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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

March-April 2016



Why We Don't Win Wars

Flynn p8

Language of Daesh

Ford p16

Justifying Islamic State Atrocities

Kibble p28

Convergence, Emergence, Complexity

Hughes p42

COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS



Greetings!

I am pleased to announce the 2016 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition. The theme of this year's competition is "Educating the Force: What is the right balance between training and education?" With the tremendous success we had in the 2015 competition, I'm eagerly looking forward to this year's submissions. To submit, see the instructions in the advertisement on page 1 of this issue and on our website.

This edition of *Military Review* includes articles that will shed light on the actions of the Islamic State (IS) and help readers better understand the enemy we face.


Maj. Theresa Ford posits that we must first understand the complexity of the domain of *deen*, an Arabic word that means faith or religion, before we can "degrade and ultimately defeat" *Daesh* (a term coined by some Muslims to describe IS). She demonstrates that words are the weapons of Daesh and shows how words can help defeat them.

Retired British naval officer David Kibble adds to the discourse with a revealing discussion on how IS justifies its brutal actions. He examines the dialogue offered by IS in its online magazine, *Dabiq*, and then provides the perspective of the majority of Muslims, who have condemned IS actions as abhorrent and un-Islamic.

I want to publicly offer a warm welcome to the newest member of our editorial staff, Beth Warrington. Beth brings a wealth of experience and professionalism from her previous job as communications director of the Kansas Bar Association and editor of its journal. Besides editing submissions to our journal, Beth is also managing our book review program.

Thank you to all our readers for your continued support and to our contributors who continue to submit timely, engaging, and relevant articles written to the highest professional standards.

Read us online at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp> or <http://armypress.dod-live.mil/>.

A photograph showing two soldiers in camouflage uniforms and helmets, crouching in a field. They are firing rifles, with bright muzzle flashes visible. The background is a grassy field with some trees in the distance.

2nd Lt. Jacqueline Marks (left), a platoon leader with the 557th Military Police Company, 94th Military Police Battalion, assigned to the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, takes her platoon through react-to-contact drills at the Rodriguez Range complex 4 November 2015 in the Republic of Korea.

(Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Matthew Veasley, U.S. Army)

Reminder: The 2016 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme is Educating the Force: What is the right balance between training and education?

Possible topics include but are not limited to—

- Do soldiers really need higher education? If so, to what level?
- Are the Army's professional military education (PME) programs teaching the right objectives; and, if so, are graduates applying them? How should the Army ensure PME reflects the force's needs?
- How should the Army measure the effects of PME on the conduct of Army operations? What metrics should it use?
- How should the Army measure the effects of Army education on soldiers' careers?
- How well is the Army taking advantage of any educational opportunities it provides soldiers?
- How well are the civilian study programs the Army pays for benefitting the force or the careers of soldiers? What fields of study does the Army need most?
- How should the Army change the way it uses the expertise soldiers gain through civilian study?

Contest Closes 11 July 2016

1st Place	\$1,000 and publication in <i>Military Review</i>
2nd Place	\$750 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>
3rd Place	\$500 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>

For information on how to submit an entry, go to <http://militaryreview.army.mil>



Soldiers helocast into Lake of the Ozarks during the Army Sapper Leaders Course 2 November 2009 at Osage Beach, Missouri.

(Photo courtesy of the Fort Hood PAO)

Themes for Future Editions

with Suggested Topics

Army Firsts

May-June 2016

- ◆ The importance of land power and its part in national security (including national defense and foreign relations): a hundred years ago, today, and a hundred years in the future
- ◆ Past wars: what worked/what did not work; what is and is not working now
- ◆ Weapon systems, an operational approach, right/wrong implementation
- ◆ Females in combat military occupational specialties
- ◆ Status of openly gay and lesbian servicemember acceptance
- ◆ A comparison of male and female posttraumatic stress disorder

The Future of Innovation in the Army

July-August 2016

- ◆ How much innovation is just right? Can you have too much?
- ◆ Historical examples of institutionally fostered innovation
- ◆ Institutional and cultural obstacles to innovation in the U.S. Army of the twenty-first century

Dealing with a Shrinking Army

September-October 2016

- ◆ Lessons from post-Civil War, post-World War I, post-World War II, post-Vietnam, and post-Cold War
- ◆ Training to standard with limited resources
- ◆ Quality retention during forced drawdowns
- ◆ The good, bad, and ugly of distance learning

Tides of History: How they Shape the Security Environment

November-December 2016

- ◆ Mao's three stages of revolutionary warfare and the rise of Islamic State and Boko Haram; winning by outgoverning
- ◆ Collisions of culture: The struggle for cultural hegemony in stability operations. Can a nation survive without a common national narrative?
- ◆ Armies as a cultural leveler: How are armies key to developing a national narrative and identity?
- ◆ Open borders: Is North America evolving toward European Union-style governance? What are the implications for the U.S. military if North America becomes a borderless continent?
- ◆ Case studies: histories of illegal immigration and how such have shaped national development in various countries
- ◆ Does the military have a role in saving democracy from itself? Compare and contrast the military's role in the life of the Weimar Republic and Mohamed Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood rule of Egypt
- ◆ How can the Department of Defense better leverage international military education and training to support U.S. Army activities in geographical regions?

"Sacred Cows": What Should Go Away But Won't

January-February 2017

- ◆ Army institutions, processes, customs, or doctrine that are anachronistic and impede needed change and progress
- ◆ How social change is having an impact on the Army
- ◆ Relevance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: What is the state of military justice and military policing, including corrections? What crimes do soldiers commit, not just against detainees but also against other soldiers, their families, civilians, or unified action partners? How well do people accused of crimes receive due process? Is military justice applied fairly and equitably across all ranks? Is racism or excessive force an issue of concern for military police? How well trained are military police as compared to civilian counterparts?

Mission Command Revisited

March-April 2017

- ◆ Has the philosophy of mission command taken hold? In what ways has it succeeded or failed?
- ◆ Doctrine 2015: Is it working?
- ◆ Span of control: How do automated mission command systems impact it?
- ◆ Case studies: The use of the Army design methodology on operations
- ◆ Modularity ten years after: An evaluation
- ◆ Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and mission command: Are we blurring too much the lines between officer/NCO duties and responsibilities? Are we training soldiers or quasi-commissioned officers? What is the impact of changing NCO evaluation reports, schooling, and the Army University on enlisted force?



Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, tactically maneuver using concealment during Decisive Action Rotation 16-02 at the National Training Center on Fort Irwin, California, 12 November 2015.

(Photo by Pfc. Daniel Parrott, 4th Infantry Division PAO)

8 How about Winning Our Nation's Wars Instead of Just Participating in Them?

**Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn,
U.S. Army, Retired**

The Islamic State presents a clear mid- and long-term threat to the cultural and political existence of the West, according to this former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. U.S. military and civilian leadership must have the moral and political will to do everything necessary to beat them.

16 How Daesh Uses Language in the Domain of Religion

Maj. Theresa Ford, U.S. Army

Daesh, also known as the Islamic State, uses words and ideas as weapons to motivate and recruit Muslims to its cause, but words and ideas may also be used to defeat it.



About the Cover: U.S. Special Forces soldiers are extracted from a mountain in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, by a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 82nd Aviation Regiment, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, after executing an air assault mission to disrupt insurgent communication, January 2010.

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Aubree Clute, 82nd Airborne Division PAO)

28 Beheading, Raping, and Burning: How the Islamic State Justifies Its Actions

**Lt. Cmdr. David G. Kibble,
British Royal Naval Reserve, Retired**

A British naval officer examines how the Islamic State justifies actions that the rest of the world considers barbaric, by considering the content of its online magazine, Dabiq.

36 Clouds or Clocks

The Limitations of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a Complex World

Maj. Donald P. Carter, U.S. Army

The author argues that the "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" model does not support the high degree of situational awareness necessary to succeed in contemporary operating environments and espouses a systemic approach to intelligence doctrine.

42 On Convergence, Emergence, and Complexity

**Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes,
U.S. Army, Retired**

A former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency provides his views on the challenges associated with the current and future national security environment, warning that these challenges require new strategies. He offers some potential solutions to these problems.

47 **The Myth of the New Complexity**

**Lt. Col. Clay Mountcastle, PhD,
U.S. Army, Retired**

U.S. political and military leaders claim that we are now witnessing an era of unprecedented complexity with a future far more unpredictable than in the past. However, the author demonstrates that a complex operating environment is nothing new for our military.

54 **Moving Beyond the MBTI: The Big Five and Leader Development**

**Stephen J. Gerras, PhD, and
Leonard Wong, PhD**

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is accepted and acclaimed throughout the Army. The authors argue that there is no scientific foundation to justify its popularity, and the Army should replace the MBTI with the "Big Five" factors as a leader development tool to analyze personalities.

58 **I'm Faded**

**1st Lt. Robert P. Callahan Jr.,
U.S. Army**

The author recounts his own experiences with "ethical fading" to show how a systemic integrity problem can be corrected by focusing on the truth.

60 **Civil-Military Engagement Program**

**Enhancing the Mission of
Regionally Engaged Army Forces**

Maj. Christian A. Carr, U.S. Army

The author discusses the success of civil-military engagement programs conducted by the U.S. Special Operations Command and recommends their use by geographic combatant commanders in support of regionally aligned forces within their respective areas of operation.

69 **Biases of the Incumbents**

**What If We Were Integrating
Men into a Women's Army?**

**Col. Karl E. Friedl,
U.S. Army, Retired**

A U.S. Army medical professional provides an alternate reality where male soldiers face discrimination in a women's Army, to demonstrate how gender diversity can lead to greater military effectiveness.

76 **Host-Nation Cybersecurity in Future Stability Operations**

Maj. Michael Kolton, U.S. Army

Nonmilitary organizations provide a framework for future Army doctrine in the fields of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection. The Army should integrate such precedents for host-nation cybersecurity during stability operations.

Spc. Jamus Grandstrom and Spc. Daniel Collazo, Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, run communications equipment from a sandbag bunker in the Daymirdad District Center, Wardak Province, Afghanistan, 9 January 2011.

(Photo by Sgt. Sean P. Casey, 10th Mountain Division PAO)

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official: 

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

84 A Trust-Based Culture Shift

Rethinking the Army Leadership Requirements Model in the Era of Mission Command

Maj. Gregory M. Blom,
U.S. Air Force

While Army leaders espouse the principles of mission command, the Army is slow to put those principles into practice. An Air Force officer discusses the need for alignment between mission command and Army leadership doctrine, and he recommends changes to the Army leadership requirements model.

92 The Use of the Reconnaissance Squadron during Joint Forcible Entry

Capt. Mike Mobbs, U.S. Army

The author offers ideas on how to more effectively employ an airborne brigade combat team's reconnaissance squadron during forcible entry operations.

99 The Role of the Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve

Capt. Eric J. Leib,
U.S. Army Reserve

The U.S. Army Reserve Component must develop as an operational reserve in support of the Army Total Force in order to effectively overcome the challenges of budget constraints and reductions to Army end strength.

105 **Building a High-Performing Unit**

An Army Battalion's Leadership Journey in Preparation for Combat in Afghanistan

Col. Kevin A. McAninch, U.S. Army

A former military intelligence battalion commander explains the unique way his unit prepared its leaders for deployment to Afghanistan by partnering with the Center for Creative Leadership to create a leader development program.

113 **The Army Civilian Corps**

Professionals in the Making

**Col. Kim Summers,
U.S. Army, Retired**

The author cites Army doctrine to argue that Department of the Army civilians are indeed professionals and members of the Army Profession. This article responds to a previous Military Review article that held a differing viewpoint.

Review Essay

120 **Counterinsurgency**

What the United States Learned in Vietnam, Chose to Forget, and Needs to Know Today

**Col. Eric Walters,
U.S. Marine Corps, Retired**

The reviewer critiques a book in which the author discusses the lessons learned during the Vietnam War (but since forgotten) and how they apply to today's counterinsurgency fight.

Book Reviews

123 *Readers provide analyses of contemporary readings for the military professional.*

Soldiers from the 774th Engineer Company, Route Clearance Package 47, provide a security sweep through fields in the Khugyani District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, 19 January 2011.

(Photo by Spc. Boyd Cameron, Combat Camera - Afghanistan)



(Photo by Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division/World Telegram photo by Dick DeMarsico)

An enthusiastic crowd of people in New York City's Times Square celebrates the announcement of the Japanese surrender on V-J (Victory over Japan) Day, 14 August 1945.

How about Winning Our Nation's Wars Instead of Just Participating in Them?

Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, U.S. Army, Retired

It has been over eighteen months since the Islamic State (IS) captured the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014, and it has now expanded well beyond its initial bases in Iraq and Syria. It currently

claims that numerous provinces of other states have declared allegiance to its authority, including in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Dagestan. IS's serious intent

to network these provinces into a new and radical Islamic nation-state with global ambitions for conquest is evident in the materials discovered in many of these locations, which emphasize in detail the required principles for administering such a state, discussing everything from the management of public utilities and wealth distribution to organization of the training within its various camps and villages.

Ominously, those materials also emphasize the continuing need for recruitment of foreign fighters in an effort to add to the approximately thirty thousand now engaged in their expansionist campaign of holy war (jihad). Those currently fighting under the IS banner have come from approximately eighty different countries—already a formidable coalition. However, in an effort to diversify and expand this force, IS has launched additional recruitment efforts in Indonesia, the Philippines, European Union states, and the Southern Caucasus. IS recruitment has even begun to creep into the very tough, security-minded state of India.

Concurrently, IS has built relationships with like-minded jihadists across the globe, directing indiscriminate, vicious, and barbaric attacks in Saudi Arabia, France, the United States, Russia, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Turkey, Kuwait, and Bangladesh. IS leaders also firmly believe that the Internet is a *virtual province*, and they dominate it.

With the above developments in mind, I strongly believe (as do many others) that this threat has metastasized far beyond a localized problem of a few thousand in only a few countries in the Middle East. It has become instead a global cancer affecting and influencing the fate and well-being of hundreds of millions of people around the world. For example, events such as the continuing forced migration of millions of refugees from the Middle East into the heart of Europe brought on by conflict with IS should clearly demonstrate in and of itself that the actions of IS present a clear mid- and long-term threat to the cultural and political existence of the West.

A Habituated State of Ennui in the Government

Recently, I testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in support of Sen. John McCain's efforts to review the Goldwater-Nichols Act thirty years after it

was enacted by Congress.¹ Historically, the Goldwater-Nichols Act helped overcome deeply embedded individual Armed Forces parochialism by forcing the Department of Defense and the military services to work together jointly under threat of sanction and penalty of law. However, much has changed since the passage of this act that calls into the question of its effectiveness and relevance to the current security situation. Important questions about our military services and their Title 10 responsibilities, the size of the Pentagon's bureaucracy, and whether our combatant commands under Goldwater-Nichols mandates had lost sight of their true reasons for existing all came up during testimony and the question-and-answer session that followed. However, what was most disturbing to me about the testimony given and the ensuing discussion was what we did not talk about. We did not discuss *winning*—or more candidly—why it appears that we can no longer win. To be even more precise, one blunt and vital question did not get asked: Can we win wars anymore?

On assessing such a question, let us just stick with IS, our latest and currently our most blatant in-your-face enemy. Though history tells us that there will be many other enemies in the years ahead, for now, let us focus on just one and on the prospects of beating this enemy.

Islamic State as a Case Study in Whether the United States Can Still Win Wars

Contrary to the pessimistic view of some pundits in academia, the government, and the media, IS is beatable. In terms of a one-for-one military match-up in armed combat, we have consistently proven that they can be beaten tactically. However, history, as well as our own painful experience with war, should demonstrate that just tactical victories on the ground are clearly not enough to win wars. The key to success is having the moral and political will to do everything necessary to beat them. But, thus far, to truly win, to steal the willingness away from the opposition and create a real sense of a victor and a vanquished—a clear winner and a loser—requires a sustained whole-of-government effort well beyond what we have been allowed to do in any conflict in which we have engaged in recent times. Strategic

victory without sustainment is a recipe for defeat, and we may be on the path to defeat.

For the proper context to understand why, it is necessary to recognize that sustaining over time the physical and moral ground gained in war to achieve victory stems mainly from political decisions. But, in order for the political leadership to make the necessary commitments, they must be thoroughly informed and familiar with the requirements to achieve victory as well as the consequences of failing to do so. Moreover, they (especially our commander in chief) must have the will to direct what is necessary. This raises some salient questions: Has our military leadership been honest in its assessments with our political leadership with regard to what was really needed to achieve victory against IS? And, have our commanders in chief taken to heart and given credence to what the nation's military and diplomatic leaders have advised them is necessary to do? It is incumbent upon readers to judge for themselves the adequacy of answers to those questions as they pertain to recent wars, including the one we are now engaged against IS.

With the above as context, the real questions I wanted to be asked during my testimony—questions I believe should have been of singular concern for those in and out of uniform—are these: Do we know how to win wars anymore? And, do we still have what it takes? Sadly, I have come to the conclusion that the answers for both are that we probably don't.

A Hard Epiphany

As a nation, our inability to win wars stems mainly from having lost sight of what it means to win and of the vital importance in doing so in our own interests. As a result, we now participate in war simply because we can, often as a result of what might be viewed critically as merely high-level political whims dressed up in high-sounding rhetoric. Many factors have produced this situation. First, because we went away from a draft Army, the broad American community has lost the personal stake it once had in any political decision to go to war, and, as a result, many Americans have lost true appreciation or concern for the real human costs involved in war. Instead, many Americans view the Army as little more than a highly respected mercenary force, one that many politicians have come to view as an impersonal



(Photo by Associated Press)

Demonstrators chant pro-Islamic State slogans 16 June 2014 as they carry the Islamic State flag in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, Iraq.



(Image from Islamic State Twitter site, courtesy Iraqi News website)

The so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria announced the names of countries it seeks to imminently control and published a map 10 October 2014. The map includes all Arab countries, nearly half of all African and European countries, including Spain, and 25 percent of the area of the continent of Asia.

plaything of policy that can be deployed without considering the actual human dimension or costs of deployments involved in war, either at home or on the battlefield. In such circumstances, decisions to order long-term deployments or endless rotations aimed at achieving limited and vague objectives that are well below what is required to achieve clear victory have become all too easy to make. Abetting such a policy mindset, over time, our entire military (especially the Army) has inflicted on itself similarly sterile and impersonal policies that don't manage people, but rather manage systems of rotational assignments—from individual, to unit, to the worldwide augmentee system going back to the Vietnam War (a loss).

The result has been entrenched and overly bureaucratic policies that stipulate repeated rotations overseas for long periods of time on missions that have no clear pathway to the terminal objective of victory. Experience has shown that these policies place an immoral burden on our soldiers—particular among the junior ranks and junior NCOs. Not surprisingly, such policies appear to be a significant factor in the greatly increased number of divorces, collapse of families, and suicides among our returning servicemembers.²

Additionally, such debilitating policies, incrementally developed over years, have produced a downward slope in the intellectual and attitudinal military mindset of our leaders who have now been habituated throughout their careers to accept as the new normal weak “wish-for-the-best” losing military strategies that usually aim at maintaining a status quo vis-à-vis the enemy and not the objective of victory.

Concurrently, our government bureaucracy, especially inside the Pentagon, has evolved over time a similar intellectual complacency encouraged by an ineffectual and rice-bowl-centric interagency process. This bureaucracy places such a chokehold on how the military operates today that we are now incapable of envisioning a politically feasible, realistically achievable victory as the end state of the operations that the military is tasked to perform, much less planning and executing the steps necessary to develop or execute a viable strategy for attaining victory.

Broad Principles for Mitigation

As a first step to mitigate such a morass of contributing factors preventing our military from being able to

defeat our enemies, our military leadership has to stop pretending like we're winning the current war against IS; we're not. Quite the contrary, our military leaders should feel morally bound to protest, in a meaningfully way, the political mindset that routinely embarks the U.S. military on participating in wars—often not even insisting that they be called wars—with no clear metrics describing a victorious end state, and does so just because it has a professional military available and it can.

In conjunction, our national commitment to demanding success must also change if we are to have victory in the future. To accomplish this, Americans in general must be made in some way to have a very personal stake in the duration as well as outcome of conflicts in which our politicians contemplate taking us. For example, if the military—including the Reserve and National Guard—was told to go to war, and that it would not be coming home until that war was won, we would organize and fight much differently than we have done for the past few decades.

We did exactly this when we habitually used to win wars. My father was a World War II veteran; when he deployed to Europe, he wasn't told he'd be home in four months or six months—or after his unit's first year's rotation to the European theater was up. He was simply told by his leaders, go win the war on the European continent—which he did, serving proudly as a corporal until the job was done.

Why shouldn't we do the same today if we are serious about winning wars? What has changed? Is it too hard? Do we lack the forces to sustain a lengthy war? Do we lack the will? Or, rather, do we now have a system in place that makes it too easy and convenient to send our forces to fight wars in which the U.S. citizenry and politicians have little personal stake? Has that system grown so overly bureaucratic that it can't get out of its own way? Has winning become too politically incorrect for our nation? The answer to all those questions, in my view, is yes.

If our military was directed to go fight a war with the specific understanding that it would be required to stay until it won the war, we would plan and fight much differently than we do today. And, more urgent and specific planning, as reflected in reformed policies and procedures, in my assessment, would result in wars that would be far less costly than the perpetual funk of perfunctory conflict in which we now find ourselves.

Such a change in mindset would prevent, for example, the nonsense we routinely see at large U.S. bases in war zones where many soldiers become preoccupied with getting to a Pizza Hut or a Burger King located on the base instead of eating the rations that are already provided. Remember, someone has to protect those convoys of frozen burgers and pizzas along the highways we fight on. Many of those protecting the convoys filled with totally unnecessary supplies like these were no doubt blown up by al-Qaida's improvised explosive devices or Iran's explosively formed penetrators.

However, complaining about the suitability of chain-business pizza in a war zone is not the point. Rather, war zone pizza parlors and burger barns serve as a collective metaphor for the inappropriate ease and comfort that policy makers now too easily promote within the military toward war making that is reflected in a lack of strategic purpose that should aim at victory in as short a time as possible. This is not an elementary argument. Clearly, winning is something we have not done well, with few exceptions, over the past half century of conflict and war. (Those exceptions include Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the early nineties and the defeat of al-Qaida in Iraq, 2009–2011.)

Therefore, we need dramatic reform of our mindset as reflected in extensive changes to our defense and interagency structure. Such changes should go well beyond Goldwater-Nichols to whole-of-government planning and execution of a war effort, and they should come as soon as possible. However, at present, there is an immediate and urgent necessity for organizing for absolute victory against IS's very vicious and cancerous form of radical Islamist extremism before it is too late; reform (in some cases, radical reform) that enables organizing and acting decisively against IS is the most important requirement today.

Organizing for War against the Islamic State

The kind of war we are currently in with IS is in many respects not at all new. Globally oriented terrorism is not a new phenomenon but has existed in many permutations since even before the nineteenth century. So, we should not be surprised at the current levels of violence involved directed mainly at soft targets that are appearing in many quarters of the



(Photo from BBC News, courtesy of Wikipedia)

The BBC posted this photo on its website 25 August 2015 with the caption, "Islamic State (IS) has published images of what appears to be the destruction of the Temple of Baalshamin at the ancient ruins of Palmyra in Syria." BBC noted that IS had announced "the complete destruction of the pagan Baalshamin temple." The destruction of the second century BCE temple was consonant with an IS policy of systematically destroying all vestiges of non-Sunni Islamic history and culture as it expands control over territory, including ancient pre-Islamic archeological sites, Shia Muslim shrines, Christian churches and monasteries, and libraries.

world today; such are normal for conflicts involving irregular fighters and terrorists. However, what is new is the traction IS has with vast numbers of potential recruits from among disaffected elements around the globe, and the speed at which IS is able to recruit and organize such recruits, primarily through the Internet. This means that IS has the realistic potential to eventually swell its ranks of fighters and supporters to hundreds of thousands in both the western and eastern hemispheres, especially if the West allows what appears to be the creation of a physical and radicalized Islamic state that would serve as an IS staging base of operations and focal point for further expansion and sanctuary.

Consequently, to win this war, we must defeat IS not only by direct action against its claimed land space and physical assets, but also by attacking the value system and moral code it uses to recruit through an information war. In doing so, we must refute the excuses the radical Islamists use to justify their actions, and we must make clear to all people the unacceptability to us of the justifications IS uses to wage war against us.

At the same time, we must promote an unambiguous alternative value system that stands in stark contrast to the primitive and barbaric dogma the grotesque and radical IS espouses. It should be made clear in disciplined information war that IS doctrines are anathema to modern peoples of any race, nationality, ethnic, or *religious* group, since they are counter to what civilized peoples everywhere have been trying to establish for generations in terms of universal agreement on basic human rights, values, and morals.

Such a conflict between competing values systems will be challenging because, too often, IS effectively appeals to the deep resentment many Islamic populations have for the West in general and in particular the United States, justifying their war against the West on philosophical grounds derived from radical Islamic scholars who use seventh-century moral codes to justify their actions. In this respect, IS enjoys a great advantage due to its intimate understanding of the mentality of the young Muslims it is attempting to lure by enticing them to join a cause that appears to offer

worldly pleasures, rewards, and adventure in addition to spiritual salvation through Jihad.

We must also recognize that IS members do not see their activities as immoral or repulsive. Quite the contrary, they feel morally justified in their actions based on the belief system that underpins their actions. As a result, we must be careful not to underestimate our enemies' intellectual capabilities in pursuing the goals they seek. They are clearly not the junior varsity or second-string team some have characterized them as being, either intellectually or in their ability to shrewdly wage psychological as well as physical war with the limited resources they have.

Though IS adherents subscribe to a return to a seventh-century set of values that condones slavery; brutalization of captives; exotic punishments for reputed crimes; domination, exploitation, and rape of women and children; and forced subjection of nonbelievers of their brand of the Islamic faith, they are not stupid. Quite the opposite, they are true believers who have shown both fanatical zeal and commitment, as well as great skill and acumen in manipulating world opinion and outmaneuvering their enemies. Moreover, many IS adherents have shown a willing—sometimes eager—inclination to die as martyrs for their global mission. To highlight a sobering comparison, few Westerners are persuaded enough in the defense of their own ideology and culture to willingly volunteer as suicide bombers for their cause. In contrast, many IS followers appear to be more than willing to do so.

As evidence of serious intent to cleanse the world of non-Islamic power and influence, IS is systematically destroying vitally needed property and infrastructure that the fragile nation-states they are attacking need to survive, including in many cases the cultural history of peaceful, non-Islamic peoples living in those states. Consequently, the ideological foundations of many nations striving to achieve stability through tolerance of ethnic and religious diversity are being undermined as IS schemes against them to compel their subjugation to the IS caliphate. Taking all this into consideration, we must also acknowledge and take seriously the fanatical commitment of IS jihadists and their serious and malevolent long-term intentions toward us. Let's face it: they want to win and believe they are.

Finally, we also have to recognize and counter the intentions of the state and nonstate supporters who are enabling growing violence against us. Defeating IS will entail not only engaging IS directly—both through

decisive force of arms and overwhelming information operations attacking their values system—but also taking dramatic steps to cut off the support they receive from a host of players, including unfortunately, many of whom are among those we nominally consider allies but who are covertly supplying and supporting IS for their own national or personal purposes. Taking such steps will require not only diplomatic dexterity and sophisticated cultural acumen, but also great courage and toughness in the face of an entrenched bureaucratic mindset that prefers at present to rely on wishful thinking as a strategy.

War Only Ends in Victory—One Way or the Other

In sum, we must face the fact that we are at war. It is not something that can be ignored or wished away. And, in war, winning is the only thing. The current war is no different. It is not a little kid's soccer game where everyone gets a trophy. As you read these words, people are being killed and maimed on the multiple sides of this war. The misery and suffering are intense, the injustices—already staggering in number—continue to mount. It is consequently in our best interests, and the interests of those who we may yet be able to preclude from becoming innocent victims, that the war be brought to an end as soon as possible, which means we must decide to seriously wage war.

We must also face the fact that a long war works to the advantage of IS. For the members of IS, the suffering of people being enslaved, raped, tortured, or in a host of other ways ruined, is irrelevant. The victims have no human rights because human rights outside of IS doctrine do not exist. IS only has one aim: to conquer and compel all people to accept their conception of a fundamentalist and much radicalized Islamic lifestyle, or die. Thus, time has no meaning for IS. Unless directly confronted, attacked, and decisively defeated, left to their own timeline, it matters not when the caliphate comes or how long it takes to get there, only that it does.

When we win against IS, it will be our right and prerogative to argue philosophically all day long about the how and the why of the war, mistakes made by military leaders and politicians, and, hopefully, lessons learned leading to successes. But, if we lose—which we must prudently recognize as a real possibility if we don't take decisive action before an IS becomes an established reality—we will lose both the right and ability to argue. I say let's stop participating in this never-ending conflict and instead, let's win! ■



(Photo courtesy of SANA)

In this undated photo released by the Syrian official news agency SANA, Khaled al-Asaad, one of Syria's most prominent antiquities scholars, speaks at an official function. Islamic State (IS) terrorists abducted the 81-year-old Asaad in May 2015 after he refused to leave the archeological site at Palmyra, Syria. After beating and torturing him, the terrorists beheaded Asaad 18 August 2015 and strapped his body to a column in Palmyra's main square. Assad had spent more than fifty years working on Palmyra, a UNESCO recognized cultural site. Until its systematic destruction by IS during 2015, Palmyra was one of the best preserved sites of ancient Roman-style architecture and sculpture.

Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn U.S. Army, retired, served in numerous high-level military intelligence assignments, culminating his military career as the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the senior military intelligence officer in the Department of Defense. He holds an MBA in telecommunications from Golden Gate University, an MMAS from the United States Army Command and General Staff College, an MA in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, and two honorary doctorates, one from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., and the other from the University of Rhode Island.

Notes

1. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Hearing to Receive Testimony on Supporting the Warfighter of Today and Tomorrow," stenographic transcript by Alderson Reporting Co., 3 December 2015, accessed 1 February 2016, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-91%20-%2012-3-15.pdf>.

2. Gene Thomas Gomulka, "Saving Military Families," *Military Review* (January–February 2010): 111–16; Aaron

Glantz, "The Truth about Veteran Suicides," *Foreign Policy in Focus* website, 8 May 2008, accessed 8 February 2016, http://fpif.org/the_truth_about_veteran_suicides/; Stacy Bannerman, "Broken Military Marriages: Another Casualty of War," *AlterNet* website, 23 January 2009, accessed 8 February 2016, altnet.org/sex/122198/broken_military_marriages_another_casualty_of_war/.



(Photo by Associated Press)

Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri (commonly known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) announces his appointment as caliph (successor to Mohammad) of the Islamic State (Daesh) 4 July 2014 in Mosul, Iraq. Under this designation, he assumed leadership of what Daesh's adherents considered the world's authentic Islamic community (excluding Shia and others they regard as Muslim apostates). This event has been his only known public appearance before the media.

How Daesh Uses Language in the Domain of Religion

Maj. Theresa Ford, U.S. Army

Jihadis can't seem to get enough anashid [devotional songs, often with ideological themes]. They listen to them in their dorms and in their cars, sing them in training camps and in the trenches, and discuss them on Twitter and Facebook.

—Thomas Hegghammer

This article examines the religious words and ideas the terrorist group Daesh, sometimes called Islamic State, uses to attract recruits. These words and ideas—from the name of its organization, its leader, and its online propaganda magazine, to key figures and ideas of Islam, including the prophet Mohammad, the end-of-days prophecy, and the caliphate—are components of the domain of *deen*, an Arabic word that means faith or religion.¹ We must understand the complexity of the domain of *deen*, where Daesh operates, before we can “degrade and ultimately defeat” it.² This article will demonstrate that words are the weapons of Daesh, and it will show how words can help defeat it.

Which Is It: Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh?

*Militants threatened to cut the tongue of anyone who publicly used the acronym Daesh, instead of referring to the group by its full name, saying it shows defiance and disrespect.*³

—Associated Press news story

What we call the enemy is important. The fact that we and our friends and allies have yet to definitively agree on a name for this enemy speaks volumes about our lack of understanding. We use acronyms interchangeably, such as ISIS for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIL for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Using those names and their acronyms, however, gives these terrorists the religious and political veneer they seek. Those names acknowledge that the group is Islamic, and that it is a state. Neither premise, however, is legitimate. Therefore, this article uses the name Daesh, which is based on the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Daesh sounds similar to an Arabic word that means to bruise or crush; the group’s leaders consider the word insulting. This article uses it with the intent to strip away any religious or political legitimacy that other acronyms suggest.⁴

Our friends and allies are encouraging others to use the name Daesh, just as the Arab League and France

currently do.⁵ Why then, would we in the United States continue to call the enemy ISIS or ISIL, with our own choice of words giving legitimacy to a terrorist group we seek to destroy? Perhaps it is because we do not understand how much words matter to Daesh.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Quraishi, Leader of Daesh

*Verily the chiefest among you all for love and devotion to me is Abu Bekr. If I were to choose a bosom friend it would be he.*⁶

—Mohammad

The Daesh leader uses the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Quraishi for its religious significance. While not his real name, it conveys themes that resonate with his followers. *Abu Bakr*, “father of the virgin” in Arabic, was the name of the prophet Mohammad’s best friend.⁷ This friend was the father of Aishah, the only virgin bride of Mohammad. When Mohammad died, Abu Bakr (sometimes spelled *Bekr*) became the first successor, or caliph. The Daesh leader’s middle name, *al-Baghdadi*, refers to someone from Baghdad, and his last name, *al-Quraishi*, refers to someone from the Quraish family.

The Daesh leader wants to associate himself in the minds of his followers with the first caliph of Islam. He wants to recapture the fervor and spirit of the first “rightly guided caliph,” and, supposedly, to put the Islamic community, or *ummah*, back on the straight path of early Islam. The Daesh leader is the father of a young daughter and can use the name Abu Bakr in a literal sense.

In fact, his middle name is used to mislead, as he is not from Baghdad. He hails from the town of Samarra, revered by the Shia because it contains the tombs of the tenth and eleventh imams. Samarra is thought to be the birthplace of the *Mahdi*, a religious figure that Muslims believe will appear at the end of days.⁸ The Daesh leader uses the name al-Baghdadi

because, according to former Daesh member Abu Omar, he wants to “revive the glory of the Abbasid



(Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

The calligraphic representation of the first Rashidun caliph, Abu Bakr, which is prominent in the Hagia Sofia museum in Istanbul, Turkey.

Editor's Sidebar: The Next Caliph?

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi borrows heavily from an ancient predecessor in his quest to be considered the next caliph. Compare the speech excerpts of the two in the texts below.

Abu Bakr al-Siddiq

Editor's note—Born in 573 AD, Abu Bakr, a prosperous merchant, converted to Islam in ap-



(Image via Wikimedia Commons)

A sixteenth-century depiction by an unnamed Turkish artist of Abu Bakr stopping an angry Meccan mob from stoning Muhammad.

proximately 621 AD. He subsequently became Muhammad's closest friend, described in the Muslim hadith writings as serving in the capacity of traveling companion, advisor, sometime military lieutenant, and intimate confidant. Following Muhammad's death in 632, Abu Bakr was selected by a group of Muhammad's leading companions (though not all supported his selection) to be Muhammad's successor (*caliph*) and to lead the developing and expanding Islamic state, which was then embroiled in a series

of expansionist wars and internal rebellions. Upon selection, Abu Bakr gave a short acceptance speech, prominently recorded in the Muslim hadith (*sayings*), excerpted below:

O people, I have been appointed over you, though I am not the best among you. If I do well, then help me; and if I act wrongly, then correct me. Truthfulness is synonymous with fulfilling the trust, and lying is equivalent to treachery ... No group of people abandons military/armed struggle in the path of Allah, except that Allah makes them suffer humiliation ... Obey me so long as I obey Allah and His Messenger. And if I disobey Allah and His Messenger, then I have no right to your obedience. Stand up now to pray, may Allah have mercy on you.

From Hadith Al-Bidaayah wan-Nihaayah, vol. 6, 305–6, quoted in Seyed Ibrahim, "Caliph Abu Bakr Siddeeq's (RA) Inaugural Speech: Text and Lessons," Social, Political, Economic, Career weblog, accessed 4 February 2016, <https://seyedibrahim.wordpress.com/2012/02/26/abu-bakrs-inaugural-speech/>.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Editor's note—"According to William McCants, Later that month [June 2014], the Islamic State's



(Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Mug shot of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, taken while in detention, by U.S. armed forces at Camp Bucca in the vicinity of Umm Qasr, Iraq, in 2004.

An Iraqi-born religious scholar, he rose to prominence as a leader of Iraqi Islamists following the death of al-Qaida (Iraq) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 7 June 2006, outmaneuvering leaders of other organizations vying for control of opposition to the Shia-led, U.S.-supported government of Iraq.

in 2010. He wore black robes to evoke the memory of the Abbasid caliphs who had ruled from Baghdad; they, too, had come to power by claiming descent from the Prophet's family and promising a return to pristine Islam.

'I was appointed to rule you but I am not the best among you,' he proclaimed. 'If you see me acting truly, then follow me. If you see me acting falsely, then advise and guide me. ... If I disobey God, then do not obey me.'

"This was a paraphrase of what the first caliph, Abu Bakr, had said when he was elected by Muhammad's comrades."

Excerpt from William McCants, "The Believer, How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer became Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Leader of the Islamic State," Brookings Essay 19-20, 1 September 2015, accessed 4 February 2016, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever>.

Caliphate, so this [name] is also a message to the enemy that Baghdad is [theirs].”⁹ He uses the last name al-Quraishi because the prophet Mohammad descended from the Quraish tribe, so this name is intended to impart further legitimacy to his position. It is doubtful he is descended from Mohammad, although supporters distributed the genealogy of his tribe allegedly showing such descent.¹⁰


Dabiq and the Judgment Day Narrative

*Indeed, fighting the kuffar, hijrah, and jihad will remain until the establishment of the Hour.*¹¹

—Quoted from a hadith

Dabiq, the title of Daesh’s online propaganda magazine, is a word cloaked in religious symbolism. The word represents both a place and an idea of great significance in Islamic thought. It conjures up ideas of the place where the final battle of good versus evil will be waged, a battle that must take place to herald the end of days. Using this name for their publication “lends urgency” to the movement, according to researcher Charlie Winter, which helps convince others to join before it is too late.¹² While these ideas may sound far-fetched to many Westerners, they bring many recruits to the Daesh battlefield, eager to fight in the crucible to bring about the end of days. Women join Daesh because they “believe that joining [it] in Syria will secure their place in paradise.”¹³

The Centre on Religion and Geopolitics conducted a study of salafi-jihadist propaganda from Daesh and two other groups from April 2013 to summer 2015, including audio and written statements, videos, and magazines. The researchers found that 42 percent of the sources studied contained “explicit references to the end of days.”¹⁴ For Muslims, this day is of supreme importance because Muslims believe they can only enter heaven through their actions and the grace of God.¹⁵ This is why many join Daesh, as they believe that waging jihad—holy war—and becoming martyrs will guarantee their entrance to paradise, a place



(Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

The front cover of Dabiq magazine, Issue 1, July 2014.

described at length in the Quran, with flowing rivers and wide-eyed *houris* (virgins).¹⁶ Many *hadith*, sayings of Mohammad, emphasize martyrdom, as in this example: “Our Prophet told us about the Message of our Lord that ‘whoever amongst us is killed (in Jihad in Allah’s Cause), will go to Paradise.’”¹⁷

The Quran describes the final day in detail, stating that, whenever it arrives, the day will be either one thousand or fifty thousand years long, the earth will quake, and sinners will go to hell with “boiling scalding water.”¹⁸ While Dabiq is never mentioned in the Quran, it is mentioned in a hadith.¹⁹ Daesh stresses the imminence of the end of days in its messaging. Recruits believe they must become martyrs soon, or else they may end up on the left side on judgment day, the side reserved for those going to hell.²⁰

Raqqa: Capital of Daesh

During World War II, western archaeologists uncovered fresh ruins of Harun's palace in his northern capital of Raqqah.²¹

—Nabia Abbott

It is no coincidence that Daesh selected the Syrian city of Raqqa as its capital. Raqqa was the home of the fifth Abbasid caliph, Harun al-Rashid, or “Aaron the Rightly Guided.” Harun moved the caliphate from Baghdad to Raqqa and “took an active interest in the further development of the city, with its new canals and palaces and other surrounding estates.”²² The Abbasid caliphate got its name from Mohammad's uncle named Abbas. The Abbasid caliphate ushered in the Islamic Golden Age and building boom as the



(Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

The former Mosque of the Prophet Yunis (Jonah) in Mosul, Iraq, which Daesh jihadists demolished 25 July 2014.

region prospered.²³ By using Raqqa as its capital, Daesh wants to profit from its historic significance and from the pride that Muslims have toward this period in their history. Many believe their new caliphate will achieve similar success and prosperity.

Abu Qasim: The Messenger of Islam

Do not be bothered with him; he will die without descendants and that will be the end of his mission.²⁴

—A critic of Mohammad

During his lifetime, Mohammad was referred to as Abu Qasim, meaning “father of Qasim.” Qasim was the name of his firstborn son, who died young.²⁵ If Qasim had lived, however, there would likely be no Shia or Sunni schism for Daesh to propagate because Qasim would have taken over at Mohammad's death (instead of Abu Bakr). Mohammad had four daughters and four sons, all from his first wife Khadija, but only one child survived him—his daughter Fatima.²⁶ Fatima married Mohammad's cousin Ali, later the fourth caliph, and they had two sons, Hassan and Hussein.

