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CAITLIN O'GRADY

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BY

Dr. Cindy Simon Rosenthal, Chair

Dr. Tyler Johnson

Dr. Ron Peters

Dr. Glen Krutz

Dr. Jill Irvine

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the behavior of members of the House of Representatives on economic issues in order to ascertain how economic characteristics of their constituencies affect their actions. Specifically, this paper examines their activity with respect to what these representatives are saying directly to constituents, what they are saying to their colleagues and those who closely monitor their behavior, and the ways in which representatives are actually acting with respect to legislation. By utilizing the notion of anticipatory representation and focusing on the potential voters representatives are trying to win over, the research I present here attempts to use economic issues as a means of understanding the relationship between a representative and his or her constituents.

Constituents' economic needs are easy for representatives to gauge given the accessibility of economic indicators, such as the unemployment rate. Therefore, as a result of the recent economic downturn and the fact that economic indicators are readily available, representatives are assumed to be fairly aware of their constituent's economic desires. Thus, the research presented here is an attempt to determine whether representatives are merely indicating to their constituents a concern for their economic well-being, or if they are in fact pursuing what is in their district's best economic interests. More often than not, findings indicate that the primary driver of representative behavior is party affiliation. Representatives may occasionally pay attention to their district's economic needs, such as when they directly address the public, but overall their biggest concern appears to be towing the party line.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The governing structure of the United States is designed to ensure that citizens have the ability to hold members of Congress accountable for their actions, as citizens are responsible for electing to Congress individuals to represent them on a national level in our federal government. Representation affords citizens the right to have their voices heard by an official of the majority's choosing. Members elected to Congress are accountable to the citizens who elect them, empowering citizens with the ability to choose not to re-elect an individual to Congress if they are displeased with his or her actions while in office. The Framers of the Constitution designed our government in this manner so that citizens could maintain power within our democratic government (Nino 1998).

The idea that the citizenry can hold a representative accountable is designed to ensure that a representative will do everything in his or her power to act in the best interests of those citizens with the ability to hold the representative accountable: constituents. If a representative acts in a manner displeasing to his or her constituents, the constituents have the ability to vote the representative out of office and vote someone else into office in the next election. However, representatives are intimately aware that their constituents do not follow their every action and thus realize they have some leeway with respect to their policymaking behavior, as not all citizens will be able to trace every behavior back to their representative (Arnold 1990). If, as Mayhew (1974) suggests, a representative's primary goal is to gain re-election and he or she does so through credit-claiming, advertising, and position-taking, then it is entirely possible

that these more public actions of the representative are the only ones of which the citizenry is aware.

This research seeks to use economic issues as a vehicle by which to understand how needs of the constituency factor into representative action. The choice of economic issues is based on both theoretical and methodological grounds. From a theoretical perspective, economic indicators are readily available to representatives. Therefore, if representatives are going to be acting on the basis of their constituent's needs, they are most likely to do so with respect to economic issues, when they are more aware of constituent desires on such issues. With social issues, representatives may believe their district has a differing opinion than in actuality because of the difficulty in gauging constituent opinion on such issues; thus, in this latter instance, representative action could be a result of skewed perception of the position of his or her district on social issues, rather than the representative simply ignoring district desires. However, with economic issues the representative has a much more accurate perception of the needs of his or her district, and therefore, if the representative does not act in the district's best interest, it is not because he or she perceived the district had different economic needs.

Moreover, economic issues have always been of concern to voters because such issues directly affect them. Social issues are likely to affect some citizens but not others, whereas economic issues affect society at large because all citizens have an interest in their own economic well-being, regardless of how much or how little they have. In referencing the use of economic indicators to gauge an individual's quality of life, Diener and Suh (1997) state: "People select the best quality of life for themselves

that is commensurate with their resources and their individual desires” (190). Thus, it seems likely that representation is most likely to occur on economic issues, and that constituents are the most likely to hold their representatives accountable on these issues.

Between 2007 and 2012, the United States experienced a housing finance crisis and “the great recession”, which made citizens extremely concerned about the state of the nation’s economy, their regional economy, and global financial uncertainty.

Economic issues have always been of importance to society, but in the past few years they have become more salient than at any time in recent history. Furthermore, the recession has been widely noted in the media, which has frequently utilized economic indicators such as the unemployment rate, foreclosure rate, or bankruptcy rate to illustrate the larger picture of how widespread and severe the recession is.

For instance, a *MarketWatch* article from April of 2009 indicated that 5.1 million jobs had been lost since the recession began and that “the labor market hasn't yet shown any signs of improvement. Leading employment indicators -- such as jobless claims or the number of temporary workers -- have worsened in recent months” (Nutting 2009). Likewise, a December 2007 article by *Reuters* noted that foreclosure filings increased by nearly 68% over the same period the previous year (Reuters 2007). Given how prominent the recession was in the news, representatives could not deny the deep-seeded effects the economy had and continue to have on many citizens. Table 1.1 indicates the primary economic indicators that will be used in this study and how they changed over the period this study examines.

[INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE]

From a methodological perspective, economic data is much easier to obtain by district than would be data on social issues, which would necessitate a survey that could be subjected to measurement, data collection, or response error. Utilizing the current economic circumstances of a district is an easy barometer of what the district's economic needs are without requiring a survey of citizens of the district to indicate the constituency's opinion, as would be necessary if the dissertation used social issues rather than economic ones. Additionally, for the representative, economic issues are easy for them to gauge for the same reasons. Representatives can easily and empirically see their constituents' economic circumstances and thus have an understanding of their constituents' economic needs that is accurate rather than merely a perceived understanding of constituent desire. Moreover, the use of a variable to measure a representative's perceptions of social issues has been heavily criticized, largely because the survey instruments used to measure individuals' assessments of social issues have been found to be deficient (Andrews 1974).

Not only does this dissertation present an understanding of representatives' actions on economic issues, as is commonly done through data on member's legislative activity, but it also examines how members present themselves to their constituents with regard to their public statements. Additionally, I will examine how they are discussing issues when their constituents are less aware of their behavior, such as in Congressional floor speeches. Thus, there are three components to the research presented in this dissertation: (1) what representatives are saying loudly to the public (public statements via their website), (2) what representatives are saying directly to congressional and

policy insiders (floor speeches), and (3) the actual legislative action of members (bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship).

Recently, a large focus of the representation literature in American politics has been on descriptive and substantive representation (Dodson 2006; Overby et al. 1992; Vega and Firestone 1995; Williams 1998), as first proposed by Pitkin (1967). While studying such aspects of representation is certainly important, such studies have taken hold of representation scholarship and, as a result, less research has focused on the dyadic relationship between constituents and their representative. This relationship is one that is important to address and understand, as constituents are the individuals who can directly hold the representative accountable. Therefore, in my research, I utilize the work of Arnold (1990) in describing attentive and inattentive publics in this dyadic manner. In order to better understand this constituent-representative relationship, representative action on three economic issues will be discussed: unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy. These three issues have been selected because they are all common indicators of economic circumstances and because, as such, representatives should be easily able to access and gauge constituent preferences pertaining to the issues.

This dissertation attempts to determine how constituency characteristics feed into how representatives speak to their constituents, to their colleagues, and how representatives act on legislation. Unlike other research that examines representative behavior, this research endeavors to go beyond the roll call vote. Hall (1987) indicates the importance of understanding the behavior of members of Congress outside of roll call votes, stating: “Unlike other, more studied forms of legislative behavior (the roll

call vote, the committee assignment request), participation in committee decision making refers to no single, identifiable act” (106). This research will examine purposive member behavior on unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues over the course of a seven-year time frame (2005-2011) to determine the extent to which representation of the district was present on these economic issues. The intention of this research is to determine the relationship between representatives’ behavior and their constituents’ economic needs.

Research Question

The proposed research seeks to answer the question: To what extent are constituency characteristics related to representative behavior? More specifically, to what extent are economic characteristics of a district related to representative action publicly, toward colleagues, and legislatively on economic issues?

In examining the dyadic relationship between constituents and their representative, the economic circumstances of the constituency are a useful tool in understanding representative action on economic issues. For instance, the unemployment rate in a given district provides information about the district’s economic well-being and, as a result, the district’s economic preferences. The district’s representative may act on unemployment issues in a manner that corresponds with the district’s unemployment rate and thus economic preference. Representative’s responsiveness to such constituency characteristics may be a product of how fearful the given representative is of losing re-election. However, representatives are aware that constituents may not be aware of their every move. The primary intention of the current

research is to understand constituency influence (or lack thereof) on representative behavior pertaining to unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues.

From a research perspective, representative behavior is comprised of three different elements. First, it is necessary to understand the message representatives are trying to publicly send to their constituents. This message is likely designed to maintain and/or gain the support of constituents when the representative is up for re-election. Second, when speaking with their colleagues on behalf of their constituents, representatives may present the issue differently than they do publicly to their constituency as a result of differing beliefs that they harbor or that are being pressed upon them by interest groups. Under these conditions, such as in floor speeches, the majority of the constituency is likely unaware of what their representative is saying and the representative may feel he or she has some leeway as a result. Lastly, the most common way of understanding how representatives are behaving with respect to their constituency is by viewing their actual legislative behavior, such as bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship (Frantzich 1979; Swers 2005; Wilson and Young 1997).

Chapter Summary

In the chapters that follow, I will expand upon my theoretical expectations and examine the effects of the economic characteristics of the district on representative's action. First, in Chapter 2, a review of the relevant literature and explanation of the theory which guides this research will be presented. The research at hand largely uses the idea of anticipatory representation and takes into account the visibility of a representative's actions, similar in some ways to the work of Arnold (1990). The theory explicated is one that assumes representatives are most concerned with winning over the

votes of skeptical constituents who may be persuaded to change their attitude toward the member. Utilizing economic issues as a vehicle, this research assumes that representatives will win over these constituents by acting on such economic issues. Hypotheses are derived that assume that those actions most visible are those that will correspond best with constituent economic characteristics.

Chapter 3 examines how representatives are speaking directly to their constituents about these economic issues. Members' personal websites are coded on the basis of both their position on the given economic issue and how visible this position is on their website. Because members' websites are designed to be constantly accessed by constituents, it is assumed that the messaging on such sites will be in line with constituent economic characteristics. However, findings reveal that representatives were not only often unwilling to take a strong stance on these issues, but also that their stance was often not reflective of their constituents economic desires. Overall, the position which representatives took corresponded more to their party affiliation than anything else.

Chapter 4 is a study of representative floor speeches on economic issues as a means to understand how representatives are speaking to one another when they think constituents are less likely to pay attention. All floor speeches given by the representative on a given economic issue (unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy) were assessed to determine the frame by which the representative was addressing the issue. Findings reveal that when speaking on the floor of the House representatives frequently see their audience as their colleagues and may be jockeying for position and influence within their party.

Chapter 5 assesses the sponsorship and co-sponsorship of economic legislation. Bills were coded according to their impact on economically disadvantaged populations and then members were assessed as to the number of bills they sponsored or co-sponsored within each category. While sponsorship and co-sponsorship may be viewed differently by representatives, both appear to be influenced by constituent economic characteristics, particularly if the legislation has a positive impact on economically vulnerable populations. Additionally, those representatives who previously won their districts by a larger margin of victory were more likely to sponsor legislation that would positively impact such populations.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings and indicates directions for future research. While the analyses of representatives speaking to constituents and speaking to colleagues suggested that their primary concern was maintaining the party line, the findings with regard to their actual legislative behavior suggest that representative democracy may in fact take constituents needs into account. In this extremely partisan era, representatives primary concern does appear to be acting in accordance with their party's position; however, when it comes to introducing and co-sponsoring legislation, they are taking into account the economic desires of their constituents.

Chapter 2: Examination of the Literature and Theoretical

Expectations

In order to better understand the relationship between a constituency and their representative, it is important to review the scholarship in this field to gain a better understanding of how the literature on representation can aid in such an endeavor, as well as how present research can build upon it. Based on much of the research on representation, I explicate a theory toward classifying constituents that is used as a driving force in understanding representative behavior. The review of the literature that follows seeks to examine representation in the following manner: the methods of studying representation, how citizens hold representatives accountable, why constituents matter, and the influence of economic factors on representation. Theoretical expectations that build from this literature will be discussed later in this chapter.

Classifying Constituents

In order to better understand the purposive behavior of members of the House, it is necessary to understand how they view their respective constituency whose support they seek. While Arnold's (1990) characterization of the public into attentive and inattentive citizens is useful, it may be too broad. For instance, Gilens (2001) finds that some citizens are entirely ignorant of policy-specific information. There exists a distorted sample of the population that actually gets out to the polls and votes; generally, socioeconomic characteristics are indicative of whether a citizen is likely to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Thus, there is some segment of the population

that is either completely ignorant to the political process and/or is unconcerned with becoming involved in this process.

Fenno (1977) creates distinctions among constituents, describing multiple different sources of potential support a representative may have within his or her district. Starting from the broadest level, these levels are: (1) the geographic constituency from which the representative is elected, (2) the supporters or those who voted for the representative in the previous election, (3) the strongest supporters, and (4) the intimates who know the representative well. Hence, it is the case that, particularly given the current partisan political climate, there are some citizens who are strongly opposed to a representative. This opposition is likely a product of both how partisan the representative is and how partisan an individual citizen is.

Bishin (2000) examines the ‘prospective constituency,’ or those members of the constituency who are swing voters or moderately partisan in the opposing direction. He indicates, “The ‘prospective constituency’ holds that legislators appeal to a moderate subconstituency along with their own party extremists. As such, they ignore “opposition party extremists, whose voters are unavailable” (395). Using a seven-point scale, Bishin classifies constituents from ‘strong Democrat’ to ‘strong Republican,’ indicating that a representative’s prospective constituency includes the six classifications closest to his or her own party affiliation but does not include those who identify strongly with the opposing party. Thus, it is the case that a representative has the ability to gain favor with certain citizens, but others will remain opposed to the representative solely based on his or her ideology or previous actions. Utilizing the *American National Election Study: Pooled Senate Election Study*, Bishin examines the

key votes of Senators and the role constituency may have had on such votes. His findings indicate that constituency ideology plays a role in Senators roll-call voting decisions.

I conceptualize four categories of constituents within each district: advocates, potentials, uninterested, and opposed (Table 2.1). This typology incorporates the work of other researchers who have found that different segments of the constituency exist. Dividing these subgroups as such illustrates the importance of understanding potentials, as these voters are the ones the representative is most likely to target if he or she wants to win over more voters. Research often contends that representatives want to maintain the support they have and gain support from other voters and the conceptualization presented here shows who specifically these voters are. Further, this research tests whether or not representatives are in fact targeting such constituents and does so on economic issues surrounding a recession – a time in which they are most likely to be salient.

Based on this conceptualization, it is assumed that advocates will always support their representative unless the representative acts in a significantly uncharacteristic manner. Potentials are voters whose position on the representative is not fixed, but rather their position changes when they are aware of the representative's actions. Uninterested citizens are assumed to nearly always stay out of the political process unless an issue gains so much traction that they somehow become aware and interested in it. Opposed citizens are those who hold very different ideological and policy standpoints from the representative, and who are unlikely to become supporters except under extreme circumstances. .

[INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE]

On the basis of this classification, I assume that representatives will generally not factor advocates or those opposed to them into their actions unless they are acting in a significantly uncharacteristic way. However, many representatives will attempt to gain the support of potentials through their behavior and will hope that, if the policy on which they are acting gains enough traction and attention, they can also gain the support of those uninterested. Economic issues provide a unique case to examine this notion given the economic downturn and the resulting attention the issue has garnered.

Potentials are a moving target that representatives want to be able to have as supporters, and with economic issues at the forefront of many constituents' minds, representatives know their actions on such issues could influence such potentials vote choice.

Representatives may be acting for these different constituencies depending on the venue in which they think they have an audience and who they believe, among these constituencies, is in that audience.

Anticipatory representation is the idea that representatives anticipate how voters, on Election Day, will retrospectively evaluate their representatives' accomplishments. Representatives thus need to be vigilant and aware of how their actions and the visibility of such actions will influence voting decisions, particularly as they are seeking to maintain or gain the support of their constituents. The concern for representatives during their term then becomes pleasing these potential supporters (as shown in Table 2.1). Representatives do their best to anticipate how these potential supporters will respond to the actions they take; however, representatives are aware that some of their actions will be more obvious to these potential supporters than others (Arnold 1990).

This classification of constituents serves to inform the proceeding research. The following literature review examines the representation and constituency literature on the basis of this theoretical classification.

Literature

Methods of Studying Representation

Considerable recent literature on representation has been the result of the work of Pitkin (1967), in which she first introduces the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation. Since her work, a number of scholars have studied the effect of gender, race, and ethnicity on representation and on representative action (e.g. Dodson 2006; Overby et al. 1992; Vega and Firestone 1995; Williams 1998). While such scholarship is useful in understanding how minority groups are represented in our government, it does not present a concept of direct accountability. Under strict accountability theory, representatives are held responsible by the constituents who elected these representatives into office based on electoral promises made, not shared characteristics.

Accordingly, Mansbridge (2003) classifies representation into four categories: promissory, anticipatory, gyrosopic, and surrogate. Literature on descriptive and substantive representation is thus just one way of focusing on representation, as it can be seen as surrogate representation, in which elected officials may be representing those outside their districts as surrogates. However, in this classification, promissory representation is the only type of representation in which the representative is held

accountable in a traditional sense by his or her constituency and is thus forward-looking: “Promissory representation thus focuses on the normative duty to keep promises made in the authorizing election, uses a conception of the voter’s power over the representative that assumes forward-looking intentionality ... and results in accountability through sanction” (Mansbridge 2003, 516).

On the other hand, the term anticipatory representation is used to describe citizens utilizing retrospective voting and thus focuses on previous action: “Anticipatory representation flows directly from the idea of retrospective voting: Representatives focus on what they think their constituents will approve at the next election, not on what they promised to do at the last election” (Mansbridge 2003, 515). Mansbridge’s (2003) conception of gyroscopic representation differs from these other types of representation, as it focuses on how the representative’s own viewpoint guides his or her actions and thus assumes the voters entrust the representative to act on their behalf when electing their representative into office.

Arnold (1990) posited that constituents must have the ability to trace representative action and that such ability comprises the tenets of anticipatory representation, which this dissertation seeks to investigate. For instance, Arnold indicates that representatives think about voters in the next election voting on the basis of outcome preferences rather than policy preferences. Representatives are acting with the knowledge that they have an upcoming election and thus must maintain or gain the support of constituents to be re-elected to their offices. While this is not accountability in the traditional sense, as Mansbridge (2003) points out, representatives are still accountable to their constituency in the sense that they must please their voters

throughout their term if they are to gain support, as voters will look retrospectively at their previous actions. Thus, in this context, the choices the representative makes with respect to economic issues during his or her term in office will be reflected upon by the voters when the representative seeks re-election and voters must again cast their ballot, along the lines of anticipatory representation.

[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE]

The way in which voters retrospectively view representative action is largely based on how visible, or easy to attain, that information is (Arnold 1990). Table 2.2 indicates how different representative actions can be seen as visible, less visible, and invisible by retrospective voters. Arnold's (1990) discussion of traceability deals directly with the causal chain by which voters can link policymaking actions to representatives. He speaks of the difficulty in tracing policies back to representatives and those making a retrospective voting calculation when the causal chain is longer. In my research, more visible policymaking actions are those that constituents are more likely to be aware of and/or to have greater access to and, thus, constituents are more likely to hold their representative accountable for such visible and accessible actions. The proceeding research assumes that representatives are aware of when their actions are more visible to constituents and that they act in a manner corresponding to the visibility of such actions.

In one of the seminal works in representation scholarship, Miller and Stokes (1963), indicate that there are two ways in which the district can control its representative: (1) to elect a representative that has the same or similar policy preferences on all issues, and (2) for the member of Congress to act in a manner he or

she thinks is pleasing to constituents. While Miller and Stokes argue that representatives' perceptions are not always accurate, Page et al. (1984) examined data from both constituents and members of Congress to determine that there was a high degree of representation with respect to social welfare issues. Additionally, Miller and Stokes (1963) find a low correlation between constituency behavior and representative action, as they indicate that representative's perceptions of constituent opinion are not highly correlated. They conclude:

Our evidence shows that Representative's roll call behavior is strongly influenced by his own policy preferences and by his perception of preferences held by the constituency. However, the conditions that presuppose effective communication between Congressmen and district are much less well met. The Representative has very imperfect information about the issue preferences of his constituency, and the constituency's awareness of the policy stands of the Representative ordinarily is slight (56).

Nonetheless, such findings have been disputed, as there may be methodological problems with the data utilized by Miller and Stokes. Specifically, each district they surveyed had a small number of respondents raising questions about generalizability (Erickson 1978). While Miller and Stokes set the wheels in motion in the examination of the relationship between constituents and their representative, their use of surveys to gauge district opinion has caused other researchers to call their findings into question.

In this research, I posit that representatives have access to accurate economic data and that the recent economic crisis provides constituents with heightened awareness of economic issues. Thus, a focus on economic issues provides a better test

of member-district linkages than using a survey with a small sample size to determine district opinion as did Miller and Stokes (1963). Additionally, I present a model of representation along the lines of Arnold's (1990) understanding of attentive and inattentive publics and, accordingly, utilize anticipatory representation in doing so. By making use of the model of anticipatory representation, this research acknowledges that representatives are concerned with how voters view them when these voters head to the polls.

How Do Citizens Hold Their Representative Accountable?

Representatives seek to minimize electoral damage when taking an action on policy and thus frequently try to please as much of their constituency as possible, at least when it comes to actions that may be visible to and accessible by the public. One of the foundational scholars of Congressional literature, Mayhew (1974), suggests that the primary goal of members of Congress is to gain re-election, such that all actions taken by the representative are aimed toward this goal. Mayhew argues that representatives primarily use advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking as means of gaining constituent support to ensure their re-election goal.

While other scholars indicate that re-election is not the sole goal of members of Congress, they do concede that it is one of the foremost goals of representatives (Bullock 1976; Dodd 1977; Fenno 1973; Hall 1987). Furthermore, elections are seen as the defining characteristic of a representative government (Manin 1997; Wahlke 1971). Nonetheless, Gastil (2000) points out that despite the existence of representative government in the United States, it does not always function the way it should. Voters

may be uninformed and yet representatives maintain their office year after year. Gastil writes, “There are two fundamental problems in American politics: The first is that most Americans do not believe that elected officials represent their interests. The second is that they are correct” (1). Thus, it is the case that the electorate may not be as well represented as one would hope in a representative government – which is what I will explore in this research.

If constituents are in fact poorly represented, as Gastil (2000) suggests, then it is unlikely that their economic needs will be predictive of representatives’ actions on economic issues, as representatives can maintain their office while showing little concern for constituent preferences. On the other hand, Jacobson (2009) raises the concern that members of Congress, who he feels are in fact primarily concerned with pleasing their constituents, are ineffective at successfully meeting policy challenges because of how fragmented electoral districts in America are. Jacobson sees Congress as ineffective as a result of systematic failure, whereas Gastil faults the representative as an individual for being ineffective. If Jacobson is correct in assuming representatives are expressly concerned with the desires of their constituents and attempt to act on constituent preferences, then my findings should show that constituents economic needs predict representative’s economic issue action. Therefore, it is necessary to understand representative actions while in office as a means of gaining or maintaining constituent support, and in doing so to examine the ways in which representatives view their constituents with respect to electoral margins.

Some of the most well-known research on re-election margins is that of Fiorina (1974; 1977). Fiorina (1974) argued that representatives could have one of two

strategies toward re-election: either maintaining the support they have or maximizing the number of supporters within their district. Generally, representatives in fairly safe districts will not need to gain a great deal of additional support and thus they merely need to work to maintain the support they already have in place. As a result of the partisanship present at the electoral level, the nature of safe seats has changed over time. Nevertheless, even in those districts that are safe, representatives need to ensure that they are aware of constituent's economic circumstances and are supporting them in their policymaking action.

In a later work, Fiorina (1977) indicated that at the time representatives were experiencing larger margins of victory because representatives concerned themselves with less contentious matters, by providing casework and pork barrel benefits instead of actual policymaking. Nonetheless, Kuklinski (1977) examined three policy areas (liberalism, taxation, and government administration) to determine their effects on incumbent electoral margins. His findings indicated little difference between those districts that were viewed as competitive and those viewed as noncompetitive with respect to change in electoral margin as a result of representative action. Such a finding indicates that representatives may not be entirely motivated by the desire to gain support from constituents.

Additionally, representatives are concerned with "the personal vote" as they build credibility by serving their constituents through casework (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). Therefore, gaining voter loyalty may be the result of personal favors, not policymaking actions that potentially affect the public at-large. While citizens may be concerned with how representatives are meeting their needs in terms of casework, I

argue that economic issues may negate the power of the personal vote because issues like employment, housing, and finances are extremely salient to the citizenry and have high policy relevance. Although these issues may require large-scale policymaking, such issues may also be deeply personal for a vast majority (if not the entirety) of the voting public.

More recent research suggests that there does exist a correspondence between electoral margin and party platform wherein representatives may be aware of constituent preferences, as on average the more an incumbent votes with his or her party, the smaller the electoral margin (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). For instance, Bovitz and Carson (2006) examined this marginality hypothesis by examining roll call voting in the 1970s and determined that roll call votes do influence an incumbent's electoral margin come election day: "Our findings offer strong evidence for the contention that members behave strategically when considering how to vote on prominent roll calls and that they do indeed worry about taking the 'wrong' position on a set of votes" (305).

On the other hand, Bartels (1991) argues that, with respect to representative support for defense spending in 1980, even those representatives in secure districts supported their constituents' desires. Unlike Bartels' analysis, my research utilizes electoral margins as an independent variable to determine its relationship to representative action, assuming that representatives who won by smaller margins in the last election are more likely to fear losing their seat in the next election and therefore act accordingly, that is, seek to gain the support of potential voters.

The majority of representation literature that examines the correspondence between constituency opinion and representative action focuses on the Senate. Such scholarship measures Senators behavior through roll call votes (e.g. Bullock and Brady 1983; Thomas 1985; Wright 1989). As there are a vast number of House districts and surveying constituents in each one is a difficult task, a number of scholars have used roll call votes as a means of gauging representative action.

Given the predominant use of roll call votes as a means of understanding representative behavior, the research I propose will instead utilize other dependent variables that measure representative action. The utilization of roll call votes has come under criticism, primarily by Krehbiel (1993, 2000), who asserts that roll call votes are merely measures of preferences rather than of actual partisanship, as his findings suggest “positive and significant party effects are rare” (Krehbiel 1993, 235). Other scholars have developed their own measures of representative action that they contend are superior to the use of roll call votes (e.g. Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman 1999; Cox 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2002; Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000).

Rather than focus on the Senate, as is often done when examining the dyadic relationship between constituent and representative, I will focus on the House of Representatives. Borrowing from Fiorina (1974), Shapiro et al. (1990) posited that two constituencies exist for Senators: the at-large constituency and those who are members of their party, and that the latter influence Senators roll call voting to a larger degree. There is little reason to expect this finding to differ with respect to the House. However, because House districts are likely less diverse than state-wide Senate districts,

it is that much more important to determine how a member of the House is pleasing his or her constituents.

It is important to note that the voting public within a district may not encompass the entire constituency given that every citizen within a district may not show up to the polls on Election Day to cast his or her ballot. Additionally, those citizens who are the most politically active are likely the ones with the motivation and resources that enable them to become involved politically (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Given that these citizens are the most active, scholars find that representatives seek to please them more so than other constituents. Furthermore, citizens who rationally evaluate the costs and benefits of going to the polls may actually not end up voting because they see the costs as outweighing the benefits (Downs 1957). If constituent policy preferences disadvantage certain subgroups of the population and only favor those who are generally the most politically active, representation is compromised. Nonetheless, representatives may act on the economic betterment of those citizens who are politically supportive and attentive and ignore those who the representative believes to be unaware or uninterested. Under this circumstance, the constituency's at-large economic needs will not be reflected in representative's action.

Hence, this dissertation seeks to understand how representatives are attempting to maintain or gain support within their district and the actions they take that they believe will payoff for them come re-election. Such actions may only be those actions that are the most visible to constituents, such as their public message, because representatives may not believe constituents will dig deeper. However, certain segments of the constituency differ from others.

Why do These Constituencies Matter?

The focus of this research is on the relationship between the constituency and the representative. As previously mentioned, the representative looks to the constituency for votes as he or she seeks to gain or maintain support from the previous election. Each constituent views the actions of the representative in terms of what the representative has done about the issues in which that individual is specifically interested. The understanding of representative action posited here is based largely on that of Arnold (1990) and his conception of attentive and inattentive citizens.

Arnold (1990) introduces a way of understanding the behavior of members of Congress on the basis of what he terms attentive publics – those citizens with known policy preferences – and inattentive publics – those citizens who do not hold stable policy preferences. According to his logic, members of Congress will act on the basis of the known preferences of the attentive public and the inattentive public's potential policy preferences. Thus, members of Congress anticipate what they believe citizen's retrospective opinion of their actions will be when the citizens go to the polls. Additionally, the ability of citizens to trace a policy decision back to a given member of Congress influences the actions of representatives who are aware of such traceability. Citizens, particularly inattentive citizens, must be able to make a connection between policy and representative action for citizen behavior to help or hurt a representative. The accessibility of information varies on the basis of how knowledgeable and determined the citizen is to find information, thus making representatives perhaps more accountable to some more than others.

Arnold (1990) indicates that while representatives' decisions are based on subjective cost-benefit analysis as well as how well they think constituents will be able to trace their actions down a causal chain. The ability of a constituent to trace such effects is dependent on magnitude, timing, proximity of those affected, and the presence of an instigator. If these effects lead constituents to blame a representative for an action he or she took, then voters are likely to hold that action against the representative. While the proposed research does not seek to understand this causal chain, it does build on Arnold's argument about the ability of citizens to trace action to their representatives. Representatives tell their constituents what they want to hear in order to maintain or gain support; however, representatives may be acting differently behind the scenes or when they take legislative action, such as sponsoring, co-sponsoring, and/or voting on bills.

Arnold's (1990) depiction of attentive and inattentive citizens helps us to understand this disconnect. When making public statements, such as on their websites, all citizens are easily able to access representative's information without putting forth a great deal of work (Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer 1998). Thus, inattentive citizens, who may not closely follow the policy process and to whom such information may be the most accessible, are able to gain an understanding of representative beliefs from representative websites. However, representative action that is less accessible to their constituents, such as their speeches on the floor of the House, may greatly differ from such public statements and the vast majority of constituents are unlikely to view transcripts from floor speeches, as they may be unaware of how to obtain them. Instead, only those attentive citizens, largely comprised of interest groups and

hyperaware supporters, are likely to pay attention to what representatives say in their day-to-day floor speeches.

Such behind-the-scenes action has been examined by Hall (1996). He indicates that there are three primary reasons that members might be active on legislation: to gain re-election, to further their own policy goals, and to aid the president's agenda. With respect to behind-the-scenes actions, Hall finds that personal goals are the most likely influence of representative behavior, whereas the electoral incentive most likely influences the more visible actions of members, such as during bill markup and floor consideration.

Additionally, much of the work on the behavior of members in Congress has focused on their function within the committee structure. For instance, Fenno (1973) discusses how committees can function for the betterment of members to reach their goal of re-election, the formation of good public policy, and power. Given that representatives face environmental constraints, such as the executive branch, committees form an organizing structure that helps them achieve these goals despite the obstacles. The institutional mechanisms of Congress, such as the committee system and party organizations, have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly research (e.g. Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 1991; Rohde 1991).

While such research is generally not at odds with the representation literature, research addressing partisanship often overlooks the role of representatives as responding to constituents within their district to focus on them as members of a Congressional organization that functions through the work of members. However, Adler and Lapinski (1997) use an institutional approach to explain how constituency

characteristics factor into member's actions with respect to a member's desire to be placed on a specific committee. They argue that economic, social, and geographic explanations are the best way of understanding committee membership, as members of Congress are more likely to join committees when they think that committee's policy work will benefit their district.

Kingdon (1973) also examines the influence of the constituency from a more institutional perspective, as he examines how a number of factors (such as constituency, fellow members, party and committee leaders, interest groups, the executive branch, and the media) influence members voting decisions. Upon interviewing members of Congress about their recent votes, he found that constituents and colleagues played the largest role in members' vote choice.

What Effect Do Economic Circumstances Have on Representation?

Several scholars have examined the influence the economic climate has on electoral behavior. Two models predominate in this literature: (1) pocketbook voting, the idea that an individual's personal economic circumstances influence his or her voting, and (2) sociotropic voting, in which the national economic climate influences an individual's vote decision (Markus 1988). Additionally, scholars have also attempted to determine whether voters perceive the economy with respect to how it has been and is at present, known as retrospective voting, or with respect to how they think it will be in the future, referred to as prospective voting.

MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) find that, with respect to voting for the president, voters anticipate the economic future and reward or punish on the basis of

their own calculations. On the other hand, Norpoth (1996) finds the retrospective model much more convincing, indicating that voters are much more likely to base their decisions on the recent economic climate. Rudolph (2003) attempts to decipher voters' views of presidential versus congressional responsibility for the economic climate, finding that voter sophistication and party identification play a critical role in voters' willingness to attribute blame, as more sophisticated voters were less likely to solely blame the president for a poor economy. Hence the economic climate clearly influences voters' decisions to some extent and therefore examining how the economic characteristics of a district feed into representative's economic policymaking actions is an important avenue of inquiry.

As previously indicated, economic issues will be the vehicle used to assess the relationship between constituents and their representative because such economic issues are easily accessible indicators by which a representative can understand his/her district. Given the recent economic recession, unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy are salient concerns in the public's mind, and both constituents and representatives are likely to be mindful of economic indicators. The recent recession has also become a very contentious political issue and, as a result, economic policymaking has become highly related to political party ideology, particularly given how polarized Congress has become.

Theoretical Expectations

Speaking publicly is likely the way in which representatives are most likely to try to gain support of their constituents, because they know that constituents are going

to see these cues more so than any other. The way in which representatives publicly speak is directed toward constituents in an attempt to gain their support when it comes time for re-election. As such, public statements are the most easily accessible information constituents have. As Arnold (1990) indicates in his discussion of inattentive citizens, “The cautious legislator, therefore must estimate three things: the probability that an opinion might be aroused, the shape of that opinion, and the potential for electoral consequences” (68).

In this manner, representatives need to make calculated decisions about how potentials may or may not support them on the basis of their actions. Representative’s public statements are ways of attempting to gain the support of voters, specifically and most often, potentials. Therefore, we can assume that these public statements are the most likely to be in line with constituency characteristics. It is my expectation that when speaking publicly on economic issues, representatives statements will likely be in line with the economic characteristics of their constituency. When representatives have won their district by a large margin of the vote, they may be less inhibited in the way they address the public and therefore may do so in a way that is less reflective of their constituent’s economic characteristics given that they feel safe and secure in their seat. Representatives who previously had won by a large margin of the vote are more likely to have strong advocates and not need to win over a lot of potentials in comparison with representatives who had a smaller margin of victory. The majority of their constituents may continue to support them regardless of their public statements.

Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on economic issues that affect those constituents facing economic hardships when their district's economic indicators are poor.

Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1.a.: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on economic issues that affect unemployed constituents when their district's unemployment rate is high.

Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1.b.: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on economic issues that affect homeowners when their district's foreclosure rate is high.

Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1.c.: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on economic issues that affect those constituents facing bankruptcy when their district's bankruptcy rate is high.

Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 2: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on economic issues when they have previously won their district by a large margin of victory.

When representatives speak on the floor of the House, it is unlikely that their constituents are aware of what they are saying. While this information is often publicly available, few constituents are aware of how to look up the actual discourse and what their representative said while speaking to his or her colleagues nor do they generally think to spend time doing so. Speaking to a smaller audience on the issues allows representatives to articulate a different understanding of the matter than they may publicly state because they believe that their constituents are unlikely to hold them accountable for these floor statements. Thus, it is the case that constituency

characteristics are less likely to be predictive of the position a representative articulates while speaking “behind-the-scenes,” as in not directly to the constituents. While publicly the representative may indicate support for an issue of concern to his or her constituency, with a smaller audience, comprised primarily of colleagues, his or her position may change drastically because he or she doesn’t think the constituency will hold him or her accountable for what he or she says while speaking in Congress.

Speaking to Colleagues Hypothesis 1: Representative’s floor speeches on economic issues are unlikely to reflect the economic characteristics of his or her constituency.

Speaking to Colleagues Hypothesis 2: Representatives victory in the previous election is unlikely to influence the language the representative uses in speaking to colleagues on the floor.

However, the constituency may follow a representative’s actual legislative actions, largely as a result of such actions being brought to light come Election Day. When a representative is up for re-election, retrospective voters, will look at what he or she did during his or her term in office. They will be aided in doing so by the media, who will try to present to them information on the representative, particularly if the representative is in a highly contested race. If the representative has a strong challenger, that challenger and/or the media is likely to bring to light the legislative actions the representative took in the previous term. While it is not always the case that a safe seat remains safe from one election to the next, it is likely true that a representative who had difficulty gaining a seat one term because of a close vote will likely have a more difficult time the next election than someone who had no difficulty at all. A representative who had a strong challenger in a previous election will want to

ensure that he or she holds onto his or her seat and thus act in a manner he or she thinks will please the constituency.

Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively active on economic issues that affect constituents facing economic hardships when their district's economic indicators are poor.

Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1.a.: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively active on economic issues that affect unemployed constituents when their district's unemployment rate is high.

Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1.b.: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively active on economic issues that affect homeowners when their district's foreclosure rate is high.

Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1.c.: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively active on economic issues that affect constituents facing bankruptcy when their district's bankruptcy rate is high.

Legislative Activity Hypothesis 2: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively active on an economic issue when they previously won their district by a smaller margin of the vote.

Hence, those representatives who won by a large electoral margin are more likely to pursue legislative activity that is not a reflection of constituency characteristics in comparison with those representatives who won the previous election by a smaller electoral margin. As with the other theoretical expectations, this conjecture is based on the size of the potential group of voters and how actively a representative is working to try and win these voters over. If the representative has a strong group of advocates and

merely seeks to maintain that support and not gain further constituent support, he or she is more likely to pursue legislation that may not be in line with constituent needs.

However, if a representative comes from a district with a small number of advocates and large group of potentials, his or her legislative activity may be such that he or she is attempting to gain the support of these potential voters.

Therefore, what a representative says publicly, what he or she says to colleagues, and what he or she does legislatively, may not all be one in the same. Representatives are acting with their own well-being in mind and are attempting to please their constituency only if they think their constituency is paying attention and/or will be aware of the actions they take. Hence, representatives are most likely to speak publicly and take legislative action that is likely to please their constituency when they had a small margin of victory during their previous election. When speaking privately, representatives are not likely to do so in a manner reflective of constituent desires.

Variables

The proposed research is an attempt to determine how constituency characteristics influence representative policymaking action. To do so, there are three types of dependent variables: (1) how the representative speaks publicly, (2) how the representative speaks to colleagues, and (3) how the representative acts legislatively. Furthermore, it is necessary to gauge constituency characteristics through the use of data on the economic circumstances of the given district. Other data, such as campaign contributions and characteristics of the representative might also affect the representative's behavior.

All the data used is confined to the 109th Congress through the first session of the 112th Congress (2005-2011), but it effectively offers a quasi-experimental design with very different political contexts (Table 2.3). These years include both divided and unified government, as well as divided and unified chambers within Congress. While some scholars argue that the influence of divided government is marginal (Mayhew 1991), others suggest that it's important we understand Congress both at times of divided and unified government because in these instances productivity may differ (Coleman 1999; Edwards et al. 1997; Howell et al. 2000). The 109th Congress included a Republican Congress and a Republican President. The 110th Congress featured a Democratic Congress and a Republican President. In the 111th Congress, the Democrats maintained control of both chambers of Congress but the presidency became Democratic when Obama was elected. The first session of the 112th Congress includes a Republican House, Democratic Senate, and Democratic President.

[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE]

The data analyses I utilize throughout this dissertation include primarily the same predictor variables in each of the different inferential models; thus, a discussion of those variables occurs below. An in-depth discussion of the dependent variables will take place in the corresponding chapters that follow.

Independent Variables

Table 2.4 summarizes the independent variables that will be discussed below. These variables are divided into the following categories: key factors, district characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics.

[INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE]

District Characteristics

The most critical district characteristics to this study are those statistics pertaining to unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcies, as these are the primary economic issues that this research utilizes. Patchwork Nation (<http://www.patchworknation.org/>), a project of the Jefferson Institution, provides data on foreclosures. Other district characteristics can be found using Proximity One (<http://proximityone.com/cdprofiles.htm>), including the percentage of unemployed individuals in the district. Proximity One compiles a great deal of data at the district level, some of which it obtains from Census Bureau databases. District-by-district bankruptcy data is difficult to find, but as a proxy, I use Proximity One's percentage of people living below the poverty threshold. In general, it is the case that an increase in poverty is associated with an increase in bankruptcy rates. Nelson (1999) found that, "The results for the poverty rate indicate that lower income individuals will tend to use Chapter 13 more often" (561). Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1997) similarly found that many of those applying for bankruptcy were below the poverty level.

Other district characteristics from Proximity One may also be utilized as predictor variables. These include:

- Percentage of population that is black
- Percentage of the population that is Hispanic
- Percentage of the population with at least a Bachelor's degree

Additionally, it is necessary to gauge party affiliation by district. Data obtained from Kyle Kretschman provides information on the number of registered Democrats and Republicans per district for the election years 2004, 2006, and 2008.

The unemployment rate, foreclosure rate, and poverty rate (as a proxy for bankruptcy) are the key independent variables of interest, as they correspond with the economic issues in this study. The other district characteristics are part of a separate district characteristics model that accounts for how differences in such factors across districts could influence representative action.

District Competitiveness

As previously indicated, considerable research about electoral margins and representation exists. However, most of these studies utilize electoral margin as a dependent variable and examine how other factors affect it (e.g. Bovitz and Carson 2006; Kuklinski 1977). In the present study, electoral margin will be used as an independent variable to predict representative behavior.

Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the percentage by which the representative defeated his or her closest challenger. Representatives who narrowly won their previous election may have more at stake because they may need to gain supporters to win their next election. A district competitiveness variable examines whether representatives with more at stake will act differently when representing their district than those who won with larger electoral margins and therefore feel as though they have the freedom to do as they please without being voted out of office.

Member Characteristics

The characteristics of the representative may contribute to the way in which the representative acts and therefore need to be taken into account when attempting to determine the explanation for member behavior. The following member characteristics will be used in this study:

- Race – White or Black
- Gender – Male or Female
- Party Identification – Republican or Democrat
- Seniority – Number of years of service in the House

The Republican Party is often associated with big business (Miller et al. 1991), and as a result, the expectation is that representatives who are affiliated with the Republican Party are more likely to act in a manner characteristic of a pro-business, pro-market, and pro-banking mentality. Members of the Democratic Party, on the other hand, are more likely to take a more liberal stance that is more favorable to those facing economic difficulties, such as unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcies. Despite that these are traditionally the way members of these parties behave on such issues, this research seeks to determine if members who see clear economic indicators are acting on them, regardless of party affiliation.

Campaign Contributions

Lastly, I take into account the representative's campaign funding. It is highly probable that representatives' actions are meant to please those individuals who fund their campaigns, in the hope that they will receive future donations and thus have an

easier time running their re-election campaign. However, Hall and Wayman (1990) argue that interest groups use their contributions to “buy” time with members and therefore their expenditures are more likely to matter in a committee setting than on actual floor votes. If they are correct, then these contributions may affect the dependent variable pertaining to representative’s behind-the-scenes activity moreso than the representative’s legislative action. To measure campaign contributions, Open Secrets (<http://www.opensecrets.org/>) will be utilized, as it maintains extensive data on campaign contributions for each representative. Open Secrets provides information as to the total dollar amount representatives received from labor as well as the total dollar amount they received from “finance, insurance and real estate,” both of which will be used as variables in this study. These variables will be able to indicate whether representative’s economic policymaking actions are the result of who is funding their campaigns. It is expected that representatives who receive a larger amount from labor will act in a manner consistent with a pro-worker, pro-buyer, and pro-consumer mentality whereas those receiving a larger amount from “finance, insurance, and real estate” will act in conjunction with a pro-business, pro-market, and pro-banking mentality.

Factor Analysis

An iterative principal factor analysis followed by a Varimax rotation was utilized as a means to scale down the four key economic characteristics of the district, in order to create a meaningful way to discuss these economic characteristics through use of a limited number of key characteristics. As shown in Table 2.5, income and poverty

load highly on the first factor, which has been named the personal financial insecurity factor as both median income and poverty are directly related and measured through one's finances.

[INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE]

The foreclosure rate loads highly on the second factor, the macro-economic stress factor, while the unemployment rate variable loads reasonably well on the personal financial insecurity factor but also to some extent on the macro-economic stress factor. The analyses reported in chapters 3-5 will utilize factors scores derived from this rotated two-factor solution to represent the finance and economic factors as the key independent variables used to explain the relationship between the districts economic conditions and the dependent variables.

Dependent Variables

A thorough examination of each dependent variable will take place in the following chapters. The first such chapter will examine how the representative speaks publicly, or when he or she is speaking directly to constituents. In order to best gauge the representative's message, his or her official website will be examined to determine both how visible these economic issues are, as well as the position the representative takes on the issue. Next, in order to understand how representatives are speaking when they are not directly talking to constituents, I examine their floor statements. I developed frames on the basis of differing stances and representatives were classified into primary and secondary frames based on all their economic statements within the given economic issue. Finally, to examine representative legislative activity, bills were

classified on the basis of who would directly benefit from the legislation. A count of the total number of bills within each category that the representative sponsored and co-sponsored was conducted to create the legislative activity dependent variables.

Chapter 3: How the Representative Speaks to Constituents

A member of Congress only remains in office as long as constituents support him or her when they go to the polls and cast their vote. As Mayhew (1974) argues, the primary goal of a member of Congress is to seek re-election and therefore remain in office. Whether in fact it is a representative's sole goal may be somewhat contested, as others argue it is one goal among several (Fenno 1973; Hall 1987); nonetheless, it remains the case that a member of Congress must please, at the very minimum, one more voting constituent than his or her opponent in order to remain in office. However, appealing to constituents only matters if constituents are paying attention to or are aware of their representative's actions.

Literature Review and Theoretical Expectations

In Chapter 2, I argued that a group of citizens, namely those citizens who are uninterested in the political process, are unlikely to follow their representative's behavior unless the issue on which they are focused becomes extremely salient to them. Therefore, I speculate that these citizens generally are not paying attention and therefore representatives are unlikely to attempt to appeal to them, as they assume doing so will not greatly benefit them and their efforts are better spent elsewhere. Those citizens opposed to the representative may very well notice member behavior; however, their attention to such behavior will generally make little difference, as they are unlikely to ever support the representative. The opposite can be said for advocates who may or may not pay close attention to member behavior, but will support the representative

regardless. Thus, one group is left for which a representative targets his or her action: the potentials.

Representatives want to make potentials aware of their behavior such that they can win the vote of as many potentials as possible in the upcoming election. Potentials are more likely to pay attention to representative behavior than those citizens who are uninterested; therefore, representatives seek to reach out to these potentials to make them aware of why they should support the representative in the next election.

Representatives reach out to constituents in a number of ways: by going to events in the district, by going on television and radio programming, by giving speeches, and/or by writing press releases.

However, in recent years, as a result of expanding technology, members have all created personal websites as a means to reach out to constituents. Each and every member of Congress has a website, and many potentials, who may want to become more knowledgeable about their representative, are likely to log onto their representative's website for information at some point in time. While it is certainly the case that those constituents who both support and oppose the representative may access the representative's webpage, they are generally less likely to be the primary target of such publicly available information. The representative's strongest advocates, as well as his or her strongest opponents, are unlikely to change their opinions as a result of the information on the websites. Websites are perhaps the easiest way for constituents to access information about their representative, as (assuming they have internet access) they can do so at their own convenience. These websites are constantly available,

unlike a speech, which occurs at a particular moment in time and then might not be accessible to everyone.

A representative's website can serve as a useful tool in understanding the direct message the representative is sending the public. On a representative's website, he or she presents the information that he or she wants constituents to review. Constituents are likely to seek out their representatives' websites for information and to see where their representative stands on the issues: "Legislative websites can serve as a one-stop portal for constituents to discover how the member portrays themselves and their accomplishments and to discover the explanations the legislator uses to justify their actions" (Esterling, Lazer, and Neblo 2010, 3). While it is certainly the case that not all constituents will have internet access, those constituents without such access are likely the ones who face significant barriers to voting. As Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) point out, certain forms of civic engagement require resources (time, money, skills and information), which may not be available to persons who also lack access to political information via the internet. Therefore, representatives are unlikely to view these citizens as potentials and may instead view them as uninterested and not attempt to gain their support.

Official congressional website data are only analyzed for the 112th Congress. While web archives exist that provide access to previously existing websites, my attempts to collect such data indicated that not every representative's website was accessible through archival resources, raising the issue of whether sampling bias could occur on the basis of those websites that were and were not accessible. Those websites that were available in the archives were generally only reached during differing times of

the year; for instance, one representative's website might be available from June 2010 while another's could be available only in October 2010, right before the representative was up for re-election. Given that such differences in the time at which they site was available archivally could influence findings, the determination was made that website data would only be collected for the 112th Congress, at the same point in time in the year.

As a result, the respective representatives' websites were all accessed and coded over a three-day period in January 2012 such that timing would be less of an issue with respect to the nature by which websites might be changed as the result of an upcoming election. January 2012 marks exactly halfway through a representative's two-year term and thus gives representatives the ability to adjust their position based on the previous year but also is not directly before the election. However, it is the year in which the election is occurring and therefore representatives are very mindful of the message they may be sending to potentials. Accessing all representative websites at the same time was critical.

At present, the internet is widely regarded as a source for obtaining information and thus every member seeks to utilize his or her website to convey information to constituents. Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer (1998) indicate that websites are a means of constituency contact, as is any other form of communication with the constituency; however, at the time of their study not every member had invested resources into an internet website. Nonetheless, Esterling et al.'s (2011) recent work illuminates how members create and change their personal websites, indicating that there is a degree of path dependence in the utilization of the internet by members, as even freshmen

representatives are locked into a status quo of web design that was present before they rose to office. This uniformity in websites was nearly universal, as policy positions by members were nearly always a tab featured at the top of the representatives' site during the present research.

Scholars have broadly recognized that there exists a difference with respect to accessibility of the internet on the basis of race, as Caucasian populations traditionally are more likely to have access to a computer (Babb 1998; Hoffman and Novak 1998; Hoffman et al. 2000). However, more recent research suggests that campaign websites from districts with a larger Caucasian population were not of better quality than those websites from less predominately Caucasian districts (Latimer 2009). Additionally, there appears to be a strong relationship between household income and computer ownership and internet usage, indicating that those constituents with a higher income are more likely to own a computer and have internet access (McLaren and Zappala 2002; Rice and Katz 2003).

Since 2001, the Congressional Management Foundation (CMF) has coded representatives' websites with respect to a large number of dimensions in order to determine their quality. Utilizing nearly 100 criteria, CMF assesses Congressional websites on a variety of characteristics, including: usability, timeliness, information on issues, constituent services and casework, promoting accountability to constituents, legislative process information, district/state information, floor proceedings, media communications, and communication technology (Congressional Management Foundation 2011). As a result of this data collection, scholars have been able to conduct research with respect to representative websites (e.g., Brotherton 2007; Burden

and Hysom 2007; Johnson 2004). For instance, Esterling et al. (2012) utilized CMF data coded for the quality by which the website presents national issues, state and local issues, and issues important to the representative, as well as the representative's rationale for such issues. However, of note to the present research, CMF states, "We looked at how effectively websites were providing content and information, and not at the individual merits of the position" (Congressional Management Foundation 2011, 2). The focus of the research presented here is, in fact, the content of the representative's website in so far as how he or she portrays his or her position on the economic issues of interest.

Dependent Variables

In order to code the websites of representatives on the basis of their stance on economic issues, I employed a coding scheme that utilized a 5-point Likert-type scale to classify the information the websites have on them and how they emphasize the issue. As shown in Table 3.1, the representative's position on each issue was classified according to his or her economic interest position. A code of 0 was employed when the issue was not present on the representative's website.

[INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE]

Under such a coding scheme, a representative was considered "very pro-worker" or "somewhat pro-worker" if, in discussing unemployment issues, he or she articulated a desire to create jobs and/or appealed to labor unions. On the contrary, a representative was considered "very pro-business" or "somewhat pro-business" if he or she stressed the importance of investing in corporations and offering tax cuts to businesses.

Naturally, there is an element of subjectivity to this coding scheme, particularly with respect to differentiating the somewhat and very categories.

The qualification for a representative to be in the extreme category (1 or 5 on the scale) is that he or she must indicate a strong stance on the issue that offers a clear statement about actions taken or intention with respect to the policy position. For instance, mentioning a desire to create jobs may be considered “somewhat pro-worker” whereas mentioning a desire to create jobs and articulating the need for such job formation would be considered “very pro-worker.” The middle-of-the-road position (coded three) was employed when the representative chose not to take any real stance on the issue but still mentioned the issue on his or her website.

For example, André Carson (D-IN) is considered “very pro-worker” given that he indicates the problem with unemployment, indicates the legislation that can be used to address it, and shows what he personally has done and would like to do to address the problem. His website indicates,

In response to our economic downturn, I became involved in bipartisan negotiations that led to the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. This landmark legislation addresses our ongoing recession with initiatives that will help bring 3.5 million Americans back to work, including 75,000 across Indiana, and provide much needed tax relief to 95% of American families. Soon, unemployed workers in industries ranging from manufacturing to health care will see their job prospects greatly expanded.

On the other hand, Steven Palazzo (R-MS) indicates a “somewhat pro-business stance,” stating:

I have run a small business and I know what it means to meet a payroll and read a balance sheet. It's my view that the federal government should look at ways to strengthen small businesses instead of abusing them with higher taxes and more regulation. With unemployment rates in Mississippi remaining even higher than the national average, it is critical for us to reign in the red-tape factory that is our federal government. Small businesses are a critical part of our economy, both locally and at the national level. Over the past 15 years, they have accounted for nearly 65 percent of all new job creation.

Congressman Palazzo does not go into depth about his pro-business stance but does clearly indicate the need to "strengthen small businesses." Unlike Congressman Carson, Congressman Palazzo's discussion does not include specific details on bills or on actions he has taken.

The middle-of-the-road position can be found on the website of Stephen Fincher (R-TN) who has an issue section on his website entitled "Economy and Jobs" which states at the top "The issues of Economy and Jobs are important to our district and to my work in Congress." However, the only statement he makes regarding the issue of employment is: "Getting our economy back on track must be our number one priority in Congress. Government needs to foster an environment where small businesses are aggressively growing and creating jobs in Tennessee and across the nation." Thus, Congressman Fincher addresses the issue of employment but not to the extent that he clearly indicates a position that can be classified as "somewhat pro-business" or "somewhat pro-worker." His statement regarding the growth of small business also encompasses the idea of job growth and does not go into detail on the matter.

Therefore, his website was coded as an articulation of the middle-of-the-road position regarding unemployment.

Using this coding scheme, each representative's website was coded according to the economic issue positions of interest. Coding the websites as such allows us to see how constituency characteristics lead to representatives who are more or less concerned with the interests of constituents who are likely to need economic benefits, such as economically vulnerable citizens who may be in need of better employment circumstances, greater assistance in housing, or at risk of bankruptcy.

Additionally, some representatives are likely to have such economic information more visible on their websites than are others; therefore, a visibility scale was also employed when coding these websites. Dolan (2005) examined the websites of members of Congress to determine the different approaches used by male and female members; she does so by examining what representatives indicate their top issues of interest to be. She coded her data according to whether or not the issue was present in the candidate's top five issues as well as where it ranked among the issues the candidate listed.

Rather than focusing on issue importance in comparison with other issues, the present research seeks to examine how visible the issue is, in general, to those individuals visiting the website. Thus, visibility was coded according to the extent to which the representative's website discussed the issue. If the issue is not mentioned at all on the site, it was coded 1; mentioning an issue briefly was coded 2, while an at-length discussion of an issue was coded 3. Table 3.2 provides information on the coding of the visibility scale.

[INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE]

Hence, the visibility scale can show whether district characteristics are predictive of the information of which the representative wants the public to be aware.

An example of a member whose website is coded on the high end of the visibility scale (3) with respect to the visibility of the unemployment issue is Congressman Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX). The front page of his site features a picture of a factory with the caption “Training a World-Class Workforce” which links to an article about Hinojosa’s action on the Workforce Investment Act, indicating in it the importance of workforce training. Another picture shows Hispanic women and is captioned, “Education and Labor Legislative Victories” and is linked to an article about the accessibility and affordability of higher education.

When examining Congressman Hinojosa’s issue positions, “Jobs and the Economy” focuses directly on unemployment, specifically in his district in Texas. This section of his site even features a graph that compares the unemployment rate within his district with the rest of the United States, as he indicates he has closed the large gap that used to exist wherein his district had a much higher than average unemployment rate. Given that Congressman Hinojosa’s district’s unemployment rate stands at 10.6% and the average unemployment rate across districts is 10.0%, it is fair to say that he is accurately representing his district’s circumstances regarding the unemployment rate.

A representative who mentioned the unemployment issue but did not discuss it at length was Congressman Sam Johnson (R-TX). Information pertaining to the unemployment rate can only be found in his “Jobs and the Economy” section which is merely ten sentences long. The issue is thus mentioned but never in detail, as

Congressman Johnson primarily asserts that the stimulus bill was ineffective and the government has failed to create jobs. The Congressman never mentions policy pertaining to how he plans to create such jobs but instead briefly mentions the issue as a means of a political attack on the Democratic Party. Congressman Johnson clearly has an issue position he is taking, but visibility on the issue on his website is not as strong as other members, like Congressman Hinojosa.

Because such coding is subjective by nature, it was necessary to ensure reliability via a second coder. In his work on images of poverty, Gilens (1996) indicates that, “to ensure reliability of the coding, a random 25 percent sample of pictures was coded by a second coder” (519). Likewise, I randomly selected a quarter of the websites coded for a second coder to review, after this coder had been trained in the coding scheme utilized for these websites. Cohen’s Kappa between myself and the second coder revealed a Kappa of .91 with a $p < .0001$, indicating strong reliability in the coding scheme.

[INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE]

More often than not, representative websites did not specifically mention and take a position on these economic issues, particularly on foreclosure and bankruptcy issues which were not mentioned 79% and 84% of the time (respectively), as shown in Table 3.4. Foreclosure and bankruptcy issues generally affect fewer people than do unemployment issues, in addition, the unemployment rate is often the most widely used indicator of the health of the economy. Of those members who took a position on these economic issues, the most common stance to take was the strongest pro-low income position (5). With respect to unemployment, nearly a third of representatives who took

a position on the issue, took the strong pro-low income stance while upwards of 60% of representatives took the same stance on foreclosure and bankruptcy issues. In the case of unemployment, it was fairly common to take the middle-of-the-road position as well, which was not the case for foreclosure and bankruptcy issues.

[INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE]

Because those representatives who did not mention the issue on their websites represent a large portion of the overall number of representatives in the 112th Congress, further examination of these members appears necessary. As shown in Table 3.5, those representatives who did not discuss the issue at all were more likely to be Republicans. Given that Republicans make up only slightly more than half (55.63%) of the seats in the House in the 112th Congress, it is surprising that they make up a larger share of those unwilling to take a stance on these economic issues. Additionally, a χ^2 test of independence examining the relationship between party affiliation and willingness to mention these issues indicated a significant difference between Republicans and Democrats [$\chi^2(1) = 41.43, p < .001$] in willingness to mention these issues. Because Republicans maintain the majority, they could deem taking a public stance on these issues as a gamble and think that not mentioning these issues will maintain the status quo, meaning keep their party in power.

Interestingly, women as well as Black and Hispanic members were increasingly more likely to take a stance on bankruptcy and foreclosure issues, opposite the trend seen overall and with respect to parties in which the unemployment issue received the most attention. With respect to race in the 112th Congress, 397 members (90%) could be considered Caucasian; thus, a slightly higher than representative sample of white

members appeared to not mention these issues on their websites, as more than 90% of Caucasian members did not mention these issues across each issue area. Similarly, 336 members (83%) are male indicating that a larger than representative number of male members (roughly 85% or more across issue areas) are not mentioning these economic issues in comparison to their female counterparts.

[INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE]

Additionally, most members who did not mention these issues were not in classically defined positions of power. For instance, on the unemployment issues 98.22% of those not mentioning the unemployment issue were not a member within the party leadership (Speaker of the House, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Majority Whip, Conference Chair, etc.). Given that roughly 96% of members were not defined as party leaders, there does appear to be a slightly larger presence of non-party leaders not mentioning the issue. Additionally, when examining the number of years of seniority those not mentioning the issue have (Table 3.6), a pattern is revealed wherein those representatives with the least experience are the most likely to have no mention of these economic issues on their websites. Those less senior members may be the ones least likely to mention these issues because of fear of losing their next election. The mean electoral margin for those representatives who did not mention these issues is 21.12%, which is considerably lower than the 33.61% overall electoral victory margin. However, an independent samples *t*-test comparing electoral margin of those representatives who took a stance to those representatives who did not take a stance indicated that there was no significant difference between the two groups of representatives on electoral margin.

[INSERT TABLE 3.6 HERE]

Also of note is that those members who did not mention these issues on their websites were overwhelmingly the same members who were less likely to sponsor or co-sponsor legislation pertaining to these issues. It may be the case that those members who are not taking a stance on these economic issues on their websites are overall refusing to take a stance regardless of the venue. Nevertheless, I conducted a logit analysis to examine those taking a stance on their website versus those who chose not to take a stance on their website. As the findings in Appendix: Logit Comparing Those Taking a Position on Their Website vs. Those Not, few variables were found to be significant. It is noteworthy that the party variable was significant only for the foreclosure and bankruptcies, as this follows the general trend of this research in that unemployment appears to differ from these other issues.

[INSERT TABLE 3.7 HERE]

Table 3.7 indicates that the foreclosure and bankruptcy issues were also much less visible on the representative websites than the unemployment issue. Over two-thirds of all representative websites did not mention these economic issues, while roughly two-fifths of all sites had little to mention regarding unemployment issues. The websites coded as not mentioning the issue were one in the same as those coded as zero on the issue position scale. In terms of each of these economic issues, those websites with the highest degree of visibility more often than not discussed these economic issues at-length and in-depth rather than had a superficial discussion of the issue.

In order to examine the relationship of each dependent variable – the economic issue position and visibility of these representative websites on each of three economic

issues (unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy) – to the independent variables mentioned in Chapter 2, both simple Pearson product-moment correlations and an ordered logit model were utilized. The selection of ordered logit was based on the nature of the dependent variables, as each may be classified as ordinal in nature.

Discussion of Findings

While it is certainly the case that some members choose not to mention these economic issues on their websites, as previously discussed, those members who do may be doing so for a particular reason. The correlations in Table 3.7 (which do not include those who do not mention the issue on their websites) show the relationship between each of the economic issue positions and the other variables in this study. Examining these correlations shows that there clearly exists a relationship among each of these economic issue positions because those taking a stance on one of these issues often take a stance on the other economic issues of interest and these representatives are more likely to do so in a visible manner.

Many of the members who listed a section under “Legislative Issues” as “Jobs and the Economy” also had one entitled “Housing” to discuss both unemployment and foreclosure issues. While it was much less likely that a “Bankruptcy” section was listed, if bankruptcy-related issues were discussed, it was often tangentially through one of these sections or one pertaining to taxes or small businesses. For example, Rush Holt (D-NJ) has an issue section on his website titled ‘Workforce Issues’ in which he discusses minimum wage, labor unions, job training, unemployment benefits, and

discrimination at length. In another section, titled “Housing,” he discusses the need to mitigate the foreclosure crisis and discusses the Housing and Economic Recovery Act as well as the Helping Families Save their Homes Act. In a section titled “Economy,” Congressman Holt discusses the heavy tax burden on the middle class and economic growth.

The issue positions and visibility of these issues on Congressman Holt’s website are somewhat surprising when one considers that his district, the 12th district of New Jersey, is not struggling financially in comparison to many others. For instance, the district’s foreclosure rate is well below the average, their median income is over 40% above the mean income across districts, and their poverty rate is over 60% below the mean poverty rate. However, Congressman Holt won his district by just 7% in the previous election and consequently may be using his website as a means of gaining support by strongly advocating for these economic issues. The positions he takes are very pro-worker, pro-business, and pro-consumer which may not necessarily be successful with a district that voted only marginally (53.6%) for the Democratic presidential candidate in the previous election. Congressman Holt is sticking to the traditional Democratic party line despite that his constituents may not have a great deal of economic concerns and may only slightly favor the Democratic Party.

Although the economic circumstances of Congressman Holt’s district do not appear to indicate a need for such economic concern, the correlations in Table 3.8 show that often it is the case that a linear relationship exists between many of these economic characteristics and the willingness of a representative to take an issue position on his or her website. A prime example is Congressman Joe Heck (R-NV), who had by far the

highest number of foreclosures, with 143 per 100,000 people. The clear message this economic indicator sends to Congressman Heck is that his district is highly concerned with the effects of the recession, particularly as it relates to homeownership. On his website, Congressman Heck states,

I voted to maintain the FHA Refinance Program. This program allows for those who are current on their mortgages, but underwater, the ability to refinance. On March 29, 2011, I voted to protect the Home Affordable Modification program (HAMP), a program which provides incentives to mortgage servicers to provide loan modifications to troubled borrowers. I voted to protect these programs because taking away programs which help homeowners who are trying to do the right thing is not the answer.

Despite his membership in the Republican Party, Congressman Heck indicates support for homeownership programs that are much more liberal than would be expected. Some Republicans have strongly opposed the FHA Refinance Program and HAMP to the extent that several pieces of legislation have been introduced to try to repeal and terminate it. Congressman Heck is thus going against the view of his own party and political beliefs in order to support legislation that he believes his constituents will view favorably.

[INSERT TABLE 3.8 HERE]

Table 3.8 also reveals that representatives' positions on the unemployment issue more strongly correlated with many of the independent variables than the positions they took on the foreclosure or bankruptcy issue. Given that Table 3.4 revealed that members were much more likely to take an issue position on unemployment than the

other economic issue, it is no surprise that these variables have a stronger relationship on this issue. A strong and significant correlation occurs between the representative's party and the unemployment issue position while another strong and significant correlation exists between those members taking a pro-worker stance and districts with a higher percentage of voters voting for the Democratic presidential candidate in the previous election.

Interestingly, while members with less seniority were significantly more likely to take a pro-worker stance, those with more seniority were also significantly likely to take a more pro-market stance on foreclosure issues. Labor PACs appear to be only significantly related to members who take a pro-worker stance on unemployment issues while contributions by finance PACs appear to be correlated with members taking a more pro-business, pro-market, and pro-banking statement across all economic issues.

We next turn our attention to the correlations between the visibility of these issues on member's websites and other variables (Table 3.9). Of note is that the relationship between visibility and issue position on these economic issues is consistently strong and significant with the exception of representative's issue position on unemployment issue and their visibility on foreclosure and bankruptcy issues. However, in general it appears as though representatives, who are stating a position on one issue (particularly when that is the foreclosure or bankruptcy issue), are the ones stating an opinion on other issues and are more likely to do so with a higher degree of visibility. More often than not, those representatives who did not have an issue position on unemployment issues were unlikely to discuss the other economic issues. While in some cases they discussed other issues (economic or otherwise) and just left

unemployment out, other times it was the case that the representative did not have specific issue positions on his or her site at all. For example, Duncan Hunter (R-CA) has no section of his website devoted to his issue positions. He does have a ‘Legislation’ section that links to his floor speeches and sponsored and co-sponsored bills in THOMAS but nowhere does he explicitly state his stance on issues on his own website. The lack of position on his website illustrates how inaccessible his positions on such economic issues are, as we know Congressman Hunter likely has a stance but for a constituent to determine it, he or she may have to do extensive research.

[INSERT TABLE 3.9 HERE]

While none of the key factors appeared to have strong or significant correlations with the unemployment or bankruptcy issue, many of them did with the visibility of the foreclosure issue. Unlike with the other two issues, if the foreclosure issue was mentioned on the representative’s website it was much more likely discussed at-length rather than just mentioned, as three times as many websites featured an at-length discussion compared to just a mention (Table 3.7). Thus, representatives who have districts that show they are struggling on the basis of economic indicators are more visible in discussing the nature of the foreclosure crisis.

The characteristics of the representative appear to have a significant correlation with nearly every economic issue. Non-minority members of Congress were more likely those visible on the foreclosure issue, while male members were more visible on each of the economic issues. A fairly strong and significant relationship exists wherein Democrats are likely less visible than Republicans on these economic issues. Because the Democratic party maintained control of the House previously and leads the

administration in the 112th Congress, they may feel as though their party could be blamed for the recession and thus they may be less inclined to address these issues with visibility for fear that the onus to act to correct the economic circumstances rests with them.

However, districts with a higher share of voters casting ballots for the Democratic presidential candidate in the previous election were more likely to have representatives who were visible on these economic issues. Of note is that while finance PAC contributions appeared to correlate with economic issue positions across the board (Table 3.8), with respect to issue visibility, labor PAC contributions are more strongly and significantly correlated. Given that labor PACs likely advocate for the more pro-worker, pro-buyer, and pro-consumer positions, the fact that they are more visible across these economic issues is fitting with the correlations with respect to the Republican and Democratic Vote Previous Election variables.

