


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Correction: The photograph on page 45 of the September-October issue was taken by Landis McIntire.

Thirty Years After the Revolution

Since the revolution, the Algerian leadership has demonstrated the ability to adapt to changing economic and political realities while remaining faithful to the ideals for which the war of liberation was fought.

BY HUGH ROBERTS

Thirty years ago, in the early hours of November 1, 1954, about a dozen small bands of poorly armed men attacked police stations, warehouses, and similar establishments at widely separated points throughout Algeria. A few hours later, a young Algerian named Ahmed Ben Bella stepped in front of the microphones of Radio Sawt el-Arab—"Voice of the Arabs"—in Cairo to claim responsibility for the attacks on behalf of an entirely unknown organization, the National Liberation Front (FLN). The Algerian revolution had begun, and with it, a bitter seven-and-a-half year war which was to cost hundreds of thousands of lives and bring down the Fourth Republic in France before Algeria at last gained its independence.

This year, the sovereign state which was the fruit of that struggle celebrates the 30th anniversary of its revolutionary birth. But what kind of state is it? What kind of independence has Algeria achieved, and what has it done with its freedom? Is the society which now exists that which the pioneers of 1954 envisaged?

The FLN was formed by a handful of adventurous activists exasperated by

Hugh Roberts, a lecturer at the University of East Anglia, England, is currently writing a book on Algerian politics. He is the author of numerous articles on Algerian sociology and politics.

the impasse in which Algerian nationalism found itself in 1954. They were all former members of the movement led by the charismatic Messali Hadj, who had dominated nationalist politics since the 1920s. By 1950, the movement was paralyzed by internal conflict between the followers of Messali, who adhered to a revolutionary vision but lacked a program for its implementation, and the advocates of an electoralist and legalist strategy, who appeared to hold out even less prospect of success.

This was the context in which the FLN was formed in the summer of 1954. Its founders' decision to launch a guerrilla war was a gamble born of desperation as much as anything else. The nationalist movement retreated from its urban bases to the countryside and, in particular, to the mountains, where few Europeans had settled and the traditional system of land tenure and its corresponding feudal structures had survived largely intact. The FLN's strategy was to mobilize these structures, and the traditions of social banditry and armed resistance to the central power which accompanied them, in order to outflank the political parties and create a new rallying point for the nationalist movement in a people's war.

The extraordinary thing is that they succeeded. Within two years, the FLN had expanded from its initial mountain

bastions to all parts of the country and had established a virtual monopoly on political representation of Algerian Muslims. Had the socialist government in Paris been able to honor its election pledge to negotiate a peace settlement in Algeria at this point, the political history of both Algeria and France would have been very different. But Paris capitulated yet again to the Algerian settler lobby and the war dragged on for five more years before Charles de Gaulle was able to overcome settler and army resistance to Algerian independence.

By 1962, however, the FLN leadership had changed dramatically. Power had passed from the exhausted guerrilla forces of the interior to the provisional government, based in Tunis. Its "army of the frontiers," prevented from returning to combat zones inside Algeria by the electrified fences and minefields along the borders, had developed into a well-equipped and disciplined regular army staffed by highly politicized and ambitious officers.

In the struggle for power within the FLN in the summer of 1962, the army was the real victor. The politicians of the provisional government lost control of the army to the general staff headed by Colonel Houari Boumedienne, and it was through the backing of Boumedienne and his allies that Ben Bella was

brought to power as independent Algeria's first president.

The political turmoil continued, however, for five years more. The abrupt departure of one million Europeans in 1962 created a huge power vacuum at every level, and the rush to fill it was accompanied by intense factionalism, reflected within the highest reaches of the regime. Boumedienne's army was the only solidly organized force which was national in character, but its claims to the role of arbiter of the situation were resisted by many factions at first. It was Ben Bella's attempt to eliminate Boumedienne and his allies and to induce the army to retire to the barracks for good which precipitated his own downfall in the coup of June 19, 1965.

It took the Boumedienne regime two years more to consolidate its position, but from 1968 onwards, it at last had its hands free to tackle the immense problems confronting the newly independent state. More than two million peasants had been uprooted during the war; agriculture was in disarray; the coastal cities

built by and for Europeans were being swamped by rural migrants; and the bulk of industry and infrastructure, not to mention the hydrocarbons sector, were still in foreign hands.

The first task was to create a state machine capable of dealing with these problems and of responding to the material aspirations of a population which had been profoundly radicalized by the war. By 1970, local and regional government structures had been established; the majority of foreign firms in the industrial sector had been nationalized; public finances had been reorganized and a state banking system set up; and more than 30 new public corporations, modeled on the French *sociétés nationales*, had been created. The ground had thus been prepared for the regime's most ambitious and decisive move yet—the nationalization of the oil industry in February 1971.

The historic nature of this event is worth recalling today. Algeria was the first Arab country to attempt the comprehensive nationalization of its oil industry since Mossadegh's failed at-

tempt in Iran in 1953. Its success testified to the changed balance of forces between the oil-rich countries and their Western customers. By encouraging other oil producers to follow suit, Algeria laid the groundwork for the rise of OPEC two years later.

State control of oil and natural gas gave Boumedienne's government the means with which to pursue what became one of the most ambitious programs of industrial development in the Third World. The priority to be given to industry was already apparent in the first four-year plan (1970-1973). The massive oil price rise of 1973-4 permitted a corresponding multiplication of planned industrial investment in the second plan (1974-77).

Emphasis was placed on heavy industry—the so-called "industrializing industries" advocated by French economist Destanne de Bernis—namely hydrocarbons and steel. The strategy gambled on securing a share of world markets for Algeria's industrial manufactures as well as for its oil and gas, and



Gas terminal at Arzew: "Nationalism of the oil industry in 1971 laid the groundwork for the rise of OPEC two years later"

this in turn required the importation of the most up-to-date and sophisticated capital equipment.

The strategy, however, had four awkward implications. First, capital-intensive industrialization generated relatively few jobs initially; hence labor migration to France remained a necessary safety valve for the unemployed. Second, the immense cost of imported capital goods required continuing austerity at home, with little scope for the satisfaction of the consumer needs of a rapidly growing population.

Third, a huge public sector bureaucracy developed, dominated by the giant state corporations, some of which, notably Sonatrach (the state hydrocarbons company), were to become virtual states-within-the-state. Fourth, the agricultural sector was largely neglected and continued to deteriorate, as a new generation of peasants' sons grew up fired by a single resolve—to get off the land and into salaried employment as quickly as possible.

Boumedienne's attempts to deal with

of a new cooperative sector of agricultural production and marketing; the introduction of "socialist management" in the public sector enterprises, much resisted by senior executives; the creation of a public health service, also resisted by private practitioners; and measures to further decentralize the system of regional government.

Resistance to these policies from the private sector and within the bureaucracy led him to assume more power within the regime and to attempt to revive the ruling party, the FLN, by recruiting new, explicitly socialist blood into its ranks. This was designed to give the party in practice the role it performed in theory—that of mobilizing the population and orienting and controlling the activities of the executive.

This attempt failed for two reasons. After independence, the FLN had never been more than a façade. The wartime FLN had not been a political party in the first place, but a liberation front in which the military wing had been predominant from the outset. Within the regime es-

1971-72, government policy had been essentially technocratic and elitist in both conception and implementation, and in no way required popular mobilization. The result was that the population had become an increasingly apathetic and cynical spectator of the political process, while the army and bureaucracy had developed vested interests which they were not prepared to have challenged by the rise of an autonomous party organization aspiring to bring them under its control.

Such popular mobilization and radicalization during the last years of Boumedienne's rule was to prove superficial and ephemeral. Had he lived, matters might have developed differently. But his death on December 27, 1978, on the eve of the first party congress since 1964, which was to have launched the FLN in its new role at the center of the political stage, ended that possibility. The congress, dominated by military delegates, was reduced to ratifying the army's choice of Colonel Chadli Benjedid as Boumedienne's successor. Within two years, Chadli had largely reduced the party to his personal instrument and eliminated the most prominent of Boumedienne's associates.

At the outset, the new government's policies were far from clear. During Chadli's first two years as president, a profound debate took place within the regime over economic strategy, which was accompanied by intense in-fighting and settling of scores. A decision was reached to retreat from Boumedienne's strictly socialist approach, to abandon the more ambitious aspects of his industrialization strategy, and in particular, to pay more attention to consumer needs, especially housing.

While these new perspectives were being clarified, Algeria lived through a period of unprecedented social and political agitation. Between 1979 and 1981, the regime found itself confronted with a wave of autonomous movements advancing essentially cultural and ideological demands and displaying an independence and, in some cases, an outright defiance of the government which would have been unthinkable in Boumedienne's day.

First off the mark were the *arabissantes*, who demanded that the government carry further its principled com-



Ahmed Ben Bella, first president of post-independence Algeria: "The FLN was formed by a handful of adventurous activists exasperated by the impasse in which Algerian nationalism found itself in 1954"

these problems led to renewed tensions within the country and among the political elite. From late 1971 onwards, he began to pursue radical socialist policies on all fronts: the "agrarian revolution," which involved the nationalization of large landed property and the creation

established by Boumedienne's coup in 1965, real power was shared by the army and the senior elements of the bureaucracy. The role of the party was to explain and justify decisions taken elsewhere, not to reason why.

Moreover, until the "left turn" of

mitment to the Arabization of education and public administration and provide more employment opportunities for students educated in Arabic. These demands were received sympathetically by the government, in sharp contrast to those of the Berberist movement, based on the two million-strong Berber-speaking population of the Kabylia region, whose second language is French rather than Arabic.

Alarmed at the prospect of further measures of Arabization, the Berberists sought to protect Kabyle interests by securing official recognition of Berber as a second national language. These demands were voiced most spectacularly in early 1980, when students occupied the university building at Tizi Ouzou, the capital of the Kabylia region, and region-wide strikes and demonstrations culminated in a general strike, quickly followed by fierce rioting when force was used to clear the university. The government has since made only the most token concessions to the Berberists and has consistently rejected their main demand. But it appears to have succeeded in quelling unrest in Kabylia, in part through massive public investment in the region.

Perhaps the most serious challenge came from Islamic fundamentalists, some of whom were organized in the Muslim Brotherhood, others who were inspired rather by the Iranian example. Between 1979 and 1982, the movement displayed a considerable degree of organization. It engaged in a number of spectacular acts, including the burning of a brothel, assaults on young women in Western dress, the holding of prayer gatherings in "wild-cat" mosques outside the purview of official, state-controlled Islam, and even armed attacks on police stations.

The movement enjoyed a measure of indulgence and even complicity within certain spheres of the regime, and proved useful in countering the influence of left-wing elements in the party and its satellite "mass organizations." But by 1982, it had outlived its usefulness in these respects and by resorting to increasingly blatant violence, had begun to overreach itself. The government finally moved decisively against it in November 1982, arresting the bulk of its leadership, some of whom have since

been put on trial for crimes against the state. The movement has not been destroyed, but it has clearly failed to evoke the support of more than a small minority.

There is no doubt, however, that a significant revival of Islamic sentiment has occurred throughout Algerian society in recent years. The government has responded positively to it in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important of these has been the promulgation of the long-debated "Family Code" in May of this year. Explicitly based on the Koran and the *Sharia* (Islamic law), it authorizes polygamy and denies Algerian women (but not men) the right to marry non-Muslims, representing a clear defeat for the liberal and modernist wing of the intelligentsia.

"Chadli's regime has emerged from its prolonged baptism of fire with its authority enhanced."

By early 1983, Chadli's regime had emerged from its prolonged baptism of fire with its authority enhanced. It had displayed an ability to listen and respond selectively to the demands and criticisms put forward by the public. The government had also managed to reorient policy in a number of areas while preserving a good deal of continuity with earlier strategic options, and to organize a far-reaching renewal of the regime's personnel with a minimum of political instability.

It accordingly felt able to take several further steps away from the highly centralized socialism which characterized its predecessor's economic policy. Problems with the vast and often inefficient bureaucracy, which Boumedienne had sought to bring under party control, were henceforth to be solved in a new way.

The giant state companies were to be "restructured" into a plethora of smaller enterprises, many of them located away from the capital. These would be far easier to manage but would also be ex-

pected to generate profits. In this way, the government hoped to put an end to the buck-passing and corruption responsible for much of the waste of resources and the low productivity levels in the public sector. Parallel to this, many of the controls on private enterprise were lifted, not only in light industry and commerce, but also in agriculture. Agriculture is to be given more attention and investment under the forthcoming five-year plan (1985-1989).

Chadli himself was effortlessly chosen as the FLN's candidate for a second five-year term as president at the party congress in December 1983. Following his re-election in January this year, he further consolidated his position through an extensive reshuffling of government, party, and army personnel.

These developments in internal politics since independence, from the cautious but elitist *etatisme* of 1965-71, to the more ambitious and radical socialism of 1971-78, to the adoption of a rather pragmatic and more liberal development strategy under Chadli, have been broadly mirrored in Algeria's foreign policy and international alignments.

In 1962, the newly independent state already possessed a remarkable team of seasoned diplomats who had learned the ropes of international diplomacy the hard way as ambassadors of the FLN's cause. Moreover, the main themes of Algeria's international outlook had been clearly established in the course of the liberation struggle. The independence of the Algerian revolution vis-à-vis Cairo and Moscow, not to mention Western capitals, was fiercely emphasized, as was its international dimension—its status as part of "the normal course of the historical evolution of humanity, which no longer accepts the existence of captive nations."

Since 1962, Algeria's foreign policy has been remarkably consistent and faithful to its original commitments. Under Ben Bella and Boumedienne, Algeria provided constant, if often unobtrusive, support to bona fide liberation movements in Africa and Asia as well as in the Arab world, while notably refraining from meddling in their internal affairs. It also looked further afield under Boumedienne, developing warm relations with North Vietnam, China, and particularly Cuba, as well as with the

USSR itself and other Soviet-bloc countries, without compromising its non-aligned position by excessive dependence on particular allies.

The early 1970s were a high point in Algeria's international prominence. As host of the conference of non-aligned countries in September 1973, Algeria assumed the leadership of the Third World, at least for a time. It was Algerian diplomacy that persuaded the majority of sub-Saharan African states to sever diplomatic relations with Israel in the wake of the 1973 October war, and that subsequently paved the way for Yassir Arafat's address to the UN General Assembly.

And it was Boumedienne who, in his capacity as president of the non-aligned movement, persuaded the General Assembly to debate for the first time in its history the question of the sovereignty of developing countries over their natural resources, a move which constituted the point of departure for the North-South dialogue and the concept of a new international economic order.

It was from this position of strength that the Boumedienne regime at last sought a definitive reconciliation with France. By late 1971, Algeria had already largely renegotiated its economic relationship with France away from that of a neo-colonial dependent to that of a respected trading partner. A major improvement in political relations appeared to have been achieved when President Giscard d'Estaing visited Algiers in 1975.

But within a year, relations with Paris were at rock bottom. The crisis in the Western Sahara had come to a head. France was backing Morocco's annexation of the territory, and Algeria suddenly found itself isolated and almost besieged, its influence ebbing on all fronts. Initially, its support for the Polisario Front not only evoked little sympathy elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa, but it also split the Maghreb into two axes, with Mauritania, previously Algeria's client, and Tunisia supporting the Moroccan position, with only Libya offering any backing.

Algeria's position on the Western Sahara was never simply a matter of narrow self-interest. It was first and foremost a consistent application of the central tenet of its entire foreign

policy—the right of nations to self-determination. This was the principle for which the FLN had fought and which Algeria had regularly upheld on behalf of other, sometimes far removed, liberation movements. How could it now stand idly by and allow it to be flouted on its doorstep?



Former president Houari Boumedienne: "State control of Sonatrach enabled his government to pursue the most ambitious programs of industrial development in the Third World"

Moreover, another central principle was also at stake. Ever since 1962, Algeria had upheld the inviolability of the frontiers inherited by the newly independent African states from their colonial predecessors. But the basis of the Moroccan claim to the Western Sahara equally implied a claim to large parts of the Algerian Sahara and much of Mauritania. Here Algeria's self-interest and political principle reinforced each other. It was for these reasons that the widespread expectation that Algeria would abandon the Polisario Front after

Boumedienne's death was to be confounded. Support for Polisario had always been the policy of the Boumedienne regime as a whole, to which its successor had no choice but to adhere.

An important change has nevertheless occurred in Algeria's international outlook in recent years. Under Boumedienne, non-alignment was informed by a clearcut anti-imperialist perspective which tilted it toward strategic solidarity with the Communist bloc. This has been largely abandoned under Chadli, in particular since Dr. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi took over as foreign minister in 1982.

Recently, Algeria has been cultivating its relations with the West, especially with the United States and France. Its key mediating role in the Iranian hostage affair inaugurated a new climate of understanding between Algiers and Washington. The election of a Socialist government in Paris in 1981 made possible a renewed rapprochement which was spectacularly consummated by Chadli's state visit to Paris in November 1983.

Under Dr. Ibrahimi's "Algeria first" policy, mending fences with Maghrebi neighbors has taken priority over more distant commitments. The concept of a "Greater Arab Maghreb," floated by Algeria last year, was intended not only to reaffirm the common interest of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in cooperative relations, but also to create a broader framework within which King Hassan could retreat from the Western Saharan cul-de-sac without too much loss of face. In any event, Morocco refused the bait and Algeria was left to strengthen its ties with Tunisia in a treaty of cooperation and friendship to which Mauritania, once again Algeria's client, has since adhered.

Libya meanwhile—once Algeria's only local ally—is now aligned with Morocco in a spectacular reversal. For some years now, the Algerians have been increasingly irritated by Qaddafi's southward penetration of the Sahara, which has involved not only the dispatch of Libyan troops to Chad, but also, among other things, attempts to suborn the population of the Algerian Sahara. This may explain why Algiers tacitly approved the sending of French forces to Ndjamena in support of Hissène Habré's regime.

The dramatic Moroccan-Libyan pact is more a deal between Qaddafi and King Hassan than a union between the two countries. It is essentially intended to strengthen Hassan's hand on the Western Sahara, while rescuing Qaddafi from his isolation, and to counter the development of a central Maghreb axis under Algerian hegemony. Thus the region is once again polarized into two antagonistic axes, and there is no end in sight to the Saharan problem.

The competition between these axes is taking place simultaneously in the search for allies in the Middle East and for clients and supporters in Africa, as well as on the European front, where Algeria has been dismayed by President Mitterrand's recent visits to Morocco, and Libya has been quietly seeking to take advantage of Algeria's current dispute with Spain over gas sales.

Dr. Ibrahimi's "Greater Arab Maghreb" policy has thus borne unexpected and probably unwelcome fruit, and this may in part explain Algeria's renewed interest this year in cultivating its Eastern European trading partners and in reasserting its solidarity with liberation movements in southern Africa.

Both in external relations and internal development, the state born out of the Algerian revolution has demonstrated an unusual capacity for evolution in response to changing circumstances, as well as an equally remarkable fidelity to the principles asserted in the struggle which began 30 years ago.

Yet there is a profound irony in this. The state is an unequivocally authoritarian one, based upon an alliance between a strongly nationalist army, commanded by officers of exceptional political sophistication, and an equally sophisticated and self-confident technocracy. It is neither the liberal democracy which many of the guerrilla leaders hoped to see, nor the pure Islamic republic envisaged by others, nor the unambiguously socialist state favored by the left.

The number of former guerrilla leaders who have found themselves in opposition or exile at some point since 1962 testifies not only to the intensity of factional conflicts within the elite, but also to the clash of competing visions and the collapse of many an illusion. The apathy and skepticism frequently encountered

in the Algerian public, and the regular retreat into a brand of irony (which many a Pole or Czech would immediately appreciate) in response to a distant leadership and an often arrogant and self-serving bureaucracy, also bear witness to profound frustrations and disappointments.

Yet if contemporary Algeria is, in many ways, far from the society envisaged by the revolutionaries of 1954, it is nonetheless very much the fruit of their

pay for the political monopoly it sought and won. Accordingly, they are a fundamental feature of its legacy.

From the outset, the FLN was essentially a military and administrative apparatus, which in its quest for support and legitimacy, was forced to destroy the political parties of the earlier generation of Algerian nationalists. In doing so, the FLN destroyed the only institutions capable of permitting genuine and sustained popular participation in the politi-



Women in Algiers: "The recent government family code authorizes polygamy and denies Algerian women the right to marry non-Muslims"

audacious venture. Its ambiguities are the corollary of cultural dilemmas and ideological tensions which remain to be resolved precisely because they were present in the original FLN. During the war, they were the price the FLN had to

pay for the political monopoly it sought and won. Accordingly, they are a fundamental feature of its legacy. □

Chadli's Pragmatic Economics

In his second term as president, Chadli Benjedid continues to liberalize the socialist economic policies of the Boumedienne era. A prudent development strategy and incentives for the private sector have revitalized the Algerian economy.

BY FRANCIS GHILES

In its most recent staff report on Algeria, completed earlier this year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed out that Algeria had been less affected than many other oil producing countries by the weakness in international demand for oil, "owing to considerable diversification in its hydrocarbons exports with the growing share of natural gas and condensate." The report added, "As a result of this and more prudent domestic policies, higher overall growth rates have been achieved in 1982 and 1983, while the current account of the balance of payments has remained close to equilibrium and the external debt has been reduced."

The IMF believes that the prospects for continued high growth and the current account are favorable for the next few years. So far this year, Algeria's income from hydrocarbons has increased slightly compared with last year's figure. The state oil and gas company, Sonatrach, earned \$12.7 billion last year and will probably earn as much in 1984, if not a little more.

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However, looking further ahead, there is great uncertainty. Sonatrach is locked in arbitration battles with two of its major natural gas customers—Panhandle Eastern of the U.S., which cancelled a contract nearly a year ago, and Enagas of Spain, which is not paying the price Algeria deems reasonable for lifting the volume of gas agreed to in a contract signed seven years ago. Gaz de France, another major customer, has meanwhile reached an accord with Sonatrach to take less gas than agreed in 1982, at least for the time being.

Sonatrach is, however, increasing its exports of condensates—up from 1.5 to 5 million tons this year—and of liquid petroleum gas. Sonatrach's prices for these exports vary competitively as they are not subject to OPEC ceilings on either price or quantity. Sonatrach exports are all denominated in U.S. dollars, while most of its imports are denominated in softer currencies. This gives Algeria a major trade advantage as long as the dollar rides high.

Algeria's foreign debt, which is projected to decline to \$15 billion by the end of 1984, is no longer a major subject of concern. The government's 1979 decision to halt foreign borrowing for three years has proven to be a very wise one, for had it not been taken, Algeria would have traveled the path to the IMF and

foreign debt rescheduling exercise which has made life painful for many a Third World country since 1981.

The reasons for Algeria's success in this field have been threefold. First, internal financial management has been very conservative and the government has usually underspent its budget. When the *wilayas* (provinces) overspend their budgets one year, they are required to make up for it by cutting their allowances for the following year. Second, the tax base has widened as per capita income has reached over \$2,000, while the state's income from indirect taxation increased by 16 percent in 1981 and by 25 percent in 1982. And third, all the industries developed in the 1970s are now producing goods. Both the public and private non-hydrocarbon sectors, which are being encouraged today more than they were in the days of President Houari Boumedienne, are booming, and real growth is at a rate of 7-8 percent.

The net and very important result has been that the state for the first time last year derived a greater proportion of its income from taxing non-hydrocarbon-based industry and private incomes than from oil or gas. This marks a sharp reversal of Algeria's financial position up to 1982 and suggests that solid foundations are being laid for the future. The gov-

ernment has also decided to sell much state-owned residential property, to tie rents in such properties to their value—they had been untouched since independence in 1962—and to create instruments of deposits to attract savings from the public.

The watchword in Algiers for Chadli Benjedid's second term as president is efficiency. Combatting bureaucratic red tape, however, is a daunting task. Since independence, Algeria's policy of state socialism, laced with a heavy dose of French administrative tradition, has given birth to a bureaucracy so cumbersome that comparisons with Kafka are not out of bounds. This is not true of all state companies, but it is true of some of the banks. The net result is infuriating delays in payments to both Algerian and foreign contractors, which suggest to some outside observers that Algeria is in a tight financial position.

A factor which has slowed the pace of decision-making considerably relates to the many changes in government personnel responsible for certain economic sectors since President Chadli succeeded Boumedienne in 1979. That many senior people needed changing or shifting is certain; however, some changes, notably in the energy sector, took the form of witchhunts and had a very depressing effect on morale. Since independence in 1962, Algeria has made a major effort to send its nationals abroad to study in U.S., European, and Soviet universities. It needs every graduate it has and can ill afford to waste good people.

Algeria's economic policy has yet to produce results in the sphere of lighter industry. While production is increasing, the country is far from having digested the massive investment it poured into industry throughout the last decade. Some of the large cement plants will probably never work satisfactorily, while the El Hadjar steel works near Annaba have cost many times the original estimate.

The emphasis today remains on building up the infrastructure—roads, railways, and ports—which was rather neglected until 1979. The highest priority is also being given to housing. The lack of construction in this sector has resulted in appalling shortages which

mean overcrowded cities and far less efficient living and working conditions.

The construction of a network of railways to cover the *Hauts Plateaux* in the hinterland is expected to stem urban migration and avoid a further increase in the already very overpopulated coastal cities. This project goes hand in hand with the location of more industry—in smaller units than in the past—away from the coast, the encouragement of private industry and trade which already



Algerian President Chadli Benjedid: "After Chadli Benjedid's accession in 1979, the socialist rhetoric began to die down"

employs one-third of the population, and the boost the authorities are trying to give to agriculture.

Next year's international fair in Algiers is being devoted for the first time to two themes—agriculture and hydraulics. Water shortages are getting worse every year in the major cities, and Algiers is deprived of water for at least half the day, even in winter. An ambitious scheme, partly financed by the World Bank, is underway to improve water supplies in Algiers. Over \$700 million is being spent, but the inhabit-

ants will have to be patient as the project will extend until 1990.

They used to talk in Algiers of an agrarian revolution—indeed, the phrase was embedded in the very title of the ministry of agriculture. But with state expropriation of large tracts of private land and the introduction of rigid work practices, the results were depressingly similar to those achieved in Eastern European agriculture—plummeting production, rising imports, bare market stalls. By 1980, Algeria was importing half the food its 20 million people consumed, and today that has risen above 60 percent. Imports of food cost the country about \$2.6 billion last year—one-fifth of its energy export income and almost one-third of its total import bill. Subsidies on staple foods added a further \$1.5 billion to the state budget.

But after Boumedienne's death in 1979, the socialist rhetoric died down, and now a real farming revolution is underway. Chadli did not wait for his second term, which started in January this year, to start dismantling the inflexible policies of his predecessor. In the last three years, his measures have:

- allowed both private and state farmers to bypass the inefficient and often corrupt state distribution monopolies, permitting free markets to spring up in all major Algerian cities;
- allowed producers of fruit, vegetables, and cereals to trade across provincial boundaries—something which was strictly forbidden in the 1970s and which created considerable supply difficulties;
- begun to compensate Algerians whose land was nationalized in the 1970s, and to hand over small plots of state-owned land to people who have expressed a willingness to develop it;
- allowed private farmers, whose holdings occupy less and poorer land than state farms, much easier access to credit, fertilizers, and machinery.

Along with these incentives for the private sector, the ministry of agriculture is also trying to make state farms more profitable. The minimum wage of farm workers was brought into line with that of industrial workers; older farm hands have been retired and training facilities for younger workers improved. "Socialist villages"—the great pride of



Sonatrach LNG plant: "The state oil and gas company earned \$12.7 billion last year and will probably earn as much in 1984"

yesteryear—are being cleared of their more than 100,000 "illegal" inhabitants, often civil servants.

Producer prices are being allowed to rise. Last year, the government cut subsidies on some staple foods: bread prices rose by 50 percent, imported eggs by 115 percent (bringing them in line with eggs produced at home). At the same time, to soften the blow to the consumer, the building of peasants' markets—the *Souk El Fellah*—has continued apace. While these supermarkets do not boast the same range or quality of produce as private shops, they do ensure that ordinary Algerians are able to buy food at more reasonable prices.

A decent profit can certainly be made from growing and marketing vegetables, chickens, and eggs and there is much talk of a new breed—"les millionnaires du legume." Since 1970, agriculture's share of investment has declined, although in absolute terms, capital spending has increased. But in the next five-year plan (1985-89) which will be launched this autumn, agriculture and water resources will rank as the top priorities.

The authorities have ambitious plans to develop agriculture over the next decade. A major effort is underway with poultry and eggs. By 1982, Algeria had become the single largest importer of eggs in the world, and this year alone, it will put out two international tenders for 900 million eggs. Domestic production, which in 1969 met 96 percent of Alge-

ria's needs, today covers little more than a quarter. The same situation applies to cereals and dried vegetable production. However, these ambitious plans could generate difficulties of their own, because the Algerian countryside does not have enough storage capacity for feedstock to cover the needs of a growing poultry population, nor the port capacity to handle the imports.

Two-thirds of Algeria's cereal requirements are imported and efforts to boost this sector will be slow. Yields are on average half those in Tunisia, and an erratic climate puts efficiency and speed in gathering crops at a premium. Further, considerable damage to Algeria's fragile soils has been done by the deep disc ploughs, which characterize most Algerian-built and European-designed machinery.

History also weighs heavily in a country whose best land was expropriated by the French in the 19th century and whose war of liberation between 1954 and 1962 ravaged the land, uprooting at least one-third of the peasantry. The agricultural El Dorado that many former settlers describe ignores the simple fact that most of Algeria's agricultural exports before 1962 were wine—at a time when many Algerians were undernourished. So however successful the Chadli government's current agricultural policy, Algeria will, for many years to come, remain a major market for Western agricultural exports—particularly from the EEC.

Algeria has also sought to consolidate

its trade position and make use of whatever strength its hydrocarbons export mix can afford it. More important is the fact that the country is considered a good credit risk by international banks and has allocated its resources more wisely than many other African countries. Foreign contractors know that Algerian officials are very tough bargainers, but they consider the country's financial—and political—stability as a major asset.

Earlier this year, a leading Japanese company accepted Algerian textiles in partial payment for purchases of capital goods. In turn, it managed to sell the goods to the Soviet Union, but at a loss. The company put on a brave face in conceding it lost money, but added that it had no intention of abandoning the Algerian market. Another Japanese company recently was faced with an Algerian request to accept partial payment, this time in refined oil products, for a large chemical plant contract it was about to clinch.

In another development, a British-led consortium headed by Wimpey, which in 1981 was awarded a \$200 million contract to build 6,000 homes near Algiers, is now finding itself faced with Algerian insistence on some element of countertrade in a renegotiated deal. The extra cost to foreign companies seeking contracts with Algeria, but faced with a countertrade element, can be up to 5 percent of the value of the contract. Hence, negotiations are often long and difficult.

These developments indicate that countertrade in Algeria is on the rise. Algerian government officials are quick to point out that it fits within their traditional policy of trying to balance their trade exchanges in pursuit of an even-handed trade policy with each of its partners.

The economy is going through a period of readjustment, which indicates that foreign trading partners will have to gird themselves for alterations in their business relationships. Among the factors puzzling foreign operators familiar with the market are complications arising from the fact that the country's imports, worth an estimated \$8.9 billion last year, are split roughly three ways: one share goes to food, feedstock, and fertilizers; a second to spare parts for

equipment necessary to keep the economy moving; a final share for the purchase of capital goods.

Since January, however, few capital goods orders have been placed. Algerian trade officials attribute the fall in orders to two factors: preparation of the country's next five-year plan (1985-89), and uncertainty in the oil markets over the value of the U.S. dollar and U.S. interest rates, which make forecasting the country's foreign income difficult this year. They say this does not mean that foreign companies dealing with Algerian concerns will face any further increase in countertrade; but foreign traders must be prepared to face tough consequences when their imports from Algeria fall out of line with their own shipments to the North African nation.

For example, since gas supply talks with Spain's Enagas came to a standstill earlier this year, Spanish companies have felt the full blast of Algerian fury. One already signed contract, under which the Spanish were to build a dam at Mexana, has been suspended; no new contracts are being awarded. As a result, Spain will not ship any cement, food, textiles, cotton thread, or steel products to Algeria this year. Exports of such goods to Algeria reached \$442 million last year, out of total exports of goods and services to the country of about \$1 billion. Spanish diplomats in Algiers fear that these figures will be more than halved this year. The absence of new contracts will be a severe blow to the likes of Dragados y Construcciones, for whom Algerian contracts have represented half of their workload abroad in recent years.

France and Italy, meanwhile, are benefiting from having reached agreements with Sonatrach on the volume and price of the Algerian natural gas they buy. France's share of Algerian imports (up from FF 13.9 billion in 1982 to FF 18.7 billion in 1983) is estimated to have risen by about 6.3 percent since 1981, reaching 25 percent last year. Italian companies have been picking up a number of contracts, including one worth \$440 million to develop the gas field at Rhourde Nouss. Both countries are fighting for more, not least the French, whose CIT Alcatel is pinning hopes on getting a share of the new telephone exchange and transmission con-

tracts which are expected to be announced soon.


Some Third World countries such as India continue to pick up contracts. Rail India Technical and Economic Services has just won a contract to supervise construction of a 150-km railway line from M'Sila to Ain Touta. Tunisian companies are also active following the patching up of relations between the two countries in 1982-83.

Algerian authorities do not appear concerned as to where the textiles, semi-finished metal goods, and plastic objects they force some companies to take end up. They are much more vigilant in seeking to ensure that whatever hydrocarbons they sell—refined oil, condensates, or LNG—do not get traded elsewhere than in the country of the company to which it has been sold.

It is not easy to predict what the future holds in store for the Algerian economy, but at this stage, it looks somewhat more optimistic than is the case for many African countries. The more than

3 percent rate of growth in the country's population every year is certainly a threat if no measures are taken. Injecting a greater measure of freedom and flexibility into what remains a very rigid system remains of paramount importance. It is all the more critical, so as to create the number of jobs needed to absorb new entrants in the labor market—half the 20-21 million population is under the age of 18—and can only be done by allowing faster growth in the service industry and in agriculture.

Algeria's political system is stable and those who are temporarily out of favor seldom risk any physical maltreatment. The memories of the cruel war of liberation against France ensure a basic respect for human dignity among the ruling elite. Algeria has come a long way since the war of liberation against France started 30 years ago, and its rulers have more to show for the country's 22 years of independence than many of their peers in Africa and the Arab world. □



Street in Algiers slum: "The highest priority is now being given to housing"

The King's Gambit

More than 99 percent of Moroccan voters supported King Hassan's treaty with Libya. Despite his diplomatic coup, however, Hassan is still confronted with serious domestic difficulties and the war in the Western Sahara.

BY GODFREY MORRISON

By signing a treaty of "union" with Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, King Hassan II astonished both his traditional friends—the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia—and his chief regional adversary, Algeria. The medium to long-term results of the marriage between one of the Arab world's most pro-Western states and revolutionary Libya, which rates star billing in Washington's demonology, are difficult to predict, not least because of Qaddafi's own past record for unpredictability and unexpected changes of policy.

Although the signing of the treaty in the northwestern Moroccan city of Oujda on August 13 took even the usually well-informed American and French embassies in Rabat completely by surprise, the move was not inconsistent with Morocco's main foreign policy goal. For over eight years, the monarchy has been preoccupied with preventing the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas from succeeding in their bid to make the Western Sahara, which Rabat claims is Moroccan territory, into an independent state.

Since the autumn of 1981 when Polisario overran an important outpost at Guelta Zemmour and downed several



King Hassan II: "Ultimate political power and authority is still in his hands"

Moroccan aircraft with newly-acquired Eastern-bloc missile systems, the sporadic desert conflict has run in Morocco's favor. This has been due to a number of factors. The Moroccan army's organization, fighting capabilities, and logistical support have greatly improved. The Royal Armed Forces have abandoned their former policy of trying to maintain isolated garrisons in favor of a policy of denying Polisario access to the economically important part of the Western Sahara, which also contains the main population centers, by building a series of sand-wall defenses which they have steadily pushed forward.

Finally, due in part to military cooper-

ation agreements with the United States, Morocco has acquired sophisticated technology which has made its aircraft immune from Polisario missile attacks, as well as radar and other surveillance equipment which has reduced Polisario's natural advantage in mounting surprise attacks.

However, on the diplomatic front Morocco has not fared nearly as well. The resolution adopted by last year's Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Addis Ababa urged Morocco to hold direct talks with Polisario with a view to reaching a ceasefire, to be followed by an internationally-supervised referendum in the Western Sahara which would determine the wishes of its people.

