SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE

Classe di Lettere e Filosofia

Corso di perfezionamento in

Scienze dell'Antichità

XXXIII ciclo

"Lucian's *Toxaris*. A Literary Commentary with Introduction, Text, and Translation"

Settore Scientifico Disciplinare **L-FIL-LET/02**

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Anno accademico 2021-2022

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAF	*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, ed. Th. Kock, Leipzig, 1880-1888.
CGF	*Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. G. Kaibel, Berlin, 1899.
CGFPR	*Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta*, ed. C. Austin, Berlin, 1973.
DK	Diels, H./Kranz, W., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Hildesheim, 1951-1952.
Du Mesnil	Du Mesnil, A. (1867), *Grammatica, quam Lucianus in scriptis suis secutus est, ratio cum antiquorum Atticorum ratione comparatur*, Stolp, 1867.
EGF	*Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. G. Kinkel, Leipzig, 1877.
GDRK	*Die griechischen Dichterfragmente der römischen Kaiserzeit*, ed. E. Heitsch, Göttingen, 1961-1964.
GP	Denniston, J.D., *Greek Particles*, Oxford, ^{2}1954.
Fraser/Matthews	Fraser, P.M./Matthews, E., *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, Oxford, 1987-2000
FrCG	*Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum*, ed. A. Meineke, Berlin, 1840 [repr. 1970].
FrGH	*Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ed. F. Jacoby, Leiden, 1923-1958
HWR	G. Ueding (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Berlin, 1992-2015.
KG	Kühner, R./Gerth, B., *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, Darmstadt, 2015.
KT	Körte, A./Thierfelder, A., *Menandri quae supersunt*, Leipzig, 1957-1959.
IGDOP	Dubois, L., *Inscriptions Grecques Dialectales d'Olbia du Pont*, Genève, 1996.
Lausberg	Lausberg, H., *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, Stuttgart, ^{4}2008.
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, Zürich, 1974-.
LSJ	Liddell, H.G./Scott, R./Jones, H.S., *A Greek English Lexicon*, *revised and augmented*, Oxford, ^{9}1996.
LTUR	*Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae*, ed. E.M. Steinby, Roma, 1998-2000.
Mette	Mette, H.J., *Die Fragmente der Tragödien des Aischylos*, Berlin, 1959.
PCG	*Poetae Comici Graeci*, ed. R. Kassel/C. Austin, Berlin, 1983-.
Preger	Preger, Th., *Inscriptiones Graecae metricae ex scriptoribus praeter anthologiam collectae*, Leipzig, 1891.
RE	Pauly, A./Wissowa, G./Kroll, W., *Real-Enzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Stuttgart, 1894-1978.

Schmid I	Schmid, W., *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern. Von Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus, Bd. 1*, Stuttgart, 1887.
TGF	*Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. A. Nauck, Leipzig, 1889.
TrGF	*Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. B. Snell/S.L. Radt/R. Kannicht, Göttingen, 1971-2004.
TrRF	*Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*, ed. O. Ribbeck, Leipzig, ³1897-1898.
Wehrli	Wehrli, F. (ed.), *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar. Herausgegeben von Fritz Wehrli mit Originaltext, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, Basel-Stuttgart, 1902-1987.
WAP	Horn, C./Rapp, C. (eds.), *Wörterbuch der Antiken Philosophie, 2. überarbeitete Auflage*, München, 2008.

Editions

Bekker	Bekker, I., *Lucianus, vol. 2*, Leipzig, 1853.
Dindorf	Dindorf, W., Luciani Samosatensis opera, vol. 2, Leibzig, 1858.
Harmon	Harmon, A.M., *Lucian of Samosata, with an English Translation, vol. 5*, London-Cambridge (MA), 1962.
Jacobitz	Jacobitz, C., *Luciani Samosatensis opera, vol. 2*, Leipzig, 1852.
Lehmann	Lehmann, J.T., *Luciani Samosatensis opera, vol. 6*, Leipzig, 1826.
Macleod	Macleod, M.D., *Luciani opera, vol. 3*, Oxford, 1980.
Marquis	Marquis, É., *Lucien. Oeuvres, tome 12: Opuscules 55-57, texte établi et traduit par Émeline Marquis*, Paris, 2017.
Sommerbrodt	Sommerbrodt, J., *Lucianus, vol. 2.2*, Berlin, 1896.
Steindl	Steindl, E., *Scytharum colloquia quae inscribuntur Toxaris, Scytha, Anacharsis cum scholiis*, Leipzig, 1970.

INTRODUCTION

1. The *Toxaris* and Its Context

The *Toxaris* and the Lucianic Corpus

The *Toxaris* is a dialogue between a Scythian (Toxaris) and a Greek (Mnesippus), who engage in a storytelling-competition in which each of them narrates five exemplary stories of friendships and which ends with their becoming friends. As will be detailed in the next subchapter ('Structure'), the *Toxaris* consists of a frame dialogue and ten short embedded narratives, and it intertwines the themes of storytelling, friendship and cultural relationships. With its complex structure and nexus of themes, the dialogue is not easy to interpret and has puzzled scholarship for some time. For example, in the 19th century, Jacob defines the *Toxaris* as a marvellous and moral story.[1] Differently, Guttentag, some fifty years later, tries to demonstrate that the *Toxaris* was not by Lucian, mainly because of the complex structure of the dialogue, which he finds absurd and nonsensical, and the invented, mendacious stories of friendship, and because of the – in his opinion – poor stylistic and linguistic quality of the dialogue in comparison to Lucian's other works.[2] However, Guttentag's judgement is one of a kind.[3] A century later, Bompaire describes the *Toxaris* as a comic dialogue full of fantasy in its dealing with its 'sources '.[4] Anderson, too, analyses the *Toxaris* with regard to its 'sources' and considers it to be amusing, though he judges the stories as absurd.[5] Jones, for his part, focusing on the theme of 'male comradeship' and trying to harmonise the *Toxaris*' ethical dimension with its embedded narratives, considers it the result of a 'fusion' of moral tales and the Greek novel. He believes that the dialogue is 'an oddity among Lucian's works', but simultaneously rejects the 'easy solution' to consider it as a 'parody or pastiche in the manner of the *True Histories* '.[6] Similarly, Swain distances the theme of friendship in the *Toxaris* from the particular case of the ancient Greek

[1] See Jacob 1832, 130-131.

[2] Noticing that the dialogue is impossible to date, as will be confirmed below, he undertakes to analyse its language and use of vocabulary; as he comes to the conclusion that there are many similarities with Alciphron and Heliodorus, he hypothesises that the *Toxaris* is contemporary to these works, and even borrows from these. This is his first argument; his second argument is a stylistic and moral one. Guttentag mostly takes offence at the 'absurd' and 'fallacious' stories ('ficta ea et commenticia'), the incomprehensible structure and 'plot' of the dialogue (for example, Mnesippus and Toxaris' making friends is 'absurd' and inconsistent), and he judges its style as 'deficient' ('quam puerilia et inepta narratiuncularum commenta sint, quam oratio perplexa et prava, infacetae et absurdae sententiae'), for he thinks that it does not keep up with Lucian's usual wit and finesse. See Guttentag 1860, citations pp. 1, 3. These are very subjective criteria. Lucian is known for his *hapax legomena* and creative use of language, which was influential on later authors, not only (Alciphron) and Heliodorus. Cf. the lists in Schmid I, 379-397. Then, one understands Guttentag's frustration at reading the stories as historical sources, because this is useless. As to the complexity of the dialogue and the question of the oath, the following work will hopefully make sense of its 'absurdities'.

[3] See the refutation of Guttentag's argumentation by Kretz 1891.

[4] See Bompaire 1958, 683-686.

[5] See Anderson 1976b, 12-23.

[6] See Jones 1986, 56, 57-58. For the relationship between the *Toxaris* and the ancient novel, see the subchapter 'Structure'. As will be argued, the *Toxaris* is definitely not a parody, neither of moral tales nor of the ancient Greek novel.

novel, and rightly points to the ubiquity of the subject in Lucian's time. However, he takes Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories very literally and compares them to 'collections exemplifying virtue'; in the *Toxaris*, the 'moral message is uppermost, something unusual but not implausible in this author '.[7] White, for her part, considers with regard to the theme of friendship in the *Toxaris* that the 'dialogue does not aim at providing serious philosophical discussion but includes some interesting statements about friendship' in line with Classical *topoi* on friendship.[8] Then, taking up Jones' interpretation, Bowersock relates the *Toxaris* to the ancient Greek novel, but concentrates on cultural issues, because to him, the *Toxaris* 'is a good representative of the toleration of diverse cultures and international diversity that characterize virtually all the extant fiction of the second century and later '.[9] More recently, Ní Mheallaigh deals with the aspect of 'fictionality' in the stories of the *Toxaris*, which she defines as 'microfictions', and analyses aspects of 'fiction' from a metaliterary perspective. In her analysis, the theme of friendship is only marginally explored, or otherwise interpreted in view of the dialogue's 'pastiche' and general reception of the genre of the ancient novel, and Chariton in particular. In her interpretation of the *Toxaris*, the dialogue is essentially comic and a pleasurable reading.[10] Before her, Pervo likewise relates the theme of friendship in the *Toxaris* with the ancient Greek novel. He considers its stories as 'sentimental and fabulous', a 'parody of the kinds of sentimental views of Greek male friendship depicted in romantic novels, as well as popular myth, legend and saga,' and therefore not at all in accord with a 'serious exposition of friendship'; neither is the frame dialogue 'to be taken seriously' because of the way the dialogue ends.[11] In conclusion, scholarship, in turn, appraises the *Toxaris* as a comic or parodic dialogue, as a pamphlet of cultural relativism, as a moralistic collection of tales on friendship, and cannot decide on whether the dialogue is comic or serious, fantastic or moralistic, or on how to reconcile the frame dialogue with the narrated stories.

As the 'Commentary' of the *Toxaris* will show, its interests are not parodic, but serious, although the dialogue does certainly not lack wit.[12] Notwithstanding – or because of – the sometimes absurd, sometimes exaggerated stories, the dialogue makes genuine ethical assertions, which emerge by analysing the relationship between the stories of friends and the way Mnesippus and Toxaris form their friendship. In other words, while the dialogue and its stories are neither entirely serious nor

[7] See Swain 1994, 174-176, citations p. 176. In his opinion, the *Toxaris* is 'the most difficult of these works [i.e. of "fiction"] to classify' (*ibid*., 174).
[8] White 1992, 40.
[9] See Bowersock 1994, 44-46, citation p. 46.
[10] See Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 40-71. In her opinion, the *Toxaris* is a 'journalistic transposition of novelistic narrative and a creative – often funny – adaptation of the genre which […] offers us a new perspective on the novels' (Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 42). I will revise this opinion in the 'Commentary', in particular with regard to Mnesippus' first story (§§12-18).
[11] See Pervo 1997. Citations p. 163, 164, 165. His interpretation is very similar to Perry's judgement that the stories are 'ideal or tragic adventures' whose 'value as romantic stories far outweighs the author's [sic] pretense that they are told only as illustrations of what friendship amounts to among Greeks and Scythians respectively.' See Perry 1967, 234.
[12] As Jones already suspected. See Jones 1986, 56.

entirely comic – but certainly not parodic – from the perspective of 'telling', the perspective of 'showing' demonstrates that the *Toxaris* deals with an earnest concern, because it provides the attentive recipients with a training in ethical thinking on friendship, and defends a view of friendship as a form of ethical commitment that rests on equality and requires willingness to self-disclosure and faithfulness.[13] The theme of cultural differences and similarities likewise constitues a serious concern of the dialogue, which advocates a cosmopolitan view on Greek cultural identity rather than supporting cultural relativism or processes of acculturation.[14]

This complex entwining of various themes and ethical and cultural issues in the *Toxaris* enables us to identify manifold relationships between this dialogue and other works in Lucian's corpus. Its Scythian character Toxaris relates this dialogue to Lucian's two other 'Scythian' works, the dialogue *Anacharsis* and the *prolalia* entitled *Scytha*, which, like the *Toxaris*, have Scythian characters (the wise and legendary Anacharsis, and Toxaris) but are set in a Greek context (in Athens and in Macedonia, respectively). A comparison of these characters with the present Toxaris will follow in a further subchapter ('Greeks and Scythians'). In general, the theme of relationships between cultures is an important one in Lucian's corpus, as shown by, for example, the *De Syria Dea*, *Hercules*, and *Prometheus*; accordingly, it will be discussed with regard to the *Toxaris* the same subchapter.[15] Then, the *Toxaris* has in common with the *Navigium* and the *Philopseudeis* in particular the theme of storytelling and the 'narrative' structure.[16] In the *Toxaris*, storytelling is significant as a process, considering that Mnesippus and Toxaris reveal their similar view on friendship by means of their narrations, and as a medium, seeing that it questions the value of speech in comparison with, or in place of, deeds in order to demonstrate virtue and *paideia*. The *Philopseudeis*, in which philosophers and educated men tell fantastic stories, also discusses storytelling from an ethical perspective and presents it as the creative and active use of (the fringes of) literary knowledge.[17] In a similar way as in the *Toxaris*, the *Navigium* uses the devices of storytelling in the context of a competition between friends. The four characters' narrations of wishes serve as a means of demonstrating the *ēthos* they would have if they were rich (*Nav*. 16), just as the narrations in the *Toxaris* unveil Mnesippus and Toxaris' *ēthos* as friends (§63.11-12).

[13] See below, the subchapter 'Friendship'.
[14] See below, the subchapter 'Greeks and Scythians'.
[15] The *SyrD*. is sometimes considered spurious by scholarship. See Hall 1981, 374-381 with a discussion of earlier scholarship. For a convincing discussion in favour of an attribution to Lucian, see Elsner 2001, who also discusses the question of the representation of cultural identities. See also Baslez 1994 (attributes the work to Lucian without discussing the question of authorship, and focuses on the plurality of perspectives on culture, though with a somewhat biographical reading), Goldhill 2003, 78-82 (on Greekness and Lucian's self-representation), Lightfoot 2003, 184-208 (discusses the question of authorship), Andrade 2013, 288-313 (focuses on the issue of Syrian-Greek identities).
[16] On the *Navigium*, see Tomassi 2019. On the *Philopseudeis*, see Ebner in Ebner *et al.* 2001, 35-134, Ogden 2007, Bowie 2017. For the relationship between the *Philopseudeis* and the *Toxaris*, see RE XIII (1926) s.v. Lukianos 1766 [Helm], Anderson 1976b, 23, Reardon 1994, 9, 10, Bowie 2008, 27, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 71.
[17] For this interpretation, see Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 90-91.

As to the question of the place of the *Toxaris* within the chronology of Lucian's works, according to the canonical order, it is at number 57, between the *Peregrinus* and the *Fugitivi*. It is impossible to establish an absolute or a relative chronology for this work.[18] Indeed, as will be seen in the next section, there are no temporal indications or allusions in the dialogue that allow for relating the dialogue to a specific and datable historical event. Nonetheless, scholarship has tried to group Lucian's works together in generic, stylistic, or thematic categories and to relate these to 'periods' of interest in Lucian's intellectual and literary 'evolution'; moreover, scholarship has also tried to relate the dialogues to particular events of Lucian's 'biography'. For example, Schwartz, according to his 'evolutionary' periodisation and biographical reading of Lucian's works, has dated the *Toxaris* to a period later than his 'period of Menippean dialogues', but to a period prior to 166 CE, the year when the *Scytha* was hypothetically performed as an introduction to a (re-)representation of the dialogues *Anacharsis* and *Toxaris*. He also relates the dialogue to the *Fugitivi*, which he dates after 165 CE, arguing that the latter must have been written after the death of Peregrinus and performed in Thrace, and that Lucian wrote the *Scytha* on his journey to Thrace, stopping in Macedonia.[19] Harmon, then, suggests a dating of the *Toxaris* to around 163 CE because of the 'diction' of the dialogue that 'suggests a relatively early date '.[20] Swain, by contrast, estimates that the *Toxaris* 'belongs to the second part of Lucian's life,' for it is 'not the trivial fake of the sophistic fictions of the first period '.[21] However, such approaches are speculative, because hardly any of Lucian's works is datable precisely and the idea to group them into periods is absurd.[22] As to Lucian's 'biography', one knows nothing about the author except for a few scarce pieces of information, and drawing conclusions from his literary *persona* is misleading.[23] Marquis, for her part, hypothesises that the *Toxaris* was written after the Roman-Parthian war of 161-166 CE and probably before Lucius Verus' death in 169 CE, as she explains the phrase βασιλεῖ τῳ μεγάλῳ (§17.19) as a witty allusion to the

[18] Cf. RE XIII (1926) s.v. Lukianos 1766 [Helm], Jones 1986, 167.
[19] See Schwartz 1965, 44-45, 130, and 149 (chronological table). The idea to link the *Scytha* and the *Toxaris* is found as early as the end of the nineteenth century CE, as, e.g., in Hirzel 1895. See Schissel 1912, 52.
[20] Harmon 1936, 101, cf. Jufresa/Mestre/Gómez 2000, 188.
[21] See Swain 1994, 174.
[22] Further such approaches are those of Croiset 1882, Helm 1906, or Gallavotti 1932. The latter classifies the *Toxaris* amongst the 'dialoghi filosofici' of an early 'Platonic' period, which constitutes a 'later' period in Lucian's literary activity (Gallavotti 1932, 69). The idea of grouping Lucian's dialogues into categories and dating them according to a teleological scheme is criticised as hazardous and unproductive by Hall in her discussion of these approaches (Hall 1981, 1-63, esp. 11-13, 154-157 for a criticism of Gallavotti's dating methodologies based on assumptions). However, she too, up to a certain point, tends to speculate about the chronology of some of Lucian's works by relating them to his 'biography' and travels. For the methodological difficulties with reading Lucian's works 'biographically', see the next footnote (Lucian's *persona*). See also Humble/Sidwell 2006, Iannucci 2009, Free 2015, 11-13, Deriu 2017, 185-199, Richter 2017, 327-336.
[23] In fact, Lucian is only *probably* mentioned once by his contemporaries, in Galen (*In Hippocratis epidemiarum commentariorum* 2.6.29). On this, see Nutton 1972, 58-59, Strohmaier 1976, 117-122, Macleod 1979. He has an entry in the Suda (Suid. λ 683), and is otherwise known to Photius (codex 128,129). For the Lucianic *persona*, see Saïd 1993, Dubel 1994, Ní Mheallaigh 2010, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 13-34, Solitario 2020, 172-174.

Roman emperor.[24] The idea of an allusion to the Roman emperor is attractive, although this phrase must not necessarily coincide with the Roman victory over the Parthians or allude to Lucius Verus in particular.

The *Toxaris* and Its Historical Context

As has been shown, it is impossible to establish a date for the dialogue. However, some aspects of the historical context of the time of Lucian's literary activity (ca. 160-post 180) might be relevant to the *Toxaris* and will thus be outlined below. With regard to temporal indications within the dialogue, it can be ascertained that, although there are no hints concerning the inner-fictional temporal setting of the *Toxaris*, it is possible to identify several noticeable allusions to the context of the second century CE that are disseminated throughout the dialogue.[25] For example, the text alludes a few times to the administrative apparatus of the Roman imperial hierarchy. Thus, in Mnesippus' first story, the friend Deinias is sent to be judged by the 'Great King' (βασιλεῖ τῳ μεγάλῳ, §17.19), which anachronistically designates the Roman emperor; in the same passage, the governor of Asia is mentioned as ἁρμοστής, which, likewise anachronistically, designates the function of ἔπαρχος (§17.19).[26] In §24.14 and §26.6, the text mentions the Massilian council of the 'six hundred' (οἱ ἑξακόσιοι) to refer to their sovereign assembly.[27] Once Massilia had become Roman, its organisation of power changed to a governing assembly of one hundred persons; it is not certain when exactly this happened, but here too, the *Toxaris* might use an anachronistic term.[28] In §32.7 and §33.10, the text mentions two Egyptian judicial functions, the ἁρμοστής (cf. §17.19) and the prefect of Egypt (ὁ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐπιτετραμμένος). In §§59-60, Toxaris' fourth story involves gladiatorial games at the Paphlagonian city of Amastris on the Pontus, which are definitely a Roman import into the Hellenised east – and Amastris itself is a city that flourished under Trajan in particular.[29] Then, in §36.6-8, Toxaris underlines that Greece lives in profound peace (cf. *Anach*. 33), whereas Scythia is constantly engaged in wars and conflicts. The text thereby alludes to the *pax Romana* within whose sphere Greece was situated, but which did neither englobe the region of the northern Black Sea nor those

[24] See Marquis, 233, 496-497 n. 65. See the next section for this and further such allusions to contemporary history. For Lucian and Lucius Verus, see Bompaire 1958, 516, Swain 1996, 312-315, Billault 2010a.
[25] For the uncertainty regarding the fictional time of the dialogue, see Visa-Ondarçuhu 2008, 176, but 182 in favour of a dating in the imperial period. The uncertainty of the fictional time of the dialogue is reflected in Dahlmann's comment that: 'Im Toxaris kommen Beispiele von Freundschaft bei den Scythen vor, die zum Theil, wie sie dastehn, in keine Zeit passen, am wenigsten aber in die Lucianische.' Friedrich C. Dahlmann, *Forschungen auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte*, II, 1, Altona, 1823, p. 29, cited in Guttentag 1860, 81, who thoroughly discusses this issue of temporal uncertainty. See Guttentag 1860, 81-96.
[26] See Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 48, Marquis, 494-495 n. 64.
[27] Other texts use the word συνέδριον (Str. 41.5, cf. Val.Max. 2.6.7: senatus) See Marquis, 508 n. 102.
[28] See Marquis, 508-510 n. 102. I do not, however, agree with her conclusion that, if the institutions had changed by the second century CE, Lucian was either unaware of the (recent) change, or 'simply did not care' to use the correct term.
[29] Amastris is also mentioned in Lucian's *Alexander* (*Alex*. 57) – a fact that says nothing about the relative chronology of Lucian's works.

regions that were the object of Roman expansionism, in particular at the turn of the second century CE (for example, the Dacian Wars under Trajan).[30]

This allusion is therefore also meaningful with regard to the historical context of Scythia, which, in those days, approximately encompassed the region from the River Ister to the River Tanais.[31] Around the middle of the first century CE, the town of Olbia on the border to the region inhabited by Scythian tribes (one of the former Milesian ἀποικίαι of the sixth century BCE) came under Roman protectorate, though without being a part of any Roman province. However, even under the Antonines, the fortified town was constantly threatened by incursions of neighbouring Scythian tribes, for example the Scythians of the Taurian area. The latter were defeated at the end of the second century CE and Olbia became part of the province of Moesia inferior, before it was invaded again by Scythian and Sarmatian tribes and the Goths at the beginning of the third century CE.[32] This region at the farthest north-eastern border of the Roman Empire was thus incessantly the stage of wars and offensives against 'barbarians'. For example, this part of the Roman Empire was invaded by the Alans in 166 CE, an invasion which the *Toxaris* (§51, §54) seems to allude to.[33] In general, the north-east of the Roman Empire was then involved in many conflicts and wars such as the Marcommanic wars (ca. 166-180 CE), or the Roman-Parthian war of 161-166 CE mentioned above. This explains why, apart from reflecting on the stereotype of the bellicose barbarian, the text highlights the military context of Scythian society and friendship so emphatically (esp. §36.8-12, §§39-40, §§51-55); it doubly corresponds to what Greeks (and Romans) recipients of the *Toxaris* associate with the life on the north-eastern borders of the Empire and the northern shores of the Black Sea.

2. The Structure of the *Toxaris* and the Question of Genres

Summary of the *Toxaris*

The dialogue begins as Mnesippus, startled about the Scythian custom to sacrifice to the Greek mythical heroes Orestes and Pylades, enquires about their motivation for this custom (§1). Mnesippus expresses his incredulity at the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades; he expects the Scythians

[30] For allusions to the *pax Romana*, see also D.Chr. 1.27, Plut. *Praec.ger*. 805A, Aristid. *Or*. 26 *passim*, D.C. 69.9.1, 69.9.5. For Greece in peace, see Plut. *An seni resp.* 784-785, 824c, Aristid. *Or*.26.69, 97, 99, with Schmitt 1997, 20-21, and 21-33 (Roman politics of expansion in the eyes of Greek historiography). For Roman peace from a critical perspective on the imperial policies of expansion, see D.Chr. 7.74 with Russel 1992, 206 , Moles 1995, 182. See also Plin. *Paneg.* 16.5-17.3, Tac. *Ann*. 4.32, Fronto *Ep*. p. 128.7-129.6 (= §§19-20), 208.7-209.9 (= §11) Van den Hout. See Free 2015, 233 n. 240, 234 n. 242.

[31] See RE XLIX 2.1 (1921) s.v. Scythia 942-943 [Kretschmer]. To Strabo (Str. 11.507), Scythia extended to India and included a good part of North Asia (the so-called Iranian-Scythians). 'Minor Scythia' designated the region of the Black Sea Scythians. There are overlaps in designation and geography with the Sarmatians and their territories.

[32] For a historical overview of this region, and Olbia in particular, in the Roman period, see Vinogradov/Kryžickij 1995, 144-148. See also Krapivina 2007. For a cultural perspective on the historical context of Scythia in the imperial period, see Braund 1997, Tsetskhladze 2014 (with a good summary of the geographical-historical context).

[33] See Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 61 n. 99.

to feel some animosity towards those who killed their king and abducted their priestess and their cult statue of Artemis. He thinks that the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades is ludicrous (§§2-3). Less curious than mocking, Mnesippus does not try to understand this practice, but rather underlines the absurdity of Toxaris' argument in defence of Orestes and Pylades' virtues and their benefits for Scythia (§§3-4). Having made clear that the Scythians do not worship Orestes and Pylades for their deeds themselves, however courageous they were, Toxaris sets about explaining the true reason for their cult of these heroes – and the Scythians' superiority in friendship (§5). The Scythians worship them because of their excellence and paradigmatic value with regard to ideal (Graeco-Roman) characteristics in friendship. As illustration and evidence of how seriously Scythian take friendship and its ethical principles, Toxaris describes murals that represent Orestes and Pylades' deeds, which the Scythians created as *memento virtutis* in the temple dedicated to the worship of their heroes (§6). Toxaris then translates the murals into ethical explanations and re-states – with much rhetorical embellishment – the Scythians' worship of virtue and friendship (§7). Mnesippus reacts with admiration to Toxaris' demonstration in words and images, and he is convinced by the latter's rhetorical talent. He is astonished that the Scythians hold friendship in such high esteem, a fact that conflicts with his prejudices against the uncivilised barbarians (§8). The first part of the introduction (§§1-8) thus sets the ground for the competition.

In the second part of the introduction (§§9-12.3), the subject of the central part of the *Toxaris*, the competition of storytelling, becomes concrete. As Mnesippus undervalues the importance of Orestes and Pylades, that is, of friendship, for the Scythians, Toxaris responds to his scepticism by calling into question the Greeks' capacity to put into practice their ideals in friendship. In this transitional chapter (§9), Toxaris rejects Mnesippus' prejudices and retorts with the *cliché* of the Greeks' worth in words and their deficiency in deeds, which he juxtaposes with the Scythians' courage and vigour. Then, Toxaris proposes a competition in order to decide which of the two peoples, the Greeks or the Scythians, are best at friendship (§10). Mnesippus accepts the challenge, and agreements are made for the rules of the contest: each of the two opponents has to narrate five stories of recent examples of friendships, and the winner will be the one who presents the more convincing examples/stories. They agree to make an oath to ensure that they will tell the truth (§§11-12.3).

The competition represents the body of the text and extends from §12.3 until §61. Equal space is dedicated to Mnesippus (§§12.3-34) and Toxaris (§§38-61).[34] The two sections of the competition are separated by a further speech by Toxaris and an excursus on Scythian practices of making friends (§§35-37), and occasionally punctuated by Mnesippus and Toxaris' evaluations of their stories (§18.15-18, §23.14-18, §56). Mnesippus' first story (§§12.3-18) is about the friends Agathocles and Deinias. Agathocles cares for Deinias, who lost his fortune on the meretricious

[34] Cf. *Rh.Pr.*, where the figure of the advisor is given as much space (§§1-12) as that of the master of rhetoric (§§13-25).

Charicleia and was condemned to exile. Mnesippus' second story (§§19-21) is about the friends Damon and Euthydicus. Euthydicus rescues Damon from drowning during a sea voyage. Mnesippus' third story (§§22-23) is about the friends Aretaius, Charixenus, and Eudamidas. The latter stipulated in his last will and testament that his friends take care of his mother and his daughter, an obligation that Aretaius fulfils notwithstanding his being derided. The fourth Greek story (§§24-26) recounts how Zenothemis helped his friends Menecrates by marrying the latter's ugly and poor daughter. Mnesippus' last story (§§27-34) narrates the adventures of Antiphilus and Demetrius in Egypt. Antiphilus saves Demetrius from certain death in prison by supporting him and accusing himself of his friend's alleged crime. Toxaris' first story (§§38-42) is set in a war between the Scythians and the Sarmatians. Amizoces rescues Dandamis, who has been taken prisoner by the enemies, by having one of his eyes cut off as a ransom for his friend. The second Scythian story (§43) deals with Basthes and Belittas, who are attacked by a lion while on the hunt. They both die while Belittas attempts to rescue his friend. Toxaris' third story (§§44-55) narrates an expedition organised by Lonchates and Macentes for the sake of their friend Arsacomas, whose pride has been offended by the Bosporan king. They kill the king, kidnap the princess, and defeat the Bosporans and their allies in battle. The fourth Scythian story (§§57-60) is autodiegetic, as Toxaris recounts how his friend Sisinnes rescued him out of a desperate situation. They had been robbed of all their belongings while on travel, whereupon Sisinnes volunteered as a combatant in gladiatorial games to save his friend from misery. Toxaris' last story (§61) is about Abauchas and Gyndanes. Abauchas rescues his handicapped friend instead of his own family when they are all caught in a fire.

The *Toxaris* ends (§§62-63) with Mnesippus and Toxaris making friends instead of naming a winner and a loser. The fact is that they did not appoint any judge for their competition and that they demonstrated that they both defend similar ideals in friendship, which makes them suitable friends.

The Structure of the *Toxaris*: *Agōn* and *Syncrisis*

The structure of the *Toxaris* recalls that of an epirrhematic *agōn* in διαλλαγή, which is known from Old Comedy.[35] Indeed, the dialogue is structured as follows: first, an argument of dispute arises on the issue of friendship (§§1-9); then, the protagonists agree on the rules of arbitration (§§10-11);

[35] For the structure of the epirrhematic *agōn* in διαλλαγή, see Gelzer 1960, 48-49. He defines διαλλαγή as 'Abmachungen für ein Schiedsgericht', 'Schiedsgericht' (*ibid*., 49 n. 1). Although this structure is theorised nowhere in ancient rhetorical theory (*ibid*., 1-2), the frequent recurrence of this structure in Old Comedy must be accepted as a valid pattern. It has been recently noticed that argumentative negotiations in the Lucianic dialogue are rooted both in the Platonic dialogue (Socrates' elenctic conversations) and in the epirrhematic *agōn* of Old Comedy. See Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 189. For the use of the epirrhematic *agōn* in Lucian, see also Anderson 1976a, 141-149, Bozia 2015, 72 (explicitly with regard to the *Toxaris*). Storey argues that Lucian's works show their debt to Old Comedy when they are 'set in the context of a debate or trial', which is the case in the present dialogue. 'Thus when we examine a possible link between a dialogue by Lucian and a classical comedy, we should be on the lookout for places where Lucian has expanded the original idea and added scenes of debate or exposition.' Storey 2016, 170 (with a list of passages).

thereupon, they take turns in presenting their defence monologues (§§12-61), and finally, a verdict is passed (§§62-63). In the end, Mnesippus and Toxaris decide to become friends, which is a form of reconciliation.[36] Throughout the dialogue, Mnesippus and Toxaris are characterised as opponents (esp. §§10-11, §35). In general, the structure of the *Toxaris* conforms to that of the *agōn* in Old Comedy, except for the end. The absence of a judge in Mnesippus and Toxaris' competition is a notable difference with regard to the way the 'reconciliation' proceeds in the *agōn* in Old Comedy. This is meaningful for Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship, because the decision to form a friendship is not imposed on them but a voluntary act.[37] However, as will be shown in the next section, the *agōn* in the *Toxaris* not only relies on that in Old Comedy, but also involves further agonistic forms, functions and contexts.

The *Toxaris* is also structured as a *syncrisis*. The disposition of the Greek and Scythian stories as two opposed sets of narratives invites us to look for similarities and differences between them. Thus, one may compare the stories with regard to their length.[38] Noticeably, both the Greek and the Scythian stories are arranged around the third story, which is the shortest (two OCT chapters) amongst the Greek stories and the longest (twelve OCT chapters) amongst the Scythian ones. The Greek stories are arranged in the following ring composition: long, medium, short, medium, long (>|<),[39] while the Scythian stories follow the mirror-like pattern: medium, short, long, medium, short (>|>). The presence of such patterns in the disposition of the stories – which, despite their contrasting dispositions, nonetheless build around the respective Greek and Scythian third story – stories that are the only ones to present three instead of two friends – invites us to compare them with regard to content.

First, one notices that some motifs recur in more than one story. For example, 'losing one's money and belongings' appears in Mnesippus' first and third stories and in Toxaris' fifth story; 'spectators laughing at the friends' is a motif used both in Mnesippus and Toxaris' third stories; 'marriage' is the central subject of Mnesippus' fourth story and Toxaris' third story, but also appears marginally in Mnesippus' third story and Toxaris' fourth story; 'supporting a friend financially' is a motif that is common to Mnesippus' first and fifth stories, and to Toxaris' fourth story. Situations in court are found in Mnesippus' fourth and fifth stories. At the end of both Mnesippus' fifth story and Toxaris' fourth story, the friends do not go on living together but depart from one another. Finally, the motif of travel is found in Mnesippus' second and Toxaris' fourth and fifth stories. Second, the stories may be compared with regard to the way they are authenticated by their respective narrator according to historiographical criteria of reliable narration.[40] Thus, all Greek and Scythian stories respect the obligation to tell recent stories. While some stories are authenticated by autopsy

[36] Cf. LSJ s.v. διαλλαγή II.2 'change from enmity to friendship, reconciliation'.
[37] See below §§62-63.
[38] For such a comparison, though with different results, compare Schissel 1912.
[39] Cf. Lizcano Rejano 2000, 240.
[40] For a discussion of these criteria, see below §§10-12.

(Mnesippus' second and fourth stories; Toxaris' third and fourth stories) or testimonies (Mnesippus' second, third, and fourth stories; Toxaris' second story – if one considers the tombstone a form of testimony – and his fourth story), the others are not (again symmetrically, Mnesippus and Toxaris' first and fifth stories).

Beyond these echoes of motifs and the disposition of the stories themselves in two parallel sets, these stories appear to be arranged symmetrically with regard to the *topoi* or precepts in friendship that are illustrated in the stories.[41] The first pair of stories illustrates – metaphorically and literally – that 'friendship is priceless'. A similar *topos* is used again in the third pair of stories, which shows not only that friendship is to be valued more than public opinion, but also that 'having friends is like having a treasure' (e.g., φίλους ἔχων νόμιζε θησαυροὺς ἔχει, thus explicitly in §45.12-13, §46.6). The second pair demonstrates that one ought to risk one's life to rescue a friend who is the victim of a (potentially) deadly accident. Similarly, the fifth pair illustrates how friends risk their life, but this time for their friend who is caught in a perilous and hopeless situation. Finally, the fourth pair presents friends that help their friends who are in dire straits materially.

From this structure as well as these motifs and their disposition, one can draw the conclusion that Mnesippus and Toxaris, due to the fact that they choose motifs from a common cultural and literary background, similarly fall back on Greek *paideia*, and that they clearly defend similar ideals in friendship. This will cause Mnesippus to think that Toxaris and he are suited for forming a steadfast friendship (§63.3-6). What is more, the structural and thematic parallelism of the stories induces the recipients of the text to compare the stories, and thus to remember and analyse them in detail, as if they were asked to play a memory game and 'match' the stories, and, finally, the friends with one another.[42]

The *Mixis* of Genres

As has been shown, the *Toxaris* consists of a frame dialogue and two sets of five embedded stories. The *Toxaris* thus seems to be both a dramatic and a narrative type of dialogue. However, in contrast to the strictly narrative dialogue, there is no narrative frame to a mimetic (dramatic) dialogue; that is, the dialogue is not narrated, but it integrates narrations. The dialogue is therefore essentially a dramatic, or mimetic, type of dialogue.[43] 'Dialogue' in itself, though, is not a genre, and the Lucianic

[41] The strict parallelism does only appear if, instead of focusing on particular details of the stories, one abstracts the topoi of friendship. Thus, unlike Bompaire who holds the view that the stories are delivered 'in bulk' (Bompaire 1958, 465), Schissel (Schissel 1912, 65-82) and Anderson (Anderson 1976b, 22-23) find similarities between the Greek and Scythian stories with regard to the motif of friendship, but, concentrating on particular aspects, argue against a symmetrical structure. Anderson even concludes that '[Lucian] could have scarcely have expected his audience to notice the pairs', which contradicts his own hypothesis that '[t]he use [Lucian] makes of parallel arrangement here suggests that he had a further incentive.' Anderson 1976b, 23. As I hope to demonstrate, the structure of the text and the arrangement of the stories do indeed have an incentive: that of inviting its recipients to compare, and actively reflect on, the stories.

[42] See the subchapter 'Friendship' below and the §§62-63.

[43] Compare the differentiation of dialogues in διηγηματικός and δραματικός in D.L. 3.50, cf. Plut. *Quaest.Conv*. 8.711B, Cic. *Tusc*. 1.8, *Amic*. 1.3. For the differentiation between narrative and dramatic (philosophical)

dialogue itself is rather idiosyncratic in that it shows elements of philosophical debate as well as comedy.[44] Here, in particular, philosophical discussion (the theme of friendship, the structure of *syncrisis*) is combined with encomiastic and agonistic elements. In fact, the characters themselves conceive of their competition simultaneously as an epic-athletic encounter, a judicial trial, and a sophistic debate.[45] The agonistic aspect is polyvalent, because the *agōn* in the *Toxaris* is related to both Old Comedy, as has been shown above, and judicial oratory. While the structure of the *Toxaris* is modelled according to the *agōn* of Old Comedy and while the beginning of the dialogue (esp. §§1-8) is eristic in nature, the competition itself rather recalls the genre of judicial oratory with its regulated progression of longer speeches by the opponents, or the epideictic speeches of sophistic orators – a form of speech that also distances the *Toxaris* from the philosophical dialogue in the Platonic tradition.[46] Moreover, one must not forget the sophistic dimension of the *agōn*, as oratory was often dramatised in the time of the 'second sophistic'.[47] This relates the λόγοι in the *Toxaris* even more with epideictic oratory, in particular with regard to its encomiastic dimension. This dimension manifests itself in Mnesippus and Toxaris' rhetoric of praise of their exemplary friends whose qualities they constantly enhance, directly or indirectly.[48] The encomiastic dimension also comes to the fore in the *syncrisis* of the characters' speeches, considering the fact that the *syncrisis*, as the epideictic form of a debate or trial, represents a double *encomion* here.[49]

Thus, it is not only the diversity of agonistic situations in the *Toxaris* that makes it an example of a hybrid dialogue, but the narratives themselvesrepresent a fusion of encomiastic and agonistic elements as well. These narratives function simultaneously as *exempla* in encomiastic *epideixeis* and as judicial demonstration. Regarding their content, these *exempla* may thus equally be considered as developed *chriai* or as extended moral anecdotes on the theme of friendship.[50] Beyond these aspects,

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dialogue, see Andrieu 1954, 284-288 (referring to Plato, Cicero and Suetonius). For the differentiation in general, see Guellouz 1992, 82-88, where she points to the difficulties related to this typology and proposes a typology based on the form of relationship to alterity. See also Häsner 2004, 29-32, who, on the contrary, underlines the importance and the consequences of this distinction with regard to the pragmatic functions and aims of a dialogue. For 'frame-dialogues' in Lucian, see, e.g., *Luct*., *Prom*., *Philops*.

[44] Lucian's principle of generic *mixis* mainly rests on this combination of philosophical dialogue and comedy, but also oratory, as is presented in the *Bis Acc*., *Prom.es*, *Somn*., *Zeux*. See below for references.

[45] See esp. §§10-12, §55.

[46] For overlaps between the judicial and comic *agōn* in Lucian, see Bompaire 1958, 252-257. For a recent discussion of the Lucianic variations on the form of the Platonic dialogue with regard to the ideal of βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι as opposed to rhetorically sophisticated monologues, see Solitario 2020, 15-21.

[47] For the phenomenon in Lucian, see Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 150-155, Mestre 2017, 243-244 n. 9.

[48] For a discussion, see esp. §§10-12. However, there is already an encomiastic dimension in the introductory part of the dialogue, as Toxaris persuades Mnesippus of the value of the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades by means of his praise and further rhetorical devices such as an exemplary *ecphrasis* (§§1-8). For the relationship between dialogue and *encomion*, see as early as Hirzel 1895, 283-284 ('Dialogpartner A überredet Dialogpartner B über dem Gute einer Sache durch Lob', cf. *Salt*.).

[49] See Bompaire 1958, 272: 'De ce point de vue la syncrisis est l'équivalent épidictique de débat ou du procès des autres genres. Mais elle est dans son principe descriptive. On peut a définir comme un "concours" devant un *arbiter*, où les mérites ou vices concurrents doivent être mis en lumière: à cette fin le discours s'est substitué à la description.'

[50] For *chriai* and moral anecdotes on friendship, see the subchapter 'Friendship' below. For the form of the rhetorical anecdote that is extended to short narratives in the *Toxaris*, see Bompaire 1958, 445.

the narratives include a few more genres, as they blend elements of historiography, but also ethnography and travel literature in particular, with elements of comedy. For example, Toxaris' first and third stories present detailed accounts of descriptions of battles (§39, §§54-55), which exhibit a tendency towards 'tragic' historiography. This story also deals with ethnographic interests such as the representation of Scythian customs (e.g., §48.1.14) and the description of similarities and differences between the Scythians and further Black Sea peoples (e.g., the Alans in §51.17-22). Toxaris' third story contains elements of travel narratives as does Mnesippus' fifth story with its focus on Egypt, including a visit to the most famous *mirabilia* such as the Memnon and the pyramids. Typical elements of comedy are present in Mnesippus' first story, which stages a meretricious wife, her husband, a bunch of parasites, and indeed, an unhappy lover who is discovered by the husband in his wife's bed-chamber.

This *mixis* of genres and the narrative form of the stories in the *Toxaris*, which sometimes include reported dialogues and further embedded accounts, have led scholarship to relate the dialogue with the ancient novel, and thus to consider the presence of single similar motifs as allusions to the genre of the novel, which the *Toxaris* is supposed to parody.[51] Scholarship also concludes from this parodic relationship that the theme of friendship in the *Toxaris* deforms or even inverts the theme of love in the ancient novel either by focusing on homoerotic relationships, which are secondary in the novel, but would function as a foil for the friendships in the *Toxaris*, or by presenting stories of adventures, etc. that are similar to those of the novel, and replacing the heterosexual lovers by a pair of male lovers. The question of homoeroticism in friendship in general and in the *Toxaris* in particular will be discussed in the subchapter 'Friendship'. As to the alleged parody of the genre of the novel, I argue that, while the *Toxaris* might use similar narrative mechanisms as the ancient novel, these do not suffice to suppose a parodic relationship. The theme of erotic love – of whatever kind – is absent from the *Toxaris*. Moreover, I would be very careful to read similar motifs as allusions to, for example, Chariton, especially when they belong to comedy or travel literature, or when they are as topical as certain motifs in friendship.[52]

Finally, it is remarkable that the text metapoetically reflects on its own *mixis* at the end of the dialogue, when Mnesippus compares Toxaris' and his friendship with the many-headed and many-armed giant Geryon (§62.16).[53] The idea that a plurality of limbs are joined together into a

[51] For the relationship between the *Toxaris* and the ancient novel, see Rostovtzeff 1931, 98-99, Zimmermann 1935, Bompaire 1958, 455, Perry 1967, 234, Anderson 1976a, 84-86, Jones 1986, 56-58, Bowersock 1994, 44, Swain 1994, 175-178, Stephens/Winkler 1995, 267-276, Hock 1997, 155, Pervo 1997, Lizcano Rejano 2000, 240, Bowie 2008, 27-28, Hall 2013, 115, Kim 2013, 300-303, Holzmeister 2014, 47-49, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 39-66, Marquis, 243-244. Both Pervo and Ní Mheallaigh defend the view that the *Toxaris* parodies the 'romantic love' of the novel and alludes to the question of homoeroticism as well as to single passages of specific novels (e.g., Chariton).

[52] I argue against this view and discuss the question in detail below §§12-18.

[53] For the comparison with Geryon, see below §§62-63. For the concept of *mixis* in Lucian, see foremost McCarthy 1934, 7–12, Reardon 1971, 163-170, Korus 1986, Braun 1994, esp. 350-358, Ureña Bracero 1995, 65–83, Camerotto 1998, 75-140, Mestre/Gómez 2001, von Möllendorff 2006,

single creature not only functions as a metaphor for their friendship, but also illustrates the variety of genres that are united to form an entity – a monstrous entity, as monstrous as this generically not classifiable dialogue is.[54]

3. Greeks and Scythians

The Characters Mnesippus and Toxaris

The names of both characters, 'Mnesippus' and 'Toxaris', are characterising them especially with regard to the ethnic group they each represent. This is an important point considering the central role that ethnic characterisation plays in the *Toxaris*, as will be shown. The name 'Mnesippus', with its ending in –ιππος, is typically Greek and is attested in Greek onomastics, while the name 'Toxaris', which alludes to a bow, is a Lucian invention and incarnates a Greek stereotype of the Scythian archers.[55] Famously, Scythians are defined by Herodotus as ἱπποτοξόται (4.46.3). That this name is stereotypical is also shown in its repeated use in Lucian, as 'Toxaris' is the name of a further Scythian character. Mnesippus' name, then, because of its similarity to the name 'Menippus', also alludes to the cynicising character used by Lucian in other works.[56] Although Mnesippus is not properly a Cynic, he shares with his quasi-homonym Menippus the tendency to deride and ironically criticise, for example, customs and traditions – in this case, the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades' friendship. In the beginning of the dialogue, Mnesippus is perplexed by the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades; he openly derides and consequently fails to understand Toxaris' efforts to explain to him the value of these heroes for the Scythians. The perplexity of the barbarian in front of Greek institutions is a common motif in Lucian's works, but here, the motif is inverted, as the Greek is bewildered by the Scythian institution and worship of friendship.[57] Mnesippus' reaction is therefore indicative of the ambiguity surrounding the attributions 'Greek' and 'barbarian' in the *Toxaris*.

The Greek-barbarian relationship in this dialogue is more complex than a simple opposition, because Toxaris' 'Scythian' customs are in fact Greek customs of worship and public honouring. This could possibly mean that the Scythians imitate Greek practices (by way of 'mimicry').[58] More likely, though, the description of these ambivalently Greek and Scythian customs makes part of the

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Saïd 2015, 187-189, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 171-216, and the contributions in Billault/Marquis 2017.

[54] To summarise this point in Whitmarsh's words: 'Lucian's writing, just as his literary persona, is avowedly anti-generic and parasitical;' his writing styles are 'generically and culturally hybrid.' Whitmarsh 2001a, 249. For Lucian's generically and culturally hybrid dialogues, see also Andrade 2013, 268-274.

[55] For Toxaris' invented anthroponymic name, see Ureña Bracero 1995, 196.

[56] See below, §§1-9, 'Mnesippus and Toxaris'.

[57] See Anderson 1976a, 14, *id.* 1976b, 19, 37, 45, 82.

[58] 'Mimicry' is a central concept in postcolonial studies. See Bhabha 1994 (ch. 4). For the idea of μίμησις of Greekness in imperial society, see Richter 2017. With regard to the *Toxaris*, see below, 'Greekness and Otherness'.

dialogue's general program of redefining the relationships between the Greeks and the Scythian 'others' by blurring any rigid identification. Thus, on the one hand, Mnesippus' incomprehension and derision of Toxaris' Scythian-Hellenic practices represents the perspective of an 'outsider' on Greek religious and cultural practices. On the other hand, Toxaris' persuasive demonstration of the value of their worship – his virtuoso *ecphrasis* in §6 is just one aspect of his rhetoric ability – makes him a true representative of Greek eloquence, not to forget his familiarity not only with Greek religious practices but also with Greek literary examples. Nonetheless, Toxaris emphatically criticises the Greeks for their elaborate discourses (§35.10-18, §42), their ineffective praises of friendship, and their inability to live up to their ideals (§9). Toxaris' preference for stylistic simplicity is ambivalent. His argument in favour of unembellished speech functions in the dialogue as a means to characterise him as an unsophisticated barbarian, but it is simultaneously representative of an ongoing discourse on style within Greek literary culture. As a result, both characters are in some way Greek and both maintain a distanced perspective on Greekness. Identity therefore appears as an ambivalent rhetoric strategy and is shaped in the interaction between Mnesippus and Toxaris.[59] Finally, this ambivalence contributes to the fact that none of the characters can be attributed the function of an authorial voice.[60]

In these regards, it is worth comparing the *Toxaris* with Lucian's two other 'Scythian works', the *prolalia Scytha* and the dialogue *Anacharsis*.[61] In the *Scytha*, the Scythian Toxaris meets his compatriot Anacharsis, who has come to Athens out of longing for Greek *paideia* (παιδείας ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς, *Scyth*. 1 and 4). This Toxaris is different from the Toxaris in the present dialogue. Although the present Toxaris tells in his fourth story that he too undertook a travel to Athens 'out of longing for Greek paideia' (ἐπιθυμίᾳ παιδείας τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς, §57.4) and has been living in Greece for some time (§9.6-7), he remains Scythian throughout the dialogue. He is the paradigm of a mixed Greek and Scythian identity. In the *Scytha*, Toxaris has so far assimilated Greek culture that he is unrecognisably Athenian in behaviour and appearance, Attic in speech, and forgetful of Scythia (*Scyth*. 5 and 7).[62] Nonetheless, the picture of Toxaris' perfect assimilation is sparkled with irony, when, for example, he is said to have become an Athenian autochthonous (αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἕνα τῶν αὐτοχθόνων, *Scyth*. 3). On the contrary, Anacharsis, in this *prolalia*, is characterised as the figure

[59] See the last section here on Toxaris' Greekness, the use of stereotypes, and the question of identities in the *Toxaris*.

[60] Cf. Whitmarsh 2004, 470. In general, there is no absolute correspondence between the characters' propositions and the author's in Lucian's works. See Branham 1989, Elsner 2001, Whitmarsh 2001a, 294. This is characteristic for the 'genre' of the dialogue. See Guellouz 1992, 45-47, Hempfer 2002, 11, Häsner 2006, esp. 158-159, 169-188. As the latter explains, '[t]atsächlich muss aber keine der Dialogfiguren die Auffassung des Autors in der entsprechenden Frage vertreten, vielmehr kann diese Auffassung im Wechselspiel konfligierender Meinungen dispergiert sein; der Dialogtext als Ganzes kann dann als eine Manifestation skeptischer Urteilsenthaltung gelesen werden, die sich darauf beschränkt, ein Tableau der verschiedenen möglichen Positionen zu favorisieren.' *Ibid*., 159.

[61] For a comparison of these characters, see Hirzel 1895 [1963], 287, Bompaire 1958, 677-687, Angeli Bernardini 1991, Whitmarsh 2001a, 124-128, Gangloff 2007, 82-85, Visa-Ondarçuhu 2008, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 65, Bozia 2015, 67-78, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 87-90, Marquis, 237 nn. 10-11.

[62] This status of the 'Hellenised' is similar to that which the Lucian-*persona* claims for himself (cf. *Somn*. and *Bis Acc*.). See Saïd 1994, 166.

of the lost foreigner *par excellence*, because he does not understand any word of Greek and stands out for his typically Scythian clothes (*Scyth*. 3). In the end, though, he has become acculturated (οὐκέτι ξένος σύ γε, *Scyth*. 7) through the *learning* of Greek *paideia* (ὁ μὲν παιδεύων καὶ διδάσκων τὰ κάλλιστα, ὁ Σόλων, *Scyth*. 8). In both the *Toxaris* and the *Scytha*, Scythian-ness and Greekness are ambivalent ascriptions, and neither in the *Scytha* is there an authoritative perspective. The authorial voice simultaneously corresponds with the fully acculturated Toxaris and the foreigner and barbarian Anacharsis (*Scyth*. 9), who undergoes a zealous process of incorporation into Athenian elite thanks to the help of Solon, the living embodiment of Classical culture.[63] However, the *Toxaris* diverges from the *Scytha* in that this dialogue, unlike the *prolalia*, does not focus on the result or the process of acculturation, but on the amalgamation of Greek and Scythian identities and on the ubiquity of Greekness.[64] A further interesting difference between the *Toxaris* and the *Scytha* regards the motif of the worship of foreign heroes. In the *Scytha*, Toxaris has become the object of a worship by the Athenians for his merits as a medical man during the pest (*Scyth*. 1-2). Greeks thus come to worship a foreigner. In the *Toxaris*, the Scythians worship the Greek – thus foreign – heroes Orestes and Pylades. The motif is thus inverted. Finally, in the *Scytha*, Anacharsis becomes Greek through his friendship with Solon, whereas in the *Toxaris*, Toxaris and Mnesippus become friends by means of their competition, that is, by means of their demonstration of Greekness. These differences between the *prolalia* and the dialogue increase the multiplicity both of perspectives taken on the barbarian-Greek relationship and of ways of negotiating Greekness.

Unlike the Anacharsis in the *Scytha*, the Anacharsis in the homonymous dialogue between himself and Solon is and remains Scythian. Even if he attempts to conceal his origins by not wearing his traditional Scythian cap, he suffers the Athenian heat and reveals his foreignness (*Anach*. 16). Like in the *Toxaris*, in the *Anacharsis*, there is a marked antagonism between Greek and Scythian cultures, but in the latter dialogue the antagonism is not solved. Anacharsis and Solon uncompromisingly remain on their respective positions, although the dialogue as a whole is an exercise in cultural relativism, a fact of which Solon is explicitly aware (*Anach*. 6). No compromise is possible, because Anacharsis constantly derides and comments with biting irony on Solon's efforts to make him acquainted with the Athenian educational system (e.g., *Anach*. 13). This behaviour recalls Mnesippus' reaction towards Toxaris' explanation of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades, as the Greek persistently misunderstands and derides the latter. Notwithstanding this antagonism, Anacharsis is ambivalently outsider and insider with regard to the criticism of Greek athletics. In fact, he echoes traditional Greek and Roman views on the uselessness of athletics (e.g., it is a loss of time taken from serious business, *Anach*. 11), and the dialogue consists in a rhetoric

[63] A Solon, though, who has travelled far away and become familiar to foreign wisdom (*Scyth*. 5).
[64] For the concept of multiple identities in the imperial period, see Swain 1996, 70, Jones 2004.

exercise in praise and blame of athletics.[65] Therefore, neither in the *Anacharsis* is there an authoritative perspective, as both Anacharsis and Solon are ironic about stereotypes about Greeks (they are impermeable to foreign knowledge, as Anacharsis interprets Solon's promise of open-mindedness as ironic, *Anach*. 37) and Scythians alike (Scythians are slow in understanding, says Anacharsis in *Anach*. 37, but he constantly demonstrates his wit).[66] And it is important to remember that, in Greek tradition, Anacharsis, as one of the Seven Sages, incarnates the paradox of the Hellenised outsider and the insider with foreign knowledge, but also represents the voice of primitive simplicity and moral integrity.[67] From the ironic use of ethnic stereotypes in the *Anacharsis* and the inherent ambivalence of the character of Anacharsis ensues an ambiguous image of Greekness and 'otherness'.[68]

In conclusion, the present dialogue shares with the *Anacharsis* and the *Scytha* the absence of a fixed authorial voice, a certain ambivalence in the representation of Scythians and Greeks, and the fact that ethnicity is constructed in the interaction between cultures. Noticeably, in all three works the use of stereotypes – Greek and Scythian alike – is ironic. However, all three works focus on different aspects of Greekness and 'otherness': the *Scytha* illustrates processes of incorporation, the *Anacharsis* stresses cultural differences, though advocating an approach of cultural relativism, and the *Toxaris* works towards a reconciliation of similarities and differences by erasing the contour of the 'other'. Finally, in all three texts, the characters Anacharsis and Toxaris represent the ideal of the noble and wise barbarian, be it for their σοφία (thus Toxaris in the *Scytha*), their archaising moralism (thus Anacharsis in the *Anacharsis*), or their archaic-epic-heroic ideology of friendship (thus Toxaris in the *Toxaris*).

The Tradition of Scythian Ethnography

It is worth comparing the use and choice of Scythian stereotypes in the *Toxaris* with previous ethnographical descriptions of Scythia. Herodotus' ethnography has been most influential in the construction of an idea of regions at the confines of the Greek world such as Scythia. Strabo's representation of the Scythians, for example, is in continuity with Herodotus' description of Scythian customs. His Scythians too sacrifice strangers, use their enemies' skulls as drinking cups (Str. 7.3.7),

[65] See Angelini Bernardini 1991, 181, Braund 1997, 127. For Anacharsis' Roman or conservative Greek views on athletics, see Goldhill 2003, 87, 89. Compare D.Chr. 32.44-45 with Pernot 1994, 111, or Diogenes' negative attitude towards athletics in D.Chr. 8 and 9. König 2005, 84-86 underlines that this Greekness of Anacharsis' is a form of archaising representation. Compare Bäbler 2007, 149.

[66] See Goldhill 2003, 87-89. Irony, in the *Anacharsis*, causes that '[t]he silly outsider's non-comprehending question cracks the cultural composure of the insider' (*ibid*., 89).

[67] On Anacharsis, see e.g., see Bompaire 1958, 152-153 (in Lucian), Anderson 1976a, 114-116 (in Lucian), Hartog 1980, 82-102 (in Herodotus), *id*. 1996, 118-127, Kindstrand 1981 (65-67 in Lucian), Branham 1983, Martin 1996, *id*. 1998, 111-112, 118, Ungefehr-Kortus 1996 (187-233 in Lucian), Goldhill 2001, 2-4, *id*. 2003, 87-89 (also in Lucian), Mestre 2003, Konstan 2010 (in Lucian and focusing *paideia*), Richter 2011, 161-176 (168-173 on Anacharsis in Lucian's *Scytha*). On Anacharsis' 'alien' wisdom and the archaising idealisation of the barbarian, see also Romm 1992, 74-77, Vlassopoulos 2013, 206-214.

[68] Cf. Richter 2017, 331: 'The transmission of Greekness in [the *Anacharsis*] is complex and ambiguous.'

and wear helmets and corselets made of oxen hides (7.3.18). Strabo thereby contributes to establish the Scythians as the paradigm of 'otherness' in the Graeco-Roman imagination. Likewise, imperial literature in general, and Greek historiography in particular, relied on Herodotus' representation of Scythia to fuel their classicising idea of the 'other'.[69] With regard to Herodotus' ethnographical method in general, it is worth noticing that he uses two different ways to present the 'other', which becomes the instrument by means of (and not against) which the 'self' can be defined.[70] On the one hand, Herodotus translates the customs of the 'other' in terms of Greek cultural references, and implies that they are comparable to the Greek ones.[71] On the other hand, he focusses on the alterity of the described culture and underlines its difference: strange or marvellous – that is, non-Greek – ritual practices, as is the case of Scythia.[72] For example, Herodotus focusses on the strangeness and the bloodiness of Scythian sacrificial practices. He affirms that, although the Scythians believe in Greek gods (Hestia, Zeus, Earth, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Heracles and Ares), they give them Scythian names (Hdt. 4.59.1-2). He notices that they do not have temples, altars and statues (4.59.2). Then, they sacrifice animals and cook their meat in strange rituals (4.60-61). For Ares in particular, they build up heaps of wood on top of which they fix a sword. They worship this god by shedding blood of both sacrificial animals and captured men on the sword (4.62). Other characteristics include, for example, that Scythians drink milk (4.2.1) and wine unmixed (6.84.1). Besides, they use the skulls of their enemies as drinking cups and their skin as garments (4.64-65). Some of them are nomads,

[69] For the influence of Herodotus' description of ethnic characteristics, see Hall 1989a, 133-135, Papadodima 2010, 1. For the influence of Herodotus' Scythian *logos* in general, see Rostovtzeff 1993, 31 and 34. Thucydides' description of Scythians as well as Strabo's Book 7 are largely indebted to Herodotus. See Cartledge 1993, 54-55 on Herodotus and Thucydides, but see Braund 2004b, 39 for a different view. For Herodotus' influence on Arrian's description of Scythia in the *Anabasis of Alexandre*, see Leon 2019, 554-559; on Dio's *Or*. 36, see Moles 1995, 184, Bäbler 2007. For the Scythian imaginary before Herodotus, see West 2002, 443-446, Skinner 2012, 68-78. Herodotus himself was probably influenced by Ionian logography and the Hippocratic corpus for the description of Scythia (Hp. *Aër*. 17-22). See Rostovtzeff 1931, 77-79, *id*. 1993, 30-31, Nippel 2002, 286, West 2002, 445. For sources on Scythian ethnography after Herodotus, see Rostovtzeff 1931, 79-104. For the representation of Scythians in iconography, see e.g., Lissarangue 1990, Ivantchik 2005. The Scythians seem to have been popular characters and rhetoric device in early imperial sophistic oratory. See Braund 1997, 127.

[70] See esp. Munson 2001, Rood 2006. The latter explains (206-300, 303) that Herodotus' 'ethnography of difference' consists in describing what is unknown from a Greek perspective, and making these 'differences' familiar to the Greeks by analogy. On the one hand, Herodotus' ethnography can be judgemental or praising. On the other hand, his approach focuses on cultural relativism and cultural interaction, and thus avoids the discourse of Greek-barbarian polarity. Besides, the 'Greeks' are not a homogenous ethnic group to begin with. Vlassopoulos 2013, esp. 4 underlines the importance, in general, to consider the two ways of representing the Greek-barbarian relationship (dichotomy or interaction) as simultaneous and dependent on context. Fundamental is Hartog's 1980 *Le Miroir d'Hérodote*. For Herodotus' description and perception of foreign cultures, see also Nippel 1990, 11-29, *id*. 2002, Cartledge 1993, Hall 1997, 44-45, Bichler/Rollinger 2000, 43-47, 54-59, Gould 2001, 368-372, Sourvinou-Inwood 2003, Skinner 2012, 237-248. For ethnography and the discourse of alterity before Herodotus, see Skinner 2012, Vlassopoulos 2013, esp. 170-179.

[71] For example, for similarities between the Scythians and the Spartans, see Braund 2004b.

[72] Thus for example, Jacob 1991, 63-72. Jacob (64-66) categorised Herodotus' 'rhétorique de l'altérité' into three forms of representation: by inversion, by analogy and by difference.

live in tents, and ride on horses, while others are farming the land (4.2.2, 4.17, 4.19.1, 4.46.3, etc.). Their bluntness is proverbial (4.127.4).[73]

In a few places, the *Toxaris* alludes to Herodotus' Scythian *logos*. For example, the description of Scythian friend making (§37) not only recalls Herodotean ethnographic *excursus* in general, but also explicitly combines motifs of the historian's Scythian *logos* such as the Scythians' practices of oath-making (Hdt. 4.70). Toxaris' ethnographic explanation of the Scythian tradition of the 'oxen hide' (§48.1-14) too is a case of Herodotean reception, as in a Herodotean way, he translates for a Greek outsider what this tradition means to the Scythians. Further allusions include the Scythian cult of Ares (§50.22, Hdt. 4.62), or Herodotus' underlining of the differences between different Scythian peoples, as Toxaris differentiates the Scythians from the Sindians, Machlyans, Alans, Bosporans, Lazi, and Sarmatians, (cf. Hdt. 4.6).[74] In general, Lucian is keen on elaborating on Herodotus' ethnographical practices.[75] However, he frequently transforms Herodotus' ethnographic approach by inverting the roles of the object described and the ethnographer, as the barbarian becomes ethnographer.[76] This is even more complex in the *Toxaris*, where, as has been said, the roles of the Greek ethnographer and the Scythian barbarian are constantly changing, and Toxaris' 'Scythian' culture is in many aspects Graeco-Roman or a projection of Graeco-Roman ideas on Scythian culture.[77]

Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* is a further important precedent for the representation of the Scythian world, and especially with regard to the *Toxaris*, as the first part of the dialogue between Mnesippus and Toxaris alludes to this tragedy.[78] In Euripides' *IT*, Orestes and his friend Pylades are confronted with the Taurians' gruesome practice of human sacrifice, as they are taken as victims in front of the priestess of Artemis who has to prepare them for sacrifice. The friends escape the violent barbarians and take with them the cult statue and the Taurians' priestess, which happens to be Orestes' sister Iphigenia. By the time of the second century CE, the subject matter of the *IT* had greatly permeated the Graeco-Roman culture of the Empire. In particular the motif of the 'escape-from-barbarians' seems to have acquired an important meaning in this period, considering the 'dominant concerns of the ancient Greek- and Latin-speaking communities of the ancient

[73] See Braund 2004b, 34.
[74] As a result, the idea of *one* Scythian people is clearly a Greek construct. See Tsetskhladze 2014,
[75] For the influence of Herodotean stereotypes of the Scythians in Lucian, see Bompaire 1958, 232 n. 2, 683-684, Saïd 1994, 163-166, Gangloff 2007, 85, Mheallaigh 2014, 65-66, Free 2015, 125-138 (126 on the *Toxaris*). In general, Lucian shows a strong interest for Herodotus, as he deals with Herodotean motifs and narrative techniques not only in his 'Scythian' works, but also in works such as the *DSyr*., *Hist.Conscr*., *VH*, *Dips*., *Luct*., and the *prolalia* entitled *Herodotus*. Lucian maintains, though, a paradoxical and contradictory relationship with Herodotus whom he evaluates positively (cf. Jones 1986, 152) but also discusses critically. See Saïd 1994.
[76] See Saïd 1994, 150, 163. This is particularly true for the dialogue *Anacharsis*.
[77] However, in a certain way, Herodotus too blurs the boundaries between cultures, as 'people changes as they come into contact with others and learn their habits.' Rood 2006, 303. N. Bryant Kirkland's unpublished dissertation on the reception of Herodotus (chapter three, dealing also with the reception of Herodotus in the *Anacharsis*) seems to defend a similar view.
[78] See §§1-9, 'Orestes and Pylades'.

Mediterranean world, who were constantly negotiating issues of ethnic identity and difference '.[79] However, underlining the difference is not the only way in which the Greek-barbarian relationship evolves. As Saïd demonstrates, Euripides makes use of stereotypes of the barbarians, but simultaneously takes distances from these and invites to criticise them; and there are many more examples of ways beside polarity and alterity in which Greeks relate to non-Greeks or use the trope of the barbarian.[80]

The *Toxaris* too explores further ways of representing Greek-barbarian relationships and uses the figure of the Scythian for its own purposes. Remarkably, in comparison with Euripides' *IT* or other accounts of the myth, Toxaris' story of Orestes and Pylades in Tauris plays down the gruesomeness of the Scythian sacrifice of strangers and the Greek friends. Then, while narrating his story by means of an *ecphrasis* of the wall paintings on the Scythian temple of Orestes and Pylades (§6), which emulates and diverges from the Euripidean play, Toxaris takes the perspective of the Greek heroes, and not that of the Scythians.[81] His Scythian version of the myth thus misses an essential element of negative characterisation of the Scythians – their barbaric violence – but simultaneously adopts a Greek perspective on the heroic deeds of Orestes and Pylades.

Greekness and 'Otherness' in the *Toxaris*

The changing of perspectives in the *Toxaris* affects the characters' use of stereotypes. On the one hand, these are either self-ascribed, when Toxaris integrates Greek preconceived ideas on the Scythians into his stories, such as their nomad life on chariots (§39, §45.10-11), their bellicose nature (§36.1-2, 8-10, and illustrated in Toxaris' first and third stories), or their handling of a sword called *akinakes* – a further Herodotean reminiscence (cf. §38.5, §43.11, §58.4, §63.2). Alternatively, Mnesippus alludes to the stereotype of the cannibalistic Scythians (§8.12) and ascribes to the Scythian heartlessness, lack of eloquence, belligerence and inhospitality (§8.1-10). On the other hand, Toxaris insists on the prejudice of the eloquent Greek sophistic orator (e.g., §35.9-18). Mnesippus, for his part, also uses stereotypes against the Phoenicians (traders, §4.3), the Ephesians (meretricious wives, as in his first story), the Syrians (dishonest, as the Syrian slave in his fourth

[79] Hall 2013, 122 and 111-134 for the importance of *IT*-motifs in Imperial times. For the reception in the novel in particular, see *ibid*. 113-4, Parker 2016, xliii.

[80] Saïd 1984. Representations of barbarians in tragedy, for example, are ambivalent, subject to contradictions, and highly context-dependent; they are used not only for ethnographic purposes, but also for comic effects, self-criticism, etc., if they are not plot-related. For further differentiated views on the Greek-barbarian motif, see Momigliano 1976, Dewald 1990 (Herodotus), Bowie 1991, esp. 184-185 (imperial literature), Pelling 1997 (Herodotus), Vidal-Naquet 1997 (tragedy), Schmidt 1999 (Plutarch), Saïd 2001 (oratory), Sourvinou-Inwood 2003 (Herodotus), Braund 2004b, esp. 39-40 (Herodotus and the Scythians in particular), Dench 2008 (Herodotus), Papadodima 2010 (Euripides), Gruen 2011 (for a more optimistic view on cultural interaction in comparison with Isaac's 'proto-racism'), Fragoulaki 2013 (Thucydides), Vlassopoulos 2013, 193-200, Skinner 2020 (esp. 197-198 on Herodotus). For theoretical approaches and specific case studies, see also the contributions in McInerney 2014.

[81] See below §§1-9, 'Orestes and Pylades'.

story), the Indians (mystic ascetics, §34.2-3), etc.[82] Remarkably, Mnesippus and Toxaris betray an orientalistic approach when using stereotypes ascribed to the Scythians. The Scythian concubines, which are mentioned twice in the dialogue (§26.17, §39), are actually a Persian stereotype. The 'Bosporan' banquets (§44.5) and bastards (§51.15), and some of the weapons used by the Scythians, which are generically oriental (κοπίδα, §55.7, κοπίδι, §55.11), create the scenery of a Persian royal court for Toxaris' third story. Mnesippus and Toxaris' idea of the Scythians thus conforms to a generalising image of the north-eastern 'other'. However, the denigrating effect of these reductive elements of ethnic characterisation is undermined by Toxaris' ironic self-ascription, the emphatic repetition of this operation, and not least the literary nature of these stereotypes, which is made more or less explicit by means of allusions, for example, to Herodotus or Ctesias. Finally, at the end of the dialogue, Mnesippus discerns in Toxaris a similarity of mind-set (§63.3-6) and defines their friendship as the fusion of bodies (§62.15-18), which symbolises a concept of mixed identities.[83] This indicates a dynamic and anti-essentialist conception of ethnicity, and makes the idea itself of 'otherness' meaningless.

Besides, the fact that Toxaris is in many ways a representative of Greek culture makes the thinking in terms of 'otherness' useless and foregrounds the concepts of ethnic syncretism and multiple identities. In fact, Toxaris recurs to different aspects of self-conceptualisation. In terms of ethnicity, he presents his geographical and cultural identity as Scythian, while his socio-cultural identity is also Hellenic: it is that of a *pepaideumenos* whose education may give access to elite society. This aspect of self-conceptualisation, that is, of Greekness, which rhetorically functions in a way similar to ethnicity, is an acquired one and builds upon the *mimēsis* of Classical Greek culture.[84]

The competition between Mnesippus and Toxaris therefore becomes a means for negotiating their superiority in Greekness.[85] Demonstrating one's superiority in friendship, in moral excellence, is a way of demonstrating one's *paideia*. The end of the dialogue shows that Mnesippus and Toxaris are of equal status; they have an equal 'degree' of *paideia*-Greekness.[86] Significantly, the competition is conceived in terms of ethnic differentiation, as both Mnesippus and Toxaris speak in terms of 'us' and 'them', and compete on behalf of their people (the Greeks, the Scythians). Eventually, though,

[82] For such unrefuted – (proto-)racist – stereotypes in Lucian, see Kuin 2017, esp. 137 for the indiscriminate use of ethnic characteristics. Thracians, Persians, Celts, Lybians, Scythians, Indians are indiscriminately 'other'.
[83] I avoid the term of 'hybridity', as it is negatively-biologically connoted and refers to Bhabha's postcolonial theories, which is not adequate for the present context. Cf. Malkin 2011, esp. 45-48. For the application of postcolonial studies on the ancient Syria and the Near East, see Andrade 2013, esp. 11-19 on the theoretical background. For postcolonial theory in the ancient world in general, see, e.g., Mitchell 2000, Van Dommelen 2002, Antonaccio 2003, Mitchell 2007, the contributions in Malkin 2001a, Whitmarsh 2010, and McInerney 2014 (there esp. Reger 2014).
[84] For this acquired *paideia*-Greekness as making part of the rhetoric of ethnicity in the imperial period, see Kemezis 2014.
[85] Cf. Goldhill 2001, 13: 'Affiliations to Greekness are seen – explored, contested, projected – also through the education system which linked the elite of the Empire in a proclaimed communality of *paideia*, a shared system of reference and expectation.' See also Anderson 1989, Swain 1996.
[86] Cf. Kuin 2017, 134-135. For the idea of degrees of Greekness, see Kemezis 2014, esp. 315-316 on Lucian.

the competition is a personal matter and is decided at the level of individual ethics. In the *Toxaris*, Greekness is thus seen as an ethic quality. It does not know any geographical borders; it is ubiquitous and englobes centre and periphery.[87] Noticeably, even Mnesippus' Greek stories deal with friendships that take place all around the Mediterranean. In conclusion, the *Toxaris* demonstrates a will to expand the realm of Greekness to its outmost confines and to oppose itself to the Athenocentrism of some Lucian's contemporaries (Aelius Aristides, for example).[88] After all, so the conclusion of the *Toxaris*, the 'other' is not so different, and there is no thing such as the 'absolute other'. 'True Greekness' is a matter of behaviour and education, of *paideia*, and not of geographic origin.[89]

4. Friendship

Friendship in the Ancient World

Friendship, in the ancient world, was an essential element of social life, as reflect the numerous texts dealing with friendship, iconographical representations of friends, and religious institutions such as the worship of Zeus Philios.[90] Friendship was also theorised as a major aspect in ethics. This, however, is not the place to write a history of friendship in Graeco-Roman world. I will nonetheless give an idea of the extent of the significance of friendship and discuss some important aspects as well as concepts of friendship that are relevant for contextualising the *Toxaris* and highlighting its particularity.[91]

Many ancient literary genres and philosophical schools that discuss the subject demonstrate the interest in friendship in the ancient world.[92] For example, paradigmatic friends appear in epics

[87] Cf. Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 86-93.
[88] See Pernot 1993, 743, Saïd 2001, 293-294, *ead*. 2006.
[89] Cf. *Pisc*. 19-20. Bozia relates this situation in the *Toxaris* with a cultural relativist approach to ethics: 'Lucian not only demonstrates that societies consider things differently, but he also suggests that except for the Greeks, who have appropriated self-righteousness, and the Romans, who claim to be paradigms of morality, there are other nations who have high, albeit different, moral standards.' Bozia 2015, 68. In my opinion, though, the point of the *Toxaris* is that outsiders defend the same moral standards than the Greeks (or the Romans), and maybe even more truly or zealously so.
[90] For an iconographical study of friendship and its literary-historical context, see recently Ruprecht 2018, in particular pp. 42-50 for Zeus Philios.
[91] For a historical outline on the subject of friendship, see Stählin 1973, 144-169, Fraisse 1974, Pizzolato 1993, Konstan 1997a. For friendship in various periods, genres, and philosophical schools, see the contributions in Fitzgerald 1997a; his introduction provides a brief overview of various texts on friendship and further specific references. Fürst 1996, 13-15 lists references of earlier scholarship. Particularly interesting for the context of imperial literature is White 1992, who discusses Christian concepts of friendship in comparison with Classical Greek ideals (see ch. 1 of this study for an outline). The more recent contributions in Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi/Keeling 2021 focus on single aspects in philosophical discourse (Plato, Aristotle, and Epicureanism).
[92] For a list of passages that explicitly discuss friendship, see Fürst 1996, 244-246. Dramatic and other representations of friendship are not listed there. For a more recent overview of friendship in Homer, see Fitzgerald 1997b, 15-23, Konstan 1997a, 24-42; in Theognis, see Donlan 1985, Konstan 1997a, 49-52; in tragedy, see Belfiore 2000; in Sophocles, see Blundell 1989; in Euripides, see Konstan 1985, Schein 1990, Stanton 1990.

(Achilles and Patroclus in the *Iliad*, Euryalus and Nisus in the *Aeneid*), tragedy (Orestes and Pylades in Euripides' *Electra*, *Orestes*, and *Iphigenia in Tauris*, Theseus and Pirithous, who mentioned, for example, in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*), and historiography (Damon and Phintias, cf., for example, D.S. 10.4). Good and bad friendships are the subject of praise and criticism, respectively, in texts as different as Ovid's exile poetry, Juvenal' *Satires* and Martial' *Epigrams*, who both focus on the issue of Roman *amicitia* in the *cliens-patronus* system. Comedy – that is New Comedy and Latin comedy – stages a few friends. These friends are, for example, involved in ideal deeds of friendship such as the willingness to die together with a friend (thus Alexis' *Συναποθνήσκοντες*, which probably inspired Plautus' lost *Commorientes*) as well as in situations of assistance in everyday life (thus in Plautus' *Trinummus* or Terence's *Adelphi*).[93] Friendship is an appropriate subject of discussion in symposia (cf., e.g., the *Theognidea*, Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.2.8, 2.4-6, and the hint in Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.70). In addition, friendship also constituted a topic of rhetorical exercise (cf. Cic. *Part. or*. 18.62, *De or*. 1.13.56, 2.67),[94] as motifs in friendship furnished subjects for developments of rhetorical examples (*chriae*).[95] Imperial philosophical oratory, too, dwelled on the subject, as show Plutarch's *De fraterno amore*, *De amicorum multitudine*, and *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*, Maxime of Tyre's *Orations* 14 and 35, Themistius' *Oration* 22, etc.

Friendship is discussed extensively across philosophical schools and even constitutes the explicit subject of treatises entitled 'περὶ φιλίας', which, though being lost, are mentioned in Diogenes Laertius, for example by Simmias of Thebes (D.L. 2.124), Speusippus and Xenocrates (D.L. 4.4.13, 4.12.7), Theophrastus (D.L. 5.45.29, cf. Gell. *NA* 1.3), Clearchus (F 17-18 Wehrli vol. iii = Ath. 8.349f and 12.535e), Cleanthes (D.L. 7.175.30), or mentioned elsewhere, such as in Chrysippus' treatise (Plut. *Stoic. Repugn*. 1039B). First of all, Plato set the base for a theoretical examination of friendship, in particular with his dialogue *Lysis*, which rather inconclusively discusses phenomena of attraction and likeness in relation to the question of goodness.[96] Aristotle then, principally in the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* but also in some passages of the *Eudemian Ethics* (7.1-12), the [Aristotelean] *Magnia Moralia* (2.11-17), and in *Rhetoric* (2.4), proceeds to a systematic analysis of friendship.[97] He categorises three types of friendships (*EN*

[93] For the motif of the συναποθνήσκοντες, see Zucker 1950, 4-5, Pizzolato 1993, 114. For a general analysis of friendship in comedy, see Zucker 1950 (although his reconstruction of New Comedy on the evidence of Latin comedy is methodologically incorrect and leads to erroneous results in some places), Raccanelli 1998, Burton 2004.

[94] For friendship as a commonplace topic, see also Powell 1995, 39 with indications of further passages. See also Pizzolato 1993, 178. For example, Quint. 6.2.17 discusses friendship as of the speaker's ἤθη.

[95] See, e.g., the proverb οἱ φίλοι θησαυροί, which is a common place in *progymnasmata*. See e.g., Theon, Spengel III p. 100. Mnesippus and Toxaris' third stories develop this *topos*. Cf. Anderson 1976a, 17 with n. 23, 22 (where he notes that the stories in the *Toxaris* are 'developments of rhetorical examples').

[96] For a commentary of the *Lysis*, see Penner/Rowe 2005, and more specifically on the theme of friendship, see e.g., Price 1989, 1-14, Brüschweiler 2011, 73-132.

[97] For Aristotelian friendship, see Cooper 1980, Vlastos 1981, Annas 1993, Schroeder 1997 (and other Peripatetic philosophers), Pangle 2003, von Siemens 2007. For a commentary of Arist. *EN* viii and ix, see Pakaluk 2005.

1155b17-28, cf. *EE* 1236a12-17): one of utility (διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον), one of pleasure (δι' ἡδονήν) and a third perfect and true friendship (τελεία φιλία, *EN* 1156b7-33, cf. 1157b6-1158a18). Aristotle defines perfect friendship as the reciprocal and disinterested – although self-serving in the sense that the friend is 'another self' – feeling of goodwill for the sake of goodwill and between equally virtuous persons. Perfect friendship also involves awareness of reciprocal goodwill and the sharing of emotions, ideals and needs. This friendship originates in virtue and the good (τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων) and is therefore stable (διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον, *EN* 1156b7-13, cf. *EE* 1236b19). It rests on principles of equality, reciprocity and likeness (*EN* 1157b34, 1158b1-12, 1159b1-8, 1162a34-b5, 1165a17). According to both Platonic and Aristotelian thought, true, or perfect, friendship has a godlike nature.[98] In Epicureanism too, friendship is regarded as an immortal good, if not the object of worship, and has an intrinsic value.[99] It is the leading principle in Epicurean communities, because friendship is an essential means to reach a state of happiness because of the security and pleasure it affords. Simultaneously, though, pleasure is primarily sought for the sake of one's friend – a fact that, as was commented on as early as Cicero (*Fin*. 1.66-70), points to a complex balance between self-interested hedonism and a selfless concern for one's friend, as if one's friend were 'another self'.[100] For Stoics true friendship exists solely among the sage. They likewise maintain that friendship operates as an interested-disinterested form of moral improvement of the friend as 'another self'.[101] Problematic, in these regards, is the question of the Stoic sage's autarky. Central to the Stoic idea of friendship, finally, are virtue as a prerequisite and cosmopolitanism, as the sage does not know any political borders. This cosmic or universal view of friendship is also present in Pythagoreanism and Cynicism. However, the cosmic dimension is sometimes restricted to those initiated to Pythagorean philosophy, and the Cynic conceptualisation of friendship is *per se* difficult due to their disinterest in anything social.[102]

Some Important Ideals in Friendship

It is worth explaining a few key concepts in friendship in order to develop a more precise idea of the ancient discourse on friendship in general, and in the *Toxaris* in particular. The reason why friendship

[98] See Gadamer 1985, 31-33.
[99] See Mitsis 1988b, Pizzolato 1993, 76, Armstrong 2016, 184 and Epicur. *Sent.Vat*. 78: 'The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship: of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal'. For the intrinsic value, see also *Sent.Vat*. 23. For passages dealing with Epicurean friendship, see *Sent*. 27, *Sent.Vat*. 23, 28, 34, 39, 52, 56-57, 78. See also Lesser 2014.
[100] See Epicur. *Sent.Cap*. 27 with Pizzolato 1993, 72-79 and D.L. 10.120. For this paradox, see Rist 1980, Mitsis 1988a, 98-128, Stern-Gillet 1989.
[101] For Stoic friendship, see Fraisse 1974, 333-373, Lesses 1993, Fürst 1996, 187-195, Banateanu 2001, Collette-Dučić 2014. Some important passages are found in Sen. *Ep*. 3, 9, 35, 48, 63, 94, 103, 109 (unfortunately, his *Quomodo amicitia continenda sit* is fragmentary, see Fürst 1996, 242-244), Epict. *Diss*. 2.22, 3.22.62-66.
[102] For Pythagorean friendship, see Fraisse 1974, 59-67, Fürst 1996, 31-34, Thom 1997 (Neopythagoreanism).

is so essential to ancient ethics is to be seen in its relation to the exercise of virtue.[103] Thus, friendship has an intrinsic moral value in Homer and Hesiod.[104] Friendship is explicitly associated with virtue throughout antiquity.[105] Virtue is most prominent in Stoic philosophy, where friendship is conceptualised as a scale of which virtue is the index of value.[106] The idea is present in Pythagoreanism and Epicureanism.[107] The *Toxaris* discusses friendship in terms of moral worth as well. For example, Orestes and Pylades are 'the best' (ἀρίστους) in this Scythian virtue that is friendship (§7.12-13); Mnesippus' examples of friends are ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βεβαίους (§35.2); Toxaris explains that the Scythians make friends with someone whose moral worth is attested by deeds (§37.3-4).

Beyond this essential connection with virtue, one of the defining aspects of friendship is the reciprocal feeling of 'goodwill', εὔνοια, or *beniuolentia*. In Aristotle, the feeling of εὔνοια, or feeling εὔνους, towards someone is defined as wishing someone well for his own sake (*EN* 1155b31-33). It is the beginning of friendship (*EN* 1167a4, 11-12), and develops into friendship on the condition that there is also a reciprocal feeling of affection and the persons concerned are aware of the reciprocal goodwill (*EN* 1155b33-34: εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι, *EN* 1156a3-4: δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, cf. *Rh*. 1380b35-36, Cic. *Amic*. 9.29).[108] The εὔνοια in friendship explicitly originates in virtue (*EN* 1167a19-22, cf. Cic. *Amic*. 14.50: boni inter bonos quasi necessariam beniuolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus). The concept is also representative of Stoicism.[109] In later traditions (Middle Stoa and Middle Platonism), εὔνοια and φιλία even become interchangeable.[110] The reciprocity of the feeling upon which friendship rests is also an essential principle.[111] In the Toxaris, the concept of εὔνοια appears in §6.20, §7.1, §32.13, and §46.7, and is further illustrated in both a Greek story (§32.13) and a Scythian story (§46.7). Moreover, one frequently finds the idea that living together or at least intimacy (συνήθεια) is one

[103] For virtue and friendship in general, see Fürst 1997, 414-417.
[104] See Fraisse 1974, 494, White 1992, 17.
[105] Virtue is an essential aspect of friendship in the *Theognidea* (e.g., 1.31-38), in Thucydides (3.10.1), in Plato (*R*. 332a, *Lg*. 837a6-7), Xenophon (*Mem*. 2.1.32, 2.6.61-2), and Aristotle (*EN* 1155a4, 31, 1156b7-24), in Cicero (*Amic.* 5.18, 6.20, 18.65, 22.83-85), Plutarch (*De amic. mult*. 93C, 94B), and Maxime of Tyre (exemplifying the ideal by using the myth of Prodicus in his 14th *Oration* – esp. §§1, 2, and 5).
[106] See Banateanu 2001, 108. See Sen. *Ep*. 9.8, 81.12, *Ben*. 7.12.2, Epict. *Diss*. 2.22, Stob. 11 p. 108.5 (= SVF III 630). See also Clem.Al. *Strom*. 219.101.3 with Banateanu 2001, 110-111. See also Fraisse 1974, 350-359 who stresses that in Stoicism friendship comes along with virtue.
[107] For the idea in Pythagoreanism, see Fürst 1996, 11 and 49 n. 122 (with passages); in Epicureanism, see Armstrong 2016, 188.
[108] For the relationship between reciprocity and the feeling of goodwill in Aristotle, see von Siemens 2007, 193-196.
[109] See also Banateanu 2001, 109-110. See at least Ph. *Plant*. 206, Sen. *Ben*. 2.17.3 (= SVF 3.725), 2.25.3 (= SVF 3.726).
[110] Sterling 1997, 209 with n. 37 (with passages).
[111] For example, in Pl. *Ly*. 212d, X. *Mem*. 2.6.6 and 34, Alcin. *Didask*. 33.187.8-10, Max.Tyr. 14.6, Apul. *De dog. Plat*. 2.13.238. Dio Chrysostom, for his part, applies the principle of goodwill to the relationship between the emperor and his people (3.86-88). Max.Tyr. (35.7) defines the lack of εὔνοια as belonging to flattery, the 'bad' friendship, or anti-friendship (compare Plut. *Mor*. 95B, cf. 56A).

condition for this 'goodwill' to be able to develop.[112] Intimacy and spending time together (philosophising) represent an Epicurean ideal (D.L. 10.135). In Pythagoreanism, where it first and most prominently appears, it came to include the Pythagorean community. Their concept of κοινονία is that of a community founded on equality and 'holding all things together' (κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, cf. D.L. 8.10) – meaning thereby having in common not only properties but also interests and ideas.[113] In comparison, a few of Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories represent friends whose relationship is also one of συνήθεια: they spend their life philosophising together in Athens (§21.4-5), study together in Egypt (§27.5-7), and travel together (§19.5-6, §57.5-7, §61.4-5).

Immediately related to the latter concept, is a further defining aspect of friendship, the concept of 'oneness of mind' (ὁμόνοια, or *concordia*). Thus, from Homer (e.g., *Od*. 17.218: 'God always brings like and like together') to Platonic οἰκειότης (cf. *Smp*. 197d), one finds the idea that friends associate with each other because of their similar character and philosophy of life. This idea, although it is particularly dominant in Stoic thought, where it is a foundational concept in friendship and political life, is almost omnipresent in the ancient discourse on friendship, as will be seen in §63.4.[114] In the *Toxaris*, the idea of ὁμόνοια is essential for Mnesippus and Toxaris' own friendship, where the idea of 'oneness of mind' is metaphorically described as 'oneness of body', and compared with Geryon, the giant whose two or three sets of limbs represent the closest friends (§62.16-18).

In addition, there is the motif of the 'other self'. From Aristotle to the Epicureans and Stoics (though with nuances), the concept explains the fact that friendship, although being disinterested, as the feelings towards, and the good done to, a friend exist for the friend's sake, may nevertheless be the source of good, utility, or pleasure. The concept of a friend as 'another self' is, according to Porphyry (*VP* 33), originally Pythagorean, but Diogenes Laertius attributes it to Zeno (ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος, ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἐγώ, 7.23).[115] Epicureanism illustrates the concept by means of the following proverb: 'a wise man will feel no less physical pain when a friend is tortured than when he himself is tortured' (*Sent.Vat*. 56). The concept is developed in Aristotle's thoughts on friendship: πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός) (*EN* 1161a31-32, 1170b6-7, *MM* 1213a5, *EE* 1245a). For Aristotle, true friendship is demonstrated when friends wish something good for the other as if it were for themselves, because the same things are good and bad for both (*Rh*. 1381a8-10).[116] Epicureans seem to adhere to this view of friendship as well.[117] The concept is not only topical in philosophical discourse on friendship, but also acquired a proverbial value. As early as Homer, the friendship between Achilles and Patroclus can be conceived of as an 'alter-ego'

[112] Thus, e.g., Arist. *EN* 1170b11-12, 1172a3-7, *EE* 1245a12-27. For the idea in Plutarch, see O'Neil 1997, 117-118.
[113] Cf. White 1992, 19. Theirs was a 'concept of friendship as an intimate and mutual relationship of affection between those of like minds, based on a natural and universal harmony'.
[114] Cf. Schofield 1991, 46-48, 128-129 (with a comparison with Plato's view).
[115] For the specificities of the Stoic doctrine in these regards, see Banateanu 2001, 39-42. Cf. SVF 1.324
[116] See von Siemens 2007, 135.
[117] Ruprecht 2018, 33.

relationship.[118] The same motif likewise appears, for example, in Plaut. *Bacch*. 549, Cic. *Amic*. 6.22-7.23, 21.80 (uerus amicus…est enim is, qui est tamquam alter ego), *Fam*. 2.15.4, 7.5.1, *Att*. 3.15.4, 4.1.7, Plin. *Ep*. 2.9 and Plut. *De amic. mult.* 93E (καὶ τὸ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν φίλον). Some of Mnesippus and Toxaris' exemplary friends consider themselves as 'other selves' or even parts of the same body (§53.5-13).

Equality is of fundamental importance in ancient discourse on friends as well. For example, the principles of compensation and equality (between the good and the bad) are discussed at length in Plato's *Lysis*, while Aristotle describes different forms of exchange – material, of pleasure and goodness, or mixed – in friendship (*EN* 1158b1-12, 1162b22-63a23). Aristotle furthermore defines different types of friendships, not only between equal but also between unequal friends (*EN* 1158b12-1159a13, 1163a24-b5).[119] Equality of exchange in friendship is imperative for its effective operation. This applies to all three types of friendship: the exchanged good is either goodwill (in perfect friendship), or material (in a friendship of utility), or enjoyment (in a friendship of pleasure). The latter two are characteristically unstable because in these cases, friendship terminates as soon as the exchange process is interrupted or becomes unequal (*EN* 1156a19-24). The question of equality, or rather inequality, in friendship is highly relevant to the *Toxaris*. It will be discussed in the last section of the present subchapter.

As has been shown, there are many *topoi* in ancient discourse of friendship, which describe the ideal behaviour of a friend and the duties in friendship.[120] Essential is, in addition, the idea that true friends share hard times as well as good times, as is stated by Toxaris in §7.5-7 and 10. This *topos* is found in a multiplicity of texts.[121] The *Menandri sententiae* show how popular the idea was (Men. *Mon*. 370 Jäkel [=F 263 FrCG] and 534 Jäkel [cf. Men. F 10 Körte II]). The idea also comes very close to the saying κοινὰ τὰ φίλων mentioned above in the context of Pythagorean friendship-community. The saying, though, is actually ubiquitous in the ancient discourse on friendship.[122] The point of this idea is that friends ought to help one another spontaneously in times of need (cf. Arist. *EN* 1124b17-18, 1171b20-21, Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 64D, Them. *Or*. 22.274b-d, Cic. *Amic*. 13.44, and frequently in Ovid's exile poetry).[123] The most extreme application of this *topos* is the idea that true friends are willing to provide help to the point of (potentially) dying for one another – thus most famously Achilles for Patroclus in *Il*. 18.80-82. This heroic model is developed in tragedy (E. *IT* 598-608 and 674-686), in bucolic poetry (Bion F 12 Gow), in the novel (e.g., Charito 4.2.14, 7.1.7,

[118] Nagy 2013, 166.
[119] For these passages in Aristotle, see Gauthier/Jolif 1970, comment *ad* VIII, 8. For friendship between unequal persons in Aristotle, see Pangle 2003, 57-64, von Siemens 2007, 179-199 and below, §19.6-7.
[120] For a good overview of these topoi and passages, see Bohnenblust 1905, 27-44.
[121] Thgn. 1.79-82, E. *Or*. 451-455, Arist. *EN* 1166a7-8, 1169b14-16, *Rh*. 1381a5-6, X. *Smp*. 8.18, Plut. *Mor*. 96A-C, D.Chr. *Or*. 3.100-101, 41.13, Max.Tyr. 14.6, Lib. *Chr*. 1.21 (Pylades' faithfulness to Orestes), Cic. *Amic*. 5.17, 6.22, *Fin*. 1.67, Ov. *Trist*. 1.5.17-48.
[122] For example, Pl. *Ly*. 207c, E. *Or*. 735, 1074, Arist. *EN* 1168b, Sen. *Ben*. 7.12.1. For further passages, see Stählin 1974, 152.
[123] For further passages, see Fürst 1996, 210-213.

Ach.Tat. 3.22.1, 7.14.4, Philostr. *VA* 7.11) and in oratory (e.g., Max. Tyr. 35.4).[124] It is also represented in Middle and New Comedy, where the *Συναποθνήσκοντες* seems to have been a popular subject, considering that it is the name of a few transmitted titles of comedies by Alexis and by Philemon and Diphilus.[125] The motif has found its way into Latin literature (see, for example, the numerous passages in Ov. *Pont*. 2.6.25, 3.2.85-86, *Trist*. 1.5.21-22, 4.4b.21-2 (4.75-6), 5.4.46, but also Plautus' lost *Commorientes*, cf. Ter. *Ad*. proem. 7, and D.S. 10.4.3-6). Noteworthy is also Nisus' heroic attempt to save his beloved friend Euryalus, as he refuses to survive his certain death (Verg. *Aen*. 9.399-445). The motif is a common place in philosophy too, as it appears, for example, in Aristotle (*EN* 1169a18-20) and in Stoicism (Sen. *Ep*. 9.4). Epicureanism defends the view that the sage has to support all sufferings, and even death, for his friend's sake, as it leads to εὐδαιμονία (*Sent.Vat*. 28, 56-57 D.L. 10.120-121, Plut. *adv. Col.*. 1111B).[126]

Therefrom ensues that faithfulness is the most important duty and virtue in friendship; πίστις actually embodies the very essence of friendship.[127] This ideal is reflected in the phrase πιστὸς φίλος (ἑταῖρος),[128] which is found throughout Greek literature.[129] In general, faithfulness in friendship is an ideal found in Aristotle (*EE* 1237b9-12, 1239b15), Plutarch (*De amic. mult*. 97B), Dio of Prusa (74.4), Maxime of Tyre (14.6), and Cicero (*Amic*. 7.25). In Stoic philosophy, the highest degree of friendship corresponds to the highest degree of faithfulness (πίστις).[130] Epicurean friends too are committed to loyalty (e.g., D.L. 10.120).[131] So are Pythagorean friends, as shows, for example, the well-known anecdote of the Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias: accused of conspiring against the Sicilian tyrant Dionysius, the latter asked permission to arrange his affairs and come back to prison by the end of the day, the tyrant accepted under the condition that he produce someone who would meanwhile take his place. Damon fulfilled this task and Phintias came back as promised.[132]

The idea that true friendship shows primarily in hardship – as is famously stated in Cic. *Amic*. 17.64: amicus certus in re incerta cernitur (= trag. frg. 210 Vahlen [= 185 Jocelyn]) – is related to the

[124] For the motif in Chariton, see Hock 1997, 156-157, Holzmeister 2014, 52-54, 68.
[125] See Zucker 1950, 4-5, Pizzolato 1993, 71.
[126] For the paradox of this view with regard to the Epicurean hedonism and precept of *ataraxia*, see e.g. Mitsis 1988, 98-128, Stern-Gillet 1989, 278-284, Konstan 1996b, 389-390, Brown 2009, 182-191, Lesser 2014, 125-126.
[127] On friendship and πίστις from a linguistic perspective, see Taillardat 1982, and *ibid*., 5-8 for literary examples.
[128] See also *schol. vetera in Homeri Iliadem* 16.147: πιστότατόν φησι τὸν παρὰ τὴν μάχην οὐκ ἐγκαταλιμπάνοντα τοὺς φίλους, οἷον ὁ ἐν πολέμῳ κοινωνεῖν θέλων τῶν κινδύνων μεγάλην πίστιν τῆς φιλίας παρέχεται.
[129] from Theognis (1.209=332a, 416, 529, 645), Euripides (e.g., Orestes to Pylades in *El*. 82), Plato (*Phdr*. 233d2), and Xenophon (e.g., *HG* 6.5.45, *An*. 3.21, 7.3) to Plutarch (e.g., *Agis et Cleom*. 45.5) and the Greek novel – to name but a few. For the passages in Chariton, see Hock 1997, 148.
[130] See Banateanu 2001, 108-109. Faithfulness and trust in friendship rest on reciprocity.
[131] See Rist 1980, 127-128.
[132] Cf. Plut. *De amic. mult*. 93E, Iamb. *VP* 33.234-237, Porph. *VP* 59-61, Cic. *Fin*. 2.24.79, *Off*. 3.10.45, *Tusc*. 5.22.33, Val. Max. 4.7.

idea that situations of need represent a test case for friendship.[133] Thus, 'tested friends', that is, friends whose faithfulness is attested by deeds and time, is an important aspect of friendship. In the *Theognidea*, for example, it is crucial (e.g., 1.119-128, 1016), although only few friends are estimated to remain faithful in times of need (1.79-82), and trust is not something self-evident (1.697-698, 857-860).[134] In fact, true and faithful friends are rare.[135] In the *Toxaris*, the *topos* of 'tested' friendship is made explicit in §61.23. The stories are all cases in which assistance is given to a friend in need, and thereby all present paradigms of faithfulness – a virtue, which, in Toxaris' opinion, is indispensable and best demonstrated in Orestes and Pylades' friendship, which the Scythians worship (§7.1-3).

The quality of a true friend must not only to be tested and confirmed in times of need, but a friend must also be carefully chosen before entering into a relationship of trust. To Greek thinkers such as Aristotle, recognising someone's moral quality by judging (κρίσις) his deeds is an essential step in ethical (in the context of friendship: *EN* 1157b5-7), but ethical judgement also plays an essential role in the formation of bonds of friendship (thus in Plut. *De amic. mult.*).[136] More generally, the importance of choosing one's friend properly is debated in Cicero (*Amic*. 17.64, 22.85) and Plutarch (*De frat. amore* 482B), who reports Theophratus' saying (F 74: τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀλλοτρίους … οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν, cf. Cic. *Amic*. 17.62, Sen. *Ep*. 3.2, Max. Tyr. 20.3). The idea of judgement is furthermore topically associated with friendship in the much-debated distinction between a true friend and a flatterer – thus the exploitation of the semantical field of κριν- in Max. Tyr. 14.3-4.[137] Besides, the idea that (true) friendship is chosen by means of ethical judgement and not on the grounds of feelings of affection, is typically Stoic.[138] However, it is above all a commonplace in friendship discourse; as early as the *Theognidea*, carefully choosing one's friends is a serious concern in times of insecurity.[139] Similarly, when Toxaris explains how Scythians make friends only with persons selected for their moral excellence (§37.3-4), he hints at the concept of κρίσις.

In conclusion, in the Graeco-Roman world, friendship is not only an essential topic in ethics and philosophy but also a very popular literary subject. All these *topoi* and ideals are found in the *Toxaris* as well, and most of them are illustrated in Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories.

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[133] See Fürst 1996, 214-215. See, for example, E. *Hec*. 1226-1227, *IT* 610, *Or*. 665-666, Arist. *EE* 1235b7-9, 1238a14-16, or also Plaut. *Epid*. 113, Petron. 61.9. See also Tim. 8.4, Thphr. Ap. Stob. 8.4.14, Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 49D-E.

[134] See Donlan 1985, 225-227, Pizzolato 1993, 23, Fitzgerald 1997b, 29-31. For the issue of unfaithfulness, see also, e.g., Pi. *Isthm*. 2.11, Men. *monost*. 687 Jäkel, Petron. 80.9.

[135] Cf. Pi. *Nem*. 10.78, E. *Heracl*. 55-59, *El*. 605-609, Arist. *EN* 1156a24, Plut. *De amic. mult*. 97B, Max.Tyr. 35.3, D.C. 516a, Ov. *Trist*. 4.5.23-24, 5.14.29-30, Phaedr. 3.9, Lucan. 8.534-535, Plin. *Epist*. 6.10.5.

[136] See esp. 94B: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἀληθινὴ φιλία τρία ζητεῖ μάλιστα … δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδέξασθαι κρίναντα καὶ χαίρειν συνόντα καὶ χρῆσθαι δεόμενον, ἃ πάντα πρὸς τὴν πολυφιλίαν ὑπεναντιοῦται, καὶ μάλιστά πως τὸ κυριώτατον ἡ κρίσις.

[137] For the distinction between a friend and a flatterer, see below §12.15; for the importance of choosing one's friends as an essential step in the formation of friendships in the Scythian way, see below §37.

[138] Pizzolato 1994, 163 on Late Stoicism such as represented by Seneca. Feelings of affection develop afterwards.

[139] See Fraisse 1974, 50-54. In this case, friendship might also be considered as a political alliance.

Friendship in the *Toxaris*

Although the *Toxaris* uses common *topoi* and images taken from the ancient discourse on friendship, it distinguishes itself for the critical and educative intents that are performed by the text. First, the situations that illustrate these *topoi* are without exception extreme, or even absurd, situations. The friends are saved from complete ruin or death at the cost of their friend's reputation, fortune, family, life, or a body part. These two aspects, topicity and exaggeration/absurdity, have lead scholars to consider the *Toxaris* either as a moralistic or as a parodic text.[140] It would be erroneous, though, to suspect a moralistic voice in the use of these common places. Rather, theses *topoi* are creatively re-functionalised into short narratives, and are thereby meant to attest to the virtuosity and rhetoric inventiveness of Mnesippus and Toxaris, and of the *Toxaris*. On the one hand, these images of moral excellence have their perfect place in a text that has such an encomiastic intent and consists in a competition in praising friendship.[141] Moreover, praise of friendship is the central theme of the dialogue, which begins as Toxaris praises Orestes and Pylades, a standard example of friendship.[142] On the other hand, the exaggeration of these examples of moral virtue tests the boundaries of praise and incites the recipients of the text to look critically upon the examples of friends. The recipients feel obliged to make use of ethical reasoning, as notwithstanding the excellence of some of the *friends*, doubts are raised whether these are functional *friendships*. In fact, in each Greek and Scythian story, one friend functions as a paradigm of friendship. The exaggeration, or absurdity, of Mnesippus and Toxaris' examples magnify the commitment of the friends and the importance they give to friendship against other ethical values. This is linked to the ongoing dilemma of how faithfulness towards friends relates to loyalty towards other ideals and emotional bonds, or to obligations towards

[140] See above, 'Context'. See esp. Swain 1994, 175-176. On the contrary, Konstan argues against a parodic intent of the *Toxaris* and underlines the exaggeration of the examples. Regarding Toxaris' fifth story, he notes that it is 'designed simultaneously to evoke a transcendent image of friendship that must have had some basis in the ideals of his time, and to shock the reader by the cool narration of a choice that seems gruesomely callous. But this very coincidence of contrary responses by which Lucian achieves his parodistic effects depends on the recognition by the audience of an exalted standard of commitment between friends which continues to elicit the approval of the audience even though it has the air of an archaic or primitive code of values.' Konstan 1993, 5.

[141] This is not the only text that insists on the fact that friendship is worthy of the highest praise, cf. Val. Max. 4.7.ext. 1: quibus paene tantum uenerationis quantum deorum immortalium caerimoniis debetur. Illis enim publica salus, his priuata continetur atque ut illarum aedes sacra domicilia, harum fida hominum pectora quasi quaedam sancto referta temple sunt. For the encomiastic intent of the *Toxaris*, see Fürst 1996, 184.

[142] One may conclude with Edith Hall that by the imperial period, Orestes and Pylades have become 'a standard example of male loyalty in Roman rhetoric'. Hall 2013, 101 referring also to Val. Max. 4.7 (see above). Moreover, numerous passages cite Orestes and Pylades as example of friendship. See e.g., Xen. *Smp*. 8.31, Plut. *De amic. mult*. 93E, D.Chr. 74.28, Them. 22.269a, Cic. *Amic.* 7.24.

other institutions.[143] Consequently, the stories of the *Toxaris* raise more questions about friendship than they present ready-made norms of behaviour.[144]

Second, the *Toxaris* raises the question of adequacy of speech in dealing with friendship. More specifically, of adequacy of praise and moral sentences, which are here expanded as short narratives. Toxaris' rebuke of Greek excellence in praising friendship but failing in enacting their ideals (§9) already points in that direction. This question of appropriateness of speech is furthermore meaningful considering the early imperial tradition of discussing friendship in the context of epideictic speeches and rhetorical exercises. Thus, the *Toxaris* significantly differs from Plutarch's treatises on friendship, with whom it otherwise shares its educative function and many images and ideals. For example, beyond the usual *topoi*, both reject the *polyphilia*, which they both compare to adultery, see friendship as 'oneness' of body and mind. Plutarch's treatises are more intent on dispensing practical advice and formulating norms of behaviour. On the contrary, the *Toxaris* invites the recipients to ethical reflection; the recipients are educated by the text not as much by means of its content as by the way it includes the recipients – the missing judge as it were – in the process of evaluation, and thereby make them progress in friendship.

While Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories each present *one exemplary friend*, which effectively demonstrates that the Greek and the Scythians share a common ethical system, these stories fail to present exemplary *friendships*. This shifts the focus and the search for a valid example of friendship upon Mnesippus and Toxaris, who become friends at the end of the dialogue, that is, at the end of their competition.[145] Their λόγοι alone do not create friendship; only by means of their *dialogue* and their exchange, or matching, of exemplary friends do they themselves become friends. Thereby, the ongoing controversy about the supremacy of words or deeds is given a further twist, as Mnesippus and Toxaris' speeches come to equal their deeds of friendship and the means by which their πίστις is proved. The way in which friendship is presented and functions in the *Toxaris* shows that it is neither moralistic, though being serious about friendship, nor parodic or simply entertaining, though presenting hyperbolic and questionable examples of friendships. The hyperbolism is functional to the dialogue and its performance of friendship – both from the perspective of the recipients and their ethical improvement, and the perspective of the characters who form friendship.

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[143] Compare Konstan 1993, 4 (referring, e.g., to Gell. *NA* 1.3): 'This balance between competing commitments informs a great many of the Greek and Roman tales of friendship, and fidelity is thus naturally measured by magnitude of the alternative claim.'

[144] As is usual for Lucianic texts, the *Toxaris* does not provide the recipients with a clear answer to their doubts. Compare in general Whitmarsh 2001a, 294: '[Lucian's] works offer no securely authoritative moral position, only a recurrently frustrated process of challenge and counter-challenge.'

[145] Competition and friendship is itself a *topos*. 'Roman friendship was also, paradoxically, competitive. Friends competed to show that they were superior in the performance of *amicitia*, both to their friends and also to a wider public in order to win political advantages.' Hall 2013, 100-101. In Aristotle, the competition between friends has a moral connotation and is a form of cooperation to reach virtue. See Kraut 1989, 115-119, Annas 1993, 257-263. See also X. *Mem*. 2.6.35.

Noticeably, references to the Roman *cliens-patronus* system and the consequences that this system brings along for the practice and conception of friendship in this period are missing in the *Toxaris*, except for one of the Greek stories (but even then, the motif of the κόλακες is reminiscent of New Comedy).[146] Unlike contemporary Latin writers such as Juvenal or Martial, and unlike his Greek contemporaries such as Plutarch, Maxime of Tyre, or even others of his works like the *De mercede conductis* (esp. §36) or the *Parasitus*, the *Toxaris* does not focus on the issue of the flatterers or (un)truthful friends. On the contrary, the Greek and the Scythian stories illustrate ideals of selflessness and devotion – in the Scythian stories even reciprocity – which are aspects of *the* fundamental and timeless ideal in friendship, a friend's πίστις. The *Toxaris* concentrates on idealised (Archaic and) Classical concepts of friendship: equality, reciprocity and tested reliability.[147] Although many of these Classical Greek ideals and further topical motifs are ubiquitous in the texts of the imperial period, nowhere else is the silence about these issues so marked. This leads to the understanding that the *Toxaris*, with its constant thematisation of the relationship between ἔργα and λόγος, points to the necessity to interrogate the relationship between speech making about friendship and actually forming friendship in the reality of the second century CE. Thus, it is evidences for the discrepancy between speeches full of (past) ideals and the concrete actions one is able to complete in the society of the early Roman Empire. Notwithstanding the awareness for such a situation, and unlike Plutarch and Maxime of Tyre, the *Toxaris* does not draw pessimistic conclusions such as 'Alas! True friends are a rarity nowadays!' (Plut. *De amic. mult*. 97B, Max. Tyr. 35.7, see also D.Chr. 74.28, Cic. *Fin*. 1.20.65, *Amic*. 15.79, Sen. *Ben*. 6.33.3),[148] but provides the instruments to sharpen one's awareness of the discrepancy between ethical ideals and moral choices, and refines one's faculty to evaluate the latter.[149]

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[146] Burton 2004, 213 describes the Roman institution of *amicitia*, underlining its political or other hierarchical relationships, which are totally absent from the *Toxaris*. Cf. Pizzolato 1993, 89-112. Typical for the Roman view of political *amicitia* is also the 'helping friends-harming enemies' principle, although it is deeply rooted in Greek thought. For the concept, see Blundell 1989, esp. 26-59. For passages, see DNP 4 (1998) s.v. Freundschaft 669 [Gehrke]. See esp. Thgn. 1.869-872. For the Roman view of political *amicitiae*, see DNP 1 (1996) s.v. amicitia [Badian]. Lucian problematises the difference between Roman political *amicitia* and ideal Greek φιλία in *Merc.Cond*. 1 (κἀν ταῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων τούτων φιλίαις ἐξεταζομένους – εἰ χρὴ φιλίαν τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτῶν δουλείαν ἐπονομάζειν;), cf. Whitmarsh 2001a, 279-291. On the opposition between *cliens-patronus* and ideal friendship in Latin literature, see Hor. *Sat*. 1.9. For the issue in Martial, see Flores Militello 2019, 125-135 (generally), 208-245 (difference with true friendship).

[147] The first two apply rather to Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship than to those of their stories. For the fact that these concepts are representative of friendship in Classical Greece, see Konstan 1998, 280, 287-288. The emphasis on equality and reciprocity, that is, providing help in time of need and giving assistance, rather than on repayment is typical of the Classical period. From the Hellenistic period onwards, the focus on honesty and frankness. Thus, the *Sententiae Menandreae* belong to the Athenian/Greek Classical tradition, as they stress reliability and loyalty in friendship. Whitmarsh, for his part, stresses that this form of friendship based on reciprocity and equality is an *idealised* (Classical) Greek friendship. See Whitmarsh 2000, 306, *id*. 2006, 108.

[148] See also Cic. *Amic*. 21.79, Sen. *Ben*. 6.33.3, Them. *Or*. 22.271a, D.C. 516a. See Bohnenblust 1905, 37. This pessimistic attitude is also characteristic of Hesiod and Theognis. See White 1992, 17.

[149] For a discussion of these contemporary issues of friendship as opposed to the concerns of the *Toxaris*, see Lizcano Rejano 2000, 229-231, 233. To her, the *Toxaris* shows an 'alabanza sincera de la amistad como sentimiento noble.' The stories 'offer a catalogue of exemplary friendships and friends, who demonstrate moral value, solidarity, altruism, and generosity to such point that the whole dialogue acquires a certain halo of

Finally, friendship in the *Toxaris* is also a pluricultural friendship between a Greek and a Scythian. Toxaris contextualises Scythian friendship on the battlefield and in the demonstration of military prowess (§36.8-12, and exemplified in his stories). This is meaningful from a few perspectives. First, it might remind someone of Roman historical examples of friendship. Valerius Maximus, for example, stresses the military aspect of his exemplary friendships – Roman friendships (haec sunt uera Romanae amicitiae indicia, Val. Max. 4.7.4). Second, it simultaneously alludes to the stereotype of the bellicose barbarian and Homeric epic battles (cf. §§10-12). Thereby, the idea of the primitive barbarian is associated with that of the Archaic Greek hero. This is not, however, a condemnation of contemporary friendship by means of contrast with an ideal – Archaic and past, or primitive and blissful – friendship.[150] Toxaris – and in the end Mnesippus too – certainly alludes to, and represent themselves as, Homeric heroes. However, his focus is on the Archaic, but in other ways also typically Stoic and generally intellectual-cosmopolitan, institution of *xenia* and all its philanthropic consequences (see §§62-63).[151] *Xenia*, in this archaic sense, is *per se* a relationship of 'cross-community contacts'.[152] Thus, friendship, in the *Toxaris*, does not know any borders and ethnical differences; it grounds on like-mindedness and is voluntary. It is born in the symbolic demonstration of πίστις, that is, in the exchange of stories of equal – ethical and aesthetic – value and number. In fact, friendship, as a central aspect of *paideia*, is anywhere where virtue is. One may even consider that, in his warlike concept of friendship, Toxaris essentially defends the cardinal virtue of ἀνδρεία – a truly Hellenic quality, which differentiates the Greek ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός against the barbarian.[153]

The Question of Homoeroticism

The ancient Greek word φίλια is notoriously vague, as it refers to more than one bond of affection: it does not only designate what we call 'friendship', but also applies to fraternal, filial, conjugal, etc. affective relationships.[154] Although texts sometimes specify the type of φιλία dealt with – for example, comradeship (ἡταιρική), family ties (συγγενική), erotic love (ἐρωτική), or benefaction (εὐεργητική) – there are some important overlaps between relationships such as 'friendship' and

hagiography' (*ibid.*, 231). However, I do not share her opinion that the *Toxaris* is 'nostalgic' about past true friendship and criticises the contemporary 'decadence' of friendship – this 'decadence' is in fact a *topos* and a rhetoric construction. Rather, the *Toxaris* points to the issue of idealising the past and repeating topical ideals in friendship without actually reflecting upon them or being able to enact them.

[150] *Pace* Pizzolato 1993, 193, Pervo 1997, 179, Lizcano Rejano 2000, 233, 248.

[151] Compare *Demon*. 10. Demonax, who considers friendship the most important human good (τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν τὴν φιλίαν ἡγούμενον), thinks of himself as everyone's friend lest those who are incurably bad.

[152] See Malkin 2001b, 14.

[153] See WAP s.v. andreia 42-43 [Kauffman]. Compare the example of Achilles and Patroclus in Max.Tyr. 35.4.

[154] Thus, Aristotle, when discussing φιλία in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, refers to bonds of affection in different contexts (familial, political, etc.). For the discussion of this issue in Aristotle, see Konstan 1997a, 67-72. See also Kakridis 1963, 44-45 (on φιλότης in Homer), Gould 2001, 30-36. For a linguistic approach of the terminology of friendship, see Benveniste 1973, 277-282.

brotherly love (φιλαδελφία), or 'friendship' and guest-friendship (ξενία or φιλία ξενική).[155] Notwithstanding these overlaps and the terminological vagueness of φιλία, the concept of 'friendship' is clearly defined and contextually differentiated.[156]

In some cases, though, making a differentiation between male-male friendship and homoerotic love is a difficult task. The distinction primarily lies in the definition of the relationship as equal (friendship) or unequal (erotic) with regard to age (and knowledge), and the absence or not of (sexual) desire in the relationship.[157] However, there are some conspicuous examples of ambiguities between friendship and erotic relationships. Whereas in the *Iliad*, the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus is one of friendship and comradeship, later literature started a controversy about the actual nature of their relationship.[158] Aeschylus first represented Achilles and Patroclus' relationship as erotic in his *Myrmidons* (F 135-136 TrGF). Plato then defined their friendship as erotic, but has Phaedrus critique Aeschylus and invert the ἐραστὴς-ἐρώμενος relation (*Smp*. 179e-180b). In general, it is not easy to draw a distinction between friendly affection and erotic desire in Plato's discussion of friendship (in particular in the *Lysis*).[159] Subsequently, according to the context, Achilles and Patroclus were either considered lovers (e.g., Theoc. 29.31-34, Luc. *Am*. 54, Mart. 11.43.9-10, but see as early as Aeschin. 1.141-142) or ideal friends (e.g., X. Smp. 8.31, Plut. *De amic. mult*. 93E, Luc. *Tox*. 10.4-5, Max.Tyr. 35.4, Lib. *Or*. 1.56, Them. *Or*. 22.266b, 271a, Hyg. *Fab*. 257.1).[160] The friendship between Orestes and Pylades is less ambiguous. As Konstan puts it: '[…] where we might expect a close connection between friendship and sexual love, especially in relations between members of the same sex, for the Greeks the opposite was the rule: friendship, as a mutual bond between equals, normally excluded the idea of amatory desire, involving as it did an unequal attachment between a lover and a beloved. The hopeless and unrequited sacrifices of the lover are poles apart from the heroic loyalty of friends such as Orestes and Pylades'.[161] Although the focus is mostly on their extraordinary deeds of friendship, as is undoubtedly the case in the *Toxaris*, where Toxaris in particular emphasises the heroic dimension of their friendship, at times, the friendship of these heroes is erotically connotated, as in Lucian's *Amores* 47.[162] On the contrary, the

[155] Cf. Plut. *Amat*. 758D with Pizzolato 1993, 69. Herman 1987, 18-19 (in particular on brotherly love, friendship, and guest-friendship).
[156] For a discussion of the issue, see Konstan 1997a, 2-8.
[157] See Konstan 1993, 6, *id*. 1997a, 38-39, Sanz Morales/Laguna Mariscal 2003, 292, Ruprecht 2018, 36, 145. For a discussion, see Sergent 1986, 250-258. For a contrasting view, see Buffière 1980, 366-373.
[158] See White 1992, 15, Konstan 1997a, 37-42, Trapp 1997, 278 n. 18 (referring also to Aesch. 1.133-135 for Achilles and Patroclus as paradigmatic friends). The controversy is also seen in the discussion of the relative age of Achilles and Patroclus in Sen. *Ep*. 88.6. For a summary of the question, see also Cantarella 2009, 295-296, 298. She strongly argues in favour of an interpretation of Achilles and Patroclus as a pederastic couple.
[159] See Price 1989, esp. 14.
[160] The distinction is not clear in Latin love elegy. Cf. Pizzolato 1993, 133-135. Sanz Morales/Laguna Mariscal 2003 argue for an erotic reading of the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus by means of intertextuality in Charito.
[161] See Konstan 1993, 6, *id*. 1997a, 68-69 and 73.
[162] See Hall 2013, 107-110. See also the mention of Orestes and Pylades as friends or lovers in August. *Conf*. 4.6.7.

relationship between the Tyrannicides Harmodius andAristogeiton is unambiguously erotic (cf. Th. 6.56-59) – but nonetheless a paradigmatic friendship (cf. Max. Tyr. 35.4). As a result, one may hazard the hypothesis that the intensity and quality of exemplary friendships such as that of Achilles and Patroclus or Orestes and Pylades (cf. πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔρωτος, §7.3) make these relationships appear as amatory, so that, perhaps, one may sometimes consider these relationships as erotic, but primarily as friendships.[163]

With regard to the *Toxaris*, both the (alleged) intertextuality with the ancient novel, where male-male friendships represent a contrasting foil for the heterosexual couples, and the unequal (passive-active) relationships between the friends have induced scholarship to interpret the examples of friends as homoerotic relationships.[164] First, the idea of a (narrowly taken) intertextual and even parodic relationship between the ancient novel and the *Toxaris* has been refuted above.[165] Second, it is true that Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories present friendships that are unequal, for example, with regard to virtue (Mnesippus' first story), wealth (Mnesippus' third story), moral strength (Toxaris' fourth story), or physical constitution (Mnesippus' second story), and with regard to the active or passive role the friends play therein (all stories). However, these aspects, and in particular the fact that the friends have an active or a passive role, is functional to the dialogue, as these inequalities serve to rhetorically emphasise the worth of one of the friends and activate recipients to critically reflect on the stories.[166] Moreover, nowhere does the *Toxaris* even hint at an erotic dimension in the illustrated friendships, and the friends seem to be same-aged: they have explicitly been friends since childhood (§12.9, §27.4) and have grown up together (§27.4-5). These two points clearly demonstrate that the examples of friendships in the *Toxaris* may be under no circumstances interpreted as erotic love.[167] In conclusion, male-male friendships may be interpreted as homoerotic relationships, but this is not a rule. Rather, the context is deciding. Therefore, considering that the context of the *Toxaris* is that of ideal friendship and that clues such as age difference or desire are missing, the examples of friends presented by Mnesippus and Toxaris should not be regarded as pederast relationships.