In order to gain a greater understanding of the relationship between the independent variables and the two dependent variables, an ordered logit model was evaluated. Table 3.10 shows the ordered logit model wherein the dependent variable is the economic issue position the representative took on his or her website, excluding those representatives who did not take a position (that is, their website position coded as 0). While it was hypothesized that the economic characteristics of a constituency could be related to the issue position a representative took, the findings in this model indicate that may not be the case. While there was a correlation between many of the key constituency variables, the linear relationship that exists may not be predictive in the context of the other predictor variables. With respect to the unemployment issue,

neither of the two factors based on district economic conditions were significant, although personal financial insecurity did reach marginal significance on the bankruptcy issue.

Additionally, the electoral margin variable indicates that a larger margin of victory in the previous election to a marginally significant extent is related to an increased likelihood with which a representative will take a pro-business position on unemployment issues and yet a more pro-buyer position on the foreclosure issue. Members who won their previous election by a narrow margin may be those emphasizing the pro-worker position to try and gain support in the next election, but at the same time, they may not see the foreclosure issue as gaining enough momentum to show concern for the pro-buyer position.

[INSERT TABLE 3.10 HERE]

Representatives may be attempting to reach out to constituents using their websites; however, their constituents' economic circumstances may not be reflected in the member's personal position on economic issues, as indicated by the results in the ordered logit model analyses. Tables 3.11-3.13 indicate the odds ratios for these analyses by economic issue area. As these tables show, the unemployment rate is most likely to be related to a change in the key dependent variables, particularly on the personal financial insecurity and macro-economic stress variables in which they are associated with more than a 10% change. Overall, the relationship of these key factors to representative's position stance is fairly small across issues.

[INSERT TABLE 3.11 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 3.12 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 3.13 HERE]

Interestingly, while many of the variables in the model failed to reach significance, both the size of the black and Latino populations in the district was significantly related to the position the representative took on the foreclosure issue. An examination of the correlation of these minority populations with the foreclosure rate itself in the district reveals a significant relationship at $p < .05$ for the black population and $p < .001$ for the Latino population. The adjusted odds ratio for the percentage black population was significant ($AOR=1.089$, 95% CI : 1.025, 1.166) indicating that for each one percentage point increase in the black population the odds of providing a rating in a higher rating category is 1.089 higher, while the adjusted odds ratio for the percentage Latino population was significant ($AOR=1.030$, 95% CI : 1.001, 1.060) indicating that for each one percentage point increase in the Latino population, the odds of providing a rating in a higher rating category is 1.030 higher.

Given this high correlation, it may be the case that representatives are stricter in their position on the foreclosure issue given the relatively high rate of foreclosures present in their districts. It may also be the case that representatives may be oblivious to actual economic circumstances but more aware of statistics regarding the race and ethnicity of their constituents and draw conclusions about their economic preferences on the basis of such characteristics.

Another confounding factor is the representative's party, as the ordered logit reveals, has a very strong and significant relationship with the representative's position on all of these economic issues. Democratic party members are far more likely to adopt a pro-worker, pro-buyer, and pro-consumer position than are their Republican

counterparts. Adjusted odds ratios similarly indicate just how strongly related party is to a representative's position on a given economic issue on his or her website. For instance, on the unemployment issue, the adjusted odds ratio for party affiliation was significant ($AOR=126.371$, 95% CI : 29.414, 542.931) indicating that odds of being in a higher rating category is 126 times more likely for Democrats than for Republicans. Across each economic issue, the party variable has a very strong relationship to the issue position a representative expresses on his or her website.

Representatives appear to be concerned with their issue position on their website reflecting their party's platform rather than appealing to constituents. Perhaps because websites are available to the general public and may be accessed by individuals who are outside of a member's constituency, a representative may want his or her site to directly reflect the party's position, particularly if he or she seeks to win favor within the party. Pressure from party members may influence a representative's public statements, particularly those that are accessible to the general public, such as on a website.

Also of note is that both labor and finance PACs were significant for the bankruptcy issue but opposite to the direction one might expect, as labor PACs seemed to influence the representative to be more pro-banking and finance to be more pro-consumer. This finding could be a function of the small sample size available for the bankruptcy issue, as it was seldom mentioned on representative's website. Nevertheless, the substantive significance for all three issues, despite how frequently they were mentioned, is relatively high, as this model explains over 66% of the variance on unemployment and foreclosure issues and 85% on bankruptcy issues.

An ordered logit model was also constructed in order to examine the relationships between the independent variables and how visible information about these economic issues is on representative's websites. As shown in Table 3.14, the macro-economic stress factor is significant with respect to the foreclosure issues, indicating a negative relationship such that districts with a higher foreclosure and unemployment rate are likely to have representatives who are less visible in addressing these issues. The adjusted odds ratio for the macro-economic stress factor was significant ($AOR = 0.703$, $95\% CI = 0.542, 0.911$) indicating that a one unit increase in the score on the macro-economic factor is associated with a .703 decreased likelihood of providing a rating in a higher rating category. The personal financial insecurity factor again failed to reach significance showing that perhaps income and poverty rates in a district are less useful in predicting members' behavior, even when it comes to how they directly appeal to constituents.

[INSERT TABLE 3.14 HERE]

Table 3.14 shows that macro-economic stress factor is inversely related to the representative's visibility on foreclosure issues. Because the foreclosure rate within a district loads significantly on the macro-economic stress factor, this undermines the predicted relationship between districts with a higher foreclosure rate being significantly more likely to have representatives visibly advocating for pro-homeowner policies. The example of Congressman Joe Heck serves as a prime example of this expectation given the high rate of foreclosures in his district. Because the unemployment rate also loads significantly on the macro-economic stress factor, it

comes as no surprise that the unemployment rate in his district is 11.2%, well above the 9.9% average among districts in the 112th Congress.

Congressman Heck is an atypical Republican in his support of homeowner policies, as the findings in Table 3.9 indicates, the average Republican member is more likely to favor pro-market policies in comparison to pro-homeowner ones. The same can be said for bankruptcy issues, as Democrats are those members significantly more likely to indicate a position that is pro-consumer. These findings are not necessarily surprising, as the Democratic Party often presents itself as the party fighting for the middle-class and those without economic wherewithal.

The key factors variables' inability to widely predict in both this and previous model may be in part due to the issue selection; on unemployment issues, members are likely to pay the closest attention to the unemployment rate while on foreclosure issues they are paying attention to the foreclosure rate. While the poverty rate, along with median income are useful variables as indicators of the bankruptcy rate, they may be insufficient to properly understand it. Nevertheless, both factors utilize unemployment rate and neither appears significant on unemployment issues. The odds ratios (Tables 3.15-3.17) similarly indicate that the key factors may not influence how visible economic information is on a representative's site. If representatives are not espousing positions on the basis of constituent economic needs but instead on the basis of their own personal ideology, as was previously found, then they may be merely indicating a party stance and not going into detail on the issue.

[INSERT TABLE 3.15 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 3.16 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 3.17 HERE]

This ordered logit model shows that the foreclosure issue is addressed to a great extent by representatives than are the other economic issues, as many more of the variables are significant within this model and the R^2 indicates slightly greater predictive ability. For instance, within the foreclosure model, both the percent Latino and the percent with a college degree appear to be related to how visible information is on foreclosure issues such that districts with a larger Latino population and those with more college-educated individuals are likely to have representatives who have webpages with less visibility on foreclosure issues when addressing constituents. Odds ratio estimates further indicate that districts with higher Latino populations and more individuals who are college educated are more likely to be visible on these economic issues.

The party variable once again is a significant predictor but not with respect to the unemployment issue, as it may be that both parties are equally animated on this issue. As this issue often gains a large amount of national attention, members of both parties may want to be expressive on this issue. However, Democrats are less likely to visibly address foreclosure issues on their websites than are Republican representatives. These findings confirm what was previously discovered when examining the correlations.

In order to determine the relationships of the different sets of independent variables with the dependent variables, I conducted a multiple-*df* contrast utilizing the Wald χ^2 test for each respective set of independent variables. These tests examine the ability of each of the four conceptual sets of independent variables (key factors, district

characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics) to predict a dependent variable, within the context of the entire model. Thus, it is a simultaneous test of whether the respective set of estimates within a set equal zero. As shown in Table 3.18, member characteristics appear to be critical in explaining economic issue positions on unemployment issues, largely a function of the strength of the party variable at explaining representative position. Member characteristics also appear to be a strong predictor on bankruptcy issues, as do election characteristics, despite the fact that the percent of voters casting ballots for the Democratic candidate for president in the previous election did not appear significant within that model. Rather, contributions from PACs appear to be a strongly associated with representatives' positions on bankruptcy issues. No set of variables appears to have a great import for foreclosure issues although the key factors and member characteristics did approach significance.

[INSERT TABLE 3.18 HERE]

The contrast findings with respect to issue visibility juxtapose those findings on issue position, as in this contrast nearly all the variable sets are significant on the foreclosure issue. Key factors, district characteristics, and member characteristics all are predictive of the visibility with which representatives discuss foreclosure issues at the $p < .05$ level. A number of sets of characteristics also appear to predict bankruptcy issues; however, on unemployment issues the only significant predictor is election characteristics. Foreclosure and bankruptcy issues were much less prevalent on representative websites and therefore the large number of significant sets of characteristics may be a product of the less variation among these variables, as most websites were coded as the issue not being mentioned on the website.

[INSERT TABLE 3.19 HERE]

Conclusion

As stated in Chapter 2, the expectation of this research is that representatives will indicate concern for this country's (and/or their districts) economic well-being on the basis of their districts economic circumstances. Representatives will show this concern directly to their constituents via their websites that they use as a direct means of contact under the assumption that potential voters will visit it and ideally be more inclined to support them. Two different dependent variables were used to measure the way in which representative's addressed constituents on economic issues on their own website: (1) the representative's position on the economic issue, and (2) how visible information on this economic issue was on the representative's website.

On coding these variables, it became evident that representatives seldom mentioned such economic issues on their websites. As a result, analysis of those representatives not mentioning these issues was assessed to determine whether such members differentiated from those did mention these issues. In general, those members not mentioning the issues were more likely to be white, male Republicans.

With respect to the representative's position on economic issues, correlations indicated a linear relationship did in fact exist between several of the key independent variables such that the direct economic characteristics in the district correlated strongly and significantly with the representative's position on these issues. However, the ordered logit analysis found that more often than not, representatives' position on these issues was not predictive of their constituents' economic situation. On foreclosure issues, the economic factor did appear to be predicted by representative's position

showing that higher foreclosure and unemployment rates lead to a more pro-homeowner position. On the unemployment issue, higher electoral margins indicated a more pro-business stance on unemployment issues.

In general, the party variable was found to be perhaps the most consistently predictive of representative's position on these economic issues. Even if representatives may be concerned with appealing to constituents based on their economic needs, their greater desire was to maintain the party line and show how they fit well into the mold one might expect of them given their affiliation. Interestingly, the same finding held for visibility of economic issues, wherein party appeared to be among the strongest predictors of how visible an economic issue on a representative's website with Republicans significantly less likely to take a visible stance.

Thus, findings with respect to representative's behavior when addressing constituents directly indicates that perhaps party affiliation of the representative matters above all else. Representatives may choose to concern themselves with their overall public message on their website rather than just the message they are sending directly to their constituents. They know that other individuals, including high-ranking individuals within their party, can access their website and therefore want the information on it to be reflective of their party's position. The Republican Party is known for having disciplined members who stick to the party line, as the findings suggest.

While it was expected that in their public messages, above all else, representatives would concern themselves with appealing to constituents by indicating a position along the lines of constituents economic desires, findings reveal that in fact representatives are far more concerned with their party than anything else. Websites

were chosen as a vehicle to examine representatives message to their constituents, as it was presumed that constituents seeking further information about their representative (likely to be potentials), would access their website to gain such information. It may be the case that representatives view their websites as their own public message that is expressed beyond their constituents and therefore the dyadic relationship is less exhibited through the web venue.

Regardless, websites were examined because such a message is vocal and displayed to all constituents not particular groups, such as a speech at a specific district location. It may be that representatives are less likely to tow the party line in such a venue and they may be more inclined to exhibit a position knowing the issue preferences of such a small group. On their websites, representatives may be trying to appeal to all of their constituents (and perhaps even those outside their constituencies) which is why they may be less inclined to take a position or to take a very strong position.

Chapter 4: How Representatives Speak to Colleagues

On June 12, 2008, in the midst of the recession and a high unemployment rate, members of the House debated the Emergency Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 2008. Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), a liberal Democrat from New York who represents a district that is not very economically prosperous, introduced legislation that much of the Democratic Party supported, as they argued for the need to provide assistance to unemployed workers amidst the recession. Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA) defended the legislation, stating “It would immediately provide 13

weeks of extended benefits for workers in every state who have exhausted their benefits.” He went on to attack the Republican Party, stating, “Helping the American people should not be a partisan issue; but the Republicans and the president [George W. Bush] are trying to make it just that.”

The Republican response came from Congressman Wally Herger (R-CA) who indicated that his party also wanted to help the American people but that the Republicans did not see the Democratic solution as one that would be helpful to the American public. He indicated, “Instead of creating an untargeted expansion of unemployment benefits, we should be focusing on growing the economy . . . Today’s legislation will result in higher taxes on small businesses, resulting in slower job creation. This won’t help U.S. workers.”

Exchanges like this one between Congressman McDermott and Congressman Herger are all too common on the House floor, particularly with respect to economic issues. With so much partisan backlash on the floor of the House, to whom are members really speaking in their floor speeches? Do members represent their districts in floor debate or seek some other goal? Are members making targeted appeals to potential supporters? These are the questions that this chapter seeks to address.

Members of Congress have an interest in maintaining and/or gaining constituent support, but they are aware that constituents may not always pay attention to their every action or every word. If members think constituents are less likely to pay attention to some of their behaviors, will they alter their actions in such instances? While representatives attend events which they speak directly to a constituent audience, there are times in which representatives may not see their constituents as their direct

audience. For instance, when speaking on the floor of the House, representatives may presume that constituents are not paying attention and may instead direct their message toward their House colleagues, particularly toward members of the opposing party.

Literature Review and Theoretical Expectations

Constituents certainly can access C-SPAN and view their representatives' speeches, but representatives may believe that the vast majority of their constituents are unlikely to tune in to listen to their every word. Uninterested constituents are certainly unlikely to tune in to watch their representatives. Those constituents strongly opposed to the representative may in fact pay attention to a representative's every action, but even in doing so, the constituents' opinion is unlikely to change with respect to how he or she feels toward the representative. They may only accept information they feel is consistent with their previously held beliefs of the representative and his or her position on the issue (Zaller 1992).

The same may be true of the advocates of the representative, who, even if paying close attention to what their representative says, may also only accept information that is strongly consistent with how they view the representative. Advocates for the representative may also pay close attention to representative action, as conceptualized by Arnold's attentive citizenry (1990), but advocates are also unlikely to change their opinions about the representative, as they will continue to support him or her under almost any circumstance. These active citizens are the ones that the representative is most likely to be aware of; as Miler (2007) indicates, "Legislative

offices are more likely to see those constituents who contact them and who make financial contributions” (598).

However, the same cannot be said for potential voters who are skeptical of the representative and his or her actions. Such potentials may not have as strong a stance toward the representative prior to receiving each additional piece of information, such that when they receive new information, they are much more skeptical and less willing to accept it. In essence, potentials, unlike advocates and opposed constituents, may be unaware or unwilling to accept new information until they are spurred to action by a specific message from the representative. How, then, will representatives address potentials when speaking on the floor?

On the one hand, representatives could view their floor speeches as a means of reaching out to potentials. They could state information that they believe potentials will accept more eagerly because of how salient such information could be. For instance, they could choose to discuss unemployment issues if they know the issue is of great concern to citizens of their district under the supposition that such potential voters are more likely to readily accept information on unemployment issues if the information fits their beliefs.

On the other hand, representatives could view floor speeches as an obsolete method of winning over potentials. They may assume that the costs associated with winning over potential voters in giving a floor speech are too high if, in doing so, the result is that they hinder their position and standing within their own party. Representatives may view towing the party line as necessary in floor speeches, as their colleagues are their direct audience. Dodd (1977) asserts that Congress is a collection

of individuals in search of power, and he asserts that the committee system is a means of doing so. Other representatives have come to use floor speeches as a means to bolster their position within their party to gain power, particularly in light of the increasing partisan nature of the body (Binder 1997).

Maltzman and Sigelman (1996) conduct a study of floor speeches and determine that when members are given unconstrained time they use it to advance a policy or political position rather than to benefit their potential electoral circumstances. When examining one-minute speeches, their findings were similar though they suggested a greater use of shorter speeches by lesser-known members than by party leaders. The research here utilizes all floor speeches, whether unconstrained or limited in time, to determine whether members are in fact merely seeking to advance themselves within the institution or to reach out to constituents.

Members may act under the assumption that potentials are unlikely to have the time to attend to all of their floor speeches. They may be aware that some potentials may watch but may presume that the percentage of overall potential voters is small, and unlikely to be won over just by a single floor speech. Therefore, a member may view floor speeches as more beneficial to their career to speak directly to their colleagues and gain status within their party or within the chamber.

Congressional floor speeches were examined to analyze how individual representatives speak on economic issues. The way in which representatives speak on unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues when addressing the chamber signifies how the member may be acting when constituents are less likely to pay attention to their representative's behavior. Thus, this research codes the way each

representative speaks on these economic issues in an attempt to understand representative action at different levels of visibility.

Floor speeches are not a frequently used measure of legislative activity except as a count variable (coded as the total number of speeches) or as a count in conjunction with other legislative variables as a measure of member activity (e.g., Krutz 2005; Moore and Thomas 1991). In an assessment of Senate floor speeches, Godbout and Yu (2009) state, “Unlike in the roll call analyses, we actually know very little about the content of speeches simply because speech as data – as opposed to legislative voting – contains too much information. The sheer volume of text produced on the floor of Congress renders any attempt to organize and analyze this data extremely difficult” (188).

Literature that utilizes floor speeches as an independent variable often produces mixed findings with respect to whether floor speeches hurt or help the legislative success of a bill (Moore and Thomas 1991). Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that members who speak on the floor at a moderate rate gain the most in terms of legislative reward. Those representatives who seldom speak and those representatives who speak too often are not met with the same level of success.

Some scholars have examined floor speeches and how they relate to constituent support. Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2003) use floor speaking as a variable in their analysis of electoral advantage but choose to take the log of this count variable, as they indicate that there are a large number of floor speeches given by House leadership. They indicate that “members can garner media coverage and constituency recognition through this activity” (262). However, they choose to look at floor speeches as a

symbolic indicator and therefore do not examine actual member discourse on the issue. Nonetheless, their findings indicate that those members giving a larger number of floor speeches had less constituent support in the following election. Other studies have examined the influence of electoral margins on floor speeches and found mixed results; Morris (2001) found a relationship between these variables whereas Maltzman and Sigelman (1996) concluded that no such relationship exists.

Scholars more frequently analyze the policy content of speeches offered in committee hearings, utilizing the work of work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Due to the vast nature of their Hearings Data Set within their Policy Agendas Data Project, scholars have been able to utilize data on hearings in their examinations of Congress (e.g., Leech et al. 2005). For instance, the work of Whitford and Yates (2003) utilizes this dataset in examining the U.S. Attorney's agenda for drug policy. While their primary variable of interest deals with presidential rhetoric, they employ the Hearings Data Set to control for congressional attentiveness toward the issue, but find that the president is the one directly responsible for influencing bureaucratic attention.

Dependent Variables

In order to code the statements representatives make in floor speeches, I examined the Congressional Record and coded each representative's statements according to the primary and secondary frame he or she used when speaking on the matter. Issue framing is a useful research technique and while it is often used for studying how the media frames an issue for public consumption (e.g., Iyengar 1990), other scholars have used it as a means for understanding public policy. For instance,

Lau and Schlesinger (2005) examined how cognitive frames of a given policy influence public support for that policy. Lau and Schlesinger interviewed members of the general public to find that policy metaphors, meaning constructed ideas individuals held about institutions based on an ideal type, constrained their beliefs regardless of their level of sophistication.

Jacoby (2000) discusses how issue framing can be more broadly or narrowly defined by different elites who are attempting to control the political discourse on the issue of government spending. Not only is he able to clearly indicate the differing frames that Republicans and Democrats champion on the issue (indicating Republicans make use of a more general frame), but he also shows how these frames influence citizen attitudes: “Differing frames produce widespread *changes* in the ways that people respond to a single issue, with systematically lower support for government spending in the general presentation and greater support in the specific frame” (763). In short, issue framing is of critical importance to convey a clear message. Even if the constituency is unaware of this message, the representative is still utilizing a frame to indicate his or her beliefs concerning the matter and supporting one stance over another.

Unlike research that examines the effects of framing (e.g., Nelson and Oxley 1999), I seek to understand which representatives are utilizing what specific frames and to examine which factors influence this choice. In other words, rather than investigating the influence of issue frames, my research attempts to examine what influences the choice of frames a representative uses. Specifically, are district characteristics influencing how a given representative speaks on the issue at hand? In order to create methodologically rigorous frames, it was first necessary to examine the

framing of these issues when they are not being addressed by members of Congress. Therefore, an examination of interest groups' position papers, adopted policy stances, and publications helped provide information to determine what frames should be utilized when assessing representative's private statements.

The following steps were taken to understand and code the way in which representatives speak on the floor on unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues:

- (1) Create a broad list of economic interest groups.
- (2) Classify these interest groups according to their issue (Appendix: Interest Group Classification).
- (3) Within each category, select two interest groups.
- (4) Examine these interest groups websites, position papers, adopted policy statements, and publications.
- (5) Identify frames on the basis of the stance of interest groups toward the issue.
- (6) Examine floor speeches and code each representative according to his or her primary frame and secondary frame.

As shown in the Appendix: Economic Interest Groups, a large number of interest groups were selected on the basis of information available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's list of "Public Interest Groups", from Project VoteSmart, and the National Journal's *Almanac of American Politics*. Thus, these interest groups are widely regarded as important in their respective area of expertise and should represent a broad range of opinions on a given issue. From this large list, the websites of each of these interest groups was inspected to determine not only the

issue(s) that are of importance to the given interest group, but also where the interest group stands on the issue(s).

These interest groups were classified regarding where they stand on the issue as shown in Appendix: Interest Group Classification. Such classifications were determined on the basis of the information on the interest groups mission statement, areas of interest, and published works. On the basis of these classifications, two interest groups were selected from each category and every attempt was made to ensure that one of these groups was more research-oriented while the other focused largely on advocacy. Thus, the following interest groups were selected for each issue area:

- Unemployment
 - *Pro-Worker*: Center for Budget and Policy Priorities; AFL-CIO
 - *Neutral*: Brookings Institution; Committee for Economic Development
 - *Pro-Business*: Heritage Foundation; National Federation of Independent Businesses
- Foreclosures
 - *Pro-Buyer*: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies; National Housing and Rehabilitation Association
 - *Neutral*: Brookings Institution; National Association of Mortgage Professionals
 - *Pro-Market*: Cato Institute; Fannie Mae
- Bankruptcy
 - *Pro-Consumer*: Economic Policy Institute; U.S. PIRG

- *Neutral*: Brookings Institution; Concord Coalition
- *Pro-Banking*: Heritage Foundation; Americans for Tax Reform

Thus, selection of these interest groups was based on: whether the group was advocacy or research-focused, the size of the group, the reputation of the group, as well as the group's influence.

Information on these interest groups' websites was thoroughly examined and key words and phrases were identified to help in the designation of frames. This purposive sampling of interest groups is designed for interpretive validity such that the frames established by this examination of interest groups will be illustrative of the opinions on the issue. Once these frames were established, representatives' floor speeches were coded on the basis of the primary and secondary frame they are using when discussing these economic policy issues.

Thus, the frames that were established are a product of the information each of the six selected interest groups (per issue area) present on their websites. Because these interest groups were selected on the basis of their stances on the issue, the groups represent a broad range of opinions on the issue. Therefore, the frames articulated represent a wide range of positions on the issue on the basis of the differing opinions these interest groups hold. Selecting interest groups at random would not present the same variety of opinions that are provided using such a purposive sampling technique. In using this purposive sampling technique, the frames that are used to examine floor speeches should represent a wide array of representative's possible opinions. The frames for each of the economic issue areas are the following:

Unemployment Frames

- *Responsibility Frame*: Unemployment is the result of a weak welfare state. Assistance for those who are unemployed is our societal obligation. The government should aid those in need.
- *Individuality Frame*: Our economy was designed based on the concept of a free market; therefore, unemployment is an individual problem. Laziness and lack of ambition contribute to an individual's unemployed status. It is not the responsibility of the government to help those without jobs.
- *Corporate Self-Interest Frame*: Corporations have become too greedy, resulting in large layoffs and an increasing number of unemployed individuals. If corporations were less concerned with their bottom line, unemployment would not be as large of an issue in our country.
- *Market Frame*: The recent recession hurt our entire economy and made a large dent in our unemployment rate. Capitalism was designed to self-correct when the economy is poor. When the market improves, so will the unemployment rate.
- *Small Government Frame*: The government is overstepping its bounds by reaching over into the private sector and attempting to control corporations. Corporations have had to let employees go as a result of government-enforced policies. If the government would leave corporations to their own devices, the unemployment rate would not be as high as it is.

Foreclosure Frames

- *Responsibility Frame*: The increase in foreclosed homes is the result of the government's inability to design and execute policy to aid homeowners. It is

therefore the government's responsibility to assist those who have had their homes foreclosed.

- *Individuality Frame:* Our economy was designed based on the free market; therefore, home foreclosure is an individual problem. Mismanagement of finances results in home foreclosure. It is not the responsibility of the government to help individuals those without jobs maintain ownership of their homes.
- *Corporate Self-Interest Frame:* The mortgage industry has become too greedy, resulting in a large number of foreclosures. If the mortgage industry was less concerned with their bottom line, the foreclosure rate would not be nearly as high as it is.
- *Market Frame:* The recent recession hurt our entire economy and made a large contribution to our unemployment rate. Capitalism was designed to self-correct when the economy is poor. When the market improves, so will the unemployment rate.
- *Small Government Frame:* The government is overstepping its bounds by reaching over into the private sector and attempting to control the mortgage industry. The mortgage industry feels pressure from the government, which results in a large number of foreclosed homes. The government should not attempt to control the mortgage industry.

Bankruptcy Frames

- *Responsibility Frame:* Bankruptcy is the result of poor government regulations that allow for individuals to lose their savings. Those who are bankrupt need governmental assistance to get back on their feet.

- *Individuality Frame*: Bankruptcy is an individual problem and society should not be responsible for helping those who are unable to pay their bills. Individuals should be more conscientious of their money.
- *Corporate Self-Interest Frame*: Banks have become too greedy and are irresponsible in looking after individual's money, resulting in bankruptcy. If banks were less concerned with their bottom line and more concerned with their clients, there would be fewer individuals going bankrupt.
- *Market Frame*: The recent recession hurt our entire economy and resulted in a large number of individuals going bankrupt. Capitalism was designed to self-correct when the economy is poor. When the market improves, so will the bankruptcy rate.
- *Small Government Frame*: The government is overstepping its bounds by attempting to regulate the banking sector. Banks feel pressure from the government, which results in a large number of bankruptcies. The government should not attempt to control the actions of banks.

Because each issue is rooted in economic circumstances, the resulting frames are fairly consistent from one issue to the next. An example of the market frame as it pertains to foreclosure issues can be found in a floor speech given by Congresswoman Judy Biggert (R-IL) on March 16, 2011 in which she stated,

I have been listening to all of this, and I think that everybody knows, we all want to get the housing market back on track. We all want to be able to help those that are in trouble. But many of my colleagues on the other side have said that if you end these programs there will be nothing, and that's just not true. Of the 4.1 million mortgage modifications that were completed, 3.5 million were done by the private sector with no government program and not a dime from the taxpayers. So there is a market out there.

In advocating for the private sector over government intervention, the Congresswoman is clearly articulating the market frame more so than any other.

An example of the responsibility frame on the unemployment issue can be found in a speech given by Congressman John Tierney (D-MA) on March 1, 2007 in which he states, “It is the policy of the United States to protect the exercise of workers of full freedom of association. It is the policy of the United States to protect their self-organizing and their ability to designate representatives of their own choosing.” Congressman Tierney is indicating that it is a governmental responsibility to protect workers.

The corporate self-interest frame on the bankruptcy issue can be seen in a speech given by Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) who states, “Make no mistake, Mr. Speaker, this bill is a big-time corporate payoff that was drafted with one overriding goal in mind, that is, profits, profits, profits.” The Congresswoman makes it clear that she believes corporations are solely concerned with their bottom-line, indicating that the proposed legislation “puts corporate greed over fairness for ordinary folks.”

Rather than include all members of Congress in the data collection process, only those members who serve (or previously served) on the Financial Services and Education and Labor committees were included. These committees were selected because members on these committees are most likely to have previously heard the relevant legislation or legislation similar in nature in their committee hearings. Committee members are more likely to be granted the opportunity to make floor speeches because debate time is limited and distributed selectively by party leaders. Weingast and Marshall (1988) suggest that members of these committees may be preference outliers; thus, if any representative is likely to take a stance on these issues it would likely be these members.

Table 4.1 indicates the prevalence of each of these frames by economic issue area over the four Congresses studied. The vast majority of representatives utilized the responsibility or individuality frame on unemployment across all of the Congresses. Members who did not articulate a frame usually did not discuss the given economic issue within the period under study. Interestingly, there was a rise in the usage of the market frame as a primary unemployment frame in the 112th Congress. While the corporate self-interest frame grew in usage in the 110th and 111th Congresses, it showed a decline in the 112th, as did the small government frame. Given that the economy was starting to recover and the unemployment rate was falling during the 112th Congress, this pattern is not surprising. As previously shown in Table 1.1, the unemployment rate rose consistently from 2005 until 2010 before dipping in 2011.

[INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE]

Notably, the number of representatives articulating no frame whatsoever declined from 12+% in the 109th Congress to no members at all in the 112th. Clearly over this time the unemployment issue gained a great deal of attention such that not only was it frequently addressed on the floor but members took notice and felt it necessary to take a stance on the issue. The small size of the small government frame as a primary unemployment frame (and, to a lesser extent, as a secondary frame) indicates that even when members were taking a stance on this issue, they were not indicating a need for unemployment to be addressed in some way through government policy.

It is worth noting how predominant taking a stance on these issues is on the floor, as the previous findings (which do utilize a different sample) suggested that many

representatives were unlikely to articulate a stance on these issues on their personal websites. Thus, while representatives may be unwilling to clearly define their position in a place and manner constituents are likely to access it, they are more than willing to take a stance when it comes to speaking on the floor of the House where their colleagues are likely to take note of their speeches (but their constituents may be less aware).

Similar to the unemployment frames, the primary frames articulated on the foreclosure issue also appear to be the responsibility and individuality frames, both of which showed a general increase in usage over time. The market frame also indicated an increase in usage as the primary frame, as the number of members not articulating a position declined drastically from roughly 75% in the 109th Congress to 6% in the 112th, a decrease of 92% over just four Congresses. While the frequently used secondary frames are similar to those utilized with the unemployment issue, it is the case that with the foreclosure issue there is a slightly greater usage of the small government frame.

The bankruptcy issue appears similar to the unemployment and foreclosure issues when examining the change in members' willingness to employ a frame in their discussion of the issue. To a greater extent than is apparent with the other economic issues, the responsibility and individuality frames are employed as primary frames, as by the 112th Congress, a full 71% of members are utilizing one of these two frames. Similarly, the corporate self-interest and market frames also dominate as secondary frames in discussion of bankruptcy issues.

Therefore, regardless of which economic issue representatives are discussing, they are most likely to employ a frame that either emphasizes the societal obligation of

helping those individuals who are less fortunate or one that stresses that our economy is based on a free market system. In conjunction with these frames, they are additionally likely to articulate either that capitalistic greed has resulted in a weak economy or that capitalism has a self-correcting mechanism. The small government frame, which articulates no government involvement, was utilized the least of all frames.

In order to delve deeper into understanding who is utilizing which frames, Table 4.2 breaks down the primary and secondary frames of each economic issue based on political party. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong divide over which party utilizes which frame. When discussing unemployment, Democrats overwhelmingly used the responsibility frame as their primary frame and the corporate self-interest as their secondary frame. Republicans weren't nearly as consistent in their use of one frame, though more than half of them did utilize the individuality frame as their primary frame when discussing foreclosure issues and almost half of them used the market frame as their secondary frame. The strong divide between Republicans and Democrats is present in many representatives speeches, as they often indicate their concern for actions made by the opposing party. For instance, on July 17, 2011, Paul Ryan (R-WI) stated,

Mr. Speaker, it has been 811 days since they bothered trying to pass a budget. Congress has gone for 2 years without a budget. What did we do when we assumed the majority? We passed a budget. We wrote a budget. We did it in daylight, not in the backroom. We drafted it. We brought it through the committee. We had amendments. We brought it to the floor. We debated it and we passed it. That is what we've done.

This example is illustrative of the partisan rhetoric representatives' use on the floor, as Congressman Ryan is contrasting the effectiveness of the Republican party with his perceived effectiveness of the Democratic party.

[INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE]

Results for the foreclosure issue on the basis of party appear to be somewhat different than do the results for unemployment. Over 40% of Democrats did not utilize a primary frame or secondary frame while slightly less than 40% of Republicans did not do so either. As with the unemployment issue, Democrats again utilized the responsibility and corporate self-interest frames overwhelmingly as their primary and secondary frames, respectively. Nearly 40% of Democrats indicated a position in line with the responsibility frame while roughly 15% employed the corporate self-interest frame. On the other hand, Republicans were more likely to employ the individuality and market frames. For instance, 34% of Republicans addressed the chamber on foreclosure issues using the individuality frame but nearly 23% did so using the market frame.

We next turn our attention to the results for the bankruptcy issue which, in many ways, is similar to the results for foreclosure and unemployment issues; however, on the bankruptcy issue not only is there a clear frame used as primary and secondary for the Democrats (responsibility and corporate self-interest), but there also is for the Republicans. While on the unemployment and foreclosure issues, the Republicans generally used the individuality frame as their primary frame, they also frequently used the market frame, but such is less the case with the bankruptcy issue, in which the

individuality frame is used at a higher rate. Again, the market frame predominated as their secondary frame.

