelled each area into a series of smaller residential lots. Whether for single, double or multi-family buildings, the layout of the different areas was significantly similar, with the larger parts forming a scaled version of the smaller compounds. Bearing names with strong connotations to the local flora, fauna and animals, such as *Hadasim* (Citrus,) *Alonim* (Oaks), *Yealim* (Ibexes), *Broshim* (Cypresses) and *Vradim* (Roses), the different parts of Shoham were supposed to promote the image of a town affiliated with nature and better quality of life, suitable for a Suburban Settlement (fig 5.16). The development works of Shoham suited the desired mass housing production. Accordingly, it was a continuous process where IBC developed the needed infrastructure to each residential parcel and conducted the first preparation works respectively; forwarding the site to private individuals and contractors.⁵⁹⁰

Planned as an assemblage of residential quarters, Shoham's public and civil centre was an additional separate compound. Constituting the main area for schools, administration offices, the country club, commercial buildings and a cultural centre, it was supposed to form the public core of the future town, connected to all its parts through a system of pedestrian paths.⁵⁹¹ Contrariwise, its location along the main access road, surrounded by open green spaces, created an isolated civic centre. With the site of Shoham being confined by the moshavim in its east and road number 444

⁵⁹⁰ Abecassis, Shoham.

⁵⁹¹ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Yearly Report: 49. Jerusalem', 455–59.

in the west, the planners' only option was to extend the town northwards. As the project expanded the planners continued attaching new residential clusters without re-adjusting the initial plan.⁵⁹² Consequently, the layout of Shoham was made out of different housing compounds allocated along a south-north access road,⁵⁹³ which provided an independent access to each neighbourhood, turning them into a collection of separated 'balloons on a string',⁵⁹⁴ rather than an integrated urban system.



FIG. 5.16 Masterplan for Shoham, 1991. (ILA)

⁵⁹² Abecassis, Shoham.

⁵⁹³ Soffer, The Stars.

⁵⁹⁴ I borrowed the term 'balloons on a string' from Prof. Hillel Schocken from Tel Aviv University

With the urban turn of Shoham, the Ministry of Interior separated it from the surrounding rural context of the Modi'im regional council, turning the planned town into an independent locality. This decision met fierce resistance from the moshavim in the area, as they saw this as a threat to the character of the region, creating urban enclaves inside the rural landscape.⁵⁹⁵ Yet, the ILA did not neglect the initial idea to establish a regional centre for the neighbouring moshavim, and the former area for public buildings was maintained. Serving the Modi'im regional council and not the newly independent Shoham, this compound turned into an ex-territorial enclave inside the borders of the new town.⁵⁹⁶ Consequently, splitting Shoham's layout ones more.

Promoted by the state to quickly enlarge the existing supply of dwelling units, the construction on-site began immediately after the permission of the special regional housing committee.⁵⁹⁷ The gradual development that began with the low-rise houses in the western parts, increased the attractiveness of the site and enabled the following denser corporate-led housing projects in the eastern parts.⁵⁹⁸ The strategy of development according to stages, enforced by IBC, assisted in focusing on a number of housing compounds each time, constructing each one more efficiently, and preventing the entire town from becoming one large construction site. To avoid a long construction process that might hinder the attraction to the settlements IBC enforced a strict realisation timetable on each family building its house own house.⁵⁹⁹ As a housing-oriented development, the first five residential compounds were completed between 1993 and 1995, before the construction of the town's public and educational functions which were finalised only by 1996. Leaving a significant amount of families, mainly those living in the low-rise housing without the needed public facilities (fig 5.17).

⁵⁹⁵ Gamzo Council, 'Changing regional jurisdiction', 1993; Modiim Regional Council, 'Letter to Ministry of Interior: On declaring Shoham as an independent council', 1993; Council, 'Letter to Ministry of Interior: Objection to Changes in Jurisdiction', 1993; Kfar Ruth Council, 'Letter to Ministry of Interior: Changing regional jurisdiction and Shoham Local Council', 1993; Tirat Yehuda Council, 'Letter to Ministry of Interior: Local Council Shoham.', 1993.

⁵⁹⁶ Urbanics Ltd, 'Expanding Shoham's jurisdiction', 14.

⁵⁹⁷ Shoham Local Council, 'Survey of the local council's work'.

⁵⁹⁸ Soffer, The Stars.

⁵⁹⁹ Abecassis, Shoham.



FIG. 5.17 First buildings in Shoham with the empty compounds in the north , 1995. Moshe Milner (GPO)

With the first compounds consisting of self-built low-rise private houses, their architectural features resembled the popular suburban models of the time. Built individually, according to the taste, needs and economic restrictions of their future owners, they followed mutual characteristics dictated by the architectural design regulations and popular aesthetic qualities. The design regulations decreed by the plan were very minimal and consisted of a limitation on the maximum permitted height (two stories) and size (200-220 m², with an additional basement area) while insisting on a sloping roof.⁶⁰⁰ While earlier versions of the plan enabled choosing between a red-tile roof and a metal one, later this changed as the regulations required tiles “*in shades of red*”, covering more than 70% of the roof’s area.⁶⁰¹ With the plan addressing only the external features of the houses, their inner arrangement, distribution of functions and dwelling concept, were to be decided individually. Nevertheless, the majority of houses were based on a similar dwelling type, reproducing in different interpretations repeated versions of the introvert private unit. Consequently, the differences between the private houses were created by setbacks and bulges in the exterior walls, the design of the windows and that of the sloping roof (fig 5.18-5.19).

⁶⁰⁰ Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920111 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920114 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920117 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920125 (Shoham)’.

⁶⁰¹ Joseph Abecassis, ‘Master Plan GZ/69/10 - Shoham’, 10.




FIG. 5.18 Low-rise private houses in Shoham, 1993-1995 (Shoham Construction Committee archives). Note that the short and closed façade is always the one facing the street




FIG. 5.19 Main variation of the 'introvert' private houses in Shoham (Illustrated by the author)

The condominium complexes followed the same lines as those of the private low-rise houses (fig 5.20-5.22). The masterplan for the new town mentioned that Shoham would be a homogeneous “White City”, meaning that its architectural design would consist of a collection of similarly appearing simple white cubes, covered with a red roof.⁶⁰²

⁶⁰² *Ibid*, 12.

In the case of the low-rise houses, this corresponded with the architecture of all other Suburban Settlements built at the time. However, regarding the housing complexes, which were quite rare at that time in this area, this meant that they were supposed to appear as if they were a scaled version of the private suburban house, mimicking its aesthetics performance and its emphasis on the isolation of the nuclear family, which were an integral part of the pull factors of Suburbia.⁶⁰³ Consequently, all housing complexes were merely larger white cubes, covered with a sloping red-tile roof, even though this demand was revoked by 1997.⁶⁰⁴



FIG. 5.20 Housing types in Shoham - Upper row: Single-Family houses; I-shaped Housing complex; I-shaped Housing complex; Bottom row: L-shaped Housing complex; H-Shaped Housing complex; Double-Family and row-houses. 2018 (govmap.co.il)



FIG. 5.21 Double-family houses, Shoham. 1994. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)

⁶⁰³ Lodim Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 920982 (Shoham)'; Lodim Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 920712 (Shoham)'; Lodim Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 920709 (Shoham)'.

⁶⁰⁴ Joseph Abecassis, 'Plan MK/SH/69/11'.




FIG. 5.22 Multi-family cottages, Shoham. 1994. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)

Forming a scaled version of the detached private houses, the residential estates consisted of similar design characteristics and dwelling concepts. The different contractors, which included leading firms such as *Shikun O'vdim*, the formerly governmental *Shikun U'Pitah* (which was privatised by then), *Mishor HaHof* and the Rubenenko Group repeated the same setting of a row of houses around an inner courtyard, which functioned as an open parking place and the main access area to the different buildings.⁶⁰⁵ The differences were mostly in the arrangement of the dwelling units inside the tenements, generating three main types that were reproduced in different parcels. The simplest was the L-shaped building, which was made out of four to two ground apartments with a direct external access, a joint staircase leading to the units in the first and second floor, while the latter enjoyed the roof-terrace that was usually attached to it. As each unit had at least two façades, the main one of the living room and kitchen was repeatedly oriented towards the street, leaving the more closed rear façade of bath- and bedrooms facing the inner

⁶⁰⁵ Shoham Engineering and Construction Committee, *Shoham Engineering and Construction Committee*.

courtyard (fig 5.23).⁶⁰⁶ The I-shaped building was the most common typology, built mainly in the larger parcels. It resembled the L-shaped as it had the same inner distribution of units, access points, and façade orientation. Built on larger parcels, it was made of small uniformed apartment building, which when placed adjacent to similar ones, created a continuous building that surrounded the inner parking courtyard; enabling a more efficient use of land (fig 5.24). The H-shaped complexes were basically four-story apartment buildings of four dwelling units in each floor, sharing a common staircase and lobby. Four apartments in one floor meant that there was no back façade, just front and side, as in each floor the living rooms of the apartments faced either the street or the courtyard. Furthermore, this also limited the option of placing buildings one adjacent to the other, due to the need for the second side façade (fig 5.25). As the apartments in both the I and H-shaped buildings were five-room units of more than 100 m² confined by only two façades, the setbacks and breaks in the external walls constituted and attempt to enlarge the given parameter and to provide each room with natural light and ventilation without having to exceed the maximum permitted built area (fig 5.26).⁶⁰⁷



FIG. 5.23 L-Shaped building, 1995. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)




FIG. 5.24 I-Shaped building, 1995. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)

⁶⁰⁶ Lodim Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 920683 (Shoham)'; Lodim Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 920379 (Shoham)'.

⁶⁰⁷ Shoham Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 940145 (Shoham)'.




FIG. 5.25 H-Shaped building, 1995. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)




FIG. 5.26 L-shaped, I-shaped and H-shaped buildings in Shoham (Illustrated by the author)

As the construction of Shoham advanced its developers' ability to influence its formation grew as well, regaining some of the spatial privileges the state initially restricted. The *Hamaniyot* complex (sunflowers) in the northern area of Shoham, which initially was supposed to resemble the previously constructed residential projects, turned into a much enlarged and denser version. It was an outcome of a collaboration between two very strong and influential private construction companies, *Shikun U'Binui* and *Mishor HaHof*, which by then turned into investments and holding corporations, and the moshav of Bareket that previously owned the rights in the land parcels of the project. In 1997, as the parties were not willing to accept the existing planning demands and restrictions, they promoted a new detailed plan for the area, intended to change the proposed layout and to enlarge the maximum permitted number of floors and dwelling units.⁶⁰⁸ Originally, the existing

⁶⁰⁸ Z.Hashimshoni Architects and Planners, 'Plan MK/SH/69/111 - Tzamarot Shoham'.

plan was based on a ring of four-story housing complexes, surrounding a core of an open green area and public buildings. The buildings were in similar density and unit composition as the complexes built in the southern parts of Shoham, which were almost in the size of a private house. As an amendment plan with small changes, it was submitted to the local level, and not the district planning council, which ensured a quick and more efficient authorisation process. Yet, as the local council is not allowed to enlarge the overall permitted residential area, only the number of dwelling units could be changed. The construction of a larger number of smaller apartments points out that Shoham of the late 1990s turned into a corporate-oriented real estate project that was no longer meant to provide the pull factors of suburbia, but rather to answer the push factors of cities.

With the growing corporate influence, the housing typologies turned into volumes dictated by real estate calculations yet coated with a suburban appearance. The denser, higher and seemingly more urban buildings that the developers eventually constructed in the *Hamaniyot* project were also defined by the ultimate sign of suburban lifestyle, the sloping red roof. Moreover, as the buildings were essentially terraced condominiums, the dwelling units, mainly those in the lower parts, were able to function as independent private houses, due to their own entrance and attached garden. At the same time, as seen then in the section of the buildings, the developers decided to allocate more of the overall permitted areas for construction in the upper floors, generating a mushroom-like shape that derived from rentability considerations (fig 5.27-5.28).⁶⁰⁹




FIG. 5.27 A façade of a building in the Hamaniyot Project; A section of a building in the Hamaniyot project (note the mushroom-like section), Shoham, 1997. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)

⁶⁰⁹ Shoham Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 20020044 (Shoham)'.



FIG. 5.28 Hamaniyot, Shoham, 1997 (Adam and Dany Eyal Architects and Planners)

While the projects of the late 1990s had some suburban characteristics, the following ones would become more quasi-urban. The development of Shoham continued with newly added patches that consisted of bigger parcels with larger building right. Intending to stimulate the local real estate market, the local council of Shoham cooperated with private developers, like Gindi Ltd, and co-promoted a new outline plan for a compound in the northern edges of towns, enlarging the permitted buildings' height while decreasing their overall number (fig 5.29).⁶¹⁰ By concentrating the construction into larger and more manageable buildings, this private-public collaboration intended to optimise the building rights and to enable a more efficient use of the site, hoping to accelerate the project's realisation process by increasing the developers' future profits.⁶¹¹ Therefore, 20 years after the construction of the first houses, Shoham completed the transformation from a Build Your Own House project into a corporate-led development mechanism, reshaped in order to attract more investments and to secure further growth.

⁶¹⁰ Fintzi Raveh Architects, 'Local Outline Plan SH/69/9/13a'.

⁶¹¹ Shauli, 'While you were demonstrating: a luxury project was launched in Shoham'.



FIG. 5.29 Cramim compound, Shoham, 2013. (Fogel Shoham Architects and Planners) – note that the third floors are larger than the lower ones

As a purely residential living environment, Shoham suffered from the lack of commercial and public functions. First is the economic issue, as the taxes collected by the local municipality were not sufficient, due to the relatively low taxation on residential functions, in comparison to commercial ones.⁶¹² The town, therefore, was in need of tax-generating properties. As a result, the Ministry of Interior granted Shoham percentages in the new industrial park of the Modi'im regional council. This was not meant to create employment for the residents of Shoham, nor to enlarge the local commercial uses but rather to enlarge the municipal budget.⁶¹³ The lack of basic shops and services was thus not solved. Therefore, in 2010, the local council promoted a new outline plan that included the transformation of agricultural lands south of Shoham into a commercial and industrial complex. The new Central Business District, as the plan refers to the new commercial area, is yet another secluded and isolated compound in the fringes of town.⁶¹⁴

The development of Shoham is a step further in the mass suburbanisation of the Green-Line, leading to a new type of suburban architecture and planning models. The initial steps did include the involvement of private individuals and families; however, it quickly gave way to large-scale developers that participated in the MCH's tenders. In a later phase, the involvement of private developers grew further and so did their spatial privileges. The amendment schemes they initiated together with the ILA or the local council, gave them a larger influence over the construction of the town, enabling them to adjust the existing planning to their entrepreneurial consideration. The supply-side housing policy in Shoham was thus further enhanced, leading to a mass production process of unrelated residential compounds, designed mainly to meet the economic speculations of their developers.

⁶¹² Urbanics Ltd, 'Expanding Shoham's jurisdiction'.

⁶¹³ Abecassis, Shoham.

⁶¹⁴ Joseph Abecassis, 'Outline Plan Sh/69/9/14c: CBD Shoham'.

5.6 Ela'ad: corporate-led Slumurbia

Ela'ad (עלאד), with its unique societal composition and the relatively high-rise environment presents an exceptional case study in the privatising settlement mechanism (fig 5.30). It is a city of almost 50,000 inhabitants located in the Israeli central district between the transnational highway and the Green-Line. It was populated in 1998, and it formed one of the initial sites of the Stars settlements. Yet, unlike the relatively low-rise suburban settlements developed at that time, which housed upper-middle-class secular families, Ela'ad is characterised as an urban settlement, designated to serve the religious ultra-orthodox sector. Therefore, it is a locality of considerably low economic characteristics (level 2 out of 10), housed by significantly low-income families, with an average number of seven children.⁶¹⁵ Consequently, its built environment is much higher, denser and more affordable than all other settlements in the region.




FIG. 5.30 Ela'ad in 2015, between the Trans-Israel Highway in the west, and the Green-Line and the West-Bank Separation Barrier in the east (Illustrated by the author)

The part the Ultra-Orthodox (UO) sector took in the territorial project of political Zionism was not a natural one. In fact, the relations between the sector, which forms almost 10% of the Jewish population in Israel, with the state are quite complex. Being more religious does not automatically mean more nationalist, due to the UO stream's general disapproval to any changes made in the Jewish way of life. The main leaders of the UO sector initially opposed the idea of an independent Jewish state, which relies on secular ideals, and some segments still do not acknowledge the state up until this day. Conversely, larger parts of the sector eventually took a very active

⁶¹⁵ MCH, 'Ela'ad'.

part in the local political system, while maintaining a secluded and clearly introvert community life. This includes distinct residential areas, a segregated educational system, low participation in the workforce while focusing on religious studies at a *Yeshiva*.⁶¹⁶ All meant to insure an isolated everyday life. The two main concentrations of the UO sector are in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, a city in the Tel Aviv metropolis, and both form the sector's cultural and spiritual centres. The group's accelerated natural growth, which derives from its emphasis on childbearing, leading to an average of around seven children per family, causes an ever-growing shortage of dwelling units in both cities, which ultimately leads to an increase in the need for more UO neighbourhoods. At the same time, as a significantly poor group, the UO sector was unable to compete in the 'free market' and was therefore in need for special governmental assistance.⁶¹⁷

Although the state's concern to address the housing shortage of one of its poorest communities might seem like a continuation of the welfare approach, it was in fact an additional case of selective privatisation. In the privatising Israeli economy, the commodified social services turned into political goods, provided to privileged groups and sectors in exchange for their support to the ruling regime. The participation of the UO parties of *Agudat Yisrael*, and later *Yahdut HaTorah*, *Degel HaTorah*⁶¹⁸ and *Shas*⁶¹⁹ in almost all coalitions and governments since 1977, no matter whether right or left, highlights their real-politic approach. Appropriately, supporting the main governmental decisions such as peace agreements and territorial withdraws on the one hand, or wars and military campaigns on the other, in return to the economic support of the sector's institutions and addressing its special needs and demands.⁶²⁰ According to Gutwein, this is practically an alternative welfare system, which runs parallel to the prevailing neoliberal agenda and is meant to reinforce it. As the alternative state funding is channelled through the different UO institutions it increases the power of their leadership, in return to their support of the ruling government. Thus, enabling the further seclusion and isolation of the UO sector.⁶²¹

⁶¹⁶ Is a Jewish educational institution for the study of the main religious texts of the Torah and Talmud.

⁶¹⁷ Cahaner, 'Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank', 112–127.

⁶¹⁸ Political parties which form the main representative of the Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi Sector.

⁶¹⁹ A party which forms the representative of the Ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi Sector, as well as parts of the traditional and orthodox Mizrahi communities.

⁶²⁰ Cahaner, 'Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank'.

⁶²¹ Gutwein, 'The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation'.

Consequently, the UO became part of the state's strategy of decentralisation and population dispersal and an active agent in the domestication of the Green-Line; a role which they refrained from playing until the late 1980s. As the proximity to the main centres in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak was crucial, the new sites for UO settlements had to be in the new periphery along the Green-Line. Not surprisingly, the largest settlements in the West-Bank are actually the UO cities of Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit, which house almost 30% of the entire Jewish population in the occupied territories. While both these cities form a suburban extension to Jerusalem, the city of Ela'ad, which was built in the western side of the Green-Line, on official Israeli territory, formed an extension to the UO city of Bnei Brak.

The site of Ela'ad was originally an integral part of the low-rise Stars Plan of the early 1990s. Mentioned in the plans as 'Ancient Mazor' it referred to the historic remains from the Roman period found in the area of the depopulated Arab village of Al-Muzayri'a and that of Qule (fig 5.31), east of the Israeli moshav of Mazor, established in 1949.⁶²² Until the 1990s, the spot was reserved as a future military compound and the new plan asked to turn it into a new suburban settlement (fig 5.32). As part of the Stars plan, the site of Ancient Mazor was supposed to take the form of the typical Suburban Settlement, designed for upper-middle-class secular families from the main metropolitan area. Nevertheless, in a meeting between the then Minister of Housing, Ariel Sharon, who took full control over the Stars Plan, his deputy, Rabbi Avraham Ravitz from Degel HaTorah party and several leaders of the UO sector, they decided to designate the area of ancient Mazor to the UO public; granting it the spatial privilege to exclusively inhabit the site. They also decided that the planners should adjust their work to the needs of the future UO inhabitants. Compatible to the initial development method of the Stars, the new UO settlement, though much larger compared to others, was to be built under the leadership of the *Beit U'Menuha* housing association.⁶²³

Despite the decision to designate the site for the UO sector, the first plans for the settlement resembled the ones for the remaining 'Stars'.⁶²⁴ In the ministry's program issued in 1990 for the Star of "New Mazor", the settlement was described as one of 3000 low-rise dwelling units, which would consist of private, detached/semi-detached- and row-houses, meant to serve secular community families looking for better living standards, as well as newly coming Jewish immigrants from the Former

⁶²² Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*.

⁶²³ MCH, 'Meeting at the Office of the Minister of MCH in Tel Aviv - 6.9.1990'.

⁶²⁴ Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.

Soviet Union.⁶²⁵ Later, as the MCH asked to adjust the project to the needs of the UO sector it neglected the small-scale low-rise suburban vision, mainly in order to reduce the construction costs by enlarging the affordability and cost efficiency of the construction procedure, while expanding the overall number of dwelling units. The upper-middle-class suburban settlement of white houses covered with a red roof had to give way to a denser, mass-produced residential environment. The requirements of the MCH in mid-1991 spoke of a settlement of more than 6000 dwelling units, housing a population of almost 35,000 inhabitants.



FIG. 5.31 The old parcels of the Palestinian village of Qula in the first plans for Ela'ad, 1992. (ILA)




FIG. 5.32 Regional Outline Plan, TMM/3/3. 1982. (ILA). The site is (in orange) declared as a military compound

Like in other projects of the MCH, the ministry assigned the governmental company of *A'rim* Ltd to manage and develop the site of Ela'ad while enacting a more corporate-led approach. Assigning *A'rim* Ltd, the ministry moved to a more commercial method and gave up the initial intentions of developing Ela'ad through *Beit U'Menuha* housing association. *A'rim* was thus in charge of the planning the future town, developing the needed infrastructure and groundwork, and then marketing the different parcels to private contractors.⁶²⁶ These would then be in charge of constructing the dwelling units and to sell them to families interested in moving to the new town. *Beit U'Menuha* tried to object this change of policy and even sued the MCH and the state of Israel for backing down on their agreement. Eventually, the Tel Aviv District Court ruled that the promises made earlier by Minister Ariel Sharon were illegal. According to this ruling, though the mandatory

⁶²⁵ MCH, 'Program for a detailed urban plan: Ancient Mazor'.

⁶²⁶ *Beit U'Menuha*, 'Decisions Regarding Mazor (El Ad)', 1993.

'Tender Procedure' law was approved only in 1992 (after the crucial meeting with Ariel Sharon), by assigning a sight for a specific association the MCH acted against the 'Conditions For the Allocation of Land to Associations' law from 1990, which was supposed to open a call for a variety of associations.⁶²⁷

As the MCH shifted the development from a religious association to private contractors, assigning the entire project to a specific sector became a more complicated task. Consequently, Ela'ad couldn't be designated exclusively to UO families and the emphasis was therefore on a "religious public". Correspondingly, the MCH could not enforce selective population and had to promote an urban layout and civil and cultural infrastructure that would appeal to the UO sector and not the general secular one. The official statement was "the need of religious families... with all that implies", and it included also an emphasis on economically constructed large dwelling units.⁶²⁸ By enforcing these planning measures, the MCH believed secular families would eventually refrain from moving to Ela'ad, as they would not be interested in living within a population with strong religious characteristics and everyday life. Despite the MCH's open declaration that it would prevent the private developers from selling dwelling units to secular families, it still doubted the intentions of organised secular groups that asked to purchase apartments in the new project and regarded them as mere provocation, which were meant to protest against the luring conditions given to religious families moving to Ela'ad.⁶²⁹ The MCH's assumptions were proven correct as eventually these organisations did not carry out any real attempts to purchase apartments in town.⁶³⁰

The plan the MCH promoted for Ela'ad focused on generating an efficient and resourceful urban layout that would optimise the development of the new town. The MCH commissioned the office of Hertz, Fogel & Schwartz to conduct the planning process and to dictate the urban layout and main design regulations. The office, which was also in charge of the district outline plan ten years earlier, was an experienced team of planners, working closely with the various government ministries and planning administrations. The planners were already contacted in the first phases when the intentions were still on a low-rise Suburban Settlement, and quite soon they had to change the scope and vision. Due to the size of the future

⁶²⁷ Tel Aviv District Court, Beit U'Menuha against the State of Israel.

⁶²⁸ A'rim, 'Ela'ad - Mazor.', 2.

⁶²⁹ Petersburg, 'UO trying to prevent National Religious to settle in Ela'ad'; Wasserman, 'MCH: Contractors that purchased lands in Ela'ad are prohibited from selling units to seculars', 5.

⁶³⁰ Krispel, Ela'ad.

town, they first composed a masterplan, which later could be processed into a detailed outline scheme for each compound. The plan included two phases, 1 (2500 units) and 2 (4000 units) and a possible third phase. The masterplan consisted of three levels of access roads ranging from a width of 24m to 9m, creating mono use blocks. The planners insisted that each block would be of an average depth of 50m, which then could be divided into two rows of residential parcels of 1000 m² with a depth of 25 and a maximum width of 20m. This enabled a highly efficient partition, due to the single façade facing the street, which reduced the construction and development costs and increased the profitability and thus the marketability of each lot.⁶³¹ The same logic, just in a smaller scale, was applied in the low-rise residential compounds, where the planners did not use the common *cul de sac* typology and preferred creating residential areas that could be divided into two rows of plots, each accessible from a different road.

The planners promoted a strict division between the different functions and the different residential areas, suitable for the demands of the UO sector for social segregations. They designated the central part of the town to the denser dwelling types and created segregated public compounds for the needed educational institutions. Still, the planners did include small-scale public function in each residential area, which was meant to become a synagogue or a religious centre. As the UO sector is far from being homogeneous and includes numerous groups and congregations, this also enabled the formation of distinct housing blocks for the use of specific religious communities, concentrated around their own synagogue (fig 5.33). Highly noticeable is the lack of public open spaces in the centre of town, which the planners thought to be less needed for this unique population, and therefore they located them in the northern and southern fringes of the residential area. Moreover, though Ela'ad was designed as a town for more than 40,000 inhabitants, it lacked almost any substantial commercial areas and had no real employment or industrial zones. As an UO town, where the majority of males are usually full-time Yeshiva students that refrain from working, the need for vast occupational opportunities was quite redundant. Moreover, as a suburb of Bnei Brak, the planners predicted that those that do work will retain their existing jobs outside of Ela'ad.⁶³²

⁶³¹ Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.

⁶³² Fogel Hertz Schwartz Architects and Planners Ltd, 'Local Outline Plan: New Mazor GZ/BM/195'.




