

# AZANIA COMBAT

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE AZANIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (APLA)

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Three SA police  
collapsed to the sound  
of the Scorpion in an  
APLA attack near  
Pretoria

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attacks have  
risen over the  
past 2 years  
-SA security  
has admitted


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as it's known  
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
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STORIES

## ARMY OF THE PAC APLA welcomes '88 in action as . . .



## People's war is on course



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## AZANIA COMBAT

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# EDITORIAL

## Let's back Angola and Mozambique by stepping up fight in SA itself

*Like a mad bull charging its way into a ring of flames, South Africa launched a large-scale invasion of Angola, where about 9 000 of its invading troops now find themselves trapped in a pathetic quagmire.*

*As the oppressed Azanian masses, trained and armed by the Azanian People's Liberation Army on PAC instructions, are waging a determined struggle inside occupied Azania, the South African forces of aggression are not only meeting stubborn resistance in Angola, but receiving heavy blows from the heroic and gallant people of Angola.*

*About 500 racist troops are now known to have died so far in this latest South African invasion, even though the terrorist Pretoria regime puts the figure of its casualties at a ridiculous and obviously false 53.*

*The large number of South African casualties indicates that the sound of the voices of the invaded but resisting Angolan people has undoubtedly begun sending violently into the warped ears of the regime of terror the message that the people of Angola, led by MPLA, will not surrender. Never ever.*

*Like in Angola, the South African racist regime, operating under the names MNR or Renamo, is receiving heavy blows from the heroic and gallant people of Mozambique, led by Frelimo.*

*However, the mad regime has gone further: to launch terrorist attacks in the form of raids, bombings and assassinations outside its borders.*

*Although Pretoria is receiving blows and worldwide condemnation in its criminal adventures, its latest terrorist activities abroad have brought into sharp focus PAC Secretary for Defence Cde Sabelo Phama's statement recently that such terrorist acts would not stop unless Azanian guerillas spread and intensify their attacks inside South Africa itself.*

*"One reason why we have consistently directed our fighters to expand the guerilla war theatre is that we want Pretoria to spread its forces, thereby denying it manpower to send abroad for aggression" said Cde Phama.*

*Once this has successfully been carried out, the regime will have to think twice before sending any of its forces across the borders for aggression or assassinations because things then would be hotter at home."*

*To this end, the PAC has long adopted the strategy of People's War, a true people's war.*

*It is our firm view that with the training and arming of the African masses, who are now able to launch guerilla attacks against the racist security forces, people's war is taking shape in Azania.*

*People of Azania, let us show solidarity with the heroic people of Angola and Mozambique and those of other frontline and neighbouring states by intensifying our war inside Racist South Africa (RSA) itself.*

*We can think of no better solidarity with our brothers and sisters in Southern Africa than to hit the enemy harder at home.*

*In this way, we will not only be keeping the enemy busy at home, but we will be steadily but surely moving nearer and nearer to liberating beloved Azania, for then we will be enjoying an undisturbed backing of our brothers and sisters in the region.*

One Settler!  
Izwe Lethul

One Bullet!  
1-Africa

## THE MARINA STREET ATTACK APLA guerilla unit kills 3 racist police in a spectacular raid

*By Operations Correspondent  
Muriel Dimpho in Winterveld*

**IN a surprise attack recently, a two-man guerilla unit of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) killed three South African policemen and seriously wounded a fourth when the APLA men stormed a shebeen near Pretoria where the racist cops were drinking.**

The shebeen at Marina Street in Atteridgeville near the South African capital is said by local residents to have been a popular watering hole for the policemen who are usually patrolling the township.

The racist Police Directorate of Public Relations confirmed the attack in an unrest report, which said three policemen had died on Friday, March 18, "when gunmen using AK-47 assault rifles opened fire on a group of people (in other words, policemen)".

It is now known that the attack was carried out at about 9 pm by two APLA guerillas - one armed with an AK-47 assault rifle and the other with the now famous Scorpion machine-pistol.

An *Azania Combat* correspondent in Pretoria reported that the Atteridgeville shebeen where the three racist policemen were killed was deserted the day after the attack.

Many people were reluctant to talk openly about the APLA surprise attack, although it had been widely reported in the weekend, particularly the Sunday newspapers, almost all of which quoted the daily police unrest report.

The owner of the shebeen refused to speak to journalists.

Neighbours, however, gave a graphic picture of the events that took place at the shebeen on the night of March 18.

Speaking rather reluctantly, they said it was at about 9 pm when two men wearing blue overalls

opened fire on a group of policemen who had been sitting in the shebeen's garden casually sipping beer.

In a typical guerilla operation, the attack lasted less than a minute, those who heard the gunfire agreed. The guerillas had quickly retreated as other policemen returned fire.

A neighbour, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said he was about 15 paces from the shebeen when the shooting had started.

"They started shooting without uttering a word," the neighbour was quoted as saying by the *Sowetan* newspaper.

"The policemen were sipping beer in the garden. One of their colleagues had just gone to the toilet when it happened, and happened so fast that when I ran into a house for cover the men had already left."

The attack was carried out with speed, precision and meticulousness that have become the operational trademark of the boys," an internal-based APLA operational spokesman said hours after the attack.

"Although it is not usually easy to take on an enemy unit, this one at Marina Street was taken by storm. Everyone agrees that the cops may not have known what hit them as the operation took a very short time."

It is now becoming an APLA operational pattern to carry out attacks that result in no arrests of the combatants involved.

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
Although in a war death or capture is a common occurrence, and although it is not always possible to avoid such setbacks, it remains the PAC strategy and tactics to direct its fighters to hit hard at the enemy while preserving themselves by following correct methods of war.

Racist South African police and soldiers have frequently come under APLA guerilla fire mostly in the African townships since the PAC intensified its military activities, particularly its programme of

training and arming the African masses, at the beginning of 1986.

Some of the most notable attacks were the raid on the Soweto municipal police training college on April 21 last year and the spate of what are now commonly known as the "Scorpion attacks" by the PAC guerillas at Alexandra Township near Johannesburg a few months earlier.

One policeman was killed and a record 85 others were injured in the training college attack while a total of 11 racist security forces were killed and several others injured in the "Scorpion attacks".



# VLOK IS SILENT BUT . . .

## PAC armed attacks have increased over the past two years, admits SA security

QUERILLA attacks by the Azanian People's Liberation Army, the PAC military wing, have increased sharply particularly in the Eastern Cape during the last few years, a senior South African security officer has admitted.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hermanus Berend Du Plessis, a senior officer with the Port Elizabeth security police, told a Kenton Magistrates' Court that the PAC was no longer what it used to be before 1986 when it had "a very quiet period".

When asked by the prosecutor to explain the increase in the number of PAC guerilla attacks, Lt Col Du Plessis claimed that "maybe the people supplying the PAC with money have asked the organisation to do something drastic so they can justify giving it money".

The security officer was giving evidence in the trial of two APLA guerillas, Cde Milton Joyl and Cde Mkelu Sabelo, who were charged with terrorism (guerilla attacks against racist forces) and possession of arms of war.

Lt Col Du Plessis' admission of increased PAC guerilla activity is not seen by PAC and other military analysts as a freeze by Pretoria on its suppression of information on PAC military and other activities.

A PAC military intelligence officer described the admission as "just a rare exception in a determined campaign by Pretoria to portray the PAC as a spent or non-fighting force".

This view was supported by Pretoria's unusual departure from the traditional South African parliamentary practice during annual security budget debates, in which the minister responsible for law and order maintenance would normally disclose to MPs the number of guerilla attacks or losses during the year under review.

*REPORT: Operations Correspondent Muriel Dimpho in Cape Town and Combat Editor Willie Mazambane*

Over the years, the minister concerned would gleefully provide the public, through parliament, with information on how the racist security forces had killed or arrested "terrorists", how many guerilla attacks on inanimate objects had been carried out and on how inactive or dead the PAC was.

Come 1987 and this previously useful practice withers away, with the racist Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, flatly refusing to make any disclosures as to Pretoria's "successes" against "terrorists" or the number of "terrorist" attacks.

But what happened in 1987 which has made Pretoria depart from its parliamentary practice? What is it exactly that the regime did not want to make public?

It is on record that this was a year during which the name, Azanian People's Liberation Army, became better known in Racist South Africa (RSA) and abroad, the year when the PAC army's strong presence and activities became just too difficult to be denied, let alone ignored.