The classification of the frames categorizes them into separate categories which have no intrinsic order or ranking, thus necessitating multinomial logistic regression which is preferred to ordinal logistic regression (Campbell and Donner 1989). Wang (2005) indicates that the usage of multinomial logistic regression, stating “Unlike a binary logistic model, in which a dependent variable has only a binary choice (e.g., presence/absence of a characteristic), the dependent variable in a multinomial logistic regression model can have more than two choices that are coded categorically” (664). Thus, in order to analyze these frames as dependent variables, multinomial logistic regression was employed due to the fact that the dependent variable was polytomous. Multinomial logistic regression allows for the prediction of a polytomous dependent variable, as found in the frames variables, using both continuous and categorical predictor variables (Bull and Donner 1987).

Given the complexity of the statistical model, which includes a relatively large number of predictor variables, a cumulative link function was chosen for estimation and tests of significance. Such a link function estimated membership in a category as a function of the cumulative likelihoods of a given category of the outcome relative to the cumulative likelihood of the remaining categories. As such, it assumes a “constant” degree or amount of change moving from category to category. The generalized multinomial logit model and its results are considered later in this chapter.

The models utilize the independent variables discussed in Chapter 2, including the variables created from the factor analysis, and how they are related to the primary

and secondary issue frame for each of the three issue areas (a total of six dependent variables). Once again, the predictor variables of interest include key district characteristics (both factor scores for economic circumstances and the electoral margin), variables indicating characteristics of the demographic makeup of the district, characteristics of the representative, and characteristics of the previous election.

Discussion of Findings

The findings from the multinomial logistic regression for both the primary and secondary frames appear in Table 4.3. These findings indicate that none of the key factors managed to reach significance though several did reach marginal significance. Representative's floor speeches are not related to the economic concerns of their constituents, as both the personal financial insecurity and macro-economic stress factors did not reach significance at the $p < .05$ level. The personal financial insecurity factor did reach marginal significance ($p < .10$) on the unemployment and foreclosure primary frames, indicating there may be a slight relationship between constituents personal economic well-being and their representatives most prominent articulation of these economic issues. The margin by which the representative defeated his or her challenger in the previous election is not related to how he or she speaks on the floor.

[INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE]

Odds ratio estimates (Tables 4.4-4.9) indicate that the personal financial insecurity factor increases to the greatest extent of nearly every variable when comparing across frames articulated. Odds ratios indicate the likelihood of each of

these predictor variables causing a change in the frame utilized by representatives. For instance, on the foreclosure issue, movement of the primary frame utilized by a representative causes a change of 1.363 on the personal financial insecurity factor (but only 1.003 on the macro-economic stress factor).

[INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 4.6 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 4.7 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 4.8 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 4.9 HERE]

Because representatives may not view floor speeches as a public forum, they are unlikely to view their audience as their constituents but instead as their fellow members of Congress. Therefore, when addressing the chamber, the concerns their constituents face are much less likely to factor into what they say than when they are addressing their constituents directly and appealing to them for electoral support.

The 112th Congress appears to be significantly different than the 109th Congress almost across the board with respect to the frames representatives are articulating, and in many cases the 112th Congress is different than the 110th Congress. This difference could largely be a result of the recession, as representatives were less likely to discuss these issues in the 109th and 110th Congresses than in the 112th, when the recession had already taken its toll and the economy was attempting to recover. Such an assertion is supported by the fact that the frames for unemployment are not as significant as those

for foreclosures and bankruptcy. Unemployment is often discussed even when the economy is not doing poorly; therefore, even in the earlier Congresses, members were more likely to take a stance on this issue within the confines of one of the frames than they were on bankruptcy and foreclosure issues.

For the most part, the district and election characteristics fail to reach significance, with a few exceptions in the secondary frames of election characteristics. However, the same is not true for the member characteristics in which the party variable appears to significantly predict all the primary frames and the bankruptcy secondary frame. While those representatives who did not speak on the issue (and were therefore coded accordingly) were fairly evenly split across both parties, the five primary frames of interest were each very much so divided along party lines, as shown in Table 4.2 above. With respect to the frames on each of the economic issues, the individuality and market frames were almost entirely the product of Republican representatives while the responsibility and corporate self-interest frames were primarily, if not entirely, utilized by Democrats. The small government frame was employed by more Republicans than Democrats but was much less partisan than the other frames. As shown in Tables 4.3, party was a strong predictor ($p < .001$ and $p < .05$) when it came to four of the six dependent variables.

One of the reasons for creating the frames on the basis of interest and research group stances was to attempt to remove the partisan element, such that the frames could hypothetically be employed by members of both parties. However, recent research suggests that the party itself is more far-reaching than is generally viewed and thus encompasses such groups (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009). While the use of frames did

appear to be highly partisan, more than one frame for each of the two major parties was utilized, making the use of frames more detailed than would have been examining the extent to which the representative took a traditional party stance on the issues, which would have been merely dichotomous. Nonetheless, when speaking on the floor it is quite clear that one of the primary drivers of the stance the representative takes is the party to which he or she belongs.

To determine whether the findings would differ over the four Congresses examined, Appendix: Speeches by Congress shows similar analyses broken down by Congress. Interestingly, the only variable found to be significant was the party variable in the 112th Congress, as all other variables in each of the Congresses failed to reach significance or even marginal significance. Findings from this analysis revealed little difference when examining frames articulated divided by Congress likely because a great deal of variability was removed from the analysis.

I again conducted a multiple-*df* contrast utilizing the Wald χ^2 test for each respective set of independent variables. Again, these tests examine the ability of each of the four conceptual sets of independent variables (key factors, district characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics) to predict a dependent variable, within the context of the entire model. Thus, it is a simultaneous test of whether the respective set of estimates within a set equal zero. Unsurprisingly, the member characteristics variable set was highly significant nearly across the board, likely as a result of the strong relationship between the party variable and the outcome variables. Interestingly, for both primary and secondary frames, this variable set was not significant for foreclosure issues.

[INSERT TABLE 4.10 HERE]

One possible explanation is that the Congress in which the representative was addressing foreclosure issues appears highly significant in Table 4.3, which could mean that member characteristics as a whole are less predictive on the foreclosure issues. Election characteristics variables did reach marginal significance on unemployment primary frames and foreclosure secondary frames, likely due to the labor PAC contributions variable.

As noted previously, the multinomial regression used to fit the model utilized the cumulative logit function, which was chosen for its simplicity in the face of a complex statistical model. Results of fitting the same model with the assumption of generalized logits can be seen in Appendix: Generalized Odds Ratio Estimates for Floor Speeches. As seen in this Appendix, the number of parameters estimated in the generalized logit model has increased fivefold over the number of parameters found in the cumulative logit function model, and a number of the estimates correspondingly appear unstable. Thus, although the generalized logit model may be the preferred model in the abstract, it is too complex to fit the observed data without some degree of uncertainty about the stability of the solutions. However, a comparison of findings reported in Tables 4.4-4-9 to those findings reported in the Appendix do show considerable consistency.

Conclusion

It was previously hypothesized that district economic characteristics variables and the election margin variable would not influence representative's floor speeches.

This finding is generally confirmed across all economic issue areas studied. The actual economic circumstances of the district appear to have little relationship to what members are saying on the floor, as shown by the inability of the macro-economic stress and personal financial insecurity factors to reach significance. Additionally, the representative's previous electoral margin of victory did not appear to impact the content through which he or she addresses colleagues on the floor.

Floor debate clearly features party debate. Rather, than speaking on behalf of their constituents, representatives appeared to be speaking to their colleagues. Rhetoric and the framing of issues on the floor appear to reinforce party positions and create the notion that the other party was at fault for their actions. As the results from the statistical analyses show, the framing of these economic issues changed to some extent over time, indicating that as the recession became more widespread, representative's party positions intensified when addressing the chamber.

Salience of these economic issues may lead representatives to be more aware of the content of their floor speeches, as parts of their statements could be featured on nightly news programs; however, representatives appear to remain unconcerned or unconvinced of this reality. Representatives did discuss these issues more as time went on, likely because they became increasingly more salient from the 109th to the 112th Congress and discussion of them became unavoidable.

While representatives often took a party-line stance on their websites, in floor speeches the direct audience may be viewed as other members of the House, given that they are the individuals present on the floor of the House. Thus, the expectation is that representatives will tailor their message to reflect their own party position, as findings

confirm. As members of their party, including more senior members and leadership, may be the direct audience of these floor speeches, representatives may see such speeches as their opportunity to gain standing within the party. They may see the avenue to gaining standing within their party as supporting a position that the party will view positively, particularly in light of the fact that floor speeches are largely party-controlled. In general, party leaders hold sway when it comes to deciding who within their party can address specific issues.

By virtually ignoring constituent needs, representatives showed little to no concern for potential constituents, as they did not attempt to reach out to voters to gain their support. Their rhetoric was very much that of a party-line stance, often aggressively so, rather than one meant to appeal to voters. However, it could be said that such messages are meant to maintain the support of advocate.

Utilizing frames was an attempt to remove the partisan element from the discussion of these economic issues, but findings confirmed that, in general, these frames were divided along party lines. Rather than viewing their time on the floor as an opportunity to openly debate a topic, my analysis of representative speeches revealed that they saw such floor time as an opportunity to attack the opposing party above all else.

Chapter 5: How a Representative Acts Legislatively

John Conyers' (D-MI) district has one of the highest unemployment rates in the country. Congressman Conyers has been in office since 1965; from 1965-1993 he represented Michigan's 1st district, then from 1993, following redistricting as a result of Michigan losing a congressional district, until the present, he has represented the 14th district. His current district, Michigan's 14th district, includes the majority of Detroit, which was hit exceptionally hard by the recession. In each of the 111th and 112th Congress, Congressman Conyers' district had the second-highest unemployment rate in the country; second only to Michigan's 13th district, which also includes areas of Detroit.

[INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE]

Congressman Conyers is one of the most legislatively active members of the House on economic issues. As shown in Table 5.1, the Congressman sponsors and co-sponsors legislation on unemployment issues much more so than the average member, and is often one of the leading members in terms of his legislative productivity in such areas. While not shown in this table, Conyers sponsors and co-sponsors legislation with similar frequency compared to his colleagues on both foreclosure and bankruptcy issues. The Congressman frequently sponsors and co-sponsors more pro-worker legislation than he does neutral legislation, but never is active in sponsoring or co-sponsoring pro-business legislation. Therefore, it can be said that Congressman Conyers may be acting on the basis of his constituent's economic desires when he sponsors and co-sponsors legislation. This chapter will examine how all members act

legislatively, with respect to sponsorship and co-sponsorship of economic legislation, in regards to their district's economic circumstances.

Members of Congress represent their districts in the House of Representatives by creating or altering policy through the specific activities of introducing, debating, and voting on legislation. The sponsorship and co-sponsorship of legislation is particularly important to understanding how representatives appeal to their constituents. Unlike voting, bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship are much stronger indicators of support. In contrast with yes-no votes taken on the floor, co-sponsorship of legislation indicates specific policy preferences and solutions put forth by a given member. Representatives not only choose wisely when attaching their name to legislation but they are also able to dictate what is within the legislation rather than merely state a preference on the passage of said legislation.

While legislative sponsorship and co-sponsorship may be seen as similar in many ways, this chapter illuminates the different characteristics at play that may influence these actions; those factors that influence legislative sponsorship are not the same as those that influence co-sponsorship. Additionally, while the characteristics of the district may have previously had little to no influence on representative action, such is not the case when we turn our attention to legislative activity. Nonetheless, member characteristics, including the party variable remain the strongest predictor, as has been consistently proven to influence member activity.

Literature Review and Theoretical Expectations

Much of the literature that examines the relationship between constituent opinion and representative action employs the use of roll call votes to examine how well a member's voting corresponds with public opinion at-large. In many ways, sponsorship and co-sponsorship are similar variables to roll call votes, as representatives are indicating legislative support for public record through their actions (Talbert and Potoski 2002); however, recent scholarship has criticized the way in which scholars heavily utilize roll call votes as symbolic of representative action (Clinton 2007).

With respect to roll call votes, members generally have to choose to take a position on the issue, whereas bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship affords members the ability to have a great deal of discretion in attaching their names to a bill (Highton and Rocca 2005). Members have the ability to single-handedly bring to the table their own initiative or to join with other members in signifying not only their stance on an issue, but the way that issue should be shaped and altered through legislation. Rocco and Gordon (2009) indicate the need to examine legislative activity outside roll call votes, stating, "Although non-roll call position taking is difficult to analyze systematically, shifting from an exclusive roll call focus is important because a large amount of MC position taking does not occur through roll call votes" (388).

Swers (2005) refers to co-sponsoring legislation as 'loud voting' because members are indicating their support for a bill above and beyond casting a yes or no vote. When members see legislation that is to their liking, they merely need to ask the sponsor of the legislation if they can add their name as a co-sponsor. In contrast, with roll call voting members are forced to take a stance one way or another when in fact

their position on the issue may be somewhere in the middle. Unlike with voting, actually attaching one's name in a sponsorship or co-sponsorship capacity has both political and policy implications (Rocco and Gordon 2009). Members may choose to co-sponsor legislation because it can affect the consideration the bill receives from other members of the House (Wilson and Young 1997). Thus, members who choose to attach their name to a bill are likely to do so only when they see a positive long-term benefit, not necessarily with respect to policy but perhaps with the legislation's success.

While co-sponsorship certainly is a strong indicator of representative investment and concern about a particular issue, sponsorship is an even greater signaling mechanism. Bill sponsors have the greatest investment in the bill, as they face a significant cost in not only researching and writing the legislation, but also in taking a political stance on the issue (Schiller 1995). Bill sponsorship is regarded as a powerful tool at a representative's disposal: "While no one familiar with the congressional scene would argue that the passage of one's own legislation is the only manifestation of power in Congress, it surely is one, if not the most important measure" (Frantzich 1979, 411).

Findings with respect to the signaling influence of sponsorship and co-sponsorship vary widely. Some work on co-sponsorship indicates that co-sponsoring a bill is in fact a signal to a representative's constituency (Campbell 1982). Other studies of sponsorship and co-sponsorship have found that these legislative actions are more influential within the House as signaling devices to other members (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Schiller 1995); thus, they are not a means to gain electoral advantage (Canon 1999; Koger 2003). Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) state, "it appears that

legislators do not use bill co-sponsorship as a mechanism for position taking aimed predominately at external audiences” (563).

In a study of representative legislative action on abortion policy, Highton and Rocca (2005) found that constituency characteristics strongly influenced representative action. For example, their findings suggest that Catholic members of Congress are less likely to take a position on the issue when their constituency is strongly pro-choice. Additionally, they find that members representing districts with a more extreme opinion on an issue are more likely to be active on that issue than those members representing districts with a more moderate opinion.

The electoral margin variable is presumed to influence bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship. A number of scholars have found that there is no significant relationship between these variables (Campbell 1982; Wilson and Young 1997). Koger (2003) found that this relationship only existed as it pertained to insecure first-term members, who co-sponsored more legislation than secure first-term members. Nonetheless, I will proceed in examining the dependent variables of sponsorship and co-sponsorship of economic legislation to determine how the key factors relating to the district’s economic circumstances and chances of re-election influence such action.

Dependent Variables

In order to better understand how members are acting legislatively with respect to the economic concerns of their constituents, I examine all bills in each of the economic issue areas (unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy). Table 5.2

indicates the total number of bills introduced and the number that received floor votes per congressional session.

[INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE]

This table clearly indicates that over the course of the four congresses examined, there was a large increase in the number of bills introduced within each of the issue areas under examination. In comparing the full number of bills introduced from the 109th to the 111th Congress, there was a 44.9% increase on unemployment issues, a 76.5% increase on foreclosure issues and a 4.2% increase on bankruptcy issues. Data was only collected for the first session of the 112th Congress but it does appear as though the total number of bills remains high, though perhaps the full Congress would not be as high as the 111th. An increase in floor votes also appears but only on the unemployment and foreclosure issues. Perhaps because the focus of the recession was on wasteful spending, lawmakers shifted their attention toward legislation to address such economic issues.

Information pertaining to bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship is publicly available through Congress' THOMAS search engine. A search in THOMAS for unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy bills revealed all legislation that in some way pertained to or mentioned these issues. Each bill was coded according to how it would presumably affect populations at risk of unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcies; the number of bills the representative sponsored and co-sponsored within each of those categories was tallied and served as the observation for the variable. The content of each bill pertaining to the specified economic issues was examined to determine what impact the proposed legislation would have on those facing economic

hardships, whether that impact be to assist such citizens, whether it would have a negligible effect on them, or whether the potential existed that it could hinder their economic situation further.

For instance, in the 110th Congress Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) introduced a piece of legislation entitled the Security and Financial Empowerment Act. This piece of legislation was designed to create emergency leave and unemployment compensation for employees, specifically workers who had experienced domestic violence. This piece of legislation was coded as positive impact because it is designed to assist workers and thus would positively affect them. On the other hand, in the 111th Congress, Judy Biggert (R-IL) introduced the Fairness in Housing Recovery Act of 2009. This act was designed to prohibit homeowners from altering their mortgages and created tougher limitations on the mortgage approval process. Because this legislation worked against homeowners and citizens financially struggling, it was coded as negative impact. Neutral impact legislation was that which would neither help nor harm those financially distressed. For example, in the 112th Congress, Congressman Tim Bishop (D-NY) sponsored the United States Call Center Worker and Consumer Protection Act which places requirements on the notification of employees within a given call center if the business chooses to relocate. While this legislation does place restrictions on employers, it does not necessarily work to better the state of employees, as did the legislation that was coded as positive impact.

Table 5.3 indicates the number and percentage of bills within each of the coded categories. In general, these tables show an increase in the percentage of bills that, if passed, would have a favorable impact on at-risk populations across the 109th to 111th

Congresses. There also appears to be an increase in the total number of bills introduced on these economic issues in each Congress from the 109th through the 111th, particularly bills pertaining to unemployment where there was nearly a 150% increase in the total number of bills from the 110th to the 111th Congress. As news of the widespread recession spread in the years in this study, the expectation would be that members would respond by introducing more legislation that was favorable to low-income populations, which is the general trend that appears above (discounting the 112th Congress for which only the first session is included).

[INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE]

However, the expectation would also be that there would be a decline in the number of bills introduced that could harm economically vulnerable populations. In the case of foreclosure and bankruptcy issues, the negative impact bills followed the expected pattern but not so in the case of unemployment issues. The first session of the 112th Congress actually includes a greater number of bills that could harm economically vulnerable populations than was introduced in any of the preceding Congresses. Once again, of the three economic issues on which this dissertation focuses, unemployment is the one to which a large majority of both the public and representatives are likely to pay attention. Representatives who support the free market system may be those who are more likely to introduce legislation that could harm at-risk populations, believing that they are creating a structure to incentivize such populations to work harder.

For each representative, the total number of bills he or she sponsored and co-sponsored within each of these three categories (positive, neutral, negative effects on low-income populations) for each issue area (unemployment, foreclosures, bankruptcy)

was tallied to create a discrete count variable. Table 5.4 indicates the total number of sponsors and co-sponsors, mean number of members who sponsored and co-sponsored, and the range in the number of members who sponsored and co-sponsored unemployment, foreclosure and bankruptcy legislation that had a positive, neutral, or negative impact on low-income populations and is broken down by party.

[INSERT TABLE 5.4 HERE]

Unsurprisingly, it does appear that there were more members co-sponsoring such legislation rather than sponsoring it, as the means and ranges for co-sponsorship are generally much larger. Also, more members sponsor and co-sponsor unemployment legislation than foreclosure and bankruptcy legislation, which reinforces the same trend already seen with unemployment issues taking precedence over other economic issues.

The mean and range also indicate a greater likelihood of Democrats sponsoring and co-sponsoring legislation with a positive impact on low-income populations and Republicans sponsoring and co-sponsoring legislation that would not aid such citizens. For instance, in terms of the mean of co-sponsorship of foreclosure legislation, Democratic legislators appear more than 13 times more likely to co-sponsor positive impact legislation in comparison to their Republican counterparts. When it came to the mean of negative impact foreclosure legislation, Republicans were at least ten times more likely to co-sponsor such legislation compared to Democrats. Overall, neutral legislation seemed somewhat evenly split between Democratic or Republican sponsors and cosponsors.

However, representatives sometimes chose to buck the party line. Of all congressional districts, Congressman Joe Heck (R-NV) had by far the highest number

of foreclosures, with 143.1 per 100,000 people. The clear message this economic indicator sends to Congressman Heck is that his district is highly concerned with the effects of the recession, particularly as it relates to homeownership. On his website, Congressman Heck states,

I voted to maintain the FHA Refinance Program. This program allows for those who are current on their mortgages, but underwater, the ability to refinance. On March 29, 2011, I voted to protect the Home Affordable Modification program (HAMP), a program which provides incentives to mortgage servicers to provide loan modifications to troubled borrowers. I voted to protect these programs because taking away programs which help homeowners who are trying to do the right thing is not the answer.

Despite his membership in the Republican Party, Congressman Heck indicates support for homeownership programs that are much more liberal than would be expected. Some Republicans have strongly opposed the FHA Refinance Program and HAMP to the extent that several pieces of legislation have been introduced to try to repeal and terminate it. Congressman Heck is thus going against the view of his own party and political beliefs in order to support legislation that he believes his constituents will view favorably.

Facing a tough re-election bid, Congressman Heck called for a Financial Services Committee hearing in Las Vegas in March of 2012 on the foreclosure issue. Prior to the hearing, Congressman Heck introduced a bill entitled the Second Chance at Homeownership Act of 2012 to provide assistance to those constituents who might otherwise have difficulty obtaining a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage for a second home.

At present, no representative has signed on to co-sponsor this legislation, which may be because (a) there have been little attempts to get co-sponsors by Congressman Heck's office or (b) because other representatives aren't attracted to the legislation.

Congressman Heck may have introduced this legislation merely to make a statement and has not substantially pursued it or attempted to get other members to co-sponsor it. Another possibility is that his Republican colleagues are hesitant to sign onto such legislation that appears, on its face, to assist those facing financial hardship, as the Republican Party has an "anti-handouts" policy. At the same time, Democrats may be hesitant to support such legislation because it does include strict requirements for those seeking mortgages, such as: proving they are income-eligible for the home, showing evidence of rent paid for at least the 12 months prior, and ensuring the mortgage payment would be no more than the current amount of rent paid. Democrats may favor less stringent policies toward giving homeowners a second chance and may therefore be fearful of such expectations. However, given that no Dear Colleague letter has been written by Congressman Heck's office and sent out to other members of Congress it an attempt to garner co-sponsors and support, it seems likely that the former is the case, as he is not trying to seek co-sponsors but merely introduced the legislation to signal constituents and help maintain re-election support.

In order to further analyze the sponsorship and co-sponsorship variables, first the simple Pearson product-moment correlations among the variables will be examined, as was the case in Chapter 3. These correlation coefficients indicate the strength and direction of the relationships between the variables. Furthermore, in order to determine the magnitude and significance of the effects of variables on the sponsorship and co-

sponsorship dependent variables, a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) was utilized. This model uses maximum likelihood estimation and ensures the repeated factor of Congress is properly taken into account. GLMM adds a random term to the standard linear predictor (Breslow and Clayton 1993). According to McCulloch (1997), “GLMM's enable the accommodation of non-normally distributed responses and specification of a possibly nonlinear link between the mean of the response and the predictors, and they can model over-dispersion and correlation by incorporating random effects” (162).

Nonetheless, for every economic issue area it was not possible to statistically analyze each sponsorship and co-sponsorship dependent variable, due to the fact that there were often very few bills that could be coded for a given dependent variable. For instance, there were few bills pertaining to the bankruptcy issue leaving few to be coded by representative as per the bankruptcy dependent variables. As a result, the analyses of these dependent variables often were unable to converge when they were analyzed. Additionally, the models concerning representative sponsorship and co-sponsorship of economically-neutral legislation were often of little added value given that little could be said about how the predictors influenced such legislation.

For those dependent variables for which the models were unable to converge, the frequencies appear in Appendix: Frequencies of Legislative Activity Dependent Variables. As previously indicated, these tables show that the vast majority of representatives did not sponsor co-sponsor any legislation on the economic issue studied, which is likely why there was difficulty analyzing such data. For these particular dependent variables, representatives were re-coded dichotomously according

to whether or not they sponsored or co-sponsored any legislation whatsoever on the economic issue of interest (rather than a count of how many bills they sponsored or co-sponsored) such that logistic regression could be utilized. The findings for these variables appear in Appendix: Logistic Regression of Legislative Activity Dependent Variables. Results from these analyses parallel the findings discussed below, and so are not otherwise presented.

Discussion of Findings

Findings with respect to the correlations between bill sponsorship and other variables appear in Table 5.5. As shown at the top of the table, in general there appears to be a trend in which those representatives sponsoring legislation that has a positive impact on economically vulnerable populations in one economic area are significantly likely to do so in another. To a lesser extent, the same may be true of those representatives who sponsor legislation that negatively impacts those economically disadvantaged. However, overall, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between those sponsoring positive and negative impact legislation, as none of these variables reached significance with $p < .1$.

[INSERT TABLE 5.5 HERE]

Interestingly, this pattern does not hold when we turn our attention to the relationship between bill sponsorship and bill co-sponsorship. Regardless of economic issue area or whether the impact was positive or negative, a significant relationship does appear to occur between sponsorship and co-sponsorship. In many instances the size of this relationship was fairly small, although still significant; regardless, it does indicate

an inverse relationship between positive impact sponsorship bills and negative impact co-sponsorship bills and vice versa. It is also worth noting that those who sponsor or co-sponsor more positive impact bills are less likely to sponsor or co-sponsor negative impact bills, generally an inverse relationship.

An examination of the relationship between bill sponsorship variables and the dependent variables in Chapter 3 (website issue position and visibility) revealed some significant relationships, although the size of the correlations appeared fairly small, particularly with respect to the issue position articulated on representatives' websites. The visibility of such information on their websites correlates significantly with representatives who sponsor economic legislation with a positive impact but not a negative impact. In other words, members are advertising their positive impact positions on their websites and those positions are strongly correlated to sponsorship and co-sponsorship activity; such members are acting on their economic issue positions.

Those representatives who sponsor legislation beneficial to vulnerable populations are members who represent districts that generally are doing poorly from an economic standpoint. For many of these key factors, a significant relationship (albeit small with respect to the size of the correlation) occurs when examining bill sponsorship for positive impact legislation. This relationship is not apparent on negative impact legislation except for in a few instances on bankruptcy issues. It may be that there is no uniformity in those sponsoring legislation that hurts low-income populations simply because there are such a small number of bills that do so.

While only a few of the district characteristics appear significant, many of the member characteristics and nearly all of the election characteristics do appear to have a

significant association with bill sponsorship. While few of the negative impact bills were significant when it came to district characteristics, quite a few member characteristic and all election characteristic variables featured significant relationships with negative impact bills. The sign associated with the correlation of these bills was generally the opposite of the sign associated with their positive impact counterparts, indicating an inverse relationship. For instance, Democrats appeared to be a strong predictor across the board; representatives identifying as Democrats were positively correlated with negative impact legislation but negatively correlated with positive impact legislation, which is at odds with what one would expect, particularly in light of Table 5.4 above.

While bill sponsorship variables appeared to only significantly correlate with other bill sponsorship variables when the impact of the legislation was positive, the same cannot be said for bill co-sponsorship variables, as shown in Table 5.6. While the sign changes, both positive and negative impact legislation are significant, and in many instances reflect a relatively strong relationship. As previously mentioned, there are likely to be a vast number of co-sponsors on any piece of legislation which creates more variability on these variables than is the case with the sponsorship variables.

[INSERT TABLE 5.6 HERE]

These data show that co-sponsorship and sponsorship are very different activities. While sponsorship of bills seldom appears to have a relationship with the position a representative articulates on his or her website, the reverse is true of co-sponsorship. Representatives articulating a more pro-business position on the

unemployment issue are more likely to favor negative impact legislation than positive impact legislation.

Additionally, while the visibility of such information on their websites only appears to be related to positive impact sponsored legislation, for co-sponsorship the significant relationships are much more widespread. Particularly with respect to the unemployment issue, those representatives who co-sponsor more legislation with a positive impact are more likely to have the issue visible on their website; however, representatives who co-sponsor more legislation with a negative impact are less likely to have the issue visible. Thus, representatives who are acting to harm those financially distressed are not advertising this position for the general public whereas those representatives who are acting to the benefit of the unemployed are most likely to indicate their legislative position to try to gain voter support.

Again, many more of the key factors reach significance with respect to co-sponsorship than previously did on the sponsorship variables seen in Table 5.5. The personal financial insecurity factor is significant for nearly all outcome variables, while the macro-economic factor is significant on positive impact co-sponsored legislation. Many of the economic characteristics that contribute to these factors are also significant on nearly every issue, and often on both positive and negative impact legislation. The election margin is again significant on everything but negative impact bankruptcy bills, the smallest category. However, on co-sponsored legislation the size of the correlation is generally larger than on sponsored legislation, although both indicate that those representatives with a larger margin of victory in their previous election are more likely

to sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact legislation, whereas those representatives with a smaller margin of victory are partial to negative impact legislation.

While many of the district characteristic variables do not reach significance in the examination of sponsorship, with respect to co-sponsorship they show that districts with more minorities are likely to have representatives who co-sponsor positive impact legislation. Additionally, the findings for co-sponsorship appear similar to those of sponsorship with respect to member characteristics and the race and party affiliation of members; however, given that these are dichotomous variables the correlations are less meaningful than the mixed model analysis results.

As previously mentioned, the same independent variables used in the previous studies were analyzed predicting each of the sponsorship and co-sponsorship dependent variables. Some of these generalized linear mixed models did not converge, notably those dealing with sponsorship that negatively impacted low-income citizens. Additionally, the models failed to converge on positive-impact foreclosure sponsorship legislation as well as negative impact co-sponsorship legislation. The failure to converge in these models is quite likely the result of a very small variance on the respective dependent variable.

Nonetheless, Table 5.7 shows the relationships in those instances that the generalized linear mixed model did converge. Overall, there does appear to be some difference in the factors that affect sponsorship when compared to those that affect co-sponsorship. While the personal financial insecurity factor appears to affect few of the models, the macro-economic stress factor reaches significance in more than half the models. The higher the district's foreclosure rate and unemployment rate, the more

likely a representative is to sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation, but the inverse relationship of lower foreclosure and unemployment rates with negative impact legislation is not found to be significant.

[INSERT TABLE 5.7 HERE]

The odds ratio estimates (Table 5.8-5.10) further support this finding, as the estimates indicate a greater degree of change in the key factors when examining bill sponsorship as opposed to co-sponsorship, particularly negative-impact co-sponsored legislation. For instance, a one unit increase in the number of bills sponsored or co-sponsored by the given representative in the particular issue area led to an increase in the personal financial insecurity factor of 1.238 and 1.033 (respectively). Thus, it may be the case that representatives who are aware of their district's financial struggles are likely to pursue legislation to benefit them, but representatives whose districts are economically prosperous are not those who are the most likely to sponsor or co-sponsor legislation that could inhibit those financial distressed at the expense of those financially thriving.

[INSERT TABLE 5.8 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 5.9 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 5.10 HERE]

While there does not appear to be a relationship between co-sponsored legislation and the electoral margin, a relationship is found with respect to positive-impact sponsored legislation. The adjusted odds ratio for election margin is significant ($AOR=1.006$, $95\% CI: 1.000-1.012$) indicating that for each one percentage point increase in the election margin, the odds of providing a rating in a higher rating

category is 1.006 higher. This finding may be the direct result of the visibility of sponsorship and the directive representatives may feel when they win by a higher margin. Representatives who know they do not face an uphill battle towards re-election may feel that they can act more freely than other representatives and may therefore pursue legislation that they themselves feel is necessary but that may be controversial and not viewed in a positive light across their district. Other representatives, who may fear a challenge in their upcoming election, are less likely to attach their name directly to such legislation.

Interestingly, while the earlier Congresses do appear to differ from the 112th Congress with respect to co-sponsorship (of both positive and negative impact legislation), such was not the case for sponsorship. Representatives sponsoring economic legislation do not appear to change as a result of the financial downfall, but those choosing to co-sponsor such legislation did. Odds ratio estimates indicate that negative co-sponsored legislation, particularly on the foreclosure issue, are very different across Congresses. For instance, the adjusted odds ratio for Congress on the foreclosure issue increases with each succeeding Congress (109th: *AOR*=1.145, 95% *CI*: 0.839-1.563, 110th: *AOR*=2.119, 95% *CI*: 1.601-2.806, 111th: *AOR*=2.147, 95% *CI*: 1.640-2.810) such that examining the 109th Congress in comparison to the 112th Congress results in a 1.145 greater likelihood of co-sponsorship; whereas that likelihood increased to 2.147 by the 111th Congress. While the odds ratios do increase on the bankruptcy issue, they were relatively small for both the 109th and 110th Congress and only reach 1.171 by the 111th.

This finding further supports the notion pertaining to electoral stability raised previously; those representatives who sponsor economic legislation are now, and have previously been, those who see it as necessary, regardless of other circumstances. On the other hand, representatives who co-sponsor legislation may be fearful of attaching their name directly to legislation but, with the economy doing poorly, want to show their concern and have increasingly chosen to do so as the economic crisis has become more widespread.

The findings with respect to district characteristics further support the differences between representative's decisions to sponsor versus co-sponsor legislation. Interestingly, while a higher black population is related to decreased sponsorship of positive impact unemployment legislation, the opposite is the case with respect to positive impact bankruptcy legislation. When examining co-sponsorship, it is apparent that districts with a higher population of college-educated constituents are more likely to have representatives who co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation; however, while this relationship exists for foreclosure issues, it is also the case that districts with a high percentage of college-educated citizens are also significantly more likely to have representatives who co-sponsor negative impact foreclosure legislation.

An examination of the member characteristics variables indicates that the attributes of a representative leading to sponsorship and co-sponsorship are not all that different. In both sponsored and co-sponsored models, minority members are those significantly more likely to advance positive impact economic legislation; the same can be said in the case of sponsorship and co-sponsored unemployment legislation, members with more years in the House. Additionally, the variables for party are

significant for nearly all outcome variables, indicating that Democrats are significantly more likely to sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation and significantly less likely to co-sponsor negative impact economic legislation.

With respect to positive impact co-sponsorship, the percent of the voting constituency that cast their ballots for the Democrat in the previous presidential election does appear to be a significant predictor, but such is not the case with legislative sponsorship or negative-impact co-sponsorship. While party does impact these other cases, the party preference of the constituency is not significant. In the case of sponsorship, members may sponsor legislation out of their own self-interest rather than concern for their constituent's desires. On the other hand, representatives may be paying little attention to constituent party influence and only considering their own on negative impact legislation because they see it as a means of appealing to their own party members rather than gaining support from the public.