FIG. 5.33 Ela'ad Masterplan, 1992. (ILA)

The detailed instructions that followed the masterplan of Ela'ad included further guidelines that corresponded with the MCH's vision of a resourceful and cost-efficient development process. In the detailed scheme, the planners here focused on processing the earlier version by dictating the building and design regulations and by parcelling the residential area into marketable lots. The planners created 14 different residential compounds, 5 low-rises for semi-detached houses and 9 for multi-family buildings (fig 5.34). Each compound had its own building borders, where the plan enabled the simultaneous construction of the different structures adjacently, though being divided into smaller parcels, as long as it did not exceed the overall allowed construction area. This enabled, in the case that each compound was developed by a single contractor, a much more efficient and profitable construction process. Due to the profile of the future population, the planners insisted on cladding the houses and buildings in Ela'ad with limestone. Characterised as a low-income UO community, the planners predicted that the likelihood of maintaining a plastered white façade would be very low, and therefore sought to enforce a much more resilient coating material. They also thought that this would also contribute to a more “*Jerusalem like appearance*”, which would correspond with the population's religious profile.⁶³³ The planners initially thought of enforcing a titled red roof over all buildings, enhancing further its Jerusalem-like, or just similar to other suburban projects (fig 5.35). Yet, to reduce construction costs and increase future revenues the MCH and the developers objected all additional expenses and the limestone cladding was reduced to 30% of the front façade while the tilted roofs were limited to the areas with significant topography.⁶³⁴

⁶³³ Fogel, Ela'ad, 12.

⁶³⁴ Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.




FIG. 5.34 Detailed plan for Phase 1, 1994. (ILA)




FIG. 5.35 Illustration of Phase 1, Hertz, Fogel Schwarts (Ela'ad Council)



FIG. 5.36 Construction of Phase 1, 1997. (Ela'ad Council)

With the tight profit margins and the emphasis on cost-efficiency the developers of Ela'ad were all large-scale construction corporations. After some setbacks, the marketing process began in mid-1996 and it took the MCH two years after the approval of the detailed plan for phase one to start tendering the construction of the housing units.⁶³⁵ The MCH eventually chose to give the different contractors the rights over several joint compounds, which they would be able to plan, develop, construct and sell to private individuals. This limited the number of possible contractors, as they needed to have the necessary expertise and guarantees for a project of such scope. Moreover, as a low-cost project, the construction had to be very efficient, and therefore only highly experienced firms were able to compete. Tenders were made in the “fixed price” method, where contractors vouched for a maximum value per dwelling unit as part of their bid. Consequently, the already limited profit margins, were even further reduced, thus limiting the competition even more. Eventually, the contractors that the MCH chose for Ela'ad were leading companies such as *Solel Bone*, *Ashdar*, *Minrav*, *Meshav*, *Heftziba* and *Friedman-Hakshuri*.⁶³⁶

To ensure the development of the Ela'ad project, the MCH enacted several supply-side interventions that guaranteed the interests of the private sector. First, in order to enable the targeted low-income UO population, the MCH offered an additional subsidy of 25% for the development costs, on top of the earlier ministerial and governmental grants.⁶³⁷ Second, the ministry, together with A'rim, decided to develop Ela'ad as a ‘closed market’, meaning that all unused funds would be invested back in the town's infrastructure, in order to improve the town's appearance and functioning, and by that attracting more developers and contractors.⁶³⁸

⁶³⁵ Petersburg, ‘Tender for apartments in Ela'ad begins’, 13.

⁶³⁶ MCH, ‘Ela'ad’.

⁶³⁷ Government of Israel, Decision 778.

⁶³⁸ MCH, ‘Ela'ad: adjusting land costs and analysing apartment prices’.

To secure the purchasing power of the UO sector and to optimise sales, the private contractors in charge of constructing the dwelling units hardly dealt with marketing them. As a low-cost project, the contractors did not invest too much in advertisement and commercials and preferred to promote the project through the different religious association and congregations. The contractors would contact, or be contacted by, a certain Hasidic or UO group that would become responsible for spreading the word and organising families interested in moving to Ela'ad (fig 5.37). The different religious associations would thus function as advertisement and sales agencies for the contractors, and individuals that contacted the private developers would usually be referred to one of these associations.⁶³⁹ In doing so, the contractors were able to ensure sales and to minimise the promotion costs while the religious associations were able to reserve entire compounds for the use of their members, or families that are affiliated with their philosophy and religious approach (fig 5.38). Furthermore, as a settlement for the religious sector, the target group was indeed orthodox, ultra-orthodox and traditional families. However, legally the contractors selling the apartments could not prevent other non-religious families from purchasing apartments in Ela'ad. Therefore, by forwarding the sales and promotion to the religious association, the contractors, with the support of the MCH, were able to restrict the access to the apartments sold in Ela'ad to the exclusive use of the orthodox and the ultra-orthodox sector.⁶⁴⁰



FIG. 5.37 The compounds marketed according to developer. 1996. (Ela'ad local council). Note the arrow pointing towards north, and the arrow pointing towards the direction of Jerusalem



FIG. 5.38 CEO of Solel Bone, presenting a model of a building in Ela'ad to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. The spiritual leader of Shas. 1996 (Israel State Archive)

⁶³⁹ Kessler, 'Savione HaShem', 12–16.

⁶⁴⁰ HaModiya, 'Arrangement for the Construction of the Hasidic Qiry'a', 5; Cohen, 'A New UO Qiry'a in Ela'ad'.

To encourage a pro-development process the MCH promoted constant construction and it started the works on the second stage before completing the first phase. Despite consisting of three different areas planned by three different offices, the second phase resembled the first one, as it followed the same planning guidelines dictated by the masterplan from 1992, and the same development and marketing process. Igniting the second phase before the completion of the first one was clearly corporate-oriented, as the MCH thought that increasing construction would promote the image of a successful and attractive project and to attract additional potential buyers.⁶⁴¹ Although the private contractors relied on the UO sector to quickly purchase all apartments, sales were initially quite slow. In response, the contractors began selling more units to families from the orthodox sector, while also slowing the construction procedure. Consequently, in the first, phase almost half of the dwelling units were sold to national-religious families. This led to a small local conflict where the UO sector sought to minimise the presence of all other religious streams in Ela'ad.⁶⁴² Thus, the relationships with the developers were tightened, ensuring a control over larger segments of the town by a specific UO stream, while also increasing the UO character of Ela'ad, by trying to limit the TV services and issuing a special subsidised and gender-separated public transportations to the UO centres in Bnei Brak.⁶⁴³ These measures proved to be highly successful, and in the marketing of the second phase, the newly constructed apartments were sold almost entirely to families from the UO sector.⁶⁴⁴

The desire to profitably develop an entire city led to the use of minimal building types and apartment typologies. Though more than 20 private developers were involved in the city, hiring more than 20 different architects and completing more than 700 buildings, the architectural product was highly repetitive. Almost all residential buildings, except for the semi-detached houses (fig 5.39),⁶⁴⁵ followed two main housing models that were reproduced all around Ela'ad. First is the elongated complex, which is usually referred to us a '*train building*' (*Shikun Rakevet*) (fig 5.40). This typology consists of four-story buildings, with two apartments on each floor. The apartments consisted of an entrance area connected to the living room and the kitchen spreading from the back to the front facade, with the bedrooms area parallel

⁶⁴¹ Ela'ad Council, 'Marketing Quarter B in Ela'ad', 1997.

⁶⁴² Maor, 'Half of 200 homebuyers in UO Ela'ad - National Religious'.

⁶⁴³ Petersburg, 'UO trying to prevent National Religious to settle in Ela'ad'.

⁶⁴⁴ Taskir, 'Survey of Homebuyers in Ela'ad'.

⁶⁴⁵ Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960087 (Ela'ad)'.

to it (fig 5.41).⁶⁴⁶ The second main housing type is the H building, which consists of four apartments on each floor (fig 5.42). The apartments in this case, resemble the ones in the first typology, yet the main difference is in the number and orientations of the façades. Lacking a rear façade, the kitchen, which was usually located near the living room at the entrance of each unit, was ventilated through a 'cavity' in the side façade (5.43).




FIG. 5.39 Semi-Detached houses, Ela'ad, 1995 (Ela'ad Construction Committee archives)




FIG. 5.40 Rakevet' building, Ela'ad, 1995. (Ela'ad Construction Committee archives)

⁶⁴⁶ Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960033 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960034 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960046 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 990025 (Ela'ad)'.




FIG. 5.41 *Rakevet* building and its typical apartment (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 5.42 H-building, Ela'ad, 1996. (Ela'ad Construction Committee archives)




FIG. 5.43 H-building and its typical apartment (Illustrated by the author)

Highly affordable, the construction process had to be very well calculated concerning schedule, time management and sales. The developers could not spare time and costs and therefore had to be in full control of the whole procedure. This meant that all apartments had to be sold before construction began, and in case they were not, then to postpone it as much as possible. The MCH tried to limit this by enforcing a strict schedule, but it eventually could not oppose the control of the private sector. This caused several setbacks in the first phase and sales to non-UO families, which eventually led to stronger connections and deals between the developers and different UO congregations in the second one, which ensured the needed capital. Nevertheless, not all contractors were successful in managing such low budget projects and one of the companies, Heftziba, which was an expert in ventures of this sort, was bankrupted in 2007.

The economic calculation made its remarks in the details and choice of materials. Already in the planning stages, the architects chose the minimal requirements of areas and spaces. This was reflected in the building's outline, which unlike similar projects in Israel at that time, was strictly cubic, creating a marginal envelope surface.⁶⁴⁷ The chosen windows and openings reflected the affordability of the project as well, as they were significantly minimal, unlike the desire of that time to create open façades. The building materials chosen by the contractors were very inexpensive, consisting of plastered wall and affordable cladding stones where they were enforced. All of this led to a significantly uniform built environment, made out of repetitive sealed cubes with small holes as windows.

A main architectural feature that distinguishes Ela'ad from other corporate-led developments is the *Sukkah* terrace that is noticeable in all of its buildings. According to the Jewish Torah, during the feast of Sukkot, it is mandatory to eat and sleep in a *Sukkah* (a hut), for a period of almost a week. The *Sukkah* has to be of temporary materials and under the open sky. Practising Jews living in an apartment building usually have a problem in fulfilling this custom, due to the lack of space. Furthermore, a normal balcony is mostly not sufficient, as it is usually too small and is not located directly under the sky. Therefore, families from the UO sector, which are keen on implementing the Torah as strictly as possible, would usually have a special terrace, that answers the needs for a kosher *Sukkah*; thus, referred to as a *Sukkah* terrace. Consequently, the contractors had to build such terraces for all apartments in Ela'ad, which added an exterior layer of retreating or 'jumping' large balconies (fig 5.44), while also breaking the uniformity of all buildings.⁶⁴⁸ In order to enable the construction of these terraces, the building regulations stated in the masterplan excluded their surface from the overall allowed built area. This gave the developers greater building rights and ensured that the *Sukkah* terrace would not come in place of the liveable area.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁷ Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960034 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960033 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960034 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 960087 (Ela'ad)'; Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 20020179 (Ela'ad)'.

⁶⁴⁸ Ela'ad Local Construction Committee, 'Permit 20020179 (Ela'ad)'.

⁶⁴⁹ Fogel Hertz Schwartz Architects and Planners Ltd, 'Local Outline Plan: New Mazor GZ/BM/195'.




FIG. 5.44 Sukkah terraces
(Illustrated by the author)

Ela'ad is a unique case of a collaboration between the state, the religious sectors and private capital that created new local urban-suburban hybrid. Different from all previous settlements in the area, that were designed according to the 'pull factors' of the suburban environment, Ela'ad was developed to answer the 'push factors' of the urban one. In a survey conducted by the MCH in 2000, the families in Ela'ad stated 'the ability of purchasing and apartment' and the proximity to Bnei Brak as the main reasons for moving to the new settlement. 'Quality of life', on the contrary, was the least stated motive.⁶⁵⁰ The affordability of the dwelling units, as well as the high governmental subsidies, might seem like Keynesian residues from welfare-state housing policies. On the other hand, the selective welfare approach applied by the MCH highlights that in the privatising Israeli economic affordable housing turned into a political commodity; traded for the sake of an electoral allegiance. As a city designated to one the weakest socio-economic groups, with minimal taxable commercial and industrial uses, Ela'ad is located at the poorest 20% of all Israeli localities; constituting an example of state-designed *Slumurbia*. Consequently, the urban and architectural form of Ela'ad were an outcome of an attempt to create a profit out of a low-budget project.

⁶⁵⁰ Taskir, 'Survey of Homebuyers in Ela'ad'.

5.7 Tzur Yitzhak: high-rise Suburbia

The last developed 'Star', Tzur Yitzhak, included a greater involvement of private capital and concluded in a unique hybrid of a high-rise suburb; representing an advanced stage of the privatisation of the Israeli geopolitical project (fig 5.45). It is an independent locality that began as an integral part of the Stars Plan and turned into a new, denser and urban-like variation of it. It was initially referred to as Tzur Nathan B, or simply the Tzur Nathan project, as it was planned to extend the nearby rural settlement, bearing the same name. Like the other Stars, it was initially under the responsibility of the MCH' rural division and it was supposed to resemble the other low-rise suburban settlements built in the area. Accordingly, the first ideas included a new small-scale settlement of around 1500 housing units. Nevertheless, with the change in the ministry's policy, the project began including more dwelling units, as well as higher and denser housing typologies.⁶⁵¹




FIG. 5.45 Tzur Yitzhak in 2015, enhancing the Jewish settlement in the area along the Green-Line and between the Palestinian localities inside the West-Bank and Israel (Illustrated by the author)

With the increasing metropolitan-based approach, the MCH began endorsing a more 'urban' image to the area, which affected Tzur Yitzhak's mode of development. Consequently, the MCH moved the project, together with all the other Stars settlements from its rural division to its urban one.⁶⁵² As all other settlements were

⁶⁵¹ MCH Directorate of Rural Construction, 'Program for Tzur Nathan'.

⁶⁵² MCH Directorate of Rural Construction.

already under construction or in advanced planning phases, this decision did not really affect their nature. The Tzur Nathan project, however, was in its first steps, which meant that the 'urban' characteristics of its future environment would be much more evident. This change was part of the MCH's attempts to locate land reserves in the area,⁶⁵³ in the attempts to create new urban compound, leaving behind the former small-scale suburban approach (fig 5.46). The new vision consisted of several different plans, including merging all localities into one town, or the establishment of a detached "urban" regional centre (fig 5.47).⁶⁵⁴ Due to the strong objections from the nearby localities, and even the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, the MCH had to put its larger plans on hold. Nevertheless, the direction was obvious, and the era of small-scale suburbia gave way to the large-scale one, and with the ILA declaring the areas east of Kochav Yair as a site of expansion, it is obvious that the urban transformation was not neglected, but rather paused (fig 5.48).⁶⁵⁵




FIG. 5.46 Areas for urban complexes along the Hills' Axis, 1994, Nahoum Dunsky (Israel State Archives)



FIG. 5.47 A plan for a new "urban" regional centre near Kochav Yair, 1998. Reches Eshkol (Israel State Archive)




FIG. 5.48 A plan for a new "urban" regional centre near Kochav Yair, 1998. Reches Eshkol (Israel State Archives)

While the vision to transform the area stagnated, the MCH proceeded in developing the project independently, integrating it into the new urban approach. This was possible mainly because the project followed the similar lines of development in the previous stars and was not fully integrated with the larger plan. The MCH had put A'rim Ltd in charge of developing the site already in 1992, and it continued in its mission separately, though the urban transition in the ministry's policy.⁶⁵⁶ A'rim, however, adapted the nature of the project to the new development policy. Despite

⁶⁵³ Nahoum Dunsky Planners, 'Development of the Hills' Axis: The Seven Stars Plan'.

⁶⁵⁴ Halufa - Dov Kehat Ltd., 'Kochav Yair- Options for Municipal formation'.

⁶⁵⁵ Fogel-Hertz-Schwartz Architects and Planners Ltd. 2002, 'District Outline Plan TMM/3/21'.

⁶⁵⁶ MCH, 'Tzur Nathan'.

the instructions to create a new urban neighbourhood, in the new outline plan for the central district the project was considered an extension of the rural environment of Tzur Nathan and the MCH labelled it as a Community Settlement.⁶⁵⁷ The project was thus a hybrid of rural, suburban and urban approaches; a combination that would continue to accompany the settlement over the years.

The new vision for an urban complex caused several objections from the nearby rural settlement of Tzur Nathan, which were appeased only after the latter was enabled to take part in the new mode of production, receiving significant spatial privileges. As the commissioned planner, Meir Nir, began composing an outline scheme for the new project, the scope and capacity of the new plan were still not clear. The MCH and the ILA were interested in a residential project of 5000 units, while Tzur Nathan and the regional council were interested in maintaining the area's small-scale rural characteristics. Eventually, it was agreed between the different parties that the new site would include around 3000 units, while Tzur Nathan, which was the lessee of the location of the project, would have the right to develop 49% of the area, containing a third of all future units.⁶⁵⁸ In the meantime, the administrative status of the future project was also not clear. Afraid that the new urban compound would change its rural nature, Tzur Nathan was not interested that the new project would be part of its settlement; willing to receive the 'urban' building rights but not the non-rural population that came with it. Therefore, in 2003 the Israeli Government, after receiving the recommendations of the MCH, ILA and the regional council decided that the new project would be an independent locality. In 2005, the government named the new settlement Tzur Yitzhak, after the former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was murdered in 1995 while in office (fig 5.49-5.50).⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁷ MCH Urban Planning Unit, 'List of the Stars Settlements'.

⁶⁵⁸ Tal, 'Development momentum'; Tal, 'Tzur Nathan: Forgot the VLKH'.

⁶⁵⁹ National Committee for Planning and Construction, 'Meeting number 534'.



FIG. 5.49 Minister of the Interior Ophir Paz-Pines with representatives of MCH at the cornerstone ceremony for Tzur Yizhak, 2005 (Tzur Yitzhak Council)



FIG. 5.50 Minister of the Interior Ophir Paz-Pines, Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv Jaffa Rabbi Meir Lau, representative of MCH, Dalia Rabin, daughter of late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, at the corner stone ceremony for Tzur Yizhak, 2005 (Tzur Yitzhak Council)

The proposed outline proceeded with the fragmentation and homogenisation of space while creating a new residential environment that is caught between urban and suburban models. The layout consisted of a system of wide roads, not streets, that created three main residential areas. Each area was defined by a circular road and a core with an open green space or a public institution (fig 5.51). Seemingly urban, Nir's vision of the project was based on strong references to the surrounding suburban environment; lacking any apparent hierarchy, commercial uses, and other functions that go beyond the settlement's role as a dormitory town. Semi-urban, Nir insisted on a relatively moderate height of buildings, mainly two to five stories, with one exception of a ten-story tenement in the middle of the project. Additionally, Nir asked to dictate a suburban appearance by enforcing a tilted roof for all buildings, and by planning a vast system of open green spaces and connecting paths (fig 5.52).⁶⁶⁰ The project was hence planned as an enlarged and expanded version of the previous Stars settlements and while the former layouts fragmented and homogenised space two-dimensionally, Nir's plan did so three-dimensionally.

⁶⁶⁰ Nir, Tzur Yitzhak [Interview].



FIG. 5.51 Outline Plan, Tzur Nathan B (Tzur Yitzhak). 2000. (ILA)



FIG. 5.52 Illustration of the Tzur Nathan Project, 1997. Meir Nir (Courtesy of Meir Nir)

The urban turn and the increasing dependence on private developers delayed the completion of the project in additional five years, causing the MCH to find alternative supplying sides. Therefore, despite the approval of the plan in 2000, construction on-site did not begin until 2005 (fig 5.53). One of the main reasons for the delay was the MCH's inability to market the project. By the end of the 1990s, after an extensive period of state-initiated or sponsored construction, the local market witnessed a state of recession. More than a decrease in the demand for new dwelling units, this recession caused a severe decrease in the willingness of developers and entrepreneurs to invest in large-scale projects and this severely withheld the construction of Tzur Yitzhak. The MCH initially thought that the project would enjoy the same interest as other residential developments in the area such, as Shoham and Modi'in, and thus asked to market the different lots to private developers. It even rejected the attempts of housing association, such as the *Pioneers of Tzur Nathan* that included almost 1800 families, which were interested in finding "suitable housing" while participating in "settling thousands of Jews in the area of Tzur Nathan, up to the outskirts of Taybeh" as part of the mission to "stop the Arab expansion".⁶⁶¹ Seeking alternative solutions, the MCH first thought of granting the

⁶⁶¹ Rabin, 'Building in Tzur Nathan', 1999, 2.

IDF personnel branch the spatial privilege to develop the site, hoping to attract military families to the project as a means to accelerate development. However, as the latter was not interested, the MCH eventually marketed the lots to housing associations,⁶⁶² hoping that the relatively homogeneous and selective character would attract a critical mass of upper-middle-class families and ignite the investment interest in the project.⁶⁶³



FIG. 5.53 First Project in Tzur Yitzhak, developed by the private settlers' associations, 2008 (Tzur Yitzhak Council)

To promote the stagnated marketing process, the MCH and the governmental construction corporation of A'rim Ltd acted to ensure the profitability of future developers by granting them the power to re-parcel the site. A'rim was well aware and attentive to the demands of private developers. For example, as each urban outline plan usually includes an architectural appendix (*nispach binui*), here, A'rim argued that such an appendix is redundant as the private contractors that will develop each lot would eventually compose one of their own, which would better suit their economic interests.⁶⁶⁴ In such a statement, A'rim basically gave away its responsibility for the nature of the future built environment, granting future developers the spatial privilege of developing space according to their economic interests.

The MCH, the ILA, and the regional council supported a series of new spot planning schemes, enhancing the developers' privileged status in order to make Tzur Yitzhak more attractive for investment. In 2006, the private developers of the *Ya'ara* compound received the local committee's approval to increase the number of dwelling units by 10% and the number of floors from five to nine, all in order

⁶⁶² Maor, 'Marketing to Associations, the Improved Version'.

⁶⁶³ Lori, 'The Strike of Real Estate Monsters Continues, This Time in the Tzur Yitzhak Version'.

⁶⁶⁴ Bar, 'Zur Nathan'.

to “*optimally use the building rights*”.⁶⁶⁵ An additional plan from 2008, submitted by a private developer and supported by the MCH, officially asked to adjust the existing outline plan to “*the demands of the market*”;⁶⁶⁶ combining different lots and increasing the number of dwelling units by 20% and the permitted floors from five to eight.⁶⁶⁷ The changes also included combining ten different lots into four larger continuous ones. This was not made to create a fewer number of buildings, but rather on the contrary, as the new plan suggested four different buildings in each of the new lots. Moreover, this also cancelled the previous paths between the buildings and merged them into two main entrances, creating an uninterrupted private area along the settlement’s main road (fig 5.54-5.55).




FIG. 5.54 Authorised outline plan, 2000. (ILA)




FIG. 5.55 New outline plan, 2008. (ILA)

With the private developers receiving an additional power to form space, they were able to secure the profitability of their projects. The changes they proposed were seemingly minor and were thus subjected to the local planning committee, what ensured an easier and quicker bureaucratic procedure. Such minor modifications cannot enlarge the overall permitted area for residential use, yet they can

⁶⁶⁵ Golan Architects, ‘Town Outline Plan SD/MK/101/15/3’, 2.

⁶⁶⁶ Cohen Lifshitz Architects, ‘Urban Outline Plan SD/MK/101/15/8’, 2.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid*

redistribute the inner functions inside the settlement, exchange lots and alter the total number of units, building and floors; ensuring the feasibility of construction. For instance, the original plan designated a strip of housings along the northern edges of the project that created marketing problem due to the proximity to the Arab city of Taybeh, not a quality that upper-middle-class Jewish families were seeking. Two local outline plans, from 2008 and 2010, authorised exchanging the residential lots with the inner ones designated for public institutions.⁶⁶⁸ Consequently, the schools and kindergartens, which were not subjected to marketing and real estate interests, were to be located in the strip close to Taybeh; an area with substantially less economic potential.⁶⁶⁹ Moreover, the amendments plans enabled the construction of the same residential square meterage in a smaller number of buildings, with a larger number of floors and apartments. Consequently, enlarging the number of apartments sharing a common staircase and elevator, decreasing the construction costs, while creating higher apartments that could be marketed as luxurious lofty “*villas in the air*” (fig 5.56).⁶⁷⁰




FIG. 5.56 Initially proposed buildings (left) and the eventually constructed ones (right); creating a denser and more cost-efficient construction process. (Illustrated by the author)

All of these aspects are clearly obvious in the marketing brochures for one of the projects built in Tzur Yitzhak, titled “*An apartment in nature*”. The brochure includes a general map of the new settlement, an exemplary plan of an apartment, a view from a living room, and the usual explanatory text. The map, which points out the location of the project in Tzur Yitzhak, also states that the strip of schools in the northern edges is turned towards Taybeh, ensuring that not the dwelling units do

⁶⁶⁸ Mintz-Melamed Architects and Planners, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/MD/101/15/1’; Gvuli, Naveh Afek.

⁶⁶⁹ Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 2008188 (Tzur Yitzhak)’; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 20070273 (Tzur Yitzhak)’; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 2007117 (Tzur Yitzhak)’.

⁶⁷⁰ Y.H. Dimri, ‘The Most Prestigious Villas in the Sharon Area Are in the Sky at All’.

so (fig 5.57). Moreover, the apartments are depicted as an autonomous dwelling unit, disconnected from all adjacent ones, a virtue that is highlighted by the units' broken outline (fig 5.58), which in a way mimics that of private houses. The living room rendering that is oriented towards a non-existing open view (fig 5.59) and the promotion text enhance this idea further:

“Along the Samarian slopes, opposite to HaMarzeva Valley, right near Alexander stream and the blossoming Tzur Yitzhak forest. There, amid nature, with no barrier to the view and the open air, stands a residential project. The project overlooks the entire settlement of Tzur Nathan in the Sharon, and is close to Highway 6 and 531, so it is easy to get to employment and recreation places in the Dan region, in the Sharon cities and in general.”⁶⁷¹

This quote illustrates the logic of the new Tzur Yitzhak, a notion of living in an open landscape, away from the city life, but accessible to all major highways. One is supposed to seek employment, recreation and cultural life outside of the settlement. Inside the settlement, one should only seek to be at home with one's family.



FIG. 5.57 Tzur Yitzhak promotion brochure, 2017. (Hanan Mor Ltd)

⁶⁷¹ Hanan Mor Ltd, 'Apartment in Nature - the Green Spot in Tzur Yitzhak'.



FIG. 5.58 An apartment in Tzur Yitzhak promotion brochure, 2017. (Hanan Mor Ltd)



FIG. 5.59 A rendering of a living room in Tzur Yitzhak, 2017. (Hanan Mor Ltd)

The alterations in the plan significantly transformed Tzur Yitzhak from the initially planned suburban residential environment to a high-rise housing semi-urban development. Though the changes made in order to increase the profitability of the project could be also explained as a beneficiary for the future inhabitants, it is quite hard to make such a claim in this case. The settlements' central park, for example, was originally supposed to be connected to the surrounding streets through several pedestrian paths, as mentioned above. By combining the adjacent lots into large parcels and cancelling the lots, the new plan of 2008 enabled the developers to construct a consecutive project along both the outer road and the inner park. Besides, though the original plan suggested underground parking and positioning the buildings at the height of the access street, the new plan allowed parking places above the ground, while also raising the level of the ground floor over the entrance level. This, as could be seen in the building permit, eventually resulted in severe height differences between the building and the street, while creating a long, continuous and closed supporting wall as the main façade.⁶⁷² The building permit also shows that these differences are not an outcome of the local topography, but rather made in order to create a separation between the 'garden apartments' in the ground floor, providing them with a better sense of privacy (fig 5.60-5.61). This also created a closed and continuous façade in the shape of a supporting wall towards the inner park, which as it was now enclosed by an unbroken residential parcel, became a confined and restricted open public space (fig 6.62).