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[163] On Achilles and Patroclus, compare Zenodotus' scholia to *Il*. 16.97-100. Noticeably, all these friends – or lovers – are described as selfless and not intent on the repayment or fulfilment of erotic desire. The focus, if not specifically erotic, is on friendship.

[164] For the contrasting foil with regard to the heterosexual couples in the ancient novel, see Hunter 1994, 1083, Whitmarsh 2011, 159-163. For this interpretation of the *Toxaris*, see Stählin 1974, 153, Pervo 1997, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 44-45, 49-51.

[165] See below, §§12-18.

[166] Moreover, one may consider the example of Orestes and Pylades, where the latter is often considered as Orestes' 'follower': '[w]enn in den anderen meist verglichenen Freundespaaren beide Teile eine jeweils eigene Bedeutung besitzten, bleibt Pylades stets nur wie ein Schatten des Orestes' (RE XXIII.2 (1959) s.v. Pylades 2081 [Radke]). This interpretation of Pylades' role as secondary protagonist is hinted at in the *Toxaris* (cf. ἅμα τῷ φίλῳ, §6.10, with Orestes as subject).

[167] In some stories it would even be absurd to think of an erotic relationship, as Toxaris, for example gives his sister in marriage to his friend in his fourth story (§60.10-13). This would have little sense, if it were an amatory relationship. In Mnesippus' fourth story, one friend takes his friend's daughter as wife, and in Toxaris' third story, which deals with three friends (no erotic love, then, I believe), one friend wishes to marry the Bosporan princess. Arguably, though, pederastic love is not necessarily incompatible with marriage. For more arguments against erotic love in the *Toxaris*, see §§12-18.

5. The Reception of the *Toxaris*

In the following, I will give a few examples of the afterlife of the *Toxaris*. The aim is to provide a rough picture of the aspects of this Lucianic dialogue that were of interest for later generations. In the Middle Ages, there is little evidence for Lucian being read (and imitated) outside Byzantium – he was known, for example to Arethas and Tzetzes.[168] In particular, the ninth century CE scholar Photius read Lucian, and summarised many of his works in his *Bibliotheca* (and Lucian's *persona* entered the compilation as well, cf. Phot. *Bibl*. Codex 128). In the Renaissance, interest of western scholarship for the Greek language and literature increased, foremost in Italy and Veneto, where Greek scholars such as Lascaris remained for some time and contributed to the expanding knowledge of this language. Scholarship set it as its task to provide translations of Greek texts into Latin, and later in vernacular languages (for example, d'Ablencourt's French translation of Lucian of 1654, or Dryden's English translation of 1711). Lucian's works too profited from this expanding interest, as they were printed for the first time by Aldo Manutius in 1496 in Florence. Lucian's works were also translated by scholars such as the fifteenth century Dutch humanist Rodolphus Agricola, but also by Italian humanists.[169] The study of Lucian's works was – then and for a long time – controversial.[170] Nonetheless, the humanists Thomas More and Erasmus of Rotterdam, who appreciated Lucian's wit, engaged in a friendly competition in translating his works.[171]

Among the first works of Lucian Erasmus occupied himself with next to the *Timon*, *Gallus*, and *De mercede conductis* was the *Toxaris*, which he translated it into Latin. He dedicated his translation of the *Toxaris* to the English statesman Richard Foxe (cf. *Ep*. 187, dated to the 1st January 1506). Erasmus had the translation published in 1506 in Paris by Jodocus Badius as part of his first collection of translations of Lucian's works. Erasmus' interest in his works was primarily propaedeutic, as Lucian's Attic Greek provided a useful practice of the language for an autodidact such as the Dutch humanist. The latter's interest in Lucian's works also regarded their aesthetic, ethical, and intellectual value.[172] This is clearly shown in his positive judgement of the language and

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[168] On the Byzantine reception of Lucian, see at least Robinson 1979, 68-81, and more recently Marciniak 2016.

[169] See. For the reception of Lucian in Italy, see Sidwell 1975 (14th century), Marsh 1998, 1-41 (14th century), De Faveri 2002 (on 15th-16th century Italian translations), Geri 2011 (Lucian's reception in Alberti, Pontano, and Erasmus; esp. pp. 172, 174 on the *Toxaris*), and the contributions in Fantappiè/Riccucci 2018 (15th century). For the German humanists' reception of Lucian, see Baumbach 2002, 27-51. For Lucian's reception in general, see Robinson 1979, Mattioli 1980.

[170] See Robinson 1979, 96-98, Panizza 2001. Baumbach 2002 is a good illustration of the German ongoing controversy about Lucian and his works.

[171] See Rummel 1985, 49-69. On Thomas More and Lucian in general, see recently Dealy 2020, 103-148.

[172] See Heep 1973, 14, 16, Rummel 1985, 50-51. On the same attractive aspects of Lucian's work in the eyes of Italian 15th century scholars, see Robinson 1979, esp. 82-83. Thus, the late 14th-mid 15th century Italian scholar Giovanni Aurispa underlined the moral value of the *Toxaris* as a collection of exemplary friendships. Robinson notes more generally that as early as the Byzantines, the interest in Lucian resided in his wit and 'moral' value. *Ibid*., 65, 68. The moral value of the stories of friendships in the *Toxaris* in the Renaissance is also conspicuous in the collection of *exempla*, such as Otto van Veen's *Album amicorum* (1575-1598), which includes two illustrations of the *Toxaris* (Toxaris' fifth story on f. 19, and Mnesippus' fifth story on f. 29). See Massing 2007 (the folio-numbering is that of J. van Gheyn, *Album amicorum de Otto Venius. Reproduction*

style of the *Toxaris*. The focus on friendship of the *Toxaris* too must have attracted Erasmus considering the importance of friendship for the humanist himself (as is demonstrated in the prominent place that friendship takes in his *Adages*) and for the humanist community in general.[173] More importantly, the theme of friendship in the *Toxaris*, and in particular the motif of friends joined into one body at the end of the dialogue, appealed to him as a Christian value.[174]

Erasmus' translation of the *Toxaris* had some impact on, or at least usefulness for, later generations. For example, Christopher Marlowe used his translation of the *Toxaris* for the characterisation of his Tamburlaine, a Scythian-Mongol shepherd who becomes emperor. In the context of contemporary religious tensions between Islam and Christendom, Tamburlaine, who appears as the prototype of the pagan and polytheist barbarian, is described as some sort of Scythian King Thoas. Remarkably, in the second scene of the first part of the 1587 play, the mention of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades is reminiscent of the passage in the *Toxaris* where Toxaris sketches the Scythians admiration for, and cult of, Orestes and Pylades.[175]

The focus on the Scythian cult of friendship in Lucian's dialogue is singular, because, more frequently, the *Toxaris* has been of interest as a source of moral examples of friendships. A case in point is Mnesippus' third story, the story of Eudamidas' testament to his friends Aretaius and Charixenus. This story reappears in quite a number of eighteenth century collections of moral examples of friendships such as the well-known Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Phintias, and further historical examples.[176] In these anecdotes, the story serves as an illustration and memento of the obligations of a faithful friendship. The focus is on the moral value of the story. Remarkable and

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intégrale en fac-similé avec introduction, transcription, traductions, notes, Bruxelles, 1911). For the translation of the *Toxaris* by Aurispa, see also Marsh 1998, 15, 31.

[173] See Eden 2001, 3-5. Friendship was an important aspect of the 'Republic of Letters' in the Renaissance and later. On friendship and humanism, see, e.g., Hyatte 1994, 137-202 (Boccaccio's novella 10.8 of the *Decameron*, de Premierfait's French translations of Cicero's *De Amicitia*, Alberti's dialogue *Dell'amicizia*), Langer 1994, Burke 1999. Indicative for the importance of friendship in the Italian and northern European Renaissance is, furthermore, Leon Battista Alberti's organisation of a *certamen coronario* in 1441 in Florence, a poetry competition in *volgare* on the theme of friendship (cf. his *Esametri* on friendship), but also texts such as Montaigne's 'De l'amitié', which was published in his *Essais* of 1580 (*Essai* 1.28).

[174] Cf. Robinson 1979, 167-168. See Erasmus *Ep*. 187 (p. 417 Allen I): Qui quidem (uti spero) non omnino futurus est ingratus tuae excellentiae, uel ob id quod amicitiam praedicat, rem adeo sanctam ut barbarissimis etiam nationibus olim fuerit ueneranda. Nunc Christianis usque adeo in desuetudinem abiit, ut non dicam uestigia, sed ne nomen quidem ipsum extet; quum nihil aliud sit Christianismus quam uera perfectaque amicitia, quam commori Christo, quam uiuere in Christo, quam unum corpus, una anma esse cum Christo; hominum inter ipsos talis quaedam communio qualis est membrorum inter se corporis.

[175] See Hall 2013, 166-168 (esp.: 'And by the love of Pylades and Orestes, / Whose statues we adore in Scythia'). Marlowe was acquainted with Erasmus' translation. In addition, she mentions the play *Orestes* by Giovanni Ruccelai (ca. 1520), which also profited from Erasmus' translations of Euripides' Iphigenia and Lucian's *Toxaris*. See *ibid*., 162.

[176] The story of this friendship appears, for example, in a collection of anecdotes about exemplary friends (including also Zenothemis and Menecrates from Mnesippus' fourth story) entitled 'The Beauty of Love and Friendship, Intermixed with a Great Variety of Surprising and Diverting Examples' (London, third edition 1745), and in a similar collection of 'human *mirabilia*' by Nathaniel Wanley (London, 1788, p. 210). It also appears in Thomas Holcroft's *The Family Picture, or Domestic dialogues on amiable subjects illustrated by Histories, allegories, Tales, anecdotes, etc. intended to strengthen and inform the mind* (London, 1783, vol. 2, dialogue 16, pp. 150-152).

meaningful for the eighteenth century fondness for moral anecdotes, is the representation of the story by Nicolas Poussin in 'The Testament of Eudamidas' (ca. 1644-1648, oil on canvas, 111 cm x 139 cm, Royal Museum of Fine Arts, Copenhagen, KMS 3889). The painting went rather unnoticed by Poussin's contemporaries, but found much positive critique a century later.[177] The mid-eighteenth century critique appreciated the work not only for its aesthetic value, foremost its clarity, its 'Stoic' austerity, and the artist's virtuosity in catching the tragic moment of the story. It especially praised the painting for the choice of the moral message of Eudamidas' generosity (though dying, his only thought goes to caring for a safe future for his mother and daughter), and the value of friendship 'over all earthly possessions'.[178] The representation of Eudamidas on his death bed, surrounded by a preoccupied doctor, the person in charge of taking the testament, and his mother and daughter in tears, confers a heroic (and was then interpreted as patriotic) dimension to Mnesippus' more pathetic and absurd than grandiose story.

These few examples show that the reception of the *Toxaris* foremost concentrated on the theme of friendship in Mnesippus and Toxaris' short narratives. The way the representation of friendship in the *Toxaris* was interpreted in the two periods analysed, the time of Erasmus of Rotterdam and the eighteenth century, reflects contemporary concerns. The Dutch humanist regarded the *Toxaris* as a means to discuss Christian ideals of friendship and philanthropy, whereas the eighteenth century saw in Lucian's work a source for moral examples of virtuous friends. In both cases, the *Toxaris* appears to trigger ethic reflection.

[177] For example, it was much praised by Diderot. See Verdi 1971. There was also some critique heard with regard to the vexed question of the relationship between painting and literature, as Poussin's painting was reproached not to be able to narrate and therefore convey the moral message, as well as would a verbal narration. See *ibid*., 517-518

[178] Verdi 1971, 514.

TEXT

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ Η ΦΙΛΙΑ

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Τί φής, ὦ Τόξαρι; θύετε Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Πυλάδῃ ὑμεῖς οἱ Σκύθαι **(1)**
καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι πεπιστεύκατε αὐτούς;

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Θύομεν, ὦ Μνήσιππε, θύομεν, οὐ μὴν θεούς γε οἰόμενοι εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Νόμος δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι θύειν ὥσπερ 5
θεοῖς;

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑορταῖς καὶ πανηγύρεσιν τιμῶμεν αὐτούς.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Τί θηρώμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπ' εὐμενείᾳ θύετε αὐτοῖς,
νεκροῖς γε οὖσιν.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Οὐ χεῖρον μὲν ἴσως, εἰ καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἡμῖν εὐμενεῖς εἶεν· οὐ 10
μὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἄμεινον οἰόμεθα πράξειν μεμνημένοι
τῶν ἀρίστων, καὶ τιμῶμεν ἀποθανόντας· ἡγούμεθα γὰρ οὕτως
ἂν ἡμῖν πολλοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ἐθελῆσαι γενέσθαι.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκετε. Ὀρέστην δὲ καὶ Πυλά- **(2)**
δην τίνος μάλιστα θαυμάσαντες ἰσοθέους ἐποιήσασθε, καὶ ταῦτα
ἐπήλυδας ὑμῖν ὄντας καὶ τὸ μέγιστον πολεμίους; οἵ γε, ἐπεὶ
σφᾶς ναυαγίᾳ περιπεσόντας οἱ τότε Σκύθαι συλλαβόντες ἀπῆγον
ὡς τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καταθύσοντες, ἐπιθέμενοι τοῖς δεσμοφύλαξι καὶ 5
τῆς φρουρᾶς ἐπικρατήσαντες τόν τε βασιλέα κτείνουσι καὶ τὴν
ἱέρειαν παραλαβόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν αὐτὴν ἀποσυλή-
σαντες ᾤχοντο ἀποπλέοντες, καταγελάσαντες τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν
Σκυθῶν. ὥστε εἰ διὰ ταῦτα τιμᾶτε τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτε
πολλοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ἐξεργασάμενοι. καὶ τοὐντεῦθεν αὐτοὶ 10
ἤδη πρὸς τὰ παλαιὰ σκοπεῖτε, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει ὑμῖν πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν

Σκυθίαν Ὀρέστας καὶ Πυλάδας καταίρειν. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖτε τάχιστα ἂν οὕτως ἀσεβεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄθεοι γενέσθαι, τῶν περιλοίπων θεῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀποξενωθέντων. εἶτ', οἶμαι, ἀντὶ τῶν θεῶν ἁπάντων τοὺς ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ αὐτῶν ἥκοντας ἄνδρας ἐκθειάσετε καὶ ἱεροσύλοις ὑμῶν οὖσιν θύσετε ὡς θεοῖς.

Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀντὶ τούτων Ὀρέστην καὶ Πυλάδην τιμᾶτε, ἀλλ' **(3)** εἰπέ, τί ἄλλο, ὦ Τόξαρι, ἀγαθὸν ὑμᾶς εἰργάσαντο ἀνθ' ὅτου, πάλαι οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι δικαιώσαντες αὐτούς, νῦν τὸ ἔμπαλιν θύσαντες αὐτοῖς θεοὺς νενομίκατε, καὶ ἱερείοις ὀλίγου δεῖν τότε γενομένοις ἱερεῖα νῦν προσάγετε; γελοῖα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα δόξειε καὶ ὑπεναντία τοῖς πάλαι.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Καὶ ταῦτα μέν, ὦ Μνήσιππε, γενναῖα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ἃ κατέλεξας. τὸ γὰρ δύο ὄντας οὕτω μέγα τόλμημα τολμῆσαι καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀπάραντας ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἀπείρατον ἔτι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὄντα πλὴν μόνων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀργοῦς ἐς τὴν Κολχίδα στρατευσάντων, μὴ καταπλαγέντας μήτε τοὺς μύθους τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν προσηγορίαν καταδείσαντας ὅτι ἄξενος ἐκαλεῖτο, οἷα, οἶμαι, ἀγρίων ἐθνῶν περιοικούντων, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐάλωσαν, οὕτως ἀνδρείως χρήσασθαι τῷ πράγματι καὶ μὴ ἀγαπῆσαι εἰ διαφεύξονται μόνον, ἀλλὰ τιμωρησαμένους τὸν βασιλέα τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν ἀναλαβόντας ἀποπλεῦσαι, πῶς ταῦτα οὐ θαυμαστὰ καὶ θείας τινὸς τιμῆς ἄξια παρὰ πάντων ὁπόσοι ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦσιν; ἀτὰρ οὐ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Πυλάδῃ ἐνιδόντες ἤρωσιν αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Λέγοις ἂν ἤδη ὅ τι γε[i] σεμνὸν καὶ θεῖον ἄλλο ἐξειργάσαντο· **(4)** ἐπεὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ πλῷ καὶ τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ πολλοὺς ἄν σοι θειοτέρους ἐκείνων ἀποδείξαιμι, τοὺς ἐμπόρους, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς Φοίνικας αὐτῶν, οὐκ εἰς τὸν Πόντον οὐδὲ ἄχρι τῆς Μαιώτιδος καὶ τοῦ Βοσπόρου μόνον ἐσπλέοντας, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ βαρβαρικῆς θαλάττης ναυτιλλομένους· ἅπασαν γὰρ οὖτοι ἀκτὴν καὶ πάντα αἰγιαλόν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, διερευνησάμενοι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος ὀψὲ τοῦ μετοπώρου εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν ἐπανίασιν. οὓς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον θεοὺς νόμιζε, καὶ ταῦτα καπήλους καὶ ταριχοπώλας,

εἰ τύχοι, τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ὄντας.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Ἄκουε δή, ὦ θαυμάσιε, καὶ σκόπει καθ' ὅσον ἡμεῖς οἱ βάρ- **(5)**
βαροι εὐγνωμονέστερον ὑμῶν περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνομεν,
εἴ γε ἐν Ἄργει μὲν καὶ Μυκήναις οὐδὲ τάφον ἔνδοξον ἔστιν ἰδεῖν
Ὀρέστου ἢ Πυλάδου, παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ νεὼς ἀποδέδεικται αὐ-
τοῖς ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, ἑταίροις γε οὖσι, καὶ θυσίαι
προσάγονται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη τιμὴ ἅπασα, κωλύει τε οὐδὲν ὅτι ξένοι
ἦσαν ἀλλὰ μὴ Σκύθαι ἀγαθοὺς κεκρίσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ Σκυθῶν τῶν
ἀρίστων θεραπεύεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἐξετάζομεν ὅθεν οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί
εἰσιν, οὐδὲ φθονοῦμεν εἰ μὴ φίλοι ὄντες ἀγαθὰ εἰργάσαντο, ἐπαι-
νοῦντες δὲ ἃ ἔπραξαν, οἰκείους αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων ποιούμεθα.

Ὃ δὲ δὴ μάλιστα καταπλαγέντες τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ἐπαι-
νοῦμεν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἔδοξαν φίλοι οὗτοι δὴ ἄριστοι
ἁπάντων γεγενῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομοθέται καταστῆναι ὡς χρὴ
τοῖς φίλοις ἁπάσης τύχης κοινωνεῖν.[ii] καὶ ἅ γε μετ' ἀλλήλων ἢ **(6)**
ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἔπαθον ἀναγράψαντες οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν ἐπὶ στήλης
χαλκῆς ἀνέθεσαν εἰς τὸ Ὀρέστειον, καὶ νόμον ἐποιήσαντο πρῶτον
τοῦτο μάθημα καὶ παίδευμα τοῖς παισὶ τοῖς σφετέροις εἶναι τὴν
στήλην ταύτην καὶ τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς γεγραμμένα διαμνημονεῦσαι.
θᾶττον γοῦν τοὔνομα[iii] ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐπιλάθοιτο τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ
τὰς Ὀρέστου καὶ Πυλάδου πράξεις ἀγνοήσειεν.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ περιβόλῳ τοῦ νεὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁπόσα ἡ στήλη
δηλοῖ γραφαῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰκασμένα δείκνυται, πλέων
Ὀρέστης ἅμα τῷ φίλῳ, εἶτα ἐν τοῖς κρημνοῖς διαφθαρείσης
αὐτῶν τῆς νεὼς συνειλημμένος καὶ πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν παρεσκευα-
σμένος, καὶ ἡ Ἰφιγένεια ἤδη κατάρχεται αὐτῶν. καταντικρὺ
δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοίχου ἤδη ἐκδεδυκὼς τὰ δεσμὰ γέγραπται
καὶ φονεύων τὸν Θόαντα καὶ πολλοὺς ἄλλους τῶν Σκυθῶν, καὶ
τέλος ἀποπλέοντες, ἔχοντες τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν καὶ τὴν θεόν. οἱ Σκύ-
θαι δὲ ἄλλως ἐπιλαμβάνονται τοῦ σκάφους ἤδη πλέοντος,[iv] ἐκκρε-
μαννύμενοι τῶν πηδαλίων καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν πειρώμενοι· εἶτ'
οὐδὲν ἀνύσαντες οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τραυματίαι, οἱ δὲ καὶ δέει τούτου,
ἀπονήχονται πρὸς τὴν γῆν. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἴδοι τις ἂν ὁπόσην
ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων εὔνοιαν ἐπεδείκνυντο, ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς Σκύθας συμ-
πλοκῇ. πεποίηκεν γὰρ ὁ γραφεὺς ἑκάτερον ἀμελοῦντα μὲν τῶν

καθ' ἑαυτὸν πολεμίων, ἀμυνόμενον δὲ τοὺς ἐπιφερομένους θατέρῳ καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνου ἀπαντᾶν πειρώμενον τοῖς τοξεύμασιν καὶ παρ' οὐδὲν τιθέμενον εἰ ἀποθανεῖται σώσας τὸν φίλον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον φερομένην πληγὴν προαρπάσας τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι.

Τὴν δὴ τοσαύτην εὔνοιαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς κοινωνίαν καὶ τὸ πιστὸν καὶ φιλέταιρον καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ βέβαιον τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔρωτος, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινα ταῦτα ᾠήθημεν εἶναι, ἀλλά τινος γνώμης βελτίονος ἢ κατὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς τούτους ἀνθρώπους, οἳ μέχρι μὲν κατ' οὖρον ὁ πλοῦς εἴη,[v] τοῖς φίλοις ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰ μὴ ἐπ' ἴσης κοινωνήσουσιν τῶν ἡδέων, εἰ δέ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἀντιπνεύσῃ[vi] αὐτοῖς, οἴχονται μόνους τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀπολιπόντες. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὅπως εἰδῇς,[vii] οὐδὲν Σκύθαι φιλίας μεῖζον οἴονται εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὅτῳ ἄν τι[viii] Σκύθης μᾶλλον σεμνύναιτο ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ συμπονῆσαι φίλῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ κοινωνῆσαι τῶν δεινῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲν[ix] ὄνειδος μεῖζον παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦ προδότην φιλίας γεγενῆσθαι δοκεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα Ὀρέστην καὶ Πυλάδην τιμῶμεν, ἀρίστους γενομένους τὰ Σκυθῶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἐν φιλίᾳ διενεγκόντας, ὃ πρῶτον ἡμεῖς ἁπάντων θαυμάζομεν, καὶ τοὔνομα ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτῶν ἐθέμεθα Κοράκους καλεῖσθαι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι "φίλιοι δαίμονες."

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

(7)

Ὦ Τόξαρι, οὐ μόνον ἄρα τοξεύειν ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν Σκύθαι καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμείνους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥῆσιν εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων πιθανώτατοι. ἐμοὶ γοῦν τέως ἄλλως γιγνώσκοντι ἤδη καὶ αὐτῷ δίκαια ποιεῖν δοκεῖτε οὕτως Ὀρέστην καὶ Πυλάδην ἐκθειάσαντες. ἐλελήθεις δέ με, ὦ γενναῖε, καὶ γραφεὺς ἀγαθὸς ὤν. πάνυ γοῦν ἐναργῶς ἐπέδειξας ἡμῖν τὰς ἐν τῷ Ὀρεστείῳ εἰκόνας καὶ τὴν μάχην τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων τραύματα. πλὴν ἀλλ' οὐκ ᾠήθην ἂν οὕτω ποτὲ περισπούδαστον εἶναι φιλίαν ἐν Σκύθαις· ἅτε γὰρ ἀξένους καὶ ἀγρίους[x] ὄντας αὐτοὺς ἔχθρᾳ μὲν ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ θυμῷ, φιλίαν δὲ μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκειοτάτους ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι, τεκμαιρόμενος τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἃ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀκούομεν καὶ ὅτι κατεσθίουσι τοὺς πατέρας ἀποθανόντας.

(8)

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Εἰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἡμεῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δικαιότεροι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς γονέας καὶ ὁσιώτεροί ἐσμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φι-

(9)

λοτιμηθείην πρὸς σέ. ὅτι δὲ οἱ φίλοι Σκύθαι πολὺ πιστότεροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων φίλων εἰσὶν καὶ ὅτι πλείων φιλίας λόγος παρ' ἡμῖν ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν, ῥᾴδιον ἐπιδεῖξαι· καὶ πρὸς θεῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων μὴ πρὸς ἀχθηδόνα μου ἀκούσῃς ἢν εἴπω τι ὧν κατανενόηκα πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον ὑμῖν συγγινόμενος.

Ὑμεῖς γάρ μοι δοκεῖτε τοὺς μὲν περὶ φιλίας λόγους ἄμεινον ἄλλων ἂν εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι, τἄργα δὲ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν λόγων ἐκμελετᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀπόχρη ὑμῖν ἐπαινέσαι τε αὐτὴν καὶ δεῖξαι ἡλίκον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς χρείαις προδόντες τοὺς λόγους δραπετεύετε οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐκ μέσων τῶν ἔργων. καὶ ὁπόταν ὑμῖν οἱ τραγῳδοὶ τὰς τοιαύτας φιλίας ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἀναβιβάσαντες δεικνύωσιν ἐπαινεῖτε καὶ ἐπικροτεῖτε καὶ κινδυνεύουσιν αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ **ἐπ**ιδακρύετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων παρέχεσθαι τολμᾶτε, ἀλλ' ἤν του φίλος δεηθεὶς τύχῃ, αὐτίκα μάλα ὥσπερ τὰ ὀνείρατα οἴχονται ὑμῖν ἐκποδὼν ἀποπτάμεναι αἱ πολλαὶ ἐκεῖναι τραγῳδίαι, τοῖς κενοῖς τούτοις καὶ κωφοῖς προσωπείοις ἐοικότας ὑμᾶς ἀπολιποῦσαι, ἃ διηρμένα τὸ στόμα καὶ παμμέγεθες κεχηνότα οὐδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον φθέγγεται. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔμπαλιν· ὅσῳ γὰρ δὴ λειπόμεθα ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις, τοσοῦτον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς πλεονεκτοῦμεν.

Εἰ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, οὕτω νῦν ποιῶμεν. τοὺς μὲν παλαιοὺς φίλους **(10)** ἀτρεμεῖν ἐάσωμεν, εἴ τινας ἢ ἡμεῖς ἢ ὑμεῖς τῶν πάλαι καταριθμεῖν ἔχομεν, ἐπεὶ κατά γε τοῦτο πλεονεκτοῖτε ἄν, πολλοὺς καὶ ἀξιοπίστους μάρτυρας τοὺς ποιητὰς παρεχόμενοι τὴν Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρόκλου φιλίαν καὶ τὴν Θησέως καὶ Πειρίθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑταιρείαν ἐν καλλίστοις ἔπεσι καὶ μέτροις ῥαψῳδοῦντας· ὀλίγους δέ τινας προχειρισάμενοι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν διηγησάμενοι, ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ Σκυθικά, σὺ δὲ τὰ Ἑλληνικά, [καὶ] ὁπότερος ἂν ἐν τούτοις κρατῇ καὶ ἀμείνους παράσχηται τοὺς φίλους, αὐτός τε νενικηκὼς ἔσται καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀνακηρύξει, κάλλιστον ἀγῶνα καὶ σεμνότατον ἀγωνισάμενος. ὡς ἔγωγε πολὺ ἥδιον ἄν μοι δοκῶ μονομαχῶν ἡττηθεὶς ἀποτμηθῆναι τὴν δεξιάν, ὅπερ ἥττης Σκυθικῆς ἐπιτίμιόν ἐστιν, ἢ χείρων ἄλλου κατὰ φιλίαν κεκρίσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα Ἕλληνος, Σκύθης αὐτὸς ὤν.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἔστιν μέν, ὦ Τόξαρι, οὐ φαῦλον τὸ ἔργον ἀνδρὶ οἵῳ σοὶ πολε- **(11)**
μιστῇ μονομαχῆσαι, πάνυ εὐστόχους καὶ τεθηγμένους παρεσκευα-
σμένῳ τοὺς λόγους. οὐ μὴν ἀγεννῶς γε οὕτως καταπροδοὺς ἐν βρα-
χεῖ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἅπαν ὑποχωρήσομαί σοι· καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πάνδει-
νον ὑπὸ δυοῖν μὲν ἐκείνοιν ἡττηθῆναι τοσούτους τῶν Σκυθῶν 5
ὁπόσους οἵ τε μῦθοι δηλοῦσι καὶ αἱ ὑμέτεραι παλαιαὶ γραφαί,
ἃς μικρῷ πρόσθεν εὖ μάλα ἐξετραγῴδησας, Ἕλληνας δὲ πάντας,
τοσαῦτα ἔθνη καὶ τοσαύτας πόλεις, ἐρήμην ὑπὸ σοῦ ἁλῶναι. εἰ
γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, οὐ τὴν δεξιὰν ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς ἀλλὰ τὴν γλῶτταν
ἀποτμηθῆναι καλόν. πότερον δὲ ὡρίσθαι χρὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἡμῖν 10
τῶν φιλικῶν τούτων πράξεων, ἢ ὁπόσῳ ἄν τις πλείους ἔχῃ λέγειν,
τοσούτῳ εὐπορώτερος ἂν δόξειεν πρὸς τὴν νίκην;

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ’ ὡρίσθω μὴ ἐν τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν τὸ κράτος, ἀλλ’
εἰ ἀμείνους καὶ τομώτεραι φαίνοιντο αἱ σαὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἴσαι τὸν
ἀριθμὸν οὖσαι, καιριώτερα δῆλον ὅτι ἐργάσονταί μοι τραύματα 15
καὶ θᾶττον ἐνδώσω πρὸς τὰς πληγάς.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ[xi]

Εὖ λέγεις, καὶ ὡρίσθωσαν ὁπόσαι ἱκαναί.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Πέντε ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἑκατέρῳ.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Πρότερος δὲ λέγε, ἀλλ’ ἐπομοσάμενος ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖν· 20
ἄλλως γὰρ ἀναπλάττειν[xii] τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν καὶ ὁ ἔλεγ-
χος ἀφανής. εἰ δὲ ὀμόσειας, οὐχ ὅσιον ἀπιστεῖν.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ὀμούμεθα, εἴ τι καὶ ὅρκου δεῖν νομίζεις. τίς δέ σοι τῶν ἡμε-
τέρων θεῶν ἄρ’ ἱκανός; ὁ Φίλιος;

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Καὶ μάλα· ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὀμοῦμαί σοι ἐν τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ 25
λόγῳ.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἴστω τοίνυν ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Φίλιος, ἦ μὴν ὁπόσα ἂν λέγω πρὸς σὲ **(12)**
ἢ αὐτὸς εἰδὼς ἢ παρ' ἄλλων ὁπόσον οἷόν τε ἦν δι' ἀκριβείας ἐκπυν-
θανόμενος ἐρεῖν, μηδὲν παρ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιτραγῳδῶν. καὶ πρώτην
γέ σοι τὴν Ἀγαθοκλέους καὶ Δεινίου φιλίαν διηγήσομαι, ἀοίδιμον
ἐν τοῖς Ἴωσι γενομένην.

Ἀγαθοκλῆς γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Σάμιος οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ ἐγένετο, ἄρι-
στος μὲν πρὸς φιλίαν, ὡς ἔδειξεν, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ οὐδὲν ἀμείνων Σα-
μίων τῶν πολλῶν οὔτε **ἐς** τὸ γένος οὔτε ἐς τὴν ἄλλην περιουσίαν.
Δεινίᾳ δὲ τῷ Λύσωνος Ἐφεσίῳ φίλος ἐκ παίδων ἦν. ὁ δὲ Δεινίας
ἐπλούτει ἄρα εἰς ὑπερβολήν, καὶ ὥσπερ εἰκὸς νεόπλουτον ὄντα,
πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους εἶχε περὶ ἑαυτόν, ἱκανοὺς μὲν συμπιεῖν καὶ
πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνεῖναι, φιλίας δὲ πλεῖστον ὅσον ἀποδέοντας.

Τέως μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ὁ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐξητάζετο, καὶ συ-
νῆν καὶ συνέπινεν αὐτοῖς οὐ πάνυ χαίρων τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ,
καὶ ὁ Δεινίας οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἐντιμότερον εἶχεν τῶν κολάκων. τελευ-
ταῖον δὲ καὶ προσέκρουε τὰ πολλὰ ἐπιτιμῶν, καὶ φορτικὸς ἐδό-
κει ὑπομιμνήσκων ἀεὶ τῶν προγόνων καὶ φυλάττειν παραγγέλλων
ἃ μετὰ πολλῶν καμάτων ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ κτησάμενος κατέλιπεν,
ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς κώμους ἀπῆγεν ἔτι αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ
μόνος μετ' ἐκείνων ἐκώμαζε, λανθάνειν πειρώμενος τὸν Ἀγαθο-
κλέα.

Καὶ δή ποτε ὑπὸ τῶν κολάκων ἐκείνων ἄθλιος ἀναπείθεται **(13)**
ὡς ἐρῴη αὐτοῦ Χαρίκλεια Δημώνακτος γυνή, ἀνδρὸς ἐπιφανοῦς
καὶ πρώτου Ἐφεσίων τὰ πολιτικά· καὶ γραμματεῖά τε εἰσεφοίτα
παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτῷ καὶ στέφανοι ἡμιμάραντοι καὶ μῆλά
τινα ἀποδεδηγμένα καὶ ἄλλα ὁπόσα αἱ μαστροποὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς νέοις
μηχανῶνται, κατὰ μικρὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπιτεχνώμεναι τοὺς ἔρωτας
καὶ ἀναφλέγουσαι τὸ πρῶτον ἐρᾶσθαι νομίζοντας (ἐπαγωγότα-
τον γὰρ τοῦτό γε, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς καλοῖς εἶναι οἰομένοις), ἄχρι
ἂν λάθωσιν εἰς τὰ δίκτυα ἐμπεσόντες.

Ἡ Χαρίκλεια δὲ ἦν ἀστεῖον μέν τι γύναιον, ἑταιρικὸν δὲ ἐκτό-
πως καὶ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀεί, καὶ εἰ πάνυ ἐπ' ὀλίγῳ ἐθελήσειέ
τις· καὶ εἰ προσίδοι τις μόνον, εὐθὺς ἐπένευε, καὶ δέος οὐδὲν ἦν
μή πῃ ἀντείπῃ Χαρίκλεια. δεινὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τεχνῖτις
παρ' ἥντινα βούλει τῶν ἑταιρῶν ἐπισπάσασθαι ἐραστὴν καὶ ἀμφί-
βολον ἔτι ὄντα ὅλον ὑποποιήσασθαι καὶ ἐνεχόμενον ἤδη ἐπιτεῖναι

καὶ προσεκκαῦσαι ἄρτι μὲν ὀργῇ, ἄρτι δὲ κολακείᾳ, καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν ὑπεροψίᾳ καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖν, καὶ ὅλη συνεκεκρότητο ἀπανταχόθεν ἡ γυνὴ καὶ πολλὰ μηχανήματα παρεσκεύαστο κατὰ τῶν ἐραστῶν.

Ταύτην οὖν τότε οἱ Δεινίου κόλακες παραλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ **(14)** μειράκιον, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπεκωμῴδουν, συνωθοῦντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα τῆς Χαρικλείας. ἡ δὲ πολλοὺς ἤδη νέους ἐκτραχηλίσασα καὶ μυρίους ἔρωτας ὑποκριναμένη καὶ οἴκους πολυταλάντους ἀνατρέψασα, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυγύμναστον κακόν, παραλαβοῦσα εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἁπλοϊκὸν καὶ ἄπειρον τῶν τοιούτων μηχανημάτων νεανίσκον οὐκ ἀνῆκεν ἐκ τῶν ὀνύχων, ἀλλὰ περιέχουσα πανταχόθεν καὶ διαπείρασα, ὅτε ἤδη παντάπασιν ἐκράτει, αὐτή τε ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ τῆς ἄγρας καὶ τῷ κακοδαίμονι Δεινίᾳ μυρίων κακῶν αἰτία ἐγένετο.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἐκεῖνα ἐπ’ αὐτὸν καθίει τὰ γραμματεῖα, συνεχῶς πεμπομένη τὴν ἄβραν, **ὡς** ἐδάκρυσε καὶ ἐπηγρύπνησε καὶ τέλος ὡς ἀπάγξει ἑαυτὴν ἡ ἀθλία ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος, ἕως δὴ ὁ μακάριος ἐπείσθη καλὸς εἶναι καὶ ταῖς Ἐφεσίων γυναιξὶ περιπόθητος, καί που συνηνέχθη πολλὰ ἱκετευθείς. τὸ **(15)** ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ῥᾷον, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἁλώσεσθαι ἔμελλεν ὑπὸ γυναικὸς καλῆς καὶ πρὸς ἡδονήν τε ὁμιλῆσαι ἐπισταμένης καὶ ἐν καιρῷ δακρῦσαι καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων ἐλεεινῶς ὑποστενάξαι καὶ ἀπιόντος ἤδη λαβέσθαι καὶ εἰσελθόντι προσδραμεῖν καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι ὡς ἂν μάλιστα ἀρέσειε, καί που καὶ ᾄσαι καὶ κιθαρίσαι.

Οἷς ἅπασι κατὰ τοῦ Δεινίου ἐκέχρητο· καὶ ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο πονηρῶς ἔχοντα καὶ διάβροχον ἤδη τῷ ἔρωτι καὶ τακερὸν γεγενημένον, ἄλλο ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπενόει καὶ τὸν ἄθλιον ἀπώλλυε· κύειν τε γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ σκήπτεται – ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο βλᾶκα ἐραστὴν προσεκπυρῶσαι – καὶ οὐκέτι ἐφοίτα πρὸς αὐτόν, φυλάττεσθαι ὑπὸ τἀνδρὸς λέγουσα πεπυσμένου τὸν ἔρωτα.

Ὁ δ’ οὐκέτι οἷός τε ἦν φέρειν τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ ἠνείχετο μὴ ὁρῶν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ ἐδάκρυε καὶ τοὺς κόλακας εἰσέπεμπεν καὶ τοὔνομα τῆς Χαρικλείας ἐπεβοᾶτο καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα περιβαλὼν αὐτῆς – ἐπεποίητο δὲ λίθου λευκοῦ – ἐκώκυε, καὶ τέλος καταβαλὼν ἑαυτὸν εἰς τοὔδαφος ἐκυλίνδετο καὶ λύττα ἦν ἀκριβὴς τὸ πρᾶγμα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δῶρα οὐ κατὰ μῆλα καὶ στεφάνους ἀντεδίδοτο αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ συνοικίαι ὅλαι καὶ ἀγροὶ καὶ θεράπαιναι καὶ ἐσθῆτες εὐαν-

θεῖς καὶ χρυσὸν ὁπόσον ἐθελήσειε.

Καὶ τί γάρ; ἐν βραχεῖ ὁ Λύσωνος οἶκος, ὀνομαστότατος τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ γενόμενος, **ἐξ**ήντλητο ἤδη καὶ **ἐξ**εκεκένωτο. εἶτα, ὡς **(16)** ἤδη αὖος ἦν, ἀπολιποῦσα αὐτὸν ἄλλον τινὰ Κρῆτα νεανίσκον τῶν ὑποχρύσων ἐθήρα καὶ μετέβαινεν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἤρα ἤδη αὐτοῦ, κἀκεῖνος ἐπίστευεν.

Ἀμελούμενος οὖν ὁ Δεινίας οὐχ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαρικλείας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κολάκων (κἀκεῖνοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν Κρῆτα ἤδη τὸν ἐρώμενον μετεληλύθεσαν) ἔρχεται παρὰ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ πάλαι εἰδότα ὡς ἔχοι πονηρῶς τὰ πράγματα αὐτῷ, καὶ αἰδούμενος τὸ πρῶτον ὅμως διηγεῖτο πάντα – τὸν ἔρωτα, τὴν ἀπορίαν, τὴν ὑπεροψίαν τῆς γυναικός, τὸν ἀντεραστὴν τὸν Κρῆτα, καὶ τέλος ὡς οὐ βιώσεται μὴ οὐχὶ συνὼν τῇ Χαρικλείᾳ. ὁ δὲ ἄκαιρον εἶναι νομίσας ἐν τούτῳ ἀπομνημονεύειν τῷ Δεινίᾳ διότι οὐ προσίετο μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν φίλων ἀλλὰ τοὺς κόλακας αὐτοῦ προετίμα τότε, ἣν μόνον εἶχεν πατρῴαν οἰκίαν ἐν Σάμῳ ἀπεμπολήσας ἦκεν αὐτῷ τὴν τιμὴν κομίζων, τρία τάλαντα.

Λαβὼν δὲ ὁ Δεινίας οὐκ ἀφανὴς εὐθὺς ἦν τῇ Χαρικλείᾳ καλός ποθεν αὖθις γεγενημένος, καὶ αὖθις ἡ ἅβρα καὶ τὰ γραμματεῖα, καὶ μέμψις ὅτι μὴ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἀφίκετο, καὶ οἱ κόλακες συνέθεον ἐπικαλαμησόμενοι, ὁρῶντες ἐδώδιμον ἔτι ὄντα τὸν Δεινίαν. ὡς δὲ ὑπέσχετο ἥξειν παρ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἦκε περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον καὶ **(17)** ἔνδον ἦν, ὁ Δημῶναξ, ὁ τῆς Χαρικλείας ἀνήρ, εἴτε ἄλλως αἰσθόμενος εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ συνθήματος τῆς γυναικός (ἄμφω γὰρ λέγεται) ἐπαναστὰς ὥσπερ ἐκ λόχου τήν τε αὔλειον ἀποκλείειν ἐκέλευεν καὶ συλλαμβάνειν τὸν Δεινίαν, πῦρ καὶ μάστιγας ἀπειλῶν καὶ ξίφος ὡς ἐπὶ μοιχὸν σπασάμενος.

Ὁ δὲ συνιδὼν οὗ κακῶν ἦν, μοχλόν τινα πλησίον κείμενον ἁρπάσας αὐτόν τε ἀποκτείνει τὸν Δημώνακτα,[xiii] πατάξας εἰς τὸν κρόταφον, καὶ τὴν Χαρίκλειαν, οὐ μιᾷ πληγῇ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μοχλῷ πολλάκις καὶ τῷ ξίφει τοῦ Δημώνακτος ὕστερον, οἱ δ' οἰκέται τέως μὲν ἐστήκεσαν ἄφωνοι, τῷ παραδόξῳ τοῦ πράγματος ἐκπεπληγμένοι, εἶτα πειρώμενοι συλλαμβάνειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐπῄει μετὰ τοῦ ξίφους, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἔφευγον, ὁ Δεινίας δὲ ὑπεξέρχεται τηλικοῦτον ἔργον ἐργασαμένος.

Καὶ τὸ μέχρι τῆς ἕω παρὰ τῷ Ἀγαθοκλεῖ διέτριβεν, ἀναλογιζόμενοι τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ὅ τι ἀπο-

βήσεται σκοποῦντες· ἔωθεν δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ παρῆσαν – ἤδη γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα διεβεβόητο – καὶ συλλαβόντες τὸν Δεινίαν, οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἔξαρνον ὄντα μὴ οὐχὶ πεφονευκέναι, ἀπάγουσι παρὰ τὸν ἁρμοστὴν ὃς ἦρμοζεν τὴν Ἀσίαν τότε. ὁ δὲ βασιλεῖ τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀναπέμπει αὐτόν·καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺ κατεπέμφθη ὁ Δεινίας εἰς Γύαρον νῆσον τῶν Κυκλάδων, ἐν ταύτῃ φεύγειν εἰς ἀεὶ τεταγμένος ὑπὸ βασιλέως.

Ὁ δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς καὶ τἄλλα μὲν συνῆν καὶ συναπῆρεν εἰς **(18)** τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ συνεισῆλθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον μόνος τῶν φίλων καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐνεδέησεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤδη ἔφευγεν ὁ Δεινίας, οὐδὲ τότε ἀπελείφθη τοῦ ἑταίρου, καταδικάσας δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ διέτριβεν ἐν Γυάρῳ καὶ συνέφευγεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ παντάπασιν ἠπόρουν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, παραδοὺς ἑαυτὸν τοῖς πορφυρεῦσι συγκατεδύετο καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τούτου ἀποφέρων ἔτρεφε τὸν Δεινίαν· καὶ νοσήσαντά τε ἐπὶ μήκιστον ἐθεράπευσε καὶ ἀποθανόντος οὐκέτι ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἔμεινεν αἰσχυνόμενος καὶ τεθνεῶτα ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν φίλον.

Τοῦτό σοι ἔργον φίλου Ἕλληνος οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ γενόμενον· ἔτη γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ πέντε ἤδη διελήλυθεν ἀφ' οὗ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐν Γυάρῳ ἀπέθανεν.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Καὶ εἶθε γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ἀνώμοτος ὢν ταῦτα ἔλεγες, ἵνα καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἂν ἐδυνάμην αὐτοῖς· οὕτω Σκυθικόν τινα φίλον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τοῦτον διηγήσω. πλὴν δέδια μή τινα καὶ ἄλλον ὅμοιον εἴπῃς αὐτῷ.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἄκουε τοίνυν καὶ ἄλλον, ὦ Τόξαρι, Εὐθύδικον τὸν Χαλκιδέα. **(19)** διηγεῖτο δέ μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ Σιμύλος ὁ ναύκληρος ὁ Μεγαρικός, ἐπομοσάμενος ἢ μὴν αὐτὸς ἑωρακέναι τὸ ἔργον. πλεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔφη ἐξ Ἰταλίας Ἀθήναζε περὶ δύσιν Πλειάδος συλλογιμαίους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους κομίζων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις εἶναι τὸν Εὐθύδικον καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ Δάμωνα, Χαλκιδέα καὶ τοῦτον, ἑταῖρον αὐτοῦ· ἡλικιώτας δὲ εἶναι, τὸν μὲν Εὐθύδικον ἐρρωμένον καὶ καρτερόν, τὸν δὲ Δάμωνα ὕπωχρον καὶ ἀσθενικόν, ἄρτι ἐκ νόσου μακρᾶς, ὡς ἐδόκει, ἀνιστάμενον.

Ἄχρι μὲν οὖν Σικελίας εὐτυχῶς διαπλεῦσαι ἔφη ὁ Σιμύλος σφᾶς· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν πορθμὸν διαπεράσαντες ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη τῷ Ἰονίῳ ἔπλεον, χειμῶνα μέγιστον ἐπιπεσεῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τί ἄν τις λέγοι, τρικυμίας τινὰς καὶ στροβίλους καὶ χαλάζας καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα χειμῶνος κακά; ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤδη σφᾶς κατὰ τὴν Ζάκυνθον εἶναι ἀπὸ ψιλῆς τῆς κεραίας πλέοντας, ἔτι καὶ σπείρας τινὰς ἐπισυρομένους, ὡς τὸ ῥόθιον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς, περὶ μέσας νύκτας οἷον ἐν τοσούτῳ σάλῳ ναυτιάσαντα τὸν Δάμωνα ἐμεῖν ἐγκεκυφότα ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν· εἶτα, οἶμαι, τῆς νεὼς βιαιότερον ἐς ὃ ἐκεκύφει μέρος ἐπικλιθείσης καὶ τοῦ κύματος συναπώσαντος, ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὐδὲ γυμνὸν ἄθλιον, ὡς ἂν καὶ ῥᾷον δύνασθαι νεῖν. εὐθὺς οὖν βοᾶν πνιγόμενον καὶ μόγις ἑαυτὸν ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ κλύδωνος.

Τὸν δὲ Εὐθύδικον, ὡς ἤκουσε – τυχεῖν δὲ γυμνὸν ἐν τῇ εὐνῇ ὄντα – ῥῖψαι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ καταλαβόντα τὸν Δάμωνα ἤδη ἀπαγορεύοντα – φαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐπὶ πολὺ ταῦτα τῆς σελήνης καταλαμπούσης – συμπαρανήχεσθαι καὶ συγκουφίζειν. σφᾶς δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν τὴν συμφορὰν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, μὴ δύνασθαι δέ, μεγάλῳ τῷ πνεύματι ἐλαυνομένους. πλὴν ἐκεῖνά γε ποιῆσαι, φελλούς τε γὰρ πολλοὺς ἀφεῖναι αὐτοῖς καὶ[xiv] τῶν κοντῶν τινας, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτων ἀπονήξαιντο, εἴ τινι αὐτῶν περιτύχοιεν, καὶ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν αὐτὴν οὐ μικρὰν[xv] οὖσαν.

Ἐννόησον τοίνυν πρὸς θεῶν ἥντινα ἄν τις ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐπιδείξαιτο εὐνοίας βεβαιοτέραν πρὸς ἄνδρα φίλον ἐν νυκτὶ ἐκπεσόντα ἐς πέλαγος οὕτως ἠγριωμένον ἢ κοινωνήσας τοῦ θανάτου; καί μοι ἐπ' ὀφθαλμῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐπανάστασιν τῶν κυμάτων, τὸν ἦχον τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπικλωμένου, τὸν ἀφρὸν περιζέοντα, τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν·εἶτα ἀποπνιγόμενον ἐκεῖνον καὶ μόγις ἀνακύπτοντα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγοντα τῷ ἑταίρῳ, τὸν δὲ ἐπιπηδῶντα εὐθὺς καὶ συννέοντα καὶ δεδιότα μὴ προαπολεῖται αὐτοῦ ὁ Δάμων. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάθοις ὡς οὐκ ἀγεννῆ σοι καὶ τοῦτον φίλον τὸν Εὐθύδικον διηγησάμην.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Πότερον δὲ ἀπώλοντο, ὦ Μνήσιππε, οἱ ἄνδρες, ἤ τις αὐτοῖς ἐκ παραλόγου σωτηρία ἐγένετο; ὡς ἔγωγε οὐ μετρίως δέδοικα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Θάρρει, ὦ Τόξαρι, ἐσώθησαν, καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν εἰσιν Ἀθήνησιν ἄμφω φιλοσοφοῦντες. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σιμύλος ταῦτα μόνα εἶχε λέγειν ἅ ποτε εἶδε τῆς νυκτός, <τὸν μὲν> ἐκπίπτοντα, τὸν δὲ ἐπιπηδῶντα, καὶ νηχομένους ἐς ὅσον ἐν νυκτὶ καθορᾶν ἐδύνατο. τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Εὐθύδικον αὐτοὶ διηγοῦνται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον φελλοῖς τισι περιπεσόντας ἀνέχειν ἐπὶ τούτων ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἀπονήχεσθαι πονηρῶς, ὕστερον δὲ τὴν ἀποβάθραν ἰδόντας ἤδη πρὸς ἕω προσνήξασθαί τε αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιβάντας εὐμαρῶς προσενεχθῆναι τῇ Ζακύνθῳ.

Μετὰ δὲ τούτους οὐ φαύλους ὄντας, ὡς ἔγωγ’ ἂν εἴποιμι, ἄκουσον ἤδη τρίτον ἄλλον οὐδέν τι χείρονα αὐτῶν. **(22)**

Εὐδαμίδας Κορίνθιος Ἀρεταίῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ καὶ Χαριξένῳ τῷ Σικυωνίῳ φίλοις ἐκέχρητο εὐπόροις οὖσι πενέστατος αὐτὸς ὤν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπέθνῃσκε, διαθήκας ἀπέλιπε τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἴσως γελοίους, σοὶ δὲ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ τοιαῦται δόξουσιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ φιλίαν τιμῶντι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πρωτείων ἀμιλλωμένῳ· ἐγέγραπτο γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, “Ἀπολείπω Ἀρεταίῳ μὲν τὴν μητέρα μου τρέφειν καὶ γηροκομεῖν, Χαριξένῳ δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα μου ἐκδοῦναι μετὰ προικὸς ὁπόσην ἂν πλείστην ἐπιδοῦναι παρ’ αὐτοῦ δύνηται” – ἦν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ μήτηρ πρεσβῦτις καὶ θυγάτριον ὡραῖον ἤδη γάμου – “ἢν δέ τι ἄτερος αὐτῶν ἐν τοσούτῳ πάθῃ, καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου μερίδα,” φησίν, “ἐχέτω ὁ ἕτερος.” τούτων ἀναγνωσθεισῶν τῶν διαθηκῶν οἱ τὴν πενίαν μὲν εἰδότες τοῦ Εὐδαμίδα, τὴν φιλίαν δὲ ἣ πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἦν αὐτῷ ἀγνοοῦντες ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελῶν ἀπηλλάττετο, “Οἷον Ἀρεταῖος καὶ Χαρίξενος οἱ εὐδαίμονες κλῆρον διαδέξονται,” λέγοντες, “εἴπερ ἀποτίσουσιν Εὐδαμίδᾳ καὶ ζῶντες αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσονται ὑπὸ τοῦ νεκροῦ.”

Οἱ κληρονόμοι δὲ οἷς ταῦτα κατελέλειπτο, ὡς ἤκουσαν, ἦκον εὐθὺς διαιτῶντες τὰ ἐκ τῶν διαθηκῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρίξενος πέντε μόνας ἡμέρας ἐπιβιοὺς ἀπέθανεν, ὁ δὲ Ἀρεταῖος ἄριστος κληρονόμων γενόμενος τήν τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου μερίδα παραλαβὼν τρέφει τε τοῦ Εὐδαμίδα τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ ἐκδέδωκεν, ἀπὸ ταλάντων πέντε ὧν εἶχεν δύο μὲν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θυγατρί, δύο δὲ τῇ τοῦ φίλου ἐπιδούς, καὶ τὸν γάμον γε αὐταῖν ἐπὶ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ἠξίωσε γενέσθαι. **(23)**

Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Τόξαρι, ὁ Ἀρεταῖος οὗτος; ἆρα φαῦλον παράδειγμα φιλίας παρεσχῆσθαι τοιαῦτα κληρονομήσας καὶ μὴ προδοὺς τὰς διαθήκας τοῦ φίλου; ἢ τίθεμεν καὶ τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς τελείαις ψήφοις μίαν τῶν πέντε εἶναι;

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Καὶ οὗτος μὲν καλῶς[xvi]· ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν Εὐδαμίδαν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐθαύμασα τοῦ θάρσους ὃ εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις. ἐδήλου γὰρ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν τὰ ὅμοια ἔπραξεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐν διαθήκαις ταῦτα ἐνεγέγραπτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἦκεν ἂν ἄγραφος κληρονόμος τῶν τοιούτων.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Εὖ λέγεις. τέταρτον δέ σοι διηγήσομαι Ζηνόθεμιν τὸν Χαρμόλεω Μασσαλίηθεν. **(24)**

Ἐδείχθη δέ μοι ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ πρεσβεύοντι ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, καλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος, ὡς ἐδόκει· παρεκάθητο δὲ αὐτῷ γυνὴ ἐπὶ ζεύγους ὁδοιποροῦντι τά τε ἄλλα εἰδεχθὴς καὶ ξηρὰ τὸ ἥμισυ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένη, παλλώβητόν[xvii] τι καὶ ἀπρόσιτον μορμολυκεῖον. εἶτα ἐπεὶ ἐθαύμασα εἰ καλὸς οὗτος καὶ ὡραῖος ὢν ἀνέχεται παροχουμένην τοιαύτην αὐτῷ γυναῖκα, ὁ δείξας αὐτὸν διηγεῖτό μοι τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ γάμου ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς ἕκαστα· Μασσαλιώτης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν.

"Μενεκράτει γάρ," ἔφη, "τῷ πατρὶ τῆς δυσμόρφου ταύτης φίλος ἦν ὁ Ζηνόθεμις, πλουτοῦντι καὶ τιμωμένῳ ὁμότιμος ὤν. χρόνῳ δὲ ὁ Μενεκράτης ἀφῃρέθη τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκ καταδίκης, ὅτεπερ καὶ ἄτιμος ἐγένετο ὑπὸ τῶν ἑξακοσίων ὡς ἀποφηνάμενος γνώμην παράνομον. οὕτω δὲ οἱ Μασσαλιῶται κολάζομεν," ἔφη, "εἴ τις παράνομα γράψειεν. ἐλυπεῖτο οὖν ὁ Μενεκράτης καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ καταδίκῃ, ἐπεὶ ἐκ πλουσίου πένης καὶ ἐξ ἐνδόξου ἄδοξος ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐγένετο· μάλιστα δὲ αὐτὸν ἠνία θυγάτηρ αὖτη, ἐπίγαμος ἤδη καὶ ὀκτωκαιδεκαέτις οὖσα, ἣν οὐδὲ μετὰ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς ἦν πρὸ τῆς καταδίκης ἐκέκτητο ἠξίωσεν ἄν τις τῶν γε εὐγενῶν καὶ πενήτων ῥᾳδίως παραλαβεῖν, οὕτως κακοδαίμονα οὖσαν τὴν ὄψιν. ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ καταπίπτειν πρὸς τὴν σελήνην αὐξανομένην.

"Ὡς δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ζηνόθεμιν ἀπωδύρετο, 'Θάρρει,' ἔφη, 'ὦ Μενέκρατες, οὔτε γὰρ ἀπορήσεις τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἡ θυγά- **(25)**

τηρ σου ἄξιον τοῦ γένους τινὰ εὑρήσει νυμφίον.’

“Καὶ ταῦτα ἅμα διεξιὼν λαβόμενος αὐτὸν τῆς δεξιᾶς ἦγεν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τήν τε οὐσίαν πολλὴν οὖσαν ἐνείματο πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ δεῖπνον παρασκευασθῆναι κελεύσας εἱστία τοὺς φίλους καὶ τὸν Μενεκράτη, ὡς δή τινα τῶν ἑταίρων πεπεικὼς ὑποστῆναι τῆς κόρης τὸν γάμον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδεδείπνητο αὐτοῖς καὶ ἔσπεισαν τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐνταῦθα δὴ μεστὴν αὐτῷ τὴν φιάλην προτείνας, ‘Δέδεξο,’ εἶπεν, ‘ὦ Μενέκρατες, παρὰ τοῦ γαμβροῦ φιλοτησίαν· ἄξομαι γὰρ ἐγὼ τήμερον τὴν σὴν θυγατέρα Κυδιμάχην· τὴν προῖκα δὲ πάλαι εἴληφα, τάλαντα πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι.’

“Τοῦ δέ, ‘Ἄπαγε,’ λέγοντος, ‘μὴ σύ γε, ὦ Ζηνόθεμι· μὴ οὕτω μανείην ὡς περιιδεῖν σε νέον καὶ καλὸν ὄντα κόρῃ αἰσχρᾷ καὶ λελωβημένῃ συγκαταζευγνύμενον,’ ὁ δέ, ταῦτα διεξιόντος, ἀράμενος τὴν νύμφην ἀπῄει εἰς τὸν θάλαμον καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγον προῆλθεν διακορήσας αὐτήν.

“Καὶ τὸ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου σύνεστιν ὑπεραγαπῶν καὶ πάντῃ ὡς ὁρᾷς περιαγόμενος αὐτήν. καὶ οὐχ ὅπως αἰσχύνεται τῷ γάμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σεμνυνομένῳ ἔοικεν, ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὡς καταφρονεῖ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καλῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν καὶ πλούτου καὶ δόξης, ἀφορᾷ δὲ ἐς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν Μενεκράτη, οὐδὲ οἴεται χείρω πρὸς φιλίαν ὑπὸ τῆς ψήφου τῶν ἑξακοσίων γεγονέναι. **(26)**

“Πλὴν ἤδη γε τούτων οὕτως αὐτὸν ἠμείψατοἡ τύχη. παιδίον γὰρ πάγκαλον ἐκ τῆς αἰσχίστης αὐτῷ ταύτης ἐγένετο, καὶ πρώην γε, ἐπεὶ ἀράμενος αὐτὸ εἰσεκόμισεν ὁ πατὴρ εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον θαλλῷ ἐστεμμένον καὶ μέλανα ἀμπεχόμενον, ὡς ἐλεεινότερον φανείη ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάππου, τὸ μὲν βρέφος ἀνεγέλασε πρὸς τοὺς βουλευτὰς καὶ συνεκρότει τὼ χεῖρε, ἡ βουλὴ δὲ ἐπικλασθεῖσα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφίησι τῷ Μενεκράτει τὴν καταδίκην καὶ ἤδη ἐπίτιμός ἐστι, τηλικούτῳ συνηγόρῳ χρησάμενος πρὸς τὸ συνέδριον.”

Τοιαῦτα ὁ Μασσαλιώτης ἔλεγεν τὸν Ζηνόθεμιν εἰργάσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ φίλου, ὡς ὁρᾷς, οὐ μικρὰ οὐδὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἂν Σκυθῶν γενόμενα, οἵ γε κἂν τὰς παλλακὰς ἀκριβῶς τὰς καλλίστας ἐκλέγεσθαι λέγονται.

Λοιπὸς ἡμῖν ὁ πέμπτος, καί μοι δοκῶ οὐκ ἄλλον[xviii] ἐρεῖν Δημητρίου τοῦ Σουνιέως ἐπιλαθόμενος. **(27)**

Συνεκπλεύσας γὰρ ἐς τὴν Αἴγυπτον ὁ Δημήτριος Ἀντιφίλῳ τῷ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν, ἑταίρῳ ἐκ παίδων ὄντι καὶ συνεφήβῳ, συνῆν καὶ συνεπαιδεύετο, αὐτὸς μὲν τὴν ἄσκησιν τὴν Κυνικὴν ἀσκούμε-

νος ὑπὸ τῷ Ῥοδίῳ ἐκείνῳ σοφιστῇ, ὁ δὲ Ἀντίφιλος ἰατρικὴν ἄρα ἐμελέτα, καὶ δή ποτε ὁ μὲν Δημήτριος ἔτυχεν ἐς τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀποδημῶν κατὰ θέαν τῶν πυραμίδων καὶ τοῦ Μέμνονος· ἤκουε γὰρ ταύτας ὑψηλὰς οὔσας μὴ παρέχεσθαι σκιάν, τὸν δὲ Μέμνονα βοᾶν πρὸς ἀνατέλλοντα τὸν ἥλιον. τούτων ἐπιθυμήσας Δημήτριος, θέας μὲν τῶν πυραμίδων, ἀκροάσεως δὲ τοῦ Μέμνονος, ἀναπεπλεύκει κατὰ τὸν Νεῖλον ἕκτον ἤδη μῆνα, ὀκνήσαντα πρὸς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ τὸ θάλπος ἀπολιπὼν τὸν Ἀντίφιλον.

Ὁ δὲ ἐν τοσούτῳ συμφορᾷ ἐχρήσατο μάλα γενναίου τινὸς φίλου δεομένῃ. οἰκέτης γὰρ αὐτοῦ, Σύρος καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, ἱεροσύλοις τισὶ κοινωνήσας συνεισῆλθέν τε αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ Ἀνουβίδειον καὶ ἀποσυλήσαντες τὸν θεὸν χρυσᾶς τε φιάλας δύο καὶ κηρύκιον, χρυσοῦν καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ κυνοκεφάλους ἀργυροῦς καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, κατέθεντο πάντα παρὰ τῷ Σύρῳ· εἶτ' ἐμπεσόντες – ἐάλωσαν γάρ τι ἀπεμπολῶντες – ἅπαντα εὐθὺς ἔλεγον στρεβλούμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ, καὶ ἀγόμενοι ἦκον ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ Ἀντιφίλου, καὶ τὰ φώρια ἐξέφερον ὑπὸ κλίνῃ τινὶ ἐν σκοτεινῷ κείμενα. ὅ τε οὖν Σύρος ἐδέδετο εὐθὺς καὶ ὁ δεσπότης αὐτοῦ Ἀντίφιλος, οὗτος μὲν καὶ μεταξὺ ἀκροώμενος τοῦ διδασκάλου ἀνασπασθείς. ἐβοήθει δὲ οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τέως ἑταῖροι ἀπεστρέφοντο ὡς τὸ Ἀνουβίδειον σεσυληκότα καὶ ἀσέβημα αὐτῶν ἡγοῦντο εἶναι εἰ συνέπιόν ποτε ἢ συνειστιάθησαν αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δὲ τῶν οἰκετῶν, δύο ὄντες, ἅπαντα ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας συσκευασάμενοι ᾤχοντο φεύγοντες. **(28)**

Ἐδέδετο οὖν ὁ ἄθλιος Ἀντίφιλος πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον, ἁπάντων ὅσοι ἦσαν κακοῦργοι ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ μιαρώτατος εἶναι δοκῶν, καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν δεσμῶν Αἰγύπτιος, δεισιδαίμων ἄνθρωπος, ᾤετο χαριεῖσθαι καὶ τιμωρήσειν τῷ θεῷ βαρὺς τῷ Ἀντιφίλῳ ἐφεστώς. εἰ δ' ἀπολογοῖτό ποτε, λέγων ὡς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον εἴργασται, ἀναίσχυντος ἐδόκει καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐμισεῖτο. ὑπενόσει τοιγαροῦν ἤδη καὶ πονηρῶς εἶχεν οἷον εἰκὸς χαμαὶ καθεύδοντα καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς οὐδὲ ἀποτείνειν τὰ σκέλη δυνάμενον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ κατακεκλειμένα· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρας ὁ κλοιὸς ἤρκει καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα χεὶρ πεπεδημένη, εἰς δὲ τὴν νύκτα ἔδει ὅλον καταδεδέσθαι. καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦ οἰκήματος ἡ δυσοσμία καὶ τὸ πνῖγος, ἐν ταὐτῷ πολλῶν δεδεμένων καὶ ἐστενοχωρημένων καὶ μόλις ἀναπνεόντων, καὶ τοῦ σιδήρου ὁ ψόφος καὶ ὕπνος ὀλίγος—ταῦτα πάντα χαλε- **(29)**

πὰ ἦν καὶ ἀφόρητα οἷα ἀνδρὶ ἐκείνων ἀήθει καὶ ἀμελετήτῳ πρὸς
οὕτω σκληρὰν τὴν δίαιταν.

Ἀπαγορεύοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲ σῖτον αἱρεῖσθαι θέλοντος, **(30)**
ἀφικνεῖταί ποτε καὶ ὁ Δημήτριος, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν ἤδη γεγενημέ-
νων. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔμαθεν, ὡς εἶχεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ δεσμωτήριον δρο-
μαῖος ἐλθών, τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰσεδέχθη, ἑσπέρα γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ὁ δε-
σμοφύλαξ πάλαι κεκλεικὼς τὴν θύραν ἐκάθευδε, φρουρεῖν τοῖς
οἰκέταις παρακελευσάμενος· ἔωθεν δὲ εἰσέρχεται πολλὰ ἱκετεύ-
ας. καὶ παρελθὼν ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἐζήτει τὸν Ἀντίφιλον ἄδηλον
ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν γεγενημένον, καὶ περιιὼν ἀνεσκοπεῖτο καθ’ ἕκα-
στον τῶν δεδεμένων, ὥσπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ τοὺς οἰκείους νεκρούς,
ἤδη ἐώλων ὄντων, ἀναζητοῦντες ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν. καὶ εἴ
γε μὴ τοὔνομα ἐβόησεν, Ἀντίφιλον Δεινομένους, κἂν ἐπὶ πολὺ
ἠγνόησεν ἂν ὅστις ἦν, τοσοῦτον ἤλλακτο ὑπὸ τῶν δεινῶν. ὡς
δὲ τὴν φωνὴν αἰσθόμενος ἀνεβόησεν καὶ προσιόντος διαστείλας
τὴν κόμην καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τοῦ προσώπου αὐχμηρὰν καὶ συμπε-
πιλημένην ἔδειξεν αὐτὸν ὅστις ἦν, ἄμφω μὲν αὐτίκα πίπτουσιν
ἰλιγγιάσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ θέᾳ.

Χρόνῳ δὲ ἀναλαβὼν αὑτόν τε καὶ τὸν Ἀντίφιλον ὁ Δημήτριος
καὶ σαφῶς ἕκαστα ὡς εἶχεν ἐκπυθόμενος παρ’ αὐτοῦ θαρρεῖν τε
παρακελεύεται καὶ διελὼν τὸ τριβώνιον τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ αὐτὸς ἀνα-
βάλλεται, τὸ λοιπὸν δὲ ἐκείνῳ δίδωσιν, ἃ εἶχε πιναρὰ καὶ ἐκτε- **(31)**
τρυχωμένα ῥάκη περισπάσας. καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου πάντα τρόπον
συνῆν ἐπιμελούμενος αὐτοῦ καὶ θεραπεύων· παραδοὺς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν
τοῖς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ἐμπόροις ἕωθεν εἰς μέσην ἡμέραν οὐκ ὀλίγον
ἀπέφερεν ἀχθοφορῶν. εἶτ’ ἐπανελθὼν ἂν ἐκ τοῦ ἔργου, μέρος μὲν
τοῦ μισθοῦ τῷ δεσμοφύλακι καταβαλὼν τιθασὸν αὐτῷ καὶ εἰρηνι-
κὸν ἀπειργάζετο αὐτόν, τὸ λοιπὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν τοῦ φίλου θεραπείαν
ἱκανῶς αὐτῷ διήρκει. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας συνῆν τῷ Ἀντιφίλῳ
παραμυθούμενος, ἐπεὶ δὲ νὺξ καταλάβοι, ὀλίγον πρὸ τῆς θύρας
τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου στιβάδιόν τι ποιησάμενος καὶ φύλλα ὑποβαλ-
λόμενος ἀνεπαύετο.

Χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινα οὕτω διῆγον, εἰσιὼν μὲν ὁ Δημήτριος ἀκω- **(32)**
λύτως, ῥᾷον δὲ φέρων τὴν συμφορὰν ὁ Ἀντίφιλος. ὕστερον δὲ
ἀποθανόντος ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ληστοῦ τινος ὑπὸ φαρμάκων,
ὡς ἐδόκει, φυλακή τε ἀκριβὴς ἐγένετο καὶ οὐκέτι παρῄει εἰς τὸ
οἴκημα οὐδὲ εἷς τῶν δεομένων. ἐφ’ οἷς ἀπορῶν καὶ ἀνιώμενος,

οὐκ ἔχων ἄλλως παρεῖναι τῷ ἑταίρῳ, προσαγγέλλει ἑαυτὸν ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν ἁρμοστήν, ὡς εἴη κεκοινωνηκὼς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄνουβιν ἐπιβουλῆς.

Ὡς δὲ τοῦτο εἶπεν, ἀπήγετο εὐθὺς ἐς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, καὶ ἀχθεὶς παρὰ τὸν Ἀντίφιλον τοῦτο γοῦν μόλις, πολλὰ ἱκετεύσας τὸν δεσμοφύλακα, ἐξειργάσατο παρ' αὐτοῦ, πλησίον τῷ Ἀντιφίλῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ κλοιῷ δεδέσθαι. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἔδειξε τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν εἶχε πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀμελῶν μὲν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν δεινῶν (καίτοι ἐνόσησε καὶ αὐτός), ἐπιμελούμενος δὲ ὅπως ἐκεῖνος μάλιστα καθευδήσει καὶ ἧττον ἀνιάσεται· ὥστε ῥᾷον ἔφερον μετ' ἀλλήλων κακοπαθοῦντες.

Χρόνῳ δὲ καὶ τοιόνδε τι προσπεσὸν ἔπαυσεν ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτοὺς **(33)** δυστυχοῦντας. εἷς γὰρ τῶν δεδεμένων, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅθεν ῥίνης εὐπορήσας καὶ συνωμότας πολλοὺς τῶν δεσμωτῶν προσλαβών, ἀποπρίει τε τὴν ἄλυσιν ᾗ ἐδέδεντο ἑξῆς, τῶν κλοιῶν εἰς αὐτὴν διειρομένων, καὶ ἀπολύει ἅπαντας·οἱ δὲ ἀποκτείναντες εὐμαρῶς ὀλίγους ὄντας τοὺς φύλακας ἐκπηδῶσιν ἀθρόοι. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν τὸ παραυτίκα ἔνθα ἐδύναντο ἕκαστος διασπαρέντες ὕστερον συνελήφθησαν οἱ πολλοί· ὁ Δημήτριος δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίφιλος κατὰ χώραν ἔμειναν, καὶ τοῦ Σύρου λαβόμενοι ἤδη ἀπιόντος. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, μαθὼν ὁ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐπιτετραμμένος τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπ' ἐκείνους μὲν ἔπεμψεν τοὺς διωξομένους, μεταστειλάμενος δὲ τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Δημήτριον ἀπέλυσε τῶν δεσμῶν, ἐπαινέσας ὅτι μόνοι οὐκ ἀπέδρασαν.

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνοί γε ἠγάπησαν οὕτως ἀφιέμενοι, ἐβόα δὲ ὁ Δημήτριος καὶ δεινὰ ἐποίει, ἀδικεῖσθαι σφᾶς οὐ μικρὰ εἰ δόξουσι κακοῦργοι ὄντες ἐλέῳ ἢ ἐπαίνῳ τοῦ μὴ ἀποδρᾶναι ἀφεῖσθαι· καὶ τέλος ἠνάγκασαν τὸν δικαστὴν ἀκριβῶς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐξετάσαι. ὁ δὲ ἐπεὶ ἔμαθεν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, ἐπαινέσας αὐτούς, τὸν Δημήτριον δὲ καὶ πάνυ θαυμάσας, ἀφίησι παραμυθησάμενος ἐπὶ τῇ κολάσει ἣν ἠνέσχοντο ἀδίκως δεθέντες, καὶ ἑκάτερον δωρησάμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ, δραχμαῖς μὲν μυρίαις τὸν Ἀντίφιλον, δὶς τοσαύταις δὲ τὸν Δημήτριον.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίφιλος ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ Δη- **(34)** μήτριος καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ δισμυρίας ἐκείνῳ καταλιπὼν ᾤχετο ἀπιὼν εἰς τὴν Ἰνδικὴν παρὰ τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας, τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίφιλον, ὡς συγγνωστὸς ἂν εἰκότως νομίζοιτο ἤδη ἀπο-

λιπὼν αὐτόν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν χρημάτων, ἔστ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ᾖ ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἀρκεῖσθαι ὀλίγοις δυνάμενος, οὔτε ἐκείνῳ ἔτι δεῖν φίλου, εὐμαρῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων γεγενημένων.

Τοιοῦτοι, ὦ Τόξαρι, οἱ Ἕλληνες φίλοι. εἰ δὲ μὴ προδιεβεβλήκεις ἡμᾶς ὡς ἐπὶ ῥήμασι μέγα φρονοῦντας, καὶ αὐτοὺς ἄν σοι τοὺς λόγους διεξῆλθον, πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ὄντας, οὓς ὁ Δημήτριος εἶπεν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπολογούμενος, ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἀντιφίλου δέ, καὶ δακρύων προσέτι καὶ ἱκετεύων καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀναδεχόμενος, ἄχρι μαστιγούμενος ὁ Σύρος ἀμφοτέρους ἀφίησιν αὐτούς.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τούτους ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πλειόνων, οὓς πρώτους **(35)** ἡ μνήμη ὑπέβαλε, διηγησάμην σοι ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βεβαίους φίλους. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη καταβὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου σοὶ τὴν ῥήτραν παραδίδωμι· σὺ δὲ ὅπως μὴ χείρους ἐρεῖς τοὺς Σκύθας, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ τούτων ἀμείνους, αὐτῷ σοὶ μελήσει, εἴ τι καὶ τῆς δεξιᾶς πεφρόντικας, ὡς μὴ ἀποτμηθείης αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖα ἂν πάθοις Ὀρέστην μὲν καὶ Πυλάδην πάνυ σοφιστικῶς ἐπαινέσας, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς Σκυθίας φαῦλος ῥήτωρ φαινόμενος.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Εὖ γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ὅτι καὶ παροτρύνεις με πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ οὐ πάνυ σοι μέλον εἰ ἀποτμηθείην[xix] τὴν γλῶσσαν κρατηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. πλὴν ἄρξομαί γε ἤδη, μηδὲν ὥσπερ σὺ καλλιλογησάμενος· οὐ γὰρ Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἔργα ὑπερφθέγγηται τοὺς λόγους. προσδοκήσῃς δὲ μηδὲν τοιοῦτο παρ’ ἡμῶν οἷα σὺ διεξελήλυθας, ἐπαινῶν εἴ τις ἄπροικον ἔγημεν αἰσχρὰν γυναῖκα ἢ εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἐπέδωκε γαμουμένῃ φίλου ἀνδρὸς θυγατρὶ δύο τάλαντα, καὶ νὴ Δί’ εἴ τις παρέσχεν ἑαυτὸν δεδησόμενον ἐπὶ προδήλῳ τῷ μικρὸν ὕστερον λυθήσεσθαι· πάνυ γὰρ εὐτελῆ ταῦτα καὶ μεγαλουργὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἀνδρεῖον ἔνι οὐδέν. ἐγὼ δέ σοι διηγήσομαι φόνους πολλοὺς καὶ πολέμους καὶ θανάτους ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων, ἵν’ εἰδῇς ὡς παιδιὰ τὰ ὑμέτερά ἐστιν παρὰ τὰ Σκυθικὰ ἐξετάζεσθαι. **(36)**

Καίτοι οὐδὲ ἀλόγως αὐτὸ πεπόνθατε, ἀλλὰ εἰκότως τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα ἐπαινεῖτε· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ εἰσιν ὑμῖν ἀφορμαὶ ὑπερμεγέθεις πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν φιλίας ἐν εἰρήνῃ βαθείᾳ βιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐν γαλήνῃ μάθοις εἰ ἀγαθὸς ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐστί· χειμῶνος γὰρ δεήσει σοὶ

πρὸς τὴν διάγνωσιν. παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχεῖς οἱ πόλεμοι, καὶ ἢ ἐπελαύνομεν ἄλλοις ἢ ὑποχωροῦμεν ἐπιόντας ἢ συμπεσόντες ὑπὲρ νομῆς ἢ λείας μαχόμεθα, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ φίλων ἀγαθῶν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς βεβαιότατα συντιθέμεθα τὰς φιλίας, μόνον τοῦτο ὅπλον ἄμαχον καὶ δυσπολέμητον εἶναι νομίζοντες.

Πρότερον δέ σοι εἰπεῖν βούλομαι ὃν τρόπον ποιούμεθα τοὺς **(37)** φίλους, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν πότων, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς, οὐδὲ εἰ συνέφηβός τις ἢ γείτων ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν τινα ἴδωμεν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ μεγάλα ἐργάσασθαι δυνάμενον, ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἅπαντες σπεύδομεν, καὶ ὅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐν τοῖς γάμοις, τοῦτο ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων ποιεῖν ἀξιοῦμεν, ἐπὶ πολὺ μνηστευόμενοι καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ πράττοντες ὡς μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν τῆς φιλίας μηδὲ ἀπόβλητοι δόξωμεν εἶναι. κἀπειδὰν προκριθείς τις ἤδη φίλος ᾖ, συνθῆκαι τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ὅρκος ὁ μέγιστος, ἢ μὴν καὶ βιώσεσθαι μετ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢν δέῃ, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸν ἕτερον· καὶ οὕτω ποιοῦμεν. ἀφ' οὗ γὰρ ἐντεμόντες ἅπαξ τοὺς δακτύλους ἐνσταλάξωμεν τὸ αἷμα εἰς κύλικα καὶ τὰ ξίφη ἄκρα βάψαντες ἅμα ἀμφότεροι ἐπισχόμενοι πίωμεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς διαλύσειεν ἄν. ἐφεῖται δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἄχρι τριῶν εἰς συνθήκας εἰσιέναι· ὡς ὅστις ἂν πολύφιλος ᾖ, ὅμοιος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ ταῖς κοιναῖς τούταις καὶ μοιχευομέναις γυναιξί, καὶ οἰόμεθα οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἰσχυρὰν αὐτοῦ τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι, πρὸς πολλὰς εὐνοίας διαιρεθεῖσαν.

Ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Δανδάμιδος πρώην γενομένων. ὁ γὰρ Δάν- **(38)** δαμις ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σαυρομάτας συμπλοκῇ, ἀπαχθέντος αἰχμαλώτου Ἀμιζώκου τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ – μᾶλλον δὲ πρότερον ὁμοῦμαί σοι τὸν ἡμέτερον ὅρκον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἀρχῇ διωμολογησάμην· οὐ μὰ γὰρ τὸν Ἄνεμον καὶ τὸν Ἀκινάκην, οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ψεῦδος ἐρῶ περὶ τῶν φίλων τῶν Σκυθῶν.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πάνυ σου ὀμνύντος ἐδεόμην· σὺ δὲ ὅμως εὖ ποιῶν οὐδένα θεῶν ἐπωμόσω.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Τί σὺ λέγεις; οὔ σοι δοκοῦσιν ὁ Ἄνεμος καὶ ὁ Ἀκινάκης θεοὶ εἶναι; οὕτως ἄρα ἠγνόησας ὅτι ἀνθρώποις μεῖζον οὐδέν ἐστιν ζωῆς τε καὶ θανάτου; ὁπόταν τοίνυν τὸν Ἄνεμον καὶ τὸν Ἀκινάκην ὀμνύωμεν, ταῦτα ὀμνύομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν ἄνεμον ζωῆς αἴτιον

ὄντα, τὸν ἀκινάκην δὲ ὅτι ἀποθνῄσκειν ποιεῖ.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Καὶ μὴν εἰ διά γε τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλους ἂν ἔχοιτε πολλοὺς θεοὺς οἷος ὁ Ἀκινάκης ἐστί, τὸν Ὀιστὸν καὶ τὴν Λόγχην καὶ Κώνειον δὲ καὶ Βρόχον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποικίλος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ θεὸς ὁ θάνατος καὶ ἀπείρους τὰς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν παρέχεται ἀγούσας ὁδούς.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Ὁρᾷς τοῦτο ὡς ἐριστικὸν ποιεῖς καὶ δικανικόν, ὑποκρούων μεταξὺ καὶ διαφθείρων μου τὸν λόγον; ἐγὼ δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον σοῦ λέγοντος.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὖθίς γε, ὦ Τόξαρι, ποιήσω τοῦτο, πάνυ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐπετίμησας· ὥστε θαρρῶν τό γε ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγε, ὡς μηδὲ παρόντος ἐμοῦ τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτω σιωπήσομαί σοι.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Τετάρτη μὲν ἦν ἡμέρα τῆς φιλίας Δανδάμιδι καὶ Ἀμιζώκῃ, **(39)** ἀφ᾽ οὗ τὸ ἀλλήλων αἷμα συνεπεπώκεσαν· ἦκον δὲ ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν Σαυρομάται μυρίοις μὲν ἱππεῦσιν, οἱ πεζοὶ δὲ τρὶς τοσοῦτοι ἐπεληλυθέναι ἐλέγοντο. οἷα δὲ οὐ προϊδομένοις τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ἐπιπεσόντες, ἅπαντας μὲν τρέπουσι, πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν μαχίμων κτείνουσι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ζῶντας ἀπάγουσι, πλὴν εἴ τις ἔφθη διανηξάμενος εἰς τὸ πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, ἔνθα ἡμῖν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατοπέδου καὶ μέρος τῶν ἁμαξῶν ἦν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐσκηνώσαμεν τότε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι δόξαν τοῖς ἀρχιπλάνοις ἡμῶν, ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὄχθας τοῦ Τανάϊδος.

Εὐθὺς οὖν ἥ τε λεία περιηλαύνετο καὶ τὰ αἰχμάλωτα συνείχετο καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς διήρπαζον καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας κατελαμβάνοντο, αὐτάνδρους τὰς πλείστας ἁλισκομένας, καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν ὑβρίζοντες τὰς παλλακίδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἠνιώμεθα τῷ πράγματι. ὁ δὲ Ἀμιζώκης ἀγόμενος – ἐαλώκει γάρ – ἐβόα **(40)** τὸν φίλον ὀνομαστί, κακῶς δεδεμένος, καὶ ὑπεμίμνησκεν τῆς κύλικος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος. ὧν ἀκούσας ὁ Δάνδαμις οὐδὲν ἔτι μελλήσας ἁπάντων ὁρώντων διανήχεται εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους· καὶ οἱ μὲν Σαυρομάται διηρμένοι τοὺς ἄκοντας ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ὡς κατακεντήσοντες, ὁ δὲ ἐβόα τὸ Ζίρην[xx]. τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τις εἴπῃ, οὐκέτι

φονεύεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δέχονται αὐτὸν ὡς ἐπὶ λύτροις ἥκοντα. καὶ δὴ ἀναχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα αὐτῶν ἀπῄτει τὸν φίλον, ὁ δὲ λύτρα ᾔτει· μὴ γὰρ προήσεσθαι, εἰ μὴ μεγάλα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λάβῃ.

Ὁ Δάνδαμις δέ, "Ἃ μὲν εἶχον," φησίν, "ἅπαντα διήρπασται ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν, εἰ δέ τι δύναμαι γυμνὸς ὑποτελέσαι, ἕτοιμος ὑποστῆναι ὑμῖν, καὶ πρόσταττε ὅ τι ἂν θέλῃς. εἰ βούλει δέ, ἐμὲ ἀντὶ τούτου κατάχρησαι πρὸς ὅ τι σοι φίλον."

Ὁ δὲ Σαυρομάτης, "Οὐδέν," ἔφη, "δεῖ ὅλον κατέχεσθαί σε, καὶ ταῦτα Ζίρην ἥκοντα, σὺ δὲ ὧν ἔχεις μέρος καταβαλὼν ἄγου τὸν φίλον."

Ἤρετο ὁ Δάνδαμις ὅ τι καὶ βούλεται λαβεῖν· ὁ δὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ᾔτησεν. ὁ δὲ αὐτίκα παρέσχεν ἐκκόπτειν αὐτούς· κἀπειδὴ ἐξεκέκοπτο καὶ ἤδη τὰ λύτρα εἶχον οἱ Σαυρομάται, παραλαβὼν τὸν Ἀμιζώκην ἐπανῄει ἐπερειδόμενος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἅμα διανηξάμενοι ἀπεσώθησαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

Τοῦτο γενόμενον παρεμυθήσατο ἅπαντας Σκύθας καὶ οὐκέτι **(41)** ἡττᾶσθαι ἐνόμιζον, ὁρῶντες ὅτι τὸ μέγιστον ἡμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀπήγαγον οἱ πολέμιοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἦν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἡ ἀγαθὴ γνώμη καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους πίστις. καὶ τοὺς Σαυρομάτας δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μετρίως ἐφόβησε, λογιζομένους πρὸς οἵους ἄνδρας ἐκ παρασκευῆς μαχοῦνται, εἰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ τότε ὑπερέσχον· ὥστε νυκτὸς ἐπιγινομένης ἀπολιπόντες τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν βοσκημάτων καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας ἐμπρήσαντες ᾤχοντο φεύγοντες. ὁ μέντοι Ἀμιζώκης οὐκέτι ἠνέσχετο βλέπειν αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τυφλῷ τῷ Δανδάμιδι, ἀλλὰ τυφλώσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀμφότεροι κάθηνται ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν δημοσίᾳ μετὰ πάσης τιμῆς τρεφόμενοι.

Τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ὑμεῖς ἔχοιτε ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἄλλους **(42)** σοι δέκα δοίη τις ἐπὶ τοῖς πέντε καταριθμήσασθαι ἀνωμότους, εἰ βούλει, ὡς καὶ πολλὰ ἐπιψεύδοιο αὐτοῖς; καίτοι ἐγὼ μέν σοι γυμνὸν τὸ ἔργον διηγησάμην· εἰ δὲ σύ τινα τοιοῦτον ἔλεγες, εὖ οἶδα ὁπόσα ἂν κομψὰ ἐγκατέμιξας τῷ λόγῳ, οἷα ἱκέτευεν ὁ Δάνδαμις καὶ ὡς ἐτυφλοῦτο καὶ ἃ εἶπεν καὶ ὡς ἐπανῆκεν καὶ ὡς ὑπεδέξαντο αὐτὸν ἐπευφημοῦντες οἱ Σκύθαι καὶ ἄλλα ὁποῖα ὑμεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι εἰώθατε πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν.

Ἄκουε δ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἄλλον ἰσότιμον, Βελίτταν, Ἀμιζώκου **(43)** τούτου ἀνεψιόν, ὃς ἐπεὶ κατασπασθέντα ἐκ τοῦ ἵππου ὑπὸ λέοντος εἶδε Βάσθην τὸν φίλον (ἅμα δὲ ἔτυχον θηρῶντες) καὶ ἤδη ὁ

λέων περιπλακεὶς αὐτῷ ἐνεπεφύκει τῷ λαιμῷ καὶ τοῖς ὄνυξιν ἐσπάρασσε, καταπηδήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπίπτει κατόπιν τῷ θηρίῳ καὶ περιέσπα, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν παροξύνων καὶ μετάγων καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων μεταξὺ διείρων τοὺς δακτύλους καὶ τὸν Βάσθην, ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν, ὑπεξελεῖν πειρώμενος τοῦ δήγματος, ἄχρι δὴ ὁ λέων ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνον ἡμιθνῆτα ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸν Βελίτταν ἀπεστράφη καὶ συμπλακεὶς ἀπέκτεινε κἀκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ ἀποθνήσκων τὸ γοῦν τοσοῦτον ἔφθη πατάξας τῷ ἀκινάκῃ τὸν λέοντα εἰς τὸ στέρνον ὥστε ἅμα πάντες ἀπέθανον, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐθάψαμεν αὐτοὺς δύο τάφους ἀναχώσαντες πλησίον, ἕνα μὲν τῶν φίλων, ἕνα δὲ καταντικρὺ τοῦ λέοντος.

Τρίτην δέ σοι διηγήσομαι, ὦ Μνήσιππε, τὴν Μακέντου φιλίαν καὶ Λογχάτου καὶ Ἀρσακόμα. ὁ γὰρ Ἀρσακόμας οὗτος ἠράσθη Μαζαίας τῆς Λευκάνορος, τοῦ βασιλεύσαντος ἐν Βοσπόρῳ, ὁπότε ἐπρέσβευεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δασμοῦ ὃν οἱ Βοσποranοὶ ἀεὶ φέροντες ἡμῖν τότε ἤδη τρίτον μῆνα ὑπερήμεροι ἐγεγένηντο. ἐν τῷ δείπνῳ οὖν ἰδὼν τὴν Μαζαίαν μεγάλην καὶ καλὴν παρθένον ἥρα καὶ πονηρῶς εἶχε. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν φόρων διεπέπρακτο ἤδη, καὶ ἐχρημάτιζεν αὐτῷ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ εἰστία, ἤδη αὐτὸν ἀποπέμπων. ἔθος δέ ἐστιν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ τοὺς μνηστῆρας ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ αἰτεῖν τὰς κόρας καὶ λέγειν οἵτινες ὄντες ἀξιοῦσι καταδεχθῆναι ἐπὶ τὸν γάμον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἔτυχον ἐν τῷ δείπνῳ πολλοὶ μνηστῆρες παρόντες, βασιλεῖς καὶ βασιλέων παῖδες· καὶ Τιγραπάτης ἦν ὁ Λαζῶν δυνάστης καὶ Ἀδύρμαχος ὁ Μαχλυηνῆς ἄρχων καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. δεῖ δὲ τῶν μνηστήρων ἕκαστον, προσαγγείλαντα ἑαυτὸν διότι μνηστευσόμενος ἥκει, δειπνεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις κατακείμενον ἐφ’ ἡσυχίας· ἐπὰν δὲ παύσωνται δειπνοῦντες, αἰτήσαντα φιάλην ἐπισπεῖσαι κατὰ τῆς τραπέζης καὶ μνηστεύεσθαι τὴν παῖδα πολλὰ ἐπαινοῦντα ἑαυτόν, ὥς τις ἢ γένους ἢ πλούτου ἢ δυνάμεως ἔχοι.

Πολλῶν οὖν κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον σπεισάντων καὶ αἰτησάντων καὶ βασιλείας καὶ πλούτους καταριθμησαμένων τελευταῖος ὁ Ἀρσακόμας αἰτήσας τὴν φιάλην οὐκ ἔσπεισεν, οὐ γὰρ ἔθος ἡμῖν ἐκχεῖν τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλὰ ὕβρις εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἰς τὸν θεόν· πιὼν δὲ ἀμυστί, “Δός μοι,” εἶπεν, “ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα σου Μαζαίαν γυναῖκα ἔχειν πολὺ ἐπιτηδειοτέρῳ τούτων ὄντι ὁπόσα γε ἐπὶ τῷ πλούτῳ καὶ τοῖς κτήμασι.” τοῦ δὲ Λευκάνορος θαυμάσαντος – ἠπίστατο γὰρ πένητα τὸν Ἀρσακόμαν καὶ Σκυθῶν τῶν πολλῶν – καὶ ἐρομένου, “Πόσα δὲ βοσκήματα ἢ πόσας ἀ-

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μάξας ἔχεις, ὦ Ἀρσακόμα; ταῦτα γὰρ ὑμεῖς πλουτεῖτε.” “Ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁμάξας,” ἔφη, “ἔχω οὐδὲ ἀγέλας, ἀλλ’ εἰσί μοι δύο φίλοι καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἷοι οὐκ ἄλλῳ Σκυθῶν.”

Τότε μὲν οὖν ἐγελάσθη ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ παρώφθη καὶ μεθύειν **(46)** ἔδοξεν, ἔωθεν δὲ προκριθεὶς τῶν ἄλλων Ἀδύρμαχος ἔμελλεν ἀπάξειν τὴν νύμφην παρὰ τὴν Μαιῶτιν ἐς τοὺς Μάχλυας. ὁ δὲ Ἀρσακόμας ἐπανελθὼν οἴκαδε μηνύει τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἀτιμασθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ γελασθείη ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, πένης εἶναι δόξας. “Καίτοι,” ἔφη, “ἐγὼ διηγησάμην αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦτον ὁπόσος ἐστίν μοι, ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λογχάτα καὶ Μακέντα, καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν ὑμετέραν, πολὺ ἀμείνω καὶ βεβαιοτέραν τῆς Βοσπορανῶν δυνάμεως. ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα διεξιόντος ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐχλεύαζεν καὶ κατεφρόνει, Ἀδυρμάχῳ δὲ τῷ Μάχλυϊ παρέδωκεν ἀπάγειν τὴν νύμφην, ὅτι χρυσᾶς γε φιάλας ἐλέγετο ἔχειν δέκα καὶ ἁμάξας τετρακλίνους ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ πρόβατα καὶ βοῦς πολλούς. οὕτως ἄρα προετίμησεν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν βοσκήματα πολλὰ καὶ ἐκπώματα περίεργα καὶ ἁμάξας βαρείας.

“Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ φίλοι, δι’ ἀμφότερα ἀνιῶμαι·καὶ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῆς Μαζαίας, καὶ ἡ ὕβρις ἐν τοσούτοις ἀνθρώποις οὐ μετρίως μου καθίκετο. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπ’ ἴσης ἠδικῆσθαι· τὸ γὰρ τρίτον μετῆν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τῆς ἀτιμίας, εἴ γε οὕτω βιοῦμεν ὡς ἀφ’ οὗ συνελήλυθαμεν εἷς ἄνθρωπος ὄντες καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀνιώμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χαίροντες.” “Οὐ μόνον,” ἐπεῖπεν ὁ Λογχάτης, “ἀλλὰ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὅλος ὕβρισται, ὁπότε σὺ τοιαῦτα ἔπαθες.”

“Πῶς οὖν,” ὁ Μακέντης ἔφη, “χρησόμεθα τοῖς παροῦσι;” **(47)**

“Διελώμεθα,” ἔφη ὁ Λογχάτης, “τὸ ἔργον· καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπισχνοῦμαι Ἀρσακόμᾳ τὴν κεφαλὴν κομιεῖν τὴν Λευκάνορος, σὲ δὲ χρὴ τὴν νύμφην ἐπανάγειν αὐτῷ.”

“Οὕτω γινέσθω,” ἔφη· “σὺ δέ, ὦ Ἀρσακόμα, ἐν τοσούτῳ – εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ στρατιᾶς[xxi] καὶ πολέμου τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δεήσειν – ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ περιμένων συνάγειρε καὶ παρασκεύαζε ὅπλα καὶ ἵππους καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν ὡς πλείστην. ῥᾷστα δ’ ἂν πολλοὺς προσαγάγοις αὐτός τε ἀγαθὸς ὢν καὶ ἡμῖν οὐκ ὀλίγων ὄντων οἰκείων, μάλιστα δὲ εἰ καθέζοιο ἐπὶ τῆς βύρσης τοῦ βοός.”

Ἔδοξε ταῦτα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐχώρει ὡς εἶχεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ Βοσπόρου, ὁ Λογχάτης, ὁ Μακέντης δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς Μάχλυας, ἱππότης ἑκάτερος, ὁ δὲ Ἀρσακόμας οἴκοι μένων τοῖς τε ἡλικιώταις διελέγετο καὶ

ὥπλιζε δύναμιν παρὰ τῶν οἰκείων, τέλος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς βύρσης ἐκαθέζετο.

Τὸ δὲ ἔθος ἡμῖν τὸ περὶ τὴν βύρσαν οὕτως ἔχει· ἐπειδ**ὰν** ἀδι- **(48)**
κηθείς τις πρὸς ἑτέρου, ἀμύνασθαι βουλόμενος, ἴδῃ καθ' ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀξιόμαχος ὤν, βοῦν ἱερεύσας τὰ μὲν κρέα κατακόψας ἥψησεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκπετάσας χαμαὶ τὴν βύρσαν κάθηται ἐπ' αὐτῆς, εἰς τ**οὐ**πίσω παραγαγὼν τὼ χεῖρε ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀγκώνων δεδεμένοι. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἡ μεγίστη ἱκετηρία. παρακειμένων δὲ τῶν κρεῶν τοῦ βοὸς προσιόντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ βουλόμενος μοῖραν ἕκαστος λαβὼν ἐπιβὰς τῇ βύρσῃ τὸν δεξιὸν πόδα ὑπισχνεῖται κατὰ δύναμιν, ὁ μὲν πέντε ἱππέας παρέξειν ἀσίτους καὶ ἀμίσθους, ὁ δὲ δέκα, ὁ δὲ πλείους, ὁ δὲ ὁπλίτας <ἢ> πεζοὺς[xxii] ὁπόσους ἂν δύνηται, ὁ δὲ μόνον ἑαυτόν, ὁ πενέστατος. ἀθροίζεται οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς βύρσης πολὺ πλῆθος ἐνίοτε, καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο σύνταγμα βεβαιότατόν τέ ἐστι συμμεῖναι καὶ ἀπρόσμαχον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἅτε καὶ ἔνορκον ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιβῆναι τῆς βύρσης ὅρκος ἐστίν.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρσακόμας ἐν τούτοις ἦν, καὶ ἠθροίσθησαν αὐτῷ ἱππεῖς μὲν ἀμφὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους, ὁπλῖται δὲ καὶ πεζοὶ συναμφότεροι δισμύριοι. ὁ δὲ Λογχάτης ἀγνοούμενος παρελθὼν **(49)**
ἐς τὸν Βόσπορον προσέρχεται τῷ βασιλεῖ διοικουμένῳ τι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ φησὶν ἥκειν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ αὐτῷ μεγάλα πράγματα κομίζων.

Τοῦ δὲ λέγειν κελεύσαντος, "Οἱ μὲν Σκύθαι," φησίν, "τὰ κοινὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ καθ'ἡμέραν ἀξιοῦσιν, μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν τοὺς νομέας ὑμῶν ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἀλλὰ μέχρι τοῦ τράχωνος νέμειν· τοὺς δὲ λῃστὰς οὓς αἰτιᾶσθε ὡς κατατρέχοντας ὑμῶν τὴν χώραν οὐ φασὶν ἀπὸ κοινῆς γνώμης ἐκπέμπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει κλωπεύειν· **εἰ** δέ τις ἁλίσκοιτο αὐτῶν, σὲ κύριον εἶναι κολάζειν. ταῦτα μὲν ἐκεῖνοι ἐπεστάλκασιν, ἐγὼ δὲ μηνύω σοι μεγάλην **(50)**
ἔφοδον ἐσομένην ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ὑπ' Ἀρσακόμα τοῦ Μαριάντα, ὃς ἐπρέσβευε πρώην παρὰ σὲ καί, οἶμαι, διότι αἰτήσας τὴν θυγατέρα οὐκ ἔτυχε παρὰ σοῦ, ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς βύρσης ἑβδόμην ἡμέραν ἤδη κάθηται καὶ συνῆκται στρατὸς οὐκ ὀλίγος αὐτῷ."

"Ἤκουσα," ἔφη ὁ Λευκάνωρ, "καὶ αὐτὸς ἀθροίζεσθαι δύναμιν ἀπὸ βύρσης, ὅτι δ' ἐφ' ἡμᾶς συνίσταται καὶ ὅτι Ἀρσακόμας ὁ ἐλαύνων ἐστὶν ἠγνόουν."

"Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σέ," ἔφη ὁ Λογχάτης, "ἡ παρασκευή. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἐ-

χθρὸς ὁ Ἀρσακόμας ἐστί, καὶ ἄχθεται διότι προτιμῶμαι αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν γεραιτέρων καὶ ἀμείνων τὰ πάντα δοκῶ εἶναι·εἰ δέ μοι ὑπόσχοιο τὴν ἑτέραν σου θυγατέρα Βαρκέτιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἀναξίῳ ὑμῶν ὄντι, οὐκ εἰς μακράν σοι ἥξω τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ κομίζων."

"Ὑπισχνοῦμαι," ἔφη ὁ βασιλεύς, μάλα περιδεὴς γενόμενος· ἔγνω γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς Ἀρσακόμα τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ γάμῳ, καὶ ἄλλως ὑπέπτησσεν ἀεὶ τοὺς Σκύθας.

Ὁ δὲ Λογχάτης, "Ὅμοσον," εἶπεν, "ἦ μὴν φυλάξειν τὰς συνθήκας, μηδὲ ἀπαρνήσεσθαι τότε ἤδη τούτων γενομένων."

Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀνατείνας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἤθελεν ὀμνύειν, "Μὴ σύ γε ἐνταῦθα," εἶπεν, "μὴ καί τις ὑπίδηται τῶν ὁρώντων ἐφ' ὅτῳ ὁρκωμοτοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἄρεως τουτὶ εἰσελθόντες, ἐπικλεισάμενοι τὰς θύρας ὀμνύωμεν, ἀκουσάτω δὲ μηδείς· εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πύθοιτο Ἀρσακόμας, δέδια μὴ προθύσηται με τοῦ πολέμου, χεῖρα οὐ μικρὰν ἤδη περιβεβλημένος."

"Εἰσίωμεν," ἔφη ὁ βασιλεύς, "ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀπόστητε ὅτι πορρωτάτω· μηδεὶς δὲ παρέστω ἐς τὸν νεὼν ὄντινα μὴ ἐγὼ καλέσω."

Ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν εἰσῆλθον, οἱ δορυφόροι δὲ ὑπέστησαν, σπασάμενος τὸν ἀκινάκην, ἐπισχὼν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τὸ στόμα ὡς μὴ βοήσειε, παίει παρὰ τὸν μαστόν, εἶτα ἀποτεμὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν ὑπὸ τῇ χλαμύδι ἔχων ἐξῄει, μεταξὺ διαλεγόμενος δῆθεν αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταχέων ἥξειν λέγων, ὡς δὴ ἐπί τι πεμφθεὶς ὑπ' ἐκείνου. καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον ἀφικόμενος ἔνθα καταδεδεμένον καταλελοίπει τὸν ἵππον, ἀναβὰς ἀφιππάσατο εἰς τὴν Σκυθίαν. δίωξις δὲ οὐκ ἐγένετο αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀγνοησάντων τὸ γεγονὸς τῶν Βοσπορανῶν, καὶ ὅτε ἔγνωσαν, ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας στασιαζόντων.

Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Λογχάτης ἔπραξεν καὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπεπλήρωσεν τῷ Ἀρσακόμᾳ παραδοὺς τὴν κεφαλὴν τοῦ Λευκάνορος. ὁ Μακέντης δὲ καθ' ὁδὸν ἀκούσας τὰ ἐν Βοσπόρῳ γενόμενα ἦκεν εἰς τοὺς Μάχλυας καὶ πρῶτος ἀγγείλας αὐτοῖς τὸν φόνον τοῦ βασιλέως, "Ἡ πόλις δέ," ἔφη, "ὦ Ἀδύρμαχε, σὲ γαμβρὸν ὄντα ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καλεῖ· ὥστε σὺ μὲν προελάσας παραλάμβανε τὴν ἀρχήν, τεταραγμένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφανείς, ἡ κόρη δέ σοι κατόπιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁμαξῶν ἐπέσθω· ῥᾷον γὰρ οὕτω προσάξεις Βοσπορανῶν τοὺς πολλούς, ἰδόντας τὴν Λευκάνορος θυγατέρα. ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀλανός τέ εἰμι καὶ τῇ παιδὶ ταύτῃ συγγενὴς μητρόθεν· παρ'

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ἡμῶν γὰρ οὖσαν τὴν Μάστειραν ἠγάγετο ὁ Λευκάνωρ. καὶ νῦν σοι ἥκω παρὰ τῶν Μαστείρας ἀδελφῶν τῶν ἐν Ἀλανίᾳ παρακελευομένων ὅτι τάχιστα ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τὸν Βόσπορον καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν ἐς Εὐβίοτον περιελθοῦσαν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὃς ἀδελφὸς ὢν νόθος Λευκάνορος Σκύθαις μὲν ἀεὶ φίλος ἐστίν, Ἀλανοῖς δὲ ἀπέχθεται."

Ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγεν ὁ Μακέντης ὁμόσκευος καὶ ὁμόγλωττος τοῖς Ἀλανοῖς ὤν· κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα Ἀλανοῖς καὶ Σκύθαις, πλὴν ὅτι οὐ πάνυ κομῶσιν οἱ Ἀλανοὶ ὥσπερ οἱ Σκύθαι. ἀλλὰ ὁ Μακέντης καὶ τοῦτο εἴκαστο αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀποκεκάρκει τῆς κόμης ὁπόσον εἰκὸς ἦν ἔλαττον κομᾶν τὸν Ἀλανὸν τοῦ Σκύθου· ὥστε ἐπιστεύετο διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐδόκει Μαστείρας καὶ Μαζαίας συγγενὴς εἶναι.

"Καὶ νῦν," ἔφη, "ὦ Ἀδύρμαχε, ἐλαύνειν ἕτοιμος ἅμα σοι ἐπὶ **(52)** τὸν Βόσπορον, ἢν ἐθέλῃς, μένειν τε, εἰ δέοι, καὶ τὴν παῖδα ἄγειν."

"Τοῦτο," ἔφη, "καὶ μᾶλλον," ὁ Ἀδύρμαχος, "ἐθελήσαιμ' ἄν, ἀφ' αἵματος ὄντα σε Μαζαίαν ἄγειν. ἢν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα ἡμῖν ἴῃς ἐπὶ Βόσπορον, ἱππεῖ ἑνὶ πλείους ἂν γενοίμεθα· εἰ δέ μοι τὴν γυναῖκα ἄγοις, ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἂν γένοιο."

Ταῦτα ἐγίνετο καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπήλαυνε παραδοὺς τῷ Μακέντῃ ἄγειν τὴν Μαζαίαν παρθένον ἔτι οὖσαν. ὁ δὲ ἡμέρας μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμάξης ἦγεν αὐτήν, ἐπεὶ δὲ νὺξ κατέλαβεν, ἀναθέμενος ἐπὶ τὸν ἵππον – ἐτεθεραπεύκει δὲ ἕνα σφίσιν ἄλλον ἱππέα ἕπεσθαι – ἀναπηδήσας καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκέτι παρὰ τὴν Μαιῶτιν ἤλαυνεν, ἀλλ' ἀποτραπόμενος εἰς τὴν μεσόγειαν ἐν δεξιᾷ λαβὼν τὰ Μιτραίων ὄρη, διαναπαύων μεταξὺ τὴν παῖδα, τριταῖος ἐτέλεσεν ἐκ Μαχλύων ἐς Σκύθας. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἵππος αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ ἐπαύσατο τοῦ δρόμου, μικρὸν ἐπιστὰς ἀποθνήσκει, ὁ δὲ Μακέντης ἐγχειρίσας τὴν **(53)** Μαζαίαν τῷ Ἀρσακόμᾳ, "Δέδεξο," εἶπεν, "καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν."

Τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ θεάματος καταπλαγέντος καὶ χάριν ὁμολογοῦντος, "Παῦε," ἔφη ὁ Μακέντης, "ἄλλον με ποιῶν σεαυτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ χάριν ἐμοὶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπραξα τούτοις τοιόνδε ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰ> ἡ ἀριστερά μου χάριν εἰδείη τῇ δεξιᾷ διότι τρωθεῖσάν ποτε αὐτὴν ἐθεράπευσε καὶ φιλοφρόνως ἐπεμελήθη καμνούσης. γελοῖα τοίνυν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἂν ποιοῖμεν εἰ πάλαι ἀναμιχθέντες καὶ ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν εἰς ἕνα συνελθόντες ἔτι μέγα νομίζοιμεν εἶναι εἰ τὸ μέρος ἡμῶν ἔπραξέ τι χρηστὸν ὑπὲρ ὅλου

τοῦ σώματος· ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἔπραττεν, μέρος ὂν τοῦ ὅλου εὖ πάσχοντος.”

Οὕτως μὲν ὁ Μακέντης ἔφη τῷ Ἀρσακόμᾳ χάριν ὁμολογήσαντι. **(54)** ὁ δὲ Ἀδύρμαχος ὡς ἤκουσε τὴν ἐπιβουλήν, εἰς μὲν τὸν Βόσπορον οὐκέτι ἦλθεν – ἤδη γὰρ Εὐβίοτος ἦρχεν, ἐπικληθεὶς ἐκ Σαυροματῶν, παρ’ οἷς διέτριβεν – εἰς δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπανελθὼν καὶ στρατιὰν πολλὴν συναγαγὼν διὰ τῆς ὀρεινῆς εἰσέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Σκυθίαν· καὶ ὁ Εὐβίοτος οὐ μετὰ πολὺ καὶ οὗτος εἰσέπεσεν ἄγων πανδημεὶ μὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, Ἀλανοὺς δὲ καὶ Σαυρομάτας ἐπικλήτους ἑκατέρους δισμυρίους. ἀναμίξαντες δὲ τὰ στρατεύματα ὁ Εὐβίοτος καὶ ὁ Ἀδύρμαχος, ἐννέα μυριάδες ἅπαντες ἐγένοντο καὶ τούτων τὸ τρίτον ἱπποτοξόται.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ – καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς μετέσχον τῆς ἐξόδου αὐτοῖς, ἐπιδοὺς ἐν τῇ βύρσῃ τότε ἱππέας αὐτοτελεῖς ἑκατόν – οὐ πολλῷ ἔλαττον τῶν τρισμυρίων σὺν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἀθροισθέντες ὑπεμένομεν τὴν ἔφοδον· ἐστρατήγει δὲ ὁ Ἀρσακόμας. καὶ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντας εἴδομεν αὐτούς, ἀντεπήγομεν, προεπαφέντες τὸ ἱππικόν. γενομένης δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ μάχης καρτερᾶς ἐνεδίδου ἤδη τὰ ἡμέτερα καὶ παρερρήγνυτο ἡ φάλαγξ, καὶ τέλος εἰς δύο διεκόπη τὸ Σκυθικὸν ἅπαν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπέφευγεν, οὐ πάνυ σαφῶς ἡττημένον, ἀλλ’ ἀναχώρησις ἐδόκει ἡ φυγή· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ Ἀλανοὶ ἐτόλμων ἐπὶ πολὺ διώκειν. τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ, ὅπερ καὶ ἔλαττον, περισχόντες οἱ Ἀλανοὶ καὶ Μάχλυες ἔκοπτον πανταχόθεν ἀφθόνως ἀφιέντες τῶν οἰστῶν καὶ ἀκοντίων, ὥστε πάνυ ἐπονοῦντο ἡμῶν οἱ περιεσχημένοι, καὶ ἤδη προΐεντο οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ ὅπλα.

Ἐν τούτοις δὲ καὶ ὁ Λογχάτης καὶ ὁ Μακέντης ἔτυχον ὄντες **(55)** καὶ ἐτέτρωντο ἤδη προκινδυνεύοντες, ὁ μὲν στυρακίῳ εἰς[xxiii] τὸν μηρόν, ὁ Λογχάτης, ὁ Μακέντης δὲ πελέκει εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ κοντῷ εἰς τὸν ὦμον. ὅπερ αἰσθόμενος ὁ Ἀρσακόμας, ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὤν, δεινὸν ἡγησάμενος εἰ ἄπεισι καταλιπὼν τοὺς φίλους, προσβαλὼν τοὺς μύωπας τῷ ἵππῳ ἐμβοήσας ἤλαυνε διὰ τῶν πολεμίων κοπίδα διηρμένος, ὥστε τοὺς Μάχλυας μηδὲ ὑποστῆναι τὸ ῥόθιον τοῦ θυμοῦ, ἀλλὰ διαιρεθέντες ἔδωκαν αὐτῷ διεξελθεῖν.

Ὁ δὲ ἀνακτησάμενος τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας παρακαλέσας ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀδύρμαχον καὶ πατάξας τῇ κοπίδι παρὰ τὸν αὐχένα μέχρι τῆς ζώνης διέτεμεν. πεσόντος δὲ ἐκεί-

νου διελύθη τὸ Μαχλυϊκὸν ἅπαν, καὶ τὸ Ἀλανικὸν οὐ μετὰ πολύ, καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπὶ τούτοις· ὥστε ἐκρατοῦμεν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἡμεῖς καὶ ἐπεξήλθομεν ἂν ἐπὶ πολὺ κτείνοντες, εἰ μὴ νὺξ τὸ ἔργον ἀφείλετο.

Εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἱκέται παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἥκοντες ἐδέοντο φιλίαν ποιεῖσθαι, Βοσπορανοὶ μὲν ὑποτελέσειν διπλάσιον τὸν δασμὸν ὑπισχνούμενοι, Μάχλυες δὲ ὁμήρους δώσειν ἔφασαν, οἱ Ἀλανοὶ δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἐφόδου ἐκείνης Σινδιανοὺς ἡμῖν χειρώσασθαι ὑπέστησαν ἐκ πολλοῦ διεστῶτας. ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπείσθημεν, δόξαν πολὺ πρότερον Ἀρσακόμᾳ καὶ Λογχάτῃ, καὶ ἐγένετο εἰρήνη ἐκείνων πρυτανευόντων ἕκαστα.

Τοιαῦτα, ὦ Μνήσιππε, τολμῶσιν ποιεῖν Σκύθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Πάνυ τραγικά, ὦ Τόξαρι, καὶ μύθοις ὅμοια· καὶ ἴλεως μὲν **(56)**
ὁ Ἀκινάκης καὶ ὁ Ἄνεμος εἶεν, οὓς ὤμοσας· εἰ γοῦν τις ἀπιστοίη αὐτοῖς, οὐ πάνυ μεμπτὸς εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα, ὦ γενναῖε, μὴ φθόνος ὑμῶν ἡ ἀπιστία ᾖ. πλὴν οὐκ ἐμὲ ἀποτρέψεις ἀπιστῶν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν ἃ οἶδα ὑπὸ Σκυθῶν γενόμενα.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Μὴ μακρὰ μόνον, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ οὕτως ἀφέτοις χρώμενος τοῖς λόγοις· ὡς νῦν γε, ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὴν Σκυθίαν καὶ τὴν Μαχλυανὴν διαθέων καὶ εἰς τὸν Βόσπορον ἀπιών, εἶτ᾽ ἐπανιών, πάνυ μου κατεχρήσω τῇ σιωπῇ.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Πειστέον καὶ ταῦτά σοι νομοθετοῦντι καὶ διὰ βραχέων λεκτέον, **(57)**
μὴ καὶ κάμῃς ἡμῖν τῇ ἀκοῇ συμπερινοστῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ ἄκουσον ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ οἷα φίλος, Σισίννης τοὔνομα, ὑπηρέτησεν.

Ὅτε γὰρ Ἀθήναζε ἀπῄειν οἴκοθεν ἐπιθυμίᾳ παιδείας τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς, κατέπλευσα ἐς Ἄμαστριν τὴν Ποντικήν· ἐν προσβολῇ δέ ἐστιν τοῖς ἀπὸ Σκυθίας προσπλέουσιν, οὐ πολὺ τῆς Καράμβεως ἀπέχουσα, ἡ πόλις. εἵπετο δὲ ὁ Σισίννης ἑταῖρος ἐκ παιδὸς ὤν. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν καταγωγήν τινα ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι σκεψάμενοι

κἀκ τοῦ πλοίου ἐς αὐτὴν μετασκευασάμενοι ἠγοράζομεν, οὐδὲν πονηρὸν ὑφορώμενοι· ἐν τοσούτῳ δὲ κλῶπές τινες ἀνασπάσαντες τὸ κλεῖστρον ἐκφέρουσιν ἅπαντα, **ὡς** μηδὲ τὰ ἐς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαρκέσοντα καταλιπεῖν.

Ἐπανελθόντες οὖν οἶκαδε καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς μαθόντες, δικάζεσθαι μὲν τοῖς γείτοσι πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἢ τῷ ξένῳ οὐκ ἐδοκιμάζομεν, δεδιότες μὴ συκοφάνται δόξωμεν τοῖς πολλοῖς λέγοντες ὡς ὑφείλετο ἡμῶν τις δαρεικοὺς τετρακοσίους καὶ ἐσθῆτα πολλὴν καὶ δάπιδάς τινας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁπόσα εἴχομεν· ἐσκοπούμεθα δὲ περὶ **(58)** τῶν παρόντων ὅ τι πράξομεν, ἄποροι παντάπασιν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοδαπῇ γενόμενοι. κἀμοὶ μὲν ἐδόκει ὡς εἶχον αὐτοῦ παραβύσαντα ἐς τὴν πλευρὰν τὸν ἀκινάκην ἀπελθεῖν τοῦ βίου πρὶν ἀγεννές τι ὑποστῆναι λιμῷ ἢ δίψει πιεσθέντα, ὁ δὲ Σισίννης παρεμυθεῖτο καὶ ἱκέτευεν μηδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐπινοήσειν ὅθεν ἔξομεν ἱκανῶς τὰς τροφάς.