Morocco has accepted the principle of holding a referendum, but refuses to enter into direct negotiations with Polisario. Rabat's grounds for refusal are that such talks would prejudice the outcome of the referendum which is designed to allow the population to decide its own political future. Polisario and its supporters maintain it is a genuine liberation movement which represents the will of the Saharawi people for an independent sovereign state. The Moroccans say the Polisario guerrillas are "mercenaries" in the pay of the enemies of Morocco and that most of those living in the Polisario tented camps near Tindouf in Algeria do not come from the Western Sahara at all, but rather from Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, and other drought-afflicted Sahelian countries.

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The United Nations endorsed the OAU's plans for solving the Sahara problem and the past year has seen the existing majority of OAU members who recognize the Polisario-proclaimed Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) grow. Both Burkina Faso and Mauritania have recognized the SADR in recent months.

Mauritania's recognition in February was particularly significant because it meant that Morocco was henceforth surrounded on all its land frontiers by states openly hostile to Rabat on the Sahara issue. In July, following two Polisario attacks against the Moroccan positions defending Dakhla—the only place beyond the sand-wall still held by the Moroccans—King Hassan sent a sharply-worded warning to Mauritanian President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, claiming that the attacks had been mounted by guerrillas based in Mauritania. He added that if such attacks continued, Moroccan forces might exercise their right of "hot pursuit" into Mauritanian territory.

Mauritania, Algeria, and Tunisia are all signatories of a 1983 treaty of "friendship and concord." With Morocco's relations with Mauritania reaching a new low, Rabat was beginning to look increasingly isolated in the Maghreb region. It is within this context that the surprise Libya-Morocco pact had its immediate significance. Libya was also becoming isolated in the Maghreb, after a series of border incidents with Tunisia this year and Algeria's refusal to let Tripoli join the treaty of friendship and concord because of an unresolved Algero-Libyan frontier demarcation dispute.

The Oujda treaty was preceded by several months of detente between Rabat and Tripoli. The process began in June 1983 with Qaddafi's surprise visit to Rabat. The visit included lengthy talks with Hassan and with leaders of all major Moroccan political parties, and ended with a cordial communique. Qaddafi's Rabat trip came after more than a decade of hostility between the two governments, resulting from Libya's enthusiastic support for Polisario. The Qaddafi government was one of Polisario's main paymasters and a strong supporter of its cause in African and other fora. In 1971, Qaddafi had supported

elements of the Moroccan armed forces who tried to overthrow the monarchy.

King Hassan has insisted that the Libyan-Moroccan "union" is directed against no one. As a goodwill gesture shortly after the treaty was signed, he announced that Algerians wishing to visit Morocco would no longer need visas. Algeria, which had reacted negatively to the Libyan-Moroccan pact, made no mention of the King's gesture in the official media.

Two weeks before the Oujda treaty was signed, Qaddafi took a radically different position on the Western Sahara when he told a ministerial meeting in Tripoli that the question should be resolved in "an Arab context." Until now,

"The belief that the Sahara conflict would either topple the King or bring him on his knees to the conference table has proven unfounded."

the matter has always been dealt with by the OAU. On September 1, he went further, suggesting that the Polisario guerrillas should join the Moroccan armed forces to fight against a common enemy—Israel.

Qaddafi's suggestion that the Sahara question be dealt with by the Arabs was welcomed in Rabat, as well as in a number of black African states which would like to see the OAU disentangled from an affair that has virtually paralyzed it for over two years. In any event, the Moroccans appear to have resigned themselves to the fact that they are now unlikely to get an acceptable solution to the Sahara problem under OAU auspices. In an interview in September, King Hassan said that if the OAU came out in Polisario's favor at its summit in November, Morocco would walk out, but would not, as in past meetings, ask its African friends to do the same.

Domestically, the King's handling of the country's Sahara policy, including the "union" with Libya, has been approved by all Moroccan political parties from the pro-Moscow communists to the far right. [Although called a "union," the treaty envisages a loose association

involving consultations and cooperation. However, one article states that aggression against one party would be considered an aggression against the other.] The "union" received massive approval in a referendum and in the campaign running up to the first general parliamentary elections held in seven years. The necessity of "defending the country's territorial integrity"—in other words, pursuing the eight-year war—was one of the few issues upon which all competing parties agreed.

The results of the September 14 vote meant that the new parliament, due to meet in October, will still be dominated by the center and center-right parties, despite major gains by the left. The poll was followed by complaints of widespread voting irregularities by some of the parties, although most political sources said that the election was an improvement on the local government elections which were held last year.

Voting took place in two stages. In the first stage in mid-September, two-thirds of the 306-member single-chamber parliament were elected by direct universal suffrage. At the beginning of October, the final one-third was elected indirectly by local government, professional, and other bodies.

Although the election campaign had a higher ideological content than in the past, the results also reflected Morocco's ethnic diversity and the continuing importance of regional loyalties. This was illustrated by the continued good showing by the People's Movement (MP), which relies on the rural Berber areas for its base of support. The Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) gained more than double the number of seats it held in the previous parliament.

Although the legislature's powers are very limited, most observers saw the election as a further cautious step toward a democratization of the regime. At the very least, it showed that the King was prepared to allow even far left parties to organize, and to let their leaders address the nation on radio and television, something which would be inconceivable in most African and Arab states.

The King believes that the parties act as "political schools;" hence, prior to the elections, he ruled out independent candidates, who had won many seats in pre-

vious elections. It seems that he wishes to channel the country's diverse political forces into the parties so as to avoid what the Moroccan authorities see as a serious danger: discontented sectors of the population becoming easy prey to external political forces wishing to stir up trouble.

In January, serious unrest swept cities in northern Morocco shortly after similar riots had taken place in Tunisia. The official death toll was 29, although foreign press reports indicated a higher number. The riots appeared to have started with unrest among high school students and then spread to the unemployed youth. Among the causes were rumors of increased school fees and of further rises in the prices of basic essentials. Subsequently, political agitators of various sorts as well as criminal elements joined in the mayhem.

In a broadcast after the riots, the King announced that there would be no increases in the prices of basic commodities, but he also blamed foreign instigators—Zionist agents, followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, and Marxist-Leninists—for the trouble. During his broadcast, he brandished subversive tracts before the television cameras. Hassan said the tracts, which bore the picture of the Iranian leader, had been circulated during the unrest.

One of the most difficult factors to assess in Moroccan politics is the real strength of Islamic fundamentalism, a force which has caused trouble for governments in Islamic countries regardless of their ideological hue. King Hassan, however, does have a number of advantages in containing fundamentalism: His position as spiritual as well as lay leader of the country is significant. As "commander of the faithful," his Alawite dynasty claims direct descent from the prophet Mohammed. In addition, although Moroccans are Sunni Muslims, they owe allegiance to a host of local "brotherhoods," which only serves to emphasize the King's unifying role.

Nor is fundamentalism in any way a new phenomenon in Morocco. Efforts to "Islamicize" the country to a greater degree and to eschew Western influence and culture has long been one of the many competing political forces in the country. Vigorous demonstrations

against the mini-skirt and alcohol occurred during the 1960s. The King has reserved some of his most outspoken criticism for the present Iranian leadership and not simply because it overthrew a fellow monarch. Indeed, in an interview a few months ago, he implied that the Shah had contributed to his own downfall. But in several of his speeches this year, the King has spoken at length



King Hassan at the Nairobi OAU summit, 1982: "A number of African states would like to see the OAU disentangled from the Western Sahara affair"

on theological matters, stressing the need to preserve Morocco's Sunni heritage.

An indication of how seriously the authorities take the fundamentalist threat came in July when a Casablanca court handed down very harsh sentences to 40 fundamentalists who had been accused of plotting to set up an Islamic republic. Sixteen were condemned to death (10 in absentia), eight were sent to jail for 20 years, nine received 10-year sentences, and seven were jailed for four years.

By contrast, the following month, af-

ter repeated calls by the left-wing political parties for release of all political prisoners before the elections, the King used his judicial powers to order the release of 354 detainees from prison, including a number of supporters of the USFP, the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS), and the Organization for People's Democratic Action (OADP).

Both external and domestic politics must be seen against what has become an extremely difficult economic situation. But the reverse is also true. Were it not for the perception of the importance of Morocco's continuing political stability by countries such as the United States, France, and the Gulf states, it is unlikely that they would have supplied the country with the assistance which has enabled it to survive economically.

Morocco's economic problems are both externally and domestically induced. First, Morocco is North Africa's hydrocarbon Cinderella. It is the only Maghreb country which is a net oil importer, with the result that, like the world's other oil-importing developing countries, it has faced a soaring oil bill over the past decade. This is the principal reason why the country's GNP, which was roughly the same as Algeria's at the time of independence, is now about half that of its eastern neighbor.

Other factors which have produced the current difficult situation have included persistent drought, which has not only depressed the important agricultural sector, but has necessitated massive grain imports, worsening still further the country's chronic trade deficit. The main merchandise export is phosphates, of which Morocco is the world's largest single exporter. Here prospects look good. Although in recent years, prices on the world market have remained flat, most observers are predicting a sharp upturn in coming months.

Moreover, thanks to an ambitious development investment program by the state-owned Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP), an increasing proportion of exports is in the form of phosphate derivatives such as fertilizer and phosphoric acid, rather than phosphate rock as in the past. Therefore, the value-added element in the industry is steadily rising.

In the longer term, phosphates are a promising natural resource for developing countries, for there are substitutes for many other raw materials to which customers turn if prices rise, as copper and aluminum producers well know. Even the mighty oil producers have found that massive price rises for their product have produced a renewed interest in coal and other sources of energy. However, if the rate of world population growth is not to result in massive starvation, more efficient (i.e. intensive) agriculture will be required, and this cannot be achieved without phosphate inputs.

In the short-term, however, Morocco's situation remains extremely difficult. It has already joined the lengthening list of countries that have been forced to seek debt rescheduling. Total foreign indebtedness, at \$1.6 billion in 1976, is today around \$11 billion—the equivalent of over 80 percent of gross domestic product. In 1983, the debt service ratio was estimated at 47 percent of export earnings plus foreign exchange transfers, and about 37 percent after the debt rescheduling operation.

The foreign exchange transfer component of Morocco's total foreign currency earnings is extremely important because the country's single most important source of foreign exchange is not phosphates, but remittances by Moroccan workers living abroad, mainly in Western Europe. These remittances are still growing, although long-term trends are less certain given the high unemployment rates and the tightening immigration regulations throughout Europe.

One of the reasons that remittances have remained strong and why foreign investment in Morocco has been increasing is that the government has pursued a realistic foreign exchange rate policy. In sharp contrast to so many developing countries which, like Morocco, peg their currency to a basket of hard currencies, but then allow their money to become increasingly over-valued, the Moroccans have made constant adjustments to keep the rate realistic. This keeps export prices for manufactures and agricultural products competitive and enables the price mechanism to play its part in restraining imports. A wel-

MOROCCAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS October 3, 1984

Political Parties	Orientation	No. of seats
Constitutional Union (UC)	<i>Right, pro-private enterprise</i>	83
National Assembly of Independents (RNI)	<i>Center</i>	61
Istiqlal Party (PI)	<i>Center, traditionalist</i>	41
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	<i>Socialist</i>	36
People's Movement (MP)	<i>Center, rural-based, pro-Berber</i>	47
National Democratic Party (PND)	<i>Center</i>	24
Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS)	<i>Orthodox pro-Moscow Communist</i>	2
Organization for People's Democratic Action (OADP)	<i>Far left</i>	1
Social Centrist Party (PCS)		1
Labor Unions		
Moroccan Labor Union (UMT)	<i>Independent</i>	5
Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT)	<i>pro-USFP</i>	3
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM)	<i>pro-Istiqlal</i>	2

come side-effect is that there is no significant black market for the Moroccan dirham.

The exchange rate policy has also contributed to one of the brightest aspects of the economy—tourism. During the international recession which followed the sharp oil price rises in the 1970s, one of the major casualties was the international tourism market. But Morocco's performance has gone against the trend, with steadily increasing numbers of tourists and real revenues. Total receipts from this sector last year were \$360 million—an increase of 27.5 percent over the previous year.

Because the Moroccan government is pro-Western and because ultimate political power and authority is still in the hands of its monarch, King Hassan, it is often assumed that Morocco is a free-wheeling "capitalist" country. In the sense that it possesses a small class of extremely wealthy Moroccans whose lot is in sharp contrast to a poorly-paid civil service, not to mention a rural population which to a large degree still lives in semi-feudal conditions, this picture of Morocco is, in a facile sense, justified.

However, if massive state intervention in the economy is seen as the hallmark of "socialism," then Morocco is a highly socialized country. When the French left, there was an insufficient number of local entrepreneurs to take over the commanding heights of the economy they formerly controlled. This, together with efforts to "Moroccanize" the ownership and staffing of the

country's economy, led to the creation of a myriad of state corporations which still control much of the economy today. The OCP, the phosphate producer and by far the country's largest enterprise, is only the most obvious example.

However, over the past few years, it has become clear that the King and his closest advisers have decided to move gradually into a new era in terms of economic policy, in which private enterprise, both local and foreign, will be called on to play a much more prominent role. A series of laws has been passed to encourage foreign investment by loosening the former tough provisions which restricted the degree of foreign ownership in different economic sectors; by improving customs and tax exemptions for new enterprises; by giving especially favorable terms for investors willing to establish enterprises in the country's more depressed regions; and by easing the terms under which profits can be remitted abroad.

Meanwhile, in terms of the domestic economy, steps have been taken to encourage the private sector. For example, companies in the important tinned fish export industry will be allowed to export directly instead of through a state corporation which formerly had a monopoly on the trade. The King made his own economic policy predilections very clear in a recent wide-ranging speech in which he announced that on an experimental basis, private operators would be allowed to compete with municipal authorities in the field of mass

transport in Casablanca, the country's largest city and economic capital.

"We are living, without noticing it, in a major contradiction," Hassan said. Moroccans can read a wide variety of opinions in their newspapers because of the country's multi-party system, "while in everyday life one sees the state in every sector." "We must choose either liberty, and thus open the way for competition, or the suppression of that liberty with a sole political party and an omnipresent state."

Compared to most African countries, Morocco possesses a very diversified industrial sector, producing a wide

the big lack in human terms is middle-level management.

The country also has a number of natural resources that it has barely tapped. The most obvious is probably its fishing grounds. In discussions of the Western Sahara question in the international media, much is always made of Morocco's economic self-interest in retaining control of the Bou-Craa phosphate mine. However, the Bou-Craa deposits represent about 5 percent of Morocco's total proven phosphate reserves and, although no precise figures are available, the mine is thought by some business sources to be an individual loss-maker.

Moroccans drew little economic benefit from them as the waters were fished by foreigners, notably the Spanish.

Hopes for the future, in all sectors, must to a large extent wait out the present economic crisis, characterized by retrenchment not only in current government expenditure, but in investment for development. To overcome the crisis, the government has to retain the goodwill of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign bank lenders. So far, the rescheduling process has gone reasonably smoothly and the IMF, which in September 1983 agreed to a loan of 300 million SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), is reported satisfied with Morocco's "adjustment" (i.e. austerity) program.

For the future, much will depend on factors outside Morocco's control such as the country's climate, and whether, or rather when, the vertiginous exchange rate of the U.S. dollar falls back. Much of the country's foreign debt was contracted when the dollar was worth four or five dirhams. Today the repayments are being made in dollars which cost well over nine dirhams.

Meanwhile, there is no early end in sight to the Sahara war. So far the belief, widely held by Polisario and by its Algerian backers, that the human and economic toll caused by the conflict would either topple the King or bring him on his knees to the conference table, has proven unfounded. On the contrary, the war has solidified what has always been a highly nationalistic people. Far from minimizing the war's cost, the King, government spokesmen, and party leaders go out of their way to say how expensive it is and that it is a major cause of the country's economic difficulties. When the annual budget is debated in parliament, the only section which is not scathingly attacked by Ali Yata, the veteran communist leader, is the chapter dealing with defense expenditures.

For their part, the Algerians appear equally determined to maintain their support for Polisario, despite the latter's military setbacks and the absence of any hard evidence of active support for the movement within the territory. As so often happens, both sides have invested so much emotional and political capital in the conflict that they are unable to draw back. □



Street scene in Rabat: "Efforts to 'Islamicize' the country to a greater degree have long been one of the many competing political forces in the country"

range of products from vehicle components to explosives and from pharmaceuticals to railway rolling stock. In comparative terms, it also has a labor force trained in a wide range of skills and a small elite in administration and in professions such as banking who can hold their own internationally. Businessmen and diplomats are almost all agreed that

Probably of far greater significance for the future are the fishing grounds off the Sahara's coast. Morocco, like most countries, now claims economic sovereignty over waters extending 200 miles offshore, and the waters on its Atlantic seaboard, including those off the Western Sahara, are among the world's richest fishing grounds. Until recently, the

Ali Treki

Foreign Minister, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Following Libya's controversial treaty of union with Morocco and the French-Libyan accord to withdraw forces from Chad, Foreign Minister Ali Treki talked to *Africa Report* about his country's foreign policy orientation and its problematic relations with the U.S.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: The Arab-African unity agreement Libya signed with Morocco in August took the world by surprise. Could you explain why Libya decided to enter into this arrangement with Morocco and what Libya stands to gain from it?

Treki: The three principal objectives of our 1969 revolution were unity, freedom, and socialism. By unity, we mean both African unity and Arab unity. From the beginning, one of the primary objectives of our revolution was to realize Arab unity, and not solely at an emotional level. We are the same nation belonging to the same region, speaking the same language, divided by colonialism.

There are many ways to realize this unity. Here in the United States, you achieved unity by the Civil War. In Germany, Bismarck did it through war sometimes, but sometimes through peaceful means. And Italy did it almost the same way. Today, achieving such unity by war is impossible due to the international context.

The only way to achieve it is by peaceful means. By peaceful means, there are also two ways—either you form an axis or you try to persuade other leaders of the need for such unity. We made a lot of attempts at unity, with Syria for example. Other attempts have been made between Syria and Iraq, between the republic of Syria and the monarchy of Jordan, between Libya and Tunisia.

We have decided to propose unity to the Arab leaders, taking into consideration local factors. We don't expect a king or a president to give up his sovereignty just for the sake of unity. But consider small states like those in the Gulf, with

populations of 40,000 or 100,000. If you take the entire Arabian Gulf, there are less than 1.5 million people—just one district in New York—which is ridiculous. Can you imagine the money they are spending? Libya, Tunisia, Algeria—these countries have no future unless they unite themselves.

Look what has happened in the Middle East now. We lost all the wars because we were not united. During the 1948 war, we fought against Israel with seven or eight armies, with different armaments, different military ideologies, and we were defeated. The same in 1956. So we think unity is a necessity for us.

What, for example, can Libya do? We can develop our industry and agriculture. We now have more than one million workers from outside to achieve our vast program of development. What can a small country like Tunisia do to develop itself? We are thinking of building an automobile industry, but no one of us can do it unless we unite ourselves. Unity becomes a necessity, regardless of who is in power in any country—monarchy or socialists. Regimes can be changed, but the people will remain.

From this context, we strive by all means to unite the Arab world and thus this federation with Morocco. It has a new element in that it is the first time in Arab history that we are seeking Arab and African unity—a federation between Arabs and Africans. And our belief comes from the charter of the OAU. We believe in African unity, and in the complementarity between Arab and African nations.

Africa Report: So other countries can join your agreement?

Treki: Of course. Senegal, Mali, any other countries can join. This is a new prospect of unity—not only Arab unity, but Arab and African unity. If such unity succeeds, it will create a new

era within the Arab world. It is not directed against any country; it is not an axis in the region. We believe it is a step toward Maghreb unity and ultimately toward Arab and African unity.

We have suggested to Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia to join us in this effort. We from our side have always supported unity between any two Arab countries. Although our relations



Ali Treki, Libyan Foreign Minister: "We strive by all means to unite the Arab world; thus this federation with Morocco"

with Sudan and Egypt are not good, when they tried to unite themselves, we were the first supporters. We think this is a good step whatever the reason.

On the federation between Libya and Morocco, each country certainly will keep its own personality, foreign policy. But we will try to reach rapprochements in foreign policy as much as we can.

Africa Report: There have been other efforts recently toward achieving Maghreb unity, such as the agreement between Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Why didn't Libya join that agreement?

Treki: We supported this unity. When the Tunisian foreign minister came to us to propose our joining, we agreed. We even submitted an official request to join the treaty between the three countries. But for material reasons in some of these countries, there is a delay in responding favorably. We have no problem in being part of this.

We have the Hassi Messaoud unity agreement with Algeria, which has never been implemented by our friends, the Algerians. And with the Tunisians we are doing well. We are achieving a kind of unity with Tunisia, with a decision that the two councils of ministers meet regularly. They will meet in November. I was recently in Tunisia and our two countries have decided to establish a common program of development. We have also decided that the Tunisian parliament and the Libyan people's congress will meet annually. This kind of unity between us and Tunisia is going very well.

Africa Report: But Algeria has criticized your agreement with Morocco, calling it a policy of axes. So doesn't it appear that the Maghreb is actually more divided now than unified?

Treki: Algeria was a bit far from the Arab world for a while due to its long relationship with France. After the Algerian revolution, they came back to the Arab world, and we were very happy about this. I think the Algerians have done a fantastic job concerning pan-Arabism. But the Algerians reacted the same way when we achieved the Djerba agreement with Tunisia. There was a strong reaction from Algeria during that time that such things should not be completed unless they expressed their opinion. The late President Boumediene said at that time, "I'm very sorry, ours was an abnormal reaction and I did not understand well." We can see the same reaction now from our Algerian brothers and friends about this new action.

First of all, no country has a right to veto. I don't think the Algerians' reaction is because of the unity itself. It is because of their relations with Morocco. Of course, they want to try to isolate Morocco and they are not happy that Morocco signed an agreement with us. But I don't think the Algerians have anything against the unity itself. We hope that this unity can help to restore relations between the Moroccans and Algerians. We believe in that. But I think it is just a reaction which will pass. We have good relations with Algeria.

Africa Report: Is foreign policy coordination with Morocco envisioned under this agreement?

Treki: Under this federation, there will be coordination in all aspects of life, whether we agree or not. But normally, each country has the right to follow its own foreign policy. If you compare my intervention here in the UN General Assembly with the intervention of our colleague and brother from Morocco, you will find some things in common, some different. That is quite natural.

Africa Report: How does the agreement affect the situation in the Western Sahara? Algeria believes that the agreement is directed against it and that it will be that much more difficult to achieve a settlement of the Western Sahara problem since Morocco's diplomatic hand may have been strengthened.

Treki: Concerning the Western Sahara problem, we support the principle of self-determination. I think no one, not Algeria or anyone else, can dispute that. Libya was the only country helping Polisario. It created Polisario during the struggle against the Spanish. From the beginning, we have said openly, in support of our principle of unity, that we are not against the Sahara joining Morocco or Mauritania. We have never said no to that.

On the contrary, we would be very happy if the people of the Sahara were to realize unity either with Mauritania or with Morocco. We have opposed and will continue to oppose the creation of mini-states in the Arab world. We were against the division of the Sahara. Unity can be achieved either through Morocco or without it, but we are against division. We said, "Let these people express themselves, if they want to join Morocco, Mauritania, if they want to have their independence, though we don't agree, as a first step toward unity, this is something which we totally support."

We are the only country with no direct interests in the Sahara—we are not looking for economic interests there, we are not neighbors of the Sahara. We sacrificed the OAU summit in Tripoli because of the Saharawi people and we also left the Addis summit because of the Sahara. But when the Saharawi people agreed to hold a referendum to allow the people to express their will, we said it's a good step. We will support it.

We have no other problem with Morocco. Our only problem with Morocco is over the Sahara. Now they have chosen the referendum, the peaceful way, we will support this, and there is no need to fight. The important thing is how to organize the referendum. We would like the referendum to be objective, neutral, without any interference and with the maximum guarantee of freedom. Let the people decide. The difference now with Morocco and Polisario is over direct negotiations. This is something to which we have no objection. If the Moroccans want to negotiate directly, we will be very happy. But the Moroccans say no. They say, "If we agree to discuss with them, it would mean recognizing them as the only element in the Sahara, which is not the case."

We believe that this should not be an obstacle toward the solution of the problem. What is important is that the two parties should give the assurance that they will respect the decision of the people and to organize the maximum guarantee for that under the auspices of the OAU or the UN. We believe that our unity agreement with Morocco is a step forward in helping to find a solution to the Sahara problem and not the contrary.

Africa Report: The Western Sahara issue has disrupted the past few OAU summits. The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic [SADR] is now saying that it will take its seat as a member-state at the upcoming summit in Addis Ababa. Since there has been no real movement toward a solution of the issue, it is likely that Morocco will walk out of the summit and perhaps out of the organization entirely. What position will Libya take in such a case?

Treki: We were not against the admission of the SADR, but is it an objective in itself to be a member of the OAU? This is the question I would ask. Will that help to solve the problem? If you say tomorrow that the SADR is an OAU member, then

the Moroccans will say, "You have recognized the country; for us this state doesn't exist. We have the right to discuss with a sovereign state or not to discuss." Then they will withdraw, they will not negotiate. What is it worth? Will it mean the continuation of war, the continuation of bloodshed? Then there will be no hope of any settlement in the near future. This is the main problem.

If by accepting the SADR as a member, we achieve our objectives, we have no problem with this. But if it is only to harass Morocco without gaining anything from it, we do not share this point of view. I think that the majority of Africans are thinking in the same terms. On the one hand, we have to save the OAU from disintegration. That is the most important thing. On the other hand, we have to see what kind of decision we will take concerning the Sahara that will help to bring back peace and stability in the region and give the Saharawi people the right of self-determination, the right to express themselves under the maximum guarantees of objectivity.

Africa Report: But do you see any way that the same confrontation at the OAU can be avoided?

Treki: Let us see when the time comes what the Moroccans and Polisario will do. Polisario has withdrawn twice now, once from the Tripoli summit and once from Addis. I don't know what they're going to do this time. In Tripoli also, they had said, "This is our last withdrawal," and then they withdrew. There was a saying at the Tripoli summit, "No 19th summit without Sahara." So nobody knows. They have said they will not withdraw, but they might and leave the Africans to solve the problem. Or Morocco might do something else. We shall see what decision will be taken. We are in consultations with our brother Africans, we are continuing to discuss this, and we shall see what we will do.

Africa Report: Should the Western Sahara issue, as some have suggested, be taken out of the OAU context? Is there a better framework for resolving the problem?

Treki: We still believe it is an OAU problem, but the OAU will not solve it. We believe that it is more reasonable to resolve it regionally, through the Maghreb countries, as we did with the Chadian problem when the neighboring countries met in Nigeria. We really did find a solution to the Chadian problem at that time.

Africa Report: Why did you agree with France to withdraw your troops from Chad? Would you agree with King Hassan's recent statement that the French-Libyan agreement on Chad has been one of the positive results of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty?

Treki: The Chadian problem is mainly an African problem and any solution should come from Africa. We have always been against any extra-African intervention in African problems and particularly in the Chadian problem, because it affects us directly, our security. For a long time, we have been against the presence of French troops—or any foreign troops—on our borders.

One of the basic issues in the Lagos Agreement was the departure of the French troops. All Chadian factions, including Mr. Habré himself, in the Lagos Agreement said clearly that the departure of French troops was the primary issue in any solution of the Chadian problem. Then the national unity government was formed and the French left. Then they came

back to help Habré again, who had revolted against his own government.

We told the French that they had to leave—not only we, but other countries. The French said that they went to Chad under certain pressure from their friends in Africa, but when the French wanted to discuss the Chadian problem, we told them we were willing to discuss only the departure of their troops. And we have had contacts for a long time with the French, even though we don't recognize the right of France or any other extra-African country to speak on African problems.

But it's a fact that the French are there, and we have to discuss with them. After long discussions, they finally agreed to withdraw their troops. And we agreed also that we would withdraw our elements of support to the GUNT [Transitional Government of National Unity]. Many countries have in one way or another helped in this, from the Arab world, from



Margaret A. Novicki

Col. Muammar Qaddafi leaving the 1983 OAU summit: "If others are inspired by the Libyan revolution, it is not our fault"

Europe, Africa also, and we are very thankful to them. But this agreement came about by direct negotiation and direct contact between France and Libya.

Africa Report: Will you withdraw your troops completely from Chad, including the Aouzou strip?

Treki: What do you mean by the Aouzou strip? Can any country be asked to withdraw its troops from its own land? The question should not even be asked. Aouzou is an integral part of Libya, just as Benghazi or Tripoli is, and this is not subject to any negotiation or discussion with any country in the world.

Africa Report: If both Libya and France withdraw their troops from Chad, that will solve one element of the Chadian problem, but how will a reconciliation of the factions be

brought about, as well as an end to the conflict, given that Hissène Habré considers the Aouzou strip a part of Chad?

Treki: I think you have posed the right question: Now what is the next step? Habré represents one of the 11 factions that signed the Lagos Agreement. There are 10 more factions which are mainly represented in Mr. Goukouni's GUNT, which is a creation of the OAU under the provisions of the Lagos Agreement. Habré is a man who revolted against his own government when he was prime minister, and he also revolted against the Goukouni government when he was minister of defense. I think our objective now is to let the Chadians meet together, discuss their problems, form their own national government again according to the Lagos Agreement, and start rebuilding their country.

We are supporting the invitation from Congo that all Chadians should come together in a meeting. But where's the problem now? The problem is that Habré himself, who invaded Chad from Sudan, supported by the CIA and other elements, is refusing to negotiate with Goukouni, raising a lot of protocol and procedural issues.

We would like to remind Habré of the fact that during the Kano Accord, when he was prime minister and [Félix] Malloum was president, he was the one who insisted that Malloum should not be treated as the president of Chad. I was there representing Libya and I remember the impolite way he spoke of his president. He was calling Malloum at that time the representative of the Chadian army. How can Habré himself now raise the question of representation, that he should be treated as head of state?

There is no way we can say that this is between a head of state and opposition, a legitimate government and an opposition. He is saying that because he has been seated in the OAU or the UN. But both Kampuchea and Sihanouk are sitting in the UN now—does Sihanouk represent anything in Kampuchea itself? He does not even control one inch in Kampuchea. This doesn't mean anything, this nonsense. How much of Chadian territory is Habré occupying with French and Zairian help? Almost two-thirds of Chad is under the control of GUNT.

If Habré is objective, he should realize that the interests of the Chadian people are more important than the interests of individuals, and he should sit with the others. Once during the Ethiopian mediation between the Sudanese government and the South, Nimeiry sat together with General Lagu without raising any procedural matters. There are many such examples in Africa and the rest of the world. The important thing now is to stop the bloodshed in Chad, to achieve national reconciliation.

This meeting on the Chadian problem should take place. Habré is saying they can meet only on the "expert level." What does that mean, the expert level? They will do nothing. Only two countries can meet on the expert level. But Chad's 11 factions—they have experts of what? It is the political leaders of the factions that should meet, not experts. Habré refused to go to Addis to answer the appeal of the OAU and now he's trying to make obstacles. Habré's problem is that he's very ambitious. I still remember during the Lagos conference, he said that he is ready to march on the cadaver of all the Chadians. But history will never forget. The Chadian people

will never forget. He should be realistic now; he should sit together with other leaders of factions to find a solution to the problem.

Africa Report: Some observers have speculated that once the French and Libyan troops withdraw from Chad, Habré will go on the offensive and attack to the north, considering that he has benefited over the past year from French military training and arms. What would be Libya's response in such a case?

Treki: This is certainly clear. If Habré tries to change the status quo in Chad before any national reconciliation, he will not face the GUNT alone. Libya stands firmly on this and everyone knows very well that if Habré in any way tries to change the situation thanks to the quantity of arms or help he has received from this or that country, he will face a worse situation than before.

Africa Report: So Libya's still very firmly behind Goukouni?

Treki: Sure.

Africa Report: A meeting of some breakaway factions from the GUNT was held in Ouagadougou in August. Given Libya's good relations with the government of Burkina Faso, some observers indicated that Libya must have been aware of the meeting and that perhaps Libya is interested in created a "third force" in Chad as an alternative to Habré and Goukouni.

Treki: You know what's happened with the factions that signed the Lagos Agreement. Some of these factions have a military presence in Chad, others have none, just political figures. Some of these political figures change from year to year. Sometimes they are in Chad, sometimes outside with no presence in Chad, living in Paris or Dakar.

When the Lagos Agreement was reached, they came back as politicians, like Abba Siddick—now he's with Habré, but he represents nothing in Chad, or Facho Balaam—a teacher at Dakar University and he has nothing inside. But it doesn't change the situation that GUNT is united and is fully representing the Chadian people. And I think our brothers in Burkina Faso know this very well. This is the Chadian tragedy—so divided.

Africa Report: Do you think it would be a good idea for Habré and Goukouni to set aside their political ambitions and to find a third leader to represent the Chadian people?

Treki: We are not against that. When the Chadians meet, they can select whomever they want, but let them meet. They can decide either to agree about Goukouni, or a third party. But I think that the interests of the Chadian people should be above all individual ambitions.

Africa Report: The French government said recently that the Libyan withdrawal had begun, and Habré expressed confidence that the terms of the withdrawal would be respected by both parties. If Libya does not withdraw from what you maintain is an integral part of your country, the Aouzou strip, how will this affect the ultimate success of your agreement with France?

Treki: The French have never discussed the Aouzou strip with us and they have no right to discuss it. They know very well that Aouzou is a part of Libya. They have never raised this question and we will never allow anyone to raise it, exactly as nobody would question whether Tobruk is part of Libya. We achieved our independence through the United Nations and Aouzou is an integral part of our territory. The

map attached to our independence resolution here in 1952 is clearcut. We will never discuss this with anyone.

Africa Report: Have your troops actually begun departing from Chad, or are they only withdrawing to the north of the country?

Treki: We are implementing the agreement, as is France, and we are very happy with it. I think this agreement will open a new phase of good relations with France. And we also believe that this a step toward a new era of relations between African countries and France.

Africa Report: So you expect that you will meet the November deadline to have all your troops out?

Treki: We are doing very well and I think everything is going fine.

Africa Report: Concerning Libya's relations with Sudan and Egypt, President Nimeiry accuses Libya of trying to overthrow him and of financing the rebels in southern Sudan. President Mubarak accuses you of sending commandos to destroy the Aswan dam and of mining the Red Sea. How do you respond to these charges?

Treki: It is quite natural that any government which fails inside will try to find scapegoats outside. I'm not talking now about interior problems in Sudan or Egypt, but it is very easy to accuse others. There have been almost 18 coup attempts in Sudan since May 1969, even during the time when Libya had the strongest relations with Nimeiry. In one of these attempts, it was Libya who saved Nimeiry's life and he is aware of this. You know the situation in Sudan concerns only the Sudanese, although we are one nation. When we speak on any other Arab problem, it is not intervention, it is interaction with other Arab countries, because we are one nation. I think the problem is that other countries like the U.S. don't understand this very well and try to intervene between this and that country. I can assure you that Libya has nothing to do with the revolt that is going on inside Sudan.

With regard to Egypt, do you know what the Aswan dam represents for Libyans, especially for our leadership now? This is the realization of Nasser, his victory. We have always considered the Aswan dam as part of a history-making epoch in the Arab world. Can you imagine that Libya would attack the realization of Nasser? Can you imagine the gravity of destroying the Aswan dam? That would mean that almost 30 million Egyptians would die. Anyone who has any mind cannot imagine this. This is ridiculous even to think about. We can say sometimes that we are against this or that leader, such as Sadat, but I don't think anybody can say that we are against the Egyptian people, to kill 30 million by destroying the Aswan dam. This is nonsense.

What happens is when any Libyans are opposed to our revolution, they say they have been trained to do this, like when the CIA received information through a Lebanese who they gave \$500,000, saying that we have sent a hit squad to kill President Reagan. Finally they realized they were deceived.

What is Libya's interest in mining the Red Sea? Do the Americans have any evidence now? The Sixth Fleet is in the Red Sea, the French, the British, and other fleets. Don't you think that if the Americans had the minimum evidence against Libya, they would tell the whole world? But they didn't find

any evidence. First of all, Libya was one of the countries using the Suez Canal during the period when they said there were mines. *Libyans ships were taking our pilgrims to Saudi Arabia.* They were crossing the Red Sea. This is nonsense, really ridiculous. It is just a way for the American administration and some Western countries to justify their military presence in the Red Sea.