It is a year declared by the Commander-in-Chief, Cde Johnson Mlambo, on behalf of President Zephania Mothopeng and the rest of the PAC leadership, as the Year of Arming the African People in line

with Uncle Zeph's teaching: "A Nation Without Arms is no Nation".

It is the year when the African masses in occupied Azania began to return fire on the trigger-happy racist security forces in the township. That was less than 12 months after APLA commander-in-chief made it public that the PAC, through its army's Military Supplies Unit, was providing military training and arms to ordinary African masses.

While the 1960s and the 1970s saw the fighting capacity of the African masses increasing ideologically and organisationally respectively, 1987 witnessed it steadily rising militarily.

Nineteen eighty seven was the year when the PAC made revelations, which were corroborated by prominent South African writer Professor Tom Lodge and acknowledged by a Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court judge, that its programme to arm and train the African masses within South Africa actually went back to 1975 in northern Zululand near the border with Swaziland.

It was the year (1987) when the PAC emphatically reaffirmed its uncompromising stand on the white liberals, who were conniving with the regime, through the English-language media, in trying to contain or suppress information on the successes of the intensified PAC arm-the-people campaign.

It was the year when PAC, through its military publication Azania Commando, said enough was enough by going out of its usual way to expose the conspiracy of the liberals by disclosing that its guerrillas had killed 11 South African soldiers and wounded several policemen in attacks in and around Alexandra Township near Johannesburg inside three months from December 1986 to February 1987.


Although Pretoria distorted information about the operational circumstances and down-played the number of its casualties, it reluctantly confirmed that Alexandra attacks, which signalled the intensification of a new type of guerrilla warfare attacks in South Africa emphasising on direct physical assault on racist security forces.

This was the year of the Scorpion, that famous machine pistol which has been seen in guerrilla attacks crowned with victory, a weapon now forming part of APLA's operational trademark.



*The Scorpion*

It was the year of the simple but spectacular APLA guerrilla attack at the Tladi Municipal Police Training College in Soweto where a policeman was killed and 64 others injured - the biggest number of security forces ever hurt in a single guerrilla attack in South Africa.



*AN injured policeman receives treatment at Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto after APLA attack on the Tladi Municipal Police Training College. (Picture by Rebecca Hearfield).*

It was in 1987 when the PAC declared, through its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Cde Gora Ibrahim, that "we are now facing Pretoria militarily."

This situation had been foreseen by the late former PAC leader, Cde John Nyati Pokela, who said in 1982: "It will be the first time that whites, who have been living in comparative peace since the Anglo-Boer War in 1902, are made to feel unsafe

"Until white people are themselves killed they will still feel that they are safe to continue killing blacks."

Nineteen eighty seven is a year that Pretoria, through Adriaan Vlok, would most naturally have not liked to talk about because it was the year of the PAC and its army, which in the eyes of the regime were supposed to be either dead or inactive or a "spent force".

Victories scored by the Azanian People's Liberation Army that year, therefore, had to be acknowledged by Pretoria in style, that is, by way of silence.

Pretoria considered that doing otherwise would only serve to promote the public image of the PAC and boost the morale of the African people now joining the liberation struggle under the PAC in their increasing numbers.

In this view, Pretoria was making a mistake in that communication between the African masses and the

PAC does not occur through the regime. Nor does silence do the regime any good. Attacks by APLA are different from those waged by others.

Until APLA stepped up its war activities against South African soldiers and police in the second half of 1986, guerrilla-related statistics readily provided by Pretoria during security budget debates in parliament were a catalogue of adventurous expeditions which caused not even a dent on Pretoria's military machine.

But even more regrettably, the statistics showed massive killings and arrests of freedom fighters, real and imaginary, and the discoveries of guerrilla arms caches.

APLA changed all that. Bullets fired by its combatants ripped through the flesh of the racists and, for the first time in many years, armed members of the white minority began to bleed.

Vlok must surely have been faced with the question: "Should we admit publicly that our invincibility is a myth and that the PAC is alive and kicking?"

But Pretoria has a big problem, a very big problem. While it is forced to maintain its traditional silence

against the PAC, it must say something to justify its ever increasing military spending to win white public confidence in its ability to contain the intensified guerrilla activities.


Although the African majority must not be made aware that Pretoria is receiving unprecedented military blows from PAC combatants, the white minority will have to be told at least part of the truth about the PAC.

Therein lies the tricky part in Pretoria's scheme of things. How does the regime, for instance, keep the white community informed without risking the information also reaching the African community? It is really a tricky situation.

But keeping silent on the PAC armed activities does not begin to solve Pretoria's problems because the African masses, who are supposed to be denied such information, in fact do not need it from the regime since they are involved in the PAC activities and in what is generally happening in Racist South Africa (RSA).

"The PAC was not built by the Press and will therefore never be destroyed by the Press," the organisation has always maintained. History is on its side in this regard.





# Training and arming the African masses for a People's War key to PAC strategy

*"A NATION without arms is no nation," once said the President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Cde Zeph Mothopeng, in what today forms the background to the PAC military programme for the African masses in South Africa.*

In white settler minority ruled South Africa today it is unlawful for anyone, particularly the Africans, to leave the troubled country without authority. Perhaps a similar rule applies in all countries of the world.

But South is unique in that authority to leave the country is not given to all who seek it. And if you do leave without such authorisation, that becomes a treasonable offence, not just an immigration one, because the South African "law" presumes that you left the country to undergo military training, if you are an African.

Once it has been proved that you did leave the country without authority then another charge may be

*By Combat Editor  
Willie Mazambane*

brought against you, and that charge is sabotage, which is punishable by a maximum death penalty.

The "law" presumes that you had undergone military training to commit sabotage or terrorism.

This arises from the Pretoria regime's fear of being removed from power unlawfully by those who have no right to do so lawfully.

*Arming the African Masses.*

This declaration was only being made in 1987 just to underline the importance the PAC attached to the arms programme for the Africans, but this did not mean that the PAC only started in 1987 to arm and train the African masses.

Although the PAC's overall military programme goes back to the 1960s, its arms and training scheme carried out from within South Africa can be traced from October 1975 when three members of the Azanian People's Liberation Army began a small-scale programme of military training for Africans at Mkalafene, a territory lying on the South African border with Swaziland.

Working within the PAC strategy of people's war, the three APLA men "started by providing basic lessons on firearms, naming parts of the 303 rifles which were being used in the programme and showing the trainees how to aim", wrote liberal writer Professor Tom Lodge in his book *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*.

"They were unable to begin target shooting practice because the consequent explosive sound of the rifle could have attracted South African or Swazi police," said Professor Lodge, adding that a month later the three fighters had obtained air rifles which they could allow the recruits to fire.

"Although this military training was unsophisticated and elementary, it struck at the core of the security of the State," said a Pietermaritzburg judge in 1978 when jailing for eight years the now late Cde. Isaac "Lolwana" Mhlekwa, one of the three APLA men and member of the PAC army High Command at the time.

From its inception, the PAC cherished no illusions about this attitude of the regime and about the correct path to the liberation of the fatherland and the realisation of the right to self-determination of the indigenous African majority on the land.

At its formation on April 8 1959, the PAC propounded what it called an "unfolding programme", envisaging one campaign leading to another in the fight against Pretoria until victory.

It is now on record that the PAC-led Status Campaign (to free Africans mentally) in January 1960 was followed just over two months later by another PAC campaign, the Decisive Positive Action Campaign Against the Pass Laws.

The banning of the PAC and the ANC in the wake of this campaign saw the emergence of the PAC-Inspired Black Consciousness Movement and the launching of the Azanian national uprisings, which began in Soweto on June 16 1976.

The intention of the PAC leadership in launching or inspiring these campaigns has never been to hit Press headlines, but to increase the fighting capacity of the African masses and prepare the ground for an effective war waged by all the oppressed masses or, in short, People's War.

It is now a historical fact that the campaigns launched or inspired by the PAC since its formation have decisively increased the fighting capacity of the African masses, both ideologically and organisationally.

"In the 1960s and the 1970s, we did the ideological and the organisational work respectively," the PAC Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Cde. Gora Ebrahim, summed up. "Our priority now is to face the enemy militarily."

The PAC emphasis on military action against the Pretoria regime was perhaps better reflected in the organisation's declaration of 1987 as the Year of



**CDE GORA EBRAHIM:** "We are now facing Pretoria militarily."

**LOLWANA Isaac Mhlekwa (1929 - 1987)**  
*Late member of the APLA High Command*



**PIONEER OF THE PAC MILITARY PROGRAMME FOR AFRICAN MASSES**

While this military training programme continues to be carried out secretly, APLA decided sometime last year to make it public that it has extended the scheme to South Africa's urban areas where PAC guerrilla fighters are not only able to train and arm the African masses, but also to lead them in attacks against racist soldiers and police now scattered in the African townships.