Καὶ τότε μὲν ξύλα ἐκ τοῦ λιμένος παρεκόμισεν καὶ ἦκεν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μισθοῦ ἐπισιτισάμενος· ἔωθεν δὲ περιιὼν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν εἶδε πομπήν[xxiv] τινα, ὡς ἔφη, γενναίων καὶ καλῶν νεανίσκων. μονομαχεῖν δὲ οὗτοι ἐπὶ μισθῷ ἀνδρολογηθέντες εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν διαγωνιεῖσθαι ἔμελλον. καὶ δὴ τὸ πᾶν ὡς εἶχεν ἀμφ' αὐτοὺς πυθόμενος, ἐλθὼν ὡς ἐμέ, "Μηκέτι, ὦ Τόξαρι," ἔφη, "σαυτὸν πένητα λέγε, εἰς γὰρ τρίτην ἡμέραν πλούσιόν σε ἀποφανῶ."

Ταῦτα εἶπε, καὶ πονηρῶς τὸ μεταξὺ ἀποζήσαντες, ἐνστάσης **(59)** ἤδη τῆς θέας ἐθεώμεθα καὶ αὐτοί· παραλαβὼν γάρ με ὡς ἐπὶ τερπνόν τι καὶ παράδοξον θέαμα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἄγει εἰς τὸ θέατρον. καὶ καθίσαντες ἐωρῶμεν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον θηρία κατακοντιζόμενα καὶ ὑπὸ κυνῶν διωκόμενα καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους δεδεμένους ἀφιέμενα, κακούργους τινάς, ὡς εἰκάζομεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσῆλθον οἱ μονομάχοι καί τινα παραγαγὼν ὁ κῆρυξ εὐμεγέθη νεανίσκον εἶπεν, ὅστις ἂν ἐθέλῃ τούτῳ μονομαχῆσαι, ἥκειν εἰς τὸ μέσον δραχμὰς ληψόμενον μυρίας μισθὸν τῆς μάχης, ἐνταῦθα ἐξανίσταται ὁ Σισίννης καὶ καταπηδήσας ὑπέστη μαχεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ᾔτει, καὶ τὸν μισθὸν λαβών τὰς μυρίας ἐμοὶ φέρων ἐνεχείρισε, καὶ "Εἰ μὲν κρατήσαιμι, ὦ Τόξαρι," εἶπεν, "ἅμα ἄπιμεν ἔχοντες τὰ ἀρκοῦντα, ἢν δὲ πέσω, θάψας με ὑποχώρει ὀπίσω εἰς Σκύθας."

Ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκώκυον, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα τὰ μὲν **(60)** ἄλλα περιεδήσατο, τὸ κράνος δὲ οὐκ ἐπέθηκεν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ γυμνῆς

τῆς κεφαλῆς καταστὰς ἐμάχετο. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τιτρώσκεται
αὐτός, καμπύλῳ τῷ ξίφει ὑποτμηθεὶς τὴν ἰγνύαν, ὥστε αἷμα ἔρρει
πολύ· ἐγὼ δὲ προετεθνήκειν ἤδη τῷ δέει. θρασύτερον δὲ ἐπιφερό-
μενον τηρήσας τὸν ἀντίπαλον παίει εἰς τὸ στέρνον καὶ διήλασεν,
ὥστε αὐτίκα ἐπεπτώκει πρὸ τοῖν ποδοῖν αὐτοῦ. ὁ δὲ κάμνων
καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ τραύματος ἐπεκάθιζε τῷ νεκρῷ, καὶ μικροῦ
δεῖν ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ προσδραμὼν ἀνέστησα καὶ
παρεμυθησάμην. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφεῖτο ἤδη νενικηκώς, ἀράμενος αὐτὸν
ἐκόμισα εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ θεραπευθεὶς ἐπέζησε μὲν
καὶ ἔστι μέχρι νῦν ἐν Σκύθαις, γήμας τὴν ἐμὴν ἀδελφήν· χωλὸς
δέ ἐστιν ὅμως ἀπὸ τοῦ τραύματος.

Τοῦτο, ὦ Μνήσιππε, οὐκ ἐν Μάχλυσιν οὐδὲ ἐν Ἀλανίᾳ ἐγένετο,
ὡς ἀμάρτυρον εἶναι καὶ ἀπιστεῖσθαι δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ πά-
ρεισιν Ἀμαστριανῶν μεμνημένοι τὴν μάχην τοῦ Σισίννου.

Πέμπτον ἔτι σοι τὸ Ἀβαύχα ἔργον διηγησάμενος παύσομαι. **(61)**
ἦκέν ποτε οὗτος ὁ Ἀβαύχας εἰς τὴν Βορυσθενιτῶν πόλιν ἐπαγό-
μενος καὶ γυναῖκα, ἧς ἥρα μάλιστα, καὶ παιδία δύο· τὸ μὲν ἐπι-
μαστίδιον ἄρρεν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον, ἡ κόρη, ἑπτέτις ἦν. Συναπεδήμει
δὲ καὶ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ, Γυνδάνης, οὗτος μὲν καὶ νοσῶν ἀπὸ τραύ-
ματος ὃ ἐτέτρωτο κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑπὸ λῃστῶν ἐπιπεσόντων σφίσι
διαμαχόμενος γὰρ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐλαύνεται εἰς τὸν μηρόν, ὥστε
οὐδὲ ἑστάναι ἐδύνατο ὑπὸ τῆς ὀδύνης. νύκτωρ δὲ καθευδόντων—
ἔτυχον δὲ ἐν ὑπερῴῳ τινὶ οἰκοῦντες—πυρκαϊὰ μεγάλη ἐξανί-
σταται καὶ πάντα περιεκλείετο καὶ περιεῖχεν ἡ φλὸξ ἀπανταχόθεν
τὴν οἰκίαν. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἀνεγρόμενος ὁ Ἀβαύχας καταλιπὼν
τὰ παιδία κλαυθμυριζόμενα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ἐκκρεμαννυμένην
ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ σῴζειν αὐτὴν παρακελευσάμενος, ἀράμενος
τὸν ἑταῖρον κατῆλθεν καὶ ἔφθη διεκπαίσας καθ’ ὃ μηδέπω τελέως
ἀπεκέκαυτο ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός. ἡ γυνὴ δὲ φέρουσα τὸ βρέφος εἵπετο,
ἀκολουθεῖν κελεύσασα καὶ τὴν κόρην. ἡ δὲ ἡμίφλεκτος ἀφεῖσα τὸ
παιδίον ἐκ τῆς ἀγκάλης μόλις διεπήδησε τὴν φλόγα, καὶ ἡ παῖς
σὺν αὐτῇ, παρὰ μικρὸν ἐλθοῦσα κ**ἀ**κείνη ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ ἐπεὶ ὠνεί-
δισέν τις ὕστερον τὸν Ἀβαύχαν διότι προδοὺς τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν
γυναῖκα ὁ δὲ Γυνδάνην ἐξεκόμισεν, “Ἀλλὰ παῖδας μέν,” ἔφη,
“καὶ αὖθις ποιήσασθαί μοι ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἄδηλον εἰ ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται
οὗτοι·φίλον δὲ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιμι ἄλλον ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοιοῦτον οἷος
Γυνδάνης ἐστίν, πεῖράν μοι πολλὴν τῆς εὐνοίας παρεσχημένος.”

Εἴρηκα, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ἀπὸ πολλῶν πέντε τούτους προχειρισάμενος. ἤδη δὲ καιρὸς εἴη κεκρίσθαι ὁπότερον ἡμῶν ἢ τὴν γλῶτταν ἢ τὴν δεξιὰν ἀποτετμῆσθαι δέοι. τίς οὖν ὁ δικάσων ἐστίν; **(62)**

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Οὐδὲ εἷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκαθίσαμέν τινα δικαστὴν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' οἶσθα ὃ δράσομεν; ἐπειδὴ νῦν ἄσκοπα τετοξεύκαμεν, αὖθις ἐλόμενοι διαιτητὴν ἄλλους ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ εἴπωμεν φίλους, εἶτα ὃς ἂν ἥττων γένηται, ἀποτετμήσεται τότε, ἢ ἐγὼ τὴν γλῶτταν ἢ σὺ τὴν δεξιάν. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἄγροικον, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σὺ φιλίαν ἔδοξας ἐπαινεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡγοῦμαι ἀνθρώποις εἶναι τούτου κτῆμα ἄμεινον ἢ κάλλιον, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς συνθέμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς φίλοι τε αὐτόθεν εἶναι καὶ εἰσαεὶ ἔσεσθαι ἀγαπῶμεν ἄμφω νικήσαντες, τὰ μέγιστα ἆθλα προσλαβόντες, ἀντὶ μιᾶς γλώττης καὶ μιᾶς δεξιᾶς δύο ἑκάτερος ἐπικτησάμενοι καὶ προσέτι γε καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς τέτταρας καὶ πόδας τέτταρας καὶ ὅλως διπλᾶ πάντα; τοιοῦτόν τι γάρ ἐστι συνελθόντες δύο ἢ τρεῖς φίλοι, ὁποῖον τὸν Γηρυόνην οἱ γραφεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται, ἄνθρωπον ἑξάχειρα καὶ τρικέφαλον· ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, τρεῖς ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν ἅμα πράττοντες πάντα, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ δίκαιον φίλους γε ὄντας.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Εὖ λέγεις· καὶ οὕτω ποιῶμεν. **(63)**

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Ἀλλὰ μήτε αἵματος, ὦ Τόξαρι, μήτε ἀκινάκου δεώμεθα τὴν φιλίαν ἡμῖν βεβαιώσοντος· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ὁ παρὼν καὶ τὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρέγεσθαι πολὺ πιστότερα τῆς κύλικος ἐκείνης ἣν πίνετε, ἐπεὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀνάγκης ἀλλὰ γνώμης δεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.

ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ

Ἐπαινῶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἤδη ὦμεν φίλοι καὶ ξένοι, ἐμοὶ μὲν σὺ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐγὼ δὲ σοὶ εἴ ποτε ἐς τὴν Σκυθίαν ἀφίκοιο.

ΜΝΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

Καὶ μήν, εὖ ἴσθι, οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι καὶ ἔτι πορρωτέρω ἐλθεῖν, εἰ μέλλω τοιούτοις φίλοις ἐντεύξεσθαι οἷος σύ, ὦ Τόξαρι, διεφάνης ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων.

Notes to the Textual Transmission

[i] The manuscripts Γ, Φ (*vett.*) and V have the article τό. The particle γε, which the manuscripts X, B, N and N have, seems to be a correction – and obviously is a correction supra lineam in the manuscript I. The article τό is grammatically hard to explain, for it is superfluous after the indefinite relative pronoun ὅ τι. On the contrary, as Marquis notes (Marquis, *ad loc*.), the particle γε is well attested in combination with the indefinite relative pronoun (KG II, p. 176, a). It then has a limitative function (GP, 141). If accepted, the misreading of γε as το, which have a similar writing (Marquis, *ad loc*.), might be the result of an erroneous understanding of the indefinite relative pronoun ὅ τι as conjunction ὅτι 'that' after λέγοις. ὅτι, however, makes no sense in the present sentence.

[ii] All manuscripts have the phrase καὶ ὑπὸ Σκυθῶν τῶν ἀρίστων θεραπεύεσθαι (§5.7-8a) after κοινωνεῖν, but the editors, following Du Soul (1743), transposed it after ἀγαθοὺς κεκρίσθαι. Nevertheless, Marquis (*ad app. crit*.) indicates that the transmitted reading might be kept, for it is grammatically and stylistically justifiable (*an ordine servato aeque θεραπεύεσθαι et καταστῆναι et γεγενῆσθαι cum ἔδοξαν legendum?*). Macleod (*ad app. crit.*) similarly proposed to keep the position of the phrase given in the manuscripts. He also proposes to change the parataxis into a subordinate consecutive clause, and/or the attributive of Σκυθῶν, τῶν ἀρίστων, into the predicative of φίλοι οὗτοι, ἄριστοι (elided), with the particle ἄν (an ordine servato ὡς = ὥστε *pro* καὶ *vel* ἄριστ' ἂν *pro* τῶν ἀρίστων *scribendum?*). The conjecture of ἀρίστων into ἄριστοι would solve the problematic definition of the 'good Scythians' – for is quite mysterious why Toxaris specifies that the Scythians who worship Orestes and Pylades are 'the best', for the excellence of the Scythian is not the matter of discussion. However, the consecutive clause with potential nuance is not an improvement and the conjecture does not explain the elimination, or want, of the article τῶν. On the contrary, the transposition is attractive from the perspective of the argumentative construction. First, it makes more sense, being thus included in the list of demonstrations of respect that the Scythians address to the heroes. Second, it prevents from breaking the continuity of thought, considering that the following sentence picks up the idea that friends share one another's fortune (καὶ ἅ γε μετ' ἀλλήλων ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἔπαθον, §6.1-2a).

[iii] Some editors propose the conjecture τοὔνομ' ἄν (Stallbaum, followed by Harmon) or ἕκαστος ἄν (Dindorf), which is unnecessary considering that Lucian frequently uses the potentialis without ἄν (Schmid I, 244), as here in the comparative clause.

[iv] The manuscripts I and M have πλέοντες, which is the reading chosen by Macleod. However, it does not make sense to relate the participle to the subject, the Scythians. This would imply that the Scythians are trying to take hold of the fugitives' ship being themselves on another ship, which is mentioned neither before nor afterwards, or that they sail away on Orestes and Pylades' ship. It is difficult to understand how, in the first case, they could be 'clinging to the rudders'; in the second, how they could sail away on the very ship that they are then (unsuccessfully) trying to board.

[v] Instead of μέχρι ἄν with the subjunctive, the optative might be used here as a form of oblique optative to express distance from the affirmation, see Du Mesnil, 18. The manuscripts Γ and the edition *princeps* (a) do not have the comma; the manuscripts X^{ac}, φ, M, *N* and N as well as the editions b and v have εἴη, τοῖς φίλοις ἀγανακτοῦσιν, which is the reading followed by all editors except Harmon, who follows the reading εἴη τοῖς φίλοις, ἀγανακτοῦσιν of the manuscripts X^{pc}, V, I and B. In the latter case, τοῖς φίλοις is dative *commodi*, whereas in the reading preferred here τοῖς φίλοις is dative object of ἀγανακτοῦσιν. In the present sentence, ἀγανακτέω 'to be vexed with someone' (LSJ s.v. II.3) requires an object – cf. *Cat*. 11.

[vi] Some editors (Lehmann, Bekker, Dindorf, Harmon, Steindl) choose the reading ἀντιπνεύσειεν of the manuscript N and the editions b and v, while Jacobitz, Sommerbrodt and Macleod follow the reading ἀντιπνεύσῃ of the manuscripts Γ, φ, I, M and B. The edition princeps (a) has the optative future ἀντιπνεύσοι, which is highly implausible in a sentence that is not an oratio obliqua (for this

use after a historical tempus, see KG I, p. 183). The manuscripts X, V and N have the indicative future ἀντιπνεύσει, which might parallel the indicative future κοινωνήσουσιν in the other protasis. The use of εἰ with indicative future is close to that with the subjunctive present, and the two forms may be used alternatively; εἰ with indicative future, however, express abstraction from reality (KG II, p. 474, 1). Considering that most manuscripts have ἀντιπνεύσῃ and that Lucian does sometime use the subjunctive with εἰ (and without ἄν) (Du Mesnil, 23-24), it seems best to choose this reading as expression of a habitual condition. Besides, as εἰ with subjunctive is frequently found in Homer (KG II, p. 474 Anm. 1), it suits the epic tone of which Toxaris makes use in this passage.

[vii] The use of the subjunctive aorist instead of the indicative future indicates an imperative nuance (Du Mesnil, 14-15). The explanation of this phrase as independent exhortative or admonitory clause that conveys an especially emphatic tone (KG II, p. 476, Anm. 6) is more convincing than the explanation by a simple ellipsis of λέγω *vel sim*. (Kersten 1889, 39).

[viii] The use of the neutral indefinite adjective τι (in the manuscripts Γ, X^{ac}, V, B) intensifies the comparative (KG I, p. 27, 6) and must therefore be preferred to the reading τις (in the manuscripts φ, I, M, N, N), which the modern editors until Steindl choose.

[ix] οὐδέν (*codd.*) is an intensifier of the comparative (KG I, p. 27, 6). There is no need to conjecture into οὐδέ, as does Macleod.

[x] All manuscripts as well as the editio princeps (a) and the Aldine (b) have ξένους, except the fifteenth century manuscript $La^{p.c.}$. The latter has the reading ἀξένους, which is followed by the Vulgate edition (v) and all modern editors. Whereas ξένους underlines the fact of being foreigner (i.e. barbarian in the sense of non-Greek and of ἔπηλυς, cf. LSJ s.v. ξένος III and Luc. *Herm*. 24), ἀξένους stresses the inhospitality of the Scythian (cf. LSJ s.v. ἀξένος I). Considering that the adjective is immediately followed by ἀγρίους, 'savage', ἀξένους appears the preferred reading; the adjectives form a synonymic pair (cf. Pl. *Sph*. 217e6 and §3.13, where ἄγριος is explanatory of ἀξένος).

[xi] The repartition of the speaking turns is unusually difficult in §11.17-26, as the tradition is confused. The manuscripts Γ, X^{ac}, Φ, B^{ac}, N and N have: (Mnesippus:) εὖ λέγεις … ἱκαναί. (Toxaris:) πέντε ἔμοιγε … ἑκατέρῳ. (M.:) κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ … ἀπιστεῖν. (T.:) ὀμούμεθα ... ὁ Φίλιος; (M.:) καὶ μάλα ... λόγῳ. This is problematic because it attributes to Mnesippus the request that Toxaris speaks first, which is impossible for the first stories are without doubt Mnesippus', and because it requires Toxaris to make an oath by Zeus Philios and Mnesippus by his native god. The manuscript B^{pc} has: (M.:) εὖ λέγεις … ἱκαναί. (T.:) πέντε ἔμοιγε … ἑκατέρῳ. (M.:) κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ … πρότερος δὲ λέγε. (T.:) ἀλλὰ ... ἀπιστεῖν. (M.:) ὀμούμεθα ... νομίζεις. (T.:) τίς δέ σοι ... ὁ Φίλιος; (M.:) καὶ μάλα ... λόγῳ. This is problematic for the same reasons, although the replicas are divided on more speaking turns. The Aldine edition (b) has: (M.:) εὖ λέγεις … ἱκαναί. (T.:) πέντε ἔμοιγε … ἑκατέρῳ. (M.:) κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ … ἀπιστεῖν. (T.:) ὀμούμεθα ... νομίζεις. (M.:) τίς δέ σοι ... ὁ Φίλιος; (T.:) καὶ μάλα ... λόγῳ. This is problematic because it equally attributes the first set of stories to Toxaris. Then, the manuscripts I and M, which all editors follow until Harmon included, have: (M.:) εὖ λέγεις … ἑκατέρῳ. (T.:) κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ … ἀπιστεῖν. (M.:) ὀμούμεθα ... ὁ Φίλιος; (T.:) καὶ μάλα ... λόγῳ. This repartition makes sense with regard to the content of the dialogue. Nevertheless, the repartition that Macleod and Marquis propose is more attractive. First, attributing the replica πέντε ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἑκατέρῳ to Toxaris, and by consequence the replica κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ to Mnesippus, is stylistically (though arguably) advantageous, for it accelerates the rhythm of the conversation. Second, it is also more consistent with the context of the passage, where Toxaris is the one to propose the contest and set its rules (§10 and §11.13-15).

[xii] All manuscripts have ἂν πράττειν except M^{pc}, which corrected ἂν πράττειν (M^{ac}) into ἂν πλάττειν, the reading adopted by the editio princeps (a) and the Aldine (b). The particle ἄν is grammatically hard to explain in a sentence consisting of an infinitive as complement to χαλεπόν (sc. ἐστι), especially in this position. Harmon, followed by Macleod and Marquis, propose the conjecture

ἀναπλάττειν, while previous editors (Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, Sommerbrodt and Steindl) propose the conjecture πλάττειν. The verb πλάσσω, 'fabricate (fictitious speeches)' (LSJ s.v. V, cf. Plb. 34.4.4, frequently in D.Chr. but see e.g. 4.2, 60.9), is used in similar contexts of verbal forgery by Lucian in e.g. *VH* 1.3 (ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ Ἰαμβοῦλος περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ θαλάττῃ πολλὰ παράδοξα, γνώριμον μὲν ἅπασι τὸ ψεῦδος πλασάμενος), *Hist.Conscr*. 50 (ambiguously: said of the artisans' work but metaphorically applied to historians). The verb ἀναπλάσσω also has the meaning of 'model' in the sense of 'invent, imagine' (LSJ s.v. I.3), and is thus used ambiguously in *Im*. 3, 23 (said of the sculptors' work but assimilated to the ecphrastic speech). Both verbs well suit the context of truth and fiction. However, ἀναπλάττειν would not only reflect Lucian's predilection for composed verbs (Schmid I, 402, ἀνα- being amongst the favourite composite) but also suit the ambiguous use of the metaphors of deeds for words and *vice versa* (see commentary). Besides, it explains the presence of ἄν in the manuscripts.

[xiii] Macleod writes Δημώνατα, probably a mistake.

[xiv] Macleod omits the καί before τῶν κοντῶν, which is needed and liely to be missing after the τε. Besides, the sentence does not make sense without καί, for otherwise this would imply taking τῶν κοντῶν τινας together with φελλούς τε γὰρ πολλούς. τινας and πολλούς are contradictory and it is not clear what 'cork-bits from poles' could be.

[xv] Macleod writes μακρὰν. All manuscripts and editors have μικρὰν. For a discussion, see commentary.

[xvi] The manuscripts Γ, X, Φ, V, B, followed by Sommerbrodt, Steindl, Macleod, and Marquis, have καλῶς, while the manuscripts I, M, *N*, N have καλός, which is the reading chosen by the editio princeps (a), the Aldine (b), and the Vulgata (v), as well as some of the modern editors – Lehmann, Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, and Harmon. The reading καλός, which interprets Toxaris' answer as a reiteration in other words of Mnesippus' judgement of Aretaeus as τέλειον παράδειγμα (cf. §23.11), might be an error committed by making the adjective congruent with the pronoun οὗτος. The slightly more complicated reading, καλῶς, which is the here preferred reading, makes Toxaris answer and agree with Mnesippus' judgement more emphatically and fundamentally, for by means of this adverbial form (translate 'rightly'), Toxaris is made to approve of the moral value of Mnesippus' example in a way that does not allow any contradiction. For a similar example (without ellipsis) in Lucian, see *Icar*. 16 (καὶ μὴν καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Μένιππε, καλῶς εἶχε λέγειν).

[xvii] Some manuscripts (Γ, V, Φ, I, M, N, *N*) have πανλώβητόν (followed by the *editio princeps*, the Aldine and the *editio vulgta* as well as Lehmann). The manuscripts X and B have παλλώβητόν, which is the reading chosen by modern editors (Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, Sommerbrodt, Harmon, Steindl, Macleod and Marquis). The adjective is a *hapax legomenon*.

[xviii] All manuscripts and editors have ἄλλον, except Macleod who writes ἄλλο, which is useless and is grammatically incomprehensible, as the adjective refers to ὁ πέμπος and stands for Demetrius.

[xix] The manuscripts B, N and *N* have ἀποτμηθείης, while the manuscrits Γ, X, Φ, V, I and M have ἀποτμηθείην, which is the reading chosen by Macleod. Harmon and Marquis have ἀποτμηθείης, which is the reading preferred here too. The second person singular makes indeed more sense, considering that Mnesippus is the one who would be cut his tongue (ὥσπερ οὐ πάνυ <u>σοι</u> μέλον εἰ ἀποτμηθείης <u>τὴν γλῶσσαν</u>) in the case he lost the contest (κρατηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις).

[xx] The manuscripts Γ, Φ, I and B, whom the editors Macleod and Marquis follow, have τὸν ζίρην. The manuscript M and the editions a (*princeps*), b (Aldine) and v (Vulgata) have τὸν ζίριν, while the less reliable manuscripts *N* and N have τὸν ζῖριν and the manuscript C has τὸ ζηρίν. The modern editors (until Harmon included) accepted Schmieder's reading τὸ ζίριν. The versions with the ending in -ιν are easily rejected and explained as spelling variations/iotacism, especially considering that the

manuscript Γ has -ην in §40.6 but -ιν in §40.15. The choice of the article τόν instead of τό is explained by Harmon (p. 168, n. 1) as a corruption due to the interpretation of the word as a masculine noun in §40.15 (ζίρην ἥκοντα). The neuter article, which is the reading of C, makes more sense than the masculine, as its use as before a masculine noun is well attested in Greek, e.g., to give further explanation (cf. KG II, §461.7). In the present case, it functions as indicator of an exclamation. For the meaning of ζίρην, and in light of the circumlocution in §40.15 and linguistic analysis, scholars propose 'ransom' or 'ransomer' (see commentary). Harmon rejects this meaning and gives the preference to meanings such as 'brother', 'friend', or 'envoy' (p. 169, n. 1). The meaning 'ransomer', however, makes perfectly sense in the context, as the phrase τοῦτο δέ … ὡς ἐπὶ λύτροις ἥκοντα (§40.6-7) clearly functions as an explanation of the foreign word.

[xxi] All manuscripts have στρατείας καί except Γ and X, which show an omission in this place. The reading στρατιᾶς καί is a conjecture by Fritzsche, followed by Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, Sommerbrodt, Harmon, Steindl and Marquis. I here chose στρατιᾶς (against Macled who has στρατείας), for the meaning here is rather that of raising an army (cf. the description in §48; for the meaning, see LSJ s.v. στρατιά I.1) than organising a military campaign or expedition (see LSJ s.v. στρατεία). Compare the discussion in Marquis, 535 n. 171.

[xxii] The manuscripts have ὁπλίτας πεζούς, while ὁπλίτας <ἢ> πεζούς is a conjecture by Du Soul, followed by Lehmann, Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, Sommerbrodt, Harmon, Steindl, Macleod and Marquis, while Jensius proposes ὁπλίτας <καὶ> πεζούς. The reading of the manuscripts is problematic with regard to ὁπλῖται δὲ καὶ πεζοί in §48.16, which clearly makes a difference bewtween ὁπλίτης and πεζός, which are both opposed to ἱππεύς, as in §48.9-10. Therefore, it seems best to maintain the parallelism. The difference between ὁπλίτης and πεζός would then be between heavy-armed (see LSJ s.v. ὁπλίτης) and light-armed soldier (see LSJ s.v. πεζός). Besides, as Marquis notes (Marquis, 536 n. 174), ὁπλίτης is sometimes opposed to ψιλός. However, the phrase ὁπλίτης πεζός is not unknown to Later Greek (e.g. J. *BJ* 2.260, App. *BC* 4.14.108, Poll. 1.132, but see as early as Plt. *Lg*. 706c1) and the phrases ὁπλίτης πεζός and ὁλπίτης καὶ πεζός are sometimes employed in turns in a same work (cf. J. *BJ* 2.260: πέμψας ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς ὁπλίτας, but *BJ* 3.126: οἷς οὐραγοὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν ἠκολούθουν πεζοί τε καὶ ὁπλῖται καὶ τῶν ἱππέων συχνοί). Thus, though the conjecture is not absolutely necessary, it nevertheless clarifies and precises the present use of πεζός and ὁπλίτης.

[xxiii] The manuscripts Γ, X, V?, I, M, B, *N* and N as well as the editions a, b, v and Lehmann, Sommerbrodt and Marquis have πυρακτωθείς – except for Φ which omits the participle. The use of the aorist passive form of the participle as it is found in the manuscripts is problematic, for it would mean that Lacentes himself were being 'burnt/hardened in the fire'. Usually, the (perfect) passive form of the participle is employed as an epithet with names of weapons such as βέλη, ἀκόντια, τοξεύματα (e.g. D.S. 3.25.2, 34|35.2.16, Str. 3.5.1, 15.2.2 and 7). The use of the aorist passive participle with the meaning 'wounded by a weapon hardened in the fire', which is expected here, is not attested elsewhere and rather difficult (cf. 'wounded by such a weapon', LSJ s.v. πυρακτέω I.1, where the present passage is in fact deemed dubious; compare Bailly 'blessé par un trait durci au feu', see Marquis, 541 n. 196). See however the use in Hld. 2.9: καὶ ζήλῳ πυρακτουμένη [sc. Arsinoe], 'inflamed by jaleousy'. Wieland, for his part translates 'wounded by a burning projectile' ('dem ersten hatte ein brennendes Geschoss den Schenkel verbrannt'), and strongly objects to Du Soul's conjecture. See Wieland 1971, [vol. I] 65 n. 46. The conjecture στυρακίῳ εἰς proposed by Fritzsche and adopted by Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, Harmon, Steindle and Macleod constructs a parallelism with the rest of the sentence and is semantically interesting. It is also grammatically interesting, for it allows to get rid of a strange construction where only the second attributive clause (ὁ Μακέντης δὲ πελέκει εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν κτλ.) would depend from the main verb ἐτέτρωντο but not the first (ὁ μὲν πυρακτωθεὶς τὸν μηρόν). The word στυράκιον might not be frequent in Greek literature (only 21 occurences in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*), but it does appear once in

Thucydides (2.4.3) and a few times in Later Greek literature (e.g. Plut. *Arist*. 14.6, *Demetr*. 4.4, Ath. 12.514b [= 12.8 Kaibel]) (*pace* Marquis, 541 n.196).

[xxiv] The manuscripts Γ and X have προπομπήν, which is the reading adopted by Harmon and Macleod. The reading πομπὴν of Φ is grammatically incorrect before τινα. The reading πομπήν of th manuscripts V, I, M, B, N and *N*, as well as the first editions a, b, and v, which is chosen here and by most modern editors, namely Lehmann, Jacobitz, Bekker, Dindorf, Sommerbrodt, and Steindl, is the simpler reading and a more generic term in comparison with προπομπήν. However, in the present context, this reading certainly makes more sense than the latter. While προπομπή more specifically means the 'sending forward', the 'escort' (LSJ s.v.), πομπή designates more generally any form of escort or, as suits the present context, a 'parade' or 'procession' (LSJ s.v. I.1-2 ans II.1-2).

TRANSLATION

TOXARIS – or Friendship

1. Mnesippus:

What do you mean, Toxaris? Do you Scythians sacrifice to Orestes and Pylades and believe that they are gods?

Toxaris:

We do sacrifice, Mnesippus, we do – though not because we believe that they are gods, but virtuous men.

Mnesippus:

Is it then a custom of yours to sacrifice to virtuous men once they have died, as if to gods?

Toxaris:

Not only then, but we also honour them with celebrations and festal gatherings.

Mnesippus:

What do you expect from them? Surely you don't sacrifice to them to gain their favour, do you? They're *dead*.

Toxaris:

Perhaps it wouldn't be such a bad thing if the dead too should be favourable to us! No, actually, we believe that it will be better for the living if we commemorate exceptionally virtuous personalities, and we honour them once they have died, for we think that, in this way, many will wish to become like them.

2. Mnesippus:

On that point, you are right. But as for Orestes and Pylades, why do you admire them in particular and regard them as equal to gods, though they are strangers to you, even total enemies? When the Scythians of that time seized them after they were shipwrecked and dragged them off to sacrifice them to Artemis, these two attacked their jailers, overpowered the guard, killed the king and captured the priestess. On top of that, they sailed off, carrying away the statue of Artemis herself, and had a good laugh at the Scythian people. Therefore, if you honour those men for these reasons, you will soon make many like them. So consider now, in view of the past events, whether you do well to have many Orestes and Pylades coming down to Scythia. To me it seems that under such conditions you will very soon find yourselves ungodly and godless, once the only gods left to you have been driven out of your land in the same way. Then, I believe, instead of all these gods, you will deify the men who came to carry them out for exportation and sacrifice to the plunderers of your temples as to gods.

3. Granted you do not honour Orestes and Pylades for these reasons, well, tell me then, Toxaris, what other benefit have they done to you such that, although you did not consider them gods in those days,

you now on the contrary sacrifice to them and believe them to be gods? That you now bring offerings to those who then almost became your victims? Surely, this might seem ridiculous and incongruous in the light of the past events.

Toxaris:

In fact, Mnesippus, precisely the actions that you have recounted are these men's noble deeds. For they were only two who ventured on so great an adventure. They sailed away from their land as far as to navigate into the Pontus, which was still unexplored by the Greeks except by those who advanced with the Argo to Colchis, without being terrified by the legends surrounding it or scared by its name, for it is called 'inhospitable' – I believe, because wild people inhabit it all around. Further, after they were captured, they dealt so courageously with the situation and were not just content to escape, but also punished the king for his wantonness and sailed off, taking with them the statue of Artemis. How could that not be admirable and worth some divine honour from all those who praise brave deeds? Truly, though, this is not what we see in Orestes and Pylades that makes us treat them as heroes.

4. Mnesippus:

Come on, please tell me what other noble and heroic deed they accomplished, for, as far as sailing to foreign parts is concerned, I could show you many more godlike men than these. Merchants, for example, [and] especially among them the Phoenicians, who sail not only as far as the Pontus, or to Lake Maeotis and the Bosporus, but who navigate on every Greek or barbarian sea, for these people examine, as it were, every single coast and every sea-shore year after year until late in the autumn when they return to their own land. According to what you said, you must consider them gods, even though most of them are probably hawkers and fishmongers.

5. Toxaris:

Listen now, my dear fellow, and consider how better and more reasonably we barbarians form our judgement of virtuous men. For in truth, while in Argos and Mycenae there's not even a tomb of Orestes or Pylades worth mentioning to be seen, on the contrary, in our country, a temple has been consecrated to both of them together, as was sensible seeing that they are comrades, and sacrifices are brought in front of them as well as any other kind of honours. The fact that they were foreigners and not Scythians doesn't hinder in any way that they are judged virtuous men and worshipped by the best Scythians. We don't enquire what land good and virtuous men come from, nor do we grudge those who are not our friends if they have accomplished virtuous deeds, but we praise what they have done and take them as ours because of their deeds.

What we find most astonishing and praiseworthy in these men is that, to us, as such friends, they seemed to be the most virtuous of all men and have become the norm for everyone else in that one must share all fortunes with one's friends. **6.** Everything they endured with and for each other, our ancestors wrote down on a stele of bronze, which they set up in the Oresteum, and they made it

a rule that the first lesson and subject of instruction for their own children should be to remember this stele and the story written on it. In fact, every one of them would sooner forget the name of his father than be ignorant of Orestes and Pylades' deeds.

But on the walls around the temple the same facts that the stele shows are all figuratively displayed in paintings made by the ancients: Orestes sailing with his friends, then, after the shipwreck of their boat on the cliffs, being arrested and prepared for sacrifice, and further Iphigenia beginning their sacrificial ceremony. On the other wall opposite is depicted how he's already unbound of his bonds and murdering Thoas and many more Scythians, and finally how he and Pylades are sailing away with Iphigenia and the statue of the goddess. The Scythians, on the other hand, while clinging to the rudders and trying to board their ship, are taking hold of it in vain, as Orestes and Pylades are now sailing away. Then, because they don't succeed in their attempt at all, the Scythians escape by swimming back to the land, some of them being injured, others for the very fear of being so. And particularly there, in the close engagement with the Scythians, one can see just how much benevolence Orestes and Pylades showed for each other. Indeed, the painter made each of them appear careless of his own enemies, but warding off those assailing the other and trying to encounter the arrows in his stead, and regarding it as insignificant to die when he can save his friend and snatch away with his own body the blow directed at the other.

7. Thus, their immense benevolence, their solidarity in dangerous situations, as well as their faithfulness and loyalty, the sincerity and steadfastness of their reciprocal love, all this we don't believe to be in reach of mortals. It is proof of a greater disposition than is found in those many people, who, as long as their friends cruise with a fair wind, resent them if they don't have an equal share their sweet fortune, but if, on the contrary, the wind blows only slightly to their harm, they leave them alone and abandoned to their ill fate. And indeed, so that you know, Scythians hold nothing greater than friendship and there is nothing a Scythian would pride himself on more than to share a dear friend's sufferings and perils, just as for us there's no more terrible disgrace than to appear to have betrayed a friendship. This is the reason why we honour Orestes and Pylades, who became the best in a virtue cherished by the Scythians and excelled in friendship. This we admire before all things, and therefore we established that they be called by the name 'Korakoi'; in our language, this is as if to say 'deities of friendship'.

8. Mnesippus:

Dear Toxaris, I must conclude that you Scythians are not only good at using your arrows and better than any other people in war, but also the most persuasive of all at making a speech. You seem to me, although until now I myself was thinking about it differently, to do right thus to worship Orestes and Pylades as gods. Besides, my dear fellow, it escaped my mind that you are also a good painter. In fact, you showed us very vividly the paintings in the Oresteum: the fighting of the heroes and the wounds they took for each other. Except, though, I would not have thought that friendship was ever

so much sought-after by Scythians. For, inhospitable and uncivilised as they are, they are always in hate, anger and bad temper, and do not enter into friendship even with their closest kin, judging by all the other stories I heard about Scythians and by the fact that they eat up their dead fathers.

9. Toxaris:

Whether for the rest we are more righteous towards our parents and more religious, I would not vie with you at present. But that Scythian friends are far more faithful than Greek friends, and that the consideration given to friendship is greater with us than with you, this is easy to demonstrate. And by the gods of the Greeks, don't be vexed listening to me if I tell you one thing I noticed living now for a long time with you Greeks.

Indeed, to me you seem to be able to make speeches about friendship better than anyone else does. On the other hand, not only does the way you practice the deeds of friendship fall short of your words, but you even content yourselves in praising it and showing what an exceptional good it is. In times of needs you then betray your words and somehow desert in the heat of the action. And every time your tragedians show you such friendships and bring them up on stage, you praise them and applaud them, and most of you even cry for those friends when they put themselves in danger for each other's sake. You yourselves, though, you don't dare to undergo anything for the sake of your friends that would be worthy of praise. Rather, if your friend happened to be in need, all these tragic tales immediately disappear like dreams, flying away out of your way, and leave you there like these empty and hollow masks, with their mouth wide open and gaping, but still incapable of uttering the slightest sound. We are the opposite: for truly, as much as we fall short in discourses about friendship, as greater is our advantage in the deeds of friendship.

10. So, if you agree, let us proceed as follows. Let us leave in silence these ancient friends, whomever of the men of old either you or we could enumerate. Indeed, in this regard at least, you would have the advantage, considering that you can bring forward as numerous and trustworthy witnesses your poets, who sing in the most beautiful verses and rhythms of Achilles and Patroclus' friendship and of Theseus and Pirithous' and all the others' companionship. But choosing as examples a few of our own contemporaries and narrating their deeds – I the Scythian, you the Greek – whoever of us gets the upper hand and presents more valuable friends shall be the winner and proclaim his land as the victor, having been contented in the most beautiful and noble contest. Thus, I would by far prefer to have my right hand cut off for having lost in a single fight – as is the penalty for a defeat in Scythia – than be judged inferior to another in friendship, especially to a Greek when I myself am a Scythian.

11. Mnesippus:

My dear Toxaris, it's not an easy task to fight in single combat with a warrior like you, for the arguments you have ready at hand are whetted arrows that hit the mark. Not so shamefully shall I betray the Greek cause and yield to you. It would be outrageous that, while as many Scythians as are

shown in the stories and ancient paintings that you have just described with such dramatic emphasis were defeated by two strangers, all the Greeks – and there are so many peoples and so many cities among us – should be convicted without defence by you alone. If that should happen, it would be better for me not to have my right hand cut off, like you Scythians, but my tongue. Should we set a limit on the number of these achievements in friendship, or should the one who offers the most examples be considered the more fortunate in terms of the victory?

Toxaris:

Not at all, the victory shall not be defined by the quantity of stories, but if yours seem better and more cutting, though equal to mine in number, it will be evident that they will cause me more critical wounds and that I will surrender to the strokes more quickly.

Mnesippus:

Right you are! Let us limit them to as many as are sufficient.

Toxaris:

To me, five each seem fine.

Mnesippus:

I agree.

Toxaris:

And please speak first, but only after having sworn to tell the truth, for otherwise it wouldn't be difficult to invent such stories and the examination would remain uncertain. On the contrary, if you make an oath, it would be impious not to believe you.

Mnesippus:

We shall take an oath, if you think it at all necessary. Which of our gods would you find suitable? How about Zeus the God of Friendship?

Toxaris:

That is fine. I, for my part, will swear to you by the god of my country in my own speech.

12. Mnesippus:

Well then, let it be Zeus of Friendship. I swear that all I tell you, either I have come to know myself or I have learnt from others with as much precision as possible, without dramatic exaggeration on my part. I want to tell you the first friendship, that of Agathocles and Deinias, which has become famous among the Ionians.

This Agathocles of Samos did not live a long time ago; he was exceptional in friendship, as he made a point of saying himself, but in other respects he was not better than most Samians – neither in birth nor in wealth. He was a friend to the Ephesian Deinias, the son of Lyson, since their childhood. But then Deinias became excessively rich, and, as naturally happens to a *nouveau riche*,

he started to have many other people around him, who were good enough to share a drink and have fun together but lacking as much as can be the sense of friendship.

So, for some time Agathocles was kept under observation among them, and shared their company and drinks, although he did not fully enjoy this kind of entertainment. Deinias did not hold him at all in higher esteem than the flatterers. In the end, Agathocles even gave him offence by often rebuking him; he acquired the reputation of being someone bothersome, for he was always reminding Deinias of his ancestors, and recommended him to preserve what his father had acquired with much effort and had left him. Therefore, Deinias did not bring him along to his merry parties anymore but joined in alone with those who were trying to avoid Agathocles.

13. At some point, poor Deinias got convinced by those flatterers that Chariclea was in love with him – Chariclea, who was the wife of Demonax, a distinguished man belonging to the highest society amongst the Ephesians. Notes from the woman were continuously passing under the threshold of his house. Then came almost withered wreaths, half-beaten apples and anything else that intermediaries usually contrive against young men, little by little fabricating some liaisons among them while they first inflame their hearts by making them believe that they are loved – this is a rather seductive technique, in particular to those who think themselves handsome – until they fall into their net without noticing.

Chariclea was a charming and pretty girl, but extremely meretricious, and this with everyone she met, even if he wanted her for a very low price; if someone only looked at her, she would immediately consent, and there was no worry that Chariclea might somehow withstand. Otherwise, she was clever and skilled as any courtesan you can think of. She could allure a lover, win him entirely through intrigues, even if he was still wavering, and, as soon as he was caught, she could spur him on and rekindle him now with anger, now with flattery, and soon with disdain and by simulating inclination for someone else. The girl was thoroughly practised in every respect and equipped with all engines of war against her lovers.

14. Such was the woman with whom Deinias' flatterers associated against the young man, and they greatly played their supporting role by forcing him into a liaison with Chariclea. Since she had already perverted many young men, ten thousand times played the role of love, and caused the ruin of some families in possession of fortunes – in a word, engaging in cunning and well trained mischief – once she had gotten hands on a young simpleton without any experience of such engineering, she did not let him slip through her fingers but ensnared him from all sides and transfixed his heart. When she finally had him completely under her power, she herself perished in the chase and was the source of ten thousand troubles for this ill-fated Deinias.

At the very beginning, she kept sending him these notes through her favourite slave, telling that she had wept, that she was sleepless and finally that she would hang herself for love, poor girl, until the blessed dupe was convinced that he was handsome and much beloved by the women of Ephesus. After many supplications, he slept with her. **15.** From there on, of course, he was bound to

fall under the charm of a beautiful woman who, in addition, is expert at making her company pleasing, crying at the right moment, sighing pitiably in the midst of conversations, withholding him just when he was leaving and running to him when he was coming in, dressing herself up in the way that most pleased him, and also on some occasions singing and playing the lyre.

All these tricks were used against Deinias, and, when she noticed that he behaved knavishly, that he had by now become soaked with love and was malleable, she started to think of another trick on the top of these and destroyed the poor boy. She pretended to be pregnant with his child – an effective way to fan the fire of a simple-minded lover – and did not visit him anymore, saying that she was watched by her husband, who had known about their affair.

But Deinias could neither bear the situation anymore nor endure not seeing her. He wept, sent the flatterers, cried Chariclea's name and wailed embracing her portrait – he had one made in white marble – and flung himself rolling on the ground; his state was clearly madness. Indeed, the gifts he had given her in exchange were not apples and wreaths, but whole apartments, lands, servants, bright clothes, and as much money as she wanted.

And what for? In little time, the whole inheritance of Lyson, which had acquired a grand reputation in Ionia, was squandered and exhausted. **16.** Then, as soon as he was broke, she left him and started to chase another, some Cretan gilded youth, and went over to him. Now she loved him, and he believed it.

Thus, Deinias, who was not only disregarded by Chariclea but also by the flatterers – for those too had gone over to the Cretan, the lover of the moment – went to Agathocles, who had long known that he was in trouble. Although, at first, he felt ashamed, he nevertheless told him everything – the affair, his distress, Chariclea's disdain, his rival the Cretan, and, in the end, how he could not possibly live without being with Chariclea. Agothocles, who knew that it was ill suited in these circumstances to remind Deinias that, formerly, he would not let him approach him alone out of his friends and even preferred the flatterers to him, sold his house in Samos, which was the only inherited good he possessed, and went to him, bringing him the income from the sale, three talents.

As soon as Deinias had taken the money, he immediately appeared to have somehow become handsome again to Chariclea's eyes. And anew, Charicleia's favourite slave came in as well as the letters and the complaints that he had not noted about her for a long time, and the flatterers too, who encircled him for harvest, seeing that Deinias was still eatable. **17.** Once Deinias had promised to come to her, had actually arrived in the early night and was inside her house, Demonax, Chariclea's husband – whether he had somehow known about it, or by some agreement with his wife (both explanations are told) – sprang up upon him as if from ambush. He ordered for the court-door to be locked and Deinias to be seized, while threatening him with fire and whip and rushing with drawn sword upon him as upon an adulterer.

Understanding in what trouble he was, Deinias grabbed a stake that was lying nearby, and killed Demonax himself, striking him on the temples, and Chariclea as well, striking her not only

with one blow, but many times with the stake and afterwards also with Demonax's sword. The servants stood there speechlessly for some time, perplexed by the unexpected turn of events, then they tried to seize him, but as he came upon them too with the sword, they fled and Deinias slipped away, leaving a slaughter behind him.

He stayed at Agathocles' house until dawn, recapitulating what had happened and considering what could result from this in the future. At dawn, the magistrates made their appearance, for the catastrophe had already been trumpeted around, and they seized Deinias. As he did not deny having committed the murders, they took him to the governor who governed Asia at the time. The latter then sent him to the Great Emperor, and, in no time, Deinias was sent away to Gyaros, an island of the Cyclades, to remain there forever by order of the Great Emperor.

18. Of his friends, only Agathocles attended to him in any way, sailed away with him to Italy, went with him to court, and in no way failed him. When Deinias finally went into exile, even then he did not abandon his comrade, but remained in Gyaros, condemning himself, and stayed in exile with him. When they were absolutely in need of necessities, he committed himself to the fishers for purple fish and went to dive with them; what he gained from that he brought back and gave to support Deinias. When the latter fell ill, Agathocles cared for him for a very long time, and, when he died, he did not want to go back to his own country but remained there on the island, for even after his death he was ashamed to abandon his friend.

This is one good deed of a Greek friend that has been accomplished not long ago, for I think only five years have passed since Agathocles died in Gyaros.

Toxaris:

Dear Mnesippus, how I wish that you had told such stories without taking an oath, so that I might have been able to disbelieve them: this Agathocles whom you have described is so much a Scythian kind of friend. I do not fear, though, that you might be able to tell of anyone else that is equal to him.

19. Mnesippus:

Dear Toxaris, do then listen to another story, that of Euthydicus of Chalcis. A certain Simylus of Megara, a captain, told me his story in detail, and gave me his word that he himself had seen the affair. He said that they were sailing from Italy to Athens at about the time when the Pleiades set and they had on board people who had shipped at various ports, among whom was Euthydicus and with him his friend Damon, who was also from Chalcis. They were about the same age: Euthydicus was in good health and had a rather stocky build, and Damon had a yellowish skin tone and was weakly, as he seemed just recovered from a long illness.

Simylus said that they had safely sailed past Sicily, but while they were already sailing towards Ionia after passing through the Isthmus, an extremely violent storm befell them. But why recount the many details: the threefold mighty waves, the whirlwinds, the hailing showers, and the other severe harms of a storm? At about midnight, when they were in front of Zacynthus, sailing with

bare yard, and additionally dragging some ropes after them to hold their rushing drive, Damon got seasick – as naturally happens on such a stormy sea – and, stooping down to the sea, he threw up. Then, I think because the ship was inclining more violently towards the side he was stooping out from and the waves helped to push him off, he fell head first into the sea, and he wasn't even naked, otherwise it would have been easier for him to swim. He immediately called for help, drowning and hardly holding himself above the waves.

20. When Euthydicus heard him – he happened to be naked on his couch – he flung himself into the sea and took hold of Damon, who was already giving up – indeed, this was largely possible because the moon was shining – carried him along and helped him stay above the water. The others on the ship eagerly came to rescue them and pitied the misfortune of the two friends, but were unable to do so, for they were driven by a strong wind. Nevertheless, they did the following: they cast many cork pieces [from the nets] at them and some stakes, so that the friends might save themselves by swimming if they had the chance to come across one of them, and in the end they also cast the embarking plank, which was not very small.

Now, by the gods! Can you think of any other firmer demonstration of benevolence one could show toward a friend who, by night, has fallen overboard in such a raging sea than to share in his death? Look at it and imagine the swelling of the waves, the roaring of the breaking water, the boiling scum, the night and the despair; then, the one chocking, holding his head out of water with difficulty and stretching forth his hands toward his friend, and the other, Euthydicus, immediately plunging and swimming after Damon and fearing that he himself would die first. You can thus understand that this friend Euthydicus is not a base one I told you.

21. Toxaris:

But did the friends perish, dear Mnesippus, or did salvation unexpectedly come to them? For I fear for them more than a little.

Mnesippus:

Cheer up, dear Toxaris! They were saved, and, still now, they are both philosophising in Athens. Of course, Simylus could only tell what he had seen then during the night: that the one fell overboard, that the other plunged after him and that they swam as far as he was able to see during the night. What happened afterwards, relatives of Euthydicus themselves explained. At first the friends came across some of these cork buoys, lifted themselves on them and painstakingly managed to hold themselves up. And later, when at dawn they saw the plank, they swam toward it and, after having climbed on it, were easily carried to Zacynthus.

22. After these examples of friends, which, I would say for my part, were not bad, listen now to another third example, which is in no way worse than the previous ones.

Eudamidas of Corinth had as friends Aretaeus of Corinth and Charixenus of Sicyon, who were merchants while he himself was extremely poor. When he died, he left a testament, which others

might find ridiculous, but which I do not think will seem so to you, for you are a good man, who worships friendship and contends for the first price regarding it. The reason is that the following was written in it: 'To Aretaeus I leave my mother to support and feed in her old age; to Charixenus I leave my daughter to give in marriage with a dowry as important as he is able to give her.' (He had indeed an old mother and a young daughter, who was just in age for marriage.) 'And if something grave happened to one of them, then the other,' so it said, 'will have the other's share.' Once the testament had been read, those who knew about Eudamidas' poverty but were unaware of the bond of friendship he had with these men, interpreted the case as a joke and no one could go away without laughing. 'Lucky Aretaeus and Charixenus! What a great fortune they inherited,' they said, 'if they shall really pay Eudamidas and leave the dead man an inheritance while being themselves still alive!'

23. For their part, the heirs to whom these legacies had been left, when they heard of it, immediately came to administer the testament. But then, after having lived over only five months, Charixenus died, and Aretaeus, as the best of heirs and inheriting both his and his friends' part, is now supporting the mother and not a long time ago has married the daughter, who gave as a dowry two of the five talents he had to his own daughter and two to his friend's. As for the wedding, he thought it worthy that it be held on the same day for both daughters.

What do you think, dear Toxaris, of this Aretaeus? Has he brought forward a bad example of friendship by receiving such possessions and not betraying his friend's testament? Or shall we pass the judgement that he too ought to be kept as one of the five examples of perfect friendship?

Toxaris:

He too should be kept, and rightly so. However, I admired Eudamidas far more for the confidence he had in his friends. He demonstrated well that he himself would have done the same for them, even if he did not write it down explicitly in his testament, and that he would have come to administer the testament before all others even without written inheritance from his friends.

24. Mnesippus:

Right you are! As the fourth example, I will tell you now about Zenothemis, son of Charmolaus of Massilia.

He was pointed out to me when I was travelling in Italy as an ambassador to my homeland: a handsome, tall man, and wealthy as it seemed. His wife sat at his side as he was strolling about the streets on a carriage; she was very ugly in all regards, lean on her right side and missing an eye – an atrociously disfigured thing, an unapproachable hobgoblin. Then, as I was wondering whether a man, who is so handsome and pleasing, could bear such a wife sitting next to him on a carriage, the person who had shown him to me told me about his motive for marrying her, knowing precisely everything about it, for he himself was from Massilia too.

'Zenothemis,' he said, 'was a friend to Menecrates, who was the father of this misshapen woman, and, like himself, was fortunate and honourable. Over time, however, Menecrates' property

was taken away from him by sentence at the same time at he was deprived of civic rights by the Six Hundred for having declared an unlawful resolution. This is how we, in Massilia,' he explained, 'punish those who propose an unconstitutional decree. Thus, Menecrates was grieving because of the sentence, for in little time he had become a poor man from a rich man, and a disreputable man from a reputable man. But what grieved him most was his daughter, who was eighteen and just at an age to be married, and for all the fortune that her father had before the sentence, no one, neither well-born nor poor, would have thought it worthy to readily take her as wife, so much was she a poor devil of an eyesore. Besides, she was said to suffer from the falling illness by the waxing moon [i.e. epilepsy].

25. 'As he was bitterly lamenting these misfortunes to Zenothemis, the latter said, "Cheer up, dear Menecrates, you will not stay in want of the necessary and your daughter will find a husband worthy of her birth."

'Having said this, he took him by the hand, led him to his house, and shared with him his fortune, which was abundant. He gave the order that a feast be prepared and received his friends and Menecrates, apparently because he had convinced one of his comrades to ask the girl in marriage. When the dinner had been served to them and they had poured libations for the gods, he held up his cup full [of wine] to him and said, there and then, "Dear Menerates, accept this cup of friendship from your son-in-law, for I will take your daughter Cydimache today as a wife; I received her dowry long time ago: twenty-five talents."

'After his announcement, Menecrates said, "Leave it, dear Zenothemis! Don't you do that; I would not enrage as far as to allow that you, a young and handsome man, be yoked in marriage to an ugly and mutilated girl!" But while Menecrates was still speaking, Zenothemis grabbed the bride and went to the bed-chamber, and came back shortly after, once he had taken the maiden's virginity.

26. 'And since then, he has been with her, loving her immensely and taking her along everywhere, as you see. It wasn't just that he wasn't ashamed of his marriage, but he even seemed to pride himself of it. For he demonstrated that he despised bodily beauty or ugliness as well as wealth and public opinion, but on the contrary, he looked after his friend and did not think lesser of Menecrates with regard to their friendship because of the sentence of the Six Hundred.

'Now, however, chance has thus given him compensation for these deeds, for a truly pretty child was born to him by this incredibly ugly wife. Besides, just the day before, when the father went to the counsellor's and took his child with him, who was crowned with victory leaves and dressed all in black in order to appear worthier of pity on his grandfather's behalf, the babe smiled up at the councillors and clapped his hands. The Council, moved to tears by his presence, released Menecrates of his sentence and now he is again in possession of his rights, having made use in court of such a young advocate.'

These deeds, which the Massiliote said that Zenothemis accomplished on behalf of his friend, as you see, are neither insignificant ones nor likely to be done by many Scythians, who are said to be very careful in selecting their concubines among the most beautiful women.

27. There is our fifth friend left, and I am determined not to forget Demetrius of Sunium and to tell of no one else.

Demetrius had sailed to Egypt with Antiphilus of Alopece, his comrade since childhood and in adolescent years, with whom he lived and studied together, he himself following the school of the Cynics under that Rhodian sophist, whereas Antiphilus studied medicine. One time, Demetrius happened to have gone on a journey to Egypt to see the pyramids and the colossus of Memnon, for he had heard that these pyramids, although high, do not cast any shadow, and that the Memnon howls when the sun rises. Driven by these desires – to view the pyramids and listen to the Memnon – Demetrius had set sails to go down the Nile six months earlier, leaving Antiphilon behind him, who was afraid of the journey and the heat.

28. In the meantime, the latter was implicated in a catastrophe that really required a true friend. One of his household slaves, Syrus by name and Syrian by nationality, associated with some temple-robbers and joined them when they entered the temple of Anubis and robbed the statue of the god, two golden cups, a caduceus, also made of gold, some dog-headed figurines and similar objects, which they all entrusted to Syrus. Then, when they landed themselves in prison – they were taken while smuggling bits of the booty – they straightaway told everything on the wheel of torture and came under surveillance to Antiphilus' house and withdrew the stolen goods lying under a couch in a dark corner. Hence, Syrus was at once placed in fetters and his master Antiphilus too, who was carried away from home in the middle of a lecture of his teacher. Nobody came to aid, and even those who had been his friends until then turned their back on him because he had robbed the Anubideum, and they thought it would be a sacrilege on their part if they had shared a meal or a drink with him. The rest of the household, which were two in number, packed everything up and fled away.

29. Thus, the poor Antiphilus, who was held to be the foulest of all the criminals who were kept in the prison, was in fetters for already a long time and the Egyptian who was in charge of the prisoners, a superstitious man, thought to please and avenge his god by violently oppressing Antiphilus. Whenever the latter advocated his case, saying that he had done nothing of this, he appeared shameless and harvested much more hatred from his keeper. For that very reason, he soon fell ill and got in a bad state, as was to be expected from sleeping on the ground and not being able to stretch his legs, which were enclosed in the stocks at night. By day, the wooden collars and a bound hand sufficed, but for the night he had to be completely put in bonds. Besides, the ill smell and the stifling heat of the prison, where so many prisoners were sequestered, confined in the same cell and hardly breathing, the clashing of the metal fetters and the want of sleep – all this was hard to bear. Yes, unendurable for a man of his kind, who is unused to these ill-treatments and unpractised in such cruel conditions.

30. At the time that he was giving up and even refusing to absorb any food, Demetrius arrived, having the smallest idea of what had happened. But when he learnt about it, just as he was, he immediately sped off to the prison. At this time, he was not able to be let in because it was evening and the keeper had long closed the doors and gone to sleep, having given his servants the order to keep the watch, but, by dawn and after many prayers, he got in. He searched after Antiphilus for a long time, passing by him, for the latter had become unrecognisable by the ill-treatments, and, walking along, he scrutinised every single prisoner, as those usually do who are searching the fallen battle lines for the corps of family members amongst those who are already decaying. And if he had not called for his name 'Antiphilus, son of Deinomenes,' he would not have recognised who he was before a long time, so much had he changed under the horrors that he had undergone. When Antiphilus heard his voice, he cried out, and, as Demetrius approached, he separated his hair strands, which were squalid and felted together, liberated them from his face and showed himself as the person he was. Both instantly passed out, stupefied by the unexpected sight.

After a while, Demetrius brought himself and Antiphilus to their senses, and, once he had clearly learned from him how the situation was in its detail, he exhorted him to gain confidence. He tore his cloak in two; one half he threw over himself and the other he gave to his friend, who drew off the dirty and worn out rags that he had on around him. After this, he attended to him in all ways by caring and taking charge of him, for he committed himself to the traders in the haven from dawn to midday and did not bring back little money by carrying burdens. Then, coming back from work, he left one part of his earnings to the keeper and made him tractable in his respect and peaceable. The rest provided him enough supply for caring for his friend. The rest of the day, he stayed with Antiphilus comforting him, and when night fell, he put himself to rest before the gates of the prison where he had arranged some straw and thrown leaves below.

32. For some time they went on living like this, Demetrius coming in unhindered and Antiphilus making his misfortune easier to bear. However, later on, after some criminal died in the prison, apparently by poison, a strict guard was established and not a single person who made a request was allowed in anymore. At a loss and distressed by this situation and because he could think of nothing else to be with his friend, Demetrius went to the governor and gave himself up to justice, pretending that he was associated in the offensive against Anubis.

When he had made this statement, he was immediately carried off to prison. Having been brought nearer to Antiphilus, through effort and after many prayers to the keeper, Demetrius achieved at least this from the latter: to be bound next to Antiphilus and in the same pair of irons. In that very moment, he showed the greatest benevolence which he had for him, not thinking at all of his own sufferings (although he himself had fallen ill too), but caring that above all his friend could sleep and would be less distressed. Thus, they bore the situation more easily by suffering together.

33. As time had passed, an event occurred which put an end to their enduring any further misfortune. One of the prisoners, who had somehow come in possession of a file and recruited many

prisoners into a conjuration, sawed off the chain to which they were attached in a row, with their fetters fastened to it, and set them all free. They easily killed the guards, who were few, and escaped in a pack. Most of those who scattered at once, going wherever each one could, were arrested afterwards. But Antiphilus and Demetrius remained on the spot, holding back the Syrian, just when he was heading out. When day came, the prefect of Egypt, on learning what had happened, sent to seek after those escapees, but summoned Demetrius and his companion and had them freed from their fetters, praising that they alone did not run away.

They, however, were not content to be discharged like this, and Demetrius loudly protested and complained indignantly that no little injustice was being done to them if they were still considered criminals and if they appeared to have been released out of pity or approbation because they did not run away. At length, they forced the judge to examine the case carefully. When the latter understood that they were not guilty, he praised them and demonstrated great admiration for Demetrius. He discharged them and made amends for the punishment that they suffered, although they were unjustly imprisoned by bestowing on each of them [a price] from his personal fortune: ten thousand drachma to Antiphilus and twice the amount to Demetrius.

34. Still today, Antiphilus lives in Egypt, whereas Demetrius, who left his own twenty thousand to the latter, chose to go off to India among the Brahmans. He only said that much to Antiphilus: that he understandably thought to be excused for deserting him now; besides, he himself did not need the money – granting that he remained what he was – for he was able to make do with little, and that he, Antiphilus, did not need a friend anymore, since things had become easy for him.

Such are Greek friends, dear Toxaris. If you had not accused us beforehand of priding ourselves of phrase-making, I could have told you his words one by one, those many and fine words which Demetrius said in court, speaking not on his own behalf but on Antiphilus', together with his crying and supplicating and taking it all upon himself until the Syrian discharged both of them under the whip.

35. For my part, I told you the few examples of good and steadfast friends among many more – those were the first that came to my mind. Now then, I close my speech and give the word to you. How not to tell worse examples of your Scythians, but much better than these, this will be your concern, if you care at all about your right hand and that you don't have it cut off. But you must show yourself an accomplished man, for you would become an object of ridicule if you present yourself as a poor orator on behalf of Scythia, after having praised Orestes and Pylades with such complete sophistication.

Toxaris:

Well said, dear Mnesippus! Your words encourage me to speak, as if you did not care at all whether you are overpowered in speech and I cut off your tongue. Only *I* will start straightaway without embroidering my speech like you, for this is no Scythian habit, and especially because deeds speak

louder than words. Besides, you must not expect anything from us like what you went through in detail, praising someone if he marries some ugly woman without a dowry, or if he gave the sum of two talents to his friend's daughter to be married, or even, by Zeus, if he submitted himself to be chained up on the clear assumption that he be released shortly afterwards. These stories are indeed absolutely trivial and there is no magnificent or courageous achievement in them. **36.** I, on the other hand, will tell you of many slaughters, wars and deaths which were perpetrated for the sake of friendship, so that you will understand that, on examination, your examples are a mere child's play in comparison with those of the Scythians.

Not without reason, though, is this the case with you Greeks. You are naturally inclined to praise these insignificant facts, for you live in profound peace and don't have any forceful incentive at all to demonstrate friendship, just as one cannot recognise on a calm sea whether a seafarer is good; in that case, you're missing a storm to prove it. Among us, wars are continuous, and we are either invading other lands or withdrawing before invaders, or fighting violent battles hand-to-hand over pastures or plundered goods; in these moments, good friends are most needed. Hence we form friendships that are as steadfast as possible, believing that this weapon is impossible to overcome and hard to fight.

37. But first, I will tell you how we close a friendship. Not like you because we're drinking together, nor because someone is our peer or neighbour. Instead, when we see a virtuous man who is capable of magnificent deeds, we all strive after him, and we think it worthy to do with respect to friends what you do with respect to marriages, courting them for a long time and at the same time doing everything not to fail in obtaining their friendship or appearing to deserve rejection. Only when someone has been chosen as a friend is a pledge taken and a very important oath made, upon my word, to live together and die on each other's behalf if necessary. And thus we carry out. Thereupon, by making one incision on our fingers, we let the blood drop in a cup and, after dipping our sharp swords in it and holding it towards one another at the same time, we drink; after this, it is impossible to dissolve our friendship. Besides, up to three people are permitted to take a pledge; for a person who has many friends, we think, is just like these prostitutes and adulterous women, and we believe that our friendship, when divided among many objects of benevolence, no longer has the same strength as before.

38. I will start with the recent deeds of Dandamis, events that happened not very long ago. Dandamis was involved in the battle against the Sauromates, and as his friend Amizoces had been carried off as prisoner of war – but I had better first swear you our oath, since I agreed on it with you at the beginning. By the Spirit of the Air and the Power of the Sword, I shall tell you nothing false, dear Mnesippus, about Scythian friends!

Mnesippus:

Never mind, I would not have needed your making an oath at all, but you did well not to swear by any god.

Toxaris:

What are you talking about? Do you not think that Air and Sword are gods? Don't you know that there is nothing greater for human beings than life and death? Well, every time we swear by the Spirit of the Air and the Power of the Sword, we make such an oath in the belief that air is the origin of life and because we die by the sword.

Mnesippus:

Is that so? But if this is the true reason, you would also have many other gods like your Sword – Arrow and Spear and Hemlock and Noose and the like, for a god such as death is manifold and provides an infinity of paths that lead towards him.

Toxaris:

Don't you see how you make it a sophistic word-match and judicial dispute, interrupting me in the midst of my speech and spoiling it? I, on the contrary, remained quiet while you were speaking!

Mnesippus:

All right, I won't do it again, dear Toxaris, as you are right to blame me. Trust me on that and be go on; as if I weren't present listening to your speech – that's how quiet I will be.

39. Toxaris:

For Dandamis and Amizoces, three days of friendship had passed since they had drunk each other's blood together. As was reported, ten thousand Sarmatian horsemen had come upon our territory, and their infantry had come upon us in three times this number. So, as they fell upon us, while we were quite unsuspecting of their assault, they defeated us all, killed many of our soldiers and took the survivors as prisoners, except whoever swam across to the safe bank of the river, where we had left half of the encampment and some of the chariots. For we had settled our encampment on both banks of the Tanais – I do not know why this was the decision of our chief-travellers.

Immediately they drove round the cattle as their booty, constrained the captives, plundered the tents, seized the chariots, took the majority of us as captives and raped our concubines and wives before our eyes; we were devastated by the catastrophe. **40.** While Amizoces was being led away – for he had been taken prisoner – he called his friend by name, miserably enchained as he was, and reminded him of the cup and their blood. On hearing this, Dandamis did not hesitate any longer and, in the sight of everyone, swam back to the enemies. The Sarmatians, for their part, drew their swords and rushed on him to stab him, but he called out 'Zires!'. If someone invokes it, his enemies can no longer kill him, but they receive him as if he had come to pay a ransom. Once Dandamis had thus

been taken to their chieftain, he asked for his friend back, but the chieftain demanded a ransom, for he would not let him go unless he received a heavy price for Amizoces.

Dandamis said, 'All I had has been seized as a plunder by you Sarmatians, and if I could pay some kind of discharge, deprived of everything as I am, I will readily submit myself to you, and command whatever you wish to. If you want, use me instead of him for whatever drudgery you like.'

But the Sarmatian answered, 'There is no need at all that you be detained… in full, especially as you come as Zires; take your friend and leave a part of what you have.'

Then Dandamis asked what he would like to take; the chieftain requested his eyes. Dandamis immediately accepted to have them cut out; and, once he had them cut off and the Sarmatians were now in possession of their ransom, he seized Amizoces and went back, leaning on him. Swimming over together, they came safe to our people.

41. This incident emboldened all the Scythians and they no longer considered themselves defeated, for they saw that their enemies did not take away the greatest of our virtues, but that we were still in possession of our noble belief and faithfulness toward our friends. The incident did not scare the Sarmatians only a little, as they reckoned what kind of men they would have to fight against in ranged order, even if they had previously gained the upper hand through the element of surprise. Therefore, when night fell, they abandoned most of their cattle, set their chariots on fire and took flight. However, Amizoces could no longer stand that he himself could see at the price of Dandamis' blindness, and so he blinded himself too with his own hands and [now] they both sit enthroned with all honours and are supported by the Scythian community at the public expense.

42. What example of this worth could you Greeks be able to give, if one could permit you, dear Mnesippus, to tell of even ten other examples on the top of the five and without taking an oath, if you wish, so that you could attribute to them many false deeds? But at least I narrated to you the feat without frills. If you had told such a deed, I know very well how many refinements you would have blended into your story, what kind of supplications Dandamis had addressed, how he had blinded himself, what he had said, how he had gone back, how the Scythians had received him with praises and all these various artifices you Greeks usually bring about for the sake of the pleasure of listening.

43. But listen, then, to another example: an equally honoured man, Belittas, the cousin of this Amizoces. When he saw his friend Basthes pulled down from his horse by a lion (they happened to be hunting together) and when the lion, who was already lying on him, clung fast to his throat and was pulling him into pieces with his claws, he dismounted as well. He fell upon the beast from behind and tried to distract him by urging him and diverting his attention onto himself, by passing his fingers between his teeth and trying to extract Basthes from his bite as much as he could. Then, finally, the lion let go of the latter, now half-bitten, and turned round upon Belittas, seized and killed him as well. Belittas, as he died, at least succeeded in the following: with his spear, he struck the lion in the breast so that they all died together. We buried them and raised two tombs next to one another, one for the friends, the other directly opposite for the lion.

44. As a third example, I'll tell you of the friendship between Macentes, Lonchatus and Arsacomas. This Arsacomas fell in love with Mazaea the daughter of Leucanor, king of Bosporus, at the time when he was sent as an ambassador for collection of the tribute that the people of the Bosporus always paid us, and when they were two months over the day for payment. During the banquet, he saw Mazaea, who was a slender and beautiful young girl, and fell in love with her and suffered a hard blow. Then, the issue of the payment of the tribute was settled, and the king gave him an audience and a feast, for it was time to fare him well. Now in the Bosporus it is a custom that suitors ask for young girls during dinner and explain who they are and that they are worth being admitted to marriage. So, this time, there happened to be many suitors present, kings and sons of kings; there was also Tigrapates, the chief men of the Lazi, Adyrmachus, the ruler of Machlyene, and many others. Every single suitor, after he announced himself and explained why he has come to seek a girl in marriage, has the obligation to have dinner reclining peacefully among the other suitors. Once they have finished dinner, the suitor asks for a cup of wine, pours a libation on the table and courts the girl by highly praising himself, demonstrating that he is of good birth, fortune, or power.

45. Thus, once many had poured a libation, made their request according to the custom and enumerated their titles of nobility and fortune, at last Arsacomas asked for the drinking bowl. But he did not pour a libation, for it is not in our habit to spill the wine; on the contrary, in our view this is an outrage to the gods. Instead, he drank in a single swig and said, 'My lord, the King, allow me to take your daughter Mazaea as wife, because I am far more suitable than these, as far as wealth and means are concerned.' Leucanor was perplexed, for he knew that Arsacomas was poor and just one of many Scythians, and asked, 'how much cattle or how many carriages do you possess, dear Arsacomas? For these are what you Scythians are rich in.' 'But I have neither carriages nor herds,' said Arsacomas, 'though I do have two excellent and virtuous friends such as no other Scythian has.'

46. Of course, at that time, he was laughed at for his pretentions, ignored and thought to be drunk. At first dawn, Adyrmachus, who had been preferred to the others, was expected to lead away the bride along Lake Maeotis to the Machlyans. Arsacomas went back home and told his friends how he had been put to shame by the king and derided at the banquet because he seemed poor. 'Although I did explain to him,' he said, 'how great my wealth is – meaning you, dear Lonchates and Macentes, and your benevolence, which is far greater and more steadfast than the power of the Bosporeans. But when I told him this in exact terms, he scoffed at you and despised you, and he let Adyrmachus the Machlyan lead the bride away because he said that he possessed ten golden drinking bowls, eighty carriages with four couches, and many sheep and cows. Thus, he has been favoured before all great men because of his many cattle, some fine beakers and large carriages.

'For my part, dear friends, I am vexed because of both motives, for I love Mazaea and the outrageous behaviour conducted in front of all these people affects me not a little. And I believe that you too have been wronged all the same, for each of us has a third of a share in the dishonour, if we really do live in this way that, since the time that we came together, we are one single person, and

are afflicted by the same disgraces and rejoice for the same fortune.' 'Not only that,' added Lonchates, 'but each of us is entirely outraged when you suffer such an affront.'

47. 'How then,' said Macentes, 'are we to deal with the present disgrace?'

'Let us divide the task,' said Lonchates, 'I swear to bring Leucanor's head to Arsacomas, and you shall bring him the bride.'

'Thus it shall be,' he answered, 'and in the meantime, Arsacomas, as an army and fighting a war will probably be necessary, while you wait for us you can gather and make ready weapons, horses and as many other forces as possible. You will easily bring together many men, for you yourself are a good person and we have not a few kinsmen, especially if you sit down on the oxen hide.'

This was decided and Lonchates immediately departed for the Bosporus just as he was and Macentes for the Machlyans, both on horseback. Arsacomas stayed at home, held a meeting with his comrades, armed a force recruited from his kinsmen, and in the end sat down on the hide.

48. Our custom about the hide goes as follows. When someone who has been wronged by another wants to avenge himself and sees that, by himself, he is not sufficiently powerful, he sacrifices an oxen whose meat he divides into pieces and cooks, and whose hide he lays on the ground and sits down on. He then brings his hands behind his back like someone who has been bound by the elbows. This is our gravest act of supplication. Once the meat pieces of the oxen are served up, the kinsmen step forward and anyone else who wants, help themselves to a bit, step on the hide with their right foot, and swear to supply, according to their resources, the one five horsemen without rations nor pay, the other ten, another even more horsemen, a further as many heavy-armed <or> foot-soldiers as he can, and the poorest only himself. Thus, a great number can sometimes be gathered on the hide, and such a body of troops best holds firmly together and is invincible over any enemy because it is bound by oath, for stepping on the hide is a form of an oath.

So Arsacomas was busy with this, and there were gathered for his cause about five thousand horsemen and twenty thousand fighters on foot, heavy-armed and simple soldiers both together. **49.** Meanwhile Lonchates came unknown into the Bosporus to see the king, who was settling some administrative work, and said that he had come from the Scythian people, but was also bringing some important issues of his own private concerns.

Summoned to talk, he said, 'The Scythians, with regard to the everyday matter of public interest, request that your herdsmen do not overrun the plain but pasture within the limits of the stony expanse. They deny that the robbers whom you accused to have ravaged your lands have been sent by a public decision, but individually came to steal for their personal profit. If one of them is taken, you are the master of their punishment. **50.** These are their orders. I, for my part, inform you that a huge assault conducted by Arsacomas, son of Mariantes, is to take place against your people. He came recently to you as an ambassador and, I believe, because he asked for your daughter and did

not succeed in his request from you, is vexed; he stepped on the hide already a week ago and no small army has been brought together for his cause.'

'I heard myself,' said Leucanor, 'that a force was being gathered on the hide, but I did not know that it is put up against us and that Arsacomas is the leader.'

'Well, they are arming themselves against you,' said Lonchates. 'Arsacomas is my enemy; he is upset because I am more honoured than him by our elders and considered superior to him in every way. If you give me your other daughter Barcetis – in other matters too I might not be unworthy of you – I will come and bring you his head before long.'

'I promise to do so,' said the king, who had become terrified, because he understood that the cause of Arsacomas' wrath was due to the marriage, and had always been intimidated by the Scythians anyway.

And Lonchates said, 'Swear that you will observe the agreements and that you will not deny them once they are put into effect!'

When Leucanor raised his hands to the sky and wanted to make his oath, Lonchates said, 'But really, not here! – otherwise someone looking at us might suspect what we are making an oath for – but let us go there to the temple of Ares, close the doors and make the oath so that no one hears us. If Arsacomas should come to learn something about it, I am more afraid that he will have me sacrificed than that the war breaks out', for he is already surrounded by no little hand of men.'

'Let's go inside,' said the king, 'but you, [guards,] stand back as far as possible; that nobody comes closer to the temple until I call for him.'

Once they had got in and the body-guards had stood back, Lonchates drew his sword, held his other hand on Leucanor's mouth so that he did not scream, stabbed him in his breast, then cut off his head and, holding it under his mantle, walked out. Meanwhile, he pretended to converse with the king, saying that he would be back soon, as if he had obviously been sent for something by him. Thus he arrived at the place where he had left his horse bound, mounted and rode off to Scythia. No pursuit ensued, because the Bosporians did not notice what had happened, and when they did notice, a riot broke out about the succession to the throne.

51. This is what Lonchates did and in this way, he fulfilled his promise to bring the king's head to Arsacomas. Macentes, who heard about it while on his way, arrived to the Machlyans and was the first to announce to them the murder of the king. 'Honourable Adyrmachus,' he said, 'the king's city calls for you to acquire the throne, seeing that you are his son-in-law. You must ride on forward and take the reign, showing yourself in the midst of the confusion; the girl shall follow after you on the carriages. In this way, you will easily convert the majority of the Bosporians when they see Leucanor's daughter. I am an Alan and a relative of this girl on her mother's side, for Leucanor took Masteira as his wife, who is from our people. Right now, I have come to you from Masteira's brothers, who have ordered me to ride as quickly as possible to Bosporus and not to allow that the

throne goes to Eubiotus, Leucanor's bastard-brother, who is a friend to the Scythians but hated by the Alans.'

This is what Macentes said, who had dressed in the same way as the Alans and was speaking their tongue, for these things are common to both the Alans and the Scythians, except that the Alans do not wear their hair in the same way. But Macentes had made his hair resemble theirs and had shorn it off to be much shorter as an Alan would likely have it, compared to a Scythian. For this reason, he Adyrmachus believed him, and indeed Macentes seemed to be a relative of Masteira and Mazaea.

52. 'And now, honourable Adyrmachus,' said Macentes, 'I am ready to ride together with you to Bosporus, if you wish to, and to stay and bring the girl, if necessary.'

'This,' said Adyrmachus, 'is what I would prefer, that you bring Mazaea, for you are her kinsman. Indeed, if you went with us to the Bosporus, we would have just one more horseman; but if, on the contrary, you bring me my wife, you will be worth a good many.'

This was decided and Adyrmachus departed, handing Mazaea, who was still a virgin, over to Macentes to lead her. During the day, he escorted Mazaea on the carriage, but, when night came, he carried her off and put her on his horse – he had taken care that only one other horseman accompanied them. He jumped to his feet and himself did not walk along the Meotis any longer, but turned away to the inland, keeping the mountains of the Mitraeans at his right. Occasionally, he allowed Mazaea to rest a little and on the third day they reached Scythia from the territory of the Machlyans. His horse, at the moment that he halted from his course, stood in rest a little and fell dead; Macentes handed Mazaea over to Arsacomas and said, 'Receive my promise too.'

As the latter was astonished by the unexpected sight and avowing his gratitude, Macentes said, 'Stop making me a different person from yourself. Avowing your gratitude for what I have done in this affair is just as if my left hand would thank my right hand for taking care of it when it is injured and kindly looking after it when it suffers. Really, this would be a ridiculous thing for us as well if we had tried as much as possible to be united as one person and would consider it a big issue if one part of our body did something propitious for the whole body. Indeed, it does so on behalf of the other because it is a part of the whole, to which the good is being done.'

54. Thus, Macentes answered Arsacomas' avowal of gratitude. Adyrmachus, when he heard about the plot, did not go to the Bosporus – for Eubiotus was already holding power there, having been called in by the Sarmatians with whom he stayed – but went back to his own lands, gathered a huge army and came upon Scythia across the hilly regions. Not long after, Eubiotus entered into Scythia too, leading the Greeks as the body of his army and the Alans and Sarmatians, each numbering twenty thousand men, as his allies. Eubiotus and Adyrmachus, upon joining their armies, were altogether ninety thousand men strong, of whom a third were horse-archers.

We – as I myself took part in the expedition with them, having contributed on the hide at that time with a hundred self-supporting horsemen – had assembled much less than three thousand men

including the horsemen and awaited the assault; Arsacomas was our leader. When we saw them advancing, we stayed fixed in front of them and sent the cavalry forward against the enemy. After a long and violent battle, our troops were finally giving in, our phalanx was breaking, and, at last, the Scythian army was entirely cut in two; one half took flight, even though it was not so clearly defeated, for the flight seemed to be a retreat and neither did the Alans dare to pursue us for long. As to the other half, which was truly the smaller one, the Alans and the Machlyans encircled it and beat it from every side by sending their arrows and javelins in great number, so that those among us who were surrounded suffered greatly and soon most of them laid down their weapons.

55. Lonchates and Macentes happened to be among them and were hurt precisely when they braved the first dangers: the one, Lonchates, was struck by a javelin-spike in his thigh, the other, Macentes, by a battle-axe in his head and a pike in his shoulder. When Arsacomas, who was in the other half of our troops, noticed this, he believed it would be terrible if he went and left his friends. Pressing the spurs on his horse, he gave a shout and charged the enemies with his curved sword uplifted, so that the Machlyans did not endure his vigorous wrath but separated and allowed him to go through.

Arsacomas, having heartened his friends and encouraged all the others, rushed against Adyrmachus, struck him in the neck with his curved sword and stretched his strike up to the belt. As soon as Adyrmachus had fallen, the whole army of the Machlyans became disassembled, and not long after the Alans and after them the Greeks, so that we gained the upper hand over them anew. We could have followed them for a long distance, killing them, if night had not put an end to the feat.

On the following day, supplicants came from the enemy and requested to make friends. The Bosporians promised to pay twice the tribute, whereas the Machlyans asserted that they would give hostages and, in order to make up for the assault, the Alans engaged themselves to give us a hand against the Sindians who had rebelled some time earlier. On these terms, we were persuaded, but not without having asked before for Arsacomas' and Lonchates' consent. So, peace was made, as the latter were in charge of the individual regulations.

Such deeds, dear Mnesippus, do Scythians brave to achieve for their friends.

56. Mnesippus:

Very tragic, indeed, dear Toxaris, and myth-like. May Sword and Air, by whom you swore, be gracious, for, if one would not believe in them, he would not seem that blameworthy.

Toxaris:

Watch out, my dear fellow, that your disbelief will not turn to jealousy in our confrontation. But, you and your disbelief will not dissuade me from telling such deeds further, which I know have been accomplished by Scythians.

Mnesippus:

My good man, only don't let them be long and don't use such prolix speeches, for, just now at least, running about across Scythia and the Machlyans and going off to the Bosporus and back again, you were thoroughly abusing my silence.

57. Toxaris:

In this too, I must obey you as you command, and must speak briefly, so that you don't get exhausted following along my speech with your ears. Better is listen to what great deeds a friend named Sisinnes helped me with personally.

You see, when I once left home to Athens, guided by the desire for Greek education, I sailed down to Amastris on the Pontus; the town is a port of call for anyone who sails away from Scythia and is not far away from Carambis. Sisinnes, who had been my comrade since childhood, was accompanying me. After looking for some resting-place by the harbour and packing our belongings from the ship over to that place, we went to the market, not suspecting anything harmful. In the meanwhile, some thieves pulled down the closing bar of the door and took away everything, not even leaving enough for us to sustain ourselves for the day.

So, when we got back home and understood what had happened, we didn't think about pursuing any of the numerous neighbours or our host, because we feared that we would look like sycophants against the public opinion by saying that someone stole four hundred golden darics from us, a whole lot of clothes, some rugs and all our other belongings. **58.** We were considering what was to be done about the situation, being complete foreigners and without any means. I was resolved to plunge my sword into my side and to take my life, just as I was, on the very spot, before enduring anything despicable and being distressed by hunger and thirst. But Sisinnes cheered me up and begged me to do nothing of that sort, for he himself would think of some means to maintain us sufficiently.

And that day he transported wood from the port and came back providing us with something from his pay. Early on the next morning, when Sisinnes was going about on the market place, he saw some procession, as he called it, of noble and handsome young men. They had been enlisted to fight in single combat for hire and were to compete two days later. Now, once he had found out the whole story about them, he came back to me and said, 'Dear Toxaris, you must not call yourself a poor man anymore, for in two days I will make you rich.'

59. This is what he said; and, in the meanwhile, we got by with a poor manner of living, but then, at the beginning of the spectacle, we ourselves were there as spectators, for he took and dragged me along to the theatre, on the pretext of having a little fun and enjoying an incredible spectacle of Greek culture. We sat down and first saw wild beasts killed with javelins, hunted down by dogs and let loose on terrorised men, some scoundrels we guessed. Then, when the fighters in single combat arrived and the herald, who was bringing along a young man of imposing stature, announced that

whoever wanted to fight in single combat against him should step forward into the middle and take ten thousand drachmas as a reward for fighting, there and then Sisinnes stood up. Leaping down, he gave his engagement to fight and requested the weapons. Taking the reward, he handed me the ten thousand to hold them and said, 'Dear Toxaris, if I win, we shall get out together with enough subsidies, but if I fall, go away and bury me back in Scythia.'

60. Whereas I was whinging on this reckless undertaking, he took the arms and bound the armour, but did not put on the helmet, and stood up and fought with a bare head. Initially, he himself was injured, cut behind at the thigh by a curved sword so that a lot of blood was running down; I, in my fright, already felt that I was dying. But he watched for his opponent to rush upon him with too much confidence, then stabbed him in his chest and passed the sword through him so that he immediately fell down in front of his feet. Sisinnes, who was himself suffering from his wounds, sat down on the dead, and his soul almost departed him, but I, running down there, made him stand up and livened him up. When he was finally dismissed as victorious, I lifted him and brought him back to our home; after a long time healing, he survived and until today, he lives in Scythia, having married my sister. He is, though, limping because of his injury.

This, dear Mnesippus, did not take place among the Machlyans or the Alans to be without witness and is impossible to believe, but many Amastrians who were present recall Sisinnes' fight.

61. I will end my speech by telling you now of the fifth deed, that of Abauchas. Once upon a time, this Abauchas came to the city of the Borysthenites, also taking with him his wife, whom he was very much in love with, and his two children; the one was a boy, still being breastfed, and the other a girl who was seven years old. Going abroad with him was his companion, Gyndanys, who was ill because of a wound that he had received on their way by some robbers who had fallen over them. While he was fighting against them, it was inflicted upon his thigh, so that he could not even stand up for pain. During the night, when they were sleeping – they happened to live on an upper floor – a huge fire broke out, every exit was shut off and the flames were embracing the house from all sides. At that point, Abauchas woke up, but, after abandoning his weeping children, shaking off his wife who was clinging to him, and exhorting her to save her own life instead, he went down carrying his friend and first burst through at a place that was not yet already devoured by the fire. His wife, who was carrying the little child, was following him, urging the girl to follow too. Half burnt, she let the baby child go from her arms and only just leapt across the flames, and with her the girl, who also came close to losing her life. And later, when someone reproved Abauchas for having abandoned his children and his wife, but for having carried out Gyndanys, he said, 'On the contrary, I could easily have other children, and it was not certain whether these had become good at all. But I would not have found in a long time another friend such as this Gyndanys, who has brought me many displays of his benevolence.'

62. I have told you, dear Mnesippus, five stories that I have chosen from many. It might be the right time now to decide which of our tongue or our right hand must be cut off. Who is it who will give the judgement?

Mnesippus:

Absolutely no one, for we did not appoint any judge over our speeches. But do you know what we are going to do? Since we have now been shooting aimlessly, let us another time choose an arbiter and, in front of him, tell of other friends; then, the one who will have lost will have something cut off – I my tongue, and you your right hand. Or, considering that this is barbaric, and as you have decided to praise friendship and I myself think that mankind has achieved nothing better or more beautiful than this, why do we not ourselves make an agreement between us to be friends from now on and that forever? Why don't we just be happy that both of us have won and obtain the most rewarding price: instead of one tongue and one right hand, we have two of each, and furthermore actually four eyes, four feet and everything double? Indeed, such a coming-together of two or three friends is just like how the painters represent Geryon, a man with six hands and three heads; to me it seems that there were three of them, who did everything together, just as is right when they are friends.

63. Toxaris:

Good idea! Let us do as you say!

Mnesippus:

But let us use no blood or sword to make our friendship steadfast, dear Toxaris. The present discussion and our yearning for the same things are more trustworthy than that cup from which you drink, because it seems to me that such things don't require constraint but reason.

Toxaris:

I agree with all you say, and let us now be friends and hosts: you are mine here in Greece and I yours, should you ever come to Scythia.

Mnesippus:

Absolutely, and be assured of this, that I will not hesitate to go even further, if I am to come across such friends as you, dear Toxaris, have shown us to be from your speeches.

COMMENTARY

The Title: ΤΟΞΑΡΙΣ Η ΦΙΛΙΑ

The manuscripts have the title *Τόξαρις ἢ Φιλία*, except for Φ, which has the title *Τόξαρις ἢ περὶ Φιλίας* in the *subscriptiones*. Neither title has earlier testimonies than those of the manuscripts (tenth century CE).[1] Notwithstanding the absence of testimonies, both subtitles (*Φιλία* and *περὶ Φιλίας*) are attractive, albeit for different reasons.[2] The latter form of subtitle corresponds to the usual formulation of philosophical treatises, which, with regard to the present subject, are entitled *Περὶ φιλίας*, as the (now lost and fragmentary) works of Chrysippus and Theophrastus, or the later work of Themistius, or similarly Plutarch's *Περὶ πολυφιλίας*.[3] It is revealing that Plato's *Lysis* too had an ancient subtitle, *Περὶ φιλίας*.[4] Therefore, the subtitle would conform to the philosophical tradition, but also represent a banalisation in comparison with the other title, *Φιλία*. On the other hand, one might argue that it would be effective for a dialogue such as the *Toxaris* to evoke a philosophical dialogue on friendship, especially Plato's dialogue.[5] Both the form of question and answer and the subject matter of the *Toxaris* hint at a philosophical dialogue.[6] It quickly becomes clear, though, that the *Toxaris* does not meet these expectations, for it is not, properly speaking, an argumentative philosophical dialogue. It lacks the cooperative dimension of the latter's dialectical dynamics, and the scope of Mnesippus and Toxaris' urbane discussion does not aim to define an ideal form of friendship or to establish moral precepts. Nor do they defend any particular philosophical school. Rather, they eclectically use commonplaces of the discourse on friendship by integrating them into their stories. Thus, with the subtitle *περὶ Φιλίας*, the *Toxaris* might intend to allude to a philosophical dialogue in order to

[1] In comparison, in Lucian's corpus, about a third of the works have a double title, especially when the first part of the title is a name (e.g. *Ἰκαρομένιππος ἢ ὑπερνέφελος* but also *Συμπόσιον ἢ Λαπίθαι*, or *Ἀνάχαρσις ἢ περὶ γυμνασίων*, *Ψευδολογιστὴς ἢ περὶ τῆς ἀποφράδος*, and *Ἑρμότιμος ἢ περὶ αἱρέσεων* as well as some of the spurious works). While Bellinger maintains that the titles in Lucian's corpus functioned as a way of introducing the protagonists, Ureña Bracero more recently assumed that Lucian's dialogues did not originally bear a title. See Ureña Bracero 1995, 23 versus Bellinger 1928, 11. On the different forms of titles of Lucian's dialogues and text critical issues, see furthermore Ureña Bracero 1995, 26, 35-37. However, it was common practice to give titles for practical reasons, e.g. for the purpose of citation, as some kind of explanation of the content. See Andrieu 1948, 277-285. Compare Goldhill 2003, 63 with n. 11 for the title of Lucian's *Somnium*. The textual transmission does not allow us to draw any conclusions for the *Toxaris*.

[2] The reason for considering the above-mentioned the title *Τόξαρις ἢ Φιλία* here is clarity, for it is the most widely transmitted title and the one adopted by modern editors.

[3] For an overview of works that discuss the theme of friendship, see Introduction, 'Friendship'.

[4] See Powell 1990, 75, Penner/Rowe 2005, xi.

[5] For the relationship between Lucian's and Plato's dialogues, see esp. Reardon 1971, 174, Branham 1989, 67-123, Nesselrath 2001, 144, Berdozzo 2011, 191-193, Saïd 2015, 184-185, 190-195, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 179-190, Kuin 2019, 263-264. See *Prom.Es* 6, *Zeux*. 2, *Bis Acc*. 26-34.

[6] Compare the definition of dialogue in D.L. 3.48: ἔστι δὲ διάλογος <λόγος> ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως συγκείμενος περί τινος τῶν φιλοσοφουμένων καὶ πολιτικῶν μετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης ἠθοποιίας τῶν παραλαμβανομένων προσώπων καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν κατασκευῆς. διαλεκτικὴ δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη λόγων, δι' ἧς ἀνασκευάζομέν τι ἢ κατασκευάζομεν ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως τῶν προσδιαλεγομένων.

emphasise the discrepancy between a philosophical dialogue on this subject and the present arrangement of themes of friendship and its meaning.[7]

The other subtitle, *Φιλία*, is attractive because – on an intratextual level – 'friendship' fulfils a performative function in this dialogue.[8] Mnesippus and Toxaris are unable to determine the winner and the best model of friendship, but by means of their exchange of stories about friendship and in the course of their conversation, they actually become friends; friendship between the characters is achieved, so to say, *διὰ λόγων*. Therein, the dialogue is perhaps closest to the principle of Plato's *Lysis*, which also ends in *aporia* with regard to the definition of friendship, but demonstrates 'how to form a friendship' in the very process of the dialogue, for Socrates and his interlocutors decide to become friends.[9] Thus, the subtitle *Φιλία* stresses the performative dimension of the dialogue in that it not only *discusses* friendship, but also creates and therefore *constitutes* friendship. Φιλία, in this title, stands for the personification of friendship – and Friendship is effectively *the* character of the dialogue to whom a multiplicity of voices is given across cultural, generic and philosophical differences. Indeed, the analysis of the dialogical dynamics between Mnesippus and Toxaris shows that they are the spokespersons of one (polyphonic) subject, friendship.[10] To the extent that, at the end of the dialogue, they become 'one body' – Geryon – to symbolise their amity.

[7] The choice of the form of the dialogue itself is part of Lucian's satire of philosophy. See Solitario 2017, 121 and n. 1 with references to Hirzel 1895 and Bompaire 1958. Although the present dialogue is not a satire of philosophy, it still alludes to the philosophical dialogue to underscore its different (but not satirical) and sometimes similar approach to the question of friendship.

[8] For different forms of performance in the dialogue, see Häsner 2004, 55-59. The present form of performance is a performance *in* the text; it is effective with reference to the totality of the fiction of the dialogue (second type). Here, the performative force refers to the (fictive) verbal exchange between Mnesippus and Toxaris. These performative aspects of the dialogue diverge from the context-restricted meaning of 'performative force' in speech-act theory. For further types of such divergences, e.g., in cultural studies and sociology, see Bohle/König 2001, Krämer/Stahlhut 2001. The present type of performance of the text is comparable to an illocutionary act in speech act theory.

[9] Pakaluk 1991, 2: 'Plato in fact makes extraordinary use of dramatic action in the dialogue: his points are conveyed as much by what the characters *do* as by what they *say*.' See Pl. *Ly*. 223b5-8: ἐροῦσι γὰρ οἵδε ἀπιόντες ὡς οἰόμεθα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλων φίλοι εἶναι – καὶ ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν τίθημι – οὔπω δὲ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν. For the concept of *aporia* in Platonic dialogues, see Erler 1991, esp. 81, 158 about the *Lysis*.

[10] See below, §§62-63.

§§1-9 The Argument: A Scythian Cult of Friendship

1. Mnesippus and Toxaris

The Dialogue between Mnesippus and Toxaris

The opening of the dialogue (§1.1-2) is typically Lucianic: the tone is familiar, and the two protagonists seem to be acquainted with each other. This form of relationship lays the ground for the conversation, which starts with Mnesippus wondering about the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades (τί φής, ὦ Τόξαρι; θύετε Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Πυλάδῃ ὑμεῖς οἱ Σκύθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι πεπιστεύκατε αὐτούς;). This question presupposes an antecedent context, which the recipients are not informed of. There are no indications of time that could define the context of the encounter between Mnesippus and Toxaris. As in most Lucianic dialogues, the spatio-temporal indexicalisation is vague.[11] In §9.6-7, Toxaris informs Mnesippus (and the text-external recipients of the dialogue) that he has been in contact with Greeks for a long time (πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον ὑμῖν συγγινόμενος), which suggests that the dialogue is set somewhere in Greece. Only at the very end of the dialogue does Toxaris make clear that it is indeed located in Greece (ἐμοὶ μὲν σὺ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, §63.8-9). Moreover, the recipients are not informed of the precise occasion, or context, of the dialogue. Have Mnesippus and Toxaris just met on the street and engaged in conversation? Does the dialogue consists of a snapshot of a 'table talk', as would be suggested by the way the two protagonists engage in a competitive, but regulated (Mnesippus and Toxaris set the rules for the rest of the dialogue/contest in §§10-11), discussion of ethical-philosophical issues – in this case, concepts of friendship?[12]

While the setting and the context of the dialogue remain vague, the recipients are immediately informed of the characters' identities. Naming the interlocutor right at the beginning is part of Lucian's dramatic technique of introducing the characters of a dialogue, and the *Toxaris* is no exception in this regard.[13] Mnesippus names his interlocutor, Toxaris, in the first reply (ὦ Τόξαρι,

[11] See Bellinger 1928, 5-7, who points to the fact that in most Lucianic dialogues, place is 'immaterial', or implied rather than named. This leaves considerable space for imagination. Guellouz notices, though, that this indefiniteness is characteristic of the genre of the dialogue: 'les conditions spatio-temporelles ne jouent pas, dans la constitution des textes qui ressortissent à ce genre [=au dialogue], de rôle déterminant' (Guellouz 1992, 116). Compare Häsner 2006, 178-179. For the principle of indexicalisation in the dialogue, see *ibid*., 166-169.

[12] For competitive speeches as part of sympotic literature, see DNP 11 (2001) s.v. Symposion-Literatur 1139 [Görgemanns]: 'Häufig treten die Teilnehmer mit ihren Beiträgen in einen Wettstreit.' In these regards, Hirzel's view that dialogue has some affinities with poetical contests (Hirzel 1895, 18-20) is interesting. For the theme of friendship in sympotic contexts, see Theognis, but also Plutarch's *Table Talks*, where φιλία and concepts related to the discourse on friendship such as εὔνοια or κοινωνία represent 'the quintessence of conversation', and where 'friendship is brought up as the condition and end of conversation' (Van der Stockt 2000, 94 with n. 12 for passages). For the relationship between friendship and the symposium, see recently Whitmarsh 2000, 306, *id*. 2006a, 94, Hutchinson 2016, 251-252. Tempting as it is, considering, on the one hand, the importance of friendship for the sympotic conversation, and on the other, the relationship between λόγος and φιλία in the Toxaris, where dialoguing turns out to be the means by which Mnesippus and Toxaris become friends, the idea of a symposium remains a speculation.

[13] For Lucian's dramatic techniques in the dialogue, see Bellinger 1928, Ureña Bracero 1995, Mestre 2014, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 171-233.

§1.1), and Toxaris answers by stating his interlocutor's name, Mnesippus (ὦ Μνήσιππε, §1.3). The two names characterise the one as Greek and the other as Scythian. Mnesippus (Μνήσιππος or Μνάσιππος) is a well-attested name in Greek onomastics and therefore sounds typically Greek.[14] The name 'Toxaris', which alludes to the stereotype of the Scythian archer, a representation that pervades ancient art and literature, is a name that sounds typically Scythian to Greek and Roman ears.[15] Mnesippus' emphatic address ὑμεῖς οἱ Σκύθαι (§1.1) makes absolutely clear that Toxaris is Scythian. However, the meaning of their names is ambivalent, an ambivalence that reflects the blurring of identities characteristic of the dialogue. The meaning of Mnesippus' name is ambiguous. Although names in –ιππος are essentially Greek, the meaning of this nominal ending, 'horse', is stereotypically related to the Scythians (e.g. Hdt. 4.28.4); a distinctive feature of the Scythians thereby becomes the attribute of the Greek protagonist.[16] What is more, part of the names of Mnes*ippus* and *Tox*aris are included in Herodotus' definition of the Scythians as ἱπποτοξόται (4.46.3, cf. Th. 2.96.1).[17] This is significant for the present dialogue, which ends with Mnesippus offering Toxaris his friendship in a way that would result in their metaphorical act of forming one body (§62.13-18). Together, one could imagine, Mnesippus and Toxaris become the emblem of a mixed form of identity that is both barbarian and Greek.[18]

The multiplicity and indefiniteness of Mnesippus and Toxaris' identities prepare the ground for the communicational dynamics of the dialogue. The question that opens the dialogue is a manifestation of wonder and expresses Mnesippus' reaction to alterity, that is, to the Scythians and their customs. However, the incomprehension and misunderstandings that structure the dialogue not only relate to questions of cultural identities, their differences and their negotiation, but are also rooted in different philosophical attitudes. An analysis of the dialogical dynamics of §§1-9 shows how the play of questions and answers further characterises Mnesippus and Toxaris. Mnesippus' name not only suggests Greekness, but, by means of *paronomasia*, also recalls the name of Menippus. Indeed, the way Mnesippus reacts to Toxaris' explanation of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades by ridiculing traditional beliefs, his satirical laughter, and the irony with which he responds to Toxaris' convictions, are familiar from other Cynic-like characters in Lucian's works. On the other hand, Toxaris incarnates traditional religious, cultural and ethical values that are as truly

[14] See Marquis, 476 n. 2 referring to Fraser/Matthews.
[15] The name 'Toxaris' is very similar to that of the Scythian slave 'Toxilus' in Plautus' *Persa*. For the representation in literature, see e.g. S. F 427 TrGF, Agatho F 4 TGF, Th. 2.96.1, And. *De pace* 5, X. *Mem*. 3.9.2, Str. 2.5.22, Plut. *Sept. sapient. conv.* 163F, Luc. *Herm*. 33, Ath. 7.289f [= 7.35 Kaibel], Sall. *Hist*. F 63, Ov. *Met*. 10.588, *Pont*. 1.1.77, 1.7.9, 3.8.19, Lucan. *BCiv*. 3.431, 8.300, Curt. 10.1.31. For the representation of Scythians on pottery, see Sparkes 1997.
[16] For this image of the Scythians in the Greek imaginary, see Skinner 2012, 68, Ferris 2013, 16. See also D.Chr. 36.7. Scythians were believed to have particular horses that were quick and tiny (Alcm. F 59, Str. 7.4.8. and Skinner 2012, 69-70).
[17] The image of the archer on horse is, however, common in the representation of Scythians, Parthians and Persians. For this aspect, see e.g. Lerouge 2007, 296-305, Skinner 2012, 75-78. For meaningful names in Lucian, see Bompaire 1958, 699, *id*. 1998, 213 n. 30, Tomassi 2011, 508.
[18] For Mnesippus and Toxaris' mixed identities, see Introduction, 'Greeks and Scythians'.

Greek as his 'Scythian' worship of Orestes and Pylades. However, this does not prevent Toxaris from espousing a critical attitude towards Greek culture, in particular with regard to sophistical rhetoric and hypocritical philosophers when he moralises about the Greeks' untruthfulness towards the ethical principles of friendship (§9).

Mnesippus the Cynic and Toxaris the Moralist?

In the beginning of the dialogue, Mnesippus implies that Orestes and Pylades are worshipped due to their quality of intrinsic godlikeness (θέους εἶναι, §1.2, and further ὥσπερ θεοῖς, §1.5-6, ἰσοθέους ἐποιήσασθε, §2.2). Toxaris, however, sets aside Orestes and Pylades' divinity *per se* (οὐ μὴν θεούς γε οἰόμενοι εἶναι, §1.3) as the motive of their worship; rather, he insists on the fact that they are worshipped because they are virtuous and heroes. Throughout his description of Orestes and Pylades' deeds, he focuses on their virtue and their courage: they are ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς (§1.4) and even καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί (§5.8); their deeds are γενναῖα (§3.7). Toxaris explicitly defines Orestes and Pylades' deeds as a mark of ἀνδρεία (οὕτως ἀνδρείως χρήσασθαι τῷ πράγματι, §3.14), which he presents as a valuable criterion for the admiration and worship of the heroes by the Scythians. In a climactic construction, he stresses the divine character of the heroes' behaviour (πῶς ταῦτα οὐ θαυμαστὰ καὶ θείας τινὸς τιμῆς ἄξια, §3.17). Because Scythians hold virtuous behaviour in high esteem (ὁπόσοι ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦσιν, §3.18), they admire Orestes and Pylades as heroes (ἥρωσιν αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα, §3.19). The true reason for the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades is the fact that they are the prime example of a most accomplished and virtuous friendship (φίλοι οὗτοι δὴ ἄριστοι ἁπάντων γεγενῆσθαι, §5.12). Moreover, Toxaris suggests that the Scythians honour Orestes and Pylades as a heroic, perhaps Homeric, pair of friends: νεὼς ἀποδέδεικται αὐτοῖς ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, ἑταίροις γε οὖσι (§5.4-5). By using the dual in the expression ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις… ἑταίροις, Toxaris underlines the communion between the two friends and explains why Orestes and Pylades are worshipped together. The conceptualisation of friends as a dyad is an ideal in friendship since Homeric epics, and it is best illustrated in ancient Greek literature, such as the paradigmatic pairs of friends such as Achilles and Patroclus, or Theseus and Pirithous.[19] Furthermore, the word ἑταῖρος is frequently used as a synonym for φίλος.[20] However, there is a difference between the two terms in that the primary and Homeric meaning of ἑταῖρος is 'comrade-in-arms' and designates a companion within a circle of non-kin who – in most cases – are of the same age, usually in a military context.[21]

[19] See Stählin 1974, 153, who stresses that the ideal of a pair of friends is present as in epic and drama. Ruprecht, however, holds that conceptualising friendship as a dyad developed particularly in the poleis of the classical period (Ruprecht 2018, 31). For the conceptualisation of friendship as a dyad (with the examples of Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, etc.), see Plut. *De amic. mult.* 93E. For a list of passages mentioning Theseus and Pirithous, see RE XIX.1 (1937) s.v. Peirithoos 121 [Fontenrose].

[20] Pertinent examples include Plato (Stählin 1974, 148 with n. 8) and Plutarch (O'Neil 1997, 107 n. 7). Neither does Stoicism make a difference between the two terms (Banateanu 2001, 113-114).

[21] See LSJ s.v. 1. See e.g. *Il.* 1.345, 9.205, 11.616, etc. for Achilles and Patroclus. For this definition, see Pizzolato 1993, 4, 13. Later, the term was used in the context of political association, but then slowly lost its political meaning. For this use, see Aristotle *EN* 1157b24 with Rackham 1935, n. α *ad loc*., but also consider

Thus, the φιλία ἑταιρική (as opposed to φιλία between kin or φιλία ἐρωτική) 'usually involve[s] a pair of young men […], beginning with Achilles and Patroclus '.[22] Toxaris situates his models of friendship in the heroic-epic context of warfare and stresses that Orestes and Pylades receive divine honours from the Scythians specifically for their exceeding virtue, which, in the Scythians' eyes, confers a more-than-human quality on them: a heroic and quasi-divine status (οὐκ ἀνθρώπινα ταῦτα, §7.3). This reveals Toxaris' Homeric worldview and high moral ideals of friendship.

However, Toxaris struggles to communicate to Mnesippus his interest in Orestes and Pylades' virtue and heroic behaviour. For example, in §1.4, Toxaris uses the expression ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς. The adjective is ambiguous in this context, as ἀγαθός means 'courageous' as well as 'morally good'.[23] Being Scythian and therefore, according to the Greek imaginary, a warrior, Toxaris might seem to be more interested in the former meaning. The misunderstanding, however, is not that Toxaris intends to communicate the meaning 'courageous' while Mnesippus interprets the semantic content of this adjective as 'morally good'.[24] Quite to the contrary: Mnesippus fails to understand Toxaris' argument in defence of Orestes and Pylades' moral virtue and keeps thinking of their military prowess, while to Toxaris, they are both courageous and virtuous. What is more, when Toxaris defines Orestes and Pylades' deeds as truly γενναῖα, 'noble' (§3.7), he adopts an objectively ethical perspective.[25] He thereby assigns a higher value to their deeds than that implied by Mnesippus, who underlines the harm that the heroes did to the Scythians and enquires about the potential benefits that their visit to Scythia could have brought (§§2-3.6). The Greek is deaf to Toxaris' ethical code and purposely, that is, as will be seen below, for the purpose of derision presents the relationship between the Scythians and Orestes and Pylades as one of interest. Finally, by underlining Orestes and Pylades' courage as a primary virtue, Toxaris subtly introduces an argument that he will develop in §36, according to which undeniable proofs of true friendship can only be found in extreme situations of hardship. He disapproves of Mnesippus' examples of Greek friendship because they lack demonstrations of 'manly courage' (ἐν αὐτοῖς ... ἀνδρεῖον ἔνι οὐδέν, §35.18, cf. ἀνδρείως, §3.14).

Toxaris' emphasis on Orestes and Pylades' virtue not only characterises him as a fervent defender of moral values, but is also meaningful with regard to the subject of the dialogue, for the

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EN 1171a14-16 (οὐ γίγνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται, where ὑμνούμεναι might allude to epic poetry or tragedy). For the semantics of φίλος and ἑταῖρος, see Konstan 1997a, 28-33. A φίλος ἑταῖρος is a particularly close comrade with whom a relationship of personal friendship exists. Thus, in Homer, the formulaic πολὺ φίλτατος…ἑταῖρος designates Patroclus as Achilles' closest friend, such as in *Il.* 17.411. For the semantics of φίλος and ἑταῖρος, see also Ruprecht 2018, 21-22, 35 with further bibliography. See also the discussion in Fitzgerald 1997b, 19-20. For the specifically military connotation in Homer, see Kakridis 1963, 49-70.

[22] Hock 1997, 147. This meaning is generally lost in later Greek authors, but Plutarch uses ἑταιρικός in this sense, e.g., in *De frat. amore* 487A. For this aspect, see O'Neil 1997, 107-108.

[23] See LSJ s.v. ἀγαθός I.2 and 3.

[24] *Pace* Marquis, 476-477 n. 6.

[25] This foreshadows the differences of values in friendship, which Mnesippus and Toxaris present in their stories: the Scythian stories, unlike the Greek ones, do not focus on donations or exchanges of material goods.

relation between virtue and friendship is an essential argument in Graeco-Roman philosophical discussions on friendship.[26] Being ἀγαθός is a prerequisite for friendship in Plato's *Lysis* (*Ly*. 214c-e), but also Xenophon (*Mem*. 2.6.16) and Cicero (*Amic.* 5.18) hold the common philosophical view that (true) friendship only exists among the good (cf. Arist. *EN* 1156b7-8, 1157b25). More specifically, the view that Orestes and Pylades' virtuous friendship confers a divine character on them is rather Stoic, for Stoicism maintains that the sage, that is, the virtuous individuals, acquires a divine status.[27] In addition, Toxaris' praise of Orestes and Pylades' friendship touches upon further ideals in friendship: the moral obligation to assist a friend in all situations and especially in times of need (ὡς χρὴ τοῖς φίλοις ἁπάσης τύχης κοινωνεῖν, §5.13-14), the idea that true friendship is reciprocal, and the concept of goodwill (ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων εὔνοιαν, §6.20, εὔνοιαν αὐτῶν, §7.1). Thus the phrase ἅ γε μετ' ἀλλήλων ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἔπαθον (§6.1-2) alludes to a few of these ideals. Besides the idea of reciprocity, which is contained in the reciprocal pronoun, the preposition μετά indicates communion between friends, while the preposition ὑπέρ ('on behalf of') hints at the feeling of devotion to a friend. The idea of communion relates to the conviction that friends should share hard times as well as good times and the expression ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων hints at the (Aristotelian) concept according to which friendship only exists when two people reciprocally act for the other's sake and well-being. Furthermore, Toxaris hints at the ideal of absolute devotion to a friend up to the point of dying for them (παρ' οὐδὲν τιθέμενον εἰ ἀποθανεῖται σώσας τὸν φίλον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον φερομένην πληγὴν προαρπάσας τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι, §6.24-25), which has been an ideal in friendship since Homer, or rather, constitutes a particularly Homeric quality.[28] The reciprocal willingness to risk one's life for a friend in battle is a form of 'total ethical commitment' characteristic of Homeric ethics.[29] More generally, the willingness to die for one's friend represents the utmost act of devotion to a friend and thus is the symbol *par excellence* for true/ideal – and heroic – friendship in Graeco-Roman thought.[30] In addition to the above-mentioned virtues in friendship, Toxaris ascribes to Orestes and Pylades further common ideals: faithfulness, true comradeship, truthfulness and steadfastness: καὶ τὸ πιστὸν καὶ φιλέταιρον καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ βέβαιον (§7.2). Trustworthiness (πίστις) is an essential virtue in friendship. It is precisely the virtue that Toxaris – on behalf of the Scythians – prides himself on because he considers them to be champions in this regard (πολὺ πιστότεροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων φίλων, §9.3-4), although all the other qualities of Orestes and Pylades' friendship apply to Scythian friendships as well. Indeed, Toxaris claims that there is nothing that the Scythians are more proud of than their sprit of self-sacrifice and mutual devotion: οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὅτῳ ἄν τις Σκύθης μᾶλλον

[26] For virtue and friendship as well as further ideals in friendship, see Introduction, 'Friendship'.
[27] For the Stoic sage's affinity to the divine, see Banateanu 2001, 188-189, 193-197. See also D.L. 7.119, and in the context of friendship as a virtue, see Sen. *Prov*. 1.5.
[28] See Millett 1991, 116-26. For the *topos* in general, see Seeck 1985, 81. For mutual help between friends as a Homeric motif exemplified by the myth of Orestes and Pylades, see Ruprecht 2018, 51 with n. 192. For representations of mutual help between friends in battle scenes, see *ibid.*, 197-207.
[29] Gill 1998, 310.
[30] See also Introduction, 'Friendship'.

σεμνύναιτο ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ συμπονῆσαι φίλῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ κοινωνῆσαι τῶν δεινῶν (§7.8-10). Finally, Toxaris shows that the Scythians defend the ethics of shame, which are basically Homeric.[31] In §7.11, he clearly states a correlation between friendship and the idea of shame as motivation for moral behaviour (οὐδὲν ὄνειδος μεῖζον παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦ προδότην φιλίας γεγενῆσθαι δοκεῖν), which, especially in the context of battles, sounds Homeric (cf. *Il.* 4.370-373).

Thus, the heroic and virtuous nature of Orestes and Pylades' friendship is the reason for the Scythians' admiration for them, but it is the exemplary value of their heroic friendship that induces the Scythians to worship them in a cult. Toxaris makes clear that the cult has a precise function: to encourage many Scythians to virtuous friendship: ἡγούμεθα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν ὑμῖν πολλοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ἐθελῆσαι γενέσθαι (§1.12-13). The affirmation that commemorating the virtues and deeds of the heroes (μεμνημένοι τῶν ἀρίστων, §1.11-12) exterts a favourable influence on the ethical education and the behaviour of those who admire them points to the concept of 'ethical *mimēsis*'. The idea that people feel compelled to imitate virtuous men, that is, moral examples of the past, is a central issue in ancient ethics.[32] In particular, it is a *topos* in funerary oratory, where the praise of the dead fulfils a pedagogical or exhortative function for the recipients by encouraging them to imitate the virtuous deeds.[33] In the following, Toxaris deals with this idea in more detail. In §5.13, he describes Orestes and Pylades as the νομοθέται, the 'lawgivers', of the commandment that friends should share all fates, good and bad. This is remarkable, for the Scythians are thus made to institutionalise friendship in a way that '[t]he bond between friends is analogized to duty to one's country, or rather, it is elevated beyond political duty to the status of a supreme obligation '.[34] To make the exemplary value of the cult of Orestes and Pylades more effective, Toxaris explains that the Scythians of old built an Oresteum where they set up a stele narrating the heroes' deeds (§6.2-3). They stipulated that the content of this dedication be the subject of the first school lesson of every Scythian child, who 'would sooner forget the name of his father than be ignorant of Orestes and Pylades' deeds' (§6.3-7). This institutionalisation of a cult of friendship may be compared to a Greek but also Roman custom, of which a passage in Valerius Maximus gives testimony (4.7.ext. 1):

> quibus paene tantum uenerationis quantum deorum immortalium caerimoniis debetur. illis enim publica salus, his priuata continetur atque ut illarum aedes sacra domicilia, harum fida hominum pectora quasi quaedam sancto spiritu referta templa sunt.

[31] For shame in Homeric ethics, see e.g. Adkins 1971 (who is criticised by later scholarship, though), Zanker 1990, 213-216, Cairns 1993, 48-146, Williams 1994, 74-95.
[32] See Whitmarsh 2001a, 54-57. For the principle in Plutarch, see Duff 1999, 30-45.
[33] See e.g. Th. 2.36-43, Isoc. 4 *passim*, Hyp. *Epit*. 32 with See Pernot 1993, 499, Greenwood 2006, 23-24, Grethlein 2010, 105-125. A similar view of the exemplary moral value of history is defended e.g. by D.S. 1.2.1-2. On the contrary, this view is questioned by Herodotus in 9.26-27. See Grethlein 2010, 178, 181.
[34] Konstan 1993, 2.

> To [friendship] almost as much veneration is due as to the rituals for the immortal gods. On the latter rests public good, on the former private wellbeing, and just as temples are the sacred homes of the gods, so are, to friendship, the faithful hearts of men like shrines filled with a sublime spirit.

Later in this passage (4.7.7), he explains that exemplary friendships of the past function as incentive for future generations to imitate them. This discussion of friendship by Valerius Maximus is in some way comparable to the Scythians' religious worship of Orestes and Pylades: exemplary friends are equal to gods and deserve the same veneration. Principally, though, this myth is at the heart of 'Scythian' *paideia* (πρῶτον τοῦτο ... παίδευμα, §6.4) and it is constitive of their cultural identity and code of conduct. This view of myth and education is strongly reminiscent of Greek (as well as Roman) cultural practices. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Toxaris illustrates this principle by recounting the myth in the form of an *ecphrasis*, a verbal imitation and emulation of an iconographic representation (and imitation); rather, his rhetorical performance also constitutes a major exercise in the Greek educational curriculum. The expression ὁμοίους ... γενέσθαι (§1.13), which reminds us of the ὁμοιότης (verisimilitude) in art critical terminology, highlights the fact that the passage deals with more than one form of *mimēsis* and imitation.[35] Toxaris thus literally performs what the wall painting is about: an inspiration to imitation – of a myth with a certain literary tradition. Finally, these dynamics of emulation described by Toxaris as a Scythian pedagogic institution are especially meaningful with regard to the theme of friendship, for they have a counterpart in philosophical (mainly Stoic) discussions of friendship.[36] For example, in Seneca, friendship has an emulating and pedagogical dimension as a means of self-completion and ethical improvement.[37] Stoicism in general relates the personal development of becoming a sage to 'making friends' and regards friendship as an encouragement to become virtuous.[38] Beyond this very specific and philosophical aspect, though, the concepts of similarity (ὁμοιότης) and moral improvement through imitation, as applied to friendship here, are essential to the understanding of the course and the ending of the dialogue. Indeed, Mnesippus and Toxaris make friends at the end of the dialogue on the grounds that they equally hold friendship in the highest esteem (§62.8-10) and, in their mindset, are ὅμοιοι (τὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρέγεσθαι, §63.4) – thus implying their identity as *pepaideumenoi* and orators/narrators who

[35] See Pollitt 1974, 204 and 432. For Lucian's obsessive reception/imitation of literature and art, see e.g. Bompaire 1958, 707-735, Maffei 1994, Camerotto 1998, 261-302, Dubel 2014.
[36] Elsewhere and more generally, friendship is related to education in Terence (*Ad.* 65-67) and Quintilian (1.2.15). For the use of friendship in Terence, see Pizzolato 1993, 99: 'L'amicizia è per Terenzio la forma privilegiata del rapporto educativo.'
[37] See Pizzolato 1993, 160: 'l'amicizia [è] essenzialmente un mezzo di communicazione della virtù.' Compare Fraisse 1974, 432 nn. 42-43, n. 42: 'L'amitié est le moyen pour le sage de communiquer sa conversion, sa réforme morale, par un enseignement […]. En ce sens il n'est de sagesse valable que par l'utilité que lui confère l'amitié, et cette utilité ne peut se faire jour que dans l'exemple vivant et le conseil direct […].' For this principle of emulation of the good, see Sen. *Ben.* 1.6.2 and *Ep.* 109.1-3.
[38] See Banateanu 2001, 116-119 and 155-181, Collette-Dučić 2014, 89.

are able to deal creatively with literary and ethical paradigms. While their stories might not imitate one another, they do certainly qualify as pairs that echo one another with regard to the ideals in friendship that each of them illustrates. Both aspects will be developed in the commentary to §§62-63, but it must be underlined here that this points to a conception of imitation that is both aesthetic and ethical.[39]

While Toxaris thus zealously advocates traditional Graeco-Roman views on *paideia*, virtue and friendship, Mnesippus wonders at these 'Scythian' customs and ideals. His answers to Toxaris' world view oscillate between incomprehension on the one hand, and derision and irony on the other. The question he raises right at the beginning of the dialogue (τί φής, ὦ Τόξαρι; θύετε Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Πυλάδῃ ὑμεῖς οἱ Σκύθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι πεπιστεύκατε αὐτούς; §1.1-2) can be interpreted in different ways. With this formulation, he may extpress his astonishment at the fact that Scythians worship Greek heroes, that they worship Orestes and Pylades of all heroes, or that they worship at all – be it because they are Scythians or because Mnesippus questions the act of worship itself, which is a way of being sceptical about traditional religious practices. Similarly, in the rest of this part of the dialogue, Mnesippus' questions and answer – on the one hand – express his unwillingness – or incapacity – to understand the views and customs of the 'other'. On the other hand, they also constitute the comic element of the dialogue by which distance is taken from tradition and things taken for granted.[40] In either way, Mnesippus' obstinate misunderstanding of Toxaris' arguments forms the base of their dispute on excellence in friendship, the dispute that results in the story-*agōn*. The first aspect will be treated in more detail later. Let us now focus on the comic aspect of Mnesippus' responses.