[INSERT TABLE 5.11 HERE]

I again conducted a multiple-*df* contrast utilizing the Wald χ^2 test for each respective set of independent variables (see Table 5.11). Again, these tests examine the ability of each of the four conceptual sets of independent variables (key factors, district characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics) to predict a dependent variable, within the context of the entire model. Thus, it is a simultaneous test of whether the respective set of estimates within a set equal zero. Table 5.11 presents the results of these contrasts. Much like the analysis in Table 5.6 revealed, it is the case that a relatively large number of variables appear to impact the sponsorship and co-sponsorship motives of representatives. Notably, the member characteristics

variables are significant in every model, perhaps in part as a result of the party variable. However, unlike in previous analyses, many of the other member characteristics variables are significant in several models and therefore it could be more than just this single variable that explains its significance. The key factors, district characteristics, and election characteristics sets of variables appear significant in nearly every model.

Conclusion

This chapter serves as an examination of representative legislative action to determine how the economic circumstances of a constituency factored into the economic legislation representatives chose to sponsor and to co-sponsor. Interestingly, findings reveal that different factors are at play with respect to the variables that influence sponsorship compared to co-sponsorship of economic legislation. While party is once again a major factor in both instances, the analysis here reveals a number of other factors that explain bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship, unlike in many of the previous analyses.

Additionally, the findings revealed that co-sponsorship in one area of economic legislation is a good indicator of co-sponsorship on other economic legislation but the same is not always the case for sponsorship. Such a finding may be reflective of the nature of sponsorship compared to co-sponsorship, as sponsorship involves a much greater cost in terms of time and investment on behalf of the representatives.

Overall, findings revealed that co-sponsorship is an easily accessible way for members to reveal their interest on an issue without taking the lead. Their action on such issues is often in accord with what they see as constituent's desires and therefore

they are often unafraid to advertise their co-sponsorships. On the other hand, sponsorship appears to be something members undertake because they themselves see a need to do so, even if it is not something they think their constituents desire. Members who choose to sponsor legislation often are secure in their district and may think they could act in a way that would be beneficial for all.

While the supposition of this research is that representatives would be most likely to appeal to constituents when they are directing their action toward them, the findings of the previous chapters indicated that the representative's party affiliation heavily drove their action. However, the findings of this chapter suggest that while the representative's party may be a driver of his or her actions, it may work in tandem with other factors to influence representatives' actual legislative behavior. While previous findings may have called into question how representative our democratic system truly is, the findings here suggest that when it comes to actually sitting down and crafting legislation or choosing to attach one's name to it, representatives may be factoring the needs of their constituents into such action.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This dissertation has sought to understand the actions on economic issues of representatives at various levels of visibility. Given the recent recession and how readily available economic data is both to representatives and for the purposes of this research, it provided a useful means to examine the actions of members of the House. Previous research that sought to understand the dyadic relationship between a member of Congress and his or her constituents largely focused on the Senate because state-level data is much more prevalent than district-level data. Because there are more House districts with smaller constituencies, these representatives are expected to be more responsive to their constituents' desires. Thus, I focused my research on members of the House to determine how well they are representing their constituents on economic issues, which are heavily salient given the recession occurring during the period studied and provide easy indicators to representatives without the need for surveying constituents.

The theory presented in this dissertation assumes that representatives target their action not towards voters who already support them but toward voters who are paying attention to the political process and who they want to win over. This theory assumes that those constituents who already support a representative are unlikely to waver substantially in their support while those who are strongly opposed to a representative are also unlikely to ever cast their ballot for him or her. While my research did not directly test this theory, it used it as a catalyst toward understanding representative behavior at differing levels of visibility.

Thus, the examination of representative action assumed that such action was done under the guise of winning over these potential voters. However, I assumed that representatives might not always be consistent in their actions, as they may present information differently depending on who they think is paying attention and how visible such information is to them. Given that representatives may present themselves differently based on how visible their action is, such representative action was examined in terms of when representatives were speaking directly to their constituents, when they were speaking to their colleagues, and when they were actually taking legislative action.

The present research has as its focus an examination of how certain key predictor variables impacted legislative activity. Because this research examined representative behavior on economic issues, these key predictor variables dealt with the economic characteristics of the district, as a factor analysis combined the district's foreclosure rate, income level, poverty rate, and unemployment rate into two variables. Also, the electoral margin by which a representative won the previous election helps to better understand how representatives are communicating with their constituents around economic issues especially being sensitive to potentials in the district. In order to examine such economic issues before, during, and (arguably) after the recession, the 109th, 110th, 111th and first session of the 112th Congress was examined.

In addition to these key predictor variables, three other sets of variables were employed in trying to understand legislative activity: variables pertaining to characteristics of the district, variables that dealt with characteristics of the representatives, and variables that concerned the representative's previous election. The

findings with respect to legislative activity and these sets of variables appeared to be very different when it came to different types of activity.

Discussion of Findings

With respect to how a representative addresses constituents, websites of the representative were examined both for the stance they took on the particular economic issue as well as for how visible information on such an issue appeared on the website. Interestingly, an examination of representative's websites revealed that even in the first session of the 112th Congress (2011), many representatives were unwilling to take a stance on these economic issues on their websites, despite national attention focusing heavily on the economy. Those who did not mention these economic issues were statistically more likely to be Republicans, Caucasian and male.

With respect to how the issue was presented on the representative's website, the driving force appeared to be the representative's party affiliation, as few other variables reached significance even at the $p < .05$ level. Representatives who identified as Republicans were significantly more likely to take a pro-business, pro-market, or pro-banking position. Key predictor variables reached marginal significance; notably, the electoral margin variable was marginally significant in indicating that those winning by a higher margin of victory in the previous election were more likely to take a pro-business stance on the unemployment issue and a pro-buyer stance on the foreclosure issue.

However, in terms of how visible the information was on the website, the personal financial insecurity factor appeared marginally significant on the

unemployment and bankruptcy issue while the macro-economic stress factor appeared to significantly influence representative's visibility on foreclosure issues. Given that the macro-economic stress factor utilizes the foreclosure rate, this finding was opposite the expected direction, as it indicated that districts with a higher foreclosure and unemployment rate had representatives who were less visible on the foreclosure issue.

With both economic issue position and the visibility of the position on the representative's website, the party variable was highly predictive and indicated large odds ratios. However, with respect to visibility on unemployment issues, this variable was not significant, indicating that representatives of both parties may be equally likely to discuss the unemployment issue, perhaps because it is the most salient of the economic issues.

An examination of how representatives speak when they may not necessarily think constituents are tuned in was crafted by the formation of frames around the chosen economic issues and applying such frames to representative floor speeches. These frames were created based on interest group issue positions in an attempt to eliminate partisan biases. Examination of members' floor speeches found that, in more recent years, these issues have been addressed much more by representatives than previously, as the economic downturn likely spurred representatives' interest in the issue.

Nevertheless, similar to the message on representatives' websites, the method by which representatives address these issues on the floor is almost entirely partisan-driven. Democratic members were much more likely to utilize the frame that emphasized that it was societal responsibility to help those hindered by the economy, whereas Republican members most often used a frame that articulated that it is the

individual's obligation to ensure his or her own financial well-being. While some variables reached marginal significance, overall findings suggest that party affiliation is an incredibly strong predictor of the way representatives are speaking on the floor of the House.

Given that representatives were much more likely to take a stance on these issues when speaking on the floor compared to how seldom they did on their websites, representatives may believe constituents are not paying attention to their floor speeches or that floor speeches if reported at all will reach fewer constituents. Alternatively, members may see floor speeches as bringing certain rewards or advantages to gain standing among colleagues and within their party.

Finally, I examined bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship of legislation that was classified according to whom it affected in a financially beneficial manner. These bills were examined to determine how they affect low-income populations to determine how many bills of each type representatives' were sponsoring and co-sponsoring. Over time there appeared to be an increase not only in the total number of economic bills but also in the total number of bills that positively impacted low-income populations.

Unlike in the other analyses, when examining legislative action, the key factors did appear to be influential. The macro-economic stress variable was significant for both sponsorship and co-sponsorship of positive-impact legislation, indicating that Districts with high foreclosure rates and unemployment rates have representatives who are acting in a positive way on these issues. Additionally, the electoral margin variable was significant but only for legislative sponsorship, showing that those winning by a high margin have representatives who are more likely to introduce positive impact

legislation but not co-sponsor it. This finding may indicate that those with a high margin of victory are willing to strike out and do so on their own whereas the other members are co-sponsoring legislation.

Interestingly and surprisingly, findings appeared to differ for sponsorship and co-sponsorship dependent variables. For instance, only on co-sponsorship did their appear to be a significant change in the membership over time, as members may increasingly want to attach their name to legislation without doing the work involved with sponsoring the legislation. Nevertheless, it was once again the case that party affiliation was significant across nearly all models.

Overall, the findings did in fact reveal that representative action at different levels of visibility is influenced by different factors. Representatives know they want to reach out to potential voters but they perceive different activities as gaining their attention; therefore, they adjust their behavior and how outspoken their position is on the basis of when they think they can garner voters' attention. Rather than simply reach out to potentials in the same way they speak on the floor, representatives are more inclined to hide or obscure their position when they think such constituents are paying attention.

Findings for Key Variables

The key variables that were of interest included the personal financial insecurity factor, the macro-economic stress factor, and the representative's electoral margin of victory. When examining the stance the representative took on economic issues on his or her website, the key predictor variables were somewhat predictive; however, they

were more predictive when examining the presence of information on the economic issues on their websites, particularly when the information pertained to the foreclosure issue. Members from districts with high macro-economic stress (e.g. high foreclosure and unemployment rates), were more likely to display their foreclosure position on their website.

When the dependent variable that examined the frame representatives used in articulating their position on economic issues on the floor, most of the key predictors appeared to be insignificant. Unlike with the website analysis, the use of floor speeches frames spanned several Congresses and the findings confirmed that earlier Congresses were significantly different than the 112th Congress with respect to floor speech frames, largely the result of representatives being much less likely to address these economic issues earlier.

When examining the sponsorship of legislation, several of the key predictors did appear to reach significance, particularly with respect to when representatives were acting on legislation that was deemed to positively impact individuals experiencing economic hardship. Both in terms of sponsorship and co-sponsorship, the macro-economic stress variable was highly significant when examining such legislation, indicating districts that are struggling financially are more likely to have representatives sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation. Members who were electorally insecure were significantly less likely to sponsor positive impact economic legislation.

Findings for District Characteristics

In the examination of the effects of district characteristics on the issue stance representatives posted on their websites, only a few variables reached significance. The foreclosure model of both economic issue position and the visibility of the issue indicated that minority prevalence and education within the district could be influential.

In general, district characteristics were not very predictive of the frames representative's utilized when speaking on the House floor. Several variables reached marginal significance ($p < 0.1$) but none beyond $p < .05$, indicating that representatives may not be speaking to constituents when they take the microphone on the House floor.

With respect to both sponsorship and co-sponsorship, district characteristics appeared to be influential in different ways. When examining the sponsorship model, the percent of African-Americans in the district appeared influential; however, its effect differed on the unemployment and bankruptcy issues. With respect to co-sponsorship, the percent of the district with a college degree appeared influential on both positive and negative impact models, indicating such education increased the prevalence of representative co-sponsorship.

Findings for Member Characteristics

When discussing economic issue positions on their website, the sole characteristic that appeared to be influential was the representative's party, as no other variable even attained marginal significance. The same cannot be said for the visibility of the representative's position, as party was not significant across the board and other factors appeared influential.

In speeches on the floor of the House, party was an extremely strong predictor of the frame the representative used when addressing these economic issues. For both primary and secondary frames, party was highly significant for almost every issue, failing to reach significance only when the secondary frame was under examination. The only variable that appeared significant nearly as often was the comparison of previous Congresses to the 112th.

The findings of the impact of member characteristics on bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship were interesting because, unlike in many of the other models, more than just the party variable appeared significant. Minorities appeared to sponsor and co-sponsor more positive-impact economic legislation, while members with more seniority were those sponsoring more positive impact legislation.

Findings for Election Characteristics

With respect to characteristics of the previous election, the position the representative took on his or her site when discussing bankruptcy issues appeared to be influenced by both labor and finance PACs, but such was not the case for the other economic issues. However, the visibility of the information did appear to be influenced by finance PACs on all issues. Those representatives receiving more money from finance PACs took more pro-business, pro-market, and pro-banking stances but were significantly less visible in doing so.

When examining secondary frames, there was some significance found in the relationship between election characteristics variables and the secondary frame employed by the representative at the $p < .05$ level. Specifically, the variable

representing the percentage of Democrats in the district as well as the labor PAC contributions variable was significant.

In the examination of sponsorship, election characteristics did not appear influential with the exception of the finance PAC variable which indicated that contributions of finance PACs significantly increased the prevalence of the sponsorship of positive impact bankruptcy legislation. Many more variables appeared to influence co-sponsorship; for instance, those districts with a larger Democratic voting public had representatives who were significantly more likely to co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation of all varieties. Labor PAC contributions appeared influential on negative impact foreclosure legislation.

Implications

While the expectation was that representatives would appeal to potential voters when addressing their constituents in more public forums, the findings appear to suggest that rather representatives are primarily concerned with pleasing their party regardless of venue. While Fenno (1978) argued that representatives speak differently when they are at home compared to when they are in Washington, the research presented here seems to suggest that representatives consistently view their audience as party members, regardless of whether they are addressing constituents or not.

This research assumed that websites provide representatives their most visible means of addressing constituents. Surprisingly, at the depth of the worst recession in a century, large numbers of Republican members presented no issue positions related to the economy on their websites. It could be the case that representatives do not see these

websites as a means of appealing to voters but instead do so through speeches to small groups of subconstituencies. Perhaps members decided not to post issue positions in order to avoid taking positions contrary to party orthodoxy. Nevertheless, these websites are meant to articulate representatives' policy standpoints and appeared to seldom do so on very salient matters, such as the economy during a recession.

Rather than reach out to their constituents to gain support, representatives appear to be reaching out to members of their party, either within or outside Washington, to get support. This finding held true both for when representatives were speaking to their constituents but also when they were speaking to other members on the floor. Representatives' unwillingness to factor the needs of their constituents into their public messages directed toward constituents is surprising. The expectation was that representatives would want to reach out to potentials with these public messages more so than in any other setting, but the findings did not support that expectation. Representatives may view the audience of their websites as much larger than their direct constituency and therefore may not use them as a means to reach out to gain electoral support.

When speaking on the floor, representatives may be inclined to support their party's position given that they want to gain favor within their party, as other members are the direct audience of such speeches. Because party leadership often controls who speaks on the floor on the given issue, members may see speaking on the floor as their opportunity to gain favor with such party leaders. These findings with respect to floor speeches were as expected.

Legislative action appears to be the instance in which representation occurs most frequently. Perhaps visibility on actual legislation concerns representatives more than does the visibility of an issue position on their website, as they may assume that the visible nature of sponsoring or co-sponsoring legislation is a much easier cue than is information on their website. If they assume that potentials have the ability to obtain their legislative action just as easily as they can access their website, they may be more inclined to use such legislative activity as cues than merely writing on a website that does not necessarily influence action in the way that sponsoring or co-sponsoring legislation does.

On the other hand, representatives may view representation as entirely party-driven and seek to uphold their party's position rather than appeal to the needs of their constituents. The message representatives may be sending, both publicly and on the floor, is partisan above all else. Recent scholarship has suggested that now, more than ever, the House is divided along party lines (Hetherington 2001; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Rohde 1991); while the research presented here was not a direct attempt to test the partisan nature of Congress, the findings do suggest that members are willing to emphasize their party's position in all of their actions.

However, representatives who choose to sponsor or co-sponsor legislation seem to reflect constituent economic needs. Therefore, while it may be concerning to the notion of representative democracy that representatives appear to not be reaching out directly to their own constituents but instead to their party, when they actually go about creating and supporting policy, they do act upon their constituent's needs.

Additionally, representatives can easily pay lip service to an issue or introduce legislation but voting on such legislation is a very different legislative activity. When representatives vote to act on legislation, they are putting forth what could become federal law. As a result, the findings presented here may be vastly different with respect to constituency characteristics when actual votes are taken into account. Even introducing legislation differs from voting on it, as representatives can introduce legislation merely to gain attention and then not take any action to gain support for that legislation, as illustrated in the example of Congressman Joe Heck.

Future Research

Further research could examine how the message representatives are sending to their constituents specifically targets potential voters. For instance, if representatives seek the support of a certain subconstituency, how clear is their action in gaining that subconstituencies support? And to what extent will winning that subconstituencies support affect the representative in the upcoming election? Such research could aid our understanding of not only how representatives see their constituencies but also how their actions feed directly into their own re-election goals.

Additionally, the research here utilized only some of the actions representatives take. There are a vast number of ways in which representatives take action that could be utilized as dependent variables to better understand what factors influence such action. For instance, representative speeches, press releases, dear colleague letters, or statements in hearings could all be helpful in better assessing what influences representative activity.

The research here examined activity on economic issues but an analysis of representative activity on social issues could also be interesting and could have different findings depending on how salient a given issue is. It is possible that for less salient issues, representative activity may be more consistent across different activities and levels of visibility than was present in these findings.

Finally, future research can examine the interplay between representative action at the different levels of visibility addressed here to determine how well action at one level corresponds with action at a different level of visibility. This research determined the impact of different characteristics on such representative action but did not examine how such action correlates with other action.

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Appendix: Chapter 1 Table

Table 1.1: Changes in Economic Characteristics, 2005-2011

Unemployment Rate	2005	4.9
	2006	4.4
	2007	5.0
	2008	7.3
	2009	9.9
	2010	9.3
	2011	8.5
Bankruptcies Declared	2005	239,214
	2006	597,965
	2007	822,590
	2008	1,074,225
	2009	1,412,838
	2010	1,536,799
	2011	1,362,847
Foreclosures Declared	2005	801,563
	2006	1,215,304
	2007	2,203,295
	2008	3,019,482
	2009	3,457,643
	2010	3,843,548
	2011	3,920,428

Source: Statistic Brain, United States Courts, Bureau of Labor

Appendix: Chapter 2 Tables

Table 2.1: Representative Actions that are Visible, Less Visible, and Invisible

Visibility	Actions
Visible	Public Speeches, Statements to the Media, Information on their Webpage
Less Visible	Statements in Hearings, Floor Speeches
Invisible	Meetings with Colleagues, Staffers, and Interest Groups

Table 2.2: Segments of the Constituency and Their Attitudes

Segment	Attitude Toward Representative	Conditions that Could Change Attitude
Advocates	Support	Representative acts in a significantly uncharacteristic manner
Potentials	Intelligent skepticism	Representative advocating a policy they support; An issue with a high degree of salience
Uninterested	Don't care	An issue with a high degree of salience
Opposed	Do not support	Representative acts in a significantly uncharacteristic way

Table 2.3: Characteristics of Congress, 109-112

Congress	Republicans	Democrats	Speaker	Senate Majority Leader	President
109	229	202	Dennis Hastert (R)	Bill Frist (R)	George W. Bush (R)
110	198	236	Nancy Pelosi (D)	Harry Reid (D)	George W. Bush (R)
111	179	255	Nancy Pelosi (D)	Harry Reid (D)	Barack Obama (D)
112	240	191	John Boehner (R)	Harry Reid (D)	Barack Obama (D)

Table 2.4: Summary of Independent Variables

Variables	Independent Variables	Measurement/Coding
Key Factors	Foreclosure Rate	Foreclosures per 100,000 constituents
	Median Income	Median household income
	Poverty Rate	Percentage of population below poverty
	Unemployment Rate	Percent unemployed
	Election Margin	Percent by which the representative won election
District Characteristics	Percent Black	Percent African-American
	Percent Latino	Percent Hispanic
	Percent Graduated College	Percent with a Bachelor's degree
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	Representative is Caucasian
	Male	Representative is male
	Democrat	Representative is a member of the Democratic Party
	Seniority	Number of years representative has been in office
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	Percent of district voting for the Democratic presidential candidate in the previous election
	Labor PAC Contributions	Dollar contributions from labor PACs
	Finance PAC Contributions	Dollar contributions from finance and real estate PACs

Table 2.5: Varimax Rotated Iterated Principal Factor Analysis Loadings for the 4 Key Economic Characteristics

Variables	Personal Financial Insecurity	Macro-Economic Stress
Foreclosure Rate	0.161	0.923
Median Income	-0.863	0.330
Percent of Population in Poverty	0.927	-0.179
Unemployment Rate	0.744	0.406

Appendix: Chapter 3 Tables

Table 3.1: Economic Interest Position Scale

Economic Issues	1	2	3	4	5
Unemployment	Very Pro-Worker	Somewhat Pro-Worker	Neither Pro-Worker nor Pro-Business	Somewhat Pro-Business	Very Pro-Business
Foreclosures	Very Pro-Buyer	Somewhat Pro-Buyer	Neither Pro-Buyer nor Pro-Market	Somewhat Pro-Market	Very Pro-Market
Bankruptcy	Very Pro-Consumer	Somewhat Pro-Consumer	Neither Pro-Consumer Nor Pro-Banking	Somewhat Pro-Banking	Very Pro-Banking

Table 3.2: Visibility Scale for all Economic Issues

1	2	3
Issue is not mentioned	Issue is mentioned but never discussed at length or in-depth	Issue is discussed at length and in-depth

Table 3.3: Cohen's Kappa

Rating	Kappa
0	1.00*** (0.095)
1	0.898*** (0.095)
2	0.557*** (0.095)
3	0.927*** (0.095)
4	0.836*** (0.095)
5	0.913*** (0.095)
Overall	0.915*** (0.049)

Table 3.4: Distribution of Economic Issue Position Scale

Economic Interest	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
No Mention	169 38.32%	350 79.37%	371 84.32%
<i>Very Pro-Worker, Pro-Buyer, or Pro-Consumer</i>	84 19.05% (30.88%)	58 13.15% (63.73%)	42 9.55% (60.87%)
<i>Somewhat Pro-Worker, Pro-Buyer, or Pro-Consumer</i>	24 5.44% (8.82%)	12 2.72% (13.18%)	7 1.59% (10.14%)
Neither	71 16.10% (26.10%)	8 1.81% (8.79%)	3 0.68% (4.35%)
<i>Somewhat Pro-Business, Pro-Market, or Pro-Banking</i>	46 10.43% (16.91%)	8 1.81% (8.79%)	10 2.27% (14.49%)
<i>Very Pro-Business, Pro-Market, or Pro-Banking</i>	47 10.66% (17.28%)	5 1.13% (5.49%)	7 1.59% (10.14%)

Note: percentages within the parentheses do not include the no issue mention category in their calculation.

Table 3.5: Member Characteristics of No Issue Mention

Variable		Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
Party	Democrat	65 38.46%	131 37.43%	149 40.16%
	Republican	104 61.54%	219 62.57%	222 59.84%
Race	White	155 91.72%	325 92.46%	336 90.57%
	Non-White	14 8.28%	25 7.14%	35 9.43%
Gender	Male	149 88.17%	300 85.71%	314 84.64%
	Female	20 11.83%	40 14.29%	57 15.36%

Table 3.6: Member Leadership and Experience of No Issue Mention

Variable	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
Not a Member of Party Leadership	166 98.2%	338 96.57%	360 97.4%
Five or Fewer Years in House	100 59.17%	211 60.29%	215 57.9%

Table 3.7: Distribution of Visibility Scale

Visibility Scale	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
Not Mentioned	170 38.55%	350 79.37%	372 84.35%
Discussed Some	117 26.53%	23 5.22%	29 6.58%
Discussed At-Length	154 34.92%	68 15.42%	40 9.07%

Table 3.8: Relationship between Economic Issue Position and Other Variables

Variables		Pearson Correlation Coefficient		
		Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
Issue Position	Unemployment	-	0.170***	0.164***
	Foreclosure	0.170***	-	0.359***
	Bankruptcy	0.164***	0.359***	-
Visibility	Unemployment	0.579***	0.242***	0.209***
	Foreclosure	0.004	0.712***	0.259***
	Bankruptcy	-0.023	0.293***	0.664***
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	-0.095*	-0.001	0.058
	Macro-Economic Stress	-0.068	0.146**	-0.069 ⁺
	Foreclosure Rate	-0.034	0.148**	-0.087 ⁺
	Median Income	0.034	0.020	-0.039
	Poverty Rate	-0.120**	0.027	0.052
	Unemployment Rate	-0.130**	0.077 ⁺	0.016
	Election Margin	-0.066	0.076 ⁺	0.016
District Characteristics	Percent Black	-0.123**	0.008	-0.067
	Percent Latino	-0.096*	0.102**	-0.001
	Percent Graduated College	0.043	0.049	-0.028
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	-0.120*	0.056	-0.040
	Male	-0.050	0.074 ⁺	0.020
	Democrat	0.331***	-0.052	0.006
	Seniority	-0.101*	0.120*	0.040
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	-0.250***	0.058	-0.052
	Labor PAC Contributions	-0.155***	0.014	-0.001
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.157***	0.124**	0.175***

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 3.9: Relationship between Visibility of Economic Issues and Other Variables

Variables		Pearson Correlation Coefficient		
		Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
Visibility	Unemployment	-	0.371***	0.345***
	Foreclosure	0.371***	-	0.488***
	Bankruptcy	0.345***	0.488***	-
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.020	0.066	0.036
	Macro-Economic Stress	0.023	0.185***	0.016
	Foreclosure Rate	0.005	0.159***	-0.011
	Median Income	0.016	0.015	0.035
	Poverty Rate	0.038	0.130**	0.083 ⁺
	Unemployment Rate	0.049	0.167***	0.057
	Election Margin	-0.019	0.111*	0.049
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.088 ⁺	0.160***	0.010
	Percent Latino	0.046	0.213***	0.139**
	Percent Graduated College	0.088 ⁺	0.089 ⁺	0.078 ⁺
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.094*	0.208***	0.064
	Male	0.139**	0.131**	0.114*
	Democrat	-0.209***	-0.312***	-0.269***
	Seniority	0.100**	0.191***	0.151***
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.244***	0.318***	0.228
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.173***	0.120*	0.156***
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.096*	-0.001	0.040

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Table 3.10: Results for Ordered Logit Analysis of Economic Issue Position

Variables	Estimate (Standard Error)			
	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy	
Intercepts	Intercept	-3.989*** (1.099)	-3.023 ⁺ (2.021)	-1.974 (137.1)
	Intercept	-3.137** (1.088)	-1.505 (2.020)	0.453 (137.1)
	Intercept	0.469 (1.084)	-0.185 (2.004)	1.970 (137.1)
	Intercept	1.834 ⁺ (1.089)	1.556 (-0.292)	4.524 (137.1)
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.102 (0.213)	-0.292 (0.476)	-1.088 ⁺ (0.698)
	Macro-Economic Stress	0.116 (0.133)	0.012 (0.236)	0.369 (0.475)
	Election Margin	0.011 ⁺ (0.006)	-0.024 ⁺ (0.014)	0.006 (0.019)
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.001 (0.014)	0.085** (0.034)	0.045 (0.048)
	Percent Latino	-0.011 (0.008)	0.029* (0.015)	0.028 (0.020)
	Percent Graduated College	0.005 (0.036)	0.102 (0.080)	0.014 (0.109)
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.071 (0.317)	0.454 (0.596)	-5.752 (137.0)
	Male	-0.109 (0.161)	0.094 (0.307)	0.506 (0.422)
	Democrat	-2.420*** (0.372)	-2.187*** (0.679)	-1.448* (0.752)
	Seniority	0.024 (0.028)	0.015 (0.050)	0.051 (0.085)
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.020 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.032)	0.080 (0.042)
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.009)	0.029** (0.011)
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
	N	269	88	68
	R ²	0.663	0.661	0.855

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 3.11: Results for Odds Ratio Analysis of Unemployment Issue Position

	Variables	Odds Ratio Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	1.107	0.730	1.680
	Macro-Economic Stress	1.123	0.865	1.457
	Election Margin	1.011	0.999	1.022
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.000	0.973	1.028
	Percent Latino	0.989	0.973	1.006
	Percent Graduated College	1.005	0.937	1.078
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	1.152	0.332	3.999
	Male	0.804	0.427	1.514
	Democrat	126.371	29.414	542.931
	Seniority	1.024	0.970	1.081
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	1.020	0.991	1.050
	Labor PAC Contributions	1.005	0.996	1.013
	Finance PAC Contributions	1.002	0.998	1.005

Table 3.12: Results for Odds Ratio Analysis of Foreclosure Issue Position

	Variables	Odds Ratio Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.747	0.294	1.897
	Macro-Economic Stress	1.012	0.638	1.606
	Election Margin	0.976	0.949	1.003
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.089	1.019	1.163
	Percent Latino	1.030	1.001	1.060
	Percent Graduated College	1.107	0.947	1.295
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	2.481	0.239	25.811
	Male	1.206	0.362	4.017
	Democrat	79.424	5.555	>999.999
	Seniority	1.015	0.920	1.120
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.988	0.929	1.051
	Labor PAC Contributions	1.001	0.983	1.019
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.996	0.990	1.003

Table 3.13: Results for Odds Ratio Analysis of Bankruptcy Issue Position

	Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.337	0.086	1.322
	Macro-Economic Stress	1.446	0.570	3.670
	Election Margin	1.006	0.970	1.043
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.046	0.952	1.149
	Percent Latino	1.028	0.989	1.069
	Percent Graduated College	1.014	0.819	1.255
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	<0.001	<0.001	>999.999
	Male	2.748	0.526	14.360
	Democrat	18.088	0.948	345.243
	Seniority	1.052	0.890	1.243
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	1.083	0.997	1.176
	Labor PAC Contributions	1.029	1.008	1.051
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.991	0.982	0.999

Table 3.14: Results of the Ordered Logit Analysis of the Visibility of Economic Issues

	Variables	Estimate (Standard Error)		
		Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
		Intercepts	Intercept	1.724* (0.829)
	Intercept	2.932*** (0.837)	3.688*** (1.068)	2.778** (1.078)
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	-0.238 ⁺ (0.169)	-0.149 (0.213)	-0.372 ⁺ (0.240)
	Macro-Economic Stress	0.025 (0.100)	-0.363** (0.132)	0.027 (0.153)
	Election Margin	0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.001 (0.011)	0.006 (0.016)	0.033 ⁺ (0.018)
	Percent Latino	0.001 (0.007)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)
	Percent with College Degree	-0.053 ⁺ (0.028)	-0.071* (0.037)	-0.054 ⁺ (0.039)
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	-0.053 (0.253)	0.348 (0.324)	0.425 (0.362)
	Male	0.235 ⁺ (0.132)	0.129 (0.169)	0.257 ⁺ (0.176)
	Democrat	0.048 (0.196)	-0.701** (0.293)	-0.927** (0.311)
	Seniority	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.056* (0.027)	-0.055 ⁺ (0.029)
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	-0.022 ⁺ (0.011)	0.004 (0.017)	0.017 (0.018)
	Labor PAC Contributions	-5.23E-6 (3.514E-6)	4.968E-7 (2.789E-6)	-8.32E-7 (2.353E-6)
	Finance PAC Contributions	-4.67E-6** (1.778E-6)	-4.41E-6* (2.269E-6)	-6.32E-6** (2.28E-6)
	N	427	427	427
	R ²	0.1032	0.1624	0.1131

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 3.15: Results of the Odds Ratio Analysis of the Visibility of Unemployment Issues

	Variable	Point Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.792	0.569	1.102
	Macro-Economic Stress	1.028	0.845	1.250
	Election Margin	1.002	0.993	1.010
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.003	0.982	1.025
	Percent Latino	1.002	0.989	1.015
	Percent Graduated College	0.950	0.900	1.004
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.966	0.360	2.593
	Male	1.606	0.958	2.693
	Democrat	1.109	0.517	2.379
	Seniority	0.972	0.933	1.014
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.979	0.957	1.001
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.995	0.988	1.002
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.995	0.992	0.999

Table 3.16: Results of the Odds Ratio Analysis of the Visibility of Foreclosure Issues

	Variable	Point Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.862	0.566	1.313
	Macro-Economic Stress	0.703	0.542	0.911
	Election Margin	0.995	0.982	1.009
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.008	0.977	1.040
	Percent Latino	0.985	0.968	1.001
	Percent Graduated College	0.934	0.869	1.005
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	2.156	0.600	7.743
	Male	1.294	0.664	2.522
	Democrat	0.248	0.079	0.784
	Seniority	0.949	0.899	1.002
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	1.003	0.970	1.038
	Labor PAC Contributions	1.001	0.995	1.006
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.996	0.991	1.000

Table 3.17: Results of the Odds Ratio Analysis of the Visibility of Bankruptcy Issues

	Variable	Point Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	0.692	0.431	1.110
	Macro-Economic Stress	1.029	0.763	1.389
	Election Margin	0.993	0.979	1.007
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.036	1.000	1.072
	Percent Latino	0.994	0.977	1.012
	Percent Graduated College	0.948	0.879	1.023
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	2.497	0.606	10.291
	Male	1.643	0.823	3.281
	Democrat	0.159	0.048	0.533
	Seniority	0.951	0.898	1.007
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	1.018	0.983	1.054
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.999	0.994	1.004
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.994	0.990	0.998

Table 3.18: Results of Contrasts of Different Sets of Independent Variables for Economic Issue Positions

Variables	Wald χ^2 (Degrees of Freedom)		
	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
Key Factors	1.450 (2)	5.073 ⁺ (2)	3.073 (2)
District Characteristics	1.688 (3)	3.858 (3)	4.767 ⁺ (3)
Member Characteristics	15.974** (4)	6.986 ⁺ (4)	10.578* (4)
Election Characteristics	5.270 ⁺ (3)	3.359 (3)	9.987** (3)

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 3.19: Results of Contrasts of Different Sets of Independent Variables for Economic Issue Visibility

Variables	Wald χ^2 (Degrees of Freedom)		
	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy
Key Factors	2.180 (2)	7.635* (2)	2.564 (2)
District Characteristics	3.624 (3)	8.082* (3)	7.635* (3)
Member Characteristics	4.666 (4)	11.597* (4)	14.939** (4)
Election Characteristics	12.387* (3)	3.855 (3)	8.878* (3)

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Appendix: Chapter 4 Tables

Table 4.1: Frequencies and Percentages of Primary and Secondary Frames by Congress

Frame	Congress	No Frame	Responsibility	Individuality	Corporate Self-Interest	Market	Small Government
Unemployment Primary	109	14 12.39%	39 34.51%	33 29.20%	8 7.08%	11 9.73%	8 7.08%
	110	5 4.00%	53 42.40%	38 30.40%	16 12.80%	10 8.00%	3 2.40%
	111	3 2.61%	50 43.48%	26 22.61%	14 12.17%	16 13.91%	6 5.22%
	112	0 0.00%	36 36.73%	34 34.69%	7 7.14%	19 19.39%	2 2.04%
Unemployment Secondary	109	14 12.39%	7 6.19%	13 11.50%	39 34.51%	28 24.78%	12 10.62%
	110	5 4.00%	14 11.20%	8 6.40%	46 36.80%	32 25.60%	20 16.00%
	111	3 2.61%	16 13.91%	12 10.43%	48 41.74%	22 19.13%	14 12.17%
	112	0 0.00%	6 6.12%	14 14.29%	37 37.7%	26 26.53%	15 15.31%
Foreclosure Primary	109	85 75.22%	8 7.08%	7 6.19%	4 3.54%	6 5.31%	3 2.65%
	110	62 49.60%	28 22.40%	19 15.20%	2 1.60%	9 7.20%	5 4.00%
	111	27 23.48%	29 25.22%	23 20.00%	16 13.91%	14 12.17%	6 5.22%
	112	6 6.12%	28 29.57%	25 25.51%	13 13.27%	22 2.45%	4 4.08%
Foreclosure Secondary	109	85 75.22%	3 2.65%	7 6.19%	7 6.19%	7 6.19%	4 3.54%
	110	62 49.60%	2 1.60%	9 7.20%	28 22.40%	15 12.00%	9 7.20%
	111	27	14	10	29	20	15