Africa Report: Do you foresee any ways in which Libya's relations with the United States could be improved?

Treki: I think the ball is in America's court. We have no direct problem with the United States. All countries have interests

what our definition is. If by terrorism, they mean the Red Brigades in Italy or Baader Meinhof in Germany, we are *categorically opposed to these criminal organizations.* We will never deal with them, or with any individual terrorism, like hijacking. Our policy is very clear. We have the most severe law in the world against these actions, and we do whatever we can to help. We saved Madame Claustre and we saved two Belgians recently who were in Chad.

But if their definition is that the ANC or PAC is terrorist, or PLO is terrorist, we totally disagree with them. This is our main problem. Now President Reagan himself is calling the



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in cooperating. Our main problem with the United States is over its African policy and Middle East policy—if we can say that they have any policy in the Middle East.

You can listen to them accusing Libya of helping terrorism. But we have discussed for a long time, especially during the Carter administration, what their definition of terrorism is and

subversion and the terrorists in Nicaragua "freedom fighters." For us these people are terrorists. They are fighting against a legitimate regime with the help of other countries. We believe the United States has no right to intervene in our relations with our neighboring countries and with Arab countries. Today two countries have good relations, tomor-

row we have other relations. This is part of the process of unity within the Arab world. I don't think the United States as a big power should intervene.

We are ready to have normal bilateral relations with the United States, and to have a dialogue. We have no interest as a small nation to be an enemy of the United States. We are a non-aligned, neutral country. We are not a satellite of anyone, either of the Soviet Union or the Americans. We would like to be friends to all.

I will give you an example now—the unity agreement between Morocco and Libya. We are friends with the Soviet Union, but it never intervened in our internal affairs, saying we should do this, or not do this, while the United States is exerting a lot of pressure on Morocco. The United States wants Morocco to be its satellite. The Soviet Union never asked that. We are ready to be friends with the United States, and I declare this frankly and openly on behalf of our people. We would like to have good relations with the United States based on mutual respect and dialogue and in the mutual interest of the two peoples.

Africa Report: Do you think that since Morocco is a close ally of the U.S., your agreement with Morocco will help in some ways to improve your relations with the U.S.?

Treki: If this agreement can help, why not? We have no problem with that. The United States policy toward us is unjustified. We're not here to threaten the United States, or to do anything. But it's a kind of scapegoat policy against us. I'll give you an example of what is going on against our mission to the United Nations. Sanctions. First 25 miles, now a 5-mile limit of movement for our own people. What kind of logical threat can ten career Libyan diplomats pose against United States security? Each one of them can be followed by thousands from the FBI or the CIA. It's against the UN headquarters agreement and the Vienna convention. Now we can only move within five miles. Tomorrow if an African colleague in Westchester invites me to his house, I can't go, I'll have to ask permission from the State Department. This is unbelievable and ridiculous and is depriving us of our right to have normal political relations not only with the United Nations, but with other nations.

The Secretary-General characterized the situation with our house in Englewood, New Jersey, as one of the most ridiculous cases in the history of diplomatic relations. I can only use my house twice a month starting from Friday until Monday. And if I go there and my children need a doctor, I have to ask the permission of the State Department 48 hours in advance to bring a doctor. They are ridiculing themselves as a big power. I'm very sorry to say this, but this is the reality. This shows how they are dealing with the Libyans.

Once I asked someone who knows the administration very well for a justification for such policies. He said that Libya is the scapegoat for the administration. It will please the friends of the United States, the Israelis, without losing any lobby inside. I think this is the main thing. This is something that has really frustrated us.

What's happening to Libya will happen tomorrow to other countries. This is the way the United States wants to deal with small nations. It is pushing them toward the other side. Look at all these small countries receiving threats from the U.S.

Mission to the UN—letters saying they should follow a particular policy. We have paid a very high price for our independence. Half of our population died during the struggle against the fascist Italians. We will not sacrifice our independence easily to the Soviet Union, to the Americans, or to anyone. When the United States is ready, we are ready. We have no hatred against the United States.

Africa Report: How do you respond to the U.S.' dispatch of Navy jets for the second time to challenge your sovereignty over the Gulf of Sirte?

Treki: This is another kind of provocation against our country. They shot down two Libyan planes and said this is a big victory for the United States. Even if they destroy Libya from the map, would the U.S. gain any prestige? Libya is a minor, small country.

It's like exactly what happened to Grenada. A big victory against whom? Against the 100,000 people of Grenada. We would like the United States to take responsibility as a major power for international security and peace. American policy should be more reasonable, it should respect small nations and should not intervene in our internal affairs. By this, they can gain the respect of small nations, but using force, economic sanctions, or harassment against diplomats will not solve United States' problems. Such things diminish the prestige of such a great nation.

Africa Report: How do you respond to the U.S. government charge that Libya seeks to export revolution to other African countries?

Treki: No one can export revolution. When we achieved our revolution, maybe the only person we were inspired by was Nasser. But we had no direct contact with Nasser at the time only after the revolution did we have direct contact with Nasser. Other revolutions in Africa, like Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ethiopia—it is not Libya that exported revolution to them. But if they were inspired by the Libyan revolution, this is something that is not our fault. If Libya has such an ideology that can inspire other countries, then it is more of a reason that the United States should take us into consideration.

Look what happened recently in the UN General Assembly. When the UN adopted a resolution on South Africa, only the United States and Britain opposed it. There is something that the American people should realize. It is not Libya really who is subverting in Africa. On the contrary, it is the others.

Africa Report: Is there anything we have not covered that you would like to comment on?

Treki: We are looking forward to the time when the United States will have close relations with the African people. We are looking forward to the time when the United States realizes that it is in the interests of the world that the apartheid policy should be ended in South Africa. We believe that the links between the United States and Africa through black Americans should be an objective element toward having good relations. We would like to see a return to the American policy of the 1950s, when the United States opposed the French colonialists in Algeria, and in other parts of the world. We would like to see the United States have neutral and objective policies in the Middle East and in Africa. I think that in that case, the United States would regain the respect and the cooperation of Africa and the Arab nations. □

After the Treaty of Oujda

The Moroccan-Libyan pact may have further polarized the Maghreb by strengthening Algerian ties with Mauritania and Tunisia. The eventual outcome could be increased military support for Polisario from its neighbors.

BY TONY HODGES

Barring a diplomatic miracle, the ex-Spanish territory of the Western Sahara enters its tenth year of war this month. At the same time, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is finally holding its postponed 20th summit in Addis Ababa, with the Western Sahara once again high on the agenda.

Neither Morocco nor its Saharawi adversaries of the Polisario Front have victory yet in sight. The conflict seems as intractable as ever, with Polisario insistent on gaining full independence and Morocco equally determined to establish uncontested sovereignty over its "Saharan provinces." Nothing has come of the OAU peace plan, adopted at the 19th summit in Addis Ababa in June 1983, which exhorted Morocco and Polisario to "undertake direct negotiations" on the establishment of a ceasefire, so that "a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination" could be held "without any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the OAU and the United Nations."

The referendum, for which the OAU optimistically set a deadline of December 1983, could not be held because Mo-

rocco refused to countenance the idea of ceasefire talks with Polisario, which it brands as "a gang of mercenaries in the pay of Algeria." The OAU's Implementation Committee on the Western Sahara, a body of seven African presidents headed by the OAU chairman, Mengistu Haile Mariam, head of state of Ethiopia, did try to bring Morocco and Polisario together in Addis Ababa in September 1983. The attempt failed, however, when the Moroccan delegation, led by Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, refused to enter the conference chamber. The Moroccan position has not softened since, so the committee has seen no purpose in trying again.

Not only has the OAU's peace effort collapsed, but the war could be on the verge of a dangerous new stage of escalation. Tension between Morocco and Algeria, Polisario's principal source of arms, has increased markedly in recent months, especially since last August's declaration of a "union" between Morocco and Libya, which the Algerians regard as an anti-Algerian axis. The Algerian government is now widely expected to retaliate by assisting Polisario to step up its war against the Moroccan forces in the Sahara.

There, Morocco has built up its troop strength over the past two years to about 100,000 men (an estimate generally accepted by U.S. government ex-

perts), increased their firepower with imported U.S. and French weaponry, and built a series of defensive "walls" since 1980 to seal off the territory's main population centers and its valuable phosphate mines.

By May 1982, a continuous defense line, about 250 miles long, had been erected around an enclave in the northwest. The area is known euphemistically as the "useful triangle" because it includes the phosphate mines at Bou-Craa, the old Spanish colonial capital of El-Ayoum and the Saharawi religious center of Smara, the territory's second largest town. This "Great Wall of the Sahara" consists of two to three yard-high sandbanks, minefields and barbed wire, bunkers for artillery, observation posts, underground quarters for the troops, and electronic ground sensors and radar equipment to detect approaching enemy vehicles.

From May 1982 to December 1983, the wall enclosed about 17,000 square miles, roughly one-sixth of the Western Sahara's 102,700 square miles (an area slightly larger than Great Britain). Beyond the "useful triangle," the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) controlled one other heavily fortified enclave—a few hundred square miles around the southern towns of Dakhla and Argoub on the Atlantic coast.

All the former Moroccan outposts be-

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yond these two enclaves had been overrun or abandoned by November 1981, as they were difficult to supply and overly vulnerable to guerrilla raids. In short, there had been a process of retrenchment, by which the Moroccan forces were consolidated and reinforced in two compact and strategic zones near the coast. At the same time, the Moroccans took delivery of French Mirage F-1 jets, Puma and Gazelle helicopters and armored vehicles, along with U.S. supplied Northrop F-5 aircraft, OV-10 "Bronco" counter-insurgency planes, Chrysler M-60 tanks, Maverick missiles, Bell helicopters, anti-personnel cluster bombs, and radar and electronic equipment.

The retrenchment and reinforcement of the Moroccan troops in the "useful triangle" and the Dakhla-Argoub area greatly strengthened the FAR's position, although the Moroccans were still not confident enough to advance beyond their walled-off enclaves in search of the guerrilla units scattered across the rest of the territory. This resulted in a prolonged stand-off, lasting from January 1982 to July 1983, a period when Polisario staged only minor harassment raids against the Moroccan defense positions.

Within the "useful triangle," meanwhile, the restoration of security allowed the joint Spanish-Moroccan phosphate mining company, Phosboucraa, to resume production at the long-shut Bou-Craa mines in July 1982, though at a much lower level (678,000 tons in 1983) than before the war (2.6 million tons in 1975) because considerable investment is still needed to rehabilitate damaged installations.

However, Morocco remained far from victory. Five-sixths of the territory had been abandoned to the guerrillas. They continued to conduct small raids against the Moroccan defenses, while building up their fighting strength and digesting new, more advanced weapons systems, including missiles, tanks, and multiple rocket launchers, in preparation for larger attacks on the FAR's earthworks. The lull finally ended when Polisario launched a sustained, month-long offensive against Moroccan defenses at Lemseyed, in the Ouarkiz mountains of southern Morocco (just north of the pre-1975 Western Sahara border), in July-August 1983. Then, in

September 1983, Polisario attacked in strength against the "wall" near Smara, reportedly overrunning parts of it.

This prompted King Hassan to embark on a new bout of wall-building. His intention was to thrust Polisario onto the defensive and so forestall new guerrilla attacks on the existing wall; to extend the Moroccan defenses to the Mauritanian border, thereby obliging Polisario to cross Mauritanian territory to reach the southern part of Western Sahara; and to build a new outer wall, closer to the Algerian frontier, to provide a first line of defense. In addition, the easterly extension off the Moroccan-controlled zone would remove Polisario from its nominal "capital" at Hawza and from its bases in the eastern valley of the Saguia el-Hamra, Western Sahara's main river, where the guerrillas enjoyed good tree cover and relatively rugged terrain.

Between December 1983 and May 1984, two new walls were built by an estimated 30,000 Moroccan troops. The first extended the existing wall from Bou-Craa to a water source named Amgala near the Mauritanian border and then swung back in a loop to rejoin the old wall near Smara. The second provided a new outer line of defense, from the southeastern Moroccan town of Zaag, across the eastern Saguia el-Hamra, enclosing Hawza, to the new stretch of wall between Amgala and Smara. From Zaag to Cape Bojador on

the Atlantic, there was now a continuous 400-mile defense line. The zone under Moroccan control had been expanded to a little less than one-quarter of Western Sahara's land area.

Polisario was unable to halt the advance of the huge Moroccan forces mobilized to secure this additional territory and establish the new lines of defense. However, this was a setback, rather than a decisive defeat for the guerrillas. They are still able to roam more or less unmolested in more than three-quarters of the country, and King Hassan is obliged to keep 100,000 troops in the desert, at a cost barely affordable to his stretched exchequer.

That the King has to keep so many troops in the Sahara, dug in along hundreds of miles of fortified "walls," illustrates the lengths to which he has had to go to fend off Polisario. Furthermore, the eastward extension of Morocco's main Saharan enclave has spread the Moroccan forces more thinly and lengthened their supply lines, while simply pushing the "front line" deeper into the desert.

It could also result in the war eventually spilling over into neighboring Mauritania, plunging that impoverished, heavily indebted and drought-stricken Sahelian country back into the conflict from which it was so desperate to extricate itself in 1979. There is nothing to stop Polisario from skirting the new Moroccan defense line to Amgala by moving



El-Ayoun, the capital of Western Sahara: The phosphate mines at Bou-Craa, the Saharawi religious center of Smara, and El-Ayoun are all under Moroccan control

through northern Mauritania, a vast and unpoliceable desert region. Besides, many Mauritians, including President Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla himself, are sympathetic to the Saharawis, if only because the "Moors" of Mauritania are ethnically and culturally related to them and because an independent Western Saharan state would provide a convenient buffer between Mauritania and "expansionist" Morocco.

The Nouakchott regime has feared Moroccan retaliation ever since Mauritania recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) last February. Such retaliation could take several forms—the encouragement of internal dissidence, the sponsorship of a coup attempt (as in March 1981 when Morocco masterminded an unsuccessful putsch by the *Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique*), a cross-border strike "in pursuit of Polisario," or a bid to seize the small fishing town of La Guera, the sole locality in the Western Sahara to have remained in Mauritanian hands since President Ould Haidalla's peace treaty with Polisario in 1979. The Mauritians are staying there temporarily, until the war ends, to prevent Morocco from moving into a town only three miles from the port of Nouadhibou, on which Mauritania depends for over 90 percent of its export earnings (from iron ore and fish).

Morocco has not yet moved against La Guera, but on July 20, King Hassan threatened to order his troops across the Mauritanian border if Polisario forces were found to be using Mauritanian territory. During the previous week, Polisario guerrillas, whom King Hassan claimed had come from Mauritania, had shelled Moroccan defense positions in the south of the Western Sahara, near Dakhla.

The Algerian government, which has security obligations toward Mauritania under the Maghrebi Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, signed by Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania in 1983, immediately leapt to Mauritania's defense, sending its foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, to Nouakchott to confer with President Ould Haidalla. This display of solidarity showed just how far the Algerian-Mauritanian relationship has developed since President Ould Haidalla came to power in 1979. To Algeria, Mauritania is a valued ally in the regional power struggle with Morocco, while, in President Ould Haidalla's eyes, Algeria is a sure source of support against either Moroccan or Libyan moves against his regime.

Algeria's swift response to King Hassan's "hot pursuit" threat was equally a sign of the deterioration in Algerian-Moroccan relations, which have gone from bad to worse in recent months. A Mo-

roccan attempt to extend the FAR's Saharan defense lines right up to the Algerian frontier near Tindouf, the next logical step in King Hassan's wall-building strategy, might spark off direct clashes between Algerian and Moroccan forces, with potentially disastrous consequences for peace in the Maghreb.

Unless or until Algeria stops supplying Polisario with arms, fuel, and food, the Moroccans will never be left in peace in Western Sahara. But King Hassan fears that a withdrawal from the Sahara would shatter his credibility as a ruler and spur embittered army officers to exploit a period of national humiliation by trying to depose him. He has therefore battled on in the Sahara, despite the enormous cost, in the hope that Algeria will eventually tire of the regional tension and force Polisario to accept a settlement on terms that he could portray to his subjects as a victory. However, this has remained an elusive goal, despite his summit meeting in February 1983 with President Chadli Bendjedid (the first such Algerian-Moroccan summit since the start of the Saharan war) in the Algerian border village of Akid Lotfi.

Contrary to press speculation, the Akid Lotfi summit did not mark a softening of Algerian support for the Saharawi nationalists. Rather, it was the opening shot in a new, imaginative Algerian initiative to extricate King Hassan from the war—while upholding the Saharawis' right to self-determination. "I was very clear about Algeria's position concerning the question of Western Sahara," Chadli confided the following June at the OAU summit. "I explained to the Moroccan king that I was not mandated to speak in the name of the Saharawis and that I would not arrogate to myself the right to speak in their name or to assume their tutelage." What Algeria was prepared to do, Chadli went on, was "to contribute to a reconciliation of the viewpoints of the two parties in conflict in the Western Sahara," in the same way that Algeria had helped to bring Mauritania and Polisario together in 1979.

In return, Chadli offered to join Morocco in a concerted effort to promote mutually beneficial collaboration in the "Greater Maghreb," in the hope that this would prove an enticing carrot eco-



Polisario guerrillas: "Tension between Morocco and Algeria, Polisario's principal source of arms, has increased markedly in recent months"

nomically for the King and would provide him with the kind of idealistic cause, rooted in traditions going back to the common struggle against France, that could arouse sufficient enthusiasm in Morocco to submerge the trauma of withdrawal from the Sahara.

An immediate upshot of the Akid Lotfi summit was a secret meeting in Algiers in April 1983 between several senior Polisario leaders and three Moroccan envoys. The Moroccans reportedly conveyed an offer of Saharawi autonomy within the framework of overall Moroccan sovereignty—a proposal rejected by their Polisario interlocutors, who wanted nothing less than full independence.

Thereafter, King Hassan backed away from Chadli's proposals, rejected further contacts with Polisario, and thus refused to implement the ensuing OAU summit's calls for Moroccan-Polisario talks on a ceasefire. This in turn irritated Chadli, who not only maintained Algeria's logistical support for Polisario, but was almost certainly consulted before the guerrilla movement ended its long lull in military operations by launching the big attacks against Lemseyed and the Smara section of the "wall" in July-September 1983. The Algerian government was further angered by King Hassan's decision to build new Saharan "walls" between December 1983 and May 1984, taking the FAR's front-line defenses nearer to the Algerian frontier than at any time since 1979.

As a result, Algeria has refused to restore diplomatic relations with Morocco, broken since March 1976, and has excluded Morocco from adhering to the Maghrebi Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, initially signed by Algeria and Tunisia in March 1983 and joined by Mauritania the following December. In April 1984, the Political Bureau of Algeria's ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) saw fit to remind Morocco, in a detailed foreign policy statement, of "Algeria's unqualified support for the struggle being waged by the people of Western Sahara under the leadership of the Polisario Front, their sole legitimate representative, for the effective exercise of their right to self-determination."

During the summer, Algerian-Moroccan relations continued to deteriorate. The arrival in Rabat in mid-May of

a U.S. delegation, headed by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, for a meeting of the U.S.-Moroccan Military Commission (set up by former Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1982), did not go unnoticed in Algiers, where King Hassan's Saharan belligerence is in large measure ascribed to the increased flow of U.S. military aid to Morocco since 1980, President Carter's final year in office. While Weinberger was in Rabat, the Algerian armed forces pointedly held large-scale exercises in Chadli's presence, near the northwestern border with Morocco, and the Algerian press warned "potential enemies" to take note of Algeria's military strength.

Then, on June 15, there was a strange incident on the Moroccan-Algerian border, about 80 miles south of

"Unless or until Algeria stops supplying Polisario, the Moroccans will never be left in peace in Western Sahara."

Bechar. A motorized Moroccan army unit of about 60 men crossed the border—"by error" according to the Moroccan authorities—and was intercepted by an Algerian patrol. Two Moroccan soldiers were killed and 31 taken prisoner during the ensuing shoot-out. Although the prisoners were subsequently released, the clash was followed only a month later by King Hassan's threat to pursue Polisario into Mauritania and by Algeria's counter-threat to aid Mauritania if it was attacked.

In July, Colonel Qaddafi tried his hand at mediating between Algeria and Morocco, by sending envoys back and forth to Algiers and Rabat—whence came rumors that the Colonel would join Hassan and Chadli, as well as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, for an Arab "mini-summit" in Morocco. In fact, Chadli had become so disillusioned by King Hassan's uncompromising stand on the Sahara that he saw no point in meeting him.

King Hassan then decided to upstage the Algerians by proposing a "union of states" with Libya. This seemingly radical proposal, which astonished almost all

observers of the North African scene (not least the obsessively anti-Libyan Reagan administration), had a *realpolitik* rationale, despite the ideological gulf between Morocco's Western-aligned monarchy and the Jamahiriya. It had been preceded, after all, by a year's courtship, dating from Colonel Qaddafi's unexpected visit to Morocco in June-July 1983.

At that time, Qaddafi and Hassan had seen a mutual interest in striking a deal not to assist each other's "backyard" enemies, in Chad and the Western Sahara. The Chad war had just flared up again, with Libyan-backed GUNT forces advancing on Ndjamen, and Qaddafi was anxious to dissuade King Hassan from sending an expeditionary force to Chad to back the threatened Habré regime, as he had to Zaire on President Mobutu's behalf, at the time of the Shaba troubles in 1977 and 1978. King Hassan concurred, in return for a Libyan promise to stop arming and funding Polisario.

There were other motives on both sides for the Libyan-Moroccan entente. Facing the combined antagonism of the U.S., Egypt, and Sudan (and later France when it dispatched 3,000 troops to Chad in August-September 1983), Colonel Qaddafi felt compelled to lessen Libya's isolation in the Arab world. He patched up his quarrels with Saudi Arabia as well as with Morocco at this time.

There was also an element of anti-Algerian pique in his overture to Morocco. This was not just because Qaddafi was furious with Chadli for not standing by his candidacy for the OAU chairmanship, which passed instead to Mengistu Haile Mariam at the 19th summit, just a fortnight before the Colonel's pathbreaking trip to Morocco. He was also angered by Chadli's refusal to support his policy in Chad or back the PLO rebellion against Yasser Arafat.

Above all, though, Qaddafi, the arch-unionist of the Arab world, was dismayed that Algeria was blackballing Libya, as well as Morocco, from the Maghrebi Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, because it refused to renounce its territorial claim to a thin strip of desert in southeastern Algeria—a claim akin to that behind Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad.

On King Hassan's side, there was



Michael Mareh

Aerial view of the Moroccan wall in the Western Sahara: "Between December 1983 and May 1984, two new walls were built by an estimated 30,000 Moroccan troops"

also no shortage of persuasive reasons to strike a deal. Apart from the prospect of Libya halting its arms deliveries to Polisario, there was a hope, on the King's part, that detente with Libya would open the way to Morocco recouping lost diplomatic ground over the Sahara—and perhaps even provide a new rationale for persuading the OAU to see the Saharan conflict as an Arab affair that could be left to the Arabs to resolve.

The possible economic rewards to be reaped from an understanding with Qaddafi were equally attractive. Morocco is one of the Third World's most indebted nations with about \$12 billion of disbursed public external debt (equivalent to more than 80 percent of its GNP). Its debt service ratio would have approached 40 percent of export earnings this year had it not been for the rescheduling of a large part of debt service obligations with both the Paris and London Clubs and Arab creditors. The attraction of being able to negotiate Libyan financial aid—and perhaps also cheap Libyan oil deliveries—does not need elaboration.

Nor, given Morocco's high unemployment and the near impossibility of doing much about it at a time of IMF-decreed austerity, is it difficult to see why King Hassan would value an opportunity to export surplus manpower to labor-hungry Libya. In fact, economic

cooperation, including arrangements to send Moroccan workers to Libya, was subsequently the subject of detailed planning at the first meeting of a new Libyan-Moroccan joint commission, held in Rabat on January 25-26, 1984, with no less than 18 Libyan ministers in attendance.

King Hassan probably also wanted to halt Tripoli's hostile radio broadcasts about his regime, and in particular to soften Libya's antagonism to his initiatives in the Middle East. The participation of Israeli officials and members of the Knesset at last May's Congress of the Council of Moroccan-Jewish Communities was the most graphic reminder that Hassan's views, are diametrically opposed to Qaddafi's uncompromising "rejectionism." Finally, King Hassan shared Qaddafi's desire to take revenge on Algeria and had every interest in encouraging Qaddafi to convert what had hitherto been a gradual erosion of Libyan-Algerian relations into a definitive parting of ways.

The Libyan-Moroccan entente had been under way for a year by last July when Hassan asked a Libyan envoy visiting Morocco to convey to Qaddafi his idea that the two states form an "Arab-African union." The proposal was sweet music to the ears of the Colonel, who has repeatedly negotiated marriages with other Arab states (Egypt, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia) and even one non-

Arab African state (Chad) since coming to power in 1969, only to see each ending in an acrimonious divorce. A treaty of union was duly signed by Qaddafi and Hassan on August 13 in the eastern Moroccan city of Oujda—and was ratified by a 99.97 percent majority of Moroccan voters on August 31 and by a unanimous vote of the Libyan General People's Congress on September 1.

The Treaty of Oujda was more important for its dramatic symbolism than its actual content. It did not really establish a "union of states" at all, as it involved no integration of Moroccan and Libyan state bodies. Indeed, each state is committed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The Treaty of Oujda was really a pact, dressed up in Arab unionist rhetoric, which systematized the close cooperation initiated by Hassan and Qaddafi a year earlier. By institutionalizing channels of communication and cooperation, notably by establishing a permanent secretariat, the rulers of Morocco and Libya have shown sceptics that their rapprochement in 1983 was not a short-term fling.

At home, the timing of the treaty was particularly opportune for King Hassan. It was signed on the eve of Morocco's September 14 general election, which saw the return of a large royalist majority despite gains for the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. The entire legal political spectrum, from the royalist right to the pro-Moscow communists, endorsed the treaty, and the King was credited with masterminding a diplomatic coup that would, in one stroke, help the Moroccan economy and provide jobs, deal a crippling blow to Polisario, and snub Algeria.

What, in fact, have been the implications of the Libyan-Moroccan entente, and the Treaty of Oujda in particular, for the war in Western Sahara and Moroccan-Algerian relations? First, it would seem, the loss of Libyan arms and money, which pre-dated the treaty, was more a moral than a practical blow to Polisario. Libya, whose role in the Saharan conflict had earlier been exaggerated by King Hassan to arouse the Reagan administration's sympathies, has never been more than a second tier actor in this dispute. Its arms supplies to Polisario were always transported via Algeria, with Algerian approval, and the

Algerian government can easily make up for any cutback in Libyan arms deliveries. Thus, quite apart from the uncertainties about its duration, the Libyan-Moroccan pact is unlikely, in and of itself, to reduce Polisario's effectiveness.

Ironically, it could put Morocco in a worse position in the Sahara, both diplomatically and militarily. In black Africa, where patience with Morocco was already running very low because of King Hassan's refusal to honor the OAU's call for Moroccan-Polisario talks, the pact looked too opportunist to have much influence. It did little for Morocco's image among its conservative, anti-Libyan African allies, while Polisario was unlikely to lose support from its traditional allies, few if any of which have ever followed a Libyan lead in determining their policy on Western Sahara.

As of early October, the SADR seemed likely to take its seat at the OAU's 20th summit without risk of sparking off a rerun of the quorum-blocking walk-outs that brought the OAU to the brink of collapse in 1982-83. Indeed, Morocco's standing in African circles is now so low that Nigeria, a country which has traditionally taken a middle-of-the-road position on the Western Sahara, resigned from the OAU Implementation Committee in September because its work had been paralyzed by Morocco's refusal to negotiate with Polisario. On September 25, Nigeria's foreign minister, Ibrahim Gambari, went a step further by announcing his support for the SADR's seating at the November OAU summit.

The principal consequence of the Treaty of Oujda has been to enrage Algeria, while disconcerting both Mauritania and Tunisia, thus hardening the divisions in the Maghreb, rather than contributing in any meaningful way to greater Maghrebi unity. In Algerian eyes, the Treaty of Oujda is an anti-Algerian pact.

After meeting on August 21 to assess the treaty's significance, the FLN's Political Bureau released a statement castigating what it described as a "policy of axes" aimed at "dividing what should be brought together," and reaffirming that Maghrebi unity could not be attained "without the people of the Western Sahara enjoying their full national rights." A few days later, the Algerian press

reprimanded President Francois Mitterrand for choosing to visit Morocco just as the Treaty of Oujda was being ratified by referendum.

Although the French president was apparently taking advantage of the post-Oujda Libyan-Moroccan honeymoon to explore with King Hassan the possibilities of restraining Libya in Chad (the mutual Franco-Libyan withdrawal from Chad was announced less than three weeks later), the Algerians complained that his presence in Morocco amounted to an endorsement of the "treaty of union."

With the Algerian leadership subsequently suspicious as well of the Franco-Libyan agreement on Chad, which Qaddafi has described as following "in the slipstream of the union with Morocco," and angry about a recent decline in French oil purchases from Algeria, apparently to Libya's benefit, Franco-Algerian relations have cooled appreciably since the halcyon days after President Mitterrand's election in 1981.

Algeria has responded to the Treaty of Oujda by drawing closer to its own Maghrebi allies, Tunisia and Mauritania,

both of which value their ties with Algeria and fear Libyan meddling in their internal affairs and, in Mauritania's case, Moroccan meddling too. In addition, Algeria has launched a new diplomatic offensive in black Africa, notably in the Sahelian states. Envoys have been sent to numerous African capitals, in preparation for the OAU summit, and Chadli himself visited Mali and Mauritania in mid-September. Overtures have even been made to President Hissène Habré of Chad, whose information minister, Mahamat Soumaila, has described the Treaty of Oujda as a "union on the backs of the Saharawi and Chadian peoples."

For all his Machiavellian brilliance as a tactician, King Hassan could lose much more than he gains from his alliance with Libya. For Libya has no direct leverage over Polisario, while Algeria, which does, could now be tempted to take its revenge for the forging of a new Libyan-Moroccan axis by escalating its support for the Saharawi nationalists, perhaps by providing them with the powerful, sophisticated weaponry they need to undermine the King's "strategy of walls." □



Algerian President Chadli; Mohamed Abdelaziz, SADR President; and President Haidalla of Mauritania: "The Western Sahara war could eventually spill over into Mauritania"

From the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara

While the search for a negotiated solution to the war in the Western Sahara continues, Morocco is investing vast amounts of money and effort to make its occupation of the territory a *fait accompli*.

BY MICHAEL MAREN

The two-hour flight from Casablanca to the Western Saharan capital of El-Ayoun stops briefly in Agadir, a tourist resort on Morocco's Atlantic coast. There, the Europeans with their beach bags, floppy hats, and sunglasses disembark, and the Royal Air Maroc jet fills up with sullen young men in army-green combat fatigues. The commercial jetliner is transformed into a military transport for the second half of the journey.

A young man in civilian clothes sits down beside me and orders a beer from the flight attendant. A lieutenant in the Army, he commands one of the outposts along the wall that the Moroccans have built across the Western Sahara. He is returning to the Sahara as part of the continuing cycle of 20 days' leave after six months on the front. The lieutenant is preparing for his fourth six-month tour. I ask him why he isn't in uniform. "I don't wear the uniform because my generation doesn't like war," he says. "We want peace." He pauses to order another beer. "But Morocco must

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be firm. We cannot be intimidated by the Polisario mercenaries."

Like the lieutenant, many Moroccans seem to bear the burden of the war in the Sahara with a mixture of duty and resentment. They see the death, the cost, and the inconvenience as things that are imposed upon them from the outside. Within Morocco, the ten years of war have caused surprisingly little controversy. There is no concerted opposition to the war, even though an estimated 10,000 Moroccans have died, and almost 100,000 troops are now committed to the front which continues to expand. The tremendous cost of the war has also created a financial burden that is felt in every Moroccan home. Though critics of Morocco's Sahara policy have called it expansionist, Moroccans believe that they are defending the country against an external threat. Policy options do not exist.

Many Moroccans now feel that the human costs of the war are behind them. There have been no major Polisario victories recently, and the principal Saharan towns of El-Ayoun and Smara, the phosphate mines at Bou-Craa, and the 100 kilometer-long conveyor which links the mines to the sea are all well-

fortified behind the wall. With the military front seemingly secure, King Hassan II is now preparing to head off the barrage of diplomatic attacks like those he has faced at past OAU summits.

The recent controversy in the OAU and in the international arena has revolved around Morocco's acceptance and then its apparent rejection of a referendum to determine the future of the Western Sahara. The Moroccans have rejected negotiations with Polisario as a pre-condition for a referendum, saying such talks would amount to de facto recognition of "a band of mercenaries."

In addition, the Moroccans feel that allowing Polisario to negotiate for the people of the Sahara would be a violation of the spirit of a referendum. According to a document issued by the Moroccan government, "Indeed, what would be the purpose of consulting the population of the Sahara on their authentic wish through a general, free, and regular referendum, if before initiating such a process one would like to impose upon them a minority and alien group as being their 'representative' and with whom it is necessary to negotiate their destiny?"

The Moroccans insist, however, that the issue of meeting with Polisario is the

only thing standing in the way of a referendum. "We are prepared to hold a referendum this afternoon," a high-ranking Moroccan diplomat said recently. "We have already worked out the details down to the size and color of the ballot boxes." Moroccan officials assert that they would gladly leave Western Sahara in the "unlikely" event that the Saharawi people vote in favor of independence.

But from El-Ayoun, the diplomatic wrangling over the details of a referendum seems academic. Judging from the money, time, and energy being pumped into El-Ayoun, it is clear that Morocco has no intention of handing the town over to anyone, referendum or no referendum. The former capital of the Spanish Sahara is being slowly transformed from a desert trading center to a modern metropolis with a current population of 93,000.

Everywhere, concrete homes and buildings by the hundreds are rising from the sand. A new airport terminal, a mini-replica of Casablanca's modern Mohammed V Airport, is being constructed. A 35,000-seat stadium is nearly completed as the center of a sports complex which will also contain an Olympic-size swimming pool. An arts center for displaying and marketing local crafts has been built. A five-star hotel is under construction, along with a zoo, a large central park, and a new hospital. Freshly tarmacked roads pass by the construction sites, tailing off into the wasteland of gravel and sand beyond the edges of the town. The newness of the buildings and the magnitude of the construction give the impression that the entire town was thrown together overnight, a Hollywood set propped up in a stark desert.

The shops are packed with canned goods and occasional fresh produce flown in from the north. At Port El-Ayoun, World War II-vintage amphibious vehicles unload consumer goods from ships moored off the coast. The vehicles will be used until a new pier is completed that will allow ships to dock beyond the shallow beaches. The goods arrive duty-free and cheap from Las Palmas in the Canary Islands: color TVs, food processors, stereos, cameras, and watches.

Officials explain that the people of the area are traders, and by letting the

goods flow freely, they are able to maintain their livelihood. Visitors from Morocco and soldiers going home on leave depart from El-Ayoun loaded down with the precious cargo.

Moroccan television and radio are beamed into the territory, with the aim of assimilating and integrating the local population and bridging the wide gap between the towns of the Sahara and the mainstream of Moroccan life.

So that the Saharawis who settle in the towns will have a place to watch their new TVs, there is free or highly-subsidized housing or free land for anyone who wants to build a house. There is running water, electricity, and a sewage system. There are newly-constructed primary, secondary, and technical schools. And, as every Moroccan official stresses to visitors, there are now 13,500 students in El-Ayoun, while in 1976, there were only 925.

The construction and the public services account for a large portion of Morocco's costs of holding on to the Western Sahara. It is called "community development," though it looks like an extremely expensive and blatant attempt to buy the loyalties of the Saharawi population. The plan, however, may be working. The Moroccans claim that there have been virtually no incidents of civil disobedience or anything remotely resembling terrorist activity or even protest. "These people con-

sider themselves to be Moroccans," a military official said. "If anyone really wanted to cause trouble, there is no way we could stop them."

There is no way for a casual visitor to confirm or deny this. The streets of El-Ayoun appear to be as peaceful as those in any comparable town in Morocco. The military is ubiquitous without seeming overtly threatening. Unarmed soldiers roam the streets unmolested. Unlike some earlier journalists who visited El-Ayoun, I was not supplied with an official translator, and I was allowed to wander freely, speaking with whom-ever I pleased. Though it may be misleading, I found no one among the Saharawi population who said that Morocco should leave. The only regrets I heard were from people who had lost relatives—some fighting with the Moroccan army and others with Polisario. Other people said that they had relatives who were refugees in Tindouf. When I asked them what was preventing them from seeing their relatives, the answer was "the war," never the Moroccans, the Algerians or Polisario, always the war.