Mohammad fought in various battles, where he received some of the revelations that comprise the Quran. Details surrounding his death are controversial; numerous accounts attribute it to poisoned meat.²⁷ After Mohammad died, a rift developed between Fatima and her stepmother Aishah, as Fatima thought Ali should succeed Mohammad instead of Abu Bakr. This is where the word Shia comes from, meaning “followers of Ali.” This rift is still felt today in the Sunni-Shia schism. The Iranian al-Quds force commander, Qasim Suleymani, likely was named after Mohammad's son who died, as the Shia revere his family members.

The Quran

You are incorrect. Every surah has the bismillah.²⁸

—Muslim military officer


As Daesh correctly stated in Dabiq magazine, many Islamic “people are ignorant of their religion and they thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it.”²⁹ Daesh capitalizes on this ignorance in its propaganda, including audio and video statements, magazines, and chants called *nasheeds*. The study by

the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics found that 87 percent of jihadist propaganda included “justifications from the Quran, Hadith, or scholarship.”³⁰ For example, the study analyzed one statement that contained twenty-four Quranic references, with thirteen different *suras*, or chapters, mentioned.³¹ Therefore, to understand Daesh, one must become familiar with the Quran, Islam’s holy book, which is believed to be the literal word of God.

According to Masood Farivar, a former Taliban leader, some Muslims do not know the meaning of the word *quran*, and some have expressed surprise to learn that it means to “read or recite.”³² Some Muslims are unaware that one chapter in the Quran is missing the *bismillah* (an invocation meaning in the name of Allah, or God). As these examples suggest, the Quran is not an easy book to read or understand, and when translated, it loses the rhythmic quality for which it is famous. For example, the first sura, titled “The Opening” or “Al-Fatiha,” is recited by all Muslims. The verses rhyme, which adds additional significance to the words. Numerous suras begin with random letters, their meaning said to be known only to God. One such chapter begins with the letters, *alif*, *laam*, and *meem*, which in Quranic recitation is sung, with the letter and word *meem* rhyming with the word that precedes it, *raheem*.³³

Another difficulty in understanding the Quran is that suras are arranged by length, not chronologically, with the longest suras at the beginning, except for “Al-Fatiha” being followed by the shortest. The ninth sura, believed to have been revealed shortly before Mohammad died, appears near the beginning of the Quran, while a sura about Qasim, which would have been revealed early, appears near the end.³⁴

As stated earlier, numerous revelations came during or after key events in Islamic history, including various battles; therefore, readers wishing to understand the Quran should develop an understanding of Islamic history. As Hassan Hassan, coauthor of a book on Daesh, says, “when ISIS burns someone alive, they do it because someone in Islamic history did it.”³⁵ Many of



(Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

An image from a manuscript of the *Shahnameh* (Book of Kings), considered the national epic of Greater Iran, depicts Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas leading the armies of the Rashidun caliphate during the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah.

the heinous acts Daesh has committed, including beheadings, drownings, and burning of individuals, have precedents in Islamic history.³⁶

Daesh has designed its black flag based on one described in books about Islamic history. The original was called *Okab*, or Black Eagle, and was carried into battle in the days of Mohammad.³⁷ It was a “black flag ... bearing the inscription, ‘there is no God but God. Mahomet [Mohammad] is the messenger of God.’”³⁸ Ibn Ishaq, author of one of the earliest biographies of Mohammad, whom he sometimes calls the apostle, discusses it: “The apostle set out in the month of Ramadan. He gave the flag to Mus’ab The apostle was preceded by two black flags, one with Ali called al-Uqab [Okab] and the other with one of the Ansar.”³⁹ Ishaq writes, “The apostle said, ‘Tomorrow

I will give the flag to a man who loves Allah and his apostle.' Mohammad then tells Ali, 'Take this flag and go with it until God gives victory through you.'⁴⁰

According to Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, many Twitter accounts of Daesh supporters display avatars of the black flag of Daesh.⁴¹ Just as the original flag was used in the days of Mohammad to rally and unify Muslims, today Daesh seeks to do the same with its version. William McCants, director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution, reports that when the Daesh flag was introduced in 2007, its designers said, "We ask God, praised be He, to make this flag the sole flag for all Muslims. We are certain that it will be the flag of the people of Iraq when they go to aid ... the Mahdi."⁴²

The Caliphate

Some wrongly assume the imamate [religious leadership, by succession] to be one of the pillars of faith. If it were one of the pillars of the faith ... Mohammad would have appointed a representative, exactly as he had appointed Abu Bakr to represent him at prayer.⁴³

—Ibn Khaldun

The central pillar of the Daesh narrative is the idea of the new caliphate, which it announced the first day of Ramadan in June 2014.⁴⁴ While not a requirement of Islam, Daesh has declared it so.⁴⁵ The caliphate was never a religious duty. In fact, the Arabic word *khalifa*, which means successor, is used only twice in the Quran.⁴⁶ In the first use, scholars doubt whether the word *khalifa* was intended. Some believe the word was meant to be *khalifa*.⁴⁷ In the other, the word *khalifa* is used to refer to David: "O, David, surely We have made you a succeeding [literally, a caliph] (Messenger) in the earth, so judge among mankind with the truth."⁴⁸ It is not surprising then, that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, alleging himself an Islamic scholar of Quranic phonetics, would avoid referring to these passages to justify the new caliphate or the supposed Muslim duty to pledge allegiance to the caliph. The Quran provides no justification for his claims.⁴⁹

Many caliphs in Islamic history have been assassinated, with the original Abu Bakr being one of few exceptions. After serving two years, he died, and he was succeeded by Omar. Omar served ten years before he was killed, followed by Uthman, who served twelve years before he too was murdered. The fourth caliph,



(Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Daesh fighters holding weapons stand with the terrorist group's flags February 2015 in Anbar, Iraq.

Ali, served five years before he was killed. Daesh's leaders, no doubt aware of the high attrition rate of caliphs in Islamic history and worried about the probability of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's demise, announced in the first issue of Dabiq magazine, "We will strike the neck of anyone—whoever he may be—that attempts to usurp his [referring to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] leadership."⁵⁰

Shia, Alawites, and the Twelfth Imam

*O Sunnis of Iraq, the time has come for you to learn the lesson of the past ... that nothing will work with the rafidah except slicing their throats. They conceal their hatred, enmity and rage towards the Sunnis ... they trick and deceive them.*⁵¹

—Daesh spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani

Like the Sunni, the Shia also believe in the figure called the Mahdi. The Shia believe the Mahdi has appeared and will return as the twelfth imam.⁵² Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reported as saying that the real ruler of Iran was the twelfth imam and government policy should be guided by hastening his return.⁵³ Vali Nasr, writing about the Shia revival in 2007, reports that Muqtadir al-Sadr, the Iraqi Shia cleric who gained prominence after the fall of Saddam Hussein, named his army the Mahdi army to indicate "that his cause was that of the Twelfth Imam."⁵⁴ According to a Pew Research Center study conducted in 2011–2012, 72 percent of Muslims surveyed in Iraq believed they would live to see the return of the Mahdi.⁵⁵

To understand Daesh's actions in Syria, one needs to understand the deeply rooted animosity between the ruling Alawites and the Syrian Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, or *Ikhwan*.⁵⁶ The Syrian government, headed by Bashar al-Assad, the son of Hafez al-Assad, has maintained control in Syria by brutally repressing the Sunni majority living there. After the Iranian Revolution (1979), Syrians "took to the streets ... demanding an Islamic state—one not controlled by infidel Alawites."⁵⁷ The Ikhwan tried to assassinate then President Hafez al-Assad and seized the Syrian town of Hama. Hafez al-Assad responded by destroying the town and killing twenty thousand members of the Ikhwan.⁵⁸ Today, Bashar al-Assad

carries the same animosity toward the Ikhwan, claiming that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan "belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology" and is "very fanatical and that's why he still supports ISIS."⁵⁹

The Assads belong to the Alawite sect, which believes in a sort of trinity.⁶⁰ The word *alawi* means "upper, heavenly, or celestial." While Alawites claim to be Muslim, with the name derived from the name Ali, Hafez al-Assad reportedly said, "I'm not Moslem. I belong to the Allawi faith The Allawi religion is a very complicated business."⁶¹ According to Sam Dagher, "Alawites believe that Imam Ali ... was an incarnation of God, who revealed himself in six other people before Ali's seventh-century caliphate."⁶² In the eyes of Daesh, the Shia and Alawites are apostates; this is why Daesh is committed to their destruction.

The Return of the Mahdi

*In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful, here is the awaited Mahdi. ... Pay allegiance to brother Mohammed Abdullah al-Qurayshi.*⁶³

—Juhayman ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-Otaybi

While Daesh clings to the prophetic end-of-days imagery, believing the end of days imminent, similar claims were also made on the last day of Ramadan in 1979, when gunshots broke the early morning silence at Islam's holiest mosque in Mecca. Snipers fired from the minarets, killing scores of worshippers.⁶⁴ The bloodbath continued for two weeks as Saudi soldiers refused to retake the holy ground, citing religious concerns, and Saudi officials sought guidance in hadith books.

Saudi soldiers thought they would go to hell if they tried to retake the mosque because the Quran expressly forbids fighting there.⁶⁵ The gunmen, Saudi youth familiar with a prophecy involving the Mahdi, believed they were ushering in the end of days.⁶⁶ They believed the Mahdi had arrived, as a man with attributes of the Mahdi had appeared. The Saudi government checked old hadith books to determine if the individual really was the Mahdi, and after determining that he was not, issued a *fatwa*, or religious ruling, giving Saudi soldiers the religious authority to retake the mosque. Despite the

ruling, many soldiers were still unsure if they might go to hell for their actions. Today, more than half the world's Muslims believe they will live to see the return of the Mahdi.⁶⁷

Defeating Daesh

*Interpreting a single word to include the numerous, non-contradictory meanings that it can carry is without a doubt the correct approach here.*⁶⁸

—Article in Dabiq magazine

Words and ideas are the most effective weapons of Daesh. It uses them to recruit and to spread its message in the domain of deen, where it enjoys freedom of movement. Therefore, this article gives several recommendations for countering Daesh, not with physical weapons, but with words and ideas, which we could use more effectively than any physical weapon.

To start, we should refer to the “Islamic State” as Daesh. This simple word expresses the organization's true identity, as a group of brutal blasphemers who bastardize Islam. We should refer to Daesh's leader not by the name he prefers, but by the name he deserves: *ad Dajjal*.⁶⁹ This name represents an evil figure Muslims fear will one day appear as a false messenger.

Next, our messaging should expose the abundance of religious fraud in Daesh's jihadist propaganda, most of which justifies fighting based on religious authorities. Raising doubts about tenuous religious rationales might dissuade potential recruits who want to adhere to their holy scriptures. Daesh's propaganda frequently mentions jihad—the report by the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics found jihad mentioned in 71 percent of the propaganda studied.⁷⁰ However, like the Saudi troops who hesitated in 1979, potential Daesh recruits and current Daesh members might think twice if they knew the sura on which they rely for authority to wage jihad is missing God's invocation, and if they thought they might be sent to hell instead of paradise for their actions.⁷¹ We should call their attention to the fact that the ninth sura is the only sura missing the bismillah.

A Quranic reference that does not help Daesh, and one they have taken pains to avoid, is the express prohibition on suicide, or *intihar*.⁷² Again illustrating how words matter, Daesh avoids the word *intihar* to describe suicide missions,

and instead it uses the term *inghamaasi*, roughly translated as “to submerge, or to go deep into something.”⁷³ Narratives focusing on the Quran's explicit prohibition of *intihar*, along with the omission of the bismillah in the ninth sura, are powerful refutations that should be used to counter the Daesh narrative.

Islamic history should also be used to undercut the Daesh narrative that says infidels should be killed. In fact, the family of Mohammad's first wife Khadija were Christian, and some refused to convert.⁷⁴ Even Mohammad's uncle and great protector Abu Talib refused to convert to Islam, despite his great love and affection for his nephew.⁷⁵ However, none of them were killed for their refusal to convert to Islam. Additionally, the positive treatment of Christians at the time of Caliph Mansur, Harun's grandfather, is exemplified by Mansur's relationship with his Christian doctor, Georgius Bakhtishua. Mansur revered Bakhtishua, naming him the new founder of Baghdad's medical school, and he and his family were allowed to practice their religion “for more than 300 years.”⁷⁶

Nasheeds (or anashid) should be used to counter Daesh, as they are extremely effective in recruiting. In 2011, a shooter who killed U.S. military personnel at the Frankfurt airport was listening to a nasheed on his way to the airport, and at his trial said, “It made me really angry,” referring to the lyrics of the nasheed.⁷⁷ Nasheeds could be just as effective in turning people away from Daesh.

Bombs and bullets alone cannot defeat Daesh. To defeat these terrorists, we must engage them in the domain of deen where they maintain freedom of movement, and we must counter words with words. We need to use the same weapons, including knowledge of Islam, Islamic history, and language, to defeat them. Unfortunately, U.S. soldiers are seldom, if ever, instructed on the proper use of these weapons, and until they are, Daesh will continue to dominate the domain of deen—its primary source of power. ■

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Maj. Theresa Ford, U.S. Army, is a legal advisor with U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. She holds a BA from Thomas Edison State College, an MA in international relations from St. Mary's University, and a JD from the University of Maine. She studied Arabic in Egypt and conflict resolution in Israel as part of her graduate studies. She deployed during Operation Iraqi Freedom and served as a member of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Notes

Epigraph. Thomas Hegghammer, "The Soft Power of Militant Jihad," *New York Times* online, 18 December 2015, accessed 19 January 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/militant-jihads-softer-side.html?_r=0. *Anashid* is a plural form of *nasheed*, or "Islamic devotional music." See also Souad Mekhennet, "German Officials Alarmed by Ex-Rapper's New Message: Jihad," *New York Times* online, 31 August 2011, accessed 19 January 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/world/europe/01jihadi.html>.

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 1 December 2015, C-SPAN video recording, "Military Operations against ISIS," accessed 19 January 2016, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?401241-1/ashton-carter-joseph-dunford-testimony-military-operations-isis>. Dunford identifies Daesh's sources of power as "existence of the caliphate ... their narrative ... [and] manpower."

2. Ashton Carter, "Statement on the U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East and the Counter-ISIL Campaign before the Senate Armed Services Committee," Secretary of Defense testimony, 27 October 2015, accessed 19 January 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/626037/statement-on-the-us-military-strategy-in-the-middle-east-and-the-counter-isis-c>; Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC, February 2015), 2, accessed 19 January 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

3. Associated Press, "Is it IS, ISIS, ISIL or maybe Daesh?" *Ynet News* online, 12 September 2014, accessed 19 January 2016, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4570385,00.html>.

4. J. Milton Cowan, ed., *Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Urbana: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1994), 325. *Daesh* is based on the Arabic acronym for Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, *al-dawlat al-Islamiya al Iraq wa ash-shams*.

5. "British House of Commons Debate on Combating ISIS in Syria," C-SPAN, 2 December 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?401458-1/british-house-commons-authorizes-airstrikes-syria-397223>.

6. The prophet Mohammad, quoted and translated in William Muir, *The Life of Mohammad* (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1923), 485, accessed 28 January 2016, <https://ia802606.us.archive.org/4/items/lifeofmohammadfr00muir/lifeofmohammadfr00muir.pdf>.

7. *Hans Wehr Dictionary*, 85. The Arabic root letters *b*, *k*, and *r* relate to the subject of virginity, with *bakara* meaning virginity and

bikr meaning virgin. The word *bakr*, however, means young camel; the words for virgin and young camel are spelled the same in Arabic. The only difference between the two is the unwritten short vowels, or diacritics, that were added long after Mohammad's day. The name *young camel* was likely a nickname for Aishah, who was a virgin.

8. Ali Hashem, "The Many Names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi," *Al-Monitor* online, 23 March 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/isis-baghdadi-islamic-state-caliph-many-names-al-qaeda.html#>. See also Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 197.

9. Abu Omar, quoted in Hashem, "The Many Names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi." See also Mark Sykes, *The Caliphs' Last Heritage: A Short History of the Turkish Empire* (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1915), 221, accessed 3 January 2016, <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.sb57529;view=1up;seq=250>.

10. William McCants, "The Believer: How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer Became Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Leader of the Islamic State," *The Brookings Essay* online, 1 September 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever>.

11. From a hadith reported by Abu Dawud from Muawiyah, cited in Dabiq 9, Sha'Ban 1436 [May 2015], 53, accessed 21 January 2016, <http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue%2B9-they-plot-and-allah-plots-sex-slavery.pdf>. *Dabiq* magazine uses the Islamic calendar.

12. Charlie Winter, *The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy* (London: Quilliam Foundation, July 2015), 30, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf>. "The emphasis on eschatology lends urgency to the IS narrative and incentivizes other jihadists—individuals or groups—to join the organization." See also Erin Marie Saltman, *Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon* (2015), 31, accessed 3 January 2016, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf. Saltman reports that a female recruit said, "I couldn't sit back one second. I was waiting for the day *Khilafah* returned."

13. Saltman, *Till Martyrdom Do Us Part*, 17.

14. Emmam El-Badawy, Milo Comerford, and Peter Welby, *Inside the Jihadi Mind* (London: Tony Blair Faith Foundation, October 2015), accessed 1 February 2016, <http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Inside%20the%20Jihadi%20Mind.pdf>, 4 and 56.

15. Quran 5:9, Muhammad Mahmud Ghali, trans., in *Towards Understanding the Ever-Glorious Quran* (Cairo: Dar An-Nashr Liljamiat, 2008). "Allah has promised the ones who have believed and done deeds of righteousness (that) they will have forgiveness and a magnificent reward." All English citations to the Quran are from Ghali.
16. Quran, 2:25, 4:13, 10:9, 52:20, and 56:22; *Hans-Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, s.v. "hourī": "virgin of paradise."
17. Muhammed Ibn Ismaiel Al-Bukhari, *The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari*, trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), Vol. 4, Book 56, 63.
18. Quran, 32:5, 70:4, 55:43–44, and 99:1.
19. Sahih Muslim, Book 41, hadith 6924, accessed 22 January 2016, <http://www.searchtruth.com/>. "Abu Hurairah reported Allah's Messenger as saying: 'The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-Amaq or in Dabiq.'" The majority of Dabiq citations normally are from Bukhari, whose hadith collection is considered to be one of the most reliable. Bukhari's hadith collection, however, makes no mention of a place named Dabiq.
20. Quran 57:3. The final day is referred to as *al youm al Akhir*.
21. Nabia Abbott, *Two Queens of Baghdad: Mother and Wife of Harun al-Rashid* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946), vii, accessed 20 January 2016, http://oi.uchicago.edu/sites/oi.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/shared/docs/two_queens_baghdad.pdf.
22. *Ibid.*, 162.
23. Sykes, *The Caliphs' Last Heritage*, 221.
24. An unnamed critic of Mohammad, in Sayyid Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur'an* (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2001), 322.
25. Muir, *The Life of Mohammad*, 25.
26. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 933–34. Other sources confirm four daughters, but accounts vary on the number of sons who died.
27. Muir, *Life of Mohammad*, 481. Mohammad and his companion, Bishr, were given meat from a woman in the Jewish village of Kheiber. While Mohammad did not swallow the meat, he said it tasted strange and asked the woman if she poisoned him. She said she did, for if he ate the meat and survived, she would know he was a prophet. Bishr died after eating the meat. See also Ibn Kathir, trans. Trevor Le Gassick, *The Life of the Prophet Muhammad: Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya*, Vol. III, (Lebanon: Garnet, 2005), 286. On his deathbed, Mohammad mentioned the poisoned meat as the cause of his affliction.
28. Conversation between the author and a Muslim military officer attending a U.S. military school in 2012. He made the statement after I mentioned that the ninth sura was missing the *bismillah*. After checking his Quran, he said that he learned something about his religion.
29. "The Return of the Khilafah," Dabiq 1, Ramadan 1435 [July 2014], 11, accessed 3 January 2016, <http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf>.
30. El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby, *Inside the Jihadi Mind*, 5.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Masood Farivar, *Confessions of a Mullah Warrior* (New York: Grove Press, 2009), 97.
33. Quran 2:1.
34. Quran 108.
35. Hassan Hassan, "Book Discussion on ISIS," C-SPAN, 12 March 2015, accessed 19 January 2016, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?324789-1/hassan-hassan-isis-inside-army-terror>.
36. William Muir, *The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall* (Oxford: The Religious Tract Society, 1891), 60, accessed 28 January 2016, https://books.google.com/books?id=JQZBAAAAYAAJ&pg=PR3&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false. "The persistent opposition of the Christian Bedouins now led Khalid into an unwise severity that embittered them against him. Their leader was beheaded in front of the city walls, and every adult male of the garrison led forth and put to death; while the women and children were made over to the soldiers or sold into slavery."
37. Muir, *The Life of Mohammad*, 375.
38. Washington Irving, *Lives of the Successors of Mahomet* (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1850), 147.
39. Ibn Ishaq, *The Life of Muhammad*, trans. A. Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 292.
40. *Ibid.*, 514.
41. Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, *ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, December 2015), 23, accessed 20 January 2016, <https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf>. Vidino and Hughes also mention avatars of lions and green birds.
42. William McCants, "How ISIS Got Its Flag," *Atlantic* online, 22 September 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/isis-flag-apocalypse/406498/>.
43. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 169.
44. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, "The Islamic State's First Year," *Al-Monitor* online, 25 June 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse>.
45. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in his first and only public appearance and sermon in Arabic, translated into English, in *Q&A with Jessica Stern*, C-SPAN, 24 March 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?324982-1/qa-jessica-stern>. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi says, "After long years of jihad and perseverance fighting the enemies of Allah, Allah has enabled them to accomplish their goal. Thus, they hastened to declare the establishment of their Caliphate and the appointment of an imam. This is a duty incumbent among Muslims Muslims who ignore this duty are committing a sin."
46. Quran 2:30 and 38:26.
47. Nabih Amin Faris, "Khalifa or Khaliqa," *The Moslem World, Khalifa or Khaliqa XXIV* (2) (April 1934), 183. The only way to tell the difference between khalifa and khaliqa in Arabic is by the number of dots that appear over the characters equivalent to "f" and "q." Since the Arabic alphabet lacks short vowels, diacritic markings were added later, as there was often confusion about the meaning of words.
48. Quran 38:26.
49. "The Return of the Khilafah," Dabiq 1, Ramadan 1435 [July 2014], 29, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf>. Dabiq was silent regarding Quranic authority to support the creation of the caliphate or the Muslim duty to pledge allegiance to the caliph. Instead, Daesh relied on hadith.
50. "The Return of the Khilafah," Dabiq 1, 29.
51. Statement by Daesh spokesman al Adnani, 22 September 2014, cited in El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby, *Inside the Jihadi Mind*, 35.

52. Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 23.

53. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then president of Iran, as reported in Richard Ernsberger Jr., Ladane Nasser, and Alan Isonberg, "Religion Versus Reality: Who Is This Man—a Mystic, a Bumbling Political Novice or an Imminent Threat to Iran's Established Order?" *Newsweek International*, Atlantic Edition, 12 December 2005; and Kamal Tehrani, "Majera-e Shegeftangiz-e Nameh-e Moaven-e Aval-e Rais Jamhour be Imam Zaman" [The Vice President's Astonishing Letter to the Twelfth Imam], *Entekhab*, 16 October 2005, <http://www.entekhab.ir/display/?ID=6760&PH-PSESSID=b24d119ca808c4c1bfdb21b173a35df4>. Ahmadinejad instructed "his cabinet to sign a symbolic pledge of allegiance to the Twelfth Imam."

54. Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 130.

55. Pew Research Center, *The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity*, 9 August 2012, chap. 3, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary/>. In Iraq, 1,416 Muslims were surveyed throughout all eighteen provinces.

56. Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), 135. Alawites are a "mostly cultural offshoot of the Shia, who constitute between 8 percent and 15 percent of the population ... ruling over the Sunnis, who constitute close to 75 percent." See also Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: University of California Press, Ltd., 1988), 8, who states that Alawis "share with other Shi'a the belief that Ali, the prophet Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law, was his rightful heir" and "push reverence for the wronged Ali to extreme lengths by seeing him infused with divine essence."

57. Robert Baer, *Sleeping With the Devil* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004), 94.

58. *Ibid.*, 103.

59. Bashar al-Assad, interview with Jonathan Tepperman, "Syria's President Speaks: A Conversation with Bashar al-Assad," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2015, 65.

60. Baer, *Sleeping With the Devil*, 93. Ilene Prusher, "What the ISIS Flag Says About the Militant Group," *Time* online, 9 September 2014, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://time.com/3311665/isis-flag-iraq-syria/>. Daesh, ironically, appears to have adopted a sort of trinity, as the three words inside the white circle on their flag read, from top to bottom, "Allah, Rasool, Mohammad," meaning, "God, messenger, Mohammad." The words along the top part of the flag are the *shahada*, or declaration of faith. The word order inside the circle is skewed, as it does not follow the order of the rest of the *shahada*, which says, "Mohammad is God's messenger."

61. Hafez al-Assad, in Eli Ben-Hanan, *Our Man in Damascus: Elie Cohn* (Bnei Brak: Steimatzky, 1969), 46. Ben-Hanan reports that Hafez Assad made these comments at the Syrian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to Elie Cohn, an Israeli spy whom he later executed. Hafez Assad would later try to remove a provision in the Syrian constitution that required the president be Muslim, a fact that seems consistent with his statement that he was not a Muslim.

62. Sam Dagher, "Syria's Alawites: The People Behind Assad," *Wall Street Journal* online, 25 June 2015, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-alawites-the-people-behind-assad-1435166941>.

63. Juhayman ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-Otaybi, during a militant takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, quoted and translated in Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine* (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 69. Here again, lineage to the Quraysh tribe was claimed by the alleged Mahdi.

64. *Ibid.*, 224.

65. *Ibid.*, 85–86; Quran 2:191.

66. Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 257–58. Sunni Muslims believe that "at the end of time a man from the family (of the prophet) will without fail make his appearance He will be called the Mahdi. Following him, the Antichrist will appear After the Mahdi, Jesus will descend and kill the Antichrist. Or, Jesus will descend together with the Mahdi, and help him kill the Antichrist." In "The Return of the Khilafah," Dabiq 1, 4, Daesh refers to Jesus, who "will descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt as salt melts in water."

67. *The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity*, chap. 3.

68. "The Return of the Khilafah," Dabiq 1, 25.

69. *The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari* 9, Book 97, hadith 7408, speaks of the Dajjal: "Allah did not send any Prophet but that he warned his nation of the one-eyed liar (Ad-Dajjal). He is one-eyed while your Lord (Allah) is not one-eyed. The word 'Kafir' (disbeliever) is written between his two eyes." While the Daesh leader appeared without glasses in his only video appearance, he wears glasses in a prison photo from Camp Bucca.

According to Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, *Growing up bin Laden* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 159–160, it was reported that Osama bin Laden had an eye injury he tried to hide. Similarly, the Daesh leader likely does not want to show followers any sign of imperfection or weakness.

70. El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby, *Inside the Jihadi Mind*, 5.

71. Quran 9. While some scholars believe this sura was originally part of a different sura, this theory contradicts the fundamental Islamic belief that each word in the Quran is of divine origin and the Quran is unchanged.

72. Quran 4:29.

73. El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby, *Inside the Jihadi Mind*, 20.

74. Muir, *The Life of Mohammad*, 36. Khadija's cousins Othman and Waraka were Christian and did not convert.

75. Muir, *The Life of Mohammad*, 106. Another uncle that refused to convert to Islam is mentioned in the Quran, at sura 111.

76. John Young, "Medical Missions in Yemen," *The Moslem World* XII (1) (January 1922), 62–63, accessed 20 January 2016, <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044021005020;view=1up;seq=9>.

77. Mekhennet, *German Officials Alarmed by Ex-Rapper's New Message: Jihad*. The Frankfurt shooter was inspired by a nasheed, recorded by a German ex-rapper named Cuspert who joined Daesh.



لأنكم سوف تخسرون هذه الحرب

(Image released 4 January 2016 by Associated Press)

This image, taken from undated video footage issued by Islamic State (IS) militants, shows five men accused of being spies for the United Kingdom just before their execution. Released online and yet to be independently verified, the footage shows a man waving a gun as he references Britain's "handful of planes" carrying out air attacks on IS targets in Iraq and Syria. It also shows the five men "confessing" to filming and photographing sites in exchange for money within Raqqa, the capital of the IS's self-declared caliphate.

Beheading, Raping, and Burning: How the Islamic State Justifies Its Actions

Lt. Cmdr. David G. Kibble, British Royal Naval Reserve, Retired

No one attentive to world events can fail to be aware of the grisly acts of terror being perpetrated by Islamic State (IS): beheadings, rapes, drownings, shootings, burning a pilot alive,

blowing up prisoners trapped in a car, and even involving child soldiers in the perpetration of some of their execution rituals. The world—including members of the Muslim community who have roundly condemned

IS's actions as abhorrent and un-Islamic—is horrified by what it sees. So, how does IS justify what it does? This article will explore this question by examining the commentary IS offers on events in its online magazine, *Dabiq*, and conclude by evaluating IS's justification.

Islamic State

IS is an Islamist organization; Islamist movements are those that aspire to use the Quran and the deeds and sayings of the prophet Muhammad (the latter two are collectively known as the *sunnah*) as the basis for organizing society. Islamists regard the Quran and *sunnah* as revelations of God's will and believe that most countries that call themselves Muslim are far from adhering to them. Those countries failing to implement Muslim law (*sharia*) are instead seen as corrupt, guided by leaders who have defiled themselves through contact with non-Muslim nations of the West. Consequently, IS believes that reordering society in accordance with the God-given tenets revealed in the Quran and the *sunnah* is the antidote for the moral bankruptcy of Western society.


Their belief in the inerrancy of the Quran as God's word to man is a primary aspect of IS's nature as a fundamentalist group. Fundamentalist interpretations of religion generally include the following characteristics:

- ◆ Its members are seen as “real” believers in contrast to surrounding societies and to members of their faith who hold views different from their own.
- ◆ Democracy is rejected in favor of a state in which religious law is implemented.
- ◆ The days when their faith began are seen to be ideal and therefore serve as a model for how things should be now.
- ◆ Modern religious scholarship is rejected.
- ◆ Only a literal interpretation of what are seen as inerrant foundational texts is seen to be valid.
- ◆ Its members hold apocalyptic beliefs—the end times are seen to be near.
- ◆ Fundamentalist Islamists wish to spread their faith together with the associated Islamic political system worldwide.

Islamic State's Fundamentalist Mission

Articles in *Dabiq* evince all such fundamentalist characteristics.¹ An article in the first edition of *Dabiq*

summarizes what IS sees as its mission: the establishment of an Islamic state by force of arms, or *jihad* (holy war). To justify its position, it quotes the Quran: “Say to those who disbelieve ... And fight them, so that sedition might end and the only religion will be that of Allah” (8:38-9).² In the second volume of the magazine, the establishment of such a state is seen to be a multinational mission: “We must confront them [people] with the fact that they've turned away from religion, while we hold onto it ... we're completely ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us from our commitment to making the religion of Allah triumphant over all other religions, and that we will continue to fight the people of deviation and misguidance until



Dabiq is the title of the official propaganda publication of the Islamic State (IS). It is an online magazine that promulgates IS ideology, policies, and objectives while also serving as a platform for grandiose threats against the West and other perceived enemies of IS such as Shia Muslims, Yazidis, and Jews. First published in July 2014 in several languages, including English, it uses sophisticated Western-style photo imagery and advertising techniques specifically aimed at recruiting young disaffected audiences. In doing so, it features lurid photos of the torture and execution of those described as IS opponents. *Dabiq* takes its name from a small town in northern Syria where, Islamic tradition holds, the apocalyptic final battle between Muslims and Christians will take place that results in a Muslim victory and ushers in the end of the secular world and a new Muslim world order.



(Image from ISIS video)

An image taken from a 2015 Islamic State video purportedly shows Al Farouk training camp for “cubs” [children]. The camp is in Raqqa, Syria, according to Flashpoint Intelligence, a global security firm and NBC News consultant.

we die trying to make the religion triumphant.”³ In the fifth edition of the magazine, the authors say that the IS flag will expand until “it covers all western and eastern extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam.”⁴

To establish the rule of Islam both within Muslim countries and worldwide, war will be necessary; not for its own sake, but to ensure that the will of Allah is carried out. In volume 7 of *Dabiq*, this is brought home in an article titled “Islam is the Religion of the Sword Not Pacifism.” Its author writes, “Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword, and evidence of this is so profuse that only a *zindiq* (heretic) would argue otherwise.”⁵ He justifies his position by quoting a variety of texts from the Quran: “Then, when the Sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, take them [as captives], besiege them, and lie in wait for them” (9:5); “Fight those among the People of the Book [Jews and Christians] who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day ...” (9:29); “O Prophet, fight the unbelievers and their hypocrites and be stern with them. Their abode is Hell, and what a terrible fate” (9:73). Other texts from the Quran also reinforce the point.

On the basis of those texts, members of IS are free to kill anyone who does not follow their own interpretation of Islam and those of other faiths. It is possible, therefore, to kill Shia Muslims, known by members

of IS as *Rafidah* (those who reject [true Islam]). For example, twenty-five were killed in an attack on a Shia mosque in Kuwait City in June 2015. Elsewhere, a gunman linked to IS killed five Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia during its Ashura festival the following October, and more than forty were killed in a suicide bombing in Beirut in November of the same year.

People of other faiths are also persecuted. Christians are told to convert to Islam or pay a special tax known as *jizya*; thousands of Christians in Iraq have fled their homes as a result. In February 2015, IS posted one of its grisly videos online: twenty-one members of the Egyptian Coptic Church, dressed in orange coveralls, were led along a beach in Libya by members of IS dressed in black. The video showed their theatrically staged beheadings.

Beheading and the Use of Child Soldiers

Beheading seems to be one of IS’s favorite methods of killing. It is favored, first, because it puts fear into those who oppose it; hence, we read of the Iraqi army simply melting away when IS took over parts of northern Iraq. Second, it is favored because it is sanctioned by verses in the Quran: “Strike [those who disbelieve] upon their necks and strike every fingertip of theirs” (8:12); “When you meet the unbelievers, strike their

necks till you have bloodied them” (47:4). The beheading of between six and nine hundred Jews from the Banu Qurayza on the orders of Muhammad is recorded by Ibn Ishaq, the prophet’s earliest biographer; Islamists see his example as another justification for beheading.⁶ Third, the use of extreme violence in holy war is promoted by Abu Bakr Naji in his Islamist text that is known to have been studied by both the leaders and foot soldiers of IS.⁷ Naji says that holy war involves “naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening [others] and massacring. ... We need to massacre (others) and (to take) actions like those that were undertaken against the Banu Qurayza and their like.”⁸

In July 2015, twenty-five Syrian soldiers were shot in the head by twenty-five of IS’s child soldiers at Palmyra, Syria; in volume 8 of Dabiq, child soldiers are pictured with guns in their hands as they stand in front of dead bodies. The article says that the prisoners in the accompanying picture had been killed by the child soldiers because they were Russian and Israeli agents. The use of children is justified, the magazine argues, because Muhammad used child soldiers at the Battle of Badr.⁹

Sexual Slavery and Rape

Apart from Jews and Christians, who share with Muslims a belief in common descent from the ancient monotheistic patriarch, Abraham, Middle Eastern religious groups with origins unrelated to Abrahamic tradition have become special targets of IS brutality. Prominent among those are the Yazidis, members of a faith with ancient roots in Zoroastrianism, another monotheistic religion that originated before the birth of Christ. At least seven hundred of its men have been executed and thousands of its women taken into slavery. In an article in Dabiq, the author justifies the actions of IS by referring to what is known as the Quranic “sword verse” (9:5, quoted above).¹⁰ The author further argues that because the Yazidi religion is categorized as an apostate faith (one whose members have turned away from Islam), Muslim law lays down that men must be killed and women taken into slavery. To justify his position, he quotes numerous traditions concerning Muhammad: the prophet is reported to have said that “Allah marvels at people who enter *jannah* [paradise] in chains”; and also that it is good to put people in chains until they convert to Islam.¹¹ Other sayings of the

Slave Prices in the Islamic State

According to Sangwon Yoon, “Islamic State Circulates Sex Slave Price List,” Bloomberg.com website, 3 August 2015,

“A senior United Nations official says Islamic State is circulating a slave price list for captured women and children, and that the group’s ongoing appeal and barbarity pose an unprecedented challenge.

“The official, Zainab Bangura, said that on a trip to Iraq in April she was given a copy of an Islamic State pamphlet, which included the list [see figure on next page], showing that captured children as young as one fetch the highest price. The bidders include both the group’s own fighters and wealthy Middle Easterners.

“The list shows the group’s view of the value of those it captures . . . , though its authenticity came under question. Bangura, who is the UN special envoy on sexual violence in conflict . . . , said she has verified that the document came from Islamic State and reflects real transactions.

“‘The girls get peddled like barrels of petrol,’ she said in an interview last week in New York. ‘One girl can be sold and bought by five or six different men. Sometimes these fighters sell the girls back to their families for thousands of dollars of ransom.’

“For Islamic State fighters, the prices in Iraqi dinars for boys and girls aged 1 to 9 are equal to about \$165, Bangura said. Prices for adolescent girls are \$124, and it’s less for women over 20.”



(MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor)

“Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves,” distributed by the Islamic State in late 2014.




Figure. The Islamic State's Price List for Yazidi and Christian Slaves

prophet are quoted that say that when slave girls give birth to their masters the day of judgment is not far off. In addition to using *hadiths* (words attributed to the prophet Muhammad), other Muslim authorities are also quoted to justify the enslaving of women.¹²

But what about the raping of women who are taken into slavery? Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah (a female member of IS) writes an article in which she argues that using slave girls as sexual slaves is acceptable because of four texts in the Quran and the example of the prophet Muhammad. One of the Quranic text says, “The believers have prospered ... and ... those who guard their private parts. Except from their wives and what their right hands possess” (23:1-6). The verse refers to men “guarding their private parts” except when they are with their wives and with women captured in war. The inference is, therefore, that men may have sexual relations with women taken captive in war in the same way that they may have sexual relations with their wives. Muhammad is said to have had four slave girls. His companions reputedly followed the same practice: al-Muhajirah says that there was not one of his companions who failed to practice *saby* (taking slaves in war). Indeed, she says, Abi Ibn Ali Talib had nineteen slave girls. A hadith says,

A translated version of the document (left) was shared online by humanitarian and peace prize winner Dr. Widad Akrawi, and reads as follows:

We have received news that the demand in Women and Cattle market has sharply decreased and that will affect Islamic State revenues as well as the funding of mujahideen in the battlefield, therefore we have made some changes. Below are the prices for Yazidi and Christian women.

The price for Yazidi or Christian women between the age of 40 - 50 is \$43 (£27)

\$75 (£48) for 30 to 40-year-olds

\$86 (£55) for 20 to 30 year-olds

\$130 (£83) for ten to 20-year-olds

\$172 (£110) for one to nine-year-olds

Customers are allowed to purchase only three items with the exception of customers from Turkey, Syria and Gulf countries.

Dated and sealed by ISIS in Iraq 16 October 2014.

Information courtesy of: Dr. Widad Akrawi, Twitter post, 4 November 2014, 4:11 a.m., <https://twitter.com/DrWidadA/status/529576654709198848>.

“Approaching any married woman is fornication, except for a woman who has been enslaved.”¹³ Al-Muhajirah concludes that the practice of *saby*, which includes what we can only describe as rape, “is a great prophetic sunnah containing many divine wisdoms and religious benefits.”¹⁴ One of its benefits, she says, is that slaves will be able to accept Islam and enter paradise.

Justification for Burning Captives Alive

In volume 7 of *Dabiq*, there is a full-page photo of a Jordanian pilot being burned to death in a cage; a few pages later there is a half-page picture of his charred remains. Lt. Mu’adh al-Kasasibah was captured in 2014 after his plane crashed in Syria. *Dabiq* argues that his burning was entirely justified: “In burning the crusader pilot and burying him under a pile of debris, the Islamic State carried out a just form of retaliation for his involvement in the crusader bombing campaign which continues to result in the killing of countless Muslims who, as a result of these airstrikes, are burned alive under mountains of debris.”¹⁵ The author of the article is aware of the hadith which states that only God can punish with fire but argues that



(Image from UNTV)

Nadia Murad BaseTaha, a twenty-one-year-old Iraqi woman of the Yazidi faith and a victim of abduction for purposes of sex slavery by the Islamic State, speaks 16 December 2015 at the United Nations Security Council meeting on human trafficking in situations of conflict.

this stipulation is abrogated in the case of retaliation in accordance with a verse in the Quran (2:194). He notes that Muhammad himself on one occasion gouged out his enemies' eyes with a heated iron, and that there were a number of occasions on which the prophet's companions also punished their enemies by burning them; he cites five separate examples. Thus, he argues, in burning the Jordanian pilot IS was simply following the example of Muhammad and his companions.

Scriptural and Historical Precedents

Throughout IS's mouthpiece, *Dabiq* contributors justify what can only be described as the organization's acts of depravity and inhumanity by citing texts from the Quran, the sayings and deeds of Muhammad and, occasionally, by referring to events in Islamic history—particularly to events surrounding the prophet's companions. (As previously mentioned, fundamentalist groups take the founding days of a faith as normative and authoritative in addition to its holy texts.) Articles that aim to justify events and practices are always well argued, often containing numerous quotations from the Quran and multiple hadiths. Where there is room for debate because of conflicting texts or sayings, there will be a careful and detailed

analysis. The magazine, which is always very professionally produced, contains numerous photographs of prisoners—particularly as they are about to face execution or, occasionally, of the executions themselves. It also includes pictures of dead bodies—usually of those who have been executed but sometimes of Syrian and Iraqis killed as a result of airstrikes.