Mnesippus uses different types of comic responses altogether: irony, incongruity and ridicule. At the beginning, Mnesippus expressly wonders about the existence of the Scythian religious custom of worshipping the dead heroes Orestes and Pylades (νόμος δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι θύειν ὥσπερ θεοῖς; §1.5-6). Toxaris responds to his astonishment by mentioning the festivities involved in their cult. This prompts Mnesippus to ask a further question, or rather to make a truly ironic comment on the uselessness of the Scythian cult, considering the fact that Orestes and Pylades are actually dead (τί θηρώμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπ' εὐμενείᾳ θύετε αὐτοῖς,

[39] See esp. Whitmarsh 2001b, 274.
[40] For this form of dialectical and intellectual humour in Plato and Lucian, see Branham 1983, 240-255 (Plato), 255-307 (Lucian). This form of humour resides in the 'arguments themselves' (241), in the 'comic incongruity which arises from the fact that the two sides do not attach the same reality to words' (251), or here to a myth. The main difference between Plato's and Lucian's dialectical humour is that Plato 'uses humor to reinforce his presentation of an ideal, a model of discourse, which he can use to criticize rival philosophical and cultural ideals ', while 'Lucian's technique is to take a received idea such as the philosopher as a cultural ideal or the agonistic ideal of Greek athletics and make it the source of humor by transposing it to ironic or ludicrous contexts through the use of seriocomic personae like Anacharsis or Lycinus.' (*ibid*., 255).

νεκροῖς γε οὖσιν, §1.8-9).[41] This rhetorical question makes clear that, at this point, the dialogue takes a different turn, for Mnesippus now confronts Toxaris' world view with a characteristically Cynic one. His remark hints at the belief in human nothingness, and – implicitly – at the fact that the dead cannot interact with the living, as Toxaris rightly acknowledges by dismissing the hypothesis of the benevolence of the dead towards the living (οὐ χεῖρον μὲν ἴσως, εἰ καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἡμῖν εὐμενεῖς εἶεν, §1.10).[42] With this ironic affirmation, Mnesippus denounces not only the uselessness, but also the hypocritical vanity of sacrifices: the alleged purpose for which the Scythians sacrifice to Orestes and Pylades is the εὐμένεια, the 'favour' that the dead heroes would grant them. Mnesippus' irony towards traditional religious practices recalls similar Lucianic passages that denote a Cynic attitude. For example, in *Cont*. 22, Charon derides the human religious practices of organising feasts for the dead by underscoring how pointless it is to give food to skulls and bones. In *DMort*. 7(17), Menippus similarly makes fun of Tantalus for wanting to drink all the time, although he should not be distressed at it, because he is dead and has been buried long ago. In 10(3).1, the same Menippus derides the fact that Trophonius and Amphilochus have become the object of a cult, which is useless because these two are dead: νεκροὶ ὄντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ναῶν κατηξιώθητε καὶ μάντεις δοκεῖτε, καὶ οἱ μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεοὺς ὑμᾶς ὑπειλήφασιν εἶναι. In *De Sacrifiis*, often considered a 'Cynic diatribe', religious practices like worship, funerals, prayers, etc. are mocked with vehemence.[43] Especially *Sacr*. 1 and 15 scornfully emphasise the ridiculous uselessness of such customs (οἱ μάταιοι πράττουσι, γελάσεται τὴν ἀβελτερίαν, τοῦ γελᾶν, τοῦ μὲν γελασομένου τὴν ἄγνοιαν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὴν ἄνοιαν ὀδυρουμένου) – no matter whether Roman, Greek, Egyptian or Scythian.[44]

Mnesippus goes on deriding the absurdity of the Scythian cult. First, Mnesippus seems to agree with Toxaris' general principle of 'ethical *mimēsis*' (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκετε, §2.1).[45] However, he quickly points out that he still does not understand why the Scythians worship Orestes and Pylades in particular (Ὀρέστην δὲ καὶ Πυλάδην τίνος μάλιστα θαυμάσαντες ἰσοθέους ἐποιήσασθε … ; §2.1-3). His incomprehension is also sceptical. By means of irony and comic inversion, and by emphasising the absurdity of the Scythian worship, Mnesippus creates a certain distance from the tradition, which enables him to question and reflect on this myth, and on religious practices in general, from a different perspective.[46] For example, Mnesippus, being sceptical about

[41] The particle γάρ explains the preceding interposed question; the question and the explanation (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπ' εὐμενείᾳ θύετε αὐτοῖς) might be taken together as a single rhetorical and ironic question (GP, 77 and 80). δή has ironic tone (GP, 229-36).
[42] For the Cynic derision of the afterlife in Lucian, see Camerotto 2013, 126 with n. 26.
[43] Helm 1906, 348-353, Andò 1984, 29-36 (who, however, stresses the contemporaneous presence of further literary, e.g. Homeric, motifs, *ibid*., 37-41). In his introduction to Lucian's *de Sacrifiis*, Harmon (Harmon 1960, 153) remarks that 'this little skit approximates very closely to the Cynic diatribe as exemplified in the fragments of Teles and in some portions of Epictetus.'
[44] For further passages in Lucian that satirise sacrifices, see Camerotto 2013, 130 n. 6 with bibliography.
[45] See also ἀλλά, which expresses agreement with Toxaris' statement and indicates that Mnesippus believes it to be correct (GP, 18-19).
[46] For the comic and satirical effects of distance and displacement of perspective, see Camerotto 1998, 199-209, referring also to Bakhtin.

the Scythians' choice of Orestes and Pylades as the object of their worship, insinuates that, in his eyes and with regard to the myth, the Greek heroes are as a matter of fact 'foreigners' and even 'enemies' to the Scythians (καὶ ταῦτα ἐπήλυδας ὑμῖν ὄντας καὶ τὸ μέγιστον πολεμίους; §2.2-3). Mnesippus interprets the ξένος relationship between the Scythians and the pair Orestes-Pylades as inimical.[47] His perspective rests on the presupposition of an opposition between the Greeks and the Scythians, and he thereby misses the point of, or rather purposely distorts and re-interprets, Toxaris' humanist argumentation, which focuses on the relationship between Orestes and Pylades and not on that between the heroes and the Scythians. Mnesippus' perspective is not only a different (or one could say alien) one, and a source of comicality, but – first and foremost – it emphasises the absurdity of the Scythian worship. What is more, it also questions the sense and the origin of any religious cult that is commonly accepted, but might seem ludicrous from an 'outsider' point of view.

Mnesippus' short summary of the myth of Orestes and Pylades (§2.3-9) deploys a considerable degree of irony: these two (οἵ γε) shipwrecked persons were taken prisoner by the Scythians to be slaughtered, but escaped their captivity, killed the guards, and abducted the priestess.[48] They then 'stole' (ἀποσυλήσαντες) the cult statue of Artemis, sailed away and 'had a good laugh at the Scythians' (καταγελάσαντες τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν). Mnesippus' deformation of the myth turns the tragic and serious moment of the heroes' dramatic flight into a comic situation, where Orestes and Pylades are represented as playing a trick on the Scythians and laughing at their expense. The verb ἀποσυλάω indicates a comic inversion as well, for Orestes and Pylades are turned into vile temple robbers (and explicitly: ἱεροσύλοις ὑμῶν οὖσιν θύσετε ὡς θεοῖς, §2.16-17).[49] In comparison, in the *Anacharsis*, the homonymous Scythian, laughing about the extremely severe Spartan custom of training their youth to bear torture, compares this exercise to the flogging of robbers and other criminals (*Anach*. 39). By means of this comic contrast, he highlights the fact that he takes a different perspective on the alien custom. Similarly, in the *Toxaris*, the Greek Mnesippus keeps distorting Toxaris' view on the myth by using comic contrasts. The motive of Orestes and Pylades' visit to Scythia, and those who, according to Toxaris' logic of imitation, will follow their example, is actually 'exportation' (τοὺς ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ αὐτῶν ἥκοντας ἄνδρας, §2.15-16).[50] Although Mnesippus first accepted Toxaris' argument of 'ethical *mimēsis*', he quickly turns it against Toxaris'

[47] The word ἔπηλυς 'incomer, stranger, foreigner' (LSJ s.v. II) is synonym to ξένος (Suid. ε 2175.1 Ἔπηλυς: ὁ ξένος, compare Philo Judaeus's *Quaestiones in Exodum* 2.2.13: ἐπήλυδας ἔνιοι καλοῦσι τοὺς ξένους). ἔπηλυς and ξένος are often used as a pair as in A. *Supp*. 195, S. *Ph*. 1190, Plut. *Demetr*. 44.6.4, *Thes*. 13.1.6, 32.1.11, D.Chr. 11.46, Luc. *Herm*. 24. A ξένος is not only a foreigner, but also a stranger in the sense of a person unknown to someone; a ξένος may become φίλος. On the contrary, in the present case, πολέμιος represents a negative evolution with regard to ἔπηλυς.

[48] The limitative use of γε with a relative pronoun is not only emphatic, but also sometimes sarcastic (GP, 128, 141-42).

[49] The verb has the strong connotation of 'to rob, defraud'. See LSJ s.v. II, but see III 'carry off' for the reference in §2.7. Temple robbers frequently appear in Lucian: *Herm*. 37-38, *Icar*. 16, 24, *JTrag*. 25, *JConf*. 12. See Anderson 1976a, 20 for the motif. The motif is taken up in §28.3-9.

[50] See LSJ s.v. ἐξαγωγή I.3.

own argumentation. In his opinion, it would do Scythians no good if they encouraged 'many Orestes and Pylades to swarm down on Scythia', because this would lead to all gods fleeing from Scythian in the same way Orestes and Pylades did (§2.9-14). By insinuating that the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades calls for a traffic of religious goods, Mnesippus deprives their cult of any solemnity. His idea that the Scythians' worship will lead them to drive all gods into exile (τῶν περιλοίπων θεῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀποξενωθέντων, §2.13-14) is a comic inversion. The gods become humans and are expelled from Scythia, whereas one would rather expect to be sent into exile to the Black Sea than being banished from there.[51] Finally, he fantasises that the Scythians would substitute deified temple robbers for the abducted gods (§2.15-17), an ultimate derision of Toxaris' incomprehensible enthusiasm that constitutes the pointe of Mnesippus' mockery. His refutation is rather nonsensical, though: Toxaris' point is that the Scythians make *their community* follow Orestes and Pylades' example (of virtuous friendship). The objection that this Scythian ethical education would cause *foreigners* to swarm into Scythia to plunder their temples in the wake of Orestes and Pylades does not hold water. However, the aim of Mnesippus' reply is not to present a sound dialectical demonstration, but, rather, loosely connected incongruous arguments in order to ridicule the Scythians' ethical and religious beliefs and exhibit their absurdity.

Indeed, Mnesippus insists on the absurdity of the Scythians' present worship of Orestes and Pylades, which he decries as inconsistent with regard to their past behaviour (ὑπεναντία τοῖς πάλαι, §3.6) towards those who nearly became their victims (πάλαι οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι … νῦν τὸ ἔμπαλιν θύσαντες αὐτοῖς θεοὺς νενομίκατε, καὶ ἱερείοις ὀλίγου δεῖν τότε γενομένοις ἱερεῖα νῦν προσάγετε, §3.2-5). The antonymic opposition πάλαι/νῦν, τότε/νῦν and the *polyptoton* ἱερείοις/ἱερεῖα further emphasise the inversion of the Scythians' attitude toward Orestes and Pylades and discredits the Scythian religious custom. Mnesippus visibly shows that he is not convinced by Toxaris' rationale for the Scythian cult and therefore asks for further 'good deeds' that Orestes and Pylades would have accomplished in Scythia, and which would justify their worship (τί ἄλλο … ἀγαθόν ὑμᾶς εἰργάσαντο ἀνθ' ὅτου, §3.1-2). Mnesippus' use of ἀγαθόν is ironic, for until now, he has not detected a single valuable achievement for the Scythians in Orestes and Pylades' deeds, but – instead – only harmful acts. By inverting Toxaris' value judgement of ἀγαθός (§1.4), Mnesippus demonstrates that they 'do not attach the same reality to certain words' or deeds.[52] Then, Mnesippus considers the Scythian worship to be not only inconsistent, but even 'ridiculous' (γελοῖα, §3.5). The adjective γελοῖος finally

[51] The Black Sea (Tomi) is famously Ovid's place of exile, and Dio Chrysostomos was also banished to Scythia (Borysthenes). More generally, 'barbarian regions' would be ideal places of exile cf. Plut. *De Herod. malig.* 857F: εἰς βαρβάρους ἀποξενῶσαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

[52] Branham 1983, 267, on the dialogue between Anacharsis and Solon. The case is similar to the situation in the *Toxaris*, except that the roles are (partially) inverted: '[Solon's] words often fail to evoke from Anacharsis the expected recognition of these benefits and in fact often have just the opposite of their intended effect: for the two parties, it seems, do not attach the same reality to certain words. The literally outlandish frame of reference by which the Scythian interprets Solon's words leads him continually to construe meanings at odds with Solon's intentions.' Here, Anacharsis' mode of communication is comparable to that of Mnesippus.

makes explicit what Mnesippus has thought of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades all along. Mnesippus judges the Scythians' customs as absurd and openly derides them. His derisive attitude adopts a Cynic tone here as well. Mnesippus' laughter, though, is as much an expression of scepticism as it is a form of relativism.[53] Here, as elsewhere in Lucian's works, laughter and derision are the means of indicating both criticism and estrangement. For example, a similar attitude is adopted by the *Scythian* Anacharsis towards the *Greek* cult of athletics, which he finds laughable in every respect: (in general) ἐπιγελῶν [...] καὶ ἐπιχλευάζων, γελοιότεροι, (*Anach*. 13); (about the prizes) καταγελᾶν, εἴ τινα ἴδοιμι σεμνυνόμενον κοτίνῳ ἢ σελίνῳ ἐστεφανωμένον (*Anach*. 16); (ironically about Spartan sports) μέμνησο ἤν ποτε καὶ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἔλθῃς, μὴ καταγελάσαι μηδὲ ἐκείνων μηδὲ οἴεσθαι μάτην πονεῖν αὐτούς (*Anach*. 38); (about the Greek tradition of theatre performances) παγγέλοια (*Anach*. 23).[54] His laughter, like Mnesippus', is grounded in their different and distorting perception of what they see (athletics) or hear (the cult of Orestes and Pylades), and the meaning they endow it with.[55] This brings about a change in their respective perspective on social and cultural conventions. As Branham comments on the dialogue between Anacharsis and Solon:

> Solon's difficulties with Anacharsis' 'barbaric' perspective on the games serve to reveal to the audience if not to Solon that the attractions and benefits of athletic contests *are not objective attributes perceptible to any observer, but local, social constructs peculiar to the Greeks*, like their language and education, without any inalienable claim to value for those who lack the relevant social background and training.[56]

In the *Toxaris*, this effect of cultural subjectivity is more complex. First, the present Scythian worship constitutes an inversion of the mythical tradition, where Orestes and Pylades' victorious robbery of the Taurian cult statue becomes the cause for a *Greek* religious practice (the cult of Artemis) and 'heroic glorification' – through *Attic* tragedy (Euripides' *IT*).[57] The Scythian worship thus represents a cultural transfer of two Greek institutions, religion and tragedy, which are re-contextualised in Scythia in a way that the 'losers' appropriate the cultural achievements of the 'winners' for their own ends. To Mnesippus, this transfer and inversion is absurd, and he expresses his opinion by means of

[53] Compare Saïd 1994, esp. 126. For a satirical function of the character of the foreigner in Lucian, see Camerotto 2009, 27-28, *id*. 2012, *id*. 2014, 74-75. Compare Bozia 2015, 55-56. See also Branham 1989, 44-46. For the use of a distancing and critical type of (cynical) laughter in Lucian, see Halliwell 2008, 429-470, Camerotto 2013, 121, 123, where he defines Lucian's critical-satirical laughter as follows: '[n]ella satira il γέλως è essenzialmente un riso critico: ha l'effetto di scardinare la visione consueta e condivisa di quello che diviene il bersaglio o l'oggetto della satira, riducendolo pubblicamente al ridicolo (γελοῖον, καταγελᾶν) e al disprezzo (καταφρονεῖν), che vanno sempre insieme. Il riso smaschera il *typhos*, rovescia la *doxa* e sancisce davanti a tutti l'*aletheia* rivelata dalla prospettiva straniante della satira.'

[54] For this aspect, see Branham 1989, 84 and 101, who, however, rightly stresses that Anacharsis' view is not altogether Cynic and that he is no Cynic character. See also Martin 1996.

[55] For Anacharsis' different view on Greek athletics, which is the reason for his laugh, derision and incomprehension, see Branham 1983, esp. 265-269.

[56] Branham 1983, 268 (my own emphasis).

[57] For this interpretation of the myth of Orestes, see Martin 1996, 139.

his ironic responses. In addition, the way he deforms each of Toxaris' attempts to contextualise the Scythian cult of Orestes and Pylades within his system of values generates a certain distance from the normal and habitual – a distance of which his laugh is an expression and which calls for a questioning of the culturally 'evident'.

Mnesippus' irony, though, does not prevent Toxaris from trying to persuade Mnesippus by presenting his version of the myth (§3.7-19). The latter, however, is not convinced yet and asks again for further examples of 'noble and divinely heroic deeds' (σεμνὸν καὶ θεῖον, §4.1), which, in his eyes, would justify the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades. These adjectives sound ironic in the context of Mnesippus' satire of the myth of Orestes and Pylades. Mnesippus points out that, according to Toxaris' praise of Orestes and Pylades' courage to sail until the far end of the Black Sea (§3.8-13), these heroes are not more divine (θειοτέρους, §4.2) than other travellers. As a case in point, he mentions the Phoenician traders who 'navigate (ναυτιλλομένους) on every Greek and barbarian sea' and 'examine every single coast and every seashore (ἀκτὴν καὶ πάντα αἰγιαλόν) year after year until late in the autumn when they return to their land' (§4.3.8). According to Mnesippus, Scythians should believe in these 'hawkers and fishmongers' (καπήλους καὶ ταριχοπώλας) as gods, too (οὓς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον θεοὺς νόμιζε, §4.9). The form of satire that Mnesippus deploys here is, once more, the comic inversion. Indeed, καπήλος means 'salesman' more generally, but here, it has the pejorative connotation of 'retailer, huckster'.[58] The name denotes someone who is base and common in general, but in particular, it refers to a typical 'base' character in comedy who is mostly depicted as a trickster. The κάπηλοι frequently appear in Aristophanes' comedies, in *Pax* 447 (as cheats), 1209 and 1210 (as characters), *Av*. 1292, *Lys*. 466, *Th*. 347 (as cheats) and 737, *Eccl*. 49. Besides, a καπήλος appears thrice in comic fragments (F 567 and 867 CAF, F 245.35 CGFPR). It is thus an everyday figure that seems fit for comic use. In the same way, the ταριχοπώλης means 'dealer in salted fish' and appears in comic contexts (e.g. Alexis F 15.14 PCG = Ath. 3.117f [= 3.86 Kaibel], Nicostratus F 5.4 PCG = Ath. 3.118e [= 3.88 Kaibel]).[59] In *Vit.Auct*. 11, the ταριχοπώλης is listed amongst other simple people (ἰδιώτης). From the numerous comic fragments found in the deipnosophists' discussion on the benefits of salted fish in Athenaeus (Ath. 3.116a-120b [=3.84-90 Kaibel]), it seems that sellers of salted fish appeared as characters in comedy.[60] A comparable

[58] See LSJ s.v. I.1. Lucian questions the probity of wine merchants (κάπηλοι) in *Herm*. 59, in a passage where merchants serve as a comic and incongruous object of comparison with philosophers (58-61). The effect is similar to Mnesippus' comparison of Orestes and Pylades with temple robbers.
[59] For the verbal form ταριχοπωλέω, see Pl. *Charm*. 163b7, Luc. *Nec*. 17.
[60] Compare the fragments (G6) in Olson 2007, 273-274. The passages above also indicate that the production of and trade in fish was mostly associated with the Black Sea region (and Egypt), e.g. the Sea of Azov in Ath. 3.118b-c [= 3.87 Kaibel], with the Danube and the Scythians in Sopater F 12 CGF = Ath. 3.119a [= 3.88 Kaibel], with the Pontus in Cratinus F 44 PCG = Ath. 3.119b [= 3.89 Kaibel], cf. Plut. *Ant*. 29.3-4. The Black Sea was praised for its fish (Hdt. 4.53), which, preserved in salt, was considered a delicacy, so that trading fish was a major source of income for the region (D. 35.34, Plb. 4.38.4, Str. 7.4.6 and 6.2, Hor. *Sat*. 2.4.65-6). For (Greek) traders coming to the Black Sea, see also D.Chr. 36.25. For the production of and trade in salted fish the Black Sea region, see Curtis 1991, 118-129. For the archaeological evidence of fishing and fish trade in Olbia, see Vinogradov/Kryžickij 1995, 75.

character is, for example, the 'sausage-seller' (ἀλλαντοπώλης) in Aristophanes' *Equites*. Mnesippus' comparison with comic characters or ordinary people offers a strong opposition to the heroic exemplariness of Orestes and Pylades, if he is not even denigrating the 'Scythian' divinities. The contrast between the mythic-heroic and the common, or between the epic-tragic and the comic, can also be observed in Mnesippus' description of the activity of the Phoenician traders. The use of poetic words such as ναυτιλλομένους and ἀκτὴν καὶ πάντα αἰγιαλόν emphasises the discrepancy between 'high' and 'low' style, and thus between 'noble' and 'base' characters .[61] In particular, the expression ἀκτὴν καὶ αἰγιαλόν is meant to echo – as the subsequent parenthesis ὡς εἰπεῖν (§4.7) indicates – and satirise a passage in Euripides' *IT*, which is contextually identical: the arrival of Orestes and Pylades on the Scythian shores sung by the chorus (ἀκτὰς ἐπέρασαν / παρ' ἅλιον αἰγιαλόν, vv. 423-424).

In conclusion, it is justified to assert that Mnesippus' laughing response to Toxaris' exposition of religious and educational practices is both the source of a comic contrast, which satirises the literary and cultural tradition and wittily entertains the intellectual audience, and the expression of a cultural difference, which raises serious questions. Compared to the laughter of other Lucianic characters, Mnesippus' reaction might seem Cynic at first sight. However, although there are several ideological similarities, especially as far as irreverence towards religion and the disbelief in the immortality of the soul is concerned (implicitly in §1.8-9), Mnesippus' laughter significantly diverges from the typically Cynic, biting derision, with its abuse and moralising attitude.[62] Rather, Mnesippus exhibits common characteristics with Lucianic figures such as Demonax or Menippus. As scholarship has shown, these characters should be distinguished from properly Cynic characters like Diogenes as well. Demonax – and to a lesser extent Menippus – defend some aspects of Cynic philosophy, mock their opponents, but they do not 'bite' (cf. *Dem*. 21) or act hypocritically, unlike other Lucianic-Cynic figures such as Diogenes or Peregrinus.[63] The same distinction applies to Mnesippus in the *Toxaris*. Like Demonax, he resorts to the principle of incongruity to confront his interlocutor with a

[61] The verb ναυτίλλομαι is a fairly poetic one (Schmid I, 339); cf. *Od*. 4.672, 14.246, and it also appears eight times in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica.* However, Herodotus likewise uses ναυτίλλομαι (five times) to say 'navigate on a sea or to a country'. See also its use in *Hist.Conscr*. 62, *Fug*. 13.

[62] For this Cynic criticism of religion in Lucian, see Goulet-Cazé 1990, 2764.

[63] Branham implies a difference between Demonax and Diogenes only once ('[a]lthough Demonax was too intellectually wary to commit himself to the doctrines of a particular philosophical sect, he is said to have most in common with Socrates and Diogenes. Lucian stresses, however, that Demonax eschews the exhibitionism of Diogenes' antics and the hauteur of Socratic irony […]', Branham 1994, 39); he generally defines Demonax as characteristically Cynic (*ibid*., esp. 38). For an explicit and convincing analysis of this difference, see Kuin 2019. Essentially, Demonax lacks the hypocrisy of Cynic characters in Lucian; unlike these, he is not inclined to vanity and exhibitionism, and he is able to laugh at himself. Compare Jones 1986, 31, 90-100. For the difference between Menippus and other Cynic characters in Lucian, see Bompaire 1958, 182-185, Hall 1981, 64-150, Relihan 1987, 189, 192, 200-201. However, Lucian also frequently represents Menippus as Cynic-dog (e.g., *Bis Acc*. 33); for this aspect, see Camerotto 2009, 26 n. 54 with further passages, *id*. 2013, 123. For the representation of Menippus as 'satirical hero' in comparison to other Cynic characters, see *id*. 2014, 63-83. For the complex relationship between Lucian's characters and Menippus, see also McCarthy 1934.

different perspective and 'turn the tables' on him by deploying a characteristically serio-comic wit.[64] Therein, he also resembles the figure of Anacharsis. Like Menippus in some of the *Dialogues of the Dead*, when he is 'concerned with debunking […] hoary myths instead of supplying his normal moralizing and abuse ', Mnesippus satirises the myth of Orestes and Pylades. In general, Mnesippus shares Menippus' attitude towards religious beliefs and customs, but unlike the Cynics and Menippus who frequently deride the rich people for their love of money or fame, he shows no interest in unmasking 'wrong' social value.[65] Therefore, one might conclude that, in Lucian's corpus, there are Cynic characters and satiric characters, that overlaps between these categories are possible, and that not all characters are consistently 'Cynic' or 'satiric', as is the case with Menippus. Likewise, while Mnesippus sometimes resembles Menippus, Demonax or Anacharsis, but he definitely possesses satiric characteristics of his own: in short, he certainly is no true Cynic, although he adopts a Cynic view and attitude in certain aspects.

For example, with regard to the dialogical dynamics of the *Toxaris*, the responses Mnesippus gives to his interlocutor exhibit essential differences from those of Demonax or Menippus. If ridiculing mockery may sometimes be a powerful weapon against one's opponent, as a means to bring discredit upon him, Mnesippus does not use laughter as such a tool.[66] Although Mnesippus engages with Toxaris in eristic dynamics, which are actually similar to those in the *Anacharsis*, his responses are not destructive. Although Mnesippus deploys semantical antitheses in order to take hold of the dialogical dynamics, as is the case with his ironic use of ἀγαθόν (§3.2) and σεμνὸν καὶ θεῖον (§4.1), he does not have the last word, as Demonax does.[67] Indeed, his irony does not affect Toxaris. While, in the beginning, Mnesippus fails to make Toxaris abandon his demonstration of Scythian values, but still succeeds in turning every argument against Toxaris (§§1-4), in the end (§8), Mnesippus is convinced by Toxaris' lengthy explanation (§§5-7) – and rhetorical ability. Once, Toxaris even briefly appropriates Mnesippus' irony and Cynic insinuation that there is nothing after death. Toxaris reacts to Mnesippus' irony with irony and takes up his insinuation: by means of a comic inversion, he imagines that the dead Scythians play the part of the gods who interact with the humans by granting them favours (οὐ χεῖρον μὲν ἴσως εἰ καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἡμῖν εὐμενεῖς εἶεν, §1.10).[68] However, Toxaris quickly resumes his preceding gravity and solemnity.[69]

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[64] For these characteristics of Demonax' laughter, see Branham 1983, 281, *id*. 1994, esp. 45, Kuin 2019, 275-281. See also *Dem*. 6-7 for the programmatic nature of Demonax' laugh.

[65] For the citation, see Relihan 1987, 201. For Menippus' love of truth, see esp. Camerotto 2009, 44-47

[66] Compare Rossetti 2000, 253 on the following important features of ridicule: 'potentiel agonal, polémique, destructeur de la crédibilité.' For the destructive laughter and ridicule of Menippus in Lucian, see Camerotto 2009, 42-44, *id*. 2013, 123-124.

[67] For the use of semantic inversions in dialogical communication, see Mukařovský 1967, 118-119.

[68] The expression οὐ χεῖρον [sc. ἐστί] in answers means 'it is as well' (LSJ s.v. χείρων III.2); ἴσως,'perhaps', might be ironical as in Pl. *R.* 339b (LSJ s.v. ἴσως III). For the expression, see also Luc. *Scyth*. 1.16, but first in Plut. *Demetr*. 1.5.8 and *De esu carn.* 996B.

[69] Therefore, not only his value of virtue and courage is revealing, but also some expressions such as τοῦ προδότην φιλίας γεγενῆσθαι (§7.11), where the use of the abstract substantive φιλία, which is applied to

Toxaris first appears as an idealist and traditionalist, but he can also be a sophistic moralist. In §9, Toxaris severely reproaches the Greeks for their low performance in friendship in comparison to the Scythians. He affirms that Scythians are better at friendship, because they are much more loyal friends than the Greeks are (οἱ φίλοι Σκύθαι πολὺ πιστότεροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων φίλων), and because they hold friendship in higher esteem than the latter (πλείων φιλίας λόγος παρ' ἡμῖν ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν). This is what he wants to demonstrate (ἐπιδεῖξαι). He accuses the Greeks of delivering great speeches on friendship, and – most importantly – of being unable to translate their fine words into action (τἄργα δὲ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν λόγων ἐκμελετᾶν). He blames them for not caring to practise friendship and for merely, only praising its value instead (ἀλλ' ἀπόχρη ὑμῖν ἐπαινέσαι τε αὐτὴν καὶ δεῖξαι ἡλίκον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν). When their friends are in need, thus Toxaris' judgement, the Greeks 'betray their words and somehow desert in the heat of the action' (ἐν δὲ ταῖς χρείαις προδόντες τοὺς λόγους δραπετεύετε οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐκ μέσων τῶν ἔργων). Toxaris then re-formulates his indictment more concretely: the Greeks praise the dramatic representations of friendship – alluding to Euripides' tragedy *IT* – but they lack the courage to undertake anything praiseworthy for their friends in need (αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων παρέχεσθαι τολμᾶτε). He goes on to unmask the Greeks' hypocrisy by comparing the grand speeches they deliver and their fine moral principles with empty dreams (ὥσπερ τὰ ὀνείρατα οἴχονται ὑμῖν ἐκποδὼν ἀποπτάμεναι) and hollow mute masks (τοῖς κενοῖς τούτοις καὶ κωφοῖς προσωπείοις ἐοικότας ὑμᾶς ἀπολιποῦσαι, ἃ διηρμένα τὸ στόμα καὶ παμμέγεθες κεχηνότα οὐδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον φθέγγεται).[70] Toxaris concludes that the Scythians, by contrast, lack the ability to make grand speeches on friendship, but are definitely superior to the Greeks in accomplishing it in practice (ὅσῳ γὰρ δὴ λειπόμεθα ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις, τοσοῦτον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς πλεονεκτοῦμεν).

Toxaris' tone is thus highly moralistic. The expression οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν, 'according to the merit', gives a moral connotation to the Greeks' fallibility in action.[71] The verb ἀποχράω (ἀλλ' ἀπόχρη ὑμῖν), 'to satisfy, to be sufficient', insinuates that choosing words over deeds is the first and easiest option, thereby blaming the Greeks for negligence and laziness.[72] Toxaris then describes the Greeks' failure in performing friendship as an act of betrayal (προδόντες) and a coward escape (δραπετεύετε). Here, Toxaris uses a military metaphor, by means of which he expands upon the meaning of ἔργον, which has the sense of 'action', that is, 'in the thick of the fight'. The deployment of a military metaphor intensifies the opposition between words and deeds, which are defined as warfare, and sets the scene for Toxaris' further development of the opposition between the Greek and the Scythian context of friendships in §§35.9-36.12. Moreover, this metaphor aligns the present

persons instead of φίλος/φίλοι, is a form of metonymy that, though frequent in Greek, confers solemnity (KG I, p. 11).

[70] For the motif that dishonest philosophers wear masks and behave like actors, compare Max.Tyr. 1.10, Herodian. 1.9.3-5.

[71] See LSJ s.v. ἀξία I.3.

[72] See LSJ s.v. I.2.a.

discourse on words and deeds with the topical question of whether the men of action (generals, politicians) or the men of words (historiographers, orators, theoreticians) deserve the greatest credit.[73]

Toxaris' censure thus touches upon the question of the relationship between deeds and words, which is an eternal subject of discussion in Greek literature, starting with Homer (*Il*. 9.312-313, for example) and pervading all genres.[74] Toxaris decidedly takes position by favouring deeds over words, a position that has been related to a Cynic attitude.[75] This view requires further explanation and is better re-contextualised – from a literary perspective – with regard to the theme of friendship. In the present passage, the inferiority of words to deeds specifically problematises the inability to concretise moral philosophical principles in friendship, which is a *topos* in the discourse on friendship. Thus, truthfulness in deeds of friendship – and not only in words – is a motif that can already be identified in Thgn. 1.979-982 ('Μή μοι ἀνὴρ εἴη γλώσσηι φίλος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργωι.' / χερσίν τε σπεύδου χρήμασί τ', ἀμφότερα·/ μηδὲ παρὰ κλητῆρι λόγοισιν ἐμὴν φρένα θέλγοις. / 'ἀλλ' ἔρδων φαίνοιτ', εἴ τι δύναιτ', ἀγαθόν.').[76] To Aristotle, being a true friend necessitates doing good deeds rather than merely wishing him well (Arist. *EN* 1166a3-4, 15-16). Cicero likewise addresses the necessity to align ideal speeches on friendship with actual behaviour in *Fin*. 1.20.65 (nec uero hoc oratione solum sed multo magis uita et factis et moribus comprobauit).[77] Then, Toxaris focuses on the conversion of moral principles into deeds; ἐκμελετάω (ἐκμελετᾶν), 'to learn perfectly, to practise', applies, foremost, to rhetorical and intellectual exercise (e.g. Pl. *Hp.Ma*. 286d6, Plut. *Lys*. 25.1, Luc. *Rh.Pr*. 16.9), but it is also used in the sense of physical training (cf. Antipho 3.2.7, Lib. *Or*. 59.64) and, as in this case, of moral practice (cf. D.Chr. 13.32). This is topical as well, for friendship, like any other virtue, essentially comes into effect through its constant *practice* (Arist. *EN* 1157b5-11).[78] Finally, Toxaris expresses the fact that the Greeks fail to put into action what they praise (λόγος) by means of a *topos* taken from the discourse on friendship: the motif of the betrayal of friends in hardship (ἐν δὲ ταῖς χρείαις). Therefore, in the present passage, the question of the relationship between deeds and words is less representative of a 'Cynic' preference for deeds over words as it reflects an ethical discussion.

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[73] For the opposition of generals versus historiographers or orators, see, e.g., Cic. *De or.* 1.2.7, Sall. *Cat*. 3.1-2; for the opposition of politicians versus theoreticians, see, e.g., Cic. *Rep*. 1.2.3-3.6; for a fourfold opposition of generals versus historiographers and politicians versus orators, see, e.g., Plut. *De glor. Ath*. (=*Mor*. 345C-351B).

[74] For an overview of the uses until and including Thucydides, see esp. Parry 1981, although the validity and usefulness of his threefold categorisation of the *topos* might be questioned. The question is discussed widely and variedly in the Imperial period, too, such as in Plutarch's *De Gloria Atheniensium* and Maximus Tyrius' *Orations* 15 (Τίς ἀμείνων βίος· ὁ πρακτικός, ἢ ὁ θεωρητικός; ὅτι ὁ πρακτικός) and 16 (Ὅτι ὁ θεωρητικὸς βίος ἀμείνων τοῦ πρακτικοῦ). The *topos* lived on in imperial oratory well until the time of Libanius: Webb 2006, 29. For the *topos* in Lucian, see *Herm*. 79, *Fug*. 19.

[75] Martin 1996, 154, Visa-Ondarçuhu 2008, 183.

[76] See also vv. 61-68.

[77] This passage very specifically problematises inconsistencies in *Epicurean* theory of friendship.

[78] See Holzmeister 2014, 45. The idea that virtue in general must be exercised is topical in ethics. See e.g. Pl. *Men*. 71c, Arist. *Pol.* 1325b, *EN* 1098b31-1099a7, Cic. *Rep*. 1.2.2.

Second, the way Toxaris formulates the ἔργα/λόγος *topos* here, where λόγος becomes a synonym for illusion and rhetorical artifice, exhibits similarities with other satirical representations of hypocritical philosophers by Lucian.[79] In §9.19-21, Toxaris compares the Greeks' unfaithfulness to their theoretical principles and praise of friendship with the actors' empty and mute masks (τοῖς κενοῖς τούτοις καὶ κωφοῖς προσωπείοις ἐοικότας … ἃ διηρμένα τὸ στόμα καὶ παμμέγεθες κεχηνότα). These masks illustrate the vanity of words as opposed to actions, for they symbolise the discrepancy between appearance and inner value – a discrepancy that is denounced by comparing words with actors and further theatrical features, for example, in *Sat*. 28, *Icar*. 29, *Nigr*. 11.[80] In *Nigr*. 11, the rejection of an actor's attire signifies the adoption of a way of life in harmony with philosophy and modesty.[81] Dishonest and hypocritical philosophers are compared to actors in *Icar*. 29, for example.[82] The *simile* of mute actors is similarly deployed in *Hist.Conscr*. 4 to express inactivity.[83]

Toxaris compares the Greeks' vain principles in friendship, which exist only in the realm of dramatic representations, with volatile dreams. The phrase ὥσπερ τὰ ὀνείρατα οἴχονται [...] ἀποπτάμεναι recalls *Od*. 11.220 (ψυχὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται), a passage where Odysseus tries in vain to embrace the soul of his dead mother in the underworld.[84] These Homeric echoes underline the ephemeral nature of words, and more specifically of verses. An allusion to poetic speech is also found in the verb φθέγγομαι, 'speak loud and clear' (the masks οὐδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον φθέγγεται). In the present context, the verb has a connotation of poetical verse singing

[79] Lucian's *Symposium*, but also his *Apologia*, *Hermotimus*, *Icaromenippus*, *Nigrinus*, *Piscator*, etc. denounce hypocritical philosophers and focus on the discrepancy between philosophical theory and praxis. For Lucian's representation of philosophers, see e.g. Bompaire 1958, 485-489, Alexiou 1990, Dolcetti 1996, esp. 63-67, Nesselrath 2001.

[80] Lucian frequently uses props and the actors' costumes in disparaging comparisons: *Gall*. 26, *Rh.Pr.* 12, *Pisc*. 32 (the actors' play and voice is laughable), *Salt*. 27 (ridiculous appearance of actors, and notice στόμα κεχηνὸς πάμμεγα). See Anderson 1976a, 18 with n. 126, Béguin 2017, 265-267. For a survey of representations of theatrical props such as masks in the Late Republican and Imperial periods in the visual arts and as material evidence, see Green 1994, 142-171 and Karavas 2005, 219 n. 69 for further bibliography. For the masks, see also Marquis, 487-488 n. 31.

[81] In the text: μὴ καὶ κατ' ἄλλο τι γένωμαι τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς ἐκείνοις ὅμοιος, οἳ πολλάκις ἢ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἢ Κρέοντος ἢ καὶ Ἡρακλέους αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον ἀνειληφότες, χρυσίδας ἠμφιεσμένοι καὶ δεινὸν βλέποντες καὶ μέγα κεχηνότες μικρὸν φθέγγονται καὶ ἰσχνὸν καὶ γυναικῶδες καὶ τῆς Ἑκάβης ἢ Πολυξένης πολὺ ταπεινότερον.

[82] In the text: ἔπειτα δὲ ὄνομα σεμνὸν τὴν ἀρετὴν περιθέμενοι … περιέρχονται ἐπιπλάστῳ σχήματι κατάπτυστα ἤθη περιστέλλοντες, ἐμφερεῖς μάλιστα τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐκείνοις ὑποκριταῖς, ὧν ἢν ἀφέλῃ τις τὰ προσωπεῖα καὶ τὴν χρυσόπαστον ἐκείνην στολήν, τὸ καταλειπόμενόν ἐστι γελοῖον ἀνθρώπιον ἑπτὰ δραχμῶν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα μεμισθωμένον. For the philosophers' ridiculous appearance expressed by means of a comparison with actors, see also *Pisc*. 31, *Nec*. 16, *Gall*. 26, *JTr*. 41, *Pro Im*. 3, *DMort*. 20(10).9, which are referred to in Camerotto 2009, *ad Icar*. 29.

[83] In the text: καὐτὸς οὖν, ὦ Φίλων, ὡς μὴ μόνος ἄφωνος εἴην ἐν οὕτω πολυφώνῳ τῷ καιρῷ μηδ' ὥσπερ κωμικὸν δορυφόρημα κεχηνὼς σιωπῇ παραφεροίμην. Scholars (Müller in 1886 and Waddell in 1927) have deduced from this passage that it referred to *personae mutae* on stage, who would have worn a mask indicating their role: Kokolakis 1960, 98-99 (with nn. 117-118 for the bibliographic references). The latter rightly underlines that the Lucianic passage rather exploits the image of an empty (κενοῖς) and abandoned (ἀπολιποῦσαι) comic mask.

[84] This verse seems to be appreciated by imperial authors, as shown, for example, by the citation in Plut. *De facie* 944F, and particularly in the context of the vanity of τιμή in D.Chr. *Or*. 37.8. The wording in the *Toxaris*, though, also recalls the vanishing apparition of Nestor in Agamemnon's dream in *Il*. 2.71 (ᾤχετ' ἀποπτάμενος, ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν).

and more particularly of dramatic recitation (cf. Luc. *Hist.Conscr.* 1, of historians: ἅπαντες γὰρ ἐς τραγῳδίαν παρεκίνουν καὶ ἰαμβεῖα ἐφθέγγοντο καὶ μέγα ἐβόων).[85] These allusions to tragedy and poetry, in the context of true philosophical behaviour, in a way relate to the ambiguous relationship of rivalry and emulation between prose and poetry, but also between philosophy and sophistic rhetoric, considering that references to costumes, masks, etc. frequently allude to sophistic performances.[86]

Thus, Toxaris indirectly criticises the Greeks' fondness of theatre performances. In comparison, Anacharsis repeatedly derides the Athenian comedians because of their attire (*Anach.* 23 – and notice the similar formulation κράνη δέ ... παγγέλοια κεχηνότα παμμέγεθες – and 32). This has been interpreted as the Scythian's incomprehension and impermeability to Greek culture.[87] However, Anacharsis might as well incarnate a Roman, or rather, a generally intellectual, critical perspective on Greek institutions such as theatre or athletics.[88] Likewise, Toxaris' criticism is not only directed at the Greeks' hypocrisy and lack of true ethical commitment, but it also represents an 'alien' view upon Greek drama and culture – a culture whose values he defends at the same time, though under the guise of Scythian customs and principles.

Indeed, the consistency of one's deeds in relationship to one's own ethics, which Toxaris so vigorously defends, is a common precept in ancient philosophy (cf. Arist. *EN* 1105b2-5), not only with regard to friendship. Noticeably, it finds a similar form of expression, that is, theatre metaphors, in Seneca, who adopts a more Cynic attitude.[89] However, it is justified to raise the question of whether Cynic is the best adjective to characterise Toxaris' invective. His focus is not so much on the discrepancy between deeds and words as upon hypocritical philosophic ideals, especially ethical ones. Except for the fact that his παρρησία and biting attack on hypocrisy might recall the Cynics' mode of abusing human shortcomings, the way Toxaris deploys the *topos* is rather satirical and moralistic than Cynic. Besides, the relationship between words and deeds in Cynicism is complex, for the Cynics themselves certainly do not refrain from speech-making to publicise their beliefs.[90] The same ambivalence is reflected here in Toxaris' rhetorical ability to unmask the Greeks' moral failure. The *topos* of deeds versus words becomes ironical considering Toxaris' own use of λόγος

[85] For the connotation of verse singing, see X. *Oec.* 8.3. For the theatrical connotation of φθέγγομαι, compare Kokolakis 1960, 92.
[86] See Schmitz 2010, 303.
[87] See Bozia 2015, 77.
[88] For Anacharsis' Roman perspective, see König 2005, 57-58 (who, however, also expresses a traditional point of criticism), 93-95. For further interpretations of Anacharsis' view on Greek athletics, see Branham 1989, 82-104, Ungefehr-Kortus 1996, 209-212, 228-229 (Anacharsis' criticism leads to a form of cultural relativism) and 212-223 (is similar to contemporary criticism of athletics), Mestre 2003, 310, Konstan 2010. For a relativising view of Romans' criticism of Greek institutions, see Gruen 1993, 260-271.
[89] See Del Giovane 2015, 77, 238-242. She relates this motif and this attitude to Cynic 'diatribe', compare Fuentes González 1998, 148-155 and Teles p. 5 Hense for this theatre metaphor in Cynicism.
[90] See Branham 1993, esp. 447-448.

and its importance for the dialogue.[91] In fact, Toxaris' ideal of the union of practical life and philosophy is characteristic of imperial thought.[92] In particular, it is a characteristic feature of Lucian, to whom the unmasking of pseudo-philosophers who do not act according to their principles is a 'favourite comic *topos* '.[93] Finally, Toxaris' chiding Mnesippus exhibits a further implication with regard to his own self-fashioning as a *pepaideumenos*, for what Toxaris criticises most in Mnesippus' dealing with 'words' – that is, the latter's rhetorical ability and his use of literary examples – is his deficient, passive, practice of *paideia*. This aspect will be developed further in §10-12.3a, but it is remarkable how, at this point, Toxaris presents his own *paideia* as superior to Mnesippus' superficial one, thereby claiming for himself a 'truer' Greekness than the Greek's.[94]

In conclusion, the dialogue between Mnesippus and Toxaris is a complex interweaving of different cultural, literary, and philosophical views. They are both alien and Greek, as will be seen in more detail in a following chapter ('Barbarians and Greeks'), and their voices have affinities with various literary genres ranging from tragedy to philosophy. Finally, Mnesippus, at times and to a certain extent, recalls a Cynic stance or adopts Cynic beliefs, but it would be wrong to regard him as a Cynic character. Perhaps he is Cynic in a Lucianic way, that is, derisive way. The entanglement of Mnesippus and Toxaris' contrasting and changing perspectives results in a product that is twice σπουδογέλοιον, in the characters' attitude in itself and by their opposition. Toxaris performs the serious role and Mnesippus the satiric-comic part; the latter is serious though being comic, while the former turns out to be quasi comic due to his overly serious moralising.

2. Orestes and Pylades: A Mythical Friendship

The Myth of Orestes and Pylades

The *Toxaris* opens with Mnesippus and Toxaris discussing the Scythian cult of Orestes and Pylades. The myth of the Greek heroes' adventures in Scythia must have been familiar to the audience of the *Toxaris*. On the one hand, these mythical characters belong to the stock examples of perfect friendship along with Theseus and Pirithous or Achilles and Patroclus, for example. On the other hand, their adventures in Scythia were the subject of a play by Euripides, the *Iphigenia in Tauris*

[91] For example, in the present passage, by means of the metaphor of the betrayed λόγος (ἐν δὲ ταῖς χρείαις προδόντες τοὺς λόγους), Toxaris personifies λόγος and implicitly equates it to friendship. This is significant for the dialogue as a whole, for it is through λόγος – and not through deeds – that friendship between Mnesippus and Toxaris comes about.
[92] See Stadter 2012.
[93] See Tomassi 2011, 499-529. Cf. also Luc. *Hipp*. 2, *Ind*. 29, *Pisc*. 47 and *passim*. See also Helm 1906, 40-42 (with further examples in Cicero, Seneca, Juvenal, Epictetus, etc.).In addition, see my argumentation above. For the dissonance between doctrine and life, and for the philosophers' hypocrisy and venality in particular, see Jones 1986, 24-32.
[94] The act of unmasking 'false' or superficial paideia – and, thus, Greekness – is essential to many of Lucian's works, such as, for example, *Ind*., *Bis Acc*., *Pisc*. See Richter 2011, esp. 148-152, also with regard to the question of cultural identity.

(*IT*). This tragedy played an important role for the later representations of the myth, and in antiquity, its reception was considerable.[95] Indeed, there seems to have been little to be said about the adventures of Orestes and Pylades in Tauris before Euripides' play, for neither Homer nor Hesiod know of Pylades, and Aeschylus' and Sophocles' plays do not deal with the events in Tauris.[96] The Euripidean tragedy is thus an important text of reference for the *Toxaris*, which is why it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the origin and fortune of the tale in order to better understand better the Lucianic version of this myth and its meaning for the *Toxaris*.

Euripides' *IT* begins with Iphigenia lamenting her unfortunate fate, from her escape from being sacrificed at Aulis to the Taurian altar, where Artemis has made her the priestess of her temple.[97] Taurians sacrifice any Greek man who comes to their place to the goddess Artemis, and Iphigenia is in charge of the rituals (vv. 1-66). Orestes and Pylades, on their quest for Artemis' *xoanon* in Tauris on Apollo's orders, are caught by the Taurians while lurking around the temple of the goddess. The strangers are handed over to the priestess for sacrifice (vv. 67-471). When Iphigenia finds out the strangers' birthplace, which is her home country, she requests that Pylades brings a letter from her to her family; in exchange for this service, he would be freed. What follows is a process of recognition between brother and sister, between Orestes and Iphigenia (*anagnōrisis*) (vv. 472-901). They plot their escape from Tauris with the *xoanon*. Iphigenia presents to Thoas, the king of the Taurians, the pretext that the votive statue and the captives must be purified at the seashore (vv. 902-1282). Although the three succeed in escaping and overcoming the Taurian guards, they are brought back to the shore by contrary winds and fall into Thoas' hands (vv. 1283-1434). The goddess Athena intervenes and explains to the king of the Taurians that Orestes must bring the image of Artemis to Halae and found a sanctuary for Artemis Tauropolos, whereas Iphigenia will become Artemis' priestess at Brauron. Thoas obeys the will of the gods and lets the Greeks sail away (vv. 1435-1496). With regard to the friendship between Orestes and Pylades, it is best illustrated, before the *anagnōrisis* has taken place, through Pylades' refusal to let Orestes die on the Taurian altar and return to Argos alone (vv. 674-686). He wants to die along with his friend, mainly because he believes

[95] See esp. Hall 2013. For Aristotle's positive judgement on the *IT*, see S. White 1992.
[96] RE XXIII.2 (1939) s.v Orestes, 997 [Lesky].
[97] The cults of Iphigenia and Artemis are associated in a few more places. In Halae (on the south-eastern coast of Attica), there was a temple of Artemis Tauropolos whose *xoanon* was believed to have been brought from Tauris (E. *IT* 1453, Str. 9.1.22). Iphigenia was also worshipped in Brauron (on the east coast of Attica), where, according to another story, the *xoanon* of Artemis had been brought from Tauris (E. *IT* 1463, Call. *Dian*. 173, Paus. 1.33.1) (RE II.1 (1895) s.v. Artemis, 1357 [Wernicke]). On the Athenian Acropolis, there was a shrine of this Brauronian Artemis (Paus. 1.23.9) and Artemis-Iphigenia was worshipped at Hermione (south of Argolis), Megara and Aegira (north-east of Achaea). See Platnauer 1938, ix-x. As reported by the tradition overshadowed by the popular versions of Attic drama, the mythological heroine Iphigenia was born in Aphidna as daughter of Theseus and Helen and, according to further sources, given to Clytemnestra. This Attic Iphigenia was to be sacrificed by Agamemnon in Brauron, but saved by Artemis who replaced her with a bear and transformed her into Hecate. According to the popular tradition, she is Agamemnon's own daughter and related to the legends surrounding the house of Atreus. The Argive Iphigenia was to be sacrificed in Aulis and replaced by a hind before being deported to Tauris and becoming a goddess (RE IX.2 (1916) s.v. Iphigeneia, 2588-2622 [Kjellberg]).

that it would be dishonouring (αἰσχρόν, v. 674) not to share his death and because he is afraid of the mistrust and the ill reputation he would gain by returning from Tauris alone. On the other hand, the simple fact that Orestes is his friend is good enough a reason – and even represents a moral obligation – to die along with him (κοὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ χρὴ συνεκπνεῦσαί μέ σοι / καὶ συσφαγῆναι καὶ πυρωθῆναι δέμας, / φίλον γεγῶτα, vv. 684-686a). Orestes strongly objects to this, whereupon Pylades seems to accept his mission to transfer Iphigenia's letter to her family (vv. 687-722). However, the central character of the play is Iphigenia and the scene of recognition between Orestes and his sister is the essential issue.[98]

The myth of Orestes and Pylades in Tauris seems to have been treated by Timesitheus, to whom the *Suida* attributes a tragedy entitled *Orestes Pylades*, the plot of which is unknown, however.[99] Rhinton, a comic poet of the third century BCE has also written a *phlyax* play entitled *Iphigenia in Tauris*, of which a single fragment has survived (F 6 PCG = 7 CGF).[100] *P.Oxy*. 3.413, probably dating from the second century CE, attests a fragment of popular mime with a similar plot, which, though set in India, proves the popularity of the story of the *IT*.[101]

On the Latin side, Naevius' *Iphigenia* probably revised the *IT* (F 53 and 62 TrRF).[102] Pacuvius dealt with the myth in his *Chryses* (F 76-112, 365[1-4], trag. inc. 138 TrRF),[103] and he was apparently immensely appreciated for his handling of the mutual spirit of sacrifice displayed by the exemplary friends (Cic. *Fin*. 1.65, 5.63, *Amic.* 7.24). The relationship between the Latin tragedy and Sophocles' lost *Chryses* (F 726-730 TrGF) is unclear – neither as is the relationship between these plays and Hyginus' *Fabulae*, which deal with the myth of Orestes and Pylades (*Fab.* 120, 261) and that of Chryses, the son of Chryseis and Agamemnon (*Fab.* 121).[104] However, what is apparent from the fragments and the appreciation by the *testimonia* is that 'Pacuvius' play placed a stronger […] emphasis than does Euripides' on the relationship between Orestes and Pylades in a way which accorded with the Roman idealisation of male friendship '.[105]

The reception of the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Tauris in Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* underlines precisely this aspect of ideal friendship. In these texts, the exiled poet revisits the Euripidean play, although it is not possible to say to what extent Pacuvius' *Chryses* played an intermediary role. Ovid not only mentions the pair of friends as an example of true friendship in *Trist*. 1.5.21-22, 1.9.27-28, 5.4.25, 5.6.25-28 and *Pont*. 2.3.45, 2.6.25, but also deals at length with the myth in *Trist*. 4.4b.9-28 (4.4.63-82) and *Pont*. 3.2.43-100. The passage in the *Tristia* begins with

[98] For the importance of the *anagnōrisis*-scene, see Cropp 2000, 33-34 with n. 5. For the value of the *anagnōrisis* in Aristotle's *Poetics*, see Preßler 1998, 93-97. See Arist. *Po.* 1455a18-22 and 1455b2-12.
[99] Suid. π 613.
[100] Kyriakou 2006, 43.
[101] See Hall 2013, 117. For the essentially parodic reception of Euripides' tragedies in New Comedy, see Nesselrath 1993.
[102] Petaccia 2000, 88 with n. 6.
[103] Petaccia 2000, 91-92.
[104] Schierl 2006, 192-239.
[105] Parker 2016, xlvi.

a description of his hosts' gore customs, which culminates in the dramatic scene of Iphigenia's sacrifice of Orestes and 'his Phocean comrade, an example of true love' (v. 17 (71)). Ovid underlines Orestes and Pylades' carelessness of their own lives and their mutual worries about the other's imminent death (vv. 21-22 (75-76)). Iphigenia stops her knife just in time, 'when in their exchange of words, she recognised her brother' (v. 25 (79)). Delighted by their reunion, they flee together with the statue of the goddess. In the lengthier passage of the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, the tale is put into the mouth of an old Sauromatian-Getic man. The narration of the myth serves as a praise for the Scythians' high esteem of friendship. The old man describes the ruins of the temple, where Iphigenia, in the time of king Thoas, once sacrificed strangers according to the ancient Scythians' custom (vv. 49-66). Orestes and Pylades, 'of equal age and love' (v. 69), were brought there to be slaughtered. Iphigenia asks the Greeks for forgiveness for her deed and proposes to free one of them to carry a message to her home (vv. 77-84). Pylades offers Orestes to go, but 'he refuses, and in turn, they fight to die' (vv. 85-86). While they carry on their 'battle of love' (certamen amoris, v. 89), Iphigenia writes a letter to her brother. The moment of recognition is summarised in Iphigenia's tragi-comical handing of the letter addressed to Orestes to her victim (ad fratrem scriptas exarat illa notas: / ad fratrem mandata dabat, cuique illa dabantur, / humanos casus adspice, frater erat, vv. 90-92). The old Getic quickly closes the story with the three escaping to the ship with the statue of the goddess (vv. 93-94), and, once again, he states the Scythians' admiration for Orestes and Pylades (vv. 95-96). Ovid has his *persona* conclude that even in these hostile regions, 'the name of friendship stirs the barbarian's heart' (v. 100). In both passages, the Ovidian representation of the myth focusses more on the tragic moment of the sacrifice than on the Euripidean scene of *anagnōrisis*. Besides, Ovid's emphasis on Orestes and Pylades' mutual self-sacrifice in favour of the other's life, which exemplifies their exceptional friendship, diverges from Euripides' representation of the myth, where Pylades wants to die along with Orestes.[106]

In these regards, Manilius' mention of the myth is similar to these Latin versions, for he, too, emphasises this contest for death between friends, which leads him to regard Orestes and Pylades as the best example of friendship (2.583-585). Finally, Martial's epigram 6.11 is noteworthy in this context because here, he complains about favours not repaid and the absence of true friendships in his contemporary world of unequal patron-client relationships. Orestes and Pylades' reciprocal love functions as a positive contrast to his present situation. Mutual devotion, as (allegedly) in Pacuvius' play and certainly in Ovid's elegies, is the central statement made by this brief representation of the myth.

Orestes and Pylades in Lucian's *Toxaris*

In Lucian's *Toxaris*, the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Scythia is first briefly told by Mnesippus (§2.5-9), then recounted more extensively (and in part by means of an ecphrasis) by Toxaris (§3.14-

[106] For a comparison of both texts, see Ingleheart 2010.

16, §6.9-25). Mnesippus summarises the myth as follows: Orestes and Pylades are shipwrecked in Scythia (ναυαγίᾳ περιπεσόντας, §2.5), where the barbarian inhabitants take them to be sacrificed to Artemis (ὡς τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καταθύσοντες, §2.6). They escape by killing the guards and the king, and sail away with the priestess after stealing the cult statue (ἀποσυλήσαντες, §2.6-9). Toxaris' storyline of the myth conforms to Mnesippus', whose version he corroborates in §3.14-16, though by giving a different value judgement on Orestes and Pylades' deeds and characterising these as heroic avengers (οὕτως ἀνδρείως χρήσασθαι τῷ πράγματι, §3.14, τιμωρησαμένους τὸν βασιλέα τῆς ὕβρεως, §3.15-16).[107] A few prompts later, he significantly expands on this summary. Orestes, accompanied by Pylades, is shipwrecked on the Pontic cliffs (ἐν τοῖς κρημνοῖς διαφθαρείσης αὐτῶν τῆς νεώς, §6.10-11), taken by the Scythians and prepared for the sacrifice by Iphigenia (πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν παρεσκευασμένος, καὶ ἡ Ἰφιγένεια ἤδη κατάρχεται αὐτῶν, §6.11-12). Together with Pylades, he gets rid of his bonds, kills the king Thoas and many more Scythians, and sails away with Iphigenia and the cult statue (§6.13-15). The Scythians, Toxaris adds with emphasis and details, sail after Orestes and Pylades and try to board their ship, but these two succeed in pushing the injured assailants back, protecting one another from the barbarians' mortal arrows with a great spirit of sacrifice (§6.16-25).

This version of the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Scythia differs from both Euripides' and Ovid's versions, for it leaves out the essential scene of *anagnōrisis*, integrates further elements such as Orestes and Pylades' shipwreck and their killing of the Taurian king Thoas, and emphasises their fight against the Scythians. First, Orestes and Pylades' shipwreck (ναυαγίᾳ, §2.5) is a Lucianic invention. It might have been inspired by Herodotus, who reports that the Taurians sacrifice foreign shipwrecked sailors to a goddess Parthenos and bring her captured Greeks, believing that the goddess is Iphigenia (τούτων Ταῦροι μὲν νόμοισι τοιοισίδε χρέωνται· θύουσι μὲν τῇ Παρθένῳ τούς τε ναυηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἂν λάβωσι Ἑλλήνων ἐπαναχθέντες τρόπῳ τοιῷδε, 4.103.1). However, it might as well be inspired by Euripides' *IT*, for one of the Taurian cowherds explains Orestes and Pylades' presence on their shores by supposing that they are shipwrecked sailors (ναυτίλους δ' ἐφθαρμένους, *IT* 276).[108] There is a further clue to the influence of these two texts upon the motif in the *Toxaris*: Orestes and Pylades are shipwrecked on the Scythian cliffs (ἐν τοῖς κρημνοῖς, §6.10).[109] Herodotus uses the word κρημνός for the cliffs upon which the Taurian temple of Iphigenia is built and from which the Taurians fling their captured foreigners and victims (Hdt. 4.103.5, 6 and 8).[110] The same

[107] For Mnesippus and Toxaris' divergent perspectives on the myth and Toxaris' heroisation of Orestes and Pylades, see below.
[108] Bompaire 1958, 724. See also Lloyd-Jones 1983, Hall 1989a, 110-2, Kyriakou 2006, *ad loc*. The shipwreck on inhospitable shores is a literary motif to be found as early as in Homer's *Odyssey* and has not only influenced Euripides's *IT*, but also the ancient novel. For the motif of the shipwreck on inhospitable shores in Homer, Euripides' *IT* and its reception in the novel, see Hilton 2012.
[109] A large part of the material of Euripides' *IT* is indebted to Herodotus' *Histories* and his description of the Black Sea region: Hall 1989a, 110-112.
[110] Therefore, it is highly improbable that κρημνοῖς refers to the toponymal Κρημνοί mentioned in Hdt. 4.20.7, 4.110.12. For the problematic localisation of Κρημνοί, see Marquis, 484-486 n. 24.

word is then used by Euripides, when the Taurian messenger tells Thoas how Orestes and Pylades have escaped to the sea (πρὸς κρημνόν, *IT* 1373) with Iphigenia and the cult statue of Artemis.

Second, the motif of Orestes and Pylades killing the Scythian king Thoas seems to be a Lucianic invention as well. Or rather, it is neither Euripidean, although the name is an invention of the tragedian, nor known from any previous literary version of the myth.[111] In Euripides' play, Orestes and Pylades do not kill the king, although Orestes considers the possibility of killing Thoas (ἆρ' ἂν τύραννον διολέσαι δυναίμεθ' ἄν; *IT* 1020). However, the idea is immediately rejected by Iphigenia (*IT* 1021). Hyg. *Fab.* 121 and 261 and Serv. *In Verg. Aen*. 2.116 also report the killing of Thoas, but Hyg. *Fab.* 121 ascribes the murder to Chryses, Chryseis and Agamemnons son. Arrian reports that Thoas died of a disease (*Peripl.M.Eux*. 6.4). It has therefore been hypothesised that the killing of Thoas is a Roman development of the myth, although it may be based on *IT* 1020.[112] The textual tradition does not allow for precise conclusions, but in any case, the use of the motif here is hardly particularly Euripidean. A further difference between this passage and the tragedian's version is that Orestes and Pylades escape from captivity and the sacrifice by force, and not by means of Iphigenia's ruse. In the *Toxaris*, the focus is clearly on Orestes and Pylades' heroic physical achievement. Thus, the massacre of 'many Scythians' (φονεύων ... καὶ πολλοὺς ἄλλους τῶν Σκυθῶν, §6.14) is an amplification of the Euripidean motif of the fight at the seashore. Besides, the Greek heroes get the upper hand over the Scythians by fighting and not because Athena appears and summons the barbarians to let them go, as Euripides' play has it. The absence of *dea ex machina* in the *Toxaris*, as in Ovid's representations, means that the focus shifts from the divine to human moral qualities and heroic behaviour.

By contrast, the scene of the sacrifice takes little place in the Lucianic version, which even completely leaves out the *anagnōrisis*. This is remarkable, considering that the gruesomeness of the sacrifice is emphasised in both Euripides and Ovid, as it accentuates the climax of the tragic moment. In Euripides' tragedy, the horror that inspired the human sacrifices on the Taurian altar of Artemis, which is alluded to in E. *IT* 35-37, 53 and 278-279, is made explicit at vv. 72-75 (καὶ βωμός, Ἕλλην οὗ καταστάζει φόνος;/ [Πυ.] ἐξ αἱμάτων γοῦν ξάνθ' ἔχει θριγκώματα / [Ορ]. θριγκοῖς δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῖς σκῦλ' ὁρᾶις ἠρτημένα; / [Πυ.] τῶν κατθανόντων γ' ἀκροθίνια ξένων) and vv. 225-228 (although this passage is corrupt). Similarly, Ovid describes the sacrifice of Orestes and Pylades at the altar in *Trist*. 4.4b.19-20 (4.73-74) (protinus euincti tristem ducuntur ad aram / quae stabat geminas ante cruenta fores), and *Pont*. 3.2.53-54 (araque, quae fuerat natura candida saxi, / decolor adfuso tincta cruore rubet) and 71-72 (protinus inmitem Triviae ducuntur ad aram, / euincti geminas ad sua terga manus).[113] The importance of this scene in the myth has definitely become legendary, considering

[111] For the name in Euripides' *IT*, see, e.g., Parker 2016, *ad vv*. 31-33.
[112] LM III.I (1978) s.v. Orestes 997-998 [Höfer].
[113] The text follows Hall's 1995 Teubner-edition for the reading of *Trist*. 4.4b.19. Interestingly, Toxaris' succinct narration of this event (συνειλημμένος καὶ πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν παρεσκευασμένος, §6.11) is closer to the

the impact of the abominable sacrifice upon subsequent literature. Achilles Tatius has Leucippe allude to the gruesomeness of the Scythian-Taurians' sacrifice (8.2.3).[114] Lucian too deals with the myth in *JTr*. 44, *Sacr*. 13. In *DDeor*. 3 (23).1 and 18 (16).1, Iphigenia's sacrifice becomes a comic element in the ridicule of the gods, a mismatched emblem of exaggerated goriness. Besides, the scene of Orestes and Pylades being brought before Iphigenia is also represented in visual arts. For example, the human sacrifice is clearly represented by decapitated heads hanging on a tree on Roman sarcophagi illustrating the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Tauris (LIMC V.II Iphigeneia 75 (left side of a sarcophagus, 140-150 CE) and 79 (lid of a sarcophagus, 150-160 CE)). In particular, a further representation, which is found on an Etruscan urn in alabaster dating from the beginning of the second century BCE in Chiusi, probably alludes to the Taurians' human sacrifice, although there are certainly further ethnic characteristics at stake.[115]

The idea that Scythians make cruel sacrifices is not only significant with regard to the discussion of the myth of Orestes and Pylades in the beginning of the *Toxaris*, but also with regard to the aspect of cultural characterisation in this dialogue. The sacrifice is already the subject of a chapter in Herodotus' ethnography of the Scythian peoples, for, as mentioned above, he reports that the Scythians sacrifice foreigners and Greeks (4.103). The sacrifice is therefore emblematic of the Scythians' barbarism. By shifting the focus from Iphigenia's sacrifice to Orestes and Pylades' escape and mutual devotion, the *Toxaris* (and Toxaris) not only emphasises friendship as a central issue, but also plays down this Scythian barbaric 'characteristic'. While the barbaric sacrifice of Orestes and Pylades through Iphigenia's hands is quickly dealt with in half a sentence (καὶ πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν παρεσκευασμένος, καὶ ἡ Ἰφιγένεια ἤδη κατάρχεται αὐτῶν, §6.11-12), Toxaris' account expands on the heroic fight of the Greek heroes against the Scythians (§6.19-25). Here, Toxaris describes how, although the Scythians are unable to hold back Orestes and Pylades escaping on their ship, they attack them with their arrows and start a battle. The vocabulary is military (ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς Σκύθας συμπλοκῇ, τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν πολεμίων, ἀμυνόμενον δὲ τοὺς ἐπιφερομένους, ἀπαντᾶν πειρώμενον τοῖς τοξεύμασιν). The focus is on Orestes and Pylades' mutual devotion in their battle against the Scythians (θατέρῳ, πρὸ εἰκείνου) and on their readiness to die for each other (καὶ παρ' οὐδὲν τιθέμενον εἰ ἀποθανεῖται σώσας τὸν φίλον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον φερομένην πληγὴν προαρπάσας τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι).

The function of the episode of the fight against the Scythians thus consists in demonstrating Orestes and Pylades' true friendship (ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων εὔνοιαν, §6.20), as is recalled later

narration of Ovid's Getan (protinus euincti tristem ducuntur ad aram, *Trist*. 4.4b.19) than to Euripides' lengthy dramatic mode.

[114] καὶ μεμίανται τὸ ἔδαφος ἀνθρωπίνῳ αἵματι. τοιαῦτα σπένδει τίς τῇ θεῷ; οὐ βάρβαροι τοῦτο καὶ Ταῦροι καὶ ἡ Ἄρτεμις ἡ Σκυθῶν; ὁ παρ' ἐκείνοις μόνος ναὸς οὕτως αἱμάσσεται·τὴν Ἰωνίαν Σκυθίαν πεποίηκας, καὶ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ ῥεῖ τὰ ἐν Ταύροις αἵματα.

[115] See LIMC V.I (1990) s.v. Iphigeneia 22 [Krauskopf]. See also Brunn/Körte 1870, II.2, 184 no. 8a. For a discussion, see Bonfante 1984. The urn is in possession of the New York University Collection.

(κινδυνεύουσιν αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων, §9.14-15). The willingness of Orestes and Pylades to die for another is a well-known literary motif from Euripides' *IT* 598-608, which is developed in the Latin version of the myth, especially as far as Cicero's praise of Pacuvius' play (Cic. *Fin*. 5.63 and 1.65, *Amic.* 7.24) and Ovid's Getic version (*Trist*. 4.4b.21-22 (4.75-76)) are concerned. There, however, their friendship is demonstrated in their willingness to die for each other in the scene of the sacrifice. Therein, the *Toxaris* significantly differs; in Toxaris' version of the myth, Orestes and Pylades appear as courageous and virtuous heroes and their friendship is specifically related to the context of heroic deeds. This foreshadows Toxaris' description of ideal Scythian friendship in hardship (§36), which is exemplified in his stories, especially where he delivers more of such descriptions of epic battle scenes (§§39-41 and §§54-55). Thus, Toxaris adapts the myth to his needs, while nevertheless ensuring that its dialogue with, and therefore difference from, previous representations is recognisable. For example, mentioning the τραυματίαι, the wounded Scythians (οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τραυματίαι, §6.18) and describing the Scythians' retreat (ἀπονήχονται πρὸς τὴν γῆν, §6.19, but Orestes and Pylades are shipwrecked ἐν τοῖς κρημνοῖς, §6.10) after their unsuccessful attempt to prevent the friends from escaping is a way to allude to the lengthy account of the fight by the messenger in Euripides (*IT* 1364-1378):

> ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον εἰχόμεσθα τῆς ξένης
> καὶ πρὸς σ' ἔπεσθαι διεβιαζόμεσθά νιν.
> ὅθεν τὰ δεινὰ πλήματ' ἦν γενειάδων,
> κεῖνοί τε γὰρ σίδηρον οὐκ εἶχον χεροῖν
> ἡμεῖς τε, πυγμαί δ' ἦσαν ἐγκροτούμεναι,
> καὶ κῶλ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν τοῖν νεανίαιν ἅμα
> ἐς πλευρὰ καὶ πρὸς ἦπαρ ἠκοντίζετο,
> ὥστε ξυναλγεῖν καὶ συναποκαμεῖν μέλη.
> δεινοῖς δὲ σημάντροισιν ἐσφραγισμένοι
> ἐφεύγομεν πρὸς κρημνόν, οἳ μὲν ἐν κάρα
> κάθαιμ' ἔχοντες τραύμαθ', οἳ δ' ἐν ὄμμασιν·
> ὄχθοις δ' ἐπισταθέντες εὐλαβεστέρως
> ἐμαρνάμεσθα καὶ πέτροις ἐβάλλομεν.
> ἀλλ' εἶργον ἡμᾶς τοξόται πρύμνης ἔπι
> σταθέντες ἰοῖς, ὥστ' ἀναστεῖλαι πρόσω.
>
> But nevertheless we got the stranger woman into our hands and we brought her to you by force. Therefrom I received these horrible blows on my cheeks, for neither these [Orestes and Pylades] nor we had weapons in hands, but fists were dashing one against the other, and from the two young men together darted arms and legs into our sides and breasts, so that we

had our share of sufferings and ceased from weariness in our limbs. Marked by terrible signs of the battle – the one having wounds at their head, the other bruises on their eyes – we took flight to the cliffs. Standing higher on the shores, we fought battle more cautiously and threw stones. But the archers, standing on the stern, kept us at a distance with their arrows so that they drove us away.[116]

There, the Taurian messenger tells his king Thoas about all the blows they received when they tried to take hold of Orestes and Pylades. While the battle proceeds in a similar way and while there are some verbal echoes (ἐφεύγομεν πρὸς κρημνόν, v. 1373, τραύμαθ', v. 1374), Toxaris' Orestes and Pylades, unlike Euripides', are the victims of the Scythians' arrows, confirming the (Greeks') stereotype of the Scythian archers. Besides, it is interesting to note that the scene in which the Scythians try to prevent Iphigenia, Orestes and Pylades from escaping (§6.15-19) is not told from the perspective of the Scythians and by means of internal focalisation, as in Euripides' tragedy, where the fight is reported by the Taurian messenger. Instead, it is described from Orestes and Pylades' perspective and by means of external focalisation. Such a description of the events leads to the conclusion that Toxaris adopts the position of a neutral (or Greek) observer and not that of a resentful barbarian.[117]

Before drawing conclusions on this version of the myth, it is necessary to consider that, for the greatest part, it is presented as an ecphrasis of the wall paintings in the Scythian Oresteum (§6.8-25). Let us first relate this ecphrasis to ecphrastic practices in general. Ecphrases may be classified into different types, according to the relationship between the object described and the description. Ecphrases may describe a specific and real object ('actual ecphrasis'), here the paintings that actually would have existed in the Artemis temple in Tauris, or a particular illustration of the myth of Orestes and Pylades, which is not necessarily located in 'the temple' in Tauris. Ecphrases may also describe an invented object ('notional ecphrasis'), or an object in a more generic way, in which case the present ecphrasis would be rather 'inspired' by (an) existing illustration(s) of the myth of Orestes and Pylades.[118] According to Harmon, the present ecphrasis is an actual ecphrasis. The fact that, except in Hyginus (*Fab.* 121, 261), the murder of Thoas does not appear in Lucian's literary predecessors leads Harmon to suppose that the frescoes and the temple in Tauris actually existed. In his opinion, '[n]othing could be more natural than for some Graeco-Scythian city in south Russia

[116] All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
[117] For the issue of cultural stereotyping and the dialogical dynamics between Toxaris and Mnesippus, see below 'Barbarians and Greeks'.
[118] For this latter possibility, see Maffei 1994, xliv-xlv. Lucian's *Imagines* 6-8 is a good example of this practice. Generally speaking, 'actual' ecphrases are the exception with regard to Lucian's ecphrastic practices. For ecphrases in Lucian, see e.g. Bompaire 1958, 707-735, Romm 1990, Bretzigheimer 1992, Maffei 1994, Laplace 1996, Newby 2002, von Möllendorff 2004, Gutzwiller 2009, Pretzler 2010, Zeitlin 2013, 24-26, Dubel 2014, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 131-136, Race 2017.

[…] to have had an Oresteum like this, with a set of murals commemorating the exploits of Orestes and Pylades '.[119] However, archaeological evidence shows that, although Greek heroes and gods were indeed worshipped in the north-western part of the Pontus – but even then, the practice is rather restricted to the Greek colonies of the Black Sea and regions such as the Bosporus, and the intensity or presence of religious and cultural interactions between Greeks and Scythians differ regionally and in time – the worship of Orestes and Pylades is not attested for this region.[120] The iconographical representations of the myth in these regions are also rare, such as a bronze crater illustrating the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Tauris, which was discovered in Varna, on the Bulgarian shore of the Black Sea (formerly Odessus in Thracia).[121] Besides, the murder of Thoas is not attested at all in iconography, even if there are representations of Orestes and Pylades killing Taurians. Contrary to Harmon, Schissel advocates a notional ecphrasis, and so does Anderson, although he also considers the possibility that Lucian could have taken inspiration from some unspecific representations. Bompaire, for his part, stresses the literary character of the ecphrasis and the dialogue's debt to Euripides' *IT*: '[l]' ecphrasis s'intègre, et par son origine tragique, et par sa coloration fantaisiste, au dessein purement littérarire de l'ouvrage '.[122]

In order to better understand the present ecphrasis of the Orestes and Pylades myth, it might be useful to give an overview of the iconographical material of concern here.[123] Admittedly, though, this material is not always easy to interpret, especially as far as the influence of Greek and Latin literature is concerned. First, because iconographical motifs follow their own evolution. Second,

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[119] Harmon, p. 110 n. 1.

[120] See Rusyayeva 2007. For various influences on the religious customs of the north shore of the Black Sea, see Ustinova 2000; for regional differences, see *ead*. SEG LIX 2009, 799. For the specific case of Classical Olbia, see also Osborne 2008, 335-7. For example, a vivacious worship of Achilles is attested for Olbia, see IGDOP 48-53. The worship of gods such as Apollo, Zeus and Athena, Aphrodite, Hermes, Dionysus, and chthonic deities is also attested for Classical Olbia, see IGDOP 60-85. For an overview of the different cults of gods and the development of their worship from the sixth century BCE until the third century CE in Olbia and the adjacent regions, see Vinogradov/Kryžitski 1995, 109-121, Kryžitski/Leïpounskaïa 2011, 139-140. In general, the degree of Greek influence in this region intensifies, but also varies, with time. See Krapivina 2010, 162-164, Kryžitski/Leïpounskaïa 2011, 28-39. By the third century BCE, the region had received an 'allgemeine(n) griechische(n) Firnis' (Rostovtzeff 1993, 38). On the contrary, the picture that Dio Chrysostom draws of Olbia in the beginning of the second century CE is one of receding Hellenism (*Or*. 36, see Gangloff 2007, 74). For a historical and literary contextualisation of Dio's Olbia, see Bäbler 2007. She concludes (*ibid*., 158) that his 'gloomy picture should not be taken at face value' and that one 'should not struggle to reconcile his description with the archaeological remains which do not fit.' Rather, 'Dio's sad description of Olbia is a rhetorical strategy that helped him to show a society almost on the brink of extinction […] but holding out.' Cf. Braund 1999.

[121] LIMC V.I s.v. Iphigenia 85. It represents Orestes being bound near the temple of Artemis and Iphigenia dictating her letter to Pylades, then (fragmentarily) a Taurian guard leading the prisoners away. The last scene shows the fight on the shore, the embarking on the ship and Apollo intervening between the fugitives and the Taurians led by Thoas.

[122] Harmon, 110-111 n. 1, Schissel 1913, 107, Bompaire 1958, 723-725, citation p. 725, Anderson 1976a, 35-36.

[123] For the reception of Euripides' *IT* in the fourth century BCE, see Trendall/Webster 1971, 91-94, Taplin 1993, 21-27, Green 1994, 52, Taplin 2007, 149-156. For a brief summary, see Kyriakou 2006, 46. For the reception of the myth in visual arts more generally, see Jucker 1998, Salskov Roberts 2013, 129-144, Ruprecht 2018, 140-143.

because only little of the Greek and Latin theatrical production, which primarily dealt with this myth, has survived; the same applies to the iconographical material.[124] In these regards, Pliny the Elder's mentioning of a painting by Timomachus of Byzantium that represents Orestes is not very helpful either (*HN* 35.136). Most of the illustrations of the myth known today focus on a few different scenes, such as the following: Orestes and Pylades being brought before Iphigenia (as prisoners); Orestes and Pylades with Iphigenia near the temple of Artemis (in various poses, and mostly in the presence of a seated Thoas); Iphigenia's letter to Argos; the *anagnōrisis*; Iphigenia with the cult statue and Thoas; Orestes and Pylades' flight with Iphigenia; Orestes and Pylades fighting against the Taurians at the seashore. Although many representations are found on vases from the fourth century BCE (twelve items catalogued in the LIMC), most representations (30 items) date from the first and second c. CE (mostly wall paintings and sarcophagi). Thus, most of these representations are Roman, except the vases and a few other pieces.[125] Then, the Roman art of the provinces apparently has a predilection for the scene of the escape of the prisoners.[126] The fight at the seashore, which corresponds to E. *IT* 1336-1419, seems to receive as much attention on the sarcophagi as in the *Toxaris*.

To put it in a nutshell, the fact that the myth was a widespread motif in visual arts, especially in the first and the second centuries CE, justifies the conclusion that the idea that actual works of art might somehow have inspired the ecphrasis and represent a subject of emulation is not absurd. At the same time, the primary intention doubtlessly remains to enter into a dialogue with previous literary models and demonstrate rhetorical prowess – after all, descriptions of battle scenes have been an indispensable subject of ecphrases since the Homeric epics.[127] In these regards, both Euripides' *IT* and Ovid's representations and interpretation of the myth are essential. For example, it is interesting to note that there is a remarkable similarity between the idea and the function of the dedicatory stele, which, in Toxaris' account, is displayed on the Scythian Oresteum, and the old barbarian's means of authentication of Orestes and Pylades' worship in Scythia in Ov. *Pont*. 3.2.49-54. In the Taurian man's exemplification of his people's veneration of friendship, he describes the material remains that are still visible (temple, basis of the statue, altar) in the place where the legend took place to underline the veracity of his story: quoque minus dubites, stat basis orba dea (v. 52). Thus, Toxaris' ecphrasis is not only a showpiece of rhetoric and persuasion, as will be analysed later,

[124] See LIMC V.1 s.v. Iphigeneia and VII.1 s.v. Pylades.
[125] These pieces are works of intaglio (LIMC V.I s.v. Iphigeneia 16-17) and two Attic fragmentary sarcophagi (LIMC V.I s.v. Iphigenia 67 and 74). Even in these cases, Kahil notices that most of the illustrations of Iphigenia in Tauris with Orestes and Pylades in Greek art come from southern Italy, see Kahil in LIMC V.I (1990) s.v. Iphigeneia pp. 717-718. For the Romans' appreciation of the subject matter of the *IT*, see Dubel 2014, 100 n. 33.
[126] Linant/De Bellfonds in LIMC V.I (1990) s.v. Iphigenia p. 728. See also Hall 2013, 130: the motif of the escape is 'a prominent feature in Roman Imperial sarcophagus carving ', for which she gives examples of a fragment of a funeral monument (Vienna) and of a stone sarcophagus from Aquincum (Budapest) [= LIMC V.II s.v. Iphigenia 69], both dating from the second century CE.
[127] Battle scenes are a favourite subject of ecphrases in Lucian. Anderson 1976a, 36-37 with n. 111 referring to Aphthonius (Aphth. *prog.* 12, Spengel *Rhet*. II, p. 47) and Hermogenes (Hermog. *prog*. 10, Spengel, *Rhet*. II, p. 16). For naval battles in Lucian, see *VH* 1.42-43.

but also a means of authentication of his incredible representation of a Scythian cult of Orestes and Pylades. Consequently, the fact that there is an inconsistency in the narration of the painted scenes – Orestes and Pylades could not have sailed away (καὶ τέλος ἀποπλέοντες, §6.15) if they had been shipwrecked a few sentences earlier (διαφθαρείσης αὐτῶν τῆς νεώς, §6.10-11) – becomes meaningful. Bompaire takes this as a piece of evidence for the fictiveness of the wall painting and the literary nature of the ecphrasis.[128] However, there might be a further meaning to this inconstistency, if it is considered as a means to direct the attention to the narration of the scenes depicted on the walls, and more specifically to its poetic nature.

In conclusion, the myth of Orestes and Pylades in the *Toxaris* focuses on the moral message of friendship in Orestes and Pylades' heroic behaviour and not on the tragic moment of the sacrifice by Iphigenia. Of central importance to this moral message is the heroes' act of reciprocal devotion and self-sacrifice. As to the ecphrastic form of Toxaris' account of the myth, it essentially constitutes a dialogue with previous literary representations, particularly dramatic ones, as Bompaire rightly underlines. As will be analysed in detail later, it competes for visual impact with its tragic predecessor. Then, the importance of the tragic representation of the myth of Orestes and Pylades as a foil for its adaptation in the *Toxaris* is conspicuous when Toxaris reflects upon the Scythians' admiration for Orestes and Pylades and compares it to the value of friendship in Greece. There, he explicitly refers to its representation on stage (ὁπόταν ὑμῖν οἱ τραγῳδοὶ τὰς τοιαύτας φιλίας ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἀναβιβάσαντες δεικνύωσιν, §9.12-14) and its impact upon the Greek spectators: they laud and applaud what they have seen (ἐπαινεῖτε καὶ ἐπικροτεῖτε, §9.14), and cry as a reaction (καὶ ἐπιδακρύετε, §9.14). There is a noticeable similarity with Cicero's description of the reception of Pacuvius' play about Orestes and Pylades in *Amic*. 7.24 here:

> itaque, si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis, aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? qui clamores tota cauea nuper in hospitis et amici mei, M. Pacuui, noua fabula cum, ignorante rege uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseueraret! stantes plaudebant in re ficta: quid arbitramur in uera facturos fuisse?
>
> Therefore, if at some point some deed of friendship comes forth, be it taking the trouble upon oneself or sharing the dangers, who would not praise it in highest terms? What applause filled not long ago the whole theatre when, in the latest play of my host and friend, Marcus Pacuvius, at the point where the king [Thoas] does not know which of the two is Orestes, Pylades says he is Orestes in order to die instead of him, but the actual Orestes is emphatic

[128] Bompaire 1958, 724.

about being Orestes! They were standing in feet applauding even if it was an invented story: what would we think of this if it had happened in real life?

Both texts use the act of reciprocal self-sacrifice for a friend as a symbol of true and praiseworthy friendship and illustrate their point by invoking the tragic representation of the myth of Orestes and Pylades. They focus on the same aspect of the public enthusiasm generated by the representation, particularly the applause (ἐπαινεῖτε καὶ ἐπικροτεῖτε/clamores, stantes plaudebant). Both texts also use this illustration to point to the difference between friendship on the stage, as a poetic object (ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν/tota cauea, in re ficta), and friendship in real life, that is, friendship as a moral principle (in uera). However, in Toxaris' mouth, the difference denounces the inability to live up to the ideal poetic representation, whereas the Ciceronian Laelius exploits the difference to magnify the act of sacrifice in real life (quid arbitramur in uera facturos fuisse). The similarities between the two texts might indicate that the *Toxaris* not only alludes to the representation of Orestes and Pylades in Euripides' play, but also to the Latin tradition of the myth. Both the Greek and the Latin play had a significant impact on imperial culture. The former still used to be popular and represented on stage in those days, while the latter left its traces in the Latin discourse on friendship, as is visible from the shift of focus to the reciprocity of the friends' sacrifice in the reception of the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Ovid, Manilius and Martial.

Consequently, one may ask whether the myth in the *Toxaris* not only emulates Euripides' *IT*, but also refers to its representations in Latin literature. On the one hand, this would be indicative of the Graeco-Latin cultural background of the *Toxaris* with regard to both the impact of Greek and Latin traditions on Lucian's literary production and the literary and cultural references of its audience, whose intellectual pleasure relies on their recognition of Ovidian motifs and of Toxaris' ciceronising attitude. On the other hand, these references are not only decorative, but also meaningful for the interpretation of the *Toxaris*. Toxaris' Scythian myth follows the Graeco-Latin tradition, but the character's perspective is ambivalent, for it is Greek and conforms to the Latin (Ovidian) representation of the Scythian barbarian at the same time. Thus, Toxaris' myth symbolises both difference, with regard to his typical barbarian view, and similarity, as far as his Greek models and Latin attitude are concerned.

3. Barbarians and Greeks

Greekness and Stereotypes

In the beginning of the dialogue, Mnesippus wonders at the Scythians' sacrifice to Orestes and Pylades; this is one of the central issues of his incomprehension. In the context of an encounter between a Greek and a Scythian – between people of different cultures – the fact that the matter of Mnesippus' incomprehension and his discussion with Toxaris is precisely a ritual does not come

without its ideological baggage. Religious cults in particular represent an important aspect in the self-definition of an ethnic group.[129] Neither is the choice of the myth itself a coincidence. The myth of Iphigenia's sacrifice, which necessarily relates to that of Orestes and Pylades, is the emblem of the Scythians' barbarism and their inimical attitude towards Greek culture.[130] Thus, Mnesippus' astonishment may be interpreted as an expression of his incredulity at the fact that the Scythians not only worship Orestes and Pylades, their former enemies (§2.1-4, §3.3-5), but also have religious customs, which, moreover, are nothing but Greek, as will be seen. Of all peoples, the Scythians are the most disinclined towards Greek culture – thus Herodotus' description (4.76.1) – certainly, because they symbolise one of the remotest ends of the known world.[131] According to the representation of the Scythians in the Greek imaginary, which owes a lot to Herodotus' description of Scythia, they hardly have religious practices – and if so, they are rather barbaric and bloody.[132] Mnesippus ironically alludes to the Scythians' lack of religiosity when he says that their worship of Orestes and Pylades will result in the expulsion of all remaining gods and leave them 'ungodly and godless' (ἀσεβεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄθεοι γενέσθαι, §2.13).[133] In the present context, ἄθεος could as well mean 'abandoned by the gods', considering that Mnesippus implies that the gods would physically

[129] Hall 1997, 38-39, 45 (Herodotus and the Scythian religion), Fragoulaki 2013, 18. 'Integral to the overwhelmingly social and cultural character of both kinship categories (xyngeneia and relatedness) is religion. In all its expressions (cult and ritual, foundation oracles, oaths, supplication, festivals, ancestral tombs, bones, relics, etc.), it is so closely intertwined with the phenomenon of kinship that the one cannot remotely be conceived in absence of the other […]. Ritual in particular is another embodiment of the relation between past and present in the dynamic landscape of kinship as a "total" phenomenon. Ritual derives its authority from the mythical past and from its traditional character, but it is at the same time in dialogue with the present and has the power to negotiate, challenge, and transform existing relations of power. In that sense it is "[a] powerful tool for creating and maintaining social relations" and "a medium for accommodating change" [Kowalzig 2007, 34]. We will see this function in operation at liminal moments in the process of ethnic communities' self-definition. […] [R]itual is a powerful transformative mechanism, through which the group's self-perception and choices of attachments are expressed and enacted.' Compare Mitchell 2007, 5-8 (referring to Hdt. 8.144.2), 39-40, 64. For the primordial importance of religion – and law and political institutions – over other aspects such as 'mythical genealogies or claims to a common territory ', see Demetriou 2012, 239.

[130] Braund 1997, 122.

[131] For a discussion of the Herodotean passage in the light of archaeological evidence in Archaic and Classical Olbia and with regard to interferences between Greek Olbians and Scythians, see Osborne 2008. The Scythian elite, who traded with the Greek inhabitants of the colonies, surely were not completely disinclined towards Greek culture and goods, although there certainly were cultural frictions between Scythians and Greeks. For the Scythian elite's interest in the Greek world, see Braund 2008, esp. 354-356. For the interactions between the Greek colonies and the various Scythian seminomadic and nomadic peoples in the region of Kerch and the northern Sea of Azov from the early settlements until the first century BCE, see Maslennikov 2005. For an excellent summary of the historical development of Greek-Scythian relationships, see Tsetskhladze 2014, 314-315.

[132] Herodotus describes in detail the Scythians' strange sacrificial rituals in 4.59-63. For the importance of Herodotus' ethnography for the present subject, see Introduction, 'Greeks and Scythians'. For a similar inquiry after the Scythians' religiosity, see Ardalus' question to Anacharsis in Plut. *Sept. sap. conv*. 150E (ἀλλὰ θεοί γε Σκύθαις εἰσί;).

[133] The adjective ἀσεβής means 'ungodly, unholy, sacrilegious' (LSJ s.v.); ἄθεος, literally 'without god', means 'denying the gods' as well as 'abandoned by the gods' (LSJ s.v.). Lucian uses ἄθεος mainly in reference to Christians or Epicureans (*Alex*. 25, 38, 46), where 'denying the gods' would be the most logical translation. In *Cal*. 14, it seems that ἄθεος is the antonym of εὐσεβής, 'pious, religious' (πρὸς δὲ τὸν εὐσεβῆ καὶ φιλόθεον ὡς ἄθεος καὶ ἀνόσιος ὁ φίλος διαβάλλεται). The two terms, ἀσεβής and ἄθεος, are used as a complementary pair (cf. *Alex*. 46.7). The absence of religiosity and/or the absence of gods are emphasised by an alliteration of the alpha privative.

leave Scythia. There is a striking similarity with Ovid's representation of Scythia as a god forsaken country here: haec igitur regio … / quam fugere homines dique … (*Trist*. 4.4b.29-30 (4.83-4)). While Ovid underscores the image of a savage, uncivilised and desolate Scythia, the stereotype becomes comic and sounds ironic in Mnesippus' mouth, as he takes the metaphor 'abandoned by the gods' literally. However, the meaning of Mnesippus' incomprehension leaves room for interpretation. The way Mnesippus expresses his astonishment, and especially the direction that the dialogue takes next, might ininuate that the Greek is actually unfamiliar with the Scythians' sacrifice as a custom *per se*, and that his expression of wonder originates in his being alien to the practice of sacrifice and worship. This transposition of roles – the barbarian explaining to a Greek an essentially Greek practice – constitutes a further effect of distancing inversion. This inversion of roles and cultural references can be observed in the way Toxaris explains the Scythians' worship, which consists in the following cultural practices.

First, Toxaris explains that the Scythians worship Orestes and Pylades as gods because they are ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς (§1.4), which seems incredible to Mnesippus (νόμος δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι θύειν ὥσπερ θεοῖς; §1.5-6). The worship of heroes was a multifaceted and widespread practice throughout Greece; in addition to that, however, cults of Friendship (Philia or Zeus Philios, see §12.1 for this aspect) are attested in Athens and Ionian Greece from the end of the fifth century BCE.[134] Beyond these cults, paradigmatic friends of the past are honoured by Greeks and Romans alike, as such friends are explicitly thought to be worthy of material worship in Val. Max. 4.7. ext. 1. Finally, there are similar cults of 'a pair', like that of the Dioscuri, which is attested all over the Roman Empire.[135] These practices are meaningful, for they indicate that Toxaris speaks of the Scythian worship of the friends Orestes and Pylades in terms of a Graeco-Roman tradition. Indeed, the way the Scythians manifest their worship, by organising festivals (ἑορταῖς καὶ πανηγύρεσιν, §1.7), building a temple, making sacrifices and honouring the heroes in many other

[134] For example, in Colonus Hippius, there was a shrine (ἡρῷον) dedicated to the cult of Theseus and Pirithous, another exemplary pair of friends (Paus. 1.30.4). See Ekroth 2009, 121-22. For the cults of Friendship, see Ruprecht 2018, 37 with n. 106 for the cult of Philia in Athens (cf. Hsch. s.v. αἰδοῦς βωμός) and 42 with n. 134 for a list of places of cult of Zeus Philios. See *ibid*., 42-50 for an evaluation of the iconographic material. She underlines, though, that the worship of Zeus Philios was more related to the worship of Good Fortune, and included more general friendly bonds such as political and family relationships (*ibid*., 50). The importance of cults of Friendship is thus rather limited, but see Tacitus, who recounts a decision passed by the Roman Senate in 28 CE to erect a double altar of *clementia* and *amicitia* in honour of Tiberius and Seianus respectively (*Ann*. 4.74.3). It is unknown whether these altars have ever been erected and there are no traces – neither literary nor material – of this *ara amicitiae* (LTUR 1 (1993) s.v. Amicitia, Ara [Torelli]). Then, with regard to the worship of virtuous men, there is the cult of Hercules, who was divinised for his virtue. Besides, this Scythian worship sounds very similar to the heroisation of prominent citizens, which was a widespread practice from Greek colonial founders in Archaic and Classical periods to *euergeteis* in the Roman period. These citizens acquired the status of heroes after their death and public cults were organised in their honour, in later times by associating these with mythical and historical heroes. Hughes 1999, 171-173.

[135] RE V.I (1903) s.v. Dioskuren 1098-1106 [Bethe]. Noticeably, from an iconographical perspective, the Dioscuroi are hard to differentiate from representations of Orestes and Pylades, as is the case with the famous 'Groupe de San Ildefonso'. See LIMC VII.1 s.v. Pylades 2 (Madrid, Prado 28.E).

ways (καὶ νεὼς ἀποδέδεικται … καὶ θυσίαι προσάγονται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη τιμὴ ἅπασα, §5.4-6), rather reflects a Greek or a Roman practice.

Then, Toxaris reveals that 'the Scythian ancestors wrote down on a stele of bronze' the exemplary exploits of Orestes and Pylades (ἀναγράψαντες οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν ἐπὶ στήλης χαλκῆς, §6.2-3), which they 'set up in the Oresteum' (ἀνέθεσαν εἰς τὸ Ὀρέστειον, §6.3). Setting up a monument or temple for the worship of heroes and gods is in conformity with Graeco-Roman practices, though not exclusively. The use of *stelae* in bronze for administration and other public affairs, however, more certainly reflects Graeco-Roman practices.[136] Thus, the verb ἀναγράφω, 'engrave and set up publicly', is the usual formula for the publication of decrees. Indeed, the ancient Scythians, according to Toxaris, 'made it a law' that all Scythians learn the content of the inscription (καὶ νόμον ἐποιήσαντο, §6.3), where νόμος has the meaning of 'law' or 'decree'.[137] This Scythian 'law' has an important symbolic meaning as an act of self-definition.[138] On the one hand, because the use of νόμος with a legislative meaning ascribes a Greek, or 'civilised', characteristic to supposedly barbarian people.[139] Besides, it recalls the description of Orestes and Pylades as νομοθέται (§5.13), which is strongly reminiscent of the νομοθέται Solon and Lycurgus, the mythical emblems of Greek legislation. On the other hand, the 'law' that the Scythian ancestors passed, has an essentially religious dimension, for it defines a particular subject of worship. As such, it is a fundamental element of ethnic self-definition. In some way, Toxaris defines himself and the Scythians through their worship of friendship, which takes the form of a cult of the heroes Orestes and Pylades. This suggests that, in Toxaris' world, the myth of Orestes and Pylades fulfils a function similar to those Greek 'myths of ethnic origin ', which, by establishing genealogies, have a defining value for a community.[140]

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[136] Or, at least, more probably those of the Greek inhabitants of the colonies on the north shore of the Black Sea (also under Roman rule) than those of the 'indigenous' Scythians. But even then, Dubois notices that the Greek Pontic colonies did not produce as many religious decrees as other Greek regions. Dubois 1996, 197: 'le Pont, à la difference d' autres régions grecques, n' a livré que très peu de lois sacrées.' In the Roman world, bronze tablets were used for 'solemn documents, such as laws, treatises, votive inscriptions, and honorific decrees.' McLean 2005, 206. For the Roman use of bronze tablets for legal documents from Republic to Empire, see Williamson 1987. Bronze *stelae* were found everywhere at the time of the Roman Empire, for they would be set up in two copies, one in Rome and the other in the concerned city in the province (Pucci Ben Zeev 1995). For inscriptions in Olbia in general, see IGDOP and Krapivina 2007. For a catalogue of decrees in the Greek cities of the north shore of the Black Sea, see Rhodes/Lewis 1997, 203-209.
More generally, one can say that '[t]he "epigraphic habit," that is the enormous spread during the second and third centuries AD of the use of inscribed monuments both in urban and in rural contexts, was an essential component of the culture of most of the Roman east.' Mitchell 2000, 118 and n. 7 for further bibliography. Toxaris' stele thus reflects a practice contemporary with Lucian.

[137] There is no difference between 'law' and 'decree': Rhodes/Lewis 1997, 497-499.

[138] For the meaning of νόμος (νόμιμα) for the self-definition of a community, see Fragoulaki 2013, 9-12.

[139] For example, it stands in contradiction to Herodotus' statement that the Androphagi, the Scythians' neighbours, do not know either justice or laws (4.196).

[140] See especially Hall 1997, 40-66 for a discussion, although his scheme of a historical evolution of the means of constructing a Greek identity from a discourse of origins to a discourse of the opposition 'Greek versus barbarians' is somewhat reductive. For the phenomenon of foundation myths used by cities of Asia Minor and the Near East to associate themselves with the Greek community, see Strubbe 1984-1986.

Finally, the Scythian worship also includes names by which Orestes and Pylades are invoked. Toxaris explains that in Scythia, they are called 'Korakoi' (Κοράκους καλεῖσθαι, §7.15), which he translates as φίλιοι δαίμονες (§7.16). Neither the meaning nor the origin of Κόρακοι is absolutely clear. The word could be Greek because of its similarity with κόλαξ or with κόραξ or κόρος.[141] However, it is more plausibly a loan word from Middle Persian; linguistically, the borrowing of Korakoi from Middle Persian *kurrak*, 'foal', is unproblematic, as Schmeja demonstrates.[142] Nevertheless, for the purpose and the comprehension of the dialogue, the reality of the word and its origin are of little importance, for it signalises foreignness, as Toxaris himself makes clear (τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ, §7.15-16).[143] The use of foreign (sounding) words for the characterisation of barbarians – non-Greeks as well as non-Romans – is a common literary device, especially in drama.[144] Here, the linguistic characterisation by means of the foreign word 'Korakoi' also serves the fiction of the dialogue and stigmatises Toxaris as 'being different' – a distinction that fulfils the necessary function of maintaining the antagonism between Mnesippus and Toxaris, and the eristic dynamics of the dialogue. Thus, it is important that Toxaris presents φίλιοι δαίμονες as the translation of the 'Scythian' word Κόρακοι, although technically speaking, if the Middle Persian origin of Κόρακοι is accepted, φίλιοι δαίμονες is rather a transposition than a translation.[145] Thereby, an evident analogy between the φίλιοι δαίμονες and the Greek appellation of Zeus Philios, which is invoked by Mnesippus in §12.1, is created. The Scythian culture is translated into Greek terms, which establishes a difference between the two cultures. This difference, however, is artificial, for the invocation of Κόρακοι is suspiciously similar to Graeco-Roman religious practices of invocation – of the Dioscuri, for example. Precisely the Dioscuri, according to Plutarch (*De frat. amore* 478A), are called δόκανα by the Spartans, who worship them under this name as the symbol of fraternal

[141] RE XXIII.2 (1959) s.v. Pylades 2080 [Radke].
[142] Schmeja 1972, 23-24. See also Bielmeier 1993, 14-15 n. 15. Schmeja also perceives a parallelism with the appellation of the Dioscuri as λευκὼ πώλω and relates the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades to further Indo-European mythologies of horsemen-deities (Schmeja 1972, 24-25). While the parallelism with the Dioscuri is certainly a valid foil, his further conclusion that the present representation of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades reflects the actual worship of such horsemen-deities in this region fails to take account of the fictional dimension of this worship in the *Toxaris*.
[143] Even less important is the provenance of Lucian's actual knowledge of Scythian or Sarmatian (Iranian) languages – besides, his Syrian origins are not determinant for his knowledge of these languages, considering that contact with these might as well be the result of the presence of Scythians, for example slaves, outside their territory (*pace* Schmeja 1972, 22). Rostovtzeff, for his part, hypothesises Hellenistic and novelistic sources for Lucian's Scythian words – sources, though, which are not attested (Rostovtzeff cited in Schmeja 1972, 21).
[144] For linguistic characterisation in Attic tragedy, see Bacon 1961, Hall 1989a, 117-121; in Greek comedy, see especially Ar. *Th.* 1001-1007, 1083-1225 with Hall 1989b, 39-40, *ead*. 2006, 225-254, Halliwell 1990, Sier 1992, 67-82, Willi 2002, 198-225. In Old Latin Comedy, Grecisms and Greek words are used, among other purposes, for the characterisation of foreigners (and slaves, etc.). See Hough 1934 and 1947, Kaimio 1979, 301-307, Jocelyn 1993, Karakasis 2005, 83-89, Zagagi 2012. In Herodotus: Munson 2005. For the Scythian language in Lucian, see *Scyth*. 4 (Toxaris and Anacharsis exchange a few words in Scythian – in Greek in the text), *Alex*. 51 (an oracle is given in 'Scythian' – actually some half-Greek gibberish; the text is corrupt), *Salt*. 64 (the languages of Pontus are synonymous with incomprehensibility), and *Pseudol*. 11 (Scythian, Celtic and Thracian are synonyms for non-Greek and barbarian languages). See also Introduction, 'Greeks and Scythians'.
[145] Compare Schmeja 1972, 22-23, Rochette 2010, 229.

φιλία. The parallelism is interesting and shows that the Scythians and the character Toxaris, under the mask of the 'other', are constructed in conformity with Graeco-Roman cultural patterns.

It is thus quite clear that the *Toxaris* stages a mixing of identities, which not only concerns the domain of religious cult, but also further ethnic characteristics.[146] Mnesippus and Toxaris' use of stereotypes is ambiguous, for they are both equally capable of distorting, inverting, and validating preconceived ideas about the Scythians. In particular, they address the stereotypes of the Scythians' animosity and cannibalism, their uncivilised, irascible and bellicose nature, but in a witty and ironic way that allows for distance.[147]

When Toxaris describes Orestes and Pylades' enterprise as an act of bravura, he emphasises the remoteness of his own homeland by alluding to the myth of the Argonauts, the first to enter the Black Sea by sailing through the Symplegades (ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἀπείρατον ἔτι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὄντα πλὴν μόνων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀργοῦς ἐς τὴν Κολχίδα στρατευσάντων, §3.9-11).[148] This myth, like the myth of Iphigenia in Tauris, is symbolic of the remoteness and danger that Scythia and the eastern shores of the rather unknown Black Sea represent in the Greeks' eyes.[149] This clearly demonstrates that Toxaris does not adopt a Scythian, but a Greek perspective. Similarly, Toxaris expresses a Greek emotional attitude towards his own barbarian people when he emphasises the horror that his homeland causes. He notes with admiration that Orestes and Pylades overcome the extreme fear generated by Greek stories about the Black Sea – that is, myths such as those around the Argonauts – to come to Scythia (μὴ καταπλαγέντας μήτε τοὺς μύθους τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν προσηγορίαν καταδείσαντας, §3.11-12). The reason why Scythia should inspire such a terror is grounded in its name 'inhospitable' (ὅτι ἄξενος ἐκαλεῖτο, §3.13). Toxaris does not refer to the Black Sea by its usual euphemistic appellation (Εὔξενος, 'hospitable') but by its original meaning (ἄξενος, 'inhospitable'), although the Pontus is rarely called ἄξενος.[150] Only in Euripides' *IT*, the Black Sea is exclusively

[146] For different aspects or realms of ethnic (self-)definition, see Horowitz 1975, 113-121, Ruby 2006, 34-36.
[147] For these stereotypes, see Hdt. 4.62.3-64, Th. 2.97.5-6, Pl. *La*. 191a8-9, Plut. *Mor*. 174E, Arr. *An*. 1.3.1, D.Chr. 36.4 and 8, etc., Ov. *Trist*. 5.7.9-21. See Braund 1997, Gangloff 2007, 79 with n. 43 and passages in Lucian: *Hist.Conscr*. 14, *Nav*. 33, *Zeux*. 8, *DMeretr*. 13.1. For the Romans' judgement of the military value of the Parthians/Scythians, see Lerouge 2007, 305-308. For the image of the bellicose Scythian barbarian in Euripides, see Saïd 1984, 39-41.
[148] Cf. e.g. A.R. 2.319, Sen. *Med*. 301-302 (audax nimium qui freta primus / rate tam fragili perfida rupit).
[149] The journey of the Argonauts takes them from the Cyanean Rocks along the coasts of Bithynia, Paphlagonia and Pontus to the mouth of the Phasis in Colchis, which represents the end of the known world (Αἶα δὲ Κολχίς / Πόντου καὶ γαίης ἐπικέκλιται ἐσχατιῇσιν, A.R. 2.417-418). For a comparison of the Argonauts' journey on the Black Sea as told in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* and geographical facts, see Delage 1930, 130-205. For the relationship between the *Argonautica* and geographical knowledge and treatises, see Meyer 2001. The myth of the Argonauts is first mentioned in *Od*. 12.69-70 (ποντοπόρος νηῦς / Ἀργὼ πᾶσι μέλουσα) and is narrated, e.g., in Pind. *Pyth*. 4, Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica*, Theocr. *Id*. 13, Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica*. Fragments of a *Carmen Naupactium* attest an epic work, probably of the mid-sixth-century BCE, which deals with the myth (F 198-202 EGF). The myth also served as material for a few lost tragedies and for historical works. Vian 1974, xxvi-xxxix.
[150] See E. *Rh*. 428, *Med*. 1264, Philostr. *Her*. 54.2 and 57.3.

referred to as ἄξενος.[151] Ovid acknowledges this fact in *Trist.* 4.4b.1-2 (4.55-56): frigida me cohibent Euxini litora Ponti: / dictum ab antiquis Axenus ille fuit. The adjective Axenus, which is a *hapax legomenon* in Ovid's corpus, certainly alludes to Euripides' *IT*, not only because of the context but also because the Latin poet underlines that 'men of old' called the Pontus Axenus.[152] In the *Toxaris*, the choice of the adjective ἄξενος not only stresses the image of Scythia as a hostile land, but also similarly alludes to Euripides' *IT*, as ἐκαλεῖτο might indicate. Toxaris furthermore gives an aetiological-etymological explanation why the Black Sea is called 'inhospitable': because savage people inhabit all its shores (οἶα, οἶμαι, ἀγρίων ἐθνῶν περιοικούντων, §3.13).[153] Toxaris summarises the usual stereotypes associated with the inhabitants of the Pontus: they are savage and uncultivated – and the Scythians most of all these peoples, for they sacrifice men and use their victims' skulls as beaker (e.g. Hdt. 1.216.2) – although the designation of ἄγριοι for barbarians is a commonplace.[154] However, Toxaris highlights the fact that the qualification of 'savage' is an inherited judgement (οἶμαι), for the parenthetical οἶμαι signals that the affirmation is topical and belongs to (literary) tradition.[155] The Scythians' barbarism, therefore, does not necessarily represent Toxaris' own opinion; rather, he ironises it. Formulated by a character incarnating an exemplary Scythian, this prejudice is invalidated by the incongruity of the situation. The discrepancy between the content of the affirmation and the subject who utters it is responsible for an ambivalent effect.[156] In addition, the tone is derisive in the passage, as the parenthetical οἶμαι indicates. The parenthesis marks the affirmation as 'literary stereotype' and, by putting it in the mouth of Toxaris, creates a distancing effect from the tradition. This results in irony (rather than criticism or satire).

Mnesippus, for his part, sticks to a Greek perspective, and mainly echoes Toxaris' characterisation of the Scythians. For example, he uses the Hellenocentric, but neutral, distinction between Greece and the rest of the world. When he mentions the vastness of the seas navigated by Phoenician merchants – a further stereotype – he expresses a binary view on the world, divided into Greeks and barbarians (ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ βαρβαρικῆς θαλάττης ναυτιλλομένους, §4.3-6).[157] While the Greek Sea designates the Mediterranean, the 'barbarian' sea probably refers not

[151] See vv. 94, 218, 253, 341 and probably vv. 124, 395, 438, 1388, where ἄξε(ι)νος might have been replaced by the later and more common name of the Pontus, εὔξε(ι)νος) (see Cropp 2000, *ad vv*. 124-125 for this aspect).
[152] Ingleheart 2010, 223. See also Plin. *NH* 4.76 (dein vastum mare Pontus Euxinus, qui quondam Axenus).
[153] A similar explanation is found in the mythographer and grammarian Apollodorus of Athens: Ἅπλουν γὰρ εἶναι τότε τὴν θάλατταν ταύτην καὶ καλεῖσθαι Ἄξενον διὰ τὸ δυσχείμερον καὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα τῶν περιοικούντων ἐθνῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Σκυθικῶν ξενοθυτούντων καὶ σαρκοφαγούντων καὶ τοῖς κρανίοις ἐκπώμασι χρωμένων· ὕστερον δ' Εὔξεινον κεκλῆσθαι, τῶν Ἰώνων ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ πόλεις κτισάντων (F 157 FGrH).
[154] See Schmidt 1999, 27-67.
[155] The parenthesis οἶμαι might be one of the usual indicators of allusion; see Hinds 1998, 1-2 for this aspect.
[156] For comic effects arising from discrepancy ('scarto') in Lucian, see Camerotto 1998, esp. 60-73.
[157] Phoenicians are commonly characterised as traders and sailors, as in *Od*. 15.415-6. For further bibliography on the stereotype, see Marquis, 481 n. 14. Phoenicians are stereotyped as traders in *Icar*. 16 (τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους γεωργοῦντας ἐπέβλεπον, καὶ ὁ Φοῖνιξ ἐνεπορεύετο καὶ ὁ Κίλιξ ἐλήστευεν καὶ ὁ Λάκων ἐμαστιγοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐδικάζετο).

only to the Black Sea, but to all other seas, as opposed to the Mediterranean.[158] 'Barbarian' has the original neutral meaning of 'non-Greek' here.[159] Interestingly, Toxaris similarly divides his world into Scythians and non-Scythians when he equates 'strangers' with 'non-Scythians' (ξένοι ἦσαν ἀλλὰ μὴ Σκύθαι, §5.6). Although Mnesippus divides the world into Greek and non-Greek, he does consider the Scythians as an independant community with a specific ethnic identity, as suggests his conception of the Scythians as a κοινόν (τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν, §2.8-9). Marquis relates the expression to a passage in Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander* (4.5), where it describes the Scythian community as some kind of – loose – societal organisation.[160] The expression, which does not, though, *per se* exclude the idea of a state-like organisation, is here foremost the way Asian communities were referred to in the Roman Empire in the sense of a common regional ethnic identity.[161] Mnesippus thus conceptualises the Scythians in terms of Graeco-Roman practice. Noticeably, Toxaris himself designates the Scythian peoples by τὸ κοινόν (§41.11, §49.3). Then, like Toxaris, Mnesippus emphasises the remoteness of his interlocutor's homeland by naming places such as the Lake Maiotis and the Bosporus, which represent the north-eastern limits of the known world – and of the Roman Empire (§4).[162] Mnesippus also knows further stereotypes. He does not fail to mention that he thought that Scythians were primarily 'good archers and the most belligerent people' (τοξεύειν ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν Σκύθαι καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμείνους, §8.1.2), and uncivilised, that is, devoid of rhetorical skills (§8.2-3). Mnesippus thought that the Scythians were savages, echoing Toxaris by repeating the two very same adjectives that he had previously applied to the Black Sea people (ἄξενος, ἀγρίων, §3.13; ἀξένους καὶ ἀγρίους, §8.9). He confirms the common idea that barbarians are hostile and irascible people (ἔχθρᾳ μὲν ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ θυμῷ, §8.9-10), where the use of *macrologia* in the synonymic and polysyndetic sequence exaggerates both the stereotypes and the stereotyping.[163]

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[158] For the Greek Sea as a synonym for the Mediterranean, see Hdt. 1.202.4 (τὴν μὲν γὰρ Ἕλληνες ναυτίλλονται πᾶσα καὶ ἡ ἔξω <Ἡρακλέων> στηλέων θάλασσα ἡ Ἀτλαντὶς καλεομένη καὶ ἡ Ἐρυθρὴ μία ἐοῦσα τυγχάνει), or more specifically the Aegean (cf. Hdt. 5.54.2, Th. 1.4.1, Arr. *An*. 2.25.1 5.1.5).

[159] For the changing semantic and ethical value of 'barbarian' in Lucian, see Whitmarsh 2001a, 126-127, Gangloff 2007, 76-77, Rochette 2010, 217-219. βάρβαρος is negative for example in *Bis Acc*. 27, *Merc.Cond*. 10 (Bozia 2015, 71 n. 44). In §5.1-2, βάρβαροι has an ironic tone.

[160] Marquis, 478-479 n. 9.

[161] For example, Herodotus uses τὸ κοινόν with the genitive of a people in 5.109.12 and 6.14.10, where it means 'the people of' in the sense of a community that is not specifically organised politically. But in 6.50.7, 6.58.2 and 9.117.5, τὸ κοινόν does approximate the idea of state, as it designates the people of Sparta and Athens as a political power. For the concept of κοινόν and ethnic identity, see Mitchell 2000, 123-126.

[162] The Lake Maiotis is the actual Sea of Azov, which is connected to the Black Sea by the Strait of Kerch (cf. Plb. 4.39). It was renowned for its trade of salted fish (Str. 7.3.11, RE XIV.1 (1928) s.v. Maiotis 590-592 Herrmann]). The Thracian Bosporus refers to the Strait between the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) and the Black Sea (cf. Plb. 4.43). There is also a Cimmerian Bosporus, which is the actual Strait of Kerch. Bosporus is furthermore the later and Greek name for Panticapaeum, a city on the Sea of Azov, on the western side of the Strait of Kerch. It expanded to a realm and became synonymous with the Cimmerian Bosporus. The region was rich in corn, in which it traded (RE III.1 (1897) s.v. Bosporos 742 and 757 [Brandis]).

[163] For the motif of the barbarian anger, see Bowie 1991, 187-188 with n. 12 (though in the context of the sexual jealousy of the ancient novel). See also Plut. *Artax*. 6.8 (καὶ βάρβαρος ἐν ὀργαῖς καὶ μνησικακίαις), Aristid. Jebb p. 433.9 (ἀλλ' ἐπέπαυτο τῆς ὀργῆς, ἄνθρωπος βάρβαρος καὶ φύσει πολέμιος), Lib. *Or*. 4.2.7 (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους βαρβάρους ἀκούομεν ὀργῇ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμοῖς), Hld. 2.12.5 (ὑπὸ μὲν θυμοῦ ληστρικοῦ καὶ βαρβαρικῆς ὀργῆς). There might be a further motive for associating the Scythians with anger, for, according to

Indeed, Mnesippus, too, indicates that these prejudices originate from traditional representations ('he would not have thought that Scythians were rhetorically able and valued friendship', 'he thought differently about that until now'), although he presents these prejudices as constitutive elements of his worldview.

Mnesippus tops all previous negative, albeit ironic, characterisations of the barbarian Scythians when he argues that he would not have imagined that the Scythians attributed such a high value to friendship, because they are so barbaric that they eat their fathers (τεκμαιρόμενος τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἃ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀκούομεν καὶ ὅτι κατεσθίουσι τοὺς πατέρας ἀποθανόντας, §8.11-12). Cannibalism is a common prejudice against barbarians. Although Herodotus does not precisely state that the Scythians eat their dead ancestors (cf. Plut. *De Alex. fort.* 328C), he informs us that their neighbours do: the Massagetes kill their fathers once they have become too old and eat them (1.216.2-3, cf. Str. 11.8.6), while the Issedones do not kill their fathers but eat them once they have died (4.26.1-2). Then, amongst other Scythian neighbours, there are real cannibals, the Androphagi (4.106).[164] This is only one step from stating that the Scythians, or the inhabitants of the northern shore of the Black Sea in general, are cannibals and eat their dead ancestors, which is a common motif.[165] Here, the prejudice of cannibalism, incongruously used as a nonsensical explanation for the Scythians' inability to create bonds of friendship, appears ridiculous, especially in confrontation with the actual 'other', Toxaris, who visibly and avowedly excels in civilised qualities such as rhetoric and ethics. Toxaris, for his part, takes this opportunity to 'turn the tables' on Mnesippus by riposting that he would not dispute with him the Scythians' superior religiosity and devotion to their ancestors (εἰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἡμεῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δικαιότεροι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς γονέας καὶ ὁσιώτεροί ἐσμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φιλοτιμηθείην πρὸς σέ, §9.1-3). Toxaris' response to Mnesippus' allusion to Scythian cannibalism takes an unexpected direction; while Mnesippus' comment insinuates, from

ancient etymology, the meaning of σκύζομαι, a poetic synonym for ὀργίζομαι, is explained by the fact that Scythians are particularly inclined to anger, as does the *Schol. in Iliadem* 4.23 T (*scholia vetera*): σκυζομένη: ὀργιζομένη. | καὶ οἱ ὀργιλώτατοι Σκύθαι καλοῦνται.

