European Management ]ournal Volume 7 No 3 0 European Management journal 1989 1SSN 0263-2373 $3.00 Meeting Mintzberg - and Thinking Again about Management Education John-Christopher Spender Professorof Business Policy University of Glasgow Business School Henry Mintzberg’s contribution to management theory is summarised as a classification of managerial decisionmaking which distinguishes between analysis and intuition. We are also taken through Mintzberg’s deeper and broader concerns with organisations and management education. Against a background of the development of management theory, particularly with its “cameralisf” (statistical and scientific) tradition, John-Christopher Spender sets out Mintzberg’s lessons for management educators. They are: recognising intuition and pursuing “all-round” knowledge, seeking an active organisational balance, and incorporating social and ethical issues in management. Introduction Henry Mintzberg is currently Samuel Bronfman Professor of Management at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He is a multilingual and much travelled man. He belongs to that small handful of management writers whose work is widely known and respected by academics and practising managers alike. In February he visited London, met with many people, consulted with the King’s Foundation and addressed the Strategic Planning Society. He also made time to join me for dinner in one of London’s many fine Indian restaurants. Over good food we renewed an acquaintanceship going back a decade, discussed what we and our colleagues had done since and talked about the many things scholarly and pedagogical that still seem important to us. That discussion, and the draft papers which Mintzberg sent later, set me thinking once again about his unique contribution and his place in the developing history of our discipline. In this paper 1 first summarise some of the more obvious aspects of Mintzberg’s work. His initial contribution is a classification of managerial work. I argue that this forces him to develop a new theory of organisations into which such a reconceptualisation of managerial work can be fitted. The convergence of these two theories of managerial activity and work content is enriched when he adopts the bi-camera1 neurophysiological view of Bogen and Ornstein. This forces a distinction between analysis and intuition and so helps Mintzberg articulate his previously implicit theory of managerial decision-making. With three interlinked theories; of process, activity and content, Mintzberg begins to surface his deeper concerns with the place and function of organisations in contemporary society and, by no means least, with management education. I argue that few of our contemporaries work with such a broad agenda, and that his doing so suggests Mintzberg may become one of the significant theorists of our time. Re-reading Mintzberg’s work revealed anew his radical agenda to change management education and, thereby, better serve practising managers and contain the damage being wrought by today’s educational orthodoxies. Management education has a long history and many critics, and Mintzberg’s criticisms need to be seen in a broader historical context than that afforded by Porter & McKibbin (1988) or the Handy Report (1987). To help me focus on this background I reviewed some longer-term aspects of the history of management education in France, Germany, the UK and the US. The underlying theoretical issues are revealed in the public and private correspondence between Mintzberg and Herbert Simon, the Nobel- MEETING prize-winning economist. Their interchanges over manv years, which mix mutual respect with profound criticism, help identify some of the central problems in organisation theory and management education. Simon’s work on administrative theory rests on a distinction between fact and value. History shows that this same distinction, in a variety of different forms, underpins most of our discipline. The distinction is also crucial to our idea of managers as professionals serving those who decide policy. Management has long struggled to establish itself as a profession, legitimated through service, founded on scientific knowledge and due its own specialised training. I argue that Mintzberg’s theories deny the fact/value distinction and are therefore irreconcilable with Simon’s position. these History shows that the struggle between positions is not new, indeed Mintzberg joins forces with some of organisation theory’s most influential thinkers. The possibility of resolving these issues is compounded by variations in management thought and teaching between nations. There has long been evidence that managers in the UK are less professional than those in the US or in the remainder of Europe. I argue that, in part, this is a consequence of the greater acceptance among US and Continental managers of the “scientific” approach that derives from the fact/value distinction. I conclude that Mintzberg’s thinking is closer to that of UK managers. Those who read him will probably find a sense of the practical realities of managing absent in much other North American work. However, Mintzberg faces a more radical possibility. As his influence increases in the US and on the Continent of Europe, he may find himself at the centre of a new attempt to revoiutionise management theory and teaching. Mintzberg’s Contribution During our dinner Mintzberg pointed to some irony in his presenting to the Strategic Planning Society since, for many of his readers, the “rational planning” mode of strategy-making is the principal butt for his critical arrows. Most business schools teach that strategic decision-making is a structured and logical process. It begins by clarifying the business’s target or mission. A careful evaluation of the business’s strengths and weaknesses is followed by an analysis of the environmental threats and opportunities. The decision-maker objectively evaluates the alternative courses of action. Against this mode, Mintzberg sets two other modes of strategy-making. First, there is the entrepreneurial or visionary mode in which the strategist creates and delivers the message which provides direction and generates commitment and MINTZBERG 255 cohesion. This mode pushes the process of analysis and decision-making into the background. It is a direct ad hominem approach to the entrepreneur whose decisions are intuitive and so beyond further analysis. Second, Mintzberg points to the adaptive or learning mode characterised by the familiar “muddling through” incrementalism proposed by Lindblom and by Quinn. Here the strategist, immersed in the detail of the organisation’s affairs and responses to environmental impulses, creates order by being a pattern and creates order by recogniser. He comprehends influencing the organisation’s responses to events. While the adaptive mode is reactive, the entrepreneurial mode is pro-active, searching out opportunities to mould and exploit the environmental situation. Though Mintzberg often criticises the rational-planning model, he actually gives it a permanent place in managerial thought as the appropriate way to deal with a particular subset of organisational problems. He suggests the two opposing modes complement rather than to oust rational analysis. He argues that whatever our concept of strategy-making, it must be rich enough to encompass all three modes. Mintzberg’s stubborn insistence on the need to consider the organisation’s emergent patterns as well as those created through rational planning is the hallmark of his work and that of the many he has now influenced. When I asked him what moved him to criticise the conventional view, and where he found the energy to sustain the struggle against such vastly greater resources, he gave me answers which suggested a wide range of concerns and, of course, many more interesting questions. I asked him whether he was outraged by “strategic planners” and their doings. During his presentation he told of the Allied plan for the attack at Passchendaele in the First World War. Quarter of a million British troops and many hundreds of thousands of others died in a four month mud/blood-bath, a tragic battle whose plan was made meaningless because the strategists had not considered the consequences of rain in such an ill-drained area. “The planning of Passchendaele was carried out in almost