⁶⁷² Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 'Permit 20090085 (Tzur Yitzhak)'.




FIG. 5.60 Underground parking in a section of a suggested building. Meir Nir. 1999 (Courtesy of Meir Nir)




FIG. 5.61 Aboveground parking areas in the section of a constructed building. 2008. (Drom HaSharon Committee)



FIG. 5.62 Area of the planned main park, 2015. (Eyal Tueg)

The changes in the plan for Tzur Yitzhak affected also the design of the buildings. Except for the changes made in the height, scale and number of units, the new regulation enabled the redistribution of the overall permitted area along the different floors. This supported the construction of larger apartments on the upper floors, where the real estate is of higher value. Consequently, this facilitated in giving the buildings in Tzur Yitzhak a mushroom-like appearance, which is dictated according to the changes in the value of a square meter depending on the floor in which it is located (fig 5.63). The intensified pro-development approach that accompanied the project eventually dictated almost every aspect of the built environment of Tzur Yitzhak, from the zoning plan to the apartment, leading to a settlement made out of isolated buildings, surrounded by parking places and supporting wall (fig 5.64).

Tzur Yitzhak project suffered from a rough start that caused several delays in its development. Besides the marketing problems and the recession in the construction industry, the violent events of the second Intifada, which began the same year as the approval of the outline plan, caused a severe decrease in interest in the area. Moreover, the planning administration subjugated the construction in Tzur Yitzhak to the development of the needed regional infrastructure, dictating several phases, which depended on the expansion of regional routes 444, 531 and 532, as well as

the construction of highway 6.⁶⁷³ As all these projects were delayed so were the works in Tzur Yitzhak.⁶⁷⁴ Eventually, although the somewhat hesitating start, the new settlement became an attractive real estate project, with substantial rises in property values that were doubled in less than ten years.⁶⁷⁵ This was an outcome of intense promotion efforts conducted by the developers of the settlements, but also by the post-2008 national housing crisis that triggered several results in other places as well. The construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier in the area in 2006 and the end of the Second Intifada at the same time also helped to promote the project.



FIG. 5.63 Section of a constructed building. 2008. (Drom HaSharon Committee). Note the upper floors are larger than the lower ones



FIG. 5.64 Tzur Yitzhak as a collection of isolated buildings, 2014. (Shikun U'Binui)

The eastern part of the settlement would undergo a larger number of changes, caused by the developers' interests to further optimise the development process. This area was mostly handled by the Tzur Nathan council, which received the building rights according to the agreement with the ILA as it was previously the lessee of the same area. Here, the involvement of the MCH was minimal, and as it stated earlier that it had no interests in developing it.⁶⁷⁶ Although the area was under the responsibility of Tzur Nathan, it was developed in a partnership with the Industrial Buildings Corporation Ltd (that was in charge of Shoham), now under the name of *Mevnim* Ltd. Since the approval of the first outline plan in 2000, the partnership,

⁶⁷³ Meir Nir Architects, 'Town Outline Plan SD/101/15/D'.

⁶⁷⁴ MCH, 'Tzur Nathan - SD/101/15/D'.

⁶⁷⁵ Buso, 'Once an Apartment was worth Half a Million Shekels'.

⁶⁷⁶ Bar, *Zur Nathan, Tel Aviv: A'rim*, 1; Steinmentz, 'Tzur Nathan', 1.

together with the ILA, submitted three different amendment plans to the local committee, which the latter approved (fig 5.65). Though their official objective was to re-arrange the public parcels in the site, they were used to redistribute the building rights inside the new neighbourhoods.⁶⁷⁷ Beside the low-rise semi-detached houses and the mid-rise “*boutique buildings*”,⁶⁷⁸ the amendment plans created a series of 16-story residential towers; way beyond the initially approved five-story ones (fig 5.66).⁶⁷⁹



FIG. 5.65 Original and amendment plans of the eastern neighbourhood, 2000, 2008, 2011, 2014 (ILA)



FIG. 5.66 Tzur Yitzhak, 2017. (Mivne Group). In the lower part of the image is the eastern part under construction. Built are the low-rise and mid-rise houses. The parcels in the left part are for the residential towers

⁶⁷⁷ Dov Koren Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/101/15/5’; Dov Koren Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/101/15/12’; Dov Koren Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/101/15/18’.

⁶⁷⁸ Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 20090215 (Tzur Yitzhak)’.

⁶⁷⁹ Mevnim Ltd, ‘Marom HaSharon’.

The different transformations in the planning and development of Tzur Yitzhak created an undefinable settlement type. Entirely suburban, yet with 16-story residential towers, it is entirely different from previously constructed settlements nearby. This was not only a question of appearance and design, but also an issue of managerial and municipal governance. It was built in the former jurisdictional area of Tzur Nathan, yet the latter was not interested in losing its small-scale character and thus advocated for a separation from the new project. Consequently, the Ministry of Interior decided that it would become a Community Settlement, on a temporary basis, in the larger regional council of Drom Hasharon. Yet, as the regional council mainly consists of small rural settlements, it was unable to support the large-scale of Tzur Nathan, and the Ministry of Interior asked to merge it with the neighbouring locality of Kochav Yair-Tzur Yigal. An attempt that was heavily fought by Kochav Yair-Tzur Yigal and was therefore rejected.⁶⁸⁰ As of 2019, Tzur Yitzhak was still officially a Community Settlement, a definition that is usually used for small-scale semi-rural settlements (see chapter III). Practically, Tzur Yitzhak is more a hybrid of suburban ideas and seemingly urban ones; functioning as a gated compound of high-rise residential buildings that are situated on a hilltop, housing a population of young commuting families (fig 5.67).



FIG. 5.67 Entrance to Tzur Yitzhak, 2016 (Eyal Tueg)

⁶⁸⁰ Levi, 'A committee of the Interior Ministry recommended'.

5.8 Conclusions: the state creates a market that shapes the state

Following the gentrification of the 1980s, the area of along the Green-Line was opened for its mass suburbanisation during the 1990s. Fuelled by geopolitical considerations and a desire for a vast production of dwelling units the development of the area turned into a national project executed by private capital. Consequently, as shown in this chapter, the former association-led mechanism was weakened and eventually cancelled, as the state preferred to rely on the experience and profit incentives of private developers. In doing so, the state commodified its frontier, hoping that this would generate a circular process of supply and demand. To create the needed real estate market, the state carried out major administrative and planning interventions, which were meant to promote an efficient and swift development process that would secure the investments of private entrepreneurs. Enacting such a top-down process meant that the state took back the *power to plan and form space*, which it had previously granted the early housing associations and developers active in the area. The spatial privileges were thus mainly property rights and the ability to develop a specific site.

As mass-produced projects, the architectural and [sub]urban models introduced in the Stars settlements were the product of the new supply-side perspective and the growing involvement of the private sector. The earlier focus on the detached house and the seclusion of the private family life from the greater communal context was not forsaken but rather enhanced by the market incentives to produce an ever-growing number of units. In that sense, the commodification of space, manifested in the tract housing developments, suited the detached suburban lifestyle urban families were looking for while moving away from the cities they lived in. Lacking almost any employment and recreational opportunities and made out of free-standing residential buildings, the high-rise suburbia that began developing in Shoham and continued in Tzur-Yitzhak, could be understood as a vertical tract housing development, subdividing a certain area in all three dimensions (fig 5.68-5.70). Accessible mainly through an underground parking area that is connected to each floor by an elevator, with an outline imitating a layout of a detached private house, the newly designed buildings were planned as a collection of separated dwelling units. Thus, constituting a scaled version of the earlier Suburban Settlements.

With the growing reliance on the market, rentability of a certain urban plan and the architectural regulations it dictated turned into a leading concern. Consequently, the [sub]urban and architectural form of the new environment were heavily dictated by profitability and economic efficiency interests. With an increase in demand for housing units, the state focused on creating more urban-like settlements, that form a more economically efficient use of a given site; concentrating efforts and enlarging profits. At the same time, as demands decreased, the state acted in order to create one, solving the ‘*market failure*’ by promising the economic feasibility of the project and with it the continuation of the development of the entire area. Later, as the state was entirely dependent on private capital, it granted the private developers additional spatial privileges, giving them the *power to form space* by promoting new schemes or making amendments to existing ones. In doing so, the state hoped to meet the developers’ speculative interests and to ensure the realisation of the project; completing the domestication of the frontier and securing the state’s *power over space*. Thus, as the state created a market, the latter eventually began physically shaping the state that created it.



FIG. 5.68 New compounds
(Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 5.69 A ‘Vertical Suburb’
(Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 5.70 Dwelling unit in a
new high-rise suburban building
(Illustrated by the author)

During the 1990s, the settlement development mechanism turned into a supply-side territorial policy, focused on creating a market as a means to promote spatial control. While classic supply-side housing strategies are usually used to answer the public need for dwelling units, in this case, the state intervened in order to regenerate it. Consequently, as the following chapter shows, the 2010 Israeli housing crisis could be explained not by the lack of supply, but rather by the over-profitability of real estate, which caused an ever-growing demand for dwelling units as investments. Harish, the focus of the next chapter, illustrates how the supply-side territorial approach continued to develop, leading to the financialisation of the national settlement mechanism.

6 Financialisation & Harish City

Merging financial and geopolitical frontiers

[A shorter version of this chapter is currently under review at Cities](#)

6.1 Introduction: forming a crisis

The transition into a supply-side approach of frontier domestication increased the speculative aspects of its built environment. Accordingly, the production and consumption of private property, became the main tool in housing development. Therefore, as the 2008 global economic turmoil led to an increase in real estate prices in Israel, which eventually led to a national housing crisis, the government sought to appease the growing public pressure by stimulating the real estate market; increasing the focus on property and regenerating the financial aspect of development. The government's main strategy relied on tendering state-owned lands, deregulation of the planning process and economic incentives to private developers, with an emphasis on large-scale developments that would increase the overall supply of residential units. Consequently, undeveloped planned cities, new urban quarters and various settlements, of which the execution was continuously halted, swiftly became sites of rapid construction. With a strong focus on the geographical periphery and areas of so-called national priority, the state hoped to use the increasing need for dwelling units for the development of previously under-developed peripheral and frontier areas. Thus, opening new financial frontiers in order to domesticate national ones.

This chapter focuses on the city of Harish, a unique case study whose different development attempts demonstrate the gradual privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism and the different architectural and urban models it produced. The first attempts included a kibbutz, a Community Settlement and later also a suburban one. All of which were unsuccessful, due to the peripheral location and proximity to the West-Bank and other Arab towns. By 2010, the wide demand for new dwelling units, the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and the West-Bank Separation Barrier all contributed to turning Harish into an attractive piece of real estate. Consequently, enabling the Israeli Government to designate it as a city with a target population of 60,000. This chapter illustrates the financialisation of the national settlement project, explaining how the state apparatus was used to create a real estate market in a certain area, in order supply the needed dwelling units while expanding the national territorial project. Analysing the different phases in Harish, this chapter demonstrates how the ability to produce space turned into the main settlement tool, initially instigating a turf battle between different groups seeking spatial privileges that was eventually won by large-scale corporations and led to a new phase in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism. Consequently, domesticating the Green-Line by completing its transition into a real estate market while promoting the formation of new architectural and urban typologies; directed by the economic considerations of their developers.

6.2 The crisis and emergency measures

The 2008 world financial crisis significantly affected the Israeli housing market. Initially, it seemed that the small and relatively isolated economy would be left untouched by the global confusion, with the local banking system and stock exchange witnessing modest fluctuations. Eventually, however, the post-2008 years became a period of an increasing real estate prices. The usual and common explanation is the lack of sufficient development during the late 1990s, which followed the early 1990s construction boom.⁶⁸¹ On the other hand, other explanations point the finger on the low interest rate placed by the Israeli Central Bank, parallel to similar decisions worldwide. This, together with the uncertainty of

⁶⁸¹ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Report of the Housing Crisis'.

the stock market, turned real estate into the most common investment method.⁶⁸² As shown by Boruchov, though the official state claims spoke of a 'real' deficit of tens of thousands of dwelling units yearly, a proper analysis of the statistics indicates a significantly much lower number. Thus, that the demand for housing is not only due to the yearly production of dwelling units lagging behind the yearly increase in households, but due to the increasing profitability of real estate investment.⁶⁸³ Or in other words, the increasing demand was not only for the 'use-value' of housing but also (or even mainly) for its 'exchange-value'.⁶⁸⁴ No matter whether it was a question of lack of supply or high demands, the increasing housing prices led to the vast demonstrations of the summer of 2011, which became known as the Israeli Social Justice Protests⁶⁸⁵. These focused on the increasing living costs of the local middle-class, and especially emphasised the ever-increasing rental prices and property values.⁶⁸⁶

The housing crisis led the Israeli Government to take significant measures that were meant to drastically enlarge the national stock of dwelling units. This was in line with the decades-long supply-side housing approach of the Israeli Government, which sought to promote the construction of dwelling units by stimulating the economic interests of the private market.⁶⁸⁷ Like in similar neoliberal economies, bureaucracy and regulations turned into the new public enemy that prevents the public from receiving the services it is entitled to.⁶⁸⁸ Accordingly, in 2011, prime minister Netanyahu promised a 'Supertanker' against bureaucracy, which would enable the immediate construction of hundreds of thousands of dwelling units in a short period of time.⁶⁸⁹ Using the metaphor of the *Supertanker*, the large-scale

⁶⁸² Boruchov, 'On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System', 63–70.

⁶⁸³ Boruchov, 80–85.

⁶⁸⁴ Harvey, *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*, 15–25.

⁶⁸⁵ Alfasi and Fenster, 'Between Socio-Spatial and Urban Justice: Rawls' Principles of Justice in the 2011 Israeli Protest Movement', 407–27; Marom, 'Activising Space: The Spatial Politics of the 2011 Protest Movement in Israel', 2826–41.

⁶⁸⁶ Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 1–26.

⁶⁸⁷ Carmon, 'Housing Policy in Israel: Review, Evaluation and Lessons', 181–208; Barzilai, 'Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence State Law: Politics and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community', 426–51.

⁶⁸⁸ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 61; Graeber, *The Utopia of Rules*, 6–29.

⁶⁸⁹ Charney, 'A "Supertanker" Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel', 1224; Somfalvi and Lahav, 'Netanyahu on Housing: Supertanker for Bureaucracy'.

firefighting aeroplane Israel had borrowed from the US in the efforts to extinguish the Carmel fires a year earlier, Netanyahu expressed his desire to promote massive governmental interventions that would bypass the existing planning and construction procedure.⁶⁹⁰ Netanyahu's different 'Supertankers' included a new National Housing Committee, de-regulation and speeding the planning process and authorisation of urban outline schemes and easing the private development of state-owned lands.⁶⁹¹ These measures, as this chapter shows, significantly influenced the popular architectural and planning practices, eventually reshaping the former frontier area.

The main challenge of the Israeli Government to enlarge the supply in areas of high demand caused it to try expanding the main metropolises into the peripheries and internal frontiers. With the neoliberal turn in the Israeli economy of the 1980s and 90s and the new market-oriented metropolitan-based planning strategy, the government did not forsake its territorial agenda and continued to invest in the development of settlements in areas of national interests, outside of the main metropolises.⁶⁹² With the limited state-owned lands in areas of high demand and the national desire to continuously expand its *power over* space, the state sought to extend the areas of high demand while incorporating parts of the geographical peripheries and internal frontiers.⁶⁹³ Eventually, creating a neoliberal frontier domestication mechanism by developing a real estate market in areas of national interests; merging social, territorial and entrepreneurial interests. To stimulate the interests of the private market, the state promoted special measures, like tendering state-owned lands for almost free and new planning committees that bypass the existing hierarchy. By doing so, the state created what Agamben refers to as "*Zones of Indistinction*", where a sovereign entity imposes a state of emergency that usually includes temporary suspending the existing legal framework, until the state emergency is solved.⁶⁹⁴ Usually, these new measures correlate with the interests of the ruling authorities and hegemonic elites, which by adapting the crisis discourse

⁶⁹⁰ Charney, 'A "Supertanker" Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel', 1224; Mualem, 'Playing with Supertankers: Centralization in Land Use Planning in Israel: A National Experiment Underway', 270; Eshel and Hananel, 'Centralization, Neoliberalism, and Housing Policy Central-Local Government Relations and Residential Development in Israel', 238.

⁶⁹¹ Rubin and Felsenstein, 'Supply Side Constraints in the Israeli Housing Market: The Impact of State Owned Land', 267.

⁶⁹² Shachar, 'Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine', 208–18.

⁶⁹³ Charney, 'A "Supertanker" Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel', 1240–43.

⁶⁹⁴ Agamben, *State of Exception*, 25.

they are able to promote their national and economic agenda.⁶⁹⁵ Building on Agamben, Weizman explains frontier settlement as extraterritorial exclaves, which remain outside of the existing jurisdiction until the frontier is domesticated.⁶⁹⁶ In this sense, the attempts to develop a real estate market in the Israeli internal frontier are a continuation of the desire to domesticate it, and the emergency measures enacted by the Israeli Government thus serve the interests of the ruling national and economic hegemony.

Harish, the focus of this chapter, was an integral part of the government's efforts to enhance the state's control over the Green-Line and the predominantly Arab Wadi A'ara (fig 6.1). From the late 1970s, the government led several attempts to develop the site, yet it was the housing crisis of 2011 that eventually enabled the mass settlement of the area. The story of Harish illustrates how, as Graeber claims, states create markets, and not otherwise.⁶⁹⁷ Moreover, it demonstrates how by creating a market in a specific area, the state is able to harness the interests of the private sector. Presenting the different stages of the development of Harish and analysing the architectural and urban products of each stage, this chapter clarifies the changing public-private alliance and how it shapes the local built environment.




FIG. 6.1 Harish in 2015, located on the Green-Line between the West-Bank Separation Barrier and the Arab area of Wadi A'ara (Illustrated by the author)

⁶⁹⁵ *ibid*

⁶⁹⁶ Weizman, 'Principles of Frontier Geography', 84–92.

⁶⁹⁷ Graeber, *Debt: The First 5000 Years*, 50–55.

6.3 Kibbutz Harish and Moshav Katzir: early rural and neo-rural attempts

During the past four decades, Harish went through different endeavours and transformations that correspond with the changes in the Israeli settlement development mechanism. These included a frontier *Nahal* outpost that was supposed to be developed into a kibbutz, a Community Settlement, a large Suburban Settlement, a city for the Ultra-Orthodox sector and eventually the current corporate-led environment. These variations were parallel to the local economic and political transformations and demonstrate the changing relation between national agendas and the private market, as well as the growing reliance of the former on the latter. Overall, the case of Harish expresses the state's efforts to create new real estate markets in order to promote the national territorial considerations and to harness the interests of the private market to those of the state.

Harish today is still a city in the making, anticipating a future of a large-scale development. As of early 2019, it consists of around a couple of thousand inhabited apartments and a population of just over 10,000. Currently, across the new town, there are some 4000–6000 dwelling units in different construction and approval phases and additional tens of thousands planned ones.⁶⁹⁸ While the original target for the year 2020 was a city with a total population of 60,000, the new objectives are aiming towards 100,000 inhabitants by 2030. These ambitious intentions, if fulfilled, will turn Harish into the fastest developing city in the history of the state of Israel; surpassing all former precedents.

The site of Harish has long been a part of the national geopolitical agenda. The first attempts to settle the site were already taken in the late 1970s as part of the Israeli Government and the Jewish Agency's (JA) Judaization campaign of the northern Galilee. Accordingly, the state-led endeavours focused on establishing an array of small-scale Jewish settlements on state-owned lands, across the predominantly Arab area. These efforts turned into an official scheme named the "lookouts plan", as they consisted of an initial temporary settlement phase, which usually included a provisional site on a vacant hilltop that later would become permanent. While the main focus was the upper Galilee, in what would later become the Misgav regional

⁶⁹⁸ ICBS, 'Localities in Israel'.

council, the JA located a few southern sites, west of the Green-Line and in the mainly Arab populated areas of Wadi A'ara and the Triangle. The site of Harish was one of these points, which included also the future settlements of Kochav Yair and Katzir. Therefore, forming a western counterpart to the settlement efforts east of the Green-Line and inside the West-Bank.⁶⁹⁹

The new site of Harish was part of the state's strategical Nahal Eron Plan. Nahal Eron, or in its Arab name "Wadi A'ara", is an area in northern Israel with a vast majority of an Arab population, living mainly in the cities and towns of Umm al-Fahm, Kufir Qara, and Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and in several smaller villages as well. With its location adjacent to the northern Green-Line, the Israeli Government had for a long time feared the formation of an Arab territorial sequence across both sides of the former border, and thus promoted the establishment of new Jewish settlements that would prevent this potential sequence. These settlements included the kibbutzim of Metzger, Magal, and Barkai in the early 1950s, as well the moshav of Mei Ami, which was built as part of the 1960s "Frontier Fortresses Plan".⁷⁰⁰ During the 1980s, the Israeli Government and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) initiated the Reihan settlement block inside the West-Bank, as an additional attempt to prevent the formation of a potential cross-border Arab territorial sequence (see chapter III).

Besides the usual emphasis on rural and small-scale settlements, the different planning administrations were interested in promoting a new city in the area. Already in the late 1970s, the "Hills Axis" plan of Baruch Kipnis for the development of urban settlements along the Green-Line mentioned three possible sites for a city in Wadi A'ara (fig 6.2). These, according to Kipnis, "*would enable introducing a big urban Jewish settlement in the Nahal Eron region, which constitutes a consecutive Arab area*".⁷⁰¹ In the same year, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) would discuss the sites recommended by Kipnis. And, while the northern option (A), enjoyed a much better planning potential, due to the site's topography and size, the tendency was to pick the southern site. An internal report submitted to Ya'acov Dash, the head of the Planning Administration, highlighted two main reasons for developing a new urban centre in the area. First, was the interest "*to break*" the Arab sequence on both sides of the Green-Line, while the second was to create an urban development reserve

⁶⁹⁹ Soffer, 'Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment', 24–29; Falah, 'Israeli "Judaization" Policy in Galilee', 69–85.

⁷⁰⁰ Tal, *The Frontier Fortresses Plan*.

⁷⁰¹ Kipnis, *Potential of Developing Urban Housings along the Hills Axis*, 18.

for the heavily populated coastal plain (fig 6.3). The report concluded that if the main consideration are territorial ones, then the southern site is the better option, and in case the main considerations are the expansion of the coastal area, then the northern site should be the preferred option. Nonetheless, the report determined that the territorial perspective should be favoured, despite the southern site's harsh topographic conditions.⁷⁰²




FIG. 6.2 Possible sites for an urban settlement in Wadi A'ara, 1978, (Baruch Kipnis)



FIG. 6.3 Possible sites for an urban settlement in Wadi A'ara, Israel Planning Administration (Israel State Archives)

Despite the growing urban focus, the JA decided to proceed with the rural option, indicating the lack of economic probability for a project of a larger scale. The masterplan for Settlement Development in the West Bank, which prevailed over the more urban idea, designated the area of Nahal Eron as a hybrid of agricultural and industrial villages of around 50 families.⁷⁰³ The early plan did not mention the site of Harish directly, but by in the early 1980s, it was included in two different plans for the development of the area. Composed by the Settlement Division, the first plan declared both Harish and the nearby site of Katzir as Community Settlements, and therefore not agricultural ones (fig 6.4).⁷⁰⁴ Similar to other settlements developed at that time, they enjoyed a reputation of being rural-like or neo-rural, bearing names

⁷⁰² Israel Planning Administration, 'An Analyses for a new Jewish Settlement in Wadi A'ara', 2.

⁷⁰³ Drobles, 'Master plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983', 4.

⁷⁰⁴ Settlement Division, 'A Proposal for Settlement Development in the Eron-Reihan Hills'.

with strong farming connotations like *Plough* (Harish-חריש) and *Harvest* (Katzir-קציר). The plan of the Settlement Division from a year later would declare Harish as a kibbutz of the National Kibbutzim Movement, to be settled on a temporary basis in 1982. The first phase would include 15 temporary units, while the plan estimated that the future kibbutz would include around 200 families, which would mainly be occupied in intensive agriculture, cotton and dairy farming.⁷⁰⁵ Thus, becoming a rural settlement *per se*.

The first step promoted by the JA resembled former rural examples and relied on the fusion of communal life, agriculture and territory. In 1982 a settling group from the *Nahal* corps, arrived at the site of Harish and established a temporary outpost. The JA's Settlement Department, which was in charge of new rural settlements inside the official borders of Israel, had already conducted the needed planning for the provisional site a year earlier, as suitable for pre-privatisation development. Consequently, this supposedly momentary station resembled the other frontier *Nahal* settlements of the area and was made out of rows of prefabricated dwelling units and a communal clubhouse (fig 6.5). Later, the JA and the Kibbutzim Movement promoted a plan to turn the temporary site into a permanent kibbutz, while the movement's settling group began occupying the settlement. As Harish was to become part of the kibbutzim of HaShomer HaTzair movement, its technical department was in charge of the drafting and submitted a detailed outline plan in 1984, which would later receive the official approval of the district committee, enabling the development of the site into its permanent phase.⁷⁰⁶ The plan for Harish followed the classical concepts of a kibbutz (fig 6.6).⁷⁰⁷ Thus, it consisted of a communal public core, surrounded by the members dwelling units, which were divided between regular, children and youth compounds; all sharing a common open green car-free space.

⁷⁰⁵ Settlement Division, 'Development Plan for Jewish Settlement In the Eron Hills- Reihan Region'.

⁷⁰⁶ Department, *Outline Plan M/146*.

⁷⁰⁷ Chyutin and Chyutin, *Architecture and Utopia: Kibbutz and Moshav*, 45–53.




FIG. 6.4 Jewish Settlements (Blue) in Wadi A'ara, 1980, WZO Settlement Division (WZO)



FIG. 6.5 Plan for the temporary site of Kibbutz Harish, 1981. JA Settlement Department. (Central Zionist Archive -CZA)



FIG. 6.6 Harish Outline Plan, 1984, (ILA). Note the public core in brown

Parallel to the decline in rural settlement during the 1980s, Kibbutz Harish was short-lived. While the initial military post turned into a civilian kibbutz, it housed mainly a variety of Nahal soldiers' settling groups, which lived and worked in it, yet never turned it into an official permanent settlement (fig 6.7). The plan of the Kibbutzim Movement was never fulfilled, and the site was mainly made of the initial temporary dwelling units. The Kibbutzim Crisis of the 1980s, which left the movement almost bankrupted, as well as the inability to find a proper civilian settling group, eventually led to the failure of Harish as a communal rural settlement. By the early 1990s, the Kibbutzim Movement vacated the site, which remained briefly settled by a small company of the Borders Police Forces.