Using Islamic texts and traditions, the magazine calls upon Muslims everywhere to migrate to Iraq and Syria to become members of the *khalifate* (Muslim state). Those who are unable to join are encouraged to undertake jihad in their own countries. "If you can kill a disbelieving American or European—especially the spiteful and filthy French—or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be ... Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling."¹⁶

Is It Really Islamic?

Many Muslims around the globe are keen to distance themselves from the philosophy and actions of

IS. Following the massacre in Paris in November 2015, Qari Asim, imam of the Makkah mosque in Leeds, UK, placed the following message on his mosque's website: "ISIS or IS neither speak for Islam nor is their poisonous ideology shared by Muslims across the globe. Once again, British Muslims unfortunately find ourselves in a position of having to publicly disassociate ourselves with the actions of a despicable group of individuals who have hijacked our religion of peace for their own political and territorial goals. Their actions are an absolute affront to Islam and are unequivocally condemned by Muslims throughout the globe."¹⁷ His exasperation is palpable.

In the book of Deuteronomy, one of the first five books of the Christian and Jewish bibles, Jews are commanded by God to kill everyone in a city in time of war; they are told to kill all the men but to take the women, children, and animals for themselves.¹⁸ Irrespective of such scriptural exhortations, very few in the Jewish (or Christian) community today would regard this biblical injunction as being God's instructions for the conduct of modern warfare. Based upon the primitive culture and local customs of the time, such actions were undoubtedly regarded then as appropriate and acceptable, but are not seen as relevant in the twenty-first century among most nations of the world today that have roots in Judeo-Christian religious traditions. In fact, such actions would be almost universally regarded as repulsive.

In response to IS's reputedly Islamic justification for its grisly actions, many Muslims are putting forward a similar rejectionist argument with regard to some of the more violent texts in the Quran and hadith; that such are now anachronistic and inappropriate if the Islamic world is to progress forward in step with modern humanistic values.

For example, in the United Kingdom, a group of imams have published their own online magazine, *Haqiqah* (reality), which aims to undermine the arguments offered by IS. The argument they offer is that if Muslims look at the Quran and hadith in a wider

context rather than taking selective verses and sayings out of context they will realize that their faith offers a very different perspective. Musharraf al Azhari concludes, "Our struggle [jihad] in today's world should be for the establishment of peace, to establish goodness and kindness between others, to engage in dialogue, and to truly work on the protection and improvement of our souls."¹⁹ The authors note that rather than prescribing the persecution of people of other faiths, the Quran allows freedom of religion.²⁰

Elsewhere, Tariq Ramadan, professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford University, argues that Muslims should use the Quran and sunnah as a whole to derive universal Muslim principles; the precise rules and regulations which are contained in them are purely relative to the time in which they were written. Faithfulness to principles should not involve literal faithfulness in applying individual texts because societies change. In every age there has to be discussion on how the basic underlying principles of the religion should be applied. As Ramadan puts it, "the concern should not be to dress as the Prophet dressed but to dress according to the principles (of decency, cleanliness, simplicity, aesthetics, and modesty) that underlay his choice of clothes."²¹

A Singaporean Muslim posted the following on his Facebook page after the Paris attacks of November 2015: "ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is Islam's biggest enemy, not the U.S., not Israel or France or Germany or the Russians. We have to own the problem. We have to admit that this is a religious problem."²²

Conclusion

Bombing IS in Iraq and Syria may be the right thing to do now, but it cannot be the only thing that is needed; the conflict ultimately is one of deeply entrenched ideology. That ideological war is one that must be fought and, as many Muslims are now saying, one that must be won from within Islam itself.²³ Those of us who are not Muslims must support them in the conflict. ■

Lt. Cmdr. David G. Kibble, British Royal Naval Reserve, retired, is a theology graduate of Edinburgh University. He is a recently retired deputy headteacher at Huntington School in York and a former commanding officer of HMS Ceres. He has written extensively in books and journals on theological, political, educational, management, and defense issues, as well as the Islamic background to problems in the Middle East and on the ethics of nuclear deterrence.

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MR We Recommend



The George Washington University report "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa," by Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, is a valuable resource for those interested in researching the threat to the United States posed by radical Islamists and the Islamic State. The report examines cases of Americans involved in ISIS-related activities, and provides a demographic analysis of those charged with ISIS-related crimes. It goes on to discuss the individual motivations of ISIS supporters, how they became radicalized, the role of the Internet and social media in their radicalization and recruitment processes, and how involved U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers actually are with that terrorist organization. Finally, the report provides recommendations on how to combat ISIS recruitment. Find the full report at <http://cchs.gwu.edu/isis-in-america>.



Clouds or Clocks

The Limitations of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a Complex World

Maj. Donald P. Carter, U.S. Army

At the heart of the new *U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040* (AOC) is “complexity.” The AOC defines a complex environment as one “that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing.”¹ Globalization and advances in technology have made the world more complex and interconnected than at any other time in history. At the same time, those factors have facilitated attacks against U.S. national interests globally on an omnipresent battlefield by enemies who can use such factors to more effectively employ irregular capabilities to achieve traditional military effects. Such attacks are being conducted

by state actors like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, as well as by nonstate actors like the Islamic State and al-Qaida.

Together, globalization and advances in technology have changed the nature and character of warfare. The era of clearly defined battle lines and firm coalitions is over. Therefore, winning in a complex world depends, more than ever, on popular support and, as the AOC points out, “more than just firepower.”²

A central component to success in the contemporary operating environment (COE) is developing and maintaining a high degree of situational awareness.³ This herculean task of finding clarity and generating



(Photo illustration by Michael Hogg)

understanding for the commander and the organization is a core intelligence function, but the Army's current intelligence doctrine is too myopic and rigid to support commanders in this regard.

For the Army, the current default analytical model for generating understanding and supporting the military decision making process is *intelligence preparation of the battlefield* (IPB), defined by the U.S. Army as "the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations."⁴

By virtue of being an analytical model, IPB eliminates consideration of certain paradigms while restricting the framing of thinking upfront in order to produce consistent and predictable results under specified conditions. One resulting fundamental problem with using IPB in the COE is that it was designed for well-structured problems of the past and not the "wicked problems" of today.⁵ In other words, IPB was designed to support commanders against a relatively well-known enemy in a conventional combined arms maneuver fight. In such a capacity, IPB served the Army exceptionally well.

However, as intelligence professionals look out into today's sea of uncertainty and increasingly complex environments, they must ask themselves if IPB—their primary *modus operandi*—is best suited

to support commanders operating in the COE. IPB is, at best, suboptimal for employment in complex environments because it is conventional-enemy centric and fails to contextualize environmental variables over time, thereby potentially concealing the root causes of conflict and instability. Better alternatives to IPB are systemic operational design or similar systems theory approaches because they focus on environmental systems. Such alternative approaches give the commander and organization a more in-depth understanding of the operating environment and problem than does IPB.

To put this in mathematical terms, IPB solves for x and design solves for y . Therefore, it makes little sense to attempt to solve for y using the x model.

To draw on the work of English philosopher Karl Popper, his analogy between "clouds" and "clocks" illustrates the point.⁶ Popper asserted that the world was broken down into two categories, clouds and clocks. Clocks are well-defined and systematic, and are easily disassembled and reduced to parts. One result is that, most often, there are correct, well-defined solutions for repairing or maintaining clocks.

On the other hand, clouds are amorphous, messy, and ill-defined. Compared to the predictable functions produced by the precision construction of clocks, clouds cannot be disassembled in any similar way to clocks and are highly unpredictable.

Similarly, IPB strives to be clock-like in describing the battlefield and predicting developments, which means that those who use it may be inclined to make the false assumption—as do many military practitioners—that everything is “clock-like” and predictable in a given operational area. Such an approach may result in discounting—or failing to observe—important factors that lie outside the parameters of the IPB analytical construct, including difficult-to-discern nuances of the human domain.

The dangers associated with analytical models characterized by rigid processes are well documented. Most notably, Carl von Clausewitz warned of the hazards of “methodism,” later expanded on by Dietrich Dörmer, which is “the unthinking application of a sequence of action we have once learned.”⁷ Their warning is clear: anything that prevents or inhibits the free flow of ideas, scope of inquiry, and critical thinking limits and impedes the commanders’ ability to understand and visualize.

Methodism is also similar to the social psychology theory of fundamental attribution error, which is the tendency to over emphasize internal characteristics while simultaneously underestimating contextual aspects of a situation.⁸ Consequently, since IPB narrowly frames critical thinking in just such ways, using it in complex environments may constrain thought and critical thinking

about the environment and underlying problems, thereby limiting both understanding of it together with the development of options made available to the commander.

More to the point, as Lt. Col. Grant Martin opined in “The Deniers of ‘The Truth’: Why an Agnostic Approach to Warfare is Key,” the problem is with the Army’s religious-like commitment to analytical models, what he calls “technically rational paradigms,” that are ill-suited for the task of understanding complex adaptive systems (environment) and the human domain.⁹ Consider for a moment the impact on the operations process and overall understanding if a picture of the operating environment is derived from only one perspective. IPB leads to one such perspective—a reductionist approach to something that is not easily reduced or quantitatively understood. Therefore, in complex environments, IPB may give artificial structure and form to something that may not actually exist.

An illustration of this point is the use of the term anti-coalition movement (ACM) during the early years in Afghanistan. ACM was a catch-all term of convenience that gave the illusion of structure, form, and affinity among groups opposing the U.S.-led coalition. However, an ACM did not actually exist. As a result, this artificial construct was misleading and



(Photo courtesy of 4th Infantry Division PAO)

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, plan for a defense 16 November 2014 during Decisive Action Rotation 15-02 at the National Training Center on Fort Irwin, California. Decisive action rotations are designed to test the capabilities of brigade combat teams against similarly equipped enemy forces.



(Photo by Ashraf Shazly, Agence France-Presse)

Insurgent fighters belonging to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a rebel group in Sudan's Darfur conflict, await orders circa 2011. JEM claims that its main objective is to overthrow the current Sudanese dictatorship, which governs under Islamic law, and establish in its place a democratic state that respects the rights of Sudan's women and diverse ethnic groups. However, the conflict is characterized by other observers as having much more complex roots, a clash between Arab and diverse non-Arab ethnicities vying for control of land and resources.

counterproductive to developing accurate knowledge and understanding of core issues and the enemy.

In known environments characterized by conventional enemies, IPB is a fantastic tool for systematically identifying mission variables which, when applied to a template, can provide indicators and warnings of enemy intentions and activities—clock problems.¹⁰ Unfortunately, in unknown environments (ill-structured, or cloud problems) that have no templates, IPB products become random, uncontextualized information and data points. From this, it is easy to see how the value of IPB begins to diminish as the level of complexity increases.¹¹

IPB falls short with regard to unearthing the unknown nature and character of instability and conflict because IPB is enemy-centric and parochial. It presupposes there is a unified “enemy/threat” in the traditional sense, which then becomes the primary focus of the commander. However, it is conceivable that in a given complex operating environment there is no “enemy,” only conditions or systems that require

adjustment to solve the problem and accomplish the mission. Therefore, in such contexts, IPB would fail to reveal root causes of problems or show relationships between variables because IPB's enemy/threat perspective would restrict and inhibit full understanding of complex situations.

IPB also comes up short temporally; it is not well suited to detect changes in the environment and human domain. In military operations among populations, tracking the evolution and character of the conflict is a priority information requirement for any commander. Maj. Scott Stafford captured the point in an article when he wrote, “Today's enemy is just as likely to be yesterday's or tomorrow's friend,” and “success or failure, tactical or strategic, depends on the Army's ability to anticipate and shape how people and their identity groups perceive military missions in relations to their interests, and what they do about it.”¹²

Obtaining the kind of information Stafford specifies as vital to success is rarely a priority and, in my

experience, rarely revisited after steps one and two of IPB. The constant reframing of Army design methodology (systemic operational design) with focus on the environmental system(s) would better serve commanders in the COE.

Design allows commanders to take an unstructured approach or “agnostic” approach to generating understanding.¹³ As Martin states, an agnostic approach is more inclusive and “appreciates multiple view points and paradigms.”¹⁴ He goes on to observe, “Creatively thinking about warfare ought to be encouraged, and we must resist institutional attempts to codify how to approach thinking.”¹⁵ Therefore, to be truly successful in the COE, Army leaders have to challenge fundamental beliefs, take a critical approach to warfare, and unweave themselves from any one approach or checklist. More than ever before, the Army needs unbridled critical and creative thinkers; this is especially true for intelligence professionals.

With that said, the Army cannot completely divorce itself from models; it must have something to help guide it, and systemic operational design and systems theories offer a better way to analyze and understand unstructured problems than IPB. On the operational side of the house, the use of systemic concepts is not new—Army design methodology is well codified in doctrine. However, on the intelligence side, the embrace of systems thinking and incorporation of it into doctrine and into tactics, techniques, and procedures has been slow going, even though understanding the complex adaptive systems that comprise the environment is the lynchpin to success in the COE.

In the COE, commanders do not have the luxury of clarity, certainty, or templates. In most cases, the commander’s set of circumstances will be wholly unique and unlike anything experienced in the past. The value of having a profound and penetrating understanding and awareness, or what soft systems theorists would call a “rich picture” understanding, cannot be overstated because it helps the commander understand “why” things are happening and drives center of gravity analysis, collection planning, targeting, and the overall operational design.¹⁶

Thus, the systemic approach focuses on the environment and problem as opposed to IPB’s focus on the enemy.

Systemic thinking characterizes the environment and identifies root causes to such problems, not just the symptoms. Lt. Col. Brigham Mann puts it this way: “In essence, systemic thinkers attempt to ensure the military is ‘doing the right things,’ which is arguably much more important than just ‘doing things right.’”¹⁷

IPB is first in class for structured, enemy-centric problems, but systems theory-based approaches will better satisfy the commander’s information requirements in complex environments. Experiences over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan show the potential consequences of failing to understand the environment, a failure partly due to the limitations of IPB. Not to be misunderstood, this article does not advocate the death of IPB, but draws attention to the limitations and drawbacks concomitant with IPB, and advises using it only where appropriate (i.e., structured, enemy-centric operating environments).

Conclusion

The consequences of failure in the COE are high. So it is incumbent on intelligence professionals and commanders to take every step and precaution necessary to avoid psychological traps that would lead to the use of ill-suited analytical models and framing tools.

Therefore, for operating in the complex world, the Army should update intelligence doctrine to include systems theory analysis and intelligence operations. By understanding the character, function, and behavior of the complex adaptive systems of an operational environment, an intelligence staff officer will be better able to characterize the environment and help the commander frame the problem, thus making sense of the chaos.

We can never fully understand the full complexity of the “cloud” in the same way we understand the “clock,” but we can develop a better appreciation for it as well as greater understanding on how to deal with it by incorporating systemic approaches. To this end, IPB and systems theory approaches complement each other and together are a great one-two punch. ■

Maj. Donald Carter, U.S. Army, holds BA and MA degrees in political science. He is a military intelligence officer and has served in a variety of assignments from tactical to strategic.

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16 Cases of Mission Command Now Available for iBooks

The Combat Studies Institute Press has released *16 Cases of Mission Command* in iBook format. This book offers historical illustrations of military leaders using the principles of mission command in battle. The cases included range from the War of 1812 to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each chapter includes a brief historical narrative followed by a discussion of the mission command principles displayed in the action. Since its first publication in 2013, *16 Cases* has been adopted by Joint Readiness Training Center and a large number of officer professional development programs to assist in teaching mission command doctrine to soldiers of all ranks. To download a free copy of this iBook, go to: <https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/id1066422475>.



(Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Europe)

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley meets with Maj. Gen. Anders Brännström, chief of the Swedish Army, during the 23rd annual Conference of European Armies, held 26–28 October 2015 in Wiesbaden, Germany. Senior land force commanders from more than thirty European partner nations, the United States, and Canada gathered to discuss the future of cooperative European security operations. The conference focused on the current security environment, how to win in a complex world, and freedom of movement throughout Europe.

On Convergence, Emergence, and Complexity

Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, U.S. Army, Retired

There are many truths, some valid for one, some for another. Things are not what they seem ... It is a lesson we must learn and relearn because we keep searching for certainty and certainty does not exist.

—Harrison Salisbury

We are inextricably linked to the global condition—physically, virtually, and spiritually. There is little we can do about the

linkage. Isolation is neither practical or feasible. There must be something more we can do about the antithetical values and reprehensible actions that may come

to our shores. We stand at the cusp of sweeping global change that will forever affect the nature of our culture and, perhaps, the fiber and character of our people.

In the contemporary national security environment, there are many complex dynamic pressures and conditions to consider and overcome. These pressures will intensify as the world becomes increasingly interconnected. The dynamics of *convergence*, the coming together of many conditions and events, and *emergence*, the development of continuing concerns and new challenges out of the entirety of the circumstances we face, give rise to a difficult collective security context.

New challenges require new solutions. Our goal must be to find new strategies to effectively deal with this problematic situation and implement whatever modifications or outright changes are required to meet future challenges. We ignore the reality of this new condition at our peril.

Challenges of the Information Environment

A large amount of information, in numerous forms, comes into our “organizational–cognitive–decision management” sphere in a constant flow of ever-changing qualities and substance. Timelines are short, geospatial interests are global, speed and tempo are rapid, and operational context is conditional and circumstantial. Intent is often hidden, and meaning is not clear. Deception is in play.

In this complex, contemporary information environment, unless we can somehow achieve selective understanding and parsing of the dynamic parts and engender complete fusion of all sources, methods, and processes of information, we are very likely to experience cognitive and operational uncertainty—and failure. We cannot hope to succeed without focused and deliberate efforts to improve our information processes, including analysis and synthesis required to achieve knowledge and understanding that can empower coherent action, out of the chaos of the information tornado.

The many interacting (converging and emerging) elements of information, including all sources, hazards, enemies, and conditions, require a much broader and more dense body of data and, at the same time, a more specific approach to building a viable national security knowledge base than we have had before.

In the past, a variety of events and actions were often viewed discretely—in the context of time, space (area), speed and tempo, topical impact, and other related

conditions. In some cases, we may not have known when intentions or events were formed or when they occurred, and their interrelationships were not apparent. Thus, our approach to dealing with them was dispersed and divergent. We may also have misperceived them or wrongly assessed them because of faulty information, time lag, dissimilarity, or even flawed preconceptions or biases. We may not have perceived any convergence. We focused on what we could cognitively manage.

Inadvertent change sometimes occurred through selective disregard of some events—either because they were assessed to be unimportant, or because they seemed less urgent than other events—and so their management was left to a later time. In some cases, events were wrongly assessed as positive and constructive and placed in a different context, not dealt with as problems or threats. The resulting effects changed the contextual perception and the substantial form of the point of convergence and resulting confluence. This change was sometimes *very* rapid and so dramatic that both the perception and the actual form or condition of those events changed as a direct result.

We sought a “logic thread” (links and connections) between and among the various forces of change and the events that were manifest of those forces, attempting to understand them and their relationships in order to better control and respond to conditions and, where possible, to preclude an event through anticipatory (predictive) action. We seldom succeeded, and we often told ourselves that we failed because of the complexity of the challenges we faced.

Convergence

The “new” premise is that, in the contemporary and anticipated future environment, there are many near-concurrent forces (intentions and events) at work that affect ambient conditions. These forces collectively converge at some political, economic, military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, public safety, security, and societal point. At this point of convergence, the collective effect, the synergy of these forces, is greater—much greater in some cases—than the mere sum of their singular effects. The figure below provides a real-world example of convergence.

Convergence is a nonlinear dynamic event, and the point of convergence is very complex and concentrated. One can postulate that the nature of the resulting

confluence of converging forces is so complex, and convergence happens so rapidly and in such a compressed way that, in order to develop strategies to meet the challenges of these occurrences, extraordinary mechanisms become vital and necessary.

At the point of convergence, a variety of changes may occur that add or subtract from the complexity of the contextually joined forces of change. When convergence occurs, there may be a tendency not to recognize the characteristics or the dynamics of change, or not to recognize the actual fact of convergence because it may not be apparent in conventional form. Thus, in order to effectively and efficiently deal with the net effect of convergence and its attendant synergy, we must have a new approach to deal with confluence, simultaneity, interrelationships, and especially with complexity, which we do not now seem to have.

Ideally, if we had such a mechanism—one that provided proper assessment and understanding using appropriate policies, tools, and processes—the resulting contextual view and insightful understanding of the convergence of forces for change would be less complicated and would provide greater clarity and focus. Without this modified view and insight, the nature of the original condition set may be so overwhelming and so confusing that the idea of developing strategies—and somehow anticipating, precluding, managing, mitigating, controlling, and responding to changes—may be unachievable or even incomprehensible.

Emergence

The construct of emergence is as important and impactful as convergence. Emergence can be thought of as the development—out of the whole of intent, capability, conditions, circumstances, events, and actions—of continued challenges or, more often, newly formed challenges (often with new characteristics) that we must contend with.




Figure. Real-World Convergence

One of the fundamental mistakes sometimes made by those who are confronted with an emerging condition is to transfer the context and the characteristics of the precondition to the new condition without considering or realizing the nature of the change that may have occurred simply through the emergence process. A lesson may be found in nature when we consider the evolution of animals from their embryonic state until they fully develop (and sometimes morph) into something quite different—although the original genus, species, or family remains the same.

The emergence of national security concerns may be very much like this—not fully recognizable or understandable if only the base information or belief is used, especially when we rely on surface observation and conventional understanding. Instead, some applied (developed) illuminating knowledge, applicable history, factual information, sensible expectations, and even imagination can in most cases predict what the evolved (emerged) condition or circumstance will look like. This is vital to insight, foresight, and anticipatory action regarding emerging challenges. If it looks like a tadpole now, it is probably going to be a frog.

Great Complexity Remains

The premise that many enemies—nation-state military as well as other applicable entities like substate actors, terrorists, or criminals—have relied upon is to create cognitive and computational dissonance (an inability to comprehend and effectively apply computational tools resulting from a complex and often misperceived or mischaracterized condition). This raises an idea or action seemingly out of the blue, frequently in an asymmetric and asynchronous nonlinear way, and sometimes confounds our best analytic efforts and clouds our perceptions. The propensity of our enemies to act in the context of surprise is one of our greatest security challenges. Its operational construct is nearly always found in emergence. We cannot hope to effectively apply the countering elements of national, state, and local capability unless we can somehow foresee the true nature of our opponents and their intentions and actions.

After achieving dynamic contextual understanding and developing knowledge—both continuous activities—we can develop a view of the forces of change and their net effect, and we can perceive their interrelationships and functional importance. If we can discern intent or accurately perceive likely courses of action, we may even be able to avoid the often-mentioned “unanticipated consequences” that have so frequently plagued us in the past. Working with and taking advantage of this newly developed knowledge and understanding should bring greater clarity and sharper focus to the imposing issues and challenges at hand. Our goals should be to reduce or see through complexity, to achieve synergy of understanding (the ability to connect and magnify the effects of points of knowledge and insight), and to develop viable responses and solutions to complex problems and conditions.

Besides using surprise, our enemies will continue to engage us using several different forms of conflict (e.g., hybrid warfare, unconventional crime, cyberwarfare and cybercrime, terrorism without traditional form, and weapons with mass and complex effects). The application of warfare and other forms of violence or crime (with national security impact) to achieve change will continue to occur, despite our best efforts to reduce it or end it. Options such as diplomacy or collegial international cooperation are worthwhile responses and hold some hope for the future. However, it is apparent that rogue groups, individuals, subnational entities, and criminals whose actions have a significant impact continue to exist, along with a few nation-states that do not share the same values

or participate in the community of nations as positive contributors to stability and peace. There is no magic antidote for this global infection. We must be prepared to fight against these enemies with appropriate force.

Any future national security challenges, no matter what form they may take, are likely to include interwoven conditions and circumstances, and new organizational structures that we may not yet fully understand. Modern communications and data processing, along with the visionary efforts of our enemies, will enable this.

It seems unlikely that even the best of people—using only their natural cognitive abilities—can achieve the knowledge base, insight, and understanding needed to reduce complexity, achieve greater clarity, and develop viable solutions to today’s complex problems. We need a set of tools, processes, and procedures, and the policies and support necessary to achieve solutions. Without them we will be overwhelmed.

Solutions

Solutions to some problems will be possible—others are likely to be persistent and insoluble. However, there are some obvious things we need that are achievable now with the right focus.

- ◆ We need better practical understanding of complexity and complex conditions. This can be accomplished by providing education and training for key personnel that will prepare them for the conditions extant and those that will develop.
- ◆ We need tools, processes, and policies that will assist with handling complex conditions and circumstances. This includes advanced computational applications and artificial intelligence that will assist the human-in-the-loop.
- ◆ We need a focused national effort to determine the right applications for the science and theory of the body of knowledge about complex systems and conditions. And, we need facilities and mechanisms to support this vital work.
- ◆ We need a future orientation that will provide us with the right focus to develop foresight to meet the next challenges. In order to achieve this precursor to success, we need the best minds and the greatest of human spirits to develop national and allied capabilities.
- ◆ As a practical matter, we will also need continuous persistent global awareness; commensurate information-gathering presence and access, analysis, synthesis,

and fusion that provides finished intelligence and actionable information; and the capability to deliver clear applicable knowledge to decision makers.

One of the key outcomes from such a consolidated and focused effort will include a revitalized national capability to design and articulate strategy, which will provide both a philosophical context and a functional guide for our responses. In the process, this could aid in the invigoration of our supporting political and public effort in a common front against our enemies and any significant or developing threats.

The Way Forward

Because the increasing speed and nature of change in the coming operational environment is indeed imposing, it is essential that we train and equip ourselves to more perceptively anticipate (foresee) strategic trends, and that we turn that knowledge and foresight into effective response strategies. We can never predict the future with certainty, but with greater, more specific effort, we can effectively anticipate possibilities and assess the probability of their occurrence. Sitting idly by, watching the future unfold and leaving our fate to others by inaction, is not an option under the high-stakes circumstances we now find ourselves in.

In order to achieve clear strategic vision, improved insight-driven planning, and appropriate actions in response to converging and emerging events, any approach should include a cadre of qualified people collaborating in a “Manhattan Project”-style effort. This cadre would share the burden of amassing and analyzing as much legally and procedurally appropriate information as possible to collectively develop means and ways to deal with anticipated or unfolding events. Our Nation can only achieve adequate understanding of how expanded areas of concern relate to each other in a thriving and ever-changing

environment by ensuring collaboration among all agencies and organizations. We should develop a common cultural and informational understanding for the purpose of planning (appropriate proportional employment) for all of the elements of national power. One of the benefits of such an approach would be to help define and strengthen our relationships with those dependable allied nations who have stood together with us in the past, to help them understand and deal with the conditions they face.

Until we approach the problems of the future with such a construct and attitude, we will continue to fall further behind in our ability to understand and estimate the future on behalf of our own strategic best interests. Our leadership and our institutions need to pay attention to the emerging future in a way that is reminiscent of, but different from, the way we have dealt with some of the greatest threats and most-dire conditions of the past—to designate the right people and resources necessary to see the way forward and to achieve strategies and an operational structure that will meet our absolute needs.

We must achieve these goals in a legal and societally acceptable way. (We have had such projects in the past—at least one of which died an early administrative death because it was perceived to be a real [or potential] threat to the constitutional rights of our citizenry.) Success will require the best minds and the partnership of legislative, judicial, and executive branch leaders as well as the best of our civilian technologists and civil rights advocates. In order to justify such an effort, we must all come to the realization that things have indeed changed over time, and we are now threatened from several vectors and points of origin by lethal threats to our way of life.

We need to deal with the challenges of great complexity, and we need motivating belief and functional capability to succeed. ■

Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, U.S. Army, retired, is the former assistant secretary for information and analysis (intelligence) at the Department of Homeland Security. His military career included assignments as an enlisted medic, an infantry officer, and a military intelligence officer. He retired from active duty as the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Notes

Epigraph. Harrison Salisbury, *Disturber of the Peace: Memoirs of a Foreign Correspondent* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 233.



(Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration)

A group of soldiers captured by German forces on the western front during World War I illustrates the great diversity within the Allied forces. This group represents eight nationalities serving within the Allied coalition: Anamite (Vietnamese), Tunisian, Senegalese, Sudanese, Russian, American, Portuguese, and English. Apart from the predominantly white European and North American forces, approximately four million non-European, nonwhite soldiers and auxiliaries were recruited from Allied colonies to fight in Europe and elsewhere. Approximately one million of these served with distinction in northern France and Belgium.

The Myth of the New Complexity

Lt. Col. Clay Mountcastle, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

The world has always been an uncertain, complicated place. The so-called “foreseeable future” is not foreseeable at all, nor has it ever been.

Yet, in recent years, collective voices in the U.S. political and military communities have claimed that we are now witnessing an era of unprecedented complexity with a future far more unpredictable than in the past. For example, in his confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 24 January 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry claimed, “Today’s world is more complicated than anything we have experienced.”¹ Elsewhere, the military authors of a recent study, “Intellectual Capital: A Case for Cultural

Change,” agreed with Kerry, stating that “our future combined and joint operating environments will be more complex than ever before in history.”²

Both active and retired military leaders have also echoed this narrative, placing emphasis on the idea of a reputedly new, previously unseen level of intricacy in modern war. For instance, retired Marine Corps Gen. Tony Zinni surmised that “Over the years, the spectrum of conflict has greatly broadened, and the battlefield environment has become far more complex.” This “new battlefield,” he asserts, is significantly different than any seen before.³ The U.S. Army has incorporated this notion into its recent doctrine. Former Army



(Photo courtesy Wikimedia)

U.S. members of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Deer Team pose with Viet Minh leaders Ho Chi Minh (third from left standing) and Vo Nguyen Giap (fifth from left standing) during training August 1945 at Tan Trao, Son Duong District, Tuyen Quang Province, Vietnam. Though the United States government recognized that Minh and Giap were ruthless and committed communists with extensive ties to the Soviet Union and a history of violence, it nevertheless saw in them leaders of organized forces that might effectively fight Japanese occupation of Indochina in an area where conventional Allied capabilities were very limited and decided to risk supporting them. OSS, the forerunner of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as well as U.S. Special Operations Forces, inserted teams behind Axis lines in both Europe and Asia to organize, train, equip, and coordinate combat operations using indigenous forces.

Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno asserted in 2012 that the “strategic environment has grown increasingly complex.” As if to underscore this refrain, the Army titled its newest operating concept *Win in a Complex World*. Perhaps more ambiguously, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey (then commander of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command) stated the year prior that “We live in a much more competitive security environment.”⁴ Such an assertion invites the challenge: More competitive than what, exactly?

Past Complexity

The mantra of a new, unprecedented complexity in the nature of military affairs is not terribly surprising, but it is misleading. At its best, the assertion that the operational environment is more complex than in previous eras is a near-sighted justification for a number of organizational and intellectual changes. And, at its worst, it is a veiled excuse for strategic and operational failures over the past decade. Most likely, however, the vast amount of self-study and introspection that the U.S. military, and in particular the Army, has

endured during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in a sort of unintended myopia that ignores history and views the challenges of today as unprecedented in their complexity and unmanageability. However, there are indeed precedents to factors that are today erroneously characterized as more complex than previously.

World War I. Over the scope of the past one hundred years, complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty in military affairs has been a constant. In many cases, the level of such complexity matched or exceeded that seen today. As the Western world launched the cataclysm that would become remembered as World War I, few at the time could articulate how or why the war came about. Even today, a century of reflection since has not produced consensus agreement on a single definitive explanation for the conflict. Instead, we find a plethora of diverse explanations that attribute the cause to some combination of a precarious tangle of political alliances, security agreements, war plans, industrialization, ethnic divides, and festering resentments from the nineteenth century that produced an unstable and explosive

security situation throughout Europe by 1914. That environment, according to military historian John Keegan, “progressively overwhelmed the capacity of statesmen and diplomats” to control it.⁵ As a result, Europe abruptly went to war with itself.

The rapidity by which the continent went from “peaceful productivity” to being fully immersed in a war of unparalleled destruction was alarming, even by today’s standards.⁶ Equally remarkable was the scale of transformation in warfare that occurred between 1914 and 1918, a relatively short period. The war gave birth to airpower, armor, chemical weapons, and the primacy of the machine gun and indirect artillery fire. Nations that were accustomed to fighting wars strictly on the ground soon found themselves fighting in the air and under the oceans’ surface. It is hard to know if the soldiers fighting in World War I realized that these new tools of war would retain their central role on the battlefield more than a century later, or how that realization might have felt. Such a dramatic, sweeping transformation in weaponry has not occurred since or much less as quickly. Therefore, when the current narrative discusses the challenges of complexity combined with the need to keep up with new technologies on the modern “ever-changing” battlefield, it is instructive to remember that such challenges are nothing new.

The interwar years. Even more than during World War I, the interwar period was defined by military innovation, the scope and speed of which had never been seen before. It was a time defined by “intellectual and technological jockeying” that, like most other interwar stretches, resulted in “systemic and massive changes to the basic nature of warfare,” according to Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet.⁷ The United States and European nations, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, along with the Soviet Union and Japan, raced to produce armaments and technologies that would provide an advantage in combat, although future opponents and battlefields were unknown. The capabilities of airpower and submarines combined with the rapidly increasing lethality of all weapon systems produced a charged strategic environment that was extremely competitive, dangerous, and unpredictable.

Such advances in warfare took place against the backdrop of dramatic changes in other domestic and political spheres. During this period, fascism and communism were taking root in Europe, while the Second

Sino-Japanese War was displaying Japan’s aggressiveness as well as its military capability. The rise of Nazism in the 1930s demonstrates that radical ideologies feeding into conflict is not a recent phenomenon at all. Also, the financial impact of World War I on nations followed by the Great Depression placed “tremendous strain on national economies” and produced an economic crisis in which “currencies crashed, unemployment figures rose, unrest flourished, and moral standards declined,” according to the authors of *Men in Arms*.⁸ This swirl of military, political, and economic turmoil during the period leading up to World War II produced a global situation that would undoubtedly be viewed today as dangerously chaotic, unstable (as it truly was), and extremely complex.

World War II. Historian Brian M. Linn recently characterized World War II as “the Army’s finest hour.”⁹ In many ways it was. It showed the U.S. military to be one of tenacious, organized professionals possessing extraordinary strategic vision, resilience, and guts. For the United States, the enemies were known and the mission was clear, or so it seemed. It is all fine and good for retired generals to wax nostalgic for “the good old days of the Good War! The old-fashioned and *simple* conventional war,” but such comments understate the real nature of the two world wars and the Cold War they spawned, just as stating that today’s wars are far more complicated than those of the twentieth century is a dubious claim.¹⁰ No event that involved the armies of over thirty nations, resulted in more than forty million military casualties and forty-five million dead civilians, and was fought in over thirty operational campaigns around the globe was simple.¹¹ Most Americans today (especially those in the military) would be awed, stunned, or overwhelmed by the enormous strategic, operational, and logistical complications and frustrations that came with fighting wars of such magnitude and dire consequences.¹² Unfortunately, the passing of seventy years has dulled our collective memory in this regard. And, unlike its predecessor, World War II also brought a new totality to war, defined most poignantly by the first use of atomic weapons—and with it, a frightening uncertainty about future conflicts.

The Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became popular to remember the Cold War in uncomplicated terms: democracy versus communism; good versus bad. The specter of mutually assured

destruction, once so fearsome, became almost quaint by 1990, and many recalled the Cold War as a bipolar contest involving only the United States and the former Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR). But if Americans at the time chose to view the Cold War in those simplest of terms, then they were fooling themselves, just as we fool ourselves today by remembering it as such. The five decades that saw the perpetual clouds of World War III looming on the horizon were trying, complicated times, both politically and militarily. Robert Golan-Viella was correct when he noted that “the world itself between 1945 and 1991 wasn’t really that simple,” and yet “Americans often imposed a simplistic framework on it.”¹³

The combination of nuclear proliferation; fascist and totalitarian regimes throughout South America and Eastern Europe; genocide in central Africa; wars in Korea, the Middle East, and between India and Pakistan; and a myriad of civil wars and insurrections ensured that much of the world was, as historian Paul Kennedy noted, both exceedingly unsettled and “un-free.” Just because the United States was preoccupied with the Soviet Union did not mean that the rest of the world was not very much on fire. “Those were really scary times,” Kennedy argued in 2007, “and much more dangerous than our present circumstance.”¹⁴

Vietnam. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought a renewed interest in the Vietnam War and have served as a potent reminder of the military, political, and cultural complexities surrounding that Southeast Asian conflict. As Stanley Karnow described, the war’s “origins were complex, its lessons disputed,” and we still struggle to grasp its true legacy.¹⁵ The reasons for American failure in Vietnam were legion: misunderstanding the enemy, strategic and operational constraints, a micromanaging commander in chief, confused generals, and loss of public support being among the most popular. The result was a wounded and demoralized U.S. Army that, in the words of Gen. Bruce Palmer, found itself “brooding over its frustrations and reevaluating its role in the world” a full decade after the fall of Saigon.¹⁶ Sound familiar?

With a robust Soviet military to confront, and the United States struggling through a cultural and economic funk, the post-Vietnam Era was steeped in uncertainty and filled with doubt. Those who argue that today’s United States somehow faces a more uncertain,

daunting future might need to seriously consider what the world looked like from the American prospective in the late 1970s.

The Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Fortunately for the United States and NATO, the USSR launched its ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At the time, the alarming move threatened to serve as the long-feared trigger to World War III, but its only real impact was to significantly deplete the Soviet military over the course of ten years and contribute in large part to the collapse of the USSR.

While the United States was rebuilding its own military and engaging in a series of smaller conflicts in Grenada and Panama, the Soviets were learning the hard, timeless lesson that combating an insurgency in the mountains of Afghanistan was exceedingly difficult, even for a superpower. One Russian veteran suggested, “The practice of massing a large number of regular forces against a small group of irregular forces to fight a guerrilla war on rugged terrain is bankrupt” and years after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan a Russian military professor concluded:¹⁷

It was an impetuous decision to send Soviet forces into this land ... the Afghans, whose history includes many centuries of warfare with various warring groups, could not see these armed strangers as anything but armed invaders.¹⁸

Of course, after nearly fourteen years of operations in Afghanistan, such observations should sound prophetic to Americans today and raise legitimate questions. Was the Soviet military experience in Afghanistan remarkably different than the American experience during Operation Enduring Freedom? Were the challenges facing the Soviets truly different? Did the Mujahideen employ tactics or strategy in the 1980s that varied drastically from the Taliban and other insurgent groups in recent years? Were the political and cultural dynamics at play inherently different? To say yes to those questions is to rely heavily on relatively small details.

A more feasible answer might note the differences in the Soviet and American military organization and doctrine, but would admit that the challenges they faced in Afghanistan—and the difficulty of those challenges—were more similar than they were different. This point is important for two reasons. First, it reminds us to look outside the American experience when making sweeping judgments about global military affairs and the operating



(Department of Defense photo by Sgt. Brendan Stephens)

A young girl appears amused to find U.S. Army soldiers lined up against the walls of her house 21 February 2000 in Mitrovica, Kosovo. The soldiers from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and United Nations police were conducting a house-to-house search for weapons. The 82nd Airborne Division unit from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was deployed as part of Kosovo Force, a NATO-led, international military force conducting a peacekeeping mission known as Operation Joint Guardian.

environment. Second, it undercuts the notion that our recent campaign in Afghanistan witnessed something particularly new, something more complicated than previous campaigns. If anything, our operations there have produced efforts, results, and lessons that are strikingly similar to those from before.

More recent examples. Sixteen years ago, a retired U.S. Army general described a conflict in which there was “no clear international consensus to fight, no sure cause, ambivalent public support, no long deployment and build-up, an incredibly complex theater environment, and difficult climactic, demographic, and geographic conditions on the battlefield.”¹⁹ This was not a prediction about Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather, an assessment of the Kosovo conflict of 1999. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley K. Clark’s description of the largely forgotten campaign serves as a reminder that complexity in unstable operating environments certainly existed prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Was Clark exaggerating or were we simply not paying attention?

Still, it is not hard to understand how the magnitude of 9/11 lead many Americans to view the world as a suddenly more dangerous, more complicated place. It was as if a multipolar world was born overnight. The campaigns

that would be fought as part of the Global War on Terrorism were filled with enough discovery, surprise, and frustration that the military looked for new ways (and terms) to define the task at hand. “Full spectrum operations” and “asymmetric warfare” became the focus, and a strategic shift to counterinsurgency operations brought sweeping changes in U.S. doctrine. In 2006, the Army produced the highly touted Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, which provided guidelines for fighting the “exceedingly difficult and complex” problem of an insurgency.²⁰ By 2007, the United States was fully immersed in what former marine and Assistant Defense Secretary Bing West called “enlightened counterinsurgency,” which focused more on nation building and less on purely kinetic military operations.²¹ The results, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, were underwhelming, with very little in the way of measurable military or political success being achieved, to the point where Secretary of Defense Robert Gates referred to the wars as “an albatross around the nation’s neck.”²²

Learning from the Past

While we cannot yet speak or write about the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq wholly in the past tense, any significant change in the

existing, almost-completed narrative of these wars would be a remarkable surprise. This fact, perhaps more than any other, has the U.S. military viewing the current operational environment as problematic: an intricate puzzle that is difficult to solve. Linn wrote that the Army has been traditionally shaped by the “echo of battle” that it chooses to hear.²³ It would seem that the echo being heard from the past fourteen years in Afghanistan and Iraq is noisy and filled with static: several sounds all at once, threatening to confuse us.