total ignorance of the conditions under which the battle had to be fought. No senior officer from the Operations Branch of the General Headquarters, it was claimed, ever set foot - or eye - on the battlefield during the four months that the battle was in progress. Daily reports on the conditions of the battlefield were first ignored, then ordered discontinued. Only after the battle did the Army chief of staff learn that he had been directing men to advance through a sea of mud” (Feld 1959:21). Outrage, Mintzberg told me, was wrong. Rather his struggle is with those “strategists”, whether military, political or business, who use systems, theories and analyses to distance themselves from the muddy practicalities, and the painful moral and emotional entailments, of the human realities for 256 JOHN-CHRISTOPHER SPENDER which they plan. He reserves his admiration for those who roll up their sleeves, get involved, search out facts, struggle for comprehension and think things through - even when they are wrong. For Mintzberg the manager is a creative and concerned person struggling for progress in a complex social, organisational and moral setting. This is no na’ive idealist talking. Mintzberg is an experienced administrative thinker and teacher whose many books and journal articles are among the most widely read, who has worked successfully with thousands of students and thousands of managers. He is a cultured and scholarly family man. He is aware of the majority of new research in his field. Yet he is still deeply critical of most of what passes as strategic theorising and analysis. Two years ago he decided to go even further and distance himself from his MBA teaching responsibilities at McGill. Now he has committed all his energies to developing his research, writing and teaching towards practising managers. What, almost a quarter of a century after his first papers, is this persistent critical thrust really about? How does it all fit in with his theoretical statements? The Nature of Managerial Work At the opening of his first book The Nature of Managerial Work (1973), Mintzberg tells how as a child he wondered what his father, then the president of a small manufacturing firm, did at the office. Eventually, as a doctoral student, he studied the work of five different CEOs very closely. He used intensive and structured observation methods, culminating in a week of close shadowing. His observations show that managerial work is actually quite different from the stereotypical decision-making of the rational planning model. Far from being mark.ed by a comprehensive and methodical analysis of data, Mintzberg finds his managers’ work characterised by brevity, variety, fragmentation and superficiality. He notes that managerial work contrasts with that of operatives, designers and salesmen. Their work is frequently repetitive, often involves long periods of concentration and is open to some degree of rationalisation. Managers actually spend little of their time reviewing data or doing other desk-work. They spend most of their time interacting verbally, in scheduled and unscheduled meetings or on the telephone. Far from concentrating on a specific issue, they work at a relentless pace, under a barrage of interruptions and seldom give more than 15 minutes to any single topic. The rational planning model sees the manager as the processing device, and focuses on his decisions, the inputs, outputs and decision processes. Mintzberg sees that this model, while having some value, is actually submerged under a totally different organisational process. He turns from the manager’s decision-making to the manager’s occupancy of the different roles which must be performed in the viable organisation. He concludes that CEOs occupy three distinct classes of role; interpersonal, informational and decisional. He further divides each class to make a categorisation scheme of ten different senior executive roles. The three informational roles are those of monitor, disseminator or spokesperson. The four decisional roles are those of entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, or negotiator. Though most managers have to be proficient in all of these twelve roles, Mintzberg goes on to suggest that managerial jobs fall into eight job types, each calling for the incumbent to adopt a particular dominant role. The most radical conciusion Mintzberg draws from this work is that the rational model cannot encompass the variety of the CEO’s roles; as a result there is no acceptable overall theory and: “ there is, as yet, no science in managerial work” (1973:132). He goes on to remark that: “ the management scientist, despite his accomplishments in the field of production and data processing, has done virtually nothing to help the manager manage. The reason is simple. Analytic procedures cannot be brought to bear on work processes that are not well understood. And we have understood little about managerial work. Hence management scientists have concentrated their efforts elsewhere in the organisation, where procedures were amenable to quantification and change” (1973:133). He writes: “ Today, managing remains an art, not a profession grounded in scientific discipline. This is so even though all managers appear to perform the same basic roles. To perform these roles, managers deal with nondocumented information that is difficult to transmit, and they use intuitive methods that are difficult to understand” (1973:160). This empirical work, and its respectful methodological commitment to anthropological observations of practising managers, are the foundations of Mintzberg’s theoretical position. Although, as he carefully tells in this book, he sees his work as merely another strand in a continuing programme of empirical research into managerial activity by Carlson, Stewart, Sayles, Guest and others, it is clear that Mintzberg has made by far the greatest impact on organisational theorising. Part of this is his considerable output. But there is also a difference of quality. More than that of any of these predecessors his work suggests an awareness of some relationship between his empirical conclusions and the longer run debates within management thought. He does not often speak about these directly, though his best-selling textbook with Quinn and James (hereafter called QMJ) clearly reflects their belief in the need for MEETING MINTZBERG a changed agenda (Quinn, Mintzberg &James, 1988). Ultimately, his defence against those who attack him as idiosyncratic, possibly even unscientific, must be his personal conviction that he is working at a more fundamental level than most of his contemporaries. He wants to deal with organisations and managers as they are, and with the social and human condition as it is, rather than with the statistical abstractions which characterise so much of what passes for management theorising. In addition to working at a deeper level than most, I would argue that Mintzberg also works on a broader canvas. Even in this first book, in addition to his attempt to advance theory, he takes a bold stand on what his results imply for managers, for their own selfmanagement and for management teachers (1973: 166). In short, in the spring of his academic career rather than in its autumn, he grasps that any significant contribution in the field of managerial thought must integrate a number of different facets before the work can become viable outside the specialist academic publisher’s list. He also sees that any theory powerful enough to impact managerial practice must be spelt out in many ways that flesh it out and illuminate its nature. It is at one and the same time a theory of the managerial process, a theory of organisational design, a theory of economic society, and a theory of management education. The qualitative thrust of Mintzberg’s work is clearly a reaction, possibly a throwback to his youth or a result of his disappointment with his early professional training, for his first discipline is quantitative. He is an MIT MBA whose first job was as an Operations Research specialist with Canadian National Railways. But he also shows his interest in modern science with his use of a physiological theory which suggests specialisation within the different hemispheres of the brain. Laboratory studies and neurosurgery currently suggest that, in the undamaged brain, the left side is predominantly