FIG. 6.7 Establishment of Nahal Harish, 1982, (Hashomer Hatzair Archives Yad Yaar); a female Nahal soldier in Harish. 1982-1990, note the prefabricated units in the background; Nahal soldiers in Harish. 1982-1990

While Harish was considered as a failure, the neighbouring Katzir was much more successful. The JA established Katzir in 1982, in the same wave as Harish. Nevertheless, Katzir, was planned neither as a kibbutz and nor as a moshav, but rather as a Community Settlement. It started as a temporary site as well, yet, it was housed by a civilian settling group, organised by the JA, and not by soldiers from the Nahal corps. The JA was thus in charge of assembling the settling families and

prepared a small group of ten members that it turned into a registered association. A year later, a group of ten more families would join the first members, all of which would live in temporary light-weight units, supplied by the JA, while the efforts to plan and to expand the settlements were underway (fig 6.8).⁷⁰⁸

As a Community Settlement, Katzir started out with a communal core that later formed the centre of future development, which suited its neo-rural profile. Similar to other Community Settlements, the layout of the initial phase consisted of the temporary dwelling units, and was made out of two parallel rows of houses, placed along the topographic lines (fig 6.9). The planners of the JA located the public area of the settlement on the site's highest point, which included the secretariat and the members club, while forming the official entrance and the main parking spot. A series of pedestrian paths connected the settlement's centre to each of the dwelling units, creating a well-integrated and communal compound, which is based on private households, yet sharing a collective open space (fig 6.10). As a Community Settlement, the JA planned to populate Katzir by a small homogeneous group, to which it would grant the spatial privilege to settle the site.



FIG. 6.8 Plans for the temporary dwelling units in Katzir. 1980. JA Settlement Department. (CZA)

⁷⁰⁸ Lanir, 'You plowed and harvested', 26.




FIG. 6.9 Plan for Mitzpe Katzir, 1981. (ILA)



FIG. 6.10 Temporary units in Katzir, 1983. Boris Carmi (Ma'ariv)

6.4 Katzir-Harish: the suburban turn

The plans for the expansion of Katzir were slightly more suburban and less communal (fig 6.11). While the logic of the first plan focused on creating the communal basic core, the logic of the latter was on forming a series of detached lots that could then be developed separately by the new members of the community. Correspondingly, the new layout was made out four dead-end streets that formed two rows of private parcels, which could then be marketed to newly arriving families.⁷⁰⁹ Though Katzir attracted several upper-middle-class families, usually with a high academic background that were interested in improving their quality of life, the expansion plan was not completely fulfilled, and the settlement remained relatively vacant. This was mainly due to the site's remote location and poor accessibility, that while enhancing the pioneer-like image of Katzir, it prevented it from becoming an attractive residential environment, attracting additional families to the area.⁷¹⁰ Katzir of the 1980s was thus still an ex-urban settlement, built in the geographic periphery of the frontier area of the seam-zone, and not yet the ideal Suburban Settlement. Still, the border of the total area of Katzir, which was more than five times larger than the developed one, indicated future intentions of turning it into a much larger settlement. Forming a small-scale settlement with vast land reserves was a common territorial tactic, repeatedly used by the different Israeli planning administration in order to limit the expansion of Arab localities nearby. In fact, this was constantly stated in the different settlement plans in the West Bank and the Galilee.⁷¹¹ However, while in former cases the land reserves were usually farming plots, in this case, they were merely a statement of intent of future actions.

⁷⁰⁹ Arye Sonino Architects, 'M/139'.

⁷¹⁰ Lanir, 'You plowed and harvested', 26.

⁷¹¹ Soffer, 'Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment', 24–29; Falah, 'Israeli "Judaization" Policy in Galilee', 69–85.



FIG. 6.11 Outline Plan of Katzir, 1985. (ILA)

By the early 1990s, the Israeli Government had already developed a new comprehensive vision for the area, with Harish and Katzir playing a major role in it. Both sites were incorporated in the greater Stars Plan, for the development of suburban settlements along the Green-Line (see chapter V). Consequently, both settlements lost their former frontier-like or ex-urban characteristics and turned into suburban residential environments. The Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), which took control of developing the 'Stars', promoted new outline schemes, with the ministry's rural department taking the lead. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior united both settlements into one council, and though they maintained their relative independence, they now formed a new locality named Tel Eron (fig 6.12).



FIG. 6.12 The joint area of Katzir and Harish - Tel Eron council - as a single continuous entity between the Arab towns in Wadi A'ara and the West Bank. (year unknown). (CZA)

The new plans for Katzir transformed the initial small-scale layout into a large Suburban Settlement; adding two additional sites while expanding the original one (fig 6.13). Dealing with topographic conditions and land ownership issues, the new plan “*Katzir: Emergency Site*” consisted of bulbs and a broken outline.⁷¹² As a new suburban environment, the proposed layout of Katzir was of a tract housing development, subdividing the site into repetitive residential parcels. Based on a non-hierarchical system of access roads and *cul de sac* streets, the new plan for Katzir focused on the private family lot, its autonomy and detachment, as well as commuting ability. In this sense, the proposed plan corresponded with other Suburban Settlements planned in same the years. Yet, while all other ‘Stars’ relied on corporate-led or organised construction, Katzir was planned as a Build Your Own House project (BYOH). Moreover, unlike all other Stars settlements, Katzir also included several prefabricated units, issued for the use of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (fig 6.14).




FIG. 6.13 Outline Plan of Katzir, 1994. (ILA)




FIG. 6.14 Temporary dwelling units in Katzir, 1988. JA Settlement Department. (CZA)

With its relative distance from the Tel Aviv metropolis, Katzir was a decade behind in the mechanism of frontier settlement. Its remote location and lack of accessibility prevented the formation of the needed conditions that would attract private developers. Its definition as a Community Settlement, with an active admission committee that secured its members' spatial privilege of controlling its societal composition, hindered the potential of an intensive private-led construction project. Accordingly, Katzir became famous in Israel for refusing to admit the Arab family of Ka'adan from the neighbouring town of Baqa al-Gharbiyye. The settlement's

⁷¹² Lavi-Bar Architects and Planners, 'Outline Plan M/196a Katzir: Emergency Site', 1–3.

admission committee, backed by the Jewish Agency (JA) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), claimed that the lands of the settlement are designated as National Lands (*Admot Leom*), and are thus intended for the exclusive use of the Jewish (not Israeli) nation.⁷¹³ This decision would later be revoked by the Israeli High Court of Justice after the appeal of the Ka'adan family.⁷¹⁴ In sites close to the Tel Aviv metropolis, such a selection committee was not needed, mainly due to the housing associations, targeted promotion and relative high-prices, where privatisation corresponded with the national geopolitical agenda. In remote locations like Katzir, a more selective privatisation had to be implemented, in order to maintain the ethnic homogeneity, and thus indicating on the difficulty of creating a simple real estate-oriented development.⁷¹⁵ Consequently, preventing Katzir from becoming another reproduced suburb.

With the new vision for the area, Harish anticipated a future of a much larger scale and the MCH began promoting its development as a Suburban Settlement. The ministry's rural department commissioned a private architectural firm to compose a new outline plan for the site. In 1994, the new plan for a settlement of around 4000 units would receive the official approval of the district planning committee, under the emergency regulations of 1990.⁷¹⁶ Typically suburban, the plan proposed a low-rise and low-density residential environment, with high emphases on integrating with the natural landscape, going as far as dictated planting a tree in each of the front yards..⁷¹⁷ The core of the plan was *HaParsa* (the Horseshoe) neighbourhood, which was intended to become the first project of Harish, followed by the northern part and then the eastern neighbourhood named *HaMagaf* (the boot) (fig 6.15). With four different housing types, the plan allocated each to a specific compound, creating homogeneous residential quarters to be gradually developed; starting with single and double-family houses in the first parts, and moving on to the denser three-story and terraced tenements in later phases (fig 6.16).

⁷¹³ Barzilai, 'Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence State Law: Politics and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community', 426–30.

⁷¹⁴ Israel High Court of Justice, Ruling 6698/95.

⁷¹⁵ Yacobi and Tzfadia, *Rethinking Israeli Periphery*, 35–52.

⁷¹⁶ 'Moshe Zur Architects and Planners'.

⁷¹⁷ 'Moshe Zur Architects and Planners', 9.



FIG. 6.15 Harish Outline Plan, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects (ILA)




FIG. 6.16 Different housing typologies: Double-Family, Row Houses; three story tenements; terraced houses in Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects (Israel State Archive)

As a typical Suburban Settlement, the outline of Harish was of a tract housing development that resourcefully subdivided the site into smaller lots. Relying on an excessive system of roads, the plan was highly car-oriented, and while the main arteries created the different residential areas, the secondary streets subdivided them into smaller marketable compounds and parcels. With the placement of all public buildings on the main entrance road, and not in the centre of any of the residential area, the plan created a public strip, rather than a public core, and thus highlighting the car-oriented approach once more. Moreover, developed in a corporate-oriented perspective, the plan created housing complexes, consisting of a single housing model, tendered to private contractors (fig 6.17). Accordingly, the basis of this plan was the residential parcel and the ability to reach it with a private car. Each housing typology, low or high-rise, dictated specific dimensions of residential lots, which would enable an optimised future construction process. Forming two rows of the same housing type, the plan ensured an optimal ratio between roads and residential area, dictating the distance between each two parallel streets according to the dimensions of the different housing parcels it served. The site's topography granted the proposed road system a nearly perfect form, which decreased needed groundwork while creating a flowing and continuous car-ride through town; eventually providing the sought comfortable car access to each of the parcels. While highly efficient for the residential lots, this circular setting created an abundance of left-over spaces in the intersection between the streets. Due to their irregular proportions these left-over spaces were of low economic feasibility for

corporate residential development, thus turning into an ideal spot for open areas and public buildings, which are not subjected to the rentability constraints of the real estate market (fig 6.18).



FIG. 6.17 Compounds of Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects (Israel State Archive)




FIG. 6.18 A section in Harish; distribution of functions with public areas (brown and green) located in the "leftover" spaces – (Illustrated by the author)

The proposed order of development corresponded with the corporate-led approach. The first neighbourhood to be developed included mainly double-family homes and row-houses, with several tenements in its centre. The following area, the northern section, included a higher percentage of tenements, yet it was still mainly of lower density. The last part in the development order, was almost purely of higher density tenements. This resembled former examples, where the MCH used the low-rise and seemingly more prestigious units to attract well-established families. These would help in promoting a more positive and esteemed image that would lead to an increase in the economic potential of the area, creating the financial feasibility needed for construction of the higher-density dwelling units (see chapter V+IV).

As a corporate-oriented plan, it was based on a clear marketing strategy that relied on a covert system of spatial privileges, intended to attract suitable middle-class families that would encourage demands and ensure the project's success. A study of the market situation conducted by *Tznovar Consultants Ltd* for the MCH, showed that in the surrounding area of Harish there is an expected surplus in both low and high-rise housing. Yet, the report stated that if the MCH is able to promote Harish as an attractive settlement, with high living standards, a strong affinity to nature and a comfortable commute to the main metropolitan region then these predictions could be disregarded. Therefore, the report suggested directing the first efforts to attracting strong young families, mainly from the moshavim and kibbutzim of the area, and urban families looking for better living standards. These would then grant Harish the required image of a settlement with a strong community.⁷¹⁸ To further promote this image the strategy report also recommended marketing Harish as a '*Green Urban Settlement*', which blends into the natural landscape and has an environmentally aware community; all in order to attract well-established families.⁷¹⁹ Compatibly, the report stated that the first units in Harish would need to be significantly cheaper than similar ones in the area. At the same time, the report warned from lowering the prices too much, due to the potential of attracting families with a weaker socio-economic background that would harm the desired image of the settlement. Thus, the suggested strategy was to conduct special sales to the pursued type of families, which would gentrify Harish, and enable the continuation of development according to an economic rationale. This internal report basically concluded that there was no market-based logic in building a new town, and thus suggested tools that would promote the formation of such a market.

With the MCH's intentions of promoting concentrated construction, it marketed the first compounds to a single developer. Ashdar Ltd, had a leading role in the construction of a variety of settlements and several key national projects; with a speciality in prefabricated units (see chapter III+IV),⁷²⁰ which enabled it to receive the spatial privilege of being the and single developer of the first compounds. Correspondingly, it was a highly cost-efficient project that consisted of a series of ten three-story apartment complexes surrounding an inner courtyard, with a total amount of 250 dwelling units. The entire compound was made out of a single model that included eight similar double-bedroom apartments (fig 6.19-6.20). Each apartment included an entrance area that directly led to the living room and

⁷¹⁸ Tznovar Consultants Ltd, 'Populating Harish Katzir', 1–10.

⁷¹⁹ Tznovar Consultants Ltd, 5.

⁷²⁰ Ashtrom, 'Milestones'.

the semi-open kitchen, with the bedrooms on the opposite side (fig 6.21). Ashdar planned and constructed the buildings out of prefabricated concrete slabs, coated with limestone and assembled on-site, thus creating an industrialised and affordable construction process. The second and seemingly more luxurious compound included some 50 double-family houses. Each unit was a semi-detached house, spreading over two floors and was covered by a sloping red roof, yet just like the denser apartment buildings, they were also of prefabricated concrete walls covered by limestone (fig 6.22-6.23).




FIG. 6.19 Main Complex, 1992. Dauber Architects. (Harish Council Archive)



FIG. 6.20 Facade of an apartment building in Harish, 1992. Dauber Architects. (Harish Council Archive)




FIG. 6.21 Floorplan of an apartment building in Harish, 1992. Dauber Architects. (Harish Council Archive)



FIG. 6.22 Front facade of a double-family house in Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects. (Harish Council Archive)



FIG. 6.23 Back facade of a double-family house in Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects. (Harish Council Archive)

Marketing and populating the apartments in Harish did not go as the MCH expected, causing it to implement various selective promotion campaigns. Eventually, the units of Ashdar were finished by 1994, yet they were only partially soled. Ashdar and the MCH found it very hard to market and sell these housing units, and the fact that they were made out of prefabricated concrete slabs did not help. Due to the over-supply of apartment, the MCH housed several families of former Soviet Union immigrants, mainly from the Caucasus area, while still trying to market the rest of the units. After almost two unsuccessful years, the MCH contacted *Hever*, the consumers' club of the IDF personnel, in order to interest its members, military officers, in purchasing the remaining vacant units. By offering this specific group the chance of a house in Harish in an affordable price, the MCH hoped that the respected public profile of the military would promote the image of the settlement, and thus help future development and

marketing efforts.⁷²¹ Eventually, several IDF personnel purchased some 230 units in Harish, yet almost none of them would physically live in the settlement and preferred renting out their properties. The failure to market the first phase caused the MCH to halt the tenders for remaining compounds, and even to cancel the infrastructure development for the northern neighbourhood.⁷²² At the same time, the idea of Harish as a settlement that is affiliated with the IDF interested the MCH, and after receiving Hever's promise to aid in the marketing efforts, it began working on a new tender for some 200 Build Your Own House plots (BYOH) for military personnel.⁷²³

The MCH proceeded in the detailed planning of Harish despite the inability to market the houses of the first phases, hoping that constant development would eventually create demand. The MCH halted all construction works after the failure of the first project, yet it continued investing in planning and it hired several architectural and planning firms to prepare detailed schemes for the remaining neighbourhoods.⁷²⁴ The MCH's perspective was that an intense effort would eventually lead to the development of Harish and thus in the late 1990s it hired an entire team of planners to compose a new masterplan, attempting to merge the isolated neighbourhoods into one urban system. The different changes and adjustments the MCH tried to promote varied one from the other, ranging from a low-rise military settlement to an Ultra-Orthodox (UO) town.⁷²⁵ The focus was constantly on re-igniting the development process, and in total, by 1997 the MCH would invest a tremendous amount of almost 100,000,000 NIS⁷²⁶ for an unexecuted project.⁷²⁷ As the MCH's urban planning unit took the lead, the new plans for Harish included exploring the options of creating a city of almost 200,000 inhabitants, stretching over an area of around 1000 km², including lands eastern to the Green-Line.⁷²⁸ Thus, the MCH persistently resisted to re-adjust its large-scale plans, and insisted on enlarging them further; assuming that as the project grows then the interests of the developers would grow as well.

⁷²¹ Council, 'Council Meeting 01/95', 1.

⁷²² Davidovic, 'Haifa District - Harish - Tender #', 1.

⁷²³ Dvir, 'Meeting Protocol regarding tendering lots in Harish 17.3.1996', 1.

⁷²⁴ Eiges, 'Development Works in Harish', 1.

⁷²⁵ Dvir, 'Meeting Protocol regarding tendering lots in Harish 17.3.1996', 1.

⁷²⁶ Roughly around 45,000,000 US dollars in 2016 prices

⁷²⁷ Karp, 'Harish', 1; Meridor, 'Harish', 1997, 1.

⁷²⁸ Freund, 'Survey for the Extension of Harish', 1–5.

By the late 1990s, the inconsistency between the plans of the MCH and the demands of the housing market turned Harish into an ill-developed town. The repeated attempts to ignite the construction process failed, and consisting only of a few buildings, Harish was not a small-scale Community Settlement, but rather an uncompleted urban project. The population of Harish was composed of Jewish Caucasian families of the Former Soviet Union, and mainly tenants that rented the apartments from the property owners that were not keen on living in the undeveloped settlement. By the late 1990s, the MCH, the Israeli Police and the Ministry of Interior relocated members of the Arab crime family of Karaja from the town of Lod to Harish, in an attempt to resolve a long turf battle and vendettas; a step that did not improve the image of the town, to say the least.⁷²⁹ In comparison with Katzir, which Harish shared its local council with, the population of the former was in scale 8 out of 10 in regard to socioeconomic status, while the latter was 2 out of 10. The violent events of the Second Intifada, which started in 2000 and the mass demonstrations held by the Arab citizens of Israel, especially in the Wadi A'ara area, did not improve the attractiveness of Harish. Despite the MCH's attempt to tender some 300 units to five different developers in 1999, by 2002, after several bureaucratic setbacks and a vast lack of interest these tenders were conclusively revoked.⁷³⁰

Promoting the image of Harish as a means for its development, concerned both its residents and contractors as well. In a letter to the MCH, the Katzir-Harish council highlighted the need for an “*aggressive*” marketing strategy.⁷³¹ Therefore, they demanded an elaborative public relations campaign, which would focus on well-established groups, with an emphasis on employees in the High-tech industry, the military and upper-middle-class families from the greater Tel Aviv area (Gush Dan). This requested campaign would include promoted Colour pieces in “*elitist*” newspapers that would improve the popular image of Harish and address the sought clientele.⁷³² Other promotion techniques would include a greater emphasis on Harish as a “Green” town, naming the streets after names of the area's fauna and flora. Disappointed with the MCH's lack of collaboration with the attempts to improve the image of Harish, a group of organised residents sent an angry petition to the CEO of the Prime Minister's Office. To emphasize their despair and their national leverage, they stated that in case the current situation continues they would eventually sell their apartments to the “*highest bidder*,

⁷²⁹ Sandrov, ‘Local Council Katzir-Harish’, 1.

⁷³⁰ Zimmerman, ‘Tender 10025/99 HaParsa Neighbourhood- Harish’, 1.

⁷³¹ Katzir-Harish Council, ‘Strategic Outline for the Development of Harish-Katzir’, 2.

⁷³² Katzir-Harish Council, 5.

meaning Arabs in the area".⁷³³ Similar discontent was expressed by a group of private developers in charge of constructing some 200 units in Harish. Their attorney sent an official complaint to the MCH, protesting against an interview given by the head of the Haifa District of the MCH, who described Harish as a site of "*prostitution and drugs, which no sane person would like to live in*".⁷³⁴

6.5 Harish: the next city of Israel

By the early 2000s, it became clear to the MCH that the possibility of creating a market-led development in the current conditions was quite impossible, causing it to implement more exclusive spatial privileges. An official report of the MCH even stated that the possible success of marketing Harish could form a double-edged sword, as such a success would also appeal to the Arab population of the area, who would then be interested in moving into Harish as well.⁷³⁵ This report mentioned the Ka'adan case from Katzir, as well as the fact that unlike Katzir, Harish does not have an admission committee that would dictate the future character of the settlement. Therefore, as the appeal to the private market was not successful, and in case it would have been successful then it would lead to the Arabisation of the planned settlement, the report suggested renewing the plans for an Ultra-Orthodox town.⁷³⁶ The MCH had already considered this idea twice in the past, under two different administrations, yet in the end, it decided to drop it.⁷³⁷ As claimed in an official report of the MCH from 2001, it is impossible to populate Harish due to its location and the current circumstances. However, as only the UO sector had the potential of bringing tens of thousands of [Jewish] families to the area, this turned into the only way out.⁷³⁸

⁷³³ Harish Representatives, 'Harish Settlement', 2001, 1.

⁷³⁴ Marom, 'Tender 10025/99- HaParsa Neighbourhood- Harish', 2001, 2.

⁷³⁵ Rubenstein, 'Harish Survey', 1–2.

⁷³⁶ *ibid*

⁷³⁷ Rubenstein, 'Proposal for the Planning of Harish'.

⁷³⁸ Rubenstein, 'The Minister's decisions regarding Harish'.

For the MCH, an Ultra-Orthodox Harish was basically the last resort, which enabled the participation of the market and continued the privatisation of the settlement mechanism. Approaching this specific sector did not mean that the MCH gave up on a market-oriented development, but rather that it asked to adapt the development process to the rationale of the UO real estate market. The Israeli UO sector has to some extent its own internal economic system, which is quite parallel to the larger Israeli one. Consisting of families with a significantly low socio-economic background, with considerably high fertility rates and a fundamental need to live in isolated neighbourhoods, the UO sector is constantly facing a housing crisis.⁷³⁹ With the existing centres of Bnei Brak and Jerusalem being unable to continue supplying the needed dwelling units, the leaders of the UO sector, the MCH and some affiliated entrepreneurs and housing associations initiated and promoted several UO oriented neighbourhoods and settlements like Ela'ad, Beitar Illit, Modi'in Illit, and others (see chapter V). The main component in a UO market-oriented development is its masses and loyalty. Private developers would focus on cheap construction, while making deals with rabbis and leaders of the different UO streams, which would guarantee the purchase of all units in a specific project. Relying on its internal loaning and mortgage systems, like the *Gemach* funds,⁷⁴⁰ interest-free loans organised by each community, the UO sector was able to grant each family the economic tools to purchase an apartment. This, of course, would be done only in case the family is part of the same UO community and is intending to use the loan to purchase an apartment in one of the community's neighbourhoods or residential projects. Thus, each specific stream is able to form alliances with private developers and to eventually create their own compounds.⁷⁴¹

The decision for a UO city followed negotiations between the MCH with representatives and contractors from the UO sector that ensured their participation in the development process. As they all agreed to cooperate on this project, the representatives of the MCH promised to adjust the development and marketing to the needs and abilities of the UO sector. Moreover, they also guaranteed the status of Harish as a site of national priority, which includes a zero pricing for state-owned lands and substantial governmental grants and funding.⁷⁴² In return, the UO leaders guaranteed the interests of the different streams to eventually purchase the future

⁷³⁹ Cahaner, 'Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank', 112–27; Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements, Interview; Kehat, Harish, Interview.

⁷⁴⁰ *Gemilut chasadim*, "acts of kindness"

⁷⁴¹ Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.

⁷⁴² Assaf, 'Meeting of the Minister with Representatives of the UO Sector - 15/01/2001', 1.

dwelling units, bringing tens of thousands of Jewish families to the predominantly Arab area of Wadi A'ara.⁷⁴³

Designating Harish as an UO city required its re-planning, in order to adjust it to the needs of the sector and the considerations of its new developers. The suburban residential environment that the MCH initially promoted, and which consisted of low-rise cottages along *cul de sac* streets and three-story apartment buildings surrounding a shared courtyard, was far from suitable for the new target group. The lack of suitability was not due to cultural differences, but above all due to the affordability of construction. Consequently, the MCH recommended transforming the approved fabric of private households into a series of larger parcels, containing four-story apartment buildings, with some 20 dwelling units each. Limiting the height of the buildings to four floors derives from the UO sector's avoidance of using electricity during Saturdays, as part of the religious practice of not working on the Sabbath; thus, limiting the option of using an elevator that is required in all high-rise tenements. Additionally, the substantially large size of a common UO family that usually consists of 8-10 members, not to mention the constant presence of multiple baby carriages, would lead to an extensive pressure on the shared elevator system. Turning Harish into an environment of four-story buildings was thus the ultimate solution for housing large UO families.⁷⁴⁴ In order to make the process even more affordable, the MCH emphasised on reducing construction costs, reaching around 500\$ per square meter; less than half the price of a common project. Therefore, the MCH asked to create a concentrated construction effort of 4000 units that could optimise the process and reduce prices further.⁷⁴⁵ This corresponded with the demands of the leaders of the UO sector, as they too believed that it would lead to a significant reduction in construction costs. Moreover, their demand to start with an initial phase of mass construction was also driven from the fear of the possibility that the MCH would eventually not proceed in developing Harish; creating a small-scale, remote and ill-developed settlement, like in the case of Emmanuel.⁷⁴⁶

The re-planning of Harish was based on a new overall vision, rather than simple adjustments, which effected all planning levels. The MCH commissioned Mansfeld-Kehat architects for the task, and the locally renowned firm first began with analysing the overall potential of the site, composing a Skeleton Plan (*Tochnit*

⁷⁴³ Rubenstein, 'Harish Survey', 1–3.

⁷⁴⁴ Kehat, Harish.

⁷⁴⁵ Rubenstein, 'Proposal for the Planning of Harish'.

⁷⁴⁶ Rubenstein, 'Discussion Regarding the Decision for Harish'.

Sheled) for the city that stated the general future vision for Harish; followed by a new masterplan and then by detailed ones (fig 6.24). Focusing on the UO sector the planners encountered several unique issues that usually do not exist in other urban contexts. Besides the previously mentioned issue of height limitations and desired building sizes, Mansfeld-Kehat needed to adjust the needed areas for public buildings and the proposed system of roads. In a usual planning process in Israel, the planners would base all of their calculations according to the overall number of dwelling units. However, while in most cases a dwelling unit consists of 3-4 individuals, in the case of an UO community the number is closer to 7-8. This means that the same number of units would need a much larger quota of public areas, facilities, and infrastructure. Moreover, while the common Israeli family usually relies on the use of a private car, UO families typically do not own a private vehicle, and they would mainly rely on public transportation and internally organised shuttle services. Therefore, the road system had to be based on large transportation vehicles, thus consisting of wider access streets and almost no *cul de sac* paths.⁷⁴⁷ As stated by Haim Kehat, Harish as an UO city basically meant a significantly affordable residential environment for large families that rely on communal transportation.⁷⁴⁸

The changes addressing the new target population changed the city's density, function distribution, layout and even design regulations. The masterplan, which deliberately stated the objective of an UO city, included an overall of 8800 dwelling units, divided into the same three main residential quarters: HaParsa, the northern neighbourhood and HaMagaf (fig 6.25). An additional part was the Central Business District (CBD) that was turned into a mere service-oriented area, due to the usual lack of commercial establishments in UO settlements. While having been previously planned, these compounds had to go through major transformations, including a higher density of dwelling units, to meet the sought population size and combination. Typical for an UO neighbourhood, the masterplan contained several design and planning guidelines, like the instruction to coat 70% of the façades in stone and the permission to construct special *Sukkah* balconies (see chapter V).