Frame	Congress	No Frame	Responsibility	Individuality	Corporate Self-Interest	Market	Small Government
		23.48%	12.17%	8.70%	25.22%	17.39%	13.04%
	112	6 6.12%	9 9.18%	14 14.29%	30 30.61%	22 22.45%	17 17.35%
Bankruptcy Primary	109	66 58.41%	20 17.70%	11 9.73%	4 3.54%	7 6.19%	5 4.42%
	110	28 22.40%	34 27.20%	28 22.40%	12 9.60%	9 7.20%	14 11.20%
	111	12 10.43%	38 33.04%	25 21.74%	15 13.04%	13 11.30%	12 10.43%
	112	2 2.04%	36 36.73%	34 34.69%	5 5.10%	12 12.24%	9 9.18%
Bankruptcy Secondary	109	66 58.41%	3 2.65%	6 5.31%	20 17.70	9 7.96%	9 7.96%
	110	28 22.40%	9 7.20%	11 8.80%	32 25.60%	30 24.00%	15 12.00%
	111	12 10.43%	12 10.43%	12 10.43%	36 31.30%	27 23.48%	16 13.91%
	112	2 2.04%	2 2.04%	12 12.24%	37 37.76%	32 32.65%	13 13.27%

Table 4.2: Frequencies and Percentages of Primary and Secondary Frames by Party

Frame	Party	No Frame	Responsibility	Individuality	Corporate Self-Interest	Market	Small government
Unemployment Primary	Democrat	10 4.27%	176 75.21%	1 0.43%	44 18.80%	0 0.00%	3 1.28%
	Republican	12 5.53%	2 0.92%	130 59.91%	1 0.46%	56 25.81%	16 7.37%
Unemployment Secondary	Democrat	10 4.27%	43 18.38%	0 0.00%	167 71.37%	2 0.85%	12 5.13%
	Republican	12 5.53%	0 0.00%	47 21.66%	3 1.38%	106 48.85%	49 22.58%
Foreclosure Primary	Democrat	101 43.16%	93 39.74%	0 0.00%	35 14.96%	2 0.85%	3 1.28%
	Republican	79 36.41%	0 0.00%	74 34.10%	0 0.00%	49 22.58%	15 6.91%
Foreclosure Secondary	Democrat	101 43.16%	28 11.97%	3 1.28%	89 38.03%	1 0.43%	12 5.13%
	Republican	79 36.41%	0 0.00%	37 17.05%	5 2.30%	63 29.03%	33 15.21%
Bankruptcy Primary	Democrat	61 26.07%	128 54.70%	2 0.85%	34 14.53%	1 0.43%	8 3.42%
	Republican	47 21.66%	0 0.00%	96 44.24%	2 0.92%	40 18.43%	32 14.75%
Bankruptcy Secondary	Democrat	61 26.07%	25 10.68%	2 0.85%	124 52.99%	0 0.00%	22 9.40%
	Republican	47 21.66%	1 0.46%	39 17.97%	1 0.46%	98 45.16%	31 14.29%

Table 4.3: Results for Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Primary and Secondary Frames

Variables		Estimate (Standard Error)					
		Primary Frames			Secondary Frames		
		Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
Intercepts	Intercept	-5.816*** (0.925)	-2.841*** (0.914)	-1.960** (0.802)	-4.258*** (0.872)	-2.537** (1.003)	-1.513+ (0.817)
	Intercept	-2.351** (0.861)	-1.657+ (0.921)	-0.224 (0.784)	-3.073*** (0.815)	-2.185* (0.997)	-1.110 (0.808)
	Intercept	-0.679 (0.861)	-0.657 (0.920)	0.995 (0.786)	-2.378** (0.853)	-1.743* (1.014)	-0.620 (0.810)
	Intercept	-0.045 (0.870)	-0.064 (0.911)	1.525* (0.794)	-0.436 (0.784)	-0.577 (1.004)	0.792 (0.804)
	Intercept	1.615+ (0.922)	1.573+ (0.923)	2.409** (0.823)	1.170+ (0.764)	0.676 (1.001)	2.348** (0.815)
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	0.209+ (0.144)	0.310+ (0.174)	-0.004 (0.164)	0.029 (0.145)	0.270 (0.196)	0.100 (0.158)
	Macro-Economic Stress Factor	-0.045 (0.095)	0.003 (0.103)	-0.013 (0.101)	-0.013 (0.117)	-0.015 (0.109)	-0.082 (0.107)
	Election Margin	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006+ (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Congress	109 th Congress	0.382+ (0.294)	2.863*** (0.371)	2.064*** (0.329)	0.412+ (0.295)	2.773*** (0.377)	2.353*** (0.312)
	110 th Congress	0.079 (0.270)	1.492*** (0.300)	0.180 (0.249)	-0.150 (0.277)	1.292*** (0.320)	0.695** (0.269)
	111 th Congress	-0.331 (0.272)	0.319 (0.257)	-0.198 (0.239)	0.180 (0.259)	0.293 (0.276)	0.278 (0.256)
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.007 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.018+ (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.010)
	Percent Latino	-0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)
	Percent Graduated College	0.041+ (0.025)	0.032 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.023)	0.041 (0.032)	0.029 (0.026)
Member Character	Non-Minority	0.242 (0.440)	0.081 (0.491)	-0.207 (0.431)	0.603 (0.429)	0.282 (0.534)	-0.571 (0.439)
	Male	0.086	0.158	-0.033	-0.438+ (0.429)	-0.128	-0.209

Variables		Estimate (Standard Error)					
		Primary Frames			Secondary Frames		
		Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
		(0.264)	(0.281)	(0.229)	(0.274)	(0.269)	(0.220)
	Democrat	2.246*** (0.427)	1.145** (0.428)	2.002*** (0.391)	1.771 (0.384)	0.679 (0.501)	1.462*** (0.422)
	Seniority	0.026 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.003 (0.025)	-0.020 (0.021)	0.003 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.024)
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.021* (0.011)
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Finance PAC Contributions	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
	N	429	429	429	429	429	429

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 4.4: Odds Ratios for Unemployment Primary

Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.232	0.93	1.633
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.956	0.793	1.151
Election Margin	1.000	0.993	1.007
Percent Black	1.007	0.986	1.030
Percent Latino	0.998	0.986	1.010
Percent Graduated College	1.042	0.992	1.095
Seniority	1.026	0.981	1.073
Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.992	0.971	1.013
Labor PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000
Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 4.5: Odds Ratios for Unemployment Secondary

Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	Confidence Interval	
		Lower	Upper
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.029	0.774	1.368
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.988	0.786	1.242
Election Margin	0.997	0.990	1.005
Percent Black	1.018	0.995	1.041
Percent Latino	1.005	0.994	1.016
Percent Graduated College	0.985	0.941	1.031
Seniority	0.980	0.941	1.021
Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.997	0.977	1.017
Labor PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000
Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 4.6: Odds Ratios for Foreclosure Primary

Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.363	0.970	1.916
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	1.003	0.819	1.228
Election Margin	0.995	0.987	1.002
Percent Black	1.004	0.983	1.025
Percent Latino	1.001	0.989	1.014
Percent Graduated College	1.033	0.981	1.087
Seniority	0.986	0.941	1.032
Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.995	0.972	1.019
Labor PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000
Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 4.7: Odds Ratios for Foreclosure Secondary

Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.310	0.893	1.921
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.985	0.796	1.219
Election Margin	0.994	0.987	1.002
Percent Black	1.015	0.991	1.040
Percent Latino	1.003	0.989	1.016
Percent Graduated College	1.042	0.982	1.107
Seniority	1.003	0.942	1.067
Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.989	0.965	1.015
Labor PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000
Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 4.8: Odds Ratios for Bankruptcy Primary

Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	0.995	0.722	1.372
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.987	0.810	1.202
Election Margin	1.004	0.997	1.010
Percent Black	0.988	0.969	1.009
Percent Latino	0.999	0.987	1.011
Percent Graduated College	0.984	0.939	1.032
Seniority	1.003	0.955	1.053
Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.987	0.967	1.007
Labor PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000
Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 4.9: Odds Ratios for Bankruptcy Secondary

Variable	Odds Ratio Estimate	Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.105	0.810	1.507
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.921	0.747	1.136
Election Margin	1.000	0.992	1.007
Percent Black	0.994	0.975	1.013
Percent Latino	1.006	0.994	1.018
Percent Graduated College	1.029	0.977	1.084
Seniority	0.974	0.930	1.020
Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.979	0.958	1.000
Labor PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000
Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 4.10: Results for Contrasts of Different Sets of Independent Variables on Primary and Secondary Issue Frame

Variables	χ^2					
	Primary Frames			Secondary Frames		
	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
Key Factors	2.38 (2)	2.95 (2)	0.02 (2)	0.06 (2)	2.30 (2)	1.10 (2)
District Characteristics	4.13 (3)	1.55 (3)	1.62 (3)	3.55 (3)	2.79 (3)	2.84 (3)
Member Characteristics	24.56*** (4)	7.39 ⁺ (4)	26.70*** (4)	23.14*** (4)	2.27 (4)	14.87** (4)
Election Characteristics	5.25 ⁺ (3)	2.36 (3)	2.16 (3)	0.49 (3)	6.35 ⁺ (3)	4.79 (3)

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Appendix: Chapter 5 Tables

Table 5.1: Conyers Legislative Activity On Unemployment Issues Compared to All Other Members of Congress

Congress	Unemployment Bills		Conyers	Maximum	Mean
109	Sponsored	Pro-Worker	1	4	.13
		Neutral	0	3	.14
	Co-Sponsored	Pro-Worker	19	22	4
		Neutral	10	12	2.53
110	Sponsored	Pro-Worker	2	9	0.17
		Neutral	2	4	0.19
	Co-Sponsored	Pro-Worker	17	29	4.62
		Neutral	10	13	3.54
111	Sponsored	Pro-Worker	2	11	0.28
		Neutral	4	5	0.25
	Co-Sponsored	Pro-Worker	29	36	5.51
		Neutral	11	14	3.82
112	Sponsored	Pro-Worker	2	3	0.17
		Neutral	0	3	0.08
	Co-Sponsored	Pro-Worker	24	28	3.17
		Neutral	2	6	1.61

Table 5.2: Total Bills and Bills that Came to Floor Votes by Congress and Issue Area

Issue Areas	112th		111th		110th		109th	
	Total Bills	Floor Votes	Total Bills	Floor Votes	Total Bills	Floor Votes	Total Bills	Floor Votes
Unemployment	139	10	256	62	171	48	141	26
Foreclosures	41	9	98	11	88	13	23	3
Bankruptcy	27	5	71	14	44	12	68	20

Table 5.3: Frequencies and Percentages of Economic Issue Bills by Category

Economic Issue	Congress	Positive Impact	Neutral	Negative Impact	Total Number of Bills
Unemployment	109	57 (40.4%)	64 (45.4%)	20 (14.2%)	141
	110	77 (45%)	77 (45%)	17 (9.9%)	171
	111	126 (49.2%)	112 (43.8%)	18 (7%)	256
	112	77 (55.4%)	36 (25.9%)	26 (18.7%)	139
Foreclosures	109	14 (60.9%)	6 (26.1%)	3 (13%)	23
	110	63 (71.6%)	16 (18.2%)	9 (10.2%)	88
	111	69 (70.4%)	19 (19.4%)	10 (10.2%)	98
	112	27 (65.9%)	9 (22%)	5 (12.2%)	41
Bankruptcy	109	25 (36.8%)	35 (51.5%)	8 (11.8%)	68
	110	13 (29.5%)	29 (65.9%)	2 (4.5%)	44
	111	33 (46.5%)	31 (43.7%)	7 (9.9%)	71
	112	15 (55.6%)	8 (29.6%)	4 (14.8%)	27

Table 5.4: Descriptive Characteristics of Bills by Category

Issue Areas	Simple Statistics	All Members			Democrats			Republicans			
	Variable	N	Mean	Range	N	Mean	Range	N	Mean	Range	
Bill Sponsorship	Unemployment	Positive Impact	1790	0.190	0-11	925	0.330	0-11	865	0.040	0-2
		Neutral	1790	0.166	0-5	925	0.198	0-5	865	0.133	0-3
		Negative Impact	1790	0.044	0-3	925	0.001	0-1	865	0.090	0-3
	Foreclosures	Positive Impact	1790	0.096	0-6	925	0.174	0-6	865	0.012	0-1
		Neutral	1790	0.028	0-2	925	0.037	0-2	865	0.020	0-2
		Negative Impact	1790	0.015	0-2	925	0.000	0	865	0.031	0-2
	Bankruptcy	Positive Impact	1790	0.048	0-6	925	0.083	0-6	865	0.010	0-2
		Neutral	1790	0.058	0-5	925	0.049	0-2	865	0.067	0-5
		Negative Impact	1790	0.012	0-2	925	0.001	0-1	865	0.023	0-2
Bill Co-Sponsorship	Unemployment	Positive Impact	1790	4.332	0-36	925	7.596	0-36	865	0.843	0-10
		Neutral	1790	2.885	0-14	925	3.836	0-14	865	1.868	0-8
		Negative Impact	1790	0.682	0-7	925	0.088	0-4	865	1.317	0-7
	Foreclosures	Positive Impact	1790	1.250	0-17	925	2.270	0-17	865	0.160	0-5
		Neutral	1790	0.431	0-5	925	0.430	0-5	865	0.431	0-4
		Negative Impact	1790	0.297	0-4	925	0.050	0-2	865	0.561	0-4
	Bankruptcy	Positive Impact	1790	0.959	0-9	925	1.691	0-9	865	0.177	0-3
		Neutral	1790	1.180	0-7	925	0.917	0-5	865	1.461	0-7
		Negative Impact	1790	0.172	0-3	925	0.019	0-2	865	0.335	0-3

Table 5.5: Simple Correlations between Bill Sponsorship and Other Variables

Variable		Pearson Correlation Coefficients					
		Unemployment Bill Sponsorship		Foreclosures Bill Sponsorship		Bankruptcy Bill Sponsorship	
		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Unemployment Sponsorship	Positive Impact	-	-0.007	0.213***	-0.036 ⁺	0.189***	-0.031
	Negative Impact	-0.007	-	-0.040 ⁺	0.157***	-0.030	0.042 ⁺
Foreclosures Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.213***	-0.040 ⁺	-	-0.017	0.206***	-0.012
	Negative Impact	-0.035 ⁺	0.157***	-0.017	-	-0.020	0.105***
Bankruptcy Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.189***	-0.030	0.206***	-0.020	-	-0.001
	Negative Impact	-0.031	0.042 ⁺	-0.012	0.105***	-0.001	-
Unemployment Co-Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.366***	-0.087***	0.277***	-0.076***	0.234***	-0.064**
	Negative Impact	-0.134***	0.160***	-0.120***	0.068**	-0.058**	0.040 ⁺
Foreclosures Co-Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.295***	-0.081***	0.333***	-0.057**	0.200***	-0.056**
	Negative Impact	-0.110***	0.042 ⁺	-0.064**	0.107***	-0.069**	0.078***
Bankruptcy Co-Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.254***	-0.082***	0.209***	-0.073**	0.201***	-0.059**
	Negative Impact	-0.086***	0.101***	-0.065**	0.042 ⁺	-0.034	0.070**

Variable		Pearson Correlation Coefficients					
		Unemployment Bill Sponsorship		Foreclosures Bill Sponsorship		Bankruptcy Bill Sponsorship	
		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Web Issue Position	Unemployment	-0.090*	0.070 ⁺	-0.068	0.028	-0.029	0.068
	Foreclosures	0.083 ⁺	0.023	0.150**	0.004	0.005	0.014
	Bankruptcy	0.058	0.035	0.042	0.032	0.025	-0.032
Web Visibility	Unemployment	0.175***	-0.032	0.127**	0.005	0.117**	0.032
	Foreclosures	0.207***	-0.053	0.278***	0.006	0.094*	0.018
	Bankruptcy	0.149**	-0.050	0.075 ⁺	-0.008	0.057	-0.039
Key Factors	Finance Factor	0.092***	-0.029	0.114***	-0.043 ⁺	0.104***	-0.088***
	Economic Factor	0.070**	0.054*	0.144***	0.018	0.131***	0.031
	Foreclosure Rate	0.030	0.058**	0.106***	0.014	0.087***	0.021
	Median Income	-0.034	0.009	-0.058**	0.039 ⁺	-0.043 ⁺	0.102***
	Poverty Rate	0.112***	-0.039 ⁺	0.137***	-0.055	0.123***	-0.081***
	Unemployment Rate	0.130***	0.010	0.176***	-0.008	0.172***	-0.017
	Election Margin	0.163***	-0.046*	0.113***	-0.047*	0.147***	-0.009

Variable		Pearson Correlation Coefficients					
		Unemployment Bill Sponsorship		Foreclosures Bill Sponsorship		Bankruptcy Bill Sponsorship	
		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.125***	-0.044 ⁺	0.158***	-0.036 ⁺	0.180***	-0.037 ⁺
	Percent Latino	0.041 ⁺	-0.032	0.069**	-0.039 ⁺	0.002	-0.024
	Percent Graduated College	0.045 ⁺	-0.020	-0.036 ⁺	0.030	-0.018	0.091***
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.213***	-0.042 ⁺	0.213***	-0.038 ⁺	0.156***	-0.033
	Male	0.111***	-0.062**	0.089***	-0.018	0.050*	-0.007
	Democrat	-0.226***	0.180***	-0.192***	0.123***	-0.129***	0.098***
	Seniority	0.170***	-0.031	0.035 ⁺	-0.027	0.142***	0.015
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.278***	-0.155***	0.221***	-0.093***	0.173***	-0.077***
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.158***	-0.125***	0.113***	-0.088***	0.084**	-0.071**
	Finance PAC Contributions	-0.022	0.060**	0.072**	0.129***	0.018	0.081***

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Table 5.6: Simple Correlations between Bill Co-Sponsorship and Other Variables

Variables		Pearson Correlation Coefficient					
		Unemployment		Foreclosures		Bankruptcy	
		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Unemployment Co-Sponsorship	Positive Impact	-	-0.362***	0.721***	-0.257***	0.723***	-0.234***
	Negative Impact	-0.362***	-	-0.321***	0.293***	-0.292***	0.418***
Foreclosures Co-Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.721***	-0.321***	-	-0.186***	0.500***	-0.196***
	Negative Impact	-0.257***	0.293***	-0.186***	-	-0.216***	0.313***
Bankruptcy Co-Sponsorship	Positive Impact	0.723***	-0.292***	0.500***	-0.216***	-	-0.208***
	Negative Impact	-0.234***	0.418***	-0.196***	0.313***	-0.208***	-
Web Issue Position	Unemployment	-0.235***	0.276***	-0.194***	0.227***	-0.192***	0.244***
	Foreclosures	0.089 ⁺	0.034	0.083 ⁺	0.176***	0.115**	0.072 ⁺
	Bankruptcy	-0.028	0.097*	-0.001	0.158***	-0.001	0.117**
Web Visibility	Unemployment	0.213***	-0.042	0.170***	0.097*	0.20***	-0.080 ⁺
	Foreclosures	0.371***	-0.139**	0.305***	0.048	0.362***	-0.113*
	Bankruptcy	0.198***	-0.102*	0.176***	0.076 ⁺	0.242***	-0.091*

Pearson Correlation Coefficient

Variables

		Unemployment		Foreclosures		Bankruptcy	
		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Key Factors	Finance Factor	0.226***	-0.086***	0.167***	-0.145***	0.097***	-0.023
	Economic Factor	0.142***	0.007	0.122***	0.004	0.103***	0.020
	Foreclosure Rate	0.067**	0.028	0.078***	0.032	0.064**	-0.023
	Median Income	-0.080***	0.014	-0.055*	0.101***	0.005	0.019
	Poverty Rate	0.304***	-0.137***	0.243***	-0.156***	0.171***	-0.080***
	Unemployment Rate	0.263***	-0.055 ⁺	0.184***	-0.103***	0.136***	0.076***
	Election Margin	0.307***	-0.112***	0.265***	-0.128***	0.238***	-0.019
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.407***	-0.122***	0.296***	-0.120***	0.276***	-0.092***
	Percent Latino	0.168***	-0.139***	0.172***	-0.059**	0.127***	-0.069**
	Percent Graduated College	-0.001	0.016	0.016	0.110***	0.065**	0.014
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.517***	-0.154***	0.369***	-0.130***	0.348***	-0.113***
	Male	0.210***	-0.114***	0.172***	-0.038 ⁺	0.170***	-0.052*
	Democrat	-0.628***	0.565***	-0.489***	0.413***	-0.522***	0.347***

Pearson Correlation Coefficient

Variables

		Unemployment		Foreclosures		Bankruptcy	
		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
	Seniority	0.161***	-0.176***	0.067**	-0.072**	0.116***	-0.084***
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.689***	-0.511***	0.542***	-0.332***	0.551***	-0.327***
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.410***	-0.409***	0.353***	-0.309***	0.339***	-0.257***
	Finance PAC Contributions	-0.103***	0.022	-0.040 ⁺	0.171***	-0.119***	0.062**

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Table 5.7: Results of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model Analyses of Sponsorship and Co-Sponsorship

Variables		Sponsorship		Co-Sponsorship				
		Positive		Positive			Negative	
		Unemployment	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
Intercept	Intercept	-3.005*** (0.703)	-7.966*** (1.263)	-0.719*** (0.221)	-3.107*** (0.296)	-2.528*** (0.295)	-0.823 (0.679)	-0.308 (1.617)
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	0.204+ (0.133)	0.186 (0.199)	0.031 (0.039)	0.115* (0.050)	-0.005 (0.051)	-0.012 (0.099)	-0.159 (0.204)
	Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.142+ (0.087)	0.466*** (0.134)	0.076** (0.028)	0.137*** (0.035)	0.130*** (0.038)	0.011 (0.052)	-0.081 (0.105)
	Election Margin	0.006* (0.003)	0.014* (0.006)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.005+ (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Congresses	109 th Congress	-0.400+ (0.222)	0.607 (0.436)	0.261*** (0.053)	-0.719*** (0.126)	0.880*** (0.091)	0.139 (0.160)	-2.195*** (0.424)
	110 th Congress	-0.201 (0.216)	-0.228 (0.501)	0.320*** (0.053)	1.236*** (0.093)	0.232* (0.100)	0.747*** (0.143)	-1.979*** (0.420)
	111 th Congress	0.006 (0.187)	0.235 (0.420)	0.379*** (0.047)	0.743*** (0.090)	0.394*** (0.091)	0.765*** (0.137)	0.156 (0.213)
District Characteristics	Percent Black	-0.028** (0.009)	0.030* (0.015)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.011 (0.012)
	Percent Latino	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.008)
	Percent Graduated College	0.034+ (0.021)	0.048 (0.036)	0.014* (0.007)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.031* (0.014)	-0.006 (0.031)
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	-1.279*** (0.355)	1.052+ (0.587)	-0.447*** (0.108)	-0.385** (0.134)	-0.405** (0.149)	-0.068 (0.451)	0.835 (1.282)
	Male	-0.357+ (0.199)	-0.722* (0.342)	-0.112+ (0.065)	-0.033 (0.077)	-0.041 (0.083)	-0.244+ (0.134)	-0.226 (0.296)
	Democrat	1.040** (0.419)	1.480+ (0.800)	1.456*** (0.118)	1.675*** (0.177)	1.684*** (0.175)	-1.140*** (0.315)	-1.796** (0.668)
	Seniority	0.065*** (0.015)	0.080** (0.026)	0.015** (0.006)	-0.012+ (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.034 (0.026)
Election Character	Democratic Vote Previous	0.016 (0.011)	0.006 (0.019)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.026+ (0.015)

Variables		Sponsorship		Co-Sponsorship				
		Positive		Positive			Negative	
		Unemployment	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
	Election							
	Labor PAC Contributions	2.302E-6 (0.000)	-1.03E-7 (1.894E-6)	6.382E-7 (0.000)	8.478E-7 (0.000)	6.638E-7 (0.000)	-9.25E-6*** (1.584E-6)	-2.74E-6 (3.179E-6)
	Finance PAC Contributions	3.1E-7 (0.000)	2.306E-6* (1.056E-6)	-4.26E-7 (0.000)	-8.14E-7 (0.000)	-1.88E-6 (0.000)	1.716E-6 (0.000)	1.521E-6 (0.000)
	N	1706	1706	1706	1706	1706	1706	1706

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 5.8: Positive-Impact Sponsorship Bills Odds Ratio

Variables		Unemployment			Bankruptcy		
		Estimate	Lower	Upper	Estimate	Lower	Upper
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.238	0.955	1.604	1.218	0.828	1.791
	Macro-Economic Stress Factor	1.153	0.973	1.367	1.584	1.224	2.050
	Election Margin	1.006	1.000	1.012	1.014	1.003	1.025
Congresses	109 th Congress	0.696	0.455	1.064	1.905	0.836	4.340
	110 th Congress	0.834	0.551	1.263	0.810	0.313	2.099
	111 th Congress	1.014	0.709	1.450	1.273	0.574	2.823
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.972	0.955	0.990	1.030	1.000	1.061
	Percent Latino	0.992	0.982	1.003	0.992	0.972	1.013
	Percent Graduated College	1.040	0.999	1.082	1.051	0.981	1.127
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.277	0.138	0.553	2.798	0.903	8.669
	Male	0.705	0.479	1.038	0.492	0.255	0.947
	Democrat	2.673	1.205	5.927	3.894	0.890	17.032
	Seniority	1.068	1.037	1.100	1.083	1.030	1.139
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	1.014	0.993	1.036	1.006	0.970	1.042
	Labor PAC Contributions	1.002	1.001	1.004	1.000	0.997	1.004
	Finance PAC Contributions	1.000	0.999	1.002	1.002	1.000	1.004

Table 5.9: Positive-Impact Co-Sponsorship Bills Odds Ratios

Variables		Unemployment			Foreclosures			Bankruptcy		
		Estimate	Lower	Upper	Estimate	Lower	Upper	Estimate	Lower	Upper
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	1.033	0.957	1.116	1.123	1.018	1.240	0.998	0.902	1.104
	Macro-Economic Stress Factor	1.075	1.016	1.137	1.144	1.067	1.226	1.134	1.052	1.223
	Election Margin	0.999	0.997	1.000	1.000	0.997	1.002	1.002	0.999	1.004
Congresses	109 th Congress	1.278	1.152	1.417	0.489	0.382	0.625	2.368	1.982	2.829
	110 th Congress	1.356	1.222	1.504	3.437	2.865	4.122	1.242	1.021	1.507
	111 th Congress	1.427	1.301	1.565	2.090	1.754	2.490	1.446	1.211	1.728
District Characteristics	Percent Black	1.000	0.995	1.005	0.999	0.993	1.006	0.999	0.991	1.006
	Percent Latino	1.002	0.999	1.005	1.006	1.002	1.010	1.001	0.997	1.005
	Percent Graduated College	1.013	0.999	1.027	1.036	1.019	1.054	1.031	1.013	1.049
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.631	0.509	0.781	0.675	0.519	0.880	0.670	0.499	0.899
	Male	0.898	0.790	1.021	0.967	0.830	1.127	0.960	0.815	1.130
	Democrat	4.129	3.280	5.197	5.255	3.720	7.422	5.016	3.580	7.027
	Seniority	1.014	1.003	1.025	0.988	0.974	1.003	1.005	0.991	1.020
Election Characteristic	Democratic Vote Previous Election	1.016	1.010	1.022	1.018	1.009	1.026	1.012	1.003	1.020

Labor PAC Contributi ons	1.001	1.000	1.001	1.001	1.000	1.002	1.001	1.000	1.002
Finance PAC Contributi ons	1.000	0.999	1.000	0.999	0.999	1.000	0.998	0.997	0.999

Table 5.10: Negative-Impact Co-Sponsorship Bills Odds Ratios

Variables		Foreclosures			Bankruptcies		
		Estimate	Lower	Upper	Estimate	Lower	Upper
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	0.991	0.816	1.202	0.853	0.571	1.276
	Macro-Economic Stress Factor	1.013	0.914	1.122	0.921	0.749	1.133
	Election Margin	0.995	0.990	1.000	1.002	0.994	1.011
Congresses	109 th Congress	1.145	0.839	1.563	0.110	0.048	0.252
	110 th Congress	2.119	1.601	2.806	0.139	0.061	0.317
	111 th Congress	2.147	1.640	2.810	1.171	0.771	1.781
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.999	0.987	1.011	1.012	0.988	1.036
	Percent Latino	1.002	0.995	1.010	1.004	0.988	1.020
	Percent Graduated College	1.030	1.001	1.059	0.994	0.935	1.056
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.925	0.382	2.244	2.277	0.183	28.383
	Male	0.782	0.601	1.017	0.794	0.443	1.423
	Democrat	0.309	0.168	0.570	0.163	0.044	0.602
	Seniority	0.988	0.965	1.012	0.967	0.919	1.017
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.991	0.977	1.006	0.974	0.946	1.004
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.991	0.988	0.994	0.997	0.991	1.004
	Finance PAC Contributions	1.002	1.001	1.002	1.002	1.000	1.003

Table 5.11: Results of Contrasts of Sets of Independent Variables for Sponsorship and Co-Sponsorship

Variables	Wald χ^2 (Degrees of Freedom)						
	Sponsorship		Co-Sponsorship				
	Positive		Positive		Negative		
	Unemployment	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy	Foreclosure	Bankruptcy
Key Factors	2.14 ⁺ (2)	6.14** (2)	3.71* (2)	8.73*** (2)	6.12** (2)	0.04 (2)	0.53 (2)
District Characteristics	4.65** (3)	2.92* (3)	1.78 (3)	8.91*** (3)	4.20** (3)	1.75 ⁺ (3)	0.34 (3)
Member Characteristics	8.15*** (4)	3.52** (4)	43.52*** (4)	26.83*** (4)	24.80*** (4)	4.62*** (4)	2.78* (4)
Election Characteristics	3.44* (3)	1.69 (3)	11.52*** (3)	8.66*** (3)	10.29*** (3)	17.56*** (3)	2.35 ⁺ (3)

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Appendix: Logit Comparing those Taking a Position on Their Website vs. Those Not

Variables	Estimate (Standard Error)			
	Unemployment	Foreclosures	Bankruptcy	
Intercept	1.745 ⁺ (0.954)	3.028** (1.075)	1.937 ⁺ (1.091)	
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity	-0.180 (0.194)	-0.157 (0.217)	-0.441 ⁺ (0.250)
	Macro-Economic Stress	0.057 (0.111)	-0.360** (0.133)	0.048 (0.156)
	Election Margin	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.002 (0.012)	0.012 (0.016)	0.004* (0.018)
	Percent Latino	0.001 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)
	Percent Graduated College	0.054 ⁺ (0.033)	-0.058 (0.037)	-0.056 (0.040)
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	-0.116 (0.287)	0.354 (0.332)	0.446 (0.370)
	Male	0.245 (0.157)	0.173 (0.171)	0.256 (0.180)
	Democrat	0.171 (0.219)	-0.670* (0.292)	-0.884** (0.049)
	Seniority	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.058* (0.028)	-0.049 ⁺ (0.085)
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	-0.024 ⁺ (0.013)	0.001 (0.017)	0.017 (0.018)
	Labor PAC Contributions	-0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
	Finance PAC Contributions	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)
	N	430	430	429
	R ²	0.078	0.239	0.176

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Appendix: Speeches by Congress

Variables		Estimate (Standard Error)			
		109 th Congress	110 th Congress	111 th Congress	112 th Congress
Intercepts	Intercept	-4.517* (2.142)	-7.685** (3.278)	-5.608* (2.626)	-2.943 (4.400)
	Intercept	-2.150 (2.072)	-4.055 (3.119)	-1.190 (2.556)	-0.261 (4.358)
	Intercept	-0.434 (2.063)	-2.332 (3.077)	0.095 (2.546)	0.168 (4.360)
	Intercept	0.088 (2.067)	-1.377 (3.081)	0.853 (2.556)	3.143 (4.489)
	Intercept	1.117 (2.089)	0.356 (3.154)	2.620 (2.597)	-
Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	-0.233 (0.380)	0.385 (0.589)	0.331 (0.443)	0.793 (0.701)
	Macro-Economic Stress Factor	-0.169 (0.305)	-0.209 (0.559)	-0.225 (0.243)	0.251 (0.377)
	Election Margin	0.009 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.019)
District Characteristics	Percent Black	0.007 (0.027)	0.026 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.055)
	Percent Latino	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.002 (0.020)	0.023 (0.031)
	Percent Graduated College	-0.019 (0.064)	0.077 (0.084)	0.058 (0.066)	0.085 (0.113)
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	0.518 (1.190)	1.185 (1.602)	-1.445 (1.409)	0.798 (2.570)
	Male	-0.139 (0.577)	0.379 (0.786)	0.290 (0.599)	-0.562 (1.168)

**Estimate
(Standard Error)**

Variables		109 th Congress	110 th Congress	111 th Congress	112 th Congress
Election Characteristics	Democrat	1.393 (1.203)	2.190 (1.804)	1.639 (1.295)	4.183* (2.015)
	Seniority	0.012 (0.062)	0.010 (0.096)	0.024 (0.061)	0.013 (0.132)
	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.007 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.032)	-0.040 (0.049)
	Labor PAC Contributions	0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.007)	0.006 (0.005)	0.020 (0.024)
	Finance PAC Contributions	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.006)
	N	445	452	452	441

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Appendix: Generalized Odds Ratio Estimates for Floor Speeches

Unemployment Primary		Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	Responsibility	1.132	0.276	4.647
	Individuality	1.349	0.328	5.555
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.314	0.400	4.310
	Market	0.932	0.212	4.093
	Small Government	1.608	0.445	5.818
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	Responsibility	0.850	0.378	1.914
	Individuality	0.764	0.314	1.856
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.740	0.390	1.405
	Market	0.722	0.279	1.867
	Small Government	0.884	0.453	1.727
Election Margin	Responsibility	0.989	0.960	1.018
	Individuality	1.005	0.968	1.043
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.984	0.960	1.008
	Market	0.997	0.958	1.038
	Small Government	0.984	0.957	1.011
Percent Black	Responsibility	1.078	0.968	1.200
	Individuality	1.003	0.900	1.118
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.078	0.972	1.197
	Market	1.013	0.906	1.134
	Small Government	1.094	0.982	1.219
Percent Latino	Responsibility	0.989	0.920	1.063
	Individuality	0.980	0.915	1.050
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.030	0.966	1.098
	Market	0.993	0.925	1.066
	Small Government	1.037	0.970	1.110

Percent Graduated College	Responsibility	0.975	0.784	1.214
	Individuality	1.033	0.818	1.303
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.006	0.843	1.199
	Market	0.966	0.758	1.232
	Small Government	1.005	0.831	1.215
Seniority	Responsibility	0.836	0.678	1.030
	Individuality	0.891	0.724	1.098
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.015	0.864	1.191
	Market	0.779	0.618	0.981
	Small Government	1.015	0.850	1.212
Democratic Vote Previous Election	Responsibility	0.985	0.897	1.081
	Individuality	0.999	0.893	1.117
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.944	0.862	1.034
	Market	1.027	0.912	1.156
	Small Government	0.967	0.874	1.070
Labor PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.005	0.988	1.023
	Individuality	0.995	0.979	1.012
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.015	0.995	1.036
	Market	0.992	0.975	1.009
	Small Government	1.006	0.983	1.031
Finance PAC Contributions	Responsibility	0.999	0.994	1.005
	Individuality	0.997	0.992	1.002
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.006	1.000	1.011
	Market	0.999	0.994	1.005
	Small Government	1.006	1.000	1.011
109 th Congress	Responsibility	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Individuality	0.556	0.017	18.725
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.093	0.014	0.612
	Market	0.512	0.013	19.576

	Small Government	0.070	0.010	0.513
110 th Congress	Responsibility	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Individuality	3.270	0.088	121.323
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.321	0.042	2.474
	Market	4.029	0.100	162.413
	Small Government	0.192	0.022	1.637
111 th Congress	Responsibility	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Individuality	0.299	0.010	9.390
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.181	0.028	1.179
	Market	0.493	0.014	17.325
	Small Government	0.224	0.033	1.534
Non-Minority	Responsibility	29.588	0.185	>999.999
	Individuality	5.021	0.049	516.073
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.580	<0.001	.
	Market	5.265	0.043	651.097
	Small Government	4.188	<0.001	.
Male	Responsibility	2.652	0.406	17.339
	Individuality	1.615	0.223	11.697
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.787	0.404	7.900
	Market	3.318	0.396	27.841
	Small Government	0.721	0.154	3.369
Democrat	Responsibility	6.485	0.051	821.836
	Individuality	>999.999	47.483	>999.999
	Corporate Self-Interest	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Market	>999.999	9.517	>999.999
	Small Government	<0.001	<0.001	.

