

An Analysis of German Emotive Reflexives

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"Sich selbst betrügen ist die leichteste Arbeit."
(Sprichwort)

Abstract:

The meaning of German reflexives is controversial, it being frequently held that the reflexive pronoun is an empty term, identical with the subject, part of the verb, meaningless, a mere valence, etc. What is here called the "German emotive reflexive" is isolated and analyzed to show that not only can the pronoun have experiential meaning and force, but that there is good reason on the Cognitive Theory of Emotion for it to be regarded as having such meaning. The structure of German emotive reflexives conforms well to this theory. A study of emotion helps to clarify reflexives, and a study of reflexives helps to clarify emotion (*Sie erklären sich*).

The various German dictionaries and grammars use the word *reflexiv* to explain and classify. What investigators now seem to be agreed about is that the word is ambiguous or is not a proper category at all.¹

Sich and *reflexiv* will be seen to be "open-context" terms. A brief clarification of reflexives in general will be given, followed by an analysis of emotive reflexives.

Reflexives have been traditionally classified as:

- a) *echt, obligatorisch, fest, formal, valenzgebunden, beziehungsbedeutend* (empty of content or meaning).
- b) *unecht, fakultativ, valenzunabhängig, begriffsbedeutend* (having conceptual meaning).

Basically, group a) corresponds to reflexive only verbs, and group b) to reflexive verbs which also have transitive or other forms. The terms are,

¹Buscha 1982, Helbig 1984, Jäntti 1978, Wagner 1977.

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however, controversial. It is even argued that group b) is "really" the genuine reflexive because group a) substitutes identity for reflexivity.²

The difference between semantic (or substantive) and syntactic classifications of reflexives also remains controversial. The meanings of the reflexive pronoun remain diverse. The approach here is semantic as well as syntactic. The reflexive pronoun will be seen to have a multiplicity of meanings rather than be a mere empty syntactical device.

German grammarians, while concerned with the syntax of *sich*-verbs, have not devoted attention to questions of these verbs and voice or of 'meanings' of these verbs ...³

The following aspects of reflexives will be briefly analyzed: self-reference, circularity, identity, active-passive, irrelevancy, reciprocity, intensification, prepositional reflexives, reflexivity, *Sprachgefühl*, linguistic tests for reflexivity, agency and causality, impersonal reflexives, exclusive reflexives, noun reflexives, context and usage, emotive reflexives.

Self-reference

Mich and *dich* double as personal pronouns and reflexives so it would be natural to think of them as referring to a person. The reflexive pronoun sometimes seems to have the function of a personal pronoun. It distinguishes the subject from other persons or things:

Ich ärgere mich.

Ich ärgere ihn.

Sich may appear to have no semantic function when there are no such distinctions to be made. The English translation of the first sentence above is, "I am angry." Why should one also say, "I am angry myself (*mich*) when the first "I" is sufficient? This is especially the case with reflexives which have only a reflexive form such as *Sie sehnte sich nach ihm* [She longed (herself) for him.] Is the reflexive then irrelevant and unnecessary?

If the reflexive pronoun refers to the subject, what exactly is being referred to?

Ich wasche mir die Hände. (Part of body)

Ich überarbeite mich. (All of body)

Ich ärgere mich. (Psychological self)

Es gibt sich von selbst. (Idiomatic or metaphorical subject or self)

²Buscha 1972, p. 152.

³Granmer 1975, p. 21.

In short, the philosophical problem of the self arises with the question of reflexives. Each pronoun refers to a different self. And self-reference generates paradoxes similar to that of the "liar paradox".⁴ The self is, for example, rendered as if it were two people. And how can one lie to or deceive one's own self (*Selbstlüge*)?

Er hat sich selbst getäuscht.

The first person usage in the following differs from the second and third: *Ich schmeichle mir*. How can we knowingly flatter ourselves by and to ourselves? Examples of such paradoxes are:

I am not myself today.
I am not identical with myself.
This statement is false.