Most misguided, albeit common, is the thinking that the U.S. military is capable of fully preparing itself for the next war. This notion suggests that the Army must be completely ready before the first shots are fired, thereby preventing the kind of “bad start” that has characterized nearly every conflict in our history. Christopher A. Lawrence recently concluded in his study *America’s Modern Wars* that following the “flawed and improvised” war in Afghanistan, “U.S. citizens have a right to demand that the national command authorities (the civilians) and the U.S. armed forces be prepared for all types of wars and to be able to initiate them with considerable competence.” While acknowledging that the United States made substantial strides in adjusting to the challenges Iraq and Afghanistan provided, Lawrence quipped, “Even if the glass is half full, the American serviceman and the American tax payer have every right to demand that the glass be completely full.”²⁴

He is wrong. The glass will neither be “completely full” nor will the military be capable of being prepared for “all types” of potential conflicts at any given time. The idea of absolute preparedness, bolstered by a faith in data analysis, models, statistics, and planning checklists, naively ignores the simple reality that it is impossible to prepare for every contingency. As U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command commander Gen. David Perkins observed, “Not only is the future unknown, but it is unknowable.”²⁵ As such, we should embrace this uncertainty and acknowledge that our ability to plan, train, and prepare for the next war is

limited. Whatever the next conflict presents, we will be required to make strategic, organizational, and doctrinal adjustments as we fight. This is not a shortcoming; it is a simple, historical truth.

The U.S. Army’s recent call for adaptability in its ranks acknowledges this truth and is appropriate given the state of political and military affairs today. To say that we are entering “a period of great transition” is correct, but to suggest that this is unique is not.²⁶ The problem with viewing current military affairs as unprecedented and somehow more complex than those previous is the tendency to ignore or discount the past. Thinking that the questions of today can only be solved with new ideas, new solutions, and new systems is both wrong and counterproductive.

Conclusion

Nearly thirty years ago, the authors of *America’s First Battles, 1776-1965*, warned against the “widespread current belief that things were never as tough as they are now.”²⁷ That warning still applies. Complexity, uncertainty, and confusion are nothing new. They are the historical norm. Today’s cyberwarfare is yesterday’s nuclear threat. Today’s nonstate actors are yesterday’s communist revolutionaries. Today’s Arab Spring is yesterday’s collapse of the Soviet Union. We know just as much or just as little about the next war as we did when we emerged from the two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, or the Persian Gulf.

It is useful to remind ourselves that—while the world around us may not exactly match the world ten, twenty, or a hundred years ago—we should keep the present (and the future) in the proper historical context. We need to maintain the long view. Doing so allows us to assess current challenges and requirements without thinking that we are somehow adrift in uncharted waters, driven by currents the likes of which we have never seen before. Because we have been here before, many times. We have never enjoyed a certain future. We are not writing a new book, we are only adding the next chapter. ■

Lt. Col. Clay Mountcastle, U.S. Army, retired, is assistant professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Lee, Virginia. He earned his PhD in history from Duke University and has taught military history at the United States Military Academy, the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, and the University of Washington. Mountcastle is also the author of Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals.

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The Complexity Trap

MICHAEL J. GALLAGHER, JOSHUA A. GELTZER,
AND SEBASTIAN L. V. GORKA
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*When you start applying blanket policies on the complexities of the current world situation, you're going to get yourself into trouble.
—President Barack Obama*

The Cult of Complexity

We live in a world of unprecedented complexity, or so we are told. President Obama's words above echo an increasingly common narrative in the American foreign policy and national security establishments: the forces of globalization, rising nonstate actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating disruptive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before. If "strategy is the art of creating power" by specifying the relationship among ends, ways, and means, then the existence of unprecedented complexity would seem to make this art not only uniquely difficult today but also downright dangerous, inasmuch as choosing any particular course of action would preclude infinitely adaptive responses in the future. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates astutely described the pre-9/11 challenges to American national security were "unusual might compared to the world today." And as former State Department Director of Policy

If you found the article above intriguing, you may also enjoy reading "The Complexity Trap," by Michael J. Gallagher, Joshua A. Geltzer, and Sebastian L.V. Gorka. Their article also critiques the concept of complexity. Find it in the Spring 2012 edition of *Parameters*, Vol. 42 Issue 1,

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdf.



(Photo by Sgt. Alexandra Hulett, Viper Combat Camera—USAREUR)

Soldiers of 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, provide security during a movement-to-contact drill 11 August 2015 while participating in exercise Allied Spirit II at the U.S. Army's Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Personality factors often influence the manner individuals respond to changes in their environment.

Moving Beyond the MBTI

The Big Five and Leader Development

Stephen J. Gerras, PhD, and Leonard Wong, PhD

In the recent past, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) has been the staple of self-awareness for Army leaders (and often their spouses) across the entire spectrum of professional military education ranging from the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy to the U.S. Army War College. For the rare few who might not be acquainted with Myers-Briggs, the MBTI assesses four pairs of opposing preferences that are said to be inborn and value-neutral to form a person's four-letter personality type.¹ The instrument determines a preference for either extraversion (E) or

introversion (I), sensing (S) or intuition (N), thinking (T) or feeling (F), and judging (J) or perceiving (P). Individuals are categorized into one of sixteen different personality types, such as an ISTJ or ENFP, based on the preferences.

Over the course of several decades, the MBTI became the military's preeminent instrument for providing insight into oneself and others as its use spread throughout the Army. Its popularity was evident in a 1990 study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) at the Army War College. In the study,

nearly all students surveyed believed that “the MBTI made them more aware of themselves and others, with 74 percent indicating that it caused them to change their behavior relating to others.”² Despite the glowing reviews, and the high regard the MBTI seemed to command, the NRC report surprisingly noted that the use of the MBTI was “troublesome” and concluded that “the popularity of this instrument is not coincident with supportive research results.”³ In other words, while the beloved MBTI is often accepted and acclaimed throughout the Army, there is no scientific foundation justifying its popularity.

It may be of some consolation that the Army is not alone in this peculiar situation. After all, eighty-nine of the *Fortune* 100 companies also use the MBTI even though research consistently shows that its reliability and validity are on par with tarot cards, horoscopes, and fortune cookies.⁴ But why is the MBTI so enduring, especially in the Army, if its effectiveness is so lacking? One of the main reasons for the popularity of the MBTI is that its use is often one of the rare occasions when Army leaders can make a serious attempt at self-awareness. The MBTI is usually administered in a nonthreatening school environment; Army leaders are buffered from the frenetic operational tempo that discourages most personal reflection. Even though research has shown that the MBTI is of little value in leader development, its administration may be one of the few institutionalized opportunities in the Army for self-awareness.⁵

Another factor contributing to the popularity of the MBTI is that it is refreshingly upbeat. There is no shame in being more feeling than thinking, and no matter how one answers the MBTI questions, none of the sixteen personality types will ever suggest that an Army leader has toxic tendencies. Finally, the MBTI may be popular because of the Barnum effect.⁶ The Barnum effect, named after American showman P.T. Barnum, suggests that individuals will find personal meaning in statements that could apply to a broad range of people. Because the MBTI’s cheerful personality descriptions are vague and general, there is a tendency to view the personal feedback as highly accurate even though the descriptions could apply to just about anybody.

In spite of its shortcomings, the MBTI manages to persist in popularity in today’s U.S. military. It is still administered at the Army War College and senior

leaders still trot it out as a leader development asset. For example, Rear Adm. Margaret Klein, the secretary of defense’s senior advisor for military professionalism, recently suggested that the MBTI might be a potential tool in the prevention of senior leader ethical transgressions.⁷ This continued affinity toward the less than optimal MBTI points to the critical need for some sort of personality assessment in the development of military leaders. The good news is that an alternative assessment—one that is both scientifically grounded and suitable for leader development—exists and is gaining attention.

The Big Five

After half a century of scientific studies, most psychologists today believe that there are five broad personality traits that consistently emerge when analyzing human personality. These five factors—often referred to as the “Big Five”—are able to describe an individual’s personality with each factor addressing a specific and unique aspect. The five factors together form a combination of qualities or characteristics that make up a person’s distinctive character or personality.⁸ The Big Five factors can be represented by the acronym OCEAN:

Openness encompasses curiosity, creativity, and imagination. It includes subtraits such as aesthetics, feelings, and ideas. Open people enjoy new restaurants, love to travel, and regularly reconsider their values. Low openness people, on the other hand, tend to prefer the familiar, appreciate a routine, and are usually more conservative.

Conscientiousness is centered on impulse control and conformity. It is reflected in competence, self-discipline, and order. A high conscientiousness person is confident, well-organized, and driven. People who score low on conscientiousness tend to be easygoing, untroubled when things are not tidy, and less goal-oriented.

Extraversion is marked by energetic engagement with the external world. Army leaders classified as introverts with the MBTI are often surprised to receive moderate to high extraversion scores with the Big Five. This is unsurprising, since there are many Army leaders who prefer to be quiet, but when required, will take charge and be assertive.

Agreeableness reflects a concern for social harmony. It includes trust, altruism, and tender-mindedness. Individuals high in agreeableness are less inclined to

retaliate when treated unfairly and believe that people are generally good. People low in agreeableness tend to be more antagonistic, guarded, and cynical.

Neuroticism relates to one's tolerance to stress. It includes anxiety, self-consciousness, and depression. People high in neuroticism become tense under pressure, easily discouraged, and worry a lot. People low in neuroticism are calm, hopeful, and less likely to be rattled. Some psychologists use the expression *emotional stability* instead of neuroticism to avoid confusion with Sigmund Freud's concept of neurosis.

While the Big Five can provide valuable insights for self-awareness, they also constitute a robust vehicle for leader development based on extensive studies examining the consequences and implications of personality. Here is a sampling of the research findings revealed in the Big Five literature:

- ◆ Studies using military samples show that successful leaders tend to exhibit low neuroticism, high extraversion, and high conscientiousness.⁹
- ◆ Openness is a significant predictor of strategic thinking capability in senior leaders.¹⁰ Interestingly, students at the Army War College tend to score lower in openness than the general U.S. population. Those

students selected for brigade command score even lower than the overall Army War College average.¹¹

- ◆ A high score in neuroticism tends to negate the positive effects of all other traits on psychological resiliency.¹²
- ◆ Studies found that people with high extraversion tend to be noticed and assert themselves, making them highly likely to emerge as a leader.¹³
- ◆ Some studies report that agreeable people, when placed in leadership positions, are more effective leaders, possibly through their emphasis on creating a fair environment.¹⁴
- ◆ Teams with no members who are low in conscientiousness report less conflict, better communication, and more workload sharing. A team will actively support a team member who is low in intelligence, but will tend to ignore a low conscientiousness member.¹⁵

The Army and the Big Five

With a formidable research foundation behind it, the Big Five offers potentially significant benefits for leader development in the Army. To establish a baseline of self-awareness, Big Five assessments could be integrated into the leadership curriculum in the

Advanced Leader Course for non-commissioned officers or the Basic Officer Leadership Course for the officer corps. Because as much as 50 percent of a person's personality could be inherited and personalities are extremely difficult to change once reaching adulthood, a Big Five self-assessment would emphasize identifying those aspects of leaders' personalities that they should accentuate (or overcome) to develop into more effective leaders in the future.¹⁶ Increasing self-awareness, not attempting personality change, should be the focus. Additionally, it is probably prudent to restrict the use of the Big Five to self-awareness as opposed to screening or selection since it is possible for a person to manipulate the factor scores through disingenuous responses to questions in the instrument.



(Photo by Sgt. James Avery, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers assigned to Team Eagle, Task Force 2-7 Infantry, consult the technical manual for their M1126 Stryker infantry carrier vehicle while performing preventive maintenance checks and services after a nearly 130-kilometer convoy from Rukla to Pabrade, Lithuania, 1 May 2015. There is a robust link between a leader's personality and leader effectiveness, especially in fast-paced, demanding situations.

Compared to the MBTI, the Big Five is a relatively simple and frugal approach to self-awareness. Because the Myers-Briggs instrument is a commercial product, its use incurs a cost for both the MBTI instrument and its administration by people certified by the corporation holding the copyright. The Big Five personality factors, on the other hand, can be measured in a variety of ways to include online versions that are both public domain (free) and anonymous. Versions exist that range from an incredibly short, not-too-specific ten-question assessment to more detailed surveys with

a hundred or more questions. Many versions of the Big Five come with average scores of other sample populations to aid in the interpretation of the results.

The MBTI has done an admirable job in introducing self-awareness and self-reflection to the Army. The time has come, however, for the Army to move beyond the MBTI and adopt an approach to self-awareness that is scientifically established and conducive to leader development. The Big Five personality factors fulfill that requirement. It is now up to the Army to take full advantage of this potent leader development tool. ■

Col. Stephen Gerras, U.S. Army, retired, is a professor of behavioral sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. He served in the Army for over twenty-five years, including commanding a light infantry company and a transportation battalion, teaching leadership at West Point, and serving as the chief of operations and agreements for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, and both an MS and PhD in industrial and organizational psychology from Penn State University.

Lt. Col. Leonard Wong, U.S. Army, retired, is a research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, who focuses on the human and organizational dimensions of the military. His career includes teaching leadership at West Point and serving as an analyst for the chief of staff of the Army. Wong is a professional engineer, and holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy and an MS and PhD from Texas Tech University.

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I'm Faded

1st Lt. Robert P. Callahan Jr., U.S. Army

In February 2015, Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras published *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession*.¹ This study portrayed an Army that purports to value honesty, but the leaders of which have sacrificed their integrity in order to meet an excessive number of administrative requirements. In order to regain our integrity, Wong and Gerras suggest that we, as an Army, acknowledge our organizational and individual fallibilities and have a candid conversation about reconciling who we are with who we want to be. I would like to add to that conversation by discussing how I fell short of who I would like to be.

From Black and White to Shades of Gray

In 2009, I was screened by the Department of Defense Medical Review Board (DODMERB); in 2010, I was examined at a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS); and in 2013, I completed a Class 1 flight physical.² I had to fill out a thorough medical history for each of these exams. At the end of each history, I certified that the history was “true and complete” and that “no person advised me to conceal or falsify any information.” I completed accurate histories for the DODMERB and MEPS, but I turned in an incomplete history for my flight physical. I had changed between 2010 and 2013, but I cannot tell you exactly why I chose to turn in an incomplete medical history.

A couple events stand out as probable factors for influencing my decision to not turn in a complete medical history. A drill sergeant informing my basic training platoon that “your units won’t care who you are or what you did before the Army as long as you’re not a scumbag when you get there,” taught me that some standards are more important to meet than others. An upper-class cadet ribbing one of my peers for telling the truth on his DODMERB because the upperclassman “thought everyone lied on that thing,” lowered the standard from absolute to conditional honesty. Joking that “you can’t tell the Army the truth about how you drink; they would go crazy,” further trivialized telling the truth at all times. Sadly, I cannot tell you if those events specifically led me to act without integrity.

Instead, I can only tell you that I did not care about signing my name to a document that I knew was incorrect.

I completed the histories for both MEPS and the DODMERB during an application process. My recruiter sent me home with a stack of paperwork for MEPS, and I accessed an online questionnaire for the DODMERB. I was applying to join the Army, and I wanted to make sure I gave an honest account of myself. I completed the history for my initial flight physical before attending the Leadership Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) after my junior year of college. I put my demographic information in the appropriate boxes, checked whichever boxes on the questionnaire required the least effort, and signed my forms before continuing onto my next appointment. Completing my paperwork on time was more important than completing it truthfully.

Accountable to Whom?

I made a troubling choice when I placed a greater weight on completeness than on accuracy. As a cadet, I was working toward earning a commission in the U.S. Army; a commission that is nominally predicated on earning the president’s “special trust and confidence” in my “patriotism and fidelity.”³ I believe volunteering to join the Army demonstrated my patriotism, but did I truly act in a manner worthy of anyone’s trust and confidence in my fidelity?

Perhaps a commission grants officers the authority to choose which requirements are worth the time and effort of meeting if satisfying every requirement is not possible. Robert E. Atkinson Jr. posits military officers are required to disobey illegal and immoral orders.⁴ According to Atkinson, illegality and immorality should be understood in the context of the professional values of military officers, the legal values of the constitutional and international laws which bind the United States, and the moral values that each officer personally holds. If an order conflicts with the common good, then an officer is bound to disobey it.

An officer cannot obey an impossible order. Officers act as agents of the public trust, and a commander is

specifically responsible for everything his or her command does and fails to do. Therefore, an officer should deconflict impossible orders by following those orders which best serve the common good. However, an officer cannot choose which orders to follow while still reporting that all orders have been followed. As agents of the public trust, some of whom have been vested with the authority to make life or death decisions, I do not believe that officers should be a force unto themselves.

Military officers are drawn from and serve the American people, and they are ultimately responsible to the people's representatives. Those representatives make decisions based on the view from the top of the chain of command, a view that is sometimes supplemented by input from the middle and bottom of the chain of command. Some officers may view falsely reporting compliance as protecting themselves or their units from micromanagement, but each individual deviation slowly changes that officer from a public servant—accountable to the American people—into a petty tyrant, accountable only to him or herself.

Policing Our Own

I believe that Wong and Gerras would attribute my action to *ethical fading*.⁵ I did not care about filling out my forms accurately because the only thing that mattered was meeting the appropriate deadline and continuing with my day. *Lying to Ourselves* outlines how ethical fading changes

a signature block from the sworn statement of a public servant to the preferred tool of a well-seasoned bureaucrat. It also offers three steps for how to repair and preempt ethical fading: "Acknowledge the problem. Exercise restraint. Lead truthfully."⁶ The medical staff screening my paperwork at LDAC did exactly that.

When I reported to the medical station, I was pulled aside and handed a folder. Among other things, this folder had the medical history I submitted to the DODMERB and the medical history I had submitted to LDAC. The conditions I had reported in 2009 but failed to report four years later were highlighted, and I was instructed to correct the history I submitted in 2013. For each highlighted entry, I verified that what I had reported in 2009 was true and updated the information as necessary. By pointing out my mistake and giving me the opportunity to correct it, the medical staff at LDAC gave me a gentle nudge in the right direction.

I believe this nudge represented an effective and reasonable first step for implementing the recommendations of Wong and Gerras. Calling out obvious dishonesty and then correcting it shows that integrity always matters. Acknowledging that a systemic integrity problem can be fixed by focusing on the truth instead of staging a witch hunt to punish dishonesty reflects that all Army officers are responsible for this problem, reaffirms each officer's commitment to the Army Values, and regenerates the military profession one officer at a time. ■

1st Lt. Robert P. Callahan Jr., U.S. Army, is assigned to Fort Rucker, Alabama. He holds an AB, magna cum laude, from Cornell University.

Notes

1. Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).

2. Enlisted and Officer Candidate School applicants are examined at a MEPS. The DODMERB evaluates the medical fitness of all Reserve Officer Training Corps and service academy applicants. Class 1 flight physicals are required for flight school applicants.

3. Department of Defense Form 1, Officer's Commission, January 2000.

4. Robert E. Atkinson Jr., *The Limits of Military Officers' Duty to Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective* (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, 2015). Atkinson explores the

relationship between military officers and their civilian superiors. However, he points out that the relationship between the civilian statesman and military officer is paralleled in the relationship between military superiors and subordinates.

5. Ann E. Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick, "Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior" *Social Justice Research* 17 (2004): 224, accessed 19 September 2015, doi:10.1023/B:SORE.0000027411.35832.53. Wong and Gerras use the definition of ethical fading offered by Tenbrunsel and Messick: "the process by which the moral colors of an ethical decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications."

6. Wong and Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves*, 28–33.



(Photo by Tech. Sgt. Daniel St. Pierre, U.S. Air Force)

Spc. Josh Guderian (left), Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Team, and Staff Sgt. Matthew Hoffman, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 448th Civil Affairs Battalion, discuss a patient who collapsed during a Medical Civic Action Program, or MEDCAP, in Lunga Lunga, Kenya, 24 August 2012. Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa was involved in the MEDCAP, one of many it participated in across East Africa, aiming to strengthen the capabilities of community health workers, enhance overall community health, provide medical care to underserved communities, and develop trust and confidence with partner nations.

Civil-Military Engagement Program Enhancing the Mission of Regionally Engaged Army Forces

Maj. Christian A. Carr, U.S. Army

Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states, and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of yesterday. The direct approach alone ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the element that can counter the systemic components of the threat.

—Adm. William H. McRaven, Posture Statement to Congress 2013

Ineffective governance create areas that terrorists and insurgents can exploit. CA [civil affairs] forces address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DOD's support to U.S. government efforts to assist partner governments.

—Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Insurgent organizations, similar to the Islamic State (IS), arguably present the United States with its most serious challenge today. The aggressive tactics and ambitious objectives of IS threaten both U.S. foreign policy and global security. After more than ten years of involvement in Iraq by the United States and its allies, how did this threat grow so rapidly? Perhaps oversimplified, but accurate nonetheless, IS grew as a result of ineffective, negligent, and sectarian governance in Syria and Iraq.¹ Generally speaking, a government's inability to demonstrate legitimate governance enables the development of nonstate terrorist and criminal organizations. The challenge to U.S. security is magnified because these organizations are able to project power transnationally and lack political accountability.²

Those organizations exploit vulnerabilities that local governments are unable to mitigate. As the vulnerabilities persist, the population begins to shift its support toward organizations capable of addressing their needs, thus weakening the legitimacy of the government. Ineffective governance is not always synonymous with a lack of security forces; rather, it may result from an increase in governance infrastructure that is not state sponsored. For example, the government in Sri Lanka has a robust presence throughout its territory, but it lacks historical legitimacy in much of the country because of sectarian differences. As a result, the nonstate Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam developed an informal infrastructure that was arguably more legitimate in the eyes of much of the populace and competed with the established government.³ That phenomenon is demonstrated globally and is one of the key contributors in the creation of undergoverned territories. Those threats are so significant to U.S. security, the

U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC) lists transnational terrorist and criminal organizations as key harbingers of future conflict.⁴

The AOC calls for regionally engaged Army forces to establish a global landpower network, shape security environments, and proactively prevent conflict.⁵ Given this view of the future operating environment, this article introduces the U.S. Special Operations Command Civil-Military Engagement (CME) Program and recommends that the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) adopt the CME program to increase both the effectiveness of the regionally aligned forces and address the threats found in undergoverned areas. The CME program can use humanitarian assistance to gain access into ungoverned areas, while potentially providing presence and situational awareness. It can also enhance the unity of effort among Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) activities in support of unified land operations. However, the greatest value of the CME program is its ability to spearhead local governance into targeted, undergoverned regions of interest to the commander, addressing the governance conditions that allow threats to thrive.

This article will first review studies and strategic guidance describing military operations in undergoverned areas. Then it will provide an overview of the CME program and its objectives. Finally, this article presents historical examples of CME missions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka that will demonstrate the value provided to special operations forces (SOF) commanders. Those examples, combined with strategic guidance, demonstrate that the CME program has been critical in the accomplishment of Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) objectives and should

be replicated by FORSCOM and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs).

Military Operations in Undergoverned Areas

Security cooperation and support to governance are not new Army concepts. In 1961, the secretary of the Army tasked Brig. Gen. Richard G. Stillwell to study activities in underdeveloped countries short of declared war. The study's focus was how the U.S. government should support political stability, conduct paramilitary activities in support of counterinsurgency, and conduct foreign internal defense (FID) in underdeveloped areas. Stillwell concluded that, in an environment possessing characteristics of ineffective governance, activities conducted by U.S. Army personnel would only be effective if done in cooperation with all the elements of national power.⁶ In the current environment, regionally aligned forces must remain closely synchronized with the DOS mission in order to be effective.

In 2007, the RAND Corporation published a study on military operations in areas lacking effective governance. This study, titled "Ungoverned Territories," defines ungovernability and provides three recommendations for how the United States may address current threats in undergoverned territories.⁷ It first recommends that

the U.S. government reevaluate the role of development assistance. While the United States tends to emphasize security cooperation and military assistance in dealing with the security problems that undergoverned territories generate, the DOD should also strive to extend the reach of government into the targeted regions.

A second recommendation made by the study is to promote competent government practices.⁸ Providing expert advice to officials on how to coordinate their actions across departments and minimize bureaucratic competition is an important step in strengthening public-sector capabilities. Joint doctrine also outlines nation assistance and humanitarian-civic actions as tasks that strengthen public-sector capabilities.⁹ Finally, the RAND study found that policy prescriptions aimed at addressing ungovernability must also reduce a region's conduciveness to terrorist activities, for example, building the capacity of the local military and counterterrorism forces.¹⁰

Building military capacity is a task that the DOD performs in many locations around the globe and appears to be the focus of regionally aligned forces. Joint doctrine calls for the use of FID and counterterrorism activities to address a region's conduciveness for terrorist activities.¹¹ However, this study emphasizes that while FID may enhance the capability of the government, it must be conducted in conjunction with other programs that address

the perceived ungovernability.¹² This suggests that FID should expand its scope from merely training foreign militaries to training governance organizations; this requires greater synchronization with the DOS.

Regarding the future operating environment, the AOC proposed that the Army, with unified action partners, is equipped to win in the future complex world. To accomplish this, the AOC describes the need for regionally engaged Army forces to shape security environments.¹³ However, the description of the threats created by ineffective governance, along with the U.S.



(Photo by Tech. Sgt. Ian Dean, U.S. Air Force)

Capt. Clemeunt Douglass, team chief of Team 0733, Company C, 407th Civil Affairs Battalion, listens as a Djibouti navy sailor briefs his leadership on a mock assessment during the Civil-Military Cooperation Training Course 11 December 2014 at Bat Hill 2, Arta, Djibouti. Members of the Djibouti army and navy participated in several scenarios to test what they had learned in the classroom.

Army strategy to counter those threats, suggests that the regionally aligned forces require a capability to synchronize DOD and DOS activities. This capability does not currently exist programmatically; commanders must either possess the ability to synchronize objectives, or they require an organization with this capability working for them.

Based on the nature of security cooperation, these regionally aligned mission sets are likely to take place in Phase 0 (Shape) environments.¹⁴ This environment is commonly referred to as a Title 22 zone, which signifies that the DOS and the U.S. ambassador assumes the lead for promoting U.S. interests, and the DOD is the supporting organization.¹⁵ As the U.S. Army seeks to become regionally engaged, in order to deter threats derived from undergoverned areas, it appears critical that DOD objectives remain nested within the DOS strategic plans.

Optimal Solution

In 2013, then commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Adm. William McRaven, presented Congress with a SOF capability that focused on preventing the emergence of conflict by projecting governance into undergoverned areas. He stated, “through civil-military support elements (CMSE) and support to public diplomacy, SOF directly supports interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qaida and other terrorists exploit.”¹⁶ McRaven went on to describe CMSE efforts that help prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization. The CMSE is the element of the CME program of record, executed by civil affairs (CA) soldiers. These elements provide commanders with a valuable way of accomplishing DOD objectives in a Title 22 environment. CMSE efforts are persistent and differ from traditional military campaigns by proactively identifying insurgent ideology and mitigating



(Photo by Pfc. Roy Mercon, 172nd Cavalry Regiment PAO)

Capt. Terrance McIntosh, a civil affairs officer from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 172nd Cavalry Regiment, distributes supplies during a humanitarian aid mission 25 August 2010 in the village of Bashikal in Parwan Province, Pakistan. The village was affected by damaging floods, and the aid included bags of rice and cooking oil.

insurgent abilities to spread that ideology, while synchronizing DOS and SOF activities, and emphasizing engagements and relationship building.

USSOCOM Directive 525-38 formalized the CME program in 2014 (which had been in execution for several years) and provided program direction. CMSE's are scalable, modular, and they deploy at the request of a combatant commander, a chief of mission, or a TSOC in support of theater campaign plans. Unlike the Army-funded Major Force Program 2 (MFP-2), which supports conventional forces, CME is a baseline MFP-11 program that supports SOF forces. However, if adopted by FORSCOM and funded through MFP-2, the core activities of CME could enhance the FORSCOM mission.¹⁷

The core activities of CME are population-centric within a specific country, region, or area of interest. Core CME activities include:

1. Gain and maintain access to areas of interest.
2. Establish enduring relationships and networks with populations and key stakeholders.
3. Address critical civil vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by destabilizing factors or groups.
4. Plan, coordinate, facilitate, and execute SOF specific programs, operations, and activities, synchronizing short-to-midterm objectives with mid- to long-term U.S. government (USG) objectives.



(Photo by Master Sgt. Dawn M. Price, U.S. Air Force)

Capt. Jill Lynn, a veterinarian assigned to the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion Functional Specialty Team, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), conducts an examination of a donkey 6 June 2011 during a veterinary civic action project in the rural village of Kagamongole, Uganda. The visit occurred during the first of a three-phase veterinary civic action program sponsored through the collaborative efforts of CJTF–HOA, the Ugandan government, and the U.S. Embassy in Uganda.

identifying and mitigating sources of instability. This training allows CA to be much more palatable to a U.S. ambassador because it provides a solution that is not traditional and, moreover, directly assists the ambassador in gaining access for governance programs. When the *National Security Strategy* seeks to apply the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts in order to prevent the emergence of conflict, the Army has already equipped CA to bridge all three domains through human interaction.²⁰

CA soldiers do not have to confine their activities

5. Conduct activities by, with, and through host-nation authorities, USG partners, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs, private entities, or international military partners to deny support to violent extremist organizations or networks.

6. Increase USSOCOM, GCC, TSOC, U.S. country team, and USG situational awareness. Provide understanding of key areas and populations to enable future operations planning through civil information management.¹⁸

CA is a component of Army SOF, and is specifically tasked by Title X to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, coordinate with government agencies, and, if needed, apply the functional specialty skills that normally would be the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.¹⁹ The CME program, combined with congressional direction, highlights that CA forces have the license to be a primary role player for regionally aligned force commanders.

CA soldiers receive education in language, cultural analysis, vulnerability assessment, mediation, and inter-agency collaboration. Where a typical soldier focuses on defeating an enemy, CA soldiers train and focus on

to permissive or semipermissive areas. As a component of SOF, CA soldiers receive survivability and force protection training consistent with SOF standards. Each member of a CA team, deployed on a CMSE, goes through a full pre-mission training that includes survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; force protection; and counter-surveillance; as well as other regionally specific training. Each team has an organic medic, allowing them to survive injury in hostile or denied areas for short periods of time.²¹

Since 2006, CA soldiers have conducted CMSE operations in over twenty countries that can be categorized as either undergoverned or containing regions that lack central governance.²² Theoretically, the CME program is a doctrinal and policy solution to achieve SOF and national objectives in undergoverned regions. In addition to CA's Title X directives, the CA regiment's doctrinal tasks of civil reconnaissance, civil information management, and support to civil administration allow them to become the solution for a force that requires a diplomatic soldier, capable of operating in a politically sensitive environment with a small footprint.²³

All active-duty CA soldiers share SOF as their branch proponent. However, CA soldiers who are assigned to the 95th CA Brigade support SOCOM and

TSOC objectives, while those assigned to the 85th CA Brigade support FORSCOM and geographic combatant command objectives. Because the CME program is funded with MFP-2, only those soldiers assigned to the 95th are allowed to conduct activities associated with the CME program.²⁴ Given the vision found in the AOC, FORSCOM should adopt the CME program to support all of the GCC's regionally aligned forces. This would allow FORSCOM to enhance DOD-DOS interoperability, gain greater situational awareness in targeted regions, and address ineffective governance that leads to insurgent growth.

Pakistan

Pakistan has experienced governance challenges ever since the British government established the Pakistani boundaries between 1871 and 1873. Analysts have noted that undergoverned territories comprise nearly 60 percent of Pakistan's territory. This lack of governance has negative consequences for regional stability and impacts neighboring Afghanistan, Iran, and India. The main regions in Pakistan that exhibit this are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Baluchistan, and the Southern Punjab.²⁵

The RAND studies depict Pakistan as a country that meets every definition of an undergoverned territory. Pakistan historically lacks government infrastructure in its rural and border areas, transforming these areas into undergoverned areas. Those regions along the border created a governance vacuum, which no one was ready to fill.²⁶ As we have examined, undergoverned territories are the best places for harboring terrorists and criminals, and have the conduciveness for violent extremist organizations to grow.

Interviews with SOF and DOS personnel who operated in Pakistan between 2007 and 2009 provided insight into how SOF was able to meet their counterterrorist objectives. Initially, the CMSE element was very successful at gaining access into the undergoverned regions utilizing

wheat drives and addressing local needs. The entire SOF element was able to capitalize on this access by initiating FID and intelligence programs, along with the traditional targeting process. However, as time passed, the short-term access was no longer the priority for DOS, and the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan began questioning the effectiveness of SOF programs.²⁷ As with all undergoverned areas, the ultimate goal should be enabling the host-nation governance to penetrate the local societies.

Recognizing this potential failure, the SOF element changed the mission of the CMSE. The new mission



(Map by Michael Hogg, *Military Review*, Visual Information Specialist)

Pakistan

was to work in the U.S. embassy and ensure that all SOF programs were properly synchronized with the Mission Strategic Resource Plan.²⁸ In this capacity, the CMSE worked daily with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), DOS, and some of their implementing partners to project Pakistani governance into the targeted regions. As a result, the Pakistani government was able to gain a greater foothold into the FATA region.²⁹ For example, as the CMSE gained access and began to conduct FID with the local governance and militias, governance infrastructure was created that USAID and DOS could work with. Supporting this

growth, USAID and DOS solidified the governance relationships that were identified by the CA team.³⁰

While the CMSE was able to gain access into the FATA and expand DOS support to governance, their actions were intended to support SOF objectives. The Special Operations Command (Forward)-Pakistan commander stated that the CA team's ability to gain access into a targeted region was the most significant capability that they possessed. However, the value to the commander was magnified when they utilized the access gained to identify the source of the insurgent growth, and develop DOS supported governance programs. The CME proved extremely capable of meeting their obligations.³¹

In 2010, a nongovernmental study conducted by the New America Foundation outlined the U.S. and Pakistani responses to insurgent activities in the FATA.³² The responses include the actions taken by SOF, which are identified in the study as counterinsurgency programs. The most interesting aspect of this study is a survey conducted in the FATA region. This is the first time a survey was conducted in that area and it focused on identifying local perceptions of the United States, Pakistani governance, insurgent groups, corruption, and the judicial system. The results showed that while the SOF programs were initially effective, it was ultimately the governance infrastructure and reforms that led to increased governance in the FATA. The reforms, which began in 2009, allowed secular political parties to compete in Pakistani elections, thus increasing political participation, and reform in the judicial processes that the local militias perceived to be unfair.

The CME in Pakistan was very valuable to SOF, and similar programs could provide similar value to FORSCOM and GCC commanders. Their value was initially confined to gaining access into the FATA by providing essential services. This access—considered a vital capability—was possessed only by the CA unit and supported several SOF objectives. It enabled the identification and targeting of the insurgent networks, and allowed the SOF element to conduct FID with the local militias and the Frontier Corps, the acting government. Those were tactical and operational successes that led to the accomplishment of strategic objectives when the team enabled the Pakistani government to expand into the FATA region, evidenced by the independent, non-USG study. The Pakistan mission provides a great

example of how the CME program provided a critical capability to achieve both SOF and DOS objectives.

Sri Lanka

A similar example of the effectiveness of the CME program is found in the mission to Sri Lanka. In 2009, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, while the Tamil insurgency may have gone underground in the short term, without addressing the root causes of conflict, the possibility for long-term violence remains. The Sri Lankan government still lacks a clear political ability to stabilize the country and enhance government legitimacy.³³ The lack of legitimacy facilitates the many pockets of undergoverned territories in Sri Lanka.

Despite the occupation by Sri Lankan military and an increasing presence of Sinhalese in the north, the Tamil minority feel that "Jaffna is being invaded by Sinhalese. We are losing our culture."³⁴ Continued media censorship, illegal detention, and human rights abuses inhibit the freedom of Tamil citizens. The Sri Lankan government is working to decrease its military presence with tangible improvements to Tamil's populated regions. This often occurs in the form of infrastructure development, increased economic aid, and inclusionary measures designed to increase Tamil participation in both local and national governance. Without government implemented nonmilitary measures, the Tamil insurgency is likely to remain dormant, only waiting for the right opportunity to reemerge.³⁵

The CMSE in Sri Lanka understood the strategic importance of their mission in Sri Lanka, and being able to consistently synchronize SOF and DOS activities. The training and education of the CMSE in Sri Lanka, along with the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) directives ensured they understood the Title 22 environment. Their program synchronization and unity of effort built trust with the ambassador and DOS contingent. The CMSE was able to demonstrate their value by ensuring that each of the SOF programs directly supported a DOS or USAID program. As a result, the ambassador expanded the SOF element operating in Sri Lanka, thus increasing SOF capability to successfully combat the extremist organizations.³⁶ The Sri Lanka mission has endured for over five years and is quickly becoming a mature mission in one of SOCPAC's priority regions.³⁷


Like other CMSEs, the element in Sri Lanka was able to provide access for SOF into undergoverned territories and produced a tremendous amount of civil information that drove the information cycle. However, the primary reason for SOF success in Sri Lanka was the CMEs ability to synchronize SOF and DOS objectives.³⁸ As regionally aligned commanders begin conducting their missions, they would be served well by having a presence in country, focused on synchronizing their missions with the DOS plans.

Conclusion

It is well documented that ineffective governance creates the conditions for terrorist and extremist organizations to find safe haven and grow in power that jeopardizes global stability and U.S. security. In response, USSOCOM developed a campaign to counter those threats, placing emphasis on legitimizing local governance and mitigating sources of instability that fuel insurgent growth and provide insurgents with safe haven. Critical to this campaign is the CME program, which provides the commanders access and information in targeted regions, but perhaps more importantly, can serve as a vanguard for DOS efforts in assisting host-nation governance in order to marginalize terrorist organizations.

While the CME program has provided tremendous value to USSOCOM, the potential advantages it provides should not end there. Given the Army's concept of unified land operations, FORSCOM may also benefit from utilizing the CME program in support of GCC objectives. The CME program has a strong potential to benefit the regionally aligned forces if the GCC's choose to fund

it through an MFP-2 source. This program should support stability tasks and enhance local governance; at a minimum, this program is capable of increasing communication between DOD commanders and DOS in their targeted regions. ■



(Map by Michael Hogg, *Military Review*, Visual Information Specialist)

Sri Lanka

Maj. Christian A. Carr, U.S. Army, is a civil affairs officer stationed at Special Operations Command Central. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy, an MMAS with Art of War designation, and an MS in administration from Central Michigan University. He has deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom-Philippines, and Inherent Resolve.

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(Photo courtesy of YPG)

A female fighter from the Syrian-based People's Protection Units (*Yekineyên Parastina Gel*, or YPG) scans forward of her position looking for Islamic State enemy fighters, 14 July 2015.

Biases of the Incumbents

What If We Were Integrating Men into a Women's Army?

Col. Karl E. Friedl, U.S. Army, Retired

Audie Murphy was too short and too light to join the U.S. Navy or the Marine Corps, but when the Army gave him an opportunity to serve, he went on to become our most decorated soldier. Military entrance standards clearly fail to predict some remarkable military performances. The presence of a Y chromosome has also not held up as a

useful discriminator of soldiering, but still we in the United States have not given women an equal opportunity to serve with distinction in combat.¹

With women in Ranger training, the U.S. Army is moving toward a new, enlightened perspective. It is changing the focus from trying to define what an entire group cannot do and, instead, it is seeking

solutions that would ensure safer and more effective job performance for both men and women. However, the Army still is trying to integrate women into occupations that have been completely designed around men, the incumbents. This approach, if maintained, will deprive the Army of the advantages that gender diversity offers.

The advantages provided by gender diversity, particularly the increased ability to respond to unexpected threats with a wider choice of solutions, will only be advantages if we modernize existing equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures that optimize the mission performance of the more inclusive group. With this modernization, we will also have the opportunity to consider health and performance issues of men that affect performance of the group.

To fully appreciate what these issues might be, it is instructive to reverse the point of view. Let us imagine we had an Army composed almost entirely of women and we were just now trying to fully integrate men. This mental exercise will evince some overlooked considerations. Of course, this is not a serious suggestion to flip the composition of the Army.

In this hypothetical reversal, what would the problems be, and how does this mental exercise help us recognize issues that we should be addressing for a more effective Army? Based, in part, on how women's issues were being discussed twenty years ago, six

problems for men immediately rise to the top of the research priorities²:

- ◆ body size and logistics
- ◆ physiological capabilities
- ◆ body fat standards and cardiovascular health risks
- ◆ frontal lobe development and self-control
- ◆ hormones and mood
- ◆ reproductive health

Body Size and Logistics

More than half of men would be excluded from service if they had to fit into equipment and crew compartments designed to accommodate the weight, height, and sitting height of the 95th percentile woman.³ Design of equipment to fit the typical dimensions of just one sex has many implications for usability of the equipment, from the width of shoulder straps on rucksacks to the vibration characteristics in vehicle crew seat cushions, with consequences for fatigue and back pain.⁴ Some performance issues can be addressed by providing equipment that is designed to fit, but maintaining expensive specialized equipment for a wide range of sizes is a challenge for many reasons.

One of those reasons is that obesity in America is not going away, and as the military services relax their fat standards to accommodate recruitment, military men—already larger than women are—will grow even larger. This means that at the upper ranges of size, men

will present a greater challenge in jobs with limited crew spaces or specialized fitted equipment. Just how many larger-than-extra-large sizes can we afford for chemical protective suits? A few decades ago, these same arguments about the economy of stocking extra-small sizes kept women from Army jobs that required specialized personal equipment.⁵

Because of their size, men also would place a large burden on the logistics chain because they need 30 percent more calories than the smaller-bodied, and more-efficient women engaged in identical physical activities. For example, men and women participating in



(Photo by Megan Locke Simpson, Fort Campbell Courier)

Capt. Lindsey Pawlowski helps Spc. Arielle Mailloux adjust her prototype women-specific outer tactical vest 21 August 2012 at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Both soldiers serve with the 1st Brigade Combat Team's female engagement team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

the same physically demanding activity, such as the fifty-four-hour intensive Marine Corps “Crucible,” expend energy proportional to their body size, with energy costs averaging 6,400 kilocalories per day (kcal/d) for men, compared to 4,730 kcal/d for women.⁶

Accommodating these greater energy requirements is a logistics burden of questionable advantage—unless large men also

serve as surrogate pack mules, carrying heavy loads of food for the force’s increased consumption.