While the masterplan was naturally of a more general nature, the detailed scheme for HaParsa neighbourhood was much more explicit, completely changing the previously approved urban fabric.⁷⁴⁹ Except for the already constructed complexes, the new layout consisted of a system of wide continuous access roads, and larger

⁷⁴⁷ Kehat, Harish.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid*

⁷⁴⁹ Mansfeld-Kehat Architects and Planners, 'Local Outline Plan Harish/1/A'.

oblong residential parcels. Accordingly, it generated buildings with a single main façade and three incidental ones that the contractors had to invest less in their development. This scaled version of tract development was based on an optimal ratio between roads and lots as well, grounding the subdivision of the site on the same economic considerations as in a typical Suburban Settlement, yet in a larger context. Respectively, the plan also divided the entire neighbourhood into some 70 different residential compounds, with an intention to tender each of them to a single developer (fig 6.26). Most important, however, was the relative flexibility enabled by the plan, which was manifested in gradual construction, and relatively adjustable instructions for the overall building rights, stating the minimum size of an average apartment (80m²) and a minimum number of units per Dunam.⁷⁵⁰



FIG. 6.24 Masterplan of Harish, 2011. Mansfeld-Kehat Architects (ILA)



FIG. 6.25 Local Outline Plan of HaParsa Neighbourhood Harish, 2012. Mansfeld-Kehat Architects (ILA)



FIG. 6.26 Compounds Plan of HaParsa Neighbourhood Harish, 2012. Mansfeld-Kehat Architects (ILA)

In order to promote the planning process, the Ministry of Interior created a special planning committee for Harish, bypassing the existing planning hierarchy. This committee was autonomous from the district of Haifa, which Harish originally belonged to, and was thus subjected directly to the national level. Becoming an independent entity, the former merger with Katzir was cancelled, and the latter returned to the regional council of Menashe.⁷⁵¹ This would help in accelerating the entire procedure, while also decreasing the public's ability to object to the plan. At the same time, the special committee's decision to approve the plans that designated Harish for the UO sector led to several objections from the general secular public. All of these were declined by the National Appeals Committee, which stated that there

⁷⁵⁰ Mansfeld-Kehat Architects and Planners, 'Local Outline Plan Harish/1/A', 12.

⁷⁵¹ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Local government audit reports', 613.

is no legal impediment in the decision to define the new town as an UO locality.⁷⁵² Nevertheless, the Appeals Committee directed the planners to add possible functions and flexibility to the plan, in case that Harish would be populated by non-UO families.⁷⁵³ Simultaneously to the approval of the detailed plan for HaParsa neighbourhood, the MCH continued planning of the town's remaining quarters.

While in 2001 the UO sector was the only optional target group, by 2010 the situation was entirely different. The global crisis of 2008 had led to severe increases in real estate prices in Israel. Whether it was due to insufficient construction, or the low interest rates that made real estate a solid investment, in 2010 Israel was facing a major housing crisis.⁷⁵⁴ Following the vast public discontent the Israeli Government continued and even enhanced its supply-side housing policy.⁷⁵⁵ Consequently, igniting a vicious circle of increasing property values and increasing profitability of real estate investment.⁷⁵⁶ Subsequently, owning an apartment, even for mere investment, became a crucial component in the economic stability of the average Israeli family. Suddenly, remote housing projects like Harish, turned into attractive pieces of real estate. Additionally, by 2010, the new Trans-Israel Highway had already reached the area of Harish, and the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier nearby had cut the site from the neighbouring Palestinian environment; causing the area to somewhat lose its peripheral and frontier-like image. Consequently, the intentions of the MCH to exclusively designate Harish for the UO sector raised a wide national objection from the secular and National-Orthodox (*dati leumi* - NO) public. In 2012 the Haifa district court ruled in favour of the appeal submitted against the MCH's intentions, forcing it to open the marketing process for the general Israeli public, religious and none religious alike and thus to revoke the discriminating spatial privileges.⁷⁵⁷

⁷⁵² *Ibid*

⁷⁵³ *Ibid*

⁷⁵⁴ Boruchov, 'On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System', 63–65; Eshel and Hananel, 'Centralization, Neoliberalism, and Housing Policy Central–Local Government Relations and Residential Development in Israel', 237–39; Muallem, 'Playing with Supertankers: Centralization in Land Use Planning in Israel: A National Experiment Underway', 269–83; Charney, 'A "Supertanker" Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel', 1223–43.

⁷⁵⁵ Rubin and Felsenstein, 'Supply Side Constraints in the Israeli Housing Market: The Impact of State Owned Land', 266–75.

⁷⁵⁶ Boruchov, 'On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System', 85.

⁷⁵⁷ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Local government audit reports', 619.

The tender and marketing process for Harish turned into a struggle between the UO and non-UO sector. While the different UO streams and communities were already represented by their own housing associations, several secular and NO groups began organising their own associations with the intentions to compete in the open public housing tenders. Tendering compounds to housing associations, and not contractors, was not a new practice for the MCH. While during the 1990s the MCH began preferring private developers due to the associations' lack of experience,⁷⁵⁸ in areas like Harish, which were still not attractive enough for private developers, the housing associations were a useful tool to ignite the first construction stages (see chapter V). Moreover, as these associations consisted of registered members, they provided the potential property owners with certainty regarding the profile of their future neighbours. Thus, enabling the creation of associations with specific ethnic or religious backgrounds, while limiting the inclusion of less wanted families, such as Arabs. In this manner, the housing associations were a sort of an admission committee that guaranteed a solid social group that could secure the appeal of the following construction stages.

The first tender of 2012 proved to be a crucial point for Harish. In the first phase, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) and the MCH tendered out some 4500 dwelling units in 29 compounds. The different participants included several UO housing associations, secular and NO organisations, and a few private contractors. A group of 12 UO associations were extremely organised and were thus able to submit a much higher bid than the other participants. However, their coordination led the ILA to conclude that they were acting as a cartel, thus contradicting the rules of the tender, leading to their disqualification. Eventually, only a single UO association acquired a compound in Harish, as well as two private contractors that were affiliated with the UO sector, making up less than 10% of the overall tendered units.⁷⁵⁹ The majority of the compounds were eventually won by secular and NO associations, and three private developers, who submitted significantly low bids, and eventually sold most of their to associations as well.⁷⁶⁰

Adapting the planned town from an UO-oriented project to a non-UO cliental was not a complicated task. Generally, the Israeli planning law has several specific regulations that are meant to enable some flexibility in the implementation of local outline plans. These enable developers to increase the overall permitted number of

⁷⁵⁸ MCH, 'Construction Through Associations', 137–51.

⁷⁵⁹ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Local government audit reports', 619; Levi, 'Harish for everyone'.

⁷⁶⁰ Levi, 'Harish for everyone'.

dwelling units by 30%, as well the permitted number of floors. This is allowed as long as the total maximum surface area is maintained and the average apartment is not smaller than 80 m².⁷⁶¹ As the planners had initially thought of substantially larger apartments and allowed quite generous building rights, the developers were able to significantly increase the number of apartments and to add up to three additional floors.⁷⁶² Due to the increase in the overall number of apartments, the ratio between residential areas and public uses was also maintained, despite the private households in Harish being much smaller than planned.⁷⁶³

The secular success in the first tenders in Harish re-incorporated the development of the city into the logic of the national real estate market. While just ten years earlier the MCH thought that “*no sane person would like to live in*” Harish,⁷⁶⁴ and that the UO sector was the only possibility to develop the settlement without turning it into an Arab town, in 2011 Harish turned into the real estate project the MCH initially hoped that it would become. As a market-oriented venture, the UO sector that the MCH relied on to save the town, did not stand a chance against the secular and NO middle-class. Subsequently, the ILA and MCH sought to find a new solution for the UO sector, which would provide them with the needed dwelling units in an isolated community while not interfering in the booming real estate market of Harish. To answer these needs and the UO discontent for “losing” Harish, the Israeli Government designated the future town of Kasif for their exclusive use. With its location in southern Israel, it was reasonably far from the expanding demand areas of the Israeli middle-class.⁷⁶⁵

With the state's intentions to accelerate development the MCH began tendering larger compounds, limiting the spatial privileges of the housing associations in favour of large-scale private corporations. In 2014 and 2015 the MCH promoted the authorisation of three additional detail plans for three new neighbourhoods while the Israeli Government declared the city as a site of national priority, promising to direct a total sum of one billion Israeli Shekels to stimulate the town's construction (fig 6.27-6.28).⁷⁶⁶ The accelerated development and planning, and

⁷⁶¹ Ministry of Interior, 'Planning and Building Regulations (considerable deviation from plan)'.

⁷⁶² Kehat, Harish.

⁷⁶³ *ibid*

⁷⁶⁴ Marom, 'Tender 10025/99- HaParsa Neighbourhood- Harish', 2001, 2.

⁷⁶⁵ Abovich, 'After Harish Comes Kasif'.

⁷⁶⁶ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Local government audit reports', 629.

the substantial governmental aid led to an increase in the appeal to the private market. Subsequently, private entrepreneurs would make the vast majority of participants and winners in all following housing tenders. In the third neighbourhood, Or HaMizrah, the MCH chose to tender all of the compounds to a single developer, thus, completing the transition from housing associations to private entrepreneurs. Symbolically, this new corporately developed neighbourhood would be built on the ruins of the former Kibbutz Harish (fig 6.29).



FIG. 6.27 Detailed Outline Plan of HaPrahim neighbourhood (previously HaMagaf), 2014 (ILA)



FIG. 6.28 Detailed Outline Plan of Maof neighbourhood (previously CBD), 2015 (ILA)



FIG. 6.29 Detailed Outline Plan of Tzavta neighbourhood (previously Or HaMizrah), 2015 (ILA). Note in yellow, the houses of the former kibbutz listed for demolition.

The layout of Harish is a spatial arrangement that enabled the recreation of the same housing typology, homogenising the site as in order to promote an optimised pro-market development. Like in the plan of the early 1990s, the basis of the ones from the 2000s was the residential parcel. Nevertheless, while former plans were slightly more varied, the current ones consisted of almost a single type of a residential parcel. As in the mentioned report of the MCH, the residential buildings with affordable and simple layout of four apartments on each floor were the focus of the plans of Harish.⁷⁶⁷ Therefore, as the mentioned elementary floorplan dictated the dimensions of the basic floor plan, the latter eventually created the dimensions of the ideal housing parcel. Respectively, the dimensions of the ideal residential parcel dictated the distance between the roads, creating two rows of buildings between them, while the circular street layout enabled the uninterrupted ride through town and generated the different residential areas. Just like in former plans, the triangular leftover spaces in the intersection between the roads, which due to their shape had little real estate value, were kept for public buildings and open public areas. Therefore, creating the framework needed for the commodification of the future city.

⁷⁶⁷ Rubenstein, 'Proposal for the Planning of Harish'.

The planned density of Harish also implies on the pro-market approach. The initial suburban plan included some 4000 units in a total area of 3021 dunams. Excluding the areas designated for a forest, existing farming parcels and plots for future planning, The early plan was of 1863 dunams, of which 655 were for residential uses. This means that the proposed gross density was 2,2 units per dunam while the net density was around 6 units per dunam.⁷⁶⁸ The new two plans of 2014 and 2015, which dealt more or less with the same site, consisted of a total area of 3564 dunams and 3155 excluding farming parcels and forest area. However, these plans offered some 8500 units and around 880 dunam of residential plots.⁷⁶⁹ Consistently, the new gross density was 2,6 per dunam while the net density was almost 10, and as the former increased by just 20% the latter increased by 60%. Therefore, the overall supply of units was not significantly larger, on the other hand, the potential of each parcel became much more attractive to private developers. Thus, the new plans were mainly meant to improve the rentability of Harish, and less to enlarge the number of planned dwelling units.

For a city of its size, Harish has a significantly limited number of housing types. Essentially, it consists of a single residential model, which the different contractors, developers, and entrepreneurs repeatedly implemented. Surveying more than 150 different permits it is possible to conclude that the basis of almost all residential buildings is the four/five-room apartment. This apartment consists of a shared family area of a living room and kitchen right at its entrance, which forms the apartment's core, with the bedrooms attached to it on the opposite side. Therefore, forming a basic unit with changing possible number of rooms. This model has mainly three different variations, which differ according to the connection between the living room and the kitchen, with a closed kitchen in apartments for the UO sector that prefers a separation between the feminine and masculine spaces, and a fully open one for more secular families (fig 6.30). The outline of the apartment follows the number of rooms creating a broken shape that provides each bedroom with its own window, and the kitchen with a rear service area. A common floor of an apartment consists of four duplicated apartments, and a building would have 4-6 repetitive floors (fig 6.31); with the penthouse and the garden apartment as the exception (fig 6.32). Defining more than 90% of the buildings in Harish, this simple housing type forms the ultimate optimisation of corporate construction, forming an exceptionally basic and efficient model, which could be repetitively implemented and adapted (fig 6.33-6.35). Thus, completing the transformation of the house into a commodity.

⁷⁶⁸ 'Moshe Zur Architects and Planners', 4.

⁷⁶⁹ Mansfeld-Kehat Architects and Planners, 'Local Outline Plan Harish/1/A', 3; Yaar Architects, 'Local Outline Plan Harish/1/b', 3-4.




FIG. 6.30 Types of Apartments in Harish according to the separation between the kitchen and the Livingroom, (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 6.31 A typical floor plan in Harish. (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 6.32 A typical building in Harish. (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 6.33 A group of typical building on top of a commercial floor (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 6.34 A typical building in a terraced option (Illustrated by the author)




FIG. 6.35 A typical building for UO families, note the "jumping" sukkah terraces (Illustrated by the author)

Similar to almost all new settlements built along the Green-Line in the past 40 years, Harish is a housing-oriented development. With the intention to attract as many [Jewish] families to the area, in a relatively short period of time, the MCH and the different planning administrations focused on creating an abundance of dwelling units. These developments, however, almost always relied on the existing social infrastructure as well as the employment and service centres in Gush Dan. Creating purely residential environments was also a tool to promote an image of high living standards, as industry, commerce and businesses did not usually fit the sought tranquil suburban setting. A study of the Office of the State Comptroller of Israel showed that in 2016, more than 70% of the property owners of Harish were employed in the greater Tel Aviv area.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁷⁰ State Comptroller of Israel, 'Local government audit reports', 627.

Besides the common critique that single-use zoning schemes generate ill-planned environments, they also create none feasible local councils. The budget of local councils relies mainly on property taxes. With tariffs for housing being significantly lower than for businesses, it is the taxes collected from the different commercial and industrial properties that enable a local council to maintain a balanced budget. A lack of sufficient business-related uses could lead to a significant deficit, leaving a local council bankrupt, or heavily depending on governmental aid.⁷⁷¹ The same study of the Office of State Comptroller stated that as of 2013, Harish is in need of additional 930,000 m² of commercial uses, just for the council to avoid a deficit.⁷⁷² In order to protect the council from an economic crash, the ILA is currently seeking to involve Harish in some of the newly developed industrial areas close by; making sure that the new city would receive a portion of the property taxes paid there. Therefore, enforcing additional state interventions in order to continue stimulating the market.

With the intentions of stimulating investment, the development of Harish was accompanied by a vast and aggressive marketing strategy. While the suggestions for such a campaign during the 1990s remained on paper, by 2015, Harish would become more a PR campaign than a housing project. The first advertisements and promotions were carried out by the housing associations that competed in the first tenders, which sought to admit as many members as possible. Beside the emphases on affordable housing possibilities, reasonable commuting distances and the usual affinity to nature, the associations focused also on the sense of community, and on the right of the non-UO sector to live in Harish. In that sense, asking to purchase an apartment in the new city became an act of civil protest, and the housing associations commonly used slogans like “*our Harish*” and “*Harish for everyone*”. A much better slogan was “*Harish is Green, not Black*”, emphasising the struggle between the UO sector [Black] and the aspirations of secular families for a suburban community [Green].⁷⁷³ With private developers taking over, their marketing strategy had some similar features, which is perhaps best represented in *HarishCity*. This is a private internet platform, consisting of a website, Instagram and Facebook page, and concentrates all the development updates and advertisements of all entrepreneurs active in the city. Consistently, it is focused on promoting an image of a young community, living in affordable houses with high living standards, which is of course surrounded by nature, yet close to all urban centres. The green-washing campaign continued in the rebranding efforts made by the Harish local council, which included

⁷⁷¹ Local Government Administration, ‘Economic Resilience of Local Authorities’.

⁷⁷² State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 623.

⁷⁷³ Eitiel, ‘Harish is Green, not Black’.

changing the previous neighbourhoods' names of *HaParsa* (horseshoe) and *HaMagaf* (boot) to more appealing ones, like *HaPrahim* (flowers), *HaHoresh* (Grove), *Maof* (bird flight) *Avne Hen* (Gems) and *Tzavta* (together). The fierce PR campaign included endless colour pieces that intended to promote the same young image. Noticeably, almost all promotion articles included an interview with Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, a lesbian couple that owns and operates a local diner named *HaMangalistiyot*; thus, adding some pink-washing to the previous green-washing attempts while promoting the appearance of a young and open-minded community (fig 6.36).⁷⁷⁴



FIG. 6.36 Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, 2019. Gil Elyahu, (Haaretz); Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, 2019 (Harsih 24); Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, 2019. Yaron Sharon. (ynet)

To promote the construction of the new city, the Israeli Government enacted an ever-growing supply-side approach that included repetitive attempts to create a market. Respectively, the recent strategy is aimed to make Harish a project that is “too big to fail”, enlarging its municipal borders and its intended target population. Harish was Netanyahu’s promised *Supertanker*, flooding the market with tens of thousands of new dwelling units. However, as shown by Boruchov, this approach eventually keeps igniting the national real estate market, leading to additional increases in housing prices, instead of lowering them.⁷⁷⁵ Not surprisingly, according to the estimations of the MCH, half of the apartments in Harish were bought by investors that rent out their new properties, relying on the received monthly rent to exceed the mortgage returns they pay.⁷⁷⁶ No wonder that the constant rise in the property values in Harish is repeatedly used as a marketing tool for new housing projects in town.⁷⁷⁷ Thus, the success of the city that was built in order to fight the increasing real estate prices is proven by the increase of real estate prices.

⁷⁷⁴ Shaked, ‘Eyal Berkowitz: “I Recommend young couples to think of Harish”’; Patilon, ‘Derech Eretz Avenue continues to populate: Get to know the new businesses’; Arad, ‘You will be recorded in history as the first reporter to write anything good about Harish’; Ynet, ‘Harish: not what you thought’.

⁷⁷⁵ Boruchov, ‘On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System’, 63–64.

⁷⁷⁶ Levi and Bahor-Nir, ‘Harish: A City for Rent’.

⁷⁷⁷ Cohen and Horesh, ‘How to Market 86 Buildings in Harish When the market slows’.

6.6 Conclusions: the architecture of exchange-value

Harish represents the gradual financialisation of the national project of settlement development. Along its different phases, from the kibbutz and to the future city of Israel, one could easily identify the manner in which the settlement mechanism transformed and how the conceived space changed accordingly. Correspondingly, along the different phases, the state granted a variety of selected groups diverse spatial privileges in order to promote the national geopolitical agenda. In the rural and neo-rural phases, the state sought to attract pioneer settlers by granting them the *power to cultivate* and exclusively inhabit space. As these attempts were unsuccessful, the government sought to turn Harish into a Suburban Settlement, attracting developers by giving them the *power to construct* and commodify space, and young privileged families by offering them the *power to consume* it. The objective was to create an appealing suburban environment and to entice upper-middle-class families to move to the area, which would then generate an image of an attractive suburb and enable the settlement's further development. As the area was still a geographical periphery, both the developers and the upper-middle-class families were not interested in the spatial rights the state wanted to provide. To solve this market failure while preventing the formation of an Arab town, the state focused on the *power to exclusively use* space, as a means to appeal to Ultra-Orthodox sector. With the housing crisis and the Israeli Government's attempt to expand the existing areas of demand into its internal frontiers, it focused on encouraging the appeal of Harish to private developers with the help of affordable tenders and a speedy planning procedure. Therefore, the financialisation of frontier settlement occurred when the *power to speculate* in spatial development turned into the leading method to stimulate entrepreneurs, contractors and investors to develop the frontier and to complete its domestication.

With the financialisation of the settlement mechanism, its architectural and urban characteristics transformed and turned into by-products of the new mode of production. Consequently, while early plans focused on the private household, later ones focused on the residential parcel as a means to optimally subdivide a given area into an ideal amount of private lots. As spatial speculation became the leading force behind frontier settlement, the emphasis on the *use-value* of the private parcel, gave way to a growing focus on its *exchange-value*, and how to efficiently and feasibly extract the economic potential of a given site. Consistently, while re-planning Harish, the emphasis was on subdividing the site into a system of residential parcels, which

would enable private entrepreneurs to generate an optimal layout and number of apartments. Respectively, as Harish turned into a high-rise residential environment, the number of units did not significantly increase. The net density of a residential parcel, on the other hand, substantially rose. Accordingly, increasing the rentability of the residential area in order to turn the planned units into constructed ones.

As *exchange-value* took the lead, architecture turned into the art of optimally using the building rights of a given residential parcel in order to generate profit. Not by chance that almost all of the buildings in Harish followed very similar spatial features. With a few minimal variations between the different apartments, the buildings in Harish were three-dimensional grids that generated cubic commodities. With some design nuances in façades, meant to create a seemingly unique envelope to the same reproduced volume, the new financialised environment completed the transition from the state-led reproduced urban environment of the 1950s and 1960, to the a reproduced corporate-led quasi-urban landscape of the 2010s.

While neoliberal development is usually used as an antonym to state intervention, Harish proves the opposite. Though allegedly, the neoliberal agenda as a market-oriented approach should lead to the decentralisation of society and its economy, followed by a decrease in national and political interests, *de facto*, this is rarely the case. To create a market in Harish that private developers would invest in, the Israeli Government thought in an “*if you build it, they will come*” approach - repeatedly investing public funds to enlarge the project and create a pro-business environment that would appeal to private developers. As the same time, as the role of the state only increased, similar to a neoliberal development approach, it was used to enforce the logic of the market on all aspects of the urban system.⁷⁷⁸ Eventually, promoting real estate speculations in order to domesticate the national frontier. Therefore, the measures enacted in Harish, turned the planning process and planning system into the “*new ally of market forces*”,⁷⁷⁹ and the market forces into the ally of the greater national territorial project.

⁷⁷⁸ Brenner and Theodore, ‘Cities and the Geographies of “actually Existing Neoliberalism’’, 349–79.

⁷⁷⁹ Lovering, ‘Will Recession Prove to Be a Turning Point in Planning and Urban Development Thinking?’, 238; Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1238.

7 Conclusions

7.1 Ends and means, tools and products

My first time visiting a settlement was in November of 2008 when I had to spend a weekend in Yitzhar. Located in the heart of the West-Bank and populated by one of the most extreme, right-wing fanatic groups of settlers, Yitzhar was basically the last place for a gentile like myself. In order not to arouse any suspicions or to quarrel with my weekend neighbours, I could not refuse an invitation of one of the families for the traditional Shabbat dinner. To avoid the awkward silence around the supper table, and in an attempt to be kind to my hosts I thought it would be a good idea to compliment them and stated that they had a lovely panoramic view. The husband, Niryah, who would later be arrested by the Israeli forces for alleged terrorism, was highly offended from my attempted compliment and stated angrily that “*we are not here for the view*”.

Niryah's comment was in the back of my mind during my entire fieldwork, especially while conducting interviews. Dealing with case studies that most Israelis would consider as light-settlements, or even as non-settlements due to their location west of the Green-Line, I was not surprised that most of my interviewees spoke with a mixture of national and personal interests. Mentioning the “*quality of life*” on the one hand, and the defence and security importance of their settlement on the other, I understood that the image they tried to portray was of an ideological group of people, which also knew how and when to seize the opportunity and upgrade their living conditions by moving to a private house in a new settlement. Thus, ideological but not extremists, and perhaps also opportunists, yet not parasites that abuse the state for their interests. These conversations reminded me of a satirical sketch from the Israeli *HaHamishia HaKamerit* television program of the 1990s, where one of the actors, Rami Heuberger, plays a role of a settler who is trying to explain the qualities of living in a West-Bank settlement:

“Look at this view. Vegetation, boulders, rocks, animals ... you have everything here. Look at the horizon how bright it is. Look at the houses, how nice they are... the kids are playing in the yard. Look at how everything was built here with faith, love, honesty... Do you feel the breeze? Do you see the skies? Aren't they bluer here? Breathe! Breathe! It's not Tel Aviv here, you can breathe with all the lungs... You know, I open my eyes here in the morning, birds on the windows, sunsets over the mountains... This house, for example, built to stand for years, three floors. With room for many children, and grandchildren 'Inshallah'... The basketball that I installed in the yard... The pool is almost finished, just left to pave around it... And I'm not a religious person, but add to all of this the sense of mission, and the power of the concept of ancestral land, which all have real meaning here, a tangible one ... isn't worth 1,200,000 [shekels]?”⁷⁸⁰



FIG. 7.1 Screen Shots of Rami Heuberger in “HaHamishia HaKamerit”, 1995. (youtube)

In a settler-chic look of a military *Doobon* coat, a chequered flannel shirt and a moustache, yet lacking the religious yarmulke headcover, Heuberger exhibits a typecast image of a secular Israeli settler. Surrounded by white cubic houses with red-roofs and a Caterpillar truck, the scene depicts a stereotypical *quality of life* settlement. Starting with the natural landscape and vivid community life, then mentioning the quality of houses, national pretensions, and ending with real estate value, Heuberger’s monologue illustrates the fusion of ends and means, objects and tools of the Israeli settlement project. This is precisely the settlement mechanism, which perhaps has a main territorial objective, yet always included additional intentions and purposes; starting from the Jewish national renaissance through agricultural work and ending with the current market-led development. Nevertheless, the privatisation of this mechanism meant that its additional purposes were of an individualistic nature, unlike the former spiritual national endeavours or state-led socialisation plans. Thus, using personal interests of self-fulfilment, seclusion and investment as settlement tools, meant to promote the national geopolitical agenda while producing a variety of new architectural and urban models.

⁷⁸⁰ Tzur, *HaHamishia HaKamerit*.

7.2 The privatised settlement mechanism

The settlements described in this thesis illustrate the gradual privatisation of the national settlement project. As we have seen, the larger objective remained the state's *power over* space, achieved through the construction of new settlements in the former frontier area of the Green-Line. Yet, to ensure their unceasing development, the state constantly sought to involve a variety of private organised families, developers and entrepreneurs, using different settlement tools, which were the spatial privileges that gave these new agents the *power to* produce, consume and market space.

With the increasing privatisation, the national settlement project went through different privatisation phases, each with its own settlement mechanism, which progressively included more organised and economically efficient private allies. Starting with the first case studies of the Community Settlements during the early 1980s, through the Suburbanisation of the 1980s and 1990s, and up until the recent corporate-led development, it is possible to notice a continuous process where the settlement agents turned into private entrepreneurial corporations, and the spatial rights they were granted became real estate oriented. In this sense, the privatisation of the settlement mechanism was intended to increase the profitability and rentability of the planned residential environments, turning them into “*bankable*” projects,⁷⁸¹ in order to enhance the national territorial agenda. Thus, the state adopted a non-interventionist *laissez-faire* approach, meant to eventually increase its control; turning the settlements of the Trans-Israel highway into a privately developed national project, just like the road that passes between them.