On a Sunday afternoon, the El-Ayoun soccer team is playing a team flown in from Safi, a coastal town to the north. Because the stadium is not yet finished, the game is held in the sandy surface of the uncompleted park in the center of the expanded town. The home team is



A 35,000-seat stadium rises behind recently constructed houses in El-Ayoun: "Buying the loyalties of the Saharawi population"

Jonathan Maron

cheered on by nearly 5,000 spectators who pack the sidelines and perch on large concrete trellises which eventually will be covered with flowers. The government pays to have the teams flown in in the hope that the people's enthusiasm for soccer will create a sense of community in El-Ayoum.

The governor of El-Ayoum province is Saleh Zemrag, a soft-spoken man in his late 50s. Over lunch, he answers my questions on Morocco's position in the Sahara. He becomes angry when I ask about the Saharawi people. "Saharawi? Why Saharawi? The Sahara runs from Egypt to the Atlantic. Why are the people who live in Libya's Sahara not called Saharawi? Algeria's? Why are only the people who live in Morocco's Sahara called Saharawi?"

His tone then becomes calm and schoolmasterish. After lunch, he stands before a large relief map of the region showing Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania without borders. The lecture lasts for nearly four hours as he delivers an

impassioned history of the conflict from pre-colonial times.

The official Moroccan interpretation of the conflict presents the problem as one of colonialism. It regards the Spanish departure from the Sahara as another phase of the gradual decolonization of Morocco, a process which will be completed when the Spanish depart from Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco.

"Why should we have a referendum on the Sahara? We didn't have a referendum when Spain returned Ifni in 1969 or when they departed from Tarfaya in 1958. What is the difference between Tarfaya and El-Ayoum? There is no difference."

One difference, clearly, is that Polisario did not exist in 1958. Indeed, had it not been for persistent diplomatic and military pressure from Polisario—with significant backing from Algeria—the Western Sahara would have passed almost unnoticed into Morocco's possession. Though it may not be true, as Mo-

rocco claims, that Polisario was created by Algeria, it is true that Polisario would not exist as a factor in Western Sahara without Algerian assistance. It is in part for this reason, therefore, that Morocco sees the entire conflict as a problem with Algeria and a manifestation of Algeria's designs to have an outlet on the Atlantic.

"The Algerians created the Polisario and then paid off the OAU and African countries to accept the so-called SADR," the governor said. "The countries which support Polisario are only listening to Algeria. They don't understand the conflict. Last February, on the anniversary of Spain's departure from Western Sahara, Benin and Mexico both sent cables of congratulations here to El-Ayoum." He laughed. "I can show them to you if you want."

The governor, like all Moroccan officials, refers to Polisario as paid mercenaries in the service of Algeria. He did concede that there were at least some local people among the Polisario forces, but he added, "Many of the local people who fight with Polisario were oppressing their own people with the Spanish police force. They fled because they were afraid when the Sahara was reunited with Morocco."

The governor and other Moroccan officials also emphasized the familial ties between the people of the Sahara and the people of Morocco. "There is no one from the Sahara who does not have relatives in Morocco," the governor said. "Even the father of [SADR president] Abdelaziz served as an NCO in the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces. And the father of one of the SADR leadership Mahfoud Ali Beiba, lives here in El-Ayoum. Would you like to meet him?"

That evening, I am escorted to a modest house in the old part of El-Ayoum. Five generations of men from the one Saharawi family are there at the door to greet me. I was first introduced to the 110-year-old patriarch and then led to a man who introduced himself as the father of Ali Beiba. The other 15 members of the family seated themselves along the perimeter of the large room as tea was served and a servant passed among us, dousing everyone with French perfume from an atomizer. It was obvious that my visit had been well-arranged before hand, and that

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these men had entertained foreign journalists before.

The man who said that he was the father of Ali Beiba said that he had not seen his son since 1974 when he left for Algeria. Ali Beiba was only 22 years old at the time and was susceptible to these outside influences, the man explained. He said that he wished his son would return home and accept Moroccan nationality.

Around the room, the men declared their allegiance to King Hassan and expressed contempt for the Algerians, the OAU, and other outsiders who they said were pretending to speak for the people of Western Sahara. "The people of the Western Sahara used to buy and sell slaves," one of the men said. "We know slaves, and [former OAU Secretary General Edem] Kodjo [who seated the SADR at the 1982 Council of Ministers meeting] is a cheap slave to the Algerians."

"The people in Tindouf," another man insisted, "are in prison. They want to come back now." Despite persistent questioning, however, no one would really discuss how many Saharawi people were fighting with Polisario, nor would anyone offer a guess as to why they would continue to press for independence.

The next day, while accompanying the commander of Morocco's forces in the Western Sahara, Col. Major Benani Abdelaziz, on a military flight from El-Ayoun to Smara, I was given a more precise answer to my question. The Polisario fighters, he said, were 25 percent Mauritanian, 25 percent Malian and Algerian, and 40 percent "southern Moroccans," with the remainder from Chad, Niger, and other countries.

"This war is a problem between Algeria and Morocco," the Colonel said. "For it to end, we will have to negotiate with Algeria. If the Algerians do not negotiate, we will continue to push the wall until we control the entire territory. . . it will be the first time a country will win a guerrilla war."

In Smara, we board American-made Moroccan Army helicopters, and proceed southwestward toward the new section of the wall. Morocco's abandoned positions along the old sections of the wall are clearly visible, as are newer positions off toward the horizon. Con-

voys of troops and earth-moving equipment are preceded by troops searching for land mines.

As we pass over a supply convoy, Morocco's threat to keep expanding its frontiers appears to be somewhat less than credible. Below, hundreds of miles of torturous desert away from the main base at Smara, are trucks hauling water, food, and other supplies to isolated outposts along the current frontier. Against the backdrop of seemingly endless desert, the lifeline looks to be treacherously thin already.

The next stop on Morocco's Saharan tour is the Polisario capital of Hawza which was closed within the Moroccan wall at the beginning of this year. "Behold the capital of the Polisario state," an officer jokes while pointing to the ruin of what was once a small village. (Even as we stood in Hawza, Polisario continued to issue radio broadcasts which they claimed were coming from a transmitter there.)

From a Moroccan position along a high point on the wall, the desert is visible for miles. The 15 or so men at the post quietly peer into the distance, while others make tea in the makeshift hovels in which they live for months at a time. Guns and ammunition are covered with blankets to protect them from the sand, and the only sound comes from the wind whistling up the side of the escarpment. "We haven't seen Polisario here in more than six months," a soldier tells me.

For lunch, the officers at a regional command post dine on lobster and fresh fruit (from Polisario's gardens at Hawza, they joke). It is their turn to ask me questions. They want to know if Reagan will win the election. "Yes, I think that he probably will," I tell them. "Good," they all agree, and having been assured by an American that their good friend in Washington will be there for several more years, an officer asks me another question which has been on his mind. "Tell us about Michael Jackson," he says.

Though a trip through the Moroccan-held Western Sahara is a decidedly one-sided experience, at least one thing is crystal clear: Morocco is in control. Despite the strain on the economy, there is nothing on the military front to pressure the Moroccans to concede to Polisario's demands for a public meeting.

But even if Polisario were to step aside and agree not to meet publicly with the Moroccans, the barriers to a referendum would not disappear. There is still the sticky issue of who would be eligible to vote. The Moroccans say voter eligibility would be based on the 1974 Spanish census which tallied 74,000 residents of the colony. Morocco has agreed that recent settlers in the Western Sahara should not be able to vote and they have consented to designate their armed forces confined to designated areas and watched over by UN or OAU troops. Polisario has claimed, however, that there are 750,000 Saharawi refugees in Tindouf. With such a discrepancy, compromise is unlikely.

An American diplomat in Rabat was pessimistic: "As far as Morocco is concerned, the question of the Western Sahara has already been answered. There is no need whatsoever from a domestic political point of view for the King to hold a referendum. For Moroccans, it would be the equivalent of the U.S. holding a referendum to decide the future of Florida. What's the point?"

"Even if Hassan were to agree to a referendum," the diplomat continued, "it's a no-win situation for him. If he wins a referendum, and I think that is very possible, the issue still won't go away. He'll be accused of fixing the ballots. And win or lose, he'll be in political trouble."

With no settlement in sight, Morocco will continue to become more deeply entrenched in the Sahara and less susceptible to military pressure. It is unlikely that Morocco will find a diplomatic strategy that will succeed as well as its strategy of walls has on the military front. If the SADR is seated at the next OAU summit, Morocco will have to choose between leading a walk-out, as it has done in the past, and reaching a compromise that will rationalize its continued presence. Either way, it will be a diplomatic defeat for Morocco and a victory for Polisario.

But when the 20th OAU summit becomes history, Moroccan troops will remain on guard behind the "great wall" of the Sahara. While Polisario may celebrate its diplomatic victory in Tindouf, thousands of Saharawis will continue to live in the city the Moroccans are building for them at El-Ayoun. □

Redefining the Revolution

Two bold initiatives—the Treaty of Oujda with Morocco and the inauguration of the “Great Manmade River”—marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Libyan revolution. But internal opposition, foreign hostility, and an economy weakened by falling oil prices have put increasing pressure on Col. Muammar Qaddafi's *jamahiriya*.

BY GEORGE HENDERSON

As he mounted the podium for his customary discourse to the General People's Congress on September 1st—the fifteenth anniversary of Libya's revolution—Colonel Muammar Qaddafi had reason to feel pleased with his achievements. On the anniversary itself, Morocco's 7.5 million voters were approving the new treaty of unity between Morocco and Libya by 99 percent of the vote. President Mitterrand of France was engaged in a series of hurried visits to Morocco in a patent attempt to exploit the new Moroccan-Libyan relationship by getting King Hassan to persuade the Libyan leader to compromise over the issue of Chad.

Just a day before the celebrations, Colonel Qaddafi had inaugurated one of the most grandiose development projects ever undertaken in the Middle East or Africa: a well field in the southern oasis of Sarir that is to feed the “Great Manmade River”—a 1,300-mile pipeline designed to bring fossil water from the Sahara to Libya's arid coast for

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irrigation and urban use. The scheme's initial cost is estimated at \$3.29 billion, although the total cost could eventually be as high as \$27 billion.

There are, it is true, some clouds on Libya's horizon. First and foremost, falling oil revenues are a chronic problem, as Libya depends exclusively on oil for foreign exchange to pay for its vital imports. Since the collapse in the world oil market after 1980, Libya has suffered more than most petroleum producers. Its oil revenues dropped from a high of \$22.6 billion in 1980 to \$14.7 billion in 1981, \$13.9 billion in 1982, and \$11 billion last year. This year, oil revenues could fall below \$10 billion, a critical decline considering that Libya depends on the outside world for 40 percent of its food, practically all its consumer goods, and all the expertise for its ambitious development plans.

The Libyan regime also faces more immediate problems. Since the Reagan administration took office in 1980—indeed even during the latter part of the Carter administration—Libya has faced virulent hostility from the United States, expressed through a break in diplomatic relations and a commercial embargo, as well as in the political sphere. In August 1981, U.S. fighters

from the Sixth Fleet, stationed in the Mediterranean, shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sirte—part of a longstanding dispute over the extent of Libya's territorial waters. In addition, the U.S. has offered powerful support to neighboring regimes such as Egypt, Sudan, and Chad that are hostile to Qaddafi.

Even more serious were the crisis with Britain and the abortive coup attempt in Tripoli one month later. The siege of the Libyan people's bureau in London caused Libya immense damage in international circles. Not only did it seem to justify the American view of Libya as a prime source of international terrorism, but it also cut the country off from its most important commercial and financial outlet when Britain severed diplomatic relations at the end of April. Since then, Libya has repeatedly attempted to soften British resolve, but the Thatcher government has resolutely refused to make any corresponding moves—even when Libya released two Britons at the end of August as a goodwill gesture.

The coup attempt on May 8, when heavily armed commandos opened fire on the military barracks in downtown Tripoli, caused panic within the regime

because it was the first time that opposition to the Qaddafi regime had been expressed in such a public manner. The vengeful hysteria afterwards, with nine public executions and thousands of arrests, house-to-house searches, and threats from the ubiquitous "revolutionary committee" movement, further demonstrated the extent of official insecurity.

No wonder, then, that Colonel Qaddafi has been so pleased with his recent diplomatic triumphs in Morocco and Chad, just in time for the 15th anniversary of his revolution. His pleasure was undoubtedly intensified by the competition among France, Greece, and Austria to claim credit for resolving the Franco-Libyan confrontation in Chad, announced just two weeks after the celebrations, particularly since Libya has been able to pose as a moderate, responsible state without having to make significant concessions.

The Political Revolution

Despite the fact that Libya continuously makes world headlines, most people have little idea of what life is like in Libya or of the radical changes in Libyan society over the past 15 years. The country has moved from its first faltering experiments with oil wealth under the previous regime of King Idris to the supposedly egalitarian and populist society of today, one which Qaddafi perceives as a beacon to the developing world.

In comparison with Libyan society at independence, the changes are even more radical. In 1951, Libya was perhaps the poorest country in the world, depending on the export of scrap iron culled from World War II battlefields to pay for essential imports. Today it is a wealthy oil exporter, where the average per capita income is \$12,000 and where over 70 percent of the population lives in an urban environment.

Shortly after the 1969 coup which ultimately brought the Qaddafi regime to power, it became evident that Libya's new rulers in the Revolutionary Command Council were strong supporters of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. They saw their coup in the Nasserist tradition and believed that they had brought Libya from the pro-Western neo-colonialist fold of the Idris re-

gime into the mainstream of Arab nationalism and unity, exemplifying Nasser's ideas.

Just prior to his death in 1970, Nasser himself selected the young Muammar Qaddafi, by then already dominant inside Libya's Revolutionary Command Council, as his designated ideological successor. Qaddafi has always held on to the identification of himself and his revolution within the "progressive" camp in the Middle East.

However, Qaddafi has gone far beyond Nasserism in his search for a suitable system to anchor his power in Libya. The Nasserist single party that had been introduced was too ossified and apathetic to mobilize Libyans as the Colonel wanted. In addition, members of the small professional groups—mainly urban in origin and quite unlike the young officers who organized the coup, including Qaddafi himself who comes from the arid rural Gulf of Sirte area—resented the Libyan regime's growing attempts at coercion and uniformity as part of its progressive course. They decried the regime's obsessive pursuit of Arab unity, expressed in a series of abortive unions, and they rejected the development policies introduced in the early 1970s, even though these were often no more than extensions of the plans put forward by the Idris regime in 1968.


As a result, Qaddafi has moved, cautiously at first and then with ever

greater confidence, toward his own unique system—the *jamahiriyyah*, or the "state of the masses." The process began on April 7, 1973, with a speech in the coastal town of Zuwara, in which the Colonel condemned the "pernicious influences of weak minds" and called for the formation of popular committees to protect the revolution.

By March 1977, popular committees had become the means by which political sovereignty and basic democracy were expressed in Libya. They were buttressed by the "Third Universal Theory," a political vision that rejected the extremes of capitalism and communism for an alternative derived from the principles of Islam, although the Colonel considered it applicable to any developing society. The theory is enshrined in Qaddafi's political testament, the famous *Green Book*, whose assumptions now underlie all formal aspects of political and economic organization in Libya.

All Libyans now participate in the "basic popular congresses" which formulate policy and send delegates to express their views at regional congresses and in a general people's congress, superficially the sovereign political body expressing the general will of the Libyan people. Popular committees control all aspects of social and economic life. In theory, Colonel Qaddafi has no formal power, since it is the people, in the *jamahiriyyah* who hold power.

In 1977, the Colonel, together with



Libyan oil refinery: "The issue of oil is the real measure of Libya's success in foreign policy"

the four remaining members of the old Revolutionary Command Council—Major Abdessalam Jalloud, Abu Bakr Yunis Jaber (now head of the Libyan army), Mustafa al-Kharoubi (security chief), and al-Khawaldi al-Hamaidi (internal affairs)—gave up their formal positions in order to carry out “revolutionary agitation.” All formal responsibility for government was transferred to the General People’s Congress, which annually appoints a General Popular Committee of secretaries—the equivalent of ministers elsewhere—who deal with the day-to-day operations of the affairs of state.

Opposition and Response

These radical changes in Libya’s political and social institutions engendered resistance. After the Zuwara speech in 1973, many intellectuals and journalists saw the writing on the wall and left the country, convinced that the growing intolerance of the system would soon make their positions untenable.

Two years later, the regime confronted a threat from within the army—the very institution through which the Qaddafi regime had come to power and the embodiment, in theory, of the Nasrist revolutionary ideal. In August

1975, Captain Omar Meheishy, a founding member of the Revolutionary Command Council, tried to organize a coup of army officers. The regime uncovered the plot with, it is rumored, CIA aid, and Meheishy fled. Of his co-conspirators, 22 were shot in April 1977 and others remain in prison. The army is now treated with suspicion and contempt. Qaddafi maintains a presidential guard that is ethnically linked to him and a deterrent battalion to cow any further army unrest.

Shortly after the failed army coup, other groups soon found themselves at odds with the Qaddafi regime. In April 1976, it was the students’ turn. After raucous demonstrations in Benghazi over regime interference in the university, three students were hanged in public—“*pour encourager les autres.*” The result was simple and predictable: students have become a major source of opposition to the regime and they comprise most of the 30,000 or so Libyans who now live abroad. At the same time, the Libyan government has increasingly used students, both in Libya and abroad, to coerce and confront its dissidents.

The final wave of emigration out of

Libya was set in motion by the radical economic reforms proclaimed in March 1978 and 1979. These destroyed private business and commerce, bringing them under the same umbrella as the massive state development projects, although they were, in theory, to be controlled by the workers themselves in a cooperative structure.

In recent years, the traditional small local shops have been replaced by massive supermarkets, characterized by inconvenience and shortage. They have proven so unpopular that during September’s celebrations, Colonel Qaddafi announced the reintroduction of the small corner shop. His decision came none too soon; during a wave of unrest in April, the supermarkets in Tripoli became a target for arson attacks.

In 1979 and 1980, along with the reorganization of private commerce and the business sector came the elimination of personal wealth. Each Libyan was limited to a maximum of \$34,000 in bank holdings and each family to one car and one house. To ensure that these limits were observed, the authorities suddenly reformed the currency in June 1980.

These moves helped to swell the ranks of opposition to the Qaddafi regime, particularly abroad, where a series of formal opposition movements began to appear. In addition to the National Movement, a Ba’athist group that harked back to the early days of the 1969 coup, a powerful and organized student opposition developed, particularly in Britain, Italy, and the U.S., where most Libyans studying abroad were located and where many other exiles had gathered.

The most significant and effective movement grew up in the early 1980s around the ex-ambassador to India, Mohammed Mugharieff. Known as the Libyan National Salvation Front and based in Sudan, it has claimed a series of actions against the Qaddafi regime, culminating in the coup attempt in Tripoli last May.

In response to this growing opposition, the regime has created its own organization of activists. Designed to operate clandestinely as the conscience of the regime, the revolutionary committee movement operates both within Libya and among Libyan communities



Muammar Qaddafi and Leonid Brezhnev: “The relationship between Libya and the Soviet Union demonstrates inherent contradictions”

Guthard Sigma

abroad. It serves to counter what Qaddafi sees as the regrettable tendency of Libyan society to regress from its hard-won radicalism to traditional apathy and reaction, individual self-interest and conservatism. It also has the more sinister duty of combatting the "stray dogs of the revolution," who oppose the Colonel's idiosyncratic ideology.

Since February 1980, the revolutionary committees have carried out this duty through physical liquidation. Apart from thousands of arrests in Libya and untold numbers of executions, there have been murders abroad—nine in Europe and the Middle East in 1980 and several this year, including six in Greece alone during a July visit by the Libyan foreign secretary, Ali Treki.

Nonetheless, the opposition abroad has continued to grow and in March this year, a new secretariat, the Bureau of Foreign Security, was created to deal with it. In coercing and controlling Libyans abroad, it parallels the Foreign Liaison Bureau (department of external affairs) which runs the people's bureaus, the populist equivalents of embassies.

The opposition and the vengeful official response stem not just from Qaddafi's insistence on retaining power, but from the absolutist nature of the regime's ideology. Insofar as the Qaddafi vision is one of popular sovereign authority, it cannot tolerate an opposing view. Since it is a complete political prescription, opposition to it must be malign and motivated by a desire for its destruction. Thus, the people have the right and duty to exterminate all manifestations of opposition, or the revolutionary committees, which are directly controlled by Colonel Qaddafi, will do so on their behalf.

Even after 15 years in power, the Qaddafi government suffers from a critical problem of legitimacy. If the Libyan people do not see things in the same light as Qaddafi, the answer seems to be that the Colonel will impose his views. In March, the General People's Congress rejected several measures close to Qaddafi's heart—a matrimonial settlement proposal that would have given women equal rights with men, measures for inducting women into the military, and a proposal that responded to the lack of sufficient teachers and funds to provide comprehensive pri-



Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt: "Just prior to his death in 1970, Nasser selected Qaddafi as his ideological successor"

mary education. All three proposals were thrown out, to the Colonel's rage and amazement—the first two because Libyan society is still conservative with regard to women's issues and the last because education is seen as essential and the Congress was not prepared to bow to short-term financial constraints.

Colonel Qaddafi's response was to denounce Libyan society as still "reactionary," despite the radical opportunities offered to it by the *jamahiri* system. Demonstrations in favor of the Colonel's proposals followed and within a month, the most important one—the militarization of women—was enacted by "popular pressure." At the same time, the revolutionary committees began to seek out "stray dogs" and reactionary elements, a process that was hastened by the coup attempt two months later. The inevitable result is that relations between the regime and the Libyan people have continued to deteriorate and the formal structures of popular and revolutionary committees have little real significance in establishing the true locus of power.

In reality, for the past seven years, Libya has increasingly been controlled by a small group around Colonel Qaddafi who hold the real levers of power in the oil industry, the army, and the security services. All members of the group are tied to the Colonel by kinship or marriage and most of them originate from the Gulf of Sirte, where the Qadhadhfa tribe traditionally lived.

The group includes such shadowy fig-

ures as Khalifa Khanesh, Ahmed Qaddafi Admn, and Mohammed al-Majdoub. Close to this inner circle are others such as al-Hamaidi, al-Kharoubi, Abu Bakr Yunis, and Jalloud—all members of the old Revolutionary Command Council. Other rivals for power within the inner group, such as Hassan Ishkal and Messaoud Abdelhafid, retain control of the oil industry. All are tied into the intricate but informal structure of family loyalties that helps ensure the continuation of the regime.

Development

It is these security considerations that have ironically been the ultimate arbiters of Libya's massive economic development plans over the past 15 years. It is no accident, for example, that the Great Manmade River is to provide massive irrigation primarily for the Qadhadhfa lands in the Gulf of Sirte region. Nor is it an accident that the proposed new capital for Libya is to be located in the same area. Irrigation would be far better used in the Jefara plain behind Tripoli—Libya's best land—where overuse of underground water resources during the past 20 years has caused salinity. A new capital at Sirte is hardly likely to persuade most Libyans to move from Tripoli or Benghazi, except at enormous and unnecessary cost.

Where security considerations have not applied, the regime has often felt the political need to demonstrate its revolutionary credentials to determine its course of action. A classic example is the Kufra scheme, a vastly ambitious attempt to exploit fossil water in the Sahara by intensive irrigation. Started in 1968 by Occidental Oil, the scheme was originally designed to generate fodder for sheep which were then to be taken 600 miles to the coast to feed the burgeoning populations of Tripoli and Benghazi.

After the 1969 revolution, the new regime continued the experiment, despite abundant evidence that the costs were far greater than expected and that the economics of the process made little sense when meat could be purchased more cheaply abroad. However, the elusive goal of food self-sufficiency has persuaded the regime to expand the scheme at whatever cost and to initiate

similar projects elsewhere. Yet these massive schemes—at Kufra, Sarir, Maknoussa, and in the Fezzan—continue only by dependence on migrant labor and foreign expertise. They have not created real self-sufficiency, nor have they persuaded Libyans to become involved with the sort of commitment the Qaddafi regime claims to want.

The same problems of political exigency and dependence on foreign labor and expertise characterize the vast industrial projects that Libya has created since 1970. The fact that oil is the source of Libyan wealth has, of course, meant that the initial development efforts involved the oil industry. An oil refinery at Ras Lanuf is due to start up later this year, and there are also petrochemical complexes at Marsa Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Sirte, all along the Gulf of Sirte.

A chemical complex has also been built close to the Tunisian border at Bu Kammash and a massive iron and steel plant—to use Libyan iron ore from Brak in the Fezzan—is under construction at Misurata. A vast aluminum smelting plant is being built at Zuwara and light and medium industry has been concentrated in the towns of the Jefera plain and the Jabal al-Akhdar, around the two major cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.

Despite the wide range of development projects, however, nearly all have fallen into the same trap. Not only do they demand foreign expertise, but the wrong choices have been made over plant and process, particularly in the case of petrochemicals and refined petroleum products. The result is that Libya's new plants are too small to achieve the economies of scale that characterize modern industry, particularly in competing areas such as the Gulf.

In the case of petrochemicals in particular, they produce the wrong sort of feedstock to compete effectively with other new producers, such as Saudi Arabia. Unit costs are too high and product ranges wrong for effective competition in Western markets or in the developing world.

In nearly every case, these mistakes are the result of the regime's incessant demand for development at any price and at maximum speed, simply to demonstrate the superiority of Libya's development process over those of its oil-

rich neighbors in the Middle East. Only in the handling of oil company operations in the early 1970s did Libya's leaders demonstrate the cautious and patient skills that could have avoided these problems.

Unfortunately, such control has not been exercised since and the sudden cutback in oil revenues in the 1980s has compounded the problem. Libyan development spending was cut from \$11 billion to \$1.4 billion between 1982 and 1983 and, although it has risen toward \$6 billion in 1984-85, this is solely to cover the costs of the Great Manmade River project.

The result is that after a decade of intensive development, Libya is left with agricultural and industrial sectors that do not offer the possibility of an autonomous national economy and which depend on the continuing input of massive amounts of foreign labor and expertise. In 1983, there were 569,000 foreign workers in Libya, 36 percent of the total labor force.

Although efforts have been made to cut the number of foreign workers, the fact is that Libya can no longer do without them. They fill vital jobs and perform work that Libyans would no longer contemplate doing. The Libyan revolution has, in short, achieved neither the degree of development nor the level of economic independence that it sought and it is now trapped by dwindling revenues and political exigency into continuing dependence on a hostile outside world.

The Failures Abroad

The hostility that the Libyan regime encounters abroad is also a consequence of its perceived need to confirm its revolutionary and progressive authenticity—a need which corresponds to the Nasserist heritage and the inherent truculence of a minor state determined to prove that it is equal, if not superior to its more powerful neighbors. In the Middle East, Libya poses as the arch proponent of Arab unity against Zionism and as the progressive partner of Syria and Iran in the conflict in the Gulf. Yet, Libya has also taken great pains to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia since 1983 and has even made conciliatory noises toward Egypt in recent months.

A similar confusion seems to characterize Libya's relations with neighboring North African and Sahelian states. Despite a decade of hostility between Morocco and Libya, the two countries are now linked in a treaty of unity, while relations with Algeria, Libya's obvious ally, have sunk to an all-time low.

Tunisia, always alert to the danger of Libyan aggression and expansionism since the abortive Djerba unity treaty in 1974 and the Libyan-inspired revolt in Gafsa in January 1980, stays watchfully on the sidelines, looking toward economic cooperation with its turbulent eastern neighbor, but encouraging political integration with its Algerian protector.

Further confusion exists in central Africa. Chronic hostility toward the Nimeiry regime in Sudan is engendered partly by Sudanese opposition to Libya's plans for unity with Sudan, Egypt, and Syria in 1971, but largely by Sudan's close relationship with Egypt and the United States. Libya's regional policies have wavered between a desire to support progressive regimes, such as the Rawlings government in Ghana and the Sankara government in Burkina Faso, and pragmatic opportunism, as best exemplified by Libya's long history of intervention in Chad.

Libya's interests in Chad predate the Qaddafi regime. They reach back into the precolonial era when the Sanusi spread southwards into northern Chad to confront French moves north-eastward at the turn of the century. Modern Libya's claims, however, stem from the unratified 1935 Franco-Italian treaty that granted the Italian colony of Libya the Aouzou strip, the 1,000 km-long, 100 km-deep strip of land along the common border between the former French and Italian colonies.

Although France forced Libya to accept the colonial frontiers when Libya gained independence in 1951, Libya has never relinquished its claim. Colonel Qaddafi, therefore, has acted in a long Libyan tradition, first by occupying the Tibesti and Aouzou region in 1973 and then by attempting to force recognition of the Libyan claim from successive governments in Ndjamená.

Indeed, Libyan interventions in Chad in 1981 and 1983 on the side of the Transitional Government of National Unity

(GUNT), set up by the OAU in the 1979 Lagos Accord, have much more to do with Libya's claims on Chad than with any idealistic factors. Even the short-lived proposal for unity between Libya and Chad in 1981 was an expression of Libyan desires to exploit a regional role to ensure that its interests would be satisfied.

The support given to Frolinat and more recently to the Goukouni Oued-dei-led factions opposed to the Habré government has been inspired by the same motives. However, given Egyptian and Sudanese interests in opposing any growth in Libya's regional influence and Habré's gut dislike of all things Libyan, this simple self-interest has now been subsumed under the struggle for regional influence between Egypt and Libya.

Behind this stand U.S. interests in seeing "Qaddafi put back in his box," as Secretary of State George Shultz so succinctly put it a year and a half ago. The U.S. has consistently tried to exploit the situation in eastern and central Africa to prevent any growth in Libyan

influence. As part of this policy, it forced France into the reluctant role of regional gendarme, one which the Mitterrand government has now abandoned, as it is more interested in Libyan oil and its potential as an export market. The result is that, at little cost, Libya has been able to reduce its military commitment to adventures in Chad without compromising its stand on the Aouzou question. Libyan troops will remain there with tacit French approval, despite the impotent fuming in Ndjamena.

Qaddafi's eager acceptance of King Hassan's offer to sign a unity treaty, despite the hostility between two totally different political regimes, reflects Libya's opportunistic realization that links with Morocco satisfy two distinct criteria. On the one hand, it nullifies Algerian hostility, which results from a simmering border dispute and Libya's cavalier abandonment of its support for the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara war last year. On the other hand, the new treaty provides Libya with an excellent foil to mitigate the constant threat of American hostility.

The improvement in relations between Libya and Saudi Arabia that resulted from Qaddafi's conciliatory visit to the Kingdom in June 1983 is another factor. With two moderate allies, it becomes far more difficult for the United States to convincingly portray Libya as a "terrorist regime" or as a Soviet stooge.

Indeed, the relationship between Libya and the Soviet Union since Colonel Qaddafi's first visit there in 1973 demonstrates the inherent contradictions in Libya's attitudes toward the wider world. Although Libya has become an excellent client for Soviet arms, having bought as much as \$14 billion worth to date, Colonel Qaddafi has for many years rejected the Soviet Union's political views.

Admittedly, he has been more amenable toward Soviet attitudes in the past four years in response to growing American hostility. Nonetheless, he has not lived up to Soviet hopes. Libya supports Iran in the Gulf war, as does Syria, despite the Soviet Union's intense dislike of the Iranian regime. Libya still looks to the West for the majority of its

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non-military imports and its export markets. Qaddafi has been quite unpredictable in his behavior toward the PLO, for example, frequently acting in direct defiance of Soviet wishes.

In response, the Soviet Union has maintained a certain distance. For years, it refused to offer Libya a formal treaty of friendship and even now does not extend automatic diplomatic support. In short, for the Soviet Union, Libya is another unreliable Arab state which provides little hope for consistent action to promote Soviet interests in the region. Only insofar as American hostility predicates Libya's responses can the Soviet Union have any confidence that Libya will act appropriately.

It is perhaps primarily for this reason that the United States has found it so difficult to persuade European nations to join in isolating Libya economically and politically. Europe, with an acute appreciation of its own interests and perhaps a more perceptive insight into Libya's real significance and potential for disruption,

has continued to concentrate on exploiting Libya's dependence on oil markets, particularly given the glut and Libya's consequent financial weakness.

Indeed, it is the issue of oil that is the real measure of Libya's success in foreign policy, for in the end, radicalism depends on revenues and revenues depend on Western willingness to purchase Libyan oil. Similarly, Libya's apparent successes in Chad and with Morocco are the result of others' perceptions of the advantages to be gained, not of Libyan diplomatic skill. Indeed, when Libya has attempted to create pacts in the past, either through conventional means or by open warfare, its efforts have failed.


An Uncertain Future

The satisfaction that Colonel Qaddafi felt as he celebrated the 15th anniversary of his regime had very tenuous justifications. Unrest is rife inside Libya itself; foreign successes depend on the tolerance of others; development is de-

pendent on foreign expertise; and ultimately, those who are prepared to purchase Libya's oil call the tune. Nonetheless, the Colonel has been remarkably successful in recent months in dismantling the apparently solid ranks of hostility to his regime. That alone will buy him time.

Eventually, however, Libya's hostage position to fortune will return to haunt the regime. Continued austerity will not sit well with Libya's population and will compound the latent discontent stemming from the radicalization of Libyan society. The Qaddafi regime is at a critical point. Either it can moderate its revolutionary rigor and gain an extended lease on life, or it can continue—as the Colonel threatens—the same radical and austere policies and face inevitable unrest. If it chooses the latter course, it will have to ensure that development or foreign affairs bring it some speedy successes. Otherwise, internal pressures for change will become irresistible. □

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U.S. and World Bank initiatives stress economic policy reform in Africa

Two major initiatives now underway are designed to provide additional funding for sub-Saharan African nations that are implementing economic reforms.

Funding for the Reagan administration's Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) was approved in October when Congress added \$75 million to the Economic Support Fund, earmarking it for influencing policy reform in sub-Saharan Africa. The funds were included in the ESF because the Senate did not want to set up a separate account.

The EPI, as proposed by the President, would provide a total of \$500 million over five years in assistance to sub-Saharan Africa above and beyond regular aid programs. Since the funds are relatively limited considering the size of sub-Saharan Africa, the administration intends to focus on only a few countries.

A major goal of the EPI is to encourage basic reforms in the agricultural sector of African nations—such as the elimination of government subsidies on food for urban dwellers, and the creation of a climate in which “supply and demand forces operate more freely,” administration officials said.

Economic policy reforms are also a major goal of the \$2 billion World Bank Fund, which was proposed at the Bank's annual meeting in September. So far the fund has received no firm pledges, but World Bank officials are attempting to mobilize support among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Countries that have expressed interest in stepping up their assistance to Africa and may contribute to the fund include France, Australia, and the Netherlands.

The U.S. has declined to support the World Bank Fund, although State Department officials say that the administration generally agrees

with the recommendations of the report on sub-Saharan Africa in which the fund is proposed. The Reagan administration prefers to provide support to Africa through bilateral channels and, administration officials say, through the International Development Association (IDA), the arm of the World Bank that provides interest-free, long-term loans to the poorest countries. However, President Reagan has balked at paying the full U.S. share of the IDA replenishment.

The report on sub-Saharan Africa warns that net capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa will decline from about \$11 billion a year to about \$5 billion over the period from 1985-87. The fund is intended to compen-

sate for that decline, maintaining aid to Africa at 1980-82 levels in real terms.

The money for the special fund should come from international agencies and world governments at a level that exceeds their existing commitments, the report said, adding that the aid should go to countries that are involved in major reform programs.

The report includes strong recommendations for changes in African government spending, including the termination of investments in prestige projects and a concentration on improving existing investments and infrastructure. Moreover, donor nations must put an end to promoting the large infrastructural and industrial projects that primarily benefit their own interests, the Bank said.

Continued on next page

South Africa sanctions fail to pass

Major export control legislation containing sanctions on South Africa died with the adjournment of the 98th Congress. House and Senate members of a committee that had been attempting to develop a compromise on the bill since April were unable to reach agreement on some major provisions; the South African measures were only part of the problem.