logical while the right is largely intuitive. Yet Mintzto rehabilitate the Kantian berg’s real objective, dichotomy of two modes of thought, analysis and synthesis, is extremely conservative. Mintzberg needs this dichotomy as the platform from which to attack our uncritical acceptance of rational decision-making. He notes that in his later empirical researches, which asked managers about their decision-making, in only 18 out of the 83 choices did the managers make any mention of analysis. Typically the managers took in the facts, impressions and other data and “ intuited” a conclusion. For Mintzberg the important finding is that neither the managers, nor the literature of managerial decision-making, can explain how the process of managerial intuition works. Managers do not regard this as a failing, since they know about intuition from their own experience. But the manage- 257 ment decision theorists who are Mintzberg’s principal targets respond by denying intuition’s existence. The Kantian dichotomy between modes of thought enables Mintzberg to recast his data on executive activity in a new light, only fleetingly foreshadowed in his first book (1973:114). Not only do the executives’ activities differ functionally, in the classical theorists’ sense of the sales function being substantively different from the production function. He can now argue that these activities also differ in terms of the decision processes involved. Structure in Fives This fundamental criticism of classical management’s universal rationality completely destroys the basis of conventional organisation theory. Mintzberg is now forced to think through how organisations can be analysed and designed in the face of his new concept of managerial work. Doing this he creates a new language and a new set of models. He wants to encompass (i) the formality of classical structures, based on the flow of formal authority, (ii) the flow of informal communication and influence, and (iii) the flow of regulated productive activity as well as (iv) the shortterm project- and problem-oriented ad hoc groupings which are constantly emerging and disappearing in the organisational process. The result is the characteristic rail-section diagram which has become Mintzberg’s “ logo” . Its elements are the operating core and its immediate supervision, the middle line managers. The operations functions and the line managers are supported by an administrative staff and a technostructure. Bringing these four elements together are those, such as the CEOs, who occupy the strategic apex. The apex produces coherence and direction by direct supervision, along the lines of classical management theory, and by creating and manipulating the corporate ideology. Mintzberg’s analysis begins with the observation that every form of human organisation must deal with two fundamental and opposing features, the division of labour into the various tasks to be performed and their co-ordination into the actual activity to be accomplished. The methods of co-ordination fall into two classes; (i) market oriented, comprising the bases of output, client and place, and (ii) functional, comprising the bases of knowledge, skill, work process and function. Broadly speaking, he distinguishes coordination by ends from co-ordination by means (1983: 53). In the same way that Simon argues that administrative theory arises out of the need to cope with bounded rationality, Mintzberg argues that the task of designing and managing the organisation arises from the need to employ different methods of co-ordination 258 JOHN-CHRISTOPHER SPENDER in different parts of the organisation. There is no uniform approach that can be applied to the substantively different areas of production, planning, supporting and directing. Mintzberg argues that there are six basic mechanisms for co-ordination (QMJ:279). Four depend on the way the work is standardised. They are standardisations of the work process, of the work outputs, of the skills applied and of the work norms (by which he means the workers’ beliefs). In addition to these four, he sees co-ordination either through direct supervision and the exercise of power, or through mutual adjustment, in which case a group effectively manages itself. The different elements of his five-part rail-section model are distinguished by their appeal to these different methods of co-ordination which they then apply to the rest of the organisation. Thus the strategic apex co-ordinates through direct supervision. The technostructure co-ordinates through standardising the work of others. The line managers co-ordinate through standardising the organisation’s outputs. The support staff co-ordinate through mutual adjustment. The operating core standardises skills. Mintzberg’s approach to structural design is to show how these methods of co-ordination balance. He proposes a contingency theory relating the organisation’s age, size, complexity and environmental conditions to the resulting appropriate structure (1983:280). He sees five characteristic configurations; (i) an entrepreneurial-simple structure resulting from dominance of the strategic apex and their use of direct supervision, (ii) a machine-bureaucracy in which the technostructure dominates, (iii) a professional-complex bureaucracy in which the operating core dominantes, (iv) a diversified-divisionalised form in which the line management dominates, and (v) an innovativeintegrated ad hocracy in which the support staff dominate through processes of mutual adjustment. He argues that young organisations in simple environments are likely to choose the simple structure, while young organisations in complex and dynamic environments will be ad hocracies. Similarly, old organisations in stable environments will adopt the machinebureaucratic and divisionalised forms. Planning on the Left Side, Managing on the Right In The Nature of Managerial Work Mintzberg argues that much of management’s behaviour is characterised by a need to deal with poor quality data. This is especially true of CEOs who, as a result, have to use intuition rather than analysis to guide their decisions. This additional dimension of differentiation became more explicit after his publication of Planning on the Left Side atid Managing on the Right in the Harvard Business Review in 1976. In this paper, reprinted in QMJ, he explores the nature of specialisation in a more fundamental way, in terms of human capabilities rather than in terms of organisational requirements. It provides the nucleus of his theory of people as organisational participants. It leaves their motivations, whether they work for power, wealth, self-actualisation, or from necessity, unspecified. So, as for the classical theorists, Mintzberg’s people are decision-makers, but unlike the classicists who presumed only rational decisionmaking, Mintzberg’s people employ both reason and intuition. His paper begins by surreptitiously introducing an extreme division of labour, between the management scientist and the politically astute organisation member. Why, he asks, do some brilliant management scientists have no ability to handle organisational politics, while some of the most politically adept individuals cannot seem to understand the simplest elements of management science? Why, he emphasises, is management not yet a science and still an art? The answers to these kinds of questions, Mintzberg argues, lie in the functional specialisation observable in the human brain. Quoting Ornstein, he sees the left side of the brain as the domain of reason, the right side the domain of intuition (QMJ:717). Planning requires the exercise of reason. Managing, as Mintzberg describes it, also calls for intuition. The distinction is especially important to an understanding of the work of the CEO, who operates at the policy level where the dichotomy between planning and managing is sharpest. The dichotomy is now factored into the complex contingency argument sketched above. The classicists’ notion of the one best way is attacked afresh. Thus the planning mode should only dominate under special circumstances, when the organisation is in a stable environment and has no use for a creative strategy. Then the development of formal and systematic strategic plans may be appropriate. But when the environment is unstable or the organisation needs a creative strategy, planning may not be the