Unemployment Secondary		Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	Responsibility	1.394	0.498	3.908
	Individuality	1.129	0.437	2.917
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.012	0.393	2.607
	Market	1.786	0.771	4.134
	Small Government	0.890	0.422	1.876
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	Responsibility	1.152	0.608	2.181
	Individuality	1.105	0.536	2.278
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.972	0.632	1.495
	Market	1.131	0.602	2.124
	Small Government	0.806	0.550	1.180
Election Margin	Responsibility	0.996	0.971	1.022
	Individuality	0.981	0.947	1.016
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.009	0.987	1.032
	Market	0.997	0.972	1.023
	Small Government	1.006	0.987	1.026
Percent Black	Responsibility	1.006	0.942	1.075
	Individuality	0.960	0.897	1.027
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.022	0.961	1.086
	Market	0.937	0.884	0.993
	Small Government	0.985	0.934	1.038
Percent Latino	Responsibility	0.980	0.927	1.036
	Individuality	1.012	0.963	1.063
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.010	0.971	1.050
	Market	0.981	0.939	1.026
	Small Government	0.990	0.958	1.024
Percent Graduated	Responsibility	1.002	0.847	1.185
	Individuality	1.016	0.859	1.201

College	Corporate Self-Interest	0.942	0.818	1.084
	Market	1.031	0.890	1.194
	Small Government	0.999	0.896	1.113
Seniority	Responsibility	0.906	0.749	1.096
	Individuality	1.027	0.850	1.241
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.056	0.928	1.202
	Market	1.142	0.978	1.335
	Small Government	0.990	0.890	1.101
Democratic Vote Previous Election	Responsibility	1.000	0.931	1.075
	Individuality	1.039	0.938	1.151
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.049	0.972	1.133
	Market	1.003	0.929	1.083
	Small Government	1.024	0.965	1.087
Labor PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.003	0.993	1.013
	Individuality	0.994	0.985	1.004
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.997	0.980	1.013
	Market	0.995	0.987	1.004
	Small Government	1.000	0.989	1.010
Finance PAC Contributions	Responsibility	0.998	0.994	1.002
	Individuality	0.999	0.996	1.003
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.001	0.997	1.004
	Market	0.997	0.994	1.000
	Small Government	1.002	0.999	1.005
109 th Congress	Responsibility	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Individuality	1.808	0.144	22.703
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.001	0.280	3.586
	Market	2.068	0.249	17.205
	Small Government	0.916	0.308	2.726

110 th Congress	Responsibility	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Individuality	0.946	0.088	10.160
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.493	0.139	1.743
	Market	0.617	0.083	4.576
	Small Government	0.890	0.329	2.406
111 th Congress	Responsibility	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Individuality	2.549	0.220	29.483
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.025	0.315	3.338
	Market	1.094	0.137	8.751
	Small Government	0.838	0.303	2.319
Non-Minority	Responsibility	2.517	0.082	77.396
	Individuality	0.279	0.014	5.543
	Corporate Self-Interest	8.887	<0.001	.
	Market	0.280	0.020	3.883
	Small Government	>999.999	<0.001	.
Male	Responsibility	0.686	0.129	3.647
	Individuality	0.864	0.146	5.118
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.151	0.042	0.541
	Market	0.345	0.072	1.647
	Small Government	0.851	0.253	2.861
Democrat	Responsibility	2.183	0.101	47.125
	Individuality	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Corporate Self-Interest	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Market	914.838	44.384	>999.999
	Small Government	0.027	0.001	0.681

Foreclosure Primary		Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	Responsibility	0.873	0.287	2.655
	Individuality	0.294	0.087	1.000
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.579	0.480	5.194
	Market	0.311	0.084	1.154
	Small Government	1.007	0.301	3.367
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	Responsibility	0.930	0.478	1.810
	Individuality	0.741	0.343	1.599
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.695	0.859	3.343
	Market	0.675	0.290	1.568
	Small Government	1.370	0.691	2.715
Election Margin	Responsibility	0.988	0.965	1.012
	Individuality	0.986	0.956	1.017
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.990	0.962	1.019
	Market	0.988	0.953	1.024
	Small Government	1.003	0.977	1.030
Percent Black	Responsibility	1.012	0.936	1.093
	Individuality	0.992	0.910	1.080
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.989	0.912	1.073
	Market	1.056	0.962	1.159
	Small Government	0.972	0.891	1.060
Percent Latino	Responsibility	1.005	0.960	1.051
	Individuality	1.008	0.960	1.060
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.972	0.922	1.025
	Market	1.039	0.981	1.101
	Small Government	0.984	0.935	1.035
Percent Graduated	Responsibility	0.973	0.826	1.147
	Individuality	0.866	0.720	1.042

College	Corporate Self-Interest	1.048	0.881	1.247
	Market	0.988	0.803	1.215
	Small Government	0.951	0.793	1.140
Seniority	Responsibility	0.939	0.805	1.095
	Individuality	1.005	0.842	1.199
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.069	0.903	1.265
	Market	0.972	0.794	1.190
	Small Government	0.990	0.836	1.173
Democratic Vote Previous Election	Responsibility	0.996	0.927	1.069
	Individuality	1.033	0.940	1.135
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.978	0.893	1.070
	Market	0.985	0.882	1.101
	Small Government	0.994	0.913	1.081
Labor PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.002	0.989	1.016
	Individuality	0.998	0.984	1.012
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.992	0.975	1.010
	Market	1.001	0.986	1.016
	Small Government	0.997	0.981	1.015
Finance PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.000	0.996	1.005
	Individuality	1.000	0.995	1.004
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.005	1.000	1.010
	Market	0.997	0.991	1.003
	Small Government	1.003	0.998	1.008
109 th Congress	Responsibility	16.170	2.421	108.018
	Individuality	0.117	0.009	1.615
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.244	0.035	1.720
	Market	0.128	0.007	2.209
	Small Government	0.360	0.053	2.441

110 th Congress	Responsibility	5.541	0.932	32.949
	Individuality	0.192	0.017	2.204
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.838	0.161	4.367
	Market	0.032	0.002	0.580
	Small Government	0.484	0.087	2.705
111 th Congress	Responsibility	1.344	0.231	7.833
	Individuality	0.180	0.016	1.987
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.516	0.111	2.400
	Market	0.219	0.017	2.903
	Small Government	0.466	0.096	2.258
Non-Minority	Responsibility	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Individuality	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Corporate Self-Interest	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Market	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Small Government	0.048	<0.001	.
Male	Responsibility	2.232	0.541	9.208
	Individuality	2.034	0.403	10.272
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.211	0.277	5.295
	Market	2.321	0.388	13.862
	Small Government	2.258	0.449	11.363
Democrat	Responsibility	6.603	0.217	200.692
	Individuality	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Corporate Self-Interest	<0.001	<0.001	.
	Market	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Small Government	0.195	0.003	15.031

Foreclosure Secondary		Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	Responsibility	1.670	0.765	3.647
	Individuality	0.885	0.319	2.458
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.400	0.524	3.737
	Market	0.659	0.286	1.517
	Small Government	2.178	0.872	5.445
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	Responsibility	1.037	0.668	1.611
	Individuality	0.910	0.462	1.792
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.511	0.905	2.522
	Market	1.019	0.612	1.696
	Small Government	1.337	0.850	2.105
Election Margin	Responsibility	0.988	0.972	1.004
	Individuality	0.996	0.965	1.027
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.990	0.968	1.012
	Market	0.992	0.971	1.013
	Small Government	0.986	0.965	1.007
Percent Black	Responsibility	1.052	0.992	1.116
	Individuality	1.103	1.022	1.191
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.046	0.969	1.128
	Market	1.029	0.967	1.095
	Small Government	1.064	0.993	1.139
Percent Latino	Responsibility	1.001	0.974	1.029
	Individuality	1.029	0.981	1.080
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.963	0.914	1.014
	Market	1.001	0.971	1.031
	Small Government	0.984	0.947	1.023
Percent Graduated	Responsibility	1.063	0.945	1.197
	Individuality	1.184	0.986	1.422

College	Corporate Self-Interest	1.028	0.886	1.192
	Market	0.960	0.842	1.096
	Small Government	1.102	0.965	1.259
Seniority	Responsibility	1.018	0.907	1.143
	Individuality	1.147	0.969	1.358
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.112	0.972	1.271
	Market	1.102	0.971	1.250
	Small Government	1.084	0.951	1.235
Democratic Vote Previous Election	Responsibility	1.000	0.952	1.050
	Individuality	0.954	0.865	1.053
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.982	0.915	1.054
	Market	1.016	0.955	1.081
	Small Government	0.980	0.916	1.048
Labor PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.010	1.001	1.019
	Individuality	1.009	0.998	1.021
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.009	0.996	1.022
	Market	1.004	0.995	1.013
	Small Government	1.006	0.993	1.020
Finance PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.000	0.997	1.003
	Individuality	0.995	0.989	1.001
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.002	0.998	1.006
	Market	1.000	0.996	1.003
	Small Government	1.004	1.001	1.008
109 th Congress	Responsibility	51.839	11.152	240.965
	Individuality	1.159	0.114	11.757
	Corporate Self-Interest	2.086	0.412	10.547
	Market	0.676	0.111	4.126
	Small Government	0.783	0.151	4.044

110 th Congress	Responsibility	13.751	3.651	51.796
	Individuality	0.308	0.031	3.107
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.279	0.318	5.141
	Market	1.135	0.263	4.890
	Small Government	1.243	0.358	4.314
111 th Congress	Responsibility	2.362	0.649	8.592
	Individuality	0.977	0.143	6.653
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.661	0.188	2.330
	Market	0.618	0.152	2.504
	Small Government	0.737	0.246	2.201
Non-Minority	Responsibility	2.652	0.224	31.346
	Individuality	2.281	0.108	48.036
	Corporate Self-Interest	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Market	0.845	0.069	10.396
	Small Government	>999.999	<0.001	.
Male	Responsibility	0.277	0.056	1.357
	Individuality	0.198	0.030	1.311
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.131	0.023	0.732
	Market	0.214	0.040	1.135
	Small Government	0.182	0.034	0.977
Democrat	Responsibility	0.784	0.104	5.933
	Individuality	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.078	0.004	1.667
	Market	18.167	1.870	176.450
	Small Government	0.019	<0.001	0.508

Bankruptcy Primary		Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	Responsibility	1.018	0.409	2.533
	Individuality	0.529	0.196	1.424
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.125	0.474	2.672
	Market	0.725	0.247	2.125
	Small Government	1.842	0.644	5.263
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	Responsibility	1.120	0.659	1.904
	Individuality	1.252	0.662	2.367
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.106	0.713	1.717
	Market	1.222	0.620	2.409
	Small Government	1.223	0.717	2.085
Election Margin	Responsibility	1.004	0.982	1.026
	Individuality	1.006	0.978	1.035
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.016	0.992	1.041
	Market	0.998	0.968	1.030
	Small Government	1.010	0.981	1.040
Percent Black	Responsibility	1.007	0.951	1.066
	Individuality	1.022	0.962	1.086
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.008	0.947	1.072
	Market	1.074	1.004	1.149
	Small Government	1.026	0.958	1.099
Percent Latino	Responsibility	1.003	0.965	1.042
	Individuality	1.005	0.964	1.048
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.962	0.926	0.999
	Market	1.025	0.977	1.075
	Small Government	0.977	0.934	1.023
Percent Graduated	Responsibility	1.001	0.874	1.145
	Individuality	0.945	0.812	1.100

College	Corporate Self-Interest	0.975	0.856	1.110
	Market	1.079	0.910	1.280
	Small Government	1.081	0.931	1.254
Seniority	Responsibility	1.075	0.928	1.246
	Individuality	1.313	1.099	1.568
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.993	0.869	1.133
	Market	1.207	0.990	1.473
	Small Government	1.037	0.885	1.215
Democratic Vote Previous Election	Responsibility	0.973	0.913	1.037
	Individuality	0.965	0.886	1.052
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.985	0.918	1.058
	Market	0.945	0.861	1.038
	Small Government	0.985	0.902	1.076
Labor PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.000	0.991	1.009
	Individuality	0.994	0.984	1.004
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.003	0.992	1.015
	Market	0.996	0.985	1.006
	Small Government	0.987	0.964	1.010
Finance PAC Contributions	Responsibility	1.001	0.997	1.004
	Individuality	0.999	0.995	1.003
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.005	1.001	1.008
	Market	0.997	0.992	1.002
	Small Government	1.004	1.000	1.008
109 th Congress	Responsibility	74.888	8.653	648.130
	Individuality	2.756	0.271	28.009
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.198	0.042	0.929
	Market	4.507	0.351	57.810
	Small Government	0.710	0.132	3.811

110 th Congress	Responsibility	5.403	0.733	39.826
	Individuality	0.771	0.096	6.202
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.399	0.128	1.247
	Market	2.219	0.230	21.458
	Small Government	0.519	0.133	2.026
111 th Congress	Responsibility	1.877	0.225	15.644
	Individuality	0.772	0.090	6.615
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.508	0.159	1.620
	Market	2.482	0.244	25.288
	Small Government	0.660	0.173	2.512
Non-Minority	Responsibility	3.086	0.260	36.659
	Individuality	2.763	0.225	33.990
	Corporate Self-Interest	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Market	8.998	0.552	146.619
	Small Government	13.288	<0.001	.
Male	Responsibility	0.369	0.094	1.452
	Individuality	0.169	0.036	0.801
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.929	0.527	7.070
	Market	0.220	0.041	1.176
	Small Government	0.526	0.137	2.015
Democrat	Responsibility	38.444	2.628	562.411
	Individuality	>999.999	<0.001	.
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.062	0.002	1.624
	Market	948.033	23.261	>999.999
	Small Government	<0.001	<0.001	.

Bankruptcy Secondary		Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	Responsibility	0.981	0.402	1.862
	Individuality	0.983	0.202	1.475
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.950	0.607	4.488
	Market	1.032	0.204	1.021
	Small Government	0.972	0.548	3.149
Macro-Economic Stress Factor	Responsibility	0.999	0.455	1.112
	Individuality	0.992	0.346	1.257
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.005	0.618	1.663
	Market	0.992	0.360	1.018
	Small Government	1.007	0.571	1.319
Election Margin	Responsibility	0.999	0.979	1.013
	Individuality	0.994	0.955	1.014
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.998	0.964	1.021
	Market	0.998	0.966	1.011
	Small Government	1.000	0.983	1.025
Percent Black	Responsibility	74.673	0.925	1.018
	Individuality	9.418	0.959	1.084
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.867	0.901	1.035
	Market	2.072	0.920	1.018
	Small Government	0.271	0.926	1.035
Percent Latino	Responsibility	10.974	0.985	1.055
	Individuality	9.597	0.980	1.077
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.563	0.965	1.062
	Market	1.021	0.977	1.049
	Small Government	1.131	0.974	1.055
Percent Graduated	Responsibility	4.239	0.882	1.116
	Individuality	14.837	0.835	1.168

College	Corporate Self-Interest	1.273	1.002	1.346
	Market	1.417	0.781	1.009
	Small Government	1.219	0.950	1.233
Seniority	Responsibility	0.102	0.880	1.104
	Individuality	0.140	0.849	1.208
	Corporate Self-Interest	>999.999	0.861	1.154
	Market	0.077	0.976	1.238
	Small Government	0.070	0.891	1.144
Democratic Vote Previous Election	Responsibility	0.623	0.931	1.034
	Individuality	0.439	0.896	1.077
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.486	0.874	1.033
	Market	0.374	0.960	1.108
	Small Government	0.930	0.905	1.044
Labor PAC Contributions	Responsibility	7.349	0.992	1.006
	Individuality	140.970	0.983	1.001
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.027	0.992	1.019
	Market	406.715	0.984	0.999
	Small Government	<0.001	0.995	1.020
Finance PAC Contributions	Responsibility	0.981	0.996	1.001
	Individuality	0.983	0.989	0.999
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.950	0.994	1.002
	Market	1.032	0.995	1.001
	Small Government	0.972	0.997	1.003
109 th Congress	Responsibility	0.999	10.691	521.562
	Individuality	0.992	0.684	129.748
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.005	0.184	4.090
	Market	0.992	0.316	13.590
	Small Government	1.007	0.067	1.097

110 th Congress	Responsibility	0.999	1.721	69.966
	Individuality	0.994	0.905	101.727
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.998	0.409	5.980
	Market	0.998	0.188	5.529
	Small Government	1.000	0.362	3.535
111 th Congress	Responsibility	74.673	0.613	29.331
	Individuality	9.418	1.374	160.227
	Corporate Self-Interest	0.867	0.337	4.809
	Market	2.072	0.257	7.829
	Small Government	0.271	0.393	3.779
Non-Minority	Responsibility	10.974	0.009	1.170
	Individuality	9.597	0.009	2.178
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.563	<0.001	.
	Market	1.021	0.007	0.911
	Small Government	1.131	<0.001	.
Male	Responsibility	4.239	0.198	1.963
	Individuality	14.837	0.097	1.986
	Corporate Self-Interest	1.273	0.132	1.797
	Market	1.417	0.106	1.311
	Small Government	1.219	0.273	3.163
Democrat	Responsibility	0.102	0.861	62.747
	Individuality	0.140	4.127	>999.999
	Corporate Self-Interest	>999.999	<0.001	1.585
	Market	0.077	21.621	>999.999
	Small Government	0.070	<0.001	.

Appendix: Frequencies of Legislative Activity Dependent Variables

Sponsored Legislation: Positive Impact Foreclosure

Sponsored Bills	Frequency	Percent
0	1,668	93.18%
1	93	5.20%
2	18	1.01%
3	5	0.28%
4	4	0.22%
5	1	0.06%
6	1	0.06%

Sponsored Legislation: Negative Impact Unemployment

Sponsored Bills	Frequency	Percent
0	1,725	96.37%
1	54	3.02%
2	8	0.45%
3	3	0.17%

Sponsored Legislation: Negative Impact Foreclosure

Sponsored Bills	Frequency	Percent
0	1,764	98.55%
1	25	1.40%
2	1	0.06%

Sponsored Legislation: Negative Impact Bankruptcy

Sponsored Bills	Frequency	Percent
0	1,770	98.88%
1	19	1.06%
2	1	0.06%

Co-Sponsored Legislation: Negative Impact Unemployment

Sponsored Bills	Frequency	Percent
0	1,114	62.23%
1	350	19.55%
2	183	10.22%
3	88	4.92%
4	39	2.18%
5	13	0.73%
6	2	0.11%
7	1	0.06%

Appendix: Logistic Regression of Legislative Activity Dependent Variables

Variables		Sponsorship			Co-Sponsorship		
		Positive Impact	Negative Impact		Negative Impact		
		Foreclosure	Unemployment	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure	
Intercept	Intercept	-5.686*** (0.918)	0.432 (1.726)	-17.652 (513.28)	0.779 (0.135)	-9.966* (4.810)	
	Key Factors	Personal Financial Insecurity Factor	0.208 (0.151)	-0.368 (0.288)	-0.216 (0.491)	0.008 (0.086)	-0.259 (0.453)
		Macro-Economic Stress Factor	0.381*** (0.096)	0.213 ⁺ (0.126)	0.539* (0.281)	0.035 (0.044)	0.289 (0.232)
Election Margin		-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.047 (0.045)	
Congresses	109 th Congress	-0.141 (0.399)	-0.507 (0.384)	0.832 (0.691)	0.302** (0.115)	-1.107 (0.896)	
	110 th Congress	0.889** (0.337)	-0.655 ⁺ (0.403)	-1.156 (1.160)	-0.093 (0.128)	0.400 (0.633)	
	111 th Congress	0.614* (0.323)	-0.293 (0.360)	0.359 (0.708)	0.132 (0.117)	0.435 (0.604)	
District Characteristics	Percent Black	-0.002 (0.010)	0.013 (0.016)	0.005 (0.040)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.0132 (0.031)	
	Percent Latino	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.037 (0.027)	
	Percent Graduated College	0.021 (0.027)	0.072 ⁺ (0.045)	0.109 ⁺ (0.070)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.067)	
Member Characteristics	Non-Minority	-0.499 (0.399)	-1.835* (0.861)	11.179 (513.27)	-0.380 (0.319)	11.070*** (0.000)	
	Male	0.039 (0.230)	0.783 (0.598)	-0.624 (0.663)	0.024 (0.128)	-0.101 (0.645)	
	Democrat	1.536** (0.522)	-3.611** (1.496)	-2.213 (1.894)	-1.382*** (0.257)	-12.166*** (0.000)	
	Seniority	-0.045* (0.023)	-0.013 (0.033)	0.081 ⁺ (0.053)	-0.031** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.061)	

Variables		Sponsorship			Co-Sponsorship	
		Positive Impact	Negative Impact		Negative Impact	
		Foreclosure	Unemployment	Bankruptcy	Unemployment	Foreclosure
Election Characteristics	Democratic Vote Previous Election	0.030* (0.015)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.008 (0.045)	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.087 (0.095)
	Labor PAC Contributions	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.018 ⁺ (0.012)
	Finance PAC Contributions	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
	N	1719	1719	1719	1719	1719

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ⁺ $p < .1$

Appendix: Economic Interest Groups

- ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty
(http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/homelessness_poverty.html)
- Alliance for Worker Freedom (<http://www.workerfreedom.org/>)
- American Federation of Government Employees (<http://www.afge.org/>)
- American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization, AFL-CIO
(<http://www.aflcio.org/>)
- Americans for Fair Taxation (<http://www.fairtax.org/site/PageServer>)
- Americans for Tax Reform (<http://www.atr.org/>)
- American Shareholders Association (<http://www.americanshareholders.org/>)
- Appraisal Institute (<http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/>)
- Brookings Institution (<http://www.brookings.edu/>)
- Cato Institute (<http://www.cato.org/>)
- Center for Community Change (<http://www.communitychange.org/>)
- Center for Urban Community Services (<http://www.cucs.org/>)
- Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (<http://www.cbpp.org/about/>)
- Citizens Against Government Waste (<http://www.cagw.org/>)
- Citizens for Tax Justice (<http://www.ctj.org/>)
- Citizen's Housing and Planning Association (<http://www.chapa.org/>)
- Coalition of Community Development Financial Institutions (<http://www.cdfi.org/>)
- Committee for Economic Development (<http://www.ced.org/>)
- Community Reinvestment Fund (<http://www.crfusa.com/Pages/Default.aspx>)

- Concord Coalition (<http://www.concordcoalition.org/>)
- Consumer Federation of America (<http://www.consumerfed.org/>)
- Council for Affordable and Rural Housing (<http://www.carh.org/>)
- Economic Policy Institute (<http://www.epi.org/>)
- Fannie Mae (<http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home>)
- Federal Home Loan Bank System (<http://www.fhlbanks.com/>)
- Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (<http://www.ffeec.gov/>)
- Federal Housing Finance Agency (<http://www.fhfa.gov/>)
- Federally Employed Women (<http://www.few.org/>)
- Freddie Mac (<http://www.freddie.mac.com/>)
- FreedomWorks (<http://www.freedomworks.org/>)
- Heritage Foundation (<http://www.heritage.org/>)
- Hudson Institute (<http://www.hudson.org/>)
- Institute of Real Estate Management (<http://www.irem.org/>)
- International Economic Development Council (<http://www.iedconline.org/>)
- International Brotherhood of Teamsters (<http://www.teamster.org/>)
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (<http://www.jointcenter.org/>)
- Mortgage Bankers Association (<http://www.mbaa.org/default.htm>)
- Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (<http://www.micanews.com/>)
- National Affordable Housing Management Association (<http://www.nahma.org/>)
- National Alliance to End Homelessness (<http://www.endhomelessness.org/>)
- National Association of Home Builders (<http://www.nahb.com/>)
- National Association of Manufacturers (<http://www.nam.org/>)

- National Association of Mortgage Professionals (<http://www.namp.org/>)
- National Association for the Self-Employed (<http://www.nase.org/Home.aspx>)
- National Center for Homeless Education (<http://center.serve.org/nche/>)
- National Coalition for the Homeless (<http://www.nationalhomeless.org/>)
- National Federation of Independent Business (<http://www.nfib.com/>)
- National Healthcare for the Homeless Council (<http://www.nhchc.org/>)
- National Housing and Rehabilitation Association (<http://www.housingonline.com/>)
- National Housing Institute (<http://www.nhi.org/>)
- National Housing Trust (<http://www.nhtinc.org/>)
- National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (<http://www.nlchp.org/>)
- National Low Income Housing Coalition (<http://www.nlihc.org/template/index.cfm>)
- National Small Business Association (<http://www.nsba.biz/>)
- National Taxpayers Union (<http://www.ntu.org/>)
- Partnership for the Homeless (<http://www.partnershipforthehomeless.org/home.php5>)
- Public Citizen's Congress Watch (<http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=183>)
- Sergeant Shriver Center on Poverty Law (<http://www.povertylaw.org/>)
- Taxpayers for Common Sense (<http://www.taxpayer.net/>)
- United Auto Workers (<http://www.uaw.org/>)
- U.S. Chamber of Commerce (<http://www.uschamber.com/>)
- U.S. PIRG (<http://www.uspirg.org/>)
- Women Employed (<http://www.womenemployed.org/>)
- Workplace Fairness (<http://www.workplacefairness.org/>)

Appendix: Interest Group Classifications

Unemployment

Pro-Worker	Neutral	Pro-Business
Alliance for Worker	Brookings Institution	Heritage Foundation
Freedom		
American Federation of	Committee for Economic	International Economic
Government Employees	Development	Development Council
AFL-CIO		National Association of
		Manufacturers
Center for Community		National Association for
Change		the Self-Employed
Center for Budget and		National Federation of
Policy Priorities		Independent Business
Community Reinvestment		National Small Business
Fund		Association
Economic Policy Institute		U.S. Chamber of
		Commerce
Federally Employed		
Women		
Hudson Institute		
International Brotherhood		
of Teamsters		

Pro-Worker**Neutral****Pro-Business**

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies National Healthcare for the Homeless Council National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty Sergeant Shriver Center on Poverty Law United Auto Workers Women Employed Workplace Fairness		
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Foreclosures**Pro-Buyer****Neutral****Pro-Market**

ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty Center for Community Change Center for Urban Community Services Center for Budget and	Appraisal Institute Federal Housing Finance Agency National Association of Mortgage Professionals Brookings Institution	Cato Institute Fannie Mae Federal Home Loan Banks Freddie Mac
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Pro-Buyer

Neutral

Pro-Market

Pro-Buyer	Neutral	Pro-Market
Policy Priorities Citizens' Housing and Planning Association Consumer Federation of America Council for Affordable and Rural Housing Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies National Affordable Housing Management Association National Alliance to End Homelessness National Center for Homelessness Education National Coalition for the Homeless National Healthcare for the Homeless Council National Housing and Rehabilitation Association		Heritage Foundation Institute of Real Estate Management Mortgage Bankers Association Mortgage Insurance Companies of America National Association of Home Builders

Pro-Buyer**Neutral****Pro-Market**

National Housing Institute		
National Housing Trust		
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty		
National Low Income Housing Coalition		
Partnership for the Homeless		

Bankruptcy**Pro-Consumer****Neutral****Pro-Banking**

Citizens Against Government Waste	Americans for Fair Taxation	Americans for Tax Reform
Citizens for Tax Justice	Brookings Institution	American Shareholders Association
Coalition of Community Development Financial Institutions	Concord Coalition	Cato Institute
Community Reinvestment Fund	Federal Financial Institutions Examination	Federal Home Loan Banks

Pro-Consumer

Neutral

Pro-Banking

Pro-Consumer	Neutral	Pro-Banking
Consumer Federation of America Economic Policy Institute FreedomWorks National Housing and Rehabilitation Program Public Citizen's Congress Watch U.S. PIRG	Council Taxpayers for Common Sense	Heritage Foundation International Economic Development Council National Taxpayers Union

Appendix: Unemployment Bills

109th Congress

HR1204	HRES409	HR3971	HR5082
HR2131	HRES995	HR3761	HR614
HR2717	HR1630	HR3976	HR3958
HR5043	HR3	HJRES35	HR3039
HR3322	HR1295	HR5352	HR5414
HR5784	HR1237	HR1815	HR6181
HR945	HR1264	HR5220	HR4471
HCONRES234	HR27	HR6276	HR5392
HR3000	HR838	HR2981	HR2744
HR1050	HR566	HRES410	HR5384
HRES1103	HRES24	HR5529	HR26
HCONRES233	HR64	HR6124	HR1695
HR3420	HR5917	HR5564	HR6201
HR1405	HR6197	HR5565	HR6426
HR3171	HR3774	HR3082	HR6
HR1704	HR886	HR1776	HRES501
HR4197	HR2290	HR6150	HR350
HR4110	HR2830	HR20	HR5186
HR3185	HR4099	HR2992	HR5742
HR3561	HR4	HR2735	HR3010
HR1589	HCONRES425	HR1640	HR336
HR1200	HR281	HR1040	HR5647
HR3192	HR3841	HR2182	HR584
HR5293	HR1999	HR2639	HR4234
HR4347	HR5312	HR3704	HCONRES95
HR4898	HR4985	HR5934	HR5625
HR1182	HR942	HR3952	HR1713
HR127	HR5837	HR4781	HR2863
HR4858	HR3333	HR3419	HR5631
HCONRES466	HR6024	HR1349	HR2360
HR5878	HR2664	HR4589	HR5386
HR2133	HR6274	HR4707	HR2361
HR4202	HR4438	HR6208	HR5441
HR6328	HR4950	HR751	HR6253
HR2965	HR3975	HR3545	HR6403

110th Congress

HR5749	HR6770	HR4058	HR4262
HR5111	HR4934	HR5688	HR6844

HR2806	HCONRES312	HR3686	HR3269
HR6867	HR7096	HR3172	HR3409
HR2608	HR6776	HR2522	HR1591
HRES1265	HR1340	HR976	HR55543
HR6799	HR2238	HR6255	HR2643
HR1513	HR6084	HR1040	HR1975
HR4016	HCONRES65	HR1279	HR3000
HR6152	HRES1301	HR914	HR1429
HR7314	HR54	HJRES20	HR3163
HR5556	HCONRES19	HR2955	HR3093
HR237	HR7260	HR3079	HR6444
HR6111	HR3801	HR1369	HR1200
HCONRES420	HRES55	HR1688	HR2419
HR6651	HJRES86	HR2901	HR6124
HR3920	HR6288	HR2129	HR4780
HR5142	HR5138	HR2764	HR2095
HR5569	HR5774	HR6036	HRES1292
HR3429	HR1985	HR2084	HR1328
HR1050	HCONRES417	HR4053	HR2950
HR5727	HRES1230	HR3915	HR4779
HR2642	HR3664	HR4156	HR3221
HR1317	HR3634	HR25	HR3220
HR6307	HR2499	HR1581	HR4128
HR7110	HRES36	HR2469	HR1585
HR2395	HR3246	HR744	HR2233
HR6580	HR7103	HR4159	HR5931
HR1702	HRES1337	HR910	HR2446
HR383	HR3621	HR3747	HR6003
HR2068	HR2403	HR3846	HR5873
HJRES35	HCONRES100	HR2413	HR4048
HR2202	HR6501	HR708	HR1621
HRES790	HR2284	HR2	HR2847
HR5962	HR1548	HR2720	HR676
HR3889	HR3395	HR6081	HR1041
HRES299	HR3253	HR7129	HR2578
HR3043	HR6504	HR2638	HRES15
HR176	HR883	HR5129	HR6080
HR5825	HR6186	HR2392	HR1150
HR1938	HR66	HR1645	HR6
HR3943	HCONRES99	HR2669	HR4986
HR6815	HR324	HR2206	