The House version of the Export Administration Act (EAA) contained a number of amendments regarding South Africa, including prohibitions on new U.S. investment in South Africa, on bank loans to South Africa and on the importation of krugerrands into the U.S. It also would have made the Sullivan fair employment principles mandatory for U.S. firms doing business in South Africa. The original Senate version of the bill contained no amendments on South Africa.

The Reagan administration strongly opposed the sanctions.

The House-Senate compromise

dropped the bans on new investment and on the importation of krugerrands and weakened the provision on the Sullivan principles, merely calling on the State Department to report annually on the progress of American businesses in implementing the principles. Later, the Senate also dropped the ban on bank loans.

Before its final vote on the bill, the House reinserted the bank loan provision and then approved the legislation. Most members of the Congressional Black Caucus voted “present” rather than “yes” or “no” on the bill to protest the fact that the provisions on South Africa were considerably weaker than those in the original House version. The Senate rejected the bill as approved by the House, thus ending all hopes that export controls would pass in this session of Congress.

Similar legislation will probably be reintroduced after the 99th Congress convenes in 1985.

Continued on next page

POLICY REFORM continued

Despite the publicity the fund has received, the main focus of the report is better coordination and use of existing investments. Other key recommendations are that African governments implement national programs to increase efficient use of financial and human resources, that donor and African nations place higher priority on existing investments rather than initiation of new projects, and that greater efforts be made in the fields of controlling population growth, conservation of

natural resources, and adaptation to technological change.

The report paints a grim picture of current conditions in Africa but offers hope with its comment that southern Asia was undergoing a similar period of difficulty in the 1960s, but managed to pull out of it with the help of international assistance.

The World Bank has also established a new Special Office for African Affairs headed by Xavier de la Renaudiere, who served for 11 years as director of the Bank's Western Africa Regional Office. ■

SOUTH AFRICA continued

In other action, the House of Representatives, on September 18, passed four resolutions concerning South Africa by voice vote. The first calls on South Africa to release all detainees held without charge or trial for six years in the Mariental detention camp in Namibia. The second calls on the South African government to free Nelson Mandela, leader of the freedom movement in South Africa, who has been imprisoned for more than 20 years, and to release his wife, Winnie Mandela, from the banning orders that severely limit her activities.

In the other resolutions, the House condemned South Africa's policy of relocating black South Africans to rural homelands and called on the U.S. to refuse to approve the opening of honorary South African consulates in the U.S.

The Senate, too, passed resolutions condemning South Africa, both for its policy of forcibly relocating black South Africans to "homelands" and for the arrest and detention of some 200 activists in the movement to boycott elections relating to South Africa's new constitution. The senate also passed a resolution calling for the release of Nelson and Winnie Mandela.

WESTERN AFRICA

Nigerian border closure hurts neighbors

In the midst of severe drought and depressed commodity prices, Nigeria's prolonged closure of its borders has further weakened the economies of West Africa. The Nigerian military government first closed all border crossings when it took power on December 31, 1983. Nigeria kept the borders closed until late January "to prevent wanted persons from sneaking out of the country." The borders were closed again in late April to prevent illicit trade and currency smuggling when Nigeria declared a surprise change-over of its banknotes.

Since then, Nigeria's borders have been opened only temporarily, to allow the transit of emergency relief supplies through Niger to Chad. The Nigerian government has repeatedly maintained that the borders will be kept closed indefinitely.

Niger has suffered the most from the closure. Nearly 500 miles from the sea at its closest point, Niger is entirely landlocked, and the immensity of its territory and the wide dispersion of its population have always made transportation and distribution of supplies extremely difficult. The closure of the border with Nigeria means that all of Niger's imports must pass through Benin, whose ports and highways are inadequate to transport the large supplies of food and drought relief now needed by Niger.

The border closing also has hurt Niger's export revenues, nearly 80 percent of which are normally derived from sales to Nigeria.

Many merchants in Niger and Benin lost a fortune when Nigeria invalidated the "old naira" in favor of newly-issued banknotes. Unable to enter Nigeria to exchange the old naira for new ones, businessmen watched helplessly as their money became worthless.

The government of Niger has implored Nigeria to reopen the border, but the traditional strength of the CFA franc against the Nigerian naira has always prompted extensive cross-border smuggling, and the new government in Lagos has stressed that Nigeria's borders "are to remain closed."

So far, however, most reports indicate that smuggling has actually increased now that legal trade has become impossible.

Benin has also been hit severely by the border closure. Normally, Nigerian imports comprised between 40 and 60 percent of all cargo passing through the port of Cotonou, and customs revenue and employment for dock workers have dropped precipitously since the border closure. Meanwhile, Nigerian goods that were once rendered cheap by the weakness of the naira are now more difficult to obtain.

The border closure is causing other tensions between the neighbors. Nomads from Niger continue to pass through the permeable border, causing intense resentment among Nigerian farmers, who feel that the Nigeriens are depleting grasslands that are already shrivelled by drought. Lagos radio reported that Fulani herdsmen from Niger had "raided and attacked" several villages in Sokoto state and that at least five people had been killed.

Meanwhile, in Niger there is a drastic shortage of nearly every staple food, including beans, rice, sugar, and vinegar. Oil and gasoline, normally imported from Nigeria, are also in short supply, making it even more difficult to distribute whatever goods can be obtained. ■

BENIN**Kérékou's news**

After his re-election by the National Revolutionary Assembly on July 31, President Mathieu Kérékou announced several important changes. The first was an amnesty for political prisoners, "excluding those implicated in the mercenary invasion of 1977." Among those amnestied was former President Ambrose Alley, who had been in prison since 1973, when he led the first coup attempt against Kérékou's government.

Kérékou also named a new cabinet. Most of the posts were filled by reshuffling ministers from other positions, but three new officials were named: Hospice Antonio, professor of political economy at the National University of Benin, became minister of planning; Frederic Affo, formerly ambassador to Cuba, became minister of foreign affairs; and Didier Dassi, a senior military officer, was named justice minister. Col. Michel Alladaye, one of Kérékou's closest associates, was demoted from interior minister to minister of higher education. ■

BURKINA FASO**Sankara strengthened**

President Thomas Sankara recently took further steps to consolidate his power and to confirm the ideological direction of his ruling National Council of the Revolution (CNR). In late August, Sankara dissolved the government. The new cabinet, announced on September 1, reduced the influence of the Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD), a Marxist faction that in recent months has opposed some of Sankara's policies. LIPAD is still represented in the cabinet, but four LIPAD members—including the ministers of information and foreign affairs—were dropped from the new government. Although most members of the new cabinet are civilians, Sankara's closest military associates—Capt. Blaise Compaoré, Maj. Jean-Baptiste Lingani, and Capt. Henri Zongo—retain key positions in the government.

Sankara also acted against

Soumane Touré, a LIPAD member and the leader of Burkina's largest trade union. Although Touré was originally instrumental in union support behind Sankara, he has recently criticized the government. In late August, in an interview with Radio France Internationale, Touré said that the CNR "had done nothing positive except to ask for more sacrifices from workers." Days later, Touré was dismissed from his post in the civil service.

One of Sankara's most important programs is the implementation of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). In the course of their efforts to mobilize workers, the CDRs have sometimes superseded the trade unions, which have been powerful in Burkina for two decades. Touré's concern over possible infringements by the CDRs upon his union's authority was well known, and his dismissal is expected to allow the accelerated development of the CDRs throughout Burkina.

Visit to U.S.

Sankara visited the U.S. for a week in early October, addressing the United Nations General Assembly and the American press. Although he also met with Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., most attention was focused on Sankara's fiery speech to the General Assembly, in which he articulated the goals of Burkina's revolution and advocated a new attitude toward the Third World by the Western powers.

"There will be no salvation for our peoples unless we turn our backs completely on all the models that all the charlatans of that type have tried to sell us for 20 years. . . . Very few countries have been so inundated with aid of all kinds as has mine. Aid is supposed to help development, but one can look in vain in what used to be Upper Volta to see any sign of any kind of development. The people who were in power, through either naiveté or class selfishness, could not or else did not want to gain control over this inflow and use it in the best interests of our people. . . ."

Referring to the CDRs and similar

structures in Burkina, Sankara said: "We have chosen to establish new techniques. We have chosen to seek forms of organization that are better adapted to our civilization. . . . rejecting all kinds of outside dictates, so that we can create the conditions for a dignity in keeping with our ambitions."

Sankara also met with leaders of the black community in Harlem, and after returning to Burkina, he commented, "I have never seen so many Africans who are proud of being Africans, so many blacks proud of being black, as those of Harlem who have kept our culture." ■

GHANA**Economic moves**

In early September, the International Monetary Fund announced a one-year \$190 million standby credit for 1984-85, which will be used to purchase spare parts and other necessary imports. The credit—the second large standby arrangement with the IMF in two years—indicates the IMF's satisfaction with the austerity program implemented by the government of Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings. Just before the granting of the \$190 million IMF credit, the Bank of Ghana announced a 10 percent devaluation of Ghana's currency, the cedi; it was the latest in a series of adjustments that have cumulatively devalued the cedi by more than 1000 percent.

And in late September, the Rawlings government took another measure against economic corruption, announcing that "with immediate effect, all major forms of economic crimes in the country will be tried by the public tribunal and those found guilty of such offenses will be made to face the maximum penalty." Domestic and foreign businessmen, government officials, and "revenue-collecting agencies" are among those cited for corruption and subsequent prosecution. ■

GUINEA**Education priorities**

Since it took power in April, the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) has made im-



Guinean boy reading Koran

United Nations

IVORY COAST Corruption trial

A long trial on charges of embezzlement and graft has ended with 20-year prison sentences for seven former government officials. The convicted men had all been managers of public housing agencies, and their trial was the culmination of more than a year of investigations.

In 1983, the government's withdrawal of housing subsidies for teachers provoked a bitter strike at the university and allegations that the public housing sector was saturated with corruption.

The recent convictions—on charges of fabricating invoices to secure illegal payments, renting nonexistent houses to the government, raising rents without cause, and even charging more than \$1 million for parts of a door—were meted out amid the greatest glare of publicity in recent years. Observers speculated that the intense press coverage of the trial was designed to distract attention from President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's own extensive involvement in Ivorian real estate. Houphouët owns great tracts of land in and around the new capital of Yamoussoukro, and in a moment of indiscretion last year, he commented: "I have billions [of dollars] abroad in Switzerland, but I also have billions in Ivory Coast, which proves that I have confidence in my country."

But the relatively free coverage of the trial may have backfired. During the trial, anonymous pamphlets circulated in Abidjan claiming that the accused men "are not the truly guilty ones" and denouncing "the selfish power and the scandalous mismanagement of the economy. . . the waste of billions of dollars of commercial loans over the last 24 years. . . and the greedy hoarding of power by the president and his party." The minister of defense, Konan Banny, went on the radio to deliver a 20-minute refutation of the charges made in the pamphlets.

Yet the Ivorian economy continues to deteriorate, even though the government has managed to re-

schedule its debt, raise producer prices for cocoa and coffee for the second year in a row, and introduce a liberal new investment code designed to promote small and medium-sized businesses. ■

LIBERIA Information please

On September 19, the minister of information, Alhaji Kromah, told the employees of his ministry, "Dictatorship and a one-party government. . . will never survive in Liberia. If the multi-party system is barred, the Liberian people are definitely aware that a one-party system is worse."

The next day, Head of State Samuel Doe dismissed Kromah from his post because of "his persistent references to the establishment of a dictatorship and a one-party system in Liberia." Doe said, "It has not been the policy nor the intention of the government to adopt such a system, as it is inconsistent with the approved constitution. . . Kromah's continuous pronouncements on this matter as the principal spokesman for the government could therefore be construed to mean that such a matter is or has been under consideration by the government, which is false." ■

NIGERIA Buhari claims progress

Head of State Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari delivered a "state of the nation" address on October 1, the 24th anniversary of Nigeria's independence. His speech concentrated on the economy, and Buhari detailed the initial results of the austerity measures instituted by his government in its nine months of power. "The previous government," said Buhari, "spent \$200 million more than it earned between January and June 1983. This year, we have spent \$200 million less than we earned during the same period. Our foreign reserves at the end of June 1984 stood at \$800 million, against \$600 million at the end of June 1983. From January to August this year, we paid \$900 million in settlement of inherited debts."

portant changes in Guinea's economic and political policies. But it is only now beginning to tackle one of the most daunting legacies of the late President Ahmed Sékou Touré—the chaotic and ineffective educational system.

Although enrollment was high under Sékou Touré, the quality of Guinean education declined steadily in the 1970s and 80s. There was a stifling emphasis on the study of Sékou Touré's own ideas, to the exclusion of nearly all "alien ideologies." Sékou Touré's hostile relationship with France made it difficult to obtain textbooks written in French. His subsequent stress on education in local languages rather than in French led to confusion as graduates from different regions found themselves speaking different languages; teachers reassigned to different districts suddenly found themselves illiterate in a new language of instruction. And, under Sékou Touré's capricious rule, high school teachers could be named as university professors and vice versa.

The new regime, while not denying the validity of some instruction in local languages, has restored the primacy of French. By making use of foreign assistance and of the thousands of Guinean teachers now returning from exile, the CMRN hopes to improve the quality of Guinean education. ■

Buhari also noted that approximately \$90 million of "loot" garnered under the previous government has been recovered by investigators and military tribunals, and an additional \$275 million has been recovered from the Federal Election Commission, the agency that directed the 1983 national elections. The cancellation of the old naira in favor of new ones reduced smuggling, put an end to the uncontrolled growth in the money supply, and would help control inflation, Buhari asserted.

Buhari also announced that 250 political detainees would be freed in honor of National Day. Among those released were a number of businessmen, several ex-cabinet ministers, and the former Biafran leader Chukwuemeka Ojukwu. ■

SENEGAL

Niasse knocks himself out

Moustapha Niasse was removed as minister of foreign affairs in early October. The new foreign minister, Ibrahima Fall, was previously minister of higher education.

President Abdou Diouf was forced to replace Niasse after a public outcry over the foreign minister's behavior. A government source leaked to opposition news-

papers the story that Niasse had punched the minister of information, Djibo Kâ, in the face during a cabinet meeting.

Diouf then removed Niasse in response to intimations by the opposition press that the president could not control the behavior of ministers from his own party. ■

SIERRA LEONE

Another reshuffle

On September 5, only weeks after his 80th birthday, President Siaka Stevens announced the second major cabinet reshuffle of 1984. Salia Jusu-Sheriff was replaced as finance minister by Abdulai Conteh, who was shifted from his previous post of foreign minister.

Jusu-Sheriff, who had implemented severe austerity measures during his tenure as finance minister, was moved to minister of development and economic planning. The government insisted that Jusu-Sheriff was not being demoted: "It is the policy of this government to interchange ministers. In keeping with that policy, most of the senior ministers in the cabinet have been assigned at one time or other the portfolio of finance. This policy of interchange affords ministers the

opportunity of acquiring a wide range of experience in the course of their assignments in the various ministries."

Conteh's appointment as finance minister confirms that claim. Whereas Jusu-Sheriff is a professional accountant, Conteh is a lawyer and had been foreign minister since 1977. He has no experience in finance. Stevens said that Conteh was appointed "in an effort to rescue Sierra Leone from economic crisis."

Conteh's appointment and the demotion of Jusu-Sheriff provoked new rumors about the power struggle among Stevens' potential successors. Despite his advanced age, Stevens has refused to designate an heir-apparent to the presidency. His frequent cabinet reshuffles seem calculated to prevent any single figure from emerging as a favorite. Jusu-Sheriff had been considered a leading contender to succeed Stevens until the latest reshuffle, and Christian A. Kamara-Taylor, another potential successor, was forced out in the previous reshuffle in May.

Observers are concerned that unless Stevens formally designates a successor, the army might be tempted to step in to prevent a factional struggle after the president's death, as the Guinean army did after the death of Sékou Touré earlier this year. ■

Strike dramatizes plight of Air Afrique

Air Afrique, the airline owned and operated by 10 African countries, was already in financial difficulties when its pilots went on strike in September.

In the last year, its passenger traffic has remained stagnant while its freight business has declined by 11 percent. Austerity measures—including layoffs and salary cuts of up to 30 percent—were introduced in July to reduce the loss of \$9 million forecast for 1984.

Pilots, mechanics, and other technical staff declared a 72-hour walkout, interrupting service on many routes and costing the airline several hundred thousand dollars a day. When Air Afrique fired more than 100 of the strikers, the rest of them then refused to return to work.

Air Afrique was forced to substitute Yugoslav, Spanish, French, and American planes and crews in order to maintain service.

The airline already has more than \$250 million in outstanding debt. Much of its financial difficulty is caused by the huge arrears in membership payments—more than \$40 million—owed by Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Until the economic health of its member countries improves, Air Afrique is likely to remain deep in debt and unable to make substantial concessions to its workers. ■

TOGO

Cabinet changes

In mid-September, President Gnassingbé Eyadema dropped seven ministers or secretaries of state from his government, while four officials changed posts.

Koffi Amega, formerly Togo's ambassador to the United Nations, replaced the long-standing foreign minister, Anani Akakpo-Ahianyo. Tete Tévi-Bénissan was replaced as finance minister by Komlan Alipui, previously a Togolese representative at the West African Central Bank (BCAO) in Dakar. The two ousted leaders had previously been considered close allies of the president. ■

East and southern states hope to increase intra-African trade

The newly operational Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for east and southern Africa has set its sights on the creation of a regional common market before the year 2000.

The trade group, which has been in the development stages for several years with the assistance of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, could help ease the continent's intractable economic problems. But a number of barriers stand in the way of its success.

Its major purpose is to reduce its members' economic dependence on the West. Currently, only about 5 percent of African export trade takes place within the continent. Past efforts to help generate more economic activity among African states have either disintegrated, such as the East African Community, or have not yet come near to realizing their potential, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

One of the biggest problems is the need to conduct trade in the major world currencies, which are in short supply in African nations. The PTA has established a clearinghouse at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in Harare which will enable members to trade in their own currencies. Periodically, the clearinghouse will balance the accounts, and members will have to pay any deficits in the PTA's new monetary unit, the UAPTA (unit of account of PTA). The PTA is also making reductions of from 10 to 70 percent in tariffs on goods on a common list and will attempt to coordinate development of railways, roads, air links, and coastal shipping among its members.

However, these measures may not be enough to overcome the barriers to increasing intra-African trade. Kenya, one of the few members with a large enough industrial base to sustain a major export trade, has already actively pursued markets in Uganda, Rwanda, and Bu-

rundi. A Kenyan trade delegation found goods from the Far East on sale in these countries that were similar to those they hoped to export, but lower in price. They were somewhat surprised to find Kenyan products already on sale in the three countries, an indication that smuggling is thriving. In addition, tires and cement from Tanzania were being sold at lower prices than the same products from Kenya.

Member countries undoubtedly will find that they are competing with each other. After independence, many African states set up similar types of industries in efforts to substitute local goods for European imports.

These concerns are among the reasons that six of the states qualifying for membership have not yet joined the PTA. Tanzania's delay is especially damaging, since it forms a geographic barrier between the east and southern members. Most of the countries that have not yet joined also belong to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), whose purpose is to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. SADCC recently appointed a team to investigate whether the two groups duplicate each other. ■

COMOROS Abdallah re-elected

President Ahmed Abdallah, the sole candidate for head of state, was re-elected with more than 99 percent of the vote on September 30.

The major issue before him as he embarks on another six-year term is the status of Mayotte, one of the four islands that comprise the archipelago. In a referendum in 1974, residents of three of the islands voted 96 percent in favor of independence from France; on Mayotte, however, 64 percent voted against it. And in 1976, more than 99 percent of Mahorais (residents of

Mayotte) voted to stay linked to France. Mahorais are due to vote again on the future status of their island before the end of this year.

For France, the expense of extending welfare benefits to the Mahorais and the international disapproval of its links to the island are major reasons for wanting Mayotte to fully join the Comoros.

President Abdallah also wants Mayotte to be integrated into the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros Islands. In a speech in August, the President said he would never accept the loss of the island, which he intended to visit at a later date. He was forced to postpone a planned visit earlier in the year due to the strong protests of the Mahorais.

Abdallah became head of the government in 1972, but was overthrown in a coup in 1975 by the United National Front, a coalition that favored a more conciliatory approach to the issue of Mayotte. He was reinstated during a 1978 coup led by European mercenaries who reportedly retain strong control over the government. ■



President Ahmed Abdallah

ETHIOPIA Little change with new slate

The official establishment of a communist party on September 10 was marked by lavish ceremonies, but no major power realignments within the Ethiopian government.

Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, head of state since 1977, was elected to the top post of party secretary-general. The six members of the military council that has ruled since the revolution 10 years ago were appointed to the party's new 11-member politburo. The politburo also includes four civilians. The military retains strong control in the new party. Some two dozen military officers serve on the 136-member central committee, and many others were formerly in the military.

The congress also adopted a 10-year plan that calls for even closer links with the Soviet bloc and forecasts an optimistic 6.5 percent annual economic growth rate. In addition, the plan calls for food self-sufficiency by 1994 through expansion of state farms and organization of the peasants into cooperatives.

These plans are set against a background of spreading drought and mounting food shortages. The rains that came recently to some parts of the country were so heavy that they caused soil erosion, and relief organizations are predicting that hundreds of thousands will die if substantial food supplies are not delivered immediately.

Though Mengistu did not mention the famine in the September 10 ceremonies, one of the first tasks assigned to the new politburo is to strengthen the coordination of drought relief. ■

KENYA Kanu cracks down

President Daniel arap Moi has directed all civil servants to join his Kenya African National Union (Kanu), the country's only legal political party. The deadline for enrollment is January 1, 1985; the cost, five shillings. In the future, only party members will be considered for government work. The move is considered part of the president's effort to consolidate his power in the aftermath of the August 1982 coup attempt.

The directive to civil servants, issued in a fundraising speech on September 26, followed the expulsion from Kanu of 15 members, includ-

ing the once-powerful Charles Njonjo, formerly attorney-general and minister of constitutional affairs. Njonjo was the subject of a seven-month judicial inquiry into allegations of treason, bribery, and fraud, that concluded abruptly in August. A report from the judicial commission of inquiry is expected soon. The party purge also included Stanley Oloitiptip and Geoffrey Kariuki, both close associates of Njonjo and former cabinet members, as well as other formerly high-ranking officials.



Oginga Odinga: A thwarted comeback

Vice President Mwai Kibaki later endorsed the expulsion, reminding all members that they are in Parliament on the Kanu ticket and can be expelled if they fail to meet the party's expectations.

The Kanu National Executive Committee (NEC) also announced in September that party elections previously scheduled for this year would be postponed again, this time because of the serious drought affecting Kenya. The NEC appealed to Kanu branches to ensure equitable distribution of food to needy regions.

Kenya is suffering its worst food shortage in 50 years, a crisis that could undermine the fragile economic recovery. A greater share of foreign exchange earnings will have to be devoted to food imports, while the earnings from tea and coffee are expected to diminish due to the drought.

In other news, former Vice Presi-

dent Oginga Odinga attempted to launch a nonprofit trust in September that he said would help establish educational institutions. Denouncement of the effort as a tribal organization quickly followed, and the trust was removed from the government register of societies.

Odinga has made numerous attempts to return to national politics since 1969 when the Kenya People's Union, the opposition party he led, was banned and he was detained. When he tried to re-establish an opposition party in 1982, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment making Kenya a one-party state. After the coup attempt in 1982, Odinga was detained for over a year. ■

UGANDA US, Uganda reconciled

Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visited Uganda in September to help mend the rift between the two countries created when U.S. Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Elliott Abrams claimed that the Ugandan government was responsible for at least 100,000 deaths.

President Milton Obote has not officially reinstated the military training contract that he cancelled in August after Abrams made his allegations. However, the Ugandans being trained under the contract are still in the U.S.

Crocker reiterated concern about human rights during his visit with Obote and also said the U.S. hoped to continue providing the country with economic, humanitarian, and other assistance. He met with both Obote and Paul Ssemogerere, leader of the opposition Democratic Party, who has made similar charges of killings by the Obote regime. James Thyden, an official with the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Human Rights, also visited Uganda in September. U.S. officials have blamed indiscipline in the Ugandan army more than direct involvement of the Obote regime for the high death toll.

Attacks by the National Resistance Army (NRA) guerrillas in the

Luwero triangle region have been the focus of the Ugandan army's military offensive. The NRA believes that a national government encompassing all Ugandan political parties must be established to diminish the growing tensions between the Nilotic north and the Bantu south. Most of the army is recruited from the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups, whereas the NRA finds its most sympathetic support among the Baganda.

Low pay and inadequate equipment have contributed to the government's lack of control over the army, whose campaign against the

NRA has allegedly turned into rampages against the local populace. Another cause of the recent indiscipline has been the long delay between the death of Army Chief of Staff Oyite Ojok in December 1983 and the appointment of Brigadier Smith Opon-Acak in August, a replacement who is considered less capable of imposing control on the army.

The army is Obote's most pressing concern right now. He seems unable to control it, but he cannot risk confronting it. It was the army that overthrew him in 1971 in a coup led by Idi Amin, who was then military commander. ■

CENTRAL AFRICA

Chad peace negotiations begin as Habré realigns foreign policy

As *Update* went to press, the long-awaited "national reconciliation conference," in which Chad's warring factions could negotiate their disputes, was at last scheduled to be held in Brazzaville in late October. The factions were expected to attempt to negotiate a truce and the formation of a coalition government. The previously intransigent preconditions set by the two main antagonists—President Hissène Habré and his rebel opponent, former President Goukouni Oued-dei—have been moderated by the withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from Chad.

Both Habré, who was supported by French troops, and Goukouni, who received Libyan military assistance, have been weakened by the departure of their "patrons." By most accounts, Goukouni's army is too weak to challenge Habré, while Habré's forces lack the logistical means to take over the areas evacuated by the Libyans. Both sides thus have an incentive to reach a peace agreement, and there is hope that, unlike all previous attempts at negotiation, this one may succeed.

France and Libya have clearly turned the Chadian problem over to the Chadian factions themselves.

The September 17 agreement on the simultaneous withdrawal of French and Libyan troops was reached with the mediation of King Hassan II of Morocco, who signed a treaty with Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in early September.

But Habré's government called the Morocco-Libyan agreement "an accord between cheats, signed on the back of Chad." Enraged that Morocco had used its influence to secure the withdrawal of foreign troops from Chad without consulting his government, Habré began realigning Chad's foreign policy as soon as the withdrawal was announced.

Gouara Lassou, Chad's foreign minister, landed in Algiers on September 18. After three days of discussions with Algerian officials, he announced that Chad and Algeria would restore diplomatic relations and that Chad would formalize its links with the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

Algeria's support for Habré's opponents had previously soured its relations with Chad. In contrast, Morocco had urged that the Habré government be seated at the 19th OAU summit in November 1982. Chad returned the Moroccan support by withholding diplomatic recognition from the SADR.

Chad's sudden move toward Algeria was meant as an act of vengeance against Morocco for its "betrayal" of Chad. Morocco, which considers Algeria its main adversary in the struggle for sovereignty over the Western Sahara, made no public comment on the new twist in Chadian diplomacy, but Libya declared that "this recognition has been taken according to an Algerian wish, and [Habré's] mutinous clique will consider that this support gives it the cover of legitimacy."

On another front, Chad is now finalizing its plans for re-entering the Central African Customs Union (UDEAC), which it left in 1968. Chad is landlocked and without major railways or roads, so the departure of the French troops—whose presence has necessitated frequent deliveries of supplies by jet transport from France—will leave Chad without a steady and convenient means of supply. The French troops also provided a healthy demand for smuggled luxury products, a market which is now certain to shrink drastically.

And Nigeria's prolonged closure of its borders (see page 44) has cut Chad off from the port of Lagos and several overland trade routes that carried goods through Nigeria to Chadian markets. A severe shortage of food and fuel has resulted.

Chad's reaffiliation with UDEAC—which is in the final stages of approval—indicates that Chad is seeking greater flexibility in its traditional patterns of trade. By moving its trade routes away from Nigeria, Chad can avoid the difficulty of exchanging Nigerian naira for its own CFA francs, and can draw closer to its central African neighbors which, like Chad, maintain extremely close relations with France.

President Paul Biya of Cameroon visited Ndjamena in mid-August. In addition to Chad's readmission into UDEAC, Biya and Habré discussed the feasibility of extending the trans-Cameroon railway into southern Chad and constructing a major dam and other development projects in the Logone river basin. ■

Argentinian move rankles Africans

The arrival of Argentina's rugby team in South Africa for an October tour provoked sharp criticism from the OAU, which expressed "indignation and dismay at the visit, which is in blatant defiance of UN and OAU resolutions." Argentina's ministry of foreign affairs clearly blundered by allowing the tour, because Argentina has recently been seeking to rally African support in the United Nations for its right to sovereignty over the Falkland [Malvinas] Islands.

In July, Argentina hosted a week-long visit by a trade delegation from Gabon led by Martin Bongo, the minister of foreign affairs and cooperation. The Gabonese delegation met with government officials and private businessmen to discuss expanding Argentine-Gabonese commercial links. And, in a joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit, Gabon pledged to "support Argentine rights over the Malvinas," while Argentina vowed to continue its "constant support for the independence of Namibia."

A month earlier, Argentina had granted a \$5 million credit to Equatorial Guinea's agricultural sector. The credit is designed to create a market for Argentine products in Equatorial Guinea. Argentina is one of the world's largest exporters of soybeans and is a growing producer of weapons and industrial equipment; the Argentine government has declared expansion of trade with the Third World to be a high economic priority. ■

BURUNDI

Voters re-elect Bagaza

President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza was re-elected August 31 in the first presidential election since he seized control of the tiny, mountainous nation in a bloodless coup eight years ago. As the only candidate, he won more than 99 percent of the 1.7 million votes and will serve a five-year term.

Bagaza had been overwhelmingly re-elected to the presidency of the Unity and National Progress Party (UPRONA) at the second national party congress held in July. Under the constitution, the party leader is the only candidate for the national presidency.

The election was another step in Bagaza's efforts to re-establish a measure of democratic rule in Burundi. The country was a monarchy under King Mwami Mwambutsa, who ruled from 1915 until he was deposed by his son, Prince Charles Ndizeye, in 1966. Ndizeye was ousted later that year by the prime minister, Michel Micombero, who declared the country a republic and increased the power of the Tutsis, who comprise a minority of the population. The Hutus, the majority ethnic group, attempted a coup in

1972. In the ensuing violence, an estimated 100,000 Hutus were killed, and the Tutsis retained power.

After Bagaza took over from Micombero in 1974, he promised to restore civilian rule and to ease the deep animosities caused by the violence in 1972 and the longstanding and bitter ethnic rivalries.

In a pre-election interview, Bagaza cited the country's "considerable deficit in the balance of payments" as a key problem. The imbalance is partly attributable to the fall in the price of coffee, which brings in the majority of Burundi's export earnings. Burundi also has one of the highest population densities in Africa and the additional burden of a large population of refugees, a total of 256,000, or six percent of the total population. ■

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Dissident arrested

President André Kolingba and his Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) continued their crackdown on political opposition in August with the arrest and internal exile of Patrice Enjimoungou, secretary general of the Oubangui Patriotic Front (FPO-PT), the outlawed opposition party.

The party president, Abel Goumba, was arrested and sent into internal exile last February, and many other activists are also under house arrest in remote areas of the country.

Goumba and Enjimoungou were sentenced to five years in prison in April 1983 for attempting to establish a "clandestine revolutionary organization," but were freed five months later.

Political unrest in the Central African Republic is related in large part to a serious decline in the economy. The government had to sharply reduce its budget deficit last year to comply with IMF conditions for receipt of a loan. Among the unpopular measures taken were cutbacks in civil service jobs and student scholarships.

Meanwhile, former Emperor Jean-Bédél Bokassa made another attempt to return to the country. His effort to obtain identity papers under a false name through a contact in France failed when a clerk recognized the former emperor in the photographs accompanying his application. In December 1983, Bokassa tried to return to the country from Ivory Coast. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who had given him asylum, foiled that attempt and then deported Bokassa to France. ■

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

New member of franc zone

President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo is taking a significant step toward ending his country's economic isolation by signing a treaty to join the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) and the CFA franc zone.

The establishment of a firm exchange rate between the country's national currency, the ekwele, and the CFA franc will be one of the final steps in the process of enrollment in the franc zone, which is expected to be completed by January 1985.

The fixed and guaranteed exchange rate is expected to stabilize the currency and attract additional investments to the country. Equatorial Guinea will be better able to cooperate financially with other

countries through a system of free currency exchange and common reserves. This year, Obiang brought his country into the Central African Customs Union as well.

These steps may help him begin to reconstruct what used to be one of the more prosperous African nations. Under the repressive 10-year reign of dictator Francisco Macias Nguema, the country's main exports fell to a small fraction of their former levels, the economy disintegrated, and the country verged on bankruptcy. ■

GABON

No Botha visit planned

President Omar Bongo, responding to reports that he was ready to meet with South African President Pieter W. Botha, complained that the press had distorted his words and that Botha had not even asked to visit Gabon.

However, Bongo said that if Botha did visit Gabon, he should come with "solutions capable of achieving a just and lasting peace in southern Africa" which would take into account UN Resolution 435 on Namibia's independence and the Lusaka conference accords in which South Africa agreed to withdraw its troops from southern Angola.

There has been speculation that Botha is planning to visit moderate African states such as Gabon, Zaire, and Ivory Coast. Pretoria would consider such a tour, building on Botha's recent meetings with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and other European leaders, to be a major step forward in South Africa's effort to gain international respectability. However, Bongo is the only African leader who has indicated a willingness to consider such a visit. ■

ZAIRE

Immigrants sent home

Longstanding tensions between Zaire and Zambia heated up in August when Zaire rounded up Zambians, mostly in Shaba province, and announced they would be deported. The move was a reaction to Zambia's expulsion of immigrants from

Zaire and West Africa in July.

President Mobutu Sese Seko revoked the expulsion orders on August 25 and ordered government officials to release all detained Zambians, but hundreds had already fled across the border, reacting to threats to their lives and property.

"Stories of hardship caused by the expulsions were not lacking, and there was a xenophobic air about official statements from both countries," according to *West Africa*. Lusaka radio reported that Zairian officials had tricked the Zambians by calling them to stadi-

ums on the pretext of disseminating important information from Lusaka. They were then detained and many were reportedly beaten.

The smuggling of essential commodities from Zambia into the isolated Shaba province of Zaire has caused considerable tension between the two countries in the past. Zambia stationed troops on the border last year to stem the illegal trade. Subsequently, border incidents involving exchanges of gunfire between Zairian and Zambian soldiers have been reported on several occasions. ■

What's behind call for new league?

Zaire's foreign minister, Umba Di Lutete, assured foreign ministers who were meeting in Zaire in early September that President Mobutu Sese Seko's call for a separate organization of black African states would not generate further conflict within the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

In July, Mobutu called on black African states to break away from the OAU and form a new regional organization. In an interview with two Senegalese newspapers, Mobutu described such a league as an ideal solution for sidetracking the two conflicts that have deadlocked the OAU for the past two years—Chad and the Western Sahara.

A number of other African leaders are more concerned about preserving the unity of the OAU than creating a breakaway organization. The foreign ministers' conference in Zaire, which brought together representatives of Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire and the Central African Republic, ended with the issuance of a joint communiqué calling for stepped-up efforts to preserve the OAU.

Mobutu's proposal has given rise to speculation that it might have originated with outside powers. "One such force that has always feared the prospect of a strong pan-African body is South Africa," said the *Nigerian Concord Weekly*. "Because of its staunch anti-apartheid policies and commitments to support liberation movements in South Africa, the OAU has always been the target of South African ridicule."

The *Nigerian Concord Weekly* also commented, "There are already suspicions among some Arab quarters that Mobutu's trumpet of discord may be yet another ploy by Israel to completely estrange the Arab world from their friends in black Africa." Mobutu resumed diplomatic relations with Israel in 1982. ■

NORTHERN AFRICA

Nimeiry lifts state of emergency

At the end of September, President Gaafar al-Nimeiry formally ended the five-month state of emergency and suspended the "decisive justice" courts which had sentenced 58 people to amputations and floggings for theft and robbery. Imposed in April after widespread labor unrest, the state of emergency had effectively banned all strikes

and unauthorized gatherings, while the army and police were given free rein to enter houses, search vehicles, and impose curfews.