"... We do not have target shooting practices in the normal sense. Perhaps our colleagues in remote areas have that sort of thing. With us, the guerrilla trainee practices shooting in the actual field of battle," once said an APLA field commander.

Says the PAC in its Field Manual: "In our weak position, we can only take up arms to wage guerrilla warfare in which we should train and build up our fighting units in the strategy and tactics of people's war, recognising the fact that the enemy is still stronger and better armed than us.



"All the African masses - men and women, old and young - are required to take part in this fight, which is commonly called People's War. We already know the theory, principles and combat methods. We are now only learning the effectiveness of this type of war in the actual battlefield."

Several APLA field commanders, whose units are now better known through the Scorpion guerrilla attacks in the African townships have given accounts of interesting and eye-opening battle experiences.

"Call it guerrilla warfare if you wish. We simply call it irregular warfare because there is no timetable for attacks," said one of the field commanders in an exclusive interview with an Azania Combat operations correspondent in Johannesburg.

"When I give out weapons to newly trained guerrillas, I expect a good operation, for we only attack after a careful study of what is to be the scene of attack and after being absolutely sure of victory in that attack.

"We have to operate in small units, each specialising in a specific type of attacks," said the field commander.

With each attack, the APLA field commanders and their men are gaining more experience and developing their combat skills.

In the back of their minds is the PAC teaching: "The guerrilla units must know how to fight by night, in sections and in platoons or even in companies.

"They must know how to place an ambush, carry out a raid, outflank the enemy forces, disengage timely for operational or other military reasons, regroup quickly and smoothly for a surprise attack and withdraw quickly in an orderly manner."

Although APLA, as a guerrilla army, may have not yet achieved this level of operational efficiency, at least one APLA unit won the recognition and respect of both friend and foe alike in South Africa when it came very close to it in January last year.

An Azania Combat operations correspondent reports that the scene was near a bantustan inside South Africa where the APLA unit whose exact size and strength may not be disclosed for operational reasons, had fallen into ambush by South African security forces.

Following a fierce exchange of fire, the APLA unit split its men who then retreated in a manner which left the South African security forces with an impression that the guerrilla fighters had gone towards a neighbouring country.

The racist forces rushed in that direction in their usual "hot-pursuit" and combed off the border area but came up with nothing.

Having concluded that the guerrillas might have gone into the neighbouring States, the racist forces were moving back towards the scene of the ambush when they themselves fell into an ambush by the APLA men.

Pretoria and the world media, particularly the BBC, gave conflicting accounts of what happened in the ambush, with the BBC speaking of heavy casualties without specifying which side had suffered and to what extent.

The PAC for its part did not comment as usual.

The PAC, through its guerrilla army, is continuing with its military programme of training, arming and leading the African masses in attacks, not against inanimate objects, but mainly against the racist soldiers and police.

And as it continues with its programme, which had been decried by APLA Commander-in-Chief Cde Johnson Mlambo as so far a success story, people's war is taking shape and gaining more ground.

# PAC strategy of people's war lays emphasis on rural guerilla warfare

"A LOT of struggle and a lot of fighting are taking place in rural South Africa, an area we (in the PAC) regard as our most serious internal rear base," said the PAC Defence Secretary, Cde Sabelo Phama, when reviewing APLA's guerrilla activities during the course of 1987.

## Suspected APLA guerillas kill 2 Ciskei policemen

JOHANNESBURG - The two police officers in the Ciskei bantustan were killed and a third wounded in a pre-dawn shootout with men believed to be Azanian People's Liberation Army fighters.

Puppet authorities in the bantustan admitted that a five-man unit of "security officers" had come under guerrilla attack when it went to an Alice town house at 4 am "on investigative duties".

On arrival at the house, the officers were fired at by suspected PAC guerrillas, who were said to be active in the area.

The guerrillas had escaped after a brief exchange of fire. Extensive follow-up operations were in progress, police said in a statement by Colonel Avery Nqaki.

Several of South Africa's bantustans have become frequent targets of guerrilla attacks since the PAC Central Committee, at its plenary session about two years ago, urged APLA combatants to expand the theatre of guerrilla war.

Pretoria and its bantustan puppet leaders have admitted guerrilla attacks in previously quiet parts of the country.

## Combat Operations Correspondent

"... We have detected an element of 'Maolism' in the PAC which lays emphasis on the rural terror and the involvement of ordinary people in armed attacks against the forces of law and order," admitted the then South African Law and Order Minister, Louis le Grange, in the racist Parliament.

The two statements, though made by two officials representing two antagonistically opposing forces in the South African conflict, mean just one thing: something is cooking in rural South Africa. But what is it?

People's war, as the PAC and its army understand it and lead the African masses in its waging, is the liberation war of an oppressed but fighting people.

It is a war that takes the form of guerrilla warfare in which the oppressed people all take part, with their creative energies brought into full play by a genuine political organisation and a genuine people's army.

It is a kind of war that can be most effectively waged from the rural or remote areas of a country such as South Africa, with backward and isolated villages being turned into bastions of political, logistical, cultural and, more importantly but most difficult to achieve, military power in the hands of the masses.

Describing rural or remote South Africa as those areas either held by white farmers or barren lands allocated to Africans or used by Pretoria for its bantustan scheme, Defence Secretary Cde Phama said such areas were the regime's "weakest link".

"... In South Africa, the rural areas are just that

From page 11

weakest link because the enemy's communication network, which is so necessary for operational mobility, is very limited in some parts and virtually non-existent in others," said Cde Phama.

"Guerilla warfare, waged within the framework of a people's war, is a struggle waged by a people with limited resources but with powerful organisational skills and operational capacity. And in the South African context, the indigenous African majority is just such a people."

This type of war, as far as the PAC is concerned, requires the mobilisation, training and arming of the African masses to gradually but most effectively destroy Pretoria's military might while systematically building up their own revolutionary strength on a countrywide scale.

The PAC and its army are under no illusions that this cannot be achieved in a short time and by a group of individuals calling themselves guerillas and launching sporadic and isolated attacks without directly involving the ordinary African masses.

The national liberation movements, especially the PAC, cannot send an invading army into South Africa because doing so, if at all possible, would be "the surest way of achieving the contrary effect at a high blood price", as the PAC Field Manual sums it up.

Still fresh in the memories of many is the bloodbath along the Zambian border with the then Rhodesia in the late 1970s when it was publicly announced that "guerilla" forces of a two-party alliance, certainly not involving APLA and ZANLA, were heading down South in a move that had all the markings of some kind of a bungled invasion.

Certainly not military gamblers who stake their fate and




**CDE SABELO PHAMA:** "Guerilla warfare, as we know it in Azania, is a struggle waged by a people with limited resources but with powerful organisational and operational capacity, which they use very effectively to hit the enemy at its weakest points."

fortune on the chance of a single throw of the dice, the PAC and its army have always been and are still clear that there can be no short-cuts to a protracted struggle in the form of a guerilla war waged within the framework of a people's war and waged from within South Africa.

And as the Field Manual puts it: "We fully understand that political power grows out of the barrel of the gun and that whoever wishes to seize and retain political power must have a strong army. . . . We can think of no greater army than the whole oppressed African masses.

"Only by harnessing the energies of our entire people in a total people's war can our struggle to liberate occupied Azania succeed."



**POLITICAL** power grows out of the barrel of the gun, but APLA forces get their direction from the PAC as (above) they march behind the flag of the organisation.

## 'Our fighters did not cross border for Messina raid' says PAC envoy

Combat Correspondent  
In Southern African



**HARARE** - Combatants of the Azanian People's Liberation Army did not cross the border Zimbabwe and South Africa to launch the recent rocket attack on a farmhouse in Messina, the PAC Chief Representative in Harare, Cde Wateri Toboti, has said.

Reacting to a charge by Pretoria that Zimbabwe had allowed guerilla to cross the border and launch the attack, Cde Toboti said Pretoria was ignoring information in its hands that guerillas were being trained and deployed from within South Africa itself.

"We of the PAC do not have bases in this country (Zimbabwe)," he told the Zimbabwe national news agency, *Ziana*, in an interview. "I do not believe that guerillas are operating from Zimbabwe."

The PAC chief representative said it was a known fact that the African people were being trained by guerillas inside South Africa and led by those fighters in launching attacks from within South Africa.