111th Congress

HR6556	HR1311	HR6457	HR3756
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HR6419	HR5107	HR2078	HR5084
HR3404	HR5204	HR3732	HR5984
HR290	HR4135	HRES801	HR5332
HR3548	HR4899	HR262	HRES409
HR6340	HR3522	HR1025	HR779
HR5618	HR3357	HRES1693	HRES345
HR4707	HR4853	HR5398	HR4381
HR291	HR1089	HR4812	HR2447
HR4213	HCONRES152	HRES706	HR3154
HR155	HRES950	HR3500	HR5916
HR4282	HR4965	HRES875	HR5376
HR6091	HR4260	HR6129	HR629
HR4740	HRES1248	HR3812	HR3083
HR6251	HCONRES227	HR1803	HR1956
HR3189	HRES553	HR4799	HR1401
HRES946	HR4819	HR1368	HR3834
HR5089	HR3413	HR5452	HR5400
HR2331	HR4851	HCONRES85	HR5024
HR6088	HR739	HRES1024	HR3060
HR3390	HR4318	HR5891	HR2099
HR4620	HR3234	HR5318	HR4417
HR4718	HRES1537	HR596	HR5424
HR3612	HR4513	HRES180	HR1607
HR4074	HR5363	HR5472	HR2979
HR3941	HR4849	HRES1472	HR3999
HRES1495	HR2168	HRES1746	HR5990
HR3314	HR598	HRES619	HR3238
HR3358	HJRES35	HR1	HR4191
HR3066	HR4268	HR4458	HR1004
HR153	HR3953	HR6539	HR1677
HR5080	HR5893	HRES242	HR4629
HR5647	HR2757	HRES1463	HR5297
HR4183	HR931	HR5558	HR3042
HR5007	HRES1570	HRES210	HR676
HR4730	HR5453	HRES238	HR3155
HR4196	HR2339	HRES1681	HR3890
HR3313	HR4691	HRES1504	HR4259
HR4163	HR330	HR2965	HR5120
HR656	HR3293	HRES1551	HR5897
HR6041	HR5296	HR5468	HR1040
HR6456	HRES414	HR901	HR3610
HR4897	HRES1452	HR2074	HR6128
HR4225	HR3811	HCONRES106	HR868
HRES186	HRES1267	HR5302	HR5971
HRES181	HRES94	HR5015	HR4206
HR6181	HRES1152	HRES1346	HR4345

HR5554	HR4481	HR2454	HR4321
HR4920	HR4785	HR6550	HR1200
HR6334	HR2352	HR3961	HR3326
HR747	HR2847	HR1723	HR1321
HR3854	HR25	HR4271	HR6517
HR4290	HR4929	HR2998	HR4173
HR1855	HR679	HR3082	HR3221
HR3585	HR5072	HR3045	HR6161
HR3420	HR3791	HR2997	HR3047
HR5019	HR6401	HR1064	HR3237
HR5715	HR1670	HR1983	HR2410
HR1728	HR4783	HR980	HR2708
HR1569	HR3288	HR3000	HR1107
HR4976	HR2920	HR2996	HR3590
HR5191	HR4154	HR3964	HR2647
HR4971	HR3201	HR1388	HR1772
HR861	HR1105	HR4529	HR3962

112th Congress

HR589	HR3601	HR2544	HR2539
HR2262	HR494	HR2237	HR235
HR1663	HR2995	HR2832	HR2467
HR3598	HRES502	HR123	HR1077
HR1113	HR3630	HJRES35	HR1527
HR2537	HR2421	HRES212	HR2873
HR650	HR3471	HR1259	HR1139
HR2120	HRES348	HR3425	HR381
HRES442	HR2898	HE2368	HR2466
HR1088	HR3743	HR12	HR711
HR2137	HR3402	HR772	HR1408
HR2972	HR3384	HRES95	HR865
HR3346	HR3178	HRES374	HR2193
HR1757	HRES344	HR2761	HR2914
HR3427	HR992	HR2394	HR1901
HR2756	HR1941	HR2855	HR1251
HR3060	HR2574	HR3493	HR696
HR659	HR2868	HR3748	HR3200
HR1745	HR3749	HR2858	HR2082
HR3615	HR2731	HR3573	HR3596
HRES501	HR2501	HR3701	HR3467
HR3234	HR3551	HR924	HR2693
HR2806	HR3638	HR3070	HR3225
HR2001	HR870	HRES385	HR2433
HR3681	HR3271	HR2828	HR2226
HR3765	HR1912	HR2411	HR1106

HR2742
HR676
HR800
HR3577
HR1135
HR1167
HR369
HR1040
HR3502

HR1977
HR3610
HR1240
HR1869
HR1287
HR2230
HR3634
HR1419
HR3259

HR2010
HR2424
HR25
HR2721
HR3400
HR2055
HR3671
HCONRES34
HR2295

HR3082
HR1209
HR3302
HR1473
HR1200
HR2346
HR2112
HR1823

Appendix: Foreclosure Bills

109th Congress

HR2644	HR4492	HR3426	HR5137
HR4027	HR5960	HR4398	HR2203
HR3043	HR1235	HR3278	HR685
HR3794	HCONRES107	HR5041	HR1461
HR200	HR378	HR525	HR1442
HR3715	HR4991	HR2411	

110th Congress

HR5855	HR3506	HR3705	HR5649
HR5822	HR5679	HR3838	HR5487
HR4735	HR5818	HR1332	HR2475
HR6116	HR7326	HR5579	HR3074
HR5963	HR5824	HR4919	HR840
HR6076	HR5830	HR4002	HR241
HR7040	HCONRES392	HR5565	HR1012
HR7126	HR7328	HCONRES39	HR2855
HR5796	HR3609	HRES1019	HR6658
HR6790	HR7307	HR3587	HR5857
HR5572	HR3778	HR3012	HR2895
HR4883	HR3073	HR1314	HR6577
HR5500	HR1147	HR3837	HR1424
HR5894	HR5870	HR1996	HR5923
HR7267	HCONRES42	HR2401	H46078
HR4135	HR3133	HR7278	HR5955
HRES526	HR2599	HR558	HR7223
HR1750	HR7175	HR3003	HR6899
HR3666	HR1491	HR6689	HR6110
HCONRES127	HR5685	HR1852	HR5563
HR44	HR3019	HR3081	HRES1427
HR7147	HR7113	HR5720	HR6521

111th Congress

HR5754	HR4766	HR4930	HR37
HR5510	HR3520	HR3195	HR472
HR527	HR421	HR1486	HRES1157
HR5028	HR1848	HR3976	HR384
HR1247	HR906	HR2394	HR3451
HR1231	HR2666	HR3489	HR200
HR1123	HR6431	HR1285	HR3146
HR6069	HRES186	HR5098	HR1106
HR4664	HRES181	HR4635	HR6304

HR5816	HR47	HE5850	HR3377
HR225	HR3739	HR6562	HR5421
HR4582	HR5766	HR2576	HR6258
HR4581	HR2181	HR4156	HR3889
HR2529	HR641	HR6468	HR1754
HR6079	HR788	HR932	HR3126
HR6218	HRES180	HR6193	HR627
HR230	HR3073	HR1356	HR3219
HR1295	HR2876	HR1782	HR4038
HR4826	HR214	HR6317	HE3713
HR1929	HR3142	HR1903	HR1479
HR2588	HR4868	HR5814	HR2400
HR2887	RH2696	HR1705	HR4944
HR888	HR3068	HR2607	HR3996
HR1784	HR3147	HR2336	
HR4264	HR703	HR3949	

112th Congress

HR3595	HR1477	HR2574	HR790
HR1131	HR3129	HR2636	HR2953
HR1238	HR2713	HR363 HR31	HR870
HR1548	HR1783	HR1911	HR1209
HR1618	HCONRES85	HR2986	HR762
HR3566	HR1567	HR1481	HR2795
HR3619	HR1587	HR1263	HR299
HR1526	HR3164	HR2599	HR2914
HRES344	HR839	HR300	HR397
HR1566	HR430	HR1147	

Appendix: Bankruptcy Bills

109th Congress

HR5215	HR5962	HR4711	HR3402
HR684	HR3729	HR4241	HR6052
HR1860	HR1751	HR5445	HR4472
HR2060	HR89	HR6129	HR3997
HR4093	HR195	HR317	HR5176
HR3662	HR3697	HR1994	HR3058
HR3518	HR1367	HR1961	HR4127
HR3650	HR4477	HR5092	HR4761
HR3533	HR5757	HR1960	HR609
HR4385	HR5014	HR5115	HR507
HRES168	HRES687	HR4920	HR22
HR2233	HR5113	HR3502	HR5576
HR4193	HR5585	HR4468	HR5970
HR4525	HR1360	HR5835	HR5122
HR2327	HR1238	HR1268	HR6408
HR5532	HR4082	HR4062	HR5252
HR2201	HR4055	HR5553	HR6111

110th Congress

HR430	HR4703	HR6143	HR3156
HR3520	HR4991	HR1781	HR3887
HR3972	HRES1444	HR55	HR2881
HR4044	HR2325	HR2061	HR4181
HR4061	HRES1452	HR4247	HR6108
HR3652	HR6796	HR3264	HR6316
HR1449	HR1240	HR97	HR2829
HR660	HR7327	HR5959	HR3746
HR6344	HR3854	HR4900	HR6779
HRES512	HR2885	HR7323	HR6001
HR5754	HR6382	HR7321	HR4137

111th Congress

HCONRES184	HR4147	HR5827	HR4364
HR4506	HR901	HR1106	HRES1031
HR4538	HR3150	HR2750	HR2906
HR1301	HR5823	HR1628	HR27
HR4950	HR4677	HR6198	HRES591
HR2445	HR3088	HRES571	HR4729
HR6046	HR4884	HR1306	HR200
HR1486	HR5043	HR5125	HRES462

HCONRES174	HR3095	HR2108	HR107
HR3968	HRES271	HR2251	HR3310
HR5503	HR2932	HR3970	HR1586
HRES65	HR228	HR2296	HR2120
HR2863	HR3492	HR5387	HR915
HR3366	HR5093	HR6099	HR3170
HR4281	HR6025	HR3371	HR3200
HR6378	HR6529	HR25	HR4872
HR1575	HR5187	HR5900	HR513602
HR6113	HR1991	HR2350	

112th Congress

HR1021
HR769
HR2667
HR940
HR1181
HR2028
HR2533
HR1587
HR3196
HR1028
HR2310
HR2010
HRES365
HR1783
HR31
HR1778
HR110
HR230
HR330
HR3259
HR762
HR3325
HR1567
HR25
HR2434
HR397

Appendix: Members by Committee

	Appropriations	Financial Services	Education and Labor	Ways and Means
109 th	29 D/38 R	32 D/38 R/1 I	22 D/26 R	16 D/24 R
110 th	37 D/32 R	41 D/36 R	26 D/21 R	23 D/17 R
111 th	37 D/23 R	42 D/29 R	27 D/23 R	26 D/15 R
112 th	29 R/21 D	35 R/27 D	23 R/17 D	24 R/15 D

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 Martin Olav Sabo, D-MN
 Steny Hoyer, D-MD
 Alan Mollohan, D-WV
 Marcy Kaptur, D-OH
 Peter Visclosky, D-IN
 Nita Lowey, D-NY
 Jose Serrano, D-NY
 Rosa DeLauro, D-CT
 James Moran, D-VA
 John Olver, D-MA
 Ed Pastor, D-AZ
 David Price, D-NC
 Chet Edwards, D-TX
 Bud Cramer, D-AL
 Patrick Kennedy, D-RI
 James Clyburn, D-SC
 Maurice Hinchey, D-NY
 Lucille Royal-Allard, D-CA
 Sam Farr, D-CA
 Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL
 Carolyn Kilpatrick, D-MI

Allen Boyd, D-FL
Chaka Fattah, D-PA
Steven Rothman, D-NJ
Sanford Bishop, D-GA
Marion Berry, D-AR
Jerry Lewis, R-CA
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL
Ralph Regula, R-OH
Harold Rogers, R-KY
Frank Wolf, R-VA
Jim Kolbe, R-AZ
James Walsh, R-NY
Charles Taylor, R-NC
David Hobson, R-OH
Ernest Istook Jr., R-OK
Henry Bonilla, R-TX
Joe Knollenberg, R-MI
Jack Kingston, R-GA
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ
Roger Wicker, R-MS
Randy Cunningham, R-CA
Todd Tiahrt, R-KS
Zach Wamp, R-TN
Tom Latham, R-IA
Anne Meagher Northup, R-KY
Robert Aderholt, R-AL
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO
Kay Granger, R-TX
John Peterson, R-PA
Virgil Goode Jr., R-VA
John Doolittle, R-CA
Ray LaHood, R-IL
John Sweeney, R-NY
Don Sherwood, R-PA
Dave Weldon, R-FL
Michael Simpson, R-ID
John Culberson, R-TX
Mark Kirk, R-IL
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT
John Carter, R-TX
Rodney Alexander, R-LA
Tom DeLay, R-TX

Financial Services

Barney Frank, D-MA
Paul Kanjorski, D-PA
Maxine Waters, D-CA
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY
Melvin Watt, D-NC
Gary Ackerman, D-NY
Darlene Hooley, D-OR
Julia Carson, D-IN
Brad Sherman, D-CA
Gregory Meeks, D-NY
Barbara Lee, D-CA
Dennis Moore, D-KS
Michael Capuano, D-MA
Harold Ford Jr., D-TN
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
Joseph Crowley, D-NY
William Clay, D-MO
Steve Israel, D-NY
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
Joe Baca, D-CA
Jim Matheson, D-UT
Stephen Lynch, D-MA
Brad Miller, D-NC
David Scott, D-GA
Artur Davis, D-AL
Al Green, D-TX
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO
Melissa Bean, D-IL
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-FL
Gwen Moore, D-WI
Michael Oxley, R-OH
James Leach, R-IA
Richard Baker, R-LA
Deborah Pryce, R-OH
Spencer Bachus, R-AL
Michael Castle, R-DE
Peter King, R-NY
Ed Royce, R-CA
Frank Lucas, R-OK
Robert Ney, R-OH
Sue Kelly, R-NY
Ron Paul, R-TX
Paul Gillmor, R-OH
Jim Ryun, R-KS

Steven LaTourette, R-OH
Donald Manzullo, R-IL
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Christopher Shays, R-CT
Vito Fossella, R-NY
Gary Miller, R-CA
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH
Mark Kennedy, R-MN
Tom Feeney, R-FL
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX
Scott Garrett, R-NJ
Ginny Brown-Waite, R-FL
Gresham Barrett, R-SC
Katherine Harris, R-FL
Rick Renzi, R-AZ
Jim Gerlach, R-PA
Steven Pearce, R-NM
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX
Tom Price, R-GA
Michael Fitzpatrick, R-PA
Geoff Davis, R-KY
Patrick McHenry, R-NC
John Campbell, R-CA
Bernard Sanders, I-VT

Education and the Workforce

George Miller, D-CA
Dale Kildee, D-MI
Major Owens, D-NY
Donald Payne, D-NJ
Robert Andrews, D-NJ
Robert Scott, D-VA
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
John Tierney, D-MA
Ron Kind, D-WI
Dennis Kucinich, D-OH
David Wu, D-OR
Rush Holt, D-NJ
Susan Davis, D-CA
Betty McCollum, D-MN
Danny Davis, D-IL
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ

Chris Van Hollen, D-MD
Ryan Timothy, D-OH
Timothy Bishop, D-NY
John Barrow, D-GA
John Boehner, R-OH
Thomas Petri, R-WI
Howard McKeon, R-CA
Michael Castle, R-DE
Sam Johnson, R-TX
Mark Souder, R-IN
Charles Norwood, R-GA
Vernon Ehlers, R-MI
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Todd Russell Platts, R-PA
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH
Ric Keller, R-FL
Tom Osborne, R-NE
Addison Wilson, R-SC
Jon Porter, R-NV
John Kline, R-MN
Marilyn Musgrave, R-CO
Bob Inglis, R-SC
Cathy McMorris, R-WA
Kenny Marchant, R-TX
Tom Price, R-GA
Bobby Jindal, R-LA
Charles Boustany, R-LA
Virginia Foxx, R-NC
Thelma Drake, R-VA
John Kuhl Jr., R-NY

Ways and Means

Charles Rangel, D-NY
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA
Sander Levin, D-MI
Benjamin Cardin, D-MD
James McDermott, D-WA
John Lewis, D-GA
Richard Neal, D-MA
Michael McNulty, D-NY
William Jefferson, D-LA
John Tanner, D-TN
Xavier Becerra, D-CA
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX
Earl Pomeroy D-ND

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, D-OH
Mike Thompson, D-CA
John Larson, D-CT
Rahm Emanuel, D-IL
William Thomas, R-CA
E. Clay Shaw Jr., R-FL
Nancy Johnson, R-CT
Wally Herget, R-CA
Jim McCrery, R-LA
Dave camp, R-MI
Jim Ramstad, R-MN
Jim Nussle, R-IA
Sam Johnson, R-TX
Rob Portman, R-OH
Phil English, R-PA
J.D. Hayworth, R-AZ
Gerald Weller, R-IL
Kenny Hulshof, R-MO
Ron Lewis, R-KY
Mark Foley, R-FL
Kevin Brady, R-TX
Thomas Reynolds, R-NY
Paul Ryan, R-WI
Eric Cantor, R-VA
John Linder, R-GA
Melissa Hart, R-PA
Bob Beauprez, R-CO
Chris Chocola, R-IN
Devin Nunes, R-CA

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Alan Mollohan, D-WV
Marcy Kaptur, D-OH
Peter Visclosky, D-IN
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Jose Serrano, D-NY
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT
James Moran, D-VA
John Olver, D-MA
Ed Pastor, D-AZ

David Price, D-NC
Chet Edwards, D-TX
Bud Cramer, D-AL
Patrick Kennedy, D-RI
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY
Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA
Sam Farr, D-CA
Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL
Carolyn Kilpatrick, D-MI
Allen Boyd, D-FL
Chaka Fattah, D-PA
Steven Rothman, D-NJ
Sanford Bishop, D-GA
Marion Berry, D-AR
Barbara Lee, D-CA
Tom Udall, D-NM
Adam Schiff, D-CA
Mike Honda, D-CA
Betty McCollum, D-MN
Steve Israel, D-NY
Timothy Ryan, D-OH
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-MD
A.B. Chandler, D-KY
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-FL
Ciro Rodriguez, D-TX
Jerry Lewis, R-CA
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL
Ralph Regula, R-OH
Harold Rogers, R-KY
Frank Wolf, R-VA
James Walsh, R-NY
David Hobson, R-OH
Joe Knollenberg, R-MI
Jack Kingston, R-GA
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ
Roger Wicker, R-MS
Todd Tiahrt, R-KS
Zach Wamp, R-TN
Tom Latham, R-IA
Robert Aderholt, R-AL
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO
Kay Granger, R-TX
John Peterson, R-PA
Virgil Goode Jr., R-VA
John Doolittle, R-CA
Ray LaHood, R-IL

Dave Weldon, R-FL
Michael Simpson, R-ID
John Culberson, R-TX
Mark Kirk, R-IL
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT
John Carter, R-TX
Rodney Alexander, R-LA
Ken Calvert, R-CA
Jo Bonner, R-AL

Financial Services

Barney Frank, D-MA
Paul Kanjorski, D-PA
Maxine Waters, D-CA
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY
Melvin Watt, D-NC
Gary Ackerman, D-NY
Julia Carson, D-IN
Brad Sherman, D-CA
Gregory Meeks, D-NY
Dennis Moore, D-KS
Michael Capuano, D-MA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
William Lacy Clay, D-MO
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
Joe Baca, D-CA
Stephen Lynch, D-MA
Brad Miller, D-NC
David Scott, D-GA
Al Green, D-TX
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO
Melissa Bean, D-IL
Gwen Moore, D-WI
Lincoln Davis, D-TN
Albio Sires, D-NJ
Paul Hodes, D-NH
Keith Ellison, D-MN
Ron Klein, D-FL
Tim Mahoney, D-FL
Charles Wilson, D-OH
Ed Perlmutter, D-CO
Christopher Murphy, D-CT

Joe Donnelly, D-IN
Robert Wexler, D-FL
Jim Marshall, D-GA
Dan Boren, D-OK
Travis Childers, D-MS
Bill Foster, D-IL
Andre Carson, D-IN
Karen Lorraine Speier, D-CA
Donald Cazayoux, D-LA
Spencer Bachus, R-AL
Richard Baker, R-LA
Deborah Pryce, R-OH
Michael Castle, R-DE
Peter King, R-NY
Ed Royce, R-CA
Frank Lucas, R-OK
Ron Paul, R-TX
Paul Gillmor, R-OH
Steven LaTourette, R-OH
Donald Manzullo, R-IL
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Christopher Shays, R-CT
Gary Miller, R-CA
Tom Feeney, R-FL
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX
Scott Garrett, R-NJ
Ginny Brown-Waite, R-FL
Gresham Barrett, R-SC
Rick Renzi, R-AZ
Jim Gerlach, R-PA
Stevan Pearce, R-NM
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX
Tom Price, R-GA
Geoff Davis, R-KY
Patrick McHenry, R-NC
John Campbell, R-CA
Adam Putnam, R-FL
Marsha Blackburn, R-TN
Michele Bachmann, R-MN
Peter Roskam, R-IL
Shelley Moore Capito, R-WV
Kenny Marchant, R-TX
Thaddeus McCotter, R-MI
Kevin McCarthy, R-CA
Dean Heller, R-NV

Education and Labor

George Miller, D-CA
Dale Kildee, D-MI
Donald Payne, D-NJ
Robert Andrews, D-NJ
Robert Scott, D-VA
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
John Tierney, D-MA
Denis Kucinich, D-OH
David Wu, D-OR
Rush Holt, D-NJ
Susan Davis, D-CA
Danny Davis, D-IL
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ
Timothy Bishop, D-NY
Linda Sanchez, D-CA
John Sarbanes, D-MD
Joe Sestak, D-PA
David Loebsack, D-IA
Mazie Hirono, D-HI
Jason Altmire, D-PA
John Yarmuth, D-KY
Phil Hare, D-IL
Yvette Clarke, D-NY
Joe Courtney, D-CT
Carol Shea-Porter, D-NH
Howard McKeon, R-CA
Thomas Petri, R-WI
Peter Hoekstra, R-MI
Michael Castle, R-DE
Mark Souder, R-IN
Vernon Ehlers, R-MI
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Todd Platts, R-PA
Ric Keller, R-FL
Addison Wilson, R-SC
John Kline, R-MN
Bob Inglis, R-SC
Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-WA
Kenny Marchant, R-TX
Tom Price, R-GA
Charles Boustany, R-LA

Virginia Foxx, R-NC
John Kuhl Jr., R-NY
Rob Bishop, R-UT
David Davis, R-TN
Tim Walberg, R-MI
Dean Heller, R-NV

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Charles Rangel, D-NY
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA
Sander Levin, D-MI
James McDermott, D-WA
John Lewis, D-GA
Richard Neal, D-MA
Michael McNulty, D-NY
John Tanner, D-TN
Xavier Becerra, D-CA
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX
Earl Pomeroy, D-ND
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, D-OH
Mike Thompson, D-CA
John Larson, D-CT
Rahm Emanuel, D-IL
Earl Blumenauer, D-OR
Ron Kind, D-WI
William Pascrell, D-NJ
Shelley Berkley, D-NV
Joseph Crowley, D-NY
Chris Van Hollen, D-MD
Kendrick Meerk, D-FL
Allyson Schwartz, D-PA
Artur Davis, D-AL
Jim McCrery, R-LA
Wally Herger, R-CA
Dave Camp, R-MI
Jim Ramstad, R-MN
Sam Johnson, R-TX
Phil English, R-PA
Gerald Weller, R-IL
Kenny Hilshof, R-MO
Ron Lewis, R-KY
Kevin Brady, R-TX
Thomas Reynolds, R-NY
Paul Ryan, R-WI
Eric Cantor, R-VA

John Linder, R-GA
Devin Nunes, R-CA
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH
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Marcy Kaptur, D-OH
Peter Visclosky, D-IN
Nita Lowey, D-NY
Jose Serrano, D-NY
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT
James Moran Jr., D-VA
John Olver, D-MA
Ed Pastor, D-AZ
David Price, D-NC
Chet Edwards, D-TX
Patrick Kennedy, D-RI
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY
Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA
Sam Farr, D-CA
Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL
Carolyn Kilpatrick, D-MI
Allen Boyd, D-FL
Chaka Fattah, D-PA
Steven Rothman, D-NJ
Sanford Bishop, D-GA
Marion Berry, D-AR
Barbara Lee, D-CA
Adam Schiff, D-CA
Mike Honda, D-CA
Betty McCollum, D-MN
Steve Israel, D-NY
Timothy Ryan, D-OH
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-MD
A.B. Chandler, D-KY
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-FL
Ciro Rodriguez, D-TX
Lincoln Davis, D-TN
John Salazar, D-CO

Jerry Lewis, R-CA
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL
Harold Rogers, R-KY
Frank Wolf, R-VA
Jack Kingston, R-GA
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ
Todd Tiahrt, R-KS
Zach Wamp, R-TN
Tom Latham, R-IA
Robert Aderholt, R-AL
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO
Kay Granger, R-TX
Michael Simpson, R-ID
John Culberson, R-TX
Mark Kirk, R-IL
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT
John Carter, R-TX
Rodney Alexander, R-LA
Ken Calvert, R-CA
Jo Bonner, R-AL
Steven LaTourette, R-OH
Tom Cole, R-OK
Patrick Murphy, D-PA

Financial Services

Barney Frank, D-MA
Paul Kanjorski, D-PA
Maxine Waters, D-CA
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY
Melvin Watt, D-NC
Gary Ackerman, D-NY
Brad Sherman, D-CA
Gregory Meeks, D-NY
Dennis Moore, D-KS
Michael Capuano, D-MA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
William Lacy Clay, D-MO
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
Joe Baca, D-CA
Stephen Lynch, D-MA
Brad Miller, D-NC
David Scott, D-GA

Al Green, D-TX
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO
Melissa Bean, D-IL
Gwen Moore, D-WI
Paul Hodes, D-NH
Keith Ellison, D-MN
Ron Klein, D-FL
Charles Wilson, D-OH
Ed Perlmutter, D-CO
Joe Donnelly, D-IN
Bill Foster, D-IL
Andre Carson, D-IN
Karen Lorraine Jacqueline Speier, D-CA
Travis Childers, D-MS
Walt Minnick, D-ID
John Adler, D-NJ
Mary Jo Kilroy, D-OH
Steve Driehaus, D-OH
Suzanne Kosmas, D-FL
Alan Grayson, D-FL
James Himes, D-CT
Gary Peters, D-MI
Daniel Maffei, D-NY
Spencer Bachus, R-AL
Michael Castle, R-DE
Peter King, R-NY
Ed Royce, R-CA
Frank Lucas, R-OK
Ron Paul, R-TX
Donald Manzullo, R-IL
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Gary Miller, R-CA
Shelley Moore Capito, R-WV
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX
Scott Garrett, R-NJ
Gresham Barrett, R-SC
Jim Gerlach, R-PA
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX
Tom Price, R-GA
Patrick McHenry, R-NC
John Campbell, R-CA
Adam Putnam, R-FL
Michele Bachmann, R-MN
Kenny Marchant, R-TX
Thaddeus McCotter, R-MI

Kevin McCarthy, R-CA
Bill Posey, R-FL
Lynn Jenkins, R-KS
Christopher John Lee, R-NY
Erik Paulsen, R-MN
Leonard Lance, R-NJ

Education and Labor

George Miller, D-CA
Dale Kildee, D-MI
Donald Payne, D-NJ
Robert Andrews, D-NJ
Robert Scott, D-VA
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
John Tierney, D-MA
Dennis Kucinich, D-OH
David Wu, D-OR
Rush Holt, D-NJ
Susan Davis, D-CA
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ
Timothy Bishop, D-NY
Joe Sestak, D-PA
David Loebsack, D-IA
Mazie Hirono, D-HI
Jason Altmire, D-PA
Phil Hare, D-IL
Yvette Clarke, D-NY
Joe Courtney, D-CT
Carol Shea-Porter, D-NH
Marcia Fudge, D-OH
Jared Polis, D-CO
Paul Tonko, D-NY
Dina Titus, D-NV
Howard McKeon, R-CA
Thomas Petri, R-WI
Peter Hoekstra, R-MI
Michael Castle, R-DE
Mark Souder, R-IN
Vernon Ehlers, R-MI
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Rodd Russell Platts R-PA
Addison Wilson, R-SC
John Kline, R-MN

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-WA
Tom Price, R-GA
Virginia Foxx, R-NC
Rob Bishop, R-UT
Brett Guthrie, R-KY
Bill Cassidy, R-LA
Tom McClintock, R-CA
Duncan Hunter, R-CA
David Roe, R-TN
Judy Chu, R-CA
Glenn Thompson, R-PA
Howard McKeon, R-CA
Judy Chu, R-CA

Ways and Means

Charles Rangel, D-NY
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA
Sander Levin, D-MI
James McDermott, D-WA
John Lewis, D-GA
Richard Neal, D-MA
John Tanner, D-TN
Xavier Becerra, D-CA
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX
Earl Pomeroy, D-ND
Mike Thompson, D-CA
John Larson, D-CT
Earl Blumenauer, D-OR
Ron Kind, D-WI
William Pascrell, D-NJ
Shelley Berkley, D-NV
Joseph Crowley, D-NY
Chris Van Hollen, D-MD
Kendrick Meek, D-FL
Allyson Schwartz, D-PA
Artur Davis, D-AL
Danny Davis, D-IL
Bob Etheridge, D-NC
Linda Sanchez, D-CA
Brian Higgins, D-NY
John Yarmuth, D-KY
Dave Camp, R-MI
Wally Herger, R-CA
Sam Johnson, R-TX
Kevin Brady, R-TX

Paul Ryan, R-WI
Eric Cantor, R-VA
John Linder, R-GA
Devin Nunes, R-CA
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH
Ginny Brown-Waite, R-FL
Geoff Davis, R-KY
David Reichert, R-WA
Charles Boustany, R-LA
Dean Heller, R-NV
Peter Roskam, R-IL

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Tom Latham, R-IA
Robert Aderholt, R-AL
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO
Kay Granger, R-TX
Michael Simpson, R-ID
John Culberson, R-TX
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT
John Carter, R-TX
Rodney Alexander, R-LA
Ken Calvert, R-CA
Jo Bonner, R-AL
Steven LaTourette, R-OH
Tom Cole, R-OK
Jeff Flake, R-AZ
Mario Diaz-Balart, R-FL
Charles Dent, R-PA
Steve Austria, R-OH
Cynthia Lummis, R-WY
Tom Graves, R-GA
Kevin Yoder, R-KS
Steve Womack, R-AR
Alan Nunnelee, R-MS
Norman Dicks, D-WA

Marcy Kaptur, D-OH
Peter Visclosky, D-IN
Nita Lowey, D-NY
Jose Serrano, D-NY
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT
James Moran, D-VA
John Olver, D-MA
Ed Pastor, D-AZ
David Price, D-NC
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY
Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA
Sam Farr, D-CA
Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL
Chaka Fattah, D-PA
Steven Rothman, D-NJ
Sanford Bishop, D-GA
Barbara Lee, D-CA
Adam Schiff, D-CA
Mike Honda, D-CA
Betty McCollum, D-MN

Financial Services

Spencer Bachus, R-AL
Peter King, R-NY
Ed Royce, R-CA
Frank Lucas, R-OK
Ron Paul, R-TX
Donald Manzullo, R-IL
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC
Judy Biggert, R-IL
Gary Miller, R-CA
Shelley Moore Capito, R-WV
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX
Scott Garrett, R-NJ
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX
Patrick McHenry, R-NC
John Campbell, R-CA
Michele Bachmann, R-MN
Kenny Marchant, R-TX
Thaddeus McCotter, R-MI
Kevin McCarthy, R-CA
Stevan Pearce, R-NM
Bill Posey, R-FL
Michael Fitzpatrick, R-PA
Lynn Westmoreland, R-GA

Blaine Luetkemeyer, R-MO
Bill Huizenga, R-MI
Sean Duffy, R-WI
Nan Hayworth, R-NY
Jim Renacci, R-OH
Robert Hurt, R-VA
Robert Dold, R-IL
David Schweikert, R-AZ
Michael Grimm, R-NY
Francisco Canseco, R-TX
Steve Stivers, R-OH
Barney Frank, D-MA
Maxine Waters, D-CA
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY
Melvin Watt, D-NC
Gary Ackerman, D-NY
Brad Sherman, D-CA
Gregory Meeks, D-NY
Michael Capuano, D-MA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
William Lacy Clay, D-MO
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
Joe Baca, D-CA
Stephen Lynch, D-MA
Brad Miller, D-NC
David Scott, D-GA
Al Green, D-TX
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO
Gwen Moore, D-WI
Keith Ellison, D-MN
Ed Perlmutter, D-CO
Joe Donnelly, D-IN
Andre Carson, D-IN
James Himes, D-CT
Gary Peters, D-MI
John Carney, D-DE
Stephen Fincher, R-TN

Education and the Workplace

John Kline, R-MN
Thomas Petri, R-WI
Howard McKeon, R-CA
Judy Biggert, R-IL

Todd Russell Platts, R-PA
Addison Wilson, R-SC
Virginia Foxx, R-NC
Duncan Hunter, R-CA
David Roe, R-TN
Glenn Thompson, R-PA
Tim Walberg, R-MI
Scott DesJarlais, R-TN
Richard Hanna, R-NY
Todd Rokita, R-IN
Larry Bucshon, R-IN
Trey Gowdy, R-SC
Lou Barletta, R-PA
Kristi Noem, R-SD
Martha Roby, R-AL
Joe Heck, R-NV
Dennis Ross, R-FL
Mike Kelly, R-PA
George Miller, D-CA
Dale Kildee, D-MI
Donald Payne, D-NJ
Robert Andrews, D-NJ
Robert Scott, D-VA
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY
John Tierney, D-MA
Dennis Kucinich, D-OH
David Wu, D-OR
Rush Holt, D-NJ
Susan Davis, D-CA
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ
Timothy Bishop, D-NY
David Loebsack, D-IA
Mazie Hirono, D-HI
Robert Goodlatte, R-VA

Ways and Means

Dave Camp, R-MI
Wally Herger, R-CA
Sam Johnson, R-TX
Kevin Brady, R-TX
Paul Ryan, R-WI
Devin Nunes, R-CA
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH

Geoff Davis, R-KY
David Reichert, R-WA
Charles Boustany, R-LA
Dean Heller, R-NV
Peter Roskam, R-IL
Jim Gerlach, R-PA
Tom Price, R-GA
Vern Buchanan, R-FL
Adrian Smith, R-NE
Aaron Schock, R-IL
Christopher John lee, R-NY
Lynn Jenkins, R-KS
Erik Paulsen, R-MN
Kenny Marchant, R-TX
Rick Berg, R-ND
Diane Black, R-TN
Sander Levin, D-MI
Charles Rangel, D-NY
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA
James McDermott, D-WA
John Lewis, D-GA
Richard Neal, D-MA
Xavier Becerra, D-CA
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX
Mike Thompson, D-CA
John Larson, D-CT
Earl Blumenauer, D-OR
Ron Kind, D-WI
William Pascrell, D-NJ
Shelley Berkley, D-NV
Joseph Crowley, D-NY
Thomas W. Reed II, R-NY