best approach and the planners have no business pushing the organisation that way (QMJ:723). The normal condition, as he notes in his 1973 book, is that managers employ intuition and that the important policy-level processes typically require the faculties identified with the brain’s right hemisphere. An important result of the use of the bi-camera1 model is the obvious implication that, in some unconsidered way, the normal brain is nevertheless complete, that intuition combines with reason, each supports the other in a dialectical relationship. This model enables Mintzberg to admit both rational planning and the more intuitive processes into his model of management. Mintzberg’s concern is still with organisational structure and this reveals that, for all his radicalism, he is MEETING MINTZBERG cast in the classical mould. The organisation is still the appropriate unit of analysis, separable from the society in which it is embedded and from the people whose activities bring it to life. In his earlier writings he seems to spend little time on why organisations exist. They are taken for granted and his focus is on the appropriateness of their structure to their chosen mission. The theoretical apparatus is applied to diagnose the various behaviours and pathologies of different organisational forms and situations. He argues that a theory of organisation must be both a scheme for classifying our experiences of real life organisations, and a method of diagnosing and reconstructing any particular organisation’s behaviour so that we can achieve a better balance of advantage and penalty, a greater chance of success (QMJ:xiv). In his more recent work Mintzberg subtly changes his ground. While he retains his original ideas about organisational structure, he now sees the emergence of any of the five configurations as evidence of unbalance. While he earlier stresses the functionality of the interaction between the various parts of the organisation, he now moves with greater concern to the possibility of dysfunctionality. The various methods of co-ordination manifest the parochial interests of the organisation’s parts and their particular ways of looking at the world. When acted on, these interests appear as forces which compete with the other elements’ interests. Mintzberg elaborates his original analysis and identifies a total of seven discrete forces which are: (i) the clarity of direction which characterises the entrepreneurial mode, (ii) the efficiency which characterises the machine-bureaucratic mode, (iii) the focused attention which characterises the divisionalised mode, (iv) the detailed proficiency which characterises the professional-complex mode, and (v) the openness to learning which characterises the innovative mode. To these five forces he adds another two; the centripetal forces of a cooperationseeking shared ideology, and the centrifugal forces of competition. When one of these forces “ political” dominates the organisation it becomes unbalanced and the stereotypical structures become evident. When the network of forces is in balance, all structures are evident. I do not know why Mintzberg changes his ground. It could be his advancing years, unlikely - and certainly not noticeable. It could be his expanding experience of organisational failure, especially his growing belief that organisations are becoming unmanageable. Equally, and I suspect more likely, his shift could signal the resurfacing of some older beliefs about the ways in which (i) organisations should serve society and (ii) organisational analysis should be used in management education. Up to this point Mintzberg seems to operate somewhat detached from the territories mapped out 259 by conventional organisational theorists and their wholly different methodologies. He takes no part in the statistical analysis of structure, strategy or performance, nor in the measurement of individual performance or productivity. While there is no loss of conviction in the theoretical apparatus, he shows no interest in objectively validating his underlying co-ordinating mechanisms. It seems that the emerging pattern of Mintzberg’s development has more to do with turning his apparatus towards new problems or to those problems left to the side during his initial work. Guided by our conversation, and by a preview of some parts of his forthcoming book Mintzberg on Management (Free Press 1989), I stepped back from the detail of his work to its broader context. The Background to Management Education It is common to date the origins of management education to around the turn of this century: the Wharton school was founded in 1881, Harvard in 1908. It is also commonly assumed that management education is primarily an American product. In fact the Americans were far from being leaders, save in the extent and vigour of their commitment. The Ecole SupPrieure de Commerce de Paris (ESCP) was founded in 1820, the Ecole des Huutes Etudes commerciules (HEC) in 1881, the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1895, the Leipsig Hundelshochschule in 1898 and that at Berlin in 1906. But these schools were the children of a far older tradition which dates back directly to Prussia and the university reforms introduced by Frederick William, the father of Frederick the Great. In 1727 he introduced the first chairs in Cumerulism at the Universities of Halle, in Saxony, and Frankfort-am-oder. Cameralism was the the formal application of study of administration, science to the affairs of state. Frederick William considered that a properly trained administration was the State’s best means of dealing with the changing theological, political, social and legal concepts which were sweeping across Europe. Cameralism’s objective was the service of the State through the scientific pursuit of national efficiency through data collection and analysis, proper accounting and administrative control. The consequences were profound, for the Prussians were able to dominate and unite the plethora of German states and eventually create the Reich. Frederick’s notion of a specially trained body of professional administrators has shaped contemporary management in many ways. To get a general sense of what Mintzberg’s work is about, I shall focus on three threads: (i) the management education syllabus, (ii) the idea of management as a profession, and (iii) society’s understanding of managerial responsibility. Despite some obvious differences, the early syllabii are remark- 260 JOHN-CHRISTOPHER SPENDER ably similar to many of those in use today; accounting, economics, law, contracts, administration, and technology. The differences are that today we see more sociology, psychology and organisational behaviour, and less law. Also absent are the earlier courses on specific current affairs, and industry languages, courses such as banking and publishing (Redlich 1957). But early and contemporary courses are similar in one crucial respect, well captured by Forrester when he discusses the original Cameralist curriculum and its underlying body of knowledge. He writes: “ the professors so feared a theory derived from Aristotle, or from the theologians, that they concentrated on ‘practice” ’ (1989:9). Forrester also notes that one important result of the professors’ deliberate avoidance of an overarching theory on which to base the teaching was that they: “ failed to find a methodology adequate to their wide-ranging interests and to the specific functions later to be fulfilled by their students” (1989: 9). The Cameralist professors understood that teaching depended on theory and that to base their programmes on business practice forced them to change their pedagogical techniques. They developed case-work, seminars and projects. They also sought to develop new theory inductively through detailed observation, recording and analysis. which now separated the ends of the organisation’s activities from its means. Goodnow reformulated Wilson’s point as the distinction between policy and administration. Simon, criticising Goodnow as pointedly as he criticised the “ principles of administration” reformulates this again as the fact/ value distinction (1957:53). This distinction is now a central part of our conventional theories of management and organisation. It is worth remarking that the Cameralist tradition had little real impact in the UK until after World War II when the