"The boers have proof of this and have disclosed that proof," said Cde Toboti.

The Zimbabwean foreign minister, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, described as a "pack of lies" the accusation by Pik Botha that the rocket attack had been carried out by "elements" who crossed into South Africa and back into Zimbabwe after the raid.

## Arm Scor deep into exports

**ARMSCOR** is now the largest single exporter of manufactured goods in South Africa, with sales to 23 countries of goods worth R1.8 billion last year, according to *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

Assets were given at R2.8 billion while the current backlog of orders was R9 billion. Arm Scor has a dual role of being the sole procurement agency for the South African Defence Force and systems management organiser for all projects.

## White police die in battle with fighters

**DURBAN** - In a contact whose details are yet to be known, two white South African policemen were killed in a fierce grenade and gun battle with guerillas in Mpumalanga township near the port city of Durban.

*Azania Combat's* operations correspondent, Muriel Dimpho, who was in another part of the country at the time of the battle, said there had been no independent report as to which liberation movement the guerillas belonged.

There has also been no independent confirmation of Pretoria's claim that two of the guerillas involved had died in the battle.

The regime, however, admitted that a third policeman had been seriously wounded by grenade shrapnel.

The policemen were on "special duty" in the township at about 1 am when they came across three armed black men, who quickly disappeared into darkness.

As the policemen gave chase there were "fierce exchange of fire," resulting in the killing of the two white policemen, Dimpho quoted sources in the area as saying.



# A TRUE PEOPLE'S ARMY

## APLA plays its part as true people's army

Combat Reporter

WITH all avenues of a peaceful form of struggle having been exhausted in Racist South Africa (RSA) and those of forceful persuasion outlawed, the only course open to the oppressed indigenous majority was armed struggle.

From March 21 1960, when Pretoria responded with callous brutality to the PAC's peaceful Decisive Positive Action Campaign Against the Pass Laws, the regime has never looked back.

But President Zeph Mothopeng of the PAC foresaw it long before the PAC was born when as early as in the 1940s he declared: "A nation without arms is not a nation."

It was against the background of this important teaching by Uncle Zeph, and in the wake of the 1960 shootings, that the PAC on September 11 1961 set up an armed wing, POQO, which has since been transformed into the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA).

"Without a people's army the people have nothing," one great revolutionary leader and teacher once observed.

To this important observation can be added that in fact without such an army the oppressed people cannot hope to ever liberate themselves because it would almost be impossible for them to wage an effective struggle such as a total people's war.

A true people's liberation army, such as APLA in respect of South Africa, becomes the backbone of people's war when its activity is combined with that of the broad masses of the people.

Historical experience says it is impossible to liberate a country from foreign rule without the active and full participation of the oppressed indigenous people.

A people's liberation army may be the foundation for victory, but the masses of the oppressed people are the richest resources for waging a total and effective liberation war. Once they have found their

role, the people will do for their army those tasks that the army is unable to do for itself

It was against this background that the PAC, through its guerilla wing APLA, began conducting a military training programme for the African masses in South Africa in 1975, a programme that has since the beginning of 1986 been carried out on a massive scale.

The PAC, through APLA's Military Supplies Unit, has gone further to provide basic weapons such as the Scorpion machines pistols and AK-47 assault rifles to African masses who have gone through the PAC army's basic military training courses being conducted inside South Africa.



*THE word of command is being given and it's the APLA forces' disciplinary requirement to be at strict attention when the commanders give such a word.*



UNCLE ZEPH

*"A nation without arms is no nation"*

These weapons have been and are being used by people-turned-guerillas in APLA-led attacks mainly against the racist soldiers and police, both of whom have admitted frequently coming under guerilla fire mostly in the African townships.

Pretoria has often admitted, albeit reluctantly, that some of the people involved in what are now commonly known as the *Scorpion Attacks* against the racist security forces were internally trained militarily.

In its strategy of people's war, the PAC considers that people develop a militant and heroic fighting spirit when they are allowed to take their rightful part in guerilla battles and play an active role in tackling war problems facing the guerilla forces.

Experience has it that when the oppressed people are aroused, no matter how difficult the conditions are, the people's army will have everything it needs to win battle victories.

Only this way can armed struggle be effectively conducted and co-ordinated with other forms of struggle to ensure that the guerilla army enjoys the co-operation of the masses in all respects.

And what is most remarkable with the mass participation of the oppressed masses in a war of liberation is that while weak in terms of weaponry and other war equipment, a guerilla army shows a creditable performance on a battlefield, with the main reason being that the guerillas are one with the people.

Against this background can be seen that the Azanian People's Liberation Army is not just a name, but a true army of the people, which clearly knows

that without a total, active and conscious participation of the African people in its activities, it must cease to be a people's liberation army.

This makes APLA different from all other armies one may find in South Africa, whether it is SADF or any other.

The political manifesto of the Azanian People's Liberation Army is clearly the product of Azania's history and of the forces and factors that have made that history what it is today.

As an instrument controlled and directed by the PAC, on behalf of the African masses, APLA's duty remains that of pursuing the political tasks of the organisation and never to lose sight of the objectives of the struggle.



*APLA is led by the PAC, whose flag is here held aloft by a PAC fighter*

It is for this reason that the aims and objectives of APLA are those enshrined in the PAC Constitution which, in part, are to unite and rally the African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism and to fight for the complete overthrow of white domination and for the implementation of the right to self-determination of the African people.

The main features of the APLA disciplinary code, which makes the PAC guerilla army different from all other armies in South Africa, are:

1. Do not surrender to the enemy or hand over arms or information;
2. Do not make a false statement or accusation in all your reports.
3. Obey orders in all your actions;
4. Do not forcibly take or demand anything from the masses of the people;
5. Report and surrender to your officers everything that is either captured from the enemy or collected from the masses of the people;
6. Speak politely to all people;
7. Pay fairly for all you buy from the people;

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8. Return in good condition anything you borrow;
9. Pay for or replace anything you damage;
10. Do not hit or insult people;
11. Do not misuse or damage people's private or public property;
12. Do not take unfair advantage over anyone;
13. Men should not take liberties with women and women should not use their feminine beauty or charm to lure men into compromising situations;
14. Do not ill-treat captives or anyone in your charge; and
15. Do not malingering or loiter around.

But APLA is, as the name implies, a people's army. While it is very tough on discipline among its members, it has always made it its finest tradition to provide democracy within its ranks.

Having summed up its own and world revolutionary experiences, it held that all its fighters had to keep their rightful democratic rights if their enthusiasm

and their creative responsibility were to be maintained, with their initiative and fighting abilities fully mobilised.

It has always regarded democracy in its ranks as the basic principle of army political work and a concrete expression of mass organisation in army building.

It therefore provides for democracy in three main fields — the political, the economic and the military.

Such is the fine tradition of APLA, the pride of the Azanian people. For APLA must cease to be a true people's army and change the name, Azanian People's Liberation Army, if it fails to provide democratic rights to its members.

The PAC army is in no doubt that democracy in the army brings creativeness and initiative of the combatants into full play. It helps promote liberatory tendencies and thinking while eradicating the incorrect ones.

And it must be said without any fear of self-contradiction that the democratic rights provided for within APLA, the PAC army's strict code of discipline and the strategy and tactics it follows in its operational activities make APLA unique in South Africa and allow it to emerge as the only true people's army in occupied Azania.



*PAC, the true custodian of the aspirations of the Azanian masses*



*Azanian People's Liberation Army men on the move*



*The pride of the masses of Azania and their vehicle to liberation. It is an army rightly own.*

## Quotable Quotes

Late PAC former chairman John Pokela: "Unless whites, who have been living in comparative peace since the Anglo-Boer War in 1902, are made to feel unsafe, and until they are themselves killed, they will still feel safe to continue killing Africans."

Sheena Duncan, white former Black Sash president: "I see no point in the 'Progressive democrats' making an issue of us (whites). Some of them are my friends, but I think they must realise that right now, black solidarity is more important than white sympathy."

Khehla Mthembu, former Azapo president: "In order for our liberation goal to be meaningful, we must guard against all kinds of watering down our militancy. Change and liberation shall not come as a result of suicidal alliances. . ."

PAC Defence Secretary Cde Sabelo Phama: "It is part of our strategy to overstretch the enemy forces to such a point where they will try to catch ten flies with ten fingers."