[164] Herodotus uses the motif of cannibalism elsewhere to make an argument in favour of cultural relativism. In 3.38, the comparison of cannibalistic and non-cannibalistic peoples is the subject of a thought experiment made by Darius, which concludes in the recognition that '*nomos* is king of all'.

[165] See Ephoros F 43 FGrH, Arist. *EN* 1148b21-24, *Pol*. 1338b19-22, Diod. 3.15.2, 5.32.7, Str. 4.5.4, 7.3.9, 16.4.17, Pompon. 3.59, Plin. *NH* 4.88, 6.53 (South Russian Scythians) and 7.11-12 (Himalayan Scythians), Aul. Gell. 9.4.6, etc. Lucian uses the motif in *DDeor*. 18.1 (τοὺς Σκύθας αὐτοὺς ἀνθρωποφάγους ὄντας) and Luct. 21 (τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου διελόμενοι κατὰ ἔθνη τὰς ταφὰς ὁ μὲν Ἕλλην ἔκαυσεν, ὁ δὲ Πέρσης ἔθαψεν, ὁ δὲ Ἰνδὸς ὑάλῳ περιχρίει, ὁ δὲ Σκύθης κατεσθίει, ταριχεύει δὲ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος). In the latter passage, it is clear that we are dealing here with a deeply entrenched stereotype, which is marked as reductive by means of the all too simplistic enumeration. However, already the uncivilised Cyclops and Laestrygonians in *Od*. 9.287-298 (cf. 10.200) and 10.116-124 are men-eating creatures who represent the prototype of the uncivilised barbarian living at the confines of and beyond the Greek world; in addition, Indians (Hdt. 3.99), the Ethiopians (Plin. *NH* 6.195) and the Irish (Str. 4.5.4) are cannibalistic peoples as well. For the cannibalism of Cyclops, see Kirk 1970, 164-168. For cannibalism in the ancient world, see e.g. Arens 1979, Dauge 1981, 244 (Juv. *Sat*. 15.44-46 about Egyptian anthropophagy), 452 (Florus 2.26.13-16 about the Mesians), 622 (Scythian cannibalism with n. 152 for further passages in Latin lierature), Isaac 2004, 207-211 (stereotype of the barbarian).
The paradoxographical corpus too contains references to anthropophagy, especially among the Scythians (Isig. F15; *Par.Vat*. 47 and 61). Popescu 2014, 45.

his Greek perspective, a negative judgement, Toxaris inverts the situation and takes cannibalism as a demonstration of respect for one's ancestors. Toxaris transforms a barbarian prejudice into a virtue, which might be characteristically Roman.[166] On the one hand, this shift of value produces comic effects, as Mnesippus and Toxaris talk again at cross-purposes and the dialogue falls into absurdity. On the other hand, the confrontation of these two opposite value judgements harbours a profound questioning and is, in a way, an expression of cultural relativism. Like Toxaris earlier, Mnesippus distances himself from the stereotype he uses by making recognisable that he is taking them from a preceding tradition (ἃ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀκούομεν). This added comment on the source of Mnesippus' knowledge functions as an 'Alexandrian footnote'. Mnesippus signals that his affirmation has precedents; the intertextual relationship is disclosed as intentional.[167] The intertextual relationship might allude to Herodotus in particular, but also to the literary-ethnographic *topos* of Scythian cannibalism in general. Indeed, right at the beginning of the *Toxaris*, the dialogue's affiliation to an ethnographic discourse is made clear when Mnesippus asks νόμος δὲ ὑμῖν...; (§1.5). This expression, when formulated affirmatively as 'it is the custom', is a key phrase for introducing ethnographical *excursus* in Herodotus.[168]

In conclusion, Mnesippus and Toxaris' use of various stereotypes against the Scythians (and the barbarians generally) fulfils two functions: it characterises him as 'other' – that is, Scythian – but simultaneously invalidates the acts themselves of stereotyping and 'othering'. This is achieved by means of the characters' distorting references to ethnographic discourses, but also by means of the incongruity of the interlocutors' replies and their irony. As has been shown, Toxaris himself applies stereotypes of the uncivilised and savage barbarian to his own people in an ironic way. However, Toxaris is not consistent in his evaluation of stereotypes. He is able to take different positions on these stereotypes, for he later describes the Scythians' retreat in the fight against Orestes and Pylades as cowardice (οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τραυματίαι, οἱ δὲ καὶ δέει τούτου, ἀπονήχονται πρὸς τὴν γῆν, §6.18-19). On the one hand, Toxaris indicates again that he does not side with the Scythians, but on the other, he contradicts the stereotype of the courageous, violent and belligerent barbarian of the Black Sea.[169] A further sign of Toxaris' ambivalent attitude can be observed when he once uses Greek formulaic language (καὶ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, §9.5). Although he uses the typical language of the 'other', the Greek (πρὸς τῶν θεῶν), he makes sure that it is understood as such (τῶν Ἑλλήνων) and

[166] One may consider, for example, the reverence for the forefathers, which is not only emblematised by the person of Cato and omnipresent in Cicero's work, but also underlined in Pliny the Elder's chapters on the Roman ancestors' practice of portraits (thus *NH* 35.6-8).
[167] For the problem of intentionality in intertextuality, see Barchiesi/Conte 1989, 90-94. The bibliography focusing on intertextuality is vast, but see e.g. Conte 1974, Ross 1975, Hardie 1993, Hinds 1998.
[168] See Hdt. 1.132.15, 2.65.11 (without infinitive), 3.2.7, 4.68.6, 5.18.7, 6.58.7, 7.209.13 etc. Similar phrases such as νόμοισι [οὗτοι] χρέωνται or [αὐτῶν] εἰσὶ οἵδε νόμοι are also numerous in Herodotus. For the use of those expressions in similar ethnographic (and parodic) contexts, compare *VH* 2.24, *Syr.D*. 53.1.
[169] In §36, though, Toxaris confirms this stereotype.

does not represent his own Scythian way of expression. The use of this formula could be taken as a symptom of Toxaris' 'acculturation' to Hellenic culture, but it equally demonstrates his awareness of cultural differences. Toxaris knows how and when to use a Greek formula, but the cultural reference remains that of his interlocutor Mnesippus; Toxaris speaks more for, than from, his perspective. Then, the way Mnesippus and Toxaris deal with these stereotypes takes them *ad absurdum*. This irony not only serves comic purposes, but also creates distance from these stereotypes. The *Toxaris*, in this part of the dialogue, emerges as a comment on the generation and circulation of ethnic and cultural prejudices, and incidentally points to the meaninglessness of such prejudices.

The analysis of Mnesippus and Toxaris' use of stereotypes has shown that there is a stress on cultural/ethnic differences between Greeks and the Black Sea peoples; Toxaris is meant to represent the inhabitant of a remote and barbaric region, Scythia. As such, he symbolises a marginal and uneducated subject.[170] However, these stereotypes are very often used ironically, and at the same time, Toxaris manifestly vindicates his 'share in […] the Greekness of the eastern empire', that is, in the one form of Greekness he can possibly obtain, *paideia*.[171] The dialogue thus displays that '[t]o overcome or to compensate for that marginality was to struggle with the very image of the Black Sea region as understood in the Graeco-Roman Mediterranean '.[172] We shall see in the following how Toxaris evidences his Greekness, which, of course, is not given by birth but through education, and thereby counterbalances his self-awareness of being both different and a barbarian. In his attempt at maintaining this ambivalent position, though, Toxaris never openly labels his education, ethic values and qualities as Hellenic. On the contrary, he exhibits them as truly Scythian. This shows that Toxaris can affirm his identity as a Scythian through the expression of his Greekness – as if these multiple identities were overlapping and superimposed.

Thus, although they are never advertised as such, Toxaris' cultural references are essentially Greek and he thereby demonstrates his Greekness. For example, he points out to Mnesippus that, while in Scythia, Orestes and Pylades have a temple, 'in Argos and Mycenae, there is not even a tomb of Orestes or Pylades worth mentioning to be seen' (§5.3).[173] Toxaris implicitly comments on

[170] In *Pseudol*. 2, being a barbaric Scythian means being uneducated and ignorant of common (literary) knowledge. For the uneducated Scythians – uneducated because of the geoclimatic conditions of Scythia, see Ungefehr-Kortus 1996, 21. See, however, the Scythians' fondness of Homeric epics in D.Chr. 36.8.
[171] Braund 1997, 123 (generally about Black Sea communities and individuals in the early imperial period). For different forms of Greekness, through *paideia* or by birth, see Kemezis 2014.
[172] Braund 1997, 126.
[173] The two Argolis cities, Argos and Mycenae, are significant as the scene of the Atreides legend and as the mythical birthplace of Orestes, whose father Agamemnon ruled in Mycenae (the background for Sophocles' *Electra*) and Argos (where Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*, and Euripides' *Electra* and *Orestes* are set). The latter came to designate synecdochally the whole dominion in his power (for the passages in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, see RE II.1 (1895) s.v. Argos 787 [Hirschfeld]). In the *IT*, Iphigeneia refers to Argos as her and Orestes' hometown. With regard to archaeological evidence, there were in Greece a few places of worship and sanctuaries dedicated, or related, to Orestes in Arcadia (RE XVIII.1 (1939) s.v. Orestes 985, 988-990 [Lesky] and s.v. Oresthasion 1014 [Meyer], cf. Paus. 8.34.1-3). Thus, there are two places called Orest(h)eion, or Oresthasion.[173] One place is located north of Sparta, between Megalopolis and Tegea (Hdt. 9.11.12-3, Th.

Orestes' invisible tomb, thereby alluding to Herodotus' anecdote on the adventure of Orestes' bones in the war between Sparta and Tegea, but also to further anecdotes about this case.[174] By means of this comment, Toxaris betrays excellent knowledge of Greek *memorabilia* and learnt controversies, and his allusion to the bones of Orestes points to a culturally significant object for the Greeks.[175]

Then, when Toxaris explains that all Scythian have to learn about Orestes and Pylades and the story of their exemplary friendship, carefully engraved on a bronze stele (πρῶτον τοῦτο μάθημα καὶ παίδευμα, §6.3-4), he gives considerable weight to the educative function of the stele and its content. In comparison, in the *Anacharsis*, the μάθημα/μαθήματα appear as an important subject of discussion (*Anach*. 6, 17, 18, 20, 24) at the very point where the two wise men, the barbarian Anacharsis and the Greek Solon, argue about the value of Greek *paideia*. In *Anach*. 22, Solon, whose views are Hellenic throughout the dialogue but at the same time anachronistically typical of imperial Greek concerns, first explains that the Greek children are required to learn by heart the laws of the community, which are exposed publicly and which Solon presents as an essential part of ethical instruction. He then goes on describing a further means of ethical regulation: tragedy, from which the children learn to emulate the virtues of the ancients. In this light, it is interesting to see how, in Toxaris' allegedly Scythian worldview, *paideia* is directly linked with the memorisation of (exemplary) past events – a concern that is otherwise characteristic of Greek writers of the Imperial period.[176] Remarkably, the Scythian children not only 'engrave' in their memory the message and the story of the stele, but also keep in mind the stele as a physical object (τὴν στήλην καὶ τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς γεγραμμένα διαμνημονεῦσαι, §6.5). This represents a materialist conception of memory and makes the memorial quality of the stele meaningful. The intensifying prepositional prefix δια- of the verb διαμνημεύω ('remember') underlines the memorial function of the stele as a medium of transmission. The memorial function also applies to the text of the *Toxaris* itself, which, in a way, passes on the myths and literary (Euripidean) examples of the past, just as the (text engraved on the) stele commits

5.64.3, Plut. *Arist*. 10.9.3, Paus. 8.3.2 and 44.1-3). The other is located in the region south of Megalopolis and relates to the myth of Orestes either as the place where, pursued by the Erinyes after the murder of his mother, he momentarily retired (E. *Or*. 1643-46, cf. sch. *Or*. 1645-1647 Dindorf, and Pherecyd. F 135a-b FGrH), or as the place where he died, bitten by a serpent (Apollod. 6.28a.7).

[174] Herodotus narrates that the Spartans had to bring back the bones of Orestes to Sparta in order to defeat the Tegeans. The Spartans could not find the tomb until a certain Liches remembered to have seen an extraordinary coffin in the workshop of a Tegean blacksmith and brought Orestes' outsized bones back to Sparta. See Hdt. 1.67-68, cf. e.g. Plin. *NH* 7.74, Paus. 3.3.5-7, Gell. 3.10.11, Philostr. *Her*. 8.3 – where Orestes' corpse is found in a horse. Pausanias also knows of a sepulchral monument to Orestes on the road between Tegea and Thyrea, which, however, does not contain either the tomb or the bones any more (Paus. 8.54.4), and a tomb near a sanctuary of the Moirae in Laconia (Paus. 3.11.10). A further version has Orestes' bones transferred from Aricia, where he died after having settled there with the sacred image of Artemis brought from Tauris, to Rome. There, they were kept in front of the temple of Saturnus, near the temple of Concordia on the Capitoline (Hyg. *Fab.* 261, cf. Serv. *Aen*. 2.116). For the relationship of the myth of Orestes and the cult of Diana in Aricia, see Petaccia 2000, 95-106.

[175] See Boedeker 1993.

[176] See esp. Bowie 1970 (reflected in language), Swain 1996, 65-100, Schmitz 1997, Porter 2001 (as aesthetic experience), Whitmarsh 2001a, Webb 2006 (in oratory), Kim 2010, 3-21. For the moral dimension of imperial memorial culture, see Anderson 1989, 140-142.

to memory the heroic deeds and examples of the past. Toxaris seems to hold the same view as Solon in the *Anacharsis* on the principle of the memorisation of laws and the pedagogical and emulative function of drama. Drama, or tragedy, has its place in the present passage as well, considering the intertextual role that Euripides' dramatic representation of Orestes and Pylades plays in the dialogue, and especially in the ecphrasis of the murals, which follows immediately (§6.9-25).[177]

Toxaris most demonstrates his Hellenic side in his defence of friendship and ethical ideals. For example, his insistence on the fact that Scythians value those who show their virtue through their deeds (ἐπαινοῦντες δὲ ἃ ἔπραξαν, οἰκείους ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων ποιούμεθα, §5.9-10) is in line with Greek ethics.[178] Then, as has been shown, throughout his praise of Orestes and Pylades' friendship, Toxaris emphatically underscores their courage and makes it their primary virtue in friendship. Considering courage as a virtue is in conformity with the Greek ethical system, which counts ἀνδρεία among the cardinal virtues.[179] Toxaris thereby not only adopts a Greek system of values, but also affirms himself as a non-barbarian, that is, as a civilised man. On the contrary, according to this system, barbarians are defined by their lack of any of these cardinal virtues, or by their exhibiting the respective vices.[180] To a certain point, ἀνδρεία may even represent an alternative to Greek *paideia*.[181] Generally, virtue, upon which Toxaris focuses so much, is among the defining characteristics of Greekness, along with language and culture.[182]

Throughout this introductory part of the dialogue, Toxaris develops the idea that Scythians value friendship above all goods and virtues. This idea comes to a head when he explains that 'Scythians hold nothing in greater esteem than friendship' (οὐδὲν Σκύθαι φιλίας μεῖζον οἴονται εἶναι, §7.8-9) and that they 'honour' and 'admire before all things' (τιμῶμεν, §7.12; ὃ πρῶτον ἡμεῖς ἁπάντων θαυμάζομεν, §7.13-14) Orestes and Pylades' excellence in the virtue of friendship. The Scythians' admiration for the pair of friends Orestes and Pylades is a motif going back to Ovid's *Pont*. 3.2.35-6, 43 and 95-102 (there especially mirus amor iuuenum, quamuis abiere tot anni, / in Scythia magnum nunc quoque nomen habet, vv. 95-96).[183] Specifically, here, Toxaris echoes the

[177] But see also the allusion in οἱ τραγῳδοὶ τὰς τοιαύτας φιλίας ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἀναβιβάσαντες δεικνύωσιν (§9.13-14).
[178] Duff 1999, 13: '[i]n Greek thought, character had an ethical element, conceived in terms of right and wrong, virtue and vice, in terms of conformity to or divergence from moral norms, and this was revealed by deeds. Ancient conceptions of character were therefore […] centred […] with actions, and their evaluation.'
[179] Cf. Pl. *R*. 427e10-11.
[180] See Hall 1989a, 121-122. The opposite of ἀνδρεία is δειλία, and that of σοφία is ἀμαθία, of σωφροσύνη, ἀκολασία, and of δικαιοσύνη, ἀδικία (cf. Plt. *R*. 427e10-11). However, as has been pointed out above, Toxaris can also present the Scythians, those who fought against Orestes and Pylades, as cowards, the opposite of courageous.
[181] Compare Bowie 1991, 198 and n. 35. In D.Chr. *Or*. 4, ἀνδρεία and μεγαλοφροσύνη are considered alternatives to *paideia*.
[182] Compare Moles 1995, 190, where he concludes about D.Chr. *Or*. 36 that 'Greekness is not just language and culture: it includes virtue.'
[183] Hall 2013, 105-106. She stress the fact that the birth of the motif in Ovid's elegy must also be considered with regard to the evidence given in surviving literature (p. 105). In E. *IT* 268-274 and 1180, barbarian also express wonder in front of Orestes and Pylades, but not for their friendship.

conclusion that the Ovid-*persona* exiled in Tomis draws upon hearing the old Scythian's praise of Orestes and Pylades' friendship, that the most savage barbarian hearts are moved by the name of friendship (scilicet hac etiam, qua nulla ferocior ora est, / nomen amicitiae barbara corda mouet, *Pont*. 3.2.99-100). In Ovid's elegy, the trope of the violent and heartless barbarian is inverted.[184] Likewise, Toxaris claims for his people the most prodigious (μεῖζον) achievement of humanity, or civilisation.[185]

More drastically than the exiled Ovid-*persona*, though, Toxaris rejects the qualifier 'barbaric' for his people. He goes as far as stating that the Scythians 'form a better and more reasonable judgement of virtuous men' than the Greeks (καθ' ὅσον ἡμεῖς οἱ βάρβαροι εὐγνωμονέστερον ὑμῶν περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνομεν, §5.1-2). Affirming that barbarians are more 'reasonable' is a strong antithesis to the usual – Platonic – stereotype of the irrational savage, but even more an affirmation of Hellenism.[186] The ability of reasoning and deliberating is considered a truly Greek characteristic.[187] Then, Toxaris asserts a further virtue of Greek *paideia*: philanthropy, the essence of civilisation. The Scythians, he says, do not care whether Orestes and Pylades are foreigners; they worship them for their virtue regardless of their origin, as they do for anyone who is virtuous, even their enemies (κωλύει τε οὐδὲν ὅτι ξένοι ἦσαν ἀλλὰ μὴ Σκύθαι ἀγαθοὺς κεκρίσθαι … οὐ γὰρ ἐξετάζομεν ὅθεν οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν, οὐδὲ φθονοῦμεν εἰ μὴ φίλοι ὄντες ἀγαθὰ εἰργάσαντο, ἐπαινοῦντες δὲ ἃ ἔπραξαν, §5.6-10). The pleonastic repetition (ξένοι, μὴ Σκύθαι) emphasises the magnitude of the Scythians' open-mindedness towards foreigners.[188] The indifference to someone else's origin is not only a mark of generosity and open-mindedness, but also of moral excellence. The fact that Scythians value someone merely on the ground that he is καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός – the supreme ideal of personal accomplishment in Greek philosophy – says a lot about their Hellenic ethical standards.[189] Toxaris' Scythians are indifferent to ethnic (genetic) identity, but attentive to ethical qualities and individual virtues.[190]

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[184] See Ingleheart 2010, 243.
[185] At the same time, Toxaris conforms to the typical, that is, literary 'Scythian' perspective, in this case, the Ovidian image of the barbarian. Thereby, Toxaris' Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades on the one hand offers multiple perspectives on the myth and on the other uncovers him as a purely literary character.
[186] Reasoning is the typically Greek characteristic in the *agōn* between Greeks and barbarians: Baslez 1984, 190.
[187] Thus Aelius Aristides: ὡς ἀληθῶς Ἑλλήνικον, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς (Jebb p. 131, 23). See Gangloff 2015, 589 with n. 57. For the motif of the barbarian who is more intelligent (and nobler and more beautiful) than Greeks, see *DMort*. 9.4. On the other hand, the meaning 'indulgent' (LSJ s.v. εὐγνώμων I.1 instead of 'reasonable' II.1) also suits the idea that the Scythians are more generous and kinder in their judgement of other people.
[188] They 'avoid parochial ethnocentrism in their assessment of Orestes and Pylades.' Whitmarsh 2001a, 125.
[189] For an overview and discussion of passages of concern for the motif of καλὸς κἀγαθός, see Bourriot 1995.
[190] Compare Gangloff 2007, 76 with n. 31. She cites the following passages in Lucian: *Pisc*. 19, *Herm*. 24, *VH* 2.17, *DMort*. 25.3

Thus, Toxaris establishes a non-correlation between ethnic identity and ethical worth, an argument similarly addressed in *Pisc*. 19:[191]

> Σύρος, ὦ Φιλοσοφία, τῶν Ἐπευφρατιδίων. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; καὶ γὰρ τούτων τινὰς οἶδα τῶν ἀντιδίκων μου οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ βαρβάρους τὸ γένος· ὁ τρόπος δὲ καὶ ἡ παιδεία οὐ κατὰ Σολέας ἢ Κυπρίους ἢ Βαβυλωνίους ἢ Σταγειρίτας. καίτοι πρός γε σὲ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔλαττον γένοιτο οὐδ' εἰ τὴν φωνὴν βάρβαρος εἴη τις, εἴπερ ἡ γνώμη ὀρθὴ καὶ δικαία φαίνοιτο οὖσα.
>
> Dear Philosophy, I am a Syrian and my fatherland is on the banks of the Euphrates. But so what? I know for sure that some of my opponents here are no less of barbarian origin than I am. In their manners and education, however, they are not from Soli, or Cyprus or Babylon or Stageira. It would not matter to you, though, if a man were of barbarian tongue, if only his mind were obviously upright and just.

Frankness' (Παρρησιάδης) answer to Philosophy highlights the fact that neither birthplace nor language is of any importance (sc. in order to claim social status), but rather intellectual and ethical qualities: manners (τρόπος), education (παιδεία), understanding and righteousness (γνώμη ὀρθὴ καὶ δικαία). It is certainly true that Frankness hereby dismisses the prejudice of the barbarian's inferiority.[192] However, this affirmation also points to the fact that 'Greekness', which is presented as a seemingly well-defined identity as opposed to the 'barbarian', is actually an indefinite concept. The cities named stand for the birthplaces of Chrysippus, Zeno, possibly Poseidonius, and Aristotle; they metonymically symbolise Greek intellectual achievements, but their ethnic origins lay anywhere but in the Attic heart of Greece. Thus, by indicating that 'Greekness' is in fact a universal and intellectual value, Frankness shows that the 'Greek versus barbarian' dichotomy is not valid.[193] Consequently, being 'civilised', or Greek, is not a matter of origin – but of education and behaviour.[194]

In a similar vein, Toxaris' defence of Scythian friendship is proof of their humanity (φιλανθρωπία), a virtue vehemently vindicated by imperial Greek intellectuals such as Aelius

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[191] Compare the pseudo-Lucianic dialogue *Nero*, where Greekness signifies ethical quality; see Whitmarsh 1999, 146. See also *Herm*. 24.

[192] See Rochette 2010, 219.

[193] Consequently, it becomes (even more) difficult to see in Frankness a *prosopopoiia* of 'Lucian-the-barbarian-embracing-Hellenism'. Contra Rochette 2010, 219. Besides, the fact that a biographical reading – the cited passage included – is *per se* misleading. Similarly, in the present dialogue, Toxaris does not represent the 'Hellenised barbarian', but one facet of a Greek identity, which expresses itself, among other things, through the affirmation of ethical values. Moreover, the all too emphatic tone that Toxaris employs in demonstrating his moral precepts raises doubts as to whether, in the present passage, an authorial voice might adopt this character's view at all.

[194] Compare Isoc. 4.50: τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ' οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας. However, Isocrates' perspective still reveals some form of Athenocentrism.

Aristides or Plutarch.[195] Specifically, the fact that Toxaris considers that friendship is based on the intrinsic worth of any virtuous person, thereby making friendship a universal value, could be representative of a view defended by later Stoicism.[196] It is therefore highly significant what Toxaris says about the Scythians who praise anyone who is virtuous and 'take them as [theirs] because of their deeds' (οἰκείους αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων ποιούμεθα, §5.10). The meaning of 'someone οἰκεῖος' is a relative, someone who is one's nearest kin, but also one's closest friend.[197] This word and its derivatives are relevant to the discourse of both ethnic self-definition and friendship. Generally, its related noun οἰκειότης, 'affinity' is a category of friendship (cf. Arist. *Rhet*. 1381b34) that is frequently used as one part of a complementary pair with φιλία.[198] Moreover, it also designates the 'emotions and attitudes, namely the intimacy and emotional closeness' that 'may or may not exist between communities who are *syngeneis* (that is, related colonially and/or racially) and non-*syngeneis* alike'.[199] This type of affinity thus exists beyond and regardless of ethnic (kinship) affinities, which is exactly the point that Toxaris makes here. The other related noun, οἰκείωσις, 'affection', is more specifically a key-word in Stoic ethics, where it represents 'the natural affection to oneself', which is then directed to one's nearest of kin and to humanity.[200] The οἰκείωσις plays a role in the Stoic formation of friendship. The principle is that the sage, that is, the virtuous individual, naturally acts for his own good (a form of οἰκείωσις), and this coincides with what is good for his beloved, that is, the friend in the making; this moral goodness consist in the exercise of virtue, which is also enacted in the making of friendship.[201] Then, in the context of the relationship towards foreigners and with regard to Toxaris' statement that Scythians accept any foreign but virtuous person as belonging to their people, the word οἰκεῖος hints at Stoic cosmopolitanism, that is, at an egalitarian principle that excludes the idea of 'foreigner'.[202] Finally, not only the philanthropy and

[195] See Saïd 2006, 52.
[196] In particular, the later Stoicism of Seneca and Epictetus; see Pizzolato 1993, 157, 176-177. For this aspect of Stoic friendship, see also Banateanu 2001, 139-147.
[197] See LSJ s.v. II.1.
[198] See, e.g., Th. 4.19.1, Pl. *Smp*. 192b7, Plut. *Rom*. 16.1.8, *Mor*. 490B7, Aristid. Jebb p. 442, 5, Procl. *Theol.Plat*. 1.107.4. In addition, it is frequently used thus in Philo Judaeus too; for this aspect, see Sterling 1997, 219 with n. 93 for a list of passages.
[199] Fragoulaki 2013, 44-45.
[200] See Banateanu 2001, 67-70, 201-202.
[201] Collette-Dučić 2014, 102-103. For οἰκείωσις and Stoic friendship, see also Blundell 1970, Fraisse 1974, 338-347, Pizzolato 1993, 82-84. For the relationship between friendship and wisdom, see Sen. *Ep*. 9. For the implications of Stoic cosmopolitanism and οἰκείωσις on friendship, see Banateanu 2001, 125-153. For Stoic friendship and the sage, see Fürst 1997, 427-428.
[202] See Banateanu 2001, 148-153. Cf. Sen. *Ep*. 48.1-3. For Stoic cosmopolitanism, see, e.g., Stanton 1968, Schofield 1991, 64-92. Stoic cosmopolitanism might also go back to Cynicism: See Moles 1996, esp. 118-120 for the relationship between Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism. For the Cynic (and Stoic) expression of indifference towards the 'other'/barbarian as reflected in Lucian, see Angeli Bernardini 1991, 174-175. For cosmopolitanism and Stoic οἰκειῶσις in the context of the discourse of cultural identity, see Richter 2011, 74-85, 245. However, οἰκειῶσις as the process by which suspect and potentially harmful strangers become honourable friends is already a Homeric idea. See Kakridis 1963, 99. See also Baldry 1965 for a study of the concept of cosmopolitanism and φιλανθρωπία. Remarkably, in Cicero (*Amic*. 9.29), Laelius defends the principle that feelings of friendship can arise towards enemies on the ground of ethical virtue.

open-mindedness with which Toxaris' Scythians greet foreigners or strangers as their friends on grounds of their virtue but also their capacity to form friendship and friendly relations (φιλία, ξενία and οἰκειότης) makes them civilised people.[203] Furthermore, this might reflect the outcome of the dialogue (§§62-63), where Mnesippus and Toxaris become friends and one another's host for the same reason, that is, because they proved themselves to be virtuous by displaying worthy deeds – or rather, virtuous *logoi.*

In conclusion, Toxaris is made to appear as a marginal inhabitant of the Graeco-Roman world. The fact that he has been living for a long time amongst Greeks (πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον ὑμῖν συγγινόμενος, §9.6-7) provides him with sufficient knowledge of their customs. Therein, his position is similar to that of the liminal characters Anacharsis and Toxaris in the dialogue *Anacharsis* and the *prolalia* entitled *Scytha*. They, the barbarians, are placed in the role of the ethnographer of Greek customs, to whom they have been initiated (*Anach*. 14, *Scyth*. 4, 8) and upon which they are able look at 'from outside'.[204] The specificity of Toxaris in the present dialogue, though, is that he himself bridges the gap between Greek and barbarian to the point that we see him explaining allegedly Scythian, but essentially Greek customs to a Greek, who, in turn, looks at his culture 'from outside' sceptically and ironically. Toxaris is a barbarian who at the same time accepts and rejects Mnesippus' preconceived ideas about inhabitants of the Black Sea region, but whose mastery of *paideia* is beyond doubt.[205]

Toxaris' Rhetorical Skills

Toxaris' *paideia* not only shows in his world view, but also in his rhetorical skills and language, as he speaks standard Attic Greek. He carefully employs rhetorical embellishments to convince Mnesippus and emphasise arguments to whom he is particularly committed. Toxaris thus makes use of poetic words and rhetorical figures in three places: when he wants to give extra emphasis to his ideals of friendship, in his ecphrasis of the murals in the Oresteum (§6), and in his censure of Greek eloquence (§9).

First, Toxaris' presentation of Orestes and Pylades' heroic and virtuous deeds is interspersed with rhetorical figures and poetic words. The formulation that the heroes 'ventured on adventures' (*τόλμημα τολμῆσαι*, §3.8) is a *figura per pleonasmon* based on repetition, or tautology; its function consists in emphasising affect, and it is very suggestive in sound.[206] While epic and Ionic literature

[203] See Whitmarsh 2006a, 96: '*Philia* and *Xenia* […] are repeatedly presented in early Greek literature as the adhesive that binds societies together, the precondition for civilised intercourse (and thus of course one of the definitive absences in barbarian societies).'
[204] This inverts the Herodotean perspective. See Saïd 1994, 163-166. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between these characters, see Introduction, 'Greeks and Scythians'.
[205] For Anacharsis as a liminal character, see Branham 1983, 258.
[206] Lausberg, §503, §648, n.2, HWR s.v. *figura etymologica*. This figure based on the derivatives of τλῆναι is also found in Ar. *Ec*. 106 and *Pl*. 419, D.Chr. 13.6 (where it is emphasised by a following πολέμους πολεμηθέντας), Luc. *Asin*. 23, Ael. F 10.34, Lib. *Or*. 48.1.2.2.

make frequent use of it, Attic prose tends to avoid it.[207] The figure has a Homeric-epic connotation, but it is also very frequent in tragedy.[208] Here, the figure might be used not only to give an epic tone to the heroes' deeds, but also to recall Euripides' description of Orestes and Pylades' actions in Tauris/Scythia as a prime example of daring (τολμῶσι, τολμητέον, *IT* 111 and 121).[209] In §7, Toxaris exposes his ideals of friendship, which motivate the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades, and equally makes use of rhetorical embellishments. He declines the friendship-virtues in a polysyndetic row (καὶ τὸ πιστὸν καὶ φιλέταιρον καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ βέβαιον, §7.2), which underlines the accumulative and synonymic construction and conveys an idea of abundance.[210] The virtues are arranged in two parallel and complementary pairs (τὸ πιστὸν καὶ φιλέταιρον / τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ βέβαιον) as well as in two chiastic synonymous pairs (τὸ πιστόν-βέβαιον / φιλέταιρον-τὸ ἀληθές), which focus on two essential virtues: faithfulness and truthfulness. This composition exerts a highly rhetorical effect; Toxaris' oratorical skills equal his moral expectations. Toxaris then uses the common metaphor of the voyage for the good and the bad fortune to express his ideal of faithfulness in friendship (οἳ μέχρι μὲν κατ' οὖρον ὁ πλοῦς εἴη τοῖς φίλοις … εἰ δέ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἀντιπνεύσῃ αὐτοῖς …, §7.5-7). Although the metaphor is common in the discourse on friendship, in the present context, it might recall the motif of the sailing in the myth of Orestes and Pylades, and even passages of Euripides: *Or*. 727-728 (Orestes of Pylades: ἡδεῖαν ὄψιν· πιστὸς ἐν κακοῖς ἀνὴρ / κρείσσων γαλήνης ναυτίλοισιν εἰσορᾶν) and *IT* 675 (Pylades on his friendship with Orestes: κοινῇ δὲ πλεύσας δεῖ με καὶ κοινῇ θανεῖν).[211] The word οὖρος, which Toxaris uses here, is rare in prose.[212] This metaphorical and highly poetic language suits Toxaris' enthusiastic-dramatic-epic presentation of Orestes and Pylades. The expression ἐπὶ τῷ συμπονῆσαι φίλῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ κοινωνῆσαι τῶν δεινῶν (§7.10) confirms this. φίλος ἀνήρ 'dear man (or comrade)' is quasi-formulaic.[213] The motif of friends' common sufferings and extreme sympathy is underlined by means of synonymic *macrologia* (συμπονῆσαι/κοινωνῆσαι τῶν δεινῶν), whose function, as a figure of *amplificatio* and as part of the *ornatus*, is to 'move the audience '.[214]

Second, Toxaris demonstrates great mastery of ecphrastic language. His ecphrasis of the murals in the Oresteum is a good example of text-image, or verbal-visual, emulation. Toxaris introduces his ecphrasis by mentioning the stele, which is set up next to the temple and which

[207] Landfester 1997, 105 – see, however, the occurrences in later orators.
[208] For a thorough analysis of the figure in Homeric epics, see Clary 2009. See also Gygli-Wyss 1966.
[209] It is also mentioned in Luc. *Salt*. 46 (τὰ περὶ τὸν Ὀρέστην δράματα καὶ τὰ ἐν Σκυθίᾳ τῷ ἥρωϊ τετολμημένα).
[210] Lausberg, §686.
[211] Similarly, friendship is described as a safe haven in tempest in Plut. *De amic. mult.* 94D, Ov. *Trist*. 1.5.17-48, 4.5.1-6, 5.6.2.
[212] Before Lucian, the expression κατ' οὖρον appears mostly in tragedy (e.g. A. *Pers.* 481, E. *Andr*. 554), although it also appears once in Hdt. 4.163.9 and in Arr. *An*. 20.6.3. Lucian only uses οὖρος twice (cf. *Trag*. 168).
[213] It is found nine times in the *Iliad*, and it is frequently, but not exclusively, used in tragedy and comedy, commonly also as a form of address. See also §20.11, §35.15, where it is synonymous with 'friend'.
[214] Lausberg, §503, see also §§649-656.

corroborates the story of Orestes and Pylades depicted on the walls of the temple (τὰ αὐτὰ ὁπόσα ἡ στήλη δηλοῖ, §6.8-9). This is a common rhetoric device of authentication, which is used not only to bestow credibility on the facts, but also to present works of art as real.[215] Toxaris then begins his ecphrasis and immediately focuses on the visual aspect. The verbs of seeing and showing he deploys (δείκνυται, §6.9, μάλιστα ἴδοι τις ἄν … ἐπεδείκνυντο, §6.19-20) are part of the usual ecphrastic terminology. The verbs of seeing provide a frame for the ecphrasis by emphasising its own visual modality and confusing it with the visual mode of apprehension of the wall paintings. The verb (ἐπι)δείκνυμι, which means both 'to show' and 'to prove', increases the value of the demonstrative gesture. This corroborates the fact that Toxaris' ecphrasis of the murals has a convincing function just like a verbal demonstration. Thus, Toxaris does not fail to use the verb γράφω (γέγραπται, §6.13), usually found in ecphrases for its ambiguity. Its two meanings ('write' and/or 'draw, paint') suit well the highly rhetorical and self-reflexive scope of art description. Then, Toxaris' description of the murals is not lacking in the rhetorical means to enhance the vividness, the *enargeia*, of the text. This is achieved by describing actions and movements, which enable the recipients to mentally visualise the 'painted' scene easily (φονεύων, ἀποπλέοντες, ἐπιλαμβάνονται, πλέοντος, ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι, ἐπαναβαίνειν, ἀπονήχονται, §6.14-19).[216] The same applies to the use of spatial and temporal markers. Indeed, describing the context of exhibition of the murals, as it is done here (καταντικρὺ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοίχου, §6.12-13, ἔνθα, §6.19), confers a spatial dimension on the ecphrasis and constitutes a means of enhancing the visualisation of the work of art.[217] The description of (the murals representing) the events in Tauris is structured in time as well: εἶτα ('then', §6.10), ἤδη ('further', §6.12), ἤδη ('already', §6.13), τέλος ('finally', §6.15), ἤδη ('now', §6.16), εἶτ' ('then', §6.17). However, this device is rather ambiguous, for it characterises the scene more as a narration than as a picture, as if the scene described were not a painting, but the action itself.[218] But in addition, this also constitutes one main effect of a good ecphrasis, which consists in blurring the lines between the depicted scene and its verbal representation. A further device that enhances the mental visualisation of an ecphrasis is the brevity of the narration.[219] The scene in which the Scythians try to hold back

[215] Compare *Dips*. 6. See Maffei 1994, xliv-xlv.
[216] See, foremost, Grethlein/Huitink 2017.
[217] For example, and more extensively, Philostratus contextualises his ecphrases by describing the gallery in which the paintings are located (Philostr. *Imag*. I.proem.). A similar description of murals occurs in Luc. *Dom*. 22-31, e.g., in ἑξῆς δὲ μετὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἕτερον ... γέγραπται (23), κατὰ δὲ τὸν μέσον τοῖχον ἄνω ... πεποίηται (26).
[218] This is a common phenomenon in ecphrases, for they generally tend to 'efface the ontological difference between a depiction and the object depicted' (Laird 2007, 97). However, it is interesting to note that in iconography, too, actions are more frequently the subject of representations of friends, who undertake ventures etc. together, than emotions (which are, arguably, hard to depict as such). See Ruprecht 2018, 287 for this aspect: 'Allerdings finden sich in der Bildkunst epochenübergreifend vor allem darstellungen gemeinsamer Taten wieder. […] Somit kann konstatiert werden, dass die Bildkunst […] nicht darauf abzielte, Freundschaft als emotionale Bindung herauszustreichen.' One might object to this, though, that her definition of friendship as 'emotional bond' in literary sources is rather simplistic. In ancient literature too, actions are one central aspect in the definition of friendship.
[219] For the *brevitas* and clarity of understanding, see Lausberg, §318.

Iphigenia, Orestes and Pylades on their flight (§6.15-17) conveys an impression of the velocity of actions in comparison to its corresponding scene in Euripides' *IT*.[220] On the other hand, the *enargeia* of Toxaris' description is contrasted with his affirmation that the painter represented how Orestes and Pylades were 'careless' of their own enemies and 'regarded as insignificant' the possibility that they might die for one another (ἀμελοῦντα, §6.21, παρ' οὐδὲν τιθέμενον, §6.22). These states of mind or mental activities rather illustrate Toxaris' hermeneutical process in analysing the actions depicted (ἀμυνόμενον, §6.22, ἀπαντᾶν, §6.23, προαρπάσας, §6.25).[221] Finally, Toxaris sprinkles his ecphrasis with a few poetic forms and words such as δεσμά (§6.13), πηδαλίων (§6.17), and τραυματίαι (§6.18).[222] In particular, the noun δεσμά echoes the corresponding scene in E. *IT* 1349-50 (ἐκ δεσμῶν δὲ τοὺς νεανίας / ἐλευθέρους πρύμνηθεν ἑστῶτας νεώς).[223]

One function of this ecphrasis is to demonstrate Toxaris' rhetorical ability, and thereby his *paideia*. A further function of this ecphrasis is, which is fulfilled by means of its focus on the 'visual' nature of the myth of Orestes and Pylades, is to enter into competition with Euripides' play, that is, with another visual representation. In comparison, in the tragedy, the recipients do not see the fight as action on stage, but learn about it through the account of a messenger; in the *Toxaris*, on the contrary, they do 'see' (visualise mentally) the fight. Not least of all, the summarising and incisive, verbal formulation of Toxaris' ecphrasis aims at surpassing the Euripidean representation. The ecphrasis represents not only a case of intertextual emulation, but also of intermedial *agōn* with regard to the murals. By thus referring to literary and iconographic objects, Toxaris' ecphrasis potentiates the imaginative quality of the fight scene, both on a verbal (textual and fictionally oral) and on a visual level. Most importantly, though, by referring to *Graeco-Roman* literary and iconographical objects, Toxaris demonstrates that his cultural references are not Scythian, but Hellenic and Roman. The scene in which Orestes and Pylades are willing to die for one another, as it is 'depicted' on the wall, has been used by Greek and Roman authors, from Euripides to Ovid, for centuries to exemplify this philosophical ideal. Thus, by describing this scene, Toxaris most effectively demonstrates that the Scythian values in friendship are precisely those that a Greek or a Roman would ideally defend, and that the codes used to express these values are the same.[224]

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[220] Compare §6.15-17: οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ ἄλλως ἐπιλαμβάνονται τοῦ σκάφους ἤδη πλέοντος ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι τῶν πηδαλίων καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν πειρώμενοι and E. *IT* 1355-1357: εἰχόμεσθα τῆς ξένης / πρυμνησίων τε, καὶ δι' εὐθυντηρίας / οἴακας ἐξηιροῦμεν εὐπρύμνου νεώς; 1364-1365: ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον εἰχόμεσθα τῆς ξένης / καὶ πρὸς σ' ἔπεσθαι διεβιαζόμεσθά νιν.

[221] The contrast between moments of rationalisation and illusion in ecphrases is a much-debated subject in scholarship; for this aspect, see, foremost, the example of Philostratus' *Imagines* and Newby 2002, 2009, Baumann 2011, 22-30 (rationalisation through hermeneutics as opposed to admiration).

[222] The metaplastic plural of δεσμός is poetic (Schmid I, 226, LSJ s.v. δεσμός I.1, cf. *VH* 2.23, *JTr*. 3, *Prom*. 1, etc.). πηδάλιον is a poetic word (Schmid I, 342), but it is also used a few times by Herodotus (e.g., in the Scythian-logos 4.110.9). τραυματίας is also a poetic word (Schmid I, 349).

[223] For the textual problems concerning πρύμνηθεν, see Parker 2016, *ad loc*.

[224] Here, it might be indispensable to remember that this reflects a general attitude in Lucian, for his texts 'focus obsessively upon the process of reception of literary and artistic product. These highly mobile satires portray a dynamic cultural environment in which the aesthetic work is not a sealed monument, but the object of debate.' Whitmarsh 2006a, 110.

Third, Toxaris shows excellent rhetorical ability in the use of figures when he reproves the Greeks for their eloquence and their lack of truthfulness towards the ideals that they so successfully represent on stage in their famous tragedies. The Greeks, says Toxaris, are only capable of praise, applause and cries (ἐπαινεῖτε καὶ ἐπικροτεῖτε καί … καὶ ἐπιδακρύετε, §9.14-15). This phrase, which is a fine climactic and polysyndetic construction with alliteration in ἐπ-, sums up the audience's response to dramatic performance, and it reveals that Toxaris is familiar with Hellenic cultural practices – and with practices of literary criticism.[225] He further expands on the metaphor of the theatre with the following phrase: ἃ διηρμένα τὸ στόμα καὶ παμμέγεθες κεχηνότα (§9.20). This phrase, which is itself synonymic (διηρμένα/κεχηνότα), constitutes a synonymic amplification of the preceding phrase, τοῖς κενοῖς τούτοις καὶ κωφοῖς προσωπείοις (§9.19). Toxaris' act of embroidering this metaphor demonstrates his rhetorical ability. His deployment of rhetoric figures in the whole passage is highly ironic, considering the fact that he is censuring precisely what he himself makes ample use of: eloquence. Toxaris' allusion to the stereotype of the rhetorically deficient barbarian, for example, when he pretends that the Scythians are the opposite of the Greeks and lack any rhetoric competence (γὰρ δὴ λειπόμεθα ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις, §9.22), is even more ironic. In fact, his entire demonstration – praise, actually – of Orestes and Pylades' virtue is ironic, considering that he reproves Greek oratory on friendship precisely because it consists of praise (ἐπαινέσαι) and the demonstration of its value as a virtue (ἀγαθόν).[226] Finally, there might be some wit in his comment that he can easily demonstrate (ῥᾴδιον ἐπιδεῖξαι, §9.5) that the Scythians hold friendship in higher esteem than the Greeks do; ἐπιδείκνυμι is the usual verb for the act of demonstrating and persuading.

Toxaris' rhetoric tactic seems to be effective, for, in the end, Mnesippus is convinced of Toxaris' point in praising Orestes and Pylades' friendship (αὐτῷ δίκαια ποιεῖν δοκεῖτε οὕτως Ὀρέστην καὶ Πυλάδην ἐκθειάσαντες, §8.4). Mnesippus is perplexed, as Toxaris' rhetoric talent and ethical values of friendship conflict with his preconceived image of the uncivilised Scythian.[227] However, he finally recognises that the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades is sensible. His persuasion is manifest as he willingly reconsiders his former opinion (ἐμοὶ γοῦν τέως ἄλλως γιγνώσκοντι, §8.3). Mnesippus' previous judgement that the Scythians' worship was 'inconsistent' (ὑπεναντία τοῖς πάλαι, §3.6) has turned to the opposite: it is sound and consistent (δίκαια ποιεῖν δοκεῖτε).[228]

[225] For Lucian and the theatre performances of his time, see Kokolakis 1960, Seeck 1990, Karavas 2005, 219-238, Schmitz 2010.
[226] For the whole phrase: ἀλλ'ἀπόχρη ὑμῖν ἐπαινέσαι τε αὐτὴν καὶ δεῖξαι ἡλίκον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν (§9.10-11).
[227] The particle ἄρα (§8.1) 'denotes, not interest in general, but in particular the interest or surprise occasioned by enlightenment or disillusionment' (GP, 35). In the present context, Mnesippus is made to express astonishment at Toxaris' unexpected rhetorical talent. Mnesippus also expresses his astonishment at the phrase ἐλελήθεις δέ με (§8.5). The expression is a dramatic formula frequently used by Lucian when a protagonist 'discovers some new facts in his friend's character' (Anderson 1976a, 11 n. 78, cf. *Gall*. 28, *Im*. 15, *Nec*. 1).
[228] The adjective δίκαιος, 'right, just', has the nuance of fittingness, of 'being in conformity with (a norm)', and more specifically of 'being reasonable' (LSJ s.v. B.II.3). Therefore, it indicates consistency of thought and action.

The persuasiveness of Toxaris' words is clear, for Mnesippus even explicitly remarks on his rhetorical skills: ὦ Τόξαρι, οὐ μόνον ἄρα τοξεύειν ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν Σκύθαι καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμείνους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥῆσιν εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων πιθανώτατοι (§8.1-3). Toxaris' defence and description of Orestes and Pylades' achievements is so effective indeed that Mnesippus even grants the Scythians the excellence in persuasive speech making (ἁπάντων πιθανώτατοι). The adjective πιθανός (πιθανότης) is part of the stock terminology of persuasion in rhetorical theory; in the context of a speech, it designates its quality of being plausible and credible.[229] Mnesippus demonstrates that the aim of an ecphrasis is 'to help achieve persuasion'.[230] Indeed, Mnesippus explicitly refers to Toxaris' ecphrastic abilities (§8.5-7):

> ἐλελήθεις δέ με, ὦ γενναῖε, καὶ γραφεὺς ἀγαθὸς ὤν. πάνυ γοῦν ἐναργῶς ἐπέδειξας ἡμῖν τὰς ἐν τῷ Ὀρεστείῳ εἰκόνας καὶ τὴν μάχην τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων τραύματα.

The noun γραφεύς designates both the painter and the writer.[231] Mnesippus recognises the ambivalent nature of Toxaris' ecphrasis, which makes use of the visual and the verbal. Toxaris uses γραφεύς in §6.21 to refer to the painter of the murals in the Oresteum; Mnesippus parallels the painter's works of art with Toxaris' verbal description of these. Mnesippus deploys further ecphrastic rhetorical terms (πάνυ γοῦν ἐναργῶς ἐπέδειξας). The *enargeia* (ἐναργῶς) is a key concept in the theory and practice of description.[232] In rhetorical theory, ἐνάργεια ('vividness', or *evidentia*, cf. Quint. 4.2.63) serves the *perspicuitas* and the purpose of making a narration *credibilis*; it consists of rendering a description (of things, events, etc.) such that the object described could appear before the recipients' eyes.[233] Then, the idea behind the verb ἐπιδείκνυμι (ἐπίδειξας) is that 'the observer views the speech as an oratorical display'.[234] Mnesippus therefore acknowledges Toxaris' demonstration as a visual and verbal act. Mnesippus' response not only reads as a metaliterary comment on Toxaris' successful description, but also represents a learnt reaction towards verbal picturing, for he is aware of the power of words and capable of analysing the mechanisms of persuasion with the appropriate vocabulary. Beyond this, Mnesippus' answer reads as a hermeneutical explication of the ecphrasis. In this sense, the *Toxaris* is self-explanatory. The form of the dialogue allows for shedding light on the very language of the text, and it unmasks the function of the text as a rhetorical showpiece for the external recipient of the dialogue. Therefore, it is important for the dynamics of the dialogue that the characters remain aware of their opponent's rhetorical manipulation and verbalise these mechanisms of persuasion. On the one hand, it suits the purpose of their characterisation as *pepaideumenoi* who have

[229] Compare Lausberg, §322.
[230] Webb 2009, 132. For the relationship between persuasion and ecphrasis in rhetoric, see Webb 2009, 131-165.
[231] LSJ s.v. I and III, cf. γέγραπται, §6.13.
[232] For this concept in literature, see, e.g., Zanker 1981, Walker 1993, Plett 2012; in rhetorical theory, see Meijering 1987, Webb 2009.
[233] Compare Hermog. *Prog*. 10 Spengel *Rhet*. iii, Quint. 4.2.123.
[234] Lausberg, §239.

complementary (performative and analytical), if not equal, rhetorical skills at their disposal, which is meaningful for the *agōn* and the outcome of the dialogue. On the other hand, the distribution of the roles of performer and analyser (in this case, Toxaris and Mnesippus, respectively) makes the text of the dialogue self-reflexive.

Conclusion

Similar motifs of characters wondering at foreign customs can be found in other works of Lucian as well. In particular, the *Anacharsis* and the *Scytha* stage encounters with a Scythian character, too. In comparison, though, the *Toxaris* inverts the parameters: as far as wondering at cultural differences is concerned, the *Anacharsis* represents a wondering Scythian, Anacharsis, who asks the Greek Solon about one of their customs, athletics (ταῦτα δὲ ὑμῖν, ὦ Σόλων, τίνος ἕνεκα οἱ νέοι ποιοῦσιν; *Anach*. 1, cf. τί φής, ὦ Τόξαρι; θύετε Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Πυλάδῃ ὑμεῖς οἱ Σκύθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι πεπιστεύκατε αὐτούς; §1.1-2).[235] Then, compared to the worship of Toxaris by the Athenians (*Scyth*. 8), the Scythians' worship of Orestes and Pylades is an inversion of the motif 'worship of the stranger'.[236] The present dialogue thus treats the question of 'otherness' and the entities 'Greek' and 'barbarian' in its own way.[237] The opening of the dialogue *Toxaris* apparently establishes an opposition between a Greek and a Scythian view. Mnesippus' idea of Scythian customs is culturally predetermined, stereotyped, and both Mnesippus and Toxaris stick to their position. However, upon closer inspection, their perspectives are shifting, and 'Greek' and 'Scythian' are unstable categories. It is therefore symptomatic that Mnesippus and Toxaris' defend 'Greek' and 'Scythian' perspectives inconsistently and in turns. Mnesippus sometimes takes a Scythian perspective, for example, when he focuses on the harms Orestes and Pylades did to the Scythians (§2.4). On the other hand, Toxaris' viewpoint is primarily a Greek one, notwithstanding his emphasis on his Scythian-ness.[238] His description of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades is in conformity with the Greek (and Roman) cult practices, and it corroborates the stereotype of the savage barbarian at the same time. Toxaris judges Orestes and Pylades with the eyes of someone who is familiar with Greek *paideia* – and which he is both avowedly (cf. §9.6-7) and obviously, as the way in which he enters into dialogue with Greek literature demonstrates. Not only does Toxaris adopt Herodotus' ethnography of Scythia, but he also refers to ethical concepts such as friendship as a form of virtue and defends a Homeric worldview of heroic friendship. He has a good knowledge of Greek mythology as he deals not only with the myth of Orestes and Pylades, but also with that of the Argonauts.[239] He is familiar with the

[235] Compare Angeli Bernardini 1991, 178-179. For Anacharsis' questioning of Greek athletics, see above.
[236] Compare Visa-Ondarçuhu 2008, 182.
[237] Bompaire underlines the extremely rhetorical nature of Lucian's use of stereotypes, which are, above all, literary. See Bompaire 1958, 232-235.
[238] Visa-Ondarçuhu 2008, 182 briefly mentions this inversion of roles, which will be described more precisely in the following commentary. See also Pernot 1993, 569, to whom this inversion represents a 'permutation humoristique qui souligne la versatilité des éloges sophistiques.'
[239] The knowledge of mythology strongly differentiates Toxaris from another famous Scythian literary character, the archer in Ar. *Th.*, who does not know the myth of the Gorgo (vv. 1102b-1103).

Greek tragedies: for the purpose of his argumentation, Toxaris inevitably refers to the myth of Orestes and Pylades and their friendship, and to its most extensive formulation in Euripides' *IT*.[240] Thus, the dialogue begins as a multiple confrontation of different and combined perspectives: Greek, Scythian, and perhaps Roman ones, too.[241]

Indeed, with regard to some aspects, Toxaris reflects a typically Roma attitude. One of these aspects is his use of the prejudice against the Greeks and their eloquence (for example: τοὺς μὲν περὶ φιλίας λόγους ἄμεινον ἄλλων ἂν εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι, §9.8-9). The Greeks' supremacy in eloquence is topical, especially amongst the Romans. Thus, for Cicero, who never misses an opportunity to notice the Romans' debt towards Greece in rhetorical theory, Athens represents the birthplace of eloquence (e.g. *De or*. 1.4.13).[242] However, the Romans more often criticise the *volubilitas* of Greek speech, which they considered 'flowery' and 'lack[ing] gravitas, moral weight'.[243] For example, Juvenal thus satirises Greek eloquence (3.73-74): ingenium uelox, audacia perdita, sermo / promptus et Isaeo torrentior […]. By criticising the ephemeral nature of the Greeks' fine words (he compared them to vanishing dreams in §9.17-18), Toxaris shows to be equally able to make use of Roman stereotypes against Mnesippus and the Greeks. The second aspect is Toxaris' moralism. Arguably, the fact that he presents the Scythians as the advocates of virtuous behaviour (in friendship) might recall the Romans' insistence on their *mores*.[244]

[240] For the myth of Orestes and Pylades in Euripides' *IT* and further accounts, see 'Orestes and Pylades' above.
[241] Reflections on Greek practices may at times also represent Roman reactions to Greek institutions, as is the case in the *Anacharsis*. For this aspect, see Goldhill 2001, 1-2, König 2005, 91-94, Konstan 2010, 184-187.
[242] In the text: Graeciam quae semper eloquentiae princeps esse voluit atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas in quibus summa dicendi vis et inventa est et perfecta.
[243] Woolf 1994, 121, 132.
[244] Compare Woolf 1994, 122. The Romans consider themselves as the warrants of 'moral well-being.'

§§10-12.3a Concluding Agreements for the Contest

The *Agōn* and Its Metaphors

The §§10-11 are the turning point of the dialogue. Following the structure of Old Comedy, the dialogue starts with a dispute, which requires some form of arbitration. In the transitional part of this type of comedy, which leads from the dispute to the arbitration, the matter of dispute and the opponents' claims are defined, and agreements about the arbitrator and the terms and conditions of the arbitration are concluded.[245] Thus, in the *Toxaris*, the argument about the Scythian cult of Orestes and Pylades as gods of friendship, which is the cause of the disagreement between Mnesippus and Toxaris, leads the latter to compare the Greek and the Scythian concepts of friendship (§9). Eventually, this results in Toxaris proposing a competition (εἰ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, οὕτω νῦν ποιῶμεν, §10.1) to establish whether the Greeks or the Scythians are best at friendship (§10) and setting the rules for this competition (§11). Mnesippus agrees and asks for the specifics of the contest (πότερον ...; §11.10). Mnesippus and Toxaris' concluding arrangements for the rules of the *agōn* marks the transition from the dispute (§§1-9) to the 'trial' (§§12-61).[246]

Accordingly, these chapters make explicit the agonistic intentions of the *Toxaris* (for example, ἀγῶνα ... ἀγωνισάμενος, §10.11), whose eristic dynamics were already tangible in the first part of the dialogue (contradictory arguments, irony, rhetorical sophisms, etc.). In particular, the §9, where Toxaris starts a polemic against the Greeks, whom he accuses of being unable to keep up with their speeches, and pretends to easily demonstrate (ῥᾴδιον ἐπιδεῖξαι, §9.5) that the Scythians are best at deeds of friendship, paves the way for the contest and characterises Mnesippus and Toxaris as opponents. For example, the phrase οὐκ ἄν ... φιλοτιμηθείην πρὸς σέ (§9.3) already introduces the idea of competition between Mnesippus and Toxaris.[247] Then, the way Toxaris is made to use the pronouns and particles builds up a clear opposition between the Scythian and the Greek *ēthos* (πλείων φιλίας λόγος παρ' ἡμῖν ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν, §9.4, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔμπαλιν, §9.21), between a friendship of fine words and one of action (τοὺς μὲν περὶ φιλίας λόγους … τἄργα δέ, §9.8-9, ὅσῳ γὰρ δή ... ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις, τοσοῦτον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς, §9.21-22). In the following, as in §9.4-5, Toxaris uses parallelising schemes to emphasise the opposition between his own Scythian and his interlocutor's Greek customs and examples (ἢ ἡμεῖς ἢ ὑμεῖς, §10.2, ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ Σκυθικά, σὺ δὲ τὰ Ἑλληνικά, §10.8). This opposition lays the foundation for the story-*agōn* between Mnesippus and Toxaris (§§12-61),

[245] See Gelzer 1960, 58.
[246] Compare with the function of the second part ('Abmachungen über ein Schiedsgericht') of the epirrhematic *agōn* in διαλλαγή in Old Comedy (Aristophanes); see Gelzer 1960, 60-61 for this aspect. See also Introduction, 'Structure'.
[247] See LSJ s.v. φιλοτιμέομαι I.1 with πρὸς τινός, 'to vie emulously with, rival'; cf. Luc. *Cont*. 20.2, *Somn*. 6.3, *DMort*. 29.2.12

which thus visibly functions as a form of *syncrisis* of barbarian and Greek (stories about) friendship.[248]

In §9, the relationship between ἔργα and λόγος is thus one of opposition, an opposition which Toxaris uses to express his contempt for the Greeks' inaptitude to transform into deeds their praise and admiration for examples of friendship represented on stage. On a metaliterary level, this criticism signifies the inability to imitate or emulate these examples, which are clearly thought of as literary: they are the examples brought on stage by tragedians.[249] In this light, Toxaris' proposal to organise a contest that consists in presenting new, contemporary examples of friendship (ὀλίγους δέ προχειρισάμενοι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, §10.7), as an immediate consequence (εἰ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, οὕτω νῦν ποιῶμεν, §10.1) of his criticism, appears as the programmatic incitement to actively engage with literary-moral examples of the past, as befits a competent *pepaideumenos*.[250] Hence, in §§10-12.3, the relationship between ἔργα and λόγοι, where ἔργα is explicated as the 'deeds of arms', changes: the deeds and the words become interchangeable, as the one is used as a metaphor for the other. The *agōn*, which is to oppose Toxaris and Mnesippus as if in court, is presented as a battle both in arms and in words by means of the topical metaphor of the speech as a weapon, thereby fusing the image of a judicial trial with that of an athletic competition – and that of an epideictic *agōn*, as will be seen later.[251] The wording used by Toxaris alludes to a judicial situation that may equally apply to the context of a judicial court, of a sophistic competition, or of an athletic competition – or of a battlefield.

On the one hand, Toxaris remarks that the Greeks can 'produce many trustworthy poets as their witnesses' for examples of excellent Greek friendships: the expression ἀξιοπίστους μάρτυρας παρέχομαι (μάρτυρας...παρεχόμενοι, §10.4) is taken from juridical language and explicitly refers to the context of a court.[252] Already in §9.8, Toxaris addresses Mnesippus with the phrase ὑμεῖς γάρ μοι δοκεῖτε. The emphatic ὑμεῖς γάρ, which is a frequent form of address in oratory, gives the impression of an orator's accusing gesture in court.[253] Indeed, Toxaris and Mnesippus are characterised as opponents in court. Mnesippus presents himself as an orator (in court or in front of a public) when he proposes that he be cut his tongue in case he lost the contest (ἀλλὰ τὴν γλῶτταν ἀποτμηθῆναι,

[248] See Introduction, 'Structure'. The use of the correlatives in the phrase ὅσῳ γὰρ δὴ λειπόμεθα ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις, τοσοῦτον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς πλεονεκτοῦμεν, §9.22-23 is indicative as well. For a similar opposition, see below §§35.10-36.12.
[249] See above, 'Orestes and Pylades'.
[250] Compare above, 'Barbarians and Greeks'.
[251] The metaphor of athletics and trial has been well known since e.g., *Il*. 23.411; see Mirhady 1991, 78 for this aspect. For the metaphor of athletic *agōn* and sophistic competition, see *Eun*. 13, and in general, see Korenjak 2000, 195-199. For the judicial *agōn* and its various forms in Lucian, see Bompaire 1958, 242-264. For the use of forensic oratory in Lucianic dialogues, see Gassino 2017. The structure of epirrhematic *agōn* is compatible with the idea of a judicial trial. See Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 150-155.
[252] See LSJ s.v. μάρτυς I and e.g. Antipho 5.20, Aeschin. 1.47, 3.27, D. 19.92 (cf. [Hermog.] *Inv*. 3.5.40), and esp. Gorg. F 11a.93 DK (μάρτυρα πιστὸν παρέξομαι). For the expression in Lucian, see *Ind*. 25, *Cat*. 27.
[253] For the use of ὑμεῖς γάρ, see e.g., D. 19.189.4, 21.171.5, 25.87.8, 34.50.2, Aeschin. 3.85.1, Andoc. 3.35.3, Antipho 1.4.1, D.Chr. 12.25, 32.71; cf. also in Xenophon, but only in speeches as in *Cyr*. 3.1.37.

§11.9), as opposed to Toxaris who would rather be cut his hand as suits a warrior and man of action (ἡττηθεὶς ἀποτμηθῆναι τὴν δεξίαν, §10.12). Here, the tongue stands not only as a symbol for Greek eloquence, but it also stresses Mnesippus' characterisation as an orator.[254] Then, Toxaris stipulates that, as if in court, Mnesippus and he take the oath to tell the truth (ἐπομοσάμενος ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖν, §11.20). In general, oaths play an important role in the settlement of disputes, and in classical Athenian law, 'oaths […] were used to guarantee the truthfulness and honesty of the disputants' (and of the participants involved, the witnesses and the judges).[255] One form of taking an oath, for example, consisted in an exchange of oaths (ἀντωμοσία), which the disputants swore at the ἀνάκρισις, the preliminary examination by the magistrate, and which is a descendant of the archaic 'oaths-contest' that settled disputes.[256] In other cases, the two parties in a trial swore a preliminary oath (διωμοσία), which was more of a formality than a decisive judicial oath.[257] A particular form of judicial oath was assigned when there was no other evidence available, as might be considered to be the case in the present dialogue.[258] The importance of the oath for the *Toxaris* is manifold, and we will come back to it later.

On the other hand, Toxaris and Mnesippus continually exploit terms whose meaning is ambiguous, that is, terms that refer not only to the context of judicial oratory and court, but also to athletic and military confrontation. When Toxaris rejects the friendships of which the Greek poets sing as examples for their contest because, considering the Greeks' prolific poetic production in this regard, this would result in an easy victory for Mnesippus, he uses the verb πλεονεκτέω (ἐπεὶ κατά γε τοῦτο πλεονεκτοῖτε ἄν, §10.3). In this context, this verb, which he used similarly in §9.22 (τοσοῦτον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς πλεονεκτοῦμεν, as opposed to λειπόμεθα ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλίας λόγοις), means 'to have the advantage [sc. of a larger share]'.[259] However, the verb is also frequently used in judicial or military agonistic contexts.[260] This suits the present use, for it introduces the metaphorical analogy of an '*agōn* in words' and an '*agōn* in arms' developed in the passage. Indeed, when Toxaris

[254] Compare the symbolical motif of the γλωσσοτομία in *Pisc*. 2, where one of the resurrected and revengeful philosophers proposes that Parrhesiades ('Frankness') be cut his tongue as reprisal.
Mnesippus' proposal to be cut his tongue as reprisal recalls anecdotes about Attic orators who had their tongue cut. The context of these anecdotes is, however, very different, for these orators were thus punished for their political (mis)alliances. For example, the *Vitae decem oratorum* attributed to Plutarch relates that the orator Hyperides was sentenced to be cut his tongue before being put to death for his anti-Macedonian feelings. See [Plut.] *Vit.dec.orat*. 849C, cf. Sopat.Rh. 8.8 Walz v. There is also a ὑπόθεσις by Sopater with the following subject: the Athenian orator Demades proposes that the anti-Macedonian orators be cut their tongue. See Sopat.Rh. 129.4 Walz viii [= Demad. F 90 De Falco 1954], cf. Tzetz. *Chil*. 6.37: Δημάδου δὲ αἰτήσαντος οἱ Ἀθηναίων μόνοι ῥήτορες ἀπετμήθησαν τὰς γλώσσας ἐν Ἀθήναις, νόμῳ καὶ ψήφῳ Ἀττικῶν οὕτω πως δικασάντων. For a further discussion of Demades, see De Falco 1954, 67-68 with n. 1.
[255] Sommerstein in Sommerstein *et al*. 2013, 57.
[256] Sommerstein in Sommerstein *et al*. 2013, 80.
[257] See Parker 2005, 74-75. See also Mirhady 1991, 81-83, Thür 1996, 60, 71, Gagarin 1997, 128. Compare *Deor.Conc*. 15, where the witnesses have to take an oath in the trial of the fake gods.
[258] For this kind of oath, see Gagarin 1997, 127.
[259] Compare Plt. *Grg*. 491a5. All the occurrences of the verb in Lucian's corpus mean 'claim a larger share of' (*Symp*. 43, *Prom*. 14, *Sat*. 25, *Herm*. 22).
[260] For the judicial context, see e.g. Isoc. 5.30 (παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν). For the military context, see e.g. Plt. *La*. 183a1 or in historiography X. *An*. 5.8.13, *HG* 7.5.11, D.S. 11.15.4.

lays down the conditions for winning the contest, he uses an ambiguous vocabulary: ὁπότερος ἂν ἐν τούτοις κρατῇ καὶ ἀμείνους παράσχηται τοὺς φίλους, αὐτός τε νενικηκὼς ἔσται καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀνακηρύξει (§10.9-10). The verb νικάω is more general and applies to victories both in arms ('win, prevail', of battles etc. and athletic games) and in court ('win a cause').[261] The verbs κρατέω, 'get the upper hand', and ἀνακηρύττω, 'proclaim' [sc. a winner/conqueror], present the winning of the story-competition as an act of physical overpowering.[262] Thus, Toxaris' idea of a contest metaphorically becomes a combat in which words equal weapons. Mnesippus responds to Toxaris' proposal in the same vein, for he describes his adversary as a rhetorically and physically fearsome opponent: πάνυ εὐστόχους καὶ τεθηγμένους παρεσκευασμένῳ τοὺς λόγους (§11.2-3). The adjective εὔστοχος, 'aiming well', 'making good shots', and the participle τεθηγμένος, 'sharp', are ambiguous, for they refer to both weapons and words.[263] The metaphor is traditional, but here in particular, the adjective εὔστοχος alludes to Toxaris' name and charges it with further meaning, for the Scythian is thus characterised as a champion of rhetoric.[264] Mnesippus, seeing his honour being threatened by Toxaris' proposal, then adds that he will not capitulate that easily, 'betraying the Greek cause all of a sudden' (οὐ μὴν ἀγεννῶς γε οὕτως καταπροδοὺς ἐν βραχεῖ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἅπαν ὑποχωρήσομαί σοι, §11.3-4) and 'be convicted without defence' by Toxaris alone (ἐρήμην ὑπὸ σοῦ ἁλῶναι, §11.8). The verb καταπροδίδωμι, 'betray utterly', and ὑποχωρέω, 'yield', go on explaining speech in terms of physical force.[265] The adjective ἐρήμην, 'by default, undefended', and the verb ἁλῶναι, 'to be taken, conquered' or 'to be convicted and condemned', exploit the ambiguity between defeat in court and in arms.[266] By making abundant use of this metaphor of rhetorical/athletic competition and warfare, the text not only succeeds in rendering visible the agonistic structure of the dialogue, but also in equating the power of words to that of deeds.

Thereupon, Toxaris states that either Mnesippus or he will win the story-competition 'having contended in the most beautiful and noble contest' (κάλλιστον ἀγῶνα καὶ σεμνότατον ἀγωνισάμενος, §10.11). The *polyptoton* ἀγῶνα … ἀγωνισάμενος emphasises the idea of *agōn*, but the meaning of the word ἀγών itself is ambiguous in the present context. On the one hand, it means 'trial'.[267] On the

[261] See LSJ s.v. I.1 and I.5 respectively. For the association between trial in court and battle, see also *Prom.Es*. 1.
[262] See LSJ s.v. II.1 and LSJ s.v. ἀνακηρύσσω I.2, respectively. For the latter see also *Anach*. 36, *Herm*. 33, *Tim*. 20, 51. For the metaphorical use of the two verbs, see *Ind*. 10.
[263] See LSJ s.v. II.1-2 and LSJ s.v. θήγω I.2, respectively. See also the following note for further passages.
[264] For the metaphor, see e.g. Ar. *Ra*. 815. See also §62.5 and e.g. *Herc*. 6 (καὶ τά γε βέλη αὐτοῦ οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἶμαι, ὀξεῖς καὶ εὔστοχοι καὶ ταχεῖς), *Nigr*. 35-36, *Hist.Conscr*. 43 (μὴ κομιδῇ τεθηγμένος ἀρχέσθω τῆς γραφῆς), *Prom.Es*. 2 (πάνυ εὐστόχως ἀποτετόξευται καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν δριμύτητα τῶν σκωμμάτων). For this characterisation of Toxaris, see Visa-Ondarçuhu 2008, 183.
[265] See LSJ s.v. and LSJ s.v. I.3.b, respectively. For the first, see also Ar. *V*. 1044, and its occurrences in various historiographers. For the latter, see also §36.9 and §59.13, always in Toxaris' mouth, once in a metaphorical use and once in a military context.
[266] See respectively LSJ s.v. ἐρῆμος III.1 and LSJ s.v. ἁλίσκομαι I.1. and II.2.
[267] See LSJ III.3.

other hand, ἀγών also designates an athletic competition and a battle.[268] The qualification of this ἀγών as σεμνότατος, though, primarily describes it as a noble, heroic, athletic contest. The adjective σεμνός does not apply frequently to athletic competition, but, in comparison with Lucian's representation of an athletic *agōn* at the *Thanatousia* in *VH* 2.22, it also communicates the idea of a traditionally archaic and heroic practice.[269] Toxaris' purpose is not only explicitly agonistic, but also agonistic in a specific, heroic way. Toxaris explains that the contest should consist in Mnesippus and himself telling stories of exemplary friendships and that the winner will 'proclaim his land as victor' (τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀνακηρύξει, §10.10). Mnesippus responds to Toxaris' proposal that he would not abandon the Greek cause (τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἅπαν ὑποχωρήσομαί σοι, §11.3) and that he would not let all the Greeks be defeated by Toxaris alone (Ἕλληνας δὲ πάντας, τοσαῦτα ἔθνη καὶ τοσαύτας πόλεις, §11.7-8, insisting on their multitude of peoples and cities). This makes clear that Mnesippus, by accepting the challenge without fleeing, adopts the heroic code of behaviour suggested by Toxaris.[270] In fact, Mnesippus represents themselves as single combatants in battle, standing for their respective people. This is not without recalling single combats of Homeric heroes – thinking, for example, of Menelaus and Paris' single combat in the third book of the *Iliad*.

Furthermore, Mnesippus makes explicit and concretises the epic-heroic modalities of their contest, whereas Toxaris only suggests these. Mnesippus applies the ideal of reprisal to their contest and turns it into a rule of the game, whereas Toxaris seems to present it only as a generality. Toxaris asserts that he would rather have his hand cut, as is the custom when Scythians lose a single fight, than be shown to be inferior in friendship (§10.11-14). Mnesippus, however, understands this as a reprisal and as part of the rules for their contest, which leads him to propose, for his part, to be cut his tongue in case he should lose (§11.9-10). This demonstrates that Mnesippus is caught up in the *agōn*, which Toxaris unmistakably set up in an epic-heroic context. Cutting the right hand of a defeated enemy as a trophy, which Toxaris presents as a Scythian custom (ὅπερ ἥττης Σκυθικῆς

[268] See LSJ s.v. II and III.2. For the overlapping of the three meaning, see *JTr*. 16-17, 33 and Bompaire 1958, 255.

[269] The adjective is originally used for gods and their attributes; all further occurrences in which it applies to contests are later than the present passage, or slightly later. One noticeable occurrence is *App.Anth*. 44 [= Paus. 8.42.9 = Preger 126]: Σόν ποτε νικήσας, Ζεῦ Ὀλύμπιε, σεμνὸν ἀγῶνα / τεθρίππῳ μὲν ἅπαξ, μουνοκέλητι δὲ δίς, / δῶρ' Ἱέρων τάδε σοι ἐχαρίσσατο· παῖς δ' ἀνέθηκε / Δεινομένης πατρὸς μνῆμα Συρακοσίου. According to Pausanias, the epigram would belong to a dedicatory inscription in Olympia set up by Deinomenes on behalf of his father, Hieron, winner of the Olympics (ca. 468 BCE). Without trying to establish any form of relationship between the epigram and the present passage, it is interesting for the kind of connotation that the adjective carries. For the *VH*, compare König 2005, 76-77. Underlining the paradoxical simultaneity of the archaising dimension of the athletic contest and its contemporary elements, he concludes that (*ibid.*, 77): '[m]any of the competitions Lucian describes suggest the possibility of harmony between heroic and contemporary custom.' 'Harmony' is maybe not the best way to describe the fusion of archaic and contemporary elements; rather, it emphasises the disparity and thereby generates a comic situation, cf. *ibid*., 78-79. By comparison, it is also significant that Anacharsis concludes his dialogue with Solon by ironically remarking that the Scythians do not possess anything like *σεμνά* that would be comparable to *the* archaic Hellenic institution, athletics (*Anach*. 40).

[270] For the fact that fleeing is against the moral values of the heroic *agathoi*, see Pagani 2008, 342 with examples in Homer.

ἐπιτίμιόν ἐστιν, §10.13), is in fact a form of *aristeia* of the combatant. The custom of taking from one's adversary a proof of his physical courage is common in athletics, but especially in war. The idea of *aristeiai* amongst the Scythians might be inspired by a passage in Herodotus' Scythian ethnology (4.64), where he reports that the Scythians cut the head of their beaten enemy and bring it to their king. They are then reported to take the skin off their enemies' heads and keep it as a sign of their valour (ὃς γὰρ ἂν πλεῖστα {δέρματα} χειρόμακτρα ἔχῃ, ἀνὴρ ἄριστος οὗτος κέκριται, echoed by Toxaris' ἢ χείρων ἄλλου κατὰ φιλίαν κεκρίσθαι, §10.13-14). The Scythians are also said to take the skin of their dead enemy's *right hand*, which they span over their quiver. Toxaris' representation of this Scythian *aristeia* in part conforms to the stereotype, that is, to Herodotus' representation, but more significantly, it is clearly in line with a Homeric-heroic vision of combat.[271] Furthermore, the fact that Toxaris, in order to express that he would rather have his hand cut than lose the contest in friendship, uses the adjective χείρων, meaning 'being inferior in physical and moral courage and in social prestige', also conforms to Homeric ethical values. Toxaris' exclamation that his Scythian honour is at issue could be interpreted as a hint that he defends a Homeric code of ethics.[272] It would be a disgrace to him to lose this single combat in storytelling about friendship, when he prides himself on behalf of his people that they are the worthiest friends, or at least worthier than the Greeks (καὶ ταῦτα Ἕλληνος, Σκύθης αὐτὸς ὤν, §10.14).

Thus, Toxaris' self-representation as a Homeric hero is successful and Mnesippus recognises Toxaris' heroic attitude. Mnesippus even addresses him as a Homeric warrior: οὐ φαῦλον τὸ ἔργον ἀνδρὶ οἵῳ σοὶ πολεμιστῇ μονομαχῆσαι (§11.1-2). The adjective πολεμιστής applies a few times to heroes in the *Iliad*, for example to Antilochus in *Il*. 15.585, but also to the god Ares, for example in *Il*. 22.133. Mnesippus thus expands on the metaphor of physical (athletic and military) combat that Toxaris introduced in §10.9-11 and picks up the idea of single combat in Scythian war (μονομαχῆσαι, cf. μονομαχῶν, §10.12). The verb μονομαχέω does not appear in Homer.[273] However, it seems to have a Homeric-heroic connotation in Lucian's works, considering its use, for example in *JTr*. 40 (Homeric context: the combat between the gods Ares and Athena), *Par*. 45 (Homeric context: Ajax' single fight against Hector), *Hist.Conscr*. 12 (Alexander's heroic fights in the words of a flattering historian), *Eun*. 3 (the philosophers contend for the Athenian cathedra of Peripatetic philosophy like Iliadic heroes).[274] This interpretation is also supported by the use of the verb μονομαχέω in the *scholia* to Homer, where the verb and related nouns or adjectives (μονομαχία, μονόμαχος) abound and

[271] For Herodotus' Scythian *aristeiai*, see Hartog 1980, 171-179. The latter establishes a parallel between the Homeric and the Herodotean-Scythian *aristeia*, except that, in Homer, 'on ne chasse pas les têtes, mais on chercher à obtenir un trophée, signe de victoire et marque de vaillance, en s'emparant des armes du guerrier que l'on a abattu' (*ibid.*, 178).
[272] Cf. οὐδὲν ὄνειδος μεῖζον παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦ προδότην φιλίας γεγενῆσθαι δοκεῖν, §7.11. For the ethics of shame in Homer, see Cairns 1993, Williams 1994.
[273] See Schmid I, 277.
[274] See the interpretation of *Eun*. 2-4 in Gleason 1995, 133: 'Their [sc. the philosophers'] Homeric duel (*monomachia*) is also a classical democratic test of suitability for office (*dokimasia*) and a Hellenistic/Roman epideictic display […].'

designate the act of fighting a single fight, as is shown, for example, in the *scholia vetera* to the third book of the *Iliad* (v. 315 in b(BCE^{3}E^4)T). The use of the verb μονομαχέω in order to refer to Mnesippus and Toxaris' story-contest demonstrates that they both understand it as a single fight of prowess and virtue.[275] It is interesting to note, here, that there is an ambiguity in this idea of single combat. On the one hand, Mnesippus and Toxaris act as representatives of their people, and indeed, the dispute is about the Scythians' or the Greeks' supremacy in friendship. On the other hand, in this passage, the single fight becomes a personal issue. While in the preceding part of the dialogue, the dispute focuses on the opposition between Scythians and Greeks, their customs and ideals, from now on, the dispute is also a matter of negotiation between Mnesippus and Toxaris, who take the challenge personally (ὡς ἔγωγε πολὺ ἥδιον ἄν μοι δοκῶ μονομαχῶν ἡττηθείς κτλ., §10.11-14, οὐ μὴν ἀγεννῶς γε οὕτως καταπροδοὺς ἐν βραχεῖ τὸ Ἑλληνικοκὸν ὑποχωρήσομαί σοι, §11.3-4). The shift from the collective to the personal sphere is shown in the anacolutha in §10.7-10. Toxaris switches from the use of plural forms, which have been used throughout the beginning of the dialogue, to the singular: προχειρισάμενοι (§10.7), but then αὐτός τε νενικηκὼς ἔσται καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀνακηρύξει (§10.10, although the phrase ἐγὼ μέν/σὺ δέ already hints at that shift, as afar as the sense is concerned). This shift is meaningful for the outcome of the dialogue, for Mnesippus and Toxaris' process of settling friendship is eventually a personal matter and a matter of virtue (and virtuosity), which eludes the question of Greek or Scythian supremacy in friendship.

In summary, Toxaris' proposal to engage in a 'very noble contest' characterises the Scythian's view as heroically archaic but, above all, as Hellenic, considering the importance of the idea of contest in all its fields of application in the Greek world, for, as Finley comments on the afterlife of Homeric contest: '[n]othing defines the quality of Greek culture more neatly than the way in which the idea of competition was extended from physical prowess to the realm of the intellect, to feats of poetry and dramatic composition '.[276] Besides, athletic competition – and the overlapping metaphor of battle – stands for a Hellenic institution par excellence, which was integrated into the Roman tradition and continued to flourish in the Imperial period, where the idea of competition in the largest sense pervades the behaviour of a *pepaideumenos*.[277] Indeed, at the same time, Toxaris' athletic-heroic

[275] This is also the idea supported by μονομαχέω in D.H. 3.12.1-2: οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συλλόγῳ παρόντες Ἀλβανῶν τε καὶ Ῥωμαίων ταχεῖαν ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ πολέμου ποιήσασθαι ζητοῦντες ὅπλοις τὸ νεῖκος ἔγνωσαν διελεῖν. … (2) Τύλλος μὲν γὰρ ἐβούλετο ἐν ἐλαχίστοις σώμασι γενέσθαι τὴν τοῦ πολέμου κρίσιν ἑνὸς Ἀλβανοῦ τοῦ λαμπροτάτου πρὸς ἕνα Ῥωμαῖον τὸν ἄριστον μονομαχήσοντος καὶ πρόθυμος ἦν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος ἀγωνίσασθαι προκαλούμενος εἰς τὴν ὁμοίαν φιλοτιμίαν τὸν Ἀλβανόν …
Interestingly, the verb is used further in the *Toxaris* (§58.11, §59.8), where it refers to gladiatorial combats and thus to an athletic context.
[276] Finley 1954, 133.
[277] For athletics and competition in the Roman Empire and its symbol as elite education, see Schmitz 1997, 97, 108-127, van Nijf 1999, *id*. 2001, König 2005, esp. 45-72, 206-225. For athletics and Graeco-Roman intercultural issues of identity building, see Newby 2005, esp. part II (with a focus on material and visual evidence). For the overlap of athletics and Roman militarism in the second and third century CE, see König 2005, 55-57.

agōn, which, by means of the metaphors, is characterised as ἀγὼν τῶν λόγων here, refers to the tradition of sophistic eristic.[278] The meanings of the verb ἀγωνίζομαι, to 'contend in court' and to 'contend' in the context of athletic competition and public speaking, are frequently associated with eristic practices, and especially with its form of public competition.[279] The representation of Mnesippus and Toxaris as speakers is already underlined previously by Mnesippus, when he comments upon Toxaris' epideictic skills (§8.1-6). Thus, the image of a heroic combat is associated with athletics, trial and verbal competition, and Toxaris characterises himself and his opponent as duelling archaic heroes and (contemporary) sophistic contenders.[280]

When Mnesippus asks whether the quantity of stories will define the winner (ὁπόσῳ ἄν τις πλείους ἔχῃ λέγειν, §11.10-12), Toxaris makes clear what he had already hinted at before (ὀλίγους δέ τινας προχειρισάμενοι, §10.6; μὴ ἐν τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν τὸ κράτος, §11.13) – that Mnesippus and he himself will not compete for the quantity of examples produced, but for the qualitative impact of the stories. By emphasising the qualitative aspect of their storytelling, Toxaris implicitly gives away that the contest is actually about the power (κράτος) of words. The ambiguity regarding the rhetorical or ethical nature of the competition is already adumbrated by Toxaris in the previous passage (πλείων φιλίας λόγος παρ' ἡμῖν ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν, §9.4). There, λόγος means 'esteem, consideration, value', but in view of the course of the dialogue, the meaning of 'speech' and 'story' equally makes sense in Toxaris' affirmation that the Scythians' 'consideration/talking of friendship is greater' than the Greeks'.[281] Here, Toxaris states more precisely that the condition for winning the contest is to tell 'the best and the sharpest stories' (εἰ ἀμείνους καὶ τομώτεραι φαίνοιντο, §11.14). While ἀμείνους regards again the moral quality of their examples of friendship, the adjective τομώτεραι not only continues the metaphor of the cutting speeches (τεθηγμένους, §11.2), but especially alludes to the rhetorical potency of Mnesippus and Toxaris' narrations. Toxaris expands on this ambivalence between battle in arms and in words when he gives further indications for the course of the contest. He establishes that not the quantity but the quality of their examples of friendship will be decisive, that is, their capacity to 'inflict more critical wounds' and cause the adversary 'to surrender to the strokes more quickly' (καιριώτερα δῆλον ὅτι ἐργάσονταί μοι τραύματα καὶ θᾶττον ἐνδώσω πρὸς τὰς πληγάς, §11.15-16). Toxaris explicitly equates their upcoming narrations with weapons.[282] Toxaris

[278] For the sophistic ἀγὼν τῶν λόγων, see Capra 2001, 115, cf. Isoc. 4.45. For a philosophical-rhetorical (sophistic) joust represented as a battle in arms in a dialogue, see Plt. *Euthd*. 272-273 with Branham 1983, 243-244. See also Pl. *Prt*. 335a and especially the *Tht*. for agonistic metaphors, D.L. 9.52 (about Protagoras), Philostr. *VS* 514 and *passim*. In his *prolalia Herodotus*, Lucian too assimilates his public declamation with athletics (and explicitly in *Herod*. 8).

[279] See LSJ s.v. II and I.1-4. It is also used in this sense in Plato. See Capra 2001, 136 n. 57 for further passages. *Ibid*., 130 defines this specific form of eristic practice as a technique, which 'se praticata in pubblico per mezzo di lunghi discorsi, coincide con la retorica giudiziaria (δικανικόν).' See also below §38.18.

[280] For example, Maximus Tyrius uses a similar imagery of athletics as a foil for describing the performative aspect of his activity (1.6) or the faculties of a good, truth-speaking philosopher-orator (25.6).

[281] See LSJ s.v. I.4.

[282] Lucian develops this metaphor particularly extensively in *Nigr*. 35-37, where the power of λόγος is described in similar terms as most aggressive (note *Nigr*. 35: οὐδ' ὡς ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος καθίκετο, βαθεῖα

presents himself and Mnesippus not only as opponents in court, but also as adversaries in the arena or on the battlefield, where he expects them to defend heroic values, and act as rival speakers in front of a public or a judge.

Praising Friendship and the Rules of the Contest

The precise nature of the epideictic element in Mnesippus and Toxaris' upcoming stories requires some explanation. Specifically, it aims at praise. The element of epideictic praise has already been introduced in §§5.11-7.16, where Toxaris displays the merits of Orestes and Pylades' friendship to Mnesippus in order to convince him of how worthy the Scythian worship of these heroes is. Toxaris explicitly explains why the Scythians praise Orestes and Pylades, and actually, as has been seen, his following speech is a form of praise (ἐπαινοῦμεν, §5.11). Mnesippus acknowledges this fact, as he not only immediately remarks on Toxaris' rhetoric ability (ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥῆσιν εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων πιθανώτατοι, §8.2-3), but also recognises his speech as a 'sophisticated praise' (Ὀρέστην μὲν καὶ Πυλάδην πάνυ σοφιστικῶς ἐπαινέσας, §35.7-8). In the present passage, where the rules are set for the contest of stories, there are some further aspects that speak in favour of points of contact between the stories and epideictic praise, in particular with regard to the function of the stories and the mechanisms of encomiastic speeches. These are the following points:

First, as mentioned above, the motivation itself for the contest emerges from the (Greeks') shortcoming in actuating their praise of friendship. Toxaris blames them for not being able to transform their praise and speeches of virtue into deeds, but applauding – passively (§9). However, the means by which Mnesippus and Toxaris are to prove – actively and creatively – their worth in friendship and compensate for this shortcoming now appear to be stories, or speeches of valuable deeds of friendship. Considering that Toxaris explicitly forbids that the mythical friendships of the past be used as examples for the present competition (τοὺς μὲν παλαιοὺς φίλους ἀτρεμεῖν ἐάσωμεν, §10.1), it becomes clear that Mnesippus and Toxaris' speeches are meant to emulate – and not solely to reproduce passively – the literary examples of the past, examples, which might be considered as 'praises' or 'hymnal' in the widest sense (πολλοὺς καὶ ἀξιοπίστους μάρτυρας τοὺς ποιητὰς παρεχόμενοι τὴν Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρόκλου φιλίαν καὶ τὴν Θησέως καὶ Πειρίθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑταιρείαν ἐν καλλίστοις ἔπεσι καὶ μέτροις ῥαψῳδοῦντας, §10.3-6). Toxaris names expressly the authoritative (or 'trustworthy', cf. ἀξιοπίστους, §10.3) examples of friends he is thinking about: Achilles and Patroclus, Theseus and Pirithous, and the others (τὴν Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρόκλου φιλίαν καὶ τὴν Θησέως καὶ Πειρίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑταιρείαν, §10.4-6). This corresponds to the usual litany (notice the verb καταριθμεῖν, §10.2) of names of exemplary friendships, especially those in the works of the Imperial period that discuss this subject.[283] The numerous Greek poets who sing their deeds,

δὲ καὶ καίριος ἡ πληγὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ μάλα εὐστόχως ἐνεχθεὶς ὁ λόγος αὐτήν). For an interpretation of λόγος in *Nigr*. and *Herm*., see von Möllendorff 2010, 15-18. For the adjective καίριος here, see Marquis, 331 n. 36.

[283] See, e.g., Plut. *Mor*. 93E, D.Chr. 74.28, Them. *Or*. 22.271a, Hyg. *Fab*. 257.1-2, Val.Max. *Mem*. 4.7, Stat. *Theb*. 1.473. Beside Orestes and Pylades, the pairs of friends cited most often are Achilles and Patroclus, and

and to whom Toxaris alludes, though, are those of archaic and classical Greece, foremost Homer and the tragedians. For example, Toxaris speaks of the exemplary ἑταιρείαν of further pairs of friends. Although φιλία and ἑταιρεία are nearly synonyms, the latter rather hints at the form of comradeship typical of epic poetry.[284] The poets themselves, so Toxaris says, 'recite/sing in the most beautiful verses' about these friendships (ἐν καλλίστοις ἔπεσι καὶ μέτροις ῥαψῳδοῦντας, §10.6). The verb ῥαψῳδέω is used by Lucian to refer to the recitation in drama (*JTr*. 1), and mostly to the recitation of Homeric verses (e.g. *JConf*. 1, *JTr*. 20, *Fug*. 30, *Pseudol*. 27, *Apol*. 8). Above all, Toxaris has in mind the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus here, for whose poetic representation he alludes to tragedy as well as to Homer and the *Iliad* in particular.[285] The tradition of the poetic representations of the friendship between Theseus and Pirithous is not well preserved. However, their friendship is mentioned in S. *OC* 1592-1594, and there is a lost play by Euripides entitled 'Pirithous', which seems to deal with Pirithous and Theseus' catabasis.[286] Pirithous is also a character already known to the Homeric epics, and he appears in the context of his catabasis to the underworld in the company of Theseus in a Pseudo-Hesiodean fragment (F 280-281 MW= F 216 Most), where their friendship must have played a role in the representation in some way, as v. 5 suggests ([...] ἅμ' ἕσπετο πι̣σ[τὸς] ἑ̣[ταῖρος).[287] The emphasis on and the references to exemplary representations of these friends in tragedy and epics is thus established. Furthermore, Mnesippus, in turn, considers that Toxaris praised Orestes and Pylades by 'exceedingly dramatising' the heroes' deeds (οἵ τε μῦθοι δηλοῦσι καὶ αἱ ὑμέτεραι παλαιαὶ γραφαί, ἃς μικρῷ πρόσθεν εὖ μάλα <u>ἐξετραγῴδησας</u>, §11.6-7). The verb ἐκτραγῳδέω, which 'suggest[s] a speaker's style rather than a theatrical setting', means 'to exceed drama' here and thus describes Toxaris' speech as a praise that emulates the representation of the myth in tragedy.[288]

Theseus and Pirithous. Other pairs include e.g. Phintias and Damon, Nisus and Euryales, Aristogeiton and Harmodius.

[284] See above, §5.5.

[285] See above §5.5. Compare, e.g., X. *Smp*. 8.31 (ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Νικήρατε, καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς Ὁμήρῳ πεποίηται … Πατρόκλῳ ἀλλ' ὡς ἑταίρῳ ἀποθανόντι ἐκπρεπέστατα τιμωρῆσαι. καὶ Ὀρέστης δὲ καὶ Πυλάδης καὶ Θησεὺς καὶ Πειρίθους καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμιθέων οἱ ἄριστοι ὑμνοῦνται … διὰ τὸ ἄγασθαι ἀλλήλους τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα κοινῇ διαπεπρᾶχθαι), Charito 1.5.2 (Πολύχαρμος…φίλος ἐξαίρετος, τοιοῦτος οἷον Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε Πάτροκλον Ἀχιλλέως), Them. *Or*. 22.271a (Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄρα οὐ πόλεμον ποιῆσαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλίαν ἠπίστατο. Ἀχιλλεῖ γὰρ Πάτροκλον ἐποίησε φίλον). Interestingly, in the passage just cited, Xenophon similarly emphasises that the friendship of Theseus and Pirithous is sung, as does Aristotle in a somewhat different context of friendship, which is nevertheless related to famous examples of mythical friends (*EN* 1171a15): οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται.

[286] Some scholars attribute the tragedy to Critias (= Crit. 43 F 1-14 TrGF). See TrGF *Fragmenta certis fabulis adscripta* F 53 = 591-600 TGF. For a convincing argumentation in favour of an attribution to Euripides, see Page 1941, 120-122 (*ad* Euripides F 15).

[287] For occurrences of Pirithous in epic poetry, see Cyp. 13 Bernabé, Panays. 14 Bernabé [=F 9 Kinkel], Min. 7 (=F 280-281 M.-W.).

[288] Kokolakis 1960, 85. The meaning of ἐτραγῴδει in *Peregr*. 3 is similar as well; see Halliwell: '"tragedy" is here equated, in a very old trope, with inflated, bombastic melodrama' (Halliwell 2008, 463-464). However, taking into account the allusion to drama in the previous description of Orestes and Pylades' myth, there might nonetheless be a latent reference to tragedy more specifically and not only to its primary connotation of 'bombastic' speech. Compare Schmitz 2010, 292-293. For further compounds of -τραγῳδέω and related adjectives in the *Toxaris*, see §12.2 (below) and §56.1. For the meaning of ἐκτραγῳδέω in the present passage,

Interestingly, Toxaris' view of their present relationship with the poetic praise of friendship of the past exhibits similarities with the practice and conception of epideictic encomia in the Imperial period. As Pernot demonstrates, the encomiasts of the 'Second Sophistic' not only think of their epideictic praise in continuity with poetry, but they also measure themselves against these models – and against Homer, who is considered the 'father of praise', in the first place – and strive to outdo them.[289] This is mainly what Toxaris requests that Mnesippus and he do in their contest. Thus, while Toxaris rejects the poetic examples of the past, he wants Mnesippus and himself to produce a few contemporary examples (ὀλίγους δέ τινας προχειρισάμενοι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν διηγησάμενοι, §10.6-8). Here, it is clear that he promotes a particular type of friendship in emulation of the poetic examples of the past, for either Mnesippus or Toxaris will win if he succeeds in 'presenting more valuable friends' (ἀμείνους παράσχηται τοὺς φίλους, §10.9). In other words, their examples of friends will have to keep up with the ideals of ethical excellence and physical courage that the poets attribute to their heroic friends. This implicit idea of emulation of the poets of the past is also significant on a meta-textual level. The ambiguity regarding the nature of the contest – deeds of friendship… or after all rather speechmaking? – directs the recipients' attention to the aesthetic quality of the upcoming story-speeches.

A second aspect, which relates this passage with the practice of epideictic praise from a more technical perspective, is the fact that praise has to persuade and therefore uses rhetoric argumentation and demonstration.[290] The most important of these rhetorical tools is the demonstration through the presentation of deeds, as Pernot notes:

> Un élément important de ce processus de demonstration est l'idée, fondamentale dans la topique, selon laquelle les actions sont la manifestation des vertus. Cette notion de manifestation s'exprime de nouveau par des mots de la famille de *deiknunai*, notamment le substantive *deigma*, les *erga* étant qualifiés de *deigmata aretês*.[291]

Toxaris' idea to 'propose as examples' (προχειρισάμενοι, §10.7) and 'produce' (παράσχηται, §10.9) a few contemporary examples of friends and to 'narrate their deeds' (καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν διηγησάμενοι, §10.7-8), concords with this principle that the narration of ἔργα serves the purpose of persuading the audience of the virtue of the praised object. The 'deeds of virtue' upon which Toxaris emphatically insisted just before, in §9, and which he wants to be the subject of the upcoming story-

compare *Merc.Cond*. 41 and Hafner 2017, *ad loc*., where he explains that the verb means, 'die Tragödie öffentlich bekannt machen' or 'ins Tragödienhafte steigern ', i.e. 'dramatisieren und damit literarisch nobilitieren.' Hence the idea of emulating tragedy in the present passage.

[289] See Pernot 1993, 635-637, 642-656. This is also seen in Lucian's *Imagines* (esp. *Im*. 8, 13, 19-20, 22). For an *agōn* of praises, see also *DMort*. 25 (12), where Hannibal and Alexander compete with praises in front of a judge, Minos. For the ambiguous relationship between prose and poetry and the dominance of prose in the Imperial period, see Whitmarsh 2001a, 27 and n. 122, *id*. 2013, esp. 188-208. For poetry in the Imperial period, see Bowie 1989, *id*. 1990.

[290] See Pernot 1993, 680-682.

[291] Pernot 1993, 680.

examples, constitute the means of persuasion of encomiastic demonstration.[292] The idea that, for this purpose, as Toxaris says, the Greeks can 'produce the poets as many trustworthy witnesses' (πολλοὺς καὶ ἀξιοπίστους μάρτυρας τοὺς ποιητὰς παρεχόμενοι, §10.3-4), also hints at the fact that encomiastic demonstration may take recourse to 'witnesses' and 'testimonies' in the widest sense in order to persuade the audience of the ethical worth of the praised object.[293] The similarity with encomiastic 'testimonies' might not be that compelling in the present passage, but it definitely will be of importance in the course of the stories, for both Mnesippus and Toxaris stress the presence of witnesses for the deeds of their examples of friends.

Oath and Friendship

Toxaris not only requests that they tell five stories about contemporary friends, but also adds as a rule that Mnesippus and he will have to make an oath to tell the 'truth' about their stories (ἐπομοσάμενος ἦ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖν· ἄλλως γὰρ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν καὶ ὁ ἔλεγχος ἀφανής. εἰ δὲ ὀμόσειας, οὐχ ὅσιον ἀπιστεῖν, §11.20-22). Toxaris presents the taking of an oath as the necessary means of proving the 'truthfulness' of their stories, for otherwise 'they could easily invent them' (ἄλλως γὰρ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, §11.20). Mnesippus agrees (§11.23) and eventually takes his oath before starting his first story (§12.1-3). Thus, the oath represents a further means of persuasion in the rhetoric of epideictic praise. Noticeably, the *Toxaris* thereby recurs to the concepts and the terminology of authentication in historiography.[294] The fact that Mnesippus and Toxaris have to demonstrate the fact that they tell the 'truth' suits the idea of a judicial trial and the necessities of epideictic praise, but the way they do so also alludes to the methodology of historiography.

For example, in historiography, the persuasion of the audience of the credibility of the information is achieved by means of the most exact enquiry possible (ἀκρίβεια), which attests to the 'verifiability' of facts – a procedure that, in a way, reminds one of the distinction of sources, that is, of witnesses, and their reliability in judicial contexts.[295] It is clear from the present passage that the

[292] Compare Pernot 1993, 681: '[…] la preuve par l'aristie fait partie de la démonstration encomiastique.'
[293] See Pernot 1993, 681.
[294] Cf. Saïd 1994, 150-163 (157 on the *Toxaris* and Herodotus' rhetoric strategies of authentication).
[295] There, it technically belongs to the *probation*. For the principle of exactitude and the distinction of testimonies, see Kurz 1970, 17-19. For the fact that historiographical methods in some way build upon the practice of evaluation of testimonies in court, see Nicolai 2007, 11. The concept of ἀκρίβεια is used in the context of both historiographical enquiry and forensic oratory. For the use of ἀκρίβεια of content or of speech (clarity) in forensic oratory, see Kurz 1970, 13-20, 22-23. For the concept of ἀκρίβεια in historiography, see below and Fox 2001, 78 n. 11: 'One central virtue for [Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Lucian] is ἀκρίβεια, which must be understood as the clear expression of correctly selected material.'

With regard to the issue of 'truthfulness' related to the concept of exactitude in historiography and oratory, it is here necessary to summarise in a few words the main points of dispute in the ancient discourse of persuasion and 'truthfulness' and its use in various texts as a means of claiming authoritativeness and as strategies of demarcation from other texts. Thus, especially in the view of historians such as Thucydides or Polybius, for whom historiography should consist in the reconstruction of the past based on 'proofs' and demonstration, there is also an essential (and ideal) difference between historiography and oratory. This is true for Herodotus too, who abundantly uses the language of scientific-logical demonstration and of proof through

Toxaris engages with the methodology of historiographical enquiry. While swearing to tell the truth, Mnesippus underlines that his information comes from a reliable source, for he has seen the events himself or has learnt about them with exactitude (ὁπόσα ἂν λέγω πρὸς σὲ ἢ αὐτὸς εἰδὼς ἢ παρ' ἄλλων ὁπόσον οἷόν τε ἦν δι' ἀκριβείας ἐκπυνθανόμενος ἐρεῖν, §12.1-3). The phrase ὁπόσον οἷόν τε ἦν δι' ἀκριβείας ἐκπυνθανόμενος is strongly reminiscent of Thucydidean historiographical methods. Exactitude, or accuracy (ἀκρίβεια), is fundamental for Thucydidean historiography, because it underlines the reliability of the account:[296]

examples and witnesses to persuade his audience, as Thomas 2000, 170-200 shows. While historiography presents itself as ideally aiming at the 'truthful' representation of facts by means of the most accurate enquiry possible, oratory also advocates the plausible representation of facts by means of persuasive speech. Some modern scholars maintain that exactitude in oratory is often nothing more than a discourse and a *topos* (Kurz 1970, 21-22) and becomes synonymous with the twisting of words ('Wortverdrehens', *ibid*. 24). For a critical discussion of the relationship between historiography and oratory, or rather, of the difference between these as far as the prerequisite of factual truth is concerned, see Schorn 2019 *contra* Wiseman and Woodman. See also Kessler 1982, 46-54, Momigliano 1984, and more recently Nicolai 2007, 11. Although 'truth' is in any way represented as the main concern of historiography, the discourse and the relationship between oratory and historiography in these regards is complicated when in Hellenistic historiography there seems to have emerged a trend towards sensationalism. By shifting the focus from a concern for the accuracy of information to a concern for its rhetorical counterpart, the plausibility of the narration, this form of historiography avowedly aimed to produce, like in oratory, a persuasive discourse, rather than present 'true facts'. Marincola describes the aim of this form of 'persuasive' historiography as follows (Marincola 1997, 76): '[…] the requirement that the historian use the more credible (τοῦ πιθανωτέρου) story is nothing more than the application to historiography of the common rhetorical practice of ensuring that the *narratio* of a speech is probable.' Compare Georgiadou/Larmour 1994, 1457. According to Polybius, the general aim of historiography is to instruct and to persuade by means of 'true words and deeds', and only tragedy – and 'sensationalist' (or 'tragic') history (see Rebenich 1997, 267-269) – aim at pleasing by illusionary and plausible representations (Plb. 2.56.11). Therein lies a huge difference between historiography and oratory: cf. Cic. *Brut*. 10.4, see Desideri 1994, 47-53, who nevertheless notices methodological points of contacts between the two genres (*ibid*., 52). For the 'rhetorical' writing of history, see Rebenich 1997, 270-274. For the relationship between history and oratory with regard to the expression of their relationship to the precept of 'truthfulness', see, e.g., Morgan 1993, 187-188 (historiography, fictional narratives and oratory), Cartledge 2002, 359 (in the case of Herodotus), Fox/Livingstone 2007, 558-559 (Lucian's *Hist.Conscr*.). For the principle of credibility (πιθανότης) in historiography in Lucian's *Hist.Conscr*., see Avenarius 1956, 118, Montanari 1987, 60-62, Free 2015, 88-91. In conclusion, while on the one hand, the aim (persuasion) and the means (exactitude) of oratory and historiography are the same, historiography discursively demarcates itself from oratory with regard to the precept of 'truthfulness' as its specific, ideal aim. In the present analysis of Lucian's dialogue, however, the question of both the 'truthfulness' and the differentiation between oratory and historiography is irrelevant – for the recipients in any case, but also for the characters, to whom the 'veracity' of their stories is secured by their oaths. Besides, their stories do not aim at demonstrating 'factual truth' but valid moral ideals.

[296] For the meaning of ἀκρίβεια in Thucydides, see Hornblower 1991, *ad* 1.22.2: 'There is also the idea of precise conformity with reality.' Compare Marincola 1997, 68: 'conformance with external reality'. Compare also *Scholia in Thucydidem* 6.82.3e: ἐς τὸ ἀκριβὲς εἰπεῖν: ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπεῖν (ed. Kleinlogel 2019). For the idea of exactitude as conformity with facts in Thucydides, see, e.g., Kurz 1970, 40-61, and recently Scardino 2007, 413-414 n. 63, Kuhn 2014, 139-141, Schorn 2019, 630-632. Herodotus likewise uses exactitude (ἀτρεκέως διακρῖναι, 1.172.1) as an instrument to demonstrate correct knowledge. See Thomas 2000, 228. For the meaning of ἀκρίβεια in Lucian's historiography, see Avenarius 1956, 42 n. 12, Free 2015, 58 n. 138 with further bibliography. For Lucian's view that historiography should exclusively consist of 'Wahrheitsfindung', see Free 2015, 170 and *passim*, Schorn 2019, 634-635. Compare Avenarius 1956, 40-45, Fox 2001, esp. 85-86, Porod 2007, *id*. 2009, 45. See esp. *Hist.Conscr*. 9. For the relationship between Lucian and Thucydides, see Bartley 2003, Billault 2010b, Trédé 2010.

> τὰ δ’ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος *πυνθανόμενος* ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ’ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ’ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων *ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ* περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών. (Th. 1.22.2)
>
> Of the things done in the war, the deeds I deemed it worthy to write not by learning them from a chance source, nor how it seemed to me, but by going through with accuracy as much as possible concerning each thing, both for those at which I myself was present, and for those I received from others. (Transl. Marincola 1997, 68)

Mnesippus clearly alludes to the Thucydidean principle, which he appropriates for his stories and thereby enhances their authority.

In a similar way, Toxaris borrows from the methodology of historiography as well, when he sets as a rule that they should take their exemplary friendships from contemporary history (ὀλίγους δέ τινας προχειρισάμενοι τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν διηγησάμενοι, §10.7-8). The choice of relating recent events, in the present context, not only expresses the demand for emulation, but also hints at the methodology of historiography, where accounts of recent events convey the idea that the information is more reliable. Especially Thucydides stresses this aspect; to him, the narration of recent events is (relatively) more reliable (e.g. Th. 1.1.1, 1.22.2-3).[297] Accordingly, in the narration of their stories, Mnesippus and Toxaris repeatedly underline how recent their examples are: Ἀγαθοκλῆς γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Σάμιος οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ ἐγένετο (§12.6), οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ γενόμενον· ἔτη γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ πέντε ἤδη διελήλυθεν ἀφ’ οὗ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐν Γυάρῳ ἀπέθανεν (§18.12), ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίφιλος ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐστίν (§34.1), ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Δανδάμιδος πρώην γενομένων (§38.1). Therefore, the emphasis on contemporary examples must be considered an application of the conventions of authentication in historiography.[298]

Thus, Mnesippus’ and Toxaris’ stories of friendships in a way function as historical proofs, that is, *exempla*.[299] When Toxaris proposes that they produce exemplary friendships and ‘tell of their deeds’ (καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν διηγησάμενοι, §10.7), the use of ἔργα and διηγέομαι already hints at historiography. For example, both Herodotus and Thucydides refer by ἔργα to the facts and deeds of the past that provide the subject of their inquiry.[300] The verb διηγέομαι, ‘set out in detail’, and the

[297] See, e.g., Grethlein 2013, 29-30.
[298] It is also a common practice in (deliberative and judicial) oratory to choose historical examples from the recent political events rather than from a ‘mythical’ past, for they are considered to be more persuasive. See Worthington 1994, 113.
[299] These *exempla*, though, are actually plausible *exempla* (*exemplum verisimile*) – in other words, fictional stories. For the types of *exempla*, see Lausberg, §§410-426. They explicitly serve the purpose of persuasion (§410). The third type of *exempla*, the poetical ones, are straightforwardly excluded by Toxaris (§10.1-6). For the use of historiography and historical *exempla* in oratory, see Fairweather 1981, 183-185, Sussman 1987, 114-115, Worthington 1994, Gotteland 2001, 102-108, Nicolai 2007, 9-10. For the use of *exempla* in imperial rhetoric, see Van der Poel 2009.
[300] Hdt. 1.p., Th. 1.21-22.

derivate διήγημα/διήγησις, 'tale/narrative', also apply to historiography/narratives.[301] Here, considering the context of trial that is alluded to, one could think that Mnesippus and Toxaris' historical *exempla* are developed into διηγήματα.[302] In fact, Toxaris will narrate a few chapters of Scythian history, and Mnesippus will narrate Greek events (ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ Σκυθικά, σὺ δὲ τὰ Ἑλληνικά, §10.8). Using the forms Σκυθικά and Ἑλληνικά might be a way to allude to novelistic narratives such as the *Milesiaca* or the *Ephesiaca*, but, more convincingly, it can be interpreted as an allusion to contemporary historiography, considering that the numerous historiographical works of authors such as Appian or Arrian had titles like *Iberica* or *Syriaca* and *Indica*.[303]

In summary, the narratives act as proofs in a judicial contest, as encomiastic demonstrations, and as historiographical accounts: they have to be true, or at least persuasive. Throughout the dialogue, the characters express that they are either actually persuaded, although some of Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories remain uncommented, or that they must consider that disbelief is only a hypothetical option. In §18.15-16, for example, Toxaris expresses his disbelief as an *irrealis* hypothetical clause and wish (καὶ εἴθε γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ἀνώμοτος ὢν ταῦτα ἔλεγες, ἵνα καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἂν ἐδυνάμην αυτοῖς). Because of their oath, Mnesippus and Toxaris have the moral obligation to believe. Indeed, the way Toxaris justifies the proposal to take an oath formulates a relationship between the oath and truthfulness (ἄλλως γὰρ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, §11.21).[304] Moreover, it implies that swearing an oath would make disbelieving blameworthy, 'not lawful' (εἰ δὲ ὀμόσειας, <u>οὐχ ὅσιον</u> ἀπιστεῖν, §11.22).[305] Taking an oath implies that Mnesippus and Toxaris are subjected to a moral judgement in case they did not believe.

However, for them, the issue is foremost an ethical one. In the present dialogue, telling the 'truth' means demonstrating the validity, or honesty, of the examples of friendship and the moral values expressed therein. In the course of the dialogue, their concern appears to be primarily for the moral excellence of their friend-examples, as is already made clear when Toxaris explains that the

[301] See [Hermog.] *Prog*. 2.4-10 (διήγημα is an 'episodic' narrative in a historiographic work, which is itself a διήγησις, cf. Lausberg, §289, n.1).
[302] For the fact that Lucianic anecdotes are extended *exempla* (and thus, by extension, also the stories in the *Toxaris*), see Robinson 1979, 227.
[303] For the relationship between the *Toxaris* and the ancient novel, see Introduction, 'Structure'. For the numerous titles of Appian and Arrian's works in –ικά, see Phot. *Bibl*. Codex 57, p. 15 b, 21 – 17 a, 21 and Free 2015, 240-244. For this form of titles and Lucian's works, see Bompaire 1958, 466-467 n. 2. However, the usefulness of a distinction between historiography and novelistic narrative is questionable for the present purpose. In these regards, the fact that Chariton, for example, also refers to his writing by διηγέομαι (Χαρίτων Ἀφροδισιεύς, Ἀθηναγόρου τοῦ ῥήτορος ὑπογραφεύς, πάθος ἐρωτικὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις γενόμενον διηγήσομαι, 1.1.1) is interesting. For the use of διήγημα in rhetorical theory in relationship with the ancient Greek novel, see Futre Pinheiro 2019.
[304] The verb ἀναπλάττειν clearly has a connotation of fiction-making. See the meaning of πλάσμα in Xenoph. B 1.22 West [= F 1.23 D.K.]. See Feeney 1991, 7. In §42.2-3, Toxaris also belittles Mnesippus' examples and affirms that he could not possibly find examples of friendship which are as excellent as that of his Scythian friends, even if Mnesippus were allowed to tell stories of friends without taking an oath (ἀνωμότους), 'so that he could invent a whole lot about them' (ὡς καὶ πολλὰ ἐπιψεύδοιο αὐτοῖς). This establishes an undeniable relationship between taking an oath and telling the truth.
[305] Taking an oath is indeed a sacred act (ὅσιον). See Parker 2005, 68-70. For the issue of piousness and oaths, see Arist. *Rh*. 1377a19-21.

winner of the contest will be the one who presents examples of the 'more virtuous' friends (ἀμείνους, §11.14). To name only a few more examples, Toxaris' expression of disbelief in Mnesippus' first story originates from his difficulty to conceive that a Greek friend could effectively be as excellent as a Scythian friend (οὕτω Σκυθικόν τινα φίλον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τοῦτον διηγήσω, §18.16-17). In §23.11-13, Mnesippus and Toxaris discuss the validity of the Greek example in moral terms (ἢ τίθεμεν καὶ τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς τελείαις ψήφοις μίαν τῶν πέντε εἶναι; – καὶ οὗτος μὲν καλός). In §35.2-5, Mnesippus emphasises that his examples were 'virtuous and faithful friends' (ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βεβαίους φίλους) and encourages Toxaris to present 'even more virtuous' friends (ἀλλὰ πολλῷ τούτων ἀμείνους). Thus, because of their oath, Mnesippus and Toxaris are morally obliged to believe and trust their opponent and accept their stories as valid, moral examples of friendship.

In fact, the oath has important implications for Mnesippus and Toxaris' act of making friends with one another at the end of the dialogue. As has been shown, Mnesippus and Toxaris' taking oaths characterises them as disputants in a judicial context. In line, then, with their characterisation as heroic combatants, the oath symbolises the beginning of a passage from heroic enemies to noble friends. In Archaic and Classical Greece, oaths have their place in both friendly and inimical relationships in which there is a lack of mutual trust:

> Between 'enemies', oaths serve to establish trust […] where there is none […]. This means that oaths between enemies, in establishing trust between them, make them friends, at least in a limited sense. At the same time, an oath between friends suggests that there was a lack of trust between them before, so that in a sense they were enemies.[306]

Mnesippus and Toxaris' choice to accept the moral implications of each other's oath and to believe their opponent – notwithstanding their doubts – consists of an act of trust and virtue. Taking an oath and believing is, *a contrario*, ὅσιον. Significantly, although this act of trust might not yet equal the absolute πίστις, the unconditional loyalty in friendship, it still forms the basis for their friendship, for Mnesippus and Toxaris' trust in each other's stories implies that they accept the examples told by their opponent as morally valid.[307] Thereby, they demonstrate that they intend to defend equal ideals of friendship, which qualifies them as suitable friends, as Mnesippus does not fail to conclude (ὁ γὰρ λόγος ὁ παρὼν καὶ τὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρέγεσθαι πολὺ πιστότερα, §63.3-4). In conclusion, to believe or not is less a matter of 'truth' than a demonstration of trust and virtue. Accordingly, Mnesippus chooses Zeus Philios, protector of friendship, for his oath (τίς δέ σοι τῶν ἡμετέρων θεῶν ἄρ' ἱκανός; ὁ Φίλιος; §11.23-24, ἴστω τοίνυν ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Φίλιος, §12.1). This is not only in line with Lucian's

[306] Kozak 2014, 60.
[307] For πίστις in friendship, see Introduction, 'Friendship'.

common practice of adapting the deity (or any other whimsical subject sworn by in oaths and interjections) according to the context, but it is also highly symbolical.[308]

Conclusion

This passage (§§10-12.3) is crucial for the understanding of the rest of the dialogue and in particular its conclusion. Not only is a detail such as the failure to appoint a judge in the moment when Mnesippus and Toxaris set up the rules of the contest significant for the end of the dialogue, but it is precisely the absence of an appointed judge which requires that Mnesippus and Toxaris find another solution for the outcome of their contest: they choose to settle friendship (τίς οὖν ὁ δικάσων ἐστίν; – οὐδὲ εἷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκαθίσαμέν τινα δικαστὴν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' οἶσθα ὃ δράσομεν; … τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς συνθέμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς φίλοι τε αὐτόθεν εἶναι, §62.3-11). The issues debated in this passage – the relationship between words and deeds, the precondition of truthfulness, the self-representation of Mnesippus and Toxaris as heroic-epic duellers – also shed light on how to understand the development of the dialogue.

While in the §9, the issue of deeds and words establishes a prevalence of the first over the latter with regard to the assessment of moral behaviour, in the present passage, it becomes clear that their relationship is more complex. Indeed, by deciding to have a contest that consists in telling stories of deeds in order to demonstrate their moral values, Mnesippus and Toxaris' words, i.e. their verbal representations of deeds of friendship, function as proof of their moral excellence. The use of the metaphors of words for deeds (of arms) and deeds for words, which creates an analogy between the two, shows that Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories (about deeds of friendship) are their own ἔργα of friendship that testify to the excellence of their moral ideals. The idea that Mnesippus and Toxaris show who they are through their speeches establishes a correlation between their speeches and their moral behaviour. This explains how one is supposed to interpret the issue of 'truthfulness' and why Mnesippus and Toxaris are represented as epic-heroic duellers in speech:

First, it makes clear that the issue of 'truthfulness' is a matter of a moral truth, which finds expression in the form of speeches or stories, that is, of μῦθοι: the verbal *mimēsis* of deeds. The practical effect of Mnesippus and Toxaris' speeches about friendship, by means of their literary creation, is to generate another form of truth, moral truth, in that these speeches reproduce moral values. This raises the question of the relationship between representation (art) and moral behaviour (life), which, in a different way, is already hinted at in §9, and directs the attention to Mnesippus and Toxaris' poetic creation (*poiēsis*): style and form of the upcoming stories as well as rhetorical *inventio* will play a role in their contest. The quality of Mnesippus and Toxaris' speeches determines the quality of their moral values and the potential worth of their friendship; on the other hand, their

[308] E.g., *JConf*. 5, 6, *Cat*. 19, 16, 17, *Prom*. 7 and Ureña Bracero 1995, 163-167, with further passages. Zeus Philios is invoked in two further passages, in *Icar*. 3, where Mnesippus' friend exhorts him to continue his story for the sake of their friendship, and in *Rh.Pr*. 4, where the invocation serves to emphasise the friendliness of the advice given.

stories are persuasive not only because Mnesippus and Toxaris make them appear plausible, but also because of the *ēthos* that the two protagonists display therein.[309]

Second, it is telling that Mnesippus and Toxaris choose to behave like Homeric heroes, although they contend with each other by means of their speeches. Especially when one considers that, in the end of the dialogue, they lay down their 'weapons' because they realise that they are of equal (rhetorical and moral) 'strength' (§63.8-10), this shows that Mnesippus and Toxaris re-enact mythical fights such as those between Theseus and Pirithous or Diomedes and Glaucus, which end with their settling friendship.[310] The speakers Mnesippus and Toxaris set themselves up as new mythical *exempla* of moral behaviour – and poetic creation.