Each of the different settlement mechanisms generated its own architectural and urban typologies. As we have seen in all previous chapters, the location of the new settlements was dictated by the territorial aspirations of the state. Nevertheless, while the strategic geopolitical agenda created new ink spots on the map, the different settling agents which the state relied on dictated how these spots would be materialised. Therefore, as the *power to* produce and consume space turned into the leading settlement tool, the transforming settlement mechanism constantly produced new architectural and urban products.

⁷⁸¹ Rolnik, *Urban Warfare: Housing under the Empire of Finance*, 95.

In the early privatisation phases, the Community Settlement in itself was still a settlement tool, and not yet a mere outcome of economic calculations. As the state initially retained its role as the planner and developer of the new sites, it attracted organised groups by granting them the *power to* exclusively populate a small-scale ex-urban settlement. In this case, the appeal was to the desires of the settling groups for a pioneer-like experience away from the cities its members originated from. Consequently, the different planning administrations imitated former rural models, which though lacking all means of production, were supposed to replicate some of the communal values of previous pioneer settlements. On the one hand, the Community Settlements symbolise the primary transformations in the settlement efforts; disconnecting them from the former coalition with physical farming and labour while starting a new one based on individualistic self-fulfilment interests. On the other, as the state still reserved its *power to* produce space, the architectural and urban characteristics of the new settlements were an outcome of pre-privatisation mechanism.

As a neo-rural territorial tool, the new Community Settlements were far from being luxurious suburban communities to begin with. Affected by earlier settlement patterns and featuring several pioneer-like residues, they consisted of spartan houses in peripheral locations. At the same time, unlike the former pioneer rural settlements that formed a physical and spiritual *avante garde* alike, the Community Settlements were mainly intended to function as segregated homogeneous localities. The individual interests of the settling groups changed as well, and while the Community Settlement first began as an attempt to create a contra to city life by establishing ex-urban communities, they eventually turned into an integral part of the expanding national suburbanisation process. Consequently, “*quality of life*” was not measured by the remoteness from urban centres, but rather by luxurious living standards and short commuting distances.

The transformations in the Community Settlement model corresponded with the growing ability of private actors to produce space which shifted the focus from communal aspects to individual and corporate interests. Subsequently, the first phases consisting of an array of small private households sharing a communal open space and a public core, gave way to more house-oriented typologies, which focused on detaching the family from the greater collective context. Respectively, the emphasis was on car accessibility and on generating detached private parcels to be developed by their future residents. Later on, with the growing involvement of private developers, these urban and architectural typologies of self-fulfilment gave way to repetitive and economic-efficient housing models. Thus, completing the shift from the *power to* customise space by the individual, to the *power to* commodify it by the developer.

With the suburban turn of the 1980s, the *power to produce space* became the focus of the settlement mechanism. Compatibly, while in the late 1970s the spatial rights granted by the state were manifested in the ability to settle secluded ex-urban communities, the suburban efforts of the 1980s relied on the *power to affordably construct spacious houses in a reasonable distance from the Tel Aviv metropolis*. Being a substantial spatial privilege, it was granted by the state either to favoured groups, like members of a ruling political party, large unions and the military, or to well-connected developers that obtained the permission to develop a certain site. These “*private initiative settlements*”,⁷⁸² as the different administrations referred to them, witnessed minimal professional involvement of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, and thus followed the desires and aspirations of their settlers and developers. Therefore, as the *power to develop new settlements* became the main territorial tool, the architecture and layout of the new site were a product of the new settlement mechanism. Correspondingly, advertising campaigns were limited, and they were used only as a backup to the exclusive mouth to ear marketing efforts. The suburban lifestyle was thus not a means, but rather an artefact of the newly enacted settlement tool.

The suburban turn of the mid-1980s illustrates the changes in both consumption patterns and production apparatus of housing and residential environments. In the attempts of the state to involve the upper-middle-class in its territorial project, it granted its members the ability to develop new settlements. Consequently, the new residential environments followed this class’ new individualistic forms of consumption. On the level of the house, this was echoed in the recurring attempt to create a private and secluded family area, which is cut off from the surrounding environment, and the frequent use of the split-level unit. The external use of vegetation, fences, walls and closed facades, and the inner orientation of the different uses, generated an urban system that is subdivided into smaller entities which have no relations one to the other. In this sense, the suburban private parcel is similar to Leibniz’s *Monads*, which are self-sufficient substances that form the universe. They are coordinated one to the other, yet there is no causal relationship between them, as they “*have no windows through which something can enter or leave*”⁷⁸³.

The mass-suburbanisation phase and the supply-side policy the state promoted during the 1990s formed a new privatised settlement mechanism. The gentrification efforts of the 1980s created the appeal to live along the Green-Line, depicting it

⁷⁸² Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 8.

⁷⁸³ Leibniz, *Monadology*, 219.

as a natural and pristine environment, populated by well-established communities. Subsequently, the state-led planning, tendering, and promotion efforts of a decade later turned the area into a flourishing real estate market that attracted additional families, contractors and investors. While initially, the intentions included a reliance on organised housing associations, the increasing public appeal and the growing economic potential enabled the state to rely on larger developers. Therefore, going one step further in the privatisation process and turning the *power to* commodify and market space into the main settlement tool. With the commodification of the newly built environment, the state hoped to generate a process of supply and demand that would lead to the continuous development of the area and complete the domestication of the frontier. Correspondingly, profitability, marketability, and rentability became leading values of the settlement mechanism. Urban and architectural planning thus turned into a framework intended to promote market-oriented environments and profitable dwelling units. Harmoniously, the shift towards the self-sufficient monads, suited the new modes of production, which used the new parcel-oriented approach in order to subdivide a given site into a series of marketable residential lots. Therefore, while Allweil depicts the development of Israeli settlements as a housing regime,⁷⁸⁴ by the 1990s it is more accurate to refer to it as a commodity regime; as the use-value of housing gave way to its exchange-value.

The commodification of the built environment was a one-way street that eventually turned architecture and planning into by-products of the privatised settlement mechanism. Once the state endorsed the market-oriented approach, there was no possible way back. Therefore, in the case of a '*market failure*', as we have seen in Tzur Yitzhak, the state and its planning agencies supported new outline plans and adjustments in order to meet the speculative interests of private developers, and to ensure that the planned dwelling units would eventually become concrete dwelling units. Therefore, the rights granted to private entrepreneurs included a substantial *power to* plan space and to turn it into a feasible residential project. Subsequently, the state financialised the settlement mechanism, creating a market that would become the main ally of the territorial agenda, and later dictate the formation of the built environment. This would reach a pinnacle in the case of Harish, which transformed greatly in the past forty years, concluding in the current corporate-led urban project. With the different attempts used by the state to ignite the process, it was eventually the market-oriented and financial-minded approach, which relies on ever-increasing investment that became the main driving force behind the development of the future city of Israel.

⁷⁸⁴ Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 5.

7.3 A privatising settlement mechanism

Over the surveyed forty years of privatisation, the role of the individual in the national settlement mechanism changed drastically. While in the Community Settlement the individual retained some of the pioneer characteristics and features, these seemingly self-sacrificing attributes gave way to the individualistic interests of better living standards in the Suburban Settlement. Consequently, the farmer or pioneer, who enhanced the territorial efforts by his plough, was replaced by the upper-middle-class commuter. This *neo-settler*, as referred to by Yacobi and Tzfadia,⁷⁸⁵ promoted the national territorial agenda by his private house and the distance covered by his car during his daily commute. Finally, the market-oriented financial development would replace the commuter with the shareholder, who is willing to take part in the national project by literally owning a piece of it. Real estate, therefore, turned into the last virtue of the patriot.

The changes in the role of the individual in domesticating the Green-Line corresponded with the way the state chose to enforce its power. According to Kim Dovey's analyses of the spatial mediation of power, which we already discussed in the introduction chapter, there are five different modes the state is able to ensure the individual's compliance: force, coercion, manipulation, seduction, and authority.⁷⁸⁶ *Force* is a situation in which the individual basically has no choice other than compliance, just like the Palestinians who lived in the area in 1948 and were forced to leave. *Coercion* is compliance made due to the fear of the consequences; which is the dilemma of many of the Mizrahi immigrants that the government settled in the area during the 1950s, who feared that lack of obedience would cut them off the welfare system. *Manipulation* is when the individual is tricked to think that one is acting out of free choice, like the pioneer-like settlers of the late 1970s. *Seduction* is when the individual is lured by one's desires, just as in the ability to produce space in the 1980s and 1990s.⁷⁸⁷ Therefore, the spatial privileges granted in the Community Settlement and the suburban ones turned the favoured groups they were granted into settlement agents; enhancing the state's spatial dominance while freely incorporating more individuals in its territorial agenda.

⁷⁸⁵ Yacobi and Tzfadia, 'Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel', 1–19.

⁷⁸⁶ Dovey, *Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form*, 3.

⁷⁸⁷ Dovey, 10–12.

Tying individuals to the state by turning them into homeowners was a common practice during the 20th century.⁷⁸⁸ Correspondingly, the famous quote of US president Roosevelt that America as “*a nation of homeowners, of people who own a real share in their own land*” is an invincible power, highlights this assumption further.⁷⁸⁹ Therefore, as *shareholders* in suburbia, citizens are *seduced*, by the ability to form their own exclusive communities. Segal and Weitzman, and Gutwein as well, state that as Israelis become homeowners and shareholders in the settlement enterprise they will more likely affiliate themselves with the right-wing territorial agenda and its representatives in the parliament; ensuring the continuous role of right-wing political parties.⁷⁹⁰ Nevertheless, while the seduction mechanism spoke of metaphoric shareholders, in the financialised mode of production, the speculating individuals and investors became real shareholders, tied not only to the continuation of the settlement enterprise but also to its constant growth. Therefore, while the mentioned modes imply on overt attempts to enforce the state’s *power over* space, the financialisation of the settlement mechanism is closer to the mode of *Authority*, which is embedded in the social structure, and is thus an undisputable given fact and the most useful means.⁷⁹¹

As described by Rabinowitz and Vardi, the Israeli neoliberal turn was accompanied by an undisputed consensus in favour of privatisation, which turned *laissez-faire* into the only means to improve and optimise the state apparatus.⁷⁹² This widespread support, they claim, was not an outcome of a greater conspiracy, but rather a contra to the decades-long state-controlled economy, and due to the perception of Israel as a state facing constant war threats, whose government should focus on security and defence while leaving marginal issues, like the economy, aside. Therefore, turning market economy into the natural way things are supposed to be done.⁷⁹³

⁷⁸⁸ Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America*; Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States*, 45–72; Hayden, *Redesigning the American Dream: Gender, Housing, and Family Life*, 3–38; Vale, *From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors*, 92–104; Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 17–19.

⁷⁸⁹ quoted in Archer, *Architecture and Suburbia: From English Villa to American Dream House, 1690-2000*; and in Allweil, *Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011*, 17.

⁷⁹⁰ Segal and Eyal, *A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture*; Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation’.

⁷⁹¹ Delso, ‘Concrete Punishment: Time, Architecture and Art as Weapons in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict’, 60.

⁷⁹² Rabinowitz and Vardi, *Driving Forces : Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures in Israel*, 11–27.

⁷⁹³ Rabinowitz and Vardi, 15–18.

Accordingly, by harnessing the development of the Green-Line to the seemingly natural process of the '*free market*', the state was able to turn its territorial project into an integral part of the social structure.

As an ethno-territorial project, the privatisation of the settlement mechanism was a means to improve the state's geopolitical apparatus and to eventually nationalise space. As seen in the case studies analysed along this thesis, the selective privatisation measures were enforced by the state in order to relocate a specific type of population to a given area, granting them privileges that enabled them to consume and/or produce space. Therefore, privatisation was not simply a tool to fulfil the national settlement agenda, but actually an integral part of it. The state-directed gentrification process, as well as its support of exclusive measures like admission committees and housing administrations, ensured that the '*free market*' would serve certain geopolitical aspirations while preventing the Arabisation of space. This ethnocentric privatisation process, or '*privati-nation*',⁷⁹⁴ was a clear attempt to adjust the '*free market*' to the state's territorial interests while enhancing the existing ethnic segregation and polarisation. Therefore, the Trans-Israel settlements were not only an outcome of a privatised national project but also a national project of privatisation, as the increasing involvement of the '*free market*' only boosted the state's involvement and its control over space.

7.4 Post-socialist neoliberalism?

The privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism constitutes a local implementation of a global phenomenon. Besides the unique geopolitical agenda that is omnipresent, this process is exceptional in the manner it was executed. While the main texts regarding neoliberalism discuss it as a return to power of the pre-war financial elites and their economic and societal values, the case of Israel is significantly different. Being a relatively young state with an ethnocentric quasi-socialist background, Israel lacked an old economic hegemony. Therefore, the privatisation of the local economy did not conclude in the revival of old financial elites, but rather in the formation of a new one. This consisted of well-connected

⁷⁹⁴ Yiftachel and Avni, '*Privati-nation*'– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps', 225–26.

individuals that either benefited from their former role as governmental contractors, becoming leading entrepreneurs, and ones that used their connections to purchase state-owned corporations.

Correspondingly, in the settlement mechanism, it is possible to identify two main groups. Either previously small contractors that turned into large-scale concerns, or formerly public or state-owned companies that were sold to well-connected businessmen and entrepreneurs. *Ashtrom* and *Ashdar*, for example, which in the late 1970s supplied the prefabricated concrete units for the frontier Community Settlements, by the early 2000s turned into a billion-dollar concern, involved in real estate, infrastructure, and holdings. Among its different projects are numerous residential neighbourhoods and high-rise buildings in the area, as well as some of the construction works of the Trans-Israel Highway. Another example is *Shikun U'Binui*, which was previously owned by the socialist central workers' union, the *Histadrut*, purchased by the *Arison Group* it became involved in large-scale high-rise residential projects such as in Shoham or Tzur Yitzhak while forming one of the main forces behind the Trans-Israel Highway as well.

The liquidation of the state-controlled monopoly over the development of the built environment did not conclude in a greater competitive market that benefited the end users, but rather in a private cartel that is able to continuously protect its interests. As noted by Rabinowitz and Vardi, the termination of the Israeli state-monopoly resolved in a severe market concentration, where a small number of post-governmental firms controls the industry, in all its aspects.⁷⁹⁵ As shown in this thesis, these unique circumstances, which one could refer to as post-socialist neoliberalism, are significantly apparent in the settlement mechanism. The development of all case studies was eventually controlled by a restricted number of developers and contractors, directing the process and concluding in larger concentrated construction segments.

As private entrepreneurs became the main executors of the state's territorial agenda, their leverage steadily increased. Subsequently, their ability to dictate, directly or indirectly, the formation of the built environment increased as well. Eventually, leading to the reproduction of the same housing typologies all across the settlements of the Trans-Israel Highway, whether in Harish, Shoham, or Rosh Ha'ayin; recreating and duplicating the same residential environments. In the long run, the old quasi-socialist monotonous horizontal development towns, which were

⁷⁹⁵ Rabinowitz and Vardi, *Driving Forces : Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures in Israel*, 18–20.

the focus of the national decentralisation efforts during the 1950s and formed the immediate example of alienated housing projects, gave way to the reproduced vertical high-rise suburbs of the 2000s, which were allegedly an outcome of a more liberal economic approach. Therefore, as the state concentration was replaced by market concentration, the former monotonous housing estates were replaced by repetitive market-led residential towers.

7.5 Architecture without architects: the neoliberal version

Every first-year architecture student is able to quote Ludwig Mies-van der Rohe and to state that “*form follows function*”. Compatibly, as the Israeli settlement mechanism consisted of a coalition of private and national interests, its form had to follow a variety of functions. On the strategic level, the form of the different territorial enclaves and exclaves was dictated by the geopolitical considerations of creating a consecutive Israeli sequence. The following smaller levels were then subjected to the relevant phase in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism in which they were produced. Nevertheless, while pro *laissez-faire* approaches usually highlight the self-fulfilment potential in the process of privatisation, with Polanyi mentioning “[private] property in land” as an essential part of the concept “of individual liberty”;⁷⁹⁶ in the case of the Trans-Israel settlements this was quite the contrary. Despite a restricted period during the early 1980s, when a small and very privileged group was able to plan and construct their houses according to their desires and needs, the process indicates a gradual diminishing individual ability to influence the production of space. Even then, these privileges were part of a state-directed gentrification process, intended to enable the corporate development of a given area; as seen in the early Suburban Settlements that were later surrounded by high-rise residential projects that followed them. Thus, briefly enabling self-fulfilment in order to eventually replace it by market-oriented development.

⁷⁹⁶ Polanyi, quoted in Rolnik, *Urban Warfare: Housing under the Empire of Finance*, 151.

Eventually, with the financialisation of the settlement mechanism the form of the built environment had to follow new functions. As private entrepreneurs and investors took the lead, the emphasis was on the profitability of planning and construction. Consequently, as seen in the last case studies of Harish and Tzur Yitzhak, this concluded in a limited number of housing models, which were an outcome of speculative calculations, meant to optimise the distribution of the overall building rights in a given parcel. Therefore, as private investment became the main force behind the development of new residential environments, the role of architects and planners turned into the capacity to create three-dimensional grids of real estate. The planner is in charge of dividing space into marketable parcels, while the architect is in charge of extracting the maximal economic potential out of a given parcel. Fittingly, design is the attempt of creating a unique and singular façade, which camouflages the commodification of the built environment while promoting a seemingly user-friendly environment that hides the financial considerations that produced it.

As entrepreneurial and speculative interests fuelled all recent developments this created the same reproduced housing models all across the Trans-Israel Highway. Similarly, Raquel Rolnik, in her writing on the financialisation of housing production, points out the increasing standardisation which includes the “*uniformization of measurements, materials, components and even forms of execution and management*”, like the example of “*40,000 units... in more than seven Brazilian cities.... following only three different housing typologies*”.⁷⁹⁷ Appropriately, the current financialised housing development mechanism, whether in Brasilia or in Harish, produces a new mode of architecture without architects, the neoliberal version; each with its own unique local implementation. As seen in this dissertation, the Israeli version of architecture without architects, was the final and perhaps the most efficient tactic to ensure the continuation of the national geopolitical project by harnessing it to the rationale of the market. Thus, using state interventions in order to encourage continuous private investments, while constantly forming new housing typologies. In his ground-breaking book, “*The Decline of the West*”, German historian Oswald Spengler wrote that “*Gothic cathedrals and Doric temples are mathematics in stone*”.⁷⁹⁸ Building on Spengler, we could easily claim that housing in the neoliberal age is speculations in concrete.

⁷⁹⁷ Rolnik, 223.

⁷⁹⁸ Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, 44.

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Acronyms

A

AC: Agricultural Centre, the

AFI: Africa Israel Investments Ltd

B

BYOH: Build Your Own House

C

CA: Civil Administration

CC: Central Command (IDF)

CD: Central District

CPALPA: Committee for the Protection of Agricultural Land and Open Areas

CZA: Central Zionist Archive

D

DA: Development Authority, the

DOP: District Outline Plan

DP/DPBC: District Planning and Building Committee

F

FSU: Former Soviet Union

G

GS: Gaza Strip, the

GH: Golan Heights, the

GPO: Governmental Press Office (Israel)

H

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HA: Housing Administration (IDF)

HCJ: High Court of Justice

I

—

IAF: Israeli Air-force

IBC: Industrial Buildings Corporation Ltd

ICBS: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics

IDF: Israel Defence Forces

ILA: Israel Land Authority

ILDC: Israel Land Development Company

INPA: Israel Nature and Parks Authority

ISA: Israel Security Agency

J

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JA: Jewish Agency for Israel, the

JNF: Jewish National Fund, the

JS: Judea and Samaria

K

—

KKL: See *JNF*

L

—

LOP: Local Outline Plan

LP/LPBC: Local Planning and Building Committee

M

—

MCS: Ministerial Committee for Settlement, the

MA/MARD: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

MAI: Ministry of Aliyah and Integration

MD: Ministry of Defence

MEP: Ministry of Environmental Protection

MH/MHC: Ministry of Housing and Construction

N

NA: National Archive (Israel)

NCPC: National Council for Planning and Construction

NCPCPHA: National Committee for Planning and Construction of Preferred Housing Areas

NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations

NHC: National Housing Committee

NIC: National Infrastructure Committee

NOP: National Outline Plan

NRCI: National Roads Company of Israel

NUO: Nationalist Ultra-Orthodox

O

OA: Oslo Accords

OT: Occupied Territories

P

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the

PNA: Palestinian National Authority, the

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the

PA: Planning Administration, the Israel

PWD: Public Works Department

R

RDP: Road Map for Peace

S

SAZF: South African Zionist Federation

SCDC: Samaria Central Development Company, the

SDV: Settlement Division

SDP: Settlement Department

SHUB: Shikun U' Binui

SHUP: Shikhun U' Pituah

SPNI: Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel

T

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TJ: Trans Jordan

U

—

UO: Ultra-Orthodox

UN: United Nations

V

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VADAL: see *NHC*

VATMAL: see *NCPCPHA*

VALKHSP: see *CPALPA*

W

—

WB: West Bank

WBSB: West Bank Separation Barrier

WZO: World Zionist Organization

Y

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YC: Yesha Council

Z

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ZOA: Zionist Organization of America

Glossary

1948 Arab-Israeli War, the: A war fought between the newly established state of Israel and a coalition of Arab countries from May of 1948 to March of 1949. It concluded in the 1949 armistice agreement, which defined the borders of the state of Israel with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. It is referred to as the War of Independence by Israelis. (for the Palestinian Exodus see *Nakba*).

1948 Arabs, the (عرب الثمانية وأربعين, *Arab Al Thamaniya WaArbaeen*; ושמונה ערבי ארבעים, *Arvei Arbaim VeShmone*): A term commonly used in Arabic and Hebrew to refer to the Arab citizens of the State of Israel, meaning the Arabs who staid after 1948. They constitute approximately 20% of the Israel population. Other terms include Israeli Arabs, Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Arab Minority, the Arab sector, the inner Palestinians or the inner Arabs.

1962 New Economic policy, the: Was a name of a series of economic reforms declared in 1962, which included a significant devaluation of the Israeli Lira, linking it to the US dollar, while cancelling its earlier linkage to the British pound.

1966 Recession, the: After the significant growth in the Israeli economy during the 1950s and early 50s, the economy entered an unprecedented recession. It was mainly and due to the cessation of the transfer of reparations money from the German government, and the conclusion of comprehensive national projects.

1967 Arab-Israeli War, the: A war fought between Israel and the countries of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, from 5–10 June 1967 (giving it the name the six-day war). The war ended with Israel taking over the territories of the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. In Arabic it is also known as the *Naksah* (the setback).

1973 Arab-Israeli War, the: A war fought between Israel and Egypt and Syria, during October 1973. (in Israel it is known as the *Yom Kippur* War; in Syria and Egypt as the October war, *Tishreen* War or Ramadan War). Though it concluded in minimal territorial changes, and the borders remained as of the evening of the war, it is considered as an Arab military achievement.

1973 Oil Crisis: Is an energy crisis that erupted before the 1973 Israeli-Arab War and worsened during and after it, when the Arab countries reduced the supply of oil to the Western countries and sharply raising its price as retaliation for their support of Israel.

1977 Economic turnover, the (המהפך הכלכלי; *HaMahapach HaKalkali*): Is the name given to the economic liberalisation program presented by Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich in 1977, shortly after the political of the same year. The plan aimed to liberate the economy from excessive government involvement and to turn the Israeli economy into a liberal free market economy.

1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, the: A treaty signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, witnessed by American President Jimmy Carter. The treaty led to the normalisation of the relations between to states, making Egypt the first Arab country to form official relation with Israel. The treaty included the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula it occupied in 1967, and the dismantling of its settlements and military bases in the area.

1980–1985 Inflation, the: A period of increasing inflation rates that, with an all-time record of 445% in 1984. The inflation was stopped only after the 1985 stabilisation plan.

1982 Lebanon War, the: Initially named Operation Peace for Galilee by the Israeli Government, was a military campaign launched by Israel in Lebanon against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), and other paramilitary organisations that supported it. What began as a limited operation turned merged with the ongoing Lebanese civil war, as Israel formed cooperated with Maronite militias, reaching Beirut. The war ended with the PLO evacuation of Beirut, and an Israeli withdrawal to the south Lebanon Security Belt.

1983 Stock Exchange Crises, the: Was a severe economic crisis in Israel, which was created due to the regulation of securities' exchange rates of the banks, concluded in the nationalisation of the banking system by the Israeli government and with a significant decrease in the public's investment in stocks.

1985 Economic Stabilisation Plan, the (תכנית הייצוב הכלכלית; *Tochnit Hayitzov Hakalkalit*): An economic plan that consisted of several steps aimed to reduce the public deficit. The plan, which included a significant reduction in public spending and a sharp decrease in subsidies symbolises the official transition in Israel from a quasi-social democratic economy towards a liberal one.

2011 Social Justice Protests, the: Is a series of protests and demonstrations throughout Israel in the summer of 2011 that focused on several socio-economic issues, with an emphasis on the cost of living and the housing shortage. Following the demonstrations, the Israeli government announced a number of steps to be taken to solve the housing shortage, some of which were already in the process of planning and ratification, while others were presented in response to the demands of the protesters.

100,000 Plan, the (תכנית המאה אלף; *Tochnit HaMeah Elef*): A master plan issued by the Settlement Division of the Jewish Agency to settle 100.000 Jews in the area of the West Bank. The plan is a detailed version of the earlier “Master Plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983” (known as the Drobles plan).

A

Absentees' Property Law (חוק נכסי נפקדים; *Hok Nihsei Nifkadim*): A law issued by the Israeli parliament in 1950. The law appoints a custodian of absentee property for property of Arab refugees including real estate, currency, financial instruments and other goods, and allows rental of such property as well as release and sale.

Agricultural Centre, the (המרכז החקלא; *HaMirkaz HaHaklai*): Is a Settlement Movement established in the pre-statehood years as a joint framework of the Labour Settlement and the agricultural education workers. It is made out of representatives of the Agricultural Labourers' Union (established 1919), which later formed a central part of the Histadrut (established 1920). With the organisational change of the Histadrut in 1994, the Agricultural Centre disengaged from it. It still represents the interests of farmers and rural settlements vis-à-vis the government institutions. Since 2001, the Agricultural Centre, together with representatives of other agricultural organisations and settlements formed a joint body named the Israel Farmers Union.

Al Hamishmar (על המשמר): The official journal of *Hashomer Hatzair* movement, which was published during 1943-1995.

Alignment, the (המערך; *HaMaarach*): Was a political alliance in Israel between the different socialist Zionist parties. The first alignment was in 1965-1968, named the “Alignment of the Unity of the Workers of Eretz Israel” made out of *Mapai* and *Ahdut HaAvoda*, which later merged with other parties, including the Poali Zion and Rafi into the Israel Labour Party (*Haavoda*). The second was during 1969-1984, formed out

of an alliance between the Labour Party and Mapam (the united workers' party). In 1991 it merged into a single party, the Labour Party. Due to the dominance of Mapai, the terms *Alignment*, *Mapai* and *Labour Party* are often used interchangeably.