AT the PAC multi-purpose centre in Tanzania are (from left) PAC Chairman Cde Johnson Mlambo, Nigerian Defence Minister Lt-Gen Domkat Bali, PAC Defence Secretary Cde Sabelo Phama, Defence Advisor in the Nigerian High Commission, Cde Olu Odekoyo, and Administrator of the centre, Cde Zebulon Mokoena, one of the PAC's Operation Villa Peri heroes.

## Nigerian defence minister on visit to a PAC centre

Combat Correspondent

DAR ES SALAAM - The Nigerian Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Domkat Bali, recently paid an official visit to a PAC multi-purpose centre in Ruvu just outside the Tanzanian capital.

He was met at the centre by the APLA Commander-in-Chief and PAC Chairman, Cde Johnson Mlambo, the PAC Administrative Secretary and Military Commission member, Cde Joe Mkwana, members of the PAC Central Committee and other senior PAC officials.

Also there to meet Lt-Gen Bali were the APLA Commander, Cde Muntu Mzolo, the Political Commissar, Cde Romero Daniels, and former APLA senior officer, Cde Zebulon Mokoena, who is now the Administrator of the centre.

From Dar Es Salaam to the centre, Lt-Gen Bali was accompanied by the PAC Secretary for Defence, Cde Sabelo Phama, the PAC Chief Representative to Tanzania and Military Commission member, Cde Thobile Gola, and the Defence Advisor in the Nigerian High Commission in Dar Es Salaam, Cde Olu Odekoyo.

Lt-Gen Bali was impressed with the determination of the PAC cadres at the centre and pledged continued Nigerian political, material and diplomatic support for the PAC and the struggling Azanian masses.

### Expert on PAC not expert enough

AN expert on the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, who had been called to testify in the trial of two alleged APLA fighters, was unable to name the president of the PAC when asked to do so by the State prosecutor.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barend du Plessis was testifying in the trial of Milton Joyi and Mkel Williams who were subsequently jailed for terrorism and possession of the arms of war.

# West's arms collusion with SA intensifies

A WEST GERMAN company, Messers-Schmitt Bolkow-Blahn Corporation, recently delivered large consignments of helicopter gunboats to South Africa through the Ciskei and Venda bantustans as Western powers intensify their military collusion with Pretoria.

Intelligence sources also say Britain, through the British Imperial Chemical Industries, has been assisting the Pretoria regime in the construction of several munition plants.

Last year alone, according to Azania Combat's London correspondent, up to 650 British companies with offices in South Africa were trading with the regime in arms production technology.

Several British-based companies are understood to have taken part in the development of a 155 mm Howitzer and its nuclear-capable shells.

One of the first consignments of such shells was delivered to South Africa by a Canadian subsidiary of the British Trafalgar House Company

Meanwhile, a PAC military intelligence officer has described the *Oliphant* tank now being used by the racist South African Defence Force as a version of the British Centurion tank, which was modified by Israeli engineers and technicians for South Africa

The intelligence officer also disclosed that the *Impala* aircraft, manufactured under an Italian licence, were propelled by British-made Rolls Royce jets.

"We also know that the South African Air Force is using British-manufactured *Buccanner* aircraft," said the officer, adding that the aircraft were being delivered to South Africa together with spares directly from Britain.

"All this is being done in blatant violation of the arms embargo against South Africa."

### Neat beard awards for SA invaders

RACIST South African servicemen who took part in Operation Modular in southern Angola last year were each rewarded with a ball-point pen, the right to wear a beard and two years relief from the camps.

The forces of aggression were told by a senior South African army commander, Lieutenant-General AJ Liebenberg that they were now permitted "to wear beard for the remainder of (their) service provided the beard is kept neat and trimmed."

They were also given a T-shirt each which bore "Operation Modular. Ek was daar (I was there). I did my bit."

### More guerillas were trained inside SA

MORE guerillas were trained inside South Africa than outside the country last year, the head of the South African security police, Lieutenant-General Johannes-van der Merwe, has admitted

Lt-Gen van der Merwe was quoted by Izwe Leibu, a PAC publication produced in Atlanta, United States, as saying that 77 of the 132 guerilla allegedly killed or arrested by South African security forces in the first nine months of 1987 had been trained inside the country.

The South African security chief admitted that local training of guerillas presented difficult problems to the regime as cadres who did not leave the country for military training were difficult to identify.

Security spies who had undergone military training outside the country were useless in helping to identify internally-trained guerillas.

The Pretoria regime has admitted that the PAC was training "ordinary people" in breach of "law and order".

It is also well known that the PAC, through the Azanian People's Liberation Army, is the pioneer of internal military training in South Africa.

### Azanian Songs of liberation

Available on tape are Azanian Liberation Songs sung by freedom fighters of the PAC of Azania.

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## BATTLEFIELD DISCIPLINE

# People's War calls for unity among all forces fighting the SA regime

By Combat Editor  
Willie Mazabane

**WITH the major liberation movements in Azania having embraced armed struggle, time may have come for them to also embrace the interests of the oppressed indigenous majority by forming a genuine united front.**

The differences and sometimes rivalry among the anti-Pretoria political organisations or anti-apartheid groups are often confusing not only to the international friends of the liberation struggle in Azania, but most regrettably to the oppressed Azanian masses themselves.

The painful truth is that no divided people can defeat the "mighty" South African regime. Nor can it ever be possible to liberate occupied Azania without a total people's war.

One of the three main weapons in a people's war is a united front, the other two being a genuine national liberation movement and a genuine people's army or guerilla force.

With armed struggle having been generally accepted as inevitable it has to be noted that once begun, such a struggle must be pursued with the greatest determination by all those involved in the war of liberation.

It is therefore the primary duty of the national liberation movements to unite the masses and organise them into armed units by mobilising individual men and women to be guerillas.

The liberation movements must, as the Vietnamese put it during their own liberation war, "militarise every family with each village and each valley being turned into a guerilla fortress, each street into a battlefield and every one into a valiant guerilla fighter".

This requires a united approach on the part of the liberation movement, which in Azania is made up of different political organisations led by either the PAC or the ANC, both of which boast long-standing guerilla armies.

The existence of the guerilla armies symbolises an

acceptance by many of the political organisations of the inevitability of armed struggle in Azania, notwithstanding the failure by some of them to take a clear and uncompromising stand on the proposed negotiations with Pretoria.

## Police wounded in APLA-like attack

**JOHANNESBURG** — Precisely in line with the pattern of guerilla attacks introduced into the South African conflict by the Azanian People's Liberation Army in 1986, four policemen were shot and wounded when their vehicle was ambushed by guerillas at Emmdaal in Soweto recently.

Senior Sergeant Gregory Beck (31), who was driving the vehicle at the time of the ambush, was shot five times, the South African Police (SAP) admitted.

The police had been arresting residents in Soweto for refusing to pay rent and were driving at Emmdaal when the guerillas opened fire on them. The police later claimed that a civilian had also been injured in the ambush.

South African security forces became frequent direct targets of guerilla fire after the APLA Commander-in-Chief, Cde Johnson Mlambo, ordered PAC guerillas to deliver the main blow of their attacks against South African soldiers and police.

The PAC is the only organisation in South Africa that has openly declared that racist security forces were its chief targets and put that declaration into full operation.

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There appears then a basis, in the form of the general acceptance of armed struggle, upon which a united front could be formed among the various anti-Pretoria political organisations, which are clearly tuned along the lines of the two liberation movements.

If all these organisations were to look at people's war the way PAC looks at it, then a united front will not only become more than a reasonable possibility, but an absolute and urgent necessity.

This should be so because the first step towards an effective struggle by an oppressed people such as the Africans in South Africa would be to create a comradely atmosphere among their political organisations, particularly the two major liberation movements and their guerilla armies.

This would enable those who feel strongly about unity of purpose to prepare for a favourable atmosphere which would be conducive to the breaking down of the existing differences or rivalries among the organisations and pave the way for an intensified people's war.

Whether this fact is accepted or not, the stumbling block to a purposeful unity seems to be that some anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa, including one major liberation movement, are in themselves some kind of unity fronts.

These organisations are satisfied with the amount of "unity" they have achieved, no matter how ineffective it may be, and appear to believe that there can be no further unity above and beyond their groupings.

In this reasoning, a greater unity of all those involved in the liberation struggle has become irrelevant or possibly obstructed by the refusal of those they consider as smaller

groupings, usually including the PAC, to disband or disintegrate.

Although it is accepted that there may be individuals within the liberation movement who may be opposed or fail to see the correct approach to genuine unity, such counter-revolutionary or erring individuals have to be persuaded or put under pressure to accept that Pretoria can only be defeated by a united people.