[309] For the importance of a speaker's *ēthos* in relation to the stylistic quality of speeches, compare Arist. *Rh*. 1356a1-3. For the idea of a correlation between speech and *ēthos* in imperial literature, see Aristid. *or*. 2.392 with Möller 2004, 300. For a discussion of the question of the relationship between speech and character, see *ead*. 2004. A further indication in favour of this interpretation of 'truthfulness' is the fact that Mnesippus and Toxaris' expressions of doubts are related to a reciprocal aesthetic evaluation of the opponent's stories (with only a few exceptions), as will be seen. Therefore, these expressions of doubts might rather sketch a meta-poetical discourse than a meta-fictional discourse in the sense that the recipients' attention is directed less to the issue of 'truth' and 'falseness' than to the question of the poetic representation of moral values.

[310] Compare Pervo 1997, 164: 'The contest [in the *Toxaris*] thus concludes […] like an epic encounter in which the antagonists exchange armor and leave in peace.' For more information on this aspect, see below §§62-63.

§§12.3b-61 The Contest: Mnesippus' and Toxaris' Stories

§§12.3b-18 Mnesippus' First Story: A Priceless Sacrifice to Save a Friend

Summary of the Story

Mnesippus' first story is about the friendship of Agathocles of Samos and Deinias of Ephesus, two young men who have been friends since childhood (§12.4-9). When Deinias inherits a considerable fortune from his father, he is at the mercy of a swarm of parasites who are more interested in profiting from his fortune than in true friendship (§12.10-21). These opportunists plot a love affair against the young Deinias by making him believe that a certain Chariclea has fallen in love with him. She is the wife of a regarded Ephesian citizen, Demonax, but also some kind of courtesan well trained in extorting money from her victims against chimeric promises of romance (§§13-14). This trick, and many others, work well on Deinias, who lavishes Chariclea and her associates with presents and money (§15). When his fortune is gone, they all abandon the poor lover. Desperate, Deinias turns to Agathocles. The generous friend sells his goods and gives all his money to Deinias. As a result, the voracious parasites fall on him again (§16). During a nightly meeting with Chariclea at her husband's home, Deinias is discovered. In his flight, he kills Demonax by accident and Chariclea in a flush of anger. Having surrendered to justice, he is judged and condemned to exile in Gyaros (§17). Agathocles follows him into exile and provides for his friend until Deinias dies, and even remains faithful to his grave (§18).

The Friends Agathocles and Deinias

Mnesippus' first story stages a few motifs and ideals of friendship. At first, Agathocles seems to stay in the background, but then, he appears as the main character, or example of friendship, of the story – a fact that Toxaris acknowledges when he comments on Mnesippus' example (οὕτω Σκυθικόν τινα φίλον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τοῦτον διηγήσω, §18.16-17). Indeed, Agathocles is the virtuous friend *par excellence*; it is thus no coincidence that the meaning of his name is 'Famous in Goodness'.[311] The first virtue in friendship that he embodies, and the most important one, is faithfulness (πίστις). His first act of faithfulness is when he gives money to Deinias, who has lost his entire legacy to Chariclea and the flatterers (§16.14-15). The considerable sum of money, three talents, which he donates is the amount he received for selling all his estate and thus truly represents a sacrifice.[312] This exemplifies the proverb that one should be kind and do good services to one's friends when they are in need (ἐν

[311] For meaningful names in Lucian, see already Legrand 1907, 176-231, Bompaire 1958, 699-794, and more recently Schwartz 1982, Ureña Bracero 1995, 171-199. Agathocles is a Peripatetic philosopher in *Dem*. 29 [=Demonax F 34 Mullach], and a Stoic philosopher in *Icar*. 16.
[312] For the huge sum of money that three talents represented at this time, see Marquis, 492-493 n. 56.

τοῖς κακοῖς δὲ τοὺς φίλους εὐεργέτει, *Menandri sententiae* 219 Jaekel [=Mon. 147 Meineke], cf. E. *Or*. 666: ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρὴ τοῖς φίλοισιν ὠφελεῖν).[313]

A further proof of Agathocles' faithfulness and virtue in friendship is shown in his assisting Deinias all the time in his struggle before imperial justice. Agathocles' συμπάθεια – an important virtue in friendship – is underlined by the anaphoric and polysyndetic *accumulatio* of the prefix συν- (συνῆν καὶ συναπῆρεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ συνεισῆλθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, §18.1-2); this *parhomoeosis* is a figure that pervades the discourse of friendship.[314] Agathocles' characterisation thus conforms to ideal friendship as regards both virtue and form. Then, Agathocles goes as far as accompanying Deinias into exile (§18.3-5), an act that, in ancient discourse on friendship, is often mentioned as a proof of loyalty.[315] Agathocles' virtue is even more impressive considering that the place of Deinias' exile is the ill-famed island of Gyaros. This island, which was the place of banishment of a few personalities of the early Empire and constituted a real threat to others, was the epitome of hardship in exile.[316] On this desert and bare island, Agathocles supplies Deinias with everything he needs by going diving for purple fish, which is considered an extremely hard job.[317] He cares for his friend until the latter falls ill and remains faithful to him after his death. Agathocles is thus the perfect example not only of the loyal, but also selfless, friend.

Agathocles' virtue also shows in his role as advisor when he warns Deinias against the flatterers; Mnesippus' story thus illustrates the difference between the true and the sham friend, the flatterer (explicitly and insistently: κολάκων, §12.15, κολάκων, §13.1, κόλακες, §14.1, κόλακας, §15.14, κολάκων, §16.6, κόλακας, §16.13, κόλακες, §16.18).[318] This is a major issue in friendship,

[313] The proverb is indeed topical, as shows its illustration in an anecdote by Plutarch, which has similar motifs. In his work *On Brotherly Love*, he narrates an anecdote (*De frat. amore* 484A-B) about a certain Athenodorus, 'whom all his [Plutarch's] countrymen still know' (Mnesippus and Toxaris also agreed to tell contemporary stories in §10.7); his brother Xenon squandered his part of their father's legacy, raped a woman, was condemned by imperial justice and had all their belongings confiscated. Athenodorus, once he got his part back, divided his share in two without grudging his brother, whose folly 'was notorious throughout Greece.' The anecdote illustrates the virtue of ungrudging and selfless solidarity in a relationship of φιλία (in the broad sense). In Mnesippus' story, though, these and further virtues are amplified, for Agathocles' devotion towards Deinias is endless; instead of sharing his belongings, he gives all his wealth to his friend.

[314] To cite only Plutarch, see Giannatasio Andria 2000, 227-230. As he mentions (*ibid*., 229), the figure is frequently used, e.g., in Aristotle's *EN* 8-9, Cicero's *Amic*. and in Epict. *Diss*. 2.22.13. For συμπάθεια in friendship, see e.g. E. *IT* 1371, *Rh*. 807, Arist. *EN* 1171a28-b12, Ph. *In Flaccum* 72, J. *AJ* 16.261, D.Chr. 41.13.

[315] For example, Pylades is the only – truest – friend who follows Orestes into his downfall and exile (esp. E. *El*. 82-85). On the contrary, the lack of such a loyalty is lamented in the *Theognidea* (Thgn. 1.209-210=332a-b), and Ovid, in his exile poetry, complains about his solitude and being abandoned by his friends (e.g. *Trist*. 1.5.63-64, 3.3.10-12). Seneca also mentions the act of following a friend into exile, but attributes it – not without a certain distance – to Epicureanism (*Ep*. 9.10). Compare Favorinus' *On Exile* (*P.Vat*. 11) ch. 16 Barigazzi 1966.

[316] Compare Juv. 1.73 with Courtney 1980, *ad loc.* See also Marquis, 497-498 n. 66, 500 n. 69.

[317] See Marquis, 500 n. 70.

[318] See in general Konstan 1996c, 9-11, 16-17, *id*. 1997a, 120-121, *id*. 1998. He demonstrates that if equality and reciprocity is the major concern of Classical Greek friendship, later periods focus more frequently on the issue of truthfulness in friendship than on equality. For the issue in the Imperial period, see Whitmarsh 2000, 308-309, *id*. 2006a, with 97 n. 22 for further passages. For the issue of κολακεία in Lucian, see Nesselrath 1985, 75-80, Whitmarsh 2000, 307-308, Tomassi 2011, *ad Tim*. 8.3-4. The *topos* of the flatterers against the true friends is treated in these periods in Theophrastus' *περὶ κολακείας*, Philodemus' *περὶ κολακείας*, Cic. *Amic*.

especially one that is treated extensively in Hellenistic and imperial discourses on friendship. Most texts that treat the subject of friendship in these periods reflect concerns born from the socio-political context, for they focus on the problem of unequal friendships between a man of power and his closest entourage. They raise the issue of how he should choose his counsellors and whom he should trust. The good and true friend is characterised by his παρρησία; he does not shrink away from his duty to honestly criticise and reprove his friend when needed (Arist. *MM* 1.31, *EN* 1165a29-30, Cic. *Amic*. 6.22, 13.44, Sen. *Ep*. 3.2-3, Plut. *Mor*. 48E-74D, esp. 65E-74D).[319] The true friend is also able to forgive a friend's mistakes and restrain from blame when it is not the right time (Plut. *Mor*. 69B, 482B). He is therefore the opposite of the false friends, the flatterers or the drinking and fair-weather friends, who enjoy one's company as long as there is some benefit or pleasure to retrieve from it (Isoc. 2.27, Arist. *NE* 1173b.32-37, Plut. *Quomodo adulat.* 94A, *Quaest. conv*. 660A-B, Max.Tyr. 14.1).[320]

In Mnesippus' story, too, the virtuous friend, Agathocles, is contrasted to sham friends, the parasites who fly around Deinias. In these regards, Agathocles possesses all the characteristics of the true and truthful friend: he uses free speech and frank reproof to help his friend, whose mistakes he tolerates and forgives. When Deinias starts enjoying the company of the flatterers, he reproves his thoughtless dealing with his father's fortune (ὑπομιμνήσκων ἀεὶ τῶν προγόνων καὶ φυλάττειν παραγγέλλων ἃ μετὰ πολλῶν καμάτων ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ κτησάμενος κατέλιπεν, §12.17-18).[321] First, though, Agathocles does not use the correct measure of reproof and makes it all the worse. Consequently, Deinias gets annoyed by his admonitions and turns to the flatterers even more gladly (τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ προσέκρουε τὰ πολλὰ ἐπιτιμῶν, καὶ φορτικὸς ἐδόκει ὑπομιμνήσκων ἀεὶ τῶν προγόνων … ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς κώμους ἀπῆγεν ἔτι αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνος μετ' ἐκείνων ἐκώμαζε, λανθάνειν πειρώμενος τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα, §12.15-17, 19-21).[322] But later, when, in his sorrow, Deinias turns to him, Agathocles reacts more tactfully and does not resent him for having preferred the flatterers to himself before (ὁ δὲ ἄκαιρον εἶναι νομίσας ἐν τούτῳ ἀπομνημονεύειν τῷ Δεινίᾳ διότι οὐ προσίετο μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν φίλων ἀλλὰ τοὺς κόλακας αὐτοῦ προετίμα τότε, §16.11-13). Therefore, he plays the role of a friend's good and generous counsellor, which is an important virtue in friendship.

By contrast, the flatterer, or the false friend, is only interested in the benefits he can get from his prey – mostly food and money – and knows more than one trick to reach his aims. Usually, a

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26, 88-100, Philo of Alexandria *Leg*. 3.182, *Conf*. 48, Plut. *Quomodo adulat.* (= *Mor.* 48E-74E), esp. 48E-59A, Gnom. Epictet. 42 p. 488 Shenkl, Max.Tyr. *Τίσι χωριστέον τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου* 18 (=14.18), Themist. 22.276c-277c, Stob. *Ecl*. 3.14. Lucian deals ironically with this issue in *Sat*. 39 and *Parasit*. 22 (the parasite affirms about himself that he is a φίλος; for this passage and further passages, see Nesselrath 1985, 345), 49 (the parasite would rather be harmed instead of his friend).

[319] Free speech is especially important a motif after the Classical period. See Konstan 1996c, *id.* 1998, 279-280. For free speech and friendship in Plutarch, see Engberg-Pedersen 1996, O'Neil 1997, 116-117.

[320] For the relationship between pleasure and κολακεία, see Whitmarsh 2000, 311-312.

[321] See the reproof that Plutus addresses to Timon in *Tim*. 15.

[322] Cf. Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 66B.

flatterer gathers with other flatterers around a target, as they do around Deinias (πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους εἶχε περὶ ἑαυτόν, §12.11).[323] In Mnesippus' story, the flatterers harpoon the unwise Deinias with easy pleasures such as drinking and feasting (συμπιεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνεῖναι, §12.11-12, κώμους, §12.19, ἐκώμαζε, §12.20). In order to get access to his money, they associate with the whorish though married Chariclea and make Deinias believe that she loves him (§13.1-2). This works well, and together, they succeed in swallowing all of Deinias' fortune.[324] Thus, Mnesippus' first story illustrates the discrepancy between a friendship of pleasure, that of the flatterers (ἱκανοὺς μὲν συμπιεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνεῖναι, φιλίας δὲ πλεῖστον ὅσον ἀποδέοντας, §12.11-12), and the true, unconditional friendship of Agathocles towards Deinias. Consequently, the story not only contrasts Agathocles' true friendship with Deinias' erotic passion for Chariclea, but at the same time, it also opposes meretricious, interested love – Chariclea's hunger for money and her simulated love for Deinias – and true φιλία – Agathocles' unlimited, gratuitous spirit of sacrifice.[325] Agathocles is presented as the prototype of the true, sage and austere friend who does not enjoy the flatterers' low pleasures (ὁ Ἀγαθοκλῆς … καὶ συνῆν καὶ συνέπινεν αὐτοῖς οὐ πάνυ χαίρων τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ, §12.13-14).[326]

However, to some extent, Agathocles' virtue and deeds of friendship seem almost exaggerated, or at least not always adequate.[327] As does Deinias on his love-affair, thus Agathocles wastes on Deinias all his belongings, for he gives him the only estate his father had left him (ἣν μόνον εἶχε πατρῴαν οἰκίαν ἐν Σάμῳ ἀπεμπολήσας, §16.14). The consequence of his miscalculated assistance is that Deinias only gets into even deeper trouble.[328] Especially in the end of the story, Agathocles' devotion takes on incredible proportions. He not only helps Deinias during the trial and follows him into exile (against all *topoi*), but he also cares for him on Gyaros in any way (παντάπασιν) and remains faithful to his friend, even to his grave after the latter's death – or despite of his death (καὶ τεθνεῶντα, §18.10). This last action exceeds the norms of a good friendship.[329]

While Agathocles is presented as 'most virtuous in friendship' (ἄριστος μὲν πρὸς φιλίαν, §12.6-7; Ἀγαθοκλῆς γὰρ <u>οὗτος</u> at the beginning, in §12.6, sounds quasi programmatic), Deinias

[323] Cf. *Sententiae Menandri* 682 Jaekel (πολλοὶ τραπεζῶν, οὐ φίλων εἰσὶν φίλοι). Plutarch uses the image of a swarm of flies (Plut. *De amic. mult*. 94A-B). See also Nesselrath 1985, 91 with n. 264 for the present passage in Lucian. Compare *Nav*. 39, where Tomassi relates the idea that a potent person gathers around him false friends or flatterers to Cynicism ('filosofia cinica e diatriba'). See Tomassi 2019, 259.

[324] Their doings are described by means of food metaphors, which is a common device and characterises the parasites as comedy characters, as will be seen later in this chapter.

[325] Philo of Alexandria opposes the friend to the prostitute in *Plant*. 104-105 and *Leg*. 3.182. See Sterling 1997, 206. For the argument of meretricious love in this story, see Konstan 1993, 11.

[326] For Stoic austere friendship, see Lesses 1993.

[327] Pervo criticises the donation as 'an act that none of the writers on the topic would recommend' and argues that it is not an act of true friendship, because Agathocles would thus encourage his friend's vice; he even doubts 'that readers are meant to approve.' Pervo 1997, 167-168. This is too subjective a perspective, though I agree with the idea that Agathocles' virtue needs to be evaluated critically.

[328] Selling one's property to help a lavish friend in need as a result of unlucky love-stories is criticised by a third in Plaut. *Trin*. 627-716. See Zucker 1950, 8-19.

[329] For the issue of excessively grieving a friend's death, see e.g., Sen. *Ep*. 63.

definitely appears as inferior in virtue, as already his name ('Terrible') suggests.[330] He is described as a young, gullible simpleton (ἁπλοϊκὸν καὶ ἄπειρον, §14.6, ὁ μακάριος ἐπείσθη, §14.14). He is unable to accept criticism from a true friend and to distinguish a good from a bad friend (§12.13-21). He therefore prefers easy pleasures and indulges in his love disease (§15.13-17, esp. καὶ λύττα ἦν ἀκριβὴς τὸ πρᾶγμα). He behaves recklessly in his love affair: he loses a fortune in presents to Chariclea twice – his gifts are emphatically listed in a polysyndetic enumeration (ἀλλὰ συνοικίαι ὅλαι καὶ ἀγροὶ καὶ θεράπαιναι καὶ ἐσθῆτες εὐανθεῖς καὶ χρυσὸν ὁπόσον ἐθελήσειε, §15.19-20). When he is discovered in Chariclea's chamber, he reacts impetuously and loses all his self-control, for he kills both husband and wife (§17.6-9). Finally, his despair over his misfortune is so great that he is unable to provide for himself in his exile, becomes ill and lets himself die (§18.7-9). There is thus a form of discrepancy between Deinias' foolishness and Agathocles' self-control. This difference in behaviour (ἔθος) presupposes differences in virtue and moral disposition (ἦθος), which maybe point to an unequal kind of friendship, but certainly stress the fact that this story is about one exemplary friend more than an exemplary friendship.[331]

Some scholars have also seen a clue to the inequality in Agathocles and Deinias' friendship in other factors, such as the difference in wealth, but this needs to be reconsidered. For example, according to Pervo, Mnesippus' story does not stage an example of perfect friendship, because in his opinion, the relationship between Agathocles and Deinias is a case of unequal friendship.[332] Aristotle, whom Pervo uses for his argumentation, considers that unequal friendships, that is, friendships in which the two friends do not possess the same socio-economic status or moral level, cannot be perfect (*EN* 1158b29-35, 1163a24-b19, 1163b32-1164a9). However, if 'unequal' refers to Agathocles and Deinias' different social status or wealth, a close reading reveals that such a difference does not play an important role in Mnesippus' story. In §12.6-10, we learn that Agathocles is 'by no means more distinguished by birth or by wealth than any other Samian citizen' (τὰ ἄλλα δὲ οὐδὲν ἀμείνων Σαμίων τῶν πολλῶν οὔτε ἐς τὸ γένος οὔτε ἐς τὴν ἄλλην περιουσίαν, §12.7-8).[333] Deinias' social status is not explicated, but the fact is that he inherits a huge estate (Δεινίας ἐπλούτει ἄρα εἰς ὑπερβολήν, §12.9-10). Although the sum of three talents, which Agathocles is able to give to his friend (§16.15), is not a little sum of money, it is certainly not as much as the expression εἰς ὑπερβολήν and Deinias' qualification as νεόπλουτον (§12.10) would suggest that the latter possesses. The (hypothetical) difference in wealth, though, does not specifically signify a difference in social status between Agathocles and Deinias – indeed, Deinias' father worked hard for his fortune (ἃ μετὰ πολλῶν καμάτων ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ κτήσαμενος, §12.18). The fact that they have been friends since childhood

[330] Konstan 1997a, 119.
[331] There are different types of inequality in friendship (inequality of social status, of wealth, etc.), and inequality of virtue is one of these inequalities. Moral inequality, or differences, in friendship has been foremost discussed by Plato in his *Lysis* and Aristotle (e.g., *EN* 1158b35-1159a3).
[332] Pervo 1997, 167 n. 25.
[333] Friendship is therefore independent of social or economic status.

(φίλος ἐκ παίδων ἦν, §12.9) might indicate that they share a common social background – and more importantly for further aspects discussed below, that they are about the same age.[334] Besides, the stress on Deinias' immense fortune might as well serve to underline the catastrophe of Deinias' misfortune and not necessarily stress a social inequality between the two friends. This aspect of 'unequal' friendship, as Pervo and Ní Mheallaigh argue, seems also related to the idea that it is difficult to maintain a childhood friendship when lives drift apart, an issue raised, for example, by Arist. *EN* 1158b33-1159a6, Cic. *Amic*. 10.33-35, Ov. *Pont*. 4.3.11.[335] Although Agathocles and Deinias not truly 'drift apart,' the story of their friendship illustrates a similar issue, for, whereas Agathocles remains faithful to Deinias throughout the story, Deinias is led astray by the flatterers. Even when the latter returns to his friend, it is out of necessity more than anything else. Nonetheless, this demonstrates that he still considers Agathocles to be a trustful friend.[336] In conclusion, first, the idea that their inequality of fortune is a sign for their unequal friendship, as Pervo argues, is not supported by the text. Second, the idea that Agathocles and Deinias are considered to have 'drifted apart' is rather related to their unequal virtue and the lack of reciprocity in their relationship.

As to this latter aspect of Agathocles and Deinias' friendship, its lack of reciprocity, Pervo compares it to Aristotelian ideas on friendship and categorises as an inferior form of friendship.[337] However, this view may be nuanced. I will reconsider his interpretation from a more theoretical perspective on the idea of reciprocity in friendship and argue that, in Mnesippus' story, the lack of reciprocity in Agathocles and Deinias' friendship is also due to the fact that the story focuses more on Agathocles as the exemplary friend than on their friendship. First, if Agathocles and Deinias' friendship is indeed unequal in the sense that it is not reciprocal, this does not mean, as Pervo argues, that it is inferior. Aristotle, to whom Pervo refers for the concept of reciprocity in friendship, states that in order for a friendship to be perfect, it has to be reciprocal. Aristotle, though, only says that the feeling of εὔνοια must be reciprocal – and that both friends must be aware of this reciprocal feeling (Arist. *EN* 1156a3-4, cf. 1157b32-37); the principle of reciprocity does not compellingly apply to the deeds of friendship, at least not in the case of a perfect friendship, which is disinterested (Arist. *EN* 1163a1-10, 1164a13).[338] On the contrary, equality and reciprocity are only strictly necessary in (imperfect) friendships of utility or pleasure (Arist. *EN* 1158b1-4, 1164a7-13). Thus, in this sense,

[334] Konstan addresses the question of age as follows: '[f]or his maturity [Agathocles] seems more the custodian of his comrade than his coeval, as though he were the prime minister of a rash prince.' Konstan 1997a, 118-119.
[335] For the view that Agathocles and Deinias 'drifted apart ', see Pervo 1997, 166, compare Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 43.
[336] This is a different issue, treated at length, for example, by Plutarch, who compares the flatterers with woodworms creeping under the soft bark of good-natured and wealthy persons in order to divert them from the right path (*Quomodo adulat*. 49B, cf. *Tim*. 8). For more about the issue of the flatterers, see below.
[337] See Pervo 1997, 167 with n. 25.
[338] Explicitly in Arist. *EN* 1163a1-2, 6-7: δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἑκόντι] …. καὶ † ὁμολογήσαι δ' † ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. The perfect friendship is disinterested, for it exists for its own sake (καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα, 1164a13).

the fact that in Mnesippus' story, the act of giving assistance to a friend is one-sided would not amount to a lack of reciprocity *in true friendship*, which is based – again according to Aristotle's *EN* – on the awareness of the reciprocity of εὔνοια for the friend's sake. This is not to say that reciprocal assistance is not an ideal in friendship; of course, someone would be a bad friend if he did not help (in turn) his friend in need and failed to perform his duty. However, already in the Greek Classical tradition of friendship, the stress is on 'services [of friendship] as such rather than repayment '.[339] The view that gratuitous acts of χάρις towards a friend up to self-sacrifice ('total ethical commitment') are only reciprocal in principle is widely held in ancient thought, and is demonstrated, for example, when helping a friend in need or a comrade in danger on the battlefield.[340] Therefore, Agathocles and Deinias' friendship might also be explained by considering the following two points: First, Agathocles' friendship precisely illustrates a form of ideal friendship in which assistance is given gratuitously to the friend.[341] The fact that Agathocles undergoes these hardships for his friend's sake is a demonstration of his loyalty towards Deinias. Thereby, he resists the 'test' of friendship – a further *topos* in ancient discourse on friendship.[342] In this case, the emphasis is more on the virtues of selflessness and goodwill for the friend's sake than on the lack of reciprocity. Second, Mnesippus' story is actually about one paradigmatic friend (not about a paradigmatic friendship), in which Agathocles is the example – his role is therefore not secondary, as it seems to be in the beginning of the story. Reciprocity might not be the moral ideal that this story illustrates, but it does illustrate the respect of the most important Classical Greek duty of friendship: assistance to a friend in need. Thus, the fact that Mnesippus' story focuses on Agathocles' deeds and does not present any proof of Deinias' virtue in friendship, is a symptom of their one-sided and morally unequal friendship, but the story nevertheless presents an exemplary case in the character of Agathocles, who embodies the ideal of an – even, in a way, excessively – virtuous friend.[343] One concludes therefrom that this is precisely the purpose of Mnesippus' story: to show *one* example of a good friend and not an example of good friendship.

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[339] See Konstan 1998, 287, 287-288 for examples, which he takes foremost from the *Menandri sententiae* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (esp. 2.6).
[340] Se Gill 1998, esp. 308-310.
[341] That is, arguing once more with Aristotle, without any benefit other than increasing one's own virtue as an act of self-love and being pleased to please an 'other self' (Arist. *EN* 1166a1-1169b2). It is symbolic of true friendship, which is defined by Aristotle as the manifestation of goodwill (εὔνοια) for the friend's sake (Arist. *EN* 1155b31, *Rhet.* 1361a36-37).
[342] See, e.g., Thgn. 1.79-81, etc. with Donlan 1985, 225-226, Fitzgerald 1997, 29-31, Arist. *EN* 1156a14-16, Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 49D, *De amic. mult*. 94C, Max.Tyr. 14.6.
[343] For the question of asymmetry, see below and Marquis, 337 n. 57: 'On constate que la relation entre les deux amis est totalement asymétrique. Agathoclès ne reçoit rien en échange de son dévouement, pas même des remerciements ni de la gratitude. Son amitié est complètement désintéressée. […] À ce point du texte [§16], le lecteur a davantage l'impression d'un récit critique à l'égard de Deinias que celle d'un éloge d'Agathoclès (qui reste généralement à l'arrière-plan).' See also *ibid*., 491 n. 46. The point is, precisely, that Agathocles' friendship is 'désintéressée' and does not expect anything in return. Although he does not play an important role in the narration, the message of the story rests upon his exemplary behaviour. Toxaris' reaction does acknowledge this fact, as has been said above.

Mnesippus' Dramatic Tale

Noticeably, Mnesippus' story situates Deinias' environment in the world of comedy, and especially New Comedy. A relationship to comedy is achieved by means of various kinds of allusions to texts and contexts of comedy (motifs, vocabulary, insinuation of performance, etc.). For example, the intrigues of the parasites are described by means of drama metaphors: they 'play the second role' in Deinias' ruin (ὑπεκωμῴδουν, §14.2, a *hapax*) and Chariclea has the experience of someone who 'played the role of thousands of loves' (μυρίους ἔρωτας ὑποκριναμένη, §14.3).[344] Then, Mnesippus' story borrows a few further characteristics from this genre. For example, characters such as the courtesan and the parasites are stock characters in comedy, and Mnesippus' text insinuates that Chariclea and the parasites as well as the rich Deinias belong to the comic tradition.[345] Chariclea is described as a ἀστεῖον ... γύναιον (§13.1). The diminutive is not only depreciating, but also an expression typical of comedy, which, applied to Chariclea in the present context, might be used to recall her comic siblings.[346] Then, Deinias too, who is described as newly rich (νεόπλουτον, §12.10), may originate from the character of the rich young man in love in New Comedy (νεανίσκον, §14.7).[347] Not least of all, this recognition may be attributed to the fact that his name appears in comic

[344] For the meaning of the *hapax* ὑποκωμῳδέω, see Marquis , 492 n. 54.

[345] For the character of the courtesan, see e.g., Henry 1988, McClure 2006, 4 (with references to earlier scholarship), 15-18, Olson 2007, 347. For the courtesan as a comedic character and its relationship with Lucianic courtesans, see below. For the parasite as a character in comedy, see Gallo/Pettine 1988, 9-12, Arnott 1996, 542-544, Tylawsky 2002 (Greek and Latin), Olson 2007, 55 (Nea) with further bibliography, Antonsen-Resch 2012, 3-19 (summary and overview of scholarship), Flores Militello 2019, 11-12, 17-18, 27-30 (difference between the *cliens* in Old Latin Comedy and the παράσιτος of Middle and New Comedy). For the parasite from a literary and historical perspective in Roman society, see Damon 1997. For this parasitic *cliens-patronus* issue in Lucian, see Bozia 2015, 21-37 (Lucian and Juvenal). For the relationship between the parasite-characters in Lucian and comedy, see already Croiset 1882, 55. See also Bompaire 1958, 206-207, Nesselrath 1985, 17-18. For the influence of comedy in the *Timon*, see Tomassi 2011a, 17-39 (character of Timon), 120 (the flatterers). In *Merc.Cond*. 1, Lucian similarly uses a drama-metaphor when he describes the behaviour of the scholar-client (*ἐπιτραγῳδοῦσιν*), and in 3, the philosopher Timocles is characterised as a hungry parasite (see therefore Hafner 2017, 65). The ancient novel, too, borrows the characters of the courtesan and the parasite from New Comedy. See Billault 1991, 147 (the parasite character in Chariton is a typical character of the Nea), Bowie 1995, 270-271.
It is not always possible to differentiate the parasite (παράσιτος) from the flatterer (κόλαξ). In Mnesippus' story, the flatterer and the parasite characters merge into one type of character, as in comedy (Konstan 1996c, 11 and Nesselrath 1985, 92-111 for a discussion of these terms in Old, Middles and New Comedy) and elsewhere in Lucian (*Nigr*. 22-24, *Sat*. 39, *Tim*. 12). In the *Parasitus*, though, the parasite is not characterised as a flatterer (Nesselrath 1985, 65-67). For the relationship between flatterer and parasite in Lucian, see Nesselrath 1985, 88-92 and 89 n. 253 for a summary of earlier discussions. In his survey of passages in which parasite and flatterer overlap, he does not mention the present passage, although the flatterers clearly represent the 'voracious' characteristic of the parasite. For this characteristic, see below.

[346] For the comedic use of the diminutive in Lucian, see Schluze 1883, 22. For γύναιον in comedy, see Ar. *V*. 610, *Th*. 792. The expression ἀστεῖον ... γύναιον itself is only found four times in the Thesaurus, and in a similar context in Aristaenet. 1.4.3 and Hld. 1.9.1. Noticeably, the heroine of this novel is called Chariclea. For the relationship between §§13-15 and Heliodor's novel, see Tagliabue 2015. The expression also recalls the description of Lycaenion, the meretricious concubine of Chromis who initiates Daphnis to sexual intercourse, as a γύναιον … ἐπακτὸν ἐξ ἄστεος (Long. 3.15.1). She is a similarly sophisticated woman, who is experienced in matters of love and, although somehow bound to Chromis, enjoys exercising her seductive power upon the young Daphnis.

[347] The νεόπλουτος also appears in Luc. *Tim*. 7, 23. Compare Alciphr. 2.4, 2.32, 3.5.

fragments (*Comica adespota* F 559 CAF, Stratt. F 33.3 CAF [cf. Ath. 15.690f = 15.42 Kaibel]).[348] His rival in love, the young Cretan, another νεανίσκον τῶν ὑποχρύσων (§16.2-3), might equally belong to the world of comedy. Finally, the μαστροποί (§13.5), the 'procuresses' who are mentioned together with Chariclea's plotting, and the ἄβρα (§16.17), her 'favourite slave', are also characters of comedy.[349]

The similarities between these and further motifs in Mnesippus' stories with typical motifs in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Courtesans* and *Timon* (esp. 5-8, 45-58) as well as passages from Alciphron's *Letters of Parasites*, texts that also exhibit a strong relationship with comedy, might intensify the importance of comedy for Mnesippus' first story.[350] Although the question of the relationship between Lucian and Alciphron has not always found a consensus, scholarship now tends to consider Lucian as the one who influenced Alciphron.[351] However, the question is not important

[348] A fact that Pervo does not consider when he stresses that Deinias is a character in Antonius Diogenes' *The Marvels beyond Thule* [=Phot. Codex 166 pp. 109-111] (Pervo 1997, 166 n. 17).

[349] The μαστροπός is expressly the term used by Ar. *Th*. 558, Epicr. F 9.1 CAF, Philippid. F tit. 14 CAF, Theophil. F 11.4 CAF [cf. Ath. 13.52 Kaibel], Diph. Zog 2.22 Meineke [cf. Ath. 7.39 Kaibel]. For ἄβρα, see Nicostr.Com. F tit 1-2 CAF, Men. *Sicyonii* F 1.1 Sandbach, F 64.3 CAF [= F 58.3 Körte], F 438.1 CAF [= F 371.1 Körte], F 520.3 CAF [= F 453.3 Körte]. The word appears also in *Dearum Iudicium* 7, *Merc.Cond*. 36 and 39.

[350] For similarities in general between §§13-15 and *DMeretr*., see Marquis, 334 n. 52. The thirteenth book of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae*, which treats anecdotes of famous and less famous courtesans, is to be mentioned in this context as well. See McClure 2003, esp. 39-40 (inspiration from Middle and New Comedy), 40-46 (other sources of inspiration such as Attic oratory, Hellenistic historiography). See also Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 712c for New Comedy and courtesans.

[351] For the relationship between Lucian and Alciphron, see the summary of the question in earlier scholarship, which has been a discussion quite like the chicken and egg problem, in Benner/Fobes 1949, 7-18, Pinto 1973, 261 n. 3. Reardon calls Alciphron the 'cadet', 'semblable', 'imitateur' of Lucian (Reardon 1971, 180). A similar view in favour of a strong Lucianic influence upon Alciphron is also adopted by Santini 1995. See *ibid.*, 58 n. 1, 59 n. 4 (with further bibliography on the question), Anderson 1997, 2195-2198. Nesselrath, for his part, somewhat downplays the importance of Lucian's dialogue for Alciphron's letters. See Nesselrath 1985, 19-20 n. 15, 20 n. 20, where he summarises: '[…] Selbst wenn Alkiphron zeitlich zwischen Lukian und der Komödie stünde, sind die Verbindungen de Samosatensers zu den komischen Dichtern doch so breitgefächert, das seine direkte Benutzung (ohne Vermittlung durch Alkiphron) außer Frage steht. Umgekehrt ist aber auch Alkiphron in seiner Verwertung der Komödie nicht (oder jedenfalls nicht nur) von Lukian abhängig, da sich seine Übernahmen nicht mit denen Lukians decken und beispielsweise in seinen Parasitenschilderungen eine Reihe von Zügen zu finden ist, die bei Lukian in dieser Weise nicht auftauchen […]. Wenn man Alkiphron also in jedem Fall direkte Benutzung der Neuen Komödie zugestehen kann […] dann ist er, selbst wenn Lukian vor ihm schrieb, noch ein weitgehend unabhängiger Zeuge und bietet wertvolle Vergleichsmöglichkeiten.' (The formulation that Alciphron presents an 'independent' testimony is quite misleading.) For similarities between Lucian and Alciphron with regard to the characterisation of the parasite, see also Alciphr. *Ep*. 3.28 and Luc. *DMort*. 20.11. In the present case, a relationship is impossible to reject. The similarity of wording between §13.3-5 (καὶ γραμματεῖά τε εἰσεφοίτα παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτῷ καὶ στέφανοι ἡμιμάραντοι καὶ μῆλά τινα ἀποδεδηγμένα) and Alciphr. 3.26.2 (καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον γραμματίδια ὁσημέραι φοιτᾷ δίθυρα παρὰ τῆς γαμετῆς τοῦ τρέφοντος ἡμᾶς καὶ στέφανοι ἡμιμάραντοι καὶ μῆλα ἀποδεδηγμένα) is astonishing. Kock defends the view that Alciphron and Lucian both draw – so to say independently – from each other for a specific source. See Kock 1888, esp. 37-38 for §13 and Alciphr. 3.62.2, and §15 and Alciphr. 3.50.1-2. While the influence of Lucian upon Alciphron is not to be dismissed, but at the same time Alciphron certainly draws motifs from comedy and other texts independently, it is hazardous to suppose a precise common 'source' for these similarities. It is equally hazardous to consider that Lucian 'transposed' in prose a specific passage from Middle/New Comedy (but see Bompaire 1958, 571, cf. Hall 1981, 32-33). As Householder notes about the 'similarities' between §13 and *Comica adespota* F 1448 CAF, and §14 and *Comica adespota* F 1561 CAF: these are 'passages of considerable length supposed to have been borrowed, turned into prose, and fitted into

for the present issue. While it is certain that, here, the one draw from the other (probably Alciphron from Lucian), both Lucian and Alciphron largely draw inspiration from comedy – but also from Greek elegiac and epigrammatic poetry, Latin love elegy and the ancient Greek novel – for the use of motifs of the game of love.[352] Chariclea's name, 'Famous for Pleasure', is a telling name like that of the courtesans and prostitutes in Lucian's *DMeretr*., which evoke their activity or physical appearance.[353] Such names are also found in Middle and New Comedy, and Alciphron follows this practice.[354] Then, Chariclea's contrivances to awaken and revive Deinias' love are the typical stratagem (μηχανῶνται, §13.6, μηχανήματα, §13.18, μηχανημάτων, §14.6, cf. *DMeretr*. 4.2, *Alciphr*. 3.14.1) of a Lucianic courtesan.[355] She does everything to make Deinias jealous (§13.17, cf. *DMeretr*. 3, 8.2-3), sheds tears and affects to be love-sick (§14.12-14, cf. *DMeretr*. 2.1), knowns how to make her presence pleasing (§15.3-6, cf. *DMeretr. passim*), and uses the argument of pregnancy (§15.9-11, cf. *DMeretr*. 2). In particular, motifs like the (bitten) apple as love-token (§13.14, cf. *DMeretr.* 12.1, Alciphr. 3.26.2), the garlands of flowers (§13.14, cf. Alciphr. 3.26.2), the languishing (τακερὸν γεγενημένον, §15.8), and the desperation of the neglected and closed out lover (§15.13-17) are present in texts as diverse as, for example, elegy, erotic epigrams, Latin love elegy and bucolic poetry.[356] These form a network the relationships of which are not easy to disentangle (which would be irrelevant here anyway).

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various contexts by Lucian'. He does well to underline that '[t]here is, of course, no evidence to prove this'. Householder 1941, 8.

[352] For the relationship between comedy and Alciphron, see Schwartz 1965, 37-47 (and Lucian, including the *Toxaris* and this story in particular: see pp. 37, 44), Treu 1973, Anderson 1997, *passim*, Ozanam 1999, 31-36 (with further bibliography), 175 n. 52, Rosenmeyer 2001, 256-307 (including a discussion on the relationship with, e.g., Lucian's *DMeretr*.), Vox 2014. For similarities between Alciphron and Latin love elegy, see, e.g., Alciphr. 4.8 and Ov. *Am*. 1.6, Prop. 1.16, 3.17, Tib. 1.2. For similarities between Alciphron and the novel: Alciphr. 2.9, 18 and Long. 1.13, 4.8. See also Carugno 1950, *id*. 1955, Scarcella 1970, 104-131, Höschele 2018, 743-749. At this point, it would also be interesting to note that Latin love elegy, too, knows New Comedy, as shown, e.g., by Ov. *Am*. 1.15.1-18, *Trist*. 2.369-372. See therefore James 2006. Ussher 1987 analyses the 'genre' of Greek love letter-fiction. On the Latin side, Ovid's *Heroides* are, of course, a case in point.

[353] For a study of names in the *DMeretr*. with regard to comedy, see Mras 1916, esp. 325-335 for names of courtesans. For the similarities of names in the *DMeretr*. and comedy, see also Macleod 1987, *ad DMeretr*. 12.1 l. 2, l. 14.

[354] The importance of comedy, and especially New Comedy for the *DMeretr*. is well-known, but see Rabe 1906, 275, Bompaire 1958, 216-218, 361-365 (esp. 362 about Chariclea in the *Toxaris*), 569-571, Bartley 2005, 365, Gilhuly 2006, 277-278.

[355] The noun μηχάνημα is frequent in drama (tragedy), see LSJ s.v. II.

[356] For the apples and garlands in Greek sympotic poetry, see e.g. Giangrande 1968, 122 n. 2, *id.* 1974, 32 (garlands). For these motifs in Old Comedy, see Ar. *Ec*. 952-965; in Greek Hellenistic epigrams, see e.g. *AP* 5.290 (apples), 5.92.3-4, 5.145.1-2, 5.191.5-6 [=Meleager 73 GP], 5.281.1-3 (withered garlands). In Greek Hellenistic poetry, see, e.g., Theocr. 2.31, 50-51, 117-128 and 153, 3.10-11, 6.32-33, 7.122-125, 11.10 and 56. In Latin elegy and poetry, see, e.g., Catull. 63.66, 64.283, Verg. *Ecl*. 3.64, 2.51, 3.70-71, Hor. *Epist*. 1.1.77-78, Lucr. 4.1132, Tib. 1.2.13-14, Prop. 1.3.21, 2.15.51, 2.34.59, Ov. *Am*. 1.6.67-68, 3.7.66, *Ars* 2.528, 3.71-72, *Rem*. 31-32. In imperial Greek prose, see, e.g., Plut. *Amat*. 753B, Long. 1.15 3.25.33-34, Aristaenet. 1.25.21-23, 57.13. For the apple as love token, see Lugauer 1967, Littlewood 1968, Fedeli 1980, *ad Prop*. 1.3.24, Calame 1992, 126, Pattoni 2005, 276-277 (Longus). For the *exclusus amator*, see Copley 1956, 60. Schwartz (1965, 37) considers that the garlands are motifs from New Comedy. By contrast, Anderson (1976a, 50 n. 79) argues that these motifs in Lucian and Alciphron are rather erotic motifs from Greek Hellenistic poetry.

In some passages, though, the tone of comedy resounds more loudly, as in the metaphors of the courtesan weaving her net (εἰς τὰ δίκτυα ἐμπεσόντες, §13.9) or the consideration that her seduction game is a 'technique' (ἐπιτεχνώμεναι, τεχνῖτις, §13.6, 13), which is also found in Middle Comedy. For example, the prostitutes' plotting to allure their preys is described by means of a 'sewing-metaphor' and similarly considered a 'technique' in Alexis F 103.4 PCG [= F 98.4 CAF].[357] While the metaphor of the net-weaving lover seems to be more common in Hellenistic epigrams than in comedy, the image of a courtesan's skill as a 'trap' is attested as early as Old Comedy.[358] Chariclea herself is described as a predator hunting its prey. The lovers fall into her 'claws' (παραλαβοῦσα εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, §14.5-6, οὐκ ἀνῆκεν ἐκ τῶν ὀνύχων, §14.7), where she 'ensnares' and 'transfixes' them (περιέχουσαν πανταχόθεν καὶ διαπείρασα, §14.7-8); her game is a true chase (ὑπὸ τῆς ἄγρας, §14.9, ἐθήρα, §16.2).[359] The description of flatterers as predators has a long tradition as well and occurs frequently in Lucian's works.[360] The image of the flatterers as voracious animals, probably birds of prey such as vultures as in *Tim*. 8 and 46, is emphasised with a comic effect by the anaphora and *onomatopoeia* ἐξήντλητο ἤδη **κ**αὶ ἐξε**κεκ**ένωτο (§16.1), which possibly imitates the sound of picking beaks, which, in turn, is reminiscent of the paronomasia κόλαξ-κόραξ. In the end, Deinias' fortune has been 'drained' to utter ruin by Chariclea and the parasites (ἐκτραχηλίσασα, §14.3, cf. Alciphr. 3.40.3, ἐξήντλητο, §16.1, cf. *Tim*. 18), and Deinias is 'drained' until his is bankrupt (αὖος, §16.2, cf. *Tim*. 8). Furthermore, the voracity of the birds of prey, that is, the flatterers, is illustrated by means of the topical and comic association of parasites and flatterers with food, which is seen here in the use of food-metaphors.[361] Thus, as soon as Deinias has money again, the parasites consider him

[357] In the passage (vv. 1-4): πρῶτα μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κέρδος καὶ τὸ συλᾶν τοὺς πέλας / πάντα τἄλλ' αὐταῖς πάρεργα γίνεται· ῥάπτουσι δὲ / πᾶσιν ἐπιβουλάς· ἐπειδὰν δ' εὐπορήσωσίν ποτε, / ἀνέλαβον καινὰς ἑταίρας, πρωτοπείρους τῆς τέχνης.

[358] For the motif in Greek epigrams, see Kenney 1970, 387-388, although he makes a strong case for Lucretius' quasi-innovative metaphor in Lucr. 4.1146-1148. The motif of the net, however, already appears in Ibycus (F 6 L-P), as Kenney notes (see *ibid*., 386-387). For the motif in Latin poetry, see esp. Ov. *Ars* 1.45-48, 263, *Her*. 20.45 (in the context of the lover as hunter). For the metaphor of the trap (παγίς), see, e.g., Ar. F 666 CAF, Amphis F 23.4 CAF, Men. F 689.2 CAF. See also the nickname Παγίς of one courtesan in *DMeretr*. 11.2.

[359] Compare *θηρᾶται* in *DMeretr*. 6.3.

[360] See Tomassi 2011a, *ad Tim*. 8.4-5. The comparison of flatterers with animals is rather a Cynic tradition, but pervades Graeco-Latin literature.

[361] Similar food-parasite associations are paramount in Latin comedy and satire, see, e.g., Plaut. *Capt*. 825, 909, Ter. *Eun*. 35, *Heaut*. 35, Lucil. 717, Hor. *Epist*. 2.1.170. Juv. 5.141. See Fürst 1996, 216 for further passages. The association is already known in Greek Old Comedy (e.g. Eupolis F 346 CAF [= Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 54B]) and endures until New Comedy, where the parasite is characterised by his τἀλλότρια δειπνεῖν (see Nesselrath 1985, 65-67 and 65 n. 172 for further passages). See also Tomassi 2011a, *ad Tim.* 45.4-5. On the other hand, the characterisation of flatterers-parasites as false friends by means of the stock character of the κόλαξ or the παράσιτος in comedy is not unique to Mnesippus' story. Although comedy does not seem to be concerned with the issue of false friends (Konstan 1996c, 11, *id*. 1998, 292), there are other examples of such allusions to comedy in friendship discourse, as in Plutarch and Athenaeus. See esp. Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 50C-D, 54B, 57A with Sirinelli 1989, 75 and Ath. 6.236d-240c with citations from comedy. See also Whitmarsh 2000 (Athenaeus), *id*. 2006a (Plutarch). For example, similar images and food-metaphors stressing the flatterer-parasite's voracity are found in Plutarch's discussion of the difference between friends and flatterers (*Quomodo adulat*. 49C-D, 50D, 94B) and the interests of Athenaeus' parasite-flatterers-false friends are especially in food.

'edible' (καὶ οἱ κόλακες […] ὁρῶντες ἐδώδιμον ἔτι ὄντα τὸν Δεινίαν, §16.18-19).[362] Besides, the fact that Deinias is immediately surrounded by the greedy flatterers 'as naturally happens' (ὥσπερ εἰκός, §12.10), stresses the predictability of the plot and could be a way to foreground the topical nature of the material.

Notwithstanding the fact that some motifs occur in other texts too, comedy plays an essential role for Mnesippus' story, also on a linguistic level. The comic *onomatopoeia* and the diminutive γύναιον have already been mentioned, but words such as πολυγύμναστον (§14.5) and κακοδαίμονι (§14.9) also create a comedic atmosphere.[363] Tragedy, or drama more generally, contributes to a theatral atmosphere in the story as well. Deinias is immediately defined as ἄθλιος (§13.1), which characterises him as a dramatic character.[364] Further expressions complete the dramatic picture: ἐλεεινῶς ὑποστενάξαι (§15.4) are two poetic words, the latter from tragedy; ἐκώκυε (§15.16) is a poetic verb with epic and tragic connotations, although it can also be found in the Greek novel, probably for the same connotation, and ἐκυλίνδετο (§15.17) is formed on the poetic form of the Attic and prosaic κυλινδέω.[365] Then, there are a few *figurae etymologicae* (ἔργον ἐργασάμενος, §17.13, ἁρμοστὴν ὃς ἥρμοζεν, §17.19), which give an additional emphasis to the narration.

Finally, particularly in the passages with motifs from comedy (§§13.3-16.4, §§16.16-17.13), the narration itself gives the impression that a drama is taking place on stage before the 'audience's eyes', for, scene after scene, it describes in great detail the characters' movements, the objects they exchange and their different emotions. The scene of the husband who rises from ambush and goes for the adulterous lover clearly is such a scene from comedy: ἐπαναστὰς ὥσπερ ἐκ λόχου τήν τε αὔλειον ἀποκλείειν ἐκέλευεν καὶ συλλαμβάνειν τὸν Δεινίαν, πῦρ καὶ μάστιγας ἀπειλῶν καὶ ξίφος ὡς ἐπὶ μοιχὸν σπασάμενος (§17.3-5). In two passages, the text hints at the affinities that the narration has with drama and theatre. In §17.10-11, when Deinias has beaten Chariclea and her husband to death, the household is said to 'stand immobilised and speechless' (ἑστήκεσαν ἄφωνοι), 'astonished by the incredible course of actions' (τῷ παραδόξῳ τοῦ πράγματος ἐκπεπληγμένοι). The expression ἑστήκεσαν ἄφωνοι, hinting at masks, suggests that the household stands on stage as if they were 'the

[362] For food-metaphors applied to a newly rich (parasite), see Alciphr. 3.14.
[363] The first is a Lucianic creation, formed as a compound in the way of comedy – as πολυταλάντους (§14.4) must sound, too. The second is frequently used in interjections in comedy, but also as an adjective, thus frequently in Aristophanes (and Lucian), but see also Arichipp. F 2.1 CAF, Aristonym. F 2-3.2 CAF, Antiph. F 56.1 CAF, F 282.1 CAF, *Comica adespota* F 646.1 CAF, *Comica adespota novae comoediae* F 244.138 CGFPR.
[364] For the dramatic connotation, see LSJ s.v. II.1.
[365] For ὑποστενάζω and κωκύω, see Schmid I, 350 and 336 and for ὑποστενάζω, see Karavas 2005, 115-116 (word from tragedy). The first is Sophoclean (but see also Alciphr. 4.14.4). The second is frequently found in Homer and in later Greek epic poetry, in comedy (Ar. *Ec*. 648, *Lys*. 1222, *Ra*. 34) and tragedy (A. *Ag*. 1313, S. *Ant*. 28, 204, 1302, *trag. adesp*. F 293 Nauck = Kannicht-Snell), but also in the Greek novel (Charito 3.1.3, Ach. Tat. 1.13.1, 1.14.1, 3.5.2, 3.10.1, Long. 2.21.3, Hld. 1.31.1, 7.14). The adjective ἐλεεινός with the meaning 'piteous' is Attic, but also tragic, see LSJ s.v. I.1.a. For the forms κυλίνδω/κυλινδέω, see LSJ s.v. κυλινδέω I.1.

unspeaking serving-characters '.[366] Then, the idea that the household is τῷ παραδόξῳ τοῦ πράγματος ἐκπεπληγμένοι potentially prefigures the recipients' reaction of deep astonishment (ἔκπληξις) to such an unexpected change in the course of events in the plot (ἀπροσδόκετον), a mechanism of dramatic narration *par excellence*. In a further passage, the text makes its drama-like narration plain by means of contrast. In §16.8-11, when Deinias returns to Agathocles, he summarises the events that have taken place: καὶ αἰδούμενος τὸ πρῶτον ὅμως διηγεῖτο πάντα – τὸν ἔρωτα, τὴν ἀπορίαν, τὴν ὑπεροψίαν τῆς γυναικός, τὸν ἀντεραστὴν τὸν Κρῆτα, καὶ τέλος ὡς οὐ βιώσεται μὴ οὐχὶ συνὼν τῇ Χαρικλείᾳ. Thereby, the contrast between this short summary and the long description of events is made obvious. The same effect is created in §17.14 by the very brief ἀναλογιζόμενοι τὰ πεπραγμένα.

The rhetorical function of such a comedy-like story is to make the recipients (that it, Toxaris in the first place) receptive to the example of friendship and direct their attention to the way this example is narrated. In addition, these elements that are borrowed from comedy may be considered to be a factor of enjoyment for the audience.

The Question of Homoeroticism and the Ancient Novel

Some scholars see in the present representation of friendship a contrast to, or even a parody of, the ancient novel – in particular Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe* – and of the motif of heterosexual love that is central to these novels. Therefore, they assume that the relationship between Agathocles and Deinias is essentially erotic.[367] Both views might be nuanced. I will argue that the friendship represented in Mnesippus' first story can also be explained as an illustration of ideals of friendship in Graeco-Roman thought, and that this story does not have to rely on the ancient novel for its understanding. This does not preclude that Mnesippus' story in some way exhibits similarities with the ancient novel, with which it shares the poetics of intertextual ποικιλία.

It has been put forward that Agathocles' selflessness is a sign of his homoerotic relationship to Deinias.[368] I will first nuance this view, and then refute the corollary that Agathocles' behaviour and the 'ordeals' (i.e. manual labours), which he undergoes for the sake of friendship, mock the devotion of the heterosexual couple in the ancient Greek novel.[369] With regard to the homoerotic

[366] See Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 45. Marquis, for her part, sees in the immobility of the household a strategy for making the story plausible. For the economy of the story, Deinias needs to flee to Agathocles. The 'normal' situation would have the household defend their masters' lives at any cost (see Marquis, 494 n. 63). In my opinion, this is not excluded, but the first interpretation is more convincing considering the wording and the image of 'mute masks'. For an interpretation of τῷ παραδόξῳ τοῦ πράγματος ἐκπεπληγμένοι, see below.

[367] For Mnesippus' story, see foremost Pervo 1997, 166-168 and Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 43-49, esp. 48: 'By rewriting an episode from *Chaereas and Callirhoe* in the journalistic style and avowedly "factual" framework of the *Toxaris*, Lucian exposes the melodramatic nature of Charitonian realism.' For further references on the relationship between the *Toxaris* and the ancient (Greek) novel, see Introduction, 'Structure'.

[368] Pervo 1997, 168 and n. 27: Agathocles' 'loyalty beyond the grave is wretched excess. Perhaps one should understand this as unrequited homosexual passion.' See *ibid*., 167 and n. 23 for the argument that Agathocles' 'engaging in manual labor' hints at the 'ordeals romantic heroes may have to undergo.'

[369] Pervo 1997, 168: 'It is possible that their undying devotion to one another mocks the romantic loyalty of the heterosexual pairs in the romantic novels […].' Here, his argumentation is not coherent, for Deinias does

interpretation of Agathocles and Deinias' unequal friendship *per se*, it presupposes that Agathocles plays the part of the philosopher and educator and emphasises his one-sided devotion to make Mnesippus' story hint at an erotic ἐραστὴς-ἐρώμενος relationship, or at least, allow for ambiguity.[370] However, Agathocles is not specifically older – rather, more likely the same age – and completely fails in his educational role, for Deinias does not profit from and listen to his friends' teaching. On the contrary, Agathocles' behaviour is also typically that of a true, loyal friend. Mnesippus' story does not focus on aspects such as erotic appeal but on the gratuitous assistance up to self-sacrifice, which is a sign of true friendship. In the absence of any further erotic connotations and any functional value of homoeroticism in the *Toxaris*, friendship might be the best interpretation of Agathocles and Deinias' relationship.

Then, the interpretation of Agathocles and Deinias' friendship as a homoerotic relationship rests on the supposition that Mnesippus' story alludes to Chariton's novel – and therefore is a parody of the heterosexual relationship in the ancient Greek novel.[371] However, in my opinion, it is not true that 'Mnesippus' tale focuses on the erotic (?) [sic] friendship between Deinias and Agathocles '.[372] As has been shown, Agathocles' behaviour conforms to ideals already present in Classical Greek friendship, and the relationship between Agathocles and Deinias is perfectly in line with these ideals as well, even if one accepts that there are ambiguities, especially with regard to the question of moral asymmetry. Therefore, it seems improbable that Agathocles' behaviour is an imitation of the model of loyal friendship found in the ancient novel, or even more specifically, that it is an imitation of Polycharmus' friendship towards Chaereas in Chariton, as Ní Mheallaigh asserts and as will be discussed in a second.[373] Rather, both representations of friendship, in the ancient Greek novel/Chariton and in Mnesippus' story, are characteristically ideal and conform to ancient

not show any sign of devotion towards Agathocles, a fact that Pervo himself underlines ('there is no reciprocity') (*ibid*., 167).

[370] See Konstan 1993, 8-12. To him, the story remains ambiguous about this matter: '[t]he asymmetry in their roles suggests the pattern of lover and beloved as much as that of mutual friends.' Konstan 1997a, 119.

[371] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 44-45. By means of allusions to Chariton's novel, she says, 'Lucian inverts the hierarchy within the novel which assigns central importance to the male-female lovers and incorporates homoerotic plots in the side-lines. […] In *Toxaris*, Agathocles and Deinias, who are separated but reunited, thereafter to remain together for the rest of their lives, usurp the role of the idealized couple in the novels; it is as if we were reading a distorted version of Chariton's novel which focused on the Polycharmus-Chaereas friendship, and contained within that plot a disastrous version of the relationship between Chaereas and Callirhoe.' Her argumentation is contradictory. On the one hand, she compares Agathocles and Deinias to Polycharmus and Chaereas, but at the same time, the friends in Mnesippus' story are supposed to 'usurp' the role of the heterosexual couple. Furthermore, it would be profitable to show where the text, or as she has it, 'Lucian has externalized a self-deconstructing tendency which is already built into the novels themselves' in virtue of the latter's homoerotic subplots (*ibid*., 44).

[372] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 44.

[373] For this view, see Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 43-48, esp. 44: Agathocles' behaviour 'is reminiscent of the selflessness of male friends in the Greek novels, in particular Chariton's Polycharmus who shares Chaereas' many ordeals, restrains and advises him […].' Giving advice is a further characteristic of the good friend; see below for this aspect.

thought.[374] I do not agree with the argument that their friendship is homoerotic *because* Mnesippus' story parodies Chariton's love novel, which is Ní Mheallaigh's main argument. I will argue that the relationship between both texts is not compelling, and even less parodic. Rather, the *Toxaris* transposes topical motifs for its own purpose.

According to Ní Mheallaigh, Agathocles and Deinias' relationship is homoerotic due to the similarity between their friendship and Polycharmus and Chaereas' friendship in Chariton's novel, where these two friends are compared to Achilles and Patroclus. Without entering into the polemic of whether the Homeric heroes had an erotic relationship, a question debated since old times, and of whether it applies to Chariton's pair of friends one thing can be observed: a direct allusion to Achilles and Patroclus is absent from Mnesippus' story.[375] Earlier in the dialogue (§10.4-5), Toxaris does name these heroes, together with other pairs of friends, but for their (literary and moral) exemplariness, an aspect that I will explain below. Then, I am not convinced by Ní Mheallaigh's interpretation of the intertextual relation between Charito 1.4.1-12 and Mnesippus' first story for several reasons:

First, there is the question of the similarity of the plots. In this passage in Chariton's novel, one of the spiteful rejected suitors of Callirhoe, who tries by all means to convince Chaereas that his fiancé is unfaithful, orchestrates a plot (ὁ δημιουργὸς τοῦ δράματος, ὁ δὲ κακοήθης...συνέττατε τὴν σκηνήν) with the help of one of his sneaky parasites (παράσιτος στωμύλος) and a sidekick (ὑποκριτὴν ἕτερον). While the first takes care of Callirhoe's preferred servant, acting as if he loved her (ὑποκριτὴν ἔρωτος), the latter pretends to be a kindly disposed anonymous friend who 'confesses' to Chaereas that he has been the witness of Callirhoe's unfaithfulness. He arranges with Chaereas a meeting in order that the young man discovers the proof of his betrayal with his own eyes. That evening, Chaereas and the liar hide themselves near Callirhoe's house and watch the parasite play the part (ὑποκρινόμενος) of the lover who furtively sneaks into the house – presumably to encounter the girl. Chaereas, full of anger and jealousy, precipitates into the house and storms into Callirhoe's room. The girl recognises her beloved Chaereas and rushes to greet him, but he gives her a kick in the breast. She falls breathless to the ground, as if she was dead. While there are certain

[374] For the influence of the discourse on friendship upon the ancient Greek novel, see Holzmeister 2014, 52-70, and 53 explicitly about Chariton. However, in my opinion, she stresses too strongly the sole impact of Aristotle upon the ancient novel. The reception of Aristotelian ideals in friendship in the ancient novel, and more generally in imperial Greek prose, might be more complex and integrate thoughts of further philosophical schools as well as motifs of previous literary representations.

[375] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 44. The comparison in Charito 1.5.2, as has been argued, is also a way to give an epic tone to the novel (Ruiz-Montero 1994, 1017, Holzmeister 2014, 52-54). For an erotic interpretation of the allusion in Charito 1.5.2, see Sanz Morales/Laguna Mariscal 2003, Whitmarsh 2011, 259 ('at least suggestive'). Konstan, for his part, underlines the controversial nature of Achilles and Patroclus' friendship (Konstan 1997a, 37-42), but the friendship between Polycharmus and Chaereas in Chariton is definitely erotic (*ibid*., 117). There seems thus to be a tension between the interpretation of Achilles and Patroclus' friendship in the ancient novel and in other texts such as [Luc.] *Am*. 54 and the general judgement of the status of their friendship. In any case, in the imperial friendship-discourse, Achilles and Patroclus were the emblem of true friendship, as is the case in Plut. *De amic. mult.* 93E, Max.Tyr. 35.4, Them. 22.271b. For the non-erotic relationship between Achilles and Patroclus as (the) classic example of friendship, see Trapp 1997a, 278 n. 18.

similarities between both stories, there are also great differences. While both texts are about a parasite, or parasites plotting a nocturnal meeting to trick a desolate lover, the purpose and the precise events of the two stories differ. While in Chariton's novel, the young Chaereas is made to discover the supposed infidelity of his girlfriend, watching someone else entering his girl's home in the hope that he repudiates her, in Mnesippus' story, Deinias is himself the adulterer and has a meeting with a married woman. Infidelity is not an issue to him. Besides, the parasites are only interested in young Deinias' wealth here and associate with Chariclea to this end. Once they have what they wanted, they organise a nocturnal meeting at Chariclea's home, one could think to finally get rid of him, for Deinias is discovered by the husband, who somehow knows about the meeting, whereupon Deinias has to flee. Both texts also show an outburst of violence against the loved woman, but in Chariton's novel, Chaereas acts out of jealousy and gives one kick into his girl's breast, who nevertheless stays alive. In Mnesippus' story, Deinias kills the husband by accident with some sort of crowbar lying around while making his escape; he actually kills Chariclea in a frenzy, striking her a few times with the same bar and then giving her the final blow with her husband's sword. While Callirhoe truly carries Chaereas' child, Chariclea only pretends to be pregnant to strengthen her grip on Deinias, a motif which is a common trick in the business of 'being a courtesan', as has been seen.[376] Moreover, Ní Mheallaigh stresses the similar description of the parasite in Chariton and of Chariclea in Mnesippus' story as 'socially skilled in the art of discussion' (παράσιτος στωμύλος καὶ πάσης χάριτος ὁμιλητικῆς ἔμπλεως, Charito 1.4.1; ὑπὸ γυναικὸς καλῆς καὶ πρὸς ἡδονήν τε ὁμιλῆσαι ἐπισταμένης, §15.3).[377] In my opinion, the textual echo is not compelling, and the parallelism between the parasite and Chariclea is not evident.

Second, Ní Mheallaigh lists further similarities such as the use of drama metaphors to demonstrate that Mnesippus' story alludes to (this passage in) Chariton's novel. However, these 'coincidences' are not specific to Chariton. In Chariton's novel, there are many drama metaphors: the characters 'act' or 'behave like actors', and the episode is 'acted out' by the parasite. In Mnesippus' story too, the intrigues of the parasites are described by means of drama metaphors, as has been seen. These similarities, though, rather mean that both texts stress their relationship to drama, and in particular to comedy, from which they – maybe independently – borrow motifs.[378] For example, Ní Mheallaigh argues that the *gnōmē* according to which 'it is easy to catch someone if he believes to be loved', which is present in both texts, is a proof of Mnesippus' story alluding to Chariton's. In Mnesippus' story, gullible Deinias is tricked by 'making him believe that he is loved

[376] *Pace* Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 46.
[377] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 45.
[378] For the relationship between Chariton and comedy, see Billault 1991, 144-151, Ruiz-Montero 1994, 1020 (with further references), Brethes 2007, esp. 25-39. For the affinity of the ancient novel with comedy in general, see, e.g., Ruiz-Montero 1994, 1021-1022, Bowie 1995, 270, Höschele 2018, with further references and esp. 736, 740 for Charito and the present passage. For the motifs taken from comedy in Mnesippus' story, see below.

– a trick that is alluring, especially for those who believe to be handsome' (ἐρᾶσθαι νομίζοντας (ἐπαγωγότατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς καλοῖς εἶναι οἰομένοις), §13.6-7). In Chariton, a similar statement appears: the parasite could easily get to Callirhoe's maid, for 'a woman is an easy prey when she thinks that she is loved' (γυνὴ δὲ εὐάλωτόν ἐστιν, ὅταν ἐρᾶσθαι δοκῇ, Charito 1.4.2).[379] This gnomic statement, though, is not specific to Chariton. Rather, it seems to be a popular saying: 'any man in love is by nature easily led', says Menander (καὶ φύσει πως εὐάγωγόν ἐστι πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐρῶν, F 352 CAF [= F 290 Körte]).[380] The adjective ἐπαγωγότατον in §13.6 echoes Menander's εὐάγωγόν; there is no need of the intermediary of Chariton. Thus, Mnesippus' story might as well draw upon comedy independently from Chariton.

A third aspect, which Ní Mheallaigh uses to make Mnesippus' story allude to Chariton's novel, is the meta-literary aspect. She lists several expressions, which, according to her, function as intertextual markers that specifically indicate a reference to Chariton's novel in the *Toxaris*. First, Mnesippus introduces his story with the statement that the friendship between Agathocles and Deinias 'is famous among the Ionians' (ἀοίδιμον ἐν τοῖς Ἴωσι γενομένην, §12.4-5). This, she rightly stresses, is not only due to the context of Mnesippus' story, which is set in Ephesus, but 'the adjective [ἀοίδιμον], which denotes fame through song, or literary fame, invests the narrator's remark with a meta-literary dimension, flagging his story's affinity to Ionian narrative '.[381] The narratives that she has in mind are, for example, Aristides' *Milesiaca*, which are renowned for their erotic tales, and Xenophon's *Ephesiaca*, which are also partly located in Ephesus, but beyond that, she interprets the adjective as a specific allusion to Chariton's novel. On the one hand, a generic allusion to 'Ionian' tales with an erotic plot is plausible, for 'Ionian' seems to have had an erotic connotation in Graeco-Latin literature.[382] On the other hand, I am reluctant to see an allusion to a specific novel or to Chariton.

The reasons, which Ní Mheallaigh gives for such an allusion are the following. First, because Mnesippus' story alludes to Chariton's novel throughout his narration anyway – but the importance of these 'allusions' has just been reconsidered. Second, because it is (vaguely) located in Ionia and the 'farther Greek east' – but so are the other narratives, and 'Ionian' may simply signal 'erotic tale', as has just been said. She also names Chariton's explicit relationship with Ionia by means of his affirmative affiliation to Herodotean historiography in the first lines of his novel (Χαρίτων Ἀφροδισιεύς, Ἀθηναγόρου τοῦ ῥήτορος ὑπογραφεύς, πάθος ἐρωτικὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις γενόμενον διηγήσομαι, Charito 1.1.1). However, Herodotus is not exclusively a reference for Chariton, and not

[379] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 46. In her opinion, the fact alone that a gnomic statement appears in Mnesippus' story is a sign for the text alluding to Chariton. It is maybe the only gnomic statement in the *Toxaris*, but I do not think, on the other hand, that gnomic statements are distinctively and exclusively 'Charitonian'.
[380] For proverbial sayings in Lucian, see Rein 1894, Bompaire 1958, 405-424. See more recently Tomassi 2011b.
[381] See Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 47.
[382] For the *Milesiaca*, see at least Bowie 2013. For the parallelism of Mnesippus' story and these short erotic stories, see Tagliabue 2015, 16 with nn. 72-73 for further references on the *Milesiaca* and *Sybaritica*.

the exclusive reference for Chariton either, because he also uses characters and events from Thucydides' *Historiae*. The ancient novel characteristically takes the shape of historiography and the practice of referring to a historiographical tradition is inherent in any of these narratives, historiographical and novelistic alike – though for other purposes; particularly Herodotus and his *mirabilia* are an adequate model to refer to for a text that builds upon paradoxical plausibility.[383] Indeed, while Chariton opens his 'histories' and their subject, which is a form of γενομένον, in the way Herodotus does, Mnesippus' ἀοίδιμον ἐν τοῖς Ἴωσι γενομένην echoes the historian, too, rather than the novelist. Research in the Thesaurus indicates that the expression ἐν ... ἀοίδιμος γενομένος is typically Herodotean.[384] The 'Ionian' narratives might as well allude to Herodotus' *Historiae*, considering that Mnesippus presents himself as a historiographer as well (ὁπόσα ἂν λέγω πρὸς σὲ ἢ αὐτὸς εἰδὼς ἢ παρ' ἄλλων ὁπόσον οἷόν τε ἦν δι' ἀκριβείας ἐκπυνθανόμενος ἐρεῖν, §12.1-3).[385] Finally, Ní Mheallaigh's third argument is that, in Mnesippus' story, there are 'multiple references' to Chariton. The expressions ἄμφω γὰρ λέγεται (§17.2) and ἤδη γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα διεβεβόητο (§17.16-17), she argues, 'draw attention to the story's currency, reinforcing its status as a narrative that is *well-known*'.[386] 'On a metaliterary level', it would function as an 'Alexandrian footnote' and, according to her interpretation, stress the fact that the story is well-known throughout Ionia and therefore alludes to Chariton. In my opinion, this is rather unconvincing. If the verb διεβεβόητο references 'the story's currency', does not necessarily allude to Charito, and the expression ἄμφω γὰρ λέγεται more likely refers to the historiographical jargon and its discourse of authentication.[387]

Beyond the fact that the phrase ἀοίδιμον ἐν τοῖς Ἴωσι γενομένην generally alludes to 'Ionian' (erotic) narratives and reminds us that Mnesippus' story is historiographical, the meaning of ἀοίδιμος, when stressing that it belongs to the word family of ἀείδω, is 'famous through *song*', that is, through poetry.[388] In the present dialogue, this recalls the Greek exemplary friendships, which, as Toxaris mentions in §10.3-6, the poets of old 'celebrated in beautiful verses and metres' (τοὺς ποιητὰς παρεχόμενοι τὴν Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρόκλου φιλίαν καὶ τὴν Θησέως καὶ Πειρίθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑταιρείαν ἐν καλλίστοις ἔπεσι καὶ μέτροις ῥαψῳδοῦντας). Thereby, the adjective ἀοίδιμον parallels Mnesippus' first story with these *moral and literary predecessors* and emphasises the paradigmatic value of his own story of friendship as both a moral and literary (contemporary)

[383] For tradition in historiography, see Marincola 1997, 12-19. For the issue of plausibility in the ancient novel and historiography, see Morgan 1993, esp. 196-215 and 205 for Chariton and Herodotus.
[384] See Hdt. 2.79.2 (ὅς περ ἔν τε Φοινίκῃ ἀοίδιμός ἐστι καὶ ἐν Κύπρῳ καὶ ἄλλῃ), 2.135.5 (τῇ οὔνομα ἦν Ἀρχιδίκη ἀοίδιμος ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐγένετο). See also the similar construction in D.H. 1.4.1 (τῆς ἀοιδίμου γενομένης καθ' ἡμᾶς πόλεως). See also Schmid I, 321 s.v. ἀοίδιμος, which he considers *per se* poetic and Herodotean.
[385] For the oath, see above, §§10-12.3. For historiography in Mnesippus' first story, see below in this chapter.
[386] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 47 (her emphasis).
[387] If διεβεβόητο references anything, it rather (incidentally) reminds us of περιβόητον in the moral anecdote reported by Plutarch, which, as has been argued, not only exhibits analogies with Mnesippus' story and the virtues it illustrates, but is also a *moral* example. For the affiliation to a historiographical discourse, see below.
[388] See LSJ s.v. I and Chantraine 1968, s.v. ἀείδω p. 22.

example.[389] The paradigmatic moral value of the story, as has been seen, generally conforms to Classical Greek or generally Hellenic ideals of friendship. The new paradigmatic aesthetic value which Mnesippus' story pretends to exhibit has as its models not only comedy, but also historiography (or rather both together).

In summary, all this is not to deny that there are similarities between Chariton's novel and Mnesippus' first story. However, these similarities are not specific.[390] All that they might indicate is that Mnesippus' story shares with the ancient novel the aesthetics of ποικιλία, particularly the *mixis* of historiography and comedy, and that it uses similar strategies of authentication for a story that would be qualified as ἄπιστα if Mnesippus had not sworn an oath.[391] Instead of searching for a single intertextual model (Chariton) that Mnesippus' story would parody along with the latter's concerns for hetero- and homosexual love, it is more fruitful to consider the story within the context of ancient discourse on friendship and with regard to its own relationship with 'paradigmatic' texts – in the present case, texts belonging to comedy and historiography.

The Question of Authority: Enhancing the Value of the Story

Throughout his narration, Mnesippus indicates that he follows the rules of historiographical enquiry. For example, Mnesippus underlines the reliability of his story and the fact that he has exact knowledge of the events. He does this by stressing that the events 'happened not long ago', and that 'Agathocles probably died on Gyaros only about five years ago' (οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ ἐγένετο, §12.6, οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ γενόμενον· ἔτη γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ πέντε ἤδη διελήλυθεν ἀφ' οὗ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐν Γυάρῳ ἀπέθανεν, §18.12-14). Thereby Mnesippus signals that the events that he relates are recent; this conforms to the rules of the contest (§10.7) and reflects the idea that contemporary historiography is more reliable.[392] The parenthetical ἄμφω γὰρ λέγεται (§17.3) is typical of the historiographers' jargon and serves to demonstrate careful but inconclusive analysis of the events.[393] Then, Mnesippus integrates pieces of information that only serve the purpose of rendering his story more plausible such as the notice that 'there happened to be a wooden bar lying nearby,' which Deinias has to grasp in order to knock down the husband and Chariclea (μοχλόν τινα πλησίον κείμενον, §17.6). The aim of such a procedure is to present to his opponent a valid example of friendship that conforms to the rules of the contest.

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[389] Compare Marquis, 490 n. 39, who explains the necessity that Agathocles and Deinias' friendship is 'famous in Ionia' in that, first, it confers authenticity to the story ('real people' know it). Second, and more importantly in my opinion, because 'si cette amitié est "célèbre", c'est qu'elle est perçue comme *modèle*, et donc qu'elle mérite de figurer parmi les exemples d'amitié exceptionnelle qui sont requis' (my emphasis).

[390] Compare Bowersock 1994, 45, who considers that the stories in the *Toxaris* 'reflect the literary tastes of which Chariton is a prime example', as Ní Mheallaih 2014, 46 n. 29 herself cites.

[391] For historiography in the ancient novel, see Morgan 1982, Hägg 1987, Fusillo 1989, 57-68, Hunter 1994.

[392] See above, §§10-12.

[393] The possibility that the husband returns home and finds out about Deinias' presence there is presented either as a hazard or as part of a plan. In the latter case, the husbands' knowledge about his wife's intrigues might suggest that he is her accomplice and considers her tricks to be a profitable source of income, see Konstan 1993, 9-10. Compare Marquis, 338 n. 58 (the situation is ambiguous).

However, this does not prevent Toxaris from discrediting Mnesippus' story, as he expresses his doubts about the credibility of the latter's story; bound to the oath, though, he is forced to accept it as a valid story (καὶ εἴθε γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ἀνώμοτος ὢν ταῦτα ἔλεγες, ἵνα καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἂν ἐδυνάμην αὐτοῖς, §18.15-16). When Toxaris then relates the incredible nature of Mnesippus' story with the moral quality of his future examples (πλὴν οὐ δέδια μή τινα καὶ ἄλλον ὅμοιον εἴπῃς αὐτῷ, §17-18), it becomes clear that his issues with the credibility of Mnesippus' example are essentially issues of the right representation of virtue, that is, of measure of praise. Remarkably, his expressions of doubt do not invalidate Mnesippus' example of friendship (or rather of a friend), for Toxaris accepts the character of Agathocles as a convincing ideal friend (οὕτω Σκυθικόν τινα φίλον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τοῦτον διηγήσω, §18.16-17). Then, by approving the example in this way, Toxaris underlines the Scythian-ness of Agathocles; one may ask what precisely it is that Toxaris finds so positively Scythian about Agathocles. Of course, Agathocles exemplifies the ideal of trustfulness in friendship (πίστις), a virtue, which, as will be seen, is also exemplified in Toxaris' stories. But taking Agathocles as a potential Scythian friend legitimates raising the question of whether Toxaris' Scythian friends are similarly exaggerated examples of virtue.

Conclusion

Mnesippus' first story combines and develops traditional anecdotes and moral principles in friendship into a comedy-like piece of historiography, which exposes its aesthetics of transformation and its value as a (new) example. Interestingly, it is an example rooted in New Comedy, a 'new' set of exemplary texts compared to Lucianic or contemporary literary practices. Thereby, the *Toxaris* integrates and develops not only less explored geographical regions, but also less explored literary provinces into its *corpus*. Then, the profusion of references to drama and the world of theatre explicates a relationship with comedy for a specific aim that goes beyond the metaliterary scope. Creating a comedic atmosphere underlines the Greekness of Mnesippus' story, at least in Toxaris' eyes, who associates Greekness with theatre performance – especially for its connotation of 'vanity' and 'superficiality'. In §9, Toxaris already commented on the Greeks' lack of seriousness in friendship by comparing their loyalty to their philosophical ideals with the comedians' empty masks and by using metaphors of drama (esp. ὑμῖν ἐκποδὼν ἀποπτάμεναι αἱ πολλαὶ ἐκεῖναι τραγῳδίαι, τοῖς κενοῖς τούτοις καὶ κωφοῖς προσωπείοις ἐοικότας ὑμᾶς ἀπολιποῦσαι *κτλ.*, §9.18-20).[394] In §§35.14-36.5, Toxaris regards Mnesippus' 'vulgar' and 'common' examples as child's play compared to the Scythian friendships (or stories?). Second, the motifs and language of comedy, which are well present in Mnesippus' story, create a dissonance with regard to Agathocles' virtue and contrast his seriousness. Mnesippus presents a story of exemplary friendship, which Toxaris readily accepts as such, but by reading between the lines, it seems that he exaggerates his praise of the virtue of his example. The fact that Mnesippus uses rhetorical strategies to make the events that he narrates appear

[394] See above, §§1-9, 'Barbarians and Greeks'.

plausible, which aims at demonstrating against the evidence that he is not overdoing the virtue of his example, precisely – and ironically – achieves the opposite. Paradoxically, his tactics point to the overpraised nature of his description, a paradox which the obviously poetic-dramatic language and subject of his story only intensify.

§§19-21 Mnesippus' Second Story: Risking One's Life for a Friend Who Is the Victim of an Accident

Summary of the Story

Mnesippus' second story is about Euthydicus from Chalcis. This story was told to him by Simylus, a Megarian, the captain[395] of the ship which Euthydicus and his Chalcidean friend Damon sailed with on Italy to Athens (§19.2-9). The weather was fair, but by the time they reached Zacynthus, a heavy storm arose (§19.10-16). Damon, who was not in good health, got seasick and somehow fell overboard, drowning and crying for help (§19.17-22). Euthydicus heard his screams and jumped into the water to succour him (§20.1-4). The others on the ship were unable to reach them because of the storm, but cast pieces of cork and a plank in the hope that this might save the two friends from drowning (§20.5-9). The captain's narration ends here (§21.5-7), but Mnesippus later learned that the friends were able to save themselves, for they swam across the cork and the plank and finally landed on the island of Zacynthus (§21.7-12). At the time of Mnesippus' narration in the dialogue, they are living together in Athens (§21.4-5).

The Friends Euthydicus and Damon

Mnesippus' second story is a further example that illustrates the act of giving assistance to a friend. This time, the friend is in peril of death, and Euthydicus gives assistance at the risk of losing his own life. As in Mnesippus' first story, the virtue in friendship is exemplified in one of the friends only, so that Mnesippus' story illustrates an exemplary friend and not an exemplary friendship. In the present story, Euthydicus is the paradigmatic friend around which the story evolves, as is evident from the beginning, for he is named in the first line, as if his name was the title of the story (ἄκουε τοίνυν καὶ ἄλλον, ὦ Τόξαρι, Εὐθύδικον τὸν Χαλκιδέα, §19.1). By contrast, his friend Damon, who is only mentioned five lines later, is clearly defined as the secondary character (μετ' ἀυτοῦ Δάμωνα ... ἑταῖρον αὐτοῦ, §19.6). Although the two friends are the same age (ἡλικιώτας δὲ εἶναι, §19.6), there are significant differences between them here as well. These do not regard virtue, as in Mnesippus' first story, but, rather, their physical constitution. There could not be a greater discrepancy between Euthydicus' strong and stout constitution (τὸν μὲν Εὐθύδικον ἐρρωμένον καὶ καρτερόν, §19.7) and

[395] The meaning of ναύκληρος is not exactly that of 'captain' (cf. LSJ s.v. I.1. 'shipowner', 2. 'skipper', 3. 'captain'). Rather, it seems to have been someone in charge of the freight, the trading routes and the persons aboard a ship, for example. See Marquis, 501-502 n. 75 with further bibliography. For want of any exact translation for this word, and believing that, in this case, a historically inaccurate translation does not alter the interpretation of Mnesippus' narrative, I decided to retain the meaning of 'captain'.

Damon's extremely poor health and pitiful appearance (τὸν δὲ Δάμωνα ὕπωχρον καὶ ἀσθενικόν, ἄρτι ἐκ νόσου μακρᾶς, ὡς ἐδόκει, ἀνιστάμενον, §19.8-9).

Thus, the ideals of friendship that are illustrated here – goodwill (εὔνοια), faithfulness (βεβαιότης), spirit of sacrifice (dying with his friend, even fearing to die after him: δεδιότα μὴ προαπολεῖται αὐτοῦ ὁ Δάμων, §20.17) – all refer to Euthydicus' achievements: jumping into a raging sea to save his friend and thus risking his life. Mnesippus makes this explicit when he interrupts his narration for a praise of Euthydicus' worth: there is 'no demonstration of one's goodwill towards a friend that would be more reliable' (ἐπίδειξιν ... εὐνοίας βεβαιοτέραν, §20.10-11) than 'sharing death' with him (ἢ κοινωνήσας τοῦ θανάτου, §20.12).

The motif that illustrates these ideals is as common as the ideals themselves. The motif of the sea-storm and the friend's rescue (no matter whether it fails or succeeds) appears in a few different contexts. One of these contexts, which has been emphasised considerably in relationship with the *Toxaris*, is the ancient Greek novel, and in particular Xenophon of Ephesus, in a passage where he tells of a lover (Hippothous) who is unable to rescue his beloved (Hyperanthes) who has fallen into the sea during a storm (3.2.12).[396] However, in the *Toxaris*, there is no strong indication that the text alludes to this passage at all or exclusively – and it is even less likely that it hints at homoerotic love: in Mnesippus' second story, the rather few semantic echoes are not reinforced by any erotic allusion either (εὐτυχῶς ὁ πλοῦς/εὐτυχῶς διαπλεῦσαι, §19.10, κουφοτέραν τὴν νῆξιν/συγκουφίζειν, §20.4). More appropriately, Euthydicus' rescue of Damon is to be regarded as a variation on the *topos* of 'dying together with one's friend' in the discourse on friendship.[397] Finally, the 'asymmetry' between Damon and Euthydicus, that is, their difference in strength and physical constitution as well as their respective role in the relationship (passive for the rescued Damon and active for the rescuing Euthydicus), does not symbolise an homoerotic relationship, as has been affirmed, but, rather, aims at highlighting the virtue of Euthydicus and showcasing *him* as *the* memorable example of a good friend.[398]

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[396] See Pervo 1997, 168-169, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 49-50. However, in my opinion, the comparison with Xenophon of Ephesus' narrative of the unlucky homosexual couple Hippothous and Hyperanthes is not a sufficient proof for the interpretation of Euthydicus and Damon's relationship as amorous. For homoerotic love and the motif of the rescue from shipwreck in X.Eph. 3.2.4, see Konstan 1994a, 26-27.

[397] See Introduction, 'Friendship'.

[398] Thus, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 50 interprets this 'asymmetry' as a hint at their homoerotic relationship, which, in my opinion, is not supported by the text. A further motif of friendship present in Mnesippus' story is that of spending time together, in the present case philosophising (ἐσώθησαν, καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν εἰσιν Ἀθήνησιν ἄμφω φιλοσοφοῦντες, §21.4-5). Cf. Arist. *EN* 1172a3-5, where philosophising is one of the examples of activities that friends ideally engage in together in order to nurture their relationship. Neither is this image an allusion to the erotic relationship between an (older) philosopher-teacher and his (younger) pupil, *pace* Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 50-51. If male relationships of friendship might sometimes be ambivalently interpreted as heroic-masculine or homoerotic, as is the case with Achilles and Patroclus, this does not hold true for the present example. For this issue, see Introduction, 'Friendship', and above §§12-18.

Mnesippus' Narration I: Enhancing his Example

Mnesippus enhances the virtues of Euthydicus first by contrasting his physical constitution and acts of bravura with Damon's weakness and lack of heroism – throwing up into the sea (ναυτιάσαντα τὸν Δάμωνα ἐμεῖν, §19.17) is anything but glorious, and it is even a motif one may associate with comedy (but see also *AP* 7.625). Second, Mnesippus rhetorically magnifies Euthydicus' virtues by employing an emphatic language of praise, and he validates his example by underlining the plausibility of his narrative. At this point in the story, where the fate of the friends seems very insecure, Mnesippus summarises the account of his eyewitness, the captain of the ship, emphasising the value of his example in the light of the dangers incurred (§20.10-19). By way of a rhetorical question and an apostrophe to the gods, Mnesippus accentuates the uniqueness and outstanding nature of his example (ἥντινα ἄν τις ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐπιδείξαιτο ...; §20.10-11). Then, he describes the storm, focussing on the fury of the sea and the anguish of the characters (§20.13-15), and he enumerates the dangers incurred by the friends, foregrounding the most thrilling moments such as Damon's distress when he is almost drowning (ἀποπνιγόμενον ἐκεῖνον καὶ μόγις ἀνακύπτοντα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγοντα τῷ ἑταίρῳ, §20.15-16) and Euthydicus' brave act of rescue (τὸν δὲ ἐπιπηδῶντα εὐθὺς καὶ συννέοντα καὶ δεδιότα μὴ προαπόληται αὐτοῦ ὁ Δάμων, §20.16-18). Besides, one might consider that describing the ladder or plank for disembarking that those on the ship throw to the friends as οὐ μακράν (§20.9), as Macleod writes in place of οὐ μικράν, which is transmitted by all manuscripts and printed by all editors, preannounces Mnesippus' propensity for exalting the description of the events. (The transmitted reading, however, is equally interesting from a rhetorical perspective, for it enhances the plausibility of the story, and as there is no reason for conjecture, attractive as it may be, it is best to reject Macleod's correction as unnecessary or perhaps as a spelling mistake.) Finally, Mnesippus stresses the worth of Euthydicus' friendship by means of the litotes οὐκ ἀγεννῆ and the demonstrative adjective τοῦτον (§20.18). Both adjectives, which are predicative, refer to Euthydicus but also implicate the narration itself in the praise (διηγησάμην, the verb of which Euthydicus is the object, §20.19), as if Euthydicus appeared noble and praiseworthy by virtue of the narration (which is actually the case). The fact that the deeds of friendship somehow coincide with their narration is hinted at when Mnesippus says that no better demonstration of friendship could be shown than Euthydicus' deeds (above, §20.10-11); the expression he uses, ἐπίδειξιν ἐπιδείξαιτο (noticeably, an emphatic *figura etymologica*), is ambivalent, for it refers to both the actual demonstration of friendship through deeds and the verbal demonstration of these deeds.

A further rhetorical strategy that Mnesippus implicitly brings into play in order to assert the validity of his story and example consists in drawing attention to the plausibility of his narrative. Thus, Mnesippus has learned about Euthydicus' achievements and the whole adventure through first-hand testimony by the captain of the ship, who even made an oath to tell only what he has seen himself (διηγεῖτο δέ μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ Σιμύλος ὁ ναύκληρος ὁ Μεγαρικός, ἐπομοσάμενος ἢ μὴν αὐτὸς

ἑωρακέναι τὸ ἔργον, §19.2-3).[399] Indeed, for the events the captain could not have seen, Mnesippus explicitly relies on the accounts of further eyewitnesses, acquaintances of Euthydicus (τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Εὐθύδικον αὐτοὶ διηγοῦνται, §21.7-8). Then, Mnesippus – or rather the captain of the ship whose story he reports in indirect speech *modo Herodoti* – includes details that do not have any other purpose than to make the story appear credible. For example, the fact that Damon had his clothes on (§19.20, emphasised by way of litotes: οὐδὲ γυμνόν), while Euthydicus was lying naked in his sleeping place when the accident happened (τυχεῖν δὲ γυμνὸν ἐν τῇ εὐνῇ ὄντα, §20.1), explains, in addition to the difference in constitution, why Damon was drowning so easily whereas Euthydicus could keep his own and Damon's heads above water for so long. Mnesippus also reports how his informant, the captain of the ship, indicated that the moon was shining on the sea (φαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐπὶ πολὺ ταῦτα τῆς σελήνης καταλαμπούσης, §20.2-3), thus making plausible that he could have witnessed the scene of the drowning and subsequent rescue. The anodyne detail is necessary. Without the information that the moon was shining, the informant would have been unable to see the events, and Mnesippus' example would lose value due to a lack of credibility. Noticeably, the detail of the moon reminds us of Thucydides' description of the nocturnal battle at Epipolae (7.44.1-2).[400] Mnesippus' source draws a similar connection between moonlight, visibility and its repercussion on the reliability of the account of the events, and he uses the detail of the moonlight to make his narrative appear plausible, and enhance the validity and authority of his story. Considering the constant highlighting of on the fact that the events happened at night (περὶ μέσας νύκτας, §19.17, ἐν νύκτι, §20.11, τὴν νύκτα, §20.14, τῆς νυκτός, §21.6, ἐν νυκτί, §21.7), the information even proves to be crucial with regard to the plausibility of the story,

Mnesippus' Narration II: Aiming at Effects

In Mnesippus' second story, the focus on visibility is also related to a different form of visualisation, the *enargeia* of the narration, which is obviously employed as a means of enhancing the example of the virtuous friend. The fact that the narration aspires to vividness is made explicit when Mnesippus exalts the dangers incurred by Euthydicus and asks Toxaris to 'look' at them (καί μοι ἐπ' ὀφθαλμῶν λαβέ, §20.13). The expression clearly alludes to the concept of the mental visualisation of a verbal

[399] According to precepts in historiography, autopsy is thought to particularly underline the reliability of an account. See above, §§10-12.

[400] In the text: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ σαφέστερα μέν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις οἶδεν· ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίᾳ …, πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ᾔδει; ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά, ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνῃ εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι. ('For what happens during thenday, those attending the events know more clearly, but even then, they do not know everything but hardly what happens next to each of them. During a night-battle, on the contrary, […] how could one possibly see anything clearly? Indeed, a bright moon was shining, and they could see each other as is usually possible in the moonlight: as mere appearance of a body, but they would distrust recognising anyone familiar.') This intertextual relationship weakens the argument in favour of an allusion to Ach.Tat. 3.1-5 in the *Toxaris*. For the allusion to Achilles Tatius, see Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 51.

description (φαντασία).[401] Thus, Mnesippus directly relates the potential for visualisation of his narration to the comprehensibility of the moral value of his examples: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάθοις ὡς οὐκ ἀγεννῆ σοι καὶ τοῦτον φίλον τὸν Εὐθύδικον διηγησάμην (§20.18-19). Significantly, Mnesippus asks Toxaris to visualise not only the actions (ἀποπνιγόμενον, ἀνακύπτοντα, τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγοντα, ἐπιπηδῶντα, συννέοντα) but also the sounds (τὸν ἦχον τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπικλωμένου) and the characters' emotions (τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν). Integrating acoustic and emotional aspects into the narration confers a multisensory dimension on it and involves the (intra- and extra-dialogical) recipients in the narration.

This impression of emotional exaltation is reinforced in a few ways, for example by means of dramatic elements. Noticeable, in these regards, is the prominent role of chance or hazard (τυχεῖν, §20.1, περιτύχοιεν, §20.9, Damon and Euthydicus are 'miraculously saved' – ἐκ παραλόγου σωτηρία, §21.2, as a question in the text), which is a key narrative mechanism in drama.[402] Then, the fact that the story deals with emotions is pointed out when Damon is described as 'miserable' and 'pitiful' (ἄθλιον, §19.21), and when his and Euthydicus' misfortune induces a reaction of pity in those who remained on the ship, for they are said to 'pity the catastrophe' (ἐλεεῖν τὴν συμφοράν, §20.5). The reaction of the intradiegetic characters in a way even prefigures the reaction of pity – and fear – of the extradiegetic, intra-dialogical character Toxaris. Indeed, after Mnesippus' emphatic description of the accident and Euthydicus' efforts to rescue his friend, Toxaris asks whether they drowned or were saved, for 'he fears for them beyond limits' (ὡς ἔγωγε οὐ μετρίως δέδοικα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, §21.2-3). Toxaris' emotions of fear reach hyperbolic levels by means of the litotes οὐ μετρίως. With regard to the effects of Mnesippus' narration, his expression of fear also acknowledges the effect of suspense that results from Mnesippus' emphatic and encomiastic appendix (§20.10-19), which functions as a retardation.

One final aspect that might contribute to amplifying the narration is the use of poetic words. For example, in the description of the tempest (καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τί ἄν τις λέγοι, τρικυμίας τινὰς καὶ στροβίλους καὶ χαλάζας καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα χειμῶνος κακά; §19.12-14), the words τρικυμίας, στροβίλους and χαλάζας have a rather poetical connotation.[403] Besides, their effect is heightened by means of their polysyndetic enumeration and the rhetorical question τί ἄν τις λέγοι;, which functions almost as a *praeteritio*. In addition, the following expressions are poetic as well: περὶ δύσιν Πλειάδος (§19.4)

[401] For the concept, see Goldhill 1994, 208-214, Elsner 1995, 26-27, Webb 1997a, 113-121, *ead*. 1997b, 231-234, *ead*. 2009, *passim*, Manieri 1998. Interestingly, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 54 notices a parallel in the custom that survivors of shipwreck place paintings as votive offering in temples. She suggests that, by stressing the visual aspect, 'Lucian has such shipwreck paintings in mind ', as seems to be the case in *Merc.Cond*. 1.

[402] And in other 'dramatic narratives', such as Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, where the narrator frequently refers to the narrative/the events as δρᾶμα (e.g. 2.28.1).

[403] See Schmid I, 349 (τρικυμία), 374 (στρόβιλος, although categorised as 'late Greek', but see Ar. *Pax* 864 and *Nu*. 1127). χάλαζα is also found in prose, but see Hom. *Il*. 10.6, 15.170, 22.151, Sol. F 9.1, Pi. *I*. 7.27 (metaphorical sense), S. *OC* 1503, E. *Tr*. 78, Ar. *Ra*. 852, A.R. 2.1083, *Adespota novae comoediae* F 255.12 CGFPR (and τρικυμία l. 11). For τρικυμία in ancient narratives, see Ní Mhellaigh 2014, 51-53, who compares the present passage with Antonius Diogenes (P. Dub. C3, Col. II, ll. 39-41) and Ach.Tat. 3.2.5. In my opinion, these storm descriptions are not specifically 'novelistic.'

for ‘midnight’; the words πέλαγος (§19.20) and κλύδωνος (§19.22), which are concentrated in a few lines; the verb περιζέοντα (§20.14); and, finally, the adverb εὐμαρῶς (§21.11).[404]

§§22-23 Mnesippus’ Third Story: Two Friends’ Sacrifice for a Third Friend

Summary of the Story

Mnesippus’ third story is about the trio of friends Eudamidas, Aretaeus, both of Corinth, and Charixenus of Sicyon (§22.3-5). Upon his death, the penniless Eudamidas leaves as a legacy his old mother to care for to the one friend and his daughter to give in marriage to the other (§22.5-13). Notwithstanding the oddity of his last will and testament, the richer friends Aretaeus and Charixenus accept its terms. Eventually, when Charixenus dies five months later, Aretaeus takes care of both the old mother and the daughter’s dowry (§§22.13-23.8).

The Friends and the Representation of Their Friendship

This story likewise enacts some form of asymmetrical friendship, as the friends are of unequal wealth: Eudamidas is very poor (πενέστατος αὐτὸς ὤν, §22.4-5), whereas Aretaeus and Charixenus are affluent (εὐπόροις, §22.4).[405] This socio-economic inequality becomes particularly significant in the affair of Eudamidas’ last will and testament, where Aretaeus and Charixenus inherit his expenses – and where Aretaeus eventually assumes all responsibilities. This creates a disparity in the distribution of the deeds of friendship. By means of his last will and testament, Eudamidas only burdens his friends with additional responsibilities and benefits, as it were, from their wealth and goodwill, while Aretaeus and Charixenus prove themselves to be true friends by accepting the imposed obligation willingly, that is, immediately (ὡς ἤκουσαν, ἦκον εὐθὺς διαιτῶντες τὰ ἐκ τῶν διαθηκῶν, §23.1-2, emphatically with alliterations in ηκ- and δια-).[406] This disparity is articulated in the reaction of those cognisant of the affair, who all laugh at the enormity of the service requested (καὶ οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελῶν ἀπηλλάττετο, §22.16). They apparently consider the last will and testament to be absurd, because they comment on the case with biting irony: Aretaeus and Charixenus are regarded as disadvantaged in comparison to Eudamidas, who, though being dead while his friends are still alive, actually becomes the one who inherits from his friends’ wealth (§22.17-19). As a consequence of this disparity, and in a similar way as in Mnesippus’ preceding stories, this story emphasises the quality of two of the friends rather than that of their trio of friends.[407] For example, a formulation

[404] See Schmid I, 328 (ἐπιζέω and e.g. S. *Tr*. 840, E. *Cyc*. 392, *Hec*. 583, *IT* 987, Ar. *Ach*. 321, *Th*. 468), 330 (εὐμαρής and for the adverb, see A. F 366.2 TrGF, B. 5.195, A.R. 2.633, 3.624), 335 (κλύδων). The noun πέλαγος might also be considered to have a poetic connotation, cf., e.g., Hom. *Il*. 14.16, *Od*. 3.91 and *passim*, *h.Ap*. 73, A. *Ag*. 659, *Pers*. 433, 867, *Pr*. 746, *Supp*. 470, B. 3.4, 77, frequently in E., Ar. *Av*. 350, Men. F 65.6, 536.6 CAF, Call. *Del*. 36, 168, 192, frequently in A.R.

[405] Cf. Pervo 1997, 169.

[406] Possible etymologies of διαιτάω are διά and *ιτάω (LSJ s.v. II.5) or διά and *αἰτάω or -αιτάομαι (Chantraine 1968, s.v. δίαιτα). In any case, the suffix διά is strong.

[407] However, their three names (Eudamidas, Aretaeus and Charixenus) equally hint at positive moral qualities. Cf. Marquis, 343 n. 93.

such as ἦν δέ τι ἄτερος … πάθῃ, καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου μερίδα ... ἐχέτω ὁ ἕτερος (§22.12-13), which applies to Aretaeus and Charixenus, noticeably echoes the topical idea of perfect friendships as an *alter ego* relationship in which the two friends are part and parcel of one and the same entity (e.g. ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν, Arist. *EN* 1170b6, cf. *EN* 1166a31, 1169b6; καὶ τὸ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν φίλον καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἑταῖρον ὡς ἕτερον, Plut. *De amic. mult*. 93E; cf. [verus amicus] est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem, Cic. *Amic*. 21.80).[408]

In particular, however, it is Aretaeus who is represented as the paradigmatic friend of this story. This is clear from Mnesippus' terms of praise (ὁ δὲ Ἀρισταῖος ἄριστος κληρονόμων γενόμενος, §23.3-4 with a pun on his 'perfect' name; ὁ Αρεταῖος οὗτος, §23.9) and his judgement of the story as 'perfect': ἆρα φαῦλον παράδειγαμα φιλίας παρασχῆσθαι [...] ἢ τίθεμεν καὶ τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς τελείαις ψήφοις μίαν τῶν πέντε εἶναι; (§23.9-12). His judgement is expressed emphatically in a rhetorical question (ἆρα) and alludes to a judicial or otherwise public context of decision-making (the ψήφοις are the pebbles used in voting, but see also the expression παράδειγμα [...] παρασχῆσθαι).[409] Aretaeus' prominence in friendship can also be observed in the way Mnesippus highlights his exemplary moral behaviour. As if it were not enough to fulfil the obligations of the last will and testament, Aretaeus zealously gives his friend's daughter in marriage by setting a huge dowry – the same amount of money, two talents, as he gives to his own daughter – and by symbolically giving the two daughters in marriage on the same day, as he 'thought it worthy' (ἠξίωσε, §23.8, a verb with a strong moral connotation).

However, the way Mnesippus exhibits Aretaeus' deeds of friendship seems hyperbolic. Besides, one may question the real usefulness of Aretaeus' sacrifice and the validity of this example of friendship – after all, the whole affair is explicitly described as nonsense by some laughing audience.

Toxaris' Evaluation of the Friendship of Eudamidas, Aretaeus and Charixenus

In §22.15, Mnesippus explains that those who heard of the last will and testament disregarded it and laughed at it because they were not aware of the friendship among the three – something he already insinuates in §22.5-7, when he comments that anyone would find the last will and testament ludicrous (γελοίους, §22.6), except Toxaris, who is 'a good man who worships friendship and contends for the first prize therein' (ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ φιλίαν τιμῶντι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πρωτείων ἁμιλλωμένῳ, §22.6-7, not without a certain sarcasm, though). Thus, as Mnesippus presents it, only those 'initiated' in the virtues of friendship such as Toxaris – and, story by story, perhaps the recipients, too – understand the actual meaning of the last will and testament. As a matter of fact, Toxaris interprets

[408] For further passages, see Bohnenblust 1905, 39-40. See Introduction, 'Introduction', and below, §53.5-13.
[409] See LSJ s.v. ψῆφος 5.a-c. Cf. the similar juridical expression παρέχομαι τεκμήρια; see LSJ s.v. παρέχω II and Rh. vol. 7, p. 453, l. 19 and p. 510, l. 1, Lib. *Or*. 34.27. For the expression in a moral context, see, however, e.g. X. *Cyr*. 8.1.39, D.H. 5.65.1, D.Chr. 43.15, [Plut.] *De liberis educandis* 14A6, Luc. *Demon*. 3, Aristid. p. 63.22 Jebb.

the affair of the last will and testament as a successful test of friendship, for, according to him, the story demonstrates Eudamidas' absolute confidence in the value and reliability of Aretaeus and Charixenus (τοῦ θάρσους ὃ εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις, §23.14). Toxaris then goes as far as to hypothesise a relationship of reciprocity between Eudamidas and his friends, for, so his supposition, Eudamidas would have done 'something similar' (τὰ ὅμοια, §23.15) for his friends (§23.14-17), which would establish the condition for a balanced exchange of services of friendship. However, this consideration remains purely hypothetical (note the use of the *irrealis* in καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν τὰ ὅμοια ἔπραξεν, §23.15), because a relationship of reciprocity is truly impossible, considering that even if Eudamidas were thus minded, the fact is that he is poor and cannot possibly act the same way as his friends do. Besides, as has been seen, the way Mnesippus presents it, the story is evidently not aimed at reciprocity.

Nevertheless, Toxaris' comment raises the question of a reciprocal friendship in Mnesippus' story. Thereby, the text not only contrasts two views on friendship (Toxaris' focus on reciprocity and Mnesippus' emphasis on the act of charitable support)[410], but also induces the recipients to reflect upon the issue of reciprocity, an aspect that Toxaris tends to take more to heart than Mnesippus (it is an aspect that is illustrated in his first and fifth stories, perhaps also in his fourth story). More generally, Toxaris' comment, and especially his use of a counterfactual construction and a concessive clause (καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν τὰ ὅμοια ἔπραξεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐν διαθήκαις ταῦτα ἐνεγέγραπτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἦκεν ἂν ἄγραφος κληρονόμος τῶν τοιούτων, §23.15-17), invites the recipients to speculate and form their own opinion about the actual moral value of Mnesippus' examples of friends. This aims at getting them actively involved in the contest and the evaluation of the friendship/friends.

Finally, Toxaris' comment also pinpoints the fact that Mnesippus' story is *not* about a perfect *friendship* and its obligatory need for (at least potential) reciprocity, but about an example of *a friend*.[411] Significantly, Mnesippus himself hints at such an understanding when he marks out Aretaeus as an example of friendship (παράδειγμα φιλίας, §23.10). This demonstrates that the dialogue constantly oscillates between the representation and the discussion of friendship/friends.

Validating the Praise of an Exemplary Friend

In order to give weight to his praise of this example of friendship, Mnesippus confers a historical dimension on his story by using the typical historiographical devices that are thought to enhance the authority of a narrative. Thus, he displays his exact knowledge of the events: he is able to reproduce the terms of the last will and testament word for word (§22.8-13); he knows the number of months that elapsed between the reading of the last will and testament and the death of Charixenus (five, §23.2) and the amount of money given as a dowry to the daughters (each of them receives two talents

[410] Compare Marquis, 344 n. 95 and 506 n. 96.
[411] For the question of (potential) reciprocity, see §§12-18 above.

from his fortune of five talents, §23.6-7).[412] What is more, according to the rules of Mnesippus and Toxaris' contest and in conformity with the historiographical principle that recent events are the base for a more reliable account, the story happened 'not long ago' (οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ, §23.5).

Reminiscences from Comedy and Moral Concerns

There are a few hints that Mnesippus' third story might be borrowing motifs from comedy, and he certainly alludes to a theatral mode of representation. Thus, there is a recurrent allusion to some sort of immediate recipients who are witnesses to the events. The mention of 'some people' (τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις, §22.5, οἱ...μὲν εἰδότες, §22.14, οὐδεὶς ὅστις, §22.16) might stand for an imagined audience or unnamed characters 'on stage'. Then, one finds a motif typically known from comedy, the motif of entrusting to one's true friend one's mother and daughter to take care of on one's deathbed is known at least from Terence's *Adelphoe* (vv. 455-8).[413] This sense of comedy-like action is underlined on a lexical level by means of the rather colloquial diminutive θυγάτριον (§22.11) and the compound verb γηροκομεῖν (§22.9).[414]

However, in comparison with Mnesippus' previous stories, the relationship with comedy – or drama more generally – is marked less strongly. Besides, there is an important element of drama that is definitely missing in his story: actions. The plot is summarised in the fulfilment of a last will and testament. As will be shown, this stands in contrast to Toxaris' third story, which, with its complex plot and subplots, abounds in actions (and deeds of friendship). By contrast, in Mnesippus' story, the moral aspect of Aretaeus' exemplary behaviour as a friend is the predominant theme. Both the lack of action and the difference from Toxaris' story induce the recipients to reflect on the relationship between moral behaviour and its verbal representation.

§§24-26 Mnesippus' Fourth Story: Helping a Friend in Need

Summary of the Story

This story is about Zenothemis and his friend Menecrates. They both live in Massilia as honoured and wealthy citizens. Due to a legislative misjudgement committed by Menecrates, the latter ends up in disgrace. Unfortunately, he has got an exceptionally ugly daughter in marriageable age to whom he cannot give an important dowry, and he is desperate to find her a husband (§24). Zenothemis

[412] Five is one of these symbolic or formulaic numbers in Lucian. Herodotus also uses symbolic numbers. For the 'formulaic' aspect of numbers in historiography, see Rubincam 1979, *ead*. 1991. This 'incongruous number-device' is also a favourite in Lucian's *VH*, and interestingly, in the *VH* as in this part of the *Toxaris*, the recurrent plausible numbers are 2, 3, 5 and 7, as well as their multiples. For this aspect, see Bompaire 1958, 662, Scarcella 1985, Georgiadou/Larmour 1994, 1496-1497, Greenwood 2006, 121-124. Tomassi notes that this device also exerts a hyperbolic and comic effect (Tomassi 2011a, *ad Tim*. 45.4).
[413] On this motif in Terence and with regard to friendship in comedy, see Zucker 1950, 210.
[414] Besides, the verb γηροκομέω might be rather poetic, cf. Call. *Epigr*. 50.2 [= *Anth.Pal*. 7.458.2 = 49.126.2 GP], E. F 954a2 TrGF [= *Trag. adespota* F 25.2 TGF] and its derived adjective γηροκόμος (e.g. Hes. *Th*. 605). Otherwise, the verb is rather frequent in Lucian's contemporaries or later Greek, such as Epict. *Diss*. 3.5.3, Max.Tyr. 34.7.

cheers up his friend and organises a dinner in order to find a husband for the girl. Zenothemis himself takes the girl in marriage by force (§25). The girl gives birth to a beautiful boy, who as Zenothemis once presents him with him to the Council, charms the counsellors and thus achieves that his grandfather's honour is re-established (§26).

Zenothemis and his Friend Menecrates

Mnesippus' fourth story deals with one exemplary friend, rather than with an exemplary friendship, as well. Here, Menecrates represents the inactive friend, while Zenothemis plays the role of the helpfully active friend. Thus, when the sentence of the Council of the Six Hundred suddenly deprives Menecrates of his fortune and his good reputation (§24.17-18), he is unable to face the change of fortune.[415] Not only is his misfortune stressed by means of *paronomasia* and *polyptoton* in the phrase ἐκ πλουσίου πένης καὶ ἐξ ἐνδόξου ἄδοξος (§24.17)[416], but, more importantly, Menecrates does not act to improve his situation but repeatedly laments his misery instead (ἐλυπεῖτο οὖν ὁ Μενεκράτης, §24.16, μάλιστα δὲ αὐτὸν ἠνία, §24.18, ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ζηνόθεμιν ἀπωδύρετο, §25.1, μὴ οὕτω μανείην ὡς περιδεῖν, §25.14). His description as a pitiable victim is explicit, as Zenothemis' aim, when presenting the child to the counsellors, is to make them feel pity for Menecrates (ὡς ἐλεεινότερον φανείη ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάππου, §26.10-11). The meaning of his name ('Abiding in Strength') is a perfect *oxymoron* considering his lack of mental strength and proactive mindset.

By contrast, Zenothemis stands out as the active, helpful friend. He is the one who provides for Menecrates by sharing his possessions, organising the dinner (§25.4-6), and finally marrying his friend's daughter without dowry himself (§25.10-12, 15-17). The magnitude of his deed of friendship is emphasised by Menecrates' exclamation of protest, as he is unwilling to give his ugly daughter to his 'young and handsome' friend (§25.13-15). Zenothemis is explicitly portrayed as a virtuous friend by the Massilian narrator, whose story Mnesippus re-narrates. By means of antithetical syntactic constructions and expressive *correctio* (οὐχ...αἰσχύνεται τῷ γάμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σεμνυνομένῳ ἔοικεν, §26.1-2, καταφρονεῖ μέν/ἀφορᾷ δέ, §26.3-4), Zenothemis is characterised as being unashamed of his marriage and his friend's disgrace, but despising bodily appearance, wealth and prestige (§26.2-4).[417] Most importantly, he values friendship more than social reputation and political decisions (§26.5-6). Consequently, this fourth story is – once again – about one exemplary friend, Zenothemis, rather than about an exemplary friendship. This is clearly indicated in the beginning of the narration, when Mnesippus announces that his third story is 'about Zenothemis, son of Charmolaus, from Massilia'

[415] For a discussion of the Six Hundred with regard to the dating of the events of the story according to the allusion to a specific political system, see Introduction, 'Context'.
[416] If, in the beginning, Zenothemis and Menecrates are friends of equal wealth and social status (§24.12), Menecrates turns into a poor and disregarded person through the sentence of the Six Hundred. However, this does not result in Zenothemis and Menecrates' friendship becoming an unequal relationship. The unhappy event is functional to the plot and Zenothemis' characterisation as a good friend.
[417] This characterisation makes Zenothemis appear as the figure of the virtuous philosopher. Interestingly, the name Zenothemis is that of a Stoic philosopher in Lucian's *Symposium* – though a Stoic philosopher derided as an arrogant person (*Symp*. 9), and as the pander of his own wife (32), etc.

(§24.1-2), and introduces Menecrates as the father of the deformed girl and Zenothemis' friend a few lines later only (§24.11-12).

Mnesippus' Hyperbolic Narration and Appraisal of his Story

Mnesippus clearly magnifies Zenothemis' deeds of friendship. For example, the sum of money he pretends to have received as a dowry amounts to no less than 25 talents (§25.12), which is an incredibly huge sum, at least compared to the amounts that similarly signify wealth in the previous stories (three talents, §16.15; five talents, which provide two generous dowries of two talents each, §23.6-7).[418] Then, Zenothemis' sacrifice and worth as a friend is highlighted by emphasising the contrast of his goodness and beauty, and Kydimache's excessively hideous appearance.[419] Thus, Kydimache is 'ugly in all regards' (τά τε ἄλλα εἰδεχθής, §24.4), 'deformed and mutilated' (αἰσχρᾷ καὶ λελωβημένη, §25.14-15), 'most hideous' (τῆς αἰσχίστης, §26.8); she is an 'atrociously disfigured thing' (παλλωβητόν τι, §24.6-7), an 'unapproachable monster' (ἀπρόσιτον μορμολυκεῖον, §24.7), and a 'miserable eyesore' (κακοδαίμονα οὖσαν τὴν ὄψιν, §24.21-22). It is not enough that she is handicapped on one side and missing an eye (§24.6); she is also affected by epilepsy (καταπίπτειν πρὸς τὴν σελήνην αὐξανομένην, §24.22-23). In particular, the portrait of Kydimache as παλλώβητόν τι καὶ μορμολυκεῖον (§24.7) is significant. The latter word presents the belittling diminutive ending in –εῖον, which is also typical of the language of comedy.[420] The expression παλλώβητόν τι is belittling due to the use of the indefinite pronoun τι, and, by means of the prefix παν-, intensifies the depreciating character of the adjective.[421] Kydimache's description as κακοδαίμονα … τὴν ὄψιν (§24.21-22) also accentuates her monstrous ugliness in a language reminiscent of comedy.[422] Zenothemis, on the contrary, represents the ideal man: 'beautiful, well-built, and rich' (καλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος, §24.4), 'graceful and youthful' (καλὸς οὗτος καὶ ὥραῖος, §24.8), 'young and handsome' (νέον καὶ καλὸν, §25.14). The mismatch could not be more extreme. Mnesippus himself recounts how he wondered at their sight (ἐθαύμασα, §24.7) and Menecrates tries to prevent his

[418] Compare Marquis, 347 n. 106.

[419] The motif of the ugly girl could be a motif from comedy (cf. Ar. *Ec*. 617-621, where ugly girls are unwanted sexual partners; there is also a lost comedy by Anaxandrides that is entitled 'Aeschra'), which adds to the ridicule of the situation. For Anaxandrides, see Olson 2007, 404. I do not believe that the motif of the ugly (and epileptic) girl is specific to the ancient novel, or at least not exclusively, if one considers Martial's *Epigrams*, for example. *Pace* Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 58-59. Generally speaking, I am not convinced by her idea that this story is 'anti-novelistic' or 'unnovelistic'. Neither do I agree with Pervo that it is a 'very sentimental story'. *Pace* Pervo 1997, 170.

[420] The word is not very common and rather Late Greek, although it is attested with this meaning at least once in Aristophanes (*Th*. 417). In Ar. F 31, F 131.2 CAF, the μορμολυκεῖον [κωμῳδικὸν] is a 'comic mask. See LSJ s.v. μορμολυκεῖον 2. The word occurs elsewhere in Lucian's corpus, in *Phal*. 1.8, *Zeux*. 12, and *Philops*. 23, where it describes a fantastic giant Gorgon-like feminine figure.

[421] The word is a *hapax legomenon*, or at least a Lucianic coinage, as the adjective παλλώβητος (πανλώβητος) is only attested a second time in the nineteenth century CE. For the textual issue, see the note to the text *ad loc*.

[422] Lucian uses the word no less than 42 times. There are 81 occurrences in Aristophanes and 31 in Menander. The word is also attested once in Timocles (F 10.1 CAF), and in two further comic fragments (*Comic. adesp*. F 646 CAF, *Comic. adesp. novae comoediae* F 244.138 CGFPR). In comparison, there are only four occurrences in Plato and one in Euripides.

friends from marrying his daughter by insisting on their enormous difference (§25.14-15). These expressions of stupefaction motivated by such an ill-assorted couple highlight hyperbolic moments in the narration.

Beyond his obviously excessively laudatory characterisation of Zenothemis, Mnesippus presents this example of friendship as valid and exceptional (τοιαῦτα ὁ Μασσαλιώτης ἔλεγεν τὸν Ζηνόθεμιν εἰργάσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ φίλου, ὡς ὁρᾷς, οὐ μικρὰ οὐδὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἂν Σκυθῶν γενόμενα, §26.15-16). His tone is laudatory, as shown by the use of the demonstrative pronoun τοιαῦτα, the litotes οὐ μικρά and the claim to uniqueness. However, Mnesippus' judgement is also ambiguously ironical. The fact that 'not many a Scythian would have done such a deed for a friend' might as well be interpreted as a negative judgement upon Zenothemis – especially so when considering that Mnesippus' line of reasoning consists in activating the stereotype that Scythians would 'carefully select the most beautiful concubines' (οἵ γε κἂν τὰς παλλακὰς ἀκριβῶς τὰς καλλίστας ἐκλέγεσθαι λέγονται, §26.17). This remark, notwithstanding its evidently 'othering' gesture and resorting to the prejudice of the Asian barbarian collecting concubines, clearly makes the act of choosing a wife with respect to her bodily appearance the central argument of the story.[423] Precisely this, though, could be considered a questionable aspect of Zenothemis' deed of friendship. More generally, the way Mnesippus represents Zenothemis as a good friend raises some questions about the relationship between the fulfilment of deeds of friendship and moral behaviour. For example, his conduct tends to excessiveness and lack of restraint. As has been argued, the amount of money he gives as a dowry is out of proportion. Then, Zenothemis draws from his deed of friendship a pride that exceeds any humble behaviour. He parades with his ugly wife through the streets, showing her off wherever he can (παρεκάθετο δὲ αὐτῷ γυνὴ ἐπὶ ζεύγους ὁδοιποροῦντι, §24.4-5, καὶ πάντῃ ὡς ὁρᾷς περιαγόμενος αὐτήν, §6.1-2, σεμνυνομένῳ τῷ γάμῳ ἔοικεν, §26.3). Clearly, importance is given to him being seen and shown with his wife (ἐδείχθη δέ μοι, §24.3, ὡς ὁρᾷς, §26.1), the symbol of his generosity as a friend. Can such an immoderate behaviour and absence of σωφροσύνη, one of the cardinal Greek virtues, be justified by his generosity as a friend? It is up to the recipients to think about the frequently assumed correlation between perfect friendship and perfect virtue – a relationship that is debated as early as in Plato's *Lysis*, but regarded as a necessity, for example, in Aristotle and Cicero.[424]

Mnesippus' Self-Authorisation of His Praise

Throughout his narration, Mnesippus takes great care to self-authorise his praise and validate his example of friendship as he applies historiographical precepts of authentication to his narration. For example, Mnesippus resorts to autopsy, which not only attests that the story conforms to the rule of

[423] Compare Pervo 1997, 170: 'Rather than applaud Zenothemis for helping to restore the fortunes of his friend's family by uniting himself with it, this *novella* singles out the contrast between the handsome young principal and his repellent wife. I suspect that the cultivated aristocrats would have found the story poor taste.' He is right in underlining the strange focus of the story, but the point is not whether some 'aristocrats' liked it or not, but, rather, what it means for the validity of this example of friendship.
[424] See Introduction, 'Friendship'.

the contest to present contemporary examples but also guarantees, in a Herodotean perspective, that the narration is more reliable. In fact, Mnesippus' narration is explicitly deictic: ἐδείχθη δέ μοι (§24.3), ὁ δείξας αὐτόν (§24.9), ὡς ὁρᾷς (§26.16). Then, Mnesippus falls back on the testimony of a reliable witness who must know the facts exactly, for he himself is from Massilia (διηγεῖτό μοι [...] ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς ἕκαστα· Μασσαλιώτης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν, §24.9-10). As a matter of fact, Mnesippus demonstrates that he is able to reproduce the narration of his source (ἔφη, §24.11), including the exact wording of the verbal exchanges between the characters.[425]

§§27-34 Mnesippus' Fifth Story: Rescuing a Friend in Danger of Death

Summary of the Story

The friends Demetrius and Antiphilus, both from Attica, are staying in Egypt for the purpose of their studies. When Demetrius happens to be out of town on a cruise down the Nile, Antiphilus gets involved in the arrest of some temple robbers. Though innocent, he is put in prison (§§27-28). There, his health deteriorates rapidly as he is not used to such a horrid place. When Demetrius returns and finds out about Antiphilus' misfortune, he starts searching for his friend amongst the prisoners. He finds him in poor health and cares for him (§§29-31). Due to an unfortunate event that took place in prison, Demetrius is not allowed to help Antiphilus anymore. He decides to accuse himself of having participated in the temple robbery. Because he is sent to prison as well, he is able to remain at Antiphilus' side again (§32). One day, some prisoners break out of prison, but the two friends remain on the spot and even succeed in holding back one of the actual temple robbers, Antiphilus' slave Syrus. They receive the praise of the prefect of Egypt, to whom Demetrius successfully pleads their case. They are liberated and rewarded with a huge sum of money (§33). Leaving his part of the reward to Antiphilus, Demetrius decides to go and live with the Brahmans in India (§34).