Champlin (1988) wrote:

There is a natural philosophical tendency within all of all to find reflexive constructions paradoxical... 'Can an object move itself?' 'Can a single sentence contradict itself?'⁵

We may then wonder about such expressions as:

Ich frage mich ob ...
... wieder zu sich kommen.
... begückwünschte sich Jörg.
... man sich selbst liebt.
sich selbst bedauern.

Identity

It is widely held that the reflexive pronoun is identical with the subject. Erben (1972) asserts that the agent and object of the action are identical: instead of the relation xRy we have xRx .⁶ There are various interpretations of this:

- a) The pronoun is in the accusative (genitive or dative) yet refers back to the nominative subject. How can *sich* be thought of as both nominative and accusative? It is paradoxical to think of the subject as also its own direct

⁴Shibles 1985, pp. 185–210.

⁵Champlin, pp. 225; 229.

⁶Erben, p. 216, # 387; cf. Helbig & Buscha 1989, pp. 64–65; Lewandowski 1975, p. 545.

or indirect object. *Duden* (1980) states that the reflexive *sich* turns one's thinking back to the subject (*zurückversetzen*). So the criterion is vaguely intuitive and experiential. The view is that the reflexive pronoun is an empty or *Null* word which is meaningless in itself, a nonentity.

*Das Reflexivpronomen ist Bestandteil des Verbs (Prädikats) und keine Ergänzung ... Es ist inhaltlich leer ... Es ist als Teil des Verbs anzusehen.*⁷

The reflexive pronoun in genuine reflexive verbs is not felt als an object in the strict sense of the term and hence is not treated as an independent element in the sentence, but merely as a part of the verb ... pronoun and verb together forming one idea.⁸

These ideas are challenged in this paper. There is good reason for the reflexive to be felt als a reflexive, and it need not be considered as merely part of the verb. In what way would it be part of the verb? Or is this just a way of saying that the pronoun is meaningless? And because the relative pronoun cannot be left out does not mean that it is only syntactical without meaning. Does the predicate pronoun have an auxiliary function or serve as a pronoun as the name suggests? The fact that nearly all reflexives and transitives are conjugated with *haben* rather than *sein* in the perfect tenses may connote that the *sich*-word is an object and not identical with its subject.

- b) To what extent is *sich* identical with the subject? In *Er rasierte sich*, one shaves one's beard, not one's entire self. *Sich* is only partially identical to, sometimes said to be attributive of, the subject. In addition, "I" has different meanings with different verbs. "I" is not the same in "I remember", "I feel", "I shave", etc.

Sich cannot be identical with the subject because no two things can be identical. It makes no sense to say that one is identical with oneself. We say, "*Ich schäme mich*," but not "**Mich schäme ich*". And if it were somehow identical it would thereby lack reflexivity and so be misconstrued. A predicate pronoun is not an identity pronoun.

Circularity

Circularity is the defining of a term in terms of itself or a synonym (overt or covert). It is also to assume that which is to be proved. The Curme (1977, p. 330) quote given earlier is circular: "The reflexive pronoun in genuine

⁷ *Duden Grammatik* 1973, p. 76.

⁸ Curme 1977, p. 330.

reflexive verbs is ... merely ... a part of the verb," where its being seen as being part of the verb is what makes it a genuine reflexive. It is not a mere stipulative definition because Curme says of other reflexives that they are "not really reflexive" (p. 330).

If we define "I" or "self" or the subject by *sich* or vice versa, we give no new information. But, as the pronoun has a variety of uses and meanings it is not mainly circular. However, most sentences may be found to be in some sense partly circular. It is important to distinguish the circular from the noncircular sense of reflexives.

"*Er langweilte sich mit mir.*" We may translate this literally and circularly as "He bored himself with me", or less circularly as "He was bored with me". If we define *er* in terms of *sich* and vice versa, as is often advocated (*Kreisbewegung*), we generate a circularity.