Nimeiry announced the conciliatory move at the fourth party congress of the ruling Sudanese Socialist Union, saying that the government's "achievement of prompt justice" had satisfactorily curbed

corruption and "freed society from destructive sins." He hinted, however, that the *Sharia*—the system of Islamic law imposed last year and occasionally applied to non-Muslims—would remain in effect. Nimeiry also promised to make radical changes in the judicial system to ensure the continued implementation of decisive justice.

The imposition of the *Sharia* and its harsh enforcement have encouraged the scattered Sudanese opposition abroad to unite and form the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF, which includes the business-backed Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, and the Sudanese Communist Party, formulated a charter in August calling for a return to democracy and accusing Nimeiry of plunging Sudan into "economic bankruptcy, corruption, and nepotism."


A greater threat to Nimeiry comes from within Sudan. Growing discontent in the south forced him in late September to reverse an earlier decision to divide southern Sudan into three administrative regions. The partitioning of the south, if Nimeiry had completed his plans, would have violated the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, which ended the long civil war between north and south. But the proposal was met with strong opposition, and after months of controversy, Nimeiry said that he would scrap the plan and keep the south as one autonomous region, if that was the wish of the majority.

Nimeiry's attempt to divide the south and to apply the *Sharia* there have fueled support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army, which is fighting a guerrilla war in the south against government troops and installations. In late August, the SPLA sank a ferry that was carrying nearly 400 government troops. The SPLA said that the attack was meant "to demonstrate to Nimeiry that he is not in control of the area he claimed."

The insecurity in the south has created new problems for Sudan's shaky economy. Even though Chevron, under government pressure, has agreed to resume oil prospecting and pipeline construction in

the south, a further escalation of violence could force Chevron to abandon its operations.

SPLA attacks have halted work on the Jonglei irrigation scheme to recover swampland in the Upper Nile, which would provide more water for both Sudan and Egypt. The Jonglei project is considered vital to Sudan's economic future, and observers are concerned that all development projects in the south may be jeopardized unless Nimeiry can find a means of reconciling the SPLA rebels. ■



President Gaafar al-Nimeiry

ALGERIA U.S. aide visits

Gen. Kenneth Burns, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for North African and Middle Eastern Affairs, met with Algerian officials in early October as part of his regional itinerary.

Algeria and the U.S. had no military relations at all until three years ago, but the 1985 Pentagon budget includes a substantial allocation for training members of the Algerian military.

A Saudi source reported that Gen. Burns may have discussed the possible sale of American weapons to Algeria, which traditionally has relied on the Soviet Union for its military equipment. The U.S., concerned about Morocco's treaty of union with Libya, is hoping to capitalize on similar concerns among other states in North Africa (see Tunisia, page 55). ■

Striving for diversification

President Chadli Benjedid has recently taken steps toward his long-term goal of diversifying the Algerian economy beyond the natural gas and petroleum industry. In September, the Algerian state gas company, Sonelgaz, signed a contract with the Soviet Union for the construction of a 630-megawatt thermal power plant at Jijel, in eastern Algeria. The \$235 million project, scheduled for completion by the end of the decade, will provide energy for the proposed steel complex at Bel-lara.

The government is also seeking aid from Western Europe and the U.S. to modernize Algeria's telecommunications network. The World Bank has already agreed to lend Algeria \$128 million to help finance the foreign currency costs of this major enterprise, while large Western telecommunications companies are vying for contracts to be awarded by the end of the year.

The recently accepted five-year development plan for 1985-89 also encourages diversification in the economy. The new \$120 billion plan, promoted by the American-educated prime minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, further develops the strategy of the present five-year plan: to reallocate investment in favor of light industries and improvements in infrastructure; to decentralize state enterprises in an attempt to increase efficiency; and to encourage private investment. It is hoped that by developing the non-hydrocarbon sectors, more than one million jobs can be created, significantly reducing the 14 percent non-agricultural unemployment rate.

In the meantime, the state-owned oil and gas company, Sonatrach, has agreed to reduce the amount of Algerian liquefied natural gas that the French utility, Gaz de France, was required to purchase under an existing contract. The French company had originally contracted to buy 9.1 billion cubic meters of Algerian gas per year, but the new agreement will cut gas deliveries by about 10 percent in the next two years. ■

EGYPT

Jordan resumes relations

On September 25, Jordan re-established diplomatic relations with Egypt. Like most Arab countries, Jordan had cut all ties to Egypt after the late Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat signed the Camp David peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

In early October, President Hosni Mubarak visited Amman at the invitation of Jordan's King Hussein—the first official visit to any Arab state by an Egyptian president in five years.

The resumption of relations with Jordan was a vindication of Mubarak's steps toward rapprochement with the Arab world. Although his administration has refused to abrogate the Camp David agreement, Mubarak has managed to slowly recoup some of Egypt's lost status among Arab nations. "Moderate" states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, have increased their economic cooperation with Egypt since Sadat's death in 1981. Egypt's firm support for Iraq in the war against Iran has also won favor for Mubarak from several Persian Gulf states.

After Mubarak's visit to Amman, Egypt and Jordan announced that they had established a joint prime ministerial committee to encourage cooperation between the two nations "in all fields." And in later meetings with American officials, Mubarak forcefully advocated an increase in U.S. military support to Jordan. ■

LIBYA

Reactors and pipelines

Since the siege of the Libyan embassy in London in May, Britain has quietly imposed what amounts to a ban on any expansion of British exports to Libya. Britain was formerly one of Libya's major sources of agricultural and engineering equipment, but the 28 percent decline in total British exports to Libya has led the government of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi to turn to different trading partners.

In late September, Qaddafi signed a \$1 billion trade agreement with Greek Prime Minister Andreas

New Lomé Convention still deadlocked

The Lomé Convention, an agreement under which 64 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) nations receive foreign aid and concessionary terms of trade from the 10 members of the European Economic Community (EEC), was once again under negotiation in Brussels in early October.

Since October 1983, the EEC-ACP nations have been trying to agree on the terms for renewing the Lomé Convention for another five years. The current pact will expire in February 1985.

The two sides disagree over numerous details. The EEC has refused to allow ACP agricultural products duty-free access to European markets. The ACP has also requested a stronger role for Stabex, a system of price supports which commits the EEC to cushion ACP nations against sudden fluctuations in the price of their commodity exports. But in the most important dispute, the ACP has pushed for a large increase in the amount of aid that the EEC gives to the ACP nations. The talks eventually collapsed over the issue of aid.

The EEC offered to increase the aid fund for the ACP from \$4 billion to just over \$5 billion. ACP representatives pointed out that the increase was barely enough to account for inflation and that the funds would have to be divided among 64 countries over a five-year period. Furthermore, they said, the population of the ACP has increased dramatically in the five years since the last pact was signed. And the anticipated entry of Angola and Mozambique into the ACP will add significantly to the need for aid, the ACP ministers added.

The current deadlock has focused attention on some of the shortcomings of the Lomé Convention. The ACP-EEC pact was praised as a model of "North-South" cooperation when it was first signed in 1975. But the ACP's share of sales to the EEC has actually fallen since then. The EEC's "import safeguards" have discouraged ACP countries from marketing low-priced manufactured goods, such as clothing and textiles, while strict controls limit the amount of agricultural products that the EEC can import. And EEC subsidies on European products, such as sugar, have made ACP exports uncompetitive in the world marketplace. The EEC criticizes the ACP countries for funneling European aid into grandiose and ineffective development projects, while the ACP is angered by the EEC's insistence on monitoring how its aid is spent and for taking human rights into consideration when distributing funds.

It is uncertain whether an agreement can be reached by December, the deadline for renewing the pact. Negotiations are expected to resume shortly. ■

Papandreou. Under the new pact, Greece is to sell weapons to Libya and perform maintenance on Libyan ships in exchange for increased purchases of Libyan oil at preferential prices. The "jumbo agreement," as it was dubbed in Greece, projects a 50 percent increase in Greek exports to Libya in the next year alone, but analysts point out that similar agreements signed by Greece in the last two years have fizzled out.

Meanwhile, strident opposition to a proposed deal between Belgium and Libya over the building of a nu-

clear power station is forcing the Belgian government to retreat. Under the \$1 billion contract, Belgonucleaire—a corporation partly owned by the Belgian government—would provide design and construction services for two or three Russian-designed nuclear reactors. "Belgonucleaire is persuaded that they could deliver nuclear plans to Libya without danger that they will be used for military purposes," said a Belgian official. "The problem is that the American government is not really pleased with the project." Diplomatic pro-

tests from the U.S. and dissension within the Belgian government seemed likely to prevent the consummation of the deal, which Belgonucleaire had hoped to reach with Libya in October.

But the "Great Manmade River," the colossal development project that will tap the water table deep beneath the Sahara and pipe water to Libya's coastal farm belt, will be constructed with technical assistance from American corporations. American engineering and contracting companies have already helped prepare the plans for the two 1243-mile pipelines.

The U.S. State Department recently expressed serious concern over the involvement of American corporations in Libya because of its "reprehensible and objectionable activities and behavior around the world." However, the spokesman of one of the American companies commented: "The pipeline is a peaceful project. I'm sure the Reagan administration is in favor of such efforts both in Libya and elsewhere in the Third World." ■

TUNISIA Weinberger visits

Amid concern over the "treaty of union" signed between Morocco and Libya, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger visited Tunisia in early October.

In two days of meetings with President Habib Bourguiba and other high-ranking Tunisian officials, Weinberger stressed that the U.S. would continue to supply Tunisia with substantial military assistance, including jet fighters and anti-aircraft missiles.

In an apparent "show of force," Weinberger's visit was timed to coincide with a port call from an American destroyer that was conducting joint maneuvers offshore with the Tunisian navy. ■

WESTERN SAHARA Nigeria loses patience

Nigeria withdrew from the OAU's Implementation Committee on the Western Sahara on September 22, claiming that "implementation had been frustrated by Mo-

rocco" and that "the Polisario Front, on the other hand, had shown considerable flexibility and concern for the solidarity of the OAU."

Nigeria's foreign affairs minister, Ibrahim Gambari, said that Nigeria's membership in the committee "did not give [Nigeria] enough room for flexibility in exercising the available options on the Western Sahara issue." Nigeria, he said, was determined to promote independence for the territory.

And in preparation for the anticipated clash with Morocco over representation at the November OAU summit, Polisario President Mohamed Abdelaziz toured capitals in east and southern Africa, meeting with heads of state and other high-ranking officials in October.

Meanwhile, Algiers radio continued to carry reports of fighting in the Western Sahara between Moroccan and Polisario troops. One broadcast claimed that in September alone, 233 Moroccan soldiers were killed and 368 wounded. There was no independent confirmation of that claim. ■

SOUTHERN AFRICA

South African government calls in army to suppress rioting

As rioting continued unabated into October, the government reinforced police riot control units with soldiers from the South African army. The troops were deployed in the township of Soweto to support the civilian police "in riot control and all other circumstances that we may decide." The government also announced that the civilian police force will be expanded by 45 percent from 47,000 to 68,000 to cope with the persistent unrest.

Since the riots began in late August, approximately 80 people have been killed. Vehicles have been stoned, overturned, and set afire, while firebombs have been hurled into government offices. Crowds of Africans have defied official bans on attending the funerals of those killed in the riots, and further violence has erupted when security forces have "restrained" the angry funeral-goers with tear gas, rubber

bullets, and birdshot.

Hundreds have been injured in the rioting and thousands arrested. One report said that among those arrested were at least 800 children. Partly from fear and partly in protest, more than 100,000 black students boycotted classes at schools throughout the country. The government, hoping to end the six-week boycott, announced in early October that "consultative councils" would be established to give black students a larger say in how their schools are run. However, the government warned that it would not allow the councils "to be used for political gain."

Meanwhile, a recent wave of bombings in and around Johannesburg has prompted the government to unveil a multi-million dollar plan to guard every government building in South Africa. The special guard unit, whose duties include protect-

ing cabinet ministers and the parliament, will be increased from 1,000 men to 10,000 over the next five years.

But after the plans for a new guard unit were disclosed, several bombs were planted in public buildings, including the Rand Supreme Court building in Johannesburg; an electrical substation in Rustenberg in the western Transvaal, where electric power was knocked out, temporarily shutting down the area's platinum mines; and an all-white technical college in Durban. ■

ANGOLA U.S. official, dos Santos meet

Recent meetings between President José Eduardo dos Santos and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Frank Wisner represent another step in the Reagan administration's struggle to

achieve a diplomatic success in southern Africa. The fact that dos Santos is now saying publicly that peaceful coexistence with South Africa is possible indicates a potential for real progress, according to administration officials.

Officers from both Angolan and South African forces are working together to monitor the Lusaka ceasefire agreement signed last February that called on South Africa to remove its forces from Angola, and Angola to refuse Swapo forces access to its territory.

However, South Africa still has two battalions of troops in southern Angola, and Pretoria says it wants a timetable on the removal of Cuban troops from Angola before it will complete its withdrawal. Angola wants South African troops to leave now, not just from its own territory but also from Namibia, a step that must be taken before the Cuban troops will be sent home.

In the meantime, Unita rebel forces have increased their efforts to undermine the Angolan government. In early October, Unita destroyed transmission towers and cut electrical lines to Luanda. Earlier, rebels exploded bombs in a railyard in the port town of Benguela, causing serious damage to a number of locomotives.

South Africa heavily supports Unita and continues to arm the rebel troops. Pretoria has recently made public its involvement with the anti-government forces. Dr. Jonas Savimbi, leader of Unita, was an honored guest at the September inauguration ceremony of P.W. Botha as South Africa's new state president. ■

BOTSWANA

Opposition makes small gains

A landslide victory for President Quett Masire's ruling party overshadowed the small but modest gains made by the opposition in the September 8th elections.

The ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won 29 of the 34 seats in the National Assembly, while the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) gained four seats, two more than in the last election in

1979. The Botswana People's Party acquired one seat.

BNF candidates surprised the nation by defeating Foreign Minister Archie Mogwe and Home Affairs Minister Disele Kebatshebele. The Oxford-educated Mogwe was trounced by the former postmaster of a small town.

The moderately socialist BNF also greatly increased its total number of votes. Stressing the extremes of poverty and wealth in Botswana, the party made its strongest showing in urban areas. The BNF also campaigned on a promise to immediately sign a security pact with South Africa if it won the election. Party leaders said that such an agreement would help Botswana survive as a nation. Masire's ruling party has refused to sign such an accord.



President Quett Masire

Masire was declared president of the republic following the victory of his party, which is conservative but strongly committed to the maintenance of a multi-party democracy. The BDP has ruled Botswana since independence in 1966. Its power derives in large part from its economic record. Under its rule, per capita income has increased dramatically. In addition, the country has become one of the world's largest diamond producers and has been exporting beef to Europe.

The elections were the first since the death in 1980 of former President

Seretse Khama, who had founded the party. Approximately 60 percent of the registered voters went to the polls. ■

LESOTHO

Tensions ease

Tensions between Lesotho and South Africa eased in early October, bringing the initiation of the Highlands water project closer to reality. Talks resumed on the joint project, after having been suspended for the third time due to Lesotho's reluctance to sign a mutual non-aggression pact with South Africa. Pretoria complained that Lesotho's "insensitivity to South Africa's security needs" had prevented any serious dialogue on the plans.

Lesotho Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan stated earlier this year that "there would be no point in Lesotho and South Africa signing a non-aggression pact, since Lesotho had neither the capacity nor the intention to attack [South Africa]." The government of Lesotho charged that South Africa wanted the agreement only to impress its Western allies. Jonathan's recent comments, however, suggest that he feels a security pact is inevitable.

Opponents of the pact claim that it would compromise Lesotho's national integrity, turning the nation into a puppet state. However, opposition parties—the Basotho National Alliance and the Basotho Democratic Alliance—both maintain that a pact with South Africa could only benefit Lesotho, which is entirely surrounded by and economically dependent on South Africa.

The water project would enable Lesotho to collect water now trapped in the highlands and sell it to South Africa, at the same time generating hydro-electric power and irrigating Lesotho's farmlands. The project would provide South Africa with much needed water and Lesotho with much needed capital, potentially doubling the nation's annual revenues.

In South Africa, much publicity was given to a statement by a World Bank official that absolute trust and confidence between South Africa

and Lesotho are prerequisites for the success of the Highlands water project. He indicated that the World Bank considers relations between states to be a factor in decisions on financing international projects. In Lesotho, however, the official radio station countered that the World Bank limits itself to economic arguments and does not take stands on purely political issues. ■

MALAWI

Dissident's home burned

The Dar es Salaam home of Grey Kamuyambeni, the new head of the Socialist League of Malawi (Lesoma), was recently burned down; no one was injured in the blaze. Kamuyambeni has been living in exile in Tanzania.

He took over leadership of Lesoma, one of the opposition parties, after his predecessor, Attati Mpakati, was killed in March 1983 in Harare, allegedly by agents of the Malawian government. Earlier, Mpakati's hands had been blown off by a parcel bomb.

The campaign for the release of two other opposition leaders, former Justice Minister Orton Chirwa and his wife, Vera, is being carried on from London by their son, Fumbani. The aging couple went into exile in Tanzania in 1964. In 1981, Fumbani and his parents were kidnapped while on a trip in Zambia. Imprisoned in Malawi, the Chirwa couple was charged with high treason and sentenced to death. The sentences were commuted to life imprisonment in June, however, and Fumbani Chirwa was released in February.

President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda, addressing the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) convention in September, said that he was pleased that there had been no reports of dissension within the party or dissidents wanting to infiltrate Malawi from neighboring countries during the previous year.

Tanzania and Zambia have harbored opponents of the Banda regime, causing ill will. Blantyre radio reported that delegations from Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe attended the convention, indicating that their relations with Malawi have improved. ■



Orton Chirwa in early 1960's

Africa Report

MOZAMBIQUE

Ceasefire still unsettled

Conflicting interpretations of the ceasefire in the Mozambican civil war indicate that the fighting may not end in the near future. South African Foreign Minister P.W. Botha announced the truce on October 3 at a news conference attended by representatives of both the Mozambique government and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Neither side made statements or answered questions.

The truce was the outcome, Botha said, of South Africa's negotiations over a period of many weeks with the MNR and the government of President Samora Machel. But less than an hour after the announcement, the MNR blew up power lines linking South Africa to the Mozambican capital of Maputo. MNR representatives had said they were going to continue fighting during the negotiations.

According to Botha, the negotiations resulted in a four-point plan calling for acceptance of Machel as Mozambique's leader, an end to armed conflict in Mozambique, a role for South Africa in enforcing the ceasefire, and the establishment of a commission to implement the plan. The commission, chaired by South Africa and including representatives of the MNR and the government of Mozambique, has reportedly already met.

Shortly after the announcement of the ceasefire pact, however, Evo Fernandes, the MNR secretary-

general, said that conditions of the ceasefire, including the right of the MNR to participate in the government, must be worked out before the fighting can stop, and that acceptance of Machel as president only means recognition of current reality, not any commitment to keep him in power.

Mozambique, on the other hand, insists that the ceasefire is unconditional and that the commission cannot be a forum for the MNR's insistence on participation in a coalition government. And the Mozambique news agency noted that offensives against "banditry" in the country must be increased.

Both the MNR and the Mozambican government have questioned Botha's statement that South African troops would monitor the truce. South Africa has given strong support to the MNR guerrilla activities that have devastated the Mozambique economy infrastructure in recent years. MNR representatives have said they would insist on a multi-national force instead.

Under the Nkomati mutual non-aggression pact that Mozambique and South Africa signed in March, South Africa pledged to stop supporting the rebel forces. It was expected that guerrilla activities would terminate or at least diminish. Instead, the rebels stepped up their sabotage during the months following the agreement, leading to speculation that South Africa has not truly withdrawn its support. Mozambique pledged in the Nkomati accord to cease its military support for the African National Congress, the banned opposition organization of South Africa. ■

SOUTH AFRICA

Uproar continues over fugitives

Archie Gumede, Billy Nair, and Paul David, the three remaining fugitives out of the six who originally found asylum in the British consulate in Durban, seem prepared to extend their stay indefinitely. Donald Anderson, a member of the British parliament and the Labor Party's spokesman on southern Africa, visited the men in mid-October and said that Britain will not force them to leave.

It is technically a violation of international law for an embassy or

consulate to grant asylum to "fugitives from justice," but Britain has made an exception in the Durban case. The implication is that the Durban men are fugitives from injustice—a suggestion resented by the South African government, which has retaliated by refusing to extradite four men wanted in Britain on charges of smuggling weapons.

The six Durban fugitives were arrested on charges of "endangering national security" by encouraging voters to boycott the elections in August. However, a Supreme Court justice found insufficient grounds for their arrest and ordered the men released. But on September 9, the government again ordered them detained, this time on unspecified charges of "creating a revolutionary climate." The six men then sought refuge in the British consulate.

All six are among the leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), a non-violent coalition opposed to apartheid and originally created to organize protest against South Africa's new constitution,

which excludes blacks from the political process. Louis Le Grange, the minister of law and order, has recently intimated that the government may declare the UDF to be an unlawful organization, which would subject its members to even more repressive measures.

While Gumede, Nair, and David remained in the consulate, the other three men left the building on October 6 and were promptly arrested by South African police. Charges that they had violated the Internal Security Act had been withdrawn several days before, but the three men were arrested without charges anyway.

The virtually unlimited powers of the government's Ministry of Law and Order, which has the authority to detain people without charge or trial, has been brought under international scrutiny by the plight of the Durban fugitives.

Miners' union wins concessions

The 90,000-member black National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) called its first legal strike in September but canceled it a day

later when the Chamber of Mines offered some concessions.

The strike took place at eight gold mines, seven of them owned by the Anglo-American conglomerate, but workers at two other mines where management has refused to recognize the NUM also walked off the job. The Western Areas mine, owned by Johannesburg Consolidated Investment, brought in the police after a night of rioting and arson; seven miners were killed and more than 100 injured.

NUM settled for a 16.3 percent wage increase—14 percent of which had already been put into effect unilaterally by the owners' organization, the Chamber of Mines—and the introduction of holiday pay, equal to 50 percent of monthly wages, for unskilled workers. NUM's general secretary, Cyril Ramaphosa, said, "If we had unionized a bigger portion of the industry, we would definitely not have settled for this."

Many mine owners, aside from Anglo-American, which is considered the most moderate employer, have refused to recognize NUM, despite encouragement to do so by the Chamber of Mines.

The NUM settlement could lead to friction with the 430,000 non-union black miners, who will not receive the additional 2.3 percent and holiday pay. But the settlement could also help the NUM in recruiting new members.

Beyers Naudé unbanned

In September, the South African government unexpectedly lifted the banning order of Dr. Beyers Naudé, the rebel Afrikaner minister who has been silenced for the last seven years.

In a characteristic gesture, Naudé celebrated his first day of freedom by flying to Durban to visit the fugitives in the British consulate.

Naudé said his political convictions had been reinforced during his restriction. "We have to understand [white] fears," he said, "but at the same time we have to urge white South Africans to see what is motivating black aspirations for jus-

Bishop Tutu wins Nobel Peace Prize

Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and probably South Africa's best-known advocate of racial equality, has been awarded the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize.

In its formal announcement of the award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee cited Bishop Tutu's "role as a unifying leader in the campaign to resolve the problems of apartheid in South Africa. . . the committee wishes to direct attention to the nonviolent struggle for liberation to which Desmond Tutu belongs. This year's award should be seen as a renewed recognition of the courage and heroism shown by black South Africans in their use of peaceful methods in the struggle against apartheid."

In a press conference in New York, Bishop Tutu said, "The award is a tremendous political statement. It says that despite all distortions of truth, the world recognizes that we are striving for peace. . . The award belongs to all the black people of South Africa who have suffered, to all who have felt and lived with the evil of apartheid and are trying and striving for peace."

The 53 year-old Anglican bishop has refused to advocate violence as an instrument of change in South Africa, but he has angered the government by calling on Western nations to apply economic pressure on South Africa and by publicly declaring that apartheid is a form of blasphemy. The government has frequently seized his passport and denied him permission to travel abroad. The SACC, which receives most of its funding from overseas, has been investigated by the government several times, and the state authorities have sought to prevent the SACC from receiving foreign funds.

The South African government had no comment on the award. ■

tice and liberation in South Africa. As long as blacks are excluded from the meaningful political process, it will be impossible to solve the problems of this country." ■

SWAZILAND KaNgwane's status changes

The government of South Africa has granted self-governing status to KaNgwane, a territory that borders Swaziland on the west and north and Mozambique on the east.

Plans to cede KaNgwane to Swaziland have been mired in controversy and confusion for years. South Africa intended to transfer to Swaziland the citizenship of approximately 800,000 inhabitants of the region. The government of Swaziland considers the territory to be part of its kingdom and has put pressure on Pretoria to incorporate it into Swaziland.



Refugee from KaNgwane

But the people of KaNgwane have demonstrated through the electoral process that they do not want to lose their South African citizenship and that they want to maintain a measure of independence over their own affairs. With self-governing status, KaNgwane is neither "fully independent" like the homelands, nor fully under the jurisdiction of Pretoria.

However, it is possible that Pretoria will push for full independence for KaNgwane, turning it into a

"homeland" like Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda.

The status of Ingwavuma, another territory that Swaziland wants to incorporate, is still undecided. ■

ZIMBABWE Elections on the horizon

Confirming that the first national elections since independence would be held by March 1985, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe made it clear that he was seeking the popular support needed for introducing a one-party state under the control of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

The first step was to accelerate voter registration, which was to be completed by the end of October. Next, the committee charged with dividing the country into appropriate constituencies set out to make its official recommendations.

Mugabe then urged ZANU central committee members to begin actively campaigning for the elections. He said the "disarray" of the opposition parties provides ZANU with a "situation of tremendous advantage" for winning a landslide victory.

With this in mind, the government released Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the United African National Council (UANC), who had been detained for 10 months for allegedly seeking Israeli and South African assistance to stage a coup. Support for the UANC, which still clings to three seats in parliament, has dwindled dramatically, and it now has only a handful of offices in operation.

Upon his release, Muzorewa held a press conference to announce that the UANC would re-enter the political arena because people were disillusioned with the government. The elections are an opportunity to reverse the downward trend in the economy caused by the government's socialist policies, he said.

Ndabaningi Sithole, who has been in exile in Great Britain since last November, also made public his intention to participate in the elections. He claimed plans were already underway to resurrect his



L to R: Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo

ZANU faction which has been inactive since independence. Sithole campaign posters soon appeared in Harare and other major cities.

Nevertheless, it is Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which remains ZANU's only legitimate challenger. In early October, ZAPU swept all of the seats in municipal elections in Bulawayo, confirming its popular support in Matabeleland. In view of the upcoming elections, ZAPU organized its first national congress since 1975 at Harare's sports centre in mid-October, in an effort to map out a solid electoral strategy enabling ZAPU to win popular support beyond the party's stronghold. To the cheers of 6,000 supporters, Nkomo vigorously denounced the proposal for a one-party state and accused Mugabe of turning the country's promise into "a reality of suspicion, terror, and failure."

In recent months, however, ZAPU has been in disarray, having come under repeated attacks by ZANU supporters and the government's anti-dissident campaign. In June, in two key electoral provinces—Mashonaland West and Midlands—the government imposed a three-month ban on ZAPU meetings, making it difficult to campaign for the elections. Because ZAPU and ZANU have traditionally maintained strong party structures in those provinces, it is likely to be there that ZANU's bid to establish a legitimate one-party state will be decided. ■

Putting the Pieces Back Together Again

President Hissène Habré has succeeded in bringing many former opponents into his government. But reconciliation with the rebels led by Goukouni Oueddei has yet to be achieved, and unrest in the south continues.

BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND

No phoenix has yet arisen from the ashes of the Chadian civil war—except in the form of an occasional Jaguar fighter-bomber roaring over the Chari River on a training flight. Ndjamenā is a ghost town. The grim realities of the vicious fighting that took place in this devastated capital are inscribed everywhere on what little remains of public buildings and homes. Reconstruction in every sense is only beginning.

Difficult as it is to recognize the urban space of antebellum Ndjamenā amid the rubble, identifying the boundaries of the Chadian state is no less a problem. With the September 17th announcement of a Franco-Libyan agreement on a phased withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from the north, the immense Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti prefecture promises once again to become part of Chad's national territory.

But at the time of this writing, the withdrawal of foreign troops is just getting underway. If and when it is accomplished, there will remain the difficult task of bringing to heel and eventually incorporating the rebel units of

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In August, GUNT President Goukouni Oueddei organized a National Liberation Council to serve as the supreme decision-making organ

Goukouni Oueddei's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) into the central government.

Similarly, the south, consisting of the Mayo-Kebbi, Logone Oriental, Logone Occidental, Moyen-Chari, and Tandjilé prefectures, has yet to be fully integrated into the Chadian polity, as evidenced by the presence in at least three

of these prefectures of a chronic, southern-led insurgency.

President Hissène Habré's jurisdiction is effectively limited to the Sahelian zone—the prefectures of Kanem, Batha, Chari-Baguirmi, Salamat, Guera, and Ouaddai. Even so, pockets of instability persist in those areas of Batha and Salamat under the sway of Mahamat Abba Said's First Army and Acheikh Ibn Oumar's Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR). And the critical conditions engendered by the drought add another unknown to Chad's political future. Of Libya, the insurgents, and the drought, it is hard to tell which poses the greatest threat to Habré's regime.

And yet, on both the diplomatic and domestic fronts, the present situation is a vast improvement over the off-and-on factional feuding that preceded and followed the Libyan invasion of Ndjamenā in December 1980, or for that matter, over the situation last year during the height of the Chadian-Libyan crisis.

As any resident of Ndjamenā will readily admit, the Habré regime has gone a long way toward insuring security in the capital city, instituting a civil administration and creating the conditions for a lasting national reconciliation and economic recovery. Signs of a return to normalcy are evident in the in-

in the south, having been entrusted with the delicate task of negotiating the re-entry of southern rebels into the fold of the central government.

A closer look at the southerners currently holding high-ranking positions reveals a calculated attempt by Habré to "recuperate" as wide a spectrum of southern politicians and civil servants as is politically feasible, including a fair number who served under Tombalbaye (1960-75) or under Gen. Félix Maloum's Supreme Military Council (CSM) (1975-79), and indeed even under Goukouni Oueddei's GUNT (1980-82).

Elie Romba and Taher Guinassou, respectively ministers of finance and livestock, both held ministerial posts under Tombalbaye. J.M. Madjimbong, who once served as ambassador to West Germany and prefect of Ndjamená under Tombalbaye, has now surfaced as prefect of Logone Occidental. Simon Adoum, Tombalbaye's chief of cabinet for political affairs, is currently prefect in Moyen-Chari, while the former head of Tombalbaye's security, Gabriel Mamadou, is now running the blood bank on behalf of the Red Cross, a retooling which in retrospect seems entirely appropriate. Joseph Yodeyman and Gouara Lassou, respectively ministers of planning and foreign affairs, both served as ministers under Maloum, and Nadji Yamarke, currently secretary of state for combating natural disasters, was appointed mayor of Kelo (Tandjilé) under GUNT and is himself remembered by the survivors of the 1979 massacres in the south as the greatest calamity they ever experienced.

The presence of this extraordinary mixed bag of southerners provides Habré with convenient proof of his good faith when he claims to be extending a friendly hand to all—"la politique de la main tendue" is the standard phrase used to describe his policy—while at the same time making it most unlikely that the "southern bloc" will ever develop into a cohesive opposition within the government and administration.

Habré's political arithmetic extends even to the *ralliés*—the former members of Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué's Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), who, although they joined the southern rebellion in 1983, decided more recently that they would rather switch than fight.

Thus, Capt. Ndilnodji Nguelor and Lt. Ngarina Mbaibikel, respectively minister delegate to the presidency for national defense and secretary of state for interior and administrative reform, are often cited as examples of the success met by Djidingar in handling his *mission de ralliement*. On this score, however, much remains to be done.

Led by former FAT soldiers, the southern insurgency has yet to be brought under control. This indeed is where Habré's record appears to be most wanting. For if the political apparatus of the state is genuinely representative of most sectors of Chadian society, and can therefore serve as an instrument of national integration, the same cannot be said of the armed forces. The insecurity that prevails in some of the southern prefectures, most notably in Logone Oriental, testifies to the difficulties faced by Habré in trying to stitch together a reasonably disciplined and cohesive constabulary force in the south.

The difficulties are in part rooted in the ethno-regional composition of Habré's Armed Forces of the North (FAN), which, as the name suggests, were overwhelmingly recruited among northerners, with a predominance of Toubou and Hadjerai elements as well as Ouaddaians. Just as the earlier stationing of southern troops in the north provoked countless incidents that soon spilled over into a major insurgency, the occupation of the south by FAN forces was bound to create grave tensions. But this is only part of the story.

In fact, there was remarkably little resistance to FAN as they entered Sarh, their first "port of call" before moving on toward Moundou. Habré's forces marched into Ndjamená on June 6, 1982, but only on September 25 did FAN reach Sarh, and then only after protracted negotiations with local notables and politicians, most of whom were former associates of Tombalbaye. Moundou, on the other hand, was Kamougué's fief, and all attempts by FAN to negotiate a peaceful entry failed. After sporadic resistance, most of Kamougué's soldiers melted away into the bush, while he himself flew out of Moundou only minutes before FAN seized the airstrip.

The vast majority of the insurgents

operating in the south—the so-called "codos," short for commandos—are remnants of Kamougué's FAT. Many are former gendarmes, and while virtually all of them are of Sara origins, the majority belong to very specific groups—Dai, Mbaye, and Ngambaye. The crux of the problem is not simply one of mitigating ethnic antagonisms between northerners and southerners, but of reconciling different southern factions, a task which seriously complicates the efforts now underway to negotiate the re-entry of the codos into the fold of the national armed forces.

Habré's choice of Djidingar to head this delicate *mission de ralliement* cannot be faulted. A Sara and a southerner, Djidingar is a highly skilled negotiator as well as a seasoned politician and the son of a well-known chief of the Tandjilé. When some 1,400 codos chose to lay down their arms and come out of the bush between December 1983 and March 1984, it was in no small measure due to Djidingar's own negotiating skills. But money also helped, and much of it came from the "special funds" of the French and American embassies. Money helped not only in luring the codos out of their rural strongholds, but in rewarding prefectural authorities for their cooperation in handling the deal. One wonders whether the *ralliements* will last any longer than the resources which made them possible.

This in turn points to another side of the problem: the creation of a reliable and properly integrated constabulary force does not depend solely on the quality of the military training afforded through French instructors, but on the capacity of the government to pay its troops and officers. Similarly, whether or not the government can provide a meaningful disincentive to the use of the Kalashnikov as a means of earning a living depends in large part on its capacity to provide jobs to the unemployed and the uneducated. On each count and especially the latter, the prospects do not seem particularly encouraging.

Meanwhile, Europeans and Africans alike express growing concern over the continued insecurity created by the remaining codos and various other groups that seek to emulate their tactics. In late July when I arrived in Moundou, the mayor of the town suffered a severe leg

injury after his car was sprayed by bullets. Two days later, two Chadian residents were shot dead, and two weeks before my arrival, the 23-year-old son of a Cotontchad executive had been assassinated in one of the rural cantons in the vicinity of Moundou. Anonymous letters have been sent to executives of Cotontchad and the Manufacture des Cigarettes de Moundou with instructions to deliver substantial sums of money at a given time and place, "under threat of reprisal."

In facing this situation, the local authorities are caught in a difficult position. If they choose to blow the whistle on the codos, they run the risk of having their brains blown out. Inaction or tacit acquiescence, on the other hand, means that they may well lose their jobs. Many have wisely settled for the latter alternative, while at the same time using the resources of their office to build a trusted clientele of bodyguards, friends, and hangers-on around them.

Over the years, a symmetry of chaos has developed at both ends of the north-south axis, but on a far more consequential scale in those parts of the north controlled by Goukouni. While the disorders in the south are serious enough, though potentially manageable, the situation in the north is rapidly getting out of hand, confronting Qaddafi with a challenge which is clearly beyond any of the recipes found in the Green Book.

The GUNT, to put it in a nutshell, is unravelling at the seams, revealing in the process its utter lack of credibility as a politico-military organization. The ceaseless bickering and internecine struggles that have plagued its constituent factions reached an unprecedented level of acrimony in the month of August, and were brought to light through a number of statements and accusations issued from such improbable places as Sebha, Libya, and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. In light of this quickly deteriorating situation, Qaddafi's decision to agree to a simultaneous withdrawal of French and Libyan forces makes sense, quite apart from the fact that it happens to coincide with the announcement of a treaty of unity between Morocco and Libya.