British business schools were set up in the image of those in America. The London School of Economics deliberately eschewed the tradition and was model!ed on the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques established in the 1850s to train men for the Diplomatic Service. In 1948 Sir Frederic Hooper, speaking for the tradition of managerial amateurism which clearly stood against the Prussian professionalism wrote: “ the British has a natural aptitude for the art of management . . . which turns mainly on personality; that is, upon the possession of, and the relation between, certain qualities. These qualities can be armed by study . . . But if the necessary qualities are not already there in the first place, or at least latent close below the surface, no amount of training, however scientific, will put them there” (1962:14). Unlike the Prussians and the Wilsonians, who cut the overall task into two parts, politics (the art of the possible) and the science of administration, Hooper argues that management itself is a blend of art and science. The Cameralist tradition, and the belief in a body of professional public administrators, spread throughout Germany and France. Eventually these concepts were brought into the private sector, and the commercial schools were set up with syllabii heavily influenced by the early Cameralist approaches. These influences also crossed the Atlantic, carried by Americans studying economics in Germany at the turn of the century. One important example was Edmund James, who helped Joseph Wharton set up his school. Another was Edwin Gay, the first Dean of the Harvard Business School (HBS), who studied mediaeval economic history under Schmoller, the last of the Berlin Cameralists. Gay introduced Schmoller’s teaching methods into the new-born HBS, aided by Harvard’s earlier acceptance of Langdell’s similar methods in the Harvard Law School. While still retaining its scientific orientation, the American management education syllabus has certainly been enlarged by the greater depth to which the original diet of subjects are studied, but also by the addition of the Human Relations work and its derivatives. It is still dependent on the distinction between the choosing of objectives and the choosing of means. Objectives are considered to be beyond management’s remit, to be in the hands of the elected officials, if the body is public, or in the hands of the shareholders, if the body is private. Science is to be directed towards the means, not the ends. The Cameralists also influenced the teaching of public administration in America. In 1887 Woodrow Wilson, who would later become President, wrote a seminal paper, The Study of Administration, in which he praised the work of the German and French administrators. He thereby set the agenda for the training of public administrators until after the Depression. He also introduced Americans to a crucial distinction between politics, the remit of the elected officials, and administration, the remit of the professional bureaucrats. This was a subtle adaptation of the original Cameralist notion of administration in the service of the State, one The policy/ means distinction is also crucial to the concept of management as a profession. Mary Parker Follett argued that professionalism connoted the motive of service and the method of science, thus posing the problems of management as those of (i) its legitimation as a new profession and (ii) its developing a body of underpinning science. Child (1968) and Miller & O’Leary (1989) see management as an emergent profession struggling with these twin problems of value (legitimation) and fact (science). But the professional achievement is modest. Mintzberg is not the first to note that there is “ at present” no MEETING MINTZBERG science, and thus no profession, of management. Gay and later Donham, who followed Gay as Dean at HBS, used the absence of theory as the explanation for HBS’s use of case-studies and for the need to do research (1922). Similarly Fayol prefaced the first part of his book, entitled The Necessity and Possibility of Teaching Management with the remark that there can be no teaching without theory (1949:14). Quite apart from the lack of a scientific basis, there is a continuing stream of dissatisfaction with the results of management teaching that goes back as far as management education itself. The dominant theme comes from the businessmen who complain that the curriculum has too much theory and too little reality. Yet the academics point to the lack of theory. In America, the deeply researched Ford Foundation report questioned whether management could indeed be regarded as a profession - given the absence of a body of systematic knowledge (Gordon & Howell 1959:69). The same theme is echoed in the Mangham & Silver report (1986). Overall, history shows that from the time of the Cameralists, those schools which stick to business practice as their organising concept have a hard time justifying their professionalism. But, equally, if they dodge this struggle and adopt an established body of theory, whether it be politics, economics, psychology, sociology or information technology, they get into deeper difficulties with the business community who seek to employ their graduates. The final point concerns the expectations built into the management education syllabus. The original Camera1 notion was the administration in the service of the State, specifically to help the State serve the people. Small notes that the Prussians had highly efficient systems of welfare as well as warfare (1909). As scientific management developed and administration was separated from policy, so the expectations of managers moved from their being leaders to their being technically efficient administrators. In the UK Child traces the shift, between the wars, from moral service to ‘society to a greater concern with efficiency (1968). Miller & O’Leary note the same shift within American thinking (1989). The result of Wilson’s dichotomy between policy and administration and the advancing concept of professionalism is that we arrive at Friedman’s dictum that the duty of the businessman is to maximise profits. Bok, then President of Harvard, drew attention to this drift when he criticised HBS for failing to educate students into an understanding of the moral and political responsibilities of senior businessmen (1977). In summary, we can see that management education struggles to occupy and articulate some ill-specified middle ground distinct from, on the one hand, the 261 social and moral involvement of politics and, on the other, the disciplined detachment of a social science such as economics. It resists falling into either by grounding itself in managerial practice. Yet there is no widespread agreement about the degree to which it has mapped out and secured this ground with a specific body of knowledge and professional practice. Without this, nature and quality of management teaching is beyond measurement and so vulnerable to criticisms from every quarter, the students, their employers, fellow professionals and academics. The impulse of academic criticism, the drive to professionalism, the search for distinctive theory to underpin the management of the research and teaching processes, and the career imperatives of the university environment, all force it to look to research to give it a sound scientific basis. Hence management education’s tendency to cut itself off from both the practical realities of organisational life and the political realities of social life. Yet there is little evidence that our researchers have generated such a science of management. Gordon & Howell conclude that more knowledge of value to business has come out of the non-business departments of universities than out of the business schools (1979:381). These problems, which have been part and parcel of our subject for over two hundred years, are not the results of the failings of individuals or even of their institutions. They are, however, at the roots of most of our present difficulties. Mintzberg and Herbert Simon It is against this background that we must consider Mintzberg’s attempts to change our prevailing concepts of managerial process and organisational structure. First there is his determination to eschew established theory and return to managerial practice. Then, from that historically respectable but methodologically shaky platform, he launches into a criticism of rational decision-making. It is illuminating to discover that Mintzberg sees his publication of Planning on the Left Side and Managing on the Right as a major turning point in his career. In his latest book he reveals that he sent a draft of the paper to Simon, who replied suggesting the argument was false. Mintzberg, having just received the publisher’s request to finalise the article for publication, agonised and decided (intuited?) to go ahead with only minor alterations. Mintzberg was much influenced by Simon’s off-hand dismissal of the evidence for extrasensory perception (ESP), which Mintzberg noted Turing had looked at most carefully and had found substantial. The article, of course, struck a resonant note with managers everywhere and its reception has sustained Mintzberg ever since. 