Intensification

One use and connotation of the *sich*-word is to emphasize the subject:

Jeder ist sich selbst der Nächste. (Sprichwort)

Er kennt sich hier aus.

Ich wundere mich manchmal über mich selbst.

Reciprocal Reflexives

Reflexives may be used to indicate reciprocity.

Wir ärgern uns.

Sie amüsieren sich.

Sie langweilen sich.

Sie sind sich (Dat.) böse.

The meaning of certain verbs suggest such reciprocity: *befreunden*, *verbrüdern*, *küssen*, etc. Many may thus be found only in the (reciprocal) reflexive form. Love may be a nonreciprocal relationship, but friendship appears to presuppose mutuality.

The use of reciprocals can create the following ambiguity: *Sie lieben sich.* (*Sich selber oder einander?*) In *Wir ärgern uns*, do we anger each other or does each anger oneself or both?

Prepositional Reflexives

Customarily the *sich*-word is used with or controlled by certain prepositional

expressions. The meanings, then, vary widely and the pronoun may not necessarily be replacable by the subject. Curme (1977) states that for *an sich* and *für sich* expressions, there is no actual antecedent.⁹ The form of prepositional reflexives is usually: *sich* (verb) (preposition): e.g. *an, für, mit, nach, über, um, von, vor*, etc. This form easily generates metaemotions or emotions about emotions:

Sich abängstigen um jemanden (Zorn, Haß, etc.)

Ich habe mich über mich selbst geärgert.

The phrase *an und für sich* typically commits the fallacy of abstractionism. It makes little sense to say that something is "bad in itself", or *böse an sich*. As will be seen, this makes emotions, e.g. *Rache, Ärger, Zorn*, etc. *an und für sich* also essentialistic and unintelligible.

With prepositions often come figurative, colloquial and metaphorical usages.

Impersonals

The impersonal reflexive subject takes additional meanings. It suggests a passive form, gives little causal information, yet can have causal force. *Es ärgert mich, daß ...* suggests that external circumstances rather than ourselves ultimately cause our emotions — a view which will be subsequently opposed. *Es wundert mich* is weaker than *Ich wundere mich*. The emotive reflexive will be seen to stress the active, personal and cognitive reflexivity. In one sense, the impersonal is not impersonal as it tends to personify.¹⁰ Curme (1977) wrote about *Sein Wunsch erfüllte sich*, that it is "as if the wish had a will of its own" (p. 107).

Further examples of impersonals are:

Es graut mir davor.

Das versteht sich.

Die Tür öffnete sich.

Der Ort nannte sich Denkendorf.

Es ekelt mich.

Linguistic Tests for Reflexivity

Some of the tests proposed to classify and determine types of reflexivity are the following:

⁹Ibid., p. 204.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 331.

- Necessity test: The reflexive pronoun cannot be eliminated. **Er schämt.*
- Substitution test: *Er schämt sich*, but not **Sie schämt ihn.*
- Coordination test: **Er schämt sich und den Nachbarn.*
- Priority test: *Er schämt sich*, but not **Sich schämt er.*
- Question test: **Wen schämst du?* We cannot reply **Mich.*
- Negations Test: **Er schämt nicht sich, sondern ...*
- Expansion test: **Ich schäme mich selbst.* Also, *einander* may not replace *sich* in a reflexive only verb.

Other tests are based on the possibility of a passive construction, whether *sich* can be accented (ordinarily it is not), whether the pronoun is in the genitive, dative or accusative, and on the nature of the prepositional phrases admitted.¹¹ Helbig (1984) points out that the tests are often merely intuitive and unsystematic (p. 82). Further semantic analysis is required.