Keeping track of the various dissensions and *regroupements* within and outside the GUNT is a confusing if not

COMPOSITION OF CHAD'S POLITICAL PARTIES & FACTIONS (As of October 15, 1984)

PRESIDENT HISSÈNE HABRÉ'S UNIR PARTY

Affiliated Group	Leader
Frolinat-FAN	Hissène Habré
Frolinat-Originel	Abba Siddick
Assembly for Unity and Democracy in Chad (RDUT)	Djidingar Dono Ngardoum
National Democratic and Popular Assembly (RNDP)	Kassiré Koumakoye
Democratic Movement of Chad (MDT)	Ngarina Mbaibikel

Partial Adhesions

Eighty-four members of the Popular Party of Chad-African Democratic Assembly (PPT-RDA); led by Antoine Moussa Yamarke.
A group of dissidents from Facho Balaam's National Democratic Union (UND); unknown number of members, led by Magloire Kim Broum and Oumar Lamana.

GOUKOUNI OUEDEI'S GUNT

Affiliated Group	Leader
Popular Armed Forces (FAP)	Goukouni Oueddei
Chadian Armed Forces (FAT)	Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué
Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)	Rakhis Manani; replaced Acheikh Ibn Oumar
First Army	Mahamat Abba Said
National Democratic Union (UND)	Iré Kertoumar; replaced Facho Balaam
Western Armed Forces (FAO)	Angonod Sani Maina; replaced Moussa Medela

ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FORCES (RFP)

Affiliated Group	Leader
National Democratic Union (UND)	Facho Balaam
Western Armed Forces (FAO)	Moussa Medela
Frolinat Fondamental	Hadjero Senoussi
Frolinat Originel	Abdelkader Yacine; replaced Abba Siddick
Frolinat Volcan	Adoum Dana

UNAFFILIATED GROUPS

Coordination and Action Committee (CAC): Paris-based. Leaders: Mahamat Senoussi Khatir, Ouchar Tourgoudi. Originally loyal to Acheikh Ibn Oumar and the CDR. Acheikh's own affiliation with the CAC is uncertain as yet.
Group of Chadian Patriots and Democrats (GPDT): Paris-based. Weakened by the recent defection of Ngangbet Kosnaye and Mamari Djimé.
Chadian Action for Unity and Socialism (ACTUS): Paris-based. Leader, Fidèle Mounzar. Attended founding conference of RFP in Ouagadougou but later disavowed all connection. Claims willingness to "work with all Chadian forces, including the government in Ndjamena."
Democratic Union for Peace (UDP): Paris-based. Also attended RFP conference but apparently left before conclusion of meeting.

pointless exercise. What is reasonably clear is that these divisions are in large part a reflection of profound disagreements over the perceived utility and ultimate implications of the Libyan connection. For many of the dissidents within the GUNT, what began as a Libyan-sponsored rescue operation quickly turned into a full-fledged annexation.

That the Libyans came to be seen with growing distaste by much of the northern population is clear from the reports conveyed by GUNT defectors. Equally well-established is that earlier this year serious violence threatened to break out between Goukouni's men and their Libyan guests and was only

avoided through Goukouni's personal intervention. Tensions between Libyans and Chadians steadily mounted throughout the year, to the point where a serious split began to emerge between the pro- and anti-Libyan factions within the GUNT.

To counter this trend, on August 7th Goukouni Oueddei invited the GUNT's four principal factions to meet in Sebha. Goukouni reaffirmed his commitment to his Libyan patron and organized a National Liberation Council (CNL) that would presumably serve as a supreme decision-making organ. The participants in the Sebha meeting were, in addition to Goukouni's FAP, Acheikh Ibn

tense buying and selling going on in the huge market surrounding the King Faisal mosque, in the ceaseless coming and going of traders and entrepreneurs across the Chari, in the emergence of commercial links with Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, and last, but not least, in the record cotton crop (165,000 tons) produced in the south. The brand-new Cotontchad building in Ndjamena—easily mistaken for Conrad Hilton's latest creation—stands as a triumphant symbol of the south's contribution to the nation's economic recovery.

Seen in the light of the anarchic conditions inherited from previous regimes, Habré's track record is indeed impressive. The least that can be said is that he has negotiated his return with consummate skill, and not by force alone. For one, a genuine effort has been made to provide the foundations of a renovated state. The party, the government, and the security forces are the critical elements around which the new polity is being constructed. Though none have yet been thoroughly institutionalized, they all are designed with the realization of national unity as their main objective.

The creation of a new party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR), in June, following a national congress of Frolinat-FAN, is perhaps the most ambitious of Habré's recent initiatives. [Author's note: Frolinat-FAN refers to Habré's Armed Forces of the North (FAN), originally known as Frolinat's Second Army. Until the creation of UNIR, FAN retained its formal affiliation to the National Liberation Front of Chad (Frolinat), the politico-military organization created in 1966 by the late Ibrahim Abatcha to overthrow the regime of President Ngarta Tombalbaye. Ironically, Tombalbaye was not overthrown by Frolinat, but by a southern-instigated military coup in April 1975, led by Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué, head of the gendarmerie.]

UNIR's declared objective is to provide the basis for the political integration of all Chadian factions, including those currently in rebellion. The pre-existing politico-military organizations not allied with Goukouni—including Frolinat-FAN and its executive organ, the Command Council of FAN (CCFAN), as well as Djidingar Dono Ngardoum's Assembly for

Democracy and Unity in Chad (RDUT), Kassiré Koumakoye's National Democratic and Popular Assembly (RNDP), and Ngarina Mbaibikel's Democratic Movement of Chad (MDT)—have been formally dissolved and integrated into UNIR.

Ultimately, the party is expected "to ensure the exercise of power for the people and by the people," "to pave the way for a socialist path to development," and "to recover by all possible means the occupied territories." Party congresses will be held every four years. Extraordinary congresses, however, may be called at the request of the President, of two-thirds of the members of the central committee, or of a majority of the regional committees.

The central committee, consisting of 80 members, is to act as the party's supreme executive organ, yet the real power is vested in a 15-member political bureau headed by Habré. Next to Habré, the most influential figure in the political bureau is the executive secretary, Gouara Lassou, a Moundang from Mayo-Kebbi, who also holds the portfolio of foreign affairs in the cabinet.

Whether UNIR will live up to the promise of its acronym is anybody's guess. For the time being, the party remains an embryonic institution. Its roots have not penetrated into the rural sectors. Its relationships with local govern-

ment institutions are not fully clarified, although the assumption is that it will operate side by side with the prefects and under-prefects in a parallel hierarchy. But its mission is clearly to provide a broad framework within which the various sectors of Chadian society will be able to make their voices heard and participate in the decision-making process.

Significantly, both the central committee and the political bureau include a substantial number of southerners, several of whom were named to important posts in the major cabinet reshuffle of late July, exactly one month after the creation of UNIR.

Of a total of 20 ministerial seats, 10 have been handed to southerners, including Gouara Lassou, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fatimé Kimto, Minister of Social Affairs and Women's Advancement. Of the ten secretaries of state, five are southerners, among them Yorongar Le Moiban, the secretary of state for general inspection and state control. A substantial number of middle-ranking civil service posts are now occupied by southerners, and this is also true of parastatal organizations.

Another leading politician from the south, Djidingar Dono Ngardoum, was named Habré's only minister of state. Although formally in charge of agriculture and rural development, Djidingar is perhaps better known as Habré's "man"



FAN troops seize Libyan propaganda office in eastern Chad: "Libya was the main source of our disagreements"

Oumar's CDR, Mahamat Abba Said's First Army, and Kamougué's FAT.

But in Ouagadougou on August 11th, the remaining anti-Libyan factions of GUNT responded to the Sebha meeting with a counter-move designed to formalize their disaccord with Goukouni and lay the foundation for a separate movement, the Assembly of Patriotic Forces (RFP). Included in the RFP are Facho Balaam's National Democratic Union (UND), Moussa Medela's Western Armed Forces (FAO), Hadjero Senoussi's Frolinat Fondamental, Adoum Dana's Frolinat Volcan, and a dissident wing of Frolinat Originel led by Abdelkader Yacine. As head of the RFP, Facho Balaam has his work cut out for him. Given his erratic personality, the suspicion with which he is regarded as a result of his brief flirtation with the French Communist Party, and the extreme weakness of the four factions which make up the RFP, one wonders how much weight his initiative will carry beyond further weakening the GUNT.

With the news of Acheikh Ibn Oumar's defection on August 27, Goukouni's CNL suffered an even more devastating blow. Acheikh broke with Goukouni when he learned that Goukouni had excluded him from the new GUNT cabinet; Goukouni replaced Acheikh as defense minister with the number-two man in the CDR, Rakhis Manani. Furthermore, only a few days before, on August 22, seven key members of the CDR—including Ouchar Tourgoudi, GUNT's former minister of information, and the prominent Mahamat Senoussi Khatir—had publicly dis-

avowed Goukouni and his Libyan connection. This massive defection meant that Acheikh was left with an extremely fragile power base within the CDR: he had no choice but to join the defectors.

With the CDR now split between the Rakhis Manani (pro-GUNT) and Acheikh (anti-GUNT) factions, its future is very much in doubt; but there can be little question that Acheikh's departure from the GUNT will weaken Goukouni's military capabilities as well as his bargaining strength if and when the occasion arises for a negotiated settlement with the Ndjamenan authorities.

As the Libyan pull-out gets underway, one can expect yet another reshuffling of the cards, with each faction casting about for a fall-back position within or outside the Habré government. Which of the new anti-GUNT factions will return to Ndjamenan, on what terms, and with what consequences for the future, is anybody's guess. Equally unclear is Habré's willingness and ability to negotiate their entry into his government on terms that would be mutually acceptable. Another critical unknown is the policing and administration of the north after the departure of the Libyans.

Can Habré afford to redeploy his troops to the north as long as conditions of chronic insecurity persist in the south? How much responsibility can safely be entrusted to former GUNT fighters to police the area? What kind of *modus vivendi* can be achieved with the administrative and military cadres installed by Goukouni? And, last but not least, what will be Goukouni's next

move? One can only speculate, but if Habré's record in dealing with southern insurgents is any index, there is reason to assume that compromise and accommodation will be used, even if it means antagonizing some of the hard-liners within his government.

In the fluid universe of factions, the concepts of friend and foe have no absolute meaning. The present conjuncture offers attractive possibilities for a policy of "recuperation"—as well as some risks. For if former enemies can be converted into friends, the reverse is also true. No compromise is ever final; no settlement is ever reached that does not contain within itself the seeds of renewed disputes. Under these conditions, the task of reconstructing the Chadian polity appears singularly demanding and subject to contingencies that simply cannot be anticipated.

The most critical of such imponderables is Libya's future role in the Chadian imbroglio. This is not to deny the significance of the diplomatic breakthrough achieved through the Franco-Libyan accords, but only to suggest that the Libyan factor will remain as crucial—and unpredictable—in the future as it has been in the past in shaping Chad's destiny.

This is clearly not the end of the Chadian crisis, but at best, to paraphrase Churchill, the beginning of the end. Perhaps the most one can hope for in the immediate future is that Habré will take full advantage of what few resources he has to further professionalize and beef up his own armed forces, while fashioning a reasonably efficient corps of civil servants. Admittedly much remains to be done on each count, but his record so far is by no means negligible. Only if one remembers the utter chaos he has inherited from 18 years of civil strife can one fully appreciate the extent of his achievements.

Habré is the only of Chad's leaders who managed to give credibility to a policy of national integration. No other leader has gone to such lengths in stitching together a genuinely representative coalition, in opening the civil service and government to his former enemies, and in giving a semblance of reality to his nationalist aspirations. This is no small feat. May friends and foes alike give him the credit he deserves. □



A. Keller/Sygnma

Training of northern members of the presidential guard: Habré's FAN is overwhelmingly recruited from among northerners

A Sketch of Hissène Habré

Born in 1942 in the northern oasis town of Faya-Largeau, into the Annakaza clan of the Daza-speaking "Toubou," Hissène Habré occupies a central role in the history of the Chadian civil war. As a key personality in Frolinat (National Front for the Liberation of Chad) and commander-in-chief of Frolinat's second army [later renamed Armed Forces of the North (FAN)], he had countless opportunities to demonstrate his political acumen and superb skill as a guerrilla fighter.

Before joining Frolinat in 1971, he served as sub-prefect in Mao and Moussoro, until he decided to request a leave ostensibly to complete his education in Paris. His active involvement in the insurgency against the regime of the late Ngarta Tombalbaye began in July 1971.

He first attracted international attention in 1974, when he engineered the kidnapping of *Françoise Claustre*, wife of the head of the French-sponsored *Mission de Réforme Administrative* (MRA), in the course of a raid on the northern oasis of Bardai. Although the Claustre affair was, in his own words, "a matter of secondary importance" compared to the intractable problems posed by Libya's involvement in the internal affairs of Frolinat, it nevertheless gave him instant publicity in the international press as well as the advantage of a substantial ransom.

From 1971 to 1982, Habré utilized the full measure of his political astuteness and military talent, never losing sight of the strategic advantage to be gained from a timely compromise. After the fall of the Tombalbaye regime in 1975, he proceeded to consolidate his position on the battlefield against both his external and internal enemies and eventually surfaced as prime minister during Félix Malloum's short-lived presidency (August 1978-March 1979).

In March 1979, sensing that the time was ripe for a kill, he turned against Malloum. Led by Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué—the head of the *gendarmérie* who had engineered the coup against Tombalbaye in 1975—Malloum's army quickly caved in during the first battle of Ndjamená. Less than a year later, Habré moved against his former ally and *compagnon d'armes*, Goukouni Oueddei, now backed by Libya. Following the Libyan invasion of Ndjamená in December 1980 and the routing of the FAN by Qaddafi's Islamic Legion, Habré fled to Sudan, where he began to plan his next move.

By December 1981, after recruiting a new phalanx of combatants and having secured enough arms, ammuni-

tion, and vehicles from Egypt and Sudan, he felt sufficiently confident to launch a series of daring military raids into eastern Chad. After a six-month campaign and at least four decisive engagements against the armed forces of Goukouni's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT)—at Goz, Kotoró-Falata, Ati, and Massaguet—Habré's FAN victoriously walked into Ndjamená in June 1982.

The next round in a seemingly endless story of armed confrontations occurred in the summer of 1983, when violence exploded in three consecutive engagements over the oasis town of Faya-Largeau, pitting Habré's FAN against the forces of Goukouni's GUNT. From June 24 to August 10, the town changed hands three times, and when, on August 10, Libyan artillery and air bombardment delivered it back into Goukouni's hands, a new chapter had begun in Chad's turbulent history.

Belatedly yielding to domestic and international pressures, and despite Habré's insistence that nothing short of an offensive operation against Faya could effectively neutralize the Libyan threat, Mitterrand finally responded by mounting Operation Manta ("Stingray"), France's largest military intervention in Africa since the Algerian war.

Although Habré privately admits that a quick, surgical strike of the kind advocated at the time by the Reagan administration was the only sensible option, he also knows that he had no alternative but to accept France's terms in dealing with the Libyans. Meanwhile his long-term objectives are clear: as he told this writer, "We shall never accept partition, and never tolerate the annexation of our national territory by Libya or any other power."

There is little in Habré's composure to suggest a lack of *sang froid* and lucidity in coping with the intractable dilemmas that he has inherited along with the presidency—except his chain-smoking. As he sits with his visitor and talks about his past as a "rebel" and his present responsibilities as head of state, the impression one gets is of a man of considerable intellectual honesty and integrity, endowed with enormous moral and physical courage. He is above all a nationalist, proud of being Chadian and uncompromising in his determination to build a nation-state. No other African head of state has shown a greater capacity for political and physical survival; few others are faced with heavier odds as they seek to translate their political vision into reality.

—René Lemarchand

Hissène Habré

President of Chad

INTERVIEWED BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND

Africa Report: With the creation of the National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR), a decisive move has been made in the direction of national integration, but will the party live up to the promise of its acronym? As a grass-roots organization, how is UNIR expected to function?

Habré: UNIR, as you know, reflects the decision of the recently held congress of the Frolinat-FAN to create a unified political framework. Within it, all tendencies are represented. It will extend not only to the prefectures, but to the cantons, the administrative districts, and even the villages. The villages will elect their own party representatives, who will then elect their representatives in each canton, and so on from the ground up. The popular committees of FAN (COPOFAN) will give way to a new structure of representation entirely centered upon the party. We want the rural masses to participate actively in the affairs of UNIR. But this cannot be achieved overnight.

Africa Report: Are the prefects and canton officials intended to act as heads of the party at their respective levels?

Habré: No, not necessarily. The party and the administration will form parallel structures, operating side by side.

Africa Report: It is often said that your initial involvement in Frolinat politics is traceable to a "divide and rule" operation engineered by Tombalbaye, that you were sent to Tripoli by Tombalbaye to drive a wedge within the leadership of the Frolinat. Is there any truth to this assertion?

Habré: I have heard that story before. It is pure fabrication. This is an absolutely groundless accusation. I went to Libya for the first time in July 1971 from Paris. I had already been in contact with the rebellion. In Tripoli, I met Abba Siddick and Goukouni, and we began to plan our next moves. I returned to Paris shortly thereafter and flew back to Tripoli in September 1971 to organize the rebellion on the ground. I was expelled by the Libyan authorities in December 1971. I went to Cairo and Lagos, and for a while, toyed with the idea of re-entering Chad via Niger. But then I managed to get a false passport and with an appropriate disguise, made my way back into Libya via Rome. This was in May 1972. There I made contact with Goukouni, who was under house arrest and lived with his

father some 30 kilometers away from Tripoli. Fifteen days later, during which I never saw the sun, Goukouni and I left for Sebha incognito. In Sebha, we bought three camels and started our march into the Tibesti. It took us 21 days. Once we got to our destination, we began organizing our combatants. To claim that I acted as Tombalbaye's emissary is nonsense.

Africa Report: What lies at the root of your quarrel with Goukouni?

Habré: It's a long story. Libya was the main source of our disagreements. One must go back to 1973. As you know, it was in 1973 that Libya occupied the Aouzou strip, probably with the approval of Tombalbaye. Then in 1976, the Libyans moved further south to Oumchi. It was at Oumchi that the FAN engaged the Libyans for the first time, in May or June 1976. We routed two Libyan sections from Aouzou and took about 20 prisoners and their vehicles. Then, in retaliation, dozens of Chadians in Libya were arrested. So we in the FAN got together at Yibi-Bou and we began to discuss what we should do, whether to exchange prisoners with the Libyans or to hang tough. Goukouni pressed for an exchange of prisoners. Later on, at the Gouro congress, when we sat down to examine Malloum's offer of a cease-fire and negotiated settlement and eventually refused to comply with Malloum's terms, Goukouni again advocated an entente with Libya so that we wouldn't have to fight on two fronts. It was at the Gouro congress in September 1976 that we reached a decisive break.

Africa Report: Your reputation as a uniquely skilled guerrilla fighter is solidly established. Surely you didn't learn the art of desert warfare in books.

Habré: Well, I did read a number of books on guerrilla warfare during my student days. I read the works of Giap, Mao, Che Guevara, and Clausewitz too. But of course I received my basic training as a child when growing up in the Tibesti. Among my people, we learn how to fight at a very early age. I was no exception.

Africa Report: What were the toughest battles you fought during the 1982 campaign?

Habré: The battles of Goz, Kotoro-Falata, and Massaguet.

Kotoro-Falata was the toughest by far of all the battles we fought. Just think, we were 350 against 1,200. I repeat, 350 against 1,200!

Africa Report: Were your opponents at Kotoro-Falata primarily CDR?

Habré: Oh no, they were a mixed group. CDR, GUNT, FAP, they were all there. And we were outgunned and outnumbered. We were lucky enough to have picked up some rather sophisticated weapons from the Libyans after they left. But even so, Kotoro-Falata was a very serious engagement. We suffered heavy losses. Gouara Lassou played a very important role in this engagement. Others too.

Africa Report: Gouara Lassou and Idriss Deby are said to be the very best of your unit commanders. Anyone else?

Habré: The best of my commanders was Ahmed al-Rassoud. He was killed last summer at Ounianga. He was a truly outstanding fighter and military strategist.

Africa Report: There has been a lot of talk recently about a possible reconciliation conference to be held in Brazzaville. What are the prospects?

Habré: I am willing to negotiate. I am willing to go to Brazzaville if necessary. But there have been many unfortunate precedents. I am not going to go to Brazzaville just to go there. If it is to bear fruit, such a conference must be taken seriously, and that means that it must be prepared carefully. As long as the Libyans keep interfering in Chadian politics, there is little hope that such a conference can succeed.

Africa Report: Is there any particular message you may want to convey to the American people through this interview?

Habré: The American people know very little about Chad. My wish is that you might shed some light on our problems, our history. The United States must recognize the significance of Chad. Geographically, geopolitically, Chad is very important on the map of Africa. Economically, too. But we are currently going through a very difficult phase because of the drought. We are very grateful to the Americans for their economic aid. The drought has had disastrous consequences for our economy. In many areas, people are starving. Providing relief to the drought-stricken areas is extremely costly. This is where America can help. We have a long way to go. There are tremendous problems ahead, not the least being the Libyan problem. But we have hope! □



Patrice Habians-Syagma

President Hissène Habré: "I am willing to negotiate"

Facing a Future Without Bourguiba

Tunisia has had nearly three decades of stable government and economic progress under President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba. But the unresolved issue of who will succeed the aging president leaves Tunisia's future course uncertain.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

Tunisia, the smallest and least endowed in natural resources among North African countries, is also the most vulnerable one in the Maghreb. Wedged between its more powerful neighbors, Libya and Algeria, Tunisia is now more than ever faced with its own internal political crisis. Not only must a replacement be found for 81-year-old President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba, but a new social consensus must be worked out to help insure Tunisia's stability in a region marked by shifting alliances. This task will be particularly delicate for President Bourguiba's successor, as most of the 7 million Tunisians—60 percent of them born since independence in 1956—expect a new deal, including greater democratic freedom and a more equitable sharing of the country's wealth.

January's riots, triggered by the doubling of the price of bread and other cereal products, shook the Tunisian regime to its foundations and jolted the political elite into an awareness of the fragility of power. It also clearly revealed that the Tunisian leaders were

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out of touch with the country's political temperature.

More worrisome, however, was the infighting that ensued among the barons of the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD), which unveiled another chapter in the struggle to control the nation's political destiny in the post-Bourguiba period. Although calm was quickly restored to Tunis and other major towns after the *Combattant Suprême* rescinded the price hike and Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali seemingly strengthened his position to the detriment of other PSD factions, the situation continues to boil slowly below the surface, as none of the fundamental problems affecting Tunisia's evolution toward a modern political entity have been resolved.

President Bourguiba has been the best guarantor of political stability. But his unwillingness to relinquish power has virtually blocked the political system, creating increasingly explosive pressures. In turn, intrigues surrounding the Presidential Palace in Carthage, a Tunis suburb, regularly transform social or regional tensions into political earthquakes that threaten the very existence of the regime.

In January 1978, a working class uprising, known as "Black Thursday," left

scores dead, hundreds injured, and thousands in prison. The origins of this upsurge of violence were the attempt by the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the most powerful trade union in Africa, to set itself up as an alternative to the ossified PSD, as well as the longstanding rivalry between UGTT leader Habib Achour and the Tunisian president.

January 1980 was marred by the Gafsa incident: a group of dissidents, then thought to have been Libyan-inspired, but now known to have had Algerian connections, attacked the southern mining town of Gafsa. The ensuing confusion strikingly exposed an alarming lack of preparedness and equipment in the Tunisian armed forces. Another ominous sign was the fact that Tunisians for the first time took up arms against the government and sought to spark off a popular uprising in a traditionally underprivileged region.

Beyond the façade of cosmopolitanism and a limited multi-party system, Tunisia's power structure functions in many ways like an Oriental court. President Bourguiba is the focal point of all decision-making, despite his increasing distance from everyday affairs over the years. Access to the president's office is the key to influence. Prime Minister

Mzali, the official dauphin, is obviously best-placed for the succession process. But he is countered by the powerful first lady, Wassila Bourguiba, and her allies in PSD circles. The aging head of state has his sentimental favorite, Mohammed Sayah, former PSD director and recently named Minister of Equipment and Housing, after a short eclipse as ambassador to Italy.

Unstable alliances, based on personal and regional factors, make life at the top a difficult task. Over the past 20 years, many senior PSD barons have found themselves cast into the political wilderness overnight. Most of the opposition forces, both recognized and unofficial, are led by ex-PSD politicians. The opening up of the political arena since Prime Minister Mzali came to power in 1980 has further complicated this alliance system, which is no longer just limited to internal PSD considerations. The rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces, principally in the form of the banned Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), is an important factor which will also undoubtedly influence the course of events in the coming years.

That such a flourishing political culture exists in Tunisia—though much of it is still in its incipient stages—is in many ways a positive achievement of the Bourguiba years. Having forged unity around the nationalist stance of the then Neo-Destour Party, Bourguiba obtained independence from France in 1956, avoiding the war and bloodshed that characterized the Algerian struggle. Bourguiba's nationalism and his modern secular approach to nation-building were the hallmarks of the first 15 years of Tunisian independence. The party remained a forum where real issues were thrashed out. But in 1969, with the sacking of economic overlord Ahmed Ben Salah and the reversal of his pragmatic socialist experiment, the Tunisian political system began to be affected by a hardening of the arteries.

Nonetheless, Bourguiba's heritage remains remarkable in numerous ways. For one, women have achieved a degree of emancipation second to none in North Africa, occupying jobs beyond the reach of their sisters in Morocco or Libya, although much remains to be accomplished. There is also a nonchalant *joie de vivre* in Tunisia which is the envy

of neighbors in puritanical Algeria and Libya. Tunisia, more open to ideas and modern realities than Algiers or Tripoli, sometimes gives the distorted picture of being the capital of a relatively developed country.

On the economic front too, Tunisia has made considerable progress. In 1982, it boasted the fourth highest per capita income in Africa—\$1,200. This record is all the more notable considering that it has been achieved with meager natural wealth: a modest amount of phosphates, a trickle of petroleum, little fertile land, and limited water resources. Tunisia's hard-working people and their ingenuity have also been basic elements in the country's relative prosperity over the last 25 years. Tunisia has managed to capture a greater share of the value of some of its natural resources by transforming them into finished products like phosphoric acid and solid fertilizers, two end products of raw phosphate rock.


Liberal economic policies have lured foreign capital from the West and the Middle East to help finance a fledgling industrial sector. Tunisia has also opened its doors to Arab banking and international finance through the establishment of an "offshore" banking center. Taking advantage of its sand, sun, and sea, Tu-

nisia has built a large tourist industry, its second largest earner of foreign currency.

The country's economy, nevertheless, remains extremely fragile. Tunisia's largest source of revenue, the oil industry, has reached a peak production of around 5.5 million tons, of which about half is exported. Unless new discoveries replace the rapidly depleting older fields and domestic consumption of petroleum products is curbed, Tunisia is likely to become a net oil importer by the end of the decade. This could pose potentially serious problems for Tunisia; only its oil export earnings keep the balance of payments at a manageable level.

A new wave of exploration activity, both onshore and offshore, was initiated in the early 1980s with American oil companies playing a central role. While initial expectations have not been realized, prospecting efforts continue. Tunisia may not possess the hydrocarbon potential of Algeria or Libya, but industry sources in Tunis believe that the country's subsoil has yet to yield all its secrets.

A major drawback for the economy is the weakness of the agricultural sector. Although a third of the population is engaged in rural pursuits, agriculture ac-



'Bloody Thursday,' January 1978: "Bourguiba's unwillingness to relinquish power has blocked the political system, creating increasingly explosive pressures"

Richard Mellou/Sygnia

counts for only 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and less than 7 percent of export earnings. The rural sector has been the "poor relation" of the Tunisian economy since independence, relatively neglected compared with the coastal region which has benefited from the growth of industry, services, and government employment. Leaving the hinterland so destitute has engendered serious social problems. Rural poverty has accelerated the exodus of young people to the shanty towns around the capital and other major urban centers, creating an ideal spawning ground for Islamic fundamentalists.

A World Bank report on Tunisian agriculture noted that in 1979, 14.6 percent of the rural population lived below the level of absolute poverty. It is true, however, that only the northern third of the country can count on sufficient rainfall. Once virtually self-sufficient agriculturally, Tunisia's agricultural trade balance in 1983 was in the red by about \$250 million, a sum equal to some 30 percent of the overall balance of payments deficit. And traditional Tunisian agricultural exports to Western Europe, such as olive oil, citrus fruits, and wine, are menaced by the eventual entry of Spain and Portugal into the Common Market.

For the nascent manufacturing sector, growing protectionism in European markets has severely curtailed the industrial export drive. Many European manufacturers, for example, who set up shop in Tunisia with the hope of exporting their finished textile products to France, West Germany, and Scandinavia, have been forced to wind down their activities. An active import-substitution sector has gradually emerged for electrical appliances, foodstuffs, textiles, and automobiles. Currently, eight major automobile and engineering companies have assembly plants in the country, but most are plagued by their diminutive size, restricting their economic viability. Plans to export automobiles and tractors to the rest of the Maghreb and even to the Middle East have failed to come to full fruition. The government has made an effort to attract American firms, but only two are present, General Motors and Standard Brands, an agro-industrial firm.

The government is counting on the

manufacturing sector to absorb a growing share of Tunisia's increasingly well-educated work force. With unemployment and underemployment affecting close to 20 percent of the population—and this with 500,000 Tunisians living and working in Western Europe and in other Arab states—the government has pledged to create some 300,000 new jobs in the non-agricultural sector during the sixth five-year development plan (1982-86). Most observers of the Tunisian economy do not expect this goal to be attained.

The system's seeming inability to absorb a segment of the population into the productive cycle and rural poverty have widened the gap between rich and poor. The top 20 percent of the Tunisian

"Tunisia's power structure functions in many ways like an oriental court."

population absorbs around 50 percent of the country's wealth, with the bottom 20 percent getting a slim 5 percent. Tunisia's expanding \$800 million balance of payments deficit and 22 percent debt service ratio in 1983 are likely to pose a serious dilemma for the government during the next few years.

Prime Minister Mzali has virtually taken control of the economic sector during the past year, since the ousting of Minister of Planning Mansour Moalla and Minister of Economic Affairs Azouz Lasram. He has named faithfuls to senior economic posts as well as to key spots in the banking system and the parastatals. Although an intellectual and Arabic scholar, the Tunisian premier is not reputed for his economic and financial acumen, which could prove to be his Achilles Heel. It was Mzali, for instance, who, against the advice of most economists and numerous ministers, pushed through the doubling of the price of bread and other cereal products, touching off last January's riots.

As previously mentioned, social crises in Tunisia are usually convenient occasions for the political elite to settle its score; the bread riots were no exception. The prime loser in the latest round

of infighting was former Minister of the Interior Driss Guiga, usually associated with Madame Bourguiba's clan. A commission of inquiry charged him with failing to enforce law and order during the rioting, thereby plotting to unseat Prime Minister Mzali and set himself up as the institutional successor. Guiga, presently in exile in London, was sentenced *in absentia* to 10 years of hard labor. Since the beginning of the year, Guiga has maintained a low profile, responding in a measured tone during interviews with the Western and Arab press. Trials in the wake of the January riots led to other heavy sentences, including 10 death sentences which President Bourguiba commuted to life imprisonment.

Prime Minister Mzali's authority is also buttressed by his growing control over the state security forces. American-trained General Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali, who headed the security forces during the 1978 trade union unrest, is in charge of security at the Ministry of the Interior. The growing links between the security apparatus and the army could have important consequences for the future. The armed forces were called on to restore order in 1978, 1980, and 1984.

Although the army has traditionally been apolitical, its increasing use as a repressive force by a regime whose authority is in jeopardy could create an ominous precedent. If the post-Bourguiba era is characterized by political disorder, the armed forces could be tempted to set themselves up as the sole guarantor of national unity. Senior officers are generally considered moderate and pro-Western, but radical Arab nationalism tinged with an Islamic credo is known to exist in the junior ranks.

The United States, especially under the Reagan administration, is paying special attention to the Tunisian armed forces through an armament modernization and training program designed to bolster the country's defense capability. During the 1960s and 70s, the U.S. provided almost five times more for development in Tunisia than for the military: between 1962 and 1979, Tunisia received a total of \$130 million in U.S. military assistance—an average of \$8 million a year, but \$605 million in economic and food aid—an average of \$38 million. Between 1978 and 1981, Tun-

sia began a modest program of military purchases averaging \$18.8 million annually.

Under Reagan, however, the situation has changed radically: Security assistance took a leap forward, while development assistance is being phased out in favor of American private sector participation in development efforts. During a May 1982 visit to Washington, Prime Minister Mzali signed a \$85 million loan for the acquisition of F-5E fighters, M-60 tanks, and anti-aircraft weaponry. This was part and parcel of a more ambitious program which could cost Tunisia around \$1 billion in defense spending during the next few years. The visit of General Vernon Walters, President Reagan's troubleshooter, at the beginning of 1984, followed by a second trip last summer, reflected American concerns for Tunisia's security.

Some observers see American interests in Tunisia as part of both the U.S.' attempt to build a *cordon sanitaire* around Libya's mercurial Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and its hope of using Tunisia's strategically placed air and naval bases in the event of crisis in the Middle East. The Tunisian army, even with new American and French weapons, is no match for Libyan forces, but, as certain observers stress, it can now play a more efficient role of internal repression.

France, the former colonial power, is also directly concerned with Tunisia's evolution. Tunisia is viewed by the Mitterrand administration as a key element in peace and stability in North Africa and the Mediterranean. President Mitterrand has paid a state visit to Tunisia and French economic aid has been increased. Cultural links have been strengthened by the financing of a French-language television station. The Elysée has not neglected the security question either, sending several military assistance teams to train Tunisians on modern French equipment. The French are also pushing for a liberalization of the political scene, pressing for the legalization of several parties that are still out of the official political spectrum.

Tunisia has always been supportive of Maghrebian cooperation, but a number of these attempts have fallen short. The most spectacular was the abortive union with Libya in 1974. Relations with Trip-

oli have been problematic ever since, with occasional crises leading to the temporary cooling of diplomatic relations. Algeria under late President Houari Boumediene was not considered a friend of Tunisia. Under President Chadli Benjedid, however, relations have warmed up, culminating in a 1983 tri-partite cooperation agreement which also includes Mauritania. Tunisia has tried to avoid giving this accord an anti-Libyan flavor, but in Tripoli, it is regarded as an Algerian attempt to check Libya's North African ambitions. The recent agreement between Libya and Morocco was partly designed to counter the rapprochement between Algiers and Tunis.

government and any future trouble must be directly attributed to his policies and judgment. Within the PSD, opposition to the prime minister has not yet been disarmed, nor has a certain public resentment in the aftermath of the bread riots. Prime Minister Mzali, who has tried to play the liberalization card, will have to push forward in this direction in order to consolidate his hold on political machinery. He is expected to seek the legalization of other opposition parties, including the MTI Islamic fundamentalist movement, as a means of blunting extremism outside the established political system.

In any case, the country's political institutions have been outdistanced dur-



Libyan Col. Qaddafi and Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali: "Tunisia has tried to avoid giving an anti-Libyan flavor to its accord with Algeria and Mauritania"

On the eve of 1985, Tunisia's latent succession crisis, with its regional and international consequences, remains as sharp as ever. Although Prime Minister Mzali may have significantly reinforced his power and authority, his position, paradoxically, could be more vulnerable than in the past. He now has control over all the sensitive portfolios in the

ing the past few years by the rapid pace of economic and social change and the rising expectations of the people. As one intellectual in Tunis is fond of saying: "Bourguiba's successor, whoever he is, won't be able to govern the country as the *Combattant Suprême* did, and finding a new formula won't be an easy task." □

Mubarak's Ambiguous Mandate

Lacking the charisma of his predecessors, President Hosni Mubarak must balance Egypt's conflicting political and social forces in an effort to assert his leadership.

BY GEOFFREY ARONSON

Egypt today is a nation struggling with the legacy of its history and geography. Egypt's relationship with the West, which began with the Napoleonic invasion in 1798, remains at the center of political debate. The revolution in Egyptian life sparked by the harnessing of the Nile has forever changed patterns of social and economic life. The transformation of this ancient society, however, is not yet complete, and Egypt is still struggling to assimilate the changes its revolution has wrought.