Physiological Capabilities

Conceivably, in the all-women’s Army, men could perform as well as women in stressful and prolonged physical activities such as Ranger School if small doses of female sex steroids were administered to increase endurance. Experiments with healthy young men have demonstrated that it is possible to improve their endurance metabolism with short-term estrogen administration.⁷ It is well established that in women’s bodies, estrogen causes better lipid utilization for energy metabolism while sparing muscle protein and glycogen.⁸ This enhances women’s ability to function in a high-stress environment and sustain submaximal exercise performance substantially longer than men.⁹ Women are better able than men to access lipids for energy in such conditions, and they appear better able to sustain small-unit leadership performance in a week of intensive, continuous operations with no food and no planned sleep.¹⁰

Women are also at reduced risk for environmental injuries such as heat illness and acute mountain sickness. The better performance of women in hypoxic



(Photo by Sgt. Russell Klika, DVIDS)

Female soldiers conduct medical training with simulated casualties 12 May 2011 during an iteration of the Cultural Support Assessment and Selection program. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s cultural support program prepares all-female soldier teams to serve as enablers supporting Army special operations combat forces in and around secured objective areas.

environments is likely associated with a progesterone effect on chemoreceptor sensitivity and a more appropriate ventilatory response to hypoxia.¹¹

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find out if men, despite their physiological limitations, could succeed in demanding specialties such as Army Rangers or Special Forces. Assumptions that men could not perform as well as women would justify the Army’s reluctance to open even training opportunities for men.

Some readers may find it ridiculous to prevent men from participating in special operations, or to assume they could not match women’s endurance physiology. But, the women’s Army uses other kinds of physical tests than the absolute strength tests designed to favor men (e.g., rope climbs, pull-ups, or 200-pound dummy drags). Men would have trouble competing with women in tests of endurance and stress limits designed around the well-trained special operations woman. What is not well known for men or women is just how much improvement in new recruits can be achieved with scientifically based physical training programs, especially in terms of specialized resistance training and its proper balance with aerobic training.¹² To determine if men’s physiology could allow them to perform



(Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration)

Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) volunteer recruits climb an obstacle during physical training in 1943 at an Army Air Forces Training Command base.

In July 1942, 440 women, including forty African-Americans, began WAAC basic officer training at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Proper clothing was an immediate issue since no uniforms had yet been designed specifically for women, and availability of smaller-size combat fatigues and footwear was limited. Obtaining appropriate duty uniforms in proper sizes remained an issue for the remainder of the war. Basic combat training drills were the same as regular Army training except women were not issued fatigue uniforms or weapons.²⁶ Press interviews "revealed that the average officer candidate was twenty-five years old, had attended college, and was working as an office administrator, executive secretary, or teacher. One out of every five had enlisted because a male member of her family was in the armed forces and she wanted to help him get home sooner. Several were combat widows of Pearl Harbor and Bataan. One woman enlisted because her son, of fighting age, had been injured in an automobile accident and was unable to serve. Another joined because there were no men of fighting age in her family. All of the women professed a desire to aid their country in time of need by 'releasing a man for combat duty.'²⁷

intra-abdominally.¹⁴ Women's bodies, by contrast, protect the abdomen and preferentially distribute fat to subcutaneous sites. For men, this intra-abdominal fat accumulation leads to acute as well as long-term health consequences from associated metabolic derangements, and this occurs at lower levels of adiposity than it does for women.¹⁵ Impaired glucose regulation, with a largely undiagnosed but high prevalence in the United States today, also affects a soldier's cognitive performance. The burden of measuring and enforcing fat standards is, arguably, greater with men than with women.

Excess fat in women can be reasonably monitored with a simple body mass index calculation, but this approach is inadequate for assessment in men because their greater variability in lean mass confounds the measurement.¹⁶ This makes it necessary to estimate the percentage of body fat. Estimation of the percentage body fat involves measuring abdominal circumference to capture the dominant site of male pattern fat deposition. As it turns

out, this site also conveniently represents the fat deposit most associated with cardiovascular and metabolic health risks, a primary marker of underexercise and overnutrition, and the key offender of military appearance standards. Abdominal fat in men is also a sensitive biomarker of longstanding psychological stress.¹⁷

special operations or combat jobs, longitudinal physical training studies would be needed, but these are difficult and expensive. When some of these kinds of studies finally were conducted to test concepts of strength improvement in women (accompanied by newspaper headlines about the Army attempting to create "female Rambos"), it was astonishing to discover the high trainability of men *and* women.¹³

Body Fat Standards and Cardiovascular Health Risks

The big problem for men is that their bodies store the first thirty kilograms of excess fat

These facts indicate that any easing of body fat standards would have a greater impact on the health and performance of men. The Army probably would not have needed to implement body fat standards, as was done in 1983, in an all-women's or mostly women's Army. In the men's Army of 2015, the approach to body composition management measures

readiness of men more effectively than it measures the readiness of women.

Frontal Lobe Development and Self-Control

Young men engage in reckless and antisocial behaviors more often than women do. If more men were introduced into a women's Army, these behaviors could cause numerous problems from misconduct, alcohol and other substance abuse, suicide, and uncontrolled aggression—such as sexual aggression and even misconduct in war. These would be issues of great concern. They likely would be the focus of study to develop behavioral screening techniques for use at recruitment stations and behavioral training for use during initial entry training.¹⁸

If including men in a women's Army were considered important, brain and behavioral maturation in teen boys could even become the focus of national attention, as the question of suitable future recruits could be construed as a national security issue.¹⁹ Arguments that impulsive, aggressive, or risk-taking behaviors make great warriors need to distinguish between unrepressed response and carefully measured action. Research needs to consider how men and women perform under the demands of a variety of situations. For example, in one experiment of soldiers standing watch, men and women began to fatigue from their continued vigilance activities after about two hours, after which errors increased—with a distinct gender difference in which men were more likely to fire at friend or foe alike.²⁰

It may be that high-risk jobs require a personality type that cannot also be a good father and husband, but this has not been established. Regardless, Army culture should have zero tolerance for any kind of sexual misconduct, if only because it has such a huge impact on the health and performance of soldiers and unit readiness. Sexual harassment and sexual assault are not just misconduct; they are a kind of aggression perpetrated almost entirely by men. According to one study, 50 percent of enlisted women have experienced sexual or physical violence before joining the Army.²¹ In the all-women's Army, concerns about sexual aggression are virtually nil, and these soldiers should not have to face new threats from their fellow (male) soldiers during military service. Therefore, with the many behavioral problems that likely would accompany

admitting men to all Army occupations, it is possible that the Army would bar them from service entirely.

Hormones and Mood

Mood and performance fluctuations associated with variation in sex steroid secretion rates in men are not reliably predictable. Unlike women, men cannot anticipate their own hormonal fluctuations and any accompanying mood effects. Psychological stressors as simple as losing an athletic match, or physiological stressors such as not eating enough, can cause rapid changes to testosterone secretion rates in healthy young men. They may experience unpredictable mood swings associated with their rapidly changing testosterone levels.

For example, a study published in 2000 showed that except during periods of significant refeeding, men's testosterone levels hovered at castration levels during the eight weeks of Ranger training.²² Men who are testosterone deficient have impaired cognitive functions, including spatial ability and math skills, which are improved with testosterone administration.²³ Mood effects associated with a reduction of testosterone are improved with hormone replacement treatment, a basis for Veterans Affairs hospitals providing hormone replacement treatment for aging males. However, there has been relatively little research on the relationship between short-term changes in male sex hormones and neurocognitive and mood effects, especially in high-stress periods with critical decision making. This relationship could turn out to be as irrelevant as earlier studies that suggested women had statistically better psychomotor performance (i.e., marksmanship ability) during a certain phase of the menstrual cycle.

Reproductive Health

Men's reproductive function has a special vulnerability because of the external testes, as compared to the protected intra-abdominal ovaries of women. Based on data from the Joint Trauma Registry, traumatic injury to the genitals has been a problem for over 1,500 serious casualty survivors since 2005.²⁴ If protected against their extreme vulnerability to traumatic injury from blast, the male genitals can experience a trade-off due to continuous high heat exposure—from interventions such as the pelvic protection system fielded in 2011.

This chronic heat exposure could compromise male fertility. However, the contribution from the male partner to infertile heterosexual couples is often difficult to identify without comprehensive clinical workups, and few studies have been conducted on infertility in male soldiers.²⁵ Consequently, the extent to which military activities cause male infertility remains unknown.

Conclusion

We started with a U.S. Army of men, perhaps because they were available and the women were already busy with other work. It is not clear that men would have been

allowed into a women's Army, when some of the physiological differences and vulnerabilities of men are considered.

The point is that there are challenges and advantages for both men and women, and we should call attention to some of these male-specific health and performance issues in just the same way we have identified issues for women. Unquestionably, it is time to stop searching for what women cannot do and to focus instead on how to get the best performance out of all soldiers, both men and women. In this manner, we can transform military culture to accept the greater effectiveness that comes with diversity. ■

Col. Karl Friedl, U.S. Army, retired, is a fellow in the Knowledge Preservation Program, Oak Ridge Institute for Research and Education, and an adjunct professor of Neurology, University of California at San Francisco. He holds a BA, an MA, and a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara. During his thirty-year career, Friedl's assignments included conducting physiology research at Madigan Army Medical Center; directing the Military Operational Medicine Research Program at the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, commanding the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, and directing the Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center.

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(Photo courtesy of Rare Historical Photos website; original photo from the Soviet Archives)

Soviet Army Female Snipers during World War II

In the photograph at left, Soviet Red Army Lt. Nina Alexeyevna Lobkovskaya (second row from top, second from left), commander of a sniper company under the 3rd Shock Army, 1st Belorussian Front, poses with some of the snipers under her command, 4 May 1945.

Lobkovskaya joined the Red Army after her father was killed in combat by the Germans. In 1942, seventeen-year-old Lobkovskaya attended nine months of training in Moscow at the Central Women's School of Sniper Training—which graduated 1,885 women during World War II. Lobkovskaya then was sent to the Kalinin Front to fight. At age twenty, she was promoted to lieutenant and given command of an all-female sniper company that would serve in the Battle of Berlin. By 1945, Lobkovskaya was credited with eighty-nine confirmed kills, and her unit was credited with 775 confirmed kills.

About 800,000 women served in the Red Army during the war, thousands in combat roles such as sniper. Some estimates credit Soviet female snipers with over twelve thousand confirmed kills. Maj. Lyudmila Pavlichenko, nicknamed "Lady Death," was said to have 309 confirmed kills, the unbroken record for female snipers. The Soviets considered women well suited for marksmanship, for reasons that included having excellent aerobic conditioning, tolerating stress and cold, and being "patient, careful, [and] deliberate" when shooting. Maj. Gen. Morozov, father of the Soviet sniper movement, reportedly said, "a woman's hand is more sensitive than is a man's. Therefore, when a woman is shooting, her index finger pulls the trigger more smoothly and purposefully."²⁸



(Photo by Khalil Senosi, Associated Press)

Amina Harun talks on a cell phone 26 July 2005 while selling watermelons at the largest fresh fruit and vegetable market in Nairobi, Kenya. Cell phone companies that set up shop in Africa over a decade ago now include poor farmers, fishermen, and the unemployed as subscribers. Some researchers even attach cell phones to elephants to help track their movements.

Host-Nation Cybersecurity in Future Stability Operations

Honorable Mention, 2015 DePuy Contest

Maj. Michael Kolton, U.S. Army

Cyberspace is now fundamental to the governance, economic growth, and social lives of populations within developed and developing countries. In addition, cyberspace capabilities have proven indispensable for relief efforts in disaster and conflict zones. Meanwhile, adversaries have also

evolved in their sophistication and now increasingly threaten cyber capabilities.

Because nonmilitary organizations retain significant experience in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, the best practices they have developed provide a framework for future Army doctrine. This article

explores integrating such precedents for host-nation cybersecurity during U.S. Army stability operations.

Defining Cyberspace

In defining cyberspace, security experts Peter Singer and Allan Friedman keep it simple: “At its essence, cyberspace is the realm of computer networks (and the users behind them) in which information is stored, shared, and communicated online.”¹ Similarly, the U.S. military defines cyberspace as “the global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”² Over the next thirty years, the Army anticipates conflicts will grow more complex as adversaries leverage advanced technologies, including those that take the fight into the cyber domain.³

For America’s homeland defense, the U.S. military has invested in cyber capabilities “to protect vital networks and infrastructure.”⁴ The Pentagon focuses cybersecurity efforts toward protecting military systems.⁵ Current military cyberspace doctrine emphasizes securing the military’s own information systems to ensure freedom of maneuver.⁶

The Army, Cyberspace, and Stability Operations

Current doctrine inadequately addresses the cyberspace imperatives for stability operations. And, since even the world’s poorest countries are now reliant on cyberspace—the most likely areas in which U.S. military operations will be conducted with coalition partners in the future—U.S. military doctrine must consider ways in which cyberspace simultaneously influences all lines of effort during stability operations.

America expects its military to train for and execute stability operations regardless of today’s uncertain information environment. Stability operations involve “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”⁷ Notably, all joint operations rely on cyberspace, which enables the joint force to integrate operations across the land, air, maritime, and

space domains.⁸ Consequently, the Army must also train to potentially achieve essential cybersecurity for a host nation during stability operations.

Mobile Wireless Networks: Examples of an Essential Service Reliant on Cyberspace

One manifestation of cyberspace is civilian mobile wireless networks. Recent crises have proven that such mobile networks are indispensable for responders. For example, during the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Sierra Leone government used text messages to transmit public health messages.⁹ Mobile data sharing was also essential in recovery efforts after the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile.¹⁰ And, after the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, mobile networks enabled lifesaving communication between relief workers and local citizens. With phone lines overwhelmed, Nepalese survivors relied on the Internet to share information.¹¹

Mobile networks again proved indispensable during the response to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami disaster in Japan, when local citizens depended heavily on mobile networks to access critical emergency information.¹² This dependency was also exemplified after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the 2007 San Francisco earthquake when anxious citizens overwhelmed mobile networks with a massive traffic surge.¹³

After Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in 2013, residents and aid organizations struggled to regain mobile service.¹⁴ During relief operations, European Union (EU) Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, and Crisis Response Kristalina Georgieva said, “The first [priority] is to get access to remote areas as quickly as possible, and the access issue is both transportation and also restoring telecommunications.”¹⁵

Before Typhoon Haiyan made landfall, Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) deployed a disaster response team to help the Filipino government and the country’s telecommunications companies pre-position their response efforts.¹⁶ GSMA is an industry body representing over 250 telecommunications companies like AT&T, Orange, Telenor, Verizon, and Vodafone.¹⁷ After the typhoon struck, GSMA’s representatives helped restore information-sharing networks to enable essential services such as mobile money (the use of devices such as mobile phones to transfer money in lieu of cash).¹⁸

GSMA explains, “Mobile devices are often one of the first things people reach for when disaster strikes; for example, one of the first requests by those displaced on Sinjar Mountain in Iraq was a means to charge their mobile phones so that they could obtain information, to locate loved ones, and to become involved in response efforts.”¹⁹ Those examples illustrate that, by 2015, mobile networks had truly become an essential component of crisis management.

Beyond straightforward communications, mobile phones have also enabled mobile banking. As of January 2015, 38 percent of the world’s population lived without access to a bank account; mobile banking promises the primary pathway for such communities.²⁰ For example, Pakistan’s largest financial institution is a Norwegian mobile phone operator.²¹ In another example, Kenya boasts one of the most popular and successful mobile phone payment systems in the world.²²

However, in a 2011 report, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Computer Emergency Readiness Team warned “mobile phones are becoming more and more valuable as targets for attack.”²³ Cybersecurity professionals consider mobile devices their networks’ greatest vulnerability.²⁴ Between August 2013 and March 2014, attacks per month against mobile devices increased over 800 percent.²⁵ In one instance, Chinese cybercriminals used fake mobile banking apps to trick users to enter credentials, which enabled hackers to steal millions of dollars.²⁶ Since communities in future conflicts will be dependent on mobile banking, cyberthreats to mobile banking will influence Army stability operations.

Protecting and Restoring Essential Services Reliant on Cyberspace

The international community plays a critical role in helping stakeholders restore telecommunications as an essential service. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has a United Nations mandate to oversee information and communications technologies (ICTs). ITU members include 173 governments and hundreds of nongovernmental institutions and private companies.²⁷ In the first quarter of 2015, ITU personnel deployed to help restore telecommunications for relief efforts in Malawi, Mozambique, Micronesia, Nepal, and Vanuatu.²⁸ Efforts in telecommunications represent a broader imperative for ICT growth for stability.

The Cyberspace Paradox and Examples of Emerging Threats

Protecting and restoring ICTs are necessary components of prosperity.²⁹ Future economic growth will depend upon the mobility and flexibility of a country’s networks.³⁰ In 2007, ITU emphasized, “Organizations and countries need to focus on innovation capacities and rapid adaptability, backed up by a powerful and secure information system, if they wish to survive and assert themselves as long-term players in the new competitive environment.”³¹ Increased access to the Internet, mobile services, and broadband boosts economic growth.³² Moreover, the World Bank identifies ICTs as key factors in social development.³³ As developing countries continued to deepen their ICT penetration, their long-run infrastructure costs decrease, thus creating a virtuous cycle.³⁴ Those falling costs spur even more broadband penetration.³⁵ In short, ICTs unleash latent economic forces in developing economies.³⁶

In a 2014 report, Microsoft researchers described a “cybersecurity paradox” facing developing countries with low ICT penetration.³⁷ Those countries suffer the highest malware infection rates. Moreover, as those countries develop ICT infrastructure, their infection rates accelerate.³⁸ Thus, the poorest countries with the lowest ICT levels can be most vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.

Since conflict zones already suffer elevated levels of human trafficking, child exploitation, illicit drug trade, and organized crime, vulnerable cyberspace makes them ripe for exploitation.³⁹ Consequently, cybercrime has become an unavoidable evolution for nefarious actors in such circumstances. For example, after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, cybercriminals immediately published web portals for fake charities to bilk donors.⁴⁰

Elsewhere, cyberattacks have become a component in political conflict. For example, when Russia seized the Crimea in 2014, mobile phone operators in Ukraine suffered significant service disruption.⁴¹ And, during Ukraine’s May 2014 presidential election, pro-Russian hackers penetrated the electronic voting system and installed malicious code capable of deleting swaths of votes.⁴²

In response, in February 2015, Kiev published a new cybersecurity strategy that establishes “a ‘national registry of crucial objects of national IT infrastructure,’ with the aim ensuring their protection.”⁴³ Notwithstanding these efforts, an alleged cyberattack on 23 December 2015



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Ryan Whitney, 1st Special Operations Wing Public Affairs)

Members of the Ukraine military monitor and maintain network access during Combined Endeavor 2011 in Grafenwoehr, Germany, 19 September 2011. Combined Endeavor, an annual exercise involving nearly forty NATO, Partnership for Peace, and strategic security partners, is designed to increase interoperability and enhance communications processes between the participating nations.

left over seven hundred thousand Ukrainians without electricity.⁴⁴ Ukraine's experience demonstrates cybersecurity's relevance to stability operations.

Public-Private Partnerships

Like Kiev, the United States continues to refine policy for cybersecurity and critical-infrastructure protection (CIP) to adapt to emerging threats. Critical infrastructure, as defined in Presidential Policy Directive 21, are "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters."⁴⁵ The United States categorizes critical infrastructure into sixteen sectors from energy to transportation.

Discussion of CIP, as well as the resulting policy implications and changes, has come to the forefront in the last twenty years. In 2002, DHS assumed a

lead role in CIP.⁴⁶ Even before that, President Bill Clinton's 1996 Executive Order (EO) 13010 categorized critical infrastructure threats as physical and cyber.⁴⁷ Nearly two decades later, the 2014 *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* emphasized the significant potential destructive effects of cyber-threats to critical infrastructure.⁴⁸

Need for Government, Military, and Civilian Cooperation in Protection of Cyberspace

The centerpiece of effective cybersecurity and CIP is public-private collaboration. In 2013, President Barack Obama's EO 13636 enhanced cybersecurity for CIP through public-private collaboration and directed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop "a framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure."⁴⁹ In 2014, NIST released a preliminary framework affirming public-private cooperation in cybersecurity.⁵⁰

Singer and Friedman point out, “the private sector controls roughly 90 percent of U.S. critical infrastructure, and the firms behind it use cyberspace to, among other things, balance the levels chlorination in your city’s water, control the flow of gas that heats your home, and execute the financial transactions that keep currency prices stable.”⁵¹ DHS Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications Andy Ozment explains, “There’s no way that the government is going to be able to help every company in America secure itself.”⁵² Public-private cooperation is fundamental to building an adaptive cybersecurity framework.⁵³

In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 launched Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which invite private sector stakeholders to build networks to exchange best practices and facilitate crisis response.⁵⁴ ISACs rely on private industry for “non-regulatory and non-law enforcement missions.”⁵⁵ They are “a clearinghouse for information within and among the various sectors, and provide a library for historical data to be used by the private sector and, as deemed appropriate by the ISAC, by the government.”⁵⁶ Since 1998, the ISACs model has evolved to facilitate cooperation between federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.

In 2013, PPD-21 ordered DHS to create two national centers to oversee physical and cyber infrastructure protection.⁵⁷ DHS incorporated this guidance in its *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*.⁵⁸ The National Infrastructure Coordinating Center oversees the physical domain, and the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) handles the cyber domain.⁵⁹ These coordination centers also facilitate public-private collaboration through the ISACs.

In February 2015, EO 13691 directed DHS to develop Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs).⁶⁰ These organizations extend the ISACs model beyond the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors to other high-value sectors like law and accounting firms, which are prime targets for cyberattacks.⁶¹ EO 13691 directs the NCCIC to supervise ISAO arrangements.⁶² Still in its infancy, ISAOs seek to provide cooperation despite distrust and friction between the government and other stakeholders. Such a balancing act parallels the Army’s future information environment and significantly impacts the Army’s conduct of stability operations.

Conclusion

Stability operations doctrinally require coordination with the host-nation government, commercial industry, multinational partners, and even nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This cooperative mindset applies to cyberspace operations. Since governments rely on cyberspace to provide essential services, cybersecurity requires a sixth line of effort that simultaneously supports the



(Photo by Staff Sgt. David Bruce, 38th Infantry Division)

More than 350 National Guard soldiers, airmen, and civilians from forty-two states converged 9–20 March 2015 at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, to participate in Cyber Shield. The intent was to train the participants to defend critical infrastructure against cyberattacks. The exercise included a competition in which twenty-four teams battled in cyberspace to protect a mock city’s computers and related industrial control systems against malicious, highly skilled adversaries. A combined team from Oregon and Idaho won the competition.

other five tasks for stability operations identified in Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, *Stability*:⁶³

- ◆ Establish civil security
- ◆ Establish civil control
- ◆ Restore essential services
- ◆ Support to governance
- ◆ Support to economic and infrastructure development
- ◆ *Secure cyberspace infrastructure*

In cyberspace doctrine, the Joint Staff notes the importance of integrating cyber efforts with other stakeholders. In its 2015 *Cyber Strategy*, the Department of Defense described “Building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships abroad” as a fundamental cybersecurity activity.⁶⁴ In a June 2015 memorandum, Adm. Michael Rogers writes, “Cyberspace operations demand unprecedented degrees of joint, interagency, and coalition collaboration and information sharing, and thus we will remain trusted partners in collaborating with other agencies, with allies and friends abroad, with industry, and with academia.”⁶⁵ The Joint Staff has identified profound obstacles to public-private cooperation on cybersecurity warning,

Many NGOs are hesitant to become associated with military organizations in any form of formal relationship, especially in the case of conducting CO [cyberspace operations], because doing so could compromise their status as an independent entity, restrict their freedom of movement, and even place their members at risk in uncertain or hostile permissive environments.⁶⁶

In building the ISAC/ISAO model, its architects have sought to surmount such distrust among government, industry, and NGOs. Though by no means a panacea, the ISAC/ISAO model offers the Army a framework for facilitating cooperation in future stability operations.

This is both a current and a future operational imperative. As required, the Army must be ready to restore cybersecurity for the critical infrastructure in a host nation by coordinating efforts with intergovernmental organizations like ITU, private industry like GSMA members, and various governmental organizations. To facilitate necessary collaboration, the ISAC/ISAO model provides a starting point for future operations. ■

Maj. Michael Kolton, U.S. Army, is a graduate student at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. Kolton is a foreign area officer specializing in China. He previously served as an infantry officer with deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds an MA in economics from the University of Hawaii at Manoa and a BA in economics from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.

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
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
CYBER WAR, CYBERED CONFLICT, AND THE MARITIME DOMAIN

Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak

I t has been well over a decade since the first "jugglers" of information warfare presided over a new age of conflict fought not just on air, sea, and land but with distance in that sense to be known as "Cyberwar." Since those early predations, many incidents have continued that concern, render useless, and government-mandated operations can result from an intentional, military communications system, and cooperation. The threat vectors have helped define the modern, global war—the long-standing ability of time to acquire sufficient nuclear material to build nuclear weapons. Recent revelations of hacking campaigns against such operations on the field have shown and how that threat has broadened concern to include even the integrity of a nation's domestic institutions. Similarly, the concern of U.S. Cyber Command has characterized other attacks designed to gain access to the intellectual property of American corporations or the "critical" infrastructure of the world will eventually engage in "Cyber war." There is a community of scholars and authors who regard this as the new landscape for the future of cyberspace and national conflict will be broken? Others in the broad field of security studies, traditional computer science or corporate communication think that while some sense of conflict is happening, government officials, military officers, and legislators are suffering from "blindness." They argue for legislative protection on building best policy decisions, especially with regard to specific adversaries, and that there has been momentum to influence other regions rather than protect domestic resources. A best-selling nonfiction book has been criticized for oversteering

If you found the above article enlightening, you may also like "Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain" by Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak in the Spring 2014 edition of *Naval War College Review*, Volume 67, Number 2, online at <https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/2014—Spring.aspx>.

A Trust-Based Culture Shift



Rethinking the Army Leadership Requirements Model in the Era of Mission Command

Maj. Gregory M. Blom, U.S. Air Force

In January 2015, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) hosted a lecture by bestselling author Ori Brafman. At this lecture, Brafman discussed agile leadership with an audience of eleven hundred military field grade officers. Prior to taking their seats, each audience member received an index card. Midway through the presentation, Brafman instructed the officers to take out their index cards and list one way the Army could more effectively engender trust and enable mission command.¹

When the audience members had written their ideas on their cards, they passed them to others in the crowd who read the ideas and assigned them a numerical value, one through five. The better the idea, the higher the numerical value assigned. The audience repeated the process of passing and grading five times before totaling the scores. Brafman next asked audience members to raise their hands if they held a card that received a perfect score of twenty-five. The individuals identified revealed those “top ideas” to the audience. Surprisingly, most of the ideas discussed shared the same theme: soldiers did not feel empowered; rather, they felt micromanaged and scrutinized by bureaucratic processes.

This result may come as a shock to senior Army leaders who have attempted to empower soldiers through a service-wide implementation of the mission command philosophy. That philosophy enables military

forces to respond quickly to ambiguous situations and supports the tenets of Army operations in *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (2014).² Successful mission command requires leaders to provide clear intent, then delegate and empower subordinates to encourage disciplined initiative. However, the Army leadership requirements model, the standard the Army sets for leaders to meet, does not reinforce these premises.³

Additionally, bureaucratic processes and recent service-wide policies have eroded trust across the force, a mission command requisite. The Army leadership requirements model needs modification to reinforce the missing mission command leadership principles. Explicit codification of these principles will serve as an embedding mechanism to reinforce mission command and foster a trust-based cultural change.

The principles espoused in the mission command philosophy are not new. The German concept of mission command, *Führen mit Auftrag* (mission-oriented leadership), more popularly known as *Auftragstaktik*, goes back two centuries.⁴ Following the crushing defeats at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, the Prussians realized their mechanistic way of conducting war had become insufficient. The Prussians began encouraging more nimble command systems and military organizations, which were championed by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.⁵ In a 2010 *Journal of Strategic Studies*



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Whitney C. Houston, 128th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division participate in an air assault on Darwazgay Pass 23 June 2014 in Zabul Province, Afghanistan.

article titled “The Long and Winding Road,” Eitan Shamir discusses how Moltke viewed *Auftragstaktik*:

Superiors specify the mission objectives and constraints and allocate resources, leaving the rest to their subordinates. The latter’s skills, creativity, and commitment, or lack thereof, will ultimately determine the battle plan and its execution.⁶

Like the U.S. Army’s mission command philosophy, *Auftragstaktik* relies on leaders to provide direction then delegate and empower subordinates. It encourages individual initiative, skill, and creativity. Embedding those principles into the Prussian military culture served as an effective driving force in German tactical victories in the Second World War.⁷

The assimilation of *Führen mit Auftrag* into Prussian military culture was gradual.⁸ The assimilation of mission command into U.S. Army culture will also be a measured process. Compounding the challenge is the Army’s managerial approach, which according to Shamir is “characterized by centralization, standardization, detailed planning, quantitative analysis, and aspires for maximum efficiency and certainty.”⁹ This managerial approach is effective for centralized

operations but runs contrary to many mission command principles.

Surprisingly, many of these principles have appeared in U.S. Army doctrinal publications for over a century. Retired Army Col. Clinton J. Ancker III details this history in a 2013 *Military Review* article titled “The Evolution of Mission Command in U.S. Army Doctrine, 1905 to the Present.” Ancker traces the roots of U.S. mission command back to the very first Army combined arms manual, the 1905 *Army Field Service Regulation* (FSR). The FSR acknowledges that a commander cannot predict or issue guidance for all possible outcomes. Rather than issue rigid orders, it directs commanders to “lay stress upon the object to be *attained* [italics in original], and leave open the means to be employed.”¹⁰ This concept of issuing guidance and then encouraging individual initiative appeared nearly unchanged in subsequent versions of the FSR for the next four decades.¹¹

The Army stressed and improved upon the mission command concepts in the FSR until 1976. In 1976, the doctrine of “active defense” overturned the mission command principles. This philosophy accentuated a “much tighter control of operations than in the past.”¹²

- Be Technically and Tactically Proficient
- Know Yourself and Seek Self-Improvement
- Know Your Men and Look Out for Their Welfare
- Keep Your Men Informed
- Set the Example
- Ensure that the Task is Understood, Supervised, and Accomplished
- Train Your Men as a Team
- Make Sound and Timely Decisions
- Develop a Sense of Responsibility Among Subordinates
- Employ Your Command in Accordance with Its Capabilities
- Seek Responsibility and Take Responsibility for Your Actions

Figure 1. Army Leadership Principles, 1958

Three years later, Army doctrine again reversed direction with the release of “airland battle.” Airland battle doctrine identified the core mission command principles as a “central tenet” and a “prerequisite for its execution.”¹³ Unfortunately, minimization of individual initiative was rampant due to bureaucratic Army processes and frameworks that valued rigid adherence to checklists over creativity.¹⁴

There were, however, those who recognized the importance of these principles and continued to fight to integrate them into U.S. Army culture. Over the last twenty years, advocates of mission command have come closer to having their vision realized. In 2003, the Army made the doctrinal leap and codified the philosophy in Field Manual (FM) 6-0. A small but significant change occurred by renaming this “command and control” manual *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. While the name change may seem trivial, it signaled an important doctrinal step for the Army because it transferred the emphasis from the rigid processes and procedures of the past to a focus on the enemy and the outcome.¹⁵

Some have asked why the Army made such a dramatic doctrinal shift if the concepts of mission command were not new. At the 2014 Association of the U.S. Army’s annual meeting, Gen. David Perkins,

commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, expressed why the shift back to mission command was necessary. “[Mission command is] in our doctrine now, because we know the world is unknown and constantly changing ... you have got to figure out how you empower subordinates to exploit the initiative.”¹⁶

Additionally, Army leadership believed the term “command and control” strayed from the original intent, and it had become largely associated with the systems rather than people. The Army was able to reframe the

antiquated concept of command and control to stress the centrality of the human domain by consolidating these principles and forming the mission command philosophy.¹⁷ This domain’s criticality, although detailed in doctrine, had largely been diminished and its importance overlooked.

This same rationale applies to the missing elements in the Army leadership requirements model. Various Army publications advocate the mission command concepts of clearly articulating intent, then encouraging disciplined initiative through delegating and empowering subordinates. However, since the Army’s “leadership requirements” do not consolidate and emphasize these mission command cornerstones, they are overlooked just as the human domain was under the “command and control” moniker.

The Army has a vested interest in training leaders and codifying the traits it values in those leaders. The current standard to which the Army holds its leaders is captured in the Army’s leadership requirements model. This model does a satisfactory job of identifying traits; however, these qualities do not exist in a vacuum. For this model to work, the traits espoused in it must be nested with related Army leadership principles, such as those championed by the mission command philosophy. To get an appreciation for the

current model, it is essential to have a basic understanding of how it manifested.

The most famous precursor to the Army leadership requirements model may be the eleven principles of leadership (see figure 1). Developed shortly after World War II, this list of leadership principles appeared in the Army’s leadership field manual, *Military Leadership*, in 1951 and again in 1958.¹⁸ The list served as the Army’s leadership foundation for over four decades.

In 1999, the Army transitioned from the eleven Army leadership principles to the Army “leadership framework” (see figure 2).¹⁹ This new model, commonly referred to as the “be, know, do” model, broke down leadership principles into subgroups consisting of values, attributes, skills, and actions. While some of the ideas were innovative, this model contained many common themes from the eleven principles.

The Army further revised its leadership framework, republishing it as the Army leadership requirements model. This model first appeared in the October 2006 version of the *Army Leadership* manual, renumbered as FM 6-22.²⁰ In 2012, the Army again made changes to the model and republished it in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22 (see figure 3).²¹ Similar to the leadership framework model, the Army leadership requirements model breaks leadership themes into subgroups based on what a leader “is” and what a leader “does.”

Examining the three models provides some interesting perspectives as it is evident that all three have strengths and weaknesses. The truth is, no model will be truly all-encompassing, nor will it be permanent. The ever-evolving nature

of conflict and corresponding doctrine necessitate an ever-adapting model.

This is one such time where Army doctrine has evolved to confront future conflicts and the current leadership model must evolve as well. The current Army leadership requirements model needs modification to align it with the mission command philosophy. Two competencies that need to be considered are *clearly communicate intent* and *encourage disciplined initiative through delegating and empowering subordinates*.

In order to align the “Leads” section of the leadership requirements model shown in figure 3 with the premises espoused in mission command philosophy, “Communicates intent” should replace “Communicates.” Simple, clear communication reduces the chance of misunderstanding. This skill takes time and practice to develop. “Intent” can take the form of



Figure 2. The Army Leadership Framework, 1999




Figure 3. The Army Leadership Requirements Model, 2012

a vision or mission statement for large organizations, a mission-type order in combat situations, or general guidance for in-garrison operations.

Once subordinates receive this clear intent they can, in theory, execute the “disciplined initiative” called for in the mission command philosophy. However, as the field grade officers in the audience of Brafman’s lecture attested, something is missing between theory and practice.²² The missing links are *delegating* and *empowering*. Those concepts are vital to mission command because they accentuate the shift from the leader being the doer of the action to being a true leader and managing the execution of the action.

Inspiring disciplined initiative through the correct balance of delegation and empowerment is an obligatory skill for effective Army leaders. Application of those principles necessitates the leader incurring a certain degree of risk. Getting comfortable with taking the appropriate amount of risk is a skill leaders have to develop. Effective execution of mission command requires leaders to accurately assess subordinates and trust in their ability to accomplish the mission in accordance with the leader’s intent.

Furthermore, the Army leadership requirements model lists “Gets results” as the single goal under the “Achieves” section (figure 3). This single-minded focus punctuates the effect achieved, which has the




Figure 4. Proposed Army Leadership Requirements Model (* denotes change)

propensity to inspire leaders to become the doer of the action or micromanage the action's execution. Getting results is an admirable goal for leaders when those leaders remain mindful that they are in their position to coordinate subordinates and inspire them into action.

Guiding subordinates requires delegation and empowerment balanced against the risk and primacy of the mission. They are both necessary to inspire disciplined initiative, yet they are absent from the leadership requirements model. The first term, delegation, is specific to tasks and requires detailed instructions from the leader. Delegation involves risk, but since leaders typically monitor delegated tasks more closely, the risk level is smaller. The latitude given by leaders

should vary to a degree commensurate with the trust developed in subordinates and their experience level and competence.

Empowerment, the second missing term needed to encourage disciplined initiative, is the essence of mission command. It provides subordinates the authority to make decisions in the absence of specific orders in accordance with the leader's intent. Empowerment demands decentralization and decentralization takes trust.

Figure 4 shows the Army leadership requirements model with the recommended changes. As previously mentioned, the recommendations include changing "Communicates" to "Communicates intent." They also

include adding “Takes prudent risk,” and modifying “Gets results” to “Encourages disciplined initiative (through delegation and empowerment) to achieve results.” Those changes align the leadership principles of mission command with the leadership requirements model. Once aligned, these mutually supportive concepts can serve as guiding principles upon which Army leaders can rely. They can also serve as embedding mechanisms to foster cultural change.

As discussed earlier, force-wide cultural adoption of a philosophy like mission command will take time. To accomplish the transition, it is important to assess the current situation to effectively evaluate what must happen next. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, asserts that culture consists of “shared beliefs, values, and assumptions about what is important.”²³

Those beliefs, values, and assumptions permeate the Army and operate at different cultural levels, such as those proposed by Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner.²⁴ Using their model, Angela R. Febbraro, Brian McKee, and Sharon L. Riedel describe how achieving lasting organization change requires altering organizations on at least two, and possibly all three cultural levels.²⁵ The most superficial level incorporates “artifacts and practices” that represent an organization’s explicit culture, including processes, procedures, and other observable behavior.²⁶ The middle layer incorporates “attitudes and expectations,” and according to Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, it is “more conceptual than tangible, and consists of doctrine, customs, and traditional practices.”²⁷ The innermost layer, “deep structure,” or “deep culture,” represents implicit culture, and it is “the source and structure from where attitudes and expectations are generated.”²⁸

Applying ADRP 6-22’s definition of culture to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s model shows that cultural change likely requires integration into all three layers of Army culture. Various Army organizational practices and policies support the surface cultural layer by promoting mission command principles; however, practical application varies by unit. Some recent changes to doctrine support the middle cultural layer by mandating mission command, but discrepancies exist between doctrinal publications. The inconsistencies noted above suggest the philosophy has not permeated the innermost layer, the layer

of “implicit culture” which will be necessary for lasting cultural change.

Further complicating the adoption challenge are some recent policy announcements that have eroded the trust necessary for this culture change.²⁹ Examples include the Army’s reduction-in-force announcements and the unmasking of officer evaluation reports at separation boards.³⁰ Those policies have frustrated many soldiers who view the measures as broken promises and centralized deterrents to mission command that encourage a risk-averse, zero-defect force.³¹ The possibility that one mistake made at the beginning of one’s career could have career-ending consequences years down the road may engender soldiers that are less willing to take risks or think outside the box.

Additionally, bureaucratic processes such as the in-garrison, daily operations order process have the tendency to perpetuate the status quo, epitomize centralization, and inhibit individual initiative, skill, and creativity.³² This runs contrary to Perkins’s guidance in *The U.S. Army Operating Concept* that states,

We must not be consumed with focusing solely on avoiding risk, but build leaders and institutions that recognize and leverage opportunities. Leaders at all levels must encourage prudent risk taking and not allow bureaucratic processes to stifle them.³³

If the Army is serious about encouraging leaders to take prudent risk and about reducing the stifling bureaucratic processes, a cultural shift is necessary. For this to occur, two actions are obligatory. First, Army leaders at all levels must examine and fix deficiencies within their organizations. Units should follow the example set by CGSC leadership through Brafman’s survey and examine their practices and policies to determine if they inspire trust-based mission command. Second, mission command and Army leadership doctrine need alignment. Editing the leadership requirements model will support and punctuate the centrality of the mission command principles. Once these steps are complete and mission command permeates the first two cultural layers, the U.S. Army may be able to make the shift the Prussians made and comprehensively adopt the philosophy.

Forecasts of future battlefields are ambiguous in threat and dynamic in nature. Success in these

conflicts will require the right amount of decentralized, trust-based disciplined initiative. This will only

happen if the U.S. Army fully integrates mission command into its culture. ■

Maj. Gregory Blom, U.S. Air Force, is a total force strategist in the Strategic Plans and Requirements Directorate Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He holds a BS from Florida State University and an MA from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Blom is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Air Command and Staff College, Squadron Officer School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has had combat deployments in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and New Dawn.

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The Use of the Reconnaissance Squadron during Joint Forcible Entry

Capt. Mike Mobbs, U.S. Army

Arguably, there is no greater commitment of U.S. military resources than an invasion of a sovereign country. Known as *joint forcible entry*, this type of operation aims to “seize and hold lodgments against armed opposition.”¹ A lodgment may be a beachhead, an airfield, or anything that allows for “the continuous landing of troops and

materiel,” and that provides “maneuver space for subsequent operations.”²

There are several methods for delivering the invasion force—amphibious landing, air assault, ground, or airborne assault—and each can be used in various combinations as the situation requires. Of these options, only airborne assault provides national command



(Photo by Airman 1st Class Jamie Nicley, U.S. Air Force)

Soldiers from the reconnaissance squadron of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team parachute from a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft 18 November 2009 at the Nevada Test and Training Range, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

authority with the ability to deliver a battalion in eighteen hours, or a brigade combat team (BCT) in ninety-six hours, from U.S. soil to anywhere in the world.