Reflexivity- "Sprachgefühl"

Are reflexives felt as reflexives? An answer to this question would require behavioral data and a clear and extensive knowledge of what is meant by reflexives and which ones are being preferred to. If they involve empty or meaningless terms, presumably such would not be experienced. The preceding discussion has, however, shown that the reflexive pronoun is semantically rich, not meaningless, and therefore able to be experienced. A few reasons for this follow:

- a) Reflexives and reflexive pronouns have diverse meanings and usages in different contexts, e.g. intensification, etc.
- b) *Sich*-words have their own grammatical forms, operational tests and uses.
- c) Impersonal, transitive, intransitive, active, passive and reflexive forms are distinguished and employed in style and rhetoric to express different things. One cannot without loss of meaning substitute or paraphrase one for the other.
- d) There is a parallel between reflexives and particles (and interjections). Both have been thought to be empty or filler words: *Flickwort*, *Interjektion*, *Füllwort*, *Lückenbüßer*, *Einschiebsel*. But particles and interjections are seen rather to have their own logic, a wide variety of meaning and to be felt to have them.¹² The same appears to be true with reflexives.

¹¹See Helbig 1984, pp. 80ff.; Helbig & Buscha 1989, pp. 210-211.

¹²Shibles 1989a, 1989b.

Sich-words may themselves even have uses as particles or interjections to render: intensification, "just", "really", "in itself" (*an sich*), "properly considered" (*an sich*). Because he thinks *sich* is not an object or conceptual pronoun, but rather in an inseparable relationship, Haselbach (1966) treats *sich* as a "*Reflexivpartikel*", a "*Beziehungsmittel*" (p. 201).

- e) Whether or not and how reciprocals can be "felt" depends upon the meaning of emotion, which will be discussed subsequently.
- f) Reciprocity, figurative and metaphorical uses of *sich*-words are understood and so may be experienced.
- g) Active, passive and causal forms may be experienced as being different (see next section for discussion).

In summary, it cannot be justifiably held that reflexives are empty of all of their various kinds of meaning and that they do not have reflexive force. This will be seen to be especially the case in the following examples.

German Emotive Reflexives

German as compared to English, for example, is especially rich in reflexives. The area of emotion is also rich in reflexives and these will here be designated as "German emotive reflexives". Brinkmann (1971) calls these "personal reflexives" which helps us to understand our inner world:

*So gibt eine umfangreiche Gruppe von persönlichen Reflexiven
Einblick in die menschliche Innenwelt.*¹³

Helbig and Buscha (1989) refer to these as "*Träger psychischer Prozesse*" (pp. 635-6). Study of the relationship between emotion and reflexives has, however, largely been ignored. Important work on emotion in philosophy and psychology is recent. In philosophy, the bulk of research took place around 1980. Freud has especially come under recent and sustained attack.

One of the most promising and well-supported theories of emotion will be first briefly presented. In the literature of therapy it is called the "Rational Emotive Theory", in philosophy, the "Cognitive Theory of Emotion".¹⁴ It is also a case where philosophy and therapy, theory and practice, have come together harmoniously. This theory may be briefly characterized as follows:

1. Emotions are not just feelings.
2. They are cognitions (self-talk, uttered statements) causing bodily feelings.

¹³Brinkmann, p. 207.

¹⁴Ellis 1977, 1979; Maultsby and Klärner 1984, Schwartz 1986, *Journal of Rational Emotive Therapy*; Gordon 1987, Lyons 1980, Rorty 1980, Shibles 1974, 1978, 1989c, 1989d.

3. We cause our own emotions by our own assessments (cf. emotive reflexives).
4. Emotions are not passively caused by the environment, so are not best represented by impersonal and passive linguistic structures.
5. Negative emotions are due to faulty thinking.
6. We can change our emotions by changing our assessments. Negative emotions may thereby be both avoided and eliminated. Positive emotions may be sustained to produce, for example, *Lebensfreude*.
7. Emotions are not eliminated by being "released" (*Gefühle herauslassen*).

The study of emotion helps to clarify reflexives and the study of reflexives helps to clarify emotion. In addition, the German emotive reflexive in common usage coheres well with the cognitive theory of emotions.