262 JOHN-CHRISTOPHER SPENDER Our understanding of their differences increases when we consider that Simon studied public administration. We have seen how the field of public administration was quick to take up the Cameralist traditions. His early work on measuring municipal activities follows these lines. Later, as he began work on “Administrative Behavior” in 1938 and published parts of it, along with much other material, in the Public Administration Review (1957:xlviii), he moved to a more critical position. Eventually he generated his justly famous criticism of the classical principles of management which he argued were little more than proverbs (1957:20). This criticism was grounded on the fact/value distinction, which determined the content of management’s decisions, and in the concept of limited rationality, which determined the process of these decisions. Since management are unable to control through complete specification of the facts, they are forced to influence the valuational premises of their subordinates. Ostrom argues that Simon’s attack, together with the evident failures of public administrators in World War II, precipitated the collapse of the Wilsonian paradigm and threw public administration theoreticians into a crisis from which they have yet to recover (19736). It is important to note that Simon has since moved steadily towards greater theoretical rigour, publishing widely on information theory, logic, computer science and on computer modelling of human processes and for many years has made his professional home in Carnegie-Mellon’s Psychology Department. The debate between Mintzberg and Simon moved from Mintzberg’s HBR article to his Administrative Science Quarterly review of Simon’s 1977 re-issue of The New Science of Management Decision (1960). In this book Simon makes a distinction between programmed and non-programmed decision-making. But far from seeing this as the familiar Kantian distinction between analysis and synthesis - or intuition - Simon writes, in both editions, that: “the processes of nonprogrammed decision-making are beginning to undergo as fundamental a revolution as the one that is currently transforming programmed decisionmaking in business organizations” (1977:63). The revolution is that of management science and computing. Mintzberg retorts, quoting his first book (1973: 132): “My own research as well as my review of others’ on the work of senior managers - those people most involved with non-programmed decision-making led to a very different conclusion, namely that ‘there is as yet no science in managerial work”’ (Mintzberg 1977345). Mintzberg goes on to express his incredulity that, although updating the book after a period of 17 years of vigorous research, Simon is unable to illustrate his thesis with new examples of the developments he claims were already taking place in 1960. There is some irony, as we noted when considering the result of Simon’s attack on the Wilsonian position, that Simon seems to Mintzberg to be the apostle of Cameralism in the field of business administration. The issue, of course, is that Simon’s attack on the classical principles of management was not an attack on principles pr se. He merely wished to replace the classicists’ principles with his own equally prescriptive theory. These new principles are most clearly sketched in the General Problem Solving (GPS) work undertaken with Alan Newell and J.C. Shaw (Simon 1960:26, Newell & Simon 1972). Therein lies Simon’s denial of intuition and his belief in the computability of nonprogrammed decision-making, for the General Problem Solving system relieves us all of the consequences of our limited rationality and, therefore, of the need for intuition. With a computerised GPS available, at least in principle, to resolve the purely human problem of bounded rationality, Simon begins to write about organisational structures and the problems of their design in terms that make one suspect he has abandoned his previous anti-classical position (1960:42). From this secure computer-assisted position he mounts an attack on his own previous position that: “The need for an administrative theory resides in the fact that there are practical limits to human rationality” (1957:240). In a recent paper, he continues the attack: “It is a fallacy to contrast ‘analytic’ and ‘intuitive’ styles of management. Intuition and judgement - at least good judgement - are simply analyses frozen into habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition” (1987). Eventually, in his ASQ review, Mintzberg spreads his fire wider as he looks at the failure of quantitative analysis, McNamaralSimon style, to serve society as it finally: “started to come apart in the paddy-fields of Vietnam” (1977:347). What went wrong, Mintzberg asks, could it have been the inability of analysis to handle the soft data, the will of the enemy as opposed to the number of bombs necessary to defoliate a jungle? He continues: “When these things happen, analysis can no longer be called amoral: it drives even wellintentioned decision-makers to make decidedly immoral choices” (1977:348). He has a long quote of Chester Bowles’s damning criticism of Kennedy’s handling of the Bay of Pigs incident: “Anyone in public life who has strong convictions about the rights and wrongs of public morality, both domestic and international, has a very great advantage in times of strain, since his instincts on what to do are clear and immediate. Lacking such a framework of moral conviction or sense of what is right or wrong, he is forced to lean almost entirely upon his mental processes; he adds up the pluses and minuses of any question and comes up with a conclusion. Under normal circumstances, when he is not tired or frustrated, this pragmatic approach MEETING should successfully bring him out on the right side of the question. What worries me are the conclusions that such an individual may reach when he is tired, angry, frustrated, or emotionally affected. The Cuban fiasco demonstrates how far astray a man as brilliant and well-intentioned as Kennedy can go who lacks a moral reference point” (in Halberstam 1972:69). Mintzberg concludes: “many of us are coming to question increasingly the extent to which we can trust analysis untempered by intuition, to question whether truly humanitarian decisions will always have to be made in places inaccessible to Herbert Simon’s computer” (1977:350). Now we can see that Mintzberg is standing out against more than Simon’s computer, he is standing out against the fundamental fact/value or policyiadministration distinction that is so deeply written into the history, orientation and praxis of our discipline. At first sight the odds are stupendously against him. Yet history is also on his side - for Cameralism is flawed. Although we teach our contemporary versions of the original syllabus, few now really expect administrative science to work. That was not always the case. Hubatsch tells of the senior Cameralist author given charge of a metal works; in 1778, when there were unfavourable production variances and deficits, he was held responsible and imprisoned (1975:84). Thus, as Mintzberg mounts his attack on Cameralism he also exposes its most fundamental internal contradictions; its dependence on high quality data and its inability to deal with the uncertainties which actually typify the human condition and, thereby, managerial work. Since he attacks a genuine anomaly, he finds the confused forces of Cameralism working