Aliyah (עלייה): Literally meaning ascent, is a term used to describe Jewish immigration to Palestine, and later the state of Israel. It is common to refer to the first waves of Zionist immigrations in 1882 as the first Aliyah (*Haliyah Harishona*). Jewish immigrants to Israel are referred to as *O'lim* (ascenders), while emigrants are referred to as *Yordim* (descenders).

Alon Plan, the (תכנית אלון; Tochnit Alon): A plan composed by Yigal Alon, the minister of Labour, and submitted to the Israeli government in 1967, a month after the 1967 war under the title "The Future of the Territories and the Treatment of Refugees.". The plan suggested creating a partition between Jordan and the West Bank by annexing most of the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, and the Etzion bloc, to Israel. An autonomous Palestinian territory was to be formed in the remaining areas (if not returned to Jordan). Alon also suggested a Druze state in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and return most of the Sinai Peninsula to Arab control. Though never adopted by the state of Israel, it did form an official guideline.

Amana (אמנה): Is a settlement movement established in 1976 by Gush Emunim, aimed to develop settlements in the West Bank, Golan Heights, Galilee, Negev and Gaza Strip. It was registered as an association in 1978, and later recognised by the World Zionist Organisation.

Afforestation: Is the process of creating a forest in a non-wooded area. In Israel/Palestine the Jewish National Fund (JNF) is in charge of planting trees in places where there had been no forests before and restoring forests damaged by pests, fires, droughts, snow, and the life of trees. These actions are often seen as part of land redemption efforts.

Africa Israel Investments Ltd. (AFI Group; or Africa Israel): Is one of the leading real state and holding groups in the Israeli market. It consists of several sub-companies active in real estate, construction, infrastructure, manufacturing, tourism, and leisure. Formed in 1934 by Jewish businessmen from South Africa interested in investing in Palestine and was named Africa Palestine Investment Limited (Changed Palestine to Israel in 1967). Was active in the local private construction from the early 1950s. Purchased by Bank Leumi in 1970 and Lev Leviev in 1997.

Albeck, Plia (פליאה אלבק; 1937-2005): A former Israeli jurist that dealt with the legal status of the settlements and the area on which they were established. During her work she was in charge of a vast land survey of the West Bank that declared intended to allocate unclaimed and unregistered lands that were then declared as state-owned; thus, legally able to be used for settlement purposes.

Arab League boycott of Israel: A boycott issued by the Arab league initially in 1945 on Jewish products from Palestine, which later evolved into a boycott on Israeli products and to companies dealing and operating in Israel. The boycott was never officially lifted, though it lost its impact after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and later the Jordanian one.

Arabah, the (הערבה): A geographical area in southern Israel. It is a narrow valley stretching from the Dead Sea to the Eilat bay, separating between Jordan and the Negev.

Arafat, Yaser (ياسر عرفات, also known as Abu Amar; 1929-2004): A Palestinian political and military figure. Headed the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and one of the leaders of the armed and paramilitary Palestinian struggle against the state of Israel. Former Chairman of the Palestinian National Authority. Signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, for which he was granted the Nobel Peace Prize. Later, in 2000 lead the “second Intifada” until his death in 2004.

Areas A, B, and C: An administration division of the West Bank area into three categories as a result of the Oslo II Accord. Areas A are under civil and security control of the Palestinian Authority. B areas are under Palestinian civil control but Israeli security Jurisdiction. Areas C are under full Israeli control.

Aretz, the (הארץ; *Haaretz*): Literally meaning the land. A term used by Israelis to refer to the geographical entity of Israel. In contrast to “outside the land” (*Hutz Laaretz, or Hul*), which means abroad.

Ashkenazi (אשכנזי): A term that refers to Jews from western or European origin.

Ashkubit (אשקובית): A prefabricated dwelling unit developed by Ashdar Ltd. Being a modular method it was widely used in the first phases of settlement construction.

Ashtrum ltd (אשטרום): Is a leading Israeli construction company established in 1963. Was initially involved in the development of prefabricated housings named *Ashkubit* and developed into a concern of several subcompanies focusing on construction, real estate, development, and infrastructure.

Austerity regime, the (משטר הצנע; *Mishtar Hazena'a*): is a term used to refer to an economic policy introduced by the State of Israel between 1949 and 1959 (though some restrictions ended in 1952) aiming to create a stable exchange by reducing the use in foreign currency. It was expressed in two main ways: targeting credit and investments, but mainly by restrictions on the purchase of food and consumer goods through the use of fixed allowances.

B

B'Tselem (בצלם): An Israel NGO, founded in 1989 and based in Jerusalem. The organisation focuses on documenting and recording violation of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel (West Bank and Gaza).

Bagatz: see *Supreme Court*.

Barak, Ehud (אהוד ברק; 1942 -): Former Israeli General and Chief of Staff. Was the tenth prime minister of Israel (1999-2001), Minister of Defence (2007-2013), and parliament member representing the Labour Party.

Balfour Declaration, the (November 2, 1917): A statement of British support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” It was made in a letter from Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lionel Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild (of Tring), a leader of British Jewry.

Begin, Menachem (מנחם בגין; 1913-1992): Israeli politician and head of state. Before the establishment of the state of Israel, he was the leader of the paramilitary Irgun Zevai Leumi (Irgun). Founder of the Herut Party and main opponent of the Labour governments from 1948-1977. Israeli Prime Minister (1977-1983).

Beitar (ברית יוסף טרומפלדור; בית"ר; *Brit Yosef Trumpledor*): A revisionist Zionist youth movement founded in 1923 by Ze'ev Jabotinsky. It was affiliated with the *Irgun Zevai Leumi*, and after 1948 with the Herut and Likud parties. It was named after Yoses Trumpeldor, a leading Zionist figure in Palestine that was killed in clashes with local Arabs, but also after the biblical city of Beitar, which was the last stronghold of Simon bar Kokhba in his revolt against the Roman Empire.

Border Police (משמר הגבול; מג"ב; *Magav: Mishmar HaGvul*): part of the Israeli national police force, it constitutes its gendarmerie and is in charge of border security. Along its tasks securing Israeli borders, it is also deployed in law enforcement tasks in the West Bank and in counter-terrorism.

Build Your Own House (בונה ביתך; BYOH; *Bnei Bitcha*): A development method, where a lot is leased or sold to an individual, upon it he is later able to construct a private house of his own design.

C

Camp David Accords (1978), the: A framework agreement signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and led to the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

Central Command, the (פיקוד מרכז; *Pikud Merkaz*): A regional command of the IDF that is in charge of the central area of Israel. This includes Gush Dan, the Sharon, the Shphelah, Jerusalem and the West Bank. The commander of the Central command is the official sovereign in the West Bank.

Checkpoint, a (מחסום; *Mahsom*): A road barrier erected by the IDF in the West Bank, in order to control and manage the flow of people in the area.

Civil Administration, the (המנהל האזרחי; *Haminhal Haezrahi*): An Israeli governing authority established in 1981 in order to replace the former Military government, which is in charge of carrying out all bureaucratic civil matters in the territories Israel occupied during the 1967 and has not formally annexed. Its duties include public services, work permits, travel permits, and building permits.

Coastal Plain, the (מישור החוף; *Mishor HaHof*): A geographical area in Israel that spreads from the Haifa Bay in the north, along the coast, to the Gaza strip in the south. It houses almost 60% of the Israeli population, most of which in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area and that the Haifa metropolitan area.

Community Settlement (יישוב קהילתי; *Yeshuv Kehilati*): A settlement method that evolved mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s, which was based on a homogeneous small group (around 250 families), that usually shared a common ideological background and was interested to form a new settlement of its own. This method was widely used in the development of Jewish settlements in the Galilee and the West Bank.

D

Development Authority, the (רשות הפיתוח; *Rashut Hapituah*): An Israeli governmental agency established in 1951 in charge of managing the absentees' property. The lands managed by the Development Authority are considered to be part of the state-owned land.

Development Town, a (עיירת פיתוח; *Ayarat Pituah*): Is a term used to refer to towns in Israel that were constructed during the 1950s and 1960s in peripheral areas, in the purpose of population dispersal.

Dekel, Michael (מיכאל דקל; 1920-1994): An Israeli politician and parliament member (1977-1988) on behalf of the Likud party. Served as deputy minister of agriculture (1981-1984), where he coordinated the development of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Galilee.

Detailed Plan, a (תכנית מפורטת, *Tochnit Mefuretet*): A zoning scheme which provides sufficient details regarding the dimensions of the possible buildings that could be constructed in its area, according to it a building permit could be issued.

Disengagement Plan, the (*Tochnit Hahitnatkut*, or simply the *Hitnatkut*): An Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and (and parts of Northern Samaria), which included the evacuation and dismantling of Jewish settlements in the area. It was led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005.

District Outline Plan, a (Tamam: *Tochnit Mitaar Mehuzit*): A planning scheme that details the lands uses and functions of a district in Israel, according to the relevant national outline plans. Usually addresses more than one municipal entity. The local zoning plans of each city derive from that of the district.

Drobls, Matityahu (מתיתיהו דרובלס; 1931-2018): Was an Israeli politician and parliament member (1972-1977) on behalf of *Gahal* and the Likud. From 1978-1992 he was a member of the board of the World Zionist Organisation, while he acted as the head of its Settlement Division. In this position, he was in charge of the development of new settlements in the West Bank. He composed the "Master Plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983", which became known as the Drobls plan, and supervised the 100.000 plan.

Dunam, a (Ottoman Turkish: *دونم* ; Turkish: *dönüm*; Hebrew: *דונם*) An Ottoman measurement unit that is an equivalent of 1000m².

E

E'retz Israel (ארץ ישראל): Literally meaning the Land of Israel. A biblical historical term that refers to the territory of the biblical kingdoms of Israel and Judea. Usually used to refer to the geographical area of Palestine, with a more Jewish/Zionist sentiment.

Erlich, Simha (שמחה ארליך; 1915-1983): Was an Israeli politician who acted as parliament member (1969-1983), Minister of Finance (1977-1979) and Minister of Agriculture (1981-1983), all on behalf of the Likud party. Known for the economic reforms he led as Minister of Finance, which constituted the official liberalization of the Israel economy.

F

Fatah (حركة تحرير فلسطين ; فتح ; *Harakat Tahrir Falastin*): A nationalist Palestinian movement, political party and paramilitary group established in 1959. Constituted the largest fraction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, as both were led by Yasser Arafat. Fatah and its sub-groups led the armed struggle against Israel, which defined it as a terrorist organisation in 1986.

Frontier Areas (אזורי ספר): A term used in Israel to define border and undeveloped areas; or areas that are sparsely populated [by Jews]. These include the Galilee, the Green Line area (eastern frontier), the West Bank, the Negev, the Arabah and the Golan Heights. These areas usually considered as “conflict areas” due to their proximity to a “hostile border”.

G

Gahal (גוש חירות ליברלים; גח"ל; *Gush Herut Liberalim*): Was the leading main right-wing political party, headed by Menachem Begin during the 1960s and early 1970s. It was formed as a merger of the Herut Party and the Liberal Party in 1965. In 1973, it merged with other smaller parties forming the *Likud*.

Galilee (הגליל; الجليل): A geographical area in northern Israel that borders Lebanon in the north, the Mediterranean in the west, the Jordan River in the east and the Jezreel valley in the south.

Gari'in, a (גרעיין; Pl.: Gari'inim): Hebrew for Kernel. Used to refer to the initial core of a settling group, which would carry out the first phases of foundations. A Gari'in could be a civilian one, belonging to one of the settling movements, or a military one, as part of the Nahal corps.

Gaza Strip, the (רצועת עזה; *Rezuat Aza*; قطاع غزة ; *Qita' Ghazza*): is an autonomous Palestinian Zone, 51 km long and 11 km wide, that borders Israel in its north and east, the Mediterranean in its west and Egypt in its south. Part of the British Mandate over Palestine it was under Egyptian rule between 1948-1967. It fell under full Israeli occupation in 1967, and in 1994 became part of the Palestinian National Authority, though Physically disconnected from the West Bank. After Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, it fell under a full closure and blockade by Israel, which controls all exits and entries to the strip. After the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Authority, Gaza became a *de facto* separated authority, as it is administrated by its own different government, different than that of the West Bank. The main cities in the Gaza Strip are Gaza city, Rafah, Khan Younis, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun.

Golan Heights, the (רמת הגולן, *Ramat HaGolan*; هضبة الجولان , *Hadabat AlJoulan*): Is a geographical area in a form of a plateau that borders The Sea of Galilee and the Hula valley in the west, the Yarmuk valley in the south, the Hermon mountains in the north and the Ruqqad valley in the east. It was occupied by Israel from Syria in the 1967 war, and officially annexed to it in 1981.

Green Line, the (הקו הירוק, *HaKav HaYarok*): Is the term used to describe the border between the official state of Israel and the West Bank. Between 1949-1967, it formed the border between Israel and the kingdom of Jordan, it got its name from the colour it was drawn in at the 1949 armistice agreements. After Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, the former international border turned into an administrative and legal one.

Gush Dan (גוש דן): Is a conurbation of cities in central Israel, along the Mediterranean, and Is a part of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Sometimes it is used to refer to the inner ring of cities in the metropolitan (Tel Aviv, Ramat, Givaatim, Bnei Brak, Holon, and Bat Yam), though it is also used to refer to the larger metropolitan area, from Netanya in the north to Ashdod in the south, The Mediterranean in the west and the Green Line in the east. It constitutes the densest area in Israel, and its economic, cultural and civic centre.

Gush Emunim (גוש אמונים): Literally meaning the bloc of believers, was a Jewish religious movement, established in 1974 aiming to develop the Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, and to strengthen the ones in the

Galilee and the Negev. It was highly active in the West Bank during the 1980s and led the construction of dozens of new settlements. Amana organisation formed its executing agency and it is still active (2018), though the movement is no longer active. Politically, the movement was affiliated with several right-wing Jewish orthodox parties like *Moledet* (Homeland), *Mafdal* (National Religious Party, *Miflaga Datit Leumit*), *Tehiya* (Revival) and later *HaBayit HaYehudi* (The Jewish Home).

H

Haaretz (the Land [of Israel]; הארץ): An Israeli daily newspaper, published in Tel Aviv since 1918. Known for its relatively left-wing and liberal agenda.

Haganah, the (ההגנה; Literally meaning the Defence): Was the largest and the main paramilitary organization of the Jewish community and the Zionist movement in Palestine during the British Mandate. It was formed in 1921 and constituted the basis of the IDF with the establishment of the state of Israel.

Heahzut (היאחזות): Literally meaning a handhold, or outpost, is a Hebrew term used to refer to the first phase in the foundation of a settlement, which usually consists of a temporary form of living in a given site, by a small group of people (see *Gari'in*), intended to prepare the ground for the future development.

Herut (חירות): Literally meaning Freedom. Is a former Israeli right-wing political party affiliated with Revisionist Zionism. It was established in 1948 by veterans of the Irgun led by Menachem Begin. It constituted the main opposition for the *Mapai* governments. In 1973, it became the main fraction of the larger Likud list, which came to power in the 1977 elections and merged into one party in 1988.

High Court of Justice (בית המשפט הגבוה לצדק: בג"ץ, *Beit Hamishpat HaGavoah LeTzedek*; Bagatz): One of the duties of the Israeli supreme court, as it deals with petitions against the state, or any other public authority, regarding the legality of governmental decisions and matters of human rights and relief.

Highway 6 (כביש 6): The trans-Israel highway, running from Galilee in the north to the Negev in the south, eastern to the Tel Aviv Metropolitan and adjacent to the Green Line, which began operating in the early 2000s. Constructed in the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) method, it is the first private road in Israel. Officially it is named after Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Histadrut, the (ההסתדרות): Originally named *HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael* (the general organization of workers in Eretz Israel), Was founded in 1920 by socialist parties in order to unite the Jewish workers in Palestine. With the establishment of the State of Israel, some of the organization's activities were transferred to the responsibility of the government. It was long headed by David Ben Gurion (1921-1936), who later became the first Prime Minister. It was considered as the main institution the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine in general, and of Labour Zionism in particular, considered by many as the representative of the *Mapai* hegemony. During the 1980s, the organization began to fall apart until in 1994 it was re-established as the New General Federation of Labour, which focuses mainly on labour union activity.

Hityashvut (התיישבות): A Hebrew term used to describe to act of settlement in a place. In accordance, Yeshuv (a settlement; Pl: Yeshuvim) and Metyashev (settler; Pl: Metyashvim). *The Hityashvut* refers to Zionist settlement enterprise in the entire area of Israel/Palestine, in contrast to the term *Hitnahlut*, which usually refers to the West Bank.

Hitnahlut, a (התנחלות): The Israeli term for a West Bank settlement. A settler is referred to as a *Mitnahel* (Pl: *Mitnahlim*). It is sometimes used as a derogatory term for settlements, while *Hitshavut* and *Metyashvim* are considered as the appropriate ones.

Hitnahlut, the (ההתנחלות): An additional term used to describe the act of settling in a place. Derives from term *Nahala* (allotment), referring to the biblical allotments of the tribes of Israel, where each tribe settled and what is described in Hebrew as *Tkufat HaHitnahlut (the settling period)*. It is used also to refer to the settlement enterprise in the West Bank.

Housing Company, a (חברה משכנת; Hevra Meshakenet): A recognised entity, that is in charge of managing the registration of dwelling units built on state-owned land, and transfer their ownership, from the Israel Land Administration to the individuals that purchased them. In cases where individual registration is not possible (like in the case of the West-Bank), the role of the company as a private registry continuous for years later.

I

IDF (Israel Defence Forces; צה"ל, Zahal: Ztva Hagana LeIsrael): The official name of the Israeli military.

Immigrant camp (מחנה עולים; *Mahane Olim*): A term used for temporary camps were temporarily built in Israel from 1947 until the early 1950s in order to accommodate Jewish immigrants coming to Palestine/Israel. Composed of tents and characterised with low living standards, they were replaced by the Ma'abarot.

Intifada, the First (אינתיפאדה; انتفاضة): Literally meaning *Shuddering*. Was a violent Palestinian uprising against the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza (1987-1991/1993). The uprising was characterised in demonstrations, strikes, stone-throwing, roadblocks, attacks by improvised weapons, kidnapping, and some shooting incidents.

Intifada, the Second (In Arabic the Aqsa Intifada, *Intifadat al Aqsa*, انتفاضة الأقصى; האינתיפאדה השנייה; *HaIntifada HaShniya*): Is a term used to refer to the violent clashes between Israel and the different Palestinian organisations (including the Palestinian Authority) during 2000–2005. It began as a civil uprising, but evolved into armed clashes, shootings, bombings, and suicide attacks from the Palestinian side and sieges, arrests, and airstrikes from the Israel side. Led to the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the construction of the West Bank barrier.

Israel Land Authority (רמ"י: רשות מקרקעי ישראל; ILA, Rami: *Reshut Mekarka'ei Yisrael*): Previously known as Israel Land Administration (ממ"י: מנהל מקרקעי ישראל; *Minhal Mekarka'ei Yisra'el*). A national authority created in 1960 in order to manage the lands in Israel that are owned by the state, the Jewish National Fund or the Development Authority. In total it is in charge of 93% of the lands inside the state of Israel.

Israel Land Development Company (הכשרת היישוב; *Hachsharat HaYeshuv*): It was formed in London in 1909 under the name of Palestine Land Development Company, by the British Zionist Federation in order to act as an executive arm of the WZO in aiding the development of Jewish rural (and later also urban) settlement in Palestine. In 1953 it turned went public and in 1954 it focused on construction and development, and later also on hotels and commercial buildings. In 1988 the Zionist institutions decided to sell the company and it was privatised.

J

Jewish Agency for Israel, the (הסוכנות היהודית; *HaSochnut HaYehudit*; JA): Is an international non-profit Zionist Jewish organisation, founded in 1929 as the executive arm of the World Zionists Organisation (originally as the Jewish Agency for Palestine). During the British Mandate, the JA constituted the representatives

and administrative institution of the Jewish population in Palestine, in charge of education, immigration, governance, and security, laying the ground for the future Israeli government. After the establishment of the state of Israel, the JA concentrated on promoting Jewish immigration (Aliya), education (for Jews outside of Israel), economic development and establishing settlements. The status of the JA (as well as that of the WZO), was formalised by law passed by the Israeli parliament in 1952, which stated that both organisations will retain their responsibilities in supervising and encouraging Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel, as well as the development of settlements. The Settlement Department (not division) of the JA played a significant role in the development of rural settlements in Israel.

Jewish National Fund, the (קרן קיימת לישראל, קק"ל, KKL, *Keren Kayemet Le'Israel*, JNF): Is a non-profit organisation that was founded in 1901, during the Ottoman rule over Palestine, in the aim to raise donations and to purchase, develop and prepare lands for Jewish settlement in the area. The JNF took a leading part in afforestation efforts and the creation of national parks.

Jordan Valley (בקעת הירדן): a geographical area between the Sea of Galilee in the north and the Dead Sea in the south, containing the southern part of the Jordan River. It separates the West Bank from Jordan and since 1967 forms the border between Israel and Jordan.

Judea (יהודה): A Hebrew term that refers to the geographical mountainous area in central Palestine, southern to the Jerusalem mountains, western to the Dead Sea, northern to the Negev and eastern to the southern Coastal Plain. Its name derives from the biblical Kingdom of Judah, and the later Roman name of the province of Judea. It is mainly used to refer to the southern part of the West Bank: the area of Judea and Samaria.

K

Keren Hayesod (קרן היסוד; literally meaning the "foundation fund"): Is the central financial institution for the activities of the World Zionist Organization. It was established in 1920, in order to form the fund-raising agency of the WZO. In 1956, the Israeli Parliament passed a law declaring Keren Hayesod as the official fundraiser of the State of Israel.

Kibbutz, a (קיבוץ; Pl: *Kibbutzim*): A communal socialist rural settlement, that is characterised by strong collective features which included shared ownership of the means of production and a collective budget with minimal private property. It usually

consisted of small-scale community based on agriculture and small industries. The Kibbutzim took a leading role in the pre-state Jewish settlement and formed the ideological role model of Labour Zionism.

Kibbutz Crisis, the (משבר הקיבוצים; *Mashber HaKibbutzim*): Is a term used to refer to the experienced by a large part of the kibbutzim in Israel. It began in the early 1980s and intensified after the 1985 stabilisation program, in which inflation was halted and characterized by the accumulation of large debts by the kibbutzim and a low ability to repay them. This was accompanied by a social and demographic crisis some kibbutzim witnessed. In 1989 and 1996, the Israeli government, the banks, and the kibbutz movements signed two debt arrangements designed to help solve the crisis. The economic and demographic crisis was a major catalyst for change processes many kibbutzim have undergone since the 1990s.

KKL: See JNF.

L

Labour Zionism (ציונות סוציאליסטית; *Tzionot Sotzialistit*): An ideological framework that formed a merger of Zionist ideals with Marxist ones, as it emphasised on creating a new progressive and socialist Jewish society in Palestine, based on communal Kibbutzim and Moshavim and an urban proletariat. It formed the leading ideological framework in Zionism through the 20th century in general, and that of the Labour Movement and the *Mapai* party in particular.

Land Redemption (גאולת אדמה; *Geulat Adama*): A term used to refer to the action of land acquisition and reclamation by Jews in Palestine, perceived as an act of redeeming the land of Israel to its historical inhabitants and a part of the rebirth of the Jewish nation in its historic homeland.

Lehi, the (לוחמי חירות ישראל; לח"י; *Lohamei Herut Yisrael*, Israel Freedom Fighters): Was a Jewish underground paramilitary organisation operating against the British Mandate from 1940 until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Lehi was declared a terrorist organization by the Mandatory government, and for a period also by the state of Israel. It was created by former members of the Irgun, that opposed the cessation of the struggle against the British Mandate during WWII. In 1980 the state of Israel recognised the Lehi as one of the pre-state undergrounds that helped in the national armed struggle.

Levi, David (דוד לוי; 1937): An Israeli politician, who acted as a parliament member between 1969-2006 on behalf of several parties that include *Gahal*, *Likud*, *Gesher* and *Israel Ahat*. Levi acted as Minister of Aliyah and Integration (1977-1981), Minister of Housing and Construction (1979-1990) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990-1992; 1996-1998; 1999-2000).

Likud, the (הליכוד): A nationalist right-wing Zionist Jewish political party in Israel. Formed out of the merger of the former *Gahal* and *Herut* parties and constitutes the ideological and political successor of *Herut*. It first came to power in the 1977 elections, while headed by Menachem Begin, and have led several governments since.

Local Planning and Construction Committee (ועדה מקומית לתכנון ובניה; *Veada Mekumit LeTichnon U'Bniya*):

Local Town Planning Scheme (*Tochnit mita'ar mekomit*): Sometime referred to as just Town Planning Scheme (Taba: *Tochnit Binyan Ir*), is a binding legal document consisting of a map and a regulation book, that determines the zoning codes of a town. It details the land uses, street layout, construction area, the height of buildings, the outline of buildings, and number of permitted units. It is in accordance with the regional and national planning scheme. It is authorised by the regional planning committee, and in case it does not have substantial changes, it could be authorised by the local committee.

M

Ma'ariv (מעריב; Evening): Was a leading Israeli newspaper published in Tel Aviv during 1948-2014.

Ma'abara, a (מעברה): Is a term used to define an immigration transition camp in Israel during the 1950s. The *Ma'abarot* were supposed to provide temporary accommodation solution for Jewish immigrant. The *Ma'abarot* were placed in the fringes of existing cities or in former Arab Palestinian towns and villages. They replaced the former immigrant camps (*Mahanaot Olim*). Along the 1950s most of the *Ma'abarot* were dismantled, and many of them were turned into development towns.

Magav: see *Border Police*.

Mahpach of 1977, the (המהפך, the “Turnover” or “revolution”): A term used to refer to the Likud victory in the Israeli legislative election of 1977, which brought an end to the sequence of *Mapai* led governments since 1948.

Mapai (מפא"י: מפלגת פועלי ארץ ישראל; *Mifleget Poali Eretz Yisrael*, The Eretz Yisrael Workers' Party): Is a socialist Zionist party established in 1930 in Palestine, as a merger *HaPoel HaTzair* (the young worker) and *Ahdot HaAvoda* (the unity of work). It constituted a leading force in the Jewish population of Mandatory Palestine, and later the main party in the State of Israel, leading all governments from 1948-1977. For several years it was part of the *Ma'arach* (*the Alignment*). The Israeli Labour Party is considered as its political and ideological successor.

Meretz (מרץ): Is an Israeli-Zionist social-democratic left-wing party. The party was formed in 1992 by the unification of the *Ratz*, *Mapam*, and part of *Shinui*.

Ministerial Committee for Settlement, the (ועדת השרים לענייני התיישבות; *Veadat HaSarim LeInyane Hityashvut*): Is a ministerial committee of the Israeli government-appointed to approve the establishment of new settlements in the State of Israel and the West Bank. Its approval grants the settlement an official status, allowing it to receive municipal and other services. Established in 1982, it operated until 1995, then during 1999-2002, and once again since 2012.

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (משרד החקלאות ופיתוח הכפר; *Misrad HaHaklout VeHapituach HaKfar*): Is an office in the Israeli government responsible for agriculture and rural areas. The Ministry's main activities include planning and development of rural settlements, agriculture, provision of veterinary services, land conservation, drainage and plant protection.