Emotions (*Emotionen, Gefühle*) are not just feelings (*Körperempfindungen*). Rather they are thoughts (nonmentalistic language use) which cause bodily feelings. Revenge, for example, involves the thought: "You did something bad to me, so I will do something bad in return", or: "An eye for an eye". From this assessment certain bodily feelings arise. The same principle is true for other emotions such as jealousy ("It is bad that someone is trying to take something I believe is mine"). It may be noted that the assessments are often fallacious. Revenge is bad therapy, and we may be jealous because we falsely believe we possess another person.

Because emotions are not merely bodily feelings, the language (German, English, etc.) systematically misleads by such expressions as "I feel angry". Ellis (1977, 1979) points out that the more adequate formulation would be: "I think-feel angry". A basic formulation suggesting that assessments are involved is: a) I feel x (cognition), b) I feel x (bodily sensation). a) shows that cognition is involved, but misleads in suggesting that feelings are emotions, that a) is like b), and that *Gefühle* are *Empfindungen*. In *Ich fühle mich x*, let x = *wohl, geehrt, wie neu geboren, unausgefüllt, nun in Sicherheit, geschmeichelt*, etc.

Other expressions suggesting that feelings are emotions are, for example: *Feingefühl, zartfühlend* and the following:

Sie spürte, wie der Zorn in ihr aufstieg. (Oder Hunger)

Sie fühlte, wie sich etwas in ihr löste. (Cognitive)

Ich empfinde da ganz anders. (Wie Kälte oder Schmerz)

Both *Empfindung* and *Gefühle* may refer to emotions; however, a decision has been made here to use *Gefühle* for emotion and *Empfindung* for bodily

feelings. Although common usage is inconsistent this is perhaps the more common usage. Also, *Gefühle* is the main word which is used in emotive juxtapositions whereas *Empfindung* is not. *Gefühls-* combines with hundreds of terms, such as: *-akrobat, -armut, -athlet, -ausbruch, -äußerung, -dinge, -durchdrungen, -duselei, -mensch, etc.*

In addition, one can substitute the various emotions (or other terms) for "x" in "*x-Gefühl*", e.g., *Ohnmachtsgefühl, Angstgefühl, Anstandsgefühl, Selbstgefühl*, or more metaphorical juxtapositions such as *Sprachgefühl*.

An examination of language use shows that value terms ("good", "bad", "right", "wrong", "ought") are "open-context terms" and have no meaning until one is substituted for them.¹⁵ "Bad" can mean or be based on the reason:

- bad in itself (a misuse)
- wrong (circular as this is also a value term)
- illegal
- deviation from the usual, etc.

It has no fixed meaning so it functions like "x" in algebra, like a valence, or is like a blank check needing to be filled in by other words or phrases to be valid or meaningful. But nothing is "bad in itself" (*an und für sich*). This fallacious usage leads to inferiority: "I am (in itself) no good", where no specific meaning or reason is given for "no good".

The usual substitution instances given for "bad" are fallacious. Negative emotions are typically due to the faulty assessment that we can do what is not within our power, or failure to accept reality. This observation was argued for by Marcus Aurelius (orig. ca. 170 A.D.; 1984). We may, for example, blame people when they cannot do otherwise than they did do, or "feel" guilty (blame ourselves) about an act which cannot be changed because it is in the past.¹⁶ In such ways, negative emotions are based on faulty assessments. This view may be observed in the following *Sprichwörter*:

Negative emotions

a) are created by ourselves:

Der ärgste Feind ist in uns selber.

b) are due to faulty thinking:

Wo der Zorn einkehrt, muß der Verstand ausziehen.

¹⁵Shibles 1973.

¹⁶Shibles 1989d.

c) are typically harmful and self-defeating:

Reue straft sich selbst.

In der Wut tut niemand gut.

Ärger zahlt sich nicht aus.

Auf Rach' folgt Ach.

Was man bereuen muß, ist um jeden Preis zu teuer.