The Friends Antiphilus and Demetrius and Further Ideals in Friendship

Like the previous stories, Mnesippus' fifth story is that of one exemplary friend rather than an exemplary friendship, for Antiphilus represents the one who receives help passively, while Demetrius plays the role of the actively helping friend. Antiphilus and Demetrius have been friends since childhood, and they are of equal age and education (ἑταίρῳ ἐκ παίδων ὄντι καὶ συνεφήβῳ, συνῆν καὶ συνεπαιδεύετο, §27.4-5, with the repetition of the prefix συν emphasising their spending time together). However, with regard to their personality and moral strength, they are of contrary constitution: Antiphilus has a weak moral character, whereas the latter has a strong and enduring character. This difference highlights Demetrius' worth as a friend. Thus, Antiphilus lacks physical and mental strength, as he is reluctant to go on a strenuous journey in the Egyptian heat (ὀκνήσαντα πρὸς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ τὸ θάλπος, §27.12-13). He is the prototype of the intellectual (or at least studious,

[425] Compare Marquis, 507 n. 101. For the principle of autopsy, see above §§10-12.

as he is arrested while attending a lesson, §28.11-12) who, having been imprisoned, suffers terribly under the hard condition (ὑπενόσει τοιγαροῦν ἤδη καὶ πονηρῶς εἶχεν, §29.6-7, ταῦτα πάντα χαλεπὰ ἦν, §29.13-14), to which he is unaccustomed (ἀφόρητα οἷα ἀνδρὶ ἐκείνων ἀήθει καὶ ἀμελετήτῳ πρὸς οὕτω σκληρὰν τὴν δίαιταν, §29.14-15). Finally, he easily gives himself up (ἀπαγορεύοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲ σῖτον αἱρεῖσθαι θέλοντος, §30.1). The extent of the catastrophic state he falls into is magnified by means of a detailed description of the extreme hardship that life in prison represents for him (σκληρὰν τὴν δίαιταν, §29.15, τῶν κακῶν, §30.8, τῶν δεινῶν, §30.12). He cannot sleep for the noise and his lying on the ground; he is unable to move as he is tightly fastened by stocks, or a collar[426] and fetters, and he breathes only with difficulty because the air is bad, stifling and hot in the crowded place (§29.7-15). Then, Antiphilus' physical decline reaches such extremes that he becomes unrecognisable (ἄδηλον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν γεγενημένον, §30.7-8, τοσοῦτον ἤλλακτο ὑπὸ τῶν δεινῶν, §30.12), and his clothes are nothing but 'filthy tattered rags' (πιναρὰ καὶ ἐκτετρυχωμένα ῥάκη, §31.2, where πιναρά is a poetic word).[427]

The description of Antiphilus' pitiable outward appearance is even amplified as the narration employs an overemotional tone. In fact, the episode where Demetrius searches for Antiphilus in prison even exaggerates the horror of the event – thus adding to the fact that the choice of situating the story in prison is in itself significant as it epitomises horror.[428] First, the macabre comparison of his search for his friend with the inspection of dead bodies in the quest for fallen family members on a battle field (§30.9-10) hyperbolises the horror of Antiphilus' condition. Then, the text stresses a sentiment of anguish when at first, Demetrius is not able to recognise Antiphilus among the prisoners, but finally recognises him, which is emphatically expressed as an existential distress: twice, and noticeably in the same end position with a cretic prose-rhythmic pattern, it is stated that Demetrius does not recognise Antiphilus or that the latter shows himself 'who he is' (ὅστις ἦν, §30.12, and 15). Demetrius' reaction at the sight of his altered friend is emotionally magnified, as they both vanish in the moment of mutual recognition (ἰλιγγιάσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ θέᾳ, §30.16) – though the 'unexpected sight' (with a focus on the visual aspect) is probably to be interpreted as a sign of joy or relief for Antiphilus, and of fright (and relief) for Demetrius. Demetrius' calling Antiphilus (τοὔνομα ἐβόησεν, Ἀντίφιλον Δεινομένους, §30.11) is likewise emphatic, for the name in apposition sounds almost like an apostrophe, and it is actually expressive for its rhythmic pattern consisting of two choriambs. Finally, this passage verges on the tragic as Antiphilus reveals his face under his filthy and felted hair (διαστείλας τὴν κόμην καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τοῦ προσώπου αὐχμηρὰν καὶ συμπεπιλημένην, §30.13-14), a phrase and a passage that recalls the way Orestes appears as a supplicant before Menelaus in Euripides' *Orestes* (ὡς ἠγρίωσαι πλόκαμον αὐχμηρόν, τάλας, v. 387). Not only are there

[426] It is not clear what a κλοιός is exactly, especially considering the fact that two (or more?) persons can be bound in such a 'wooden collar' (cf. §32.13, see LSJ s.v. 2). See Marquis, 521 n. 126, 522 n. 127.
[427] For πιναρός, see Schmid I, 343. See e.g. Cratin. F 372 CAF, E. *El*. 184, Eup. F 251.2 CAF. For the word in Lucian, see *Gall*. 14, *Tim*. 7, *Somn*. 8, 13, *Philops*. 24, *Peregr*. 15, said of hair or garments.
[428] For the prison as a place of horror, see Marquis, 518-519, n. 119.

verbal similarities (πλόκαμον αὐχμηρόν/ τὴν κόμην … αὐχμηράν), but both passages also (*Or*. 385-395, §30.7-16) depict a helpless, desperate, and emotionally and physically exhausted character, whose wretched appearance (ἠγρίωσαι, *Or*. 387, δεινὸν δὲ λεύσσεις ὀμμάτων, *Or*. 389a, ὦ παρὰ λόγον μοι σὴ φανεῖσ' ἀμορφία, *Or*. 391) is compared to a corpse (ὦ θεοί, τί λεύσσω; τίνα δέδορκα νερτέρων; *Or*. 385, ὥσπερ εἴωθασιν οἱ τοὺς οἰκείους νεκρούς, §30.9). These similarities additionally characterise Antiphilus as a helpless and pitiable subject (cf. ὁ ἄθλιος Ἀντίφιλος, §29.1) – his name itself, which means something like 'For the Sake of a Friend' is (ironically) programmatic. As the emphatic description of his pitiable appearance and horrific sufferings, it magnifies the importance of Demetrius' gesture of help.

Indeed, Demetrius is clearly the active and truly exemplary friend of the story, as demonstrated by his deeds of friendship which touch upon more than one ideal. He is the embodiment of the idea that a friend in need is a friend indeed, as is hinted at when Antiphilus' misfortune is described as a situation that 'really requires a true friend' (ὁ δὲ ἐν τοσούτῳ συμφορᾷ ἐχρήσατο μάλα γενναίου τινὸς φίλου δεομένῃ, §28.1-2).[429] And in fact, when he learns that his friend is in need, Demetrius *immediately* comes to his aid (εὐθύς, §30.3, ἔωθεν, §30.6), while all the other 'friends' and the household slaves desert the sacrilegious Antiphilus (§28.12-16).[430] He provides the necessary help for Antiphilus in prison by doing some hard manual work in the harbour (§31.3-8). He cuts his cloak in two (§30.19), and shares the same pair of irons with Antiphilus (§32.12-13).[431] These deeds are symbolical of the idea that friends sharing pain alleviate the suffering (ῥᾷον δὲ φέρων τὴν συμφορὰν ὁ Ἀντίφιλος, §32.2, ὥστε ᾖον ἔφερον μετ' ἀλλήλων κακοπαθοῦντες, §32.16-17, but see also the repetition of the verb σύνειμι in §31.3 and 8, and πάρειμι in §32.6).[432] Demetrius explicitly provides emotional support, as he repeatedly cheers up Antiphilus (θαρρεῖν τε παρακελεύεται, §30.18, παραμυθούμενος, §31.9). Above all, he willingly commits acts of self-sacrifice. His self-accusation as accomplice in the temple robbery in order to join Antiphilus in prison (§32.6-8) is the most obvious one, but neither does he care for falling ill as long as he can support Antiphilus (ἔδειξε τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν εἶχε πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀμελῶν μὲν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν δεινῶν (καίτοι ἐνόσησε καὶ αὐτός), ἐπιμελούμενος δὲ ὅπως ἐκεῖνος μάλιστα καθευδήσει καὶ ἧττον ἀνιάσεται, §32.14-16).[433] His

[429] For the *topos*, see above §§5.13-6.1.
[430] Stealing cups and other sacred objects from a temple was considered the worst form of ἀσέβεια. See Solitario 2020, 353-354.
[431] For the motif of the cloak divided in two, see Panayotakis 2011. The sharing of fetters or irons etc. is a recurring motif in the discourse on friendship, see Pervo 1997, 171 n. 47. See also Plut. *De amic. mult*. 96C (Theseus and Pirithous).
[432] For the *topos* of friends sharing their pain, see esp. Arist. *EN* 1171a31-32, 1171b12-14, 1171b21-23. The passage in *EE* 1245b39 is interesting, because the same verb κακοπαθέω as in §32.17 appears in a similar context: the question of whether to share one's pains with a friend or not.
[433] Some scholars relate the motif of self-accusation to the ancient Greek novel (Pervo 1997, 171 n. 46, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 56). However, the motif also appears in the rhetorical tradition. See Anderson 1976b, 21, Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 56 n. 79 referring to Russel 1983, 35-37. Self-accusation in the ancient novel thus 'reflects the conventions of friendship.' Hock 1997, 155. Besides, compared with the motif in the ancient novel, the act of self-accusation is not a means to commit suicide out of despair, but to keep company with a friend. Moreover,

selflessness is even underlined by Mnesippus in his evaluation of the example. With a tongue-in-cheek comment on Toxaris' censure of Greek speech-making (§34.8-10), and by means of some form of *praeteritio*, he praises the moving speech of defence that Demetrius is supposed to have made in court, which illustrates his self-abnegation: he had taken all the fault on himself because the only thing he had in mind was the salvation of his friend (§34.11-13). Besides, Demetrius is explicitly the 'title-friend' of the story (λοιπὸς ἡμῖν ὁ πέμπτος, καί μοι δοκῶ οὐκ ἄλλον ἐρεῖν Δημητρίου τοῦ Σουνιέως ἐπιλαθόμενος, §27.1-2), and the sum of money of more than three talents that he receives from the prefect of Egypt (§33.20-22) is significantly huge – if not disproportionate – and functions as a symbol of recognition for his merit and moral value.[434]

A Questionably Exemplary Friend

Yet, Demetrius' virtue in friendship is also questionable in certain regards. On the one hand, providing prisoners with food and other necessary things, also by bribing the guards, is more a common act of charity than specifically one of friendship (cf. *Peregr*. 12). Besides, the extent of his self-sacrifice through self-accusation might also seem exaggerated; at least, it is a useless deed of friendship, because if it were not for the hazard of the events, both Demetrius and Antiphilus would have died in prison. Perhaps, the more plausible solution and the more effective gesture of help would have been the attempt – on the part of Demetrius – to clarify the situation in court immediately rather than having himself put in prison as well. On the other hand, Demetrius is noticeably characterised as a Cynic-like figure, which, as will be shown below, undermines his worth as an exemplary friend for more than one reason. Demetrius is explicitly characterised as an adept of Cynicism, because he went to Egypt to follow the Cynic school of some 'Rhodian sophist' (αὐτὸς μὲν τὴν ἄσκησιν τὴν Κυνικὴν ἀσκούμενος ὑπὸ τῷ Ῥοδίῳ ἐκείνῳ σοφιστῇ, §27.5-6). This might allude to the Cynic school of Alexandria, which attracted many students of philosophy in the imperial period.[435] In the same vein, his name, though rather common, might be a hint at a certain Cynic philosopher named Demetrius who is mentioned in *Adv.Ind.* 19.[436] Moreover, there are some details in his characterisation that further hint at a Cynic figure. For example, the cloak he divides in two is a τριβώνιον (§30.19), which is the typical cloak of the Cynic.[437] Throughout the story, he is shown to

whereas in the ancient novel, the self-accusing hero (e.g. Chaereas, Clitophon) is acquitted, Demetrius actually ends up in prison. These are meaningful differences.

[434] For the sum of money, see Marquis, 522-523 n. 130.

[435] It might also allude specifically to the Cynic philosopher Agathobulus. See Marquis, 511 n. 109. See also *Demon*. 3, *Peregr*. 17, D.Chr. 32.11. For Alexandria as the place where both medicine and philosophy were studied, see Jones 1986, 56 with n. 53, Marquis, 511 n. 110. See also *Philops*. 33 (with Anderson 1976b, 21), *Alex*. 44. For the importance of travelling abroad for education as a *pepaideumenos* in the Roman Empire, see Pretzler 2007, 127-128 (citing Alexandria among these cities).

[436] For the name, see Jones 1986, 56 n. 52, Marquis, 348 n. 108. See also *Demon*. 3, Sen. *Ep*. 7.8.

[437] See Marquis, 520 n. 121. Cf. *Vit.Auct*. 8, 9, *Peregr*. 36, *DMort*. 1.2, *Hist.Conscr*. 3, *Fug*. 14, 27. See also the occurrences for τρίβων: *Demon*. 48, *Gall*. 9, *Fug*. 20, *Peregr*. 24, *Merc.Cond*. 34, *Tim*. 56, *DMort*. 20.2. See further e.g. Crates Theb. 16, Arr. *Epict*. 3.1.24. It is, however, also attributed to other philosophers. See LSJ s.v τρίβων. See e.g. *Herm*. 81.

adopt an ascetic behaviour. Not only does he support arduous manual work and the harsh life in prison without lamenting, but, like a 'Cynic' dog, he is content to sleep before the gates of the prison on some straw and leaves (§31.9-11).[438] And in the end, he leaves Antiphilus all his money, which, as befits a Cynic, he does not need, and goes to live in India with the Brahmans (§34.2-3), who live an ascetic and self-sufficient life that is consistent with the Cynic ideal of autarky.[439]

However, there is also a noticeable irony that surrounds Demetrius' value as a Cynic and friend. Beyond the evidence that he is not the most exemplary Cynic, the fact that Demetrius is a Cynic *per se* raises the question of whether he can be an appropriate friend at all.[440] His abandoning Antiphilus 'for he would not need a friend anymore, seeing that the situation had now become easy for him' (οὔτε ἐκείνῳ ἔτι δεῖν φίλου, εὐμαρῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων γεγενημένων, §34.6-7, where εὐμαρῶν is a poetic word)[441], not only demonstrates a dubious conception of friendship. It even relates to the question of autarky in Cynic philosophy and its (in)compatibility with forming friendship, which is a point that is repeatedly debated in the ancient discourse on friendship.[442] In fact, due to his being a Cynic, Demetrius' worth as an exemplary friend becomes questionable.

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[438] Cf. Sen. *Ep*. 5.2, 87.2.

[439] Cf. Peregrinus the (somehow) Cynic philosopher (*Peregr*. 25, 39). See Pervo 1997, 173. Cf. *Fug*. 7. For the Brahmans, see Marquis, 523 n. 132 referring to Muckensturm 1993 and DNP 5 (1998) s.v. Gymnosophisten, 28-29 [Muckenstutm]. See also *Macr*. 4 (Ἰνδῶν δὲ οἱ καλούμενοι Βραχμᾶνες, ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς φιλοσοφίᾳ σχολάζοντες, καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι δὲ μάγοι). The Indian Gymnosophists, who were likewse representative of an ascetic lifestyle, attracted a few Greeks for their 'timeless mystical quality' (cf. Philostr. *VA* 3.12-14). See Andrade 2013, 253: 'In fact, many sophists believed that the Brahmin or 'gymnosophists' exemplified forms of Greek erudition, philosophy, and mystical knowledge worthy of respect and imitation.' See Bowie 2016.

[440] First, if one accepts the relationship between the Brahmans and the Gymnosophists (cf. *Fug*. 6-7), his adhesion to the former demonstrates a tendency towards mysticism. Second, he shows a marked interest in Egyptian *mirabilia* (§27.8-11). The motive of his journey is to go and *see* (κατὰ θέαν) the pyramids and the colossus Memnon; and he is explicitly said to have a strong desire for *seeing* and hearing these curiosities (τούτων ἐπιθυμήσας Δημήτριος, θέαν μὲν τῶν πυραμίδων, ἀκροάεως δὲ τοῦ Μέμνονος), a desire that was raised by hearsay (ἤκουε γάρ). According to Schwartz, travelling to Egypt for the purpose of studying had become rather unusual by the time of the imperial period. Rather, one went to Egypt in order to see the tourist attractions and curiosities. See Schwartz 1951, *ad Philops*. 33. For more recent scholarship on these (pseudo-)educationally touristic tours in Egypt in the Roman Empire, see Casson 1994, 229-237, 253-262, Adams 2007, esp. 163, Gangloff 2007, 80 with n. 45 for further references and bibliography. This further underlines that Demetrius' real motive for going to Egypt might be to spend time looking at the Egyptian *mirabilia* rather than studying seriously – after all he spends a lot of time, six months, travelling along the Nile (for the long period of time, see Marquis, 514-515 n. 113). In any case, Demetrius' fascination for exotic sects and supernatural wonders is not quite in accordance with a Cynic world view. Third, the similarities that Demetrius shares with Lucian's figure of Peregrinus does not support seeing him as a 'model Cynic'. See Pervo 1997, 170 n. 42, 172-173. For the figure of Peregrinus, see e.g. Hall 1981, 176-182 (reassuming the issues of earlier scholarship), Branham 1989, 194-195, Alexiou 1990, 115-126, Jones 1993, Bremmer 2017.

[441] See Schmid I, 330. See also A. *Suppl*. 339, *Ag*. 1326, S. *El*. 179, E. *Alc*. 492, *Hel*. 1227, *IA* 519, 969.

[442] See Pervo 1997, 173. A related question is that of whether the sage, or the happy person, needs a friend. See, e.g., Arist. *EN* 1169b8, Cic. *Amic*. 9.30. The question of (the sage's) self-sufficiency and its compatibility with friendship is discussed for Stoic philosophy in particular. See, e.g., Sen. *Ep*. 1.9, 6.7, 9.15. See Lesses 1993 for a thorough discussion. One further aspect is that of distance. Aristotle, for example, considers proximity as a condition for the development and actuation of εὔνοια (*EN* 1170b11-12, 1172a3-7, *EE* 1245a12-27); distance thus endangers a friendship. Cf. Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 52A, *De amic. mult*. 93D, Them. *Or*. 22.275c with Fürst 1996, 201. Similarly, intimacy and spending time together are prominent in Epicurean friendship (D.L. 10.135).

The Representation of Otherness: Exoticism

One final noteworthy aspect of Mnesippus' fifth story is the way it deals with the representation of 'otherness'. The description of Egypt as an exotic place receives a notable place in the narration. First, the text dwells on Demetrius' desire to see Egypt's wonders *par excellence* – the pyramids and the singing colossus Memnon, whose marvellous qualities are expressly specified (ταύτας ὑψηλὰς οὔσας μὴ παρέχεσθαι σκιάν, τὸν δὲ Μέμνονα βοᾶν πρὸς ἀνατέλλοντα τὸν ἥλιον, §27.9-10, cf. *Philops*. 33). Of course, the Nile is mentioned as well (§27.12). Furthermore, the crime in which Antiphilus inadvertently gets involved has to do with temple robbery. Although this is a frequent motif in Lucian's works, the specification that it is the Anubis Temple that has been robbed (§28.4) is by no means neutral, for Anubis is one of the most important gods amongst the Egyptians' plethora of deities.[443] Then, as is reflected in the list of golden and silver objects that were stolen from the temple, amongst which is a dog-faced statuette (καὶ κυνοκεφάλους ἀργυροῦς, §28.5), the text alludes to the typically Egyptian custom of representing their deities with animal heads.[444] Finally, in line with this stereotype, the guardian of the prison is characterised as a superstitious person (καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν δεσμῶν Αἰγύπτιος, δεισιδαίμων ἄνθρωπος, §29.3).

It is useful to compare this present insistence upon Egyptian *mirabilia* and stereotypes with the way the text generally deals with stereotypes. As has been shown seen and as will be developed further in Toxaris' stories, objects and customs typically associated with Scythia – or, by adopting an 'orientalising' approach, more broadly the eastern or Persian world – are used simplistically to create a 'barbarian' setting. This is a practice which the text then distances itself, as these objects are mentioned and mediated through Toxaris' Scythian focalisation. Here too, with regard to the depiction of an Egyptian background, one would suggest, the text tackles the question of the representation and conceptualisation of 'otherness' in the mind of the imperial world. In these regards, it is worth mentioning the wordplay on Antiphilus' slave, who is 'Syrus by name and Syrian by origin' (οἰκέτης γὰρ αὐτοῦ, Σύρος καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, §28.2). This anodyne etymological joke, which refers to the common practice of naming slaves according to their place of origin, similarly points to a perhaps unconscious, but widespread, mechanism of marking 'otherness'.

[443] For the motif of the temple robbery, see above §2.16. For Lucian's association of wondrous religious, quasi magic, customs with Egypt, see *Philops*. 31, 34, *Fug*. 8 (μετὰ δ' οὖν τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας εἰς Αἰθιοπίαν εὐθύς, εἶτα εἰς Αἴγυπτον κατέβην, καὶ ξυγγενομένη τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν καὶ προφήταις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ θεῖα παιδεύσασα). In Lucian's works, Anubis seems to function as the god who is most representative of Egyptian religious practices, cf. *Icar*. 24. Anubis is also mentioned in *Deor.Conc*. 10, 11, *Vit.Auct*. 16, *Sacr*. 14, *DMort*. 13.3.

[444] Lucian makes fun of the stereotype of Egyptian animal-headed gods in *JTr*. 9. The definition of 'dog-faced baboon', which is given in LSJ s.v. κυνοκέφαλος 2 for the present passage, is arguable, for, here, the κυνοκέφαλος probably refers to some statuette of the god Anubis, who is represented as a human body with the head of a dog (cf. LIMC I.1 (1981) s.v. Anubis [Leclant]).

§§35-37 Further Polemics about Greek and Scythian Friendships

Summary

Mnesippus closes his stories and speech by encouraging his opponent, Toxaris, to prove himself a virtuous speaker and to keep up with his praise of Orestes and Pylades' friendship at the beginning of the dialogue (§35.1-8). Toxaris emphasises that he, unlike his opponent, will speak without rhetorical embroidery and will not praise trivial acts of friendship (§35.9-18). He sets apart the Scythian values in friendship from the Greeks': in Scythian friendship, acts of courage in battle and hardship come to the fore. Scythian friendship is therefore more trustworthy than Greek 'fair weather' friendship (§36). Toxaris closes his preamble with an *excursus* on the way Scythians choose their friends and make friends (§37).

The *Agōn*: Rhetoric and Virtue

This part of the *Toxaris* revives the agonistic dynamics of the dialogue and reminds the recipients of the competitive context of Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories. While Mnesippus insists on the rhetorical and judicial aspects of the competition, Toxaris focusses on its function as an epic duel, although his polemics are ambiguous and, as will be seen below, equally show a concern for effective speech and rhetoric.

Mnesippus closes his set of stories by affirming that he could have presented many more examples of Greek friends, but that he only narrated those few that first came to his mind (ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τούτους ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πλειόνων, οὓς πρώτους ἡ μνήμη ὑπέβαλε, διηγησάμην σοι, §35.1-2). This forcefully responds to the doubts that Toxaris expressed earlier concerning Mnesippus' ability to present any further valid example of friendship (πλὴν οὐ δέδια μή τινα καὶ ἄλλον ὅμοιον εἴπῃς αὐτῷ, §18.17-18). Mnesippus' affirmation thus underlines the improvisatory nature of his stories, which is a way not only to allude to the plethora of Greek exemplary friends he could have brought into play but also to advertise his competence as a clever speaker.[445] In order to make plain the point of his encomiastic demonstration, Mnesippus then emphasises the specific ideals in friendship he has just illustrated by means of his stories. His friends – *nota bene*: friends and not friendships – are all 'virtuous and faithful' (διηγησάμην σοι ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βεβαίους φίλους, §35.2).[446] These two virtues, moral excellence and loyalty, represent the essence of Greek concepts of friendship and are the values by which Mnesippus and Toxaris measure their examples, at least according to the avowed motive of the dispute and reason for the contest (ὅτι δὲ οἱ φίλοι οἱ Σκύθαι πολὺ πιστότεροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων φίλων εἰσίν … ῥᾴδιον ἐπιδεῖξαι, §9.3-5).

[445] For this last aspect, see Gleason 1995, 53.
[446] As has been pointed out for Mnesippus' stories, the focus is on the value of one of the friends. Toxaris deals with his examples in the same way. This fact is significant for their making friends at the end of the dialogue. See below, §§62-63.

However, here as well, the *agōn* proves to be as much about rhetoric as about virtue. Toxaris' use of the verb ἐπιδείκνυμι in §9.5 and of the noun ἐπίδειξις here (§36.6) already indicates that their contest in virtues of friendship is also a rhetorical contest in praising these virtues. In this passage, Mnesippus actually characterises Toxaris and himself as competing sophists. First, Mnesippus contextualises their competition as a judicial situation when he closes his speech and gives the word to Toxaris as follows: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη καταβὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου σοὶ τὴν ῥήτραν παραδίδωμι (§35.3-4). The expressions καταβὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου and τὴν ῥήτραν παραδίδωμι are noteworthy. The first is a metonymic version of the more common phrase καταβαίνω [ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος],[447] and, according to its importance in the *Toxaris*, it gives such substance to the λόγος as to make it almost material. The second, a *hapax legomenon* in this combination of words,[448] develops the image of the orator descending and ascending the tribune and makes the judicial or public dimension of Mnesippus and Toxaris' contest unequivocal.[449] Then, Mnesippus directly appeals to Toxaris (σὺ δέ, §35.4) to narrate even better examples of friends, if he cares for his right hand (ὅπως μὴ χείρους ἐρεῖς τοὺς Σκύθας, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ τούτων ἀμείνους, αὐτῷ σοὶ μελήσει, εἴ τι καὶ τῆς δεξιᾶς πεφρόντικας, ὡς μὴ ἀποτμηθείης αὐτήν, §35.4-6). Furthermore, he encourages Toxaris to 'be an accomplished man' and an orator as skilful as he proved to be when he praised Orestes and Pylades' friendship (ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖα ἂν πάθοις Ὀρέστην μὲν καὶ Πυλάδην πάνυ σοφιστικῶς ἐπαινέσας, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς Σκυθίας φαῦλος ῥήτωρ φαινόμενος, §35.6-8). Thereby, he shifts the discourse from concerns for moral values to rhetorical qualities, or rather, he merges these two aspects by alluding to the idea of the ideal orator, the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.[450] Especially the ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν (§35.6), which Mnesippus exhorts Toxaris to be with regard to his upcoming narration, where ἀγαθός means 'capable' from a technical perspective and also 'good' from a moral perspective, alludes to this rhetorical ideal. By means of the same kind of ambiguity, Mnesippus urges Toxaris not to be a φαῦλος ῥῆτωρ (§35.8) and reinforces this allusion. In terms of Greek *paideia*, the wording of Mnesippus' exhortation projects the dialogue onto the contemporary socio cultural stage. When Mnesippus says that Toxaris 'praised Orestes and Pylades with all the skills of a sophist' (Ὀρέστην μὲν καὶ Πυλάδην πάνυ σοφιστικῶς ἐπαινέσας, §35.7-8), he clearly thinks of his opponent as an accomplished speaker, skilled at perorating encomiastic *epideixeis* and possessing the best of moral qualities, which he has internalised and is able to communicate through his speech.

[447] For the expression, see, e.g., Lys. 12.92, and in full, see, e.g., D. 19.113, D.S. 17.109.2, D.H. 4.37.5, Plut. *Per*. 28.5, *Pomp*. 13.2, App. *Syr*. 218, Them. *Or*. 4.37b.
[448] There is the expression παραδίδωμι τὸν λόγον; cf., e.g., Plt. *Phlb*. 12a9, *R*. 331d6, D.H. 7.63.4 (and frequently), Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 58C, Ach.Tat. 8.9.14. In comparison, the expression in the present passage is more explicitly anchored in the context of public speech.
[449] Reminding ourselves that the *Toxaris* is not only a written text for (loud) reading but also perhaps a text for actual representation by one or two reader-actors, one could hypothesise some concrete moves or changes of voice to make the transition from Mnesippus' part to that of Toxaris clearer.
[450] For the ideal in Graeco-Roman thought, see Möller 2004.

On the other hand, Mnesippus' exhortation also implies that he feels self-confident enough to encourage his rival to make a brilliant speech. He even persists in his antagonistic position, for he makes clear that Toxaris has to live up to the standards he set himself in the beginning of the dialogue. His tone is jeering and almost ironic when he underscores that Toxaris still runs the risk of exposing himself to ridicule if he fails to live up to this ideal (γελοῖα ἂν πάθοις, §35.7). As a response to Mnesippus' encouragements, Toxaris notices that the Greek spoke as if he did not care to let him win the contest and be cut his tongue (ὥσπερ οὐ πάνυ σοι μέλον εἰ ἀποτμηθείης τὴν γλῶτταν κρατηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, §35.10-11).[451] Toxaris thereby acknowledges the overconfidence of his opponent and the improbable honesty of his encouragement.[452] On the other hand, Toxaris' answer to Mnesippus' encouragements, notwithstanding (or additionally to) his characterisation as a skilful speaker, communicates to the recipients that the Scythian sees himself and Mnesippus as opponents engaged in an epic combat. The choice of the verb (παρ-)οτρύνω (εὖ γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ὅτι καὶ παροτρύνεις με πρὸς τὸν λόγον, §35.9) is significant, for it hints at a Homeric context.[453] The practice of encouraging one's opponent is common in Homeric epics and characterises the combatants as epic heroes.[454] Thus, Toxaris grasps the occasion to twist Mnesippus' words of encouragement, which, besides their meaning in a rhetorical contest, now receive a Homeric connotation. Thereby, the parallelism between the metaphor of the combat in words and that of the combat in arms is reaffirmed, emphasising once more the value of words as acts.

Some Paradoxical Arguments

Toxaris' preamble (§§35.9-36.12) indeed elaborates on the theme of 'deeds and words', which he addressed previously (§9), and uses it again to oppose the Greeks and the Scythians on the subject of friendship but also, as will be seen, to confront in a polarising way the stylistic ideals that Mnesippus and he himself stand for, and thus affirm his superiority. In this passage, according to his fighting spirit and military ideals, Toxaris assimilates the theme of 'deeds and words' to the *topos* of 'friendship in war and in peace', or more generally to the topical *syncrisis* of virtues in times of war

[451] For a discussion of the present reading ἀποτμηθείης, which differs from that of Macleod, see the note to the text *ad loc*.
[452] An alternative interpretation could be that Mnesippus' exhortation constitutes an act of selflessness, which may be considered a sign of Mnesippus' aptitude for friendship. By encouraging Toxaris to 'narrate even better examples of friends' than his and be a brilliant orator, Mnesippus appears disinterested in potentially losing the contest in favour of his opponent. Whether or not Mnesippus has assimilated the 'Scythian' ideal of self-sacrifice in friendship in the course of the dialogue – that is, through Toxaris' demonstration of the worth of their worship of Orestes and Pylades, the paradigms of the spirit of sacrifice between friends, or through his own process of narration – he thereby manifests to possess exactly *the* quality that is defining an exemplary friend and that makes him suitable to become Toxaris' friend.
[453] The form παροτρύνω is rather later Greek, but see Pi. *O*. 3.38 (in *tmēsis*); ὀτρύνω is the poetic-epic and tragic form. The verb has no less than 135 occurrences in the *Iliad*, mostly in a military context where it means 'exhort to fight and take courage' (e.g., *Il*. 4.268).
[454] See Pagani 2008, 332. For a similar use in Lucian, see *Deor.Conc*. 4.

and peace.[455] Toxaris thus denigrates Mnesippus' rhetorical style full of embellishments (μηδὲν ὥσπερ σὺ καλλιλογησάμενος, §35.11-12), which he oppos es to the Scythian's preference for deeds over words (οὐ γὰρ Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἔργα ὑπερφθέγγηται τοὺς λόγους, §35.12-13). He then condemns the Greek's stories for their nugatory content (πάνυ γὰρ εὐτελῆ ταῦτα, §35.17-18, παιδιὰ τὰ ὑμέτερά ἐστιν παρὰ τὰ Σκυθικὰ ἐξετάζεσθαι, §36.2-3, τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα ἐπαινεῖτε, §36.4-5), which he summarises in a derisory tone (§35.13-17). Essentially, in his view, they lack the manly courage and the grandeur of Scythian heroic and military achievements (καὶ μεγαλουργὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἀνδρεῖον ἔνι οὐδέν. ἐγὼ δέ σοι διηγήσομαι φόνους πολλοὺς καὶ πολέμους καὶ θανάτους ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων, §§35.18-36.2). The reason for this discrepancy is that Greece lies dormant in lethargic peace, while Scythians are always engaged in military confrontations: the Greeks are therefore fair-weather friends lacking the occasion to demonstrate their worth, while the Scythians have many opportunities to actuate their virtue in true, faithful friendship (§36.5-12). As I will show, Toxaris' polemics against Mnesippus' use of ornamentation and trivial examples are meaningful but also paradoxical in several ways.

Greek Values and Barbarian Friendship

First, Toxaris' polemics are meaningful with regard to Greek (but also Roman) ideas about moral development and friendship. Toxaris appropriates strands of discourses on moral worth and by playing them off against Greek stereotypes of the wild barbarian, succeeds in invalidating these stereotypes. This passage deals once more with the idea of the ferocious Scythians, who are always eager to fight.[456] Throughout his preamble, Toxaris emphasises the context of combats and hardship of Scythian friendship. In particular, the idea that moral virtues develop best under hard conditions forms one part of the image of the barbarian.[457] However, this stress on heroism in Scythian friendship is also ironic, if one considers that the Greek traditional and exemplary friends are 'pairs of heroes whose exploits were essentially military'.[458] Typically, in Graeco-Roman thought, virtues of friendship are strongly related to ideals of manliness and combativeness. For example, in Valerius Maximus, heroic deeds and deaths are characteristic of Roman achievements in friendship (4.7.4).[459] Thus, Toxaris conforms to Greek and Roman conceptions of ethical development and friendship and

[455] The motif that some virtues show in peace and others in war is topical. It is adumbrated, e.g. in Th. 2.36.3, 4, 2.39.1. See also Aristid. *Or*. 2.422 Behr; X. *Mem*. 2.2.32, *Oec*. 1.17, 6.1. In Lucian, the motif recurs in *Parasit*. 41, 49-50, 52-53, *Gall*. 21-22, *Anach*. 20. In Lucian's *Parasitus*, the parasite's virtues in war have an epic connotation and are exemplified by Homeric epic heroes. Interestingly, in *Parasit*. 49, one of the virtuous deeds in war is to endanger oneself for one's friend: καὶ τῶν βελῶν ἀφιεμένων γυμνώσας ἑαυτὸν τοῦτον σκέπει· βούλεται γὰρ ἐκεῖνον μᾶλλον σώζειν ἢ ἑαυτόν. This recalls Toxaris' description of Orestes and Pylades' friendship in §6.21-25. For the *topos* in rhetoric and further passages, see Nesselrath 1985, 399-400.
[456] For the stereotype, see above.
[457] Compare the end of Herodotus' *Histories* (9.122.3-4), where Cyrus points to the fact that true virtue is found where living condition are tough. Toxaris' attitude here is similar to Anacharsis' derision of Greek athletics in comparison to the achievements in war, of which the Scythians are proud.
[458] Pervo 1997, 174.
[459] Val.Max. 4.7.4: mixtum cruorem amicorum et vulneribus innexa vulnera mortique inhaerentem mortem videre, haec sunt vera Romanae amicitiae indicia…

thereby transforms a barbarian stereotype into a non-barbarian virtue. He even comes forward as a moralist when he condemns the frivolity of Mnesippus' examples from everyday life. The way Toxaris presents Mnesippus' stories and summarises them hints at *topoi* in the discourse on friendship. In his view, Mnesippus presents stories that deal with arranging marriages, giving money, and helping someone out of prison (§35.14-17). The examples from everyday life that Toxaris chides are actually typical cases of assistance to friends in need in the cities of Athens as well as those of the Roman Empire.[460] Hence, on the one hand, Toxaris proves to be aware of Graeco-Roman practices of friendship, and on the other hand, he defends a moralist view within this system – in either case, not a very barbarian worldview. Then, if one accepts the allusion to the *pax romana* in Toxaris' mentioning the deep peace in which Greece reposes (ἐν εἰρήνῃ βαθείᾳ βιοῦσιν, §36.6), there is a further ironic twist to Toxaris' reproof of Greek friendship, for the *pax romana* actually preserves the Greeks from the invasions of… the barbarians.[461] In Toxaris' words, peace makes the Greeks different from the barbarians but also less virtuous than the latter. (Perhaps the Greeks would become better friends if they had to fight against the barbarians – or what are Mnesippus and Toxaris duelling for?)

Similarly, Toxaris' ethnographic description of the Scythian custom of making friends (§37), which he constructs as a *syncrisis* between Greek and Scythian social practices (οὐκ ... ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς/ἀλλ' ... ἴδωμεν, §37.2-3, καὶ ὅπερ ὑμεῖς/τοῦτο ἡμεῖς, §37.4-5) is ambiguously Greek, though being Scythian. The comparison rests on two points: First, Toxaris opposes the fact that the Greeks find their friends among their entourage of the same age or among their neighbours (οὐκ ἐκ τῶν πότων, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς, οὐδὲ εἰ συνέφηβός τις ἢ γείτων ᾖ, §37.2-3) to the way Scythians seek their friends among those whom they consider virtuous and capable of great achievements (ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν τινα ἴδωμεν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ μεγάλα ἐργάσασθαι δυνάμενον, §37.3-4). Thereby, he insinuates that

[460] For example, Xenophon (*Mem*. 2.4.6) mentions the following ways of supporting a friend in public and private life: one ought to help a friend in deep trouble with money, either by assisting him, through persuasion or by pressure. Plutarch, then, is more specific (*De amic. mult*. 95C). Underlining that one can help only one friend at a time, he names the following case in which assistance needs to be given to a friend: when he is going to sea, one should support him by travelling with him; when he is accused or accusing, by helping him in trial; when he is engaged in a sale, by supporting him; when he is getting married, by giving him a hand with the ceremonies; when he is mourning, by mourning with him. Interestingly, these sort of examples are especially found in condemnations of materialist (Epicurean) friendship. Thus, Seneca condemns Epicurean friendship because it consists in banalities such as caring for a friend when he is ill and helping him when he is in prison or in need (*Ep*. 9.8, cf. F 175 Usener). Plutarch condemns Epicurean friendship in a similar way (*Non posse* 1097C-D). When discussing the pleasure retrieved from the help given by a friend, Epicurean examples, which are as trivial as sharing food (cf. F 184a Usener), are opposed to really impressive examples of assistance given to a friend, such as obtaining for him remission from banishment or release from prison – paradoxically examples, which, in Seneca, are attributed to Epicurean deeds of friendship. The actual philosophical attribution or the true nature of Epicurean friendship is of no importance for the present discussion, but these passages illustrate concrete deeds of friendship in Graeco-Roman everyday life. For the fact that criticism of the materialist view of friendship is related to Cyrenaism and Epicureanism, see Fürst 1996, 200.

[461] Pernot 1993, 752 n. 142: 'Plusieurs passages de Lucien, mentionnant la paix profonde dans laquelle vivent les Grecs, paraissent être des allusions contemporaines.' Cf. *Anach*. 33, *DMort*. 14.2, etc. See Introduction, 'Context'.

the Greeks make friends by coincidence and for reasons of pleasure or utility.[462] The context of their friendship is set in the symposium (ἐκ τῶν πότων). By contrast, the Scythians choose their friends according to ethical criteria: only those who possess moral and physical excellence (ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ μεγάλα ἐργάσασθαι δυνάμενον) are worthy of their friendship, which, not surprisingly, has a heroic connotation.[463] Second, Toxaris compares the Greek tradition of seeking marriage (ὅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐν τοῖς γάμοις, §37.5) with the 'courting' of friends in Scythia (τοῦτο ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων ποιεῖν ἀξιοῦμεν, ἐπὶ πολὺ μνηστευόμενοι, §37.5-6). In order to gain someone's friendship, the Scythians 'court' their potential friend by acting as virtuously as possible and avoiding being blamed in any way (καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ πράττοντες ὡς μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν τῆς φιλίας μηδὲ ἀπόβλητοι δόξωμεν εἶναι, §37.6-7), which recalls the ideal of moral improvement in making friends.[464] Toxaris also compares Scythian practices of making friends to marriage in the Greek world (καὶ ὅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐν τοῖς γάμοις). He focusses on the image of marriage a second time, when the πολυφιλία, the opposite of a good friendship, is compared to prostitutes and adulterous women (ὡς ὅστις ἂν πολύφιλος ᾖ, ὅμοιος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ ταῖς κοιναῖς ταύταις καὶ μοιχευομέναις γυναιξί, §37.14-15), the opposite of matrimony. The comparison and metaphors of marriage and courting illustrate the contractual nature of Scythian friendship and the insoluble bond that unites Scythian friends (οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς διαλύσειεν ἄν, §36.13). But the use of such metaphors also clarifies that the comparison Toxaris makes is actually between a (Greek) domestic world and a (Scythian) world of manly companionship. By means of this transfer, Toxaris sketches a Scythian world where male friendship has suppressed matrimony as an institution. This suits Toxaris' rhetoric of manliness and the heroic background of his stories.

More importantly, Toxaris' Scythian practices of making friends builds on Greek ideals in friendship, and, as has been seen, this does not only concern the idea of moral improvement, for he addresses further *topoi*. For example, his comparison to the Greek friendships, which, as can easily be guessed, are made for the purpose of pleasure and profit as opposed to Scythian friendships with their regard for virtue (§36.2-4), hints at the tripartite categorisation of friendships (of pleasure, necessity and virtue), an idea originally developed by Aristoteles that pervades subsequent Graeco-Roman thought.[465] A further *topos* implied by Toxaris' description of making friends is the idea that

[462] The focus on neighbours as potential friends is an important concern in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. See Fraisse 1974, 65.
[463] For friendship and the ideal of ἀγαθός, see §1.4.
[464] See, e.g., X. *Mem*. 2.6 *passim*, and in Stoicism in general. For the principle of moral improvement through friendship, see above §1.13. The description of this search for friendship is described as 'courting' (*μνηστευόμενοι*). This does not have an exact parallel in the context of friendship, but the idea of courting is closely associated with the metaphor of hunting for trying to make friends with someone, which tends to have a homoerotic connotation (cf., e.g., Thgn. 1.1238a, 1345-1350, Plt. *Ly*. 206a-c2, X. *Mem*. 2.6.28, Plut. *Amat*. 4). In the two latter ones, the metaphor is explicitly used in the context of philosophical *erōs* and moral improvement. On hunt as courting in pederasty, see recently Barringer 2001, 71-124. However, in X. *Mem*. 2.6.8, this metaphor of hunting is deprived of any erotic connotation.
[465] See Introduction, 'Friendship'.

friends need to be carefully chosen (κρίσις) according to moral criteria (ἐπειδάν τινα ἴδωμεν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, §36.3, κἀπειδὰν προκριθείς τις ἤδη φίλος ᾖ, §36.8).[466] Then, the idea that friends should spend time together and die for one another (ᾖ μὴν καὶ βιώσεσθαι μετ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢν δέῃ, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸν ἕτερον, §36.9-10) is topical as well; the phrase ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸν ἕτερον is even almost formulaic (cf. e.g. Plut. *De amic. mult.* 93c, Clem. Alex. *Strom*. 2.9.41).[467] The precept that a friendship should not consist of more than two or three friends (ἐφεῖται δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἄχρι τριῶν ἐς τὰς συνθήκας εἰσιέναι, §36.14) is also recurrent in Graeco-Roman discourse on friendship.[468] In particular, the motif of adultery as a comparison for πολυφιλία is found in Philo of Alexandria (*Plant*. 104-105, *Leg*. 3.182) and Plutarch (*De Amic. Mult*. 93C).[469] The idea that πολυφιλία represents a dispersive force in friendship (καὶ οἰόμεθα οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἰσχυρὰν αὐτοῦ τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι, πρὸς πολλὰς εὐνοίας διαιρεθεῖσαν, §37.16-17) is found in Plutarch as well (*De amic. mult.* 93C and *passim*). Lastly, Toxaris explains that when two Scythians agree to make friends with one another, they conclude a pact, which is confirmed by a ritualised form of oath. The two friends cut a wound in their finger and let the blood drop into a cup, dip the tip of their sword into the cup and drink from the cup (§37.11-13). Ritualised forms of oaths or pacts of friendship have a tradition in Greek literature, especially in Homer but also in New Comedy.[470]

Speaking with the Voice of Greek Literary Tradition

Remarkably, Toxaris' Scythian oath of friendship is clearly an allusion to Herodotus' ethnographic description of Scythian customs. The semantic similarities between the present passage and

[466] See Introduction, 'Friendship'.
[467] For the idea that friends should spend time together, see esp. Arist. *EN* 1170b11-13, 1172a3-7, *EE* 1245a12-27 but also Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 52A, 93D with O'Neil 1997, 117-118, Them. *Or*. 22.275c. For the idea that friends should help one another up to the point of dying for one another, see §6.21-25.
[468] See X. *Mem*. 1.2.53, Arist. *EN* 1158a10-18, 117020-1171a, *EE* 1245b20-25 Plut. *Quomodo adulat.* 65A, D.Chr. 1.32, 3.105-107, Diog.Laert. 7.124, 2.81, Lib. 8.7, Them. *Or*. 22.267a, Cic. *Fin*. 1.65 (against Epicureans), *Off*. 2.8.30, Sen. *Epist*. 9.15, 74.26, 63.11, *Rem.Fort*. 15.2, *Tranq.An*. 3.6. See also Bohnenblust 1905, 15, 37-38, Fürst 1996, 184-185, Raccanelli 1998, 50 n. 24.
[469] In Ov. *Pont*. 3.2.19-20, materialist friendship is compared to a courtesan.
[470] For oaths of φιλότης in Homer, see, e.g., *Il*. 3.73, 94, 256, 323. For Homeric oaths in general, see Kitts 2005. For oaths and pacts of friendship comedy, see Pizzolato 1993, 114, Lizcano Rejano 2000, 244. Another exemplary oath of friendship is that of Theseus and Pirithous (Plut. *Thes*. 30.1-2). See also the proverb μέχρι τοῦ βωμοῦ φίλος εἰμί ([Plut.] *Reg. et imperat. apophthegmata* 186C, Plut. *De vit. pudore* 531C, *Praec. ger*. 808B, cf. Gell. *NA* 1.3.20, *Paroem.Gr*. II, p. 523). Oaths also play an important role in political 'friendships', cf. Th. 4.74.2, Plb. 7.9.4, etc., D.H. 4.58.4, 5.26.4, etc. For 'interstate' oaths of friendship, see Bayliss/Sommerstein 2013, 147-290. Although oaths of friendship are more often problematised than made the reason of trust, it still is a motif in the discourse on friendship. The fact that oaths are not always to be trusted is shown in archaic poetry, as, e.g., in the *Theognidea* or Hipponax. See Thgn. 1.283-286: ἀστῶν μηδενὶ πιστὸς ἐὼν πόδα τῶνδε πρόβαινε / μήθ' ὅρκωι πίσυνος μήτε φιλημοσύνηι, / μηδ' εἰ Ζῆν' ἐθέλοι παρέχειν βασιλῆα μέγιστον / ἔγγυον ἀθανάτων πιστὰ τιθεῖν ἐθέλων. See also Hippon. F 115.15-16 West. Later authors like Dio Chrysostom or Lucian, too, present oaths of friendship as something suspicious. Oaths of loyalty in friendship are also problematised in D.Chr. 74.6, 12, 14-15, Luc. *Cal*. 1. Dio Chrysostom, for his part, even insists on the unreliability of the word of friendship in 74.27: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἂν πιστεύοι τις τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς φιλίας […] φανερὸν δήπου. For the idea of a binding form of friendship – at threat, see Ov. *Pont*. 4.3.12 (paene puer puero iunctus amicitia), 4.13.43-44 (at tu, per studii communia foedera sacri, / per non uile tibi nomen amicitiae).

Herodotus' report of Scythian oath practices (4.70) are significant. Toxaris informs Mnesippus of a Scythian custom to take an oath of friendship 'in the following way' (καὶ οὕτω ποιοῦμεν). The two Scythian friends-to-be cut a little wound on their fingers, let the blood drop in a wine-cup (εἰς κύλικα) and drink the mixed blood from the tip of a sword (τὰ ξίφη ἄκρα). The account of the Scythian way of taking oaths in Herodotus proceeds similarly. The historian narrates that the Scythians proceed 'as follows' (ὧδε … ποιέωνται), that they cut a wound in some part of their body with a knife (μαχαίρῃ), mix the blood with wine in a cup (ἐς τὴν κύλικα), dip into it the tip of their arms (ἀκινάκην καὶ ὀϊστους καὶ σάγαριν καὶ ἀκόντιον) and drink the mixed blood. Although not all the words used are the same, the similarities are noticeable both on a semantic level (οὕτω/ὧδε, εἰς κύλικα/ἐς τὴν κύλικα) and with regard to the sequence of ritual gestures.[471] The description in the *Toxaris* thus undeniably echoes Herodotus' account. Thereby, as regards both content and form, the text proves to model the Scythian customs on their Greek literary portrayal once more. Besides, relating the κύλιξ with friendship is also significant with regard to Greek symposium culture as it might allude to the 'cup of friendship', which circled among the symposiasts.[472] By putting such a markedly Herodotean description of a Scythian custom into the mouth of a Scythian, that is, by underlining and at the same time denying the Scythian-ness of this oath-ritual, the text blurs the limits of what is Scythian and what is Greek.[473] This procedure allows confusing the boundaries of periphery and centre of Greek *paideia*: *paideia* is – geographically – everywhere, even on the lips of a Scythian.

Indeed, Toxaris is also the immediate mouthpiece of Hellenic views of friendship. Not by chance does Toxaris' phrasing when he confronts the Greek fair-weather friends with the true Scythian friends put to the test of hardship and tempest (ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν γαλήνῃ μάθοις εἰ ἀγαθὸς ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐστί· χειμῶνος γὰρ δεήσει σοὶ πρὸς τὴν διάγνωσιν, §36.6-8) recall a passage of Euripides' *Orestes*. Of course, the idea that true friends prove themselves in difficult times is topical.[474] However, the image of the calm sea (οὐδ' ἐν γαλήνῃ) in opposition to the true and tested friend recalls the passage of Euripides' tragedy where Orestes laments Menelaus' unreliability (vv.

[471] However, Toxaris knows the Persian ἀκινάκης, which he names a few times and even makes the god by which he swears his oath (§38.11). For the blood-mixing contract in Herodotus, see Hartog 1980, 180-184.
[472] Cf. Ach.Tat. 2.2.4, κύλικα φιλοτησίαν. See Whitmarsh 2020, *ad loc*. referring to Wecowski 2014, 50-51.
[473] However, it has been noted that in Herodotus, the practice of taking an oath and the idea to use blood in rituals is a recurrent custom and gesture in anthropology: 'Greeks and foreigners can differ locally in the details of their oath rituals, but the functions and essential features of oath-taking remain the same for all national groups.' Torrance in Sommerstein *et al*. 2013, 307. In general, she notes that the way an oath is performed is usually not a means to characterise the other. 'Representations in classical Greek sources of oaths and alliances sworn with and by foreigners ("barbarians") display no real features of "othering" proposed by the "polarity" and "alterity" approaches to Greco-foreign relations.' *Ibid*., 320. Notwithstanding this, it must be said that *drinking* blood does not seem to be involved in Greek rituals.
[474] See Fürst 1996, 210-216, esp. 214 referring to the famous saying in E. *Hec*. 1226-27 (ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ σαφέστατοι | φίλοι.) and to Cic. *Amic*. 17.64 (amicus certus in re incerta cernitur [=Enn. F 210 Vahlen]). See *ibid*. for further passages. See furthermore Thgn. 1.78-81, 697-698, Them. 22.274b-d. The idea is somewhat differentiated in Arist. *EN* 1171a22-b28: friends are needed in both good and hard times, and friendship in good times is even nobler, for it is free of necessity (1171a26).

719-24) and opposes his parent to his most faithful friend, Pylades, in the following way (vv. 725-28):

> ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε φίλτατον βροτῶν
> Πυλάδην δρόμωι στείχοντα Φωκέων ἄπο,
> ἡδεῖαν ὄψιν· *πιστὸς ἐν κακοῖς ἀνήρ*
> *κρείσσων γαλήνης ναυτίλοισιν εἰσορᾶν*.
>
> But I see Pylades, most cherished [friend] amongst the mortals, coming at a run from Phocis; what pleasant sight! A man faithful in adversity is worthier to see than a calm sea for sailors.

The use of the calm sea in the *Toxaris* is not quite the same as in Euripides' *Orestes*: while in the dialogue, the calm sea is equated with the absence of means of testing a friend, in the tragedy, the calm sea is only the minor term of a comparison that stresses the benefit of a true friend. However, the vv. 727-28, which might be considered to have a gnomic value, are unique in the association of γαλήνη with friendship, although sea metaphors do occur in the discourse on friendship (see §7.5-7). Then, considering that Toxaris takes the seven first chapters of the dialogue to praise Orestes and Pylades and thereby engages with Euripides (the *IT*), it seems quite appropriate to maintain that he reactivates the comparison with *the* exemplary pair of friend for the dialogue, especially in a passage that, as in the tragedy, opposes unreliable to faithful friends (βεβαιότατα συντιθέμεθα τὰς φιλίας, §36.11). On the other hand, there are some astonishingly similar images of friendship in Ovid. For example, in *Trist*. 1.5.17-18, the Ovid-persona observes in terms that reminds us of Toxaris' point here that the loyalty of his friends would not have been tested if he had had fair wind for sailing.[475] Even without accepting the specific reference to Euripides and/or Ovid, it is clear that Toxaris speaks with the voice of the Graeco-Roman tradition of friendship. Moreover, Toxaris presents himself and Mnesippus as epic contenders.[476] This is significant not only with regard to his (problematised) characterisation as subject of a warlike people, but also because it inevitably alludes to the paradigm of epic warfare, Homer – Homer, who is the foundation and culmination of *paideia*. By means of his self-fashioning as a Homeric hero, Toxaris becomes the reincarnate manifestation of Homeric values and is made to embody the quintessence of *paideia*.

Poetological Arguments

The second aspect that comes into play in Toxaris' polemics is poetological and rhetorical, for the passage proves to engage not only with a broad literary tradition (from Homer to Herodotus and

[475] See also the nautical metaphor in v. 36, where friendship is compared to a safe harbour (cf. *Trist*. 4.5.5-6, 5.6.2). For the idea in general, see also Val.Max. 4.7.*praef*.

[476] Toxaris places much emphasis on the Scythians' heroic virtues in friendship (παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχεῖς οἱ πόλεμοι, καὶ ἢ ἐπελαύνομεν ἄλλοις ἢ ὑποχωροῦμεν ἐπιόντας ἢ συμπεσόντες ὑπὲρ νομῆς ἢ λείας μαχόμεθα, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ φίλων ἀγαθῶν, §36.8-10).

Euripides) but also with literary criticism and contemporary practices of rhetorical self-fashioning. When Toxaris announces that, unlike Mnesippus, he will start his stories 'forthwith' and 'without embellishments' (πλὴν ἄρξομαί γε ἤδη, μηδὲν ὥσπερ σὺ καλλιλογησάμενος, §35.11), the verb καλλιλογέω, also 'to speak in an ornate style', clearly hints at the grander style in the ancient categorisation of *genera elocutionis*. The verb itself, which is used before Lucian only by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, has no clear meaning but is always related to the idea of euphony, grandeur and solemnity.[477] Toxaris thus opposes his, by deduction, simple style to Mnesippus' ornate speech and thereby reclaims for himself a style that denotes purity and archaism in contrast to the sophistications of his opponent in narration – although the meaning of the verb is certainly also related to the idea of exaggerated, or more precisely 'embellished', praise, a fact that hints at the encomiastic practice of εὐφημία.

Then, Toxaris takes offence at the content of Mnesippus' stories. Their characters are base (τις ἄπροικον), ugly (αἰσχρὰν γυναῖκα) and shrewd (§35.15-17); their content is πάνυ γὰρ εὐτελῆ (§35.17-18) and μικρὰ (§36.4). These are, *prima facie*, moral judgements. However, the adjective εὐτελής could also contain a literary-critical judgement. In the beginning of Aristotles' *Poetics*, where he describes the birth of poetry as a mimetic process, he explains that the εὐτελέστεροι-poets started imitating the works of the base and common people (*Po*. 1448b27) and that comedy developed therefrom (*Po*. 1449a4). Further on, he uses the adjective to describe everyday words as opposed to poetic diction (*Po*. 1458b22).[478] The things εὐτελῆ that are represented in Mnesippus' stories thus designate what is low, base, common, the things of everyday life, which are the subject-matter of comedy, but there is also an assimilation of the subject represented with the way it is represented (style, speech), and beyond this with the ethical character of the author/speaker. The interpretation of Toxaris' εὐτελῆ as a comment upon Mnesippus' comedy-like stories, then, is supported by the definition of the latter as παιδιά (§36.2). Elsewhere, too, in Lucian, the word has a connotation of 'laughable', 'not serious' or 'joke' (*Pseud*. 16, *Sat*. 13, *DDeor*. 22.1; cf. §22.15). By opposition, again (ἐγὼ δέ, §36.1), Toxaris claims for himself the contrary of 'base subject-matter'. Indeed, his stories deal with what is lacking in Mnesippus' stories: 'imposing' (μεγαλουργόν) deeds of courage (ἀνδρεῖον, §35.18). This and the announced stories of battles and heroic fights (§36.1-2) therefore

[477] In *Is*. 9, the verb means something like 'to embellish with' (here elegance, σεμνότερον); in *Comp*. 3, it denotes the opposite of simplicity. The related noun καλλιλογία recurs more frequently. In *Comp*. 16.14, its meaning is rather unclear, but it is translated by Aujac/Lebel 1981 as 'mots qui comportent une belle sonorité', cf. Longin. *Rh*. p. 561.9 Walz, where it also defines the sonorous effect of rhetorical embellishment. In *Dem*. 3, it is placed on the same level as Demosthenes' excellence in adorning (τὰς ἐπιθέτους κατασκευὰς βέλτιον ἀποδειξαμένους) an essentially simple style. In *Comp*. 16.17, it is associated with μεγαλοπρέπεια and σεμνότης, and in *Thuc*. 27 with μεγαληγορία and δεινότης. Cf. similarly *Dem*. 4 (referring to Gorgias and Thucydides), 13 (as opposed to ἀκρίβεια), and *Pomp*. 5.3.4. Interestingly, καλλιλγογία is used in Max.Tyr. 17.1 with reference to the sophist Prodicus. In the list of synonyms in Poll. 5.117, the word is strongly associated with praise: ἔπαινος, εὐφημία, εὐλογία, ἐγκώμιον· βίαιον δὲ τὸ καλλιλογία καὶ εὐστομία· ἐπαινεῖν, εὐλογεῖν, εὐφημεῖν, ἐγκωμιάζειν, καλῶς λέγειν, εὐστομεῖν.
[478] See Möller 2004, 72-76.

associate Toxaris' stories with epics. Thus, Toxaris plays off against one another not only two styles, grand and simple, but also two modes: comedy and epic.[479]

Possible interpretations of this passage develop along two perspectives. The first is related to the question of rhetorical self-fashioning and the rhetoric of virility that pervade ancient rhetoric but particularly concern the practices of speech-contests and rhetorical exhibition of the Imperial period. Not least of all, the fact that Mnesippus presents himself and is characterised by Toxaris as an orator points in that direction.[480] In particular, Toxaris' aggressive behaviour towards Mnesippus, though, makes sense of the eristic dynamics of the dialogue, as its characters are presented as rival orators.[481] Toxaris' emphasis on the lack of manly courage in Mnesippus' stories and on the heroic character of Scythian friendship and stories of friendship is meaningful with regard to the ongoing rhetoric of virility and this reflects a contemporary social practice.[482] Indeed, in the Imperial period, issues of rhetorical style are deeply connected with those of power and self-representation, and the rhetorical self-fashioning, or display of rhetorical skill, is a way to prove one's 'manly excellence'. Toxaris' stress on the comedy-like nature of his opponent's stories and on his use of ornate embellishments indicates that he resorts to the polarising rhetoric of effeminacy and manliness to denigrate and discredit his adversary. In his opinion, Mnesippus appears to be unmanly – in fact, Toxaris clearly says so (καὶ μεγαλουργὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἀνδρεῖον ἔνι οὐδέν, §35.18). In this way, the passage stages a power struggle that is essentially rhetorical but also has moral implications. The second perspective is poetological. By means of this discussion, the text incites the recipients to read/listen to Toxaris' stories with an eye upon, or an ear for, evidence of stylistic effects besides ethical questions. The recipients are thus involved in the judgemental process of the dialogue, of which they become active participants.

To sum up, Toxaris' polemics about style and friendship reveal themselves as paradoxical transactions: the more Toxaris underlines the Scythian-ness of his stories and values, the more he

[479] Interestingly, Toxaris claims for himself the opposite of εὐτέλεια, which is σεμνότης (cf. Arist. *Po*. 1448b26, cf. *Rh*. 1408a13). The meaning of these words with regard to style shows that there is a discrepancy between style and subject-matter in Toxaris' condemnation of Mnesippus' stories: they are of grand style (καλλιλογησάμενος) but at the same time present ordinary matters (εὐτελῆ). Similarly, one deduces that Toxaris prefers for himself a simple style, but presents heroic actions. The dialogue incites the recipients to reflect on the stories but is definitely not a rhetorical compendium.

[480] There is a further aspect to Toxaris' criticism of Mnesippus' narrative style, which characterises him, in part *ex negativo*, as an orator: he does not start immediately with the subject at hand, but – one needs to add – uses long proems. This, at least according to Lucian's Timon, is characteristic of these 'devils of orators' (λέγε, μὴ μακρὰ μέντοι, μηδὲ μετὰ προοιμίων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπίτριπτοι ῥήτορες, *Tim*. 37).

[481] In the *Toxaris*, it is evident that Toxaris' aims are antagonistic and that his attitude towards Mnesippus is even offensive. His aggressive attitude shows in the way he downplays Mnesippus' stories and constantly belittles him (e.g. τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα ἐπαινεῖτε, §36.4-5). Cf. Marquis, 356 n. 136: 'Toxaris fait un résumé un peu méprisant des actions accomplies par les amis dont Mnèsippos a fait l'éloge. […] Il minimise donc la valeur des exemples de Mnèsippos en insistant sur le caractère strictement matériel de l'aide procurée pas [sic] les amis grecs et l'absence de danger veritable encouru.'

[482] See Gleason 1995.

defends Greek social, aesthetic and ethical ideals. Besides, his Greekness comes to the fore in his use of literary models such as Homer, Herodotus and Euripides, to whom he recurs in different ways (punctual allusions and foil for ethical values). To this a further aesthetic aspect that stresses Toxaris' paradoxical positioning is added: He actually contradicts what he reproves in his very speech act. His promise to start immediately (ἄρξομαί γε ἤδη, §35.11) plainly fails: first, he lingers with his polemics against Greek friendship (§36); then he delays his speech with an excursus on Scythian practices of making friends (§37). Toxaris thus proves to be intent on creating an effect of retardation and arousing the expectations of the (intra- and extra-)diegetic recipients.[483] Finally, Toxaris partly contradicts his own objections against stylistic embellishments by making himself ample use of these in this passage. What at first seems to be a *recusatio* for his choice of a simple style develops into polemics against Greek friendship (§36) by means of which Toxaris is able to display his eloquence. In this diatribe-like passage, there are numerous figures of style. Within hardly 12 OCT lines, one finds a polysyndetic climactic construction with *homoioteleuta* and ending with a *clausula* in cretics (φόνους πολλοὺς καὶ πολέμους καὶ θανάτους ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων, §36.1-2), a οὐδὲ-ἀλλά construction (§36.4), and a polysyndetic parallel construction and *amplificatio* in the third colon, which could be described as *macrologia* (καὶ [1.] ἢ ἐπελαύνομεν ἄλλοις [2.] ἢ ὑποχωροῦμεν ἐπιόντας [3.] ἢ συμπεσόντες ὑπὲρ νομῆς ἢ λείας μαχόμεθα, §36.9-10). Additionally, there is a nautical *simile* (ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἂν ἐν γαλήνῃ μάθοις εἰ ἀγαθὸς ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐστί· χειμῶνος γὰρ δείσει σοὶ πρὸς τὴν διάγνωσιν, §36.6-7), a metaphor (φιλία = μόνον τοῦτο ὅπλον, §36.11), and a synonymic expression ending with a *clausula* in dactyl and *spondaeus* (ἄμαχον καὶ δυσπολέμητον with *brevis in longo*, §36.12). The concentration of these figures in this place characterises the style of Toxaris' preamble as *ornatus* – not quite the simplicity that he advocates so vehemently.

§§38-42 Toxaris' First Story: A Priceless Sacrifice to Save a Friend

Summary of the Story

Toxaris' first story is about Dandamis and his friend Amizoces. According to the Scythian fighting spirit, the action takes place on a battlefield, where the Scythians are engaged in a war against the Sarmatians, a people whose territories were not clearly defined in antiquity but in any case adjacent to the Scythians'.[484] Dandamis and Amizoces, who have become friends only recently, are engaged in the war against the Sarmatians. The Scythians are defeated, and Amizoces is taken prisoner (§39). He calls his friend Dandamis for help, and the latter, perceiving his friend's distress, rushes to his aid. Dandamis succeeds in negotiating with the leader of the Sarmatians that Amizoces be released in exchange for his own eyes. They both swim back to the Scythian shore of the river Tanais (§40).

[483] Cf. Aeschylus in Ar. *Ra*. 909-20 with Novokhatko 2021, 46-47.
[484] Their geographical localisation varies from the eastern side of the Tanais, the actual Don river, (thus Hdt. 4.123) to various territories between the eastern confines of Germania to the river Borysthenes, te actual Dniepr. See RE XLIX.3 (1921) s.v. Sarmatia 1-3 [Kretschmer].

Their courageous demonstration of friendship heartens the Scythians but frightens the Sarmatians, who understand the valour of their enemy and take flight. As a sign of his gratitude and as an act of equity in friendship, Amizoces blinds himself, too. The story ends with Dandamis and Amizoces receiving public honours from the Scythian community (§41).

Toxaris' Oath and Mnesippus' Reaction

Toxaris abruptly stops his narration (§38.3), reminding himself and Mnesippus that he has not yet taken the oath he promised to take at the beginning of his speech (ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἀρχῇ διωμολογησάμην, §38.4, cf. §11.25-26). He thus returns to this and swears that he 'will tell no lie about his Scythian friendships' (οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ψεῦδος ἐρῶ περὶ τῶν φίλων τῶν Σκυθῶν, §38.5-6). Toxaris' deferring of the oath and the litotes (οὐδέν ... ψεῦδος) discredit the reliability of his stories in the eyes of Mnesippus, who immediately questions the validity of Toxaris' oath. He did not need Toxaris' oath, he says (ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πάνυ σου ὀμνύντος ἐδεόμην, §38.7), and does not recognise 'Wind' and 'Akinakes' ('Sword'), by whom Toxaris takes his oath (οὐ μὰ γὰρ τὸν Ἄνεμον καὶ τὸν Ἀκινάκην, §38.5), as gods (σὺ δὲ ὅμως εὖ ποιῶν οὐδένα θεῶν ἐπωμόσω, §38.8).[485] From Mnesippus' antagonistic perspective, Toxaris' oath is inappropriate – and indeed, considering its connotation of 'empty words' (cf. the expression ἀνέμῳ διαλέγεσθαι [cf. Suid. α 2663]), swearing by the 'Wind' might, objectively, call for critique or suspicion. Moreover, uttered by Mnesippus, the expression εὖ ποιῶν is either ironic (as he does not recognise the Toxaris' gods) or he insinuates that Toxaris is willingly cheating and will deceive him. However, notwithstanding the doubts he raises, Mnesippus is bound by the oath to believe and trust Toxaris.[486]

Mnesippus' reaction also recalls his scepticism at the beginning of the dialogue, where he responded to Toxaris' description of the Scythian worship of Orestes and Pylades with disbelief and mockery (cf. §§1-8). As in the beginning of the dialogue, Toxaris continues with an explanation that justifies his, or rather the Scythians' (he uses the first person plural), socio-religious practices, which he regards as self-evident (τί σὺ λέγεις; οὔ σοι δοκοῦσιν ὁ Ἄνεμος καὶ ὁ Ἀκινάκης θεοὶ εἶναι; §38.9). 'Wind' and 'Sword', according to Toxaris, stand for the two most important moments of a human being's life: birth and death (ὡς τὸν μὲν ἄνεμον ζωῆς αἴτιον ὄντα, τὸν ἀκινάκην δὲ ὅτι ἀποθνήσκειν ποιεῖ, §38.12-13). Toxaris' equation between ἄνεμος and 'life' is essentially a Graeco-Roman one, as this equation is traditionally explained either by taking 'wind' as a generative force (cf. Verg. *G*. 3.273-275, Plin. *NH* 8.67), or by associating 'wind' with πνεῦμα, the breath of life (e.g., E. *Suppl*. 533-535). Mnesippus, however, takes Toxaris' 'otherness' for granted and deconstructs Toxaris' religious symbolism, which he takes literally and whose logic he comically takes *ad absurdum*. If

[485] Alternatively, or additionally, one could think of the proverb 'to speak like a Scythian', which means 'to speak the truth' (thus D.L. 1.101 who applies it to Anacharsis' παρρησία). Mnesippus does not need Toxaris' oath, as, being a Scythian, he will speak the truth anyway.

[486] For an interpretation of Mnesippus' (and Toxaris') objections and remarks about the truthfulness and quality of their stories as making part of the inner-fictional eristic dynamics of the competition and the structural aesthetics of the dialogue, see Schissel 1912, 51, 58-61.

'death' should be represented through a deity, thus Mnesippus' objection, the Scythians could as well consider weapons such as 'Arrow' and 'Spear' as gods (καὶ μὴν εἰ διά γε τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλους ἂν ἔχοιτε πολλοὺς θεοὺς οἷος ὁ Ἀκινάκης ἐστί, τὸν Ὀιστὸν καὶ τὴν Λόγχην καὶ Κώνειον δὲ καὶ Βρόχον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, §38.14-16). Mnesippus thus not only derides Toxaris' (etymologising) ethnographical explanations of names of gods; his reaction also seriously questions specific religious practices that underlie the 'Scythian' identification of deities.[487] The religious symbolism he mocks and whose arbitrariness he demonstrates could equally apply to the identification of any other more or less extravagant deities, and possibly to the Greek pantheon too.[488]

On the other hand, Toxaris' oath by 'Wind' and 'Akinakes' conforms to the common stereotyped characterisation of the Scythians as bellicose people. In particular, the word ἀκινάκης evokes the Scythian-Persian world.[489] Throughout Greek literature, this foreign word and object symbolises in an essentialist way the 'otherness' of the populations of the East, for it seems to be a *mot obligé* to recreate the idea of a Persian context.[490] The fact that, regardless of the linguistic and actual origin of the object, the ἀκινάκης is indiscriminately identified with Scythians or Persians in Greek literature indicates that it works as a stereotype.[491] The idea of Scythian worship of the 'Akinakes' could also be a witty, if not ironic, deformation of Herodotus' account according to which the Scythians worship Ares under the form of a sword (ἀκινάκης) placed on the top of a sacred pile (Hdt. 4.62.2).[492] The question of whether this worship is based on actual Scythian religious practices is irrelevant for the understanding of its use in the *Toxaris*.[493] There, the deities 'Wind' and 'Akinakes' by whom Toxaris takes his oath represent a stereotype stressing the belligerent spirit of

[487] For Herodotus' hermeneutics and interest in the etymology and metaphors of foreign languages, see Munson 2005, 30-66.
[488] To which Mnesippus alludes by mentioning the 'many paths' that lead to the god of death, in other words, to Hades (ποικίλος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ θεὸς ὁ θάνατος καὶ ἀπείρους τὰς ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν παρέχεται ἀγούσας ὁδούς, §38.16-17). For a similar criticism, see *Deor.Conc*. 9, where Momus criticises the practice of making a god of anyone one wishes to regards as a god, as the Scythians (the Getans) do: τοιγαροῦν οἱ Σκύθαι ταῦτα ὁρῶντες, οἱ Γέται αὐτῶν, μακρὰ ἡμῖν χαίρειν εἰπόντες αὐτοὶ ἀπαθανατίζουσι καὶ θεοὺς χειροτονοῦσιν οὓς ἂν ἐθελήσωσι.
[489] With few exceptions including words for clothes, weapons and socio-religious institutions, foreign words are usually translated into Greek. One of these exceptions is ἀκινάκης. See Baslez 1984, 187 (generally in Greek literature), Munson 2005, 56 (ethnographic accounts), 58-60 ('orientalistic' use of ἀκινάκης).
[490] See, e.g., X. *An*. 1.2.27 and *passim*, *Cyr*. 7.3.14 and *passim*, D. 24.129, Plb. *Fr*. 54.15, Charito 6.4.2, J. *AJ* 20.186, Plut. *Art*. 15.2, Arr. *An*. 6.29.6, Paus. 1.28.11, D.C. 49.29.3 and *passim*, Lib. *Decl*. 17.1.46. The most conspicuous example of the essentialist use of the ἀκινάκης is Plut. *De Alex. Fort*. 329C: τὸ δ' Ἑλληνικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικὸν μὴ χλαμύδι μηδὲ πέλτῃ μηδ' ἀκινάκῃ μηδὲ κάνδυι διορίζειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ἀρετῇ τὸ δὲ βαρβαρικὸν κακίᾳ τεκμαίρεσθαι, κοινὰς δ' ἐσθῆτας ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τραπέζας καὶ γάμους καὶ διαίτας, δι' αἵματος καὶ τέκνων ἀνακεραννυμένους. In this passage of the *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, where he illustrates the cultural exchange between the Greeks and the conquered Asians, Plutarch metonymically uses the weapons and clothes for the peoples (χλαμύς and – though originally Thracian – πέλτη for the Greeks and ἀκινάκης and κάνδυς for the Persians).
[491] Thus, Herodotus mentions it as a Persian sword (and word), e.g., in 7.54.2, but in 4.62.2-3, 4.70 the word is used for the Scythian sword. For the ἀκινάκης in Herodotus, see Munson 2005, 59-60 with n. 133.
[492] In the text: ἐπὶ τούτου δὴ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀκινάκης σιδήρεος ἵδρυται ἀρχαῖος ἑκάστοισι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ Ἄρεος τὸ ἄγαλμα. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ ἀκινάκῃ θυσίας ἐπετείους προσάγουσι προβάτων καὶ ἵππων, καὶ δὴ καὶ †τοῖσδε† ἔτι πλέω θύουσι ἢ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι θεοῖσι.
[493] For a discussion of possible references to or modifications by Lucian of actual Scythian religious worships of the 'Wind' and the 'Akinakes', see Marquis, 526-528 n. 143.

the Scythians. However, the stereotype is not accepted as an ethnographical 'fact'; the purpose is not to characterise Toxaris as a barbarian but foremost to invalidate the significance of the stereotype.[494] This is achieved by transforming the stereotype into the object of worship. What Herodotus explains as a religious symbol in the context of the Scythian worship of the Greek god Ares is taken literally as the worship of the symbol itself, the ἀκινάκης. The fact that the ἀκινάκης represents a stereotype is also observed in further passages in Lucian's works where the Scythians are said to worship the 'Akinakes'. In *Scyth*. 4, Anacharsis, who represents the prototype of the foreigner arriving in the capital of Greek culture, Athens, swears by 'Akinakes' and 'Zamolxis', his and Toxaris' 'native gods' (τῶν πατρῴων ἡμῖν θεῶν). In *JTr*. 42, Damis mocks the traditional Greek religion whose non-sense is shown – among other things – by the proliferation of its new adaptations, for which the Scythian worship of the 'Akinakes' is one example.[495] The comparison reinforces the idea that, in the *Toxaris*, the oath by the 'Akinakes' and its worship refer to Greek religious practices and simultaneously caricatures Greek stereotypes of the Scythians.[496] In some sense, Toxaris conforms to Greek stereotyped ideas about Scythians, but at the same time, by exaggerating these, he deconstructs them. By way of the caricature that the oath represents, the text distances himself from the prejudiced idea of the warlike barbarian: the stereotype is clearly marked as such and invalidated by its emphatic transformation into a god and the absurd discussion this generates. The stereotype is less actuated than it is used ironically or ambivalently.

Finally, Toxaris contradicts the image of the violent and ineloquent barbarian when he resorts to – assumedly Greek – rhetorical stratagems to answer Mnesippus' derision of the Scythian gods. In order to cut short any further objections to or discussion about the Scythian worship of the 'Akinakes', Toxaris strikes back by reproaching Mnesippus with interrupting him and making their contest 'a sophistic word-match and judicial dispute' (τοῦτο ὡς ἐριστικὸν ποιεῖς καὶ δικανικόν, §38.18-19). Remarkably, the adjective δικανικός draws attention to the judicial-epideictic modalities of the storytelling-competition and further characterises Mnesippus and Toxaris' dialogue as a sophistic disputation, while ἐριστικός emphasises the aggressiveness of Mnesippus' intervention.[497] This characterisation of the competition between Mnesippus and Toxaris as an eristic-sophistic contention is reinforced by Toxaris' thematising the implicit rules of speaking in turns during epideictic speeches (ὁρᾷς ... ὑποκρούων μεταξὺ καὶ διαφθείρων μου τὸν λόγον; ἐγὼ δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον σοῦ λέγοντος, §38.18-20).[498] While it remains unclear during the whole dialogue whom of the two contenders, the Greek or the Scythian, prevails, in this round, Toxaris regains control over the

[494] Compare Woolf 2011, esp. chap. 4, for traditionalism in the ethnography of the barbarians (of the West) in (Latin) imperial literature. For persistent ethnic stereotypes, see also Spawforth 2001, analysing the self-representation and representation of the Lydians by the Greeks and Romans.
[495] Compare Clem.Al. *Protr*. 5.64.5.
[496] For 'ridiculous' oaths in Lucian, see e.g. *Vit.Auct*. 4. See also Anderson 1976a, 20.
[497] For the important role of aggressiveness and 'manly power' in sophistic contention, see Gleason 1995.
[498] Compare Plt. *Tim*. 26e6-27a1, esp. Socrates' statement ἐμὲ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν χθὲς λόγων νῦν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα ἀντακούειν, but see also *Hp.Mi*. 364b6 for not interrupting a speech. See below §56.7-57.2.

interaction. Mnesippus has to accept the critique and promise to keep silent, as if he were 'not present in Toxaris' speech at all' (ὡς μηδὲ παρόντος ἐμοῦ τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτω σιωπήσομαί σοι, §38.22-23).[499] In conclusion, this exchange of ripostes by Mnesippus and Toxaris demonstrates once more that no single perspective is defended in the dialogue: both characters represent – in turns and simultaneously – the voice of tradition and that of criticism, the serious and the comic voice, which takes the Greek perspective as well as the external perspective.

Historiography and Scythian Ethnography

In his narration, Toxaris adopts the stance of a historiographer. Although Toxaris distances himself from the content of the narration, which consists in part of reported facts (ἐλέγοντο, §39.4) and presents motivations unknown to him (οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι δόξαν τοῖς ἀρχιπλάνοις ἡμῶν, §39.9), he demonstrates that he has precise knowledge of the events. Thus, he narrates the battle and its aftermath in detail: the posting of the enemy's troops, the attack by surprise, the defeat of the Scythians, who are killed, taken prisoners or succeed in escaping to the part of the encampment on the other side of the river. Then comes the retaliation, which includes the description of the booty that the Sarmatians take from the Scythians and the rape of their concubines and wives.[500] Moreover, Toxaris uses expressions that belong to the stock vocabulary of historiographical accounts.[501] Detailing the course of the events in this way is not only topical of narrations of historical events, but also fulfils a specific function: to testify to the reliability of the account. Details typically indicate that the narrator possesses accurate knowledge of the narrated events and that he has conducted his inquiry conscientiously, methodologically and critically.[502] In the present passage, details such as indications of time (τετάρτη ... ἡμέρα, §39.1), geographical setting (ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὄχθας τοῦ Τανάϊδος, §39.10), or the number of enemies (μυρίοις, τρὶς τοσοῦτοι, §39.3) underline Toxaris' accurate knowledge of the events and attest to the reliability of his story, which is a necessary procedure to have Mnesippus validate the story.

On the other hand, some of these details and further elements support the ethnic characterisation of the story, by creating a Scythian setting for the friendship of Dandamis and Amizoces. Therefore, the names of geographical features such as the river Tanais are significant. The choice of this river is all the more significant in that it represents the farthest north-eastern limits of Europe and the border to Asia, thus emphasising the remoteness and the 'exoticism' of Toxaris' story. Further objects, such as the Scythians' chariots (τῶν ἁμαξῶν, §398, τὰς ἁμάξας, §39.12 and

[499] Later in the dialogue, in his turn, Mnesippus is justified to criticise Toxaris' abuse of his silence (§58.9-10). See below.
[500] For battle scenes in Lucian, see Anderson 1976a, 36-39.
[501] Besides the military vocabulary (ἱππεῦσιν, πεζοί, στρατοπέδου, αἰχμάλωτα, κτλ.), the expressions οὐ προϊδομέμοις τὴν ἔφοδον (§39.4, cf. e.g. D.S. 18.52.6, D.H. 1.65.3, Plb. 1.3.9, 3.116.6), αὐτάνδρους…ἁλισκομένας (§39.12, cf. e.g. D.S. 12.48.1), ἐπὶ λύτροις (ἥκοντα) (§40.7, cf. e.g. Plut. *Marc*. 18.3, App. *Mith*. 418, Luc. *VH* 2.44), and ἐκ παρασκευής (§41.5-6, cf. e.g. Plut. *Pomp*. 60.1) are worth mentioning.
[502] See above, §§10-12.3.

§41.8), their tents (τὰς σκηνάς, §39.12) and cattle (τῶν βοσκημάτων, §41.7), illustrate Greek ideas about Scythians and their famous nomadic lifestyle.[503] Mentioning the Scythians' concubines (τὰς παλλακίδας, §39.14) indicates an 'orientalistic' (that is, stereotyped, undifferentiated and essentialist) perspective on Scythia, for, in the Greek imagination, concubines are typically associated with the Persian-Asian world.[504] However, in the *Toxaris*, these stereotypes undergo a comic, or at least humorous, transformation. For example, the verb σκηνόω (ἐσκηνώσαμεν, §39.8) here means 'to encamp', but it can also mean 'to live in a tent', thereby alluding again to the Scythian nomadic lifestyle.[505] Embedding the stereotype in a wordplay invites the recipients to read this and the other ethnic characteristics in Toxaris' stories as tongue-in-cheek comments on the Greeks' Scythian imagination. Then, the word ἀρχιπλάνος (ἀρχιπλάνοις, §39.9), which is a *hapax legomenon*, confers a comic tone on the staging of a Scythian setting. The noun ('chief-wayfarer') must refer to some sort of administrative institution or function (ἀρχι-), but its exact meaning or reference to possible Scythian historical realities is obscure.[506] In fact, it is a Lucianic invention, whose compound nature recalls comic word-formation, another pun on the Scythian nomadic lifestyle (-πλάνος).[507] The two characters' names, Ἀμιζώκης and Δανδάμις, likewise constitute inventions, and – not surprisingly – sound like 'Persian' names.[508] Or at least, they sound generically exotic and foreign, as Dandamis was also known as an Indian gymnosophist (cf. Plut. *Alex*. 65.3, Arr. F 175b.4 FrGH).

Toxaris further emphasises the Scythian context of his story by means of ethnographical *excursus*. First, there is the mysterious custom of 'calling out Zires' (ὁ δὲ ἐβόα τὸ Ζίρην, §40.6), which Toxaris explains as a way of gaining immunity from one's enemies in order to negotiate a ransom (ὡς ἐπὶ λύτροις ἥκοντα, §40.7). In fact, the invocation of βοή (βοάω) implies a situation of emergency, in particular in war, and is a compelling call for help.[509] The exact meaning of the foreign word 'Zires' is not clear. Schmeja, following Vasmer's suggestion, relates the word Ζίρης with the Old Iranian word for 'gold' (*Zer*). Hence, interpreting the sentence καὶ ταῦτα Ζίρην ἥκοντα (§40.15) as a concessive phrase, he translates Ζίρης as 'ransom' ('Lösegeld').[510] However, this is problematic in two respects: first, as Marquis underlines, Dandamis comes to the Sarmatians in order to negotiate a ransom, not to propose himself as a ransom. This solution is only adopted because Dandamis has nothing else to offer but his own person. The meaning of Ζίρης could well be 'negotiator of ransom',

[503] For the chariots, see, e.g., Hes. F 97-98, Pind. F 105ab, A. *PV* 709-710, Hippoc. *AWP* 18, Hdt. 4.46, Luc. *Icar*. 16. See also Skinner 2012, 68 and 71 with n. 63. For their nomadic lifestyle, see, e.g., Hdt. 4.2.2, 4.46.
[504] See, e.g., X. *HG* 3.1.10, *An*. 1.10.2, *Cyr*. 4.3.1, 5.2.28, Ctes. F 1p *α.10 [= Ath. 12.528f = 12.38 Kaibel], 1q.12 [= Ath. 12.529b = 12.28 Kaibel], F13a.8 [= Ath. 13.560e = 13.10 Kaibel] FrGH III.C, D.S. 1.47.1, 1.84.6, 2.21.2, etc., Duris F 14.9, Charito 6.9.6, Plut. *Quaest. Conv*. 613A, Luc. *Merc.Cond*. 29, Ath. 13.576d [= 13.37 Kaibel], 13.608a [= 13.87 Kaibel]. Significantly, the word παλλακίς does not appear in Scythian contexts.
[505] See LSJ s.v. I.1. and 2.
[506] Compare Marquis, 528 n. 147.
[507] For a similar comic coining of compound words that denote exoticism, see *VH* 2.33.
[508] See Marquis, 358 n. 141 (with references).
[509] See Schulze 1966 [1932], 182-184, 186-188, Telò 2003, 167-168. One could say that shouting out βοή has an illocutive function.
[510] See Schmeja 1972, 25-27.

as suggests Toxaris' explanation (ὡς ἐπὶ λύτροις ἥκοντα). Consequently, it is difficult to accept the concessive meaning of καὶ ταῦτα Ζίρην ἥκοντα; rather, it is a causal phrase, for the Sarmatians are not allowed to keep Dandamis *because* he came as a negotiator and not as a ransom.[511] Be that as it may, the point of the story is definitely understandable, and it does not matter whether the word is Iranian or not, or what it exactly means; the purpose of this foreign (-sounding) word is to confer an effect of difference, of exoticism on the story. The way this 'Zires-custom' is represented, as a strange habit that requires some explanation (τοῦτο δέ, §40.6), recalls the tradition of ethnographical θαύματα.[512]

Then, there is the episode of cutting off the eyes (§40.17-21), which does not *per se* have an ethnographical intent, but must nonetheless be categorised as a wondrous account. When Dandamis is brought to the leader of the Sarmatians, he succeeds in negotiating that his friend Amizoces be released, but the price for the ransom is high: he must leave his eyes behind. Here, the eyes primarily represent something precious, even priceless – as priceless as friendship.[513] However, there has been an attempt to relate the episode to its Scythian context as well, and in particular to Herodotus' observation that the Scythians blind their prisoners (Hdt. 4.2.2).[514] The two episodes of blinding, in the *Toxaris* and in Herodotus, are not similar enough to take the Herodotean ethnographic notice as anything else but possible reminiscences in the present episode, and to thus see therein an allusion these specific ethnographic θαύματα.[515] Toxaris' narration of the blinding nonetheless unveils a sensationalist intent. At least, it intends to affect its recipients, for the episode is given the form of a dialogue that builds up a suspenseful tension in the negotiation of the ransom (§40.8-18). Reply after reply, Mnesippus – and with him, the extradialogical recipients – are made to understand that the leader of the Sarmatians is asking not just for any belongings but for some parts of Dandamis' *body* in exchange for Amizoces' liberty. The suspenseful 'climax' – ransom, part of Dandamis' belongings, his eyes – ends with a dramatic effect of surprise (ἀπροσδόκητον).[516]

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[511] See Marquis, 529-530 n. 151.

[512] For the tradition of ethnographic θαύματα and paradoxography, see generally RE XVIII.3(1949) s.v. Paradoxographoi 1137-1166 [Ziegler], Sassi 1993, Giannini 1963, *id*. 1966, Schepens/Delcroix 1996, Popescu 2009 (Lucian), Pajón Leyra 2011. For the sensationalist and emotionally moving aim of travel writing, see e.g. Romm 1992, esp. 202-203, 211-214 (Lucian's *VH* and travel writing), Pretzler 2007, 44-56. On the other hand, such a description also allows the recipients to compare the two peoples' customs and recognise that there are similarities between them, apart from the terminological differences.

[513] See Pervo 1997, 175 n. 61 with further passages.

[514] See Anderson 1976b, 13-14. The other possible 'sources of inspiration' he mentions are, in my opinion, not comparable with the present passage.

[515] On the contrary, the 'removable eyes-episode' in *VH* 1.25 is definitely part of a pseudo-ethnographical *excursus* full of θαυμάσια. See Fusillo 1999, 362 with n. 16.

[516] For this form of suspense in ancient narratives, compare the description of Ctesias' narration of Cyrus' death in Demetr. *Eloc*. 216: δεῖ τὰ γενόμενα οὐκ εὐθὺς λέγειν, ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρόν, κρεμῶντα τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ἀναγκάζοντα συναγωνιᾶν. τοῦτο ὁ Κτησίας ἐν τῇ ἀγγελίᾳ τῇ περὶ Κύρου τεθνεῶτος ποιεῖ. ἐλθὼν γὰρ ὁ ἄγγελος οὐκ εὐθὺς λέγει ὅτι ἀπέθανεν Κῦρος παρὰ τὴν Παρυσάτιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ λεγομένη ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν ῥῆσίς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ἤγγειλεν, ὅτι νικᾷ, ἡ δὲ ἥσθη καὶ ἠγωνίασεν· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷ, βασιλεὺς δὲ πῶς πράττει; ὁ δὲ πέφευγέ φησι· καὶ ἡ ὑπολαβοῦσα κτλ. See recently Novokhatko 2021, 35-36.

A Moving Tale

One further characteristic of Toxaris' narration is indeed the focus on effects such as an emphasis on the visual modality. The detailed description of the aftermath of the battle; that is, the moment from which on the friendship between Dandamis and Amizoces becomes the subject of the narrative, is framed by acts of seeing. The gruesomeness of the Sarmatians' retaliation, the rape of the Scythians' concubines and wives, happens ἐν ὀφθάλμοῖς ἡμῶν (§39.13). By mentioning the Scythians' visual perception, the text thematises the act of seeing and thereby alludes to the recipients' potential mental visualisation of the scene. The first-person plural pronoun ἡμῶν, which stands for the Scythians but also for the narrator, calls for integrating the recipients and for inviting them to think of the narration as something scenic. The narration of the Sarmatians' retaliation is indeed carefully constructed and aiming at an effect: there are four parallel clauses (ἥ τε λεία περιηλαύνετο καὶ τὰ αἰχμάλωτα συνείχετο καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς διήρπαζον καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας κατελαμβάνοντο, §39.11-12) related syndetically by καί. This amplification is expanded by two participial clauses with increasing subjects (αὐτάνδρους τὰς πλείστας ἁλισκομένας, καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν ὑβρίζοντες τὰς παλλακίδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, §39.12-13). Considering the horrid subject of the scene, this stress on the scene and its visualisation would definitely be an issue for historians such as Polybius, who, for example in 15.34-36, reproves this sort of procedures precisely because of their 'tragic' flavour and the 'disgust' they aim to cause – a criticism that could equally apply to the episode of cutting off the eyes. Similarly, Dandamis is said to swim back to the Sarmatians ἁπάντων ὁρώντων (§40.4). Who is seeing the following detailed narration of the events, in the course of which Dandamis is captured by the armed Sarmatians, conducted to their leader, and negotiates in a reported dialogue about a ransom for his friend? Perhaps not only the Scythians. Even before Toxaris begins his story, the intradialogic recipient of his narration, Mnesippus, considers himself a spectator. When he says that he will be 'absent' from Toxaris' speech (§38.22-23), the formulation παρόντος ἐμοῦ τοῖς λόγοις reminds us of the παρόντες ἐν λόγῳ, the addresses to spectators at theatral performances.[517]

Then, the text focuses on the characters' emotions. In §40.2, when Amizoces is taken away as a prisoner by the Sarmatians, he calls for his friend Dandamis, 'reminding him of drinking cup and the blood'. In this moment, the text focuses on his emotions of fright: he is κακῶς δεδεμένος. At the culminating moment of the narration, when Amizoces blinds himself in an Oedipal gesture and extreme demonstration of empathy with his blind friend, Toxaris uses the poetic verb τυφλόω (τυφλώσας, §41.10).[518] There, too, the motivation is emotional (οὐκέτι ἠνέσχετο, §41.9). Finally, the narration is intent on producing effects such as an unexpected change of fortune in the events, a περιπέτεια so to say, which is a typical device of drama (or 'tragic' historiography) and aims at effects

[517] See Ar. *Ach*. 513, *Av*. 30.
[518] See Schmid I, 349.

such as astonishment and surprise.[519] The Sarmatians' sudden decision to take flight and leave behind the victorious battlefield with all their booty (§41.4-8) could be considered such an unexpected change of fortune for the Scythians, albeit a lucky one. All these effects move the recipients (and Mnesippus in the first place) and render them sympathetic towards the characters of the story. This serves the purpose of enhancing the value and praise of the friendship-example.

The Friends Amizoces and Dandamis

In this story, Toxaris simultaneously illustrates stereotypes of the bellicose Scythian and Greek ideals of manly courage and moral worth. In particular, the friend Dandamis shows great courage: he does not hesitate a single moment to go and succour his friend (ὧν ἀκούσας ὁ Δάνδαμις οὐδὲν ἔτι μελήσας, §40.3-4), and then to cut off his eyes to free Amizoces. By contrast, the Sarmatians are real cowards, who abandon the battlefield at night (καὶ τοὺς Σαυρομάτας δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μετρίως ἐφόβησε … ὥστε νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης ἀπολιπόντες τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν βοσκημάτων καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας ἐμπρήσαντες ᾤχοντο φεύγοντες, §41.4-8). Although Toxaris later underlines the worth of the friends as a pair, Amizoces' deeds of friendship are decidedly absurd in comparison to Dandamis' achievements. His only deeds consist in blinding himself (once the danger has passed) because he was mortified by his friend's blindness, and receiving the honours of the Scythian community. Not by chance, perhaps, does Dandamis' name appear first in the beginning of the story, when Toxaris names his first pair of friends (τῆς φιλίας Δανδάμιδι καὶ Ἀμιζώκῃ, §39.1). Nevertheless, both friends stand for ἡ ἀγαθὴ γνώμη καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους πίστις (§41.3-4). Moral goodness and faithfulness in friendship are the highest moral qualities that a Greek can possibly aspire to.

Noticeably, the language Toxaris uses to highlight Dandamis and Amizoces' merits is typically that of praise. With regard to vocabulary, the quality of the friends is underlined by the demonstrative adjectives οἵους (§41.5) and τοιοῦτον (§42.1), the latter being included in a rhetorical question (τί τοιοῦτον, ᾦ Μνήσιππε, ὑμεῖς ἔχοιτε ἂν εἰπεῖν...; §42.1-3) which expresses the idea that no better example of friendship could be put forward (on the Greek side) than that of Dandamis and Amizoces. Then, by emphasising the *aristeia* of Dandamis (and Amizoces, but especially of the first), Toxaris' story appropriates an important argumentative strategy of encomiastic demonstration, for their manliness and courage (ἀνδρεία) is a virtue that is typically the object of epideictic praise (cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1366a33-b3, 1366b11-13). The worth of the friends is finally demonstrated by the huge

[519] In historiography, the change of fortune is often related with the idea of wonder and astonishment (θαῦμα, ἔκπληξις), as, e.g., in Plb. 3.4.5, 21.26.16 and *passim*, D.S. 4.9.7, 4.55.1, 8.10.4, 34/35.2.41 and *passim*, D.H. 3.22.10, Plut. *Nic*. 21.10. In other passages, the change of fortune is explicitly compared to the περιπέτεια in tragedy, as in D.S. 32.10.5, D.H. 3.18.1, *Th*. 5.29. For περιπέτεια in literary criticism and with regard to drama, see Arist. *Po*. 1452a22-29 (definition, but see also *passim*). For a definition of περιπέτεια in tragedy, see Arist. *Po*. 52a22-29. In *Rh*. 1371b10, it is mentioned amongst the pleasurable things, in this case probably from the perspective of a spectator, and is thus a thing pleasurable to see. The term obviously belongs to the terminology of literary criticism, considering its use in ancient scholia. The judgement concerning the scarce use of περιπέτεια in Aeschylus (*scholia in Prometheum vinctum*, *sch*. *v*. 5), a judgement that underlines the gravity and the archaic tone of his tragedies, is interesting.

honours that the Scythian community confers on them, for they 'sit enthroned with all honours' (αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀμφότεροι κάθηνται … μετὰ πάσης τιμῆς, §41.10-11). Mentioning the τιμή of the lauded subject, which, here, is even amplified by the hyperbole μετὰ πάσης, is part of the rhetorical strategies of praise as well.[520] Remarkably, Toxaris' praise of Dandamis and Amizoces' friendship is embedded in a Greek cultural context, which becomes evident in the fact that for their merit the two Scythian friends receive official honours by being 'sustained by the Scythian community at public expenses' (ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν δημοσίᾳ … τρεφόμενοι, §41.11). This is an allusion to the Greek institution of honouring meritorious men at banquets in the Prytaneion.[521] While from a Scythian perspective, the honour conferred on Dandamis and Amizoces might be adapted to the great deeds they accomplished, objectively, the deeds seem too hyperbolic. Amizoces' blinding is pointless, and the idea to give one's eyes as a ransom is – except for its symbolical meaning – rather absurd, as the usefulness of possessing Dandamis' eyes for the Sarmatians is questionable. This encourages the recipients to question the validity of the story as an example of friendship and take it rather as an example of one valuable friend.

Evaluating the Story: Stylistic Aspects

After concluding his story, Toxaris proceeds to a critical and stylistic evaluation of Dandamis and Amizoces' friendship and his narration of it. He directly emphasises the worth of his exemplary story by underlining that Mnesippus could not possibly present more valuable friends, even without the agreed restrictions of the number of stories and the oath (§42.1-3), which would allow him to produce invented stories (ὡς καὶ πολλὰ ἐπιψεύδοιο αὐτοῖς, §42.3). This reveals an interesting correlation between the credibility of Mnesippus and Toxaris' stories and the moral value of their examples. The oaths which Mnesippus and Toxaris have taken guarantee that their examples are not invalidated for being 'false' – and here, 'false' (ἐπιψεύδοιο) explicitly has the connotation of exaggeration, and more precisely, of 'falsely imparted qualities'.[522] The verb ἐπιψεύδομαι thus confirms that Mnesippus and Toxaris' concern for credibility is a concern for the right measure of praise of their moral examples, as it is a means of problematising the rhetorical device of αὔξησις, which has an essential argumentative function in encomiastic *epideixis* (cf. Arist *Rh*. 1368a10-23). The discussion on the validity of the examples of friends in the *Toxaris*, from Mnesippus and Toxaris' perspective, sways between expressions of doubts and acceptance, and strategies of authentication that reflect the ambiguous nature of encomiastic hyperbole: one knows it is overdone but must still accept it as sincere (cf. Quint. 8.6.73-74, [Longin.] 38.2-4).[523]

[520] For these rhetorical strategies (demonstrative adjectives, stress on the honourable nature of the subject, etc.), whose function is to underline the quality of the praised object in epideictic speeches, see Pernot 1993, 404, 681, 700.
[521] See Pervo 1997, 175, Marquis 2017, 530 n. 154.
[522] Compare X. *Hier*. 2.16, Plut. *Mar*. 16.4 and Luc. *Ind*. 1, *Pro Im*. 20, *Hist.Conscr*. 12.
[523] For αὔξησις or amplification in rhetorical theory, see Lausberg, esp. §259, §§400-405, §579. For the hyperbole in epideictic praise, see Pernot 1993, 403-410, esp. 407 for its ambiguity. See Quint. 8.6.73-74:

The second aspect of Toxaris' evaluation is even more clearly a stylistic one. Toxaris affirms: 'I told you the achievement without rhetorical embellishment' (καίτοι ἐγὼ μέν σοι γυμνὸν τὸ ἔργον διηγησάμην, §42.3-4). Again, the meaning of ἔργον is that of exemplary deed, which, in the context of epideictic praise, functions as a proof of the virtue of the lauded object, here their ἀνδρεία and fulfils the aim of the καλόν (cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1366b28-30, 1367b22 and 33). Interestingly, the wording γυμνὸν τὸν ἔργον διηγησάμην recalls a passage in the *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* where Lucian compares historians who exaggerate with rhetoric devices with the body of a richly and ridiculously dressed athlete (*Hist.Conscr*. 8). This thus illustrates the counter-example of an appropriate historiographical style.[524] In general, the expression of 'naked' style applies to speech devoid of rhetoric ornaments (cf. e.g., Quint. 2.4.3). Here, Toxaris' rhetorical strategies consist in antithetically demarcating his narratorial style from that of his antagonist (καίτοι ἐγὼ μέν/εἰ δὲ σύ). He then proceeds to criticise Mnesippus by enumerating all that the latter would have said in his place and how he would have formulated it in Toxaris' opinion (εἰ δὲ σύ τινα τοιοῦτον ἔλεγες, εὖ οἶδα, ὁπόσα ἂν κομψὰ ἐγκατέμιξας τῷ λόγῳ κτλ., §42.4-8). The use of the adjective κομψός with regard to Mnesippus' style is significant for a specific conception of epideictic speech and rhetorical style. The adjective is generally used in the sense of 'clever argumentation' (e.g., E. *Cyc*. 315, *Supp*. 426, Plt. *Phdr*. 266d, *Cra*. 429d), but more specifically, it has an important place in discussions of style.[525] Thus, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, it designates the use of figures of speech, be it in an extremely elegant and affected style that uses (too) many of these, as does Isocrates (*Isoc*. 12, once in relationship with θεατρικά), or in a more balanced style, as does Demosthenes (*Dem*. 5, where τὸ κομψόν does not lead to anything θεατρικόν).[526] A passage in which τὸ κομψόν means 'embellishment' is particularly revealing. Its avoidance defines a grave and austere style, as opposed to a 'polished' and 'theatrical' style, which does use τὸ κομψόν (*Dem*. 36).[527] Such use of ornament explicitly aims at 'charming and bewitching' (κηλοῦνται) the large audience. Remarkably, Toxaris reproves Mnesippus for being primarily concerned with the listening pleasure of his recipients and

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quamuis enim est omnis hyperbole ultra fidem, non tamen esse debet ultra modum, nec alia uia magis in cacozelian itur. (74) … monere satis est mentiri hyperbole, nec ita ut mendacio faller uelit. quo magis intuendum est quo usque deceat extollere quod nobis non creditor. Similarly, [Longin.] reproaches Isocrates with overdoing his praise (38.2): σχεδὸν γὰρ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἐγκώμιον ἀπιστίας τῆς καθ' αὑτοῦ τοῖς ἀκούουσι παράγγελμα καὶ προοίμιον ἐξέθηκε. For further reflections on the ambiguity of hyperbolic praise in Lucian, compare the pair of dialogues *Im*. and *Pr.Im*. See esp. Bretzigheimer 1992, 169-177.

[524] Compare also *Hist.Conscr*. 16.1: ἄλλος δέ τις αὐτῶν ὑπόμνημα τῶν γεγονότων γυμνὸν συναγαγὼν ἐν γραφῇ κομιδῇ πεζὸν καὶ χαμαιπετές.

[525] Thus, the meaning 'pleasurable ornament' already occurs in Plt. *Grg*. 521e1. For the meaning of 'clever argumentation' similar to the sophists' method of discussion in Lucian, see *JConf*. 6 (Cyniscus' ἔλεγχος in the fashion of sophists), *Bis Acc*. 11 (of the contemporary philosophers' argumentation about virtue and metaphysics). In general, the term occurs more frequently in Attic Comedy, prose (especially Plato, where it tends to irony, see LSJ s.v. II) and in Euripides. The following passage of a fragment by Cratinus (F 342 PCG) is interesting: τίς δὲ σύ; κομψός τις ἔροιτο θεατής. / ὑπολεπτολόγος, γνωμιδιώκτης, εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων.

[526] Although according to the same Dionysius, Lysias too uses κομψός.

[527] In the text: ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τὴν εὐσταθῆ καὶ βαρεῖαν καὶ αὐστηρὰν καὶ φιλάρχαιον καὶ σεμνὴν καὶ φεύγουσαν ἅπαν τὸ κομψὸν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἁρμονίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν γλαφυρὰν καὶ λιγυρὰν καὶ θεατρικὴν καὶ πολὺ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ μαλακὸν ἐπιφαίνουσαν.

for deploying any kind of rhetorical trick available to achieve this aim (καὶ ἄλλα ὁποῖα ὑμεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι εἰώθατε πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, §42.7-8). The use of the expression πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν hints not only at epideictic speech, whose purpose is to draw attention to its rhetorical quality (cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1358b6, 1391b16), but also at a specific rhetorical style, as the use of the verb μηχανάω accentuates.[528] The latter verb gives the idea of something worked out sophisticatedly, while the expression πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν indicates a style aiming at acoustic and rhythmic effects to move the listeners. On the other hand, rather than alluding to a particular style, Toxaris' criticism of Mnesippus might also point to a stylistic 'intention', ostentation of eloquence, and represent a caricature of the judgement of this dramatic style.

Toxaris' own narrative style, on the contrary, is essentially simple and lacks the ornaments he reproves in Mnesippus' style, although his chiding Mnesippus might seem paradoxical in two respects: first, in that he reproaches Mnesippus with aiming at his recipients' listening pleasure (πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν), but then immediately begins his second story by addressing Mnesippus with the imperative ἄκουε (§42.9). Second, he seems to be intent on affecting his recipient – his ἀκροατής, Mnesippus – by making use of narrative mechanisms of suspense, which he will abundantly employ again in his third and longest story. Broadly speaking, Toxaris' style is plain and refrains from sophisticated constructions, poetic vocabulary, sound effects, etc. For example, he does not describe in detail the blinding (the scene is rather factual: ὁ δὲ αὐτίκα παρέσχεν ἐκκόπτειν αὐτούς, §40.18), and there are not many speeches by the characters. On the other hand, Dandamis' request to the Sarmatians is given in direct speech (§40.10-13) and his return with his friend Amizoces is described with precision (παραλαβὼν τὸν Ἀμιζώκην ἐπανῄει ἐπερειδόμενος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἅμα διανηξάμενοι ἀπεσώθησαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, §40.19-21). However, apart from these rather unspectacular formulations, there are no remarkable embellishments. Consequently, the passage where he sums up what Mnesippus would have embellished in his place is more representative of Toxaris' style. There, he uses a rather artless polysyndetic addition of his points of critique (οἷα..., καὶ ὡς..., καὶ ἅ..., καὶ ὡς..., καὶ ὡς..., καὶ ἄλλα ὁποῖα..., §42.5-7). The procedure comes close to a *praeteritio*, which intends to underline the simplicity of his style.

In conclusion, it is clear that the *Toxaris* engages with literary criticism in two ways. On the one hand, it alludes to an old and ongoing discourse on the differences of style, as the dialogue stages an apparent opposition between a sophisticated style (κομψά, μηχανᾶσθαι) intent on creating pleasurable effects for the listening audience (πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν) and an austere style without ornament (γυμνὸν τὸ ἔργον διηγησάμην). On the other hand, Toxaris' polemics on style draw attention to the use of style in all the stories. The focus on epideictic speech and style drives the extradialogical recipients to question and examine the dialogue from a stylistic perspective, and to compare Mnesippus and Toxaris' stories under this light.

[528] For the misleading idea that epideictic speech is only intent on style and form and not on content, see the discussion in Pernot 1993, 333-336.

The recipients are furthermore invited to reflect on how these aspects relate to the values in friendship displayed in the stories. They will note that, although Mnesippus and Toxaris' stories differ in style and context, they share two essential similarities. First, they do not demonstrate what 'friendship' is, but what makes a true friend. Second, the narration – or praise – of their deeds of friendship is, to different extents, hyperbolic. Thus, the text raises the question of how to appropriately represent moral principles: is speech (narration) an adequate instrument for such a purpose?

§43 Toxaris' Second Story: Risking One's Life for a Friend Who Is the Victim of an Accident

Summary of the Story

Toxaris' second story deals with the friends Belittas and Basthes, who went hunting together and were surprised by a lion. The lion first attacks Basthes, whom he tears into pieces (§43.1-5). Belittas jumps from his horse and tries to save his friend from the jaws of the animal (§43.5-8). But it is too late for Basthes to be saved, and in the end, the lion attacks and kills Belittas as well (§43.8-10). While dying, Belittas succeeds in killing the lion (§43.10-12). The Scythians set up a tomb for the friends and another one for the lion (§43.12-13).

The Friends Belittas and Basthes

More explicitly than his first story, Toxaris' second story is about one exemplary friend, rather than about an exemplary friendship. Conspicuously, Belittas, who is named as the subject of the story in the first line (ἄκουε δ' οὖν καὶ ἄλλον ἰσότιμον, Βελίτταν) whereas Basthes is named two lines later only as Belittas' companion (Βάσθην τὸν φίλον), is the one who accomplishes the deeds of friendship by succouring his friend at the risk of death. Toxaris testifies to his worth by immediately qualifying him as a further ἰσότιμος friend (ἄλλον ἰσότιμον, §43.1) – which implicitly acknowledges that the first story is about *one* exemplary *friend* as well. The qualification of Belittas as ἰσότιμος ('equal in honour' or 'equal in value')[529] either stresses the aspect of being recognised by a community, or it refers to an intrinsic value. Here, the aspect of social recognition especially suits the idea that the Scythian community sets up a tomb for the friends, probably to honour them as they honour Orestes and Pylades by setting up a temple and an epitaph (§1.7, §5.4-6, §6.1-9) and as they honour Dandamis and Amizoces with meals at public expense (§41.11). The focus on Belittas' intrinsic worth underlines the ethical aim of the story.

The ideal that Toxaris' second story illustrates is the motif of 'dying together with one's friend', which is precisely the motif with which Mnesippus' second story deals as well, only with the difference that Toxaris has the two friends actually die together (in Mnesippus' second story,

[529] Cf. LSJ s.v. 1 and 2, respectively. Lucian uses the adjective in the context of social status, referring either to the social status itself (*Deor.Conc*. 2, *Sat*. 15, *Apol*. 12, *Herm*. 24, *Nav*. 40) or to the recognition related to it (*Merc.Cond*. 27, *DMort*. 29.3). Only once is it used metaphorically to indicate the value of an object (*Cat*. 22).

Euthydicus succeeds in saving Damon and himself from drowning).[530] The motif is emphasised in the image of the tomb that unites the two friends in death (καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐθάψαμεν αὐτοὺς δύο τάφους ἀναχώσαντες πλησίον, ἕνα μὲν τῶν φίλων, ἕνα δὲ καταντικρὺ τοῦ λέοντος, §43.12-13). Although actual cases of friends who were buried together are rare, there is at least one prominent literary example: in the *Iliad*, dead Patroclus' soul appears to Achilles and asks him to have their bones lie together in a single urn (23.82-84).[531] This gives Toxaris' second example of friendship an epic flavour.

A Very Short Story

Toxaris' second story is strikingly short (thirteen OCT lines and one single sentence) compared to all the other stories. The effect of this narration is scenic, and both the narration and the narrative (hunters battling against a lion and two tombs) suggest the description of a relief in three panels. The rather long sentence that the modern editors print is characterised by an additive process of actions (verbs and participles) structured in three main clauses and a few subordinate clauses. This grammatical structure clearly organises the narrative into 'scenes': the first scene shows the two friends fighting the lion. The second scene represents the lion attacking Belittas and dying Belittas pressing his sword into the chest of the lion. The third scene shows the two sepulchres. This gives the impression that the narration describes a plastic object such as a relief, or actually a stela. Moreover, this sense of materiality is further intensified by numerous sonorous effects of alliteration in -π- (ὁ λέων περιπλακεὶς αὐτῷ ἐνεπεφύκει τῷ λαιμῷ, §43.4-5, and καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπίπτει κατόπιν τῷ θηρίῳ καὶ περιέσπα, §43.5-6), -ων (πρὸς ἑαυτὸν παροξύνων καὶ μετάγων καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων μεταξὺ διείρων τοὺς δακτύλους, §43.6-7), and -κ- (συμπλακεὶς ἀπέκτεινε κἀκεῖνον, §43.10).

Toxaris' narrative thus exhibits both an iconographic (lion stelae) and a literary dimension (epigrams and epitaphs).[532] It is obvious that this narration not only creates the image of a relief but

[530] The parallelism is highlighted by the fact that both of these stories, unlike the other ones, begin with the imperative ἄκουε. This is probably not a coincidence.

[531] For further passages on Patroclus and Achilles' sepulchre, see LIMC I.1 s.v. Achilles, 114 [Kossatz-Deissmann]. For the motif of the simultaneous death, see below §55. It is sometimes expanded to that of shared burial, a motif also known from erotic poetry. See Hardie 1994, *ad Aen.* 9.444. On the other hand, actual shared burials for friends are rather uncommon. See Citroni 1975, *ad* Mart. 1.93. On this epigram, see immediately below.

[532] Anderson mentions as a parallel the stela of a lion in Iamblichus (Anderson 1976b, 14, *id*. 1994, 15), while Harmon underlines the epigram-like character of the story (Harmon, *ad loc* n. 1). For the reference in Iamblichus, see Phot. *Cod*. 94.74a. For the representation of lion hunt in the visual arts of the ancient world, see Kluge 1906, Vaccaro/Uggeri 1966 (on Roman sarcophagi from the third century CE and their specificities in comparison with other motifs of lion hunt, see pp. 41-48 for a historical overview). Representations of lion hunt in Scythia are influenced by Greek iconography as a consequence of Greek contact in the Black Sea region. See Cohen 2010, 91. As the lion hunt is a custom particular to the Near East and Egypt, as will be emphasised below, representations of such scenes abound in these regions, and directly or indirectly influenced Greek representations of men fighting against a lion. See Giuliani 2003, 47 discussing an example of an Athenian high standed bowl from ca. 740 BCE (Kerameikos Museum, Inv. 407). A famous representation of lion hunt in Mesopotamia is, e.g., the 'Lion Hunt of Ashurnarsipal II', a gypsum relief from Nimrud (ca. 883-859 BCE, British Museum ME 124534, London). The quest for a specific source (literary or iconographic) is, however, utterly pointless.

also functions analogously to an epitaph, commemorating and showing the virtue of the dead friends.[533] Although Toxaris' second story is not explicitly a funerary epigram and certainly does not contain an intricate epitaph, the story nevertheless describes what could be a stela. It therefore possesses a commemorative function that is typical of funerary literary-epigraphic epigrams. This commemorative function is indeed coherent with Toxaris' idea that honouring virtuous and exceptional friends by means of inscriptions and visual representations is essential to encourage the readers/viewers of the latter to imitate these (cf. §1.10-13, §6). Thus, by means of such a funerary epitaph-like narration, Toxaris' second story reactivates the paradigmatic function of his and Mnesippus' stories and the program of ethical formation in the dialogue. The recipients are reminded to think of the stories as an incitement to reflect upon and actively imitate models of friendship (or friends).

A Scythian Setting

It has been noticed that the presence of a lion in this story constitutes an oddity (or a literary element), for the animal is supposed to have vanished from Greece by Lucian's time.[534] These views do stress

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[533] By comparison, Mart. 1.93 is a funerary epitaph-like epigram with a similar function:

> Fabricio iunctus fido requiescit Aquinus,
> qui prior Elysias gaudet adisse domos.
> ara duplex primi testatur munera pili:
> plus tamen est, titulo quod breviore legis:
> 'iunctus uterque sacro laudatae foedere vitae,
> famaque quod raro novit, amicus erat'.
>
> Aquinus rests next to his faithful Fabricius, who gladly went first to the Elysian abodes. The double altar-tomb attests to the charge of the first centurion. There is more [to that], though, what you read in the rather succinct inscription: 'Both were bound by the sacred tie of an honourable life, and, what fame often ignores, they were friends.'

This epigram illustrates the scarcity of true friends (fido, amicus erat), a value that is even superior to the military virtue of the two centurions. Compare Citroni 1975, 290: 'Carmi funerari, letterari ed epigrafici, sono spesso dedicati a celebrare la fedeltà reciproca di persone sepolte assieme, ma per lo più si tratta di coppie di coniugi […] o di fratelli, o comunque di appartenenti alla stessa famiglia. Che due amici di famiglie diverse si facessero seppellire l'uno accanto all'altro era probabilmente un fatto assai raro. Cosa insolita in un carme funerario è, naturalmente, che la *fides* nell'amicizia sia valutata più della *virtus* militare.' Martial's epigram closes the description of the friends' joining in death (iunctus) and common sepulchre (ara duplex) by citing its inscription. This is typical of both literary and epigraphical epigrams. See *ibid.*, 290: 'I due primi distici hanno indubbiamente il carattere di un'epigrafe funeraria […], ma a loro volta introducono un'altra epigrafe contenuta nel distico finale: quasi un'iscrizione nell'iscrizione. Un simile procedimento, per cui uno o più versi introducono, o annunciano al lettore il contenuto dell'iscrizione, ricorre più volte negli epigrammi funerari, sia letterari che epigrafici. In particolare questo modulo è frequente negli epigrammi funerari in cui si immagina che il contenuto dell'iscrizione sia pronunciato dalla tomba stessa.'

[534] See the discussion in Marquis, 531-532 n. 156. While lions were probably present in Archaic and Mycenaean Greece, by the time of Herodotus and Aristotle, in Europe, the lion is only found between the rivers Achelous and Nestus (Hdt. 7.126 and Arist. *HA* 579b). The lion had disappeared from western Europe by the first century CE to such an extent that it became a rarity (D.Chr. 21.1). See Hölscher/von Möllendorff 2008, 308. For archaeological (biological) evidence in comparison with literary sources, see e.g. Hurwit 1985, 115-116, Usener 1994, and more recently Jensen 2016, esp. 13-16, 32-38, 89-92. There are, however, contrary views (*ibid*., 32 n. 108, 37, and 127 referring to Giuliani 2003, 50-53 who assumes that, even as early as the 8th century BCE, the motif of the lion is to be taken symbolically as 'extreme danger'). Jensen's arguments are rather fragile, though, and he notices himself that the remains of lion bones are scarce and that the iconographic

that the lion is actually an example of non-Greek – and probably even non-Scythian *realia* – but they do not take into account the purpose of including such an element in the story, which actually consists in denoting an element of 'exoticism' and thus creatinge a non-Greek setting. In fact, this animal is rather associated with regions such as Syria/Mesopotamia and Africa (Plin. *HN* 8.45, cf. Hdt. 7.126, Arist. *HA* 606b14). Of course, this is not to deny that the lion is also (but not exclusively) a literary element, and that the present passage may be seen in relationship with literary accounts or iconographic representations of lion hunts, where the settings are, for example, the Near East and Egypt.[535] Further such 'othering' elements are the characters' names or the word for Belittas' sword, which is, again, an 'akinakes' (ἀκινάκῃ, §43.11), and stereotypes him as a Scythian.[536] Finally, the form of the friends' burial might be a 'Scythianising' element in Toxaris' story as well. Indeed, as Marquis explains, the verb ἀναχώννυμι ('heap into a mound') 'correspond parfaitement à ce qu'on sait des pratiques funéraires scythes, et plus précisément aux tumulus qu'ils élevaient pour leurs morts'.[537] Although it remains questionable whether Lucian or his recipients had such a precise knowledge of Scythian burial customs at all, the rarity of the verb, and therefore its non-generic value, might actually support this hypothesis. These objects and customs that, in some way or another, symbolise 'otherness', but not only Scythian-ness in particular, as the lion blatantly does, indicate that the text is less concerned with characterising or contextualising Toxaris' story than with adopting an 'orientalistic' perspective on it, for, from a Greek perspective, these elements stand for features that are regarded as typical of a generalised north-eastern region. The fact that these features are put in the mouth of a non-Greek, then, effectively questions such 'orientalistic' practices.