Ministry of Aliyah and Integration (משרד העלייה והקליטה; *Misrad HaAliyah VeHaKlita*): Is a government ministry responsible for implementing government policy in the area of immigrant absorption. Was established in 1968, after operating earlier during 1948-1951.

Ministry of Defence (משרד הביטחון; *Misrad HaBitahon*): Is the government ministry responsible for the security of the State of Israel. The responsibilities of this ministry include the IDF and the government defence and security industries.

Ministry of Housing and Construction (משרד הבינוי והשיכון; *Misrad Habinui VeHashikun*): Is the office responsible for the construction and housing sector in Israel, as well as the creation of conditions that will enable households with reasonable housing opportunities.

Misgav Regional Council (מועצה אזורית משגב; *Moatza Ezorit Misgav*): Is a regional council in the Galilee, formed in 1982, mainly to form the administrative framework for the newly constructed Jewish settlements in the area (*Mitzpim*). It comprises 29 Jewish settlements and 6 Arab villages.

Mishkei Herut Beitar (משקי חירות בית"ר): Is a Zionist settlement movement affiliated with Revisionist Zionism, *Beitar* movement and the *Herut* Party (later Likud)

Mitzpe, a (מצפה): Literally meaning a lookout point. It is used to describe a settlement, which was established as part of the *Mitzpim* plan, that asked to establish Jewish settlements in the Galilee, in a relatively short period of time. The term refers to the settlements' location on a hilltop, providing it with panoramic views. Other settlements may have a name starting with Mitzpe, due to their location as well, though as they were not part of the *Mitzpim* plan, they do not constitute "A" *Mitzpe*.

Mizrahi (מזרחי; literally meaning eastern): A term used to refer to Jews originated from Arab or Islamic countries. This also includes Jews who are members of communities originated from Spain and relocated after their deportation in 1492 to North Africa, Turkey, the Netherlands, Greece, the Balkans or Palestine. Referred to also as Sephardim (or Sephardians), meaning Spaniards.

Moshav, a (מושב; Pl: Moshavim): A rural settlement with agricultural characteristics. Usually consists of private households with differing levels of communal and shared features.

Moshav Ovdim (מושב עובדים; literally meaning a workers' *Moshav*): A rural settlement where each household operated autonomously in regard to labour, finance, subsistence, and consumption. Its communal aspect is manifested in joint administration and mutual responsibility.

Moshav Shitufi (מושב שיתופי; literally meaning a communal *Moshav*): A rural settlement where each household forms an autonomous unit in regard to consumption, housing, and family life. The lands of the Moshav however, as well as the buildings, the means of production and their outcome are considered as collective property, owned by the association of all members of the Moshav. Each family receives a budget, according to its size and needs.

Moshavim Movement, the (תנועת המושבים; *Tnuat HaMoshavim*): Established in 1933 by members of Moshavim to deal with their unique problems vis-à-vis the various national institutions. It is the largest settlement movement in Israel, representing 254 of them. The movement also deals with the representation of the moshavim vis-

a-vis state institutions in all matters relating to members rights to land ownership, agricultural and rural policy in the State of Israel and economic development in rural areas.

N

National Committee for Planning and Construction of Preferred Housing Areas

(Vatmal: *Veada letichnun u'labinya shel mithamim mo'dafei diur*): Formed in 2011 by the Israeli government, it is intended to approve large-scale construction projects on a national level in a rapid manner and to overcome all other plans (with the exception of Tama 35). The promoted plans are large construction plans on state-owned land (750 housing units and 500 minority housing units). The committee consists of representatives of government ministries, 4 from the local government, a planning professional, a representative of the Israel Lands Authority and a representative of a body that deals with the protection of the environment. In 2017 the committee's authorities were expanded also to include private-owned lands.

National Infrastructure Committee (ועדה לתשתיות לאומיות; *Vatal: Veada letashtiyot Leumiyot*): A committee established in 2002 in order to speed up the planning process of infrastructures defined as “national infrastructures”. The committee is vested with the powers of the National Council in the planning and construction of national infrastructures, including infrastructure installations, airports, ports, anchorages, water desalination plants, water and sewage installations including reservoirs, waste disposal and treatment sites, roads, railways, gas installations, mining and quarrying sites, all if the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior declared each of them to be of “national importance”.

National Institutions, the (המוסדות הלאומיים; *HaMosadot HaLeumiem*): Was a term used to refer to the institutions established by the Zionist movement during the pre-statehood years, in the preparation for the establishment of a state. They included: The World Zionist Organisation (WZO); the Jewish Agency (JA); the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and Keren Hayesod.

National Outline Plan (תמ"א: תכנית מתאר ארצית; *Tama: Tokhnit mit'ar artzit*): A plan that applies to the entire territory of the State of Israel, affecting all regional and local planning, as well as issues of public importance, such as the principles of construction and the use of beaches, transportation, and other subjects of national importance. The national outline plan also serves the regional and local committees and guides them in their work.

National Outline Plan 35 (תמ"א 35; Tama 35): Is a national master plan designed to define planning and settlement policy in Israel by 2020. The plan, also called the National Master Plan for Construction, Development, and Conservation, was published in 2000 and approved by the Israeli in 2005. The main objectives of the plan were to “ Respond to the building and development needs of the State while preserving the open spaces and the land reserves for future generations “ The main principles of the plan were the strengthening of existing cities and metropolises, avoiding suburbanization, encouraging mixed land uses and urban renewal, while strengthening public transport, construction of textures, and more. The plan also called for the preservation of green buffer zones between in order to avoid turning Israel into one large built sequence. It was the first plan to recommend not to establish any new settlements (a restriction later exempted in “frontier areas”).

Nahal, the (נוער חלוצי לוחם; נח"ל; *Noar Haluzi Lohem*: Pioneer Fighting Youth): A military corps established in 1948, under the direct orders of prime-minster Ben Gurion, where members of the different Zionist youth movements would be able to serve together, combining military service with educational tasks and other national missions. In the first three decades up to 1978, the Nahal soldiers took an active part, and led the construction of almost 150 new settlements. In 1982 soldiers from the Nahal founded an infantry brigade under the same name.

Nahal Settlement, a (היאחזות נח"ל; *Heahzut Nahal*): A settlement that was initially established by soldiers from the *Nahal*. The first phase would usually consist of an early temporary settlement by a *Gari'in* (a kennel or a seed, that would later evolve into a settlement). The *Gari'in* was in charge of the first preparation stages, and, after a given period, they were handed to a civilian settling group, in what became to be known as a civilizing ceremony

Nakba, the (النكبة , *Al-Nakbah*): Literally meaning catastrophe, is an Arabic term used to describe the Palestinian exodus of 1948, which occurred during the 1948 Israeli-Arab war and included the displacement of around 700.000 people and the evacuation and destruction of some 400 towns and villages.

Naksa, the (النكسة , *Al-Naksah*): Literally meaning the *Relapse*. An Arabic term used to refer to the outcomes of the 1967 war, which concluded in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula.

Negev, the (النقب , *Al-Naqab*; הנגב, *HaNegev*): Is a desert area in southern Israel, bordering Jordan and the Arabah valley in the east, the Red Sea in the south, the Sinai Peninsula in the west and the Judea mountains in the north. It constitutes more than 50% of the area of the State of Israel.

Netanyahu, Benjamin (בנימין נתניהו; 1949-): An Israeli politician and head of state, who acted as UN ambassador (1984-1988), Parliament Member (1988-1999; 2003), Head of Opposition (1993-1996), Minister of Finance (2003-2005), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996, 1998, 2002-2003, 2015), Minister of Defence (2016), Minister of Communications (2014-2017) and Prime Minister (1999-2000; 2008-), all on behalf of the Likud party.

Noar Oved VeLomed, Ha (הנוער העובד והלומד; literally meaning “working and studying youth”): Is a socialist Zionist youth movement established in 1924. It formed the youth movement of the *Histadrut*, Labour Zionism, and the *Mapai* party.

O

Oslo Accords, the: A term that refers to a series of agreements signed by the State of Israel and the PLO, as part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, intended to lead a permanent solution in the area. As an interim agreement, it created the autonomous Palestinian Authority, as a temporary self-governing body, in charge of the newly created areas A+B in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which consists of the major Palestinian cities and towns, while Israel retained its control over all other areas (area C). The agreements included mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel. It left the issues of the nature of the Palestinian State and its borders, the status of Jerusalem and the question of Palestinian refugees to be dealt with in later agreements.

Outpost (מאחז; *Maahaz*): A term used to refer to a Jewish settlement point in the West Bank, which did not receive the permission of the state or the other authority.

Oved HaTzioni, ha (העובד הציוני; The Zionist Worker): A settlement movement established in 1936, affiliated with the non-socialist line of Zionism (yet non-revisionist), later the liberal Israeli Progressive Party and the General Zionists.

P

Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the (PLO; منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية; *Munadhamat A'Tahrir Al Falastiniah*); Is an umbrella organization of several Palestinian national movements established in 1964. The organization's main and most important movement is Fatah. The organization's main goals were the political representation of the Palestinian people and armed struggle against the State of Israel (until the Oslo accords). In 1974 it gained an observer status at the United

Nations and was later recognised by the majority of the international community as a legitimate (and *the sole*, by some) representative of the Palestinian people (including Israel in 1993, though considering it as a terrorist organisation until 1991).

Palestinian National Authority, the (PA; הרשות הפלסטינאית, *HaRashut HaFalastinayit*; السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية, *A'Sulta AlWataniya AlFalastinya*): Is a limited self-governing Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in charge of civil administration and, in area A, also internal security. Established in 1994 as part of the Oslo accords, the PA is supposed to form the foundation of a future Palestinian State.

Palmach, the (פלוגת המחץ: הפלמ"ח; *Plugut HaMahatz*; literally meaning the strike force): Was a paramilitary organisation that formed the leading force of the *Haganah*, which was the main fighting force of the Jewish community during the British Mandate over Palestine. It was established in 1941 and in 1948 merged into the newly founded IDF.

Peres, Shimon (שמעון פרס; 1923-2016; Born as Szymon Perski): Was an Israeli politician and head of state, served in multiple roles including parliament member (1959-2007), Minister of Transportation (1970-1973), Minister of Finance (1988-1990), Minister of Defence (1995-1996), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1986-1988, 1992-1995, 2001-2002), Interim Prime Minister (1977) and Prime Minister (1984-1986, 1995-1996) on behalf of *Mapai*, the Labour Party and later Kadima. He served as the President of the State of Israel (2007-2014). He was a leading figure in the Oslo Accords, for which he received the Nobel Prize for Peace.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the (PFLP, الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين; *Al-Jabha AlShaabiya LeTahrir Falastin*): Is a left-wing nationalist Marxist and socialist Palestinian movement and paramilitary organisation. It was founded in 1967 and formed the second strongest group inside of the PLO, after Fatah.

Planning Administration, the Israel (מנהל התכנון, *Minhal HaTichnun*): Is in charge of formulating the national planning policy of the State of Israel in various subjects. It initiates and promotes national, regional and local master plans. It is also in charge of running the national planning institutions, handling detailed plans, preparing and promoting regulations; and supervising the work of district planners and district planning bureau employees. In addition, it is responsible for all aspects of the operation of the planning institutions in the national and regional level, in matters of manpower, budgeting, coordination, and governance.

Practical Zionism (ציונות מעשית): An approach that supported a variety of activities focusing on immigration to Palestine, land acquisition and establishing settlements as a means to eventually lead to a Jewish homeland.

Q

Qiryat Arba'a (קריית ארבע): Is an Israeli urban settlement with the status of a local council, located east and near the city of Hebron. It was established in 1968 and considered as one of the earliest Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

R

Rabin, Yitzhak (יצחק רבין; 1922-1995): Was an Israeli military general, politician, and head of state. He was the IDF chief of staff during the 1967 war, and later parliament member (1974-1995), Minister of Labour (1974), Minister of Communications (1974-1975), Minister of Defence (1984-1990, 1992-1995) and Prime Minister (1974-1977; 1992-1995). He was the Prime Minister during the Oslo accords, for which he received the Nobel Prize for Peace. He was assassinated in 1995 while in office.

Revisionist Zionism (ציונות רוויזיוניסטית): A right-wing ideology within Zionism, founded by Zeev Jabotinsky as an ideological counter to the socialist Labour Zionism. In 1923 after Jabotinsky quit from the World Zionist Organisation due to his objection to its policies, which he saw as too appeasing to the British control of Palestine and called for a “revision” in Zionism. Revisionist Zionism advocated for a Jewish sovereign state in the greater area of Eretz Israel, which includes both banks of the Jordan and the rejection of territorial compromises. Revisionism opposed socialism and supported a liberal economy. The political party of Revisionist Zionism was *HaTzhoar* [*HaTzionim HaRevizionistim* (הציונים הרוויזיוניסטים)], while the Irgun was in paramilitary force and *Beitar* its youth movement. After 1948 and the establishment of Israel, the *Herut* party became the representative of Revisionist Zionism, and later the Likud.

Road #60 (כביש 60): A road that connects major cities, from Nazareth in the north, through Jenin, Nablus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron and Be'er Sheva in the South. The majority of the road passes through the West Bank and forms its main transportation artery.

Road Map for Peace: Is a political plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was presented by US President George W. Bush 2002. The plan proposes a gradual, multi-stage, multi-year solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, supervised and supported by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, and the UN), by 2005.

Rural Settlement (התיישבות כפרית; *Hityashvut Kafrit*): A term initially used to refer small-scale agricultural settlements (such as the *Kibbutzim* and *Moshavim*), though in the 1970s it began being used also for non-agricultural one (like to community settlements).

S

Sabra, a (צבר; *Tzabar*; literally meaning “cactus” or “prickly pear”): Is a term used to refer to a Jew that was born in the area of Palestine, before the establishment of the State of Israel, or in the State of Israel. In contrast to an “*Oleh*”.

Sabra and Shatila Massacre, the: Is a massacre conducted by the Lebanese Christian Maronite militias, the *Kataeb* (Phalanges) forces in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, as a retaliation to the assassination of their leader Bashir Gemayel. The number of victims, who were mostly Palestinians, ranges between 300-4000 according to different sources. The Kataeb were Israel's allies in Lebanon, and Israel was therefore blamed for being responsible for their actions.

Samaria (השומרון; *HaShomron*): A Hebrew term, originated from the bible, used when referring to the northern part of the West Bank. The area it refers to is located between The Jezreel valley in the north, The Jerusalem mountains in the south, the Jordan valley in the east and the coastal plain in the east.

Samaria Central Development Company, the (המרכזית לפיתוח השומרון: החל"פ); *HaHevra HaMerkazit LePituah HaShomron, Halap*): Is a private company owned by different communities in the Samaria Regional Council and does not receive government assistance

Sebastia (سبسطية ; סבסטיה): Is a Palestinian village in the West Bank, western to the city of Nablus. In 1976, members of *Gush Emunim* movement attempted to establish a Jewish settlement in the historic train station near the village. Due to the refusal of the Israel government to cooperate with the attempt they were evacuated. Though unsuccessful, Sebastia became a milestone in the development of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Settlement Division (החטיבה להתיישבות, *HaHativa LeHityashvut*): Is an independent unit of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and consists the executive arm of the State of Israel for the purpose of developing settlements in the West Bank and the Golan Heights (Previously also in the Sinai Peninsula). Since 2004 the establishment Galilee and Negev, being considered as frontier areas, also came under the responsibility of the Division. Founded in 1967, it operated as part of the Settlement Department, under the same management (though with different funding sources) in order to expand its works also to the newly occupied areas, until their separation in 1992. The Division is funded entirely by the State of Israel.

Settlement Department (המחלקה להתיישבות, *HaMahlaka LeHityashvut*): The executive arm of the JA, in charge of establishing agricultural settlements in the State of Israel, and previously in Palestine during the British Mandate. The department supported the settlements from their initial phases up until the establishment of their own economy, provided them with productive means, farm buildings and residential units. The financing was provided as loans under long-term favourable terms, within the framework of the JA's budgets. Its activities later dissolved into other departments of the JA.

Settlement Movement, a (תנועת התיישבות; *Tnuat Hityashvut*): Is a term used to refer to Zionist organizations that engaged (and still engage) in organising the foundation of new settlements, before and after the establishment of the state of Israel. The term refers to movements from a variety of political affiliation and ideological or religious orientation.

Separation Barrier: Is a multi-layer fence system, separating Israel and the Palestinian territories, running partly along the Green Line and partly through the West Bank. It has been constructed by Israel since 2003. It is considered by Israel as a necessary defensive measure while Palestinians consider it as a tool of racial segregation or as an apartheid wall,

Sinai Peninsula, the: Is a peninsula in Egypt between the Mediterranean Sea in the north, the Negev to the northeast, the Gulf of Eilat to the southeast, the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal in the west. It was occupied by Israel during the 1967 and returned to Egypt in 1982 as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Shalom Achshav: see *Peace Now*.

Shamir, Yitzhak (יצחק שמיר; 1915-2012): Was an Israeli politician and head of state. He was the leader of the Zionist right-wing Paramilitary organisation Lehi. After 1948 and the establishment of the State of Israel, he joined the Mossad until 1965. Later,

he served as a parliament member (1973-1994), Speaker of the Knesset (1977-1980), Foreign Minister (1980-1986) and Prime Minister (1986-1992), all on behalf of the Likud.

Sharon, Arie (אריה שרון; 1900-1984): Was an Israeli architect. After studying at the Bauhaus under Hannes Meyer, Sharon returned to Palestine, where he became a leading architect, earning several commissions for the Histadrut (the General Organization of Workers), gaining the admiration of its leader, David Ben Gurion, who later became the first Prime Minister. After the establishment of the State of Israel, Sharon played a key role in the state's architecture and planning, composing the Physical Plan for Israel in 1951. Later he continued his private practice, leading several major projects, in Israel and in Africa.

Sharon, Ariel (אריאל שרון; 1928-2014): Was an Israeli military officer, Parliament Member (1974, 1974-2006), Minister of Agriculture (1977-1981), Minister of Defence (1981-1983), Minister of Economy (1984-1990), Minister of Housing (1990-1992), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998-1999) and Prime Minister (2001-2006). He began his political career in the Liberal Party, later merging the Likud, which he then left during his tenure as Prime Minister to establish the Kadima party. He is mostly remembered for commanding unit 101; leading the Suez crossing and counter-attack against Egyptian forces during the 1973 war; promoting of the settlement enterprise as Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Housing; planning and executing the 1982 war in Lebanon as Minister of Defence (he was later prevented from acting in this office due to his responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacre); leading Israeli fighting in the Second Intifada as Prime Minister and later the withdrawal from Gaza and the evacuation of Jewish settlements the area.

Sharon, the (השרון; *HaSharon*): Is a geographical area in central Israel, located in its coastal plain it borders the Samarian hills in the east, the Yarkon river and Tel Aviv in the south and Taninim stream and the Carmel mountains in the north.

Sharon Plan, the (תכנית שרון; 1951): Was the first national master plan of the State of Israel. The plan was composed by Arie Sharon and published in 1951, who headed the planning department in the Prime Minister's Office (giving its unofficial name). The plan's main principles were the dispersal of the population in the Negev and the Galilee and the creation of a hierarchical network of settlements, towns and cities. Though the plan did not have statutory validity, it served as the basis for the development policy of the State of Israel for many years.

Shomron: see *Samaria*.

Shomer HaTzair, ha (השומר הצעיר; literally meaning the young guardian): A Socialist-Zionist youth movement established in 1919. It is also the name of Marxist-Zionist Party active in Mandatory Palestine, which later became part of the Israeli *Mapam* (*Mifleget HaPoalim HaMeuhedet*; The united workers' party).

Shikun: literally meaning dwelling, The Hebrew term for housing-estate. Used to describe a housing estate built by the state. Similar to the American term "Project".

Shikun O'vdim (שיכון עובדים; literally meaning "housing workers"; or a "housing for workers"): Was a construction company owned by the *Histadrut* (Central Workers' Organisation). Officially established in 1955 as a merger of two different *Histadrut* companies (*Neve Oved* and *Shikun*). Highly active during the 1960s, it was responsible for almost 25% of all public construction done in Israel up until the 1980s. In 1988 it merged with another *Histadrut* company, *Solel Bone*, into *Shikun U'benui* (Housing and Construction), that was sold to the Arison group in 1996.

Shikun U'benui (שיכון ובינוי; Housing & Construction Holding Company Limited): A company that was initially owned by the *Histadrut* (Central Workers' Organisation) and formed out of a merger of two other *Histadrut* companies (*Shikun Ovdim* and *Solel Bone*). In 1996 the *Histadrut* sold its shares to the Arison group as part of its privatisation process. The company turned in a construction, holding and investment company, taking part in Public Private Partnerships (such as Highway 6), Infrastructure and real estate and.

Solel Bone (סולל בונה; literally meaning "paving and constructing"): A construction company established by the *Histadrut* (Central Workers' Organisation) in 1921. It was the in charge of public and infrastructure project in the pre-state years, and after 1948 it became one of the leading companies in the field. In 1988 it merged with another *Histadrut* company, *Shikun Ovdim*, into *Shikun U'benui* (Housing and Construction), that was sold to the Arison group in 1996.

Supreme Court (בית המשפט העליון; *Beit HaMishpat HaElyon*): The Israeli supreme court, it is the highest court in the judicial hierarchy in Israel in charge of appeals over decisions from lower courts. It also acts as the High Court of Justice (*Bagatz*; See: High Court of Justice).

T

Territories, the (Hashtahim): A term used to refer to the territories Israel occupied in 1967. Mostly used for the West Bank, and formerly also for Gaza.

Transfer (טרנספר): A nationalist political agenda that calls for displacement of Arab population in areas controlled by Israel (by deportation or immigration encouragement), mutual population exchange or agreed mutual expulsion between Israel and other Arab countries, in order to promote it as the nation-state of the Jewish people. This agenda is inspired by the Turkish-Greek population exchange of 1923.

Two-States Solution, the: A political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian that is based on the creation of two states: Israel and Palestine, in the area of the state of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Most proposals rely on the 1967 border as the future border between Israel and Palestine, with different levels of territorial adjustments.

U

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181: Known also the Palestine partition plan. A resolution accepted by the general assembly of the United Nations on 27.11.1947 that called for the division of the area of the British Mandate of Palestine to two different states; an Arab state and a Jewish state, leaving Jerusalem under international rule. The violence that broke after the resolution is seen as the first (and internal) phase of the 1948 Arab Israeli War.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242: Was a resolution adopted by the security council in 22.11.1967, after the 1967 war, that called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories (*The territories*, according to the French version) it occupied; End of violence and respect of mutual sovereignty; ensuring the freedom of naval navigation in international routes ; a just solution to the refugee problem; ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the region.

V

Va'ada (ועדה): the Hebrew term for “committee”. See committees.

W

West Bank (الضفة الغربية , A'Dhafa Al-Gharbia; הגדה המערבית, HaGada HaMa'aravit): Is a term used to refer to the territories Israel occupied from Jordan in 1967, and the formerly were part of the British Mandate over Palestine. The term originated from

the British Mandate period, originally referring to the entire area that lies west to the Jordan river, unlike Kingdom of Transjordan, which forms the east bank. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war it turned into a part of Jordan, until being occupied in 1967 by Israel. Its borders today are Jordan in the east and the Green Line in the north, west, and south. In 1988 Jordan declared its official disengagement from the area, in order to promote a future Palestinian state. With the formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the West Bank was divided into three categories Areas A, B, C, with varying levels of Palestinian autonomy and Israeli responsibility. Never annexed by Israel (except for east Jerusalem), the west bank is still considered as occupied territories. The formal term used in Israel is “The District of Judea and Samaria”. Mostly referred to as the territories (*HaShtahim*).

Weitz, Ra’anan (רענן וייץ; 1919-1998): A main figure of the settlement department since 1948, and its director from 1963-1984. Though being in charge of settlement development he ideologically opposed the West Bank enterprise and advocated for other areas.

World Zionist Organization (WZO; ההסתדרות הציונית העולמית, *HaHistadrut HaTzionit HaOlamit*): Is an umbrella organisation established in 1897, in order to coordinate the activities of all Zionist movements and organisations in terms of lands acquisition, settlement, immigration, education and absorption. It was originally named the Zionist Organisation (ZO) and changed its name in 1960. In 1929, the Jewish Agency took over the practical actions of the WZO and remained as a policymaking and administrative body. It formed to representative of the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, and the basis for the future government of the State of Israel. After 1948, with the establishment of Israel, its roles were redefined, and the WZO focus turned to encourage Jewish immigration, development of Jewish settlement and education of Jewish communities outside of Israel. The Organisations institution include the World Zionist Congress; the Zionist General Council; The Palestine Office (no longer active); the Israel Land Development Company (sold); the JA; the JNF; the Israeli Zionist Council; the Settlement Division.

Y

Yediot Ahronoth (ידיעות אחרונות): Literally meaning the latest news, it is a daily newspaper that has been published in Tel Aviv since 1939. It is regarded as the most widespread newspaper in Israel by sales and circulation.

Yesha Council (מועצת ישׁע; *Moetzet Yeshah*): Officially the committee of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (*Yehuda, Shomron VeHevel Aza – Yesha*). It

is an organization that incorporates all Jewish municipalities in the West Bank (and formerly Gaza Strip). It is regarded as the representative of all Jewish settlers.

Yeshiva, a (ישיבה): A religious Jewish educational institution, mostly for men only, which concentrates on the teachings of religious texts.

Yeshuv, a (יישוב): The Hebrew term for a settlement. It could take the form of a village, a town or even a city.

Yeshuv, the (היישוב; Literally meaning a settlement): A term used to refer to the entire body of Jews living Palestine during the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, which formed the backbone for the latter Jewish population of the state of Israel. It is common to refer to the Jews residing before 1882 (the first Aliyah) as the old Yeshuv (*Hayeshuv HayYashan*), and the community that was formed afterwards as the new Yeshuv (*Hayeshuv HaHadash*).

Yom Elaad (יום الأرض; *Land Day*): Is an annual event held by Arab citizens of Israel on March 30th, in commemoration of the 1976 demonstrations against the expropriation of Arab lands in the Galilee, for the sake of expanding Jewish settlement in the area.

Z

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Zahal: see *IDF*.

Ze'evi, Rehavam (רחבעם זאבי, also known as Ghandi; 1926-2001): A former Israeli general and commander of the Central Command. Later a politician, parliament member, and minister. He founded the nationalist right-wing party of *Moledet*. Assassinated by the PFLP in 2001.

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The Privatisation of a National Project

The settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway since 1977

Gabriel Schwake

The settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway illustrate the privatisation of the national settlement enterprise. To understand this process, this dissertation focuses on the settlement production mechanism, which consists of the reciprocal interests of the government and various private groups to develop and domesticate the border area between the State of Israel and the occupied West-Bank - the Green-Line. Centring on the spatial privileges the state granted to diverse spatial agents, this dissertation examines the manner in which different favoured groups were given the power to colonise, plan, develop and market space as a means to enhance the state's power over it. Investigating the gradual transformation of this production mechanism, this dissertation explores the increasing privatisation of the local economy and culture, as well as how this was manifested in the built environment. Examining the modifications in the architectural and urban products this mechanism produced, this dissertation analyses the materialisation of the privatised national settlement project and how it transformed together with the changing political and economic interests.

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