Wer seinen Zorn bezwingt, hat einen Feind besiegt.

Furcht bessert nicht.

Im Zorn ist Zaudern das beste.

Negative emotions may be seen as due to faulty thinking also in the Rhenish dialect where "falsch" means "ärgerlich" in "Meine Mutter war falsch"; and in Saxon where "stupid" means "wütend, zornig, verrückt".

The usual form of the German emotive reflexive represents and pictures well the fact that we cause our own emotions by our assessments, whereas the English way of representing the theory is not so ordinary:

I bore myself — *Ich langweile mich*

I anger myself — *Ich ärgere mich*

I delight myself — *Ich freue mich*

I embarrass myself — *Ich schäme mich*

"*Ich ärgere mich*", if literally translated as "I anger myself", appropriately suggests that we make ourselves angry. Here the reflexive may be seen as having reflexive force ["*Rückbezüglich*", "*auf das Subjekt zurückwirkendes Geschehen*"].¹⁷

And because emotion is an active psychological cognitive process, it is not adequate to render it by a passive form such as "I am angry". "*Ich fürchte mich vor ihm*" is regarded as being the same relationship as "*Ich fürchte ihn*".¹⁸ It is not. The former is more active and semantically different. "*Das Mädchen hat sich verliebt*" better shows activity than "*Das Mädchen ist verliebt*". The fact that the reflexive only verb cannot be used in the passive may be seen to favor regarding it as an active, causative verb.

**Er wird (sich) geschämt.*

**Ich werde von mir geschämt.*

The *sich*-word also appears in noun forms as: *Sichübernehmen*, *Sichgehenlassen*. Another form is: *Das sich freuende Kind*, *das sich schämende Kind*.

¹⁷Stammerjohann 1975, p. 356.

¹⁸Buscha 1972, p. 153.

It may be noted that French has many similar emotive reflexives, for example, *s'aimer*, *s'amuser*, *s'irriter*, etc. There is a parallel between "I feel", "*Sich fühlen*" and "*se sentir*".

"*Ich ärgere mich krank (maßlos, schwarz)*" suggests that anger is an excess and faulty. "*Es ärgert mich, daß ...*" misleads in suggesting merely an external cause or even personification.

Following is a list of the main emotive reflexives generally regarded as having a reflexive only form. Not all sources agree especially in colloquial use. Haselbach (1966: 201) appears to be in error in treating *vergnügen* as a reflexive only verb. It has a nonreflexive, transitive form, too, for example: *Paul vergnügte sich auf dem Fest* and *Der Anblick des turtelnden Liebespaares vergnügte Paul*. Reflexive only emotive verbs: *abhängstigen*, *abärgern*, *abgrämen*, *abhärmen*, *abquälen*, *befassen mit ...*, *begnügen*, *empfinden*, *einleben*, *entschließen*, *erdreisten*, *ereifern*, *erfrechen*, *erholen*, *erkühnen*, *ermannen*, *gedulden*, *getrauen*, *härmen*, *mitfreuen*, *revanchieren*, *schämen*, *sehnen*, *verbrüdern*, *verlieben*, *verlustieren* (archaic), *zufriedengeben*.

Some emotive reflexives have both a psychological and physical meaning:

- sich abquälen (seelisch)* — I fret; I worry myself
- sich abquälen (körperlich)* — colloq.: toil
- sich abhärmen* — I grieve; I worry myself
- sich bemühen* — I try = I trouble myself to
- sich entrüsten* — I am indignant = I fill myself with indignation
- sich amüsieren* — I am having fun = I enjoy myself
- sich empfinden* — I empathize = I think-feel my way into something

It may be noted that the *ab-* prefix stresses the intensification function of the *sich* form.