The relevance of airborne units was called into question by Dr. Marc R. Devore's 2015 publication *When Failure Thrives: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces*. Devore argues that U.S. airborne forces have outlived their relevance, that it is not practical to employ airborne forces against a near-peer competitor, and that the cost of maintaining this capability is not worth the benefits.³

I do not attempt to argue directly against Devore's study but rather to show that airborne units can be relevant if they employ a new way of conducting an airborne assault as part of a forcible entry operation. Devore asserts that an "organization's ability to innovate is contingent upon its willingness to dismantle or otherwise abandon elements of its existing structure and operational procedures," and in that regard, I agree.⁴ To make airborne assault more relevant, we must abandon existing procedures and embrace a new, effective way of employing the airborne brigade's organic reconnaissance squadron during joint forcible entry.

Effectiveness of Airborne Assault

As the land force component of a joint task force conducting forcible entry, the 82nd Airborne Division is the proponent for developing and training procedures for airborne assault. Unfortunately, the way the 82nd plans, rehearses, and trains for airborne assault is outdated. The standard by which the Army's five airborne brigades conduct an airborne assault fails to employ the BCT's organic reconnaissance squadron to its full potential.⁵

For example, at the time this article was written, an operation plan (OPLAN) developed by the 82nd's G-5 (assistant chief of staff, plans) and used as the planning and training template for airborne assault at the brigade level had placed the reconnaissance squadron in a defensive position for most of the operation.⁶ The current "82nd Airborne Division Airfield Seizure Standard Operating Procedure," derived from this OPLAN and other institutional documents, does not even mention the reconnaissance squadron.⁷ Fortunately, these shortcomings are an opportunity not only to update standard operating procedures (SOPs), plans, and training guidelines but also to revisit the challenging problem of

fully integrating the reconnaissance squadron into the joint fight during a forcible entry operation.

According to current practice, the reconnaissance squadron conducts an airborne assault without the majority of its vehicles—that is, during the assault phase of a forcible entry. The squadron relies on those vehicles to arrive later, on “heavy-drop” parachute platforms or on aircraft that land after an airhead is secure. Because the squadron is task-organized with two mounted troops and one dismounted reconnaissance troop, essentially two-thirds of the squadron’s combat power is unavailable during initial combat operations. This practice deprives the ground force commander of a unique asset. By design, the reconnaissance squadron can quickly reconnoiter more area than an infantry battalion, and it can provide more persistent surveillance from a ground perspective than modern unmanned aerial vehicles. Despite these unique capabilities, during forcible entry the reconnaissance squadron typically is tasked with isolating part of the lodgment while the infantry battalions seize and clear it. This is a task for which the reconnaissance squadron is ill suited.

In essence, the reconnaissance squadron is treated as if it were task-organized like an infantry battalion, possessing similar capabilities and limitations.⁸ This has negative consequences for operations because “when reconnaissance units are assigned close-combat missions or become decisively engaged, *reconnaissance ceases*. When reconnaissance ceases, the potential for achieving and capitalizing upon information dominance is lost.”⁹

Improved Organization

Before BCTs realigned to incorporate an additional maneuver battalion, brigade commanders had to limit the use of the reconnaissance squadron because the BCTs lacked adequate capacity and capability to conduct forcible entry while employing the reconnaissance squadron in its intended role. This is no longer the case. With the addition of a third infantry battalion to each BCT as part of the Army 2020 design, commanders can employ the reconnaissance squadron in new ways.¹⁰ The increase in combat power from two to three infantry rifle battalions necessitates a fundamental change in how the reconnaissance squadron is used during forcible entry.

A joint staff typically conducts forcible entry in five phases: preparation and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment, introduction of follow-on forces, and termination or transition.¹¹ According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, *Joint Forcible Entry Operations*, surveillance operations and reconnaissance operations, along with other supporting operations, “are key to setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success,” and “these enablers should be integrated into the operation at every stage from initial planning to transition.”¹² A key consideration for preparation and deployment planning is not whether to employ these assets but rather how to best employ the reconnaissance squadron within the limitations of its capabilities while accepting appropriate levels of risk.

Risk Management

In any combat operation, a commander must identify and assess hazards, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate. Seizing a lodgment presents numerous hazards, not least of which is the expectation of armed resistance. Even during the invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, which Devore describes as being against “ill-equipped and poorly-organized opponents,” airborne assault forces faced 23 mm anti-aircraft guns (known as ZSU-23-2) and .50-caliber machine guns—weapons capable of posing a significant threat to aircraft and personnel on the ground.¹³ The lesson learned was that even when conducting a forced entry against a nonpeer force, commanders should avoid “enemy defenses to the greatest extent possible.”¹⁴ According to JP 3-18,

Major General Alexander A. Vandergriff, United States Marine Corps, clearly articulated that view [to avoid enemy defenses] in his 1943 assessment of operations in the Solomon Islands. He noted that a comparison of the several landings leads to the inescapable conclusion that landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed within striking distance of the objective.¹⁵

The reconnaissance squadron provides real-time intelligence on enemy composition, disposition, and




Figure. Joint Forcible Entry by Air Assault, with the Reconnaissance Squadron Inserted on an Offset Drop Zone to Create a Screen Line

strength. In this way, it improves the commander's ability to avoid concentrations of enemy forces.

While infantry battalions are organized, equipped, and trained for the close-in fight necessary to control a lodgment and prepare it for follow-on forces, the reconnaissance squadron is designed to operate within and behind enemy lines without becoming decisively engaged. During the assault phase, the infantry battalions will be, by necessity, focused on terrain. Conversely, a reconnaissance squadron will not be concerned with controlling terrain but rather with providing timely and accurate reporting for the joint force commander. To achieve this, while the main assault force masses on the lodgment, the reconnaissance squadron can insert on an offset drop zone simultaneously but outside the lodgment itself.

This course of action, depicted graphically in the figure, would require two coordinated airborne assaults. Forcible entry “may include linkup and exploitation by ground maneuver from a separate location,” an option that provides the ground force commander with several benefits.¹⁶ By inserting the reconnaissance squadron onto a separate drop zone, the joint force commander enables the squadron to develop the situation beyond the lodgment so the joint force can achieve significant effects on enemy forces.

Because a reconnaissance squadron can operate independently from the actions on the lodgment, the enemy may feel compelled to shift part of its

“attention and effort away from actual assault objectives.”¹⁷ The enemy then would be forced to choose between massing combat power against the actual lodgment and confronting the possibility of an additional lodgment being created by the squadron's assault onto an offset drop zone—terrain the squadron would never intend to hold. The result would be that the enemy could not “mass decisive force to deny joint force assaults.”¹⁸ Meanwhile, as the enemy attempted to fix and finish the reconnaissance squadron—a challenging task given its design—the squadron would continue to provide timely information on enemy maneuvers without becoming decisively engaged.

Information Dominance

It is during the assault phase that information dominance is most critical to a commander's decision-making process. As the joint force is most vulnerable during this phase, “effective indications and warnings, targeting support, and collection management of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets to track enemy reaction to the assault and force protection are paramount concerns.”¹⁹ While these concerns represent considerable risks during the most critical phase of the operation, they can also be mitigated through employment of the reconnaissance squadron in a manner consistent with Army and joint doctrine. When properly

employed, the “squadron’s reconnaissance operations yield an extraordinarily high payoff in the areas of threat location, disposition, and composition, early warning, protection, and battle damage assessment.”²⁰ Reconnaissance operations have the direct effect of allowing commanders to accept or initiate combat at the time and place of their choosing, thus maintaining the BCT’s freedom of maneuver and initiative during the critical early phases of the airborne assault.²¹

During the assault phase, the main assault force—comprising three infantry battalions, engineers, a fires battalion, and a mission command node—can approach a target lodgment while the reconnaissance squadron approaches a secondary drop zone. Though the assault force must mass firepower on the lodgment, the reconnaissance squadron is not limited to a single piece of terrain. Instead, it can use its superior maneuverability to find and report on the enemy while avoiding direct engagement. Any area capable of receiving multiple heavy drops and up to five hundred paratroopers can suffice for the secondary drop zone. Such an area can be secured

and marked by the special operations forces that precede a forcible entry operation. When the main assault force lands on the lodgment, its fight begins; the force works to clear an airhead and prevent the enemy from impeding air landings.

Meanwhile, the reconnaissance squadron is not concerned with holding terrain but rather with finding and, as necessary, fixing enemy forces that seek to influence friendly actions on the intended lodgment. Upon landing, the two mounted troops move to their vehicles, inserted by heavy drop moments before paratroopers exit their aircraft, and they quickly begin to disperse. They expand the security zone around the target lodgment, establish screen lines, provide terminal guidance for air power, assess battle damage, and make adjustments for artillery. The mounted troops, working in concert with aerial ISR, provide real-time reporting on enemy locations, composition, and disposition, as well as early warning of enemy reactions to friendly forces.

Simultaneously, the dismounted troop moves to targets designated as secondary objectives for the primary assault force. The dismounted troop observes and reports on these objectives and remains available for retasking by the commander to observe named or targeted areas of interest. The individual reconnaissance teams of the dismounted troop provide imagery and full-motion video from a ground perspective to the joint force commander and staff. This enables them to prioritize targets and facilitate a target handover with battalion scouts as the infantry battalions expand the lodgment and turn their focus toward their secondary objectives. After the battalion scouts link up with the dismounted reconnaissance



(Photo by Spc. L'Erin Wynn, 49th Public Affairs Detachment)

Paratroopers with 1st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, establish security 26 October 2015 during a rehearsal for a live-fire exercise in preparation for Combined Joint Operations Access Exercise 16-01 on Fort Bragg, North Carolina.



(Photo by Baz Ratner, Reuters)

Soldiers from 4th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, fire a mortar during a firefight with Taliban forces 18 April 2012 in Zhary District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

teams, the scouts lead the infantry battalions to their secondary objectives while the dismounted troop pushes further out into the security zone.

Synchronized Reconnaissance

During the assault phase and subsequent phases, the squadron commander synchronizes the squadron's maneuver forces with ISR assets external to the BCT, providing priorities and ensuring that the joint force commander's priority intelligence requirements are answered by phase, collaborating with the brigade intelligence officer to analyze enemy activity, and adjusting reconnaissance assets accordingly. Sustainment is facilitated through the squadron's mission command node. The squadron may need to remain self-sustaining for at least forty-eight to seventy-two hours, or until the assault force secures the lodgment and brings in resupply by aircraft. Once sustainment is secured on the airhead, resupply can reach the reconnaissance squadron through low-cost, low-altitude (LCLA) aerial resupply.²²

The joint force commander will assume risk by employing the reconnaissance squadron in this fashion. The two mounted troops and the dismounted troop

will, possibly, operate outside the range of indirect fire support from the airfield or naval gunships. While the mounted troops establish screen lines and expand the security zone, and the dismounted reconnaissance teams maneuver over land toward their objectives, they may all encounter superior enemy forces. While this is a reasonable cause for concern, it is also a risk that can be mitigated through planning, preparation, and execution. Accepting that the squadron is primarily a find force and possibly a fix force, but not a finish force, the joint force commander can rely on the squadron's organic 120 mm mortars to support maneuver troops in contact effectively enough to allow them to break contact and avoid becoming decisively engaged. What the squadron lacks in direct firepower it mitigates with superior maneuverability, communications, and battlefield awareness.

The Human Element

These concepts are not new. As with most audacious plans, it is not merely the understanding of a concept but rather its application that can mean the difference between success and failure. Commanders achieve success by exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities and seizing the

initiative, enabled by timely and accurate reporting from the reconnaissance squadron.

There is no doubt that technology will continue to be a force multiplier during conflicts of the future. That said, central to any military action is the service member on the ground. In an era of U.S. electronic warfare and all-source intelligence dominance, it is easy to overlook the value of the human element within the reconnaissance squadron when considering SOPs

or operation plans. However, what satellite imagery, full-motion aerial video, or ground sensors can never replicate is the ability of the soldiers on the ground to process what they see and hear, while applying intuition, experience, and initiative. To use this human element, how we plan, train, and execute forcible entry does not require a radical overhaul of our airborne capability, but rather a radical new approach to a complex challenge. ■

Capt. Mike Mobbs, U.S. Army, is pursuing an MA in history at the University of Pennsylvania. He earned his undergraduate degree at the United States Military Academy. He previously commanded a company in the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and in the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, both of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, *Joint Forcible Entry Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 27 November 2012), viii.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Marc R. Devore, *When Failure Thrives: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Army Press, June 2015).

4. *Ibid.*, 1.

5. Field Manual (FM) 3-96 *Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, October 2015), 1-3 and fig. 11. During a joint forcible entry by airborne assault, an airborne infantry brigade combat team can employ three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a field artillery battalion, and a support battalion.

6. Operation Plan (OPLAN) Giant in its various versions (used in 2015, all now obsolete) outlined the tactical plan for an airborne brigade combat team conducting forcible entry onto a denied airfield. This OPLAN was the template for how each airborne brigade in the 82nd planned and trained for forcible entry as part of the "global response force" requirement. It divided tasks into *secure*, *clear*, *isolate*, *fires*, and *support*. In every iteration, the plan relegated the reconnaissance squadron to providing part of the isolation force during the initial assault, even though the squadron is neither manned nor equipped to repel a deliberate attack. Additionally, under OPLAN Giant, the priority during the initial hours of the assault was to deliver paratroopers to the battlefield. Consequently, the scout vehicles that provided the squadron firepower and maneuverability were manifested on aircraft designated to land hours after the initial assault.

7. 82nd Airborne Division, "82nd Airborne Division Airfield Seizure Standard Operating Procedure," 2015 version, draws from OPLAN Giant III, among other sources. The SOP provides a specific task and purpose for every maneuver and support asset within a brigade, except for the reconnaissance squadron. The only reconnaissance assets the SOP refers to are the long-range surveillance units organic to the corps.

8. FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 12 March 2010), 1-3, login required, "The placement of dedicated reconnaissance units in the modular force takes into account their inherent direct combat vulnerabilities or capabilities and demands employment in accordance with those defined capabilities. This understanding also requires abstaining from employing them in missions and roles for which they were not created or resourced."

9. *Ibid.*

10. Michelle Tan, "The Huge BCT Overhaul," *Army Times*, 2 July 2013, accessed 22 October 2015, <http://www.armytimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130702/NEWS/307020002/The-huge-BCT-overhaul>.

11. JP 3-18, xi.

12. *Ibid.*, I-5.

13. Marc R. Devore, *When Failure Thrives: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Army Press, June 2015), 61. The ZSU-23-2 is a Russian twin-barreled autocannon designed in the 1950s for defense against air assault. Devore cites Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle For Grenada* (Lexington: Lexington, 1989), 131-39, regarding enemy guns used in 1983 in Grenada. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, retired, in an interview with author, Arlington, Virginia, 27 December 2015, stated that enemy forces used the ZSU in 1989 in Panama.

14. JP 3-18, I-9.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, I-8.

17. *Ibid.*, IV-17.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, IV-15.

20. FM 3-20.96 *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*, 1-3.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*, 15.



(Photo by Spc. Michael Crawford, 354th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Sgt. Anthony Goodman (left), a truck driver with the 298th Transportation Company based in Franklin, Pennsylvania, removes a ground-rod for a fuel tanker while Staff Sgt. Jonathan Collier, a fuel handler with the 1st Infantry Division, prepares to remove a fueling hose 24 July 2007 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Seventy-eight percent of the Army's sustainment forces are projected to reside in the reserve component by 2017.

The Role of the Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve

Capt. Eric J. Leib, U.S. Army Reserve

[The Nation must] ensure the right mix of operationally ready and responsive Total Army forces and capabilities to rapidly meet emergent global combatant command requirements while maintaining an operational and strategic landpower reserve.

—Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, former chief of staff of the Army

Current U.S. military strategy calls for an expeditionary force that is available for short-notice deployments. This means that active component (AC) forces must conduct unpredictable mobilizations and deployments. In contrast, reserve component (RC) forces follow predictable mobilization and deployment schedules. The Army now needs viable courses of action to synchronize employment of the RC in an Army Total Force (ATF) structure.

Background

The events of 11 September 2001 changed the way AC and RC forces were mobilized and deployed, as evidenced by Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Dr. John Winkler, in his 2010 article in *Joint Force Quarterly*, describes the operational reserve with this statement:

The concept of an operational reserve, in which Reserve forces participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions, is viewed as a fairly recent development. This concept is distinct from an earlier view in which the RCs were seen mainly as a “strategic reserve” whose primary role was augmentation and reinforcement of Active forces during a major contingency—an event that was anticipated to occur at best once in a lifetime.¹



(Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Kendall James, Oklahoma National Guard)

A soldier negotiates one of the nine stations on an obstacle course 7 November 2015 during the Oklahoma Army National Guard Best Warrior Competition on Camp Gruber in Braggs, Oklahoma.

Winkler further states that “key developments ... in policy and practice that governed the transformation of Reserve forces and enabled the development of an operational reserve recognized that the reserve components provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.”² With ongoing postwar reductions to the Army end strength in the current fiscally constrained environment, the ATF concept is a particularly useful way for the RC to be leveraged as an operational reserve.

With no long-war plans, the U.S. Army must change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC as follows:

- ◆ fully implement ATF strategies, concepts, and policies
- ◆ integrate geographically colocated AC and RC forces
- ◆ conduct ATF training at combat training centers, regional training centers, and home stations
- ◆ create additional multicomponent headquarters to better utilize capabilities inherent to each component

Fully Implement Army Total Force Strategies, Concepts, and Policies

The U.S. Army must change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC by fully implementing ATF strategies, concepts, and policies. Senior leaders at the joint and Army level are clearly calling for a better-integrated ATF, and the current fiscally constrained environment

is a natural impetus for this change. Several strategic documents discuss the role of RC forces as an operational reserve, most notably the 2015 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*; Army Directive 2012-8, *Army Total Force Policy*; the former chief of staff of the Army’s *CSA Strategic Priorities*; and, the posture statements of the chief of the Army Reserve and the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Each document identifies the requirement for an operational reserve and the need to integrate all of the Army components.

The CCJO details how future forces require pervasive interoperability, saying that “interoperability refers not only to materiel, but

also to doctrine, organizations, training, and leader development.”³ The CCJO also states that the military will need to be more agile and expeditionary in order to meet combatant commanders’ requirements. For the operational reserve to be effective, it will require integration with AC forces. With 78 percent of the Army’s sustainment forces projected to reside in the RC by 2017, the demand for this support will facilitate the ATF policy.⁴

In “CSA Strategic Priorities,” former CSA Gen. Raymond T. Odierno calls for the use of “Total Army forces and capabilities to rapidly meet emergent global combatant command requirements while maintaining an operational and strategic landpower reserve.”⁵ The priorities also seek to leverage the unique sustainment capabilities of the RC to set and sustain theater and regional campaigns. With the reduction of AC end strength, the future security environment will necessitate an Army that is predominantly based in the United States but retains power projection capabilities. To foster a regionally focused and globally responsive Army, the former CSA championed the regionally aligned forces concept. When fully implemented, regionally aligned forces will provide a holistic approach to regional activities by integrating special operations forces, conventional forces, and Army National Guard (ARNG) State Partnership Program forces.⁶

According to the *Army Total Force Policy*, “the Army will integrate AC and RC forces at the tactical level (division and below), consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s policies for use of the Total Force.”⁷ The policy also outlines the need to streamline mobilization to provide RC capabilities to support the ATF and Army missions. The document calls for the consolidation or elimination of certain U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and ARNG publications concerning training and personnel, stating, “All components will collaborate in the development, administration, and execution of publications to ensure streamlining while addressing the uniqueness of the component and leveraging their subject matter expertise.”⁸

The *United States Army Reserve 2013 Posture Statement* clearly articulates the role that the USAR will play in the ATF by providing an operational reserve “crucial to supporting Army and global combatant command theater security cooperation objectives. In addition to being utilized in the ‘available year,’ the unit’s soldiers and leaders

will remain operationally engaged throughout the entire force generation cycle.”⁹ The document also discusses how the USAR can augment AC formations through the ability to “sustain and enhance Total Army capability through employer partnerships and an innovative force mix that facilitates movement of soldiers between active and reserve duty.”¹⁰

The *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement* describes how the ARNG complements the AC, stating that the “Total Army ... will be pressed to modernize while preserving combat power with fewer resources. Today’s unprecedented National Guard readiness posture as part of the Total Force offers options to preserve both capability and capacity rather than choose between them.”¹¹ The ability to retain combat power in the ARNG is a key strategic enabler that allows the AC to flex combat arms forces to meet global demand. The ARNG is projected to provide more than half the Army’s infantry brigade combat teams and engineer, motor transport, and medical treatment capabilities by 2019. The ARNG is a proven combat multiplier and an integral part of the ATF.

Integrate Colocated Active and Reserve Component Forces

The Army must change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC by integrating geographically colocated AC and RC forces. The following example uses Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington, as the focus area due to its large number of both AC and RC forces. JBLM is home to I Corps, the 7th Infantry Division, and subordinate AC units totaling more than twenty thousand soldiers, spanning all warfighting functions. The Washington National Guard Joint Force Headquarters and the 81st Armor Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) are located less than five miles away at Camp Murray, Washington. JBLM is home to the 66th Theater Aviation Command (also an ARNG unit), as well as USAR sustainment, civil affairs, and aviation units. Additional sustainment units, including the 385th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and subordinate watercraft units, are located approximately twenty miles north in Tacoma, Washington.

The design methodology is to align echelon-above-brigade RC units with I Corps headquarters in a direct support role to augment a deployed

headquarters. Several corps headquarters have a small number of USAR soldiers assigned to the staff, most notably in the Army Reserve engagement teams (ARETs). The ARETs integrate USAR units into corps training events. However, although there are opportunities for small units or individual soldiers, USAR training requirements often take precedence over AC exercise participation. The Army continues to make progress in integrating the unique capabilities of each of its components to support the needs of the global combatant commands, as outlined in the 2015 *U.S. Army Capstone Concept* and *Army Posture Statement*:¹²

As part of the Army's Total Force Policy, the U.S. Army Forces Command is leading the way by partnering every Guard and Reserve division and brigade with a Regular Army peer unit. The Army is also piloting a program to assign Guard and Reserve personnel directly to each Regular Army corps and division headquarters.¹³

Assigning RC personnel to AC units allows the Army to effectively meet operational requirements and facilitates integrated training.

Conduct Army Total Force Training

The Army must change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC by conducting ATF training at combat

training centers (CTCs), regional training centers (RTCs), and home stations. Integrated training opportunities abound, such as ATF warfighter exercises and CTC rotations. Currently, AC maneuver units conduct training at CTCs, while RC units train at RTCs. To better support ATF, the CTCs and RTCs should be integrated or combined. With the Army's focus on mission command, it is imperative that AC and RC units train collectively. The *Army Posture Statement* speaks to this requirement when it states that the Army "will develop and field a robust, integrated tactical mission command network linking command posts, and extending out to the tactical edge and across platforms."¹⁴

One example of current integrated training is First Army (AC) units providing RC company-level tactical training at one of three RTC sites. Another example is platoon- or detachment-sized RC sustainment units supporting AC formations with subsistence items and bulk petroleum.

Further employment of RC units as exercise participants at CTC rotations will expand and enhance skill sets under tactical conditions and replicate the roles sustainment units play in AC deployments. RC forces could also be integrated in warfighter exercises and simulation programs at home-station facilities. The *Army Posture Statement* calls for training programs



(Photo courtesy of South African National Defense Force)

New York Army National Guardsmen from Company C, 2nd Battalion, 108th Infantry, based in Gloversville, New York, compete with South African soldiers in pistol marksmanship using the South African Z88 pistol during the South African Reserve Force Council Military Skills Competition 11 November 2010 at Potchefstroom Military Base, North West Province, South Africa.

that provide integrated learning with the aim to “provide tough, realistic multiechelon home-station training using a mix of live, virtual, and constructive methods that efficiently and effectively build soldier, leader, and unit competency over time, contributing to the effectiveness of the current and future forces.”¹⁵

The Army provides land forces for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), a requirement that could also be better accomplished through integrated ATF training. The *Army Capstone Concept* states that the “ARNG plays a unique role in homeland defense and DSCA, whether under the mission command of a state governor or federalized in a Title 10 status under the mission command of the president, secretary of defense, and supported combatant commander.”¹⁶

DSCA support provides additional AC and RC integrated-training opportunities with civilian partners at the local, state, and federal levels. This training would enhance the capabilities of each component while demonstrating interagency unity of effort.

Further integrated-training opportunities lie in converting RTCs to the same network caliber as the CTCs. The RTCs have sufficient maneuver space to support both AC and ARNG brigade combat team formations, which will allow RC sustainment, engineer, military police, and medical forces an increased scope for support that will deliver realistic training. This will also provide additional geographically dispersed training venues that may reduce transportation cost and time. An example of cost savings is the 10th Mountain Division conducting CTC-like training at the RTC at Fort Dix, New Jersey, rather than the national training center at Fort Irwin, California. The reduced transportation costs alone will provide significant savings. Each RTC has an equipment concentration point that can expand to include additional maneuver equipment that returns from Afghanistan, which will in turn provide a solution to the excess equipment issue the Army is facing as it departs theater. To manage these new opportunities will require fully integrated multiple-component headquarters.

Create Additional Multicomponent Headquarters

The Army must change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC by creating additional multicomponent headquarters. As the size of the AC force continues to decline, the RC can provide the additional personnel necessary to create more multicomponent headquarters, allowing for

better utilization of the capabilities inherent to each component. The USAR and ARNG can staff vacant positions with RC Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) or mobilized personnel; this will not affect the USAR or ARNG end strength as the increase will come from accessions of current personnel. The *Army Posture Statement* details an increase in the AGR force in the following excerpt:

Although we are making reductions in the overall end strength of the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve, we have continued to invest in higher full-time support levels, including Active Guard and Reserve, military technician, and civilians. This budget supports 82,720 full-time support positions in FY16 as compared to 68,000 in FY01. This level of full-time support constitutes a 20 percent increase since 2001.¹⁷

Future multicomponent headquarters will use the First Army force structure as the template. A current First Army unit, the 189th Infantry Brigade (Training Support) is a multicomponent unit stationed at JBLM. The unit is comprised of ten subordinate units including a headquarters and headquarters company and nine battalions, three of which are AC units. The subordinate units provide warfighting function capabilities in movement and maneuver, fires, and sustainment. The following approach to more comprehensive integration may provide additional solutions to mitigate the effects of future force reductions.

An opportunity exists to replace the headquarters element of 2nd Battalion, 358th Armor Regiment (AC), a subordinate command of the 189th, with the 81st ABCT (ARNG) to integrate additional RC units under the brigade headquarters. This would allow AC soldiers the opportunity to fill positions within maneuver units throughout the AC force structure. This would also provide ARNG integration at the battalion level while maintaining current state and corps alignment. Assigning the 81st ABCT as a subordinate unit would provide a similar structure and full-time support while increasing capabilities to provide training and support to DSCA operations.

RC soldier integration into key positions within the brigade headquarters also would act as an incentive for retention and growth, and it would provide stakeholders in the USAR and ARNG commands. Assigning AGR or mobilized RC soldiers to key staff positions would

provide operational continuity and risk mitigation as the AC force reduces. This plan would not affect the total number of positions within the brigade headquarters, only the component filling the position. RC soldiers could easily fill key positions in personnel management, operations, logistics, and communications—capabilities that reside in the RC force structure. These key staff functions reside in both the ARNG and USAR, so either component could fill the positions.

Conclusion

The ATF can provide the right mix of trained and ready forces for combatant commanders despite the

current drawdown and fiscally constrained environment. To do so, the RC must continue to develop as an operational reserve. The Army approach to the ATF must be four-fold: first, it must implement the ATF strategies, concepts, and policies already outlined in strategic documents; second, it must integrate the USAR and ARNG units with geographically colocated AC forces; third, it must train as an ATF at CTCs, RTCs, and home stations; and finally, it must create additional multicomponent headquarters to leverage capabilities and capacities inherent to each component. These adaptations would allow the Army to meet operational requirements, even as end strength and budgets shrink. ■

Capt. Eric J. Leib, U.S. Army Reserve, is an Active Guard and Reserve force manager assigned to the 364th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) in Marysville, Washington. He holds a BA from The Ohio State University. Leib has served with the 406th Corps Support Battalion, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

Notes

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(Photo courtesy of Capt. Lindsay Roman, U.S. Army)

Members of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion collaborate May 2012 during participation in a specialized Center for Creative Leadership orienteering course in Greensboro, North Carolina. The course was designed to create greater trust among leaders.

Building a High-Performing Unit

An Army Battalion's Leadership Journey in Preparation for Combat in Afghanistan

Col. Kevin A. McAninch, U.S. Army

Investing in people pays dividends for a lifetime.

—Kevin McAninch

Leadership is a core Army function and a unifying element in mission accomplishment. Therefore, creating a unique and challenging leadership development program to grow subordinate leaders is a key task for all commanders. The U.S. Army's doctrine on leadership says, "Through education, training, and experience, leaders develop into competent and disciplined professionals of the Army."¹ But, how do Army units develop leaders to ensure excellent leadership that operates cohesively across the levels of command?²

Most units establish a leader professional development (LPD) program that is briefed and approved during quarterly training briefings. Program topics range from individual professional development skills to execution of routine collective Army tasks. However, in some LPD programs, though some members of the audience might learn elementary standards to improve performance and unit effectiveness, they may not always be exposed to the sophisticated leadership skills necessary to conduct units through the current or future battle space. In other words, while unit LPDs may build leaders who are generally competent in achieving baseline organizational outcomes, some LPDs fail to address the level of individual, team, and organizational development necessary to lead effectively in the increasingly dynamic and complex operational environments most units will face now and in the future.

Simply put, LPDs often establish and enforce routine and baseline standards for minimal task execution. But, they do not routinely grow dynamic leaders who know themselves, seek self-improvement, effectively build teams, or help to develop high-performing organizations.³

A different approach, therefore, was undertaken by the 519th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in an effort to increase the effectiveness of leader development. In 2012, while preparing for deployment to Afghanistan, the 519th embarked on a unique journey to grow leaders. The battalion partnered with the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL)

from Greensboro, North Carolina, to build an LPD program focused on three pillars:

- ◆ Individual: *Who are you?*
- ◆ Team: *Who are we and what are we part of?*
- ◆ Unit: *Who are we as an organization?*

This program fostered the creation of a shared "direction-alignment-commitment" mindset across the organization because each leader knew that collective success came from individual growth and that each individual team member contributed value.⁴ The program was also tailored to the specific needs of the 519th. The battalion developed eight learning objectives for this training:

- ◆ Foster a positive leadership environment by creating shared "direction-alignment-commitment" across the organization.
- ◆ Improve leadership abilities by leveraging leader strengths.
- ◆ Collaborate more effectively with others.
- ◆ Communicate better with peers, subordinates, and superiors.
- ◆ Think creatively about solving difficult tasks and personal challenges.
- ◆ Lead with greater personal insight and improved interaction with others.
- ◆ Provide and act on developmental feedback.
- ◆ Build high-performing teams.

Context for Development of the Program

When employed, the 519th is dispersed to provide intelligence support to the edge of the battlefield at the lowest level. Subordinate companies are allocated to work for different organizations with platoons and teams further disaggregated to smaller elements.⁵ Additionally, the companies deploy task-organized with other MI units' capabilities depending on the mission.⁶ Consequently, to meet the challenges of decentralized execution, the leadership challenge was defined as building the skills necessary to maintain a cohesive organization that could conduct decentralized operations within the commander's intent. This required greatly increased emphasis on building trust among all leaders and the introduction of "boundary-spanning" principles to develop a high-performing team.⁷ To do this, the unit had to create "the conditions, time, and space" to achieve the

desired outcome.⁸ This is where the CCL's expertise was essential.

The CCL is a world-class leadership development organization. It facilitated achieving the vision of our organization's leadership (illustrated in the image) through application of academia, intellect, and other resources. Using established assessment instruments—the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation–Behavior (FIRO–B) tool, and the Change Style Indicator (CSI)—the CCL provided empirical analysis for each leader, focused along the three pillars of growth.⁹ The comprehensive program not only put the growth spotlight on the individual leaders and their teams, but it also broke the CCL's usual paradigm for leadership training.

Typical CCL programs are offered to leaders at the same experience and responsibility level. The 519th flipped that around, putting second lieutenants in the same training as company commanders and field grade officers. This vertically aligned cohort was unique. The varying levels of experience in the training created friction, and the challenge was to get the entire group to operate on one level while learning each other's strengths and weaknesses.

So what did the CCL provide that was unique? It provided—

- ◆ Immediate immersion of the leaders in a creative learning environment where risk is accepted and rewarded
- ◆ An environment to think and act “outside the box” and “outside the military framework and culture”
- ◆ A mix of classroom instruction, experiential interaction, and practical application
- ◆ Feedback through assessments and interaction with others
- ◆ Extensive time for networking, reflection, and greater learning from others
- ◆ Team building through exercises aimed at the individual, team, and unit

The training occurred during multiple sessions over the course of one year and coincided with predeployment stages developed by the unit. The leadership training was synchronized with deployment preparation phasing:

- ◆ Build the foundation (nine months prior to deployment).



(Image courtesy of Capt. Lindsay Roman, U.S. Army)

Vision statement of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion.

- ◆ Employ the techniques (six months prior to deployment).¹⁰
- ◆ Reinforce the principles (three months prior to deployment).

Build the Foundation

The 519th started its leadership journey with the CCL in May 2012, eight months before its early 2013 deployment to Afghanistan. Over three days at the Greensboro campus in North Carolina, attendees focused on individual growth, team development, and unit-cohesion training.



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Shane Hamann, U.S. Army)

U.S. soldiers secure a compound while other soldiers meet there with Afghan elders 3 March 2013 in Spin Boldak District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. The soldiers are assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division's Female Engagement Team 6, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, and the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion.

The individual growth session allowed attendees to “see themselves” better. This deeper awareness was achieved by providing each attendee MBTI feedback to understand his or her personality.¹¹ The session also helped leaders appreciate their teammates by understanding their personalities. As the Myers-Briggs Foundation website states, “The goal of knowing about personality type is to understand and appreciate differences between people.”¹² Leaders were subsequently able to lead with greater insight about themselves and their teammates.

The CCL also administered the CSI assessment to identify one of three change styles for each attendee. Considering the changes anticipated during their deployment, this tool allowed leaders to understand how they approached change and preferred to deal with situations requiring change.¹³ For example, according to the CSI, *conservers* desire “solutions that are tested and proven,” while *originators* “prefer quick and expansive change” and to “challenge assumptions” and “enjoy risks.”¹⁴ With an appreciation for how each leader saw change, subordinate leaders could assess the situation and provide more informed personnel and operational recommendations.

The focus of the program then shifted to the development of teams. Renowned leadership expert John C. Maxwell says, “Everyone wants to be part of a winning team. Individuals play the game, but teams win championships.”¹⁵ The FIRO-B tool helped because it assesses how one feels about interpersonal relationships: “how the need for inclusion, control, and affection can shape interactions with others.”¹⁶ Leaders apply their FIRO-B feedback to increase effective collaboration and communication with others.

Leaders began practical exercises designed to bring their individual talents together after analyzing their assessments. They began to form their teams with the knowledge of each other’s personality, strengths and weaknesses. The CCL’s vast array of experiential activities and experienced staff proved beneficial again. The crawl phase was over, and now leaders were walking.

The “color blind” experiential activity required teammates to be blindfolded while trying to solve a complex puzzle. The solution to the activity required effective verbal communication and each individual managing his or her own perceptions

(without the sense of sight) while the group developed a strategy. During the exercise, each team achieved a shared comprehension, but only after accounting for each member's different perspectives on the activity. The activity improved each individual's ability to think creatively about solving difficult tasks and challenges, while also improving the team's ability to communicate.

Shifting next to development of the unit, the CCL team introduced the concepts of "direction-alignment-commitment" and "boundary spanning."¹⁷ According to Donna Chrobot-Mason and Chris Ernst, "Boundary-spanning leadership is the capability to create direction, alignment, and commitment across boundaries in service of a higher vision or goal."¹⁸ This advanced organizational leadership idea was applicable to the unit given the vertical, horizontal, stakeholder, demographic, and geographic boundaries it had to manage and span once deployed.¹⁹ Experiential activity coordinators then asked company command teams, the battalion staff, and the battalion leadership to define the specific boundaries affecting the organization. In a candid discussion, leaders described boundaries they felt impacted organizational success. This exercise employed the concept of buffering, which helped create team safety and the feeling of psychological security that develops when intergroup boundaries are defined.²⁰ Each leader understood the complex nature of the 519th's mission and the need to develop into a high-performing team to span these boundaries.

The unit's vision statement called for a team in which members were accountable to each other and committed to each other's success. The goal was to create a greater trust among leaders, allowing for risk taking, seizing the initiative, creating teams, and fostering collaboration (both internal and external). Increased trust allowed team members to feel more comfortable and to express their opinions freely. As Chrobot-Mason and Ernst describe it, the experience is about building a sense of community:

[It] is about the experience of belonging emotionally, spiritually, and psychologically to a larger group. Each group identifies with a collective that is larger than its individual group alone. It is also about the sense of ownership that develops when groups feel that

they belong. When community exists, groups may have widely different sets of experiences, values, and expertise, yet they feel committed to taking joint action on behalf of a larger common purpose.²¹

To reinforce this, leaders conducted another experiential activity. A unique orienteering course required each company team to find points equating to a monetary value, and to maximize the amount collected. However, companies could not act alone. They had to work through the battalion leadership to have their plans approved while the staff synchronized the plans to help the unit raise the maximum amount. This interactive, multiechelon exercise stimulated the communication and coordination the unit needed. It put to test the commitment of each leader and enabled all attendees to see their roles individually, on the team, and within the organization.

The foundation had been laid, for the most part, but the leader development was not complete until the concluding session—a session that made a lasting impression on the leaders. Before graduating from the CCL program, all attendees had to write down goals for themselves and to draft an accountability statement: *What do you want to do better as a leader in the future, and how are we going to keep each other accountable?* Each attendee spoke openly to the group, offering an individual growth plan and a personal commitment to the team.

The commander then asked a series of questions to reinforce instruction and to effect ownership by the participants of the commander's vision for the unit:

- ◆ Could we create a high-performing team?
- ◆ Do you accept the responsibility to build a high-performing team?
- ◆ Do you want to work in a community and feel like you're in a cohesive unit?
- ◆ What will you do to help us achieve this as a unit?

By building a foundation, the LPD program reinforced the commitment to the organization's mission while also ensuring individual leadership growth.

Employ the Techniques

The battalion's next interaction with the CCL came during a training rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In August 2012, six months before deployment, the CCL



(Photo by Capt. Lindsay Roman, U.S. Army)

Soldiers of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion work hand-in-hand with Afghan National Security Force soldiers during situational training exercises 8 August 2012 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

facilitators braved the stifling heat and expeditionary living conditions of the NTC to visit the 519th and work with it “in the box.” This culminating training event simulated the harsh environment of Afghanistan and put stress on the relationships built in Greensboro. It was the perfect environment for the CCL team to reinforce the learning points and to ensure leaders retained what they were taught.

Over four days, the CCL facilitators conducted one-on-one interviews with leaders and went out on patrol as much as possible with 519th’s soldiers. By being outside the wire, they observed the decentralized employment of the unit in support of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. Companies and teams came face-to-face with boundaries every day, and leaders applied what they learned to overcome them. The CCL facilitators attended the unit’s after action reviews and reemphasized boundary-spanning techniques. This was critical to reinforce in leaders’ minds their development and their role in achieving unit success.

The visit also allowed the commander and CCL facilitators to discuss the commander’s deployment

vision. Closer to the deployment, there was a clear sense of what would be required for the unit once downrange. We applied the concept of *mission-soldiers-me*—which, though not new, fit well given the unit’s planned employment. We used this concept to establish priorities at all levels while also signaling the importance of the *me* portion. The idea was that developing and improving yourself while also being responsible for your actions was clearly linked to effective mission accomplishment and to taking care of soldiers. As the CCL so expertly captures in its *Leading Effectively* blog,

We must always accomplish the mission—it is why we are here. And while doing the mission, we must care for our soldiers ... after leaders have met the first two requirements, we must take care of ourselves. If we do not take care of ourselves by sleeping right, eating right, and even talking with others about our experience ... well (here he hesitated and then looked at the ground slowly) then we become casualties. Then everyone has to take care of us and that detracts from our soldiers’ readiness and mission accomplishment.²²

Reinforce the Principles

Because new teammates were arriving to the 519th prior to deployment, the unit needed a way to train them as well. In November 2012, two months after training at the NTC, and before the deployment, fifty-five leaders went to Greensboro for a one-day “leadership tune-up.” The CCL team facilitated the session, which was focused on the fundamentals of the three pillars of growth. Each attendee received MBTI, FIRO-B, and CSI assessments, and learning groups were created with the now task-organized company teams. The battalion staff and leadership, which included two new members, also participated. This session reinforced individual development while also allowing teams to work on their goals and communication.

Soon after their trip to observe the unit at the NTC, the CCL facilitators provided observations and feedback that helped unit members also understand the boundaries limiting their effectiveness. To overcome these boundaries, the facilitators then armed each leader with tools to span them. They introduced Chrobot-Mason and Ernst’s six practices for solving problems: buffering, reflecting, connecting, mobilizing, weaving, and transforming.²³ Though only lasting one day, and touching only the surface of those key principles, the training nevertheless provided useful context for leaders to take forward to Afghanistan. Writing from Afghanistan later, Capt. Nick Keipper, a 519th company commander, put it best:

Direction, Alignment, and Commitment are common practice here. We may use different terms—Mission, Task and Purpose, End state, Mottos—but the intent is still the same. Change is constant: adaptation is the name of the game. One minute we may be conducting major operations and several hours later we are counting equipment. Strong leadership at the lowest levels is even more important now than ever. So how do we keep focused?