Claiming kinship with the West, but insistent upon maintaining its distance from it, Arab yet intensely Egyptian, bound by the rhythm of tradition yet compelled to revolutionize social and economic relations, Egypt symbolizes the challenges facing the Third World. Only 32 years have passed since Nasser and his Free Officers removed the Pashas from political power. Britain's occupying army would leave soon thereafter, freeing Egypt for the first time in centuries from the hegemony of alien power.

But the transition to political independence has not been an easy one. Without stable institutions to legitimize politi-

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"Three years after coming to power, President Hosni Mubarak continues to rule in Sadat's shadow"

cal power, Egypt's modern leaders, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, have been compelled to mobilize selective constituencies in order to protect their claim to rule. Nasser crushed Muslim extremists and broke the power of the royal and landed aris-

toocracy. Through his creation, the Arab Socialist Union, he cultivated the loyalty of the government and military bureaucracy. Land reform won the masses of *fellahin* to his flag.

Sadat, acceding to the presidency upon Nasser's death in 1970, sought to revise this coalition, if only to establish an independent political foundation to secure his rule. He crushed a left-wing bid for power and eased Nasser's socialism and the omnipresent power of the state. Whereas Nasser had suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), Sadat built mosques and encouraged the revival of religious orthodoxy, particularly among the youth.

His "open door" policy, created in the wake of the October 1973 war, liberalized the national economy as well as the rules governing foreign investment. A new wealthy class was created, tied to the political realignment with the U.S. Sadat's assassination in 1981 at the hands of disgruntled soldiers claiming inspiration from Islam exposed his failure to match Nasser's legacy.

Three years after coming to power, President Hosni Mubarak continues to rule in Sadat's shadow. He must assimilate, yet transcend the antagonistic legacies of his predecessors if he hopes to leave his mark on Egypt's history as they have. By most accounts, Mubarak had no burning ambition to rule. In his

first speech to Parliament he declared, "God knows I never dreamed of this job."

A professional military man, Mubarak rose to lead the Egyptian Air Force. His technical and managerial skills drew the attention of Sadat, who, in 1976, appointed him vice president. Egyptians and foreigners alike, without doubting Mubarak's abilities, saw him as little more than a good soldier whose best attribute was his desire not to challenge Sadat's leadership. Sadat, during his tenure as number two, had suffered a similar image problem.

Yet unlike Sadat or Nasser, Mubarak lacks the flair for the dramatic which enabled his predecessors to mobilize domestic and international support for their rule. He has sought to ease internal tensions with sober talk. "Don't expect miracles from me," he declares. "I have no magic wands." Mubarak's style is not of the spontaneous sort that propelled Sadat to visit Jerusalem or Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. His pace is slower and more methodical, perhaps reflecting his technical training.

Since assuming power, he has moved slowly but deliberately to heal the divisions rending Egyptian society, which were so painfully exposed during Sadat's arrest of over 1,000 opponents in the month before his death. Well-wishers and opponents alike, however, are impatient for progress. "There is a great deal of frustration," said an Egyptian who served under Sadat.

Mubarak is struggling with a dilemma. He is alone at the pinnacle of power, without natural or dependable allies. He is not a Free Officer, and can only indirectly claim the legacy of those who vanquished imperial rule. He presides over a ruling party, the National Democratic Party, that is not his own. His legitimacy stems from Sadat—an ambiguous mandate—but to survive politically he has distanced himself from the excesses which so alienated Sadat from the Egyptian people. Mubarak has chosen merely to refine Sadat's policies in the name of stability. In so doing, he is ignoring the dictum by which his predecessors ruled: The elimination of competing sources of power is the only avenue to retaining power.

Mubarak sees a direct correlation between the growth of extremist groups,

Muslim and otherwise, and their use of terror, and the growing wealth of the ruling elite. He is counting upon the political opposition to defuse such tensions and to curb the power of Sadat's still-powerful political and economic allies. The reappearance of a truly free press and the reconstitution of political parties are the most important components of this strategy.

Through the opposition and the press, Mubarak can strike, albeit indirectly, at corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, while defusing tensions which have accumulated from decades of repressive rule. According to Mohammad Sid Achmed, a left-wing intellectual, such actions "permit Mubarak

"The most potent and explosive challenge to Mubarak's rule is likely to come from another quarter—the street."

to consolidate his authority by the reciprocal neutralization of the two constitutive factors of Egyptian political life [the press and political parties]—neither of which he has yet completely mastered."

Sadat's Law of Shame and the Law of National Emergency, declared after Sadat's assassination and renewed annually since then, are frequent targets of criticism. Constitutional questions are also the source of animated debate and an effective, if indirect, means of criticizing the status quo. Mubarak has tolerated such demands for reform—by opponents who have yet to attack Mubarak himself. "His legitimacy is not questioned," explained Marius Deeb, a professor at Georgetown University who follows Egyptian politics closely.

A striking example of Mubarak's strategy of reform and stability is the resurgent popularity of the New Wafd—the reincarnation of the pre-revolutionary Wafd (delegation) Party which dominated Egyptian politics and was the voice of Egyptian nationalism from its inception in 1919 to its dissolution under Nasser.

The Wafd was banned again soon after Sadat announced the formation of a

multi-party system in 1976. He declared their values "incompatible with the attainments of 1952," and described the party's septuagenarian leader, Fuad Serrageddin, as the "Louis XVI of Egypt." Serrageddin was one of many opposition figures rounded up in the wave of arrests in September 1981.

True to its origins, the Wafd remains, first and foremost, an Egyptian nationalist party. It claims kinship with Arab nationalism, but is moderate in its allegiance to Arabism. It advocates non-alignment, in what Georgetown's Deeb describes as "the Saudi Arabian" sense of the term, supporting for example, the recent agreement on exchanging ambassadors with the Soviet Union. The unresolved issue of Taba—an area of the Israeli-occupied Sinai claimed by Egypt—is a point of great discomfort, and not only to the Wafd. Like many Egyptians, the Wafd retains doubts about the wisdom of Sadat's rapprochement with Israel, but it would not contemplate any action which might threaten Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. The PLO and its embattled chairman, Yasser Arafat, are supported without reservation.

Looking south to Africa and west to the Maghreb, the Wafd approves of Mubarak's support for Sudan's Nimeiry, the Habré government in Chad, and OAU resolutions concerning the Western Sahara. Since its electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd appears more tolerant of moves such as Nimeiry's imposition of Islamic law. That compromise, however, has harmed the Wafd's standing in the influential Copt community.

The alliance between the Wafd and the Ikhwan brings together antagonists who struggled bitterly against one another in the last years of King Farouk's rule. The Ikhwan, whose rehabilitation after Nasser's death was first encouraged and then repressed by Sadat, appears, by its cooperation with the Wafd, to have indicated its willingness to abandon a strategy of extra-parliamentary mobilization and terror. The Ikhwan, believes Deeb, have been tamed. "They want to work within the system. They stand for God and property. Politically they are not anti-Western, although culturally. . . yes." This latter concern is shared by more and more

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Egyptians, who have agitated, with great success, for a reduction in the Western imports they find most culturally offensive.

In the May 27 elections for Egypt's People's Assembly, the Wafd-Ikhwan list, alone among the opposition parties, exceeded the 8 percent minimum vote required for representation in the 458-seat body. Before the elections, there was great anticipation among Wafd candidates that Egyptians would return them in force to parliamentary life. There were estimates that they would secure as many as 50 percent of the seats—in a fair election. Only 57 Wafd-Ikhwan deputies representing 15 percent of the vote were in fact elected, fewer than opposition successes in the two previous parliaments.

There were, predictably, accusations of election rigging—not a new charge in a country where the president routinely wins more than 99 percent of the vote. The ruling National Democratic Party won 391 seats with 73 percent of the vote. The former opposition party created by Sadat, the Socialist Labor Party, won 7 percent; the left-wing Unionist Progressives 4 percent; and the right-wing Liberals 1 percent. Interestingly, only 42 percent of Egyptian voters went to the polls, evidence perhaps of a lingering distrust in what all too often has been an occasion for an orchestrated demonstration of the regime's popularity.

The low turnout and the exclusion of most opposition parties by virtue of their failure to win the 8 percent minimum vote indicate that parliament is not yet the forum for real political debate. What the opposition hoped would give its agenda a new lease on political life failed to materialize. Within the ruling party, as many as 30-40 percent of the MPs are new, and one would assume, pro-Mubarak. The NDP remains, however, Sadat's creation. "He [Mubarak] is all alone," commented a former Sadat appointee.

Regardless of the election results, Mubarak must contend with the increasing popularity of the Wafd, while he attempts to manipulate it to his own ends. The party, banished to political oblivion for close to three decades and unknown to 75 percent of the 47 million

Egyptians born after 1952, is now the focus of hopes for democratically instituted reform.

Accounting for the Wafd's strong revival, Sid Achmed has written, "If the Wafd has survived a 'blackout' of the last 30 years, it is because it remains in the collective memory as the trustee of a certain tradition of patriotic struggle, of respect for the constitution, of civil rights, of popular participation in political life, of the values of toleration and liberalism that the military was largely able to repudiate in the years after 1952." These characteristics are dear to the middle class, whose desire for stability Mubarak is trying to cultivate. Such a strategy is not without its risks, however, for Mubarak is the product of the very system which he is hoping to reform.

The most potent and explosive challenge to Mubarak's rule is more likely to come from another quarter—the street. On September 30, riot police battled stone-throwing demonstrators who were described by officials as "known radical leftists" in the industrial town of Kafr el-Dawwar near the port city of Alexandria. A number of protesters were killed in demonstrations against price increases for bread and flour and demands for higher worker contributions to pension plans.

In 1952, the new Free Officer regime was similarly challenged by workers in Kafr el-Dawwar. The regime suppressed the strike, issuing a warning "particularly to the working class," that instigators would be punished for high treason in the future. Mubarak's response was less strong-willed. After battling the workers, he acquiesced to their demands, restoring prices to their previous levels.

The masses of unemployed and marginally employed urban workers have proven to be a greater challenge to the stability of the Egyptian regime than the political opposition. In January 1952, the mass riots of "Black Saturday" marked the beginning of the end for the *ancien regime*. In January 1977, across-the-board reductions in government subsidies on foodstuffs—part of a package of reforms demanded by the IMF—sparked an urban revolt which rocked the Sadat regime, exposing the failure of

the "open door" as a remedy for the ills of the urban poor. Sadat quickly backed off, but his political vulnerability was dramatically exposed.

Mubarak has thus inherited a situation which has bedeviled not only his predecessors, but also other nations with an underemployed urban population, as disturbances this year in Tunisia and Morocco have demonstrated. Short of unskilled labor at the turn of the century, Egypt today suffers from a labor glut. Its population is expanding at the rate of 2.8 percent, too great for the economy to absorb. The dislocations caused by the expanding population and the transformation of traditional agriculture have yet to be offset by increases in the commercial and industrial sectors of the urban economy, and the prospects for such development are less than promising.

This has not stopped the Egyptian *fellahin* from leaving the countryside en masse for Egypt's cities and towns, where there is at least the hope for a change for the better. Today close to half of Egypt's 47 million people live in urban areas, compared with 23 percent in 1937. Over half of an urban workforce of 7 million is employed in the public sector.

To survive, Egypt's leaders must feed the poor while placating the bureaucrats. Political stability has been bought with ever-increasing food subsidies, and a public sector which employs 35-40 percent of a labor force of 12 million. Yet without the introduction of market forces into an economy which functions largely without reference to world prices, the prospects for the sustained development needed to break out of Egypt's dilemma are bleak.

Last year, Egypt earned \$2.5 billion from the sale of petroleum. Production is running at 840,000 barrels per day and within a few years should reach 1 million. Depressed world prices and an annual increase in domestic consumption from 12 to 15 percent of production suggest, however, that revenues from this source have peaked. Some experts have estimated that because of rising domestic demand, Egypt's exportable oil could disappear altogether by the 1990s.

Arms sales are Egypt's second most

remunerative export industry, earning almost \$500 million annually. Egypt, like Brazil, Greece, and Argentina, is well-placed to exploit local markets for weapons. Egypt's own rearmament costs will reach an estimated \$30 billion by 1990. Not surprisingly, it is anxious to develop co-production agreements with Western manufacturers.

Tolls from the Suez Canal are a vital source of foreign currency. This year's receipts are expected to top \$1 billion. Cotton exports, once the leading foreign exchange earner, are valued at \$350 million per year, or two-thirds of all foreign agricultural sales.

nity" of the Middle East, providing workers to many other Arab economies. Remittances have helped with the balance of payments and fueled a construction boom in the chronically inadequate housing market.

The larger picture is not as rosy. Remittances barely cover the government's bill for subsidizing energy and oil consumption. Oil revenues equal the cost of food subsidies. Such expenditures created a budget deficit of \$6 billion in FY 1983's \$16 billion budget. Debt service on an external debt of \$22 billion absorbs more than 30 percent of current earnings. The U.S. is Egypt's



Mary Ann Fackelman/The White House

Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Ronald Reagan: "The U.S. gives more aid to Egypt than to any other country, with the exception of Israel"

The revenues from these sectors are matched by remittances from the three million Egyptians working outside the country. Last year, \$3.5 billion was sent home by construction workers in Iraq and school teachers in Saudi Arabia. Today, Egypt is described by one U.S. economist as "the bedroom commu-

largest creditor, with \$8 billion in outstanding loans, most of which, however, are long-term and offered at concessional rates.

An IMF survey in 1983 observed that Egypt "could probably sustain a further increase in external indebtedness." The U.S. embassy in Cairo is not so san-

guine. In a report issued by the Commerce Department in August, the embassy warned, "A serious domestic/international financial crisis could result because of fundamental structural difficulties in the Egyptian economy."

The U.S. gives more aid to Egypt than to any other country in the world, with the exception of Israel. The \$2 billion annual appropriation is split about evenly between economic and military assistance. The French, British, and Japanese contribute an additional \$750 million, a large portion of which is earmarked for food imports.

cultural land is being lost to urbanization at the rate of 40,000 acres annually. Consumption, fueled by population growth and changing dietary habits, is growing at 5 percent annually while production increases are stagnating at a rate of 2 percent. Agriculture is starved for investment capital, and state-supported disincentives to production, such as producer prices below world market value, discourage expansion.

The public sector absorbs 90 percent of all investment, but it is responsible for only 70 percent of production. Industrial production has increased by more than


The "open door" inaugurated in 1974 was designed to bring in large amounts of foreign capital and increase the private sector's share of the national pie. Indeed, Egypt has much to attract foreign investors. It has a strong market base, relative political stability, an educated workforce, and is strategically placed at the crossroads of three continents.

Foreign capital, however, never materialized, and the private sector has not made a significant dent in industrial production. Many companies have examined the Egyptian market, and having seen the bureaucratic bottlenecks and the unreliability of Egyptian statistics, left with their money in their pockets. Over 60 percent of private investment since 1974 has been domestically generated. U.S. direct investment amounts to only \$61 million.

However good the government's intentions, it has done little more than tinker at the margins of the system. Energy and agricultural prices are to be increased over a number of years to a level equivalent to the world market price. Investment incentives are being reoriented to encourage what Mubarak describes as "productive investments" in agricultural development, food processing, garment manufactures, and cement. Mubarak has warned of "terrible famine, unemployment, and terrorism" if family planning is postponed.

Projects to increase the supply of electricity are on stream and are of particular importance in light of a projected 300 percent increase in demand by the year 2000. Egyptians are disappointed, however, that the U.S. Export-Import Bank has refused to finance the construction of a turnkey nuclear plant at El Dabaa. Urban infrastructure is being rehabilitated. U.S. AID is contributing to the modernization of Cairo's sewer and water system. Seventy-thousand new telephones are being installed in Cairo as part of a multi-billion dollar modernization program.

Egypt and its allies are only too aware of the problems the country faces. The road to solving them, however, begins with difficult political decisions. The regime of Hosni Mubarak must summon the political will and mobilize the necessary managerial talent to affect the needed changes. □



Ray Wilim/World Bank

"Tolls from the Suez Canal are a vital source of foreign currency"

In 1970, Egypt imported only 20 percent of its food needs, whereas today it buys over 50 percent in foreign markets, at an annual cost to the government of \$4.5 billion. The causes for this turn-around are numerous. Prime agri-

10 percent annually, but five of 12 public sector metal and chemical companies are not competitive because of government subsidies on their raw material and energy inputs. Industrial exports have actually decreased in the last decade.

Maghreb Policy in Disarray

The Treaty of Oujda caught the Reagan administration off guard. New alliances in the region could significantly alter American policy options and hamper administration efforts to contain Libyan influence.

BY ROBERT A. MANNING AND
JENNIFER NOYON

American policy in the Maghreb spans two poles—political and strategic support for Morocco at one end, and isolation and containment of Libya at the other. Thus, it is not surprising that the recent Moroccan-Libyan unity pact signed in Oujda, Morocco, on August 13, has left an embarrassed Reagan administration with its policy in disarray.

Considered an Arab moderate, King Hassan II, Morocco's monarch, is a key American ally in the Maghreb. Since 1982, Morocco has been part of the "strategic consensus" former Secretary of State Alexander Haig sought to forge to gain U.S. access to military bases in the region. But Hassan conducted the negotiations with Libya in haste and secrecy, without notifying Washington beforehand. In fact, the American ambassador to Morocco, Joseph V. Reed, who prides himself on his access to and ostentatious support for King Hassan, was vacationing in Maine in late July and early August when the pact was being negotiated. Reed learned about the treaty only when King Hassan phoned to reassure him the day before it was signed.

Unlike Colonel Qaddafi's previous efforts to forge pan-Arab unity with

Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Sudan, the idea for this federation came from King Hassan. In an August speech, Hassan recounted that Qaddafi had sent him a message complaining about the lack of Arab unity. The King told the Libyan envoy who delivered the message, "Let us construct a federation between Libya and Morocco." Officially entitled the "Treaty of Arab-African Federation," the document's preamble discusses the dangers facing the Arab world, "as a result of the policy of violence and aggression which the Zionists have been practicing," and describes the pact as laying the foundation for a greater Maghreb union.

Under its provisions, the two leaders will share the federation presidency. A general secretariat will rotate on a biannual basis between the two countries. While the treaty respects the sovereignty of each state, it provides for a number of joint institutions, including an assembly, a court, and political, military, economic, technical, and cultural councils with cabinet-like functions.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the pact for the Reagan administration are two articles that deal with defense. Although not spelled out in detail, they call for safeguarding each nation's independence, and in what appears to be a mutual defense provision, article 12 states: "Any aggression against one of the two states constitutes an aggression toward the other."

Like Hassan's alliance with the

United States, the treaty is rooted in the complex web of North African politics, and particularly in Morocco's efforts to outflank its rival, Algeria, with which it has territorial disputes as well as a major conflict over the Western Sahara. Aside from obtaining Libyan support for Morocco's position with regard to the Western Sahara, the prospect of financial reward also motivated Hassan. The pact was also a reaction to an Algerian-led entente signed in 1983 with Tunisia and Mauritania.

Some U.S. officials view the prospect of two rival blocs in the Maghreb as a recipe for regional instability. The U.S.' immediate response to the Libyan-Moroccan agreement came in a State Department statement that said, "The Libyan record for international mischief-making stands for all to see. We have seen no evidence that Qaddafi is seriously trying to moderate his behavior and we would be concerned about any steps which would serve to legitimize his position in any way." Administration officials were particularly disturbed at the timing of the pact, coming when Qaddafi was in an unusually weak position, facing both economic and political difficulties at home, including a May coup attempt.

The administration sent its troubleshooter, ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters, to North Africa in early September, where he held lengthy discussions with King Hassan. The King dispatched his senior adviser, Reda

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Guedira, to Washington to assure the Reagan administration that Morocco was not embarking on an anti-American course. At the same time, Senator Daniel Moynihan called the treaty "a diplomatic defeat for the United States of very large proportions." Moynihan added that the Libyan-Moroccan pact was "of very large significance to the stability of North Africa and the Middle East," explaining that it "calls into question the very premises of American policy toward the region."

Despite the fact that the agreement took the U.S. by surprise, the rapprochement between Libya and Morocco had actually begun in June 1983. At the time, President Hissène Habré had asked Morocco to send troops to Chad as it had done twice in Zaire. Instead, Hassan struck a bargain with Qaddafi: Libya would stop funding and arming Polisario in exchange for Morocco's acceptance of Libya's role in Chad and its refusal of Habré's request. Hassan viewed the Libyan-Moroccan treaty as an important new element of support for Morocco's position in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), hoping that Libyan money and influence could counter the pro-Polisario majority.

Beyond its traditional friendship with Morocco, the administration has tended to view North Africa in East-West terms, backing "moderates" such as King Hassan and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, while regarding Libya as a source of regional instability. While the U.S. has a substantial economic relationship with Algeria, political ties have been no more than proper, perhaps because of memories of Algeria's radical posture as a sanctuary for airline hijackers and the Black Panthers, and as an ardent backer of liberation movements in Africa.

The U.S. has not been directly involved in the Saharan conflict. It has remained officially neutral and supportive of a peaceful OAU solution, but at the same time, has quietly tilted toward Morocco. This posture was dramatized in the early days of the Reagan administration when, despite Algeria's instrumental role in negotiating an end to the Iranian hostage crisis, then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced the approval of the sale of M-60 tanks to Mo-

rocco. The 1982 agreement establishing a U.S.-Moroccan military commission and providing the Rapid Deployment Force with access to Moroccan military facilities served to reinforce the East-West component in American policy.

Since Morocco annexed the former Spanish Sahara in 1975, the war launched by Polisario guerrillas based in Algeria has become increasingly burdensome. Although popular as a nationalist issue, the war is costing Morocco an estimated \$1 million a day, and military spending is now consuming 40 percent of its budget. With Morocco's \$11 billion foreign debt, Algeria has felt that time is on its side and that Morocco cannot indefinitely sustain the war effort.

"U.S. officials and outside analysts view the Libyan-Moroccan pact as a marriage of convenience likely to be short-lived."

Until 1979, the U.S. sold no weapons to Algeria, and none to Morocco that could be used in the Sahara. However, in the face of growing Polisario military successes in 1978-79, the Carter administration, after intense deliberations, altered its stance and got approval from Congress for a \$232 million arms package for Morocco that included six OV-10s, 24 Hughes helicopters, and 20 F-5E fighter planes equipped with Maverick missiles. But Congress passed a provision linking continued arms sales to Morocco's willingness to seek a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.

Under the Reagan administration, American policy toward the Maghreb has shifted significantly. Morocco's willingness to participate in Haig's anti-Soviet "strategic consensus," combined with administration antipathy toward Libya, has expanded the East-West dimension of American policy toward the region. This trend was underscored when Polisario obtained, via Libya, Soviet-made SA-6 ground-to-air missiles in 1981 with which it shot down at least two Moroccan planes.

While Morocco's policies toward the U.S. have been motivated by its own

interests rather than by hostility toward Libya, a substantial confluence of interests permitted Morocco to strengthen its ties to the U.S. as the Reagan administration was increasing its support for friendly regimes in the region. Overall American aid to Morocco increased substantially after 1981, and has been running at about \$140 million a year. Military aid peaked at \$103 million in 1983 and has since been about \$50 million a year.

The fact that the agreement regarding U.S. access to the military bases has never been made public demonstrates the limits of U.S.-Moroccan cooperation. The agreement reportedly involves U.S. upgrading of the Sidi Sliman and Mohammed V airbases, but the circumstances under which the U.S. would have access to the bases are not clear. Former Moroccan Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta has said that they would never be used against another Arab country.

At the same time, Congress has placed limits on American support for Morocco, prohibiting American advisers from operating in the Western Sahara. The Reagan administration has never publicly endorsed Rabat's claims to the disputed territory. Instead, the U.S. has continued to state that only negotiations in a regional context could resolve the problem. Even supporters of Morocco in Congress and the administration are concerned that the war may be unwinnable and that the cost to the economy may undermine Hassan's stability. The financial and political limits of U.S. support for Morocco have undoubtedly been a factor in King Hassan's own regional initiatives, the most recent of which led to the unity pact with Libya.

Libya was a trouble spot for the U.S. well before President Reagan took office. A month after the Iranians took over the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979, a Libyan mob burned the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, and the U.S. withdrew its representation from Tripoli in May 1980. At the time, the U.S. was receiving 40 percent of Libyan oil exports—15 percent of U.S. oil imports. The Reagan administration singled out Qaddafi as one of the major sources of international terrorism and

lawlessness, publicly denounced him, applied economic pressures, and strongly supported friendly nations threatened by Libya.

As Libya intervened in Chad, the Reagan administration sought to decrease oil imports, which it saw as financing massive imports of Soviet weapons, and to pressure U.S. companies to stop doing business with Libya. In May 1981, following reports that Libyan hit squads were threatening Libyan dissidents in the U.S., the administration closed down the Libyan "People's Bureau" (embassy) in Washington. The U.S. reportedly considered a plan to overthrow Qaddafi, but abandoned it when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak refused to go along.

Libya's claim to a 200-mile territorial waters zone led to a direct confrontation with the U.S. in August 1981, when fighters from the Sixth Fleet shot down two Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sirte, further heightening tensions. By December, the administration had asked all Americans to leave Libya and claimed to have evidence of a Libyan "hit squad" seeking to assassinate President Reagan. By mid-1982, the oil glut had reduced Libyan exports to the U.S. to 1 percent of U.S. imports (20 percent of Libyan oil exports), and the administration placed a total embargo on oil from Libya.

In February 1983, the U.S. sent AWACs to Egypt in response to Sudanese claims of a Libyan threat, a move which Secretary of State George Shultz described as an effort to "put Qaddafi back in his box where he belongs." But Qaddafi popped out of his box to continue his intervention in Chad, and a Libyan jet bombed Omdurman, Sudan, in late 1983.

King Hassan claims that the unity pact will have a moderating effect on Qaddafi. The combination of political and economic strains plus failed adventurism seems to have facilitated European diplomatic overtures to Libya. In addition, a secret trip to the region by French President Mitterrand and other diplomatic contacts shortly after the Ouja pact was signed led to an agreement between France and Libya to withdraw their forces from Chad. King Hassan claims credit for this development, but

U.S. officials say there is no direct connection.

U.S. officials and outside analysts view the Libyan-Moroccan pact as a marriage of convenience likely to be short-lived. King Hassan's immediate objective was probably the November 12 OAU meeting in Addis Ababa. Last year, Polisario was persuaded not to attend, as Morocco threatened to walk out. Polisario, with increased political support despite serious military setbacks, is likely to claim its membership this time around. It is unclear how much support there would be for a Moroccan boycott.

Barring the collapse of its economy, Morocco could hold on to the Sahara. It

"Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the pact for the Reagan administration are two articles that deal with defense."

has recently succeeded, after some of the heaviest fighting in the eight-year war, to build fortified walls in the northern portion of the Western Sahara which borders on Morocco proper, and around the Saharan port of El-Ayoun. By the same token, neither Polisario nor its Algerian backers are likely to cease their efforts. The likelihood of an OAU-sponsored referendum on the Western Sahara—which both sides have agreed to in principle—whose verdict is accepted by both sides is also highly unlikely.

The Algerian initiative that led to the tripartite unity accord last year was an effort by Algerian President Chadli Benjedid to construct a face-saving way out of the Saharan conflict for King Hassan, by bringing Morocco and an independent Western Sahara into a Greater Maghreb. The first Algerian-Moroccan summit since the Western Sahara war began in 1975 was held in February 1983. The pact signed between Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia amounts to a mutual security agreement. With a well-regarded army, Algeria is providing at least tacit security guarantees against any efforts by Qaddafi to intervene in Tunisia, which will face a difficult suc-

cession after the aging President Habib Bourguiba dies.

A clause in the agreement states that the pact "remains open to other states of the Arab Maghreb which accept its provisions." Although Mauritania joined last December, it is unlikely that either Morocco or Libya will follow. Chadli sought to tempt King Hassan with offers of economic cooperation, such as supplying Algerian natural gas at concessional rates, running a pipeline through Morocco to Spain, and developing iron deposits near the Moroccan border.

The U.S. has not played any significant role in this regional diplomacy. A \$6 billion trade relationship with Algeria and some \$3 billion in public and private loans to the country have not translated into any political leverage in either direction. The administration has maintained cordial ties with Algiers, and has sold the government C-130 cargo planes. But ironically, U.S. economic ties to Algeria dwarf those with Morocco, which also has a major economic relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the largest Soviet project in the Third World—a \$1 billion phosphate plant—is in Morocco.

With a stalemate in the Western Sahara and now two rival political blocs in the region, the Reagan administration is still assessing the implications of the Libyan-Moroccan pact. Secretary of State Shultz has said that the U.S. wants assurances from Morocco that its goods and military supplies will not fall into Libyan hands. The U.S. is also concerned about intelligence-sharing between the two new allies. Morocco hosts a new Voice of America broadcast facility, and U.S. ships—including nuclear submarines—dock in Moroccan ports.

The impact of the accord on Congress is difficult to assess. The agreement was consummated as the 98th Congress was preparing to recess and did not receive full scrutiny. "In a way," said one Washington analyst, "Hassan was lucky in his timing. There was a flutter of disapproval which might not hurt him at all in the end." Many in Congress do not share the administration's penchant for demonizing Qaddafi, viewing it as counter-productive. Morocco's behavior may generate cynicism

on Capitol Hill about Rabat's value to Washington. U.S. officials are reserving final judgment until they have a chance to monitor the pact's implementation and assess whether it may have secret riders.

As a result of this heightened concern, an inter-agency review examining U.S. policy toward Morocco and the region has been initiated and the pact may well affect future U.S. interests vis-à-vis the monarchy. In 1983, when Congress reprogrammed aid destined for Morocco to El Salvador, King Hassan canceled Moroccan participation in planned "Bright Star" military exercises.

There is little sense of what direction the review process will recommend. But with the presidential elections, the inauguration, and the appointment of new personnel to manage the policy, it is unlikely that any substantive decisions will be made before early 1985. In the meantime, as one U.S. official put it, the administration hopes that the union "will be about as short-lived as possible so that the U.S. and Morocco will be in concert again in containing Qaddafi."

Another problem for the administration has been U.S. private sector activity in Libya. American construction and engineering firms have played a major role in planning a huge water pipeline project in Libya that may ultimately cost as much as \$27 billion. Such moves, combined with a new posture toward Libya taken by Morocco and other Maghreb countries, as well as by Western Europe, underscore the limits to the steps the U.S. can take against Qaddafi.

Some American officials feel that relations with Algeria should be improved. Under President Chadli Benjedid, Algeria has pursued more Western-oriented economic policies, and has bolstered ties with France and other industrialized nations. There may be room for improved commercial and military ties. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture John Block visited Algeria earlier this year, and U.S. officials say Algeria is also open to military cooperation such as the IMET or foreign military sales programs. The stance the U.S. adopts toward Algeria is likely to depend on the policy review recommendations on the Western Sahara. A tilt toward Algeria is

highly unlikely, but the administration could adopt a policy of stricter neutrality with regard to the Sahara war.

The Libyan-Moroccan pact was clearly a setback for U.S. policy in North Africa and it has left many unanswered questions. Morocco says there has been no change in its foreign policy, and that the union does not compromise its independence. The pact clearly implies

that the U.S. could not use Moroccan facilities against Libya in the event of future confrontation, and it is unclear if they could be used in other conflicts in Africa or the Middle East. The administration may have to reassess its anti-Libyan position in light of these developments, or King Hassan could be forced to choose between friendship with the U.S. and Libya. □

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Books

Exploring a Desert War

Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1983, 367 pages and appendix, bibliography and index.

Tony Hodges, *Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara*, Metuchen, N.J., and London: Scarecrow Press, 1982, 369 pages and bibliography.

Ever since the Madrid Agreements of November 14, 1975, the epitome of a *décolonisation manquée*, the Western Sahara has been the scene of a seemingly endless desert war between Morocco's Royal Armed Forces and the Algerian-backed Polisario. It is the focal point of a major inter-African conflict and a central issue in the geopolitical calculations of American policy-makers. Moroccan irredentism, though based on flimsy historical grounds, has given the monarchy a new lease on life. Yet ultimately, the human and financial costs of the war (\$1 million a day) may well deal a fatal blow to Hassan's throne, American props notwithstanding.

There is no better entree into the labyrinth of Western Saharan politics than the two works under review. Together they provide the richest source of information available in English on the origins of Saharawi nationalism, its tortuous course through the vagaries of Spanish decolonization, its complex relationships with the Algerian and Mauritanian sanctuaries, and its armed struggle against Moroccan territorial claims.

Of all the *African Historical Dictionaries* produced under the editorship of Jon Woronoff, Tony Hodges' contribution is among the very best. A mere glance at the entries reveals an encyclopedic knowledge of the personalities and events surrounding the Western Sahara crisis. His chronology offers an excellent preliminary survey of historical developments; and his remarkably extensive bibliography, covering some 700 French, Spanish, and English language sources, is the most thorough available anywhere, constituting an invaluable guide for further research. There is simply no better reference work on the Western Sahara than Hodges' dictionary.

His companion volume, *Western Sa-*

hara: The Roots of a Desert War, is likely to remain the definitive work on this little known war of attrition, whose ramifications, as the author repeatedly shows, go far beyond the boundaries of this contested stretch of desert land.

The story begins with a discussion of the precolonial history of the area and its tenuous links with Morocco's *bilad al-makhzen* ("government lands"). It unfolds, chapter by chapter, into the origins of the Spanish Sahara; the intricacies of early Saharawi resistance movements against both Spanish and French colonial rule; the subsequent threats posed to Saharawi independence by the rival claims of Greater Morocco and Greater Mauritania; the highly ambivalent, if not downright hypocritical response of the Spanish authorities; and their ultimate surrender to Moroccan and Mauritanian pressures. The birth of the *Frente Popular para la liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro*—in short, Polisario—in 1973 was more than a typical nationalist response to a dying colonialism; it was a desperate attempt to prevent Spain from striking a deal with Morocco and Mauritania at the expense of Saharawi nationalism. Hodges is at his best when discussing the evolving political fortunes of Polisario in the light of its complex and sharply contrasting relationships with the governments of Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. Among the conclusions that emerge from his narrative, the first and not the least controversial is that Saharawi nationalism is neither a myth nor the creation of external "sponsors," Libyan or Algerian. It is the product of identifiable cultural identities rooted in the precolonial past, nurtured by Spanish colonization and effectively mobilized by modern-day nationalists; that it happens to be largely associated with the predominance of Reguibat elements in no way lessens its reality.

Secondly, and despite the insistence of some "committed" historians to the contrary, Morocco's historical claims to the Western Sahara are extremely doubtful. Such indeed was the conclusion reached by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of October 16, 1975, which Moroccan authorities chose to ignore, along with a series of UN resolutions advocating a referendum under UN auspices. That King Hassan II of Morocco could remain so brazenly indifferent to interna-

tional public opinion and yet attract the sympathy and growing military support of Giscardian France and the United States is as much a tribute to his remarkable political skills as it is a commentary on the continuing importance of Morocco from the standpoint of French and American geopolitical interests.

The chances of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) becoming a reality depend to a considerable extent on the decisions made not just in Rabat, Nouakchott, or Algiers, but also in Washington. As the author points out, for U.S. policy-makers, the validity of the claims advanced by the SADR is immaterial. What counts is Morocco's continued willingness to provide transit facilities to the Rapid Deployment Force.

"Improving the ability of the Moroccan armed forces to carry out offensive counter-insurgency military activities in the Western Sahara" (p. 364), even at a cost of \$100 million for FY 1983, is a relatively modest concession to the Moroccan crown in return for its granting of transit facilities. Yet regardless of whether the SADR materializes otherwise than as a government in exile, the significance of the quid pro quo will not be forgotten by Saharawi nationalists.


Meanwhile, serious questions remain as to the wisdom of U.S. aid to Morocco. Hodges' assessment is worth quoting: "U.S. military aid served to prolong the war without much chance of altering its final outcome. Ironically, it seemed likely to worsen rather than relieve Hassan's predicament in the long run. It risked promoting the process of destabilization in Morocco that it was designed to halt" (p. 365).

Regardless of whether or not one agrees with his dismal diagnosis, the reader cannot fail to be impressed by the extensive evidence supplied by the author, his careful delineation of the external forces involved, and his keen sensitivity to the historical dimension of the crisis. His book is the best introduction to one of the most complex conflict situations anywhere on the continent. It deserves to be widely read not just by academics, but by policy-makers as well. If nothing else, at least some of the clarity of Hodges' style may eventually rub off on their memos.

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
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
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