Other emotive reflexives may be used nonreflexively. Each may be put in the following forms: *jemanden oder sich + verb*; e.g. *jemanden ärgern*, *Peter ärgert Paul* (to anger somebody, Peter angers Paul), *sich ärgern*, *Ich ärgere mich* (I anger myself = I am angry). Emotive reflexives (broadly conceived) which are not reflexive only are:

Amüsieren, *ängstigen*, *ärgern*, *aufregen*, *ausleben*, *ausruhen*, *begeistern*, *bemühen*, *beruhigen*, *beugen*, *beunruhigen*, *blamieren*, *demütigen*, *ekeln*, *empören*, *entflammen*, *entrüsten*, *erbosen*, *fassen* (compose oneself), *ergötzen*, *erheitern*, *erinnern*, *erhitzen*, *erleichtern*, *erniedrigen*, *erregen*, *erschrecken*, *erzürnen*, *finden* (compose oneself), *fragen* (wonder, "feel" doubt), *freuen* (*er-*), *fühlen*, *fürchten*, *gefallen*, *grämen*, *interessieren*, *irren*, *langweilen*, *mäßigen*, *quälen*, *rächen*, *scheuen*, *schmeicheln*, *stören*, *trauen*, *vergnügen*, *verhärten*, *vermessen*, *versuchen*, *verwirren*, *vorstellen*, *wagen*, *wundern*,

(ab-, ver-)-zehren, zurückhalten, zurückversetzen, zusammenraffen.

Conclusion

It has been shown that reflexives and their pronoun have a multiplicity of meanings in addition to the alleged empty syntactic usage. Whether or not speakers experience reflexives as reflexives may now be further clarified. *Sprachgefühl* and *Reflexivgefühl* are emotions. According to the emotion theory, we cause our own *Reflexivgefühle* by our own assessments. Thus, such emotions are possible. We may "see reflexives as" having their diverse meanings, or "see them as" being syntactic devices without reflexive import. After reading about emotive reflexives a speaker may say: "Now I see reflexives in a different light. I will no longer think of them as I did before."

Because assessments are always accompanied by some bodily sensations we are always experiencing emotion, however subtle. Even indifference, and the assessment to see linguistic structures solely or mainly as syntactic, are emotions (*Syntaxgefühle*).

Furthermore, we do not have exactly the same emotion twice. There is always a variation of cognition and bodily states. We do not have *Ärger an sich*, but only *Ärger*¹, *Ärger*², *Ärger*³, etc. In this sense we can never experience the same joke, love, aesthetic experience twice or on separate occasions. In this respect we do not have a *Reflexivgefühl* (R), but only *R*¹, *R*², *R*³, etc.

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Das Schlagwort in der modernen Sprache

1. Bedeutung und Funktion

Das Schlagwort wird allgemein als die erfolgreichste sprachlich-stilistische Erscheinung der Propaganda betrachtet. Alles was Schlagwörter sind, sind sie erst dann, die öffentlichen Stellungnahmen der Politiker seien unrichtig ist, was sich nicht auf die Propaganda bezieht.

Es hat sich nicht nur die Selbstevidenz von Verstandlichkeit und Deutlichkeit eingebürgert. In Bezug auf das Schlagwort ist es nicht die Mächtigkeit des Wortes, welche Triumph feiert, einmal einen Blick auf die Kunst der Propaganda, die den Begriff Schlagwort zu werfen. In der einschlägigen Literatur finden sich die Begriffe *Wortwahl*, *Wortwahl*, *Wortwahl* (siehe Schöpp 1955) und *Zauberformeln* (Schulz 1936).

Inhaltliche Entleerung, Vereinfachung und Vereinfachung sind zwei dunkle Kräfte, welche dem Schlagwort allgemein zugesprochen. Der Schlagwort ist dabei so alt wie das Schlagwort selbst. Schon in der Antike wurde der Schlagwort als ein Mittel zum Mithras der Sprache und eine moderne politische Wortwahl, welche die Produktion von Schlagwörtern und die Weltanschauung der Sprachkritiker über den von Sprache Wirkung auf Sprache und Kultur sind also letzterweg ein Phänomen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.

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