equally hard in favour of his argument, for they demand that the analysis must be at once practical and embedded in the real social circumstances of the situation as well as reflecting sound moral and ethical principles. Mintzberg’s Theory of a Managed Society The true test of a set of theoretical underpinnings is their ability to illuminate events to those who are experiencing them - rather than those theorising about them. Managers are on the experiencing side of this divide, so Mintzberg is now re-fashioning his ideas to focus more specifically on the ways organisations serve or dis-serve society. Society, he argues, is dominated by organisations. Dealing with organisations now itself demands organisation. He illustrates the point with a story of how the Cree Indians have had to change their informally structured society in order to organise and contest the bureaucratic processes of the government and companies that are destroying their traditional lands. Mintzberg argues MINTZBERG 263 that understanding organisation and the processes which influence organisational behaviour is the key to sustaining the delicate balance between organisations that serve the public interest and those that abuse it. While Mintzberg retains his 5-fold principles of organisational diagnosis and prescription, he shifts to a new perspective and theoretical target. Since all the forces are active in all organisations, it is out-of-balance that leads to an observable “configuration”. When the forces are in harmonious balance the organisation is unconfigured and in “dynamic tension“. Mintzberg now enriches the analysis with several new concepts. each other, The forces are likely to “contaminate” calling for careful structuring so as to sustain and “contain” the balance between dissimilar forces that act in the separate parts of the organisation. Under conditions of balance these forces evidently act in “combination”, only revealing their differences in the tendency to display “cleavage” along the organisation’s “natural fault lines”. Mintzberg illustrates this term by referring to the love-hate relationship common between an orchestra and its conductor. Because these structures are fluid, organisations can “convert” from one configuration to another. Managers trying to direct all real organisations have to deal with the inherent “contradictions” existing between the forces and configurations by creating and manipulating the “cooperative” ideology. When successful, contradictions are not managed by eliminating them. It is better management to ensure that the contradictions are not merely tolerated but actively respected (1988:19). Ideology is the medium of communication and Mintzberg’s test is authenticity. He writes: “I believe in a psychic law of management: that workers, customers, everyone involved with a management, no matter how physically distant, can tell when it is genuine in its beliefs and when it is just mouthing the right words” (1988:20). Finally, politics and competition are both agents of change. Every configuration or balance of forces carries the seeds of its own passing. Politics and competition, on the other hand, carry the essence of the organisation through into innovative new configurations. Mintzberg now wants to flesh out the social and moral dimensions of his gradually emerging theory of managing in a managed society. Casting his net wide, Mintzberg proposes a theory that links society at large with his theory of organisation (1989). First he argues that there is a tendency for our society’s organisations to grow, we see a society dominated by big organisations. Then there is a tendency for large organisations to become unbalanced and, most frequently, exhibit the machine-bureaucratic configuration. There is the accompanying unbalance of forces which generates a professional bureaucratic “thinness” which pushes out 264 JOHN-CHRISTOPHER SPENDER a “ thicker” understanding of the socially related processes and purposes of the organisation. Here Mintzberg reveals more of his shift from his 1970’s position. Previously he regarded good managers as those who could make decisions in spite of the brief, varied and confused pattern of work his first researches revealed. He assumed, perhaps, that when things get unmanageable the real managers get managing. They overcome the superficiality, the thinness of their knowledge. Now Mintzberg is arguing that superficiality, epitomised in the computer-printed report, is the unavoidable lot of managers, especially those in large organisations. It is the manager’s separation from the true “ thickness” of what is being managed that is unbalancing. Superficiality, he says, is the problem. Next, large organisations respond to the thinness of their knowledge by emphasising the rational and calculative analysis of such information as they do possess. They apply “ professional management” . This promotes further imbalance as social goals are sacrificed to purely organisational goals, and managers are driven to diminish the organisation’s true effectiveness. As the organisation begins to come under increasing pressure to adapt and improve, it runs for cover, it turns to government for help, translating its power to serve - or disrupt - society into the power to enlist political support to prevent change. It moves completely beyond the efficiency-oriented domain of administration. Mintzberg illustrates this point with Iacocca’s performance at Chrysler. While Chrysler exists, the knowledge that governments are not likely to allow large firms to die may lead to terrible results. Mintzberg’s conclusion is that the spread of “ professional management” has made society unmanageable. This organisation-society interaction is a bold theory of economic dysfunction that is wholly within the tradition of Merton, Selznick and, especially, Crozier. Whether it can be validated empirically is beside the point, at least for the time being. Its immediate importance is that it is the final piece in a coherent Mintzbergian scheme which now links managers, organisations and society. Managers have to balance the forces within their organisations, balance the social benefits and efficiencies in their organisation’s external relations, and balance the incentives and costs of participation. Managers have the responsibility to recognise and resist the inherent and complex tendencies to dysfunction which everyone knows are present. Mintzberg argues convincingly that In Search of Excellence was an instant success primarily because it celebrated the organisations that avoided getting caught up in these dysfunctional loops - even if only temporarily. Mintzberg on Management Education Mintzberg’s lessons for management educators become clear. They revolve around the recognition of intuition, the pursuit of “ thick” knowledge, a search for an active organisational balance and an awareness of the social and ethical issues of managing others in a highly managed society. In common with others (e.g. Livingstone, 1971 in QMJ: 706; Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Leavitt. 1987), Mintzberg feels that the business school curriculum has wildly overstressed the science, the technical and quantitative elements. The Gordon & Howell report saw insufficient rigour and technique in the 1950s curricula. The schools certainly reacted to this report, and to the similarly critical Pierson report, but Mintzberg argues that they also responded to the academic imperatives, the faculty’s natural interest in pursuing academic research and publication at the expense of active involvement in learning to solve practical managerial problems. The result is that we outlaw intuition and thick knowledge. Ironically the MBA has become a licence to bypass the grittier realities of organisational life, so keeping the aspiring manager away from the very experiences that will force his intuition to develop (1989). In the same vein, Mintzberg criticises the use of GMAT scores to select business school students and doubts the validity of the PhD degree as a ticket to teach in a business school. The real lesson, Mintzberg feels, is that management can only be taught to those who already have some managerial experience. Here he agrees with Hooper (1962). The primary selection criterion should be the nature and quality of the student’s experience and his proven ability to perform as a manager. Few