This does not mean that members of each liberation movement, in the event of a united front being formed, should not honestly and genuinely speak out or struggle constructively against wrong ideas, tactics or actions on the part of the other.


But for such an approach to succeed, the movements must, in the framework of people's war, proceed from a principled foundation and be guided by common discipline and common commitment collectively known in short as the "Discipline of the Battlefield".

"Discipline of the battlefield" demands that the armed struggle must be waged within the scope of the nationally integrated plan, with guerilla units being organised and deployed where Pretoria is weakest to, first and foremost, train and arm the African masses in order to increase their fighting capacity both militarily and politically.

This brings in the question of the use of the most adaptable forms of warfare and the role guerillas should be tasked to play in resolutely leading the African masses in battle against the enemy forces until final victory.

These first steps should be the initial unifying bonds in the internal relations among guerilla fighters and in the relations between the fighters and the ordinary masses.

Out of this will emerge real and genuine unity, and not just a public declaration of unity to the world. This will pave the way for an effective struggle waged by all the oppressed under a unified command based on the discipline of the battlefield.



Commander-in-Chief Cde Johnson Mlambo and PAC Military Commission member Cde Joe Mkwanzai

# DIPLOMATIC COMBAT



THE PAC Chairman, Cde Johnson Mlambo (standing), addressing a Sharpeville gathering in Dar Es Salaam. Looking on are (from his left) Tanzania's Deputy Minister for Communication and Transport, Cde Ukwana Ditope-Mtuzuru, the UNDP resident representative in Tanzania, Ms Mary Chimery-Hess, and the Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee, Brigadier Hashim Mhuta (partly hidden). On Cde Mlambo's right is the PLO Ambassador to Tanzania, Cde Abdel Aziz Aboughhass.

In his address, Cde Mlambo said the gathering was a vehicle for giving impetus to the campaign aimed at saving the Sharpeville Six.

## PAC role in saving the Sharpeville Six

WHEN the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania began a campaign to save the lives of the "Sharpeville Six", less than a week after the six were convicted of "complicity" in the 1984 killing of a township councillor, the world did not know at the time what the PAC was talking about.

Some people, who thought they knew the PAC then, might have been of the view that the organisation was just trying to create a mountain out of an ant-hill.

But others, who truly knew the PAC as an organisation which did not engage in any campaign if that campaign would not increase the fighting capacity of the African people in occupied Azania, rallied behind the PAC.

And as the days drew near the execution date of the six, it was indeed all those who had immediately rallied behind the PAC, and of course many of those who initially did not know South Africa's brand of justice, who won a temporary reprieve for the six Azanian patriots.

"On behalf of the oppressed people of Azania, I

*Combat Reporter  
in Dar Es Salaam*

convey heartfelt appreciation for the efforts of all the people at home and at abroad who, through their governments, organisations or mass media, contributed to the stay of execution of the Sharpeville Six," said APLA Commander-in-Chief and PAC Chairman Cde Johnson Mlambo shortly after a Pretoria supreme court judge gave the reprieve to the six.

"The PAC and the great majority of the oppressed Azanians need even greater unanimity in their concerted effort to save the lives of our six patriots," he said.

But Cde Mlambo was not just at the head of an

organisation that came the longest way with the Sharpeville Six, but was also instrumental in the final hours that helped save the lives of the six.

On the eve of the execution date, the PAC leader held emergency meetings in Dar Es Salaam with ambassadors or high commissioners of United Nations Security Council permanent members - the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China - on the plight of the six.

"We implore all the people, known and unknown to us, their organisations and their governments, to intensify their efforts to save the lives of these young men and a woman . . ." said Cde Mlambo in a last minute plea.

These events are being cited, not because the PAC deserves a significant part of the credit for the determined fight to save the Sharpeville Six, but just to place on record what the PAC did from the outset, in the intervening period and in the final hours.

But even more importantly, these events reflect the

PAC's consistency in its policy to launch only campaigns that serve to boost the fighting capacity of the oppressed Azanian masses.

The Six Azanian patriots are Cde Mojalela Setatsa (32), Cde Reid Mokoena (24), Cde Oupa Diniso (32), Cde Duma Khumalo (28), Cde Francis Mokgesi (30) and a woman, Cde Theresa Ramashamola (27).

They are from Sharpeville, the political home of the PAC, for it was at Sharpeville that the PAC concentrated its Decisive Positive Action Campaign Against the Pass Laws in March 1960 and made this previously little known township a glittering milestone in the history of the Azanian liberation struggle.

"... When the annals of the liberation of Southern Africa, and Azania in particular, come to be written, Sharpeville will assume the prominence of a historical watershed," one African newspaper once editorialised.

The Sharpeville Six are the products of that watershed. And like the PAC, their names are now inextricably intertwined with the name Sharpeville.

## One accused in PAC trial alleged to be 'top official'

*Legal Affairs  
Correspondent*

ONE of the five alleged Pan Africanist Congress of Azania members on trial in South Africa was a senior official in the PAC, it was alleged in the Pretoria Regional Court recently.

Mabatu Enock Zulu (53), who is on trial with others on various charges under South Africa's Internal Security Act, was allegedly a member of the PAC Central Committee, the organisation's top leadership.

The court also heard that another accused, Paul Mohohlo, was a commander of a PAC special squad and held a senior post at a PAC military camp.

On trial with Zulu and Mohohlo are Siyabulela Gcanga, Vincent Mathunjwa, Reverend Daniel Nkopodi as well as two alleged members of Qibla, Achmad Cassiem and Yusuf Patel.

They are all charged under various sections of the Internal Security Act for offences ranging from possession of arms to recruiting people for military training by the PAC to further the aims of the organisation.



*Enock Mabatu Zulu*



# Bans came on the eve of

## THE SOBUKWE WEEK

JUST as the oppressed but fighting Azanian masses were bracing themselves countrywide to mark what they had declared the Sobukwe Week, Pretoria effectively banned 17 anti-apartheid groups on February 24.

"This feverish and draconian action by the Botha regime comes in the wake of nationwide militant activities organised to mark the 10th commemoration of the death of the PAC founding president, Cde Mangaliso Sobukwe," said the PAC Director of Publicity and Information, Cde Cecil Msomi.

Pretoria's move, said Cde Msomi, had to be seen against the background of the increasing gains scored by the Azanian People's Liberation Army, the African youth, women and workers and generally the land dispossessed masses of Azania.

The PAC declared that the period from February 27 to December 5 (Sobukwe's birthday) this year would be marked by the Azanians as the 10th commemoration of the death of the late PAC founding leader.

"This declaration is in line with Sobukwe's directive that every serious liberation movement should launch campaigns which should continuously increase the fighting capacity of the oppressed masses," said PAC Chairman Cde Johnson Mlambo.



**MANGALISO SOBUKWE** to South African Police just before Sharpeville: "Please, do not give my people impossible orders such as 'disperse within three minutes'. And such order we shall regard as merely an excuse for baton-charging and shooting my people."

**MANGALISO SOBUKWE:** "We must fight for freedom, for the right to call our souls our own. And we must pay the price."



"The State will be failing in its duty if it were to set this man (above) free. For here we are dealing with a person, let me say this, who has a strong magnetic personality . . ." the then South African Justice Minister when introducing the Sobukwe Clause in the SA parliament in 1963.



### MANGALISO SOBUKWE on Soweto:

"In Soweto, the racist white man had to fall back on his ultimate weapon, the gun. And now that he relies on the gun, and we too can get the gun, confrontation is inevitable."

## Court hears of PAC's military training scheme for SA Muslims

THE South African Muslim organisation, Qibla, reached an agreement with the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to have its members trained by the PAC militarily "inside or outside" South Africa. It has been alleged by the State in a South African Court.

People were recruited by Qibla for this scheme and later deployed in certain parts of South Africa to commit "acts of warfare, terrorism, sabotage and/or subversion", it was alleged.

Among things Qibla is alleged to have done for the PAC inside South Africa were printing pamphlets which included one entitled "Afrika Our Afrika", another headlined "Land! Freedom! Justice!" and reproducing an interview with APLA Commander-in-Chief and PAC Chairman Cde Johnson Mlambo.

The allegations were made by the State against leading Muslim activist and Qibla leader, Achmed Cassiem (42), who is on trial together with six other people alleged to have worked to further the aims and objects of the PAC.

The six are Yusuf Patel (37), Enock Zulu (53), Siyabulela Gcanga (26), Vincent Mathunjwa (30), Paul Mohohlo (30) and Reverend Daniel Nkopodi (27).