On the other hand, lion hunting is a highly aristocratic activity, especially in the Near East, where the influence of its symbolic value is noticeable, but not only that: it also functions as an emblem of manly fortitude amongst the elite of Archaic and Hellenistic Greece or Roman Imperial times.[538] The context of Toxaris' second story therefore illustrates ideals of heroic masculinity and aristocratic virtue which are essential to his representation of friendship.

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material is probably inspired by Egyptian and Asian motifs. For a sceptical interpretation of these remains as a proof of the presence of lions in Greece, see Mahler 1998, 18-26.

[535] Cf. Harmon, *ad loc* n. 1. He considers the presence of a lion in Scythia in Lucian times implausible. He does not mention any specific passages of lion hunt, but see, e.g., X. *Cyr*. 1.6.28, *Cyn*. 11.1, where the exoticism and Persian particularity of these hunts is underlined, and see Pancrates' small epic poem on Hadrian and Antinous at the lion hunt in Egypt [=Ath. 15.677d = 15.21 Kaibel]. On this, see Hoffa 1912. See also SHA *Hadr*. 26.3.

[536] For a discussion of the 'akinakes' from a linguistic and functional perspective, see §38.5. For the characterising presence of this sword in Toxaris' stories, see §50.29 and §58.4. The 'akinakes' is also the attribute of Anacharsis, cf. *Anach*. 7 and Kindstrand 1981, 12.

[537] Marquis, 532 n. 157 and LSJ s.v. Compare ἀναχόω, which is rather later Greek, but see E. F 1090.1 TGF, *El*. 1320, *Or*. 1599, D. 55.28, D.H. 2.42.6, and in Luc. *Lex*. 2. In these passages, it rather seems to describe the refilling of a hole, cf. the *scholia recentiora* to Aristophanes (*sch. plut*. 431.16).

[538] See Andreae 1985, esp. 11 (focuses on the Roman Empire of the second and third century CE), Cohen 2010, 82-93 (focuses on the Asian origin of the motif and symbol and its spreading in the Greek world). For hunting in general in Roman times until the Antonines, see Aymard 1951. Lion hunt is used as a symbol of manly virtue, for example, by Alexander the Great and Hadrian; for this aspect, see above and Vaccaro/Uggeri 1966, 44-45, Cohen 2010, 70-71, 74-77. Conspicuous are also the lion-hunt similes in Homer, such as *Il*. 20.165-173,

§§44-56 Toxaris' Third Story: Two Friends' Sacrifice for a Third Friend

Summary of the Story

Toxaris' third story is about the Scythian Arsacomas and his friends Macentes and Lonchates. Arsacomas happened to be on travel for administrative business at the court of the king of Bosporus when he fell in love with the latter's daughter, Mazaea (§44.1-7). He asked for her hand, but his advance was refused. Upon his return to Scythia, he informs his two friends of the offence he has just suffered. They agree on a plan to make Mazaea marry their friend Arsacomas (§§44.7-46.21). Lonchates promises to kill the king of Bosporus, Leucanor, and Macentes undertakes to retrieve the princess from her future husband, the Machlyan Adyrmachus, while Arsacomas is entrusted with the raising of a Scythian army. The three of them succeed in their respective enterprises (§§47-53). However, this results in a war between the Scythian army and the allied troops of the Machlyans, the Alans, the Sauromaians and the Bosporans and with them Greek mercenaries. At first, the Scythians are losing, but when Arsacomas sees that his friends are injured severely or even deadly, he becomes infuriated, launches an assault against the enemies and kills his rival, the Machlyan Adyrmachus. Thereupon, the allied enemies surrender and end the war by agreeing upon retaliatory measures (§§54-55).

The Friends Macentes, Lonchates, and Arsacomas: Epic Context and Further *Topoi* in Friendship

The 'main character' Arsacomas is visibly not deprived of virtues, as he shows manly courage in the battle against the Machlyans, the Bosporans and their allies; his deeds of friendship, which demonstrate his sense of honour and his unwillingness to abandon his (injured and dead?) friends (δεινὸν ἡγησάμενος εἰ ἄπεισι καταλιπὼν τοὺς φίλους, §55.5), symbolise reciprocal help in friendship. Arguably, though, he is the only one who profits from the friendship, for, though less markedly than the other stories and in a somewhat different way than in Mnesippus' third story, this story, too, presents a one-sided relationship between the friends, for the benefits that Lonchates and Macentes actually retrieve from the friendship are inexistent. By contrast, Lonchates and Macentes appear as those who are actively engaged in the friendship and are explicitly characterised as φίλοι καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί (§45.12-13) – just as in Mnesippus' third story. They are the reliable friends who are ready to sacrifice themselves in order to effectively aid their helpless friend. First, they plan a perilous plot against those who offended Arsacomas, which involves courage and ruse, for they have to intrude into the territories of the enemy and convince them – Lonchates must persuade the king to go into the temple of Ares (in order to kill him off the sight of the guards), while Macentes has to persuade Adyrmachus to hand his bride over to him. Second, they expose themselves in the first

which illustrates the manly heroism of Achilles on the battlefield – Achilles, however, is compared to the lion, not to the hunters.

ranks in the final battle against the enemies (προσκινδυνεύοντες, §55.2, hinting at a heroic *aristeia*). Unlike the urban frame of Mnesippus' third story and its civic issues, but in line with Toxaris' general mind-set in the dialogue, the third Scythian story has an epic dimension and focusses on heroic behaviour.[539] This is particularly obvious in the final part of the story, that is, in the battle against the allied enemies. There, the friends Lonchates and Macentes are presented as heroic combatants, fighting in the first line and suffering the hardest blows (ἐτέτρωντο ... ὁ μὲν στυρακίῳ εἰς τὸν μηρόν, ὁ Λογχάτης, ὁ Μακέντης δὲ πελέκει εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ κοντῷ εἰς τὸν ὦμον, §55.2-4). Arsacomas, too, behaves like an epic warrior in this passage. Reacting to the wounding of his friends with a strong sense of honour (δεινὸν ἡγησάμενος εἰ ἄπεισι καταλιπὼν τοὺς φίλους, §55.5) and motivated by his wrath (τὸ ῥόθιον τοῦ θυμοῦ, §55.8 – notice the poetic noun τὸ ῥόθιον)[540], he attacks the Machlyans all on his own, 'roaring' (ἐμβοήσας, §55.6) and 'pressing the spurs of his horse' (προσβαλὼν τοὺς μύωπας τῷ ἵππῳ, §55.6), 'with his curved sword uplifted' (κοπίδα διηρμένος §55.7). Now, this is a strong illustration of heroism, which is reminiscent of the scene in the ninth book of Virgil's *Aeneid*, where Nisus understands that his friend Euryalus, encircled by the enemies, is in danger of death, and attacks the centre of the enemies' lines all on his own as well (9.395-402). Although, in the *Toxaris*, Arsacomas and his friends do not die together like Nisus and Euryalus, there are nevertheless some similarities: the motivation is the same, for both Arsacomas and Nisus are unwilling to leave the endangered or wounded friend(s) to their fate (*Aen*. 9.399-400; §55.5), and both Arsacomas and Nisus launch a direct attack on the enemies all on their own, with their drawn sword or spear ready to attack them (… an sese medios moriturus in hostis / inferat … / ocius adducto torquens hastile lacerto, *Aen*. 9.400-402, cf. at Nisus ruit in medios …, *Aen*. 9.438; ἤλαυνε διὰ τῶν πολεμίων κοπίδα διηρμένος, §55.6-7). Arsacomas' gesture in the *Toxaris* is thus clearly modelled upon a heroic and epic behaviour. The second aspect of the epic context in Toxaris' third story is the fact that the whole story consists of an epic journey along the territories of the Scythians and their neighbours. This aspect will be treated in further detail below.

The story also thematises further ideals in friendship, all of which are actualised in the characters Lonchates and Macentes. For example, when, according to the Bosporan custom, Arsacomas answers the king's request to enumerate his belongings in order to count as a valid suitor for Mazaea's hand, he denies possessing any chariots or herds but affirms that his wealth consists of his two good friends (§45.11-13). This alludes to the old adage that friends are worth a treasure (see φίλους ἔχων νόμιζε θησαυροὺς ἔχειν, *Menandri sententiae* 810 Jaekel, cf. Plut. *De amic. mult.* 93C, *De frat. amore* 479C).[541] The importance of this saying for the story is explicated a few lines later,

[539] For the epic connotation of Toxaris' third story, see Bompaire 1958, 687 with n. 1.
[540] See Schmid I, 345. Especially in tragedy (e.g. A. *Pr*. 1048, S. *Ph*. 688, E. *IT* 407, 426), but see also D.H. 6.10, Arr. *Fr*. 164-165. Unlike in §19.16, it is used metaphorically here, but in both passages, its poetic nuance comes to the fore.
[541] See Anderson 1976b, 17 with n. 23 referring to Theon *Prog*. p. 100 Spengel ii Rhet. It is also known as a *chreia*, cf. Hock/O'Neil 2002, 126-128 (regarding Alexander the Great) and Lib. *Chr*. 1.23 (referring to E. *Or*.

when Arsacomas gives an account of his rejection to his friends (§46.6-8): 'καίτοι,' ἔφη, 'ἐγὼ διηγησάμην αὐτῷ *τὸν πλοῦτον ὁπόσος ἐστίν μοι*, ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λογχάτα καὶ Μακέντα, καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν ὑμετέραν, πολὺ ἀμείνω καὶ βεβαιοτέραν τῆς Βοσπορανῶν δυνάμεως κτλ.' There, the saying is amplified by a further essential ideal in friendship, goodwill (τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν ὑμετέραν), which defines Lonchates and Macentes as perfect friends and endows their friendship with higher moral (πολὺ ἀμείνω) and practical (βεβαιοτέραν) worth than any of the Bosporans' fortunes. In comparison, in Mnesippus' third story, the *topos* that friends are worth a treasure might also form the foundation of the moral message of the story, although it is taken literally there, for the two friends' material wealth constitutes the deed of friendship – a hint that this friendship may be taken ironically. The *topos* and its image of friendship as material wealth is actually the point of both stories. Ironically, both stories illustrate the non-profit retrieved from the friendship by the two friends as opposed to the profit that the third one retrieves. The second *topos* in friendship addressed by Toxaris' story is that friends (metaphorically) form one body. It occurs in two passages: In §46.17-21, Toxaris suggests that his friends feel the same as he does about the Bosporan king's insulting response (καὶ ὑμᾶς *ἐπ' ἴσης* ἠδικῆσθαι, §46.17), for the three of them form one body (εἷς ἄνθρωπος ὄντες, §46.19), as it were, and they all share the vexations and joys they feel for a third person (τὸ γὰρ τρίτον μετῆν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τῆς ἀτιμίας, §46.17-18, τὰ αὐτὰ ἀνιώμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χαίροντες, §46.19-20). In §53.5-13, Macentes uses the same motif in his answer to Arsacomas' thanks, when he demonstrates that his deed of friendship is a matter of course. Because they are limbs of one and the same body, it would be ridiculous for one member to thank the other for helping him.[542] From a broader perspective, the image of friends constituting one body is pervasive in the ancient friendship discourse.[543] As it reoccurs in §62.12-18, where it has important consequences for the understanding of the dialogue, it will be dealt with in detail there.

Arguably, though, this epic-like representation of ideals in friendship might, on the one hand, be exaggerated, and, on the other hand, raise the question of whether decapitating a king and kidnapping a bride, thereby provoking a war and causing many deaths, are morally defendable deeds of friendship, or proportionate to the extent of the offence inflicted upon Arsacomas. However, this appraisal of Toxaris' third story directly relates to issues that are not unfamiliar to the ancient

1155-1156). See also the sayings: ἐν ταῖς ἀνάγκαις χρημάτων κρείττων φίλος (*Menandri sententiae* 214 Jaekel [= *Mon*. 143 = Men. F 711 CAF]), and οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κτῆμα κάλλιον φίλου (*Menandri sententiae* 575 Jaekel). Compare the discussion in X. *Mem*. 2.4.1-5.

[542] This recalls the concept of self-sacrifice and empathy motivated by self-love and the striving for virtue in friendship as explained in Aristotle *EN* 1169a17-29 and *EE* 1240a32-38, combined with the idea of 'other selves' in friendship. For the issue of self-sacrifice in Aristotle, see, e.g., von Siemens 2007, 135. For the idea of 'other selves' and further passages, see above, in Mnesippus' third story. Annas 1977 deals in depth with the issue of 'other selves' in friendship in Aristotle (with regard to Plato's *Lysis*).

[543] See, e.g., Arist. *EN* 1168b8, Cic. *Amic*. 21.81, 25.92, Hor. *Carm*. 1.3.8, 2.17.5, Ov. *Trist*. 4.4.72, 4.10.32, *Pont*. 3.4.69, Stat. *Silv*. 3.2.7, D.Chr. 3.104-106, D.L. 5.20, Lib. *Or*. 8.7. See Bohnenblust 1905, 10, Fürst 1997, 413 n. 2 and 413-414, Raccanelli 1998, 92 n. 35.

friendship discourse as well: the question of whether the necessities of a friendship are superior to the common good or not.[544]

Comparing the Third Stories of Mnesippus and Toxaris

Interestingly, Toxaris' third story exhibits some similarities with Mnesippus' third story. Not only do both stories exemplify the same ideals in friendship, trustfulness and spirit of sacrifice, as most of Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories do in fact, but several specific motifs are also comparable, starting with the fact that both stories are the only ones amongst the five pairs that feature three friends. Thus, as in Mnesippus' third story, two friends sacrifice themselves to resolve their friend's familial, or, in the present case, marital issue. Specifically, in both stories, one of the two 'helping' friends plays a more active or decisive role, while the other dies sooner or later. This is obvious for Mnesippus' story, where Charixenus dies five months later than the 'passive' Eudamidas. But in Toxaris' story, too, Lonchates appears as the leading friend, for he is the one who proposes the plan of revenge (§447.2-4) and who is involved in the negotiation of peace at the end of the battle (§455.22-23), while Macentes only executes his duty and dies in the battle. Or it is at least probable that he dies: in §55.3-4, his head and shoulder are injured seriously, and he is never mentioned again in the narration. Further remarkable similarities consist in the fact that the one friend who profits from the friendship is characterised as poor (ἠπίστατο γὰρ πένητα τὸν Ἀρσακόμαν, §45.8, cf. πενέστατος αυτὸς ὤν, §22.4, and τὴν πενίαν μὲν εἰδότες τοῦ Εὐδαμίδα, §22.14), and in the fact that the friendship between the three is fundamentally misunderstood or underestimated by those witnessing the affair, a reaction which, in both cases, translates into laugh and ridicule (τότε μὲν οὖν ἐγελάσθη ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ παρώφθη καὶ μεθύειν ἔδοξεν, §46.1-2, and γελασθείη ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, πένης εἶναι δόξας, §46.5, cf. οἱ … τὴν φιλίαν δὲ ἣ πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἦν αὐτῷ ἀγνοοῦντες ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελῶν ἀπηλλάττετο, §22.14-16). The purpose of these similarities is to invite the recipients to compare the two stories with regard to further aspects as well, thus reading them indeed as a pair, and therefore to actively reflect on the moral content of the stories – not to forget the fact that the *synkrisis*-structure and intent of the dialogue already favour such a (literally) syn-critical approach on the part of the recipients.

Scythian Ethnography and Toxaris' Self-Othering

The discussion of friendship above shows that the ideals illustrated in Toxaris' third story are typical motifs of the Graeco-Roman friendship discourse. The fact that Toxaris defends such a view on friendship, as has been underlined, is at odds with the marked Scythian-ness or stigmatisation of the story as barbarian.[545] Besides, the want of 'public morality' displayed in this story (murdering,

[544] See Cic. *Amic*. 11.37, Val.Max. 4.7, Gell. *NA* 1.3.9On this argument, see Konstan 1994b.

[545] Pervo 1997, 176: 'These splendid fellows appear to be bound by no law or scruples other than loyalty to one another and their people. The story is utterly (and appropriately) "barbaric".' Pervo 1997, 177: 'The resultant dissonance [between barbaric action and typical themes associated with Greek friendship] raises questions about this ethic of friendship. If one can use Hellenic themes to illustrate barbaric action, what are the

kidnapping, lying, etc.) presents truthful (Greek) friendship as the only rule amongst the Scythians and gives friendship a prominent significance. The appropriation of these ideals in friendship by non-Greeks, and especially barbarians *par excellence* as the Scythians are, indicates a universalistic view on moral values such as friendship. However, separating these ideals in friendship from the rest of the ethical system of which it usually forms a part is meaningful as well, for it questions their validity in the absence of other moral, for example, civic values. Thus, Toxaris' third story, like, in fact, the whole text and especially Mnesippus' third story, reads as an invitation to reflect on the use of moral norms and their limits beyond the topic of friendship.

What Pervo calls 'barbaric action' is actually a more complex interrelating of 'barbarian' and 'Greek' elements presented from changing perspectives, which includes mechanisms of 'exoticising', self-othering and appropriation at the same time. In this third story, more extensively and systematically than in any other of Toxaris' stories, 'barbarian' objects and customs are integrated into the narration. Noticeably, they fulfil an ambiguous function. On the one hand, they are used to foreground the Scythian setting of the story – or rather, its north-eastern non-Greekness, for there are plenty of generalised 'barbarian' characteristics and a few ethnographic inaccuracies, which, in turn, are contrasted with moments of precise differentiation of various Black Sea peoples, for example. On the other hand, the fact that these objects and customs re-project, in a way, the Greek image of the barbarian onto Scythians, that is, the fact that Greek images of the barbarian are put into the mouth of a Scythian and considered as idiosyncratic by the latter, defines these images as stereotypes. Then, with regard to the confrontation of this text with Greek ethnography of the Scythians in general, and with Herodotus' Scythian *logos* in particular, it shows that, by means of intertextuality, Toxaris appropriates a Greek voice, but adopts a critical distance from it at the same time.[546]

Let us now look at these characteristics and the way they are deployd in the text. The first category of these characteristics regards typical objects. For example, when Toxaris has the Bosporan king ask Arsacomas 'how much cattle and how many carriages he possesses' (πόσα δὲ βοσκήματα ἢ πόσας ἁμάξας ἔχεις, §45.10-11), he activates the common stereotype that Scythians are a nomadic people. This also alludes to Herodotus' description of the Scythians at the beginning of his ethnography of Scythia (τοῖσι γὰρ <ἂν> μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ᾖ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες ἔωσι ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματά τέ σφι ᾖ ἐπὶ ζευγέων,

implications for the ethic? At the very least, friendship without a ground in public morality can be a questionable virtue.'

[546] Compare Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 65-66: '[…] Toxaris rescripts what it means to be "Scythian" from inside the Greek ethnographic *imaginaire*. […] Throughout this dialogue, Toxaris shows that he is familiar with Greek (largely Herodotean) ideas about Scythians through his pronouncements on "what Scythians are like" – a masterful gesture of self-assimilation to a cultural stereotype which is undermined, however, by his evident Greek literary connoisseurship and rhetorical flair.'

κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν, 4.46.3).[547] Interestingly, in the *Toxaris*, the Bosporan king, who, from the Greek perspective, is another barbarian, emphasises that these objects are characteristically Scythian (ταῦτα γὰρ ὑμεῖς πλουτεῖτε, §45.11). This recalls Herodotus' way of describing non-Greeks from the perspective of other non-Greeks, as is precisely the case for his account of the Persians' invasion of Scythia in 4.83-144. In §50.17, however, as the text addresses the stereotype of the fearsome Scythian, the Bosporan king confesses to Lonchates that he is afraid of the army raised by Arsacomas against him, also because 'he had always been diffident of the Scythians' (ὑπέπτησσεν ἀεὶ τοὺς Σκύθας). Thus, the different perspectives taken on various stereotypes are alternately that of another barbarian or that of a Greek. In this way, the text allows for ambiguity – Whose perspective is it: the Greek or the barbarian? Whose imaginary is projected onto whom? – and it certainly indicates some form of self-awareness in manipulating Scythian stereotypes and labelling them as such. Thereby, the text establishes a certain distance from these stereotypes. On the other hand, the idea of measuring wealth on the basis of someone's possessions might be less Scythian, or barbarian, than Homeric. For example, the Machlyan suitor Adyrmachus received Mazaea as his bride on account of his wealth, which consists in golden cups, carriages, sheep and oxen (§46.10-12). Now, oxen and cups constitute the measure of social status and wealth, for example, in *Il*. 12.311-313. This means that the text presents Black Sea people(s) as archaically Greek and barbarian at the same time.

Then, the text activates further stereotypes, some of which, though, are not specifically or traditionally associated with Scythians. While obbing and plundering is rather a Scythian prejudice (§49.5-10, cf. Th. 1.5.3 ('barbarians' generally), Arr. *An*. 4.5.1, Ov. *Trist*. 5.10.15-24) as are their unusual habits when it comes to drinking alcohol (humorously alluded to in §45.3-5 and §46.1, cf. Hdt. 1.207.6: the Massagetae drink their wine unmixed), 4.66 (at victory-ceremonies the Scythians drink wine in their enemies' skulls), mentioning the Bosporans' banquets (ἐν τῷ δείπνῳ, §44.5) and bastards (νόθος, §51.15) rather points to the context of the Persian royal court.[548] On the one hand, this is a means of differentiating the various Black Sea peoples from one another, in this case the Scythians from the Bosporans – thereby paralleling Herodotus' confrontation of the Scythians and the Persians. On the other hand, it suggests that the text presents a generalising, 'orientalistic', view on Scythia. For example, the weapons used by the Scythian characters in Toxaris' story are either generic (στυρακίῳ, §55.2, πελέκει, §55.3, κοντῷ, §55.4 – though the latter two have an epic-tragic

[547] A further stereotype that alludes to this passage in Herodotus is that Scythians are archers on horses (ἱπποτοξόται, §54.10). Cf. Th. 2.96.1, Arr. *An*. 3.8.3, 5.12.2, Luc. *Nav*. 34, Ael. *Tact*. 2.13.
[548] See Munson 2005, 61: 'The banquet is a key-event of Persian culture, a feature in some sense symbolic of what the Persians are.'

connotation),[549] generally oriental or Persian (κοπίδα, §55.7, κοπίδι, §55.11),[550] or typically Scythian (ἀκινάκην, §50.29).[551] This aims at creating an overall non-Greek imaginary for the setting of Toxaris' story, in conformity with the idea of the eastern 'other'. In any case, considering the fact that this is Toxaris speaking (either as primary narrator or by reporting his Scythian characters' indirect speech), this employment of stereotypes rather signifies an act of self-othering, for Toxaris has his characters emphatically endorse non-Greek attributes. However, more than characterising Toxaris as a Scythian or generally as an eastern barbarian, the text, like a mirror, confronts the recipient with his own (assumedly Greek) idea of the 'other'.[552] There is thus a parodistic approach to traditional cultural characterisation and ethnography, an aspect that will be treated in more detail below, which is as comic as it is seriously thought-provoking.

The second point regards the relationship of the text with the Greek (Herodotean) tradition of Scythian ethnography. In Toxaris' story, single motifs as well as narrative aspects of the characterisation of the Black Sea population and geography strongly relate to Herodotus' Scythian *logos* (4.1-144).[553] The specific motifs in Toxaris' third story that are similar to Herodotus' Scythian *logos* strengthen the thesis that the latter is a text of reference for the *Toxaris*. For example, the fact that Lonchates urges the Bosporan king to enter the temple of Ares to make his oath (§50.22) is a hint at Herodotus' portrayal of the Scythians' worship of Ares, whom they prefer to any other of the few Greek gods they honour (4.62). And when Lonchates brings back to his friend Arsacomas the decapitated head of the Bosporan king as a proof of his keeping his promise (§51.1-2), the passage alludes to the Scythian custom of bringing back the heads of the enemies fallen by their hand as a trophy in Herodotus (4.64.1, 4.65-66 for the function as a trophy).

More meaningful, though, than these punctual allusions, is the marked ethnographic intent in Toxaris' third story. This is signalled by the formulaic way of presenting ethnographic facts such as ἔθος δέ ἐστιν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ (§44.8-9), κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον (§45.1), οὐ γὰρ ἔθος ἡμῖν (§45.3), τὸ δὲ ἔθος ἡμῖν (§48.1). The insertion of *excursus* on Scythian customs constitutes a further element of this ethnographic scheme. Thus, there is a short *excursus* on the Scythians' refusal to pour wine-libation (§45.3-5) and a longer one on the Scythian practice to 'step on the oxen hide' to request active support from one's peers (§48.1-14).[554] Both *excursus* read as an effort to explain the Scythian

[549] For the epic-tragic connotation of πέλεκυς, see e.g. Hom. (19 occurrences), A.R. (five occurrences), Q.S. (six occurrences); A. *Ch*. 889, S. *El*. 99, E. (11 occurrences), *tragica adespota* F 412.1 TrGF=TGF. For the epic-tragic connotation of κοντός, see Schmid I, 335. For the text-critical issue regarding στυρακίῳ, see note to the text *ad loc*.
[550] The κοπίς is some sort of broad curved knife (see LSJ s.v. I.1, cf. μάχαιραν *Scholia in Lucianum* 17.6 l. 4). For the Persian context, see, e.g., X. *Cyr*. 2.1.9, 6.2.10.
[551] For the ἀκινάκη, see above §38.5, §43.11, and below §58.4. For historical information on all these weapons, see Marquis, 527 n. 143, 541-543 nn. 197-198.
[552] Thereby distorting, as it were, Hartog's 'mirror' of Herodotus.
[553] For the relationship between the *Toxaris* and Herodotus in general, see Introduction, 'Greeks and Scythians'.
[554] See *Appendix Proverbiorum* 2.80.1-8; *Suid.* ε 2255. See Bompaire 1958, 685, Anderson 1976b, 15, Marquis, 536 n. 173. Dumézil relates this representation with actual funerary rituals in this area and concludes that the oxen hide (βυρσή) symbolises 'une détresse mortelle'. Dumézil 1978, 281-282.

customs to some 'other' unfamiliar with these. The first one is explicitly marked as an explanation (γάρ, §45.3) and aims at justifying from the perspective of the Scythians why they drink the wine and do not, unlike other peoples, pour wine-libations: in their opinion, pouring the wine would be an offence to the god (ἀλλὰ ὕβρις εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἰς τὸν θεόν, §45.4). The second *excursus*, too, indicates an explanatory gesture by means of the demonstrative adverb οὕτως (τὸ δὲ ἔθος ἡμῖν τὸ περὶ τὴν βύρσαν οὕτως ἔχει, §48.1). It translates – for a Hellenic perspective – the meaning of the Scythian custom as a sign of supplication (καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἡ μεγίστη ἱκετηρία, §48.6) and the response to this as a formal oath (τὸ γὰρ ἐπιβῆναι τῆς βύρσης ὅρκος ἐστίν, §48.14). The ethnography of the Scythians and further Black Sea peoples in Toxaris' third story is instructive to understand the different approaches adopted by both the *Toxaris* and Herodotus to represent the 'other'. One of these approaches, which has been hinted at above, is the differentiation of Black Sea peoples. One specificity of Herodotus' description of Scythia is indeed his insistence on their differences: with variable degrees of precision and vagueness, he catalogues, describes and localises the different Scythian tribes and their neighbours, comparing them with regard to their physical appearance, language, lifestyle, religion, idiosyncratic customs, etc.[555] In the *Toxaris*, too, these aspects play a role in sketching the context of Toxaris' story, in which several peoples are involved: Scythians, Bosporans, Machlyans, Alans, Lazi, Sindians, and Sarmatians.[556] For example, Toxaris points out that the custom of courting he describes in §44.8-18 is Bosporan (ἔθος δέ ἐστιν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ, §44.8). In §51.17-22, there is a remarkable comparison of the Alans with the Scythians, this time with regard not only to νόμος but also φύσις. In order to give credibility to the assertion that the Scythian Macentes can pass for an Alan in the eyes of Adyrmachus, Toxaris explains that the Alans and the Scythians dress and talk the same way, but have a different hairstyle (ὁ Μακέντης ὁμόσκευος καὶ ὁμόγλωττος τοῖς Ἀλανοῖς ὤν· κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα Ἀλανοῖς καὶ Σκύθαις, πλὴν ὅτι οὐ πάνυ κομῶσιν οἱ Ἀλανοὶ ὥσπερ οἱ Σκύθαι, §51.17-19).[557]

[555] See esp. Corcella in Asheri/Lloyd/Corcella 2007, 554. For the differentiation, see Hdt. 4.17-27, 103-107. In 1.215-216, Herodotus distinguishes the Massagetae from the Scythians.

[556] Alans: see RE I (1894) s.v. Alani [Tomaschek] nomadic people living in the steppes north of the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus up to the River Tanais. For the Bosporans, see above. The Lazi were a Colchian people. See RE XII.1 (1924) s.v. Lazi [Herrmann]. See also Marquis, 533 n. 160. For the Sarmatians, see RE XIL.2.3 (1921) s.v. Sarmatia [Kretschmer]. According to Hdt. 4.123 they were a people living east of the Tanais. However, the sources are contradictory and their geographical location is vague, as it seems to overlaps with Scythia (coll. 1-4). By contrast, the Machlyans are a Libyan tribe in Hdt. 4.178, 180. Marquis, on the other hand, points to a fragment of Aelianus that mentions Machlyans living near Colchis. See Marquis, 533-534 n. 161. Considering, though, the fact that the name of Adyrmachus, in Toxaris' story a Machlyan, resembles the name of a North African tribe in Hdt. 4.168.1, the Adyrmachidans, there might be a further twist to Toxaris' ethnography of the Black Sea, for the 'confusion' points to the aleatory and generalising nature of descriptions of the 'other'. The Sindians were a people living on the east side of the Kertch Strait on the Sea of Azov. See RE LI.3.1 (1927) s.v. Sindoi 226-227 [Kretschmer].

[557] For a differentiating ethnic description of the 'other' according to clothes and hairstyle, compare Luc. *Nav*. 2-3. See also Marquis, 533 n. 161. Interestingly, Herodotus explicitly distinguishes the Massagetae from the Scythians with regard to their clothes (1.215.1).

Then, Toxaris' ethnography includes a further perspective, a rather ambiguous Graeco-Roman one. Toxaris' description of the Scythian background of his story punctually alludes to some forms of their societal organisation. The text mentions Lonchates and Macentes' 'relatives' (τῶν οἰκείων, §47.14), which suggests that the Scythians are organised in family clans.[558] On the other hand, they also seem to be organised in a whole 'community' (ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν, §49.3).[559] The text also knows of a Scythian authority called 'the ancients' (τῶν γεραιτέρων, §50.11), which evokes some kind of societal organisation, too, and perhaps more specifically a Spartan one.[560] While it remains ambiguous whether these terms consist in a projection of Graeco-Roman concepts, such as Athenian or Spartan institutions, and perhaps also the Roman *familiares* and *maiores*,[561] onto the 'other' or reflect a Scythian reality, the formulation that the peace with the allied enemies is concluded 'by Arsacomas and Lonchates acting as movers of a motion' (καὶ ἐγένετο εἰρήνη ἐκείνων πρυτανευόντων ἕκαστα, §55.22-23) more clearly alludes to the system of Athenian democracy.[562] One further trait of Toxaris' Scythian ethnography is that, in some passages, the text adopts an approach of cultural relativism. For example, in §45.4, when Toxaris discusses the question of wine-libation and highlights the sacrilege it represents to Scythians, he obviously adopts an alien view on a common Greek religious practice and emphasises that the same gesture can have different meanings depending on the cultural context.

Finally, geography constitutes a noteworthy aspect in Toxaris' Scythian ethnography as well. In Toxaris' third story, there are a few elements of Scythian geography. For example, Toxaris mentions that Adyrmachus takes Mazaea from the Bosporans to his land, the Machlyans, along the lake Maeotis (§46.3). Later, he describes how Macentes takes the bride to Scythia along the lake Maeotis first and then turns to the land with the mountains of the Mitraeans on his right (§52.11-14). I leave the discussion of the incongruities in the description to the next section and focus on the importance of the depiction of the geographical context here. The geographical elements described in this passage not only express exoticism but also symbolise a liminal space. In particular, the lake Maeotis alludes to a poetic imaginary and, harbouring the mouth of the river Tanais, represents the border between Europe and Asia.[563] These geographical elements are meaningful for the issues of cultural identity negotiated in this story: '[t]he Scythian heartland, an ill-defined, liminal space at the frontier between the civilized and the barbarian […], intensifies Toxaris' obfuscation of tidy and

[558] Marquis, 536 n. 172.
[559] For a discussion of this term, see above §2.8. See also §41.11.
[560] Marquis, 537 n. 179. For the parallelism between the Spartans and the Scythians in Herodotus, see Braund 2004b.
[561] Cf. *Suid.* μ 344 (Μαιώρεις: οἱ πρεσβύται).
[562] See LSJ s.v. πρυτανεύω II. Compare Ar. *Ach*. 60, Isoc. 4.121, Luc. *Demon*. 9.
[563] For the poetic imaginary, see A. *Pr*. 418 (vv. 417-419: καὶ Σκύθης ὅμιλος, οἳ γᾶς / ἔσχατον τόπον ἀμφὶ Μαι- / ῶτιν ἔχουσι λίμναν), E. *HF* 409 (related to the Amazons), Ar. *Nu*. 273. For the connotation of the 'borders of Europe', see Ephorus F 158.2 FGrH [= Anon. Per.P.Eux. 49 = Ps.-Skymn. 835], Arr. *An*. 3.30.8. See also e.g. Hdt. 4.3.6, Plb. 4.39.2, D.S. 2.43.2, App. *Mith*. 54.1.

reductive cultural categories.'[564] The geographical space described in this story thus reflects the way it deals with ethnic and cultural characteristics, mixing and blurring the border between what is Greek and what is non-Greek.

In conclusion, taking the two aspects together – the representation of the virtues in friendship and the changing perspectives upon various 'barbarian' stereotypes – one notes several paradoxical aspects. On the one hand, Toxaris' third story exhibits a constant contrast between the *topos* of the idealisation of the 'primitive barbarian' who excels in the virtue of friendship, and the denigration of the latter by means of stereotypes.[565] On the other hand, the virtues in friendship that are represented are questionable not least because of their exaggeration, and the stereotypes themselves are persistently invalidated.

A Tale from a Distant Land

The marked Scythian context, on the one hand, and the complex narration, which includes a few inconsistencies, on the other hand has led scholarship to suppose a 'Scythian novel' as a 'source' for Toxaris' third story, of which the latter would be an 'excerpt'. The so-called *Calligone* novel, of which two papyri fragments have survived,[566] has been adduced as a possible 'source' for Toxaris' third story by Rostovtzeff, not only because of the same Scythian-Sarmatian context of war, but also because the name Eubiotus appears in both texts (*PSI* 8.981 ll. 8-9, §51.14).[567] This hypothesis has been rejected for various reasons, which will not be elaborated upon here once more; the idea that Toxaris' third story should refer to (or parody?) this novel in particular makes no sense with regard to the general scheme of the dialogue.[568] Then, the idea that this story is an 'excerpt' constitutes a rather unsatisfactory explanation for the intricate narration and its inconsistencies.[569]

What is more, Toxaris' third story is indeed complex. In comparison with the other stories, this one is by far the longest of all; it includes many long reported speeches and dialogues between

[564] Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 66.
[565] On the *topos* of the 'idealised primitive barbarian' in the *Toxaris*, see Bompaire 1958, 685: '[Les illustrations de vertus] diversifient et grossissent, jusqu'à rendre méconnaissable, le topos primitif de l'idéalisation de la société barbare.'
[566] These are the *PSI* 8.981 [= Pack² 2628] and the *P.Oxy* ined. 112/130 (a). See Stephens/Winkler 1995, 271-276.
[567] See Rostovtzeff 1931, 98-99. Anderson 1976b, 15-16, Pervo 1997, 176 with n. 66 do not really reject the idea of dependence. Stephens and Winkler, although they reject Rostovtzeff's argument (Stephens/Winkler 1995, 268-269), nevertheless posit a common 'source' for both texts (*ibid*., 270).
[568] Zimmermann 1935, 1212-1214 (points to the lack of material to draw any conclusions about similarities or the existence of a 'Scythian novel'); Bompaire 1958, 455 (does not take position but underlines the topicality of further motifs in Toxaris' third story with anecdotes known elsewhere); Swain 1994, 175 ('the idea of type of "Scythian" novel is far-fetched and the particular comparison with *Calligone* is not particularly illuminating'); Kim 2013, 300-302 (tackles the issue of an 'oral source' for the *Toxaris* more generally); Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 61-62 (considers the relationship to be not compelling and the hypothesis to be 'unconvincing'). Toxaris' third story may seem 'novelistic', but the sole actual allusion to the ancient novel is the mention of Mazaea's virginity, which appears out of context and does not make sense otherwise (§52.8). As will be seen, the focus is rather on the role of historiography broadly speaking.
[569] *Contra* Harmon, 101, 186 n. 1. Compare Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 63-64.

the intradiegetic characters, and its plot is intricate.[570] Besides, there are many inconsistencies and contradictions at various levels. First, there is the fact that characters disappear in the course of the narration, as does the horseman mentioned in §52.10. Macentes is not mentioned anymore after being wounded in §5.3-4, while Lonchates does reappear in the narration of the transaction for peace at the end of the battle (§55.22-23). Moreover, there is no information at all in the text about the fate of the 20,000 Sarmatians and Eubiotus, who had been called by the latter as allies (§54.7-8), for neither of them is mentioned again after the end of the battle.[571] Second, there are chronological inconsistencies in the description of Lonchates and Macentes' journeys to the king of Bosporus and the Machlyans, respectively. In §47.11-12, Lonchates and Macentes depart from Scythia at the same time; in §50.4-5, Lonchates says that it has been six days since Arsacomas stepped on the oxen hide, which would be the day of his departure. Macentes, on the other hand, arrives at the Machlyans after Lonchates' murder of the king of Bosporus (§51.3-4), but he only needs two days to get back to Scythia (§52.13-14).[572] There is of course room for speculation, but the effect of confusion is unavoidable. Third, there is a certain vagueness in the geographical descriptions. In §52.11-12, the localisation of the Machlyans' is unclear and does not correspond to reality (based on the hypothesis that they are not the North African tribe but the people near Colchis).[573] In §54.5, it is definitely not clear what mountains Adyrmachus crosses to come to Scythia (διὰ τῆς ὀρεινῆς ἐσέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Σκυθίαν).[574] Finally, there is the mysterious 'mountains of the Mitraeans' (§52.12), for which there are no further evidence. All this gives a slight impression of chaos and incomprehensibility, which not only reflects the distant and almost mythical universe of the far north east of the Black Sea, but also recalls Herodotus' 'chaotic' Scythian *logos*.[575]

In fact, Toxaris presents himself as a historiographer, foremost in the wake of Herodotus. Elements of historiographical jargon abound in this narration, which also includes conventional motifs and narrative patterns. For example, the detailed report of battles and the description of the moves and tactics of the opponents is thought to demonstrate accurate historiographical enquiry.[576] This historiographical precept is conspicuously reflected upon in §§54-55, where Toxaris narrates the battle of the Scythians against the allied forces of the Machlyans, the Alans and the Sauromatians. He first describes the exact composition and number of the allied enemies and of the Scythian army,

[570] Cf. Anderson 1976b, 18: 'the story is far too complicated for the listener to grasp at a hearing'. For more on the aspect of the recipients, see below.
[571] For these inconsistencies, cf. Harmon, 194 n. 1 (Macentes), 195 n. 1 (the Sarmatians), Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 63 (Macentes), 62-63 (the Achlyan horseman), Marquis, 544 n. 204 (Macentes), 376 n. 201 (the Sarmatians), 538 n. 184, 543 n. 200 (the horseman).
[572] For these chronological inconsistencies, cf. Harmon 183 n. 1, 184-185 n.1. See Marquis, 369 n. 178, 371 n. 181 for alternative plausible explanations.
[573] For this argument, see Marquis, 538-539 n. 185.
[574] Cf. Bompaire 1958, 683 n. 2.
[575] Corcella in Asheri/Lloyd/Corcella 2007, 558 (Herodotus' Scythian *logos*), 561 (contradictions, especially with regard to geography).
[576] Compare the battle in the Moon-episode in Lucian's *VH* 1.13-20, which similarly proceeds according to canonical historiographical accounts of battles. For this aspect, see Fusillo 1999, 364.

and then narrates how the battle took place, opening the description of the fight in perfect historians' jargon (γενομένης δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ μάχης καρτερᾶς, §54.16).[577] The battle itself is depicted in its details and by emphasising all the moves of the opponents. Toxaris describes how the Scythian phalanx was divided by the allied forces, with one part having to retreat while the other was outdone by the arrows and javelins of their enemies. He recounts how Arsacomas, seeing his friends wounded, set the rest of the Scythians against the enemies and killed their king, so that, in the end, the Scythians were able to defeat the Machlyans and their allies, who are forced to capitulate. The episode of the battle conventionally closes with the signature of a treaty. One further such principle, which is developed in *Hist.Conscr*. 49, is the fact that a good historiographer should narrate a battle from different perspectives. Toxaris recurs to this rule when he describes the battle from his perspective as an active participant in the combat (§54.11-14) and from an omniscient perspective, which, on the one hand, includes knowledge of the moves and fortune of both parts of the Scythian army, whose forces were divided by the enemies in the first assault (§54.14-23), and, which, on the other hand focusses on single events such as the *aristeiai* of Lonchates and Macentes (§55.1-4) or Arsacomas (§55.4-12). Then, Toxaris presents himself as a witness of the events he narrates and frequently uses the first person plural as a way to include himself in the narrative. This device alludes to the idea in historiography that autopsy makes an account more reliable.[578] All these historiographical aspects confer authority upon Toxaris' narrative with regard to both its reliability and its literary (mimetic) value.

But this story could also read as a humorous allusion to the more or less contemporary history of the Black Sea region and to its historiography in particular.[579] During the Roman Imperial period, tribes from regions farther east and north of Scythia repeatedly invaded Scythia and the area of the Cimmerian Bosporus, which were largely under the protection of the Romans. For example, at the end of Hadrian's rule, the Alans made incursions into Cappadocia (cf. Arrian's fragmentary *Expeditio contra Alanos* and *ἔκταξις κατ' Ἀλανῶν*).[580] Thus, in a few passages, Toxaris' story describes the interactions between the Scythians and their neighbours. In §44.4-5, a Scythian embassy is sent to the Bosporans to collect their tribute which has been due two months earlier. In §49. 5-10, Lonchates pretends to come to the Bosporan king with a message from the Scythian

[577] There are innumerable occurrences for this phrase in historiography, but see Hdt. 1.76.14, 2.63.15,3.11.13, D.S. 3.54.7, etc., D.H. 1.64.4, etc., J. *AJ* 1.175, etc., Plut. *Alc*. 31.5, *Phoc*. 13.5, *Pyrrh*. 26.6, Arr. *An*. 4.17.6, etc., App. *BC* 1.10.89, 2.7.44, *Hisp*. 125, *Mith*. 275, Hdn. 3.2.2, etc.

[578] Autopsy testifies to the reliability of an account in the eyes of historians such as Thucydides and Polybius, but is also a prominent feature of Herodotus' narration – the historian even emphasises frequently that he has direct contact with his source. For the principle in historiography, see Nenci 1953, Schepens 1980 (Herodotus), Ligota 1982, 6-8, Marincola 1987, 122, 125-128 (Herodotus), Marincola 1997, 67 and 70, Hutton 2005, *passim*. Compare Th. 1.1.1, Plb. 3.4 and 12.25-28 with Walbank 1962, Str. 2.5.11 and Paus. 2.22.3 with Pretzler 2007, 54-55 (also for the *topos* in Imperial literature).

[579] For the relationship between Lucian and contemporary historiography, see Free 2015, 203-208 (Fronto), 208-217 (Arrian) with 203 n. 103 for further bibliography.

[580] See RE I (1894) s.v. Alani 1282 [Tomaschek] referring to J. *BJ* 7.7.4, *AJ* 18.97, D.C. 69.15.

community (ἥκεν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν, §49.3) regarding quarrels about border-crossing herdsmen and robbers. In §51.5-16, Macentes describes friendly and hostile family and hereditary relationships between Black Sea tribes. Similar political interactions are attested in historiography. For example, Strabo knows of quarrels and wars over unpaid tributes between the Scythians and their neighbours (Str. 7.4.6). Arrian narrates that a Scythian embassy once came to Alexander to clarify that some robbers were not sent by the Scythians (οὐκ ἀπὸ <τοῦ> κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἐπράχθη) but acted individually (ἀλλὰ καθ' ἁρπαγὴν λῃστρικῷ τρόπῳ σταλέντων, *An*. 4.5.1, with noticeable similarities to Toxaris' story).[581]

Furthermore, considering the focus on extraordinary adventures and the theme of travel, this story also must be understood as a deforming parody of the tradition of travel accounts (*periēgēseis*) – deforming because it is transposed in the voice of a Scythian.[582] For example, the dimension of the extraordinary is self-reflexively alluded to by the intradiegetic character in §53.4 (τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ θεάματος καταπλαγέντος), which recalls the interest of travel literature not only in wondrously unfamiliar customs, objects, and sights, but also in astonishing exploits. In §56.8-9, Mnesippus' reaction makes the relationship between Toxaris' story and travel literature explicit and emphasises the geographical vastness englobed in his narration. He chides Toxaris for his extremely long story, which took him 'up and down Scythia, for a run across the Machlyans and far off to the Bosporus' (ὡς νῦν γε, ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὴν Σκυθίαν καὶ τὴν Μαχλυανὴν διαθέων καὶ εἰς τὸν Βόσπορον ἀπιών, §56.8-9). More specifically, Mnesippus' reaction to Toxaris' story not only defines it as a 'Herodotean' or periegetic narrative but also as an 'Odyssean' one, the ancestor of all travel accounts.[583] The epic-Odyssean nature of this story is in fact hinted at by Toxaris himself, when he reassures Mnesippus that his next story will not be as long as the present one in order that 'he does not get exhausted by vagrantly following [him] with his ears' (μὴ καὶ κάμῃς ἡμῖν τῇ ἀκοῇ συμπερινοστῶν, §57.2). The use of the verb συμπερινοστέω is remarkable. Without the prefix, it would resemble the verb νοστέω and allude to Odysseus' νόστος.[584] This might be intended too, but the verb primarily alludes to the tradition of periegetic narratives (-περι-), with a hint at the theme of friendship (συμ-).

Any account of things and places distant is subject to suspicion.[585] Accordingly, Mnesippus is sceptical about Toxaris' story – and the latter, aware of the issue by the end of his fourth story,

[581] But see already Hdt. 4.102.
[582] For transposition as a mechanism of parody in Lucian, see Camerotto 1998, 60-70.
[583] See Jacob 1991, 24-30, Hartog 1996, esp. 13, Dougherty 2001, Hutton 2005, 8-9, Pretzler 2007, 44-48, *ead*. 2009, 358. Cf. Luc. *VH* 1.3.
[584] The verb συμπερινοστέω is rather Late Greek. See Schmid I, 375. Cf. Luc. *Symp*. 14, *Cont*. 1. For the epic connotation of νοστέω, see Hom. (51 occurrences, of which 33 in *Od*. and 60 for νόστος in *Od*.), A.R. (13 occurrences), Q.S. (12 occurences), Nonn. *D*. (15 occurrences).
[585] For the issue, see esp. Str. 11.6.3 and 1.2.19 (Eratosthenes' critique of Homer and the Phaeacian tales in the *Odyssey* = F I A 14 Berger), but see 1.2.3-37, esp. 6-9 and 35, for a contrasting view. See Romm 1992, 183-202, Kim 2010, 60-71. For suspicions about Odysseus' narratives, compare Hom. *Od*. 11.363-367, esp. v. 366: … ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο. Compare also [Long.] 9.13. Strabo's defence of Homer demonstrates a

underlines that this story, unlike the preceding one, 'did not happen among the Machlyans or the Alans, to be without witness and impossible to believe' (§60.14-15). Mnesippus reproves Toxaris by saying that his third story is 'very tragic' and 'myth-like' (πάνυ τραγικά, ὦ Τόξαρι, καὶ μύθοις ὅμοια, §56.1) and that 'one would be blameworthy if one did not believe it' (εἰ δ' οὖν τις ἀπιστοίη αὐτοῖς, οὐ πάνυ μεμπτὸς εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, §56.2-3). The meaning of μύθοις ὅμοια hints at accounts that have been 'invented' in the sense that, for example, Strabo gives to Herodotus' *Historiae* and other 'mythographers'.[586] The meaning of τραγικά is similar to that of μύθοις ὅμοια, as, here, it highlights the aspect of the *fabula*, the poetic and mythic subjects of tragedies, rather than their 'tragic (that is, bombastic) speech'.[587] In fact, the language and style of Toxaris' narration – even in the intradiegetic characters' speeches – are kept simple and present very few rhetorical figures such as the metaphorical language in §50.24-25 (δέδια μὴ προθύσηταί με τοῦ πολέμου), the *parhomoeosis* and alliterations in §50.33 (κατα**δεδ**εμένον κατα**λελ**οίπει) and the *parhomoeosis* in §51.17 (ὁμόσκευος καὶ ὁμόγλωττος). The sole exceptions are a few epic accents, which have been discussed above, and a dramatic touch in §50.22 with the verb ὀρκωμοτοῦμεν.[588]

However, Mnesippus not only reproaches Toxaris for the epic-fantastic elements of his story but also criticises his behaving like a sophist (μὴ μακρὰ μόνον, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ οὕτως ἀφέτοις χρώμενος τοῖς λόγοις, §56.7-8) and his 'abusing his silence' (πάνυ μου κατεχρήσω τῇ σιωπῇ, §56.9-10).[589] This point of critique alludes to the rules of dialogical communication as opposed to epideictic oratory (as discussed by Plato's Socrates, for example, in the *Protagoras*) and leads back to Mnesippus and Toxaris' characterisation as sophist-contenders.[590] A specific allusion to this text is not excluded considering the similarities – I take the following passage, *Prt.* 334c8-d5, as exemplary for the longer passage in which the issue is debated:

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complicated relationship between 'factuality' and 'myth' in poetry and between historiography and poetry. To Herodotus, too, accounts from places unexplored are an issue, as shows his dealing with the question of the Hyperboreans and the information of Aristeas (Hdt. 16-36.1).

[586] Compare the formulation in D.S. 2.44.3, 31.9.1, Long. 4.20.1, Plut. *De facie* 940D. For mythography in Strabo, see, e.g., Malinowski 2001 (including paradoxography), Patterson 2013. For the same issue in Herodotus, compare *VH* 2.31. See Romm 1989 (Herodotus and the Hyperboreans). See also Thucydides' allusion to Herodotus (amongst other poets, orators, logographers, etc.) in 1.21 (cf. τὸ μυθῶδες). See Flory 1990, 195, 198, Hornblower 1991, *ad* 1.21.1, Greenwood 2006, 21.

[587] For the meaning of τραγικός in the present passage, which alludes to the mostly mythical subjects of tragedies and not only to a 'pompous and affected style', see Kokolakis 1960, 87, Karavas 2005, 198, Schmitz 2010, 293.

[588] The verb is poetic. See Schmid I, 341. See A. *Eu*. 764, *Th*. 46, S. *Ant*. 265, F 1116a1, E. *Supp*. 1190, Ar. F 96.1 CAF. But see D.S. 14.34.6 and Plut. *Pyrrh*. 5.5, 6.8. The word appears only once in Lucian's corpus.

[589] For the long-winded speech as characteristically oratorical, see the similar wording in Ar. *Th*. 382 (ὅπερ ποιοῦσ' οἱ ῥήτορες. μακρὰν ἔοικε λέξειν). For the sophists' tendency to interrupt, see, e.g., Plt. *Hp.Mi*. 364b6.

[590] See esp. Plt. *Prt.* 334c7-338b2. Interestingly, in one of the other of Lucian's 'Scythian' dialogues, in *Anach*. 18, it is the Scythian Anacharsis who asks the Greek Solon not to make long speeches but to speak briefly (cf. διὰ βραχέων, *Anach*. 20), for otherwise he, being a barbarian, would forget the beginning of his speech – and thereby alludes to the same passage in Plato's *Protagoras*. Anacharsis' point is to direct the conversation towards a more philosophical rather than rhetorical dimension (compare Philosophy's claims to speak βραχεῖς τινας λόγους in *Bis Acc*. 28). In a certain way, Toxaris here defends an opposite position with regard to Anacharsis.

> Ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, (d) ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν, ᾧου ἂν χρῆναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι.
>
> Dear Protagoras, it happens that I am a forgetful person, and if someone makes long speeches, I forget what the speech was about. Therefore, just as in the case you wanted to talk to me and would have to speak louder than to others if I were hard of hearing, so now, since you have come across someone forgetful, keep the answer short and make it brief, if you want me to follow you.

In both texts, a contrast is established between making long speeches and keeping them brief (μακρὰ λέγη and μὴ μακρά, §56.7; βραχυτέρας ποίει and βραχέων λεκτέον, §57.1), and in both texts, the interlocutor is represented as someone who follows the other's speech as if it were an itinerary (εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι, cf. 335e4-5, and §56.8-9). The interest of this passage in the *Protagoras* for the *Toxaris* is that the latter text can thus refer to the immediate context of the Platonic dialogue, which is explicitly agonistic. The *Toxaris* uses the Platonic dialogue as a foil for its own eristic dynamics, but also appropriates for itself its criticism of the empty and prolix speeches of sophists – a point of criticism that Mnesippus directs with much irony at a Scythian who repeatedly condemned such verbiage.

This directly leads to the question of how to best narrate examples of friendship. Indeed, the contrast between short and long speeches is of immediate relevance for Mnesippus and Toxaris' third pair of stories. While Mnesippus' third story is rather short and lacks action, that is, deeds of friendship, Toxaris' third story is complex and presents manifold levels of narration and action. Consequently, in this case, a long speech allows for more deeds of friendship than a short one. The reference to the discussion of length and brevity in Plato's dialogue, where it is bound to the question of how to best conduct a philosophical debate, points to the difference between the Greek and the Scythian story and invites the recipients to compare them and reflect upon ways of narrating friendship. The *Toxaris*, however, does not present any answer to this question – this is left to the recipients to think about.

§§57-60 Toxaris' Fourth Story: Helping a Friend in Need

Summary of the Story

Toxaris' fourth story is about himself and his friend Sisinnes, who followed him on his journey along the Black Sea to Athens. In Amastris on the Pontus, they are robbed of all their belongings, which they had left at their dwelling place while they went to the market (§57). Toxaris is desperate, but

Sisinnes cheers him up and provides for both of them by working at the port. One day, Sisinnes comes to the knowledge of a gladiator contest and the possibility to earn a lot of money (§58). On the pretext of enjoying some spectacle, he drags Toxaris with him to the theatre where the gladiatorial games are to take place. It then turns out that Sisinnes had in mind to fight in a combat against one of the gladiators in order to earn the prize money in case he won. After a violent combat, and although he is severely injured, Sisinnes wins the fight. Toxaris succours him, heals his wounds and gives him his sister in marriage as an expression of his gratitude (§§59-60).

A Story between Scythia and Greece

One remarkable aspect of Toxaris' story is his insistence on the geographical context, which has the purpose of stressing its liminal quality. Noticeably, the focus of his narration constantly sways between Scythia and Greece. It starts in Scythia (οἴκοθεν), but soon moves to Greece, as Toxaris and Sisinnes are on their way to Athens (§57.4). They stop at Amastris on the Pontus, which is described as a 'port of call for anyone who sails away from Scythia', 'a town quite near Carambis' (§57.5-7).[591] These places are thus representative crossroads between Greece and Scythia, points of exchange between two worlds, from both a geographical and cultural perspective. The choice of situating the story in such a place does not come without its intercultural baggage, for their geographical ambivalence and confluence of Greek and Scythian landmarks reflects Toxaris' own ambivalence with regard to his Greekness and Scythian-ness and his judgement of Greek culture.[592] To Toxaris, Greekness is something desirable, for he undertakes his journey out of longing for Greek *paideia* (ὅτε γὰρ Ἀθήναζε ἀπῄειν οἴκοθεν ἐπιθυμίᾳ παιδείας τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς, §57.4-5).[593] But simultaneously, there are highly questionable aspects of Greek culture: Is that 'sensationalist spectacle of the Greeks' (παράδοξον θέαμα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, §59.3), this cruel exhibition of violence in the arena, really 'something pleasurable' (ὡς ἐπὶ τερπνόν τι, §59.2-3)? Probably not, for the tone is ironic.[594] Moreover, the story ends in Scythia (καὶ ἔστι μέχρι νῦν ἐν Σκύθαις, §60.12) and the project of getting to know, or possibly adhering to, Greek *paideia* is abandoned, at least as far as Sisinnes is concerned. Indeed, it is not clear where the story ends for Toxaris. Did he look after Sisinnes at their dwelling place at Amastris (ἀράμενος αὐτὸν ἐκόμισα εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, §60.11), or back home in Scythia (cf. οἴκοθεν designating Scythia in §57.4)? The fact is, though, that at the intra-fictional moment of the

[591] Amastris (today Amasia in Turkey) is situated in Paphlagonia and became part of the Roman province Pontus-Bithynia. Carambis is a cape in Paphlagonia, just opposite of the Taurian peninsula, where the strait is narrowest. For the geography of Amastris and Carambis in antiquity, see Marquis, 544 n. 209. Amastris expanded as an urban centre in the Claudian period, and its architectural development reached its peak under Trajan. See DNP s.v. Amastris 4 [Marek].

[592] For the ambivalence of the Black Sea region with regard to Hellenic identity, see further Braund 1997.

[593] Compare Anacharsis' motivation for travelling to Athens (*Scyth*. 1, 4).

[594] For Lucian's criticism of these violent spectacles in theatres, see Karavas 2005, 208. See in general Kokolakis 1959. Compare *Anach*. 10-11. See also the connotation of 'laughable' that dramatic performances as theatre spectacles receives, e.g., in *Anach*. 22-23, *Nigr*. 18. On the other hand, gladiatorial games are rather a Roman 'pleasurable' custom, although it rapidly spread throughout the Empire.

dialogue, Toxaris has been in Greece for some time (§9.6-7). These ambiguities and paradoxes surrounding Greekness and Greek culture demonstrate that there is an obvious difference between (true) Greek *paideia*, which Toxaris idealistically longs for, and the spectacle culture which he is confronted with, and which belongs to the reality of a Hellenised town at the fringes of the Roman Empire.[595]

While Amastris is characterised as a Hellenised place – or even Athenised, for the sycophants, which Toxaris is concerned to be taken for (δεδιότες μὴ συκοφάνται δόξωμεν, §57.15), clearly have their place in the Athenian judicial system – there are some distinct signs that Toxaris, in his narration, presents himself as, and truly feels like, the 'other'. For example, typically Scythian or 'eastern' objects are mentioned, such as Toxaris' Scythian 'akinakes' (τὸν ἀκινάκην, §58.4) or the gladiator's Thracian 'curved sword' (καμπύλῳ τῷ ξίφει, §60.4).[596] The money, the 40 golden coins (δαρεικοὺς τετρακοσίους, §57.16) that Toxaris and Sisinnes were robbed of, is Persian.[597] Finally, it is remarkable that Toxaris directly expresses his, or Sisinnes' and his own, feelings of 'being other'. To them, Amastris and the situation they are confronted with there make them feel helpless and foreign (ἄποροι παντάπασιν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοδαπῇ γενόμενοι, §58.2-3).[598]

Toxaris and Sisinnes

Toxaris' fourth story presents one exemplary friend instead of an exemplary friendship as well. While Sisinnes is the active and courageous one, Toxaris plays the role of the passive, timorous friend. Toxaris indeed represents a coward character, which does not go well with the fighting spirit and combative ideals he defended earlier in the dialogue, and he unveils a self-derisory tone in the narration. Besides, he shows a strong inclination for overemotional reactions. When the first troublesome incident occurs – Toxaris and his friend are robbed of all their belongings – he considers committing a spectacular suicide by plunging his Scythian sword in his flank (§58.3-4). His motivation is disproportionate as well, for he fears not only a disgraceful life but also a death of hunger or thirst (§58.4-5). His reaction is explicitly contrasted with Sisinnes' positive and encouraging attitude (κἀμοὶ μέν, §58.3, ὁ δὲ Σισίννης, §58.5). The fact that Toxaris is an overemotional character is shown further in his reaction to Sisinnes' single combat. Toxaris effeminately laments his friend's deed and fate (ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκώκυον, §60.1, noticeably using a poetic verb, κωκύω, cf. §15.16). His lack of courage is so great that he feels like dying of fright at the sight of his wounded friend (ἐγὼ δὲ προετεθνήκειν ἤδη τῷ δέει, §60.5). Foremost, though, he

[595] This spectacle culture is a central and recurring theme in Lucian's works, for which he often uses theatrical metaphors. See Whitmarsh 2001a, 247-257. Lucian's emphasis on this aspect of Graeco-Roman culture reflects and actuates a central issue of this time, the self-exhibitionism and spectacularisation of (fake) *paideia*. For further metaphors that express this concern, see §9.8-23.
[596] For the former, see §37.5. For the latter, see Marquis, 549 n. 223.
[597] See Marquis, 378 n. 214. See also 'Persian golden coin' in LSJ s.v. Δαρεικός.
[598] Compare Anacharsis' feelings of confusion and dismay when he arrives for the first time as a complete foreigner at Athens in *Scyth*. 3-5.

does not act to get out of the unlucky situation or engage in deeds of friendship, but waits for his friend to act and help him out.

Sisinnes, by contrast, is characterised as the heroic friend, which is illustrated within an athletic-military context. First, he is described as a true friend, as his faithfulness is underlined. Sisinnes has been Toxaris' friend since childhood, and he accompanies Toxaris on his journey to Greece, which is one of the typical duties of a friend (εἴπετο δὲ ὁ Σισίννης ἑταῖρος ἐκ παιδὸς ὤν, §57.7). Moreover, he offers emotional support (§58.5-7) and provides for Toxaris and himself by doing hard manual work, transporting wood from the port (§58.8-9, §59.1). Most importantly, he behaves heroically. He engages in a single combat that defines his commitment as an *aristeia* (μονομάχοι, §59.6, μονομαχῆσαι, §59.8, words which, beyond their technical meaning in the context of gladiatorial games, might have an epic-heroic connotation, cf. §10.12, §11.2).[599] What is more, his adversary is an imposing and forceful man (εὐμεγέθη νεανίσκον, §59.7). His bravery goes as far as not to wear a helmet (emphatically by means of *correctio*: τὸ κράνος δὲ οὐκ ἐπέθηκεν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ γυμνῆς τῆς κεφαλῆς καταστάς ἐμάχετο, §60.2-3). Although he is wounded badly (τιτρώσκεται ... ὥστε αἷμα ἔρρει πολύ, §60.3-4), he succeeds in killing his adversary with a single blow of his sword in and through the latter's chest, so that the gladiator immediately falls at his feet (§60.5-7). Even on the verge of death, he manages to sit down on his adversary's corpse as a sign of victory (§60.7-9).

With regard to the aspect of the characterisation of Sisinnes as the actual friend of the story, it must be objected that Toxaris' behaviour at the end of the story – his gesture of succour, his devotion while healing his friend, and his giving his sister in marriage – reads as a sign of reciprocity and symmetry. The verbal parallelism between Sisinnes' encouraging Toxaris not to despair (παρεμυθεῖτο, §58.5) and Toxaris' encouraging Sisinnes in order to keep his wounded friend conscious (παρεμυθησάμην, §60.10) stresses the symmetry between the two situations and characters.[600] Sisinnes is actually on the verge of death (μικροῦ δεῖν ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν ἡ ψυχή, §60.10), while Toxaris only considers suicide out of apprehension to die of hunger and thirst (§58.3-5). Nevertheless, this story's example of friendship is indeed that of a single friend, Sisinnes, as is made clear when Toxaris introduces his fourth story, which explicitly tells of Sisinnes' deeds of friendship (οἷα φίλος, Σισίννης τοὔνομα, ὑπηρέτησεν, §57.3).

Finally, there are remarkable thematic similarities between Toxaris' fourth story and Mnesippus' fourth story.[601] Both stories present a friend marrying a family member of his friend

[599] The motif of engaging in gladiatorial combats oneself to provide for one's friend or family is topical in rhetorical exercises. See Marquis, 548 n. 220 referring to [Quint.] *Decl*. 9, 302.

[600] In Euripides' tragedy, though, Apollo orders Orestes to give his sister in marriage, and it is not explicitly an expression of gratitude. Ní Mheallaigh, for her part, sees here a parallel with Chariton 8.8.12, where Chaereas gives his sister in marriage to his friend Polycharmus as an acknowledgement of his faithfulness. Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 67. However, the motif might be common (cf. E. *Or*. 1658-1659, where Orestes gives his sister Electra in marriage to his friend Pylades out of gratefulness).

[601] Marquis underlines some of these similarities and then accurately generalises: 'On observe beaucoup de parallèles directs entre les récits grecs et les récits scythes.' Marquis, 380 n. 228.

(Sisinnes marries Toxaris' sister and Zenothemis marries Menecrates' daughter, §25.9-17). In this story, Sisinnes encourages and cheers up his desperate friend by promising a solution for a financial and existential difficulty (ὁ δὲ Σισίννης παρεμυθεῖτο, §58.5). In the corresponding Greek story, Zenothemis encourages his friend not to despair and cheers him up by hinting at an expected salvation from his financial and familial misfortune ('θάρρει', ἔφη [sc. Ζηνόθεμις], 'ὦ Μενέκρατες, κτλ.', §25.1-3).

Effects of Empathy and Visualisation

The characterisation of Sisinnes as epic combatant, as in the previous stories, reveals that there is a hyperbolic dimension to the praise of his deeds of friendship.[602] The fact that he fights bareheaded is a sheer exaggeration, and his victory *in extremis* over the heavily-armed gladiator is overstated to the extent that it becomes improbable. His saying goodbye to Toxaris as he heads to the arena, which is overemotional ('if I win, we shall get out together with enough subsidies, but if I fall, go away and bury me back in Scythia', §59.12-13), highlights this hyperbolic aspect of the narrative praise and makes clear that its intent is to stir the recipients' – or, more immediately, Mnesippus' – empathy.[603]

Beyond the representation of emotionally poignant actions, which calls for the empathy of its recipients, the narration is also intent on creating further, visual, effects, as it thematises sight and spectacle. In §59.2-4, at the beginning of the narration of the episode in the theatre, words related to the act of seeing and the spectacle abound: θέας, ἐθεώμεθα, θέαμα, θέατρον, ἐωρῶμεν. This emphasises Toxaris and Sisinnes' function as spectators and the aim of going to the theatre, which explicitly consists in enjoying something visual. This has implications for the recipients, or, let us say, Mnesippus in the first place, for it advertises the fact that the following narration is intent on enhancing his visualisation of the events narrated, as if he himself were among the spectators of the show and emotionally involved in the happening.[604] For example, the course of the spectacle is detailed (first come beasts chasing some condemned persons, then the single fights against gladiators), and the narration is clearly structured (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, §59.4, ἐπεὶ δέ, §59.6, ἐνταῦθα, §59.9). Then, Sisinnes' fight against the gladiator is described in detail (§60.1-10). The description of his wound and the weapon which caused it is precise (καμπύλῳ τῷ ξίφει ὑποτμηθεὶς τὴν ἰγνύαν, §60.4), and every move of the combat is narrated with a marked focus on verbs of action (λαβών, περιεδήσατο, ἐπέθηκεν, τηρήσας, παίει, διήλασεν) and movement (καταστάς, ἐπιφερόμενον, ἐπεπτώκει, ἐπεκάθιζε, προσδραμών, ἀνέστητα). The purpose of such a narration that aims at

[602] Compare Coleman 2000, 491 (esp. for the improbable fighting without helmet), Ní Mheallaigh 2014, 67.
[603] The use of tenses in this sentence is noticeable. While the case in which Sisinnes would win is expressed by means of a potential hypothetical clause (εἰ μὲν κρατήσαιμι ... ἄπιμεν, with indefinite apodosis), the possibility that he would die is expressed by means of a prospective hypothetical clause (ἢν δὲ πέσω, θάψας με). This case is considered more probable than his surviving the fight. This increases the melodramatic tone of the situation.
[604] For indications or allusions to the presence of an audience in Lucian, see Urena Bracero 1995, 51-56. Such indicators are words such as ἐπίδειξις (§20.10), ἀκρόασις (§42.8), θέατρον (§59.3), μελετάω, κτλ. For the context of performance of Lucian's dialogues, see, e.g., Korenjak 2000, 24 with n. 26 (with further references). See also Branham 1989, 18-20.

visualisation and involving Mnesippus/the recipients in the events, is to enhance the merit of the praised example of friendship/friend by making its praiseworthiness more comprehensible and poignant.

In fact, a major part of the story is devoted to this description of the gladiatorial games and Sisinnes' single combat, and Toxaris' narration aims at visualisation only in this most significant moment. Generally, though, Toxaris' narration is characterised by subtle effects that emotionally involve the recipients. For example, Toxaris enumerates all their lost belongings in detail (ὡς μηδὲ τὰ ἐς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαρκέσοντα καταλιπεῖν, §57.11-12, δαρεικοὺς τετρακοσίους καὶ ἐσθῆτα πολλὴν καὶ δάπιδάς τινας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁπόσα εἴχομεν, §§57.16-58.1), which somehow emphasises how terribly and suddenly they are poverty-stricken, a situation that leads him to contemplate suicide. More conspicuously, at the beginning of the story, suspense is created by the mention that Toxaris and Sisinnes went on the market 'without suspecting anything bad' (§57.9-10). Consequently, Mnesippus/the recipients expect something to happen and tension increases. Similarly, Mnesippus/the recipients are not told directly what Sisinnes plans to do in order to 'make Toxaris and himself rich within three days' (§58.14), as if the narrator intended to recreate the effect of surprise that Toxaris experienced at that time. While these narrative mechanisms that increase emotional engagement, visualisation and suspense may work well on Mnesippus, some critical recipients – and perhaps Mnesippus, too – might evaluate this story as inflated praise for precisely this reason.

§61 Toxaris' Fifth Story: Rescuing a Friend in Danger of Death

Summary of the Story

Toxaris' fifth story deals with the Scythians Abauchas and Gyndanes. Abauchas is accompanied by his family and his friend Gyndanes on his journey to the 'city of the Borysthenites' (Olbia). During the night, a fire breaks out at the place where they are staying. Abauchas succours his friend, whose leg is injured and who is thus unable to walk, but leaves his wife and children to their fate. Abauchas and Gyndanes reach a safe place first, but the family only saves their skin *in extremis*.

A Story at the Edges of Scythia

Like the previous stories, Toxaris' last story is set in a characteristically Scythian context. Abauchas, together with his family and friend, is on his way to the 'city of the Borysthenites' (εἰς τὴν Βορυσθενιτῶν πόλιν ἐπαγόμενος, §61.2). This alludes to the River Borysthenes and the city of Olbia, a former Milesian colony on the shores of the Black Sea, at the estuary of the former. Both are landmarks of the northern shore of the Black Sea, and thy appeal to the undifferentiated Graeco-Roman imaginary of Scythia.[605] Then, the name Gyndanes echoes the name of a Libyan tribe in

[605] For the Borysthenes, see e.g. Hdt. 4.18, 24, 53 and *passim*, Ephor. F 158.7 FrGH 2a.70, Str. 2.4.6, 7.3.17, and *passim*, Arr. *Peripl.P.Eux*. 20, Hdn.Gr. 3.1 p. 70.19-24 Lentz, D.L. 4.55, Vitr. *De arch*. 8.2.6, Pompon.

Herodotus, the Gindanes (4.176, 177), and thus adds an extra touch of exoticism with regard to the other names in Toxaris' stories that are invented and sound foreign.

The Friends Abauchas and Gyndanes

Unlike the previous ones, this last story does not feature a clearly exemplary friend. Although Gyndanes is utterly passive because of his inability to move, and although the deed of friendship is carried out by Abauchas alone, this one-sidedness only regards one part of the events. Indeed, Gyndanes has previously demonstrated his courage, virtue, and worth as a friend, because it is explained that his injured thigh stems from his brave defence of his friend and his family from a robbers' attack (§61.5-8, especially διαμαχόμενος). In fact, this serves Abauchas as the decisive argument for saving Gyndanes, but not his family: his worthiness is obviously attested (πεῖράν), while that of his children is not (καὶ ἄδηλον εἰ ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται οὗτοι· φίλον δὲ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιμι ἄλλον ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοιοῦτον οἷος Γυνδάνης ἐστίν, πεῖράν μοι πολλὴν τῆς εὐνοίας παρεσχημένος, §61.21-23). The idea that a friend's value should be attested by some proof of his faithfulness or goodwill, as stated here (εὐνοίας), is a ubiquitous precept in ancient friendship discourse.[606] (And apparently, the Scythians share this view.)

Nevertheless, the focus of the narration is on Abauchas and his admirable salvation of Gyndanes. The narration of his deed of friendship equals a praise because the extreme peril they are facing is magnified. For example, the use of the epic aorist (ἔφθη) underlines Abauchas' heroic deed. Then, his act of rescue is vividly described by means of rhetorical figures and lexis. When it stated that the fire has seized the entire building and surrounds the characters *from all sides*, the text illustrates this by means of a chiasm, *polyptoton*, and anaphoric use of the preverbal prefix περι- (καὶ *πάντα* περιεκλείετο || καὶ περιεῖχεν ἡ φλὸξ ἁπανταχόθεν τὴν οἰκίαν, §61.10). Then, the text makes abundant use of the word 'fire' and its synonyms: πυκαϊά (§61.9), φλόξ (§61.10), πυρός (§61.15), φλόγα (§61.17).

A Problematic but Significant Deed of Friendship

On the one hand, this story illustrates the ethical question of the relative measure of friendship.[607] Abauchas' choice to save his friend and not his family is not only questionable, but even explicitly

2.6, Aul.Gell. 9.4.6. For aspects that are associated more explicitly with the world outside Greece and the Mediterranean, see D.Chr. 36, Aristid. p. 263.2 Jebb, Ath. 1.10, 2.16 Kaibel, Curt. 6.2.13. For Olbia, see e.g. Str. 7.3.17, Ptol. *Geog*. 8.10.3, Hdn.Gr. 3.1 p. 70.23 Lentz, St.Byz. *Ethnica* 2.128 Billerbeck, Plin. *HN* 4.82 and *passim*.

[606] See, e.g., Thgn. 1.119-128, etc. with Donlan 1985, 225-226, Fitzgerald 1997, 29-31, Arist. *EN* 1156a14-16, Plut. *Quomodo adulat*. 49D, *De amic. mult*. 94C, Max.Tyr. 14.6. The idea of tested friendship is related to the principle of ethical discrimination (κρίσις) according to which one should keep as a friend only the virtuous one – that is, the one whose faithfulness (πίστις) has been tested and has been demonstrated through deeds. On this aspect, see above §5.2.

[607] Cf. Konstan 1993, 5. Toxaris' fifth story exemplifies a 'utilitarian calculation of the relative value and replaceability of friendship versus children'. He relates this question with the question of the primacy of friendship over the well-being of the state, which is a much-debated issue in the ancient discourse on friendship.

the object of an anonymous' reproof (ὠνείδισέν τις, §61.18-19), which anticipates a possible reaction and judgement by the recipients. These might recognise in this story a motif that is already present in Herodotus' account of the choice of Intaphernes' wife to ask Darius to spare her brother rather than any other of her imprisoned relatives, including her husband and children (3.119), or a motif that is represented in Sophocles' play (*Ant*. 905-912), where Antigone chooses to violate the city's law for the sake of her brother – something she would not (hypothetically) have undertaken for her husband or children.[608] These representations of a similar ethical dilemma compared to that exemplified in Toxaris' fifth story (choosing between saving one's brother/friend or one's husband/wife/children) brings to light the ethical-critical dimension of this story.

On the other hand, however, Abauchas' choice to save his friend and not his family hyperbolically illustrates his high opinion of friendship –which is even increased by the way the text overtly and implicitly underlines the emotional bonds of affection that Abauchas has for his family.[609] Thus, he is said to love his wife very much (ἧς ἥρα μάλιστα, §61.3). Indirectly, then, the description of the age of his 'still breastfed' baby-boy and his little girl (τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαστίδιον ἄρρεν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον, ἡ κόρη, ἑπτέτις ἦν, §61.3-4) establishes some form of attachment, or bond of affection, between the recipients and the family-characters of the story. Finally, there is an emphasis on the fact that the family nearly lost their lives. Abauchas' wife is half-burnt (ἡμίφλεκτος, §61.16), and only reaches a safe place just in time (μόλις διεπήδησε τὴν φλόγα, §61.17), while the girl almost loses her life (παρὰ μικρὸν ἐλθοῦσα κἀκείνη ἀποθανεῖν, §61.18). All these details increase the emotional impact of Abauchas' act of abandoning his family upon the recipients and further reflect the priceless value of friendship in Abauchas' eyes.

[608] Cf. Marquis, 550 n. 232. For a discussion of the motif in general, see Asheri in Asheri/Lloyd/Corcella 2007, 506-507. Compare Plut. *De frat. amore* 481E.
[609] Cf. Marquis, 550 n. 232.

§§62-63 The End of the Dialogue: How Mnesippus and Toxaris Make Friends

Concluding the Competition: Words and Deeds

In the same way as Mnesippus concludes his stories, Toxaris closes his speech by underlining that he chose only 'five examples from many' (εἴρηκα ... ἀπὸ πολλῶν πέντε τούτους προχειρισάμενος, §62.1, cf. τούτους ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πλειόνων … διηγησάμην, §35.1-2). As for Mnesippus, this shows that, first, Toxaris equally presents himself as a virtuoso in his rhetorical performing, that is, as a sophist who is able to improvise speeches. Second, it implies that he could have found many more such examples, which not only demonstrates that friendship is a widespread virtue among Scythians, but also further attests to Toxaris' rhetorical competences. Thereby, aspects of the storytelling competition related to the act of delivering speeches are foregrounded, as will be developed below. Then proceeding to the conclusion of the competition, Toxaris asks for someone to pass a judgement (τίς οὖν ὁ δικάσων ἐστίν;) and decide whether Mnesippus or himself is to be the winner, or the loser (§62.2-3). For obvious reasons – Mnesippus and Toxaris did not appoint anyone as the judge for their competition, a fact that should not have gone unnoticed by Toxaris – such a judgement cannot be given, as Mnesippus duly remarks (οὐδὲ εἷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκαθίσαμέν τινα δικαστὴν τοῦ λόγου, §62.4). Toxaris' question prompts Mnesippus to find a solution. The latter proposes that Toxaris and he make friends and consider themselves both as 'winners' (§62.10-12). Inconclusive as this solution may be with regard to the conclusion of the competition, which Mnesippus reports to some indefinite future (αὖθις ἑλόμενοι διαιτητὴν ἄλλους ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ εἴπωμεν φίλους, §62.5-6), Toxaris readily accepts the offer (εὖ λέγεις· καὶ οὕτω ποιῶμεν, §63.1).

Noticeably, here, as earlier in the dialogue when the competition was introduced (§§10-11), the vocabulary used by Mnesippus to describe their aborted competition associates judicial and military images. Thus, the words δικάσων, δικαστήν, and διαιτητήν (§62.3, §62.4, §62.6) belong to judicial vocabulary, while the words τετοξεύκαμεν and ἆθλα belong to the athletic-military realm – the words ἥττων and νικήσαντες belong to both the latter and the judicial vocabulary.[610] This hints, once more, at a particular relationship between words and deeds in the dialogue, where Mnesippus and Toxaris' deeds of friendship are replaced by their words of praise of friendship. The meaning of this assimilation of words and deeds for the competition in friendship between Mnesippus and Toxaris is twofold. First, it substitutes 'words' for 'weapons' in the idea that opponents fighting with equal arms become friends, as is alluded to a little further on in the dialogue, an aspect that will be discussed in the next section. Second, it means that Mnesippus and Toxaris' speeches function as their 'test of friendship', thereby modifying the precept that true friends prove themselves through their deeds – a precept that is actually illustrated in both Mnesippus and Toxaris' stories. As Mnesippus remarks, they have demonstrated that friendship is given a pre-eminent position their respective scale of ethical values (ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σὺ φιλίαν ἐπαινεῖν ἔδοξας, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡγοῦμαι

[610] Cf. above §§10-11.

ἀνθρώποις εἶναι τούτου κτῆμα ἄμεινον ἢ κάλλιον, §62.8-10). They (or at least explicitly Toxaris) have shown their own moral virtue in friendship through their speeches (εἰ μέλλω τοιούτοις φίλοις ἐντεύξεσθαι οἷος σύ, ὦ Τόξαρι, διεφάνης ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων, §63.11-12). The latter are reliable enough a proof of their quality as friends (ὁ γὰρ λόγος ὁ παρὼν καὶ τὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρέγεσθαι πολὺ πιστότερα … ἐπεὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀνάγκης ἀλλὰ γνώμης δεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, §63.3-6). An essential reason for their making friends is indeed that their exchange of stories not only demonstrates their genuine interest in friendship, but also represents an ethical commitment. The fact alone that they take an oath and let themselves in for the competition attests to their voluntary self-disclosure and willingness to put their trust in one another to the point of promising to sacrifice a part of their body in case they lost. This is indeed a good basis for their initiating a friendship, because friendship requires sharing similar values and at a level of mutual confidence that is 'generated through a lengthy process of interaction' – maybe the sort of interaction Mnesippus and Toxaris have been through in their competition.[611]

Mnesippus and Toxaris' exchange of stories of friends is not only about their praising virtuous deeds of friends and illustrating ideals in friendship, but also about negotiating their status as *pepaideumenoi*. As has been pointed out before (cf. §§10-11), metaphors of judicial, athletic, or military *agōn* commonly refer to the competitive nature of *paideia* in the early imperial period. Here too, it is obvious that Mnesippus and Toxaris' rhetorical ability, their active and adroit re-employment of *topoi* and literary models, and their precise knowledge of philosophical-ethical concepts, which are all prerequisites for being a member of the educated elite, are as much of importance as their aptitude for making friends. In other words: being able to debate on friendship and acting according to one's *ēthos* in friendship appears as a prerequisite for affirming one's status as *pepaideumenos*.

The end of the competition is inconclusive, because the question of who presented the best stories of friendship (Mnesippus or Toxaris?) remains unanswered. What is more, before Mnesippus proposes to become friends, the judgement is deffered to another competition, at some undefined point in the future (§62.6).[612] A further rare case of inconclusive judicial situation is found in the *Eunuchus*. The latter text, however, refrains from a final judgement on the grounds of the two opponents' equal deficiency in *paideia* and their inadequacy for the post of the chair of Peripatetic philosophy. Whereas in the *Eunuchus*, judges are indeed involved in the process and the situation is inconclusive only in the sense that there is no winner in the competition, in comparison, the

[611] For these aspects of friendship, see Herman 1987, 29. The requirement that friends '[partake] of the same social system' is not fulfilled in the present case, as Mnesippus and Toxaris are not physically living in the same place. Instead, they engage in a relationship of *xenia*, which is an even stronger relationship, as will be discussed in more detail below.

[612] This device of referring, at the end of a narrative, to a subsequent narrative, is not unknown to ancient narratives, and it is used a few times in Lucian's works. See Ureña Bracero 1995, 88-91. Most conspicuous is the closure of the *Verae Histriae* (see Fusillo 1999, 362, who relates it with paradoxographical accounts, Baumbach 2013).

inconclusive end of the *Toxaris*, and in particular the non-assignment of a judge, lets the recipients assume this role, and incites them to become active and evaluate the stories, not only from a literary perspective, but also from an ethical perspective. Not by chance does Mnesippus use the first person plural pronoun when he praises Toxaris' worth as a friend, which, through his speech, became conspicuous to 'us' (οἷος σύ, ὦ Τόξαρι, διεφάνης ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων, §63.11-12), thereby alluding to an audience of recipients who were present during the competition, so to say.[613] This invites the recipients to reflect upon the value and meaning of the examples. Thus, as is already indicated by the structure of the competition and its form of *syncrisis*, they will notice parallelisms between the Greek and the Scythian stories, which they will be inclined to match and examine as pairs of stories. They will understand that, as has been demonstrated in the course of the commentary of the stories, the illustrated friendships always consist in one active and one passive friend, and that Mnesippus' and Toxaris' stories are representations of friends rather than friendships. They will see that, as has been demonstrated as well, these representations of the friends' worth are exaggerated and follow the narrators' eulogistic intent. In particular, this latter aspect incites the recipients to reflect upon the relationship between the form and the content of the stories, between words and deeds – a question that has already been introduced as it were by Toxaris in the excursus preceding his stories, where he finds fault with Mnesippus' eloquence and inadequate examples of friends (§35). This, finally, may lead the recipients to ask themselves whether this mode of representation, speech, is appropriate at all for inquiring into true friendship.

In fact, the *Toxaris* raises the question of *how* to adequately talk about friendship with words as much as it deals with the question of how to *become* friends. This is achieved by means of the exchange of words – words that, in the end, equal the deeds of a tested and approved friend (paradoxically, this is shown in a text, that is, in words). Thus, in the *Toxaris*, λόγος not only constitutes the means of the competition (hence the judicial and athletic metaphors and the metaphors of words as weapons), but it also becomes the essential means by which friendship is formed.[614] In

[613] Cf. Marquis, 384 n. 235. For the device of alluding to an audience in sophistic performances, see e.g. Philostr. *VS* 514, 580 with Webb 2006, 33. For the device in Lucian, see Solitario 2017, 144: 'Infine, risulta del tutto pertinente l'osservazione di Bruns, il quale attribuisce a questa strategia argomentativa una funzione del tutto particolare. Tenuto conto della tendenza drammatizzante dei dialoghi lucianei e dell'attenzione al pubblico astante, la rappresentazione poliedrica di una medesima questione, ovvero la descrizione di punti di vista differenti e contrastanti rispetto al medesimo tema, stimolerebbe il giudizio critico personale dell'ascoltatore/lettore. Questi, infatti, risulta indirettamente invitato a prendere parte alla discussione, che supera la mera dimensione di esercizio retorico, facendosi dialogo diretto con il destinatario dell'opera. In tal modo, questo procedimento retorico-filosofico esula dal ruolo di mera rappresentazione drammatica della parola dei filosofi messi in scena, ammiccando alla dimensione performativa concreta del testo stesso.' More generally, the present case may be seen in the light of typical dialogical mechanisms. See Cossutta 1997, 41: 'La règle [d'arbitrage] assigne juge et public comme témoins mais aussi comme participants potentiels à une adhesion réfléchie […].'

[614] As a general principle in friendship, compare von Siemens 2007, 210-212: 'Die Verbalisierung gehört also sowohl zum gegenseitigen Erweisen von Wohltaten als auch zum affektiven Austausch. Auch das dritte Element des Zusammenlebens [cf. Arist. *EN* 1170b10-12] kann ohne das Wort nicht bestehen. […] Ohne den Austausch von Worten und Gedanken können sie sich auch ihrer Übereinstimmung in ihren Zielsetzungen nicht sicher sein.'

other words, friendship is formed through the process of διάλογος. Friendship cannot arise from the stories of Mnesippus or Toxaris alone – and indeed, these are stories of friends – but only through their dialogue, careful negotiation and sharing of values. The recipients of the *Toxaris* likewise play their active part in this dialogue inasmuch as they are involved in the recognitive process of the activation of motifs, ideals, etc. In a sense, the text thus not only shows *paideia* in dialogical action, but also endorses a formative function by dialoguing with its recipients: reflecting on friendship necessitates making use of one's *paideia*. All these considerations ascribe a performative function to the *Toxaris*, which employs a 'showing' rather than a 'telling' mode. The latter actually appears insufficient, as Mnesippus and Toxaris' occasional objections and criticism suggest that the single stories of friends are unsatisfactory means to sketch an efficient concept of friendship – let alone to produce friendship.

Two Images for Mnesippus and Toxaris' Friendship

At the end of their competition, Mnesippus and Toxaris summarise their view on their newly-formed friendship by illustrating it through a comparison with the mythological giant Geryon (§62.15-18), and by alluding to specific pacts of friendship between Homeric heroes (§63.7-9). The relationship between these two images of friendship will be discussed below, but first, they will be considered separately. In the literary and iconographical tradition (notice the allusion to visual arts: ὁποῖον τὸν Γηρυόνην οἱ γραφεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται, §62.15-16), Geryon is usually represented as a giant either with several (usually two or three) heads on one upper body, or with multiple (two or three) upper bodies on one lower body, as in the present case (§62.16-18).[615] This image is deployed by Mnesippus to persuade Toxaris to make friends. Thereby, he highlights the gain that a friendship between them would represent as opposed to naming a winner and a loser, for, so he says, 'instead of [losing] a tongue or a hand', they would acquire the double of tongues, hands, and even arms and legs, in short, everything would be duplicated to their advantage (ὅλως διπλᾶ, §62.14). Here, the giant Geryon serves as a symbol of unity between friends (τρεῖς ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν ἅμα πράττοντες πάντα, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ δίκαιον φίλους γε ὄντας, §62.17-18). One might be tempted, at this point, to think of the Aristophanic 'double-human' in Plato's *Symposium*, as there too, the 'original' human creatures are described as a multi-membered and -headed organism (189d5-190a8), and, once Zeus had separated these beings in two, thus Plato's Aristophanes, the halves were longing for their other half to become 'one from two beings' again (ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἕν ἐκ δυοῖν, 191d2). Indeed, the Aristophanic image comes close to that of Geryon in the *Toxaris*. However, there are two significant differences. First, the comparison with Geryon illustrates the parallelism between Mnesippus and Toxaris' stories. Therefore, it is a metaphor for duplication, not a metaphor for complementarity, as is the 'double-human' in Aristophanes' speech. Second, Geryon is the union of two parts – or even three, as

[615] See RE XI 7.1 (1910) s.v. Geryoneus 1290-1296 [Weicker], LIMC IV.1 (1988) s.v. Geryoneus [Brize]. Cf. Marquis, 550-551 n. 234.

iconography has it, and as suggested by Mnesippus and Toxaris' third pair of stories representing three friends – whereas the 'double-human' is originally one being which is subsequently cut into two parts. This implies that the image of Geryon, unlike Plato's Aristophanic myth, utterly lacks the erotic dimension of the longing for an original state and the quest for one's other half. Thus, this represents an essential difference between love and friendship.

The Geryonic image of the duplication of beings and the union of friends in fact addresses a few concepts in friendship. For example, the idea of duplication constitutes another form of the idea that true friendship represents an extension of the self.[616] Although the conception that friends are in some way or another united into one body is not particularly common, related views on friendship abound, some of which have become proverbial. There is the idea that a friend is an 'other self' (ἄλλος αὐτός, or *alter idem*), which is an important aspect, for example, of Aristotle's reflections on friendship (*EN* 1166a, 1170b6, *EE* 1245a, *MM* 1213a), and that friends hold everything in common (κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, cf., e.g., Arist. *EN* 1168b7-8). Most conspicuously, though, in the *De Officiis*, Cicero develops the concept of the mutual attraction of people of the same character, or rather, the same virtue, for one another, and illustrates this line of argument by referring to Pythagoras' consideration that perfect friendship is achieved through the union of bodies (efficiturque id quod Pythagoras uult in amicitia ut unus fiat ex pluribus, *Off.* 1.17.56). The image of 'oneness of body' is thus taken symbolically for 'oneness of mind'. In comparison, in the *Toxaris*, Mnesippus, too, associates the image of united bodies, which is expressed by means of the comparison with Geryon, with the idea of 'oneness of mind'. Indeed, Mnesippus considers that their speeches and, most importantly, their 'yearning for the same' (τὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρέγεσθαι, §63.3-4), reliably confirm that they are fit to become friends. These 'same things' for which both Mnesippus and Toxaris yearn may be interpreted in two ways: On the one hand, it refers to the fact that they share a common ethical system and conception of true friendship. As their stories indicate, the concepts of faithfulness (πίστις) and selflessness – and to a lesser extent reciprocity – are essential to both of them, as is their valuing friendship above any other social or personal quality. The friendship that Mnesippus and Toxaris are forming is going to be a trustworthy one (πιστότερα, §63.4) that will last 'for ever' (εἰσαεί, §62.11). On the other hand, these 'same things' Mnesippus and Toxaris are yearning for may also point to their similar understanding of how to speak about their examples of friendship, because Mnesippus and Toxaris share a comparable rhetorical programme of praise and equally exaggerate the deeds of their exemplary friends.

The likeness of mind, which Mnesippus invokes as a motive for their friendship, is an essential aspect of friendship and a widespread idea. For example, Homer has Agamemnon express a correlation between 'oneness of mind' and his favourable disposition toward Odysseus (*Il.* 4.360-

[616] Cf. Praechter 1973, 370 [56] n. 4 with references to further passages. For the idea that a friend is a part of one's self, see Hor. *Carm*. 1.3.8.

361).[617] In the *Lysis*, Plato shows Socrates trying to define friendship in terms of similarity and attraction for the same (good and virtuous) (*Ly*. 214d4-215a5, 221e-222c, cf. *Grg*. 510b, *Lg*. 837a). For Aristotle, too, similarity and agreement of thought plays an important role in friendship (*EN* 1156b7-11, *EE* 1235a, 1237a26-30, 1241a15-18, 1245a25). As mentioned above, like-mindedness is central to Cicero's definition of friendship also in further passages in his dialogue on friendship (for example, *De amicitia* 4.15, 6.20, 14.50, 21.81, 25.92).[618] The idea is attested for Cynicism (Plut. *Lyc*. 31.2 referring to Diogenes) as well as Stoicism (for example, Clem.Al. *Strom*. 2.9.41.2 = SVF 3.292).[619] For example, when discussing the question of the sage's autonomy, Seneca applies to friendship the proverb 'idem uelle atque idem nolle' (Sen. *Ep*. 109.16), which was earlier used by Sallust (*Cat*. 20.4). Then, to the Pythagoreans, ὁμόνοια (understood as the fact of sharing a common doctrine) represents the foundation for friendship.[620] The union of likes is, finally, an essential element of friendship for Plutarch (for example, *De amic. mult*. 96E, 97A), Dio Chrysostomus (4.42), Maxime of Tyre (14.7), and Apuleius (*De Plat.* 2.13.238). In the *Toxaris*, the idea of 'oneness of mind' between Mnesippus and Toxaris is remarkable beyond the fact that it is illustrated by the strong image of 'oneness of body'. Their ὁμόνοια is the explicit motive of their friendship and the implicit aim of their competition, or rather, the competition is the means by which, in a performative way, Mnesippus and Toxaris' like-mindedness is established.

Then, the comparison with Geryon also entails consequences regarding the inclusion of the recipients in the dialogue as active participants. In the present iconography, he is represented as 'six-handed' and 'three-headed' (ἄνθρωπον ἑξάχειρα καὶ τρικέφαλον, §62.16-17), thus symbolising the union of three friends. As Geryon stands for the friendship between Mnesippus and Toxaris, one might ask who the third member of this union is. One possible answer is that the third member in this union represents the recipient who has committed her ears to listen to two sets of five stories, and foremost, has used her/his critical mind to weight up the value of each single friend. Furthermore, if this recipient has matched the Greek and Scythian stories as pairs and has noticed that the stories each exemplify one good friend, and if she/he has memorised the similar ideals illustrated in these pairs, he will have successfully completed the memory game that the *Toxaris* is. After all these ethical reflections and inquiries into the representation of friendship, the recipient is entitled to equally form one part of the pact of friendship as a proven friend. Thus, rather than definig true friendship or presenting moral norms for behaving as a true friend, the dialogue shows that friendship is not only a matter of rhetorical exercise, but also a human reality that requires full ethical commitment to the ideals of absolute faithfulness and unconditional selflessness. This is also shown by means of the

[617] For the concept of Homeric ὁμοφροσύνη in the context of friendship, see Fitzgerald 1997a, 21-23.
[618] See Powell 1990, *ad* 8.27 (with list of passages), Fürst 1996, 11.
[619] For the concept in Cynicism, see Moles 1993, 273 [= *id*. 1996, 113]; for the concept in Stoicism, see Bohnenblut 1905, 11 (with passages), Banateanu 2001, 112-115. For ὁμόνοια in Stoic friendship, and in Zeno in particular, see Schofield 1991, 46-48
[620] See Fraisse 1974, 65 referring to Porph. *VP* 33.

contrast between Mnesippus and Toxaris' stories of friends and by their own act of making friends at the end of the process of the competition – a process in which the recipients are engaged as well.

The fact that Mnesippus and Toxaris' verbal competition is also conceived as an armed duel reminds us of mythical encounters such as Theseus and Pirithous' confrontation; this is the second image that Mnesippus, and subsequently Toxaris, allude to in order to describe the conclusion of their competition and their forming a friendship. Here, one could imagine, Mnesippus and Toxaris' words have the same function as Theseus and Pirithous' weapons: they are the means by which they confront and test each other. However, just like the mythic heroes, who, instead of fighting out their encounter, take an oath, Mnesippus and Toxaris leave the competition undecided and enter into some form of mutual agreement of friendship.[621] Mnesippus and Toxaris have indeed presented themselves as suitable adversaries who compete on equal terms because of their identical intent in narrating their stories and their similar ideals in friendship. This is fundamental to the outcome of the competition resulting in their making friends, for it indicates that their friendship is founded on equality. Their stories are equal not only with regard to the quantity of stories told, which was predetermined at the beginning of the competition when they established the rule to narrate the same number of stories about friendship (§11.13-14), but also with regard to their quality, which was defined as the decisive criterion for victory (§11.14-15).[622]

There are, though, further pairs of duelling heroes that also function as parallels for Mnesippus and Toxaris' competition. One of these parallels is Hector and Ajax' encounter in the *Iliad* (7.1-312). As has been seen at the beginning of the dialogue (§§10-11), Mnesippus and Toxaris represent themselves as Homeric single combatants (μονμαχῶν, §10.12); they thus meet as duelling competitors and depart as friends of equal strength. So do Hector and Ajax. More specifically, though, both encounters end as friendships because no winner can be named and because the judgement is deferred to an unspecified future encounter (*Il*. 7.290-292, §62.5-12, esp. αὖθις ... εἴπωμεν, §62.5-6, and αὖτε μαχησομεθ', v. 291). A further, and more remarkable, parallel is the episode of Diomedes and Glaucus' encounter (*Il*. 6.119-236). Although there is a major difference between the two passages in that, unlike Mnesippus and Toxaris, Diomedes and Glaucus do not actually fight against each other, for, recognising in each other ancestral guest-friends, they renovate this pact of guest-friendship and drop their arms, Toxaris clearly alludes to this Homeric episode and

[621] For the mythical confrontation between Theseus and Pirithous, see RE XIX.1 (1937) s.v. Peirithoos 120 [Fontenrose]. Compare Plut. *Thes*. 30.1-2.
[622] Equality is an essential principle in Classical Greek reflections about friendship. For this principle, see Introduction, 'Friendship'. In Cicero's *Laelius*, it pragmatically means the competition in the exchange of favours (*Amic*. 9.32: honesta certatio, cf. Sen. *Ben*. 1.4.3).This idea of competition is also developed in Toxaris' description of the Scythian way of making friends, see above §37.

presents Mnesippus and himself as if they re-actualised the heroic encounter.[623] When Toxaris accepts Mnesippus' offer of forming friendship, he adds that they will be each other's friends and guests, he himself in Greece and Mnesippus whenever he comes to Scythia: καὶ ἤδη ὦμεν φίλοι καὶ ξένοι, ἐμοὶ μὲν σὺ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐγὼ δὲ σοὶ εἴ ποτε ἐς τὴν Σκυθίαν ἀφίκοιο (§63.7-9). The context and the wording in *Il*. 6. 225-226 is similar: τὼ νῦν σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ ξεῖνος φίλος Ἄργεϊ μέσσῳ / εἰμί, σὺ δ' ἐν Λυκίῃ ὅτε κεν τῶν δῆμον ἵκωμαι. In both passages, the reciprocity of the ex-opponents' guest-friendship is underlined by the syntactic structure and balanced by the naming of their respective home country. This gives an unexpected twist to the *Toxaris*, as Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship now specifically becomes a guest-friendship. This form of friendship is a particular one because it is fundamentally reciprocal and particularly durable (cf. Arist. *MM* 1211a46).[624] Guest-friendship is always related to feelings of affection – formally or genuinely.[625] In the present case, Toxaris emphasises that they are φίλοι and thereby specifies the affective quality of their guest-friendship (φίλοι καὶ ξένοι).[626] Then, it seems meaningful that Toxaris conceives of their friendship as *xenia*, as it reminds us of his paradigmatic example of friends at the beginning. Indeed, Orestes and Pylades are sometimes also considered as guest friends (cf. Πυλάδη, σὲ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ / πιστὸν νομίζω καὶ φίλον ξένον τ' ἐμοί, E. *El*. 82-83).[627] Finally, Toxaris' conception of their friendship as *xenia* also entails consequences for the question of identities in the *Toxaris*, an aspect that will be developed in the next section.

In both examples – Ajax and Hector, Diomedes and Glaucus – gifts are exchanged in order to symbolically seal the new friendship. However, in the example of Ajax and Hector, both gifts turn out to be nefarious, as Ajax kills himself with the sword that Hector had given him, and Hector's corpse is dragged by Achilles around the walls of Troy, bound to his chariot by the belt Ajax had given to Hector. In the example of Diomedes and Glaucus' encounter, the exchange of armours is explicitly unequal, which can be interpreted as a sign for Diomedes' superiority over Glaucus.[628] This

[623] For the explanation that Diomedes and Glaucus' *xenia* is not hereditary, but rather renovated as if it were a new guest-friendship, see Konstan 1997a, 36-37. For an argumentation in favour of a hereditary bond of *xenia*, see Herman 1987, 69-72 (p. 70 for Diomedes and Glaucus).
[624] For reciprocity in guest-friendship, see RAC 8 (1972) s.v. Gastfreundschaft 1065-1066 (in general), 1077-1078 (Homeric guest-friendship) [Hiltbrunner]. For the durability and Aristotle, see Herman 1987, 30.
[625] Affection and emotional involvement in ritualised forms of friendships such as *xenia* are taken for granted, but they can also be of formal nature. See Herman 1987, 17-18.
[626] Cf. Hsch. ξ 29: *ὁ ἀπὸ ξένης φίλος.
[627] Remarkably, Mnesippus' stories, too, somehow conform to the concept of *xenia*, as the sort of deeds such as offering hospitality to an unfortunate friend and caring for his material and spiritual well-being, which usually belong to the obligations of guest-friendship (cf. Herman 1987, 28), are found in Mnesippus' first story. However, this might precisely be a case in which obligations of guest-friendship and friendship overlap. The same goes for the example of Orestes and Pylades. For the issue of perceptual boundaries between different forms of φιλία, see Introduction, 'Friendship'.
[628] For this interpretation of Diomedes and Glaucus' exchange, see Stoevesandt 2008, *ad* 234-236 (with references). The exchange is actually unequal, as Glaucus lets himself in for it only through divine intervention (v. 234), which symbolises their unequal strengths. This exchange might function as a substitute for Diomedes *hypothetical* victory over Glaucus in the case that a duel had taken place. For a presentation of the problem from an ancient perspective, see Maftei 1976, 52-53, 54-55.

is a major difference from Mnesippus and Toxaris' forming a friendship. They do not exchange anything after their competition, although one might argue that they did exchange stories in the process of the competition. By means of comparison, and in contrast to the epic heroes, the fact that Mnesippus and Toxaris either did not exchange nefarious or unequal gifts, or actually did exchange equal gifts (stories) during the competition, further underlines Mnesippus and Toxaris' equal (rhetorical and intellectual) strength. However, one must assume that, considering Mnesippus' argumentation that they do not need any oath because of what they both demonstrated in their speeches (§63.2-6), the latter serve as an exchange of gifts. In fact, their λόγοι function as a symbolic exchange and as a means of sealing their friendship – and indeed, they constitute the means by which their friendship is formed, as has been argued above. Mnesippus and Toxaris' λόγοι assume the function of *symbola*, of gestural or material tokens, in ritualised friendship.[629] Just as in ritualised friendship, their exchange of stories – their dialogue – is a performance of πίστις, the means by which antagonism becomes consensus.[630] Just like these tokens whose halves join exactly, Mnesippus and Toxaris' Greek and Scythian stories of friends match one another one by one; and thereby, λόγος takes on a materialistic and performative-ritual dimension. In conclusion, Mnesippus rejects one form of ritualised friend-making (the Scythians' ritual of drinking blood) and replaces it with another form: dialogue.

Furthermore, with regard to the example of Ajax and Hector, who essentially remain enemies notwithstanding their momentary ending the duel in friendship due to external circumstances (night falls; the gods have decided not to harm any of their protégés), the comparison raises the question of whether Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship might somehow be ambiguous. And indeed, the comparison with Geryon leaves a doubt as to whether Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship might somehow be interpreted as menacing. Then, Mnesippus and Toxaris do not swear an oath to seal their friendship. Any such oath, or pact, of friendship, which, for example, involves shedding blood, as is the custom with the Scythians, is explicitly cast aside by Mnesippus (§63.2-6).[631] However, unlike the situation in Ajax and Hector's encounter, the idea to iterate the competition and defer the judgement to a later time is rejected by Mnesippus straightaway (§62.8).[632] Instead, he proposes that

[629] For the function of *symbola* in ritualised friendship, see Herman 1987, 50 (e.g., Scythian blood drinking), 63 (*symbola* cut into two halves).
[630] For the gesture of shaking hands, or other pacts and oaths (ὅρκια) of friendship, in Homeric epics as a symbolic engagement of πίστις, see Taillardat 1982, 4-5.
[631] For the Homeric 'pact of honour' in a *xenia*-relationship that is confirmed by making an oath see, e.g., *Il.* 3.94, 7.302, 22.265-267 with Pizzolato 1993, 13. But see Konstan 1997a, 36 for a different view; to him, *xenia* is usually not marked by an oath. For Homeric *xenia* and exchange as, e.g., in *Il.* 6.215, see, e.g., Finley 1978, 109, Herman 1987, 1-5, 58-61. With regard to the Scythian oath of friendship (cf. §37), it is worth mentioning the fact that is not specifically bound to the act of making friends, but a way of making a pledge in general. See Marquis, 526 n. 139.
[632] In fact, in Homer, an encounter ends in a friendship only rarely. Compare Kitts 2005, 53: 'Yet rarely do they part as friends. The duel between Hector and Ajax does not remedy the ruptured Achaian-Trojan pact, and Hector's vision of friendship after strife belies what usually happens, which is that heartrending strife culminates not with friendship but with the rending of bodies.' Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship thereby appears as an exception, if it is not even demarcated from the Homeric world.

Toxaris and he be winners and friends 'for ever' (§62.11). The absence of an oath of friendship is less a sign of caution than it is replaced by a different cultural practice, speech (thus Mnesippus: §63.2-6). By means of the comparison with the episode between Ajax and Hector, Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship appears as *voluntary* even more, for it is based on personal and ideological affinities (ἐπεὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα *οὐκ ἀνάγκης* ἀλλὰ γνώμης δεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, §63.5-6).[633] In conclusion, these two comparisons point to several essential aspects of Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship such as equality of excellence and voluntary commitment.

Finally, the comparison with mythical encounters such as Theseus and Pirithous' is meaningful from further perspectives as well. By conforming to a mythic model of (guest-) friend-making, and thus integrating their friendship into a defined socio-cultural system, it becomes clear that the role of their competition is to prove that they are ἀγαθοί and therefore apt to be friends and *xenoi*.[634] The comparison shows that the *Toxaris* claims to operate as the 'new' (mythical and literary) example of friendship to be followed, becasue, by means of the dialogue, friendship is demonstrated, performed, and perhaps even instilled in the recipients.[635] The principle of ethical *mimēsis*, which Toxaris expounded at the beginning of the dialogue with the example of Orestes and Pylades' worship by the Scythians (cf. §1.11-13, §§5.11-6.7), actually applies to the *Toxaris*, too.[636] The end of the dialogue also refers to the initial argument between Mnesippus and Toxaris, where the Scythian reproved the Greeks for their lack of active/productive engagement with literary examples of friends and challenged Mnesippus to remediate to this problem (cf. §§10-12). The reason for the competition, as it were, is to grant Mnesippus the opportunity to prove that he is not – rhetorically, intellectually, and ethically – inferior to Toxaris in friendship.

Greekness and Ethnic Identity in the *Toxaris*

Both the comparison of Mnesippus and Toxaris' friendship with Geryon and the conceptualisation of their friendship as a relationship of *xenia* entail consequences for the representation of Greekness and Scythian-ness in the *Toxaris*. The comparison with Geryon is a metaphor for Mnesippus and Toxaris' amalgamation with regard not only to their friendship but also their self-representation, because it signifies the subversion of a binarism between Greeks and Scythians that has been

[633] *Xenia* is usually defined as a 'friendship between strangers […] [which] is voluntary and affective'. Konstan 1997a, 36. For voluntary guest-friendship in Homer, see Herman 1987, 2.
[634] In the Homeric world, in order to become *xenoi*, one needs to prove that one is ἀγαθός. See Adkins 1963, 35.
[635] Compare Schissel 1912: 'Durch diese Eintracht der Wettkämpfer am Dialogende steht in Mnesippus und Toxaris ein vorbildliches Freundespaar der Gegenwart – gemäß der Vereinbarung von §10 – einem wegen seiner Musterhaftigkeit vergöttlichen Freundespaar der Vorzeit, Orestes und Pylades, gegenüber.'
[636] The emphasis on moral exemplarity is not only of importance with reference to Orestes and Pylades in the beginning of the dialogue, but it is also a *Leitmotiv* throughout the dialogue. The stories that Mnesippus and Toxaris tell each other insinuate that they could potentially function themselves as models to be followed by the recipients. However, these stories are exaggerated to the point that they become inimitable, thereby calling into question the actual value of their moral exemplarity. The recipients thus have to turn to another exemplary friendship – that of Mnesippus and Toxaris.

maintained throughout the dialogue, or rather, because it unveils this purported binarism as an artificial construct. There is thus a shift from an oppositional conception of the Greek-Scythian relationship toward a comprehensive and inclusive one.[637] Furthermore, it is significant that Mnesippus defines their similarity of mind-set as the motive for their friendship. At the end of the competition, the relationship between Mnesippus and Toxaris is no longer discussed in terms of (modern as well as ancient) ethnic criteria such as kinship and religious customs, but according to cultural criteria such as their frame of mind (γνώμης, §63.5), which shows through their λόγος (§63.3); Toxaris is not the 'absolute other' any more but someone who thinks 'similarly' (ὁμοίων, §63.4).[638] As has been shown throughout the dialogue, Toxaris is characterised as Scythian (that is, he represents a projection of the Greeks' stereotyped and generalised image of the Black Sea peoples), but, along the way, has negotiated his part of Greek cultural identity. Indeed, Toxaris' Greekness shows through in his command of the Greek language, his moral values, which reflect many Greek ideals in friendship and virtue, as well as his use of Greek cultural and literary references and motifs. Moreover, the way the Scythians worship Orestes and Pylades, 'with celebrations and festal gatherings' (ορταῖς καὶ πανηγύρεσιν, §1.7), indicates that Toxaris even partakes in a collective Hellenic identity.

However, the process described in the *Toxaris* is a process of negotiation and not one of acculturation, as Toxaris 'remains' Scythian and avowedly intends to return to Scythia.[639] Thus, if the competition is presented as a way for Mnesippus to prove his (that is, initially the Greeks') excellence in friendship, it also serves Toxaris to prove his excellence in Greek *paideia*. Consequently, Greekness, which is expressed through *paideia*, is independent of origin, and transcends not only the Attic heart, let alone Athens, but also the Hellenic world. This demonstrates a decentralised understanding of *paideia*. It is significant that Mnesippus' stories, which represent 'Greece', take place all around the Mediterranean, from Massilia to Ephesus, from Alexandria to Athens and bypassing southern Italy. Paradoxically, though, if Greekness has no geographical centre, as the *Toxaris* suggests, the text nonetheless supports a form of Hellenocentrism, as (Classical) Greek culture remains the aesthetic, ethical, and linguistic point of reference. In addition, it is also the ultimate vantage point of moral judgement upon cultural differences, for, at the end of the dialogue, Mnesippus still discards 'Scythian customs', such as cutting lids in case of defeat, which he judges

[637] For the concept of 'oppositional' ethnic identity, see Hall 1997, although he distinguishes this 'oppositional' ethnic identity from an (earlier) 'aggregative' one.
[638] The tendency to focus on the cultural rather than on the ethnic concept of identity is typical for the imperial period. See Swain 1996, 33-39 (Attic Greek), Goldhill 2001, 6, Saïd 2001, Spawforth 2001, Whitmarsh 2001a, esp. 35-37, 299. For the various defining 'components' of ethnic identity, see Smith 1986, 24-31, Tullio Altan 1995, 19-32. See, however, the caveat in Whitmarsh 2013, 3: the concept of 'cultural' identity only bypasses and does not solve the issue of 'nationality'.
[639] See also Bozia 2015, 68, to whom the discussion of issues of identity in the *Toxaris* represents 'an attempt to promote ethnic tolerance and cultural communication, but not cultural annexation'. Cf. Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 90. *Pace* Marquis 2012, 406-408 ('assimilation').

'boorish' (ἄγροικον, §62.8),[640] and taking an oath of blood – a perspective that Toxaris does not argue against, thereby suggesting that, after all, these are not important practices in comparison with his *ēthos* of friendship.[641]

In conclusion, the metaphor of Geryon represents a multiculturalist friendship. It is the emblem of an anti-essentialist conception of ethnic identity and an inclusive understanding of Greek cultural identity. Mnesippus is not only the one who resolves the binarism between Greeks and Scythians, but he is also the one who expresses a philanthropic-cosmopolitan view on friendship (and consequently on ethics in general) when he says that he 'would not hesitate to go even further [than Scythia]' if he wanted (εἰ μέλλω ... ἐντεύξεσθαι) to meet as excellent a friend as Toxaris is (§63.10-11).[642] Mnesippus' view, when one pursues this line of thought further, rejects the idea of foreignness itself– or at least, it bespeaks an understanding of *philoxenia* that englobes all mankind regardless of origin. This concept is particularly present in Stoic philosophy, but also in Cynic thought. Stoics defend a broad concept of fellowship that includes guests and foreigners, and that could be assimilated to the universal community of mankind; they conceive of *philanthropia* as an extension of friendship.[643] Unlike Diogenes' cosmopolitanism 'by default', Mnesippus adheres to a form of cosmopolitanism that welcomes the sage – or in this case, the potential friend and accomplished *pepaideumenos* – on the grounds of his intellectual and ethical qualities alone and thus regardless of any political borders or ethnic and cultural differences.[644] *Philoxenia* is also the form of friendship of which Toxaris thinks (ὦμεν φίλοι καὶ ξένοι, §63.7) as a means of extending the reach

[640] The same word is used by Dio to denote something that is opposed to Hellenic values. See D.Chr. 36.26 with Saïd 2001, 290.

[641] Schissel explains this rejection of blood-oath as a sign that Mnesippus and Toxaris' pact of friendship is 'ethnically neutral'. Schissel 1912, 64 with n. 3. I am not sure whether the rejection of Scythian customs as 'boorish' on the part of Mnesippus' is neutral. He also notices that the opposition of a friendship by oath (§37) and by agreement (§63) represents a difference between conventionality and individualism. *Ibid*., 63. For the argument of Mnesippus and Toxaris' voluntary friendship, see above.

[642] Compare Favorinus' *On Exile* (*P.Vat*. II, 16.3 Barigazzi 1966), where he regards undertaking immense journeys for their friends – as Pylades did – as the duty of exemplary friends. The focus is different here, as the journey is made in order to make friends, not for the sake of friendship. For the idea that one should not hesitate to travel far away to find virtuous persons, compare Thgn. 1.71-72. This idea underlines the rarity of true friendship. Cf. Schissel 1912, 57. For the idea that friendship is a rarity, see also Arist. *EN* 1156a24, Plut. *De amic. mult*. 97B, Max.Tyr. 6.7, D.C. 516a, Them. *Or*. 22. (p. 329 D.), Cic. *Amic*. 21.79, Sen. *Ben*. 6.33.3.

[643] 'Les Stoiciens enseignèrent en effet que tous les hommes, indépendamment de leur origine et de leur nationalité, participent de la raison universelle, le logos, qui gouverne le monde, et qu'ils sont par consequent égaux et apparentés entre eux. […] Ils forment une communauté de vie rationelle et sont liés par un même rapport d'amour les uns avec les autres. […] La cosmopolis étant une communauté d'égaux, elle exclut la notion d'étranger. […] [L]' amitié dépasse la relation avec les proches en s'adressant également aux étrangers : c'est la philoxenia, l'hospitalité, c'est-à-dire l'art de la relation avec les étrangers. Les étrangers ont des amis (philoi) et des frères (adelphoi) car la communauté universelle du genre humain franchit toutes les frontiers. Cette notion de fraternité entraîne que finalement nul n'est étranger, au nom de l'impératif d'égalité de la raison.' See Banateanu 2001, 114, 120-123, 146-148 (quotation, cf. Sen. *Ep*. 48.1-3, Epict. *Ench*. 1.13.4). See also Fraisse 1974, 370-371, König/Whitmarsh 2007, 18 and n. 61 (with references). The concept of cosmopolitanism itself is essentially Cynic (cf. D.L. 6.63, see Moles 1993), although it is also present in Stoic thought. For the relationship between Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism, see Banateanu 2001, 140-141. On Stoic cosmopolitanism in general, see, e.g., Schofield 1991.

[644] For the question of 'identity', see Introduction, 'Greeks and Scythians'. For the different concepts of cosmopolitanism in Lucian, see Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, esp. 98.

of Greek *paideia* beyond any borders and differences.[645] In both cases, forming a steadfast friendship is presented here as being conditioned by one's willingness to literally go out beyond one's cultural sphere and to communicate with the 'other', who is, by now, no longer an opponent but, rather, someone similar.

Finally, from a metaliterary perspective, Geryon illustrates the plurality and changes of perspectives adopted simultaneously, or consecutively, by Mnesippus and Toxaris throughout the dialogue. The fusion of perspectives, more than the absence of a dominating voice and winner in the competition, reflects the absence of a defined (that is, unilateral) authorial voice for Lucian's *persona*.[646] Poetologically too, the image of Geryon is meaningful, because it symbolises the generic *mixis* of the *Toxaris*, a dialogue in which short narratives are embedded that blend historiography with drama, and a dialogue that is functionally and structurally indebted to judicial and encomiastic epideictic oratory as well as comedy.[647] Just like further images used by Lucian to present his poetological programme such as the Centaur in the *Zeuxis*, the metaphor of Geryon, although it does not focus so much on the seamless and harmonious combination of its various, and sometimes even contradictory, constitutive 'parts', illustrates the aesthetic ideal of a (literary) work as an entity resulting from the fusion of different genres. The Lucianic dialogue, according to the painters' representation of Geryon, is not an addition of genres but a growing together of seemingly incompatible 'limbs'. The effect of such an innovative use of literary genres and characteristics on the recipients might in fact be as threatening as is a centaur or the giant Geryon. These monstrous creatures, like Lucian's creation, can only be overwhelmed through Herculean force – or an exceptional ability to utilise one's *paideia*.

[645] Compare Popescu 2013, 63-66 for a discussion of *proxenia* in the *Scytha*, which defends an inclusive view of Greek cultural identity. Here, however, Toxaris might be speaking from an archaic Greek perspective. For archaic Greek *philoxenia* with regard to issues of concepts of identity, see Hall 1997, 46.

[646] Compare Camerotto 1998, 84: 'E dietro ai personaggi è Luciano, regista della *mixis* narrativa, che appare come un Gerione.' With regard to the undefined authorial voice in the *Anacharsis*, see Visa-Ondarcuhu 2008, 193: '[…] en ce sens, il n'y a pas lieu de chercher Lucien derrière Solon ou Anacharsis, puisqu'à travers la variété de son écriture, il semble réconcilier les deux.' See also Branham 1989, 82-104, Baumbach/von Möllendorff 2017, 177 ('[…] [d]er Dialog bringt verschiedene Bildungsvertreter miteinander ins Gespräch […] und avanciert zu einem Bildungsträger der Zweiten Sophistik, der sich besonders gut für die Inszenierung von Dialogizität im Sinne der Polyphonie heterogener "Stimmen" eignet, die sich mischen, überlagern oder im Agon miteinander befinden.'). For the issue with Lucian's persona, see Introduction, 'Context'.

[647] On Lucianic *mixis* see Introduction, 'Structure'.

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