- ◆ Clear and concise guidance, even when the current end state is ambiguous.
- ◆ Empower junior leaders and recognize their work.
- ◆ Reinforce the basic principles of leadership and force leaders to lead through difficult times.

- ◆ Lead by example ALWAYS.
- ◆ Allow for cross-talk, even when you “think” you know the solution. This stimulates team work and not individualism.
- ◆ Let down your preconceived notions. Do not let rank, patches, and badges cloud your judgment. Just because someone is not a part of your organization does not mean they are of lesser value. Quite the contrary, they tend to provide more honest feedback.²⁴

It is certainly clear from these comments that boundary-spanning training helped in leadership development. The reinforcement session helped junior leaders put the concepts they learned into practice during deployment. By conducting the reinforcement session, the leaders solidified their development while making progress towards becoming a high-performing team capable of spanning boundaries.

The unique leadership development program instituted by the 519th focused on individual, team, and organizational growth. The uniqueness of the program came from how it developed leadership skills—by emphasizing the *me* aspect together with *mission* and *soldiers* while simultaneously building capable and informed teams. Utilizing the CCL’s vast leadership resources was decisive. The 519th’s leaders now had a deeper self-awareness and the tools to span boundaries for greater organizational effectiveness. The training helped young officers develop the leadership skills needed in the operating environment they faced in Afghanistan, while also fueling their leadership development journey.

Conclusion

The CCL’s research shows that “early career experiences play a formative role in igniting any or all of the future leadership skills.”²⁵ In the case of the 519th, a leader professional development program helped its leaders become competent and disciplined Army professionals, while also serving as an investment in their lifetime leadership development journey. It built company teams with improved cohesion and communication. It gave unit leaders a deeper understanding of themselves and how to leverage their strengths. It also reinforced the importance of the trust needed in a highly decentralized environment. ■

Col. Kevin A. McAninch, U.S. Army, is a student in the Carlisle Scholars Program, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York; an MA from Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan; and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He formerly commanded the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Notes

Epigraph. Kevin McAninch (the author) during a speech to his unit given at the beginning of the leadership development program established in conjunction with the Center for Creative Leadership.

1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2012), 1-2.

2. *Ibid.*, 1-1.

3. "Professional Development that Platoon Leaders Value," *Army Magazine*, March 2013, 65. This article provides examples of routine tasks often taught during leader professional development sessions.

4. Donna Chrobot-Mason and Chris Ernst, *Boundary Spanning Leadership: Six Practices for Solving Problems, Driving Innovation, and Transforming Organizations* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2011), 6.

5. Task Force Thunder companies operated from four different locations. There were up to sixty teams operating at over twenty-five locations consistently during the deployment.

6. ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 2-15. *Task organization* is defined as "a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission."

7. Joseph Grenny, "The Best Teams Hold Themselves Accountable," *Harvard Business Review*, 30 May 2014, accessed 14 January 2016, <https://hbr.org/2014/05/the-best-teams-hold-themselves-accountable/>. High-performing teams are often categorized as being (1) accountable to each other and (2) committed to each other's success.

8. Chrobot-Mason and Ernst, *Boundary Spanning Leadership*, 191.

9. It is important to highlight that the commander removed all 360-degree-type instruments to ensure the focus of the feedback was on the *assessment* of the individual and not any evaluative data that could be misperceived as being used in evaluation reports. This was a deliberate decision to ensure a positive learning environment.

10. This phase happened to coincide with high-intensity training at the U.S. Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Two Center for Creative Leadership facilitators, Clemson Turregano and Tom Gaffney, joined the 519th Military

Intelligence Battalion for four days during that training to observe leaders in action and reinforce principles learned during foundation building in Greensboro, North Carolina.

11. The Myers & Briggs Foundation, "MBTI [Myers-Briggs Type Indicator] Basics," The Myers & Briggs Foundation website, accessed 12 January 2016, <http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics/>.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Center for Creative Leadership "Change Style Indicator (CSI)," [developed by W. Christopher Musselwhite and Robyn P. Ingram], in *More on the Changing Nature of Leadership*, 2007, slide presentation, 11–20, Center for Creative Leadership website, accessed 12 January 2016, <http://www.ccl.org/leadership/pdf/landing/changestyleindicator.pdf>.

14. *Ibid.*

15. John C. Maxwell, *Teamwork 101: What Every Leader Needs to Know* (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2008), 8.

16. CPP, Inc. [formerly Consulting Psychologists Press], "FIRO-B [Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation–Behavior] Profile," CPP, Inc. website, accessed 12 January 2016, <https://www.cpp.com/en/firobproducts.aspx?pc=143>.

17. Chrobot-Mason and Ernst, *Boundary Spanning Leadership*, 5–6.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, 84. Buffering is one of the authors' six practices for solving problems.

21. *Ibid.*, 154.

22. Clemson Turregano, "Cool Leadership in a Hot Place," *Leading Effectively.com* blog, 1 October 2012, accessed 12 January 2016, <http://www.leadingeffectively.com/cool-leadership-in-a-hot-place/>.

23. Chrobot-Mason and Ernst, *Boundary Spanning Leadership*. Parts 2–4 describe the six tactics.

24. Nick Keipper, email message to author during Operation Enduring Freedom XIII deployment.

25. Bob Johansen, *Leaders Make the Future: Ten New Leadership Skills for an Uncertain World* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1 May 2009), 21.



(Photo by Sgt. Brian Rodan, 5th Signal Command PAO)

Civilians with 5th Signal Command reaffirm their oath of office during the Operation Solemn Promise annual commemoration ceremony 16 November 2012 at Lucius D. Clay Kaserne, Wiesbaden, Germany. The ceremony began 5th Signal Command's Army Profession campaign. Throughout 2013, 5th Signal Command held several events that highlighted the five essential aspects of the Army Profession—trust, military expertise, esprit de corps, honorable service, and stewardship of the profession.

The Army Civilian Corps Professionals in the Making

Col. Kim Summers, U.S. Army, Retired

In a 2015 *Military Review* article, author Robert Hynes argues that civilians in the Army, by definition, do not technically meet the requirements to be considered professionals in the Army.¹ His thought-provoking article highlights questions that need to be answered in order for Army civilians to be recognized as full members of the Army Profession. In the author's words, the Army as a profession can be defined from this passage: "It was the combination of these three components—the technical expertise of

warfare, the relationship of trust between itself and the American public, and awareness of the professional responsibilities pursuant to that trust—that collectively established the Army as a profession."² What is significant about this definition, along with the definition provided in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, is that both substantiate why Army civilians *can* meet the criteria for being members of the Army Profession.³ In this discourse, it is necessary that one contextualize the role Army

civilians play in the conduct of national security, specifically in the land domain, and recognize those aspects that certify Army civilians for professional membership. The fundamental question remains: Are Army civilians members of the Army Profession? Once certified, the answer is yes, and here is why.

Understanding Professionalism

It is important to examine those aspects that define professions and the qualifications outlined as characteristics of the Army Profession in order to understand what it means to be a professional and what are the rights of passage for full-fledged membership. Under current definitions, professions have aspects (elements that frame professions) and characteristics (elements that describe a specific profession) articulated in ways that generate formal societal recognition and socially acceptable behaviors in performance of professional tasks.⁴ These acceptable professional behaviors are defined in terms of broad social necessities that require specialized knowledge to perform a unique service society cannot provide itself.⁵ Examples of professions usually include medicine, law, engineering, education, and the clergy. Each of these are examples of callings vice jobs, which society requires to provide a unique service. The unique service outcomes are realized through the behaviors of a profession's members whom society willingly accepts and trusts. In order to garner society's trust, professional competence is necessary. To achieve this level of competence requires mastery of specialized knowledge specific to the profession's unique service. Mastery is demonstrated in the behaviors that are the result of utilizing the specialized knowledge required to perform the unique service.

In the case of the Army Profession, the first defined concept referenced by Hynes, "technical expertise of warfare," is a description of one aspect of professional qualification, a component of specialized knowledge required to be a member of the Army Profession.⁶ It is also embedded in one of the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession, that being military expertise.⁷ The second and third concepts of the article, "trust between itself and the American public" and "awareness of the professional responsibilities pursuant to that trust" are foundational concepts that nest with Army doctrine.⁸ Trust is an essential characteristic of the Army Profession. It is the essence of the

relationship between society and the profession. This trust results in empowerment of the profession to self-govern, regulate, and certify its members. ADRP 1 outlines the criteria for evaluating whether the Army Civilian Corps is in or out: five aspects of a profession, and the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession, which include trust. This article examines these and other aspects and characteristics that define an Army professional. It then raises the question, how do we substantiate the Army Civilian Corps meeting the required aspects and the essential characteristics of the Army Profession? We start with the five aspects of a profession, as outlined in Army doctrine.

Aspects of a Profession

ADRP 1 clearly identifies what the Army considers a profession and a professional. It states that members of a profession—

- Provide a unique and vital service to society, without which it could not flourish.
- Provide this service by developing and applying expert knowledge.
- Earn the trust of society through ethical, effective, and efficient practice.
- Establish and uphold the discipline and standards of their art and science, including the responsibility for professional development and certification.
- Are granted significant autonomy and discretion in the practice of their profession on behalf of society.⁹

The first, provide a unique and vital service to the society served that it cannot provide itself, is self-evident. Security and the common defense with a landpower focus are unique to the Army, and vital.¹⁰ Civilians by the thousands are contributing to that security and defense in all ways necessary to support and sustain the preeminence of the Army's ability to perform the service. Each contributor can take credit for security and defense within the landpower environment as long as they are members of the Army Civilian Corps. One down, four to go.

The second, provide this service by developing and applying expert knowledge, is more problematic but no less applicable. As stated previously, the Army Profession's unique service provided to our society and the Nation is security and defense in the land domain.¹¹

Some would advocate that technical expertise in war fully encompasses that unique service and is by default the Army Profession's expert knowledge. Technical expertise in warfare is an important aspect of expert knowledge and a component of the overall requirement for national security, but to limit the Army's expert knowledge only to technical expertise in war is inaccurate. The *U.S. Army Operating Concept* clearly articulates the scope and complexity of national security requirements in the land domain.¹²

To reduce the Army Profession's expert or specialized knowledge to only technical expertise in war neglects far too many aspects of what is necessary to be successful in the business of security and defense. The scope and diversity of Army missions far exceed tasks associated only with war.¹³ Make no mistake, successful outcomes of war are necessary and critical to performing the Army's unique service, but so are those aspects of preventing, shaping, and winning in the defense of our country in the land domain.¹⁴ These aspects describe landpower with combined arms forces.¹⁵ Landpower is much broader than just technical expertise in war.¹⁶

Another example of the scope of landpower is resident in Army doctrine. Doctrine defines military expertise, one of the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession, as the "design, generation, support, and application of landpower."¹⁷ The Army Civilian Corps is integral to each of these functions, and in some cases it is the major contributor. The spectrum of expert or specialized knowledge is inclusive of war but in no way limited by it.

Army professionals are masters of expert knowledge in the land domain. Inculcating the Army Profession's expectation and commitment to understanding the realm of landpower, which includes the moral and ethical components, as well as its technical aspects, is the key to understanding what the Army Profession's

specialized knowledge truly is. The land domain, and the need for dominant power in it, defines the Army's specialized knowledge and expertise requirements. To understand and support an army to a level required to achieve dominance within this unique domain mandates a specialized focus and deep holistic understanding of what landpower is and what knowledge is required to exercise the profession's unique service.

To reduce the Army Profession's expert or specialized knowledge to only technical expertise in war neglects far too many aspects of what is necessary to be successful in the business of security and defense.

There are common skill sets supporting many facets of an army's routine functions that are not specialized professional knowledge. But, effectiveness and optimization are not achieved until there is a shared understanding of what landpower is, and of what the Army's unique contribution to the Nation is. Without this understanding and a commitment to achieving the diverse outcomes mandated in complex

environments, outcomes that assure winning, the dominance of landpower is simply not feasible.¹⁸ I would liken this to a medical doctor who was expected to practice his or her craft without any knowledge of healing.¹⁹ The doctor might have all the technical competencies associated with a specialty but lack the comprehensive understanding of the contextual and cultural aspects of a unique service. The doctor might be able to fix the sickness but could not heal the patient. Understanding landpower for Army civilians is similar to medical doctors needing to understand healing. It is fundamental to their mastery of specialized knowledge. The *U.S. Army Operating Concept* outlines the requirements for dealing with complexity by creating contextual multiplicity. Landpower provides leaders with multiple options that conjure multiple dilemmas in multiple domains with multiple partners.²⁰ This mandates a level of commitment to understanding the intricacies of how each component of the Army Profession fits in order to create, support, and execute landpower. Optimizing landpower requires a personal subscription to the professional culture that drives

results in order to contribute to the larger whole, understanding the intricacies of what landpower is, creating contextual multiplicity, and mastering its tenets. Without a shared understanding of complexity within the security environment from a cultural context of the

Army Profession by all cohorts—moral, ethical, and optimal outcomes are compromised.²¹ This realization drove the Army to invest in changing and melding the cultures of Army civilians and soldiers who embrace commitment as a prerequisite for optimized performance within the landpower environment.²² In order to generate a shared understanding of culture and the commitment necessary to operationalize change, the Army must professionalize all its cohorts.

Commitment

Commitment is one of the three certification mandates for professional membership. We can better appreciate the concept of commitment and its value by contrasting it with compliance. Compliant employees exemplify the nonprofessional. (Note the term is nonprofessional vice unprofessional.) Compliance can be all that is necessary to perform a task in the day-to-day workings of a civilian's job. The measure of success is completion or production. Contextual and cultural understanding never enter into the process as there is no need. Compliant employees do not need to see their contributions as part of a larger whole or as the perpetuation of a professional culture. There is no connection to optimizing landpower or even understanding what it is because there is no commitment to do so. As long as the compliant employees complete *x* or produce *y*, they have met the objective—task completion. The Army Profession concluded that compliance was not acceptable if the Army was to

effectively deal with the level of complexity apparent in the current and future security environments. The level of commitment on the part of the Army and its Civilian Corps to master the specialized knowledge inherent in creating and optimizing dominant land-

The level of commitment on the part of the Army and its Civilian Corps to master the specialized knowledge inherent in creating and optimizing dominant landpower is daunting but achievable. Producing Army civilians who emulate this commitment is critical.

power is daunting but achievable. Producing Army civilians who emulate this commitment is critical.

Any focus on discounting Army civilians as members of the Army Profession because they use readily available skill sets that embody technical knowledge available in the public sector misses the point of what the Army Profession's specialized knowledge is and how the Army uses that knowledge to optimize its unique

service. The Army is not developing budget analysts or training developers or human resource specialists; instead, the Army is developing committed landpower experts certified in competencies that ensure it can perform the unique service society demands. It just so happens those experts also develop budgets, educate Army professionals, and create training programs. The Army is creating a level of commitment within its Army civilians that will generate great personal sacrifice whether one takes up a weapon or a key board. And, the Army is developing professionals of character who warrant the trust our nation has granted across all cohorts and specialties. The test of membership for the Army civilian is realized by certifying competence in the specialized knowledge of landpower that includes acquiring complete cultural understanding and acceptance, demonstrating character in the conduct of our professional and personal behavior guided by the Army Values, and exemplifying the level of commitment commensurate with the sacrifices of our uniformed partners. It is true there are gaps in the current policies, strategies, and professionalization

programs within the Army Civilian Corps. But, we must not confuse the inadequacy of the current civilian personnel management systems with the requirement to build a professional Army civilian.

The next three aspects of professions, and the remaining characteristics of the Army Profession, can also be shown to warrant professional membership. The remaining aspects of a profession are earned trust, self-regulation through education and certification, and autonomy of action through honorable service.²³ Army professionals live the Army ethic to sustain the essential characteristics of the profession now and into the future—to strengthen trust, the special faith and confidence of the American people, esprit de corps, the bond formed by mutual trust, shared understanding, and stewardship.²⁴

Documentation

To be certified as Army professionals, Army civilians must document how the aspects and essential characteristics are being met within the Civilian Corps. The documentation starts with the aspect of self-regulation. The Corps is self-regulated by its ever-evolving evaluation system, targeted required education, and professional development.²⁵ It also includes the development of professional certification requirements, revisions to leader development certification, and creation of career program standards.²⁶ Next, stewardship and esprit de corps are built through the consistent quality of outcomes that are possible because of Army civilians' application of landpower expertise and the continuity associated with their stability. The resulting effect generates mutual trust. The trust afforded the Army Profession encompasses all its members. Army civilians who are committed to the profession share equally in that trust and its responsibilities. This includes the effective and ethical application of their expertise.²⁷ Finally, autonomy of action is embodied in the organizational constructs and the doctrinal concepts of the mission command philosophy that apply to all.²⁸ This documentation provides ample justification for Army civilian membership, but beyond the academic definitions and documenting the aspects of our doctrinal roots, I would offer another more practical reason why Army civilians are critical to the Army Profession, that being change.

To stimulate critical thinking and debate, *Military Review* occasionally publishes articles that provide differing viewpoints on controversial subjects. For an alternative view on the inclusion of civilians in the Army Profession, we encourage you to read the following article:

"Army Civilians and the Army Profession," Lt. Col. Robert Hynes, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

Hynes holds that while they fill an important role, Department of the Army civilians do not, by definition, meet the requirements to be considered members of the Army profession.

The original article can be found in our May–June 2015 issue on page 71. For online access, go to

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150630_art015.pdf.



Ed Campbell, a Task Force Cyclone human terrain analyst (HTA), along with his fellow team members, meets with the chief of police of Kabul in late July 2009 during a landforce engagement in Sarwan Province, Afghanistan. The Afghan police hosted the landforce in honor of a departing American police mentoring team commander.

Army Civilians and the Army Profession

Lt. Col Robert Hynes, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

One notable difference between the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and previous conflicts was the omnipresence of U.S. government civilians. More than in any conflict past, civilians were everywhere. No, I am not talking about the locals. I refer to the visible presence of government civilians on nearly every U.S. installation in the war zone. Since the start of combat operations in 2003, civilians from

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May/June 2015 MILITARY REVIEW

Change

Army civilians are necessary members of the Army Profession because of change. The inevitability and velocity of change, along with the magnitude of its impact, warrant the need for all members, civilian and military alike, to be indoctrinated as Army professionals. The ability to deal with complexity and uncertainty, to lead change, to demonstrate mental agility and adaptability, to hold a

strategic perspective, and to understand the scope and the context of landpower's role in national security are but a few of the developmental needs that our Army requires of its civilian cohort—these skills are not readily available in the public marketplace. Even though each civilian will still have functional and technical performance requirements that may be publicly attainable, these skills are far less valuable than expert landpower knowledge, commitment to the point of sacrifice, and character that guides professional stewardship of our corporate responsibilities framed in the context of Army culture and leading in an environment of perpetual change.

To help illustrate this point, we can contrast the Army civilian professional with an auto industry employee. Most auto workers in a given plant on an assembly line contribute to building a vehicle. They insert a part, or connect a bolt, or attach a component—whatever is their task to keep the car or truck moving. There is no need for commitment. Compliance with task completion is what the individual is responsible for as each unit moves by. There is little or no need for competence in specialized knowledge—the task is either accomplished or it is not. And, demonstrating character is not even considered because completing a task is all that is required. In contrast, it takes a culturally assimilated Army Civilian Corps professional, employing his or her specialized landpower knowledge competently, to contribute to the optimal outcomes of a multifaceted problem set, share understanding of the technical standards of quality, and appreciate the moral obligation to succeed guided by the ethical aspects of his or her character, to create a combat system that can operate in a complex environment—that just happens to be a truck. The specialized knowledge necessary to have this level of shared understanding is not something that is readily available within the public sector.

The driving force of change requires a culture that is committed to developing leaders who deal with uncertainty. It creates a climate that values and promotes specialized knowledge of the Army culture and the tenets of landpower across the breadth of its membership, and it creates an environment where all members are committed to leading change. The Army's commitment to developing the Army civilian as a full-fledged member of the profession is strongly influenced by the velocity of change. Army Civilian Corps professionals

are not hired, they are grown. That investment in cultural growth develops Army professionals who are competent, committed teammates of character and who certify as such.

Conclusion

What does this all mean for the Army Civilian Corps and its future? We have dialogued about professional definitions and their utility to the Army Civilian Corps. We have examined the five aspects of a profession, the essential characteristics of the Army Profession, and their application to the Army civilian. We have even considered the effects of change and its impact on why the Army civilian is a necessary member of the profession. But to integrate the Army Civilian Corps as full-fledged members of the Army Profession, it is essential to certify those that meet the criteria. Certifying character, competence, and commitment are the three requirements to justify membership in the Army Profession.²⁹ Competence, as previously discussed includes facets of military expertise and specialized knowledge that span the cohorts. There are those tasks within the facets of military expertise and specialized knowledge that do not apply universally. This realization should never be justification for excluding a cohort. As we have demonstrated, the breadth of knowledge that is the essence of landpower expertise is the criterion for professional certification in competence. The Army is creating certification requirements within its career programs. There is a required civilian leader development program for Army civilians. And, revised learning requirements encompassing landpower's specialized knowledge are an essential component of the Civilian Education System. As long as Army civilians certify in landpower expertise, then competence can be certified. The measurement of commitment and character is much less problematic. Army values, the essential characteristics of the Army Profession, and the aspects of professions are congruent with the Army Civilian Corps as part of the team and in no way impede certification or membership. Revised personnel evaluation systems, Army leader development strategy updates with a civilian annex, and the commitment of substantial resources for training, development, and education demonstrate the progress being made.

The title “Department of the Army Civilian” no longer captures the requirements laid out by our profession. As this article has demonstrated, Army civilians are not members of the Army Profession by decree but by necessity. The aspects and essential characteristics of the Army Profession remain the same for all cohorts. All members of any profession must be certified. They must master specialized knowledge and use it in a moral and ethical manner as they apply their unique service. And, they must never abrogate

through omission or commission the inherent trust afforded by the society the Army serves. We have demonstrated that the Army Civilian Corps meets those criteria. The current situation is not nirvana, nor is the Army Civilian Corps fully professionalized. There are gaps in current policies, strategies, and programs that produce friction in the process. But these inadequacies and gaps do not and will not dissuade the commitment of the Army to building the professional Army civilian. ■

Col. Kim Summers, U.S. Army, retired, has earned undergraduate and graduate degrees in education. He is a graduate of the Army Senior Service College Fellowship, the Federal Executive Institute, the Brookings Institution, the George Washington University’s National Security Studies Program, and the John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Senior Executive Fellowship, Harvard University. He has held multiple command, staff, and leadership positions during his military and civilian careers, including director of the Army Management Staff College and garrison command, where he has observed the professionalism of the Army Civilian Corps firsthand.

Notes

1. Robert Hynes, “Army Civilians and the Army Profession,” *Military Review* (May–June 2015): 72.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], June 2015), 1-1.
4. *Ibid.*, 1-1–1-2 and 1-4–1-5.
5. *Ibid.*, 1-1.
6. Hynes, “Army Civilians,” 72.
7. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, 1-1.
8. Hynes, “Army Civilians,” 72.
9. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, 1-1.
10. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 1-7.
11. Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, September 2012), 2-2.
12. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014), i.
13. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 1-7.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, 1-2.
18. *Ibid.*, 3-1.
19. Louis Lasagna, “Hippocratic Oath, Modern Version,” Tufts University, 1964, as cited in “Bioethics,” Johns Hopkins University Sheridan Libraries and University Museums website, accessed 27 January 2016, <http://guides.library.jhu.edu/c.php?g=202502&p=1335759>.
20. TP 525-3-1, *Army Operating Concept*, iv.
21. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, A-1.
22. Army Training and Leader Development Panel, *Army Civilian Study*, 30 January 2003, para. 127. See also “Army Training and Leader Development—Civilian Implementation Plan (ATLD-CIV); Civilian Personnel Online website, 5 December 2006, accessed 27 January 2016, <http://cpol.army.mil/library/permis/75b.html>.
23. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, 1-1.
24. *Ibid.*, 1-5 and 2-4.
25. Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 19 September 2014), 88, para. 3-64.
26. *Ibid.*, 96, para. 3-80.
27. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, 1-1.
28. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 2-1. The distinction between commanders and civilian supervisors is moot due to the need for all to adopt the philosophy of mission command as unified action partners.
29. ADRP 1, *Army Profession*, 1-1.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

What the United States Learned in Vietnam, Chose to Forget, and Needs to Know Today

David Donovan, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2015, 224 pages

Col. Eric Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

From the title of this book, one could be forgiven for thinking that it was published when the situation in Iraq was devolving into insurgency in late 2003. It wasn't; however, if it had been, perhaps military leaders of all ranks and senior political figures might have adapted far more quickly to what was happening then. Standing where we are today, in the immediate aftermath of two counterinsurgency wars and current involvement advising the Iraqi government against the Islamic State, one could also imagine some future volume similarly titled, only substituting Iraq and Afghanistan for Vietnam.

David Donovan is the pen name of Terry T. Turner, a professor emeritus at the University of Virginia's Department of Urology. He is also the author of *Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam*, an account of his tour as a Special Forces advisor in that country when U.S. involvement was winding down in 1969.¹ In the last few lines of his earlier book's preface, Donovan writes,

There will be many who will say that this book and my recollections are too simplistic ... I

would agree; my story is simplistic. It eschews the finer topics of international politics, military strategy, global economics, and who did what to whom first. These subjects are well worn and only lead to endless debate and disagreement, achieving nothing.

Conversely, it's clear in the introduction of his most recent work that he has since had a change of heart. In *Counterinsurgency*, Donovan recounts his participation in a 2006 Combined Arms Center symposium concerning the Army's experience overseas providing security assistance to host-nation governments, when he realized that what the Army learned and painstakingly documented in Vietnam had been forgotten. What he witnessed was an institution "re-inventing the wheel" in its current (2006) struggle. No doubt, Donovan's latest book serves as a warning that this should not happen again.

The author treats those "well-worn" subjects in a way that transcends the context of any specific conflict, despite the Vietnam examples. He briefly describes why the Army abandoned the

counterinsurgency method as a major subject after the Vietnam War, and it's easy for the reader to forecast the same happening again, but Donovan doesn't dwell on it. Far more important to him is encapsulating lessons learned based on his experiences from over four and one-half decades ago in a concise, digestible format for future generations of leaders who will once again, as he argues, have to advise and assist host nations fighting insurgencies.

The resulting product favorably compares to other better-known classics of counterinsurgency theory and practice. The work consists of checklists of things to consider or execute, with a few real-world illustrations and examples from the author and other advisor colleagues. Those lists cover everything from strategic estimates to operational design challenges, from specific tactical tenets for advisors to twelve general principles for counterinsurgency programs, and from a dozen ways those programs can fail to what drives a bureaucracy to put the best face on things and paper over such failures. The text is both pithy in its advice and also rich in its rationales and examples.

One is reminded of the Samuel B. Griffith translation of Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, with its selected ancient commentaries on the master's aphorisms.² Like the Chinese classic, Donovan's *Counterinsurgency* has something to say to both strategic policymakers and lower-level military leaders, particularly the need for high degrees of discernment and nuance in estimating,

planning, and executing support to counterinsurgency. Unlike Sun Tzu's maxims, this text is written less in a positivist, prescriptive voice and more in a tone warning of dangers to be dodged and pitfalls to be avoided. Most readers with firsthand experience in implementing counterinsurgency in the field will nod their heads in agreement with what Donovan says.


Does this book offer anything to those critical of counterinsurgency theory, such as Col. Gian Gentile

or Douglas Porch? As can be seen in *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, Gentile has long been skeptical of the Army's efforts in developing and implementing counterinsurgency as "community building" at the cost of what the institution is primarily intended to do: dis-pense organized violence in the service of the state.³ Porch makes a compelling case that counterinsurgency is not so different than other kinds of wars in *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*.⁴

Given Donovan's background, his first book, and the title of this one, it's easy to assume that there is little in this slim vol-

ume that answers the concerns of Gentile and Porch; however, that would be a mistaken impression.

In chapter 9, "The Soldiers They Send," Donovan simultaneously stakes out requirements not only for advisors with special training in counterinsurgency, but also for conventional forces that execute more traditional tasks. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that Special Forces advisors and conventional forces



both played key roles in the Vietnam War. Of course, the author puts most of his effort into explaining why specialized training and education in the subject are so important, and his examples are compelling in justifying his point of view. Certainly leaders of both types of forces would benefit from a close read of Donovan's *Counterinsurgency*.

There will be those who will say that this book certainly seems to fit the mold of a classic work on counterinsurgency theory and practice, such as Roger Trinquier's and David Galula's famous treatises, as it too is founded on the experience of a lost counterinsurgency war.⁵ Why should we think we can gain something useful from the losing side? As Sun Tzu tells us, "Those unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so." Perhaps nothing is so instructive than learning lessons from one's failure to overcome those

dangers, from losing battles, even from losing wars. Therein lies the irony encapsulated in the title of Donovan's book. We came, we saw, we learned, we lost, and then we forgot; it shouldn't be this way.

This is a work that deserves a place on professional military and U.S. foreign policy reading lists. First, it reinforces a respect for historical experience that can inform future readiness. *Counterinsurgency's* tenets are timeless and transcend technology. The full title alone is a plea to give up "deliberately self-inflicted institutional amnesia." Second, the work dispenses practical advice to both senior strategists and junior leaders coping with the demands of fighting indigenous insurgencies. Finally, this particular book is arguably the best place to begin studying counterinsurgency as it establishes the relevance of the topic and provides a sturdy bridge between theory and practice. Consider it the newest and best foundational primer on its subject for American audiences. ■

Col. Eric Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, retired, has been an assistant professor in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at the Fort Lee Satellite Campus, Virginia, since 2013. He holds an MA in military studies in land warfare from American Military University and an MS in strategic intelligence from Defense Intelligence College.

Notes

1. David Donovan, *Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).
2. Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).
3. Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency* (New York: The New Press, 2013).

4. Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
5. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1964); David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964).

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CREATING KOSOVO: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions

Elton Skendaj, Cornell University Press, New York, 2014, 248 pages

Kosovo remains an experiment in progress seventeen years after the Rambouillet Accords and the issuance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, authorizing international civil and military forces in Kosovo to end the violence, reestablish governance, and enable security in the region. *Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions* is an informative and thought-provoking book that investigates how international and local actors have built state bureaucracies and democratic institutions in Kosovo.

This book, structured as a comparative research study, is well organized and easy to follow. Unlike other literary works on Kosovo that focus on broad aspects of state building, Elton Skendaj, an assistant professor at the University of Miami and a former European studies research scholar at the Wilson Center, examines in detail the effectiveness of select core bureaucracies within Kosovo. He explores the court system, customs service, police force, and central administration, while simultaneously analyzing the progress of democratic reforms in elections, civil society, the media, and the legislature.

Skendaj posits that state building and democratization by international actors are two different processes that require complementary but different approaches to build and sustain effective bureaucracies. To support his hypothesis, he argues, “effective bureaucracies can be built when local actors take ownership of the institutions or international actors insulate the bureaucracy

form political influence.” Additionally, Skendaj argues, “democratic progress is more likely when citizens mobilize for regime change, citizens are demobilized, as authoritarian liberal elites negotiate for regime change, and coalitions of international and local actors jointly support regime change.”


The author skillfully creates a realistic narrative on the challenges of building effective state institutions in post-conflict environments. He does this by using data from numerous authoritative sources to support his analysis of various institutions in Kosovo: one hundred fifty formal interviews, internal and official government reports, strategies of international organizations, government agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and public surveys. Using the indicators of mission fulfillment, penalization for corruption, and responsiveness, Skendaj illustrates the various factors to create variances in institutional effectiveness caused by local, national, and international actors.

One of the most intriguing aspects of this book is his analysis of how international actors have prematurely demobilized citizens and hindered their participation in the democratic process, inadvertently undermining the accountability of political leaders to the citizens of Kosovo. Skendaj is clearly at his best in the closing chapter of the book, applying aspects of his analysis of institutions and state building policy in Kosovo to other countries, including Bosnia, East Timor, Georgia, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

This book contains useful figures and tables that help support the analysis, and an extensive reference section.

I highly recommend this well-written and documented book to both researchers and midgrade to senior-level military officers and government officials involved in developing postconflict strategies and policies.

Lt. Col. Edward D. Jennings, U.S. Army, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas



GETTING MORE: How You Can Negotiate to Succeed in Work and Life

Stuart Diamond, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2012, 416 pages

Every reader who wants to learn how to get more of what he or she personally values, from improved stability in an Afghan village to a child eating dinner without a fuss, should read *Getting More: How You Can Negotiate to Succeed in Work and Life*.

Stuart Diamond is one of the world's leading negotiation strategists, and he has advised corporate and governmental leaders in over forty countries; academic and military leaders also trust his advice. He currently teaches negotiation at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton Business School, and he previously taught negotiation at Columbia, New York University, Berkeley, Oxford, and Harvard. Retired Adm. William McRaven, former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, included *Getting More* as one of only fourteen books on his 2014 reading list.

Diamond's thesis is that every interaction in life is a negotiation. Consistently using the strategies discussed throughout the book results in a marked improvement toward getting more of what the reader values. As Diamond explains his negotiation techniques, he illustrates his points with anecdotes about real-world successes from his students. Those stories are concise and appropriate. Each illustration lends practical credibility to Diamond's theories. Collectively, they motivate the reader to try the negotiation tools explained in the book.

Diamond organizes *Getting More* into three primary topics. First, he contrasts his theory with other well-known negotiation styles. For example, he strongly disagrees with using leverage to coerce other parties in a negotiation. He also shuns purely logical win-win arguments. Instead, his negotiation approach centers on building relationships, situational relativity, and incremental progress toward clear goals.

Second, he explains the details of his many strategies to progress toward one's goals. One of his primary techniques is trading items of unequal value. Diamond explains, "First, find out what each party cares and doesn't care about, big and small, tangible and intangible, in the

deal or outside the deal, rational and emotional. Then trade off items that one party values but the other party doesn't." Only creativity limits negotiations.

Another technique uses the other party's standards to frame the situation. Diamond's students showed scores of convincing examples using this technique: from negotiating with Comcast about poor customer service to buying sponsorship rights from a professional sports team. In addition to techniques like these, he also explains that no individual technique is flawless in every situation. The cumulative goal is improving one's batting average, not total victory.

Third, Diamond shows how to apply his many negotiation techniques in a variety of settings. Constantly prepare. Understand the other party's needs, and keep asking questions to refine one's understanding of those needs. Always stay focused on one's own goals. Through the myriad settings and student examples, the reader feels overwhelmingly convinced of the validity of Diamond's techniques.

The only weakness in Diamond's strategy is that it requires the reader to practice, as success depends on one's effort. One must use the techniques and work to master them. Luckily, Diamond's approachable writing style motivates the reader to try. Throughout *Getting More*, he proves how commonplace negotiations are in daily life. Diamond's strategies teach the reader how to get more of what each reader values, and the student examples show the reader success is possible. If one wants to get more in life, reading this book is a good place to start.

**Maj. Christie Downs, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE GREAT WAR: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917

David R. Stone, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2015, 368 pages

The centenary of the First World War has been met with a flood of commemorative scholarship and events, helping us to reassess the causes and course of the war. David Stone's *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front* is a very necessary reexamination of the Eastern Front. This is the first English language general work about


the Eastern Front since Norman Stone's (no relation) *The Eastern Front*, published in 1975.

The Russian Army benefits from work done in the Russian archives, as well as the deeper understandings of Russian civil and military society, possible only after the Cold War. Stone's main argument is an important one—despite staggering defeats, setbacks, and waning public support, the Russian Empire collapsed from the inside. The Russian Imperial Army remained in the field and, surprisingly, effective until 1917, when political disintegration in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere destroyed it. Stone also provides vital context and corrections for several common mischaracterizations about the Russian, as well as Austro-Hungarian and German, experiences of the Great War.

On the rare occasion that most people think about World War I's Eastern Front, the Russian losses at Tannenberg, and finally, the peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, all paint a simple narrative of failure.

While the Russians certainly struggled to counter the material and tactical superiority of the German army, they did have successes—usually against the Austrians and the Ottomans. The 1914 loss at Tannenberg was counterbalanced by major Russian victories in Austrian Galicia, including the capture of Lviv, Austria-Hungary's fourth largest city. Even after the devastating effects of the Great Retreat in 1915, the Russian army conducted major offensives in every year of the war, including a 1916 offensive led by Aleksei Brusilov—this was one of the most effective tactical performances of any army during the war.

Russia clearly lost in World War I, but Stone correctly emphasizes that all of the Eastern empires—Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottomans, and Imperial Germany—collapsed as well. Russia's difficulties with multinational troops, supply, transport, and command and control, were different only in degree from the other combatants.



Even the breakdown of the Russian army in 1917 had parallels on the Western Front—the French army likewise refused to fight after the failed Nivelle offensive. This is not to overemphasize the similarity of the war's combatants; Russia had its quirks. For example, during the initial burst of patriotism in July 1914, Tsar Nicholas II had to make a special exception to policy so volunteers could join the army.

Overall, *The Russian Army* is a strategic-level study. Stone delves little into the low-level tactics or the personal experiences of Russian soldiers. While this approach certainly has its drawbacks, it results in a clear, focused narrative on the overall successes and setbacks of the Russian army throughout the war. It also provides Stone the opportunity to overview Russian campaigns in the Caucasus Mountains and in Romania. Briskly paced, clearly written, and efficient, this is a must-have for students of the First World War.

John Fahey, Vienna, Austria

THE FRENCH ARMY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2014, 468 pages

In the size of France's fielded forces, the scale of its industrial output, and the vastness of the price it paid in blood, the French contribution to Allied victory in World War I was enormous. What is more, in the decisive theater of war, the Western Front, the French army was the dominant Allied force through most of the war. Yet, a hundred years afterward, the mountain of World War I books provided by British authors has encouraged American readers to undervalue the French contribution to victory. In recent years, authors such as Leonard Smith and Robert Doughty have helped to balance this distorted perspective on the war. In her new book, *The French Army and the First World War*, Elizabeth Greenhalgh takes another important step closer to getting the story right.

Greenhalgh's study of the French army provides a chronological narrative that takes the reader from France's preparation for war to victory and demobilization in 1919. In doing so, she uses three relationships as her thematic framework: the French army to the

French nation and the republic's political leaders, the French army to France's allies, and the French army to its enemies. Each relationship tells us something important. First, Greenhalgh describes the way a succession of French military commanders sparred with the civil government while, at the same time, depending on the politicians to mobilize and remobilize public support for the war. Second, with France's allies, Greenhalgh suggests the many ways that French generals found Douglas Haig (and later John Pershing), difficult partners in the project of war. Third, in its life-or-death struggle with the most powerful army in the world, the author believes the French army ultimately proved to be a more successful "learning organization" than its German enemy was.

With this book, along with her previous works *Victory Through Coalition* and *Foch in Command*, Greenhalgh has solidified her place as one of the most important of our current World War I historians. More important, *The French Army and the First World War* will help balance what the author believes are the unfair judgments of contemporary British observers, as well as the distortions found in the received views expressed in current English-language historiography. This new volume reflects both her own extensive research into the French war effort as well as a comprehensive summary of the new works appearing on the war. It is well documented and well supported by detailed maps, and when considering the topic of the French army in World War I, one should expect this book to serve as "the" scholarly reference for many years to come.

**Dr. Scott Stephenson,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**SHAPING U.S. MILITARY LAW: Governing a
Constitutional Military**

**Joshua E. Kastenberg, Ashgate Publishing Limited,
Burlington, Vermont, 2014, 257 pages**

Shaping *U.S. Military Law: Governing a Constitutional Military* is a comprehensive study of the evolution and shaping of U.S. military law. The military has requirements for a set of governing laws unique to the culture and discipline of the

military, yet it must allow for a degree of transparency and civilian oversight commensurate with the military being subordinate to civil authority. Joshua Kastenberg's central idea addresses the supposition by many legal academicians that the federal judiciary (the U.S. Supreme Court and the appropriate appellate courts) largely shows deference to the military establishment, thereby allowing the military to provide its own legal oversight and operate as a questionable anomaly. This is a common friction point of many of the cases the author uses to address this claim.

Two major themes recur throughout the book: the personalities of the Supreme Court justices throughout the years, and the ways their personal jurisprudence helped shape military law. The author provides surprising insight into the political leanings of the justices and which cases they did or did not address. From his research findings, you could also expect which justice would likely write the dissenting opinion. It might come as a surprise to the reader that "politics of the court" are alive and well even at the Supreme Court level.

The other recurring theme is how the courts attempted to define the jurisdiction of crimes committed by service members that might otherwise be the purview of a civil court, such as rape of a civilian in an off-post apartment or sexual assault of a minor. The main idea in those types of offenses was proving a service connection so the service member could be tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Kastenberg ties these two themes together using a long series of cases beginning shortly after World War II with *O'Callahan v. Parker*, up to and including today. *O'Callahan* was landmark in that it overturned jurisdiction from the military into the federal judiciary, and mandated that the military must prove a clear service connection in order for there to be a trial under the UCMJ. Many cases were not deferred to the military courts because of the stringent requirement to prove this nexus. This, along with the personalities of the justices, has shown that there has been little deference to the military in terms of self-oversight, and that the military courts system has been, and is still under, quite a bit of federal judiciary review.

Kastenberg is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a judge advocate general (JAG) officer, thereby providing credibility to the book's analysis and documentation. The book is well written, extensively using the

language of the legal courts, and is well cited. The historical background of the formulation and progression of military governing laws over the years is extremely informative. However, I would limit my recommendation mainly to JAG students or other legal profession members.

**Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas**

**UNMAKING THE BOMB: A Fissile Material
Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and
Nonproliferation**

**Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian,
and Frank N. von Hippel, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 2014, 296 pages**

Ad bellum pace parati: Prepared in peace for war.
Si vi pacem para pacem: If you want peace,
prepare for peace.

Those two Latin phrases form an interesting contrast. The first phrase is the motto of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the school located just east of the *Military Review* offices. The second phrase graces the inside front cover of *Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation*. Each upholds a deep belief about our world, and a belief about what we must prepare for. Which of the two beliefs you hold may determine your reaction to this book. The authors discuss nuclear war, and how we can eliminate the possibility of nuclear war by eliminating the primary materials used to make a nuclear bomb: the fissile materials.


The book is an accessible and interesting look into the mind of disarmament proponents. It is written with minimal technical language and no math. If you can remember your high school physics, you will be comfortable with everything in this book. It is interesting because it documents the world of fissile material production, storage, and security. There are 470 endnotes that

superbly lay out the sources of information for each technical assertion made by the authors. They definitely know their subject in great depth.

The book envisions a post-fissile world where all fissile materials are eradicated—or at least made inaccessible without enormous effort. The authors begin by extensively documenting their estimate of the current amount of fissile materials held throughout the world. They sum it all up to about 1,900 tons of fissile material in 2013: 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium and 500 tons of separated plutonium. Since they estimate it only takes approximately four kilograms of plutonium or twelve kilograms of uranium to make a nuclear weapon, there is enough fissile material on earth now for more than one hundred thousand weapons. It is hard to not to agree that this is far more than is needed. Some current studies predict a nuclear winter after as few as one hundred nuclear detonations. The authors maintain that those large stockpiles may not be very safe in terms of thefts or attacks. They point to a study that postulated raiders of a storage facility could produce and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb before security forces could arrive to stop them. Even if decision makers are opposed to the complete elimination of fissile materials, they may still acknowledge a need to reduce the total quantity of those materials.

The authors propose a four-step action plan for complete elimination of fissile materials. First, gain transparency of all stockpiles so we know exactly what quantities are in existence. Second, stop all further production of fissile materials. Third, eliminate the materials in an irreversible method (various methods are proposed). Finally, ensure international verification of all these actions. In principle, this is a simple plan, but the difficulty is in the execution of the steps.

The vision of a world without the need for, or stockpiling of, nuclear fissile materials and thence no nuclear power plants and no nuclear weapons is thought provoking. It is also unlikely to be universally embraced, as even today there are new power plants and breeder reactors under construction in some countries still committed to nuclear



power. Nuclear-weapon states are still cloaking their weapons programs and do not appear likely to make them fully transparent. Nation states are jealous with sovereignty issues, and the step of turning all materials over to international verification seems unlikely. Putting a technological genie back in the bottle has historically been counter to human nature and perceived national interests.

This is a good book for learning about nuclear fissile material issues. It is enjoyable to read, and you will come out with a better appreciation for the global security threat posed by having excessive amounts of fissile materials spread throughout the world. Although the proposed vision of the complete elimination of fissile materials seems unlikely to be realized, it is an idea worthy of consideration.

**Lt. Cdmr. Harold A. Laurence, U.S. Navy,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WAGING WAR, PLANNING PEACE: U.S.

Noncombat Operations and Major Wars

**Aaron Rapport, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
New York, 2015, 280 pages**

Aaron Rapport, a lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, argues that conventional singularly centric theories on why U.S. political leaders make the decisions they do in war planning—particularly for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations—are limited by their inability to account for the complex nature of war. He asserts that construal level theory (CLT) from the field of psychological research can better explain how political leaders consider noncombat operations in war planning.

The author believes long-term war planning by political leaders routinely emphasizes a desired military outcome while discounting the role of postconflict operations in achieving a strategic end state. Furthermore, their near-term planning focuses almost exclusively on achieving combat objectives—discounting the time and costs associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. There is a direct correlation between the future distance in time when an operation is conducted and the propensity among leaders to discount its risks and associated costs.

Poor planning of postconflict operations produces less than desired outcomes often resulting in other enduring destabilizing activities, such as civil war.

Political leaders establish aspirational goals but fail to diligently consider the military means necessary to accomplish them. This lack of engagement leads to political ends that are disconnected from the military realities on the ground. Rapport notes that U.S. history shows that military occupations have succeeded less than one-third of the time since 1815. The premise here is that political leaders fail to adequately listen to and consider the advice of military leaders and intergovernmental or intragovernmental organizations and institutions before making policy that leads to war.

Rapport applies CLT while comparing and contrasting prevailing theoretical models to four historical war efforts led by the United States. Those cases include World War II (Germany), the Korean War, Vietnam, and Iraq. His analysis supports his argument and proves CLT as a better means of accounting for the U.S. policy decision-making process and the political strategic assessments involved in those military endeavors. These case analyses convincingly demonstrate that political leaders were overly optimistic in the feasibility of noncombat tasks, were unable to visualize how combat operations would affect meeting these tasks, or were unaware of how such tasks and events might help lead to a strategic military end state. Officials also lacked the necessary understanding of the costs of operations and the details of executing them.

Other notable results from the analysis included long-term goals can be disregarded even though they are known to be important; long-term objectives typically lack political aims and feasibility assessments; political and military leaders can be short-sighted; political leaders are essential in determining policy effects; and finally, the personality of leaders influences foreign policy, coupled with time, space, context, political constraints, and information. All results were in line with what CLT predicted.

Rapport concludes that concurrent integrated planning of all phases of war must take place to achieve desired outcomes. There should be a governmental organization created to coordinate combat and noncombat tasks and to assess all that is necessary to execute military operations before the military option chosen. If postconflict efforts are assessed fairly in war

planning, the United States may opt out of war beforehand after recognizing the prohibitive costs relative to risks in achieving desired outcomes.

Through fascinating insight, the author has done a superb job supporting his theoretical argument. The exhaustive scholarship, relevant detail, and personality nuances of political and military figures provided in each case study are beyond compare. The well-crafted book is easy to read and understand. It is a must-read for political science, international security or international affairs professionals and scholars, those involved in state building, government policy makers, and senior military professionals. Anyone else interested in learning about the importance of integrated and comprehensive near- and long-term war planning in achieving strategic objectives through military means will also find this book an enlightening read.

Lt. Col. David A. Anderson, PhD, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**CRUCIBLE OF COMMAND: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee—
The War They Fought, the Peace They Forged**
William C. Davis, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2015,
686 pages

Historian William C. Davis has written an excellent dual biography of two men who shaped the American Civil War. At first glance, it may seem that the two could not be more different. Ulysses S. Grant was the Northern son of a tanner while Robert E. Lee was the Southern son of a ne'er-do-well Revolutionary War officer. Yet, the author succeeds in underlining key similarities. He portrays them as real men of their times while still explaining the origins of their traditional iconic images. This is a valuable book for those who have already studied tactical and operational levels of command yet need to become students of strategic thinking. These


persons necessarily need to understand the philosophy of others in strategic decision-making positions, such as Grant and Lee. This is not a comprehensive view of each man's personal and professional lives. The focus is squarely on their moral worlds and illuminates how and why they made the decisions they did. Fortunately, the author writes of only the most salient points of each man's personal lives as they relate to leadership. This intelligent approach narrows the scope of the book, as well as effectively highlighting how individual ethics and perspectives shaped each man's life and decisions.

This book is authoritative partly because of Davis's credentials and partly due to his wisdom for writing only what he knows to be true. He is primarily interested in facts, and he deliberately relies on contemporary accounts as source

material. An interesting aspect of the work is that the author repeatedly delights in dispelling myths about each man. An example would be lengthy descriptions of how each man experienced slave owning and slavery, which reveals nuanced truths about the times. As a crucial theme, the author draws several successful parallels between Grant and Lee. Among these are that each could compartmentalize their awesome responsibilities, yet each had outstanding strategic vision. Each carefully planned operations, yet either could audaciously find advantages in unexpected setbacks. One important contrast between the two is that while Grant had no fear of direct personal confrontations, Lee detested them. Finally, Davis's primary point is that each man possessed a willingness to seize the initiative and never let go.

One deficit is that the author spends a lot of time defending Grant from charges of alcoholism, which may be revealing of some bias by Davis. As a primarily Southern and Confederate historian writing about Grant, he may have felt a conscious need to explain away Grant's possible failings in order to appear objective.

A student of war who wants to understand how a military leader's personal ethos affects strategic decision



making would be Davis's ideal reader. Both men were—clearly—gifted in understanding strategy. Yet, their behavioral influences and choices also affected how they each made decisions. Davis outlines how their aptitudes developed and how they each were influenced by their ethics. Neither stopped being a student of war, and each had his own ideas of how to use, or not use, a general staff. This is invaluable information for midgrade leaders who aspire to become more beneficial to their senior leaders or to ascend to higher command.

Lt. Col. John T. Miller, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

LEGEND: A Harrowing Story from the Vietnam War of One Green Beret's Heroic Mission to Rescue a Special Forces Team Caught Behind Enemy Lines

Eric Blehm, Crown Publishers, New York, 2015, 304 pages

Legend is a concise biography of retired U.S. Army Master Sgt. Roy P. Benavidez. Its centerpiece is an account of a single day of combat in 1968 in Cambodia—outside the recognized battle lines of the Vietnam War. Eric Blehm grips the reader's attention in the opening paragraphs of the prologue with the final scenes of the battle. He introduces the struggle that followed to give Benavidez full recognition for his actions that day.

Blehm recounts the impoverished upbringing that forged the traits that made Benavidez a man who would defy impossible odds to help his friends in need. He then reviews Benavidez's early military career, his dogged pursuit of an airborne assignment, and his first tour in Vietnam, which left him paralyzed in a military hospital bed. His recovery and return to duty are proof of Benavidez's indomitable spirit.

Interwoven in Benavidez's personal story is the history of the Vietnam War. It provides a broad context for those

less familiar with the subject. Blehm briefly delves deeper into the history and the politics of the parallel secret war in Cambodia, providing the reader a sense of the intrigue that surrounded Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk and of the tenacious mindset of the Viet Cong enemy. Both set the stage for the battle to come.


Blehm's straightforward, no-nonsense prose captures the pace of the action that unfolds. Once the battle begins, the reader will not want to put the book down. The actions of the small team from the Studies and Observations Group, of the aviators of the 240th Assault Helicopter Company, and of Benavidez himself, could potentially leave the reader in total disbelief—if not for Blehm's earlier illustration of how such men develop to be so tough.

This book is a worthwhile contribution to the history of the Vietnam War. Its depiction of the values and determination that led a man to risk his life and overcome extreme adversity has much wider appeal. Anyone unfamiliar with the story should ignore Internet videos on the subject and learn about it for the first time as Blehm reveals it.

Consider this book required reading for anyone thinking of trying out for Special Forces because it clearly describes the mind-set and determination expected to earn the Green Beret. For those who served in Special Forces, this book is a reminder of the principles for which they fought and should continue to fight. Readers of John L. Plaster's book *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* will find *Legend* an eye-opening expansion upon the shorter summary Plaster provides of the battle. While Benavidez's autobiographical *Medal of Honor* provides greater detail on other aspects of his life, *Legend* updates the tale with accounts from additional witnesses, archives, and declassified files.

The greatest service of this book is in keeping the legend alive—not merely of Benavidez but of all of those with whom he served that day—and their generation. It is a vivid reminder to adopt, as Benavidez did, the credo of "Duty, Honor, Country."

Maj. Thomas Nypaver, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



A VERY PRINCIPLED BOY: The Life of Duncan Lee, Red Spy and Cold Warrior

Mark A. Bradley, Basic Books, New York, 384 pages

Petraeus, Cartwright, Sterling, Kiriakou, Manning, Snowden—these are military and civilian officials who, admittedly, reportedly, or as revealed after conviction in a court of law, provided classified information to those without requisite security clearances or a need to know. Recipients included lovers, journalists, and—perhaps directly or eventually—foreign intelligence services. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director David Petraeus paid a fine, and he remains on probation. Jeffrey Sterling, a former midlevel CIA officer, was prosecuted and sentenced to prison. With regard to the case of former Marine Gen. James Cartwright, the information that would have been needed to be released in support of a court proceeding was, reportedly, deemed too sensitive. While critics have suggested nefarious motivations for this variance in prosecution, this is not the first time our leaders have struggled with how far to go in prosecuting espionage.

Such is the setting for Mark Bradley's *A Very Principled Boy: The Life of Duncan Lee, Red Spy and Cold Warrior*. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the predecessor of the CIA, and in 1943, Duncan Lee worked in the office of OSS director William "Wild Bill" Donovan.

J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) knew Lee was also a Soviet spy and investigated him extensively, but Lee died a free man in 1988. How did he get away with this when others did not? Mark Bradley, himself a former CIA officer, taps into declassified primary and secondary sources for *Principled Boy*, providing readers with a valuable examination of this ultimately feckless counterintelligence prosecution, hobbled as it was by internecine politics and national security concerns.

Things went awry for Lee when his second Soviet NKGB (Soviet secret police) handler, Elizabeth Bentley, with whom he claimed to have had a sexual relationship, voluntarily provided detailed information to the FBI about the network of spies she ran, including Lee. It seems obvious what should have

then happened: the FBI's star witness provides enough information to allow the FBI to investigate Lee fully, collect additional damning evidence, and prosecute him in a court of law. As the reader learns, Lee quite cleverly committed his information to memory and only delivered it verbally to his NKGB handlers. As such, the FBI had no "smoking gun" documents to use in court as evidence of his betrayal.

The FBI did, however, have the Venona transcripts—decrypted Soviet communiques that confirmed Lee's identity as a Soviet source and corroborated Bentley's information. Even so, and perhaps as a result of parallels to current cases, U.S. national leadership at the time decided that the revelation of its intelligence capabilities—specifically, the ability to decrypt Soviet communiques—would do more damage than the value gleaned from its use in a criminal court proceeding.

This is where *Principled Boy* gets interesting—not so much for the information Lee was reported to have provided or his motivations, but rather for the government's inability to prosecute. Over the years, Lee was able to keep his story straight enough, and FBI surveillance never was able to identify any incidents in which he conducted espionage. Lee thus benefited from the officials' appropriate concerns regarding inadvertently providing sources and methods to Soviet intelligence, raw politics, Cold War national security excesses (McCarthyism), and the intercession of high-level supporters. Donovan, who hired Lee in the first place and who may have been as much or more interested in preserving his own reputation, continued to support Lee even as Bentley's revelations surfaced and the FBI and State Department took steps to deal with Lee. The section of *Principled Boy* that addresses Ruth Shipley, director of the State Department's passport office, and her Ahabian efforts to refuse Lee a passport, are quite entertaining, especially if you have any direct experience dealing with government bureaucracy.

The reader interested in a detailed history of Cold War espionage, and looking for useful lessons related to today's counterintelligence challenges, will find *A Very Principled Boy* thought provoking and informative.

**John G. Breen, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**MISSION CREEP: The Militarization of U.S.
Foreign Policy?**

**Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, eds., Georgetown
University Press, Washington, DC, 2014, 303 pages**

In the chapter “An Introduction to Mission Creep,” editors Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray assert that since the end of World War II, leaders of the U.S. government have “brought about a growing institutional imbalance at the heart of the foreign policy and national security policy process. This imbalance, many of the chapters in this book suggest, could be said to be gradually ‘militarizing’ American statecraft and global engagement.” To examine this statement, Adams and Murray have collected contributions from a diverse group of authors—some with academic credentials, others with experience in government, and a few with both attributes.

The author of each chapter investigates factors that have led leaders of the government to rely increasingly on the military rather than the Department of State (DOS) to represent the Nation in its interactions with leaders of other nations and their governments. For example, Gordon Adams, who has both academic and government credentials, claims there is a key reason why both the executive and legislative branches have inadequately funded DOS as compared to the Department of Defense (DOD). It is because the number of Americans with ties to DOD is considerably larger than the number with ties with DOS. These funding decisions have notably contributed to an imbalance between DOS and DOD for the past seventy years.

Edward Marks, retired from the foreign service, makes an intriguing proposal: DOS should establish a civilian position that has a scope of responsibilities similar to those of geographic combatant commanders. This individual would be accountable to synchronize the actions of the various elements of the government to achieve the goals of U.S. foreign policy on a regional basis rather than just within a country. Establishing this position would place a civilian that has an equal stature to geographic combatant commanders in position to lead foreign policy across a region. In short, this person would represent the lead department except during the conduct of combat operations.

The authors’ conclusions in *Mission Creep* effectively support the editors’ claim regarding the “militarization” of U.S. policy. The authors explain the implications of continuing the current approach, and they make viable suggestions to correct some of the problems. The chapters in the book are readable and well researched. *Mission Creep* is highly recommended for those who want to understand factors that have led to DOD becoming the lead department in performing many noncombat tasks, and to understand some of the steps that should be taken to enable DOS to assume the lead in developing and conducting the foreign policy of the U.S. government.

Paul B. Gardner, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**COMBAT-READY KITCHEN: How the U.S.
Military Shapes the Way You Eat**

**Anastacia Marx de Salcedo, Penguin Random House,
New York, 2015, 294 pages**

This book examines the impact of the feeding of the military—how it has translated into feeding our families, and how it has effected the corporations and academia that support both functions. Anastacia de Salcedo presents two sides of the issue—the military and corporate/academia facets—and the cooperation between the military and civilian corporations and universities. She proffers the information starting from 3500 B.C. up through what the Natick Soldier System Center is currently cooking up.

This book explains the vital role food plays in the modern military and discusses the interconnection between the military and the food industry. It goes into depth about some of the issues and processes the American military faced during different eras, such as the canning techniques developed by the U.S. Army for troops of the Civil War that spread into the commercial market thanks to the Swift and Armour companies. In addition, the author describes the advent of methods to treat meat products chemically and thermally to kill the bacteria that thrived in the tropical climate encountered by the Army during the Spanish-American War.

The book goes on to discuss how, during World War II, with millions of U.S. and allied troops to feed,

the Army applied new flash-freezing and freeze-drying methods, and it researched and implemented new deboning methods. Also introduced was airtight packaging, which was employed for bread, vegetables, and snacks. With the end of World War II, food manufacturers focused their manufacturing and marketing efforts on the consumer.

The author shows the significant impact of the military on food science, the American diet, the military-culinary complex, the efficiency of American agriculture, and new food-processing techniques. With scratch cooking becoming a dying art, many of the military techniques described in the book have been adopted by commercial food service companies.

I would recommend this book for anyone interested in the connections between the military and society. My impression of this book is that it is well researched and written.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AMERICA AND WORLD WAR I: A Traveler's Guide

Mark D. Van Ells, Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., Northampton, Massachusetts, 2015, 432 pages

Mark Van Ells's *America and World War I: A Traveler's Guide* is an excellent book that skillfully executes the difficult task of combining the two genres of historical narrative and travel guide. In setting out to mesh the two styles, the author provides a great service to the reader without trying to be definitive in either genre. Thus, Van Ells's work is not a traditional historical narrative with a thesis and supporting points, but it is scholarly and well researched, and it reads well. In addition, it is not a traditional tour book. Those looking for a guide to battlefield sites that leads the tourist from historic location to location will not find that here. However, Van Ells's approach places the locations into a more comprehensive context that explains the importance of each site. Perhaps even more important, his book explores scores of locations beyond the well-known battlefields in France, locations that provide fresh new looks at the entire American war effort: an abundance of sites in the United States;


airfields, training bases, and supply bases in France; and even sites in Great Britain and Italy. As the author puts it, "Great War history can turn up in the most unexpected places."

The book is generally arranged chronologically, but it includes topical chapters such as those on Pershing, the American rear area, areas outside of France, African-American troops, the war at sea, and the air war.

The first four chapters (almost one-fifth of the book) cover events before American units arrive in France, which is one of the great strengths of the book. These pre-deployment sections examine skirmishes with Poncho

Villa in Columbus, New Mexico (a training ground for the Army and John Pershing), the training of American soldiers on bases across the United States, and the embarkation of American forces for their deployment to France. The next chapter, "The Great War at Sea," covers sites in the United States and Europe—locations that are truly unique because the Navy's role in the war is virtually ignored by tour guide books. Chapters 6 and 7 cover the American arrival and training in Europe before being committed to battle. Van Ells explores ground that is rarely treated in other works: debarkation ports and training bases throughout France, as well as "quiet" sectors of the front where Yanks got their first taste of combat. The remaining chapters trace the major battles of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France.

While not the best guide book (but still very useful) for seeing the traditional AEF battlefields in France, Van Ells's work excels in many areas. Those wishing to visit the major AEF battlefields can use other guides such as the Michelin series, the works of Maj. and Mrs. Holt, and modern road maps, and supplement them with material from Van Ells. Those who seek the more unique sites in both Europe and America will



find *America and World War I* (again, augmented with modern road maps) to be a superb guide.

Curtis S. King, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE GREAT CALL-UP: The Guard, the Border, and the Mexican Revolution

Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 2015, 576 pages

Remembrance of the federal mobilization of the National Guard for service along the Mexican border in 1916 has largely been conflated with the concurrent Punitive Expedition into Mexico, and overshadowed by the entrance of the United States into the Great War. Charles Harris and Louis Sadler aim to correct this oversight with their detailed study of the National Guard's service on the border. The border crisis is often seen as a sideshow to the Punitive Expedition, even though around one hundred fifty thousand guardsmen served on the border, while around twelve thousand soldiers served in the Punitive Expedition. Therefore, Harris and Sadler question which was the main effort and which was the sideshow. They dismiss the common misperception that movement of National Guard units from every state to the border was an overreaction to a few bandit raids on Texas towns in the aftermath of the raid by Francisco "Pancho" Villa on Columbus, New Mexico.

Instead, they argue that the government of Mexican President Venustiano Carranza was sponsoring raids along the border, and that it was involved in the Plan of San Diego, a proposed uprising of Hispanics within the Border States. They show that the threat of war was very real. In that light, the mobilization was part of a successful American effort to demonstrate the ability to mass large numbers of troops on the border to deter the Carranza government.

Against that background, the volume tells the story of the mobilization of the Guard and its service along the border. The book is in two sections: the first section is an overview of the border crisis from early 1916 until the removal of most National Guard units by February 1917. The second section centers on the experience of National Guard units from specific states to specific sections of the border. Drawing mainly on newspaper

accounts, War Department records, and state records, the authors describe the process of mobilization and the service on the border, with chapters moving in geographical order from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean.

The book's organization is effective if encyclopedic, although tighter editing could have avoided some repetition. What emerges is the span of readiness of units, from barely functional to well organized and ready for service. The Army, however, tried to hold National Guard units to standards that Regular Army units could not meet, and it tended to denigrate the competency of the Guard formations in an attempt to force Congress to institute universal military training. While on the border, Guard units began ambitious programs that not only gave guardsmen toughening and training but also gave Regular Army officers experience handling larger formations.

The border call-up provided important practical experience to regular officers who would soon be handling similarly sized formations in Europe. The presence of two guard divisions (New York and Pennsylvania), plus enough Guard and Regular units to make another seven provisional divisions, allowed regular officers to create corps and conduct large-scale training exercises.

The Great Call-Up is a welcome addition to the historiography of the National Guard and the evolution of the U.S. Army. Harris and Sadler have caused us to look anew at the border crisis and the call-up. They have brought a long-needed recognition of the importance of the call-up to an understanding of the border and relations between the United States and Mexico during the second decade of the twentieth century, the evolution of the National Guard, and the preparation of the U.S. Army for entrance into the Great War.

Barry M. Stentiford, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THINKING BEYOND BOUNDARIES:

Transnational Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy
Hugh Liebert, John Griswold, and Isaiah Wilson III, eds., Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2015, 256 pages

Thinking Beyond Boundaries: Transnational Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy is a compilation of eighteen papers into three

narrower—yet still broad—topical areas. The papers were primarily written by U.S. Military Academy faculty for the 2011 Student Conference on U.S. Affairs. The conference is an annual four-day event focused on U.S. foreign policy, hosted at the academy. It brings together faculty and undergraduates from universities across the United States and foreign universities, as well as policymakers from around the world.

The first six papers examine domestic issues in foreign policy. The second six papers examine regional dynamics in foreign policy. The final six papers consider how to turn global challenges into foreign policy opportunities.

In thought-provoking fashion, the papers within the first section address a myriad of domestic issues that influence, if not drive, U.S. foreign policy. Consider the challenges and opportunities in developing and coordinating whole-of-government approaches to foreign policy issues within the current domestic political environment. How does the evolution of education in the United States influence foreign policy? Does the average citizen give thought to how civil-military relations in the United States affect foreign policy? How do these, and other domestic issues, influence domestic policies as we strive to protect national interests?

The second section of the book focuses on regions of the globe beyond U.S. boundaries. Issues are pursued relating to China as a competitor and partner and to the continually changing politics of the Middle East, as relationships with allies shift in accordance with their strategic interests. The authors consider how the European economic crisis, the European Union, and the future of NATO affect foreign policy. What does the recent United States policy shift toward the African continent portend with its myriad of foreign policy challenges and opportunities? What roles do North, Central, and South America play as producers and consumers of drugs, and what are the challenges to sovereignty that accompany drug production and consumption?

The final section of the book addresses the potential for turning global challenges into foreign-policy opportunities. How does the United States govern the electronic commons—the open-access resource that is the Internet? Are there opportunities within the challenges of controlling the proliferation of nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons with the myriad of state and nonstate actors? What is the correct mix of trade protectionism versus trade liberalism for the United States to maintain a leading position in the global economy? The writers consider the challenges of resource extraction, production, and movement to market and the environmental concerns associated with each step in the process. Other minerals besides oil have strategic implications for nations; for example, phosphate rock is essential for global fertilizer production. This resource clearly has global implications for a human population projected by some to reach around eleven billion by the end of this century.


Thinking Beyond Boundaries represents an opportunity for the reader to delve deeply into the complex issues facing U.S. leadership striving to protect current strategic interests, identify new interests arising from changing global situations, assist current allies, and sway possible future allies. This book is an excellent read, guaranteed to adjust most reader's views on contemporary topics of concern.

**Lt. Col. Kevin Lee Watson, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Belvoir, Virginia**

**ALWAYS FAITHFUL, ALWAYS FORWARD: The
Forging of a Special Operations Marine**
Dick Couch, Berkley Books, New York, 2014,
352 pages

For those familiar with Dick Couch's writing, the subject of his most recent work, *Always Faithful, Always Forward*, will not come as a surprise. In it, Couch follows the path of Class 1-13 on their journey to become critical skills operators (CSOs) and special operations officers in U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC, or Raiders).

Couch's previous works in this field have followed the paths of similarly hopeful Army Rangers and Green Berets, and Navy SEALs (Sea, Air, and Land teams), among others. However, the most noticeable difference in *Always Faithful, Always Forward* is not the discrepancies between training in the various branches, but the newness and still-nebulous nature of MARSOC within the larger special operations forces (SOF) community.



Yes, its history is one steeped in the tradition of World War II's Raiders, but the formal structure of MARSOC is one that arose in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan less than one decade ago. In this sense, the book is as much a learning process for the writer as it is for the reader.

Over the course of about 350 pages,

Couch spans a great breadth of subjects related to MARSOC, including the history of Marine SOF, MARSOC's current structure, and the role it has played in recent conflicts in the Middle East. Despite the frequent lack of detail in accordance with the classification that comes alongside MARSOC training, Couch also manages to give a close look at the pipeline from marine to CSO or special security officer (SSO).

Unfortunately, Couch does not take advantage of the relative dearth of history to build upon the story of Class 1-13 or the few that have come before it. The book frequently comes off as prescriptive and shies away from the telling of this class's story in a personal manner. Considering the lack of history, this book's most thoughtful opportunity was to tell the story of the marines who choose to go through this process, their backgrounds, and where they ended up (while CSOs stay within the MARSOC community, SSOs cycle out akin to the Army Ranger model).

That is not to say the book does not have value. In a policy environment that emphasizes interoperability, it is a worthwhile practice to understand not only the capabilities of corollary units, but also their culture, background, and values, particularly for service members at the tactical and operational levels of combat. *Always Faithful, Always Forward* acts as a basic text in this regard, but by seeking to cover a great expanse at the cost of depth and personality, Couch does not cover any one topic in a satisfying way. My bottom line? Use it as a bouncing-off point for a more in-depth understanding of the unit, or alone if you are looking to brush up on the basics.

Adin Dobkin, Washington, D.C.

**APPOMATTOX: The Last Days of Robert E. Lee's
Army of Northern Virginia**
Michael E. Haskew, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2015,
256 pages

The Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) could be called the heart and soul of the entire Confederate Army during the American Civil War, and the heart of the Confederacy itself. Without its defeat, the idea of a Confederate States of America could not be eliminated.

Michael Haskew does a superb job in presenting the last days of the ANV and the defeat of Robert E. Lee. While this relatively short work of history concentrates on the final thirty days or so before its surrender, the author also intersperses a great deal of other noteworthy information.

He injects short, informative personal backgrounds on the key military and political figures of the period that support not only the main story but also the discussion of the war itself. In addition, the author compares and contrasts the leaders of both armies (he writes, "rarely have there been such differences in personality and style than between Lee and Grant"), lending credence and support to how events played out. When Lee became concerned about the delay in times between letters with Grant concerning the proposed cease fire before the surrender, it was Gen. James Longstreet who, based on his knowledge and relationship with Grant before the war, assured Lee that the terms would be generous. Haskew quotes the famous words of Lee just leaving for the surrender meeting, "There is nothing left for me to do but to go see Gen. Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths."

There is preface and build up to the final battles leading to the surrender that make the book useful as a larger work of military history. These include the description of Grant's ambitious and broad strategy in 1864, the four major battles of the Overland Campaign in 1864 that led to the establishment of the trench works around Petersburg and Richmond, and the startling comparisons of what would be nearly identical conditions of trench warfare in the First World War. The author provides

vivid descriptions of Richmond's fall and the evacuation of the Confederate government in the vain hope of maintaining its existence. He also discusses Abraham Lincoln's visit to Richmond almost immediately after its fall and adds a short insight into Lincoln's desire to quickly integrate the South back into the Union. Speaking to his guide, Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, Lincoln said, "If I were you, I'd let 'em up easy, let 'em up easy." Haskew adds a rather humorous quotation of a North Carolina infantryman after capture: "Yes, you got me, and a hell of a git you got." This does much to illustrate the poor state of the ANV along with its still-combative spirit. The author describes Philip Sheridan's aggressive operations to interrupt and stop the joining of Lee's force with Gen. Joseph Johnston's in North Carolina.

The generous surrender terms by Grant and the poignant story of William McClean—who could rightfully claim that the war began in his front yard in Manassas and finished in his parlor in Appomattox—bring the human side of the conflict into the forefront. Haskew was correct when he concluded that Lee embodied the highest qualities of honor and nobility and led an army that covered itself in glory—but in the end was conquered, not the least reason being that it was tarnished by its defense of slavery.

I highly recommend including this book in any military professional's library.

**Col. Richard D. Koethe III, U.S. Army, Retired,
Alexandria, Virginia**

**AMERICANS AT WAR IN FOREIGN FORCES:
A History, 1914-1945**

**Chris Dickon, McFarland & Company,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 234 pages**

Chris Dickon is an Emmy Award-winning public broadcasting producer and self-described researcher of "lesser-known aspects of American history." His latest work is a thorough and in-depth account of Americans who have fought and died under the banners of foreign powers during the first half of the twentieth century. The author presents a painstakingly researched collection of personal stories and government records that intertwines tens of


thousands of American-born combatants with some of the greatest military struggles of the last century.

Americans at War's strength lies in its intensely human account of the personal lives and convictions of individuals leaving their home country to fight in the unspeakable horrors of combat. Covering land, air, and sea battles, Dickon weaves an account of little-known Ivy League adventurers, middle class professionals, and outcast mercenaries who risked their lives and citizenships in conflicts where the United States was determined not to participate.

Americans at War provides a glimpse into the lives of thousands of Americans who signed on with foreign forces to fight in some of the twentieth century's bloodiest conflicts. Those men and women remained personally loyal to their home country but willingly left its isolationism to protect countries that did not have the luxury of deferring war. The book is valuable for its insight into the individual and international drama that accompanied the involvement of many Americans fighting European wars.

While rewarding for anyone interested in military or American history, the readability of the book could benefit from a thorough editing to correct distracting spelling errors and an occasionally difficult-to-follow progression. Particularly in the first half, the book suffers from a somewhat rambling and recursive narrative, making abrupt chronological shifts that occasionally leave the reader wondering what decade the author is talking about. I recommend readers patiently stay with the book from its beginning, though, as the historical accounts given in the first chapters enable the reader to understand American citizens' involvement in the book's later conflicts.

I believe this book is an important and recommendable glimpse into the heart of an individual fighter's commitment to the causes he or she believes are righteous. It also provides a historical narrative against which readers can better understand Americans who today join foreign causes. Modern accounts that



parallel *Americans at War* include Lawrence Franks, the former U.S. Army lieutenant who deserted U.S. military service for the French Foreign Legion in 2009, or the scores of U.S. citizens estimated to be fighting the Islamic State in Kurdish *Peshmerga* formations. Perhaps most applicable, though, might be insight that readers can find in understanding the backgrounds of the Americans who flocked to Europe in the last century and comparing them to the ultimately human motivations of the foreign fighters that have battled against coalition forces in the Global War on Terrorism.

Maj. Lance B. Brender, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE OTTOMAN ENDGAME: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923

Sean McMeekin, Penguin Press, New York, 2015, 550 pages

The Ottoman Endgame by Sean McMeekin opens dramatically with the coronation of the last independent Ottoman emperor, Abdul Hamid, in 1876, and ends with the establishment of modern Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Between those two seminal events, McMeekin narrates a history of complex strategic decisions, momentous battles, and human tragedy.

The story, in different forms, has been told before. The genius of McMeekin's work, however, is how he highlights the importance of all actors—local, national, religious, political, and military—in shaping the outcome that led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Turkey.

The simplistic belief that the troubles of the Middle East are solely the result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and greedy division of the Ottoman Empire by France and Great Britain is a great flaw of modern educated discourse. This book's importance lies in its ability to explain the geopolitical decision making of the Entente powers (to include Russia, usually ignored), as well as that of the Ottomans, Imperial Germany, and local ethnic groups such as the Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Kurds.

Readers will note the numerous and forgotten successes of the Ottomans in their final years. From

the Balkan wars in the early twentieth century to the final battles of World War I, the Ottoman forces showed a particular ability to regenerate and inflict grievous damage on their opponents. In fact, the book highlights that rather than solely being victims of Western imperialism, the Ottomans, and particularly the Young Turks, who ran the operations of the state following the revolution of 1911, were skilled at manipulating their opponents to prolong the existence of the empire. This is illustrated dramatically by the resurgence of Turkish forces under Mustapha Kamal after World War I that led to the creation of Turkey.

Military officers will benefit from the analysis of the numerous battles that shaped these outcomes. Diplomats and geopolitical thinkers will achieve a greater understanding of the forces and complex negotiations at play in the Ottoman Empire's final years. Those historians and military enthusiasts with knowledge of the era will gain a better perspective on the relative importance of such iconic events as the battle of Gallipoli and T.E. Lawrence's support for the Arab revolts, in comparison with the lesser-known but equally important Russian and British battles in the Caucasus.

The limits of McMeekin's work lie in the breadth of the topic he addresses, which inhibits in-depth study of any single event, and the reliance of the author on his previous works as sources. The book will likely face criticism for its refusal to paint any group purely as victims, no matter how decimated during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This detached and pithy analysis proves a respite from other politically charged historical narratives. The only chink in this detachment comes in McMeekin's breathless coverage of the nationalist Turkish resurgence against the Greeks in 1922.

The Ottoman Endgame will prove to be an important addition to the academic literature on the final years of the empire and the creation of the modern Middle East. It acts as a cautionary tale to any entity attempting to alter the geopolitical landscape of this region. McMeekin's narrative has no innocent leaders, only actors skillfully seeking the best possible outcomes for their associated groups.

Maj. Roland Minez, U.S. Army Reserve, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE NEW CYBERWAR: Technology and the Redefinition of Warfare

Dennis F. Poindexter, *McFarland & Company*,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2015, 221 pages

Dennis Poindexter, a former faculty member of the Defense Security Institute and member of the president's Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee, points out that cyberwar is a secretive and daunting type of warfare. Although cyberwarfare is not new, it is much more prevalent today, in the information age, than it was in the past. With the widespread use of the Internet, and its impact on developed and developing countries, cyberwar can have catastrophic effects on how we all live our lives. This book takes us on a journey by discussing traditional warfare and then describes how cyberwar, in conjunction with an interconnected world and high-speed Internet, redefines it.

Poindexter lays the groundwork for his audience as he discusses the history of warfare and how it has transformed from armies facing off on bloody battlefields to the secret technology sparring matches that warfare has become. He believes that some countries, mainly China, Russia, and the United States, are in the midst of a cyberwar, and their citizenries are oblivious to that fact. He places a spotlight on Chinese and Russian efforts to conduct war without firing a weapon or ever touching American soil. The war that these two countries wage against America is not a war of armies but rather a technological war in which the battlefield is cyberspace and the prize is control of information and access to crucial military, government, financial, and infrastructure systems.

Contrary to popular belief, cyberwar encompasses more than stealthy hackers stealing data and breaking into information systems. It also depends heavily on


media outlets, including network news and social media, to propagate various agendas or to distract adversaries. Therefore, controlling the media or the narrative in the media is paramount because it allows cyber warriors to manipulate the psyche of a large population. This book gives the example of Russia's overwhelming control of Crimea's information and media outlets, which projected the idea that the region was welcoming of the Russian invaders. With this egregious distortion of information transmitted through conventional and cyber means, the author indicates that cyber warriors not only have the power to conduct cyberwarfare, but they also have the ability to wage an effective psychological campaign that can affect the perceptions and behaviors of a target audience.

Although there are numerous advantages to cyber technology, Poindexter focuses on the dangers of technology when it is used as an instrument of war. Therefore, he argues that the military should have a more defined role in combating cyber threats. He debates that a task so great should not leave the military out. Well, there is definitely validity in his argument. Even though the military is not as advanced as it would like to be, its leaders continue to address their role in cyber battles. Their struggle with defining the military role speaks to the complexity of cyberwarfare and forces them to look to scholars like Poindexter.

The book's description of the new cyberwar is intriguing. We do not just need to protect nuclear launch codes. Electrical grids, hospital records, bank accounts, Internet topologies, and much more need our protection. This is a thought-provoking read that traces how cyberwar morphed from what it was in the 1980s to what is today and what it is likely to become as

technology advances in the future. The author designed this book for inquisitive readers who are interested in the effects of technology on modern warfare, much like the military leaders mentioned earlier.

Capt. Matthew Miller, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas






Capt. Florent A. Groberg

MEDAL OF HONOR

Afghanistan



Capt. Florent A. Groberg, U.S. Army, retired, was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Barack Obama during a ceremony held 12 November 2015 at the White House. Groberg received the military's highest award for valor for his actions on 8 August 2012 in Kunar Province, Afghanistan.

On that day, then 1st Lt. Groberg was commanding a personal security detachment designated to protect twenty-eight coalition and Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel, including two brigade commanders, two battalion commanders, a brigade command sergeant major, a battalion command sergeant major, and an ANA battalion commander. Groberg was leading the security formation on foot from Forward Operating Base Fiaz to the provincial governor's compound in Asadabad, Kunar.

As the patrol neared a small bridge, Groberg noticed a man walking backwards toward the patrol. Thinking that the man looked suspicious, Groberg yelled at him, and the man abruptly spun around and approached the patrol. Groberg and his radio telephone operator, Sgt. Andrew J. Mahoney, moved to cut him off. As they pushed the man back away from the patrol, Groberg noticed a bulge under the man's clothing and realized it was an explosive vest. The two soldiers physically drove the man away from the patrol and onto the ground. When the man hit the ground, his vest exploded, sending lethal ball bearings in every direction. The blast threw the two soldiers fifteen feet and left them both with severe injuries.

A second suicide bomber, approaching from a different direction, also detonated his vest, possibly prematurely due to the first explosion. The second blast killed four others: brigade Command Sgt. Maj. Kevin J. Griffin, Maj. Thomas E. Kennedy, Air Force Maj. Walter D. Gray, and Foreign Service officer Ragaei Abdelfattah from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

During the Medal of Honor ceremony, President Obama said Groberg's actions were "extraordinary," and



(Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)
Sgt. Andrew Mahoney and then 1st Lt. Groberg in Asadabad, Afghanistan, circa August 2012.

that Groberg "had the instincts and the courage to do what was needed."

The president also spoke of the four men who were killed. "These four men believed in America," he said. "They dedicated their lives to our country. They died serving it. Their families—loving wives and children, parents and siblings—bear that sacrifice most of all."

Groberg was inducted into the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes the day after the Medal of Honor ceremony. During the induction ceremony, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter praised Groberg and the other members of the personal security detachment, citing many of them by name for their actions on 8 August 2012.

Carter said of Groberg, "At the moment of greatest testing, he made the most selfless and courageous choice of all: to run toward the direction of danger; to willingly put his life on the line for the sake of his brothers."

Mahoney was also recognized for his actions during the attack. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal during a ceremony on 22 April 2013 at Fort Carson, Colorado, and was honored as the Army Soldier of the Year during the 2014 United Service Organizations (USO) Gala on 17 October 2014 in Washington, D.C.

Groberg has medically retired from the Army, but continues to serve as a Department of Defense civilian. Mahoney still serves as a soldier.

Left: Capt. Florent Groberg, U.S. Army, retired, speaks at the White House Medal of Honor Ceremony, 12 November 2015.

(Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense PAO)