in their twenties could qualify. The educational process is then one of drawing out, structuring, clarifying and extending the student’s own experiences. Technical skills, such as accounting and operational research, can be taught to those without experience at any time. They are staffers’ skills, necessary in any complex organisation but fundamentally peripheral to the real managerial task. The ideal programme would combine science with art, classroom education with experiential training. Such training would comprise around a third of the total input, focused on the skills which match Mintzberg’s original interpersonal, informational and decisional activities; collecting information, conducting negotiations, making decisions with soft data, communicating direction, taking charge, etc., all those situations which develop the student’s intuitions and give him a feel for the difference between thin and thick knowledge. Another third of the programme would deal with “ descriptive insight” , input based on systematic research about the ways in which the managers’ world actually works. This is divided into MEETING (i) knowledge about the way organisations work, and (ii) knowledge about the way society works. This input would enable the student-managers to contrast their own implicit theories, whichThey naturally apply to with others which may be more their experiences, soundly based. Thus Mintzberg feels the proper role for the management educator is to hold up a mirror so that managers, be they students or clients, can see their own analytic and intuitive processes in action. The teacher can help the student, but ultimately the student must base his learning on his experience of his own decisional processes, be they analytic or intuitive, his experience of the organisation’s structures and process, and his experience of his own society. Summary and Conclusion In this paper, I argue that management education has been struggling with a well understood set of problems from the time of the Cameralists. Though there have been shifts of emphasis and method, there has been a sustained level of concern since the 1740s. The British are almost unique in their lack of theoretical contribution. But the current vogue in experiential education and action learning owes a great debt to British consuitants and industrial practitioners such as Reg Revans. The American attempts to proceed beyond these problems have not been enormously more successful than the earlier, or even later, French or German efforts. My argument is that this statis, and the attendant problems in the profession of management education, are usefully explained as a natural consequence of the Cameralist preconceptions about how to apply the methods of natural science to the subject of administration. Mintzberg is interesting because he is almost alone amongst senior management academics in directly attacking the Cameralist position which Simon now so devotedly defends. Mintzberg does not deny the value of measurement, statistical analysis, records and plans, he merely pleads for us to recognise and accept their limitations. For him the shift of administrative technology from mediaeval land survey lists and population records to be worked over by armies of clerks to our present real-time MIS systems and vast databases is ironical. If we survive the enhanced risks with which computer-assisted organisations now threaten us, it will only be because people begin to grasp it as these basic preconceptions and limitations which are causing organisations to fail us. Mintzberg is arguing for critical science and radical change, rather than a sustained belief in our present methods. He is interesting because he is a doubter who has gone beyond the methodology of the physical sciences to the more natural methodology of organisational MINTZBERG 265 anthropology. As a result of his own experiences, he found evidence for a system of ideas which has grown steadily to encompass the full list of problems which our discipline has inherited. We noted earlier that at first sight he would seem easily overpowered by the weight of the orthodoxy. But as history suggests, and as Simon’s Nobel Prize demonstrates, it takes only one person to strike cleanly at the anomalous fault line of an orthodoxy to set off the train of discussion which leads to “ critical science” . Kuhn shows us that the appropriate conditions of dissatisfaction and of anomaly must be already present (1970). These conditions have been present since 1740. The British position is interesting, for Mintzberg’s views are largely consistent with all but the very small group who have either gone through the US system or the UK’s own business schools. The British determination to eschew professionalism and stick with “ pragmatism” has been noted for centuries, and is repeated again in the Handy Report (1987). We should also note John Locke who, apart from his contributions to the American constitution, influenced Kant greatly and wrote: “ the faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where it cannot be had, is judgement . . . The mind sometimes exercises this judgement out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness or haste, even where demonstrative proofs are to be had” (1928:298). Somewhere in these attitudes lies the reason why the UK’s management education effort and performance is so modest. In Mintzberg’s analysis lies a suggestion that there is a limit to the number of MBAs that are needed, a limit to the roles they should be allowed to fill and a limit to the types of decision which they should take. There is a suggestion that management is something broader than the profession of which Frederick William, and Wilson, and Simon dreamed. But Mintzberg is probably more immediately concerned with US management education and its effect on the US and Canadian economies. He finds himself frustrated by the same puzzle which Crozier noted, i.e. the difficulty of determining whether bureaucracy is a source of social benefit or a method of private deprivation. Crozier writes: “ this paradoxical view of bureaucracy in Western thought has paralysed positive thinking . . . and has favored the making of catastrophic prognostications” (1964). Naturally Mintzberg feels we may not have much time. He feels we are training managers to reinforce the most dysfunctional aspects of organisational behaviour, so diminishing the supply of those with the natural abilities to begin solving the problems and exacerbating the tasks of managers everywhere. At the same time we erode the quality of our lives and 266 JOHN-CHRISTOPHER SPENDER the prospects of future generations. Even if we are not overtaken by ecological disasters, or the ultimate “normal accident” of a nuclear war, we may so damage our society that economic privations force us backwards. The Japanese, who produce only 60 MBAs per year, compared with the US’s 70,000 also make prognostications. Konosuke Matsushita puts it this way: “We (Japanese) are going to win and the industrial West is going to lose: there is nothing much you can do about it because the reasons for your failure are within yourselves. Your firms are built on the Taylor model; even worse, so are your heads . . . For you the essence of management is getting the ideas out of the heads of the bosses into the hands of labour . . . For us the core of management is the art of mobilising and pulling together the intellectual resources of all the employees in the service of the firm . . . Only by drawing on the combined brainpower of all its employees can a firm face up to the turbulence and constraints of today’s environment. This is why our large companies give their employees three to four times more training than yours, this is why they seek constantly everybody’s suggestions and why they demand from the educational system increasing numbers of graduates as well as bright educated generalists, because these people are the lifeblood of industry. Your ‘socially minded’ bosses, often full of good intentions, believe their duty is to protect the people in their firms. We, on the other hand, are realists and consider it our duty to get our own people to defend their firms, which will pay them back a hundredfold for their dedication. By doing this, we end up being more ‘social’ than you” (1985:8). 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