The are charged with contravening various sections of the Internal Security Act ranging from alleged possession of arms to recruitment of people for military training and promotion of the aims of a banned organisation, the PAC.

According to a 90-page charge sheet, Qibla agreed to support PAC in its internal activities in exchange for military training of Qibla members by the PAC, which is said to be conducting military training programmes inside and outside South Africa.

Cassiem and Patel, says the charge sheet, were active members of Qibla, an organisation alleged to have made contact with the PAC on three occasions - in Cape Town in February 1988, Zimbabwe a month before and in Botswana in February 1985.

Subsequent to the alleged contacts, Zulu and Gcanga are said to have visited Cassiem in Cape Town to discuss weapons, ammunition and explosives which were to be given to Qibla for use in military activities against the South Africa security forces.

## '[ZWE LETHU' (the land is ours)

A 20-minute recently released video programme available on all systems.

[ZWE LETHU is a video programme about the APLA Commander-in-Chief and PAC Chairman, Cde. Johnson Mlambo, and contains recent material on the liberation struggle in occupied Azania.

Cde. Mlambo, who was filmed during his successful solidarity tour of West Germany in February this year, tells about his 20-year imprisonment on Robben Island, the current uprisings in South Africa, the history of the Azanian liberation struggle, the objectives of the PAC and the prospects for the future.

A Vrijheidsjournaal-production made in co-operation with the Azania Committee in Holland, has already featured on Amsterdam TV.

Distribution:  
Cineclub Vrijheidsfilms  
P.O. Box 1626  
1000 BP Amsterdam, Holland  
Tel (0)20-230045 or (0)20-250057

## 'I will not testify for the State' says principled witness

Legal Affairs  
Correspondent

A QIBLA member refused to testify for the State in a PAC trial on grounds that giving evidence for the State was against Islamic principles.

Abdul Aziz Kadar (27), had been called to testify in the trial of five alleged PAC members and two alleged Qibla men at the Pretoria Regional Court.

Kadar, who had for 18 months been kept by police in solitary confinement, told the court that he was under emotional stress and that giving evidence for the State was against Islamic principles.

"I am a practicing Muslim and have to choose between being what I am and testifying for the State," he said.

Asked by the state counsel if he was "willing to take more stress" by refusing to testify, Kadar said he viewed his refusal on a long term basis. The stress he was presently under was just short term.

# HONESTLY SPEAKING

## PAC poses greatest threat to talks plan

The following is a whole and un-edited reproduction of an article in the Johannesburg Star (January 25, 1988) written . . .

By Sam Mabe

Prominent SA Journalist

Disunity among black political organisations could frustrate the efforts of the African National Congress to come to the negotiating table with the Government.

At an executive meeting held in Lusaka recently, the ANC decided it was ready to negotiate a settlement of the country's political problems with Pretoria.

Though unlikely to be met in full, the conditions laid down by the ANC for negotiations - the unconditional release of all political prisoners, the lifting of the state of emergency and the repealing of all repressive laws - seem likely to be given serious consideration by the Government.

The mildness of the conditions, however, indicates a weakness and desperation to enter into a truce - which might lead the Government to force its own conditions on the ANC.

But the most serious threat to the ANC's efforts could be the Pan Africanist Congress, whose image in the black community has improved tremendously in the past two years.

### UNCOMPROMISING

The PAC, with all organisations subscribing to the Pan Africanist tendency in the country, has adopted an uncompromising stance against negotiations with the Government.

The Azanian People's Organisation, and all groups subscribing to the black consciousness tendency have also made it clear that negotiations are out for now.

This means the ANC might have only Inkatha and maybe the United Democratic Front supporting its stance on negotiations.

But should talks towards negotiations start gaining momentum, the PAC, which gets scant publicity compared with the ANC, which has not been

## ONE SETTLER ONE BULLET!

considered when the future of South Africa is discussed, could come out very strongly against the negotiations. This could give it a shot in the arm while seriously harming the image of the ANC.

It seems the only way the ANC could save itself from embarrassment would be to seek negotiations first with the PAC. But what are the chances of reconciliation between the two movements which have been at loggerheads for the past 30 years?

Many organisations, including the Media Workers' Association of South Africa, have called for a truce between the two movements. But the ANC's leadership has no intention of talking to the PAC. It even refuses to share the platform with the PAC except at the United Nations where it has no choice because the international community recognises the PAC as an equal partner with the ANC.

The ANC's recent attempt to be recognised as the sole representative of the political aspirations of the South African majority has been criticised by many African leaders who believe that no organisation can claim copyright to the liberation struggle.

This is a decision ANC should probably leave to the people themselves since the strength of its support might have to be tested through the ballot box.

The reluctance of the ANC to enter into a truce with the PAC is believed to be based on the fear that the PAC may have an upper hand at the talks because of an apparent willingness by the younger members of the ANC to see more co-operation between the two movements.

This was indicated by a decision taken at a consultative conference attended by 250 delegates from 21 external missions, in Kabwe, northern Zambia, in June 1985, that the ANC should start "working with" the PAC.

The resolution, which the ANC's leadership has so far done nothing about, was pushed through by younger and more radical members.




# INTELLIGENCE FILE

## Details of SA's G-6 artillery are revealed amid show of contempt

AS Pretoria displays its utter contempt for international opinion by boasting publicly that it is developing weapons for fast cross-border aggression and speedy withdrawal, details have emerged about South Africa's latest artillery weapon, the G-6 155 mm.

The weapon, developed by South Africa's arms manufacturer, Armscor, is already being used in Namibia and against Angola. Like G-5, its forerunner, the G-6 was built with the financial and technological assistance of the West, with Canada's Space Research Corporation playing a leading role in the production process of both weapons.



SOUTH AFRICAN G-6

Properties of the G-6, as disclosed by *Jane's Defence Weekly* in its latest issue, include:

- A 6 x 6 drive;
- Four grenade launchers on either side of the turret; and
- Increased armour protection, with a double armoured floor against mines.

The artillery weapon has bullet-proof windows, with 180 degree visibility through the front. It weighs 46 tonnes.

### REPORT: Romero Daniels and Willie Mazumbane

The weapon's crew compartment consists of seats for the commander, the layer, the loader and the ammunition handler, with an escape hatch on the floor.

Details of the G-6 emerged at a time when the Armscor Chief Executive, Johan van Vuuren was disclosing that South Africa was looking ahead by 15 to 20 years in its military plans.

Armscor's philosophy, he said, was to "develop systems with high mobility, rapid, effective fire-power and stand-off capability".

Speaking with a candour that revealed the contempt Pretoria's military-political establishment has for international opinion, he said: "You need to strike across the border and come back before the international situation comes down on you too hard."

South Africa needed medium-range rockets and long-distance artillery, he said, adding that the regime would unveil "two or three exciting new products in the area of high mobility warfare" at an international arms fair in two years.

While extolling Armscor's achievements, Van Vuuren admitted that the arms firm's biggest problem was aircraft engines, whose development had to be a priority.

"Unless the political situation changes, this is going to be a priority, despite the cost of development," he said.

## Pretoria is manufacturing battlefield nuclear weapons

By David Fairhall

Israel and South Africa are not merely potential nuclear powers, according to a new study of the Israeli armaments industry, but longstanding partners in the development of specialised battlefield nuclear weapons.

In a book, Israeli academic, Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, says that the flash seen by an American spy satellite off the coast of South Africa in 1979 was almost certainly the test of a 155mm nuclear shell secretly produced by the two countries under a joint programme.

### 600 Israeli fighter bomber builders head for racist SA

Combat Correspondent

ABOUT 600 Israeli engineers and technicians, who took part in the development of a fighter bomber for South Africa, have been invited by Pretoria to work or settle in the apartheid-ruled country, says an intelligence source.

The Israelis are said to have been promised citizenship, comfortable dwellings, high salaries and attractive fringe benefits.

The 600 Israeli engineers and technicians took part in the development of the highly sophisticated Lavi fighter bomber, according to a PAC military intelligence officer responsible for monitoring Western compliance with the arms embargo against South Africa.

He told *Azania Combat* that it was now generally known that 50 of the engineers and technicians had already accepted the invitation and that part of the group had already flown to South Africa.

"We even have names and brief personal backgrounds of some of them," said the intelligence officer.

Israel and South Africa share a sense of being political outcasts threatened by their neighbours, Mr Beit-Hallahmi argues, and they both see a military requirement for a "clean," low-yield weapon that could be used tactically in a regional war of survival.

Technically, the trade-off is between South African supplies of enriched uranium and Israeli design expertise in both warheads and delivery systems.

"The world has been watching Israel, and sometimes South Africa, using the old, conventional notions about nuclear weaponry," Mr Beit-Hallahmi writes. "What some brilliant minds in Israel have developed is an original Israeli solution to an Israeli problem. South Africa has been the partner, and the beneficiary.

"Both countries realised in the 1960s that what they needed was tactical nuclear weaponry. This led to the development of the nuclear shell, fired from the 155mm howitzer, or from a naval gun tested in 1979. . .

"Such cooperation between the two countries in the development of nuclear weapons proves an extremely high level of trust and intimacy in the relations between them. . . An alliance cemented in plutonium is sealed in blood, and should be taken very seriously."

The other aspect of Israel's strategy for survival identified in the book is a readiness to do the United States' "dirty work" in parts of Central America, Africa, and Asia where congressional restraints or concern about human rights make it difficult to provide direct military aid.

Israel may not always share American political perceptions about the threat of Communist subversion, but it welcomes the chance to sell arms in the Third World.

And if it is prepared to get its hands dirty on the United States' behalf, it can present itself as a strategic partner, deserving of support, not merely a client state looking for charity.

Mr Beit-Hallahmi quotes Israel's role in arranging US arms supplies for Iran as an example of its usefulness.

Another joint project on which he alleges the Israel intelligence agency, Mossad, has been collaborating with the CIA is the supply of Soviet arms captured in the Middle East to US-backed groups fighting forces that are similarly equipped - the Mojahadin in Afghanistan, the Contras in Central America, Unita in Angola and the MNR in Mozambique.

The advantage he cites is that such captured weaponry cannot readily be traced back to its real source.



## COMBAT POETRY

# Woe to be Black in South Africa!

By  
Bojana Jordan

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I have no citizenship rights.  
I cannot vote, own land or stay where I want.  
I cannot choose whom to work for and where to work.  
I cannot live with my family in urban areas.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I'm not a South African.  
I must belong to one or either of the tribes they've manufactured.  
I must owe allegiance to a thing called Bantustan I've never seen.  
I must belong to a puppet chief even if my parents never saw him.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I must agree to be a sub-human.  
Every white person, young or old, insane or savage, is my boss.  
Every white person, illiterate, dirty, ugly or criminal, is my boss.  
Every white man, wicked or good, obese or thin, is my boss.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I must not demand human rights.  
Every gathering of more than ten Blacks is a crime.  
Every attempt to improve our social, economic, and educational lot is communism.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I'm a constant threat to whites.  
Therefore whites fear forces of darkness they can't understand.  
They fear for the future of their born and unborn.  
They hold me accountable for any past or present troubles.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I'm a threat to white privilege.  
So they band together to make life more miserable for me.  
They band together to formulate most inhuman laws against me.  
They band together to reduce what's left of me to ashes.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, my plight is immeasurable.  
Nights I can't sleep for fear of being raided at any hour.  
Daytime I can't walk about for fear of being called a vagrant.  
At most times I can't do anything because of an empty stomach*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I have no real name.  
At their pleasure white people call me anything.  
Young and old call me: Boy, Kaffir, Stupid, Donkey . . . anything.  
They call me Communist, thief, agitator, trouble-maker.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I should know what to do  
Eradicate, demolish, annihilate the injustices to my people.  
Destroy racism, civilize the savages, teach manners to the crude.  
Have whites learn some humanism: purge them of greed and ignorance.*

*If I'm Black in South Africa, I should inspire and agitate.  
From roof tops, from city to city, village to village.  
I must rally my people to believe the time is now.  
Together we must dedicate our lives and our futures.*

## FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S DESK

# 'Continue swelling the ranks of APLA' Azanians are urged

*Chief-Operations Correspondent  
Muriel Dimpho in Johannesburg*

The Commander-in-Chief of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, Cde Johnson Mlambo, has called on the Azanian masses to continue building their army, APLA, by responding in even greater numbers to its military training and arming programme.

Cde Mlambo, who made the call during a visit in Harare where he attended a conference of African and Western European Parliamentarians' Action Against Apartheid, was speaking in a telephone interview with me on the military and political situation in South Africa.

The need for Africans to consolidate their achievements to date by being part of the big people's army, with APLA as a nucleus of that military force, was greater now than at any other time before, said the commander-in-chief when referring to the banning of 17 anti-apartheid groups in South Africa.

"These bannings closed all the doors the optimists might have held about the regime being reasonable to an extent of co-operating in any proposed dialogue.

"What happened to these organisations actually means that however peaceful we may be, the regime will always use its hammer of arms of law to crush us.

"P.W. (Botha), in this case, took the cue from (Andries) Treunicht during a no-confidence debate in the South African parliament that the groups affected had needed to be investigated."

With the bannings that followed a few weeks later, the main task remained to continue building the Azanian People's Liberation Army while strengthening the Azanian mass organisations.

Cde Mlambo said in 1987, APLA had given a strong indication of "what exactly should be done to liberate Azania by actually hitting directly at the enemy's security forces".

Some of the APLA attacks were quite well-known while many others would probably be admitted by the regime "some day".

"Through these attacks our army, a strong impetus has been given to the African people to take

## 'We need arms, we need military fire-power, to launch the final assault on Pretoria'

up the task of rebuilding the walls of Azania," said the commander-in-chief.

He noted that there had been an encouraging response to the PAC declaration of 1987 as the *Year of Arming and Training the African Masses*.

"Many of those trained and armed by APLA within South Africa are now able to even engage the enemy on their own. It is known that racist security forces have been frequent targets in such engagements since we made that bold military declaration."

Cde Mlambo said the PAC had given the Azanian masses a foretaste of victory when it forced the regime to suspend pass laws for some time following a decisive positive action campaign by the organisation.

"Now we need arms, we need military firepower to launch the final assault against Pretoria."

The commander-in-chief said armed struggle could not be wished away.

"We are dealing here with an entity which does not have any morality, a regime with no conscience whatsoever, a regime that has no time for the world public opinion and a regime that remains in power through the brutal use of arms of war against anyone challenging its policies.

"Our people need the means with which to defend themselves against such a regime. These were are giving to them, but need more," said Cde Mlambo.

# TRIBUTE TO ABU JIHAD

APRIL 16 1988 fell upon the Palestinian people suddenly and wrapped not only occupied Palestine but the peace and justice loving world in a mantle of sorrow and anguish.

For it was on that fateful day that an immense void was opened when the assassins' bullets cut short the life of a great fighter, a self-less revolutionary, a seasoned commander and a tested leader.

The incomparable Brother Khalil Al-Wazir, better known as Abu Jihad is no more, but his shining example lives on and the struggle to liberate beloved Palestine continues.

But who was this man? Who was this inimitable commander? Who was this great fighter?

Abu Jihad (meaning Father of the Holy War) was born in Ramleh in what is today Israel. He joined the struggle to liberate Palestine at an early age and later became a key aide and comrade-in-arms to the PLO Chairman, Cde Yasser Arafat.

He took the lead in thwarting the Zionist Israeli and imperialist campaigns to destroy the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the struggling masses of Palestine.

As a deputy commander-in-chief of the Palestinian armed forces, Abu Jihad (53) displayed his extra-ordinary military skills during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon when he geniusly marshalled both the strategic and tactical operations of the PLO against naval attacks, airforce raids, artillery bombardments and infantry attacks.

In that invasion, the latest naval boats, fighter bombers and other weapons supplied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation were used in what was probably the first major use of the most advanced and sophisticated Western military technology against a liberation movement.

By Political Editor  
Romero Daniels

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was to make the PLO probably the first liberation movement to resolutely withstand NATO's wrathful might. And this determined fight cannot be talked about without the mentioning of Abu Jihad, who masterminded it.

"Abu Jihad left a school behind," said a key aide to the late commander shortly after his brutal assassination.

"Abu Jihad had been recruiting young Palestinian men and women since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and these cadres have now been tried and tested in several operations and proved capable inside and outside Palestine," said the aide.

As the Palestinian people pick up the gun from the fallen hero to continue with the struggle, the Azanian people draw inspiration from Abu Jihad to forge ahead in the struggle to liberate Azania. For the struggle of the Palestinian and the Azanian peoples is one.

Long live the spirit of Abu Jihad!  
Aluta Continua!

To make the most fitting contribution to  
the war for Azania's total liberation . . . .

**JOIN THE PAC**  
the organisation of the  
African People.  
**IZWE LETHU !**

